Access to Electronic Thesis

Author: Myung Jun Kim
Thesis title: The Role of the Environmental Movement in Government Decision Making in Newly Democratised Korea, Focusing on the Anti-Dam Protest
Qualification: PhD

This electronic thesis is protected by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. No reproduction is permitted without consent of the author. It is also protected by the Creative Commons Licence allowing Attributions-Non-commercial-No derivatives.

If this electronic thesis has been edited by the author it will be indicated as such on the title page and in the text.
THE ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
IN GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING
IN NEWLY DEMOCRATISED KOREA,
FOCUSBING ON THE ANTI-DAM PROTEST

Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD
by
Myung Jun, Kim

The University of Sheffield
Department of Town and Regional Planning
2012
ABSTRACT

This research started from a concern about the changing role of the environmental movement in government decision making in newly democratised Korea. Many empirical studies found that environmental movements in other transitional democracies reached their peak during the liberalisation of authoritarian regimes, and considerably declined after democratisation. Unlike these cases, the Korean environmental movement grew greatly after democratisation, but faced its decline later within civil society-friendly administrations (1998-2007). This trajectory raises questions about what actually happened between the government and the environmental movement in Korea.

To explain this phenomenon, this research selected the political opportunity structure (POS) approach, which stresses the importance of political environment around social movements. Based on the two dimensions of the POS – “access to the political system” and “configuration of actors”, this research has explored, (i) what forms of access chances were created by the Korean government in decision making; (ii) what change occurred in the relationships between the environmental movement, government, and other social actors; and (iii) how these factors influenced the environmental movement’s ability to influence outcomes. The research is based on case studies of two anti-dam movements, the Dong River dam movement and the Hantan River dam movement, and interviews were carried out with key stakeholders, including environmental activists, public officials, experts, and newspaper reporters.

The research findings reveal that the relationship between democratisation and social movements is not a simple process. The development of the environmental movement should be understood within domestic political contexts. Many citizens have still been distrustful of political institutions, and environmental groups staged active protests to take advantage of the increased access chances and a more balanced power relation between the state and civil society. However, the change in the configuration of actors surrounding decision making gradually led to the decline of the movement. This empirical study suggests that firstly, the Korean government adapted their proposals to lower perceived negative impacts and to increase potential financial benefits, and used participatory procedures to arrive at final
decisions. Secondly, the persistent protests of the environmental movement resulted in a loss of external support and a growth in public pressure to moderate their demands.

In conclusion, the research findings indicate that while the two dimensions of the POS are meaningful to the outcome of social movements, the “configuration of actors” is much more important in the rise and fall of the social movement. The position of related stakeholders surrounding the conflicting parties largely shaped the outcomes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor Professor Gordon Dabinett for his support and guidance throughout the PhD process. His commitment to my PhD has been exceptional and despite his busy schedule he always found both time and enthusiasm for my research. His valid suggestions, insightful comments, and constant encouragement have been a great driver for me in completing this thesis. I also thank my second supervisor, Dr. Ed Ferrari, for his critical comments on the drafts.

I am grateful to all the staff within the Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University of Sheffield who helped me to achieve what I set out to do. In particular, I want to thank Professor Heather Campbell and Dr. Aidan for their critical comments in the Rip sessions. I also would like to thank my fellow research students who have supported this thesis in various ways. It was a great pleasure to work with them.

I am also grateful to the financial support from the Korean government and many other supports from the MLTM (Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime affairs) which I have worked for. I am also highly indebted to all the interviewees who provided me with their valuable time and expertise. Without all these support, it would have been impossible to conduct this research.

Finally, my special thanks go to my family for their continual support and encouragement. I would like to thank my wife Ji Hyun, my son Jun Hwi, and my daughter Min Jae for their patience and support over the last three years. Without them I probably would have not completed this research. I am also grateful to my parents and parents in law in Korea for their support and encouragement, and for always hoping that I would finish the PhD one day.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. 9
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... 10
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 12

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 14
1.1 Research aim and background ......................................................................................... 14
1.2 Research questions ........................................................................................................... 17
1.3 Structure of the thesis ....................................................................................................... 24

CHAPTER 2 DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT ......................................................... 26
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 26
2.2 Brief overview of democracy ............................................................................................ 27
   2.2.1 Types of democracy .................................................................................................... 27
   2.2.2 Democratisation .......................................................................................................... 33
2.3 Brief overview of social movements ................................................................................. 34
   2.3.1 Definition of social movements ................................................................................. 35
   2.3.2 Typical social movement: environmental movement ................................................. 37
2.4 Social movement in democratised countries ...................................................................... 40
   2.4.1 Relationship between social movement and democracy .......................................... 40
   2.4.2 Various explanations for social movements in democratic countries ...................... 42
   2.4.3 Importance of political context ................................................................................. 43
2.5 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 46

CHAPTER 3 DEMOCRATISATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT IN KOREA .............. 48
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 48
3.2 Democratisation history in Korea ...................................................................................... 49
   3.2.1 Prior to democratisation (the 1960s - 1987) ............................................................... 49
   3.2.2 Since democratisation (I) (1988 - 1997) ................................................................. 52
   3.2.3 Since democratisation (II) (1998 - 2007) ................................................................ 55
3.3 Environmental movement in Korea .................................................................................. 59
3.3.1 Prior to democratisation (the 1960s - 1987) ........................................59
3.3.2 Since democratisation (I) (1988 - 1997) ........................................62
3.3.3 Since democratisation (II) (1998 - 2007) .......................................66
3.4 Movements against national construction projects during 1998-2007 ..........68
  3.4.1 Environmental group’s criticism against national construction projects ...68
  3.4.2 Rise and decline in movements against national construction projects......70
3.5 Characteristics of the Korean environmental movement ..........................73
3.6 Summary ...............................................................................................77

CHAPTER 4 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE APPROACH......78
4.1 Introduction .........................................................................................78
4.2 Overview of political opportunity structure.........................................81
  4.2.1 Definition of political opportunity structure ....................................81
  4.2.2 Conceptual issues of political opportunity structure ..........................83
4.3 Dimensions of political opportunity structure ......................................84
  4.3.1 Review of various views of the dimension of POS ............................84
  4.3.2 First dimension: “Access to the political system” ..............................86
  4.3.3 Second dimension: “Configuration of actors” ..................................88
4.4 Political opportunity structure and aspects of social movements ..............92
4.5 Summary ...............................................................................................94

CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHOD......................96
5.1 Research questions ..............................................................................96
5.2 Research methodology .......................................................................98
  5.2.1 The qualitative approach ..............................................................98
  5.2.2 The longitudinal case study .........................................................100
  5.2.3 Case study selection ....................................................................100
5.3 Research methods ................................................................................102
  5.3.1 Utilization of secondary sources ..................................................103
  5.3.2 Conducting interview ..................................................................107
5.4 Methodological and method issues ......................................................115
  5.4.1 Validity issues ..............................................................................115
  5.4.2 Translation issue ...........................................................................119
# 5.3 Ethical issues

# 5.5 Data analysis

## 5.5.1 Transcription following fieldwork

## 5.5.2 Data categorisation and analysis

## 5.5.3 Further data analysis

## 6.0 Introduction

### 6.1 Introduction

### 6.2 Dam construction in Korea

#### 6.2.1 History of dam construction

#### 6.2.2 Policy making process

#### 6.2.3 Main actors in policy making

### 6.3 The anti-dam movement in Korea

#### 6.3.1 History of the anti-dam movement

#### 6.3.2 Position of the government

#### 6.3.3 Position of the anti-dam movement

### 6.4 The context of the Dong River dam case

#### 6.4.1 Dam project outline

#### 6.4.2 Anti-dam movement actors

#### 6.4.3 Anti-dam movement's arguments

### 6.5 The context of the Hantan River dam case

#### 6.5.1 Dam project outline

#### 6.5.2 Anti-dam movement outline

#### 6.5.3 Anti-dam movement's arguments

### 6.6 Summary

## 7.0 Introduction

### 7.1 Introduction

### 7.2 The anti-Dong River dam movement process

#### 7.2.1 Conflict emergence

#### 7.2.2 Conflict development

#### 7.2.3 Conflict crisis

#### 7.2.4 Conflict conclusion
CHAPTER 8 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND PROTESTS ................................................................. 191
8.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 191
8.2 Political opportunity structure and protest in the Dong River dam case ............... 192
  8.2.1 Access to the political system and protests ................................................................. 192
  8.2.2 Configuration of actors and protests ......................................................................... 196
8.3 Political opportunity structure and protest in the Hantan River dam case ........... 203
  8.3.1 Access to the political system and protests ................................................................. 203
  8.3.2 Configuration of actors and protests ......................................................................... 207
8.4 Political opportunity structure and protest from 1998 to 2007 ................................ 217
  8.4.1 Continuous protest by improved political context ....................................................... 217
  8.4.2 Weakened mobilization by the change in configuration of actors ...................... 226
8.5 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 240

CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 241
9.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 241
9.2 Research findings ............................................................................................................... 242
9.3 Research implications ........................................................................................................ 246
9.4 Research reflections .......................................................................................................... 254

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 258
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................................... 313
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Main concepts of the research
Figure 3.1 Characteristics of administrations from the 1960s to 1987
Figure 3.2 Characteristics of administrations from 1988 to 1997
Figure 3.3 Characteristics of administrations in the 1998s and 2007
Figure 3.4 Democratic movement in 1987 and income per capita
Figure 3.5 Movements opposing national projects in Korea
Figure 3.6 Environmental protests against national projects during 1998-2007
Figure 3.7 Social movements after democratisation in the literature
Figure 3.8 Social movements after democratisation in Korea
Figure 4.1 Analytic framework of research
Figure 5.1 Triangulation
Figure 6.1 Policy making process and main actors
Figure 6.2 Average monthly precipitations in Korea
Figure 6.3 Submerged Goyang in Gyeonggi province and Seoul
Figure 6.4 Dams in the North Han River and the South Han River
Figure 6.5 Location of the planned Dong River dam
Figure 6.6 Main actors involved in the anti-Dong River dam movement
Figure 6.7 Submerged Paju in Gyeonggi province and collapsed Yeoncheon dam
Figure 6.8 The Imjin River and the Hantan River
Figure 6.9 Location of the planned Hantan River dam in Korea
Figure 6.10 Main actors involved in the anti-Hantan River dam movement
Figure 7.1 Anti-Dong River dam protests
Figure 7.2 33 day sit-in campaign of 33 celebrities
Figure 7.3 KBS documentary and the picture of the Chosun Ilbo
Figure 7.4 Anti-Hantan River dam protests
Figure 7.5 Darakdae artillery range and demonstration against the MND
Figure 7.6 Establishment of the Citizens’ Coalition to save the Hantan River
**LIST OF TABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.1</td>
<td>Frames of the environmental movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1</td>
<td>Percentage distribution of Korean NGOs in founding years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.2</td>
<td>Korean ENGOs in Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.3</td>
<td>Korean public corporations’ projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.1</td>
<td>Dimensions of political opportunity structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.1</td>
<td>Necessary data and its source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.2</td>
<td>Newspapers as data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.3</td>
<td>Internet sites as data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.4</td>
<td>Government documents as data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.5</td>
<td>TV program as data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.6</td>
<td>Interviewees – Groups and Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.7</td>
<td>Interviewees according to case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.8</td>
<td>Data categorisation of the Dong River dam case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.9</td>
<td>Data categorisation of the Hantan River dam case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.10</td>
<td>Similarities and differences between the two cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.11</td>
<td>Causes of the change of configuration of actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.1</td>
<td>Dams in Korea: Numbers according to type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.2</td>
<td>Anti-dam movements in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.3</td>
<td>Average precipitation in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.4</td>
<td>Change of water use pattern in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.5</td>
<td>Forecasted water deficit in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.6</td>
<td>Major floods in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.7</td>
<td>Number of large dams according to country (Top 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.8</td>
<td>Profile of the proposed Dong River dam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.9</td>
<td>NGOs involved in the anti-Dong River dam movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.10</td>
<td>Profile of the proposed Hantan River dam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.11</td>
<td>NGOs involved in the anti-Hantan River dam movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.1</td>
<td>The ME’s EIA discussion history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.2</td>
<td>Government’s economic support for submerged area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8.1</td>
<td>Public briefings and hearings during the EIA process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.2  Informal meetings in the Dong River dam case
Table 8.3  Number of newspaper articles which relate to the Dong River dam case
Table 8.4  Public briefings, hearings and conferences during the EIA process
Table 8.5  Informal meetings in the Hantan River dam case
Table 8.6  Number of newspaper articles which relate to the Hantan River case
Table 8.7  Number of audit request
Table 8.8  Review (or mediation) committee during 1998~2007
Table 8.9  ME ministers’ relationship with ENGOs
Table 8.10 BAI’s audit results regarding national construction projects
Table 8.11 Economic damage caused by construction stops by
ABBREVIATIONS

ACF  Advocacy Coalition Framework
BAI  Board of Audit and Inspection
B/C  Benefit/Cost Ratio
CAGE Citizens’ Alliance for General Election
CCEJ Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice
CHA Cultural Heritage Administration
CFE Center for Free Enterprise
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EJ  Environmental Justice
ENGO Environmental Non Governmental Organization
EPRA Environmental Policy Review Association
FS  Feasibility Study
GKU Green Korea United
ICOLD International Commission on Large Dams
KAPMA Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association
KBS Korea Broadcasting System
KCON Korea Civic Organization Network
KDI Korea Development Institute
KEI Korea Environment Institute
KEPCO Korea Electric Power Corporation
KFEM Korean Federation for Environmental Movement
KGS Korean General Social Survey
KIET Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade
KOWACO Korea Water Resources Corporation
KPRI Korean Pollution Research Institute
MCIE Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy
ME Ministry of Environment
MLTM Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime affairs
MNA Member of the National Assembly
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOCT</td>
<td>Ministry of Construction and Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLEG</td>
<td>Ministry of Government Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Ministry of Strategy and Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIER</td>
<td>National Institute of Environmental Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Office of President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCSD</td>
<td>Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>Prior Environmental Review System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFS</td>
<td>Preliminary Feasibility Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POS</td>
<td>Political Opportunity Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Resource Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social Movement Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State-Owned Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCD</td>
<td>World Commission on Dams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research aim and background

The aim of this research is to contribute to our knowledge about the changing role of the environmental movement in government decision making in newly democratised countries. The environmental movement is a general trend, which is often noticed in both advanced and developing countries and it is therefore accepted as a normal phenomenon in democratic societies (Norris et al., 2005). In addition, the environmental movement often has a considerable impact on government decision making (Betsill and Corell, 2008). For this reason, there have been a great number of studies related to the environmental movement. However, scholars have often had interests in the environmental movement in mature democracies (Imura and Schreurs, 2005; Mason, 1999; Pekkanen, 2006; Schreurs, 2002 b). According to Huntington’s classification of democratisation (1991), many studies focused on the environmental movement in the first and second democracies (e.g. the US, the UK, France, Germany, and Japan).

On the other hand, there are relatively few studies in relation to social movements in newly democratised countries, the so-called third wave democracies (e.g. Hungary, the Czech Republic and South Korea). That is, while existing studies often focus on social movements in old democracies, movements in new born democracies did not receive much interest. What actually happened to social movements in transitional democracies is not sufficiently examined because the history of democracy isn’t that long and in addition existing studies on democratisation focused their attention on the factors that led to the establishment of democracy (Tang and Tang, 2000; Im, 2000, 2004). Therefore, the environmental movement after democratisation in new born democracies is still a black box which requires further examination. Democratisation is a transitional process by which a highly dynamic and unpredictable change happens (Berg, 1999; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Shriver and Messer, 2009; Tong, 2005). In newly democratised countries, considerable dynamic change happens; That is, two things – the state and civil society – rapidly change in those countries. This research has a particular interest in the rise and fall of the environmental movement in these newly democratised countries and selects South Korea (Hereafter Korea) as research object because the researcher is Korean and Korea is a typical newly democratised country, which is
considered one of the successful third-wave democracies in Asia (Hahm, 2008; Huntington, 1991; Shin and Lee, 2003).

Korea experienced a long-term military dictatorship from the 1960s until the late 1980s and finally achieved democratic transition in 1987. Prior to democratisation, the Korean government exerted strong power and decision making was dominated by the president and a limited number of elite bureaucracies, whereas the role of social groups was almost overlooked (Kim, T. K., 2008; Seth, 1997). Instead, the authoritarian military regimes strongly pursued economic development to offset the lack of their regime’s legitimacy (Choi, J. J., 2005; Choi, J. J. et al, 2007; Hong, S. T., 2007 a; Jung and Kim, 2009) and therefore the Korean government was often portrayed as a typical developmental state (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990, 1998; Weiss, 1998, 1999).

However, since democratisation, particularly after the civilian administration took power in 1993, the situation has greatly changed. The channels to the government expanded and public participation in decision making such as national infrastructure construction gradually increased. In particular, the taking of power by a progressive party during the 10 years 1998-2007 led to the greater change in decision making (Jin, 2008; Kim, E. Y., 2007; Kim, J. R. and Kang, 2000; Park, J.C., 2007). The two administrations pursued participatory democracy as the governing goal and stressed public participation and communication between the government and civil society (the Kim Dae Jung administration, 1998-2002, the Roh Moo Hyun administration, 2003-2007). This study has a particular interest in the period of 1998-2007 after democratisation.

Along with the democratic change of the government, civil society also rapidly developed (Armstrong, 2007; He, 2010, Im, 2008; Kim, S. H., 1997). Citizens started to express their opinions and even organized protests to put pressure on the government (Ku, 2004 c; Oh, S. K., S. H. Lee, H. A. Kim, and B. S. Park, 2005). Social movements began to significantly grow and in particular, the environmental movement grew in both quantitative and qualitative terms (Park, S. P., 2002). Many environmental organizations were established, which further strengthened the environmental movement. They criticized the government’s development-orientation, arguing that the Korean government still depended heavily on construction projects for economic development (Cho, M. R., 2003; Hong, S. T., 2007 a, 2007 b).
In particular, during the period of 1998-2007, there were a great number of protests against national construction projects (e.g. dams, roads, railways, canals, and nuclear waste facilities), which became hot social issues. The environmental movement initially received widespread support from the public and sometimes achieved meaningful outcomes (e.g. the cancellation of the Dong River dam in 2000 and the Buan nuclear waste facility in 2003). However, approaching the late 2000s, its protests did not achieve their desired goals and lost much support (Jang, S. I., 2006; Lee, P. R., 2005; Oh, S. K. et al, 2005). They were even criticized for staging protests without presenting constructive alternatives by other actors such as the mass media and citizens (Joongang Ilbo, 2006, 2007; Korea Herald, 2005).

In summary, in the 1990s after democratisation, the Korean environmental movement grew remarkably to the point where it exerted a strong influence (He, 2010; Lee and Arrington, 2008), but it also faced its decline in the 2000s (Jang, S. I., 2006; Lee, P. R., 2005; Oh, S. K. et al, 2005). The Korean case is different from environmental movements in newly democratised countries in Central and Eastern Europe or Latin America (Canel, 1992; Gaspar, 1984; Hipsher, 1996; Mainwaring and Viola, 1984; Pickvance, C. G., 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999; Pickvance, K., 1996, 1997; Pridham, 1994; Schneider, 1992). While the environmental movements in those countries reached their peak during the liberalisation phase under authoritarian regimes, but rather declined after democratisation (Botcheva, 1996; Fagan, 2000, 2004; Hicks, 2006; Manning, 1998; Pickvance, C. G., 1999; Shriver and Messer, 2009), the Korean environmental movement enjoyed rapid growth with citizens’ rising interests in the environment after democratisation (Kim, J. B., 2000; Kim, Y. K., 2002; Ku, 2003; Park, S. P., 2002; Shin, 2002). It received widespread support from social actors, but it gradually lost support and faced criticisms in the 2000s.

In addition, the decline in the environmental movement paradoxically happened within the civil society-friendly administrations (1998-2007). While many studies suggest that open political structures contribute to movement development (Eisinger, 1973; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994), the Korean environmental movement faced its decline within the participatory and civil society-friendly governments. This trajectory raises questions about what actually happened between the democratic government and the environmental movement in a period of democratisation. Moreover, why did the environmental movement face its crisis in
seemingly favourable political contexts? These are the broad questions that the research seeks to address.

1.2 Research questions

**Main concepts and subject area**

As mentioned above, the aim of this research is to understand the influence of the environmental movement in government decision making in newly democratised countries. This aim is composed of the three important constructs – “social movement”, “the government”, and “democratisation”.

Firstly, “social movement” is the most important research object. Social movements are a normal phenomenon even in advanced democratic countries and are considered to play a complimentary role for representative democracy (Goldstone, 2004; Ibarra, 2003; Tilly, 2003). This research has an interest in the environmental movement in new born democracies.

Secondly, “the government” is another crucial construct. The target body of social movements is not entirely limited to the government and for instance, the private corporations can also be its target body. However, social movements often stage protests against the government because the government is considered to be responsible for protecting the environment by the public. In addition, government policies such as large infrastructure projects have a great impact on the environment and in this sense the government is identified as a potential threat to the environment (Cho, M. R., 2003; Hong, S. T., 2007 a, 2007 b). For this reason, this research explores the environmental movement in government planning around infrastructure provision (e.g. dams, roads, or railways).

Thirdly, “democratisation” is the key concept surrounding both parties. It is one of the important changes which Korea faced in the 20th century. Democratisation results in rapid change in political contexts, even if there is some extent of difference according to country. Democratic institutions replace authoritarian ones and free political space rapidly expands. Like other democratised countries, Korea has experienced significant changes since democratisation. This research will explore what happened to the environmental movement in government decision making after democratisation.
However, the relationship between democratisation and the environmental movement is debatable. While some scholars argue the flourishing of social movements since democratisation (Goldstone, 2004), many empirical studies indicate the decline of the environmental movement (Botcheva, 1996; Fagan, 2004; Manning, 1998; Pickvance, C. G., 1999). Empirical studies suggest that contrary to expectations that democratisation will facilitate social movements with the removal of constraints, social movements diminished and lost public support right after democratisation because environmental issues were gradually absorbed into institutional politics (Hicks, 2006; Pickvance, C. G., 1996, 1999) and that governments and citizens focused their attentions on other issues such as economic growth and daily life (Botcheva, 1996; Fagan, 2000; Hicks, 2004; Jancar-Webster, 1998; Manning, 1998; Shriver and Messer, 2009). According to the studies, while the environmental movement, which was relatively tolerated under authoritarian regimes, was often used as an alternative tool for the anti-regime movement, the strong interest in it faded away with democratisation.

However, the Korean experience shows the pattern which is different from these empirical studies. The Korean environmental movement experienced rapid growth and exerted a strong influence in policy making in the 1990s after democratisation, but gradually lost its influence and public support in the 2000s. Therefore, the examination of the Korean case studies will contribute to a wider understanding of the controversial relationship between democratisation and social movements.
**Literature review and analytical framework**

For this research, the literature about social movements was reviewed because the environmental movement is a kind of social movements. Until now, social movements have been examined in various perspectives such as motivations, resources and political contexts. Each approach is useful in analysing a social movement, but approaches which stress motivations and resources have critical limitations which are as follows:

Firstly, while “motivations” such as discontentment, distrust, or values is certainly underlying condition of social movements (Braithwaite and Davies, 1962; Geschwender, 1968; Inglehart, 1977 a, 1977 b, 1979; 1981; Levi, 1998; Miller, 1974 a, 1974 b, Nilson and Nilson, 1980), they are not automatically linked to social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McCarthy, Zald, and Jenkins, 1983). Even organizations with strong motivation cannot stage protests without sufficient resources or a favourable environment. Therefore, it is not appropriate to explain movement dynamics simply by motivation.

Secondly, while social movements require “resources” to stage contentious actions (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McCarthy, Zald, and Jenkins, 1983), they cannot flourish and achieve their goals only with resources alone. For instance, environmental NGOs in the US, which are considered to be large, well funded, and professional, have often failed to achieve their goals against the state. Social movements are relatively weak organizations compared to the state or the industry and are heavily dependent on support of other actors (Jenkins, 1985; Rucht, 2004). Social movements are embedded in a web of multi-organizational fields (Curtis and Zurcher, 1974; Klandermans, 1990; Kriesi, 1985, 2004; Rucht, 2004) and thus should be understood through their relationships with other actors including the government.

For these reasons, the political opportunity structure (POS) approach, which stresses the importance of political environment that provides protesters opportunities or constraints (Goldstone, 1980; McAdam, 1982), was selected to explore the Korean environmental movement (However, the importance of motivations and resources is not disregarded. They are necessary minimum conditions for social movements and therefore the explanation on them will be given in chapter 6 which shows the context of social movements). Many scholars have studied social movements in terms of political environment and now the “political opportunity
structure (POS)” approach is even said to be the hegemonic paradigm among social movement theories (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999). The POS approach holds the idea that social movements are largely shaped by political circumstances which are composed of both the “access to (or openness of) the political system” and the “configuration of actors” surrounding issues (Gamson and Meyer, 1996); The former means whether the government provide sufficient access chances to challenging groups and the latter means whether related stakeholders support social movements. It is said that more access chances to the government and more allies supporting movement groups guarantee the successful outcome of social movements.

This study selected the POS approach as analytical framework to explore the Korean environmental movement because it helps to look at the change in the complex process and relationship between the state and the environmental movement (Kriesi, 1985, Klandermans, 1990; Rucht, 2004). In addition, the two dimensions of the POS contribute to analyzing social movements around policy making. The “access to the political system” shows the public’s access to policy making and the “configuration of actors” tells the positions of the various groups towards policy making.

**Research questions and contributions**

Based on the dimensions of the POS, which was selected as analytical framework of this research, the main research question is raised as follows:

In a period of democratisation, how were political opportunities in major infrastructure policy making created for the Korean environmental movement, and how did these opportunities determine the movement’s ability to influence outcomes between 1998 and 2007?

And the above main question is divided into the two sub-questions below because political opportunities are created through both access chances to the political system, and the support of external allies.

- What forms of access chances were created by the Korean government within dam construction decision making, and how did this influence the environmental movement’s ability to influence outcomes?
What change occurred in the relationships between the environmental movement, government, and other social actors in dam construction decision making, and how did this influence the environmental movement’s ability to influence outcomes?

The first research question deals with how the government treated challengers against the government policy. This research will explore how the government provided the environmental movement with both formal and informal access chances and how these access opportunities influenced the outcome of the environmental movement.

The second question deals with the relationship between the environmental movement, government, and other social actors. This research will explore what opinions related stakeholders surrounding dam construction had towards environmental protests and how these influenced the outcome of the protests.

By addressing these questions, the research will find out the reasons how the Korean environmental movement went through the particular trajectory which is different from other countries’ experiences and why it had difficulties in exerting its influence and faced its decline within civil society-friendly administrations.

**Case studies and selection criterion**

To address these research questions, this study examines the environmental movement in “dam policy making”. The reasons why this research has an interest in dam policy making are as follows:

Firstly, dam construction is a fundamental infrastructure investment. Water resource investment is one of the basic and common government decision makings because water is indispensable for daily life and should be appropriately controlled for human safety. In addition, amongst water resource policies, dam construction is the most basic policy project which has been used as a means to acquire water and control floods. Therefore, dam policy making was chosen as the object of the research.
Secondly, dam policy making shows the changes in government decision making over time because of its characteristic as a common activity as mentioned above. Dam construction has been carried out throughout history. It is therefore one of the best tools to examine the variation of government decision making since democratisation. It can explain how the government has changed its decision making process and how the related stakeholders have changed their behaviours since democratic transition.

Thirdly, dam construction has been one of the most contentious policy projects in Korea (Hong, S. T., 2007 c; Lee, M. C., 2005; Yeom, 2003, 2006). There were many anti-dam protests opposing dam construction and they resulted in the government’s review of environmental impacts caused by dam constructions and at times led to its cancellation of the projects (MLTM, 2008).

**Context of anti-dam movements around the world**

Anti-dam movements are universal phenomena around the world (McCully, 2001; Raina, 2000). Many countries including advanced countries have built dams as basic infrastructures. In the 1950s to 1960s, dam building was a symbol of modernization and scientific progress. As the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru described, dams were the modernist vision in the developing countries (McCormick, 2006). In these countries, dam construction was considered an indispensable task for economic development and citizens’ daily lives.

However, since the 1970s, anti-dam movements started to occur all over the world (McCully, 2001; Raina, 2000). Anti-dam protests have often been noticed in many countries which have made large dams such as Japan, China, India, and Brazil (Aditjondro, 1998; Bello, 2007; Chan and Zhou, 2007; Gadgil and Guha, 1994; Jain, 2000; Lin, 2007; Rothman and Oliver, 1999; Ru and Ortolano, 2009; Swain and Ang, 2004; Vosse, 2000; Waley, 2005). As Wolfgang Pircher, former president of International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) in 1992 warned, dam construction industry faces its crisis because of strong counter-movement (McCully, 2001). Anti-dam campaigners argue that dams do not live up to expectations and their costs outweigh their benefits. They severely criticize the government’s justification for dam building by collaborating with researchers (Chan and Zhou, 2007; McCully, 2001; McCormick, 2006).
A number of dam projects have been delayed or cancelled because of the strong opposition to dam construction as shown in the below table. In response to the escalating controversy over dams, countries have not pushed ahead with dam projects and have managed conflicts through participation. Even in Japan, which was one of the largest dam-building nation, new democratic party government announced that it would review all the dam projects and, if necessary, cancel them in 2009 (Swain and Ang, 2004; The New York Times, 2009; Daily Commercial, 2009 a, 2009 b). The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was also established to review the past performance of dams and assess alternatives for water resources, and it suggested a set of guidelines to build dams (WCD, 2000).

Now dam building is no longer accepted in the name of indispensable infrastructure. Korea is not the exception. Like other countries, there were many protests against dam buildings and hot debates regarding the necessity of dam construction. Therefore, this study should be understood within this wider context.

Table 1.1 Conflicts over dam building around the world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Dam</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Nagara river dam</td>
<td>Influenced by local opposition to dam construction, the Democratic Party announced the review or cancellation of many planned dam projects in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kawabe river dam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yoshino river dam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Nujiang dam</td>
<td>China’s anti-dam movement enjoys more room to protest against the state than interest groups advocating for political objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three gorges dam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Narmada Dam</td>
<td>India’s anti-Narmada River dam movement is the world’s best known anti-dam movement. It succeeded in forcing the World Bank to withdraw its financial support to the dams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Silent valley dam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rasi Salai dam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Belo Monte dam</td>
<td>Many anti-dam protesters including international celebrities criticize that dam buildings would damage indigenous people and the Amazon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Pak Mun dam</td>
<td>The fight against the Pak Mun dam forced the World Bank to withdraw its planned support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nam Choan dam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Bakun dam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Chico river dam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam</td>
<td>The anti-dam movement contributed greatly to regime change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bello, 2007; Chan and Zhou, 2007; Gadgil and Guha, 1994; Jain, 2000; Lin, 2007; Rothman and Oliver, 1999; Swain and Ang, 2004; Vosse, 2000; Waley, 2005
1.3 Structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 will explore main concepts which are necessary for the understanding of this research. Democracy and social movements will be defined and the relationship between them will be discussed. There have been numerous studies regarding social movements in democratic countries. However, there are not many works in relation to social movements in transitional democracies. Through this discussion, a practical question is raised – what happened to the social movement in the process of democratisation?

Chapter 3 will show the democratisation process and the history of the environmental movement in Korea. Korea is characterized as a strong presidential system and the democratisation process is therefore explained according to the change of presidents. After democratisation, the environmental movement made rapid progress in terms of its numbers and influence, but gradually lost public support and gradually declined in the 2000s. This pattern is distinguished from other countries’ movement trajectories and this difference will raise questions about what happened to the Korean environmental movement.

Chapter 4 will explain the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) approach as the analytic framework of the research. A definition of the POS will be given and its two dimensions - access to the political system and configuration of actors around social movements - will be explained. With these two dimensions, the rise and fall in the Korean environmental movement, which is the research object, will be explored.

Chapter 5 will raise operational research questions through the POS. This research will take a qualitative approach and do case studies. It will select the two case studies – the anti-Dong River dam movement and the anti-Hantan River dam movement – and set out the rationale of this selection. Next, this chapter will explain research methods and analysis process after field work. Qualitative interview data analysis is used to draw research findings.

Chapter 6 will explain the process of dam policy making while also exploring the history of the anti-dam movement in Korea. Next, it will set out the broad contexts of the two dam case studies. The background of the two dam projects, composition of the anti-dam movements, and their arguments will be explained.
Chapter 7 will set out the protest history of the two anti-dam movements. While the anti-Dong River dam movement succeeded to achieve the cancellation of the dam project, the anti-Hantan River dam movement failed to achieve it. This chapter will show what the anti-dam movements and the government did to achieve their goals around these two dam projects.

Chapter 8 will explore the relationship between the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and the outcomes of the anti-dam movements. How the POS influenced the outcome of the anti-dam movements in dam policy making will be analyzed and more importantly, how the differences in the outcomes in both cases were shaped by the POS will be analysed.

Chapter 9 will summarise research findings and suggest their implications. Research findings from the Korean case studies suggest that it is not proper to assume a simple relationship between democratisation and social movements and this relationship should be discussed within country-specific context.
CHAPTER 2 DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT

2.1 Introduction

This research has an interest in the environmental movement in newly democratised countries. In this chapter, to deal with this issue, democracy and social movements will be discussed in broad terms. Firstly, the theory regarding democracy will be explained. Democracy is a significantly elusive term. According to scholars, numerous definitions and classifications have been suggested (Bohman and Reg, 1997; Dahl, 1971, 1989; Diamond, 1994, Diamond and Kim, 2000; Downs, 1957; Dryzeck, 2000; Joo and Jeong, 2006; Held, 1987, 1996; Macpherson, 1977; Schumpeter, 1976). However, in general terms, a distinction can be made between representative (or liberal) and participatory democracy (Haerpfer et al, 2009; Held, 1987, 1996; Porter et al, 1997; Saurugger, 2004). Therefore, here these two democracies will be examined.

Secondly, as main topic of this research, social movements will be explored. With respect to democracy, there are a great number of research subjects from the prerequisites of democracy to its impact on other factors such as civil society. However, this research has a particular interest in the development of “social movements” in democratic countries. Social movements will be defined and the environmental movement, a typical social movement, will also be explored.

Thirdly, the relationship between democracy and social movements will be explained. Social movements are commonplace in almost all countries. They have often been found even in mature democracies such as the UK. Therefore, the co-existence of democracy and social movements is generally accepted and it is expressed as the ‘normalization’ of unconventional political participation (Goldstone, 2004; Norris et al. 2005). Until now, there were numerous studies in relation to social movements and these studies show that the political context in a given country is important in the development of social movements.

However, these studies were relatively limited to mature democracies (Shriver and Messer, 2009; Tang and Tang, 1997; Tong, 2005). According to Huntington’s classification of democratisation (1991), many studies focused on social movements in the first democracies
(e.g. the US, the UK and France) and second democracies (e.g. Germany, Italy and Japan). On the other hand, there are relatively few studies in relation to social movements in newly democratised countries, the so-called third wave democracies (e.g. Hungary, the Czech Republic and South Korea). Therefore, this research will examine social movements in “newly democratised countries.” Democratisation is still a black box whose impact is yet to be fully understood. It is a highly dynamic and unpredictable process. This research will examine what actually happens to the government and social movements in this dynamic process.

2.2 Brief overview of democracy

In general, a democracy is regarded as a type of government which is “run by the people” and contrasts with a dictatorship or a monarchy which is run by a limited number of individuals who are not accountable to citizens (Dahl, 1989; Haerpfer et al, 2009; Potter et al, 1997). However, the established practice of democracy varies according to country and it is accepted in different ways according to people (Chu, Diamond, and Chin, 2001). In this section, democracy will be understood by exploring the two broad types of democracies – representative (or liberal) and participatory democracy (Haerpfer et al, 2009; Held, 1987, 1996; Potter et al, 1997; Saurugger, 2004).

2.2.1 Types of democracy

Traditional representative democracy

- Working mechanisms of representative democracy

Representative democracy is a traditional form of government founded on the principle of elected officers representing the interests of citizens within the rule of law (Held, 1987). Simply put, it is a political system by which people decide who governs instead of deciding what government does (Haerpfer et al, 2009). It is based on several principles as follows:

Firstly, the rationale of representative democracy starts from “representatives”. Representation systems differ according to country; while the US has the presidential system, the UK has the parliamentary system. However, it is a common fact that a limited number of
representatives form an independent ruling body and take the responsibility of acting in the people’s interest (Haerpfer et al, 2009; Held, 1987, 1996; Potter et al, 1997). Representative democracy has grounded into social contract theory that the government is a kind of trust created by the people who are its beneficiaries. Citizens deliver trust to representatives and give up certain rights, and representatives in turn work for people’s interest. However, representatives are not everlasting trustees, but temporary trustees. In so far as the government as representative meets its obligation as a trustee of the people, it enjoys a legitimacy to govern and citizens have a corresponding obligation to obey it. Therefore, in a representative democracy, the government is judged at regular intervals by citizens.

Secondly, the essence of representative democracy is “election”. Through election, representatives to act in the interests of citizens are selected. Election is the process by which citizens express their preference by choosing representatives they like. Electoral democracy is therefore regarded as the basic condition of representative democracy (Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992; Diamond, 1996; O’Donnell, 1996; Schumpeter, 1976; Stanley, 1990). For electoral democracy to be operated, citizens should have the right to vote and access to the power. Through fair and competitive elections, representative democracy can be finally guaranteed (Dahl, 1971, 1989). Election is also the means of acquiring the accountability of elected representatives. As stated above, representative democracy builds upon the promise that elected representatives should act in the interests of their citizens. However, there is always a possibility that representatives might violate the expectations of their citizens, irrespective of whether this is conscious or unconscious. It is related to the principal–agent problem. The government as an agent can violate the interests of citizens and at that time citizens can withdraw power from existing trustees through voting. In summary, election is the best political tool for choosing and judging representatives in representative democracy.

Representative democracy is based on rational decision making (Kweit and Kweit, 1980; Reich, 1990; Shannon, 1990, 1992; Wondolleck, 1987). Those elected are considered rational actors in the selection of solutions to social problems. That is, it is assumed that representatives have sufficient knowledge regarding the problems, examine the possible alternatives, and make sensible judgments that will maximize the interests of citizens. The rationality in this decision making is called “instrumental rationality”, which focuses on the most efficient means to achieve a specific end. In this sense, the government and bureaucracy
are the most effective tools in the achievement of goals. Decision making is often the domain of a limited number of representatives and technical experts (Cubbage et al., 1993). As a result, citizens are relatively passive actors. They leave representatives make decisions regarding them and accept their choices.

- **Limitation of representative democracy**

While the most basic political system is representative democracy, its problems have often been pointed out. Two main problems have been raised, directly related to the basic principles of representative democracy. The first problem is the failure of representatives; the second is the limitation of voting systems.

Stemming from “representatives”, the first problem is the so-called principal-agent issue. Representatives are supposed to work for the interests of citizens, but this expectation can often be unsatisfactory. They can betray people’s trust irrespective of whether this betrayal is either conscious or unconscious. In terms of conscious betrayal, they can be corrupted or unfaithful to their original duties (Kim, J. Y., 2005; Kim, M. S., 1997; Kim, S. H., 2002; PCGID, 2007; Sheridan, 1994; Quah, 2004; You, J. S., 2005). Politicians and public officials are often seen to pursue their own interests, not public interests. Representatives can sometimes care more about the expansion of their organization and the growth of their budget rather than better service provision for citizens. Even if they are not engaged in conscious betrayal, they can be trapped in unconscious betrayal. This is related to the limitation of human rationality. Rational decision-making is based on the assumption of a rational individual (Hoogerwerf, 1990; Vedung, 2000). However, it is not possible for individuals to be perfectly rational (Lindblom, 1959; March, 1978; Simon, 1957, 1990, 1991). Therefore, rational decision making has been challenged by bounded rationality, based on the argument that rationality of individuals is limited by the cognitive ability, the information, and the time which they have.

A more serious problem is the limitation of “voting systems”, which only allow a fairly crude expression of choices. Citizens can make the choice for a candidate with wide variety of policy packages in routine voting and cannot express a preference respectively for each policy (Im, 2007). This is a fatal problem in representative democracy, because it is almost impossible that people find a candidate who has all policy packages which they like (Im,
Next, an election is a highly intermittent process. In democratic systems, when representatives break contractual trust, citizens express distrust through voting. However, even if citizens are discontented with certain politicians or policies, they have to wait for the next election to remove the power from existing trustees (Im, 2007). These weak points are critical in representative democracy, because citizens cannot express their preference instantly about each policy. Furthermore, voting systems, which is based on the majority rule, often might disregard the opinions of minorities (Tocqueville, 1835, 1840). While democracy must guarantee the expression of the majority, it must also ensure that the majority will not abuse their power to violate the basic rights of the minority. However, rule by the majority sometimes causes dissenting individuals to be oppressed by the “tyranny of the majority” (Im, 2007; Tocqueville, 1835, 1840). These limitations of representative democracy have caused the democratic deficit in reality (Bevir, 2006; Moravcsik, 2004; Marquand, 1979) and have resulted in the discussion regarding participatory democracy as an alternative system.

**Participatory democracy**

- **Citizens’ rising desire to participate and empowerment**

In addition to the limitations of representative democracy, changes in civil society have called for more discussions regarding democracy (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Diamond, 1994; Edwards et al, 2001; Hall, 1995). Now citizens do not simply accept public policies in the cause of public interest or substantive rationality (Im, 2008; Kim, S. H., 1997, 2000 a; Koo, 2002). They want to listen to the government’s explanations and express their opinions about it, by participating in policy making. As a result, public policy without public participation does not often have its legitimacy and therefore, the governments try to introduce participatory systems, particularly in policy domains where people’s interests conflict severely (Jeong and Oh, 2010; Moote and McClaran, 1997; Park, J. C., 2007).

Moreover, citizens have become more powerful compared to the past (Vibert, 2007). The agency problem caused by information asymmetry was to a great extent solved (Im, 2007, 2008). Citizens now have a considerable amount of knowledge and information comparable to the government. Based on this increased information, they hold their own ideas about
social issues and take more critical approaches towards public policy (Fisher, 2000; Irwin, 1995; Van de Kerkhof, 2006). These changes have led to the emergence of participatory democracy. However, although citizens’ power and their desire to participate greatly increased, their actual participation can be restricted because of the constraints of time and distance. This problem is addressed by several factors.

Firstly, the development of technology is another important factor. The development of computers and communication has reduced the constraint of time and space and has enhanced the possibility of participation (Harvey, 1990). Now normal citizens can actively express their opinions and raise their concerns through the internet. In addition, technological development promotes the formation of associations and the accumulation of knowledge. Through the internet, people meet with the same belief and opinion in an easier way and share the information. This function contributes to citizens’ empowerment. Based on this change, the discussions about e-democracy or internet democracy have been made.

Secondly, civic organizations composed of voluntary citizen play a role as the intermediary between normal citizens and the government (Bidet, 2002; Cho, H. Y., 2000 a; Kim, P. S., and Moon, 2003; Lee, S. H., 2001; Lee, Y.S., 2004). While normal citizens often do not have sufficient time, information, or expert knowledge needed to give meaningful input into specific issues, NGOs can organize and deliver public opinions to the government (Bryce, 2007; Mercer, 2002). When there is any mismatch between citizens’ expectation and the reality, NGOs can represent the voice of citizens that are not covered in the institutional arena.

The growth of citizens and civil society has resulted in the changes in decision making circumstances. Now it is often found that government policies are not supported by absolute majority. Very often half of the citizens have objection to the government’s policy and if not, strong opposition groups raise the objection to policy making. In particular, there are severe conflicts around environmental issues (Walker, Daniels, and Emborg, 2008). While the government and private corporations pursue development policies (e.g. nuclear plants, dams) for economic reasons, residents and environmental NGOs raise objection to them because of environmental destruction. As society has become more diverse, there are various sections of the public with different values, perspectives, cognitive styles and worldviews (Innes and Booher, 2000). The complexity and uncertainty in contemporary society intensify the limits
to bureaucratic decision making (Ascher, 2004; Costanza and Cornwell, 1992; Lee, K. N. 1993).

- **Emergence of Participatory democracy**

As explained above, various factors have challenged representative democracy and have called for some extent of change. Therefore, democratic governments have made efforts to introduce participatory systems, at least partly. Participatory democracy emphasizes the “participation” of citizens in the direction and operation of political systems (Dryzek, 2000; Held, 1987; Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992; Macpherson, 1977; Pateman, 1970). Through participation, all related stakeholders articulate their demands and listen to other parties’ demands (Austin, 2000; Gray, 1989; Innes and Booher, 1999; Mattessich and Monsey, 1992; Moote and McClaran, 1997). People gain an understanding of each other’s concerns and establish mutual trust. Therefore, it is also a process of “interaction” between stakeholders. Finally, through participation and interaction, they can arrive at “consensus or agreement” (Blumenberg, 2002; Healey, 1997; Huxley, 2000; Moote and McClaran, 1997; Ozawa, 1991; Saarikoski, 2006; Susskind and Field, 1996). The ideal of participatory democracy is to reach a decision through participation and interaction (Bohman and Rehg, 1997). While representative democracy, which is based on rational choice theory, assumes stable preference, participatory democracy accepts preference transformation through deliberation (Dryzek, 2000). That is, dialogue is believed to transform opinions of stakeholders (Innes and Booher, 2010).

Decision making theories mirror broad political trends. While rational decision making paradigm came from traditional representative democracy, communicative (or collaborative) governance has been suggested as an alternative paradigm in 21th stakeholder society (Innes, 1995; Innes and Booher, 1999, 2000; Moon and Kim, 2006; Park, J. C., 2007; Park, K., 2001; Sager, 1994, 2009; Tolentino, 1995). According to communicative governance, decision making is not about finding the best solution and there is no one best solution. It is about engaging with stakeholder groups to work out how to improve in the face of conflict. Communicative governance has its foundation in the so-called communicative rationality, which calls into question the substantive rationality and instead puts forward procedural rationality (Habermas, 1984, 1996). This communicative philosophy developed into “communicative planning” by various scholars (Friedmann, 1973, 1987; Forrester, 1985, 1989;
According to them, planning should be a communicative process involving multiple stakeholders, because in contemporary society, there are so many public with different values and perspectives and some people’s view cannot be absolutely right. There is not one single correct way of reasoning and new reasoning through interaction and debate should be adopted. Whether it is reasonable is shaped by the process of reasoning (Heather, 2006) and therefore discussion, deliberation and negotiation between stakeholders are stressed.

**Democracy in reality: representative democracy**

Now we face the stakeholder society and many governments have tried to enhance public involvement in policy making. However, the full introduction of participatory democracy is possible in small republics or communities where people can engage in face-to-face deliberations and it is actually impractical for large-scale, modern society (Im, 2007). That is, democracy in reality is necessarily representative, even if participatory system can be partially introduced (Bohman and Rehg, 1997; Dahl, 1970, 1971, 1997; Haerpfer et al, 2009; Im, 2007). Although direct or participatory democracy can be discussed in theory, it is impossible to be completely put into practice in reality. Therefore, Robert Dahl considered democracy in reality “polyarchy”, a representative system with political inclusiveness (Dahl, 1971). Firstly, according to him, public involvement requires a great deal of time and efforts from related stakeholders (Dahl, 1970; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Tolentino, 1995). Citizens do not have the time to commit themselves to attend meetings. Finding and including all the stakeholders in decision making is not easy. Secondly, some issues or some situations require technical knowledge and expertise which normal citizens do not have (Dahl, 1970). It is impossible and even undesirable that all the citizens participate in every issue.

In summary, democracy in reality is representative and in this research it is also understood as being representative. Therefore, democracy is a political system by which representatives are selected through fair and competitive elections and liberal individual rights (e.g. freedom of assembly and association, freedom of the press) are guaranteed.

**2.2.2 Democratisation**
In the above section, the discussions on democracy were introduced. Simply put, democratisation is the transition to a more democratic political regime (Porter et al, 1997). However, as seen above, as the views in relation to democracy vary according to people, the opinions about democratisation can be also different. While some people see the establishment of liberal democracy as democratisation, others may consider the securing of social and economic rights and more comprehensive participation as true democratisation (Grugel, 2002). However, democratisation in the latter is too broad and not easy to apply in the practice. It is also inappropriate for cross-national comparison. Therefore, in this realistic perspective, many scholars identify the establishment of representative (or liberal) democracy as democratisation (Diamond, 1996; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1990; Huntington, 1991; Kim, W. J. et al, 2005).

Huntington (1991), a leading scholar in the studies on democratisation, classified global democratisation into the three waves; the first wave (1828-1926), the second wave (1943-1962), and the third wave (1974-1980s). According to his studies, the first wave began with the effect of the American and French revolutions and that the US, Britain, and France made the transition towards democracy in the 19th century. The second wave occurred after World War II with the victory of the allies who promoted and encouraged democratisation in the defeated nations of West Germany, Italy and Japan. Finally, the third wave of democratisation began in Portugal which ended the dictatorship in 1974 and moved on to Southern Europe (e.g. Spain and Greece), Latin America (e.g. Argentina and Uruguay) and Asia (e.g. Korea and Taiwan). This wave reached its peak when the communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Hungary and Czechoslovakia) made transition to democracy (Huntington, 1991; Oh, 1999).

In Huntington’s classification, while the first and second wave democracies are considered to be relatively mature democracies, the third wave democracies are regarded as new born (or transitional) democracies. As stated previously, this research has a particular interest in social movements in newly democratised democracies. Therefore, it will select Korea, which is a typical third wave democracy, as research object and will explore what actually happens in Korea. More explanation will be given in section 2.4.

2.3 Brief overview of social movement
2.3.1 Definition of social movement

Definition of protest

The starting point of discussion about social movement is protest, because a social movement is a certain kind of protest (Opp, 2009). Protest is the fundamental feature which distinguishes social movements from institutional politics (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004). Therefore, here the term “protest” will be defined prior to the definition of social movements.

Firstly, protests are joint (or collective) actions of a group of individuals. According to Eisinger (1973), protest is a host of types of collective action designed to provide relatively powerless people with bargaining leverage in the political process. For example, it is not a protest if a single citizen raises an objection to a policy by writing a letter to a congressman (Eisinger, 1973; Opp, 2009).

Secondly, protests are objections or disapprovals which people express against one or more decisions of a target body (Opp, 2009). Lipsky (1968) defines protest as a mode of political action oriented towards objection to one or more policies. Turner (1969) says that protest expresses a grievance, a conviction of wrong doing or injustice. This means that actors who are discontent and have grievances against certain things stage protest to address their concerns.

Based on above explanations, a protest is defined as a “collective action” of a group of individuals as the expression of their objection to certain decisions of a target body.

Definition of social movement

Among protests, social movements refer to the “organized” protests. While protests include not only organized but also unorganized actions, social movements only point to “organized” actions. In the literature, several factors are often mentioned to explain the meaning of the term “organized”.
Firstly, a social movement is a collective challenge with *some degree of formal organization and some degree of group size* (Snow and Oliver, 1995; Opp, 2009). A social movement is usually composed of social movement organizations (SMOs) – formal organizations that plan and coordinate collective activities irrespective of whether they are hierarchical or loosely-coupled structures. Moreover, a social movement organization has a relatively large group size among protest groups. Secondly, a social movement is an attempt with *some degree of temporal continuity* (Snow and Oliver, 1995; Opp, 2009). That is, longevity is another component of social movement and therefore, one-off protest events are not social movements.

In summary, the more formal its organization, the larger the group is, and the longer a group exists, the closer it comes to a social movement (Opp, 2009: 41). Typically, the peace, environmental, civil rights, or women’s movements are considered the examples of social movements. Based on the above exploration, this research defines social movement as a particular kind of protest with some degree of organization, size and continuity.

**Roles of social movement**

There can be several methods for citizens to express their opinions; through institutionalized politics (e.g. voting) or through social movements. However, there are some limitations in expressing opinions through institutionalized politics because representative democracy, the widely accepted democracy, has the characteristic that people have to wait for the next ballot (Goldstone, 2004; Im, 2007). This may not be effective for addressing immediate concerns. In addition, institutional politics through voting only allows the choice of candidate with a wide variety of policy packages (Im, 2007). That is, institutional politics cannot reflect the exact interest of the citizens in relation to a specific issue.

In this sense, a social movement can play a role expressing citizens’ opinions beyond established mechanisms. Therefore, scholars see social movement as a complimentary mechanism for representative democracy. According to them, both democracy and protests are “mutually reinforcing mechanisms” (Goldstone, 2004; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Opp, 2009).

**Strategies of social movement**
In general, social movements are said to have two strategies (Dubrow et al, 2008; Grant, 2000; Jordan, 1998; Jordon and Maloney, 1997; McAllister and Mughan, 1984; Soule et al, 1999; Van Dyke et al. 2001); One is conciliatory (assimilative, insider, or soft) tactics which are within the boundaries of the norms of conventional political activity, such as lobbying, petitions and letter-writing. This is the strategy of persuasion through conversation and debate (Richards and Heard, 2005). The other is confrontational (disruptive, outsider, or hard) tactics which deviate from the norms and favour demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, and strikes. Social movements often seek to influence political decisions through the use of these unconventional methods (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Lipsky, 1968, Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004), which tend to strongly characterize social movements.

In relation to two strategies, some scholars argue that confrontational tactics have been replaced by conciliatory tactics (Jordan and Maloney, 1997). According to them, typically, in the case of NGOs, because of a growing involvement in the policy making process, NGOs have gradually lost the character of movement groups and have instead become public interest lobbies (Carter, 2001; Freudenberg and Steinsapir, 1992; Grant, 2000). However, many scholars still argue that, in spite of more opportunities to employ conciliatory strategies, direct action is still considered the effective tactic in social movement (Gamson 1990; McAdam, 1982; Richards and Heard, 2005; Tarrow 1994). They say that the favourable changes in the political environment such as democratisation haven’t got rid of social movement organizations’ preference for the use of disruptive strategies and only added legitimate tactics to their existing repertoires (Goldstone, 2004; Richards and Heard, 2005). In conclusion, the uses of disruptive strategies by NGOs are still important in terms of their effectiveness and success because they can draw the attention of policy makers, citizens and mass media through these actions.

2.3.2 Typical social movement: environmental movement

Among social movements, this research has a particular interest in the environmental movement and will make case studies within it. Therefore, the environmental movement will be briefly examined here.
Scholars say that the environmental movement is “the most comprehensive and influential movement of our time” (Castells, 1997: 67). The side effects caused by rapid industrialization have allowed the environmental movement to enjoy widespread public support (Christie and Jarvis, 2001; Worcester, 1994) and now in many industrialized countries, environmental movement organizations have become substantial operations and have acquired the characteristics of an institutionalized organization (Brulle, 2000; Rootes, 2004; Touraine et al, 1983; Wapner, 1996).

Then how can we define the environmental movement? Initially, it is noted that an environmental movement is a kind of social movement. Therefore, it is also the organized and collective efforts of a number of people who want to achieve their shared goal by influencing a target (e.g. public policy, individual behaviour). Then, to find out the shared goal (or identity) in the environmental movement is important.

In general, the environmental movement is regarded as the social movement based on “environmentalism”. However, the problem is that there is no single, unambiguous, universally-agreed definition of environmentalism (Brulle, 2000; Brulle and Jenkins, 2005, 2008; Rootes, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2004). Environmentalism is an umbrella term which includes a wide range of competing and sometimes contradictory ideas concerning the environment. Thus, there are a large number of classifications of environmentalism.

In broad terms, scholars have distinguished between conservation and preservation. While conservationism is related to the wise and efficient use of natural resources, preservationism is related to the harmony between humankind and nature (Rootes, 2004). More specifically, while the former argues that humankind should manage nature for the effective use of limited natural resources (conservation “for” humankind), the latter says that nature should be preserved because of its self-value (preservation “from” humankind) (Choi, T. K., 2001; Park, J. M., 1999; Meyer, 1997). In addition to these two big streams, ecologism was introduced as a new alternative (Baxter, 1999; Smith, 1998). Although this idea stems from preservationism, it is much more progressive in relation to the attitude towards nature. Ecologism requests more basic change in the relationship between humankind and nature (Dobson, 1990; Dobson and Eckersley, 2006).
In this study, environmental frames are classified into three frames in the table below, even though some scholars suggest more detailed distinction (Baxter, 1999; Bruelle, 2000, 2008; Byrne, K., 1997; Eckersley, 1992; Jeong, D. Y., 1996; Ku, 1996; O’Riordan, 1976; Smith, 1998). The difference between these three frames is how much the frame stresses nature over humankind. One of these frames does not fully represent the environmentalism and all frames above cover some part of it. Environmentalism is the shared ideas concerned with conserving, preserving, or protecting the environment in spite of the difference of the orientation between humankind and nature. Therefore, in this research, the environmental movement is seen as the organized and collective efforts concerned with conserving, preserving, or protecting the environment.

Table 2.1 Frames of the environmental movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservationism</td>
<td>Natural resources should be technically managed from a utilitarian perspective to realize the greatest good for the greatest number of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservationism</td>
<td>Nature is an important component in supporting both the physical and spiritual life of humans. Therefore, the continued existence of wilderness and wildlife, which is not disturbed by human action, is necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecologism</td>
<td>Humankind does not hold a privileged or central position in social and political evaluation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Environmental movement organization**

The environmental movement is represented by a range of groups, from professional environmental NGOs (ENGOs) to grassroots environmental groups (Ku, 2000, 2003; Rootes, 2004). That is, the movement includes not only ENGOs which continually exist to address environmental problems, but also local residents’ countermeasure committees which are temporarily established in relation to a specific issue (Ku, 2000, 2003; Rootes, 2004).

In particular, in relation to their role, ENGOs give citizens more chances for environmental awareness. Although citizens’ perception of environmental values has been improved, the public can overlook or disregard the fault of the government policy because of their
constraint of time and money. These limitations can be overcome by NGOs’ raising awareness of environmental problems and staging an active opposition movement (Kim, J. R., and Kang, 2000). Through NGOs’ efforts of mobilizing the crowd and drawing the attention of mass media, social issues, that otherwise might be overlooked, can be dealt with as policy agenda by the government. In particular, in developing countries, the government is inclined to be rather development–oriented and under this circumstance, ENGOs can play a role as a balancer for the development-oriented government (Broadbent et al, 2006).

In relation to the role of ENGOs, in broad terms, there can be two kinds of groups - activist groups and research-focused (or advisory) groups (Gulbrandsen and Andresen, 2004). While activist groups obtain legitimacy by carrying out action (e.g. campaign or demonstration) against public policy, advisory groups obtain legitimacy by giving advice to decision makers on legal, technical and scientific matters (Gulbrandsen and Andresen, 2004; Lee, S. H., 2001). However, many ENGOs in modern society actually have both characteristics. They have currently staged research based protests and therefore they are considered “an integration of expert academism and aggressive activism” (Lee, S. H., 2001; 459; Lee, C. H., and S. H. Lee, 2002).

2.4 Social movement in democratised countries

2.4.1 Relationship between social movement and democracy

Traditional view: Social movements as “outsiders” from the polity

In the past, the prevailing image of social movements was the attempt by outsiders from society to gain leverage within politics (Goldstone, 2004; Gurr, 1970). They were actors who were excluded or marginalized in the normal political process (Gurr, 1970; Jenkins, 1995). Therefore, social movements were understood as the tools used by people who may not have sufficient access to the political system (Dalton and Sickle, 2004, 2005).

According to this idea, an ‘undemocratic’ or ‘limited’ political system was the main source of social movements. Social groups which are unable to gain access to institutionalised politics by conventional channels express their frustration against the government by protesting (Opp, 2009). This perspective therefore assumed that institutionalization of a political system - democracy - would reduce the frequency of protest actions, because
democratic institutions and processes will lessen the frustration of citizens. It was believed that the openness of the system and the availability of conventional channels in the democratic system have a moderating effect or substitution effect on the action of movement actors (Dalton et al., 2009; Koopmans and Kriesi, 1995). That is, it was suggested that citizens will select conventional channels instead of social movements if democracy is established.

**Modern view: Social movements as normal phenomenon**

However, the above argument has been not empirically substantiated and instead the opposite has occurred (Goldstone, 2004). Social movements and protests did not fade away and have continually existed even in many advanced countries, where political institutions are relatively well-developed (Dalton and Sickle, 2004; Dalton et al., 2009; Goldstone, 2004; Norris, 2002, 2003; Norris et al., 2005). Now protests are the phenomena which are often noticed even in central London, and the environmental movement is the more active social movement in advanced democratic countries such as the UK and the US (Dalton et al., 2009). Thus, the normalization of social movements and protest is now accepted (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Norris et al., 2005). Some scholars even argue that we are moving toward “a movement society” (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998) or “a movement world” (Goldstone, 2004). Therefore, now the dominant view regarding the relationship between social movement and democracy is that democracy does not fully replace social movement. Citizens do not give up social movements and protests for the reason that they have an institutional channel to the government. Rather, institutional politics and social movement are both political actions which open up to the citizens with the process of democratisation.

In addition, the noticeable thing was that many direct participants have been well educated and relatively affluent (Dalton, 2000; Inglehart, 1977 a., 1977 b, 1979, 1981; Norris et al. 2005). This fact showed that protest is not a tool used only by the disenfranchised and the politically frustrated, but a tool used by those who are active in politics (Norris, 2002, 2003). Therefore, social movements or protests should not be seen as simply a matter of repressed forces fighting states (Goldstone, 2004). This is the so-called “new social movement” perspective. New social movement theorists argue that in post-materialistic society, the key participants in social movements are the middle class, intellectual and professional elites.
They have interest in new values such as the environment, human rights and make great efforts to pursue their goals. In summary, social movements are identified as a form of participation with conventional political action (e.g. election). As stated above, in modern society, political system is representative democracy which public participation is still limited, although participatory system has been partially introduced. In this regard, social movements contribute to expanding participatory democracy.

2.4.2 Various explanations for social movements in democratic countries

**Motivation based perspective**

There have been several explanations regarding the reasons why social movements are common in democratic countries. However, above all, grievance (or discontent) is a starting point for explanations for social movement (Buechler, 2004; Gurr, 1970). Although democracy is considered a better political system than other systems, it does not resolve all of the grievances of citizens (Strachey, 1964). Democracy is not a cure-all system as Winston Churchill, the former British prime minister, mentioned: “Many forms of government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time” (James, 1974). Therefore, even in democratic countries, people’s dissatisfactions still exist.

In addition, the gap between citizens’ expectation and the reality of democracy could cause them to become disillusioned and create a sense of disappointment which could possibly be linked to their protest actions. Although representatives are supposed to work for the interests of citizens, they might not be faithful to their duties. In particular, corruption and other ethical standards violations by the government can increase the level of public discontentment towards democracy (Park, C. M., 2009). Furthermore, the weakness of institutional politics might result in the dissatisfaction of citizens becoming stronger than their high expectations (Lee, S. J., and Arrington, 2008; Norris, 1999; Jang, S. C., 2007). For these reasons, political distrust is also regarded as a powerful determinant of political protests (Citrin, 1974; Gamson, 1968, 1971; Hetherington, 1998; Kasse, 1999; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Miller, 1974 a, 1974 b; Nilson and Nilson, 1980; Paige, 1971; Sigelman and Feldman, 1983). In summary, many
social problems, which have still been left unaddressed, and the distrust of government are the sources of protests.

**Resource based perspective**

Another perspective is the approach which stresses the importance of “resource”. Resource Mobilization (RM) theory is a typical approach. It suggests that social movements require resources that facilitate the mobilization of citizens (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004; Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977, 2002). According to this theory, the motivations for social movements are commonplace in every society, even if their extent varies and therefore the availability of resources is most important. Although there are some differences in relation to the types of resources according to scholars, they often include human, material, and informational ones (Cress and Snow, 1996; Edwards and McCarthy, 2004; Martin, 2008; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977, 2002; Tilly, 1978; Yanacopulos, 2005). That is, social movements need people, money, and knowledge as basic resources to activate protest.

According to the RM theory, in a democratic society, citizens have more resources – their income and education level – to participate in protests compared to in an authoritarian system where the state monopolizes most resources (Dalton and Sickle, 2004). Citizens have more access to knowledge and information and they can establish or participate in organizations more easily (Bovens and Wille, 2008; Mondak et al., 2007). Therefore, it is commonplace to see the well-educated and professional classes participate in political protests in advanced industrial democracies (Dalton et al., 2009; Dalton and Sickle, 2004; Inglehart, 1977a, 1977b; Norris, 2002).

**2.4.3 Importance of political context**

The previous explanations provide good insight regarding the normalization of social movements in democratised countries. However, there are limitations to these two approaches. While they broadly suggest the normalization of social movements in democratic countries, they do not give sufficient explanations about the particular characteristics of and the variation over time in social movements in a given country (Grugel, 2002). Actually, the extent to which social movements flourish in democratic countries is not the same (Grugel,
2002). Even in the transitional democracies, the trajectory of social movements since democratisation is different. While social movements in some countries weaken right after democratisation, those in other countries might be stronger.

However, the approaches, which simply focus on the motivations or resources, have difficulty in explaining this difference. The more detailed reasons are as follows: Firstly, while “motivations” such as discontentment or distrust are certainly underlying conditions of social movements, people cannot do anything simply with these motivations alone (Cuzan, 1990; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McCarthy, Zald, and Jenkins, 1983). Although grievances and distrusts are commonplace throughout the world, they are not always linked to social movements. Therefore it can be suggested that motivations are just the first filter in emergence or outcome of social movements (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986). Even the organizations with strong motivation cannot stage protests without sufficient resources or a favourable environment. Therefore, it is not appropriate to simply explain movement dynamics with this motivation alone.

Secondly, while social movements require “resources” that turn the grievances into contentious action, they do not guarantee the emergence or outcome of social movements. Social movements are relatively weak organizations compared to the state or the industry and therefore it is impossible for them to achieve goals solely based on their own abilities (Andresen and Skodvin, 2008, Jenkins, 1985). Thus they have no choice but to depend on the support or favourable attitude of other actors. In addition, social movements are embedded in a web of multi-organizational fields (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973, 1974; Klandermans, 1990; Kriesi, 1985, 2004; Rucht, 2004). They emerge and develop through interactions with many other actors such as the mass media and local residents. Therefore, social movements should be discussed within this complex relationship. For example, while environmental NGOs in the US are large, well funded, and professional, they have failed to gain concessions from the state because the US government was influenced by business groups’ strong opposition (Schreurs, 2002 b). This example shows that the internal resources of a social movement do not satisfactorily explain its activism. While the power of the movement is important to some degree, what is really crucial is the relative power vis-à-vis other actors (Kim, Y. H., 2002; Schreurs, 2002 b).
For the above reasons, many scholars focus their attention to external environment (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Giugni, 2009; Goldstone, 2004; Kitschelt, 1986; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004; Rootes, 1999; Rucht, 2004). They argue that the structure surrounding social movements needs to be carefully examined, because they do not exist in a vacuum and are shaped by a given context (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon, 2009; Daft, 2004; Meyer, 2004a, 2004b; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Tong, 2005). With respect to context (or structure), many others focused on political context because many movements are often directed towards the government (Lipsky, 1968) and therefore their destiny is ultimately determined by the relationship with it. In conclusion, political context around social movements is very crucial in the social movement studies.

**Political context perspective**

Political opportunity structure (POS) theory is a typical perspective which emphasizes the impact of political context on social movements. After Eisinger (1973) developed the concept of political opportunity structure, many scholars have stressed the importance of political environments (Goldstone, 1980; Kriesi, 2004; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow 1994). They argue that in spite of strong grievances and many resources, social movements cannot arise or succeed without favourable political opportunities. Therefore, the critical factor determining the dynamics of a social movement is the existence of a favourable political structure among other things. The comments below show how much scholars emphasize the impact of the POS on social movements.

“Even groups with mild grievances and few internal resources may appear in movements, while those with deep grievances and dense resources – but lacking opportunities – may not.”
(Tarrow, 1994: 18)

“High mobilization does not necessarily lead to profound impacts if the political opportunity structures are not conducive to change. Conversely, lower mobilization may have a disproportionate impact, owing to properties of the political opportunity structure.”
(Kitschelt, 1986: 72)

POS theory explains the full cycle of the social movement - from its emergence to its outcome - with political environment (See 4.4 in chapter 4). There were a great number of
studies regarding the impact of political context on social movement from longitudinal to
cross-national comparative studies. They dealt with a wide variety of movement issues from
the civil rights to the environmental movement. However, the studies were to a large extent
limited to relatively mature democratic countries in America and Western Europe. In
particular, many studies of the environmental movement have dealt with the environmental
movements in the US, the UK, Germany, France and Sweden (Dryzek et al, 2002, 2003;
Rootes, 2003). For example, in relation to the anti-nuclear movement which is a typical
environmental movement, many studies deal with the movements in mature democracies in
America and Western Europe. After Kitschelt (1986) initially compared the anti-nuclear
movements in four countries including France, Germany, Sweden, and the US, many other
scholars also compared the movements in mature democracies (Jasper, 1990; Joppke, 1993;
Diani and van der Heijden, 1994; Flam, 1994; Rucht, 1990, 1994). Likewise, with respect to
the environmental movement as a whole, scholars often focused on movements in advanced
countries in America and Western Europe (Dalton, 1994; Dryzek et al, 2002, 2003; Rootes,
2003, 2004; Schreurs, 2002 b).
As a result, while there is a lot of accumulated literature regarding the environmental
movement in mature democracies, there is relatively little literature relating to movements in
new born democracies. This circumstance completely leaves open the question of how
political context affects social movements in newly democratised counties, whereas in
matured democracies the influence of political context on social movements has often been
confirmed (Dalton and Van Sickle, 2005; Dalton et al, 2009; Tarrow, 1994). In a period of
democratisation, what political opportunites are given to social movements and how do these
opportunities influence social movements’ outcomes? This research will address the
development of social movements in newly democratised countries.

2.5 Summary

In chapter 2, the relationship between social movement and democracy was broadly
explored. Nowadays, social movements are normal phenomenon even in matured democracy
and political context is identified as crucial elements to give explanation about the particular
characteristics of a given country (Dalton et al, 2009; Meyer, 2004 a, 2004 b; Tong, 2005).
However, as stated above, existing studies often focused on social movements in old

46
democracies and as a result, movements in transitional democracies did not receive much interest. It can be guessed that this is largely ascribed to the short history of social movement in new born democracies. Many newly democratised countries did not experience the transition to democracy until the late 1980s. Therefore, many studies regarding new born democracies primarily focused on the prerequisites of democratisation (Diamond, 1994; Edwards et al, 2001; Hall, 1995; Keane, 1988; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Perez Diaz, 1993; Rueshmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Walzer, 1992). That is, the focus of studies was to examine what factors resulted in democratisation.

However, as about 20 years have passed since the establishment of democracy, the impact of democratisation needs to be addressed now. Democratisation is a transitional process by which uncertain and complex change happens (Berg, 1999; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Shriver and Messer, 2009; Tong, 2005). While mature democracies are relatively stable and predictable society, transitional democracies are dynamic and unpredictable process. This research examines what has happened to the social movement in this dynamic democratisation process in transitional democracies.

Among newly democratised countries, this research selects Korea as research target, because the researcher is Korean and Korea is a typical newly democratised country, which is considered one of the successful third-wave democracies in Asia (Hahm, 2008; Huntington, 1991; Shin and Lee, 2003). Korea achieved the transition to democracy in 1987 and has made progress towards democratic consolidation. Among social movements, the environmental movement was selected, because it has been the most conspicuous social movement since democratisation and is closely related to land-use planning. In Korea, which has the tradition of the developmental state, along with the development of democracy, the environmental movement made rapid growth and had strong public support (Bello, 2007; He, 2010; Lee and Arrington, 2008). However, in the 2000s, within left-wing administrations, which stressed public participation and were friendly with civil society, it gradually lost public support and faced its crisis. This research considers this dynamic process which the Korean environmental movement experienced within a seemingly favourable political context. Detailed explanations with respect to the Korean context will be given in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3 DEMOCRATISATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT IN KOREA

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 will explain the Korean democratisation process in a broad context. Next, it will explore the development of the Korean environmental movement in the process of democratisation and will raise practical questions regarding the research.

Korea is a form of new born democracy, having achieved the transition to democracy in 1987 and made progress towards democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1991; Im, 1997, 2000, 2004). While, prior to the establishment of democracy in 1987, the military dictatorship exerted a strong influence and the opinions of civil society were overlooked, since 1987, civil society has been gradually recognized as partners along with the emergence of civilian administrations (Im, 1997). In addition, in the previous progressive administrations (Kim Dae Jung administration, 1998-2002, Roh Moo Hyun administration, 2003-2007), public participation reached its peak (Jeong, M. G., and Oh, 2010; Ki, E. Y., 2007; Park, J. C., 2007).

However, even though Korea established a democratic regime, citizens’ discontent with and distrust of the government have still existed and it has been linked to active social protests (Kim, S. H. et al, 2007; Koo, 2002; Lee, S. J. and Arrington, 2008; ). In particular, the environmental movement has been a distinctive social movement in Korea. Since democratisation in 1987, environmental groups dramatically have grown and exerted strong influence (Kim, J. B., 2000; Ku, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2004 c; Park, S. P., 2002). They staged active protests against national construction projects and they caused many projects to be suspended or cancelled in the 1990s. However, they gradually lost support and faced a critical crisis in progressive administrations which were civil society-friendly (Jang, S. I., 2006; Lee, P. R., 2005; Oh, S. K., S. H. Lee, H. A. Kim, and B. S. Park, 2005). This dynamic process shows the particular characteristics of the Korean environmental movement compared with ones of other newly democratised countries. Detailed explanation of the characteristics is given in section 3.5.
3.2 Democratisation history in Korea

Korea has traditionally developed a presidential system. Therefore, to explore the development of the Korean democracy, it is necessary to examine the features of the presidents and their administrations. That is, the history about how the presidents were elected and what form of democracies they pursued illustrates the democratisation process in Korea (Chung, C. K., 1989; Hahm, S. D. 1999; Hahm, S. D. and Plein, 1995, 1997; Shin, E. H., 2004). The attention is focused particularly on the term 1998-2007.

3.2.1 Prior to democratisation (the 1960s to 1987)

*Long-term military dictatorship*

Korea experienced long-term military dictatorship from the 1960s to 1987. During that period, the two presidents from the military took the power: President Park (1960-79) and President Chun (1980-87). They seized the power through military coups and clamped down on the democratic movement. In the military authoritarian regime, institutional politics and civil society greatly diminished and the freedom of speech and the press was oppressed (Cho, H. Y., 2000 a, 2000 b; Hahm, C. B., 2008; He, 2010; Kim, S. H. et al, 2008; Lim, 2000). In particular, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which was created to prevent a countercoup and to suppress all potential enemies, exerted broad power in oppressing the anti-dictatorship movement (Lee, M. S., 2010). Instead, the military regime put the emphasis on economic development to acquire the legitimacy of the administrations (Choi, J. J., 2005; Choi, J. J. et al, 2007; Hong, S. T., 2007 a; Jung and Kim, 2009).

President Park seized power through the coup on 16 May 1961 and remained as the president for almost 20 years. During his term, the Korean industry developed remarkably and he is considered to have played a great role in the economic development in Korea (Chung, 1989). The growth of the Korean economy secured a level of support for the Park presidency in the 1960s, but that support started to fade away in the 1970s because of the strong authoritarian measures taken by President Park. The military authoritarian regime was replaced by the stricter Yushin (Revitalizing Reform) regime in the 1970s (Cho, H. Y., 2000 a, 2000 b). Citizens criticized the brutality of his dictatorship. There were widespread human rights
abuses and thousands were arrested and imprisoned for criticizing him (Jung and Kim, 2009; Lee, M, S., 2010). By the late 1970s, demonstrations against the dictatorship erupted throughout the country and finally his dictatorship ended in his death in 1979.

After the death of President Park, General Chun seized power through a coup on 12 December 1979 and was elected as the president indirectly by the National Conference for Unification, the puppet electoral organization (Lee, M. S., 2010). President Chun also ruled in an authoritarian manner and exerted fairly broad powers. However, his rule was somewhat milder and turned to an appeasement policy (Lee, M. S., 2010). In addition, he announced that he would not run for president once he finished his 7 year term. During his dictatorship, the Korean economy enjoyed continual progress. In summary, in the period between the 1960s and 1980s, while strong leadership under the authoritarian regime led to rapid economic growth (Reinfeld, 1997), even electoral democracy as the minimalist definition of democracy was not established and citizens’ basic rights were infringed on by the state (Cho, H. Y., 2000 a, 2000 b; Jung and Kim, 2009; Lee, M, S., 2010).

Figure 3.1 Characteristics of administrations from the 1960s to 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Park Chung Hee (60-79)</th>
<th>Chun Doo Hwan (80-87)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New military dictatorship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Strong developmental state: Decision making by President and the bureaucracy**

During this term, the Korean government dominated decision making, whereas the participation of civil society was largely limited (Choi, J. J. et al, 2007; Im, 2008). Economic development was the first aim of the Korean government (Fiori and Kim, 2011). The rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s was primarily planned and accelerated by the Korean government (Amsden, 1989; Kim, J. K. and C. H. Lee, 2010; Lee, H. U., 2007).
“The state masterminded the early import-substitution projects in cement, fertilizers, oil refining and synthetic fibers. The transformation from light to heavy industry was also initiated by the state. It was fully responsible for the push into heavy machinery and chemicals in the 1970s…Major milestones in South Korea's industrialization have been decided by the state” (Park, S. C., 1997: 243)

Under the strong leadership of president, the Korean bureaucracy, equipped with the expertise, pushed forward economic policies (Chung, 1989; Hahn, S. D., 1999; Hwang, 1996; Jung, Y. D., 1999; Lee, H. U., 2007). Above all, the Economic Planning Board (EPB), which was chosen by President Park to be a superagency in the economic area, played a masterful role in presiding over economic plans (Chung, 1989; Park, S. C, 1997). It coordinated economic policy through the control of the budgetary process and allocated resources by launching a series of Economic Development Plans (EDPs) (Chung, 1989). According to the five year EDPs since 1962, the fundamental infrastructures were built. In the 1960s and 1970s, intensive investment in infrastructure occurred and a number of roads, railways, highways, and ports were provided. Even in the 1980s, infrastructure investment remained fairly high, because a growing economy created massive demand for infrastructure facilities (Hahm, C. B., 2008). The Korean government made efforts to provide infrastructure facilities to maintain stable economic development (Chung, 1989).

During this process, the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were mainly utilized in the provision of infrastructures. While infrastructure investment was the top priority for the Korean state in that period, capital scarcity was an important problem to resolve like other Newly-Industrialized Countries (NICs) (Chung, 1989). Therefore, the nurturing of the “commanding heights” by the state was adopted as a tactic to spur the economy (Chin and Ng, 1996; Reinfeld, 1997; Ro, 2002). The SOEs were strategically fostered to develop fundamental infrastructures which need large start-up investments. The construction of infrastructure contributed to economic development (Kim, E. J., 1995; Kim, M. S. and J. H. Kim, 1997; Kwack, 1987; Yang, 1992; Ro, 2002) and Korea finally had phenomenal industrialization known as “the miracle on the Han River.”

Because of the above characteristics, Korea is considered a typical exemplar of the developmental state (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990, 1998; Weiss, 1998, 1999).
The developmental state means the state which has strong autonomous political power and intervenes directly in the economy to promote industrial growth (Johnson, 1982). In a developmental state, the state elites are the main actors in decision making, whereas the autonomy of the private sector is considerably restricted. Scholars argue that the developmental state played a major role in the unprecedented economic growth in Korea (Chang, 1993, 1998, 1999; Chang, Park and Yoo, 1998; Kim, J. K. and C. H. Lee, 2010; Park, S. C., 1997). During that period, decision making was bureaucratic rational planning focusing on economic growth and a top-down approach of decision making was mainly utilized (Kim, J. K. and M. C. Lee, 2005; Kim, C. S. and K. Y. Yang, 2007).

On the other hand, public involvement was highly restricted under the military dictatorship (Fiori and Kim, 2011; Jeong, H. S., 2002). Aside from a limited number of private corporations, citizens did not have sufficient access to policy making. Most policies were accepted as absolute and people necessarily endured negative impacts caused by the government policies (Kim, J. K., and Lee, 2005). Anyone who criticized government policies was in danger of being labelled an anti-governmental activist (Jeong, H. S., 2002). Though the government introduced public displays of information in some policy fields, they were used simply to enhance policy legitimacy by satisfying minimum legal requirements (Kwon et al., 2006). That is, policies were decided and implemented by the will of the government (Kim, J. H., 2005; Kwon et al., 2006; Lee, M. K. 2005).

3.2.2 Since democratisation (I) (1987 to 1997)

The transition to representative democracy

In 1987, Korea underwent a democratic transition. Nationwide citizen protests against the military dictatorship reached a peak in June 1987 and forced the authoritarian regime to accept the demands of the pro-democracy movement (Lee, M. S., 2010). Finally, a newly established democratic constitution prescribed both direct election of the president and a single five-year presidential term to prevent dictatorship (Lee, M. S., 2010). According to this, the first presidential election was held in December 1987. However, in the election, the two leading pro-democracy movement figures, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung (they later became presidents), did not reach a compromise and split the opposition vote. As a result, the
ex-general Roh Tae Woo, the successor of President Chun, won by a narrow margin and became the first president by democratic election. Therefore, the Roh administration was considered to be the succession of the military dictatorship, even though it was chosen by democratic election (Kim, S. H., 1997; Kim, S. H., Han, and Jang, 2008). Progressive social groups called the Roh regime as “soft authoritarianism” (dictablanda) or “pseudo-democracy” and focused their efforts on achieving complete democratisation (Kim, S. H. et al, 2008).

Through the 1992 presidential election, the Kim Young Sam administration, the first civilian government since the 1960s, emerged. It was therefore greatly welcomed by citizens, even though Kim joined the ruling authoritarian regime through the grand party merger in 1990 and therefore lost much of his credibility as a pro-democracy leader (Kim, S. H. et al, 2008; Lee, M. S., 2011). With the support of civil society, President Kim carried out a series of democratic reforms such as expansion of civil liberties, elimination of press censorship, and official recognition of legalization of social groups (Kil and Moon, 2001; Kim, S. H. et al, 2008). Above all, the Kim administration successfully completed the civilian control of the military and had the former President Chun and Roh arrested on charges of treason and corruption. It also launched the intensive anti-corruption campaign to reform the government and the chaebol, the large Korean conglomerates which dominate the economy. Political corruption was a long-established bad legacy bequeathed by the military dictatorship and the Kim government fought to eradicate this unsavoury practice (David, 2002; Kim, S. H. et al, 2008). To sum up, during the term 1987 to 1997, Korea took an important step in the processes of democratisation. Korea moved away from the military dictatorship towards representative democracy.

Figure 3.2 Characteristics of administrations from 1988 to 1997

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roh Tae Woo (88-92)</td>
<td>Kim Young Sam (93-97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first administration since 1987</td>
<td>The first civilian government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The beginning of public involvement in decision making

The Roh Tae Woo administration was the first administration which was selected by direct election after the democratization in 1987, even though it was regarded as a pseudo-democracy by progressive groups. While there was no significant change in state-civil society relations, the Roh administration had no choice but to accept gradual change (Kim, S. H., 1987; Kim, S. H. et al, 2008). For example, during the Roh administration, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), the first modern civic organization, had a strong influence and the government partially accepted some of CCEJ’s policy proposals (Cho, H. Y. 2000 a; Ha, 2002; Koo, 2002). In contrast, social movements which had objections to the regime were strongly suppressed.

Since the transition to democracy in 1987, the state-society relationship was substantially changed. The Kim administration was willing to adopt the opinions of civil society and introduced many systems to enhance citizen participation in policy making (Jeong, H. S., 2002). As a result, public involvement rapidly increased. Citizens began to be aware of the importance of participation under democratic government (Lee, M. K., 2005) and various NGOs started to be established as shown in the table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Percentage distribution of Korean NGOs in founding years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Founding years</th>
<th>For all Korean NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1960</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990s</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Directory of Korean NGOs (2005)

In addition to political democratization at the central level, the establishment of local autonomy in 1995 has broadened democracy at the local level (Jeong, H. S., 2002; Kang, 2003; Lee, D. G., Seong, 2000). Political democratization and local autonomy was the big momentum for public involvement. Along with the two big changes, the government became much more responsive to citizens’ demands and public participation in policy making greatly
increased (Jeong, H. S., 2002). However, the participation was still confined to some stakeholders such as experts and central NGOs (Lee, M. K., 2005). It was therefore claimed that the bureaucratic vertical decision making was embedded in policy making and the government still depended on top-down decision making (Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005). However, in spite of this limitation, it is clear that the Korean government showed more open characteristics compared to the military dictatorship. This term is therefore recognized as the beginning of network governance or incremental change of government (Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005).

Compared to the situation under authoritarian regime, the Ministry of Environment (ME) made rapid progress. It became a junior ministry in 1990 and was finally elevated to cabinet level in 1994 (ME, undated). With the quantitative growth of the organization, the ME pursued institutional measures to improve the environment. During the 1990s, a number of environment-related laws were enacted and in particular, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act was separately enacted from the existing the Basic Environmental Policy Act (Moon, 2003). The scope of projects which should complete the EIA discussion widened and substantial measures such as public briefings (or hearings) were also introduced. Since then, developers have been obliged to hold public briefings (or hearings) to explain the overview of the project and its environmental impact (Choi and Kwon, 2006; Jeong, H. S. 2002; Seok, 2007; You and Kim, 2003). In 1997, the Korea Environmental Institute was established to review the EIA professionally (KEI, 2011).

3.2.3 Since democratisation (II) (1998 to 2007)

The emergence of progressive administrations

In Korea, the decade 1998 - 2007 is recognized as an experiment in participatory democracy (Jeong, M. G. and Oh, 2010; Jin, 2008; Park, J. C., 2007). President Kim (1998-2002) and President Roh (2003-2007), politicians from the same left-wing party, pursued participatory democracy. They had the same experience of the pro-democracy movement against the military dictatorship and made many efforts to expand citizens’ participation during their terms.
The seizure of power by President Kim Dae Jung, a lifetime pro-democracy leader who won the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize, was an important turning point in Korean politics. President Kim, the so-called "Nelson Mandela of Asia", achieved the turnover of political power for the first time after 50 years of the long rule of a conservative party in Korea (Lee, M. S., 2010). This was largely affected by the economic crisis that hit Korea in 1997 (Cho, Y. J., 1998; Yoon, 2010). Korean people felt outraged facing the economic crisis and turned their backs on the conservative party. They believed that the economic crisis came out of political backwardness, in particular, the collusion between the political and economic leaders (Kim, S. H., 2000 b; Mo, 2001; Yoon, 2010). Therefore, after Kim took power, he vigorously pushed economic reform to break the bad ties between the government and the chaebol (conglomerates). The Kim administration, the minority government, cooperated with civil society in pursuing political and economic reforms (Jeong, H. S., 2002; Lee, M. S., 2010). Many civil society leaders were incorporated into government organizations and committees.

Five years later, Roh Moo Hyun, the former human rights lawyer, was elected by the explosive support of young voters and civil society. As a matter of fact, no Korean believed that Roh would be elected as president because he did not have strong support groups even within the progressive party. However, young people started to support him for his will to terminate the old-fashioned politics based on the regionalism of the three Kims (Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, Kim Jong Phil) and he was selected as the nominee of his party through primary contest (Lee, M. S., 2010). His internet-based fan club, “Nosamo”, which means the gathering of people who love Roh Moo Hyun, played a crucial role in his election in December 2002, along with the widespread support of civil society. The Roh administration called itself “participatory government” and had a closer relationship with civil society than the Kim administration (Park, H. J., 2006 b; Park, J. C., 2007).
The stress of participation and communication

Both presidents were from the pro-democracy movement and emphasised communication and social consensus. They wanted to resolve conflict through discussion and negotiation (Kim, C. S. and Yang, 2007; Jin, 2008). This desire can be ascertained from their statements below.

“The person who cannot talk with others is the one who is not prepared to be a democrat. Moreover, the person who is not eager to listen to others is one who is not qualified as a conversation partner…. The society which lacks communication is like the machine whose belt is cut. It breaks the belt of communication and finally fails to achieve harmony and cooperation within the society. Democracy is not a one way, but a two-way street. It is give and take, and come and go…. If we are democrats, the development of a conversation culture is necessary. In addition, we should bear in mind that true conversation requires good listening.” (Kim, D. J., 1984, 1993, 1994)

“‘Law and principle’ and ‘dialogue and compromise’ are the two measures which the government has. If the government only tries to use law and principle, it is not politics but battle. We should use law and principle when there is no way of resolving the conflict with dialogue and compromise. When we use law and principle after many attempts at dialogue and compromise, the law can be effective….The best wisdom which I heard during my career as a judge is that reconciliation is better than any good verdict.” (Roh, 2006, 2009; Donga Ilbo, 2005 a, 2005 b)
The governments tried to apply the idea of participatory democracy in policy making process (Lee, M. K., 2005; Park, K., 2001). The concept of “public participation” or “governance” gained popularity during this term, reaching its peak in the Roh administration (Kim, S. H., 2010; Lee, M. S., 2010). Even prior to his tenure, President Roh made the Citizens’ Participation Centre under the Presidential Transitional Committee and, during his tenure, established the Secretariat for Civil Society in the Office of the President to respond to the demands of civil society (Park, J. C., 2007). As a way of participation and communication, the committee system by public officials, experts, and NGOs representatives was popular (Jeong, M. G. and Oh, 2010). Therefore, the Roh administration was often called a “republic by committee.”

Communicative practices have developed particularly in the fields of conflict mediation and community-improvement projects (Jeong, S. H., 2008; Kim, E. H., 2008; Kim, H. S. et al., 2006; Lee, K. H. and Ahn, 2007; Moon and Kim, 2006; Park, K, 2001; Yoo and Hong, 2005). In the field of environmental conflicts, communicative approaches were often undertaken as a resolution processes (Kim, C. S., 2002, 2003, 2005; Jeong, G. H., 2002 a, 2002 b, 2006 a, 2006 b, 2007; Jin, 2008). Joint review committees composed of public officials, experts, and NGOs were often organized to reinvestigate the environmental impacts caused by construction projects. The community-improvement projects, which were aimed to turn citizens’ community into healthy and cultural areas through public involvement, were other typical cases of communicative approaches (Jeong, S. H., 2008; Kim, H. S. et al., 2006; Shin and Shin, 2008).

**NGO-friendly administrations**

Another conspicuous characteristic of both administrations was that they maintained the close relationship with NGOs. They were NGO-friendly administrations. While civil society has rapidly developed since democratisation, the extent of NGOs’ participation in policy making mostly increased under both administrations (Cho, H. Y., 2000 a; Hong, K. D., 2005; Joo, 2000; Kim, J. R. and Kang, 2000; Kim, P. S, 2002; Lee, M. S., 2010; Lee, S. J. and Arrington, 2008; Park, J. C., 2007).

The Kim Dae Jung minority administration needed the support of NGOs to fight for political
and economic reforms against the deeply rooted conservative groups and actively supported NGOs’ activities (Jeong, H. S., 2002). President Kim appointed NGO leaders as presidential secretaries, ministers, and committee members of presidential committees. Moreover, the Kim administration enacted a law to legalize and encourage NGOs’ activities in 1999 and started supporting NGOs economically from 2000 (Cho, H. Y., 2002 a). The government funded £3.75 million a year for eligible NGOs. Lastly, the changed status of NGOs within the society is directly seen in President Kim’s participation in New Year’s greetings of NGO coalition, whereas any former president did not.

In particular, in the Roh Moo Hyun administration, the participation and influence of NGOs were at their zenith (Lew and Wang, 2006). He considered NGOs important partners in “governance” and recruited more NGO leaders into government than the Kim administration. Many NGO members participated in governmental committees and had an effect on decision making (Kim, Y. R., 2008; Lew and Wang, 2006; Park, H. J., 2008). The participation of NGO members in governmental committees amounted to 19.6 percent in 2004 according to the Ministry Of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) (Park, H. J., 2008).

3.3 Environmental movement in Korea

3.3.1 Prior to democratisation (The 1960s to 1980s)

The 1960s to 1970s: Primitive stage of the movement

The 1960s and 1970s is called the primitive stage (prehistory) of the Korean environmental movement (Ku, 2000, 2003, 2004 a, 2004 b; Lee, S. H., 2001; Lee, S. J., 2000 a). As stated already, under the authoritarian leadership of President Park (1960-1979), economic growth was the top priority of the government. During that period, most human and material resources were invested in economic development. The environment agency was just an affiliate of the Ministry of Health and Social affairs (MHS) and it had very weak power compared to development ministries (ME, 2011). At that time, the first and foremost mission of the Korean government was to make its people escape from severe poverty.
However, with rapid industrialization, side effects began to occur. Pollution around industrial complexes gradually became a social problem and local residents staged protests to demand compensation for damages to their farm products and health. However, over this period, there were no environmental organizations equipped with professional expertise and organizational structure (Ku, 2004 a; Shin, 2007). As a result, most protests were the unorganized collective action of indignant grassroots victims demanding compensation of damage caused by environmental aggravation (Ku, 2004 a). Therefore, their actions are not considered those of the environmental movement, because they did not have some degree of organization, size, and continuity (Ku, 2004 a, Shin, 2007). Nevertheless, it is certain that their protest was the beginning of the contemporary environmental movement (Ku, 2000, 2003, 2004 a; Shin, 2007).

The 1980s: anti-pollution movement

The period of the 1980s is described as an anti-pollution movement period (Ku, 2000, 2004 a; Lee, S. H., 2001; Lee, S. J., 2000 a; Schreurs, 2002 a). Even since the death of President Park in 1979, President Chun (1980-1987) maintained authoritarian dictatorship and the Korean government primarily concentrated on economic development. Finally, Korea achieved rapid economic development which is called “the Miracle on the Han River”. However, as industrialization continued, pollution worsened and anti-pollution protests near major industrial complexes became more intensified. Like pollution-related diseases spurred environmental activism in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called Onsan Disease issue led to strong anti-pollution protests in the 1980s and drew the full attention of mass media, experts, and general citizens (Ku, 2004 a; Lee, S. J., 2000 a; Schreurs, 2002 a; Shin, 2007). Although the Korean Government denied the seriousness of the illness, it had to resettle the Onsan residents because of the strong public pressure (Shin, 2007).

The important characteristic of the environmental movement in the 1980s is that anti-pollution groups were established and they started to stage organized protests (Ku, 2004 a). In 1982, the first environmental organization, the Korean Pollution Research Institute (KPRI) was organized by a small number of environmentalists, religious and democratisation activists. The KPRI lay in the centre of the anti-pollution movement in the 1980s and
contributed considerably to raising public awareness about the Onsan Disease issue. It later developed into the Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association (KAPMA) in 1988.

However, the environmental movement led by the KPRI was regarded as part of the democratisation movement rather than a pure environmental movement. Although environmental conservation was the main goal of the organization, many anti-government activists and students with a pro-democracy inclination participated directly or indirectly in it (Shin, 2007). Therefore, the authoritarian Chun administration considered the anti-pollution movement to be either an anti-governmental group or leftist-agitators and strongly oppressed it and jailed environmental activists (Kim, J. W., 1996; Kim, M. T., 2005; Schreurs, 2002 a; Shin, 2007). This limited political context made it difficult for the anti-pollution movement to actively express its opinions.

To gain momentum, environmental problems need to be developed into social issues (Hannigan, 1995) and therefore in order to achieve this, the attention of the press is indispensable (Einsiedel, 1990). However, at that time, the mass media didn’t take much interest in environmental issues and moreover, it was under the control of the government (Weekly Kyungyang, 2006 a). The military dictatorship regarded environmental protests as a challenge to its regime (Kim, J. W., 1996; Shin, 2002, 2007) and as a result the environmental agency tried to block the news report of environmental problems before the actual coverage (Kim, J. W., 1996). Therefore, the number of environment-related reports was very low (Weekly Kyungyang, 2006 a).

Experts lay in the same situation as the mass media. At that time, experts were unwilling to help the environmental movement and even tried to evade the press because of possible government pressure (Kim, J. W., 1996; Shin, 2007). For example, even though affected residents in the vicinity of the Onsan industrial estate complained of pain, the experts to help finding the cause of the disease were not found (and the KPRI finally requested the help of Japanese doctors) (Shin, 2007; Weekly Kyungyang, 2006 b). Therefore, environmental organizations had difficulties acquiring the evidence to support their arguments.
3.3.2 Since democratisation (I) (1987 to 1997)

The emergence of professional environmental organizations

The period of the 1990s is recognised as an era of the new environmental movement (Ku, 2000, 2004 a; Lee, S. H., 2001; Lee, S. J., 2000 a). Scholars regard this period as the beginning of the real environmental movement.

The success of citizen protests in June 1987 was the important turning point for the growth of the environmental movement. It opened up a socio-political space for the movement to extend the scope of their activities (Lee, S. H., 2001). Since political democratisation, civil society began to take an interest in other social issues which had not been properly covered previously such as the environment (Cho, H. Y., 2000 a; Jeong, H. S., 2002; Lee, S. J., 2000 a). In addition, economic growth allowed the citizens to take more interest in environmental matters (Kim, M. T., 2005; Ku, 1996, 2003; Schreurs, 2002 a). A good environment, such as fresh air and clean water, has been identified as being just as important as economic development. The new perception of citizens for environmental rights became the foundation of the environmental movement. Citizens became members of environmental organizations in the 1990s, whereas direct victims of pollution were the main participants of anti-pollution movements in the 1980s (Ku, 2003, 2004 a).

Figure 3.4 Democratic movement in 1987 and Gross National Income (GNI)

Source: The Bank of Korea (BOK)
In addition, the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 provided the momentum for the development of the Korean environmental movement (Shin, 2007). Numerous NGO representatives had the opportunity to face the international environmental movement and it contributed to expanding the breadth of the Korean environmental movement (Shin, 2007). As a result, the scope of the movement was broadened and the number of environmental organizations increased.

Within this domestic and international context, professional environmental organizations were established. While small anti-pollution groups emerged in response to the environmental degradation near industrial complexes in the 1980s, the big professional environmental NGOs such as the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) and Green Korea United (GKU) were established and supported by citizens in the 1990s. The typical Korean environmental NGOs are as follows:

**Typical Korean environmental NGOs**

The Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), the largest and the most influential environmental NGO in Korea, was established in April 1993 (KFEM, undated). The origin of the KFEM starts from the Korean Pollution Research Institute (KPRI), which was founded in 1982. Choi Yul, the founder of the KPRI, had an interest in environmental problems while he was imprisoned in the 1980s for protesting against the dictatorship. After he was released in 1982, he founded the KPRI, which is the first environmental NGO in Korea. The KPRI developed into the Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association (KAPMA) in 1988 and became the KFEM in 1993 after merging with some other environmental NGOs. The KFEM includes professional subsidiary organizations such as the citizens' institute for environmental studies, the environmental information centre, and the legal centre for public interests. Local branches were organized and as of 2008, the KFEM had 52 local branches nationwide. The KFEM has participated in many movements opposed to national projects.

Green Korea United (GKU), the second largest environmental NGO, was established in 1994 (GKU, undated). It has the purpose of finding alternatives and taking action for the Earth and the Earth’s people by questioning economic-oriented trends embedded in modern society.
GKU has engaged in the conservation of ecological habitats and wildlife based on fieldwork by tackling destructive developments including roads, nuclear power, and dams. It has also had an interest in the anti-war movement and has sought to stop the military arms industry which causes war. Now it has 15,000 members and 8 local branches (2008).

Environmental Justice (EJ) is one of Korea’s fastest growing NGOs focusing on environmental justice and the fair distribution of national resources (EJ, undated). In fact, the origin of EJ started from the Centre for Environment and Development (CED) as a division of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), which was the first NGO in Korea. The CCEJ established the CED after its participation in the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Later, the CED changed the title of the organization into the Citizens’ Movement for Environmental Justice (CCEJ) and separated from the CCEJ in 1999. In 2005, it had 3,500 members, 28 staff and 130 specialist volunteers. Its name was later changed from the CCEJ to the EJ.

Korea’s national YMCA and YWCA are among the strong NGOs in Korea, which have a long history of social action (Park, S. P., 2002). They have also included the environmental movement among their various movements since their participation in the UNCED in 1992.

Table 3.2 Korean ENGOs in Seoul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>NGOs (30)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive environmental activities</td>
<td>Korean Federation For Environmental Movement, Green Korea United, Environmental Justice, Green Family, Green Christ, Green Transport, Suwon Centre for Environment Movement, Wonbuddhism Ecological Movement Association, Young Korean Academy, Green Cosmos, Green Future, Indramang, Woman Environment Movement Centre (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green consumer activity</td>
<td>Green Consumer Network in Korea, Consumers Korea, Hansalim, Korean Womenlink, YMCA Korea, YWCA Korea (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental education and research</td>
<td>Buddhist Academy for Ecological Awakening, Korea Institute for Environmental and social policy, Eco Catholic, Environment and Pollution Research Group, Refarm, Doore EcoTour, Korea Environmental Education Association (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation of nature</td>
<td>Korea Birds Association, Korea Association for Bird Protection, Korea Society for Protection of Wild Animals, Korean Eco club (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since democratisation, environmental movement organizations have had good relationships with the government. Central government started to pay more attention to the environment. Environmental agency became a junior ministry in 1990 and was finally elevated to cabinet level ministry, the Ministry of Environment (ME) in 1994 (ME, 2011). Many ENGO representatives were also included in government committees. Central government carried out joint projects with ENGOs (e.g. environment-friendly product accreditation system with the ME, the forest restoration movement with the Forestry) and even supported activists’ short term overseas observational tours (Ku, 2003; Lee, S. J., 2000 a; Shin, 2007). ENGOs also had cooperative relationships with local governments. Since the introduction of local autonomy in 1995, local governments formed joint committees with environmental organizations and produced local agenda 21 which is an environmental blueprint.

Moreover, environmental issues have often been covered by the mass media and ENGOs have become the important source of news (Kim, J. B., 2000; Kim, Y. K., 2002; Shin, 2002). The report rate of ENGOs increased from 20% in 1994 to 76.5% in 2000 in comparison to the Ministry of Environment’s (Shin, 2002). Until the mid 1990s, environment reporters depended heavily on the government’s press releases. However, since the late 1990s, environment reporters have started to utilize ENGO’s press release and ENGOs have emerged as a news source comparable to the ME (Shin, 2002). In addition, the mass media started to carry out joint environmental campaigns with environmental organizations (e.g. the Chosun Ilbo’s “save our stream” movement).

Furthermore, the participation of professional experts increased. The pressure from the government on experts who were involved in environmental issues disappeared and experts participated in the environmental movement with no limitation (Kim, J. W., 1996). Their increased participation played an important role in the development of the environmental movement (Weekly Kyunghyang, 2007).

The environmental movement was also supported by general citizens. In spite of democratisation, under-institutionalization of party politics and citizens’ distrust of institutional politics resulted in citizens’ support for civic movements (Lee and Arrington,
2008). Therefore, their movement was warmly welcomed by the public who had become disillusioned with the existing institutional politics.

3.3.3 Since democratisation (II) (1998 to 2007)

Movement opposing national infrastructure projects

The most conspicuous characteristics of the environmental movement during this period can be summarised as the fight against national construction projects. While the environmental movement in the 1960s to 1980s was an anti-pollution movement, it was a movement opposing national infrastructure projects since the 1990s.

The Korean environmental movement had many fights with central government over national infrastructure projects such as dams, roads, railways, and canals and severely criticized the development-orientation of the government. Since democratisation in 1987, there have gradually emerged the opposition movement against national construction projects and in particular, since the late 1990s, the number and intensity of movements against national projects have become stronger.

Protests were often staged by the coalition of professional environmental organizations and local residents (Lee, S. J., 2000 a). Since 1987, local residents started to raise their voice against the government and stage organized protests by forming countermeasure committees. In particular, professional ENGOs contributed significantly to raising issues and organising local residents. They were opposed to those construction projects for the reason that they caused serious environmental loss without economic feasibility. They strongly distrusted the government, arguing that it is much too development-oriented and depends heavily on large-scale construction projects, though there is no desperate need for them. Some of their movements were very successful and the government had to cancel the projects (Detailed explanation of movements opposing national construction project is given in the section 3.4).
Political mobilization of the environmental movement

While environmental organizations relatively limited their activities to environmental issues in the 1990s, they sometimes were involved in political issues. Typically, the environmental movement participated in the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election (CAGE) which was called the “Blacklist Movement”. They argued that political corruption should be rooted out if environmental problems are to be solved because corrupt politicians have supported construction projects in return for political funds (Lee, S. J., 2000 a). They announced names of unqualified candidates to prevent corrupt politicians from being nominated as candidates and from being elected if nominated. The result of their strong campaign was impressive. 59 of 86 candidates designated as unqualified by the CAGE failed to be elected in the general election. In response to citizens’ support, the CAGE staged the Blacklist Movement again in the 2004 general election.

In addition, environmental organizations participated in the campaign against the impeachment of President Roh Moo Hyun in 2004, which had been initiated by conservative opposition party. They argued that the anti-impeachment campaign was necessary to defend democracy, which is an essential value of green politics (Ku, 2004 b, 2004 c). They also participated in the anti-troop dispatch movement in 2004, objecting to the government’s plan to dispatch military troops to Iraq.
3.4 Movements against national construction projects during 1998-2007

3.4.1 Environmental group’s criticism against national construction projects

Controversy over the persistence of “developmental state”

Since 1987, Korea has had the two important structural transformations of political democratisation and market-oriented economic restructuring (Kim, S. H., 2000 a). Democratisation significantly empowered various societal actors and relatively weakened the power of the state. In addition, the economic crisis in 1997 led to restructuring of the old state to reduce interventionism (Shin, J. S. and Chang, 2003; Lim and Jang, 2006).

However, many scholars argue that in spite of several major transformations, a developmental state is still persistent in Korea (Cherry, 2005; Dittmer, 2007; Hunt, 2005; Kim, S. H., Han, and Jang, 2008). According to them, political democratisation and market-oriented economic reforms did not fundamentally change the power of the Korean state, but rather bolstered the Korean state’s standing in relation to other social actors. Therefore, it is said that Korea is still a developmental state and has gone through its evolution from ‘developmental’ to a ‘transformative’ state (Cherry, 2005; Doucette, 2007; Kim, S. H., Han, and Jang, 2008; Ku, 2004 a; Lim and Jang, 2006; Weiss, 2000, 2003; Weiss and Hobson, 1995). Although the state relinquished its direct control over industrial policy with the interventionist approach of the past authoritarian regimes, the prominence of a developmental state remained only with changed goal and role. The main goal changed from one of ‘catching up’ to one of ‘upgrading’ the industrial economy and the role of government is now ‘senior partner’ rather than ‘commander-in-chief’ (Haggard et al, 1999; Weiss, 2000: 28-29, 2003: 249; Weiss and Hobson, 1995). Environmental groups strongly criticize that even since democratisation, the Korean government has still pushed forward construction projects and rather the “New Developmentalism” - a more mature version of developmentalism - which is disguised by procedural democracy, has put the environment in crisis (Jang, 2006; Jeong G. H., 2006 b).

Controversy over “construction state”
As stated above, in Korea, the construction of infrastructure contributed to economic development (Kim, E. J., 1995; Kim, J. K., 2002; Kim, M. S. and J. H. Kim, 1997; Kwack, 1987; Ro, 2002; Yang, 1992). In this process, particularly the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that were strategically fostered played an important role in developing fundamental infrastructures. The table below shows the current construction projects of the SOEs.

Table 3.3 Korean public corporations’ projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporation</th>
<th>Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Korea land Corporation / Korea Housing Corporation | • Two million housing construction plan & five new towns development (1989-96)  
- Bundang (1964ha), Ilsan (1574), Pyeongchon (511), Sanbon (420), Joongdong (545)  
• One million social housing construction (1998-)  
• Administrative city development (2003-)  
• Innovative city development through relocation of public corporations (2003-) |
| Korea Expressway Corporation         | • Road construction – Seoul circular expressway construction.             |
| Korea Railroad Corporation           | • Railway construction  
• High speed railway construction – Gyeonbu, Honam high speed railway |
| Incheon International Airport Corporation | • Incheon international airport construction                           |
| Korea Water Corporation              | • Dam construction- the Dong River dam project, the Hantan River dam project  
• Gyeongin Canal project               |
| Korea Electric Power Corporation     | • Pumping up power plant construction – Jiri mountain, Jumbong mountain  |
| Korea Hydro & Nuclear power Corporation | • Nuclear power plant construction – Gori, Wolsong, Ulchin, Youngkwang. |
| Korea Rural Community Corporation    | • Sihwa reclamation project (1975-)  
• Saemangeum reclamation project (1991-) |


However, regarding these projects, environmental groups strongly criticize the Korean government, calling it the “construction state” (Hong, S. T., 2004, 2005, 2007 a). They admit that the SOEs have contributed to economic development, but they argue that the Korean government has depended heavily on unnecessary construction projects, which have resulted in large scale environmental devastation and weak economic structure which is strongly influenced by the construction industry. For them, the Korean government is the main offender of environmental devastation.
Environmental group’s criticisms against national construction projects

Environmental group’s criticisms against national construction projects are broadly summarised in the two terms.

Firstly, in substantive term, environment organizations raise questions about the necessity of national construction projects. As mentioned above, they argue that the Korean government (and public corporations) pursue unnecessary projects and that even if necessary they are excessive projects (Hong, S. T., 2005, 2007 a, 2007 b, 2007 c). They think that many unnecessary national projects keep coming out of politicians’ intent to draw citizens’ support (or to acquire political fund) and public agencies’ desire to maintain their organizations. The so-called “construction iron triangle” composed of development ministries, public corporations, and construction companies keep making justifications for national projects (Cho, M. R., 2003; Yeom, 2003, 2006, 2007).

In procedural term, environmental organizations point out the fact that large-scale national projects which might bring about a huge environmental impact have been carried out without sufficient examination (Hong, S. T., 2005, 2007 a, 2007 b, 2007 c). They also criticize that in spite of high levels of uncertainty in large-scale development, the government has pushed ahead with them without sufficient discussions with the relevant stakeholders with the only justification being that they are national projects (Kim, C. S., 2002, 2003; 2005). Therefore, they argue that the government should make careful decisions after thorough conversations and discussions with the various stakeholders who have different kinds of views or interests surrounding development issues.

3.4.2 Rise and decline in movements against national construction projects

Occurrence of protests against national projects

This research is mainly concerned with the Korean environmental protests against national construction projects over the decade 1998-2007. During this period, social movements opposing national construction projects were hot social issues in Korea. These movements often filled the headlines of the mass media. There were numerous movements opposing national construction projects such as roads, railways, dams, canals, and nuclear plants.
Environmental NGOs led strong movements with local residents, experts, and religious groups. The figure below shows the frequency and durability of environmental protests.

Movements against national construction projects were maintained for a long time. For example, environmental conflicts around the Saemangeum reclamation project, the Gyeongin Canal, and the Hantan River dam remained as social issues for almost 10 years. What was worse, the nuclear waste disposal facility issue was not resolved for almost 20 years.

Figure 3.6 Environmental protests against national projects during 1998-2007

Source: KCCI (2005), OPM and KDI (2009)

Weakened mobilization

As seen above, the Korean environmental movement strongly pressurised the government to influence national construction projects from 1998 to 2007. However, the support for the environmental movement gradually changed. Initially, they received widespread support from other actors including the mass media and ordinary citizens. The Korean civic movement was welcomed by citizens who had a deep-rooted distrust in institutional politics.
As a result, many national projects were stopped for the reconsideration and some of them were finally cancelled. The environmental movement achieved considerable outcomes in the anti-dam movement and the anti-nuclear movement; for example, the Dong River dam project and the Buan nuclear waste facility project were cancelled in 2000 and 2003 respectively.

However, approaching the late 2000s, in spite of active protest, the environmental movement did not receive wide public support or achieve its desired outcome; for example, environmental protests against the Hantan River dam project and the Gyeongju nuclear waste facility project did not achieve prominence comparable with those of previous projects (the Dong River dam project and the Buan nuclear waste facility project) and finally failed to achieve the cancellation of the projects. In addition, the environmental movement faced the criticisms for persistent protests without compromise as shown below.

“Now interest groups have a louder voice than authorities… Environmental and civic organizations have hindered nationally funded projects… Everywhere in society, people are ready to act as a group when their interests are at stake, almost instinctively. The public authority is retreating and interest groups are advancing to fill the void. Perhaps we might soon hear more about an overdeveloped interest group theory, not an overdeveloped state theory.” (Joongang Ilbo, 2003)

“The environmentalists cannot simply be allowed to interdict all national projects all the time. At least when the court rules on a proper balance between socio-economic advantage and nature preservation, all parties involved should accept it. They are not above the law and have no monopoly of the cause of social justice.” (Korea Herald, 2005)

“The entire nation is suffering bitter experiences due to environmental conflicts…. Taxpayer money has been spent in vain now… Environmental groups, who have been staging protests without presenting constructive alternatives, must come back to their original purposes.” (Joongang Ilbo, 2005)

“Despite the court ruling, environmental groups said they would continue their fight. That is inappropriate. Insisting on development is a problem, but environmentalism with no alternative should end now.” (Joongang Ilbo, 2006)
“Our civic groups have a tendency to use their collective power and ignore expert opinion or even the law….. It is wrong to approach environmental issues from a political standpoint. The issue should be dealt with scientifically in order to make the country more competitive and the future more prosperous” (Joongang Ilbo, 2007)

According to the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), NGOs were ranked the 5th in 2005 and 2006, and finally were ranked the 6th in 2007, whereas they ranked the highest among 16 institutions in the reliability from citizens in 2003 and 2004. Environmental NGOs and pro-environment experts themselves judged that the Korean environmental movement faced serious crisis as shown below.

“The public opinion is no longer favourable to the environmental organizations and their cause. A national pro-environment rally… was attended by only a few hundred people and failed to attract public attention…. Why were environmental organizations, despite their fervid activism related to these high-profile projects during last two years, unable to garner public support, while even experiencing a decline in membership in 2004?... I believe that this is a clear indication of a crisis within the environmental movement.” (Lee, P. R., 2005)

“Social movements faced their crisis in Korea… We can no longer see the upsurge of social movements like we did in the 1990s…. Nowadays the status and role of social movements has rapidly weakened and public trust and support has also dropped. In particular, the situation of the environmental movement has become worse. Environmental groups have almost lost their political influence and citizens no longer support them” (Jang, S. I., 2006)

This thesis has an interest in this rise and decline in the Korean environmental movement in the process of democratization. After democratization, what actually happened to the environmental movement in the government decision making and how did this influence the movement outcome (or policy decision)? The research will address this interesting question.

3.5 Characteristics of the Korean environmental movement

Environmental movements in other countries
In this chapter, as the background of the research, the democratisation process and the development of the environmental movement in Korea were explored. However, many empirical studies on the environmental movements in Central and Eastern Europe found out that the environmental movements in those countries reached their peak in the late 1980s and have considerably declined since democratisation (Berg, 1999; Botcheva, 1996; Fagan, 2000, 2004; Hanley, 2005; Hicks, 2006; Manning, 1998; Pickvance, C. G., 1999; Shriver and Messer, 2009). While environmental groups contributed to the collapse of authoritarian rule, they lost their activism with the establishment of a liberal democracy (Berg, 1999; Fagan, 2000).

For example, while the Hungarian environmental movement reached its peak in the late 1980s, its activism gradually weakened as a result of the development of party politics (Berg, 1999; Botcheva, 1996; Hicks, 2006; Manning, 1998; Pickvance, C. G., 1999). While the Czech Republic experienced an active environmental movement along with a full blown civil society following the 1989 Velvet Revolution, it soon found environmentalism to be out of fashion after the emergence of the political conservatism in 1992 (Costi, 2006; Fagan, 2000, 2004; Hanley, 2005; Sarre and Jehlicka, 2007; Shriver and Messer, 2009). In addition, in other Eastern European countries such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, the prominence of the environmental movements diminished after the political changes of 1989, while their vocal protests accelerated the collapse of communism in the 1980s (Botcheva, 1996; Fagan, 2004; Hanley, 2005; Manning, 1998; Pickvance, C. G., 1999). Contrary to the anticipation that democratisation will lead to flourishing of social movements, many environmental movements in European countries have not made significant steps forward since the fall of communism.

Based on these empirical studies, many scholars argue that while liberalisation in authoritarian regimes encourages the development of social movements, democratisation on the other hand leads to the decline of social movements as shown in figure 3.7 below. They assert that democratisation does not guarantee a linear progression towards the political prominence of social movements.
They suggest several reasons for the decline of movements after democratisation.

Firstly, many political actors, who joined social movements as a means of opposing the regime, had no motivation to participate in them after democratisation. The environmental movement was often tolerated even by authoritarian regimes (Ichikawa, 2003; Lin, 2007; Tong, 2005) and therefore it was utilized as the best alternative forum for the anti-regime movement (Carmin and Fagan, 2010; Fagan, 2000; Hicks, 2004; Ichikawa, 2003; Jancar-Webster, 1998; van der Heijden, 1999). However, after democratisation, political elites, who were not real environmentalists, no longer stayed in the environmental movement (Botcheva, 1996. Pickvance, C. G., 1999).

Secondly, the development of institutional politics was a significant change even for environmentalists. Environmental issues, which had been disregarded by the authoritarian regime, were absorbed into institutional politics under the post-Communist regime (Hicks, 2006; Pickvance, C. G., 1996, 1999). Democratic governments and political parties started to represent environmental interests after democratisation.

Thirdly, democratisation resulted in a change in the attention of green issues. While environmental issues received a lot of attention by being combined with anti-regime
sentiments, after democratisation, economic development issue took priority over environmental issue (Botcheva, 1996; Hicks, 2004; Jancar-Webster, 1998; Katula, 1998; Pickvance, K., 1998 a, 1998 b; Van der Heijden, 1999). Governments focused more on economic restructuring and citizens were more concerned with more realistic issue of daily life (Botcheva, 1996; Fagan, 2000; Manning, 1998; Shriver and Messer, 2009). Even in some countries (e.g. the Czech Republic), environmentalism was considered an obstacle to economic development and environmental groups were looked upon as enemies of reform (Fagan, 2000; Jehlicka, 1999; Pavlinek and Pickles, 2000; Shriver and Messer, 2009).

**Characteristics of the Korean environmental movement**

Contrary to the above cases, the Korean case shows a significantly different trajectory of the environmental movement. While the environmental movement in other countries is said to have declined after democratisation, since the democratisation in 1987, the Korean environmental movement has enjoyed rapid growth with citizens’ rising interest regarding the environment. Environmental NGOs significantly increased in terms of their numbers and exerted strong influence against the government. After democratisation, the Korean movement did not decline and instead flourished for a considerable period of time. While the environmental protests received widespread support from social actors in the 1990s, they finally lost a great deal of support and faced criticisms in the 2000s. In addition, its crisis paradoxically happened within civil society-friendly administrations. While the POS research findings indicate that open opportunity structures contribute to movement success (Eisinger, 1973; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994), the Korean environmental movement faced its decline within favourable progressive regimes. This path of the Korean environmental movement is clearly different from the experience of Central and Eastern European countries (Ku, 2003, 2004 a; Lee, S. J., 2000 a).
3.6 Summary

This chapter explored the development of the Korean environmental movement since democratisation. This shows the particular characteristics of the Korean movement which are different from other countries’ movements. This difference raises what actually happened to the Korean environmental movement after democratisation and how political context affected it. These practical concerns are the starting points of the research and will be addressed by case studies.

To explore the rise and fall in the environmental movement, the attention of the research will be focused on government decision making. The reasons are as follows. Social movements are often the oppositions to the government policy, while it at times stage protests against private corporations. In many cases, social movements aim to change government policies. In particular, in Korea, which is identified as a developmental (or construction) state by environmental groups, government decision making has been main target of the environmental movement. Moreover, since democratisation, policy making is no longer the dominant sphere of the state and has been the battle field where the state and society competes with each other (Hong, S. M., 200, 2002). Therefore, careful attention needs to be paid to government decision making.
CHAPTER 4 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE APPROACH

4.1 Introduction

This research tries to understand the dynamic variation of the Korean environmental movement in the process of democratisation. As an analytic framework, the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) approach is selected. The reasons why this approach is adopted are as follows:

Firstly, this study deals with the state-social movement relationship in newly democratised countries. In this regard, the POS makes contributions to analyzing this relationship. As social movements lie in a web of relations which various actors participate in, the two dimensions of the POS - access to the political system and configuration of actors surrounding an issue - helps to look at this complex relationship (Kriesi, 1985, Klandermans, 1990; Rucht, 2004). In addition, it helps explain the change in this relationship over time according to political shift (Koopmans, 1993, 1995; Tilly, 1995 a, 1995 b). This is one of strengths of the POS approach compared to other approaches.

Secondly, the POS approach is appropriate for the analysis of policy making. Its two dimensions contribute to describing the situation surrounding a given policy. The first dimension - “access to the political system” - shows the public’s access to policy making and the second dimension - the “configuration of actors” – tells the positions of the various groups towards policy making. Therefore, the POS perspective is a suitable tool for the analysis of government decision making. Based on these reasons, the POS approach was selected as the analytical framework of this research.

Thirdly, the POS approach has been considered a leading framework to explore social movements over the past 20 years. As mentioned previously, the perspectives stressing the motivation or resources of social movements provide a good insight about protests. However, they have a limited role when trying to explain the role of social movements because social movements cannot be understood simply with motivation or resources. While motivation or resource based perspectives focus largely on social movements themselves, social
movements have to be necessarily interpreted in relation to the structure surrounding them, because they are embedded in complex relations and are significantly affected by other actors.

For the above reasons, many studies regarding the environmental movement have chosen the POS approach. Scholars explain Japan’s weak environmental movement and China’s rising environmental movement with political structure. According to the studies, in Japan, the political system which limits opportunities and contains activities, especially at the national level, made a weak national environmental movement (Mason, 1999; Pekkanen, 2006; Schreurs, 2002) and the expanded political openness in China provided the political space for environmental protests (Chan and Zhou, 2007; Lin, 2007; Tong, 2005). The upsurge of the environmental movement in Hungary or Czechoslovakia was also affected by the expansion of political opportunities in the 1980s (Berg, 1999; Pickvance, 1999; Shriver and Messer, 2009). Moreover, in relation to anti-dam protests, many studies have been explored through the POS approach (Chan and Zhou, 2007; Fu, 2009; Rothman and Oliver, 1999; Zhou, 2006). According to their studies, political context such as rapid development of civil society and citizens’ rising interest in the environment contributed to the development of the anti-dam movement.

Fourthly, this study deals with the environmental movement in “newly democratized counties” and the POS approach is a good tool for this study. In transitional countries, the government also greatly changes along with civil society unlike advanced democratic societies. Thus the change of “the government” during democratization period should be closely explored in studying social movements in new born democracies (Chan and Zhou, 2007; Ho, 2005a; 2010). In this regard, the POS framework, in particular, its first dimension – the access to the political system - provides the researcher with good analytical lens to see the change of the government. For the above reasons, many studies regarding the social movement in transitional democracies have been carried out through the POS approach (Chan and Zhou, 2007; Ho, 2006, 2009; Rothman and Oliver, 1999).

In Korean studies, the POS approach has been gradually selected to explain the Korean social movements (Kim, K. S., 2000; Ku, 1996; Lee, S. J. 2000 b; Suh, 2001; Yun, 1997). Various social movements including labour movement (Suh, 2001, 2009) and women’s’ movement (Jones, 2006; Suh, 2011) have been explored by the POS framework. However, these studies
often focused on social movements either in the period of democratisation (the latter 1980s) (Yun, 1997) or in the 1990s right after democratisation (Jones, 2006; Ku, 1996; Lee, S. J. 2000 b; Suh, 2001). This applies to the Korean studies regarding the environmental movement. The existing environmental movement studies often dealt with its dramatic growth after democratisation (Ku, 1996; Lee, S. J. 2000 b). Therefore, the change of the environmental movement in the 2000s need to be also explained through the POS approach.

Lastly, it is undeniable that there can be different approaches which analyse environmental protests (Jeong, J. H., 2006). As a matter of fact, many Korean studies with respect to environmental protests have focused on “conflict resolution” or “governance” (Cho, Joo, and Hong, 2002; Jeong, G. H., 2002 a, 2002 b, 2007; Jin, 2008; Kim, H. R., 2009; Kim and Yang, 2007; Koh, Kim, and Lee, 2009; Lee, S. J., 2006). These studies paid attention to the negative aspects of conflicts and found out why conflicts happened or how these conflicts could be resolved. For example, many studies regarding the Hantan River dam case, which is one of the case studies in the thesis, tried to find out why this conflict occurred or to explore why consensus building approach of the government did not work properly (Choi, Hong, and Joo, 2003; Joo, Choi, and Joo, 2003; Koh, Kim and Lee, 2009). They had much interest in the reasons why the government’s well-designed conflict resolution mechanism did not work.

However, this study approaches environmental conflicts in different perspective. It is based on realistic perspective that conflicts are natural phenomena and may not be resolved in spite of conflict resolution efforts. That is, conflicts are often not resolved, but are just mitigated. In this regard, this study explores how environmental protests experienced the rise and decline according to shifting political context. Specifically, the change in the decision making process and the relationship between the state, the movement, and social actors over time is primarily examined. For this reason, this research adopted the POS approach.

In this chapter, the term “political opportunity structure” which is the core concept of this research will be defined. Broad dimensions of political opportunity structure - both a stable political institution and dynamic configuration of actors - will be extracted through careful examination of various dimensions which many scholars suggested. Finally, the analytic framework of the research will be constructed with these dimensions.
4.2 Overview of political opportunity structure

4.2.1 Definition of political opportunity structure

Popularity of the POS approach

Since Eisinger introduced the concept “political opportunity structure” (POS) in his article “The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities” (1973), a large number of scholars have studied the role of the POS in social movements (McAdam, 1995, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988; Tarrow, 1994, 1998). POS scholars hold the idea that the emergence and outcome of social movements are largely shaped by political context and therefore the attention of the research should be focused on political environment around social movements (Goldstone, 1980; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, 1995, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1988; Tarrow, 1994, 1998).

Some scholars still deal with social movements in terms of motivations or resources. However, as previously mentioned, these approaches have some limitations in explaining the particular characteristics of social movements in a given country (see 2.4.3 in chapter 2). Even the organizations with strong motivation or resources cannot stage successful protests without a favourable environment (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986). Moreover, as social movements lie within complex relationship with other social actors, they should be discussed within this context. Furthermore, POS theory is regarded as a useful tool in explaining the variation over time in the outcomes of social movements and in carrying out a cross-national studies of social movements (Almeida and Stearns, 1998; Rootes, 1999, 2009). For these reasons, many scholars claim that the analytic lens should be moved from movement itself to the external environment. In fact, this kind of opportunity approach is also often found in other field of studies such as crime theory. While traditional crime theories take into account the causes of crime such as genetic make-up or social background, modern theories focus on the opportunities to commit a crime (Augustine et al, 2002; Felson and Clarke, 1998; Wilcox et al, 2003). Now that the political opportunity structure approach has become very popular it is considered to be the hegemonic paradigm among social movement theories (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999). What political opportunity structure means will be explained below.
Meaning of political opportunity structure

To find out the meaning of POS, we need to go back to Eisinger who used the term political opportunity structure for the first time. After Eisinger (1973) investigated the variation in riot behaviours in 43 US cities, he argued that protest is not simply a function of the resources which protesters have, but of the political system which is different according to cities. He called the political context, which facilitates the emergence of protests and increases their chances of success, “political opportunity structure” as shown in the paragraph below;

“That is to say, such factors as the nature of the chief executive….serve in various ways to obstruct or facilitate citizen activity in pursuit of political goals. Other environmental factors, such as the climate of governmental responsiveness…. help to establish the chances of success of citizen political activity. In short, elements in the environment impose certain constraints on political activity or open avenues for it…..There is, in this sense, interaction, or linkage, between the environment, understood in terms of the notion of a structure of political opportunities, and political behaviour. ” (Eisinger, 1973: 11-12)

Many other scholars also see political opportunity structure as the political context which facilitates or constrains the social movement to engage in protest activities as shown in the paragraph below (Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1978).

“….specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others….” (Kitschelt, 1996: 58)

“By political opportunity structure, I mean consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 1994: 85)

“Opportunity concerns the relationship between a group and the world around it. Changes in the relationship sometimes threaten the group's interests. They sometimes provide new chances to act on those interests.” (Tilly, 1978: 1-11)
Based on the above definitions, political opportunity structure (POS) is defined as the political environment (or context) which facilitates or constrains protests by affecting the expectation of individuals or groups in this research. However, this concept is still broad to grasp the meaning of political opportunity structure. In fact, while the POS approach has become the dominant paradigm in the study of social movement, the concept “political opportunity structure” has suffered from definitional sloppiness (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Kriesi, 2004; McAdam, 1996; Sartori, 1991). Therefore, in the next sections, to define it in a clearer and more systematic way, the POS will be distinguished from other concepts (e.g. resource, culture) and its main dimensions will be specified.

4.2.2 Conceptual issues of political opportunity structure

In this section, the term POS will be distinguished from other concepts (e.g. culture, resource).

- **Distinction with cultural factors**

  The cultural context is one of main factors in explaining the feature of social movements in each country, because all individuals and groups lie in the impact of national culture (Brand, 1990; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Nelkin and Pollack, 1981; Rootes, 2003). For example, some scholars argue that Japan’s underdeveloped national environmental movement might be the manifestation of Japanese cultural characteristic ‘Wa’ (Harmony) which keep people harmonious with other people within the society (Han and Furumura, 2005; Mason, 1999).

  Some POS scholars include this cultural factor in the scope of political opportunity structure (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). However, it should be distinguished from political opportunity structure, because this kind of conceptual stretching may cause POS to be in danger of becoming a sponge (McAdam, 1996).

  Culture is generally conceptualized as “norms, values, and ideas” which are deeply held within a population (Almond and Verba, 1965; Williams, 2004). While culture plays a crucial role for the integration of population, it delimits the boundaries of legitimate or socially acceptable actions (Williams, 2004). Thus social movements have to work within this cultural context so as to have effect on the government or the public. In addition, culture can be
sometimes a catalyst to spur a social movement. If the frames with which a social movement uses fit well with the cultural structure, they can resonate with the public and have much more impact on the government (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1988).

In summary, cultural context is the structure in relation to “social values and norms”. For this reason, many scholars have distinguished between this cultural context and political context, calling it “cultural opportunity structure” (Noonan 1995; McAdam, 1996; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Benford and Snow, 2000; Williams, 2004).

- **Distinction with internal resources**

Resources are another term to be distinguished with political opportunity structure. Some resource mobilization theorists incorporate political opportunities into the concept “resources”. They contend that political opportunities are one of many resources whose availability encourage the emergence and growth of social movements (Zald, 1992). Therefore, for them, POS theory is a variant of the resource mobilization perspective. In addition, the POS theorists sometimes express political opportunity structures as “resources external to the group” (Tarow, 1994:18). This usage makes the distinction between resources and opportunities difficult. Therefore, careful distinction between them should be made.

For many scholars, the major difference between both factors is that while resources are internal goods which social movement actors can have control of, opportunities are external environments which they cannot control easily (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977, 2002; Opp, 2009). Therefore, while people, money and knowledge, which social movements can internally control, are resources, the approach of government in dealing with social movements (e.g. repressive or facilitative) or the support of other social actors, which is external to social movements, is political opportunities.

**4.3 Dimensions of political opportunity structure**

**4.3.1 Review of various views of the dimensions of POS**

In an effort to enhance understanding for POS, many scholars have tried to specify its dimensions as shown below. Brockett (1991) listed the dimensions such as meaningful access
points, presence of allies, elite fragmentation and conflict. Kriesi (1996) suggested the dimensions such as formal and informal facilitation of access and the configuration of power as regards a given challenger. McAdam (1996) listed the dimensions such as the openness of the political system, the stability of elite alignments and the presence of elite allies. Rucht (1996) listed the items such as access to the party system, the alliance structure as regards a given challenger, and the conflict structure in relation to a given challenger. Tarrow (1998) mentioned the items such as the openness of access to the polity, stability of political alignments, presence of elite allies, and division within the elite.

Table 4.1 Dimensions of political opportunity structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brockett</th>
<th>Kriesi</th>
<th>McAdam</th>
<th>Rucht</th>
<th>Tarrow</th>
<th>synthesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meaningful access points</td>
<td>Formal institutional structure</td>
<td>The openness of the political system</td>
<td>Access to the party system</td>
<td>The openness of the polity</td>
<td>Access to the political system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of repression</td>
<td>Informal procedures</td>
<td>The state’s propensity for repression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of allies</td>
<td>Configuration of power</td>
<td>The stability of elite alignments</td>
<td>The alliance Structure</td>
<td>Stability of Political alignments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite fragmentation and conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td>The presence of elite allies</td>
<td>The conflict structure</td>
<td>Presence of elite allies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Division within the elite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to scholars, specifying the dimensions of political opportunity varies. However, most studies generally depend on the two broad dimensions of POS (McAdam, 1996); “the access to (or openness of) the political system” and “the configuration of actors surrounding a given issue” (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; McAdam, 1996). Among the two dimensions of the POS, while the former means the degree to which challenging groups are able to gain access to power, the latter represents the extent to which protest groups are able to gain the support of allies. While the access to the political system is relatively stable, the configuration of
related actors is relatively dynamic (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; McAdam, 1996). More detailed explanation of the two dimensions of POS will be given in the section below.

4.3.2 First dimension: “Access to the political system”

Many social movement scholars mention the importance of the access to (or openness of) the political system (Kriesi et al, 1992; McAdam, 1996; Rucht, 1996; Tarrow, 1994). They view that “the relative openness or closure of political institution” largely shapes the emergence and success of social movement. To influence the political system, social movements should have a channel to voice its opinion. However, “access” and “political system” are relatively broad concepts and thus the explanation regarding those concepts will be given below.

Political system

In general, political system has several meanings; the set of legal institutions that constitute a government or a state (e.g. the executive, legislature, and the judiciary) and more broadly, the system of how the state functions (e.g. presidential or parliamentary system, democratic or authoritarian system) (Kim, J. Y., 2003; Lee, G. C., 2010; Shin, K. H. et al, 2010). In the POS approach, “political system” points to the former, that is, legal organizations comprising the government. Therefore, the access to the political system means individuals or groups’ access to political institutions which has power in relation to a given issue.

However, legal institutions are closely related with operating system of the state (Kim. J. Y., 2003; Lee, G. C., 2010; Shin, K. H. et al, 2010). While the political system in democratic countries is generally composed of the executive, legislature, and the judiciary, the form of the separation of power between the three branches varies according to country (Kim. J. Y., 2003; Kriesi, 2004; Lee, G. C., 2010; Shin, K. H. et al, 2010). For example, while the legislative branch is relatively powerful in the UK which has the parliamentary system, the executive branch tends to be strong in the US which has the presidential system. Moreover, even within countries with the same presidential system, the relative power of the executive branch is different according to country. In summary, the source of power is different and therefore gaining access to the institution with actual power is important.
South Korea is considered as the state with a “strong executive branch” and a weak legislative branch (Jung, 1999; Lee and Arrington, 2008; Morris, 1996; Niemann and Burghart, 2004). The executive branch including the president takes the initiative in decision making. Therefore, in this research, the access to “the executive” is the main focus and moreover, dam projects as research object are national policy projects which are planned and implemented by central government. That is, main authorities regarding policy making lie in central government. Therefore, within this context, this research should investigate what kind of access the environmental movement had to the executive branch.

Access to the political system

Access to the political system refers to whether individuals can deliver their opinions to the political system and these access chances are composed of both formal and informal chances.

- **Formal access**

Formal access chances are the access opportunities which are provided by formal institution (Della Porta, 1995; Della Porta and Diani, 1996; Kriesi, 1996; 2004; Smith et al, 1997). In a democratic country, citizens are provided with formal access chances by institutions such as laws or constitutions. For example, in relation to development projects, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system guarantees citizens’ opportunities to voice their opinions through public hearings and electoral system provides citizens with access chances to the political system (Kriesi, 2004).

However, the extent of formal accessibility of political systems varies according to country, because every country has developed a different kind of democracy and political institution.

In broad terms, the kind of democracy which a country has makes difference in the formal access chances. It is often said that while majoritarian democracies relatively limit citizens’ accessibility, consensus democracies contribute to the greater accessibility of citizens (Kriesi, 2004). Similarly, in narrower terms, while a plurality electoral system relatively limit citizens’
access, a proportional system guarantees that a wider range of citizens have access to the political system (Kim, J. Y., 2003; Lee, G. C., 2010; Shin, K. H. et al, 2010).

- **Informal access**

Access to the political institution is not fully covered only by formal institution (e.g. law, constitution), but sometimes provided by the government’s strategies of interaction with challengers (Della Porta, 1995; Della Porta and Diani, 1996; Koopmans and Kriesi, 1995; Kriesi, 1996, 2004). Even in the same country, the approach of the government towards social movements may be different according to the characteristics of administrations (or the political philosophy of presidents). For example, under the administration which stresses social consensus, social movements might acquire additional informal access opportunities. Participatory government sometimes introduces committee system to review government policies when stakeholders raise objections. Therefore, many scholars consider the approach (or strategy) of the government dealing with challengers as a crucial factor which affects accessibility of the political system (Eisinger, 1973; Koopmans and Kriesi, 1995; Kriesi, 2004; McAdam, 1996).

Kriesi (2004) calls this characteristic as informal procedures employed by the political system when it deals with challengers and McAdam (1996) considers this feature as the state’s propensity for repression. Irrespective of what they call it, they commonly argue that the prevailing strategy of the political system has a significant influence on access chances. It is said that according to whether actors of the political system are integrative or repressive, access chances of social movements are different. In particular, in Korea which is a strong executive state centered around the president, the access to the policy system is dependent heavily on the characteristics of administrations (or the political philosophy of presidents) (Chung, C. K., 1989; Jung, Y. D., 1999; Mo and Moon, 1999). Therefore, the informal access chances need to be closely examined in this research.

### 4.3.3 Second dimension: “Configuration of actors”

The configuration of political actors explains a large part of social movements which the accessibility of the political system cannot cover. While political accessibility shows the
“process” by which social movements voice their opinions, it does not explain what kind of “relationship” they had with other related actors. However, social movements need to be understood in relational terms, because they occur within complex relationships (Della Porta and Diani, 1996; Rucht, 2004).

Without question, “social movements” and their “adversaries” are the most important actors in social conflicts. In this research, the environmental movement and the government – in particular, development ministry and public agencies - are main actors.

**Various actors around social movements**

However, aside from the two major conflicting parties, there are many related actors around them. That is, social movements do not lie in a bilateral game between themselves and their adversaries, but rather a multilateral game in which various actors are involved (Della Porta and Diani, 1996; Rucht, 2004). They interact with not only their adversaries (e.g. governments, corporations), but also a variety of other actors (e.g. the mass media, citizens). Among these various actors, they find both allies who support them and adversaries who are against them. In addition, social movements fight with more powerful organization such as the government and therefore they have difficulty in achieving successful outcomes. Under this circumstance, social movements often receive the help of other social actors. For this reason, what relationship social movements have with other stakeholders are significantly important. Therefore, configuration of actors in a given time needs to be closely examined (Kriesi et al, 1992; McAdam, 1996; Rucht, 1996; Tarrow, 1994).

Among related actors, there are (1) the agencies which are directly involved in a given issue (e.g. government ministries, local governments) and (2) the third parties which are not directly involved, but are attentive audiences (e.g. the media, public opinion) (Hunt et al, 1994; Kriesi, 2004; Rucht, 2004). According to what view these parties have about a given issue, in other words, according to whether they become allies or adversaries of the social movement, the outcome of the social movement is determined. Therefore, their positions towards social movements are very important. The composition of these various actors will be explained in detail below, by being classified into different level of groups (Miller, 1994;
Oberschall, 1996; Rootes, 1999 a, 1999 b; Rothman and Oliver, 1999; Smith, 2005; Tarrow, 1998).

- **Actors at central level**

At national level, there is central government as main actors (Rootes, 1999 a, 1999 b). In particular, in centralized countries, the role of central government is significantly important.

However, within central government, there can be “government ministries” supporting or objecting to the social movement. For example, in case of the environmental movement, environment ministry, which represent environmental interests, might support it, whereas development ministry might oppose it.

In particular, “presidents or prime ministers” are main actors at the national level (Lee, S. J., 2000 b, 2000c). According to whether they take position towards social movements, their outcomes can be different. Moreover, “political parties and parliaments” are also considered important actors at the national level (Kriesi, 2004).

- **Actors at local level**

Actors around social movements are not only confined to central government level (Eisinger, 1973; Rootes, 1999 A, 1999 b).

In less centralized countries such as Germany or the United States, the role of “local or regional governments” is very important. In Korea, since the introduction of a local autonomy system, local governments sometimes have shown different position towards central government’s policies. Therefore their positions are very important. According to issues, while some local governments might be allies of the movement, others might be its adversaries.

In general, local government representatives tend to respect the opinions of “local residents” so that they can be re-elected as representatives. For this reason, alongside with local governments, local residents are regarded as one of important actors at the local level.
• Third parties

As the actors in the third parties, there are the media, citizens, and experts (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Klandermans and Goslinga, 1996; Kriesi, 2004; McCarthy, Smith, and Zald, 1996; Rucht, 2004). Increasingly, many scholars have stressed the role of these groups.

The “mass media” is one of the most crucial actors (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Gitlin, 1980; Kriesi, 2004; Gamson, 2004). The way how the media deals with social movements can be critical opportunity or constraint for movements, because it shapes public opinions by both delivering information and interpreting this information (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Therefore, the mass media is considered a double-edged sword. While the media’s support is very helpful for social movements, conversely, its criticism can do damage to them.

“Public opinion” has a significant impact on social movements. Although citizens are generally audience around social movements, they don’t necessarily stay as bystanders and can participate as new players (Gamson, 2004). This engagement sometimes changes the power relation between exiting conflicting parties. Public opinion tends to be affected by the mass media.

“Experts” also play a crucial role in the development of social movements (Kriesi, 2004). Their raising questions might do damage to government policies and provide social movements with strong motivation. For example, the change of the US nuclear power policies is said to have greatly been affected by the challenge of experts in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (Kriesi, 2004).

In relation to configuration of actors, what should be noted is that it is volatile and changeable. While political institutions are relatively stable, it is highly changeable according to the situation (Kriesi, 2004). Therefore the shift of actor configuration often creates new opportunities for movement mobilization. This is the reason why scholars have a great deal of interest in configuration of actors. It explains the change of social movements over time in a given country (Kriesi, 2004).
4.4 Political opportunity structure and aspects of social movements

In the above section, the main dimensions which constitute political opportunity structure were explored. With these components, POS theorists have explained all the aspects of social movements - its emergence, its form, and its outcome. These three aspects are a kind of dependent variables which the social movement study tries to explain (McAdam, 1996; Meyer, 2004; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004).

- **Emergence of social movements**

Political opportunities have initially been employed to account for the emergence of social movements. There are numerous nation-level studies. Goldstone (1998) points out that the collapse of the former Soviet Union is related to several political contexts in the 1980s such as a state weakened by economic and political failures, divided elite groups, and discontented people. McAdam et al (1996) and Oberschall (1996) argue that the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 were caused by the change in political circumstances such as Gorbachev’s unwillingness to intervene and the democratic opposition’s success in other Eastern European states. There are also city-level studies. For instance, Eisinger (1973) conducted comparative studies across American cities and found that protests occur frequently in cities whose POS shows a mixture of open and closed characteristics, whereas in an extremely closed system, protest groups cannot mobilize due to the state’s repression and in an extremely open system, they do not need to mobilize.

- **Mobilization form of social movements**

While researchers initially focused on the emergence of social movements, they have gradually turned their attentions towards the action repertoire of movements. Some scholars carried out longitudinal studies regarding the social movement within a given country. Tilly (1995 a, 1995 b) suggested that the shift in the repertoire of British protest from 1758 to 1834 - from short-term and local forms of contention towards long-term and national forms – was largely shaped by a change in the POS such as centralization of the state and capitalization. Koopmans (1993, 1995) demonstrated a change in protest repertoire - from novel strategies to militant ones to moderate ones - according to the shift in the opportunity structures in West
Germany from 1965 to 1989. Others conducted cross-national studies. Koopmans and Kriesi (1995) argued that the extent of the openness between the Swiss and the French system makes the difference in the form of mobilization. According to their studies, while Switzerland’s relatively open political system often facilitates social movements, it moderates their action repertoires. In contrast, while the closed French political system does not often provide opportunities for collective action, it leads to the radicalization of the action repertoires.

- **Outcome (or development) of social movements**

The outcome of social movements is still less studied than other aspects. Some scholars carried out studies regarding the outcomes of the social movement within a given country. For example, Amenta and Zylan (1991, 1992) analyzed the outcomes of the Townsend movement, which sought pensions for the elderly in the Great Depression. Cress and Snow (1996, 2000) studied the outcomes of homeless social movements throughout the United States in the 1980s. However, research about movement outcomes has often taken the form of cross-national comparison studies. The anti-nuclear movement is a typical study in relation to the outcome. Many scholars have often compared anti-nuclear movements’ impacts in different countries and have found that the POS plays a crucial role in the outcome of the anti-nuclear movement (Diani and van der Heijden, 1994; Flam, 1994; Jasper, 1990; Joppke, 1991, 1993; Kitschelt, 1986; Rucht, 1994). According to their studies, the variance in the access to political system and the support of powerful allies made the difference in both the outcome of the movements and the timing of the outcome.

**Research target: outcome of social movements**

As shown above, the POS approach has been used as a key explanatory factor in explaining all the aspects of social movements. In the past, the attention of POS studies was focused mainly on the emergence of social movements. It has been a long-standing interest to social movement theorists (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996).

However, scholars have gradually turned their attentions into other subjects; the forms (or repertoires) and outcomes of social movements (McAdam, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy and
Zald, 1996; Kriesi, 2004). Among them, in particular, this research has an interest in the outcome (or development) of social movements, because it deals with “the rise and fall” of the Korean environmental movement in government decision making since democratisation. While the environmental movement greatly grew from democratisation until the early 2000s, it lost its prominence and vigor in the late 2000s to such an extent to which environmental NGOs themselves call “the crisis in the environmental movement”. They did not have much influence over government decision making and did not receive wide public support. This research will explore this dynamic change in the environmental movement during the period of 1998-2007.

4.5 Summary: Analytic framework of the research

As stated in chapter 3, the purpose of the research is to explore how political contexts influence the outcome of the environmental movement around policy making in democratizing Korea.

In order to answer this practical question, this research reviewed various views regarding the dimensions of POS and selected the main two dimensions - the access to the political system and the configuration of actors - as analytical lens. In this research, POS is identified as both the degree to which political system is accessible and configuration of actors around an issue is favourable to social movements. That is, favourable political context for social movements means more access chance to the government and more allies supporting movement groups. This research will explain the dynamic change in the Korean environmental movement with these two main dimensions of POS.

In addition, the access to the political system will be explored in terms of both formal and informal access channels, and the configuration of actors will also be examined in terms of three levels; central level, local level, and the third parties as shown in the figure below. In the next chapter, according to this framework, research questions will be raised and appropriate research methodology and method will be selected.
Figure 4.1 Analytic framework of research

POS

Access to political system
- Formal access
- Informal access

Configuration of actors
- Central / local level
- Third parties

Movement outcome

Source: Author
CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHOD

5.1 Research question

This research started from a curiosity about the rise and fall in the environmental movement in democratizing Korea. After the democratisation in 1987, the Korean environmental movement remarkably grew and exerted a strong influence on policy making until the early 2000s. However, it faced its decline in the late 2000s and in particular, this dynamic change happened in the civil society-friendly administrations (1998-2007). This change of the Korean environmental movement after democratisation raises a primary research question as follows:

In a period of democratisation, how were political opportunities in major infrastructure policy making created for the Korean environmental movement, and how did these opportunities determine the movement’s ability to influence outcomes between 1998 and 2007?

To understand this phenomenon, political opportunity structure (POS) theory was adopted as an analytic framework of the research. Moreover, after carefully reviewing various opinions related to the dimensions of the POS, the two main dimensions of it - the access to the political system and configuration of actors surrounding a given issue – were selected. According to this framework, the primary research question is broken down into the two sub-questions below.

- What forms of access chances were created by the Korean government within dam construction decision making, and how did this influence the environmental movement’s ability to influence outcomes?

- What change occurred in the relationships between the environmental movement, government, and other social actors in dam construction decision making, and how did this influence the environmental movement’s ability to influence outcomes?

Explanation for research question
• **First question**

The first research question means how the government dealt with challengers against the government policy, in other words, what kind of access chances were given to the environmental movement by the Korean government. As explained in chapter 4, access chances are provided through both formal and informal channels. Therefore, this research will explore what kind of formal and informal opportunities the government gave the environmental movement.

As previously mentioned, although political system includes the executive, legislature, and the judiciary, it mainly refers to the executive branch, particularly the central government in this research. The reasons are as follows:

Firstly, unlike the UK and Japan, Korea has presidential system (Jung, Y. D., 1999; Lee and Arrington, 2008; Morris, 1996; Niemann and Burghart, 2004). In particular, it is a strong presidential state where the president exerts a considerable amount of concentrated power. The Korean president is often said to enjoy “imperial” power (Chung, C. K., 1989; Jung, Y. D., 1999; Mo and Moon, 1999). For instance, even the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) is controlled by the president unlike other Western countries in which the counterparts of this agency are controlled by parliament. Under the tradition of strong presidential system, the Korean bureaucracy has also played a major role in realizing president’s political vision (Chung, C. K., 1989; Jung, Y. D., 1999). Policy formulation has still been made by the bureaucracy which the president relied largely on in the 1960s and 1970s (Lee, H. U., 2007). This leading role of bureaucracy is caused by the expertise and information which the Korean bureaucratic elites have (Jung, Y. D., 1999; Lee and Arrington, 2008; Morris, 1996; Niemann and Burghart, 2004).

In contrast with the executive branch, the legislature branch in Korea has been relatively underdeveloped (Morris, 1996; Lee and Arrington, 2008). Under the character of a “strong developmental state,” the legislature’s policymaking and oversight over the executive branch has been considerably limited (Jung, Y. D., 1999). The legislative branch has to depend heavily on information provided by the executive branch. In conclusion, Korea is still regarded as the president-centred bureaucratic state. Therefore, within this context, this
research should investigate what kind of access the anti-dam movement had to the “executive branch”.

Secondly, dam projects as a type of national policy project were mainly planned and implemented by the central government amongst the executive branch, even though it listened to the opinions of local governments in policy making process. That is, dam decision making is wholly dominated by the central government. The Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT) establishes dam construction plan and discusses environmental impacts with the Ministry of Environment (ME), and the Korea Water Resources Corporation (KOWACO) as central public agency actually builds the dam. In addition, Korea is basically considered a highly centralized country. Although local autonomy was established in 1995, the central government has still exerted stronger power compared to local governments. Therefore, it is important to find out how many chances environmental groups had from the central government including president which is the highest decision maker.

- Second question

This question deals with the relationship between the environmental movement, government, and other social actors. There are many social actors around government decision making. As stated in the previous chapter, related actors might be divided into the three levels; central level (e.g. ministries), local level (e.g. local governments), and the third parties (e.g. mass media) for more systematic analysis. This research will explore who were actually main actors and what viewpoints they took towards the environmental movement in government decision making. That is, whether they supported or objected to the movement will be examined. Moreover, the relationship between stakeholders is regarded as highly changeable according to situation. For example, while the mass media sometimes supports the environmental movement, in other times they can criticize it. Therefore, how and why the positions of related actors were changed is very important and this will be closely examined.

5.2 Research methodology

5.2.1 The qualitative approach
While research strategy is broadly distinguished between qualitative and quantitative research, this research selects the qualitative approach. While the simple distinction between the two methodologies is whether research emphasizes texts or numbers in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2001), detailed reasons of selecting a qualitative approach are as follows:

Firstly, this research investigates the “how” question. It is often said that a qualitative research pursues the “how” question to get a deeper understanding of social phenomenon (Bryman, 2001; Creswell, 1998). In this regard, this study obviously explores “how” the change in political context in the process of democratization influenced the outcome of the anti-dam movement and thus the qualitative approach has been adopted. Through this approach, this study will gather an in-depth understanding of the role of environmental movements.

Secondly, the research deals with complex “relationship” between various actors in government decision making. Human relationship in a society is a subjective thing which is difficult to assess by numbers and need to be interpreted through explanation (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). In this regard, the qualitative approach contributes to finding out interactions or relationships between social actors (Marsh and Stocker, 1995). In addition, social relationships lie within specific contexts and thus they needs to be interpreted considering these context. Therefore, to get a deeper understanding of this relationship, the qualitative approach is necessary.

Thirdly, the research investigates “change” in relationships over time. Configuration of actors surrounding social movements, which is the second dimension of POS, is not constant and continually changes by social actors. Social structure is not pre-given external reality and continually changes through interactions between social actors (Bryman, 2001). To find out this change and its reason, this research adopts a qualitative approach which contributes to a deeper understanding of human behaviours (Creswell, 1998).

In the section below, the case studies which this research employs among various qualitative approaches will be explained.
5.2.2 The longitudinal case study

In relation to qualitative study, various research designs can be carried out (Bryman, 2001; Flick, Kardorff and Steinke, 2004). In the study of the social movement, two types of research designs have often been used: comparative and longitudinal design. While some scholars compared between the same movements according to country, others examined the variation in the movement over time in a given country (Koopmans, 1993, 1995; Tilly, 1995 a, 1995 b). This research is basically a longitudinal study, because it will explore the change in the Korean anti-dam movement over time during the process of democratisation. It has an interest in finding out how the government approach in dealing with decision making was changed over time, how the relationship between the movement and social actors was changed and as a result, how these changes affected the environmental movement.

In particular, this research explores the variation in the influence of the Korean environmental movement “over the period of 1998-2007”. It is the matter of time range which is one of the most critical elements in the research. The reasons why this ten year period is focused on are as follows: Firstly, there were a great number of environmental protests against national infrastructure projects which became hot social issues during this period. Secondly, this period of time clearly shows the rise and fall in the Korean environmental movement. Therefore, the main interest of the research is laid on the ten years from 1998 to 2007.

5.2.3 Case study selection

Selection of policy sector

This study will address research questions by examining “dam policy making”. The reasons why this research has an interest in dam policy making are as follows:

Firstly, dam construction is a fundamental infrastructure investment. Water resource investment is one of basic and common government decision makings because water is indispensable for daily life. Among various water related policies, dam construction is the most basic policy project which has been used as a mean to acquire water and control flood. Therefore, dam policy making was chosen as the object of the research.
Secondly, because of its characteristic as a common activity, dam policy making can show the change in government decision making over time. Dam construction has been carried out from the past until the present. It is therefore one of the best tools to examine the variation of government decision making since democratisation. It can explain how the government has changed decision making process and how related stakeholders have changed their behaviours since democratic transition.

Thirdly, dam construction has been one of the most conflicting policy projects since democratisation in Korea (Hong, S. T., 2007 b; Lee, M. C., 2005; Yeom, 2003, 2006). Among the environmental movement, the anti-dam movement was a typical movement in Korea (Kim, M. S., 2003). There were many anti-dam protests opposing dam construction and they often resulted in the review of the government regarding the environmental impact of dam construction.

**Selection of projects**

Among dam projects, the two anti-dam movements are selected – the anti-Dong River dam movement (1998-2000) and the Hantan River dam movement (2000-2007). The reasons why these two cases are selected are as follows:

Firstly, the two anti-dam movements are the most typical anti-dam movements over the last decade. The anti-Dong River dam movement led to the cancellation of project through active protest and the anti-Hantan River dam movement, which was called the second Dong River dam movement, was maintained for over 8 years, even though it did not achieve its goal.

Secondly, the two anti-dam movements fully cover the years 1998-2007. While the Dong River dam case (1998-2000) represents an anti-dam movement from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, the anti-Hantan River dam movement (2000-2007) shows the anti-dam movement in the late 2000s. Therefore, the researcher can observe the change of the political opportunity structure and its impact on the anti-dam movement across this period.

Thirdly, the two case studies seem to be suitable in terms of research feasibility. It is said that external validity can be problematic in qualitative study compared to quantitative study,
because it uses just small number of cases (Marsh and Stoker, 1995). There is more possibility that the greater the number of cases, the greater the generalization of the research will be. However, because the researcher is constrained in the amount of time he has when carrying out his research he should compromise between its explanatory power and realistic restraints. In particular, as this study explores national policy projects which are complex and messy, the selection of many cases can weaken the researcher’s in-depth analysis. For this reason, this research will look at the two case studies.

5.3 Research methods

To address research questions, a great deal of information on dam policy making and activities of the anti-dam movements is needed. This section shows the data which is needed for the research. The necessary data is as follows:

Table 5.1 Necessary data and its source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Necessary data</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Contexts of the anti-dam movements (Chapter 6) | • Dam policy making process in Korea  
• Main actors in dam policy making in Korea  
• Background of the two dam projects  
• Composition and arguments of the two anti-dam movements | Secondary data          |
| Protests of the anti-dam movements (Chapter 7) | • Protest history of the two anti-dam movements  
• Approach of the government dealing with the anti-dam movement | Secondary & Interview data |
| Political opportunity structure (POS) and protests (Chapter 8) | • Access chance to the political system and its impact on the outcome of the anti-dam movements  
• Configuration of actors and its impact on the outcome of the anti-dam movements | Interview data          |

Source: Author

Based on this table, necessary information was assembled through both secondary and interview data. While chapter 6 (Context of the two anti-dam movements) was largely composed of secondary data, chapter 8 (Political opportunity structure and protests), a main analysis chapter, was mainly covered by semi-structured interview data. In chapter 7 (History of the two anti-dam movements), both secondary and interview data were utilized. That is,
newspaper articles and ENGOs’ press statements were utilized with the interview data. In relation to the time order of assembling data, after sufficient investigation of secondary data, semi-structured interview were carried out. Detailed data collection process is shown below.

5.3.1 Utilization of secondary sources

The research depended on secondary data to examine the basic facts with respect to the two anti-dam movements. Through the examination of secondary data, main controversies about the two dam projects, protests of anti-dam movements, and response of the government were identified. This process was intensively carried out from September until December 2009 prior to the fieldwork in January 2010, in order to get rid of time loss caused by unnecessary interview questions and draw more meaningful answers. Secondary documents were largely assembled from newspaper articles, anti-dam movement actors’ homepage (e.g. Environmental NGOs’ homepage, local resident committee’s homepage), and government documents and environmental journals. In particular, the homepages of anti-dam movement actors included various and systematic data including campaign statements.

Newspaper articles

Firstly, through newspaper articles, activities of the anti-dam movements, position of related actors, and the attitude of the media towards movements were assembled. Most protests and statements of the anti-dam movements and the positions of related actors were reported in detail, because the two anti-dam cases were noticeable social conflicts which mass media often dealt with.

Various kinds of newspapers were reviewed as follows: nationwide newspapers, local newspapers, internet newspapers, and other newspapers. As nationwide newspapers, the four newspapers were selected. Among 4 newspapers, the two were selected from conservative newspapers (the Chosun Ilbo and the Donga Ilbo) and the two were selected from progressive newspapers (the Hankyoreh Shinmun and the Kyunghyang Shinmun) to explore various opinions with respect to the anti-dam movements. However, in relation to the mass media, what needs to be importantly considered is that the conservative newspapers are the
major media. Therefore, more attention should be given towards their position on the anti-dam movements.

Local newspapers of the region which the two anti-dam movements occurred in were also reviewed. While nationwide newspapers had the strength in reporting the position of the central government, local newspapers had advantages in reporting the opinion of local governments and residents. That is, through local newspapers, the initial position and its change of local government and residents were found out. Internet newspapers also gave useful information. For example, the Prometheus reported local residents within the Hantan River dam site several times and showed their interview contents word-by-word. These kinds of reports were very helpful for acquiring more information about the anti-dam movements.

Table 5.2 Newspapers as data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinction</th>
<th>characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationwide newspaper</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosun Ilbo</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donga Ilbo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hankyoreh Shinmun</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyunghyang Shinmun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local newspaper</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangwon Ilbo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangwon Domin Ilbo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeonggi Ilbo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeonggi Shinmun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internet newspaper</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohmynews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prometheus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

Initially, related articles were searched through each newspaper site. However, after the useful site, which is called the KINDS (Korea Integrated News Database System), was accidentally recognized, the KINDS were mainly used to acquire related articles. The KINDS is the system which is operated by the Korea Press Foundation (KPF) and includes the articles of almost all the mass media in Korea except a couple of newspapers. In particular, this system was considerably useful in finding the volume of news coverage in relation to the two cases.
**Internet homepage of movement actors**

The internet homepages of anti-dam movement actors (Nationwide environmental NGOs, local NGOs, and local residents committee) were an important source of data. A lot of data related to their arguments (e.g. press release and policy suggestion) and protest activities could be found on their homepages.

In the homepages of central ENGOs – the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), Green Korea United (GKU) and Environmental Justice (EJ), related data was well organized by the sequence of time that events happened. These data was downloaded from these homepages. However, among these homepages, the homepages of the KFEM (http://www.kfem.or.kr) was the main source, because the KFEM played a leading role in the anti-dam movement. In addition to the homepages of central ENGOs, a lot of data were acquired via the internet homepages of local NGOs and local residents’ committees. Like local newspapers, these local homepages had detailed information related to local context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-dam group</th>
<th>Internet site</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Federation of Environmental Movement</td>
<td><a href="http://www.kfem.or.kr">http://www.kfem.or.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Korea United</td>
<td><a href="http://www.greenkorea.org">http://www.greenkorea.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Justice</td>
<td><a href="http://www.eco.or.kr">http://www.eco.or.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uiryeong Conservation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.uircc.or.kr">http://www.uircc.or.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hantan River Network</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hantanet.com">http://www.hantanet.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County</td>
<td><a href="http://www.yonchon.com">http://www.yonchon.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local residents committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dong River conservation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dongriver.net">http://www.dongriver.net</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hantan River lovers</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hantanlove.net">http://www.hantanlove.net</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

**Government documents and other documents**

Government documents were also used as the source of data. The important data such as the EIA report, the Audit report, and conflict resolution report was provided by interviewees. In particular, the final report by the joint review committee under the OPM in the Dong River
dam case and the conflict mediation report by the PCSD in the Hantan River dam case were highly useful documents. Through these documents, much information surrounding the anti-dam conflicts and related actors’ positions in both issues were acquired.

Moreover, dam policy making process and its changes over time were found through documents related to water resource policies (e.g. water resource policy handbook). For example, the introduction of incentive system for submerged area by the government was found through these documents.

Table 5.4 Government documents as data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinction</th>
<th>Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Dong River dam</td>
<td>Policy alternative to the Dong River dam (Professor Park, 1999.3.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review report for the Yeongwol dam (OPM, 2000.6.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hantan River dam</td>
<td>EIA review report of the Hantan River dam project (ME, 2003.7.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict resolution report of the Hantan River dam project (PCSD, 2005.5.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Audit report for the Hantan River dam project (BAI, 2005.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Management in Construction Projects (including the Hantan River dam case) (OPM &amp; KDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Water resources in Korea in 2007 (MOCT, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water resource manual (MLTM, 2009 a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water resource policies of Korea (MLTM, 2009 b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Korean environmental movement of 25 years (Weekly Kyunghyang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various discussions in relation to the environment (Environment and life)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

TV and radio programs were also used as a source of data. As environmental issues were controversial during this period, TV and radio programs, in particular, debate programs often dealt with environmental conflicts. NGO representatives and policy makers joined as main panels in the debate programs. Therefore, these programs contributed to understanding the broad context surrounding the environmental conflict. The TV and radio programs examined are shown in the table 5.5.
Table 5.5 TV and radio program as data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinction</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| MBC         | 2000.11.19 / 2001.4.26  The controversy over the Saemangeum reclamation project  
2003. 7.31 / 2003. 8.7    The controversy over the Buan nuclear waste disposal facility |
| KBS         | 1999.3.3     Documentary “The Dong River”  
1999.3.17    The controversy over the Dong River dam project  
2003.6.7    The controversy over the Saemangeum reclamation project  
2003.8.2    The controversy over the Buan nuclear waste disposal facility  
2005.1.29  Environmental policy of the Roh administration  
2006.7.21   Flood control measure: the properness of dam construction  
2006.9.24   Dam! Should the Hantan River dam be built? |

Source: Author

Environmental journals (e.g. Environment and life) were also a good data source regarding the environmental movement. They clearly showed the situation of the Korean environmental movement. They often carried the crisis of the environmental movement as the feature article.

5.3.2 Conducting interview

To explore the relationship between political environment and the anti-dam movement, it is essential to make interviews with key persons such as environmental NGOs, public officials, and experts. Therefore, after examination of secondary data, semi-structured interviews with main actors were carried out. Initial interviews (35 people) were carried out in January 2010 and follow-up interviews (18 people) were performed from September 2010 to March 2011. While initial interviews were face to face interviews in Korea, after coming back to the UK the follow-up interviews were conducted by either telephone or e-mail.

Interview preparation

The main issue of interview preparation is to decide who to ask and what to ask. Both tasks were carried out almost simultaneously. Through the examination of secondary data from September to December 2009, possible interviewees were identified and interview questionnaires were prepared.
• Identifying potential interviewees

Identifying and gaining access to key interviewees are critical to the research. For successful research, a researcher should find appropriate interviewees and an effective way to access them. In this research, potential interviewees were identified through newspaper articles and ENGOs’ websites. After initial identification through secondary data, snowballing techniques were used in the field work. Initial interviewees introduced additional potential interviewees to the researcher. The main interviewees of the research are composed of three groups of actors as follows: (1) ENGOs and local NGOs’ activists, (2) Public officials and public agency staffs, and (3) professional experts (See table 5.6).

Firstly, in relation to anti-dam groups, activists of major environmental organizations such as the KFEM, GKU and EJ were selected. In particular, as the KFEM played a leading role in the anti-dam movement, many interviewees were selected from the KFEM activists. If possible, senior activists who led the anti-dam movement were selected. In addition, local NGO activists were included because they played a crucial role in the anti-Hantan River dam movement.

Secondly, public officials of central and local governments involved in the two dam projects were selected. For example, the MOCT officials who took charge of the dam projects, the ME officials who were involved in the EIA process, the BAI officials who carried out the audit on the Hantan River dam project, and local government officials around the dam sites were selected as main interviewees. Regarding central government officials, department head (3rd or 4th grade) and section chief (5th grade) were selected. With respect to local government officials, department head (5th grade) and section chief (6th grade) were selected. These officials are the people who know most about the dam conflicts because they actually took charge of these projects.

Thirdly, experts, reporters, and politicians were also included as potential interviewees. As experts were involved in the mediation process for conflict resolution, they know a great deal about the main issues of anti-dam conflicts and positions of related actors a lot. Newspaper reporters and politicians were also interviewed to examine the relationship between political context and the mass media (or the president).
The reason why this research depended on the three categories of interviews is related to “triangulation” approach. Triangulation contributes to the validation of data through cross verification from multiple data sources (Denzin, 1978; O’Donoghue and Punch, 2003) and therefore it is often used to confirm research results in social science. In this study, triangulation through multiple interview sources contributed to heightening the reliability of interview contents.

- Making interview questionnaires

After categorizing the groups of potential interviewees, interview questionnaires were made. As public official group were composed of persons from different organizations (e.g. MOCT, ME, BAI, and local governments), respective interview questionnaires were made according to organizations. Therefore, over 5 sets of different interview questionnaires were made according to interviewees – (1) the anti-dam movement protesters, (2) the development ministry officials, (3) the environment ministry officials, (4) the Board of audit and inspection officials, (5) local government officials, and (6) experts.

Interview questionnaires were broadly composed of three parts – introduction, anti-dam protest activities and the impact of protests. In introduction part, warm up questions such as personal background were constructed to soften up research interview. In relation to anti-dam protest activities, questions regarding what and why protesters did were made. Lastly, questions why the two anti-dam protests had different outcomes were made.

Conducting pilot study

Before making final interview questionnaires, the pilot study was conducted. Through this process, whether the interview questionnaires can draw necessary data for the research was checked. The researcher contacted several public officials from both central and local government through personal connections. They were willing to accept the pilot study request. They reviewed whether the contents and order of interview questions are appropriate and provided me many useful points about the interview questionnaires.
The tips which the researcher received from the pilot study were as following; Firstly, some people suggested that the interview questionnaires are too formal and therefore they should be more informal to make a favourable interview atmosphere. This point was also raised by the supervisor of the researcher. Therefore, the researcher added the “introduction” part which asks interviewees their personal background. Likewise, in other parts, the so-called warm-up questions were introduced before going to details. Secondly, some questions were deleted or modified, because most respondents suggested that public officials do not have sufficient knowledge related to that and thus it is difficult that the researcher acquire necessary information.

- **Gaining access to key interviewees**

Access to interviewees was largely gained through sending e-mail. The e-mail addresses of potential interviewees were found in the websites of environmental NGOs, ministries and universities. All the organizations, which potential interviewees are affiliated, have their own websites in which e-mail addresses of the members are ascertained. Through e-mail, the researcher found out whether they are inclined to accept interviews and are available during his visit to Korea in January 2010. At times, instead of e-mails, phone calls were used to gain access to potential interviewees.

It was not difficult to make interview appointments. Many potential interviewees showed a positive attitude towards interview requests. However, the researcher could not make contact with all the potential interviewees. For example, several NGO members were not in Korea because of their long-term stay in foreign countries. In spite of repeated attempts, the researcher did not receive any response from them. In case of a certain expert, the researcher did not find his e-mail address and telephone number. The university did not give the telephone number due to the reason of privacy protection. However, these things did not affect the validity of the research, because the researcher met many other interviewees.

There were several contributors in gaining access to potential interviewees. For example, in relation to the access to NGO members, the researcher’s older university alumnus who had worked in the KFEM gave a lot of help. He proposed potential interviewees and also helped contacting environmental NGO members. In relation to the access to the MOCT officials, the
MOCT section chief who was dispatched to the UK was a great help. As he was directly involved in the two dam projects, he had a great deal of information and knew many related actors. He introduced the ME public officials and the KOWACO staffs who were involved in the two dam projects at that time. In summary, regarding the access to ENGOs activists and public officials, several people who the researcher is acquainted with in these organizations played an important role.

Although potential interviewees promised to be interviewed, detailed interview dates and times could not be firmly fixed in advance. Most of them wanted to make specific appointments after the researcher arrived in Seoul, Korea. Therefore, when the researcher left for the field study, only interviews in the first week were fixed and other interviews were fixed in the field. As some interviewees were supposed to go abroad for a work, the interviews with these persons were planned in the first week. Prior to the departure, small gifts for interviewees were prepared, because manners and courtesy is stressed in Korea.

**Conducting interview**

- **Initial interviews**

Many interviewees stayed in Seoul Metropolitan City and Gyeonggi province and therefore this made it possible to conduct numerous interviews within a short period of time. Over 30 people in these areas were targeted for initial fieldwork, including anti-dam activists in either nationwide ENGOs or local NGOs, public officials in government ministries (e.g. the MOCT, ME, and BAI), and staff in public agencies (e.g. the KOWACO and KEI). Usually one or two interviews per day were carried out and at times even three. Although it was strenuous work with bad weather conditions such as unexpected heavy snow, the target number was achieved with great effort.

The outcome of the interviews was very satisfactory. Through initial interviews, considerable information was acquired. Most interviews lasted two to three hours per person. Contrary to initial concern, environmental activities kindly expressed their opinions. They were more active rather than other respondents in delivering their arguments. In spite of their kindness, the researcher tried to maintain well-mannered behavior.
Most interviews except two were recorded by MP3 player under the approval of interviewees. The failure in those two interviews occurred because the researcher forgot to take an MP3 player by mistake. However, note taking was done for all interviews including the two unrecorded ones. The main argument of interviewees and the overall interview atmosphere were noted. Certain interviewees sometimes requested the researcher to stop recording in relation to a specific part and therefore note taking was done for that part. Most interviews were carried out in not-intervened environment such as interviewee’s office or silent cafe. In initial interviews, interview questions were asked according to prepared interview guide. However, after 5 to 6 interviews, interview questions became slightly different, because some questions already had sufficient answers and instead other important questions emerged. Therefore, some questions were skipped and other key questions were asked according to the situation.

- **Follow-up interviews**

Follow up interviews were carried out from September to March 2011 after the careful analysis of initial interview data. As a matter of fact, through secondary document and initial interview, a sufficient volume of data was acquired. Therefore, after several key factors were extracted through the interpretation of initial data, follow up interviews were planned to confirm these factors.

In the follow up interviews, local government officials and other key actors (e.g. news reporters, experts) were interviewed. The researcher had some difficulties in gaining access to news reporters, whereas he had little trouble in interviewing other groups. Although he tried making contact with 15 reporters, only 4 replied. Despite the low responses, it was fortunate that two people from conservative and progressive newspapers were interviewed respectively. Finally, 18 people including 4 reporters were interviewed.

This time telephone calls or e-mails were used for the interviews. So far as interviewees agreed, telephone interviews were carried out in order to catch respondents’ voice tone. Out of 18 people, 14 persons were accessed by telephone and 4 persons by e-mail. There wasn’t any specific problem when conducting telephone interviews apart from the fact that researcher had to pay attention to the time as there is a nine-hour time difference between
Korea and the UK. For example, since public officials liked to be interviewed after lunch at 2 to 3 pm, the researcher had to get up at 5 to 6 AM and carry out interviews. All the interview contents aside from four e-mail interviews were recorded via an MP3 player. In summary, the group and number of the people which the researcher interviewed are as follows:

Table 5.6 Interviewees – Groups and Numbers (see appendix 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinction</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-dam movement actors</td>
<td>Nationwide ENGOs (KFEM, GKU, Ej)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local (E)NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officials</td>
<td>MOCT (Ministry of Construction and Transportation)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KOWACO (Korea Water Corporation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ME (Ministry of Environment)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KEI (Korea Environment Institute)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BAI</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>University professors</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other experts</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newspaper reporters</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7 Interviewees according to case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinction</th>
<th>The Dong River dam case</th>
<th>The Hantan River dam case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-dam movement actors</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officials</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author (* Some interviewees were involved in both cases)

Rejection rates from different categories of interviewees

The acceptance rates from different categories of interviewees are as shown in the below table. The researcher did not have much difficulty in contacting interviewees. All the
categories of interviewees except newspaper reporters showed positive attitude towards interview requests.

Most public officials, both from central government and local government and experts including university professors accepted interview requests. Even anti-dam protesters were willing to agree to the interviews, whereas the researcher was initially concerned about their rejection of interview requests because of the researcher’s position as a public official working for the MLTM (MOCT until 2007). My position as a civil servant did not damage interview acceptance rate and they rather wanted to express their opinions. Several failures in interviewing anti-dam protesters were only caused by their stay in foreign countries and sudden illness. The reasons why the researcher did not interview a couple of experts were because the researcher did not acquire his e-mail address because of the university’s privacy policy and a potential interviewee was considered not the key person after being contacted by phone call.

However, the rejection rates from newspaper reporters were high. The researcher sent e-mails to request interviews at least two times, but could not get any response from many reporters. As a matter of fact, the researcher did not expect high acceptance rate from newspaper reporters because they are very busy and a kind of power group who exert strong influence on the government. However, the rejection rate was higher than expectation. In particular, while the researcher succeeded to interview some nationwide newspaper reporters, he failed to talk to most local newspaper reporters.

In summary, the researcher succeeded to meet most potential interviewees except unexpected cases. This high acceptance rates seem to be related to the researcher’s position as a civil servant working for the central government. More detailed description about the author’s positionality is mentioned in 5.4.1.
Table 5.8 Acceptance rate from different categories of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinction</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Expected numbers</th>
<th>Achieved numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-dam movement actors</td>
<td>Nationwide ENGOs (KFEM, GKU, EJ)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local (E)NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officials</td>
<td>MOCT (Ministry of Construction and Transportation)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KOWACO (Korea Water Corporation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ME (Ministry of Environment)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KEI (Korea Environment Institute)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BAI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>University professors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other experts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newspaper reporters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 Methodological and method issues

5.4.1 Validity issues

Above all, for the validity of data, interviews were conducted with the most appropriate people, who were deeply involved in dam policy making and were well informed of the two dam projects. In addition, most interviews including public officials and NGO activists were relatively senior, who could give a clear answer to questions. However, there might still be concerns about the validity of the data.

Firstly, interview data can receive criticism because of its “subjectivity” (Arksey and Knight, 1999). Even though people participated in the same meeting, their memory of discussion contents might be different. That is, people may interpret the same phenomenon differently according to people’s background and knowledge. In this research, ENGOs might be very positive about their activities, whereas they would not accept their mistakes (Arts, 1998; Arts and Verschuren, 1999; Betsill and Corell, 2008). On the contrary, public officials might be generous to their behaviours, while they criticize environmental protesters’ activities. This factor might be a threat to the validity of the research. This subjectivity issue is also related to
“the positionality of the researcher”, as the researcher is a public official from the MOCT which was one of the conflicting parties. Therefore, even if the researcher argues his impartiality, this concern can be raised.

In addition, there exists “power relationship” between interviewer and interviewees. It is possible that the researcher’s power can affect the results of the interview (Arksey and Knight, 1999). Social actors tend to act on their perception of other actors’ power (Arts and Mack, 2003) and therefore depending on the interviewer there may be some bias in the interview contents. For example, the position of the researcher as a central government official might have an impact on acquiring appropriate answers.

**The positionality of the researcher**

For the above reasons, the positionality of the researcher needs to be dealt with carefully. In general, it is said that the position of a researcher can have a significant influence on both “access to interviewees” and “responses of interviewees” (Cochrane, 1998; Visser, 2000; Herod, 1993; 1999; McDowell, 1998).

- **The researcher’s position and access to interviewees**

As stated previously, the researcher’s position had a positive effect on the access to potential interviewees. The researcher had relatively easy access to them. Public officials, professors, and public agency staff were willing to accept interview requests. Environmental protesters were not also reluctant to meet the researcher. In relation to the access to interviewees, the researcher had a significant advantage, while many students have much difficulties meeting those people. In addition, he had the chance to acquire more information. For instance, the KOWACO staff gave me much information, both by responding to interviews and providing written data. This was the strength of the author’s positionality. Therefore, with respect to the positionality of the researcher, more attention should be paid on its impact on the responses of interviewees.

- **The researcher’s position and response of interviewees**

116
The researcher is a civil servant working for the MLTM (MOCT until 2007) which is the central government. Considering the power relationship between central government and local government (or public agencies) in Korea, the positionality of the researcher might influence interviewees’ answers in any way. Interviewees might have some bias or even prejudice towards the researcher and it is therefore important to control this bias so that it cannot damage the validity of the data.

In this regard, the researcher made great efforts to minimise possible bias. Firstly, interviews were undertaken in a comfortable atmosphere, if possible. Interviews were undertaken wearing casual clothes and proceeded by a period of easy talk before conducting every interview. Efforts were made to seek to minimise the public official image in the interview process. Secondly, it was explained to all interviewees that although the interviewer had worked for the MLTM, this work had not engaged in dam construction projects and the role in MLTM had not directly related to dam construction. Thirdly, it was also clearly emphasised that all interview data would be used only for academic purposes and would not be opened to the public for any other use.

These efforts seem to have resulted in a relatively comfortable atmosphere for interviews. As a result, many interviewees expressed their opinions relatively freely. For example, in addition to anti-dam protesters, some professors and experts severely criticized the dam construction policy of the MLTM in the face of the researcher who is the MLTM official. They said that the MLTM has built dams for its own profit and therefore dam construction policy should be scrapped.

However, in spite of the researcher’s efforts when conducting the interview, it is impossible to completely exclude its impact on interviews. For example, local government officials or the KOWACO staff might not have said what they really thought about some sensitive matters by being conscious about the researcher’s position. For this reason, in the process of data analysis, triangulation technique was used. By cross-checking data from different categories of interviewees, the validity of the data was enhanced.

**Triangulation**
The term triangulation broadly refers to an approach that uses multiple “methods, data sources, researchers, and even theoretical approaches” to grasp complex social reality (Denzin, 1989). However, the emphasis has often tended to be on multiple “methods” and “data sources” (McGrath, Martin and Kulka, 1982; Webb et al, 1981). Therefore, in general, triangulation is considered the use of multiple methods or data sources so that research findings can be adequately grasped through cross-checking (Bryman, 201; Snow and Trom, 2002; Somekh and Lewin, 2005). Triangulation is applied as following; the results of an investigation employing a method (e.g. interview) are cross-checked against the results of using the other method (e.g. secondary analysis). Likewise, the data collected from a kind of source (e.g. A group) are also cross-validated against the data collected from the other source (e.g. B group). Triangulation supports a finding by showing that independent measures agree with it or, at least, do not contradict it (Denzin, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1944). It also generates richer and more detailed analysis about a research topic than any single methodology (Blee and Taylor, 2002; Snow and Trom, 2002).

Through triangulation, this research increased the amount of the information about the cases and tried to overcome the bias which comes out of the power relationship. Two kinds of triangulation – use of multiple methods and data sources – were used as following;

Firstly, in relation to data collection methods, secondary documents were collected with semi-structured interviewing. Secondary documents consist of newspaper articles, anti-dam groups’ statements, and government documents. To describe the time-series accounts of the two anti-dam protests, the researcher initially analysed the relevant newspaper articles and then explored all the statements from anti-dam protesters in their homepage (e.g. Environmental NGOs’ homepage). Government documents (e.g. conflict resolution report) were also explored. Through this process, main events and the activities of main actors were broadly found out. In addition to this, semi-structured interview data strengthened the quality of the information about the anti-dam protests. The combination of secondary document with semi-structured interviewing contributed to analysing the specific contexts surrounding the anti-dam conflicts.

Secondly and more importantly, interview data was collected from different kinds of sources - the anti-dam protesters, government officials, and related stakeholders such as experts and
reporters. Moreover, in relation to government officials, the data was collected from various sources - the MOCT, the ME, and the BAI officials. The reliability of the data was acquired by checking out the consistency of these different sources of data (Denzin, 1978; Patton, 1999). For example, in relation to the access to the political system, most interviewees agreed that under the two administrations, access to decision making was expanded. There was some degree of difference in their view regarding the extent of accessibility; (1) Professional ENGO members accepted more access chances during the period of 1998-2007, even though they often regarded the efforts of the government to communicate as procedural things. (2) The MOCT officials and the KOWACO staff strongly argued that anti-dam protesters had a lot of opportunities to voice their opinions. The ME officials and the KEI staff also said that environmentalists had many access chances to the government and therefore the environmental movement arrived at its zenith. (3) University professors, politicians, and reporters said that under the Kim and Roh administration, ENGOs had many chances to communicate with the government. Even some conservatives severely criticized that the administrations gave ENGOs excessive opportunities. Through this process, the researcher drew the finding that environmentalists had many access chances to the government, because all the different categories of interviewees agreed with the fact, even if the extent to which interviewees agreed with it was somewhat different.

5.4.2 Translation issue

This issue is a challenging problem for international researchers which use English as foreign language. It might happen in the translation of both Korean journals and interview data. An inappropriate translation might lead to a different interpretation, which has a different meaning from the original message and as a result, it has the possibility of being a serious obstacle in the reliability of the data. It is very difficult to find an exact equivalent for certain words in one language. Therefore, the researcher needs to be careful that original meanings are not lost in the translation from Korean to English.

In addition, translation is simply not the matter of language, but the issue of cultural difference (Lee, T. K., 2007). Sentences have their own historical and cultural meaning and therefore, translation is the researcher’s decision making in relation to these meaning. Interview contents in this research have a specific Korean context which is not easy for
foreigners to understand. Therefore, explaining the precise meaning of interview data by overcoming the nuance issue is a very tricky task for a researcher who is not fluent in writing English. The researcher made a great deal of effort in addressing this problem. In particular, the support of bilingualists which are fluent in Korean and English was the great help.

5.4.3 Ethical issues

As mentioned previously, the researcher works for the MOCT (now, MLTM) which took charge of the two dam constructions. However, he has worked in housing supply and local development and has never worked in dam policy making. Therefore, the researcher does not have any specific interest or prejudice towards the two dam policy projects and did not have any acquaintance prior to the field work. In spite of these arguments, impartiality issue can still be raised. This problem was tackled by applying triangulation approach in using data source.

Like other researches, this research has general ethical issues such as honesty and confidentiality. In relation to honesty issue, the purpose, methods, and intended uses of the interview were explained precisely to interviewees. Prior to each meeting, the researcher showed an information sheet which explained the purpose of the research, reason for interviewee involvement and the use of interview data. Furthermore, a signed consent form was received from each participant stating that they agree to take part in an interview. After the approval of interviewees a MP3 player was used as a means to record the interviews. With respect to the confidentiality of interviewees, information gained through interviews was securely held and was not provided to third parties.

5.5 Data analysis

5.5.1 Transcription following fieldwork

After completion of the research interviews, all the data was transcribed. Transcription needed two stages of works – transcription of interview data in Korean and translation of the Korean transcription into English.
The first stage, which was the transcription of interview recordings in Korean, was not a big issue. The researcher completed it within a short period of time. However, translation of the Korean transcription into English was a big challenge. As the researcher is not a native speaker of English, it was a very difficult task to construct English sentences which have the same meaning with the Korean ones. In addition, a translation issue is not only a matter of language, but also one of cultural differences. That is, some expressions can imply a peculiar Korean-specific context which foreigners cannot understand. In this situation, a direct translation of them can distort the real meaning of the interview contents. Therefore, the researcher made efforts to deliver their real meaning in the Korean context, while also if possible maintaining the accuracy of translation.

In this process, several Korean-American or Korean-British, who is fluent in both Korean and English, gave the researcher a lot of support. As they know the nuance of English words along with the Korean context, their support contributed to constructing proper English sentences.

5.5.2 Data categorisation and initial analysis

Following transcription of the data, the data was organized according to the cases – the Dong River dam case and the Hantan River dam case - and was divided into categories based on the anti-dam movements, development authorities, and other related stakeholders.

After categorisation of data, data analysis was carried out. Although computer-assisted data analysis (e.g. Nvivo) was considered a possible analysis tool, it was not selected as it was found out to be inappropriate, because it can remove the contextual meaning of interview contents. Moreover, I did not like to use the computer-based tool as I was not accustomed to using computer software. Therefore, I chose to work on paper by using the colour coding technique. Initial data analysis was the process of drawing out the key elements. Initially, the researcher summarised the arguments of the three groups of actors according to the case. Then, through the comparison between the opinions of the three groups, the common characteristics in each case were extracted as seen in the table 5.8 and 5.9.
Table 5.8 Data categorisation of the Dong River dam case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to the political system</th>
<th>Configuration of actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-dam movement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pro-democracy administration</td>
<td>• Development-oriented government, but listening to environmental groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil society-friendly administration</td>
<td>• Support of the ME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engagement in the EIA process</td>
<td>• Support of local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Many informal meetings with the gov’t, but the gov’t still pushing ahead</td>
<td>• Support of the mass media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint review committee under OPM</td>
<td>• Support of professional experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development authorities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• President’s stress of conversation</td>
<td>• President, generous towards ENGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Numerous meetings with ENGOs</td>
<td>• Support of the ME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MOCT, OP, OPM</td>
<td>• Full support of the mass media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pushing forward – fait accompli</td>
<td>• Support of many experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Related stakeholders</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Many access chances since democratisation</td>
<td>• The government, relatively neutral between development and environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• President Kim stress of conversation</td>
<td>• Support of many social actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The MOCT, many conversations, but basic position of dam construction</td>
<td>- Mass media, experts, local governments, general citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many access chances</td>
<td>Many allies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9 Data categorisation of the Hantan River dam case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to the political system</th>
<th>Configuration of actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-dam movement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Many access chances</td>
<td>• Support of experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engagement in the EIA process</td>
<td>• Change of the ME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Citizen’s audit request system</td>
<td>• Support of a few local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government’s mediation (ME, PCSD), but the government still pushing ahead</td>
<td>• the Mass media’s gradual criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The most NGO-friendly administration</td>
<td>• Citizens’ inattention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development authorities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The most NGO-friendly administration</td>
<td>• Support of some experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Participatory democracy</td>
<td>• Compromise between the MOCT and the ME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Many discussion chances</td>
<td>• Change of local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mediation of the ME</td>
<td>• Mass media’s criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mediation of the PCSD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mediation of the OPM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Related stakeholders</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• President’s stress of communication</td>
<td>• Less allies compared to the Dong River dam case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The ME’s efforts of mediation</td>
<td>• Change of many social actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The PCSD’s efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many access chances</td>
<td>Some allies, but relatively less allies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5.3 Further data analysis

After the initial analysis of each case, the similarities and the differences between the two cases were acquired. Through this process, the key findings were drawn out as follows: In relation to the two dimensions of political opportunity structure, while the access to the political system was continually maintained, the configuration of actors changed over time, even though there were still some allies supporting the anti-dam movements. That is, the positions of various actors towards anti-dam movements changed as seen in the table below and this resulted in the gradual decline in the Korean environmental movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similarities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Many access chances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Participatory government: stress of conversation and compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Formal and informal conversation opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Differences</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Change of related actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Change in the position of the ME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Change in the position of local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Change in the position of the mass media and citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Counter mobilization of pro-development groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the above analysis, the attention of the research was focused on the reason why the political opportunity structure, in particular the configuration of actors, was changed over time. Through initial fieldwork, the researcher had some knowledge of potential factors, but needed more information to have confidence in them. Therefore, follow up interviews which focused on this issue were carried out from September 2010 to March 2011. This process was carried out based on triangulation principle.
Table 5.11 Causes of the change of configuration of actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-dam movement</strong></td>
<td>• Excessive economic incentive for dam site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The MOCT’s compromise: acceptance of flood control dam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Breaking agreement of mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public fatigue for environmental protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development authorities</strong></td>
<td>• Economic support for local government within dam site – carrot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The MOCT’s concession: several effects (environmental conservation, risk reduction, no need of the regulation for water conservation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A lot of communication – justification for decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Backlash against excessive protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Related stakeholders</strong></td>
<td>• Economic benefit: helpful for local development / Lowered risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Real communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Backlash against strong oppositions without realistic alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>• The change of government approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (Substantive term) Incentive: lowered risk / increased benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (Procedural term) Communication: mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Opposition to strong environmental protests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 6 THE CONTEXT OF THE ANTI-DAM PROTEST

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, dam construction and the anti-dam movement in Korea will be explored. In addition, the broad contexts regarding the two anti-dam movements will be explained.

First, the history of dam construction and the process of dam policy making will be examined. In Korea, many dams have been built along with economic development and urbanization since the 1960s (MOCT, 2007; MLTM, 2009 a). However, since democratisation, dam policy making has changed a lot. While a limited number of bureaucratic elites dominated policy making in the authoritarian regime, various actors have participated in decision making since democratisation (Choi, H. S., 2007; Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005). In particular, environmental NGOs and local residents emerged as key actors. ENGOs often organized anti-dam protests in alliance with local residents. While local residents depended heavily on the support of environmental NGOs in the past, they gradually took a more active role and started to organize their own committees and express their own opinions (Ku, 2004 c; Oh, S. K. et al, 2005).

Next, the history of the anti-dam movement and its arguments will be explained. The anti-dam movement does not accept dam construction as a necessary project. They strongly question the necessity of dam construction and rather believe that its negative effects far outweigh any possible benefits.

Lastly, the contexts of the two case studies – the Dong River dam and the Hantan River dam case - will be explained. Together with the reasons why those dam projects were planned, the main actors of anti-dam movements and their motivations for opposition protests will be explored. The two dam projects display many similarities in background, movement actors, and their arguments, although the outcomes were different. The detailed explanation will be given below.

6.2 Dam construction in Korea
6.2.1 History of dam construction

**Dam construction since 1900s**

- **1910 - 1945**

During this period, Korea was under the rule of Japan and the main purpose of dam construction was to secure food production to meet the Japanese demands (Lee, S. H., 2002; MOCT, 2007). Therefore, most dams were reservoir dams to irrigate rice fields. However, after 1940, many hydroelectricity dams were also built, because Japan required electricity generation for the war support (Hong, S. T., 2004, 2007 b; Lee, S. H., 2002; MOCT, 2007).

- **1945 - 1960s**

In 1945, Korea achieved independence from Japanese colonialism. However, in 1950, the Korean War broke out and the whole infrastructure including water resource systems were destroyed (MOCT, 2007). After the Korean War, the Korean government started to build dams to satisfy increasing water demand (Lee, S. H., 2002). At that time, most dams were single-purpose dams.

- **1960s - 1980s**

In this period, alongside remarkable economic development and urbanization, dam construction significantly increased (Lee, S. H., 2002). The characteristic of this phase was the construction of multi, rather than single, purpose dams. The multi-purpose dams simultaneously carried out the function of water provision, flood control, and electricity generation and were recognized as the most effective strategy for water resource development.

  In this period, particularly large-scale multi-purpose dams were constructed in the four major rivers (MOCT, 2007).

- **1990s-Present**

During this period, the focus of dam construction was moved to make medium-scale multi-purpose dams in individual rivers, following the construction of large dams in major rivers. Moreover, while the government focused on the quantitative supply of water resources in the
past, it has taken more interest in the qualitative improvement such as water quality. As of 2010, Korea has about 18,000 dams including 17 multi-purpose dams as shown in the table below.

Table 6.1 Dams in Korea: Numbers according to type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dam type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-purpose dam</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams for domestic and industrial water</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams for power generation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood control dams</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River’s edge dams</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservoirs for agricultural purposes</td>
<td>17,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,910</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.2.2 Policy making process

The policy making process of dam construction can broadly be broken down into four areas: planning, feasibility study, design and construction. These four stages will be discussed in more detail below.

- **Planning**

(Water resource plan) The central plan regarding dam construction is the long range comprehensive water resource plan which is produced every 20 years (MLTM, 2009 a). It is a kind of blue print suggesting the future direction of all water resource policies including dam construction. This plan is made after the forecast of the demand and the supply of water resources based on river basin investigation.

(Dam construction plan) Based on the above plan, the government sets up the long range plan of dam construction which is also a 10 year plan (MLTM, 2009 a). While the water resource plan is a non-legal plan, the dam construction plan is a legal plan which is established by law. According to this plan, the government confirms new dam construction sites and priorities for construction. A dam construction plan is produced by the Ministry of
Construction and Transportation (MOCT) through prior consultations with related ministries such as environment ministry.

- **Feasibility studies**

While various dam projects can be broadly included in the long range plan, the feasibility of an individual dam project is actually examined in this stage. Feasibility studies are composed of the evaluation of economic, environmental, and technical feasibility.

**(PFS)** The Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MSF) conducts the Preliminary Feasibility Study (PFS) for over $50 million public projects in terms of economic validity before the budget is set. The PFS was introduced to judge the necessity of national investment carefully. If a project is not accepted as economically feasible, it cannot be undertaken.

**(PERS)** The Ministry of Environment (ME) carries out the Prior Environmental Review System (PERS). It analyzes the negative effects of development projects on the environment and decides whether the dam construction is environmentally feasible. If a project is not accepted as feasible, it can be cancelled or be changed.

**(FS)** After the PFS and the PERS are completed, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT) carries out the Feasibility Study (FS) on its own. In this stage, the MOCT analyses the technical feasibility of dam construction on the premise that the project is economically feasible.

**(Public notice)** After the feasibilities of the project are examined, the MOCT can give public notice of the basic plan. This public notice means that the necessity of the dam project was justified and so the implementation is carried out.

- **Design & Construction**

**(Design)** While the above phases are related to policy formulation, these stages pertain to policy implementation. In these stages, the Korea Water Resources Corporation (KOWACO) makes a detailed design for a dam project.
(EIA) Once the design is completed, the MOCT discusses environmental impacts with the ME. In this stage, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is carried out with the intention of reducing its negative impacts after dam construction is already decided, whereas the Prior Environmental Review System (PERS) in the feasibility study has the role of judging whether dam construction itself can be approved.

The KOWACO makes the report of environmental impacts and measures to reduce them and explains it to local residents. Then, local governments and local residents suggest their opinions and the KOWACO present the final report to the ME after considering their opinions. Finally, the ME suggests its opinion with the support of the Korea Environment Institute (KEI) which is the professional EIA examination institution.

(Public notice) After the EIA discussion is completed, the MOCT can confirm a detailed plan and give a public notice of it. In addition, the KOWACO can actually build dams.

Policy making process in the “case studies”

However, research fieldwork informed that the Preliminary Feasibility Study (PFS) by the MSF and the Prior Environmental Review System (PERS) by the ME have been introduced since 2000. Therefore, the two dam projects did not go through these two processes. As a result, the policy making process in the case studies was like that in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1 Policy making process and main actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Acting Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long range comprehensive water resource plan</td>
<td>MOCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long range plan of Dam Construction</td>
<td>MOCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS (Feasibility Study)</td>
<td>MOCT → KOWACO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Notice of Basic Plan</td>
<td>MOCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic &amp; Detailed Design</td>
<td>KOWACO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment)</td>
<td>MOCT (KOWACO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>↔ ME (KEI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Notice of Detailed Plan</td>
<td>MOCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>KOWACO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Notice of Completion of Dam Project</td>
<td>MOCT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MLTM (2009 a)
6.2.3 Main actors in policy making

The government actors related to policy making are the institutions in charge of dam construction (e.g. MOCT, KOWACO) and the institutions which examine environmental impacts (e.g. ME, KEI). As previously mentioned, as the PFS was not introduced yet in those two cases, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MSF) was not one of the main actors. There were also actors such as local governments, environmental NGOs, and local residents.

- **Institutions in charge of dam construction**: MOCT and KOWACO

Korea’s infrastructure investment depends considerably on the public sector. In particular, water resource development has been largely shaped by the MOCT and the KOWACO. The MOCT is responsible for formulating dam construction policies such as the water resource plan and the dam construction plan (MLTM, 2009 a). Once the MOCT makes policy decisions, the KOWACO carries out policy implementation.

- **Institutions examining environmental impact**: ME and KEI

Through the EIA system, the ME estimates the negative effects of a development project on the natural environment and requests development organizations to take measures to reduce the negative environmental impacts. However, as the ME does not have the expertise to carry out the EIA, it requests the Korea Environment Institute (KEI), which is a professional EIA review institution, to carry out the EIA (KEI, undated).

- **Other institutions checking the impact of dam construction**: BAI

Aside from the ME, there are other institutions to examine the feasibility of dam construction; For example, the forest service and the cultural heritage administration check the impact of dam construction in terms of forest and national heritage and they can raise its problems. In particular, the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) is an important institution because it examines the problem of government projects and requests the correction of project plans. Many infrastructure projects were often reviewed by the BAI and they were changed according to its requests. Compared with other countries, the BAI lies under the control of the
president in Korea. Therefore, it can actually do the audit with the approval of the president (Cho, J. H., 2006).

- **Local governments**

When the MOCT establishes a dam construction plan, it listens to the opinions of local governments. Local governments suggest their opinions about dam construction representing local residents. In Korea, local governments are broadly composed of 16 provincial (or metropolitan) level governments and county level governments. Since 1995, the heads of local governments have been elected by local residents and they have often been seen to raise questions regarding national projects because of the opposition of local residents in spite of their reliance on the financial support of government (Jeong, H. S., 2002).

- **Local residents**

Local residents are one of the most important stakeholders. In the past, they did not have many chances to voice their opinions. In fact, they did not know about dam construction until its implementation because policy making was largely shaped by a limited number of bureaucrats and experts (Joo, 2005). Nowadays they know about dam construction earlier through long range plans of water resources or dam construction. However, in most cases, their opinions can only be voiced through the EIA process (Joo, 2005).

Local residents are generally divided into two groups – those who live downstream and those who reside upstream of the river (OPM, 2000; OPM and KDI, 2009; PCSD, 2005). Both parties have complex views in relation to dam construction. Local residents living upstream generally oppose it because they do not have any advantages (Raina, 2000). Dam construction can cause flooding in their villages by reversing the current and submerging their homes. It can also result in various regulations being imposed on residents to conserve the water within the dam. On the contrary, the position of residents residing downstream is somewhat different. They do not oppose dam construction because they are the very persons that will lose everything through flood damage.

- **Environmental NGOs**
Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) are not necessarily inhabitants who live in areas affected by a dam, but are some of the most important stakeholders in dam policy making. As explained in Chapter 3, their involvement in government decision making has been conspicuous since the 1990s in Korea. They often organize local residents or make coalitions with residents’ committees. While in the early 1990s, central NGOs played a major role in the environmental movement, after the establishment of local autonomy in 1995, locally based NGOs have rapidly increased (Lee, Y. S., 2004). ENGOs strongly object to the government’s dam construction because firstly, they think that it destroys the environment and community and secondly, that dams have no effect in preventing flooding.

Change of policy making characteristics

While in the past a limited number of actors dominated dam decision making, now more of them have started to participate in that process (Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005; Lim and Tang, 2002). In relation to this change, it has been stated that that the policy making on dam construction has changed from “policy monopoly”, which is characterized by its closed membership to “issue network”, which includes various participants (Choi, H. S., 2007; Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005).

According to their studies, before the 1990s, dam construction policy was led by a limited group of people comprising the MOCT, the KOWACO, private companies and professional experts. However, since democratisation, the participation of various stakeholders in policy making has greatly expanded. Significantly, the newly emerged network of opposition is now composed of environmental NGOs, local activists and residents. As a result, nowadays, the pro-dam group and the anti-dam group have formed an issue network and interact with each other.

6.3 The anti-dam movement in Korea

6.3.1 History of the anti-dam movement

Anti-dam movement in Korea

- Prior to democratisation
The history of the anti-dam movement is not very long in Korea. Prior to democratisation, government projects were accepted as absolute and unchangeable (Hong, S. T., 2004, 2007 a, 2007 b; Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005). Even though their property rights were violated without compensation, citizens accepted state projects in the name of national development or public interest. There was no exception in dam construction projects. At that time, there were no environmental organizations with professional expertise and local residents did not raise objections to dam construction (Hong, S. T., 2004). The protests of local residents, if any, were limited to anti-pollution (Ku, 2000, 2004 a) and therefore it is difficult to find evidence related to opposition action against dam construction (Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005).

- **Since democratisation**

All the conspicuous protests have occurred since democratisation (Hong, S. T., 2004, 2007 a, 2007 b; Lee, M. C., 2005). However, initial protests did not develop into organized movements and stayed as local residents’ expression of discontentment about the damage to their property and the loss of the community (Kookmin Ilbo, 1992; Seoul Shinmun, 1992; Yonhap News, 1996). For example, local residents staged protests against the Tamjin dam or Yongdam dam, but their protests did not develop into organized movements. Organized anti-dam movements have started with the participation of ENGOs which have emerged since 1993 (Lee, S. J., 2000 a). The anti-Jiri Mountain dam movement and the anti-Jumbong Mountain dam movement were actively staged with the participation of environmental NGOs. In particular, the anti-Naerin dam movement was conducted with close cooperation between local residents and ENGOs and finally frustrated the dam construction plan, even though it was cancelled in the planning phase.

However, above all, the highlights of the Korean anti-dam movement are the opposition movements against the Dong River dam and the Hantan River dam. The anti-Dong River dam movement developed into a national movement with the widespread support of social actors and cancelled the dam construction, and the anti-Hantan River dam movement stopped dam construction for over 8 years through the strong protests. Compared with the past anti-dam movements, they started to question the fundamental issues such as the effect of dam construction.
Table 6.2 Anti-dam movements in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dam</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiri mountain dam</td>
<td>ENGOs opposed the dam construction within the national park, but they failed.</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy &amp; Korea Electric Power Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jumbong mountain dam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Apr 1995-1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naerin stream dam</td>
<td>The Naerin stream dam project was cancelled at its planning stage.</td>
<td>Ministry of Construction and Transportation &amp; Korea Water Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Apr 1997-Jan 1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong river dam</td>
<td>The anti-Dong River dam movement started after the government confirmed the construction plan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hantian river dam</td>
<td>The anti-Hantan River dam movement also started after the government confirmed the construction plan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Oct 2002 – 2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Homepages of the KFEM, GKU, and EJ

Table 6.2 shows main anti-dam protests in Korea. While dams for water supply and flood control have been constructed by the MOCT and the KOWACO, dams for electricity generation have been built by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MCIE) and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). The MCIE and the KEPCO were strongly criticized for destroying national parks when they built a couple of electricity generation dams in the mountains within national parks. However, as many dams have been mainly built for water supply and flood control, most anti-dam movements were in opposition against the MOCT and the KOWACO.

6.3.2 Position of the government

In this section, the necessity of dam construction at present will be explained. This is the Korean government’s argument regarding the necessity of dams. The MOCT argues that Korea will face a water shortage in the near future and dams still need to be built for the time being to secure sufficient water supply. It also argues that to prevent persistent flood damage, dam construction is inevitable. Detailed explanation will be given below.

*Water availability is insufficient*

Korea gets an average precipitation of about 1,245mm annually, which is 1.4 times higher than the world average 880mm. However, the average annual precipitation per capita is...
2,591 m$^3$ which is only about one eighth of the world average 19,635 m$^3$ (MOCT, 2007; MLTM, 2009 a, 2009 b).

Table 6.3 Average precipitation in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>World average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average precipitation (mm)</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>1,718</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precipitation per capita (m$^3$/year)</td>
<td>2,591</td>
<td>5,107</td>
<td>4,693</td>
<td>25,002</td>
<td>4,959</td>
<td>174,016</td>
<td>19,635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOCT (2007)

The low annual precipitation per capita is caused by the seasonal disproportionate distribution of its precipitation. Korea is located in a temperate monsoon zone and 2/3 of the annual precipitation is concentrated during a relatively short period in the summer between June and September (Lee, S. H., 2002; MOCT, 2007; MLTM, 2009 a, 2009 b; Noh, 2009). Due to this seasonal disproportionate distribution, it is very difficult to preserve water and avoid drought problems. The topographical condition should be considered as well. Unlike European countries that have several large plains, 65% of the land in Korea is mountainous and so channel slopes of rivers are relatively steep (Lee, S. H., 2002; MOCT, 2007; MLTM, 2009 a, 2009 b; Noh, 2009). The length of rivers is also relatively short. For these geographical reasons, when a heavy rainfall comes, much potential water resource is swept away by floods immediately.

Figure 6.2 Average monthly precipitations in Korea

Source: MOCT (2007)
In addition, there has been an increase in water demand due to a rise in the standard of living, urbanization and industrialization. Water demand has increased by an average of 1.6 percent a year until the latter 1990s and it is still expected that even if not much, a moderate increase of water demand will continue (MOCT, 2007; MLTM, 2009 a, 2009 b; Noh, 2009).

Table 6.4 Change of water use pattern in Korea (Unit: billion m$^3$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross use</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOCT (2007)

Based on the supply and demand of water, the Korean government considers that Korea might arrive at a water shortage in the near future and therefore dam construction still need to be maintained as a strategy for water resource development (Noh, 2009).

Table 6.5 Forecasted water deficit in Korea (Unit: billion m$^3$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water demand</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOCT (2007)

**Flood damage needs to be prevented**

Both the climate factor and the topographical conditions have resulted in frequent floods which caused considerable damage. Major floods in Korea are shown in the table below. These floods occurred because of torrential rains and typhoons during the summer and caused the huge losses of both life and property. Therefore the government argues that to prevent serious flood damage, dam construction is necessary.
6.3.3 Position of the anti-dam movement

While dam construction was considered indispensable in the past, this trend has started to be challenged since the 1990s. ENGOs have raised questions about the necessity of dam construction. Local residents have also objected to dam construction in terms of community breakdown and economic loss. Detailed explanation will be given below.

**Environmental destruction and community breakdown**

The most fundamental reason why environmental groups criticize dam constructions is that they result in environmental destruction and community breakdown (Hong, S. T., 2004). They argue that dams are the symbol of ecological destruction. Normal passing ways of territorial animals are hindered since the dam works as a barrier. The upstream fish movement aiming for ovulation and feeding is prevented and thus fish population decrease significantly (Stott and Smith, 2001). Moreover, the stagnant, big scaled mass of water might result in climatic change around dam sites. For humans, the crucial disadvantage of dam construction is community breakdown and relocation problems. The construction of dams submerges a large area and forces many people to relocate. Relocation has a negative impact on the life of residents (Hong, S. T., 2004, 2007 b). In addition, the places that have value in terms of geology, archaeology and history can disappear after lying under the reservoir (Raina, 2000; Tahmiscioglu, M. S. et al, 2007).

**Water deficit is not serious**

Table 6.6 Major floods in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.9-12</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.19-30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.31-8.18 (typhoon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4-11 (typhoon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.30-9.1 (typhoon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.12-13 (typhoon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths/Missing (person)</td>
<td>187,265</td>
<td>24,146</td>
<td>24,531</td>
<td>25,327</td>
<td>8,107</td>
<td>88,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood Sufferers (person)</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>2,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage (million £)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>2,574</td>
<td>2,111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Archives of Korea (NAK, 2007)
With the above possible negative effects of dam construction, environmental groups directly raise questions against the arguments of the government. They do not believe a water shortage in the future, arguing that the estimate of water shortage by the KOWACO was fabricated and water conservation will be enough to meet the increased demands (Lee, S. J., 2000 b, 2000c). Environmental groups point out that water supply pipes are so old that a considerable amount of water has been leaked before it may be delivered to the users. Therefore, the replacement of old pipes will offset additional water supply (Lee, S. J., 2000 b). Moreover, they assert that because of its low price, water has been wasted in Korea compared to other countries and thus this waste should be corrected (Rhee, 1999).

Environmental groups argue that the supply-oriented policy depending much on dam construction is problematic (Hong, S. T., 2004; 2007 b; Rhee, 1999). They see that it is the remains of a high-speed economic growth policy in the 1960s and 1970s and the government has depended on the ceaseless construction of dams without making any effort to seek other alternatives to manage water supply and prevent floods.

**Flood control should be covered by other measures**

In terms of flood control, anti-dam movements do not accept the flood control effect of dam. They argue that in spite of numerous dam constructions, flood damage did not reduce and rather increased. Therefore, dam construction is not an effective way for flood control. In addition, they question whether dams can prevent the present torrential rains (Choi, D. J., 2007). They say that Korean floods since the 1990s were caused by flash flooding and consider dams to be an inadequate measure to stop this unexpected heavy rain. Based on these reasons, environmental groups argue that the government needs to move away from dam-oriented policies and adopt environment-friendly policies. For example, they feel that alternative measures such as making forests or flood detention should be adopted.

**There are too many dams in Korea**

Environmental groups argue that there are already many large dams in Korea. According to the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), a large dam is 15 meters or higher from the foundation. If dams are between 5 - 15 meters and have a reservoir volume of more than 3 million m$^3$, they are also classified as large dams. Korea is considered one of the largest dam building nations - 7th ranking country in the world according to the 1998 ICOLD
data. Moreover, it is said that Korea is the 1st largest dam nation considering the nation’s total land area. Therefore, they argue that dam construction should be stopped.

Table 6.7 Number of large dams according to country (top 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dams</td>
<td>1,855</td>
<td>6375</td>
<td>4,011</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.4 The context of the Dong River dam case

6.4.1 Dam project outline

Project background

The need for constructing the Dong River dam was raised by the heavy floods in the 1990s. The most direct reason was the flood damage around the upper South Han River in 1990. In September 1990, a disastrous flood, which could be considered a 100-year flood, caused serious damage to residents’ lives and properties in both Gangwon and Gyeonggi Province. In particular, the damage of Yeongwol County in Gangwon Province was serious. Because of heavy rain, the Dong River Bridge was submerged, 2,671 homes were devastated and 11,012 people were forced to seek shelter in makeshift relief camps (OPM, 2000). In the Seoul metropolitan area, there were 179 life damages and £250 million worth of damage. This flood finally resulted in the dismissal of the minister of the Ministry of Construction (MOC). Some of Yeongwol residents strongly requested that the government should build a dam quickly to prevent flooding when the President visited Yeongwol County to look around the flooded villages (OPM, 2000).

In addition, there was another flood in the lowest South Han River in 1995 and local residents barely escaped serious flood damage because river water did not flow over the embankment. However, it was almost close to inundation. This flood caused 54 deaths and £200 million of damage. After the flood, local residents severely criticized that this flood was not a natural flood, but a man-made flood which came out of an inadequate flood prevention system and requested that the government should take thorough measures.
The South Han River is much more vulnerable to floods because it has only one dam (the Chungju dam) in a large basin area (12,929 km$^2$), whereas the North Han River is relatively safe from floods because it has 6 dams in a smaller basin area (10,899 km$^2$) (Chosun Ilbo, 2006; MOCT, 2007). Under this circumstance, floods in 1990 and 1995 caused serious damage to both lives and properties. There might have had more damage if river water had flowed over the embankment. Therefore, the argument that the dam is necessary to prevent floods in the South Han River area was raised.
In addition, the MOCT forecasted that Korea would fall in the category of a water shortage country in the 2000s and planned to construct additional multipurpose dams by 2011. Under this circumstance, the Dong river dam also included water supply as its main purpose for construction.

Construction site

The Dong River dam was planned in the Gangwon province, more specifically along Yeongwol (YW), Jeongseon (JS), and Pyeongchang (PC) counties within it. There was the Chungju dam in the middle of the South Han River and therefore the Dong River was judged as the best option to locate a dam in the upper river to prevent flooding most effectively (OPM, 2000). As a matter of fact, the necessity of the Dong River dam construction had been examined many times (1957, 1958, 1962, 1974, 1985, and 1988) since the Japanese colonial period (OPM, 2000).

Figure 6.5 Location of the planned Dong River dam

Source: Author (YW: Yeongwol, JS: Jeongseon, PC: Pyeongchang)

Project profile

The overview of the Dong River dam project is shown in the table below. The Dong River dam was planned as a multi-functional dam which includes water supply, flood control, and electricity generation, even though the initial purpose was mainly flood control (Cho, K. H. et
al., 2002). According to the ICOLD’s criterion, the proposed Dong River dam was a large dam (Height 98m). It was also a big dam considering water storage capacity (698 million m$^3$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinction</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dam size</td>
<td>Height 98m, Length 325m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water storage capacity</td>
<td>698 million m$^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood control capacity</td>
<td>200 million m$^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity generation</td>
<td>19,600 KW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submerged area</td>
<td>21.9 km$^2$ (526 households to be evacuated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>£ 500 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Dam construction process**

Decision making regarding the construction of the dam was made in a short time through a top-down approach (Cho, K. H. et al., 2002; Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005). As mentioned above, after several incidents of flood damage in September 1990, President Roh Tae Woo went on an inspection of the areas damaged by the flood and heard Yeongwol residents’ request for dam construction (OPM, 2000). Immediately after that, President Roh announced “A Permanent Anti-Flood Plan of the Han River Region” on 16 October and dam construction feasibility studies began on 28th December, which took 2 years (Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005; OPM, 2000). As soon as the feasibility studies began, the MOCT officially announced the construction of the Dong River dam in January 1991 (Cho, K. H. et al, 2002; Kim, J. K. and Lee, 2005; OPM, 2000).

In summary, in response to severe flood damage, the President ordered that appropriate measures be taken and therefore a dam construction plan was quickly established by the MOCT and the KOWACO. The necessity of dam construction was accepted as being sufficient because there was serious flood damage as a result of there being only one dam in the South Han River. As explained above, the Preliminary Feasibility Study (PFS) and the Prior Environmental Review System (PERS) were not in place at that time. Therefore, after
the dam construction plan had been established, only the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) was discussed to reduce the negative environmental impacts.

6.4.2 Anti-dam movement actors

Actors involved in the anti-Dong River dam movement are composed of ENGOs and local residents. ENGOs and local residents’ committees formed an alliance and staged the anti-dam movement.

Above all, ENGOs played the most important role in the anti-Dong River dam movement (Hong, S. M., 2002; Lee, S. J., 2000 b, 2000 c). They organized the opposition of local residents and led the anti-dam movement. The ENGOs might be comprised of two broad categories; Central NGOs and local NGOs. However, at that time, local NGOs did not develop much (Moon, 2001) and local NGOs involved in this issue were just local branches of major ENGOs. That is, in the Dong River dam case, central ENGOs played a leading role (Park, S. Y., 2001). Among central ENGOs, the Korean Federation of Environmental Movement (KFEM) led the anti-dam movement (Cho, K. H. et al, 2002; Hong, S. M., 2002; Lee, S. J., 2000 c). With the leadership of the KFEM, which is the biggest ENGO in the Asia, the anti-Dong River dam movement developed into national movement.

In addition, local residents around the Dong River dam site opposed the dam construction. Some local residents of Yeongwol, Pyeongchang, and Jeongseon County participated in the anti-dam movement. They organized “the joint committee of 3 counties for the Yeongwol dam cancellation” and formed the alliance with central ENGOs. Initially, Jeongseon County residents who reside upstream of the Dong River expressed active opposition because they had many disadvantages caused by dam construction. However, later, Yeongwol County residents who live downstream actively participated in the anti-dam movement after they recognized the ecological importance of the Dong River and heard about the safety of the dam. The diagram below shows main actors involved in the Dong River dam movement.
6.4.3 Anti-dam movement’s arguments

The main discontents of the anti-Dong River dam movement were composed of two broad categories: discontent with policy contents and policy actors.

- **Discontent with policy contents**

Table 6.9 NGOs involved in the anti-Dong River dam movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central NGOs</th>
<th>ENGOs</th>
<th>Set up</th>
<th>Main concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KFEM</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Korea United</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive environmental issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Justice</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uiryeong conservation</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conservation of mountain and river</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGOs</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>Baekdudaegan conservation (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
<td>Local branches of KFEM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Focusing on local issue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author
Firstly, the anti-dam movement focused attention on the ecological diversity around the dam site and criticized the government’s plan to build a dam in this beautiful area (KFEM, 1997-2000). According to ENGOs, there is much endangered wildlife and rare species of plants around the river. They argued that the Dong River is a kind of ecological museum with 30 species of mammals, 72 species of birds, 34 species of fishes and 300 species of plants (Kim, H. J., 1999; Lee, S. Y., 2004). There are also beautiful limestone caves (e.g. Baikryung cave) and splendid cliffs around the river. Furthermore, anti-dam groups argued that the Dong River area is the place full of national sentiment and cultural inheritance (KFEM, 1997-2000; Kim H. J., 1999). According to them, it is the birthplace of the Jeongseon Arirang, the Korean folk song which has been sung for hundred years by ferrymen.

Secondly, anti-dam groups were dubious of the role of the dam in flood control (KFEM, 1997-2000). They argued that the dam has limitations in controlling regional torrential rains and it is necessary to find alternatives such as flood detention or forest (Lee, S. J., 2000 b, 2000 c). Moreover, they argued that the Yeongwol County already made drainage pumps and increased the height of embankments and it is not necessary to build the Dong River dam. They insisted that even if the dam were to be built, a small single-purpose dam in the upper valley would be sufficient (Lee, S. J., 2000 c).

Thirdly, the anti-dam movement argued that water supply would be enough to meet future demand, whereas the government has warned of the lack of water in the near future (KFEM, 1997-2000). ENGOs insisted that the estimate of water shortage was exaggerated and water conservation would be enough to meet the increased demands (Lee, S. J., 2000 b, 2000 c). They also argued that demand-side management is necessary rather than a supply-oriented policy (Rhee, 1999). The replacement of old pipes and the adjustment of water rate would simply offset the additional water supply by the Dong River dam (Rhee, 1999).

Fourthly, ENGOs warned that the dam site is not appropriate in terms of safety (KFEM, 1997-2000). They insisted that it is situated in the limestone area which is weak against shock and is particularly exposed to earthquake risk (Chosun Ilbo, 1999 b; Park, J. K., 1999). ENGOs insisted that there is a high possibility the dam in the limestone area could collapse anytime because of earthquakes.
• Distrust of policy actors

Together with the discontent with the project, anti-dam groups had a distrust of policy actors.

Firstly, ENGOs argued that the government was very development-oriented and depended on large-scale construction projects, though there was no desperate need to make dams (KFEM, 1997-2000). They regarded the Korean government as a construction state and criticized that the Kim administration, which emerged after the economic crisis in 1997, pursued development-oriented policies. They also argued that the MOCT and the KOWACO pushed forward dam construction for their own profits, calling them “construction mafia” or “dam mafia”.

Secondly, ENGOs argued that the policy making process for dam construction was just procedural process to justify the dam construction (KFEM, 1997-2000). According to them, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) simply considered the method to lessen environmental impact after the dam construction had already been decided. They claimed that the EIA should be capable of stopping policy projects, if they are undesirable, but the EIA did not have “no action” option.

6.5 The context of the Hantan River dam case

6.5.1 Dam project outline

Project background

The Hantan River dam was initially proposed as a multipurpose dam focusing on water supply because 361.7 million m³/year of water scarcity around the Imjin River area was forecasted (BAI, 2005; OPM and KDI, 2009). However, in 1996, 1998, and 1999, there were serious floods in the lower Imjin River areas (BAI, 2005; OPM & KDI, 2009; PCSD, 2005). In 1996, a concentrated rainfall measuring over 600 mm in the Imjin river basin overwhelmed the Yeoncheon dam’s flood control capacity and flooded the downstream region. The Yeoncheon dam even collapsed. In August 1998, another severe rainfall fell across the Imjin River area and resulted in 14,776 affected people and £155 million of property damage. In 1999, rainfall of over 700 mm in the Imjin river basin destroyed the
Yeoncheon dam once again, and this caused severe flood damage in Paju and Yeoncheon County. In summary, Gyeonggi residents around the Imjin River suffered heavy flood damage including 232 deaths owing to 3 massive downpours between 1996 and 1999. Under this circumstance, the necessity of a dam construction was raised to prevent future flooding.

Figure 6.7 Submerged Paju in Gyeonggi province and collapsed Yeoncheon dam

![Image of submerged Paju and collapsed Yeoncheon dam]

Source: National Archives of Korea (NAK, 2007)

However, two-thirds of the Imjin River is under the occupation and control of North Korea. Thus, the government could not plan a big-sized dam in the Upper Imjin River because the construction of a big-sized dam in the Imjin River will submerge the part of North Korea’s territory. Therefore, the government decided to make a small-sized dam in the Imjin River and to make another dam in the Hantan River instead (BAI, 2005; OPM & KDI, 2009; PCSD, 2005). The Hantan River is the biggest of the Imjin River tributaries (The Hantan River accounts for 30 percent of the Imjin River’s basin area) and thus the government thought the Hantan River might be the second best option to control the Imjin River flood. Therefore, the government established “A Comprehensive Anti-Flood Plan of the Imjin River Region” centering on the Hantan River dam construction. Based on this plan, the KOWACO finalized a blueprint for the Hantan River Dam construction. Water supply was included in the purpose of dam construction to prepare for water shortage in a dry season. In the long run, the Hantan River dam was planned as a multi-functional dam.
Construction site

As explained above, the Hantan River dam was introduced to prevent floods in the lower Imjin River areas (e.g. Paju and Yeoncheon in Gyeonggi Province). However, because of geographical reasons, the government decided to build the dam in the Hantan River instead of the Imjin River. The Hantan River dam site ranged between the Gyeonggi province and Gangwon province, even though the larger part of the site is located in the Gyeonggi province. More specifically, the dam site is located along Yeoncheon (YC, 23%) and Pocheon (PC, 74%) County in Gyeonggi Province and Cheorwon (CW, 3%) County in Gangwon Province.
Project overview

The overview of the Hantan River dam project is shown in the table below. The Hantan River dam was planned as a multi-functional dam which includes water supply, flood control, and electricity generation, even though its main function was to prevent floods (BAI, 2005; PCSD, 2005). Although the Hantan River dam was relatively small compared to the Dong River dam, it was certainly a large dam (Height 85m) according to the ICOLD’s criterion.

Table 6.10 Profile of the proposed Hantan River dam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinction</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dam size</td>
<td>Height 85m, Length 705m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water storage capacity</td>
<td>311 million m$^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood control capacity</td>
<td>305 million m$^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity generation</td>
<td>56.6 GWh / year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submerged area</td>
<td>15.3 km$^2$ (299 households to be evacuated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>£ 500 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dam construction process**

Decision making related to the Hantan River dam was promptly made through a top-down approach (BAI, 2005; PCSD, 2005). After a series of serious floods, on 28 December 1999, the Office of the President ordered that the MOCT should establish a master plan to prevent floods in the Imjin River (BAI, 2005; OPM and KDI, 2009). According to this order, the MOCT and the KOWACO carefully examined anti-flood measures and finally established “A Comprehensive Anti-Flood Plan of the Imjin River Region” focusing on the Hantan River dam construction on 25th March in 2002.

Like the Dong River dam case, the dam construction plan was largely decided by the MOCT and the KOWACO after the order of the President. There were not the PFS (Preliminary Feasibility Study) and the PERS (Prior Environmental Review System) in the Hantan River dam case. Therefore, after the necessity of dam construction was accepted as an established fact, only the EIA was discussed to reduce the negative environmental impacts.

**6.5.2 Anti-dam movement actors**

Actors involved in the anti-Hantan River dam movement were as follows. Like the Dong River dam case, environmental NGOs and local residents’ committees formed an alliance and staged the anti-dam movement. However, there were some differences between the two cases. Unlike the Dong River dam case, locally based NGOs actively participated in the movement, even although central NGOs still played a role. In the anti-Hantan River dam movement, local NGOs made contributions to organizing local residents and delivering their opinions to the government.

With the leadership of local NGOs, some residents of Yeoncheon, Pochon and Cherlwon County around the Hantan River dam site participated in the anti-dam movement and they organized “the Anti-Hantan River dam countermeasure committee”. In particular, Cherlwon County residents in the Upper Hantan River staged strong protests because of the disadvantages caused by dam construction. Local residents formed an alliance with central ENGOs and staged protests against the government. Among central NGOs, the KFEM still
lay in the centre of the anti-dam movement. The diagram below shows main actors involved in the Hantan river dam movement.

Figure 6.10 Main actors involved in the anti-Hantan River dam movement

![Diagram of main actors involved in the anti-Hantan River dam movement](source: Author)

Table 6.11 NGOs involved in the anti-Hantan River dam movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGOs</th>
<th>Set up</th>
<th>Main concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFEM</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Comprehensive environmental issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Korea United</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Justice</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hantan river network</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Conservation of the environment around the Hantan River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic group promoting</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The issues related to the Yeoncheon County (Civic group focusing on environmental issues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeoncheon County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeoncheon Forum</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

6.5.3 Anti-dam movement’s arguments

This section explains the motivations of the anti-Hantan River dam movement. They are similar to the anti-Dong River dam movement’s motivations. They are also composed of the two broad categories:

- **Discontent with policy contents**
Firstly, the anti-Hantan River dam movement argued that the Hantan River is the Korean Grand Canyon which has a beautiful natural environment and cultural heritage (Civic group Promoting Yeoncheon County, 2000-2007; Hantan Love, 2003-2007; Hantan River Network, 2000-2007; KFEM, 2000-2007; PCSD, 2005). Local NGOs and residents argued that the dam construction would destroy the ecological system and cultural assets around the Hantan River. According to them, the Hantan River area is an ecological museum where rare animals and plants such as otter, eagle owl and Siberian chrysanthemum live (Monthly Mal, 2001). In addition, it is a treasure house of Old Stone Age culture and there is a possibility that unfound prehistoric relics could be submerged by the dam construction. It is difficult to excavate unfound relics after damming. Furthermore, the dam construction could submerge beautiful Jaein waterfall, dove cliff, pillar-shaped joint, and basalt valleys which are rare in Korea (Monthly Mal, 2000, 2001).

Secondly, anti-dam groups raised strong questions regarding the flood control function of the Hantan River dam, pointing out that while the Imjin River is a main river, the Hantan River is just a small stream that leads off from the main Imjin River (Civic Group Promoting Yeoncheon County, 2000-2007; Hantan Love, 2003-2007; Hantan River Network, 2000-2007; KFEM, 2000-2007; PCSD, 2005). They also insisted that the Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) of the dam construction was actually very low (Monthly Mal, 2001) and it was exaggerated by the MOCT and the KOWACO (Kim, N. J., 2006; Lee, C. W., 2007). Furthermore, they claimed that as the width of the Hantan River is too narrow, the dam construction might result in more flood damage through the elevation of water height in a short time. In addition, the Paju County, which experienced the most severe flooding, already made a big-sized drainage pump and increased the height of embankment, and consequently, it could escape flood damage even when a massive rainfall of 1,400 mm fell across it in 2003 (Oh my news, 2006).

Thirdly, the anti-dam group questioned the water supply function of the Hantan River dam with the reason that water supply around the Imjin River area was not insufficient (Hantan Love, 2003-2007; Hantan River Network, 2000-2007; KFEM, 2000-2007; PCSD, 2005). They argued that all the localities around the Imjin River already had their own water source. In addition, they claimed that the water quality could not be guaranteed on account of the poisoning caused by heavy metal in the artillery range (Monthly Mal, 2000, 2001).
Fourthly, the safety issue was raised. Anti-dam groups argued that the planned dam site is dangerous as the Yeoncheon dam collapsed twice (Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County, 2000-2007; Hantan Love, 2003-2007; Hantan River Network, 2000-2007; PCSD, 2005). They were strongly concerned about the possibility of the Hantan River dam collapsing. Moreover, they insisted that it is not safe for the dam site because it is made up of basalt in which water leakage occurs. Furthermore, there is the biggest artillery range in Asia close to the dam site and therefore bombshells can be a serious threat to the dam safety.

- **Distrust of policy actors**

The anti-dam movement was distrustful of policy actors carrying out policy project. Like the Dong River dam case, they called the MOCT and the KOWACO “Dam Mafia.” They argued that the MOCT and the KOWACO had no role in the water resource field (KFEM, 2000-2007). They say that all the necessary dams were already built, but they have kept investing money in dam construction. In their view, the MOCT and the KOWACO have made dams not for the citizens, but for themselves (Cho, M. R., 2003; Hong, S. T., 2004, 2005, 2007 a, 2007 b, 2007 c; Lee, C. W., 2007; Oh, K. Y., 2003; Yeom, 2003, 2006, 2007).

In addition to public agencies, they criticized private construction companies and dam experts (KFEM, 2000-2007). They argued that private companies and experts have made the logic of construction projects through cooperation and have shared economic profits. According to them, construction groups composed of the MOCT, the KOWACO, private companies, experts, and the press are the “iron triangle” which continually leads to the construction of large dams (Hong, S. T., 2004, 2005, 2007 a, 2007 b, 2007 c).

Furthermore, environmental groups were basically discontented with the Roh administration (KFEM, 2000-2007). They criticized that the development-orientated inclination of the government has not changed and the government has rather pushed forward construction projects in the name of democracy (Jeong, G. H., 2006 b). They argued that the so-called “New Developmentalism”, which is disguised as procedural democracy, put the environment in danger (Jang, 2006; Jeong, G. H., 2006 b; Ku, D. W. 2004 c).

**6.6 Summary**
In this chapter, the broad context surrounding dam construction in Korea was explained. To sum up, while, in the past, Korean citizens accepted the government’s dam projects submissively, since democratisation, they have staged strong protests against them. The Dong River dam case and the Hantan River dam case were typical examples. Careful examination has shown that these two cases have many things in common. Initially, the two dam projects were planned to prevent flood damage after the experience of serious flood damage. That is, the main purpose of the two dams was flood control. Water supply was added to the function of the dam because of occasional drought and the forecast of water scarcity in the near future.

The anti-dam movement actors and their motivations were also similar. In both cases, the two anti-dam movements were the coalition of ENGOs and local residents. They were commonly discontented with dam projects and strongly distrusted policy makers. They objected to dam projects in terms of the environment and safety. They questioned the flood control effect of dams. They also criticized that the government was too development-oriented and the “construction mafia” had pushed forward dam projects for their interests.

Furthermore, in broad terms, the two anti-dam movements occurred under similar political context; the anti-Dong River dam movement (1998-2000, Kim Dae Jung administration) and the Hantan River dam movement (2000-2007, Roh Moo Hyun administration). As explained in chapter 3, the two presidents were from the same progressive party and had the similar political philosophy. They pursued participatory democracy and stressed conflict resolution through communication. Both administrations were all NGO-friendly administrations.

However, in spite of these similarities, the influence of the anti-dam movements proved to be different. While the anti-dam movement in the Dong River dam case had a strong impact on government decision making, in the Hantan River dam case, its influence became weak. The anti-Hantan River dam movement, which started with high spirits after the anti-Dong River dam movement, did not achieve the same result as in the Dong River dam case. Why the anti-Hantan River dam movement, which was called the 2nd Dong River dam movement, did not exert as much influence in spite of the similar contexts will be explained in chapter 7 and 8.
CHAPTER 7 THE PROCESS OF THE ANTI-DAM PROTEST

7.1 Introduction

Before presenting the main results of the research in chapter 8, this chapter will describe the change in the two anti-dam movements over their conflict periods. This time series analysis will contribute to understanding of the process of the two anti-dam movements and the change in their relationship with the government. Specifically, this chapter will show what the government (in particular, the MOCT) and the anti-dam movement actually did in terms of escalating confrontations in the two dam conflicts.

The history of the two anti-dam movement protests will be explained according to their conflict phases which will help identify the similarities and differences between the two cases more easily. Although there are various kinds of views regarding the phase of conflict (Brahm, 2003; Pondy, 1967; Robins, 2002; Rothchild, 2003; Kievelitz, 2001; Wallensteen, 2002), this research regards conflicts as consisting of four stages of processes; emergence, development, crisis, and conclusion. Based on these four stages of conflict, the behaviours of the government and the anti-dam movement will be explained.

7.2 The anti-Dong River dam movement process

7.2.1 Conflict emergence (1990 – September 1997)

As mentioned previously, the Dong River dam plan was made to prevent flooding in the South Han River area which is located down the Dong River. While the residents of Yeongwol County living downstream stood on the positive side of the dam construction, the residents of Jeongseon County residing upstream strongly opposed it (Jeongseon County official -1; Yeongwol County official - 1; OPM, 2000). Jeongseon County residents even obstructed the KOWACO’s public briefing in October 1996 (Jeongseon County official – 1; Donga Ilbo, 1996) and as a result the KOWACO had to hold another public hearing again on 27 March 1997.

On the contrary to local residents, all local governments were in favour of the dam construction planned by the central government. Gangwon Province, Yeongwol County and Jeongseon County showed favourable stance towards the dam construction in terms of local
development, only with the condition that the complaint of local residents is minimized (KFEM activist-1, 2; Jeongseon County official-1; Yeongwol County official-1; Yeongwol County Council, 1996). They established the dam construction support organization and supported the MOCT’s dam construction (Yeongwol County official - 1). At that time, as local autonomy did not start yet (This means that county governors were appointed by the central government) and local governments depended heavily on the central government in terms of the budget, they tended to follow policies put forwarded by the central government.

“In the early 1990s, the Yeoewol County Head was in favour of dam construction. The dam was regarded as being helpful for local economy and flood prevention. Local residents were also in favour of dam construction provided the compensation was sufficient. Some local residents even petitioned the government to build the dam more quickly.” (Yeongwol County official - 1)

However, in February 1996, as land compensation of the dam site was identified as relatively low compared to other dam sites, Yeongwol County residents started to become discontented with the dam construction (Yeongwol County official - 1). In addition, through the public briefing on 22 October 1996, after they thought that the environmental impact was not carefully considered, their opposing opinions towards it expanded increasingly (Yeongwol County official - 1; KFEM activist-1, 2). However, in spite of rising discontentment, their struggle was deemed to be insufficient.

Under this circumstance, ENGOs emerged as the main actor of the anti-dam movement. Initially, they were unaware of the environmental value of the Dong River and it was not until August 1997 that for the first time, they visited dam construction site in response to the request from the residents. Through their visit, ENGOs finally became aware of the untouched beauty and ecological diversity of the Dong River and started to take more interest in this issue (KFEM activist - 1, 2, 3; Uiryeong conservation activist-1). Their serious intervention started from September 1997 when the MOCT made public notice of the Dong River dam construction site. Prior to the public notice, ENGOs mainly conducted site investigations and contacted local residents around the dam site.

“As a matter of fact, we did not know much about the Dong River. After visiting the Dong River area, we found out that there were many wild animals, beautiful limestone caves (e.g.
Baikryung cave) and splendid cliffs around the river.” (KFEM activist-3). “After deciding on the anti-dam movement, we focused on organizing local residents, because only when local residents stand in the centre of environmental movement, the movement can have power and achieve successful outcome. Even if general citizens support movement, it cannot but fail without the support of local residents.” (KFEM activist-1)

7.2.2 Conflict development (September 1997 – February 1999)

Through the MOCT’s public notice of the Dong River dam construction, the issue became more controversial. The MOCT’s public notice before the completion of the EIA discussion was accepted pushing the dam construction forward, even though the public notice comes before the EIA discussion by the law.

“In the past, the MOCT made notice of dam site after completing of the EIA discussions because the dam site can be adjusted by the opinion of the ME. However, as the dam construction was delayed, the MOCT became concerned about the speculative behaviour of local residents around the dam site, because residents had planted either fruit trees or flowers to get more compensation. Therefore, the public notice was an inescapable action. In actual fact, there is no problem with the law, because the public notice of dam site comes before the EIA discussion. Nevertheless, it was seen as the MOCT’s pushing ahead with the plan. ENGOs criticized that the MOCT pushed dam construction forward.” (MOCT official – 3)

“Making notice of dam site before the completion of the EIA discussion was wrong in terms of procedure. The dam site should be announced after the EIA discussion is completed. The MOCT just pushed ahead with dam project. Then, what is the use of the EIA discussion?” (ME official –1)

“The public notice of dam site before the EIA discussion was a typical example of the government’s “Decide, Announce, and Defend (DAD)” decision making approach. After the MOCT announced dam construction, it tried to persuade us. Naturally, we had backlash against the MOCT’s stance.” (KFEM activist – 2)

In October 1997, the KFEM started the systematic anti-dam movement with raft demonstration in the Dong River. In November 1997, 35 ENGOs including the KFEM finally organized the “National Citizen Coalition against dam construction” and they staged
demonstrations in the dam construction site. With demonstrations, ENGOs focused on raising public awareness of the fact that the Dong River is a beautiful place and a habitat for many rare and endangered species. Moreover, they raised questions against the effect of dam and suggested the alternatives for dams. They held policy conferences to criticize the necessity of the Dong River dam in February 1998 and suggested “the opinion for new government’s water policy” in March 1998. According to them, supply-oriented policy such as dam construction should be stopped and demand-side policy such as the readjustment of water price was necessary.

Facing the opposition of ENGOs and local residents, the MOCT tried to persuade them through numerous conversations. Even the MOCT minister had conversations with the representatives of ENGOs and local residents on 7 April 1998. The MOCT held policy conferences on 7 May and 24 June 1998. In these conferences, they tried to explain the necessity of dam construction to the anti-dam groups. However, their efforts all resulted in failure (KFEM activist - 1, 2)

“To persuade ENGOs, the Minister, vice minister, bureau director and I had meetings with them. The MOCT also participated in the TV debates. The number of meeting with ENGOs will amount to over 100 times including unofficial meetings.” (MOCT official - 2)

“The MOCT made efforts to have conversations with ENGOs because the times changed significantly. Korea achieved democratisation and in particular, President Kim wanted to resolve conflicts through discussion.” (Secretary of Environment during Kim administration)

At last, the committee to scrape the Dong River dam construction composed of ENGOs and local residents was officially organized in April 1998. That is, local-based residents committee to deal with the problems of the dam construction was developed into the serious proponent organization. The KFEM, as a leading organization, staged various campaigns: visiting the Dong River, tracking, the declaration of 100 celebrities for the cancellation of the Dong River dam (21 July), declaration of local residents and NGOs for its cancellation (28 August), protest visit to the KOWACO, national signature campaign (1 to 30 September), and rafting tournament (6 September). ENGOs also participated in the conferences organized by academic associations and attacked the problems of the Dong River dam construction (24 June and 18 August 1998).
After the Dong River dam issue emerged as social issue, many “professional experts” started to join the anti-dam movement (Chosun Ilbo, 1998 a, 1999 a, 1999 b). They pointed out the problems of dam construction and provided the academic evidence to back them up. This contributed significantly to the growth in the anti-dam movement.

“Ecologist Hyun, a member of Uiryeong conservation, found several indigenous plants including the Dong River pasque flower. I guess after that, the ME could not agree with the KOWACO’s EIA report. In conclusion, the anti-dam movement gained momentum with the support of professional experts.” (Environmental Justice activist -1)

“I carried a survey with 1004 local residents around the dam site. The result showed that about 77% of residents opposed dam construction. In particular, it revealed that even Yeongwol County residents downstream of the river disliked dam construction. As a result of this the mass media put this news on the headlines.” (Professor - 1)

“Many professors participated in the anti-dam movement. The KFEM explored the Dong River area with Speleologists and found 192 caves.” (Chosun Ilbo, 1998 b)… “We warned against the safety of the dam. This result was a shock to citizens because the KOWACO said that there were only 30 caves within the dam site.” (KFEM activist -1, similar view expressed by KFEM activist-2)

At this stage, within the government, the conflict between the MOCT and the ME intensified. After the opposition of the anti-dam movement became serious, the ME took a careful approach towards the dam construction. The ME wanted the MOCT to propose appropriate measures to conserve the environment around the Dong River dam. Therefore, as shown in the table below, the ME kept requesting the revision of the EIA to the MOCT. Moreover, it carefully pointed out on 30 August and 25th October that due to the potential negative effect on the ecology, it would be desirable to conserve the Dong River (Donga Ilbo, 1998 a; ME official - 3).
Table 7.1 The ME’s EIA discussion history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>EIA discussion between the MOCT and the ME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 June 1997</td>
<td>MOCT, submission of EIA report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 August 1997</td>
<td>ME, requesting 1st revision of EIA report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 March 1998</td>
<td>ME, requesting 2nd revision of EIA report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April 1998</td>
<td>ME, requesting 3rd revision of EIA report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1998</td>
<td>ME, requesting 4th revision of EIA report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 September 1998</td>
<td>ME, requesting 5th revision of EIA report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


“The ME continually raised the questions against the Dong River dam construction. It had the position that it could not complete the EIA discussion if the MOCT could not persuade the anti-dam movement.” (MOCT official - 2)

“We carefully listened to ENGOs’ arguments. They argued that the EIA report for the proposed Dong River dam project was so poor and therefore its environmental impact should be thoroughly assessed again. In addition, the opposition of local residents was so strong. Facing these oppositions, we kept requesting additional reinvestigation of the environmental impact.” (ME official - 3)

Despite this unfavourable policy environment, the MOCT maintained its initial position. At that time, some residents of Yeongwol County who had serious flood damage in the 1990s and the residents within the dam construction site urged the MOCT and the KOWACO to start the dam construction and to pay compensation as soon as possible. They filed the petition to the MOCT and the ME and staged a signature campaign to request early construction of the dam. Moreover, there was much flood damage nationwide in August 1998 and the necessity of the Dong River dam was raised once again. In this situation, the MOCT minister repeatedly argued that the construction of the Dong River dam was absolutely necessary and should be constructed as soon as possible on 11 August, 28 September, and 3 December 1998.
In response to the repeated announcement of the MOCT minister, ENGOs and local residents were upset and organized the first intensive campaign to repeal the dam project (KFEM activist - 1). ENGOs including the KFEM started broad scale protests with the release of public statement from December 1998. They used all available means: holding photo exhibition of the Dong River, signature campaign (1 to 17 December), rafting demonstration (13 December), newspaper ads, street demonstration and protest visit to the Blue House which is the Korean presidential residence (17 December).

Figure 7.1 Anti-Dong River dam protests

This intensive protest was possible with the help of strong support of the mass media. As seen in the statements below, there were many reports in relation to the beauty of the Dong River and the problems of the supply-oriented water resource policy. This framing of the mass media gave citizens a bad impression on the development group. In addition, thanks to the support of the mass media, the anti-dam movement could acquire more supporters. 207 writers and 237 media producers supported the anti-Dong River dam movement by presenting a statement to oppose the dam construction on 21 December 1998 and 14 January 1999.

“Korean Amazon disappears. The Dong River area has a splendid cliff and a beautiful Baekryong cave. However, all of them are destined to submerge” (Chosun Ilbo, 1997 a)…. “Environmental NGOs strongly oppose the dam construction which destroys beautiful natural environment, whereas the KOWACO argues that it is indispensable for water provision and flood control. Many local residents are also concerned about environmental damage and dam safety.” (Chosun Ilbo, 1997 b)
“The Dong River dam project should be reconsidered. Many social actors oppose the construction of the Dong River dam…. It should not be approached only in terms of water supply or flood control. Environmental destruction caused by dam construction should also be considered. The Dong River area has beautiful scenery and is the habitat of endangered species…. Moreover, as dam construction results in environmental damage, developed countries try not to build dams, if possible. Once the environment is damaged, it is difficult to recover. The government need to listen to the argument of ENGOs. ” (Donga Ilbo, 1998 b)

“The Dong River dam issue was possibly the first case which raised objections to national infrastructure projects and as a result the mass media covered this issue a lot. The anti-Dong River dam movement were able to appeal to the public through the mass media.” (Uiryeong conservation activist - 1)

Along with the strong opposition of ENGOs and local residents, the Yeongwol County Head finally stopped the hesitation between local residents and the central government and expressed his opposition to the dam construction on 30 December 1998.

“Although Yeonwol County initially had a positive view towards the dam construction, the issues of safety critically emerged and we had to confirm the safety of the dam. However, we could not be convinced of its safety and decided to oppose the dam construction.” (Yeongwol County official - 1)

Facing rising opposition, the MOCT tried to organize a joint review committee composed of the MOCT, the ME, Gangwon Province and ENGOs in order to acquire policy reliability in October 1998. It proposed that ENGOs participate in a joint review committee and recommend committee members. However, ENGOs opposed the MOCT’s suggestion.

“While the MOCT at first suggested it would have conversations with us, it kept saying that it would construct the Dong River dam as soon as possible. Then how can we trust their sincerity in the communication? In conclusion, it can be said that the MOCT used the conversation as the tool to persuade us.” (KFEM activist – 1)

After the MOCT’s failure to organize a joint review committee, the Office of the President (OP) tried to mediate conflicting parties on 18 December 1998. However, the MOCT and ENGOs did not change their opinions and the mediation efforts resulted in failure.
“It was an all or nothing game. There were only arguments, not discussions in the meetings. We thought that we could not resolve the conflict through discussion.” (Uiryeong conservation activist- 1)

“In addition, while the representative of the KFEM participated in the mediation, department head in the MOCT participated. We thought that the MOCT did not have the will to resolve the conflict.” (KFEM activist -1)

7.2.3 Conflict crisis (February 1999 – August 1999)

In January 1999, the MOCT again proposed that ENGOs participate in a joint review committee and recommend committee members. However, ENGOs declined the MOCT’s suggestion. On the 18 February, they were decisively upset hearing about the MOCT’s announcement that right after the review of environmental impact by August 1999, it would start dam construction in October and finish the construction by 2005. ENGOs strongly argued that the MOCT tried to utilize a joint review committee to justify dam construction and staged demonstrations in front of the government complex on 19 February.

“We did not accept the MOCT’s suggestion, because we thought it would utilize the review committee as the chance to persuade us, even though they told that they would carry out an objective investigation. The MOCT minister repeatedly announced that the MOCT was going to push forward the Dong River dam project. Therefore, the MOCT’s offer presupposed policy implementation and it did not have any sincerity in having a conversation with us…Hearing about the MOCT’s announcement in February, we knew that our judgement was right.” (KFEM activist – 1)

“The reason why ENGOs did not participate in the committee was because they did not trust us. They said that they could not believe us anyway. In addition, their decline was the expression of their confidence as they got the support from the ME and civil society.” (MOCT official – 2)

Outraged by the MOCT’s announcement, ENGOs and local residents decided to stage full strength protests on 20 February and organized the second intensive campaign to repeal the dam project. They staged various anti-dam movement activities from March 1999; prayer meeting for the cancellation (15 March), street march (21 and 26 March, 12 April), newspaper ads, and press release of seminar result (30 March, 21 April). In particular, the
KFEM organized 33 day sit-in campaign of 33 celebrities from 23 March to 25 April and this contributed to drawing the attention of the press and a wide range of support which included the ME, the National Assembly and citizens.

Figure 7.2  33 day sit-in campaign of 33 celebrities

In addition, with the support of professional experts, ENGOs strongly raised the safety problem of the Dong River dam. They said that the Dong River area is erosion-prone as it is situated in a limestone region and vulnerable to earthquake as it is in a fault zone. This warning about the safety of the dam expanded controversy. A scholar said that the environmental damage of the Dong River dam amounts to £50 million each year (Chosun Ilbo, 1999 c; Joongang Ilbo, 1999).

"With the help of experts, ENGOs strongly raised the safety issue including limestone cave and earthquake risk." (MOCT official-2; Similar view expressed by professor-1, 5) …

"Those problems can be solved by the construction of barrier walls and earthquake-resistant design. However, after they were already raised, the controversy was continually expanded.” (MOCT official-2)

On 3 March, the KBS (Korea Broadcasting System) broadcast the documentary of ecology of the Dong River and this documentary developed the Dong River dam issue into a national issue (KFEM activist -1, 2). With the support of the mass media, ENGOs could mobilize supports from various organizations including the democratic lawyers' association, the writers' association of national literature, the national environmental Teachers' Association and the culture-tourist Solidarity (University Student Newspaper, 2001).
“The victory of the anti-Dong River dam was dependent heavily on the KBS documentary. After its broadcast, people began to rage. We struggled to fight against the government for 2 years, but it changed public opinion in such a short time.” (KFEM activist -1)

Figure 7.3 KBS documentary (left) and the picture of Chosun Ilbo (right)

Consequently, on 12 March, the dramatic news became known. The newspaper said that according to a high authority within the Office of the President (OP), President Kim ordered a reinvestigation into the Dong River dam project, considering the opposition of ENGOs and local residents.

“After President’s order to re-examine the Dong River dam on a zero base became known, ENGOs started to stage a full-fledged anti-dam protest. The KFEM announced that it welcomed President’s order and would stage the anti-dam movement every day until the dam project was officially repealed.” (KFEM activist -3)

In addition, the Korea Forest Service argued that there were 540 plants including 37 rare species and 39 forest birds and therefore the Dong River area should be designated as the forest reserve in February 1999 (Yonhap news, 1999). The Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA) insisted that there were more than 20 prehistoric remains in the Dong River area and there should be proper measures to conserve them prior to the construction. Furthermore, the ME officially expressed its opposing opinions against the Dong River dam project once again. It said that dam construction would make ecology and water quality worse and thus to conserve the Dong River area was more desirable (Hankyore Shinmun, 1999; Sekye Ilbo, 1999).
In conjunction with the strong opposition of the anti-dam movement, Governor Kim of Gangwon Province also expressed his opposition to the dam construction on 8 April 1999. He argued that the proposed dam site was at risk of collapsing because it was a limestone area which had many caves, and the compensation for submerged local residents was extremely insufficient (Hankook Ilbo, 1999; Munhwa Ilbo, 1999). The KFEM welcomed his official announcement to oppose the Dong River dam construction and strongly pressurised the government to repeal the Dong River dam (KFEM, 1999).

In spite of the strong anti-dam opposition, the MOCT minister argued the necessity of the Dong River dam once again on 22 March. However, faced by the country-wide expansion of the anti-dam movement, he announced that the feasibility of the dam construction would be reviewed by a foreign professional organization and that the dam construction would be stopped during the review period. However, ENGOs opposed the MOCT’s suggestion.

Under this circumstance, the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), which is a government-funded research institute, expressed an opinion that the feasibility of the Dong River dam is not high in terms of water supply and flood control on 4 August (KIET, 1999). Following the announcement, President Kim mentioned his personal opinion about the dam construction in the press conference with the Gangwon Province mass media on 6 August as following: “If many people are much concerned about the environment of the Dong River, the government need not to push forward the Dong River dam project.” (Donga Ilbo, 1999 b; Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1999 b). His expression of personal opinion to oppose the dam construction intensified the conflict.

“At that time, the MOCT officials were discontented with President Kim’s personal opinion. What on earth is the personal opinion? President can have personal opinion? We thought that it would be no longer possible to build the dam.” (MOCT official - 2)

### 7.2.4 Conflict conclusion (August 1999 – June 2000)

After President Kim’s announcement, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) decided to carry out a feasibility study of the Dong River dam project on 7 August. The OPM organized a coordinating committee in cooperation with the KFEM and later this committee appointed a
joint research team which comprised of equal number of experts recommended by the KFEM and the MOCT. The joint research team had five subcommittees: water supply, flood control, safety of dam, environmental preservation and cultural asset. It was ordered to produce results within 6 months (September 1999-February 2000) and after September 1999, researchers started to conduct field works and visit foreign dams.

Even during the process of joint investigation, the conflict surrounding the dam construction continued. While ENGOs continued to stage campaigns, the KOWACO said that the construction of the Dong River dam was still necessary on 15 November 1999. The residents in the submerged area of dam construction staged a demonstration to urge the MOCT to construct the dam. However, the Minister of Environment mentioned that other alternative measures aside from the Dong River dam should be taken (February 2000) and the ruling party announced its opposition to the Dong River dam construction ahead of 4.13 general election on 21 March 2000. The anti-dam movement made the best of the general election and as a result it achieved the concession from the ruling party.

“Approaching the general election, the Democratic Party (ruling party) officially announced its objection to the construction of the Dong River dam. It promised to confirm the cancellation of the Dong River dam through the government-ruling party consultative meeting.” (KFEM activist -1)

Through the joint investigation, it was found that a safety problem involving the dam could be addressed via an engineering technique. However, the environmental value of the Dong River area was still a hot issue. Following on from the joint investigation, a flood control dam was proposed as an alternative to a multi-purpose dam. Team leader Park of the joint investigation team said that a small flood control dam can be an alternative solution to the multi-purpose dam (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2000 and Munhwa Ilbo, 2000 a).

“The leader of the joint investigation team said that a flood control dam could minimize environmental damage, but there could be inefficiency in terms of the B/C ratio because of its use only in rainy season.” (HanKook Ilbo, 2000; similar news articles reported by Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2000 and Munhwa Ilbo 2000 a)
In response to this, ENGOs severely criticized his remark and requested the OPM to dismiss him on 7 May. They argued that the mission of the joint investigation team was only to judge whether the Dong River dam plan was appropriate or not and the examination of a flood control dam as an alternative was not the objective of the investigation. They had demonstrations in front of the OPM and argued that the government and the ruling party should keep the promise to cancel the construction of the Dong River dam on 17 May. Finally President Kim officially announced to repeal the Dong River dam construction in the ceremony of World Environmental Day on 5 June. In the long run, the government accepted the argument of the anti-dam movement and adopted the cancellation of the Dong River dam project.

After facing strong opposition to dam projects including the Dong River dam case, the central government introduced incentive system to support local residents around dam sites. It concluded that although the local residents agreed on the necessity of dam construction, they objected to it because of the huge disadvantages (MLTM, 2009 a; MOCT, 2007; MOLEG, 2000). Therefore, the government enacted “Act on Dam Construction and Assistance to Neighborhood Area (Hereafter act on dam construction and assistance)” and started to provide economic support for local governments and residents.

“(MOCT minister Lim) Korea is not a water rich country and may face water shortage in the 2010s. Thus, it is indispensable to build dams to develop water resource. However, to overcome fierce opposition from local residents and civic groups is the key to dam construction. The government will continue to expand economic support for local residents around dam sites.” (Econo Talking, 2001)

“A dam is considered a typical NIMBY facility because dam construction submerges local community and has a negative impact on residents’ property. Therefore, since the Dong River dam conflict, the assistance on submerged areas has been intensified. This system is very important in dam construction.” (Professor – 3)

Moreover, the size of the economic assistance increased rapidly over a relatively short period as illustrated in the table below. At the same time the scope of support also expanded; while economic support was only given to new dams at the beginning, it was also given to the existing dams later on. In addition, the government prioritized the location of other forms of
infrastructure investment such as roads, to favour these dam construction sites over competing areas.

Table 7.2 Government’s economic support for submerged area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Local government</th>
<th></th>
<th>Local residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>During dam construction (once)</td>
<td>During dam operation since its construction (every year)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1% of electricity generation revenues 5% of water sale revenues</td>
<td>£ 1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2000</td>
<td>£ 10 to 15 million (New dam)</td>
<td>2% of electricity generation revenues 10% of water sale revenues</td>
<td>£ 1,500 + £ 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>£ 15 to 25 million (New dam)     £ 10 to 15 million (Existing dam)</td>
<td>3% of electricity generation revenues 15% of water sale revenues</td>
<td>£ 1,500 + £ 12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>Including flood control dam</td>
<td>6% of electricity generation revenues 20% of water sale revenues</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MLTM (2009 a), MOLEG (2011)
7.3 The anti-Hantan River dam movement process

7.3.1 Conflict emergence (1996 – June 2001)

After the major floods in 1996, 1998, and 1999, a plan to build a dam around the Hantan River was introduced in order to prevent further flooding in the region. After the establishment of a comprehensive anti-flood plan of the Imjin River Region in December 1999, the KOWACO made a basic design for the construction of the Hantan River dam in December 2000.

Initially, the plan was met with a strong opposition from the local residents from Cherlwon and Pocheon Counties who resided in the upstream part of the Hantan River. In particular, the Cherlwon County residents who have lived in its furthest part of the upstream expressed the strongest opposition because they thought a multi-purpose dam would seriously damage their rafting business and impose various restrictions on their properties. They warned the MOCT that the past case of the Dong River dam could be repeated if the plan went ahead with the construction of the Hantan River dam.

In contrast, the Paju county residents from the downstream part of the Imjin River were in favour of the dam construction because they had serious damages owing to the last floods. However, the position of Yeoncheon County residents also from the downstream region of the river was little bit more complex. For instance, some people who have suffered from the past floods accepted the plan, but more people were against it due to the fear that more damages could incur if the dam were to collapse as it did in the case of the Yeoncheon dam in two occasions. They argued that the dam construction in the Yeoncheon region would cause more flood damages and hence it would be more desirable to build a dam in the Imjin River through the cooperation with North Korea. In addition, the safety issue of the dam site started to be raised. Local NGOs such as Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County argued that the dam site is not safe and therefore dam should not be built.

“It is not safe for a dam site because the dam area is composed of basalt with many holes. In addition, there are about 30 caves around the dam site…. Furthermore, there is the big artillery range close to the dam site. How can a dam be built near the artillery range?” (Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County -1)
Unlike the Dong River dam case, local governments started to express objections to the dam construction from the start after the establishment of local autonomy. Cherlwon County expressed the strongest objections to the dam construction from the start to the end. Initially, Yeoncheon County also opposed the dam construction because of the objections of its local residents (Yeoncheon County official -1, 2). They requested the MOCT to reconsider the Hantan River dam construction. In addition, provincial level governments such as Gyeonggi Province and Gangwon Province kept monitoring the situation. However, at that moment, the opposition of local residents and governments were at the level of only displaying discontentment.

7.3.2 Conflict development (October 2001-December 2004)

Under this circumstance, in spring 2001, the Korean peninsula had been hit by the worst drought. It was the lowest spring rainfall since 1904. This drought damaged 19,000 ha crops and caused 93,615 households to become exposed to water shortage. In response to this drought, on 12 June 2001, the MOCT announced “water vision 2020” plan (2001-2020) which incorporated the construction of 12 dams including the Hantan River dam and started to undertake the construction of 12 dams (Water vision 2020 was the long range comprehensive water resource plan which is established every 20 years).

However, they were faced with the strong resistance of NGOs and local residents. Outraged by the MOCT’s plan, ENGOs organized “No Dam Citizen Action” composed of 52 NGOs and local residents in the 12 proposed dam sites on 29 October and began to stage active protests (KFEM, 2001). With the high spirits from the success of the anti-Dong River dam movement, ENGOs warned against the central government to cancel all of the dam projects.

“After the serious drought in 2001, the government announced a long range comprehensive water resource plan which included a plan to construct 12 dams. We organized “No Dam Citizen Action” with local NGOs (e.g. Hantan River Network) and local residents. The Hantan River dam was the biggest one of 12 dams.” (KFEM activist –4, Similar view expressed by KFEM activist -2, 5)

In the Hantan River dam case, local NGOs (e.g. Hantan River Network, Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County) also played an important role in the anti-dam movement (Yeoncheon
County official – 1, 2; Pocheon County official – 1, 2; Gyeonggi Ilbo, 2004 and Monthly Mal, 2003). After they announced the statement to oppose the Hantan River dam in June 2000, they started to organize the opposition movement. They participated in the policy debate and contributed to raising questions regarding the feasibility of dam construction. They used their own internet site in mobilizing the residents (e.g. the Hantan River Network: www.hantanet.com; Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County: www.yonchon.com).

“Some people misunderstand that the Hantan River Network was organized to oppose the Hantan River dam. However, it is not right. We established it before the Hantan River dam issue occurred.” (Gyeonggi Ilbo, 2004)…. “We intended to make a river-centred local community and conserve the natural ecology around the Hantan River, which is the only non-developed area in Korea. The anti-Hantan River dam movement was one of activities to achieve this goal.” (Seoul Shinmun, 2001; Similar articles reported by Monthly Mal, 2003)

“The Yeoncheon dam collapsed twice in 1996 and 1999 and this resulted in huge flood damage. That is, the dam rather led to more flood damage. Right after that, we were engaged in the movement to dismantle the Yeoncheon dam and it was finally torn down. In this process, Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County was organized in July 1998. However, we heard that the Hantan River dam was to be built and started the anti-dam movement.” (Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County activist -1)

Because of the strong oppositions of local NGOs and residents, on 14, 16 and 17 August 2001, all the “public briefings” in Pocheon, Yeoncheon and Cherlwon County, which were intended to give project explanations, were cancelled. They blocked briefing places and marched through the streets holding placards. On 9 October, “public hearing”, which was planned to collect various resident opinions, was also cancelled.

Therefore, the KOWACO had to hold public briefings from 29 August until 11 September and a public hearing on 11 December 2001 which was barely held under the supervision of the office of Gyeonggi province. In the public hearing, the KFEM and the Hantan River Network strongly criticized the problems of the Hantan river dam, upon hearing this local residents became upset.

“There were many problems in the EIA report. It did not consider the environmental impact of the artillery range around the dam site. It was so ridiculous… Professor Park, who was in
charge of the EIA report, was severely criticized by the residents in the public hearing.”
(KFEM activist - 4)

“We overturned the public hearing. The EIA report was so poor. It left out various animals and did not deal with the impact of artillery range. In conclusion, it was an unreliable report.”
(Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County activist -1)

After the strong resistance of local residents, the mass media began to pay more attention to the Hantan River dam issue. They described the Hantan River dam issue as the 2nd Dong River dam issue (Changbi, 2001; Monthly Mal, 2000; Munhwa Ilbo, 2000 b; Seoul Shinmun, 2000) and delivered the arguments of the anti-dam movement and the MOCT.

“Soon after the cancellation of the Dong River dam, the Hantan River dam issue had risen up. The mass media described the Hantan River dam issue as the 2nd Dong River dam. They covered ENGOs’ activities and arguments a lot and reported that the feasibility of the dam was problematic. We thought that the Hantan River dam might face the same fate as the Dong River dam.” (MOCT official – 3; Similar view expressed by KOWACO staff-1)

First mediation: Mediation by the ME (April 2002 – December 2003)

Like the Dong River dam case, the Ministry of Environment (ME) pointed out environmental problems and requested measures to reduce those problems. However, the role of the ME in the Hantan River dam case became much bigger. At this time, they did not stay passive, but played an active role as a mediator between conflicting parties. The ME kept requesting the MOCT to discuss with the conflicting parties and to draw a consensus (ME -3; KEI – 1, 2).

According to the request of the ME, the MOCT made efforts to resolve the conflicts. It held discussions with the conflicting parties twice after consulting experts five times from 29 April until 10 July. Unlike the Dong River dam case, it did not make a public notice of the Hantan River dam construction site and focused on the discussions (MOCT - 3; KOWACO - 1, 2). However, the MOCT could not persuade the anti-dam movement. After the failure of the MOCT, the ME tried to draw conclusion by conducting meeting itself. The ME held meetings to discuss about conflicting issues on 4, 5, and 9 December 2002. In those meetings, ENGOs and local residents strongly questioned the technical feasibility of the dam
construction. They argued that the KOWACO distorted the flood control effect of the Hantan River dam. As a result, conflicting parties did not arrive at a compromise and did not complete all the meetings as planned because of the serious conflict from both sides.

“At that time, the conflict surrounding the dam construction was so serious. So we proposed that the ME would see if whose opinion was right in a midway position….The debate between conflicting parties was so fierce. In the 3rd meetings, the atmosphere was really rough. There was hand to hand fighting which resulted in the police being called.” (ME official – 1)

During that period, ENGOs and local residents kept staging the anti-dam movement. On 22 October 2002, they assembled in Cherlwon County, presented a statement to oppose the Hantan River dam and staged street demonstration.

Figure 7.4 Anti-Hantan River dam protests

![Anti-Hantan River dam protests](Source: KFEM (2002))

On 21 November, No Dam Citizen Action staged strong protests in front of the office of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) on the reason that it agreed with the construction of the dam next to the artillery range with the condition that submerged military facilities would be moved (KFEM, 2002). If the Hantan River dam is built, about 10% of the artillery range would have been be submerged during the monsoon season (Hankyoreh Shinmun, 2001).
After discussions with related stakeholders, the MOCT submitted the revised EIA report in December 2002 and the ME suggested a critical offer after careful consideration (ME – 1, 3). The ME’s condition was that the role of dam should only be of flood control and not of water supply. It demanded that the water gate should be always open except 15 days during rainy season each year so as to preserve the ecosystem around the dam site. Moreover, the ME requested that the dam construction should be started only after getting approval from 3 local governments. This idea was suggested in order to minimize environmental impact and get rid of the concern of dam site residents that water supply dam would cause several disadvantages. The MOCT was initially at a loss over what to do with the conditions, but finally accepted the offer (KEI - 2). The ME completed the EIA discussion on 28 July 2003.

“The ME made all the effort to resolve the conflict and the mediation was really good. ENGOs argued that the dams should not be built. However, it is not right. If it is necessary for the prevention of flooding, the dam should be built. We could not continue to have a debate over the flood effect of the dam. Therefore, we suggested the second best option which can contribute to both flood prevention and environmental conservation.” (ME official – 3, Similar view expressed by ME official-1)

“It is problematic to utilize £ 500 million dam only for the purpose of flood control. So it is necessary to include water supply in the function of dam. However, to prevent more flood damage, we had to accept the ME’s offer. Finally, after careful consideration, we decided to make flood control dam.” (KOWACO staff - 1)
“We thought that the ME indirectly expressed its opposition to dam construction and the MOCT would not accept the offer. However, contrary to our expectation, the MOCT accepted it. I think that it was an important turning point in the anti-Hantan River dam movement.” (Newspaper reporter-1; this view is shown in Naeil Shinmun (2003))

The MOCT’s acceptance of the ME’s offer had the effect of satisfying the demand of other parties in the conflict. Yeoncheon County could reduce the worries about the collapse risk because flood control dam would not receive the pressure caused by contained water. Cherlwon County could keep doing rafting business and be free from the regulation to conserve water if the dam is not for water supply.

However, the anti-dam movement continued to stage protests. ENGOs and local residents held rallies, tent sit-ins, and picketing. On 3 September, they requested the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) to conduct an audit of the Hantan River dam according to the Citizens’ Audit Request System. On 17 October, they held the press interview to call on the government to repeal the Hantan River dam and met with the MOCT minister. They had strong distrust of the MOCT’s promise to use the dam only for flood control and argued that making a dam for 15 days of monsoon season was a waste of money.

“It costs £ 500 million to build a dam. How can you believe that it will be used only for flood control? For sure, the MOCT will change its purpose in a future. Until now there was no flood control dam in Korea. Moreover, where is there a dam working for 15 days in the world? Making this dam is a waste of national money.” (Yeoncheon Forum activist-1; similar view expressed by Yeoncheon forum activist-2)

The strong opposition of local residents led to Gangwon provincial governor’s official address against the dam construction in August 2003 and the National Assembly’s disapproval of a large part of the dam construction budget in November 2003 (Kangwon Ilbo, 2003 b). As the controversy continued, the MOCT still didn’t make public notice of the dam site, even though it completed the discussion with the ME and the MND (MOCT- 2; KOWACO - 1, 3).

“The MOCT minister said that the legal process including the discussions with the ME and the MND was all finished, but the MOCT would not carry out dam construction before
coming to the agreement with local residents.” (Kangwon Ilbo, 2003 a)

Second mediation: Mediation by the PCSD (December 2003 – December 2004)

The conflict reached a turning point on 19 December 2003 when new President Roh Moo Hyun, who took office in February 2003, promised to reconsider the Hantan River dam project during his visit to Gangwon Province (BAI, 2005; PCSD, 2005). After he heard the opinion of the residents in Gangwon province, he instructed the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD) to resolve the controversy of the Hantan River dam by having the related parties discuss and come to an agreement. It was Korea’s first experiment where a well-designed conflict resolution mechanism was applied in a large-scale environmental conflict (Koh, Kim and Lee, 2009). He wanted to develop a prototype for conflict management by solving long-lasting policy conflicts through consensus building approach (PCSD, 2005; OPM and KDI, 2009).

“In spite of the passage of several years, the Hantan River dam problem has not been settled yet. As the public opinion of Gangwon province including the Governor of Gangwon province is still not good, I (President Roh) think it is necessary to review the Hantan River dam project again. I will assign the PCSD to make a systematic mediation system for social conflict and solve this conflict.” (BAI, 2005; President Roh’s instruction is also shown in ME, 2004)

“The PCSD was established by the request of ENGOs in the Kim Dae Jung administration. Its original role was to give environmental advice in relation to important national plans. However, the new role of conflict management was added in the Roh administration.” (Expert -2 / PCSD mediation committee member)

Although there was the compromise between the MOCT and the ME, the mediation process was undertaken again.

“According to President Roh’s order, all the discussions started from a zero-base. We thought that the PCSD was actually the ME’s auxiliary organization. So we were deeply concerned that the Hantan River dam might be cancelled when the PCSD was assigned to mediate the conflict. We almost gave up on dam construction …” (MOCT official – 3)
The PCSD organized a conflict coordination committee and carried out mediation meetings. A coordination committee was composed of conflict mediation experts and the representatives of four conflicting parties (PCSD, 2005); (1) MOCT and KOWACO in charge of the dam construction, (2) local residents who are in favour of the dam construction, (3) local residents who oppose the dam construction (Hantan River Network and Yeoncheon Forum), and (4) ENGOs (KFEM). After the mediation started in February 2004, the anti-dam movement stopped protests and started to prepare for the debate.

There were numerous discussion meetings such as thirteen pre-mediation sessions (February to May 2004), sixteen mediation sessions (May to September 2004) and arbitration period (September to November 2004) (PCSD, 2005). During the pre-mediation sessions, they set seven controversial issues to discuss (e.g. the flood control effect of the dam) and devised a mediation process.

Related parties discussed with five alternatives; (1) riverside flood detention basins and increasing the height of the embankment, (2) increasing the height of the embankment, (3) a spillway to divert water and increasing the height of the embankment, (4) the Hantan River Dam, (5) the smaller Hantan River Dam and riverside flood detention basins. Raising objections against the flood control effect of the Hantan River dam, ENGOs and local residents strongly argued its cancellation (Professor-2; expert-2 / both persons were PCSD mediation committee members). They thought that increasing the height of the embankment or making riverside flood detention basins would be sufficient to prevent flooding (KFEM activist –4; Yeoncheon Forum activist - 1, 2).

“We thought that we could repeal the dam construction plan if we raised the problem of feasibility. We were confident, because dam experts pointed out the problem with specific evidence.” (Yeoncheon Forum activist - 2)…“The discussion in the PCSD was almost one-sided. We overwhelmed the government in terms of the logic of our argument.” (KFEM activist – 4)

As a result, neither party could persuade the other. Neither party had superior scientific information and methods to persuade the other side (Professor 2; expert 2). Both sides just repeated their own point of view. The controversy about the flood control effect of the Hantan
River dam made it difficult to come to an agreement. After a three-day overnight session to make a compromise, the stakeholders finally realized that they could not reach a voluntary agreement (Professor – 2, KFEM - 4).

On 27 August 2004, the process took a major turn when all the stakeholders signed an agreement to accept the mediation team’s arbitration. By mutual consent, the parties delegated final decision to the mediation team.

“I agreed to assign the final decision to the mediation team, because our argument was superior to the government’s argument and so I was confident about the arbitration result…I recommended that the local resident group entrust the decision to the mediation team” (KFEM - 4)

“Initially, I objected to the arbitration of the mediation team. However, the rumor that our argument would be accepted went around and the situation changed. Finally, we decided to assign the final decision to the mediation team.” (Yeoncheon Forum activist – 2; similar view expressed by Yeoncheon forum activist-1)

The mediation team made the final conclusion, based on the opinion of experts. They assembled 7 professional experts in relation to dam construction and made them discuss and find out the best option.

“We are conflict mediation experts, not dam experts. So we assembled the dam experts and made them find a solution through discussion. It was remarkable that the compromise was made by the experts who fought with each other in the mediation process. We told them that their decision would be judged by their colleagues, students, and the descendants and so they should make their decision with the conscience of scientists.” (Mediation - 4)

On 2 November 2004, the final decision was announced. According to the decision, the existing flood control dam via a compromise between the MOCT and the ME would be reduced to a smaller-scale one and instead 2 riverside flood detention basins will be made. Moreover, the decision included that the MOCT should have a local referendum to change flood control dam into multi-purpose dam and organize the joint committee composed of conflicting parties to manage follow-up steps.
This decision of the PCSD had some extent of effect. Local governments of Yeoncheon and Pocheon showed the favourable opinions towards the dam construction.

“After the mediation of the PCSD, Yeoncheon County Head kept saying that the dam could prevent flooding and contribute to local development.” (Yeoncheon County official–1; similar view expressed by Yeoncheon County official-2)

“The government announced to build a flood control dam after numerous discussions. It was clear that the dam should be built to prevent flooding for the local residents in the downstream part of the river. We thought that the governments made all efforts and the dam would be finally built.” (Pocheon County official - 1)

However, the agreement was criticized and disregarded by ENGOs and some local residents (Hankyoreh Shinmun, 2004 a; Kangwon Ilbo, 2004). In particular, Cherlwon County and its residents strongly reacted against the PCSD’s decision. They announced that they would not participate in the joint committee.

“The mediation process was good. The committee members made all their efforts. However, in the arbitration stage, they seem to have taken this issue too naively. They seem to have thought that the reduction of the dam size and introduction of flood detention basins would satisfy us. However, this was not an issue of compromise.” (KFEM activist–4)

“Regarding the mediation result of the PCSD, environmental groups strongly criticized that the PCSD made illogical and ambiguous decision based on government-oriented information.” (Naeil Shinmun, 2004; similar view expressed by Environmental Justice-1)

“Cherlwon County residents do not accept even the flood control dam. They say: why does the government build such an ineffective dam for the purpose of flood control? Why does it waste money to build a dam just for 15 days? Therefore, we cannot trust the government’s promise to build a flood control dam. If the situations change, the government will surely change the function of the dam. In addition, the decision of the mediation committee was not transparent and fair. We were deceived by the mediation committee.” (Chosun Ilbo, 2004; similar news reported by the Hankyoreh Shinmun 2004 a and Kangwon Ilbo, 2004)
In relation to the discontentment of the anti-dam movement, the mass media, even the progressive newspapers, said that the compromise made through the PCSD mediation should be respected.

“The mediation process between conflicting parties during the last 5 months was a very important experience. The decision made by the mediation committee – flood control dam and flood detention basins – is a rational alternative. Therefore, it is not right that the anti-dam movement objects to the PCSD’s final decision in spite of their promise to accept it. The compromise should be respected.” (Hankyoreh Shinmun, 2004 b)

7.3.3 Conflict crisis (December 2004 – August 2005): the BAI’s audit

In the long run, the two attempts of mediation efforts by the ME and the PCSD all ended in failure. The negotiation reached a deadlock. Under this circumstance, ENGOs and local residents had a new momentum to stage the anti-Hantan River dam movement.

As the Hantan River dam issue remained controversial, the National Assembly (NA) decided to inspect it in terms of the appropriateness of its budget and requested that the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) would conduct an inspection of it on 9 December 2004. In particular, the Member of the National Assembly (MNA) Lee contributed to the NA’s order of the BAI’s audit (MOCT - 3; Secretary of environment during the Kim administration / member of the PCSD under the Roh administration) He was the former executive director of Hantan River Network and was elected as the MNA of Yeoncheon and Pocheon County in 2004 because of his active leadership in the anti-Hantan River dam movement.

The BAI carried out field investigation (20005.1.5~2.25), engaged in internal examination (2005.2.26~5.19) and finally announced the findings on 23 May 2005. The BAI pointed out two main problems of the Hantan River dam (BAI, 2005). Firstly, the flood control effect of the Hantan River dam was uncertain (BAI, 2005). Because of insufficient hydraulic and hydrologic data, accurate “flood volume” by which the dam's flood control capacity is determined, was difficult to calculate. The MOCT made the Hantan River dam construction plan even before examining the necessity of the dam. Secondly, the adoption of the Hantan River dam among various policy options lacks objectivity (BAI, 2005). The MOCT and the KOWACO heightened the benefit of the Hantan River dam, whereas they increased the cost
of an embankment, which was a competing option. In conclusion, based on its opinions, the BAI proposed that the Hantan River dam plan should be re-examined from a zero-base.

Right after the BAI’s announcement of inspection result, ENGOs and local residents severely criticized the MOCT and argued that the Hantan River dam should be cancelled immediately. They staged demonstration to insist on the cancellation of the Hantan River dam in front of the government complex on 31 May 2005.

“Finally the BAI’s audit result was announced. The BAI said that there were problems in the estimation of the flood control effect of the Hantan River dam and the comparison between dam and other policy options. The result was what we continually argued about. Now there is no room for an excuse. The Hantan River dam should be repealed.” (KFEM, 2005)

In relation to the BAI’s audit result, the MOCT, the KOWACO, and the PCSD were perplexed. They were discontented with the BAI’s audit because it reviewed the MOCT’s initial plan and announced what was already discussed in the PCSD (OPM and KDI, 2009).

“The BAI’s audit result was what we already discussed during the mediation of the PCSD. We accepted some errors of data in the mediation process and the final decision was made based on the revision of the data. The PCSD just did not say about it… As a result, the BAI’s announcement of audit result provided a new momentum for anti-dam movement and enlarged the distrust of the government policy.” (KOWACO staff - 3)

“The BAI’s announcement was all what we already discussed in the PCSD mediation. It was not new. I think this happening occurred because the PCSD is the weaker organization. Of course, the BAI can do inspection, but it should have done it earlier. The BAI did not accept the Citizens’ Audit Request in 2003. It was not reasonable to overturn what was already mediated issue in that way. As a result, this announcement invalidated the mediation of PCSD.” (Expert -2 / PCSD mediation committee member)

7.3.4 Conflict conclusion (August 2005 - 2007)

In response to the BAI’s announcement, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) installed the Imjin River Flood Countermeasure Special Committee (Thereafter, Imjin River Special
Committee) and re-examined the flood prevention measures for the Imjin River basin (August 2005 ~ August 2006). The Imjin River Special Committee was composed of 23 members including seven ministers, Governor of Gyeonggi province and Ganwon province, the presidents of government-affiliated research institutes and the presidents of academic associations with the Prime Minister as chairman. It formed a working committee and carried out an analysis of the flood control effect of the Hantan River dam and a comparison of economic feasibility between dam and embankment.

However, the anti-dam group criticized the makeup of the special committee and its working committee. They argued that they could not trust the impartiality of the committee, because many members of the special committee were on the government side and the representatives for ENGOs and local residents were excluded. They strongly questioned that the committee would be nothing more than a procedural process to legitimize the necessity of the dam. Therefore, they kept releasing statements to the press and staging demonstrations in front of the government complex to call on the government to scrape the Hantan River dam (23 March, 25 July, and 22 August 2006).

“In the process, the experts who had been recommended by ENGOs and local residents were excluded. In addition, the working staff of the Imjin River Special Committee, who had been dispatched from MOCT and KOWACO, dealt with the operation of the Imjin River Special Committee.” (KFEM activist – 5)

However, their arguments were not accepted. The government said that the mediation process involving related parties was already carried out several times and the decision of the Special Committee would be made based on the opinions of the experts, excluding the directly related parties.

At that time, there was a severe flood damage. In July 2006, heavy rains pounded Korea for a fifth straight day and left 19 people dead, 31 missing, and 2,400 people homeless. Faced by serious flood damage, major conservative newspapers and local papers argued that the government should have made dams to prevent flooding and ascribed the reason of this damage to anti-dam movement (Chosun Ilbo, 2006; Donga Ilbo, 2006 a, b; Gyeonggi Ilbo, 2006; Gyeonggi Shinmun, 2006)
“There was much flood damage in the region where dam construction was cancelled or temporarily stopped because of ENGOs or local residents (e.g. the Dong River dam, the Hantan River dam). This flood damage implies that the delay in policy projects finally leads to considerable damage.” (Chosun Ilbo, 2006)

“South Korea has not made a dam for 10 years because of extreme environmentalism.” (Donga Ilbo, 2006 a)…. “ENGOs should throw away the belief that dam construction is an environmental destruction. If dam construction is continually stopped and people continue to have flood damage, the responsibility will be on both ENGOs and the government” (Donga Ilbo, 2006 b)

“Environmental movement is responsible for this flood damage. Although we have had flood damage every year, we have not built any dam for 10 years since the Jangheung dam in 1996. The Dong River dam and the Moonjeong dam were cancelled and the Hantan River dam is still surrounded by controversy. Environmental conservation is necessary, but extreme environmentalism is not desirable. We request the government’s resolution” (Gyeonggi Ilbo, 2006; similar view expressed by the Gyeonggi Shinmun, 2006)

The working committee of the Imjin River Special Committee concluded that there was no doubt in the flood control effect of the Hantan River dam and in terms of economic efficiency and safety, it was superior to embankments as recommended by the anti-dam movement and reported it to the Special Committee. According to the report of the working committee, on 22 August, 2006, the Imjin River Special Committee made the final decision to build a small-sized Hantan River dam with riverside flood detention basins as flood control measures for the Imjin River area.

The anti-dam movements immediately refuted this decision. Even after that, ENGOs and local residents continually carried out campaigns against the government. Again, they made the Citizen’s Audit request against the MOCT, the KOWACO, and the OPM (The Imjin River Special Committee) on 29 November 2006, pointing out the unfairness of the decision of the OPM. However, their request was declined with the reason that the decision was made by the government after the sufficient discussions (March 2007). Under this circumstance, 20 NGOs such as the KFEM and Cultural Action made the Citizens’ Coalition to save the Hantan River and decided to cooperate in staging protests on 26 February 2007. They argued
that there are many historical relics to be conserved and therefore the government had to cancel the dam construction (Hankyoreh Shinmun, 2007a).

**Figure 7.6 Establishment of the Citizens’ Coalition to save the Hantan River**

Source: Hankyoreh (2007)

With the Citizens’ Action, the anti-Hantan River dam movement carried out legal action against the government from March 2007 until May 2009. However, in spite of its tenacious efforts, the Supreme Court made the final ruling against the anti-dam movement on 14 May 2009 and the movement almost lost its vitality.
7.4 Government approach and the anti-dam movement

In the sections above, the protest history of the two anti-dam movements were explored according to their conflicting phases. The time-series explanation has shown the behaviours of related parties around the dam projects according to the conflict phases. In this section, the chronical change in the behaviours of the government and the anti-dam group will be presented.

7.4.1 Behaviours of the government

Communication and mediation

In procedural terms, there were considerable amount of efforts from the government to communicate with the two anti-dam movements. During the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, the government tried discussing with the anti-dam groups many times. As a result, the anti-dam groups had conversations not only with related ministries such as the MOCT and the ME, but also with high institutions such as the OPM and the OP.

However, there were some differences in the government’s approaches. In the Dong River dam case, the MOCT’s behaviour rather incited the anti-dam movement to stage active protests. The MOCT’s public notice of dam construction before the completion of the EIA discussion in 1997 and its announcement that it would shortly start dam construction in 1999 expanded the extent of conflict. In addition, the mediation process was adopted in the final stage of the conflict. Although the joint review committees were proposed a couple of times, the anti-dam movement did not participate in the meetings proposed by the MOCT, which was the directly conflicting party.

On the other hand, in the Hantan River dam case, the MOCT did not push ahead with the dam construction and the mediation process was introduced very early on in the conflict development stage. As soon as the conflict started to escalate, the ME, which was the third party, actively engaged in mediation between the MOCT and the anti-dam movement. Later, the PCSD, which was considered another neutral organization, tried mediation again and provided a large number of discussion meetings between conflicting parties for a whole year.
**Change of dam function and incentive system**

In substantive terms, there were continuous efforts from the government to reduce the cost of the dam construction and increase its compensation. In the Hantan River dam case, the MOCT changed a multi-purpose dam into a flood control dam in the early stages of conflict, whereas in the Dong River dam case it limited construction to that of a multi-purpose dam and when the suggestion of the flood control dam emerged it was too late as the situation was almost at an end.

In addition, after the Dong River dam case, the MOCT had introduced and strengthened the incentive system to support local government and residents around dam sites. Realizing the necessity of more compensation for disadvantages caused by dam construction, the government enacted act on dam construction and assistance and started to provide economic support for local government and residents (MLTM, 2009 a; MOCT, 2007; MOLEG, 2011).

**7.4.2 Behaviours of the anti-dam movement**

*More opportunities and active protests*

According to the case studies, the anti-dam movements actively fought against the government using all the available means. While they sometimes had conversations, in other times they depended on direct actions.

Firstly, they had conversations not only with the relevant ministries such as the MOCT and the ME, but also with the high institutions such as the OPM and the OP. Although their engagement started from the EIA process, they also actively utilized the mediation chances by the high institutions to express their arguments. In addition, anti-dam movements staged strong outsider strategies.

Secondly, they still utilized demonstrations to put pressure on the government. They held assemblies in front of not only the office of the MOCT and the KOWACO which were in charge of dam projects, but also the office of the OPM which took charge of the mediation.
Moreover, they utilized mass media to draw the citizen’s attention by releasing statements to the press and holding press conferences.

In summary, the Korean environmental movement staged active protests by adopting a combination of conciliatory (soft) and confrontational (hard) strategies. While they depended on the outsider strategies which were often utilized under authoritarian regime, they also actively utilized the conversation opportunities which were provided by democratic regimes. That is, they made the best use of new opportunities provided by the favourable change of political environment (Goldstone, 2004; Richards and Heard, 2005). The below comment of an interviewee explains the Korean environmental protest since democratisation.

“Since the emergence of civil administration, ENGO’s opportunities to communicate with the government have greatly increased and so conversation has become a new effective strategy to fight against the government since democratisation. There is always a chance that outsider protests will be necessary. So they will always use demonstration if it is necessary. In conclusion, ENGOs have become to use a wide range of strategies.” (Secretary of environment under Kim administration / member of the PCSD under the Roh administration)

**Gradually weakened mobilization**

According to the case studies, the anti-dam protests show untiring characteristics of the Korean environmental movement. Their protests were very persistent and tenacious. By using various strategies as explained above, they staged strong protests.

However, in spite of their active protests in the two cases, while the anti-Dong River dam movement developed into a national issue, the anti-Hantan River dam movement didn’t develop into a national issue and remained as a local issue. As a result, while the former achieved the cancellation of the dam, the latter failed to achieve the cancellation. Without question, it is impossible for the anti-dam movement to always win over the government. However, the point is that in spite of its active protests, the anti-dam movement gradually lost public support and even faced criticisms towards the movement. This change of related stakeholders led to the decline of the anti-dam movement. In chapter 8, how and why these
features of the anti-dam movements were made will be explained in detail with the POS framework.

7.5 Summary

In this chapter, the behaviours of main actors in the two cases were explored. There were some similarities and differences between them. In particular, in case of the government, while in broad terms, both administrations commonly made efforts to communicate with anti-dam movements, they showed different aspects in detailed approaches. In procedural terms, while the government relatively pushed ahead with dam construction in the Dong River dam case, it actively engaged in discussion from early stage in the Hantan River dam case. In substantive terms, various measures to reduce the cost and enhance the benefit were undertaken.

Along with the change of the government, the anti-dam movement experienced considerable variation. While anti-dam groups staged active protests under democratic governments, they gradually dwindled and lost its influence. Paradoxically, the anti-dam movement faced its decline within a seemingly favourable political context. In chapter 8, the relationship between the above political contexts and the anti-dam movement will be explored in detail.
CHAPTER 8 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND PROTESTS

8.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 explored the history of the two anti-dam movements from 1998 to 2007. The time-series explanation showed the change of the anti-dam movement over time. However, the information was provided in a relatively descriptive way, rather than, in an analytic way, which makes it somewhat difficult to sufficiently explain what political context was given to the anti-dam movement and how it had an effect on the development of the anti-dam movement. This chapter will give a more analytic explanation about “political context” around the anti-dam movement. In particular, it will investigate into various social actors surrounding the anti-dam movement and explain their viewpoints towards dam construction. Furthermore, it will examine how their viewpoints changed over time and their overall impact on the anti-dam movement.

As stated previously, this phenomenon will be explained through the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) framework, which contributes to finding out this complex interaction between the government and the social movement. Utilizing the two dimensions within the POS - access to political system and configuration of actors, the dynamic change of the Korean anti-dam movement during the period 1998-2007 will be analysed.

This analysis is based on interviewing with various sorts of people. Not only the agencies which were directly involved in the dam conflicts (e.g. anti-dam protesters and government), but also the third parties which were not directly involved, but were attentive in those issues (e.g. experts and reporters) were interviewed. However, the third parties cannot be simply considered impartial for the reason that they are the third parties.

For example, even though “experts” are classified the third parties, they should not be considered neutral from the dam conflict because they also have their own value or position towards the dam construction (Fisher, 2000; Worcester, 1999). While dam experts often support dam building, ecologists might oppose it (Hong, S. T., 2004, 2005, 2007 a). The former often works with the MOCT and defends the necessity of dam construction, whereas the latter points to its potential environmental problem. Therefore, according to their value or
position, experts might have different opinion towards dam construction. In addition, there are relatively neutral experts compared to both experts (e.g. mediation experts).

Considering this perspective, the researcher contacted various kinds of experts. Experts were interviewed who both supported the dam building and those who were against it. Conflict experts who mediated conflicting parties were also interviewed. Through interviewing with these various people, the views of experts were grasped.

8.2 Political opportunity structure and protest in the Dong River dam case

Among the two dimensions of the POS, “access to the political system” represents how many participation opportunities are provided by a political system and how easily a social movement can express its arguments. “Configuration of actors” represents how much support a social movement receives from related social actors.

8.2.1 Access to the political system and protests

To influence policy making, a social movement requires access to the political system. Access opportunities are provided through both formal and informal processes.

*Formal access to political system*

(EIA) In the Dong River dam case, the anti-dam movement’s formal access to policy making was the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process. Through it, local residents had the chance to listen to the contents of the dam project and express their opinions.

In Korea where there is a strong tradition of top-down decision making, the EIA process is one of the most important systems in hearing the opinion of local residents (Joo, 2005). Even though initially introduced in 1981, the EIA process has substantively improved since democratisation. In the 1980s, it was actually a nominal procedure as developers did not need to hear the opinions of local residents (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1985; Donga Ilbo, 1988). However, in 1991 the system was changed to gather the opinions of local residents, though only in written form. In 1994 after the emergence of the civic administration, the process of a public hearing was finally introduced and implemented. Since then, developers have been obliged to hold face-to-face public hearings (Choi and Kwon, 2006; Jeong, H. S., 2002; Seok, 2007; You and Kim, 2003). More specifically, a broader public hearing termed “public
“briefing” is a mandatory procedure and provides explanation for projects, while a narrower “public hearing” is held at the request of over 30 residents to have discussion over the projects.

Table 8.1 Public briefings and hearings during the EIA process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public briefing</th>
<th>Public hearing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 October 1996 (Yeongwol)</td>
<td>27 March 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October 1996 (Jeongseon): cancellation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KOWACO staff -3, ME -3

In the Dong River dam case, through this improved EIA process, local residents listened to the information regarding the dam project and express their discontent.

“Until the 1980s, development projects were public authority-oriented. Even when the government expropriates the land for development projects, only written notice were posted on the board of town hall. However, since democratisation, the EIA has greatly changed and now there is no system as democratic and open as the EIA. The EIA system includes public briefings and hearings. Through these processes, local residents recognize the project and express their opinions. It was the same in the Dong River dam case. Local residents started to object to the dam construction after the EIA process. The anti-Dong River dam movement also started from the EIA Process.” (ME official – 1)

ENGOs also focused attention on the EIA process. They acquired the information from the EIA report and strongly pressurised the ME to disagree with the dam construction.

“We did not have any information of the Dong River dam project before the EIA process. Through the EIA process, we came to know about the contents of the project and started to point out the problems of the dam project. The EIA process was almost the start of all the controversies.” (KFEM activist – 1)

“We gathered ENGOs’ various opinions. ENGOs asked for many things. They requested that the MOCT should revise the EIA report. In addition, they argued that the ME should even examine economic feasibility, because the MOCT would not listen to their opinions.” (ME official - 3)
(Committee) Since democratisation, various conversation channels have emerged between the government and NGOs to seek NGO’s advice on policy-making (Lee, 2000). In the Dong River dam case, ENGOs expressed their opinions in those committees (ME official -1, 3, KEI staff - 1).

“Since democratisation, ENGOs have participated in the committees within the ME. They acquired information and expressed their opinions through these channels. This trend was more intensified under the Kim Dae Jung administration.” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration / member of the PCSD under the Roh administration)

The NGO Environmental Policy Review Association (EPRA) was established as a typical communication channel between the ME and ENGOs. However, it was a consultative body and therefore substantive discussions over environmental issues were made through the EIA process. This view is reflected in the interviews of a couple of ME officials (ME official-1, 3) as shown below.

“The EPRA is the official communication channels between the government and ENGOs. In this committee, we discussed over important environment issues. The Dong River dam issue was also discussed in the committee. However, it is not a decision making body, but a consultative body.” (ME official -3; similar view expressed by ME official-1)

**Informal access to political system**

In addition to formal access opportunities, there were many informal access opportunities provided by various channels as shown in the table below. The anti-dam movement had conversations with the MOCT/ME, the Office of the President (OP), and the Office of the Prime minister (OPM). While these informal meetings were provided for conflict resolution, the anti-dam movement actively voiced their arguments through them (MOCT official -2, 3; ME official -1, 3).

**Table 8.2 Informal meetings in the Dong River dam case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOCT/ME</th>
<th>Office of the President</th>
<th>Office of the Prime minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• MOCT and ME’s unofficial meetings with ENGOs</td>
<td>• Mediation try by Secretary of Environment (Dec 1998)</td>
<td>• Joint review committee (Aug 99 to Jun 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MOCT’s suggestion of review committee (Oct 98, Jan 99)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOCT official, Secretary of environment under the Kim administration, and OPM (2000)
Firstly, the anti-dam movement had many meetings with the MOCT and the ME. Until the 1980s, policy implementation by the government was accepted as absolute and unchangeable to citizens, even though their property rights were violated (Kim, J. K. and M. C. Lee, 2005). However, since democratisation, the government has not disregarded citizens’ opinions and has not simply pushed dam construction forward. In the Dong River dam case, the MOCT had many discussion meetings to persuade the anti-dam group and even proposed a joint review committee for the first time among large national policy projects (see page 150 in 7.2.2).

“We met many high public officials. We could have conversations with almost all political institutions except the National Intelligence Service.” (Uiryeong conservation activist -1)

After the MOCT failed to make a compromise, high institutions such as the OP and the OPM were engaged in the discussion with the anti-dam movement. In particular, they suggested a joint review committee comprised of equal numbers from each party to be represented at the negotiation table. In this way, the government guaranteed not only participation, but also an equal voice in the committee, to such an extent for some experts as to criticize that Kim administration gave NGOs too many opportunities.

“Since democratisation, the government had to listen to ENGOs. In particular, the Kim Dae Jung administration heavily communicated with NGOs. However, the administration gave ENGOs too many opportunities in the Dong River dam issue. Of course, the government should hear their opinions, but should not let them make the decisions. It was wrong for the administration to approve a joint review committee with an equal number of representatives.”
(Expert 1 / mediation committee member in the Dong River dam issue)

**Summary**

These access chances became a crucial momentum for the ENGOs to express their voice. Along with the democratisation, the President contributed to the creation of these access chances. Various interviewees including ENGO members confirmed President Kim provided the anti-dam movement with many opportunities.
“Since democratisation, political space has expanded and as a result we were able to make our arguments more freely. In addition, the Kim administration wanted to resolve social conflicts through discussion and compromise. Therefore, we had many access opportunities to the government and voiced our opinions.” (KFEM activist – 2; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-4 and Green Korea activist-1)

“In general, NGOs can actively stage protests when the government provide them with participation opportunities. Under the Kim Dae Jung administration, opportunities for the environmental movement were wide open. Therefore, there were active protests of ENGOs against government projects including the Dong River dam issue.” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration)

8.2.2 Configuration of actors and protest

In spite of increased access points, social movements cannot be successful with unfavourable configuration of actors. Therefore, much attention should be paid to the configuration of actors in a given time (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, 1996). In the Dong River dam case, the anti-dam movement was supported by many actors and this support contributed to its successful outcome.

Configuration of actors at central level

(President) President Kim had more interest in the environment and positioned himself in a relatively neutral position compared with past presidents under authoritarian regimes. Although he stressed economic development, he also tried to listen to the voice of environmental groups. In the Dong River dam case, President Kim did not push ahead with dam construction, but instead tried to make a careful decision through sufficient discussions on the various problems involving the construction of the dam.

“According to presidential spokesman, President Kim said that the government should not push the Dong River dam project forward for the reason that the government had already established a construction plan and the environment minister should judge this issue fairly and carefully.” (Donga Ilbo, 1999 a; similar news article reported by Hankyung 1999)
“President Kim grappled with the Dong River dam issue for a long time. He kept asking himself about whether the government could revoke the planned national project and then how it could prevent flooding in the future.” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration / member of the PCSD under the Roh administration)

He even expressed his personal opinion about the dam construction and it had a crucial impact on the movement result. It added fuel to the anti-dam movement’s protest and contributed to the cancellation of the dam.

“President Kim provided ENGOs with driving force to stage active protests. After he expressed his personal opinion, ENGOs had high spirits. They were inspired to carry out the anti-dam movement” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration / member of the PCSD under the Roh administration)

“The cancellation of the Dong River dam was achieved not by the MOCT’s giving up, but President Kim’s resolution. If he did not side with ENGOs, the Dong River dam would have continued to be implemented.” (KOWACO – 3)

“The most important factor was the resolution of the president. President Kim made a drastic resolution to scrape the Dong River dam construction. In this regard, he was more environment-friendly compared to President Roh.” (KFEM activist-4; Similar view expressed by KFEM activist-1)

(Ministries) The Korean government has often been considered a developmental state where the development ministry exerts relatively much more power compared with other ministries such as the environment ministry. However, in the Dong River dam case, organizations opposing dam construction overwhelmed the development ministry.

Among various government ministries, in particular, the ME played an important role in the anti-dam movement. The ME continually requested the revision of the EIA report, which prevented the MOCT from moving forward with the construction of the Dong River dam. In addition, the support of the Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA) and the Forest Service (FS) was helpful to the anti-dam movement. This is shown through responses by ENGO members and politicians as shown below.
“The ME has relatively weak power compared with the development ministry. Moreover, it is very difficult for the ME to raise objections to national projects. However, it later recognized the importance of the Dong River area and kept raising concerns related to the environmental impact against the MOCT.” (KFEM activist-1; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-2 and Uiryeong Conservation activist -1)

“The ME expressed objections to the Dong River dam construction and therefore ENGOs were more encouraged to stage active protests. Moreover, the Cultural Heritage Administration, and the Forest Service raised objections. The MOCT fought with them alone…” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration)

The support of the ministries became a driving force of the anti-dam movement and contributed to the success of the anti-dam movement as shown in the comment below.

“The Ministry of Environment, the Cultural Heritage Administration, and the Forest Service stated that the Dong River area is not suitable for the dam site and should be preserved because there are numerous rare species and cultural assets. Therefore, the MOCT should give up dam construction as soon as possible” (KFEM, 1998)

Configuration of actors at local level

(Local residents) In relation to dam construction, it is generally said that while residents residing upstream oppose it because of several disadvantages such as reverse flow risk and economic regulation, residents living downstream who had flood damage are in favour of dam construction. As expected, Jeongseon County residents upstream opposed the dam construction from the start to the end and Yeongwol County residents downstream were in favour of dam construction. As a matter of fact, dam construction was planned at the strong request of Yeongwol County residents who had serious flood damage in 1990 (Yeongwol County -1).

However, after the ENGOs raised a safety issue with environmental destruction, Yeongwol residents gradually changed their position and started to have opposition. Although the government assured that there was no problem in relation to safety, the controversy did not subside but only intensified.

“The safety issue of the dam was really problematic. ENGOs kept raising the safety
problem and Yeongwol County residents were greatly concerned about the risk of dam collapsing. The government said that a safe dam could be built with modern construction technique, but local residents believed that as the dam site was a limestone area, it was erosion-prone and vulnerable to shock.” (Yeongwol County official -1)

“When local residents stand in the centre of the environmental movement, it can have power to achieve a successful outcome. In the Dong River dam case, there was an active participation of local residents including Yeongwol County residents. They voluntarily organized the committee and staged protests. This was a big help for the anti-dam movement” (KFEM activist -1)

(Local governments) In the Dong River dam case, most local governments initially showed positive views towards dam construction in terms of local development, only under the condition that the complaints of local residents be minimized. Even Jeongseon County upstream established an organization for the administrative support for construction of the dam. At that time, this stance of local governments was usual, because local autonomy had not been implemented until 1995 and moreover they were dependent to a large extent on the financial support of central government.

“The office of Yeongwol County established a support organization for dam construction within it. Initially, we were favourable to dam construction. We approached it in terms of local economy and thought that it could lead to the vitalization of regional economy at least for 10 years... In addition, it was hard to imagine that local governments opposed central government’s projects. Local governments accepted national project as necessary and unchangeable thing.” (Yeongwol County official -1)

“At that time, I often visited the Dong River area for field trips with students and I knew that many Yeonwol County residents did not like dam construction. I had the chance to meet the Yeongwol County governor and I asked about the position of residents. However, contrary to my expectation, he said that over 80% of Yeongwol County residents were in favour of dam construction and criticized my intervention in this issue. So I made up my mind to search out the truth and carried the surveys of 1004 local residents and found out that many local residents opposed dam construction.” (Professor -1)

However, after the objections of local residents intensified, the heads of local counties expressed their opposition to dam construction. In particular, the objections of the Yeongwol
County head and Gangwon Province governor were important factors in the development of the anti-dam movement. As mentioned above, local residents’ concern about the safety was critical. The anti-dam movement made the most of local governments’ objections to the dam construction in order to put pressure on the central government.

“Local governments did not initially oppose the central government’s projects, because they depend heavily on the central government. They later made announcements… Anyway, irrespective of whether their announcements were voluntary or involuntary, their announcements of objections encouraged the anti-Dong River dam movement. With them, we could place stronger pressure on the government to repeal the Dong River dam.” (KFEM activist –1; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-2)

**Configuration of actors in the third parties**

**Experts** In the Dong River dam case, considerable support from experts was a powerful impetus to the anti-dam movement. Many experts of ecology, cave and earthquake supported the anti-dam movement by alerting the public to the problems of dam construction. This is reflected in the interviews of many ENGO activists, professors and government officials.

“Many renowned professors participated in the anti-Dong River dam movement and gave us the logic and evidence to attack the government policy. Thanks to their support, we could compete on the same level with government policy.” (KFEM activist –1; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-2, Environmental Justice-1, and Professor 5)

“A large number of experts supported ENGOs. When ENGOs warned that the Dong River topography is a limestone region prone to erosion, geologists on our side explained that a safe dam could be built with the present construction technique. However, right after that, the earthquake issue was newly raised. Some experts argued that the Dong River dam area is vulnerable to earthquake as it is an active fault zone. Objections were continually raised by experts.” (MOCT official - 2)

**Mass media** The role of the mass media is very crucial in an environmental movement because when an environmental problem is accepted as a social agenda, the movement is easily mobilized (Gitlin, 1980; Ku, 2000). Problems do not automatically become a social agenda; they need a social process through which they are designated as social issues (Hannigan, 1995).
The Dong River dam case study confirmed that the mass media played a vital role in the expansion of the anti-dam movement. The table below shows the total numbers of newspaper articles published on the dam issue. From the table, it is clear that the Dong River dam issue drew much attention from the mass media. In particular, newspaper coverage reached a peak in 1999 when the conflict was at its highest. (The Chosun Ilbo and the Donga Ilbo are conservative newspapers, whereas the Hankyoreh Shinmun and the Kyunghyang Shinmun are progressive newspapers).

Table 8.3 Number of newspaper articles which relate to the Dong River case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Chosun</th>
<th>Donga</th>
<th>Hankyoreh</th>
<th>Kyunghyang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kinds

There were numerous reports on the importance of the Dong River’s ecosystem and the problems of a supply-oriented water resource policy in both conservative and progressive papers. Even conservative newspapers strongly supported the anti-dam movement in the Dong River case (See page 153 in 7.2.2).

“The role of the mass media was crucial in the cancellation of the Dong River dam project. The conservative Chosun Ilbo often delivered field reports of the dam site and once covered an entire page completely with a colour photo of the Dong River (See page 156). At its request, I wrote several columns and editorials criticizing the Dong River dam project. At that time, the Chosun Ilbo was a newspaper which focused on the environment.” (Professor-7 / the Chosun Ilbo columnist during the anti-Dong River dam movement)

Many interviewees agreed to the fact that the mass media contributed heavily to the expansion of the movement.

“I recall that the mass media supported ENGOs a lot. Both newspapers and TV dealt with ENGOs’ objections many times. Environmental destruction and safety issue were magnified by the mass media. As a result, ENGOs received the support from general citizens.” (MOCT official - 1)
“The role of the mass media was considerable. Many mass media reported the beauty of the Dong River. A KBS documentary contributed greatly to the success of the anti-dam movement and the famous picture of the Dong River was taken by Chosun Ilbo.” (KFEM activist-2; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-1 and Uiryeong Conservation activist-1)

(Citizens) In the Dong River dam case, general citizens showed considerable interest in the anti-dam movement and supported it. According to the opinion surveys of various sources, 70% to 85% of citizens opposed the Dong River dam. Interviewees said that public opinion was a crucial factor for the anti-dam movement and was much affected by the mass media.

“We met local residents, experts, and public officials even in the Office of the President. However, public opinion played the most important role in the cancellation of the Dong River dam. Many citizens supported the anti-Dong River dam movement.” (Uiryeong conservation -1)

“Even if we staged protests and proposed policy alternatives, general citizens did not know the fact. However, after the Dong River dam issue was put on the headlines of major newspapers and KBS, citizens began to have interest in it. Even elementary school students uploaded their criticisms against the dam construction on the homepage of the Office of the President.” (KFEM activist - 1)

Summary

In conclusion, the development group was almost surrounded by the anti-dam groups including local governments, experts and the mass media.

“The essence of dam conflict is a power game between the pro-development bloc and pro-environment bloc. As many political actors supported the anti-Dong River dam movement, they could actively stage protest and achieved their goal.” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration)

“In environmental movement, the positions of social actors around the issue are really important. In the Dong River dam case, the mass media and citizens sided with ENGOs.” (Uiryeong conservation-1)
8.3 Political opportunity structure and protest in the Hantan River dam case

8.3.1 Access to the political system and protests

Like the Dong River dam case, the anti-dam movement’s access to the political system was made through both formal and informal meetings. However, the extent of the access between both cases was somewhat different.

*Formal access to political system*

(EIA) Like the Dong River dam case, the anti-Hantan River dam movement’s formal access to policy making was the EIA process. As shown in the table below, local residents had many chances to listen to the contents of dam project and express their discontents through this process. Among them, policy conferences organized by the MOCT and the ME are not formal meetings which are prescribed in the law but rather informal meetings which were provided at the strong request of the ME. However, as they were organized in relation to the EIA process, they will be explained in the formal access part.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public briefing</th>
<th>Public hearing</th>
<th>Policy conference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug 2001 (Pocheon): cancellation</td>
<td>9 Oct 2001: cancellation</td>
<td>29 April, 10 July 2002: organized by the MOCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Aug 2001 (Yeoncheon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug – 11 Sep 2001 (Pocheon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sep 2001 (Cherlwon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As mentioned previously, the EIA system was rapidly improved in the 1990s and in particular, the introduction of public briefings (or hearings) guaranteed the substantial participation of related stakeholders. In the Hantan River dam case, the public briefings (or hearings) provided the anti-dam movement with opportunities to point out the problems of dam construction (See page 164 in 7.3.2).

However, in this case, the ME was not content with public briefings (or hearings) and organized mediation meetings. That is, the ME did not stay as a passive actor who only pointed out environmental problems but played an active role as the mediator between
conflicting parties. The ME kept requesting the MOCT to hold discussion meetings with the anti-dam movement. After the MOCT failed to reach a compromise, the ME itself held discussion meetings. ENGOs and local residents actively participated in those conferences and pointed out the problems of dam construction.

“In relation to the EIA process, there were many discussion meetings such as public hearings and policy conferences. In policy conferences organized by the MOCT or the ME, ENGOs and local NGOs raised many problems.” (MOCT official–3; similar view expressed by KFEM activist–4)

(Audit) Unlike the Dong River dam case, the anti-Hantan River dam movement had another formal access chance, which is the so-called audit request system. It itself made audit request against the MOCT and the KOWACO two times (September 2003 and November 2009) and also pressurised the National Assembly to request audit (December 2004).

Both the citizens’ audit request system and the National Assembly’s audit request system were introduced in 2002 and 2003 respectively as a way to scrutinize the government. (As a matter of fact, although the audit request system was introduced in 1996 after democratisation, it was not prescribed in the law and was implemented at the BAI’s directive. For these reasons, its institutional foundation was very weak). Civic groups and a group of over three hundred citizens can make a citizen’s audit request about the government’s corruption or legal transgression. While citizens’ request is selectively accepted by an audit request screening committee to prevent the abuse of the system, an audit request by National Assembly should be necessarily accepted. Both systems were introduced to enhance the citizens’ participation in the BAI’s audit work.

In the Hantan River dam case, the announcement of the audit result gave fatal blow to the development ministry and reignited the anti-dam movement.

“The BAI’s announcement reignited controversy. I think that BAI was so irresponsible. So what was the difference? There were already sufficient discussions in the two times of mediations under the supervision of the ME and the PCSD. In conclusion, the BAI exacerbated a resolved issue.” (Secretary of environment during the Kim administration / member of the PCSD under the Roh administration)
(Committee) As mentioned previously, the environmental movement had more participation opportunities in the government committees. In particular, after the cancellation of the Dong River dam in 2000, President Kim established the Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development (PCSD). Therefore, other than the existing NGO Environmental Policy Review Association (EPRA), ENGOs members participated in the committees within the PCSD and gave advices regarding environmental issues. However, as the PCSD was also a consultative body, ENGOs’ substantial channel to voice their opinions was still the EIA process.

“We expressed our opinions through the EIA process. Advisory committees within the ME were just the organizations for communication between ME and ENGOs. We did not have official meetings with the ME officials in relation to the EIA process, but, if necessary, we met them and expressed our opinions.” (KFEM activist – 4)

**Informal access to political system**

Like the Dong River dam case, the anti-Hantan River dam movement had many informal access channels such as the PCSD mediation and the meeting with the Office of the President.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PCSD</th>
<th>Office of the President</th>
<th>Office of the Prime minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 13 pre-mediation meetings (Feb to May 2004)</td>
<td>• Discussion with Secretary of Civil society -8 June 2005 -2 February 2006</td>
<td>• Policy conference by the Imjin River Special committee -8 June 2006 -4 Aug 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 16 mediation meetings (May to Sep 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BAI (2005), PCSD (2005), OPM and KDI (2009)

(PCSD) In the Hantan River dam case, President Roh gave the anti-dam movement a good opportunity to express their arguments, particularly through PCSD mediation. He suggested that the PCSD should resolve the conflict through discussions with the related parties, even though the EIA discussion between the MOCT and the ME had ended. That is, he provided an arena for debate and negotiation again, even though the formal legal process had been completed. Interviewees mentioned that President Roh’s suggestion was spurred by the persistence of the anti-dam movement.
“Through the long discussions, the MOCT and the ME came to a compromise. Then, the project had to be implemented according to legal process, even if there was some discontent. It is problematic for the government to re-examine the project from scratch because of the President’s order despite the legal process having been completed. As a result, the order of president became the momentum of continuous protest (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration / member of the PCSD under the Roh administration)

“The MOCT and the ME made a wonderful agreement. We proposed a flood control dam and the MOCT accepted it. Then, this EIA discussion should have been respected. However, President Roh ordered the PCSD to restart discussion between related parties. It was wrong for the government to re-discuss an issue which had already been decided through the legal process. I do not understand why this issue was dealt with by the PCSD again. Finally, this decision resulted in endless fighting.” (KEI staff–2; similar view expressed by ME official-1 and KEI staff-1)

(OP/OPM) The anti-Hantan River dam movement also had access chances to high institutions such as the Office of the President and the Office of the Prime minister. In particular, the Roh administration established the Secretariat of Civil society within the Office of the President in 2004 in order to encourage communication and cooperation with civil society and the Secretary often met citizens in relation to a social conflict issue. In the Hantan River dam case, he met with anti-dam groups on a number of occasions.

“The Roh administration was NGO-friendly and there were many access channels. In relation to the Hantan River dam, we participated in the PCSD’s mediation and also had a couple of meeting with the Secretary of Civil society.” (KFEM - 4)

Summary

In terms of the access to the political system, the anti-dam movement had many chances to express its opinions, the creation of which was largely influenced by the President. The statement below describes the situation under the Roh administration.

“President Roh was the person who thought highly of discussion and negotiation and therefore he tried to solve conflicts through participation of conflicting parties. Therefore, under the Roh administration, environmental movements had many participation opportunities and could carry out a variety of activities. In this regard, the conservatives criticized that President Roh provided ENGOs with too many participation opportunities
and brought out the excess of democracy.” (Spokesman of ruling party under the Roh administration)

“At that time, ENGOs dominated a social issue. It was related to the characteristic of the administration. The Roh administration was a NGO-friendly administration and President Roh wanted the government to resolve conflicts through communication.” (ME official - 3)

8.3.2 Configuration of actors and protest
Like the Dong River dam case, configuration of actors surrounding the Hantan River dam conflict was an important factor in the development and outcome of the anti-dam movement. It will be explained in terms of three groups; central level, local level, and the third parties.

Configuration of actors at central level
(President) Like President Kim, President Roh had relatively neutral position between the development and the environment. Although he put the emphasis on economy, he did not unilaterally side with the development bloc and tried to listen to the arguments of the environment group. He always sought to resolve conflicts with discussion and compromise. The development group even argued that the Roh administration was an environment-oriented government.

“The Roh administration was environment-oriented. President Roh lent his weight to ENGOs too much.” (KOWACO staff-1)… “Roh administration was the government which had a close relationship with ENGOs. The information we reported to the high institutions in relation to the Hantan River dam issue was instantly transmitted to ENGOs and they refuted our arguments one by one.” (KOWACO staff-3)

In the Hantan River dam case, President Roh encouraged discussion and compromise in deciding whether the dam should be built or not. He announced that he would accept any result as long as it was acquired through sufficient debate. However, unlike President Kim, he did not express his personal opinion about dam construction. Some interviewees said that this factor might have affected the difference in the movements’ outcome.

“While President Kim gave his position on the anti-dam movement through the expression of his personal opinion, President Roh held the position of not expressing his opinion and
accepting any result if it came out of active debate. This difference might have had an impact on the decision making of the Hantan River dam.” (KFEM – 4)

However, more interviewees including high level politicians said that this difference in the presidents’ expression just came from the difference in public opinion towards the dam construction. According to them, president cannot help following public opinion including the opinion of local residents.

“When President Kim announced the cancellation of the Dong River dam, I helped him as the Secretary of environment in the Presidential Office. President Kim grappled with the Dong River dam issue for a long time. He kept asking himself about whether the government could revoke the planned national project and then how it could prevent flooding in the future. Finally, what made President Kim express his objection was that he knew more people opposed the dam construction. Because he knew that more local governments and residents opposed the dam construction, he expressed his objection to the dam construction. If more local residents had been favour of the dam construction, he would have carried out the dam construction in spite of some resistance. President is a politician and therefore judges every policy in the political point of view. President cannot help following the opinion of local residents and citizens. This approach was also applied in the Saemangeum Reclamation project. More local governments and residents were favour of the Saemangeum Reclamation project and therefore President Kim continued to carry out it despite strong opposition by environmental groups…. I think that the Hantan River issue was just like these cases. The anti-Hantan River dam movement did not have superiority over developmental authorities. Relatively less local governments and residents opposed the Hantan River dam project. In this context, it is natural that President Roh could not make decision to cancel the dam project.” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration / the PCSD member under the Roh administration)

“That difference is so natural. In case of the Dong River dam, public opinion against the dam construction was really strong. More local governments and residents opposed it. In particular, the mass media fully supported the argument of the anti-Dong River dam movement. Under this circumstance, President Kim could not help accepting its cancellation and there was also no risk to his political position, even if he expressed his personal objection to it. However, the Hantan River dam case is different. There were little people who knew the Hantan River dam issue. In addition, the mass media did not have much interest in it and rather criticized the arguments of environmental groups. There were a lot
of news reports that the delay in national projects by environmental groups caused a great deal of economic damage. In this situation, how can President Roh make a resolution against public opinion?” (Spokesman of ruling party under the Roh administration)

“It is clear that President Roh provided environmental groups with a lot of opportunities and carefully listened to their opinions. Even so, he cannot take their side in the face of more people’s support of the dam construction. President is a politician. Politicians thinks highly of public opinion and cannot help following it. ” (ME official – 3)

(Ministries) Like the Dong River dam case, the ME continually requested that the MOCT revise the EIA report and make an agreement with the anti-dam movement.

“In some aspects, the Hantan River area is better than the Dong River area in terms of ecology. Moreover, as there are not factories, upstream water is very clean. Therefore, we called for more measures to lessen environmental impact. In fact, we hoped that if possible, other measures aside from dam construction could be taken.” (KEI staff – 2; similar view expressed by KEI staff-1)

“The EIA was almost like social impact assessment. The ME tried not to complete the EIA discussion before we reached an agreement with the anti-dam group. It said that the project should be accepted by ENGOs and local residents.” (KOWACO staff-2)…. “By the EIA act, the ME had to give us its opinion within 60 days. However, it did not give us their opinions until the designated date and continued to examine the EIA report. The ME put way too much emphasis on social acceptability.” (KOWACO staff – 3)

However, there were some differences between the Dong River dam case and the Hantan River dam case. While the ME maintained a firm opposition to the Dong River dam construction in response to the MOCT’s pushing ahead, in the Hantan River dam case, though it was still not in complete favour of dam construction, it came to accept it eventually after numerous discussion meetings. The ME proposed a flood control dam and the MOCT accepted the offer. That is, this time the MOCT did not adhere to the original plan and changed it. However, despite the ME’s contribution, protests continued. After that, the ME no longer sympathized with the anti-dam movement.

In the Hantan River dam case, along with the ME, the role of the BAI was important. The BAI’s announcement of the audit result provided the anti-Hantan River dam movement with
new momentum by instigating distrust in the government policy (KOWACO – 3; Expert 2/PCSD Mediation committee member). The BAI’s announcement served as a platform for the anti-dam movement to make its strong argument that the Hantan River dam should be repealed (KFEM, 23 May 2005). However, following the BAI’s announcement, the Imjin River Flood Countermeasure Special Committee under the OPM confirmed the feasibility of the Hantan River dam and after that, the BAI no longer engaged in this issue.

**Configuration of actors at local level**

*Local residents* In general, residents downstream who suffered from flood damage were in favour of the construction of the dam, whereas residents upstream who found several disadvantages with dam were against its construction. Likewise, local residents upstream of the Hantan River opposed dam construction. In particular, Cherlwon County residents living furthest upstream of the Hantan River had strong objections to dam construction because of possible economic disadvantages. Their objections were upheld even after the mediation of the OPM in 2006.

The key point was the opinion of residents downstream: Yeoncheon County residents and Pocheon County residents. They gradually changed their opinion towards dam construction. Firstly, Yeoncheon County residents had suffered great flood damage in the 1990s that was aggravated by the collapse of the Yeoncheon dam (two times), eventually the dam was torn down at residents’ request. Therefore, unlike the general inclination of local residents downstream, Yeoncheon County residents initially objected to the construction of the dam. Although Yeoncheon residents recognized the necessity of dam construction to some degree, they strongly objected to it because of the possibility of dam collapsing. However, as a result of the compromise between the MOCT and the ME, the purpose of the Hantan River dam was narrowed down to flood control only. This change relieved the concerns of local residents, because as a flood control dam wouldn’t contain water it would be a safer option from dam collapse. In addition, it provided advantages to environment conservation. This is reflected in the interviews of local government officials and professors.

“Initially, the Hantan River dam was planned as a multi-purpose dam for both water supply and flood control. However, Yeoncheon County residents have the bitter experience of the
Yeoncheon dam collapses and so they strongly opposed dam construction. The flood damage which was caused by the Yeoncheon dam collapses was really disastrous and therefore they expressed a great deal of concern over the possibility of dam collapsing. However, the function of the dam was narrowed down to flood control and after then event, their concerns greatly subsided. In addition, environmental destruction could be reduced through the construction of flood control dam.” (Yeoncheon County official – 1)

“I think that the safety of a dam is dependent on its design and construction. Therefore, engineers can possibly address the safety problem by providing physical solution. However, the key lies in the residents’ trust. In spite of assuring dam safety, Yeoncheon County residents can still have misgivings about the safety aspect. However, the purpose of the Hantan River dam was reduced to flood control and this would have relieved the concerns of local residents. In general, the collapse possibility of a flood control dam, which would contain water only for rainy season, is much smaller compared with other types of dams.” (Professor – 4)

“The suggestion of flood control as an alternative was crucial. While a multi-purpose dam can lead to big-scale environmental destruction, a flood control dam can greatly reduce a submerged area. The adjustment in the dam function changed the opinions of Yeoncheon County residents.” (Professor -3)

Moreover, the attitude of Pocheon County residents gradually changed. Interviewees said that initially many residents had objections to dam construction, but their objections gradually weakened after several mediations and the MOCT’s change of dam function. This is shown in the interviews of local government officials and professors.

"Many Pocheon County residents initially opposed dam construction, although their objections were not so strong as the objections of Cherlwon County residnets. The former executive director Lee of the Hantan River Network was from Pocheon and he was elected as the Member of the National Assembly (MNA) representing Pocheon County because of his leadership in the anti-Hantan River dam movement. However, after the mediation of the PCSD and the OPM, the opinion of local residents gradually changed. They thought that the dam would be built because the government had made a number of discussions and finally adopted a flood control dam by changing the existing multi-purpose dam. The intensity of their objections really diminished.” (Pocheon County official – 1)
“A flood control dam as an alternative was crucial.” (Professor-3)….. “Like Yeoncheon County, in Pocheon County, the objections of local residents greatly weakened. The alternative reduced the extent of the objections.” (Professor –4)

This turn of events by local residents negatively affected the anti-dam movement.

“In the Hantan River dam case, there were many local residents to oppose dam construction. However, it was not so strong as the anti-Dong River dam movement and didn’t develop into a powerful movement.” (KFEM activist -1)

(Local governments) Unlike the Dong River dam case, local governments did not simply show a favourable stance towards the central government’s dam construction but rather considered the opinions of local residents. Since the introduction of local autonomy in 1995, heads of local governments could not disregard the opinions of local residents if they wanted to be re-elected.

Cherlwon County upstream expressed the objections to dam construction because its residents strongly opposed it. In Cherlwon, the County representatives led the anti-Hantan River dam movement. Their objections remained steadfast even after the mediation of the OPM in 2006. The Governor of Gangwon Province also expressed his opinion to oppose dam construction as the Dong River dam case.

Moreover, as the newspaper articles below show, Yeoncheon County downstream initially opposed the dam construction because of the objections of its local residents who experienced the severe flood damage caused by the collapses of the Yeoncheon dam. Pocheon County also had an unfavourable stance towards dam construction as many of its residents opposed it. Their opposition was an important factor in the anti-dam movement.

“Yeoncheon County Head filed a petition to the MOCT in July 2000 to object to dam construction.” (Gyeonggi Ilbo, 2000 a).... Yeoncheon Council filed the resolution to object to dam construction to the OP in November 2000. It argued that the Hantan River area is not good for dam construction because it is made up of basalt which is very weak and causes water leakage. Moreover, it argued that dam construction would submerge the Jaein waterfall which is a famous tourist site in Yeoncheon County.” (Gyeonggi Ilbo, 2000 b)
However, later the situation surrounding the dam conflict took a turn of events. Along with the introduction of an incentive system after the Dong River dam case, the MOCT’s acceptance of a flood control dam changed the opinions of local counties. Yeoncheon County publicly said that it was in favour of the construction of the Hantan River dam. Pocheon County also accepted dam construction. This is reflected in the interviews of some of local county officials as shown below.

“In fact, we recognized that the dam was necessary for the safety of local residents because we had serious flood damage. One of the reasons why Yeoncheon County initially opposed the Hantan River dam was because it was a multi-purpose dam. Yeoncheon dam, which caused serious flood damage with its two collapses, was a hydroelectric dam and was very weak in preventing flooding. However, the government narrowed down the function of the Hantan River dam to flood control.” (Yeoncheon County official - 1)….. “Moreover, there were economic incentives (£15 to 25 million) to local governments when the dam is built. That money can be helpful for the development of poor Yeoncheon County. We kept requesting the MOCT to give more incentives.” (Yeoncheon County official - 2)…. “In conclusion, we judged that the dam construction would be helpful in both flood control and local development.” (Yeoncheon County official - 3)

“The head of Pocheon County was actually favourable to dam construction, but Pocheon County did not express any comments towards dam construction because there were many local residents who had objections. However, after numerous mediations by the government and the change in the dam function, we thought that the dam would finally be built.” (Pocheon County official – 1; similar view expressed by Pocheon County official - 2)

In the end, because of the shift in position of local governments, the anti-dam movement could not stage a strong opposition. This is shown through responses by environmental activists and the MOCT officials.

“We often had contacts with the Office of Cherlwon County, whereas we did not have contact with the Office of Yeoncheon and Pocheon County. It was the limitation of the anti-Hantan River dam movement” (KFEM activist - 4)

“Yeoncheon County Head expressed the approval for dam construction and Gyeonggi Province also expressed approval. As a result, the situation changed. If Yeoncheon County continually had objections to dam construction, the situations would have been different.
The position of local governments was an important part in the anti-Hantan River dam movement.” (Yeoncheon Forum activist –2; similar view expressed by Yeoncheon Forum activist-1)

“While ENGOs always oppose dam construction, the government, if necessary, has to push ahead with dam construction. Therefore, the point is where other related actors stand in relation to dam construction. In the Hantan River dam case, as more local counties were in favour of dam construction, dam construction was possible. If the anti-dam movement formed a coalition with more local counties, the result might have been different.” (MOCT official – 3)

Configuration of actors in the third parties

(Experts) Like the Dong River dam case, the anti-Hantan River dam movement had the support of experts. The notable difference here is that ENGOs with the aid of dam experts started to call the technical feasibility on the dam into question. This opinion is shown in the interviews of environmental activists, government officials, and mediation experts.

“In the Hantan River dam case, the support of professional experts was more serious than the Dong River dam case, even if their numbers might be smaller. In terms of the concentration, experts cooperated with the anti-dam movement more closely.” (Environmental Justice activist - 1)

“This time ENGOs attacked the MOCT with more logical criticisms. While in the Dong River dam case, experts of ecology and geology participated, in the Hantan River dam case, even experts in hydraulics and hydrology were engaged. They raised questions about the technical feasibility of the project. So ENGOs had a debate about the properness of data and modelling.” (ME official -1)

“Professor Park, dam expert Choi supported ENGOs, who kept raising objections to the government’s plan.” (Professor-2; similar view expressed by Expert-2)

“In particular, dam expert Choi pointed out the problem by providing specific evidence.” (Yeoncheon Forum activist-1)

However, expert participation in the Hantan River dam case was not as numerous as in the Dong River dam case. Many interviewees pointed out several factors such as the change in
dam function, substantive communication, and the low attention of the mass media as a reason for this. The detailed explanation in relation to this difference will be given in 8.4.2.

(Mass media) Like the Dong River dam case, the mass media’s coverage of main controversies of the Hantan River dam conflict and the arguments and activities of the anti-dam movement contributed somewhat to the development of the movement. However, in the Hantan River dam issue, the number of newspaper articles did not reach the magnitude of the Dong River dam case and the anti-Hantan River dam movement later even received criticism from conservative media. The table below shows how many times newspaper covered the Hantan River dam issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chosun</th>
<th>Donga</th>
<th>Hankyoreh</th>
<th>Kyunghyang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kinds

In addition to the coverage of newspapers, the overall attitude of the mass media towards the anti-dam movements also differed from the Dong River dam case. Conservative newspapers such as the Chosun Ilbo and the Donga Ilbo started to criticize the persistent protest of the anti-Hantan River dam movement and even blamed them for flood damage, whereas they showed a favourable attitude towards the anti-Dong River dam movement (See page 175 in 7.3.4). Even the progressive newspapers argued that the result of the mediation organized by the PCSD should be respected by all conflicting parties (See page 172 in 7.3.2).

The field study confirmed that although the mass media reported the Hantan River dam problem as a social agenda, they did not cover it to the extent as in the Dong River dam issue and rather started to criticize the radicalism of the environmental movement.
“The mass media described the Hantan River dam issue as the 2nd Dong River dam and continually reported the feasibility problem of the Hantan River dam and anti-dam movement’s arguments. We were concerned that the Hantan River dam might face the same fate as the Dong River dam. However, this time we made efforts to have substantial conversation and made compromise. As a result, the mass media did not focus such attention on the Hantan River dam case as it did with the Dong River dam case. If the conflict continually escalated without a compromise like the Dong River dam case, the mass media would have provided much more coverage on this issue.” (MOCT official–3; similar view expressed by KOWACO staff-1)

“Initially the mass media covered the Hantan River dam issue and it contributed to agenda setting. However, conservative media gradually started to criticize the anti-dam movement and we had difficulty mobilizing protests. They argued that we persistently objected to dam construction without an alternative.” (KFEM activist – 2)

(Citizens) In the Hantan River dam case, citizens were not much interested in the anti-dam movement, whereas they showed considerable interest in the Dong River dam issue.

“As a matter of fact, the environment in the Hantan River area is more beautiful than the Dong River area. Moreover, there are more things to see and visit. However, while the Dong River dam issue received the full support of citizens, the Hantan River dam issue did not draw much attention.” (Yeoncheon Forum activist – 2)

“The Hantan River region is a very beautiful place, well worth preserving. However, citizens were not very familiar with the Hantan River.” (KEI – 1)

Summary

The anti-Hantan River dam movement did not receive the widespread support from various social actors and finally failed to achieve the cancellation of the Hantan River dam. This difference in configuration of actors made the difference in the movement outcome.

“The debate over the Hantan River dam issue was not about the environment. It was almost a power game between the anti-dam movement and development authorities. The anti-dam protesters did not succeed to achieve their goal because of the lack of allies.” (BAI -2)
8.4 Political opportunity structure and protest from 1998 to 2007

The analysis of the case studies showed that there are both similarities and differences between them. Increased opportunities for access to the government and more balanced power relation between the development authorities and environmental campaigners after democratisation led to continuous protests in both cases. However, changed configuration of actors over time weakened the anti-dam movement’s mobilization and this resulted in difference outcomes. Here, those similarities and differences will be explained and the causes for those differences will be addressed in detail.

8.4.1 Continuous protest by improved political context

*Increased access chances*

The case studies confirmed that the two anti-dam movements had numerous participation opportunities from government ministries and other high institutions such as the OPM, through both formal and informal access channels. Since democratisation, formal access chances have been continually improved and in particular, over the decade 1998-2007, many informal access chances were provided by progressive presidents.

*(Formal access)* The case studies confirmed that the two anti-dam movements had many formal access chances. Typical formal channels were the EIA system and the audit request system. While the EIA process encourages citizens’ participation in development projects, citizens’ audit request guarantees citizens’ participation in the government’s audit (Cho, J. H., 2006).

Firstly, the EIA process was the anti-dam movement’s main formal access channel and in particular, public briefings (or hearings) introduced in the EIA system since democratisation provided the anti-dam movement with substantial opportunities to acquire project information and raise questions against projects. In both cases, through public briefings (or hearings) in the EIA process, local residents and ENGOs started to recognize the problems of dam construction and express their opposition to it. Moreover, public briefings (or hearings) were often cancelled because of the strong resistance of local residents, which contributed to
drawing the attention of the mass media.

Secondly, the audit request system also gave the anti-dam movement good opportunities to raise question against the government policy making. In the Hantan River dam case, ENGOs and local residents depended much on this system and the audit result gave a fatal blow to the development ministry. The table below shows a gradual increase in the numbers of audit requests, greatly increasing particularly after the Roh administration.

Table 8.7 Number of audit request

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1998-2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Request number</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kyunghyang Shinmun (2006)

“Since the introduction of the audit request system, ENGOs have very often utilized this system to check national projects. Many audits in relation to national construction projects started from the request of civil organizations. They directly made citizens’ audit request or pressurised the National Assembly members to make an audit request.” (BAI – 1; similar view expressed by MOCT-3)

“A BAI official said that even though the audit is a good solution, civic organizations tend to resolve all the problems through the audit. He said that while there are some issues which we need to examine, many other issues do not need an audit. Therefore, we need much time selecting proper audit requests.” (Seoul Shinmun, 2008)

(Informal access) The case studies confirmed that the anti-dam movement had many informal access chances. Informal access was provided through various channels such as the MOCT, the Office of the President (OP), and the Office of the Prime minister (OPM). Moreover, the anti-dam movement participated in a review committee (or mediation committee) with equal numbers of representatives. These review committees were also organized in many other cases. The table below shows joint review committees under both administrations.
Table 8.8 Review (or mediation) committee from 1998 to 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Kim admin</th>
<th>Roh admin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dong River dam</td>
<td>Joint review committee (99.8 ~ 00.6)</td>
<td>Joint review committee (03.4~03.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saemangeum reclamation</td>
<td>Joint review committee (99.5~01.5)</td>
<td>Joint review committee (03.5~03.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul outer expressway</td>
<td>Joint review committee (02.8~02.12)</td>
<td>EIA review committee (05.8~05.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongbu KTX project</td>
<td>Joint review committee (06.4~07.12)</td>
<td>Sustainable development committee (05.5~07.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honam KTX project</td>
<td>PSCD’s mediation (04.2~04.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hantan River dam</td>
<td>Special committee (05.8~06.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongin canal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KCCI (2005), OPM and KDI (2009)

In relation to this, interviewees confirmed that many conversation opportunities were created out of the characteristics of president or administration. Conservatives even argued that both administrations brought about the excess of democracy by giving NGOs too many opportunities in the name of participation democracy.

“Basically, both administrations had the political positions where they could not disregard or turn away the opinions of civil society.” (KFEM activist–1; similar view expressed by KFEM-2 and Green Korea activist-2)

“Both administrations were the ones which gave pro-democracy movement groups power. Civic movement groups were their supporting groups. Therefore, they could not make light of ENGOs’ opinions. They had no choice but to have conversations with ENGOs. However, the problem is that the government gave ENGOs too many opportunities and they abused them.” (Expert – 1 / mediation committee member in the Dong River dam issue)

“Chairman Park and Secretary General Suh of Citizen Action for the Advancement argued that since democratisation, democratic excess was continually expanded and in particular, under President Roh, democratic excess was much intensified and it resulted in populism and group egotism (Munhwa Ilbo, 2007).

*Improved power balance in broad terms*
The case studies show that power relation between the development and environment bloc improved “in a broad sense”. Compared with the 1970s to 1980s, the pro-environment bloc expanded substantially, enough to compete with the development bloc.

**President** The case studies showed that the Presidents were key actors in conflicts surrounding environmental protests. Unlike the presidents of authoritarian regimes, both presidents did not unilaterally side with the development authorities, even though they were still mainly concerned with the economy. They tried to listen to the opinions of the environmental movement. They issued an order to re-examine dam construction from a zero-base, even though an agreement had already been established between related ministries in the Hantan River dam case. In addition, President Kim expressed his personal objection to dam construction. As a result, this characteristic of the presidents had an impact on the anti-dam movement. Interviewees accepted that both presidents tried to listen to the voice of environmental groups, although they pursued development.

“Although both administrations were more democratic and progressive compared to past administrations, they were development-oriented governments. They maintained economic growth-first policies. However, it is certain that they did not push projects forward unilaterally. They tried to go through many procedural processes. And we could voice our opinions in that process. It is somewhat true.” (KFEM activist – 4; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-1,2)

“Although ENGOs criticize that both administrations were development-oriented, there is no government which does not make much account of economy. Until now, for the Korean government, economic growth was always the most important task….. However, both administrations had relatively more interest in the environment compared with other administrations. The volume of listening to and accepting the opinions of environmental groups increased. Those times were the stages of development and environment being balanced.” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration / the PCSD member under the Roh administration)

“Korea is a typical developmental state. Since the 1960s, it has maintained the tradition as a developmental state …. However, under progressive administration, the environment ministry had strong power and environmental issues were adopted as the main government
agenda. Both administrations also gave ENGOs many participation opportunities in government decision making to listen to various voices. As a result, under the Roh administration, the environmental movement became significantly active” (Spokesman of Ruling party under Roh administration)

(Ministries) The case studies confirmed that the ME and the BAI raised questions against dam construction and these had a considerable effect on the development of the anti-dam movement.

Firstly, the role of the ME is to some extent related to the development of the anti-dam movement. The ME continually requested additional environmental measures and social consensus between conflicting parties, which prevented the MOCT from moving forward with dam construction. In the Hantan River dam case, the role of the ME became more significant. In that case, it assumed the role of a mediator between the development authorities and the anti-dam movement. Interviewees said that since democratisation, the ME has become much powerful and this trend was more conspicuous under both administrations (Expert-1, KOWACO-1). The table below shows the participation extent of ENGOs in the political system under both administrations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.9 ME ministers’ relationship with ENGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ME minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim administration (1998-2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choi Jae Wook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son Sook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Myung Ja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Myung Sook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwak Kyul Ho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roh administration (2003-2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Jae Yong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Chi Beom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Kyoo Yong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CFE (2008), Weekly Kyunghyang (2007 a)
Secondly, the role of the BAI was crucial as well. The BAI’s announcement of the audit result came as a serious blow to the development ministry, but gave new vitality to the environmental movement for protests. Its decisive role is often realized in other environmental conflicts as well as shown in the table below. For example, the BAI accepted the ENGO’s audit request of the Gyeongin Canal project in 2003. The audit results for this created a controversy regarding the necessity of the project and as a result brought the project to a standstill for several years.

Table 8.10 BAI’s audit results regarding national construction projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National project</th>
<th>Audit result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongbu KTX</td>
<td>The BAI, raising economic feasibility problems (April 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saemangeum reclamation</td>
<td>The BAI, pointing out 70 problems related to economic feasibility and environmental impact (September 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul outer circular way</td>
<td>The BAI, pointing out the poorness of the EIA report (August 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongin Canal</td>
<td>The BAI, raising economic feasibility problems (September 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hantan River dam</td>
<td>The BAI, raising technical feasibility problems (May 2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Donga Ilbo (2003, 2005 d)

Interviewees including environmental activists agreed that the BAI pointed out the problems of many national projects and its announcement was fairly helpful to environmental protests.

“The Saemangeum reclamation, the Gyeongin Canal, and the Hantan River dam… All those projects are ones whose problems were raised by the BAI. Even if they did not intend to represent the voice of environmental groups, thanks to the BAI’s audit result, environmental movement had a strong momentum for protests” (Secretary of environment under Kim administration / the PCSD member under the Roh administration; similar view expressed by Green Korea activist-2)

Interviewees ascribed this approach of ministries in relation to development projects to the characteristics of administrations (or presidents). They said that under the presidential system, government ministries naturally follow Presidents’ political philosophy and so the role of the ME and the BAI was much affected by the President.
“According to administrations, government ministries’ approach to development projects seems to be different. Under the Kim and Roh administration, the role of the ME was relatively substantial. Therefore, it frustrated many national projects. In addition, many audit results which pointed out the problems of government projects came out under both administrations. As the BAI was under President Kim and Roh, the BAI accepted ENGOs’ request and announced the audit result. Ministries adapt themselves to the characteristics of the administrations.” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration; similar view expressed by ME official-3)

“Unlike the former authoritarian presidents, President Kim did not intervene in the BAI’s work once after he appointed me as the chairman of the BAI. He wanted the BAI to only fulfill its mission only according to the law.” (Seoul shinmun, 2009)

“President Roh said that he would not engage in the BAI’s activities. He believed that President’s intervention in the BAI is like breaking democracy.” (Spokesman of Ruling party under Roh administration)

**(Local governments)** The alignments of local governments proved valuable to the anti-dam movement, even if they did not intend to represent environmental value. In both cases, several local governments objected to dam construction and therefore the anti-dam movement could stage active protests with the support of local governments.

This trend is a changed phenomenon compared with the past. In the past local governments fully respected the policy of central government, but after the establishment of local autonomy in 1995, they started to raise questions even against national projects. Scholars argue that as localization progressed, environmental disputes greatly increased because local autonomy encouraged local governments to be much more responsive to residents’ demands (Jeong, H. S., 2002). In both cases, many local governments expressed their opinions in the latter stages of the conflict after they had waited and observed the situation. That is, after having strategically judged the situation, they expressed their objections. Even so, their objections were helpful for the anti-dam movement.

**(Experts)** The case studies confirmed that there was a great deal of support from professional experts, which became a powerful impetus for the anti-dam movement. Many experts in
various fields supported the anti-dam movement by raising the problems of dam construction. Interviewees said that the argument of experts based on professionalism was a fatal blow to dam construction and the MOCT had difficulty in defending those criticisms.

“In the Dong River dam case, the anti-dam movement gained momentum with the support of professional experts…. In the Hantan River dam case, the support of professional experts was more serious than the Dong River dam case, even if there can be the difference of number.” (Environmental Justice activist - 1)

To achieve a successful outcome, an environmental movement needs scientific evidence to support its argument. Outside protests alone is not sufficient in maintaining protests. However, since democratisation, experts’ participation in the environmental movement has notably increased and as a result the environmental movement has significantly strengthened (Shin, 2007)

“Since democratisation, the participation of experts has been much more intensified and it arrived at the zenith under both administrations.” (Secretary of environment under the Kim administration / member of the PCSD under the Roh administration)

“The movement needs activism, popularity, and expertise, but the Korean environmental movement depended mainly on activism. Among three factors, expertise was the most difficult task. Experts were unwilling to participate…. However, since democratisation, the participation of experts has increased a lot and this has greatly contributed to the growth of the environmental movement.” (Weekly Kyunghyang, 2007 b; Shin (2007) was later published based on articles in Weekly Kyunghyang)

Summary

The case studies indicate that the anti-dam movement had many access chances and improved power balance since democratisation and these factors contributed to its active protests.

Firstly, the anti-dam movement had considerable opportunities to access the political system. It had many conversations with not only ministry officials, but also high profile officials. Although their primary engagement channel was through a formal process such as the EIA, their protests often created other informal discussion channels. Over the period of 1998-2007,
the space for the environment movement was laid wide open resulting in an active performance from the ENGOs. Below comments of ENGO members clearly show their increased access chances they had.

“Korean ENGOs’ access to power has continually risen. Communication and cooperation between ENGOs and the government which began after the Kim Dae Jung administration were more intensified under the Roh administration.” (Lee, P. R., 2005, pp. 339; Similar view expressed by Oh, S. K. et al, 2005)

“Environmental activists are in an advantageous position in terms of their access to government officials. Manager-level activists within environmental organizations can often discuss matters with director general-level government officials on an equal footing, while at times director-level activists will be able to meet with ministers. On the other hand, the directors of private businesses or public corporations have to deal mainly with director-level or program officers. The reality is, that while the directors of public corporations can have a hard time meeting with even program officers, environmental activists can readily gain access to senior-ranking officials.” (Lee, P. R., 2005, pp. 339)

Secondly, the power balance between the state and civil society has improved since democratisation. As the power disparity between the development authorities and environment groups diminished, conflict has become more common (Expert-2/mediation committee member). However, active environmental protests are not only explained by democratisation. It was also the result of the political philosophy of these administrations, which stressed the importance of civil society (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1999 a)

“In the past, civil society restrained its anger because it knew it could not influence the government. Thus the conflict did not occur and remained as potential conflict. However, since democratisation, in particular, since the Kim administration, the imbalance of power has been much improved. The power of people became stronger. So conflict is an inescapable thing.” (Expert-2/ mediation committee member)

“The reason why ENGOs gained momentum these days is not just due to democratisation. The characteristic of an administration which stresses the importance of civil society is another crucial factor. The present administration tries to become friendly with civil organizations and ENGOs currently enjoy a renaissance.” (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1999 a)
8.4.2 Weakened mobilization by the change in configuration of actors

As seen in the previous section 8.4.1, improved access to the political system and more balanced power relation between the development authorities and environmental groups since democratisation made active protests possible during this period.

However, there is an important difference between both cases, which is the change in the configuration of actors. While the anti-Dong River dam movement had numerous allies, the anti-Hantan River dam movement had very few allies. This changed configuration of actors finally led to weakened mobilization and movement failure. The environment ministry, local residents and governments, and the mass media showed different positions in the Hantan River dam case.

Firstly, while the ME maintained the opposition to dam construction in the Dong River dam case, it did not do so in the Hantan River dam case after a compromise with the MOCT.

Secondly, while more local governments and residents objected to dam construction in the Dong River dam case, fewer local governments and residents opposed dam construction in the Hantan River dam case. In the Hantan River dam case, Yeoncheon County and Pocheon County initially objected to the construction of the dam, but they later agreed to its construction.

Thirdly, while the mass media supported the anti-Dong River dam movement, it criticized the anti-Hantan River dam movement. Citizens also showed the lack of interest in the Hantan River dam case. Furthermore, criticism against environmental protests was raised by business groups and conservative scholars.

The following section will examine how and why their positions changed.

Change of central government

The most important ministry within the central government is the Ministry of Environment (ME), because the ME represents environmental value. Therefore, this section will mainly address the change of the ME.
On each case, the ME took a different position. While it kept raising concerns about the negative environmental impact caused by dam construction in the Dong River case, it approved construction in the Hantan River case, after a compromise with the MOCT. The change of the MOCT’s approach was mainly responsible for the ME’s changing its position on this issue.

In the Dong River dam case, the MOCT issued a public notice of the dam construction site before the completion of the EIA discussion and the ME considered this behaviour a typical example of development ministry’s “Decide, Announce, and Defend (DAD)” approach. Moreover, while the MOCT minister kept announcing that he would carry out dam construction as soon as possible, the ME kept requesting additional measures to reduce environmental impact. There was no compromise between the two ministries.

“When the MOCT made notice of dam site before the completion of the EIA discussion, we thought that the MOCT did not have any desire to have conversation …. Moreover, the MOCT minister continually mentioned the necessity of the dam. This behaviour was also an indication that the MOCT would push ahead with dam construction irrespective of the objection to dam construction. Therefore, we kept raising various environmental questions.” (ME official – 1)

However, in the Hantan River dam case, the ME did not go to the extreme and came to an agreement with the MOCT. At this time, the MOCT did not make a public notice of the dam site before the completion of the EIA process but instead had many discussions with the anti-dam movement according to the ME’s request. Moreover, not adhering to the original plan, the MOCT accepted the ME’s proposal that the function of £ 500 million dam should only be for flood control. Through this process, the MOCT was able to complete the EIA discussion.

“The MOCT accepted a flood control dam and in my opinion, it contributed much to conflict termination. I fully agree to this idea. In an economic term, a multi-purpose dam should be built, because constructing dam costs a lot of money. However, we gave up water supply to achieve flood control as soon as possible. It was the second best choice to prevent flood damage. We also thought that our acceptance might weaken the justification of the anti-dam movement.” (MOCT official – 3)
However, in spite of the ME’s contribution, the anti-dam movement continued with its protests. As a result, the ME no longer sympathized with the anti-dam movement and started to have an unfavourable position against the anti-dam movement.

“The ME made all efforts to resolve the conflict and the mediation was really good. This flood control dam does not usually contain water and so it has much less impact in natural ecosystem. It is what ENGOs wanted. However, they still argued that the dams should not be built. It is not right. If the dam is necessary for the prevention of flooding, it should be built. We cannot continue to have debate over the flood effect of the dam. I do not think they staged protests just for the environment. It was actually hegemony game. Since the 2000s, the environmental movement has turned into the movement for themselves.” (ME official – 1)

“The MOCT and the ME made a wonderful agreement. However, ENGOs and local residents continued to be opposed to it. The anti-dam movement’s continuous protests were because the mediation result was not what they wanted. They argued that the “flood control dam” offer of the ME was actually an expression of objection. Their protests were almost objections with no alternative.” (KEI staff – 2)

In particular, the ME public officials’ comments below show the ME’s general position towards the environmental movement beyond the Hantan River dam case.

“Under the Roh administration, the environmental movement arrived at its zenith. It was engaged in almost every development issue. In response to continuous protests since the 2000s, citizens’ perception towards the environmental movement completely changed. ENGOs themselves will recognize it. The government including the ME naturally follow public opinion.” (ME official - 1)

“From the past, the ME had good relationships with ENGOs. It is true that the ME has significantly grown thanks to them. However, under the Kim and Roh administration, ENGOs often had objections without alternatives. Environmental value is important, but we cannot accept those arguments.” (ME official - 5)

Change of local residents and governments
While many local residents and governments had objection to the construction of a dam in the Dong River dam case, some of them changed their positions and accepted the construction of a dam in Hantan River dam case.

(Local residents) There was no difference in the attitude of local residents living in upstream of the river (Jeonseon County residents in the Dong River dam case and Cherlwon County residents in the Hantan River dam case). They maintained their objection to the construction of the dam because of anticipated disadvantages. However, the position of local residents downstream was important. There was a gradual change in the attitude of local residents downstream of the River (Yeonwol County residents in the Dong River dam case and Yeoncheon / Pocheon County residents in the Hantan River dam case).

In the Dong River dam case, after the issue of safety emerged, Yeongwol County residents changed their position from initial acceptance into opposition against the construction of the dam. On the contrary, in the Hantan River dam case, although Yeoncheon County residents initially objected to dam construction, they later changed their position after the government narrowed down the function of the dam so that it was flood control only. As a matter of fact, Yeoncheon residents recognized the necessity of dam construction, but they initially objected to it because of the possibility of the dam collapsing. However, the change of dam function relieved their concerns, because as a flood control dam doesn’t contain water it would be safer as the possibility of the dam collapsing would be low. In addition, it would reduce submerged area and so there was less impact on the tourist site.

“Yeoncheon County residents have the bitter experience of the Yeoncheon dam collapses and so they strongly opposed dam construction…. However, the function of the dam was narrowed down to flood control and after that, their concerns significantly subsided.” (Yeoncheon County official – 1)

“While a multi-purpose dam can lead to big-scale environmental destruction, a flood control dam can reduce a submerged area. The adjustment of dam function changed the opinions of Yeoncheon County residents a lot.” (Professor -3; similar view expressed by professor-4)
Likewise, although Pocheon County residents initially objected to dam construction, their objection also weakened after a number of mediation committees and the MOCT’s change of dam function which resulted from the mediation.

“After the mediation of the PCSD and the OPM, the opinion of local residents was gradually changed. They thought that the dam would be built because the government made a number of discussions and finally adopted a flood control dam by changing the existing multi-purpose dam. The intensity of their objections was greatly reduced.” (Pocheon County official – 1)

(Local governments) There was a notable difference between local governments in both cases. There were several important factors which changed local governments – “reduced cost” (lowered risk & no regulation) and “increased incentive”. The former was already explained in detail in 8.3.2 and therefore, the latter is mainly explained here.

In the Dong River dam case, while Yeongwol County initially showed favourable stance towards dam construction in terms of local development, its stance changed as local residents strongly objected to dam construction because of safety issues. The government did not relieve the concerns of local residents. On the contrary, in the Hantan River dam case, although Yeoncheon County downstream initially opposed the construction of a dam because of local residents’ objections, it changed its position after the MOCT’s acceptance of the flood control dam. Yeoncheon County publicly said that it was in favour of dam construction. Pocheon County also accepted dam construction as the intensity of local residents’ objection weakened. Therefore, a lowered risk affecting the perception of local residents finally resulted in a change in the stance of local governments. In addition, the change of dam type had a strong impact on Cherlwon County’s protests. While Cherlwon County argued that a water supply dam would bring about regulations on residents’ property in that they would have to conserve water, the change into a flood control dam weakened its argument.

In addition, an incentive system contributed to local government’s acceptance of dam construction. In Korea, local governments are highly dependent on the central government in terms of financial resource. Although local expenditure comprises 60% of national expenditure, local tax makes up only 20% of the total tax collected and the remaining
difference of 40% is supported by central government transfers. Therefore, local governments have no choice but to depend on the support of central government (GRI, 2011, KRILA, 2008; TRI, 2007). Many interviewees believed the incentive system contributed to the change in the stance of local governments.

“We changed our position from objection to dam construction into approval of it because of the two things - the safety problem and incentive provided by the central government.” (Yeoncheon County official-1)….. “The Yeoncheon County governor often mentioned that economic incentive could contribute to local development, because the financial status of our county is not so good. He said that if the incentive is sufficient, Yeoncheon County will accept dam construction.” (Yeoncheon County official – 2)

“After the Dong River dam case, an incentive system was introduced. That system is the important difference between both cases. The so-called carrot was given to local government. While in the past, the government just pushed ahead with dam construction, now £ 15 to 25 million has been given to local government. This system played a role in changing the position of local government. For example, Yeoncheon County kept requesting more incentives in return for its approval for dam construction. The role of this system is justified in other dam projects such as Seongduk, Buhang, and Gunnam dam. Since the introduction of this system, dam construction has become easier.” (MOCT official – 3; similar view expressed by MOCT official 1)

“After several conflicts in national projects, the government’s inclination to push projects forward weakened. Instead, an incentive system was introduced. According to the act on dam construction and assistance, the incentive given to local government was excessively increased. Local governments wanted to utilize this money to build infrastructure such as roads or bridges within the County.” (KFEM activist – 4)

“This incentive system was also introduced in a nuclear waste disposal facility project. After consecutive failures to build nuclear waste disposal facility, the government promised the economic incentive of £ 150 million for the hosting County and this promise triggered the frantic competition between local governments to host it. The central government utilized the strong aspiration of local government about economic development.” (KFEM activist–4; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-6)
Change of the third parties

There was the difference between experts, the mass media and general citizens. In particular, while the mass media supported the anti-Dong River dam movement, it did not have much interest in and even criticized the anti-Hantan River dam movement. This difference of the mass media was linked to citizens’ lack of interest in the Hantan River dam case.

(Expert) There was the participation of experts in both cases. However, in the Hantan River dam case there was little interest from experts unlike the Dong River dam case which received widespread support. Many interviewees including environmental activists and reporters mentioned that the difference in the approach of the government and the media contributed to the difference in the participation of experts.

“The Roh administrations made considerable efforts to mediate the Hantan River dam conflict. For the first time, a well-designed conflict resolution mechanism was applied.” (Professor-4)….. “The government also changed a multi-purpose dam to a flood control dam. This effort of the government weakened the level of the anti-dam opposition and lowered the participation of experts.” (Professor-5)….. “After the PCSD’s mediation, the anti-dam movement lost much of its justification for protests.” (Reporter -1)

“In general, experts tend to have interest in social issues which are often covered and supported by the mass media. However, while the anti-Dong River dam movement received great attention from the mass media, the anti-Hantan River dam movement did not draw much attention and were criticized by it. In conclusion, this difference of the media brought about the low participation of experts.” (KFEM activist -1; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-2 and professor-5, 6)

(Mass media) The case studies showed that although both dam issues received attention from the mass media, there was a remarkable difference in the volume and attitude of newspaper articles. While the anti-Dong River dam movement had a lot of support, the anti-Hantan River dam movement did not draw much attention and later received strong criticism. In particular, prior to the final decision of the Imjin River Special Committee, severe criticisms were made by major conservative newspapers. Both central and local newspapers strongly attacked the anti-Hantan River dam movement on the basis of extreme environmentalism
They argued that the flood damage in 2006 was caused by the cancellation or delay in the construction of the dam which was in turn caused by the strong protests of the anti-dam movement. In relation to the difference of the mass media in quantitative and qualitative terms, interviewees mentioned several factors;

Firstly, related to the “volume” of news coverage, fast and substantial mediation was considered as the main reason. The mass media are inclined to have interest in drastic conflict, but in the Hantan River dam case, the government was engaged in mediation relatively early and the MOCT accepted a flood control dam. These factors lowered the extent of conflict and removed the Hantan River dam issue outside the attention of the mass media. This is reflected in the interviews of a couple of reporters and activists as shown below.

“The reason why the anti-Hantan River dam movement was less active might be because it was incorporated early into the mediation process of the government. The Roh administration was interested in social conflict resolution and so quickly engaged in mediation. Without the PCSD’s mediation, there would have been fierce outsider protests instead of debates and the situation would have been different.” (Environmental Justice-1; similar view expressed by Yeoncheon Forum activist-1)

“In the Hantan River dam case, the government quickly engaged in the mediation and the MOCT accepted flood control dam proposed by the ME. If the MOCT pushed ahead with the dam construction without any compromise, it would have been attacked by the mass media and the conflict would have been continually maintained. Moreover, the MOCT accepted the ME’s hard proposal and the anti-dam movement lost vitality for their protests. Finally, they faced the criticisms for persistent protests.” (Reporter - 1)

“The critical difference between the Dong River dam case and the Hantan River dam case is whether there was substantial communication. Although there was the government’s communication effort in the Dong River dam case, it was not conversation, but one-sided persuasion. As the government just pushed ahead with the dam construction, the conflict continued to escalate and the mass media severely criticized it. However, in the Hantan River dam case, there were substantial conversation efforts. The mediation organized by the PCSD was an experimental environmental dispute mediation attempt. Conflicting parties directly participated in the mediation committee.” (Reporter - 2)
Secondly, in relation to the change in the mass media’s “attitude” towards the anti-dam movement, interviewees pointed to the backlash against the environmental movement. They said that the continuous stop of dam construction by the anti-dam movement led to the mass media’s criticism. In the Hantan River dam case, in spite of their initial promise to accept mediation, the anti-dam movement did not accept the mediation result and this uncompromising attitude led to an unsupported protest. This is shown through responses by reporters, environmental activists, and the KOWACO staff.

“The mediation organized by the PCSD was an exemplary conflict resolution effort. Although there were some problems, we have to admit that it was a desirable experiment. However, the anti-dam movement did not accept the mediation result. After that, the anti-dam movement did not receive support and lost its vitality.” (Reporter - 2)

“Breaking a promise was a fatal blow to the anti-dam movement. It was really critical that we did not accept the mediation result, even if we ourselves made a promise, because it is related to the accountability problem. The mass media criticized us because we did not accept the agreement and plainly objected with no realistic alternative.” (Yeoncheon Forum activist - 1)

“Contrary to the Dong River dam case, the government made great efforts to persuade the anti-dam movement. However, even after the PCSD mediation, it upheld its position and did not accept the mediation result. That attitude was a fatal blow to its movement.” (KOWACO staff-1)… “The environmental movement became far too excessive and radical. They were engaged in every development issue and stopped many national projects. Last time they cancelled the Dong River dam project and this time stopped the Hantan River dam project for almost 10 years. They went far beyond the acceptable boundary and naturally received strong criticism.” (KOWACO staff – 3)

“While reporting the Hantan River dam issue, I heard much more experts argue the necessity of the Hantan River. The KOWACO’s arguments were considered more rational rather than the movement’s arguments by experts. I think that the judgment of professional experts is most important. However, anti-dam groups did not accept dam construction even after the OPM’s final decision. I doubt about whether this uncompromising and radical environmental movement is beneficial to society.” (Reporter – 3)
“One of the main reasons why the mass media changed its attitude is the environmental movement’s excessive protests. Under the Roh administration, the environmental movement engaged in almost every issue and fought against the government to the end. There were always demonstrations, street march, and legal actions. The anti-dam movement, the anti-nuclear movement, and the anti-road (or railway) movement are typical examples..... The Korean environmental movement had to refrain from radical protests. Now general citizens are tired of the environmental movement.” (Professor -7 / Chosun Ilbo columnist during the anti-Dong River dam movement)

“In fact, the 1990s was the renaissance of the environmental movement. It was the honeymoon between the mass media and the environmental movement. The mass media supported the environmental movement and used to stage environmental campaigns with ENGOs (e.g. Save streams!, Lets’ reduce waste). However, after several strong environmental protests, the mass media gradually began to make criticisms against the environmental movement.” (Environmental Justice activist-1; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-4, 6)

In addition, many interviewees suggested that the change in the mass media’s attitude was also attributed to its position against the government along with the antipathy felt towards the environmental movement.

“Another important reason why the mass media, in particular the conservative newspapers, changed its attitude is that they did not like the Roh administration. As you know, President Roh had conflicts with the Chosun Ilbo and the Donga Ilbo even before his inauguration. He criticized the conservative newspapers objected to many policies of the Roh administration. Under this circumstance, ENGOs, which had a close relationship with the government, started to be criticized.” (Professor - 7 / Chosun Ilbo columnist during the anti-Dong River dam movement)

“The Korean environmental movement did not always have good relationship with the Roh administration. Rather, it often aggressively fought against the Roh administration’s development-oriented policies. However, conservative newspapers judged that the environmental movement was supported by progressive government and criticized its protests a lot.” (Reporter – 4)
“In the 1990s, the Chosun Ilbo and the Donga Ilbo actively supported the environmental movement. The success of the anti-Dong River dam movement should be somewhat ascribed to their reports. However, after the 2000, the major newspaper became significantly conservative. They strongly criticized environmental protests. They saw civil organizations as support groups for the Roh administration.” (KFEM activist –2; similar view expressed by KFEM activist-4, 5)

“The mass media’s stance towards the Roh administration was really critical. The conservative newspapers such as the Chosun and Donga Ilbo criticized almost all the policies the Roh administration pursued. Under this circumstance, civil organizations, which often participated in policy making as a member of the governance, became the target of conservative media.” (Spokesman of ruling party under the Roh administration)

(Citizens) While general citizens had a great deal of interest in the anti-Dong River dam movement, they showed a lack of interest in Hantan River dam case. In relation to the change of general citizens, interviewees mentioned citizens’ fatigue and disappointment in the environmental movement as the cause. That is, they considered that the consecutive opposition against other national construction projects following the anti-Dong River dam movement resulted in citizens’ loss of interest in and criticism against the environmental movement.

“The anti-Hantan River dam movement started right after the Dong River dam controversy. Although we were convinced of the problem of the Hantan River dam construction, citizens might have been tired of our movement following the anti-Dong River dam movement. People tend to be tired of the same thing.” (Yeoncheon Forum activist - 1)

“Citizens were not interested in the Hantan River dam movement. They were tired of continuous objection and protests. At that time ENGOs had intervened in almost every national project and had opposed it without proposing realistic alternatives. People do not like radical argument and behaviour. Who will agree to the argument that no large dam should be built in Korea?” (KOWACO staff -1; similar view expressed by MOCT official-3)

“The important problem is public fatigue for the environmental movement. In the past, if we stage protests, citizens showed much interest. However, now there is not any response. They say that we should not intervene in every issue and should not criticize government policies
without alternatives. We are now considered trouble makers rather than mediators of conflict and are also seen as interest groups…….We often participated in political movement; for example, we joined the movement opposing the impeachment of President Roh and staged the blacklist movement to get rid of unqualified politicians in general election. These political activities seem to have caused damage to ENGOs’ image” (Environmental Justice activist - 1)

“The environmental movement has focused heavily on movements opposing national construction projects and did not deal with the issues related to the quality of life. So citizens became discontented that we always fought against the government but neglected our original task….. Moreover, ENGOs did not focus solely on environmental issues and often participated in political movements. Therefore, citizens came to think of ENGOs as political groups. ENGOs should, from now on, focus on environmental issues, not on political issues.” (KFEM activist – 4)

This fact was also confirmed by public opinion poll. Citizens showed the negative feeling towards excessive movement opposing national construction projects.

“53 % of general citizen say that ENGOs only oppose national projects without suggesting alternatives.” (Hankyoreh Shinmun, 2007 b)

“Citizens expressed antipathy towards ENGOs’ radical anti-development movement. 57.9 % of respondent said that the environmental movement had waged movements opposing national construction projects too excessively.” (Sekye Ilbo, 2007)

This negative perception was also confirmed in a change in their reliability. While NGOs enjoyed relatively high public trust until the early 2000s, the statistics shows the rapid drop in their reliability. The Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) shows NGOs as having ranked the highest among 16 institutions in reliability from citizens in 2003 and 2004, ranked the 5th in 2005 and 2006, and finally ranked the 6th in 2007. The Institute for Social Development and Policy Research (ISDPR) in Seoul National University also shows the reliability of NGOs sharply dropped from 48.8 percent to 21.6 percent over the decade 1997-2006. Furthermore, the Korea Civic Organization Network (KCON)’s survey targeting about 200 professors, researchers, NGOs reporters and NGO activists announced that 70.5% of them admitted Korean NGOs are in the serious reliability crisis (NGO NET, 2008).
(Business group) The environmental movement also provoked a backlash from pro-business groups and criticism of environmental protests was on the rise. For example, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), the nation's largest private economic organization, strongly criticized the environmental movement, mentioning economic damage caused by the delay in national construction projects as shown in the Table 8.11 (KCCI, 2005). It argued that the Korean environmental NGOs stuck to the victory of their movements rather than the resolution of social conflicts. They added that the Korean ENGOs are far too radical compared to other countries’ ENGOs and are opposed to all the constructions which affect environment.

Table 8.11 Economic damage caused by the delay in construction projects (KCCI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Economic damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saemangeum reclamation project</td>
<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongbu KTX project</td>
<td>1.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul circular expressway</td>
<td>0.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National highway No. 1</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongin Canal</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong (Hantan) River Dam</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (billion £ )</td>
<td>2.089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI, 2005)

In addition, the KCCI established the Business Institute for Sustainable Development (BISD) to point out the problems of the environmental movement’s argument and to defend the importance of economic development (BISD, 2005). The chairman of the KCCI argued that now business group needs the organization to prevent radical demands of environmental group, whereas it mainly gave financial support to environmental civic groups so far (Donga Ilbo, 2004).

After its establishment, the BISD issued reports which point out problems of the Korean environmental protests. For example, through the comparison between the Korean ENGOs and their counterparts in the US, it suggested that while the US ENGOs have established productive partnership with private companies through mutual cooperation to an extent that the controversy over NGOs’ neutrality was raised, the Korean ENGOs have harboured a
hostile attitude towards private companies (BISD, 2006 a). It also argued that legislation should be introduced to stop lawsuit abuse filed by environmental groups in Korea like the so-called Hofmann bill which was introduced in Switzerland that limits the scope of the plaintiff (BISD, 2006 b; Jung, 2007; Park, S. H., 2006)

The Center for Free Enterprise (CFE), which supports liberalism and free market principle, also argued that the government should resume national construction projects which were stopped because of the strong opposition of environmental groups (CFE, 2005). Since 2007, it has kept up to date with the activities of NGOs including the KFEM and has opened them to the public through its homepage (CFE, 2008).

(Academic circles) Within academic circles, there was a growing criticism over the fact that civic movements are increasingly becoming a type of political power. Some scholars argued that civic groups have become an unchecked power and that over time they have increased their political influence (Donga Ilbo, 2005 b). According to them, civic groups, which are centered around the so-called “Big 4” (e.g. the KFEM and GKU), have become semi-political parties and have been preoccupied with blaming economic and political actors who were against their standards (Park, H. J., 2005; 2006 b, 2008). In particular, “conservative scholars” strongly criticized that environmental groups staged excessive protests without presenting constructive alternatives. They also criticized the government’s attitude about environmental protests. They argued that the government lost the ability to manage social conflicts and implement national projects, whereas interest groups were heavily overdeveloped.

“Civic groups are becoming a power that is not limited by laws, while quickly increasing their political influence because they share the same political orientation as the incumbent government…” (Donga Ilbo, 2005 b)… “They have become a Goliath who can stipulate what is the public good.” (Park, H. J., 2005)

“Civic movements which started under the banner of anti-political parties have gradually become semi-political parties… If political parties play the part of actors on the stage of the parliamentary politics, civic groups have become the producer in the main control room… It is time for civic movements to choose whether they will appear on the stage by joining a political party or will be seated as an audience by returning to their original mission.” (Lee, K. W., 2005; Lee’s article was introduced in Donga Ilbo (2005 b))
8.5 Summary

The case studies confirmed that in spite of broadly improved political context caused by democratisation and the emergence of progressive administrations, the gradual shift in configuration of actors visibly weakened the mobilization of the anti-dam movement and finally led to its failure.

The various stakeholders between the development ministry and the anti-dam movement changed their viewpoints towards the anti-Hantan River dam movement. Firstly, on the central government level, the ME displayed a different position in each case. The ME did not raise questions about the environmental impact caused by dam construction after considerable mediation efforts. Secondly, on the local level, local governments and residents had different viewpoints towards dam construction. In the Hantan River dam case, some local governments and residents changed their views towards dam construction after the change of dam function and increased incentive. Thirdly, the mass media, experts, and citizens also showed different views in relation to dam construction. In particular, the mass media – among them, conservative newspapers - significantly changed. While the mass media greatly contributed to the expansion of the anti-Dong River dam movement, it strongly criticized the anti-dam movement in the Hantan River dam case.

There are some factors which are considered to be the reasons for the change in the related social actors. Firstly, the government’s change affected the difference in social actors. In the Hantan River dam case, the government took a different approach towards the anti-dam movement in both procedural and substantive terms. It tried many discussions and mediations to re-examine dam construction, and changed the B/C ratio of dam construction by redesigning policy model (change of dam function and introduction of incentive system). This weakened the justification for persistent anti-Hantan River dam movement. Secondly, the mass media’s criticism and citizen fatigue from continuous environmental protests also weakened the vitality of the anti-dam movement. They were critical of the environmental movement’s excessive objection to national projects and its uncompromising attitude.
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION

9.1 Introduction

This chapter will set out the conclusions of the research. This research started from a concern about the changing role of the environmental movement in newly democratised Korea. The Korean environmental movement grew greatly after democratisation, but faced its decline within civil society-friendly administrations (1998-2007). To explain this phenomenon, this research selected the anti-dam movement which was a typical environmental movement in Korea and explored what happened to this movement with the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) approach. Based on the analysis of the case studies, this chapter will suggest research findings and research implications;

Firstly, this chapter will suggest the research findings which offer the answers to the primary and two-sub research questions below.

In a period of democratisation, how were political opportunities in major infrastructure policy making created for the Korean environmental movement, and how did these opportunities determine the movement’s ability to influence outcomes between 1998 and 2007?

- What forms of access chances were created by the Korean government within dam construction decision making, and how did this influence the environmental movement’s ability to influence outcomes?

- What change occurred in the relationships between the environmental movement, government, and other social actors in dam construction decision making, and how did this influence the environmental movement’s ability to influence outcomes?

Secondly, this chapter will discuss the wider significance of the research by relating empirical findings to the relevant literature. That is, what the Korean phenomenon suggests in relation to the relationship between democratisation and social movements will be explained.
9.2 Research findings

**Improved political context and active protests**

Since democratisation, the Korean government has provided citizens with more access chances, through which the anti-dam movement expressed their opinions. These opportunities were acquired through formal and informal access channels.

Firstly, since political democratisation, formal access chances have been continually improved. The government could not repress different opinions with governmental authority and had to begin talks with social groups (Lee, S. J., 2000 a). Therefore, the government made various systems to guarantee citizens’ participation. For example, in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system and the Audit system, the channels which citizens can access to were newly introduced. In the EIA process, public briefing (or hearing) was introduced and the audit request system was introduced to control government’s policy making.

Secondly, many informal access chances were also provided. The two anti-dam movements had many informal access chances. Informal access was provided through various channels such as the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT), the Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development (PCSD), and the Office of the Prime minister (OPM). Both administrations were the left-wing ones and the presidents made much importance of civil society. They stressed the communication with civil society and tried to resolve conflicts through conversation and negotiation. Under both administrations, NGOs’ participation arrived at its zenith, to such an extent for conservatives as to criticize that both administrations brought about the excess of democracy by giving NGOs too many opportunities in the name of participatory democracy (Jun, 2006; Park, H. J., 2005; 2006 a, 2006 b, 2007; 2008; Park, J. C. 2007).

With these increased opportunities, diminished power disparity between the developmental authorities and environmental groups also contributed to the development of the anti-dam movement.
Firstly, presidents were the key actors in the configuration of actors surrounding environmental protests. Unlike the presidents under authoritarian regimes, President Kim and Roh put themselves in relatively neutral position between the development and the environment. They had more interest in the environment and tried to listen to the opinions of environmental groups.

Secondly, the check and balance between the development and the environment within the government appeared. The organization size and the influence of the Ministry of Environment (ME) grew to the extent that it had the power to stop some of the MOCT’s development projects. The Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) often put the brakes on developments as well. While their checks gave serious blow to the MOCT, they provided the anti-dam movements with the vitality for protests.

Thirdly, there was a lot of support from professional experts which was a powerful spur to the anti-dam movement. Many experts in various fields supported the anti-dam movement by raising the problems of dam construction. The MOCT had difficulty in defending the criticisms of these experts.

In conclusion, political democratisation in 1987 and the emergence of progressive administrations (1998-2007), which increased the access to the political system and reduced the power disparity between the developmental authorities and environmental groups, resulted in active anti-dam movement. The anti-dam movement did not stay outside the political system, but actively utilized discussion arena provided by the government after democratisation. In particular, these opportunities were often provided by presidents who want to resolve conflicts through discussion and compromise. By using these increased opportunities, the anti-dam movements staged active and tenacious protest.

**Change in the positions of actors and weakened mobilization**

In the two cases, there was the difference in the position of related stakeholders around government decision making. While the anti-Dong River dam movement had numerous allies, the anti-Hantam River dam movement had far fewer allies. The latter did not receive the support from various stakeholders.
Firstly, within the central government, there was the difference in the position of the ME which represents the voice of environmental group. While the ME maintained opposition to dam construction in the Dong River dam case, it allowed construction in the Hantan River dam case.

Secondly, while many local residents and governments objected to dam construction in the Dong River dam case, much less objected to it in Hantan River dam case. Some of them changed their positions from their objection into acceptance in the latter case.

Thirdly, there was some difference in the support of the mass media and general citizens. While the anti-Dong River dam movement had a lot of support from the media, the anti-Hantan River dam movement did not receive much attention and later faced strong criticism. Citizens also did not show much interest in the former, whereas they supported the latter.

While increased access chances and more balanced power relation since democratisation made active protests possible, the outcome of the anti-dam movement became much different according to the change of actors. Although the anti-Hantan River dam movement, which was called as the 2nd anti-Dong River dam movement, actively began, it did not receive widespread support from various stakeholders such as local governments and the mass media and even faced strong criticism from them. This change in the configuration of actors resulted in the difference in the outcome and the decline of the movement in both cases.

These changes in related actors were caused by several reasons.

Firstly, the case studies showed that the change of the government’s approach had a considerable effect on the change in the position of stakeholders. The government showed different approaches in both procedural and substantive term and these approaches changed the opinions of the ME, local governments, and local residents.

In procedural terms, the government changed their approach and actively engaged in conflict meditation. In the Hantan River dam case, the mediations were introduced several times at a relatively early stage. There were numerous meetings between conflicting parties. In addition, the MOCT did not push ahead with dam construction and made efforts to persuade the anti-
dam movement. This effort at communication greatly weakened the justification of the anti-dam movement.

In substantive terms, the MOCT changed dam function and introduced an incentive system for local counties. The change into a flood control dam was a critical factor in the change in the positions of related actors. It led to the acceptance of dam construction from the ME and local residents because it can reduce environmental destruction, collapse risk, and property regulation. The incentive system for local counties, which was introduced after the Dong River dam case, also affected local government’s perception towards dam construction. Local governments wanted to utilize economic incentives for local development. That is, the MOCT’s new approach resulted in the change in the B/C ratio by lowering cost and heightening benefits.

Secondly, antipathy or lack of attention towards continuous protests was the reason of the change in the mass media and general citizens. Consecutive and uncompromising protests resulted in the mass media’s criticism against the environmental movement and citizens’ lack of attention about it. In the Hantan River dam case, in spite of its initial promise to accept mediation, the anti-dam movement’s persistent protest had a negative effect on the movement. In addition, the media’s repulsion against the progressive was also pointed out as another reason for the media’s criticism. Conservative media, which was hostile towards the progressive Roh administration, strongly criticized the environmental movement, which were friendly with the administration.

In conclusion, this research suggested that while increased access chances and more balanced power relation contributed to active protests of the anti-dam movement, the changed configuration of actors surrounding the anti-dam movement led to its the decline.
9.3 Research implications

In section 9.2, research findings from the case studies were suggested. This section will deal with what these findings mean in general terms beyond the Korean context.

**Main implication: democratisation and social movements**

- **Social movements after democratisation**

As stated previously, while some scholars argue the flourishing of social movements since democratisation as repression is removed and new channels of participation are opened up (Goldstone, 2004), many empirical studies suggested that social movements including the environmental movement declined in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America after democratic transition (Canel, 1992; Gaspar, 1984; Hipsher, 1996; Mainwaring and Viola, 1984; Pickvance, C. G., 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999; Pickvance, K., 1996, 1997; Pridham, 1994; Schneider, 1992). According to their studies, social movements tend to decline with the opening up of democratic channels (Pickvance, C. G., 1999).

They say that democratisation constrains social movements rather than encourages them (Hipsher, 1996), because institutional politics gradually replace social movements (Grugel, 2002; O'Donell and Schmitter, 1986) and other crucial issues take precedence over green issues. For example, the environmental movement in Hungary is said to have declined as the government and political parties began to represent environmental interests after democratisation. While there has been a continuing environmental movement in Hungary, increased political channels led to the decline in support of the movement (Lang-Pickvance et al., 1997; Pickvance, C. G., 1996, 1999). In addition, in Eastern European countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, after democratisation, environmental issues did not receive much attention and instead economic issues emerged as the main focus (Fagan, 2000; Hicks, 1996; Jagiella, 1997; Katula, 1998; Shriver and Messer, 2009). Environmentalists were even considered radicals who were obstacles to economic development and democracy (Pavlinek and Pickles, 2000). According to their studies, while liberalisation in authoritarian regimes led to a high level of social movements, after democratisation is in place, the prominence of social movements is no longer sustained (Hipsher, 1996).
As mentioned above, although many empirical studies demonstrate that regime change brings about the decline of the movement, the Korean case studies show that the relationship between democratisation and social movements is not a simple process which ends in its fall (Hochstetler, 1997). The environmental movement in Korea did not decline immediately after the democratic transition in 1987 and instead enjoyed rapid growth for over 10 years. It increased explosively and exerted strong influence along with the democratisation process (Koo, 2002). This phenomenon is contrary to the above argument. The Korean case indicates that the relationship between democratisation and social movements is more complex and the development of the environmental movement should be understood within domestic political context.

Even in democratic administrations, Korean citizens’ discontentment still exists (Chang et al, 2007; Cho and Park, 2004, 2008; Jang, S. C., 2007; Koo, 2002; Lee, A. R., 2003; Lee and Arrington, 2008; Park, C. M., 2009; You, 2005). According to survey results, many citizens have still been highly distrustful of political institutions (Edelman, 2007; KDI, 2006; KGSS, 2003; SERI, 2009). The government, parliament, and political party have always been the most distrusted institutions in Korea. In particular, environmental groups have strongly mistrusted institutional politics (Koo, 2002), arguing that the Korean government is development-oriented and focuses heavily on large-scale construction projects. Within this context, environmental groups themselves directly pressurised the government to deal with environmental problems, instead of depending on institutional politics even after democratisation.

Moreover, while environmental issues in Central and Eastern Europe received strong attention along with anti-communist sentiments prior to democratisation, these issues lost their popularity and instead economic issues dominated after democratisation. On the other hand, in Korea, while political democratisation was the biggest pending issue before democratic transition, environmental issues started to enjoy public attention once the democratic regime was established (Hong, S. T., 2007 a). Although environmental problems gradually emerged as social issues even before democratisation, the environmental movement was not a main stream social movement at that time and it wasn’t until after democratisation that it received widespread public attention. In addition, environmental groups had more power to compete with the developmental authorities after democratisation. These conditions
resulted in more active social movements after democratic transition. Although economic development was still the top priority following democratisation, the importance of the environment started to be stressed and the environmental movement developed along with this change.

- **Social movements in progressive administrations**

The research findings also indicate that within progressive administration, which is seemingly favourable political context, social movements can face their decline, whereas many studies related to the POS approach suggest that closed opportunity structures contribute to movement failure. For example, Fagan (2000) and Shriver and Messer (2009) argued that the emergence of the conservative Civic Democratic Party in 1992, which was hostile to the Czech environmental movement, resulted in its rapid decline right after democratisation, whereas the election of the progressive Social Democratic party in 1998 provided environmental groups with political influence again. It is somewhat compatible to the common sense.

However, unlike the Czech Republic case, the Korean environmental movement experienced its crisis in civil society-friendly progressive governments. Within the administrations which gave environmental groups financial support and many participation opportunities in policy making, the environmental movement has gradually had a difficulty in acquiring public support. This paradoxical phenomenon also shows that the relationship between democratisation and social movements is not simple and is intertwined with a specific political context in a given country.

Over the period 1998 to 2007, both presidents had a political philosophy, which stresses “communication” between the state and civil society and “check and balance” between the development and environment ministries. According to this political belief, there were many changes in both the access chances to the government and the approach of government ministries towards development. More specifically, the process by which the government listens to various opinions or voices was often introduced and the ME exerted considerable influence which was enough to frustrate some national projects.
However, while social movements had many access opportunities to the government, their persistent protests resulted in a loss of external support and a growth in public pressure to moderate their demands. They faced strong criticisms that they should stop making extreme demands and staging ceaseless protests. While the authoritarian government’s development-oriented policies were not supported in the past, persistent environmental protests has been criticized by the public. The public expressed the fatigue or antipathy towards the environmental movement. Moreover, continuous environmental protests created their opponents. The high profile of environmental groups in progressive government incurred pro-development counter movements to mobilize. As counterbalancing forces gained strength, environmentalists were put on the defensive corner. Their active involvement in decision making was even considered the excess of democracy or populism.

In conclusion, it is not appropriate to argue a linear relationship between democratisation and the environmental movement. Without doubt, democratisation is one of crucial factors affecting the environmental movement. However, it is simply a broad context surrounding social movements and the rise and fall of social movements are closely related to domestic political context in a given country. The pattern or extent of democratisation is different according to country (Pickvance, K., 1997, 1998 a, 1998 b) and fluctuates over time according to the political disposition of incumbent government (Fagan, 2000). That is, the environmental movement is subject to variation according to its national context and therefore it should be discussed in this context.

**Dimension of political opportunity structure and social movements**

As explained in chapter 4, this research employed the POS approach as an analytic framework and political opportunity structure was divided into two main aspects - the access to the political system and the configuration of actors.

The research findings indicate that while the access chances enable environmental groups to stage continuous protests, the critical factors determining movement outcomes are the “configuration of actors”. That is, movement outcomes are largely determined according to the actor configuration. The position of related stakeholders (e.g. local governments and the mass media) surrounding the directly conflicting parties (e.g. the MOCT and the anti-dam
movement) shapes the outcome of movement. In particular, as the environmental movement lack resources compared to the government, seeking allies is the indispensable factor to achieve its goal.

In addition, what we need to pay attention to is that structure was not stable, but was changeable. The “configuration of actors” was considerably changeable. In the case studies, while the access to the political system were more favourable to social movements after democratisation, the disadvantageous change in configuration of actors – less allies and more opponents - greatly damaged to the anti-dam movement. That is, the position of stakeholders was a critical factor in the development of the environmental movement. Therefore, it is important whether movement groups acquire the support from those changeable stakeholders. This importance of actor configurations is also confirmed in the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) explain that the interaction between competing coalition groups with different beliefs finally determines the direction of policy makings.

In summary, while the two dimensions of the POS are meaningful to the outcome of social movements, in particular, “the actor configuration” is much more important in the rise and fall of the environmental movement. Therefore, we need to take a close look at relational fields surrounding social movements in order to explore the role of social movements in newly democratised countries.

**Government approach and the change of political context**

Various factors have an effect on political opportunity structure. The case studies show that among those various factors, conflicting party’s approaches have a considerable effect on the position of stakeholders. In particular, in the case studies, the government’s different approach changed the position of related stakeholders. For the resolution of the conflict, the Korean government adapted their proposals to lower perceived negative impacts and to increase potential financial benefits, and used participatory procedures to arrive at final decisions. In consequence, change in the B/C ratio of the dam construction appealed to local residents and local governments. Communicative decision making - discussion between
conflicting parties and mediation by neutral third parties - also contributed to legitimize government policies, even though it failed to resolve the conflict.

In conclusion, these two factors – the government’s change in both procedural and substantive terms - changed the position of stakeholders which resulted in a different outcome. The incentive was a critical factor in changing the position of actors. Lowered cost and increased economic benefit were all incentives, even though the types were different. Democratic procedure was also a kind of disincentive. It weakened the justification and motivation of movement actors to stage persistent protest. In the cases, the government’s changed behaviour altered the positions of many social actors and this influenced the outcome of the movements.

This change was also found in the anti-nuclear protest, which is another typical environmental movement in Korea (Jang and Lee, 2008; Kim, C. K., 2005; Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2004; Yun, 2005, 2006). For 20 years, the Korean government has failed to construct a nuclear waste disposal facility. In 2003, the Korean government failed to site a nuclear waste storage facility in Buan County because of the strong protests of ENGOs and local residents. However, after the enormous conflict in Buan County, it finally designated Gyeongju as the site for a nuclear waste facility via a residents’ vote in four towns including Gyeongju. In this process, the government introduced a similar approach as the dam case and as a result these factors changed the configuration of actors.

Firstly, facing strong protests, the government announced it intended to make a storage space just for medium and low level nuclear waste, not high-level waste. That is, the government had changed the original plan which also included high-level nuclear waste, so lessening the concerns of local residents.

Secondly, by increasing the existing economic support (£ 25 million), the government promised the economic incentive of £ 150 million and the relocation of the headquarters of the Korea Nuclear Power Company for the hosting county (Jang and Lee, 2008).

Thirdly, the government held a local referendum to decide upon the construction site. The central government induced local governments to apply for hosting nuclear facilities and
finally decided the construction site through the approval rate among those applicant counties (Choi, M. O., 2005; Joo, 2007; Rho, 2004).

Like the dam cases, the government’s change in both substantive and procedural terms altered configuration of actors surrounding nuclear waste conflict and considerably weakened the anti-nuclear movement (Kim, C. K., 2005; Joo, 2007; Rho, 2004; Yun, 2005, 2006). Local governments even competed against other local governments to host nuclear waste facilities and local mass media also argued that hosting a nuclear waste facility was the way to go for local development (Jang and Lee, 2008; Kim, C. K., 2005; Yun, 2005). The anti-nuclear conflicts show that the findings, which were derived from the anti-dam projects, are replicated in other areas of the Korean development.

Similar phenomena are also found in a number of LULUs (Locally Unwanted Land Use) such as the siting of cemeteries, crematoria, or waste treatment facilities (CFE, 2001; Kim, H. R., 2009; Lee, S. J., 2006). Compensation offered to local residents has increased and construction plans were sometimes modified through considering the opinions of local residents. Therefore, dam examples are not unique cases and are relevant explanations of wider government process in Korea.

In conclusion, even if there are various factors affecting political opportunity structure, the approach of “conflicting actors” is one of the most important factors which change it. Among them, particularly, the approach of the government is very important. The government’s conflict management approach has a significant impact on the perception of various actors around government projects.

**Another aspect of the relationships between actors: Trust**

As previously stated, public distrust of institutional politics is very high in Korea (Edelman, 2007; KDI, 2006; KGSS, 2003; SERI, 2009). The government, parliament, and political party have always been the most distrustful institutions. In particular, in Korea which has the tradition of the developmental state, development ministry has often been mistrusted for the reason that it has focused heavily on construction projects and even carried out the projects without sufficient feasibility. One of serious problems is that the government data or statistics
has often been mistrusted. Environmental groups argue that many government data is unreliable and is often fabricated to validate construction projects. Within this context, the Korean environmental movement was supported a lot by citizens (Koo, 2002; Lee, S. J. and Arrington, 2008; PCGID, 2007) and played a strong influence in the construction projects. Environmental group enjoyed high public trust until the 1990s.

However, the case studies show that the situation has significantly changed. Although environmentalists have still criticized the government’s development-orientation, they have also been mistrusted by citizens. Their reliability dropped rapidly compared to it in the 1990s. The Korean environmental movement, which grew much with the support of citizens, has been criticized for the reason that it raised objections to government projects without alternatives. After ENGOs have been regarded as one of powerful interest (or political) groups, their ability to influence the government decision making dwindled. In particular, this negative perception has been expanded by conservative mass media. Conservative newspapers have criticized that environmental groups have neglected their original task and paid attention to objecting to construction projects by ignoring expert opinion.

One of important issues is that public trust in scientist is also being threatened. The government examines the necessity of dam building and decides the type and size of the dam based on the expertise of dam experts. In the past, the authority of experts was respected and therefore the project which was planned by them was regarded as being necessary. However, since democratisation, the argument of the government depending on those experts has been no longer accepted as being right. Its logic and evidence has been often attacked by other experts who support the environmental movement. Now there are many experts who object to dam building and they have many logics which back up their arguments. They also have sufficient extent of expertise to compete with experts who support dam building. This situation made environmental groups fight against the government’s dam projects. However, like environmental groups, the pro-environment experts have been also gradually criticized for the reason that they support the anti-dam movement only by pointing to the problems of government projects. They have been attacked for the reason that they have conducted belief-based evidence finding. They are recognised as environment-oriented groups, as dam experts are considered development-oriented.
In summary, the development ministry and dam experts were mistrusted by citizens in Korea which has the tradition of developmental state and this became the spur to the development of the environmental movement. However, environmental groups and pro-environment experts have been also gradually mistrusted and have a negative influence on the environmental movement.

9.4 Research reflections

Social movements in newly democratized countries in Asia

In spite of its contribution, this research has some limitations. It offers limited insights into social movements in newly democratised countries, because the research only deals with the Korean environmental movement, particularly, with the two dam cases during the period of 1998-2007. Although this research plan came out of a compromise between its explanatory power and time constraint, it is undeniable that more case studies would have been able to provide more resourceful knowledge. In addition to the anti-dam movement, case studies on other environmental protests (e.g. the anti-nuclear movement, the anti-canal movement) will contribute to a better understanding of the Korean environmental movement since democratisation.

While this research focuses on the Korean movement, future research should examine the environmental movement in other new born democracies. In particular, a comparison between Taiwan and Korea seems likely to be useful for the study of the environmental movement in transitional societies because in Taiwan which is identified as a typical developmental state along with Korea, the environmental movement experienced a similar trajectory (Broadbent, Jin, Chien, and Yoo, 2006; Ho, 2005 a, 2005 b, 2010 a, 2010 b; Tang and Tang, 1997, 2000; Tong, 2005). The Taiwanese environmental movement rapidly developed in the relaxed political context after democratization in the 1980s. However, with taking power of the Democratic Progressive Party which had been cooperating with environmental groups for decades, they had great access to the government, but they did not achieve their intended outcomes and faced strong counter-mobilizations. That is, in spite of new political opportunities, their influence became severely weak (Ho, 2005 a, 2005 b). This trajectory of the Taiwanese environmental movement is quite similar to the one of the Korean
environmental movement. This similarity might come out of the similar economic development path of the two countries. They experienced democratic transition after rapid economic growth guided by strong states. These East Asian cases might provide a new knowledge which is different from European cases.

**Anti-dam movement in wider context**

As previously stated, dam-building is controversial around the world. Throughout the country, there have been conflicts surrounding dam construction projects. The case studies indicate that the Korean case is not isolated from this world trend. As the former president of ICOLD warned in 1992, dam construction faces its crisis even in Korea. Since democratisation, anti-dam protests are common phenomena and thus it is not easy for the government to build dams. Local residents no longer accept dam building in the name of national project and environmentalists oppose it for the reason that it is a waste of taxpayers' money and a threat to the environment. The case studies also show that like in other countries, the justification for dam construction itself has been questioned. In a typical developmental state, Japan, there have been hot debates about whether dams are indispensable infrastructures (Daily commercial, 2009 a, 2009 b). The Japanese anti-dam movements have questioned about the necessity of dam constructions and argued that dam construction should be scrapped. The same situation is also shown in Korea. While in the past, anti-dam protesters simply expressed discontentment about community or environmental destruction, they have currently raised questions about the necessity itself of dam construction. That is, dam building is no longer recognized as the symbol of modernization. In the case studies, ENGOs and local residents have questioned the “technical feasibility” of dam construction. Now they have technical knowledge to have a debate about the properness of data and modelling with the help of experts.

In spite of this common trend, the form of anti-dam protests seems to be different according to country. The Korean anti-dam movement shows somewhat different features compared to other countries such as Japan and China. The case studies indicate that while the Japanese or Chinese anti-dam movement is said to pressurise local governments to achieve their goals (Chan and Zhou, 2007; Waley, 2005; Yang, 2004; Zhou, 2006), the Korean anti-dam movement focuses on putting pressure on the central government. The Korean anti-dam
protesters often raised objections directly against the development ministry or the presidential office. The case studies also show that the Korean anti-dam protesters often depend on direct action, whereas the Japanese or Chinese anti-dam movement is said to adopt more pragmatic and cooperative stance (Jain, 2000; Lee and Arrington, 2008). It is said that these characteristics might stem from the difference in political, cultural, or historical context. For example, in relation to the cooperative characteristics of the Japanese environmental movement, some scholars point to a cultural factor such as ‘wa’ (harmony) as one of reasons. For more detailed explanation regarding this, future research is needed.

Reflections on the Political Opportunity Structure approach

After the analysis of the two case studies, it was found that the POS approach was useful in exploring the environmental movement in newly democratised countries. Firstly, it contributed to finding out the change in the process of decision making. The first dimension of POS showed how many participation opportunities were provided by the government and whether these opportunities were given through either formal or informal channels. Secondly, the POS framework was useful in exploring the relationship between various stakeholders over time. The second dimension of POS helped the researcher to observe what position various stakeholders held towards dam building and why some of them changed it over time. In conclusion, thanks to the POS approach, the researcher could properly explain the rise and decline of the Korean environmental movement.

The case studies also suggested another important finding regarding the POS approach. They indicated that while both dimensions of POS are useful in exploring social movements, the critical factors determining movement outcomes are the configuration of actors which is the second dimension of POS. Up to now many POS studies suggested that open political structure guarantees the growth of the movement (Mason, 1999; Pekkanen, 2004, 2006). However, as shown in the case studies, more access chances to decision making do not necessarily make movement success. While the Korean environmental movement had more access chances in the Roh administration, their protests did not succeed and faced its crisis. In NGO-friendly progressive administration, the environmental movement had difficulty influencing decision making. This phenomenon is also found out in other empirical studies. According to Luders’ study of the civil rights movement in the US (2003), while South
Carolina State’s acceptance of peaceful protests delayed movement success, the repression policies of Alabama State led to movement success by causing sympathy for the protests. This phenomenon is not compatible to the existing studies suggesting that open opportunity structures (or more access chances) contribute to movement success. Therefore, it is not right to argue that more access chances always make movement success. The development of social movements is not simply a matter of access to the system, but is affected by complex relationships involving various actors. Therefore, while the two dimensions of the POS are meaningful to the outcome of social movements, the relationship between stakeholders should be dealt with as more important factor.

Meanwhile, except political factors, there are also other factors to be considered such as culture or history (Botcheva, 1996; Fagan, 2004; Pickvance, C. G., 1999). National culture or historical context can be one of main factors in explaining the feature of social movements in each country (Brand, 1990; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Nelkin and Pollack, 1981; Rootes, 2004). Social movements are not simply products of political opportunities and lie under the impact of deep-rooted national culture or historical context. For example, Lee and Arrington (2008) argue that Korean NGOs’ contentious character stems from the effects of the historical development of civil society; Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) and the independent movement, and the long-standing authoritarian regime (1960s-1980s) and the anti-dictatorship movement. To get more of an understanding of the Korean environmental movement, more various approaches can be useful.

Based on the above reflections, future studies can be undertaken in the several fields. Case studies on other environmental protests within Korea can produce useful information. Moreover, comparison between the Korean environmental movement and the environmental movement in other countries will also be useful. In this regard, comparison between the environmental movements in new born democracies (e.g. Taiwan) or comparison between the anti-dam movement in large dam nations (e.g. Japan, China) can be carried out.
References


Bae, Y. I. (2009), Decentralization and Transformation of Central State in South Korea: The Role of Local and Civil Society, Paper delivered at the Korean Studies Association in Australia Bi-annual Conference, July 8-10, 2009, Sydney, Australia.

BAI (Board of Audit and Inspection) (2005), Audit Report for the Hantan River dam Project


-------- (2006 a), Comparison between the US ENGOs and Korean ENGOs and its implications, 9 February,


Broadbent, J., J. Jin, Y. J. Chien, and E. H. Yoo (2006), Developmental States and Environmental Limits: Regime Response to Environmental Activism in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China, EAI Working Paper Series VI

260


------ (2005), Strives for Economic Recovery is urgently needed,
http://www.cfe.org/mboard/bbsDetail.asp?cid=mn20061221203859&pn=7&idx=1113
(Accessed on 15 March 2010)
------ (2008), KFEM should be recreated, 31 October
http://www.cfe.org/mboard/bbsDetail.asp?idx=13384&cid=mn20061221203838
(Accessed on 15 March 2010)
Chan, K. M. and Y. Zhou (2007), Political Opportunity and Anti-Dam Construction
Movement in China, Paper presented at the International Conference on Non-Profit
Sector in Asia-Pacific Region organized by National Central University of Taiwan on
16th and 17th November, 2007.
Changbi (2001), The Hantan River, the 2nd Dong River,
--------------- (1998), Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis, World Development, 26, pp. 1555-
1561.
--------------- (1999), The economic theory of the developmental state, in M. Woo-Cumings
Liberalisation, Industrial Policy, and Corporate Governance, Cambridge Journal of
Economics, 22(6), pp. 735-746.
Chang, Y. T., Y. H. Chu, and C. M. Park (2007), Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia, Journal of
Cherry, J. (2005), Big Deal or Big Disappointment?, The continuing evolution of the South
Chin, A. and H. G. Ng (1996), Economic management and Transition toward a market
Cho, H. S. (2005), The Crisis of the Environment or the Crisis of the Environmental
Cho, H. Y. (2000 a), Democratic Transition and Changes in Korean NGOs, Korea Journal,
Summer 2000, pp. 275-304.

Cho, K. H., J. B. Joo, and S. M. Hong (2002), Conflict Resolution between Central Governments: Focusing on the conflict between the MOCT and the ME around the Dong River dam construction, Sung Gok Non Chong, 33, pp. 125-159


Choi, J. J. et al (2007), Assessment on Korea’s 20-year democratization, Seoul: Dangdaebipyegong


Chosun Ilbo (1997 a), Beautiful Baekryong Cave in danger of being submerged, 5-6 February

------------- (1997 b), Beautiful Dong River in danger of disappearing, 8 September,
--------- (1997 c), Dong River and Baekryong Cave in danger of being submerged, 11 September
--------- (1998 a), Environmental NGOs’ anti-Dong River dam movement, 4 April
--------- (1998 b), 192 caves in the Dong River area, 27 October
--------- (1999 a), Dong River Conservation Forum: the Dong River dam should not be built, 12 February
--------- (1999 b), The Dong River should be preserved, 13 March
--------- (1999 c), Expected Damage by the Construction of the Dong River Dam is valued at 110 Billion Won, 20 May
--------- (2004), The government’s mediation efforts come to nothing?, 15 December
--------- (2006), South Korea has not made a dam for 10 years despite repetitive flood damage, 19 July


Civic Group Promoting Yeoncheon County (2000-2007), Statements opposing the Construction of the Hantan River dam, http://www.yonchon.com/new/bbs/search.php?sfl=wr_subject&sop=and&stx=%C7%DB%C5%BA%B0%AD%B4%EF (accessed on 30 September 2009)


*Daily Commercial* (2009 a), Construction freeze on Japan dam marks end of era, 25 September

265
Protests prompt Japan to halt dam project, 30 September


*Donga Ilbo* (1988), Environmental Impact Assessment System Exists in Name Only, 4 June

---------- (1996), KOWACO holds public briefings regarding the construction of the Yeongwol dam, 21 October

---------- (1998 a), Ministry of Environment says the Dong River dam construction have negative impacts on water quality, 31 August.

---------- (1998 b), The Dong River Dam Project should be Reconsidered, 30 October.

---------- (1999 a), New Environment Minister Kim Myung Ja, 25 June.

---------- (1999 b), President Kim expressed his objection to the Dong River dam project, 7 August

---------- (2003), The feasibility of the Gyeongin Canal was fabricated, 25 September

---------- (2004), KCCI establish a Research Institute for Environment to represent the opinions of the business community, 22 December

---------- (2005 a), President Roh says the core of democracy is dialogue and compromise, 3 March

---------- (2005 b), Civil Movements: Unchecked Power, 9 March

---------- (2005 c), Social conflict should be resolved through dialogue and compromise, 15 March

---------- (2005 d), Public Projects should be based on feasibility studies, 6 June

---------- (2006 a), South Korea has not made a dam for 10 years because of radical environmentalism, 18 July

---------- (2006 b), Dam projects facing strong oppositions, 19 July
Doucette, J. (2007), The Perils of Capitalist Nostalgia: Neoliberalism and the South Korean Post-Developmental State, Paper presenting at the forum organized by SungKongHoe University


Dryzek, J. S., C. Hunold, D. Schlosberg, D. Downes, and H. K. Hernes (2002), Environmental Transformation of the State: the USA, Norway, Germany and the UK, Political Studies, 50, pp. 659–682


Eckstein and Gurr, (1975), Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry. New York: John Wiley and Sons Ltd


Freudenberg, N. and C. Steinsapir (1992), Not in our backyards: the grassroots environmental
Friedmann, J. (1987), Planning in the Public Domain. From Knowledge to Action, Princeton,
Fu, T. (2009), Dams and transnational advocacy: Political opportunities in transnational
Gadgil, M. and Guha, R. (1994), Ecological Conflicts and the Environmental Movement in
------------------ (1971), Political Trust and its Ramifications, In G. Abcarian and J. W. Soule
(ed.) Social Psychology and Political Behaviour, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill,
pp. 41-55.
Gamson, W. A. and D. S. Meyer (1996), Framing Political Opportunity, In D. McAdam, J. D.
McCarthy, and M. N. Zald (ed.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.
Giugni, M. (2009), Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly, Swiss Political Science
25 September 2009)
Goldstone, J. A. (1980), The weakness of Organization: A New Look at Gamson’s The
------------------ (1998), Social movements or revolutions? On the evolution and outcomes of
collective action, in M. G. Giugni, D. McAdam, and C. Tilly (ed.), From contention to
------------------ (2004), More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity


GRI (Gyeonggi Research Institute) (2011), Current Financial Position of Local Governments


*Gyeonggi Ilbo* (2000 a), Yeoncheon County and Cherlwon County forms a United front against the construction of the Hantan River dam, 14 September

-------------- (2000 b), Construction of the Hantan River dam is not right, 27 November

-------------- (2004), People of the Hantan River: the Hantan River Network, 6 December

-------------- (2006), Anti-Dam Movement is much too excessive, 22 July

*Gyeonggi Shinmun* (2006), ENGOs’ Anti-Dam Protests are Problematic, 19 July


---------------------------------- (1997), After Development: Transformation of the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy,


Han, E. S. and H. Furumura (2005), Weak Environmental Movements in Japan?: Study on Japanese Environmental Groups, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Inter-Continental Hotel, New Orleans, LA, Jan 08, 2005


Hankook Ilbo (1999), Gangwon Province Governor expressed his opposition to the construction of the Dong River dam, 8 April

-------------- (2000), NGOs’ opposition to the flood control dam, 15 May

Hankyoreh Shinmun (1999), The Ministry of Environment announced its negative position on the Dong River dam building, 26 March

-------------- (2001), Local oppositions to the proposed 12 dam projects, 9 August

-------------- (2004 a), Government’s mediation efforts come to nothing?, 5 November

-------------- (2004 b), Decision made by the mediation committee should be respected, 5 November

-------------- (2007 a), Citizens’ Coalition to save the Hantan River is established, 27 February

-------------- (2007 b), General Citizens say NGOs oppose national projects without suggesting alternatives, 12 June

Hankyoung (1999), Dam Construction should be judged carefully, 25 June


Harvey, D. (1990), The Condition of Postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell

He, L. (2010), Social Movement Tradition and the Role of Civil Society in Japan and South Korea, *East Asia*, 27, pp. 267-287


(2006), *Environmental Movement in Democratizing Taiwan (1980-2004): A Political Opportunity Structure Perspective*, International Conference on Tradition, Environment and Publicness in Asia and the Middle East, Chiba University, Chiba City, Japan. 15-16 December


Hong, K. D. (2005), The Impact of NGOs on South Korea’s Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq, *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 12(2), pp. 31-46.

Hong, S. M. (2000), *Policy Competition between the Governmental agencies and NGOs*, Ph.D. Korea University.


(2007 a), *Criticism against Developmentalism*, Seoul: Dangdae

(2007 b), *Developmentalism and the KOWACO*, Paper presented at the spring conference organized by the Korean Association for Environmental Sociology


Ibarra, P. (2003), Social Movements and Democracy, London: Palgrave Macmillan


Ichikawa, A. (2003), The Implication of Polish Environmental Improvement in Transition Period, 21 November 2003, at Roppongi Hills, Tokyo, Japan

ICOLD (International Commission on Large Dams) (1998), World Register of Dams


Im, H. B. (1997), Politics of democratic transition from authoritarian rule in South Korea, In S. Y. Choi (ed.), *Democracy in Korea: Its Ideals and Realities*. Seoul: KPSA.


Inglehart, R. (1977 a), Values, objective needs, and subjective satisfaction among Western publics, Comparative Political Studies, 9, pp. 429-458.


--------- (1979), Socioeconomic change and human value priorities, in S. Barnes and M. Kaase (ed.) Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies, Beverly Hills: Sage.


-------------(2007), The Implications and Problems of a Governance Approach to Environmental Conflict – The Experiences of Sihwa CSD and Gulpo CSD, Trends and Outlooks, 71, pp. 114-152


Jones, N. A. (2006), Gender and the Political Opportunities of Democratization in South Korea, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.


Joongang Ilbo (1999), Expected Damage by the Construction of the Dong River Dam in Youngwol is valued at 110 Billion Won, 20 May.

-------------------- (2003), Interest groups are taking over, 16 November
-------------------- (2005), Progress vs. the Environment, 4 February
-------------------- (2006), At long last, 16 March
-------------------- (2007), Ecology as a Political Tool, 2 March

Joo, S. S. (2000), Understanding the NGO Revolution in Korea, Global Economic Review, 29(4)


*Kangwon Ilbo* (2003 a), Construction Minister requests an audit of the Hantan River dam, 15 November

-------- (2003 b), National Assembly Cut a Considerable Portion of the Budget for the Hantan River dam, 30 December

-------- (2004), Local Residents say they cannot accept the decision made by the committee, 4 November


Katula, M. (1998), The Development of the Environmental Movement in Poland, A review article of Environmental Politics in Poland by Barbara Hicks, Indiana University Polish Studies Center Newsletter, 20 (2)


*KCCI* (Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry) (2005), Economic damage caused by the delay in large-scale national construction projects, 6 April http://www.korcham.net/EconNews/AreaReport/CRE02102R.asp?m_menu=&m_SITEID=kimpocci&m_BOARDID=7&m_BOARDSEQ=76&m_cciCode=&m_query=&m_queryText= (accessed on 15 October 2009)

*KDI* (Korea Development Institute) (2006), Report on a Survey and Policy Analysis for Enhancing Social Capital in South Korea, Seoul: Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management.


KEI (Korea Environment Institute) (undated), *Purpose and history of the KEI*, http://www.kei.re.kr (accessed on 15 September 2009)


KIET (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade) (1999), *B/C analysis of the Yeongwol Multi-purpose Dam and its alternative*, 4 August

Kievelitz, Uwe et al (2001), *Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management*, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH.


Kim, J. H. (2005), *National Styles of Development Control: Certainty, Flexibility and Discretion in English and Korean Systems*, PhD. University of Newcastle upon Tyne


Kim, M. S. (2003), *History of the Environmental Movement in relation to water issues*, http://eco.or.kr/?mid=pds&category=12044&search_target=content&search_keyword=%EB%AC%BC%EC%9A%B4%EB%8F%99%EC%9D%98+%EC%97%AD%EC%82%AC&document_srl=12227 (accessed on 25 February 2010)


Kim, M. T. (2005), The Development of the Environmental Movement and Open Space Planning and Design During the Democratic Period in Korea, In H, Jeffrey (ed.), *(Re)constructing Communities: Design Participation in the Face of Change*. Davis, CA: Center for Environmental Design, 2005

Kim, N. J., (2006), The plan to build the Hantan River dam should be cancelled, *Korea Democracy Foundation Newsletter*, October 2006


Kim, Y. K. (2002), Social Movement and Mass Media’s Framing of Environmental Problems: Focusing on the anti-Dong River dam movement, *Mass Media and Society*, pp. 45-90


Klandermans, B. and S. Staggenborg (2002), Methods of Social Movement Research, Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press.


Kookmin Ilbo (1992), Some National Construction Projects Delayed by Local Opposition, 4 May


Korea Herald (2005), Court Gives Go-Ahead to Reclamation Project, 22 Dec


------------- (1996), The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context. In D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, (ed.) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 152-184


Kriesi, H., R. Koopmans, J. W. Duyvendak, and M. G. Giugni (1992), New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe, European Journal of Political Research, 22, pp. 219-244.


KRILA (Korea Research Institute for Local Administration) (2008), Improving the Management System of Local Government Finance: Focused on Local Fiscal Crisis


------------- (2004 b), Development Coalition and Green Solidarity: the Analysis of Discursive Formation, ECO, 7, pp. 43~77.

------------- (2004 c), Development and future of the Korean environmental movement, Paper presented at the meeting organized by the Korean Sociological Association, 2004

Kwack, T. W. (1987), Social Overhead Capital and Productivity, Korea Development Institute (KDI)


286

*Kyunghyang Shinmun* (1985), Environmental Impact Assessment System Exists in Name Only, 21 May

------------------------------------------------- (1999 a), Power Shift: The Rise of Civil Society, 3 April
------------------------------------------------- (1999 b), President Kim expressed his objection to the Dong River dam project, 7 August
------------------------------------------------- (2000), Flood control dam is under consideration, 6 May
------------------------------------------------- (2004), Reasons for National Projects Failure, 21 November
------------------------------------------------- (2006), Audit Claims Increased 2.8 times, 26 February


--------- (2003), Down and down we go: Trust and compliance in South Korea, *Social Science Quarterly*, 84, pp. 329–343


Lee, M. S. (2010), The History of Democratization Movement in Korea, Korea Democracy Foundation (KDF) and The May 18 Memorial Foundation

Lee, M. S. (2010), The History of Democratization Movement in Korea, Korea Democracy Foundation (KDF) and The May 18 Memorial Foundation

Lee, M. S. (2010), The History of Democratization Movement in Korea, Korea Democracy Foundation (KDF) and The May 18 Memorial Foundation


Lee, S. J. (2000 c), Movement against the Construction of the Tong River (Yongwol) Dam in Korea, Paper prepared as a submission to the Fourth Consultation of the World Commission on Dams in Hanoi, 26-27 February 2000


Lee, S. J. and C. Arrington (2008), The politics of NGOs and Democratic Governance in South Korea and Japan, Pacific Focus, 23(1), pp. 75-96.
Lee, S. Y. (2004), The Dong River came back to us, In Uiryeong Conservation (ed.)
Uiryeong People, Seoul: Sumun publishing Co.
Lee, T. K. (2007), The Reproduction of ‘government dependency’ and High-tech start-ups in
Daedeok, South Korea, PhD. University of Sheffield.
Lee, Y. S. (2004), Study on local NGOs’ participation in policy process, Public
Administration Studies, Paper presented at the KAPA summer conference in 2004
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 77-101
Political Science, 3, pp. 475-507.
Democracy). Non-Governmental Organization Series 14, p. 93. Seoul: Centre for Free
Enterprise.
Lichbach, M. I. (1987), Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of
Lim, H. C. and J. H. Jang (2006), Between Neoliberalism and Democracy: The
Transformation of the Developmental state in South Korea, Development and Society,
35(1), pp. 1-28
Lim, H. S. (2000), Historical Development of Civil Social Movements in Korea: Trajectories
and Issues, Korea Journal, pp. 5-25
Lim, J. H. and Tang, S. Y. (2002), Democratization and Environmental Policy-Making in
Korea, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and
Institutions, 15 (4), pp. 561–582.
Lin, T. C. (2007), Environmental NGOs and the Anti-Dam Movements in China: A Social
Lindblom, C. E. (1959), The Science of Muddling Through, Public Administration Review,
19, pp. 79-88.


Luders, J. E. (2003), Countermovements, the State, and the Intensity of Racial Contention in the American South, in Goldstone, States, Parties, and Social Movements, pp. 27-44


ME (Ministry of Environment) (2003), EIA review report of the Hantan River dam project ------ (2004), Environmental Impact Assessment for the Hantan River dam project: Current situation and future plans

------ (undated), History of MOE,

http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=abo_his_history

(Accessed on 30 October 2009)


MOCT (Ministry of Construction and Transportation) (2001), Water Vision 2020

------- (2006), Revised Water Vision 2020

------- (2007), Water Resources in Korea 2007

MOCT (Ministry of Construction and Transportation) & KOWACO (Korea Water Resources Corporation) (1997), EIA Report for the Yeongwol Multi-purpose Dam Project


Monthly Mal (2000), The Hantan River, the 2nd Dong River, August 2000

---------- (2001), 5 Reasons for the anti-Hantan River dam movement, September 2001

---------- (2003), Exemplar of local movement, the Hantan River Network, April 2003


Moon, H. S. (2006), Partnership between SAI and CSO: Korean Experience,


Moon, T. H. (2003), Environmental Policy and Green Government in Korea,


Moravcsik, A. (2002), In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing the Legitimacy


*Munhwa Ilbo* (1999), Gangwon Province Governor expressed his opposition to the dam construction, 8 April.

---------- (2000 a), Even flood control dam should not be built, 15 May

---------- (2000 b), Controversy over the Hantan River dam: the second Dong River dam, 23 November

---------- (2007), Populism is the enemy of democracy, 12 June

*Naeil Shinmun* (2003), Controversy over the flood control effect of the Hantan River dam, 4 November

---------- (2004), New Controversy over the final decision of the mediation committee, 10 November

*NAK* (National Archives of Korea) (2007), Flood Damage,

http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.do?id=001878&pageFlag= (Accessed on 13 August 2009)


*New York Times* (2009), Japan Rethinks a Dam, and a Town Protests, 15 October

NGO Forum on ADB (2005), The Asian Development Bank and Dams

NGO NET (2008), Reliability Survey about the Korean NGOs


*Oh my news* (2006), Building More Dams is not the Solution to Prevent Flood Catastrophe, 18 July


OPM (Office of Prime Minister) (2000), Review Report for the Yeongwol Dam

------- (2005), Conflict Resolution Plan for the Hantan River dam

OPM (Office of Prime Minister) and KDI (Korea Development Institute) (2009), Conflict Management in Construction Projects (including the Hantan River dam case)


Park, C. M. (2009), Political Discontent in South Korea, A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance, and Development, Working Paper Series 49, Jointly Published by Global barometer, Issued by International Political Science Association, 2009 Chile


PCGID (Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization) (2007), Increasing Trust in Government through more Participatory and Transparent Government, 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government, Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization

PCSD (Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development) (2005), Conflict resolution report of the Hantan River dam project


---

298


Rho, M. H. (2006), *President Roh’s commemorative address on the 61st anniversary of Korea’s National Liberation*,

------------ (2009), *Democracy, Tolerance, and Relativism*,


------------ (1990), Campaigns, skirmishes and battles: anti-nuclear movements in the USA, France and West Germany, Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 4, pp. 193-222.

------------ (1994), Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen. Frankfruft am Main: Campus.


Sekye Ilbo (1999), The Ministry of Environment announced its negative position on the Dong River dam building, 27 March

----------- (2007), Citizens show negative feeling towards excessive movement opposing national construction projects, 12 July


Seoul Shinmun (1992), 23 National Construction Projects including the Yondam dam are delayed, 29 March

------------ (2000), The second Dong River dam controversy: the Hantan River dam, 27 October

------------ (2001), NGO / The Hantan River Network, 21 September

------------ (2008), BAI has much difficulty in dealing with numerous audit requests, 30 July

------------ (2009), Former BAI Chairman says about the Former President Kim Dae Jung, 21 August

SERI (Samsung Economic Research Institute) (2009), Tasks to strengthen social capital


--------------- (2009), Political protest and labor solidarity in Korea: white-collar labor Solidarity in Korea: White-Collar Labour Movements after Democratization (1987-1995), New York; Routledge


-------- (1996), States and Opportunities: The political structuring of social movements, in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald (ed.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41-61.


TRI (Tax Research Institute) (2007), Study on a plan for sound finance of local government


Views and News (2010), Visiting the South Han River, 11 January.


----------------------------------- (2007 a), Korean Federation of Environmental Movement (4), 6 February

----------------------------------- (2007 b), Discussion regarding the Korean environmental movement, Issue 712, 13 February


Wen, M. (2006), The Mountains are High, and the Emperor is Far Away: Spaces for Dissent in China’s Environmental Movement, thesis at Haverford College
Yang, J. C. (1992), Efficient Supply of Social Overhead Capital, Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement (KRIHS)
Yeom, H. C. (2003), The dam is no longer necessary, Environment and Life, 35
--------------------- (2006), Dam Mafia and dam construction, In S. T. Hong (2006), Modernization and Water in Korea, Seoul: Hanul
Yeongwol County Council (1996), Assembly Records, 15 November,
http://council.yw.go.kr/upzone/page/question/part/result_list.asp?SEQ=373&P=%C8%AF%B0%E6%BA%B8%C8%A3%B0%FA&A=+%B0%FA%C0%E5+%B1%E8%C8
310

*Yonhap News* (1996), Local Residents held a rally opposing the construction of the Tamjin Dam, 22 May

------------ (1999), Forest Service, the Dong River area should be designated as the forest reserve, 3 February


311


Appendices

Appendix 1: Secondary sources

I. NGOs’ websites

1. National NGOs
KFEM (Korean Federation for Environmental Movement): http://www.kfem.or.kr
GKU (Green Korea United): http://www.greenkorea.org
EJ (Environmental Justice): http://www.eco.or.kr
Uiryeong Conservation: http://www.uircc.or.kr

2. Local NGOs
Civic group promoting Yeoncheon County: http://www.yonchon.com
Hantan River Network: http://www.hantanet.com

3. Local residents’ committee and Others
Hantan love: http://www.hantanlove.net
Save the Dong River: http://www.dongriver.net

II. Government websites

BAI (Board of Audit of Inspection): http://www.bai.go.kr
KEI (Korea Environment Institute): http://www.kei.re.kr
ME (Ministry of Environment): http://www.me.go.kr
MLTM (Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime affairs): http://www.mltm.go.kr
MOPAS (Ministry of Public Administration and Security): http://www.mopas.go.kr
NAK (National Archives of Korea): http://contents.archives.go.kr
OPM (Office of the Prime Minister): http://www.pmo.go.kr
Former President Kim Dae Jung Cyber Hall: http://www.kdjhall.org
Former President Roh Moo Hyun Cyber Hall: http://www.knowhow.or.kr
III. Newspaper websites

1. Nationwide newspapers

Chosun Ilbo: http://www.chosun.com
Donga Ilbo: http://www.donga.com
Hankyoreh Shinmun: http://www.hani.co.kr
Kyunghyang Shinmun: http://www.khan.co.kr
Joongang Daily: http://www.joongang.co.kr
Sekye Ilbo: http://www.segye.co.kr
Korea Herald: http://www.koreaherald.co.kr
Yonhap News: http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr

2. Local newspapers

Kangwon Ilbo: http://www.kwnews.co.kr
Kangwon Domin Ilbo: http://www.kado.net
Gyeonggi Ilbo: http://www.ekgib.com
Gyeonggi Shinmun: http://www.kgnews.co.kr

3. Internet News

Ohmynews: http://www.ohmynews.com
Prometheus: http://www.prometheus.co.kr
Views and News: http://www.viewsnnnews.com
Appendix 2: Interview guide with a set of questions

Interview questionnaires (ENGOs and local NGOs)

After the political democratization in 1987, there were a large number of strong environmental protests. Particularly, during the period of 1998-2007, there were numerous protests against various national construction projects such as dams, roads, and nuclear waste facilities which became hot social issues. I am interested in exploring these issues and inquiring why this has been the case.

1. Introduction

Now I will begin with simple questions about you and your organization.

- What is your current position in your organization and how long have you worked there?
- How did you start your career in environmental NGOs?
- As I am aware, you participated in the protest against the Dong river dam (or the Hantan river dam). How did you get involved in these issues? During the protest, what was your role?
- When and how did your organization begin to take interest in dam issues?

2. ENGOs’ activities

Let’s move to the Dong river dam case or/and the Hantan river dam case.

<< The Dong river dam case >>

- Prior to talking about activities, can you explain how your organization engaged in this issue?
- Which of the two approaches did your organization mainly take; either talking to the government (or the national assembly) or appealing to public opinion?
In relation to talking to the government, did your organization focus on talking to the central government or the local government? Why?

- As you know, local autonomy was introduced in 1995. How was your organization’s contact with the local government? If there was not much contact, why was that?

- How was your organization’s contact with the ME in this case? How about ENGOs’ contact with the national assembly?

ENGOs seem to have made a lot of efforts to gain public support. To gain public support, what did your organization primarily do?

ENGOs pointed out many problems in government’s decision making. How did you find them?

- Why did ENGOs try to address this problem themselves and not through the ME which represents environmental interests?

What was the power relation between the MOCT and ME? Do you think the ME was still weak compared to the MOCT, though it was in charge of checking the MOCT’s wrong doings?

Do you think the ME’s persistent request of the EIA revision was affected by ENGOs’ strong protests?

ENGOs declined to participate in the joint review committee proposed by the MOCT. Why?
After President Kim’s personal expression of opposition to dam construction, the OPM organized a joint review committee and this time ENGOs participated in the committee. Why?

- Was there any change in the government institution and attitude in relation to dam policy making after the Dong river dam case?

<< The Hantan river dam case >>

- Prior to talking about activities, can you explain how your organization engaged in this issue?

- Which of the two approaches did your organization mainly take; either talking to the government (or the national assembly) or appealing to public opinion?

- In relation to talking to the government, did your organization focus on talking to the central government or the local government? Why?

- How was your organization’s contact with the local government? If there was not much contact, why was that?

- In this case, local governments did not show much support for ENGOs’ activities unlike the Dong river dam case. What is your opinion on this?

- How was your organization’s contact with the ME in this case? How about ENGOs’ contact with the national assembly?

- ENGOs seem to have made a lot of efforts to gain public support. To gain public support, what did your organization primarily do?

- ENGOs pointed out many problems in government’s decision making. How did you find them?
- Why did ENGOs try to address this problem themselves and not through the ME which represents environmental interests?

- What was the power relation between the MOCT and ME? Do you think the ME was still weak compared to the MOCT, though it was in charge of checking the MOCT’s wrong doings?

- Do you think the ME’s persistent request of the EIA revision was affected by ENGOs’ strong protests?

- In spite of the mediation of the PCSD, which is a neutral third party, ENGOs did not accept and criticized its decision. Why did they not accept the final decision of the committee even although they promised to accept it in the beginning?

- According to newspaper reports, an ENGO member who participated in the mediation of the PCSD said that its mediation was not transparent, reasonable and neutral. What is your opinion on this?

- ENGOs also rejected and criticized the final decision made by the special committee organized by the OPM after the BAI’s announcement of audit result. Why?

- ENGOs still staged protests in spite of the two mediations. Why? Why did ENGOs not accept the decision of the mediation committees?

- There were the mass media’s strong criticisms against anti-dam protests. What do you think was the reason?

<< Synthesis >>

- As a result of the political democratization in 1987 and the emergence of NGO-friendly administrations (1998-2007), the political context surrounding NGOs seemed more favourable. What was ENGOs’ initial expectation for both administrations?
In spite of the favourable political context for NGOs, the relationship between the government and ENGOs was not good and even got worse. Although ENGOs at times communicated with the government, they often showed confrontational attitudes against the government. Why?

- Why do you think ENGOs was confrontational? Is it because the Korean government was development-oriented and was inclined to push forward construction projects without considering environmental problems sufficiently?

- Do you think power imbalance between pro-development and pro-environment group was too much and policy making was mainly dominated by development ministries?

- Do you think the government’s efforts to talk to ENGOs were actually procedural, not substantive and therefore they could not help but to maintain their confrontational activities rather than engaging in discussion and negotiation?

- ENGOs seem to have a strong distrust on the government, especially the MOCT and KOWACO. Where does this distrust come from?

- Do you think the pro-development group did not assess environmental impact properly when they carried out construction projects and sometimes fabricated false project information?

- There seems to have been controversy related to the government’s water resource policy. In particular, ENGOs seem to have no trust on the government’s prediction for water demand. Why?

- In relation to demand prediction, did the MOCT expose several important problems? If so, what were they?

3. Impacts and any comment
Now let’s talk about ENGOs’ impact on decision making.

● While the anti-Dong river dam was successful, the anti-Hantan river dam movement wasn’t successful. Why?
  - What factors do you think determined the outcomes of ENGOs’ protests?
  - In the Hantan river dam case, there were criticisms against ENGOs’ continuous protests. What do you think is the reason?

● Finally, could you make any comment on this issue or government’s policy making?
  - Could you suggest anything that the government would need to improve?
  - Could you say anything that ENGOs would need to improve?
After the political democratization in 1987, there were a large number of strong environmental protests. Particularly, during the period of 1998-2007, there were numerous protests against various national construction projects such as dams, roads, and nuclear waste facilities which became hot social issues. I am interested in exploring these issues and inquiring why this has been the case.

1. Introduction

Now I will begin with simple questions about you and your organization

- What is your current position in your organization and how long have you worked there?
- As I am aware, you participated in the policy making of the Dong river dam or the Hantan river dam. What was your role?

2. ENGOs’ activities

Let’s move to the Dong river dam case or/and the Hantan river dam case.

<< The Dong river dam case >>

- Before we go into details, could you explain what the purpose of the dam construction was?
- Were there any problems in relation to the EIA report? If so, what were the problems?
  - The safety problem seems to have been the important issue. For example, although the MOCT said that there were a small number of caves, there were many big caves on the contrary to what the government had announced. How did this happen?
- The MOCT made a public notice of the dam construction site prior to completion of discussion with the ME regarding the EIA. Why did the MOCT do that?
After that, how was the relationship between the MOCT and the ME? The ME kept requesting the revision of the EIA report. Do you think this was heavily affected by the strong environmental protests?

What did the MOCT discuss with ENGOs about this issue? Did the MOCT minister or high rank public officials meet ENGO members? What was the result? If the MOCT’s attempt was not effective, what do you think was the reason for it?

Although the MOCT requested that environmental groups should participate in the joint review committee twice (October 1998 and January 1999), they refused to join them. What do you think was the reason for it?

- The Office of President tried to coordinate opposing parties but it resulted in failure. Why did it fail?

While the MOCT discussed with ENGOs, it kept announcing it would continue with the dam construction. Don’t you think these behaviours made ENGOs develop a strong distrust and decline to talk with the government?

ENGOs seem to have employed protests rather than engaging in conversation with the government. Why do you think they did so?

After the Dong river dam case, was there any change in the government’s institution and attitude in relation to dam policy making?

<< The Hantan river dam case >>

Before we go into details, could you explain what the purpose of the dam construction was?
• ENGOs questioned the flood control effect of the Hantan river dam and suggested embankments as an alternative to the Hantan river dam. They said that the MOCT pushed ahead with the dam construction. What was the MOCT’s response?

- Did the MOCT’s EIA report expose many problems? If so, why did this problem not change despite the experience of the Dong River dam case?

• In spite of the mediation of the PCSD, ENGOs did not accept the final decision made by the PCSD. Why do you think they did not accept it?

- According to a newspaper report, an ENGO member who participated in the PCSD’s mediation said that the mediation of the PCSD was not transparent, reasonable and neutral. What is your opinion on this?

• The BAI questioned the feasibility of the Hantan river dam in terms of the flood control and requested that the MOCT should reinvestigate its feasibility by comparing it with other alternatives (e.g. embankment). How did this thing happen?

- According to the BAI’s audit result, the KOWACO already began to make basic design of the Hantan river dam prior to the government’s decision regarding the best choice to prevent flooding. How did this thing happen?

• After the BAI’s announcement of the audit result, the OPM organized a special committee to make a final decision about the construction of the Hantan river dam. However, ENGOs criticized about the composition of the committee. They argued that the committee was only composed of government-friendly people including ministers and heads of government-funded research institutes.

- They also said that the working committee of the special committee was composed of staffs dispatched from MOCT and KOWACO and the experts who had been recommended by ENGOs were excluded. What do you think of this argument?

- Was it actually different from the Dong river dam case? If so, why was that?
• There were the mass media’s strong criticisms against anti-dam protests. What do you think was the reason?

<< Synthesis >>

• Why do you think ENGOs was confrontational? Is it because the Korean government was development-oriented and was inclined to push forward construction projects without considering environmental problems sufficiently?

  - Do you think power imbalance between pro-development and pro-environment group was too much and policy making was mainly dominated by development ministries?

  - Do you think the government’s efforts to talk to ENGOs was actually procedural, not substantive, and therefore they could not help but to maintain their confrontational activities rather than engaging in discussions and negotiations?

• ENGOs seem to have a strong distrust on the government, especially the MOCT and the KOWACO. Where does this distrust come from?

  - Do you think the pro-development group did not assess environmental impact properly when they carried out construction projects and sometimes fabricated false project information?

  - There seems to have been controversy related to the government’s water resource policy. In particular, ENGOs seem to have no trust on the government’s prediction for water demand. Why?

  - In relation to demand prediction, did the MOCT expose several important problems? If so, what were they?

3. Impacts and any comment
Now let’s talk about ENGOs’ impact on decision making.

- While the anti-Dong river dam was successful, the anti-Hantan river dam movement wasn’t successful. Why?
- What factors do you think determined the outcomes of ENGOs’ protests?
- In the Hantan river dam case, there were criticisms against ENGOs’ continuous protests. What do you think is the reason?

- Finally, could you make any comment on this issue or government’s policy making?
- Could you suggest anything that the government would need to improve?
- Could you say anything that ENGOs would need to improve?
**Interview questionnaires (The ME and KEI)**

After the political democratization in 1987, there were a large number of strong environmental protests. Particularly, during the period of 1998-2007, there were numerous protests against various national construction projects such as dams, roads, and nuclear waste facilities which became hot social issues. I am interested in exploring these issues and inquiring why this has been the case.

### 1. Introduction

Now I will begin with simple questions about you and your organization

- What is your position in your organization and how long have you worked in it?

- As far as I know, you were engaged in the policy making of the Dong river dam or/and the Hantan river dam. What was your role?

### 2. ENGOs’ activities

Let’s move to the Dong river dam case or/and the Hantan river dam case.

<< The Dong river dam case >>

- There seems to have been many controversies related to the properness of the EIA report. What were the problems in the EIA report which the KOWACO submitted? Did this kind of thing happen many times?

- The safety problem seems to have been the most important issue. For example, although there were a small number of caves according to the MOCT, there were actually many big-sized caves on contrary to what the MOCT said. Why do you think this problem happened?

- Do you think the MOCT is inclined to push forward policy making?
What was the ME’s initial position about the Dong river dam case? The MOCT made a public notice of the dam construction site prior to the completion of discussion with the ME in relation to the EIA. What was the ME’s response?

The ME kept requesting that the MOCT should revise the EIA report. Do you think it was partly affected by ENGOs’ strong protests?

Did the ME have contacts or cooperation with ENGOs? If there was cooperation, can you describe it?

In this case, ENGOs seemed to have employed strong protests rather than engaging in conversation with the government. What do you think was the reason?

The ME is the ministry representing environmental interests. However, ENGOs seem to have depended on their own activities rather than cooperating with your organization. What do you think was the reason?

Is it because ENGOs thought the ME was too weak compared to the development ministry? Any other reason?

Although the MOCT requested that ENGOs should participate in the joint review committee twice (October 1998 and January 1999), they refused to join the review committee. What do you think was the reason?

The Office of President tried to coordinate opposing parties but it resulted in failure. Why did it fail?

While the MOCT discussed with ENGOs, it kept announcing it would continue with the dam construction. Do you think these behaviours made ENGOs develop a strong distrust and decline to talk with the government?

After the Dong river dam case, was there any change in the government’s institution and attitude in relation to dam policy making?
ENGOS questioned the flood control effect of the Hantan river dam and suggested embankments as an alternative to the Hantan river dam. They said that the MOCT pushed away with the dam construction. What was the ME’s response?

Did the MOCT’s EIA report expose many problems? If so, why did this problem not change despite the experience of the Dong River dam case?

In the Hantan river dam case, EGNOs seemed to have employed protests rather than engaging in conversation with the government. What do you think was the reason?

The ME is the ministry representing environmental interests in Korea. However, ENGOs seem to have depended on their own activities rather than cooperating with your organization. What do you think was the reason?

Is it because ENGOs thought the ME was too weak compared to other development ministry such as the MOCT in the cabinet? Any other reason?

There was a mediation attempt made by the PCSD, but ENGOs did not accept the final decision suggested by the PCSD. Why do you think they did not accept it?

The BAI questioned the feasibility of the Hantan river dam in terms of the flood control and requested that the MOCT should reinvestigate its feasibility by comparing it with other alternatives (e.g. embankment). How did this thing happen?

- According to the BAI’s audit result, the KOWACO already began to make basic design of the Hantan river dam prior to the government’s decision regarding the best choice to prevent flooding. How did this thing happen?

- After the BAI’s announcement of the audit result, the OPM organized a special committee to make a final decision about the construction of the Hantan river dam. However, ENGOs criticised about the composition of the committee. They argued that
the committee was only composed of government-friendly people including ministers, heads of government-funded research institutes. What do you think of this argument?

- Was it actually different from the Dong river dam case? If so, why was that?

- In spite of the OPM’s decision, ENGOs kept fighting with the government. They were also engaged in legal action. What do you think is the reason?

- There were the mass media’s strong criticisms against ENGOs’ protests. What do you think was the reason?

<< Synthesis >>

- Why do you think ENGOs was confrontational? Is it because the Korean government was development-oriented and was inclined to push forward construction projects without considering environmental problems sufficiently?

- Do you think power imbalance between pro-development and pro-environment group was too much and policy making was mainly dominated by development ministries?

- Do you think the government’s efforts to talk to ENGOs were actually procedural, not substantive, and therefore they could not help but to maintain their confrontational activities rather than engaging in discussions and negotiations?

- ENGOs seem to have a strong distrust on the government, especially the MOCT and the KOWACO. Where does this distrust come from?

- Do you think the pro-development group did not assess environmental impact properly when they carried out construction projects and sometimes fabricated false project information?
There seems to have been controversy related to the government’s water resource policy. In particular, ENGOs seem to have no trust on the government’s prediction for water demand. Why?

In relation to demand prediction, did the MOCT expose several important problems? If so, what were they?

3. Impacts and any comment

Now let’s talk about ENGOs’ impact on decision making.

- While the anti-Dong river dam was successful, the anti-Hantan river dam movement wasn’t successful. Why?

What factors do you think determined the outcomes of ENGOs’ protests?

- In the Hantan river dam case, there were criticisms against ENGOs’ continuous protests. What do you think was the reason?

Finally, could you make any comment on this issue or government’s policy making?

- Could you suggest anything that the government would need to improve?
- Could you say anything that ENGOs would need to improve?
Appendix 3: Newspaper articles in relation to the two anti-dam movements

1. Newspaper articles in relation to the Dong River dam case

(1) Conservative newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chosun &amp; Donga</th>
<th>Main Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1997 &gt;</td>
<td>The beautiful Dong River is destined to be submerged (8 / 11 September)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The beautiful Baikryung cave is destined to be submerged (11 September)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1998 &gt;</td>
<td>Many ENGOs stage anti-dam movement activities (4 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>192 caves in the construction site, ENGOs raise the safety problem (27 October)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1999 &gt;</td>
<td>President Kim order to reconsider the dam construction (13 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENGOs’ anti-dam movement activities and their arguments (13 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KFEM organized 33 day sit-ins of 33 celebrities (23 March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gangwon province governor oppose the dam construction (9 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholic 16 organizations oppose the dam construction (20 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Councils of Gangwon province oppose the dam construction (27 April)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opinions of neighbouring local governments – 8 out of 13 oppose (17 May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WWF (World Wide Fund for nature) oppose the dam construction (3 June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Kim personally oppose the dam construction (7 August)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 2000 &gt;</td>
<td>Ruling party oppose the dam construction (22 March)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) Progressive newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| < 1997 > | Breaking nature / fierce battle with dam in Korea (25 June)  
The beautiful Dong River is destined to be submerged (23 October) |
| < 1998 > | Environment forum in the national assembly oppose the dam construction (21 July)  
Cost of dam construction – USA, breaking existing dams (18 August) |
| < 1999 > | MOCT, pushing forward the dam construction (19, 20 February)  
What is the advantage of the dam construction? (21 February)  
ENGOs’ objection and reasons – criticism against supply-oriented development (12 March)  
Dam construction budget should be used for replacing worn-out water pipe (13 March)  
ENGOs’ anti-dam movement activities (17 March)  
Water demand management is necessary rather than dam construction (22 March)  
KFEM organized 33 day sit-ins of 33 celebrities (24 March)  
The dam construction site is prone to earthquake (31 March)  
Gangwon province governor oppose the dam construction (9 April)  
Research report says that the dam construction leads to £ 50 million loss (21 May)  
President Kim personally oppose the dam construction (7 August)  
Government organize the joint investigation team (27 August) |
| < 2000 > | Ruling party oppose the dam construction (22 March)  
Joint investigation team propose flood-control dam as an alternative (16 May)  
Strong objection against flood control dam (18 May 2000) |
### 2. Newspaper articles in relation to the Hantan River dam case

#### (1) Conservative newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chosun &amp; Donga</th>
<th>Main Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>&lt; 2000 &gt;</strong></td>
<td>ENGOS’ movement activities and their arguments (3 July, 10 November)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&lt; 2001 &gt;</strong></td>
<td>ENGOS’ movement activities and their arguments – ENGOS raise the safety problem / Yeoncheon county oppose the dam construction (15 August) Cherrywon residents oppose the dam construction (13 July)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&lt; 2002 &gt;</strong></td>
<td>Gyeonggi province review poor EIA report (16 January) ENGOS’ raising concerns – technical feasibility (flood control effect of the dam), economic feasibility and the safety from artillery range (12 June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&lt; 2003 &gt;</strong></td>
<td>Anti-dam protest against the ME’s completion of the EIA discussion (20 Aug) Gangwon province governor oppose the dam construction (21 August) Cherrywon residents continue to oppose the dam construction (6 September)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&lt; 2004 &gt;</strong></td>
<td>The PCSD is engaged in the mediation of the Hantan River dam conflict (12 June) The PCSD suggest a small-sized flood control dam (3 Nov) The PCSD’s mediation becomes in vain? (15 December)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&lt; 2005 &gt;</strong></td>
<td>The BAI says the Hantan Rive dam should be reconsidered (25 May)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>&lt; 2006 &gt;</strong></td>
<td>Much flood damage in the region where dam construction was stopped (19 July) South Korea has not made a dam for 10 years (19 July) Gangwon province strongly oppose the dam construction (21 August) The OPM announce that flood control dam and flood detention basins are the best measures (23 August)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## (2) Progressive papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 2000 &gt;</td>
<td>The controversy related to the Hantan River dam (29 June)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| < 2001 > | Excessive dam construction destructs nature (9 September)  
           Local residents oppose the Hantan River dam (16 August)  
           The flood control effect of the Hantan River dam is low (2 December)  
           The feasibility of the Hantan River dam is low (3 December) |
| < 2002 > | Dam state, Korea (23 February)  
           The problem of dam construction policy (11 April)  
           The feasibility of the Hantan River dam is problematic (11 May) |
| < 2003 > | Anti-dam citizen action argue the cancellation of the Hantan River dam (31 Jan) |
| < 2004 > | PCSD organizes mediation committee (3 February)  
           PCSD suggest small-sized flood control dam (3 November)  
           PCSD’s mediation comes to nothing?: Local residents do not accept it (5 Nov) |
| < 2005 > | National policy project does not consider the environment (5, 7 February)  
           BAI suggest that the Hantan River dam should be reconsidered (24 May 2005) |
| < 2006 > | The Hantan River dam plan should be repealed (7 February, 30 June)  
           The construction ministry ascribes flooding to the lack of dams (19 July)  
           The biggest cause of flooding is the existence of the construction state (21 July)  
           Local residents’ strong objection to the OPM’s decision (23 August)  
           The OPM made the wrong decision (24 August) |