Early modern systems of command

Queen Anne’s generality, staff officers and the direction of allied warfare in the Low Countries and Germany, 1702-11

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Abstract

Throughout the operations of the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries and Germany, senior commanders such as John Churchill, duke of Marlborough, were aided, abetted and, on occasion, disrupted by a number of general and staff officers. These officers provided the mechanism by which supra-regimental command, military direction and management was effected. While these individuals possessed military dignity according to their rank and station, their real authority in the army was in no small part drawn from the powers and duties delegated to them by the commander-in-chief, or assumed upon their own initiative; clear chains of command did not exist.

Such officers functioned not only as vital elements in their own army, but within the broader context of the confederate warfare as a whole, in an army composed of English (later British), Dutch, Imperial, Danish and auxiliary German contingents. They came from diverse backgrounds and could possess constrasting political affiliations, aspirations and notions of duty. Their careers were governed as much by patronage and preference as any personal merit. A burgeoning sense of military duty was complicated by personal prejudice and the boundary between public and private endeavour was indistinct. Some officers gained wealth and financial security; others were ruined by the peculations of others.

Note

Dates are listed as Old Style (O.S.) or New Style (N.S.) depending on the context. For clarity, the English convention to start the new year with Lady Day (25 March O.S./5 April N.S.) has been ignored.
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Introduction

With the recent tercentenaries of the battles of Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706), Oudenaarde (1708) and Malplaquet (1709), there has been a brief renascence in the publication of works relating to the War of the Spanish Succession – or, more accurately, the role and agency of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722), in such, with particular regard to the campaigns in Germany and the Low Countries, 1702-1711. This has brought a spate of such works as Charles, Earl Spencer’s Blenheim: battle for Europe (London, 2004); and James Falkner’s present quartet of Great and glorious days: the Duke of Marlborough’s battles, 1704-1709: Schellenberg, Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenaarde, Malplaquet (Staplehurst, 2002); Blenheim 1704: Marlborough’s greatest victory (Barnsley, 2004); Marlborough’s Wars: Eyewitness Accounts 1702-1713 (Barnsley, 2005) and Ramillies 1706: year of miracles (Barnsley, 2006).

The above works have been published with the considerable, popular military history market in mind. None claim any new powers of analysis with respect to the period, its actors, or the paradigms of early modern warfare (if, indeed, they are written with regard to such), nor do they advance understanding of a field that has seen but little development in the past quarter of a century. Instead they are in the main readable narratives that refresh a relatively little-known period of British and European history in the popular consciousness, satisfying a niche in the popular market that exists. Yet the works are also indicative in style, format and focus of the great majority of material published on both the War of the Spanish Succession and the Duke of Marlborough himself, by and for an Anglophone British audience. In such works man and conflict can often appear to be synonymous, with the literature focusing on Marlburian biography (albeit with no little focus on military endeavour), or semi-biographic military studies of the Captain-General’s campaigns themselves.
There is no shortage of writings describing the life of Marlborough. Recently, James Rees Jones' brief but cogent Marlborough (Cambridge, 1993), and Corelli Barnett's own Marlborough (London, 1974; Ware, 1999) have proven the most instructive for a general readership. Yet all such works suffer by their scope of reference, as a function of the difficulties attending the historian in researching the primary materials, by far the largest collection of which - the Blenheim Papers, concerning a wealth of correspondence and documents pertaining to Marlborough, Sarah and Sidney Earl Godolphin, among others - was until relatively recently kept in private hands. Those biographies that have enjoyed such access to these archives, formerly at Blenheim Palace, thus formed a source upon which all others have been dependent. Those that have had recourse to view the Blenheim Papers, such as Barnett, have still used the source manuscripts as an adjunct to those works that have guided the later historiography: the biographies of Archdeacon William Coxe, Sir Winston Churchill and, to a far lesser extent, Thomas Lediard.

Coxe's Memoirs of John, Duke of Marlborough (new edition, ed. J. Wade, 3 volumes, London, 1847), part-biography, part-reproduction of original correspondence, has proven the most influential since its publication, Lediard's The Life of John, Duke of Marlborough (3 volumes, London, 1736) having waned in importance relative to this later work. Coxe's access to and copious use of Marlborough's correspondence in the Blenheim Papers, together with his early categorisation of such, supplied his volumes with a direct connection to their subject that was unsurpassed until another multi-volume work was published a century later. Furthermore, the subsequent loss of some of the manuscripts rendered into printed form by Coxe in the Memoirs fortifies the volumes' continuing import, though elements of the Blenheim Papers are now better served by other printed collations.

Sir Winston Churchill's *Marlborough, his Life and Times* (4-volume edition, London, 1933-1938; 2-volume edition, Chicago, 1947) could be said to bestride Marlburian biography much as 'Colossus' [Marlborough] bestrode his milieu, with occasionally the same irony. Though Churchill also used Coxe heavily, his (and his team of highly capable researchers') access to his kinsman's papers allowed a work that, in terms of sheer breadth, is unlikely to be matched. With its contemporaneous counterpart, G. M. Trevelyan's *England under Queen Anne* (3 volumes, London, 1930-4), Churchill's work defined the period and person, for better or worse and for much of the twentieth century. No biography has since attempted to analyse Marlborough and depict his life in the detail to which Churchill did; and though he provides a highly personal analysis that indulges in self-identification, polemic, familial myth and heroism, the depth of inquiry and wide utilisation of domestic and foreign sources can still illuminate those that look beyond Sir Winston's own manner and agenda. Only Richard Holmes' recent *Marlborough: England's Fragile Genius* (London, 2008) has come close to matching Churchill's work in its scope; though it does not match it in depth, it provides a more lucid and balanced insight into its subject.

Like biography, the military history of Marlborough and his campaigns is somewhat limited by its depth of reference. Excepting Holmes—whose biography, while covering the broad scope of Marlborough's activities, is militarily founded—no history has made extensive, or even notional, use of the Blenheim Papers, which provide the largest single collection of operational details with regard to the campaigns, 1702-1711. Studies of the war are thus dependent in part upon Coxe, Churchill, and printed collections of primary sources, such as Sir George Murray's *Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough from 1702 to 1712* (5 volumes, London, 1845), together with the reports of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts and the holdings of the National Archives (né Public Record Office), all of which shall be discussed further below.

Though Frank Taylor's *The Wars of Marlborough, 1702-1709* (2 volumes, Oxford, 1921) has remained a useful narrative, the core of the Anglophone historiography in the

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2 Oliver's pocket looking-glass: new fram'd and clean'd to give a clear view of the great modern Colossus begun by K.C. —, carry'd on by K.J —, augmented by K.W —, and now finish'd in order to be thrown down in the glorious r— of Q.A —, 1711.
twentieth century and beyond has been provided by two authors, Christopher T. Atkinson and David G. Chandler. Atkinson’s *Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army* (2nd edition, London, 1924), together with his numerous contributions to the *Journal of the Society for Army Research*, have proven important in framing the issues discussed and guiding the tenor and approach of subsequent historians.1 David G. Chandler, a student of Atkinson in more ways than one, has inherited the role as the pre-eminent British military historian of Marlborough and his role in the War of the Spanish Succession, both in the discussion of the central issues of the conflict and the collation of primary sources for public consumption. Chandler’s *Marlborough as Military Commander* (London, 1973) has provided the standard modern source in English on the duke’s campaigns, influencing the authors of the tercentenary works noted above, not least Earl Spencer; while his *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough* (London, 1976), and the his more recent *Blenheim Preparation, The English Army on the March to the Danube: Collected Essays* (Staplehurst, 2004) have provided informative case studies of more particular elements, not least the tactical handling of the various arms of the service.

Like many works of military history, Chandler’s publications have often blurred the gap between popular study and more rigorous academic analysis. In common with Atkinson, Churchill and a great deal of the British historiography, Chandler’s portrayal of Marlborough as a captain whose military capabilities were beyond reproach has brought mixed comment. Retained references to Marlborough’s avarice and connivance, although diminished relative to Swift and Macaulay’s condemnation, occasionally carry the appearance of a crutch of objectivity against which the Captain-General’s myriad qualities may be all the better set. Churchill, though arguing that such avarice “never prejudiced [Marlborough’s] public duty”, nevertheless “sought not to palliate his voice of foible in money matters”; whilst Chandler noted as to the same

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allegations that "there was a little fire beneath all the smoke of party and factional vituperation". Whether or not Marlborough's fiscal desires and/or improprieties were significantly greater than others' in a period marked by a somewhat idiosyncratic approach to the conflation of public and private enterprise, or are indeed exacerbated by the eye and sensibilities of the beholder, is open to further comment.

Modern criticisms of British portrayals of the military character of the duke have focused upon two elements, usually in conjunction: (i) the edification of Marlborough's thoughts and deeds in particular, and many British military personnel in general, to the detriment of those among the other allies (Prince Eugene usually excepted), most notably the Dutch - an anglocentric motif commonly witnessed in the supposed trials and tribulations of Marlborough in the face of Dutch obstruction; and (ii) a tendency to portray Marlborough as a commander who was less a captain in the context of the early modern military paradigm in which he operated, but rather a harbinger or practitioner of a more modern military practice, not least in his recognition of the importance and efficacy of battle, and his ability to enforce it - a conception that links in with the above in the motif of a rationally aggressive and decisive Marlborough, held against the Dutch with their stultified notions of strategy.

It is difficult to defend popular British military history, Churchill or indeed elements of Chandler's analyses from either charge. The works hitherto noted have generally lacked any balanced appreciation of the Dutch or the German allies and auxiliaries, and all too little consideration of the detailed workings of confederate warfare. Analyses of the character of the Anglo-Dutch alliance, as in R. Geikie and I. Montgomery's *The Dutch Barrier, 1705-19* (Cambridge, 1930), or Douglas Coombs' *The Conduct of the Dutch: British Opinion and the Dutch Alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession* (The Hague, 1958) and 'The Augmentation of 1709: a study in the Workings of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance', *EHR*, lxxii (1957), 642-661, are rare. Primary English sources, which so often display informative, contemporary prejudices against the Dutch and other allies, should be investigated with regard to their merits, as opposed to being taken *de facto* as objective accounts of the war.

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The predilection for battle, real and imagined, and with regard to Marlborough and historians alike, is considered in detail by Jamel Ostwald in his paper ‘The “Decisive” Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare’, Journal of Military History, vol. 64, no. 3 (2000), 649-677. It is certainly true that studies of the tactical engagements of Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenaarde and Malplaquet &c. preponderate over those of other elements of operations, such as the passage of the Lines of Brabant and Ne Plus Ultra. Ostwald succeeds in promoting the study of Marlborough and his actions in the context of the military paradigm of the time, and such careful reappraisals and criticisms inform John B. Hattendorf’s entry on Marlborough in the new edition of the Dictionary of National Biography (2004-7). Hattendorf had earlier promoted a far wider conception of the nature of the conflict in his England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy (New York, 1987). To understand the degree to which leading historians in the early modern academic community have revised their common opinion in opposition to the general trend of the British historiography, it is worth quoting one of Hattendorf’s closing DNB paragraphs in full:
As a general and as the allied commander-in-chief during the War of the Spanish Succession, Marlborough based his success on his ability to co-operate effectively with the Dutch, who had the largest number of troops under his command, paid the largest share of the military effort, and controlled the army's logistics. As a field commander he was noted for promoting mobile warfare, manoeuvring to engage in decisive battle, using effective operational intelligence, planning long-range logistical support, and having a remarkable ability to analyse and to react to changing tactical situations in the heat of battle. Some of these same characteristics led contemporaries to see him as impulsive, imprudent, and reckless in terms of eighteenth-century warfare. Seen at a distance of three centuries, these characteristics appear much more appropriate to warfare in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, in viewing him at long range, some military specialists have applied anachronistic values that distort the view of Marlborough within his own time.

Though one might consider this statement fair and accurate, the lack of any involvement by historians intimately aware of the British primary sources in such a reappraisal proves problematic. A line such as "... the Dutch... controlled the army's logistics" is a touch disingenuous. British historians have often considered the nature of supply and transport in the War of the Spanish Succession, not least with regard to the 'famous' march to the Danube that is a constituent part of Marlburian legendry, but the analyses of same by such as Alan Francis and Ivan Phelan lack weight. Certainly there is no British work to match Olaf van Nimwegen's *De subsistentie van het leger: Logistiek en strategie van het Geallieerde en met name het Staatse leger tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog in de Nederlanden en het Heilige Roomse Rijk (1701-1712)* (Amsterdam, 1995), whose work, along with Ostwald's, forms much of the basis for Hattendorf's revision.

Van Nimwegen, in his summary, comments upon the fact that, excepting Henry Snyder, British historians otherwise remain ignorant of a great many logistical documents present in the archives of Blenheim Palace [sic], but he makes no reference to them himself. An analysis of such suggests a slightly more ecumenical consideration of logistics with regard to the allied army. Such does not diminish the great Dutch responsibility in this regard, or even the preponderance thereof in a great many areas of supply; but to minimise to negligibility of British actors in such matters takes a

wholly valid and necessary reappraisal a little too far. Though of great merit, *De subsistentie* remains based largely on Dutch sources, and an understanding of logistics, within both the wider allied army and those forces in English and joint Anglo-Dutch pay, will be better served when the multitude of operational minutiae in the Blenheim Papers are brought to public attention.

This is a common problem in the reading of primary sources relative to military operations in the War of the Spanish Succession. Much of the bias detected may be less a function of national prejudice, intentional or otherwise (though a full cognisance of all sources, no matter the language of provenance, would assuredly eliminate the issue), than a result of source-perception that might be exacerbated in sources of greatest familiarity. Affirmative statements of agency by an actor in a given regard are too often taken as exclusive, whereas they are often anything but. It was all too common in the somewhat pluralistic command structures of the allied army and its constituent parts, with less than rigorously defined networks of responsibility, to witness a multiplicity of people carrying out exactly the same duties in similar or differing contexts. Whilst a zero-sum principle may seem reasonable - the notion that any reassessment of Dutch responsibility sponsors a commensurate and outright reduction in the agency of others - it is not necessarily correct.

Beyond the Marlburian historiography noted above, relatively little has been written on the army, its administration and its personnel during the War of the Spanish Succession. Though authors such as Chandler touch on elements of organisation and function, not least tactical, there is no analysis that can compare with Major Raibeart E. Scouller's *The Armies of Queen Anne* (Oxford, 1966), itself influenced by Clifford Walton's still-useful *History of the British Standing Army 1660-1700* (London, 1894). Like Henry Snyder and Ivor Burton, Scouller contributed considerably to the understanding of the British army and its personalities in the period, without exclusive recourse to the typical pattern of biography or campaign history. *The Armies of Queen Anne* remains

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7 Ivor F. Burton, *The Secretary at War and the administration of the army during the War of the Spanish Succession*, Ph.D. thesis (University of London, 1960); 'The Committee of Council at the War Office: an experiment in Cabinet government under Anne', *HJ*, vol. 4 (1961), 78-84. For Scouller's other works informing *The Armies of Queen Anne*, and subsequent publications, see: 'Queen Anne's Secretaries at War', *AQ*, 57 (1949), 215-220; 'Quarters and barracks', *JRUSI*, 98 (1953), 91-94; 'Recruiting: a familiar problem', *AQ*, 71 (1955), 105-112; 'Secretaries at War to
the most valuable work on its subject, and perhaps also of any publication regarding the British army in any way, shape or form in the period.

The sole criticism concerning Scouller’s work relates to the nature of his source material. The still-private nature of the Blenheim Papers in the 1960s resulted in a book that drew heavily upon, in addition to the usual sources, a great many documents at the Public Record Office. Though Scouller’s use of such resulted in a highly informative work, the very nature of the PRO papers, drawn from largely domestic sources, provided a representation of army administration that spoke more as to the broad schema of general organisation in overview, principle and theory than the particular nature of organisation and function in the field, as practised in the Low Countries. Scouller attempted to rectify this problem to an extent in the subsequent article ‘Marlborough’s administration in the field’, Army Quarterly, 95 (1968), 197-208; 96 (1968), 102-113, but the brevity of such, and the lack of detailed reference to the mass of pertinent information in the Blenheim Papers, reduce the utility of the analysis.

Of related import are studies of the English forces that operated in the Low Countries during the Nine Years’ War. This conflict provided considerable experience to the soldiers and officers that would serve in the War of the Spanish Succession, and forms a useful point of reference for later studies. John Childs’ The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester, 1987) and The Nine Years’ War and the British Army, 1688-1697: The Operations in the Low Countries (Manchester, 1991) provide an excellent survey, but of particular interest is Louis M. Waddell’s unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ‘The Administration English Army in Flanders and Brabant from 1689 to 1697’ (University of North Carolina, 1971). While Waddell investigated some similar themes to those explored in this thesis, his work is more akin to that of Scouller. There is little detailed coverage of the workings of command and control on campaign, particularly at a lower level; rather it is a broader overview. If it is lighter on certain administrative and material elements than Scouller, it offers greater specificity relative to the campaigns, and greater coverage of the social, political and economic context.

Both works are dry, with their analyses set within relatively narrow limits (no criticism, given the nature of much of the English-language literature); there is no work on the English or British army of the period to match John Lynn’s *Giant of the Grand Siècle: the French Army 1610-1714* (Cambridge, 1997), for example. Lynn’s work covers a much greater province, both temporally and ideologically, and his arguments and syntheses on the nature of the warfare of the period are deeper and wider-ranging. If the sheer breadth of the study limits its depth with regard to specific topics (such as the nature of command in the War of the Spanish Succession in particular), it does not diminish the broader insights, emphasising the *Why?* as much as the *What?*

Alongside *The Armies of Queen Anne*, the most useful work to any historian of the English and British armies in the Low Countries is Charles Dalton’s *English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714* (6 volumes; London, 1898-1904). Though occasionally in error and not always complete (see, for example, Ivor F. Burton and Aubrey N. Newman’s article ‘Sir John Cope: promotion in the 18th century army’, *EHR*, 78 (1963), 655-668), Dalton’s mammoth collation of commissions, rolls and various ancillary information remains an invaluable aid, not least in the investigations of the staff officers that served as at all levels – general, brigade and regimental – to accommodate the better functioning of the forces in camp, winter quarters and on the march, from supply and quartering to discipline and formation in the line of battle. Studies of the headquarters staff employed by the allied forces in the War of the Spanish Succession, irrespective of nationality or position, are distinctly lacking; beyond occasional eulogising references to such, typically in passing, their agency is in no small part subsumed into the *Gestalt* commander-in-chief’s function as army comptroller.⁸

The most famous and distinguished member of Marlborough’s staff, William (later Earl) Cadogan, Quartermaster-General to the British forces in the Low Countries (and, by extension, acting in part in a similar capacity to the allied army as a whole) and sometime diplomatic envoy and administrator, is the only individual to have attracted particular notice, in the form of J. N. P. Watson’s biography, *Marlborough’s Shadow, the Life of the First Earl Cadogan* (Barnsley, 2003). If, indeed, ‘Marlborough’s Shadow reveals

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that, not only was Cadogan the power behind, and major influence on his master Marlborough...’ then it is perhaps unconvincing in doing so. Watson’s revisionist portrayal of Cadogan indulges in part in the zero-sum forms of argument hitherto noted. The transfer of capability and worth does not serve particularly well in characterising the nature of the professional, reciprocal relationship between Cadogan and Marlborough, nor the greater framework of command within which they existed as prominent nodes.

Faced with the peculiarly fluid and variable paradigm of early modern command, it is can prove all too easy to suppose the existence of distinct and exclusive structures more common to the modern period. Watson positions Cadogan in the role as Marlborough’s ‘chief of staff, chief of intelligence’; while James Falkner, in his Dictionary of National Biography (2004-7 ed.) article, follows Watson in casting Cadogan as ‘unofficially, [Marlborough’s] chief of staff and director of military intelligence, although these posts did not exist in the modern sense at that time’ – nor, one might argue, did they exist in any sense at that time. Setting aside the issue of Cadogan’s purported role as ‘chief of staff’ (which, albeit requiring a great deal of further discussion, might bear some truth after a fashion), his depiction as a chief of intelligence, even military, is flawed.

Though Cadogan, in his twin roles as Quartermaster-General and diplomat, directed the collection of and personally collated a sizeable amount of intelligence, particularly of an operational nature, he did not oversee all such activities for the army, nor the many other officers who through personal initiative, or direction from Marlborough or others, acted in a like manner. Cadogan’s aides and deputy quartermasters-general, such as Alexander Spotswood, John Armstrong and Richard King, were often as liable to communicate directly with Marlborough (via Cardonnel) as with Cadogan himself, or be directed to act as the situation required by diverse other officers for the good of the service.

These other officers, the general officers of the army, appear largely as ciphers to the modern audience. There is no work on the corps as a whole, or that discusses in any depth their agency in the War of the Spanish Succession. There is certainly no study of the form of Erik Lund’s War for the Every Day: Generals, Knowledge, and Warfare in Earl
Lund attempts, with success, to recover for the modern reader the experience, background, education and outlook of the Imperial generals of that period; to provide a more cogent investigation of the tasks these officers engaged in and the degree to which they were prepared for them. Even if it is difficult to apply Lund’s ideas on the scientific nature of personal and corporate military development to some of the British generality, his thesis, particularly in its application of the ‘economy of knowledge’ and its provocative counterpoint to those that characterise the warfare of the time as stolid and unimaginative, is apposite. The likes of Cadogan, Armstrong, King and Lascelles in particular have much in common with Lund’s ‘soldier-scholars’.

Though the secondary literature, therefore, does not provide the most cogent model of the field administration and control of the British and allied army, the primary sources, both printed and manuscript, provide a considerable wealth of detail that should promote the better formulation of such. The actions of Marlborough and his subordinates in the Low Countries and Germany are quite well served in terms of the contemporary papers collated and printed for a wider audience. In addition to Coxe’s *Memoirs*, three major series of printed correspondence provide a significant proportion of the correspondence of Marlborough in readily accessible form. Sir George Murray’s edition of *Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough from 1702 to 1712* (5 volumes, London, 1845), though poorly indexed and not without occasional errors [as in, for example, the attribution of Josiah Sandby’s account of the Blenheim campaign to Dr Francis Hare; see Robert D. Horn, *Marlborough, a survey: panegyrics, satires, and biographical writings, 1688-1788* (Folkestone, 1975), item 75; and F. Harris, ‘The Authorship of the Manuscript Blenheim Journal’, *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, iv (1982), 203-206] is a useful compendium of diplomatic and military correspondence, including that with many field officers.

Bert van ‘t Hoff’s edition of *The Correspondence 1701 – 1711 of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, and Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland* (The Hague, 1951) provides a valuable record of the direction of allied warfare at the highest levels; and is superbly accompanied and expanded upon by the considerable endeavour of A. J. Veenendaal (fils) in producing the nineteen volumes of *De briefwisseling van Anthonie*
Heinsius 1702–1720 (The Hague, 1976-2001). Henry L. Snyder's *The Marlborough–Godolphin Correspondence* (3 volumes, Oxford, 1975), does likewise with regard to the activities of the 'duumvirate', in many cases surpassing Coxe's *Memoirs* in such usefulness. Furthermore, Snyder's erudite edition and notation, lacking parochialisms and written in a multinational context, means the volumes transcend their value as a collection of primary sources, and provide additional utility.

These provide necessary insights into the actions of such as Marlborough, military, politic, diplomatic and otherwise. Yet, with the partial exception of Murray's *Letters and Dispatches*, they focus on the very highest echelons of command; a state that is mirrored in the largest reproduction of the Blenheim Papers, the microfilm edition prepared by David Hayton. Though a significant amount of Marlborough and Adam de Cardonnel's correspondence with field officers is transferred to the microfilm edition (British Library, Add. MSS 61101-61413 *passim*), the great majority of manuscripts pertaining to a wealth of operational details and matters of army administration are not, with the focus of the edition remaining the correspondence of Marlborough, Sarah, and Charles Spencer, third Earl of Sunderland.

In addition to Marlborough's own papers, there are a significant number of published, contemporary accounts of the campaigns in the Low Countries and Germany. Of considerable importance is Dr Francis Hare's *The Conduct of the Duke of Marlborough during the Present War, with Original Papers* (London, 1712), a more impartial account than might be expected of a strong supporter of, and Chaplain-General to, the duke, not least on the origin and development of the antipathy between Marlborough and Frederick Johan van Baer, Baron Slangenburg.9 The remainder of the Anglophone accounts are of martial provenance, belonging to commissioned and non-commissioned officers and private soldiers in the regiments serving in the northern European theatres. The materials are of varying degrees of utility; many writers are all too laconic with regard to a great many details of campaign and camp life that would favour a more vibrant social history of the army; and accounts occasionally provide but the merest itinerary of the march. Nevertheless, for all their limitations and unfulfilled promise, the following remain as a whole a valuable source.

9 Hare, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
Of goodly import is Captain Robert Parker’s *Memoirs of the Most Remarkable Military Transactions from 1683 to 1718* (London, 1746), one of the more revealing accounts of the war and most recently republished in Chandler’s collection *Robert Parker and the Comte de Mérode-Westerloo* (London, 1968); in terms of military detail it may be set comfortably aside Richard Kane’s *Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne from 1689 to 1712*. Also, a new system of military discipline for a battalion of foot on action, with the most essential exercise of the cavalry... (London, 1745). Of additional note is The life and diary of Lieut. Col. J. Blackader of the Cameronian Regiment (ed. Andrew Crichton; Edinburgh, 1824), who served with Cranstoun (see below); while The memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake. Containing, an account of many strange and surprising events... and several material anecdotes, regarding King William and Queen Anne’s wars with Lewis XIV of France. (2 volumes, Dublin, 1755; reprinted London, 1960, ed. S. Burrell, Amiable Renegade) are more fascinatingly ribald than either Cranstoun or Blackader’s tales, but should be treated with attendant caution. Finally, a handful of George Hamilton, first Earl of Orkney’s missives are published in H.H.E. Cra ster’s edition of ‘Letters of the First Lord Orkney during Marlborough’s Campaigns’, *English Historical Review*, Vol. 19, No. 74 (April 1904), 307-321, with particular reference to the field of battle.

Corporal Matthew Bishop’s *The life and adventures of Matthew Bishop of Deddington in Oxfordshire*... (London, 1744), and Chandler’s editions of Private John Marshall Deane’s account in *A Journal of Marlborough’s Campaigns during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1704-1711* (Society for Army Historical Research, Special Publication No. 12; London, 1984); and Sergeant John Wilson’s ‘The Journal of John Wilson, an ‘Old Flanderkin Sergeant’, who served 1694-1727’, *Military Miscellany II: Manuscripts from Marlborough’s Wars, the American War of Independence and the Boer War* (Publications of the Army Records Society, vol. 23; Stroud, 2005) provide often useful accounts from the lesser ranks; though Sergeant John Millner’s *A Compendious Journal of all the Marches, Battles, Sieges and other Actions of the Allies in their War against France in Holland, Germany and Flanders, 1701-12* (London, 1733) is the least colourful of records, if suitably compendious.

Of the foreign sources relating to the functioning of the confederate armies, of primary importance is Sicco van Goslinga’s *Mémoires relatif à la Guerre de succession de 1706-1711*. As a ‘field deputy’ for the province of Friesland during the years in question (1710
excepted), Goslinga was intimately involved with the direction of the war in Flanders, and his account provides a necessary Dutch voice. Sadly other Dutch accounts are less forthcoming in published form, but there are several German sources, most notably in the *Feldzüge* of Prince Eugene (Series I, vols vii–ix; Series II, vols i–vi; Vienna, 1876–1881); the *Kriegs- und Staatschriften über den spanischen Erbfolgekrieg* of Ludwig Wilhelm, Margrave of Baden (2 volumes, ed. P. Röder, 1850); and Kurz von Schöning’s edition of *Des General Feldmarschalls Dubislav G. von Natzmer Leben und Kriegsthaten* (Berlin, 1838) is particularly informative.

The *Reports of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts* contain in calendars, abstracts and extracts a great deal of pertinent correspondence. Of particular note with regard to officers’ correspondence are the letters of Colonel Cranstoun and others in the *Portland MSS*, Series 29; the letters of Lord Orkney, since repeated in Cra’ster, *op. cit.*, in the *Atholl MSS*, Series 26; and also the letters of John, Baron Cutts of Gowran, in the *Frankland-Russell-Astley MSS*, Series 52. The *Bath MSS*, Series 58, contain a great deal of correspondence to and from Marlborough, and the *Hare MSS*, Series 38 detail the letters of Dr Francis Hare, Chaplain-General to the army in Flanders. A variety of other series, including the *Bagot MSS*, Series 13; the *Clement MSS*, Series 55; the *Cowper MSS*, Series 23; the *Dartmouth MSS*, Series 20; the *Downshire MSS*, Series 75; the *Ketton MSS*, Series 27; the *House of Lords MSS*, Series 17; the *Mar and Kellie MSS*, Series 60; the *Ormonde MSS*, Series 6; and the *Townshend MSS*, Series 19 contain various letters of interest relating to officers serving in, and commenting upon, the state and nature of the campaigns in the Low Countries and Germany, 1702-1711.

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In reviewing the published literature, it will be seen the systematic nature of command and control in warfare represents one of the least studied of subjects in early modern military history, not least in the War of the Spanish Succession. The conflict occurred in that era Martin van Creveld provocatively dubbed the ‘Stone Age of Command’ in his *Command in War* (Harvard, 1987). Certainly the armies of the *grand siècle* lacked the operational flexibility and systemised organisations of later divisional and corps-level
formations; military cartography was somewhat ordinary; and staff work did not adopt the formalised and dauntingly impressive-sounding bureaucracies of later eras. Admittedly it also remained an era of often personal, immediate direction, exercised by officers whose talents and conceptions of duty varied considerably; but this did not presuppose inefficiency in control and leadership, or indeed the lack of any apparatus of organisation aiding a commander like the Duke of Marlborough and his contemporaries.

Throughout the War of the Spanish Succession, Marlborough was supported by various individuals, in both public and private service, in the management of the conflict. In a military context, two particular groups are apparent. The first is the generality of the British and Allied armies, those subordinate officers of general rank that served under the aegis of the commander-in-chief, ready to accept duties and responsibilities on the campaign as dictated. These individuals—the 'full' generals of infantry and cavalry, the lieutenants- and majors-general, and the brigadiers—were often deputed with considerable authority and played a major part in the prosecution of the conflict. Their duties frequently transcended the boundaries of what a modern audience might perceive to be such commanders' due spheres of control and interest, yet their agency and their relationship with their commander in the field is rarely discussed.

The second group comprises the staff officers of the army, a diverse organisation of individuals, their deputies and aides-de-camp, often under a general's immanent oversight but not infrequently beyond it, responsible for actioning the daily sustenance, maintenance and operation of the army on campaign or in winter quarters. The British staff officers included such figures as William Cadogan, quartermaster-general and envoy; Adam Cardonnel, Marlborough's personal and military secretary; Thomas Meredyth, Henry Durrell and Metcalfe Graham, adjutants-general; such engineers and logisticians as John Armstrong and Richard King; and a variety of brigade-majors and aides-de-camp. Their acts, and relationships with both their commander-in-chief and their peers, subsumed friendship, rivalry, prejudice, politics and patronage as well as service, and provide a fertile source for any social, political
and/or military historian who wishes to take a more pluralistic approach to Britain's army in the war.

Such individuals provided but the British contingent relative to control of a war that was an allied enterprise, not least in the campaigns in the Low Countries and Germany. The Duke of Marlborough controlled both a discrete British force within the context of a larger confederate force, with its own internal command apparatus; and this greater force itself, consisting also of Dutch soldiers and a variety of other allied and auxiliary forces in their own, English, Dutch or joint Anglo-Dutch pay. The direction of the field army as a whole thus further drew upon the talents and services of a variety of individuals from the States-General and the Raad van State of both Brussels and The Hague, the *gedeputeerden te velde* or 'field deputies' representing same, and the general and supporting officers of the Dutch and Imperial forces.

This thesis seeks to provide a more developed and critical analysis of the agency of these individuals and offices in the management of war in the Low Countries and Germany in this period. Because of the breadth of the topic, and the sheer wealth of the sources available, it has been necessary to limit its *primary* line of inquiry to the study of the British general and *staff officers* serving in the Low Countries — albeit with full reference to their activities within the context of a confederate force. Whilst this is lamentable, given the preponderance of studies on British military topics, analyses of the detailed apparatus of army control on campaign are very rare. Hopefully it is but a first step towards an integration of its findings with further research on the Dutch, Imperial and auxiliary forces.

The thesis will attempt through its investigations to contribute to the understanding of the military, political, social and economic history of the British army within the wider European context; and to provide a more ecumenical approach to the study of Marlborough's *provincia*. The thesis shall examine the hierarchy and mechanisms of command and control in the army, including the organisation of logistics, discipline and military justice on campaign and in winter quarters; the collection, collation and transfer of information; and the active planning of operations in the field, in response to a variety of factors, domestic, foreign and local. It shall investigate the degree to which all actors, from commander-in-chief to subordinate officers, were active in the
decision-making processes of the campaign, and the extent to which their actions proceeded from the direction of others, and/or from personal or group initiative. I shall also pay particular attention to the nature of the personal, professional and political relationships of the parties involved, the degree to which their roles conflicted and complemented each other, and the interaction of the public and the private spheres in the apparatus of army command and administration.

The thesis is split into eight chapters. Beyond this introduction and survey of the historiography, Chapter II provides an overview of the nature and organisation of the general and staff officers of the British army, their major roles and functions, together with a full list of all (known) individuals who served in such posts, from aides-de-camp and majors of brigade to the general officers themselves. Chapter III discusses the life and paradigm of the early officer, on campaign and otherwise, with regard to the individuals and their thoughts, experiences and relationships during operations. Chapter IV considers the conflicts between public and private enterprise that occurred within the army, and the degree to which individuals enriched themselves—or found penury—through their own and other’s conduct.

Chapter V highlights the importance of communication and the gathering of intelligence in the function of the army on campaign, including the nature and role of posts and packets, the interception of such, and the organisation of human intelligence. Chapter VI analyses the part general and staff officers played in the decision-making process during the campaign, and the degree to which military and political authority was centralised or delegated. Chapter VII discusses the role of general and staff officers in the day-to-day management of the army, be it on the march, in camp or in garrison. Chapter VIII looks at the systems of command utilised in the preparations for and conduct of the sieges and battles of the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries and Germany.

The thesis draws upon a variety of source material, but three particular sources bear highlighting. The first is Chandos Papers, held at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California. The papers of paymaster James Brydges, later duke of Chandos, they provide an invaluable perspective on the financial supply (and misdemeanours) of the army under Marlborough. The second is the Blenheim Papers, now held (in the
main) at the British Library. No study of the British army in the War of the Spanish Succession has used these to any significant degree and they offer a wealth of information on all aspects of British military practice in the period. The third is perhaps the most interesting. These are the papers of Richard King, held in the Royal Collection at Windsor Castle. Beyond a whimsical overview in Sir John Fortescue’s *Historical and Military Essays* (London, 1928)—Sir John discovered the mislabelled papers during his tenure as Royal Librarian—they do not appear to have been studied by any other historian. These papers were uncatalogued; I have endeavoured to provide a summary and a provisional catalogue in the Appendix.
The apparatus of command: General and staff officers, c. 1700

The *general officers* of the early modern English army were exactly that: officers with a general responsibility, as opposed to a specific local authority provided by a regimental commission. They existed as a loose umbrella of command over and above the fundamental building blocks of the army—its still heavily proprietorialised permanent and semi-permanent regiments—beyond which there was no persistent organisational structure. Regimental and general rank were not mutually exclusive; many (indeed, most) general officers were substantive colonels in their own right, possessing a regiment and overseeing it as their fief.

Though a general officer demanded respect and deference (not to mention a considerable level of financial remuneration) according to his rank and seniority, it would be misleading to suggest that such simply provided a *de facto* level of authority over those of lesser rank. Their commissions specified no particular aspect of command, other than a branch of military service: Horse, Dragoons or Foot. They were officers to whom a commander-in-chief (see below) ‘deputed his own powers in a subordinate degree and within certain local limits’.¹⁰ Rank alone perhaps best represented *potential* authority—with all its power and portent—rather than absolute authority; more *dignitas* than *auctoritas*. The actual authority of a general officer was a product of both his rank and the charge bestowed upon him by a superior.

This is perhaps best illustrated by a supreme example of a general officer in Queen Anne’s army, the *Captain-General*. John Churchill, the (then) Earl of Marlborough’s commission as captain-general was heavy on style but lighter on substance. As captain-general, Marlborough was to command, regulate and keep discipline in Her Majesty’s

Land Forces; and to enjoy the office’s “Powers, Authoritys, Rights, Priviledges, Prehemincies, Perquisits, Profits, Allowances, Advantages, and Emoluments...” Much alliteration, but less transparent meaning. Indeed, Queen Anne even gave the attorney or solicitor-general free rein to insert into this commission “all such apt and proper Clauses as [he should] think fit and necessary for this purpose...” 11 Its opaque pageantry rivalled the post of Generalissimo, Marlborough’s notional superior in the army, held by Prince George of Denmark. By Marlborough’s time the post of captain-general had lost many of the powers it had possessed in the immediate aftermath of the Restoration, when held by George Monck: it had no power, for example, to raise forces or exert control over money and stores.12

Much of Marlborough’s functional authority in the army in the Low Countries stemmed from his warrant to act as Commander-in-Chief, together with his post as Master-General of the Ordnance (which gave considerable powers with regard to the officers, equipment and supply of the train of artillery, as well as the arms and ammunition of the army itself). It was as commander-in-chief that Marlborough held the specific authority to command all English forces in the theatre; to prepare and publish rules and ordinances for the command of the army; to regulate and administer justice within it; to appoint subsidiary posts (such as a provost marshal) and brevets to its better function – to in all ways act as his sovereign’s designated prime military plenipotentiary in the Low Countries.13

His senior subordinates were the Generals of Horse and Generals of Foot (typically referred to as generals of the infantry and the cavalry in foreign armies). Only four individuals held the rank of ‘full general’ during Marlborough’s command in the Low

11 National Archives (NA), State Papers (SP) 44/168 pp. 380-381. Order to prepare a bill to Marlborough as captain-general. Anne and Vernon. St James, 10 March 1702 N.S. For the actual bill, see War Office Papers (WO) 25/3207, 14 March 1702 N.S.
12 Raibeart E. Scouller, The Army of Queen Anne (Oxford, 1966), pp. 54-58. [Hereafter, ‘Scouller’.] Charles Clode had argued that the captain-general commanded-in-chief over all forces when the sovereign—the supreme commander of the army, from whom all officers held their commissions and, ultimately, authority—was absent. Scouller was more cautious, particularly on the relationship between a captain-general and commander-in-chief. Charles M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown (London, 1869), vol. ii., pp. 256-257, 690, 694-695.
Countries; and for much of the war in that theatre—the campaigns of 1702, most of 1703, 1708, 1709 and 1710—no English or British officer served in such a post.14 The generals of the Foot and Horse were the paternal overseers of their branch of the service; when other general officers made dispositions for elements of the army, they would typically do so with reference to the general(s) of Foot and Horse concerned. On the march, a general of Foot might lead the infantry of a corps 15; in an order of battle they would be given oversight of a considerable body of soldiers relative to their competence, such as the infantry of a line of the army (in whole or in part), or a wing or more of cavalry. Scouller suggests that the generals of Foot and Horse were 'normally lieutenant-generals in rank', but this author has found no evidence of a concurrent toponomy. The rank of general of Foot or Horse exceeded the rank of lieutenant-general in all aspects (including pay and post on the establishment, forage allowance, the number of guards and aides-de-camp allowed and the salutes received in camp) rather than existing as a parallel distinction.16

Beneath the generals of the army were the Lieutenants-General and Majors-General. Each functioned much like his namesake in a company, troop or battalion, exercising similar duties but with regard to the army as a whole. The lieutenant-general in his original form functioned as a lieutenant, legate or second in command to the general-in-chief of an army. He was the first point of delegation, be it on the march, in camp or on the battlefield; ready to perform any subsidiary role or duty ordered. As the formulation of general officers evolved, the rank's pre-eminence diminished and its population grew—but incumbents still performed the same basic duties in the army. They commanded

14 One of these was Marlborough himself, who was promoted General of Foot in 1701. The others were General of Foot Charles Churchill (1656-1714), General of Foot George Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (c. 1666-1737) and General of Horse Henry Lumley (c. 1658-1722).
15 E.g. British Library (BL), Stowe MSS 481, ff. 7b-9: Michael Richards' diary, 19 to 30 June 1705 N.S.
16 Scouller, pp. 52-53. The unqualified title general developed as an abbreviation of rank of colonel-general. As a contemporary source noted: "Sometimes there are Colonels-General of Horse, Foot and Dragoons, whose Authority extends over each of these Bodies." A Military Dictionary Explaining All Difficult Terms in Martial Discipline, Fortification and Gunnery (Third Edition, London, 1708). Though there was no General of Dragoons in the army, Charles Ross was promoted Colonel-General of Dragoons in 1711. This rank lacked the authority and remuneration of a general of Horse or Dragoons, but held a similar position of pre-eminence within its branch of service.
detachments and oversaw sections of its order of battle as required by the general-in-chief.  

Similarly, majors-general reflected the duties of the battalion major or sergeant-major. A major provided the ‘medium of communication from commander to unit’, receiving and distributing orders, and overseeing its dispositions, drill and exercise. Of the field officers, he possessed the greatest tactical responsibility; his was a more technical, functional role than that of the lieutenant-colonel or colonel, whose leadership was typically moral (or proprietorial). This distinction to some degree persisted into the ranks of general officers, as shall be discussed later in the thesis. Majors-general would be assigned commands as necessary, typically falling under the aegis of a lieutenant-general if the overall command was large enough.

Outside of the army itself, with its lines and wings, the brigade was the only supra-regimental, tactical body that might approach a degree of semi-permanency on campaign. Composed of a variable number of battalions of Foot, or of squadrons of Horse or Dragoons, brigades were not permanent military institutions; but neither were they wholly ephemeral. A brigade could gain a semblance of identity and continuity over a campaign if it experienced few changes in its roster. It was commanded by a Brigadier or Brigadier-General. A distinction was occasionally made between the brigadier and the other general officers. Whilst a brigadier might be termed a general officer in various establishments and sources, in others he would be set apart, with a major-general being the lowest ranked specimen of general officer.

In Marlborough’s army, the lieutenants-general, majors-general and brigadiers were associated with a particular branch of the service—Horse, Foot or Dragoons—rather

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17 Scouller, p. 61. The first lieutenants-general in the standing army appeared in 1679, when James II created three lieutenants-general “over all our Forces, as well Horse as Foot”; but the rank had been used in Ireland (1662, 1674) and the Low Countries (1673). Walton, p. 618.


19 This distinction should be treated with caution, as it was far from pervasive and usage could be inconsistent at best. In some cases, both forms could occur in the same document. (See, for example BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b and KP I(i)/64: order for the limitation of baggage. 7 July 1708 N.S.) The Board of General Officers, which originally comprised all officers above field rank, was later split into a superior board (composed of majors-general and above) and an inferior board (composed of brigadiers). See Chapter VI.
than 'of the Army' (though this was not always apparent in the nomenclature). While a senior general officer leading a detachment on campaign, on the march or in garrison might command a mixed force of infantry and cavalry, his authority in the army as a whole was typically limited to his arm. Table A.1 (p. 261) lists the general officers that served on the establishment of the forces the Low Countries under Marlborough.

Assisting the commander-in-chief and the general officers were the staff officers of the army (Table A.2; p. 272). Although the commander of an early modern army took a much greater, personal role in the direction and regulation of the campaign than his descendents did, these staff officers played an important role: "good, unobtrusive administrative staff work was one of Marlborough's outstanding successes." The two principal staff officers in the army were the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General. Both posts drew a pay-allowance of 10s. per day and were accompanied by a brevet of colonel of Horse or Foot for the incumbent, if he did not hold that rank already – though this did not preclude an individual rising to the rank of general officer while still exercising the staff post.

The adjutant-general is the least well documented of the two. In one paper on the Duke of Marlborough's field-administration, the adjutant-general receives two sentences. In essence, the adjutant-general acted for his general-in-chief in much the same way that a battalion adjutant acted for a field officer, "relieving him of the more laborious details of his duties and forming the medium of communication with the troops on any matter of discipline generally or of tactical movements. After Thomas Meredyth left the post in 1704, the adjutant-general was always one of Marlborough's aides-de-camp.

20 Scouller, p. 54.
22 Raibeart E. Scouller, 'Marlborough's administration in the field', Army Quarterly, 95 (1968), 197-208; 96 (1968), 102-113.
23 Walton, p. 623. The post was first added to the standing army in 1673. One served with Marlborough throughout the duke's campaigns. Meredyth's successors, Henry Durell and Metcalfe Graham, were both aides-de-camp to the duke prior to, and during, their period of office as adjutant-general. The post in this period was notably different to its namesake of the later 18th century. Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 155-6.
The quartermaster-general was the principal operational staff officer of the army. His duties were considerable and a discussion of the nature and extent of his role in the army forms much of the basis of Chapter VII. It shall suffice here to say that the quartermaster-general was responsible, in whole or in part, for routing, supplying and quartering the troops engaged on the campaign or in winter quarters (often directing such activities in person) and providing the necessary reconnaissance and intelligence pursuant to the execution of such. He was aided in his duties by a Deputy Quartermaster-General (also termed Assistant Quartermaster-General or Lieutenant Quartermaster-General), who drew 5s. a day in pay.

The office of quartermaster-general throughout Marlborough’s campaigns in the Low Countries was held by William Cadogan, an officer often mentioned in the same breath as Adam de Cardonnel, personal and military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief. Cardonnel was the principal personal and administrative aide to the duke in the Low Countries; an incredible volume of correspondence—public and private—and intelligence on political, diplomatic, economic and military matters passed through his hands. Though Cardonnel did not take any role in directing the strategic or operational affairs of the army, Marlborough’s orders and warrants were usually written and issued by his secretary, in the commander-in-chief’s name. The secretary drew 10s. per day as pay upon the establishment, but received numerous further payments on account of the commissions and contracts he counter-signed for Marlborough.

Confusingly, Henry Watkins, who served as Judge-Advocate or Deputy Judge-Advocate in the Low Countries was also often referred to as ‘secretary to the commander-in-chief’, or even ‘secretary at war to Her Majesty’s forces in the Low Countries’. He certainly served as the duke’s Latin secretary and fulfilled a variety of administrative roles from his office at the Hague; but as deputy judge-advocate he acted as Marlborough’s legal counsel, with powers to regulate the general courts-martial of the army according to

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24 For a useful discussion on the antecedents of the quartermaster-general and his duties (such as its relation to the earlier offices of scoutmaster-general and harbinger, see Walton, pp. 621-627.
25 Scouller, p. 67. Cardonnel had been Chief Clerk at the War Office and served has secretary to Marlborough in the Nine Years War; but when the (then) earl went to the Low Countries in 1701, he was accompanied by Richard Warre. Cardonnel soon replaced him. Dictionary of National Biography [hereafter D.N.B.], Henry Snyder (ed.), The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, (Oxford, 1975), vol. i, pp. xxx, 56 n. 2. [Hereafter ‘Snyder’.]
the Mutiny Acts and the Articles of War, attending the meetings himself when possible. Watkins' pay as deputy judge-advocate was 10s. daily; his expenses as Marlborough's secretary at the Hague were considerably greater. Watkins was often allowed leave over the winter and appointed a deputy in his place.26

The Provost Marshal joined the deputy judge-advocate in overseeing the discipline of the army. It was his duty to police both the camp and its environs, and the line of the army on the march, apprehending all manner of deserters, plunderers and other transgressors, which he would place in his custody - ready to be brought before the general courts-martial of the army, of which he would announce and manage the logistics. The provost marshal was paid 12s. a day for himself and "his two men", but received considerable fees from the sutlers and traders that accompanied the army, on account of his regulating their practices in the camp.

Other officers included the Wagonmaster-General, who ruled over the baggage of the army as his personal fief—none were to question his regulation on the line of march; those that did were liable to be severely punished and any errant wagons plundered on the spot—and the Deputy Paymasters of the army in the Low Countries. Subordinate to the Paymaster-General and Paymaster to the Forces Abroad, in England, these individuals formed the continental end of the financial chain that stretched across the North Sea to London. By virtue of public and private credit they provided the army with its pay and other extraordinary sums as needed. There had originally been one deputy paymaster in the Low Countries - Benjamin Sweet, at Amsterdam; but in 1706 he was joined by a colleague, Henry Cartwright, who operated from Antwerp. The regulation of these two individuals was never entirely clear and at times considerable level discord existed between Sweet and Cartwright. Both initially received an allowance of 12s.6d. a day, with expenses claimed on account - though this was later increased to £3 p.d. in pay, with a further 20s. daily in expenses. In addition, each was liable to receive a variable percentage on the monies they paid out to the regiments.28

26 BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 135: order allowing six months' leave for Watkins. 4 November 1706 N.S. See also ibid., ff. 206b: order dated at the Hague, 11 November 1707 N.S.
27 The wagonmaster-general received 7s.6d. daily for himself and his assistant.
28 For further discussion of the financial agencies and misdemeanours of the paymasters and their accomplices in the Low Countries, see Chapter IV.
Two sets of junior staff officers completed the military-administrative establishment of the army in the Low Countries. The first grouping was of the Majors of Brigade, or Brigade-Majors. These individuals were regimental officers who were seconded, typically upon the petition of a general officer, to serve in the sole staff posting that attended each brigade. They acted as the link between the officer commanding the brigade (typically a brigadier) and the battalions or squadrons that comprised it; in essence, they served as the brigadier's aide-de-camp, albeit with a more defined role (given the semi-permanent nature of the brigade, relative to any temporary command issued to a lieutenant- or major-general). 29

Brigades-major were linked to individual brigadiers or brigades for the course of a campaign, and thus an arm of service, which reflected their own military experience and regimental history. Their remuneration varied. In 1702, each received £91.10s. for their service on the campaign (i.e. 5s. each p.d. over the calendar year); for the period 1703 to 1706 they were paid £100 each (10s. p.d. for 200 days); from 1707 they drew the typical staff officer's pay upon the establishment – 10s. a day over the calendar year. A list of those that served in the Low Countries under Marlborough appears in Table A.3 (p. 275). 30

Aides-de-Camp were the perquisite of all general officers of the rank of major-general and above, typically chosen "on account of family connexion or personal friendship" as opposed to any conspicuous statement of military merit. 31 These officers served as aides and liaisons in all matters, both military and private. Though a general was allowed a certain number of aides-de-camp on the establishment, a senior officer—especially the commander-in-chief—might be accompanied by any number of unofficial aides (particularly volunteers that were 'people of quality') that had no place on the establishment, but still possessed the aide-de-camp's dignity on account of their

29 Walton, p. 627; Scouller, p. 66.
30 BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 110b-111; Add. MSS 61370, ff. 70b, 179b; Add. MSS 61371, ff. 45, 129b-130.
31 Walton, p. 628. There were exceptions: In the early years of the war, before he was promoted to the rank of general officer on the establishment, Cadogan possessed at least one adjutant as quartermaster-general. BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 83b: warrant to pay Cadogan £82.5s. from Contingencies, to make up the pay of his staff officers on the Establishment of Ireland to that of the Establishment of Her Majesty's said forces in the Low Countries, with an allowance for an adjutant to 25 December 1704.
commander's patronage. Furthermore, any officer that was tasked with a particular
duty on the behalf of the commander-in-chief might be referred to as an aide-de-camp,
as occurred with Colonel Michael Richards in 1705.\textsuperscript{32}

Known aides-de-camp to the general officers are listed in Table A.4 (p. 280). An aide-
de-camp filling a post allowed on the establishment typically received 10s. per day or a
fixed sum for their 'service during the campaign'. Later in the war, the numbers of
aides allowed the general officers were as follows: commander-in-chief, 6; generals of
Foot or Horse, 3; lieutenants-general, 2; and majors-general, 1. Until 1707, however,
there was considerable variation. Promotions frequently outpaced the establishments
allowed by Parliament; as a general might not always receive pay according to his
rank, he was also not assured of receiving a proportionable number aides-de-camp.

In 1702 Marlborough, as commander-in-chief, received the full allowance of 10s. p.d.
for two aides-de-camp (James Bringfield and Henry Durell) and partial sums for four
more. This fell to three in 1703, before rising to four in 1704 and 1705 (two at 10s. per
day for 365 days and two at £100 "for the like service during the campaign"). From
1707 onwards, Marlborough was allowed six aides-de-camp, each drawing 10s. a day
for the calendar year, amounting to £1098 in total. The numbers allowed his generals
varied. Prior to 1707, each aide-de-camp was paid 10s. a day for 200 days a year. In
1702, Marlborough's brother, Charles, had two aides-de-camp as a lieutenant-general;
Majors-General Cutts, Lumley, Orkney and Ingoldsby possessed one each. Yet in 1703,
though Churchill retained two, his fellow lieutenants-general Cutts and Lumley,
received pay for one each. For 1704, General of Foot Churchill and Lieutenants-General
Cutts and Lumley were allowed two each; Lieutenant-General Ingoldsby one; and
Majors-General Withers and Wood shared the pay of a single aide-de-camp on the
establishment between them. There was no mention of the Earl of Orkney's aide(s)-de-
camp at all. By 1707 there was a degree of regularity, with the officers serving being
allowed a number of aides on the establishment according to their actual rank.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32} Murray, ii, p. 184: Marlborough to the Bishop of Raab, camp at Vlierbeck, 21 July 1705 N.S.
\textsuperscript{33} BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 111, 114b.; Add. MSS 61370, ff. 69b, 74b-75, 87-87b, 176b, 177; Add.
MSS 61371, ff. 50-51b, 52, 129-129b, 130-130b, 207b, 208-208b; Add. MSS 61372, ff. 95b-96, 107b-108, 146b, 148, 150, 256-257b; Add. MSS 61373, ff. 43, 52b. The bill for aides-de-camp of one
general of Foot, three lieutenants-general and five majors-general in 1707 came to £2555.
Over the course of the war, the numbers of general and staff officers serving in the Low Countries swelled considerably. The initial establishment, prior to the onset of operations in 1702, was that agreed with the States-General for the command of the twelve regiments of English Foot raised for their service. This body consisted of a lieutenant-general (at £4 p.d.), two majors-general (£2 p.d. each), two brigadiers (30s. p.d. each), a quartermaster-general (10s. p.d.), deputy quartermaster-general (5s. p.d.), four aides-de-camp (10s. p.d. each), two majors of brigade (ditto), a secretary to the lieutenant-general (ditto), a provost marshal (5s. p.d.) and four men (2s.6d. p.d. each), and a wagonmaster (3s. p.d.). This establishment amounted to £6469.12s.6d. yearly.\(^{34}\)

Marlborough's initial warrant to authorise pay to the general officers for their service in the year 1702 followed this basic establishment (himself as commander-in-chief excepted), though an additional warrant provided for the promotion of two brigadiers to majors-general for six months of the campaign, and four brigadiers were forced to share the pay of one brigadier as listed on the establishment.\(^{35}\)

In 1702, the total allowed to the general and staff officers of the English proportion of the 40,000 men—Marlborough as commander-in-chief included (£3650 p.a.)—amounted to £10,000.\(^{36}\) By way of comparison, the establishment of Danish general and staff officers in the service of England and the States-General ran as follows: two lieutenants-general (fl. 500 each p.m.), two majors-general (fl. 250 each p.m.), four adjutants-general (fl. 166:13.25 each p.m.), a 'first auditor' (fl. 75 p.m.), a secretary (fl. 25 p.m.), provost marshal-general (fl. 60 p.m.) and two men (fl. 16 each p.m.), three 'officers of justice' (fl. 16 each p.m.), an executioner (fl. 32 p.m.) and two men (fl. 16 each p.m.). This body oversaw a force of 12,520 soldiers; the staff's total pay amounted

\(^{34}\) BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 63-64b, 65-66b, 67-72b: estimates for the charge to the States-General for the twelve regiments of Foot raised for their service, according to a treaty of 3 March 1677. 12 May 1701 (O.S.? ). Under this scheme, the lieutenant-general was the commander-in-chief of the English forces.

\(^{35}\) BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 109-109b: warrant for pay to general officers, 30 December 1701 to 25 December 1702 (O.S.). The warrant listed a lieutenant-general (Churchill), two majors-general (Cutts and Lumley) and four brigadiers (Orkney, Ingoldsby, Wyndham; brigadiers Wood, Stanley and Hamilton shared the pay of the 'remaining' brigadier listed on the establishment). This establishment amounted £6254.12s.6d. The warrant to make up Orkney's and Ingoldsby's pay from brigadiers to majors-general for six months of the campaign appears at Ibid, f. 112. The money needed was taken from the remainder of the £10,000 apportioned to the general and staff officers that was unused, as also from the Contingencies.

\(^{36}\) BL, Add. MSS 61317, f. 107. 24 January 1702 O.S.
to fl. 2639:18 per month (or fl. 3695:17 per six weeks, which was the typical period of account for the foreign troops in English pay). 37

In 1704, the number of general officers allowed on the establishment of the 40,000 men was as follows: a commander-in-chief (£10 p. d.), a general of the Foot (£6 p. d.), three lieutenants-general (two of Foot, one of Horse), two majors-general (both of Foot) and five brigadiers (three for the Foot, two for the Horse and Dragoons). Including other staff officers, the total bill amounted to £44.13s.5d. daily, or £16302.10s.10d. for the year. 38 By 1707, it had grown further — the estimates for the establishment of general and staff officers had risen to £19040.10d. 39

The dichotomy between the number and rank of officers serving in the field, and those allowed by Parliament on the establishment for the Low Countries, was particularly marked in 1709. Of the nine lieutenants-general serving in the army, only three—Lumley, Orkney and Withers—were supported upon the establishment in that rank, receiving the full £1460 p. a. each. Five further lieutenants-general—Wood, Ross, Argyll, Webb and Meredyth—were actually paid as majors-general (£730 p. a.) upon the establishment, with the balance (another £730) to be paid from funds drawn from beyond the establishment. The remaining lieutenant-general, Cadogan, was paid as a brigadier (£547.10s.) on the establishment, requiring a further £882.10s. to be found from other sources. This imbalance produced a knock-on effect among the other general officers. The army’s majors-general—Temple, Stair, North and Grey and Wynne—were paid as brigadiers on the establishment; as was Brigadier Kellum. The other brigadiers—Primrose, Sabine, Lalo, Evans and Orrery—had, in effect, no place on the establishment.

37 BL, Add. MSS 61317, f. 153: Establishment of Danes in Her Majesty’s service. 25 December 1702 (O.S.?). As another comparison, the establishment of the general and staff officers of the Prussians and Hessians of the 40,000 men, already provided for in Holland, came to £6363.12s.6d. (Ibid, f. 113).

38 BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 169-170b: establishment of the General and Staff Officers and Contingencies &c. on the Establishment of the 40,000, 1704. The other staff officers comprised: an adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, secretary to the commander-in-chief and deputy judge-advocate, physician to the commander-in-chief and chirurgeon likewise (all at 10s. p. d.); a deputy quartermaster-general (5s. p. d.), deputy paymaster (12s. 6d. p. d.), chaplain to the commander-in-chief (6s. 8d. p. d.), wagonmaster-general and his assistant (7s. 1s. 5d. p. d.), and a provost marshal and his two men (3s. p. d.). In a scrawled memorandum, Cardonnel noted the branches of service of each of the general officers, according to the estimates laid before the House of Commons (Ibid, f. 171).

39 BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 125-126b: estimate for the 40,000 men for 1707.
establishment whatsoever! Kellum excepted, these officers required significant
amounts of money, beyond the totals voted by Parliament, to balance their pay.40

The establishment for 1711 allowed for the commander-in-chief (with six aides-de-
camp), a general of Foot (with three aides-de-camp), nine lieutenants-general (with two
aides-de-camp each), five majors-general (with an aide-de-camp each), eight brigadiers
and eight majors of brigade. These posts, together with those of the other staff officers
(quartermaster-general, adjutant-general, etc.), amounted to a charge of £36195.10d.
Perhaps surprisingly, the charge resulting from the computation of the officers that
actually served in the Low Countries and France in 1711 undershot this establishment
by £1839. Although Lumley and Orkney were both promoted to the rank of general
early in 1711, and drew pay accordingly, the shortfall in serving lieutenants-general
and brigadiers, relative to those allowed on the establishment, suggested money to
spare. But there was a catch. A further £7847.10s. was owed various officers notionally
attached to the army in the Low Countries, but doing no service in the field
whatsoever. These were Charles Churchill (£2737.10s. as a general of Foot, with three
aides-de-camp), John Richmond Webb and Francis Palmes (£1825 each as a lieutenant-
general with two aides-de-camp), the Earl of Orrery (£912.10s. as a major-general with
an aide-de-camp) and Frederick Hamilton (£547.10s. as a brigadier).41

40 BL, Add. MSS 61317, f. 174: computation of the sums paid and to be paid to the General
Officers and other serving in the Low Countries, 1709. This issue also affected the lesser staff
officers that attended the army in relative proportion to the general officers: the aides-de-camp
and majors of brigade. Of the eight majors of brigade employed in the Low Countries in 1709,
six—Cathcart, Tétetolle, Whitney, Congreve, Hamilton and Ligonier—were catered for
according to the establishment; two—Wolfe and Looker—were to be paid the pay of one
brigade-major between them, and that drawn from beyond the establishment. Here the aides-
de-camp and majors of brigade are highlighted as being paid upon the establishment;
elsewhere, they appear under head of the £10,000 Contingencies (e.g. BL, Add. MSS 61369,
f.114b; Add. MSS 61370, ff. 69b, 176b, 177; Add. MSS 61371, ff. 50-51b, 129-129b—mention of
Contingencies appears to cease in 1707).
Lieutenants-General Lumley, Orkney and Withers received their two aides-de-camp’s pay on
the establishment; Wood, Ross, Argyll, Webb and Meredyth received pay for one aide-de-camp
according to the establishment (i.e. as majors-general), with pay for the other to be drawn from
elsewhere. Both Cadogan’s aides-de-camp were paid beyond the establishment. As Majors-
General Temple, Stair, North and Grey and Wynne received pay as but brigadiers upon the
establishment, their aides-de-camp had to be paid from elsewhere. Marlborough and Churchill,
and their aides-de-camp, were properly accounted for on the establishment.
41 BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b: State of the Pay of the General Officers in the Low Countrys
for the year 1711 (send to Mr Lowdes from the audit in September 1711). Withers, Wood, Ross,
Cadogan, Stair, Temple and North and Grey were listed as serving as lieutenants-general;
This expansion in the English army was mirrored among the Allies as a whole. In an order of battle for the Allied army at the camp at Soignies, on 21 August 1707, the first line (26 brigades of Foot, Horse and Dragoons – only one of which did not have a brigadier listed) was overseen by a three generals (Tilly, Orange and Churchill), a dozen lieutenants-general and seventeen majors-general. The second line (22 brigades, each possessing a brigadier) possessed one general (Lottum), nine lieutenants-general and thirteen majors-general. The whole was commanded by Marlborough, with Ouwerkerk as his immediate lieutenant.42

But by the latter stages of the war, it was not uncommon to find a near parity between the divisions of general officers. At Willemeau, on 2 July 1709, the British contingent with the Allied army consisted of but two brigades of Foot (comprising ten battalions; there were a further two from the Guards) and two of Horse (numbering thirteen squadrons) – out of a total strength of 65 battalions and 127 squadrons. Yet this fairly small corps was overseen by two lieutenants-general of Horse or Dragoons (Lumley and Ross), three lieutenants-general of Foot (Orkney, Webb and Meredyth), one major-general of Horse (Stair), one major-general of Foot (North and Grey), and three brigadiers (Sibourg of the Dragoons, and Evans and Lalo of the Foot)!43

Indeed, as of 9 July 1709 there were with Marlborough in the Low Countries four generals of cavalry (Tilly, the Hereditary Prince of Hesse, Albermarle and Bülow), four

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42 KP I(i)/52. Order of battle of the Allied army at the camp at Soignies, 21 August 1707 N.S. The British forces were placed on the extreme right of the first line. The British contingent provided five brigadiers, five majors-general, three lieutenants-general and one general of Foot. Running from the right to the centre, the brigades were commanded as follows: the Earl of Stair (4 Sqns of British and Irish dragoons); Palmes (11 Sqns of British Horse); then four battalions of Foot, with no brigadier annotated; Fenk (18 Sqns of German Horse); Chancel (4 Sqns of Horse); Mattha (6 Sqns of [Dutch?] Horse); Meredith (4 Bns of Foot); Temple (5 Bns of Foot); and North and Grey (5 Bns of Foot). The British and auxiliary Horse of the right wing of the first line lay under Lieutenants-General Count van der Nath, Bülow and Lumley, and Majors-General Wood, Ross and Schuleburg; the Foot under Lieutenants-General Ingoldsby and Orkney, and Majors-General Argyll, Webb and Withers.

43 KP I(i)/124. Order of battle of the Allied army at the camp at Willemeau, 2 July 1709 N.S. See also KP I(i)/127 for two copies.
generals of infantry (Lottum, Orange and Fagel), thirty-five lieutenants-general (eighteen of cavalry, seventeen of infantry), thirty-seven majors-general (twenty-one of cavalry, sixteen of cavalry) and thirty-eight brigadiers (sixteen of cavalry, twenty-two of infantry). An actual order of battle at the camp at Flines, dated 25 April 1710, listed twenty-nine lieutenants-general, thirty-two majors-general and thirty-three brigadiers.

44 Murray, iv, p. 538: Marlborough to Villars, camp before Tournai, 9 July 1709 N.S.
45 KP I(i)/186. Order of battle of the Allied army at the camp at Flines, 25 April 1710 N.S. Marlborough commanded the whole, with Tilly as his lieutenant. The first line was overseen by the Hereditary Prince of Hesse (Horse), the Prince of Orange (Foot) and Baron Bülow (Horse); the second by the Earl of Albermarle (Horse), Fagel (Foot) and Anhalt-Dessau (Foot).
III

The paradigm of the early modern officer:
Life, career and duty

What a young Officer is to do when he comes into the Army.

When a Man has never been in an Army, when he comes into the Camp, he is in an Amazement, he hears a Language spoken, which till then was unknown to him and to which before he is accustomed, he must be some time in the Camp. The Guard of the Camp: the Piquet: The Guard of the Colours: The Orderly Guard: The Generals Guard: The Main Guard: The Ordinary Guard: And the Bivac, are new words to him...46

The young officer was not helped by the proprietorial system in place in the army, which meant that common practice could vary considerably from regiment to regiment. In the winter of 1706/7, Ingoldsby had been exercising the battalion adjutants and non-commissioned officers in their duties. They were mightily pleased, he said, that Marlborough had thought fit to have all battalions regiment their evolutions and exercise in the same manner, for there had been little uniformity; there were even considerable differences in equipment: Argyll's regiment of Foot did not possess and pouches or slings for their ammunition, but carried a little cartouche box, which would not contain half the ammunition necessary for a day of action. Ingoldsby wrote that it was impossible to describe the disorder the battalions were in, for

... not two Regamts Exercising a lik, nor anney one companney off Granadrs eable to Exercis with the Battalyone so that iff your Ldship had a mind to see the Line Exercise, all the Granadrs off the armey must have stood still, and not [two] Regamts eable to perfforum a like...47

If the freshly commissioned cornet or ensign was faced with a bewildering complexity of regulations and geometrical evolutions—for which the armies of the time possessed

46 The Perfection of Military Discipline After the Newest Method; As Practiced In England and Ireland, &c. Or, The Industrious Souldier's Golden Treasury of Knowledge in the Art of making War (London, 1702), pp. 143-144.
47 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 44-47b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 31 December 1706 N.S.
a particular fancy, in battle, camp and siege—for his own company or troop, then a
staff officer like Richard King or John Armstrong (whose portfolios of responsibilities
variably included company command, aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief,
engineer and officer of the artillery train, and assistant to the quartermaster-general)
may have been particularly taxed. (Yet in 1706, Holcroft Blood, the senior engineer in
English service and commander of the artillery train, humbly begged to be grated the
command of a brigade for the following campaign, blithely asserting that the artillery
really took up very little of his time!48)

In the Spring of 1704, King was appointed as an engineer to attend the artillery train in
Holland, under the command of Holcroft Blood. His direction, from the principal
officers of the Board of Ordnance, highlighted the duties expected in such a post. By a
letter accompanying the instructions, dated 4 April 1704 O.S., King was to leave
forthwith for Holland,

... and on your arrivall there to attend [Colonel Blood], and employ your time and
Skill in learning the Art and Business of an Engineer according to the inclosed
Instructions, and to keep a Journall of your proceedings, to be laid before his Grace
the Duke of Marlborough and the Board of Ordnance, and to be obedient to the
Commands of your superior Officers as you will answer to the contrary.49

As the campaign was expected to open soon, King had relatively little time for
preparation. The nature of the learning expected was explained in no small detail in his
instructions:

You are to use your utmost Endeavours to improve your Knowledge in all things
belonging to an Engineer, and to render your Self capable in all respects for Majts.
Service in that Art, to be well Skill’d in the Mathematicks, particularly in
Stereometry, Altemetry, and Geodesic, to take Distances Hights Depths Surveys of
Land Measures, of Solid Bodys, and to cut any part of Ground to a Proportion
given, to be well skilled in all manner of ffoundations, in the Scanlings of all
Timber and Stone, and of their severall Natures, and to be perfect in Architecture
Civill and Military, and to have always by you the Descriptions or Modells of all
manner of Engines usefull in ffortifications or Sieges to draw and designe the
Scituation of any Place their due Prospects Uprights and Perspective, to know

48 BL, Add. MSS 61309, ff. 45-46b: Blood to Marlborough, Rotterdam, 9 April 1706 N.S.
49 KP I(i)/1. Letter from the ‘Office of Ordnance’ to Richard King, 4 April 1704 O.S.
exactly the Rates of all Materialls for Building of Fortifications, thereby to judge of any Estimates propos’d to you to examine.\textsuperscript{50}

Authors and publishers were quick to seize upon deficits in a new officer’s knowledge. Various works were put out (some in new editions) for 1702, to take advantage of the coming campaign. Their merit was variable. Publications such as the aforementioned \textit{The Perfection of Military Discipline}, \textit{The Compleat Gentleman Soldier}, \textit{An epitome of the whole art of war}, John Barker’s \textit{The Treasury of Fortification}, and \textit{A Military Dictionary} could prove useful for the uninitiated.\textsuperscript{51} But, titles aside, actual treatises on the nature of warfare were noted by their absence. There was little in the way of the didactic upon the art of war, composed by an experienced military author with reference to past campaigns – to provide a literary apprenticeship to officers that had no formal training; to provide learning beyond the basic regulations. During this period, such an apprenticeship—the customs of war—was learned beside experienced officers in the field.

The official regulations or drillbooks themselves were limited to the mechanics of the platoon, company, battalion, troop or squadron: which for the Foot amounted to the manual exercise, the platoon exercise, the evolutions, the firings and the manoeuvres. No new, full drillbooks were published during Anne’s reign; instead, the army drew upon those issued at William’s command, from the first new regulations of 1690, through to the largely similar \textit{The Exercise of the Foot... To which is added, the Exercise of the horse, grenadiers of horse, and dragoons}, issued in Dublin in 1701. But there was further development in the field, however, as highlighted by the publication in 1708 of \textit{The new exercise of firelocks and bayonets; appointed by his Grace the Duke of Marlborough to be used by all the British forces... These had been adopted by Marlborough’s forces while on

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{50} KP I(i)/Z. “Instructions from the Board of Ordnance how to improve the Art of Engeneering”, 4 April 1702 O.S.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{51} John Barker, \textit{The treasury of fortification}. \textit{Wherein that art is made intelligible to the meanest capacity; and the several methods of fortifying, according to the late most approved engineers in Europe, explained... To which is added, a new and compendious method to fortifie irregular places, compared with that generally made use of.} (London, 1707); \textit{The Compleat Gentleman Soldier: or, A Treatise of Military Discipline, Fortifications and Gunnery. In Three Parts.} (London, 1702); \textit{An epitome of the whole art of war, in two parts. The first of military discipline... the second of fortification and gunnery} (London, 1692); \textit{A military dictionary. Explaining all difficult terms in martial discipline, fortification, and gunnery... By an officer.} (London, 1702); \textit{The Perfection of Military Discipline After the Newest Method; As Practiced In England and Ireland, &c. Or, The Industrious Souldier’s Golden Treasury of Knowledge in the Art of making War} (London, 1690; fourth edition, 1702).}
campaign, and were spread elsewhere by the likes of Captain Robert Parker, who was summoned by Ingoldsby to Ireland to train the soldiers in the 'Flanders discipline'. Similar instructions were reissued by Orkney at Ghent, in 1711.52

If finding one's own edition of a particular work was difficult, there was only one thing for it: to painstakingly hand-copy as much as possible. King's own papers contain a home-made copy, bound with a pin, of The Maxims or general Rules which are observed in the Modern Fortifications, together with a like transcription of Mr Vane's Observations on Powder, and the small, hand-copied sixteen-page booklet, Les Calibres et les Noms des Peices que l'on fondoit anniéement.53 Nor did he neglect his company duties: among his possessions was a neatly copied piece of paper describing the various evolutions of discipline that a sentinel of the Foot would make in giving fire, or fixing his bayonet54; together with a far scruffier, much-folded piece marked only 'Exercise', as might befit an aide memoire stuffed in an officer's pocket on parade!55

Not all officers were so conscientious. Charles Churchill, the illegitimate son of the Marlborough's similarly named brother, "professed never having read a whole book through in his life, and his letters were so ill wrote and so ill spelled" — a trait he may have inherited from his father, who possessed one of the least refined hands — "that Sir Robert Walpole used to keep them unread till he saw him, and then he often could not read them himself."56 Others tried, but struggled. John Pitt, long-time aide to the commander-in-chief, remarked (not wholly remorsefully) that he had left a little primer on arithmetic in Henry Watkins' rooms at the Hague. He continued:

I ffind it harde to goe to Schoole but necessity [? per force] & I have a master heere one Captaine Cartwright who sayes will make a profittien in two dayes with my owne Industry hope in a few more may make as darke a Lanthorne as himselfe...57
If Pitt’s ingenuity in applied mathematics even approached his teacher’s (whose peculations of army funds were considerable), he would have been assured a bountiful existence, now matter how dim his light.

Nor were all officers so quick to learn the rudiments of warfare, as John Wolfe admitted in an apologetic petition to his commander-in-chief:

... that your Graces petitioner being but a Younger Brother and Souldier of ffortune and not three months in the Armie which short time of a service I could not attaine unto the skill knowledge & experience of Marshall affairs, yet may it please your Grace your petitioner being willing and desioruse to serve my Queen and Country to the utmost of my power in order where to have laid out my small ffortune to purchase a Company for her Majesties service which my present want of experience in Marshall affairs hath given some of grater experience therein to impose on your petitioner in severall manner of wayes and Humbley conceive may have represented Matters to Your Grace to my great preiudice if not by your Graces great Wisdome knowledge and goodness considered.

Which your petitioner most humbly prays for your Graces pardon for whatever may be represented to your Grace amendment of all such dislike actions committed through my ignorance and want of knowledge whuch your petitioner will studdy as well to amend as to informe his Judgement for to performe his duty in all respects of obedience to command and Marshall Discipline craveing your Graces ffavour to this my Humble petition which as in Duty bound.

But it appeared the military life was not one for John Wolfe. A later petition, of Captain Daniel Woollet of the Coldstream Guards, begged leave to purchase Wolfe’s captaincy in Leigh’s – a plan amenable to young Wolfe. Woollet had served for seventeen years in the guards, but his regiment was stuck in England and he desired service in the seats of war abroad. There is no record of this purchase being made, but the guardsman did get his wish; unfortunately, the only further reference to a Daniel Woollet is to a lieutenant-colonel in Blood’s regiment of Foot, who was killed at Almanza.

King might perhaps have been interested in the suggestion of two ingenious gentlemen, who forwarded their plans for the better prosecution of the war to the Duke of Marlborough. One gentleman proposed “A new invention for borning of

58 BL, Add. MSS 61297, ff. 174-175b: petition of John Wolfe, captain in Leigh’s regiment of Foot. [1704 marked in pencil.]
59 Dalton, v, p. 99; vi, p. 366. For Wolfe’s commission, see also BL, Add. MSS 61298, ff. 5-6b.
Cities, and Ships, also for defending and taking of fortifications." His device was a chemical preparation,

... a feuer of that force that it distroys any thing, melts al Metals knowne so sure it fals opan it, it distrois stones, timber, ['tis] of that quality, that if two, or free drops fals opan any limb of a man, and not Cut of within the space of five minutes that man mus deay, and al the art of the Worelt Cannot Save him.

This fire was distributed by an engine, ejected by the force of wind “drawen into the ingien with Matimatical instruments,” from which it “fals like a regen aut this Confinement, the Circumferance of Sexty and more foot.” Somewhat worryingly, considering its stated nature, the inventor claimed that it was “Vere proper abord a ship.” And if the Duke of Marlborough was not taken by the particular invention, the author had a ‘blunderbos’ that could throw 2.5-inch diamter grenades a distance of one-hundred yards. Though the inventor’s name is not mentioned in the proposal, it is possible that the individual was one William Powell. A warrant of 3 November 1710 N.S. noted that “Whereas Mr William Powell has been at some Expence in preparing an Engine for Shooting Liquid Ffire which has not answer’d expectation...” Marlborough had nevertheless thought fit to allow him the sum of £20, in full satisfaction of his expenses.

Mr George Taume was similarly alert to the ingenuities of warfare. Inspired by the example of the Romany’s travelling wagons, he proposed an early modern Trojan horse:

I apprehend & have bin told by a Master Workman y\textsuperscript{t} a Waggon might be so [tarthed] or [covered] y\textsuperscript{t} to all outward appearanse it might seem & pass for A Load of Hay: I am assured y\textsuperscript{t} ye rommon travilling Waggons often bring from Gosport to London thirty Persons beside their lugage, y\textsuperscript{t} their rommon louding is fourty hundred weight; & in y\textsuperscript{t} summer they some times travill with three store hundred, the Waggons y\textsuperscript{t} are of generall use in Kent seem to be equally strong & I apprehend that more then twenty Armed Men might easily & conveniently be lodged, conveied, & concealed, & might have more than room enough & liberty to breath in

61 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 244: order to Colonels Pendlebury and Hopkey. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. 3 November 1710 N.S. The £20 was charged to the Contingencies of the Train in the Low Countries.
y* cavity of one of these seeming loads of Hay since there might easily be continued a free passage for y* Eyre...62

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Many general and staff officers in Marlborough's army, however, had already served their apprenticeship in the field. At the start of the first campaign, in 1702, the senior generals—Marlborough, Lieutenant-General Charles Churchill and Majors-General Lord Cutts, Henry Lumley, Richard Ingoldsby and the Earl of Orkney—had all seen considerable service in Ireland and Flanders under William. Of the five brigade commanders, only Hugh Wyndham had done duty as brigadier previously, but the new promotees—James Stanley, Cornelius Wood, Frederick Hamilton and Henry Withers—were experienced Williamite officers. In addition, both Ingoldsby and Withers had served as senior staff officers, having held the post of adjutant-general, and five out of the six majors of brigade held field rank in their own right—a proportion unmatched during the war. 63

Some officers, like Hugh Caldwell (brigade-major for the Dragoons in 1704), had led a particularly eventful life. The son of Sir James Caldwell, Bt of Castle Caldwell in County Fermanagh, Hugh claimed to have raised the first troop to be mustered in Ireland for English service during the Williamite war, where he 'maintained a frontier next to the Irish army that lay before Londonderry' and defended Donegal Castle against Jacobite forces under the Duke of Berwick in 1689—refusing to take a bribe of £1000 and the offer of a troop in Berwick's regiment to surrender his charge. If that was not enough, Caldwell later raised three companies of Foot and armed them at his own expense; the men were incorporated into Orkney's regiment and served throughout the war in Ireland. After the capture of Limerick, a dispute between Caldwell's father and Major-General Kirke led to his being broken by his colonel, Brigadier William Wolesley in a regimental reduction (notwithstanding Caldwell claiming to have the

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62 BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 252-253b: A project from George Taume. Undated.
63 Ingoldsby served as adjutant-general of Foot to the Duke of Schomberg in 1692, on his expedition to the French coast (Dalton, iii, p. 283); Withers was adjutant-general to William in Ireland (D.N.B.). For the ranks of the majors of brigade, see Table 2.3.
The Duke of Schomberg gave him a troop in his regiment, in which he continued to serve throughout the remainder of the war in Ireland, and in the Nine Years War and War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries, where he rose to the post of lieutenant-colonel and effective regimental commander. Caldwell was wounded at the storming of the Schellenberg (where he had his horse killed beneath him) and killed at the siege of Douai, in 1710.

Those chosen as staff officers came from a variety of backgrounds. Consider two of Marlborough’s longest serving aides-de-camp, Henry Durell and Thomas Panton. Durell was the child of a learned Anglican clergyman, scholar and apologist; Panton’s father was an infamous gambler, philanderer and rake: “There was no game but what he was an absolute artist at it, either upon the Square or Foul Play ... His chief game was hazard, and in one night at this play he won as many thousand pounds as purchased him an estate of above £1,500 a year.” Though all Marlborough’s aides-de-camp were favoured with a degree of patronage, those serving in posts allowed upon the establishment were of more humble birth. The likes of Sir James Chamberlain, Bt; John Murray, Marquess of Tullibardine; William de Nassau-Zuylenstein, Viscount Tunbridge; The Honourable James O'Hara, son of Baron Tyrawly; Charles Schomberg, Marquess of Harwich; and Algernon Seymour, Earl of Hertford that accompanied Marlborough as his aides did so as gentleman volunteers.

Staff officers’ proximity to the generals of the army, typically men of prestige could aid the progress of their careers. Of Marlborough’s six aides-de-camp in 1702, all were promoted to the rank of general before the end of the war. Charles de Sibourg and William Evans were promoted brigadiers in 1708 and majors-general in 1710; Henry

64 Caldwell’s troop was one of those raised by Gustavus Hamilton, the governor of Enniskillen, for service under William. His troop was placed in the regiment of William Wolseley, and Caldwell’s commission as captain was probably dated c. 20 June 1689 O.S. Wolseley’s regiment initially consisted of no fewer than twenty-five troops; this was later cut to twelve in 1690, and six in 1691. It was in this last reduction that Caldwell was broken. Dalton, iii, p. 35.

65 BL, Add. MSS 61284, ff. 159-160b: memorial of Captain Hugh Caldwell in the Royal Irish Dragoons commanded by Major-General Ross. Undated. Dalton, v, II, p. 7 n. 50. See also BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 75-76b: Orkney to Cardonnel, Maastricht, 7 May 1703 N.S. for Orkney’s recommendation.

Durell and Francis Godfrey were made brigadiers in 1710, Thomas Panton in 1711. The only exception, James Bringfield, had perished at Ramillies. Joseph Sabine, who served as a brigade-major in 1702 and 1703, was a brigadier by 1708 and a major-general by 1710.

When George Morgan, who had served for a dozen years in Ingoldsby's regiment of Foot, petitioned for a commission of major in the new levies, his candidature was supported by a wealth of prominent individuals: Thomas Mansell, Member for Glamorganshire and Comptroller of the Household to Queen Anne; Charles Churchill; Ingoldsby himself; Henry Withers; William Cadogan; and 'several Welsh gentlemen'. In the event Morgan, who had served as a major-of-brigade and sometime aide-de-camp to Ingoldsby, and was wounded at the battle of Blenheim, went one step better; he received a commission as lieutenant-colonel in Colonel Wynne's newly raised regiment of Foot, dated 25 March 1705 O.S. Yet such service was not a guarantee of preferment. When George Watkins, who had served as aide-de-camp to Charles Churchill for three whole campaigns, earnestly petitioned for a lieutenant-colonelcy in the new levies being raised, in view of various past hardships and a distinct lack of pay, his desires went unrequited. And succour could arrive rather late in an officer's career: *circa* 1708, Lieutenant John Looker (who would be a major of brigade in that year's campaign) petitioned that he had been serving in Schomberg's regiment of Dragoons since 1689 and was the eldest lieutenant that did duty there.

Being a staff officer could only advance one's career so far; it was typically necessary to purchase a regiment—or at least command one in the field—to secure the prestige and standing in the army to rise to general rank. It is unsurprising, therefore that William Breton, who had served as a major of brigade to the Foot in 1702, declined the offer as

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67 BL, Add. MSS 61292, ff. 39-40b: memorial of Morgan to Cardonnel. Morgan stated that he had been made ensign 8 March 1688 O.S. and captain of grenadiers 15 March 1694 O.S. Ibid, f. 38: testimonial of Thomas Mansell on behalf of Captain George Morgan, who desired to be made major. 28 February 1703/4 (this date would appear to be in error; 1704/5 is more probable). Ibid, ff. 41-42b: Ingoldsby to Cardonnel, London, 24 January 1704 O.S. By order of Marlborough, Cardonnel was to remind Marlborough that Morgan had been recommended for preference in the new levies. See also Add. MSS 61378, ff. 4b, 60.


69 BL, Add. MSS 61291, f. 60: petition of John Looker. [1708?, in pencil.] Dalton's (v, II, p. 23 n. 7) earliest reference to Looker is as a cornet in this regiment, that commission being dated 22 November 1696 O.S.
serving as Henry Withers' brigade-major for the campaign of 1703, wishing to remain at the head of Howe's regiment of Foot (of which he was the lieutenant-colonel commanding). Alexander Irwin, of Orkney's regiment, took the post instead, being Withers' subsequent choice.  

In the latter stages of the war, many of Marlborough's aides were thus clamouring for their regiments. Late in 1709, Metcalfe Graham was languishing, ill, at Breda. He begged forgiveness for being unable to wait upon Marlborough, but nevertheless wondered if he might return to England: for Marlborough's wife had been 'so extremely good and generous' as to promise him a regiment, or equivalent! Richard Molesworth, whose father, Robert (a former Member for Lostwithiel and East Retford, and later 1st Viscount Molesworth) protested that his son's debts made him unable for the present to attend his duty abroad, while at the same time asking that Marlborough might grant his son leave to sell his company and purchase a regiment. Some even wanted to have their cake and eat it. Henry Durell thought to decline a regiment that had been made available unless he was also made brigadier and allowed to keep his adjutant-general's post.

A vacant colonelcy attracted many hopefuls, and the success of one might be attended with attempts to satisfy those rebuffed. One such agreement was formulated when Lieutenant-General Thomas Meredyth took brief command of the Scots Fusiliers in 1710. Colonel Robert Stearns (being the eldest colonel in Flanders) had a 'reasonable pretense' to succeed him in his old regiment; but the post instead went to Windress. In order to give Stearns satisfaction, Meredyth had agree to resign his governorship of Tymouth to the colonel, and by way of some recompense Windress (as well as some

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70 BL, Add. MSS 61287, ff. 37-38b: Withers to Cardonnel, camp near Maesdyck, 7 May 1703 N.S. Breton commanded Howe's regiment at Blenheim; he received a brevet of colonel on 2 August 1704 O.S. Dalton, v, p. 165; v, II, p. 49 n. 1.

71 BL, Add. MSS 61313, ff. 230-231b: Metcalfe Graham to Marlborough, Breda, 13 November 1709 N.S.

72 BL, Add. MSS 61298, ff. 179-180b: Robert Molesworth to Marlborough, 31 March 1710 O.S. Richard had himself earlier petitioned Marlborough for his advancement, but his pretensions 'proved such as were some way inconsistent with Marlborough's designs...' Molesworth desired a regiment to aid in 'screening him from the injuries he receive[d] in his rank by younger officers buying regiments over his head...'

73 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 279-280b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Whitehall, 20 December 1709 O.S.
other officers that were preferred on this occasion) agreed to pay Meredyth £1800.\textsuperscript{74} Even if successful, the new colonel might look to his fief only to discover a multitude of strings attached. George Macartney, who enjoyed Marlborough's support, protested that he had the naming of but one captain in his regiment, who was a relation of Lieutenant-General Ramsey. "All the rest are men of interest whom the Ministers of State have given." These captains included two recommended by the Duke of Marlborough himself; one by the Duke of Argyll; one by the earls of Loudon and Stair; the nephew to the Earl of Stair himself; Lord Fincastle, the son of the Earl of Dunmore; one recommended by his father, Sir David Mairne; and one by a member of Parliament, to whom a company was promised in Scotland.\textsuperscript{75}

As the pre-eminent soldier in Queen Anne's army and commander-in-chief in Flanders, Marlborough possessed—until the very end of the war—a considerable autonomy and agency in appointing commissions, particularly with regard to brevets. Of the 217 brevets made in the Foot, Horse and Dragoons until 1 January 1707, 129 were made by Marlborough, often in the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{76} Such a preponderance of influence in the hands of one soldier would make Marlborough liable to gratifying some and disaffecting others, as he juggled deserts, influence and his own prejudices. Marlborough displayed a bias towards those that served on campaign, particularly in Flanders.\textsuperscript{77} In one letter to the gentlemen of the Board of Ordnance, he wrote that he was

... apt to believe if [they] had seen and considered Brigadier Sabines's memorial, which he might have shown you, you would not have thought it any hardship to oblige him to dispose of [Colonel Bennet's] company after having enjoyed it as a sinecure through the whole course and hottest of the war, now at a time when the regiment is employed at the siege, and reduced to two captains only to do the duty

\textsuperscript{74} NA, SP 41/3/235. Cardonnel to Granville, Westminster, 14 February 1711 O.S.

\textsuperscript{75} BL, Add. MSS 61298, ff. 41-42b: Macartney's list of officers to be laid before Marlborough. Undated.

\textsuperscript{76} Dalton, v, pp. 165-7; vi, p. 199.

\textsuperscript{77} Following the action of Wynendael in 1708, Marlborough wrote to Godolphin: "All her Majesty's subject has had the good fortune this campagne in all actions to distinguish themselves, so that I should not do them justice, if I did not beg the Queen that when this campagne shall be ended, that she will be pleased to make a promotion amongst the generals of this army only, which will be a mark of her favour and their merit. For hetherto, though almost all the action has been in this army, yet every generall has advanced equally with them, though two parts of three of them has not so much as served this warr." Snyder, ii, pp. 1106-1107 n. 1108.
of the whole. For my part I think it a very great indulgence that he has been continued so long, while so many gentlemen have lost their lives doing his duty for him.\footnote{Murray, v, pp. 41-2: Marlborough to the Board of Ordnance, 5 June 1710 N.S.}

One Marlborough's most famous clashes with Anne and the other influence bases in England accompanied the general promotion of 1710. This unprecedented order saw sixty-eight officers promoted to the rank of brigadier above; seventeen of those were serving in Marlborough's army in the Low Countries.\footnote{Promotion dated at St James, 1 January 1710 O.S. Dalton, vi, pp. 17-18.} Though Marlborough had suggested that all colonels' commissions bearing the date of 1705 were eligible for promotion, he had earlier intimated to Robert Walpole, the Secretary at War, that it should have gone no further than 25 March 1705; Walpole told Anne that he thought this was Marlborough's wish. The queen mentioned Jack Hill, whose commission was dated 1705, but excluded on account of Marlborough's later proscription. Her Majesty did not insist on Hill's inclusion in the promotion, but did desire Walpole to query the matter.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61133, ff. 196-197b: Walpole to Marlborough, Whitehall, 18 April 1710 O.S.} Marlborough gave in. Protesting that though he thought his proscription of not going beyond 25 March 1705 was correct—otherwise too many would have 'include a much greater number than are proper for the service, or that do really expect it'—he resigned himself to going a step further, including the four colonels Walpole had mentioned: Hill, Sutton, Hobart, Ferrers.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61133, ff. 198-199b: Marlborough (Cardonnel) to Walpole, camp before Douai, 5 May 1710 N.S. There is some confusion in this exchange of correspondence, on account of antedated commissions. Marlborough had asked that 'all such major generals as have their commissions dated in the years 1708/9 and such brigadiers as are dated in the years 1706/7 and all the colonells dated 1705 may have their regular promotions' (a letter of Marlborough to Walpole, 24 April 1710 N.S.; quoted in Snyder, iii, p. 1461 n. 6—it is this letter that Walpole's reply, above, acknowledges). Marlborough's own intentions pursuant to those requirements, however, excluded some apparently qualified officers. The duke had intended that the promotion of lieutenants-general stopped at Temple and Stair—there being some disputes between majors-general and brigadiers regarding seniority; this excluded North and Grey, whose commissions as brigadier and major-general were identically dated (an error Marlborough himself noticed, "his rank aswell as his service deserving that encouragent"). For the promotion of brigadiers to majors-general, Marlborough had earlier intimated to Walpole that the promotion should go no further than Evans. Walpole queried this, for he presumed that Marlborough meant to include Sibourg and Kellum—who were serving with Marlborough—in this category; Marlborough, somewhat clumsily and contradictorily wrote that Walpole had the right of it, and that the promotion should go no further than Evans. Evans, Sibourg and Kellum all bore commissions as brigadiers dated 1 January 1707 O.S.}
While the disappointment of opponents and promotion of friends might seem a sensible tactic, it could prove counter-productive. Secretary of State the Earl of Nottingham, writing to Lord Cutts in January 1703, noted that the most he could feasibly obtain on the major-general's behalf—and the utmost that some friends of other prospective promotees would suffer—was to hasten the promotion of all his peers, rather attempt to promote Cutts alone and thus allow his path to be retarded by their various arguments and challenges. As the war wore on, and Marlborough's rein over promotions within his army diminished, he found himself presented with significant changes authored by Anne without his knowledge, as in the case of Charles Ross, who in May 1711 (having not yet joined the army) begged leave to acquaint Marlborough with the fact that the Queen had been pleased to raise him to the rank of colonel-general of Dragoons, 'without any alteration as to [his] rank in the army'—which he hoped would have Marlborough's approbation.

Anne's army was deeply politicised. Though officers possessed a burgeoning sense of military duty that was in part distinct from political persuasion, its nature varied considerably and was frequently coloured by personal beliefs. Of the fifty general officers that served under Marlborough over the period 1702-1711, six sat at some occasion as English or Scots representative peers in the Parliament of Westminster (Marlborough, Rivers, Orkney, Argyll, North and Grey and Stair; Orrery received his English title after he became envoy at Brussels and the Hague) and fifteen sat as Members of Parliament for an English constituency for a period of their service in the Low Countries. In addition, various other individuals with the army represented constituencies, including Adam de Cardonnel (Southampton, 1701 to 1712); the aides-

See also Snyder, iii, p. 1488 n. 1526: Marlborough to Sarah, before Douai, 19 May 1710 N.S.; and ibid., p. 1500 n. 1536: Godolphin to Marlborough, 19 May 1710 O.S.

82 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 1-2b: Nottingham to Cutts, 1 January 1703.

83 For more on this subject, see Chapter VI. BL, Add. MSS 61315, ff. 56-57b: Ross to Marlborough, London, 11 May 1711 O.S.

84 The parliamentary seats were as follows: William Cadogan, New Woodstock 1705-1716; Charles Churchill, Weymouth and Melcombe Regis 1701-1710; John, 1st Baron Cutts of Gowry (in the peerage of Ireland), Cambridgeshire 1689-1702, Newport on the Isle of Wight 1702-1707; Thomas Erle, Wareham 1701-1718; Francis Godfrey, St Mawes 1705-1710; John Hill, Lostwithiel 1710-1713; Henry Lumley, Sussex 1701, 1702-1705; Thomas Meredyth, Midhurst 1709-1710; Francis Palmes, West Looe 1707-1708; The Honourable Charles Ross, Ross-shire 1710-1722; The Honourable James Stanley, Lancashire, 1690-1702; Richard Sutton, Newark 1708-1710; Sir Richard Temple, 4th Baronet, Buckingham 1697-1702, 1708-1713, Buckinghamshire 1704-1708; John Richmond Webb, Ludgershall 1695-1698, 1699-1705, 1706-1713; Henry Withers, Queenborough 1708-1710.
de-camp Alexander Abercrombie (representative Member for Scotland, 1707-1708, Banffshire 1708-1727), William Nassau de Zuylenstein, Viscount Tunbridge (briefly for Steyning in 1708, before succeeding to the earldom of Rochford) and Algernon Seymour, Earl of Hertford (Marlborough 1705-1708, Northumberland 1708-1722); and regimental colonels such as William Kerr (Berwick upon Tweed, 1710-1713), John, Viscount Mordaunt (Chippenham, 1701-1705, 1705-1708) and Thomas Stringer (Clitheroe, 1698-1706). These men were not simply military functionaries, serving the State; they were political actors with a vested interest and engagement in the direction of State policy.

Attaching these officers to notions of party and faction—to Court and Country, Whig and Tory—is difficult. The labels could vary in character as the whims and interests of the generals did; officers like Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough and John Campbell, Duke of Argyll could make fairly drastic changes in loyalty in a short space of time. Many of the senior officers—Marlborough himself, Churchill, Lumley, Orkney—might be called mild Tories in the very broadest sense, but the army in the Low Countries never possessed truly strident Tories to the extent that it featured staunch Whigs. Lords Orrery and North and Grey were certainly Tories, as were John Richmond Webb and Charles Ross. Yet Webb was a moderate who did not vote for the Tack in 1704, and his estrangement with Marlborough, accentuated by the affair of Wynendael, came relatively late; and Ross, the ‘Cunning Scotchman’, “[seemed] to gave shown little interest in politics prior to 1708” before developing into a prominent Tory and opponent of Marlborough in the duke’s censure.65

Whigs were more prominent among the low and middle-ranked generals (and some colonels). William Cadogan, Francis Palmes, Thomas Meredyth, George Macartney, Sir Richard Temple Bt—a stalwart of the Kit-Cat Club—Francis Godfrey and Thomas Stringer all possessed strong whiggish views. Temple was an established country squire in his own right, but the likes of Cadogan, Palmes and Meredyth all owed their parliamentary seats to Marlburian patronage.66 William Cadogan was returned as one

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65 Hayton et al. (eds), HoC, v, pp. 816-819 (Webb); ibid., 307-310 (Ross). BL, Add. MSS 61321, ff. 245-246b. 1716/17. List of officers that were dismissed in the late reign ad the persons that succeeded them.
66 On Temple, see Hayton et al. (eds), HoC, v, pp. 128-129 and D.N.B.
of two members for the Oxfordshire borough of Woodstock on 11 May 1705 O.S. Marlborough had hoped that Cadogan would bring support to the duke’s position in England, yet Cadogan was hardly a distinguished or particularly active member of the House in the period 1705-11. Even for the winter sessions his military and political duties in the Low Countries often precluded his effective attendance, with his ‘honesty and courage to speak truth’.87

The political alliances and disputes in England and Scotland had an important effect upon the relationships within the army in the Low Countries. Marlborough, ever attempting to appear the urbane, apolitical statesman and manager tried to distance himself from much of the fraction, to variable effect. When Cadogan, towing the Marlburian line, protested:

As to what relates to Partys in England I have ever avoided speaking to my Lord Duke on that Subject, and I allways found his Grace declined as much as he could meddling in any Domestique matters, or disposal of Civil Employments, Confining himself to the business of the war wholly, or such Forreign affairs as have a Relation and connexion with it.88

His old friend Thomas Wentworth, Lord Raby was hardly in agreement, scoffing:

... you must give me leave as a friend to tell you, that I believe you laugh at me, when you say that his Grace does not meddle in any domestick matters, or disposal of Civil employt. for I believe all England as well as my Self are assured of the Contrary...89

87 On Marlborough’s desire to secure Cadogan’s election, see Snyder, i, nos. 430 & 438, pp. 417-8 & 426-7. The Duke desired to secure the Borough, in which his royally granted manor lay. It had typically been a Tory stronghold, with Lord Abingdon, the previous local patron having backed the Tory cause and suffered through it. The election was thus of considerable importance to Marlborough and the government: see Snyder, i, p. 417, n. 1.

Cadogan was re-elected for Woodstock on 7/18 October 1710, and along with Stanhope was much desired to attend Parliament that winter by Marlborough: ‘39 [Marlborough] shall this Winter expect more assistance in 87 [the House of Commons] from 197 [Cadogan] and 202 [Stanhope] then from any other numbers... So that I do earnestly desire that those two men may be chose preferable to all others...’ for ‘These are two men that are both honest and brave, and 39 can rely on their speaking truth.’ Snyder, iii, nos. 1645, 1646 & 1650, pp. 1590-2 & 1595-6.

But with Cadogan’s duties at The Hague and Brussels this was not always possible: as Marlborough would write to Godolphin, ‘I shall send over all the Parliament men before I leave the army, except Cadogan, who can not well come before me.’ Snyder, i, no. 519, p. 503 (9/20 October 1705).

88 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 194-197b: Cadogan to Raby, Brussels, 12 March 1709 N.S.
89 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 198-199b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 26 March 1709 N.S.
The factions in the army increased throughout the war, catalysed by the deeply partisan ministries of 1708 (Whig) and 1710 (Tory). Family connections were no guarantee against rumour and strife - Charles Churchill assured his brother that any man who insinuated the General of Foot had a disinclination to serve with Marlborough in the next campaign "Lies Like a Villen," for Charles would ever love his brother and rather serve under him than any man breathing. Raby noted that he was mightily sorry his friend, Lord Windsor, had lost his regiment; his first inclination was that if was down to politics, the colonel being a 'violent Tory' - which would have made him, Raby believed, the first military officer to be put out on account of party. As James Taylor at the Treasury confided to Henry Watkins in August 1710:

I am very sorry to hear that faction is crept into the Camp as well as at home. I pray God avert the Evills that hang over us and give us a good peace at last.

One of the most notable disagreements was that between Marlborough and Lords Argyll and Orrery. Arising from out of a combination of personality clashes, political differences, and perceptions of personal and familial slights, the conflict simmered for a while before both Argyll and Orrery left the army - the former taking the command in Spain and the latter the post of envoy and plenipotentiary at Brussels and the Hague. Argyll's new command restored a necessary element of concordance to the army. Henry Watkins wrote that he had heartily wished—as Marlborough did—that Argyll departed to Iberia, where there was as much glory as he could desire; and that when he had 'gained himself a good stock of reputation' perhaps he would not envy theirs in Flanders.

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90 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 174-175b: Charles Churchill to Marlborough, London, 17 April 1705 O.S.
91 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 75-76b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 31 May 1707 N.S.
92 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 53-54b: James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Whitehall, 1 August 1710 O.S.

Both Archibald Hamilton and John Ligonier, who had served as brigade-majors under Marlborough in the Low Countries (Hamilton for five campaigns; Ligonier for three), left their posts in 1711. The accompanied the Duke of Argyll to Spain, attending him as majors of brigade in that theatre. BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 289: order for leave to allow Archibald Hamilton (of Orkney's) and John Ligonier (of Lord North and Grey's) leave to attend Argyll in Spain. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. The Hague, 8 April 1711 N.S. They were to be allowed on the musters of their regiments for a period of 12 months. Their commissions as brigade-majors for Spain were dated 3 March 1711 O.S. (Dalton, vi, p. 182).
Subtle differences existed in the tenor of Argyll’s and Orrery’s differences with their commander in chief. Argyll, a vibrant, rising force in both the army and British politics, possessed a greater sense of propriety towards his opponents, for all his self-confidence. Orrery could be particularly contemptuous, driven and vindictive; he sarcastically referred to Marlborough as the ‘Vicar-General’ and desired that Her Majesty would send himself and Orrery a letter saying they could excuse themselves from the army, for:

The Duke of Argyll and I have yet had but very little correspondence with [Marlborough], and we have no inclination to have any with him for the future, further than the duty of our posts obliges us to; but it is the custom for all officers when they quit the camp to ask his leave, which is a ceremony we would willingly omit if we could.\(^94\)

Argyll had likewise resolved “to serve, that is to suffer, out this campaign but never to serve another under the Duke of Marlborough.” Marlborough was similarly dismissive, noting that though Charles Ross, who had come over to the continent with Orkney, Argyll and Orrery, had been with him those past three days, the others had “not made the same dilligence, so that I know not where they are, nor do I much care, considering the temper the last two are in at this time.” Yet he would make them do their duty, so the service did not suffer. Writing to Orrery in April 1711, Marlborough had somewhat tartly informed the general:

You are hereby directed and requir’d to remain with the Regiment under Your Command in Quarters at Gand, and to continue to do the usual duty of that Garrison until further Order.\(^95\)

Marlborough’s resentfulness of Argyll was so public that none conversed with the Scot unless they were ‘angry’ with the commander-in-chief themselves.\(^96\) When Her Majesty’s leave for Argyll and Orrery to depart the camp—without the commander-in-

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\(^94\) HMC, 52, Portland MSS, iv, pp. 544-545: Orrery to Harley, camp near Douai, 21 June 1710 N.S. 1710. Argyll was not as wholly for Sacheverell’s acquittal as Orrery was, believing that the minister had behaved improperly and deserved censure, despite the political issues behind the scandal. Ibid., pp. 537-538: Orrery to Harley, 14? March 1710.

\(^95\) BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 293: Marlborough to Orrery, Tournai, 28 April 1711 N.S.

\(^96\) HMC, 52, Portland MSS, iv, pp. 548-549: Argyll to Harley, 17 July 1710 N.S. Snyder, iii, pp. 1465-1466 n. 1502: Marlborough to Godolphin, Flines 28 April 1710 N.S. See also the letters of Marlborough to Godolphin and Sarah of 8 and 29 May 1710 N.S. (Snyder, iii, pp. 1474, 1499-1500).
chief's position—came through, Marlborough was astonished: "This is so very extraordinary a step, that even the Duke of Argyle came to me yesterday to assure me that he had made no applications, and that when he should desire to for England he should apply to me for my leave." It is doubtful that Argyll could have been so unaware of Orrery's scheme, however.97

Other disagreements were not so public or violent. Marlborough's relationship with Cutts could be difficult on occasion; the commander-in-chief could be critical of his lieutenant and had some agency in the latter's leaving the army and taking up the post of commander-in-chief in Ireland. It is possible that this was in part born out of altruism, given Cutts' considerable financial difficulties, but the baron's sister, Joanna Cutts, took it particularly ill.98

Cutts died in 1707. (Upon hearing a false rumour of his passing, in 1706, Marlborough had waspishly quipped that he hoped Her Majesty would not be hasty in engaging herself for his employment.) Unmarried, Joanna's own financial situation was enmired with that of her brother. Her petitions for royal favour ran with a certain amount of weariness, formality - even brusqueness.99 She protested that her brother's passage to Ireland "a very unwilling act of obedience and submission to those commands that sent him."100

Joanna Cutts' anger at the slights—real or perceived—to her situation and her brother's memory hardened into a particularly vituperative form. In a draft of a letter to Cutts' old friend, Colonel Dudley (a former governor of the Isle of Wight), she wrote:

... soon after your departure for New england, the designe the Duke of Marlborough had to Ruin [Cutts] began to appear visible to all his friends, who by

97 Snyder, iii, pp. 1637-1638 n. 1704: Marlborough to Godolphin, before Aire, 4 October 1710 N.S.
98 Snyder, iii, p. 291 n. 301: Marlborough to Godolphin, Ruremond, 10 May 1704 N.S.; ibid., pp. 313-314 n. 325: Marlborough to Sarah, camp at Gardach, 8 June 1704 N.S. For Cutts' financial difficulties, see D.N.B. His post in Ireland was said to be worth £6000 a year. Hayton et al (eds), HoC, iii, p. 820.
99 Snyder, ii, pp. 621-622 n. 629: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 22 July 1706 N.S. BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 162-163b: [Joanna] Cutts to Cardonnel, Pollard Street, 14 July 1708 O.S.
100 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 176-177b: memorial to the Lord High Treasurer of Mrs Cutts' pretentions, [14 May 1714 O.S.]
that treachery and flattery which his Grace excells in he kept him from believing it a great while.

In the Campaigne of [1702] the success of the Seiges of Huy, Venlo Ruremond, Leige being intirely owing to his Conduct, Gained him so much Reputation that the designe was a while suspended tho All that year all possible difficultys were put upon him the Pension the King Allow'd him till his losses were made up and which I believe you may Remember was promised him should be Continued, was struck off, his Arrear of that And the Contingent mony due to him at the Kings death Refused him.

But Cutts resolved, according to his sister, to dispute nothing and remain a servant to Queen and Country, for he discerned that

... the Duke was as little a friend to Either as to him ... Afterwards [i.e. after Cutts' death] the Duke of Marleboro to Conceal his Villeiny Raised innumerable Slanders on his memory.101

Those officers that enjoyed Marlborough's particular patronage increasingly drew the ire of others. Major James Cranstoun of the Cameronians, who was no critic of Marlborough himself, was dismissive of such as the Irishmen Cadogan, Palmes and Meredyth, who were "men of little service and experience." John Drummond, the Scots merchant, went further, stating that Cadogan was "hated as all the Irish favourites are." "Blame and Envy are the only Fruits I have gathered out of the Post I am in," Cadogan lamented.102

William Cadogan was central to the dispute over John Richmond Webb's victory at Wynendael in 1708, when an erroneous report in the Gazette mistakenly granted the laurels to Cadogan, "to whom the Success of this Day was said to have been (tho' falsely) imputed, through the Partiality of a certain very Great Man." Webb never forgave Marlborough and his Whig friends for the unintentional slight; he embarked upon such a course self-valediction that even Argyll, upon hearing Webb regale the company of how many wounds he had received that day, supposedly retorted: "What

102 HMC, 52, Portland MSS, p. 255: Major James Cranstoun to Robert Cunningham, camp at Herenthals, 1 October 1705. Ibid., pp. 572-573: Drummond to Harley, Amsterdam, 2 September 1710 N.S. BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 194-197b: Cadogan to Raby, Brussels, 12 March 1709 N.S.
a pity, my dear general, that one of them was not in your tongue. You would then have left to others the task of celebrating your victory!"\textsuperscript{103}

Webb’s action was rewarded by a vote of thanks to the general in the House of Commons, on 13 December 1708 O.S., which was proposed “not so much out of any reall kindness to him, but that one of their leaders might take that handle to show as much malice as he could to [Marlborough].”\textsuperscript{104} The same might be imputed of the dismissal of Thomas Meredyth, George Macartney and Philip Honeywood two years later. Late in 1710, all three had supposedly drunk to the “destruction to the present Ministry, and dressing up a hat on a stick, and calling it Harley; then drinking a glass with one hand, and discharging a pistol with the other at the maukin, wishing it were Harley himself; and a hundred other such pretty tricks, as inflaming their soldiers, and foreign Ministers, against the late changes at Court.” The officers were forced to dispose of their regiments at knock-down prices.\textsuperscript{105} It was said that Charles Ross “always when they begun these sort of healths left the company, he’s reckon a cunning Scotchman.”\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{103} Hare, op. cit., pp. 148-52. Webb, considerably outnumbered, had held off the force of La Motte, allowing the convoys from Ostend to pass. Cadogan had arrived with a considerable part of cavalry, and no doubt influenced the French view of the broader operational situation, but the success had been Webb’s. See Churchill, ii, pp. 447-51. The mistaken dispatch emanated from the Landgravial Prince of Hesse-Cassel, and came via the United Provinces. For his part, Marlborough was entirely recognisant of Webb (Murray, iv, pp. 242-5, letters to Webb and Sunderland), if also giving of Cadogan a little credit (Snyder, ii, no. 1108, pp. 1106-7). Webb returned to England: ‘One of the reasons of sending Webb over was to prevent a quarrel between him and Cadogan, and that the latter may no be deprived of the second place of honour’ wrote one correspondent of Robert Harley; HMC 52, Portland MSS., iv, p. 507: Lewis to Harley, 7 October [O.S.] 1708. On Argyll’s comment, see William Montagu, Court and Society from Elizabeth to Anne (London, 1864), ii, pp. 380-381.

\textsuperscript{104} Snyder, ii, p. 1175 n. 1186: Godolphin to Marlborough, 14 December 1708 O.S.

\textsuperscript{105} The officers were dismissed on 8 November 1710 O.S. (BL, Add. MSS 61321, ff. 245-246b), after the notorious incident of their (supposedly) drinking to the destruction of the Tory ministry. Jonathan Swift, Journal to Stella. Letter 11, London, 9 December 1710 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 664. The officers protested that they had done nought but drunk the health of their commander-in-chief and confusion to his enemies, a common procedure among armies, ‘though it happened at the time to be equivocal’; see also Thomas Lediard, The Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Prince of the Roman Empire, 2 volumes (2nd edition, London, 1743): i, p. 237.

\textsuperscript{106} Another anecdote suggested that the toasts were drunk at Cadogan’s house—though there was too little evidence to proceed against him—and that upon hearing the toast Ross “flew out of the company in a passion.” James Cartwright (ed.), The Wentworth Papers, 1705-1739 (London, 1883), pp. 162, 164.
Marlborough's chaplain, Francis Hare, did not seem to be particularly close to Cadogan; indeed, their characters were somewhat different, to say the least. When Hare heard that Cadogan was in Lille, his curiosity spurred him to think of learning any news of the army; but the chaplain-general lamented that he was not in such good graces with the Irishman was Watkins was, and thus had little inclination at that time to make a visit. When Hare heard that Cadogan had complained, on account of the chaplain's 'melancholy letters' from Cardonnel's bedside, he was dismissive in his response.107

One of the most interesting series of letters is that between Cadogan and Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby. The two were friends in their youth in Ireland and continued a correspondence throughout the War of the Spanish Succession. At the beginning of the war, Raby was in the ascendancy; he was the peer and ambassador to the court of the King in Prussia at Berlin, while Cadogan was but a brevet colonel and newly appointed quartermaster-general. Over the years, the correspondence would be marked by subtle reflections upon the changing fortunes and influence of each, as Raby's career (both as a statesman and army officer) to some extent stultified in Berlin, while Cadogan's flourished under Marlborough's immanent patronage. Occasional elements of discord arose, as in the case of their respective regiments. Raby's was sent to Portugal, despite his protestations, while squadrons of Cadogan's attended the army in the Low Countries.108 As Raby noted:

... Ross will be flourishing in a little while at the Head of the Scoth & Irish Dragoons where he may reign dispotickly without Controale now all the English are turnd out of his Bregarde. I must confess it Stickes in my Stomach that my poort Regmt. was turned away to make room for his two damd troops, but believe me sincerely I am glad you have the satisfaction of having your whole Regmt. with you, for I don't much value what I suffer when it is with my friends advantage, nor do I believe you had any hand in gitting my Regmt. removed to make way for others, if you had any such thoughts I know you are generous enough to have told me...109

Raby was not alone in suspecting the quartermaster-general's agency in this, but Cadogan protested his innocence, claiming that both Lumley and Cardonnel could

107 BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 56-57b: Hare to Watkins, Lille, 10 August 1710 N.S. Ibid, ff. 58-59b: ditto, 11 August 1710 N.S.
108 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 5-6b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 4 September 1703 N.S.
109 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 13-14b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 4 March 1704 N.S.
‘clear him’, Raby held no especial grudge and seemed glad when Cadogan was made plenipotentiary in room of George Stepney. Yet Cadogan’s commission to conclude the treaty for the augmentation with the Prussian troops was a source of particular ire, and reflected the differing momentums of their careers. Raby seemed fine on the surface, making the usual protestations of joy and friendship; but added:

... entre nous, you must own that it will hereafter look odd to the world, that I who have been here six years [at Berlin], have not had the signing of one Treaty.

It is clear that Raby was unhappy with his progress with respect to Cadogan, despite his protestations of happiness at his friend’s fortune:

... & I find you think I was a little piqued (tho you don’t say so) that you was appointed to Sign that treaty; wth. really naturely belong’d to me to Sign; but I once more protest to you I was not, & should not have been the least concern’d had you Sign’d it, but as I take you for a true friend I will tell you plainly, that all my design & aime is to let my Lord Duke know, I see when I am past by & neglected, but being tis by his Grace I will [reassure?] I think he has some reasons I do not know, then that he does it not of the least ill to me... but must own to you I see something in my fate, that seems to bar all my hopes of his Graces giving the goodness to do something for me.

By the end of the war, Cadogan’s letters had grown more formal and infrequent, as Raby well noted:

I flattered myself when you was made Minister, I shou’d have heard oftener from you, being then I had a sort of call to it, & being you used often to favour me with your letters before, but as marriage making a certain pleasure as duty takes intirely of the pleasure it wou’d have ben otherways it has fared ever so, with yr writings Since we were wedded into the Ministry tho I will still flatter myself, that yr friendship is as form to me as ever - being as I have always merited the continuation of it...

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Not all officers could call upon a long friendship to ameliorate disagreements. The antipathy of a senior officer was a dangerous thing. Captain William Garvin of the Earl

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110 Ibid., ff. 15-16b: Cadogan to Raby, London, 14 March 1704 O.S.
111 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 99-100b: Raby to Cadogan, 1 November 1707 N.S.
112 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 190-193b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 9 March 1709 N.S.
113 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 206-207b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 9 April 1709 N.S.
114 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 214-215b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 3 May 1710 N.S.
of Orrery’s regiment of Foot incurred his colonel’s wrath to such a degree that at a court-martial he was accused on three separate charges by the earl, which included the keeping of false musters and cowardice at the siege of Ath. One cannot say for certain that these charges were manufactured; but it is clear that Orrery pursued his subordinate with a particular level of vindictiveness. The court sat on 19 and 20 July 1707 (nine months after the siege of Ath) and one charge even related to events in 1705, when Thomas Stringer still held the regiment. That particular accusation related to a quarrel between Garvin and Lieutenant William Gargrave: a deponent noted that Gargrave had pursued the accused into a captain’s tent, where he abused him and broke his sword over his head. Garvin’s crime? That—in an army that hardly approved of duelling—he did not demand satisfaction for this slight. Gargrave appeared to be slightly confused by the re-examination of the issue; he had reconciled with Garvin at Stringer’s urging, and heard no more on the issue until Orrery had questioned him two years later! Garvin was sentenced to be broken for the false returns, and declared unfit for service; for his cowardice at Ath he was sentenced to death. The court recommended mercy on the latter issue, and Marlborough respited Garvin’s sentence.\(^{115}\)

Orrery was similarly (and to all appearances, more justifiably) driven in the case of John Platt, of his lordship’s own regiment. Platt, by several accounts, had been a serial absentee, but Orrery could not resist adding, “as a particular inducement to his Grace to consent to his Tryptal,” that he’d had the regiment, he’d “observ’d that this Captain’s Behaviour [had] been remarkably disrespectful to all his Superior Officers.” Orrery concluded:

’Tis now, I think, time to convince Him that there is such a thing as Military Discipline by making Him an Example of its Severity, lest by a larger Connivance He shou’d grow into a kind of Precedent for others to misbehave wth Hopes of Impunity.\(^{116}\)

Woe betide the officer that sought to bring a case against his superiors. Ensign Henry Fletcher of Webb’s regiment of Foot, complaining of various injustices and hardships

\(^{115}\) BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 162b-166: proceedings of a general court-martial at the camp at Meldert, 19 and 20 July 1707 N.S., the Hon. Colonel George Preston presiding.

\(^{116}\) BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 31-32b: Orrery to [Cardonnel?], Brussels, 14 May 1711 N.S. For the notes of evidence from Orrery, his brevet colonel and brevet lieutenant-colonel, see ff. 33-38b.
put upon him by Webb, and Colonel Richard Sutton in his absence, delivered a petition to Marlborough, asking for redress. The court, having heard the testimonies of Webb, Sutton and Fletcher, was not amused. Not only was the petition decreed groundless, but Ensign Fletcher was found guilty of acting contrary to the 61st Article of War and sentenced to three months’ suspension. 117

Disagreements between officers on campaign not infrequently broke out into physical violence, though duels were strictly forbidden in the army. The 38th Article of War stated:

No soldier or officer shall use any reproachful or provoking speech or act to another upon pain of imprisonment, and of asking Pardon of the person offended; as also of such further punishment as a Court-Martial shall think fit. Nor shall any officer or soldier presume to send a challenge to another officer or soldier to fight a duel; neither shall any soldier or officer upbraid another for refusing a challenge: and we do acquit and discharge all men that have quarrels offered, or challenge made to them, of all disgrace or opinion of disadvantage since they byt do the duties of soldiers who ought to subject themselves to discipline, and they that provoke them shall be proceeded against as breakers of discipline, and enemies to out Service. 118

The union of the gentleman officer’s sense of honour with the insensibilities of drink could be a dangerous combination, as the dispute between Captain Fry Vickeridge of Godfrey’s and the late Captain Robert Bridges of Orkney’s showed. Vickeridge killed Bridges in a duel, the cause of which is wholly transparent, being the unhappy end to successive bouts of drunken reconciliation and antagonism. The resulting court-martial examined the circumstances. Vickeridge, Bridges, Major Thomas Parsons and Ensign Shuckborough Whitney of Godfrey’s, Captain Richard Molesworth of Orkney’s and Lieutenant Florence Kane of Rowe’s of Godfrey’s had been drinking ‘to some excess’ in the accused’s tent, when Molesworth, considerably the worse for ware, vomited and in a drunken attempt to leave the company drew his sword and appeared to strike Vickeridge on the head. Despite this contretemps, Vickeridge and Molesworth “seem’d to be in perfect friendship.” Yet Bridges, in insisting upon the improbability of

117 BL, Add. MSS 38853, f. 128. General court-martial held at the camp at Rooselaere, 16 & 17 October 1708 N.S., by Marlborough’s order, Colonel Andrew Hamilton presiding.
118 Walton, p. 813, quoting the 1692 Articles of War. This article remained constant, with little alteration, during this period.
Molesworth having injured Vickeridge, stoked some quarrel with accused, which simmered over the hours following.

On two occasions the company left the tent in some anger, but motions to a duel were stopped by their comrades and all returned to the tent to imbibe further. Tiredness and inebriation proved no barrier on the third occasion, as Vickeridge and Bridges met with swords two hundred yards from the Quarter Guard – which, also being of Godfrey’s regiment of Foot and seeing a field officer with the drunken company, had initially left the officers alone, believing there would be no mischief. Besides Whitney, the other officers called as witnesses to the act were of little use. Major Parsons said that he had drunk “to such excess, that he [was] utterly ignorant of what past. ” (A fellow officer bore witness to this fact, stating that Parsons entered his tent a little after the Reveille was beaten, told him of the mischief that had occurred, “but was so very drunk he could not gather any circumstances from what he said.”) Molesworth claimed “that he fell asleep for some time” and missed much of the dispute.

A more sober Sergeant John Biggs of Ferguson’s saw the denouement of the quarrel, seeing Vickeridge and four other officers

... go over a Hedge, that the Deceased kissed an Officer, then turn’d about and drew his Sword, the Prisoner having stood some time before with his Sword drawn, that they made passes at each other, and presently fell to the ground, the Prisoner first and the Deceased upon him.

Vickeridge was found guilty of fighting with and killing Bridges, in breach of the Articles of War, and sentenced to death – though mercy was recommended, in consideration of Bridges’ antagonisms. Both Parsons and Molesworth had been confined in the aftermath of the duel; they were acquitted of any part in it. But Parsons, “being a Field Officer and having not prevented the quarrel,” was sentenced to be suspended at Marlborough’s pleasure.119

A fatal duel at least precluded a continuation of the animosity between its participants (if not their friends and patrons); a conflict in which neither party found satisfaction could simmer, furthering the discord within a regiment or army. John Scot, a

119 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 8-11b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at Elst, 16 June 1705 N.S., Brigadier Webb presiding.
chirurgeon’s mate in the Foot Guards, testified on the matter of a duel between Captain (and Lieutenant) John Jefferson and Ensign Thomas Woodcock of the same corps, occasioned

... upon a dispute about the Reckoning [whereupon] Capt: Jefferson told Ens: Woodcock dam him he ly’d, that thereupon Ens: Woodcock rose up, told Capt: Jefferson he was a Vilain and a Rascal, hit him a slap on the face, then jumpt back and drew his Sword which was seized by One of the Company, that the Company advised them to agree, and that the Captain of the Main Guard was sent for, and having examin’d the matter, the Prisoners gave their Parole of Honour that no more should come of it.

This did not particularly count for much, as not long afterwards both went to fight in an adjacent meadow. The fight was halted by other officers, the only wounds appearing to be to the gentlemen’s temperament and pride (Woodcock: “Damme I have done that Rascals business, I have disarmed him, broke his sword over his head and thrown it away.” Jefferson: “You have us’d me like a Rascal, and I will use You as such.” Woodcock: “Damme, you are not able, for You could not make One pass at me. Damme, I have us’d You as You ought to be and will use every one so that meddles with me.”)

In starting the duel, Jefferson was found guilty of acting contrary to Articles of War and sentenced to be suspended for one muster; upon being restored he was to be severely reprimanded by the commandant at the head of the battalion, before the officers. Considering the ‘great provocation’ Woodcock faced, the court sentenced him to just a reprimand. It was clear that the antagonism between the two remained, and it is unsurprising that neither enjoyed a long career in the Guards. Jefferson was out the regiment by 1708 (an officer of the same name received a commission as a lieutenant in Hill’s regiment of Foot in 1711); no further mention can be found of Woodcock. 120

Violent disagreements between officers or soldiers did not always run to anything so formulaic as a duel. In 1703, the wagonmaster-general Giles Spicer was involved in a disagreement with a sutler. Spicer’s testimony ran as follows:

120 BL, Add. MSS 61336, proceedings of a court-martial of the Foot Guards held at the camp at Tirlemont, 12 September 1705 N.S., Lieutenant-Colonel John Maurice presiding. Dalton, v, II, p. 31 n. 17; vi, p. 79.
One John Jackeson a pretended sutler, meets mee a Wednesday last ye 18 of Augt 1703 old stile in Huy, where I was with Lt. General Churchill, & told mee, if I did not pay him his money, I owyed him hee would have my Life or I should his, ye Lt Genl being behine mee, I went on, being a horse backe, & tooke noe notice of him.

On Thursday morning, ye 19 of August 1703 old stile, mee meets mee at ye Generall gate a Coming out of ye quarters, and told mee if I did not pay him his money, hee would make mee, & ye hee had petitioned Mr Cardinall. I went into ye Coffee Tent where was Capt. Stephenedge Capt. Lewis Capt. Inkeings Capt. Ball Capt. Roney & Ensigne Smith. I told him very civilly ye if I owyed him any thing, on my own account, I would pay him, & hee would goe to Mr. Cardinall & Let him apoint any Gentleman to Examine ye Buseness, & if hee should say I owyed him any thing, I would pay him, hee goes out of ye Tent, & calls mee all, ye Rogues, & villains in ye world among all ye people, upon wch I went out, wth this kane he Sees, mee coming hee meets mee halfe way wth an oaken great sticke, I recd ye blow upon my arme & closed into him & strucke up his heels & caused ye gard to take him prisnorr & acquaint my Lord Cuts wth it & hee ordered him to the [Provosts], but as soone as I had Closed with him hee [twists] his hands into my haire & says god dame you I will murther you, upon which these Gentlemen came & Loosed his hands.121

For his part, Jackson claimed that Spicer had given his word on account of money lent (and goods entrusted) by him to the wagonmaster-general in the previous campaign. The sutler had lost his carts and horses, and needed funds to pay his debts. In his initial testimony, he claimed that Spicer did “a solt [i.e. assault] me barbaosly” and “mack him self plantif for my one [own] Mords and for a solting of me and my wife being big with Child att that Time put me to a Stret againe and now is brout to bed in ye provos marchall and have nothing in to [the subsistence] our selfes but ye Charite of good pepell.”122

The restoration of an officer’s honour after a dispute might involve its own peculiar brand of officerial corporal punishment. The Board of General Officers, adjudicating on a dispute between Captain Gabriel Crepigny and Mr Caulfield, the son of the Viscount Charlemont (which itself had occurred while the Board was hearing testimony on a complaint between Charlemont and the Earl of Peterborough), found as follows:

121 BL, Add. MSS 38848, ff. 175-176b: written testimony of Giles Spicer, c. 18 August 1703 [in pencil].
122 BL, Add. MSS 38848, ff. 177-178b: written testimony of John Jackson, directed “To ye Right honourable Lord Judge of ye Court and ye Right Honorobabell bench of ye Court Marchall.” See also f. 178, for a petition of similar content.
That the said Mr Caulfield having struck Capt. Crepigny in the Guard-Chamber with a Cane, during the Time the General Officers were sitting, the least thing the said Mr. Caulfield can do, to Repair so great an Injury and Affront to a Gentleman's Honour, is, in the said Guard Chamber, during the sitting of the Board, on his Knees, to ask pardon of Capt. Crepigny, who is at the same time to gave a Cane in his Hand, with Liberty to use it, as he pleases.

The dignities and safeguards due to officers on campaign and in garrison were carefully regulated by rank. General officers were accorded various compliments and salutes according to their rank. The general-in-chief of the English forces, or the Field Marshal of their Dutch allies, would receive a full salute from the officers and the quarter guard, which would beat a march; furthermore all the army would turn out without its arms on the general's passing. A full general of the Foot or the Horse could expect a march beat to their passage by the quarter guard, who would turn out with rested arms, and to be saluted by all their subordinate officers, excepting colonels. A lieutenant-general was to be saluted by all officers—colonels, lieutenant-colonels and the colours excepted—and might expect three ruffles of the drums as they passed, unless they were in the field or the camp, when a march might be beaten. Majors-general were to be saluted by no officers, but would be honoured by a couple of ruffles on the drums in camp or garrison. A brigadier could expect only rested arms in response to his passing; a colonel or other commanding officer but shouldered arms. None of the above officers could expect the honour of a salute by the cannon, which was reserved to the captain-general of the British forces alone of the generality, on his

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123 NA, WO 71/1, p. 160. Thursday 5 May 1708 O.S. Crepigny was attended by discord, it seems. Later, on 16 February 1712 O.S., the Board considered another case. Crepigny, "Employed in Recruiting the said Regt. [Gorge's] the last Year, And that being at Wigan in Lancashire a that Service, he mett There with a very barbarous Treatm't, from the People who had gathered Themselves together in a Tumultuous Manner to hinder his carrying off his Recruits; And Assaulting him with Stones, he had One of his Ribs Broke, and Rec'd Sev'. Bruises, for which he has lain long under the care of Surgeons & Physicians, And been Obliged to an Expensive Journey to the Bath in Order to his Recovery; by all which he is reduced to very great Necessity & Straits, And is so much in Debt as to be Rendered unable to Subsist, without Some Speedy Relief."

Crepigny and Sir Roger Bradshaigh, the M.P. for Wigan, could not apprehend the principal actors of "said Riott", so could gain no recompense on that account. The Board therefore thought that Crepigny was a "Fitt Object" of Her Majesty's compassion, deserving leave to sell his company to discharge his debts, and might receive further aid as thought fit. He had served 28 years in the army, 22 of them as a captain.

124 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 117, 145b, 152. Compliments for the general officers. For a similar note of military honours, see Kane, Camp Discipline, p. 8.
entering or leaving the camp or garrison.\textsuperscript{125} On occasion, these honours would forborne. At the siege of Menin, the soldiers were under orders to take no "Notice of the Gen\textsuperscript{th} in the Trenches"—whether not to distract the men to the tasks at hand, or to inform the enemy of the generals' presence.\textsuperscript{126}

When encamped, officers would be allowed the following guards. Two separate schemes are listed in the regulations detailed in Stowe MS 481, and presented in Table 3.1: a list of 'Camp Guards of Foot', and a note of the 'Orderly Guards' allowed among the British troops. By their quarters' actual door, full generals and lieutenants-general were allowed a sergeant and two sentinels; majors-general two sentinels; and brigadiers but one sentinel. Any general officer who held the colonelcy of a regiment would be allowed to take his guards from it, were it present with the army. Those that did not were allowed to take their guards from any other regiment in the line. In addition, a lieutenant and twenty-five men to disposed to provide a guard to the sutlers at the headquarters.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{125} BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 118. The source mentions the captain-general, rather than commander-in-chief. Whenever the captain-general entered into any garrison, the eldest regiment present was to form his guard: ibid, f. 124b. On an example of a salute by the cannon at Antwerp and Ghent in 1708, see SP 87/4 f. 26: Cardonnel to [Tilson], Ghent, 9 May 1708 N.S. At Ghent, Marlborough was also met some distance from the town by Lumley and the principal officers of the British troops in the garrison. The same honour was paid Ouwerkerk as Marlborough—see BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 4: camp journal, camp at Thys, 23 May 1703 N.S.

\textsuperscript{126} BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 64: camp journal, before Menin, 4 August 1706 N.S.

\textsuperscript{127} BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 117, 140b-141b. Stowe MSS 469, ff. 74-75b: undated general orders.
### Table 3.1: Camp guards to be allowed and provided for by the Foot.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer or corps</th>
<th>Camp Guards(^{128})</th>
<th>Orderly Guards(^{129})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Captain-General</strong></td>
<td>1 captain, 2 subalterns, 3 sergeants, 50 men</td>
<td>1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 40 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General of Foot</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>'Body of Guards of Horse and Foot.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lieutenant-General (of Foot)</strong></td>
<td>1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 30 men</td>
<td>1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 30 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major-General (of Foot)</strong></td>
<td>1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 20 men</td>
<td>1 sergeant, 20 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brigadier (of Foot)</strong></td>
<td>1 sergeant, 12 men</td>
<td>1 sergeant, 14 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery</strong></td>
<td>1 captain, 2 subalterns, 4 sergeants, 114 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery Horses</strong></td>
<td>1 captain, 3 subalterns, 6 sergeants, 150 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provost (Marshal)</strong></td>
<td>1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 36 men</td>
<td>1 sergeant, 12 men; an extra 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 30 men when the Provost Marshal has prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bread Wagons</strong></td>
<td>1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 36 men</td>
<td>1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 20 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weighing House</strong></td>
<td>1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 24 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guides</strong></td>
<td>3 sergeants, 30 men</td>
<td>7 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secretary (to the commander-in-chief)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Judge-Advocate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjutant-General</strong></td>
<td>1 sergeant, 12 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quartermaster-General</strong></td>
<td>1 sergeant, 10 men in addition to any according to his quality as a general officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Envoys, residents &amp;c.</strong></td>
<td>1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 25 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brigade-Major (each)</strong></td>
<td>6 men</td>
<td>7 men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\(^{128}\) BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 151b: camp guards for the Foot. Undated.

\(^{129}\) BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 140-141b: orderly guards. Undated.
The general officers' baggage was also regulated by rank. Conscious of the considerable trappings that accompanied the general officers on the campaign, the army occasionally issued orders to limit the number of vehicles that such officers might employ on the march, and thus any potential hindrance to the army's movement. An order of 7 July 1708 dictated that, after the heavy baggage of the army had been ordered away, the general officers and colonels might retain the following vehicles: a general of the Foot, three wagons and one coach; a lieutenant-general, two wagons and one coach; a major-general, likewise; a brigadier, one wagon and one coach; and a colonel, two wagons. While the general officers were permitted to retain their coaches within the line of march, their wagons were relegated to the train. This was not unforeseen: earlier, on 26 February 1708, Lumley (the deputed commander-in-chief) had written to Marlborough, noting that he had recommended to the officers of Foot that they made use of as few wheeled carriages; and the same to the Horse, with the addition that no chaises or caleches belonging to any under the degree of a general officer should travel with the squadrons — indeed, Lumley would have been glad if they were not used at all.

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As the campaigning season was heavily limited by the nature of the weather and the availability of fresh forage for the army's horses, its soldiers would spend much of the year in their winter quarters, in garrison. The degree to which officers stood their duty with them—as opposed to returning to England, Scotland or Ireland—varied. Recruiting officers were sent yearly (at least) to bring the regiments up to muster, and could provide a convenient permission of absence for those that wished to winter at home. The names of those granted extended leaves of absence were often eponymous indicators of patronage. In an order granting a leave of six months (over the winter of 1703/4) to but a handful of officers in various regiments, the grantees included: Cornet Wentworth of Lord Raby's regiment; Ensign Alexander Hamilton of the Earl of Orkney's; Ensigns William Howe and Burlace Webb from Webb's; Ensigns James Howe and Edmond Webb from Howe's; Ensign Brook Bridges from Sir Matthew

130 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b: order for the limitation of baggage. 7 July 1708 N.S. See also KP I(i)/64 (the same order).
131 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 126-127b: Lumley to Orkney, Ghent, 26 February 1708 N.S.
Bridges'; Lieutenant John Ferguson from Ferguson's; and Captain Sabine and Henry Ingoldsby from Ingoldsby's. General officers were allowed particular liberties, particularly those that were expected to sit in the Houses of Parliament.

If it was no difficulty to prevail upon officers to return to the British Isles over the winter, the same could not be said of enticing them back again, to fill their posts with the army in Spring. William Blathwayt sent a letter to a baker's dozen of regimental colonels in 1702, noting that it was Her Majesty's pleasure that all officers were "to Repair forthwith to their Regiment upon pain of being respitted." This tardiness did not diminish over the course of the war. In 1704, Cutts protested that his fellow generals, Orkney and Ingoldsby—'if not both'—ought to hasten their passage to the Low Countries; at least one of these (then) majors-general of Foot should have been with the army by the middle of March, at the latest. Neither of them, he continued

... Cane in reason think it hard or make any hesitation after having had so much time one that side of the water but when your Grace orders any of them you'll please to doe it without speaking of relieving me or my coming over that will not have soe much weight as the present posture of affairs what is to be apprehended from the enimyes undertaking something before the Campagne.

Writing at the end of April 1710, Secretary at War Granville lamented that many of the officers belonging to the army in Flanders tarried in London, notwithstanding the public notice given in the Gazette on 28 February. These officers were to depart for the continent by the 4 May, or face Her Majesty's highest displeasure and have their commissions immediately superceded. As these orders came at the height of the tensions over the Sacheverell affair, Orrery saw it less as a call to duty than an attempt to manage the outcome of the minister's trial. He noted that Granville's order was "so extraordinary that I apprehend 'tis designed to send some people out of the way, as the

132 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 53-54b: orders granting 6-month leaves of absence to various officers.
134 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 35-38b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 7 March 1704 N.S.
135 NA, WO 26/12 p. 254: Granville to Mr Lewis at the Secretary of State's office, Whitehall, 23 April 1711 O.S. This was actually an extension on the earlier imposed deadline of 25 March. BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 27-28b: James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Whitehall, 7 March 1710 O.S. See also Snyder, iii, no. 1461, pp. 1425-7: Marlborough to Godolphin, The Hague, 28 February/11 March 1710.
properest method to defeat the present scheme," and hoped that Robert Harley would help him in obviating the ill consequences that might accompany strict compliance with the order. Orrery sought an exemption for himself and Argyll.\(^{136}\) Godolphin, who saw both Argyll and Orkney (another latecomer to the army) at the House of Lords, was not confident that either would return to the continent with any rapidity. Argyll protested that he'd been sick, but would go by Friday's packet boat; Orkney, more diffident, seemed to agree with his fellow Scot, but the Lord Treasurer wryly questioned "whether either of them will make much hast."\(^{137}\)

Other officers spent the winter in the Netherlands, Flanders or Brabant, as needs directed. Cadogan, in his duties as envoy and plenipotentiary, frequently wintered on the continent and gave a brief synopsis of the social scene at Brussels:

> Count Corneille is the Principal Fuckster and Oxenstern the Top Wit. My Lord Aylesbury a Shining Beau, and his Lady a celebrated [ - ?], not a woman but puts on as much red as Lady S ------ n. They play Deep and pay ill, and in short there is a tolerable deal of Scandal but no F ------ ng. Tho to do the women Justice tis not their fault.\(^{138}\)

Cadogan appeared to enjoy a vigorous social life. Raby scolded him losing so much 'at play' as he had heard the quartermaster-general had done, thinking that his friend had "Shook off that passion, for in Ireland you gave me reason for your playing so much there that I am sure you gave not now."\(^{139}\) He also enquired after Cadogan's

> ... old mistress at Dublin, I hear she and her husband is now very poor, & a little mony would go further now with her, than fine Sayings, I suppose you have a correspondence from thence, & when you do me the Honour of another letter, I should be glad to hear how matters goes there.

But is possible that this letter caught Cadogan during his courtship with his future bride, Margaretta Munter, for the quartermaster-general cautiously rejoindered:

\(^{136}\) HMC, 52, Portland MSS, p. 537: Orrery to Harley, 14\? March 1710 O.S. This particular letter relates to the earlier deadline of 25 March.

\(^{137}\) Snyder, iii, pp. 1453-1454 n. 1490: Godolphin to Marlborough, 4 April 1710 O.S.

\(^{138}\) BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 129-133b: Cadogan to Raby, Brussels, 19 January 1708 N.S.

\(^{139}\) BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 99-100b: Raby to Cadogan, 1 November 1707 N.S.
Your Lordship in your letter speaks of your old mistress in Ireland, but I had much rather have news of some of the new ones you make at Berlin.\textsuperscript{140}

And later:

... the most sensible Part of the concern I have that my private Affairs hinder me from waiting on my Lord Duke to Berlin at the same time they prevent me from having the Pleasure and satisfaction of seeing your Lordship... but something since I have changed my condition, so very lately must be given to Decency and [Interest?], I will not add Inclination since I am afraid your Lordship will hardly think that possible in the Holy State.\textsuperscript{141}

* * *

Early modern officers enjoyed a freedom of activity denied their successors, but the tempo of the campaign might necessitate the imposition of various restrictions. As the campaign of 1703 got underway in May, camp notices warned that any officers that had business at Maastricht or Liege should settle such affairs presently, and enjoy the security of the escort that would depart the camp the following morning.\textsuperscript{142} Ten days later it was ordered that any private soldier travelling to Liege or Maastricht without a pass from the commanding officer of his regiment would be taken up and prosecuted as a deserter.\textsuperscript{143} On the march to the Danube in 1704, commanding officers were given leave to dispatch two officers per corps to Heidelberg to buy necessities, where they might remain until the army came to meet them.\textsuperscript{144}

The availability of the personal and corps funds that officers might use to purchase such necessities and entertainments varied. The other ranks of the army were paid as regularly as possible. Private soldiers and non-commissioned officers might receive as much as a fortnight or more's pay at a single time; on other occasions they were paid twice-weekly.\textsuperscript{145} Officers were not so lucky, particularly on those rarer occasions when

\textsuperscript{140} BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 5-6b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 4 September 1703 N.S. Ibid., ff. 7-8b: Cadogan to Raby, St Gron, 20 September 1703 N.S.
\textsuperscript{141} BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 25-26b: Cadogan to Raby, Frankfurt, 15 November 1704 N.S.
\textsuperscript{142} BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 2-2b: camp journal, 15 May 1703 N.S.
\textsuperscript{143} BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 4b: camp journal, camp at Thys, 25 May 1703 N.S.
\textsuperscript{144} BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 191-191b: camp journal, 6 June 1704 N.S.
\textsuperscript{145} BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 30-30b: order regulating the payment of the English dragoons on campaign. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's order. Camp at Maastricht, 24 May 1703 N.S. The subsistence was
their charges were not paid on time, and they had to cover the difference by way of their own credit. In March 1704, Cutts noted that many officers complained of being in arrears of subsistence for their companies and regiments; this hindered them in making their own preparations for the campaign, having to advance so much money to their men.146

Richard King’s credited subsistence as a captain of Foot for the period 23 April to 27 June 1705 was paid in two instalments, on 21 May and 27 June.147 Similarly, his subsistence for himself as captain and his three servants, for the period 10 July 1707 to 17 March 1708, came to fl. 1095:17:2 (at fl. 112:17:20 per month). Of this, King received 20 pattacoons (fl. 52) of this on 22 August 1707; 200 guilders on 3 September 1707; and a further 20 pistols (fl. 195) and 100 Dutch shillings (fl. 27:10) on 12 September 1707. This amounted to less than half King’s pay, though much of it was received in advance; the balance of fl. 541:7:2 was paid to the captain on 23 March 1708.148

King’s allowance as aide-de-camp to Cadogan in 1710 consisted of the usual £182.10s. p.a. (at 10s. per day, out of which was deducted £9.2s.6d. poundage and 10s. for the Royal Hospital) and two-hundred days’ forage at 12 stuivers a day (out of which was deducted fl. 12 poundage). The total came to fl. 2086:3 Holland money. Of this, King received fl. 1170 in the form of 120 pistols from Cadogan directly, with the remainder paid by a bill on Sweet in Amsterdam.149 If an officer was absent on campaign for an extended period, arrangements might even be made to satisfy a needy spouse: in June 1707, Cardonnel drew a bill on Mr Le Bas, Marlborough’s banker of Duke Street, to pay Mrs Elizabeth Spicer £10 on her wagonmaster-general husband’s account.150

set at 12 st. p.d. for dragoon and horse together, without further abatement. When subsisting on forage, without the aid of magazines, 3 st. was to be deducted for remounting costs; and a further 1.5 st. a day from each corporal, drummer, trumpet and private during the campaign for such camp necessitities as were not furnished from off-reckonings (for which each soldier was to be accounted at the end of the campaign). 2 st. was deducted monthly for the chirurgeons. The remainder was to be paid to each NCO and soldier twice weekly, on Monday and Thursday, deducting what may have been received in bread.

146 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 36-40b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 15 March 1704 N.S.
147 KP I(i)/18. Company accounts, 23 April to 22 October 1705 (inclusive) O.S.
148 KP I(i)/58. Captain King’s Abstract of his own subsistence. 23 March 1708 O.S.
149 KP I(i)/98. An account of my Aide de Camps Pay for the Year 1710. In addition to the poundage, King paid a further 0.5% on his pay to the paymaster.
General officers presented an even more extreme case, being paid according to establishments agreed by Parliament. These establishments could lag quite badly behind the actual compositions of generals serving in the field, with several officers accepting the dignity and seniority of rank on the full understanding that they could not easily expect its due remuneration. Marlborough highlighted this situation to Raby in a letter of 21 February 1709 N.S., when he wrote:

Mr. Palmes has no manner of allowance as a general officer, and Mr. Wood and Mr. Ross, with several others, are obliged to serve on less pay than their characters [i.e. rank] would allow them.\textsuperscript{151}

Warrants authorising pay for the previous campaign were typically issued by Marlborough as commander-in-chief in the Low Countries in November or December. Until then, a general was expected to live upon his personal credit. This could present particular problems to less wealthy officers: in 1703, Cutts was only able to attend the army in the field by virtue of a loan from a ‘monied friend’.\textsuperscript{152} And a general’s salary alone was thought inadequate to sustain his dignity and comfort in the field. As Ingoldsby wrote to his commander-in-chief in 1705, pretending claims to a post of Master of Ordnance recently vacated by Lord Mountalexander:

Your Grace has been pleas’d to express your self so Sensible of my being the only Lieut Genl that has no additional entertainment to Support the extraord’nary expences of our Campaigns...\textsuperscript{153}

Ingoldsby, who commanded the garrison at Ghent, complained of the great expense he had been at since his arrival, and “the Impossabillity off supporttinge so publicke an Expenc, out off my poor privat ffortune”; especially as Marlborough had commanded him to maintain a ‘good correspondence’ with the people, which could not be done “without a little hospitallity.”\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{151} Murray, iv, pp. 451-452: Marlborough to Raby, The Hague, 21 February 1709 N.S. Another, earlier example related to the rank of Withers and Wood in 1705. The establishment at the time allowed but one major-general of Horse and two of Foot. BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 101-102b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Frankfurt, 2 November 1705 N.S.

\textsuperscript{152} BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 14-15b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 2 June 1703 N.S.

\textsuperscript{153} BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 14-15b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Dublin, 20 March 1705 O.S.

\textsuperscript{154} BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 24-29b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 12 November 1706 N.S.
A central expense was the provision of horses and their forage: an early modern general or staff officer was expected to keep a considerable stable. The charge of a good horse could be considerable; a decent trooper’s horse might cost £20, while a dragoon’s would amount to £15, or £10 for “A good squat Dragoon Horse from 14, to 14 hands & ½ high” secured at the cheapest rates from Ireland.\textsuperscript{155} Hugh Caldwell, later a major of brigade, had to outlay £115 of his own funds to replace ten horses of his troop, which had been lost through the ‘stress of weather’ on the voyage of Ross’s regiment of dragoons to Holland in 1702. His basic pay as a captain of dragoons was £146 p.a.\textsuperscript{156}

Dry forage—a supply of hay, straw and/or oats from a magazine—was provided during times of little or no grazing, such as during winter quarters or at a siege. A typical allowance for the year would amount to 200 days’ worth of forage for each horse.\textsuperscript{157} A ration of forage was ‘the Day’s Allowance for a Horse’. In the Low Countries it typically amounted to fifteen pounds of hay (with another five pounds of straw, on occasion) and a variable measurement of oats.\textsuperscript{158} The standard allowance of forage for a general or staff officer, be it for winter quarters or another occasion, was as follows: general of Foot or Horse – 40 rations p.d.; lieutenant-general – 30 rations p.d.; major-general – 24 rations p.d.; brigadier – 12 rations p.d.; quartermaster-general – 6 rations p.d.; deputy paymaster – 6 rations p.d.; deputy judge-advocate – 4 rations p.d.; wagonmaster-general – 2 rations p.d.; provost marshal – 3 rations p.d.; aide-de-camp – 4

\textsuperscript{155} NA, WO 30/89 (1) p. 31. 21 January 1712 O.S. Noted an account from Cardonnel, given by Lumley’s direction, of the horses lost or killed in the previous campaign. The values are those the horses were rated at. NA, SP 41/3/41. Proposals for the cheaper and easier furnishing of horses from Ireland. London, 19 July 1704 O.S.

\textsuperscript{156} BL, Add. MSS 61301, ff. 31-32b: petition of Hugh Caldwell to Marlborough. Undated. Including servants’ pay and forage money, Caldwell’s income from the army would have amounted to £274.4s.6d. a year. He humbly begged Marlborough to be allowed a couple of horses from Raby’s dragoons, who were to leave their mounts in England before departing for Portugal.

\textsuperscript{157} E.g., BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 207: regulation of the forage to be allowed and paid for 200 days’ Winter Quarters for one year commencing 26 December 1706 and ending 25 December 1707. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. The Hague, 6 November 1707 N.S. Add. MSS 61372, f. 255b: regulation for forage during Winter Quarters, 26 December 1709 to 25 December 1710.

\textsuperscript{158} A Military Dictionary (1708). BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 203-206: warrant to pay John Hudson and Francis Heymans for forage supplied at the siege of Douai. BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 137-139b: conditions agreed by Cadogan and the Field Deputies for the provision of forage to the Danes. Camp at Asche, 24 October 1707 N.S.
rations p.d.; major of brigade – 3 rations p.d. The adjutant-general did not usually receive forage for winter quarters with the rest of the general and staff officers; he received an allowance as an aide-de-camp alone. Adjutants-general did on occasion receive a forage allowance, however, such as at the siege of Douai, where both Henry Durell and Metcalfe Graham (who “acted as Adjutant General”) received an allowance in that post.

At the siege of Douai in 1710, the general and staff officers of the army received 60107 rations of forage—42,484 rations of which were over and above the amount allowed them! By the original contract, the officers were accounted for 47 days’ forage (the siege itself lasted 63 days, from 23 April to 25 June). Many officers’ accounts exceeded such amounts by as much 100% or more. Lieutenant-General Lumley received 1786 rations for himself and his two aides-de-camp, and a further 1976 rations on top; his colleague, Orkney, received a further 1774 rations over and above his normal allowance. Cadogan received, on his own account, far more than any other officer: 1786 rations as a lieutenant-general, 282 rations as quartermaster-general, 940 rations for the guides under his oversight; to this total of 3008 rations was added a further 3422 received beyond the allowance – a total of over 40 tonnes of hay alone. He was not alone in being taxed by the rigors of the siege: his deputy, John Armstrong, received 376 rations on account and 1094 beyond it.

The junior staff officers also exceeded their original allowance. The seven majors of brigade consumed a third again as much – amounting, in effect, to the provision of an extra horse for each during the siege. Of the dozen aides-de-camp to Marlborough listed in the account, eight received more forage than allowed upon the original contract; two of them, Lord Harwich and Lieutenant-Colonel Richard King, receiving

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159 See, for example, HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8 passim and BL, Add. MSS 61369-61373 ditto.
160 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 180: forage rations for the general and staff officers, 1704.
161 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 241-242: notes on forage received by general officers at the siege of Douai from M. Pangaert. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Camp before Aire, 3 November 1710 N.S.
162 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 241-242: notes on forage received by general officers at the siege of Douai from M. Pangaert. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Camp before Aire, 3 November 1710 N.S. Armstrong’s allowance was eight rations per day – this most probably combines four rations as an aide-de-camp and four as deputy quartermaster-general.
almost their initial allowance again, in addition.\textsuperscript{163} As often occurred, Her Majesty was
to pay an advance of 6.5 stuivers per ration agreed in the contract; the remaining 6
stuivers was to be charged to those who received it, Brydges and his deputies paying
the sum to Pangaert upon the contractor providing receipts for its delivery. That
delivered over and above the contract received no advance from Her Majesty, but was
to be accounted by Brydges in full and placed on the officers' accounts.\textsuperscript{164}

As the army coalesced in the Spring of 1711, further stores of forage were delivered to
the general officers and their corps, on their march and at the camp near Douai. A
brigadier typically received less than one-thousand rations; a major-general one to two-
thousand. General of the Foot Orkney received 4108 rations. But by far the greatest
recipient was Cadogan, who received 8265 rations—a sum that exceeded even his
commander-in-chief and patron, Marlborough, who took by 7652 rations.\textsuperscript{165}

Those that did not receive such an allowance, accounted for by the army’s paymasters,
were put to considerable expense. Writing c. 1706, Deputy Quartermaster-General
Alexander Spotswood earnestly petitioned Marlborough for financial redress, lest he
be forced to resign his post. Not only had this officer been for some years denied the
warrant necessary to act in his duties as deputy quartermaster-general—a somewhat
vital role in the army, admittedly—encouraging all manner of obstructions from the
officious and pedantic; but he had also been denied a basic financial remuneration
necessary to his post: the forage allowance. Richard King, as an aide-de-camp to
Cadogan, was allowed this necessity upon the establishment; the deputy
quartermaster-general, nominally King’s senior in such duties, was not. As Spotswood
lamented:

... I here humbly represent how my indefatiguable Labours during four Campains
in the Lt. Quart. Master General’s Employment have turn’d to no other account
than to run me in Debt beyond the Value of the Company, wch I serv’d Ten Tears to
obtain.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. The aides were allowed 188 rations each: Lord Harwich received 182 rations over the
allowance, King 187 rations.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{165} BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 334: order to pay Pangaert for forage delivered from 16 April to 24
May 1711 inclusive. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Camp near Bouchain, 6
October 1711 N.S. For Pangaert’s accounts, see ff. 334b-335. Cardonnel received 1383 rations;
Armstrong 900.
That the Cause is evident; seeing I have been necessitated to furnish & maintain all along upwards of a dozen horses, in order to discharge a Duty wth Brigadier Cadogan can best inform how I have acquitted my Self of: whilst the whole consideration that I have hitherto had, has scarce amounted to 160 Pounds; & even without one Ration of Fourage allow'd me during the whole time.

If that was not enough, Spotswood took the opportunity to beg that "for some encouragement in the interim, he may not be thought unworthy, after 13 years of service, of the title and rank" that usually accompanied the post of deputy quartermaster-general (i.e. lieutenant-colonel). 166

The forage allowances provide an estimate of the number of horses each general and staff officer was expected to maintain in the execution of his duties. They provided a considerable resource to the army in times of need. When planning the siege of Saarlouis, Marlborough had hoped to muster the extraordinary number of horses required—around 12,000 in total to move the Allied artillery from Trarbach; which would effectively amount to three thousand horses, if the trains were moved in four separate stages—by requisitioning them from the army. Each of the army’s eighty battalions and one-hundred squadrons would give ten horses each (and no sutlers’ horses were to be forcibly taken by their regiments to serve in this capacity!); the remainder would be supplied by the artillery and the general officers. The generals of Horse and Foot would give twenty each; lieutenants-general, ten; majors-general, six; and brigadiers, four. 167 This plan appeared to meet with little approval; later Marlborough was drawing up various projects to draw the 3000 horses from the allied Rhineland states of Mainz, Trier, Cologne and the Palatinate, and various local villages. In any event, these plans were to no effect, as the operation was cancelled. 168

Marlborough’s stable while on campaign was considerable. During the winter months, it fell under the care and duty of Mr Christian Versyle and Captain Daniel Coenen, themselves noted contractors of mounts to the army. For the period 29 October 1705

167 BL, Add. MSS 61335, ff. 32-33b: account of what the army was to furnish in horses, to draw the artillery for the siege of Saarlouis. 1705.
168 BL, Add. MSS 61335, f. 34: project to supply 3000 horses for transporting the artillery and ammunition. 1705.
N.S. to 8 May 1706 N.S., they fed and stabled Marlborough’s horses, and provided lodgings for the duke’s own grooms, at Ijslemonde. Forty-three of Marlborough’s horses were stabled there; at 6 stuivers of fodder a day, the bill for feeding this stable alone amounted to nearly 2500 guilders. A dozen of the duke’s horses died that winter, including one ridden by his trumpeter.169

A later memorial listed Marlborough’s stable as numbering eight riding horses (a ‘chestnut stone’ from Colonel Lillingston; ‘Snipe’; a ball stone horse from Godolphin; a barbary, also from Godolphin; ‘Ffetherson’; a little barbary; a bay Turk from the Elector Palatine; and a grey Turk from Colonel Pendlebury); a black Spanish horse and a grey gelding; six servants’ horses; and a welter of coach horses, including two new Prussian coach horses, three gray Romans, five bay Wittemburgers, two bay Palatines, ten assorted grey coach horses and a mare to draw the duke’s chase. A further three of Marlborough’s riding horses were invalids: the grey Turk from the Elector Palatine was lame, ‘Merydeth’ had floundered and ‘Copenger’ was blind.170 Marlborough’s horses were often named with an element of wit, and/or a nod to certain individuals: ‘Meredyth’, ‘Somerset’, ‘King of Prussia’. One might even assume that ‘Cutts’, who died at the camp at Tirlemont, was named on account of its temper.171

Marlborough’s aides-de-camp were typically tasked with overseeing such parts of the duke’s equipage, as well as receiving and expending various sums on their master’s behalf.172 Cash and bills were usually collected by what appeared to be the most senior of Marlborough’s aides-de-camp, the adjutant-general excepted. In 1703, for example, James Bringfield was issued with 1100 guilders in April, and a further 550 in October, on the account of Marlborough’s pay as commander-in-chief. In April Bringfield also received a further 4300 guilders on account of the contingencies; and Cardonnel 1492:1

169 BL, Add. MSS 61335, ff. 49-50b: Versyle and Coenen’s bill for keeping Marlborough’s horses, mules and lodging for servants, 29 October 1705 N.S. to 8 May 1706 N.S. Marlborough paid fl. 2535:12 in satisfying this bill, 21 September 1706 N.S. Two of the duke’s horses died 2 November; one on 7 November 1706 N.S.; two on 27 November; four on the 9 and 10 December; one on 12 January 1706 N.S.; the trumpeter’s horse on 20 January; and one coach horse on 30 January

170 BL, Add. MSS 61335, f. 51b: memorandum on Marlborough’s horses. Confusingly, the memorandum gave a total of 30 horses, 7 mules and a further ten grey coach horses—which did not quite match the individual entries.

171 BL, Add. MSS 61335, f. 52b: memorandum on Marlborough’s horses.

172 BL, Add. MSS 74237 K, ff. 33-34b: Bringfield to Watkins, 6 February 1705 [O.S.?]
guilders likewise. These patterns of disbursement continued; in 1705 Bringfield received various sums on Marlborough’s accounts, including over 400 pistols for his use on the campaign. From later in 1706, it was John Pitt who received funds in Marlborough’s name; in 1710, it was Mr Eaton. Cash was even paid to Mrs Cadogan for the Duchess of Marlborough’s use in the Netherlands.

Although Marlborough’s aides oversaw the purchase of many of life’s comforts on the campaign, the duke also maintained a fair household of servants while in the field, many of local provenance. An account of the wages due to Marlborough’s servants for the campaign of 1710 included a confectioner, two manservants (Mr Daniell and Mr Arnauld), a baker, Mr Lovegrove of the duke’s cellar, a sculleryman and Mr Leimbach, the a steward. Throughout the war Marlborough also retained a body of trumpeters, typically numbering two, who were paid £10 p.a. each. Even Henry Watkins was tasked with helping oversee the duke’s arrangements on occasion.

It was the duty of every senior officer to show hospitality to his peers. Richard Ingoldsby hoped that, if the commander-in-chief visited the forces besieging Ath, he

173 BL, Add. MSS 61406, passim. See also, for example, Add. MSS 61135, ff. 35-36b: Marlborough to Sweet, The Hague, 16 November 1709 N.S. Marlborough ordered Sweet to give Captain Pitt fl. 600 on his account.

174 BL, Add. MSS 61407, f. 117.

175 Marlborough was particularly fond of his tea and chocolate. In one instance, Captain Pitt paid fl. 57 for tea and fl. 200 for chocolate on the duke’s behalf (BL, Add. MSS 61407, f. 117.). Other receipts include ten pounds of green tea at fl. 14 per pound, provided by Drummond (BL, Add. MSS 61348, f. 63: bill of John Drummond, Amsterdam, 8 November 1707 N.S. The total, including money for the boxes, came to fl. 144) and 54 pounds of chocolate at fl. 2 per pound (BL, Add. MSS 61348, f. 69. 1708/9. See also ibid., ff. 84, 93, 101, 113). For servants, see, for example, BL, Add. MSS 61348, f. 49: Les Gages Pour les Domestiques mentionée pour la campagne pour 223 Jours 1706. They included Arnauld Claude and William Daniell, who at 4 Flemish shillings per day received £44.12s. Flemish money; Daniell Tephine, at a flat £40 Flemish money per year; Henrie Barrat at 3 shillings per day and Jean Halland at 2 shillings and 6 sols per day. The total came to £220.8s. Flemish money.

176 BL, Add. MSS 61348, f. 107: An account of the wages due to the following domestiques for the campaign 1710. 23 January 1710/11. Puzzlingly, the cover makes reference to them being in England.

177 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 74, 179; Add. MSS 61371, f. 46b; Add. MSS 61372, f. 42b. Their names were Joseph Williams, then John Conrad Richter from 1705; and John Vandemande (who was the only trumpeter mentioned for 1711).

178 Upon landing with Marlborough at the Brill, in Rotterdam, Cardonnel wrote to Watkins on the matter of the duke’s welcome and accommodations. Aides-de-camp Bringfield and Durell would have their usual rooms, Cardonnel supposed, but desired that Watkins would manage various minor matters, such making sure there was a good fire in the duke’s room upon his arrival. BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 67-68b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Rotterdam, 29 January 1704 N.S.
would dine with him; he begged to know which other officers in the camp Marlborough would have for their company. Marlborough was no exception and invited the general officers to dine with him on various occasions, such as the anniversary of the victory of Blenheim. Supporting such a table and household was costly. Marlborough expended fl. 2151:7 on provisions at the Hague for the 1707 campaign; by 1711, the sum had risen to fl. 5662:4 (not including provisions for his yacht), and an account of wine bought in the same year included 142 bottles of Pierry, 54 bottles of champagne and 14 bottles of burgundy. Marlborough was not alone in stocking his cellar; general officers were allowed their wine free of custom, and on one occasion Richard Ingoldsby wondered if such kindness might be expanded to the regimental officers:

My Lord, several of the officers who command Battalions, have desiered me, to pass them a little wine for thayer one use, custom free, which I have refus'd; your order, being onley in favour of the Genll: officers that stay heare, but iff your Grace thought itt ffit, I believe itt would not be mutch, and Extremley pleas the officers.

* * *
General and staff officers did not lead a sheltered existence, and were frequently exposed to the risks of death and injury on campaign. Brigadier Archibald Row was killed at Blenheim, where Meredyth and Wood were injured, as were four of the seven majors of brigade. Webb received such wounds at Malplaquet that he was invalided out of active service. A general officer that died whilst on campaign would usually have his general equipage (as opposed to any more personal items that might be returned to his family and estate) auctioned off before the army, typically before his own corps or at the headquarters. Notice would be given beforehand, for the benefit of prospective buyers.

On the evening of 25 September 1709, William Cadogan had been present as the allied forces broke ground from the their lines of circumvallation and began to open trenches near the Port à Havre at Mons, an action in which Private John Marshall Deane noted that “the enemy did feirly oppose them, and did beett our folkes 2 or 3 times from there works—but at length our folks beet them in againe, and abundance of men was killed on both sides & likewise abundance wounded.” Cadogan was one of those wounded, while his aide-de-camp, Thomas Foxon, was killed. The Quartermaster-General had been injured by a musket ball to the neck—a wound of some seriousness to the fleshy Irishman, for as Marlborough noted to Godolphin: ‘Thay can’t find the ball, nor can the surjeans give any judgement til they have dressed him once or twice more.’

Those individuals that survived their wounds might continue in the service, though few examples of injury and subsequent perseverance could compare with the experience of Henry Gordon. Gordon had been a second lieutenant in the Scots Fusiliers when he lost “a legg & half of his thigh” at the battle of Blenheim. Undeterred by this grievous injury and its implications on his serving with the Foot, Gordon

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184 Dalton, v, II, pp. 1-2; vi, p. 299. Webb, D.N.B.
185 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 123b, 124b: camp journal. Note of Count Oxenstierna’s equipage being sold following his death at Malplaquet. Several British officers’ effects were also sold before the Duke’s headquarters.
186 Deane, op. cit., pp. 96-7. Snyder, iii, no. 1409, pp. 1376-7: Marlborough to Godolphin, Camp at Havre, 26 September 1709 N.S. Marlborough also wrote a similar letter to Sarah (see n. 10 below), and one to Secretary Boyle; see Murray, iv, pp. 605-6: Marlborough to Boyle, Camp at Havre, 26 September 1709 N.S. In a letter to Heinsius of the same date he hopefully commented ‘...as he has no ill scimptoms, I hope he will do well.’ t Hoff, op. cit., no. 798, p. 467.
secured a commission as a cornet in the Earl of Stair's regiment of Dragoons – in which he served for five further campaigns, despite being “shot through the other leg at the Battle of Mons”\textsuperscript{187}

A more common impediment to the senior officer, however, was illness. The health of Marlborough's general officers was not exceptional. Charles Churchill suffered a stroke in 1708, ending his military career, and gout was a common complaint of the period, laying out Francis Palmes at Westerwald in 1707 and Sir Thomas Erle at Ostend in 1708\textsuperscript{188}. Fevers were common on account of the climate. In 1705, Wood lay desperately ill at Breda, his recovery 'despaired off'\textsuperscript{189}; while both Colonel Thomas Stringer and Brigadier Lord John Hay died in quick succession in the autumn of 1706, while a welter of officers and assistants were similarly stricken, including Richard Ingoldsby, the Earls of Albemarle and Orkney, Charles Ross, Thomas Meredyth and Adam de Cardonnel.\textsuperscript{190} Writing from the siege of Dendermonde, Meredyth noted that he was "very weak [and] not able to walk well without help but shall be as well as ever in a day or two," but in the meantime was able "with a little help to be where [he] could be of use..."\textsuperscript{191}

In May 1708, Meredyth apologised to Marlborough for his delay in attending the army; he was then engaged in 'a very severe course' of medical treatment, which could continue for a fortnight longer. He claimed to be feeling the benefits already, and hoped to be quite well when the course had finished.\textsuperscript{192} A few years earlier, the Earl of

\textsuperscript{187} NA, WO 30/88 (3), p. 49. Petition of Cornet Henry Gordon to Her Majesty, asking for a yearly gratuity on account of his wounds. Granville and Brydges, Whitehall, 15 February 1711 O.S. See also Dalton, v, p. 81; II, pp. 57, 59 n. 29; and vi, p.314. Gordon received at bounty of £22 on the Blenheim Roll.

\textsuperscript{188} Snyder, ii, pp. 915-916 n. 908: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 29 September 1707 N.S.; pp. 1100-1101 n. 1101: Marlborough to Godolphin, Lannoy, 24 September 1708 N.S.

\textsuperscript{189} Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 548: 10 May 1705 O.S.

\textsuperscript{190} For Hay, see Murray, ii, p. 105: Marlborough to Harley, Helchin, 26 August 1706 N.S. Hay perished after being ill for near three weeks. For Stringer, see Snyder, ii, p. 662 n. 671: Marlborough to Godolphin, Villaine, 12 September 1706 N.S. On Ingoldsby's sickness, see BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 20-21b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 24 July 1706 N.S. Snyder, ii, pp. 635-637: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 9 August 1706 N.S and ibid., pp. 689-690: Marlborough to Godolphin, Gramets, 30 September (also contains note of Orkney's and Ross's illness). For Cardonnel, Snyder, ii, pp. 677-678 n. 686: Marlborough to Sarah, Gramets, 23 September 1706 N.S.

\textsuperscript{191} BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 222-224b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Grimberg, 24 June 1706 N.S.

\textsuperscript{192} BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 229-230b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Chelsea, 4 May 1708 O.S.
Orkney took to the waters at Wiesbaden on the recommendation of Marlborough’s surgeon, Dr Lawrence – though he was not confident they would cure him of “that violent sharpness” he had in his blood. Orkney was one of the more frequent sufferers in the army. In 1705 it was an acute earache resulting from an abscess; a complaint so violent that it gave him “noe rest night nor day,” keeping the general at Aix-la-Chapelle; in 1711 it was a fever and pleurisy.

In August 1710, Adam Cardonnel was struck down by a particularly debilitating illness. His company was kept by Dr Francis Hare, Marlborough’s chaplain-general and one of the most voluble (and perhaps ingratiating) of correspondents. What followed was a series of over two-dozen letters addressed to Watkins, written by Hare at Cardonnel’s sickbed in Lille, and containing the most minute, often hour-by-hour observations on the secretary’s health over a fortnight and more.

Cardonnel had been fatigued by his journey to Lille; a weariness that was not dissipated by a night’s rest. As he deteriorated, developing a ‘bilious fever’, diverse physicians prescribed various remedies: a glyster (an enema), which appeared to work well; cordials (both with and without opium), which did not;—in a particularly apposite comment upon common medical science of the day, two doctors ventured in the early stages of Cardonnel’s fever to bleed him; and if that didn’t work, the physicians would be ‘at a loss’. One evening, after Cardonnel had been feeling somewhat better, the doctors ordered him to take a ‘blister between the shoulders’ (i.e. a plaster, typically with Spanish flies, designed to raise a blister). To their surprise, he

193 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 89-90b: Orkney to Marlborough, Wiesbaden, 17 October 1704 N. S.
194 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 93-94b: Orkney to Marlborough, Aix-la-Chapelle, 18 May 1705 N. S.
Add. MSS 61162, ff. 113-114b: Orkney to Marlborough, London, 11 May 1711 O. S.
195 BL, Add. MSS 33225, letters of Hare to Watkins: ff. 25-26b (Lille, 1 August 1710 N.S., 8 a.m.); ff. 27-28b (ditto, 3 p.m., 4 p.m.); ff. 29-30b (2 August, 3.30 p.m.); ff. 31-32b (3 August); ff. 33-34b (4 August, noon); f. 35 (ditto); ff. 36-37b (ditto, 8 p.m.); ff. 38-39b (5 August, 7 a.m.); ff. 40-41b (ditto, 3 p.m.); ff. 42-43b (6 August, 8 a.m.); ff. 44-45b (ditto, 3 p.m.); ff. 46-47b (7 August, 12 o’clock); ff. 48-49b (8 August, 7 a.m., 8 a.m., 9.30 a.m.); ff. 50-51b (ditto, past 3 p.m.); ff. 52-52b (9 August, past 3 p.m.); ff. 56-57b (10 August, 3 p.m.); ff. 58-59b (11 August, 3 p.m.); ff. 60-61b (12 August, past 3 p.m.); ff. 62-63b (13 August, 3 p.m.); ff. 64-65b (14 August, 2 p.m.); ff. 66-67b (15 August, 2 p.m.); ff. 68-69b (16 August, afternoon); ff. 70-71b (17 August, 12 o’clock); ff. 74-75b (18 August, 10 o’clock); ff. 76-77b (Ghent, 19 August, 6 o’clock); ff. 88-89b (Ghent, 24 August, noon); ff. 104-105b (Ghent, 1 September).
was somewhat restless afterwards. On the 4 August, Cardonnel was well enough to bid Hare to write a note on his behalf, to which he attached a scrawled signature:

I am forbid to write, however I think it would bee to great a peice of uncharitableness not to let you & Mr Teale know, that I am much better than I was, when the last letters went away. I hope to write you both by the next post.

By the 9 August, Hare ventured to believe that Cardonnel was out of danger; but a lengthy convalescence continued. A few days later, he was able to take the air, and salivating at the scent of roast beef. Cardonnel then repaired to quarters at Ghent where, a month after he had first taken ill, Hare declared him fitter than he had been in the past five years, and could discover nothing wanting as to a perfect recovery but

... [Raff?] & Piquet, which he seems as yet to have no relish off, & 'twould be ne'er the worse, if he had no more for the rest of the Campaign.

Cardonnel had so long managed much of the bureaucracy of the army in the Low Countries that his illness was mirrored by a slight distemper the headquarters' affairs. Necessary papers and contracts required oversight, but Cardonnel was in no position to effect such; and was so delirious that any advice he might give was of unsure footing. Hare tried to aid in Cardonnel's affairs, but admitted that he could not distinguish between 'what [was] distemper and what [was] not' in the secretary's ramblings, and was hesitant to dispatch papers to the army or England in such circumstances.

196 BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 38-39b: Hare to Watkins, Lille, 5 August 1710 N.S.
197 BL, Add. MSS 33225, f. 35: Cardonnel (via Hare) to Watkins, Lille, 4 August 1710 N.S.
198 BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 66-67b: Hare to Watkins, Lille, 15 August 1710 N.S.
199 BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 104-105b: Hare to Watkins, Ghent, 1 September 1710 N.S.
200 BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 31-32b: Hare to Watkins, Lille, 3 August 1710 N.S.
IV

Logistics and larceny:
Reconciling public and private enterprise

"Cadogan being Quartermaster Generall gave him many opportunities
to rob the poore Peisants & for the better Executeing thereof he
Industerously gave out by his assistants that it was don by order &
for the use of the Genll. Which was very well known to the contrary by
all that were neare the Generall."

Memorial of charges against Cadogan. Anonymous.

The payment of Her Majesty's subject forces in the Low Countries, and the English
portion of those foreign auxiliaries in English or joint Anglo-Dutch pay, was a
convoluted process. The transfer of public funds and credit from London to the army
lay in the hands of several individuals. The overall responsibility for the payment of
the troops lay with the Paymaster to the Forces Abroad, a post held first by Charles Fox
(23 December 1702 to 10 May 1705 O.S.) and then James Brydges (10 May 1705 to 4
September 1713 O.S.).\textsuperscript{201} The paymaster charged himself with all public moneys due to
the army; a responsibility that was discharged by the pay of the soldiers and officers by
his Deputy Paymaster(s), who served in the Low Countries. These deputies received
credit by way of remittances from the Paymaster or other prominent individuals—the
financier Sir Henry Furnese was prominent—or by drawing bills upon same. This
credit was used to supply the army with money from local bankers and merchants.

At the beginning of the war, the English retained one deputy paymaster in the
Netherlands: Benjamin Sweet, who resided at Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{202} Sweet was under

\textsuperscript{201} There was also a Paymaster of the Forces, who handled matters prior to the creation of a
separate post for the forces serving abroad.

\textsuperscript{202} An idea of the duties of Sweet is provided by his expenses in the months prior to the onset of
the war. Amounting to £226.18s.4½d, they included: four months' extraordinary charges for
going express from England to the Hague to get vessels to disembark the forces, and several
journeys to Sevenbergh, Breda, the Hague and Amsterdam (£122); a large iron chest (£83.4½d.);
constant orders to pay what was ordered by a warrant or other direction from the
duke, without any further order from Cardonnel or otherwise.\textsuperscript{203} Sweet dealt with the
solicitors and paymasters of the regiments, who were allowed a commission on all
funds they secured for their corps, usually ½% from their regiments.\textsuperscript{204} When the army
moved further from Sweet's base at Amsterdam, additional stages entered the process,
as credit was provided at other towns and cities. On 1 July 1704, during the march to
the Danube, Sweet informed Marlborough that the army would be successfully
subsisted for two months from that day, on account of the bills that Cardonnel and
drawn on Sweet, and the credit (over 300,000 guilders' worth) Sweet had and would
send to Cardonnel on Frankfurt. Sweet's correspondent in Frankfurt would account for
such monies when and wheresoever Marlborough ordered them, much 'in the same
manner, as M. Behagel does it'. Beside the specific credit obtained in Frankfurt, Sweet
had also obtained a general credit for the army 'in all the great towns that they pass to
supply them upon any exigences'.\textsuperscript{205}

Different centres of credit could offer different rates of exchange – which paymasters,
merchants and bankers could exploit to bring profits by way of arbitrage. The conquest
of much of the Southern Netherlands in 1706 provided a significant opportunity for
this, given the difference in the rates of exchange of current money between Holland,
and Brabant and Flanders. The Lord Treasurer, Sidney, Earl of Godolphin, had been
made aware of the difference in exchange between Amsterdam and Antwerp by a
banker from the last place, Jacobus de Koninck. In outlining the process of payment as
he expected it to be managed (by bills drawn upon Antwerp, 'as was usual in the late
war', with considerable sums remitted there in the manner of bills on Amsterdam, and

\textbf{the charge of an office at Rotterdam, and for fire, candle and other necessities (\£20); sums paid
by him for the loss in receiving bad money, and money received short in bags (\£20); postage of
letters and packets (\£25); and books, paper, wax, pens etc. (\£9.10s.). BL, Add. MSS 61330, ff. 23-
24b: note from Lowndes to Blathwayt, passing on a list of disbursements asked for by Sweet.
Copy. Treasury Chambers, 3 February 1701/2 O.S. Blathwayt's acceptance of same, dated
Whitehall, 18 March 1701/2 O.S. Later in the war, his expenses for like over a six-month period
came to \£357.7s.6d. Ibid., ff. 34-35b: Sweet's petition for his expenses, 24 December 1704 to 23
June 1705, "being in Proportion to what the Rt Honbte Lords of the Treasury thought fit to allow
him for three months, when the army was but 10,000 men."}

\textsuperscript{203} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 1-2: Brydges to Cardonnel, Amsterdam, 7 September 1706
N.S.
\textsuperscript{204} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 177: Brydges to Cartwright, 17 March 1709 O.S.
\textsuperscript{205} BL, Add. MSS 61135, ff. 20-21b: Sweet to Marlborough, Amsterdam, 1 July 1704 N.S. Isaac
Behagel was a Dutch merchant, and the financial agent of the States General in Frankfurt.
actual specie transported from Dutch banks) he highlighted the way in which the
exchange could be managed to the ‘best advantage’. This exchange between Holland
and Flanders had suffered since the last war: whereas the agio on the patacoen (or
difference between the value of current and exchange money) had been 8½%, it had
since risen to 16½%; such was the difference, that the local merchants anticipated a
return to the earlier rate.206

Table 4.1: Rates of exchange between Holland and the Spanish Netherlands, 1706207

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flemish specie and rate of exchange (in Dutch guilders)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exchange money</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ducatoon fl. 3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Patacoon (or Crown) fl. 2:8</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Flemish) Shilling 6 st.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gold:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sovereign fl. 15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea fl. 11:3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pistol fl. 9</td>
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<td>Ducat fl. 5:1</td>
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<td>Albertin fl. 6:15</td>
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<td>Ducatoon fl. 3:10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Patacoon (or Crown) fl. 2:16</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Flemish) Shilling 7 st.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Current money</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gold:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sovereign fl. 17:10</td>
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<td>Guinea fl. 13:1</td>
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<td>Pistol fl. 10:10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ducat fl. 5:18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albertin fl. 7:17</td>
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</tbody>
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206 BL, Add. MSS 61134, ff. 94-95b: English translation of a letter from Jacobus de Koninck,
Antwerp, 14 June 1706 N.S. Koninck noted that the exchange in London was 33 Flemish
shillings and 3 or 4 pence to the Pound Sterling—but the rate would fall, and that for
Amsterdam rise, on account of the sums that would be paid to the army in Flanders.
207 BL, Add. MSS 61134, ff. 96-97b: figures appended to a translation of a letter from M. de
Coninck, Antwerp, 14 June 1706 N.S.
James Taylor, at the Treasury, wrote to Brydges with Godolphin's concerns regarding the exchange: the Lord Treasurer had found that a 'very great advance'—even allowing for charges in transportation and exchange—of not less than 9 or 10% to be made on sending specie from Holland to Flanders and Brabant. Godolphin desired that Brydges would immediately order Sweet (or another, if he was too busy) to Antwerp, to 'take all possible care that this Advantage be duly Accounted for.'208 Brydges, well aware of this difference, sought to obfuscate the matter by protesting the hardship the officers would feel if the advantage was made good to the public rather than themselves, not least because the "provisions an Liquors they have occasion of, are so dear in the Countrey." 209 Godolphin was not moved, believing Brydges had misunderstood—"perhaps Wilfully"—his intentions; he was glad that any profit be shared proportionately, but not that it should be swallowed up "by particular officers, much less by any of the paymasters or the deputyes," and was not impressed "with those who have taken such pains to misrepresented [his directions] to the officers and soldiers."210 For his part, Marlborough was studiously ignorant, being "extreame glad of the directions [given]... for I do not understand the matter..." and simply wishing an equality of pay with the Dutch and anything else saved to the Public.211

An idea of the profits gained is presented by the merchant Francis Stratford's account for 1706. Out of the fl. 959,345:1 passed to Stratford to pay the army, fl. 710,000 had been negotiated 'to advantage', giving a 2% profit to the interested parties: Stratford, Brydges, Adam de Cardonnel and William Cadogan.212 This did not amount to much, but still excited anger in the army, which complained that while their Dutch colleagues received the Flemish shilling at just 6½ stuivers, they had it at 7 st. It gave Marlborough such a bad impression of Stratford, Cardonnel thought, "that it may

208 BL, Add. MSS 61134, ff. 92-93b: Taylor to Brydges, Whitehall, 20 June 1706 O.S. Godolphin's interest was pricked by the letters of Marlborough and Coninck.
209 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 115-116: Brydges to Godolphin, Amsterdam, 14 July 1706 N.S.
210 Snyder, ii, p. 625 no. 632: Godolphin to Marlborough, 16 July 1706 O.S.
211 Snyder, ii, pp. 602-603 no. 613: Marlborough to Godolphin, Harlebeck, 8 July 1706 N.S.; pp. 608-609 no. 618: Marlborough to Godolphin, camp at Helchin, 12 July 1706 N.S.; pp. 616-618: Marlborough to Godolphin, camp at Helchin, 19 July 1706 N.S.
212 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, p. 101: Brydges to Cardonnel, 29 April 1707 [O.S.] Stratford claimed 1%; Brydges was "fully resolv'd (as I have all along) not to share any part of it my self", so the remaining 1% was split between Cardonnel and Cadogan.
break his measures entirely for the future." Sweet himself was put out by such large sums of public money being in private—as opposed to his own—hands. Although Brydges and Cadogan had sought to calm the affair, protesting (disingenuously) that the army was content in the manner utilised, the secret of the 2 to 2¼% profit made on the exchange was out, and blew up into a full-blown row between the Paymaster and Sir Henry Furnese, whose own profits in the remittances were being diminished by the scheme. Summing up the situation, Cadogan wrote:

I shall say nothing more of the payments in this letter, but that Wee have had the Scandal without the joy hitherto and that I believe it might be order’d wee should have the Joy without the Scandal.

There would be plenty of joy to come.

Sir Henry had sought to send his own agent to Antwerp to manage the profit of the exchange, but Brydges acted quickly to prevent it. He sent to Antwerp his own choice, Captain Henry Cartwright, as a second deputy paymaster. Views on Cartwright’s arrival varied. Marlborough was annoyed that he’d not been consulted in the commission, but relented; Cartwright noted that Sweet said he was satisfied with his coming over, “but I am very sure his words did not agree with his thoughts.” Cardonnel, surprisingly, seemed dismissive— that, or he was giving Watkins the lie when he said Cartwright was “... inter nos ... sent over chiefly for a riddance, pray advise our friend Mr Sweet not to [intermeddle] with him but let him go on his own way.” Stratford quickly introduced him to the usual mercantile suspects in matters

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213 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, p. 5: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Helchin, 20 July 1706 N.S. Stratford attempted a convoluted defence of his method—see ibid., pp. 6-7: Stratford to Brydges, “From the Great Camp”, 23 July 1706 N.S.

214 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 5-7: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 October O.S. Stowe 58, i, pp. 100-101: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 16 November 1706 N.S. Cadogan enclosed two signed papers from the general officers in the camp as a justification of the method.

215 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 100-101: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 16 November 1706 N.S.

216 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 64-66: Brydges to Drummond, 10/21 January 1707. Ibid., i, p. 4: Brydges to Sweet, 29 October 1706 [O.S.]. The rate of payment was to remain fl. 10.15 Holland money to the pound sterling, with the Flemish shilling paid at the rate of 6½ stuivers.

217 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 91-92: Cartwright to Brydges, The Hague, 8 November 1706 [O.S. marked].

218 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 157-158b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Whitehall, 10 December 1706 O.S.

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of financial ingenuity, such as Abraham Romswinckel and the Scot, John Drummond.²¹⁹

Undeterred by Brydges sending his creature to Antwerp, Sir Henry continued to remit to Antwerp in the same manner as he did to Amsterdam; and by giving bills for such sums on his agent, Koninck, sought by picking up private bills or buying specie, to transmit to Antwerp and make a considerable profit. Yet Brydges was sure he could secure these transactions at a more advantageous rate than Sir Henry and proceeded with his own experiment, into which Cartwright was swiftly inserted. Drummond and Romswinckel bought up specie in Holland, which was sent to the deputy paymaster at Antwerp with all secrecy, out of sight of Koninck and Sir Henry.²²⁰ Cartwright’s loose lips almost spoiled the scheme, when he let slip that he might take the whole remittance out of Sir Henry’s hands, drawing on Brydges directly: “such a piece of indiscretion in you,” Brydges scolded, “that I am amaz’d at it, & you have almost spoil’d the whole design by it.”²²¹

Sweet had a whiff of the affair. His obstructions were minor at first: in December 1706, after Marlborough had decreed to Cartwright (in Sweet’s hearing) that the army was to receive the pistol in Antwerp at the same rate as it was taken in Holland, Sweet signified the same to Ingoldsby and had a ‘sworn broker of Amsterdam’ send the general every week a summary of the exchange in Holland, ‘for the better governance of the paymasters of each regiment’.²²² Brydges disagreed; Marlborough had in fact since stated that the payments should continue as before and any advantage be accounted to the public. To diminish Sweet’s capacity for further disruption, he gave the following reprimand:

I can’t forbear saying upon this occasion that I am sorry to see, you will mistake so grossly in matters of this nature, & run on out of peke to a particular person (as I presume) to do such acts as those without consulting first all your freinds in England, but that you may not have any colour of doing the like again for want of

²¹⁹ HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 101-103: Stratford to Brydges, The Hague, 19 November 1706 [N.S.]
²²⁰ HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 47-48: Brydges to Drummond, 22 November 1706 O.S.; p. 49: Brydges to Cartwright, 28 November 1706 O.S.
²²¹ HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, p. 53: Brydges to Cartwright, undated [c. December 1706].
²²² BL, Add. MSS 61406, f. 133 (rev.): Sweet to Marlborough, Amsterdam, 3 December 1706 N.S. Add. MSS 61135, ff. 45-46b: Sweet to Ingoldsby (copy), Amsterdam, 3 December 1706 N.S.
Sufficient explanation from me I must acquaint you that you are not concern’d in any wise to the take notice of any manner or rates the payments are made to the troops by Capt. Cartwright he will take their notes in Current mony of Holland which when you clear at the end of the two months they must allow being constantly & regularly transmitted by him to you, so that there will be no occasion at all of your entring into the detail of the prices at which the severall species are taken.223

The basic method, of buying specie at cheaper rates to send to Antwerp, while paying the army at a more expensive one, was continued into 1707. Cadogan privately agreed with Palmes and several other friends that their regiments took payments on his terms. He made a bargain with a Jew to provide 6000 Louis d’or and patacoons (£8000 in another estimate) each month at fl. 9:10 and 51 st. Holland money respectively; given that the army was paid the Louis d’or fl. 9:15, this was a clear profit. In order to carry to proceed with this method, a sum of 50-60,000 guilders had to be lodged in Romswinckel’s hands to pay the Jews as the money came in. Cadogan was confident that they would turn £15-16,000 a month at 2%; a greater sum could not be managed easily, and would alarm Sir Henry Furnese.224 Cartwright was in full accord with Cadogan and helped remove Brydges’ objections to the plan.225

William Sloper, at the pay office in London, was brought into the scheme, which now included Brydges, Cadogan, Romswinckel and William Burroughs, Cadogan’s secretary.226 Sweet, however, proved a problem. He was not unaware of the enterprise; indeed, at the beginning he was tacitly involved, providing money to Romswinckel to buy up gold. Brydges even noted his desire to cut Romswinckel (and his ½% commission) out, as Sweet could readily fill his role to his advantage, but it was not to be.227 Sweet refused to pay the bills Cadogan gave on Romswinckel, unless they were charged to his own regiment. Romswinckel believed Sweet apprehended “the Management of these Sums by the Hands of the Brigadier to his Prejudice and

223 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, p. 50: Brydges to Sweet, 3/14 December 1706.
225 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 171-173: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 19 May 1707 N.S.
226 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 99-100: Brydges to Cadogan, 28 April 1707 [O.S.]
therefore will Study all that He can to Obstruct it" and Brydges ceases his attempts to bring Sweet into the method.228

An alternate scheme was raised by Cadogan, who suggested that Brydges could sideline Sweet by remitting money to his wife. Bills were remitted to Holland on Cartwright, who endorsed them and made them payable to Mrs Cadogan.229 Poor Romswinckel, however, was still thought expendable. Burroughs, Brydges argued, could just as easily collect the money from the Jews instead, which would "go a good way in ye profitt." Romswinckel was temporarily removed from the cabal.230 The method was further modified in July, when the ongoing dispute between Sweet and the Baron Waleff (see below) caused Johan Hallungius—a close acquaintance of Brydges—to be appointed as Waleff’s regimental solicitor, giving Brydges a pretence to transfer funds on account of that regiment to aid the affair of buying gold.231 The sums could prove considerable: when Hallungius asked Mrs Cadogan how much she needed every month, she replied that fl. 25,000 a week should suffice232

Despite the early tribulations, the method seemed to have been set on a secure foot. To quote Brydges:

I am very sensible the disappointments occasioned by Mr Sweet and some delays by [Romswinckel] have prov'd a great prejudice to the success of this Affaire and its becoming so advantageous as was expected; but ye method tis in at present in regard of Mr. Hallungius being made use of, to pay for ye Gold ... is such, that it

228 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 192-193: Cadogan to Brydges, camp at Meldert, 6 June 1707 N.S.; pp. 200-202: Romswinckel to Brydges, Amsterdam, 10 June 1707 [N.S.]. Stowe 57, i, pp. 159-160: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 June 1707 O.S. Romswinckel himself had thought it best if Sweet was brought as a full partner into the scheme. Stowe 58, i, pp. 209-210: Romswinckel to Brydges, Amsterdam, 17 June 1707 [N.S.]
229 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 192-193: Cadogan to Brydges, camp at Meldert, 6 June 1707 N.S.; ii, pp. 1-2: Cadogan to Brydges, camp at Meldert, 27 June 1707 N.S.
231 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 187-188: Brydges to Cadogan, 18/29 July 1707. Cadogan was in full agreement with the use of Hallungius. Stowe 58, ii, pp. 60-61: Cadogan to Brydges, Soignies, 15 August 1707 N.S.
may be carried on the rest of the Campagne wth great east & in the winter the same, & next summer too...233

The affair continued successfully, with minor alterations, over the years 1707 and 1708. Brydges was glad that their being "concern'd in any manner of Proffit [was] so great a secret to every one."234 Any opportunity to increase their profits was seized readily - when Stair's and Ross's dragoons desired to receive their payments from Cartwright, rather than Sweet, even though they were quartered at Gorcum in Holland, Brydges and his comrades were elated: this would allow another legitimate reason to provide credit to Cartwright, which could be used to buy specie.235 Unfortunately for the conspirators, the plan came to nothing, as Ross and Stair subsequently changed their minds and asked for their subsistence to be paid by Sweet.236 Sweet would later hint at his knowledge of the profit at Antwerp and desired an account of it, as he did not think it reasonable that he should be a stranger to it - but his chance had gone.237

Cadogan's role with the Council of State at Brussels was invaluable, as when he used his authority Brussels to prevent an order postulated by the States of Holland for the alteration of the rate of exchange in Flanders, which would have destroyed the project.238 The quartermaster-general also used his power to put the payment of the Imperial soldiers on such a good foot, paying them six weeks in advance, that they allowed him a thousand crowns a year for the Foot (and the Horse in proportion) for prompt payment, which was deducted from the sums paid them. Cartwright's part in this enterprise was the five Brabant regiments, which would produce 1300 or 1500 a year.239 Cartwright actually received ~3% on the fl. 80,000 paid - a method that

233 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 209-210: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 August 1707 O.S.
234 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 1-2: Brydges to Cadogan, 5 December 1707 O.S.
236 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 5-7: Brydges to Cadogan, 24 December 1707 O.S.
237 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 91-92: Brydges to Sweet, 19 October 1708 O.S.
238 HL, Stowe MSS Stowe 58, ii, pp. 158-160: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 12 November 1707 N.S.
239 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 196-199: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 19 January 1708 N.S.

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couldn’t fail as long as Cadogan was in charge of affairs at Brussels.\textsuperscript{240} There was little chance to secure profit on the exchange in 1709, but Cadogan’s private account for 1708 ran as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item By exchange of fl. 600,000 brought from Holland to Antwerp \quad fl. 11129 [1.85%]
  \item By exchange of fl. 72,500 brought from Lille to Antwerp \quad fl. 5094 [7%]
  \item By profit on the Prussian and Danish forage, for money advanced to the undertakers \quad fl. 1612:16
  \item By exchange on the embarkation account \quad fl. 21,745:11
  \item By profit on money advanced to the Imperial troops \quad fl. 11,692:10
  \item By profit on money advanced to the Spanish troops \quad fl. 19,500
\end{itemize}

Total: \textit{fl. 70773:7}

Cadogan assigned Burroughs fl. 3600 for three years’ charges, leaving fl. 67173:17 to be split between himself, Brydges and the others.\textsuperscript{241} Brydges declined to take a share in the fl. 11129 (he thought Cadogan deserved alone) and suggested a further fl. 5000 for Cartwright and fl. 10000 for Sloper, who remitted the money from England. This left fl. 41044:7 between himself and Cadogan, of which Brydges would take 20,000 guilders and leave the remainder to the Irishman.\textsuperscript{242} Cadogan was apprehensive Cartwright would think his share too little, and was happy to satisfy him from his own portion, “since he has not only been instrumental in doing service as to the past, but may be so for the future.”\textsuperscript{243}

The tensions between Sweet and Cartwright escalated as the war continued. Each attempted to infringe upon the privileges of the other. Early in 1708 the deputy paymasters were ordered to pay a third of the money due to the British regiments in

\textsuperscript{240} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 222-223: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 8 March 1708 N.S.

\textsuperscript{241} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, v, pp. 65-67: Cadogan to Brydges, 19 December 1709 N.S.

\textsuperscript{242} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, pp. 139-140: Brydges to Cadogan, 6 January 1710 O.S.

\textsuperscript{243} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, v, pp. 127-130: Cadogan to Brydges, Brussels, 17 February 1710 N.S. Cartwright’s share was later increased to 10,000 guilders.
Holland and two thirds in Flanders, a recipe for confusion. Cadogan and Cartwright were up in arms at the development, but Brydges calmed them, assuring the others that he would still be able to remit £10,000 a month to continue the enterprise. Brydges was at this time wholly in favour of Cartwright managing the entirety of the British regiments' subsistence; he prevailed upon Marlborough to order that, during the campaign, the whole subsistence of the soldiers would be issued by the deputy paymaster at Antwerp [the copy in Add. MSS 61371 had 'Amsterdam', which was then crossed out] - who when necessary could give bills upon the deputy paymaster at Amsterdam, for what was wanting in the subsistence in Holland, and likewise upon the pay office in England, for what was necessary there.

The campaign of 1708 was particularly fraught in terms of supply. The French capture of Ghent and Bruges, and their blockade of the Scheldt, often reduced the army to great straits. Cardonnel could get no more than 2000 pistols at Courtrai (and that at 4%); Erle, at Ostend, managed to advance some, draw on Amsterdam or receiving specie itself from England. Any money transported was at risk from French parties, and Brydges entreated Cartwright to “take care to tun not y*e least hazard, for y*e loss of one advance would not be made up by y*e profit of a war of much longer continuance than this is likely to be.” And if this was not clear enough, he later repeated:

You must remember that you have my positive directions never to send any money (& I repeat them again in this) to y*e Camp without directions from his Grace in writing by one of his Secretarys, in w*ch case if any misfortune should happen y*e Publick will bear y*e loss.


245 BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 260b: order regarding the payment of the troops. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Asch, 8 July 1708 N.S.

246 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, p. 64: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Roncq, 8 October 1708 [N.S.]; pp. 75-76: Erle to Brydges, St Albert, 15 October 1708 N.S. and 23 October 1708 N.S.; pp. 117-119: Erle to Brydges, Ostend, 11 November 1708 N.S.

247 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 23-34: Brydges to Cartwright, 14 March 1708 O.S.

248 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 31: Brydges to Cartwright, 21 May 1708 [O.S.]. Cartwright himself was nearly captured with a considerable sum in 1710. Stowe 57, ii, pp. 70-71: Brydges to Cartwright, 10 September 1708 [O.S.]. The paymasters were usually assigned escorts from the army and nearby towns. On one occasion Ross was ordered to dispatch twenty dragoons out of each of his two regiments, with officers in proportion, to convoy the paymaster to Ghent; thence
Brydges had actually protested that the money he had issued in the years 1705-1708, via remittances in bills to the Low Countries, or bills drawn upon him from thence, had not always produced the full fl. 10:15 per pound sterling — though he continued to pay the army at that rate, despite the loss. Anne was happy to continue the payments on the same foot as before—at fl. 10:15, “notwithstanding any variation that might happen on the Exchange upon the remittance thereof” —directing the auditors to allow such differences on Brydges’ accounts; while encouraging the paymaster to seize what opportunities he might to make good the loss, by surcharging to himself any profits that might arise when the pound produced more than the set rate, or was gained by the agio on remittances to Antwerp.249

Despite the care taken in their designs, the likes of Cadogan and Brydges were open to the antagonisms of the army through their management, as when the army was angered at being forced to take the pistol at fl. 9:15 (a 3% loss) in 1709.250 Sir Henry Furnese was angry at the sheer amount of money being drawn upon England, for it negated the commission he gained on the remittances he sent. Godolphin forbade such paymasters and merchants drawing any more, unless a letter was sent over in advance on what it was for, and the correspondents received subsequent directions from Brydges. Brydges cautioned Cartwright against letting slip the least knowledge of their schemes, for Sir Henry’s malice was such that he’d make use “of it to all our prejudices.”251
Cartwright was typically the focus of the officers' discontent, not least on account of his poor working relationship with Sweet, which could rebound upon the army. When Cartwright was concerned by the rumoured opposition the Lords North and Grey, Argyll and Orkney in 1709, Brydges assured him that they made no complaint against him, but noted:

I wish I could say ye same by other Officers, but ye misfortune of not having sent Mr. Sweet ye notes hath renndred him unable to settle their subsistence with them ... [so] their mouthes are filld with [...] talk of being hardly used that I think ye Town talks of nothing else, & I [doubt but] my Ld Treas' is not prevailed upon to put an end to ye office at Antwerp & rest it all again at Amsterdam.252

Cartwright could count upon the support of the clique within the headquarters, however - perhaps because they were as embroiled in the various schemes as he was. Cardonnel believed Cartwright acted "without reproach"; while Cadogan claimed the complaints against him were "Grounded on Malice or Mistake."253 Later in the war, Cartwright described his commander-in-chief's own urbane approbation:

... I presumed to acquaint his grace wth the great concerne I was in for liberty to Justifie my selfe wth I could easely doe by the letters I receiv'd upon the Occasion His grace in a Wonderfull kind manner laying his hand on mine, told me I must not mind wt was said and bid me throw of all Concerne...254

Brydges, however, was not convinced. Whatever his occasional exasperation or anger at Sweet, he never displayed the contempt to his deputy that coloured the letters of Cadogan, Cartwright or Hallungius. Even in 1709 he secretly considered putting an end to the office at Antwerp and putting all payments through Sweet's hands. Naturally, his thoughts were sweetened by the fact that his deputy at Amsterdam had made mention of the acknowledgements he might receive if gratified that office so.255

June 1709 [O.S.] For a detailed account from Brydges upon how the dispute with Furnese arose, see his letter to Cardonnel of 23 June 1709 O.S., ibid., pp. 232-234.
252 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 202-204; Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 10 January 1708 [N.S.]; Stowe 57, ii, p. 155: Brydges to Cartwright, 28 January 1709 O.S.
253 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, p. 228: Cardonnel to Brydges, Brussels, 4 February 1709 [N.S.]; pp. 248-249: Cadogan to Brydges, Ostend, 9 March 1709 [N.S.]
254 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 156-158: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 17 December 1708 [N.S.]
255 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 158: Brydges to Sweet, 3 February 1709 O.S.; Stowe 58, iii, pp. 256-258: Sweet to Brydges, Amsterdam, 5 March 1709 [N.S.]
No alteration was decided upon in 1709, but Sweet and Cartwright continued their discordant relationship.

Cartwright was not alone in engendering the antipathy of others. Sweet was engaged in several long-running disputes during the war. The first was on account Etienne Cailleaud—an intelligencer also acting as a financial agent—who had been the solicitor of Baron Waleff's regiment before his bankruptcy. Cailleaud had allegedly used huge sums of public money, sometimes exceeding 400,000 guilders (granted irresponsibly, it was said, by Sweet), to buy gold. Sweet took role as temporary solicitor—"a Little Solicitor makes above a Thousand pounds per annum of a Regiment as I am informed"—but the dispute soon grew to include Waleff and Hallungius.

Cailleaud had held fl. 60,000 of Her Majesty's money in his hands when he went bankrupt, which Sweet promptly charged to Waleff's regiment, to the baron's great anger. There then proceeded a period of mutual antagonism, with Waleff refusing to have anything do with Sweet, appointing Hallungius as a new solicitor and desiring to receive his regiment's money from Brydges directly. Hallungius also grew tired of Sweet and desired to be free of his meddling:

I am sorry that a person of so Considerable a Trust as Mr Sweet has so much Vanity, & Conceit as to discov'r. his Poor Braines, and Plenty of Malice by instinct of Jealousy & hatred ag't. Me; for by Anatomizing the whole Position, nothing but that will remaine in the bottom of it.

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257 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 163-164: Sweet to Brydges, Amsterdam, 13 May 1707 N.S. Upon Sweet's being made solicitor, Brydges callously noted: "I am glad you did not pay him ye' former Extraord: you'll be able to negotiate now that matter with them your Self to both our advantages." Stowe 57, i, pp. 103-104: Brydges to Sweet, 8 May 1707 O.S.
258 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 217-219: Hallungius to Brydges, 12/24 June 1707; p. 239: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Meldert, 7 July 1707 [N.S.]; pp. 244-248: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 1/12 July 1707.
The dispute was finally fixed on 9 August 1708 N.S., though the animosity remained.\textsuperscript{260} Sweet later wrote that he did not want “to order one farthing of Extraordinaries [for Waleff’s regiment]. Let them behind.” And added:

It has been always a pitiful Regt. & ye Baron was a poor beggin Baron when his Regt. was first rais’d. Since w’th he has built a Pallace which none of his Ancestors ever saw ye like, & by relation of all ye Officers are grown rich & turn’d Bankers.\textsuperscript{261}

Another dispute arose between Sweet and his fellow lodger, Bardeau, “French Scoundrell”, over diverse financial issues. John Drummond acted as arbitrator in the matter and managed to secure a settlement.\textsuperscript{262} Indeed, the Scot found the affair amusing—“They are a comical couple,” he noted—though his humour was not shared by Brydges. Bardeau had threatened to turn informer unless he was satisfied, and Brydges was angry that Sweet had been indiscreet enough to do others beside himself a great prejudice, given the delicacy of the accounts he managed for himself, his superior and the commander-in-chief.\textsuperscript{263}

Cartwright continued to believe that the entirety of the British subsistence should flow through his office. In 1710 Brydges sent a deputation on this issue to Cardonnel, suggesting that such a resolution would be workable if Marlborough agreed; but Brydges was not that concerned if the duke did not, for Cartwright had “the misfortune not to be acceptable to the army, as I wish he was.”\textsuperscript{264} Sweet took the deputation badly, laying it at Cadogan’s door, and Brydges confided to Cardonnel that if he had seen the letter Sweet wrote, “protesting what revenge he’d take of him for it, had you never so much been in ye spleen, I am confident you could not have forbore splitting your sids with laughter...”\textsuperscript{265} Cardonnel joked that if Brydges had seen the manner in which Sweet resented it, he would have thought him “fitter for Bedlam,

\textsuperscript{260} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 7-8: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 10 August 1708 N.S.
\textsuperscript{261} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, x, pp. 58-61: Sweet to Brydges, Amsterdam, 13 November 1711 [N.S.]
\textsuperscript{262} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, p. 22: Brydges to Bardeau, 23 August 1709 O.S.; iii, p. 32: Brydges to Drummond, 6 September 1709 O.S.; pp. 81-82: Brydges to Drummond, 10 October 1709 O.S. Stowe 58, iv, pp. 234-235: Drummond to Brydges, Amsterdam, 4 October 1709 [N.S.]
\textsuperscript{263} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, pp. 182-183: Drummond to Brydges, Amsterdam, 10 September 1709 [N.S.]. Stowe 57, iii, pp. 30-31: Brydges to Sweet, 6 September 1709 O.S.
\textsuperscript{264} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, pp. 202-205: Brydges to Cadogan, 7 April 1710 O.S.
\textsuperscript{265} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, pp. 244-246: Brydges to Cardonnel, 6 May 1710 O.S.
than any other place.” But Marlborough put a stop to the matter and ordered both paymasters to keep a good correspondence. 266

The following year the spectre of combining the two offices—only this time in the person of Cartwright—was raised again. Marlborough had no objection, being very much of the opinion that the service could never be carried on regularly in different hands. 267 Sweet caught wind of the proposal, and earnestly protested to Marlborough that ‘the reasons which they pretend to a league for this’ were frivolous, and of no weight; he also hinted at the ‘great deal more’ he could offer on the subject, to others’ prejudice. 268 Later, Sweet gave an even more explicit threat, telling Cardonnel that Brydges should “not to think of removing him, & that he does not think it would be for y’. [Brydges’] interest.” 269 Again, no alteration was made. 270

As the war progressed, Brydges and Cadogan became more discerning in their peculations. They had each made a considerable sum and clearly did not wish to risk their positions and reputations unnecessarily. The buying up of gold to transport to the army was one of the first casualties of their caution; Cadogan ceased to have much interest in that transaction as early as 1709, perhaps influenced by the proximity of a potential peace. 271 Brydges found himself ‘pretty easy’ in his ‘own little fortune’. 272 Yet Cartwright, who had received little relative to a Brydges or Cadogan, was still eager to seek an advantage. An quip from Hallungius earlier in the war, describing another financial agent’s joy at the continuation of the war, is apposite:

266 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, v, pp. 260-262: Cardonnel to Brydges, before Douai, 8 May 1710 [N.S.]
267 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, viii, pp. 205-209: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Lens, 24 June 1711 [N.S.]
268 BL, Add. MSS 61135, ff. 47-48b: Sweet to Marlborough, Amsterdam, 25 June 1711 N.S.
269 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ix, pp. 122-123: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp near Bouchain, 17 September 1711 [N.S.]
Thus that the Prayers of one Mr. Petkum will be heard certainly, that the warr will continue; the reason of this Prayer is because he thinks not to have made that Profit by it he proposed to himself at the beginning. I do not question there are more of this mind.\textsuperscript{273}

Brydges tried to dissuade Cartwright from the riskiest of enterprises:

I am really wholly ignorant thereof, but am determined to be no ways concern'd in any that can arise from bringing money from Holl\textsuperscript{4} to Antwerp. I know it is so hazardous in many respects that I must desire you 'I never think to pratice it.

Instead, he advised his deputy that the greatest (and safest) advantage was to be had with the management of the forage contracts; but that was the perquisite of another.\textsuperscript{274}

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In addition to receiving pay (in cash or credit) for their service, the officers and regiments of the English army typically received an allowance of forage—hay, straw and oats—for their horses at various times, usually upon taking the field, investing a fortress and/or entering into winter quarters. The quantities involved could be considerable. 399,250 rations were delivered to English, Hanoverian and Prussian troops in Her Majesty's pay during the siege of Douai, each ration consisting of fifteen pounds of hay and three \textit{piccolins} of oats. The whole, at 12.5 stuivers per ration, amounted to fl. 186600:0.5.\textsuperscript{275}

As quartermaster-general of the English army in the Low Countries, Cadogan held considerable responsibility in the management of the forage, acting as a liaison between the army, commissaries, and various civilian contractors and providers. On occasion this would involve the direction of substantial forces in wide-ranging operations, as when Cadogan led a detachment as far as La Bassée in Artois to secure

\textsuperscript{273} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 92-94: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 9 September 1707 N.S.


\textsuperscript{275} BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 203-206: warrant to pay John Hudson and Francis Heymans for forage supplied at the siege of Douai.
what fodder it could. At other times towns would provide forage ‘voluntarily’, albeit under threat of greater sanction. As the army grew lean during the siege of Bouchain in September 1711, Cadogan and Dopff were dispatched to Tournai to inquire if the environs would furnish any oats, “Otherways they must expect to be foraged.” In November 1708 Cadogan asked Marlborough that the Commandant of Courtrai had orders to send what troops Captain King desired, “to execute those villages that dare not forthwith furnish their Quota according to the Repartition made by the Directors of the Chatillennie.” Yet much forage was provide civilly by providiteurs, with whom Cadogan might be authorised to contract with on the ‘most reasonable terms’, either separately or with the Deputies of the States General.

As the war progressed and his influence increased, Cadogan took a greater part in these affairs. The Irishman was never shy in aggregating responsibility to himself and his offices, be it for the English forces or others. Whilst the English army remained his fief as its quartermaster-general, Cadogan often concerted with Field Deputies in arranging the forage of those foreign troops in joint Anglo-Dutch pay. In the autumn of 1707, he, Ferdinand van Collen, Johan van Vrijbergen, Godard van Reede, Sicco van Goslinga and Adrian van Borssele drew up the contract for the provision of forage, by Pierre Pangaert and Martyn Robyns, to the four battalions, twenty-one squadrons and staff of the Danish forces in the service of Her Majesty and the United Provinces. This detailed contract settled the number of rations and place of delivery, as well as the

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276 La Bassée was a fortified town some fifty miles to the southwest of Marlborough’s camp at Roeselare. Cadogan took 10 squadrons to join the 2000 horse and ten battalions already there. He could find supplies only for the remainder of the month, forcing Marlborough to send Lord Stairs to Dixmunde, to assault the French fort there and open a path to forage in that country. Snyder, ii, nos. 1146 (6 November 1708 N.S.) & 1153 (16 November 1708 N.S.), pp. 1140-1 & 1145-7; Murray, iv, 297-9, 301-2.

277 In 1706 the States of Brabant proposed that they be allowed to deliver oats to the army to avoid foraging (Murray, iii, pp. 174-5). Snyder, iii, no. 1771, p. 1680: Marlborough to Godolphin, Bouchain, 21 September 1711 N.S. BL, Blenheim Papers, Add. MSS. 61160, ff. 97-98.

278 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 75b: authorisation for Cadogan, major-general and plenipotentiary at Brussels, to contract for forage. Oudenaarde, 27 November 1708 N.S.

279 These were the five Field Deputies chosen by the States-General for 1707. Their responsibilities were as follows: Collen (Holland), Vrijbergen (Zeeland), Reede (Gelderland), Goslinga (Friesland) and Borssele (Raad van State). Borssele was more commonly known by his title, as the lord of Geldermalsen.
price of each ration. Cadogan and the Field Deputies continued this joint arrangement of the forage for the Danish contingent in later years.

In the winter of 1708, Cadogan again co-operated with the Field Deputies in securing from Pangaert and Robyns 300,000 rations of hay and 500,000 rations of oats for the magazine at Terminde. The provisioners were to be exempt from all tolls and other charges dependent on their rights of entry, passage and exit, be it in Holland, Brabant or Flanders as well as the city where the magazine was constructed. Rarely—English subject troops excepted—Cadogan would possess sole control in agreeing initial conditions for the provision of forage to a corps, as in the case of the Hanoverians in 1709, whose rations were to be paid for by Queen Anne alone. All other contracts that involved the United Provinces in some financial manner, such as those for the majority of the auxiliary forces in Anglo-Dutch pay, would of necessity be sent to the Raad van State at the Hague, to examined and approved—whereupon Slingelandt might give his certification.

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280 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 137-139b: conditions agreed by Cadogan and the Field Deputies for the provision of forage to the Danes. Camp at Asche, 24 October 1707 N.S. See also Veenendaal, vi, p. 609 no. 1203: Goslinga to Heinsius, camp at Asch, 24 October 1707 N.S. Each ration was accounted at 7 sols in the current money of Holland; it consisted of 15 lbs of hay, 5 lbs of straw (both Brabant weight), and a ration of oats according to the ‘Ghent sack’ (which contained 24 rations of same). If the Danish cavalry, infantry and staff paid 6 sols per ration, and the dragoons 5 sols, the surplus would be covered by the British Crown and the States-General.

281 See, for example, BL, Add. MSS 61333, f. 150: copy of the resolutions of the Raad van State relating to the forage provided by Messrs Pangaert and Robyns to the Danish forces. As agreed by Cadogan and the Field Deputies, 4 January 1709 N.S. Checked at the Hague, 16 February 1709 N.S.; signed by Slingelandt, 21 February 1709 N.S. Also Add. MSS 61334, ff. 121-122b: a contract for the Danes made by the Field Deputies and Cadogan, May 1709. The price of each ration was higher than the previous year, on account of the great frost delaying transportation; the destruction of much forage in the field; and by the lateness of the season of the season when making the contract—Bruges where the Danes quartered, was not evacuated until January 1709.

282 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 168-169b: conditions agreed by Cadogan and the Field Deputies with Pangaert and Robyns for the provision of forage. Brussels, 8 December 1708 N.S. The agreement was signed by the two provisioners, Cadogan, Collen, Goslinga and Rechteren. Delivery was to commence 14 December 1708 N.S. Pangaert and Robyns were to be paid 7 ¼ sols current Holland money for each of the 300,000 rations of hay and oats, each of which comprised 15 Brabant lbs of hay and oats according to the Ghent sack—here listed as containing 22, rather than 24, rations. The 200,000 further rations of oats alone were to charged at 3 ½ sols per ration. It will thus be seen that they hay and oats each provided 50% of the usual ration’s cost.

283 BL, Add. MSS 61334, ff. 121-122b: minutes of contracts for forage signed by Cadogan. May 1709. The contract for the Hanoverians was on the same terms as the previous year, ‘not withstanding the lateness of the time it was made in, the Country’s being ruin’d, and the great Frost’. See also Add. MSS 61372, ff. 258-260: note of warrants to pay for the forage of the
For the English part, these contracts were at least by the mid-late stages of the war the preserve of Cadogan. Cardonnel, for example, had relatively little involvement—and that only reluctantly. ("We have had many disputes together on this subject," he noted, wryly.) Cadogan's deputies might play a role in overseeing lesser details, memoranda, capitulations and agreements—but their role was limited; it certainly did not extend to the formulation of the contracts themselves. In one example, Armstrong was ordered by Cadogan and Cardonnel to examine the pretentions of Pangaert and Robyns, who had presented a certificate to the headquarters detailing the funds still owed them by Her Majesty.

Regiments would typically agree to pay the bulk of the price of forage, by assignations upon their paymasters and solicitors out of the funds made available to them; the remainder would be footed by State—Her Majesty and Parliament; or the States-General of the United Provinces. A proportion of this price would be paid in advance to the contractors by Her Majesty and the States-General, by way of their paymasters-general. It was here that the possibilities for profit arose.

In 1707, the money to be paid as the Queen's proportion of the forage allowed to the Prussians, for their winter quarters at Aix-la-Chapelle and the Pays de Cologne, was to be paid directly to the country itself. As the difference in exchange was ~4% between these places and Amsterdam, Cadogan provided nearly the whole sum due himself.

Hanoverian troops for the winter of 1709/1710, according to contracts made by Cadogan. The ration was contracted at 9.5 and 7 stuivers per ration, of which 6 stuivers (5 for dragoons) was to be paid by the Horse, Foot and General Staff, and the remainder by Her Majesty.

284 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, viii, pp. 41-45: Cardonnel to Brydges, The Hague, 7 April 1711 [N.S.]

285 E.g. BL, Add. MSS 61333, f. 192: recapitulation of the money owed Pangaert and Robyns for the forage delivered to the troops in 1709. 18 December 1709 N.S. The provisioners claimed fl. 128393: 6/ in current Holland money. By Armstrong's inquiries, he found that they had received on 27 April 1709 N.S., by eight letters of exchange sent by Cadogan upon Henry Cartwright, the sum of 52500 guilders; and further fl. 26845 by assignation on the latter in November. This left fl. 49047: 6½ remaining to be paid.

286 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 171-172: conditions for the provision of forage by Pangaert and Robyns, made with Cadogan and the Field Deputies. (c. 1708.) Signed by Cadogan, Collen, Rechteren, Welvelde, Bussell and Geldermalsen. Contract for the provision of 350,000 rations of forage and oats; and 50,000 rations of oats with hay. Britain and the States would agree to pay 3½ sols a month in advance for each ration of forage to be delivered to the Foot and Horse, and 4½ sols in advance for each ration due to the Dragoons.
providing a 'quick and certain gain'. In addition, the Prussians allowed the Irishman a gratification of 3% on the sum forwarded for his services in securing the payment. Unfortunately for Cadogan, he could not contract in time with the other deputies, who went to Sweet and made their 'bargain' with him.

Cadogan tried again the following winter. If Her Majesty's moiety for Prussian forage was remitted to Cartwright, he wrote in a memorial to Brydges, it could be managed so that 3 or 4% was allowed them by their advancing the payments one month – as the money was not stipulated in the treaty to be paid at Amsterdam, it could be paid elsewhere, possibly to further advantage. The same method could be applied for the Hanoverians and Danes. But Brydges was somewhat tardy, again, in the management of the affair, and the undertakers to the Hanoverians and Danes raised the money on the credit of the contracts themselves. Only the deputies of Aix-la-Chapelle and the Pays de Limburg made an agreement with Cadogan, allowing him 4% as long as they were paid by 1 March N.S.

Brydges suggested that Cartwright take a greater interest in the management of the forage contracts, rather than the more hazardous attempts at arbitrage they had engaged in before. The deputy paymaster was indeed sensible of the advantages to be made on this head, but protested that any design toward this was “Sunk by the Gentleman [Cadogan] who Sign'd the Contracts, who having a power & Strong pretensions, for drawing bills in that time of necessity, grasp'd the tout...” Of the fl. 966,676:2 which Cartwright paid upon the forage account, he never received the least present, from either Cadogan or the undertakers.

Though it might appear as if the peculations of the likes of Brydges, Cadogan and others were committed without any regard to the nature of the sum brought to

287 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, p. 131: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 1 April 1707 N.S.
288 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 145-147: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 23 April 1707 N.S.
289 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 86-87: Brydges to Cadogan, 31 March 1707 [O.S.]
290 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 160-161: Cadogan's memorial (enclosed with a letter of 13 November 1707 N.S.). On another occasion, Cadogan thought one corps would allow him 6% upon the advance on the forage contracts. Stowe 57, iii, pp. 159-162: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 February 1710 O.S.
291 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 195-196: Cadogan to Brydges, Brussels, 9 January 1708 N.S.
292 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ix, pp. 141-143: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 31 August 1711 [N.S.]
account, there was a distinction made between what was termed ordinary expense – the payment of the men's (and, to a lesser degree, on account of their recourse to credit, officer's) subsistence; and other extraordinary payments, such as various subsidies, reimbursements of sums expended in the campaign, and so on. Relatively little license was taken with the soldiers' pay, given the ill consequences of its delay; nobody thought the situation of the Hessian troops in Italy, whom the Landgrave had threatened to recall within ten days if the last of their ordinary pay was not delivered (they not being able to subsist otherwise), was a piece of good management. Extraordinaries, however, seemed to be viewed as a nicety, not a necessity; foreign princes could be lucky to be accounted with an element of these sums at all, never mind the full amount or whether it was on time.

Payment might be received in the dreaded tallies (guarantees of credit upon future tax revenues, which were typically heavily discounted), or at a considerable discount. Francis Stratford, the merchant who had overseen the pay of the army in the early-middle years of the war managed to get the Prussian and Holsteiner corps to agree to sell their arrears to him at a 8% discount, not including the infamous '2½%' due to Marlborough. Earlier, Stratford had complained that the Danes had been so punctually paid in their extraordinaries that they weren't the least interested in his heavily discounted offer; but if Brydges could be prevailed upon to get the next quarter that fell due postponed a while, they might think better of it!

The payments for the army's bread usually fell under the same ill category. In terms of logistical supply, the English war-effort in the Low Countries typically followed the lead of its Dutch ally. An agreement for the supply of bread to the army by Antonio Alvarez Machado, and Amsterdam merchant of Portuguese Jewish extraction, specified that the English would receive their provisions at the rates and conditions
contracted by the States-General of the United Provinces for their own soldiers.296 In one of the first contracts of the war, possessing twenty-one various articles, Antonio Alvares Machado was called upon to provide and maintain 350 wagons to carry bread, meal and grain for the army; each with a good wagoner and 'ffoure Strong and well fooded Horses'.297

A company of Foot might receive its bread every three or four days, with a single loaf expected to last a soldier for that amount of time. Rations were typically rated as half, whole, or three-quarter rations: for a company of 42 men, for example, a whole ration would be 42 loaves; a half ration 21 loaves.298 In one scheme, each loaf was to weigh three Brabant pounds and to be marked to prevent fraud; in another, a 5 stuiver loaf might weigh as much as six Brabant pounds.299 All accounts were to be made and settled within a fortnight of delivery; or three weeks at the latest. Machado and his executors were to bear the loss of any negligence caused through their underlings. In addition, Machado was to retain in the field

... a sufficient Number of Persons of good Substance who may Answer and be Obliged in writing for the Performance of the Contents of this Contract...

For the convenience of the army, bread might be delivered occasionally to the head of each brigade, and the train of artillery, to the respective regimental quartermasters or

296 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 121-126b: articles of agreement between Sidney Godolphin and Antonio Alvares Machado (on behalf of Queen Anne and Machado) for the supply of bread to the army, 4 March 1705 (O.S.? ) (copies, 21 March 1705). To provide provisions of rye for stocking Machado's magazines, England was to advance the provisioner 100,000 guilders at fl. 10:15 per pound sterling.

297 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 113-115b: contract for Antonio Alvares Machado, 8 December 1701 N.S. Ratified by the Dutch Raad van State. 'Englished' out of a printed paper in Dutch, 29 December 1701.

298 KP I(i)/20. Captain King's Bread-Note. 10 May 1706 to 27 October 1706. In the month of June, for example, King's company received eight deliveries (one half, the remainder whole), totalling 318 1/2 loaves.

299 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 121-126b: articles of agreement between Sidney Godolphin and Antonio Alvares Machado (on behalf of Queen Anne and Machado) for the supply of bread to the army, 4 March 1705 (O.S.? ) (copies, 21 March 1705). Add. MSS 61333, ff. 123-126b: copy of a treaty made for bread and forage to the Spanish cavalry. 29 May 1709 N.S. By cause of the uncertain price of grain, Castano obliged himself to deliver bread to the corps at the rate of 5 sols per 6 lb loaf. The conditions, weights and measures followed those contracted with Cadogan earlier in the month (14 May). A list of contemporary weights with S.I. values is as follows: Hague lb, ~470 g; Amsterdam lb, ~494 g; Ghent lb, ~430 g; Brabant lb, ~472 g.
others appointed; Machado was to have a clerk stationed at each brigade, the train and/or the headquarters, with others as necessary to assist him.\textsuperscript{300}

The bread contracts were central to the charges laid before Marlborough in 1711 and 1712. Solomon de Medina testified that he gave Marlborough for his own use fl. 265614:14:8 over the years 1707 to 1710, and a further 21,000 guilders for the year 1711 thence far; the accounts of Antonio Alvarez Machado for the years 1702 to 1706, he suggested, beneficed Marlborough to a similar yearly magnitude. Medina also said that he had allowed the general officers the free use of twenty-two wagons each year, a dozen or so of which were taken by Marlborough. Cardonnel benefited too, taking 500 ducats at the yearly sealing of the new contracts for his services; while Benjamin Sweet was allowed 1% on all sums he passed to Medina, theoretically on account of his prompt payment, though Medina rarely enjoyed hasty remuneration.\textsuperscript{301}

Marlborough and Cardonnel were clear that the perquisites offered by the bread contractors being a ‘constant practice’, both during the campaign as in the preceding war, was to be emphasised as the central part of their defence. Watkins was asked, the minute he received one of Cardonnel’s letters, to go express to the Hague, and endeavour ‘by all means’ to obtain the account books of the late Machado, and Pereira. But Cadogan, who took the errand, seemed to opiniatre, and it was all too late (if indeed they offered any chance of respite at all).\textsuperscript{302} For his own part, Cardonnel protested, in a draught statement to be read to the House:

But if every Campaigne from the first Day to the last; I am daily employ’d in procuring orders and Letters from the Generall for the Contractor’s service, for Escourts for his Corn, Meal and Bread to, and from the Army, with other Services; and that I never Claim’d or received the least ffee from the Contractor, though I was at Charge in keeping my own Clerks, I hope if on these Considerations the Contractor freely made me a Present, the receiving of it for my daily care and Pains,

\textsuperscript{300} BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 121-126b: articles of agreement between Sidney Godolphin and Antonio Avlares Machado (on behalf of Queen Anne and Machado) for the supply of bread to the army, 4 March 1705 (O.S.? ) (copies, 21 March 1705).
\textsuperscript{301} BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 151-152b: testimony of Sir Solomon Medina, 6 December 1711. Cardonnel denied many of the charges against him. He admitted the gratuity, though stated that it was less than mentioned in the first three years. See BL, Add. MSS 42176, f. 347. HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, v, pp. 162-164: Brydges to Cartwright, 8 August 1711 [O.S.]
will not be imputed to me as a Crime, which I humbly submit to the favourable Construction of the House.\textsuperscript{303}

The sums paid Marlborough on account of the bread contracts were dwarfed by those that accrued to his charge as a function of the 2\%\% deducted from Her Majesty's portion of the ordinary and extraordinary pay of the foreign auxiliaries and the contingencies of the army. In general terms, this deduction was entirely above board, having been authorised by a royal warrant of 6 July 1702 O.S. that authorised

... that there be reserved Two and a half per Cent out of all moneys payable to and for ye said [foreign] Troopes as well as for their pay and Entertainment as on any other accot: towards defraying such Extraordinary Contingent Expences relating to them as Cannot otherwise be provided for.\textsuperscript{304}

It was in the expenditure of this 2\%\%, however, that questions arise. Marlborough happily accounted for the 2\%\% alongside the pay due to himself, aides-de-camp, personal physician and other servants in his books.\textsuperscript{305} The accounts show that much of the 2\%\% was lent to the States at a return of 4\% p.a., being laid out in obligations on the province of Holland. The first loan was made on 1 May 1703 N.S., with fl. 130,000 paid to the Receiver-General of the Province of Holland and West Friesland to secure twenty obligations of fl. 4000 and ten of fl. 5000. Further sums were lent as follows, all at 4\%: fl. 32250 on 18 June 1703 N.S.; fl. 52750 on 20 November 1703 N.S.; fl. 53600 on 24 September 1705 N.S.; fl. 20000 on 19 October 1705 N.S.; and fl. 33900 in February 1706 N.S.\textsuperscript{306}

The interest one these was moderate. In the accounts for 1704, one year's interest at 4\% p.a. on the fl. 130,000 of Dutch securities came to fl. 5200 (to 1 May 1704), with a further fl. 3400 to 20 November 1704. The 2\%\% on the sums due the Danish, Hanoverian, Hessian, Prussian, Saxe-Gotha, Palatine and Holstein regiments, and Waleff's Dragoons, came to fl. 20716:8 for the two month-period 25 June to 24 August 1704. Extended to the full year, 25 December 1703 to 23 December 1704, this deduction,
together with that on the foreign forces' extraordinaries and subsidies, came to fl.
140,091:8.307

Taken as a whole, Marlborough's account was credited by Sweet with almost £30,000
(fl. 293,113:19½) for the year 1704. This included his pay as commander-in-chief (£3650
p.a.; which, after deductions for the Royal Hospital and poundage, came to £3457.10s.,
or fl. 37168:2:8 Holland money, at fl. 10:15 per pound sterling), the above 2½% from
the auxiliary forces, the pay of his physician and chirurgeon, the balance of the £10,000
Contingencies held for his use (£6857.2s.6d., which came to fl. 73,712:15), Solomon
Abraham's benefice to the commander-in-chief (a note for fl. 18,000) and funds granted
by warrant to the sick and wounded of the Danes (£1100, which was to be remitted to
their chief officers).308

Near the end of the war, in 1710, the items resulting from Marlborough's pay as
commander-in-chief (fl. 37168:2) and the interest on the securities taken with the Dutch
(fl. 20000 received from D'Ellemett and fl. 17860 from Slingelandt for the various
securities) were dwarfed by the funds that 'passed through his hands' on account of
the 2½% (fl. 203398:16.75) and the army's contingencies (fl. 98424:2:9).309 Marlborough
protested that all such expenditure and management was used in the public service,
but there is all too little evidence to say how.310

The likes of Brydges and Sweet kept such delicate matter in private accounts. Sweet
himself kept a book on account of the deductions he made on behalf of his superior as
well as other sums brought to profit, which Brydges shared to varying degrees with

307 BL, Add. MSS 61330, ff. 26b-33: Marlborough's accounts as commander-in-chief, by Benjamin
Sweet. The Hague, 20 December 1704 N.S. Cadogan would later invest Marlborough's interest
on the States' securities in Dutch East India Bonds, at 4.5% interest. Add. MSS 61351, ff. 239-
240b: account of the interest due from Cadogan on the interest money he received from the
States on Marlborough's obligations.
308 Ibid. Of Marlborough's pay as commander-in-chief, fl. 16575:1 was disbursed by Sweet over
the period 14 November 1703 to 15 December 1704; the balance was paid on 20 December 1704.
Of the contingencies, £500 (fl. 5375) was paid to James Bringfield on 2 May 1704; the balance
was paid as above.
309 BL, Add. MSS 61406, f. 103; Add. MSS 61407, f. 2. These figures, accounted for 1710, also
include a few elements of interest in 1711 and a couple of headings of extraordinaries dating
back earlier (including a remittance from Mindelheim for 1709).
310 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 147-148b: Marlborough (by Cardonnel) to the commissioners of
accounts for the army. The Hague, 10 November 1711 N.S. Copy.
the deputy. In one example, pertaining their private account for the year 1707, Brydges himself told Sweet of the fl. 14,000 was split between Stratford and two persons “you may easily guess whom” [Cadogan and Cardonnel] on account of the money taken to the army in 1706. Beyond that, there remained in their account fl. 19655:9, of which he hoped Sweet would take fl. 7655:9, leaving the remainder for Brydges until he could find some way to dispose of it. A further fl. 500 was given as a present to Watkins, for his kindness in preparing warrants for payment. This private account also disbursed sums such as a yearly bill of fl. 5000 on Sweet to Cardonnel, on account of the gratifications made by foreign troops.

Cardonnel knew that “Mr Sweets Acc* himselfe wth my Ld. Duke for y* deductions he keeps a book of his Graces Acc* and takes his hand to it from time to time.” Marlborough’s money was carefully and discreetly handled; Brydges himself was never returned any account by Sweet with note of the deductions, and was careful to remit the duke his money directly into the bank, or manage the affair carefully with Marlborough’s banker, Charles le Bas. Sweet, whatever faults others might have apportioned to him, was firm in defence of Marlborough, noting somewhat ingenuously:

I had rather dy then devulge it the humbl conus of accos will not get any advantige against the D. of Marlborough by tormenting of me; I am not to be frightend, Let them send me to Prison or where they please.

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311 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 129-130: Brydges to Sweet, 22 May 1707 O.S. These payments continued; see, for example, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 49-50: Brydges to Sweet, 14 July 1708 O.S.
313 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, pp. 148-149: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp before Tournai, 5 August 1709 [N.S.]
314 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, v, pp. 88-89: Brydges to Cardonnel, 9 June 1711 [O.S.] BL, Add. MSS 61135, ff. 37-37b: Sweet to Marlborough, Amsterdam, 6 May 1710 N.S. Sweet noted that he would continue remitting Marlborough’s money, as he received it every two months, into the bank—where it would always be ready for the duke’s use. HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, pp. 87-88: Brydges to Cardonnel, 14 October 1709 O.S. Stowe 58, iv, pp. 197-200: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Havre, 23 September 1709 [N.S.]. Stowe 57, iii, pp. 56-57: Brydges to Cardonnel, 19 September 1709 O.S.
A variety of other forms of personal enrichment existed. The simplest included gifts from the Crown or other individuals on account of services rendered. In February 1703, Cadogan was granted by Anne the sum of £175.4s. "in Consideration of the his Extraordinary Charge, Care and Pains in the Execution of his said Office of Quarter Master Genll. during the last Campagne." A year later, he was given £182.10s. out of the wagon money—a sum equal to his pay as quartermaster-general, which he was warranted to receive later in the year—toward paying the 'extraordinary charge and expence' he had been obliged to incur in the performance of his duties as quartermaster-general.

Other gifts were altogether more valuable. When Cadogan protested that his recent marriage prevented his accompanying Marlborough to Berlin, Raby gently chided him with tales of the gifts received by the duke and Cardonnel. The duke later claimed that the King in Prussia had 'forced' a ring said to be worth £1000 upon him in 1707. Cadogan himself received from the King in Prussia "the little Cross of his order" in 1706—which, Raby confided, he did not think was worthy of his acceptance unless it had a "good diamond fixed to it." Grumbkow—who Raby despised—had assured the ambassador that Cadogan was very desirous of the order (and, no doubt, the thousand ducats that were also dispatched); a fact the quartermaster-general not entirely convincingly protested, telling his friend that it

... was a greater to surprise to me then to any body else when Gromkaw brought it me; I was so far from desiring it, that I never thought it. However I received it with all the Deference and Respect Imaginable and my Lord Duke has writt to the Queen for leave for me to wear it. I am told there is a thousand Ducats designed for me to buy a Jewel as soon as the affair of the Winter Quarters is fully regulated.

But his 'Deference and Respect' were not without limit, for the Irishman continued:

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316 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 2b: warrant to pay £175.4s. to Cadogan, court at St James, 9 February 1703 O.S. After Sir Bevil Granville, Bt, who had lately been a colonel of Foot, was appointed governor of Barbados, he stood respited upon the musters of his late regiment his and his servants' pay for the period 1 August to 24 December 1702 O.S. Marlborough directed the paymaster-general to pay the sum to Cadogan, which Her Majesty was pleased to allow him.

317 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 112: warrant to pay Cadogan £182.10s. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. The Hague, 3 May 1704 N.S.

318 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 27-28b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 29 November 1704 N.S. Snyder, ii, pp. 762-763 no. 774: Marlborough to Sarah, The Hague, 29 April 1707 N.S.
... but I cannot at the same time help telling your Lordship that there is hardly any of the little Princes in Germany who have Troops here, that have not acknowledged much more considerably the Services I have done them in the business of the Winter Quarters. Perhaps the Honour of this order sent me so to make up for everything else, and I will understand it so if it cannot be otherwise but I am persuaded your Lordship may find the King in one of his Generous fits and by hinting to him something of this kind encrease the Value of the Jewel intended me.319

Raby raised the matter delicately with Friedrich, and received a promise that the thousand ducats would be doubled.320 When Grumbkow later brought Cadogan the cross with a diamond "of about threescore or Fourscore pounds value att the utmost," he claimed to have accepted it with the same 'Defereence and Respect' as if it had been worth five hundred.321 Cadogan appears to have borrowed a more expensive diamond from Brydges to make up for the paucity of the one he received as a present, but his tardiness in returning it enmired his friend in a difficult court case!322 Still, Cadogan thought himself good value for his rewards:

I assure your Lordship that for Waggons, Quarters, Forrage and carriages for their [the Prussians'] sick, they have more douceurs by my means than any Troops in the army, and I shall continue to act on the same foot notwithstanding tis uneasy to be allways prosecuted with unreasonable demands by People that think I am under an obligation to them in everything because of the present the King made me...

he protested, not forgetting to remind Raby, by way of an aside, of what he perceived to be his present's diminished worth.323 Graf Lottum, the Prussian general of infantry, assured the quartermaster-general that the king would very generously acknowledge the services he'd done the Prussian soldiery, but Cadogan was not alone in receiving

320 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 53-58b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 18 December 1706 N.S. Regarding Grumbkow, Raby wrote: "... I am not made Like the rest of the World & cant bring my Self to speak fair to a man I hate tho the Custome & Politick of the world will make [-] to bring my Self to it, but I must do him this Justice that he has done you a piece of Service here for as he loves to tattle & talk all he knows to make himself appear a great man here, he has told two or three times in publick company how you have quarelid with Slingelandt about the quartering of the Kings troops. You are assured I hope, that I am too much your friend to Let Such an opportunity Slip of ading that to my reasons why they should ogment their acknowledgements to you for the Service you have done their troops ... but you know the man & how to use him: for silly as he is it is better to have such a Blockhead speak well of one then other ways."
321 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 77-80b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Meldert, 16 June 1707 N.S.
322 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 5-7: Brydges to Cadogan, 24 December 1707 O.S.
323 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 85-88b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Meldert, 7 July 1707 N.S.
such rewards.\textsuperscript{324} Pierre de Montargues, the Prussian quartermaster-general, received an increase of 800 crowns in his appointments, in no small part through the recommendations of Cadogan and Raby to the Prussian court. In return, Raby hoped that Montargues would take to Cadogan a very nice horse from the King in Prussia's stables.\textsuperscript{325}

Another article of remuneration was the 'safeguard'. Safeguards, or promises to protect certain lands and properties from the depredations of the army, were not issued solely out a concern for the populace on account of enlightened generalship, or to preserve discipline in the name of military effectiveness; local dignitaries and municipalities were expected to pay for the privilege. Such sums were the perquisite of the commander-in-chief of any Anglo-Dutch army. If the army possessed an officer bearing the rank of field marshal (such as Ouwerkerk) in addition to the General-in-Chief, the safeguards were issued under both signatures. The generals' secretaries would every month account for all the monies they'd collected under this head, and share them between their masters.\textsuperscript{326}

Safeguards could be assigned in conjunction with others. The comte d'Avelin also corresponded with Marlborough's staff on the matter of safeguards, enclosing a list of prospective places and their masters and thanking Richard King for those already dispatched. (He also took care enough to send Cadogan his deepest respects.)\textsuperscript{327} Later Avelin even asked for four or five blank safeguards, so that he could regulate them himself.\textsuperscript{328} In 1709, Cadogan had promised the comte de Coppigny that he would exempt the villages of Hoyck and Balar—which lay in the count's interest—from quartering troops or furnishing wagons, so hurriedly wrote to his subordinate, Richard King, telling him to appoint new villages for said purposes to cater for the march of the

\textsuperscript{324} BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 95-96b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Helchin, 22 September 1707 N.S.
\textsuperscript{325} BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 155-156b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 3 March 1708 N.S. Ibid., ff. 163-164b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 24 March 1708 N.S.
\textsuperscript{326} BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 240-241b (rough draft) & 242-243b (neat): Cardonnel's memorials on safeguards. Undated. Add. MSS 61338, ff. 17-18b: Reglements pour la Campagne de 1704. In Cadogan's hand. For examples of safeguards given, see Add. MSS 61369, ff. 18-18b (English and French); ff. 21-22b.
\textsuperscript{327} KP I(i)/65: Comte d'Avelin to Richard King, Lille, 8 July 1708 N.S.
\textsuperscript{328} KP I(i)/70: Comte d'Avelin to Richard King, 10 July 1708 N.S.
Palatine soldiers. Others were altogether gentler affairs, as when John Laws, in Brussels, wrote to King, asking him to leave two villages near Brussels out of the routes appointed for the troops to march to their winter quarters, noting:

I am employ’d in this Affair by so fair a Person, that I persuade myself, when You see her, Her thanks will be a sufficient Recompense for Your trouble, tho She granted You no other favour.

On occasion, this impetus—to remove the army from one’s own, or friendly, territory—could be inverted; such as in situations arising on account of the troublesome interface between civic and ecclesiastic authority in early modern Germany. In 1705, the Bishop of Raab humbly begged that the regiment of auxiliary soldiers from Cologne, destined for Bonn, might instead be directed to their own city, “the burgers there growing troublesome and Very unruly.”

Some officers attempted to extort funds from the local populace, in return for providing an effectual, temporary safeguard. On 19 October 1703, a general court-martial at Breda found Major John Stewart guilty of extortion. When offered ten pistols to not quarter his soldiers in Tilbourg, the major saw fit to haggle and drive the offer up, finally accepting twenty-five pistols from the burghers. The officers of the court recommended that Stewart paid back the entire sum, and be suspended from pay and employment for one year, and as much longer as Marlborough thought appropriate. The duke approved of the order for repayment, but remitted the sentence of suspension, directing that the major be restored to his post and command.

Cadogan’s activities as plenipotentiary in the Southern Netherlands drew a similar amount of opprobrium from the Dutch on several occasions. His actions in

329 KP I(i)/109: Cadogan to King, Brussels, 20 May 1709 N.S.
330 KP I(i)/229: Laws to King, Brussels, 19 October 1710 N.S.
331 BL, Add. MSS 61308, ff. 112-113b: Durell to Marlborough, Brielle, 21 July 1705 N.S. Christian August of Saxe-Zeitz (1666-1725) was, in addition to being the bishop of Raab (Györ) in Hungary, the provost of Cologne. As such, he played a considerable role in overseeing the archdiocese in the absence of the exiled pro-French Wittelsbach archbishop, Joseph Clemens. Marlborough, concerting with the Baron van Heiden, who commanded the soldiers of the Rhenish Circle, was happy to oblige. Murray, ii, p. 184: Marlborough to the Bishop of Raab, camp at Vlierbeck, 21 July 1705 N.S.
332 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 75b-77b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at Breda, 19 October 1703 N.S., Colonel Holcroft Blood presiding. Marlborough’s review of the sentence was dated at the Hague, 6 November 1703 N.S.
manipulating the forage and securing funds\textsuperscript{333}, or of managing the affairs of the local councils to his political and financial advantage\textsuperscript{334}, were keenly watched by the likes of his fellow member on the condominium, Johan van den Bergh, and others. Van den Bergh considered Cadogan the greatest thief in the army (and he was not alone); writing in March 1709, he noted that the quartermaster-general had supposedly had 600k rixdollars or 15 tons of gold transferred to England by way of Antwerp bankers, so that all the safeguards, marches and orders for winter quarters no doubt brought in nice profits. Drummond himself noted “a terrible complaint” formed by Van den Bergh against Cadogan on account of financial matters; and when the Dutchman spoke to him about it he “got ill language” in return, which only exacerbated the dispute.\textsuperscript{335}

In a brutal memorial on Cadogan's fiscal and moral probity, in the Duchess of Marlborough’s possession and possibly by Sweet's hand, the Irishman was indicted with numerous charges. It touched upon his misunderstanding with Raby in 1703, over the destinations of their regiments (Cadogan had, “by his underhand dealing and invention of Lies” supposedly prevailed upon Marlborough to use his own Horse in Flanders, and ship Raby’s dragoons to Portugal instead), and the Irishman’s rapaciousness in the field, for

Cadogan being Quartermaster Generall gave him many opportunities to rob the poore Peisants & for the better Executeing thereof he Industerously gave out by his assistants that it was don by order & for the use of the Genil. Which was very well known to the contrary by all that were neare the Generall.

His union with Francis Stratford (“a bankrupt merchant although not then publiquely known”) in 1705, effected “to pillage the Armey” upon its march into Germany, by paying it with its 'own money': possessing little credit himself upon which to support the army, Stratford was believed to have drawn large sums in bills upon Sweet in Amsterdam, which funds he would then supply to the army at a healthy profit. These bills Sweet protested, Marlborough instead encouraging the colonels to draw upon the

\textsuperscript{333} Veenendaal, vi, pp. 514-517 no. 1030: Van den Bergh to Heinsius, Brussels, 5 September 1707 N.S. Ibid., pp. 597-599 no. 1182: Van den Bergh to Heinsius, Brussels, 17 October 1707 N.S.

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid., vii, p. 290 no. 612: Catharina M. Westphalen to Heinsius, Brussels, 31 May 1708 N.S. Ibid., ix, pp. 470-472 no. 996: Philippe François de Meulemeester, Ghent, 1 December 1709 N.S.

\textsuperscript{335} HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, pp. 184-185: Drummond to Brydges, Amsterdam, 13 September 1709 [N.S.]
deputy paymaster directly, so that the Cadogan and Stratford were “frustrated... of their Desined Cheate”. Later, Cadogan and his wife

... fell into the ways of the Jews trading that is buying up of Gould in amsterdam at cheap rate and sending of it to the armey to the Camp to Impose it on the officers & soldn at high rates, which was discovered and the armey Grew wary of them, and sent for their moneys to Amsterdam.

And

Besides Cadogan Robing of Countries &c he had an artfull way of Robing Gen[III] in the day of Battel as L' Gen[II] webs Gloriouse action at winendall besides he did not spare the Comander in Cheife the D. of Marlborough, in attributing to himselfe that all the won battles was in a Greate Measure owing to him; and this was Industerously Insinuated both in towne and Country by his Creatures; whereas its well Known to the Contrary; that his Confused, puzzeld head, was not, nor is not, able to Conduct an armey in action; but its beleived to the Contrary if he had been absent things had gon better by haveing an abler man to suply his post.336

But Cadogan was nothing if not self-confident. He was confident of his ability to absolve himself of all charges, for

... there is nothing pretended against me, but what I can very easily answer. I flatter my self that neither the States of Brabant or Flanders nor even any Town or Community here made the least complaint against me, if it were needful I can produce a great many letters from the States of those Provinces, to thank em for the exactness and care with which I executed the Duke of Marlboroughs commands to save and preserve the Country as much as possibl could. What they have suffered can only be computed to the misfortune of their sitution which made them the Seat of war and Scene of action during three Campagnes of the two greatest armys ever known...

If in Endeavouring to doe what I thought my Duty under the before mentioned Difficultys, I may have disobliged some particular Persons that had other views, or if I opposed as far as was in my Power the trusting and employing such People as I know in the Duke of Anjou’s Interest, and under the influence of the Comte de Bergeik I hope their Charge will be thought of little weight and their accusations looked on as malice and particular Pique.337

Malice or no, Cadogan emerged from the war in a position of considerable wealth. Like many of his peers, including his friend, Brydges, he had invested his money - to


337 NA, SP 87/4 ff. 619-626: Cadogan to [St John?], camp at Warde, 25 May 1711 N.S.
varying effect. Investments rose and fell according to the fortunes of war and one might have thought that Cadogan’s position in the army, and advance knowledge of its actions and objectives, could render a healthy profit.\(^{338}\) All investments in London—particularly the bank—rose about 8% on news of the victory at Malplaquet, but fell 4% on that over the next couple of days. Likewise, on the passing of the French lines in 1710, stocks in the capital rose by 3 or 4%.\(^{339}\) But although Cadogan had the luck to win 6000 pistols at play, he proved a fairly poor judge of the ebb and flow of the War of the Spanish Succession.\(^{340}\) He lost money on the failure of Toulon and failed to give Brydges any accurate predictions as to the state of the peace negotiations in order to purchase or dispose of bank and India stock at favourable rates.\(^{341}\)

Yet he did well enough to secure himself sizeable estates at Caversham, Berkshire and Oakley, Buckinghamshire (the latter being just twenty miles from his constituency at Woodstock, and amounting to £9450) and place £6000 into the Bank of England, which was to pay about 9 or 10% a year.\(^{342}\) Not everybody profited so from the conflict; while some flourished, others foundered. Thomas Meredyth was said to have suffered considerably by the merchant Francis Stratford’s “villanous Bankrupt”; he had deposited £10,000-worth of blank orders and tallies in Stratford’s hands, signed, ready to receive the interest upon their investment as it became due. Contemporary gossip placed Stratford’s bankruptcy at the heart of the suicide of Sir Steven Evans, who hung himself, being broken in his debt for a considerable sum; and poor Meredyth and his wife, for the loss of that £10,000 “broke madm merediths hard and shortend the dayes of her husband,” as one commentator had been ‘Credibly Informed’.\(^{343}\)

\(^{338}\) See, for example, HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 86-87: Brydges to Cadogan, 31 March 1707 [O.S.]; pp. 99-100: Brydges to Cadogan, 28 April 1707 [O.S.]; pp. 104-106: Brydges to Cadogan, 8 May 1707 [O.S.]; pp. 149-150: Brydges to Cadogan, 4 June 1707 O.S.; pp. 187-188: Brydges to Cadogan, 18/29 July 1707; p. 207: Brydges to Cadogan, 3 August 1707 O.S. HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 165-166: Cadogan to Brydges, Brussels, 15 May 1707 N.S.

\(^{339}\) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, p. 36: Brydges to Cardonnel, 9 September 1709 O.S.; pp. 218-219: Brydges to Cardonnel, 15 April 1710 O.S.

\(^{340}\) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, p. 248: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 October 1707 [O.S.]

\(^{341}\) BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 95-96b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Helchin, 22 September 1707 N.S. HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 200: Brydges to Cadogan, 6 May 1709 [O.S.]; p. 216: Brydges to Cardonnel, 3 June 1709 O.S.

\(^{342}\) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 219: Brydges to Cardonnel, 6 June 1709 O.S.

\(^{343}\) BL, Add. MSS 61351, ff. 241-242b: memorial of charges against Cadogan. Anonymous; undated. With Benjamin Sweet’s papers.
By the end of the war, John Fury, so long the aptronymic scourge of the army’s malcontents, sutlers and others, found himself in the unhappy position of the gaoler turned prisoner; lawman made debtor. Fury’s change in fortunes followed Marlborough’s removal from the head of the army. His numerous claims were highlighted in a lengthy petition to Henry Watkins, then secretary to Marlborough’s successor, the Duke of Ormonde. Having been refused five-hundred guilders in lodgings money for the year 1710, Fury faced bills for the goods he’d purchased on that account, charged to him at the Board of General Officers appointed to inspect all accounts relating to the army - though erstwhile Provost Marshal protested that said sum had been accepted by the magistrates of Ghent. The Board further sentenced Fury to pay over four-hundred guilders’ worth of bills exhibited against him by various sutlers. These had been the ‘allowances’ the sutlers had made to the Provost Marsh during the previous campaign (in the same manner, Fury protested, as they had done ‘all war hitherto’) and which, he claimed, had always fallen short of what was his due.

To satisfy the above debts, the Board stopped Fury’s pay, seized his personal effects and, in the event that such should not suffice, ordered the Provost Marshal to be delivered up to the mercy of the town of Ghent. Fury, in no mind to be taken, fled that place for Ormonde’s protection, having taken the care to leave individuals ‘to tend his employ’ in his absence. The degree to which he received succour is unknown; but subsequent sources suggest he found little comfort. A year later he wrote to Watkins from the confinement of the Queen’s Bench at Southwark: though his creditors had brought no case for the prosecution against him, he could not be discharged until the following term and owed upwards of £30 in debts for his subsistence there. Fury complained that he was ‘much abused’ in the sum, but forced to be silent to prevent being ‘starved’. What little money he’d possessed had passed into the pockets of his attorneys and other necessesities, and the former Provost Marshal was reduced to begging what he felt his due, fearing that the his long confinement would ‘in all probability end his life’.

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344 BL, Add. MSS 38852, ff. 234-239b: petition of John Fury to Henry Watkins, 29 December 1712 N.S.
345 BL Add. MSS 38852, f. 297: John Fury to Henry Watkins, London, 2 December 1713 O.S.

115
Communication and intelligence-gathering

Outside of immanent, verbal interaction between officers and their aides—be it on the march, in camp or council, or on the field of battle itself (for which see Chapter VIII)—the sole form of communication to and from the army was by way of the written note, order, bulletin or letter, which would be delivered by a variety of agencies. The content of such dispatches ranged from secret intelligence and missives touching upon the critical management of public affairs, through to the most benign and unimportant articles of friendly correspondence—and frequently all parts in-between. The prosecution of the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries was marked by several sets of correspondence between friends and acquaintances: from that of Marlborough and Godolphin (which transcended the functional discussions of a commander-in-chief with the Lord Treasurer); through the letters of the old friends William Cadogan, quartermaster-general, and Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, ambassador at Berlin; to those of Richard King, staff officer and aide to Cadogan, and William Willis, a financial agent and aide to Francis Palmes.

The primary method of delivery of such letters was provided by the contemporary postal services. A central figure in the management of communication between England and the army in the Low Countries was Jacob van der Poel (d. 1715). A local dignitary in Brielle, the point of arrival of many ships bound for Holland, Van der Poel had served in a variety of posts in the town and province—including burgomaster in 1707, on the Board of the Admiralty of Rotterdam (‘of the Maze’) from 1695 to 1698, in the Council of Holland from 1706 to 1708—and had held the position of postmaster at Brielle since 1680. Van der Poel thus brought considerable experience, and not a little political weight, to his role in overseeing the delivery of mail to and from the army.

In 1702, at the very beginning of the war, Van der Poel wrote a memorial for Marlborough, helpfully summarising the methods practised in the previous war and
the possibilities for the future. In the Nine Years War, all the English mail addressed to
Blathwayt (as secretary to William III, the commander-in-chief) had arrived at Brielle
via packet boat; they were then sent express to the army—the cost of which was
covered by the States. The overall charge for postage of Blathwayt’s letters from
England was accounted by the Dutch with commissioners Sir Robert Cotton, Bt and Sir
Thomas Frankland, Bt at the Post Office in London, and paid by them. 346

In 1702, however, the emphasis lay on the use of the ‘ordinary’ posts. Letters from
England for the army left Brielle and were transported via the Hague—a notable
detour. These letters then left the Hague via the ordinary post every Tuesday and
Friday evening, around the time the letters from England typically arrived from Brielle;
this created a potential for disruption. If the ordinary post had already left the Hague,
the letters from England would be dispatched with any subsequent express sent to the
army from the Hague.

If Marlborough’s packets—or any English mail—were dispatched directly from the
Brielle, in the manner enjoyed by Blathwayt and bypassing the Hague, their postage
would cost a third less and arrive sooner; though if it was agreed to send the packets
from Brielle express to the army, the charge of each express would be 25 guilders.
Marlborough’s mail from the army to England could be sent to Van der Poel with the
ordinary post, which left twice a week from the army; the posts always arrived at the
Hague before the letters for England were sent from there to the Brielle, so there was
no danger of them being delayed. 347

As many letters might arrive at the Hague for Marlborough in his absence, it was
proposed that they were passed to Jan Danckerts, the States-General’s commissary of
the Posts since 1688, who would be able to properly forward them to the then earl,
wherever he might be. This, naturally, would occur at a charge, which might be

Bt (1669-1749), a moderate Tory M.P., was one of the two postmasters-general, until replaced by
John Evelyn in 1710. Sir Thomas Frankland, Bt was a moderate Whig M.P. and served until
1711.

347 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 1401-141b: Van der Poel’s memorial on packets. Brielle, 13 June 1702
N.S.
accounted with the commissioners of the Post Office in London, as was done in Blathwayt’s time.348

These postmasters were keen to offer advice, particularly if it directed more custom to their own posts. Letters from England to destinations in Germany, Italy, Switzerland and other places, for example, arrived at Brielle on the packet boats. The Holland couriers that carried the foreign mail departed from Amsterdam every Tuesday, Friday and Saturday. If the English letters arrived on these same days, as they typically did, this could present an efficacious transition; but quite often the post left Brielle for Amsterdam before the English letters had come in, causing the couriers to leave without the English mail. Such discrepancies in the alignment of the postal schedules could cause considerable delays in important correspondence; missing the post to Italy, which departed once a week at noon on Friday, would delay the English letters by eight days.

Herman Clignet (1645-1721), the postmaster at Utrecht, was quick to point out the inadequacies of that system; not unsurprisingly, his solution involved routing the post through his own province. Letters routed from Brielle to Utrecht would suffer from few of these problems, and not miss any posts. Likewise, the letters from Germany, Italy and elsewhere to England might pass through Utrecht to Brielle in an ordinary post. Those letters that passed by Amsterdam were delayed from Wednesday morning (when they arrived) to Friday evening, when they were dispatched from thence to England via the Saturday morning packet boat at Brielle. If they instead travelled by way of Utrecht and Rotterdam to Brielle, they would, Clignet assured, arrive in time for the Wednesday packet boat for Harwich.349

There is no positive proof that Clignet’s proposals were accepted; indeed, a later missive from Van der Poel did suggest that the English mail for Germany and other such places still went via The Hague or Amsterdam. Writing in April 1705, the postmaster at the Brielle made it clear that a great many problems remained in the effectual transport of mail. It was ‘evident and notorious’ that there had been in the

348 Ibid., ff. 138-139b. Memorandum, 11 May 1702 N.S. Unsigned.
349 Ibid., ff. 142-143b: Demonstration from M. Clignet for the expedition of letters abroad. [1702 in pencil.] For a project expanding on these issues, see ibid., ff. 144-145b. The latter is not signed, but is obviously the work of Clignet or his clerk.
past year great interruptions and delays in the dispatch of the letters to and from England, by way of the ordinary posts. For Van der Poel, the solution again lay in the employment of expresses - which, naturally might be employed from Brielle and charged to that account. Letters arriving at Brielle might be sent by express to the army by way of Moerdijk; at the most it would take three and a half days for an express to reach Trier or the army on the Moselle. This would obviate the problem Clignet also described: that letters for Germany from England arriving at Brielle on Tuesday or Friday would frequently miss the connecting post to Holland, and be delayed there three days, until the next post.350

Van der Poel admitted that the charge of the expresses would be considerable, but optimistically suggested that the overall charge could be brought to such a moderate sum that it should not exceed the ordinary postage.351 Even if the letters were to be sent by the ordinary post for most of the way, sending them by express to Moerdijk first would take but six hours, and save a great detour of the mail into Holland to the north. Letters from the army to England might then be transported in the same manner, arriving punctually at Brielle each Wednesday and Saturday, in time for the packet boat to England.352

The early modern postal system was extensive, but variegated. While earliest stages in dispatch of letters from England were overseen by the Post Office (specifically the Foreign Office) to the packet boats at Harwich and Dover, the delivery of mail on the continent fell under the jurisdiction of various public and private agencies. Most of the Empire (with the exception of Hamburg, Brandenburg-Prussia and certain Westphalian duchies) fell under the Thum und Taxis monopoly. This included the Spanish Netherlands until 1700, when the Angevin seizure of the provinces placed the responsibility in the hands of Léon Pajot, who held the farm for the French post. When

350 Ibid., ff. 148-149b: proposal regarding the dispatch of Marlborough's and others' letters from and for England, 1705.
351 On BL, Add. MSS 61336, f. 149, two schemes for the cost of postage to the army are scrawled in a hand different to Van der Poel's. Unfortunately, it is not clear which scheme refers which prospect (the ordinary posts to and from Brielle, and the expresses to and from likewise). The first scheme accounted the postage of a single letter to the Moselle at 17 st. (9 st. to Brielle and beyond; 6 st. from Maastricht; and a further 2 st. from Trier to the army), a double at 24 st., and 32 st. per ounce. The second scheme placed the postage of a single letter from Trier to Brielle at 8 st., a double at 14 st. and the ounce at 20 st.
352 Ibid.
the Grand Alliance conquered much of the Spanish Netherlands in 1706, following Ramillies, the role of director in the areas of Flanders and Brabant under Allied control was given to François Jaupain, who had previously been director-general for the Luxemburg posts. As an idea of the extent of the service in the Low Countries, in 1706 the posts from Brussels departed as follows:

There had been daily posts at 10 a.m. and 10 p.m. to Malines and Antwerp (though these had suffered in the war). Every day at 4 p.m. there were posts departing on routes to towns including Alost, Termonde, Oudenaarde, Ghent, Courtrai, Bruges, Ostend, Dunkirk, Lille, Menin, Ieper, Gravelines, Calais, Boulogne, Aire, Bethune, Douai, Arras and Amiens; at 11 p.m. that evening, they were dispatched to Namur, Wavre, Leuven, Tirlemont, Nivelles, Enghien, Ath, Mons, Valenciennes, Tournai, Bouchain, Paris and all France.

Posts for Charleroi departed 11 p.m. Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday evenings. Those for Cologne, and the towns on the Demer (Aerschott, Diest, Hasselt, St Trond), and Meuse and its tributaries (Maastricht, Tongres, Huy, Liège, Limburg, Aix-la-Chapelle), left every Monday and Thursday at 11 p.m.; as did the couriers for Dusseldorf, Wesel, Münster, Koblenz, Mainz, Frankfurt, Augsburg and the rest of Germany. Posts for Luxemburg and Lorraine departed every Monday, Wednesday and Saturday at 11 p.m.; those for Holland, Bremen and Hamburg every Wednesday and Sunday at the same time, and every Monday and Thursday in the morning. And thus the scheme continued.

The mail was carried to its destinations by couriers, typically described as postilions (or 'post-boys', in English), who 'rode post' or drove a post chaise (a small, two-wheeled carriage). The term post itself was used to describe several things. It could mean a location where the couriers changed horses; a unit to measure the distance between two postal houses, and thus a basis for postal charges; and an office where the mail

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was dispatched and distributed.⁵⁵⁵ On occasion, the army more fully integrated itself into the existing civilian postal systems by establishing temporary post houses for its own utility, as in that set up at La Gorgue in 1711. All the officers and soldiers of the army—of whatever quality—were ordered not to touch the hay and oats stored there for the subsistence of the post-horses, nor to attempt to lodge there, or forcibly enter the house.⁵⁵⁶ After the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, the Allied army typically kept a Carolingian clerk of the posts within its body.⁵⁵⁷

Individuals other than the postilions could typically take advantage of a network of posts and use its horses and/or chaises for a fee. An excellent example of an early modern postal system, its cost, frequency and dispositions, is provided by Michael Richards (1673-1722). Richards, an engineer by training, was the consummate military professional. He displayed keen powers of observation, with an eye for the utility of the information he collected.

Following the successful passage of the Lines of Brabant in 1705, Richards was dispatched by Marlborough to Vienna, to give a report of the action to the Emperor. Leaving the camp at Vlierbeck on 20 July, he reached Vienna six days later, covering nearly three hundred leagues. Richards’ rough diary lists his itinerary, together with various notes on the quality of the journey and the posts. The engineer then proceeded to make similar observations on his return journey to the army, which took a different route, passing through Bohemia. These are reproduced in Table A.5 (p. 288).⁵⁵⁸

³⁵⁵ Anne Conchon, ‘Cost Economics of Carrying the Mail by Postal Services and Messageries in France (Mid-17th Century – Late 18th Century), in Muriel Le Roux (ed.), Post Offices of Europe, 18th-21st Century: A Comparative History (Comité pour la histoire de La Poste, 2007), pp. 223-235.
³⁵⁶ BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 237b: order for the protection of the post house at La Gorgue. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Camp before Aire, 11 October 1711 N.S.
³⁵⁷ BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 150-151b: reasons to maintain the clerk of the posts of Charles III in the army of the Allies in the Low Countries. The clerk’s presence had been agreed by Marlborough, and both the Field Deputies and deputies of the States-General at Brussels. The clerk was one of Jaupain’s men.
³⁵⁸ BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 71, 78, 80, 81-81b, 84-84b. Richards’ itinerary and notes are written on various separate pieces of paper, not necessarily in order. A hand-written schedule of the posts to Vienna from Frankfurt (minus Richards’ diversion on the Danube) appears on ff. 70-70b. There were 20 post-stages to Regensburg from Frankfurt, and 26.5 from Regensburg to Vienna—the entire distance from the camp at Vlierbeck to Vienna was some 287 leagues. On the return, there were 29.5 stages from Vienna to Eger (at half a dollar or 15 grosches per man or horse), and 21 posts from Eger to Frankfurt (at a florin or 20 grosches per horse).
Richards’ diary shows the relentless daily progress involved in the dispatch of mails to their destinations; it also displays the difficulties that could attend it, such the inundations Richards experienced on 24 and 25 July. The army’s correspondents frequently claimed of missing mails, or of several arriving together, as various events inflicted their vicissitudes upon the regularity of the postal systems – though some of these are understandable, as when Marlborough himself stopped the post at the camp for as long as a day, preventing the postilions from departing until he (or, more accurately, Cardonnel) had been able to complete his own letters for dispatch.  

Postal couriers were often retarded on account of the towns’ gates being closed for the night – the regulation of which was the fief of the garrison commander. In 1709, the postmaster-general of Brabant’s concerns over the delays were communicated by way of Marlborough to Lieutenant-General Wood, the commander at Ghent (a town of particular notoriety in this regard); similar missives were sent from the Council of State to the town magistrates. Wood protested that it was less to do with the actions of the garrison (who observed the same method with regard to the couriers as they had under Ingoldsby and Lumley in the past), but rather on account of level of the local watercourses.  

The mail was particularly affected in the campaign of 1708, when the fluid situation in Flanders and Brabant meant that the Allied army’s communications were stretched to breaking point as the French captured Ghent and Bruges, and besieged Brussels, and Marlborough and Eugene were pushed to various extremities in the siege of Lille. French posts on the Schelde delayed the Allied couriers to such an extent that Cadogan quipped that the arrival of any mail was ‘by accident’. Richard Molesworth was more measured when noted that his brother would no doubt see the “the strange incertainty and irregularity that attends the conveyance of our letters to and fro.”  

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359 Murray, ii, pp. 270-271: Marlborough to Harley, camp at Aerschot, 22 September 1705 N.S.; p. 272: Marlborough to Hedges, camp at Aerschot, 22 September 1705 N.S.  
360 For Marlborough’s order to Wood, see Murray, iv, p. 441: Marlborough to Wood, Brussels, 13 February 1709 N.S.; and BL, Add. MSS 61162, f. 177 (of the same date).  
361 Snyder, ii, pp. 1111-1112 no. 1113: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Roncq], 4 October 1708 N.S.  
362 KP I(i)/93. Copy of a letter from Cadogan to John Laws, regarding Wynendael. 20 October 1708 N.S.  
363 BL, Add. MSS 61312, ff. 186-191b: Richard Molesworth to his brother [unclear which one], camp at Berleghem, 3 December 1708 N.S.  

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The French-engineered inundations by Leffinghem and Ostend hampered Allied communications with its one port in Flanders; a situation exacerbated, as Hallungius wrote to James Brydges, by the French using

...flatt bottom’d Vessells armed wth. Canon, to Stop since the 8/19th all our Correspondence and getting of [Ammunition] from Ostend...364

Ostend itself had become available to the Allies in 1706, when it had capitulated after a twenty-day investment. The West Flanders port offered a new route through which the mail might be sent, though its adoption was a touch hesitant and in no way replaced the old method of sending the mail through Holland. Marlborough considered that the Ostend packet boat was the quickest way of sending mail between the theatre and England, but also the most dangerous; it would be judicious to also send copies of letters via Brielle. Indeed, for his part the duke was happy to sacrifice celerity for security and regularity, desiring that the Post Office dispatched all mail to the army by way of Holland, as a division between the two methods could lead to disruption.365

This was not the case later in 1708, however, when the French blockade along the Scheldt and the Bruges-Ghent canal rendered communication with Holland difficult, and Cardonnel had considered it safest to write by way of Ostend (though Godolphin had yet to miss a letter of Marlborough’s sent via Brielle).366

The transport of mail between England and the continent — be it by Brielle or Ostend — was usually effected by packet boat, often convoys.367 Even a seemingly small, simple journey across North Sea from Brielle or Rotterdam to Harwich was at the mercy of the winds and the tides. Given that the wind was dominantly in the west (as evidenced by the many ‘popish winds’ that preceded the ‘Protestant Wind’ in 1688), the transport of mail from Holland to England

364 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, p. 69: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 24 October 1708 N.S.
365 Snyder, i, pp. 629-630 no. 637: Godolphin to Marlborough, St James, 22 July 1706 O.S.; and pp. 635-637: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 9 August 1706 N.S. This was the first letter Godolphin ventured to send by the Ostend packet boat; he assured Marlborough that it would not hinder him from writing regularly by the old way, as well. See also Murray, ii, pp. 25, 68; Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 67.
366 Snyder, ii, pp. 1114-1115 no. 1117: Godolphin to Marlborough, Windsor, 27 September 1708 O.S.
367 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 189-190b: Charles Churchill to Marlborough, Rotterdam, 11 November 1706 N.S. Churchill was set to depart to England aboard the William and Mary yacht, there being a convoy of two Dutch men-of-war departing the following day.
could face minor delays; yet the journey to Holland could also be attended by various inconveniences, as Michael Richards’ diary for the campaign of 1705 displays.

On Wednesday 28 March 1705, the Duke of Marlborough arrived at Harwich. Two days later, Marlborough, the recruits and various other officers departed England under convoy, escorted by six men-of-war. Unfortunately, the tardiness of the enterprise meant that there was too little water to carry out the large escorts, and the vessels laid at anchor all night. The next day, Saturday 31 March, the contrary winds forced all to return to Harwich. On Sunday they sailed again, and by Monday they had reached the Dutch coast; but the wind failing, they were forced two anchor – except for two yachts (the Peregrine, upon which the Duke of Marlborough sailed, and the Sous Dike) which struck on the sands, but got off the following day. That Tuesday the duke arrived at Rotterdam at noon, before departing for the Hague – four days after he’d originally sailed. Marlborough’s sea journey had not been a happy one, confiding to Sarah: “I have been so very sick, that my blood is as hote as if I were in a feavor, which makes my head eake extreamly...”

Both packet boats and postilions ran the risk of being taken by the enemy; the former particularly on account of the French privateers that operated out of Dunkirk. To safeguard against the effects of the mail being taken, Allied correspondents in the field occasionally made use of ciphers. Those used by Marlborough typically substituted numbers for whole words (for prominent individuals and places) and individual letters (for spelling unforeseen or uncommon words). One example of a cipher used on campaign, with Allied commanders and staff officers in the army, can be found in the correspondence of the duke with Dopff. This cipher was fairly simple: numbers 1 to 41 were reserved for various individuals, entities and places (the last, 41, was the Baron de Weiser). Numbers 42-87 (the highest numeral in the example shown) described the alphabet, A-Y, with two consecutive numbers for each letter, in sequence. Thus ‘E’, for

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368 BL, Stowe MSS 469, ff. 1-2b: Michael Richards’ diary for Flanders, 1705. Snyder, i, pp. 413-415, nos 424-427.
369 For an example of a packet boat being taken, see Snyder, ii, p. 729 no. 737: Marlborough to Godolphin, The Hague, 16 November 1706 N.S.
370 See Snyder, iii, Appendix I, for an excellent discussion of the ciphers used by Marlborough in his correspondence with Godolphin and others. These ciphers consisted wholly of number-word substitutions.
example, could be enciphered by 50 or 51; ‘H’ by 56 or 57, and so on. As befitted a cipher adopted by correspondence near totally continued in French, there was no cipher for ‘W’.

On other occasions, correspondents took advantage of the travel plans of confidants (particularly military officers travelling in force, with an escort), who would deliver letters safe from the enemy, or the prying eyes of political opponents. In July 1707 Marlborough delivered his letters to England by way of Brigadier George Macartney, which allowed him “more freedome [to write freely] than I darst do by the post” and Lumley. Philip Honeywood, Macartney’s partner in the infamous ‘Damnation Club’ who was carrying dispatches from Spain to England (via the Low Countries) offered a similar avenue a year later. Yet the common post could on occasion prove safer than the private messenger. Van der Poel’s couriers were provided with passes governing their safe conduct, which a private messenger could not obtain without ‘difficulty and loss of time’; the absence of which placed the deliverer at the mercy of the enemy.

Passes were an important form of military and diplomatic protocol. Issued to both friendly and enemy individuals, by both armies, as well as local authorities and provinces, they offered a level of civility amid the disruptions of war. They were issued within clear spatial and temporal limits. Allied passes to the individuals travelling to the army from England, and vice versa, might be for a fortnight at most and issued by way of local agents, such as Thomas Brown in Ostend. To modern

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371 BL, Add. MSS 61202, ff. 1-4b: Dopff to Marlborough, Dusseldorf, 4 December 1702 N.S.
372 Snyder, ii, pp. 841-842 no. 845: Marlborough to Godolphin, Meldert, 18 July 1707 N.S. Macartney had attended Marlborough in the Low Countries after being released upon his parole, following Salamanca. BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 123-123b: Lumley to Marlborough, London, 30 September 1707 O.S.
373 Snyder, ii, p. 986 no. 989: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Bellingen], 28 May 1708 N.S.
374 Murray, iii, p. 425: Marlborough to Harley, camp at Meldert, 20 June 1707 N.S. Harley had, Marlborough believed, forwarded one mail by way of a private messenger, who had not arrived at the camp.
375 BL, Add. MSS 61308, ff. 44-45b: Blood to Marlborough, Rotterdam, 4 May 1705 N.S. Blood was reporting the progress of two vessels carrying Marlborough’s baggage and the hospital to Koblenz, and thence Trier. The States of Gelderland had granted passports ‘very readily’.
376 E.g. WO 26/11 (1), f. 42. Note of a pass given to Mr Samuel Noyes, chaplain to the Earl of Orkney’s regiment, together with his servant Edward Grubb, to go to Holland, in force 14 days. Dated 29 March 1705. BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 127-128b: Richard Sutton to Henry Watkins, London, 18 September 1711 O.S. Sutton was returning to the continent, and desired that a pass would be sent to Brown at Ostend to speed his passage.
eyes, the issue of passes could appear particularly loose: passports were allowed to the French couriers that took potentially valuable letters and packets to their towns and forces in the Low Countries. Indeed, writing in January 1706, Ingoldsby made note of the ‘unaccountable passes’ the States-General (and their subsidiaries) gave, “to annoy man that will but pay ffive or six Gillders ffor them,” and complained that as a result he was “Every day pestor’d with people ffrom Lyle, Tourney, Mons, and all parts of Ffrance” expecting likewise.

Generals themselves were frequently possessed passes granted by their opponent. After leaving Brussels on 18 July 1708 to join the army, Marlborough happened upon a French party near the abbey of Beaupre, who ‘examined his pass very strictly’. That same day the duke’s party passed through some part of the march of the enemy, when they passed the confederate army’s flank. The most famous situation, however, occurred in 1702, when Marlborough, Geldermalsen and Obdam were travelling by boat on the Meuse. A small French party took advantage of their distracted escort (which had wandered too far from the riverbank) and boarded the boat. While Obdam and Geldermalsen had their passes, Marlborough did not. However, his attendant, William Gill, possessed an unused pass in duke’s brother Charles’ name, which he placed in Marlborough’s hand, playing an amusing (and successful) masquerade.

Military officers were frequently used as more substantial envoys in addition to post-boys, adding a verbal addendum to any details contained on paper. Those thought worthy of the honour were dispatched post-haste with news of a victory in battle or siege. Colonel Thomas Panton, who carried Marlborough’s dispatches express to London after the fall of Douai, alerted London of the affair four days before Watkins’ letters had reached his correspondents in the capital. Metcalfe Graham, who carried news of the victory at Maplaquet to England, landed at Harwich at noon and reached Windsor that same night; he delivered Marlborough’s letters to the queen and

377 BL, Add. MSS 61369, 19 September 1702 N.S.
378 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 16-19b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 5 January 1706 N.S.
379 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 84: camp journal, 22 July 1708 N.S.
381 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 35-36b: James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Whitehall, 30 June 1710 O.S.
Godolphin the following morning, before going to Sarah at Blenheim. He noted that in coming through London, he thought he'd never escape the hands of the clamouring mob; Sir Thomas Franklin had to convey him out of his house through a vault. 82

Others were not so lucky. When Sir Richard Temple, Bt, honoured with carrying the news of the fall of (the town of) Lille to England, arrived in London on 18 October, he found it was no surprise at all: Thomas Erle having already sent a courier to England with a copy of Marlborough's letter to the general. Though he did suggest, as a sheen to his slightly diminished pride, that it was not entirely unnecessary that somebody else arrived to give more detailed information. 83 Unfortunately, that mission was not a triumph, either. Temple carried details of Marlborough and Eugene's various ideas and plans for the follow-up operations, which the duke dared not put in writing; but Godolphin dejectedly noted that Temple could not "answer half the questions [he] could ask him." 84

Other envoys were more successful. Cadogan would frequently welcome and escort dignitaries and generals to Marlborough's camp, greeting Baden in the march to the Danube in 1704, and both the Elector of Hanover and Prince Eugene in 1708. Not just mere pleasantries on Marlborough's behalf, these meetings provided means to informally and flatteringly pass on the views of the duke regarding the campaign, and perhaps begin a process of gentle education in the Marlburian strategy. 85 Cadogan would again be dispatched to concert on Marlborough's behalf with the Margrave of Baden on two occasions between April and June 1705, to discuss operational matters, the Duke being "so little satisfied with the notions [Baden] has for the opening the campagne, that I have resolved to send Collonel Cadogan to him." 86

382 BL, Add. MSS 61313, ff. 189-190b: Metcalfe Graham to Marlborough, September 1709 O.S.
384 Snyder, ii, p. 1128 no. 1132: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Roeselare], 24 October 1708 N.S.
385 Cadogan greeted Baden at Eppingen in June 1704, and escorted him to the conference at Groß Heppach (Murray, i, pp. 306, 309-10); he was also sent to escort the George of Hanover on 10/21 June 1708 (Murray, iv, p. 71) and to meet Prince Eugene at Maastricht on 22 June/3 July 1708 (Murray, iv, pp. 86-7, 90-1, 94-6).
386 Cadogan had written to Baden's officers on Marlborough's behalf to discuss operations as early as that January (Murray, i, pp. 569-70): Marlborough had desired a two-pronged offensive

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Cadogan was not always successful. His manner could not sway the Elector of Hanover from his refusal to send forces for Marlborough's planned expedition to relieve the Duke of Savoy, though Marlborough's use of his Quartermaster-General on this absolutely secret mission, "at a time in which he is so usefull to me" is indicative of the regard in which the commander-in-chief held both the planned enterprise and his aide. Cadogan's fellow Irishman and 'favourite', acted in a similar role; indeed, his military career morphed into a diplomatic one as the war wore on.

Henry Durell, Marlborough's adjutant-general and senior aide-de-camp was also employed on these enterprises. In June 1705, as the duke's army was forced to leave its theatre of operations on the Moselle to attend to the growing danger on the Meuse, Durell was dispatched to the Imperial Court to concert with the Allies. If Marlborough had sent Durell with celerity in mind, he was disobliged by the temporarily invalided Prince Louis of Baden, who kept the adjutant-general waiting for three hours before granting him an audience. This delay lost Durell an entire night's riding, the gates being shut for the evening. He had greater luck at Vienna, where the long-time English envoy, George Stepney, managed to secure him an audience two hours after his morning arrival.

upon the upper Moselle; Baden preferred independent operations, with him threatening Alsace. Cadogan left The Hague on 18/29 April 1705 and returned to Maastricht on 1/12 May. Although Marlborough was confident that Cadogan had left Baden 'in a good disposition to act with his troops in concert with me,' he was grimly aware that it might require the personal touch, and that Baden would not 'possatively resolve to march towards the Moselle til I have the honour of being with him.' Snyder, i, nos. 433 & 434, pp. 420-2; Murray, ii, pp. 16-17, 21-8 and 41-3. Marlborough was due to meet Prince Louis at Creutzach on 20 May, but the latter's illness delayed the conference and necessitated its siting at Ratstadt. Cadogan would find his own travel plans altered by Baden's circumstances in June 1705, when he was due to meet Baden at Birkenfeld, but was forced to track the Margrave down to the spa at Slangenbad. Murray, ii, pp. 101-2 & 113.

387 Snyder, i, no. 540, pp. 521-2: Marlborough to Sarah, The Hague, 27 April 1706 N.S. The Elector was quite content in Marlborough's plan, but would not consent to the marching of his troops on such an enterprise, in which he was in good company, the Danes and Hessians likewise refusing to send their regiments. The planned march was thus abandoned. Murray, ii, pp. 498-9, and Snyder, i, nos. 539, 540, 542, 544 & 547, pp. 520-5 & 528.

388 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 133-134b: Cadogan to Raby, The Hague, 30 January 1708 N.S. Francis Palmes brought instructions to Cadogan on the matter of Her Majesty's intentions regarding Spain (upon which the States would resolve little until knowing Britain's final intentions), before travelling to the courts of Hanover, Vienna and then Turin.

389 BL, Add. MSS 61308, ff. 83-84b: Durell to Marlborough, Frankfurt, 22 June 1705 N.S. Ibid., ff. 93-94b: ditto, Vienna, 27 June 1705 N.S. Michael Richards, who also bore dispatches in the
Some journeys were altogether more eventful. Writing in 1709, Robert Walpole asked the Lord Treasurer to consider the petition of Lieutenant Andrew Pope. This officer had travelled express from Major-General Stanhope to Marlborough (among other officers and destinations). Arriving in Genoa, Pope delivered letters to Mr Chetwind, the British agent, and the admirals. He then set off for Germany, Flanders and England, carrying Stanhope’s packet for Cardonnel; a letter for Heinsius that the Dutch general, Belcastel, had asked to be delivered; the letters of Stanhope to individuals in Germany (including Raby in Berlin), which were to be left with Henry Davenant at Frankfurt; and letters to the Secretary of State in England, which were to be delivered upon taking his leave of Marlborough. All this mail was carefully warded by Pope, who took “care on his going Abroad to sling to the Bag of Letters, a Ball, or any thing to sink it in case of danger or being taken by the Enemy.”

In his journey to the duke, Pope was taken prisoner by a French corporal and six soldiers bear Courtrai. He was escorted by the corporal and one soldier toward the Vendôme, but somehow prevailed upon the non-commissioned officer to send his sentinel back – upon which he soon found an opportunity to turn the tables on his captor, seizing his own sword and pistols back from the corporal, and obliging the poor fellow to return his letters and follow him to Courtrai. Once there, Pope prudently obtained a guard for the next stage of his journey and delivered his charge to Marlborough safely. Walpole believed that his service and expenses in this duty warranted a reward of £200.390

Mail was typically accounted under three headings: a ‘Single’ referred to a letter consisting of a single sheet of paper; a ‘Double’ was a letter comprising two sheets of paper; and parcels and packets of letters were charged by the ‘Ounce’. The charge for delivering the letters would be a function of the above classifications and the distance they were carried. Despite Marlborough’s armies’ movements, however, there was no variation in the charge Van der Poel claimed from the duke for the delivery of his mail over the campaign: it remained constant at 8 st. for a single letter, 16 st. for a double

aftermath of the crossing of the lines in Brabant, was similarly delayed by Baden and his ‘Company of Struting Comediens’ – a sarcastic reference he later crossed out in his account of his journey. BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 82.

letter and 24 st. per ounce. In 1705, the account of the mail sent to Marlborough from Brielle, over the period 13 May 1705 to 28 November 1705, listed 93 single letters, 57 double letters and packets totalling 763 ounces – all of which came to just under a thousand guilders.$^{391}$

The charge rose over the following years, albeit not by a significant amount. From 14 May 1706 to 26 October 1706, Marlborough received 86 single letters, 62 double letters and packets totalling 919½ ounces – the whole amounting to fl. 1187½ (or £107.19s.).$^{392}$ from 6 May 1709 to 30 October 1709, 85 singles, 64 doubles and 926 ounces, of packets came to fl. 1196½ (or £108.14s.6d. at fl. 11 per pound sterling).$^{393}$ The charge for Marlborough’s final year of tenure (from 26 April to 5 November 1711) amounted to fl. 1348 (or £121.12s.8d. at fl. 11 per pound sterling), on account of 106 single letters, 57 double letters and packets weighing 1050 ounces.$^{394}$ By way of comparison, a bill for the postage of letters from England to the army as a whole in 1703 came to fl. 1073:18$^{395}$; and at the other end of the spectrum, Captain King’s company paid fl. 1:11 on account of his commandant’s charge for letters, over the period 23 October 1705 to 22 April 1706.

Henry Watkins, as Marlborough’s factotum at The Hague, bore the brunt of much of the charge in the communications with the army. His expenses as secretary to Marlborough at the Hague in 1702 came to £269.10s.1d., all to be charged under the head of Contingencies. This amount included £17.14s. on stationary bought at the Hague; £74.18s. paid to Van der Poel for the transport of letters from England to the

$^{391}$ BL, Add. MSS 61348, ff. 44-45b: details of posts sent to Marlborough, 13 May 1705 N.S. to 28 November 1705 N.S. By Jacob van der Poel. A single letter cost 8 stuivers, a double 16 stuivers and a packet 24 stuivers per ounce. The whole came to fl. 998½. Marlborough’s first account, from his arrival in Holland (in July 1701) to 5 September 1701, ran to fl. 116:11; that from 9 September to 26 November of the same year came to fl. 459:5. The whole bill, including various posts from Vienna, Hamburg and Breda, and 6 guilders of stationary, amounted to fl. 689:07. Ibid., ff. 26-27: bills for posts received by Marlborough as envoy of England.

$^{392}$ Ibid., ff. 47-48b: account of posts sent to Marlborough in 1706. The charges remained the same. Cardonnel noted: “The Packets and Letters herein mention’d were brought from the Brill to the Army during the last Campagne. Hague the 20th Novr 1706.”

$^{393}$ Ibid., f. 90: account of letters sent to Marlborough during the campaign. 1709.

$^{394}$ Ibid., ff. 117-118b: account of letters sent to Marlborough during the campaign. 1711.

$^{395}$ BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 73: order to pay fl. 1073:18 to Johann van der Poel out of Contingencies, for the postage of letters from England to the army. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. The Hague, 5 November 1703 N.S.
army; £58.13s. for letters received at The Hague in the English post house; £8.14s.10d. to a printer at The Hague as a ‘gratuity’ for prints; £1.10s. to the German post house at the Hague; £43.14s.9d. to the postmasters of the States for the expresses and postage of letters from the Hague to the army during the campaign; and a further £52.18s. expended on more stationary and various other items of postage, such as extraordinary expresses. There was also £7.18s. that Watkins gave as a bounty to several sick and disabled soldiers, widows and French deserters; and £3.9s.6d. given as a bounty to the shoulders who took enemy colours.396

Watkins’ expenses fluctuated as the war progressed. In 1704, Marlborough’s march to the Danube increased the volume of mail passing through Germany; out of the fl. 4787:12 (£445.17s.6d. at fl. 10:15 to the pound) expenses incurred by Watkins that year, fl. 1190 was payable to Henry Davenant at Frankfurt on account of letters sent and received.397 In 1708 the charge ran to fl. 10350:17 (£962.17s.6d.), which included: fl. 5600 to Van der Poel for the postage of letters between the army and Brielle; fl. 657:13 to the English postmaster at the Hague; fl. 269:2 to the German postmaster at the Hague; and fl. 3363:2 for various stationary, extraordinary expresses and intelligence.398 This then dropped over the next two years (fl. 8475:10 in 1709 and fl. 8110:17 in 1710399) before rising to fl. 8906:7 (£828.10s.) in 1711.400

The mail from England to Holland or Flanders brought a variety of news and intelligence to officers who were often as involved in the affairs at home as they were on campaign. James Craggs (senior) sent Marlborough confidential political reports; Cardonnel asked that he be informed every post of how the elections of 1708 (which secured the brief dominance of Whigs) progressed.401 Lord Cutts desired the Gazette

396 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 116-116b: warrant to pay Watkins for his disbursement for the officer of the Secretary of the General. The Hague, 19 November 1702 N.S.
397 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff.181-181b: Watkins’ expenses for 1704. A further fl. 500 for this year was carried over to 1705; see Add. MSS 61371, ff. 73b-74.
398 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 105b: Watkins’ accounts for 1708. The Hague, 23 February 1709 N.S. For the warrant to pay these, from Marlborough, see ibid., f. 97, dated at The Hague, 23 February 1709 N.S.
400 BL, Add. MSS 61373, ff. 44-44b: warrant to pay Watkins’ expenses. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. The Hague, 16 November 1711 N.S.
401 NA, SP 87/4 f. 29: Cardonnel to Tilson, Brussels, 14 May 1708 N.S.
every post, together with "one of the best of the other printed papers, the votes, and what is commonly call'd the Whitehall letter." His interest continued after he went to Ireland, as he asked his sister to write constantly, providing him with news of all

... the State: Intreagues, Partys, Designs, and (in a Word) whatsoever comes under the head of secret, Or Cabinet: News.

She was to write nothing but that which she had good grounds for; or to mention any doubts if they existed. In a passage that bears a counterpoint to the Duchess of Marlborough's own involvement in domestic politics, Cutts finished:

And, if I may add one request more, it shall be, that you'll keep your Sentiments of publick affaires as much to your self as you can possibly; but by no means to say any thing of the Ministers and great men (you understand me) which may be misrepeated, or they may take ill; nor to declare with any Warmth for any Party; for which your Sex has a fair pretence. This, since it will let you into the Knowledge of more secrets, and be for my Interest, I hope you will not deny me; I have grounds for my request not so proper for a letter.

Marlborough's headquarters received a considerable amount of political, diplomatic, strategic and operational intelligence. Much of this passed through the hands of the duke's secretary, Adam de Cardonnel. Lucien Bély portrayed Cardonnel as Marlborough's bureau chief; John Rule classed Cardonnel as one of his 'master spies', in so far as he was a 'paymaster and overseer' of a spy network, though Cardonnel's role was less executive direction than subordinate direction and management. Similar claims are made, albeit far less accurately, on the part of William Cadogan. J.N.P. Watson calls the Irishman Marlborough's 'Chief of Intelligence'; James Falkner, in his Dictionary of National Biography entry, classes him as an unofficial 'director of military intelligence'. Patricia Dickson also labelled Cadogan as being the

402 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 3-3b: Cutts to [Cardonnel?], The Hague, 12 January 1703 N.S. Draft/copy.
403 BL, Add. MSS 69380, Cutts to [Joanna] Cutts, Dublin, 18 October 1705 O.S.
404 Snyder, ii, pp. 677-678 no. 686: Marlborough to Godolphin, Gramets, 23 September 1706 N.S. Marlborough was writing on the occasion of Cardonnel's severe illness, noting: "If he should dye it would be give me very great trouble, for all this business I have with the foraine courts goes thorow his hands."
406 Rule, op. cit., p. 739.
‘Chief of Intelligence’, making subsequent references to his ‘Intelligence Department’ and ‘Intelligence Service’. 407

These labels are at best disingenuous, at worst false. Cadogan, in his position as quartermaster-general and plenipotentiary at Brussels and The Hague, oversaw the collection of a considerable amount of operational and strategic intelligence, but did not direct all such activities for the army. Many other officers, through their own sense of duty or orders from senior commanders, acted likewise. General officers were typically ordered to attend to matters of intelligence as part of their daily duties. Late in 1702, orders were dispatched to the officer commanding-in-chief with the dragoons to march into their garrison of Weert, where that officer would take command. They were ordered to send out parties, from time to time, towards Brey, Peer and Ruermonde, to observe the enemy and ‘annoy’ their own parties, giving Marlborough constant intelligence upon all that occurred. 408

During the campaign of 1706 Marlborough would ask Cadogan and Brigadier Chanclos to send ‘trusty people’ to gain intelligence from Mons, Nivelles and the local lands, to which Cadogan replied that he would

...take such measures with Monsr. Chanclos for intelligence that nothing shall pass att Mons or the Camp but what your Grace shall be forthwith informed of. Att my coming here my first care was to send two People I could rely on to Mons and Ath who are both returned this morning with an account that the Elector waited for the coming back of the Detachment from Dermond att Ath, and went from thence this morning to Mons. 409

In this manner Cadogan frequently sent spies to gauge events in the enemy camp, to view their lines or to spy upon preparations in their towns. 410 Some spies would take

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408 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 74b-75: order for Ross or Hay or the officer in chief with the dragoons, to march to garrison. Camp at Asch, 9 September 1702 N.S. Order given by Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's command.
409 BL, Add. MSS 61160, ff. 31-32b: Cadogan to Marlborough, Oudenaarde, 23 June 1706 N.S.
410 E.g. for visiting an enemy camp, see BL, Blenheim Papers, Add. MSS. 61160, f. 1-1b: Cadogan to Marlborough, Camp at St. Gron, 24 September 1703 N.S. Cadogan had dispatched agents to view the lines from La Bassée to Douai, and Douai to Valenciennes in April 1710 (ibid., f. 131), and a man to Tournai in November 1708 (ibid., f. 98).
the form of more permanent correspondents in enemy cities, and Cadogan would receive frequent letters from Dunkirk and Tournaï in 1708, and could confidently state in February 1710 that he had "a person at Valenciennes and another at Douay, who constantly transmitt me accounts of what is doing in that side, and your Grace may depend on being early informed of the Enemys Preparations." 411

Others acted on their own initiative, sending the headquarters various articles of intelligence. 412 In December 1703, James Ferguson excitedly informed Cardonnel that Yvoy, who commanded at Bosch, had shown the Scot his secret intelligence from France, with an account of the locations of the winter quarters of Villeroi’s army, among other things. Ferguson begged the Dutchman to let him make a copy, to send to Marlborough; but Yvoy demurred, happy to retain the satisfaction of informing the duke himself. Ferguson professed no reason to doubt Yvoy’s diligence in this matter, thinking the Dutch general an honest man and a good officer, who professed himself very much Marlborough’s servant. A covering letter to Marlborough’s secretary would never go amiss, however. 413

In the winter of 1706, when an English officer in Ghent had detained a postilion at the Antwerp Gate with several letters, he sent him to the governor, Ingoldsby. Finding a letter directed to the President of the Council of Hainault at Mons (which was still under French control), Ingoldsby tried a conceit to test the ‘fidelity and care’ of the Ghent postmaster: he sent the postilion with his letters to the post office, to judge its

411 See ibid., ff. 52-52b, wherein Cadogan reports of divisions between the magistrates of Lille and Tournaï and the French generals, and Snyder, iii, nos. 1260 (16 April 1709 N.S.) & 1323 (24 June 1709 N.S.), pp. 1241-2 & 1292-3. In June there was advice that James Stewart, the Old Pretender, had come to Villars’ camp, and Godolphin thus hoped that Marlborough would ‘order Mr. Cadogan to renew his correspondence with that place [Dunkirk], that so wee might have timely notice of the enemy’s designs.’ In actual fact, none were considered by the enemy until December 1709, and were then abandoned the following January. Ibid., p. 1233, n. 1. For 1710, see BL, Add. MSS 61160, f. 129b.

412 For example, BL, Add. MSS 61183, ff. 86-87b: Yvoy to Marlborough, Beuvry, 14 August 1701 N.S. Details of enemy numbers between St Venant and Aire. Ibid, ff. 142-143b: Salisch to Marlborough, Liège, 9 April 1706 N.S. Note of the enemy’s march with a large detachment towards Germany, consisting of 20 battalions and 30 or 32 squadrons. Add. MSS 61413, ff. 76-77b: Churchill to Cardonnel, Brussels, 12 August 1706 N.S. Charles Churchill wrote that the commandant of Brussels had just then received intelligence that the enemy had formed a camp at Bossu, consisting of 10,000 men and 25 guns, and were in the process of making a great magazine

413 BL, Add. MSS 61413, ff. 17-18b: Ferguson to Cardonnel, Busch, 2 December 1703 N.S.
reaction. He was gratified when the postmaster—'a very honest man'—returned the letter to Ingoldsby immediately, thinking it something to be brought to the governor's attention. Ingoldsby opened the letters himself, but upon finding some 'dark Expressions' and 'words like a cant In them' passed them on to Marlborough. Some officers employed their own spies, or received information from 'Marlborough's friends'—a euphemism for allied spies writing from various enemy towns. In 1706, Thomas Meredyth, on learning that the magistrates and burgers of Dendermonde were very much inclined to oblige the garrison to surrender, found a way to deliver a secret letter to the chief magistrate, informing him of the advantageous terms the town could expect.

The tenor of the campaign offered various opportunities for the gathering of useful information. An enemy's review of its army or a particular corps offered a chance to secure detailed intelligence on its order of battle and the numbers of battalions and squadrons it comprised. Parleys with the enemy might precipitate a brief cessation in conflict, but they did not do likewise for the gathering of intelligence; indeed, they often promoted it. After the battle of Ramillies in 1706, the Allies were occupied with attempting to secure various towns in Flanders and Brabant. Some capitulated quickly; others did not. Ostend prevaricated for a while, offering various hints of welcome and defiance (it finally surrendered on 9 July, after a three-week siege). Marlborough's letters to the governor of Ostend, delivered via Major-General Ross, were carried by a trumpet, as per usual. The trumpet, being entertained for three hours by the governor's servants while their master held counsel with lieutenants, was in an excellent position to gather local, human intelligence on the feelings of the populace and strength of the

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414 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 32-33b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 11 p.m. 14 November 1706 N.S.
416 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 207-208b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Lebbeck, 12 June 1706 N.S.
417 Snyder, ii, pp. 980-981 no. 984: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Brussels], 24 May 1708 N.S. Marlborough noted that the French would review their army that Saturday (26 May).
garrison; he was even spoken to by some of the chief magistrates themselves.\textsuperscript{418} La Motte, the French commander at Ostend, himself confided with Lord North and Grey on the poor defence of the town, two days before it fell!\textsuperscript{419}

Field intelligence might be gained by way of small detachments of regular soldiers. During the siege of Dendermonde, Meredyth was visited at 5 a.m. by ‘some persons’ who informed him that there was a strong body of the enemy at Alost. He was sceptical, but formed two small parties—each composed of an officer and six dragoons—and dispatched them to gather further information; both confirmed the initial intelligence, and brought back with them some peasants and a friar, who said the enemy amounted to a regiment of dragoons and some three-thousand Foot. Meredyth then took his own steps to act upon this intelligence, drawing in his outposts for security, warning other detachments nearby and marching with a body to make a defence at Bostrow. To continue observations of the French, Meredyth dispatched his major of brigade and an officer of Horse to different posts to monitor their advance guard.\textsuperscript{420} The Allied forces managed to beat off the French in the ‘insignificant’ engagements that followed; they had ten or twelve wounded with small shot and one killed by French cannon. Meredyth blamed the surprise on the citizens of Alost, for failing to send intelligence of the enemy’s march; he feared that the burgomaster who had promised him help in that regard was a rogue.\textsuperscript{421}

These parties were often led by a partisan.\textsuperscript{422} A good partisan was “an able and cunning Soldier, well skill’d in commanding a Party, who knows the Country, and how to avoid Ambushes, and surprize the Enemy.”\textsuperscript{423} When Meredyth had intelligence from Churchill that the enemy had moved to Hal, he again sent two parties of six dragoons,

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[418] BL, Add. MSS 61309, ff. 110-112b: Ross to Marlborough, Bruges, 6 June 1706 N.S. The intelligence suggested the enemy had seven battalions in Ostend (three French and four Spanish), with seven more along the canal and in Nieuwport.
\item[419] BL, Add. MSS 61312, ff. 231-232b: North and Grey to Marlborough, before Ghent, 31 December 1708 N.S.
\item[420] BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 211-212b: Meredyth to Marlborough, noon 21 June 1706 N.S.
\item[421] Ibid., ff. 213-214b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Bostrow, 21 June 1706 N.S.
\item[422] BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 191-192b: Charles Churchill to Marlborough, Brussels, 31 May 1707 N.S. Cutts noted that a partisan and his whole party had been taken ‘by water’; Charles desired that Marlborough would secure the release of the partisan and the lieutenant of Wood’s regiment of Horse that accompanied him.
\item[423] Military Dictionary (London, 1708 ed.)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
each led by a partisan, to Ath and Hal; but each returned this time without 'so much as hearing of a Frenchman'.

Those soldiers that accompanied these individuals as a ‘partisan party’ were often ordered to be ‘lightly clothed’, eschewing their normal uniforms. Upon returning from an expedition, partisans might be expected to make a report to the major-general of the day.

Partisans might fall under the aegis of a particular commander, but also interacted with the army as a whole. On the night of 25 July 1705, Colonel William Evans liaised with a partisan of Ouwerkerk, who acquainted the English officer of the movements of several squadrons of French dragoons, which were threatening to intercept a convoy bound for Landen and beyond. Evans gave the partisan a horse, so he might advise Ouwerkerk immediately; upon his return, the partisan asked for a few more dragoons for his party, and returned to his duty. The convoy made it to its destination safely.

In 1710, Panton himself directed a partisan to get intelligence regarding French designs from Leper upon boats sent up the Lys. Johan Wijnand van Goor recommended that four particular partisans were taken into the service of Her Majesty and the States in 1704. Each received three months’ pay (the English portion of which was taken from Contingencies) for his service, equating to fl. 125 for one John Falk; fl. 100 for W. Goselken; and fl. 87:10 each for Paulus Petrotti de Bansi and Jacobus Jungblunt.

After occupation of Brussels in 1706, the post in the Allied-occupied southern Netherlands came under the control of François Jaupain. Furthermore, as a function of a deal made between himself and the previous controller, Pajot (who resided in Namur), Jaupain got control of all mail delivery between the French-occupied Netherlands and northern Europe. Jaupain offered his services to Sunderland and Marlborough (and, secretly it seems, the Dutch), carefully opening and copying many of the letters, and sending the intercepts to the Black Chambers in London and The

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424 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 229-230b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Lebeck, 7 August 1706 N.S.
425 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 88: camp journal, 6 August 1708 N.S. The party comprised two subalterns and a hundred men. Ibid., f. 117: camp journal, camp at Orchies, 23 August 1709 N.S.
426 BL, Add. MSS 61308, ff. 118-119b: Colonel William Evans to Marlborough, Tirlemont, 25 July 1705 N.S.
427 BL, Add. MSS 61314, ff. 46-47b: Thomas Panton to Marlborough, [Ghent], May 1710 N.S.
428 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 178b: warrant for fl. 400 to four partisans. Maastricht, 3 May 1704 N.S.
Hague for decryption. Jaupain even accompanied Marlborough in the field in 1707 and 1708, providing his services at the army headquarters, in an intelligence unit that collected information on enemy troop movements and provisioning. On 4 June 1708, Britain and the States—in the persons of Marlborough and Johan van den Bergh—authorised Jaupain to retain one or two ‘couriers or postilions supernumerary’ for the secret service during the war, whose expenses would be paid from the revenue of the posts.

This process could be remarkably proficient (Marlborough, Richard Molesworth was ‘credibly informed’, had known of the French plan on Brussels at least six days before the army decamped from Roeselare), but they was far from perfect. Marlborough and Cadogan and been somewhat indiscreet in their discussions regarding the 1708 campaign, spurring the French into action. Jaupain intercepted a letter that spoke of a conspiracy in one of the Allied towns, but Marlborough and Cadogan would not initially countenance it. Both Ghent and Bruges fell to the initiative of the French.

Prior to the surprises that opened the 1708 campaign, the British had been worried by rumours of a Jacobite descent on Scotland from Dunkirk. Cadogan, from his posts at Ostend and Bruges, played a considerable role in organising the British response and gathering what news he could of the French plans. The quartermaster-general was not alone in this, with the likes of Lumley also providing their own intelligence.

432 BL, Add. MSS 61312, ff. 186-191b: Richard Molesworth to his brother [unclear which one], camp at Berleghem, 3 December 1708 N.S. See, for example, the letters of Marlborough to Erle and Chanclos, 20 November 1708 N.S.: Murray, iv, p. 315.
434 BL, Add. MSS 61160, ff. 62-64b (14 March 1708 N.S.), 64-65b (20 March N.S.), 66-68b (28 March N.S.) and 69-69b (2 April N.S.), letters of Cadogan to Marlborough. See also NA, SP 84/574 ff. 221-230b: extracts of Dayrolle’s letters from the Hague, 17 February to 22 March 1708 N.S. Intelligence relating to the intended invasion. SP 84/574 ff. 231-240b: further extracts from Cadogan and Dayrolle’s letters on the invasion scare.
When the threat was renewed in the winter of 1709/1710, Cadogan was kept occupied at Brussels and The Hague. In his absence, much of the valuable work was carried out by his aide-de-camp, Richard King, who was at Bruges. King employed his own ‘intelligencers’ and himself passed valuable intelligence to his superior, and also Marlborough, via Cardonnel, in London. Indeed, Cadogan, who approved very much of his aide’s measures, later writing

The Accounts you have transmitted are so Very clear and exact that they seem to leave no room for any further apprehending the Enemies have any Design of a Descent on foot.

told King to communicate directly with both Secretary of State the Earl of Sunderland and Cardonnel, while the threat seemed real enough. Cardonnel was the link through which much information passed; as deputed commander-in-chief in the winter of 1704/5, Cornelius Wood informed Marlborough that we would give an account every post of what occurred in the army – but as he understood how occupied the captain-general was, would do so most commonly by way of letters to the commander-in-chief’s secretary.

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436 KP I(i)/147: Cardonnel to King, Whitehall, 20 December 1709 O.S. Cardonnel noted receipt of King’s letters of 22 and 24 December N.S. KP I(i)/148: Cadogan to King, Brussels, 25 December 1709 N.S. KP I(i)/151: Cadogan to King, Brussels, 1 January 1710 N.S. Cadogan informed King that, the threat having dissipated, he was no longer needed at Bruges and might leave when he saw fit. KP I(i)/153: Cardonnel to King, Whitehall, 10 January 1710 O.S.

437 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 152-153b: Wood to Marlborough, Breda, 11 January 1705 N.S.
VI

Command, delegation and military decision making

Until his dismissal on 30 December 1711 O.S., John Churchill, duke of Marlborough was Queen Anne’s prime military plenipotentiary in the Low Countries. Initially promoted “Generall over all and singular Our Foot Forces, Employed, or to be Employed for Our Services”438 and commander-in-chief of the English contingent in Holland by William III439, he was later advanced to the rank of Captain-General by Anne, who renewed the (then) earl’s patent as her commander-in-chief in the Low Countries.440 The text of Marlborough’s warrant as commander-in-chief highlights authority of the post. It encompassed the right to issue orders and regulations,

438 NA, SP 44/168 p. 354. Warrant to Marlborough. William and Vernon. Hampton Court, 1 June 1701 O.S.
439 NA, SP 84/574 ff. 23-24b and SP 44/168 pp. 355-358. Warrant to Marlborough as commander-in-chief in the Low Countries. William and Vernon. 1 June 1701 O.S. The warrant appointed Marlborough to the “... command in chief of all Our Forces employed or to be employed by Us in the service of the States General of the United Provinces. For the better Government of Our said Forces during the continuance in that Service, We have thought fit, & by these Presents do authorise & empower You to prepare & publish such Rules & Ordinances as are fit to be observed by all Officers and Soldiers under your Command; as also to punish all Offenders & Transgressors against the same, according to the Nature of their Offences as they shall appear upon Tryal before a Court Martial, which We hereby give You Power & Authority to assemble as often as You shall see Occasion; to be composed of Field Officers & Captains only of Our said Army, whereof seven at least are to make a Quorum, who are to judge for all Crimes & offences against the said ordinances by a Majority of Voices, & according to their Judgement you are to cause sentence to be pronounced against the Person or Persons offending, as shall be thought fit, according to the true Intent & Meaning of the said Articles.”
440 SP 84/574 ff. 25-26b and SP 44/168 pp. 391-394. Warrant and orders to Marlborough as commander-in-chief in the Low Countries. Anne and Vernon. 9 March 1702 O.S. This warrant authorised Marlborough to be “General, and Commander in Chief of all Our Forces aswell Horse, as Foot, which have, or shall be Sent to Holland, to be Employed in conjunction with the Troops of our Allies...” Marlborough was to “prepare and Publish such Rules and Ordinances as are fit to be observed by all Officers and Soldiers under your Command”, punishing same by courts-martial, “We giving you power to Reprieve any Person under any Sentence, till our Pleasure be known.” See also SP 44/168 pp. 380-381: Direction to the Attorney or Solicitor-General to prepare a bill for Marlborough as captain-general. Anne and Vernon. St James, 10 March 1702 O.S.
administer military justice and issue promotions. It is this suite of dignities, rights and powers that formed the corpus from which elements might be delegated, by order and custom, to subordinate general and staff officers, and provided the mechanism by which supra-regimental control of the army functioned. All officers held their commissions from the queen, and Marlborough was her designated, immanent military legate. What could not be so easily delegated to his subordinates were the authority that attended Marlborough on account of office as captain-general, his position on the cabinet, his close friendship and excellent working relationship with the Lord Treasurer, Godolphin (until the latter's dismissal), and his elevated role in the direction of the workings of the Grand Alliance, among other things.

From an English or British perspective, Marlborough's notional powers in the field—as opposed to his practise of them, which might be limited by a variety of political or diplomatic considerations—changed little. The earliest possible alteration lay in the commission by Anne of a Board of General Officers in London, in 1706, which was to

... meet together for Redressing and Preventing as much as possible the great Abuses and Disorders that are frequently committed by Officers and Soldiers thereunto belonging [with particular emphasis on malpractices in recruiting] ... [unto which the General Officers were] to receive, hear and examine all Informations and Complaints that shall be brought before them of the Misbehaviour of any Officer or Soldier in Our Service; Or any Other Abuses of Irregularities ... committed as aforesaid.441

While this body provided another court of inquiry or appeal that might be set against Marlborough's local administration of military justice as commander-in-chief—and his dignity as captain-general—it in truth proved little imposition on Marlborough's authority for much of the war; indeed, the cases the Board examined tended to minutiae and tedium, and removed several time-consuming articles (such as the

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441 NA, WO 71/1, pp. 1-2. Warrant of Her Majesty to institute a Board of General Officers, countersigned by Henry St John. St James, 9 February 1706 O.S. Three was to signify a quorum, and the eldest was to act as president. The Board was allowed to act for itself, or refer cases to a court-martial if proper. The first meeting was held on Wednesday morning, 20 February 1706 O.S. Out of those who served under Marlborough in the Low Countries, Orkney, Withers, Hamilton, Hay and Meredyth were present. Later, on account of the meetings' previous irregularity, it was ordered that the Board met every Monday, Wednesday and Friday, weekly, consisting of seven general officers 'of the several degrees' by turns, relieved weekly—excluding those involved in regulating the clothing. WO 71/1, p. 123: circular letter to the general officers. Her Majesty, the Prince Consort and Marlborough. Whitehall, 23 February 1708 O.S.
regulation of clothing) from his duties.\textsuperscript{442} (In 1711, the Board was restructured into a 'Superior Board', composed of general officers proper, of major-general and above; and an 'Inferior Board', comprising brigadiers.\textsuperscript{443}) One of the first significant acts of the Board was on the matter of promotions. Marlborough's commission as commander-in-chief had granted him the right to grant breveted promotions, thus:

And that the respective Troops and Comp\textsuperscript{y}s. of Our said Forces may not be unsupply'd of Officers to Command them, whilst they are abroad in the said Service, We do give you Power and Authority in case of the Death, Removal by Sentence of a Court Martial, or the quitting of any of the present Officers of the said Forces, to supply the said Vacancies by such Persons as you shall make Choice of for that purpose, who are to be acknowledged, and to Command in their respective Stations, as if they had received Commissions from Us, and to continue in their said Employments till Our further Pleasure be known.\textsuperscript{444}

Yet in 1708 Anne issued a royal prohibition against brevets, overseen by the Board:

Whereas the Granting of Brevetts to Officers in Our Armys hath been found to be of ill Consequence and very Prejudicial to Our Service and hath created many and frequent Differences and Disputes among them, for Remedy whereof We are pleased hereby to Declare Our Royall Intention That from henceforth We will grant no Brevett to any Officer in Our Service.

A will that was extended to the Generalissimo, captain-general and all her commanders-in-chief and other officers likewise; though the order received two notable exceptions in the positions of the adjutant-general and quartermaster-general of the army, which were by custom allowed the brevet of colonel – a practice that was

\textsuperscript{442} A key duty was the regulation of clothing in the army, which Marlborough delegated to his general officers upon every opportunity. A series of boards of officers were set to see to the matter; the first. See NA WO 71/1, pp. 101-107, 109-110, 150-151, 152-153, 176-179, 180-181, 182-185, 197-199, 200-201, 203-204, 205, 208-209, 228-229 (Sir Temple, Bt actually sat on this board of 21 February 1709 O.S.; a rarity for officers that typically served in the Low Countries after the first board, which included Orkney, Ingoldsby and Temple), 262-263, 286-287; WO 71/2, p. 54; WO 72/1 (Bundle 1), 12, 13, 14, 23, 26.

\textsuperscript{443} NA, WO 71/2, pp. 1-2. Three general officers would continue to constitute a quorum for the senior board, with the eldest presiding. The inferior board would comprise three or more brigadiers "actually in [Her Majesty's] service", appointed by the senior board, who would sit at least twice a week. The superior board possessed the power to refer matters regarding the recruiting service and other articles to courts-martial if necessary; or in the case of extraordinary occurrences, to make a report to the Committee of Council and general officers of the privy council, as such affairs happened.

\textsuperscript{444} NA, SP 44/168 pp. 391-394. Warrant to Marlborough as commander-in-chief. Anne and Vernon. St James, 9 March 1702 O.S.
allowed to continue. Marlborough himself was aware of the potential ill-use of the brevet, and supportive, so it was not the assault upon his rights that might be contended. The same could not be said for the next brand of senior military council convened in England, the ‘Committee of Council’ of the war office.

A group that sat in Anne’s absence, it consisted of a number of “lords of the committee of council” (i.e. the cabinet, in essence, of which Marlborough and James Butler, duke of Ormonde were members) and those general officers of the army that held the dignity of privy councillor - of which there were six in 1711: Meinhardt, duke of Schomberg; John Campbell, the duke of Argyll; George Hamilton, duke of Orkney; Charles Boyle, earl of Orrery; Richard Stanley, earl Rivers; and Thomas Earle. The board was designed as a more subtle Harleyite counter to Marlborough’s authority; Orrery believed the Queen “should take back to herself a good deal of that power which she has given away to the several Commanding Officers in Chief” — particularly Marlborough—referring that which she did not deal with herself to those judged proper, which the earl suggested might compose a committee of the general officers in the privy council (as opposed to the existing Board of General Officers, which he thought tainted). His suggestion was the basis of the later creation.

The central act of this committee was agreed on 11 April 1711 O.S., when a series of regulations were agreed by the Committee of Council and the general officers in the Privy Council; these were certified by Anne under her sign manual, becoming effective 1 May 1711 O.S. in England, and abroad as of the time they were communicated to the army. The provisions were considerable: no general officer or any other officer that sold his commission, and was no longer in service, was in any instance to act as a

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445 NA, WO 71/1, p. 235: proclamation of Anne, countersigned by Robert Walpole. 12 July 1708 O.S. Also SP 41/3/122. See, for example, NA, WO 71/2, pp. 72-73. “... it having been always the Practice to Allow the Rank of Colonel to the Adjutants Gen'l. of the Army, Which Your Maj'. Has been lately Pleased to Declare Your Approbation of by Your Order of ye 7th Sept. last.” For which, see WO 72/1 (Bundle 1), 17: warrant allowing rank of colonel to the adjutants-general and quartermasters-general, in exception to the regulations prohibiting brevets. 7 September 1711 O.S. WO 26/12 pp. 284-285, 286.

446 For an excellent discussion of this body, see Ivor F. Burton, “’The Committee of Council at the War-Office’: an experiment in cabinet government under Anne’, The Historical Journal, iv, 1 (1961), pp. 78-84.

general or other officer, or rise in the Court; no further brigadiers would be promoted – instead the seniormost colonels would be ordered to act as brigadiers when necessary; the Board of General Officers was to consist of lieutenants-general and majors-general alone (a sub-board of brigadiers was appointed); and Anne’s order of 12 July 1708 N.S. that forbade the issuing of brevets (and was widely ignored) should be strictly restated.448 Barring the last, these were notable intrusions into what had hitherto been Marlborough’s dominion; but if the duke was disquietened by the existence and competence of the council, he found an unlikely ally in the secretary of state, Henry St John. St John helped Marlborough undermine several of committee’s dictats, not least in securing necessary (as the duke viewed them) brigadiers’ promotions. With St John’s connivance, the committee atrophied, and nothing more was heard of its meetings after July 1711.449

Despite his stymieing of the Committee of Council, Marlborough could not prevent his disgrace to more persistent and vigorous methods of attack. Upon his dismissal, and prior to Ormonde’s appointment, the British army in the Low Countries had no single general-in-chief; rather, orders were dispatched to each branch of the service. Orkney as general of Foot in the absence of a commander-in-chief, received the authority to give orders for that arm as necessary, in preparation for the coming campaign. Lumley, as general of Horse, received like orders for his charge, with the additional requirement to give orders to Ross, who as Colonel-General of Dragoons was the senior officer of that service, and received his own order from Anne – albeit with the clause that he should act “with regard nevertheless to such Directions as you may receive from Our General of the Horse.”450

448 BL, Add. MSS 61134, ff. 37-38b: Regulations agreed by the Committee of Council, War Office, 11 April 1711 O.S. (see also NA, WO 26/12 pp. 281-283; SP 41/4 pp. 12, 13). Add. MSS 61134, ff. 35-36b: Granville to Marlborough, Whitehall, 1 May 1711 O.S. A letter stating that Anne had agreed to the regulations there sent, which were to be made public to the army in the Low Countries. Other provisions of these regulations included: no commissions were to be sold but by royal approbation, and no officer had leave to sell if he had served less than twenty years or been disabled in the service, unless there was an extraordinary occasion for it; no person under the age of sixteen was to have a commission – those under that age that already possessed commissions were to serve or be cashiered.

449 Burton, ‘Committee of Council’, pp. 82-84.

450 NA, WO 26/12 pp. 291-293. Orders to Lumley, Ross and Orkney. Anne and Lansdowne. St James, 1 January 1712 O.S.
In addition to his command over the English contingent in the Low Countries, Marlborough also held a degree of authority over the forces of the States General in the theatre, and by extension those of the auxiliary forces in Dutch, English and joint Anglo-Dutch pay—albeit with several important qualifications. In a secret resolution of the States General, dated 30 June 1702 N.S., it laid out a dozen articles governing the command and activity of the English and States’ troops, to which Marlborough signified his approbation. Interestingly, while Marlborough’s functional authority as a commander of English troops in the theatre derived from his warrant as commander-in-chief (see Chapter II), his authority as an Allied commander effectively came from his commission as captain-general, as it was in the captain-general’s name—not Marlborough’s, nor the commander-in-chief of the English soldiery then in the Netherlands—that the articles were composed.451

The resolution did not simply bind the Dutch to English command; rather, it provided for a mutuality of command, wherein Dutch soldiers could be expected to serve under English generals and vice versa, as necessity demanded. Marlborough was not explicitly named as a general-in-chief of the Anglo-Dutch battalia, though his pre-eminence in the theatre was implicit in certain articles. Any States’ generals and regiments that were attached to his army were to fall under the duke’s command; in his absence, the army would be commanded by highest-ranked general with the force, which effectively meant a derivation to Dutch command, as no English officer except Marlborough exceeded the rank of lieutenant-general, while the States possessed the generals Athlone, Ouwerkerk and Obdam.452

An added complication lay in the matter of the Dutch gedeputeerden te velde, or ‘field deputies’: a group of individuals, three to five in number, appointed by the States General on behalf of the provinces of the Netherlands and the Raad van State to provide an interface between the army and its political masters.453 The secret resolution of 30 June provided little mention of the field deputies, other than a vague direction to

451 Inventory States General no. 2347, ff. 270-272 - copied in ’t Hoff, pp. 609-611.
452 Ibid. The reciprocal nature of command is highlighted in articles 1, 2 and 10. Marlborough was expected to give all orders regarding the Dutch forces in his army to the senior Dutch general present, if the situation allowed, rather than commanding them directly.
453 For a list of the field deputies in the war, see Wijn, viii, vol. 3, Appendix 37, pp. 368-369 and Snyder, iii, Appendix 2.
the effect that Marlborough would concert with them (and the senior general of the States' forces in the theatre) on the conduct of operations. The field deputies' own instructions, however, were more detailed, particularly on the issue of disputes between the English and Dutch commanders. The secret resolution of 30 June required Marlborough to entreat the advice of the senior general of the States with his army (who would in turn take the advice of his subordinate generals), but understandably made no mention of how the army would act when the commanders were not in agreement. By their own instructions, the field deputies had powers to forbid the use of Dutch troops in any action they thought prejudicial to the States, and were to attempt to reconcile the parties in dispute; and, if that was impossible, to give such orders to the earl of Athlone (the Dutch general-in-chief) as they thought proper, while informing the Griffier of the States-General.\textsuperscript{454} The field deputies were not simply the obstructive, 'veritable political commissars' noted by some; they could as soon be staunch supporters of Marlborough and his strategy, as Lord Raby quipped: "... as Mas'. Van Collen does in the Councils of Warr, to say I am for wt ever Mylord Duke is for."\textsuperscript{455}

No such agreement existed with the Imperial generals, and in a union with the armies of Eugene or Louis of Baden the nature of the command was agreed according to circumstance. Early in 1704, for example, Marlborough concerted with Count Sescherwind, an imperial envoy, on the operations for the following campaign. One of the issues covered was the issue of command if the armies joined. Baden had thought it proper that the parole would be given for the campaign by the Emperor (or his representative); or, if that would be a difficulty, by the Emperor on one day and Her Majesty on the next. Marlborough quite firmly agreed with the latter proposition, if he was to command his army in that theatre.\textsuperscript{456}

\textsuperscript{454} Concept van Instructie voor de Heeren Gedeputeerden te Velde. Secret Resolution of the States General, 7 July 1702 N.S. Wijn, viii, vol. 3, bl. 10, pp. 699-702. Article 8 noted the protocols to be followed in case of dispute between the generals. The Dutch
\textsuperscript{455} Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 99. BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 53-58b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 18 December 1706 N.S.
\textsuperscript{456} BL, Add. MSS 61338, ff. 39-43b: memorial on the coming campaign, London, March 1704 N.S. See also Add. MSS 22196, ff. 9-12b: Cadogan to Raby, the Hague, 17 February 1704 N.S. Cadogan made it clear that the command for the ensuing campaign had not been absolutely determined.
Table 6.1: Derived commanders-in-chief of Her Majesty’s forces in the Low Countries, 1701-1711

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of warrant (N.S.)</th>
<th>Derived commander-in-chief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ - ; c. late 1701]</td>
<td>[Major-General John, Lord Cutts]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 November 1702</td>
<td>Major-General John, Lord Cutts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 November 1703</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General Charles Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 December 1704</td>
<td>Major-General Cornelius Wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 October 1705</td>
<td>Brigadier Holcroft Blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[c. January 1706?]</td>
<td>[Major-General Henry Withers]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 November 1706</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General Richard Ingoldsby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 November 1707</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General Henry Lumley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March 1709</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General Cornelius Wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November 1709</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General William Cadogan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 November 1710</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General Cornelius Wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 November 1711</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General William Cadogan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


458 There is no order appointing Withers commander-in-chief in Marlborough’s absence in the copybook covering this period, BL, Add. MSS 61371. There is an undated order, written at the Court at St James, c. January 1706 in BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 216-217b (together with an order to appoint courts-martial, ibid., ff. 218-219b).
When Marlborough was absent from the army in the Low Countries, he devolved the command-in-chief of the English or British forces upon another. This delegation was usually made in the winter, when many English, Scots and Irish officers returned to the British Isles upon the cessation of the campaign to attend to their own affairs (not least the winter session of Parliament). Marlborough's own offices—as envoy and plenipotentiary to the United Provinces, in addition to being commander-in-chief—meant that he frequently outstayed his subordinates in the Netherlands, reducing the pool of officers available. On most occasions it was bestowed upon trusted general officers of recognised capability or desire for the dignity, and a middling status in society (Cutts and Lumley, as the brother of the earl of Scarborough, excepted). Indeed Holcroft Blood, who was appointed in 1705, was but a brigadier, and a junior one at that. Only once did command devolve upon the seniormost general officer of the preceding campaign, when it was given to Charles Churchill in 1703, perhaps giving the lie to what Cutts' agent told the late general's sister, when he wrote:

... for ye moment ye Duke went for England at ye End of the Campaign, Genl Churchill (like one risen from ye Dead) Started up the next morning to reap all those advantages for having made a glorious Campaign (as he did every Summer) at Aix la Chapelle.459

The duties expected of the commander-in-chief in Marlborough's absence were summarised in the warrant appointing him to his post; these orders were written in a form that could provide for further deputation, if necessary, such as in the absence or incapacity of the original addressee. The order given to Cutts, for example, for the winter of 1702/3, ran as follows:

Whereas upon My Embarkation for England and during My absence, the Command in Chief of her Majestys Forces will derive to You, for Your better guidance therein, I have thought it for Her Majestys Service, to give You the following Instructions which You are Strictly to observe. Vizt:

You are to keep a constant Correspondence with the Commanding Officers of Her Majestys Forces in the severall Garrisons, to give Orders that the Soldiers be kept in the Strictest Discipline, and to take Care that no Officer be absent from his Command except upon very urgent occasions.

459 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 174-175b: letter of Cutts' agent to [Joanna] Cutts, Basingstoke, 5 July 1713 O.S.
And whereas it may be thought necessary to draw a Body of Troops together for
anoying the Enemy during the Winter season, or to oppose any Designs they may
have upon the Frontiers, You are upon Application from the States, to Order a
proportionable Number of Her Majestys Forces both Horse and Foot, if it be
necessary to March and join the Troops of the States where the Service may require
and in such Case, You are to insist in the most decent manner, that Her Majestys
Forces be furnish'd by the States with the necessary Carriages and Forage for such
expedition, and You are also to give Notice to the Troops that they do not at any
time march out of their respective Garrisons without Orders in Writing from Your
self or the Commander in Chief of Her Majestys Forces for the time being.

And as I have already given Furlows to a competent Number of Officers of each
Regiment of Horse, Foot and Dragoons, to repair to England and Scotland, for
Recruits and other affairs of their Regiments, You are not to permit any more
Officers to come over unless it be upon the greatest Emergency.

Lastly You are to give Me a constant account of the State of Her Majestys Forces,
and of all accidents that may happen for Her Majestys Information and such further
Orders as the Service may require.460

Minor variations could exist from year to year. In 1705, Blood had orders that the
regimental officers were constant in exercising the men and had them fire as the
weather permitted. He was also to review the regiments each month, ensuring that
there remained with each a field officer, along with two officers (including a
quartermaster) for each troop of Horse of Dragoons, and at least half the commissioned
officers of a battalion of Foot; Blood gave monthly lists of the troops garrisoned in the
Low Countries throughout the winter.461 The conquest of much of the Southern
Netherlands in 1706 caused the addition of a new clause, demanding that the army was
respectful of the Catholic clergy of Flanders and Brabant.462

The article touching upon the forming of a detachment of soldiers in a time of necessity
was one of the main issues of contention. Occasionally it was restated: even though

460 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 117-117b: Orders to Lord Cutts and to the officer commanding in
chief Her Majesty's forces for the time being. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command.
The Hague, 20 November 1702 N.S.

461 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 54b-55. Add. MSS 61309, ff. 20-21b, 22-23b: Blood to Marlborough,
Dort, 11 January 1706 N.S. The state of the forces in the Low Countries as of 11 January 1706
N.S. was: five regiments of Horse and two of Dragoons (Lumley's, Wood's, Cadogan's,
Wyndham's, Schomberg's; Hay's, Ross's), with 1684 effectives; and twenty battalions of Foot
(Guards, two of Orkney's, Churchill's, Webb's, North and Grey's, Row's, Godfrey's,
Ingoldsby's, Mordaunt's, Sabine's, Tatton's, Ferguson's, Meredyth's, Lalo's, Stringer's, Evans's,
Farrington's, Temple's and Macartney's) with 9949 effectives.

462 See, for example, ibid., ff. 119-119b and Add. MSS 61372, ff. 105-106b.
Cornelius Wood’s standing orders as deputed commander-in-chief in 1710 provided for the eventuality of being called upon to draw a body of soldiers out of garrison, he still received a further, positive order on this issue from Marlborough, who had yet to leave The Hague. Wood was authorised and required upon any emergency to furnish a proportionable number of Her Majesty’s forces under his command, to act in concert with the Earl of Albermarle (or the commander-in-chief of the States’ forces in those parts at the time).463

Upon Cutts’ leaving the army early in 1702, Ingoldsby was deputed in his place Marlborough had told Ingoldsby that he was to follow the commands of the Dutch commander, the Prince of Nassau-Saarbrücken, in whatever related to the English corps. Cutts did not demur, but felt the need to clarify that he was sure that Marlborough intended that any and all orders for the English were to be given to Ingoldsby, not the regiments directly,

Because that would be yeilding a point that a Generall Officer could not justifie to the King, the Nation, or his own Honour. And an Accident might unfortunately happen at some time or other, which might ruin a Mans fortune and Reputation, if he preffered himself to be a Cypher at the Head of an English Army in a Foreign country.

By way of an example, Cutts referred to a recent case wherein orders of march were sent directly to some of the Danish regiments, not the Prince of Württemberg, their commander - who complained to Nassau-Saarbrücken, the States-General and the Court of St James, indicating that if the episode was repeated, he would not be held responsible. Upon hearing this from Wurttemberg himself, Cutts noted he

... carelessly [insinuated] to the States, and the Prince, that I was sure the same Regard at least would be had to the English; and they assured me, that no orders shall be given to the English, but through my hands, or the next Commander in Cheif in my absence.464

Previously, during the preparations for war in late 1701, Cutts had highlighted to a subordinate that, if he was ordered to march or make any detachment by the Dutch, he

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463 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 272b: orders for Lieutenant-General Wood. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. The Hague, 31 December 1710 N.S.
464 BL, Add. MSS 69379, packet 1, ff. 7-10b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 10 January 1702 N.S.
was to politely state his readiness to obey such an order, but to check with Cutts (as commander-in-chief) by express first – excepting the case of extraordinary necessity, in which case the commander's discretion, in light of Cutts' directions, would be required. The secret resolution later adopted by the States-General on 30 June 1702 was indistinct on this matter. Although it provided that, when joined in the field, English or Dutch troops would receive all orders by way of their general-in-chief with the army, there was no clear provision when dispersed in garrisons during the winter. While the early orders stated that a general was to mobilise garrisons on the application of the States-General themselves, later warrants mentioned specific commanders by name. In 1707 it was to be Ouwerkerk who would authorise any detachment; in 1709 and 1710 it was Eugene, who was implicitly referred to as 'commander-in-chief' of the Allied forces in the Low Countries in Marlborough's absence; and in 1711 it was the earl of Albemarle.

The process might involve multiple stages, each with a different scheme of authority. In March 1711 Cornelius Wood oversaw the march of British detachments to be cantoned between the Scarpe and the Dyle, according to a route delivered by Marlborough. Like routes were also sent to the respective governors or commanders of the garrisons in Flanders and Brabant where any subject troops were quartered; Wood wrote to the respective commanders to ensure their compliance. Yet when these forces were, at the behest of Albermarle and Cadogan, augmented (by a further sixteen soldiers detached from each battalion in garrison, in Flanders, Brabant and Hainault), it was the comte de Tilly that would oversee the scheme's direction and to whom Marlborough wrote with the routes of march. The duke informed the commanders of the English and Hanoverian forces, so that they would be in a position to conform to Tilly's commands. Wood was but one of those officers.

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465 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 197-198b: Cutts to [? An unnamed regimental commander], The Hague, 7 December 1701 N.S.
466 See 't Hoff, p. 610, articles 6 and 12.
467 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 208b-209b. Add. MSS 61372, ff. 105-106b; f. 149b; f. 251b. Add. MSS 61373, ff. 41-41b.
468 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 283b: Marlborough to Wood, the Hague, 10 March 1711 N.S.
469 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 288: Marlborough to Tilly, the Hague, 29 March 1711 N.S. Seven British battalions besides the Guards were not to provide any detachments; the regiment at 151
Deputed commanders oversaw a variety of duties. In December 1701, Cutts' duties as local commander-in-chief included a careful oversight of all the English corps in the Low Countries, in preparation for the impending conflict. All regiments were to be complete by 1 January 1702 O.S. Cutts attended a review in January and took an account of all the forces' arms and equipment, keeping himself informed of any alterations that had occurred since his last review (23 September 1701 N.S., for one battalion) according to a prescribed form; updates were to be sent to him weekly by every Monday's post, dating any alterations from Saturday to Saturday.\(^{470}\)

Charles Churchill, who acted as commander-in-chief over the winter of 1703/4, was also tasked with overseeing the regulation of the clothing in the army in the Low Countries. He received from the colonels the patterns they desired for their regiments and inspected them with the assistance of other general officers as he saw fit. Those that met with his approval were marked with his seal; when the clothing was manufactured, examples were to be checked to ensure they matched the patterns. Only then would Churchill certify his approbation to the Comptroller of the Accounts of the Army, that he might report the same to the regimental paymasters who would then pay for it as the off-reckonings became due.\(^{471}\)

Lumley, placed in temporary command while Marlborough journeyed to the Imperial Court at Vienna, faced a similar set of responsibilities regarding clothing - together with overseeing the dispatch of recruiting officers, musters, exact accounts of the stoppages to the Horse and Dragoons over the campaign (and the number of horses such would purchase) the sending of field officers to manage the embarkation of remounts, and so on.\(^{472}\) When he was deputed as commander over the winter of 1707/8, his tenure saw the attempted Jacobite descent upon Scotland, and Lumley was

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\(^{470}\) BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 197-198b: Cutts to [? An unnamed regimental commander], The Hague, 7 December 1701 N.S.

\(^{471}\) BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 85: order to Charles Churchill regarding clothing. Court at St James, 6 January 1704 O.S. See also, ibid., ff. 108b-109, 25 March 1704.

\(^{472}\) BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 45-46: instructions for recruits and clothing of Her Majesty's Horse and Dragoons in the Low Countries. Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's command. Camp at Brecht, 22 October 1705 N.S.
in a position to regulate with Brigadier Sabine and Cadogan the British battalions that were to embark to prevent the design.473

This derivation of command-in-chief could take precedence over any other seniority in rank. When Marlborough ordered Henry Lumley to Ghent, to take command of the British forces in those parts in accordance with his rank, he also commanded Lumley to “pursue such Orders & Instructions” as would be delivered to him by Richard Ingoldsby. Both were lieutenants-general, though Lumley was more senior. Ingoldsby had been deputed as commander-in-chief in Marlborough's absence the previous November; and although Marlborough was then in Holland, Ingoldsby retained a level of management.474 Its pathways of communication could also be somewhat awkward. When in 1703 Ingoldsby sought leave for a lieutenant of his regiment to return to England, on account of his health, it was to the acting commander-in-chief, Cutts, that his petition was addressed – if in a rather convoluted manner, going first by Cardonnel in London, who then asked Watkins at The Hague to speak to the lieutenant-general!475

These temporary commanders-in-chief were careful to absolve themselves of the most difficult decisions; theirs were typically minor choices and resolutions. Writing early in 1703, after councils and conferences held in Marlborough's absence had directed minor detachments into Flanders and to the Moselle, Cutts assured the duke that, these aside, all things would be 'at liberty' upon his arrival in the Low Countries. Cutts had missed a conference of the deputies of the States-General on 9 March through illness, but was informed of its resolutions by Jacob Hop, the treasurer-general. The plan had been to order Coehoorn to attempt an operation in Flanders, if the engineer thought it practical; the States desired Cutts to make a detachment from the English troops to support the enterprise – whether to take part in the operation, or replace those Dutch troops that did (in their garrison at Bergen-op-Zoom). Cutts chose the latter, despite

473 E.g. BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 128-129b: Lumley to Marlborough, Ghent, 11 March 1708 N.S. Ibid., ff. 130-131b: ditto, 28 March 1708 N.S.
474 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 144-144b: order to Henry Lumley. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. The Hague, 19 April 1707 N.S.
475 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 61-62b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Whitehall, 7 December 1703 O.S.
Marlborough's earlier dictat that no English soldiers were to be sent there, on account of the oft-rampant sickness there.\textsuperscript{476}

The order to take temporary command-in-chief over the English forces was accompanied by an order to appoint courts-martial. These orders were addressed to the named deputy, or the 'commander in chief with Her Majesty's forces in the Low Countries' in that individual's absence. They permitted the recipient, pursuant to the powers granted to Marlborough by virtue of his own commission as commander-in-chief under the Great Seal, the authority to appoint courts-martial as he thought fit; to order the judge-advocate or deputy judge-advocate to attend; and to require the provost marshal to summon all necessary to attend and give notice of the court's time and place, as chosen by the president. The sentence of the court would be reported to the deputed commander-in-chief for his approbation and directions.\textsuperscript{477}

On one occasion, orders to subordinate generals to appoint courts-martial were passed prior to Marlborough leaving the continent, or appointing a deputy. On 9 September 1703 (two months before he was deputed as commander-in-chief in Marlborough's absence), Charles Churchill was given orders to appoint courts and review their sentences. (No mention was made to a particular branch of the service). The following day, Lumley was ordered likewise, but for the Horse and Dragoons alone.\textsuperscript{478}

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Courts-martial, be they general or regimental, represented one example of collective decision-making in the army, a phenomenon present at various levels of command.

\textsuperscript{476} BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 30-32b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 13 March 1703 N.S. Cutts stated that Flanders was just as sickly as Bergen-op-Zoom had been in the past, and that the latter was much healthier than it had been.

\textsuperscript{477} BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 112b-113: order for holding courts-martial, to Lord Cutts, or the commander in chief with Her Majesty's forces in the Low Countries. The Hague, 12 November 1702 N.S. For further orders to appoint courts-martial, directed to the derived commanders-in-chief, see: BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 80b-81 (Churchill, 1703), 175b-176b (Wood, 1704); Add. MSS 61371, ff. 55b-56 (Blood, 1705), ff. 119b-120b (Ingoldsby, 1706), ff. 209b-210 (Lumley, 1707); Add. MSS 61372, ff. 106b-107 (Wood, 1709), f. 150 (Cadogan, 1709), f. 252 (Wood, 1710); Add. MSS 61373, ff. 41b-42 (Cadogan, 1711).

\textsuperscript{478} BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 51b-52 (Charles Churchill) and 52-53b (Henry Lumley): orders allowing said generals to appoint courts-martial. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at St Trond, 9 and 10 September 1703 N.S.
Marlborough's warrant as a commander-in-chief authorised him to appoint general
courts-martial for the army, and appoint the officers necessary to same:

And for Execution of Justice in Our said Army, We do give you Authority to
appoint a Provost Martial, to use, and Exercise that Office, as is usually practiced in
the Law Martial. And Whereas We have appointed a Judge Advocate to attend the
said Court Martial for the more orderly proceedings of the same, We do hereby
give you power in case of Death, Sickness, or necessary absence of the said Judge
Advocate to depute another Person, such as in your discretion you shall think fit to
Execute the Said Office.479

In authorising a general court-martial, the commander-in-chief of the forces in the Low
Countries would send an order to a field officer within the army, typically a colonel
(who might also be a general officer). The recipient, who would be the president of the
court, would then appoint a number of officers from local regiments, usually of the
same branch of service as the accused. He would also appoint a guard to the provost
martial, who would summon such as were called upon to give testimony. Finally, the
president would authorise and require the court to examine all information by
affidavit, and to give judgement and sentence according to the time-honoured Rules
and Articles of War for the Better Government of Her Majesty's Forces in the Low
Countries, and the Mutiny Act.480 The competence of the general court-martial was not
always as 'general' as implied; if those charged with offences were common soldiers in
the Foot Guards, for example, Adam de Cardonnel might ask that they were not tried
under a commander's warrant, but held in custody until further orders were
received.481

479 NA, SP 44/168 pp. 391-394. Warrant to Marlborough as commander-in-chief. Anne and
Vernon. St James, 9 March 1702 O.S.
480 E.g. BL, Add MSS 61339, ff. 22-22b: order to Colonel Francis Palmes to hold a general court-
martial, camp at Duikenburg, 20 July 1702 N.S. In this particular case, the court-martial was
convened to try disorders committed by individuals in Lumley's and Wyndham's regiments of
Horse; the officers of court were thus to be drawn from the four regiments of English Horse
present in the camp. Add. MSS 61336, ff. 24-24b: order to form a court-martial for the Foot,
given at the camp at Roeselare, 14 October 1708 N.S. For similar orders to the Artillery, and
Horse and Dragoons, see ibid., ff. 25-25b and ff. 30-30b.
481 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 230-230b: order to hold courts-martial in three battalions of Foot
under Major-General Murray in Flanders. Camp at Terbanck, 16 June 1708 N.S.
While there appears to have been no proscription against a court's president and members sitting on cases relating to their own regiment, cases involving commissioned officers typically utilised a board comprised of officers from different regiments. This proved particularly necessary at a rather confusing court-martial convened at the camp at Thys on 31 May 1703, with Sir Matthew Bridges presiding. Captain John Stewart of Lieutenant-General Stewart's regiment of Foot had been accused of killing Lieutenant-Colonel William Stewart of the same corps, in a duel occasioned by a spilt glass of punch. Among those giving evidence was a Lieutenant William Stewart, and although Captain John Stewart was acquitted, the court found that another Stewart, the major of the regiment, had been guilty of a 'great fault, misdemeanour and neglect of duty' in not preventing the duel. They sentenced him to be suspended during Marlborough's pleasure.

Courts might be ordered to sit frequently, especially in times of particular ill-discipline, be it real or feared. On 11 October 1706, Marlborough ordered that a 'standing' court-martial be appointed to meet at least four times a week, assembling at 8 a.m. and not adjourning until midday. The rank of the members of the court would depend upon the rank of the accused; no officer, for example, would be judged by those of junior rank. The deputy judge-advocate was responsible for the legal veracity and protocol of the court. Writing to John Ellis late in 1702, and hoping to forestall his future duties in this regard, deputy judge-advocate Henry Watkins quipped:

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482 See, for example n. 43 above and the court of Palmes, who presided over a case involving his own regiment (Wyndham's).

483 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 12-15: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at Thys, 31 May 1703 N.S., Sir Matthew Bridges presiding.

484 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 111b-112 (regulations to prevent marauding) and 112b-113 (order to hold courts-martial). Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's command. Camp at Gramez, 11 October 1706 N.S. These courts would be presided over by colonels, and the board would consist of twelve other field officers or captains.

485 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 32-33b: proceedings of a general court-martial, Colonel Howe presiding, camp at Overijssel, 20 July 1702 N.S. A lieutenant having been accused of cowardice in his duties, the court comprised six captains and six field officers. The lieutenant was wholly acquitted; his accuser, John Reading, was found guilty of casting aspersions against his officer, and sentenced to be picketed three times, at the head of each English brigade, for two hours each day and with his crime written on his breast. He was then discharged from the service.
I shall begin my circuit next week and hold my assizes at Breda and the Bosch which I hope will strike such a terror that I shall not frequently have occasion to remove from my residence [at The Hague].

At a court-martial presided over by the Earl of Barrymore, held at the camp at St Tron, 18 September 1703, Henry Watkins kept tallies of the votes for guilt and innocence given by each officer of the court. In this single example, voting was anything but equivocal. For the first case, he carefully recorded nine ‘guilties’ before noting the verdict as unanimous; on another he got no further than eight. After that, Watkins simply denoted the final verdict. If the officially appointed deputy judge-advocate was not present—Watkins’ terror or no—other officers might be appointed as a local deputy judge-advocate, for the purposes of a single general court-martial, with concomitant powers to summon witnesses and advise upon the time and location of the proceedings. In one example—on the march to the Danube, when the army was distant from its otherwise typical theatre of operations—the duke of Marlborough’s chaplain stood in as a local judge-advocate, taking reports of crimes and evidence from parties in advance of the court-martial.

If a particular case involved more than one nationality, or soldiers from different branches of the service, then the composition of the court might reflect that. On 26 June 1703, William Palmer presided over a court at the camp at Haneffe, consisting of twelve commissioned officers of the Dragoons—six of whom were English, and six foreign officers of corps in Her Majesty’s pay. They met to adjudicate on a disturbance between Rowland Pickering of Colonel Featherstone’s troop, who was acting as a safeguard, and two soldiers from Hessen-Homburg’s regiment of Dragoons. On

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486 Quoted in Hayton et al. (eds), HoC, v, p. 810.
487 BL, Add. MSS 38853, ff. 95-97b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at St Tron, 18 September 1703 N.S. by Lord Cutts’ order, the Earl of Barrymore presiding. Ff. 97-97b notes Watkins’ notes of the officers’ verdicts.
488 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 30b-31: order to Colonel Howe to hold a court-martial, relating to all troops in the Low Countries. Captain Andrew Hayes was authorised to act as deputy judge-advocate. Camp at Nijmegen, 24 June 1702 O.S.
489 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 20b: camp journal, 12 June 1704 N.S.
490 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 24-24b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at Haneffe, 26 June 1703 N.S., William Palmer presiding.
another occasion, a fatal fight between a corporal in Orkney's regiment and a dragoon led to a board composed of both officers of Foot and Dragoons.\textsuperscript{491}

Indeed, the multinational composition of the army could raise questions on the issue of jurisdiction: the German and Danish auxiliaries in the army possessed their own conceptions and traditions of military justice, but were also subordinated to the Maritime Powers by virtue of their being in Dutch or joint Anglo-Dutch pay. The States-General decreed that corps solely in Dutch pay were to fall under the United Provinces' orders and directions relating to discipline; and for those regiments in joint pay, the regiments of England and Holland together—excepting when the treaties signed with the auxiliary nations specified otherwise. It was not the duty of the generals of the auxiliary forces to judge whether the orders of England and the United Provinces were contrary to their treaties (except in the case of very clear clauses to the contrary), and the Maritime Powers were to be responsible for all orders given in this regard. Foreign generals accused of disobedience were to be judged by a general court-martial of the army, and their princes were not to limit their subordination to England and the United Provinces by any secret orders.

On the specific issue of courts-martial, the States noted that whereas most foreign corps had their own courts, "too great a weight and liberty [had] been allowed to the judicature of same," – it was thus necessary to put them under a new method, viz:

(i) that the general-in-chief of the combined army, as also the senior general of the States' forces (and vice versa, if the general-in-chief was Dutch) would be informed by way of the judge-advocate of all the excesses committed by the auxiliary soldiers;

(ii) that such information was transmitted to the general-in-chief of the corps of which the complaints were made, within a limited time from which that corps would be obliged to see justice done and make a report thereof – and if this did not occur, the matter was to be settled by courts-martial of the army;

\textsuperscript{491} BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 24b-25.
(iii) that the foreign troops were obliged to see justice done according to the articles and military ordinances of Holland, and to no other laws and customs;

(iv) that they were to produce the proceedings of such justice to the general from whom they received the complaint, for his approbation, before it was put into execution;

(v) that they were not allowed to grant pardon or grace to offenders, since such a right should have been stipulated in their treaties;

(vi) that as the forming of the army, all generals of the auxiliary forces would be notified that damages committed by their charges would be deducted out of the pay of their whole corps.492

The proceedings of courts-martial under English jurisdiction were sent to the commander-in-chief for his approbation and confirmation of any sentences given, which would then be put into execution; or if they were mitigated in some manner, such as on account of a court’s recommendation of mercy despite the sentence, the alterations would be returned to the court, which was to act accordingly.493 On one occasion, the court was authorised to put its sentence into execution in advance, without receiving the commander-in-chief’s confirmation.494 This was a distinct rarity and in no way normal practice. In one instance, Cutts wrote that he would have given powers to a court-martial to confirm its sentences themselves, but by his commission he was “not authorised to vest these Powers in any Person” besides himself.495


493 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 12-13b: Richard Sutton to Cutts, Breda, 19 February 1703 (N.S.)

494 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 30b-31: order to Colonel Howe to hold a court-martial, relating to all troops in the Low Countries. Camp at Nijmegen, 24 June 1702 O.S.

The power to remit a sentence of a court-martial, or offer a pardon to any individual sentenced, was the perquisite of the commander-in-chief, who possessed the power "to Reprieve any Person under any Sentence," until Her Majesty's further pleasure was known. This right extended to the deputed commanders-in-chief, as well as Marlborough, by virtue of the warrants the duke sent them. After the court-martial of two deserters, both condemned to death, Wood took the liberty to reprieve them, as was his right, but still explained his motives to Marlborough:

... it being (with great submission) my opinion that mercy; weare any roome is left to excersise it; is much more acceptable to Heaven; then is the Rigorous prosicutions of Justice. 'tis almost three yeeres sence the one left his post by the Grave and has sence serv'd in a Colone Regiment 'tis nere time enough to have had his fault forgotten, the other left his Regiment at Daniwert, haveing lost a Horse a grateing and was fearfull of returneing to his Collors, and was taken workeing his trade by Rotterdam, wch circumstances dos somethinge mitigate his fault; I shu'd not, my Lord, have presumd to have made this representation, to your Grace, if I had not seene soe many profes of your Generous disposition you have given Joy to Europe in Shakeing of A Crowne, that longe has stood firmely fix'd on the Head of a Saucey Monarke - in giveing life to these pore wretches, you put them in the number of those millions of people that are bound to pray for your prosperity.

Marlborough was noted for his willingness to show mercy. Some of the examples may seem perplexing to a modern mind. A dragoon in Ross's regiment, Simon Connard, was charged with resisting the sergeant of the guard, going so far as to threaten to shoot the non-commissioned officer with a pistol, which he held to his chest. Unsurprisingly, Connard was found guilty of transgressing the 17th Article of War and sentenced by the court to death. Yet, as happened not infrequently, the court represented that Connard had only recently arrived at the army; never having heard the Articles of War read out by his officers, he could hardly be found guilty of acting contrary to them! The court-martial thus recommended mercy, a recommendation with which Marlborough agreed. When John Franter had fallen out of his corps on the march, and a corporal made to order him back, the soldier pointed his firearm at the NCO and threatened to fire. A serious charge; but as Franter was a recruit and had not—by all appearances—had the Articles of War read to him, and had spend most of

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496 NA, SP 44/168 pp. 391-394. Warrant to Marlborough as commander-in-chief. Anne and Vernon. St James, 9 March 1702 O.S.
497 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 154-155b: Wood to Marlborough, Breda, 2 February 1705 N.S.
498 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 80b-81: proceedings of a court-martial, 1702.
his service sick in garrison and the field, the court was unanimously of the opinion that he be acquitted.499

Marlborough rarely went against the courts' recommendations. A rare occasion related to a general court-martial held at Ghent in 1708, with Colonel Patrick Meade presiding. Two men were sentenced to death for desertion, for which the court could recommend no mercy; but as they were aware of Marlborough's willingness to save some when more than one man was condemned, they recommended that any pardon went to the first-time offender, who deserted on account of 'love for his family'. The other soldier was a serial deserter, who had changed his name 'to go on better in his wicked Trade'. Marlborough, however, was content to pardon both, on account of their long imprisonment and (their colonel) Lord North and Grey's representations.500

Others were not so lucky, despite their attempted ingenuity (or otherwise). Thomas Tenant, a deserter, was found in Maastricht clothed in the uniform of the Duke of Holstein-Ploen's regiment. At the time, Tenant said he did not particularly like the English service, and much preferred the Dutch. Later, he tried to explain the entire situation by saying that two Irishmen had gotten him rotten drunk and clothed him in his new uniform, and that he knew nothing of his new enlistment. No protestations of Jacobite bogeymen could save Tenant, however: he was sentenced to death.501

An officer in dereliction of his duty, such as one found guilty by a general or regimental court-martial, might be indefinitely suspended of his rank and pay, until the commanding officer or commander-in-chief was confident of his suitability to serve. Major Thomas Parsons, of Godfrey's regiment of Foot, had been found guilty at a general court-martial in on 16 June 1705, for failing to prevent a quarrel in which a fellow officer was killed. His sentence was to be suspended as Marlborough thought

499 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 12-14b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at Lien les Beguines, 8 July 1705 N.S., Sir Richard Temple, Bt presiding.
500 BL, Add. MSS 38853, ff.124-125: Marlborough's mercy was only signified 26 June 1708 N.S., more than three months after the original court-martial.
501 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 101b-103.
fit; having petitioned the commander-in-chief in acknowledgement of his guilt, he was restored to his post and command less than two months later. 502

In certain cases, it was considered necessary to avoid the matter of a court-martial at all, to forestall its possible consequences. Writing to Francis Palmes in 1707, Marlborough somewhat exasperatedly noted the behaviour of two cornets, Strickland and Smith, in Palmes' regiment of Carabiniers:

>You know what scandal has been given, and what noise has been made on the like occasion before you left us, without any regular information or proof, but this is become so very public, and the proof so undeniable, that though I am in great straits what to do in the matter on account of their relations, yet I think myself obliged in honour and conscience not to suffer such persons to serve any longer in the army. I have forborne bringing them to a court-martial, foreseeing the inevitable danger they would be in of losing their lives, or undergoing a worse punishment. I therefore desire you would consult with your friends in England, and let me know your opinion of what is fit to be done in a case of so extraordinary a nature. 503

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Courts-martial were occasionally termed conseils de guerre or 'councils of war', a label we more readily associate meetings on the subject of strategy, operations or tactics, rather than military justice. Councils of war were the prime expression of the collective nature of military decision making in the period, particularly given the multinational context to the Allied prosecution of the war.

Such meetings could be convened on a variety of subjects. In June 1703, Henry Lumley, the senior general of the English Horse in the Low Countries, appointed a council of the commanding officers of the regiments of Horse and Dragoons to debate certain issues relating the corps. The officers comprised Brigadier Cornelius Wood, Colonel Charles Ross, Lieutenant-Colonel William Palmer (of Lumley's), Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Palmes (of Wyndham's), Lieutenant-Colonel Owen Wynne (then of Ross's), Colonel Robert Killigrew (of Raby's), Lieutenant-Colonel John Fetherstone (of

502 BL, Add. MSS 38853, f. 120: order of Marlborough to Colonel Francis Godfrey, Camp at Meldert, 14 August 1705 N.S.

503 Murray, iii, p. 616: Marlborough to Palmes, camp at Helchin, 10 October 1707 N.S. There is no trace of Cornet Smith in Dalton; Cornet Thomas Strickland had left the regiment by 1709. A Thomas Strickland received a captain's commission in the marines, dated 23 March 1708; he resigned his commission to another on 18 February 1710. Dalton, vi, pp. 121-123.
Wood's), Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Sibourg (of the Duke of Schomberg's), Major George Preston (of Viscount Teviot's) and Captain-Lieutenant James Fleming (of Cadogan's).

The first point of order was whether the three regiments of Dragoons in the Low Countries (of which two were 'Royal') were to roll equally in their duties; the council was unanimous in the belief that they should. That considered, the officers debated discipline on the march. Relating that the 'Strangers' made it a custom to send such numbers of men with the baggage and quartermasters that they made a 'great Destruction' before the army came to camp, the officers suggested to Marlborough that he allowed a number from each regiment to accompany the baggage and quartermasters, and no more - which would be strictly enforced by the wagonmaster-general. The duke was in complete agreement, rendering the council's suggestions into being by the order of 1 July 1703.

Of more critical import were the councils called to regulate the operations of the campaign. In January 1703, a conference of the Allied generals was called at Wesel, with a view to discussing such matters as the siege of Bonn. There was to be an Imperial general, a Prussian general, Athlone on behalf of the States, and Cutts for the English, if he desired. Marlborough had left Cutts no instructions by word or letter relating to his powers in councils or conferences to be held outside the United Provinces, so Cutts excused himself with all politeness (protesting that he could not leave the English soldiery, they having but one brigadier over them at the time). Cutts had no conception of Marlborough's plans for the following campaign, and did not wish to make a mistake. But the finer points of his reasoning are more interesting:

This was the summe of what I gave them in answer, but I'll presume to tell your Grace more important reasons (if possible) that I had for declining my being at this Generall consultation.

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504 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 63-64b: proceedings of a council of commanding officers of the Horse and Dragoons, appointed by Lumley. June 1703.
505 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 65-66b: order of Marlborough, relating to the baggage. Camp at Coursell, 1 July 1703 N.S. The limit was set at one man per troop or company, with a further sergeant or corporal for each regiment or battalion.
First, I had discover'd privately being every day with some or other of the Ministers, that there was a design to draw me in, to let some of the Queens troops, either English or Lunembourgh be employ'd in the Expeditions before mention'd, which could ruine them for the next Campagne, and in the next place my going thither, and being present in such a Council of War, if I should be outvoted by much a greater number, may run me upon a Dilemma, either that I must be forc'd [...] most of the rest, which might occasion ill refl[... ] in [...] in some resolution which may be its consequence to be contrary to the Plan, which your Grace may possibly have projected for the ensuing Campagne which tho I don't know it I may possibly guess at by something, Comte Synsendorf let fall to me in private at Leige, and one thing confirms me that my Lord Athlone has some reason for my going to the Congress, more than he tells, me which is yt. Hee also never us'd to consult me, or communicate anything to me, was mighty pressing for my undertaking this journey, having employed [since] Monsieur Smettau and Geldermalsen to persuade me how much it would be for my Honour but I excus'd it...

Cutts hoped Marlborough would approve of his actions; but if he did not, it would be too late to amend them.506 This presents the conundrum of the council of war. If a general officer was absent, he could not exert the agency of himself or his corps; his authority in the decision-making process, and in influencing the conduct of his peers and the Allied armies as a whole, was thus diminished. But by the same token, his absence in no small way abrogated him of its resolutions; whereas if he had been present, and thus consented to be a participant in the process, he could be considered bound by the collegiate resolution, even if he disagreed.

Another council, on 6 March 1703, Cutts attended. An initial meeting was summoned by the Dutch general of cavalry, the Baron van Obdam, and consisted of the lieutenants-general of the Allies present at the Hague. The generals debated a project for the coming campaign, authored by Obdam and Slangenburg. After an initial consultation, the participants resolved that they would meet again and give their opinions in writing, signed, the following morning (7 March). Cutts summarised the meeting, and the generals' views, as follows:

Wee mett in a Chamber adjoining to the Chamber of Treves, and being late, Monsieur Opdam's secretary read every ones opinion, the Sume of wch is as followes

**Monsieur Salyche.** That the upper Rhyne and Moselle ought to bee sustained, and Monsieur Overkirke Reinforced if occasion should require it. That the Infantry

506 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 24-27b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 30 January 1703 N.S.
should be lodged in places along the Mase and the Horse drawne out and Cantoned to make roome for them. That it was not Practicable to make any diversion of Consequence in Brabant or Flanders.

**Count de Noyelles.** To sustaine the Rhyne, secure the New Conquests; and make a diversion in Brabant and Flandres.

**Lord Albemarle.** That the Seige of Bon was necessary but not practicable as yet. That wee ought to forme an Army upon the Meuse, and make a Diversion in Brabant and Fflanders.

**Liut. Genall. Hagell.** That the Generalls ought to be named for two Army's, one to bee formed upon the Meuse, and one att Bergen-op-Zoome; and that there should remaine troops enough to reinforce Monsieur Doverkirke. That an Artillery ought to bee formed for those two Armyes and got ready forthwith, that Boats should bee got together att Bergen-op-Zoome to Allarm the Enimy, and our troopes Assembled upon our ffrontiers. That the Seige of Bon was necessary but not Practicable yet. That wee ought to have a great Artillary at Wesel. That the Ballieux of the Plat Pay's of Brabant and Fflanders should be summoned to have Carts in a readiness the more to Allarm the Enimy in those parts.

**My own opinion (as I gave in writeing) was.** That all necessary preparatifs should Immediately be made to forme an Army upon the Meuse, as sone as it might bee practicable. That the necessary preparations for a Seige be made wth out determining wch Seige, till we see the Effect of the present operations of Germany. That a Diversion may be made in Brabant or Fflanders, whilst, the necessary preparations for opening the Campagne are making; but that it bee made by detachment only, not by Entire Regiments wch detachments must returne to their Garrisons before the opening of the Campagne. But this upon supposition that the Intelligence, wch the States has of the Enimyes weakness in Brabant and Fflanders bee certain.

I concluded with a representation that he Majt's forces could not possibly march out of their Garrisons in intire Corps, till our Recruits, Cloaths, and officers are Arrived.507

No positive conclusion to the conference is recorded by Cutts; this is perhaps because he fell ill on the evening of the 8 March and was afflicted by a fever for thirty hours. Heinsius, however, noted that the proposals of some officers to support operations on

507 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 30-32b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 13 March 1703 N.S.
the Rhine and Moselle led to the detachment of ten battalions to the lines between Trarbach and Wissembourg.508

Not all forms of collective discussion were made with every participant present in person. Communications between the various civil and military officials on such matters would often take the form of a memorial delivered by post, framed in the style of question (or proposal) and response. A single officer, or body of officers acting in concert, might put their considerations and views in a memorandum, which would then be passed to their peers for comment.509 These memoranda, typically with the initial authors' views copied on one half of the paper, and the respondents' next to them on the other half, would be circulated to the interested parties.510 As an example, a typical question on a memorial composed in 1703 ran thus:

6. What officers would compose the staff of the army to be sent to the Moselle?

To which an answer ran:

6. If the army on the Moselle was to act separately, it should have a general-in-chief, two lieutenants-general, four majors-general, eight brigadiers, a [Dutch] deputy, a commissary for the army's pay, an officer (or more) of artillery with a company of same, a quartermaster-general and his lieutenant, a wagonmaster and twenty conductors, a lieutenant of guides and ten guides, a commissary for supplies and forage, provost-marshal and executioner.511

Marlborough was not present at many of these initial meetings or discussion, but received copies.512

508 Van 't Hoff, no. 87, pp. 51-52: Heinsius to Marlborough, The Hague, 9 February 1703 N.S.
509 E.g. BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 31-37b: Considerations of the Prince of Nassau, Dutch and Allied general, on the subject of present affairs. Camp before Kaiserert, 15 May 1702 N.S. This was responded to by Athlone and other generals under his command at the camp at Clarenbeck, 21 May 1702 N.S. They agreed on some elements and made detailed comments on others. Add. MSS. 61337, ff. 38-46b.
510 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 83-83b: memorial on the subject of passing the Meuse, Overijssel, 22 July 1702 N.S. This memorial contained seventeen points. Ff. 84-85b contains the above, copied in the right-hand column, with the thoughts of the respondents as annotations in the left-hand column.
511 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 178-178b. [1703.]
512 E.g. BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 59-60b: results of a council of war, The Hague, 25 June 1702 N.S. The generals were of the opinion that a considerable army was to be formed at Nijmegen; and
Relatively little is heard of the councils of war that produced happy, concordant resolutions in the War of the Spanish Succession; by contrast, those that were riven by discord gained an element of notoriety. One such event occurred in August 1703, when the Allied generals debated an opportunity to attack the French lines after they had finished the siege of Huy; others favoured an investment of Limburg. Initially the conference was to have consisted of those of lieutenant-general and above, but was expanded to include some majors-general of the army.

Marlborough was for attacking the lines, for which he promoted several reasons: the weakness of the lines meant the French would have to defend them with a battle, of which the duke expected success, with the Allies possessing "the best Foot that can be seen" such that "wee noe ways doubt by the blessing of God to have a glorious Victory over them"; the diminution in the enemy's numbers (the French magazine at Namur would necessitate a large detachment for its security); the lack of forage on the Allied side of the lines, and between the Meuse and the Saar, which would promote moving into a new area of operations; and the French superiority in Germany and Italy required the Allies to justify themselves in the Low Countries and force France to recall troops from those critical theatres. The siege of Limburg, on the other hand, could be made by a detachment later.

This statement was signed by Marlborough; Lieutenants-General Charles Churchill, Lord Cutts and Henry Lumley for the English; the generals commanding the Hanoverian soldiers—Lieutenants-General Carl von Somerfeldt, Cuno von Bülow, the comte de Noyelle and Ernst August, duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg; the Hessian commanders—Friedrich, hereditary prince of Hesse-Cassel, Heinrich Wilhelm von Spiegel zum Desenberg and Albrecht, baron von Tettau; and the Danish generals—Karl Rudolph, duke of Württemberg-Neustadt and Jobst von Scholten.513

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513 A draft of the propositions advocated for the attack on the lines, made at the council of war—or indeed Marlborough's position noted beforehand—is contained in BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 183-186b. The final statement on the proposition is at ibid., ff. 187-188b. A copy appears in Murray, i, pp. 165-166 and Lamberty, ii, pp. 462-463.
Of a different opinion were other generals of the army: General Ouwerkerk; the earl of Albermarle; Major-General Nicolaas de Dompré; Lieutenant-General Daniel, baron van Dopff; the Prussian general Leopold, prince of Anhalt-Dessau; the Hanoverian major-general, Louis Saint-Paul des Estanges (often rendered ‘St Pol’); Major-General Willem van Heukelum; Major-General Bengt, count Oxenstierna; and Rantzau. While they admitted that the attack on the lines was the most ‘glorious’ option, they tended to favour the siege of Limburg—albeit in a somewhat diffident manner: for a siege of that town was best effected while the season allowed it, and would both cover the lands of Jülich and Gelderland, and allow a consolidation of the Allies between the Meuse and the Rhine.

Confusingly, the copy of the field deputies report on their generals’ sentiments in the Blenheim Papers also listed Noyelle as a signatory (meaning he signed both opinions); but the transcription in Lamberty replaces the signatory of Noyelle with that of Slangenburg. Nevertheless, the distinction between the two modes of opinion on grounds of nationality is striking. There was a clear difference between the generals of the left (Dutch and auxiliary) and the right (English and auxiliary) wings of the army. Excepting Anhalt-Dessau, Saint-Paul and Rantzau, the auxiliary general sided with Marlborough. The degree of dispute, however, rendered an attempt on the lines void.

While the duke urbanely noted that he was “heartely sorry that wee are not all of own opinion, those Generals which differ with us in opinion being Persons for whome wee have a great estime and honour ¬ec, “ others were not so restrained. Cadogan, who (quite naturally) thought Marlborough’s reasoning for the attack as being “so clear and

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514 It is difficult to discern whether this was the officer in Dutch and Hanoverian service, Detlev von Rantzau; or the Danish cavalry commander in Dutch service, Jorgen von Rantzau. Neither, incidentally, held the substantive rank of major-general until 1704.

515 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 189-190b: memorial of the deputies of the States-General on the conference held on 24 August 1703 N.S. Camp at Vignemont. A version (with slight differences) is printed in Lamberty, i, pp. 464-465. A second, complimentary opinion to this was signed by the generals in the army under Claude-Frédéric Tserclaes, comte de Tilly: Major-General Baron Hompesch; Major-General Johan Theodore, Baron van Friesheim; Gerhard, Graaf van der Nath and general Baar. Add. MSS 61337, ff. 195-196b: memorial for the States-General on the conference of 24 August 1703 N.S. Camp at Bridgrice, 25 August 1703 N.S. This is not printed by Lamberty.
convincing”, muttered that most [sic] of the general officers were in agreement, while those

... that chiefly oppose this undertaking are Slangenbergh Dopf and Dompré and the rest of the Dutch Genl's except Monst. Overkirk [even though he signed the deputation arguing for the siege of Limburg]. Most of the Deputys here, particularly Monst Hop and Witzen the Burgomaster of Amsterdam are extremely for it, and indeed the resolution and Vicour the Deputys show on all occasions were enough to put their Genl's out of countenance if the were not equally incapable of shame as reason.516

A far more serious disagreement occurred two years later, following the passing of the Lines of Brabant. An attempt to cross the Dyle at Corbeck, on 29 July 1705, had ended in failure when the French brought their army to bear quickly enough that the enterprise was put in doubt. After a consultation with the generals, the operation was cancelled. Not all were of the same opinion, as the camp journal noted. But the anonymous author of the journal, a Briton, admitted:

But what appears most certain is that the French Household & all the Bavarian and Liege Troops were come up behind the rising Ground on the other side of the River before we fired a Cannon with Resolution to stay for us which must have cost us very dear had we pass'd with success.517

The failure had put Marlborough out of temper. His letters in the immediate aftermath, to the States General and Harley, were polite enough, simply noting the decision to retire from the crossings and seeking to apportion no blame.518 Two days later, however, the duke wrote a disgruntled missive to Heinsius, noting that if the mode of command in the army continued in its present form

... it will be impossible to attempt anything considerable with success or advantage, since councils of war must be called on every occasion, which entirely destroys the secrecy and dispatch upon which all great undertakings depend; and has unavoidably another very unhappy effect, for the private animosities between so many persons as have to be assembled being so great, and their inclinations and interests so different, as always to make one party oppose what the other advises, they consequently never agree.

516 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 3-4b: Cadogan to Raby, camp before Huy, 27 August 1703 N.S.
517 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 46b-47: camp journal, 29 July 1705 N.S.
518 Murray, ii, pp. 194-195.
The duke desired to be able to act as he thought best, without being obliged to communicate his plans to his general officers further than he thought 'convenient'. But there was no alteration, for the matter was replayed with greater portent on 18 August.

Marlborough desired to attack the French lines along the River Yssche, and to that end had ordered a detachment, commanded by his brother, to move through the Forest of Soignies to threaten the enemy's flank and rear. The French had been forewarned, however and made various obstacles to his progress; it was unable to proceed and later called back. Meanwhile, the duke could see advantageous nature of the enemy's post on the high ground above the other bank of the river, but still pressed for an attack. Other officers disagreed. Many appeared unaware of the orders given to Churchill; Slangenburg was particularly disconcerted that although Ouwerkerk's Foot had been formed into line of battle on arriving, those of Marlborough had not. Ouwerkerk's forces had been formed along the Yssche since the early morning, but it was 5 p.m. before any design was imparted to them, Slangenburg claimed.

A conference of the generals and field deputies was called. Slangenburg stated that it occurred between 5 and 6 p.m.; but in an extract of a letter written to Henry St John, the anonymous author claimed: "Twas betwixt 12 and 1 when ye Consultation began, but was 5 before it ended." Slangenburg was discountenanced that he'd been called to give his thoughts on a design he'd not previously been made aware of, but agreed — passively-aggressively it seems — that he would help to put any design into execution, but make no other judgement; Tilly, Salisch and the Dutch lieutenants-general agreed likewise. Marlborough appeared to take issue with Slangenburg's temperament, for he pressed further, which only exacerbated the situation, with the generals stating that they would execute any orders given, but not be held responsible for the consequences. This spurred the field deputies into action. Noting their generals' reticence, they ordered them — twice — to give their true sentiments on the issue.

519 Ibid., pp. 197-198: Marlborough to Heinsius, Meldert, 2 August 1703 N.S.
520 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 49-49b: camp journal, 18 August 1705 N.S.
522 Ibid. KP I(i)/6: extract of a letter to St John, camp at Tirlemont, 31 August 1705 N.S.
The results were decisive. Many of the Dutch generals were against it; Slangenburg added that he had served nearly forty years and had never heard of such an attack proposed, not least when the generals had not had an opportunity to see the ground. After a further conference between Marlborough, Ouwerkerk and the field deputies, it was agreed to send Slangenburg, Tilly, Noyelle and Salisch to view the enemy's posts; Noyelle declined, but the others made their reconnaissance—the results of which were hardly surprising. Marlborough rode past this party without the least acknowledgement; Ouwerkerk was asleep when they attempted to make their report. Nothing came of the enterprise, and the army turned its attentions elsewhere.\(^{523}\)

The events at Overyssche are often held as an example of Dutch obstruction. The likes of Cranstoun and Parker made great play upon Slangenburg supposedly holding up the march of the English artillery until his own baggage had past by.\(^{524}\) But senior English generals were also against the enterprise. Slangenburg noted that several of the 'considerablest' generals of Marlborough's army had declared it impracticable, while the author of the camp journal conceded: "... & indeed few of our own Gen* were for it, the Ground being extremely Disadvantageous, & not at all what it had been represented to his Grace."\(^{525}\) Orkney was a particular opponent. One writer noted that Slangenburg opposed the enterprise with

... a great earnestness, as did likewise my Ld Orkney. The former my Ld Duke told when he urged a great Many difficulties in leading on ye 4 attacks that my Ld designed to give; but especially that he (Mr Slangenburg) was to Lead. That his Highness was so far from proposing anything he thought not very practicable, that he himself would lead on that attack that he said was attended with so many difficulties; and that he should have his Choice of the other three. This had no other effect on Monsr Slangenburg, than to make him a little less Noisy than he was before. Monsr Auverkerque & one or two of the Dutch Generals agreed with my Ld Duke in attacking the Enemy; as did Compt Noyelle and General Ingoldsby of ours.\(^{526}\)

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\(^{523}\) BL, Add. MSS 61188, ff. 7-10b: narrative of Slangenburg’s opposition to Marlborough at Overyssche; ff. 11-28b: Slangenburg’s memorial to the States-General. Stowe MSS 748, ff. 37-41. Wijn, VIII, i, pp. 620-625 and iii, pp. 771-772. Letter of Schagen to Heinsius, 19 August 1705 N.S.


\(^{525}\) BL, Stowe MSS 748, ff. 37-41. Add. MSS 61404, ff. 49-49b: camp journal, 18 August 1705 N.S.

\(^{526}\) KP I(i)/6: extract of a letter to St John, camp at Tirlemont, 31 August 1705 N.S.
Slangenburg was also perplexed by the notion that Ouwerkerk was of the same opinion as Marlborough; rather, he thought his Field Marshal was in agreement with the Dutch generals, judging it to be 'a very difficult enterprise'. A similar confusion existed at Corbeck.527

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation, Marlborough was incensed. The situation grew worse when his castigatory letter to the States General was published and the Dutch retaliated with the publication of several letters from the army in defence.528 Charles Churchill, upon hearing of these and their supposed criticisms of his brother, sent Francis Palmes to Slangenburg as his second to demand satisfaction; but the Dutchman showed Palmes his letters, protesting his innocence, and the duel was averted.529 With such dissent within the army, it was "little wonder," as Het Staatsche Leger noted, "that the States by a resolution of 2 September instructed the field deputies to with all means promote unity among the generals." Slingelandt himself wrote to Goslinga, inquiring further into the situation, and the degree to which the affair between Marlborough and Slangenburg affected the army.530

Marlborough's complaints were perseverant enough that Slangenburg was eventually dismissed.531 But it aggravated his growing concern at the notion of councils of war into something bordering on contempt. When Earl Rivers was preparing for a planned descent upon the River Charente in France in 1706, Marlborough hoped that he would "make use of counells of warr but upon extraordinary occasion."532 Likewise, the duke's desire to keep his plans close to his chest remained. Prior to the passing of the Scheldt in 1708, Marlborough, according to the opinions of Richard Molesworth, indulged the enemy in an extensive programme of deception and bluff. He ordered the transport of much forage from the camp to Courtrai and Menin; the dispatch of the

527 BL, Stowe MSS 748, ff. 37-41.
529 Ibid., p. 255.
531 For Marlborough's initial letters, see n. 87 above, and 't Hoff, no. 324 p. 203: Marlborough to Heinsius, camp at Basse Wavre, 19 August 1705 N.S.; pp. 203-204: Marlborough to Slingelandt, 19 August 1705 N.S.; p. 204: Marlborough to Slingelandt, Basse-Wavre, 21 August 1705 N.S.; no. 327 p. 327: Marlborough to Heinsius, Corbais, 24 August 1705 N.S. On Slangenburg's dismissal, Wijn, VIII, iii, p. 781: Slangenburg to Heinsius, Maastricht, 28 September 1705 N.S.
532 Snyder, ii, no. 621 p. 613: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 15 July 1706 N.S.
Dutch and English artillery to Menin; and sent quartermasters to Courtrai to secure lodgings for Marlborough and other officers of distinction. Indeed, as Molesworth was concerned, this deceit extended to many of the duke’s own generals:

This farce was so well managed that our whole army was imposed upon by it, and I’me confident all our Generalls except those few whom it was necessary to admitt into the bottom of the design, really thought it was intended (as was given out) to cantoone and refresh the army for a while.533

This analysis is of the form favoured by contemporary supporters of Marlborough and much of the historiography: a prescient, perfectly executed operation; a bluff that had been planned well in advance. Though there was no doubt that Marlborough saw the necessity of making a move to relieve Brussels534, there was considerable delay in its execution, not least on account of the heavy rains that rendered the roads to the Scheldt particularly difficult; a delay that had caused disquiet in Prince Eugene’s army.535

* * *

The relations between the English, Germans and Dutch in the army could be marked by considerable prejudice. When discussing what he considered the necessity of dropping the distinction between wings in the army, Cadogan wrote that one should have thought that a recent misfortune “might convince those Herring sellers of the inconvenienceys which unavoidably attend a distinct right and left wing; which is in effect the making of a great body of men useless at best.”536 Whereas the Prussian, Grumbkow, would “outlye a Dutch Gazette and is no more capable of keeping a secret than a woman.”537 Holcroft Blood wished that Marlborough “might act this sommer without the heavy Cloge of Deputyes and Generalls that your Grace is neither shure of their Courige nor their affections.”538

But there could be sense amid the outrage. When, In 1707, Cadogan wrote:

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533 BL, Add. MSS 61312, ff. 186-191b: Richard Molesworth to his brother [unclear which one], camp at Berleghem, 3 December 1708 N.S.
534 See, for example, the letter of Marlborough to Fagel, camp at Roeselare, 20 November 1708 N.S. (Murray, iv, p. 316).
536 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 9-12b: Cadogan to Raby, The Hague, 17 February 1704 N.S.
537 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 69-70b: Cadogan to Raby, The Hague, 19 April 1707 N.S.
538 BL, Add. MSS 61309, ff. 45-46b: Blood to Marlborough, Rotterdam, 9 April 1706 N.S.
You may imagine how uneasy 'tis to my Lord Duke to have been this three weeks att the head of the best Army that ever was with his hands tied, the Hopes he had by mild methods and Reason to bring up the Deputys to some vigorous resolution, induces him to suffer what Geldermalsen and Goslinga instructed by their Genrils, governed by their Fears, and mislead by false accounts of the Enemys strength have proposed as yet for the operations of the Campagne, but matters will not remain much longer on this Foot, for if my Lords representation in Holland, and his warmly pressing the Deputys att the Army to consent to our attaquant the Enemy in the Camp they now are, have no effect my Lord must in Justice to himself let the world know when the fault lies, which he was willing to hide for the good of the common cause as long as there was hopes of it being mended.\(^{539}\)

Raby checked him, neatly encapsulating the concerns of the United Provinces,

... however here is this to be said for the Hogen Mogens [i.e. States-General] that if you beat the french they retire behind their Strong Towns, wch will cost you the Summer to take, but if they [the French] should have the Good luck they had in Spain all Flanders & Brabant is lost at a Stroke for you...

albeit adding that he was confident Marlborough would be victorious in a general engagement.\(^{540}\)

In spite of such views, the working relationships of English and other Allied generals was usually effective, or at least no worse than between the English generals themselves. Disagreements tended to be minor. In November 1706, Ingoldsby, the garrison-commander at Ghent, protested at the imposition of over two regiments of Spanish troops upon his town by Ouwerkerk; the Dutch field marshal had politely informed Ingoldsby of his attention to send the corps – then sent them anyway, without waiting to receive any reply. The English general protested vehemently: the magistrates could not accommodate them in the town—they still wanted proper bedding for 4000 English soldiers—and the duke had said it was to be an English garrison, and left no orders whatsoever for the receipt of other formations, not least those that brought with them a gaggle of near nine-hundred women and six-hundred children (as reckoned by the town major). Defeated for that moment by Ouwerkerk in

\(^{539}\) BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 77-80b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Meldert, 16 June 1707 N.S.

\(^{540}\) BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 81-84b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 25 June 1707 N.S.

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this particular bout of logistical buck-passing, Ingoldsby begged Marlborough for instructions on how to act in the future.541

The 'general' nature of general officers' command, combined with the added element of a multinational army with a variety of masters and mistresses, provided a ready impediment to senior officers attempting to exercise their authority. A general officer of senior rank was given the dignity and deference due to his station — but not necessarily subordination, without positive orders from a recognised general-in-chief. Charles Churchill was literally stepping into his coach, ready to depart Brussels— which he had left under the command of Pascal, pursuant to Marlborough's orders— when he was confronted by a Dutch colonel, who protested that he would obey no orders other than those of Churchill, without further confirmation from the States-General.542

To forestall such arguments, officers might receive a positive order from a general-in-chief to follow the directions of a specific subordinate. On one occasion the officers commanding the battalions of infantry at Ghent were ordered by Marlborough to follow what commands they received from him via Brigadier Cadogan the quartermaster-general, regarding their march to join the army; on another, Sir Thomas Prenderghast (or the officer-in-chief among the three battalions at Ghent) was told to observe the orders of Major-General Murray.543 Though this would of course suffice in a given instance, it did lead to a culture that expected such orders to be given, and hardly promoted quick and unthinking subordination in those instances when they were not.

541 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 34-37b & 38-39b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 18 November 1706 N.S.; order from King and Council of the same date. Marlborough's letter to Ouwerkerk on this matter was singularly non-committal; he represented Ingoldsby's concerns on this issue, but little more. Murray, iii, p. 334: Marlborough to Ouwerkerk, The Hague, 24 November 1706 N.S.
542 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 200-201b: Charles Churchill to Marlborough, Brussels, 11 September 1707 N.S.
543 BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 87b: order for the officers of the battalions at Ghent. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Roeselare, 24 June 1706 N.S. Ibid., f. 227b: order to Sir Thomas Prenderghast (or the officer-in-chief with the three battalions at Ghent). Camp at Terbanck, 8 June 1708 N.S.
In August 1710, as General Schulenburg commanded the Allied siege of Béthune, he faced a modicum of resistance in his command from Lieutenant-General Ross. Although Ross lay under the local command of Schulenburg, he had received orders from Marlborough intimating that his corps (21 squadrons and 9 battalions) might be called back from the siege at short notice. In light of this, he had no desire to burden himself in the minutiae of the investing armies operations, such as sending detachments to man posts, which might hinder his retreat; indeed, he had even laid a couple of bridges over a local watercourse, in anticipation, to speed his return.\(^{544}\) Marlborough did nothing to emphasise Ross’s subordination to Schulenburg at the siege. Rather than commanding Ross to follow the general’s orders, Marlborough asked that Schulenburg might instead send the list of posts designed for Ross’s corps to secure to himself, so that he could send the necessary orders to the British general; and Ross himself he urged only to occupy those posts that were not at ‘too great a distance’, and inconvenient.\(^{545}\)

English generals themselves were engaged in the own squabbles over authority. In September 1703, as the English troops were preparing to enter their winter quarters, Marlborough’s absence had devolved the command of such corps upon his brother, Charles Churchill, the senior lieutenant-general. Churchill himself then proceeded to pass the command to Lord Cutts, leaving him his ‘general order’. Cutts was the seniormost general of the English Foot in the Low Countries, but also the eldest general officer in the army as a whole. As acting commander-in-chief, all orders for the army should have passed through his person—be they for the Horse, Foot or Dragoons—before the army separated; the contrary would be viewed as a hardship to him:

> Your Grace may firmly depend upon it, that I shall never make any ill use of my Power; nor be guilty of any thing in my Command or Behaviour, that the next Officer to me can be uneasy at. And as I never desire any thing in these cases, but

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\(^{544}\) BL, Add. MSS 61314, ff. 94-95b: Ross to Marlborough, near Béthune, 21 August 1710 N.S.

\(^{545}\) Ross had been ordered to observe the enemy, concerting with the generals of the siege to prevent a French relief, without being engaged in the detail of the siege itself. BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 175b: order to Lieutenant-General Ross. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Camp at Viler Brulin, 19 August 1710 N.S. Murray, v, pp. 109-110. Letters of Marlborough to Schulenburg, 21 August 1710 N.S.; and Marlborough to Ross, camp at Viler Bruin, 22 August 1710 N.S.
what her Majesty's Commission literally intitles me to, so I never am wanting in my
due I believe and Respect to any One that is my elder Officer.546

But, before he had left the army, Cardonnel had passed a separate order to Lieutenant-
General Henry Lumley, who commanded the English Horse.547 As Cardonnel rather
exasperatedly complained to Watkins:

We have rais'd a Devil that I am afraid it will not be easy for us to lay, and I was
realy apprehensive of it when I desired two orders one for the Horse & one for the
Foot, and you told me one to the Commander in Cheif would suffice, if they had
had each of them one at that time, we should have heird no more of it, but now my
Lord Cutts has writ a long Letter to my Lord Duke & another to my Self on that
subject, expostulating the great hardship it would be upon him, if after the
Command had devolv'd upon him from Lt Gen Churchill he should be distinguisht
by another order being sent to Mr Lumley ... but now 'tis gone so far we must make
it up as we can, in order whereto my Lord Duke writes to my Lord Cutts & I write
to Mr Lumley not to make any use of the order sent him.548

A week later, the wounds continued to fester, with the headquarters receiving 'warm
Letters' from both sides, but Cardonnel hoped that the anger would soon cool.549 In
some circumstances, officers would seek to overcome or forestall conflict by turning on
the charm. Marlborough could be famously urbane; the temper of the fiery Leopold of
Anhalt-Dessau was once cooled by the duke's amity, with prince stating: "the
ascendancy of that man is inconceivable. I was unable to utter an angry word; he
totally disarmed me in an instant." Cutts would neatly encapsulate the theory when, as
temporary commander-in-chief, he desired that

...all her Majesty's officers will act with that decency and temper as is suitable to
the Duke of Marlborough's instructions to me... by which means we shall always
make unreasonable people appear in the wrong and more easily carry our point.550

An example of this occurred in the interactions with marquis of Tarazena in 1706.
Tarazena had been the governor of Antwerp when Cadogan was dispatched to secure

546 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 16-17b: Cutts to Marlborough, camp at St Trond, 17 September 1703
N.S.
547 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 35-36b: Cardonnel to Watkins, 16 September 1703 N.S.
548 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 37-38b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Camp at Werwick, 18 September 1703
N.S.
549 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 45-46b: Cardonnel to Watkins, 26 September 1703 N.S.
550 Churchill, ii, p. 833. Historical Manuscripts Commission, 55, Frankland-Russell-Astley MSS.,
the surrender of the place, which he helped achieve through being alert to the intrigues of the mixed Franco-Spanish garrison, and a little flattery of its governor.551 This paid dividends when Tarazena was employed in directing the siege at Dendermonde. The marquis allowed Thomas Meredyth considerable autonomy in his operations before the town; perhaps because of—rather than despite—Marlborough’s frequent reassertions that Meredyth was to be ‘very observing’ of the marquis’ orders; that it would not be amiss to make Tarazena a compliment as soon as Marlborough’s letter can to his hands; and that Meredyth was to ‘take care to humour’ him in everything he could do.552 Cadogan, who would join the operations for a while, acted in a similar manner, acting as if only to give idle compliments to the marquis while his real duties involved taking an exact account of all that occurred, and how it might be improved.553

Rank was obviously critical in the interactions between general officers, but was complicated by the multiple component nationalities within the army. The English and Dutch managed their promotions with a degree of reciprocity, to prevent imbalance and discord. In 1706, Marlborough provisionally declared Webb major-general, and Sir Richard Temple, Bt and Lord Dalrymple brigadiers, “to preserve the rank of the English”, after the Dutch had made a promotion of general officers. Later, ironically, Webb’s promotion to lieutenant-general was retarded by the same measures the duke was “oblige’d, for the Queen’s Service, to keep with the States Generall...” [and] done

551 Cadogan and six squadrons of horse had been dispatched on 1 June 1706 N.S. with letters to summon the garrison of Antwerp to surrender, and the various civic organisations to declare for Charles III. Murray, ii, pp. 545-6. For note of same, see also ibid, pp. 547-8; Hare, op. cit., pp. 99-100; ’t Hoff, no. 392, pp. 235-6; and Snyder, i, no. 574, pp. 557-8. The Marquis de Tarazena, guided by an officer in his employ, was eager to accept an honourable capitulation, for he felt he ‘had been very ill used by the French, and that if they pretended to hold out the Town... he would show himself to be un Bon Espagnol.’

After an aborted attempt by the garrison to secure the Elector of Bavaria’s will in the matter, the garrison and town surrendered on 6 June N.S., the citadel a day later (Tarazena and Winterfeld having denied the French its use). The surrender was ‘entirely owing’, as Cadogan would write, to the actions of Tarazena and the Walloon commander, Winterfeld, though special mention must be made of the elderly bishop, ‘upwards of fourscore years old, [who] was very active in prompting the magistrates and other inhabitants to declare for their lawful sovereign [Charles III], absolving those who made any scruple from the oaths they had taken.’

Cadogan and Marlborough’s correspondence adequately illuminates the events: BL, Blenheim Papers, Add. MSS. 61160, ff. 7-18b (Cadogan to Marlborough, 2 to 6 June 1706 N.S.); Murray, ii, pp. 555, 558-9, 563-6, 571, 577; and Wijn, VIII, ii, pp. 62-63.


553 Murray, ii, p. 624. BL, Blenheim Papers, Add. MSS. 61160, f.37b-38.
with management with them..."554 In January 1703, Cutts begged that his commission as lieutenant-general might be dispatched with all haste, even if pay was not to be allowed on the establishment until a later date, such as the start of the campaign. He felt it was a disrespect to the English army to be without a general of that rank; that it would disconcert the English soldiers on account of their having but a major-general in command, while the other nations had lieutenants-general in the theatre,

... with whom I cannot take upon me so much (where the interest of the English requires it) as if I had that Character, beside that if I had that Character they would not put more than a Ma: G: of their owne with me, and in all things, I should carry more weight for the good...555

Writing in the early years of the war, Captain Alexander Spotswood protested that he had served for nearly two years in the position of 'Lieutenant Quarter Master General', yet still had no commission to act in that role. This understandably caused him "many vexatious disputeds that tend[ed] to the questioning of his authority; whereby the service often suffer[ed] merely for his want of power to execute his office according to the Rules & Discipline of all services."556 John Laws, for some time Cadogan's deputy and factotum at the Council of State in Brussels, was placed in a similar position. Though the local Low Countries dignitaries had been acquainted of his post, but his lack of proper credentials allowed little more than his attending the conferences and presenting Marlborough's and Cadogan's memorials; a state of affairs that would only worsen when the army moved further from Brussels, and the umbrella of its power in the political field diminished, and lessened Cadogan's frequent peregrinations.557

554 Snyder, ii, no. 671 p. 662: Marlborough to Godolphin, Villaine, 12 September 1706 N.S.; no. 1118 p. 1116: Marlborough to Godolphin, Turhout, 8 October 1708 N.S.
555 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 24-27b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 30 January 1703 N.S. Cutts' commission as lieutenant-general was dated 11 February 1703 O.S.
556 BL, Add. MSS 61295, ff. 108-109b: memorial of Captain Spotswood to Marlborough. Undated. [1706 in pencil—though this may be in error. Dalton carries no record of Spotswood's commission as deputy quartermaster-general; Spotswood first appears on Marlborough's warrants for the staff officers' pay in 1703, where he was allowed pay for the calendar year as deputy quartermaster-general (which might suggest the date of 1706 is in error, given the reference to 'near two years' service'). Spotswood was brevetted lieutenant-colonel on 1 January 1706 O.S., a rank that might be expected to accompany a formal staff commission. Dalton, v, p. 166.]
557 BL, Add. MSS 61311, ff. 165-166b: John Laws to Marlborough, Brussels, 26 June 1708 N.S. Naturally, Laws also begged that he might be given an allowance to cover his expenses in that role; which, typically, he had hitherto not been granted.

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The orders to subordinate officers could often encompass a variety of acts and responsibilities. Brigadier James Ferguson, tasked with directing the march of a brigade of five regiments of Foot from southern Germany back to the Low Countries, in the aftermath of Blenheim, received an itemised list of seven instructions. These included his route of march and orders pertaining to such; orders relating to the French prisoners he was to escort from Mainz to Nijmegen, the progress of which he was to give exact accounts to both Marlborough and Slingelandt; instructions to examine the regiments upon his arrival in Holland, and order recruiting officers over to England and Scotland (who were to be back by 25 December, or face the severest penalties); a command to review the garrisons at Bosch and Breda; and standing orders to inform Marlborough frequently of all that occurred, so that the duke might dispatch further orders if required.\textsuperscript{558}

They were typically attended with various sub-clauses, qualifications, conditions and advice. Colonel Ross, who was to command the march of two regiments of Dragoons and a squadron of Horse—together with various recruits that were within reach of his column (the officers of which were to observe his orders) and the English artillery, which Ross would meet \textit{en route}—in a march from Overijssel to Grave, via Breda and Bois le Duc. On arriving in Breda, Ross was to meet with the local commissary, who had the necessary routes to continue his march; he was also to inform General Fagel, the governor of Grave, of his time of departure from Bois le Duc, so that the Dutchman would be able to give further orders or assistance if necessary.\textsuperscript{559} Ross was later halted by a subsequent order, to await yet further directions.\textsuperscript{560}

General officers might expect upon discharging a particular element of their duty—particularly the transfer of a charge to another officer—to receive an acquittance acknowledging such. In 1708, as the Allied army prepared for the siege of Lille, the

\textsuperscript{558} BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 140-141: instructions Brigadier James Ferguson. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Langcander, 11 September 1704 N.S. Ferguson's detachment consisted of one battalion from Orkney's, together with Rowe's, Churchill's, Lord North and Grey's and Meredyth's.

\textsuperscript{559} BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 29: order to march for dragoons and artillery. To Colonel Ross. Camp at Overijssel, 18 July 1702 N.S. For an order to Colonel Hopkey concerning the artillery, see ibid., f. 30.

\textsuperscript{560} BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 34b: order to Ross to remain at Bois le Duc until further orders, camp at Overijssel, 23 July 1702 N.S. The subsequent order to join the army (f. 37) was dated 27 July 1702 N.S.
Dutch brigadier Maurits van Plettenberg was ordered to take charge of the horses and wagons that were to be delivered to Courtrai. Upon receiving these, he was given an acquittance to the providiteur before Conducting them to Brussels, where he was to deliver them to Cadogan or one of the commissaries of the artillery, and receive a like acquittance.\textsuperscript{561}

If there were formations from two different branches of the service at a particular post or garrison, separate orders might be sent to the senior officer of each branch, even if one was of a higher rank. As the English forces made ready to march out of their garrisons in May 1706, two separate orders were sent to the garrison at Gorcum: one to Major-General Ross, for the two regiments of Dragoons; and one to Colonel Tatton, the senior colonel, for the two battalions of Foot.\textsuperscript{562} Yet on other occasions, orders for both Horse and Foot (for example) were sent to a single general of either branch: to General Charles Churchill at Breda, Brigadier Cadogan at Heusden and Lieutenant-General the Earl of Orkney at Bosch.\textsuperscript{563}

Once the army had dispersed and marched to enter its winter quarters, subordinate generals were necessarily responsible for the conduct of their corps. Yet the actions and oversight expected of them were typically highlighted by their superiors, in their orders of march. Marlborough’s commands—or indeed reminders—to the Hereditary Prince of Hesse late in 1705 included orders to: (i) put the quarters in a state of defence upon arrival, and see to the subsistence of the soldiers; (ii) establish a good communication between all the quarters, and to retain an officer close to him to aid such; (iii) order the commanders of the quarters to keep him informed of all things that occurred; (iv) have quarters commanders order peasants to repair the roads between the quarters, for ease of march and communication; (v) to make public in all quarters (at the head of each company) that it was the Alliance’s intention that the soldiers conducted themselves with the greatest discipline, without committing the least disorder, and that misdemeanours would receive prompt punishment; (vi) render the officers responsible for the acts of their soldiers in all disorders, obliging them to make

\textsuperscript{561} BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 259-259b: order for Brigadier Plettenburg. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Camp at Werwick, 1 August 1708 N.S.

\textsuperscript{562} BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 78b and 79: orders to Major-General Ross and Colonel Tatton. Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough’s command. Maastricht, 5 May 1706 N.S.

\textsuperscript{563} Ibid., ff. 78, 79b.
prompt and entire restitution of any damages; and (vi) impede the passage of enemy
Horse as much as possible – any officers or soldiers that seized horses passing through
enemy territory would receive a reward.564

Others were allowed—or assumed—a degree of autonomy and initiative. After the
battle of Ramillies in 1706, the operational situation was particularly fluid. A number
of Flemish and Brabant towns lay open to the Allied army, by virtue of poor defences,
small garrisons and the diminution of French power; various commanders and
detachments made haste to secure the gains of 23 May. Charles Ross was tasked with
taking Bruges, which he eventually prevailed upon to accept a garrison of a captain
and fifty dragoons (the Foot, in the rush, still not having reached his command). He
also thought it proper to take possession of nearby Damme, which had likewise been
abandoned; he hoped Marlborough would pardon him if he’d acted amiss.565 Given
Bruges’ proximity to Ostend, Ross also sought to increase his agency in the taking of
that place, desiring that Marlborough’s commands for the future for the area might be
addressed to him.566

In 1703, as the main body of the army was encamped by St Trond while a detachment
besieged Limburg, the Earl of Orkney reminded Marlborough that Henry Withers was
the only brigadier of Foot present; so that if the duke wished to name any, it would be
to the benefit of the service. Yet Orkney continued:

... but I wish to God we had men that would make it ther business to mind the
service, which is pretty raire amongst us.

In the meantime, Orkney had placed the sixteen battalions of Foot into three brigades,
and ordered the eldest colonels to take care of the details regarding them themselves.567

Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough’s command. Camp at Kalmthout, 25 October 1705 N.S.
565 BL, Add. MSS 61309, ff. 92-93b: Ross to Marlborough, near Bruges, 2 June 1706 N.S. Ross
correctly wrote ‘June’; Cardonnel mistakenly noted ‘May’.
566 BL, Add. MSS 61309, ff. 102-104b: Ross to Marlborough, Bruges, 4 May 1706 N.S. Again,
Cardonnel mistakenly wrote ‘May’ on the letter. Ross had been slightly put out that the officer
commanding the two battalions of Foot sent to garrison the new conquests had no knowledge
of Ross’s being there—or, worse, had been ordered to take no notice. Needless to say, Ross
acquainted them of his presence, so that they might take his own orders.
567 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 77-78b: Orkney to Marlborough, Maastricht, 10 May 1703 N.S.
VII

Military management

It is necessary to preface the following analysis on the manner in which the army regulated its affairs on campaign, be they in camp or on the march, with an introduction to two of the subject's most critical agencies: (i) the quartermaster-general; and (ii) the officers of the day.

The quartermaster-general was arguably the most important staff officer in the English army in the Low Countries. Throughout Marlborough's tenure at the head of Queen Anne's forces on the continent, the post was held by William Cadogan (1671/2-1726), who was appointed to the post in 1701. There is considerable confusion over the nature of the post and the duties it entailed, within the paradigm of command as then existed. To quote Major Raibeart Scouller:

Any such definition [of the Quartermaster-General's role]... is misleading as the title is to modern ears. Cadogan, for example, when we allow for the closer personal control of the battle [and by extension the campaign] exercised by the commander himself in those days, was certainly more approximate to a Chief of Staff than a Quartermaster-General as we know it.568

And what 'staff'? Scouller highlighted the problem when he noted that "the 'General Staff' as we know it today was practically non-existent. That was because of the much greater personal control the general himself kept over the minute-to-minute direction of the battle [and, again, by extension the campaign]"; while C.T. Atkinson wrote in his military biography of the Captain-General, "To say that Marlborough had to be his own Adjutant-General and Quarter-Master-General would hardly be an exaggeration, for while Cadogan held the post of Quarter-Master-General his duties were from the modern point of view rather those of the Chief of Staff."569

568 Scouller, p. 62.
This obfuscates the issue somewhat; studies of early modern military practice have occasionally suffered through the application of military terminology, and in this case it is informative to let the officers of the time describe their own duties. Richard King, who for some time served as an aide-de-camp to Cadogan and assisted the Irishman in executing the numerous duties of his office, provided one of the most enlightening contemporary depictions of the role of the quartermaster-general—in conception, expectation and practice. King had been appointed as the quartermaster-general to Jack Hill’s Canadian expedition, in 1711. Though his papers inevitably deal with many items specific to that ill-fated campaign, one item in particular shows the fruits of his learning in the Low Countries and illuminates the practices he would have learnt under the likes Cadogan, Dopff and Yvoy. Entitled Memorandum: for me as Q.M.G. this small, homemade octavo presumably served as an aide-memoire to King who, as shown previously, was notably diligent in preparing for duty. Its contents summarise the requirements of a quartermaster-general in series of succinct reminders. Many of its contents bear quoting in detail.

Beginning with the maritime component of Hill’s expedition, there are necessary notes on the oversight of naval expeditions: of how King should proportion the men and their provisions among the tonnage regulated by the government for their transport, after checking the soundness of the vessels; of how he should account for how many boats belonged to each transport, and the number of men they could carry in both rough and calm weather. To which were added the necessity of learning the signals used during the embarkation and voyage, and the need to “put the General in Mind that the Men may be order’d to take ashore with them two Days Provision.”

It is in expectation of the events following disembarkation that his pamphlet becomes particularly relevant. Quebec was to be invested upon the day of the landing, if practical; King, as quartermaster-general, should himself take fifty men and reconnoitre all the avenues leading to the town, and post guards in the chief of them, until the main body of the expedition arrived and the investiture could be made ‘in form’. Parties should always be sent to patrol the land flanking the route the expedition

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570 KP I(ii)/28, ff. 1-8b (5b-8b blank). It is also denoted as a memorandum for the AQMG, and marked ‘1711’, in pencil.
marched; and care was to be taken that all such guards placed towards the country were posted in security, so as not to expose themselves to the "Embascades of the Indians", who were considered a dextrous and accomplished foe in their country.

Particular care should be taken before the opening of the campaign, that the necessary proportions of provisions and forage might be provided to the expedition during its time in the field, "at such Places where neither the Enemy nor the Badness of the Season may prevent its being brought at all times conveniently to the Army." And in case said body advanced or retired any distances from these magazines, proper measures were to be taken that the army was always supplied with bread. On the routes of march of the army, and their taking of quarters, King reminded himself:

To See that the Routes by which the Troops are to march from their respective Quarters to the general Assembly of the Army may be so made that they may not interfere one with another: that the Troops may not be insulted on their March by the Enemy: & that there may be prepar'd for them what is necessary for their Support at the Several Places they are to encamp or cantoon at, without forraging or plundering the Country.

To endeavour to have always good Intelligence of the Movements of the Enemy & to be perfectly inform'd of all the great Roads Planes & Places where an Army can March so as to be able to prevent surprises* [*note in margin: "make your Fourages with Security"]; & form an Order of March at all times either to march to or retreat from the Enemy.

And in considering the most efficacious site for the camp:

To make choice of such Places for encamping on, where both Men & Horses may have plenty of Water: & if possible where the Front & Flanks of the Army may be cover'd whether by Rivers, Morasses, Woods &c.

To reconnoitre the Ground design'd for the Encampmt. sometime before the Army is to march into it: & to take particular care that the Roads & Ouvertures for the Army may be well made before it begins to march. For there's nothing more hazardous, or harasses an Army more than any Neglect of this.

Finally, King highlighted the importance of foraging, and its direction under the quartermaster-general:

Fouraging is one of the principal Duties of a Q. M. Generals Duty. On the Right Management. of it, the Horse is well provided for, without Danger or Fatigue: the
Foot much less harass'd in giving Escortes: the Country preserv'd from Ruin: & encourag'd to bring in the Provisions it affords: therefore he ought to make it his chiefest Application to be perfect in it: as to know well the Country: to proportion as near as possible the Quantity of Fourage he invests, to the Number of Horses which are to Fourage in it. To post the Guards in such Manner that they may equally keep out of the Place distined to be fourag'd the Enemy: & in all the Fouragers: To take care, that the Road the Fouragers are to return to their camp by, be good & well guarded.

A national contingent of any size in the Allied army possessed one or more quartermasters-general. As Cadogan fulfilled the role for the English forces, the Dutch were attended to by Daniel Wolf, Baron von Dopff (c. 1655-1723), a considerably experienced Palatine officer in Dutch service, who had been kwartiermeester-generaal of the States' army since 1694; and Frederik Thomas de Yvoy (1663-1719), who was promoted quartermaster-general of the Dutch cavalry in 1705. Pierre de (Peter von) Montargues (1660-1733) served as quartermaster-general to the Prussian corps serving with the confederate army.

Each officer was assisted by one or more aides and/or deputies. In the English army in the Low Countries, there was one deputy quartermaster-general (which on occasion also termed assistant quartermaster-general or lieutenant-quartermaster-general), a post that was held first by Alexander Spotswood (1676-1740), then John Armstrong (1674-1742) during Marlborough's command. Later in his career, Cadogan was allowed one (as a major-general) or two (as a lieutenant-general) aides-de-camp on the establishment, according to his rank as a general officer; but there is evidence of him being allowed one or more adjutants on the establishments of Ireland and/or the forces in Low Countries prior to this.

While the post of quartermaster-general was permanent, the various officers of the day were temporary appointments. As armies, particularly later in the war, possessed many officers of general rank, military custom dictated that on any given day a

571 Wijn, J. W. (ed.), Het Staatsche Leger, vol. 8, Het Tijdperk van de Spaanse Successieoorlog, 1702-1715 (The Hague, 1959-64), d. iii, p. 427. Marlborough had great confidence in the Dutch staff officers, on one occasion writing that Yvoy had served with him in the capacity of quartermaster-general during the whole campaign, and acquitted his office with 'all the zeal and diligence that one can attend to of an officer of his merit', being distinguished in all occasions of service. BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 168: certificate for Yvoy. Camp at Weissemburg, 11 November 1704 N.S.
572 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 83b.
number of them would be chosen to oversee the duties of the generality as a whole and act as an interface between their peers and the general-in-chief that commanded the army. The camp journal preserved in the Blenheim Papers, which concerned itself with the diary and endeavours of the English Foot (and the larger corps of which those battalions might be a part), lists three general officers of the day: a lieutenant-general, a major-general and a brigadier - all commanders of infantry, drawn from a variety of national corps. Another source, considering the army as a whole but undated, stated that there was a lieutenant-general, major-general and brigadier of the day for each wing of Horse, and the like officers for the entire body of Foot; while a series of proposed regulations drafted by Cadogan in 1704, there was to be a lieutenant-general, major-general and brigadier of the day for the infantry, and the same for all the cavalry.

Interestingly, a summary of the practices commonly employed by the army in Flanders stated that each wing had for its picquet 'a lieutenant-general, major-general and brigadier for the day'. Indeed, the generals of the day provided a similar service and duty as the field officers in charge picquets (see below), but on a far larger scale.

There were variations upon this method. On 24 June 1709, as Marlborough prepared - after an initial ruse involving Ieper and Bethune - to invest Tournai, it was ordered that, henceforth, a major-general and brigadier 'of each wing', with a lieutenant-general 'of the whole army' would be on duty each day. At that time, the right wing of Marlborough's army consisted of British, Prussian and Hanoverian troops; the left wing, Dutch forces. On the 25 June, the general officers of the day by this new schema consisted of two Prussians (Lieutenant-General Albrecht, Graf Finck von Finckenstein and Brigadier Friedrich Wilhelm von Grumbkow), a Briton (Major-General Sir Richard

573 General officers of the day were also a feature of, for example, the French and Imperial armies. In the French army, lieutenants-general could rotate daily command, and general officers of the day would oversee such operations as foraging. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, pp. 129 (quoting Belhomme, L'Armée Française en 1690, pp. 185-6), 290, 313, 539. In the Imperial army, majors-general of the day would fulfill similar tasks. Lund, War for the Every Day, pp. 10, 142.
574 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 1b: camp journal, camp at Hocht, 10 May 1703 N.S.
575 BL, Stowe MSS 469, ff. 74-75b: undated general orders.
577 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 140b-141b.
578 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 109b-110: camp journal, camp at the abbey of Loos, 24 June 1709 N.S.
Temple), a Dutchman (Johan Rabo van Keppel, the earl of Albemarle’s younger brother) and a Swiss in Dutch service (Daniel Chambrier). If such a large body dispersed, or made considerable detachments, this number would diminish: from 4 September 1709, for example, the allied army split, as a large detachment of Horse was made under the Hereditary Prince of Hesse, and the left and right wings marched to different destinations. The right wing (which included the British Foot the camp journal detailed) reverted to appointing three general officers for the day.

The general officers of the day were quite literally the ‘first generals on call’. Small, planned enterprises requiring detachments from the army, or a wing, were often their perquisite; similarly, in time of emergency, they would typically command the first forces roused by way of reaction. On 16 August 1708, as Marlborough’s army covered Eugene’s nascent investment of Lille, Withers (the lieutenant-general of the day) was ordered with a detachment to take up posts from Pont-à-Chin to Lannoy, to cover the march of a convoy of artillery leaving Menin for the siege. At the same time, he was also to forage. The following day, Orkney (also lieutenant-general of the day) was commanded to assemble with a party at the Pont d’Espieres, on the Scheldt, to engage in various works. In 1703, as his preparations for the siege of Limburg encountered difficulties on account of a lack of horses and wagons to draw the artillery and supplies, Marlborough wrote to all the generals of the right wing as a body, seeking aid. Cutts noted that General Scholten, as the lieutenant-general of the day, opened it.

579 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 110: camp journal, camp at the abbey of Loos, 25 June 1709 N.S.
580 BL, Add. MSS 61404.
581 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 89-89b: camp journal, 16 & 17 August 1708 N.S. Withers’ detachment consisted of 3000 Foot and 1000 Horse, with a major-general and two brigadiers (none of which were ‘of the day’). Orkney’s party numbered 2600 Foot (400 without arms, ready to do work) under a major-general and two brigadiers of Foot (neither rolling for the day), and 1000 Horse under a major-general of same. This latter detachment was delayed, and only ordered the following night, when Orkney was no longer lieutenant-general of the day. For Withers’ dispositions, see also KP I(i)/77: disposition to occupy the posts of Templineuve and Lannoy and to cover the march of the artillery from Menin to the army before Lille. Made at Helchin, 16 August 1708 N.S. Another order was made on 19 August (KP I(i)/79).
582 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 16-17b: Cutts to Marlborough, camp at St Trond, 17 September 1703 N.S. For Marlborough’s letter, see Murray, i, p. 181: Marlborough to the generals of the right wing, camp at Robertmont, 16 September 1703 N.S.
Yet such officers did not exercise these duties exclusively. On 8 September 1708, while the covering army was encamped at Peronne, Marlborough was disturbed in his dining by accounts of enemy foraging parties passing close to his quarters. The duke ordered Major-General Webb to take the two closest battalions to hand (Howe's and Temple's), and drive the French off. Webb was accompanied by several digestif-seeking volunteers, including the Duke of Argyll. None of these individuals were general officers of that day (Table A.6; p. 292); rather those to hand and, presumably, willing. 583

In addition to the general officers of the day, there were in various instances mentions of a major of brigade of the day. This officer would receive all orders issued by senior officers (such as the general-in-chief, the general officers of the day and the generals of the Horse and Foot) and pass them to his colleagues, his fellow brigade-majors. The major of brigade for the day was to remain within the camp, and not stir from his tent 'on any account'. 584

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In his reconnoitring of the country to find a suitable site to encamp and/or secure intelligence of the enemy, the quartermaster-general would be accompanied by a detachment from the army thought sufficient for the mission's security. In June of 1709, as Marlborough sought openings to the French position from his camp at the Abbey of Loos, Cadogan and Dopff led a scouting and working party into the country. They were accompanied by 1300 men, who assembled at six o'clock in the morning by Hambourdin, led by a major-general, two colonels and other officers 'in proportion'. The party, accompanied by a great many local peasants, cut roads towards the lines of La Bassée, so that when the party returned to the camp that night, people believed they

583 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 93b: camp journal, camp at Peronne, 8 September 1708 N.S. Webb found the enemy well posted in the hedges surrounding Chateau d'Evelin. He attacked, forcing the enemy into the castle; his attacks on that fortification were stalled when the advance brigades of the French army appeared.

584 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 151: instructions for the more speedy execution of orders. Undated. Confusingly, there is also the mention of a 'brigade major of the day' for each brigade. BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 57b: camp journal, 16 June 1706 N.S.
'designed going to the enemy that way'. 585 This exercise, however, had been but a ruse; having distracted Villars with these threats towards Ieper and the French left, the allies swung their armies about and marched with haste on the 26 and 27 June to invest Tournai. 586

Given the needs of the army, suitable sites for an encampment were at a premium; it was a mutual desire on the behalf of Cadogan and his opposite numbers in the French army to occupy the well-sited land by the village of Ramillies that helped precipitate that battle. Cadogan was a fairly astute judge of the land and its operational utility. In the successful summer of 1706 he informed Marlborough that he had viewed "with great exactness the camp at Harlebeck which is extremely convenient in respect of Forrage and Water. Your Grace can best judge whether the Situation of it be not such as that the Siege of Ostend may be covered from thence as well as Rousselar, and your Grace would be more a partie att the same time to observe the Electors motion." 587

Leading parties in advance of or beyond the main body of the army placed the quartermasters-general at risk; within the space of a week in the autumn of 1706, three senior quartermasters were captured by the French – both Cadogan and Spotswood for English, and Yvoy for the Dutch! The French had taken advantage of the allies' siege of

585 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 109b-110: camp journal, camp at the abbey of Loos, 23 & 24 June 1709 N.S. Hare, op. cit., p. 18 mentioned an escort of 1200 Horse; Deane, op. cit., p. 80. Deane stated that Cadogan was accompanied by 4000 horse and foot on 24 June 1709, 'and at the same time he took several thousands of bores [boers] of the country along with him to open the passages & make roads for our armies marching in several columns. The left of our lines now running within a league of Tournay.' This reconnaissance is the scene of the story that Cadogan disguised himself as a peasant to view the enemy lines (quoted in G.M. Trevelyan, *England Under Queen Anne*, 3 volumes (London, 1931-4), iii, p. 6; and Pearman, op. cit., p. 63) - it is possible he acted in this manner on 23 June, but on 24 June he certainly conducted the reconnaissance in force.

586 Chandler, *Marlborough*, pp. 247-248. Cadogan and Dopff often performed their reconnaissance together. On 7 September 1709, for example, they reconnoitred the French advance upon the positions of the Hereditary Prince of Hesse, upon which advice the army was ordered to march, soon to precipitate the battle of Malplaquet. BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 118b-119: camp journal, camp at Havre, 7 September 1709 N.S. For further examples of joint reconnaissance, see Murray, iii, pp. 75 & 76; iv, pp. 514-5; iv, p. 570 (investigation of the river crossings near Hanon and Pont-à-Vendin) and iv, p. 590 (marking the campsite for the army for the siege of Mons).

587 BL, Add. MSS 61160, ff. 31-32b: Cadogan to Marlborough, Oudenaarde, 23 June 1706 N.S. Marlborough did not take up Cadogan's advice at that particular moment, and the siege of Ostend was prosecuted to its finish from the camp at Roeselare. However the army marched from there to Harlebeck on 17 July, halting at this good site until 10 August to facilitate the taking of Menin. See Deane, op. cit., p. 41.
Menin to sortie out two columns from Lille and Tournai, with a view to harassing those elements of Marlborough’s army foraging. Cadogan was taken first, on 16 August 1706. As Marlborough wrote to Sarah:

An officer is this minut come to me to give an account of the forage we have made this day, and tells me that poor Cadogan is taken prisoner or killed, which gives me a great deal of uneasiness, for he loved me, and I could rely upon him.588

Such was Marlborough’s unease that he desired to immediately send a trumpet to the French, for he could ‘not be at quiet til [he] knew his fate.’ Early fears as to Cadogan’s death proved unfounded; Marlborough opened his hitherto sealed letter to add with some relief to the duchess that Cadogan was ‘a prisoner at Tournay and not woned.’ The somewhat chastened Irishman managed to pen a quick note to Adam de Cardonnel, asking that his two servants, together with his clothes and linen, and one-hundred pistols, might be sent to Tournai. In the lower left-hand margin, he wrote a quick, but more personal and heartfelt expression of his relief: “I thank God I am very well.”589 Cadogan later explained the nature of his close shave in a letter to Raby:

I was thrust by the Ground I endeavoured to stop into a Ditch on the right of the way we passed, with great difficulty I got out of it, and with greater good Fortune escaped falling into the Hussars hands who first came up with me. A little resistance I persuaded some few of the Dragoons I had before made alight, and who could not get to their Horses, saved them and me, since it made us fall to the share of the French Carabiniers who followed their Hussars and Dragoons from whome wee met with Quarter and [civility saving] their taking my watch and mony.590

Marlborough managed to secure Cadogan’s exchange with remarkable celerity; he was returned on his parole by the duc de Vendôme on 19 August.591 The very next day

588 Snyder, ii, p. 645 n. 652: Marlborough to Sarah, Helchin, 16 August 1706 N.S. See also Coxe, i, pp. 451-2.
589 BL, Add. MSS 61413, f. 78: Cadogan to Cardonnel, 16 August 1706 N.S.
590 BL, Add. MSS 22168, ff. 33-34b: Cadogan to Raby, Helchin, 17 August 1706 N.S.
591 Marlborough had endeavoured to exchange Cadogan with Torcy’s brother, the chevalier de Croissy. As a match for Croissy had already been secured, Vendôme suggested Lieutenant-General Pallavinci, a Savoyard in French service who had been taken at Ramillies – a measure to which the duke pushed the Field Deputies for their acceptance, stressing Cadogan’s importance to him. Murray, iii, p. 87: Marlborough to comte de Gassy and the duc de Vendôme, both dated 16 August 1706 N.S.; Snyder, ii, no. 654, pp. 646-7: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 19 August 1706 N.S. Murray, iii, p. 90: Marlborough to States’ Deputies, Camp before Menin, 17 August 1706 N.S.
Cadogan went with Dopff to monitor the dispositions of the Dutch general Ernst Willem von Salisch; adherence to the spirit of the rules of war could be somewhat situational.\footnote{Murray, iii, pp. 92-3: Marlborough to Salisch, Helchin, 20 August 1706 N.S.}

On 22 August, a party of French hussars again attacked the Allied army's foraging parties. Alexander Spotswood, Cadogan's deputy, pursued the enemy with a small body of troops; but, going too far, he fell into a body of French Foot,

... who ffiring from the hedges kill'd his horse & took him Prison.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 76b: camp journal, 22 August 1706 N.S. The soldiers initially dispatched to cover the forages amounted to 350 men, with a major in command; a further 150 marched with the foragers themselves.}

Two days later, the Dutch quartermaster-general Yvoy was himself captured, 'within call' of a detachment that he was leading, which had been sent on a reconnaissance.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 77: camp journal, 24 August 1706 N.S. Yvoy was captured again in 1709 while exercising his duties. BL, Add. MSS 61183, ff. 84-85b: Yvoy to Marlborough, The Hague, 16 July 1709 N.S.}

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A suitable destination or objective having been decided, and a route composed, the army would be ordered to march. Marching orders would usually be dispatched from Marlborough's headquarters when the duke was in command, perhaps by the quartermaster-general himself, who would issue them to the general officers of the day.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 95b: camp journal, camp at Langham, 17 September 1708 N.S.}

In the case of detachments or garrisons separated from the army, the orders might be addressed to the senior general or field officer, who was often directed to follow subsequently the orders of the senior officer at his destination; or even issued by subordinate officers, who wrote marching orders drawing upon Marlborough's authority.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 18-19b: order of march for the Royal Regiment of Foot of Ireland, to march from Worcum to Breda. Marlborough, by Cardonnel's hand, to Ingoldsby or the officer commanding. The Hague, 5 May 1706 N.S.}

The orders for the army itself were usually composed and issued the evening or night before an army was due to leave its camp, ready to be executed the

\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 16-17b: order from the Earl of Orkney to the officer commanding Godfrey's, Sutton's and Ingoldsby's regiments of Foot. Camp at Turenhout, 9 November 1705 N.S. Orkney had received instructions from Marlborough to order the three regiments listed to march according to an annexed route.}
following morning; each copy of the orders was typically numbered. While the geographical itinerary of march would typically be prepared in advance, the specific dates by which formations were expected to reach certain towns and posts were often left blank – to be filled in at an appropriate time, pursuant to such issues as readiness, alarms and the weather.

Marching orders followed a standard scheme. The General would be ordered beat at a given time; the Assembly would typically follow thirty minutes later; and the army would be ready to march a further half-an-hour after that. The battalion and squadron quartermasters and their escorts would leave some time before the soldiers themselves, in order to prepare the site marked for the next camp. This vanguard would be commanded by the major-general of the day and the quartermaster-general. A typical order to march ran as follows:

The Gen\(^{\text{I}}\) at 4, half an hour after the Assembly and to March at 5. The Qr\(^{\text{I}}\) Mas\(^{\text{I}}\) at the head of Woods [\(\text{'s regiment}]) at 4. The Gen\(^{\text{II}}\) Baggage to be at the Rear of the Train. The Baggage of the Lines to be ready at 4 and to wait till called for by the Baggage Mas\(^{\text{I}}\) Gen\(^{\text{I}}\). No Qua\(^{\text{I}}\) to be mark\('d for any under a Brigad\(r\). No soldier to stir out of his Rank as the Commanding Officer shall Answer. Two men of a Batt\(a\) to be immediately at Coll. Cadogans to Guard the Waggons for the Foot. Marauders to be hang\('d without mercy. No houses behind Regiments to be taken till the Qr Mas\(^{\text{I}}\) Gen\(^{\text{I}}\) be acquainted when the Army comes to ground. No Soldier to stir from the camp without leave from his officer.

It was expected that all officers ‘kept their divisions’ on the march, remaining in their posts and keeping their men in due order. The major of each regiment was tasked with ensuring that his company and troop officers brought their men up to the place of

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598 E.g. KP I(i)/82. Order to march from the camp at Amongies to that at Helchin. Camp at Amongies, 23 August 1708 N.S. This is a neat copy, marked ‘no. 14’, of a draft order (KP I(i)/81).
599 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 143-143b: routes for the Hessian cavalry and infantry. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Brussels, 30 October 1709 N.S. The order stated that quartermaster-general Dopff would fill in the dates. See also KP I(i)/76: order of march to leave the camp at Helchin to go to that at Ath. Camp at Helchin, 12 August 1709 N.S. KP I(i)/173: order of march for tomorrow, from the camp at Avelgem to that at Ottignies. Avelgem, 15 April 1710 N.S. KP I(i)/187: route for the Palatine troops from Maastricht to the army before Douai. Camp at Flines, 30 April 1710 N.S. Some locations were left blank, and no dates were indicated.
600 BL, Add. MSS 61404: camp journal. Ad passim.
601 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for the impending campaign (1703).
602 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 17: camp journal, camp at Castre, 19 May 1704 N.S.
encampment in proper order, and put those acting negligently under arrest. If he did not, then it was the duty of the major-general of the day to put this major himself under arrest. Furthermore, the orders of the day stated:

If any Soldier is found 100 paces from his Regiment without an Officer with him he shall be taken up as a Marauder and punished with Death. This order to be published at the head of every regiment. 603

Various orders were made to promote discipline on the march. In May 1704 two officers of each brigade were commanded to patrol the flanks of their corps, to keep the men in order. 604 Later, this was increased to two officers of each regiment; and a further two parties of fifty men, each led by a captain, would keep post on the flanks as the brigadier of the day directed them. 605

During Marlborough’s army’s march to the Danube in 1704, its passage through the allied regions of the Rhineland, Swabia and Franconia necessitated the strictest discipline. Continual orders were passed forbidding the cutting of corn or trees. 606 On 8 August, in anticipation of entering the lands of the Elector Palatine the next day, Marlborough ordered that nobody in the army was to burn or plunder on pain of death. 607 On another occasion, four subalterns with thirty men each were ordered to march with the quartermasters on the way to the next camp. Spotswood, as deputy quartermaster-general, was to post them at villages on the line of march, to take up all marauders and stragglers they encountered. 608

Marlborough’s march through the lines of Ne Plus Ultra in 1711 was organised with typical attention to detail. All the army’s heavy baggage and sutlers were ordered to collect at the train of artillery by 4 p.m. on the afternoon of 4 August. The general officers of the day were to meet at Marlborough’s quarters at 6 p.m.; Cadogan, who left

603 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 9b: camp journal, notes on march discipline. 20 June 1703 N.S. This was a common stricture; see, for example, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308-309b: orders against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Camp at Lens, 15 June 1711 N.S. This order specified that no NCO, trooper, dragoon or foot soldier was to be one hundred paces from his corps on the march, on pain of death.
604 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 17: camp journal, 21 May 1704 N.S.
605 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 19b-20b: camp journal, 9 June 1704 N.S.
606 E.g. BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 19-19b: camp journal, 6 June 1704 N.S.
607 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 30: camp journal, camp at Santzelle, 8 August 1704 N.S.
608 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 19b: camp journal, 7 June 1704 N.S.
to join with Hompesch before the main body of the army marched, had two captains and two hundred men with tools muster at his quarters at 5 p.m., where they received his own orders.

At 6 p.m. the Retreat was beaten as per usual; the tents were struck as the evening grew and it was ordered that no more fires than ordinary were to be made in the camp, on pain of death. At 9 p.m., the Dutch and British artilleries departed—the Dutch, escorted by one hundred Horse, would head to Vitry, to make bridges over the Scarpe; the British, similarly escorted, would pass through Douai and make their bridges on the canal of Arleux, above Guelzin.

At 10 p.m., the army was to march 'with all possible silence', the regiments in close order, with their supply horses marching on their flanks where the ground permitted; the general officers would be at their posts on the line, where they would find guides to conduct them. It would file off by the left on its march from Villers Brulin to Oisy-le-Verger: each wing in two columns, as then encamped, the first line on the right and the second on the left. The left wing would proceed pass by the villages of Servin and Carency on the left and thence march across the Scarpe, leaving the villages of Brebières and Arleux on their left. The right wing would pass by Villers-au-Bois, Neuville St Vaast, Gavrelle and Vitry to their right, crossing the Scarpe between the last place and Brebières.609

Small detachments of soldiers or local peasants were frequently formed to help clear the roads, paths and passages of the countryside, to speed the passage of the army on the march. For the march of the army on 31 May 1703, a sergeant and twenty men of each regiment, with arms, were ordered to meet at the head of Ingoldsby's regiment of Foot at 3 a.m. for the 'making of ways'. These, together with a major from each regiment [brigade?] who would be sent would supervise them, would then muster at the head of Webb's regiment at 4 a.m., where they would meet the Earl of Orkney and proceed with their duty.610 The majors of each regiment were on occasion expected to

609 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 142-142b: camp journal, camp at Vilers Brulin, 4 August 1711 N.S.
610 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 5b: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 30 May 1703 N.S.
visit the nearby bridges and roads made by their charges, and organise the repair of any that were wanting or spoiled.611

A peasantry forcibly corralled into service by a variety of civic and rural authorities was not necessarily the most reliable or diligent workforce; as the author of camp journal noted with some chagrin on one occasion: "we had 9000 Boors Order'd but not 7000 ever appear'd & of those sev'l. missing every minute."612 Yet the rewards could be considerable, particularly depending on the season: daily rates of as much as 20 stuivers existed, though those that shirked their 'duty' might be punished. Sergeants and other soldiers from the army were deployed to see the workers kept to the task at hand.613

In 1704, a specific company of guides was formed for the purpose of aiding the army on its march and forage, and taking care to make and repair the roads and other passages. The company was commanded by a captain or conductor (paid 6s. p.d.), aided by a quartermaster or corporal (4s. p.d.). They would oversee ten guides, who were paid 2s.3d. a day each, for themselves, their horses, clothing and accoutrements. A further 3s.6d. a day was allowed the company to answer for whatever contingencies might arise. These sums were not accounted for as, for example, Contingencies, but stopped from the pay of the English regiments in the Low Countries (who consented to the deduction). 2s. was stopped from each squadron of Horse a day, 12d. from each squadron of dragoons, and 6d. from each battalion of Foot. The entire fund (£1.16s. p.d.) was handled, perhaps unsurprisingly, by Cadogan, to be applied by him to the guides maintenance according to the directions he received.614 Although the guides

611 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 6: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 1 June 1703 N.S.
612 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 61b-62: camp journal, 24 July 1706 N.S.
613 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 63: camp journal, 29 July 1706 N.S. By way of contrast, a private sentinel in the English Foot might make an additional 8 stuivers a day (in addition to their daily subsistence, which, depending on the local exchange and other stoppages, might amount to 5 or so stuivers) when engaged in such working parties as might be involved in making works or construction gabions and saucissons. Furthermore, each regiment would be paid 10 stuivers for every gabion constructed, though there was no requirement as to how such money would be accounted.
614 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff: 111-111b: deductions to furnish a body of guides during the campaign. The Hague, 28 April 1704 N.S. For the establishment of the company, see ibid., ff. 111b-112 (same date). For an example of a deduction for these guides, out of a company's accounts, see KP I(i)/7. The deduction on this account (23 October 1705 to 22 April 1706 O.S.)
were normally under the command of the quartermaster-general, they were on occasion under the orders of his aides and deputies.\textsuperscript{615}

The baggage of the English army was the fief of the wagonmaster-general.\textsuperscript{616} For most of the war this was Lieutenant-Colonel Giles Spicer. Spicer was unable to attend the army in the Spring of 1711, on account of his recent receipt of the governorship of Guernsey (which would require his attention for three months). He asked for a leave of absence for that time; assuring Marlborough that his two aides would be able to do his duty in his stead; but the situation was unworkable – a week later Spicer was recommending Hugh Pudsey as his replacement and Marlborough signed Pudsey’s warrant to be wagonmaster-general at the camp at Werder on 1 June 1711 N.S.\textsuperscript{617}

The wagonmaster-general oversaw the march of the baggage of both the army and its generals.\textsuperscript{618} As an example, the marching orders of 1 September 1710 stated that Spicer was to marshal the grand baggage of the army upon the highlands of Houdain, before it marched off – that of the generals first, according to their rank, followed by that of the army, with the second line following the first, in the same order as the soldiers had been camped. It would be escorted by 200 Horse and 400 Foot, and all would carry two days’ forage.\textsuperscript{619}

Each regiment would typically be allowed to send a small party of soldiers—such as a sergeant and ten men per battalion—to guard its baggage, “and no more as the Commanding Officer shall Answer [otherwise].” The regimental baw (baggage) horses with the soldiers’ tents would be carefully directed by the wagonmaster-general and amounted to fl. 2:11. On typical duties, see KP I(i)/143. Order of march for the left wing on the 26 October 1709, from the camp at Bousois to that at Roeux. Made on 25 October 1709 N.S.\textsuperscript{615} KP I(i)/226. Order of march, 3 September 1710 N.S. “Le Colonel King aura soin de les envoyer des Guides.”

\textsuperscript{616} The train of artillery also had its own wagonmaster-general on the establishment of the Board of Ordnance. BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 53b: order for Captain Charles Ball, wagonmaster-general and captain of the artificers in the English Train to fell wood in or adjoining the camp, to repair carriages. Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough’s order. Camp at Peer, 9 August 1702 N.S. See also Add. MSS 61370, f. 19b: order to Charles Ball, wagonmaster-general and captain of the artificers, to cut down wood for the train. 1703. Ball’s warrant as ‘Waggon-Master’ to the Ordnance (at £100 p.a., paid quarterly) was dated 1 February 1703 O.S. WO 55/488 p. 41.


\textsuperscript{618} BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 23b: camp journal, 30 June 1704 N.S.

\textsuperscript{619} KP I(i)/222. Order of march for the grand baggage. Rebreuve, 1 September 1710 N.S.
his assistants (on passing a bridge, for example, they might be ordered to keep to the left); and wheeled carriages prohibited from travelling at the head of a regiment. On the march to the Danube, a typical order stated that the baw horses would march with a sergeant at the head of the battalion or regiment; while the sick would take post at the flank or the head of the regiment, likewise with a sergeant accompanying. Any sergeant who derelicted this duty would be broken.

Within his own sphere of influence, the sheer autocracy of the wagonmaster-general compared favourably with any post in the army. Any officer or soldier that disobeyed the wagonmaster-general, or disputed his orders in regulating the march of the baggage, was to be severely punished, and his corps held accountable for any damages inflicted; wagons and carts that disrupted the regulated order—such as those of sutlers that were found within the march, or with or before the vanguard of the army—were liable to be plundered. No commanding officer was permitted to send any detachment to the head of the baggage to ensure that his passed preferentially, by force; all the baggage was to follow according to the ranks of the generals and corps of every nation. The general officers themselves were called upon to give certificates to their domestic servants who conducted their baggage.

One disturbance is highlighted in a court-martial held at the camp at Sutendal, on 23 September 1702. Five individuals—David Moore, a sergeant in The Honourable James Stanley’s regiment of Foot; David Graham and Henry Lyddal, servants to Hans Hamilton, the lieutenant-colonel of said regiment; Richard Bradley, a servant to Major Worden of likewise; and William Clark of Captain Freeman’s company therein—were all accused of disobeying the wagonmaster-general and making a disturbance in the march of the baggage from the camp at Asch, earlier in the day.

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620 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 1b-2: camp journal, camp at Hocht, 13 May 1703 N.S. Orders of march for the army. Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b: order for the limitation of baggage. 7 July 1708 N.S.
621 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 19b-20b: camp journal, 9 June 1704 N.S.
622 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 65-66b: order of Marlborough relating to the baggage. Camp at Coursell, 1 July 1703 N.S. Add. MSS 61404, ff. 142-142b: camp journal, camp at Vilers Brulin, 4 August 1711 N.S. Ibid, f. 9b: 21 June 1703 N.S. Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b: order for the limitation of baggage. 7 July 1708 N.S.
623 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b: order for the limitation of baggage. 7 July 1708 N.S. For a similar order, see BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 65-66b, dated 1 July 1703 N.S.
624 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 26b-27: camp journal, 20 July 1704 N.S.
The principal accusers were Colonel Spicer, the wagonmaster-general, and two of his English conductors, James Fleming and John Diggle. By their accounts, disagreements on the roads over the rights of way of the various carts, wagons and horses of the army could be violent affairs. Fleming testified that the disturbance began when Lyddal led his cart into the ranks of Major-General Ingoldsby's baggage; it was upon hearing this that Spicer sent his conductors to officiate, quickly following himself. Worden's servant, Bradley, was particularly violent, "laying about him with a flail", striking one of Ingoldsby's men on the nose and crying, "Damme lets knock them all down!" Graham, Hamilton's servant, struck the watchmaster of the guard with his halberd, before relenting and surrendering his weapon to the wagonmaster-general; Lyddal gave Spicer nought but 'ill language'.

Sergeant Moor, who accompanied Stanley's wagons, was found guilty on account of his failure to prevent disorder; he was broken. Graham, Lyddal and Clark were to ask the wagonmaster of Ingoldsby's regiment's pardon. Bradley, the instigator, was found guilty of a high misdemeanour and sentenced to be taken by the provost and whipped by his man at the head of the regiments to which the watchmaster and wagonmaster belonged, as well as his own regiment - all three punishments to occur in one day, with fifty stripes at each.625

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While the army was on still its march, the quartermasters would have preceded them to the site marked for the next camp. Each battalion or troop quartermaster would be accompanied by a number of aides from his regiment. For a battalion of Foot, this might typically consist of a sergeant, and a man from each company - the 'camp colour men', each of whom was to carry a spade or hatchet taken from the train.626 The quartermasters were to keep their charges in good discipline on the journey to the new camp site, ensuring that none straggled or marauded, be it on the march or upon

625 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 89-90: proceedings of a court-martial held at the camp at Sutendal, 23 September 1702 N.S., Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Elliot presiding.
626 Aides to the battalion quartermasters. An order of 1711 specified that this was to amount to one man per company of Foot; for the Horse and Dragoons, these activities were carried out by the regimental and troop quartermasters alone. BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308-309b: orders against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Lens, 15 June 1711 N.S.
arrival at their destination. Occasionally, they were given help in this regard. An order of 1704 stated that a captain, lieutenant and ensign from every battalion were to accompany the quartermasters and their men each day, to answer for whatever abuses they might do and to keep such parties as accompanied the quartermasters in order. Later, in 1710, a similar order dispatched a major of each corps or nation and an officer of each regiment with the quartermasters, accompanied by 600 Horse. Of the two provosts-general in the army, one would accompany the quartermasters and the other the baggage.

When a quartermaster arrived at the ground, he was directed to his own battalion's or troop's place in the camp by the quartermaster-general or his deputies. It was the senior staff officers' duty to regulate the dispositions of the camp; none but the quartermaster-general or his deputies were to mark any quarters and any officer that did so besides might be broken. Such stark ordinances were often repeated. In 1704, an order stated that no quarters were to be taken but for the general officers and the commanders of regiments; and these were to be marked by the quartermaster-general and his deputies. These commands were not given idly: on 18 September 1705, at the camp at Montaigne, Captain John Pickering of the Foot Guards confined his lieutenant-colonel's servant for just such a marking of quarters; an act that escalated into a serious dispute between Lieutenant-Colonel James Dormer and the captain, the former killing the latter in a duel.

The dispositions of the battalions and squadrons in an army's encampment would vary, but a typical placement (a 'true Distance') was as follows, provided the ground 'affor'd it': 400 paces between each line of the army; 30 paces to be allowed to each squadron, with an interval of 20 paces between; and 100 paces for each battalion of

627 BL Add. MSS 23642, f. 13: Orders for the (battalion) quartermaster, or his sergeant.
628 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 21b-22: camp journal, 21 June 1704 N.S.
629 KP I(i)/213. Order or march for 10 July 1710 N.S., to leave the camp at Henin Lietard to go to that at Neuville. See also KP I(i)/214.
630 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 13: camp journal, 13 July 1703 N.S.
631 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 19b-20b: camp journal, 9 June 1704 N.S.
632 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 33-35b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at Aarschot, 21 September 1705 N.S., Major-General Withers presiding. The court comprised six colonels and six lieutenant-colonels. Dormer was found not guilty.
Foot, with an interval of 40 paces in-between.\textsuperscript{633} It would be the major-general of the day’s responsibility to post guards at the camp and occupy the posts necessary for its security; to regulate any forage on the day they arrived in camp; and to decide with the quartermaster-general the villages the army would collect its straw from.\textsuperscript{634}

Having been directed to his own ground, the quartermaster was to place any available sentinels on all the local houses, fishponds, trees, hedges, straw, fuel, forage and other items that were within his corps’ limits – but not to stretch his lines irregularly, or alter the dispositions given him by the quartermaster-general, so as to bring into his encampment anything that was not ‘justly due’. The ground having been marked, the men attending the baw horses carrying the battalion’s tents, and the men carrying the camp colours, ensured that the tents were laid in a proper placement, to be pitched by the main body of the battalion upon its arrival. The quartermaster would draw up a parade line to the front of the battalion’s tents, and plant the camp colours upon it, as a guide for all. Sentinels were posted to dissuade other formations from marching across the battalion’s ground and causing a disturbance. The quartermaster was also tasked with ensuring proper lines of communication and movement with adjacent corps and making the battalion’s ‘houses of office’ (latrines).\textsuperscript{635} (If an army tarried for long in the same camp, the quartermaster was also to make sure that new latrines were cut every six days, while the old ones were carefully stopped up.\textsuperscript{636})

A quartermaster possessed many responsibilities. He

\begin{quote}
... ought to be a honest careful man, exact at his Pen, & good accomptant very well skill’d in the Detail of a Regiment & ought constantly to know ever individual circumstance of a regiment as to Duty & finances.\textsuperscript{637}
\end{quote}

In garrison or in camp he was to see that the quarters were kept clean and ensure that all the battalion’s equipage, tools, provisions and carriages were properly provided

\textsuperscript{633} BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 138: orders for the encampment of the army. Undated.
\textsuperscript{634} BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for the impending campaign (1703).
\textsuperscript{635} BL, Add. MSS 23642, f. 13: orders for the quartermasters. Undated.
\textsuperscript{636} BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 149: instructions for the quartermasters concerning their encampment. Another order assigned this duty to the major of each battalion. Add. MSS 61404, ff. 47-47b: camp journal, camp at Meldert, 1 August 1705 N.S.
\textsuperscript{637} BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 146b: rules to be observed by all the quartermasters of the British Foot.
and distributed; an especial care was to be taken in ensuring that the bread and other provisions were wholesome and undamaged, and delivered on time - on 18 July 1704, for example, the regimental quartermasters were met at the cellars in front of D'Herleville's regiment, so that they might each receive three barrels of beer for their battalion.638 On all this a quartermaster was to keep exact accounts and return such as was not necessary or ordered, so that the regiment was not answerable. Duties were thus numerous,

& whereas there is a great many things belonging to this imploy that cannot be recit'd here, & that happens without rule, ancient Customs, & the Custom of war must be follow'd, & a good understanding will make it easy.639

It was also the quartermaster's duty, or that of his sergeant, to see that the streets of the garrison town, or avenues of the encampment elsewhere, were swept clean and kept free of rubbish; all sutlers and butchers were to bury their waste every day, lest they suffer punishment as the regimental commanding officer thought fit. The speedy burial of all dead horses was also a duty of the quartermaster, and he was to ensure that no soldiers, sutlers, servants or others made to 'ease themselves' anywhere but in the latrines.640 On other occasions the quartermasters were tasked with reconnoitring for grass and straw in the vicinity of the encampment, informing their brigadier of what guard might suffice to keep any grazers safe.641

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When the army was successfully encamped its general and staff officers would regulate the dispatch of receipt of orders. The orders of the day for the Foot (to use that branch of service as an example) would be issued at the appointed ('orderly') time at the general-in-chief's quarters, where the general officers of the day would be in attendance. The exact form could vary, but the general orders for the army might typically be received by the major-general of the day, who would then pass them on to the brigadier of the day, who would likewise distribute them to the majors of brigade

638 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 26b: camp journal, 18 July 1704 N.S.
639 Ibid.
640 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 149.
641 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 149b-150: orders for straw and fuel, grazing and foraging.
while himself overseeing the formation of any detachments made in the camp. The majors of brigade would be accompanied by orderly sergeants, who could be dispatched with orders to various formations as necessary. On other occasions the disposition might have been more complex, given the multinational composition of the army. A memorial c. 1703 suggested that each ‘nationality’ would receive its orders at the headquarters via its commanding general, who would then order all that was necessary in his corps; the major-general, who would also be at the general-in-chief’s quarters when the orders of the day were given, was to regulate with each nation the fine details with regard to forage, escorts, guards etc.

While the brigadier of the day and the majors of brigade attended their duties, the major-general of the day would visit the general(s) of the Foot, to see if that officer had any other orders for his own or other corps in the army. As a general of the infantry himself, Philipp Karl, Graf von Wylich und Lottum (1650-1719) possessed very keen ideas on where the rights and dignities due to such an officer lay in this system of organisation, and wrote a memorial to Marlborough on this subject in 1707. It is difficult to define the degree to which his observations reprised, or at most clarified, contemporary practice; or differed to a considerable degree from it. Nevertheless, it is instrumental to list Lottum’s points in summary:

(i) That it might please Marlborough to order the major-general of the day to give regularly the parole to the generals of infantry according to their seniority, and inform them of all the orders given. And when a general (of infantry) was present at the parole, the major-general of the day would order nothing without concerting with him; and at his absence in a case of necessity, such general officers of the day might make to execute all orders they received from the commanders-in-chief, but would immediately make an effort to share those orders with the general.

(ii) That the major-general of the day would make a report of all that passed in the army on his day, the following day.

642 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 143. Method for the better dispatching in the distributing orders. Undated.
643 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 56-56b: camp journal, camp at Alost, 30 May 1706 N.S.
644 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for the impending campaign (1703).
That if the general(s) of the infantry was incommoded, or otherwise impeded, which might oblige him to remain in his quarters, the major-general of the day would still send the parole to his house.

That no detachment of infantry would be made out of the army, without orders dispatched directly from Marlborough or the Dutch Field Marshal to the general of infantry, who would then give the orders to the major-general of the day for the infantry regarding the battalions to be employed - although the exact details of the detachment would remain the responsibility of the generals of the diverse corps of the army.

That if there were two generals of infantry, each would have command of his line; and that each line would possess a major general of the day.

That it would be good to define the honours which were due to the generals of infantry in the army.

That the general of infantry, and the lieutenant-general and major-general of the day would inform Marlborough or the Field Marshal of any news or extraordinary arrivals, and appraise them on any affairs of import personally.

Having received his orders, from whatever source, the major-general of the day would acquaint the lieutenant-general of the day with all that had been issued. Should any further orders be given, the major-general of the day would send them, with his aide-de-camp, to the major of brigade for the day – who was to remain in camp, and to be sure to at all times let the other officers know where he was to be found. The lieutenant-general of the day was also to keep an aide-de-camp close to hand, to dispatch any orders he might make to the majors of brigade, and to acquaint the general-in-chief and general of the Foot with the measures he might have taken. Usually, the lieutenant-general of the day was obliged to give an account to the general-in-chief of all orders he might make, before they were put into action; but in a case of emergency he might execute them immediately, while sending notice to his superior at the earliest convenient moment.

645 BL, Add. MSS 61231, ff. 108-109b: Lottum's memorial, camp at Soignies, 19 August 1707 N.S.
646 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 143. Method for the better dispatching in the distributing orders. Undated.
647 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for the impending campaign (1703).
To react better to the flow of information in the camp, formations would send orderlies to the various generals’ quarters to receive orders and other information as required. One source suggests that each wing of Horse was to send an orderly cornet, and each brigadier of Foot an orderly sergeant, to the generals’ quarters every day; while every brigade was to send an orderly sergeant to the General of Foot’s quarters.648 These orderly sergeants were expected to be “... good understanding Serjeants that can write well to wait orderly, & if occasion happens to carry verball messages.”649 The adjutant-general was tasked with keeping details of all the orders given, detachments made and any other matters that might pass in the army; it was also his role to decide upon any disputes that might arise in the exercise of duty, and to visit all the outposts frequently if possible, otherwise keeping close to the general-in-chief.650

To maintain good communications between each other, the general and staff officers of the day—particularly the major-general of the day and the brigadier of the day—were expected to keep their quarters very close to those of the majors of brigade, who were themselves to encamp together in the middle of the army, between the first and second lines. All the general officers’ aides-de-camp were expected to know the location of the quarters of the majors of brigade, to deliver them as celeritously as possible they might be tasked to carry.651 An order of 7 July 1708 stated that all majors-general, brigadiers and majors of brigade that were, or came ‘to take the day’, were to encamp in the rear of ‘their brigade’.652

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Discipline with the camp was the province of the provosts-general or provost marshals of the army. John Fury fulfilled the post as provost marshal to the English forces, and his most remunerative duty was his oversight of the various sutlers, provisioners and traders that accompanied the army. He regulated the prices of their wares and checked the fairness of their weights and measures – and demanded a healthy compensation for

648 BL, Stowe MSS 469, ff. 74-75b: undated general orders.
649 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 146. Rules to be observed by the adjutants of the British Foot.
651 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 151: instructions for the more speedy execution of orders. Undated. BL, Stowe MSS 469, ff. 74-75b: undated general orders.
652 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b: camp orders, 7 July 1708 N.S.
the privilege. Richard King's papers contain an extract from the Dutch regulations of order and discipline in army, which were adopted by the Allied army as a whole; articles 82 to 92 concerned the management of the army's sutlers, and the provost marshal's interactions with them.

A battalion was to have no more than six sutlers; a squadron no more than four. Each was obliged to be provided with a written authorisation from the colonel or commanding officer of the regiment, and to follow the battalion or squadron for the whole campaign, "for which purpose they must provide themselves with a good Waggon or Cart drawn at least by two strong horses," and encamp themselves behind their formation. All other sutlers or traders were to present themselves to the provost-general, who would grant them authorisations of admission to the army and camp with the generals' consent, directing them to the 'General Suttling Place'.

All sutlers, butchers and retailers bring or selling any provisions to the forces under English pay were subject to the 'inspection and direction' of the provost marshal, as noted. In one example, an order specified that sutlers found guilty of any offences were to be fined: 2 guilders for the first offence; 20 guilders for the second; and on the third the sutlers were to forfeit all their goods and wares, besides such further punishment as the nature of their offence might require. Of the goods forfeited, two thirds were to pass to the provost marshal himself, while the other third was to be put to 'charitable uses'. In addition, the provost marshal was to receive the 'usual fees' from the sutlers attending the forces in English pay, which comprised (and were not to exceed):

(i) 3 stuivers for each tun of beer brought into the camp;

653 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 12: camp journal, 6 July 1703 N.S. Ibid., f. 145-145b: camp journal, camp at Avesnes-le-Seqq, 21 August 1711 N.S. In 1708, Marlborough ordered both Fury and Lieutenant John McQueen of Orkney's regiment to investigate the people who raised public tents at the army's headquarters, on account of the great disorders that occurred there daily, with various 'idle and debauched persons' making a nuisance of themselves to the 'great prejudice' of the army. The provost marshal and the lieutenant were to inform themselves of the character of all such individuals and report their findings to the duke, with an account of their behaviour. BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 229b: order to Fury and Mr Macquin to enquire into the character of the persons allowed to keep public tents at the head quarters. Marlborough. Camp at Terbanck, 12 June 1708 N.S.

654 KP 1(i)/9: Extract out of the Regulations of their High Mightinesses the States General of the United Netherlands concerning the Subordination, Military Discipline and several Points serving for the better maintaining of Good Orders in the Army. Concluded 15 March 1706.
(ii) 24 stuivers for each hogshead of wine;

(iii) 48 stuivers for a hogshead of brandy or 'distilled waters';

(iv) 4 duits for each bottle of wine;

(v) The head of a calf or sheep slaughtered;

(vi) The tongue of an ox or cow slaughtered;

(vii) Half the head of a hog slaughtered;

(viii) And so proportionately for all other sorts of goods.

Furthermore, each sutler or trader who erected a tent anywhere in the camp was to pay 3 stuivers a week to the provost-marshal in 'place money'. (Confusingly, the regulations could vary with the ebb and flow of the campaign and the war. While an order of 12 July 1704 clearly stated that any sutler that refused to give the provost marshal his dues would be plundered, an order made later in the war, at the camp at Langham on 17 September 1708, stated that neither the provost marshal nor the battalion majors or adjutants were to exact dues from those who sold provisions in the camp!)

No other officer than the provost marshal of Her Majesty's forces was to demand any other pay or profits from the sutlers, except at the headquarters of the general-in-chief and the quarters of the general officers, where the like fees were to be received by the quartermasters or harbingers of the generals. Marlborough commanded the provost marshal to publish these conditions at the head of each regiment under English pay, accompanied by the sound of a trumpet or beat of a drum, so that none might 'pretend ignorance'.

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655 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 20b: camp journal, 12 June 1704 N.S. Ibid., f. 95b: camp journal, camp at Langham, 17 September 1708 N.S.

656 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 28-28b: order regulating the prices of provisions, in stuivers Holland money. Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's order. Camp at Vorselaar, 11 July 1703 N.S. See also BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 104-105b: Rules and Orders for the better Government of the Sutlers and others bringing provisions to her Majesties Forces &c. The camp and date are left blank; the year was 1702. This example rates the penalty for the first offence at fl. 12, and that
Yet The provost marshal might choose on his own account to sell or farm out his
perquisites to the regimental officers themselves. John Fury petitioned Marlborough on
this very point: having obtained several douceurs from the sutlers and other
provisioners 'for his care in keeping a due regulation of their wightes and measures',
he had agreed to resign these benefices to the adjutants of the regiments in the army,
for the fee of 2 pistols each campaign per regiment. The arrangement had worked well
until that present campaign, when the adjutants denied the agreement; they believed
that such sutlers' fees properly belonged to them anyway. Fury begged Marlborough
to order that the old agreement be fairly discharged—indeed, Fury claimed that his
claim upon the adjutants was less than if he had continued to collect the perquisites
himself—or it would be impossible to support his post as provost marshal.

Fury was also responsible for the discipline of the soldiers, troopers and dragoons
within the camp and its environs. The basic fundamentals of military discipline were of
course handled by the regimental officers, who saw to such trivialities as forbidding
the sergeants or men to talk, smoke tobacco or make noise when the battalion was
forming on parade; or making sure the men pitched their tents before they suffered
them to sit and rest, or attend to any other business. While in garrison, company
officers visited the quarters of their men at least twice a week, ensuring that the
grounds were tidy and that the soldiers men messed as they ought; no soldier was to
appear outside his quarters after the taptoo, for example, nor be dressed slovenly or
without his sword on the street. Above all, the soldiers were to offer no disrespect to
the citizens of a town, nor take matters into their own hands:

for the second at fl. 25. It also listed the provost marshal, as well as the quartermaster or
harbinger of the generals, as being a beneficiary of the dues given at the headquarters - though
the provost marshal's rank was subsequently crossed out. See also KP I(i)/9: Extract out of the
Regulations of their High Mightinesses the States General of the United Netherlands concerning the
Subordination, Military Discipline and several Points serving for the better maintaining of Good Orders
in the Army. Concluded 15 March 1706. This specified a penalty of fl. 6 for each inspection by the
provost-general of wares brought into the camp without the approbation of the Dutch clerk or
comptroller-general of the provisions.

657 BL, Add. MSS 61287, ff. 195-196b: petition of John Fury to Marlborough. Sadly, this petition
is undated; the date of this disagreement cannot be positively identified.
659 BL, Add. MSS 29447, f. 113-11b: directions for all the commanding officers of the British
infantry, from the Earl of Orkney. Camp at Marchiennes, 23 October 1711 N.S.
If any dispute happens between a Soldier & a Burger - the Soldier is not to do himself justice, or give any Scurrillous Language or blows but complain to his Officer who is to represent it to ye Gen» MO.

But as a simmering pot of variably bored, tired, hungry and violent individuals, acts of ill-discipline were common, despite these measures. Marlborough and his fellow commanders (occasionally in conjunction with dignitaries) issued numerous orders for the prevention of plundering and marauding by soldiers in camp or in garrison. Men were not to offer the least insult or injury to the populace,

... by uncovering and pulling down their Houses, or Bairns, breaking into their Orchards, destroying their Gardens and Plantations, taking away their Poultry, Horses, or any other Cattle whatsoever out of their Stables or Pastures, or any way Molest or Disturb the Suttlers and others bringing Provisions to the Army...

under the penalty of immediate execution under martial law.

An additional element of disorder was introduced in 1706, when the Protestant Dutch, English, Danish and German forces of Marlborough's army conquered much of the largely Catholic Southern Netherlands in the name of Charles III. An army of officers and men raised on a diet of anti-papist bigotry were expected to treat the Catholic populace, ecclesiastics and houses of worship as they would those of their co-religionists. Soldiers seized in a church outside the hours of divine service would be considered robbers, and suffer death; any that plundered a church or cloister would be hanged without mercy.

A central element in the prevention of crimes such as marauding was the principle of shared responsibility: officers and corps were frequently held responsible for the actions of their charges and fellow soldiers. A simple order, like that of 9 August 1704, which stated, “None to stir out of the camp, of their ranks,” was appended with the

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660 KP I(i)/13: Garrison orders for Capt. King. Ghent, 30 October 1706 O.S.

661 E.g. BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 169b-170: order against marauding. Comte d’Avelin and Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough’s command. Tournai, 23 June 1710 N.S.

662 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 67-68b: order ageists straggling and marauding. Camp at Tielen, 6 July 1703 N.S.


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explicit addendum: “as the commanders will answer.” Anybody found with stolen goods was considered a robber unless they produced the true culprit immediately; not that it might guarantee clemency if that individual was a soldier of the army, as ‘receivers and buyers’ were to be punished equally alongside the robbers themselves and suffer death. None were to pretend ignorance; commanding officers were answerable to such orders according to “their Intent & meaning”, leaving little liberty. As it was recognised that such disorders “frequently happen[ed] by the negligence of officers”, Marlborough declared that the officer to whose company or troop marauders belonged would be held liable for the damage committed, “and be obliged immediately to make restitution to the utmost Value.” On another occasion, the duke ordered that any officer who did not inform his superior immediately upon notice of stolen goods being brought into ‘his province’, or of disorders committed by the soldiers, would be cashiered.

A list of the contingent payments made by the Earl of Orrery’s regiment of Foot over the period 8 May to 23 October 1707 included an item of fifty guilders, which had been paid by Benjamin Sweet to the priest at Bouterghauw, on account of the soldiers “plundering the Village.” Those close to the duke were not immune, as this following order, directed at Henry Durell, shows:

Whereas the Inhabitants of the Village of Grenay in Artois, and the Sauvegarders appointed for their protection, have depos’d upon Both, that several soldiers of the Regiment under Your Command, together with some Dragoons of Brigadier Daudegries Regiment, did on the Twenty fourth of June last, in a violent manner, force into a House in the said Village, and, among many disorders committed there, did take away four Cows, & several Household Goods, valued at One hundred Patacoons, in Breach & Contempt of the Order read at the head of each Regiment for preventing maroding: I do hereby direct & require that You forthwith pay to the Inhabitants of the said Hundred Patacoons, or such part thereof as You can Compound, & that You Charge the Same to the pay, as well of the officers, as Soldiers of Your Regiment, for punishment for their remissness and for an Example.

664 E.g. BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 30: camp journal, camp at Hexhem, 9 August 1704 N.S.
665 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 20-20b: order contra marauding, camp at Beaulieu, 27 May 1706 N.S.
to deter others from the like offence & Breach of Orders; For which this shall be your Sufficient Warrant and Direction.

Given at the Camp at Cote this Twenty Seventh day of July 1711. Marlborough.666

These prohibitions extended to the civilians of the army. Sutlers were forbidden to buy anything from marauders on pain of being treated as such themselves; the provost marshal was authorised to seize the horses, wagons, carts and goods of those who violated such an order, which were confiscated to ‘his use’.667 A woman ‘taken up putting off false Coin or money’ was ordered to be whipped at the head of the line, if she did not name her associates.668

Keeping the soldiers within the bounds of the camp was a prime concern. Rolls were taken frequently to ward against unlawful absence, albeit not always successfully. In May 1703, at the camp at Thys, the rolls were ordered to be taken punctually, three times a day. This did not appear to have the designed effect, as it was soon increased to four times a day, attended with various warnings on the penalties due to those that committed disorders.669 One proscription of 1704 warned that any soldier found a mile from the camp was to be considered deserters; in 1711 another forbade any soldier to go a thousand paces from his camp or corps – offenders were to be hanged without mercy.670 On 30 June 1704, a particularly stark order was issued, affecting officers as well as other ranks: all personnel under the rank of general officer that did not ‘lye in the camp’ would be broken. Furthermore, the brigadiers were expected to be ‘not above 500 paces’ from their brigades. Such strictures applied to the march, too,
whereupon every officer was expected to keep his place in the line and wear his ‘livery clothes’ (i.e. uniform, in so far as it existed). 671

Posts were occupied to prevent disorders and the passage of soldiers from the encampment into nearby towns, and the quarter and rear guards were ordered to be alert to the least evidence of marauding. 672 The majors of brigades were to report transgressors, such as those who attempted to leave the camp or broke other articles of discipline, while company officers might be ordered to visit the tents of their men at least three times a day – as well to know which men were absent as to discover stolen goods; all that had absented themselves without leave were to be made to run the gauntlet on their return. 673

The main actor, however, remained the provost marshal. He would patrol with the guards distributed to him, making his rounds of the camp and its surroundings. The provost marshals or provosts-general of the various corps and armies were often authorised to render summary judgement and execution upon those transgressing orders against marauding and straggling. 674 Their authority would on occasion go beyond their particular corps: an order in June 1711 stated a provost who took transgressors from within his own corps was to render them to the heads of their squadrons and battalions, where they would be hanged; those that were not of their own corps were to be hanged on the spot, “to avoid the disputes and difficulties that might otherwise happen if they were brought to their own Corps”. 675

671 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 23b: camp journal, camp at Balmershoven, 30 June 1704 N.S.
672 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 2b: camp journal, 16 May 1703 N.S. A captain, two subalterns, three sergeants and fifty men guarded the bridge on the camp’s side of Tongres to prevent any soldiers crossing. Ibid., f. 5b: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 30 May 1703 N.S. The guards were ordered to seize all soldiers that brought timber into the camp; no houses were to be pulled down on pain of death.
673 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 30: camp journal, camp at Havel, 9 August 1704 N.S. Add. MSS 61371, f. 10: order against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Camp at Elst, 8 June 1705 N.S.
674 One order stated that those who robbed “any Boor or Subtler coming to the Camp shall be hang’d without Mercy.” BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 19-20 (Dutch), 20-20b. 7 July 1702 N.S. Add. MSS 61336, ff. 67-68b: order against straggling and marauding. Camp at Tielen, 6 July 1703 N.S. Add. MSS 61404, ff. 3-3b: camp journal, camp at Thys, 20 May 1703 N.S.
675 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308-309b: orders against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough’s command. Camp at Lens, 15 June 1711 N.S.
On 27 July 1703, there were fifty-six prisoners from the right wing at the provost's quarters charged with marauding. Most were apprehended by the provost marshal, with a sergeant and a guard of fifteen men. These soldiers had been taken while carrying such diverse items as: bottles of buttermilk; hogs, cows, calves and potatoes; a 'Kettle said to be found in a Ditch'; pieces of hogs' flesh; salt and fat; 'Garden stuffs'; dishes and linen; honey (some had also been stopped in the act of 'burning bees'); meal; 'A baggfull of Boors Cloths'; and a cartload of household goods. A further eight men had been taken from the left wing: four with cows and four with twenty sheep (which they said they had been given by Danish troopers, who could not carry them).676

A few days later, some of these individuals were apparently brought to trial. Edward Dawkins, a drummer in Stewart's regiment of Foot who had been found a league from the camp, burning bees and stealing honey, was sentenced to death – but he was recommended for, and received, a pardon. Others faced a more capricious fate: Robert Carr and John Melmady, who had been found guilty of robbing a peasant, were sentenced to death; Marlborough ordered that they drew lots – one was to be pardoned, the other killed. Most received corporal punishments: three were to be tied to stakes and 'severely whipped' by the hand of the common hangman; others were sentenced to run the gauntlet; or returned to their regiments to answer for their being absent without leave, and punished 'according to their desert'.677

It was not just the soldiers of the army that might plunder the local populace; the situation could occur in reverse, with soldiers and sutlers the targets of local gangs of robbers, or even peasants. Gallus Kalger (a burger of Nijmegen and sutler attending the headquarters), John Holsinger (a sutler in Colonel Schmettau's regiment) and James Haygre (a dragoon and sutler in Colonel Benne's regiment) were travelling from Tirlemont to the camp with a wagon and two carts loaded with provisions, when they were "stopt and plunder'd" by a party of fifteen boers, three of whom carried firearms and the rest 'great sticks'. Haygre set about the bandits with a tent-pole, before he was

676 BL, Add. MSS 38853, ff. 39-40: list of prisoners at the provosts for marauding, 27 July 1703 N.S.
677 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 31b-33b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at Kalmthout, 30 and 31 July 1703 N.S., Colonel John White presiding.

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hot in the arm (which he subsequently lost the use of); Holsinger was taken with the robbers to a local farm, where they at least allowed him the kindness of a glass of Kalgin's own wine while they drank from his bottles and divided the spoils. 678

On other occasions, a more senior individual than the provost marshal might be called upon to investigate (and punish) disturbances, as when the Dutch quartermaster-general, Yvoy, was ordered to examine the disorders committed by the soldiers posted along the Moselle. Yvoy was given powers to punish those responsible and give orders to prevent such acts in the future; all were to submit themselves to his authority in this regard. 679

The central form of military justice was the court-martial. Two forms of this court existed: the regimental court-martial and the general court-martial. The former could award corporal punishment if approved by the commanding officer, and largely concerned itself with intra-regimental matters such as the neglect of duty and disorders within quarters, as well as serving as a board of inquiry and arbitration between soldiers and officers, or soldiers and soldiers. 680 General courts-martial were appointed by virtue of a warrant issued on the part of Marlborough as commander-in-chief (or by the acting commander-in-chief in his absence) to senior officers, who would form and preside over the resulting court. 681 These orders to hold courts-martial were typically specific, limited to a single occasion, but others constituted what were in effect standing courts: an order of 11 October 1706 stated that courts-martial were to meet at least four times a week, starting at 8 a.m. and not adjourning until 12 noon; deserters' sentences would be put into execution the following day. 682

678 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 19-20b. Camp at Tirlemont, 14 September 1705 N.S. The three sutlers claimed losses running to just over 1500 German florins.

679 BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 12: order to Yvoy to examine disorders. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Elst, 11 June 1705 N.S.

680 Scouller, A Q 102, pp. 334-335.

681 E.g. BL, Add. MSS 38853, f. 112: warrant from Marlborough to Sir Richard Temple, Bt, to hold a general court-martial at the camp at Lien les Beguines, dated 6 July 1705 N.S. The general court-martial was held at the camp two days later (ff. 114-116). In September 1703, three courts-martial were convened under Lord Cutts' orders: 18 September, the Earl of Barrymore presiding (ff. 95-97b); 27 September, Colonel Tatton presiding (ff. 99-101); and 29 September, the Earl of Barrymore presiding (ff. 103-105b).

The execution of sentence might occur in the camp, at the head of various regiments; or on the line of the army's march, as in a case in 1704, when two deserters, a robber and a purveyor of false money were put to death 'on the road'. But justice was typically subservient to efficacy. The day before the battle of Blenheim, as the impending nature of action was explicit, every effort was made to secure the strength of the battalions. (No general officer, for example, was to keep more than six men on their guard and the regimental commanders were urge to let their corps march 'as strong as possible'.) This desire was clear in the amnesty allowed to many of the army's transgressors: all prisoners at the Provosts' were to be pardoned, excepting those accused of murder or desertion.

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The security of the army's camp was discharged by its guards. There were various guards manned by the army in camp or garrison, often with conflicting terminology. In camp, the Camp Guard, Main Guard or Grand Guard would be the main guarantor of security consisting of a large detachment posted as the geography of the camp and its environs, and the position of the enemy, dictated. It is thus difficult to derive any consistent system for its use. The other guards, however, were more formulaic.

Each regiment of Foot, for example, would have its own quarter-guard, which would be posted directly to the front of the battalion's colours; this guard was never made by the army as a whole, but by each individual regiment, providing an extra ring of security to the camp. The picquet-guard was

... a body of men always to be ready with their arms in their hands to turnout in case of an alarm ... commanded not by the next officer on detail, but such as are appointed for Picquet ... [and] must march either to sustain outposts, forraging escorts or any other service ...

Each regiment would provide a small party of soldiers as its own picquet; taken across the army as a whole, this would provide a moderate force under arms in emergencies. The picquets would be expected to wear their uniforms on whilst their duty, so that

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683 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 21: camp journal, 14 June 1704 N.S.
684 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 30b: camp journal, camp at Munster, 12 August 1704 N.S.
they would appear as regular soldiers of the army and nothing else. The exact form and command of picquets varied. By one scheme, each wing of Horse would have a colonel, lieutenant-colonel and a major commanding its picquets, with the same ranks to command the picquets of the entirety of the Foot. In 1705, a camp order for the Foot listed the picquets' officers as comprising a colonel (who oversaw the picquets along the first line), a lieutenant-colonel (who did likewise for the second line), and a major, whose duty it was to pass reports from these officers to the major-general of the day. It was duty of the generals of the day—and none other—to call out the picquet under arms, or to change or reinforce the camp guards and outposts upon an alarm, or intelligence of the enemy's movement. They would also post any picquet of Horse that was to be drawn out and patrol at night, before returning at daybreak. The officers of the picquets would make their report the morning following their picquet.

Central to the security of the camp was the parole, or 'Word'. The parole was a word of security typically given by the general-in-chief; indeed, the very act of giving the parole symbolised a general's command over the army. The parole was changed daily; in the camp journal of the English Foot, the paroles noted were usually the names of towns and cities. Initially these were towns in the Low Countries, but from 25 May 1704 Marlborough's the army switched to using English towns and cities for the

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686 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 7: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 7 June 1703 N.S.
687 BL, Stowe MSS 469, f. 74-75b: undated general orders. By an order given of 1704, when Marlborough's army joined that of Baden's, the picquets of the duke's army rolled for that formation alone. The lieutenant-colonel of the Marlburian picquet would do his duty ahead first line; the major would place himself to the rear of the second line. Each man of the picquet carried powder and ball for twenty-four shots. Add. MSS 61404, f. 23: camp journal, 28 June 1704 N.S.
690 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 4b: camp journal, camp at Thys, 26 May 1703 N.S. According to the scheme presented in Stowe MSS 481, ff. 140b-141b, it was the duty of the colonel of the picquet of 'each nation' to make his report the following morning ('at the orderly time') at the general-in-chief's quarters. Complicating the issue was the daily officer of the 'Rounds', who was occasionally recorded in addition to the three field officers of the picquets. BL, Add. MSS 61404, ad passim. Contrastingly, other sources mention the colonel of the picquet making the 'grand round', typically before midnight, accompanied by a sergeant and four men. Stowe MSS 481, ff. 120-121, 140b-141b.
parole. Once Marlborough's army joined with that of Baden, two paroles began to be used: a town's name and a saint's name. Similar patterns continued throughout the war. It is doubtful that Marlborough's critics in England would have been pleased to hear that, the day after such a sanguine battle as Malplaquet, the paroles issued for 12 September had been St Jacques and Turin - in salute to the army's twin captains.

Without the camp, the security of the army was maintained by various posts appointed at key villages, river crossings and the like to secure the army's flank and its communications. In theory, the initial scheme for any outposts made by an army might be determined by the generals of the day, the quartermaster-general and the adjutant-general; it would then be passed to the generals of Horse and Foot, who would make any alterations as they thought appropriate. Once the locations of the posts, and the numbers of men and officers needed to secure them, were known, the lists would be passed to the major of brigade of the day of the corps that was to make the detachments. The major of brigade would form these parties, while the quartermaster-general would ensure that the guides conducted the detachments to these posts on at least the first occasion; and afterwards kept an orderly man with the major of brigade of the day; when a post was occupied, the officer in command there would send an 'expert soldier' back to the major of brigade of the day, who would stay at the staff officer's tent for any orders, or serve as guides for parties of relief. Outposts sited a fair distance from the camp were typically relieved every eight days; care was taken that the adjutant-general, or the generals of the day, sent to all outposts the countersign for use by their patrols, in writing and sealed, carried by an orderly trooper. Detached officers, such as those commanding posts on the army or overseeing the sick and wounded, would make their reports to the major-general of the day.

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691 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 17b: camp journal, 25 May 1704 N.S.
692 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 23: camp at Geingen, 27 June 1704 N.S.
693 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 120: camp journal. 'Jack' was a common diminution of John applied to Marlborough; Turin was the scene of Eugene's great triumph.
694 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 140: general rules to be observed in an army about outposts and other guards, and also the methods used in the army of Flanders for regulating duties in general in the army. Outposts close to the main camp were to be relieved at 8 a.m. Stowe MSS 481, f. 143. Method for the better dispatching in the distributing orders. Undated.
695 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 6b: camp journal, camp at Hanefte, 3 June 1703 N.S.
Foraging could be a particularly hazardous time for an army, when its elements were dispersed over a wide area of ground, without arms and under reduced discipline. Every attempt was made to safeguard the activity and prevent disorder (as much for the security of the army as the well-being of the local populace). A typical forage would involve two fundamental elements: the forage parties themselves, and a guard. The use of any wheeled carriages by the foragers would typically be forbidden. The quartermaster(s)-general, in conjunction with the captain of guides, would usually be given the task of reconnoitring the ground near, or in advance of, an army's camp or line of march for suitable places for forage. Having collected such knowledge, it would be his duty to advise the general officers of the posts best occupied for the security of the enterprise. The dispositions for forage would then be settled by the lieutenants- and majors-general of the day, together with the quartermaster-general. Its execution would be directed by a lieutenant-general, major-general of brigadier.

A typical foraging expedition ran as follows. On 21 May 1703, an order was given in camp to signify that foraging parties would be sent out the following morning, to collect supplies for three days. A body of 800 Foot, under Brigadier Webb, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton and Major Meade, would form at the head of Orkney's first battalion at the time of 3 a.m. This party would then move to secure the avenues and posts necessary to protect the foragers. The foragers themselves would form later: each battalion would send a number from its ranks to the head of their respective brigades at 6 a.m; once mustered, each brigade's foragers would be drawn up at the head of the Hessian grenadiers by 7 a.m. An officer of each battalion, and a captain from each brigade, would accompany the followers, to ensure they did no excessive mischief.

A few days later, a looser approach was prescribed: any brigades that needed forage might send an escort of their own with their forages, the escort not exceeding a captain, two subalterns and sixty men. Another example had each regiment contributing one
man per tent to a foraging party, with the whole being covered by a detachment of 250 men (commanded by a major, three captains, four lieutenants, four ensigns and twelve sergeants), who were also to respond to any disorders and ensure that the foragers entered no house or cemetery under any pretext whatsoever. Each regiment was to forage twice every eight days, grouped by nationality: the English on one day; the Danes and Hessians another; then the Dutch; and finally the Hanoverians.\textsuperscript{701}

The foragers would not be allowed to march out of the camp until given orders by the general officers of the day. Guides would be send to each line of the army, to the parade grounds where the foragers mustered, to conduct them to place(s) of forage. The signal for their return would usually be the firing of three cannon. Any foragers found without the guards would be taken up as robbers and deserters, and punished accordingly. In times of particularly stringent discipline, as occasioned by recent abuses and other disorderly behaviour, the foragers' 'trusses and tents' might be searched to check if they had brought any plunder into the camp.\textsuperscript{702}

Any forage collected was to be used for battalion subsistence only; it was not to be cut to be sold to any other party on pain of arrest, and the forage seized.\textsuperscript{703} If an army was specifically ordered to plunder and maraud, it was suggested that one line alone was to engage in such activities at any given time, and only one man out of each tent in that line was to maraud; no others were to stir out of the camp or their duties on pain of death.\textsuperscript{704}

A forage by the two lines of the right wing of Marlborough's army, to be made 2 July 1706 in the fields between the villages of Sarren and Hautsamen, was disposed as follows. The escort would consist of a thousand Foot and 160 Horse. The majority (650 Foot and 100 Horse) would be posted between the great guard on the right wing and

\textsuperscript{701} BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 25-25b: order against marauders, and for foraging. 1705.
\textsuperscript{703} BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 7b-8: camp journal, camp at Hanefte, 11 June 1703 N.S.
\textsuperscript{704} BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 149b-150: orders for straw and fuel, grazing and forage.
the village of Sarren, along the road, split into several groups; it would be so posted to
deter enemy sorties from the Bois de Hulst, as well as to keep the foragers in check.
The officers commanding the infantry would detach smaller parties to flanking posts,
with outlying sentinels, to continue communications with each other; the officers
commanding the cavalry would mount continuous patrols, so as to herd the forages
within their proper bounds. The foragers themselves would muster at 5 a.m. (three
hours after the escort had mustered) before General Wood’s regiment of Horse and
then march out, directed by the guards, the first line taking the lead.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 23-24b: memorial of the forage to be made 2 July. Camp at Roeselare, 30 June 1706 N.S. The forage escort comprised 2000 Foot and 200 Horse, which were posted as follows: 800 Foot to line the wood of Linthout, from the village of St Peters Woluwe until the high ground between Watermael and the abbey of Cambre; 300 Foot and more footmen between the said high ground and the abbey of Cambre; 500 Foot at the abbey of Cambre; 400 Foot between the abbey, Itterbeck and the road from Brussels; 100 Horse on the high ground between Watermael and the abbey; and 100 Horse on the plain between the village of Crainhem and the wood of Linthout. The officers at the posts desired mentioned would take care to not let any foragers pass without escort. The infantry and cavalry that would muster that evening at 11 pm behind the British dragoons camped on the right of the first line. The foragers themselves would gather at 5 am the following morning before their regiments, to march to the right of the first line. This copy of the order was one of several; it is marked ‘no. 5’.}

Further examples of foraging expeditions exist in Richard King’s papers.\footnote{E.g. KP I(i)/62. Dispositions for the Hanoverian and Prussian forage. 30 June 1708 N.S.}
Organized chaos or chaotic organization?

Controlling the battlefield

"I am exactly of your opinion that a Battle in Flanders would give much Satisfaction to Our People at home be the Even almost what it will; It must Some way or other turn to our Advantage for the English like nothing so well as Action & Blood for their Mony..."

Letter of James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Horse Guards, 13 July 1711 O.S.

That this provides the last (and least) chapter is a function of two issues. The first is that studies of tactical engagements dominate the historiography of the War of the Spanish Succession, not least the Anglophone and Marlburian corpus. This thesis has instead focused on the operational level of the war, and the various systems, customs and protocols used in the direction of the army. The second issue is that the skirmishes and battles of the war were in great part fluid, chaotic affairs. The primary mode of communication in a battle itself was verbal, of which no record remains other than anecdote. This reduces the amount of primary source material available. Furthermore, to this author's knowledge only one set of battle orders remains- for Malplaquet, in 1709. Comparatively, a greater number of sources exist for the manner in which the armies prepared for the investment of enemy fortresses, and the systems they employed in the management of the subsequent siege.

The Allied armies in the War of the Spanish Succession adopted a common form, typically composed of two or more lines, which might be organised into two wings, with infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the flanks. The fundamental building blocks of the army were its battalions of Foot and squadrons of Horse and/or Dragoons. The notional deployment drawn out in line of battle would be drawn out on

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707 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 96-97b: James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Horse Guards, 13 July 1711 O.S.
paper in an order of battle. The were carefully constructed, often with several iterations of work by diverse hands. The battalions and squadrons of the army would be distributed across a large sheet of paper, relative to their position in camp and/or the line of battle. Each battalion or squadron would first be sited by a provisional mark, such as a pinprick; later it would be covered by a quadrilateral, drawn in ink and often coloured by a light wash, to denote a specific corps or nationality, or simply provide a brighter aesthetic. These elements were bracketed according to their brigades, which, while not permanent entities, could achieve an element of longevity on the campaign. Further annotations might bracket brigades according to nationality or administrative heading (such as the English, Dutch or joint Anglo-Dutch establishments).

A wisdom of the time was that when minor detachments were made from an army, they were often formed from small parcels of soldiers taken from multiple sources, rather than a single battalion, for example, being detached whole. Given an equal number of men, an army composed of a larger number of slightly smaller battalions was almost certainly thought preferable to that comprising a smaller number of larger battalions. Though never explicitly stated, this is borne out continuously in the manner in which the army managed its detachments. Major detachments designed to engage in operations were composed of entire battalions and squadrons.

In one example, Cutts described the ‘two battalions’ needed at Ruermonde being made up of detachments from Hamilton’s, Ingoldsby’s and Marlborough’s regiments of Foot; Meredyth’s regiment, which supported this force, was to have its numbers made up by taking one hundred men apiece out of two detachments at Maastricht, or fifty men apiece out of four. Cutts also noted that Meredyth’s regiment, being a newly formed corps, should be placed in a garrison where the ‘exactness of the discipline’ and a ‘number of good examples of old Regiments’ would aid its military development. Each of these temporary battalions was to be commanded by a field officer, or the most senior captain.
In 1709, a welter of small detachments were made out of the battalions for various duties. Lumley was ordered to detach 36 men out of each British battalion (the Foot Guards and two battalions on the Maes excepted), with officers proportionable, which were to be disposed in several places (including 500 at the castle at Ghent, 256 at Courtrai and 72 at Ostend). Pascal was to send 400 men from the garrison of Brussels to Louvain, and a further 50 out of each Spanish battalion to Leeuwé. Württemberg was to take 36 out of each Danish battalion, sending 124 to Courtrai and 100 to Ostend; and similar numbers were to be detached by Bülow out of the Hanoverians (300 of which were to go to Lier, and 204 to Ath), the Hereditary Prince of Hesse out of the Hessians (to Oudenaarde), Schulenburg out of the Saxons (216 to Ath, 72 to Oudenaarde) and Lottum out of the Prussians (500 to Liège, 184 to Huy). The colonel commanding the regiment of Münster was likewise ordered to dispatch 36 men to Maastricht.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 115-116b: orders to detach out of battalions. Brussels, 11 June 1709 N.S.}

By that year, the size of the Allied armies was considerable; so much so, that the prospect of joining both the Anglo-Dutch-auxiliary army under Marlborough (104 battalions, 143 squadrons), and the Imperial army under Eugene (66 battalions, 140 squadrons) was impractical. If a temporary combination of both forces was necessary, Eugene’s corps would form the right wing (with both its wings of cavalry being deployed on the right), while Marlborough’s formed the left (with all its cavalry deployed likewise); the two corps of infantry would join in the centre. Detachments for a siege would be made by each corps \textit{pro rata} for the infantry; while the cavalry of one army or the other would be employed at the siege.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 146-147b: memorial on the subject of the formation of the two armies, The Hague, 25 April 1709 N.S.}

The latter provision is central to understanding how forces were apportioned for a siege. To serve at a siege could be highly dangerous; no corps was to be exposed more than was its share – and those that did could even expect a healthy remuneration. At the siege of Menin, those grenadiers that formed the point of the attack were to be given a half-crown each; their sergeants a crown.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 67-68: camp journal, before Menin, 18 August 1706 N.S.} Before Lille, in 1708, the wounded Prince Eugene of Savoy supposedly gave out a thousand pistoles to encourage the soldiers, while on the evening of 22 August 1711, when the trenches were opened...
before Bouchain, the massed attack by 66 battalions of the army—37 of the right wing, 29 of the left—was allowed as ‘Sieging Duty’ to the general officers, but not, unfortunately, the regiments.\(^{714}\)

Prior to any investment, the forces detached to besiege an enemy town or fortress would be carefully computed and selected from the battalions and squadrons available. This provision was the very picture of ecumenicality, as all were expected to share its labours in due proportion. For the siege of Aire (6 September to 8 November 1710 N.S.), for example, the forty battalions required were drawn from the armies in ratio to the nations’ commitments in a manner that might have taxed the less mathematically adept staff officer. Once the approximate demography of the army had been calculated, the fairest distribution was calculated to the last 146th and 148th.\(^{715}\)

In all cases the numbers of battalions and squadrons, and the numbers and qualities of general officers commanding them, would be settled first, before specific corps and individuals were chosen. The computation of these exact repartitions might fall to a major of brigade or other staff officer—during the siege of Bouchain, August-September 1711, Major William Congreve was tasked with detailing the posture of the right wing of the army.\(^{716}\)

The other sieges of the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries were similarly organised. At Huy in 1703, the besieging force drew eight battalions and six squadrons from Marlborough’s army, and four battalions and four squadrons from Ouwerkerk’s, to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Scholten, Major-General Wade

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\(^{714}\) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 28-29: Lalo to Brydges, before Lille, 24 September 1708 N.S. BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 145b: camp journal, camp at Avesnes-le-Secq, 22 August 1711 N.S.

\(^{715}\) KP I(ii)/14. Undated. See also KP I(i)/223: Repartition for the siege of Aire and St Venant. 1710. Eugene’s army was to furnish 20 battalions and 15 squadrons (6 Bns and 2 Sqns for St Venant; 14 Bns and 13 Sqns for Aire); Marlborough’s, 40 battalions and 30 squadrons (14 Bns and 4 Sqns for St Venant – of which each wing would give 7 Bns and 2 Sqns; 26 Bns and 26 Sqns for Aire – of which each wing would provide 13 Bns and 13 Sqns). For the right wing of Marlborough’s army, this was settled as 3 English battalions, 2 Prussian battalions and 2 Hanoverian battalions, 1 Prussian squadron and 1 Hanoverian squadron for St Venant; and 5 English battalions, 5 Prussian battalions, 3 Hanoverian battalions, 3 English squadrons, 6 Prussian squadrons and 4 Hanoverian squadrons for the siege of Aire.

\(^{716}\) BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 146: camp journal, 24 August 1711 N.S. The siege had been underway a little over a fortnight.
and Brigadier Meredith, with another brigadier for the Horse. Seven years later, at Mons, the detachment was considerably larger and featured an inflated command structure: the Prince of Orange, accompanied by two lieutenants-general (Rantzau and Dönhoff), six majors-general and six brigadiers of Foot, commanding thirty battalions; and a lieutenant-general, two majors-general and three brigadiers of horse, commanding thirty squadrons.

For the siege of Bethune, 17 July to 29 August 1710 N.S., the repartition dictated that the right wing of Marlborough's army would supply eight battalions and six squadrons, under the command of a lieutenant-general (the Prussian, Finck), a major-general (Gilbert Primrose) and two brigadiers (one of which was Orrery); while the left wing would provide nine battalions and six squadrons, under a similar complement of general officers. One lieutenant-general (emended from a major-general; Cornelius Wood) and a brigadier would command the above squadrons; a further six squadrons detached from Eugene's army, under the command of a major-general, would also be subordinate to Wood. The siege as a whole would consist of two attacks: one by the detachment from Marlborough's army, under General Fagel; the other by Eugene's forces, under General Schulenburg.

The investing detachment at Bouchain consisted of twenty battalions under the orders of a General of Infantry, who would be aided by two lieutenants-general, four majors-general and four brigadiers of Foot. A force of twelve squadrons of cavalry, under a major-general and two brigadiers, provided mounted support. The generals would direct the soldiers from the point of muster to the siege; the general-in-chief would also have care to ensure that posts such as the village of Aubigny were occupied for the investing forces security, and to destroy nearby bridges over the Sansette and canal.

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717 BL, Stowe MSS 469, f. 10: Michael Richards' diary, 6 July 1705 N.S. The reference to 'Wade' is confusing; it is certainly not the famous 'George Wade' who served on the Iberian peninsula.
718 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 122: camp journal, camp at the abbey of Belian, 18 September 1709 N.S.
719 Three were British: Orrery's, Newton's and Evans's.
720 The camp journal (see n. 4, below) lists two majors-general.
from Arleux. Yvoy served as the quartermaster-general at the siege and was responsible for marking the lines of circumvallation.\textsuperscript{722}

Some sieges called for multiple attacks, which were decided in the same manner. For the siege of Douai (23 April to 25 June 1710 N.S.), the officers for the siege were determined on 1 May, a day before the battalions were chosen. Each of the two attacks—one on the right towards the Port de Grechin, under Leopold von Anhalt-Dessau; the other on the left towards the Port d'Ocre, under the Prince of Orange—was apportioned two lieutenants-general, four majors-general, four brigadiers and twenty battalions (half Dutch, a quarter British, a quarter Hanoverian). Orange's subordinates consisted of lieutenants-general Orkney and Dohna; majors-general Willem van Wassenaer, Johan Rabo van Keppel, Frederik Vegelin van Claerbergen and George Macartney; and Gilbert Primrose among the other brigadiers.\textsuperscript{723}

The actual attacks mounted could be planned and disposed with the same degree of equality and fairness.

The initial plans for the investment of Tournai dictated that Marlborough and Eugene would oversee the siege alternately; the three generals of Foot of the investing armies (Lottum, Fagel and Schulenburg) would each command one of the main attacks. Beneath the generals would be the investing battalions—of which the British would provide seven: two of Orkney's, and Argyll's, Temple's, Evans's, Meredyth's and Prenderghast's. The British would also provide two lieutenants-general (Withers and Argyll), one major-general (Temple) and two brigadiers (Primrose and Sabine). Of the other nationalities of the right wing of Marlborough's army, the Prussians would provide one lieutenant-general, major-general and brigadier; and the Hanoverians one brigadier.\textsuperscript{724} While Argyll and Sabine would accompany Schulenburg's attack, Withers, Temple and Primrose would be under the Prussian, Lottum. They were joined by four

\textsuperscript{722} BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 226-227b: disposition for the siege of Bouchain, 9 August 1711 N.S.

\textsuperscript{723} BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 127-127b: camp journal, before Douai, 3 May 1710 N.S. This disposition varies somewhat from that originally planned on 28 April, of which a copy is at KP I(i)/184 (dated 28 April 1710 N.S.). The initial plan noted that the two attacks would comprise one of 30 battalions (commanded by a general of infantry, four lieutenants-general, four majors-general and four brigadiers) and one of 20 battalions (commanded by a lieutenant-general, four majors-general and four brigadiers).

\textsuperscript{724} BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 111-111b: camp journal, camp at Willemeeau, 29 June 1709 N.S.
further Prussians (Lieutenant-General Finck, Major-General Dönhoff and Brigadiers Borch and Grambeau), three Dutch generals (Lieutenant-General Van Heiden and Major-General Vegelin) and one Hanoverian (Brigadier Gauvain).

The sixty-two battalions detached for the siege were cycled according to a rota, over twelve nights of duty. Each battalion was to serve once in the first six nights, and once in the second six nights. For Lottum’s attack this took the following form, with four battalions doing duty each night: an English, Danish, Saxon and Hessian battalion on the first night; an Imperial, Palatine, Württemberger and Dutch battalion on the second night; a Prussian, Danish, Saxon and Dutch battalion on the third night; an English, Hessian and two Dutch battalions on the fourth night; an English, Dutch and two Prussian battalions on the fifth night; and a Danish, Hessian and two Dutch battalions of the sixth night. This was truly multinational warfare.\(^{725}\)

Not that the dispositions agreed were necessarily amicable to all participants. In the winter of 1708, Lottum, who commanded the Allied siege of Ghent, remonstrated with the Hereditary Prince of Hesse over his corps’ endeavours in the enterprise. The Hessians had sent a battalion to take their nation’s turn in the trenches; but for the ‘rude’ work and other engineering preparations, the prince could find no relief. Lottum pressed for the five battalions of Hessians Marlborough had earmarked for the attack to set aside their issues and join his corps.\(^{726}\)

A siege required a considerable amount of ordnance, ammunition and other materiel. Cardonnel’s tally of the articles necessary for the siege of Huy in 1703 included 42 pieces of cannon (30 of 24 lbs; 12 of 12 lbs), 10 mortars with 10 ‘howitzers’, 15,000 24-lb cannon balls and 5,000 12-lb cannon balls, 2,500 bombs and 2,500 grenades for the howitzers, 3 or 4,000 grenades for the grenadiers, and 200,000 lbs of powder.\(^{727}\) Transporting such an arsenal was a mammoth task: for the proposed siege of Saarlouis, in 1705, it was estimated that 11,860 horses would be needed to draw the artillery from

\(^{725}\) KP I(i)/125. Disposition for the attacks on the town and citadel of Tournai. 3 July 1709 N.S. The sixty-two battalions comprised as follows: 23 Dutch (18 from Marlborough’s army, 5 from Eugene’s), 7 English, 7 Prussian, 5 Hanoverian, 5 Palatine, 4 Hessian, 3 Imperial, 3 Danish, 3 Saxon, 2 Württemberger. Though the orders often refer to 60 battalions, the individual components amount to 62. See also KP I(i)/128.

\(^{726}\) BL, Add. MSS 61231, ff. 130-131b: Lottum to Marlborough, 28 December 1708 N.S.

\(^{727}\) BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 181-182b: dispositions for the siege of Huy. 1703.
Trarbach to the site of investment, allowing for a load of 300 lb per horse. The army could not supply such a number of beasts of burden, so multiple journeys would be required. A total of three thousand horses departing the army would need to make a total of four trips to Trarbach and back; at a dozen days per 'turn', this would require 48 days' preparation to get the artillery ready for the siege. 728

Such materiel was not always readily available. At Venlo, Menno van Coehoorn complained to his fellow engineer, Holcroft Blood, that the States' assurances and guarantees had left much to be desired. They had promised him eighty cannon and told him several times that everything had been dispatched, but he'd found only twenty-two guns complete, with the rest wanting carriages, or lying elsewhere within Flanders. He had but three-thousand tools, few bombs and little other ammunition. Opening the siege at that time was foolish; Blood, who'd originally thought that the delay might have been a caprice of Coehoorn's temper, was in complete agreement. 729

Engineers themselves could be in short supply also, on account of the perils of the service. Writing of the siege of Lille, the merchant Jacob Hallungius noted that the besiegers wanted a master and some 'subaltern' engineers - for from the seventy-four that began the siege they had no more than fifteen able for service, the rest being casualties. 730 This perhaps renders Marlborough's criticisms of the previous week a little harsh, when he complained of the ill conduct and misbehaviour of the army's engineers, and their poor dealings with the commander of the siege, Prince Eugene. 731

728 BL, Add. MSS 61335, ff. 32-33b: account of the horses necessary to draw the artillery from Trarbach to Saarlouis. 1705. The exact requirements were calculated as follows: 80 cannon - 2100 horses; 50,000 24 lb cannon balls, at 300 lb a horse - 4000 horses; powder - 2000 horses; ten great mortars - 170 horses; ten small mortars - 90 horses; 300 rounds for the big mortars - 1300 horses; 500 rounds for the small mortars - 600 horses; 200,000 more charges of powder for bombs &c. - 700 horses; working tools - 100 horses; timber and iron, for constructing platforms - 300 horses; ten thousand 6 lb bales - 200 horses; various small shot and grenades for the infantry - 300 horses.

The distance from Trier to Saarlouis was shorter: estimated at seven days per 'turn', or 28 days in total, if the artillery could be dispatched there by barge, for example. The operation was eventually cancelled due to an inability to co-ordinate with the Imperial forces. Snyder, i, no. 462, pp. 447-448: Marlborough to Godolphin, Dreyborn, 24 June 1705 N.S.

729 BL, Add. MSS 61306, ff. 35-36b: Blood to Marlborough, before Venlo, 28 August 1702 N.S.

730 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 61-62: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 5 October 1708 [N.S.]

But whatever their capacities, engineers provided the most critical human resource at a siege, for no others understood the esoteric art of siegecraft, and the learning it entailed. Little wonder that in 1706, at the siege of Menin, the orders of the day for the army noted that "all the officers who Command the Work are to Obey the Engineers." 732

A critical event in the progress of the siege—particularly with reference to the general officers of the army—was the ‘breaking of ground’, when the army began to cut its trenches—often under heavy fire. It was a dangerous time; Cadogan was struck by a musket ball in the neck when the army broke ground at Mons, on 25 September 1709, while aide-de-camp, Thomas Foxon, was mortally wounded. John Marshall Deane recorded that the "the enemy did feirsely oppose them, and did beett our folkes 2 or 3 times from there works—but at length our folks beet them in againe, and abundance of men was killed on both sides & likewise abundance wounded." 733 Henry St John remarked:

I was very much concern’d to hear of Mr. Cadogan’s wound, & surpris’d at ye occasion wth he recd it, Since I had imagined his employments & business very remote from that sort of service. 734

As is not infrequently the case with St John, it is difficult to assess the degree of sarcasm with which he wrote.

When breaking ground, the investing forces would supply a mixed number of men with tools and arms, the first to dig the trenches, the latter to cover them. At Ath in 1706, Ouwerkerk’s initial attacks at the opening of the trenches consisted of two prongs: each led by a major-general and brigadier, with 300 coverers, 600 workmen

1104-1105: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Lannoy], 27 September 1708 N.S. Marlborough thought the engineers had communicated poorly with Eugene—who had been wounded—for when he told the prince that there was not powder or ball for above four days, Eugene was much surprised.

732 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 66-66b: camp journal, before Menin, 13 August 1706 N.S.


734 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, pp. 237-238: St John to Brydges, Bucklebury, 6 October 1709 O.S.
and two battalions to sustain them. A further two battalions and one-hundred horse
were held as a reserve, and Lieutenant-General Ingoldsby commanded the whole. In
order to deceive the enemy, a lieutenant and thirty men were ordered to make a
diversion at the same place the French had attacked when they took the town, making
a great deal of noise, harassing their pickets, and so on - a tactic that was wholly
successful.35

At the siege of Douai, the enterprise involved the general officers of the day for
Marlborough's besieging army, who reported to the Prince of Orange. Those appointed
for 4 May—the Earl of Orkney, Major-General Wassenaer and Brigadier Primrose—
commanded and supervised at the opening of the trenches that evening. Orkney left
the attack at the break of day on 5 May, it being stated that lieutenants-general were
not allowed to remain in the trenches (though they continued to visit them daily and
review the works, in turn); he devolved his command upon Major-General Wassenaer.
In the days following, the majors-general of the day of the besieging force commanded
the trenches as their duty. They would be relieved each evening at 6 p.m., by their
successor for that day.36 Involving the general officers of the day in trench-duty,
however, deprived them to some degree of the freedom intended in their office. On 11
May it was thus decided that generals not active in the trenches would thenceforth
'take the orders for the day'.37

Similar modes of relief were put in place for the two attacks on Menin. The attack on
the right was overseen by Lieutenant-General Schultz738 (sic), Major-General Eberfeldt
and Brigadier Capol739, and consisted of the Prussian Guards, and Slangenburg and
Prince Charles' regiments of Foot; that on the left was commanded by the Earl of
Orkney, Major-General Rantzau and Brigadier Amama740, with battalions from Webb's,
Heukelom's and Rantzau's regiments of Foot. Once the ground had been successfully

35 KP I(i)/21. Part of Richard King's journal of the siege of Ath. 1706. See also I(i)/25 for a plan
that accompanies King's description.

36 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 127b: camp journal, before Douai, 4 May 1709 N.S. BL, Add. MSS
61404, ff. 127b-128: camp journal, before Douai, 5 May 1709 N.S.

37 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 128b: camp journal, before Douai, 11 May 1709 N.S.

38 Most probably Scholten, the Danish lieutenant-general.

39 Hercules de Capol (1642-1706). A physician, and since 1702 colonel of a regiment in Dutch
service. He was killed at the siege of Menin.

40 Joachim van Amama (1657-1720). A Dutch officer; brigadier since 1702.

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broken and secured, the trenches that evening would be relieved by Majors-General Wecke and Vilat, and Brigadiers Swetiel and the Duke of Argyll.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61183, ff. 166-167b: Salisch to Marlborough, camp before Menin, 5 August 1706 N.S. Veenendaal, Briefwisseling, v, no. 858 pp. 450-451: Salisch to Heinsius, camp before Menin, 5 August 1706 N.S.}

Graf Lottum’s plans for the attack on Ghent provided for a regular relief of the men as well as the general officers. Five-hundred workmen, mustering at 3 p.m., would make an initial lodgement for the attack before the gate of St Pierre; they would be relieved the next day at 6 a.m. by four hundred others. A further three-hundred workmen would muster on the parade at 3 p.m., to aid the artillery; they would be relieved by one-hundred men at 6 a.m. the following morning. That next day, two-hundred men were also earmarked to rest for 24 hours, before assisting the cannoniers and the bombardiers in the heavy work. The majors of brigade were to give a list of the infantry officers commanding the workmen who were to aid the artillery, so that the officers of the latter could distinguish between the workmen under their control, and other soldiers; they were also to oversee the proper distribution of all the gabions and fascines that had been constructed.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61231, ff. 132-133b: dispositions for the attack on Ghent, Camp at Swynaerde, 28 December 1708 N.S.}

During the siege of Bouchain, the three regiments that mounted the trenches daily were split between the right and left wings – two from one and one from the other, alternating daily, and cycling through the army.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 145b: camp journal, camp at Avesnes-le-Secq, 22 August 1711 N.S.}

At Ghent, as at other sieges, general and staff officers were appointed to specific roles in the siege. Lottum chose three Generals of the Trenches for his enterprise—Lieutenant-General Fagel, Major-General the Duke of Argyll and Brigadier Grumeke—in much the same way as the general officers of the day served in that capacity for Orange, before Douai.\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61231, ff. 132-133b: dispositions for the attack on Ghent, Camp at Swynaerde, 28 December 1708 N.S.}

Of particular import was the major of the trenches. At Menin, each of the two main attacks possessed its own major of the trenches: Major Berrs at General Sholts’ attack; and Major Brockhausen\footnote{Possibly Wolter Jan van Broekhuisen (1676-1732), a major in Keppel’s Dutch regiment of Foot.} at the Earl of Orkney’s. Both officers were to post the covering forces, fifty paces in front of the workmen; each covering platoon would have

\footnote{BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 145b: camp journal, camp at Avesnes-le-Secq, 22 August 1711 N.S.}

\footnote{Possibly Wolter Jan van Broekhuisen (1676-1732), a major in Keppel’s Dutch regiment of Foot.}
a small party deployed in front of it, and a single sentinel in point in advance of those, 'on his belly'. At Ghent, the majors of the trenches were also tasked with other minor details; while at Bouchain, the majors of the trenches would report to a brigadier, who was appointed to oversee the trenches each night.

Lord Cutts' precipitous attack on the Fort of St Michel before Venlo, in 1702, provides an interesting counterpoint to some of the more methodical attacks noted above. While the initial design had been but to clear the covered way of the fort, so that the workmen could make their lodgement in security, Cutts entreated his officers to pursue the defenders if they thought fit, and let the attack play out as it would. Robert Parker, who would take part in the assault on the glacis, thought Cutts' orders "rash... contrary both to the rules of war, and the design of the thing."

Cutts' initial command structure was inflated by a gamut of thrill-seekers. In addition to Brigadier Frederick Hamilton (leading the Royal Regiment of Ireland—to which Parker belonged—and Willem van Heukelom's regiment of Dutch Foot, together with 172 grenadiers, 100 fusiliers and 300 workmen) and Colonel Holcroft Blood (commanding the engineers), his headquarters was weighed down with 'voluntiers of Distinction': men such as the George Hastings, the young earl of Huntingdon; John Campbell, later the duke of Argyll but then still the marquess of Lorne; the Prince d'Auvergne; John Dalrymple, then master of Stair; Sir Richard Temple, Bt; and Colonel John Richmond Webb. The Crown Prince of Hanover, the future George II, also passed the night with Cutts in the trenches before the attack, and then 'behaved with a great deal of gallantry'.

The Salamander told his the grenadiers that, as soon as he saw fifty of their number atop the ravelin, he would sacrifice himself and all the troops to sustain them—and they should push on with all assurance if they found it possible to continue, promising various rewards in Her Majesty's name to those that distinguished themselves. And so,

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746 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 64: camp journal, before Menin, 4 August 1706 N.S.
747 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 145b-146: camp journal, before Bouchain, 23 August 1711 N.S. Add. MSS 61231, ff. 128-129b: Lottum’s dispositions for the attack before Ghent, 29 December 1708 N.S.
748 Parker, op. cit., p. 72.
749 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 13-14b: (Lord Cutts') relation of the attack on the Fort of St Michel, 18 September 1702 N.S.
when the signal for the attack—the detonation of a tun of powder, and the discharge of all the cannon and mortars—was made, on rushed the soldiers, "like mad-men without fear or wit". The attack was a complete success, as the garrison was taken off-guard by the speed and ferocity of the assault and soon surrendered.\textsuperscript{750}

Parker dismissively noted that Cutts did not leave the trenches until the attack was over, but the same could not be said for Holcroft Blood, who was, it seems, a willing accomplice; a kindred spirit. While it was supposed to be he who was to have the dignity and duty of securing the lodgement on the fort, he displayed no evident chagrin when Cutts changed the battle to his own tempo. Indeed, when the Blood saw that the major-general had 'quitted [the original] design'—to use Cutts' own neutral description of the affair—he "acted the Part of a good Officer charging with the Men Sword [in] Hand, & Killing an Officer of Granadiers who made a very vigorous Defence with his Party."\textsuperscript{751}

Cutts' English soldiers suffered two captains and two lieutenants wounded; an ensign killed and three wounded; a sergeant killed and six wounded; and thirty soldiers killed and 132 wounded. His own aide-de-camp, Captain Rolas, and another English volunteer, Mr Cley, were killed on the spot.\textsuperscript{752}

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Set-piece battles were a good deal rarer than sieges in the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries. The first major engagement that the English participated in, at Donauwörth on 2 July 1704, is particularly interesting as it involved, beyond Louis of Baden's conventional battalia, a picked force or special detachment of infantry drawn from Marlborough's army. This is what Deane referred to as the 'Fforlorne Hope', consisting of '10 men of a company throughout the army'.\textsuperscript{753}

Specifically, the orders called for the general officers of the day (the Dutchman Lieutenant-General Johan Wijnand van Goor, and the Hanoverian officers Major-
General de Luc and Brigadier Barthold von Bernsdorff, together with Brigadier Hulsen, six colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors to lead a force comprised of 130 men taken from each battalion (with two captains and other officers in proportion). Of the 130 men taken from each regiment, ten—the grenadiers—were to be armed with two grenades apiece from the train. The picked men were to be mustered at the head of their regiments by 2 a.m. on the morning of 2 July, and their march would be covered by 37 squadrons of cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-General Lumley, three majors-general and three brigadiers.

In comparison, the other engagements of the war were largely conventional. Oudenaarde was in some ways an exception, as it was an 'encounter battle' and is particularly notable in the way in which it thrust the early, critical responsibility of prosecuting the engagement on a detachment that had been made to secure a crossing over the Scheldt, and was led by an experienced staff officer but tactical novice—Cadogan. Facing the rapidly rousing army of Burgundy and Vendôme, the quartermaster-general commanded an estimated sixteen battalions of foot (of which four were initially guarding the pontoon bridges), including Webb's, Ingoldsby's, Sabine's, Meredith's, Orrery's and Evans' British battalions, and eight squadrons.

754 The standard English battalion of Foot consisted of thirteen companies; hence Deane's reference to ten men per company—though the orders did not specify this.

755 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 23b: camp journal, camp at Amerlinge, 1 July 1704 N.S. See also Wijn, VIII, i, pp. 745-747: Relatie van d'attaquo op den Schellenberg and Murray, i, pp. 332-338.

756 Sources for the size of Cadogan's initial command vary considerably: excluding ancillary forces, Hare (p. 140) notes that he possessed eight squadrons and sixteen battalions, and Coxe (i, p. 255) agrees, mentioning '16 battalions, consisting of the brigades of Sabine, Plettenburg and Evans; and eight squadrons of the dragoons of Bulau, Leibregement [sic], and Schulemburg... and 32 pieces of artillery'; Deane (op. cit., pp. 58-9) '15 battalions of foot & 30 squadrons of horse and 24 pieces of cannon'; Atkinson 'fifteen squadrons, twelve battalions, thirty-two guns' (op. cit., p. 336), and is followed in this by Barnett (op. cit., p. 206); Trevelyan 'a dozen battalions chiefly of British infantry, and eight squadrons of Hanoverian dragoons' (ii, p. 357); Chandler (Military Commander, p. 214), with '16 battalions, 8 squadrons, 32 regimental guns', follows Hare and Coxe, as do Frank Taylor (The Wars of Marlborough, 1702-1709 (Oxford, 1921), 2 volumes: ii, p. 129) and Ivor F. Burton (The Captain-General (London, 1968), p. 125).

Mentions of twelve battalions can be reconciled with a confusion over the fact that Cadogan only initially took such a number into action (leaving four to guard the pontoons); 'fifteen' is near enough, and Chandler himself notes that '11 battalions [of Cadogan's advanced guard] had advanced to the line of the River Diepenbeck' (rather than the expected twelve, following his numerical base; Military Commander, p. 214). It would seem that Deane's reference to thirty squadrons represents the combined forces of Rantzau's eight Hanoverian squadrons and
Cadogan may have had little experience in tactical command, but his staff duties appear to have provided him with a decent judgement of the applications of terrain and movement - qualities that can be at a premium in such an engagement. He reacted quickly to Vendôme’s abandonment of Biron’s outlying position at Eyne and Heurne, and secured these posts safely, his free left flank guarded by Rantzau’s horse. With the movements of Vendôme and quiescence of Burgundy, Cadogan’s dispositions were switched under Marlborough’s guidance. As Natzmer’s and Rantzau’s horse moved to occupy the open ground by the Scheldt, north of Eyne and Heurne, the brigades of Cadogan would move to oppose the French foot in the broken ground by the Marollebeck and Diepenbeck, by the villages of Groenewald and Herlegem. His battle, though crucial to the success of the day, became little more than a protracted and desperate firefight amidst hedges, houses and defiles, against a French line superior in numbers. Yet his battalions held on, later under Eugene’s oversight, as Marlborough first battled to save Cadogan’s initially open left flank and then sent such timely reinforcements in Lottum and Lumley, and by the end of the evening regained the offensive as the Dutch presaged victory on the Allied left.

The antithesis of Oudenaarde as a battle is that of Malplaquet, 11 September 1709, where the Allied and French armies had faced each other for one-and-a-half days before moving to a general engagement. This allowed the Allies plenty of time to consider their options in attacking the French positions; indeed the only surviving battle orders in the Blenheim Papers are those for the attacks at Malplaquet. It is instrumental to compare these against the recorded events of the day, but only briefly so - as the earliest Allied movements on 11 September are in complete concord with the orders as given.

Three separate orders were given out the day prior to the battle: a disposition for the attack of the left wing, largely consisting of Dutch forces; a disposition for the attack of

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Natzmer’s twenty Prussian squadrons, which were hurried forward at an early stage by Marlborough to give Cadogan further support; the ‘fifteen squadrons’ of Atkinson and Barnett are more problematic.

757 Hare, op. cit., pp. 141-2. Vendôme had come to reinforce Biron’s detachment, but being informed (by a certain M. Puységur) that Biron was fronted by a morass, he passed to the west, and at approximately 3pm Cadogan threw all of his battalions and squadrons into an attack. Three enemy battalions were captured, one destroyed by Rantzau’s cavalry, and a further three put to flight. See Churchill, ii, pp. 361-5 and Deane, op. cit., p. 59.
the right wing, consisting of British and auxiliary formations; and a disposition for the
attack of the largely Imperial army of Eugene. Each set of orders, copied by clerks, was
numbered. Minor variations exist between some of the orders contained in the King
Papers and the Blenheim Papers, but there is general uniformity of structure and
content.

The attack of the left wing, under the Prince of Orange, was to be prosecuted by the
Dutch infantry. They were ordered to attack the French lines in front of the Wood of
Tiry, using as many battalions as the terrain would allow, arranged in three or four
lines. It would be the generals' duty to ensure the lines were properly spaced and not
too close, such that a battalions would be able to pass to provide support to, or relieve,
the attackers. The extreme left of the attack would be carried by five or six battalions,
which were tasked with attacking the grenadiers that covered the French right flank, to
the right of the Chausée Brunehaut; they would be supported to their right by a further
six to eight battalions, who were to hold the enemy so that they could not reinforce
their colleagues.

The large-calibre guns would be placed in batteries to bombard the entrenchments of
the enemy; the smaller cannon would march with the brigades, and be used as
opportunities allowed. Once the infantry had forced the enemy from its trenches, it
was not to enter into the plain beyond, but post itself to the rear of the French
fortifications – where the generals would take care to make openings through which
the cavalry could pass, so that Foot and Horse alike could then form themselves in
mutual support on the plain. The generals would be partitioned among the formations;
each was to take his post in the first, second, third and fourth lines. Twenty-one
squadrons of cavalry, arrayed in two lines, would support the infantry attack; the
remainder of the Horse would be posted in such a manner that they had the ability to
move to the right or the left, or follow the first twenty-one squadrons to support the
infantry in the plain.758

758 BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 158-159b: disposition for the attack of the left wing, 10 September
1709 N.S. KP I(i)/84. Disposition for the attack of the left wing, made at Blaregnies, 10
September 1709 N.S.
The initial attack of the right wing was to comprise eight British battalions commanded by the Duke of Argyll, which were to attack the French formations in the south-eastern reaches of the Wood of Sars. Argyll would be supported by a further eight Prussian battalions, who would in turn be sustained by six Hanoverian battalions. This entire thrust was to be commanded by the Prussian General of Infantry, Count Lottum. A major-general of both the Prussian and Hanoverian corps would march with this detachment.

The remaining infantry of the right wing was ordered to advance to the left of Lottum's detachment, and to the right of the infantry of the left wing, assaulting the enemy entrenchments between the woods of Sars and Tiry. The generals were to take great care that no space was left between the infantry of the two wings, nor between Lottum's corps and the infantry to his left.

The main body of the cavalry of the right wing was ordered to march in two columns (that of the first line on the right, and the second on the left), which would advance as the infantry cleared the enemy positions, ready to deploy upon the plain beyond. Thirty squadrons commanded by the Prince d'Auvergne would follow the infantry of the right wing in two columns, forming themselves to the left of the main body of cavalry on the plain. The attack would commence at the start of the day, if possible, and would be signalled by a discharge of all the British artillery, which would be responded to by all the Dutch artillery.759

Eugene's orders stated that his infantry was to form in three lines and attack the French positions in the Wood of Sars between the enemy's extreme left and its formations facing Lottum. The Imperial cavalry, in two columns, was to support

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759 BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 162-163b: disposition for the attack of the right wing, made at Blargennes, 10 September 1709 N.S.

Richard King's papers contain two orders for the attack of the right wing at Malplaquet. One (KP I(i)/85) is the same as that contained in the Blenheim Papers. The other (KP I(i)/83) notes several differences. Firstly, the battalions of Lottum's attack in this order were not split into lines by nationality; in this scheme, for example, Prussian battalions accompanied English soldiers in the first line (under Argyll), while Orrery's battalion was in the second line. The general officers commanding the first line were to be Lieutenant-General the Duke of Argyll, Major-General Tettau and Brigadier Cronne [the Crown Prince?]; Lieutenant-General Webb, Major-General Ghoer and Brigadier du Bruil would command the second line; and Brigadiers Trusselle and Orrery would over see the third line.
Marlborough's army, forming itself to that body's right upon the plain beyond the entrenchments. Given the increased distance Eugene's army had to cover, its infantry was to begin its march an hour before the break of day. The detachment of two-thousand men under Count Dönhoff, from Mons, was to be posted on the right of the first line of Eugene's infantry.\textsuperscript{760}

On the evening of 10 September, the Allied soldiers were ordered to pray at 4 a.m. the following morning for good success, and the orders were sent out.\textsuperscript{761} A thick fog enveloped the battlefield until 6 a.m., allowing the Allies to make their initial dispositions unnoted, though it was about 7 a.m. before the army marched to attack, and 8 a.m. before the battle began in earnest.\textsuperscript{762} The earl of Orkney, who commanded the infantry to Lottum's left, fulfilled his role well, keeping his communications with the Prussian and sending two battalions (one of Guards, one of his own regiment) on his own initiative to secure the flank of the attack in the wood and defeat a French thrust that had sought to infiltrate there.\textsuperscript{763} Though the Allies were ultimately successful, no amount of planning or careful orders could obviate the fact that theirs was a frontal attack upon an enemy that they had allowed to entrench for two days, with grim consequences.

Orkney provides one of the most insightful commentaries on another battle, that of Blenheim on 13 August 1704. Although there are no battle orders for this engagement, the earl's letter to John, Lord Hervey in the aftermath of the battle provides an interesting depiction of the degree to which the general officers of the army concerted their actions outside of the influence of the general-in-chief, Marlborough. When Orkney and Ingoldsby moved their battalions of Foot to support the attacks of Cutts and Churchill on the village of Blenheim, they held a mini-conference in the field with the local cavalry commanders: Lumley, who led the Horse supporting Cutts' initial attack; and the hereditary prince of Hesse and Hompesch, who commanded the second line of cavalry in the centre. The generals agreed that while the Foot of Ingoldsby and

\textsuperscript{760} BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 160-161b: disposition for the attack of the army of Eugene, made at Blaregnies, 10 September 1709 N.S.

\textsuperscript{761} BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 119r: camp journal, on its arms at Blariginies, 10 September 1709 N.S.


\textsuperscript{763} BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 119b-120. Cra’ster, p. 319.
Orkney assaulted the village, the Horse would secure their flank by engaging the enemy's cavalry. This done, and his troops deployed, Orkney then went to concert with Churchill, asking that the battalions of Cutts attacked at the same time as Orkney's and Ingoldsby's. All this was organised on the generals' own initiative, and proved a success.\textsuperscript{764}

During and after the battle for the village of Blenheim the generals' aides-de-camp would prove of considerable import. Cutts' aide-de-camp, for example, would ride with dispatch to Lumley, to secure five squadrons of Horse to cover the Foot's flank; while the aide of Orkney would be employed in negotiating the surrender of the enemy corps inside Blenheim, and liaising with Cutts on that very matter.\textsuperscript{765} Aides-de-camp would also play a significant part at the battle of Ramillies, on 23 May 1706, William Cadogan himself would find employment as a battlefield aide in the engagement, and some controversy. As the earl of Orkney's attack across the Nebel struggled on amid difficult terrain and considerable opposition—"a great deal of fire... both musquetry and canon; and indeed I think I never had more shot about my ears"—and was on the crux of gaining the villages of Offus and Autre-Église, he was attended by no fewer than ten aides-de-camp, sent to ask him to desist and retire, "for the horse could not sustain [him]". It was Cadogan that was seemingly dispatched as a final cog to engineer and explain the reasons for Orkney's retreat, for the aid of his formation and the larger picture. As Orkney explained:

\begin{quotation}
Cadogan came and told me it was impossible I could be sustained by the horse if we went on then, and since my Lord [Marlborough] could not attack everywhere, he would make the grand attack in the centre and try to pierce there, which, I bless God, succeeded.\textsuperscript{766}
\end{quotation}

Though earl was hardly overjoyed at such an intervention—"I confess it vexed me to retire," he wrote—he effected his retreat 'very well and in good order', and ultimately moved to support operations in the centre, to the victory of the Allies and his overall approbation. Yet not all officers welcomed the interference in the direction of affairs on the Allied right, and several speculated that it was not the captain-general's doing. The

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{764}{Cra'ster, pp. 308-309.}
\footnotetext{765}{Murray, i, p. 403. Cra'ster, pp. 310-311.}
\footnotetext{766}{Cra'ster, p. 315.}
\end{footnotes}
then Lieutenant-Colonel Cranstoun was clear in his view of events, flatly stating that “Brigadier Cadogan came with orders as he pretended from the Duke, and obliged [Lord Orkney] to retire.” Cranstoun was certain in his own mind that, had the Allied right been allowed to continue their attack, the consequences of victory would have been the sweeter. He thus lamented:

It is suspected much the Duke really gave no orders to call Earl Orkney off, but that Cadogan having viewed the ground where we were to attack before at a distance, or perhaps rather relied too much on what is marked in his charts believed there was another ruisseau and morass betwixt us and the village of Offuz which would be impracticable, and upon that took it upon him in my Lord Duke’s name to call the troops back.767

Such an action did not endear Cadogan to several of the English and Scots officers engaged. Had Cadogan’s increasing sense of his role in the Allied headquarters and personal inclinations exceeded his authority, admittedly with a view to adapting to the circumstances, but in a wholly mistaken manner? Marlborough expressed considerable umbrage at the mere thought of such a charge, not least through the assertion that his perquisites of command had been infringed. Writing to the junior (or ‘northern’) Secretary of State, Robert Harley, the duke irascibly noted of Cranstoun’s mail, which had been made known to him:

That part in which he mentions Cadogan, he is very much in the wrong, for if those troops had not been brought back they must have been cut to pieces.768

The dismissiveness of the Duke’s reply hints at the falsity of the claim, for such short exchanges were common outcomes of his privately expressed ire, all the clearer when referenced against Marlborough’s tendency to construct more apologetically verbose and considered explanations for what might be considered his failures.769 Marlborough

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767 HMC, 52, Portland MSS., iv, p. 186: Cranstoun to Cunningham, Camp at Roeselare, 21 June 1706 N.S.
768 Historical Manuscripts Commission, 58, Bath MSS., i, p. 96: Marlborough to Harley, 30 August 1706 N.S.
769 It is commonly asserted that Cadogan was instrumental in forcing the retirement of Orkney’s forces from across the little Gheete; certainly this is what is professed by the chagrined Cranstoun, and Cadogan is largely conflated with the ADCs (anywhere from two to eleven, variably including Cadogan himself; see also n. 77, below) in the various narratives of Trevelyan, Chandler and Taylor, among others. However, the grammar of Orkney’s letter can be read as implying that Cadogan simply supplied a more cogent tactical explanation of the reasons for Orkney’s retreat after the fact; certainly Atkinson (p. 290) takes this view—with
accurately saw in Cadogan great potential on the field of battle. The physical presence of Cadogan was considerable; popular memory, crystallised in the Dictionary of National Biography, depicts him as 'a big, burly Irishman', a picture attested to in the portrait, supposedly by Laguerre. Trevelyan would follow such in his affectionate references to the 'burly Irish giant' and 'gigantic Irishman'. Not all descriptors were so congenial. The Bishop Atterbury vexed considerable spleen when he later classed Cadogan as 'A big, bad, bold, blustering, bloody, blundering booby'.

Cadogan was an astute psychological choice. Allied to his known familiarity and favour with the commander-in-chief, it was Cadogan's name that marked countless ordinances for forage, marching orders and quarters. He was one of the few of Marlborough's English headquarters staff directly and personally known to the commanders of the confederate army; his engagements at the Hague, and in Brussels, Vienna and Hanover, and his frequent appearance in correspondence, marked him out to the Dutch and auxiliary commanders of the army. A command issued from the lips of a proxy like Cadogan might be considered synonymous with a direct order from the captain-general himself. And this, to not a few officers of the army, was a problem.

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An analysis of the agency of general and staff officers in the War of the Spanish Succession can lead to contrary conclusions. It is clear that these individuals, often of considerable talents, bore a considerable burden in the lower-level direction and execution of the campaigns. To render them anonymous, to emphasise the role of the 'Great Captains' at such officers' expense, renders an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the nature of military control. Yet, contrastingly, to over-emphasise the

admittedly a little supposition—stating 'Back therefore Orkney came to the near side of the Gheete where Cadogan met him and explained that the horse were all needed for the main attack and so could not be spared to sustain him had he gone on.' Such an analysis renders a little more transparent the processes of rumour of those officers opposed to 'Marlborough's favourite', but it must also be argued that such a linear reading of a note penned by an exhausted commander who had hardly eaten a morsel or drunk of drop in forty-eight hours has its problems.

770 DNB; Trevelyan, i, p. 316, and ii, p. 105. Bishop Atterbury described Cadogan thus to Alexander Pope, quoted from Walpole's Letters, DNB.
general and staff officers role to the detriment of an army commander leads to a similarly unsatisfactory picture. The more one analyses the actions and responsibilities of these military subordinates, the clearer the supreme responsibility of the general-in-chief becomes; far from denigrating the power of such captains, the analysis reinforces it. The central agent in directing Queen Anne's forces in the Low Countries remained its commander-in-chief, John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough.

Central to this condition was the remarkable level of responsibility that could be placed upon individuals in an early modern army. This did not simply apply to Marlborough—who was commander-in-chief of a British army in the field and (with considerable qualifications) commander of a multi-national allied army, captain-general of much of Anne's land forces in a broader sense, Master-General of the Ordnance, ambassador extraordinary to the United Provinces, co-administrator of the Spanish Netherlands, Privy Councillor, politician and statesman, being at certain times something approaching a prime minister (particularly regarding the broader, foreign dimensions of state policy) who was a pre-eminent force in allied strategic planning and the conduct of the war—but also the likes of William Cadogan, who was himself a general officer, logistician, political administrator, diplomat and financial entrepreneur; while subordinates such as John Armstrong and Richard King were simultaneously army officers, engineers, logisticians, aides-de-camp and envoys.

Such power was not easily—nor willingly, considering the mores of the period and the constant struggle for personal advancement many officers and statesmen waged—devolved. Though a sense of military identity and duty, distinct from social rank, was already fairly developed, 'quality' remained an important factor in the command of an early modern army. An English colonel of noble birth would dutifully follow the orders of a common-born brigadier or major-general, as the good of the service demanded; but Marlborough presided over an army of numerous princes and nobles, to whom the duke corresponded not simply as a military officer, but as a peer and statesman. That personal connexion remained important, not least on account of the duke's noted urbanity. Legates, known to be in good standing with the duke, could be useful intermediaries; but they could also be the subject of various jealousies and
antagonisms, as were occasionally visited on Cadogan, Thomas Meredyth, Francis Palmes and the other ‘Irish favourites’.

As a command-entity, therefore, Marlborough was irreplaceable. That is not intended as a trite comment on military greatness, real or perceived; merely to note that his portfolio of roles made him uniquely equipped to manage a campaign at multiple levels. Few officers, other than absolutist soldier-monarchs, have enjoyed such power. While this brought responsibility and privation, it also served to obviate interference from other sources. It is doubtful that any British officer could have replaced Marlborough in kind; not necessarily on account of personal talent, but by reason of the aggregate role the duke had in moulding allied strategic policy.

Consolidating such powers in a centralised command structure could prove effective if an individual possessed the capability to use them; if he did not, it could prove destructive to the efficiency to the order and organisation of the army. Marlborough, and similarly burdened subordinates like Cadogan, both proved capable at managing their responsibilities. Though this was in part through natural energy and ability, it was aided by the presence of staff personnel, including Cadogan himself in the duke’s case, who eased the burden. The senior staff apparatus of the British army under Marlborough was not new; it shared the same basic form as that used in the Nine Years’ War. Nor were the roles marked by any great innovations: the adjutancy-general remained much of cipher, bearing little in common with the office it would become; and Cadogan’s vigour and wide-ranging activities as quartermaster-general, noted in the historiography, were little different to those of Adolph von Wolf van Dopsch, who fulfilled a similarly expansive for William III in the previous war.\footnote{Waddell, ‘Administration’, pp. 191-195.}

If it lacked novelty, it possessed flexibility. Temporary, situation-dependent delegation of command was a central element to the direction of armies and detachments. After all, the very nature of general officers—senior officers with general authority within the army, as opposed to fixed responsibilities—was predicated upon this concept. Rank (and seniority of commission) conferred dignity and an element of authority, but real, functional authority over an element of the army came only when the commander-in-chief, the military plenipotentiary of the sovereign, invested a general officer with a
specific role. While the seniormost general officers (typically full generals, in the campaigns) might be associated with a line or wing, or the Horse or Foot as a whole or in part, junior generals above the rank of brigadier had no army divisional commands to occupy them. Earlier in the war, the roles of general officers were clearer. Under the commander-in-chief in 1702, for example, there were two lieutenants-general – one for the Horse, and one for the Foot; each served as the duke’s principal lieutenant for that arm. By the end, when the numbers of lieutenants-general and majors-general equalled those of brigadiers, the generality was little more than an unemployed mass with no defined day-to-day responsibility.

The rise of a staff system, particularly at corps and divisional level, is recognised as being one of the elements in the emergence of the operational art of war. Claus Telp provides a cogent analysis of this development. The ability to divide one’s forces into discrete (preferably all-arms) bodies that can operate independently yet provide mutual support when necessary, each with its own staff structure (which can both coordinate with the headquarters, and plan and act upon its own initiative), allows a greater level of flexibility than that provided by a ‘unitary army’.72 This structure did not exist under Marlborough in the Low Countries. The only semi-permanent organisation above the level of battalion or squadron, the brigade, possessed a permanent staff officer (the major of brigade). General officers of the day and detachment commanders at a strategic level, or local commanders at a tactical level, had no such apparatus to draw upon; their aides-de-camp temporarily fulfilled the role.

This system as practised by the British and their allies in the Low Countries, though ill-defined, was successful to a certain degree during the War of the Spanish Succession. Allied armies made frequent use of detachments, multiple columns and separate lines of march, but there was nothing that might be equated with Telp’s description of an operational level of warfare, marking the close transition of strategic manoeuvre into tactical advantage. Marlborough’s ability to force a battle on an unwilling opponent was limited. This is not to say that manoeuvre did not contribute to each of the four

72 Claus Telp, The evolution of operational art, 1740-1813: from Frederick the Great to Napoleon (London, 2005).
major battles (Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenaarde and Malplaquet); rather that such manoeuvre was strategic, rather than the operational deployment of multiple force-components to force an engagement in favourable terms. These engagements could arise from a mutual willingness to fight, spurred by greater political-strategic considerations (Ramillies and, to an extent, Blenheim—though at the latter the Franco-Bavarian intentions must be the heavily qualified), or manoeuvres attending the investment or defence of a town, such as Oudenaarde or Mons (for Malplaquet).

Marlborough, who often expressed a desire to engage in battle, is occasionally referenced as a John the Baptist figure; a forerunner to the more militarily adventurous generals of later, not least Napoleon. Military history revels in its structures and theories. Teleologies can abound; it is too easy to apply modernist interpretations to early modern phenomena, to the latter's detriment. After all, were not the basic components (Foot and Horse), weapon-systems (the portability and uniformity of artillery excepted) and media of communication much the same for Marlborough as they were a hundred years later? Yet many socio-political and economic, as well as military, foundations of later warfare were very different, as were the goals and strategies of the participants. The armies of Revolutionary France and Frederician Prussia sought battle out of strategic necessity; Marlborough merely recognised its potential efficacy.

Naturally, the tripartite strategic-operational-tactical model of warfare mirrors the progression it grew to describe: the strategic imperatives to defeat the enemy, managed by the operational deployment of forces to secure a preferential tactical engagement. Destruction of Louis XIV's France in this form was hardly an option; rather, the allied belligerents adopted a variety of strategies. It was in prosecuting those in the field that the armies of the late-17th and early-18th centuries engaged in a continual process of empirical development. Telp describes (in his two-component model, regarding the conduct of war prior to what he considers to be the full development of the operational art) 'strategy' as the

art of war at the strategic level, concerned with political decisions such as the definition of the war aim, the mobilization of manpower and material, the planning
and conduct of campaigns and the determination of the purpose as well as the context of battle.\textsuperscript{773}

This embraces an incredible number of roles, duties and responsibilities, the adroit performance of which would be critical to securing a successful outcome to a campaign. Managing the interaction of these elements was as important as bridging the gap between 'strategy' and 'tactics' in the early modern army; not that the latter was so simple as the manoeuvre—battle divide presupposed: armies were frequently engaged in daily skirmishes with each other as a consequence of the escort of convoys, the taking up of posts and general patrols, \textit{razias}, partisan warfare and foraging.\textsuperscript{774} As Erik Lund (colourfully) put it:

If the Succession Wars are to be understood, it is in a large measure in terms of a conflict whose daily terms were set by soldiers scything down the green herbage in the fields under a haying sun amidst stands of muskets, watched by friends mounted and sweating in their armor as they waited for the warning shots, followed by fleeing pickets bursting through woodlots and over fences, drawing pursuers in range for a hasty countercharge or fusillade.\textsuperscript{775}

General and staff officers formed a vital component in the management of this everyday form of warfare. Their personal capacity and initiative, together with flexible systems of delegation, aided commanders in their prosecution of a campaign. Improvements, be they innovations or refinements, in the conduct of early modern warfare have not been described by any new rubric, but formed an important part of continuing military development.

\textsuperscript{773} Ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{774} E.g. Lynn, \textit{French Army}, pp. 128, 538-546.
\textsuperscript{775} Lund, \textit{War for the Every Day}, p. 77.
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Add. MS 61162 (letters from Richard Ingoldsby, Charles Churchill and Thomas Meredyth to Marlborough)
Add. MS 61163 (letters from Lord Cutts, the Earl of Orkney, Henry Lumley and Cornelius Wood to Marlborough)
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Appendix I

Supplementary Tables
Table A.1: General Officers serving on the establishment in the Low Countries and Germany, 1702-1711 (with dates of commissions noted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General Officers</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1702* | Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief: JOHN CHURCHILL, EARL (LATER DUKE) OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702)  
Lieutenants-General (2): RICHARD SAVAGE, EARL RIVERS (27.4.1697 re. 9.3.1702; Maj.-Gen. 1.4.1693); CHARLES CHURCHILL (9.3.1702; Maj.-Gen. 2.3.1694)²  
Majors-General (4): John, Lord Cutts (1.6.1696 re. 9.3.1702; Brig. 22.3.1693); Henry Lumley (27.4.1697 re. 9.3.1702; Brig. 22.3.1693); George Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (9.3.1702; Brig. 1.7.1695); Richard Ingoldsby (9.3.1702; Brig. 1.6.1696)³⁴  
Brigadiers (5): Hugh Wyndham (-; Col. 31.1.1692); The Hon. James Stanley (9.3.1702; Col. 1.8.1692); Cornelius Wood (9.3.1702; Col. 1.12.1693); Frederick Hamilton (9.3.1702; Col. 19.12.1692, recomm. 1.10.1695); Henry Withers (9.3.1702; Lt-Col. 7.12.1696)⁶ |
| 1703b | Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief: JOHN CHURCHILL, DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702)  
Lieutenants-General (3): Charles Churchill (9.3.1702; Maj.-Gen. 2.3.1694); John, Lord Cutts (11.2.1703; Maj.-Gen. 1.6.1696 re. 9.3.1702); Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Maj.-Gen. 27.4.1697 re. 9.3.1702)⁷  
Majors-General (2): George Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (9.3.1702; Brig. 1.7.1695); Richard Ingoldsby (9.3.1702; Brig. 1.6.1696)⁸  
Brigadiers (5): Hugh Wyndham (-; Col. 31.1.1692); Cornelius Wood (9.3.1702; Col. 1.12.1693); Frederick Hamilton (9.3.1702; Col. 19.12.1692, recomm. 1.10.1695); Henry Withers (9.3.1702; Lt-Col. 7.12.1696); Charles Ross (9.3.1702; Col. 16.7.1695)¹⁰ |
| 1704c | Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief: JOHN CHURCHILL, DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702)  
General of Foot: Charles Churchill (15.9.1703; Lt-Gen. 9.3.1702)¹¹  
Lieutenants-General (4): John, Lord Cutts (11.2.1703; Maj.-Gen. 2.3.1694); Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Maj.-Gen. 27.4.1697); George Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (1.1.1704; Maj.-Gen. 9.3.1702); Richard Ingoldsby (1.1.1704; Maj.-Gen. 9.3.1702)¹³  
Majors-General (2): Cornelius Wood (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702); Henry Withers (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702)¹⁴  
Brigadiers (5): Frederick Hamilton (9.3.1702; Col. 19.12.1692, recomm. 1.10.1695); Charles Ross (9.3.1702; Col. 16.7.1695); James Ferguson (9.9.1703; Col. 25.8.1693); Archibald Row (--; Col. 1.11.1697; d. 13.8.1704 N.S.); John Richmond Webb (1.1.1704; Col. 26.12.1695)¹⁵¹⁷ |
| 1705d | Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief: JOHN CHURCHILL, DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702) |
Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief: JOHN CHURCHILL, DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702)

General of Foot: Charles Churchill (15.9.1703; Lt-Gen. 9.3.1702)
Lieutenants-General: John, Lord Cutts (11.2.1703; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1696); Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Maj-Gen. 27.4.1697); George Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1702); Richard Ingoldsby (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1702)
Majors-General: Cornelius Wood (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702); Charles Ross (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702); Henry Withers (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702)
Brigadiers: John Ferguson (9.9.1703; Col. 22.10.1705 N.S.); John Richmond Webb (1.1.1704; Col. 26.12.1695); Thomas Meredyth (25.8.1704; Bvt Col 1.6.1701; Col. 12.2.1702); Francis Palmes (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 10.3.1702; Col. 1.7.1702); William Cadogan (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 1.6.1701; Col. 2.3.1703); Holcroft Blood (25.8.1704; Col. Art. 1702; Col. 26.8.1703)

1706e

John Richmond Webb (1.1.1704; Col. 26.12.1695); John Campbell, Duke of Argyll and Earl of Greenwich (1.1.1704; Col. 29.9.1703); Thomas Meredyth (25.8.1704; Bvt Col 1.6.1701; Col. 12.2.1702); Francis Palmes (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 10.3.1702; Col. 1.7.1702); William Cadogan (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 1.6.1701; Col. 2.3.1703); Holcroft Blood (25.8.1704; Col. Art. 1702; Col. 26.8.1703)
† Lord John Hay (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 10.3.1702; Col. 7.4.1704; d. 25.8.1706 N.S.) (Both John, Lord Dalrymple and Sir Richard Temple, Bt served as brevet brigadiers in the latter stages of 1706. See note 29.)

1707f

Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief: JOHN CHURCHILL, DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702)

General of Foot: Charles Churchill (15.9.1703; Lt-Gen. 9.3.1702)
Lieutenants-General: Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Maj-Gen. 27.4.1697); George Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1702); Richard Ingoldsby (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1702). (Withers, Wood and Ross may have served in the capacity of lieutenant-general in 1707; see note 26, below.)
Majors-General: Cornelius Wood (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702); Charles Ross (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702); Henry Withers (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702); John Richmond Webb (1.6.1706; Brig. 1.1.1704); John Campbell, Duke of Argyll and Earl of Greenwich (1.6.1706; Brig. 1.1.1704)
Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief: JOHN CHURCHILL, DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702)

Lieutenants-General (9): Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Maj-Gen. 27.4.1697); GEORGE HAMILTON, EARL OF ORKNEY (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1702); Henry Withers (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1702); Cornelius Wood (1.1.1704); Charles Ross (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704); John Richmond Webb (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706); John Campbell, Duke of Argyll and Earl of Greenwich (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706); Thomas Meredyth (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707); William Cadogan (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707).

Majors-General (5): Sir Richard Temple, Bt (1.1.1709; Brig. 1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1702); John Richmond Webb (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706); William Cadogan (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707); John Dalrymple, Earl of Stair (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706); Owen Wynne (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706); George Macartney (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707).

Brigadiers (7): Joseph Sabine (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1703; Maj-Gen. 1.4.1705); Gilbert Primrose (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.3.1703; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1708); William Evans (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 10.4.1703); George Kellum (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1707).
Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief: JOHN CHURCHILL, DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702)

Lieutenants-General (13): Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Maj-Gen. 27.4.1697); GEORGE HAMILTON, EARL OF ORKNEY (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1702); Henry Withers (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704); Cornelius Wood (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704); Charles Ross (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704); John Richmond Webb (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706); John Campbell, Duke of Argyll and Earl of Greenwich (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706); Thomas Meredith (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707); William Cadogan (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707); Sir Richard Temple, Bt (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709; Brig. 1.6.1706); William, Lord North and Grey (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709; Brig. 1.6.1706); John Dalrymple, Earl of Stair (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709; Brig. 1.6.1706); George Macartney (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709; Brig. 25.10.1705).

Majors-General (5): Gilbert Primrose (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707); Joseph Sabine (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1703; Col. 1.4.1705); William Evans (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707; Col. 1.1.1704); George Kellum (1.1.1710; Brig. 27.6.1703); Charles Sibourg (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1704); Charles Boyle, Earl of Orrery (1.1.1710; Brig. 17.8.1709; Col. 1.3.1704).

Brigadiers (7): Hans Hamilton (1.1.1710; Bvt Col. before 8.1704; Col. 1.2.1706); Richard Sutton (1.1.1710; Bvt Col. 2.8.1704; Col. 23.3.1709); Henry Durell (Brig. 1.1.1710; Col. 17.2.1711; Bvt Col. 25.8.1704); Richard Russell (Brig. 1.1.1710; Col. 19.10.1704); Henry Morrison (1.1.1710); Francis Godfrey (1.1.1710; Col. 25.3.1705); John Hill (1.1.1710; Col. 8.5.1705).

Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief: JOHN CHURCHILL, DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702; dismissed 30.12.1711)

General of Horse: Henry Lumley (31.1.1711; Lt-Gen. 11.2.1703)

General of Foot: GEORGE HAMILTON, EARL OF ORKNEY (31.1.1711; Lt-Gen. 1.1.1704)

Lieutenants-General (7): Henry Withers (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704); Cornelius Wood (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704); Charles Ross (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704); William Cadogan (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709); Sir Richard Temple, Bt (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709); William, Lord North and Grey (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709); John Dalrymple, Earl of Stair (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709).

Majors-General (5): Joseph Sabine (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707); Gilbert Primrose (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707); William Evans (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707); Charles Sibourg (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707); George Kellum (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707).

Brigadiers (11): Richard Sutton (1.1.1710; Bvt Col. 2.8.1704; Col. 23.3.1709); Henry Durell (Brig. 1.1.1710; Col. 17.2.1711; Bvt Col. 1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1704).
Richard Russell (c. 1654-1712) does not appear on Marlborough's warrant authorising pay to the general officers for their service in 1702, but was accounted for two aides-de-camp as a lieutenant-general for the same period on BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 111. Relatively little note is taken of his service in 1702; he would later serve as commander-in-chief in Spain. See Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 239; Murray, i, pp. 21, 55;
D.N.B. (2) Lieutenant-general effective 9 March 1702 (Dalton, v, p. 15). Luttrell stated that Churchill was promoted lieutenant-general in his entry for 7 May 1702 O.S. Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, v, p. 171. (3) Commissions (renewed, in the case of Cutts and Lumley) of major-general dated 9 March 1702 (Dalton, v, p. 16). (4) Orkney and Ingoldsby are listed as brigadiers on the initial warrant, as per the establishment voted; a supplementary warrant (The Hague, 6 November 1702 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61369, f. 112) authorises making up their pay from brigadiers to majors-general for the six months of the campaign, out of the £10,000 'Contingencies' voted by Parliament and the balance of funds allocated the general officers by same; commissions as majors-general dated 9 March 1702 (Dalton, v, p. 16). (5) Date of commission of Wyndham as brigadier unknown, but he is listed as a brigadier in 1699 (Dalton, iv, p. 217). Wyndham's commission as a major-general antedated to 9 March 1702 (Dalton, v, p. 16). (6) Brigadiers Withers, Wood, Stanley and Hamilton had the pay of a single brigadier (£540, for the shortened year) divided between them for their service on the campaign (Dalton, v, p. 16). Luttrell noted that Stanley was made brigadier of the forces in the Low Countries in his entry of 14 July 1702 O.S. Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, v, p. 194. (7) Warranted to receive their pay as general officers for the full year, 26 December 1702 to 25 December 1703. Although Cutts and Lumley are listed as majors-general on the warrant for general officers' pay, they clearly served in the capacity of lieutenant-general during the campaign of 1703 (see, for example, Murray, i, p. 96), and their commissions as such were dated 11 February 1703 O.S. (Dalton, v, p. 15). Luttrell noted that Cutts, Orkney (sic) and Lumley were all made lieutenants-general, in his entry of 13 February 1703 O.S. Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, v, 268. (8) As per 1702, Orkney and Ingoldsby and were paid as brigadiers (for the full year, 26 December 1702 to 25 December 1703) on the establishment voted by Parliament, but had their pay as majors-general (for two-hundred days of the campaign) made up by other funds. In this instance, the difference came out of £1095 awarded to the pair out of the revenues of Ireland. This had originally been designed to pay Orkney and Ingoldsby £547.10s. each for pay as brigadiers; but as these heads were instead covered on the establishment of the forces in the Low Countries, the £1095 was put to contingent uses. In addition to making up the pay of Orkney and Ingoldsby, it provided the brigadier's pay of Wyndham for the early part of 1703, and the pay of aides-de-camp to the general officers for the campaign. By Marlborough's warrant made at The Hague, 30 October 1703 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61370, ff. 87-87b. (9) Wyndham served in this capacity until 25 April 1703 O.S. For the source of his pay, see note (8), above. He later commanded as a major-general in Portugal. (10) Withers, Hamilton, Wood and Ross were paid as brigadiers for the period 1 May 1703 O.S. to 31 October 1703 O.S. (11) Churchill's commission as general of the Foot made effective 15 September 1703 O.S. (Dalton, v, p. 15; BL Add. MSS 61321, ff. 5-6b); in an alternate list of dates of officers' commissions in BL Add. MSS 61321, ff. 7-8b, it is dated as 15 July 1704 O.S. John Marshall Deane still referred to Churchill as a lieutenant-general in April 1704. Deane, *Journal*, p. 2. Marlborough sought the rank for the dignity and command of the English soldiers in his absence. See Snyder, i, nos 232 & 243, pp. 236-237, 244-245. (12) Cutts' and Lumley's commissions dated 11 February 1703 O.S. (13) Ingoldsby is listed as a major-general on the warrant for pay. Orkney's and Ingoldsby's commissions were antedated 1 January 1704 O.S.; a copy of a list of commissions to be prepared and presented to Queen Anne (to be signified to that date), was made at the Court at St James, 5 April 1704 O.S.; Orkney and Ingoldsby are both listed for promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general. BL Add. MSS 61321, ff. 95-96b. Luttrell recorded their promotion to
lieutenants-general in his entry of 11 April 1704 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 412. See note 18, below. (14) Wood and Withers noted as brigadiers made up to majors-general for the six months of the campaign. Their commissions as majors-general were antedated 1 January 1704 O.S. (Dalton, v, 16). Wood’s and Wither’s commissions as majors-general are listed among those to be prepared and present to Queen Anne in April 1704 (BL Add. MSS 61321, ff. 95-96b). Luttrell recorded their promotion to majors-general in his entry of 11 April 1704 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 412. (An earlier entry by Luttrell of 20 January 1704 O.S. had Wood promoted major-general before this date; ibid, v, p. 582.) Ross is not listed as a major-general on the initial warrant; he was declared major-general by Marlborough in the aftermath of Blenheim. Marlborough to Godolphin, Camp at Steinhem, 17 August 1704 N.S. (Snyder, i, no. 363, pp. 351-352); this is also mentioned in Luttrell’s entry of 22 August 1704 O.S.: Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 458. (15) For the dates of Ferguson’s and Webb’s commissions, see Dalton, v, p. 16. The date of Row’s commission is unknown. William Cadogan, Lord John Hay, Francis Palmes and Thomas Meredith were declared brigadiers by Marlborough in the aftermath of Blenheim, but were not warranted as such—nor served in that role—for the balance of the campaign. Their commissions were made effective 25 August 1704 O.S. Marlborough to Godolphin, Camp at Steinhem, 17 August 1704 N.S. (Snyder, i, no. 363, pp. 351-352). Dalton, v, p. 17. See also Luttrell’s entry for 22 August 1704 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 458. (16) £273.15s. was warranted to Hamilton for his services as a brigadier in 1704; and the like amount to Archibald Row’s executor’s for the same, after he was killed at Blenheim. BL Add. MSS 61370, f. 187b. (17) Webb does not appear on the initial warrant; a warrant for his pay as brigadier from 24 December 1703 O.S. to 24 December 1704 O.S. (Court at St James, 15 January 1705 O.S.) is copied in BL Add. MSS 61370, f. 186b. Luttrell recorded his promotion to brigadier in his entry of 11 April 1704 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 412. (18) On the warrant, Cutts is indicated as serving on the Low Countries establishment as a lieutenant-general until 30 June 1705 O.S., ere he took up his duties in Ireland. Ingoldsby took his place as lieutenant-general on the establishment on 1 July, having been paid as a major-general until that date. (Though he demonstrably served as lieutenant-general in the field in 1704.) (19) Ross is still listed as a brigadier on the warrant for general officers’ pay, though his commission as major-general was antedated 1 January 1704 O.S. and he served in that capacity in 1705. (A list of commissions duly ordered, dated Whitehall, 10 April 1705 O.S., signifies Ross to be made major-general. BL Add. MSS 612321, ff. 116-117b.) (20) Ferguson is listed as a brigadier on the establishment until 21 October 1705 O.S. He died at Bois-le-Duc, 22 October 1705 N.S. (21) Meredyth, Hay, Palmes and Cadogan are warranted for pay as brigadiers for their services ‘during the campaign’, receiving £202.17s. 6d. each on the establishment. Although Marlborough expressed his desire for their promotion shortly after Blenheim (as he did for Ross), it was not effected until 1705: their brigadiers’ commissions are among those ordered in a document, dated Whitehall, 10 April 1705 O.S. BL Add. MSS 61321, ff. 116-117b. (22) Blood is not listed on the warrant for general officers’ pay for 1705; he did serve in that rank in 1705, however, and is among those officers ordered to be commissioned as brigadiers that April. (See note 21, above.) Luttrell mentioned Blood’s promotion in his entry of 7 April 1705 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 538. (23) Ross is still listed as a brigadier on the warrant for general officers’ pay. (24) Webb and John Campbell, Duke of Argyll and Earl of Greenwich, both served as brigadiers for the majority of the 1706 campaign. Though Argyll initially commanded the Scots Brigade in Dutch service, he also held the rank of
brigadier on the English establishment and acted in that capacity in other operations (though does not appear on the warrant for general officers' pay for 1706). Marlborough desired that both Webb and Argyll be promoted to the rank of major-general, writing to Godolphin to this effect on 12 September 1706 N.S. (Snyder, ii, no. 671, p. 662). Argyll returned to England to help with the negotiations for the Union, but Webb remained on the continent. A Dutch promotion of general officers led Marlborough to enact Webb's promotion provisionally, in the field. (See Snyder, ii, no. 681, pp. 672-3: Marlborough to Godolphin, Gramets, 20 September 1706 N.S.) Both official commissions were antedated 1 June 1706 O.S. (25) Blood, Cadogan, Palmes and Hay were paid £273.15s. each from the establishment for their service during the campaign—i.e. half that due to a brigadier for a full year's service. (26) Withers, Wood and Ross were listed as majors-general on warrant for the general officers' pay for 1707. Luttrell noted in his entry of 13 May 1707 O.S. that Woods was to be made a lieutenant-general; he recorded his actual promotion in his entry for 18 October 1707 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, pp. 171, 225. On 15 November 1707 O.S., Luttrell recorded that Withers and Ross had been made lieutenants-general. Ibid, vi, p. 234. (27) Cadogan, Palmes, Temple, Dalrymple, and North and Grey were all allowed £507.10s. each (i.e. £40 less than a brigadier's annual pay) for their service as brigadiers in 1707; Meredith received the full sum. Cadogan, Meredith and Palmes were promoted majors-general in October 1707. See Luttrell's entries for 16 and 18 October 1707 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 224. (28) Blood died on 30 August 1707 N.S. in Brussels, after a lengthy illness. His executors were granted £200 on the establishment, for his pay for that year. (29) Both Sir Richard Temple, Bt and John, Lord Dalrymple had served as brevet brigadiers in the latter part of 1706 (Snyder, ii, no. 681, pp. 672-3: Marlborough to Godolphin, Gramets, 20 September 1706 N.S.). (30) Ingoldsby rolled as lieutenant-general on the establishment until 28 April 1708 O.S., at which point he took up his duties in Ireland. His place on the establishment was then taken by Lieutenant-General Withers, who had hitherto drawn pay as a major-general. (31) Though both Wood and Ross ranked as lieutenants-general, they drew pay as majors-general upon the establishment of the forces in the Low Countries. As Marlborough himself remarked in a letter of 21 February 1709 N.S. to Lord Raby: "... Mr. Wood and Mr. Ross, with several others, are obliged to serve on less pay than their characters would allow them." (Murray, iv, pp. 451-2). Later, a royal warrant of 10 July 1709 O.S. ordered that Wood and Ross received back-pay as lieutenants-general for the period 10 August 1708 O.S. to 22 December 1708 O.S.; confusingly, this also applied to Withers, whose pay for that period had been covered by the establishment (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, p. 300). (32) Major-General Meredith, hitherto paid as a brigadier, replaced Withers in his position as major-general on the establishment on 29 April 1708 N.S. His commission as major-general was antedated 1 January 1708 O.S. (Dalton, v, p. 159). See also Note 27, above. (33) Cadogan, though serving with the rank of major-general since late 1707, drew pay as a brigadier on the establishment for 1708. His commission as major-general was antedated 1 January 1707 O.S. (Dalton, v, p. 159). Brydges' accounts note that his pay was later made up from brigadier to major-general (Brydges actually wrote 'lieutenant-general', but it is clear from the figures that this was an error) for the period 24 December 1707 O.S. to 23 December 1708 O.S. (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, p. 301). (34) Temple, Stair, North and Grey, and Sabine drew a full (leap) year's pay as brigadiers on the establishment (£549). (35) As the invasion scare developed in November 1708, Owen Wynne and George Hamilton were suggested by Marlborough as officers that might command a detachment of Erle's force, to
be sent to Antwerp. Murray, iv, p. 321: Marlborough to Erle, camp at Roeselare, 22 November 1708 N.S. They do not appear on the warrant for the general officers' pay for 1708. (36) Primrose drew pay only for his service as brigadier 'during the campaign' (£358.10s.). (37) William Evans is not listed upon the warrant for pay for 1708, but did serve in the Low Countries in that year, and was referred to as 'Brigadier Evans' on several occasions by Marlborough. See, for example: Murray, iv, pp. 221, 271, 280, 283 etc. Evans also appears as a brigadier in Brydges accounts for those officers that served in 1708, beyond the establishment (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 301-302). (38) Kellum and Crowther do not appear on Marlborough's warrant for 1708; but both are denoted by Brydges as serving in the capacity of brigadier for the year 1708 (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 301-302). Charles Sibourg is not listed on the pay warrant for 1708, but Dalton lists him as being a brigadier at Oudenarde. Dalton, v, ii, p. 22. Luttrell recorded Sibourg's promotion to the rank of brigadier in his entry of 15 November 1707 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 234. Sibourg is also listed as a brigadier for 1708 by Brydges (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 301-302). (39) Wood and Ross continued to be paid as majors-general on the establishment. A royal warrant of 31 January 1709/10? O.S. ordered that their pay be made up to that of lieutenants-general for the period 23 December 1708 O.S. to 23 December 1709 O.S. (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 296-297). (40) The lieutenants-general's commissions of Webb, Argyll, Meredyth and Cadogan were all antedated 1 January 1709 O.S. Dalton, vi, p. 17. Luttrell made mention of the promotions of Webb and Argyll on 2 April 1709 O.S. (Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 425), Cadogan (and Palmes) on 12 May 1709 O.S. (ibid, vi, p. 440) and Meredyth on 26 May 1709 O.S. (ibid, vi, p. 445). Cadogan continued to draw pay at the rank of brigadier on the warrant for 1709; Argyll, Webb and Meredyth were paid as majors-general. Argyll, Webb and Meredyth later had their pay as majors-general made up to that of lieutenants-general for the period 1 January 1709 O.S. to 22 December 1709 O.S. (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, p. 297); Cadogan had his made up from brigadier to lieutenant-general for the same period (ibid, pp. 297-298)—analysed in conjunction with Note 33, above, this suggests a period of a week at the end of December 1711 when Cadogan was paid only as a brigadier. (41) Commissions as majors-general antedated 1 January 1709 O.S. Dalton, vi, p. 17. Luttrell recorded their promotion on 2 April 1709 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 425. All three continued to be paid at the rank of brigadier on the establishment for 1709. Their pay was later made up to that of majors-general for the period 1 January 1709 O.S. to 22 December 1709 O.S. (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, p. 298). (42) Wynne received pay as a brigadier on the establishment, according to the warrant for general officers' pay for 1709, but this was later made up to that of a major-general (see Note 41 above). Major-general's commission antedated 1 January 1709 O.S. Dalton, vi, p. 17. Marlborough wrote to him as a brigadier in February 1709. Murray, iv, p. 427: Marlborough to Brigadier Wynne, Brussels, 5 February 1709 N.S. Listed as a major-general, 9 July 1709 N.S. Ibid, iv, p. 538. (43) Hamilton possessed the rank of a major-general in the British army, but served under Dutch command in 1709. Dalton, vi, p. 302. His commission as a lieutenant-general in the British army was antedated 1 January 1709 O.S., but he was, for example, listed under the dignity of major-general in July 1709. Murray, iv, p. 538. (44) Macartney's service as a general officer had been in Spain, and while a brigadier he was captured at the battle of Almanza. Following his exchange, he was accused of assaulting his housekeeper, and forced to sell his regiment (D.N.B.). Macartney served as a volunteer with Marlborough in the Low Countries in 1709, and his rank is at the time is unclear; Dalton suggested he was
temporarily deprived of his commission in any case. Marlborough refers to him as a brigadier in a letter of 26 April 1709 N.S. (Murray, iv, p. 492). He is not listed under any rank in the list of general officers made by Marlborough on 9 July 1709 N.S. (ibid, iv, p. 538). (45) Only Brigadier Kellum is listed as receiving pay as a brigadier on the warrant for pay according to the establishment in 1709. Sabine, Primrose, Evans and Sibourg all had to be paid beyond the establishment agreed for that year. BL, Add. MSS 61317, f. 174. (46) Sampson de Lalo's commission as brigadier was antedated 1 January 1709 O.S. Dalton, vi, p. 17. Luttrell made note of his promotion on 2 April 1709 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 425. Lalo was killed at Malplaquet. Dalton, vi, p. 302. (47) Marlborough had desired a commission of brigadier for Orrery on account of his being the eldest colonel and a 'man of quality'. Although Marlborough had not received a written commission, upon hearing Anne's approbation of the move he declared it in the field, c. July-August 1709. See Snyder, iii, pp. 1288-1289, 1301, 1326-1327. There is confusion as to the date of Orrery's commissions in the secondary literature. This is because, in his list of general officers commissions, Dalton lists Orrery's as brigadier on 17 August 1709 O.S., and as major-general on 1 January 1710 O.S. (Dalton, vi, p. 17). But later the dates are switched: brigadier on 1 January 1709 O.S. and major-general on 17 August 1710 O.S. (ibid, vi, p. 302). BL, Add. MSS 61321, f. 17 lists Orrery's commission as brigadier as bearing the date 17 August 1709 O.S. (48) Webb continued to be listed upon the establishment of the forces in the Low Countries for 1710, though he was invalided at the battle of Malplaquet in 1709, and there is little evidence that he served at his post subsequently. (49) Meredyth and Macartney were dismissed from the army on 8 November 1710 O.S. (BL, Add. MSS 61321, ff. 245-246b), after the notorious incident of their (supposedly) drinking to the destruction of the Tory ministry. Jonathan Swift, Journal to Stella. Letter 11, London, 9 December 1710 O.S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 664. (50) Queen Anne signified a general promotion of officers on May 1710, with all commissions antedated 1 January 1710 O.S. (Dalton, vi, pp. 17-18). Temple, North and Grey, Stair and Macartney were made lieutenants-general. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 580 (9 May 1710 O.S.). There were announced in the camp of the army c. 3 June 1710 N.S. Deane, Journal, p. 108. None of the newly promoted lieutenants-general received pay as such on the establishment; Macartney, Stair, Temple and North and Grey were all listed as majors-general on the pay warrant for 1710. A subsequent royal warrant, dated 19 February 1711 O.S., authorized the making-up of their pay to lieutenants-general for the period 1 January 1710 O.S. to 23 December 1710 O.S. (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, p. 29). (51) General promotion. See Note 50, above. Primrose, Sabine, Evans, Kellum and Sibourg were promoted majors-general. Only Primrose was warranted to receive pay as a major-general, according to Marlborough's warrant of 5 December 1710 N.S. Sabine, Evans, Kellum and Sibourg were all warranted to receive pay as brigadiers on the establishment. All four, however, later had their pay made up to the rank of major-general. (52) Orrery was also promoted major-general, but Deane does not list him as one of those declared major-general in the camp. See Note 47 on the confusion regarding the dates of his commissions. Orrery was listed as a brigadier on the warrant for general officers' pay for 1710. (53) General promotion. See Note 50, above. Deane listed the newly promoted brigadiers as comprising Durell, Russell, Morrison, 'Hamble', Godfrey, Sutton and Hill (Deane, Journal, p. 108). 'Hamble' is most probably Hans Hamilton, who was listed as a brigadier in Brydges' accounts for the year 1710 (Huntington Library, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, pp. 11, 29). Excepting Durell, who was listed as the adjutant-general, none of these officers appear upon Marlborough's warrant for the general officers' pay in
1710. All—except Sutton—are listed as brigadiers in Brydges' accounts for 1710, however. Sutton was ill during 1710, and may have missed most or all of the campaign; he was also delayed in returning to the Low Countries in 1711. Hayton et al., HoC 1690-1715, v, pp. 598-600. (54) Lumley and Orkney were promoted to the rank of full general (of the Horse, and the Foot, respectively), antedated 31 January 1711 O.S. (Dalton, vi, p. 19). Only one General of Foot was allowed on the establishment (and none of Horse): BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b. Marlborough's warrant for pay to the general officers denoted both Lumley and Orkney as receiving pay as lieutenants-general until 30 January 1711 O.S.; and as full generals from 31 January. Charles Ross was promoted to the novel rank of 'colonel-general of Dragoons', dated 1 May 1711 O.S. (Dalton, vi, p. 19) but this rank was not recognised upon the establishment or Marlborough's warrant for pay. The camp journal noted that both Orkney and Ross (there is no mention, as per usual, of the affairs of the Horse) were 'declared' general of the Foot and colonel-general of Dragoons, respectively, on 4 July 1711 N.S., at the camp at Lens (BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 136b). (55) Withers, Wood, Ross, Cadogan, Stair, Temple and North and Grey all received proper pay in their posts as lieutenants-general upon the establishment, as per Marlborough's warrant. The establishment allowed nine lieutenants-general but, following the elevation of Orkney and Lumley, only seven served. BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b. (56) Primrose, Sabine, Evans, Kelum and Sibourg were duly paid as majors-general, according to the establishment. (57) In Marlborough's warrant authorising general officers' pay for 1711, Sutton, Durell, Morrison and Russell were all accounted with usual brigadier's pay (£547.10s. p.a.); this is echoed in the states of pay for the general officers listed in BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b. (Dalton, vi, p. 19). The army's camp journal recorded that colonels Preston, Panton and Napier were 'declared' brigadiers in its entry of 3 September 1711 N.S. (BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 147). Hamilton, Grove, Freke, Panton and Napier were accounted as brigadiers for 'part of the campaign' on Marlborough's warrant, and drew six months’ pay each (£273.15s.). Yet another state of pay for 1711 (c. September 1711; BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b) lists Preston (see Note 59, below), Panton and Napier as brigadiers who served from 12 February 1711 (the date of their commissions), and thus due £484.10s. each, at the usual rate of 30s. p.d. The same source states that Hamilton might be given a full year's pay, but 'did not serve' during the campaign; Freke and Groves only appear in the margin, as officers who might also receive £484.10s. each for their service as brigadiers from 12 February 1711 O.S. (59) George Preston's commission as brigadier was antedated 12 February 1711 O.S. (Dalton, vi, p. 19). By Marlborough's warrant, Preston ('who commanded the English [that] winter at Lille", and for his part as Brigadier for part of the campaign) was to receive £350. See also Note 58, above. (60) Patrick Meade's commission as brigadier was antedated 12 February 1711 O.S. (Dalton, vi, p. 19). Marlborough's warrant for pay stated that Meade only joined the army when the troops were marching into their winter quarters, and should be given but £100. On this account, Meade was not mentioned in the state of pay made c. September 1711 (BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b).
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<td>Adjutant-General</td>
<td>Thomas Meredith 1.6.1701-25.8.1704 (Bvt Col. 1.6.1701; Col. 12.2.1702; Brig. 25.8.1704; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707; Lt-Gen. 1.1.1709); Henry Durell 25.8.1704-19.2.1711 (A.D.C. 1701-1710; Capt. 6.1.1702; Lt-Col. c. 1703; Bvt Col. 25.8.1704; Col. 17.2.1711; Brig. 1.1.1710; died 1.12.1712); Metcalf Graham 19.2.1711- (A.D.C. 1707-1711; Corn. 14.4.1702; Bvt Capt. 1.9.1704; Capt.-Lt 2.4.1708; Bvt Lt-Col. 14.5.1709; Bvt Col. 19.2.1711); William Cadogan 1.7.1701-22.12.1712 (Bvt Col. 1.6.1701; Col. 2.3.1703; Brig. 25.8.1704; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707; Lt-Gen. 1.1.1709); John Armstrong 22.12.1712- (A.D.C. 1707-1711; Sub-Eng. 17.3.1704; Eng. 1707; Lt &amp; Capt. 26.10.1706; Bvt Lt-Col. by 4.1709); Alexander Spotswood 1702?-c. 12.1709 (Ens. 20.5.1693; Lt 1.1.1696; Capt. 9.4.1703; Bvt Lt-Col. 1.1.1707; Dep.Gov. Virginia 1710); John Armstrong 1709/1710-22.12.1712 (A.D.C. 1707-1711; Sub-Eng. 17.3.1704; Eng. 1707; Lt &amp; Capt. 26.10.1706; Bvt Lt-Col. by 4.1709); Thomas Lascelles 22.12.1712- (Sub-Eng. 17.3.1704; Eng.; Capt.); Walter Whitfield c. 1701-31.5.1702; Henry Watkins 1.6.1702-3.1712 (chief clerk, Secretary-at-War’s office, c. 1699-1702; deputy judge-advocate general 6.1702-3.1712; secretary to the embassy at the Hague 4.1711-1.1712; extraordinary envoy to Vienna 12.1711; secretary to the embassy at Utrecht 1.1712-3.1712; secretary to the duke of Ormonde as commander-in-chief in the Low Countries, 3.1712); Giles Spicer c. 1701-c. 1.6.1711 (Ens. 16.1.1678; Lt. 26.1.1683; Capt.-Lt 17.7.1685; Capt. 31.12.1688; Maj. 31.3.1690; Lt-Col. 1.8.1692; Lt.Gov. Guernsey 10.4.1711); Hugh Pudsey 1.6.1711- (Lt. 5.3.1708)?; Francis Robinson 7-30.6.1703; John Fury 1.7.1703-c. 1713; Benjamin Robinson (Solicitor to the Foot Guards 25.12.1704-1.1.1712); Henry Cartwright 8.5.1706- (Capt. 10.3.1702)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Judge-Advocate</td>
<td>Adam (de) Cardonnen10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Wagonmaster-General</td>
<td>Benjamin Robinson (Solicitor to the Foot Guards 25.12.1704-1.1.1712)17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Paymaster to the forces abroad (at Amsterdam)</td>
<td>Henry Cartwright 8.5.1706- (Capt. 10.3.1702)18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authorities (all dates are O.S., unless otherwise noted): (a) Copies of warrants for the pay of general and staff officers serving on the establishment in the Low Countries, various dates: BL Add. MSS 61369, ff. 109-109b (1702); BL Add. MSS 61370, ff. 87b-88b (1703), ff. 182-183 (1704); BL Add. MSS 61371, ff. 70-71b (1705), ff. 127b-129 (1706), ff. 205b-206b (1707); BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 99b-100 (1708), ff. 143-145b (1709), ff. 256-256b (1710); BL Add. MSS 61373, ff. 51b-52 (1711). (b) Huntington Library, Stowe MSS (the accounts of James Brydges, paymaster to the forces abroad). Stowe 8, vol. i, passim (24.6.1705-23.12.1706); vol. ii, passim (24.12.1706-24.12.1709); vol. iii, passim (23.12.1709-22.12.1712). (c) Dalton, iv-vi, passim. See, especially, Dalton’s transcripts of the Blenheim (v, II, pp. 1-11) and Malplaquet (vi, II, pp. 299-306) rolls relating to general, staff and engineer officers.
Notes: (1) The post of adjutant-general does not appear on the warrants for the pay of general and staff officers for the years 1702 and 1703, although Meredyth’s commission and function in that role is well attested (see note 2, below). (2) For a full copy of Meredyth’s commission as adjutant-general, 1 June 1701, see BL Add. MSS 61336, ff. 175-176b. His staff commission was accompanied by a brevet as colonel of Horse. NA SP 44/168 (commissions entry book), pp. 351-352. Dalton, iv, pp. 264-265. (3) Durell replaced Meredyth as adjutant-general upon the latter’s elevation to the generality, following Blenheim; he received a brevet as colonel of Foot. NA SP 44/170, pp. 327-328. Dalton, v, p. 157. (4) Graham was the senior aide-de-camp to Marlborough in 1711, and continued the tradition of the previous six years of that person occupying the rank of adjutant-general. Although his commission as adjutant-general was dated 19 February 1711 (taking his rank as a colonel of Horse), there is evidence that he acted in that role before then, as at the siege of Aire, 1710 (BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 241-242). NA SP 44/175, pp. 45-46. Dalton, vi, p. 182. (5) Cadogan’s commission as quartermaster-general was preceded by a brevet as colonel of Foot. NA WO 25/6, p. 102. Dalton, iv, pp. 264-265. (6) Cadogan continued to serve as quartermaster-general under James Butler, Duke of Ormonde, in 1712; his deputy, Armstrong, replaced him when Cadogan joined Marlborough in his Dutch exile. His commission as quartermaster general was dated 22 December 1712; his commission as deputy quartermaster-general is untraced. NA 44/175, p. 266. Dalton, vi, p. 184. (7) Also styled ‘assistant quartermaster-general’ and ‘lieutenant quartermaster-general’. (8) Spotswood’s commission as deputy quartermaster-general is untraced. He is indicated as serving in that post on the warrant for general and staff officers’ pay, 1703. Spotswood himself suggested that he held this ‘most active & Considerable Employment’ in the ‘first Campaign of this War’ (i.e. 1702), and by the end of 1709 had served in eight campaigns. Letter of Spotswood to his cousin, dated Virginia, 20 March 1710 O.S., quoted by Cappon, ‘Correspondence of Alexander Spotswood’, p. 228. Armstrong is referred to as ‘Lieutenant Quartermaster-General of Her Majesty’s armies’ in an order of 16 April 1709 N.S. (BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 109) but Spotswood is still listed as serving in that post on the warrant for 1709. On his return to England from the campaign of 1709, he noted that he was ‘as yet in the same station as formerly’. See the letter of Spotswood dated London, 24 December 1709 O.S., quoted by Cappon, ibid., p. 226. Spotswood’s departure from the army was not altogether amicable. He was involved in a dispute with certain cavalry officers after his capture at Oudenaarde, whom he accused of cowardice, an action that proved ‘disagreeable to [Marlborough]’ (Cappon, ibid., p. 226 n. 29). Later, in 1709, Spotswoods complaints over his lack of station and remuneration (q.v.) came to a head. Spotswood himself wrote:

The prospect I then had of advancing my Fortunes was a fair One, especially considering the fine Promises made me: but these prov’d nothing better than a Will of the Wisp, which I follow’d during my last eight Campaigns through most excessive Labours & numerous Dangers, till at length quite tired out & sufficiently undeceiv’d how vainly a Man of Conscience & honest Principles pretends to thrive immediately under Those who think nought of a Crime that works their Ends, I was provok’d soon after the Battle of Taisniere to throw up my Commission & to tell them plainly that their continual breach of Promises was no longer to be endured. But a Man of my Business was not so readily to be spar’d, & therefore they endeavoured with fresh Assurances of Preferrment to reengage me; but I insisted upon immediate Performances, & protested that I would no more trust their Promises.
(Letter of Spotswood to his cousin, dated Virginia, 20 March 1710 O.S., quoted by Cappon, 'Correspondence of Alexander Spotswood', p. 228.) Though Spotswood was careful not to mention him by name, Cadogan was clearly involved. As John Drummond wrote to James Brydges, Spotswood had “in the general opinion of men of honour ... not been fairly treated by ... Cadogan,” whom Drummond believed took “particular care of himself, whatever may become of others.” Brydges had no sympathy for his friend Cadogan in the matter, not least because, as Drummond warned: “I wish [the affair] may have a good end, for if [Spotswood] is indifferent to whose interest & whose reputation suffers, if his actions turn him to his private advantage, let them never be so tyrannical or barbarous.” (See the letters of Drummond to Brydges, dated 20 November 1709 and 27 December 1709 N.S., HL, Stowe 58, vol. 5, pp. 49, 69-71; and the letters of Brydges to Drummond, dated 1 December 1709 and 4 January 1710 O.S., Stowe 57, vol. 3, pp. 115-117, 133-135.) (9) Lascelles was made deputy quartermaster-general when Armstrong succeeded Cadogan. NA SP 44/175, p. 267. Dalton, vi, p. 184. (10) Cardonnel served as Marlborough’s secretary throughout the campaigns, replacing Richard Warre, who had accompanied the duke in 1701. (11) BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 119-119b: warrant for deputy judge-advocate’s pay, from Contingencies. Whitfield was paid in this post from 30 December 1701 to 31 May 1702 O.S. (12) Watkins succeeded Whitfield on the establishment and served in the post throughout Marlborough’s tenure. (13) Spicer’s commission is untraced. (14) For Spicer’s recommendation of Pudsey as his replacement, see BL, Add. MSS 61295, ff. 96-97b: Spicer to Marlborough, London, 24 April 1711 O.S. (15) BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 66b contains a note of expenses due to Captain Francis Robinson, provost marshal-general, for the present campaign (i.e. 1702). Robinson had been appointed Provost-Marshal-General in 1691 (Dalton, iii, pp. 214-215 n. 16) and received a further commission to that extent in 1706 (Dalton, v, p. 158). (16) Fury was warranted as serving in his post from 1 July 1703 O.S. BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 69: warrant to pay John Fury as provost marshal, out of Contingencies. The Hague, 29 October 1703 N.S. (17) The office at Amsterdam (or Rotterdam) was originally the sole paymaster’s office in the Low Countries. Sweet initially received 12s.6d. per day in this post, and sent accounts of his expenses to the Treasury. Circa 1710 this was increased to £3 p.d. (backdated to 25 June 1705) with a further 20s. daily for extraordinaries (backdated to 24 June 1706). Stowe 8, vol. iii, pp. 121, 322. (18) After the conquest of much of the Spanish Netherlands in 1706, the army set up a parallel office in Antwerp, under Cartwright. Cartwright’s pay was backdated to 1 November 1706, his extraordinaries to 1 October 1706. Ibid., pp. 122, 322.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Majors of brigade (by arm of service)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1702 | Maj. [Philip] Chenevix [Horse?] (Maj. 3.10.1700)
Maj. [Robert] Hunter [Dragoons?] (Maj. 23.4.1698)
Lt-Col. [Joseph] Sabine [Foot?] (Lt-Col. 1.6.1695)
Lt-Col. [William] Breton [Foot?] (Capt. & Lt-Col. 3.7.1703)
Maj. [Mark Anthony Davessin de] Moncal [Foot?] (Maj. ren. 7.7.1702)
'Maj.' [Thomas] Oldfield [Foot?] (Capt. Lt. in 1686; Bvt Maj. 1.10.1703) |
| 1703 | 'Maj.' William Ashby [Horse] (Cor. 27.3.1699)
Lt-Col. [Robert] Hunter [Dragoons?] (Bvt Lt-Col. 1.1.1703)
Lt-Col. [Joseph] Sabine [Foot?] (Lt-Col. 1.6.1695; Bvt Col. 1.1.1703)
Maj. [Mark Anthony Davessin de] Moncal [Foot?] (Maj. ren. 7.7.1702; Bvt Lt-Col. 1.10.1703), 'Maj.' Alexander Irwin [Foot] (Capt. 2.10.1695) |
| 1704 | Lt William Ashby [Horse] (Cor. 27.3.1699; Lt 25.8.1704)
Maj. Hugh Caldwell [Dragoons] (Capt. 1690s; Maj. 1.1.1703)
Maj. Alexander Irwin [Foot; -2.7.1704] (Capt. 2.10.1695; Maj. 3.8.1704)
Capt. Patrick Gordon [Foot] (Capt. 3.8.1694)
Capt. George Morgan [Foot] (Capt. 10.2.1695; Maj. 7.1704?)
Capt. Henry Whitney [Foot; 2.7.1704; ] (Bvt Capt. 25.8.1703; Capt. 3.8.1704)
Capt. Thomas Whitney [Foot?] (Capt. 10.2.1695) |
| 1705 | Lt Claudius Têtèfolle [Horse] (Lt 15.2.1699)
Capt. James Campbell [Dragoons?] (Capt. 25.2.1702)
Capt. Patrick Gordon [Foot] (Capt. 3.8.1694)
Capt. Thomas Whitney [Foot?] (Capt. 10.2.1695)
Capt. William Congreve [Foot?] (Capt. 30.5.1696) |
| 1706 | Lt Claudius Têtèfolle [Horse] (Lt 15.2.1699)
Capt. James Campbell [Dragoons?] (Capt. 25.2.1702; Lt-Col. 24.8.1706)
Capt. Thomas Whitney [Foot] (Capt. 10.2.1695; Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706)
Capt. William Congreve [Foot] (Capt. 30.5.1696; Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706)
Capt. Archibald Hamilton [Foot] (Capt. 23.6.1704) |
| 1707 | Lt Claudius Têtèfolle [Horse] (Lt 15.2.1699)
Capt. Charles Cathcart [Dragoons] (Capt. of Foot 29.1.1704; Capt. of Dragoons 24.8.1706)
Maj. Thomas Whitney [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj.
William Congreve [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Capt. Archibald Hamilton [Foot] (Capt. 23.6.1704) |
| 1708 | Capt. Claudius Têtèfolle [Horse] (Capt.Lieut. 24.2.1708)
Capt. Charles Cathcart [Dragoons] (Capt. of Foot 29.1.1704; Capt. of Dragoons 24.8.1706)
Maj. Thomas Whitney [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj.
William Congreve [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Capt.
Archibald Hamilton [Foot] (Capt. 23.6.1704)

The following are not listed in the year's warrant and were not provided for on the establishment of the forces in the Low Countries, but served in the post of brigade-major, 24 December 1707 to 23 December 1708 (see HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 300-302):

Capt. John Looker [Horse; to Brigadiers Sibourg and Kellum] (Lt 25.3.1703; Bvt Capt. 6.4.1708)
Mr Charles Lancaster [Horse; to
 Brigadier Crowther [Cor. 25.8.1709], Maj. John Ligonier [Foot; to Brigadier Primrose] (Capt. 30.3.1703; Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Capt. Edward Wolfe [Foot; to Brigadier Evans] (Capt. by 1709)


1709

The following are not listed in the year’s warrant and were not provided for on the establishment of the forces in the Low Countries, but served in the post of brigade-major, 23 December 1708 to 22 December 1709 (see HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 296-299; there is no mention of Charles Lancaster serving as brigade-major for the year 1709**):

Capt. John Looker [Horse] (Bvt Capt. 6.4.1708), Capt. Edward Wolfe [Foot] (Capt. by 1709)


Capt. Claudius Têtéfolle [Horse] (Capt. 2.4.1711), Capt. John Looker [Horse; -31.5.1711†] (Capt.Lt. 24.2.1711), Mr Charles Lancaster [Horse; 1.6.1711-] (Lt 24.2.1710), Capt. George Skene [Dragoons] (Capt. 16.1.1707), Maj. Thomas Whitney [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj. William Congreve [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj. Edward Wolfe [Foot; -19.2.1711] (Maj. 24.4.1710), Capt. George Grove [Foot] (Capt. 10.4.1703), Capt. Charles Legg [Foot] (Capt. 3.8.1704), Capt. Richard Roberts [Foot; 20.2.1711-] (Capt. 1.4.1706)

Notes and authorities (all dates indicated in warrants and commissions O.S. unless otherwise noted).

Majors of brigade that did not hold the substantive rank of major or higher were nevertheless often given the prefix ‘major’ in various sources; in these cases, ‘Maj.’ is noted in inverted commas. The arm of service is indicated in square brackets, with note of the brigadier under whom the major served, if known—e.g. [Foot; Brigadier Evans]. Where the arm of service is not specifically indicated for a given year, but the regimental history and/or experience of the officer suggests the most likely choice, it is indicated in italicised square brackets—e.g. [Foot].

*An entry in the army’s camp journal, dated 24 July 1708 N.S., notes that ‘Captain Primrose’ did the duty of major of brigade in Hamilton’s absence (BL Add. MSS 61404, f. 84b). If the rank of captain is not an error, it probably refers to Archibald Primrose, whose promotion to lieutenant (and thus captain in the army) in the 1st Foot Guards is dated 1 April 1706 (Dalton, v, p. 45). The only other officers of close rank

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are: William Primrose, commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant in Mordaunt's (formerly Row's) regiment of Foot, 25 August 1704, and out of that regiment in 1708 (Dalton, v, p. 82; II, p. 57); and Gilbert Primrose, supposedly the natural son of the general officer of the same name, who served in Sabine's regiment of Foot (2nd lieutenant, 24.6.1706; 1st lieutenant, 23.2.1709) (Dalton, vi, pp. 341-342).

**The author is not the first to notice an awkwardness in Brydges' accounts. In the details of the charge for 23 December 1708 to 22 December 1709 (inclusive), the six brigade-majors warranted by Marlborough are listed: Cathcart, Tétedefolle, Whitney, Congreve, Hamilton and Ligonier (p. 283). Then, following, are the additions due to those officers who served in posts not allowed on the establishment for that period (as detailed in the special discharge, pp. 296-299); this includes note of Wolfe and Looker serving as majors of brigade in 1709. Immediately following that, Brydges details the sums due those officers who served in similar posts, not allowed on the establishment, in 1708 (a leap year; as detailed in the special discharge, pp. 300-302); this includes note of Wolfe, Looker, Lancaster and Ligonier serving as brigade-majors in 1708. Taken in comparison, there is no record of Charles Lancaster serving as a major of brigade in 1709 or 1710.

1702: Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1702. The brigade-majors received £91.10s. each for their services in the last campaign. The Hague, 2 November 1702. BL Add. MSS 61369, ff. 110b-111. 1703: Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1703. Each brigade-major received £100 for two-hundred days' service during the campaign. Out of Contingencies. The Hague, 28 October 1703 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61370, f. 70b. 1704: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1704. Each brigade-major received £100 for his service during the campaign. Out of Contingencies. The Hague, 17 December 1704 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61370, f. 179b. (ii) Majors of Brigade who Served the last Campaigne. Marked 1704. BL Add. MSS 61321, f. 40. (iii) Blenheim Roll. Dalton, v, II, p. 2. 1705: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1705. Each brigade-major received £100 for his service in the campaign. Out of Contingencies. Camp at Kalmthout, 24 October 1705 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61371, f. 45. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. i, pp. 4, 58. 1706: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1706. Each brigade-major received £100 for his service in the campaign. The Hague, 15 November 1706 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61371, ff. 129b-130. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. i, pp. 202-203, 237. 1707: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1707. Each brigade-major received £182.10s. for his service (i.e. 10s. per day for a full calendar year). The Hague, 6 November 1707 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61371, f. 208. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 15, 23. 1708: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1708. Each received £182.10s. Camp at Merelbeke, 10 December 1708 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 96b. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 300-302. 1709: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1709. Each received £182.10s. The Hague, 7 November 1709 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 149. (ii) The Malplaquet Roll. Dalton, vi, p. 300. (iii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 283-285, 293, 296-299. 1710: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1710. Each receive pay at the rate of 10s. per day, for up to the full calendar year. The total amounted to £1261.10s. The Hague, 5 December 1710 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 257b-258. (ii) Warrant to pay William Congreve £98.10s. for his pay as major of brigade for the 'present year'. Although '1711' is noted in the margin, the warrant is dated The Hague, 30 December 1710 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 289b. (iii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, pp. 10, 25. 1711: (i) Warrant for pay
to the majors of brigade, 1711. The total amounts to £1460. The Hague, 15 November 1711 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61373, f. 40b. (ii) Account of forage delivered to the army, 16 April to 24 May 1711 N.S. Lists Grove, Whitney, Looker, Congreve, Tétêfolle and Legg as brigade-majors. BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 334b-335. (iii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, pp. 158-159.

22-23. (20) The only 'Charles Lancaster' noted in Dalton was commissioned cornet in the First Regiment of Carabiniers (Palmes'), 25 August 1709; lieutenant, 24 February 1710. Also served as an aide-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough. Dalton, vi, pp. 30, 312. (21) The second son of a Huguenot, Ligonier would lead a distinguished career as a soldier, becoming Field-Marshal and Commander-in-Chief, and being elevated to the peerage. Served as a volunteer in Flanders in 1702, before being commissioned into Lord North and Grey's regiment of Foot. Dalton, v, II, pp. 45-46. (22) Father of Major-General James Wolfe (1727-1759). Commissioned as an ensign in Viscount Shannon's regiment of marines before transferring to the Foot. A captain in Sir Richard Temple's regiment of Foot in 1709; promoted major, 24 April 1710. Dalton, vi, pp. 349-350. (23) Commissioned as a cornet in Teviot's (later Hay's) (Royal Scots) Dragoons in 1694; served on that regiment's rolls throughout the war. Acted as an agent for the Earl of Stair for several years. Dalton, v, II, pp. 24-25. (24) Commissioned into Fitzpatrick's (later Sir Charles O'Hara's/Lord Tyrrawley's) regiment of Foot (the Royal Fusiliers) in 1692; captain in William Evan's newly raised regiment of Foot in 1703. Dalton, vi, pp. 353-354. (25) Lord North and Grey's regiment of Foot. Commission as brigade-major dated 24 December 1710 (Dalton, vi, p. 182); may also have served as an aide-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough. Dalton, v, II, pp. 45, 47 n. 21. (26) This officer appears on a list of brigade-majors for 1712 consulted by Dalton, who (erroneously, it appears) inserted him into those serving in that post in 1709, on the Malplaquet Roll. Roberts is not listed on the pay warrants for 1709 and 1710. He served vice Wolfe in 1711. Dalton, vi, pp. 300, 303.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>General Officer; Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Abercrombie¹</td>
<td>Capt. 16.3.1709</td>
<td>1711⁸</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sir) James Abercrombie (Bt)²</td>
<td>Capt. 31.5.1701; Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706; Bvt Lt-Col. 14.5.1709; Capt. &amp; Lt-Col. 1710; Bvt Col. 1.11.1711</td>
<td>1704, 1709²¹</td>
<td>Orkney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Armstrong³</td>
<td>Lt &amp; Capt. 26.10.1706; Bvt Lt-Col. by 4.1709</td>
<td>1707-1711²³</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Bragg⁴</td>
<td>Capt. 25.8.1704; Lt-Col. 6.5.1709</td>
<td>1710-1711²⁷</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Brinfield⁵</td>
<td>Exempt &amp; Capt. 1.12.1693; Bvt Maj. 6.3.1703 N.S.</td>
<td>1701-1706⁴⁸</td>
<td>Marlborough; killed at Ramillies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir James Chamberlain, Bt⁶</td>
<td>Brig. &amp; eldest Lt 1.1.1692; Capt. 12.4.1706</td>
<td>1710³⁰</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. N. Chanclos⁷</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1711³¹</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Churchill⁸</td>
<td>Capt. 1.9.1697; Maj. 3.4.1706; Bvt Col. 1.1.1707; Col. 25.3.1709</td>
<td>1704³²</td>
<td>Chas. Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Disney⁹</td>
<td>Lt 15.2.1703; Capt. before 8.1704; Capt. &amp; Lt-Col. 11.3.1708; Col. 23.10.1710</td>
<td>1704³³</td>
<td>Withers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Durell¹⁰</td>
<td>Capt. 6.1.1702; Lt-Col. c. 1703; Bvt Col. 25.8.1704; Col. 17.2.1711; Brig. 1.1.1710</td>
<td>1701-1710⁴⁶</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Evans¹¹</td>
<td>Capt.-Lt 15.7.1695; Capt. 1.8.1695 (Lt-Col. c. 1702); Col. 10.4.1703; Brig. 1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1710</td>
<td>1702³⁴</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[James] Eyton¹²</td>
<td>Lt. 1.4.1697; Capt. 25.8.1704</td>
<td>1704³⁵</td>
<td>Wood? (Served in Wood’s regiment.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Foxon¹³</td>
<td>Capt. 10.4.1703; Lt-Col. 6.5.1709</td>
<td>†1709</td>
<td>Cadogan; killed before Mons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Godfrey¹⁴</td>
<td>Capt. &amp; Lt-Col. 3.3.1703; Col. 25.3.1705; Brig. 1.1.1710</td>
<td>1702³⁶</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[?] Goodwyn¹⁵</td>
<td>Capt. in 1710 (see notes)</td>
<td>1710, 1711³⁷</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metcalfe Graham¹⁶</td>
<td>Corn. 14.4.1702; Bvt Capt. 1.9.1704; Capt.-Lt 2.4.1708; Bvt Lt-Col. 14.5.1709; Bvt Col.19.2.1711</td>
<td>1707-1711³⁸</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Edward] Hamilton¹⁷</td>
<td>Corn. 19.6.1702; Lt 23.8.1707</td>
<td>1704, 1709³⁹</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Rank and Dates</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ens. 20.7.1696; Lt 1.2.1700; Capt. 24.12.1704</td>
<td>1704, 1709&lt;sup&gt;M&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Ingoldsby? (Served in Ingoldsby's regiment.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard King&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Eng. 4.4.1704, 17.3.1707; Capt. 25.3.1705; Bvt Lt- Col. 14.5.1709; Col. 12.2.1710; Q.M.G. under Jack Hill 1.3.1711</td>
<td>1710&lt;sup&gt;M&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Cadogan, Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Lancaster&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Corn. 25.8.1709; Lt 24.2.1710</td>
<td>1710-1711&lt;sup&gt;M&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough; also served as a brigade-major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lancaster&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Corn.24.10. 1709</td>
<td>1707-1709&lt;sup&gt;M&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Peter?] Law&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Corn. 1.6.1697; Lt before 13.8.1704</td>
<td>1704&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Lumley? (Served in Lumley's regiment.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Charles or Richard] Legg&lt;sup&gt;23&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Capt. 3.8.1704 or 1.2.1706</td>
<td>1710&lt;sup&gt;M&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough; may also have served as a brigade-major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Leigh&lt;sup&gt;24&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Bvt Maj. 10.4.1707, Bvt Lt-Col. 1.1.1712</td>
<td>1710, 1711&lt;sup&gt;M&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[William] Lloyd&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Capt. 14.9.1693; Capt. &amp; Lt-Col. 25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 1.1.1707</td>
<td>1704&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Chas. Churchill? (Served in Churchill's regiment.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. N. Meerbach&lt;sup&gt;26&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1710&lt;sup&gt;M&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Molesworth&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Ens. 14.4.1702; Capt. &amp; Lt-Col. 5.5.1705/7; Col. 9.7.1710</td>
<td>1706, 1709&lt;sup&gt;R&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Murray, Marquess of Tullibardine&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Bvt Col. c. 1706</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>Marlborough; killed at Malplaquet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Nassau Zuylenstein, Viscount Tunbridge&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Bvt Col. 1.1.1704; Col. 12.4.1706, 1.2.1707</td>
<td>1704&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hon. James O'Hara&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Lt 15.3.1703; Capt. 24.3.1705</td>
<td>1709&lt;sup&gt;R&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Lewis Oglethorpe]&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1704&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Panton&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Capt. 20.4.1695; Bvt Lt-Col. 25.10.1703; Bvt Col. 1.7.1706; Brig. 12.2.1711</td>
<td>1702-1710&lt;sup&gt;R&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Parke&lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Col. ?</td>
<td>1704&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Matthew] Pennefather&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Ens. 1.6.1695; Lt 31.5.1701; Capt. before 25.8.1704; Lt-Col. 1.4.1705; Bvt Col. 1.1.1707</td>
<td>1704&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Ingoldsby? (Served in Ingoldsby's regiment; later commissary-general under him in Ireland.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Pitt&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Lt 27.3.1699; Capt.-Lt 24.8.1707.</td>
<td>1704-1711&lt;sup&gt;D&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Anthony] Pujolas&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Lt &amp; Capt. 19.4.1697; Capt. 1.1.1706</td>
<td>1704&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Thomas] Pulteney&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Ens. 16.11.1702; Lt &amp; Capt. 23.10.1708</td>
<td>1710, 1711&lt;sup&gt;M&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>N. N. Rolas</td>
<td>†1702</td>
<td>Cutts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. N. Roosendael</td>
<td>1710, 1711</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Francis] Scawen</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>Cutts? (See note.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Schomberg, Marquess of Harwich</td>
<td>Col. 27.1.1711</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algernon Seymour, Earl of Hertford</td>
<td>Col. 23.10.1709</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Charles or Frederick] Sibourg</td>
<td>1702b</td>
<td>Marlborough</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[George] Stephenson</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>Wood? (Served in Wood’s regiment of Horse.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Watkins</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>Chas. Churchill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Adam or Francis] Williamson</td>
<td>1709</td>
<td>Orkney, Withers, Argyll, Webb or Meredith?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Robert?] Wilson</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>Lulmley? (May have served in Lulmley’s regiment of Horse.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Years of service are listed in *italics* when they derive from non-serial, ‘snapshot’ sources (e.g. the Blenheim and Malplaquet Rolls), typically listing aides-de-camp to general officers other than Marlborough—these officers are rarely distinguished in the sources, and data is incomplete. An aide-de-camp who died in his post is marked by † at the termination of his service.

**General authorities (all dates indicated in warrants and commissions O.S. unless otherwise noted):**

(a) Warrant to pay the to aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough, 30 December 1701 to 25 December 1702. Paid out of Contingencies. The Hague, 19 November 1702 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61369, f. 114b.

(b) Warrant to pay the general officers’ aides-de-camp for the campaign of 1702. The Hague, November 1702 N.S. Also includes £50 each to be paid to Lt Col. Evans, Lt Col. Sibourg and Captain Panton, “as a gratification for their Service [to Marlborough] as Aids de Camp for part of the said Campagne.” BL Add. MSS 61369, f. 111.

(c) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough, 26 December 1702 to 25 December 1703. Paid out of Contingencies. The Hague, 28 October 1703 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61370, f. 69b.

(d) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1704. Paid out of Contingencies. The Hague, 15 December 1704 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61370, f. 176b.

(e) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1705. Camp at Kalmthout, 23 October 1705 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61371, ff. 50-51b.

(f) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1706. The Hague, 15 November 1706 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61371, ff. 129-129b.

(g) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1707. The Hague, 6 November 1707 N.S. No specific mention of Contingencies.

Whereas the previous warrants had only allowed for two aides-de-camp to be paid at the rate of 10s. per day for a full year, this warrant listed four aides due that allowance; see also authority (h), below. BL Add. MSS 61371, f. 207b.

(h) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1707. The Hague, 6 November 1707 N.S. An additional warrant, covering the pay of two further aides-de-camp, at 10s. per day for a full year. BL Add. MSS 61371, f. 207b.

(i) Warrant to pay four aides-de-camp to the
Duke of Marlborough for the year 1708. Camp at Merelbeke, 10 December 1708 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 95b-96. (j) Warrant to pay two aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1708. Camp at Merelbeke, 10 December 1708 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 96. (k) Warrant to pay four aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1709. The Hague, 7 November 1709 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 145-145b. (l) Warrant to pay two aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1709. The Hague, 7 November 1709 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 150b. (m) Notes on forage received by general and staff officers at the siege of Douai, 1710. Camp before Aire, 3 November 1710 N.S. These notes list twelve officers as being aides-de-camp to Marlborough at the siege; the majority appear temporary. BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 241-242. (n) Warrant to pay four aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1710. The Hague, 5 December 1710 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 257. (o) Warrant to pay two aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1710. The Hague, 5 December 1710 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 257b. (p) Account of forage delivered from 16 April to 24 May 1711 N.S. Seven aides-de-camp are listed (quite possibly in relation to Marlborough). BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 334b-335. (q) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1711. The Hague, 16 November 1711 N.S. Three aides-de-camp are paid the usual £182.10s. for the full year; two share that sum, receiving £91.5s. each for a full year’s service. BL Add. MSS 61373, f. 43. (r) Warrant to pay two aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1711. The Hague, 16 November 1711 N.S. BL Add. MSS 61373, f. 43. (s) The Blenheim Roll. Twenty-one aides-de-camp appear on Dalton’s transcribed (and emended) list. Dalton, v, II, p. 2. (t) The Malplaquet Roll. Nine aides-de-camp are named on Dalton’s list. Dalton, vi, p. 300.

Notes: (1) Received £91.5s., half the usual allowance, for his service as aide-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough in 1711. Noted as a ‘captain’ on the warrant, indicating the Alexander Abercrombie who was a captain in Tatton’s regiment of Foot, as opposed to the lieutenant of the same name in Ross’ Royal Regiment of Dragoons of Ireland. Served as the M.P. for Banffshire, 1707-1727, representing Scotland in the first parliament of Great Britain. Sought a captaincy in the Scots Guards by Marlborough, but was unsuccessful; enjoyed the patronage of the Earl of Seafield (whose brother had also sought the above vacancy) in other matters. Dalton, vi, pp. 343-344; Hayton et al., HoC 1690-1715, iii, pp. 1-5; Snyder, iii, pp. 1225, 1670. (2) Aide-de-camp to the Earl of Orkney at Blenheim (Dalton, v, II, p. 6); and Malplaquet (Dalton, vi, p. 300). Created a baronet in 1709 for his service. (3) The famous engineer, deputy quartermaster-general under Cadogan (date of his commission and brevet of lieutenant-colonel unforthcoming), and later quartermaster-general under Ormonde. Received 10s. per day as an aide-de-camp to Marlborough, 1707-1711. There is confusion in the secondary literature over Armstrong’s rank in the army. The DNB suggests that, after distinguished service at Blenheim, Armstrong was given a lieutenantcy of grenadiers in Howe’s regiment of Foot; but Dalton lists no such commission (though a John Armstrong is listed as a lieutenant of grenadiers in Meredith’s, 1702: Dalton, iv, p. 282; v, p. 241). A John Armstrong also served in Wynne’s regiment (captain, 25 March 1705, on its raising; out of the regiment, 24 January 1708: Dalton, v, pp. 184-185, 268). What is known is that the engineer held a commission as lieutenant and captain in the 1st Foot Guards (26 December 1706; Dalton, v, p. 45), and held this rank in 1708 (as attested by instructions given to ‘Captain Armstrong, of Her Majesty’s first regiment of Foot Guards’, 1 June 1708 N.S.—see Murray, iv, pp. 46-47). (4) Does not appear on the warrant for aides-de-
camp for 1710, but is listed as serving in that capacity under Marlborough at the siege of Douai that year. Commissioned as an ensign in the 1st Foot Guards in 1702, after serving four years as a volunteer (BL Add. MSS 61378, f. 16b); petitioned for a vacant company in Rivers' regiment of Foot, but instead took a captaincy in Tatton's after Blenheim. Lieutenant-colonel in the Earl of Islay's regiment of Foot in 1709. Dalton, v, II, pp. 29, 31. (5) Bringfield received the usual pay of an aide-de-camp (10s. per day, or £182.10s. for a calendar year) for the years 1702-1705. He died at Ramillies in 1706, decapitated by a cannonball as he aided the Duke of Marlborough in mounting his horse. His assigns received £70 for his 140 days' service in that post. Dalton, v, II, p. 2, 5. Dalton lacked a date for Bringfield's appointment as major of Horse, and lists it as '1702'; his brevet as major of Horse was actually signed at The Hague, 6 March 1703 N.S. (BL Add. MSS 61370, ff. 6-6b). (6) Succeeded to the baronetcy of Wickham, Oxfordshire, in 1699. Captain in a newly raised regiment of Foot (Viscount Tunbridge's) in 1706; out of the regiment, 13 March 1710. Listed as an aide-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough at the siege of Douai, 1710. Dalton, v, p. 199. (7) Untraced. Presumably related to Denis François Urbain Joseph de Retz de Brisuila de Chanclos, the Dutch general officer and governor. Listed as receiving forage as an aide-de-camp in 1711, in readiness for the siege of Bouchain. (8) Natural son of General Charles Churchill; nephew of Marlborough. Aide-de-camp to his father at Blenheim. Sedgwick (Ed.), HoC 1715-1754, i. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 31. (9) Disney (an Anglicization of 'Desaulnais') was the only aide-de-camp to general officers other than Marlborough to be named in the accounts seen by this author; he was noted as being an aide-de-camp to Major-General Withers in 1706 (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. i, p.202). Disney was noted as being the 'loving friend' of Withers; the two had shared a house together, in Greenwich, since at least 1713 (see the article on Henry Withers, DNB). Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 34. (10) The longest-serving aide to the Duke of Marlborough during the War of the Spanish Succession. Durell continued to serve as an aide-de-camp to the duke upon the establishment whilst also doing duty as adjutant-general. Was given the honour of escorting several French generals back to England after the victory at Ramillies. Dalton, v, II, p. 5 n. 27. (11) Twice wounded at the siege of Namur, 1695. Evans received £50 "as a Gratification" for his service in 1702. Dalton, vi, p. 302 n. 9. (12) Spelt 'Eaton' in some sources; served at Malplaquet and Ramillies. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 36. (13) Cadogan's aide-de-camp, he was killed on the evening of 25 September 1709 N.S., at the skirmish in which the quartermaster-general was wounded, before Mons. Deane, Journal, pp. 96-97. Captain in William Evans' newly raised regiment of Foot, 1703. Lieutenant-colonel en second in Colonel William Breton's regiment of Foot, 6 May 1709 O.S. Dalton, v, pp. 173-174. (14) Nephew of Marlborough (son of Arabella Churchill). Groom of the bedchamber to Prince George of Denmark, 1706. Inherited half the estate of George Churchill, by the latter's will.Received £50 for his service as aide-de-camp to Marlborough in 1702. Godfrey received only £91 (or £90, according to annotation in the margin), instead of the £180 awarded Bringfield and Durell, for 'the like service during the campaign'. (15) Rendered 'Godwin' in some sources. The identity of this officer is not clear; he is mentioned as being a captain in both 1710 and 1711, receiving forage as an aide-de-camp. It could be one of three officers; indeed, the aides mentioned for 1710 and 1711 need not necessarily be the same. The possibilities are: (i) John Goodwin, promoted lieutenant in Colonel Evans' regiment of Foot, 20 November 1708 N.S. There is no record of a captain's commission, and he was placed on half-pay in 1713. (ii) Captain William Goodwyn, who served at that rank in Lumley's Horse at Blenheim, and was believed to have been at Ramillies. He had left Lumley's regiment by 1709. Dalton, v,
II, p. 14. N.6. (iii) (John) Philip Goodwyn, an officer in Stringer's/Argyll's/Orrery's/Sibourg's regiment of Foot. Captain, 15 March 1693; major, 24 April 1712; lieutenant-colonel, 1 June 1712. Dalton, vi, p. 144. (16) Received the full pay of £182.10s. p.a., 1707-1711. Graham succeeded Durell as adjutant-general and 'senior' aide-de-camp in 1711, but was recorded as acting adjutant-general at the siege of Douai in 1710. Carried dispatches to England after the battle of Malplaquet. Dalton wrote that Graham served as Marlborough's aide-de-camp at Ramillies, but this author has found no evidence of that so far. Dalton, v, II, p. 19 n. 6. (17) Noted as an aide-de-camp at both Blenheim and Malplaquet. Served in Ross's regiment of Dragoons; Ross was only a brigadier at Blenheim, and would not have possessed an aide-de-camp. Wounded at Schellenberg. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n.45. (18) Wounded at Schellenberg. Noted as being an aide-de-camp at both Blenheim and Malplaquet. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 40. (19) Served in various posts as a staff and engineer officer in the Low countries, 1704-1710. Dalton, v, II, p. 10 n. 18. His papers are held at the Royal Library, Windsor Castle. King received pay as an aide-de-camp to Cadogan in 1710 (KP, I(i)/98, 212); received forage as an aide-de-camp to Marlborough at the siege of Douai, also in 1710. (20) Commissioned into Palmes' regiment of Carabiniers. Received the full £182.10s. in 1710 and 1711 as aide-de-camp to Marlborough. Dalton, vi, p. 312. A Charles Lancaster (and Dalton only lists one officer of this name) was also noted as serving as a major of brigade in 1708 and 1711; see Table 2.3. It was most probably this officer that the accounts for forage in 1710 and 1711 indicated, when referring to 'Major Lancaster'; see sources (m) and (p) above. Although Lancaster did not possess the substantive rank of major, those who served as majors of brigade were frequently denoted as 'Maj. ——'. (21) William Lancaster was commissioned as a cornet to Lumley's own troop in the Queen's Regiment of Horse, 24 October 1707. Dalton, vi, pp. 27, 307. Lancaster received the standard 10s. p.d. as an aide-de-camp to Marlborough, for the years 1707-1709. (22) Dalton's supposition; Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 43. Helpfully, two other potential candidates—Charles and Nathaniel Law—were both in the same regiment as Peter: Lumley's regiment of Horse. (23) There are two possibilities for the 'Captain Legg' mentioned: Richard Legg, a captain in Howe's regiment of Foot; or Charles Legg, a captain Lord North and Grey's regiment of Foot. If Charles Legg, he also served as a brigade-major in 1711. Dalton, v, II, p. 47 n. 21; p. 49 n. 13. (24) Probably the William Leigh of Erle's regiment of Foot (Dalton, vi, pp. 194, 197, 338 n.4). Received £91.5s., half the usual allowance, for his service as aide-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough in 1711. For the dispute over his brevet of major (which Leigh had received to the prejudice of many senior captains in his regiment), see NA WO 71/1, pp. 53, 55, 58-9, 64-5. (25) Captain and lieutenant in Prince George of Denmark's (Churchill's) regiment of Foot in 1691; noted as a captain in Churchill's at Blenheim, but seemingly transferred soon after the battle: he was promoted captain and lieutenant-colonel in the First Foot Guards, 25 August 1704. Appears on Dalton's list for Blenheim. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 32. Lloyd appears immediately after Charles Churchill (fils) on the Blenheim Roll, and may also have been one of General Churchill's aides-de-camp. (26) Unknown. (27) Son of Robert Molesworth, Whig M.P. for East Retford, 1705-1708. Saved Marlborough's life at the battle of Ramillies (Snyder, i, no. 596, pp. 584-585: Godolphin to Marlborough, 14 June 1706 O.S.), where secondary sources typically list him as an aide-de-camp. He is also listed as an aide-de-camp on the Malplaquet Roll. Dalton, v, II, p. 34 n. 7 suggests his promotion as captain and lieutenant-colonel in the Coldstream Guards was effective 5 May 1705; but ibid, vi, p. 55 lists it as 5 May 1707. (28) Eldest son of the Duke of Atholl. A Scots officer in largely Dutch service, Tullibardine.
served as an aide-de-camp to Marlborough in 1706 (BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 60b: camp journal, 20 July 1706 N.S.). He was killed leading a regiment of the Scots Brigade at Malplaquet. Dalton, vi, p. 201 n. 33. (29) Carried the second express from Marlborough to the court, after the battle of Blenheim, for which he received a royal bounty of £1000 (Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 457). Dalton, v, II, pp. 5-6 n. 29. (30) Son of Baron Tyravly; commissioned into his father’s regiment of Fusiliers. Also served as an aide-de-camp to the Earl of Galway at the battle of Almanza, where he was wounded in saving his commander’s life. Wounded at Malplaquet. Dalton, vi, p. 303 n. 14. (31) Equerry to Queen Anne. Luttrell recorded that Oglethorpe had been made aide-de-camp to Marlborough in his entry of 4 April 1704 O.S. (Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 410). He did not appear on any pay warrant for 1704. Died of wounds received at the storming of the Schellenberg. Dalton, v, II, p. 7 n. 45. (32) After Durell, Panton was the duke’s second-longest serving aide-de-camp during the War of the Spanish Succession. Dalton, v, II, p. 5 n. 28. Received £50 as a gratification for his service as aide-de-camp in 1702; £100 for like service in 1703, 1704, 1705 and 1706; and 10s. a day (£182.10s. p.a.) for his services, 1707-1710. (33) Parke carried Marlborough’s first dispatch from Blenheim to England. Later Governor of the Leeward Islands, 25.4.1706; he was killed by an insurrection on Antigua in 1710. BL, Add. MSS 61293, f. 5: copy of a letter by favour of Colonel Gledhill, Montserrat, 5 January 1711 (O.S.?), enclosed with William Churchill’s letter, 12 March 1711 O.S. (ff. 3-4b). An account of Parke’s murder. There is little information on his military service prior to Blenheim. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 30. (34) Of a Tipperary family. Commissioned into Ingoldsby’s regiment of Foot [Royal Welsh Fusiliers]. Wounded at Oudenaarde. BL, Add. MSS 61293, ff. 58-59b: petition of Colonel Pennefather to Marlborough. Commissary-General of Ireland, under commander-in-chief Ingoldsby. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 39. (35) Received £100 for his services as aide-de-camp in 1704 and 1705. In 1706, he received £112.10s., taking Bringfield’s place upon the establishment after the latter died. For the remainder of his time as aide-de-camp to Marlborough, he received £182.10s. p.a. Based upon his sources, Dalton was hesitant in positively identifying the ‘Captain Pitt’ on the MS Blenbkeim Roll with the John Pitt of Wood’s regiment of Horse (who was only promoted captain a few years later); this identification appears correct, however. In Marlborough’s warrants authorising pay to the aides-de-camp, Pitt is consistently referred to as ‘Mr. John Pitt’ (commonly used in this context for those beneath the rank of captain) until 1707, when he was promoted Captain-Lieutenant. Dalton, v, II, pp. 6 n. 33, 17 n. 8. (36) Transferred from the first regiment of Foot Guards to Ingoldsby’s regiment of Foot in 1706. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 41. (37) Youngest brother of William Pulteney, who was later created earl of Bath; commissioned into the first regiment of Foot Guards. Dalton, vi, p. 319 n. 8. Referred to as an aide-de-camp in accounts for forage made in 1710 and 1711. (38) Cutts’ aide-de-camp, killed at the storming of Fort St Michel at the siege of Venlo, 1702. No mention in Dalton. (39) Unknown. (40) Of the Coldstream Guards. Dalton lists different dates for his commission in different entries. Dalton, v, p. 46; v, II, p. 6 n. 37; vi, p. 321. Scawen was most probably the aide-de-camp of Cutts in 1704; it appears he was either wounded, or taken ill, in the Blenheim campaign. A letter from his uncle, William Scawen, thanks Cutts for the ‘singular care’ the general showed his nephew in giving him his own lodgings and providing for him. BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 47-48b: William Scawen to Lord Cutts, Tunbridge Wells, 24 August 1704 O.S. (41) Only son of Meinhardt, 3rd Duke of Schomberg and 1st Duke of Leinster. Died in 1713, from syphilis. (42) Only son of Charles Seymour, 6th Duke of Somerset. Went over to the Low Countries to serve as a volunteer in 1708 (Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 297). Present
with Marlborough after Malplaquet. Dalton, vi, pp. 86 n. 1, 303. (43) The identity of this officer is unclear. In the warrant authorising £50 as a gratification of his service as aide-de-camp, the officer is listed as ‘Lt-Col. Sibourg’. The warrant was dated November 1702; Charles Sibourg’s commission as lieutenant-colonel was dated 1 March 1703 O.S. (His major’s commission was dated 1 May 1694 O.S.) It is possible the rank in the entry was a mistake; or it is also possible that the officer referred to was Frederick Sibourg, who left to undertake the role of adjutant-general to the forces sent to Portugal in 1703, and was killed with John Richards and Edward Thornicroft at Alicante, in 1709. (44) Of Wood’s regiment of Horse. Dalton, v, ii, p. 6 n. 44. (45) Dalton, v, ii, p. 6 n. 35. A petition of George Watkins, undated (it is marked ‘after 1704, before 1708’ in pencil”), desired of Marlborough a commission of lieutenant-colonel in the new levies, in view of past hardships and a lack of pay. The petitioner noted that he had served as aide-de-camp to the General of Foot (i.e. Charles Churchill) in the past three campaigns. BL, Add. MSS 61297, ff. 52-53b: petition of George Watkins to Marlborough. (46) The camp journal entry of 23 June 1709 N.S. noted that ‘Mr Williamson’ was declared the ‘lieutenant-general’s’ aide-de-camp (BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 109b). The British lieutenants-general of Foot present in the theatre at that time were Orkney, Withers, Argyll, Webb and Meredyth. Two possibilities for the aide are Adam Williamson, commissioned as a lieutenant in Meredyth’s regiment of Foot, 12 May 1706 O.S. (Dalton, vi, p. 348 n. 11); and Francis Williamson, who was a lieutenant and captain in the Coldstream Guards (9 December 1703 O.S.) before transferring to Charles Churchill’s regiment of Foot, where he took a captain’s commission (21 April 1706 O.S.; Dalton, vi, p. 326 n. 7). The usage of ‘Mr’ to typically denote a rank lower than captain, combined with the presence of Meredyth and the possibilities for patronage, may indicate the former. (47) Dalton identifies this ‘Lieutenant Wilson’ as Robert Wilson, who was commissioned in the Queen’s Regiment of Horse (Lumley’s). Dalton, v, ii, p. 6 n. 42. Robert Wilson’s brevet of captain (5 August 1704 N.S.) might render the rank of lieutenant on the MS list an error; or point to other alternatives. The two other possibilities are Lieutenant John and (Captain-)lieutenant Archibald Wilson, both of Ferguson’s regiment of Foot (the Cameronians). See Dalton, v, ii, p. 67 n. 12 & 14.
Table A.5: Michael Richards' itinerary on his journey from Vlierbeck to Vienna, and back to Frankfurt, 20 July 1705 to 7 August 1705 N.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (N.S.)</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Time of arrival</th>
<th>No. of Richards' comments</th>
<th>Richards' comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monday 20 July 1705</strong></td>
<td>Tirlemont</td>
<td>9 p.m.</td>
<td>3 leagues</td>
<td>3 leagues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St Trond</td>
<td>11 p.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tuesday 21 July 1705</strong></td>
<td>Maastricht</td>
<td>4 a.m.</td>
<td>7 leagues; left at 8.30 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aachen</td>
<td>11 a.m.</td>
<td>6 leagues; by 'dilligence post'. Changed bad horses once.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jülich</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>5 leagues; met with a French party.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The city gates had just been shut when Richards arrived, but they were opened again. Waited on the Prince of Saxony. Departed at 11 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wednesday 22 July 1705</strong></td>
<td>Warts</td>
<td>3 a.m.</td>
<td>8 leagues; via a chase with two horses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phibosch</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>6 leagues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frehlingen</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Walmenracht</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dokrken</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Sent the Elector of Trier’s letters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swalbach</td>
<td>4.30 p.m.</td>
<td>8 leagues; stayed 3 hours.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cassel</td>
<td>8.30 p.m.</td>
<td>8 leagues; sent the Elector of Mainz’s letters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>11.30 p.m.</td>
<td>[In one stage'] 8 leagues; stayed until past 12.30 a.m. Left at 5 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thursday 23 July 1706</strong></td>
<td>Hanau</td>
<td>7 a.m.</td>
<td>By chase.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dettingen</td>
<td>9.30 a.m.</td>
<td>By chase.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bessenbach</td>
<td>11 a.m.</td>
<td>By chase; place within the woods.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rohrbrunn</td>
<td>Noon</td>
<td>By horse. In the woods; post house only.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Esselbach</td>
<td>2.30 p.m.</td>
<td>By a good horse. The wood breaks, and the road too, being stony. 2 or 3 good inns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remlingen</td>
<td>4.30 p.m.</td>
<td>By a good horse. ‘Ordinary place’.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Würzburg</td>
<td>6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>By a very good horse. Handsome fortified town.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kitzingen</td>
<td>9 p.m.</td>
<td>By a chase; ‘good people’. Open way.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possenheim</td>
<td>11 p.m.</td>
<td>Stayed for horses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Friday 24 July 1706</strong></td>
<td>Langenfeld</td>
<td>2.30 a.m.</td>
<td>By a good chase.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emskirchen</td>
<td>4 a.m.</td>
<td>By a chase; good way.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farenbach [Burgfarrenbach]</td>
<td>7 a.m.</td>
<td>By good horses; good way.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nürnberg</td>
<td>8 a.m.</td>
<td>1 small post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feucht</td>
<td>10.30 a.m.</td>
<td>By a good horse and way.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postbauer</td>
<td>Noon</td>
<td>1 By a bad horse; stony way.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deyningagen</td>
<td>2.30 p.m.</td>
<td>1 By a good horse; stony way.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarsberge</td>
<td>5.30 p.m.</td>
<td>1 By a good horse; stony way.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laberg</td>
<td>6 p.m.</td>
<td>'Bad stones.'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regensburg</td>
<td>8.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Good way. Crosses the Danube.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faben/Bhadern</td>
<td>9 p.m.</td>
<td>Slow way. Full of water, often very deep, and close by the Danube. Difficult and dangerous on account of the dark.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday 25 July 1705</td>
<td>4.30 a.m.</td>
<td>The waters being 'much out', was forced down a stream in an attempted crossing. Saved himself with some difficulty, and lay in a little house until day.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straubing</td>
<td>4.30 a.m.</td>
<td>Eventually</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Plattling*</td>
<td>8.30 a.m.</td>
<td>Good horses from Straubing. The next town was full of water on account of an overflow of the Isler, due to the recent weather. The local wooden bridge broke while Richards was there; he had no means to depart but by boat. He departed by water at 10 a.m., travelling to a nearby chateau a league away, where he hired horses and rounded the high country to Pleinting.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleinting*</td>
<td>12 noon</td>
<td>Hired another boat (with three men) for 20 ducats; left at past 1 p.m. on the Danube. 96 leagues to Vienna.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed by</td>
<td>2 p.m.</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vliescheren</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed by</td>
<td>4 p.m.</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunday 26 July 1705</td>
<td>Break of day</td>
<td>The flood had been so great that all the islands of the Danube were under water. Upon arriving, Richards delivered all his letters and met Count Wratislaw.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>3.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday 27 July 1705</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Dined with Francis Palmes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday 28 July 1705</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Dined with Count Wacherbach, from Poland.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday 29 July 1705</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Dined with Mr Stepney.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday 30 July 1705</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dined with Mr Brunitz, from the United Provinces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday 31 July 1705</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dined with [-] from Denmark.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday 1 August 1705</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td></td>
<td>Took his leave.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday 2 August 1705</td>
<td>Enzersdorf</td>
<td>5 p.m.</td>
<td>Left Vienna at 2 p.m. Passed the Danube at by way of a ferry, as many bridges were broken. Ways flooded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stockerau</td>
<td>7.30 p.m.</td>
<td>By way of Cronenburg, through a small wood on a low ay.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hollabrun</td>
<td>10.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Ground rises more. Way good.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neudorf</td>
<td>12 midnight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday 3 August 1705</td>
<td>Pulkau</td>
<td>2 a.m.</td>
<td>Hard way; a little stony.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Languenau [Langau]</td>
<td>4 a.m.</td>
<td>Passed a firwood; stony hill.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fratting [Vratěnín]</td>
<td>6 a.m.</td>
<td>2 stony ways; some woods.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Piesing [Písečné]</td>
<td>8 a.m.</td>
<td>Partly good, partly rocky, partly made with timber.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zlabing [Slavonice]</td>
<td>10.30 a.m.</td>
<td>As above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koningsegg [Kunžák?]</td>
<td>12.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Partly good, partly sandy, partly stony.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neuhaus [Jindřichov Hradec]</td>
<td>2 p.m.</td>
<td>Long stages. Rocky, partly made with timber.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wesseley [Veselý bad Lužnicti]</td>
<td>6.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Shorter stage. Stony, aptly made with timber.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Their [Týn nad Vltavou?]</td>
<td>9.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Very long and stony way.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuesday 4 August 1705</td>
<td>Strakonitz [Strakonice]</td>
<td>5.30 a.m.</td>
<td>Shorter stage, but very stony.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horazdoveneitz [Horažďovice]</td>
<td>7 a.m.</td>
<td>Shorter stage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grurzberg [?]</td>
<td>10 a.m.</td>
<td>Long stage. Partly good, partly stony hill.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wildstein [Vlčtejn?]</td>
<td>1 p.m.</td>
<td>A long, single stage. Partly rough.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pilsen [Plzeň]</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>As above. Empty town.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ulitz [Ulice?]</td>
<td>5.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Waya little better. Empty town.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mies [Stříbro]</td>
<td>7 p.m.</td>
<td>Pretty good way, but long stage. Empty town.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>Plaar [Planá]</td>
<td>12:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Extremely bad descent and ascent at the second hill. Rest of the way stony.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 August 1705</td>
<td>Sandau [Dolní Zádov]</td>
<td>3 a.m.</td>
<td>Long stage; stony way.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eger [Cheb]</td>
<td>5 a.m.</td>
<td>Better way. As far as Eger he paid but half a dollar per man, or 15 grosches. 29.5 posts to this point from Vienna.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frankenhauer [Franken?]</td>
<td>9 a.m.</td>
<td>Long stages; hard stony way. From Eger, Richards paid a florin per horse, or 20 grosches.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Berneck</td>
<td>12 noon</td>
<td>Rocky, difficult, steep hills to the town (with ruined castles).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bayreuth</td>
<td>3:30 p.m.</td>
<td>A walled town, with a chateau with cannon. Top rocky, then a pleasant bottom (but soft in the winter). A fine lake supplied with boats, and pretty pleasure houses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Streitberg</td>
<td>8 p.m.</td>
<td>Partly made way; three great descents, the last into town situated in a fair narrow plain. An old castle at the entrance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>Altendorf</td>
<td>12:30 a.m.</td>
<td>A steep hill to get up and a great descent; long stage; much made ways.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 August 1705</td>
<td>Bamberg</td>
<td>2 a.m.</td>
<td>Good way. A pretty town; passed the River Main by a bridge.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burckiseinheim [Burgwindheim?]</td>
<td>6:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Good, even way, but long stages.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neissingen [?]</td>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Made way; broken, very long stage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dettelbach</td>
<td>11:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Partly made way, but better later.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Würzburg</td>
<td>Noon</td>
<td>For the most part a good way and long. Passed the River Main on a stone bridge. A pretty, fortified town.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remlingen</td>
<td>4 p.m.</td>
<td>Several stony, hollow ways; long stage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Esselbach</td>
<td>6 p.m.</td>
<td>Descended down a hill, then passed the River Main on a ferry. Then ascended a stony way into the woods.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rohrbrunn</td>
<td>8 p.m.</td>
<td>A post house built in the woods.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bessenbach</td>
<td>10 p.m.</td>
<td>The woods reached down to this village in a wet bottom.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>Dettingen</td>
<td>1 a.m.</td>
<td>Up a rocky hill; the rest of the way was good.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August 1705</td>
<td>Hanau</td>
<td>3 a.m.</td>
<td>Good way. Stayed for the keys into the Faubourg, where the post house was</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>6 a.m.</td>
<td>Could not enter until 7 a.m. Notes that on Friday the gates were not normally opened until 8 a.m. 21 posts from Eger to Frankfurt. Richards remained at Frankfurt until 3 p.m., meeting with Mr Behage and mending his chase.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date (N.S.)</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General of the Day</td>
<td>Major-General of the Day</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 August 1708</td>
<td>[Henry] Withers (British)</td>
<td>[Coenraad] Wecke (Dutch; typically spelt 'Wike' or 'Week' in English sources)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 August 1708</td>
<td>[George Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (British)]</td>
<td>[Johan Werner van] Pallandt (Dutch)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 August 1708</td>
<td>[Coenraad Willem van] Dedem (Dutch)</td>
<td>[Stevan van] Welderen (Dutch)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August 1708</td>
<td>Withers (British)</td>
<td>[Otto Magnus, Graf von] Dönhoff (Prussian; 'Denhoff')</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 August 1708</td>
<td>Dedem (Dutch)</td>
<td>[John Campbell, Duke of] Argyll (British)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1708</td>
<td>[Bengt, Count] Oxenstierna (Dutch)</td>
<td>[John Richmond] Webb (British)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 August 1708</td>
<td>Withers (British)</td>
<td>[Thomas] Merydith (British)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 August 1708</td>
<td>Orkney (British)</td>
<td>Swartzell [Schwartzel?] (Danish?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18 August 1708</td>
<td>Dedem (Dutch)</td>
<td>Lage Hohendorff [Danish; presumably this officer, rather than Georg Wilhelm von Hohendorff, the Imperialist officer and adjutant to Eugene]</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 August 1708</td>
<td>Oxenstierna (Dutch)</td>
<td>Wecke (Dutch)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20 August 1708</td>
<td>Withers (British)</td>
<td>Pallandt (Dutch)</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 August 1708</td>
<td>Orkney (British)</td>
<td>Welderen (Dutch)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 August 1708</td>
<td>Dedem (Dutch)</td>
<td>Dönhoff (Prussian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 August 1708</td>
<td>Oxenstierna (Dutch)</td>
<td>[Daniel von] Tettau (Prussian)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24 August 1708</td>
<td>Withers (British)</td>
<td>Argyll (British)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 August 1708</td>
<td>Orkney (British)</td>
<td>Webb (British)</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 August 1708</td>
<td>Dedem (Dutch)</td>
<td>Swartzell [Schwartzel?] (Danish?)</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 August 1708</td>
<td>Withers (British)</td>
<td>[Detlev von] Rantzau (Hanoverian, in Dutch service)</td>
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<td>29 August 1708</td>
<td>Orkney (British)</td>
<td>Wecke (Dutch)</td>
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<td>Welderen (Dutch)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 September 1708</td>
<td>Withers (British)</td>
<td>Dönhoff (Prussian)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 September 1708</td>
<td>Orkney (British)</td>
<td>Tettau (Prussian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 September 1708</td>
<td>Dedem (Dutch)</td>
<td>Webb (British)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 September 1708</td>
<td>Oxenstierna (Dutch)</td>
<td>Merydith (British)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 September 1708</td>
<td>Withers (British)</td>
<td>Swartzell [Schwartzel?] (Danish?)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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776 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 88-101: camp journal, 9 August to 10 October 1708 N.S.
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Name 2</th>
<th>Nationality 1</th>
<th>Nationality 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>6 September 1708</td>
<td>[François Nicolaas, Baron] Fagel (Dutch)</td>
<td>Hohendorff (Danish)</td>
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<td>Rantzau (Hanoverian)</td>
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<td>Weckeren (Dutch)</td>
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<td>Pallandt (Dutch)</td>
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<td>Welderen (Dutch)</td>
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<td>17 September 1708</td>
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<td>Weckeren (Dutch)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 September 1708</td>
<td>Withers (British)</td>
<td>[Alexandre-Auguste, baron des Villates (Dutch, Huguenot; 'Villat')</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21 September 1708</td>
<td>Fagel (Dutch)</td>
<td>Pallandt (Dutch)</td>
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<td>22 September 1708</td>
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<td>Welderen (Dutch)</td>
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<td>Weckeren (Dutch)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 September 1708</td>
<td>[Ernst Ludwig von] Wilcke (Saxon in Dutch and then Hessian service; 'Wilks')</td>
<td>Pallandt (Dutch)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 October 1708</td>
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<td>Welderen (Dutch)</td>
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<td>Dönhoff (Prussian)</td>
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<td>Tettau (Prussian)</td>
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<td>Argyll (British)</td>
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<td>Oxenstierna (Dutch)</td>
<td>Swartzell [Schwartzel?] (Danish?)</td>
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<td>Pallandt (Dutch)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 October 1708</td>
<td>Withers (British)</td>
<td>Argyll (British)</td>
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</table>
Appendix II

The papers of Colonel Richard King relating to the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries, (1704)-1710: a brief catalogue

The papers of Colonel Richard King and Captain Robert King (fl. 18th century), are held at the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle. The papers are organised in two box files by date, marked KING$ PAPERS 1705-1710 and KING$ PAPERS 1711-1745. Attempts have been made to place the papers in chronological order, largely successful. Within each box, papers are bound into one or more loose bundles, by date and/or focus.

Only those papers pertaining to the actions of Richard King in the Low Countries and Germany, 1704-1710, have been catalogued by myself. These are confined to the first box (with one possible exception), and in the main consist of nearly three hundred MSS forming the first, discrete bundle in said file. A note erroneously states that this bound collection relates largely to King's service with Jack Hill in Canada, and the preparations for such; however this more accurately applies to the second bundle, which also contains a few items pertaining to Flanders, 1709-1710.

In the catalogue a scheme of identification is used, of the form

KP I(i)/23b

Where KP denotes ‘King Papers’ (excluded hereafter); I or II denotes the box; (i), (ii), (iii)... the bundle within same; 1,2,3... the ordinal number of the item within the bundle; and a, b, c... distinct parts within a given MS, or attachments to or continuations of a given item. Most items are discrete MSS, and easily identifiable as such. On occasion, I have assigned part-marks (a, b, c...) as opposed to a new item reference (1, 2, 3...), as when a MS represents a clear continuation of another item, or multiple MSS have been collected together by other hands (e.g. folded within one
another, attached with a metal pin, etc.). The items below run from KP I(i)/1 to KP I(i)/264; KP I(ii)/11-17, 28; and KP II(i)/35a-b.

Accounts, company: I(i)/7 [23 October 1705 to 22 April 1706 O.S.]; I(i)/12 [9 September to 4 December 1706 O.S.; latest date 12 December in notes]; I(i)/18 [23 April to 22 October 1705 O.S.]; I(i)/23 [23 April to 9 September 1706 O.S.]; I(i)/27 [9 January to 5 February 1706/7 O.S.]; I(i)/28 [6 February to 5 March 1706/7 O.S.]; I(i)/29 [6 March to 2 April 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/32 [3 April to 30 April 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/33 [1 May to 7 May 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/34 [8 May to 4 June 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/36 [5 June to 2 July 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/39 [3 July to 30 July 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/40 [31 July to 27 August 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/41 [28 August to 24 September 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/45 [25 September to 23 October 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/46 [24 October to 19 November 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/47 [20 November to 17 December 1707 O.S.]; I(i)/48 [18 December 1707 to 14 January 1707/8 O.S.]; I(i)/53 [15 January to 11 February 1707/8 O.S.]; I(i)/54 [12 February to 10 March 1707/8 O.S.]; I(i)/57 [11 March to 7 April 1708 O.S.]; I(i)/59 [8 April to 28 April 1708 O.S.]; I(i)/61a-h [Eight leaves tied by tag: 24 April 1708 to 4 May 1709 O.S.]; I(i)/103 [5 May to 23 May 1709 O.S.]; I(i)/108a-d [24 May 1709 to April 1710 O.S.]; I(i)/256 [10 December 1710 O.S.].

Accounts, contingencies and various: I(i)/20 [Bread note for Rich. King’s co., 10 May to 27 October 1706 N.S.?]; I(i)/35 [Regimental contingencies for Orrery’s Regiment, 6 February to 26 May 1707 O.S.?]; I(i)/42 [Regimental stoppages, with proportions due from each co., 28 October to 30 April - no years]; I(i)/43 [an account of co. subsistence, undated]; I(i)/44 [Regimental contingencies for Orrery’s Regiment, 8 May to 23 October 1707 O.S.?]; I(i)/60 [Regimental contingencies for Orrery’s Regiment, 24 October 1707 to 23 April 1708 O.S.?]; I(i)/99 [Field equipage and accoutrements for the campaign of 1709, and regimental expenses for Orrery’s Regiment since 23 April 1708 O.S.?].

Accounts, personal: I(i)/37 [Rich. King’s arrears, 24 February to 23 June 1707 O.S.?]; I(i)/55 [February 1707/8]; I(i)/58 (Rich. King’s own subsistence, 23 March 1707/8 O.S.?); I(i)/89 [Rich. King’s arrears as capt., to 22 December 1708 O.S.?]; I(i)/98 [Rich. King’s pay as ADC to Cadogan, 1710]; I(i)/101 [Rich. King’s arrears, 1 March 1705? to 23 June 1706 O.S.?; London, 3 March 1708/9 O.S.]; I(i)/102 [Rich. King’s arrears, 24 June 1706 to 23 February 1706/7 O.S.?; 3 March 1708/9 O.S.]; I(i)/146 [Rich. King’s
accounts, 23 December 1708 to 22 December 1709]; I(i)/212 [Rich. King’s accounts as ADC to Cadogan, 8 July 1710 O.S.?].

Correspondence, by sender (all to Rich. King, unless otherwise noted):

*Comte d’Avelyn:* I(i)/65a-b [Letter (a), with note (b) folded therein, Lille, 8 July 1708 N.S. Regarding the movement of allied forces.]; I(i)/70 [Letter, 10 (20?) July 1708 N.S.]

*Comtesse d’Avelyn:* I(i)/113 [7 June 1709 N.S.]

*Bridget Cadogan:* I(i)/154 [London, 17 January 1709/10 O.S. Re: Prendergast affair.]; I(i)/156 [25 February 1709/10 O.S. Re: Prendergast affair.]; I(i)/216a-b [Letter (a), copied, and note (b), both undated. Re: Prendergast affair]; I(i)/218 [28 July 1710 O.S. Re: Prendergast affair.]

*William Cadogan:* I(i)/90 [Camp at Fretin, 10 September 1708 N.S. Re: convoy to Oudenarde and Menin; would have King go to Brussels to provision wagons.]; I(i)/91 [Camp at Fretin, 13 September 1708 N.S. Re: Pascal’s regiments passing to Brussels and the provisioning of the wagons; in the event of problems King was to seek Renswoude’s help. Events at camp; asks King to write daily and give note when all was in ready.]; I(i)/92 [Camp at Fretin, 18 September 1708 N.S. Glad all is near ready to leave; will send directions, with King ready to leave at 4 or 5 hours’ warning. Enemy marched that morning; not certain whether to Douai or Tournai, but focused on disrupting convoys and forage.]; I(i)/92 [Copy of a letter from Cadogan to John Laws, re: action at Wynendael; 20 October 1708 N.S.]; I(i)/105 [Brussels, 12 May 1709 N.S. Re: march of Prussians. King to be sent to conduct Palatine troops; Armstrong the Prussians. By his next Cadogan will note rations to be provided.]; I(i)/109 [Brussels, 30 May 1709 N.S. Re: Palatine troops, to halt at Roermonde until further orders. Supplies for same. Note of Torcy returning to Paris, and thoughts on peace. Cadogan promised to refrain from using a count’s villages for lodging or furnishing wagons; King must appoint new villages.]; I(i)/110 [Brussels, 1 June 1709 N.S. Cadogan sorry his last had not come in time to stop the Palatines crossing the Maas. Supply must be deposed of. Letter to commissary at Ruermonde re; bread enclosed (absent). More on peace, when Palatines might camp
along the Sambre, but King is to say naught to Palatine general.]; I(i)/111 [Brussels, 4 June 1709 N.S. Word from Torcy - no peace. King to direct Palatines on route settled; corps always to camp together. Enclosed letters from Eugene (absent) to press the march. After King had made dispositions for march of Foot, he was to come with the Horse.]; I(i)/114 [Ghent, 13 June 1709 N.S. Re: Palatine troops. Letter from Eugene. King must acquaint comte de Vehlen that they are to receive no dry forage. Give direction to Solomon de Medina's commissary re: bread.]; I(i)/115 [Ghent, 15 June 1709 N.S. Re: Palatine troops. Notes crossed notes.]; I(i)/116 [Ghent, 17 June 1709 N.S. Marlborough would have King come with the Palatine Foot to Ghent, to escort artillery thence to Courtrai. King will receive instructions from Geldermalsen to send artillery to Menin, and then King is to return to the army. Cadogan goes to Courtrai.]; I(i)/132 [Camp at Havre, 25 September 1709 N.S. Re: convoys. First arrived that morning; will be unloaded and sent back. Would have King stay at Brussels until second convoy departs from there. Notes the army will break ground and make two attacks that night (N.B. Cadogan would be wounded that night). Enemy camped between Tournaie and Valenhennes, and begin to march.]; I(i)/135 [Camp at Havre, 10 October 1709 N.S. Unfortunate that the country had failed to furnish the wagons. Notes that King said his waiting on the authority of the Duke was a hindrance in the matter, yet King proposed naught to be done to empower him: if he gave Cardonnel notice, care would betaken to resolve matters. Note on bread wagons.]; I(i)/140 [Camp at Havre, 16 October 1709 N.S. So no time is lost re: bread wagons, he sends an enclosed note (absent) to M. Vandenbrock to desire 120 of the 400 bring bread.]; I(i)/148 [Brussels, 25 December 1709 N.S. Approves of King's measures to be informed, re: Dunkirk.]; I(i)/151 [Brussels, 17/5? January 1710 N.S. Re: Dunkirk. Note on King employing agents. Note of Mr Brown in Ostend, whom he does not normally rely upon.]; I(i)/152 [Brussels, 7 January 1710 N.S. More on intelligence from Dunkirk, no danger of a descent on foot. King no longer needed at Bruges, and may leave when he sees fit.]; I(i)/159 [Brussels, 12 March 1710 N.S. Approves of King's actions; would have him stay (?) until matters finished. Notes supply of English bread and forage; if fails, has directed it be delivered upon King's orders. Cadogan to Hague day following. John Laws adds that he'd be obliged if King told him what was to pass.]; I(i)/161 [Brussels, 26 March 1710 N.S. Received King's from Menin, since heard he went to Ghent; then received
King's of Courtrai. Re: forage.] I(i)/162 [Brussels, 11 April 1710 N.S. Enc. order for Lumley to march out the garrison of Ghent (absent). More on forage, and boats.
Must be four days' hay at Lille and Tournai by the 8 May. Must give directions to the Dutch commissaries to receive bread and forage according to King's memorial drawn out of the General Dispositions; Vegelin assisting in necessary.] I(i)/172 [Tournai, 16 April 1710 N.S. Re: poor state of artillery horses; when joined up again, will endeavour to replace wanting with the best of the bread wagon horses.
Speeding Dutch troops. Marlborough to arrive at Oudenarde the day following at 9 am, so an escort of 50 Horse must be sent this night, with an order to have 18 horses of relay ready.] I(i)/188 [Camp at Flines, 2 May 1710 N.S. Encloses disposition for bread and forage for Palatine and Hessian troops from Maastricht. King to settle with States of Brabant the wagons to carry forage. If anything wanting, King may use Marlborough's name. Let States know he has Cadogan's directions to help them in any way he can.] I(i)/197 [Camp before Douai, 18 May 1710 N.S. Sends route for Palatine troops. Length of some stages is desire of Provinces to have good troops present if Villars attacks. Siege advances extremely: hopes Douai will fall by the end of the month.] I(i)/208 [Tournai, 15 June 1710 N.S. Marlborough states the convoy must depart from Mons on the 16 June, though not all the wagons might be come. More on convoy.] I(i)/219 [Menin, 12 August 1710 N.S. Re: various matters of supply.] I(i)/230 [Brussels, 23 October 1710 N.S. Thanks King for accounts of the siege of Aire. Goes the next day to Ghent, and desires King to send away for his waggon with a saddle horse to Armentieres 'til he arrives.] I(i)/231 [Ghent, 25 October 1710 N.S. More on horses and forage.] I(i)/232 [Camp at Aire, 1 November 1710 N.S. Glad convoy arrived safely at Menin; Duke sends word to Collins to push hard with the boats with the bombs. Desires King to hasten the matter, then return to the camp.] I(i)/233 [Note from Cadogan, undated.]

David Campbell: I(i)/100 [London?, 3 March 1708/9 O.S. Note regarding Rich. King's arrears and clearings, and payments and discharges thereupon].

Adam Cardonnel: I(i)/133 [Camp at Havre, 16 October N.S. Notes march of 12 squadrons to escort the artillery, and further note of the wagons.] I(i)/136 [Camp at Havre, 10 October 1709 N.S. Marlborough sent squadrons to meet ammunition.
wagons, to be brought in safe.]; I(i)/137 [Camp at Havre, 11 October 1709 N.S. Horse to meet ammunition wagons from Brussels tomorrow morning at Soignies. Marlborough desires King to inform him ASAP how far Flanders and Brabant have complied with the arrangements for furnishing the wagons, and will require use for a fortnight longer. King to hasten dispatch of what is further wanting for the siege.]; I(i)/138 [Camp at Havre, 12 October 1709 N.S. More on the wagons.]; I(i)/139 [Camp at Havre, 16 October 1709 N.S. More on wagons. Notes Cadogan will go to Brussels in 2-3 days to press things. ]; I(i)/141 [Camp at Havre, 14 October 1709 N.S. More on wagons: Marlborough surprised that none had yet come back to King.]; I(i)/142 [Camp at Havre, 19 October 1709 N.S. Marlborough ordered escort to aid artillery wagons. Cadogan now on the road.]; I(i)/147 [Whitehall, 20 December 1709 O.S. Regarding matters at Dunkirk, of which King had informed Marlborough.]; I(i)/153 [Whitehall, 10 January 1709/10 O.S. Re: Dunkirk. Marlborough received intelligence.]; I(i)/155 [Westminster, 14 February 1709/10 O.S. Notes kind part King takes in his affairs.]; I(i)/157 [The Hague, 21 March 1710 N.S. Notes Marlborough’s regard for King’s actions.]; I(i)/160 [The Hague, 28 March 1710 N.S. Marlborough satisfied with King’s actions at Courtrai.]; I(i)/192 [Camp before Douai, 10 May 1710 N.S. Marlborough approve’s King’s actions and would have him continue same, re: forage and routes of German troops. Keep them to their route and prevent disorder until Palatines have arrived at Maastricht, then join them, set them on march, back to Hessians, then come with them to army.]; I(i)/193 [Camp before Douai, 13 May 1710 N.S. Notes on the Hessians, and hastening their march. Marlborough to send General Spiegel a new route, and not leave it to his discretion.]; I(i)/196 [Camp before Douai, 17 May 1710 N.S. Re: Spiegel and the march.].

John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough: I(i)/130 [Letter from Marlborough to comte de Tilly, regarding Cadogan’s duties.]

Baron de Curtenai: I(i)/189 [2 May 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/190 [10 May 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/191 [10 May 1710 N.S.]. Regarding various matters of forage and movement.

Richard King: I(i)/6 [? extract of a letter to Hen. St John, Tirlemont, 31 August 1705 N.S.]; I(i)/217 [Letter, unsent, to Bridget Cadogan].
John Laws: I(i)/229 [Brussels, 19 October 1710 N.S. Asks King to spare two villages from the routes of march to winter quarters, due to the interest of a lady. Also the matter of a regiment, which wished to be quartered at Brussels, or at least Ghent.].

General Spiegel: I(i)/195 [Wavre, 16 May 1710 N.S. Re: march.].

M. Siestoyeff: I(i)/104 [10 May 1709 N.S.].

M. Vandenbroeck: I(i)/194 [Brussels, 13 May 1710 N.S. Re: march of Spiegel.].

William Willys: I(i)/131 [Turin, 13 August 1709 N.S. Speaks of past correspondence, and events in Italy. Palmes, Daun and Duke of Savoy. List of enemy forces on his side of France.]; I(i)/134 [Turin, 9 October 1709 N.S. Notes missing letters. Speaks of bias in Imperialist accounts of recent action. Events in Italy. Glad to hear King recovered from his sickness.]; I(i)/176 [Vienna, 19 April 1710 N.S. Palmes would be grateful if King could send notes of the army, plans of sieges, lines of battle, etc.].

Memorials, miscellaneous: I(i)/24a-b [Revenues and expenses for the provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, undated; French]; I(i)/38 [List of French troops in Spain, June 1707; French]; I(i)/62 [Disposition of forage for the Hanoverians and Prussians, 30 June 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/64 [Memorial on the subject of the baggage, 7 July 1708 N.S.]; I(i)/66 [Memorial regarding the move to Bissingen between Grenoge and Ypres, 18 July 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/68 [Memorial on the canal of Brussels and the convoy of artillery coming from Ghent, 18 July 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/69 [Memorial, 18 July 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/73 [Memorial, including notes on camp and duties of quartermasters, 3 August 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/74 [Disposition of forage for the right wing, Camp at Werrick, 4 August 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/75 [Memorial, Camp at Helchin, 12 August 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/77 [Dispositions for occupying the posts of Templeure and Lannoy to cover the passage of the artillery from Menin to Lille, Camp at Helchin, 16 August 1708 N.S.]; I(i)/79 [Dispositions for occupying the posts between Pont au Chin and Lannoy to cover the passage of the artillery from Menin to Lille, Camp at Helchin, 19 August 1708 N.S.]; I(i)/88 [Memorial for the comte de Tilly, undated]; I(i)/94 [Revenues for the province of Flanders, ending 1708; French]; I(i)/95 [Revenues for the province of Brabant, ending 1708; French]; I(i)/118 [Memorial of the posts that should be occupied between the army and Oudenarde, 1709]; I(i)/119 [Memorial on the
movements the army will make to form on both banks of the Dyle, 19 June to 21 June 1709 N.S.; I(i)/120 [Memorial on the movements of the armies, 25 June 1709 N.S.]; I(i)/121 [Memorial, 25 June 1709 N.S.]; I(i)/122 [Memorial on the baggage, 26 June 1709 N.S.]; I(i)/123 [Memorial on the detachment of Marlborough's army, 26 June 1709 N.S.]; I(i)/183 [Memorial for the movements of the army, 23 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/185 [Memorial for the assembling of the army, 15?25? April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/198a [Memorial for the detachments that will be sent to seek bread and forage at Louvain and Brussels, c. 1710; see I(i)/198b]; I(i)/206 [Dispositions for the wagons that need to be sent from the army to Mons to collect ammunition, first date 9 June 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/207 [same as the above]; I(i)/210 [Dispositions for forage for the British troops in the vicinity of certain villages; Camp before Douai, 30 June 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/215 [Memorial for the forage of the left wing between Liller and St Zenant; Aubigny, 6 August 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/227 [Dispositions to bring up the batteries of artillery, 6 September 1710 N.S.]; I(ii)/15 [Posts to be occupied, between the army and Villers Brulin; 1710].

Memorials, notes of troops: I(i)/4a [Hanoverians, Tirlemont, August 1705], I(i)/4b [Danes, Rousselaer, June 1706]; I(i)/56 [Statement of allied forces: rank and file of the Horse, excluding officers etc., with an estimate of the French equivalent; calculated 26 February 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/78 [Statement of allied forces: rank and file of the Foot, excluding officers etc., with an estimate of the French equivalent; 1708; French]; I(i)/128 [Notes on the proportions of the forces for the siege of Tournai furnished by the corps of the army, 29 June 1709 N.S.]; I(i)/255 [List of Allied troops in Flanders, 1710].

Memorials, personal: I(i)/21 [Part of Rich. King's journal of the siege of Ath, 1706; incomplete]; I(i)/149 [Queries concerning the carrying on the War in Flanders, 1709; 15 pp]; I(i)/204 [Account of the siege before Douai, 1 June 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/205a-b [Account of the march the French made to attack the allies before Douai, 2 June 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/253 [Reflexions Upon the Siege of Douay; 1710]; I(i)/254 [Rapport des Ingenieurs au Liege de Douay. 1710]; I(ii)/28 [self-penned memorandum for himself, as Quartermaster-General of Jack Hill's expedition, with notes of duty; 1711]; II(i)/35a-b [? Thoughts on forming an academy for the education of engineers; 1706? in pencil].
Memorials and orders, march routes (excluding to winter quarters): I(i)/14 [Prussian troops, 4 November to 12 November 1706 N.S.; French]; I(i)/50 [Order of march of Prussian troops to winter quarters, 1707; French]; I(i)/51 [Order of march for the army to leave the camp at Templeune, undated; French]; I(i)/67 [Memorial on the march of the forces of Prince Eugene, 18 July 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/71 [Route for the wagons and horses that are to leave the army, 28 July 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/72 [Route for the bread wagons, 30 July 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/76 [Order of march to leave the camp at Helchin to go to that at Ath, Camp at Helchin, 12 August 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/81 [Order of march to leave the camps of Amongies to go to that at Ath, Camp at Amongies, 23 August 1708 N.S.; French; marked 'N. 13']; I(i)/82 [as above; marked 'N. 14']; I(i)/87 [Dispositions for the passage of the artillery and ammunition wagons from Brussels to the army, September 23 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/106 [Dispositions for the march of the Palatine troops from Dusseldorf to Roermonde, towards Flanders; 18 May 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/107 [Dispositions for the march of the troops from the Meuse to the camps at Affeleghe; Brussels, 21 May 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/112 [Route for the artillery, 26 June 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/117 [Route for the Palatine troops, to come from Ruermonde and engage in the campaign of 1709; 29 May to 8 June 1708 N.S.; French]; I(i)/143 [March of the left wing from the camp at Boussois towards that of Roeux, 25 October 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/144 [Order of march for leaving the camp at Havre to go to that at Théusies, 25 October 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/158 [Mémorial for the march of the Prussian troops to join the army in Flanders, La Haye, 21 March 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/164 [Dispositions and marches for the garrison of Maastricht and the troops camped, to go to the camp at Tongré; 9 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/165 [Dispositions for the passage of the baggage, 13 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/166 [Memorial for the march of 13 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/167 [Order of march for the troops who are at Ghent and those camped at Schwynarde, to go to the camp at Heurne; Ghent, 13 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/168 [Order of march to leave the camp at Heyne for that of Warmerade; Heyne, 14 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/169 [as I(i)/168]; I(i)/170 [Order of march for the 15 April from the camp of Cop le Grand towards that of Dongelberg; 14 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/171 [Order of march for the 16 April from the camp at Dongelberg towards the camp of ?; Dongelberg, 15 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/173 [Order of march for leaving the camp at Avelghem for that at Ottignies; Avelghem, 15 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/174 [Order of march for the 17 April from the camp at Wavre towards that at Promelle; Wavre, 16 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/175
[Order of march for leaving the camp at Ottignies for that at Baissieu; Ottignies, 17 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/177 [Order of march for the detachment commanded by the Duke of Württemberg to leave the camp at Lezenny - no destination; Tournai, 20 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/178 [Order of march for the 21 April from the camp at Soignies towards that at Chievres; Soignies, 20 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/179 [Order of march for the 22 April from the camp at Chievre towards that at Veran; Chievre, 21 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/180 [March route for the artillery, undated]; I(i)/181 [Order of march for leaving the camp at Lens; Lens, 22 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/182 [Order of march for the 23 April from the camp at Veron towards that before Tournai, 22 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/187 [Route for the Palatine troops from Maastricht to the army before Douai - some days and locations left blank; Camp of T. lines, 30 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/198b [Route the Hessian troops will take to Soignies, and how they will have bread and forage; dates 14 May to 18 May 1710 N.S.; folded within I(i)/198a]; I(i)/199 [Order of march for leaving the camp at Flines for that at Gulezin, on the 24 May 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/201 [Order of march for leaving the camp at Gealezin for that at Beaumont and Henin, on the 27 May 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/202 [same as the above]; I(i)/203 [March of the States’ troops for Brussels, Malines and the frontier; undated]; I(i)/209 [Route for the Imperial recruits, and their passage of the Rhine, until close to Douai; copy, 1710]; I(i)/211 [Order of march for the corps commanded by Ross to Hedignine, and for the baggage of the army; undated]; I(i)/213 [Order of march to leave the camp at Henin for that at Neuville, on the 10 July 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/214 [Order of march for 12 July 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/220 [Order of march for the corps commanded by Ross to Hedegniel, and for the baggage; 1 September?]; I(i)/221 [see above]; I(i)/222 [Order of march for the baggage; Rebreune, 1 September 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/224 [Order of march for leaving the camp of Villerbrulin for that of Lier; 1 September 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/225 [same as above]; I(i)/226 [Order of march for the 3 September 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/240 [Order of march for leaving the camp at Divion for that of Annay close to the Pont-a-Vendin, 16 November 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/241 [Order of march to leave the camp at Blessi for that at Divion on the 19 November 1710 N.S.].

Memorials and orders, winter quarters: I(i)/22 [List of winter quarters, 1706/7; French]; I(i)/26a [Memorial covering Flanders and Brabant, 1706/7; French]; I(i)/26b [Memorial noting the actions of the enemy in regard to 26a; French]; I(i)/49 [List of winter quarters, 1707/8, tabled by garrison; Dutch]; I(i)/96 [List of winter quarters,
1707/8]; I(i)/97 [List of winter quarters, 1707/8; as above, Dutch]; I(i)/145 [Notes of winter quarters for the old and new Prussian troops, 1709/10]; I(i)/228 [Dispositions for the impending move to winter quarters, and plans for the forage; 18 September 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/235 [Route for the Hanoverians to enter into their winter quarters aking the Demer; unfinished, c. November 1710]; I(i)/235 [Route for the Palatines to move from their camp at Soignies and enter into their winter quarters by the Meuse, c. November 1710]; I(i)/236 [Winter quarters for the Imperial troops, 1710]; I(i)/237 [Route for the Prussians to move from their camp at Ichin an262263d enter into their winter quarters, c. November 1710]; I(i)/238 [Route for the Prussians to move from their camp at St Quentins-Linnieke, and enter into their winter quarters; route 4 November to 12 November 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/239a [Route for the Hanoverians to leave the camp at St Quentins-Linnieke and enter into winter quarters by the Demer; route 4 November to 8 November 1710 N.S.], I(i)/239b [Route for the Prussians to attend likewise; route 4 November to 12 November 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/242 [Route for the British and Danes to leave the camp at Sechin to enter into their winter quarters in Flanders, 1710]; I(i)/243 [as above; route 18 November to 22 November 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/244 [Dispositions for the march of the States’ troops to various destinations, 11 November 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/245 [Notes of the winter quarters for the British, Danes, Saxons and Hanoverians, 1710]; I(i)/246 [Route for the troops of the Meuse and the garrisons of Brabant, from the camp at Sechin to enter into their winter quarters, 1710]; I(i)/247 [Route for the Palatine troops to enter into their winter quarters along the Meuse, route 20 November to 3 December 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/248 [Route for the troops of the Meuse and the garrisons of Brabant and Holland, from the Camp at Sechin to their winter quarters, 18 November 1710 N.S. – ]; I(i)/249 [Route for the Imperial troops from the camp at Pont-a-Vendin as far as their winterquarters, 1710]; I(i)/250 [Route for the English squadrons from the camp at Sechin to their winterquarters at Brussels, Warum and Heusden; 1710]; I(i)/251 [Route for the Prussians to their winter quarters, 1710]; I(i)/252 [Route from Louvain up to Roermonde for the Hessians returning to their own lands; 1710]; I(i)/257 [Memorial on the numbers of troops that have their winter quarters in the Spanish Netherlands, 1710]; I(i)/258 [Route for Hanoverians to move from the camp at Sechin, and enter into their winter quarters at Brussels, Malines, Leuven and along the Demer; 1710]; I(i)/259 [Route for the Palatines at Soignies to enter into their winter quarters beyond the Meuse; 1710]; I(i)/260 [Route for the British
dragoons to go from the camp at Sechin to their winter quarters at Heusden and Gorchum; 1710; I(i)/261 [see above]; I(i)/262 [Route for the horses of the British artillery to pass from Ghent to Breda; 1710]; I(i)/263 [Route for the British dragoons to pass from the camp at Sechin to their winter quarters at Heusden and Gorchum; 1710; see I(i)/260 and 261]; I(i)/264 [Distribution of the winter quarters for the Prussians; 1710]; I(ii)/11 [Dispositions for winter quarters; 1710/11]; I(ii)/13 [Dispositions for winter quarters; 1710/11]; I(ii)/16 [Distribution of the winter quarters for the Imperial troops; 1710/11]; I(ii)/17 [Distribution of the winter quarters for the Prussians (old and new corps); 1710/11].

Orders, Board of Ordnance: I(i)/1 [Board of Ordnance to Rich. King, 4 April 1704 O. S. Order to attend train of artillery under Col Holcroft Blood]; I(i)/2 [do, instructions relating to I(i)/1]; I(i)/30 [Warrant of Anne to the Master General of Ordinance, signifying that Rich. King should draw £100 p.a. as an engineer; 17 March 1706/7 O. S.; copy]; I(i)/31 [Note of receipt and action of above by Marlborough, to Tho. Erle and the principal officers of the Ordnance; 31 March 1707 O. S.?].


Orders, tactical and poliorcetic: I(i)/83 [Dispositions for the attack of the right wing at Malplaquet, Camp at Blareguies, 10 September 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/84 [Dispositions for the attack of the left wing, Camp at Blareguies, 10 September 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/85 [Dispositions for the attack of the right wing, Camp at Blareguies, 10 September 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/86 [Dispositions for the attack of the forces of Prince Eugene, Camp at Blaregries, 10 September 1709 N.S.; French]; I(i)/125 [Dispositions for the attacks on the town and citadel of Tournai, 3 July 1709 N.S.]; I(i)/184 [Dispositions for the siege of Douai; Camp before same, 28 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/223 [Memorial for the siege of Aire and St Venant, 1710]; I(ii)/12 [Disposition of troops for the siege of Bethune, 1710]; I(ii)/14 [Proportions of troops for the siege of Aire, 1710].

Orders of battle: I(i)/3 [Camp at Kinderkingen, 9 July 1704 N.S.]; I(i)/8 [Camp at Boissint, 8 August 1705 N.S.]; I(i)/52 [Camp of Soignies, 21 August 1707 N.S.]; I(i)/63 [Camp at Terbanck, 8 June 1708 N.S.]; I(i)/80 [Camp at Helchin, 21 August 1708 N.S.]; I(i)/124 [Camp at Willemear, 2 July 1709 N.S.]; I(i)/126a [Camp de Lomprez, 26 June
1709 N.S.; I(i)/126b [Camp at Esplechin, 3 July 1709 N.S.]; I(i)/127a [Camp at Willemeau, 2 July 1709 N.S.; see I(i)/124], I(i)/127b [copy of (a)]; I(i)/129 [Besieging Tournai, 5? July 1709 N.S.]; I(i)/150 [Camp at Fretin, 1708/9]; I(i)/163a-b [Orders of battle for (a) the cavalry of the left wing of the corps on the Meuse, and (b) the infantry of same; 4 April 1710 N.S.; French]; I(i)/186 [Camp at T. lines, 25 April 1710 N.S.]; I(i)/200 [Camp at Vitry, 24 May 1710 N.S.].

Plans: I(i)/10 [plan of assault on a fortress, batteries marked; undated]; I(i)/11 [plan of assault on a fortress, batteries marked; undated; more detailed version of I(i)/10]; I(i)/25 [plan of assault on a fortress, undated].

Regulations: I(i)/9 [Extract of military regulations of the States General, concluded 15 March 1706 – points concerning the sutlers of the army, Articles 82-92].

Works, miscellaneous: I(i)/5a-c [The Maxims or general Rules which are observed in the Modern Fortifications; hand copied, 21 pp text + 3 pp blank, no diagrams, undated – 1706 in pencil]; I(i)/15 [The New Exercise of the Firelock & Bayonet; hand copied; Ghent, 1706], I(i)/16 [undated scrawled copy of the above, with some expansion and different terminology]; I(i)/17 [Mr Vane’s Observations on Powder, undated]; I(i)/19 [Les Calibres et les Noms des Pieces que l’on fendoit antientement, undated; hand copied, very small booklet – 16pp but with text on only pp 1, 3-7 – detailing the names, calibres, weight, length etc. of various artillery pieces].