Interaction, Gender, Identity:
A Conversation Analytic Examination of
Person Reference

Clare Jackson

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Abstract

This thesis reports the findings of a conversation analytic study exploring how gendered and sexual identities are made relevant in mundane interaction. Drawing on a dataset of over seventy telephone calls made or received by pre-teen or teenage girls, these studies explore how (hetero)sexual matters are oriented to and managed in talk between friends (Chapter Four), as well as how gendered identities are spontaneously produced (Chapters Five and Six). The main, but not sole, analytic tool involves an examination of practices for referring to persons. A distinction is made between referring terms that are linguistically marked for gender and those that make gender relevant in talk. The upshot of this distinction is that the gendered nature of English language does not necessarily make gender relevant interactionally for participants. Indeed, non-gender marked terms can be used to ‘do’ gender. The most striking example of this is occasioned uses of ‘I’, a presumed categorically empty term, in order to produce gendered self-references. A final empirical chapter (Chapter Seven) moves away from gender and language to explore the ways in which speakers can manipulate social distances implied between speaker, recipient and non-present referents by their selection of referring term. Overall, this thesis demonstrates the utility of conversation analysis for feminist researchers, and contributes to conversation analytic understanding of person reference.
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Dedication

For my daughters.
Author’s Declaration

This is to certify that I am responsible for the work submitted in this thesis, and the original work is my own except as specified in acknowledgments or in footnotes, and that neither the thesis nor the original work contained therein has been submitted to this or any other institution for a higher degree.

............................................. (Signed)

............................................. (Date)
Parts of this thesis have been published, or are under review for possible publication.

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Chapter One

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview: Conversation Analysis and Person Reference

This thesis began with a personal paradox. I had routinely experienced sexism in both private and public contexts, yet I knew that for most of the time I did not feel gendered. That is, the experience of sexism can appear somewhat out of the blue, and remind us, that whatever identity is relevant for us at a particular moment, gender is readily available as a resource for others (and ourselves) to invoke in pursuit of any number of actions. One can go from inhabiting a non-gendered identity, to being gendered and back again in the course of a few moments.

The gendered nature of persons is, therefore, not straightforward. We might (variously) display ourselves as gendered but at any given moment in interaction, it might not be this aspect of identity that is relevant for us. After all, as persons, we are also classed, aged, belong to national and ethnic groups and so on. As speakers, we might articulate ourselves from one (or more) of any number of subject positions, for example, as members of: family, ethnic, aged, professional, or hobbyist groupings. In any one of these contexts, gender may or may not be relevant.

I began this thesis, then, with a clear understanding of gender as always available as a categorical resource that might serve diverse social actions, but that it is not always and forever relevant in our lives. I, therefore, rejected any notion of a search for gender differences because this notion relies on an essentialist conception of gender as standing behind and directing social conduct; as if every utterance has its origins in some biological or heavily socialised gendered arrangement of neuropsychological processes. This argument made no sense to me either on a personal or academic/theoretical level.

As a psychology undergraduate, my training had been very much grounded in ideas about essential differences between men and women. This ‘truth’ was one that I was never comfortable with, not least because it appeared
that ‘differences’ were presented hierarchically, so that women were almost invariably shown to be deficient in relation to men. On the relatively few occasions that research showed women to be more highly skilled than men, it would be in ways that reinforce stereotypes of women as nurturing, maternalistic, and communal beings (see Chapter Two).

This said, I could see that the debates raised by those conducting (and resisting) difference research were informing important changes in social science. Women were becoming visible as both researchers and researched. Additionally, despite my misgivings about ‘difference’, it was refreshing to see femininity celebrated by at least some authors. Of these authors, I would single out Gilligan as having the most influence on my thinking.

Gilligan’s work has an appeal because, as a psychologist, she was challenging models of human conduct which were based on male-only samples and attempting to redress the balance by working with female-only samples. Over the course of her career, she has consistently celebrated women’s voices, whilst remaining clearly cognizant of the various social constraints that limit feminine potential. Her work is grounded in an understanding of gendered worlds being produced by social rather than biological processes, and therefore offers the possibility of change.

Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced about the notion that gender is the principal mediator of social conduct. This thesis had its origins in what would have amounted to a critical response to Gilligan’s work; particularly her work on adolescent girls, in which she claimed that girls ‘lose’ their capacity for power and assertion in interaction. I therefore began collecting data from teenage girls. Instead of relying on accounts co-constructed by researchers and participants in interviews and focus groups, I wanted to work with naturalistic data so that I could analyse girls’ voices in the everyday contexts in which they are produced. This was important because
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I am wary of data which is collected in response to researcher-led questions that are then rarely analysed as part of the resulting interaction. More than this, though, if we are to understand the (re)production of social life, it makes sense to observe and analyse social interaction, as it were, \textit{in situ}. My main data source, then, is a corpus of telephone calls made and received by (pre)teenage girls.

The thesis has its theoretical underpinnings in ethnomethodological ideas about social life as accomplished in the shared understandings of social actors. According to this approach, gender (amongst other things) is \textit{achieved} in interaction rather than \textit{preceding} it. In this sense, gender is something we do, rather than something we have. The search for gender, then, should not begin with the embodied nature of a speaker, but in the talk that occurs between persons. The question should not be how do pre-categorised persons conduct themselves, but how does gender become live and relevant between people.

Despite its name, ethnomethodology does not provide a reliable and systematic method for researching social life.\footnote{Indeed, the ‘methodology’ part of the name refers to the methods ordinary people use as part of their sense-sharing practices, and not to a research method.} The method that this thesis is based on - Conversation Analysis (CA) - has its origins in ethnomethodology (as well as Goffman’s ideas about the importance of everyday conduct) but is more systematic and offers a range of robust analytic tools for discovering routine social practices. CA views interaction as inherently ordered. This orderliness is produced as a situated activity in the moment-to-moment unfolding of interaction. That is, order does not preexist any single interaction but is, instead, accomplished locally in the co-ordinated activities of participants. The fit between this approach and my approach to gender is clear.

However, there are tensions for using CA for a politically motivated project. My commitment to feminist concerns are reflected throughout the thesis.
But, a conversation analytic mentality requires a fore-grounding of participants’ orientations and warns against importing analyst motivations into the data. I attempt to resolve this tension by approaching the data in the first instance, without a feminist motivation. Any political upshot of the work should be post-analytic. However, there are places where the tension between method and personal politics is more apparent than others - especially in Chapters Three and Four, where I reflect more reflexively than is typical (for conversation analysts) on the research process (Chapter Three) and apply CA to a topical discussion of a first sexual experience (Chapter Four).

The realisation of this thesis has not progressed linearly. Perhaps it was naive to think that it might. However, having started with a clear idea of my aims, data and methods, I was soon caught up in the necessary training in conversation analytic methods. Whilst the training only confirmed my resolve to use CA, and to use it on the data I was already collecting, the aims of my work underwent substantial revision.

As part of my training in CA, I was introduced to, and ultimately intellectually engaged by, practices for referring to persons. I was immediately struck by the connections between person reference and patterning of social life. The gendered nature of many person references (in English) is apparent, especially in the selection of pronouns (‘he’ and ‘she’). Names might similarly make clear a referent’s gender. It also struck me that person references are a rich source for analysing social hierarchies and distance. For example, a reference that includes a formal title (‘Mrs’, ‘Mr’, ‘Doctor’) invokes a different kind of social relationship than one that is simply a first name. This thesis is, therefore, (mostly) an examination of person reference in interaction.

1.2 Introduction to Person Reference

In English, there are various ways of referring to persons in talk-in-interaction. Speakers may refer to: themselves (Extract 1), co-participants
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(Extract 2), third-parties (Extract 3) and a range of variably specified others (Extracts 4 and 5).

Extract 1: Self-reference

[CTS16]
Sta: I just spent most of the day playing on Mario cart

Extract 2: Reference to co-participant

[CTS02]
Emm: What you been up t(h)ough?

Extract 3: Third-party reference

[CTS02]
Sop: Frankie’s lost my gem.

Extract 4: Reference to a specific group of others

[CTS05]
Sta: I don’t understand it. I don’t- uh scallies and (.). everyone (.). mention (.). long hair.

Extract 5: Non-specific reference

[CTS16]
Pen: Some people started watchi(h)ng me right.

The precise formulations of references are consequential for the interaction. They convey something of the relationships (known or perceived) between speakers, recipients and referents. For example, in third-party reference there are: names, which convey that a referent is known (about) to a recipient; kinship or relational terms such as ‘Dad’, ‘Grandma’ and ‘my wife’, which more directly convey relationships, and; categorical terms such as ‘professor’, ‘doctor’ and ‘child’ that might construct the ways in which these referents feature relevantly in talk.
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One place we see that the form of reference matters to participants is in self-repairs (Lerner and Kitzinger, 2007; Stokoe 2011). For example, in Extract 6, a speaker first refers to her Linguistics Professor as ‘this feller I have’, a reference that she then repairs to ‘this man’

**Extract 6**

[TG]

01 Bee: nYeeah, hh **This feller** I have(nn)/(iv)
02 "felluh"; **this ma:n.** (0.2) t! hhh He
03 ha::(s) uffehwhwho I have fer
04 Linguistics [is really] too much,=
05 Ava: [Mm hm?]  
06 Bee: =hh[h ] I didn’t notice it at first=
07 [Mnhm, ]

*The* speaker draws attention to the inappropriateness of ‘fellow’ to refer her professor. She does so, not only by repairing it to ‘man’, but also by specifically repeating ‘fellow’ in order to question its selection. ‘Fellow’ is not only a person reference but is also a category term; as is ‘man’. Both terms are gendered, but it is not gender that is at issue for the speaker; she does not change the referent’s gender in her repair. We might speculate that the issue is the sense of the relationship between speaker and referent that is conveyed by these referring terms. ‘Fellow’ conveys an altogether less formal and perhaps more congenial relationship to the referent than ‘man’ does. ‘Fellow’ is not only less fitted to the relationship between student and professor but is arguably also less fitted to the action underway; a complaint against the referent.

The fit of reference for action is also evident in the next extract. In this call, Leslie is telling her friend Joyce about a putdown she experienced from a man of their acquaintance. She *could* name the referent but selects not to do so. Instead, she uses a designedly ironic reference; ‘your friend and mine’ (line 9). ²

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Extract 7

[Holt Xmas 85:1:4:1]

01 Les:  "Oh!:" hh & Yi-m- You ↓know I-I- I'm broling
about something hhhheh heh hhhh
02 Joy:  [What?]
03 Les:  Well that sa:le. (0.2) at- at (. the
vicarage.
04 Joy:  Oh ↓yes[rs,
05 Les:  [ t
06 (0.6)
07 Les:  u (. ihYour friend 'n mi:ne wz the_re
08 (0.2)
09 ( ): (h{h hh)
10 Les:  [mMister: Ri,
11 Joy:  (Oh ee:z )

As a reference, 'your friend and mine' displays Leslie's understanding that Joyce knows the referent and that, therefore, he could be named. Leslie is engaged in a complaint and the reference is fitted for the complaint in two ways. First, the name is knowingly withheld. Second, it is ironic. Clearly, the referent is not a friend to either speaker or recipient. Partly, this analysis depends on the context Leslie has provided; that she is 'broiling about something’ which happened at a particular event, and that this ‘something' is connected to the conduct of the referent. Perhaps there is additional work done in the separating out of the recipient and speaker in the reference. That is, Leslie could have said, ‘our friend was there’ but this would have put Leslie and Joyce together in the matrix of relationships between speaker, recipient and referent. By saying, ‘your friend and mine’, Leslie points to something complainable in the conduct of the referent that both she and Joyce have experienced individually. It generalises his poor conduct beyond the specifics of this event. As it happens, Joyce does not recognise the referent from this reference, as signalled by the lack of uptake at line 11. So, Leslie reformulates the reference as ‘Mister R’, a form that again withholds the full name or, as Stivers (2007) notes, delivers it in the form of a code; it is what Stivers calls an ‘in-the-know’ reference. It is
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more fitted to the complaint against the referent than a proper name would have been.

Practices for referring to persons are potentially central to any project interested in analysing the ways that people are individuated and classified in a given society (Stivers, Enfield and Levinson, 2007). It is through person reference (amongst other things e.g. membership category devices, Sacks, 1972; Schegloff, 1996a, 2007a, style and presentation, Butler, 1990; Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1959) that traditional identity variables such as kinship, gender, race, class, professional status and so on, are made live and relevant in talk-in-interaction. Yet, there has been what Stivers et al. 2007 describe as a curious neglect of empirical study of conversationally grounded ways of referring to self and others. Lerner and Kitzinger (2007a) make a similar point, showing there have been, in a sense, two false dawns in person reference research; the first in the 1970s with the publication of Sacks and Schegloff’s (1979) germinal work on the preference organisation of person reference, and then another almost twenty years later with Schegloff’s (1996a) analysis of its sequential organisation. Given the potential social scientific import of person reference, it is surprising that it has taken until the mid-2000s for any noticeable impetus for additional research in the area. With the publication of Enfield and Stivers’ (2007) edited collection and a special issue of Discourse Studies (Lerner and Kitzinger 2007) dedicated to the topic, there is now a third dawning of interest.

This thesis is a conversation analytic examination of practices for referring to persons. At a broad level, the thesis is also about the connections between conversational person references and social identities, particularly gendered identities. The precise formulations of reference can be inferentially rich (Sacks, 1995). A name, for example, may invoke age, gender, ethnicity and class (See Sacks, 1995, Spring, 1966, Lecture 8 for an account of anti-Semitic practices based on identifiably Jewish names). Gender is routinely displayed by terms such as ‘he’ and ‘she’. Sexuality is
invoked using the same terms; for example, ‘he’ or ‘she’ (as well as hearably gendered names) to refer to partners. It is important to note, however, that whilst categorical inferences concerning age, gender, sexuality, ethnicity and the like, may be available in references, they are not always made relevant in interaction (Kitzinger, 2007a). So, a key aim of the work is to explore how social categories, particularly gender categories, are oriented to (or not) by participants in interaction.

That person references might be saturated with categorical information should not obscure the fact that most commonly, references are used not to draw attention to some social dimension of a person, but instead simply to refer to them (Schegloff, 1996a). In fact, Schegloff observes that, in order to show that referencing is doing something other than simple referring, the references have to be special or unusual in some way. Thus, he distinguishes between what he calls ‘reference simpliciter’, references that do simple referring, and references that constitute some other form of action. Contained in this distinction is the very notion that practices for referring to persons can be used to perform a range of social actions and that, therefore, the particular ways that references are formulated bear examining for their functionality beyond achieving simple reference. A third aim of this thesis is therefore to examine person references for the actions they may constitute.

To summarise, this thesis has three broad aims:

1) To contribute to our understanding of practices for referring to persons

2) To explore how social categories - particularly gender categories - are made available and oriented to (or not) through practices for referring to persons.

3) To examine social actions constituted through the technology of person reference.
Introduction

In this introductory chapter, I situate the study of person reference within conversation analysis, and discuss how this research focus reflects broader methodological and substantive concerns of that discipline. However, it is necessary also to acknowledge that numerous scholars, working in different or related traditions, have examined the relationship between language and identity, and so I review some of the key contributions to this literature. This allows us to identify the strengths of a conversation analytic approach.

1.2 Conversation Analysis

Conversation analysis is a theoretically and methodologically distinct approach to the analysis of social action in talk-in-interaction that originated in the work of American sociologist, Sacks, in collaboration with his colleagues, Schegloff and Jefferson. CA has its roots in, and was inspired by Goffman's (1967, 1972, 1983) and Garfinkel's (1967) independent attempts to re-specify the subject matter of sociology by opening it up to research of everyday life. Before Goffman and Garfinkel's influential work, researching the everyday had been largely dismissed as irrelevant and/or too chaotic for systematic analysis (Sacks, 1995, Lecture 4, 1964). Sacks and colleagues took seriously both Goffman's account of the normative organisation of the interaction order, and Garfinkel's (1967) focus on practices for producing and recognising culturally meaningful social acts. Heritage and Atkinson (1984) observe that these themes are evident in one of CA's earliest publications in which Schegloff and Sacks argue:

We have proceeded under the assumption ... that in so far as the materials we worked with exhibited orderliness, they did so not only for us, indeed not in the first place for us, but for the co-participants who produced them. If the materials (records of natural conversation) were orderly, they were so because they had been methodically produced by members of the society for one another. [Schegloff and Sacks, 1973; 290]
Studies in CA repeatedly demonstrate that interaction is inherently orderly, and indeed that there is ‘order at all points’ (Sacks, 1984:22, 1995:484). This orderliness is produced as a situated activity in the moment-to-moment unfolding of interaction. That is, order does not pre-exist any single interaction but is, instead, accomplished locally in the co-ordinated activities of participants.

One upshot of this for analysts is that orderliness ought to be discoverable in any data, at any starting point, and, therefore, analysis might properly begin with any single case. This contrasts with traditional social science traditions, particularly those concerned with language, in which objects of study tend to be preselected and the rest dismissed as irrelevant.3 The problem of preselection is that it relies on an a priori or non-analytical understanding of what is interesting and relevant (Sacks, 1984). Sacks’ notion of ‘order at all points’ means that nothing in interaction should be dismissed as uninteresting or accidental before it has been subject to analysis.

Sacks began by analysing whatever data he was able to access. It happened that he was working for the Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Centre, so his first corpus consisted of recorded calls to the centre. In his words:

... I started with tape recorded conversations ... simply because I could get my hands on it and I could study it again and again, and also, consequentially, because others could look at what I studied and make of it what they could, if, for example, they wanted to be able to disagree with me. [Sacks, 1984:26]

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3 Take Chomsky (1965) for example. Chomsky worked with hypothetical instances of talk because he dismissed real talk as too messy for analysis.
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Recordings of naturally occurring (or naturalistic) interactions are the core data of CA. This contrasts with conventional forms data in social science. For example, the requirement for data to be naturalistic means that formal experiments in which investigators necessarily manipulate variables tend not to be conducted in CA.\(^4\) Interviews, the mainstay of qualitative investigation, are treated in CA as a particular form of institutional talk-in-interaction and not as providing insight to behaviours that are actually conducted elsewhere. Hypothetical or invented examples are never analysed in CA. Finally, the recording of data frees analysts from the limitations of selection and memory biases that influence observations and the construction of field-notes.\(^5\)

Transcription of data is a central activity in Conversation Analysis, and though recordings remain the primary data, analysis frequently begins with transcription. In CA, it is conventional to use the transcription system first developed by Jefferson (1983, 2004) in which she adapted the basic symbols on a typewriter to convey the sorts of details that participants orient to in interaction. So, for example, there are symbols that capture the speed, timing and intonation of interaction. The aim of transcription is to represent as closely as possible the details of talk as it actually unfolded for the participants.

Conversation analysis is fundamentally the study of language-in-use: of talk as action. Researchers in this tradition interrogate talk to explicate interactional methods for producing recognisable social activities; how speakers \textit{do} things with talk, and are recognised by their recipients as doing these things. Sacks directs his students to the primacy of social action in talk in the very first of his transcribed lectures (published posthumously):

\[^{4}\text{For a recent exception see Heritage et al 2007.}\]

\[^{5}\text{Though as Kitzinger (2007a) observes, field notes (short transcripts of remembered interactions) are used very occasionally. These transcripts are denoted in published materials using the acronym FN.}\]
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Someone says, “This is Mr Smith” and the other supplies his own name. Someone says, ‘May I help you?” and the other states his business. Someone says, “Huh?” or “What did you say?” or, “I can’t hear you” and then the thing said before gets repeated. What we want then to find out is, can we first of all construct the objects that get used to make up a range of activities, and then see how it is those objects do get used? [Sacks, 1995:10-11 Lecture 1, 1964]

Sacks foundational position is that conversation consists of devices for accomplishing things. Schegloff (1995), in his introduction to the collection of Sacks’ transcribed lectures, observes Sacks’ early work was directed at demonstrating how interactional devices can be deployed in order to solve problems. Not that Sacks’ vision was to provide a ‘how to...’ manual of social life. His insight was that no single utterance can be defined as always performing a particular action; not all hello’s are greetings, for example. Instead, utterances are seen as situated and as performing actions in their sequential context.

Using the recordings and transcripts of any interactions they could obtain, Sacks and colleagues began to describe orderly practices for: taking turns at talk (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974); the sequential progression of talk (Sacks, 1987; Schegloff, 1968; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973); and for dealing with (or more technically, repairing) ostensible troubles in hearing, speaking, or understanding (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977). These three areas of research, turn-taking, sequence organisation and repair, remain core to contemporary CA.

An appreciation of practices of turn-taking, sequence and repair lead to a deeply social understanding of the organisation of human sociality. An understanding of turn-taking practices is fundamental to claims about power and rights to speak (Kitzinger, 2008a; Toerien and Kitzinger, 2007). Work on sequence organisation reveals interactional constraints that shape
progression of conversation by the force of conditional relevance; questions require answers (or some account of why an answer is not possible), invitations and offers require acceptance or declination, and so on (Schegloff, 2007b). Combining sequential analysis with the idea of preference (Sacks, 1987) provides analytic grounds for the interactional trickiness of ‘just saying no’ (despite the best efforts of the assertiveness movement. See Kitzinger and Frith, 1999). Finally, work on repair reveals how interlocutors manage mutual understanding as a thoroughly social, as opposed to psychological, matter. That is, whatever cognitive or neurological processes occur internally, understanding and lack of understanding is displayed and managed between people in talk.

Conversation analysis is now firmly established as a field it its own right. It is influential in disciplines as diverse as sociology, psychology, cognitive science, linguistics, education and anthropology. It is increasingly applied in institutional settings (See Arminen, 2005; Drew and Heritage, 1992; Heritage and Clayman, 2010) including: news interviews (e.g. Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Greatbatch, 1988), job interviews (e.g. Button, 1992), legal proceedings (e.g. Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Drew, 1992, Ehrlich and Sidnell, 2006), psychotherapy (e.g. Perakyla et al 2008), education (e.g. McBeth, 2005; McHoul, 1978), emergency- and help-line calls (e.g. Kitzinger and Kitzinger, 2007; Sacks, 1967; Torode, 2001, 2005; Zimmerman, 1992), doctor-patient interaction (e.g. Heritage and Maynard, 2006; Stivers, 2006, 2007), surgical procedures (e.g. Mondada, 2003) and psychic mediumship (Wooffitt, 2006).

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6 Stivers and Rosano 2010 develop a more nuanced argument in respect of conditional relevance, showing that ‘firsts’ do not equally share a capacity to mobilise response.

7 This does not refer to the psychological disposition of a speaker, but rather to the empirical observation that alternative responses to various ‘firsts’ such as questions, invitations, offers etc are not equivalent. For example, consider invitations. When an invitation is accepted, overwhelmingly it is done so quickly and without further account. Declinations, on the other hand tend to be done with hedges, hesitations and explanations. Responses that forward the action of the first (here accept the invitation) are said to be preferred. Those that block or delay the action of the first (here a declination) are said to be dispreferred. See Schegloff 2007b for an authoritative review on matters of sequence and preference.
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Given the extent and diversity of the conversation analytic literature, I do not propose to provide a comprehensive account of the field (for recent accounts see: Drew, 2004; Drew and Heritage, 2006; Heritage, 2008; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008; Lerner, 2004; Liddicoate, 2007; Sidnell, 2010; ten Have, 2008). Instead, I review conversation analytic work on person reference as the body of research having most relevance. Before doing so, I briefly situate person reference in broader concerns of turn-design.

1.3 Turn Design: The Problem of Description

Turns at talk are constructed from at least three linguistic resources: lexical items (lexis), word order (syntax) and phonetics/prosody. Each of these has a bearing on, and is consequential for, the interaction. In this section, I briefly review conversation analytic work on syntax and phonetics before moving on to the area of lexis, which is of most relevance to this research.

Sacks, Scheglof and Jefferson (1974) identify syntax as a key resource for turn-taking (see also Jefferson, 1973; Schegloff 1982). So, turns at talk (turn constructional units, henceforth TCU) comprise of lexical, sentential, clausal or phrasal syntactic units. For example, in Extract Eight, taken from Sacks et al. 1974:702), there is an instance of a sentential TCU at line 1; a phrasal TCU at line 3, and; a lexical TCU at line 5.

**Extract Eight**

[SBL 2:8:5]

01 Ann: Was last night the first time you
02 met Missiz Kelly
03 (1.0)
04 Bea: Met whom?
05 Ann: Missiz Kelly
06 Bea: Yes

Using rules of grammar, participants track ongoing talk for points of possible completion. If we consider the first TCU in Extract Eight, we can hear that the turn cannot be possibly complete after ‘was’, ‘last’, ‘night’, or
'the'. There is a possible completion after 'first' and 'time', but not after 'you', 'met' or 'Missiz'. There is a final possible completion point after 'Kelly'.

Schegloff (1996c) additionally argues that phrasal and clausal TCUs gain grammatical adequacy by being second to some previous spate of talk. This is certainly the case here, where the phrasal TCU 'met whom' only makes sense by its relationship to the prior TCU.

Early work on syntax focussed mainly on its role in turn-taking but it has since been considered more broadly, particularly in two edited collections: Hakulinen and Selting (2005), and Ochs, Schegloff and Thompson, (1996). One focus has been the internal expansion of sentential TCUs with parenthetically inserted words (e.g. Auer, 2004; Duvallon and Routarinne, 2005; Mazeland, 2007; Schegloff, 2007b). Parentheticals are a device for managing additional activities whilst keeping the projected turn in play. Kitzinger (2000) shows that parentheticals occur within a ‘protected’ space in an ongoing TCU, in the sense that transition to a next speaker is not yet relevant, and this allows speakers to perform social actions that are designedly not formulated for a response. For example, in Extract Nine, a speaker uses a parenthetical to come out as lesbian during a student seminar discussion.

Extract Nine

[From Kitzinger, 2000: 182-183]
01 Lin: It does, it does have an effect on you because (0.2)
02 if you've thought of yourself as heterosexual (1.0)
03 and you (.) suddenly find yourself attracted to a
04 "it happened to me,< (0.2) a few years ago" 
05 woman it's very (0.8) disturbing, [in a] way it's

Other important topics of research in syntax include the incremental addition to turns after possible completion (Schegloff 1996c), left
dislocations (Monzoni, 2005), pivot constructions (Betz, 2008; Scheutz, 2005) and the relationship between the polarity of an item and its corresponding response (Heritage, 2002; Heinemann, 2005; Koshik, 2002, Raymond, 2003; Schegloff, 1995).

Conversation analytic work on prosody (the pitch, loudness and rhythm of talk) also has its origins in the Sacks et al. (1974) turn-taking paper. One insight was to see that the organisation of turn-taking could not rely upon syntax alone. This is because TCUs are flexible and dynamic units that may extend across one or more possible completion points. Consider line 1 in Extract Eight – was last night the first time you met Missiz Kelly. As we have already seen, this sentential TCU runs past at least two possible completion points (after ‘first’ and ‘time’). However, the prosodic features of utterances are a resource for participants in tracking the turn. The ends of turns are typically intonationally complete as well as grammatically complete.\(^8\) So, in our example, the lexical items ‘first’ and ‘time’ are produced with continuing intonation and ‘Kelly’ with closing intonation.

Ford and Thompson (1996) argue that prosody is a more important resource for tracking turn-completion than syntax because possible syntactic completion does not reliably coincide with intonational completion (see also Auer, 1996; Wells and Peppe, 1996). Selting (2005: 37) resists ordering the relative importance of syntax and prosody but argues that prosody plays a ‘constitutive, not just concomitant role’ because ‘syntactic formulations are packaged as interactionally relevant units via prosody’.

Another prominent topic of research on prosody is on the different interactional import of utterances that look superficially similar (e.g. uses of ‘oh’ or ‘why’) but which are produced using dissimilar intonational patterns (see the range of work in the edited collection by Couper-Kuhlen and

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\(^8\) Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974 in fact identify three resources for the organisation of turn-taking: syntax, prosody and action. I review action in an earlier section – see 1.2. But briefly stated, a turn is not treated as complete unless it completes an action.
Selting, 1996, particularly chapters by Local and Selting). These studies demonstrate the importance of the phonetic features of lexical and syntactic units for constituting social action.

Turning now to lexis, we see that turns at talk comprise of lexical items selected from alternatives. So, any given turn at talk could have been produced differently. This is not to say that all selections are a choice made from a range of equal alternatives. Talk is an accountable activity, so there are strong norms and preferences framing selection. However, the fact that alternatives are always possible, even within grammatical and contextual constraints, poses a problem for speakers and analysts alike: the problem of description (Schegloff, 1972). The ‘problem’ of description is that for any object or event there is, theoretically at least, any number of ‘true’ descriptions available. For example, in formulating place (location), Schegloff, writes:

Were I now to formulate where my notes are, it would be correct to say that they are: right in front of me, next to the telephone, on the desk, in my office, in Room 213, in Lewisohn Hall, on campus, at school, at Columbia, in Morningside Heights, in Morningside Heights, on the upper West Side, in Manhattan, in New York City, in New York State, in the Northeast, on the Eastern Seaboard, in the United States, etc. [Schegloff, 1972:81]

As Schegloff observes, all these descriptions are in some sense true. However, ‘true’ is not equivalent to ‘relevant’. On some occasions, any one of these descriptions might be appropriate for the particular recipient and context of talk. On other occasions, any one might be analysable for the actions they constitute besides referring – e.g. being jokey, arrogant or obtuse. So, the selection of a particular formulation takes work and each selection might be examined for its import to, and consequences for, the interaction. Schegloff asserts that the design of place formulations (and
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turn-design generally) is based on a number of considerations, including recipiency and action.

Recipiency refers to the fact that speakers design turns at talk to make them understandable and accountable to recipients. Recipient-design is first mentioned formally in Sacks et al’s paper on turn-taking:

For conversationalists, that turn-size and turn order are locally managed ... party-administered ... and interactionally controlled ... means that these facets of conversation ... can be brought under the jurisdiction of perhaps the most general principle particularising conversational interaction, that of ‘recipient design’. With ‘recipient design’ we intend to collect a multitude of respects in which talk by a party in conversation is constructed or designed in ways that display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the co-participants. [Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974:727]

That is, a basic goal of interaction is that it should be comprehensible to participants and, therefore, speakers tend to select terms that (they figure) make sense to recipients. In formulating place, for example, Schegloff (1972) shows that terms are selected on the basis of to whom one is speaking. For example, if approached to give directions to a stranger in one’s home town, it may be possible to assess (from accent, the design of the question, which itself will necessarily formulate a place, and so on) whether that stranger is a ‘co-class member’ of that town or not; an insider or outsider. The way that directions are formulated is likely to vary according to what the recipient might be supposed to know about the town (e.g. ‘next to the old swimming baths’ for an insider, as opposed to detailing a specific route for an outsider). In designing for a recipient, the precise formulations selected display the speaker’s analysis of what a recipient ‘knows’. Sometimes, speakers get this wrong. For example, in the
following extract, taken from Schegloff, a speaker formulates a place in a way that displays no expectation that the recipient might not recognise it.

Extract Ten

[Schegloff, 1972: 93]

01 A:  I just came back from Irzuapa
02 B:  Where’s that?

The issue here is that speaker A has shown him/herself to understand person B as the type of person who should recognise ‘Irzuapa’, and speaker B might feel deficient for not having recognised it.9

So, formulations and descriptions are ‘designed’, their relevance provided for, and have consequences for the interaction and participants. As Heritage and Watson note:

The use of a description invites recipients to fill in - to see in the situation the particulars the description proposes of it while, at the same time, see those aspects of the description which are relevant to this situation – description and situation, in other words, stand in a mutually elaborative [sic] relationship [...] A description, in the ways it may be a constituent part of the circumstances it describes, unavoidably elaborates those circumstances and is elaborated by them. [Heritage and Watson, 1979: 338]

With this basic point in mind, Sacks (1995: Winter, 1967) observes that speakers may have occasion to design their talk so as to be imprecise. For example, with group therapy, which is perhaps a ‘delicate’ setting to mention by name, Sacks notes use of terms such as ‘here’ and ‘this place’ (ibid: 519), where at least one alternative might be ‘therapy’. Sacks’

9 Similarly, Kitzinger and Mandlebaum (2009) show how recipients defend themselves against having been treated through a speaker’s word selection as having less knowledge than they in fact have.
analysis is that words and phrases like ‘here’ and ‘this place’ are abstract, here-and-now references to a setting that avoid formulating it in precise terms. In contrast, ‘therapy’ carries (more explicitly) additional, and not necessarily welcome, connotations that might be hearable as constituting actions beyond referring (e.g. putting someone down, invoking mental states and/or a disordered identity). In more general terms, as Schegloff (1988a: 19) asserts: ‘Describing is a vehicle for acting’.

So, turns can also be analysed for the actions that are constituted by particular selections. Drew and Heritage (1992) offer the following example, from interaction between a health visitor (HV) and new parents (M for mother and F for father).

**Extract Eleven**

[HV:4A1:1]

01 HV: He’s enjoying that [isn’t he
02 F: [**Yes, he certainly is=
03 M: He’s not hungry ‘cuz (h)he’s ju(h)st (h)had
04 ‘iz bo(ttle .hhh
05 (0.5)
06: HV: You’re feeding him on (. ) Cow and Gate
07 Premium

When the Health Visitor describes the baby as ‘enjoying that’, she is commenting and assessing the baby’s actions as s/he is sucking or chewing on something. The parents treat the same comment differently and, through their respective turns, each displays their divergent analyses of the action it performed. Through his simple agreement with the comment, the baby’s father seems to have treated it as innocent and conversational. In contrast, the mother’s slightly defensive response (lines 3 to 4) displays that she has inferred something potentially critical from the Health Visitor’s remark. Drew and Heritage comment that the mother, through her defensiveness, appears to be orienting to the Health Visitor’s
role in monitoring and appraising baby care and her own role in providing that care.\textsuperscript{10}

In the following extract (taken from Drew, 1992:489) a witness in a rape trial is asked, by the attorney, about where she met the defendant. His formulation of the location implies that it was a sort of place people go to in order to meet potential sexual partners.

**Extract Twelve**

[Taken from Drew, 1992:489]

01 A: It’s where uh (.) uh girls and fellows
02 meet isn’t it?
03 (0.9)
04 W: People go there.

The attorney’s description is potentially damaging to the witness’s claim that she was an unwilling sexual partner. Her response reformulates the location in order to remove the sexual connotations.\textsuperscript{11} Drew presents a number of other instances of, as it were, moments of conflict as the attorney formulates and the witness reformulates events. For example, (the attorney’s version is shown first): ‘started to kiss you’/‘started talking’ (*ibid*: 488), ‘come over to sit with you’/‘sat at our table’ (*ibid*: 489), and ‘fairly lengthy conversation with the defendant’/‘we were all talking’.

In each case, where the attorney works to maximise the focus on the witness as a potentially willing sexual partner, the witness works to minimise that focus. Clearly, in a rape trial (or indeed any trial) the management of descriptions is crucial; the outcome is partly contingent on which versions are taken to be credible. The contingencies and consequences in other contexts may be approximately comparable. As Schegloff, (1972) writes in relation to formulating place, speakers unavoidably reveal, through their selections, the kind of person they figure

\textsuperscript{10} Drew and Heritage comment very briefly on the gendered division of labour that might underpin the parents’ different responses. The data were collected in the 1980s at a time when parental roles were arguably more sharply gendered than might be the case now.

\textsuperscript{11} It is worth noticing that she does so by using a linguistically gender-neutral reference to ‘people’.
their recipient is. It might only be at the level of being the kind of person who would recognise an exotic location by name, but it is partly on such matters that relationships are built, damaged or lost. The ways that turns are designed are deeply consequential for interaction, identities and relationships. This makes the problem of description a potentially contentious and precarious matter. As Sacks observes:

...when it comes down to having to do a formulation, there will not be definitive ways, non-consequential ways of doing it. As we go about constructing the methodology of any given activity, we will come to find that the method is able to produce a thing that is seeable as ‘an alternative’. And my guess is that we’ll never get a stable formulation in which these things stand one to one...


One upshot of the fact that there are always alternative ways that a turn could have been produced is that recipients tend to hear selections as designed, or motivated. This makes interaction a highly political arena, and CA a systematic tool for making available findings that can be recruited to political positions. In cases where a level of neutrality is expected, it takes work for speakers to show themselves to be producing talk as ‘neutral’ (Atkinson, 1992; Clayman, 1988, 1992; Hutchby, 2005, 2011; Maynard, 1992, Pomerantz, 1984).

1.4 The Design and Organisation of Person Reference in Mundane Interaction

Sacks and Schegloff (1979) published the foundational conversation analytic statement on the organisation of person reference, in which they distinguished between two forms of reference: recognitional and non-recognitional. They showed how this distinction was tied to preference organisation such that there are preferences for using recognitional forms and for using a single formulation to achieve reference (minimisation).
Schegloff (1996a) expanded understanding of the organisation of person reference by differentiating in sequential terms between locally initial and locally subsequent forms.\textsuperscript{12} Taken together, these two foundational papers provide the basis for understanding how person reference might be organised to do simple reference and nothing else; what Schegloff (1996a) calls ‘reference simpliciter’. In addition, he sketches how deviations from default practices for doing reference are used in the service of other actions (e.g. to indicate a new spate of talk about a referent, or to disambiguate referents when pronouns are possibly confusing).

1.4.1 Recognitional and Non-Recognitional Person Reference Forms

In analysing references to non-present persons in English, Sacks and Schegloff (1979) draw a distinction between recognitional and non-recognitional forms. A recognitional person reference displays the speaker’s expectation that their recipients know (about) a particular referent sufficiently to be able to identify them from a name or description. In contrast, a non-recognitional person reference form displays that the identity of the referent is, or may be supposed to be, unavailable for either/both speaker and recipient. Typical non-recognitional forms are ‘this guy’ or ‘someone’ i.e. forms that convey to the recipient ‘you’ (and possibly ‘I’) do not know this person’. Schegloff (1996a) includes categorical descriptors (such as ‘doctor’ or ‘head-teacher’) in resources for doing non-recognitional person reference but notes their capacity to mobilise common-sense knowledge and to colour events in interactions in ways that simple non-recognitional terms generally do not.

Given, then, the distinction between recognitionals and non-recogntionals, as well as the variety of their respective forms of expression, speakers are faced with an array of possible selections when deciding how to refer to a non-present person. These selections are locally organised through

\textsuperscript{12} This is a distinction long studied in linguistics where it is labelled differently as indefinite and definite articles. The latter only become recognitional after a first mention.
sequence (Schegloff, 1996a) and orientation to preference as well as recipient design (Sacks and Schegloff, 1979).

1.4.2 Locally Initial and Locally Subsequent Person Reference

Schegloff (1996a) anchors forms of person reference to sequence organisation (broadly speaking) by drawing a distinction between locally initial and locally subsequent positions during talk-in-interaction. Mapped on to this distinction in position is Schegloff’s differentiation between initial and subsequent formulations. Locally initial forms tend to be recognitional noun phrase, names or descriptions, where possible (i.e. where a speaker figures that the recipient knows [about] the referent) or non-recognitional nouns or noun phrases (e.g. someone, this girl, people) if not. Locally subsequent forms are those pronouns (e.g. he, she, and they) that are generally used to index a referent already referred to in the same sequence of talk, using a locally initial form. For example, in Extract Thirteen, taken from a call between two twelve-year old girls arranging to meet, a new sequence of talk begins at line 4 when Louise announces (as a pre-telling) that a non-present third party has just sent her a text message. 13

Extract Thirteen

[CTS10]

01 Lou: Right. Is Annie allowed to come.
02 Fra: Yeah.
03 Lou: Right hh .hh Aneka’s just text me hh .hh
04 Fra: What did she say.
05 Lou: What time are we meeting

The referent, Aneka, is produced using a locally initial noun phrase, in this case, her name. At line 5, Aneka is referred to again, this time by the recipient, through the appropriate locally subsequent form of ‘she’. The locally subsequent form, in a locally subsequent position claims recognition of the referent and the turn as a whole at line 5, displays an expectation about why the announcement was made by Louise at line 4, and functions

13 See Schegloff (2007b) on pre-sequences
as a go-ahead for Louise to tell Frankie the content of Aneka’s text message.

1.4.3 Preference

Sacks and Schegloff (1979) demonstrated that ways of referring to people are recipient designed and based on two preferences. The first preference is that where possible (i.e. where a recipient can be assumed to know [about] the referent), speakers use a recognitional reference. Within the domain of recognitional reference, there is a strong preference for naming rather than describing. The second preference is for minimisation. That is to say, only one reference (a name, a kinship term or a descriptor) is taken as necessary to achieve referring (and any more than this constitutes a marked practice of some kind). Where the preference for minimisation conflicts with recogniseability, achieving recognition takes priority and the norm for using a single reference per referent is relaxed (Heritage, 2007).

Evidence for the structure of preference of one form over another form is provided, in part, by the sheer frequency of usage of one compared with the other. Sacks and Schegloff (1979) point to the relative frequency with which English speakers use recognitionals as compared with non-recognitionals. Other evidence is provided when speakers change from one form to the other during delivery of a turn. For example, in the extract below a speaker changes from a non-recognitional to a recognitional reference in the course of her turn.

**Extract Fourteen**  
[CTS09]

01 Sop: **Right, you know this lad at my school.**  
02 Y- **Oh yeah you do. .hh Martin?**  
03 (0.4)  
04 Emm: **One minute you’ve gone really quiet**  
05 ((clicks for 1.4))  
06 Sop: **Can you hear me now.**  
07 Emm: **Erm yeah.**  
08 Sop: **Right you know Martin.**
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09 Emm: Oh it’s gone fuzzy.
10 (1.5) 
11 Sop: Right it doesn’t matter .HHH
12 Emm: It’s this phone line ( )
13 Ooh (0.5) can you hear all those noises 
14 (0.4) 
15 Sop: No 
16 (0.4) 
17 Emm: Oh 
18 (0.7) 
19 Emm: Right okay 
20 Sop: Right you know Martin. You spoke to him 
21 on MSN. 
22 (1.0) 
23 Emm: Oh I hate him 
24 Sop: Huh .hh yeah: 
25 Emm: #Yeah huh huh ((starts story))

In this extract, two fourteen-year-old girls, Sophie and Emma, are discussing life in their respective schools. At line 1, Sophie launches a storytelling sequence and uses a non-recognitional person reference ‘this lad at my school’. She then displays awareness that it is possible to use a recognitional by halting her turn-so-far with a cut off on Y- (line 2), and producing an oh-prefaced assertion (a ‘change of state token ‘Oh’; see Heritage 1984) that her interlocutor does in fact know [about] the referent. She then redoes the person reference using the referent’s name, ‘Martin’ (possibly try-marked). Following a period of dealing with difficulties with the telephone connection (lines 4 to 18), and Sophie’s reminder of the context in which Emma ‘knows’ Martin (lines 19-20), Emma claims that she does in fact recognise the referent (line 22) with her production of an assessment of her feelings towards him.

So, here a speaker disrupts the progressivity of her turn in order to repair a non-recognitional to a recognitional person reference, thus manifesting the preference for recogniseability.

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34 Try marking refers to the prosodic delivery of a reference. Typically, the intonation is rising and questioning.
Sacks and Schegloff (1979) also identified a preference for use of names over recognitional descriptors. As Schegloff (1996a) observes, evidence for this preference is produced when a speaker first uses a recognitional descriptor but then either speaker or recipient halts progressivity of the talk, in order to replace the descriptor with a name. For example, in the extract below (taken from Schegloff, 1996a p.452), a referent is introduced by Mark (line 6) using a recognitional descriptor: ‘that girl he use to go with for so long’ (note use of ‘that’ here displays Mark’s understanding that Karen knows the referent).

**Extract Fifteen**

[SN-4]

01 Mark: So ('r) you da:ting Keith?
02 (1.0)
03 Karen: 'Sa frie:nd.
04 (0.5)
05 Mark: What about that girl 'e use tuh go with
06 fer so long.
07 Karen: Alice? I [don't- ] they gave up.
08 Mark: [(mm) ]
09 (0.4)
10 Mark: ('Oh?)
11 Karen: I dunno where she is but I-
12 (0.9)
13 Karen: Talks about 'er evry so o:ften, but- I dunno
14 where she is.

The descriptive reference is formulated within an interrogative directed to Karen. In next position, where a response to the interrogative is due, Karen instead opts to provide a candidate name before continuing to provide conditionally relevant information relating to her.

**1.4.4 Reference Simpliciter**

Anecdotally, people frequently report great difficulty in remembering names, and this leads Searle (1979) to pose the question: why have names
to refer to persons, when there are descriptions that are possibly more readily available as resources for identifying others? Searle argues that description is risky in that selecting a description involves making salient particular features of a referent and making no comment on others. This is tricky interactional business, and one that is solved (to some extent) by use of names; a name can achieve recogniseability without having to, as it were, commit to a stance on a referent (Stivers et al. 2007). Searle’s theoretical point resonates with the problem of description as outlined in section 1.1 on turn-design. The basic problem is that because alternative descriptions are always possible, recipients tend to hear actual descriptions as somehow motivated or chosen to perform a particular social action. It is easy to imagine the interactional quagmire of referring to non-present third parties if naming was not an option. As was noted earlier, names are exemplary reference simpliciter.

Schegloff (1996a) defines reference simpliciter in the following terms: for non-present third party references the term selected is treated as doing simple reference if it is in a preferred form (i.e. a name where possible) and is fitted to the local sequential organisation of the talk i.e. a locally initial term in a locally initial position or a locally subsequent form in a locally subsequent position (ibid: 449). For two-party and/or co-present interaction, the prototypical self-reference simpliciter is ‘I’ (and grammatical variants, ‘me’ or ‘my’). For selected interlocuters, the default reference is ‘you’ (and grammatical variants, ‘your’). When references appear in something other than these default terms, Schegloff (1996: 449) asserts that they ‘invite a recipient/hearer to examine them for what they are doing other than simple reference to speaker or recipient; they are marked usages’.

As illustration of the preliminary actions Schegloff had in mind, consider the following extract, in which there is an instance of marked usage because of the reappearance of a locally initial person reference to a non-present referent that is already under discussion (see also extract fifteen).
The referent is ‘Alice’ and, as we noted above, she is introduced into the interaction with a recognitional descriptor (lines 5-6).

**Extract Sixteen**

[SN-4]

01 Mark: So (‘r) you da:ting Keith?
02 (1.0)
03 Karen: ‘Sa frie:nd.
04 (0.5)
05 Mark: What about that girl ’e use tuh go with fer so long.
06 (0.4)
07 Karen: Alice? I [don't- ] they gave up.
08 Mark: [(mm) ]
09 (0.4)
10 Mark: (‘Oh?)
11 Karen: I dunno where she is but I-
12 (0.9)
13 Karen: Talks about ’er evry so o:ften, but- I dunno where she is.
14 (0.5)
15 Mark: hmm
16 (0.2)
18 Sheri: *Alice was stra::nge,
19 (0.3) ((rubbing sound))
20 Mark: Very o:dd. She usetuh call herself a pro:stitute,="n I useteh- (0.4) ask ’er if she wz gitting any more money than I: was.(doing).

Alice is then named by Karen (line 7) and then referred to using locally subsequent terms (as part of ‘they’, line 7 and then ‘she’ lines 11, 13, and 14). When the topic of Alice reaches possible closure, Sheri produces a new spate of talk relating to the same referent (line 18). It is notable that Sheri refers to Alice by name; a locally initial form in what looks like a locally subsequent position. However, the referent features differently here. In the first sequence relating to Alice, the conversation focuses on her relationship with Keith. In the second, introduced by Sheri at line 18, the topic is Alice’s character. The fact that the referent features differently in the second sequence is incipiently constituted by Sheri’s use of a locally
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initial reference term. As Schegloff (1996a:452) observes, ‘by use of a locally initial reference form a speaker can try to bring off a new departure in talk which is otherwise apparently referentially continuous with just prior talk’.

Empirical investigation of the actions that are accomplished with marked person references is currently gaining impetus. For example, Land and Kitzinger (2007) examine the use of third-party references to refer to self (e.g. in one extract a woman refers to herself as ‘that silly old bat that lives across the road from you’) and show how this functions to shift footing (Goffman, 1981) such that the speaker displays another’s (usually the recipient’s) view of him/herself. Land and Kitzinger analyse this switch in footing as occurring in the service of maintaining the speaker’s agenda in the face of a possible incipient topic shift. Stivers (2007) formulates a newly discovered and marked form of recognitional third-party reference, which she calls Alternative Recognitions that are used to shift the ‘domains of responsibility’ that speakers and/or recipients have for referents.

The previous sections have introduced the field of conversation analysis and the topic of person reference, which underpin this thesis.

1.5 Thesis Outline

In sum, the thesis is a conversation analytic project that explores gender (and sexuality) as it is introduced, managed and negotiated in interaction. I particularly focus on referring to persons, but it includes a chapters where gender takes precedence over reference in the analysis (see Chapter Four), and a chapter where person reference is analysed without a particular focus on gender (see Chapter Seven). In a sense, the chapters arise from matters that I found interesting (puzzling) and stimulating when reading through the data. This is in keeping with a conversation analytic mentality

15 There was a rather nice example reported in the Guardian 20th July 2009, in which Tom Watson referred to himself as ‘the old codger’ after winning the Golf Open Championship aged 59.
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that argues for an unmotivated examination of data. The chapters certainly do not represent all that there is to be said about the data. Much work remains to be done, both of a feminist and conversation analytic nature.

The main body of the thesis is presented across the following seven chapters.

In **Chapter Two**, I locate the thesis in broader theoretical discussions of gender, language and identity. I treat gender as a social construct rather than biological fact; people ‘do’ gender rather than ‘are’ gendered. Conversation analysis offers a theoretically and empirically distinctive approach to researching gender as social practice. The route CA offers is not, however, straightforward, and I draw attention to several dilemmas for (feminist) conversation analytic researchers working with matters of gender, language and identity. These tensions are taken up and discussed in relation to my own methodological practices.

In **Chapter Three**, I set out my method of collecting and analysing data. The thesis is based on telephone calls made and received by teenage girls, and the participants include my own children. I reflect on my own ethical practices and the tensions that arose for me as a mother collecting data from my daughters. I argue that feminist research involves a more critical engagement with ethical practice than provided for in standardised ethical codes. I also reflect on the potential conflicts between doing a conversation analytic project and doing feminism. I end with a discussion of putting together collections of conversation analytic phenomena and working with single-cases.

In **Chapter Four**, I apply conversation analysis to a single extract of data in which gender and sexual conduct are topicalised and managed in interaction between two fifteen-year-old girls. This chapter contributes to the literature on gender, sexuality and language by examining naturalistic data, as opposed to researcher-led data, which is common to this field. So
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it is possible to trace how sex as a topic is initiated and negotiated by and for the participants themselves, as part of everyday interaction. It is clear from the progressive realisation of the talk, that talk about sex is taboo, and that the speakers orient to their moral identities as young women negotiating early sexual experience. The chapter contributes in several ways to conversation analytic research, including the embedding of a news telling as part of another action, so that the ‘news’ gets told but a response to it is not made relevant. This ‘loosens’ the connection between adjacency pairs, so that, in common with the ways that complaints against third parties are built, news can be delivered indirectly over long sequences of talk, and only told directly after tellers have made attempts to secure alignment.

In Chapter Five, I make a distinction between linguistic formulations of gender and interactional forms that may also interactionally invoke gender. This distinction is analysed through person references, resulting in four categories of reference: Those that are linguistically gendered (‘he’, ‘man’, ‘woman’) that are also interactionally gendered - that is, they relevantly invoke the gender of the referent; those that are linguistically gendered, but which do not make gender relevant for the participants; those that are not linguistically gendered and neither do they invoke gender; and, finally, and perhaps most interestingly, those that are not linguistically gendered but which do invoke gender of referents. I argue that the interactional meaning of gender is not intrinsic to gendered linguistic forms but to the action a linguistic form is used to do on any given occasion of use. This significantly opens up the possibilities for research on gender and language, since it frees researchers from the perceived necessity of focussing their research on linguistically gendered terms and urges sensitivity to the multiplicity of ways in which people ‘do gender’ in interaction. It also continues the development of a feminist conversation analysis that exposes the ways in which gender is constructed in everyday interaction.
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In **Chapter Six**, I extend the findings of the previous chapter by examining uses of the self-reference “I”. This ubiquitous linguistic formulation does not typically convey categorical information about the speaker. However, I show instances where speakers do in fact mean to refer to themselves as gendered (and/or other categorical) beings when they use ‘I’. My collection of what I call gendered-‘I’s, includes examples where speakers exploit sequences in which gender has already surfaced in the interaction and can use ‘I’ to display themselves as either embracing or resisting a gender norm. Together with the previous chapter, this chapter contributes to the literature on gender and language by showing that there is nothing in language that is uniquely gendered nor uniquely non-gendered. It contributes to the literature on conversation analysis in suggesting that uses of ‘I’ bear more examination for their interactional import.

In **Chapter Seven**, I focus on a practice for referring to persons in which a prototypical non-recognitional third-party reference (e.g. ‘this guy’ is used to refer to a referent who is known and known-to be-known to the parties in the interaction. Put simply, the practice, which I call alternative-less-than recognitional (ALTR) reference - is the use of a non-recognitional form when a recognitional form *could* have been used. I show that ALTRs often constitute a hostile action by distancing the referent(s) from parties to the interaction, making the referent(s) unnameable and not connected to the speaker and recipient. Further, I argue that this hostile action is used to shore up complaints against the referent, particularly in places where naming them might invoke precisely those terms on which they are warranted to do whatever is being complained about. This chapter connects to broader issues about the ways in which people manage their relationships to one another. Third-party references set up triangular relationships between speakers, recipients and referents and create particular domains of responsibility. The ALTR places the referent *outside* of the domain created between speaker and recipient.
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**Chapter Eight** provides an assessment of the thesis as a whole. I begin with a summary of the main findings from each chapter and then discuss the overall contributions it makes to feminist work on gender and language, as well as to conversation analysis. I consider the limitations of the work and make suggest directions for future research.

This introductory Chapter has reviewed major themes of conversation analytic work generally, and work on practices for referring to persons in particular. In the next chapter, theoretical connections are made between CA and work on social identities, and I situate my work more broadly in the field of language and gender. One of the central concerns for those working with language and (gender) identity has been, what ‘counts’ as identity, and ‘where’ it should be located: within the person or within social practices. These debates, taken up in the next chapter, crudely stated, equate to the difference between essentialist and non-essentialist approaches.
Chapter Two

Chapter Two: Interactional Production of Gendered and Sexual Identities

This thesis contributes to two broad literatures. The first, conversation analysis, was introduced in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I review the second literature relevant to my work; gender, language and identity.

2.1 Identity, Discourse and (Non-)Essentialism.
Identity is a much theorised concept in social science and one that has undergone radical critique, particularly following the so-called ‘turn-to-discourse’ in its diverse forms (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Hall, 1996). The traditional Cartesian notion of a unified, authentic and agentic self located inside the minds of individuals (e.g. Erikson, 1950; Eysenck, 1952; Gilligan, 1982; Jesperson, 1922/1998; Piaget, 1952; Rogers, 1959; Tannen, 1990) has been fundamentally challenged, arguably resulting in the development of more nuanced, though often contested, understandings of identity as practice; as constituted in discourse (Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Bucholtz and Hall, 2005; Harre and Moghaddam, 2003; Foucault, 1972). The argument that identity is constituted in and through discourse is (or was) a radical one that does not amount to a claim that identity is merely reflected in discourse, nor that there is a true inner self that is somehow realisable in social action. Instead, broadly discursive approaches treat identity as something people ‘do’ (or have done to them) rather than as something they ‘have’. This has implications for the many approaches to identity that rely on interview data where discourse, or more specifically, language is commonly treated as a vehicle of expression; a conduit between inner and outer worlds (see Kitzinger, 2006; Potter and Hepburn, 2005, 2007; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 2006).

Recent research on identity is often operationalised through a range of discourse analyses, varying in scope and level of investigation; from macro-analyses of socio-historical arrangements that regulate identities (e.g. Baxter, 2002, 2005; 2008; Butler, 1990, 1993; Foucault, 1972; Parker, 1992;
Wodak, 2003), to ethnomethodologically influenced micro-interactional analyses of the ways that identities are realised, ascribed, resisted and managed in the details of talk-in-interaction (e.g. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998; Edwards, 2003; Land and Kitzinger, 2005; Hepburn, 2002; Speer, 2005, 2007; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2003).\textsuperscript{16}

Of the multiple identities that persons possess, it is gender that has been most widely researched in discursive data (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006: 49). The perspectives taken by interactional researchers vary from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), to Ethnomethodology (EM), to CA, and Discursive Psychology (DP), but most share a rejection of the position that gender (or any other aspect of identity) is an essential property of individuals.

An essentialist understanding of identity is one that sees individuals possessing a true, substantially fixed and rational self that directs behaviour in consistent, even predictable ways and makes people ‘who they are’ (Haslam et al. 2004). This approach to understanding identity pervades contemporary social life at both mundane and institutional levels. It resonates with common sense or folk-psychology views of the self as autonomous and consistent across time and contexts (Mallon, 2007). People treat themselves and others as having a continuous identity (Edwards and Stokoe, 2004) and recruit this notion of identity in explanations of conduct. The understanding of people as autonomous rational agents also permeates modern Western socio-political institutions (du Gay, Evans and Redman, 2000). Governments treat individuals as persons with capacities, rights and responsibilities and liberal notions of individuality and rationality operate in the arenas of legal and social policy. In academia, the idea that individuals embody a ‘self’ that is separate to the ‘selves’ embodied in others was the starting point for much work in the social sciences (Elias, 1978/2000. See also Bucholtz and Hall, 2004; Haslam et al. 2004). This is seen particularly in those social sciences that have

\textsuperscript{16} See the ESRC Identity and Social Action Programme for a broad range of recent work on identity – www.identities.org.uk
traditionally been dominated by a concern to locate causal explanations for behaviour in the inner worlds of individuals (Harre and Moghaddam, 2003; Smith 1998).

Essentialism also pervades treatment of more collective notions of identity (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004; Spelman, 1990). This is common in social scientific work in which persons are categorised into apparently clearly bounded groups; man/woman, black/white, adolescent/adult, working-class/middle-class. Typically, categories are used as quasi-independent variables against which to measure members’ skills and conduct (Benwell and Stokoe, 2005; Bucholtz and Hall, 2004), in what Cameron (1992:32) calls an, ‘endless ferreting for differences’.

This approach is most clearly seen in the literature on gender and language, which was once dominated by the differences paradigm (Cameron, 2005; Ehrlich, 2004; Speer, 2005) and tested for the effects of gender on language; in short, treating gender in essentialist terms, as a quasi-independent variable. That is, men and women were treated as always-already belonging to different, internally homogeneous categories and research both tested for (linguistic) differences and recruited gender as the explanation for these differences. The differences paradigm tended to group around three accounts (Cameron, 1992, 2005; Sunderland, 2006). These were: deficit, dominance, and cultural differences. The deficit account is that women’s use of language reflects their powerlessness in relation to men (Lakoff, 1975). The dominance account is that men control language to such an extent that women are effectively silenced (Spender, 1980). Finally, the cultural differences account suggests that men and women have different but equally valid ways of talking (Tannen, 1990). Lakoff, Spender and Tannen treat gender in essentialist terms, as fixed and embodied in the biological space of male and female cells, and as having an existence independent of any discourse. This partly arises because at the

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17 And has done so for a long time. For example, Aristotle wrote very clearly about divisions and hierarchical arrangements of attributes between men and women (Spelman, 1990) and between whites and non-whites (Byrd and Clayton, 2000).
time these authors were writing, expressly social constructionist views of
gender as fluid and constituted through practice were just being developed
(although this is less true for Tannen than for Lakoff and Spender). It also
arises as an artefact of the variables (gender) and effects (difference) model
of research adopted by all three authors.

Non-essentialist feminists (variously) object to the reification and
privileging of sex/gender differences typified in the traditional approaches
(e.g. Butler, 1990, 1993; Cameron, 1998, 2007; Kristeva, 1989; Lorde 1984;
Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1992; Spelman, 1990; West, 1995). These
authors view even feminist essentialism with great suspicion, arguing that
any form of essentialism reproduces rather than disrupts patriarchal
stereotypes. Kessler and McKenna summarise the argument:

As long as the categories ‘female’ and ‘male’ present
themselves to people in everyday life as external, objective,
dichotomous, physical facts, there will be scientific and naive
searches for differences, and differences will be found. Where
there are dichotomies, it is difficult to avoid evaluating one in
relation to the other, a firm foundation for discrimination and
oppression. Unless and until gender, in all of its manifestations
including the physical, is seen as a social construction, action
that will radically change our incorrigible propositions cannot
occur. People must be confronted with the reality of other
possibilities, as well as the possibility of other realities.
[Kessler and McKenna, 1978:164] (Emphasis in original)

Non-essentialist feminists additionally stress the intersections between
gender and other categories to which women (and men) belong; class,
ethnicity, professional status and so on. For these authors, the mobilisation
of political action around sex/gender differences relies on an incredible
level of abstraction. As Spelman asks:
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Is it really possible for us to think of a woman’s ‘womanness’ in abstraction from the fact that she is a particular woman, whether she is a middle-class Black woman living in North America in the Twentieth Century or a poor white woman living in France in the Seventeenth Century? [Spelman, 1990: 13]

Goodwin (1990) takes the argument further and suggests that activities, not groups or individuals should be the basic unit of analysis for understanding socially produced phenomena, including gender. Her ethnographic study of African American school-aged children, conducted in the Maple Street neighbourhood, Philadelphia in the 1970s, demonstrated that activity was a better predictor of language style than gender. Goodwin notes that:

Stereotypes about women's speech ... fall apart when talk in a range of activities is examined; in order to construct social personae appropriate to the events of the moment, the same individuals articulate talk and gender differently as they move from one activity to another. [Goodwin, 1990: 9]

A second stream of criticism of traditional essentialist approaches to gender, and particularly to work on gender and language, is the cognitivist underpinning of much of the research. Difference approaches are prone to ‘psychologise’ or ‘cognitivise’ language such that it is purported to be a mere reflection of internal states (Speer, 2005, see also Edwards, 2004), a medium through which it is possible to see what is going on inside people’s minds. For example, in Lakoff’s work, suggesting that women’s language is powerless, the tag question is said to reveal a speaker’s lack of confidence. That is, a speaker experiences inner uncertainty and uses a tag question to reflect this inner experience. Tannen also treats language as a representation of internal states, and her work is replete with descriptions of inner desires, motivations, and feelings purportedly revealed in spoken
language. This sort of understanding of language and its relationship to the ‘internal structures’ of mind has been subject to a sustained critique in the philosophies of Wittgenstein (1953) and Austin (1962), and subsequently in the work of Sacks (1995), and in psychology, especially by proponents of discursive psychology (e.g. Edwards and Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997, 2004; Hepburn and Wiggins, 2005, 2007; Potter 2005). Instead of treating language as a transparent and secondary by-product of thought, discursive psychologists treat language as the primary resource for doing social actions. Their focus is on the way that a range of ‘mental’ states are constructed and used discursively in talk in order to achieve particular social actions. Those working in a difference paradigm, whether deficit, dominance or cultural-differences, fail to look for what is being done by speakers in the local context of their utterances. Speer (2005) relates this criticism to Lakoff’s treatment of tag questions, which are regarded as reliably revealing an inner state of low self-confidence. When a more contextualized conversation analysis is performed, (some) tag questions do appear to reduce the force of declarative statements (Heritage and Raymond, 2005). However, rather than being seen as a reflection of inner uncertainty, they are treated as a possible resource for downgrading claims to knowledge in local environments where such claims are accountable (also see Hepburn and Potter, 2011)

Essentialist approaches are problematic because they privilege assumed differences between group members at the expense of other aspects of identity that intersect with gender. The issue is one of relevance. Persons are (generally) gendered and this forms an important point of departure for understanding (some) behaviour. However, because people are also understood in terms of a wider range of identity markers (class, ethnicity, age, profession and the like), it is not enough to claim that conduct is gendered just because persons happen to be male or female (Schegloff, 1997). What is important is that different aspects of identities are seen as relevant for conduct; not just female/male but relevantly female/male (Kitzinger, 2007a; Kitzinger and Rickford, 2007; Stockill and Kitzinger, 2007;
Stokoe, 2006; Stokoe and Smithson, 2001). It is also important to consider approaches that theorise gendered identities in non-essentialist ways as a product of social organisation, particularly the work of Butler and Garfinkel. These authors adopt positions that resonate with postmodernism and social constructionism (Speer, 2005), though Garfinkel in particular would not necessarily align with constructionism (Stokoe, 2007; Wowk, 2007) nor even with feminism (Stokoe, 2006). These nuanced relationships to constructionism will be discussed in a later section.

2.2 Non-Essentialism: Butler and Garfinkel

Non-essentialism is an ontological position in which instances of categories have no common essence (Mallon, 2007). This basic position is taken up in various ways, but is most often associated with social constructionism and postmodernism. Ehrlich (2004: 307, citing Bohan, 1997: 33) contrasts essentialism and constructionism in terms of level of description, describing individuals (essentialist) as opposed to describing interactions (constructionist). Cameron, using slightly different terms, puts it like this:

Whereas sociolinguistics would say that the way I use language reflects or marks my identity as a particular kind of social subject – I talk like a white middle-class woman because I am (already) a white middle-class woman – the critical account suggests language is one of the things that constitutes my identity as a particular kind of subject. Sociolinguistics says that how you act depends on who you are: critical theory says that who you are (and taken to be) depends on how you act.

[Cameron, 1995: 15-16] [Emphasis in original]

So, for non-essentialist (broadly constructionist) approaches, gender is not viewed as a fixed attribute of an individual but rather something that is constituted in social practice. This view has far-reaching implications and leads to various challenges of any notion of fixed identity that resides inside
individuals above and beyond talk (Du Gay, Evans and Redman, 2000). In
the 1990s, feminist authors such as Butler (1990, 1993), Kitzinger (1994)
and Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992, 1999) began exploring the
discursive properties of gender as a concept and how these might be used
in the service of a feminist agenda. Questions were asked about how
gender came to have its status as a naturally occurring binary, as a ‘real’
embodied biological fact. A feminist goal was to disrupt whatever
processes produced gender as a reality (McElhinny, 2003; Sunderland,
2006). Perhaps the most radical statement is in the work of Butler.

2.2.1 Butler and the Discursive Production of Gender

Butler’s major contributions to post-modern challenges to the notion of
fixed binary gender are contained within two books; Gender Trouble (1990)
and Bodies that Matter (1993), though she summarises and refines her
earlier analyses in a more recent text, Undoing Gender (2004).

The starting point for her work was to disrupt the then widely accepted
ontological distinction between sex and gender, i.e. that whilst the former
is biological and fixed, the latter is social and subject to fluid cultural
understandings about what counts as gender appropriate behaviour (see,
for example, Oakley, 1972; Shapiro, 1981). Drawing on Foucault’s post-
structuralism, Butler collapses this distinction and argues that both sex and
gender are constructed socially through discursive practices. As she puts it:

Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural
inscription of meaning on a pre-given sex... gender must also
designate the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes
themselves are established. As a result, gender is not to culture
as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means
by which "sexed nature" or "a natural sex" is produced and
established as "prediscursive" prior to culture, a politically
neutral surface on which culture acts. [Butler 1990:7]
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Individuals are born into a society where notions of femininity and masculinity precede and exceed them as individuals (Butler, 1993). Rather than being an already present internally unfolding maleness or femaleness that stands behind and directs gendered behaviours, she argues that externally constructed discourses about gender ‘speak’ girls and boys into being. Drawing on Austin’s (1962) Speech Act Theory, she suggests this process of citation and iteration is initiated when an infant is addressed as ‘boy’ or ‘girl’. For her, the midwife’s announcement, ‘it’s a girl’ is the act of gendering a body (Butler, 1993). Her idea of performativity extends beyond Austin’s original conceptualisation (which had been related to utterances in speech) to discursive practices, so that broader social acts (e.g. style of dress, hair, and make-up) have the illocutionary force of gendering. For her, gender is a set of performances, which reproduces that which it performs. Thus, girls/women and boys/men perform gender according to culturally sanctioned conventions and practices. In her often quoted words ‘gender is the repeated stylisation of the body’ (Butler, 1990, p.32).

Butler’s revolutionary work resonates with social constructionist versions of feminism and has received much critical acclaim for challenging essentialist ideas about sex, gender and sexuality (Speer and Potter, 2002). For some feminists (e.g. Wodak, 1997; Weston, 1993), however, her constructionism leads her to ignore power relations that constrain performance, as if agents are free to construct gender however they choose. This is probably a misreading of Butler’s concept of performance (Kulick, 2003). In fact, Butler distances herself (with contested levels of success. See Brickell, 2005 and Hall 1996) from any notion of a pre-discursive agent making free-choices. For Butler, performance is the act of doing, and performativity is the process through which subjectivity emerges. So, performativity involves performance but they are not equivalent. Crucially, performativity involves an analysis of what is left out of performance – of what is not done and/or could not be done. This analysis connects with power relations through awareness of the regulatory frameworks that make gender
intelligible (Bucholtz, 1999; Ehrlich, 2003; Kulick, 2003). For Butler then, an adequate understanding of gender involves both local analyses of gender as a performance and broader analyses of the regulatory norms that authorise and police acceptable resources for doing gender.

By conceiving of gender (and sex and sexuality) as achieved rather than given, Butler’s work stands as a challenge to the sex-differences research reviewed earlier. As Speer (2005) observes, her analysis overcomes the implicit determinism of a sex-difference framework and avoids reifying gender by re-specifying it as a process rather than a thing; an adjective rather than a noun. This collapsing of the binary view of gender was the impetus for a new focus on discourse and sexuality (Cameron, 2005) and has inspired a range of work on gender as performative (e.g. Bucholtz and Hall, 2004; Cameron, 1997; Livia and Hall, 1997; Morrish and Saunton, 2007). Despite its radical and groundbreaking status, however, Butler’s work has an uneasy status with many feminists because it effectively destabilises and even eradicates the category ‘woman’ around which political engagement is customarily mobilised in the women’s movement (Oakley, 1998; See also Holmes and Meyerhoff, 2003).

Butler’s work, though revolutionary and influential, is primarily theoretical and her notion of discourse is fairly abstract (Cameron, 2005; Speer and Potter, 2002). In keeping with post-structuralism and other forms of Fauchaldian inspired Critical Discourse Analysis, Butler treats discourse separate to, and as having a constraining effect on, identity (Speer, 2005). The problem with this is that it fails to notice the ways that identities, including gender, are constituted and oriented to within discourse, in the locally organised context of interaction (Speer, 2005; Speer and Potter, 2002). As Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995:28) put it (though not targeting Butler in particular), abstract theories ‘are produced in isolation from the actual behaviour of those individuals whose... practices these theories are meant to illuminate’. Butler’s analysis of discourse is not based on actual contextualised instances of gender performance and provides no
methodological basis for studying them. A more empirical project is to be discovered in Ethnomethodology.

2.2.2 Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology

The notion of gender as an achievement or accomplishment was presented in the work of American sociologist and founder of ethnomethodology, Garfinkel some twenty years before Butler’s work. Like his contemporary, Goffman, Garfinkel was interested in the apparently trivial and mundane activities that people engage in everyday, the details of people’s situated lives that other sociological traditions had ignored (Heritage, 1984; Maynard, 1991). According to Garfinkel (1967), people live in a potentially chaotic environment; individuals cannot predict what will happen nor how others will behave in a given situation, and so need to be able to make sense of everyday events in order to contribute and respond meaningfully. Thus, people are oriented to producing order as they speak, so that they may be understood by, and understand, others. One feature of these sense-making activities is indexicality; that meaning is indexed to particular circumstances. Hence, making sense of particular interactions requires analyses of the local context in which it is produced.

Garfinkel argued that what he called ‘members methods’ for producing order become routinised and taken-for-granted, ‘seen but unnoticed’ (1967: 118). The method he favoured for demonstrating this feature of social life was with his ‘breaching experiments’ (Heritage, 1984). For example, he encouraged students to disrupt the taken-for-granted in relationships at home by behaving like strangers toward parents, and then to take note of the confusion (and anger) that followed.

Of the many taken-for-granted features of our lives that Garfinkel wrote about, the one of most relevance here, is his work on gender, which he called ‘sex-status’. He was struck by the way that for most us, sex-status is achieved so routinely that it renders the accomplishment of gender almost
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invisible. There are, however, some people for whom the production of
gender becomes a salient matter (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Kessler and
McKenna, 1978; Kitzinger, 2004; Speer and Green, 2007). For example,
intersexed persons have mixed anatomical characteristics such that it is not
straightforward to identify them as clearly male or female from an
examination of the external features of their genitals (Fausto-Sterling,
2000; Kessler, 1998). For such individuals, passing as one sex or another
becomes a studied and practical matter of achievement. In 1958, Garfinkel
was given the opportunity to work with Agnes, who claimed to be
intersexed and was requesting reconstructive surgery to fit with her elected
status as a woman.

At nineteen, Agnes had fully developed breasts and a normal penis and
scrotum, and had been referred to a psychiatrist in order to be granted
surgical reassignment to female. As is common practice, before surgery
was granted, Agnes had to pass as a woman in her daily activities. This was
partly, as Garfinkel put it, to avoid ‘degradation’ after an obvious change in
appearance. Agnes became preoccupied with the details of femininity, and
therefore, a student of ethnomethodology as she researched ways of
accomplishing female status as a natural and ascribed category.

Drawing in his experience of working with Agnes, Garfinkel concluded that
gender is ‘accomplished through witnessed displays of talk and
conduct’ (1967:180). He also made the following observations about the
way that gender is produced as ‘natural’. First, gender is treated as having
two and only two categories. Second, this sexual dimorphism is treated as
a moral fact. Third, most people identify as one sex-status or the other, and
this identification is taken-for-granted massively as a lifelong and
immutable fact. Agnes also subscribed to these ideas, believing that she
had been female all along and that her gender-reassignment surgery had
been putting right what nature got wrong.
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Garfinkel’s study of Agnes is controversial partly because he acknowledges she admitted lying to the researchers about her status as an intersexed person. In fact, she was a male to female transsexual, who had grown breasts due to deliberate ingestion of female hormone pills. She had lied in order to be admitted to the research in the belief that this would improve her chances of being granted surgery. This raises issues of power in research that were picked up by Rogers (1992) in a highly critical review of the study. According to Rogers, Agnes was powerless as a research subject and only allowed herself to be investigated to gain what the scientists were able to grant or withhold. Further, in his focus on Agnes’s passing, Garfinkel was blinded to the ways that he was passing as a male. To support this claim, Rogers points to Garfinkel’s frequent references to Agnes as a sexualised object; her shapeliness and measurements. In doing this, he was producing himself as a heterosexual male with almost voyeuristic fascination for this woman. Rogers accuses Garfinkel of conducting poor ethnomethodology because of having failed to bracket off his own common sense understandings in analysing his interactions with Agnes. Rogers doubts the radical status of the work because of Garfinkel’s lack of reflexive consideration for how his own role contributed to his passing as a man and Agnes’ passing as a woman.

Speer (2005) defends Garfinkel’s study, pointing out that he was challenging sexual dimorphism long before feminists such as Butler were making largely the same points. As Speer observes, the study and its author were embedded in a pre-feminist era of academic debate, and can hardly be blamed for that. Kitzinger (2006) and Stokoe (2006) also see Garfinkel’s study as influential for feminists, arguing that his concern for the everyday and the personal finds resonances in contemporary feminist approaches. Nevertheless, it remains a non-feminist study, written by a non-feminist academic. It was left for two young and relatively unknown psychologists Kessler and McKenna (1978) to reveal the feminist potential of ethnomethodology some ten years after the publication of Garfinkel’s work (Crawford, 2000).
Kessler and McKenna (1978: 2) interviewed transsexual people to illuminate what they call ‘the primacy of the gender attribution’. In the opening pages of their text, Kessler and McKenna observe that:

> Gender very clearly pervades everyday life. Not only *can* gender be attributed to most things, but there are certain objects (i.e. people) to which gender apparently *must* be attributed. [Kessler and McKenna, 1978: 3] (Emphasis in original)

This becomes most clear when dealing with people whose gender is ambiguous and a major theme of Kessler and McKenna’s interviews was the ways transsexuals managed the business of ‘passing’ as gendered beings. Their central question, articulated at a time when social constructionism was still a relatively novel idea (Crawford, 2000), was with how reality is constructed so that there are two and only two genders. Through their interviews, Kessler and McKenna illuminate not only the work that transsexuals are engaged in, but the work we all do in order to ‘pass’ as male or female.

The idea of ‘doing gender’ was first explicitly stated by Sociologists West and Zimmerman who proposed ‘an ethnomethodologically informed... understanding of gender as a routine, methodical and recurring accomplishment’ (West and Zimmerman, 1987: 126) and discuss resources for doing gender. 18 Drawing on Goffman (1977), West and Zimmerman argue that, whilst we are all members of categories that may be either displayed or not during social action (e.g. teacher, friend, spouse and so on), gender is taken as given, visible and therefore an ever-available resource with which to hold persons accountable. When gender is done ‘appropriately’, sexual dimorphism is produced and reproduced as legitimate. When it is not done ‘appropriately’, then it is the individual who

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18 See Wickes and Emmison, 2007 for a discussion of the various ways this has been taken up in research.
is held accountable and not the social arrangements; doing gender is also doing power. For social change to occur, West and Zimmerman assert there must first be a radical disruption of the binary norm that predicates asymmetrical social relations.

The ethnomethodological approach offers feminists an important route to overturning oppressive social institutions by calling attention to the ways in which hetero-patriarchal systems are made to appear as natural and expected consequences of ‘undisputed’ differences between men and women (Kitzinger, 2000). The strength of the approach is that it provides a method for exploring ways in which gender is done in the locally organised practices of social actors. As Heritage (1984) notes, ethnomethodology takes gender as the end-point of social interaction rather than its starting point. The focus on the everyday and the ordinary methods by which unequal and often unnoticed realities are produced turns gender in interaction into a topic that requires investigation rather than a thing in itself standing beyond discourse (Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998; Kitzinger, 2000; Speer, 2005). It may be surprising, therefore, to discover that the classic ethnomethodological texts reviewed here are not replete with the details of social interactions (Kitzinger, 2000; Speer, 2005). Garfinkel’s groundbreaking work was based on his recorded conversations with Agnes, but we see very little of the details of these beyond the occasional de-contextualised single line of transcript. Both Kessler and McKenna (1978) and West and Zimmerman (1987) make their respective cases with scant attention to the detail of circumstances in which gender is occasioned. Heritage (1984) argues that in fact this is not too surprising given the ethnomethodological focus on the unnoticed. He claims that Garfinkel was well aware of the inadequacies of his ‘breaching experiments’, acknowledging they did little beyond reveal the ways people behave in specially contrived circumstances. Garfinkel, it appears, was unable to provide an appropriate empirical base to his work because he could not think of a way to show people’s continuous understandings of social situations in which they participate. It is this empirical work that Sacks and
colleagues committed to undertaking, and whilst, what might be called mainstream CA has developed sophisticated analytical tools missing from Garfinkel’s work, it has not taken up his concern with gender until more recently (Kitzinger, 2000; Stokoe, 2006).

In summary, this section on non-essentialist accounts of gender has focussed on postmodernism and ethnomethodology as exemplified by Butler and Garfinkel respectively. The two accounts are compelling in their rejection of the ‘natural’ status of gender. They both reject the common distinction between gender and sex by arguing that even bodies are discursively produced and understood, and that the traditional idea that sex causes gendered behaviour should not only be revised, but reversed (Crawley and Broad, 2004). Yet, typically, the two accounts are treated as being rather different (Brickell, 2003). In the next section, I examine the potential for rapprochement between the two approaches and argue that their combined strengths may be realised and their weaknesses addressed in Conversation Analysis.

2.2.3 Combining Strengths, Addressing Weaknesses of Butler and Garfinkel

Butler’s postmodernist account of gender and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological account create different understandings of social action and discourse. Certainly, it is the case that Butler does not cite Garfinkel’s work despite her work appearing more than two decades after his relevant analysis of gender (Brickell, 2003; Namaste, 2002). Instead, she draws on elements of Austin’s Speech Act theory, Foucault, and Lacan’s psychoanalysis. It seems unlikely that Butler was unaware of Garfinkel and of ethnomethodology more broadly. Indeed, she seeks to distance herself from Garfinkel’s close contemporary Goffman, following work that sought to re-specify her theorising as a reworking of Goffman (Bordo, 1993). Butler (1998) challenges this re-specification based on her understanding of Goffman as retaining an essentialist element in his theorising. This is
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perhaps a misreading of Goffman (Brickell, 2003) but it illuminates her failure to consider Garfinkel’s work: she is expressly theoretically constructionist. In contrast, Garfinkel resists any ontological and epistemological theorising (Lynch, 1999; Watson, 1992), and instead focuses on how social actions are done (Garfinkel, 1967). Ethnomethodology, therefore de-emphasises social theory and is apparently agnostic on matters of constructionism (Lynch, 1999). So, whilst Butler is theoretically rich and empirically poor, for Garfinkel and ethnomethodology, the situation is arguably reversed.

The constructionist difference is played out in the ways that gender is written about in Butler and Garfinkel’s work. For Butler, performativity invokes the subject and does not involve a performance by a subject. In her words, gender is ‘not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed’ (Butler, 1990: 25). In contrast, ethnomethodologists are concerned with the achievement of gendered selves through social action (Garfinkel, 1967; West and Zimmerman, 1987). However, the ethnomethodological position does not rely on an essentialised notion of subjectivity. To say that persons act in the world and become (gendered) selves through social interaction does not engender a sovereign subject (Brickell, 2003). Despite claims to the contrary, a form of constructionism is detectable in ethnomethodology insofar as it rejects notions of natural realism and adopts instead an anti-foundationalist stance (Lynch, 1993).

Constructionism, like feminism is not a singular concept and the extent to which an approach is constructionist depends upon what form of constructionism is being indexed (Kitzinger, 2000, 2008). Both Butler’s postmodernism and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology treat gender as a social process, as a property of discourse rather than an attribute of individuals. Both approaches lead researchers to consider how gender is achieved. There are, then, lines of convergence between Butler and Garfinkel’s work.
Interaction and Gender

Where Butler and Garfinkel clearly differ is in relation to method. Whilst Butler offers a highly abstract and deeply political analysis, Garfinkel (and others) offer an empirically grounded though (apparently) agnostic analysis. Butler’s strength is in her understanding of the limits of performance – of what could not have been produced. Garfinkel’s strength is in the directive to be driven only by participant concerns. Again, these appear incompatible. However, we have only to turn to West and Zimmerman (1987) for an account of the ways that power relations frame and limit the possibilities for doing gender. West and Zimmerman write about the competent performance of gender and the risk of negative assessment and possible sanctions for performances that are non-normative.

What neither Butler nor Garfinkel provide is a coherent method for studying gender as practice. Butler, as a philosopher, is not concerned with actual conduct. Ethnomethodologists are, of course, concerned with exactly this, but Garfinkel failed to develop a systematic set of analytical tools to bring to bear on situated conduct. A much richer and empirically coherent approach is realised in Conversation Analysis. CA is empirically grounded, and through its feminist applications (see Kitzinger, 2000, 2002, 2007b; Speer, 2005; Speer and Stokoe, 2011, Stokoe, 2006, 2007, 2008) can offer an analysis of the achievement of gender (and other) identities and has the potential to explicate the regulatory norms that make gender intelligible and accountable.

The highly empirical nature of CA means that practitioners tend not to engage in debates about social theory or the ontology of identity (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006. See Heritage (2008) and Hutchby (1999) for exceptions). This is partly because debates about ontology threaten the fundamental requirement for data-driven enquiry. Instead of discussing theories of self, conversation analysts focus on what people do in talk (Widdicombe, 1998) by analysing the identities that relevantly feature in interaction. That is, CA allows for the multiplicity and flexibility of identity by acknowledging that
persons belong to a range of different categories, gender, age, social class, professional status and so on, and stand in various relationships with others, parents, lovers, children, siblings, friends, colleagues and consumers, but not all these identity categories will feature relevantly in interaction. To assume that one of these categories is always and forever relevant (as sex-difference researchers do, for example) is treated in CA as a kind of theoretical imperialism (Schegloff, 1997). The question of ‘who people are’ is not a meta-question. Instead, ‘who people are’ is to be discovered in, and accountable to, the contextualised moment-by-moment production of interaction.

In summary, an adequate account of gender, and of identity more broadly, is non-essentialist and grounded in empirical research. The definition of gender/identity adopted for this research relies upon the following assumptions:

1. Gender is not a property of individuals. It is instead, contingent upon social processes as a thoroughly technical and practical phenomenon. Accounts of gender should therefore be empirical and grounded in instances of actual conduct.

2. No aspect of identity, including gender is forever relevant. This is because, as speakers, we have many categorical memberships, and therefore, it is not enough to say that a speaker invokes gender just because they happen to be male or female.

3. The relevance of gender is primarily a participant concern. It is not for us as analysts to impose gender on discourse. Where gender is relevant, it is made so first by the participants for the participants.

4. The requirement for a primary focus on what is happening for the participants should not preclude an analysis of what is not said.
A focus on gender should involve demonstrating in technical terms precisely how gender is germane to the social processes being constructed at a local level between participants. All point to Conversation Analysis as an appropriate method for discovering how gender (and identity more broadly) is made relevant, negotiated and resisted.

2.3 Conversational Identities: Membership Categorisation Analysis and Person Reference

Identity and social category are related concepts and occasionally used interchangeably (e.g. Berard, 2005). However, the relationship between the two concepts bears examination. Some authors (e.g. Bucholtz and Hall, 2005) make a distinction between identity as the psychological sense of self, and social categories as the practical achievement of subjectivity moment-by-moment in interaction. In these terms, social categories are more fleeting and therefore less encompassing than psychological identity. However, this approach is based on an a priori understanding of identity as having an unarticulated relevance for analysts. If identity is psychological and always-already has a bearing on interaction, how should we gain analytic purchase on it? It makes more sense, at least analytically, to focus on social categories and to treat identity as emerging through categorical memberships. This is not to say that subjectivities are at the mercy of interaction. Categories, at least in the way they are treated by Sacks (1972a; 1972b) and followers, have broader relevance and are more inclusive than might be supposed by an interactional viewpoint.

2.3.1 Membership Categorisation Analysis

Sacks’ early work proposed analysing ‘the structural properties’ (Sacks, 1995:23) of what might be characterised as members’ known-in-common knowledge about the types of persons in a given society. His proposal involved analysing situated uses of categories in interaction; the ways people categorise themselves and others. In his early lectures (given
1964-65), Sacks noticed that categories have remarkable explanatory value; in Sacks’ words they are ‘inference-rich’ (Sacks, 1995:41). Drawing on the events surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy, Sacks remembers people asking such questions as ‘Was it one of us right-wing republicans?, Was it one of us Negroes?, Was it a Jew?’, (Sacks, 1995:42) as if an individual’s membership of one of these categories would be taken as evidence of their potential guilt; if one right-winger or Jew carried out this crime then all members of these categories might be capable of the same.

Categories, then, are inferentially rich and provide a rhetorical resource for speakers because they are associated with known-in-common characteristics. As Schegloff (2007a:469) notes, what is known-in-common about members of categories is not to be equated with ‘beliefs’ or ‘stereotypes’ because ‘for members [this] has the working status of ‘knowledge’, whatever its scientific status or moral/political character might be’. This knowledge is protected against induction so that members who do not behave as expected for their ostensible category are treated as being exceptions or even defective members. That is, people do not ordinarily revise their knowledge about categories in the face of contravening evidence.

Sacks’ central insight was that categories are treated as being linked by members of a culture. For example, in his analysis about a story offered by a very young child (Sacks, 1972b), ‘The baby cried. The mommy picked it up’, Sacks wondered how it is that we hear that the mommy is in fact specifically mommy to the baby mentioned in the story. Sacks solution was to suggest the operation of membership categorisation devices (MCD); the grouping of categories into such things as ‘family’, ‘professions’, ‘religions’, and within these, standardised relational pairs (SRP) where categories tend to be paired and set up a system of rights and obligations in relation to one another, e.g. husband-wife, doctor-patient, teacher-pupil. In the child’s story, we hear the baby and mommy as being a mother and child unit because these are categories from the same MCD, namely, the family, and
within this MCD, one of the SRPs is mother-child. Sacks also links categories with associated conduct that is normatively expected by category members, what he calls category bound activities (CBA). This means that category membership can be inferred from what people do; mothers pick up crying infants.

Sacks further classified SRPs into those defined by relationships (R categories) and those defined by knowledge (K categories). This came from his PhD work on calls to a suicide centre, in which he noticed that callers oriented to the difficulties of talking to a stranger about such personal problems (1972a). Callers to the centre were caught between social systems; the improper rights and obligations of talking to strangers (R categories) and the proper rights and obligations of seeking professional help from specialists (K categories).

Sacks defined two rules of application of MCDs; (1) the economy rule and, (2) the consistency rule. The economy rule states that one category is adequate to describe someone (and in this sense, resonates with the preference for minimisation in person reference). The consistency rule states that once a MCD has been invoked, members might be classified as belonging to one from the range of categories within it. For example, it is not uncommon to describe groups of people in terms of their professions (tinker, tailor, soldier, sailor) or their familial relationships (husband, wife, daughter, son) and so on. It would be unusual, however, to see a group of persons described as including a lawyer, a father, a Conservative, a woman, and a forty-year old.

The consistency rule and the economy rules are relevance rules (Schegloff, 2007a). That is, persons are ostensible members of many categories, and so, in categorising selves and others, speakers are faced with a problem of selection. If there is a choice, and there always is, then it is incumbent on the speaker to select a category that is relevant to, and makes sense for the local context of interaction. If I describe my supervisor as a ‘man’ then I
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will be heard as doing something different from if I describe him as a ‘professor’. These two categories are heard differently because they belong to different MCDs and therefore have divergent consequences for our ‘knowledge’ about, and possibly treatment of the same person.

The issue of relevance is an empirical one. That is, we cannot simply analyse categories using our common-sense knowledge of the world. In what he entitles ‘a tutorial on membership categorisation’, Schegloff (2007a) is highly critical of what he sees as the rather loose interpretation of Sacks’ project. In fact, MCA and CA have had rather different trajectories, despite their common start (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006; Schegloff, 2007a). The potential of MCA for understanding social life has been taken up by some who would (I assume) not count themselves as conversation analysts (e.g. Carlin, 2003; Eglin and Hester, 1997, 2003; Hester, 2002; Hester and Francis, 2000, Lepper, 2000) as well as by those who (I assume) would (e.g. Land and Kitzinger, 2005; Mazeland and Berenst, 2008; Kitzinger, 2005; Schegloff, 2007a, 2007b). This has led to a range of interesting work on the topic, but Schegloff (2007a) expresses concern about the extent to which MCA has moved beyond its original home and is practiced without due regard for Sacks’ rigorous standards. So, for example, MCA is often conducted on interview data, without a focus on its institutional context, and on non-interactive data such as text and ethnographic observations. For Schegloff, such data do not lend themselves to analysis by the full range of conversation analytic tools, and so MCA seems to float free from data in a way that, ‘permits’ analysts to move quickly to their own concerns rather than participant orientations. For their part, those working with MCA outside of CA accuse Sacks (and Schegloff’s development of his project) of moving away from his ethnomethodological roots towards an excessively rigid or even positivistic paradigm (Hester and Eglin, 1997; Lynch and Bogen, 1994).

The relationship between CA and ethnomethodology is contested and often controversial (Maynard and Clayman, 2003). Whilst both share a
common focus on bottom-up practices for producing intelligible social life, they have developed somewhat independent methodological trajectories. Ethnomethodology investigates everyday practices using a broad array of investigative tools including ethnography and quasi-experiments in a wider set of contexts than usual in CA. However, the commonalities and continuities between EM and CA are not easily dismissed. The two foundational authors of each domain, Garfinkel and Sacks, worked together and published a co-authored article (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970) in which they clearly share analytic disdain for classical sociological theorising and methodological precepts about properties of language-in-use. Whilst the topics and methods of enquiry may have diverged in the intervening period, it is clear that EM and CA share, at a deep level, ‘common theoretical assumptions, analytic sensibilities and concerns with diverse phenomena of everyday life’ (Maynard and Clayman, 2003: 177).

2.3.2 Membership Categorisation Analysis and Identity

The vast majority of work on identity using an ethnomethodological perspective has been done on membership categorisation (Widdicombe, 1998). In their influential edited collection on the topic, Antaki and Widdicombe (1998:3) list five principles of this analytic approach to researching identity. These are:

- To have an identity is to be invoked in talk (by self and/or others) as belonging to a category of person, with associated characteristics or features.
- The invocation is indexical and occasioned
- The category should be analysably relevant for the ongoing talk ...
- And have procedural consequentiality for it
- These features of identity should be available in the data
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In other words, any use of a given category will set up inferences about the likely conduct, beliefs and relationships of ascribed members; have meaning only within the local interaction; have relevance and consequences for the ongoing talk; be visible in features of the interaction.

Zimmerman (1998) describes conversational identities as consisting of: (1) discourse identities, which are to be located in the immediate actions that people perform in talk, storyteller/recipient, questioner/answerer, repair-initiator/solution provider and so on; (2) situated identities such as those that are relevant for the context of interaction, e.g. institutional interactions such as those taking place in the context of medical consultations, cross-examinations in courtrooms, or in classrooms, and; (3) transportable identities are those that are potentially ascribable to persons across situations and conversations. These are identity categories that are assigned on the basis of some culturally accepted insignia: gender, ethnicity and age (amongst others). Zimmerman (1998:91) observes that transferable identities are ‘a way of encoding some of the major structural features of a society in a fashion that is capable of bearing directly on concrete social activities’. In this respect, Zimmerman is careful to point out the important difference between the apprehending a person’s categorical membership and orienting to it as being relevant for interaction. In his words:

It is important to distinguish between the registering of visible indicators of identity and oriented-to identity, which pertains to the capacity in which an individual should act in a particular situation. Thus, a participant may be aware of the fact that a co-interactant is classifiable as a young person or a male without orienting to those identities as being relevant to the instant interaction. [Zimmerman, 1998: 91] (Emphasis in original)
Antaki, Widdicombe and Zimmerman adopt what Schenkein (1978) calls a conversation ‘analytic mentality’. That is, they prioritise two matters that are distinctive to ethnomethodology and conversation analysis: relevance and procedural consequentiality (Schegloff, 1987; 1992; 1996). It is incumbent on analysts to warrant claims by demonstrating how categories feature relevantly in talk and how they are consequential for interaction. In Schegloff’s words, we ought to be able to see how the ...

...participants’ production of the world was itself informed by ... particular categorisation devices ... that the parties were oriented to that categorisation device in producing and understanding – moment-by-moment – the conduct that composed its progressive realisation. [Schegloff, 2007a: 475]

The explicit focus on participant orientations and procedural consequence sets up interesting dilemmas for conversation analysts, particularly those working with a critical agenda (Kitzinger, 2000, 2002; Speer, 2002, 2005). The difficulties for politically motivated researchers are taken up most cogently in the Schegloff-Wetherell-Billig debate published in *Discourse & Society* in the late 1990s.

This debate was sparked by Schegloff’s (1997) critique of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), in which he asserts that the practice of CDA is steeped in the assumptions and political persuasion of the practitioners, and that this detracts from what is going on for the participants in research. However, in arguing that analysis should proceed with participants own orientations, Schegloff does not preclude the potential for politically engaged work in CA; it is a matter of analysing and understanding an episode(s) of talk in ‘its endogenous constitution’ (Schegloff, 1997; 168) before asking what political issues may be addressed by the data. Wetherell (1998) agrees there is analytic purchase to be made on data using the fine-grained approach of CA, though she is sceptical that analysts can ever be satisfied they have paid sufficient and appropriate attention to a potentially infinite
number of ‘fine-details’. Wetherell is also unwilling to limit her analysis to the talk, arguing that this falsely separates talk from the deeply political and cultural extra-discursive milieu in which it occurs, and by which it is constrained. Billig (1999a) writes in support of Wetherell’s basic position but goes further in his attack on CA, or as he stresses, ‘Schegloff’s portrayal of it’ (Billig, 1999a; 544), by accusing Schegloff of a series of rhetorical moves that disguise CA’s own ideological position. Of relevance here, Billig points to the matter of using the technical terms of CA to describe participant orientations to ongoing action in a course of talk; something which he characterises as intellectual hegemony due to examining participants in their own terms without actually using their own terms. For Billig, the idea of unmotivated looking is epistemologically naïve and shores up a realist fallacy that facts speak for themselves.

In response to Wetherell, Schegloff (1998, 1999) reiterates his assertion that CA is not beyond lending itself to politically engaged work. In his words, ‘it would be useful not to underestimate what the reach of CA’s questions is’ (Schegloff, 1998; 416). He also points to weaknesses in Wetherell’s illustrative analysis of a focus group consisting of young men discussing masculinity. Schegloff observes that her analysis seems to miss the institutional setting in which the data is situated; that the talk is taking place in a particular setting for a particular purpose and that, in this setting, the participants are not simply young men chatting amongst themselves, but research participants responding to an agenda. In looking for the broader ideologies of talk, Wetherell fails to analyse the contributions made by the interviewer, despite the clear sense in which he plays the ‘agent provocateur for the sequence being analysed’ (Schegloff, 1998; 415).

In his response to Billig, Schegloff (1999) asserts that CA is not as theoretically naïve Billig suggests. Indeed, Schegloff claims that ‘participant’s own terms’ is not to be taken as pure or free from interpretation, and he acknowledges the inevitability of political and
theoretical lenses through which data has to be examined. Nonetheless, he stresses that this is not reason to side step a rigourous investigation of actual occurrences of talk nor does it justify a self-conscious projection of ideology into data motivated by ones own political agenda.

Schegloff (1999) is clear that CA is not rendered politically insensitive by requirements for close analysis of the fine-grained features of talk. For him, relevant social issues such as power, inequality and abuse are tractable in data. Further, CA offers a powerful tool for explicating how they operate and for understanding ‘how others might intervene to detoxify’ them (Schegloff, 1999; 14).

The problems of relevancy and procedural consequentiality set up additional challenges for conversation analysts investigating categorical identities. Schegloff (2007a: 476) is highly critical of MCA research that uses ‘common sense’ knowledge to develop the analysis. This is tricky because of the inferential nature of category analysis. Categories operate implicitly on the basis of shared assumptions or knowledge about the world. For example, Kitzinger (2005) analyses relationship categories in out-of-hours calls to the doctor, showing how they are used as a powerful interactional resource for common sense reasoning about the rights and obligations of family members. In one extract, a caller accounts for her apparent failure to seek medical help for a sick child because she is ‘only his grandma’ (ibid: 491). The speaker does not elaborate, nor does the doctor inquire exactly how ‘grandma’ stands as an account in this instance. The reasoning that members of the category grandma have fewer obligations towards the medical care of grandchildren than parents have towards children is implied rather than stated. In this case, the analytic leap does not appear too large because the category is explicitly mentioned and is treated as adequate-for-purpose by the doctor. However, speakers rarely announce they are speaking as members of particular categories; husbands, mothers, friends and so on (Pomerantz and Mandlebaum, 2005) and yet, relationships do have analysable consequences for interaction.
Pomerantz and Mandlebaum (ibid) propose that collecting and analysing explicit uses of categories is likely to be ineffective because we cannot predict beforehand where categories will be used (making collections difficult) and where they are used, they are likely to serve different interactional purposes. Their solution is to analyse conversations between SRPs (friends, siblings, parents/children and the like) for the range of activities that pairings are accountable for (e.g. forms of greetings, updating news, minimal reference to past events and the like). Stokoe (2007: 150) argues that this is problematic in CA terms because ‘there is the danger of returning to explanations based in what the analyst knows about a speaker’s category membership’ (c.f. arguments against analysing words spoken by a male/female as exemplifying male/female language). Pomerantz and Mandlebaum are careful to point out that analysts should avoid assuming that category membership is necessarily relevant and only focus on places where activities appear demonstrably pertinent for relationship SRPs. The problem with this, as Stokoe (2007) points out, is that it is not clear how activities like updating news is any more related to one SRP (e.g. friends) more than any others (e.g. sisters).

Other CA researchers focus on unnoticed and non-oriented-to features of categorical membership and, in this sense, breech conversation analytic requirements for both relevancy and procedural consequentiality (see Schegloff 2009 for critical commentary on Enfield and Kitzinger’s work in this respect). For example, Kitzinger (2005) explores what she calls the heterosexist presumption evident in the ways that speakers use categorical terms that assume heterosexual identity as the default (e.g. use of ‘your husband’ when talking to a (presumed) female recipient not formally known to the speaker). Kitzinger argues that it is precisely because heterosexuality is continually and routinely inferred without causing ripples on the surface of interaction that we can see heterosexism in action, even when participants themselves are not oriented to sexuality. Kitzinger is aware of the departure of her work from conversation analytic procedures and is careful to point out her ‘unusual analytic strategy’ (ibid: 223).
However, her work raises interesting issues for others in CA about what counts as ‘making relevant’ and ‘participant orientation’ in interaction (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006).

2.3.3 MCA and Gender
A substantial amount of work in MCA is directed to exploring gender. Here is an example from Sacks (1995: 461), in which he analyses a fragment of group-therapy talk between a group of teenage boys and a therapist. The fragment begins with one of the boys asking, ‘Did Louise call or anything this morning?’ Louise is the only female member of the therapy group and is absent from the meeting. The therapist treats the first speaker’s question as accountable and pursues the matter, and later asks ‘Do you miss her?’ The first speaker weakly agrees that he does miss her in ‘some ways’ and provides the following account: ‘It was nice having the opposite sex in the room, ya know, having a chick in the room’. Sacks interest is in the switch from ‘Louise’ to ‘the opposite sex’ and ‘chick’, and observes that the switch serves to index Louise’s gender category membership above all else as the reason she is missed. In Sacks’ words: ‘It’s not a ‘personal’ loss, it’s a categorical loss’ (ibid: 464). The selection of ‘the opposite sex’ also relevantly genders the other members of the therapy group. Sacks’ analysis is that the formulation of Louise as gendered functions as a ‘safe’ compliment. That is, as the only female in the group, it is something that can safely be said of her without engendering argument from other group members. If the speaker had invoked some other, more personal quality (that she is witty or bright) he may have risked either displaying a personal, possibly sexual, interest in her, or insulting others in the group with a claim to being witty or bright.

More recently, Stokoe has developed a sustained argument for adopting a conversation analytic understanding of MCA into research on gender (amongst other things). Amongst her many findings, Stokoe shows how gender is used as grounds to nominate the only female in a group as ‘secretary’ (Stokoe, 2006), that neighbour disputes are routinely gendered
so that being a ‘woman’ can sufficiently warrant complaint (Stokoe, 2003), and, how gender can be mobilised to do denials in police interviews (Stokoe, 2010). With denials, for example, Stokoe (2010) shows a recurrent practice in male suspect denials of violence towards women when questioned by police. This practice routinely involves constructing a generalised and often idiomatic identity of not being the sort of man who would hit a woman. Conversation analysts have shown that idiomatic statements invite affiliative responses because they are based on what we all know about the world (Drew and Holt, 1988). Stokoe notes that the idiomatic quality of the denial rests on an understanding that male violence towards women is common in society. It constructs a world in which more powerful agents have a moral duty towards vulnerable populations; here women, but it would work with the categories children and older people too. In formulating a category-based denial, the male suspects are producing themselves as relevantly male and as a particular sort of male; one that takes the moral high ground in relation to a second group of men who do hit women.

In the next example, taken from Wowk (1984), a male suspect constructs a blameworthy identity for a female murder victim through implicit categorisation of her as a ‘slut’ or ‘tramp’. The suspect never uses these words though. Instead, he relies on mundane reasoning about acceptable female sexual behaviour (in the early 1980s) and formulates his descriptions of her in ways that show her to have transgressed category-relevant conduct for women (i.e. she was drunk and propositioned him in an era when moral women were expected to be passive). Wowk notes the recipients of these accounts, in treating them as adequate, actively co-produce a sexual moral order ‘out of the particulars provided by the suspect’ (ibid: 77). This goes back to Sacks’ observation that conduct is a resource for doing categorisation by inferring social identity from known-in-common knowledge about how people behave.
The work of Sacks, Stokoe and Wowk illustrate the way that categories constitute an inference-rich resource for everyday life. D’hondt (2002:212) asserts that a focus on category references to gender permits us to ‘work towards a moment-by-moment account of the way participants accomplish the transformation of ‘gender’ into a feature that is accountably relevant to the production and interpretation of talk’.

One aim of my thesis is to explore how gender is made relevant through the related, though distinct practice of person reference. Schegloff (2007a) asserts that the domain of categorisation is not equivalent to the domain of person reference because, whilst each domain can be used to do the other (categories can do person reference and vice versa), categories can be used to do other actions and person references can be done without categories.

### 2.3.4 Person Reference, Gender and Sexuality

In English, third-party person references often unavoidably make gender of participants available in talk.¹⁹ Names are commonly hearably gendered and locally subsequent noun-phrases ‘he’ and ‘she’ are routine. For example, in Chapter One, Extract Thirteen above, when two teenage girls are talking about a text message received from Aneka, the referent is referred to in locally subsequent position as ‘she’; we (and they) know that the referent is female. However, the availability of gender and its relevance for the interaction should not be taken for granted. The referent ‘Aneka’ is indeed female but it is not her gender that features relevantly here.

This is not to say that parties do not take up gender once it has been available in talk. For example, Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2003) analyse a stretch of talk from a focus group on the topic of breast cancer in which a speaker (Eve) refers to her male partner four times using three different formulations: a name (‘Bill’), a locally subsequent noun-phrase (‘he’), a kinship reference (‘my husband’) and as a presumptive member of the

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¹⁹ The gender marking of third-party references is not universal. For example, Finnish, Hungarian and Estonian languages have gender-neutral third person noun-phrases (Dasinger, 1997).
category men (‘all men like boobs don’t they’). Although the referent is hearably male, it is only in the last of these references that he is positioned as being relevantly male. Wilkinson and Kitzinger point out that the speaker’s invocation of gender is not done in the service of gender per se. Eve makes the statement ‘all men like boobs don’t they’ following discussion of close family members’ reactions to a diagnosis of breast cancer. Other participants had focussed on their husband’s concern for their welfare. In contrast, Eve alludes to the impact a mastectomy had on her sex life. The comment ‘all men like boobs don’t they’ is an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) and acts to reduce blame on Eve’s husband by legitimising his response; it is not (just) him personally that has a problem with the mastectomy but that all men would. Eve, through her comment, reproduces a heterosexual world in which men’s likes and dislikes can be taken for granted.

Similarly, Kitzinger (2005) is centrally concerned with ways in which the heterosexual world is produced as normative. She begins with an examination of how heterosexual identities are explicitly oriented to through sexual banter, jokes and innuendo, as well as through topic-talk about heterosexual relationships. However, the bulk of the paper is taken up with analysing the routine and unnoticed reproduction of heterosexuality through use of particular kinship person references (e.g. ‘husband’, ‘wife’ and ‘in-laws’) (See also Rendle-Short, 2005). Kitzinger notes that:

By referring to their husbands, female [speakers] position themselves as wives; by referring to their wives, male [speakers] position themselves as husbands, thereby displaying, incidentally, in the course of the action in which they are otherwise engaged, their location within heterosexual marital units. [Kitzinger, 2005:235]
Kitzinger shows that heterosexual identities are readily inferable from interaction and are regularly used, virtually without comment, in the service of other actions. Drawing on Sacks’ suicide data, for example, Kitzinger shows how mention of the loss of a wife or husband makes available a heterosexual identity and removes the necessity for any further account for feeling suicidal. In other examples, Kitzinger shows that heterosexual identities are used in accomplishing a range of ‘non-accountable’ actions such as: decision making, establishing ‘doctorability’ (Heritage and Robinson, 2005), and instituting eligibility for tenancy.

Kitzinger additionally shows that normative arrangements of heterosexual relations are routinely reproduced in talk. For example, in calls to an out-of-hours emergency doctor service, the doctor typically asks callers who have identified as calling on behalf of a wife or husband, ‘Where do you live’. The selection of ‘you’ in this question reveals a cultural expectation that husbands and wives reside at the same address. This contrasts with an example in which a caller identifies as calling on behalf of a friend, when the doctor asks, ‘Where does she live?’

The unremarkable quality of the production of heterosexual identities contrasts with what Kitzinger calls the derailing of conversations when a homosexual identity is displayed (see section 2.2.6). The very fact that heterosexual identities are not oriented to reveals a cultural system in which opposite sex-couples are ‘seen-but-unnoticed’ and other sexual identities are marked and remarkable.

Land and Kitzinger (2005) expand on Kitzinger’s (2005) demonstration of the everyday practices through which heterosexual identities are produced as normative. They focus on places in interaction where lesbians, faced with being placed in the default category of heterosexual with gendered person references, opt to correct (or not) the heterosexist presumption. Building off Jefferson’s (1987) distinction between exposed and embedded
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correction, they also examine the interactional consequences of managing correction in an exposed versus an embedded formulation.

Correction of others is relatively rare in conversation because, as noted earlier, there is a strong preference for self-initiated self-repair. Even when others do initiate repair, the preference is for the speaker of the trouble source to provide the repair solution. Correction typically involves both other initiation and other repair. This is tricky interactionally because it dampens speakers’ authority to own what they say. However, Jefferson (1987) made the important observation that correction can be managed rather subtly, without the need to initiate repair ‘as a by-the-way occurrence in some ongoing course of talk’ (ibid: 95). For example, speakers can embed a correction within a sequentially relevant next turn. In one extract, Jefferson shows how a categorical reference to the ‘police’ is corrected in next turn with a reference to the ‘cops’. This correction is accepted when the speaker of the first turn selects ‘cops’ in his next turn. Neither the correction, nor its acceptance, ruffles the surface of the interaction.

Land and Kitzinger (2005) observe that heterosexual speakers routinely display their sexuality (mostly through selection of gender-marked person references) virtually without comment, even in interactions with strangers. In contrast, lesbian speakers, although openly gay in many social contexts, tend not to make their sexuality available in interactions with persons not known to them. Further, they stress that when lesbian speakers do make their sexuality available in these interactions, it is often as a result of correcting the presumption they are heterosexual.

The option of correcting the default assumption of heterosexuality is not always taken, but when it is, it tends to be done as an embedded correction (Land and Kitzinger, 2005). In these corrections, the matter is managed within sequentially relevant next turns and avoids suspension of the ongoing business of an interaction. For example, in one instance the caller
has telephoned NHS Direct to locate an emergency dentist for her partner. The caller makes her request without revealing the gender of her partner. However, the call-taker displays her assumption that the partner is male through selection of the reference ‘he’ in a question designed to assess the urgency of the situation (‘is he in pain’). In next position, after some turn-initial delay, the caller opts to embed a correction of the pro-term within a sequentially relevant response, saying, ‘she’s: (.I lost (0.2) th- the front tooth and is in quite considerable pai:n.’ The business of the call continues but the call-taker displays her understanding that she has been corrected by producing the correct pro-term ‘her’ when it becomes relevant to do so.

Embedded correction deals with errors discretely and virtually without disruption of the progressivity to a course of action. In Land and Kitzinger’s data (as elsewhere) embedded corrections are collaboratively produced in order to keep the matter of correcting below the surface of the interaction; all participants manage to bring off business-as-usual. This is accomplished despite the fact that the heterosexist presumption of one of the parties displays a stance that lesbian identities are not normative. Land and Kitzinger acknowledge that lesbian identities are becoming increasingly normalised in British society and that none of the speakers in their data express disgust or outrage on discovering that their co-conversationalist is a lesbian. Nevertheless, the presumption of heterosexuality remains pervasive and places persons with alternative sexual identities in the position of having to make decisions about when, where and how to come out. The frequency of routine referring to partners in everyday interaction means these decisions are made repeatedly.

In this section, I have focussed on the ways that gendered (sexual) identities are made relevant in talk through the technology of person reference. Most of this work is based on third-party reference because these are, at least in English, often marked for gender. There is a relative paucity of work on self- and second-party reference, at least in relation to gender. This is because the default terms for referring to self and co-
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Conversationalists are ‘I’ and ‘you’ respectively and these are relatively opaque regarding any categorical information (Schegloff, 2007c). They are not obviously marked for gender. Occasionally people do refer to themselves and recipients in ways other than these default terms and gender might become relevant here (see Land and Kitzinger, 2007, for an analysis of third-person reference forms in self-reference). However, it is worth examining uses of ‘I’ and ‘you’ for their potential in producing gendered-identities. Whilst accepting that these references are not linguistically marked for gender, it is simplistic to reject them as having any interest for gender and language research. The same goes for third-party referenced that are apparently gender-neutral: ‘people’, ‘they’, ‘someone’ and the like. One of the clearest findings from the CA literature on person reference is that whilst many references are marked for gender, they are not necessarily making gender relevant in interaction. There seems no logical reason why the opposite might not be true. That is, gender-neutral references may in fact invoke gender-relevant identities.

2.4 Concluding Comments

I have set up my work to address two related literatures on identity and gender and language. In focussing on gender and reference I do not mean to imply that this is the only way that gendered identities are made relevant in interaction, nor do I think that person reference is interesting only for what it reveals about ‘doing gender’. Clearly, what counts as gender occurs in places other than person reference and categorisation (e.g. see Speer and Green, 2007, for an analysis of gender in the reporting of third-party compliments). And person references are capable of social actions beyond gender (e.g. see the collection of articles in Stivers et al. 2007).

This chapter constructs the theoretical underpinnings of my work. I treat gender as a social construct rather than biological fact; people ‘do’ gender rather than ‘are’ gendered. Conversation analysis offers a theoretically and empirically distinctive approach to researching gender as social practice.
Interaction and Gender

The route CA offers is not, however, straightforward, and I have drawn attention to several dilemmas for conversation analytic researchers working with matters of gender, language and identity. These tensions will be discussed more reflexively in the next chapter, where I describe the methodology.
Chapter Three: Methodology

In the previous chapter, I set out the broad theoretical and methodological approach to research. This chapter covers my own conversation analytically informed research practices. I will begin with a description of the basic demographics of my corpus of young women’s talk. I then address the ethical issues that arose in gathering this particular set of data. I set the discussion of ethics in the broader context of feminist research practices and, in particular, pay attention to my own presence as a participant in the data set. This warrants a personal reflection examination of the research process. I then set out the analytical steps in doing conversation analysis, whether working with single-case studies or building and analysing collections.

3.1 The CTS Corpus: Populating a Data-Set

In this section, I outline the basic demographics of the corpus of young women’s talk that I have collected for my research. Before this, I discuss the significance of the data set as one of a fairly limited body of British data that features the interactions of pre-adult women. I situate the discussion in the wider setting of what it means to adopt a conversation analytic mentality.

3.1.1 A British Corpus of Young Women’s Talk

As outlined in the Introduction to the thesis, my original plans for the research involved analysing young women’s and girl’s talk for the ways in which this group produced themselves (and others) as gendered beings. I had a particular ambition to comment critically on the work of Carol Gilligan and others who had claimed that adolescent girls lose their ‘voice’ over the period of transition from childhood to adulthood (e.g. Brown and Gilligan, 1993a,b; Taylor, Gilligan and Sullivan, 1995). To fulfil this ambition, I needed to work with a relevant set of data. That is, a non-institutional corpus that included the talk of adolescent women. I soon discovered that
such a corpus did not exist. The existing corpora of non-institutional data were based mostly on the talk of US adults or late-teenagers (students recording data for their CA lectures). As far as is known, the only existing significant non-institutional British corpora (by which I mean, in wide circulation) are the Holt, Heritage and Rahman data sets. As with the American corpora, these feature mostly adult interactions. It appears, then, that the mundane interactions of young British women (and men) are relatively absent from CA corpora.

It remains an empirical question whether the regional and historical context of the data makes a difference for the interactional practices that persons engage in. The organisation of interaction has strongly recurrent and generic properties, that might be considered universal. That is, despite differences in such things as lexical ordering, prosodic patterns and the social actions of language-specific objects, there are striking commonalities in the resources that persons from across cultures draw on to produce social action. As Moerman (1988: 3) comments on his own comparisons between American and Thai languages, ‘the extent to which [languages] are the same came as a surprise, even a shock. . . ’ This similarity leads conversation analysts to treat with caution the relevance of any cultural variation and, in particular, the personal attributes of speakers (gender, class, ethnicity, nationality and the like) has for any specific interaction (Sacks and Schegloff, 1984; Schegloff, 1997; Sidnell, 2009). Where other approaches, such as critical discourse analysis and sociolinguistics, typically treat cultural and personal attributes as either evidently and necessarily (in)forming the interactional context or as a variable to be correlated with aspects of talk, CA requires that the relevance of various attributes be demonstrated through an analysis of participants’ actual orientations to them.

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20 That is, mundane everyday interactions. However, it is worth noting that, in practice, the distinction between mundane and institutional data is not always clearly defined. The classification of talk as either institutional or mundane is negotiated in the local interactional context of the talk and should not be taken as prefiguring the shape and constraints of the interaction (Drew, 2002; Drew and Heritage, 1992; Heritage and Clayman, 2010)
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Given this particularly conversation analytic perspective, I am mindful of my reasons for wanting to work with a specific type of corpus and of making claims for its significance. In this respect, it is important to note that CA does not deny the existence of socially organised differences but, rather, that these differences should have observable consequences for the interaction. In collecting a contemporary British corpus of young women’s talk, I do not claim that I have collected samples of interaction that represent young British femininity in general. I do not, therefore, treat the data as representative of the talk of a particular category of persons. Although I have characterised the corpus as British and based on the talk of young women, the extent to which it was collected as this type of object can only be established after analysis and is not treated as a predefined feature of the data.

Nevertheless, it remained (and remains) important that I work with a relatively contemporary, British corpus of young women’s talk. As noted above, the voices of young British women are largely missing from CA corpora. This might well reflect a broader history in social research in which female participants are relatively absent (Gilligan, 1982; Oakley, 1980; Stanley and Wise, 1983; Taylor, Gilligan and Sullivan, 1995). However, as a qualitative method, CA offers an opportunity literally to add the voices of women to social research. Whether these women orient to their gender (or age, or ‘Britishness’ for that matter) is, of course, an empirical question, but recruiting young women to the research, for whom gender might or might not feature relevantly in their everyday interactions was an important starting point.

I chose to work with younger women, not merely because they are largely invisible in data, but also because of the nature of my original research proposal. In arguing against Gilligan’s (Brown and Gilligan, 1993a,b) notion that girls are silenced during adolescence, it was imperative that I worked with this population. In part, my plan was to demonstrate that girls do not

21 Where relevant, supplemented with other data
always talk as girls and that, therefore, one of the weaknesses in Gilligan’s influential work is to treat participants in data as prefiguratively representing members of a particular category of speakers. In a sense, then, I would be looking for the absence of gender as well as its presence in talk. This approach is in keeping with CA, but is, perhaps, an unusual approach for feminist researchers more broadly (see Kitzinger, 2000) and has generated a number of critiques (e.g. Billig, 1999a, b; Wetherell, 1998; Wowk, 2007; see Chapter Two for a fuller discussion). The approach I adopt here, then, is not without tensions but suffice to say at this point that I agree with the more cautious approach to studying broader social and categorical issues practiced by conversation analysts.

Finally, in this discussion of the significance of the data set, I wish to comment on the contemporary and British characteristics of the corpus. If gender is treated as a socially constructed property of individuals, then it follows that the norms for doing gender are historically and locally specific (Foucault, 1984; Laqueur, 1990; and writing from a different perspective, Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1977). Without prejudging the outcomes of the research, it was important to work with a set of data that is relatively contemporary and comes from a context with which I am familiar. 22 Once again, I make no claims about the particular British context of the data.

In this section, I have considered the broader characteristics of my data set. In characterising it as a contemporary British corpus of young women’s talk, I recognise the originality of the data, whilst at the same time fully recognising the ambivalence around any claims as to its significance that arise from adopting a conversation analytic approach.

22 The extent to which a researcher should be familiar with the context of the research is a matter for debate. There is a persuasive argument that an outsider’s perspective leads researchers to notice what others take for granted (Geertz, 1975). However, as Moerman (1988) comments, being an insider means that analysts can attend to the particularities of their own culture – whether or not something is said jokingly, for example. CA requires that nothing be taken for granted and, in doing CA, a researcher is in an interesting position as an outsider, even when the data features the most familiar. I will return to this point when I discuss my own presence as a participant in the research.
3.1.2 The CTS Corpus

The data upon which this thesis is based comprises recordings of the naturally occurring telephone conversations made and received by nine participants in the period 2005 to 2007.\(^{23}\) I decided to record telephone calls as opposed to video everyday interactions in order to simplify analysis by removing the need to consider body movements.\(^{24}\) The corpus consists of over 75 calls, ranging in length from a few seconds to over one hour (totalling approximately 25 hours). A brief description of each call appears in Appendix II.

My central participants were an opportunity sample of nine girls and young women aged between 12 and 19 years old. All were recruited to the project through personal contacts and connections (and this raises ethical issues in its own right, which I will deal with more fully in Section 3.1.4). Three of the participants were my own daughters and the remainder were either their friends, or the daughters of my own friends.

Most of the recordings are of interactions between the participants, but there are also calls to other friends, partners, parents and grandparents. It so happened that most of these participants were also female and there is only one male in the corpus. As the long-term boyfriend of one of the central participants, however, he does make a significant contribution to the data set.

CA transcripts, following the conventions developed by Gail Jefferson (see Jefferson, 1983, 2004) are the chief method for presenting the data in the thesis. Transcripts make available details of talk that are highly elusive to memory e.g. silences, pitch, emphasis, repairs and the like. They also make

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\(^{23}\) Some years after completing the data collection, I am aware that I perhaps recorded the calls in the closing period of a time when it was common for teenagers to call each other at home. With the much wider use of mobile phones and other technologies, I am very aware that my daughters and their friends now rarely speak on the phone, having abandoned this practice in favour of text messaging and online networking.

\(^{24}\) For a growing literature for the embodied nature of interaction see: Goodwin, 2000; Streeck et al 2011; Lerner, Zimmerman and Kidwell, 2011; Raymond and Lerner (2008); and Woootton, 1991.
the data available for repeated analysis, at least as it is (re)presented in written form, and, therefore, allows for methodological transparency (Sacks, 1995).

In this section, I have provided an account of the CTS corpus. In the next, I describe the data collection process and the ethical codes of conduct to which I adhered. Following that, I consider the ways in which ethical practices were complicated by working with my own daughters.

3.1.3 Data Collection and Adherence to Ethical Codes of Conduct

As noted above, all participants were recruited through personal contacts and connections. That is, I did not advertise or otherwise seek methods to recruit participants unknown to me personally. This decision was taken purely on pragmatic grounds; as the mother of (then) three teenage daughters, I had particular access to this population.

After reaching prospective participants, I provided further details about what participation would involve, stressing that the decision to take part was entirely up to them (and, where relevant, their parents). A number of prospective participants decided not to take part at this early stage. Those who did agree were provided with a telephone recording package, comprising: a consent form; either a tape recorder (plus tapes) or a digital recorder with spare batteries; a BT connector which allows recording of telephone calls; and instructions on using the equipment. All equipment complied with British Health and Safety Standards.

In setting up the project, I considered my work in relation to the British Sociological Association’s Statement of Ethical Practice, and, since I am a psychology graduate, to the British Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics and Conduct. A common prerequisite for participation in academic research is that participants are given informed consent (the possible exception being ethnography). I was very aware of the particular
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importance of this for the young people with whom I would be working. Given the nature of the data, I knew that I might potentially be privy to the most intimate details of the participants’ lives and, further, that I might overhear aspects of young people’s lives that they would not normally share with adults.

Explaining the nature and purpose of the research in ways that were meaningful to the participants raised particular issues, particularly with the younger participants. I briefed participants (and where relevant, their parents) on the aims of the project, informing them, in simpler terms, that my principal interest lay in describing where and how gender is played out in telephone calls; in how girls display and orient to being girls in ordinary conversation. On some occasions, it took several attempts to find ways of expressing this interest in ways that made sense to a non-academic and younger sample of participants. It was important that all participants demonstrably understood the nature of the research before consenting to take part. I am confident that this was achieved.

All participants signed a consent form (see Appendix I) giving permission to record calls and to use the data for research purposes. Following the BSA’s (section 20) requirement that participants be alerted to and consent to sharing of data with others, and following the exemplary models of consent commonly used by conversation analysts (see for example, ten Have 2007:81), I sought separate permissions for use of data in contexts beyond my own research, for use in publications, for display on academic websites, for use in public professional contexts such as teaching and conferences, and for placing in archives for other researchers. In most cases these extra permissions were granted.

In line with requirements of the BPS (section 1.3) to ‘restrict the scope of disclosure’ and BSA (section 30), where a participant was under the age of sixteen, parental permission was also sought along with that of the child. However, in keeping with BPS (section 1.2) requirements to ‘restrict the
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scope of disclosure’ and BSA’s (section 34) to respect the privacy of participants, younger participants were assured that the contents of their calls would not be discussed with their parents. This, of course, was more complicated where the calls involved my own daughters – a theme that I will comment on presently.

Additionally, and in line with BPS (section 1.4) and BSA (section 17) requirements, I made all participants aware, in writing, that they had the right to withdraw from the study at any point without explanation. Participants also had the right to withhold any parts of the data they did not want to submit for research purposes. I undertook to edit audio material as requested, as far as possible without listening to the extracts being removed.

Both the BPS (section 1.2) and BSA (section 18) codes require that participants be afforded (realistic) rights to anonymity and confidentiality. Clearly, there is an inherent threat to both anonymity and confidentiality in audio recordings of personal telephone calls. I adopted the following steps to prevent, as far as possible, any unforeseeable breaches: -

• Audio recordings were digitised and given a code prefaced with my initials - CTS - followed by a number (the order in which the recordings were digitised). One purpose of the code is to break the link between the content of the recordings and the persons featuring in them.

• In accordance with BSA (section 36) requirements, the audio tapes are placed in a locked environment, and are only accessible to me. The digital recordings are stored on an external hard-drive, which is also secured in a locked environment, though separate to the tapes.

• Central to CA is the production of detailed transcripts of recordings. In my transcripts, I have taken care to provide all participants and the people to whom they refer, with
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pseudonyms and to alter any potentially identifying features of talk such as place names.

- If permission was granted to play the recordings in large public contexts, names and place names were digitally altered to prevent hearing of potentially identifiable material.

In this section, I have provided an account of the procedure for data collection and the ethical practices that were conducted in relation to both the BSA’s and BPS’s codes of conduct. These codes were developed, in part, due to widespread and repeated violations of human rights over the course of the Twentieth Century (Priessle, 2006). The emphasis is placed on protection from harm for the individuals involved in the research for the duration of the data collection (Brown, 1997). As Brown notes, acting in accordance with ethical codes does not always and automatically lead to broadly ethical conduct because ‘harm’ is treated in a limited way, as a highly individual concept. The importance of this criticism can be appreciated if one considers the history of sex-difference research in which it is unlikely that any single participant came to any harm as a consequence of participating in the research, but which did harm to women as a group as they were consistently found to be lacking in various ways in relation to men (see also, Eyre, 2010). As a feminist researcher, I am obliged to consider the ways in which my research might raise ethical concerns that go beyond ethical codes. I consider the implications of these issues for my own research in the next section.

3.1.4 Feminist Ethics: Going Beyond Codes of Conduct

My work is situated within a CA framework but I am also a feminist researcher. Having a commitment to feminist politics generated ethical concerns in my own research that went beyond the BSA and BPS narrowly defined interests in the study of human participants.
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Feminist researchers generally agree that there is not a singular feminist method (Kelley et al. 1994; Kitzinger, 2000; Maynard and Purvis, 1994) but, rather, there is an underlying research ethic that makes the research ‘feminist’ (Kirsch, 1999). The ethical responsibilities of feminist research are more demanding than the obligations outlined in existing mainstream codes of conduct because, as deLaine (2000: 17) argues, a positivist ethics policy “tends to neglect the wider moral and social responsibilities of simply being a researcher...[and negates] the complexity and specificity of any given ethical or moral dilemma”.

A feminist ethic involves a move from abstract neoliberal principles of respect for individual participants (Davies, 2005) to a more personal ethic of responsibility, care and integrity; not only with individuals but also with the broader communities they represent (Preissle, 2006).25 In qualitative research in particular, a feminist ethic involves challenging patriarchal, hierarchical and exploitative relations between researchers and the researched (Oakley, 1981; Stanley and Wise, 1983) and, therefore, challenges researchers to identify and acknowledge their own roles in the research. One way in which this is reflected is in the use of the term ‘co-researchers’ to characterise more empowered participants.

In one sense, then, it is not possible to have a universal feminist ethic because ethical practice is deeply tied to the researcher and the research context and must respond to situated unanticipated consequences as they arise. That is, ethical practice is part of the ongoing research process and not merely an exercise at the beginning of the work (Miller and Bell, 2002; see Hammersley, 1999 for a critical discussion). Ethical dilemmas do not, then, disappear for feminists. They are dynamic and integral to the research.

Translating the language of feminist ethics into feminist practice is not easy because often new challenges arise when we try to adopt ways of acting

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25 Carol Gilligan (1982) is influential here as she first referred to the ethic of care in her work on moral development.
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that maintain integrity, responsibility and care (Avis, 2002; Wolf, 1996). For example, Wolf (1996) discusses the complications that might arise for feminist ethnographers working within their own friendship networks. Similarly, Nutt (Bell and Nutt, 2002) discusses her naivety in assuming that she could subordinate her professional role as a social worker in order to equalise relations between herself and the group of foster parents she interviewed for her doctoral research.

To summarise, feminist ethical practices are dynamic, demanding and highly contextualised. They are also difficult to put into practice without new dilemmas surfacing. However, there is, at least, a commitment to consider the power-relations that inevitably arise in research and to act responsibly and with integrity towards participants. The implications of the above reflections for my own ethical practices are discussed below in relation to two specific matters: working with my own children and my presence in the data.

There is a minority but noteworthy tradition of social scientists working with their own children as research participants (e.g. Darwin, 1877; Skinner (n.d., cited in Slater, 2004); Piaget, 1952; Wootton, 1997). Research of this kind has been, on occasion, a basis for major theoretical and methodological developments (especially the works of Darwin and Piaget) but has also generated great controversy (see Slater, 2004 on Skinner’s work with his daughter and Skinner-Burzan’s (2004) rebuttal). One of the tensions for anyone who works with children, particularly preverbal children, is their capacity to consent to participate in research. When the researcher is also the parent, this issue is amplified.

In CA, Wootton (1997) famously worked with his young daughter on a conversation analytic project. Despite the fact that he was recording his daughter and regularly appeared in the data himself, Wootton does not discuss at any length the ethical or methodological dilemmas that might have arisen. Instead, he focuses on the implications of a single-case study.
This is entirely in keeping with practices for conducting and reporting research at the time that Wootton was working. Historically, then, analysts working with their own families have tended not to consider in a public way the ethical matters that arose for them.

In my own case, three of my four daughters were either approaching teenage or already in their teens when I started to collect data. I provided them with the same consent forms as I had provided for others and they signed the forms gladly. However, looking back, I wonder about the extent to which they were actually free to withhold their consent. Living with me, they were hardly unaware of the significance the research held for me. I am also keenly aware that a number of the assurances in the consent forms were difficult to put into practice when applied to my children. For example, the assurance for anonymity has been problematic in practice because I have entered a small community of conversation analytic researchers who were mostly aware that my data includes my daughters’ interactions. In part, the decision to disclose the fact that my daughters were included was to pre-empt some of the less professional conduct that I had witnessed in previous data sessions, where inappropriate personal comments would be made about the personalities of the participants.26, 27

I have decided not to identify my daughters in the pages of this thesis, nor will I do so in any publications or conferences. Where my daughters appear, I treat them as I would any other participant and, in common with the others, I invited them to invent their own pseudonyms, so that, if they so wish, they will be able to identify themselves.

A second major complication in the assurances given in the ethics form was the declaration that I would not discuss the content of calls with parents.

26 I had an occasion to discuss this with Elizabeth Holt, who had recorded her mother’s conversations for her own thesis in the 1980s. I know that she too found that colleagues sometimes made inappropriate and hurtful comments about her mother.

27 Having decided not to identify my daughters in wider academic arenas, I was once subjected to a thorough and nasty rendering of the relationship between myself and my eldest child whilst presenting data to a staff-student seminar in a psychology department. This was upsetting, not least because I was unable to defend myself without giving away the speakers’ identities.
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Plainly, this was impossible to deliver for my own children. My daughters were aware of this and nevertheless consented. For the most part, this did not cause any major problems because, like all participants, they were free either to switch off the recording device at any point in an ongoing conversation or to request that I refrain from listening to - and delete - particular sections from the calls. These requests were seldom made, but when they were, I honoured them.

So, my daughters had some control and gave me the data freely having considered for themselves the content they were willing to share. However, this is only part of the story. I also have to acknowledge my own responses to listening to my daughters’ calls; especially the few occasions on which, as a mother, I would have censured the children for what I perceived to be problematic or unsafe conduct. I am privileged to have literally listened in on an aspect of my daughters’ lives in which I would otherwise not have been included. There was joy in this, as I learned something new about each of them. However, I was also discovering something of how the girls were in the world, away from me and witness to descriptions of a range of behaviours that I will gloss here as (unsettling) teenage activities. As a mother, these matters would be worthy of discussion. As a researcher, I was not warranted to discuss them.

I never resolved this dilemma with any satisfaction. My principal role was as a mother and on the rare occasion that troubling matters arose, which I saw might compromise my daughters’ safety or health, I did comment on them. I was given some licence to do so by the fact that my children had freely chosen that I overhear these aspects of their lives. However, I was aware that I was treating my children differently from my other participants whose parents might be similarly disturbed by the content of their daughters’ interactions.28

28 Note that I am not here referring to anything that might be seriously harmful. None of the interactions referred to suicidal behaviour, for instance. Examples of the kinds of things discussed included: deceptions about whereabouts; drunken nights; and sexual activities.
The duality of the interrelations between mother/researcher and daughters/participants required very careful navigation. I remain uncertain about the success of these navigations, which were heavily personal and highly contextualised. As noted above, ethical dilemmas are an ongoing and integral part of the research process and extend beyond those considered by mainstream ethical codes. That my daughters consented and had some control over the data does not sufficiently obviate the ethical quandaries that arose in practice. In offering these reflections, I do not claim to have reached a satisfactory conclusion. I am more confident of reaching a conclusion on the second matter I raise here; that of my own involvement in the data.

3.1.5 Being in the Data: Failing the ‘Dead Scientist’ Test?

One of the claimed advantages of collecting and analysing naturalistic data is that it passes what Potter (2003) calls the ‘dead scientist’ test. That is, the researcher has no effect on the studied interaction because it would have occurred whether or not the researcher was recording it.29 In referring to the dead scientist test, Potter was commenting critically on the tradition of researcher-initiated data, particularly that gathered by interviews in which people are asked to provide retrospective reports of experiences (but see Speer, 2007). My data is naturalistic to the extent that it is not researcher-initiated and the calls would have (likely) occurred whether or not I was recording them. However, as the mother of three of the participants, I was a frequent recipient of their phone-calls and am, therefore, very much present in the corpus.

There is, in fact, as Kitzinger (2008) observes, a long tradition of (leading) conversation analysts working on data in which they appear (e.g. see Jefferson 2007; Wootton, 1997). In part, this might arise from Sacks’ (1995), call to analyse whatever data is to hand and the mere fact that our own interactions are the most accessible to recording. There is

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also the matter of ‘being’ a conversation analyst, which results in heightened awareness of interactional phenomena as they are spoken. Sacks, Scheglof and Jefferson, for instance, regularly used field notes to document interesting and puzzling snippets of interaction, some of which they participated in (e.g. Sacks et al. 1974, extract 17: 716; Scheglof et al. 1977, extracts 58 and 60: 373 &376).

However, there are reasons to be cautious. For example, Wowk (2007:148) explicitly criticises working on data in which the analyst is a participant, claiming that, ‘...there has always been a caveat in CA advising against’ this practice ‘...precisely to avoid attributing motive to speakers/hearers which are not publicly and equally available to all the parties to a conversation’.

If it is true that analysts have ‘always’ been cautioned against appearing in their own data, it is a caution that several do not heed in a strict sense (Kitzinger, 2008b). Whether analysts choose to ignore the warning, however, is not in itself sufficient to justify the action – just because some analysts appear in their own data does not make the practice satisfactory. Hence, we must consider seriously the second part of Wowk’s claim: that by participating in data, analysts are vulnerable to attributing motives to speakers/hearers that are not oriented to in the data. Theoretically, it removes analytic objectivity. Taken further, with heightened awareness of interaction, analysts might also be open to the suspicion that particular phenomena had appeared in the interaction because the analyst deliberately set the ‘right’ context for their delivery. These are serious concerns indeed. I will take each in turn.

The notion of analytic objectivity is complicated. It conjures long debated positivistic ideas about the researcher as an unmotivated and distant observer of events. In a sense, CA’s approach to analysis, with its emphasis on participant orientations, resonates with these positivistic ideals.

Arguing along these lines, Beach and Anderson (2003:4) suggest that CA is,

30 see Mehan 1978 for a critical commentary on the methodological failings of these field notes.

31 italics in the original
‘a science for discovering and verifying the social organisation of everyday life’. This is perhaps a surprising and controversial characterisation of a (largely) discursive/qualitative method (Westerman, 2011; Wetherell, 2001). Nonetheless, the requirement to focus on participant orientations guards against the importation of cultural or political agendas that do not relevantly feature for persons in interaction (Schegloff, 1997). So, ideal conversation analytic research involves a neutral discovery of phenomena that have generic relevance.33

Questions of whether this level of objectivity is either possible or desirable feature in the Schegloff-Billig-Wetherell debate (Billig, 1999a,b; Schegloff, 1998, 1999; Wetherell, 2000; Wetherell, 1998. See also Chapter Two); these questions are, however, largely raised by researchers working in other discursive traditions. Perhaps more serious are questions that are raised within the field of CA and its closely connected relative, ethnomethodology. For example, feminist conversation analyst, Kitzinger (2000: 171), asserts that it would be ‘unbearingly limiting’ to focus only those parts of the data where participants explicitly orient to the (oppressive) cultural norms in which conversations are embedded. Instead, Kitzinger prefers to do what she characterises as a post-analytic examination of the various ways that heterosexism is an unseen, taken-for-granted presumption of the social world (see Kitzinger 2005 a, b; Land and Kitzinger, 2005). Enfield (2007) adopts a similar position in relation to studying social hierarchy in a Laoation speaking community. The ‘problem’ with this approach for CA (defined in Schegloff’s (2009) terms) is that once the analyst enters a post-analytic phase, they are again in danger of losing objectivity and becoming ‘undisciplined’ (Schegloff, 2009). Yet, as Heritage and Maynard (2006) argue, doing CA involves more than coldly applying a set of analytic tools. In their words:

32 There has been a recent move in CA to provide ‘quantitative extensions’ to research (see, for example Clayman et al (2007). Also see Drew and Heritage (2006) for further discussion of quantification in CA).

33 footnote re loose definition of universality.
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CA inquiries often make use of intuition, theory, ethnography and coding, depending on the study, the phenomenon of interest, the requirements of analysis, and the disciplined ways in which CA can be related to these other resources. [Heritage and Maynard, 2006: 432]

The basic question is whether CA is, or can be, an objective science. I have argued earlier chapters that CA fits well with a social constructionist framework. It seems contradictory, then, to claim that CA also requires a positivistic orientation. There is no doubt that CA offers systematic tools for analysis but what counts and what does not count as ‘proper’ CA is as much socially constructed as other approaches in science (see, for example, Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Latour and Woolgar, 1986). If, as Heritage and Maynard suggest, CA involves, amongst other things, intuition, then the question of objectivity becomes, at the very least, complex. Hutchby and Wooffitt (2008: 89), go further in suggesting that CA relies on ‘essentially interpretive skills’ rather than a, ‘...static and prescriptive set of instructions’. These arguments raise doubts about the objective nature of CA in general. Whether, as the analyst, my own participation in the data might further undermine objective analysis could turn out to be a moot point.

One argument is that it is impossible to analyse my own talk objectively. Putting aside, for the moment, questions of whether objectivity is ever possible, we might point to the fundamental conversation analytic requirement for analysis to be focussed on participant orientations, which safeguards against importing interpretations that are not available from the talk as talk. This would apply to my own talk as much to anyone else’s. That is, if I go beyond the empirical data in examining my own talk, then this would be a readily observable feature of my analysis. One advantage of CA data is that it is available for scrutiny by others. If, as an analyst/
participant, I go too far, then my analysis will simply be evaluated in these
terms.34

My presence in the data is retained for other analysts to see and this is far
removed from the kinds of research practices in which those collecting the
data make themselves invisible (see, for example, Schegloff’s (2008)
critique of Edley’s (1997) analysis of interviews with young men). My own
visibility means that I am equally open to scrutiny in terms of the influence
I had in the progressive realisation of the interactions in which I
participated. This fact goes some way to guarding against suspicions about
‘manufacturing’ data. That is, like all speakers, I have no choice but to
participate in talk in ways that are meaningful and understandable to
recipients. I am, therefore, not simply free to manipulate interaction in
ways that provide a rich environment for the appearance of verbal
practices that I am interested in, without such manipulation being visible in
the data.35 As Moerman (1988: xi) observes, ‘the conscious actor cannot
be the author of his or her own talk’. In any event, even if had I been able
to ‘order-up’ particular phenomena, at the time I was collecting the data
for this thesis, my interests were in young women’s assertiveness and not
in person reference, so I would have undoubtedly ended up ‘ordering’ the
‘wrong’ activities.

If, as suggested by Wowk’s arguments, my participation in the data is less
than ideal, I have argued here that there are safeguards in adopting a
conversation analytic approach that mitigate troubles with objectivity and
integrity. These safeguards seem to be absent in other approaches to
collecting social data, particularly of a qualitative kind, where the role
played by the researcher in generating the data might be reflected upon,
but rarely available for scrutiny.

34 I am reminded here of Moerman’s (1988) account of a non-Thai speaking student finding an error in one of his translated transcripts.
Without knowing a word of Thai, this student was able to draw on his/her knowledge of how language works to successfully challenge Moerman’s translation.

35 I am not here claiming that speakers never draw on strategies to ensure that certain activities get done in talk but that they cannot
do so without the strategies being hearable to recipients (and analysts).
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Having reflected on the potential problems associated with participating in my own data, I want now to consider whether there is any possible advantage to being so involved intimately in the research, not only through recording my own calls but those of my daughters and their friends.

In commenting on the British nature of the corpus of data (see section 3.1.1) I collected for this thesis, I argued that I make no claims about it representing ‘British-ness’. However, it should not be forgotten that all talk is contextualised. As Moerman (1988) puts it:

We all know that all talk is thoroughly and multifariously embedded in the historical, cultural, social, biographical ... context of its occurrence. We make use of this in constructing and interpreting the sense, import and meaning of every bit of talk we encounter. [Moerman, 1988: 8]

In writing this, Moerman was pointing to a deficiency in CA; that although CA is a useful resource for understanding the organisation of talk, it tends to bypass the context for that talk’s production. Moerman therefore proposes a synthesis between CA and ethnography, which he calls Culturally Contexted Conversation Analysis (CCCA). Implicit in this proposed synthesis is Moerman’s understanding that ‘context’ is external to the mechanics of talk and that analysis of talk is enriched by consideration of these external factors. This approach does not fit well with a conversation analytic perspective (Mandlebaum, 1990) because of the analytical risks involved in jumping too quickly to extrinsic factors. Nevertheless, ethnography is included in the list of useful skills that Heritage and Maynard (2005) point to in their account of CA as method (see quote above). It should be noted, however, that they additionally refer to the disciplined ways in which CA can draw on ethnography (amongst other things). I take it, then, that Heritage and Maynard are not arguing for a synthesis in the way that Moerman does, but rather that
ethnography can be applied to CA within its own tenets. That is, on occasion, knowing who the participants are, and the kinds of worlds they inhabit, can add usefully to a conversation analytic project, as long as the analysis does not substantively rely on these ethnographic details.

In relating these arguments to my thesis, it might (debatably) be an advantage that I know the participants well, that I understand the context of their lives, and the meanings of their Northern British vernacular. For the most part, as the analyst, I personally know (about) the referents when my participants refer to people and places. I have some insight into why a particular utterance is treated as laughable, benign or offensive. This does not mean that these insights are unavailable to other analysts – after all, anyone trained in CA can spot a recognitional person reference, or points at which utterances are treated by recipients as being of one kind or another. However, the additional ethnographic details are analytically useful. It is a matter of being disciplined.

In Section 3.1, I have described my corpus of data and reflected on the range of ethical dilemmas that arose during its collection. Looking across other conversation analytic work, beyond confirming that project adhered to current mainstream guidelines, I am aware that conversation analysts do not normally discuss the ethical practices involved in their research. My methodology section is therefore unique in its focus on broader issues. I consider the discussion important, not only for contributing to conversation analytic practices, but also for situating my work in a largely feminist context. As noted near the beginning of this chapter, feminist research involves a heterogeneous set of methods that might be united by a more incisive examination of ethical practices than currently required in

36 This has been helpful in data sessions. For example, few of my colleagues understood the category reference to ‘scallies’, (roughly, working class, young, white, unemployed men); a reference that is made frequently by two of my participants.

37 By way of illustration, I was recently in a data session which included data in which a young black American man used the ‘N-word’ (in full) when addressing a white police officer. I could see analytically that this address term appeared to be pretty mundane for the speaker but was somewhat confused by this being the case. Surely something special was being done. Two American analysts present in the session explained that the use of this (usually) pejorative term was almost as routine as use of ‘like’ for young speakers in the Black American community, and that nothing special was happening.
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mainstream codes. It might be that my reflections sit uncomfortably for a conversation analytic audience but, if, as Kitzinger (2000) argues, CA has relevance for feminists, then we can do better than to leave our own practices unexamined.

I turn now to consider ground that is more familiar to a CA audience: the practical and analytical matters of actually ‘doing’ Conversation Analysis.

3.2 Working with Single Cases and Collections

Conversation analytic projects are normally based on analysis of collections of cases or fragments that feature analytically similar objects in talk (e.g. repairs, assessments, laughter particles, complaints and the like). However, it is not unusual for findings to be published that are the product of a single-case analyses, i.e. of a single fragment of data. The empirical chapters in this thesis are evenly divided between analyses of collections and analyses of single-cases. Here, I briefly review the work involved, beginning with building collections.

Schegloff (1996b) sets out a cogent and systematic conversation analytic methodology that begins with the importance of noticing that something interesting or puzzling is happening in the data. Generally, this instigates a search for more examples of the phenomenon, so that eventually (hopefully) a collection of illustrative cases is amassed. There is no specific quantifiable minimum for something to ‘count’ as a collection (Beach and Anderson, 2003); frequency is less important than recognising the significance of an action, whether it is common or rare. The ultimate aim is to contribute to the list of recognisable social acts (Schegloff, 1996b) that are done in talk through an empirical examination of their structural organisation. This ‘examination’ is both specific to each case and generic across all cases, so that the project ends with an empirically grounded, generalisable description of how a particular action is accomplished (Hopper, 1989; Mazeland, 2006; Schegloff, 1987)
To illustrate this process in my own work, I will describe the analytical route that led to the findings presented in Chapter Seven, where I report on the use of non-recognitional person references to refer to referents known to participants in the talk. Work on this practice began with a puzzle. As part of my training in CA, I was required to work through all the person references in a phone-call. The call I selected at random happened to be one between myself and one of my daughters. The main topic of conversation was a series of complaints, instigated by my daughter and directed towards her father and his partner. Most of the references to her father were routine uses of the name she uses for him, i.e. ‘Dad’, or the locally subsequent variant, ‘he’. However, towards the end of the call, she refers to him using the prototypical non-recognitional format ‘this guy’. Here, then, was the puzzle. What action is accomplished by this atypical selection for a known-in-common referent? Does it lead co-conversationalists to misrecognise the referent?

Analysis of this single-case inspired a change of direction in my PhD. Intrigued by the work done in selecting from alternative referential formulations, I decided to focus substantively on references to persons for the thesis. So, although there was not necessarily anything gendered in the use of a non-recognitional format, I spent several months searching for other cases, eventually constructing a collection of over forty examples. There followed a lengthy process of case-by-case analysis, looking for generic interactional patterns (e.g. turn-design and sequential environment) that might characterise the phenomenon. As well as searching for ‘confirmatory’ cases, CA also involves an active search for deviant cases; cases where there is some departure from the described pattern that can either result in modification or substantiation of working theories (see Schegloff, 1968). Finally, I was able to articulate the criteria for inclusion in my collection and, from there, able to identify the social action accomplished by the strategic use of a non-recognitional reference

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38 In this sense, CA involves a recurring set of single-case studies (Mazeland, 2006).
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when a recognitional reference is straightforwardly available to co-participants (see Chapter 7).

The collection continues to evolve. Analysis has led to the pruning of some cases and the inclusion of others, as the grounds for exclusion and inclusion have solidified. My disappointment at ‘losing’ a ‘favourite’ example is often mitigated by the discovery of new cases. There is, then, a sense of relationship with a collection; one that is not normally acknowledged in academic writing. In line with feminist research practices, I comment on it here to draw attention to the private and personal journey involved in doing social scientific work. The stereotype of CA as a dry approach to social life (e.g. Moerman, 1988) is simply not one that I recognise from my own experience.

The norm, then, is to work with a collection of illustrative cases. However, it is also commonplace to analyse and publish findings based on single fragments of interaction (e.g. Drew, 2002; Goodwin, 1979; Kitzinger, 2007a; Scheglof, 1984; 1987, 1988; Toerien and Kitzinger, 2007; Whalen, Zimmerman and Whalen, 1988). Scheglof (1987) proposes that single-case studies are useful in demonstrating the scope and variety of issues addressed by conversation analysts over the course of its existence as a field of enquiry. Certainly, this was what I had in mind in Chapter 4, where my analysis is focused on a single interaction between two-teenage girls in which they discuss their developing sexual relationships. Despite a burgeoning range of research on young women and sex, much of this work is researcher-initiated (interviews, focus groups, surveys and the like), and very little is based on naturally occurring interactions. The principal aim of Chapter 4, then is to demonstrate the utility and effectiveness of adopting a conversation analytic approach to gender and sexuality. In this sense, the findings may not be original for a conversation analytic audience. The contribution made by this chapter lies in its methodological originality.
Chapter Three

A second purpose for single-case analysis is to generate ideas for further research (Mazeland, 2006; Schegloff, 1988b; Wooffitt, 1992). This was the basis for my single-case analysis of gendered and non-gendered references reported in Chapter 5. The rationale for this analysis was to test whether gender can be indexed with non-linguistically gendered terms (e.g. uses of ‘they’, ‘we’ or ‘I’). Examination of the references across a single spate of interaction confirmed that linguistic markers of gender are not necessary in invoking gendered categories in talk; at least with these speakers in this context. This single-case study was the grounding for the launching a novel project based on what I call ‘categorical-I’, that is, uses of ‘I’ to self-index a categorical membership (reported in Chapter 6). In this instance, the single-case study led to original findings in its own right as well as contributing to the development of further, novel conversation analytic research.

3.3 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have described the corpus on which this thesis is based, arguing for its status as a contemporary British data set that unusually features the talk of adolescent girls and young women. I have also reflected on my own practice as a conversation analyst working within a broadly feminist tradition. This led to explicit consideration of practices that might not sit comfortably with a CA audience; or at least are not normally made visible in reports of CA projects. Examination of research practices, however, fits well with the feminist position I have adopted throughout the research.

I have also contemplated the tensions between the more positivistic overtones of CA and its relationship to social constructionist perspectives. One of the key points used to illustrate this tension was a discussion about my own participation in the data, and the consequent matter of maintaining objectivity in the analysis of my own talk. I argued that, by making the data available for scrutiny by other analysts, there are some safeguards against temptation to import interpretations that are simply not
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oriented to by the participants. One can accept this as part of CA’s
disciplined approach to research, whilst also accepting that the customs
and tools of conversation analytic work are themselves socially
constructed.
Chapter Four: ‘I sort of did stuff to him’: A single-case study of the everyday language of sexual conduct.

4.1 Introduction

In this first empirical chapter, I apply a conversation analytic method to examine ways that sexual identity and sexual morality play across a single episode of interaction. Following Scheglof’s (1987) proposal about the value of single-case studies in signifying the utility of CA (see Chapter 3), my analysis draws on understanding of a wide range of conversational practices that are consequential for interaction. The principal aim is to demonstrate the utility and effectiveness of CA for studying participants’ orientation to gender, sexuality and identity and they ways these are articulated in talk. Here, the analysis is of a single interaction, and therefore represents exploratory work. Scheglof (1987) presents a cogent defence of the use of single-case studies. In his words:

A variety of analytic resources provided by past work in conversation analysis are brought to bear on the analysis of a single utterance in its sequential context, drawn from an ordinary conversation. Various facets of the organization of talk-in-interaction are thereby both introduced and exemplified. The result displays the capacity of this analytic modality to meet a fundamental responsibility of social analysis, namely, the capacity to explicate single episodes of action in interaction as a basic locus of social order. [Scheglof, 1987: 101]

This chapter is, therefore, an exploration of method as much as it is a means to report original findings. Of course, these two things are closely related; if CA cannot produce interesting and novel things to say about gender and sexuality then we will fail to display its utility as a method for researchers in this field.
The chapter begins with a brief (and necessarily selective) review of research on the sociology of sex and sexuality, showing that a great deal of this work is based on researcher-initiated data, (data produced as a result of interviews, surveys, focus-groups and the like) and historical analyses. Research of this kind has been influential in putting sex-research on the sociological agenda and in providing various critical commentaries on sexual norms and assumptions that maintain an oppressive social order (e.g. Boston Women's Health Book Collective, 1973; Brownmiller, 1975; Butler, 1990, 1993, 1997; Dworkin, 1981, 1987; Gagnon and Simon, 1974; Foucault, 1984; Friedan, 1963; Jackson, 1978, 1995, 1999; Plummer, 1975, 1995).

Whilst a good deal of this work is (more or less) critical of the supposed ‘special’ status of sex as a private matter (Gagnon and Simon, 1974: 16) there is an understandable difficulty for researchers who wish to examine sexual activities as they are produced and experienced in everyday practices (though see Kinsey et al. 1948, 1953 and Masters and Johnson, 1966 for (non-feminist) accounts of observed sexually embodied conduct). The reliance on retrospective-accounts and historical data is, therefore, unsurprising. Conversation analysis offers an alternative methodological approach by examining spontaneous and naturally occurring talk in which speakers routinely produce themselves, or as produced as, sexually active beings in everyday contexts. This approach fits well with Maynard's (1995: 276) call to, ‘... generate theory which is empirically grounded and oriented' in feminist thinking.

The current chapter explores the value of CA for addressing Maynard's concern by analysing a naturally occurring telephone conversation between two fifteen-year old girls, in which their (hetero)sexual conduct is topicalised. The main focus will, therefore, be on teenage sex. First, I briefly review sociological studies of sex and sexuality more generally.
Chapter Four

4.2 Sociology of Sex

Research on sexuality has typically focussed on minority sexual lives and identities (Jackson, 2008). The impetus for much of this work is to disrupt heteronormative assumptions about sexuality, and has led to what Jackson (2008: 34) calls a ‘fascination with novel and potentially subversive sexual lifestyles and practice’. The collective value of this work is clear because not only does it challenge heterosexual hegemony, it also establishes sexuality as a topic worthy of academic scrutiny.

Another strong line of sexuality research emerged around sexual violence and its connections to gender politics, with sex being theorized in terms of oppression and exploitation; an argument much critiqued by those seeking a language of empowerment and pleasure in sex (Hawkes, 1996).

Research on sexuality seems polarized around violence and oppression on the one hand and diversity and pleasure on the other. What is missing from this research agenda is a focus on conventional, mundane sexual lives. Work on sexual violence continues to be important, even urgent, as is work that challenges heterosexual dominance. However, we also need to know about the everyday and normative because this will help to illuminate what is unacceptable, taken-for-granted or exotic. As Jackson puts it:

An ethically informed defence of diversity, moreover, requires a critical stance on both normative and transgressive sexualities. As feminists have long appreciated, the ordinary and routine gives us clues to the persistence of (and many forms of) sexual violence and exploitation, while a sensitivity to inequality and oppression is essential to a political and ethical stance on the variability of sexual relations and practices. Only by knowing more about both normative and non-normative sexualities can we judge what is actually novel or subversive, how much is actually changing or remaining the same and thus map in more detail the contours of our changing sexual landscape.
A focus on the non-conventional or on the oppressive at the expense of research on the everyday risks making of sexuality something exotic or dangerous. Jackson and Scott (2004) argue that sexuality should not be treated as belonging to some special sphere, separate to the rest of social life. Sexuality is embedded in our social landscape, yet is seen as special, often secret activity that is imbued with the power to make or break individuals, relationships and even civilizations. Jackson and Scott suggest that sex is not either good or bad in its own terms and we need instead to think about the ways that it is constructed and socially ordered.

We need, therefore, to widen the research agenda to include work on the everyday, mundane and conventional, and to explore how sexual acts are located within our social lives, rather than as something beyond the norm.

Recent attention to heterosexual lives has gone some way to meeting these requirements. However, much of this work is based on and empirical analysis of data collected through interviews or focus groups conducted by social researchers (for recent examples, see Bayer, Tsui and Hindin, 2010; Beres and Farvid, 2010; Chambers, Tincknell and van Loon, 2004; Vannier and O’Sullivan, 2010). At one level, this makes sense. If we are going to learn about the everyday sexual conduct of persons, then it is appealing to ask them to describe their experiences. Left at this, however, such research seems to miss the point of researching the everyday. Instead of learning about how sexuality is made relevant and oriented to in ordinary interaction, we learn about how it is constructed in the specific institutional context of social research. Interview data only gets us so far in understanding how sexuality is socially ordered by and for participants. There seems a pressing case to research how people actually talk to each other about their sexual conduct.
4.3 Young People and Sex

Becoming sexually active is a normative event for adolescents, yet there is considerable social and moral debate about such matters as how and when to teach young people about sex. The UK seems to have particular problems. Despite a recent decrease in teenage conceptions (ONS, 2011), the UK still has the highest rates of teenage pregnancy in Western Europe (Avery and Lazdane, 2008). Teenage parenthood is associated with poor health outcomes for both mothers and babies, as well as with socioeconomic disadvantage and social exclusion (Allen et al. 2007; Paranjothy et al. 2009. For a counter view see Graham and McDermott, 2006). This has led to serious concerns about young people’s sexual conduct and the introduction of policies aimed at reducing underage sex and unsafe sex amongst young people (Social Exclusion Unit, 1999). In general, young people’s sexual conduct is treated as problematic.

Part of the problem, as Jackson (1982) points out, is that sexual conduct is viewed as an adult activity, and one from which children ought to be protected. The concern for protection not only extends to protection from potential abuse, but also to protection from knowledge about sex. At the time Jackson was writing (in the early 1980s), Sex Education policy in the UK was limited, so that young people were sometimes entering puberty with little or no knowledge about sex but were in some way expected to enter adulthood as mature sexual beings. Since that time, various policies have been introduced that broaden the curriculum and widen the target age-range, so that now children at the age of five are taught about body parts and introduced to the notion of reproduction (DfES, 2000). However, the curriculum has been largely biological and has been criticized for ignoring relationships and life-styles – for treating sex as a special and separate to the rest of social life (Buston and Wight, 2002; Halstead and Reiss, 2003). Recent changes to Sex Education policy (Sex and Relationships Education Bill, 2010) attempt to contextualise sexual conduct within the everyday matters of negotiating relationships and managing healthy life-styles. Still, what and when young people find out about sex is
a major point of division for policy makers, adults and even young people themselves.

One approach to resolving these matters has been to talk to young people to gain an insight into their sexual knowledge and practices. The research interview has been the central methodology. For example, Jackson (1982) interviewed teenage girls, finding that they entered puberty with variable understandings of sex but with a very strong message of the heterosexual imperative and of risk. Similarly, Lees (1986) talked to fifteen- to sixteen-year-old girls, concluding that girls’ lives are limited by the mere fact of being girls. That is, the sexual lives of girls are constrained in ways that reflect wider cultural notions of femininity. Girls are expected to be sexually circumspect at the same time as being sexually ‘available’ within socially sanctioned limits.

These studies are important for informing a critical understanding of girls’ perceptions of managing their sexual lives. They also provide much needed space for the voices of young women in social research (Gilligan, 1982; Lees, 1986). However, interview studies (indeed any of the traditional ‘talking’ research methodologies) are problematic from a conversation analytic standpoint for two principal reasons. First, interviews rely on memories for events and experiences and are therefore subject to faulty recall. Second, they are a form of social practice in which there are normative and contextualised roles (interviewer and interviewee), and associated obligatory frameworks. Hence, it does not make sense to extract interviewees’ comments from the context in which they were produced, and to exhibit them as representing something more general about them or their experiences. In CA, interviews are, therefore, treated as a particular form of institutional talk (Schegloff, 1997) and not as providing unmediated access to participants’ realities (Speer and Hutchby, 2003). Interviews are not ‘naturalistic’ data in the sense that they are contrived and driven by social researchers, who unavoidably construct their own data in interaction with their participants. The results, however
interesting, cannot be treated as the neutral outpouring of respondents’ thoughts and opinions. Instead, using CA to analyse interviews reveals (some of) the practices for conducting social research (e.g. question and answer sequences). Schegloff (1998), targeting Wetherell and Edley’s masculinity project (e.g. Edley and Wetherell, 1995, 1996, 1997) warns against interviewers ignoring their own role in constructing data.

Not that feminist writers are oblivious to such matters, and indeed, feminist researchers in particular tend to be reflexive about their own (powerful) roles in relation to those they research (see Preissle, 2006 for a review). For example, Speer (2005) writes about how she tried to minimize her contribution to group discussions by using picture prompts as opposed to direct questions, a strategy, which she acknowledges did not eliminate the collaborative nature of the data.

Interestingly, moreover illuminating about the problems with interviews/focus groups, one feminist researcher writes about her powerlessness in the research process when interviewing a group of nine-year-old boys about girls’ periods. Matthews-Lovering (1995) reproduces an extract in which the boys simply do not treat her questions seriously, and begin to undermine the process by laughing and using ‘inappropriate’ language such as ‘tits’ and ‘fannies’. In commenting on this episode, Matthews-Lovering writes:

It could be argued that this event was an empirical problem in that I did not handle the discussion correctly. However, I was an experienced forty-year old secondary school teacher, youth worker and educational psychologist when this discussion took place. I argue that it was not my inexperience or mismanagement that led to this event, but rather that in this context I became a woman in the company of a group of young men using a patriarchal sexist discourse - and I experienced it as oppressive and distressing. [Matthews-Lovering, 1995: 29]
I do not doubt that this was an uncomfortable and even distressing experience. However, we have to remember that these nine-year-old boys were brought together specifically to discuss menstruation for research purposes. The situation is contrived insofar as an adult with a specific agenda imposed the (potentially embarrassing) topic on the boys. It also seems to be stretching a point to attribute their response to a patriarchal sexist discourse. At nine, these boys cannot cogently be described as young men. They are children responding as a group to questions that have probably never been posed to them before, on a topic they likely understood little. Any number of things could explain their not taking up their proper role as research participants: disguising lack of knowledge or embarrassment, or simply resisting a process that we can imagine was alien to them.

How, then, do we find out about young people’s sexual lives without asking them? A conversation analytic approach would be to analyse their naturalistic talk to examine places where speakers make sex relevant for each other. There is an apparent lack of research on everyday talk about sex, and as a result, we lack understanding of the mundane language of sex even for adults. I turn now to briefly consider CA research that has addressed or touched on these matters.

4.4 Indexing Sex and Sexuality in Talk

There is a small but significant conversation analytically informed literature on the ways that sexuality is indexed in talk (e.g. Kitzinger, 2005a; Land and Kitzinger, 2005; Rendle-Short, 2005; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2003). Much of this research (reviewed more fully in Chapter 2) focuses on the ways in which heterosexuality is taken-for-granted in social life. So, speakers regularly produce themselves and others as heterosexual with recognisably gendered names and pro-terms, and do so without troubling the interaction in ways connected to the gendering of an opposite sex-
partner. In contrast, when lesbian or gay identities are indexed in the same way, it unsettles the heterosexual presumption and regularly leads to a sequence of repairs, and recipients disrupt progressivity in order to manage the ‘news’. In talk, then, heterosexuality is normative and homosexuality is marked.

The public display of sexuality through talk is often not achieved as an action in its own right (Kitzinger, 2005) but rather because of other unrelated actions. The mentioning of a partner or a gendered pro-term is often deployed in the service of a range of activities; for example, complaining, requesting, inviting and so on. Sexuality, or at least heterosexuality, is the unnoticed backdrop to achieving these things.

More explicit orientations to sexuality occur in talk about sexual activity. For example, in Drew’s (1987) analysis of po-faced responses to teasing, there are three instances in which the teasing is related to matters of sexual conduct. In one instance (ibid: 224), Vic is telling a story about having almost been caught engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute (apparently at the time of the telling, it was a possibility that ‘being caught’ might oblige marriage).

### Extract 1: Frankel : USI: 121

| 01  | Vic:  | So w(hh)e sst: sstuff her under the goddam bed |
| 02  |      | rolled up in the blanket and Royal Mounted Police |
| 03  |      | comes in, says I heard there was a complaint from |
| 04  |      | the landlord last night that some women and |
| 05  |      | some guy came through the window uh .hh any |
| 06  |      | women in here I says n:o sir. I’m in the Navy |
| 07  |      | and I don’t mess with you know |
| 08  |      | (I’m [     ]     )     |
| 09  | Mik: | [I don’t mess with] women eh heh ha |

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39 Note that CA is not concerned with the internal and private desires of speakers, recipients and referents. Instead, the focus is on the publicly displayed sexual identities produced in talk. As Kitzinger (2005: 222) observes, publicly displayed identities are ‘insistently heterosexual’.

40 Itself a comment on sexual morality of the time and place.
Drew’s analysis focuses on the three teasing ascriptions to Vic of homosexuality by the recipients of his story at lines 9, 13, and 18. Consistent with CA’s commitment to examine the actions accomplished by turns at talk, Drew concentrates on the actions performed in this extract: storytelling, teasing, agreement and so on. He does not comment directly on the ways in which this extract reproduces a sexist and heterosexist world. Indeed, none of the participants in the interaction explicitly orient to, or challenge the (hetero)sexism inherent in the talk, so as the analyst, working in a CA tradition, Drew is warranted to gloss over this aspect of the talk.

However, as feminists, we might want to notice that the participants do produce a hetero(sexist) social world without explicitly orienting to this as being in any way untoward or problematic. The whole sequence, as Drew observes, jokily raises the possibility that Vic is gay, perhaps touched off by Vic’s mentioning of the Navy (line 6).\footnote{The Navy, as an all male environment, frequently at sea for months at a time, has (or had) a British and American cultural reputation as a gay military service. See for example, the quote attributed to Winston Churchill, ‘Don’t talk to me about naval tradition. It’s nothing but rum, sodomy and the lash’} It seems likely here (although we cannot say for sure because the end of Vic’s turn is inaudible) that Vic was already heading for some form of joke. There are two primary
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possibilities: that he was Ironically invoking the notion that naval men ‘have a woman in every port’ (see Burg, 2002), or the notion that naval men engage in homosexual activity during the long months at sea. Picking up on the Navy’s ‘gay’ reputation, Mike completes Vic’s turn (line 9) with a jokey claim (note the laughter on line 10) to Vic’s homosexual activity. This theme is taken up by Joe (line 13) and Mike further reinforces the joke with an explicit reference to Vic as one of a pair of ‘faggots’ (line 18). Vic jokingly accepts the gist of the tease by claiming, ‘that’s what I am man if I got to marry that shit’ (lines 22-23). In other words, he would identify as gay rather than marry the prostitute he had had sex with. Vic’s acceptance is non-serious and the statement is ironic. Vic is straight, and his recipients know him to be straight. Indeed the non-serious environment in which Vic’s turn at line 22 is uttered allows him to reassert his heterosexuality. The joke is funny precisely because Vic is heterosexual.

Sexism and heterosexism is reproduced across this extract; in the way that homosexual men are referred to in derogatory terms as faggots, in the sense of ridiculousness that Vic might be having sex with a man, in the treatment of prostitutes as good for sex but not suitable for marriage, and in the insulting reference to a (any?) prostitute as less than human, merely a byproduct of human consumption; ‘that shit’ (line 22). However, nowhere do the participants mark their talk as potentially problematic in these terms. Instead, they reveal their shared understanding of a social world in which the notions that one of the co-present men might be gay and that prostitutes are marriage material are ridiculous, laughable matters. As analysts, the extract illustrates the value of examining participants’ actions even when they are not explicitly marking something as offensive or discriminatory. We can ask what kind of social world is in place where discriminatory talk is freely spoken, without troubling the surface of the interaction.

In noticing the participants’ unproblematic treatment of the interaction, I am not commenting on their private reservations or dispositions. It might
well be the case that one or more of the participants was privately
troubled by the content of the talk (or indeed privately holding back for
fear of being excessively offensive). However, CA does not interpret
whatever psychological processes motivate the talk.\textsuperscript{42} We cannot merely
label these speakers as individually sexist because we are unable to access
their private thoughts. But we can clearly see that the \textit{interaction between}
them reproduces sexism and heterosexism.

Labeling the talk as sexist, especially when the participants are not
explicitly oriented to it as such, might be uncomfortable for a conversation
analytic audience (see Schegloff, 2009). Sexism is my ‘post-analytic’ term
for what is happening in this extract. That is, the social actions that the
participants are performing are those identified by Drew (1987):
storytelling, teasing, responding to teasing. As a conversation analyst, I
would not wish to override or ignore these features of the talk. However,
as a feminist, I would not wish to ignore the topic of the interaction or the
social world it reproduces. As Kitzinger (2005b: 479) comments:

\begin{quote}
...from the point of view of many social activists, and others
concerned with social problems—indeed, including Sacks, the
founder of conversation analysis himself, in his early lectures
(Sacks 1995:175–87)—social problems can also be produced,
and reproduced, by social actors who are not oriented to any
trouble in their interactions. A social problem exists only for us,
as analysts eavesdropping on their talk, who see in it the
untroubled reproduction of a heterosexist (or racist or classist
or otherwise oppressive) world.
\end{quote}

The point is, however, as Kitzinger (2000, 2005, 2008) argues, that
whatever we make of talk’s broader social implications and consequences,
this should not be done at the expense of a systematic analysis of what
actions participants are producing and oriented to.

\textsuperscript{42} Although there are debates within CA about the status of cognition – see te Molder and Potter, 2005
So, there are dual concerns in this chapter. As someone who is interested in sexuality research, those places in interaction where sexuality spontaneously arises as a topic are of evident significance. Yet, as a conversation analyst, there are features of the talk such as its action and organization that are analytically interesting and should precede investigation of topic.

I turn now to the analysis of the single-case which forms the empirical basis for this chapter. First, I present a conversation analytic analysis of the actions performed across the extract then I draw on the broader social implications of this interaction for the moral social world it produces. I show how a young woman manages the description of the progression of a new relationship from texting to first sexual activities, whilst constructing (maintaining?) a moral identity as a ‘respectable’ girl.

4.4 Karen and Mary: Respectable Sexuality and the Paradox of Teenage Sex

The case examined here is taken from a telephone call between two fifteen-year-old girls – Karen and Mary. They are good friends and both have new boyfriends. Karen is with Davie, and things are going well. Mary has recently come out of a relationship with Adam but is now with John. Karen knew that John was interested in Mary but has not heard about recent developments between them. The twenty-minute call consists mostly of discussions about these new relationships.

The extract presented here deals with the progression of Mary’s relationship with John, from texting each other, through the first kiss, to their first sexual activities. I show the call from the beginning (though not quite in full), to show the progressive unfolding of sex as a topic in the interaction. Consequently, this is a rather longer extract than typical for CA. However, important interactional work is performed early in the call that has clear procedural relevance for the speakers.
Extract Two

**[CTS33]**

00  
01  Mar:  ((Ring ring))
02  Kar:  .hh Hiya Mary
03  Mar:  Hi:::
04  Kar:  .hh Hello:. Can you tell me the craic now.
05  (.)
06  Mar:  Uhm Yeah I can. But uh got a really really cheeky
07  favour to ask you.
08  Kar:  Oh go on. Go on.
09  Mar:  Uhm (0.3) I’m going to a *party* tonight right
10  Kar:  Yeah?
11  Mar:  *John’s invited me* **(1.2)**
12  (1.2)
13  Mar:  *But uhm (0.9) sorry
14  (0.3)
15  Kar:  Huh huh huh huh .hhhh
16  Mar:  H(h)m
17  (2.9)
18  Mar:  But uhm: (0.6)like my mum wouldn’t let me go. So
19  I just said I was going with John. So I s- I said
20  that I’m sleeping at yours. Is that alright.
21  (.)
22  Kar:  Yeah. It’s fine.

(87 lines deleted in which Mary and Karen discuss Karen’s
forthcoming holiday plans)

109 Mar:  HHh Did you want the craic
110 Kar:  I do. I do.
111 Mar:  [Okay ]
112 Kar:  [That’s what I-] that’s what I want.
113 (.)
114 Kar:  The craic
115 Mar:  You know (  ) hhhh h(h)m .hh You know like
116 (0.2) John was texting me. Saying that he liked
117 me and stuff.
118 Kar:  Yeah
119 Mar:  And I didn’t know what I wanted to do.
120 Kar:  .hh Mmhmm
121 (.)
122 Mar:  But I [decided ] that I do like really like=
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123  Kar:        [((sniffs))]
124  Mar:      =him now.
125            (0.2)
126  Kar:       Mmhm:
127  Mar:    And uhm I didn’t know like I don’t know-
128      still don’t know what to do about Katie.
129          Because she said it’s fine.
130          (0.8)
131  Mar:    And like (.) but (0.3) I d- I don’t know.
132    She keeps saying- every time I talk to
133 her about it she keeps saying you know
134 .hh well it’s not like I can do anything about
135 it. Blah blah blah. You know.
136  Kar:      I saw Katie:: yesterday. I thought
137 she seemed like just (.) really happy about
138 everything s[0
139  Mar:        [Oh that’s all right then.
140            (0.2)
141  Mar:    She’s probably fine
142            (.)
143  Kar:      Yea::h
144  Mar:      (Because the) ( ) said nothing’s actually
145 happened except that it has happened.<But
146 she probably didn’t know. Huh
147  Kar:      Ooh::: ↑↑Tell me,
148            (.)
149  Mar:      Well er:m (0.7) I was at his house
150 the day before I went to Wales
151 ‘and we kissed’
152            (1.0)
153  Kar:      Aw was it good.
154            (.)
155  Mar:      <Yea::h. It was lov:ley:>
156            (.)
157  Kar:      Ah:::[:::::::: ]
158  Mar:        [It was all] like (0.8) Oh it
159 was all the kind of fireworks
160 tingly feeling one
161            (0.7)
162  Kar:      ↑↑Aw mpt That’s so cute.
163  Mar:      Oh: I was so happy.
164            (0.3)
Mar: And then (1.0) And then I went away and
I was texting him loads. And then I
came back. .hhh And we’d sort of
talked about it.
(0.5)
Kar: Yeah::
Mar: [( ) like. And then (0.9) I was
a little naughty hhhhhhhhh
Kar: Wh(h)t d(h)id you do::.
(0.9)
Mar: Erm well I tol- I don’t know why
but I told him I was on my period.
(0.5)
Mar: I think that was like kind of
like a barrier thing wasn’t it.
Kar: Oh right. [Yeah.
Mar: [Because you don’t
want to rush into anything. So
I told him I was on my period but
like I sort of ’ did stuff to
him.’
(0.9)
Kar: Tch tch tch [Mary.
Mar: [Hum hm
(0.7)
Mar: But I don’t know it didn’t feel
like wrong or anything.
(0.9)
Kar: It’s good I think.
(0.9)
Kar: I think you make a good couple.
Mar: Yeah. That’s what everyone says.
(I mean we went on a really nice
walk last night right.
(0.9)
Kar: ((Sniffs))
… Continues to discuss reported (independent) views of Mary
and John as a couple, without returning to topic of sex.

Broadly, there are four episodes (or segments) of analytic interest in this
extract: The call opening, including Mary’s request for Karen to provide an
alibi; the report of the beginnings of a relationship through texting; the
description of the first kiss; and, finally, the telling about sexual activity. I take each in turn.

4.4.1 A ‘Telling’ Request for an Alibi

The call-opening (reproduced as extract three below) is atypical for a social call (for example, there is no ‘howareyou’ sequence and the caller moves, approximately, straight to business – See Schegloff, 1968) and makes clear that Karen and Mary have recently spoken.

Extract Three

[CTS33]

00 ((Ring ring))
01 Mar: Hello?
02 Kar: .hh Hiya Mary
03 Mar: Hi:::
04 Kar: .hh Hello:. Can you tell me the craic now.
05 (.)

So, at line 4, Karen gets to call-business by soliciting a story-so-far from Mary with ‘Can you tell me the craic now’; the turn-final positioned ‘now’ makes of this a re-request. That is, Karen has apparently requested the story before but for some reason, Mary was unwilling, or, more likely, unable to supply the details.

As it happens, Mary agrees to the telling (line 6 – see extract four) but again delays the actual granting of this re-request with a request of her own, which she characterises (in the pre-request) as a ‘really really cheeky favour’ (lines 6-7).

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43 ‘Craic’ is a Gaelic word with no direct translation in English but is generally used to mean something along the lines of ‘news’ in a positive or entertaining sense (Cambridge Dictionary Online).

44 The evidence that it is more likely that Mary was unable rather than unwilling to complete her story is in the design of Karen’s request: Use of a low contingency formulation - ‘can you...’ - as opposed to a high contingency formulation - ‘I was wondering if...’ See Walker and Drew (2009)
Extract Four

[CTS33]

06  Mar:  Uhm Yeah I can. But uh got a really really cheeky
07  favour to ask you.
08  Kar:  Oh go on. Go on.
09  Mar:  Uhm (0.3) I’m going to a party tonight right
10  Kar:  Yeah?
11  Mar:  *John’s invited me* *( )**
12  (1.2 )
13  Mar:  *But uhm (0.9) sorry
14  (0.3)
15  Kar:  Huh huh huh huh huh .hhhh
16  Mar:  H(h)m
17  (2.9)
18  Mar:  But uhm: (0.6)like my mum wouldn’t let me go. So
19  I just said I was going with John. So I s- I said
20  that I’m sleeping at yours. Is that alright.
21  (.)
22  Kar:  Yeah. It’s fine.

This sets up the forthcoming request as something that might be highly
bothersome for Karen to grant. It turns out that Mary is going to a party
that evening, against her mother’s wishes, and has (already) told her
mother, untruthfully, that she is staying at Karen’s house (lines 18-20).
Mary is checking (after the event) that Karen is willing to go along with this
alibi.

Note that, in keeping with Schegloff’s (2007) observations about making
requests, Mary speaks hesitantly (for instance, the silences at lines 9, 12,
13, 14, 17 and 18, and speech perturbations at lines 9, 13, 16, 18 and 19),
and only after a clear go-ahead from Karen (line 8).\(^{45}\) However, the fact
that Mary has already informed her mother that she is staying at Karen’s
house is testament to her confidence that the request will in fact be
granted. Indeed, its formulation - ‘is that alright’ (line 20)- is suggestive of
her expectation that it is straightforwardly grantable (compare this to a

\(^{45}\) Note also Mary’s whispering, which underlines the conspiratorial nature of this part of the interaction.
higher contingency formulation such as ‘I was wondering if that would be alright with you’ – See Curl and Drew, 2009). The actual delivery of the request, then, is somewhat at odds with what was suggested earlier by ‘really really cheeky favour’. That is, ‘really really cheeky favour’ suggests something that might be difficult to grant in terms of effort for Karen and Mary’s rights to ask, whilst the request itself displays Mary’s understanding that it will be granted.

More important, for the current chapter, is to observe that Mary’s request for an alibi already contains within it a telling of the ‘craic’ that Karen earlier wanted to know. That is, Mary embeds the news that her relationship with John is now sexual (potentially, at least) when she asks her friend for an alibi that will permit her to spend the night with him (lines 11 and 18-20). So, although not yet delivered as news, Karen is now in-the-know about how far things have progressed between Mary and John. Yet, Karen does not respond to the ‘news’ aspect of Mary’s request. Instead, she simply grants her request and then goes on to discuss the fact that Mary would not have been actually able to stay with her (Karen) that night because the family were leaving for a holiday early the next morning (data not shown). The speakers do not return to the ‘craic’ for some minutes but they do return to it, and the telling gets done as a telling, despite, in a sense, having already been done.

Doing the telling without doing it as a telling, and, therefore, without setting up a conditionally relevant response from a recipient, might appear to be rather odd. However, there are related interactional phenomena. For example, Kitzinger (2000, 2002) shows instances where speakers ‘come-out’ as being lesbian without reaction or response from recipients. In a heterosexist world, revealing a gay identity might be considered ‘newsworthy’ and certainly there is a large literature on managing the moment(s) and its consequences (e.g. recent writings include: Bowleg et al. 2008; Broad, 2011; Goldman, 2007; Hetherington and Lavner, 2008; Hunter, 2007). Much of this and related work either tacitly or overtly constructs
coming-out as daunting, difficult and painful. Yet, Kitzinger (2000) had data in which young women were revealing a lesbian identity without any (immediate) troubling consequence, indeed, without any response at all, either affiliative or punitive. Kitzinger noticed a particular and systematic pattern of turn-taking across these cases of ‘non-response’ comings-out. That is, regularly, these speakers were coming out almost parenthetically, in the protected space in the middle of a compound TCU. Compound TCUs are long sentences, which are clearly composed of two or more parts. The clearest example is an if/then construction, in which the turn is not hearably complete until both components are uttered. The relevance of this is that, generally, recipients wait for turn completion before speaking (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1973). So, if a speaker reaches the middle of a compound TCU, and instead of going on to the second part, does something else (like come-out), recipients nevertheless tend to wait until the second part is in fact produced and completed before making a bid to speak themselves. By which time, whatever was done in the middle of the TCU may or may not be relevant for the progression of the interaction.

For instance, in Extract 5 (taken from Kitzinger 2000: 182-183), the speaker, Linda begins a compound TCU at line 2 (‘if you’ve thought of yourself as heterosexual), which is extended after the first component by an and-prefaced component (‘and you suddenly find yourself attracted to a woman) but before producing the final component (‘it’s very disturbing’), she inserts a coming out parenthetically (shown in bold, line 4). This data is taken from a seminar on intersexuality, and Linda is commenting on how it might have an impact on one’s own sexual identity to find oneself attracted to someone who is intersexed.

**Extract Five**


01 Lin: It **does** it **does** have an effect on you. Because
02 (0.2) if you’ve thought of yourself as
03 heterosexual(1.0) and (.) >you suddenly find
04 yourself attracted to a woman °**it happened to me**
(0.2) <a few years ago it’s very (0.8) disturbing,
[in a] way its=
Kit: [Mm ]
Lin: =it’s (0.2) makes you very anxious.
(.)
Lin: Because you then don’t know how you’re supposed
to respond.=
Kit: =Mm [mm
Lin: [And (.). e- if you found out that your
partner was an intersex you would wonder (.). >how
do I respond to this person sexually<
((continues))

Kitzinger’s point about this extract is that by inserting the coming-out
parenthetically, Linda does not set up her sexual identity as news. She is, as
Kitzinger points out in a later article (Kitzinger, 2008b: 192) ‘maximally
assured’ that recipients will not respond to her revelation because at the
time she produces it she is ‘hearably, there and then, in real time, for all
participants, part way through a compound turn constructional unit’ and
that, therefore, turn-transition is not yet relevant.

Although relying on a different set of interactional resources, there are
resonances here between what Linda does in managing a telling without it
being news, and what Mary does in embedding a telling in a request
sequence. That is, Mary reveals that her relationship with John has
progressed to a (potentially) sexual stage, without making this the focal
part of the action in which she is engaged. This ‘news’ is neither presented
nor responded to as such because it is embedded within a sequence that
sets up different contingencies for participants. Yet, the news that Karen
seeks at the start of the call is clearly there.

As observed earlier, in a heterosexist world, we might easily understand
why a speaker might come-out in a way that minimises the interactional
opportunities for recipients to comment on the ‘news’. We might also ask
why Mary opts to delay a telling, only to do it under the auspices of
another action. What are the interactional gains for Mary in doing this?
One line of argument is that Mary is hypothetically testing the waters, trying to gauge her friend’s likely response before giving her a full account. In support of this argument, we can turn to Drew and Walker’s (2009) analysis of the introduction of complaints into conversations. Drew and Walker note that complaints (about third parties) tend only to be ‘put on record’ in interaction after cautious efforts to secure alignment from a recipient. That is, complaints are rarely made in isolation from attempts to elicit some form of tacit agreement from a co-participant. In this sense, Drew and Walker point out that it is an oversimplification to regard a complaint simply as the first part of an adjacency pair. Generally, the ‘first-ness’ of a complaint is the place at which it is explicitly put on record but this tends only to come after implicit attempts to ensure alignment from a recipient. Its ‘first-ness’, then, is an achievement that relies on work taking place earlier in an interaction. The interactional payoff is that the conversationalists negotiate and maintain affiliation.46

Drew and Walker’s analysis relates to the domain of complaints against third parties but it is a small step to see that the same kind of interactional work might be involved in other sorts of delicate social actions. In the focal data for this chapter, in revealing a sexual relationship with her new boyfriend, fifteen-year-old Mary might well have reason to secure alignment before putting her story on record. The social obligation for teenage girls to have an acceptable sexual identity, that is, not to be ‘slutty’, is well documented (Delamont, 1980; Kehily, 2002, 2004; Lamb, 2002; Lees, 1986; Ringrose, 2008, 2010; Wolpe, 1988). This obligation is regulated within friendship groups as well as more broadly. Hence, even when talking to a friend, there are reasonable grounds for Mary to proceed cautiously in matters of reporting sexual conduct. One interactional payoff, then, in embedding the news that her relationship with John is now (potentially) sexual within a request sequence, is that Mary is enabled to judge from Karen’s response, whether or not she is warranted to tell the

46 However, as Drew and Walker (2009) show, the goals of affiliation and alignment are not always achieved.
story more explicitly. As it turns out, Karen simply grants Mary’s request, therefore providing some evidence for Mary that Karen is not demonstrating any resistance or moral judgement about what is happening, and that, therefore, Mary can indeed proceed with her story.

4.4.2 Holding Back: The Beginnings of a Relationship

With Mary’s request granted, the talk goes through several topics, including the reasons for Mary’s mother’s reservations regarding the party, Karen’s new relationship with Davie, and Karen’s forthcoming holiday before returning to Mary’s updating of her relationship with John. In fact, it is Mary whom now makes an offer to tell what was earlier projected in a partial repeat of Karen’s original bid for the story to be told (i.e. ‘Did you want the craic’ (line 109, compare with line 4)). Here is the relevant data, reproduced as Extract Six.

Extract Six

[CTS33]

109 Mar: HHh Did you want the craic
110 Kar: I do. I do.
111 Mar: [Okay ]
112 Kar: [That’s what I–] that’s what I want.
113 (.)
114 Kar: The craic

By this point in the interaction, it is clear to Mary that Karen both wants to hear the story and is likely to receive it well. To this extent, Mary’s offer to tell is a ‘safe’ offer; an offer of what the other ‘wants’.

Insofar as ‘craic’ acts as a story preface, it sets up the telling as (positive) news/gossip. It does not herald a particular sort of punch line. It tells the recipient to listen for the newsworthy item; for the new ‘thing’.
Mary gets into the telling (Extract 7) by reminding Karen of what she already knew before the current phone-call, and this sets up a contrast between what was known-in-common, and what is ‘news’ (for Karen). The use of past (lines 116, 119 and 122) and present (lines 122 and 124) tenses adds to this contrastive structure.

**Extract Seven**

[CTS33]

115  Mar:    You know (   ) hhh h(h)m .hh You know like
116    (0.2) John was texting me. Saying that he liked
117    me and stuff.
118  Kar:    Yeah
119  Mar:    And I didn’t know what I wanted to do.
120  Kar:    .hh Mmhm
121    (.)
122  Mar:    But I [decided   ] that I do like really like=
123    [((sniffs))]
124  Mar:    =him now.
125    (0.2)
126  Kar:    Mmhm:

The beginnings of Mary’s relationship with John is represented through a report of his texting her to let her know that he liked her (lines 115 to 117). Mary formulates John’s texting using the past-progressive tense. That is, she reports that he ‘was texting’ (line 116) as opposed to reporting the fact that he ‘texted’. This is important because it formulates his action as recurrent and persistent. There was not simply one text, but many. Together with Mary’s report that she was unsure about how to respond (line 119), this constructs a scenario in which she was romantically pursued over some (unspecified) period, but without her ‘giving-in’ or being ‘easy’.

Further evidence that Mary is constructing herself as having initially held back from John’s advances is contained within her next turn (lines 122 and 124) in which she describes herself as having ‘decided’ that she does ‘really like him now’.
‘Decided’ is a mental verb, but, following an ethnomethodological approach (e.g. Coulter, 1979), there is no need to consider the underlying cognitive states that this verb invokes to understand its interactional import. More important is to consider the social action that ‘decided’ appears to perform in interaction. Schegloff (2002) notes that ‘decided’ is deployed in environments where something that might be expectable does not happen, where it acts to show that this non-occurrence was motivated rather than a result of mere failure. For example, in an earlier paper Schegloff (1988c) presents a case in which one of the interlocuters remarks to her friend ‘You didn’t get an ice-cream sandwich’. This is what Schegloff calls a negative observation; it points to something that is relevantly not done. Negative observations are regularly forms of complaint, and holds the recipient accountable for their (non)action. In this case, by way of defence, the recipient responds that she ‘decided’ that her body did not need an ice-cream. Schegloff’s analysis is that ‘decided’ acts to show that not getting an ice-cream was a considered, motivated act rather than a failure.47

Following this line of reasoning then, we might argue that in reporting a decision to like John, Mary is acting to construct her response to him as somewhat unexpected, and as having been worked at. That is, her stance towards John is a new one, and the outcome of effortful, considered and rational choice. There are resonances here with Smith’s (1978) account of ‘K’s’ mental illness, in which K’s friend reports an unwilling and progressive realisation of K’s poor psychiatric state. In the same sense, Mary presents herself as having come to a position which she might have been initially unwilling to adopt. She does not say, as K’s friend did not say, ‘I knew right away’.

47 See also Schegloff (1992:331) in which he analyses the ‘overwrought’ sentence from Trip to Syracuse, in which Charlie says to Ilene that ‘it was really bad because she decided of all weekends for this one to go away’. This is later simplified as ‘she decided to go away this weekend’. The repeat of ‘decided’ in this repair is important because Charlie could have said ‘she’s going away this weekend’. The point is that something that was expected to occur is now not occurring, and its non-occurrence was motivated. That is, Charlie is placing the blame on whoever is referred to in the indexical ‘she’.
So, from the beginning of the call, Mary constructs a moral sexual identity: she delays the story, despite having been asked directly for it, and only provides it after she has grounds to suspect that Karen will not judge her negatively; she presents herself as having been pursued and having resisted this pursuit until such time that she had considered her position and adopted a positive stance towards John. The orientation to moral identity continues in the next segment (reproduced here as Extract 8)

Extract Eight

[CTS33]

127  Mar:  And uhm I didn’t know like I don’t know-
128     still don’t know what to do about Katie.
129     Because she said it’s fine.
130     (0.8)
131  Mar:  And like (.) but (0.3) I d- I don’t know.
132  She keeps saying- every time I talk to
133     her about it she keeps saying you know
134     .hh well it’s not like I can do anything
135     about it. Blah blah blah. You know.
136  Kar:  I saw Katie:: yesterday. I thought
137     she seemed like just (. ) really happy about
138     everything s[0
139  Mar:  [Oh that’s all right then.
140     (0.2)
141  Mar:  She’s probably fine
142     (. )
143  Kar:  Yea::h

At the start of this segment, Mary’s talk is ‘and’-prefaced (line 127), marking the story as ongoing. However, what follows is not more about her decision but instead, what appears to be a contingency to it – her concern about John’s ex-girlfriend, Katie’s, response (lines 128 to 135). It is worth noting that Katie is not explicitly described as John’s former girlfriend. The use of the recognitional person reference indicates that Mary expects Karen to know who Katie is, and the terms on which she features relevantly in the talk. As analysts, we can also see that Katie
features relevantly, as posing a problem for Mary and her new stance towards John. It seems that Katie has some prior claim on John that Mary reportedly feels has to take into account. Drawing on the principles of Membership Category Analysis (Sacks, 1972) and the concept of standard relational pairs, it seems likely that Katie is in the category of former girlfriend. Clearly, she is also a friend of Mary’s (and possibly Karen’s), and so there is some delicacy here; something to be negotiated.

The set of repairs beginning at lines 127/128 mark this delicate matter as ongoing and unresolved. First, Mary repairs the past tense (I didn’t know) to present tense (I don’t know) and then she inserts ‘still’, as in ‘still don’t know’. This is despite the apparent fact that Mary and Katie have discussed the matter and Katie has declared it ‘fine’. As a reported assessment ‘fine’ appears lukewarm and suggests a resigned acceptance of a situation as opposed to a happy acceptance (See Jefferson, 1980). In this sense, Mary’s dilemma is ongoing because ‘fine’ is not treated as the green-light she apparently seeks from Katie as consent for this new relationship.

Another noteworthy repair appears on lines 132 and 133: the insertion of ‘every time I talk to her about it’ before ‘she keeps saying’ makes this Mary’s concern, not Katie’s. That is, Katie does not talk about the matter unprompted, but only when it comes up relevantly between them. Katie’s reportedly repeated reply is that she is not able to do anything to stop John and Mary dating; note the ‘well-prefacing (line 134), denoting a non-straightforward response - Schegloff and Lerner (2009). This reported reply has a resigned air that fits with ‘fine’ above. That is, Katie is presented as being unable rather than unwilling to do something about it.

Normatively, inability accounts are preferred to unwillingness accounts (Schegloff, 2007). For example, the preferred format for turning down an invitation is to decline it using some formulation of ‘I cannot attend’ (inability) rather than ‘I do not wish to attend’ (unwillingness). However, in the context of commenting on a past-partner moving on to a
new partner, it would seem preferable for the past-partner to show themselves as unwilling rather than unable to revive the relationship.

Mary completes her reporting of Katie’s stance with a three-part list (line 135) – ‘blah, blah, blah’. In Jefferson’s (1991) analysis of three-part lists, she shows that repetitious lists (e.g. ‘rang and rang and rang’, ‘on and on and on’) are used to indicate ‘muchness’ (ibid: 64). In the current context, Mary appears to be using ‘blah, blah, blah’ to signify there is a great deal more that could be said about her conversations with Katie, but it also conveys a sense in which the content of these interactions might be guessed at (as pretty much repeating the reported sequence contained in the prior turns), and is not, therefore, worth explicating in full. Perhaps the list also captures the irresolvable nature of the problem; there is much talk but without satisfactory conclusion.

Once again, across this spate of interaction, we see Mary presenting herself as a measured and considerate person. She has not entered this relationship lightly and has even considered the impact of her recent choices on John’s ex-girlfriend, Katie. So, the beginnings of this new relationship are highly respectable and Mary constructs an identity that is line with ‘proper’ conduct for young women. That is, she initially holds back from John’s attentions and only enters into the relationship after a period of reflection about her own feelings towards him and the consequences for others. It appears that only after this initial phase of ‘chase’ and, perhaps respectable ‘playing hard to get’ that Mary and John share their first kiss.

4.4.3 Fireworks: The First Kiss

Mary next describes the circumstances of her first kiss with John (Extract 9). Initially, she uses the topic of Katie to bridge into the news that something more substantial has happened, and is introduced, almost as an aside, as something that Katie probably does not know (lines 144-146).
Extract Nine

[CTS33]

144  Mar:  (Because the) ( ) (said) nothing’s actually
145      happened except that it has happened.<But
146      she probably didn’t know. Huh
147  Kar:  Ooh::: ††Tell me,
148      (.)
149  Mar:  Well er:m (0.7) I was at his house
150      the day before I went to Wales
151      ’and we kissed’
152      (1.0)
153  Kar:  Aw was it good.
154      (.)
155  Mar:  <Yea::h. It was lov:ley:>
156      (.)
157  Kar:  Ah:::::[:::::::: ]
158  Mar:  [It was all] like (0.8) Oh it
159      was all the kind of fireworks
160      tingly feeling one
161      (0.7)
162  Kar:  ††Aw mpt That’s so cute.
163  Mar:  Oh: I was so happy.
164      (0.3)

The way that the topic of the kiss is launched is akin to instances of what
Jefferson (1984) calls stepwise transition. Inspired by Sacks, Jefferson was
analysing ways in which speakers manage to exit from troubles-talk into a
new topic. She identifies various ways of doing this, but one of relevance
here, is to use a current topic as a bridge into something new. Quoting
Sacks, Jefferson writes:

A general feature for topical organisation is movement from
topic to topic, not by a topic close followed by a topic
beginning, but by a stepwise move, which involves linking up
whatever is being produced to what has just been talked
about, such that, as far as anybody knows, a new topic has not
been started though, we’re far from wherever we began.

In our case, Mary manages to exit from her troubles-talk about Katie (which was hearably coming to a close- see Extract 8, lines 139-143) and into the (good) news that she and John have kissed by speculating that Katie is probably unaware of the true state of affairs between the new couple (lines 144-146). That is, Katie is reportedly under the impression that nothing has actually happened between Mary and John. The key news, however, is that, in contrast to whatever Katie understands, something actually has happened (line 145). There is a sense in which this ‘news’ is, as it were, cautiously dangled for Karen to take up or not (though it seems very unlikely at this point that Karen would pass up the opportunity to find out more). However, again, the news is not delivered as news. But, as it happens, this time, Karen does notice the newsworthiness of Mary’s turn.

That is, Karen does not respond to the immediately prior talk about Katie. Instead, she treats the embedded information (i.e. that something has

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48 Unfortunately, inaudible data at this point makes it difficult to hear whether Katie’s understanding about the status of John and Mary’s relationship results from deception or withholding information.

49 Compare with this example from Hyla and Nancy in which the recipient is invited to ‘guess’ at the news, but where the newsworthiness of the thing is made clear on the surface of the interaction:

01 Hyla: Y’know w’t I did las’night?
02 Nancy: oWha’t=,= 
03 Hyla: =Did a terriible thi…éng, 
04 Nancy: =You called Si:mn, 
05 (0.4) 
06 Hyla: No, 
07 Nancy: What, 
08 () 
09 Hyla: =h’hhhh =Well I hed- 
10 Nancy: =You called Richard,= 
11 () =hh-hhh= 
12 Hyla: =-h(h)(h)=W(a)(h) en I h(h)ung w(h)un ’e a(h)nséwer 
13 Nancy: =Oh: 
14 Hyla= why::

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happened between Mary and John) as newsworthy and invites Mary to tell more (line 147).

Mary then sets the scene for what turns out to be the story of a first kiss. Mary was at John’s house the day before she went on a family holiday (lines 149-150) and we might speculate that the forthcoming enforced separation provides the perfect platform to launch a kiss.

There is a notable dropping of volume at the point Mary tells of the kiss (line 151) and so it is treated as a matter of some delicacy. We might also note that it is reported as a joint activity; not something that he did to her, or that she did to him. They were both active in this kiss. Somewhat delayed (perhaps indicating an expectation of more to come), Karen produces a response token (line 153) that might be best characterised as denoting ‘cuteness’ and follows this with an interrogative – ‘was it good’ - which is built to prefer, and gets a yes (see Heritage and Robinson, 2006; Raymond, 2003). In fact, it gets ‘yea::h’ (line 155), delivered somewhat dreamily (slow and stretched), and is culturally fitted to a romantic context. Indeed a short ‘yes’ would be wrong here because it could indicate a pithiness by aligning with the position implied in the question but also possibly denoting an epistemic lack of rights to ask.

Mary’s ‘dreamy’ yeah is followed by an upgraded assessment (Pomerantz, 1984); it was not just ‘good’ but ‘lovely’. Karen produces another aligning response token (line 157) that not only acknowledges the event but also almost assesses it – again as something positive and cute.

Mary then categorises the kiss as a ‘fireworks tingly feeling one’ (line 160) thereby producing herself as a woman of the world, someone who has experienced enough kisses to be able to categorise them. There is an interesting paradox here, in that Mary has been so far apparently bashful and cautious about telling her story, but, yet, here is presenting herself as having knowledge about romantic kisses. It is notable, however, that she
draws heavily on cultural images of what perfect (romantic) kisses should feel like. The repeated use of ‘all’ – ‘it was all like’ (line 158), and ‘it was all the kind...’ (line 159) convey a sense of being consumed by this kiss – the total experience was lovely. In response, Karen produces an even more emphatic display of delightfulfulness with a high-pitched ‘aw’ and a verbal assessment ‘so cute’ (line 162).

Kisses are treated here as an appropriate activity. That is, although there is some marked delicacy in the sotto voce delivery of the news that Mary and John kissed, there is no disapproval in the sequence. Indeed, Karen’s responses are repeatedly positive and strongly aligning. Nor is there any resistance on Mary’s part to Karen’s repetitive ‘cute’ responses/assessments.

This sequence ends with Mary’s assessment of her internal feelings towards the kiss (line 163) – ‘oh I was so happy’, which is a report of an emotional state that fits with popular romantic notions of how one ought to feel after a first kiss.

So, Mary reports the first kiss as occurring after an appropriate period of conscious reflection and initial resistance (to the relationship itself) on her part, and at an opportune moment before a brief period of separation. The moral stage for this first kiss forms the backdrop of Mary’s discussion. The kiss itself is described in highly romantic terms. Clearly, there is a physicality to her description – that it was tingly and like fireworks – but the potential sexual nature of the kiss is somewhat submerged under romantic imagery. It is notable that the kiss reportedly makes Mary ‘happy’ as opposed to ‘turned-on’ or aroused. As a recipient, Karen displays nothing but positive assessments of this turn of events. Certainly, it seems that the kiss was an appropriate activity.

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50 Fireworks are a common Hollywood movie representation of the excitement and high emotion of a first kiss between lovers. For example, in the 1998 film Meet Joe Black, the scene in which actors Brad Pitt and Claire Forlani first kiss, the sky is filled with a spectacular firework display, or in the 1955 film To Catch a Thief, in which a similar fireworks scene accompanies the kisses of Cary Grant and Grace Kelly.
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The ‘appropriateness’ of the kiss, as revealed in its tell-ability and comment-ability, contrasts with the next stage of the story, which is a description of progression of the relationship to some form of sexual contact.

4.4.4 ‘Did Stuff to Him’: First Sexual Contact

The story resumes (Extract 10) with a report of ongoing and extensive communication from Mary to John during her holiday (lines 165-166). This is appropriate grounds for a relationship; not just a kiss, but keeping in touch and suggests a certain commitment between them for future activities.

What follows (lines 166-168) notably does much work for showing Mary (and John) to have talked things through before developing the relationship further. This is not a cursory thing for them, and this safeguards against possible understandings of behaving casually, which is important for what comes next: Mary alludes to sexual activity having taken place between her and John.

Extract Ten

[CTS33]

165 Mar: And then (1.0) And then I went away and
166 I was texting him loads. And then I
167 came back. .hhh And we’d sort of
168 talked about it.
169 (0.5)
170 Kar: Yeah::
171 Mar: (( ) like. And then (0.9) I was
172 a little naughty hhhhhhhh
173 Kar: Wh(h)at d(h)id you do:::
174 (.)
175 Mar: Erm well I tol- I don’t know why
176 but I told him I was on my period.
177 (0.5)
Mary’s possible allusion to sexual activity is achieved through an assessment of her own conduct; ‘I was a little naughty’ (line 171-172). This (non-serious) negative self-assessment is in keeping with both Sacks’ (1975) and Pomerantz’s (1978) observation that epistemically speaking, the rights to assess oneself negatively appears to take precedence over the rights to assess oneself positively (see also Speer, 2011). That is, as speakers on our own behalf, we tend to minimise self-praise but are freer to self-criticise.

The non-serious nature of the negative self-assessment is achieved in two ways: first, through the selection of the modifier ‘a little’, which downplays the significance of the act; second, through use of ‘naughty’ as a description. Naughty has childish connotations and might suggest mischief or minor transgression rather than serious wrongdoing. Of course, in this environment, ‘naughty’ might also have sexual connotations because of its common use in sexual contexts (e.g. Aral and Manhart, 2009). In this
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sense, ‘I was a little naughty’ nicely alludes to sexual activity without bragging about it. Use of ‘little’ also suggests limited sexual activity.

I have used the phrase ‘possible’ allusion to sexual conduct because what happens next is the report of a lie that Mary told John. It is, therefore, possible that ‘a little naughty’ could refer to her having been deceitful. If Mary is referring to her lying here, then the analysis of its ‘non-serious’ status applies. That is, it seems that the ‘lie’ was, for Mary, understandable and/or justifiable.

If, as analysts, we find it difficult to distinguish the action that Mary is engaged in with ‘a little naughty’ it might well be that her recipient is in the same predicament. What we do know (from the design of the next turn) is that Karen treats ‘little naughty’ as something that Mary did rather than something she said. Karen’s laughter also nicely aligns with the non-serious nature of whatever it is that Mary is heading for. We also know that, by now, the understanding that Mary and John have progressed to a sexual stage in their relationship is hanging in the air. Indeed, it has been there since (near) the start of the call.

If ‘little naughty’ is a mild sexual reference, we should note that the report of sexual activity is alluded to rather than done directly. We can compare this with the more direct report of the kiss, where the activity is named (though remember the dropping of volume). The turn at lines 171-172 has a long pause in it, again, conveying a sense of delicacy. Note that, again, in contrast to the kiss (where ‘we’ is used), the reference to self - ‘I’ - makes of this activity something that Mary did to John; it is not ‘we were a little naughty’. This continues the sense of limited sexual contact – they did not have full sexual-intercourse.

We should also note the different sequential positions in which reports of the kiss and the possible allusion to sex occur. The report of the kiss is a (possible) upshot of a telling, whereas ‘I was a little naughty’ is hearable as
a story-preface, making Karen’s ‘what did you do’ the go-ahead to do the telling.

Mary begins her story (line 175) by starting to report something she had told John but she halts this to insert ‘I don’t know why’ before restarting the turn. Potter (2004) and Widdicombe and Wooffitt (2006) argue that ‘I don’t know’ is used as a resource to manage positive face-wants (Goffman, 1955). That is to pre-empt any possible unfavourable attributions being made of whatever comes next; a disclaimer. Similarly, Schegloff (1996c) suggests that ‘I don’t know’ can initiate a turn but at the same time hedge its content. In our focal turn, there is also the sense that ‘I don’t know (why)’ constructs whatever Mary told John as spontaneous, in the moment and not planned. What John was told turns out to be an inability account (line 183); Mary was on her period.

Menstruation is a culturally acceptable way to turn down unwanted sexual penetration/intercourse (see Kitzinger and Frith, 1999). It appears then that the insertion of ‘I don’t know why’ additionally heralds the ‘period story’ as untruthful. That is, Mary knows why she told John she was on a period (indeed, she explicates her reasons more fully in the turns that follow). Instead, the claim not to know is an indirect method of conveying (to Karen) that whatever she said was non-truthful. Importantly, the apparent spontaneity of this inability account makes Mary’s ‘lie’ a contingency rather than a premeditated strategy, and therefore wards off possible accusations of having deliberately planned to deceive John.

The reasons for saying she was on her period are more fully explicated in Mary’s next turn (note the inter-turn gap at 177, at which Karen passes the opportunity for a turn – suggesting that the relevance of being on a period is lost on her at this point). The period acts like a chastity belt – a physical barrier to intercourse. Mary’s turn at 178 is epistemically downgraded in two ways: first by ‘I think’ and, second, by the tag-question ‘wasn’t it’. ‘I think’ mitigates the epistemic authority with which Mary speaks, invoking a
sense of spontaneity at the time and applying post-hoc reasoning. The tag question recruits Karen as someone in-the-know (Heritage and Raymond, 2005) about recruiting a menstruating body to turn down intercourse. That is, the lie about the period is not to be treated as arising from Mary’s character or as representing her psychological attitudes. Instead, Mary treats the presence of menstruation as a known-in-common way to avoid (hetero)sexual intercourse. Karen next displays her (new) understanding and acceptance of this position through her oh-prefaced receipt – ‘Oh right’ (line 94, which, as a change-of-state token, supports the suggestion that Karen’s absence at line 177 was indeed due to lack of understanding) followed by agreement - ‘yeah’.

So the (fabricated) period acts as a barrier to intercourse and next Mary deals with why she needed a barrier – because she didn’t want to rush into anything (line 181/182). However, this is not done as something personal to Mary but rather as a generic norm – the ‘you’ in this turn is a generic you, perhaps referring to all teenage girls, or all respectable teenage girls? The reference to ‘anything’ – as in ‘don’t want to rush into ‘anything’ is presumably another allusion to sex – this time, full sexual intercourse because it is this that is being prevented by the period. Not wanting to rush, might be fitted for either stage of relationship or for stage of life. That is, either not wanting to pursue a sexual connection too early in a particular relationship or too early in life (remember that Mary is fifteen). Either way, the wanting to wait is consistent with the rational, moral persona Mary constructs for herself over this call.

So, using her menstruating body as an excuse, Mary draws on a culturally available reasoning for preventing unwanted intercourse. However, this does not stop her in engaging in any sexual activity because, as she puts it, she ‘sort of did stuff’ to John (line 184). Here, then is another allusion to sexual activity. The verb ‘stuff’ could refer to almost any activity, but is hearable, from the topical context, as performance of some form of act on his genitals. The news that Mary ‘did stuff’ is delivered with a notable drop
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in volume, which conveys a sense of the telling being delicate, and is mitigated with ‘sort of’.

So, here is the punch line to the story that Karen elicited from Mary at the start of the call. The ‘craic’ is that Mary’s relationship has progressed from an initial expression of interest through to a romantic first kiss to a stage where she is willing to engage in some form of sexual conduct for his pleasure but is (or, at least, was) not yet ready to have full intercourse with him.

As the recipient of this story, a response is now due from Karen. What follows, however, is a relatively long gap (line 186. See Jefferson, 1988), signalling some trouble ahead (see also, Scheglof, 2007 on dispreference). It might be that this silence helps to construct a sense of (fau) disapproval, which Karen produces next (line 187) in the form of a repeated non-lexical sound – recognisable as ‘tuts’ - and the use of the address term ‘Mary’. The second of these things (i.e. the address term) is straightforwardly analysable: A post-positioned address term in a two-party interaction (i.e. where speaker selection is not an issue – See Lerner, 2003) tends, amongst other things (e.g. Clayman, 2010), to strengthen the stance implied in whatever comes before it (e.g. compare the hypothetical ‘I love you’ with ‘I love you X’ – See also Jefferson, 1973; Rendle-Short, 2007). In the present case, Karen’s display of (fau) disapproval is underlined by her use of Mary’s name at the end of the turn.

The repeated tongue-clicks – in effect; tut, tut, tut - are less straightforward. As far as I know, there has not been a systematic conversation analytic study of the use of tongue-clicks in English. Indeed, in comparison to many Southern and Eastern African languages, English is not generally regarded as having a linguistic ‘click’ component (Wright, 2011). However, it is not difficult to find examples of clicks in English
interaction – particularly the ‘tch’ (more commonly denoted as ‘tut’).\textsuperscript{51} More work has been conducted on these clicks outside of CA, specifically in phonetics (e.g. Clarke and Yallop, 1990; Gimson, 1970; Ladefoged, 1982; Laver, 1994), where their function has been analysed as conveying disapproval or dissatisfaction of some kind (see also, Fraser, 1990; Ward, 2006).\textsuperscript{52} This has intuitive appeal, but without systematic analysis, we should be hesitant about linking a non-lexical sound with expression of a particular stance.\textsuperscript{53} In this extract, we can note that the repeated tongue-clicks occur in a place where a response to a story is due from a recipient, and certainly seems to function as an assessment of sorts. If we remember that the story-preface in this case was ‘I was a little naughty’ the disapproving stance possibly implied with the tuts appear fitted to ‘naughtiness’. There is evidence that the possible disapproval is good-humoured rather than serious. My sense of this arises from the three-part repetition. We might speculate that whereas one tut appears to convey a negative stance, three tuts is more gentle or playful by virtue of its staged and crafted nature.\textsuperscript{54} This is speculative and a more thorough analysis of the possible systematic uses of tongue-clicks in English is called for.

\textsuperscript{51} There are other tongue clicks in English. For example, the sound that English speakers would recognise as accompanying a wink, or encouraging a horse to move forwards.

\textsuperscript{52} Here is a possible example (though not formally analysed as such in any publications) of a tongue click used to express dissatisfaction with a speaker’s own talk:

\begin{verbatim}[TG]
O1: I^ ^ ^Yeaaah, *hh This feller I have- (nn)
O2:  ‘fflubb’; this man n [O.2] t-hhh He ha:(s)- uff- eh- who- who I
O3: have fer Linguistics fl is really too much.
\end{verbatim}

The tongue click, transcribed as ‘t’ on line 2 comes after a self-repair, in which the speaker reformulates ‘feller’ as ‘man’. There is already some indication that the speaker is dissatisfied with the original formulation because she repeats it, almost as self-commentary.

\textsuperscript{53} See Wright (2007) for an early analysis of the uses of tongue clicks in closing sequences.

\textsuperscript{54} I am reminded of the following fictitious exchange in P.G. Wodehouse’s (1934: Chap 9) Right Ho, Jeeves:

"Tut!" I said.

"What did you say?"

"I said "Tut!"

"Say it once again, and I’ll biff you where you stand. I’ve enough to endure without being tutted at."

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To return to the narrative of the phone-call, the repeated tuts generate noncommittal laughter from Mary (line 188), and is followed by a self-assessment of her conduct.

Mary’s self-assessment is that ‘it didn’t feel wrong’ (lines 190/191). 55 Again, the orientation to sexual activity is not achieved directly (e.g. through naming), but is instead referred to using the indexical ‘it’. In this way, the details of whatever activity Mary engaged in are glossed in a generic situational reference. We should also note the epistemic orientation of Mary’s assessment. She refers to an internal state – that it didn’t feel wrong. This makes it difficult for others to judge, because persons do not normatively have access to or rights to assess the internal states of others (Pomerantz, 1980). Mary does not say that ‘it wasn’t wrong’, which would have been an external evaluation of her conduct and consequently potentially vulnerable to challenge by her recipient.

Given that Mary is assessing a state over which she has personal epistemic authority, we might expect an unmitigated assessment. However, Mary in fact does mitigate her assessment using ‘I don’t know’ (line 190). This seems oddly formulated. Again, adopting a speculative focus, we might enquire about the extent to which Mary is orienting to a possibility that it ought to have felt wrong. Weight is added to this claim if we note the but-prefacing of the whole turn. The ‘but’ also seems misplaced because there is no directly articulated contrastive component in the talk. Rather, the ‘but’ seems to contrast with some unarticulated possibility that Mary should not feel like she did.

As the recipient of the assessment, Karen is in a tricky interactional environment. The assessment sets up a conditional relevance for the production of an agreeing (upgraded) second assessment (Pomerantz, 1984). However, as an assessment of Mary’s internal state, Karen is hardly

55 This appears somewhat reminiscent of the Clinton/Lewinsky affair in which the President claimed not to have sex with his intern Monica Lewinsky, on the grounds that they did not have vaginal intercourse. In this sense, then, he did not feel himself to have done anything wrong.
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warranted to evaluate it. This interactional dilemma might account for Karen passing up the opportunity to talk at the projectable end of Mary’s prior talk (note the relatively long silence at line 106). When Karen does speak (line 193), it is with a somewhat non-specific assessment – ‘it’s good I think’. The vagueness of the turn comes from the ambiguity of the ‘it’ as an indexical. The last ‘it’, used by Mary appeared to index whatever sexual activity took place between her and John. It seems unlikely that Karen’s ‘it’ would also be referring to sexual conduct. One line of evidence for this contrast is the tenses used in the turns. Whereas Mary’s ‘it’ refers to something in the past (it didn’t ...), Karen’s refers to something in the present (it is ...). A second line of evidence comes from the way that Karen extends her assessment by reformulating it as ‘I think you make a good couple’ (line 193). This reformulation appears to retrospectively cast the prior ‘it’ as indexing the general status of Mary and John as a couple rather than the sexual activity that took place between them.

Karen’s second position assessment heralds a change in topic from talk about sex to talk about John and Mary as a couple. Mary immediately produces independent evidence that other people share Karen’s stance, first through a generic statement of what ‘everyone says’ (line 195) and then a specific example of someone saying to them whilst out together on a ‘really nice’ walk (line 196). The conversation continues along these celebratory lines.

In previous sections, using the systematic practices of CA, I have analysed the reported progression of a new relationship from its beginnings to the first sexual contact. Remembering the limitations of a single-case study, next, I select and comment in more depth on three themes that have particular significance for the literature on gender and sexuality: talk about sex without naming it (section 4.5), the menstruating body (section 4.6), and paradox of respectability of teenage sex (section 4.7).
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4.5 Talking Without Naming

Our social world partitions topics into ones that are ‘safe’ and ones that are ‘unspeakable’. For example, it is generally ‘safe’ to enquire about a person’s state as part of a greetings sequence (‘How are you’), but less so to enquire about a specific illness. In British culture, the list of ‘unspeakables’ might include cancer, reproductive body parts, death, and details of sexual conduct. Yet, ‘unspeakable’ is too strong, because these things do get spoken about, but a range of resources are used to display their special, taboo status.

One of the ways in which we can produce a thing as unspeakable, whilst actually speaking about it, is to refuse to name it overtly. For instance, it is not uncommon to hear cancer referred to euphemistically as ‘the big C’ or dying as ‘passing-over’. There are also a range of (variously polite) euphemisms for referring to bodily sexual organs (e.g. ‘willy’, ‘lady parts’. See also Benneworth, 2006; Hysi, 2011). Indeed, in the extract we have been examining, Mary refers merely implicitly to her own genitals when she talks of her period being a barrier; a barrier to what is not overtly expressed. In addition, Sacks (1995: Winter, 1967) notes the ways in which a potentially sensitive setting, such as group therapy, can be invoked without explicitly formulating its activities through context-specific references such as ‘here’ or ‘this place’.

Euphemisms belong to a class of terms for referring to or indexing subjects, objects or events. As with all referring terms, there are always alternative ways of indexing the same thing (Schegloff, 1972; 1988; 1996a; Stivers, 2007) so that the term that is actually selected is designed for a particular interactional purpose.

In this sense, the special status or ‘unmentionableness’ of a topic does not necessarily precede the interactional environment in which it comes up. It

56 Of course, these things are locally occasioned and context dependent.
is more that the topic is *locally* constructed as ‘taboo’ in the progressive
moment-by-moment unfolding of interaction between participants; it is not
that something *is* unspeakable, but rather that it is *produced as*
unspeakable. Ironically, then, the unmentionable is achieved in how it is
(not) spoken of.57

In the call between Karen and Mary, we can notice that, although sexual
activity is the main topic of Mary’s story, it is never overtly named. Rather,
the sexual activity is alluded to through phrases such as ‘I was a little
naughty’ and ‘I did stuff to him’. Whilst, arguably, there is a hint of
sexuality in the selection of ‘naughty’ and the description of doing stuff to a
hearably male partner, out of context, these phrases might refer to almost
any activity. This allusive treatment of sexual conduct contrasts with the
description of John and Mary’s first kiss. The kiss is referred to overtly,
albeit in slightly hushed tones. It appears that, between these speakers,
the act of kissing is at least mentionable, if not entirely without delicacy.
Once mentioned, there is a fairly full and unabashed description of how the
kiss felt for Mary.

The recipient’s responses to news about the kiss and sexual activity are also
contrastive. Karen treats the kiss as something to be celebrated,
interrogated and assessed. We can see this in the high-pitched ‘aw’s, the
direct question of whether it was good, and the orally positive assessment
of the whole thing as ‘cute’. In contrast, in response to news that Mary had
sexual contact with John, Karen merely produces the repeated tongue-
clicks (plus address term). There is no sense of celebration, and no
questioning of how it had felt. If we can treat the tongue-clicks as an
assessment of some kind, then, although (arguably) playful, it lacks the
positivity of ‘cute’. Notably, despite the vagueness of ‘did stuff’, there is no
interrogation for the precise details. We might also notice that the tongue-

57 A similar argument is developed by Billig (2006), in which he argues that talk is repressive as well as expressive, and urges analysts to
examine what is not said as well as what is said. Billig develops his argument as a method for exploring the interactional realisation of
the psychoanalytic concept of regression. Whilst accepting the premise that some topics appear to be ‘unmentionable’, the link with
psychoanalysis is not something that I intend to make here.
clicks are apparently sufficient for Mary to accept that Karen understood what was indexed by ‘stuff’. That is, Mary does not either attempt to repair her original formulation or question Karen’s response to it.

So, kissing and sex are co-constructed in this extract in different ways. For these speakers, kissing is a mentionable, pursuable topic, but sex is not. This places the two activities in different categories: the former is ‘ordinary’ (though celebratory), the latter is ‘taboo’ (and occasions playful disapproval, fitted with a sense of naughtiness in the story-preface).

These contrastive constructions might well arise from matters such as the stage of life of these speakers the stage of John and Mary’s relationship (as well as the different sequential environments in which talk about them occurs). As two-fifteen year old girls, it is likely (though admittedly presumptuous) that their respective sexual lives (at least with partners) are only just beginning. Perhaps they have not yet learned a vocabulary for articulating sexual acts. Indeed, even the description of the more overtly discussed kiss seems to rely less on ‘personal’ expression and more on cultural romantic notions of what a good kiss involves. Nonetheless, there is something very familiar about the less-direct, less-detailed, references to sexual activity. The production of sex as extraordinary in this conversation does not itself appear to be extraordinary.

We might also speculate that the allusive description of sexual conduct was performed for the overhearing analyst. That is, although the data is not researcher-generated in the traditional sense, these speakers had agreed to be recorded and were in full knowledge that this conversation was being taped. However, this fact does not detract from the strength of the argument; kissing and sexual conduct are still treated differently. The former as ‘acceptable’ for an audience and the latter as ‘unacceptable’, at least in its glossing.
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These speakers seem to align, through their practices, with feminist claims that sexual behaviour, though common, is treated as something exotic, something special (e.g. Jackson and Scott, 2004). Whilst these claims are almost certainly targeted at social scientists, it seems that ordinary people themselves construct sex as something delicate and private; not to be discussed in any detail.

4.6 Menstruating Bodies

A conversation analytic mentality obliges us to examine the action of turns in terms of the orientations of participants. When Mary reports having told John that she was on her period, it occurs as part of a story-telling sequence, in which the ‘punch line’ is that she performed some kind of sexual act on her new boyfriend. The period provides an account for why she did not herself receive genital stimulation/intercourse. Mary uses her (reportedly) menstruating body as a resource to display to Karen (and, previously, John) that she did not want to rush into anything. Undoubtedly there is some form of morality work going on here too (see section 4.7), but what I want to focus on here is why periods are apparently an acceptable barrier to sexual activity.

In a focus group study, Kitzinger and Frith (1999), asked young women how they turned down unwanted sexual advances. One of the major findings was that young women rarely ‘just said no’ but instead fabricated reasons for being unable (as opposed to unwilling) to have sex. This finding was in line with others (e.g. Mernon, Perot and Byrne, 1989) where it had been used to underpin campaigns to make women more assertive; to be able to say no more clearly (see Crawford, 1995). These assertiveness campaigns tended to be either implicitly or explicitly influenced by Tannen’s (1990) miscommunication model of inter-sex communication (O’Byrne, Rapley and Hansen, 2006). This is a much evaluated model of gender differences in language use (Cameron, 1992; Crawford, 1995), which places the responsibility of managing sexual risk on women’s (in)ability to say no clearly and concisely. Kitzinger and Frith (1992) argue that the theoretical
underpinnings of assertiveness campaigns are fundamentally misguided. Drawing on conversation analytic studies, they demonstrated that there is a systematic apparatus for ‘saying no’ that involves, amongst other things, hesitations, acknowledgment of the desirability of the proposed course of action and inability accounts. It is rare to find an interlocuter simply rejecting an offer/invitation using a flat ‘no’. Indeed, where ‘no’ is used, recipients tend to treat it as inadequate, accountable, problematic. Kitzinger and Frith’s point was that, as cultural members, the young women in their study were perfectly able to produce meaningful, understandable ways of rejecting sex, and did not need training to articulate it more unmistakably. More to the point, and also as cultural members, men are able to recognise a rejection when they hear it (see also, O’Byrne, Rapley and Hansen, 2006).

In Kitzinger and Frith’s study, one of the ‘inability’ accounts that young women often gave to reject sexual advances was that they were menstruating. In the current data, Mary does not (reportedly) use menstruation as an excuse to turn down sex so much as to control the limits of her sexual engagement. It seems that menstruation is an acceptable inability account.

We should also note that a heterosexual norm is being reproduced here, that men are always ready for sex and women have to, in a sense, control male sexual desire by assenting or not to sexual requests (Hollway, 1984; Weeks, 1986). That is, John is never presented as uncertain or hesitant about his relationship to Mary. His sexual desire is not questioned, and nor really, is her untruthful solution to managing that desire and her own role in it. The use of menstruation as an account for limiting sexual conduct appears acceptable and understandable.

As sociologists and feminists we might want to subject this ‘acceptability’ to critique. What is it about menstruating bodies that makes them unavailable to heterosexual genital contact?
Menstruation has a long cultural history as taboo (Bobel, 2010; Delaney, Lupton and Toth, 1988; Delora and Warren, 1977; Fahs, 2011; Guterman, Mehta and Gibbs, 2008). This is despite the fact that menstruation is a normal biological process for women. Yet, it has often been labelled a curse, disgusting, harmful (to both men and women), and dirty. Indeed, Dworkin (1987: 215) cites Freud as declaring in a letter to Jung that ‘menstrual blood must be counted as excrement’. With the appearance of medical conditions such as Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder (PMDD – See American Psychiatric Association, 2000: DSM IV-TR), menstruating bodies have been pathologised (Ussher, 2003; Offman and Kleinplatz, 2004). In this context, it is hardly surprising that women often report feeling shameful about their bleeding bodies (Kleinplatz, 2001).

There has, however, been relatively little research about how this disgust and shame transacts with sexual conduct (Fahs, 2011). We know there are some religious taboos that forbid heterosexual relations during a woman’s period. For example, Guterman et al. (2008) cite the Jewish code of law that governs the everyday conduct of people of Orthodox Jewish faith – Halakha- expressly forbids physical contact between men and women during and for a week after menstruation. The reason given is that menstrual blood is ritually unclean (ibid. See also Delaney et al: 19). Such reasoning also underpins a similar caution against sex with a menstruating woman in Islamic law (Guterman et al. 2008). There has also been what Delaney et al. (1988: 21) call pseudoscientific advice against menstrual sex for both men and women. For example, last Century men were thought to contract urethritis from menstrual sex, whilst women were thought to be at

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58 Robert Graves’ (1942) novel ‘Wife to Mr Milton’ is a semi-fictional portrayal of the poet John Milton’s (1608 to 1674) marriage to Marie Powell. In the novel, Milton is characterised by his wife as a bigoted and hypocritical man. By way of illustration, Marie (or Graves) writes about the failure to consummate the marriage because of his (mistaken) belief that she is menstruating and his desire to avoid being contaminated by her.

59 In fact in two comprehensive texts on sex and sexual conduct (Hawkes, 2004 and Person, 1999) I could find no references to sex and menstruation.
increased risk of infection (including AIDS) and haemorrhage. However, in more recent times, the most common (secular) reason for avoiding menstrual sex appears to be related to the ‘un aesthetic’ nature of blood (Delaney et al. 1988). In a recent study, Fahs (2011) noted that women tended, with great frequency, to report their male partners are ‘grossed out’ by the blood. As Delaney et al. (1988: 18) observe menstrual blood ‘...is not something [a man] wants to get on his penis’.

If, generally speaking, both men and women avoid menstrual sex, then ‘that’ time of the month becomes a legitimate reason to turn down unwanted sexual advances, or, as Mary does in our extract, to limit the range of sexual activity. Given the secrecy and privacy of menstruation, this is the case whether or not the period is actually present.

Women do report feigning menstruation in order to avoid unwanted sex (Delaney et al. 1988). It appears that men often suspect that they are being deceived (see Thornton, 2011). However, adopting a conversation analytic mentality, the action of the report of a period in response to a sexual invitation, is to reject the invitation in a culturally acceptable way. As Kitzinger and Frith (1999) note, it is not normative to simply say no to any offer/invitation. To do so is to risk being perceived as arrogant, or rude. Excuses or accounts that ‘acceptably’ explain a refusal are expected. There is also a strong preference for excuses/accounts that emphasise inability as opposed to unwillingness to accept an offer. For the reasons discussed the period provides an almost prototypical account for refusing (or limiting) sexual conduct. In drawing on this, Mary shows herself to be a competent social member who is sensitive to her own boundaries as well as those of

60 Urethritis is an inflammation of the urethra, the tube that carries both urine and semen.

61 It should be noted that in Fahs (2011) study, the avoidance of menstrual sex was not reported across all cases. Around a third of participants expressed positive attitudes on this matter. There were notable sexual identification differences, with lesbian and, significantly, bi-sexual women reporting more positive attitudes than heterosexual women. It might be that (perceived or spoken) male disgust is an important factor in the menstrual taboo, primarily in heterosexual-identified relationships. See also Bobel (2010) for an account of women reclaiming their menstrual bodies and challenging negative cultural discourses.

62 Particularly in new or short-term heterosexual relationships, where a woman’s cycle is not yet known to a male partner.
the (reported) recipient. That is, she manages to stay in control of what she is and is not prepared to do sexually, but also manages to limit John’s activities without making herself appear rude or arrogant, and, presumably, without upsetting him. As feminists, then, we might question the symbolic status of menstruation as Mary produces it, but as conversation analysts, we can note simply that Mary is acting competently to set her own boundaries.

4.7 Lying, Morality and (dis)Empowerment: The Paradox of Teenage Sexuality

We live in a culture where the telling of lies is not generally sanctioned. We are warned in the Bible (Exodus 20:2-17), for example, not to ‘bear false witness’. There are institutions whose roles partly depend upon the uncovering of lies – police, lawyers, investigative journalists, and the like. There is also a Gricean conversational maxim (Grice, 1975) urging speakers to be truthful. Yet, lying is an everyday practice, and as Sacks (1975: 57) famously declared, ‘everyone has to lie.’

We should note the imperative in Sacks’ declaration. It is not simply that everyone lies, but that everyone has to lie. What Sacks means by this is that in order for interaction to continue in a way that observes the mundane rituals of everyday life, lies are necessary. In giving a concrete example, Sacks (1975) points to the prototypical use of ‘fine’ in response to a ‘how are you’ uttered in a greeting sequence. What Sacks observes is that enquiries about a person’s state in a greeting sequence are not to be treated as ‘genuine’ enquiries (see also Jefferson, 1980; Schegloff, 1968). That is, the sequentially relevant response to a ‘how are you’ enquiry uttered in the opening of an interaction is not a full explication of one’s state of health/mind. The proper (expected) response is ‘fine’ or ‘ok’. This is the case even if a person is actually feeling lousy or feeling fantastic. There are then, two classes of responses to ‘how-are-yous’: a first class conveys nothing-to-report; a second conveys that there is something to be told. And, when there is something to be told, recipients will normatively
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seek that something. In other words, anything other than ‘fine’ or ‘ok’ initiates a search for what might be wrong (or wonderful) and some things are not tellable to just anyone. So a speaker meaning to respect the proper boundaries of interaction will avoid having to account for themselves following a personal status enquiry by using some formulation of ‘nothing-to-report’ even if there is, in fact, something reportable. That is, they lie. Not to lie at this stage risks treading on social obligations to co-conversationalists.

Despite its classic status as a conversation analytic piece of work, ‘Everybody has to lie’ was not in fact an analysis of lying. Sacks’ main point is that lying regularly occurs in formulaic responses to formulaic enquiries. However, he was not concerned with lying as oriented to by participants in their own terms. The paper did not initiate a systematic study of telling lies in interaction, with the result that lying remains relatively under-researched in naturalistic contexts (Vrij, 2000).

Although we have an intuitive understanding of what is meant by lying, it is actually remarkably difficult to define. Vrij (2008) provides a summary of definitions and the grounds on which most can be dismissed. For example, the kind of social lies that Sacks wrote about appear to be the most benign of deceptions, what Vrij (2008: 12) characterises as ‘social lubricant’; they might not count as lies at all. Yet, they are lies insofar as they differ from some ostensible truth, at least the truth that lays inside a speaker’s head. The problem with this is that (arguably) we do not have access to speakers’ internal mental states (e.g. Coulter, 1979, 2005; Edwards and Potter, 2005). How, then, are we to judge, research, or analyse lies unless they are made overt in interaction?

We are fortunate, in this instance, to have two examples of lies being oriented to in interaction. The first lie is referred to in the request sequence that occurs near the start of the call (lines 6 to 22). That is, Mary reports telling her mother something that is untrue, and seeks Karen’s
support for her story. The second lie is Mary’s patently untrue account (directed at John) that she was on her period. In neither instance does Mary overtly label her action as lying, but we are left in no doubt that she has indeed lied (or at least reports doing so). And, in neither instance, does the recipient display any moral judgment of lying. Both lies are understandable as matters either/or of stage-of-life or stage-of relationship.

In the first case, teenage girls lying to their mothers in order to be able to participate in an event or activity from which they have been forbidden is at least understandable, if not generally acceptable (for parents). Studies have shown that adolescents frequently report lying or only partly disclosing information to their parents (Darling et al. 2006; Jenson et al 2004; Smetana et al. 2009). This might be particularly true for young people embarking on a sexual relationship in the context of a (potentially drunken) party. Equally, for a teenage girl to confide in her friend and request an alibi (thereby recruiting her to the lie) seems explicable in terms of the social obligations formed in teen friendship groups. Indeed, Porter (1996) specifically cites the provision of alibis as one of the developmental lessons of how to behave in supportive female friendships. In these ways, then, the fact that Mary reports lying to her mother and easily recruits her friend to that lie is unsurprising, if not altogether of unconcern to overhearing adults. There are broader implications though. For instance, the recent riots in the UK led to various debates about the knowledge that parents have about the whereabouts of their teenaged children. One thing we see acted out in this call is one of the ways that teenagers conspire to ensure that parents are kept ignorant of exactly this.

The second lie reported by Mary is her telling her new boyfriend that she is menstruating. On one hand, we could view her as acting in an empowered way to limit the range of sexual activities she is prepared to engage in. From a CA perspective, Mary is simply managing a (possible) offer of sex in a culturally normative way. On the other hand, from a feminist perspective,
she apparently is not empowered to set those limits honestly. Her lie, also, analysably reinstates harmful sexist assumptions in which normal functioning female bodies are seen as disgusting, or, at least, not sexually appropriate at certain times in their monthly cycles.

This tension between what we might want to read into Mary’s actions from a feminist perspective and what we can analyse from a CA perspective leads us to question whether or not she is acting from a morally grounded and empowered position. On one hand, Mary is seen to fabricate a situation in order to limit sexual contact. The situation fabricated is itself open to critique because it rests on a notion of menstruating bodies as disgusting. So, not only does Mary appear to be unable to set her own boundaries honestly, she is reproducing gendered assumptions that are damaging to women. We might also wish to express concern that Mary reports herself to have been sexually passive, whilst accommodating her male partner’s desires; that she ‘did stuff to him’ conveys no sense of mutuality (in contrast to the kiss). Again, this reconstructs damaging gendered assumptions about women’s sexual passivity and obligations to satisfy men’s ‘needs’ (Hollway, 1984; See also Ehrlich, 2007 and Powell, 2008).

On the other hand, in telling John she is on a period, Mary is competently drawing on normative strategies for refusing or, in this case, limiting sexual conduct. It is not difficult to argue that this displays Mary as an empowered social actor, negotiating on her own terms the limits of her own conduct without potentially risking her relationship with John. The latter claim, i.e. that she is not risking her relationship, rests on our understanding that outright (sexual) refusals are likely to be treated as indicating negative character traits such as arrogance and rudeness (Kitzinger and Frith, 1999). Refusing John would also convey Mary’s
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dismissal of an offer that he (presumably) presented as legitimate. The inability account is, therefore, a contextualised instantiation of Goffman’s (1955) theoretical concept of Facework (Blesson, Roloff and Paulson, 1998).

The negotiation of sexual consent is a deeply social situation, and one that is fraught with potentially face threatening acts (Cupach and Metts, 1994). Taking ‘Face’ as an underlying concern, ‘risk’ is inherent in sexual encounters: making/accepting sexual advances too soon/late in stage of relationship; being seen as desirable/sexually active ... but not ‘too’ active; having skills to set boundaries in ways that respect self and other; and so on. The story Mary tells (at least as reported to Karen), demonstrates her successful negotiation of this socially problematic context. That is, the admittedly fabricated presence of a period allows Mary to maintain her social role as acceptable girlfriend (and, perhaps also, as ‘good girl’) without risking offending John in ways that a more direct refusal might. In this way, Mary designedly achieves several goals beyond the mere limitation of her sexual conduct.

The question of the morality of Mary’s (reported) fabrication is a complex one. Feminists, following Gilligan’s (1982) critique of masculine notions of universal ethical principles, have long challenged abstract, anti-relational conceptions of moral conduct. In an individualistic and abstract sense, Mary is seen to be deceiving her boyfriend, and deception is unacceptable. However, as a young woman caught up in a relational network, with obligations to be responsible to balance her own needs with care of others, a more broadly feminist (at least Gilliganesque) perspective would be more sympathetic to Mary’s ethical reasoning.

63 Of course, this takes for granted that John actually made some form of sexual advance on Mary. In fact, we do not know the details of how the sexual contact was initiated. As far as we can tell, Mary was willing to act on John’s body and he was willing to accept these acts.

64 I am not arguing here, as Gilligan might, that Mary’s moral reasoning is of a type that women are inclined to conduct. To do so would be to develop an essentialist argument.
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The ethic of care described by Gilligan has some resonances with Goffman’s concept of facework (though they write from radically different perspectives). When Goffman writes about the obligations of social actors to maintain each other’s faces, he is writing of a deeply moral order. In his words:

During interaction the individual is expected to possess certain attributes, capacities and information which, taken together, fit together into a self that is at once coherently unified and appropriate for the occasion... At the same time [s]he must accept and honour the selves projected by other participants. [Goffman, 1956: 105]

The consequent balancing of social obligations to self and others is not too distant from the feminist conception of an ethic of care. If we take morality as a social practice, fabricating a period in order to set limits of sexual conduct, whilst ‘honouring’ the other’s ostensible rights to have offered sex in the first place, we can treat Mary’s (reported) actions as a deeply embedded, contingent and moral.

This said, the matter of lying to a partner is not treated lightly and Mary does much work, over several turns, to justify what she told John. That is, Mary treats her own act as warranting an account (see Sacks, 1995 on accountable actions). Her account for having lied draws on a generic understanding of what (good) girls ought to do. That is, she specifically recruits Karen as someone in-the-know about how to prevent or limit a sexual encounter. But more than this, she uses a generic ‘you’ to construct her behaviour that all (decent) girls engage in.

Across the whole extract, Mary constructs herself as a deeply respectable and moral young woman. She displays to Karen that she has not entered into a relationship casually and without reflection. She shows herself to be concerned about the consequences of her relationship for others in her
social network. Perhaps most importantly, she shows that she has managed not to ‘rush into’ a fully sexual relationship (by which she presumably means vaginal penetration). However, her negotiation of a respectable identity is not without paradox. First, as a teenage girl, Mary faces a challenging scene on developing a sexual relationship. Teenage sexuality is embedded in a contradictory context in the UK. That is, teen sex is often treated with caution, a matter fraught with danger. Yet, there appears to be strong message that teenagers are driven sexually and that there is a need to educate and control what is essentially a normal aspect of development (Elliott, 2010). So, taking Mary as representative of her peers (though, admittedly not without enormous abstraction), she could be seen as simultaneously experiencing typical bodily responses as part of a normal and fulfilling relationship, and the strong pressure to behave responsibly and with restraint. This may be particularly the case because she is a girl, and partners, friends and parents police the line between behaving ‘normally’ and being seen as a potential ‘slut’.65 We do not know for certain what Mary’s own physical desires were, but if she did indeed experience sexual desire for John, we do know that she delayed any gratification on her own part for an unspecified period of time. There is a strong sense of Mary negotiating the paradox of being at a stage of life where sexual desire is normative, something that she should be appropriately aware of, but managing to stay, as it were, in the right by limiting her own participation. Certainly, interactionally, Mary displays herself to be behaving sexually whilst remaining respectable. A second paradox occurs because, although Mary works hard to achieve a respectable identity, she shows herself to have lied on two occasions. Ironically, the lie about the period is itself part of the work she does to construct this respectability. Thus, lying per se is not treated (at least here) as antithetical to morality.

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65 We should note that Mary does not appear to do moral work on behalf of John. His desires are somewhat taken for granted. See Valenti (2008) for a list of gendered double standards.
4.8 Concluding Comments

This chapter has shown the application of conversation analysis to a single extract, in which gender and sexuality are interactionally relevant. The chapter contributes to the literature on gender and language by focussing on talk about sex that occurs in a naturalistic context. The conversation is primarily by and for the participants (albeit with a recording device). The originality of the work lies, in part, in its contrast to much previous work that has relied on accounts of sex solicited by researchers in surveys, interviews and focus groups.

One of the advantages of naturalistic data is that it permits us to analyse how sex as a topic is introduced and managed in (this) interaction. What is clear, is that, for these participants, sex is a delicate and deeply moral topic. The ‘news‘ that Mary is engaging in a sexual relationship with John is managed very carefully - first through an embedded telling in the course of another action, and then as the culmination of a period of reasoned resistance on her part. In line with previous findings, Mary displays herself as being concerned for her reputation. She very skillfully negotiates a moral identity at the same time as she presents herself as sexually active.

The ‘special’ status of sex is also reproduced in this data. Sex is not discussed straightforwardly. Instead, it is constructed as taboo in the ways that it is introduced and referred to only in vague, unelaborated terms. We have seen that this contrasts markedly with the description of the first kiss, which is eminently an ‘appropriate’ topic. The taboo nature of talk about sex is connected to its moral status - in not being descriptive, Mary (and Karen) tacitly manage being ‘good’.

The moral work undertaken in this extract is not without paradox. Mary’s story involves deception (of her mother and John) and potentially reproduces a social world in which menstruating bodies are sexually unavailable, and men’s desires are to be satisfied. However, we can also view Mary’s (reported) actions as empowering, as she decides the limits of
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her own conduct at the same time as showing herself to care about those she interacts with.

This chapter also contributes to conversation analytic research. In particular, three lines of future study are suggested:

1. Embedding a telling in another course of social action.
2. The consequent ‘loosening’ of adjacency pairs
3. Use of tongue-clicks in English

This chapter has applied the tools of CA in a generic sense, without taking person reference as its focal point. In the next chapter, I examine person references for the social actions they perform in interaction.
Linguistic and Interactional Relevance

Chapter Five: Gendered Language: Distinguishing Linguistic and Interactional Relevance.

In the previous chapter, the utility of using CA for research on gender and language was examined. The analytic focus was fairly broad, as the tools of CA were applied across a single spate of talk. In this chapter, the focus is more narrowly on practices for referring to persons. Of particular interest are references that invoke the gender of the referent and makes it relevant in talk. In examining gendered person references, I do not assume that a linguistically gendered reference necessarily makes gender relevant for the participants. Nor do I assume that linguistically non-gendered references lack the capacity to do gendered interactional work. That is, I make a distinction between linguistic and interactional invocations of gender.

5.1 Distinguishing linguistic and interactional relevance

In English some person reference (and categorical) terms can be defined linguistically as indexing gender (e.g. he/she, man/woman, boy/girl) whereas others do not index gender, linguistically speaking (e.g., I, you, they, people). Feminists have contested the uses and implications of gendered terminology over many decades. For example, in the 1970s, feminist researchers counted the numbers of pejorative gendered terms that refer to females as compared to males (Nilsen, 1977; Stanley 1977), and noted the negative or insulting tilt of mundane female references such as ‘girl’ or ‘mistress’ (Schulz, 1975). There was also a concern about the linguistic invisibility of women in ‘generic’ expressions (e.g. chairman, the man in the street, and ‘he’), which make the masculine the linguistically unmarked form, and the female form marked (Henley, 1977; Sontag, 1973; Spender, 1980. See also Crawford and English 1984; Miller and James, 2009). Feminist action concerning this last point has been largely successful (though not without contestation, Cameron, 1994, 1995), so that it is now commonplace for institutions to publish guidelines on anti-discriminatory language practices and for authors to adopt these practices (Mills, 2003).
However, there at least two major weaknesses with the treatment of lexical items as having harmful effects in themselves. First, it relies on a non-contextualised understanding of language, as if words can be predefined as sexist and harmful (Butler, 1997). Second, it assumes a distinction between gendered terms and gender-neutral terms. Whilst this might hold at the level of linguistics, it is not clear that it holds at the level of interaction. As Schegloff (2007c) points out, there is a ‘key difference [...] between something taken to be intrinsic to a linguistic form or usage on the one hand and the use to which it is put -- the action it is used to do -- on any given occasion of use, on the other’ (Schegloff, 2007c: 2). In other words, applied to gender and language, this means that an analyst cannot simply rely on the fact that a term is gendered linguistically to claim that participants are using it, on any given occasion, to ‘do gender’ (or sexism) in their interaction.

The argument that gendered references should be interrogated in the local context of their production is now the mainstay of research on language and gender and a key approach is to explore places where gender is explicitly, linguistically indexed. Some of this work supports the more abstract findings of the early feminists by demonstrating, in interaction, uses of gendered terms that denigrate women and reveal sexist understandings of the world. For example, Hopper (2003) notes both denigration and sexism in the following interaction. In this extract, Ava enquires about her friend Bev’s visit to a doctor, and refers to the doctor using ‘he’ (line 1), thereby displaying her assumption that doctors are male.66

**Extract One**
[Hopper, 2003: 136]

01 Ava: Well- what’d he say

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66 We have to trust Hopper on this point because he does not show the interaction immediately before Ava’s reference to the doctor. It might be that her reference to a male arises from some misunderstanding evident in the prior talk. However, there are analytical ground to support Hopper’s analysis in both recipients’ responses to the discovery that their friend was ‘checked out’ by a woman.
02 Bev:  He is a she- and everything’s fine
03 Pat:  [So you went to a woman?
04 Ava:  [A girl doctor?  Sick!
05        What if she’s a lesbian
06 Bev:  I’d rather have a lesbian check me out than a pervert!

The assumption is corrected by Bev in next turn. Actually, Bev delays responding to Ava’s query in order to deal with the incorrect assumption at the earliest opportunity and it is this, the correction, rather than the news that ‘everything is fine’ that is taken up by her recipients. So, the fact that the doctor was a woman is remarkable and changes the trajectory of the talk projected from the first turn (i.e. the state of Bev’s health).

Bev’s recipients align on the remarkable status of a female doctor but differ in their treatment of this news. Pat’s turn, delivered in overlap with Ava’s, is an understanding check (note the upshot marker ‘so’), and whilst it reveals a default (sexist) assumption that doctors are male, it is not explicitly pejorative about female doctors. In contrast, Ava is explicitly hostile and critical of her friend’s choice, declaring female doctors to be ‘sick’. Further, she refers to the doctor as a ‘girl’, thereby reducing her adult status and undermining her professional importance. Then she unpacks the sense in which female doctors are ‘sick’ by raising the possibility that she might be a lesbian. The insult here relies on our understanding of the category bound activities of doctors; that they routinely examine the naked bodies of patients (see Henslin and Briggs, 1971 for example). Doctors are assumed to adopt a non-sexualised approach to this activity. Through her selections of ‘sick’ and ‘lesbian’, Ava displays doubt that women are able to suppress their sexual responses in a professional context. Implicitly, we hear that male doctors can be trusted in this regard. Bev challenges this in her next turn by contrasting lesbians with perverts, which is also a contrast between women and men.
As Hopper demonstrates, then, there are occasions when women are

denigrated and apparently made invisible in naturally occurring talk, and

this supports concerns about the sexist nature of language. However, it is

important to note that not all the concerns of the early feminist

researchers are borne out when we examine members’ actual practices in
talk. For example, Stringer and Hopper (1998) inspected over thirty hours

of talk for uses of the ‘generic he’ and concluded that there is no evidence

that speakers select ‘he’ when they mean to refer to both males and
females (but see Wetherall, 2002 for counter-evidence). Instead, the
default practice for gender-neutral reference in talk is ‘they’.

Overall, the body of work directed towards examining gender as practice in

interaction demonstrate its salience across a range of domains including
mundane interaction (Hopper and LeBaron, 1998; Schegloff, 1997),
research interviews or focus groups (e.g. Speer, 2002b, 2005; Speer and
Potter, 2002; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2003) and institutional contexts
(Edwards, 1998; Sacks, 1995; Stokoe, 2003, 2010; West and Fenstermaker,
2002). In these studies, gender is made relevant through explicit uses of
gendered terms and in the actions these lexical and syntactic selections
perform. That is, they explore places where gendered references are both
linguistically and interactionally relevant.

This is in line with Schegloff’s (1997) directive for analysis to be empirically
grounded in participants’ contextualised orientations to the ongoing
activities they are producing. This argument is actually at the crux of many
critiques of conversation analysis (e.g. Billig, 1999a,b; Bucholtz, 2003;
Holmes and Meyerhoff, 2003; McElhinny, 2003; Wetherell, 1998), in which
the Schegloffian approach is characterised as limited. For example,
Bucholtz (2003: 63) claims that CA severely restricts the way that gender
can be analysed in interaction because ‘only the most blatant aspects of
gendered discourse practice, such as the overt topicalizing of gender in
conversation, are likely candidates for Schegloffian analysis’. However, as
Stokoe (2004) argues, if gender is a salient category, its presence in
everyday life should not be difficult to find. Furthermore, it is not true to say that a conversation analytic explication of gender is only possible when there are explicit uses of gendered terms. For example, Schegloff (1997: 182) writes, ‘orientation to gender can be manifested without the category being explicitly named or mentioned’. Similarly, Kitzinger (2000: 171) suggests that it would be ‘unbearably’ limiting if only overt invocations of gender had any analytical currency.

Stokoe (2004), drawing on Edwards (1997), argues that language is a flexible resource that permits speakers to be clear on some occasions and ambiguous on others, depending on the course of action being constituted. 67 So, there might be occasions where references to gendered identities are implicit and subtle rather than explicit and overt. In relation to person reference, this opens up the possibility that non-gendered expressions (‘people’, ‘they’, ‘you’, ‘I’) might, in context, convey gender interactionally if not linguistically.

So, a distinction can be made between linguistically gendered terms and interactionally gendered terms. On some occasions, lexical items will be both linguistically and interactionally gendered, on others they will be neither, and on yet others, they will be one but not the other. It is the last category (one but not the other) that is most interesting, and provides the most original contribution to research on language and gender. It does so in two ways: first, items that are linguistically gendered but not interactionally gendered, free analysts from the assumption that gender is necessarily relevant when terms like ‘woman’, ‘man’, ‘he’ or ‘she’ are used; second, it requires closer examination of linguistically non-gendered terms (like ‘you’, ‘people’, ‘we’ and ‘they’) for their potentially gendered actions.

A start to the examination of what might (clumsily) be called non-relevantly linguistically gendered terms appeared in Kitzinger’s (2007a) analysis of the

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67 Sacks (1995) analyses use of ambiguous references to place, or, more correctly, instances where speakers refer to place without naming it (e.g., ‘this place’ for ‘therapy session’) as a way of avoiding negative inferences.
linguistically gendered term ‘women’ as used variably across a spate of a
single interaction such that it is sometimes relevantly gendered for the
participants in the interaction, and sometimes not. In fact, Kitzinger does
not claim that gender is irrelevant in the categorical use of ‘women’ in her
extract, but rather that the speaker is not using it, in the first instance, to
do gender. Kitzinger’s extract (partly reproduced below), is taken from a
call to Birth Crisis, a British help-line for women in trauma after birth. The
caller, Amy, is in some distress and has earlier reported feeling emotional
‘today’ and, at the start of the extract, indicates that she was ‘getting
emotional’ at the end of her pregnancy. The call-taker (denoted as Clt)
reassures Amy that her responses are normal (line 10) and that, ‘anyone
would’ feel emotional (line 5). Amy displays scepticism in two ways. First,
by restricting the terms on which she accepts the normality of feeling
emotional (line 7), and second, by questioning the call-taker’s claim (line
11).

Extract Two
[Kitzinger BCC01, 2007: 41-42]

01 Amy:    Yeah. Well I- I was- I was getting emotiona:l at
the end [( )]
02 Clt:            [mm .hhh well it’s not sur]prising and
04 you’re in no way £abnormal because you get
em(h)otional huh anyone would.
06 (0.2)
07 Amy:    As- as- in- pre(h)gnancy(h)?=yea(h)h huh.
08 [ (      )]
09 Clt:    [Yes and a]fterwards too I mean all these
reactions are VEry very normal you know.
11 Amy:    yea::h?
12 Clt:   .hhhh I know the:y uh: they (. ) >turn your world
upside down< but u::h .hhh hhhhh .hh I have women
worryi:ng whether >you know< i:t’s (. ) they’re
gonna crack up. Mentally.
16 Un[der the stress of it.]
17 Amy:      [(                   )]
18 Clt:   .hhhhh a:nd hhhh that VEry Very rarely happens. .hh
Kitzinger argues that the call-taker’s use of ‘women’ (line 13) is used in the service of managing Amy’s scepticism. In fact, it occurs as a second attempt because the first (lines 12-13) is abandoned after ‘but’ (line 13). The first attempt, Kitzinger argues, is heading for a positive assertion of Amy’s ability to contend with difficulties despite her distress. Such an assertion is open to challenge because it is for Amy and not the call-taker (a stranger) to assess her ability to cope. The call-taker repairs her turn and instead provides the grounds on which she is warranted to make such judgements; that she has experience of women in Amy’s position. It is here, then, that the call-taker refers to the category ‘women’, saying, ‘I have women worrying that they’re gonna crack up... and that very very rarely happens’. By saying, ‘I have women’ rather than ‘I know women’, the call-taker brings off her professional status and thereby produces her authority in such matters.

So, it is Kitzinger’s position that, in this extract, on this occasion, the linguistically gendered term ‘women’ is not relevantly gendered for the participants. That is, the term is not used, in the first instance to invoke gendered attributes of women, but rather to construct an authoritative claim to reassure a caller that her emotional responses are normal. In her words:

... it is not only gender, and in fact not most saliently gender, that is achieved through use of ‘women’... and to suggest that an exclusive preoccupation with the production of the category term ‘woman’ and its associated attributes as the main focus of analysis obscures crucial interactional features of this episode, which have less to do with gender and are much more directly related to the business of the help-line in delivering its advertised service. [Kitzinger, 2007a: 43]

Building on the distinction introduced by Kitzinger (2007) between ‘linguistic’ and ‘interactional’ gender, this chapter offers an initial sketch of linguistically gendered and interactionally gendered terms as they are
deployed across a range of data. I show that, besides the use of gendered linguistic terms that are relevantly gendered for the participants gender can be indexed linguistically but not interactionally, and conversely, that a term that is not linguistically gendered can nevertheless be treated as relevantly gendered by social participants in interaction. In other words, linguistically gendered terms are neither sufficient nor necessary to achieve gender relevance in interaction.

5.2 Linguistically Marked Gender Terms

In English, gender is routinely indexed lexically. It is not difficult to find references to hearably gendered persons. Gender can be indexed linguistically by: name (Extracts Three and Four); relational kinship term (Extracts Five and Six); categorically (Extracts Seven and Eight) and by pronouns (Extracts Nine and Ten). However, these linguistically gendered formulations are often not doing gendered work for the participants.

Extract Three

[CTS11]
01 Lou: And then on the way they are (.) they’re taking me: and Jan to Teen Circuit.
03 (0.2)
04 Lou: They just drop Anne off ( ) Rainbows on the way back.

Extract Four

[CTS36]
01 Ell: HHH but John was there, he was even worse.
02 I swear after like a shot of vodka he was (.) pretty much out of it.

Extract Five

[CTS16]
01 Sta: Yeah. So it was pretty boring at my dad’s today man. But on the way back we were talking about the band.
Extract Six
[CTS11]
02 Lou: Yeah. ‘Cause my sister’s got Rainbows.

Extract Seven
[CTS08]
01 Emm: Oh there’s a lad at my school. My year.
02 (0.6)
03 Emm: Because .hh he hasn’t got neat handwriting so he writes on a lap-top instead.

Extract Eight
[TG]
01 Bee: nYeeah, .hh This feller I have(nn)/(iv)"felluh"
02 this ma:n. (0.2) t! .hhh He ha::(s) uffeeh who who
03 I have fer Linguistics [is real]ly too=
04 Ava: [Mm hm?]
05 Bee: =much, .hh[h ][I ] didn’=
06 Ava [Mm][hm,]
05 Bee: =notice it b’t there's a woman in my class who's
06 a nurse 'n. .hh she said to me she s'd didju
07 notice he has a ha:ndicap en I said wha:t.
08 You know I said I don't see anything wrong
09 wi[th im, she says his ha:nds.

Extract Nine
[CTS13]
01 Emm: Have you already told your dad you’re coming
02 at mine.
03 (0.4)
04 Sop: Yeah
05 (0.2)
06 Emm: Right. What did he say?
07 (0.8)
08 Sop: He said (.) okay
09 (0.2)
10 Emm: Oh cool

Extract Ten
[CTS23]
03 Mum: [Who’s this friend
04 of Teagen’s then. hh

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Pen: Oh she’s just called Alice. I don’t know her I’ve never met her. Well I’ve met her once before but (0.7) never been to her house or nothing ‘cause-ACTually yeah (0.4) erm the reason why I went there is because Teagen let me down?

To demonstrate that gender is not being made relevant in all of these gendered references, I will expand the analysis of four cases: the gendered names and relational kinship terms from CTS11 (Extracts Four and Seven); the gendered categorical terms (Extracts Eight and Nine).

Here are Extracts Three and Six (taken from the same call) reproduced in expanded form as Extract Eleven. This call is between two twelve year old girls, Frankie and Louise, and at the start of the extract they are discussing their respective plans to attend ‘Teen-Circuit’; a twice-weekly aerobic exercise class for girls.

**Extract Eleven**

*[CTS11]*

01 Fra: .hhh Are you going next Tuesday.
02 (.)
03 Lou: Erm I might not be going on **Tuesday**.
04 (0.6)
05 Fra: I’m only going on Tuesday’s. I’m not going on Thursdays.
06 (.)
07 Lou: Au::
08 (0.4)
09 Fra: Unless I go on Thursdays and not on Tuesdays.
10 Lou: I’m going on Thursdays. So it’s more convenient.
11 (0.3)
12 ( ): ((Background cough))
13 Fra: It’s- (.) I don’t know. ‘Cause I’ve got like no way of getting home and stuff.
14 Lou: Yeah. ‘Cause my sister’s got Rainbows.
15 (1.2)
16 Lou: And then on the way they are (.) they’re taking me: and Jan to Teen Circuit.
17 (0.2)
18 Lou: They just drop Anne off ( ) Rainbows on the
The linguistically marked gendered references highlighted earlier are in the names, ‘Jan’ (line 19) and ‘Anne’ (line 21), and in the relational kinship term, ‘my sister’ (line 16). Although, with Teen Circuit and Rainbows (the Girl Guiding club for girls aged between five and seven years old), gendered activities form the backdrop of this interaction, there is nothing that particularly ‘does’ gender in the sense of invoking gendered attributes of girls. The gendered names at lines 19 and 21, refer to gendered persons but not to make their gender relevant. We might note that they are formulated for recognition using the preferred practice for referring to non-present third parties. Jan is a mutual friend to both Louise and Frankie and can be named unproblematically. Jan also happens to live around the corner from Louise, so it would be ‘convenient’ (line 11) for her parents to take the girls to Teen Circuit together. Jan does not feature in the interaction as a ‘girl’ (though she is one) but, rather, as part of an account for the practical limitations for getting to a particular club on a particular day. ‘Anne’ (line 21) is Louise’s younger sister but she is first referred to using the kinship term ‘my sister’ (line 16). Given that Frankie knows and is known-to-know Louise’s sister, the reference to ‘my sister’ might seem oddly formulated. However, the reference is very nicely fitted to the broader action of accounting for Louise’s difficulties in attending the club on Tuesdays. So, ‘my sister’ is a kinship term and invokes the category ‘family’ more explicitly than ‘Anne’. This serves to underline the constraints on the family’s activities, and explicates the claim that Thursday’s are ‘more convenient’. Here, then, the norm for naming is relaxed in the service of a

68 I am interested to note that Louise’s parents are not named, even by their kinship titles (Mum and Dad) in line 13. Instead they are referred to using a prototypical locally subsequent reference ‘they’. As there has been no locally initial reference to them, this might appear to be doing something special; something in addition to referring (Schegloff, 1996a). However, it does not seem to be doing anything unusual here – it is simply taken for granted. As analysts, we might ask what evidence there is that this is a reference to Louise’s parents. This might be a place to see the coming together of MCA and person reference; in providing lifts, the referents are analytically performing a category bound activity for parents. Further, with ‘my sister’ (line 17) the category device ‘family’ is already in play. So, in this extract, we see the loosening of the canonical, Schegloffian view of locally initial and locally subsequent person references.
particular action. That Louise later names her sister (line 21) appears to be a restoration of the preferred practice. The key point though is that whilst ‘my sister’ and ‘Anne’ refer to a gendered being, gender is not being made relevant.

In Extract Seven, reproduced here with slightly more context as Extract Twelve, two fifteen year old girls are talking about the apparent advantages of having injured an arm. Emma has earlier expressed a desire to break an arm so that she might be excused from writing for her coursework. This touches off a telling from Sophie about an occasion when she was permitted to do her work on a computer owing to an injured hand. This story itself touches off another from Emma about a ‘lad’ in her school (line 09), who uses a computer because his handwriting is so poor.

Extract Twelve

[CTS08]

01 Emm: ‘Cause I knew I wouldn’t have to any writing for GCSE coursew(hh)o(h)rk .hhhhh I probably will but you know.
04 (0.8)
05 Sop: Well I liked it you know when I burned my hand .hhh I got to go on the computer all the time when everyone else had to write down stuff.
08 (.)
09 Emm: Oh there’s a lad at my school. My year.

(0.6)
11 Emm: Because .hh he hasn’t got neat handwriting so he writes on a lap-top instead.
13 (0.4)
14 Sop: Huh huh huh You know when we used to like play ti::g

So, Emma refers to a referent using the linguistically gendered ‘lad’. The reference is formulated as a non-recognitional and displays no expectation that Sophie might recognize him. As is common with non-recognitions

69 The action of invoking family constraints and dealing with matters of convenience is done, in part, with ‘my sister’ at line 17. Had Louise repeated ‘my sister’ in the later turn it might have, less appropriately, displayed an understanding that Frankie would not recognise the referent.
(e.g. ‘this guy’, ‘some woman’, ‘a man’), the formulation of the reference picks up on the referent’s gender. There are, after all, alternatives (e.g. occasionally, a speaker will refer in a gender neutral way to ‘someone’ or, more commonly to a professional category; ‘doctor’, ‘teacher’). However, the category gender is what Sacks (1972x) calls pn-adequate. Pn-adequacy refers to the breadth of categories; the extent to which any given person might belong to the category (compare with professional categories or hobbies/interest categories, which are inevitably limited and cannot apply to all humans). 70 That is, any human being is potentially categorisable in terms of gender. This is a member’s concern, so does not necessarily rely on the ostensible fact that there are two genders, indeed this fact is debatable (e.g. consider the case of intersexuality). However, persons are overwhelmingly treated as if they are always-already categorisable as belonging to one of two genders (Garfinkel, 1969). If we know nothing about a person, we generally assume (‘know’) that they are gendered. If, as speakers, we do know more about the referent but know that our recipient does not (as is the case with ‘this lad at my school’) it tends to be gender that is selected as the basis for description. This privileging of gender is interesting and perhaps reflects and reproduces our society’s taken-for granted notions of this most fundamental division between human beings.

It might also be a consequence of the gendered nature of English grammar, so that in subsequent mentioning of a referent it becomes (normatively) necessary to refer to them using the gendered pronouns ‘he’ or ‘she’; as indeed Emma does in Extract Thirteen (line 11).71 The locally initial reference to a gendered person sets this up more straightforwardly.

70 It makes no sense to categorise a baby as a teacher or a bird-watcher but we can, and invariably do categorise them in terms of gender.

71 This is, of course, an empirical matter and so it would be useful to collect, for comparison, non-recognitional references from less gendered languages.
Whilst person references may be linguistically gendered in interesting ways, they do not always make gender relevant for the interaction. To return to Extract Thirteen, the reference ‘a lad at my school’ points to a gendered person but this is not what matters for the interaction in terms of action. The reference occurs as part of a touched-off telling about using computers as an alternative to handwriting. It is touched-off from Sophie’s story about the time she was permitted to use computers as a consequence of injuring her hand. Emma’s story is ‘oh’-prefaced, displaying that something Sophie has just said led her to recall a similar event pertaining to a third party, but, in contrast to Sophie’s story, the ‘lad’s’ use of computers arises from poor handwriting rather than injury. There is no sense here of gendered attributes of either the participants or the referent. Emma is not arguing that boys have worse handwriting than girls, nor that boys have privileges that are denied to girls. Instead, Emma’s turn is designed as a second story (Sacks, 1995) to show her understanding of Sophie’s story. We might note that she could have used this slot differently; to appreciate or even congratulate Sophie’s ‘good luck’. Instead, Sophie’s response to Emma’s story is delayed (line 13) and, when delivered, pays no attention to it; she laughs as a stance marker to her own further telling about events that happened because of her injured hand. We might speculate that Sophie treats Emma’s story as irrelevant (perhaps because it is not a story about injury).

The key point is that Emma’s gendered person reference does not appear to be doing gender in the interaction. The same applies to the gendered references in Extract Fourteen, in which two girls are complaining about their professor. As we saw in Chapter One, Bee refers to her linguistics professor using the linguistically gendered reference ‘this feller ... I have for linguistics’. This is repaired, within the turn, to ‘this man’. Both references are gendered male but neither does gendered work, beyond noting the gender of the referent. Later, Bee refers to another student in her class and

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72 I refer to them as girls because the transcript is called TG, an acronym that stands for ‘Two Girls’. It is likely that, as students, they might prefer to be referred to as women.
again, the person reference is linguistically marked for gender; ‘a woman in my class who’s a nurse’. Once again, the gender of the referent is not of interactional relevance for the participants.

**Extract Thirteen**

[TG]

```markdown
01 Bee: A:nd, _she wz very difficul'tuh unduhstand.
02 Ava: No, _she ain't there anymoh,
03 Bee: No I know I mean she, _she's gone a long t(h)ime (h)a'rea(h) [dy? hh
05 Ava: [Mm, [hhmh!
06 Bee: [.hhh
07  
08 Bee: nYeeah, _hh This feller I have(nn)/(iv)"felluh"; this ma:n. (0.2) t! .hhh He ha::(s) uffeh who who
09 I have fer Linguistics [is really too much=
10 Ava: [Mm hm?]
11 Bee: =.hh[h ] I didn' notice it b't there's a woman=
12 Ava: Mn [hm,]
13 Bee: =in my class who's a nurse 'n. hh she said
to me she s'd didju notice he has a
16 ha:ndicap en I said wha:t. You know I said I don't
17 see anything wrong wi[th im, she says
18 his ha:nds.=
```

So, what are these references doing if not gender? As noted previously, (Chapter One) Bee’s repaired reference from ‘this feller’ to ‘this man’ deals with the relationship Bee has with the referent. The canonical reference for a professor would be something like ‘my linguistics professor’ but Bee is complaining about him and one way of complaining is to withhold naming or identifying a referent in the terms they are usually called. The reference to the woman in her class is slightly more complicated. Bee is working up a proactive defense for the poor mark she expects to get for this module (see Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2003). Her defense (not shown in the extract) amounts to the claim that disabled lecturers are hard markers.

73 Compare Leslie Holt’s reference to a known-in-common referent as ‘your friend and mine’ and later as ‘Mister R’ in a complaint against him (Extract 7, Chapter 1).
The female referent is introduced early in this course of action as the source of the noticing that the linguistics professor is disabled and of the knowledge that he will be a hard-marker. The formulation is interesting because, as a non-recognitional, it could have been ‘a woman in my class’ but this would not have done the additional work of providing the grounds that warrants the referent having noticed the disability and having knowledge about its relevance for the students. This is provided by placing the referent in the category ‘nurse’. Similarly, ‘a nurse in my class’ is not quite right; the woman is there as a student but also happens also to be a nurse.

In line with other non-recognitional references, Bee’s reference marks the gender of the referent but does not make her gender relevant. We might ask why the fact that she is a woman is noted but not relevant whilst the fact that she is a nurse is relevant. In this case, the information that she is a nurse is made relevant through the category bound activities of medically qualified individuals. The category attributes of women are not referred to at all, and her being a woman has no bearing on the interaction.

It appears, then, that marking of gender through linguistically gendered references is the norm for non-recognitional reference, a kind of baseline noticing that does not necessarily make gender relevant for participants. This is perhaps true of other forms of reference in the sense that names are (often) hearably gendered, as are pronouns. So, where a language is gendered, we cannot help but refer to persons in a way that makes their gender available, but not necessarily interactionally relevant.

This does not mean that the gender of a referent is never relevant or that it cannot become relevant at some later point. Consider the following extract (Extract Fourteen in which a speaker, Stan, refers to his friend using his hearably male name, ‘Kev’.)

74 There is identity work going on here: Bee is not the sort of person who might notice a disability.
Extract Fourteen
[CTS15]
01 Sta: I was talking to Kev ri:ght.
02 (.)
03 Sta: And I think we were watching something on telly.
04 (0.4)
05 Sta: And he he he went he came in- knocked on the
06 door. And I went *(come in* ((timidly))
07 (0.4)
08 Sta: A[n]d (0.3) we must have looked like a gay=
09 Pen: [hh]
10 Sta: *=couple* or something.
11 Pen: hhh hh[hh .hhh]
12 Sta: [I don’t] care.
13 Pen: hhh [huh huh ] .hhh
14 Sta: [But like uhm]
15 Sta: He came and in and went are you coming
16 downstairs. ‘Cause you meant to be socialising.
17 Aren’t you. Come downstairs.

In this call, Stan is telling his girlfriend, Penny, about the recent visit of his extended family; an event which he did not enjoy because they ‘just stormed the house’ and he is ‘not sociable’ and indeed, a ‘little hermit’.

Just before the extract starts, Stan reports that he ‘escaped’ to his bedroom with his friend ‘Kev’ but ‘one of them’ came to find him. At line 1, Stan tells Penny that he was ‘talking to Kev’ and it is here that we get the hearably gendered reference to a male person. However, at this point, Kev’s gender is not relevant to the interaction. Kev is male but he features here as Stan’s friend, someone with whom he can escape his family. Kev’s gender nonetheless becomes relevant later (line 8) when Stan later comments that they ‘must have looked like a gay couple’. That is, the significance of two teenage boys being alone together in a bedroom is not lost on Stan; not just friends but two relevantly male friends. So, the move from ‘Kev’ to putative members of the category ‘gay couple’ transforms the referent (and speaker) from a non-relevantly gendered person to relevantly gendered.
In Extract Fifteen we see a move from an interactionally non-gendered categorical reference to ‘girls’ to gender being made relevant in the ensuing talk. In this extract (which is a long expansion of Extract Eleven), two twelve year old girls, Frankie and Louise are discussing a forthcoming school trip to an ice-rink. Frankie has not been invited to participate in the trip but Louise has; a situation which she describes using a Northern English colloquial term, ‘shan’ (line 9), meaning unfair. It is with this characterization that Frankie launches the topic of the trip.

Extract Fifteen
[CTS11]
01 Lou: And the:n on the way they are (. ) they’re taking me: and Jan to Teen Circuit.
02 (0.2)
03 Lou: They just drop Anne off ( ) Rainbows on the way back.
04 (1.1)
05 Fra: Yeah
06 (1.1)
07 Fra: That’s shan where you go to get to go ice ( ) i- ice-skating tomorrow. hhh huh .hhh
08 (0.2)
09 Lou: Mm†hm ( )
10 (0.3)
11 Fra: That’s just shan. hhh .hhhhh Is it li- like ( . ) all the girls that she teaches or just your class.
12 Lou: No. She’s taking some out of her form. And there’s just enough spaces for some more girls to go.
13 (0.7)
14 Fra: hhhhh .hhhh
15 (0.3)
16 Fra: So she just said right you’re going. hhhhh huh huh
17 (0.8)
18 Lou: Mm
19 (1.3)
20 Lou: What?
21 (0.2)
Fra: Did she just say like right you’re going hhhh
Lou: Mm
Fra: Did she like say that boys could go first. And then talk to you all.
Lou: No
Fra: What did she do
Lou: (please) hh huh
Fra: hh huh
Lou: And then erm Kate ran out and goes .hh WE’RE GOING ICE-SKATING. [Huh] (boys started to=
Fra: [Huh]
Lou: =(shout)
Fra: .hhhh Yeah. HHHH [If it] was that I would=
Lou: [Uhm ]
Fra: =be going. hhh
Lou: What?
Fra: .hh If it was that I would be going.
Lou: What?
Fra: Uo ((fake cry?))
Lou: (0.6)
Fra: But I'm not.
Lou: So she had to spend a::ges telling everybody that it was only the girls who were allowed to go.
Lou: (.)
Fra: H(h)m
Fra: Tch Oh well [then.
Lou: [(And she goes) and to be honest I’d much much much much prefer the girls to go.}
Because they’re better behaved on buses.

(0.3)

Fra:  H(hh)m:

Lou:  Which is perfectly true.

(.)

Fra:  Yea(hh)h huh huh

Lou:  Do you remember when we were going down to

((Village)) there was a food fight on the bus.

On the front

(0.2)

Fra:  HHHH huh huh (0.4) .HHH

(1.0)

Fra:  When we were going to that Theme Park people kept

on passing somebody’s shoe:

(1.1)

Lou:  Shoe

Fra:  Yeah

Lou:  hih ug(hhh)h

(0.3)

Fra:  .HHHHH hhhh .hh Some [(            ) shoe or=

[(                 )   =

=something]

Lou:  ={(   ) ]

(0.7)

Lou:  Guess who ate a lump of cat poo today.

(.)

Fra:  Wha(hh)t

Lou:  Guess who ate a lump of cat poo toda(hh)y

I(h) do(h)n’t kno(h)w. Who .hhh

Lou:  Caspar

It is clear from the extract that the only people going on the ice-skating trip are members of the category ‘girls’ (line 14), though Frankie is unclear about which subdivision of girls are invited (those from the teacher’s form or all those that she teaches). However, it is not until line 29, with the reference to the contrasting category ‘boys’ that gender becomes

---

75 Caspar is a dog.

76 In this school, each teacher takes administrative responsibility for a particular class (form) of students, acting as the form-tutor. But they will also teach groups from across the school.
interactionally relevant. The first mention of ‘girls’ simply refers to a group of persons attending a trip: they happen to be girls but this is not the relevant thing about them. By line 29, those invited become relevantly gendered by virtue of the fact that gender has been used as one basis for invitation or exclusion. From this point, gender rises to the surface of the interaction as Louise works to defend the gendered nature of the invitation. She does so by pointing to the poor behaviour of boys on school-trips: they have food fights and pass round people’s shoes. There is more going on in this extract, not least of which is the challenging issue that Frankie, who is both a girl and a member of the teacher’s PE group, has not been invited to take the trip. However, of relevance here is the distinction between linguistically gendered lexical items and the gendered work they do or do not perform.

In Extract Sixteen, there is an instance of gender becoming relevant through the use of gendered pronouns. In this co-present interaction, three year old Alice (actually filmed a month before her fourth birthday) is setting up an imaginary game with her mother, father and older sister. Alice allocates the roles of ‘grown-ups’ at a nursery to herself, her mother and her father (who is present, but is off camera). She calls herself Janet, her mother is to be Linda, and her father is Emma. Alice’s older sister, Frankie, is behind the camera and is also called into the game and told to ‘lie down’ (lines 1 and 4) as one of the sleeping children.

**Extract Sixteen**

**[CTS76]**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Ali: Oh: hhh lie down both of ((Pointing to Fra)) you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Then you: [lie] down=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Mum: [Mm ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Ali: =and Frankie lie down. Then I’ve got too many. So you ac::tu::ally::: be- and ((Pointing to Mum and Dad)) you two be the grown up. And I’ll be the grown up. (Pointing to Mum)) You be called Linda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Mum: Right.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

191
Ali: And ((pointing to Dad)) you will be called Emma.

Ali: Nurs- nursery has a grown up Emma so ((pointing to Dad)) you be the (..) Emma.

Mum: So I’m Linda.

Ali: Yeah. And I’m Janet. And ((Pointing to Dad)) sh- and he and she and hhh and- (..) h:e he (.)

he be Emma. But but Emma’s a girl but but the

but hhh but d- (0.3) tch but Daddy can-

.hh but but the boy the boy but he but

the man can be the the the the the grown up.

Ali: Called Emma.

Mum: Yeah

Ali: He can be the boy Emma.

Mum: "He can b(h)e the-"

Ali: ( ) nursery has a lit- erm just a girl but

erm but hh but lets just go now.

Mum: Huh huh huh .hhhh Okay. So (..) Janet!

What are we going to do today. In nursery.

What are we going to do with all the children.

Ali: No. They just sleep 'cause it’s sleep time.

Mum: Oh. Is it sleep time.

Ali: ((Pointing to Mum and Dad)) You two can’t.

((...game continues))

There are a number of interesting observations that could be made about this extract. However, for present purposes, we will focus on Alice’s evident dilemma about casting her obviously male father in a female role (lines 13 to 24). It is here that her father’s gender identity is made a live issue in talk-in-interaction and it is largely through interactional practices for referring to persons that Alice’s dilemma is constituted.  

The gendered nature of the roles to be taken up in Alice’s game are made available in the names that she gives them; ‘Janet’, ‘Linda’ and ‘Emma’.  

77 The distinct lack of dilemma in relation to the allocation of herself and her mother to female roles is also interesting for what it suggests about gender stability.
However, at the point they are first uttered (here lines 5, 7 and 13) they are not *relevantly* gendered. That is, at the first mention, the relevance of the imaginary Janet, Linda and Emma for Alice is that they are ‘grown-ups’. The gender of the participants themselves does not appear to be relevant at first – note the apparently unproblematic assigning of Alice’s father to the role of ‘Emma’ at line 7. It is not until Alice is forced by the nature of the English language to refer to her father as ‘he’ (line 13) and his candidate role as a ‘she’ that the contradiction between his actual gender and the female role he has been assigned becomes problematic. Alice clearly struggles to select the right pronoun.

There are potentially many ways, other than gender, in which Alice’s father may be thought unfitted to the role of ‘Emma’, though admittedly the only other information we have about ‘Emma’ is that she is a grown up and works in a nursery. That Alice’s father is also a grown up is evident and may be oriented to in the interaction when Alice repairs the stage-of-life categories; from ‘boy’ to ‘man’ (line 17). The fact that her father is an accountant and not a nursery nurse poses no problem for Alice – professional occupation is not the immutable category that gender appears to be for her.

To summarise, there is a distinction to be made between linguistically gendered references and those that make gender interactionally relevant. In this section, we have seen that linguistically gendered references do not necessarily make gender relevant for the participants. However, they do make the gender of the referent(s) available for the interaction and, on occasion, this can be taken up and used (at least partly) in the service of transforming them into relevantly gendered beings. The next section will be used to explore the category of references that are linguistically gender-neutral but which nevertheless seem to be doing gendered work.
5.3 Gender-neutral references that invoke gender

Generally, the literature on gender and language has ignored the gendered potential of linguistically neutral references such as ‘they’, ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘I’. In some ways, this is surprising because, with the possible exception of ‘I’, other instances can index categories of persons. For example, Sacks (1995: Lecture 11:568) focuses on ‘we’ as a categorical reference. He points out that, ‘we’ is a pronoun, and if used subsequent to a category reference, it preserves that reference. In Sacks’ illustrative case - ‘Kids don’t drive long....we do race’ - the use of ‘we’ preserves the category ‘kids’. Clearly, there will be instances in interaction where ‘we’ is used subsequent to gendered categories.

If used as a locally subsequent reference, the word ‘they’ has similar properties. For example, in the next extract, in which the speaker, Stan, is talking about comments made to him about his long hair, Stan uses the categorical reference ‘women’ (line 1) followed by a subsequent ‘they’ (line 3) that indexes the same category.

Extract Seventeen

[CTS01]

01 Sta: And then these woman- women sat sat behind us
02 (0.5)
03 Sta: And (0.4) they started going on about it
04 (0.4)
05 Sta: Saying watch your cigarettes because they
06 might catch light an’ everything.

In this case then, the linguistically neutral ‘they’ is gendered by virtue of indexing a gender category that was earlier mentioned in the interaction. However, it is not the case here that ‘they’ is doing any gender work in the talk. This is because it relies grammatically on a reference that happens to be linguistically gendered but is not itself relevantly gendered interactionally. That is, Stan’s use of ‘women’ is not particularly invoking a gendered social world beyond the fact that he identifies persons unknown
to him as women (as opposed to any of the other categories by which he could, presumably, have selected). He is not suggesting that it was because the referents were women that they made these comments about his hair.\footnote{Although, we should note that gender forms an important backdrop to this interaction because it is because Stan’s long hair breaks norms for men’s hair length that people comment at all.}

Perhaps more relevant here, are cases where uses of non-gendered references are not used as locally subsequent indexicals. That is, where ‘we’ and ‘they’ are used independently (or at least semi-independently) of an earlier named referent or category. Sacks (1995:762-763) points to one such instance in which use of ‘they’ (see Extract 18, line 3) relies, in part, upon an understanding of marital relationship, and leads to recognition of an otherwise unidentified ‘he’ (line 6) as a referent’s husband.\footnote{There is certainly more to be said about this extract. As Sacks notes, the analysis of ‘he’ as Mr Hooper also relies on use of ‘Mrs Hooper’ and information about her poor state of health - caring for an ill wife being analysable as one that a husband might be expected to perform.}

**Extract Eighteen**  
[Sacks, 1995:762-763]  
01 A: How is Missuz Hooper.  
02 B: Uh oh, about the same.  
03 A: mm, mm mm mm. Have they uh th-uh  
04 Then she’s still continuing in the same way.  
05 B: Yes, mm hm.  
06 A: Well I hope uh he can con- uh can, carry on  
07 that way, be[cause-  
08 B: [Well he wants to make a chay- a change,
holiday, attending parties, getting up late, having friends round, are all activities that tend to point to a relationship.

Context is also important in the next extract, and acts locally to gender a linguistically neutral ‘they’ (line 16). In this call between two friends, Nancy is telling Emma about a new man - Rob - she had recently met at a dinner party. She describes Rob as ‘just a real nice guy’, ‘personable’ and ‘considerate’, and, as evidence of his considerate nature in particular, she tells Emma that he would, almost without prompting, jump out of his chair to light her cigarettes.

Extract Nineteen
[NB II 4]

01 Nan: [A:nd a]h,.hhh hez bih with'm f*er *abaht fifene
02 yea*:rss.h a:nd ah,h So consequentl*y he's very?
03 (.) eez intelligen'? en he's ah .hh NOT
04 HAI:NS''M. .hh But he's nijce l*ook*i:ng
05 ih a::n]d ah iist a ri:1 ril nice:=
06 Emm: [N m hm]
07 Nan: =PEr's'nable, VERY pers'nable, VERY SW*EET. .hhh
08 VE:R*y: (.) C"NSIDERATE MY GOD ALL I HAD DO WZ
09 LOOK ETTA CIGARETTE'N 'E WZ OUTTA TH'CHAIR
10 LIGHTING(h)IT CHHHE KNO(h)OW [.hehh.hh]=
11 Emm: [I:  KNO:]=
12 =[W  U T ]
13 Nan: =[One a' th]ose kind .hhhhh [A::]n'==
14 Emm: [Yes]
15 Nan: =so[: but [we w'r]
16 Emm: [THEY [DO THAT ][BEFORE EN] A:FTER THEY]=
17 Nan: [eeYheheee] AHH  HAH]=
18 Emm: =_D_O]:n't. ]
19 Nan: = HAH], hhhhhh|hhhh
20 Emm: [('R gez)]
21 Nan: [N__O__H] i? E-HELEN HEZ "KNown Ro:b,"
22 (E): hmmm[hh hhmhhhh
Linguistic and Interactional Relevance

Nancy closes her extensive extolling of Rob’s attributes with a general categorical reference - ‘one of those kind’ (line 13). That is, she places Rob in a category of persons that behave in attentive and considerate ways. It is likely that gender is beginning to creep relevantly into the talk with this categorical reference. Although Nancy does not explicitly say, ‘one of those kind of men’, the list of behaviours and attributes she describes might be hearable as those that are (or were at the time) desirable in a potential male lover or partner. There is evidence for this in Emma’s rather cynical (though teasing) response at lines 16 and 18: ‘They do that before and after they don’t’.

Emma uses ‘they’ twice in this turn, without fully explicating who ‘they’ are. In fact, not much in this turn is fully articulated. The reference to ‘that’ indexes the lighting of the cigarette, which apparently ‘they’ will do before some unspecified act, but not after. However, treating Nancy’s ‘one of those kind’ as referring to a particular kind of man, Nancy’s uses of ‘they’ are hearable as locally subsequent references to men. Having invoked the category ‘men’, the kinds of things that men might do are relevant for the interaction. Emma does not specify the conduct to which she is referring, but instead invites her recipient to inspect ‘known’ male behaviours in order to make sense of her claim. More specifically, Emma is alluding to, and reproducing a discourse of male heterosexual conduct in which men will pay attention to a woman in pursuit of sex, but having achieved this goal, will no longer be so attentive.

This is a tease.80 It occurs in the sequential environment that Drew (1987) identifies as being ripe for teasing - i.e. after overdoing something. In this case, Nancy overdoes her positive description of Rob. It is built to be non-serious, and this is achieved, in part, by the non-gendered reference - so, Emma does not say, ‘men do that before…’, which might have been more hearable as outright pessimism. Nevertheless, Emma is displaying some skepticism with Nancy’s somewhat overbuilt description of Rob. Insofar as

80 Indeed, this extract is included in Drew’s (1987) collection of po-faced responses to teases.
the tease plays off a ‘known’ male attribute, and reminds Nancy that she might be being ‘taken-in’, she is warranted to treat it seriously. Indeed, her po-faced response (line 21) displays that she has recognised and rejected Emma’s teasing allusion to the possibility that Rob, being a man, is simply after ‘one thing’.

Here, then, is a gender-neutral reference (‘they’) that is clearly interactionally gendered. The question of why Emma selected ‘they’ as opposed to ‘men’ is resolved when we see her action as a tease. As Drew (ibid) argues, teases have to be produced so as they come off as such, rather than being seen as directly hostile. One of the ways this is achieved is through the selection of unusual or gross lexical items. In Emma’s case, the selection of ‘they’ is hearable as an indirect, more subtle and atypical reference to men.

In the preceding sections, I have shown cases where linguistically gendered words either carry an interactional force of gender, or do not. Similarly, there are cases of linguistically neutral words that nevertheless convey gender interactionally. In the remaining sections, I focus on a single extract to show how the distinction between linguistic and interactional references plays over the course of an interaction.

**5.4 Single-Case: Penny and Stan discuss hair**

Penny and Stan are some twelve minutes into the call. Immediately before this stretch of interaction opens, Stan reports having just had his hair cut and dyed in an attempt to ‘sort it out’ after Penny’s recent attempt to style it for him, which (according to Stan) ‘completely messed it up’ leaving him looking ‘stupid’ and ‘like a piece of bloody lego’. He announces ‘You’re never cutting my hair again’; describes what she had done to his hair as ‘a haircut you give to a dog’. Penny is unrepentant throughout. She rejects his allegations (‘I made a good job of your hair’), and laughs at his complaints. As the extract opens, she is defensively comparing her
attempts on Stan’s hair with what she claims to be a much worse previous
haircut executed by her friend Kev.

Extract Twenty

[CTS01]

01 Pen: .hhhh Yeah we(h)ll I di- at least I cut it
02 like .hhhh >you know< in like a no:rmal sort’a
03 [s h a : pe[ even though- [yeah [but =
04 Sta: >I’ve sort(ed it out< [now [anyway=
05 [( ])
06 Pen: =[KEV JUST CUT A BI[G CHUNK out’a the back’v
07 your cro:wn. He just got hold of your hai:r
08 ’n chopped it. [H u h h u h h u h uh ]=
09 Sta: =[So:. I can cover that u:pp.]=
10 Pen: =[huh huh huh [.hhhh ]WHA:T u: at least=
11 Sta: =[I couldn’t’v [( ]]
12 Pen+= =I did it l[i k e] you know, intentionally==
13 Sta: =[mHHh!]=
14 Pen: =to make it look nice.=Kev just chopped a
15 big (.l- like (.l) sloa:ds: hhh! (.l) a big
16 piece of your ↑hai:ri off at the b↑ack. .hh
17 That’s gonna- .h when that [starts growing ]
18 Sta: =[Yeah he did ( ] )
19 he messed it [u p .]
20 Pen: =[When-] when that starts growing
21 though you’re going to have like a bi(h)g pie(h)ce
22 of (h)hair “sti(h)cking up” [Hah hah hah]=
23 Sta: =[↑OO:::H! ]=
24 Pen: =[Heh heh heh heh! ]
25 Sta: =[Why is that funny.]
26 Pen: =.hhhh huh [huh! huh “hah” ]
27 Sta: =If it’s funny ]= I’ll have (.)
28 [people sai:ying things to me] ’n:: (.l) shout=ing=
29 Pen: =[hah hah hah hah ]
30 Sta: =at m- <The other day I got on the Me:t: .hh I
31 thought “what the he:ll goes through your hea:d.”
32 [ I probably to:ld you:: ]
33 Pen: =[(voiceless laughter getting louder ))]
34 Sta: It’s like .hh [bloody .hh every-]
35 Pen: =[,HHH hah hahah ] hah
36 Sta: I don’t understa:nd it. I do:n’t-
Chapter Five

37 uh scallies and (. ) everyone (. )=**
38 =mention: n (. ) long hai:r when I’m on on a- Like
39 (mimics) ”Oo: h hah hah hah hah” (think) .hh
40 “Look at the fine head of hai:r”.=I heard that.
41 =I heard that= an’ I thought “they’re ta:liking
42 about me and Kev”, and like I thought “w- wh-
43 what you do:ing man. You- you’re like for:ty:
44 You know. You- you’re a grown man and you’ve
45 still not go- got over the fact that- that some
46 peo:ple have- have quite long hair.”
47 Pen: ([v1] huh huh)
48 Sta: “You can’t get o- you can’t accept it.”=It’s like
49 (. ) (mimics) ”Only gi:rls have long hai:r”.
50 Pen: Huh!
51 Sta: .hh ”Girls have long hair boy:es have
52 short hair”, that’s what they think.**
53 [(They think=)]
54 Pen: [.hh That’s=] that’s just sa:id though really:
55 enit. I mean he’s gonna have no: hair huh! like
56 in another fi:ve yea:rs so::
** There is continuous voiceless laughter (overlapping with
Stan’s ongoing talk) from Penny between these symbols.

Before focusing specifically on gender issues, I will first sketch out what is
happening in this episode. The interaction opens in the course of Stan’s
complaint against Penny, which she is attempting to field: (a) by pointing
out that Kev’s attempts on Stan’s hair were even more disastrous than her
own; and (b) by treating Stan’s badly cut hair as amusing rather than as a
legitimate complainable (lines 1-22). Stan rejects both of Penny’s efforts to
defend herself against his complaint. Not only does he not join in her
laughter (at lines 9 and 11, See Jefferson, 2004), but with ‘so:’ (line 9) he
challenges the implication she is inviting him to draw that Kev’s haircut was
worse than hers, and he provides an account for that challenge (what Kev
did could be concealed whereas the damage she has done apparently
cannot, lines 10-11). When Penny indignantly dismisses Stan’s account
(’WHAT’, line 10 is a reaction token conveying outraged incredulity,
Wilkinson and Kitzinger 2006), and launches into further self-defence,
Stan’s reaction (mHhh!, line 13) is an emphatically exasperated sigh. Penny
tries again to make her haircutting efforts less heinous by comparison with Kev’s: her intentions were good (‘to make it look nice’, lines 14), whereas Kev ‘just chopped’ (line 14). The repeated use of ‘just’ to modify descriptions of Kev’s actions - ‘just cut’, line 6, ‘just got hold of your hair’, line 7, ‘just chopped’, line 14 - convey a sense of Kev as acting without compunction and with “an unjustified [so to speak] sense of determined entitlement” (Schegloff, 2007a: p.34). And Penny counters Stan’s argument that he can ‘cover ... up’ (line 9) what Kev did to his hair by claiming that (while, by implication, covering it up may be possible now), as his hair starts to grow out there will be ‘a bi(h)g pie(h)ce of (h)hair “sti(h)cking up”’ (lines 21-22). Again she invites him to treat his bad haircut as amusing and here again there is no affiliative laughter from Stan (lines 23 and 25) but instead another reaction token conveying irritation and exasperation (line 23), followed by Stan’s explicit challenge to her treatment of his haircut as ‘funny’ (line 25). Stan now holds Penny accountable, not only for what she has done to his hair but also for making his hair a laughing matter.

His account for why his ‘funny’ haircut is not, for him, amusing runs almost to the end of this extract (lines 27-53). It is an account that avoids directly blaming either Penny or Kev for what they have done to his hair, but which instead mocks other people whose sexist stereotypes lead them to make comments about it. Gender erupts into the interaction here as part of Stan’s shift from an extended complaint against Penny to a complaint about other, non-present and not specifically identified people. This shift of Stan’s is conciliatory. Complaints against a co-conversationalist (such as Stan’s against Penny) are tricky interactional environments for recipients (as well as speakers) and make relevant as preferred next actions apologies, accounts, explanations, offers of restitution and the like (Schegloff, 2007b), none of which have been forthcoming from Penny here. In designing his complaint about strangers who pass comments on his appearance, and who do so on gendered grounds, Stan apparently hopes (given what he knows about her values) to elicit Penny’s support and affiliation in mocking other people’s narrow sexism. Stan’s overall project in shifting from a
complaint against his co-conversationalist to a complaint against non-present others - and to this particular complaint (i.e. their sexism) - is designed to produce alignment between himself and Penny. (He also shifts the role of Kev from that of a perpetrator of bad behaviour against him to that of a victim along with him of another person’s bad behaviour.) During these 80 seconds, then, the interaction shifts from a complaint/self-defence sequence, to a telling with aligned reciprocity as the participants express shared judgments about the deplorable sexism of their elders. Stan’s portrayal of gendered beliefs about hair, and his treatment of them as sexist, are locally occasioned and locally managed and cannot be analysed as standing above and beyond the talk as representative of Stan’s feminist principles (for a contrasting kind of analysis see Edley, 2001).

Although there is much more that could be said about this interaction, my analysis will now focus on the ways in which gender is, and is not, relevantly produced. Since gendered terms in gendered interactional contexts constitute the mainstay of language and gender research, I will first briefly point to the use of linguistically gendered terms that also have clearly gendered meanings for the participants (here, ‘girls’, lines 49 and 51; ‘boys’, line 51). Second, for completeness, I show the use of a linguistically non-gendered term (‘people’, line 28) that is also non-gendered for the participants. My key contributions however lie in the analysis of terms that are linguistically gendered without being relevantly gendered and those that are linguistically gender neutral but which nevertheless are gendered interactionally. Thus, third, I show - as Kitzinger (2007) showed for ‘woman’ - the use of a gendered term (‘man’, line 34), deployed in a context in which gender is not the primary interactional meaning of that term for the participants. Finally I analyse a term (‘people’, line 46), that is not gendered linguistically but which is understood by the co-interactants as gendered.
5.4.1 ‘Girls’ (line 49, 51) and ‘Boys’ (line 51): Both Linguistically and Interactionally Gendered

As dictionary definitions, the terms ‘girls’ and ‘boys’ are linguistically gendered as female and male respectively. As noted at the start of this chapter, it is not sufficient, however, to claim that gender is relevant to social participants simply on the basis that they use terms that are linguistically gendered since linguistically gendered terms can be deployed without gender being a key orientation for the participants. Adequate analysis must show that and how these linguistically gendered terms are also relevantly gendered interactionally (if they are).

The action here turns on the cultural understanding, displayed in the talk, that having long hair is category-bound (Sacks, 1972x) to ‘girls’ such that Stan (who takes himself to be readily seen as male) is breaching some conventional moral order by having long hair. In his account here, Stan both shows how he has come to learn that ‘long hair’ is culturally treated as a property of ‘girls’ (not boys) and contests that claim. What is seen here is an animated aspect of gender-contestation in talk-in-interaction.

In the course of his account for why his hair is no laughing matter, Stan has shifted the topic under dispute from ‘funny’ (i.e. oddly cut) hair to ‘long hair’ (line 38), thereby obliquely drawing on gender for the first time in the interaction, and inviting the understanding that the ‘long hair’ is a source of comment from others because he and Kev are both male - a gendered understanding that is subsequently made explicit (lines 49, 51-52). Why and in the service of what action does gender erupt into the interaction here? Over the course of this extract, Stan is engaged in shifts from an extended complaint about Penny’s having ‘messed ... up’ his hair to a complaint about other (non-present) people’s sexist stereotypes of hair length. Complaints against a co-conversationalist (such as Stan’s against Penny) make relevant as preferred next actions apologies, accounts, explanations, offers of restitution and the like none of which are forthcoming from Penny. Instead she has indignantly rejected his
complaint, named another person (Kev) as having done worse than she, defended her own good intentions, and continued to treat the outcome of her actions (Stan’s ‘messed up’ hair) as amusing. This last move is challenged by Stan (‘why is that funny’) who claims that as a consequence of his ‘funny’ appearance (to which Penny’s styling of his hair has contributed), he is victimised in public places, something he does not find amusing. To reiterate, Stan’s overall project in shifting from a complaint against his co-conversationalists to a complaint against non-present others - and to this particular complaint (i.e. their sexism) is designed to produce alignment between him and Penny.

The gendered meanings of ‘girls’ and ‘boys’ in this extract are achieved in part because of a contrast that is first inferable and then explicitly articulated. The inferable contrast is between ‘girls’ and ‘me and Kev’. Since ‘me and Kev’ are known by both Stan and Penny to be male (thus gendering the non-gendered term ‘me’), the claim ‘only girls have long hair’ is hearable as designed to express disapproval or to insult a known-to-be-male person by drawing attention to his gender nonconformity. In reporting, with disapproval, the man’s comment, Stan is challenging the relevance of ‘sex’ as a membership categorization device for the attribute of ‘long hair’. He reports a man as commenting, in the face of an encounter with a boy with long hair, that, ‘only girls have long hair’, thereby juxtaposing a (clearly false) belief with ‘the fact’ (line 45) of the existence of people who are not ‘girls’ but who have long hair. His formulation of the man’s comment supplies an instance of what Schegloff means in saying that:

The commonsense knowledge organised by reference to membership categories is protected against induction. If an ostensible member of a category appears to contravene what is “known” about members of the category, then people do not revise that knowledge, but see the person as “an exception”, “different”, or even a defective member of the category. [Schegloff, 2007c:469 ]
In his subsequent turn Stan labours the contrast between the man’s claim and the ‘facts’, through his explicit naming of the contrast class of people who are not girls: the contrast category (‘boys’) of which he is one. In treating as a reportable the sexist beliefs of others he displays his own distance from those beliefs and disavows sexist stereotyping for himself.

In sum, in pursuit of alignment from Penny, Stan uses the linguistically gendered terms ‘girls’ and ‘boys’ in ways that are specifically gendered for this interaction.

5.4.2 ‘People’ (line 28): Neither Linguistically nor Interactionally Gendered

When Stan accounts for why his ‘messed up’ hair is not a laughing matter, he describes the widespread harassment he receives as a consequence of it when in public places (‘the Met’, line 30 is part of the public transport system in his home town). In referring to his harassers as ‘people’ (line 28), he treats their gender as irrelevant. The term ‘people’ is not linguistically gendered: that is, as a dictionary definition ‘people’ means simply ‘human beings’, irrespective of gender. Nor is there any indication here that Stan treats the gender of the people who say things as interactionally relevant either. They are simply ‘people’ (line 28) or ‘everyone’ (line 37) - men and women alike (and indeed incidents involving both are subsequently reported, data not shown). The gender-neutrality of ‘people’ is part of the design of Stan’s turn which conveys the pervasive and routine experience of harassment about his hair, built to be hearable as a ‘script formulation’ (Edwards, 1994) i.e. that in his everyday experience ‘people saying things’ is predictable from the premise having ‘funny’ hair. Stan’s use of ‘people’ is important to carry this off. That is, naming or otherwise identifying particular others may provide grounds for dismissal by Penny (e.g. not worth listening to, having their own agenda and so on). ‘People’ in general are a much more amorphous group and are therefore more difficult to target in the middle of a disagreement. Stan subsequently
singles out one particular group of ‘people’ who harass him: ‘scallies’, thereby foregrounding distinctions between people based on class and not on gender.\textsuperscript{81} Since ‘scallies’ names a category of people Stan knows Penny to despise, and since the actions of ‘scallies’ are known-in-common between them to be reprehensible, his use of ‘scallies’ is part of his continuing effort to seek alignment from her in condemning his harassers.

5.4.3 ‘Man’ (line 44); Linguistically Gendered but not Interactionally Gendered

Out of the non-gendered group of ‘people’ (line 28) and ‘scallies and everyone’, (line 37) who harass him about his hair, Stan extracts one particular person as part of his telling about a specific illustrative incident. This person is linguistically gendered male: in his reported thoughts addressing this person, he uses the address term ‘man’ (line 43 - though this might also be applied to people gendered female under some circumstances) and he describes him as ‘a grown man’ (line 44). ‘Man’ is linguistically gendered in the sense that it can contrast with ‘woman’ in referring to a male person and it is selected here (line 44) where ‘woman’ would presumably be incorrect for the person concerned, and in this sense it is gender-specific: it refers to a male person. It also commonsensically refers to an adult male person (by contrast with ‘boy’ which refers to a young male person). Stan is engaged in criticising the kinds of people who make comments about long hair, and his use of ‘grown man’ is one of the devices he uses to construct his criticism. To see how this criticism is produced as such a thing it is necessary to consider what Sacks (1992) calls Membership Category Devices (MCD). These are conventional ways of categorizing persons in talk. For example, there are situated devices for classifying people according to gender, age, ethnicity, sexuality, profession, class and so on. Sacks treats MCDs as culture-in-action because not only

\textsuperscript{81} The term ‘scally’ is commonly used across the north-west of England, and particularly in Liverpool and Manchester, as a derogatory slang term to describe the unemployed working-class, who are involved in antisocial behaviour. The word’s origins lie in the Irish language: it is short for ‘scallywag’, which comes from an old Irish word for drudge or farm-servant ‘gaileog’. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scally) There is a specifically gendered version (‘scallylads’) that is not here used.
do they display the range and limits of available categories within any given community, but they also carry with them cultural and social expectations about the normative behaviour of persons defined in terms of them (this refers to Category Bound Activities or CBAs). Thus, MCDs and CBAs provide a resource for holding people accountable for their conduct and indeed one way to produce an insult is to draw attention to some breach of CBAs by members of that category. This is what Stan is doing. The category ‘grown man’ is a MCD that is clearly a gendered, but it also invokes a particular stage-of-life and so carries with it a set of CBAs connected not only to masculinity but also to maturity. For Stan, it is the immaturity of the man’s attitude that is the salient feature and the one for which Stan holds him accountable; the mismatch between his stage-of-life and his failure to accept that, ‘some people have quite long hair’ – something that is displayed as a fact that should have been ‘got over’ - no longer a cause for comment by forty year old men. The fact that the man is a man is not at issue, and this is not what matters here and now for Stan. The insult hinges on maturity and not gender and would still have been produced as such if Stan had chosen ‘grown person’ or ‘grown-up’.

This analysis does not preclude the possibility of participants’ subsequent orientation to ‘man’ as a gendered category. In aligning with Stan’s account, Penny disparages the ‘grown man’ in a manner that displays an orientation primarily to his age but also to his gender. Her observation that he will have, ‘no hair’ (line 55) in a few years time refers to baldness, which is characteristic not so much of people in general as they age, as it is of ageing men in particular. Penny is pointing to the ‘poetic justice’ that the ‘grown man’ may shortly find himself a target of harassment due to about having too little head hair, just as he has made Stan the target of harassment for having too much (a ‘fine head of hair’, line 40).

In sum, Stan’s use of ‘man’ (line 44) makes manifest the gender of the person who harassed him on this occasion, without the display of gender being his key orientation in selecting this description. Gender thereby
becomes available in the talk and can be oriented to and used by his co-conversationalist, but without either of them treating gender as the most relevant feature of the person so described or referred to. Although ‘man’ is linguistically gendered it is not used primarily to foreground gender and is not gendered interactionally.

5.4.4: “People” (line 46): Interactionally Gendered but not Linguistically Gendered

As I have said, ‘people’ is not a linguistically gendered term. However, here (line 46) it occupies a slot where ‘boys’ (or ‘males’ or some other masculine reference) would be properly fitted to describing the category of persons whose long hair is problematic for Stan’s harasser. Both conversationalists know that, ‘people’ having ‘quite long hair’ is not what the grown man objects to: it is (as Stan later says) specifically ‘boys’ (line 51) with long hair that he finds problematic. No matter how ridiculous or unwarranted it appears to Stan, it is gender that he knows underwrites the man’s comments. Thus, in referring to ‘some people’ in this context, Stan is hearably avoiding a gendered term and thereby making gender relevant: the puzzle is why he is referring to a known-to-be-gendered category using a term that specifically obscures it.

Notice that, ‘people’ is here (unlike its earlier use at line 17) a category that includes Stan, since he is one of the ‘people’ who has ‘quite long hair’ - and, indeed, is one of those harassed by the grown man about whose value system he is complaining. It may be that there is some local difficulty in coming up with a gendered category term for himself and Kev here: ‘men’ may not be quite right given that his harasser has been described as a ‘grown man’ and he and Kev (as teenagers still) are not ‘men’ as those aged 40 are; ‘boys’ would produce him with just the immaturity he is ascribing to his harasser (and is only used later in what is heavily marked as the ‘reported thought’ of other); ‘males’, ‘guys’, or ‘blokes’ (by being non-age-specific) might have done the trick.
In any event, Stan’s selection of a term that is not linguistically gendered in a slot that nonetheless is clearly hearable as referring to a gendered category serves to magnify the ludicrousness of the grown man’s objections to his own (and Kev’s) long hair. The term ‘people’ precisely fails to make the crucial distinction (between males and females) that purportedly led the grown man to comment on Stan’s hair in the first place. Without this gendered distinction his objections are deprived of even the flimsy gender-based rationale that Stan subsequently explicitly attributes to him (at lines 49, 51 and 52). Since ‘people’ occludes the rationale for his inability to ‘get over’ the indisputable ‘fact’ of some ‘people’s’ hair length, his behavior is produced as incomprehensible. This is fitted with Stan’s earlier claims to incomprehension about why people harass him about his hair length: (‘what the he:ll goes through your head’, line 31; ‘I don’t understand it’, line 36). To have said, ‘some boys/males/guys/blokes have quite long hair’ would have exposed Stan’s understanding of the grown man’s objection to his hair as gendered - something he has not yet made explicit, claiming simply to be baffled as to why people harass him on the basis of his hair length. By withholding a gendered term at this point, Stan produces himself as someone who is so far from holding sexist stereotypes about hair length that he is not able immediately to recognize them in others. His telling is in part a story of his having discovered, from others’ treatment of him, that they must hold the belief that, ‘girls have long hair boys have short hair’ (lines 51-2).

In sum, precisely by selecting the linguistically non-gendered term ‘people’ for a slot where some masculine reference would properly represent what Stan knows to be problematic about his long hair from his harasser’s perspective, Stan is both representing his harasser’s position as ludicrously sexist, moreover presenting himself as nonexistent. This linguistically non-gendered term is thus deployed to do gendered interactional work.
5.5: Implications for gender and language research.

This analysis was motivated by an interest in identifying participant orientations to gender in talk-in-interaction. I have shown that participants can use linguistically gendered terms both with and without a displayed orientation, in the first instance, to their gendered meanings as primary for the interaction. I have also shown that participants can use a linguistically non-gendered term (‘people’) both with and without gendered implications interactionally. I have shown, then, that the interactional meaning of gender is not intrinsic to gendered linguistic forms but to the action a linguistic form is used to do on any given occasion of use.

Building on prior analysis showing that participants’ deployment of a linguistically gendered term is not sufficient evidence for analysts to claim the relevance of gender to interactional participants (Kitzinger, 2007), I have both extended the scope of that observation and shown that deployment of a linguistically gendered term is not necessary for gender to be interactionally relevant. This significantly opens up the possibilities for research on gender and language, since it frees researchers from the perceived necessity of focusing their research on linguistically gendered terms and urges sensitivity to the multiplicity of ways in which people ‘do gender’ in interaction. It also continues the development of a feminist conversation analysis (Kitzinger 2000) that exposes the ways in which gender is constructed in everyday interaction.

The analysis also draws attention to the importance of understanding the deployment of gender (whether or not linguistically marked as such) in its local interactional context. In the single-case study, I have examined gender is used as part of a speaker’s attempt to shift from a complaint against his co-conversationalist to a telling about which she can align with him in shared judgment about others. As such gender can be deeply enmeshed in - and constitutive of - an interaction as a whole.

In the next chapter, the analysis is extended of linguistically neutral
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references that have interactionally gendered implications. In particular, I examine mundane uses of ‘I’ as a self-reference; a form of reference that has generally been taken-for-granted as categorically ‘empty’.
Chapter Six: The Gendered-I

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, a distinction was made between linguistic and interactional references. That is, on occasion, linguistically gendered references do not have gendered implications in the interaction (though sometimes they do). Conversely, on occasion, linguistically gender-neutral references can have gendered implications. In this chapter, I extend the analysis of these gender-neutral selections by focussing on perhaps the most commonly used reference of all - the self-reference ‘I’. I show that, although, generally speaking, uses of ‘I’ do not invoke any categorical information about the speaker, there are occasions when its use is categorically loaded.

In English, the lexical item “I” does not contain any categorical information about the speaker; not gender, age, class, nor race. It is what Schegloff (1996a: 440) calls reference simpliciter; that is, it designed to do simple self-reference (as opposed to constituting some further action) and its use ‘masks the relevance of the referent and the reference for the talk’ (ibid: 446) because it is ‘opaque with respect to all the usual key categorical dimensions – age, gender, status and the like’ (Schegloff, 2007a: 123). One potential upshot of this is that the apparent simplicity of “I” might make its use appear less appealing analytically than other forms of self-reference. However, the use of “I” for self-reference is always selection from a range of possible alternatives. For example, speakers may self-refer through uses of: ‘we’ (Lerner and Kitzinger, 2007); ‘you’ (in a generic sense, Schegloff, 1996a); and formulations typically used for third-party reference (Land and Kitzinger, 2007). On any occasion then, the selection of ‘I’ is as designedly relevant for the ongoing talk as any other selection, and therefore bears examination. Given this, there is no reason to suppose that individual instances of ‘I’ are equivalent across cases. The key claim I make in this chapter is that there are some instances where a speaker’s self-referential “I” is hearable as indexing categorical information. That is, sometimes, “I”
The Gendered-I appears to do more than simply index a generic speaker. Instead, it can be used flexibly to index something more specific about the speaker without having to name what that something is. Drawing on extracts from my dataset, the CTS corpus, and on extracts from other corpora, I demonstrate the categorical indexicality of particular uses of “I” with special reference to speaker membership categories of gender. I show how the apparently ordinary unremarkable form of self-reference (“I”) can, in context, index gender without speakers’ categorical membership being explicitly so referenced. I am calling this use of “I” the gendered-I. However, the category-implicative “I” is not limited to gender and so I end with instances of “I” that appear to index categorical information other than gendered-memberships.

As outlined in Chapter Two, I locate my work in the emerging field of feminist conversation analysis (see Kitzinger, 2000, 2007a, 2008; Speer, 2001, 2002a, 2005; Stokoe and Weatherall, 2002). One aspect of Feminist CA (also outlined in Chapter Two) is the claim that gendered (and other) identities are emergent, locally occasioned and routinely constituted in interaction. Feminist conversation analysis resonates with ethnomethodological feminisms (Kitzinger, 2000:166), in which men/boys and women/girls are not regarded as always-and-forever talking as gendered beings, but rather may produce themselves or be produced as gendered in the taken-for-granted, routinised details of interaction (see Garfinkel, 1967, Kessler and McKenna, 1978:136, West and Zimmerman, 1987: 13-14).

One key finding to emerge from this kind of work is that use of terms that are gendered linguistically (such as ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘gentleman’, ‘lady’) are not necessarily analysable as interactionally gendered for participants in talk-in-interaction (e.g. Kitzinger, 2007b:43, Stockill and Kitzinger, 2007:230). Conversely, terms which are gender-neutral in their abstract, linguistic sense, are not necessarily gender-neutral for participants, In Chapter Five, I show how, in context, a particular use of the linguistically gendered term “man” was not relevantly gendered in the interaction; on
the other hand, deployment of the linguistically gender-neutral “people” in
the same conversation was clearly hearable as referring to a gendered
category. That is, deployment of a linguistically gendered term is not
necessary for gender to be interactionally relevant.

Building on my earlier work, this chapter extends the scope of the this
claim by exploring how the linguistically non-gendered term “I” can be
interactionally gendered for the participants.

This chapter contributes to feminist analyses of gender and language
by showing where and how speakers are oriented to themselves as
gendered. It also contributes to conversation analytic work on person
reference; particularly self-reference in talk, where uses of “I” so far
examined are those that obscure rather than index categorical
information (Schegloff, 2007a:123). To provide some context for this
last claim, I will first review the CA literature on self-reference and
illustrate its key discoveries with extracts drawn from my own data.
Then, I will show uses of “I” that: index a speaker’s gender, age, or
stage of life and, finally, other categories.

6.2 Self-Reference

Schegloff (1996a; 442) shows that, in English, the default practice for doing
self-reference, is through use of the dedicated pronoun “I” (or its
grammatical variants). He has patently clear grounds for doing so; “I” is the
most numerically common form of self-reference, and it is uncomplicated
in that its basic form, “I”, remains unaffected by its sequential position in
talk. That is, normatively, the first, second and nth time that a speaker
references themselves in a spate of talk, they do so with “I” (or its
grammatical variants). This contrasts with referring to non-present
persons, where an initial reference is typically done using a prototypical

1 Schegloff (1996a; 442), citing Sacks 1995, cautions against ‘pronoun’ as a term because linguistically, it means standing in place of the
noun. However, as Schegloff observes, first person pronouns ‘I’ and ‘me’, and second person pronoun ‘you’ are default ways of referring
to speaker and recipients. Third person pronouns ‘he’ and ‘she’ are default locally subsequent reference terms. In all cases, if nouns
(e.g. names) are used then they are used in place of the pronoun and not the other way round.
locally initial form such as a name or a descriptive phrase (e.g. “Vicky” or “my best friend”) whereas subsequent references to the same person are normally done using the prototypical locally subsequent form of pronouns (e.g. “she”). In Extract One, a non-present referent is introduced into the conversation for the first time using a locally initial name (line 1) and then referred to again in the next turn using a locally subsequent pronoun (line 3).

**Extract One**  
[CTS36]

01 Ell: Hum. HHH C– I saw Vicky drunk last night.
02 Kar: Oh:: was she piss:ed.

By contrast, in Extract Two, a teenage-boy, Stan, tells his girlfriend that he cannot visit her until his mother has made his travel arrangements. Across this short spate of talk, Stan refers to himself six\(^82\) times. Of these self-references, five take the form “I” (the remaining one being a grammatical variant -“me” at line 2) and each is produced in default terms and its form does not change across the turn (except, of course, in the case of “me”, due to grammatical necessity).

**Extract Two**  
[CTS05]

01 Sta: I’m just waiting I just want my mum to sort out this t- ticket and tell me what I’m doing because like I’ll just stuff it up won’t I

Default self-reference then takes the standard form of ‘I’ (and its grammatical variants) no matter what form of self-reference precedes or follows it. Extract Three also illustrates that “I” masks categorical information about the speaker: Though Stan is male, and is known by his

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\(^82\) Putting aside the complication of the implied self-reference contained in what is actually a reference to a non-present third-party; “my mum”
recipient so to be, he is not talking *relevantly* as a male (Schegloff, 1997:165). Stan is many things besides being male – a musician, a teenager, a British citizen, an atheist, a Virgo and so on. Following Schegloff (1996a, 2007a), these categorical memberships (with the possible exception of his maleness which is available from the quality of his voice, though not here relevantly so) are obscured in Stan’s uses of “I” that mean simply “I the speaker”.

In comparison to self-reference, references to third parties are often categorically loaded. For example, names and locally subsequent terms are often linguistically gendered and *can* make available inferences (or reveal assumptions) about such things as sexuality (Land and Kitzinger, 2005: 408) and national, ethnic or religious heritage (Sacks, 1995: 338) *even when speakers are not designing them to do so*. That is, even though gender may not be interactionally *relevant*, it is interactionally *available* as a resource when speakers use prototypical male and female names, descriptors and locally subsequent non-present third-person terms such as “he” and “she”. By contrast, “I” is used by men and women, heterosexual and LGBT persons, Jews and Gentiles alike, and is not inflected with age, status, gender, race and the like. The relative abstruseness of “I” as revealing categorical information ordinarily means that when speakers wish to draw specific attention to their own categorical membership (or some aspect of their identity) through talk-in-interaction, they do so designedly, through use of alternative forms of self-reference.

One practice speakers use to highlight a particular aspect of their identity is self-description using the basic format “I am an X” or a grammatical variant, as in Extracts Three and Four, in which speakers say such things as; “I’m a girl” and “I’m really girly”. In extract three, Penny’s declaration that she is a girl (line 7) constitutes a tease (note the laughter, and the soft delivery) and is occasioned by boyfriend Stan’s lengthy complaint about the sorts of comments he receives about his long hair. Just before the extract opens, Stan complains to Penny that someone had asked him if he gets hot under
all that hair. Penny’s response at line 1 is the beginnings of a tease, which she elaborates in the target line following a typical po-faced response from Stan (see Drew, 1987).

**Extract Three**  
[CTS01]

01 Pen: [I sa(h)y that thou(hh)gh:
02 Sta: No but that shouldn’t- why- why would
03 you say that, you- you’ve got
04 [longer] hair than me:
05 Pen: [.hh ]
06 (.)
07 Pen: Huh huh I’m a °girl° [haHAHAHA .hhhh ]
08 Sta: [Yeah ye- d- what]

We might note in passing here, the force of the other person references in this extract, which are also not gendered. So, at line 1, Penny’s ‘I’ simply means ‘I, the speaker’. At lines 2-3, Stan uses ‘you’ multiply during his turn to refer to his recipient and at line 5, he uses ‘me’ to refer to himself. Evidence that these simple, straightforward references are not hearably gendered, at least for the recipient, is provided by Penny’s invocation of gender as a tease in her turn at line 7. Here, it is apparent that Penny has not oriented to ‘you’ and ‘me’ as possibly gendered.

In Extract Four, Sophie describes herself as “really girly” (line 5) in order to highlight a contrast with a friend of her recipient. The non-present friend is referred to in line 01 using (a locally subsequent) ‘she’ and so is also hearably a girl, but that she is clearly not ‘girly’ is given by virtue of her membership of the here contrastive category ‘Mosher.’

**Extract Four**  
[CTS02]

01 Sop: But is she a Mosher.
02 (0.7)
03 Emm: Yeah

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83 A Mosher is a UK term for a youth culture that involves dancing (or ‘head-banging’) to rock/punk music and often dressing in dark clothes.
Using such formulations as ‘I am an X’, speakers describe themselves as
gendered persons. However, it is not the self-reference -“I” - that achieves
this. “I” is simply a person reference that refers to the speaker (See
Schegloff, 1996a:441, Schegloff, 2007a:123). The person reference in such
statements is produced independently of the descriptive component – even
when that descriptive component is a category, as it is in Extract Three or
an adjective built off categorical membership, as in Extract Four (see
Schegloff, 2007b:434). When a speaker describes themselves as belonging
to a category it is the categorical component of the utterance that conveys
the gendered nature of the speaker and not the person reference (See Land
and Kitzinger, 2011). My interest in this chapter, is specifically in the self-
reference, and its localised context-specific capacity for conveying
categorical information without having to name the category.

Speakers do have other practices for referring to themselves other than
through using “I” (Schegloff, 1996a:442-445). These include use of a generic
“you” which often seems to mean “I” or “me” (see Extract Five, line 11,
below, in which a generic “you” refers to the speaker as well as to her
recipient and an unspecified collectivity of others, in accounting for her
behaviour as normative.84 Speakers might also use kinship names to refer
to themselves, when talking to small children for instance (as in a mother
telling her child that, ‘Mummy is tired’). Self-reference can also be
accomplished through use of “we” to convey speaking on behalf of an
institution or collectivity of persons (see also Lerner and Kitzinger, 2007);

84 Compare Mary’s use of “I” as agent of the ‘being naughty’ with her use of “you” in her account for why she told her boyfriend she
was on her period. In both cases, Mary means to refer to herself, though with the “you”, Mary is bringing herself of as a member of a
group of people who do not ‘rush into things’.
and even use of prototypical (locally initial) third-person references (e.g. I might refer to myself as ‘the author’).

Extract Five
[CTS33]

01 Mar: [( ) like. And then (0.9) I was
02 a little naughtly hhhhhhhhh
03 Kar: Wh(h)at d(h)id you do::.
04 (.)
05 Mar: Erm well I tol- I don’t know why
06 but I told him I was on my period.
07 (0.5)
08 Mar: I think that was like kind of
09 like a barrier thing wasn’t it.
10 Kar: Oh right. [Yeah.
11 Mar: [Because you don’t
12 want to rush into anything. So
13 I told him I was on my period so
14 that like I sort of ‘did stuff to him’

In the matter of designing self-reference to invoke a particular relevancy of self, Land and Kitzinger (2007) show how speakers sometimes use terms ordinarily reserved for references to absent/non-addressed third parties in order to do self-reference (e.g. they have data in which a speaker refers to herself as ‘the woman he fell in love with’, where ‘he’ is her male partner, and the speaker is engaged in presenting herself as if from the perspective of her husband (ibid: 498)). In many of their data extracts, the third-party self-reference terms are descriptive rather than names. This is perhaps not surprising since in using third-party terms for self-reference, speakers need to ‘select such terms as display (or constitute) the current relevance with which the referent figures in the talk’ (Schegloff, 1996a: 447). This contrasts with situations where third-party descriptors are necessary to achieve recognition of a non-addressed/absent referent (see Sacks and Schegloff, 1972; Schegloff, 1996a). The key point about this difference is that when third-party descriptive terms appear in their normative environment, they may convey a stance or categorical information about a
Chapter Six

referent even if they are not designed so to do (Stivers, Enfield and Levinson, 2007; 4), but in self-reference, the inferences available in a third-party descriptor are specifically designed to be there and are fitted to (indeed may constitute) whatever course of action is underway (Land and Kitzinger, 2007;521). The third party self references are:

...selected to make available in the talk those aspects of ‘I’ or ‘me’ that are otherwise submerged in an English pronoun that conveys nothing about gender, nationality, relationship with recipient, etc.[Land and Kitzinger, 2007;521]

Previous conversation analytic work (particularly Land and Kitzinger, 2007, and Schegloff, 1996a, 2007a) therefore treats “I” as reference simpliciter and shows the extra work required of speakers if they are designedly to convey the local relevance of a particular feature of their identity through use of an alternative practice for referring (as opposed to naming a category). I turn now to work that extends the analysis of uses of ‘I’ beyond its status as a self-reference simpliciter, particularly the recent work of Lerner and Kitzinger (2007b) and Turk (2007). Both papers resonate with my work on the gendered-I, by showing that there is more to be said about ‘I’ than that it is a term dedicated for doing self-reference.

Lerner and Kitzinger (2007b; 551) extend the scope of canonical self-reference to include “we” as well as “I”. That is, they show that, in referring to themselves, speakers sometimes have a choice between two equally viable (or equally unremarkable) forms of self-reference - “I” and “we”. Speakers are sensitive to the consequences of selecting one over the other, as they might halt the progressivity of talk to deal with (or more formally, repair) some ostensible trouble with self-reference. Citing Schegloff’s (1996a: 446) argument that “I” masks the relevance of the referent for the talk, they observe that:
when its use is the result of a repair operation that explicitly selects it over another form of self-reference (i.e. collective self-reference), then its local relevance may be partially unmasked. (Lerner and Kitzinger, 2007b:531).

They show that “I” and “we” are both possible selections in many turns at talk and that recipients can inspect either of them for what they might be doing given that the other could have been used. Repairs make visible precisely the import of these issues for the participants. Given participants’ concerns with forms of self-reference, any use of “I” (or “we”) may be analysed for ways in which its selection is informed by considerations beyond simple reference. Lerner and Kitzinger’s work opens up a potentially rich seam of analytic scrutiny of the use of “I” on a case-by-case, turn-by-turn basis in order to explicate its sequential fit for the speaker, recipient and action.

A beginning to this analytic scrutiny is made by Turk (2007), who examines self-referential gestures (e.g. bringing the hand to the chest) in data where the participants are co-present. Turk’s analysis focused on those self-referential gestures that coincided with the speakers’ production of a prosodically stressed “I” in speech. She shows how this combination of self-referential activities (i.e. of speech and gesture) accomplishes more than simple reference. Specifically, she develops Lerner and Kitzinger’s (2007) analysis of repairs in which speakers extract themselves from a collectivity (e.g. some variant of ‘we’ to ‘I’), showing how these repairs may be embodied in gesture. For example, in one of Turk’s extracts (extract three, p. 565) the speaker repairs (in third turn) “the first day” to “the first time I was there” and places prosodic stress on the self-reference “I”. Here the combination of gesture and prosodic stress accomplishes extraction of the speaker from a collectivity (of students in her class). Turk informs us that the gesture was produced just before the production of the stressed “I”, which is important because it suggests that the gesture itself projects the extraction and is not a simple reference to self.
The work of Lerner and Kitzinger (2007) and Turk (2007) show there is more to be said about uses of “I” beyond its use as a reference simpliciter. Extending this analysis, in the next section it is argued that the normatively non-gendered self-reference “I” can sometimes be hearably gendered (or as referring to age) by virtue of the context of its production.

6.3 The Gendered-I
The vast majority of uses of “I” in talk are instances of reference-simpliciter; they do nothing but self reference. Here are some examples from my own data. In Extract Six, sixteen year old Penny is building a claim to have ‘real depression’ rather than some temporary low mood.

Extract Six
[CTS05]

01 Pen: Yeah: .hhh No I- I’ve been feeling this
02 for ages. I’ve been feeling it coming on
03 for like wee:ks: now. .hh I’ve been feeling
04 really down you know because I’ve been
05 crying a lot. And everything.

In Extract Seven, fifteen year old Sophie has invited her older sister Penny to the cinema.

Extract Seven
[CTS20]

01 Pen: There’s a couple of films I want
02 to see. I haven’t got any money though.
03 (.)
04 Sop: Yea::h. I’ll pay and you can pay
05 me back

In Extract Eight, sixteen year old Ellie is telling her friend Karen about a party she went to the night before.

Extract Eight
In each of these extracts, speakers’ self-references are produced using the canonical form of “I” or its grammatical variant “me”. In each case, the “I” simply refers to the current speaker and does nothing to invoke particular categorical membership. However, there are cases where the self-reference “I” does invoke categorical membership by virtue of the context of its production. Four cases are presented in the remainder of this section.

The first instance of a gendered-I, Extract Nine, is taken from a call between girlfriend and boyfriend - Penny and Stan - and the candidate gendered-I occurs on line 8. Stan is complaining about the sorts of comments people reportedly feel free to make about the length of his hair. He patently resents the gender stereotypes that cast him as deviant for having long hair and, at the opening of the extract, asks rhetorically ‘what’s the big deal’ (line 1).

**Extract Nine**

**[CTS01]**

01 Sta: What what’s the big deal. .hhh
02 Pen: It’s l- it’s like when people come up to you and go [uh ((mimics))=
03 Sta: ={‘\<Are you hot in with that hair\> cut’}.=
04 Pen: ={[Huh huh huh huh ]}
05 Sta: =Are y- No. Why woul- why the hell
06 Sta: =Would I be hot? Girls have long hai:r.
Chapter Six

09 Pen: Are you a what...hh
10 Sta: Wh- 'are you hot'.
11 (0.3)
12 Pen: °I-(h) [.hhhhhhhh= ]
13 Sta: [(Isn’t) Aren’t you hot with that] hair cut

Following his rhetorical question at line 01, Stan illustrates the sort of comment he typically receives and emphasises its silliness by mimicking the voice and style of a possibly male, possibly stupid person (i.e. he noticeably lowers the pitch of his voice, and slows the pace of delivery) when he says at line 5, “Are you hot in with that hair cut.” Note the generic person references ‘people’ (line 2) and ‘you’ (for ‘me’ – line 3), make this a reporting of a scripted event (Edwards, 1994); something that typically happens to Stan rather than a specific one-off occurrence. Later (lines 7 to 8) Stan challenges the basis of this typical comment and does so with an insertion repair that upgrades its force – (that is, after ‘Why woul-’, Stan cuts off and reproduces “why” and what was clearly hearable as “would”, but with ‘new’ words - “the hell” - inserted between them. This changes, “Why woul” to “why the hell would... I be hot”). Two analytical points are noteworthy about how Stan presents this turn as a challenge before we get to the matter of self-reference. First, note that Stan’s comment is formulated as a ‘why’ - interrogative, thereby rendering the comments he receives, and not his hair length, as the accountable matter (Sacks, 1995; 4). Second, Stan deploys the modal verb ‘would’, which, following Edwards (2006), works to invoke normative, scripted and timeless knowledge of the world such that one can hardly imagine the precise circumstances in which Stan may be caused to be hot by the length of his hair. It is the self-reference “I” as it appears in this robust challenge (line 8) to his critics that is now the focus of my analysis.

At the moment the self-reference “I” is uttered at line 8, it is not specifically gendered. That is, it is spoken as the default form of speaker self-reference by a speaker whom is male but whom is equally British, an employee, a socialist, and so on. Although Stan’s story is all about the discrimination he
experiences as a male person with long hair, this “I” does not, specifically, relevantly, invoke gender, or make gender hearably relevant at the point of its production. To use Schegloff’s phrase, the relevance of the reference and the referent for the talk is ‘masked’ by self-reference with “I”, since this is “opaque” with respect to gender. At the moment of its use, it means “I the speaker”. It is only in the production of the contrastive category ‘girls’ in his next turn constructional unit at line 8 that ‘I’ is, retrospectively, gendered. In effect, Stan’s challenge amounts to asking why he, a boy, would have a different physiological response to having long hair than members of the category ‘girl’. Here then, “I” is hearably gendered by virtue of the contrast category “girls”, which make relevant Stan’s membership of the category “boys”.

In Extract Ten, the candidate gendered-I occurs in line 16, and here it also displays an orientation to normative heterosexual relations. Fifteen-year-old Emma is telling her older brother Michael about a Valentine’s Day date the week before. Just before this extract starts, Michael has teasingly requested an account from Emma for having ended up on the back row at the cinema with her boyfriend. As we join the call, Emma is explaining that, having gone for a pizza first, she and her date arrived late at the cinema, “and it was absolutely packed in there” (line 3-4), implying thereby that they had little option about where to sit.

**Extract Ten**
[CTS41]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Emm:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Mic:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Emm:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Michael topicalises part of Emma’s account with “so he treated you to a meal- for a tea then” (lines 6-7). There are a number of interesting observations about the design of this turn. The so-preface acts as an upshot marker – as in ‘from what you just said, I am surmising the following...’. The self-initiated replacement repair of ‘meal to ‘tea’ perhaps reveals a stance on the choice of eating establishment, by replacing ‘meal’ with ‘tea’, Michael is downplaying its significance as an appropriate Valentine’s Day treat. The turn as a whole is what Labov (1972; 301) characterises as a B-statement – that is, a statement about a recipient’s domain of knowledge, which requires dis/confirmation (hence, ‘then’ at the end of the tcu). However, I wish to focus more fully on the selection of ‘treated’ to characterize the respective roles of Emma and her boyfriend. When Emma tells of going to Pizza Hut, she describes it simply as something they did together. She says, ‘we went to Pizza Hut’, and there is no hint here about who paid for the meal. Emma does not say, ‘he took me to Pizza Hut. Yet, at lines 6-7, Michael guesses (correctly as it turns out) that Emma’s boyfriend paid for the food. It might be that Michael is invoking an unnamed hetero-gendered norm for the organization of dating behaviour, i.e. That boys/men pay for girls/women. However, it might equally be that Michael is drawing on his personal knowledge of his sister – perhaps she would not pay for meals in any event. It is not until after
Emma constructs her boyfriend’s ‘treat’ as something he does typically (lines 9-10), that Michael names (line 12) the hetero-gendered norm he may have earlier obliquely invoked.\(^8\) Certainly, by the end of line 12, hetero-gendered relations are firmly on the table (so to speak). As a (heterosexual) male, Michael is included in the category of persons who normatively cover the expenses of a date with a girlfriend, a fact which is obviously not lost on him as he makes it the subject of a joke at lines 15 to 16. The gendered-I is produced as part of this joke (line 16), and it serves to extract himself from the collectivity of heterosexual males in order to produce himself as the exception. Here, then, “I” means more than just “I the current speaker”. It is instead hearable as “I as a male”.

In Extract Eleven, the candidate gendered-I occurs at line 9. In this call, two-fifteen year old girls, Mary and Amy, are discussing boyfriends. Mary has recently come out of what she implies was a ‘long relationship’ with Dan (lines 2-3), a breakup that had caused her some heartache, but she is ‘better’ now because she has a new boyfriend, Tom. Her ex-boyfriend, Dan, is reported as also having ‘moved on’ to form a relationship with new girlfriend Tess.

**Extract Eleven**

[CTS33]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Mar:</th>
<th>Amy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Libby made me feel better ‘cause</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>she said (. ) well boys after a long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>relationship they [tend to ]kind of (.)=</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>[((coughs)) ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>go down hill with girls whereas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>girls go up hill.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>[Mm:::]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>So I’ve gone for Tom who’s up hill.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dan’s gone for Tess who’s downhill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>huh huh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^8\) The invocation of a gendered norm is ambiguous here, as Michael could mean something like ‘it should always be the case that other people pay for our meals’. 

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As the extract opens, Mary is describing the sympathetic words of a friend, Libby, who made her ‘feel better’. Libby’s reported words have a proverbial feel about hetero-gendered relationships; ‘boys after a long relationship... tend to...go downhill whereas girls go uphill’ (lines 2-6). Exactly what is meant by ‘downhill’ and ‘uphill’ is not specified except in terms of persons known in common to Mary and Amy, as Mary shows how she and Dan exemplify Libby’s reported claim (lines 9-11), and later, Amy provides an example of her own (lines 18-19). Its meaning is likely to be something roughly equivalent to up/down market i.e. that boys subsequently have female partners who are widely considered less desirable in the heterosexual marketplace, and girls subsequently have male partners considered more desirable. Mary later acknowledges the insult contained within her remarks directed at either/both Dan and Tess (line 15).

So the “I” at line 9 does not simply mean “I the speaker” but “I as a (presumed heterosexual) girl”. Using this “I”, Mary extracts herself from the category ‘girl’ named at line 5 in order to display that, in choosing Tom, who is ‘uphill’; her conduct is normative for her categorical membership. Note that Mary’s turn at line nine is ‘so’ prefaced – an upshot marker, conveying that it is because she is a girl that she has gone ‘uphill’ (and because Dan is a boy, he has gone ‘downhill’).

In Extract Twelve, the candidate gendered-I appears on line 10. In order to show that the gendered-I is not limited to British talk amongst young people, the next example is taken from a call between two middle-aged sisters from the US. This extract comes from the classic NB corpus (transcribed by Jefferson), and here features Nancy expounding to Emma
about her very positive experiences as a mature student working along side much younger students, or ‘kids’ as Nancy refers to them. She tells Emma how ‘sweet’ the kids have been with her, and as illustration of this she recounts being invited out for ‘a beer’ with ‘eight or nine’ of them who regularly ‘go over to Shakey’s’ (a pizza bar) after work. The invitation is reportedly issued by Ralph, a young man in his twenties and there is a locally subsequent reference to him at line 4. As the extract opens, Nancy reports her acceptance of the invitation (lines 1-3) and then details how she ended up being the only female with a group of ‘five or six fellas’ and feeling something of a ‘den mother’ (an older female who supervises a group (or ‘den’) of boys in the Cub Scouts).

**Extract Twelve**  
[NBII 2]

01 Nan: .hhhh I 'said no kidding? ;I s'd listen  
02 _js gotta rai:se I said ah(h)'ll buy you  
03 one. Ah'll se(h) ah'll break my rai:se.h  
04 .hhhh A::n' so'e laughed en: so a whole bunch  
05 of us wen'over'n .hhh.t there were three of us  
06 gals'n: five er six fellas u-a:nd uh,h (.)  
07 then one a'the girls ha:dtuh lea:ve about a  
08 half'n hour later cuz she 'aduh guh home u let a  
09 roommate in en .hh-.hhh one a'the other girls  
10 hadda leave fer something en there I sit with  
11 all these (h)you(h)ng fellas I fel'like a  
12 den[mother. ]  
13 Emm: [*Uh huh*]

It is worth noting the way gender plays across this extract in the categories of persons going to Shakey’s. First, there is a gender-neutral ‘whole bunch of us’ (line 05), in which Nancy produces herself as having co-categorical membership with the younger students (i.e. a student going to Shakey’s for a beer). From this gender-neutral category, Nancy divides and enumerates the membership in gendered-terms, using ‘three of us gals, and five or six fellas’. It is also worth noting the difference between ‘gals’ in line 6, and the pronunciation of ‘girls’ produced by Nancy at line 7. We might
speculate that, on this occasion, the two pronunciations refer to two
different categorical memberships, ‘gals’ being more gendered and ‘girls’
being more age-relevant. Some support is lent to this by the terms
prefacing the two categories – ‘us gals’ and ‘the girls’. Clearly, with ‘us gals’,
Nancy is producing herself as relevantly gendered, along with her two
(younger) female companions. With ‘the girls’, Nancy is using a canonical
way to refer to a category to which one may or may not belong. It is also
notable that when Nancy is referring to younger females across the call she
uses ‘girls’, whereas the one occasion she refers to students of her own age
she calls them ‘women’ (NBII2, page 7, line 2). Further evidence for the
gender/age split comes in the categorical references to the men in the
group at Shakey’s. At line 6, the category that contrasts with the gender-
relevant ‘gals’ is ‘fellas’. When this group is referred to again in line 11, it is
prefaced with an age descriptor – ‘young’. So at line 6 the fellas is
gendered and at line 11 the same category gets a stage-of-life preface,
making not only their gender relevant, but also their age (relative to
Nancy’s).

The gendered I in this extract occurs as part of a process of elimination
from the original group of three ‘gals’ in the party. One girl is reported as
being obliged to leave in order to let a roommate in (8-9), thereby perhaps
highlighting an element of category relevant conduct for students of more
typical age, and the other for a vaguely formulated ‘something’ (10), thus
leaving Nancy, unexpectedly and without volition on anyone’s part, the sole
female in the party. At line 10, Nancy refers to herself using ‘I’, in what is
quite a striking clause – there I sit. It is striking for two reasons. First, note
the change in tense from past to present, which lends an emphatic

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86 Consider for example the following from Drew (1992-489), in which ‘girls and fellas’ are clearly interactionally gendered, a point
which is not lost on the witness in line 04. This extract comes from cross-examination of a witness in a rape trial. The ‘its’ on line 01
indexes a club where the defendant and alleged victim met.

01 A: Its where uh (. ) uh girls and fellas
02 meet isn't it?
03 (1.0)
04 W: People go there
immediacy to what follows. Second, it summons up the ‘there-ness’ of it in a way that a more (speculatively) default phrase such as ‘I was sitting there with all these young fellas’ fails to do.87 The combined effects of the change in tense and the ‘there-ness’ of the event make creates a sense of the unusual – reporting of a unique, unexpected event. It is the “I” as it appears in this clause that is gendered - here by the context of the subtraction of two from three women (note the ‘and’ on line 10, which works to produce Nancy as the remaining female from this minus sum). The remainder of the turn plays on both gender and age, with Nancy referring to her companions as ‘young fellas’ (line 11) and describing her feeling of motherly authority over them. There is a sense then in which the ‘I’ at line 10 is not only gendered but also aged – ‘I’ an older woman sat with young men. As with the previous extracts, the gendered(aged)-I occurs in close vicinity to a categorical descriptor and is produced in order to individuate the speaker as a member of that category.

In Extract Thirteen, a Professor is leading a data session in which the matter of phoning relatives is raised, touched off by something in the data. When the matter is raised, there is nothing specifically gendered about the discussion. However, during the interaction, the Professor makes gender relevant by using the example of daughters ringing their mothers on Sunday afternoons; a claim that he justifies at the start of the extract by invoking a gendered norm.

Extract Thirteen

FN

01 Pro: I use the gendered example deliberately
02 because boys don’t ever ring their parents.
03 At least I didn’t

There are two uses of ‘I’ in Extract 13. The first one (line 1) is a straightforward reference to self and there is nothing categorical implied in

87 Compare, for example, with Woolfitt’s (1992:118) analysis of X/Y formulations in which the X component typically describes mundane activities occurring immediately before an extraordinary event or experience – the Y component; ‘I was just doing X...when Y’.
Chapater Six

its use. This ‘I’ simply ties what the speaker is now saying with what he had just said. The second ‘I’ (line 3), in contrast, invokes the speaker’s gender. In common with other examples, the gendered nature of this ‘I’ plays off its use subsequent to a spate of talk where gender has already been made relevant in the interaction. Here, the speaker appeals to a gendered norm about contacting parents in order to justify his specifically gendered example. That is, he accounts for his use of daughters contacting their mothers by appealing to a norm that boys ‘never’ contact their parents. The gendered-I appears subsequent to this norm, in a turn in which he specifically extracts himself as a male that exemplifies the gendered behaviour he had earlier invoked. This ‘I’ is not simply ‘I’ the speaker, but ‘I’ as a member of the category male.

Looking across these extracts and others like them in the collection, it is possible to offer tentative observations common to them all. First, it is evident in all cases that the gendered-I occurs in an environment in which gender has already ‘crept into’ the talk (Hopper and LeBaron, 1998; 59). In Extract Nine, gendered norms underpin the basis of Stan’s complaint about comments on his long hair. In Extract Ten, gender is obliquely present, though not yet explicitly, when Michael comments on how the norms of dating behaviour ‘should’ be. In Extract Eleven, gender is explicitly invoked in the reported words of comfort of a friend following Mary’s breakup. In Extract Twelve, Nancy describes her drinking companions in gendered (and aged) terms when she recounts how she became the only female left drinking with a group of young men. In extract Thirteen, the Professor produces himself as relevantly male as part of an account for why he had invoked gender in the interaction. In each case, the speakers are producing and managing gendered norms – and particularly the relevance these have for themselves as individuals.

- Stan (Extract Nine) is resisting gender-stereotypes about hair-length.

- Michael (Extract Ten) is (jokingly) reproducing and resisting hetero-gendered norms about paying for dates with girls.
• Mary (Extract Eleven) is reporting and embracing for herself, a
gendered claim - that girls choose better male partners after a
breakup.

• Nancy (Extract Twelve) as part of showing how successful she has
been in assimilating herself with younger students, produces as
strange or unusual, finding herself, an older woman, drinking beer
in a pizza parlour alone with a group of young men.

• The Professor (Extract Thirteen) produces himself as male in order
to underpin his claims about male (and female) conduct towards
parents.

The gendered world reflected and produced by these social members is a
world in which hair is a contested site of gendered identity (see Toerien and
Wilkinson, 2003); women and girls are not expected to pay their own way
on heterosexual dates, and boys are (see Rose and Frieze, 1989); girls
apparently learn from the mistakes of past heterosexual relationships and
boys do not; and older women do not typically drink beer with young men;
and girls, but not boys, maintain filial contacts with parents (see Stein et al
(1998). All these rely upon and reproduce common understandings of
what it means to be gendered male or female in a social world. The
gendered identities produced by each speaker are emergent, locally
occasioned features of ongoing talk-in-interaction. That is, although each
speaker is a member of a gendered category (as well as others), it is in part
with and through the use of a gendered-I that Stan, Michael, Mary, Nancy
and the Professor become relevantly gendered in the talk.

This finding contributes to the feminist conversation analytic distinction
between terms in language that are gendered because of their linguistic
definition and those that gendered interactionally by and for the
participants in talk (See Chapter 5). The self-reference “I” is linguistically
gender-neutral, but I have shown instances where its use is hearably interactionally gendered; where it means “I as a male” or “I as a female”.

The gendered-I also shows that there is more to be said about uses of “I” than its use as a self-reference simpliciter. It demonstrates that, far from ‘masking’ categorical information about the speaker (Schegloff, 1996a), “I” can hearably and relevantly convey categorical information – here gender - by virtue of the context of its production. There is reason to suppose that ‘I’ works like this (occasionally) in relation to gender only and it is likely that speakers can and do use “I” to reference themselves as members of other categories such as class, race, professional status and so on. We have already seen in Extract Twelve an example of age-implicative-“I” in which a speaker, Nancy, uses “I” to produce herself as a person at a particular stage of life. There follows two further examples of uses of “I” that hearably index a speaker’s age category.

6.4 The Age-Implicative-I
In the next extract, an age-norm gets produced as part of a complaint by Penny about her stepmother, Mandy, and occasions a speaker – Mum - to produce herself as an exception to the reported ‘rule’ that older people do not find the British comedian and presenter Russell Brand amusing. In this instance, the self-reference, “I” at line 25 hearably conveys the speaker’s age category.

Extract Thirteen
[CTS29]
01 Pen: Yeah she’s just like it it was just
02 unbelie:vable what she what she-
03 You know that Russell Brand Mum.
04 Mum: Yeah:
05 Pen: She said the same thing about him.
06 He came on after after it[and] I=
07 Mum: [W- ]

88 In developing this argument, it is my intention to explore uses of ‘gendered-you’. As a preliminary to this work, I was pleased to notice the following occurrence of a ‘female-you’ in the by-line on the cover the March 2008 UK edition of the women’s magazine Cosmopolitan, which read: ‘The truth! The sex advice men wish you knew’
This extract comes from a call in which seventeen year old Penny has rang her mother to complain about the way she (Penny) was treated on a recent visit to her father. Penny’s parents are divorced and her father has a long-standing live-in relationship with his new partner, Mandy, whom Penny regards as her stepmother. Penny is upset because Mandy reportedly treats her as a child, and by way of illustration of this, she reports Mandy as assuming (adult/parental) rights to assess her (Penny’s) sense of humour – ‘You only think that because he’s a bit different’ (lines 11 and 14). Persons normatively reserve the epistemic authority to assess their own behaviour,
but not that of others (Heritage and Raymond, 2005). That this is the case is evidenced, in part, by the practices that speakers deploy to display the status of their epistemic authority (e.g. use of tag questions to downgrade rights to assess or access to knowledge (Heritage and Raymond, 2005)). These practices are not evident in Mandy’s reported speech (which is of course, not to claim they weren’t there ‘originally’). With ‘you only think that because...’, Mandy is reportedly assuming direct authority to assess Penny’s sense of humour. The grounds on which Mandy (reportedly) claims this authority are related to stage-of-life – that ‘when you’re young them kind of things do appeal to you...but when you get old you wa-like a bit more of a mature humour’ (lines 21-23). It is Mandy’s (reported) presumptuous behaviour that Penny finds ‘just unbelievable’ (lines 1-2). Mum is in a tricky interactional environment here. To align with her daughter, is possibly to detract from her ex-husband’s partner (and co-parent). She manages this by presenting her own views on Russell Brand rather than, as she might have done, on Mandy. Mum resists the suggestion that ‘older’ people would necessarily view Russell Brand as performing a style of comedy for the young/immature by producing herself as an older person who nevertheless finds the broadcaster ‘really funny’ (note the upgrade in assessment here from Penny’s ‘funny’ at line 9, signalling agreement (Pomerantz, 1984)). Mum accomplishes this, in part, through the use of the singular self-reference “I”. As a whole, the turn at line 25 produces Mum as a co-member (with Mandy), of the category ‘old’ but conveys her views as contrastive to Mandy’s. Note that Mum is not claiming that she is somehow young-at-heart because to do so would be to support Mandy’s reported position. Rather, Mum is challenging the reported claim that it is routine for the category of ‘older people’, of which she is one, to find appreciation of Russell Brand’s humour immature. If the overall course of action that Mum is engaged in here is trying to align with her daughter without being directly critical of Mandy, it fails. Note the inter-turn gap at line 26, where Penny is relevantly missing, Mum’s multiple reassessments of Russel Brand, which Penny treats as self-evidently, but not relevantly true (i.e. she was not doubting Russell Brand’s talent), and
finally Penny’s reissuing of the complaint against Mandy, which in effect is a move to reopen the sequence.

In Extract Fourteen, there are two candidate age-implicative-Is, the first at line 33 and the second at 44. This extract is taken from later the same call as in Extract Twelve, and in fact, starts very soon after Nancy recounts her celebratory night out with the younger students. Just before we join the extract, Nancy’s story prompts her interlocutor, Emma, to ask if she (Nancy) is the oldest in the class, a question that Nancy treats as inapposite (Heritage, 1998) as conveyed in her oh-prefaced non-type-conforming response to a yes/no interrogative (see Raymond, 2003), when she says, ‘Oh by far’. Perhaps faced with this slight awkwardness, Emma proffers another topic when she inquires whether Nancy is ‘learning a lot’. Nancy’s response pays respect to the insights she feels she is gaining into the lives of young people and not to the intellectual developments she might have reported here. As the extract opens Nancy shows herself to be singularly successful in bridging relations across generations through the reported compliment of a third-party, one of the ‘kids’ (lines 24-27) – that she ‘was the best thing to happen to the generation gap’.

**Extract Fourteen**

[NB11 2]

20 Nan: .tch I can't rehr one: (. ) one a'the
21 f: ;kids ed said in his thin:g u-something
22 abou:t (. ) yer the,h
23 (2.0)
24 Nan: I don'know something abou:t (. ) the
25 bes'thing that's hap'n to the (. )
26 generation ga:p er something
27 I ca[:n't reme]mber.
28 Emm: ["M m h_m,**"]
29 Nan: Yihknow, p.hhhh_a:nd so I tol'
30 Mister Bradley I said yihknow it's too
31 ba:d,h (. ) the:(t) par:ents. Espe:cially the:se
32 (. ) of teenag:ers.h .h:hh_:ca:n't meet them:
33 on the _level, (. ) thet I ha:ve.
Chapter Six

34 (.).
35 Emm: [Nm]hm,
36 Nan: [Bc]cuz
37 (0.9)
38 Nan: .tch when: u-we were in cla:ss these kids: react,h .hhhh as they rilly a:re.
39 Nan: An'they tah lk as they rilly a:re.h
40 A:n' becuz I'm a student. they see:m to,h
41 overlook the fa:ct or the fa:ct that they
tet I'm the:re. Yih [know].hhhh
42 Emm: [M m ] hm,
43 Nan: A:nd h-ah: d- it rilly gives you a
truhm:enous insight.h
44 Emm: °I:bet it does,°

Emma minimally acknowledges Nancy’s stated relationship with her fellow students (line 28) and Nancy continues to report a conversation she had with the class convenor – Mister Bradley – in which she tells of confiding in him her assessment that it is ‘too bad’ that ‘parents’...’especially of teenagers’ (lines 31-32) cannot (note the inability conveyed in this) meet the younger students ‘on the level’ that she has. It is in this context that the first age-implicative I appears (line 33). There has been a categorical reference to parents – a particular generation of parents, to which we know from elsewhere in the NB corpus that Nancy belongs, and of course this is already known to her recipient. On line 33, Nancy refers to herself using ‘I’ and, with this singles herself out from the parental (generational?) category as something of an exception – someone of an older generation who is able to meet young people on their level. The ‘I’ on line 33 hearably and relevantly contains categorical information about the speaker to which it refers.

Following minimal receipt from Emma (line 35) Nancy elaborates on her experience of young people by producing them as authentic beings – able to talk and behave ‘as they really are’ (lines 39-40) with her in the classroom (thereby implying that students are prevented from this level of
openness in front of others of Nancy’s generation). Then, describing herself as a student (using the ‘I’ am a X format) she goes on to produce a very clear example of a categorical ‘I’ (line 44). Nancy surmises that as a student herself, the others pay no attention to her generational status – as Nancy puts it they don’t ‘consciously remember that I’m there’. Now, we can take it from the forgoing reported positive relations between Nancy and her colleagues that she does not mean this literally – the younger students are patently aware of her and include her in their activities, and even compliment her. Thus, with this ‘I’, Nancy is not claiming that her fellow students forget her presence as a person, but as a person of a particular (older) generational category. Again, this ‘I’ clearly conveys relevant categorical information about the speaker to which it refers.

So, as with the gendered-‘I’
's here we have speakers managing norms about their categorical memberships – here related to stage of life. In extract 14, Mum resists assumed (reported) norms of taste in humour and in extract 15, Nancy produces herself as an older person, who, despite her age, is able to connect with younger people because of her shared membership with them as students. The cultural world reflected and produced in the first of these extracts is one in which sense of humour (arguably) matures with age, thus leaving a generation gap in favoured comedians (a ‘fact’ that Mum disputes). The generation gap also features heavily in the second extract, with Nancy remarking on her privileged access to younger people ‘as they really are’ – as though they are not able to reach this level of authenticity with other people in her generation. And, as with the gendered-‘I’
's, these age-implicative-Is appear in the context of categorical memberships that have already surfaced in the talk, and so the practice is embedded within a situated context of personal connections with cultural and social categorical classes.

In all cases presented so far, “I” is used flexibly to make relevant a particular aspect of a speaker’s identity without having to directly name the category. The practice is highly contextualised and relies upon elements of the
discussion that have already surfaced in talk. However, the categories are also easily identifiable and the speakers could, presumably, be so classified without any talk (i.e. in the earlier examples, the speakers are already gendered, and in the later examples, the speakers already belong to age categories (though these are relative and slightly more complex)). In the next section, the focus is on indexing less overt or even playful aspects of self.

6.5 Other Categories
As I have argued before, persons have multiple identities. Some of these, like gender and age, are ascribed, others are acquired. In the next two examples, we see instances of categorical ‘I’s that index a speaker’s acquired memberships. In the first, a fourteen year old girl uses “I” to index her membership of a specific PE class at school and in the second a male speaker uses “I” to produce himself, playfully, as a co-member of the category ‘prostitute’.

In the first example (Extract 15), two teenage girls, Frankie and Louise, are discussing an upcoming school trip to an ice-rink, to which Louise but not Frankie has been invited; a set of circumstances that Frankie patently resents. Frankie probes for information about how the invitation was issued, and in response Louise gives an account along gendered lines – that it’s a trip for girls only. Clearly, Frankie is also a girl but she does not object on these grounds. Instead, she reissues questions about how the invitation came about. So, before this extract starts she asks, ‘Is it li- like (.) all the girls that she teaches or just your class’, and later, referring to the teacher responsible for the trip, ‘Did she just say like right you’re going’ and later still, ‘what did she say’. Through reissuing questions, Frankie treats Louise’s responses as inadequate. As the extract opens, Louise is recounting how she heard the news from a third party, which neatly excuses her from having to account for the precise details of the invitation that Frankie is pursuing so keenly. Louise then reports the response of an unnamed collective of boys, whom, on hearing the news, had reacted to the
unfairness of the apparent gendered basis for the decision (lines 2, 4 and 5). To ward off these accusations, Louise reports that the teacher was compelled to say that the invitation was limited to members of Miss Fimby’s PE group (line 6). Frankie treats this with a sceptical ‘Hm!’ (line 8), the reason for which becomes clear when at line 10, she produces herself as a member of Miss Fimby’s PE group, and therefore eligible for the trip. Frankie produces her group membership without naming the category, with a categorically loaded ‘I’.

**Extract Fifteen**  
[CTS11]

01 Lou: And then erm Kate ran out and goes .hh †† WE’RE
02 GOING ICE-SKATING. [ ( )] (boys started to shout)
03 Fra: [Huh]
04 (0.5)
05 Lou: Oh we wanna go. That’s not fair. How come the
06 girls get to go. .hh So she had to say just
07 Miss Fimby’s PE group.
08 (0.3)
09 Fra: Hm!
10 (0.8)
11 Fra: .hghh Yeah. HHHH [If it] was that I would be=
12 Lou: [Uhm ]
13 Fra: =going. hhh
14 Lou: What?
15 Fra: .hh If it was that I would be going.
16 (0.2)
17 Fra: Uo ((fake cry))
18 (0.6)
19 Fra: But I’m not.
20 Lou: So she had to spend ages telling everybody that
21 it was only the girls who were allowed to go.
22 (.)
23 Fra: H(h)m
24 (1.4)
25 Fra: Tch Oh well [then.
26 Lou: [(And she goes) and to be honest I’d
27 much much much much prefer the girls to go.
28 Because they’re better behaved on buses.
29 (0.3)
So, the candidate categorical “I” appears on line 11, when Frankie says, ‘if it was that I would be going’ (and is repeated on line 13 as part of a repair solution, following an open-class repair initiator (line 12)). Here the “I” does not simply mean, ‘I the speaker’, but ‘I a member of Miss Fimby’s PE class’. Again, we note that the category ‘Miss Fimby’s PE class’ has been made relevant in the prior talk, making it possible for Frankie to produce herself as a member without having to name the category. She extracts herself and uses her category membership to highlight the inherent untruth in the teacher’s reported claim. That is, if it were just the members of Miss Fimby’s class whom had been invited to go ice-skating then Frankie would have been included in the invitation, but as she points out on line 17, she was not. Frankie is not raising the possibility that she has somehow been overlooked but that the whole basis for the teacher’s claim is false.

Frankie’s actions might be characterised as petulant because Louise did not in fact present the teacher’s reported claim as ‘genuine’. Note that the reported claim that only members of Miss Fimby’s PE class were invited on the trip is presented as something that the teacher ‘had’ to say (line 6) in the face of resistance from the boys. It seems all involved – Frankie, Louise, the teacher and the boys – understand the claim to be an excuse. Louise does not overtly attend to Frankie’s highlighting of what she already knows is not a genuine claim, but with the upshot marker, ‘so’ on line 18, and the additional claim that the teacher ‘had to spend ages’ explaining that it was only the girls who were allowed to go, she (Louise) implicitly acknowledges that the ‘Miss Fimby’ claim was not treated as adequate by its recipients.
The remainder of the sequence plays out, with limited uptake from Frankie, along gendered lines. The teacher is presented as having accepted that her decision was gender-based and as accounting for it on the grounds that girls are better behaved than boys (a position that Louise wholeheartedly endorses, line 29). Frankie’s less than enthusiastic uptake might be accounted for by the fact that she is also a girl and yet has not been invited on the trip. It is notable though that she does not pursue this line, and instead shows herself to be resigned to the non-invitation with an ‘Oh well then’ (line 23).

In extract fifteen, the categorical ‘I’ is used in a contentious environment and its import is to escalate the contention by highlighting what is already taken to be an untruth. In the next example, the categorical ‘I’ is used in a jokey way to produce an evidently ‘false’ identity as a prostitute.

In extract sixteen, a group of students are discussing a non-present third-party, Alice. Alice is assessed as ‘strange’ by Sheri (line 1), an assessment with which Mark agrees (line 3). As evidence of Alice’s strangeness, Mark reports that she used to call herself a prostitute. We can assume from this that Alice was not in fact a prostitute. That is, her strangeness is not that she was a prostitute but that she used to call herself one. Next, perhaps to highlight the strangeness of Alice’s reported self-characterisation, Mark jokingly produces himself as a co-class member of the known-to-be untrue category. He does so using a categorically loaded “I” (line 5).

**Extract Sixteen**

[SN-4]

01 She: Alice was stra::nge,
02 (0.3) ((rubbing sound))
03 Mar: Very o:dd. She usetuh call herself a
04 prostitute,='n I useteh- (0.4) ask 'er if she
05 wz getting any more money than I: was.(doing).
06 (°An' she said-°) we'd compare notes yihknow.
07 ???: ('hh hh [hhh ] )
08 Mar: [What cor]ner's the best t'sta:nd on,
Chapter Six

09 [stuff like that.
10 Kar: [h(h)e a(h)h a(h)]=
11 Rut: =(h)hh (h)uh (h)uh (h)uh!=
12 She: =[hhh(h)H(h)m]
13 Kar: =[Which lampost? 
15 (0.4)
16 Kar: Y'know in Los Altos: the::y were tryin' t'sue
17 the city becuz- ih- some w omen were, becuz-
18 (hh) all the street lights 'er an ugly colored
19 yellow, en et ni:ght, (0.4) they make women
20 look really u:gly.
21 ???: {°(mmh-hmh)/(1.0)}
22 Kar: An' they wanted t'sue :
23 She: Cuz it hur[ts business?

Mark in fact uses two self-refereces on line 5 – both “I”s – when he says, ‘I useteh- (0.4) ask ‘er if she wz getting any more money than I: was’. The first “I” simply means ‘I the speaker’ – at least Mark is not doing any categorical work with this “I”. The second “I”, however, means “I” the prostitute, in fact a co-class member with Alice.

The joke plays on knowledge that neither Alice nor Mark are prostitutes but note that the joke falls somewhat flat to begin with. First, Mark adds an increment ‘doing’ in the transition space and then a further tcu (line 6) in pursuit of responses from his co-interlocuters, which finally comes in muted form at line 7 and then more enthusiastically after Mark adds another tcu to the joke at line 8. Finally, Karen topicalises prostitution at line 16 and a new sequence begins.

We can only speculate about the lack of uptake of Mark’s joke. However, we might note that one thing it does is to shift the focus of the talk away from Alice. Sheri has launched a sequence on Alice with her assessment at line 1, but Mark’s joke in a sense derails the sequence by refocusing it onto him, making it somewhat difficult for his recipients to continue talking.
about Alice (see Land and Kitzinger, 2007 for a related action using third party formulations to refer to self).

Whatever the action the joke serves, it is important to note that Mark, produces his identity as a prostitute using the self-reference “I”. Like the other instances presented here, this “I” is categorically loaded and does not simply mean “I” the speaker. As with the other examples, Mark is able to produce this identity in context because the category has already been made relevant in the interaction.

6.6 Discussion

Uses of “I” bear examination for their categorical import. The practice is a contextual one and relies upon category relevant talk having already surfaced in prior talk. If a category is already ‘out there’ speakers can extract from it and produce themselves as members in the service of a range of actions. Given that the sort of categorical self-reference that I have detailed in this chapter appears to be occasioned by talk about normative conduct and its implications for individuals, then the practice may illuminate social scientific debates about the relationship between self (or selves) and society. As Goffman (1961:175) says, if every social category ‘implies a broad conception of the person tied by it, we should go on to ask how the individual handles this defining of himself’. I have shown how speakers handle this by resisting (or embracing) category normative conduct in relation to gender and age as a situated practice.

The analysis suggests that there is nothing in language that is uniquely gendered. That is, I have identified a practice in which pronouns can be used to convey categorical information about a speaker - but there is nothing specific about gendered identities here. Gender is only one of a number of categories that can be conveyed. Together with the findings of the previous chapter, we can conclude that there is no connection between a language form and gender specifically. However, I do show how gender (amongst other things) can be invoked in interaction, without being named.
The work in this chapter also contributes to conversation analytic understanding of self-reference by building on existing knowledge about its operation in talk-in-interaction, showing that the apparently unremarkable “I” can, on occasion, convey categorical information about the speaker. The phenomenon is based on turn-design and plays off its sequential positioning. These categorical ‘I’s invoke gender (and other identities) primarily through contrast with a specific identity that is already in play in the interaction. Often, they suggest or resist some incongruence with normative conduct, and have a normalising or explanatory role. So speakers exploit the sequence in order to present themselves as having a particular identity, without having to name that identity. It is notable in every case that recipients do not directly orient to the categorical information - in no case does a recipient declare ‘oh you mean you are a man/woman/middle aged). In this sense, the phenomenon is sequential rather than interactional because it is hard to identify ways in which the category has progressive and procedural consequences for the talk. Conversation analytically, this might be seen as problematic. However, there is evidence that speakers do exploit interactional resources such as knowledge about each other’s attributes as well as broader knowledge about conduct that is normative and expectable without having to explain these things to recipients. This leaves the question of why speakers make specific selections and not others. In this case, what are the interactional advantages of not naming the category? This question is certainly one that bears future enquiry.

So far, the chapters in this thesis has applied conversation analytic methods to examine ways in which gender and sexuality are made relevant in talk. The main finding has been that there appears to be no uniquely gendered or, indeed, gendering practice. The next chapter examines a practice for referring to others that is not expected to lead to specific findings about gender.
Chapter Seven: ‘Why do these people’s opinions matter?’ Use of Alternative Less-Than-Recognitional Person Reference to Suppress Relational (or Role) Relevant Conduct.

7.1 Introduction

Gender and sexuality have been the major themes of previous analytical chapters. This chapter marks a change of focus. Here, I focus more particularly on a technical practice for referring to persons. The focus for this chapter arose from an interesting and puzzling observation made as part of an analytical exercise in my CA training (see Chapter Three). The observations made in this chapter are not, therefore, motivated by a political commitment to feminism. In this sense, the chapter is more ‘purely’ conversation analytic, and might well sit more comfortably with a CA audience. However, a question might arise as to its fit with the rest of the thesis. I have decided to include it because its subject matter - person reference - is methodologically continuous with previous chapters, even if not thematically. In addition, having found in previous chapters that there is no essential link between linguistic form and interactional usage, we cannot assume a priori that the practice identified here will not tell us anything about gender.

This chapter describes a practice that does not fit the default pattern for using recognitional references. Using this practice, which I call alternative-less-than-recognitional (ALTR) reference, speakers select a prototypical non-recognitional form (guy, woman, somebody) to refer to a referent that
is known and known-to-be known to the recipient. Put simply, it is the use of a non-recognitional form when a recognitional form could have been used. I show that ALTRs often constitute a hostile action by distancing the referent(s) from parties to the interaction, making the referent(s) unnameable and not connected to the speaker and recipient. Further, I argue that this hostile action is used to shore up complaints against the referent, particularly in places where naming them might invoke precisely those terms on which they are warranted to do whatever is being complained about.

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89 For comparison, here are three non-recognitional references that convey the referent is not known to the recipient:

[NBM13]

Emm: Oh that's swell, *Ye haven* got the Hi'waliann House

Lot: *Ll *. *Ye* got the house up at it

Doc: *Ye* got the house up at it

Don: Yeah

Emm: make the heu.

Lot: *Ye* got any money or anything, *huh* *huh* *huh* *huh*. *Ye* got any money or anything, *huh* *huh* *huh* *huh*.

[Chinese Dinner]

Ann: *B't* there're people. Like they— the bigges' debate in or depart mom. in, at Trent’n was that when we had these faculty meetings. Some people smoke?

(0.5)

Joh: Mm hm.

Ann: *En* the people who smoke, (0.3) really. The ones who smoke now, cannot, I mean really. ha'we tried tuh quiet,

Don: *They give up*

Ann: Like this woman, tried tuh quiet but she's list like— you see on a television where they're like this. Y'know what I mean,

[CTS08]

Emm: Well I was in Sebdien:. You know when I went to Sebdien.

Sop: Yeah

Emm: And I was wearing my Vans:(0.4)and (.) just black clothes basically (.hh)

Sop: *hmm*

Emm: And erm somebody goes to me *what are you wearing* huh I just went *clothes* huh .HHHH
In what follows, I outline Schegloff’s (1996a) distinction between default and marked person references. I then describe Stivers’ (2007) analysis of a form of marked reference, which she calls Alternative Recognitionals, which has resonances with the practice of ALTR (and indeed inspires its name). The remainder of the chapter is concerned with exploring the practice and actions of ALTRs.

7.2 Default and Marked Person Reference

Schegloff poses the question:

How do speakers do reference to persons so as to accomplish, on the one hand, that nothing but referring is being done, and/or, on the other hand that something else in addition to referring is being done by the talk practice which has been employed? (Schegloff, 1996a: 438-9)

His answer builds off his earlier work with Sacks (Sacks and Schegloff, 1979) on the preference organisation of person reference. The central claim in that paper was that person reference is a systematic domain with its own preference structure. Sacks and Schegloff propose the operation of two preferences: 1) A preference for recognisional forms and; 2) a preference for minimisation: use of a single reference only. Schegloff’s later work (1996) expands the analysis to draw distinctions between locally initial and subsequent positions (i.e. first and subsequent mentioning of a referent in a sequence of talk), and locally initial and subsequent forms (i.e. reference forms typically used in initial position, often names, and those typically used in subsequent position, often pronouns).90

The definition of default reference relies on an understanding of preference organisation and local positioning and form. So, for non-present third party references the term selected is treated as default if it is in a preferred form

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90 I use ‘pronouns’ for simplicity. However, Schegloff (1996a), citing Sacks, cautions against the term because its meaning – standing in place of a noun - does not resonate with practice. That is, words like ‘he’ and ‘she’ are the default terms in locally subsequent positions. If a noun appears in locally subsequent position then it is standing in place of the pronoun.
Chapter Seven

(i.e. a name where possible) and is fitted to the local sequential organisation of the talk (i.e. a locally initial term in a locally initial position or a locally subsequent form in a locally subsequent position). For two-party and/or co-present interaction, prototypical default references are ‘I’ (and grammatical variants, such as ‘me’ or ‘my’) for self-reference, and ‘you’ (and grammatical variants, such as ‘your’) for reference to a (selected) interlocutor. When person reference terms appear in something other than these preferred terms, they ‘invite a recipient/hearer to examine them for what they are doing other than referring to speaker or recipient; they are marked usages’ (Schegloff, 1996a: 449).

Contained in the distinction between default and marked references is the very notion that practices for referring to persons can be used to perform a range of social actions and that, therefore, the particular ways that references are formulated bear examining for their function beyond achieving simple reference. As illustration of the kind of actions constituted by references that depart from the default form, I next describe Stivers’ (2007) analysis of Alternative Recognitionals.

7.3 Alternative Recognitional Reference

Stivers’ (2007) describes a practice of third-party person reference that departs from the unmarked default practice insofar as speakers use a term that is something other than a name (or descriptor) when the default form would be usable. Importantly, the marked reference still achieves recognition for the recipient. In what is perhaps Stivers’ most striking example (McBeth, 2007), a speaker in conversation with her mother mentions having had a call from ‘your sister’, where the default form ‘(Aunt) Alene’ could have been used. Stivers calls such instances ‘Alternative Recognitionals’ and defines them in the following terms:

1) The speaker must know the unmarked form (e.g., the name).
2) The speaker must assume
In line with Scheglof’s (1996a) proposal about the function of marked person references, Stivers shows that when speakers use Alternative Recognitionals they are doing more than simple referring. She argues that Alternative Recognitionals shift the ‘domains of responsibility’ in the triangular relationship between speaker, recipient and referent by highlighting a specific facet of the referent’s identity. In the ‘your sister’ example, the speaker means to draw attention to the nature of the relationship between the recipient and the referent in a way that ‘Alene’ (the referent’s name) does not do. The precise Alternative Recognitional is better fitted to the action underway (in this case, a complaint) than the default form.

Here is an example from my corpus. In Extract One, a daughter, Penny, in conversation with her mother, refers to her father three times in quick succession using three different forms: as ‘Dad’ (line 9), ‘your husband’ (line 11) and ‘my bloody mum’s husband’ (line 12).

**Extract One**

**[CTS29]**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 Pen:</td>
<td>She broke up my .hh OH::</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Mum:</td>
<td>No. No no no no I don’t blame her for that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>[at all]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 Pen:</td>
<td>[I know] you don’t. I don’t mean she broke up the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>marriage but she was definitely a bloody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>catalyst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 Mum:</td>
<td>Well yes: certainly the catalyst .hh but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Pen:</td>
<td>You know she was bloody you know bloody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>shagging DAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Mum:</td>
<td>Yeah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Pen:</td>
<td>Huh huh you know she was shagging (0.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
your husband for Christ sake my bloody mum’s husband.

Mum: [Yes: ]
Pen: [She’s there] quoting that she’s the most faithful woman you’ll ever meet

Just before the extract opens, Penny is complaining about her stepmother’s reported self-assessment that she is ‘the most faithful woman you’ll ever meet’. For Penny, this is an extreme and perhaps indefensible claim because her stepmother, Mandy, began an extramarital affair with her father, when he was still married to her mother. At the start of the extract, Penny begins to undermine Mandy’s (reported) claim with an (incomplete) assertion that she had broken-up her parents’ marriage. This assertion is not finished however, and, perhaps in order to pre-empt her mother’s objection, Penny withholds the final portion of the turn (parents’ marriage) and instead lets out an exasperated ‘Oh’. This perhaps points to matters of epistemic authority (Raymond and Heritage, 2006) in that it is not really Penny’s place to tell her mother what or whom broke up her marriage. Mum, picking up on the projected end of Penny’s incomplete turn, asserts her epistemic authority by producing an objection (line 3): first, with a firm denial, followed by multiple re-sayings of ‘no’ (which halts a projected course of action, Stivers, 2004) and, finally, with a counter-assertion that she does not at all blame Mandy for the breakup of her marriage. Penny concedes that Mandy was not entirely responsible but insists that she was ‘definitely a bloody catalyst’ (lines 4-6), a position that Mum accepts (notice that at line 7 Mum switches from Penny’s ‘a catalyst’ to ‘the catalyst’ - a slight upgrade on Penny’s concession – see Pomerantz, 1984). Returning to her complaint against Mandy (line 8), Penny slightly revises her reasons for objecting to Mandy’s self-proclaimed fidelity by detailing the case against her more precisely. It is here that we get the first of three references to Penny’s father. On this occasion, it is the unremarkable recognitional kinship form Penny typically uses to refer to her father (‘Dad’). However, the prosodic emphasis with which Penny produces the word ‘Dad’ presumably marks it as slightly more than a simple referring
and highlights the incredulity of Mandy’s (reported) claim because, as the
daughter of the referent, Penny has some knowledge of the nature of
Mandy’s relationship to him. Mum’s response is lukewarm (‘Yeah’ – line
10) and falls short of aligning with Penny’s complaint (see Drew and Walker,
2009). In pursuit of alignment, Penny reissues the charge against Mandy
and changes the formulation of the reference to her father from ‘Dad’ to
‘your husband’ (line 11). In doing so, she re-emphasises the inconsistency
between Mandy’s reported claim and her conduct by pointing to the fact
that she was engaging in sexual relations not just with somebody’s father
but with somebody’s husband. ‘Your husband’ also places Penny’s father
firmly in her mother’s domain, which ought to solicit greater alignment
from Mum because it is she (and, less so, Penny) that was ‘wronged’ by
Mandy. At the end of this turn, Penny redoes the person reference, this
time formulating as ‘My bloody Mum’s husband’. As a reference to one’s
father, this is remarkable. It places Penny’s father outside of Penny’s
domain, except insofar as he is connected, through marriage, to her
mother. However, it contrasts with the greater distancing (from Penny) of
‘your husband’ by allowing for some form of relationship between Penny
and Dad, albeit at one-step removed. It gives Penny a particular vantage
point from which to view Mandy’s conduct —Mandy was having sex with
her mother’s husband, which entitles her to dismiss the idea that Mandy is
a faithful woman — even if her mother does not.

So, in this example, ‘Dad’ is the default reference form (notwithstanding its
prosodic features) and ‘your husband’ and ‘My bloody mum’s husband’ are
two Alternative Recognitionals. With them, Penny manipulates the
domains of responsibility between speaker, recipient and referent.

The practice of ALTR person reference described in this chapter has
resonances with Stivers’ concept of Alternative Recognitionals in that the
speaker uses something other than the default person reference when the
default form is known and known-to-be-known by parties to the
interaction, but done in such a way as the referent remains recognisable to
the recipient. However, ALTR is different because the ‘alternative recognitional’ is produced as a prototypical non-recognitional formulation.

7.4 Alternative-less-than-Recognitional Reference
The practice described in this chapter – ALTR - shades the classic distinction between recognitional and non-recognitional person reference terms (see Sacks and Schegloff, 1979) in order to bring off a (usually hostile) action in relation to the referent(s). The practice involves use of a prototypical non-recognitional person reference term (e.g. ‘guy’, ‘girl’, and ‘people’) where a recognitional term (such as a name) or a categorical descriptor (such as ‘The Crisis Team’) is known and known-to-be-known by parties to the interaction. For example, in the following extract, taken from Sacks (1995: II: 499), the practice occurs at line 5 when the speaker refers to his father (or more accurately given that he is animating his mother’s words, his mother’s husband) as ‘that guy’.

Extract Two

01 Bob: Oh God! Christmas has gotten so damn painful!
02 You know there’s always this great no-one likes what they’re getting. You know what I mean?
03 So you say ‘thank you’ and like my mom, ‘shit,
04 when’s that guy gonna learn that I don’t like want an electric skillet, I wanna coat or I wanna sweater’ and uh-
05 Ted: Well, doesn’t she even make any attempt even to hint or even-
06 Kim: What’s funnier is, his father said ‘well after
07 25 years I don’t think we’re gonna give presents’ and that’s just ridiculous
08 Bob: It’s just that becuz presents are so important to her...

In this extract, Bob is complaining about Christmas being ‘damn painful’ (line 1), and as an illustration of the festival’s problems, he cites the
widespread difficulty of having to express gratitude for unwanted gifts and provides the specific example through the reported speech of his mother, as if uttered to Bob, presumably outside of her husband’s hearing – ‘Shit, when’s that guy gonna learn that I don’t like want an electric skillet…’ (Lines 4-5).

In Sacks’ (1995) analysis of this extract he notices that the speaker could have used a recognitional kin term, as in, ‘when is your dad gonna learn…’, or a name, as in, ‘when is Bill gonna learn…’, or some pejorative term, fitted to the complaint against him, such as ‘when is that dope gonna learn… ’. ‘Guy’ is a prototypical non-recognitional. That is, it is the sort of term used to indicate that the recipient does not know the person. In this case, the initial recipient of the utterance that includes the person reference ‘that guy’ is Bob (at least as he reports it), the referent’s son, and ‘guy’, - a prototypical non-recognitional reference form - is therefore a striking way to refer to someone who is known and known to be known through shared kinship with parties to the (reported) interaction. The current recipients are Bob’s interlocutors, and it is conceivable that they do not know the referent indicated by ‘that guy’. However, the referent is identifiable to Bob’s interlocutors; they have no trouble working out who ‘that guy’ is and indeed, the same person earlier referred to as ‘that guy’ is referred to by another participant as ‘his father’, line 10, showing that she correctly heard ‘that guy’ as a reference to Bob’s father in the first place.

In Extract Two, then, there is use of a term usually used as a prototypical non-recognitional person reference, when it is clear that the recognitional form could have been used. I expand on the features of ALTR in the following section.

7.5 The Practice of Alternative Less-Than-Recognitional Person Reference
The collection of ALTRs consists of instances where less-than-recognitional reference terms (like guy, girl, boy) are used to refer to persons who are,
earlier in the same interaction, referred to in locally initial position either with:

1. Names
   ⇒ e.g. ‘This girl’ where ‘Miss Rabins’ or ‘she’ could have been used

2. Kinship Terms
   ⇒ e.g. ‘These people’ where ‘your dad and Mandy or ‘their’ could have been used

Or, in a different but related practice\(^91\)

3. Categorical Descriptors
   ⇒ e.g. ‘These people’ where ‘The Crisis Team’ or ‘they’ could have been used.

Here the practice is expanded in two pieces of data. Extract three comes from the Heritage corpus, and the target referent is Miss Rabins, a person assisting in selling a flat for her friend (who is abroad). Miss Rabins is reported as having been ‘nothing but a damn nuisance’ to the caller, Gay Noakes and her recipient, Jeremy Spantun. Gay has called Jeremy to give him the good news that the flat he is trying to purchase is being taken off the estate agent’s books and is proceeding as a private matter and that therefore they can ‘forget about Miss Rabins’. Here then, Miss Rabins is a third party referent, known to the parties to the interaction and named in unproblematic terms early in the call (a few lines from the beginning of the call are included to demonstrate this is the case). At line four, Gay refers to the same referent, earlier referred to as Miss Rabins, but now using the less-than-recognitional ‘this girl’.

**Extract Three**

[Heritage_01_Call_7] Miss Rabins – This girl

\(^91\) Schegloff (1996a) proposes that categorical descriptors, such as ‘The Crisis Team’, are not (necessarily) recognitional. I am including them in this collection because once referred to in locally initial position as, say ‘the doctor’ then it is common practice to refer to the same person using the appropriate locally subsequent form (he/she, they) and therefore the use of ‘these people’ to refer to someone earlier referred to as ‘The Crisis Team’ is marked.
Gay: She's given up work? hh.hh An' she w' come over en take the deal o:ver an' do the rest of it an' we'll forget about Miss Rabins

Gay: =Well I jus' thought I mean I didn' understand en I she admits to me tog', .hh[.hh

Jer: [Ye:h,

Gay: that there is n:no: wa:y. that this girl:

(0.2) We think there's so:me flaw that she may'v wanted another friend'v hers t'have it

It don' know that's just between the books'n it doesn' really matter because it's no- she won't get the chance now.hh

Gay: [uRi:ght

[She gunnuh

wash uhr hands off it .hh[hh

Jer: [Ri((h)ight h[hh

Gay: [But

(0.2) you: (0.2) want it. an' you're a pri:vate bah:uh you buy it an'the hell

excuse the expression with Mann'n Company.

Jer: w:Well said.

Note that Gay does not complete her turn at line 4, but this disruption to the progressivity of talk is not connected to the person reference, as evidenced by the production of a locally subsequent ‘she’ at line 5. That is, having introduced what is, at line 4, a locally initial ‘this girl’ in an incomplete turn, there is no repair-initiation on the person reference in the restart at line 5 and the referent is taken as having already been introduced. The recipient, Jeremy, displays no trouble in working out who was meant by ‘this girl’ (and the subsequent ‘she’) simply receipting Gay’s analysis of the situation with ‘Right’ at line ten.

In extract Four, the practice of alternative-less-than-recognisational reference occurs at line 16, when the former UK Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott refers to award winning political journalist Andrew Rawnsley as ‘that man’. This extract is from a Newsnight interview with Jeremy Paxman following Rawnsley’s (2010) allegations about UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s
reported bullying of staff at Number 10. Rawnsley is present in the
studio as Prescott is being interviewed but does not participate in the
interview. Prescott is in a separate studio and so appears on a large screen
next to Paxman and Rawnsley. Rawnsley has just been interviewed by
Paxman during which he explained that he was confident of the veracity of
his allegations because they came from ‘twenty-four carrot sources’. As the
extract begins, Paxman is making the point that Rawnsley’s allegations
‘sound plausible’. Prescott argues that whilst it might sound plausible,
there is no evidential basis for the claims and he dismisses the value of
anonymous sources.

Extract Four
[Newsnight 22/02/10]

01 Pax: The big problem (0.4) with the
02 [( )]
03 Pre: [The big pro blem is him
04 Pax: Er hang on a second. The big problem is it sounds
05 plausible.
06 (0.5)
07 Pre: .hh Well it may be plausible but he gives you no
evidence for it. He quotes twenty-four carrot
09 sources. Why doesn’t he mention them. Journalists
can always hide behind having said something .hh
11 really Jer- uh Jeremy .hh I can’t tell you that
12 because I’m protecting the sources. .h You’ve got
to remember on his original book he made an awful
14 lot of highly personal comment about Gordon
15 Brown. That got all the publicity then. This is
16 about money, for a book, and that man has not
17 given any proof of his allegations. These remain
18 (.) allegations.
19 Pax: You’ve never seen the Prime Minister get angry.

92 Newsnight is a news discussion programme broadcast event day night in the UK. It is presented by journalist Jeremy Paxman,
who has a reputation as a tough political interviewer.

93 Number 10 Downing Street is the official residence of the British Prime Minister.
The third party referent, then, is Andrew Rawnsley. In this extract, he is never referred to by name, though he is referred to several times. The first is a locally subsequent ‘him’ at line 3 and this is followed by several other locally subsequent references, for example, ‘he’ on lines 7, 8 and 9. Rawnsley is included in the category journalist, and so is referred to again in Prescott’s use of the category label on line 9. Prescott, then, uses direct reported speech to animate (and mimic) the hypothetical words of a journalist ‘hiding’ behind a claim to be protecting sources. Contained in this reported speech are two self-references that here refer to journalists and hence, by implication, to Rawnsley. There are two further locally subsequent references: ‘his’ on line 12 and ‘he’ on line 13. Finally, Rawnsley is referred to in less-than recognitional terms using ‘that man’ on line 16, when he says, ‘that man has not given any proof of his allegations’. This reference is selected as an alternative to either a locally initial name or a simple locally subsequent ‘he’. Prescott’s recipient, Paxman, displays no trouble in recognising the referent and moves on to his next question.94

Tracing the use of alternative less than recognitional person reference across these extracts and others like them, the practice consists of the following two features:

- First, a prototypical non-recognitional person reference (e.g. ‘girl’, ‘man’) is selected as an alternative either to a recognitional or descriptive reference form or to a simple locally subsequent form (she/he/they). The non-recognitional is often prefaced with ‘this’ but sometimes with ‘that’.95
- Second, despite the use of a non-recognitional to refer to someone earlier referred to with a recognitional or categorical

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94 This is a question despite its declarative format. This relies on epistemics because it is a B-statement and it is for Prescott, and not Paxman, to report on what he has seen or not seen (Heritage 2002).

95 I suspect there is analytic purchase to be made of the difference between this- and that- prefacing but have not yet managed to construct an analysis that satisfies all or even most cases. One point is that ‘that guy’ contains more ‘recognition-ality’ than ‘this guy’ by indexing the particular referent more forcibly i.e. ‘that guy’ carries a sense of the guy we have been talking about compared with ‘this guy’, which could mean ‘anyone’.
descriptor, recipients do not display any difficulty in identifying the referent.

ALTR, then, is a marked practice in person reference. Drawing on Schegloff (1996a), marked practices are used in the service of an action of some kind; their markedness alerting recipients that something other than simple referring is being done. The next section offers an account of at least one of the salient actions constituted by ALTR.96

7.6 ALTR and Complaints
What sort of action might be better served by a non-recognitional form?
As Sacks (1995: Vol II, 502) observes in relation to Extract Two:

‘that guy’ is ‘a reference to someone who, its use suggests, is relatively distant from the parties involved... in using the term you indicate at least that sort of distance between speaker and the person, or recipient and the person. ‘Just a guy I know’, ‘Some guy whose name I forgot’ as compared to ‘Bill’. Now, plainly the person involved is not such a person. He’s not distantly related, or distantly unrelated... And plainly, a way of producing a hostile reference to someone is to increase the apparent distance via the use of a reference to them beyond the actual known distance.

According to Sacks, then, the use of a non-recognitional person reference for a husband/father is done in order to display distance and hence hostility. My analysis builds off this fundamental insight but goes further by showing that ALTR strips the referent of their relevant membership category (Sacks, 1972a, 1972b) and hence their standardized relational pairing with one or more of parties to the interaction.

96 Other actions may emerge from analytical engagement with the collection, and so coverage of action here is not intended to be a complete account.
This bears some explanation. A first observation is that ALTRs tend to occur in complaining environments - as seen in Extracts Two and Three above in which the speaker is pointing to something complainable in the conduct of Bob’s father and Miss Rabins respectively. In Extract Four, Prescott is producing a counter-complaint to Rawnsley’s allegations against Gordon Brown. Now, various forms of person reference may and do occur in complaints and negative assessments against third parties, some of which (‘that little brat’, ‘the idiot’ etc) are clearly more explicitly hostile than ‘that guy’, ‘this girl’ or ‘that man’. What the non-recognitional format does that is not done with other forms is it strips the referent of their relevant membership category; making them unnameable and unidentifiable in the terms they are usually known (about) by parties to the interaction. Doing this achieves dismantling of the relational obligations in which referents and speaker/recipients are normatively bound together (see Sacks, 1972a, b). In Extract Three, with ‘this girl’, Gay dismantles the terms in which Miss Rabins relevantly features in selling of the flat; Miss Rabins is rendered so insignificant that she can be forgotten about. 97 In Extract Four with ‘that man’, Prescott undermines the journalistic relationship that Rawnsley has with his informants and others by making him unnameable.

In the next extract, the ALTR undermines a kinship relationship between the referents and the recipient, in an explicit move by the speaker to remove the familial obligations that a daughter (the recipient) has toward her father and stepmother (the referents).

Extract Five comes from earlier in the same call as shown in Extract One - the call between seventeen year-old Penny and her mother. As mentioned earlier, Penny’s parents are divorced and she has called her mother to

97 We might note the additional work done by the selection of ‘girl’ as opposed to ‘woman’. We have no sense of Miss Rabin’s actual age, but we know that she is engaged in adult conduct. A child would probably not be in a legal position to manage the sale of a house on behalf of a friend. So, Miss Rabins is an adult and the selection of ‘girl’ to refer to a woman adds something to the markedness of the reference by downgrading her status – she was not fit for the responsible role of selling a house (see Edwards, 1998; Stokoe, 2011). In contrast, we can assume that Paul Padget is more relevantly referred to as a boy because he is a teenager – a friend of Mom’s teenage daughters and therefore, for Mom at least, a child.
complain about the treatment she and her boyfriend received on a recent visit to her father, whom she calls ‘Dad’, and his partner, whom she calls by her first name, ‘Mandy’. The first mention of each of the referents are included in the unnumbered, single-spaced lines at the beginning of the extract. The ALTR occurs at line 20 when Mum asks ‘Why do these people’s opinions matter?’, where ‘these people’ are Penny’s father and stepmother; a noticeably marked way for a woman to refer to a collectivity composed of her former husband, the father of her children, and his girlfriend.

**Extract Five**

**[CTS29] Your Dad and Mandy – These people.**

Pen: Yea[: ::h I wen t to Dad’s last night.
Mum: [Why::: ]
Mum: [Oh]
Pen: [We] went to Dad’s to stay over and we got back today and .hhh to be honest mum he just spent the whole ti:me calling me fa:t

// ((37 lines omitted))
Pens: I just .hh and Mandy was just unbelie:v:ably patronising towards me and Stan.

// (( 75 lines omitted))

01 Pen: [She’s like saying like basically we only
02 like people (. ) because they’re a bit za::ny or
03 whatever.
04 (. )
05 Pen: And like
06 Mum: Hhh huu huu huu
07 Pen: And it’s like ‘NO:’ >I mean- (. ) I was
08 thinking before thou:gh I was in the shower and
09 I just thought ‘You know what I am such like
10 a better quality human being than she will ever
11 be.’ And she’s nearly forty and I’m not even
12 eighteen yet.
13 Mum: #I kno:w
14 Pen: You know what I mean and I’m like- I think I’ve
got the emotiona- ((crashing sound offline)) oh
15 Stan what you doing?
16 Sta: ((inaudible offline))
17 Pen: Erm (0.7) I’ve got like the emotional maturity
18 just like (0.3) so: much more than she has.
19 Mum: Oka:y. So explain to me theen why you’re down.
20 Pen: Why do these people’s (. )

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22      [opinions      ] matter.
23  Pen:    ['Cause I just-
24  Pen:    I just think why do I- well because I was polite
to them.
25    (0.3)
26  Mum:    Y-
27  Pen:    I have to sit there and put up with it.
28  Mum:    No you d- I know.
29  Pen:    And like I ca[n’t just say to- ] I can’t just=
30  Mum:                 [But you’ve nothin-]
31  Pen:    = say to them ‘fuck off:’

Until the start of this extract, some six minutes into the call, Penny has
complained at length, first about the things said to her by her father and
then about the things said to her by Mandy (that these are complaint
sequences is available from the unnumbered lines at the start of the
extract in which Penny launches the complaints; see Drew, 1998). At lines
seven to eighteen, Penny reports the thoughts that had occurred to her
whilst showering (and as is often the way with retorts, presumably not in
the midst of actually being insulted). Penny’s self-assessment is that she is
a ‘much better quality human being’ than Mandy and that at ‘not even
eighteen yet’ she has ‘more emotional maturity’ than her forty year old
stepmother. At line 19, Mum accepts Penny’s assessment with ‘okay’ and,
in an attempt to align with her daughter, uses this agreed ‘truth’ as a basis
for challenging Penny’s complaints (notice the upshot marker ‘so’ at line
19). However, just what Mum intends with ‘so explain to me then why are
you down?’ might not be immediately apparent to Penny, especially given
that she has spent the last six minutes recounting events that are
transparently responsible for her ‘being down’. Mum clarifies the basis on
which she is challenging Penny in a third TCU shown here as line 20, ‘why
do these people’s opinions matter’. In other words, given that Penny is a
better quality human being, and more emotionally mature than ‘these
people’, why is she allowing their views to affect her so negatively? In using
‘these people’, Mum does (at least) two things. First, she brings Penny’s
Dad back into the conversation where he had not been for some time. And
second, by using ‘these people’ Mum strips both referents of their kinship relationship to Penny; they are the sort of distant people whose opinions should not impinge on her mood or self-worth. We might note that if Mum had asked ‘why do your father’s and Mandy’s opinions matter’ or more simply, ‘why do their opinions matter’, she would have been, perhaps inconveniently, invoking the kinds of category relevant conduct expected of people in (here asymmetrical) kinship relationships such that it would have been self-evident why their opinions matter. Daughters are normatively obliged to listen to (if not act on) their parents opinions. ‘These people’ undermines the relationship that actually warrants the referent’s having opinions about Penny, by placing them at a distance from her, such that they are treated as unnameable, unidentifiable and nothing to do with her.

Notice that Penny’s response (after a couple of abandoned starts dealing with the overlap) is ‘well’ preaced (middle of line 22), signalling perhaps that she has some trouble with the basis of Mum’s challenge to her complaint (Schegloff and Lerner, 2009). Penny’s trouble is that it is precisely because she is in a kinship relationship with her Dad and Mandy that she has obligations to be ‘polite to them’ (lines 23/24) and has to ‘sit there and put up with it’ (26) and cannot actually just dismiss them (28/30) as if they were some distant unnameable strangers. Notice that Penny produces part of this list of obligations in the present tense, showing that for her this conduct is a modal and continuing aspect of her relationships with her father and stepmother and not simply something she was forced to do on a single occasion. As it happens, Mum resists Penny’s reinstatement of familial roles (see the self-initiated repair on line 29).

In this extract, then, the action constituted by the practice of ALTR is to place referents at a distance from the recipient by dismantling the kinship obligations between them. In dismantling the kinship role, Mum attempts to inhibit the basis on which the referents are, in fact, warranted to have opinions that matter to Penny.
In Extract Six, an ALTR is used to strip the referent of their professional relationship – this time with the speaker. The practice occurs on line 31. This call comes from a corpus of calls to Mind Infoline, a British mental health helpline. The caller, denoted as CA, has called the helpline to seek legal advice to take possible action against what he characterises as a ‘pestering service’ – the crisis team. In the UK, the crisis team operate as part of the area mental health team and have the specific remit of treating serious and urgent cases in client’s homes as an alternative to hospital care. Before the extract starts the caller has detailed his reasons for feeling ‘pestered’ and being forced to receive home-visits from the team. As the extract starts, he is telling the call-taker (denoted as MW) that he thinks the whole area mental health team should be ‘wiped out’ (line 5), ‘sacked’ (line 9) because ‘the service is crap’ (line 12). Later, he summarises his problem as ‘perplexing’ (line 28) because he is ‘physically disabled’ and yet he is being treated as a ‘mental nutcase’ (lines 25/26). At line 31, the caller refers to the crisis team as ‘these people’.

Extract Six

[68749 ] The Crisis Team – These People

CA Er::m !I HHHHHH hhhh .thhh I’m having serious difficulties (.) a pesting service (0.4). .hh .thhh who are known as the crisis team:. (.)

MW Oh right. Okay, CA .hh uhm (0.6) HHHHH .hhhhhh They keep (.) PESTering me with their visits.

// (83 Lines omitted)

01 CA: .HHHH I think that ((County)) Social Services
02 hhhhhh
03 (0.4) should look into uhm (.) the
04 ((area)) mental health team.
05 (0.9)
06 CA: An’ wipe [them out.]
07 MW [''okay.'']
08 (0.6)
09 MW: .hhh=
10 CA: =Actually s- sack the lot of ’em.
11 (0.9)

98 I am grateful to John Moore for his permission to use this data.
CA: I mean as a chap he’s alright, but you know this service is crap.
(1.0)
MW: Right
CA: .hhhhhh An’ I know there’s a ((city)) Mind office
MW: Yes there is.
CA: Yeah (.)
CA: And it’s the nearest one to me, hh .hh An’ I have got a good mind to actually get on the train and go out to it.
MW: Okay.
CA: .hhhh Uhm but I can’t because I’m housebound. hhh
MW: Right=
CA: =>I’m actually< physically disabled and they’re treating me as a mental nut case.
MW: Right.
CA: “.hhhhhh” .hhhhhhhh It’s (.) a perplexing problem,
MW: [Mmmm.]
CA: [.HHHH] because I’ve >never done< anything wrong, =I’ve been terrorised by these people.
(1.5)
CA: >They’re actually< (. ) keeping me under house arrest.
(0.9)
(16 Lines omitted)

MW: tk .hhhhh So can I ask <what you’re looking> for from the information [line today I understand there’s a lot there=
CA: [ tk.hhh °Ye:ah °°(I can)°°=
MW: ={for you.}
CA: ={Yeah } >There is<° .hhh ah a mental health (. ) lawyer’s number.

The ALTR is used in place of either a default locally subsequent ‘they’ or a locally initial ‘the crisis team’. Its use strips the team of their professional role with the caller such that they are not a mental health team treating him for a known problem but a group of people whose credentials are unknown, and therefore not the sort of people who would have a right to insist on visiting one’s home.
If the caller had used the categorical descriptor ‘The Crisis team’, the caller may have invoked exactly the mental health grounds on which such a team might be warranted to visit someone to provide treatment. So, here again we have an ALTR used to strip someone of their relationship to one of the parties in the interaction. This time, the referent is stripped of their professional role in relation to the speaker. Again, note that had the default reference been used – ‘The Crisis Team’ (or ‘they’), then the complaint against the referent would be undermined. The ALTR dismantles those aspects of the referent’s identity that warrants conducting whatever is being complained about.

In the next extract, the referent is a doctor and is referred to in locally initial position using a non-recognitional category descriptor – ‘this doctor’. This call is taken from a corpus of calls to a Birth Crisis Help line. Lucy has called the help line to talk through her traumatic birth experience and as the extract starts, she is telling the call-taker about the preparations for her epidural, which apparently took place in a ‘filthy’ delivery room (line 4) that was ‘full of broken chairs’ (line 3).

Extract Seven

[BCC62] This Doctor – This Guy

01  Luc:  .hh So she took me along to a delivery room  
02         huh huh and it was- it just sounds like this one  
03         in the magazine full of broken chairs ‘n: .hhhh  
04         it was just filthy: [and uhm] she put me on=  
05  Clt:  [A:::H ]  
06  Luc:  =this bed and by that time my contractions were  
07         comin’ so fast ‘n so hard she went ‘Right I  
08         think you need an epidural.’ .hhh So she- she  
09         hooked me up with an epidural and this-  
10         this doctor came into the room and he  
11         was foreign. .hhh And he could hardly speak a  
12         word of English:. .hhhh And I’m only five  
13         foot three and ‘e pumped the bed up t- right  
14         to the top and says ‘will you put your feet on
the floor ‘n do all this an’ I was in
screamin’ [agony:.]

Clt: [.hhh h ]
Luc: He asked you what. To put your [feet on- ]

the floor huh! while this bed was right up in
the air an’ he asked me to s:- h!: ‘e- ‘e
just didn’t ‘ave [a clue what’e was (doing)]

Clt: [To put my]feet on
Luc: [What an extraordinary ]

position.

Luc: It was (. ) Awful.=’N (0.2) all sorts’v things ‘e
was tellin’ me. .hhh So I said I didn’t want
this epidural ‘cause I was petrified of this guy
puttin’ this needle in my spine and I didn’t
know whether he was a vet or huh

Luc: huh huh

Luc: D’you know what I mean I just didn’t know whether
he was qualified to do [it. ( )] wi’ a big=

Clt: [No:. No. ]

Luc: needle wanting to put it into my spine.

At line nine, Lucy refers to ‘this doctor’ – a categorical descriptor that she
has some trouble producing (this-this-this doctor), and thus conveys a
sense of not quite wanting to honour him with the title. There follows a list
of reasons for not trusting the doctor – he was ‘foreign’ (10), he could
‘hardly speak a word of English’ (11), he asked her to sit in an unreasonable
position, leaving her ‘screaming in agony’ (14), and he ‘just didn’t have a
cue what he was doing’ (line 20). At line 23, Lucy remarks that the upshot
of all this was that she no longer wanted the epidural because (at line 24)
she was petrified of ‘this guy’ putting a needle in her spine.

Here the ALTR strips the doctor of his professional role with Lucy such that
he is not a doctor putting a needle in her spine, but any person whose
credentials are unknown, and therefore not someone you would allow to
insert a needle into your spine. Again, it might be noted that if Lucy had
used the categorical descriptor ‘doctor’, as in ‘I was petrified of this doctor
putting this needle in my spine’, or a locally subsequent version ‘I was
petrified of him putting this needle in my spine’, the person reference terms would not have contributed to the complaint against him, and may even have suggested the trouble could be attributed to her fear of ‘this needle’ rather than with the apparent untrustworthiness of the doctor – ‘this guy’ as an ALTR makes clear that Lucy’s fear is attributable to her problems with the referent and not to anything else. He is so unlike a doctor that he cannot be identified as one.

Lucy provides additional evidence that this is the case at line 26 with ‘I didn’t know whether he was a vet’ and then again at lines 28/29 with ‘I just didn’t know whether he was qualified to do it’. So, here again is the use of an ALTR used to strip someone of their relationship to one of the parties in the interaction. This time the referent is stripped of their professional role in relation to the speaker. Further, had the default locally initial or its locally subsequent form been used, then the complaint against the referent would be undermined.

However, ALTRs are not exclusively used in complaining environments. In Extract Eight, the ALTR, which occurs on line 23, strips the referent of his relationship to one of the parties in order, in part, to praise him as an individual.

This call is taken from the CallHome Corpus, in which students were given free long-distance calls (in the days when such things were prohibitively expensive), in exchange for use of the resultant data. In this call May has rang Dee in Japan. It turns out that May and Dee had both been hit by cars in recent weeks. However, May is more interested in what has happened between Dee and her boyfriend, Danny, whose name she cannot remember, thus she asks ‘What happened with what’s-his-face’.

Dee and May talk for several minutes about the ups and downs of the relationship with Danny – he cheated, she was devastated, they broke up, she forgave him, they got back together but it wasn’t the same. When he
wanted to live together, Dee realised that it wasn’t what she wanted, so they broke up again. Dee then tells May about a drunken call from Danny in which he’d said how much he missed her and how much he wanted her back. The numbered section of the extract opens with her reported response.

**Extract Eight**

[CallHome: 5788]

May: But more important things.

Dee: [Okay]


Dee: Oh Danny?

May: Yeah

Dee: Oh: God.

//

( lines omitted )

01 Dee: .hhhhhhhh So: an’ he’s just- an’ I’m like listen
02 you know you never know we might get back
together why in thuh future: but I just can’t
04 think about that now (an’) I wanna be free an’
05 all this stuff so .hhhhh that an’ I just got a
06 letter from hi:m, h[hh] (laugh)
07 May: [Oh]: great.
08 Dee: .mtch an’ he’s like .hh you know I really miss
you still an’ blah >bl< blah< an’ he’s like ’by
09 thuh way (this) big phone bill can you h(help
11 m)h e p(h)ay it, huh huh=
12 May: =N[:o: W::y=.
13 Dee: [ .hhhh ]
14 Dee: =t$:Ye:ah$:i=
15 May: =.h[h :Forget thA::::t; hhh=[huh]
16 Dee: [.h An’ uhm ] [Wha]::[t?]  
17 May: [.h]h $Forget
18 thA::t,$
19 Dee: Well (. ) no=no (th’) =thing is though is like I
20 would help ‘im pa:y it. Be[cau ]se (. ) h:e: (. )
21 May: [Yeh-]
22 Dee: pa:id for e:verything. >like< (. ) >(more)<
23 seriously this guy spent like twelve thousand
24 dollars (h)on (h)our r(h)el(h)atio(h)nsh(h)ip.
25 Or some[thing. ( )]
26 May: [Twelve thousand]d?
27 Dee: Like he w(h) ent tuh- he flew to see=me: (.)
28 three times,=
29 May: =R:i[:ght. Ye]ah that’s true.
30 Dee: [Was it? ] [>An’=’e]’s paid
31 for all thuh phone bills,…

It turns out that Dee has just received a letter from Danny in which he says that he still really misses her but makes a ‘by-the-way’ request for help with a large phone bill that he had presumably run up in the service of maintaining his relationship with her. Dee’s recipient is indignant, saying ‘no way’ (line 12) and ‘forget that’ (line 15, repeated at 17/18). Dee resists her friend’s indignant response - notice the open-class repair initiator on line 16 (see Drew, 1997) and the well-prefaced response on line 19 both of which signal misalignment of some sort. Dee goes on to explain that, in fact, she does feel she owes her ex-boyfriend because he ‘paid for everything’ for the duration of their relationship (line 22).

At line 23, Dee refers to her ex-partner in less-than recognitional terms using ‘this guy’ as an alternative to more canonical formulations such as a name or the locally subsequent ‘he’. So, she says, ‘seriously, this guy spent like twelve thousand dollars on our relationship’, which seems too much even by modern standards. In using an ALTR, Dee is taking the referent out of the category ‘boyfriend’ to show how he behaved beyond what might be expected for a boyfriend. A boyfriend might be obligated much more than ‘a guy’ would be to go to considerable expense in maintaining a relationship. As a girlfriend, she might be considered free to accept his financial investment in their relationship without obligation to return any money when the relationship ends. By selecting ‘this guy’, Dee removes his relationship to her as a boyfriend and hers to him as a girlfriend. In doing so, she reduces his obligation to pay excessive amounts to maintain contact with her and, at the same time increases her obligation to return at least a portion of the money he invested.

This section has offered an account of the action of ALTRs. As a marked practice, they can be heard as doing more than simply referring. In most of
the cases presented, the action is hostile. The ALTR distances the referents from parties to the interaction by making them unnameable. One effect of distancing is to dismantle the terms in which the speaker, recipient and referents are usually known to one another; it removes their standardised obligations to each other. In complaining environments, this removes the basis on which referents might be warranted to do whatever is being complained about.

7.7 ‘This Thing’: An extension of ALTR for referring to objects

Referring to objects, like referring to people involves lexical selection from possible alternatives (see Schegloff, 2000). Whilst being cautious about the equivalence of the domains of person reference and object reference, we might offer a tentative observation that prototypical recognitional (names and descriptors) and non-recognitional (this guy, this thing) formulations figure in the practices for both. I am interested in this final section in development and application of the analysis of ALTR (though without naming as such) to the practice of referring to objects. ⁹⁹

Sometimes, speakers convey in their formulation of objects that they do not have access (and/or do not suppose their recipient to have access) to the proper name of an object. A typical formulation of the non-recognitionality of an object is ‘this thing’. Take for example, Extract Nine, in which Nancy refers to an object (line 9) presumably used by a dermatologist to ‘open up a lot’ of the pimples she has.

Extract Nine

[Hyla and Nancy]

02 Nan: My f:face hurts, =
03 Hyl: =’W’t-⁹
04 ( · )
05 Hyl: Oh what’d’e do tih you.

⁹⁹ My hesitation here is partly based on the lack of data pointing to ‘alternative recognitional’ formulations of objects. This is not to say that it does not occur, but that I haven’t yet conducted the proper search.
06  (·)
07 Nan:  GOD'e dis (·) prac'ly killed my dumb face,=
08 Hyl: =Why: Ho-ow.
09 Nan:  (With,) (·) With this thing I don'ee
10          I wzn'e even looking I don't kno::w,
12  (·)
13 Nan:  B't 'e jis like o:pened up, (0.6)a lo:*t*
14          y'know('v) (0.4) the pimples I ha:ve¿=
15 Hyla:  =Eoh::,

There is a similar formulation of object, this time using ‘the thing’ (line 5),
in Extract Ten.

Extract Ten
[CTS05]
01 Sta:  Am I definitely being recorded.
02 Pen:  Yeah
03 Sta:  Re- Because last time you only recorded yourself
04          remember
05 Pen:  Yeah I know I put the thing in the wrong socket
06          huh huh
07 Sta:  ( ) Go [on then
08 Pen:                       [Think I put it in the right
09          one ((clears throat and continues with story…))

What Extracts Nine and Ten have in common is reference to an object using
a non-recognitional ‘thing’; what we might call a dummy term. There is no
evidence in either extract that the speaker could have selected a
recognitional alternative - particularly as in neither case do speakers set up
a search for a recognitional form. In both cases, the recipient accepts the dummy term ‘thing’, or at least displays no trouble in accepting it. In a sense the recognitionality of the objects here referred to does not appear to be consequential for the interaction; ‘thing’ works.

Compare this with the following exchange, taken from ‘Chicken Dinner’, in which the object being referred to is a potato and something of a tussle emerges over how it is formulated in the course of the interaction.

Extract Eleven

[Chicken Dinner]

01 SHA:  Kin y’bring the table closer?
02 VIV:  Dz everybody have everythin;=
03 NAN:  =y’want / (=Move) the table clo[ser?
04 SHA:  [M-hm.
05 (1.4)
06 MIC:  hnh.  t ’h (0.2) ’h mMy Peop[e.
07 (.)
08 SHA:  hhhha:h [ h a h a]
09 NAN:  [huh h h h  h]
10 (2.4)
11 NAN:  Wai’lemme move do:wn a li’l bi[t.
12 (1.1)
13 SHA:  Ah can’t- Ah can;t[get this thing mashed.
14 VIV:  [Aa-ow.
15 (1.2)
16 NAN:  You [do that too?: tih yer pota]toes,
17 SHA:  [This one’s hard ezza rock.]

100 Compare with the following example of use of ‘thing’, where the speaker clearly conveys that she does have access to a recognitional form.

[CTS01]

14 Pen:  Your hair grows the wr(b)ong w(b)ay.
15 Sta:  Ha I don’t think I’m [.]entirely human am I].
16 Pen:  [Huh huh  ]
17 Pen:  Your little things what them things called where
18 your hair comes out of. Pollu[urles, They’re wrong!
19 (0.8)
20 Sta:  No they’re [not]=
21 Pen:  [They! point the wrong way
22 Sta:  ={  ) Look (.) they don’t

101 Schegloff (2007:12) analyses this same extract.
The data involves two couples; the hosts, Vivian and Shane and their friends, Nancy and Michael. Vivian has prepared a meal, and this extract is taken from near the start of the recording, where the diners are settling down to eat (lines 1-12). At line 13, Shane complains that he ‘can’t get this thing mashed’, where ‘this thing’ is the potato on his plate. The complaint is partly constituted through the unusual formulation of being unable to ‘get’ the potato mashed; conveying a sense of entitlement, of having tried and failed at something he ought to have been able to get done. With ‘this thing’, he locates the problem in the potato rather than with his own inability or some other hindrance (e.g. lack of space, faulty cutlery) – compare with ‘I can’t get the potato mashed’. Rather like the previous examples of referring to persons using ALTR, naming the object would detract from the complaint against it. However, at the point Shane produces the reference, we have no evidence, at least internal to the data, that he could in fact have selected the proper name for it. This changes in Nancy’s turn at line 16 – ‘you do that too. To your potatoes.’ Here, Nancy topicalises mashing, and thereby ignores the implicit complaint in Shane’s prior turn. In doing so, she names the object to which he was referring. Notice that she does this incrementally – almost insisting on naming the object after the first possible completion of the tcu, in a way that emphasises the reference.
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Nancy’s turn at 16 overlaps with Shane’s redoing of his complaint at line 17 (using ‘this one’ to refer to the potato) but evidence that he hears Nancy’s topic proffer and responds to it is provided at lines 18 and 20 – ‘Yeah. But this thing is hard’. The ‘yeah’ is a type conforming response (Raymond, 2003) to the yes/no interrogative addressed to him by Nancy and the ‘but’ is contrastive – despite being someone who generally mashes his potatoes, he cannot actually carry this out on this potato because it is (apparently) undercooked. Notice again, Shane’s use of ‘this thing’ to refer to the potato. Now, at the time he utters ‘this thing’ in line 20, he has heard and responded to Nancy’s turn (line 16) in which the object was named, so we do now have evidence that he has access to the recognitional formulation and is selecting not to use it.

The person to whom Shane’s complaint is directed – Vivian – apparently fails to hear the objection when it is first issued at 13 (the video shows her to be distracted and removing butter from her fingers), but she certainly hears it when it is reissued at line 17, and again at line 20. Notice that line 22, Vivian’s negatively formulated (embodying the complaint) ‘It’s not done’, the potato is referred to indexically using ‘it’ but is then named in the increment that follows. Rather like Nancy had done at line 16, Vivian is insisting on naming the object of complaint – emphasising it out in the clear. Shane’s response to this at line 23 is something of a withdrawal – ‘I don’t think so’. The sequence ends with Nancy’s assessment that the potato is cooked, her appeal to Michael for his opinion (line 25), his weak agreement with Shane (line 28) and Shane’s acceptance of Michael’s assessment (line 29).

In this extract, Shane draws on a parallel practice to ALTR in order to bring off a complaint about an object. Although not immediately clear, it becomes obvious through the course of the interaction that Shane is selecting not to name the object rather than being unable to do so. His selection of ‘this thing’ partly constitutes the complaint and locates the
problem in the object he is referring to rather than in his own inability to name it.

Bracketing off differences in referring to persons and referring to objects that might become apparent with future research, there does seem to be a resonance between the two in the practice of using non-recognitional reference forms in order to bring off a complaint.

7.8 Concluding Comments
In referring to others in talk, speakers have available a range of referring expressions. There are default practices for doing simple referring and marked practices that constitute a social action of some kind (Schegloff, 1996a). In this chapter, I have described a marked practice that departs from the default practice by selecting a prototypical non-recognitional reference in place of either a canonical locally initial or subsequent form, when clearly the canonical form could have been used.

In line with Schegloff (1996a), we have seen that marked reference forms perform more than referral. The selection of a prototypical non-recognitional form to refer to a recipient who is known and known-to-be-known manipulates the social distance between speakers, recipients and referents by making the referents unnameable. This move undermines the normative social obligations that people have to one another and one effect of this is to downplay the basis on which referents might be warranted to play a part in someone’s life – parental rights to express opinions that matter to a daughter or a mental health team’s right to access a patient’s home, for example. In this way, speakers can shore up a case against a third-party.

Interestingly, we have seen only one example where this strategy is exposed and undermined. This occurs in Extract Five, where a daughter resists her mother’s attempt to place her father and stepmother beyond familial relationship obligations. In this case, it might occur because Mum’s
use of an ALTR occurs as a way of closing down her daughter’s lengthy complaint and it is this that Penny resists. That is, Mum appears to have missed the point. It is not that the things said to Penny were in themselves hurtful but that her father and stepmother, people who patently do matter to her, said these things.

This chapter contributes to the literature on person reference by examining the action of a marked referring practice (as well as, more tentatively, to object reference). The use of a non-recognitional form when a default form is available might appear to compromise the preference for recognition. However, in none of the cases presented here do the recipients display any trouble with recognising the referent. In these cases, the referent has already been introduced to the talk and the ALTR is often selected as an alternative to a locally subsequent reference. Still, we might ask how it is that the recipient figures that the ALTR is in fact a re-referring rather than a first referring to someone ‘new’. Part of the answer lies in the continuity of topic or action in which the referents feature. That is, the referents appear in topically continuous environments and, in context, the non-recognitional reference could only be a reference to a particular referent (e.g. Bob’s father is the only referent to have given an unwanted gift, Penny’s father and stepmother are the only referents to have expressed hurtful opinions, and the Crisis Team are the only people to have terrorised the caller to a mental health help-line).

Finally, this chapter connects to broader issues about the ways in which people manage their relationships to one another. Third-party references set up triangular relationships between speakers, recipients and referents and create particular domains of responsibility (Stivers, 2007). Stivers shows how Alternative Recognitionals can place a referent in a recipient’s domain of responsibility (as in Extract One when Penny places her father in her mother’s domain). In this chapter, we have seen that the ALTR places the referent outside of the domain created between speaker and recipient.
In doing so, perhaps the speaker and recipient are, even momentarily, brought closer together.
Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusions

In this concluding chapter, I first summarise my main findings and then consider the contributions the work makes to two fields of study: Conversation Analysis and Gender and Language. I end with an assessment of the limitations of the work and offer suggestions for future research.

8.1 Summary of Findings

In the first empirical Chapter Four, where gender takes precedence over reference, I examined a single extract of data in which two fifteen-year-old girls talk about the development of a relationship from its initial stage of (his) pursual, through the first kiss to the first sexual contact. In contrast to most previous research on young people and sex, the data was not researcher generated. The naturalistic data permitted an analysis of how sex as a topic is introduced and managed in (this) interaction. What was clear, is that, for these participants, sex is a delicate and deeply moral topic. The ‘news’ that one of the speakers - Mary - is engaging in a sexual relationship with her new partner is managed very carefully - first through an embedded telling in the course of another action, and then as the culmination of a period of reasoned resistance on her part. In line with previous findings, Mary displays herself as being concerned for her reputation. She very skillfully negotiates a moral identity at the same time as she presents herself as sexually active. Sex is not discussed straightforwardly. Instead, it is constructed as taboo in the ways that it is introduced and referred to only in vague, unelaborated terms. We saw that this contrasts markedly with the description of the first kiss, which was eminently an ‘appropriate’ topic for the interactants. The taboo nature of talk about sex is connected to its moral status - in not being descriptive, Mary (and her recipient Karen) tacitly manage being ‘good’, though this is not without paradox.

In Chapter Five, a distinction was made between linguistically marked gender terms and terms that invoke gender relevantly in the interaction. In
a sense, this gives rise to a four-by-four matrix: terms that are both linguistically marked and make gender relevant, those that are neither, those that are linguistically gendered but which do not make gender relevant, and those that are not linguistically marked but which do invoke gender. The interactional meaning of gender is not intrinsic to gendered linguistic forms but to the action a linguistic form is used to do on any given occasion of use. This significantly opens up the possibilities for research on gender and language, since it frees researchers from the perceived necessity of focussing their research on linguistically gendered terms and urges sensitivity to the multiplicity of ways in which people ‘do gender’ in interaction.

Chapter Six, extended the analysis of linguistically neutral references that have interactionally gendered implications. In particular, I examined mundane uses of ‘I’ as a self-reference; a form of reference that has generally been taken-for-granted as categorically ‘empty’, showing that the apparently unremarkable “I” can, on occasion, convey categorical information about the speaker. The practice described is a contextual one and relies upon category relevant talk having already surfaced in prior talk. If a category is already ‘out there’ speakers can exploit it and produce themselves as categorical members (including, but not limited to, gender) in the service of a range of actions. The analysis suggests that there is nothing in language that is uniquely gendered. However, I do show how gender (amongst other things) can be invoked in interaction, without being named.

In Chapter Seven, where reference takes precedence over gender, I described a marked practice that departs from the default practice for referring to third parties by selecting a prototypical non-recognitional reference in place of either a canonical locally initial or subsequent form, when clearly the canonical form could have been used. The selection of a prototypical non-recognitional form to refer to a recipient who is known and known-to-be-known manipulates the social distance between
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speakers, recipients and referents by making the referents unnameable. This move undermines the normative social obligations that people have to one another and one effect of this is to downplay the basis on which referents might be warranted to play a part in someone’s life – parental rights to express opinions that matter to a daughter or a mental health team’s right to access a patient’s home, for example. In this way, speakers can shore up a case against a third-party.

8.2 Principal Contributions

The research in this thesis contributes to two fields of study: 1) conversation analysis, and 2) gender, sexuality and language. In this section, the contributions to these fields are summarised.

8.2.1 Contributions to Conversation Analysis

At a general level, a major contribution of this research has been the collection of a new data set of mundane interaction, based the talk of persons who are not widely represented in CA data: young, British, working class women. This corpus also offers conversation analysts a comparatively up-to-date data set.

For the most part, the data examined in this thesis has been of mundane interaction (with the exception of Chapter Seven). In CA, ordinary interactions are treated as having ‘bedrock’ status, such that institutional talk is often analysed for its deviations from everyday conversations (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984: 12). However, much funded research tends to be analyses of institutional data, and perhaps this is understandable within current academic cultures, which stress the applicability of research findings and develops notions of ‘impact’. The institutional nature of data also extends to CA (influenced) research on gender, sexuality and language (e.g. Shaw and Kitzinger, 2004; Speer, 2011; Speer and Green, 2007; Stokoe, 2010; Toerien, 2004, Wilkinson, 2011). The mundane data on which this thesis rests provides a key source for analysing how gender and sexuality (amongst other things) are oriented to and managed in the ordinary
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everyday lives of persons. This is important, because I have collected data in which, in contrast to some of the institutional work, the participants are not already embedded in analysably institutionally constructed gendered roles (e.g. beauty therapist and client, or newly delivered mother and childbirth counsellor). This is not to say that gender is always relevant in these sorts of settings, nor that mundane interaction does not take place in a generalised context of pre-existing notions of gender. In both cases, the relevance of gender should be demonstrated. Nevertheless, insofar as institutional interaction appears to involve systematic deviations from mundane interaction, it is sociologically pertinent to explore ordinary encounters, if not in the first instance, at least simultaneously with institutional encounters. In this way, we can demonstrate how participants navigate ordinary social worlds.

In a more particular sense, this thesis contributes to cumulative conversation analytic understanding of person reference. In the analysis of referring terms, it is imperative to consider the alternatives available to speakers. In Chapter Seven, for example, it is clear in every case that speakers could have selected a recognitional (or categorical) term. In selecting a prototypical non-recognitional term instead, speakers are hearably designing their turns to accomplish a social action beyond referring. In this case, the social action accomplished by the non-recognitional is to place referents at a distance from speakers and recipients in order to warrant a complaint. It is noteworthy that had the recognitional been selected, the complaint against the referent might have been weakened by implicitly reminding recipients of the grounds on which the referent had grounds to conduct themselves in the ways that are now being treated as complainable. For example, when a mother in conversation with her daughter, refers to her ex-partner and his new girlfriend as ‘these people’, she is tacitly undermining their role in her daughter’s life, and therefore the extent to which the daughter is obliged to take their opinions seriously. A recognitional construction such as ‘why do your father’s and stepmother’s opinions matter’ is rhetorically less
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powerful because it is pertinently clear from the invoked categorical obligations why their opinions matter. This leads us to consider the intersection between membership categorisation and person reference.

As outlined in Chapter Two, conversation analysts tend to be wary of categorical analysis because this form of research, although initiated by Sacks, arguably does not stay faithful to CA standards. Yet, the work in this thesis demonstrates that speakers are sensitive to referents’ (locally relevant) categorical memberships when selecting a referring term. This is most clear in Chapter Seven, but can also be seen in Chapter Six, when speakers are referring to themselves in ways that embrace or resist the categorical norms which have surfaced in the interaction. For example, a male speaker, in conversation with his sister, invokes the (hetero)norm that men should pay for meals on a date, but then resists this norm for himself. When he uses ‘I’, in this context, he is accepting and producing himself as a member of a gendered category, even if he is resisting the social implications of that membership.

Further impetus for consideration of the intersection between category and reference is provided in Chapter Five, particularly in the selection of prototypical locally subsequent references such as ‘they’. It is not uncommon for ‘they’ to appear as an initial reference to some unspecified group of persons. In Chapter Five, for example, we saw a speaker select ‘they’ as an initial reference to the category men. Our understanding of this as a reference to men plays off commonsense reasoning about their typical behaviour. Similarly, though only referred to in a footnote (number 67), Chapter Five includes an extract in which a teenaged girl refers to her parents using ‘they’ in locally initial position. We only recognise this reference because it rests on members’ understanding that the role described (in this case, provision of lifts to take children to activities) is typically fulfilled by parents.
Hence, person reference and social categorisation appear to be closely related. This underlines the sociological importance of studying practices for referring to persons, because these practices make available (if not always relevantly so) referents’ social statuses. In addition, using CA, and particularly analysing person references, provides an empirical grounding for examining ways in which categories are invoked and negotiated by and for participants.

A second contribution to the conversation analytic literature on person reference lies in the demonstration that the self-reference - ‘I’ - can be locally occasioned as indexing categorical membership. In this sense, uses of ‘I’ ought not to be automatically considered to be reference simpliciter. This finding might also sensitise us to the possibility that the notion of reference simpliciter is itself simplistic. The grounds for developing this notion are clear - the recurrent regularity in which certain forms are selected over others. However, one of the problems with developing generic understandings of the organisation of interaction based on cumulative findings, is that certain findings risk being treated as already ‘true’. This leads analysts away from examining data in its own right. In this case, the taken-for-granted idea that ‘I’ is a simple reference to self steers analysts away from exploring its interactional uses.

I was reminded of the risks inherent in treating data in accordance with established findings when analysing the single-case extract for Chapter Four. In this extract, a speaker tells the story of her developing relationship. The recipient opts not to react to the story at several positions in the interaction, with the result that there are numerous gaps in the talk. When first analysing this extract, I treated the recipient’s silence according to what I already knew - that silence signals interactional ‘trouble’. The result was an analysis of the recipient’s disapproving stance that did not fit with what was happening in the interaction. It was only when I returned to the analysis that I saw that I had missed what the recipient clearly had not; that the news that her friend’s relationship was
now sexual had been implicitly delivered early in the call, and that therefore she was waiting for the ‘appropriate’ moment to respond as a news recipient. The silences were not signalling trouble, so much as displaying the story-recipient’s understanding that the end of the story had not yet been reached.

The single-case study also provides grounds for shifting generic understandings of sequences. In CA, there is a tendency to examine immediately prior turns to analyse how a particular turn at talk, or new sequence is occasioned. In this way, it makes sense to discuss new or bounded sequences of talk. The focal extract in Chapter Four contains a story-telling sequence, that analysably begins in the traditional sense with a story-preface (did you want the craic). However, if, like I did originally, we start analysing the story from this moment, we miss the fact that the endpoint of the story was heralded from the beginning of the call, within a request sequence. I am struck by the resonances between what was happening in this call, and work conducted by Walker and Drew (2009) that demonstrates the ways in which co-interactants attempt tacitly to accomplish an agreeable environment in which to issue a complaint before the complaint is put on the record. There are grounds, then, for extending analyses of sequences prior to the point they actually surface in interaction. The suggestion that CA reconsider its foundational findings is in line with recent moves to a more nuanced understanding of preference and epistemics (e.g. Stivers and Rossano, 2010, Heritage, frth).

8.2.2 Contributions to Gender, Sexuality and Language Research
There are three main contributions to this field of research. The first contribution is methodological in that I have demonstrated the utility of conversation analytic work for investigating gender and sexuality. Second, I have analysed how gender and sexuality can become relevant through actions accomplished in mundane talk-in-interaction (as opposed to other linguistic markers such as lexical selections). Third, I have shown that male
and female talk is not ‘male and female language’ simply by being produced by members of these categories.

**a) CA as a Method for Studying Gender and Language**

The sociological impetus to treat gender and sex as routine to ordinary social landscapes makes CA an appropriate analytic tool. Language is a primary site for producing identities, and as Kulick (2000: 246-7) argues, research in this field benefits from a more thorough engagement with ‘well-established linguistic disciplines and methods of analysis, such as conversation analysis, discourse analysis, and pragmatics’. This thesis demonstrates the effectiveness of CA as a methodologically and theoretically powerful approach to studying gender and sexuality in language.

In Chapters Two and Three, I described the range of objections that are commonly directed towards CA as a method for politically engaged work; that it has a limited concept of context, a restricting focus on participant orientations, which ignores broader social influences, and a naïve claim to neutrality. These objections are revisited here, in light of the findings presented in this thesis.

A conversation analytic understanding of context is that which is oriented to by participants in interaction. That is, context is actively and locally constituted moment-by-moment between speakers, as opposed to bearing down on talk. There follows from this theoretical point, a methodological focus on participant orientations. In this thesis, I have followed this basic tenet of CA as far as possible. This has meant, that, on occasion, I have not analysed data where I had a strong sense that gender was relevant, but in which the speakers did not demonstrably orient to it. For example, I did not include the following data in which a young man orients to the possible offensive nature of his talk about a recent orgy. His recipients are female.

**Extract One**
In this extract, Mark cuts off a telling in order to check with his recipients that they are not offended by its sexual content (lines 29-30). The person reference (you) is not linguistically gendered, though I do hear it as interactionally gendered - as reflecting stereotypes of what counts as appropriate topics of conversation for women; this question is unlikely to be directed towards male recipients. Mark’s jokey response to his recipient’s denials that they are offended - that they ‘should’ be - seems to add weight to this analysis. However, this hearing relies on my own cultural understandings, and, unlike the categorical ‘I’s presented in Chapter Six, the ‘you’ as a reference does not occur in an environment where relevant categorical identities have already surfaced. So, it might be a simple reference to recipients, based on Mark’s personal knowledge of their personal sensitivities. The joke that the young women ‘should’ be offended does seem to play off some categorical identity (e.g. possibly age, gender, religion), but it is difficult to pinpoint which is relevant for Mark. So, I decided not to include the data as an example of a gendered reference.

Hence, in some senses the privileging of participants’ orientations has restricted the selection of extracts. However, the same privileging is a key analytic resource, and without it, the findings presented in Chapter Five would not have been possible. That is, the distinction between linguistic and interactional marking of gender relies entirely on the participants’ own treatment of referential terms.

The analysis that deviates most from participant orientations is presented in Chapter Four, where I use the data to reflect on the kind of social world
that it reproduces. CA remains the primary analytic tool, but, as I acknowledge in that chapter, the post-analytical discussion (about gender, sexuality and morality) might not be comfortable for a conversation analytic audience. I could have restricted my analysis to that of a co-construction of a story, analysing its preface, development and conclusion without reflecting on its content. However, the extract was selected precisely because sexuality was the major topic for these speakers. To have ignored this might have been (more) acceptable conversation analytically, but would risk losing sight of what was clearly driving the interaction. By grounding my post-analytic reflections in a CA of interaction, I trust that these reflections are warranted by the data. Focusing on the minutiae of interaction does not preclude reflecting on broader social processes (Goodman and Duranti, 1992).

There is more discussion to be had about CA’s claim to neutrality. As outlined in the methodology, there are grounds for doubting that any method or, for that matter, analyst, is objective. The principles of CA - analysis of naturalistic data and focussing on participant orientations - are useful tools for guarding against making unwarranted claims. However, even the most faithful adherents to CA cannot totally avoid importing their own cultural perspectives when commenting on data. For example, Schegloff (2005: 458) comments on the lack of a father figure present at a family meal, which seems to be his concern and is not oriented to at all by the family. In these pages, I have taken the unusual (for CA) step of reflecting on my own relationship to the data and its analysis. In this sense, I have not claimed to have been objective. However, I remain persuaded that by grounding claims in naturalistic data, and adhering as much as possible to participant orientations, CA offers a key method for analysing the investigated rather than the investigator (to parody Schegloff, 2005). This is strengthened when data and its analysis is made publicly available, and, therefore, open to challenge and reanalysis (routine in CA).
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\textit{b) Gender as Social Action}

There is no evidence in this thesis that gender (and sexuality) are accomplished by dedicated practices. That is, there is no particular practice for doing gender. There are no specific lexical selections that invoke gender as a category - even when those lexical selections are linguistically marked for gender (Chapter Five). Instead, gender is accomplished through the \textit{actions} that speakers are implementing. The practices that might invoke gender might also be used in the service of a range of other actions. For example, the categorical ‘I’ might be used on some occasions to index a speaker’s gender but the same practice (exploiting a sequential environment in order to bring off a self-identity) can also be used to index a range of other identities (Chapter Six). There is nothing particularly gendered about this.

This does not mean that lexical selections or other linguistic features such as pitch and tone cannot be used to do gender. For example, in the focal data in Chapter Five, a male speaker, Stan, notably drops the pitch of his voice in order to parody the voice of another male speaker. We can imagine that altering pitch to construct gendered voices is common - though this bears examination. Nevertheless, it remains important to analyse the action being accomplished by these pitch changes. For example, when Stan drops his pitch, he is not simply conveying a male speaker, but also a man of dubious intellect. It is doubtful that linguistic and lexical features have the capacity to produce gender regardless of the interactional context in which they appear. Hence, gender is accomplished in nonspecific actions.

\textit{c) Rejecting Difference}

By treating gender as interactionally achieved through (possibly) nonspecific actions, we move away from notions of men’s talk and women’s talk as arising from the gendered properties of persons. It is not that speakers are not gendered, nor that their gender is not available for
Conclusions

others, but that their gender is simply not always relevant for interaction. This makes sense, not only in terms of the diversity within gendered groups but also in terms of the diversity within persons; the multiple identities pertaining to individuals. When women or men speak there is no evidence within these pages that they are speaking as women and men unless their gender is relevantly invoked during the interaction.

In some senses, this thesis began with my own struggle with the traditions of my home discipline - psychology. Over the course of the thesis, I have been embedded in a sociological discipline, where arguments about sex-differences are no longer taking place. I grew increasingly concerned that my work was offering nothing original in this regard. However, whilst the argument that gender differences in use of language is no longer taken seriously in sociology, it is massively pervasive both within other academic disciplines and outside academic arenas. The latter is evidenced by the popularity of books such as Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus, which essentialises gender, and promises guidance for communicating with members of the opposite sex. More seriously, the ideology of difference impacts on the hierarchical ways that men and women are treated in relation to each other. For example, Litosseliti (2006) notes that in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on 9/11, women journalists tended not to report on these violent events unless they were writing human interest stories. She argues that sexist reasoning about women as emotional and men as objective maintains women in unequal status to men; as belonging to private spheres, rather than public spheres.

Within psychology, sex-difference research remains key. For example, recent publications in the British Journal of Psychology include titles such as The influence of sex and empathy on putting oneself in the shoes of others (Mohr, Rowe and Blanke, 2010), Close women, distant men: Line bisection reveals sex-dimorphic patterns of visuomotor performance in near and far space (Stancey and Turner, 2010) and Examining mental health literacy and its correlates using the overclaiming technique (Swami and Papanicolaou,
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2011), which reports exploring, but not finding, sex differences in knowledge about mental health terms.

Evolutionary psychology is predicated on sex differences and develops a strong stance on the influence of sex on the development and production of various social skills, including language (Geary, 2009). Recent articles in the journal *Evolutionary Psychology* include studies of language differences in the use of: vocabulary in imagined romantic encounters (Rosenburg, 2008), emotional expression (Vigil, 2008), verbal aggression (Moroschan, Hurd and Nicoladis, 2009) and production and responses to humour (Greengross, 2008).

The language of difference is also evident in mainstream social psychology of gender texts. For example, Rudman and Glick (2010: 219) assert the following:

> For male adolescents, the combination of a persistent sex drive with a more assertive, aggressive style of interaction can spill over into sexual coercion... Sometimes this can simply be a matter of misinterpretation. Both adolescent boys and men are prone to incorrectly interpreting female friendliness as sexual invitation.

The last quote is particularly disturbing because it appears to condone sexual coercion, turning it into a matter of cross-sex miscommunication.

There remains, then, a strong imperative to challenge notions of gender differences. Especially when these differences are treated as natural and inevitable, and used to condone oppressive conduct. My work contributes to this challenge, but clearly the task of undoing pervasive assumptions about essential differences is large scale. After all, the work has been done within sociology. It is also being done in discursive psychology, without apparently influencing the mainstream (Hepburn and Jackson, 2009).
question might be one of where and how to publish the work. Conversation analytic work has the advantage of resonating with people’s lived experiences, because it is based on people’s lived experiences. Sociological feminism tends to be heavily theoretical and not straightforwardly accessible either to lay audiences or to heavily empirical academic disciplines. Discursive psychology, we might speculate, tends to be treated as a challenge to psychology as opposed to wider societal structures. Clearly the message is the same, but perhaps we should consider ways to circulate our ideas and findings to broader audiences.

8.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Two major limitations are discussed here. The first is the topical restriction of the work. The second, which arises from the first, is the lack of consideration of structurally organised gendered power relations in talk.

The method of CA requires hours of repeated listening to data, and production, and ongoing refinement, of highly detailed transcription. Conversation analytic studies are therefore labour intensive and the range of data analysed over the lifetime of a thesis is necessarily constrained. The search for gender was, in a sense, expedited by a focus on person reference, where, certainly in English, a person’s gender is routinely made available to recipients and analysts. However, person reference might not be the best or even most interesting way that gender gets done in interaction. The topics included in this thesis, then, are not representative of all that could be done. The finding that there is no apparatus solely dedicated to accomplishing gender sensitises us to the argument that there are potentially many other technical procedures for its production. The finding that even non-gendered linguistic formulations have the potential to make gender relevant, suggests that the search for gender in interaction might itself be labour intensive. This is a matter that I intend to follow up post-thesis.
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Throughout these pages I have positioned my work as having a commitment to feminist concerns. Whilst I am clear that the work contributes to matters of interest for research in gender and sexuality, I am not sure that its findings act politically to inform understandings of oppressive gender practices. Conversation analysis is agnostic about the outcomes of analysis, and although its findings can be recruited in support of various political positions, it does not set out to do politics. In this sense, I suggest that the title Feminist CA is something of a misnomer.

Undoubtedly, CA can be used in the service of feminism, but it is not, in the first instance, a feminist discipline. The tools of feminist CA are, in the end, simply CA applied to matters that concern feminist researchers. CA can be applied to any arena of social life, without needing to particularise it in a title.102

CA as applied to gender and sexuality research can be treated as part of the so-called turn to identity in language research (Mills and Mullany, 2011). Cameron (2005, 2009) challenges identity researchers to debate the kind of feminism they reproduce. In common with other contemporary language-based studies, this thesis is concerned with how gender is constructed in interaction. Cameron (2009:8) questions whether this focus on local practice can really address ‘classical feminist concerns’ that rely on understanding of women as having a commonality of experience as a basis for collective activism. As noted above, I am ambivalent about the status of my work as a piece of feminism, at least in the political (or classical) sense. However, there is nothing inherent to CA that precludes the possibility of producing findings that can be used in the service of feminist activism. If oppressive categorical understandings of women (or men) are present in social life, we can be sure that they will be reproduced in talk.

In the coming months, I plan to follow up on a number of conversation analytic and/or gender themes. First, there is scope to explore the notion

102 Interestingly, Mills and Mullany (2011) suggest that gender and language researchers should use feminism in the titles of projects in order to stress the political nature of the work.
of default reference or reference *simpliciter*. The range of alternative referring terms available makes any single selection worthy of analysis. This is as true of self-reference as it is of third-party reference. This thesis has not considered uses of ‘you’ to refer to recipients. Indeed, recipient reference seems generally under-researched.

Second, and following on from the above, there is more work to be done on the relationship between category analysis and person reference. There are undoubtedly places in talk (though not analysed in this thesis) where speakers directly categorise themselves and others using formulations such as ‘I am/she is an x’. However, we have also seen that categorical work can be done without such explicit naming, and indeed through the selection of terms that appear to be categorically ‘empty’. I should also like to explore uses of terms like ‘they’ that index categories that have not necessarily been introduced in the talk. For example, the use of ‘they’ to refer to ‘parents’ mentioned above, that can only be understood by reference to category bound activities.

Third, this thesis has mostly focussed on gender rather than sexuality. These categories are interdependent (Cameron, 2009). The speakers in my corpus happen to be heterosexual and whilst sexuality was the focus of one chapter, there is potential for further analyses. Much of the work on sexuality has focussed on minority sexualities, leaving heterosexuality largely unexplicated; standing as the norm. However, there is scope in my data set to examine the practices by which (young) people produce themselves as heterosexual, or even just take it for granted.

Finally, the data set lends itself as a platform to launch conversation analytic studies not related to this thesis. For example, I have a collection of well-prefaced self-repairs and have presented an analysis of these (with my colleague Danielle Jones) at the recent International Conference in Conversation Analysis (Jackson and Jones, 2010). I also intend to follow up on the analysis of ‘thing’ as a non-recognitional reference to objects that
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originated in the work for Chapter Seven. More broadly, the corpus provides data with which to analyse young people’s talk and to address the questions that invoked my interest in studying for a PhD in the first place. So, for example, to examine young women’s capacity for assertion. This would require analytic work on the practice of assertion, which is currently unexplicated in interactional terms.

Final Comment
As outlined in the introduction to the thesis, my intellectual interest in CA originated in my personal experience of operating as, and being positioned as, a gendered being in the world, yet knowing that my gender is not of relevance in all (or even many) contexts. This makes gender a thoroughly social matter; a category that is invoked interactionally in the service of various social actions. I was attracted to CA as a tool for understanding how gender as practice is accomplished. My initial concerns, then, were feminist. However, over the last six years, as I have trained as a conversation analyst, I have been engaged by CA as a method in its own right. This is, perhaps, reflected in the presentation of empirical chapters: Chapter Four, with its emphasis on topic-talk and what it suggests about the social world, is probably the least comfortable chapter for conversation analysts, and Chapter Seven, with its technical focus on a particular practice for referring to persons, the most. I end this thesis impressed by the potential CA offers both politically engaged research and research on the basic structures of human interaction.
Appendix I: Informed Consent Form

Telephone Recording Consent Form

Name of Researcher: Clare Stockill  Supervisor: Professor Celia Kitzinger

Below is a consent form, which gives me permission to use your recordings for research purposes. Please read it through and feel free to ask any questions before signing your consent. If you are under 16 years old then you will also need to show this form to a parent/guardian for their consent. Under no circumstances will the contents of your calls be revealed to your parents.

Over the page is a series of consents which gives you control over the way that I can use your recordings. Please sign each one that you consent to.

Name of Research Participant______________________

I consent to the recording of personal telephone calls of my choice for research purposes. I understand that I am free to decide which calls to record, and that I can turn the recording device off at any time during a call.

I have the right to withdraw from the research at any time. I understand that I also have the right to withdraw all or part of the conversations that I give to Clare Stockill call for up to one week after she has received the data.

Name       Signed

Date

If you are under 16 years old, please show this form to a parent/guardian and ask them to sign the parental consent below. Please note that you will not be permitted to take part in the research without such consent.

Parental Consent

Name of Parent       Signed

Date
**AUDIO RECORDS RELEASE CONSENT FORM**

As part of this research you have made audio recording of some of your telephone conversations. All recordings were made with the consent of the other parties to your calls, and they have consented to use of the recordings for research.

Please indicate below what uses of these records you are willing to consent to. This is completely up to you. We will only use the records in ways that you agree to. Please be assured that no names and identifying information will be given in any verbal or written communications based on these records.

1. The records can be studied by Clare Stockill and her research team for use in the research project.

   Signature

2. The records can be used by Clare Stockill and her research team in publications.

   Signature

3. The recordings can be displayed on academic web sites in conjunction with publications using extracts from my calls.

   Signature

4. The records can be played in academic contexts (e.g. teaching) and professional meetings (e.g. conferences).

   Signature

5. The records can be placed in an archive for use by other researchers.

   Signature

I understand that the recording of telephone conversations without obtaining consent from the person I am speaking to is illegal. I have ensured that the other speaker has consented and I have only sent tapes that both of us are happy for you to use in your research.

I have read the above description and give my consent for the use of the records as indicated above.
Appendices

Date __/__/__ Signature____________
Name________________________

Parent/Guardian

I have read the above information and consent to uses of recordings as indicated by my child.

Name of Parent Signed
Date

Clare Stockill’s Contact Details

1. Carlisle
   Work Address (St Martin’s College)
   Applied Social Sciences
   St Martin’s College
   Carlisle
   CA1 2HH

   Tel 01228 616319
   Email ctstockill@ucsm.ac.uk

2. University of York (as above)
   Tel 01904 433044 (Sociology Graduate Office)
Appendices

Appendix II: CTS Data Log

1. CTS01 Penny Hair
   Kathryn (16) and Dan (19) = Penny and Stan
   Call edited at request.
   Topic – Hair
   Rough transcript made August 2005
   Transcript revised Sept 05
   Sections of transcript worked up for F&P 2006/07

2. CTS02 Sophie Gem
   Charlotte (14) and Victoria (13) = Sophie and Emma
   Call starts at some point into an ongoing situation
   Topics- Lost gem, sleepover, friends, school meals
   Rough Transcript of full call

3. CTS03 Penny Row
   Penny and Stan
   Being snippy with each other
   Topics – Their respective days – causes a row because Stan had to get
   up ‘early’ which is not early to Penny
   Call ends abruptly.
   Rough transcript of full call

4. CTS04 Frankie Triops
   Rachel (12) and Emma (12) = Frankie and Tessa
   Recording starts a few minutes into on-going phone call
   Lots of background noise and conversation – mostly not interactionally
   significant.
   Topics- what Frankie has done in last few days; Triops; Fish
   Rough transcript of full call

5. CTS05 Penny Parents
   Kathryn and Dan = Penny and Stan
   Long call ranging, recorder runs out before end of call over many topics
   but several themes are clear;
   Penny’s work, trouble with parents, wanting to leave home; living
   together; people putting things away and Penny’s depression.
   Mentions being recorded on a couple of occasions and about a minute
   deleted on request (from 46.5).
   Rough transcript of various sections
   Bus sequence worked up for overlapping talk. Depression sequence
   used for CA Data session at York.

6. CTS06 Freddy Five Live
   Radio Five Live phone in programme on sexual content of magazines
   aimed at teenage girls (link with Jackson, 2005 in F&P?). Freddy is a

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guest on the programme and is there with her mother (who disapproves of content of magazines).
No transcript.

7. **CTS07 Sophie Ring Back**
   Charlotte (Sophie) and Vicky (Emma). C rang V, but V asks her to ring back in five minutes.
   Complete transcript.

8. **CTS08 Sophie Summer Shopping**
   Vicky wants to stop recording on two occasions, but Charlotte continues, which V accepts reluctantly. C does not pick up on V’s reluctance. I asked V subsequent to call whether she was happy for me to listen and use the call – she gave her permission.
   Parts of call transcribed.

9. **CTS09 Sophie Stomach Rumbles**
   Charlotte (Sophie) and Victoria (Emma).
   Got a non-recognitional repaired to a name.
   Recording finishes suddenly —ran out of space on recorder!
   Parts of call transcribed.

10. **CTS10 Frankie Arrange**
    **Rachel (Frankie) and Jenna (Louise)**
    A call to arrange a meeting in town – (background - this call takes place at a difficult moment in Rachel and Zoe’s (Annie) relationship. Rachel is wanting to widen her circle of friends to include Jenna). In this call Rachel and Jenna negotiate the ‘Zoe’ problem – they will stay in town after Zoe has left.
    Draft transcript completed.

11. **CTS11 Frankie Dogs**
    Rachel and Emma
    The Triops are dead! Teen circuits, ice-skating. Girls are better behaved on buses. Cat poo. Normal averaged size jack Russell – half way to knee height. Description of all the puppies. Long series of what’s at end of call.
12. CTS12 Frankie Skate
   Rachel and Emma
   What’s happening today? Emma’s party at the local rink, which had
   been closed due to the floods in Carlisle – thus refs to it being open
   again. Both Rachel and Emma talk to parents off-line to check transport
details.

13. CTS13 Sophie Christmas Holidays
   Charlotte and Victoria – more references to the flood. I am really itchy.
   Try having my eczema. Fairy lights. Christmas tree fell on me. I was in
   Leicester last night. You were in Austria? I was in Leicester. Oh right, I
   thought no you weren’t.
   This person had a face transplant. Oh yeah I know. Tells the story
   despite the block – ends with a tag question. A man who hadn’t
   started puberty and he was 30 – what – and he was dead weird.
   Ignores the OI repair – treats ‘what’ as an appropriate response. Man
   got excited when he got an erection – Ugh!

14. CTS14 Penny Ring Back
   Penny rings Stan – He does greetings but then gets in quick to ask her
   to ring him back – ‘Penny don’t be mad at me’ – great pre!

15. CTS15 Radiohead
   How are you man. Songs. Radiohead. Arrangements for New Year’s Eve
   – Stan gets romantic. It is to be hoped that it will be a pretty cool year.
   Hopefully. A lot of shit could go down in a year. Locally initial Megan in
   locally subsequent position. I don’t want to put pressure. Collaborative
   completion – I don’t wanna go out with...Ste and Jane. I don’t want you
to go out.

16. CTS16 Penny Stan Complains
   Penny and Stan. Penny describes a ‘fucking awful’ night out. Rapping.
   Stan had sent Penny a text – it was nice, sweet, cute. But if any other
   boyfriend had sent it, normally girls would be put off. ‘Stay in my
   consciousness’. Man with no ears. Stan describes a family gathering at
   his house – he hated it. Why is everyone treating each other like the
   fellowship of the ring – pretending we are a family. Not our sort of
   people. Imposed themselves upon us. It seems really hectic. It was. It
   was really really really hectic.

17. CTS17 Sophie 50p Bench
   Charlotte (15) and Drusilla (15) – Sophie and Imelda. Charmed – Imelda
   tricks Sophie into telling her how one of the characters dies in
   Charmed. They talk about some falling out at school – complicated
   story. Ends with ‘We’re just good friends who hang round with each
   other’. Story about a dog – running past the 50p bench. Sophie
   doesn’t recognise this description at first – gets it eventually. Imelda
   goes to the loo – keeps talking! Then makes herself a milkshake.
18. **CTS18 Penny Gay’s House**
Penny and Stan. Penny has a night out – ends ups at ‘some gay guy’s house’, but doesn’t know how to get back. Stan clearly disapproves. Penny met the girl that got off with Pete Doherty – she’s proper like pretty but she’s a slag. Stan – Don’t go to strange gay men’s houses – Penny responds – I didn’t know he was gay ’til I got in the house – does a parody of a gay man – We have just got to watch spaced. Dancing – I am not even saying-trying to defend myself. Good call for girlfriend/boyfriend interaction – he’s offended by Penny’s behaviour.

19. **CTS19 Penny Train**
Penny and Mum – Arrangements for collecting Penny from station. Mum is frustrated because the pick up will interfere with working day. Lots of sighs! Got a third position repair in sorting out the recording ethics.

20. **CTS20 Sophie Cinema**
Sophie rings Penny on the train – Invites her to the cinema to see the Da Vinci Code, but she’s seen it the day before. Interruption? Penny interrupts Sophie’s list of films to say she has no money. Loses call because the signal goes. Reconnects. Good call for repair.

21. **CTS21 Sophie Grandma**
Hair – Colouring – Brown, Brown, Eh, Why? Grandma’s holiday

22. **CTS22 Penny Piano XX**
Not using

23. **CTS23 Penny Friends**
Penny and Stan go out separately, but friends let them down. A dickhead of a night. Mum interrupts Penny – Teagen’s taxi ride. Around 4 mins into call. Good call for locally initial person references in locally subsequent positions.
Murder on the train – Got a ‘this guy’ to index the murderer – in locally subsequent position. Link with Hyla & Nancy, use of this guy in the story of the play.
Third position repair – 12th or 5th June towards end of call. Go into closing but then gets re-opened twice before ends.

24. **CTS24 Penny XX**
Not using

25. **CTS25 Penny Air Bag**
Air bag – Radiohead song – flashes up on screen where warning signs come up. Step-Dad saw sign and thought it was real – nearly made an idiot of him self. Third position repairs. Teasing back fired.
Emma been for the week, Sophie keeps her pink Bench top. Penny wants to wear it too – Mum says but it will be too small for you – Penny reacts in a jokey way to an imagined slight about her weight. Penny is hungry. Stan’s made her something but she didn’t like it.

Revision – not going to nag you – your choice.

Complicated repair re buying shoes from e-bay.

Went to Teagen’s – spent £50 – Mum comments on both the visit after the ‘bust-up’ and spending that much money. How did you let Teagen know you were annoyed with her? Spending – stop being so passive in it. Its like this happens to you.

Mum had forgotten to buy train ticket.

Call moves to closing but then reopens twice.

26. CTS26 Sophie Simon
Sophie and Emma. Tells Sophie all about a call to Simon – arrange a camp at Bowleigh. Overlapping TCU, that Sophie OL repair and then answers.
Reports having told Simon that she’s thick and doesn’t read. Nice accent – I wish I had it but sort of in a man way.
MSN – people get confused and fall out because you can’t make the tone match the situation.

27. CTS27 Sophie Postcard
Sophie and Imelda - This call happens immediately after CTS26. Imelda tells Sophie about her suspicions as to why the postcards she has received have not been written by her Nanna. Uncle – My dad hates my uncle – ask C if uncle is dad’s brother.

Talk about having children – put with CTS42 where they talk about not wanting children. We have to miss work if we have kids. Discuss maternity pay. Expect parents to look after children.

Golden ticket for Big Brother.

Imelda’s Dream – This lad I was engaged to. He was getting off with this other woman. Storming. In the end, she went off with a lad she liked, married him and had two kids.

The wedding – slept with him, not with him just in the same room. Shared a bed with Alex, which is a girl by the way, just in case you were thinking it was a boy. Which I was.

28. CTS28 Penny Porn
Appendices

Penny talks to Stan about her interest in researching porn. Stan is not involved in this call – he seems bored and tetchy. Penny has some very long turns where he is relevantly missing.

Rough transcript completed.

29. CTS29 Penny Dad
Penny talks to mum and complains about her Dad and step-mum. He calls her fat and she is ‘unbelievably patronising’. Great call for person reference – alternative recognitionals and alternative less than recognitionals.

Mum keeps wanting to disrupt the father-daughter relationship – why do these people’s opinions matter? Penny is upset precisely because he is her father. Mum is doing sympathy but is running on parallel lines from Penny.

30. CTS30 Penny Scallies
Penny complains to Stan about scallies. Been to a birthday party – watched England getting knocked out of the World Cup. Rooney is a just a fucking scally pushing and shoving Ronaldo. I live in the country side where we don’t have scallies.

I told mum I was crying last night, and the only response I got was ‘get a job’. Imagine getting a job in the summer holidays! Depressing. Is that what old people-

Conform to society. I am depressed after this call. What. (large gap) Did you not hear me.

31. CTS31 Sophie Ring Back
Sophie rings Emma – she’s having her tea. Asks her to ring back in 10 minutes.

32. CTS32 Sophie Switchboard Call
Sophie rings Emma back. Emma’s mum answers, recognises Sophie. Emma takes a long time to come to the phone. Sophie says something that Emma doesn’t get, says it doesn’t matter. Emma persists three or four times, in the end Sophie gives in and makes another attempt.

Why didn’t Andy text me at your house. Have a disagreement about this.

Long silences.

Get rid of your cellulite.
At about 21.30 Sophie interrupts Emma and says she is going to go because her cake is waiting. The interruption gets topicalised.

33. CTS33 Karen
Karen and Amy. Amy asks Karen a really really cheeky favour. To cover for her going to a party with John.

I told him I was on my period as a barrier, but I did stuff to him. It didn’t feel wrong or anything. Do you think I’ve done the right think...what people might think. Its not like we are not going anywhere. Micky pesters Amy...wouldn’t stop touching her in the gym. Cuddle and things. Wants him to go out with another girl. She’s really nice.

John is a bit of a man whore. He’s gutted that he has this reputation. He is 16 – he’s not going to turn people down. It’s not his fault.

I am over Alec. It was upsetting seeing him with Jan. I couldn’t put them to together. Look-wise they don’t go together. Sally says that she’s really ugly.

Got an ALTR – Amelia - that girl. She gets drunk at 4.00 in the afternoon. Desperate attempt to fit in. Used to go out with fat Edward.

34. CTS34 Penny and Mum Row
Mum rings Penny on a mobile phone – doing an experiment to see if the mobile can record the call. Beep in the background. Is Anna on a loop?

Mum is going on a farm walk – there will be animals and everything.

NK is a priest – or are they priests in the C of E.

What is the beeping?

How did college go this week. Well the days I went in it was fine. Oh what does that mean? I went in on Mon, Tues and Wed. What happened to Thurs and Fri? I didn’t have any clothes. Oh Penny!

Schools go on to the middle of July. Study leave. I am not getting a job over summer last time. I made that mistake last summer. You made that mistake? Mum and Penny argue over the job.

Disagree over Penny’s revision techniques. Overlapping TCUs.

35. CTS35 Frankie Mob

01 Fra:    Hello?
02 Mum:    Hello::?
36. CTS36 Ellie Party
Ellie (16) and Helen (?)


Ellie tells Helen about a drunken party that she’s been to the night before.

Curls are sexy. He has got very nice hair. Helen doesn’t agree – he looks like he gets up out of bed and does nothing with it.

Elder gets round the circle (of boys) very fast. Yes she does. I haven’t got a circle- well:

Discuss Ellie’s ME and likely effects on drinking. Around 9 mins Helen interrupts with a touched off story. Says sorry for interrupting - Ellie says to go on - she doesn’t mind. Miss Jones was having a gossip about Alma Badcock in German. Out-raged response from Ellie. Topicalise teachers’ responses to people returning to school after a period of absence, thus drawing attention to the absence. Ellie had missed ‘three fucking years’ due to ME

A lot of talk about alcohol – people who can and can’t hold their drinks. Helen is clearly impressed by Ellie’s ability to consume lost of alcohol without getting drunk.

Emo’s – teacher doesn’t understand what they are.

37. CTS37 Penny Mum

38. CTS38 Frankie Phone Card
39. CTS39 Sophie Bus Arrange
Sophie wants to be collected from the bus stop. Does not know what time the bus is. Mum asks Frankie but she doesn’t know. Current recording sound is very poor – check original!

40. CTS40 Sophie Bus Ring Back

01 Ring ring
02 Mum: Oh be careful. Be careful. It’s wet
((offline))
03 Sop: Hi:
04 Mum: Oh hello sweetheart. Are you on the: (.) bus.
05 Sop: Yes.
06 Mum: Okay. Right [I’ll-
07 Sop: [Are you going to be late.
08 Mum: O- hhh probably. So(h)rry. .hh
09 (.)
10 Mum: I’m l- leaving now.
11 (.)
12 Sop: Bye:
13 Mum: Right then see you soon. Bye::

41. CTS41 Emma Brother
Emma (15) rings her brother Michael (22). He asks her about her Valentine’s date. Great interruption at start of call – establishes himself as ‘this type of recipient’ for her telling about the film ‘Hot Fuzz’

CK – using part of this call for an or-initiated repair.

Michael ‘to be honest I completely forgot it was half term’. There is no rest for us old people.

Do you know what Sophie did before? Oh have you two kissed and made up then. Kissed. Well, made up then. I’m in Carlisle, so isn’t it obvious. Not in Emma’s world.

Talk about Anna – someone thought she was 4, but she’s only 2. Michael comments that she won’t always want people to think she’s double her age. So when she’s 50, how old will people think she is?

Teases her about behaving like a 7 year old. Aah you are all grown up. You are 15, you have nothing else to learn. You know everything.

Alexander get your hair cut.com ‘aah that’s harsh’ ‘You like his long hair’ ‘yes’. Launches a story about Brittany Spears having her head shaved due to a ‘crisis’. ‘This woman refused to shave her head’...some more conversation ‘Why did this woman refuse? Question – is the second ‘this woman’ a non recognitional? Compare Hyla and Nancy ‘this guy’.
Dumped his girlfriend on Valentine’s day – she accused him of cheating on her. He didn’t cheat, but didn’t believe him so checked his phone. I went out with a looney tune. I am not getting married this side of 30. When? Thursday? 30. I am not wasting my life. I need to live my twenties out. That will make Emma an old bridesmaid.

Think things through before you speak.

Someone’s getting a bit full of themselves now aren’t they – at end of call – Emma directs it at Michael.

42. CTS42 Sophie Imelda
Sophie and Imelda talk about their plans for Imelda’s 16th Birthday party. Imelda is not allowed to depend on her mum and dad any more for mother’s day and father’s day and Christmas presents. Imelda is looking after her younger siblings. Sophie comments that she sounds like a stressed out parent.

My dad hasn’t got me a present. He’s just throwing me a party. Her dad will buy them a drink. Her uncle would. Does a parody of her uncle, whose routine mustn’t change. Very stilted voice.

Most people are between our age and 25 – all the young people.

Talks to a small child offline.

Sophie doesn’t know what a wedged heel is – Imelda has trouble explaining it. Ends up saying ‘you’ll see them on Saturday’.

Locally initial ‘we’ talking about Sophie and her drama group. ‘I watched Jeremy Kyle’, ‘We acted that out in drama’.

Going to adopt children because babies are too difficult. At four a child can say what they want, sleep through the night etc.

43. CTS43 Penny Mum
Mum doesn’t want to go back to work. Well don’t then. I need the money – what for fat face clothes. For what basically – nice miscued repair.

Penny and Stan had been to Eureka. The guy asked them whether they had children – as a basis for entry. They said no, they were just paedophiles. Mum is shocked. Says they only got in because they didn’t fit the stereotype of a dirty old man.

Quite a lot of talk about psychology and A’levels. Mum worried that Penny is planning to fail psychology deliberately.
Two-and-a-half year old Anna talks to Penny, around 11.30 (she is saying ‘I’m climbing but Mum doesn’t get what she’s saying). Lots of laughter in turns. Mum says ‘that was sweet, that’s the longest conversation she’s ever had on the phone’.

Collaborative completion around 16.30 – I think Sophie wasn’t suited and would much prefer…something else. Something else. Complaining about Sophie’s not moving to York.

Piaget – mountain study – causes much laughter. Object permanence. Piaget underestimated children didn’t he. He did. Someone did a study, who showed that if you give the children a much simpler task – can’t remember his name. It was Donaldson and it was a woman!

44. CTS44 Sophie Imelda
Party plans. This call takes place just before Imelda’s 16th birthday party. What are you going to wear? Are you looking forward to it? Imelda wants to escape this mad house – she’s been left to look after her younger brothers and sisters for a week. She is going to die an old distressed woman. Lots of shouting at younger children. One sibling ‘talks’ to Sophie – she does not join in except to say hello.

Imelda mock threats to leave the younger children – one child says something like ‘please don’t leave’ – she says she won’t leave, she’s only joking.

I am going to kill myself – well do it after the party!

45. CTS45 Sophie Sleepy
Mum rings 16 year old Sophie who has been to Imelda’s 16th birthday party and stayed overnight at a friend’s house. She is still asleep when the call comes and is very quiet, causing mum some concern.

46. CTS46 Sophie Sleepy Follow Up
Mum rings Sophie two hours later (following CTS45) in order to arrange the pick up. Good call for dispreference – S asks for a phone top up – long gap and then ‘well, we’ll have to think about that’. Later M asks S to look out for her arriving but C says no without saying no.

47. CTS47 Penny No Ticket
Penny rings Mum first, and asks mum to ring her back. Mum is too slow, so Penny rings her again. Finally mum gets through – hence laughter at start of call. Business of this call is tell Mum that Penny is not coming for the weekend, but she does it in a roundabout way – lost ticket and train crash. Compare with Trip to Syracuse.
48. CTS48 Sophie Ill Bus
Sophie has caught bus unexpectedly because she is unwell. Rings mum to collect her. Mum asks her what is wrong but Sophie aware that people can overhear says that she will tell her later.

49. CTS49 Frankie Ski
Mum rings Sophie to arrange collecting after her skiing holiday. Hannah talks to her. Mum is very pleased to be seeing Frankie again, but Frankie is strangely muted. Is it because Dad and Mandy were there as overhearers?

50. CTS50 Penny York
Penny rings mum to talk about arrangements for the weekend. Decide that it will take too long and be too expensive, so delay for one week. Discuss the move to York and younger sisters lack of willingness to move. Third position repair – There are some here. It’s sunny here as well. Good call on age – young, adult, etc.

51. CTS51 Penny A
Penny rings mum to tell her she got an A in her Biology exam.

52. CTS52 Penny Biology
Ring back call – Mum returns Penny’s missed call. Penny has rang to ‘brag’ about the mark she got in her biology exam. Explains that she got a B in her psychology coursework, but the work has to be re-graded due to some problem with the exam board.

Mum tells Penny about the second health review meeting with work. Has a locally initial person reference in a locally initial position – Rosemary came. Rosemary is very level headed...

Penny complains about her psychology tutor. Honestly, honestly, honestly I don’t think I’ve learned anything about psychology all year.

Hannah is a distraction to Mum during the call.

53. CTS53 Frankie Sophie Home
Frankie rings mum to arrange a lift home – asks her to ring back because she’s on a mobile. Going to McDonalds – Mum reacts, she’s having her tea at home. Passes phone to Sophie but line goes dead and Mum rings back. Sophie doesn’t want to come home and insists on it. Just trust me...why? Have a struggle over this for a while, then reach a compromise.

54. CTS54 Frankie Touch Your Nose
Recording starts towards end of call...Frankie tries to get her friend to touch the end of her nose with her eyes closed.

55. CTS55 Penny on Train
Ring back call – Mum returning Penny’s call. Penny tells mum what time
train she’ll be on.

56. CTS56 Penny Dad Porn
Penny rings Stan – long call 50 minutes. Reports to Stan about Frankie’s
experience on holiday with her father. Incident when her father
watched porn. Stan ‘fails’ to react as Penny expects, so pursues a
‘better’ response. Then complains about Stan’s response. Lots of
overlapping talk.

Thirteen year old girls shouldn’t be exposed to this sort of thing.

You know what they are like in bloody Italy.

Stan turns it into a joke, but Penny is shocked.

Makes a big deal of Frankie being 13.

Penny interrupts Stan to report two year old sister’s ‘discovery’ of her own
genitals. Stan is horrified!! Does not want to discuss this.

More talk about hair!! 19 minutes.

Third Turn Repair on ‘part of the furniture’

Lots of yawning - around 22 minutes

Problems with dads – not type of my people.

Gills – interruption about 45 mins

Towards end of call discuss Comic Relief – the comedy and the sadness. –
lots of overlapping talk.

57. CTS57 Penny MP3 Charger
Penny rings Frankie to find out where her MPS player charger is.

58. CTS58 Penny MP3 Charger
Penny rings Sophie to ask her what she has done with her MP3 player.
Holds her accountable for ‘not knowing’ where it is.

59. CTS59 Frankie Arrange pickup
Ring back call – Mum returns Frankie’s call but has had some trouble
because of the bad signal. Frankie asks permission to go to a friend’s
house. Mum asks about Sophie, who has been drinking.

60. CTS60 Frankie arrange pick up
Follow up call to previous – Mum rings Frankie in order to collect her from
her friend’s house.
61. CTS61 Penny Right Move dot com
Penny rings mum to ask her name of house they are looking at. Penny apologises right at the beginning – she’s rang several times that evening. Mum takes her through the website details – Rightmove.com - and Penny types as she speaks.

62. CTS62 Penny Old Toll House
Penny rings back again to ask Mum if she’s seen the virtual tour of the Old Toll house. They talk about the house’s attractions including a ‘Maypole’. Offline, Geoff mentions the fact that it has no garage...mum says – you know what men are like.

63. CTS63 Penny Tidy Up
Switchboard call – Mum rings Penny, Stan’s Mum answers. Takes a long time for Penny to get to the phone. Mum talks about the sale of the house and the fact that the people buying their house love it. Then talks about the stress of waiting for the vendors of Old Toll House to accept the offer.

Penny complains about Emma’s lack of ability to throw things out. Mum co-complains about Geoff’s hoarding – tells a story if the vinegar bottles.

Sophie comes in and shows Mum a text message from Anthony. Mum reads it out to Penny – ‘you are sexy’ – mum reacts. Penny disapproves of Anthony because he gets drunk. Don’t let her lose her virginity to him.

Discuss Sophie’s plans to stay in Carlisle.

64. CTS64 Penny Coursework
Penny rings mum, but opening of call crashes into answer machine. Penny makes a request for Mum to look at her psychology report.

Call made on day that the clocks go forward, so Mum has been rushing around. Had JJ and KK over with their families.

Realise could be moving quite soon.

Penny is having duck for the first time.

65. CTS65 Penny Offer Accepted
Ring back call – Mum rings Penny. Penny has ring to ask if offer accepted on Old Toll House – it has and Mum exclaims on the coincidence that she has just emailed Penny ‘this second’ with the news.

66. CTS66 Penny Post Code
Penny asks Mum what the post code is – she doesn’t know, so asks Geoff. Penny wants to look it up on google maps. Mum advises Penny to look
for houses in Selby as they are much cheaper. Penny asks for a
description of Barby.

67. CTS67 Penny Lost Email
Penny rings mum to ask if she’s received her email. Mum had already
replied.

Penny had received a letter congratulating her on her high graded A. Mum
tells her a story about walking through the biology department at York.
Get into a repair sequence about shark’s penis.

Stan has had his hair cut short.

Teagen – 19th birthday, going to Ghana for three weeks. When she gets
back her mum is buying her a house. Only child of rich parents.

Discuss furniture that may take to York.

Discuss Sophie living with Penny and Stan in York.

68. CTS68 Frankie Ring Me Back
Frankie has buzzed. Mum rings back but before she can, Frankie rings her
first.

69. CTS69 Frankie Mum Rings Back
Follow up call to previous. Frankie has missed the bus and asks Mum for a
lift. Mum is reluctant but agrees to take her so far.

70. CTS70 Frankie Bus
Ring back call – Mum returns Frankie’s call. Frankie talks through the
choices of buses back to Lowry Hill. Call cuts off before end.

71. CTS71 Frankie Don’t know
Mum rings Frankie to tell her to be home before 6.00. Frankie does not
know where Sophie is.

72. CTS72 Sophie Before Six
Mum rings Sophie to ask her to be home before six. Says she will probably
get back but not definitely. Mum asks her to be more definite about her
plans.
Mum asks her where she is, and she is not very specific – in a field.
Appendices

Appendix III: Transcription Key

**Aspects of the relative timing of utterances:**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>[     ]</td>
<td>square brackets</td>
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<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>equals sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>'greater than' sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>time in parentheses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>period in parentheses</td>
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**Characteristics of speech delivery:**
Punctuation symbols are designed to capture intonation, not grammar and are used to describe intonation at the end of a word/sound, at the end of a sentence or some other shorter unit.:-

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<td>hyphen/dash</td>
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<td>:</td>
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<td>here</td>
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<td>HERE</td>
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<td>(</td>
<td>empty single</td>
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<td>parentheses</td>
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Appendix IV: Example Transcript

CTS29 Penny Dad

01 Pen: ((off-line)) She’s just getting the recording stuff
02 Mum: Hello
03 (1.5)
04 Mum: Hello?
05 Pen: Hello?:
06 Mum: Hello
07 (0.6)
08 Pen: You all right Mum.
09 Mum: Yes I’m fi:ne. [Yes. ]
10 Pen: [Is it] recording Mum.
11 Mum: Yes I think so:
12 Pen: ((off-line)) {
13 (1.0)
14 Mum: I can never remember whether it’s the mike or the ear
15 but it is the mike isn’t it.
16 Pen: Mm:::............: don’t know. Huh
17 Mum: .HHHH Oh well oh well I think it’s probably the mike.
18 (1.0)
19 Mum: Erm no we were just about to go out for a walk so
20 Pen: Oh:
21 Mum: I won’t stay on for very long but erm (0.6) are you
22 alright?:
23 (0.7)
24 Pen: A bit dow:n Mum
25 (0.3)
26 Mum: You’re a bit tDO::wn.
27 (0.3)
28 Pen: Yea[:::h I w]ent to Dad’s last night.
29 Mum: [Why:::
30 Pen: [Oh]
31 Mum: [We] went to Dad’s to stay over and we got back today
32 and .hhh to be honest mum he just spent the whole
33 t ime calling me fa:t
34 (0.6)
35 Mum: Did he.
36 Pen: Yeah. The who::le (0.3) time I was there I was just
37 put down. I was just like-
38 Mum: hhhh
39 Pen: I’ve just come back now and completely like
40 (1.0)
41 Pen: I don’t know deflated just you know [(  )
42 Mum: [T’oh:: Penny
43 Pen: Just really horrrible. [It not like got to me] in a way=
44 Mum: [Hhhhhhhhhhhhhhh  ]
45 Pen: =(he) weren’t like going ‘oh I’m fat, I’m fat’ and
46 everything. I know I’m overweight obviously but I’m not
47 like (0.3) I’m down about that I’m just down about the
48 fact that like (. ) he’s just (. ) he was just horrible.
49 It was [like you] know he invites me around there and=
50 Mum: [Mm::: :]
51 Pen: =everything and the first thing he says to me is .hh
52 ‘Look what card Sophie got me for Vale=’, for
53 Valentine’s day for- (. ) ‘for Father’s day’. Do you know
54 what I mean it was like-[ it had this long] like poem in
55 (Rea::lly::
56 Pen: =it and everything.
57 Mum: Oh:::
58 Pen: Like mine was just like a fifty pee one from the Spar
59 Mum: [.hh hhh ]
60 Pen: [And it was ]like really crappy and horrible.
61 Mum: .Hhh[h
62 Pen: [But you know
63 Mum: Yea:::h hhh

321
Pen: He thinks like what. He thinks he can treat me like shit like for fucking years and then I have to fucking pay you respect through fucking cards.

Mum: Yea::h

Pen: Yo(h)u know like-

Mum: Right. Why::

Pen: Well I can’t even- I can’t think of (     ) examples now but weren’t she Stan.

Sta: ((off-line)) (     )

Pen: ((off-line)) What:

Pen: Yeah because we’re young like we have different o- erm opinions and views of like erm (0.4) of like people’s personalities and stuff like that.

What was it she said now. We were watching Big Brother and we were talking about Pete [who’s] the guy with-

Mum: [Mm ]

Pen: =Tourettes

(0.8)

Mum: He’s the wh[at.] Oh Tourettes.

Pen: [He-]

[Yeah]

Mum: [Yes ]

Pen: She was basically saying that we only really liked him (0.3) erm because we were young and he was a bit wack:y

Mum: [Oh yeah ]

Pen: [And ] erm you know that we- you know that when you get older you can see through these ty- kinds of things.

Mum: [Oh yeah ]

Pen: [And I went] to her I went ‘No, I don’t like him erm because of that’ and she went ‘Yeah you do ‘cause it-it’s because you’re a child’

Mum: .HHHH oh::: [.HHHH ]

Pen: [And like] Stan was like (0.5) She was saying this to Stan as well.

Mum: I kno::w

Pen: And Stan’s TWENTY-ONE

Mum: No well she’s always had this issue hasn’t she:::

Pen: Yes I know she has. [It’s just redic- ]

Sta: ((off-line)) [She’s always what]

Pen: ((off-line)) She’s always had this thing-

Sta: ((off-line)) Stan’s just listening.

Pen: ((off-line)) She’s always had this thing with like er (0.4) like (0.7) children being inferior and dumb and adults being like completely all knowing and everything

Sta: [She’s just got a bit of a (0.4) [problem wi]th=

Pen: [Prbbbbbb ]

Sta: =er (con-) superiority complex (     )

Pen: Yeah

Mum: Yeah I- I- that’s who- I agree. Yeah

Pen: Yeah she’s just like it it was just unbelievable what she what she- You know that Russel Brand mum.

Mum: Yeah:::

Pen: She said the same thing about him. He came on after after it[and] I went (0.6)erm me and Stan were saying=

Mum: [W-]

Pen: like ‘Oh he’s funny’ and everything

Mum: [Yeah ]

Pen: [She was going 'you only think that because (0.4)

Mum: Oh[hhhh::: ]

Pen: [He’s- he’s] a bit different

Mum: [Ha ha ha ] [.hhhhh]
21 Pen: But when you’re young (0.5) [them kind of things do appeal to you.
22 Mum: [Right ]
23 Pen: [When you-] But when you get old you sort of think (0.4)
24 No: you wa- you like a bit more of a mature humour and stuff’ and I’m like ‘fuck off’
25 Mum: Well I think he’s really funny:
26 (0.5)
27 Mum: I [don’t like-] .hh I don’t like that Big Brother (.).
28 Pen: [HE I::S ]
29 Mum: =thing that he’s on. But
30 Pen: No I d-
31 Mum: I saw him on Jonathan Ross. I thought he was
32 hilai::rious. [He was very]funny. Very witty=
33 Pen: [Yeah he is]
34 Mum: =clever [man.
35 Pen: [She’s like saying like basically we only like people .] because they’re a bit za::ny or whatever.
36 (.)
37 Pen: And like
38 Mum: Hhh huh huh huh
39 Pen: And it’s like ‘NO:’ >I mean- (.) I was thinking before
40 though I was in the shower and I just thought ‘You
41 know what I am such like a better quality human being
42 than she will ever be.’ And she’s nearly forty and I’m
43 not even eighteen yet.
44 Mum: I know:
45 Pen: You know what I mean and I’m like- I think I’ve
46 got the emotiona- ((crashing sound)) oh Stan what
47 you doing?
48 Sta: ( )
49 Pen: Erm (0.7) I’ve got like the emotional maturity just like
50 (0.3) so: much more than she has.
51 Mum: Oka:y. So explain to me then why you’re down. Why
52 do these people’s (. ) [opinions ] matter.
53 Pen: [’Cause I just-]
54 Pen: I just think why do I- well because I was polite
55 to them.
56 (0.3)
57 Mum: Y-
58 Pen: I have to sit there and put up with it.
59 Mum: No you d- I know.
60 Pen: And like I ca[n’t just say to- ] I can’t just say=
61 Mum: [But you’ve nothin-]
62 Pen: =to them ’fuck off:’
63 Mum: [.HHH No-]
64 Pen: [You know why should] I come over here. To see you
65 But basically because I have to because I (.) .h feel
66 bloody obligated to because I haven’t been there. I’ve
67 been there about three times since they moved in.
68 Mum: I know:
69 Pen: I had to sit there and like listen to them telling me
70 (.) that you know I should get dad better father’s day
71 cards. [While he sits there] calling me FAT
72 Mum: [.h hhhh huh huh huh]
73 Pen: Huh huh huh .hhhh [#Oh I’m sorry I’m laughing .hh
74 Pen: [() ] (.) [fucking sits there and (.) tells me all about how I’m erm (0.3) you
75 know (0.5) erm (0.4) [not erm] I’m not I can’t judge=
76 Mum: [Phhhhh ]
77 Pen: =people basically because I’m too young. I can’t judge
78 people accurately because I’m young.
79 (0.3)
80 Pen: Or something like that. Or erm (. ) DO YOU SEE WHAT ELSE
81 we were watching you know that Jeremy Kyle show mum?
82 (0.5)
83 Mum: N erm I don’t. [No.
84 Pen: [Oh it’s just like some talk show thing
like Trisha but he’s a lot more tougher and stuff like that.
Mum: He’s a lot more? (.) [Tougher]
Pen: [Tougher.] He like basically tells them what they think of you.
Mum: Oh right
Pen: And like he’s that much more to the point.
Mum: Yeah
Pen: And erm: (0.7) there was this thing on with like cheating and stuff about erm this guy (.) hh cheating on his erm girlfriend or wife or whatever.
Mum: Yeah
Pen: She’s stood there watching it and she was going .h ‘LEAVE HIM, LEAVE [HIM. Don’t-‘] {put up with that}]
Mum: [.HHHHHHHHH ] [SHE WASN’T]
Pen: What
Mum: Did sh- really.
Pen: Yeah
Mum: This is Mandy
Pen: Yeah
Pen: Going ‘I wouldn’t put up with that. I wouldn’t put up-’ and I th-
Mum: HHHHHHH huh ha ha .HHHH
Pen: I didn’t think about it at the time and then like I came out and Stan was saying ‘Can you believe Mandy’ and I thought ‘Oh my god’. I weren’t [thinking about it]
Mum: [Mmm:mmmmmmmm]
Pen: What a hypocrite
Mum: I kno[:w]
Pen: [I couldn’t believe it. She is dumb.]
Pen: [And she also] said .hh QUOTE right. She SAID THIS [I know::::: ]
Pen: ((Off-line)) What was it Stan now. What was the one with the quote about the opinions [she said]
Sta: ((off-line)) [{ }) (. ) Erm
Sta: ((off-line)) ( ) nominations in Big Brother (0.3) and erm
Pen: Can you hear this Mum
Mum: Yeah
Sta: ((off-line)) And erm ‘isn’t it funny how people have different op(h)in(h)ions’.
Mum: Isn’t it funny how people have different opinions
Pen: Yeah
Pen: ‘Isn’t it funny how people can have different opinions’ Er:
Mum: [#That’s so profound.
Pen: It’s it’s you’re forty years old and [you’ve only]=
Mum: [huh huh huh]
Pen: =[[just worked out]
Mum: [[[voiceless laughter]]) Ha ha
Pen: ‘You know, people do have different opinions.[That’s]=
Mum: [.HHH ]
Pen: Pretty weird that isn’t it’
Mum: Yeah but its only because of-
Pen: We don’t think like you Mandy. I mean come on.
Mum: HHH huh huh
Pen: What would the world be like would be like
Mum: Well
Pen: God
04 Mum: The thing is though-
05 Pen: I know this is being recorded but
06 Mum: You can look forward to maturing into Mandy
07 (0.4)
08 Mum: Y- [You- ]
09 Pen: [What:][t]
10 Mum: Well you know you’ve only got different opinions to
11 Mandy now because you’re young.
12 (0.8)
13 Mum: But one day (.) you’ll be as mature as Mandy
14 (0.5)
15 Mum: And you’ll be able to think like her:
16 (0.6)
17 Pen: Y:eah: maybe- maybe you know maybe then I’ll just
18 was such a child. Ish little girl then.
19 (0.9)
20 Mum: Aah Penny, I am being sarcastic:C.
21 Pen: I KNOW YOU ARE:: So was I:
01 Mum: Oh GOD. I thought you were ser- took me seriously.
02 (0.4)
03 Pen: Ha .hhh bloody hell. No I was being sarcastic.
04 Mum: No. So okay. So we’ve al- we’ve established that these
05 people don’t have anything reasonable to say.
06 Pen: They were just [dumb
07 Mum: [They’re not worth [listening] to.
08 Pen: [Everything-
09 Mum: So:
10 Pen: [{] funny
11 Mum: [N- No no. SHUT UP. PENNY. LISTEN to me:]
12 Mum: Listen. Listen. So: (.) WHY ARE YOU DOW:N:
13 Pen: I’m just- I’m not down because of that. I am not down
14 I’m just (.). down. Well not down because of that I’m
15 down because I can’t (0.4) I can’t stand up for myself.
16 (0.5)
17 I can do is think it. [When she was saying well that’s]=
18 Mum: [hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh ]
19 Pen: =me ( ) during Big Brother the other day.
20 (0.5)
21 Pen: I was just thinking (0.5) The only way I could like get
22 through it was just to think (0.4) ‘You know what I know
23 I am better than y(h)o(h)u.’
24 Mum: Yeah well I thi- yep. But you’ve got to think would have
25 been a reasonable thing to do.
26 (0.5)
27 Mum: I mean w- i-is she a reasonable person. Is he a
28 reasonable person.
29 Pen: No. No. [ ( ]
30 Mum: [Would you have been able to sit down and have
31 a debate about it.
32 Pen: I just- I just- I just don’t like the fact that like
33 ALL the way up Dad dropped us off, me and Stan.
34 (0.5)
35 Mum: Mm mm
36 Pen: I was just sat in the front and then I were::n’t
37 (.).completely just minding my own- Weren’t I just
38 every time he mentioned mum he just went ( )
39 he poked my belly and stuff [going ‘Yo]u’ve been =
40 Mum: [Ohhhh ]
41 Pen: =getting a bit fatty you little porky’ and st[uff like
42 Mum: [Ohhhhhh
43 Pen: Just basically just didn’t he- how many times- how many
44 references to my weight Stan.
45 Sta: ((off-line)) About twenty.
46 Pen: About twenty yeah. It were. It were loa::ds.
47 (0.4)
48 Mum: Tch:
49 (.)
50 Pen: Absolut- just would not shut up. Would not. He kept
51 going on and on. About every twenty minutes there would
be some reference t- to my .hh (0.4) t- to my putting on
weight or me being over weight or me getting obes:e .hhh
(.)

Pen: You know I- [I think-
Mum: [He used the word obese
(.)

Pen: What
Mum: He used the word obese

Pen: He said that I was going to become obese the way that
carry on or something like that.
(.)

Pen: And like er:im
Mum: .hhhh HHH[HHHH ]

Pen: [I- he says]he- (0.3) he asked me how much
weighed(.) and I said (0.4) I just lied basically

because I thought if I tell him how much
[I weigh he’d just ]hold it against=

Mum: [Oh:: you don’t hhhhhh]
Pen: =me so I just lied.
(0.7)

Pen: It’s about ten and a half ish.

Pen: I thought 'Do I dare say that I’m like eleven ‘cause
he’ll just go ma:d.

Pen: He’ll be just like ‘.HHOH THAT’S HOW MUCH I WEIGH’. He
said I was fatter than him.

Pen: He goes 'I can’t believe you’re eighteen and you’re
bigger than me and I’m your dad.’

Mum: Ochhhh::::: .hhh Penny you’re beautiful. And this is his
issue not you[rs.

Pen: [Apart from anything Mum it’s just plain
rude.

Mum: I know it’s [rude.

Pen: [Just so like (0.3) arrogant and like (.)
like I don’t how he presents= I was just talking Anna
about it and I was just saying ’Anna I just- I just
(1.0) I’m just kind of just I just don’t know really
know what to think about it.’ (.)’cause he’s like’ and
Anna was saying ’well (.). I wouldn’t think anything of
it. It’s not worth [(0.4) wo]rth your=

Mum: [No: ]

Pen: =thoughts’ basically because if he’s (.). my father
then he- all he does is just .hh s- er basically put
down his daughter then you know what kind of a
father is that.

(.)

Mum: No exactly

Pen: If he demands respect of you erm (.). you know i- it’s=
(.). you know you should even mo:re so think you know
‘you fuck off’ huh

Mum: I know

Pen: You know an- it- (.). I can’t- I can’t get my words
out I’m just like (0.8) HHHHH str- I was stressed
out before really stressed out.

Mum: Well don’t be.

Pen: And (0.6) Mandy was just telling blatant lies
about me.

(0.3)

Mum: [Was] she?
Pen: [Erm]
03 (0.6)
04 Mum: [What do you mean]
05 Pen: [Ages ago (0.7) you know sort of
dieting pills.
06 Mum: Yeah
08 Pen: And I didn’t even take them. This was ages ago
09 [when I was] living with Dad and Mandy
10 Mum: [I know ]
11 Mum: I remember yeah
12 Pen: Erm I weren’t ill off them were I?
13 Mum: No?
14 Pen: And she- She said- I telling y- you know the- Oh yeah
15 I haven’t told you yet, you know the pills I’m taking
16 for my stomach at the moment.
17 Mum: Yes
18 (1.0)
19 Pen: The acid ones
20 Mum: Ye:is
21 Pen: Them. They’re making me really ill.
22 Mum: Oh:::::: no::::::::
23 Pen: Bad side effects and stuff. I feel like- I go really
dizzy and stuff and really like (.) .hh like I can’t-
01 I start like rocking and my eyes start like going ove-
03 steaming over and stuff misting over and
04 [I start feeling ] dizzy and I have to=
05 Mum: [.HHHave you got-
06 Pen: = lie down and stuff.
07 Mum: Have you got a follow up appointment for that.
08 Pen: Erm two months yeah
09 Mum: Oh no:: Well you can’t wait that long
10 Pen: I know. {}
11 Pen: [Well make an appointment next [week.
12 Pen: [I was saying
13 because I felt really ill, to Dad yesterday, I was
14 sat [on the)couch and I was going, ‘Stan can I lie down-
15 ‘[Yeah’]
16 Pen: I don’t feel very well’ and everything. .HH and like erm
17 (0.3) Mandy was saying like (0.5) ‘Oh No you shouldn’t’
18 Pen: be taking pills’ and everything and I was like ‘yeah’
19 Mum: You shouldn’t be taking pills:
20 Pen: Yeah. ‘You cou-’ you know ‘you shouldn’t take pills’
21 and stuff like that and I said ‘Yeah but (0.3) I need
22 them’ and stuff. [I’m like]you know ‘for my stomach’=
22 Mum: {}
23 Pen: =and stuff
24 (0.3)
25 Pen: She was going ‘Yeah but it doesn’t solve the problem, it
01 just gets rid of the pain’. Does she just think pills
04 are just [for ( ) ]
05 Mum: [Oh::: For goodness sake
06 Pen: ‘No. It actual[l(y st)ops my stomach from producing ACID’
07 Mum: [No ]
08 Mum: Ye[ah I know]
09 Pen: [I doesn’t numb the pain.
10 Mum: Yeah
11 Pen: (That ) I may as well just take paracetamol then
12 (0.4)
13 Pen: [Do you know what I mean] [ ( )
14 Mum: [Well she doesn’t ] understand [pharmaco ]logy
15 then.
16 (.)
17 Pen: Eh?
18 Mum: PHARMACOLOGY. Isn’t Mandy’s thing then hhhhh
19 (0.3)
20 Pen: Well nothing is really is it.
21 Mum: Huh [huh
22 Pen: [Like erm (0.3) She goes ( ) ‘Oh I remember
23 when you took them dieting pills an- .hh and you felt
Mum: No.
Penny: I found the packet there were- I only took about two
out of them.
Mum: Yeah
Penny: I just could be bothered taking them. I can’t- I don’t
take pills everyday.
(0.3)
Mum: Mmm
Penny: I’m getting really bad at taking pills. I just stopped
taking them. Not because I felt ill.
(0.4)
Penny: And like erm (0.5) she was going on about all these
quote-ations that I used to say.
(0.3)
Penny: And stuff. She used to go .hh ‘you used to go around
saying ‘I wanna knock you out’ and stuff like that. And
I was like
Mum: I wanna knock you ou:
[Penny
Penny: Yeah. Potrayin- Basically portraying me as what I used
to be like as a scally.
(0.3)
Mum: Huh hhhhh huh huh huh .hhhhhh
Penny: And she’s there going ‘I remember when Penny
used to go to school and she was like really
loud’ And I’m like (0.9)
Mum: Oh m[y ] gOD
Penny: [Huh]
Penny: I just thought ‘what the hell [ ( ]
Mum: [She’s remind- remembering
her own childhood.
(0.3)
Penny: Eh?
(0.3)
Mum: Remembering her own childhood.
(0.8)
Penny: Yeah
(0.4)
Penny: Seriously but (. ) she’s so shallow Mum
Mum: I kn[ow: ]
Penny: [( )] (. ) They thought- They think that Pete, you
know the Tourettes guy, they think that he puts on his
Tourettes.
Mum: Mmm
(0.3)
Penny: And they were just taking the mick out of him basically.
Mum: What the p- pair of them.
Penny: Yeah
Mum: Tch
Penny: Like laughing at him and call- like going just like
mimicking his erm twitches and stuff.
Mum: Oh my god. Nice
Penny: And I just thought (0.8) like ‘what- who are you, you
(0.3)
Mum: I know
Penny: You’re like y- y- right Dad’s like over forty now
or whatever
Mum: Yeah
Penny: And he’s still like he still hasn’t got over the fact
like people have like Tourettes syndrome and stuff.
Mum: I know
Penny: He doesn’t know about my OCD. I can’t- I don’t dare
tell him
(0.3)
Mum: Don’t. [Don’t ]
Penny: [I’m his-] I’m his fat daughter with OCD
Mum: Oh:: Penny stop.
Mum: Well that’s not how it is.
Pen: Oh it is. To him. In his eyes that’s what I am.
Mum: They’re just horrible. And I go there and I’m like=
Pen: =And like (0.3) he demands me to like (0.6) you know get
him a better bloody father’s card.
Mum: Oh:::
Pen: ( ).
Mum: But that’s just to show:. You know? That’s
what he thinks there is to fathering.
(1.1)
Mum: Going- Going on fathers day to visit- well the day
before father’s day. Pick up the cards, put them on the
mantelpiece and then they can show- show everybody that
comes into his (. ) [CHILD]LESS HOUSE what a [fantastic]=
Pen: [Well that-] =father he is.
Pen: And then like Mandy just how hypocritical she is
[like go]ing on about how shocking it is=
Mum: [I know ]
Pen: =that people cheat:
Mum: Huhhh [ha ha ha ha]
Pen: [I thought ] (0.4) ‘are you thick’
Mum: .Hhhh
Pen: I kind of ( ) when she went like- when we
went salsa dancing and she said .hhh quote
‘I am probably one of the most faithful people
you will ever meet’
Mum Ye[ah huh huh ‘huh huh huh huh= 
Pen: [I still haven’t got over that quote. That was
about a couple of years ago.
Mum: =.HHH [oh:: God::]
Pen: ( )
Pen: I think
Mum: The thing is though is that he is[n’t
Pen: [She cheated
Mum: #Yeah- I kno::w
Pen: She broke up my .hh OH::<
(0.3)
Mum: No. No no no no I don’t blame her for that [at all
Pen: [I know you
don’t. I don’t mean she broke up the marriage but
she was definitely a bloody catalyst.
Mum: Well yes, certainly the catalyst .hh but
Pen: You know she was bloody you know bloody
shagging DAD.
Mum: Yeah
Pen: Huh huh you know she was shagging (0.4)yours husband
for Christ sake my bloody mum’s husband.
Mum: [Yes: ]
Pen: [She’s there] quoting that she’s the most faithful
woman you’ll ever meet
Mum [I kn(h)ow hhhh]
Pen: Going on at other people for being unfaithful.
Mum: Huh huh huh .hhhh
Pen: ‘I wouldn’t put up with that’ (. ) I thought
Mum: But she does put up with it. It’s interesting:
Pen: I know ‘cause Dad does cheat on her.
Mum: I know he does. Er- we ALL know he does.
(.)
Mum: She must know that he does.
Pen: Dad kept getting text messages all last night
(0.3)
Mum: What ( )
Pen: Lik- Like obviously like conversation text messages
Mum: What do you mean
Pen: Last- Not last night sorry today. <Like you know like
erm (0.7) you know like when you text— when you like
text message conversation with people. having a
Mum: [Mm]
Pen: Like you always get one back about every like five to
minutes [or] something like that ‘cause you’re having a—
Mum: [Mm]
Pen: = ten conversation with someone
Mum: Mm
Pen: So I don’t know that made me a bit suspicious. And it
was like (0.7) he [kept] wondering off to text huh huh
Mum: [Mm ]
Pen: Mmm::: Well there you are you see.
Mum: ( ) Like I don’t even feel sorry I don’t like
Pen: think anything of it ‘cause I just think you know what—
Mum: [I know ] I don’t— No I don’t
feel sorry for— for either of them. [But I think—]
Pen: I just— I don’t even pity them to be honest I just
think whatever get on with it huh huh
Mum: Well then what you mustn’t do is internalise their
views of you.
Pen: You mustn’t
Mum: Yeah. I don’t (0.4) like take it all- to heart or=
Pen: =anything ['Cause like] It’s not like it’s not like=
Mum: [No:: ]
Pen: =I think I’m thin or anything. [I know] that I’m=
Mum: [No ]
Pen: =overweight.
Mum: No
Pen: But I don’t appreciate the comments that I don’t
appreciate the constant reminder of like huh like
patronising that I have to like put up with.
Mum: No
Pen: All all just to make him feel like a better dad.
Mum: [I know ]
Pen: [That’s all] it is.
Mum: No
Pen: No- All all just to make him feel like a better dad.
Mum: [I know ]
Pen: [That’s all] it is.
Mum: Well no I don’t think [it’s even that ]
Pen: [I just think you know] why
why the hell should I sit here
Mum: No I thi—
Pen: (At your) house now like with you just telling me
Pen: I’m fat and Mandy telling me I’m
Mum: No he has a real thing about it because (0.3) erm
Pen: his m- mum and dad (0.3) I don’t know about his real
Pen: mum, but I think she probably was but (. ) his dad
Pen: and his step-mum and his brother and his sister .hhh
Pen: were all over-weight and he’s had to work really hard
not to be.
Mum: (0.6)
Pen: Yeah
Mum: And er it’s a big issue for him but that’s for him
Pen: (0.6)
Mum: You know
Pen: I don’t see why he has to project it. It’s just like
Mum: No
Pen: It- it’s (0.7) It’s not like erm I’m like there
Pen: blubbering along the street [you know] like eating=
Mum: [No— ]
Pen: =pies all day.
Mum: Of course not.
Pen: I’m overweight. I’m like not (. ) fat. You know
Mum: [what I mean]
Pen: I'm like you know. I could lose a bit of weight, could
[lose a bit of weight off my ( )]
Mum: [You don’t have to justify it. STOP] Stop, stop, stop.
Don’t. Don’t. This is hi- it was his issue not yours.
Pen: Mm
(0.6)
Pen: Mm
Mum: That’s how he measures people [value is how-
Pen: [You know what. ( )]
Right. You know that Stan’s really paranoid about his
weight.
(0.4)
Mum: Mm
Pen: Imagine how (. ) paranoid Stan must feel. Sat there, with
this guy going on and on and on about me, when Stan
thinks he’s really fat and everything.
Mum: Ohhhhh
Pen: He isn’t but. They went on about Stan’s hair.
Mum: Ohhhch [hhh hhh .hhhh]
Pen: [Taking the mick out of his hair.]
Mum: Oh wow
Pen: Stan at one point just went (. ) erm (. ) ‘I’ve heard
it all before’ and just turned around and stuff.
Mum: Well, good for him. That’s exactly what. That’s (. )
that good for him.
Pen: But I can’t do it. I’m scared of the conflict
(0.3)
Pen: Like- ‘cause they were just- Mandy was going ‘Oh I
bet you get birds living in there and,’
Mum: OH:: GO::D that’s HORRIBLE.
Pen: Saying like- just being like-
Mum: Have you seen photographs of your dad when he was
sixteen seventeen.
Pen: Exactly. ( ) had long hair. Yeah I know.
Mum: Yeah
Pen: And like (. ) I think basically it’s like what Stan was
saying to me on one of the other recorded phone calls
that we had ages ago
Mum: Mm
Pen: And Stan was saying that basically most people nowadays
just think all boys have to have short hair and girls
have long [hair.
Mum: [Well that’s really- ‘cause that’s th- that’s
that’s the conversation that I’m writing. That I hope
will be published actually.
Pen: Yeah well that’s what it is.
Mum: [It’s like- It’s just like]=
Pen: [No it- that’s right. ]
Mum: [Anything out of the- out of the ordinary like where
i.e. a gu:y has slightly longer hair than bloody short
back an[d sides] and it’s like ‘.HH Ooh (. ) is he a bit=
Mum: [I know ]
Pen: =effeminate.’ ‘He’s a girl him er- he’s a girl. Look at
him got long hair. A [bird’s nest er]’ It’s like-
Mum: [Ohch go::d ]
Pen: It’s ( ) They’re FORTY YEARS OLD
Mum: Huh I k(h)n(h)w huh huh huh
Pen: I mean COME ON
Mum: .HHH #I know I know I know.
Pen: ( ) it. Why what’s the- what’s huh Mandy
basically er we were watching Big Brother last night
and all Mandy went on about is the dress sense of
people.
Mum: Ohhh
Pen: And she was like (0.5) that guy you know P-Pete with
tourettes. She [was] erm saying- she went ‘Mm I think=
Mum: [Mm-]
Pen: = he’s- I think he’s er I think he’s putting on that
tourettes’ and she was like imitating it and laughing
and [Dad] was laughing and doing it. And then she went=

01  Mum:        [Tch]
02  Pen:    = (0.5) ‘Oh his dress sense is a bit funny though isn’t
03          it. Oh no he’s a bit weird. I don’t
04          [like his clothes.’ Like- like] you=
05  Mum:    [oh hhhhh huh huh .hhhh    ]
06  Pen:    =know if that really mattered. What like- like what
07          he- no she was really going on about it though. Not just
08          like an off-the-hand comment. {() ‘he dresses a bit
10  Mum:                                   [Mm   ]
11  Pen:    =funny doesn’t he.’ It was like (.). she- she was
12          surprised by it. Like she’d never seen anyone dress
13          slightly like eccentric before.
14  Mum:    Mm
15  Pen:    Like her bloody (0.3) you know secretarial bloody land.
16          (0.5)
17  Pen:    Where everybody just wears bloody suits
18          (1.7)
19  Mum:    Huh .hhhh
20  Pen:    I feel (     ) it’s just like- you just go back
21          in time when you there.
22          (0.3)
23  Mum:    Back in time. To what.
24  Pen:    Up to like bloody- I don’t know how to explain it like
02          ‘cause there’s no like- you can’t have any bloody
04          liberal bloody views of things.
05  Mum:    Mm
06  Pen:    Everyone- it’s like everyone like one set mind one track
07          mind everyone bloody thinks the same in that house.
08          (.)
09  Mum:    Yeah
10  Pen:    (     ) so shocked that other people were like (0.5)
11          giving their own bloody opinions.
12          (0.4)
13  Pen:    [You should] have heard her
14  Mum:    [Yeah    ]
15  Pen:    It was just (0.3) it was shameful.
16          (0.4)
17  Mum:    Yes
18  Pen:    Even like Stan just came out and he just went ‘To be
19          honest with you Penny (.). I don’t like them.’
20          And I went ‘Neither do I’
21  Mum:    O(h)h
22  Pen:    Because they are both just moronic.
23          (0.4)
24  Mum:    Yes
25  Pen:    They are so unbelievable the stuff they say.
26          (.)
27  Pen:    Like (.). just (.). like just things that like a ten year
28          old would comment on basically.
29  Mum:    I know
30  Pen:    You know. The kind of things.
31          (0.3)
32  Pen:    And then just her being patronising. I thought (0.9) she
33          doesn’t- she’s just- she’s just like she’s got no mind.
34  Mum:    I know
35          (0.9)
36  Pen:    ‘You you only a child. You won’t understand it until
37          you’re older’ basically is what she was saying. <Stan is
38          twenty-one years old
39  Mum:    I know
40  Pen:    And I’m eighteen. What [does she] think I’m like,=
41          [I know    ]
42  Pen:    =what seven.
43          (0.4)
44  Mum:    [O(h)h  ]
45  Pen:    [()   ] and you know because someone- someone’s got
46          a bit of funny hair (.). that I’m going to like them
47          basically. <Do you know how many people have weird
Appendices

01 hair these days and I can’t stand them.
02 Mum: Huh huh huh huh huh huh .hhh YEAH huh huh .hhh
03 #I know.
04 (0.3)
05 Pen: Just ‘cause she might have thought like that when
06 she was younger.
07 (0.3)
08 Mum: Hm::
09 Pen: Like honestly it’s like she’s like she thinks
10 everyone was like her when they were kids.
11 (0.6)
12 Mum: Yes
13 Pen: But she’s- but I’m eighteen.
14 (0.4)
15 Mum: #I know
16 Pen: I’m eighteen years old. [I’m not-]
17 Mum: [I know ]
18 Pen: I’m not like (0.5) OH::: I don’t know who she
19 thinks- (0.7) I don’t know who she thinks she is and
20 I don’t know who she thinks I am.
21 (0.3)
22 Pen: But I can tell you now I’m so much more intelligent
23 than she is.
24 Mum: .HHHH
25 Pen: I know I am. I’m not even being arrogant.
26 Mum: I know.
27 Pen: It’s- (0.3) hhh huh She’s forty man. And oh:: I can’t
28 get over it.
29 [{(background noise)}]
30 [ (0.5) ]
31 Pen: I can’t get over it. Honestly it- and today I’ve just
32 been in awe all day. Just like completely like (0.3)
33 like (1.0) like shocked.
34 {(Background crying)}
35 Pen: And like I can’t believe how dumb she is.
36 Mum: I know.
37 Mum: ((off-line)) What’s the matter.
38 Pen: [{ ]
40 Mum: ((off-line)) What’s the matter
41 (0.6)
42 Sop: ((off-line crying)) Long story.
43 (1.3)
44 Mum: HHHH Okay. I’m going to have to go sweetheart.
45 Pen: Okay
46 (.)
47 01 Pen: Okay
48 02 Mum: Okay
49 03 Pen: I’m a bit paranoid now.
50 04 Mum: Why::
51 05 Pen: Don’t let this leak. Huh
52 (0.3)
53 07 Mum: Don’t let what leak.
54 08 Pen: All this information.
55 09 Mum: What. What. You don’t want me to record the call
56 10 Pen: Yeah:: but (0.5) Dad better not find o(h)ut huh huh
57 11 Mum: Well- what do you think your dad is going to be
58 reading much conversation analysis.
59 (0.5)
60 14 Pen: Right okay
61 15 Mum: Do you think him and Mandy are going to be
62 there on a Friday night discussing the latest
63 paper by Schegloff.
64 18 Pen: ( ) huh huh
65 19 Mum: #He(h)y
66 20 Pen: Huh huh
67 21 Mum: .HHH hhhh
68 22 Pen: Actually one thing that did like strike though when
69 I went in is that they have no books.

333
Mum: They have no what.
Pen: No books in the house
Mum: No. Well they don't read huh huh huh. hhh
Pen: Seriously there's like a Next catalogue
Mum: HHHH O(h)h g(h)od .hhh
Pen: Erm (.) a theasaurus and erm I think erm like some
symptoms and allergies like er (0.3) kind of log
thing and a phone book. And I just thought (0.6)
like- you know their life is just like so (0.6)
like nineteen bloody sixty-four or whatever it is.
Mum: Nineteen sixty-four.
Mum: That's the year of my birth. What's wrong with
nineteen sixty-four.
Mum: Nineteen eighty-four:
Pen: Bloody hell. Huh .hhh [{ ( ) nineteen}=]
Mum: [Huh huh huh huh huh ]
Pen: =eighty-four like where you have to think like
the right things.
Mum: .HHH #That's exactly what it's like. You're right.
Mum: Yes
Pen: Bloody oh::
Mum: Let's put them in room 101.
Pen: Just ridiculous
Mum: Mm hm
Pen: I'm going to have to go. I don't know Sophie's crying
at something, I need to find out what the matter is.
Pen: Oh:: gaw:id
Mum: .HHHH HHHHHH I know.
Pen: No probs
Mum: Sorry
Pen: No probs I said. I'll erm (0.3)[ring] you later on then.
Mum: okay
Pen: Er Clift on-
Mum: Saturday.
Pen: Yeah. I know yeah
Mum: Saturday.
Pen: Yeah
Mum: I think we finish at four
Pen: Right
Mum: [So I'll co- If you get a train that get's into
Clift kind of half fourish that would be (.) great.
Pen: That's- Yeah that's fine.
Mum: Okay
Pen: No problem Mum.
Mum: [All right] then
Pen: [All right]
Mum: I love you
Pen: I love you too Mum.
Mum: Okay Bye. You're gorgeous Penny okay
Pen: Pretty damn fine me.
Mum: You are
Pen: Ha ha ha
Mum: A(h)ll r(h)i(h)g(h)ht .hhhh Bye
Pen: See you later Mum
Mum: Bye
Pen: Okay Bye
Mum: Bye
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