Using Cultural Heritage as a Tool in Post-war Recovery:
Assessing the Impact of Heritage on Recovery in Post-war
Dubrovnik, Croatia

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Abstract

Cultural heritage is a significant aspect of both conflict and the recovery from conflict, but its role in shaping and influencing the post-conflict landscape has not been fully explored conceptually, nor has its role been fully implemented into recovery processes by practitioners. This thesis explores the disjuncture that exists between heritage theorists’ conceptualisation of cultural heritage as a cultural process, and practitioners’ tendency to privilege material reconstruction. By bridging cultural heritage and post-conflict literatures, the thesis presents the foundations for a holistic approach to cultural heritage in post-conflict settings. An Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (IHAF) is developed to operationalise this holistic conceptualisation.

This thesis makes three key contributions to the fields of cultural heritage studies and conflict studies. The first is a substantial contribution to the literature by reconceptualising the use of heritage in post-conflict recovery to argue for a shift away from reductive uses of heritage as cultural property towards more expansive notions of heritage as a process that can actively influence the course of recovery. Secondly, and building upon this conceptual foundation, the thesis has created and tested a methodological framework, the IHAF, capable of balancing recovery practitioners’ and policy-makers’ priorities with a nuanced conceptualisation of heritage. The purpose of this framework is to identify what impact heritage has on recovery, in order to reposition heritage as an active component of recovery processes, and remove it from being perceived as passive recipient of damage and restoration. The third aspect of the thesis applies the IHAF to the case study of Dubrovnik, Croatia, demonstrating the impact of heritage in three key areas of the city’s recovery. This assessment of Dubrovnik’s physical, economic and socio-political recovery viewed through the active lens of heritage adds an important new perspective on the Old Town’s long term narrative of recovery and reconciliation.

The thesis demonstrates the importance of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework and its potential broader application to different conflicts, and in doing so, puts heritage firmly at the heart of post-conflict recovery.
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Authors Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination. It has been submitted to the University of York for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Katherine Bishop
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Chapter One: Introduction

During war, cultural heritage becomes a target for aggression, resulting in the widespread damage of cultural property and irreversibly changing the intangible connections to its people and place (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95; Meskell, 2005, p. 124; O'Keefe, 2006, p. 25; Silberman, 2015; Smith 2006, 83). In the aftermath of conflict, cultural heritage becomes a focal point for reconstruction efforts, which tend to prioritise material reconstruction of damaged built cultural property (Ascherson, 2007, p. 17; Barakat, 2007, p. 36; Wijesuriya, 2005, p. 33). These reconstruction efforts can often result in a restored façade of cultural property, but lingering damage remains to the invisible, non-material, aspects of heritage.

The issue that has been identified and explored in this thesis is the disjuncture between how heritage is perceived by heritage theorists as a cultural process (Ashworth et al., 2007, p. 68; Meskell, 2010, p. 199; Smith, 2006, p. 83), and the way it is materially perceived and restored by those responsible for its post-conflict recovery (Merryman, 1986, p. 831; Musitelli, 2005, p. 324; UNESCO, 1954). The nuances of the varied and flexible definitions of heritage that have evolved in academic thought which prioritise the links to people, their past, and the trauma of conflict are sometimes lost in the physical reconstruction of heritage, becoming retrospective interrogations of the recovery process rather than their guiding principle (Jokilehto, 2002, P. 2; Smith, 2006, pp. 93-94). Cultural heritage is defined in this thesis as a process of meaningfully connecting people to place and the past, which is symbolised by tangible objects and intangible narratives. Cultural heritage’s role in post-conflict recovery is interrogated by this research as the negotiator between the past events of conflict and the new reality after conflict. Dubrovnik, in Croatia, is one such example of reconstruction after conflict which focused primarily on the material reconstruction of cultural heritage. These efforts sought to repair the town’s built cultural property but did not fully explore the effect the damage on the town had on its residents, their connection to Dubrovnik, or the lasting effect it had on neighbourly reconciliation.

This thesis proposes that a response to this problem is to put cultural heritage at the heart of recovery, to enable a more sustainable route to peace and reconciliation which acknowledges phenomenal influences of culture over conflict-affected societies (Kaldor, 2006, p. 18; Kaplan 2001, p. 22; Richards, 1996, p. xii; Sen, 2006, p. 85). In order to achieve this solution, the way cultural heritage is already used in conflict and recovery must be better understood, and a new framework of heritage analysis must be created to do so. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to create a research framework which is capable of investigating heritage in a post-conflict setting based on the integration between the demands of recovery and the needs of cultural heritage. This mixed-method based framework has been tested in the field in Dubrovnik to gain empirical evidence into why cultural heritage matters to post-conflict recovery, and why definitions of heritage-as-material property are incapable of adequately reflecting the needs of a post-conflict society.
1.1 Context

This thesis seeks to interrogate the impact that heritage has on the processes of recovery faced by places and people affected by conflict. The focus of this research is primarily on the post-conflict period, but also seeks to understand how heritage affects, and is affected by, conflict. The conceptual foundation for this research is heritage studies, particularly the perspective that argues that heritage is a process of creating and ascribing meaning to sites, places, and people (also known as meaning making), which is profoundly affected by its contemporary circumstances (Ascherson, 2007, pp. 17-20; Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996; Hewison, 1987, p. 9; O'Keefe, 2006, p. 25; Smith, 2006, p. 66). The culmination of the argument made by this thesis is that if heritage is considered to have an important influence over all aspects of society, then it must be better represented in post-conflict studies and real-world interventions.

The internationally accepted meaning of heritage has altered numerous times, and it can be argued that despite its widespread appreciation and acceptance as a significant aspect of society, a singular agreed upon definition remains elusive. Despite its ability to change and evolve, the concept of heritage has been codified in many different international agreements, laws, and conventions (Kastenberg 1977, p. 277; Merryman, 2005, p. 12; Starzmann, 2008, p. 368). It is this formalisation process that has shaped both the definition of heritage and the way it is used in international efforts to assist in the recovery from conflict. In order to create a better way to measure its impact on post-conflict recovery it is imperative to interrogate how the concept of heritage has developed within these formal structures. Arguably, the most influential formal conventions over heritage in a conflict setting are the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (hereafter Hague Convention) and 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (hereafter the World Heritage Convention). The Hague Convention determines what counts as acceptable military use of heritage, and the protection it should receive in conflict (UNESCO, 1954), whilst the World Heritage Convention defines certain heritage sites as universally significant (UNESCO 1972). The aim of these two conventions was to produce a list of heritage of agreed international, cross-cultural importance; heritage that is universally accepted as important and which is well protected should conflict occur. In practice this has not happened; the lists have been produced, but the safety of the sites is by no means assured and the reasons for this are further explored in this thesis. Indeed, the fact that world heritage sites are targeted precisely because of their massive impact on a global opinion undermines the efficacy of these formal conventions (Francioni, 2011, p. 10; Meskell, 2002, pp. 568-569; Sen, 2006, p. 88; Stone, 2013, p. 166). The Standing Buddhas in the Bamiyan valley in Afghanistan were one such famous example of a universally significant heritage site being destroyed in 2001 in an effort to undermine international cooperation.

If the formal process of heritage definition has proven to be fallible then the question is raised as to why they fail. This thesis argues that the formal codification of heritage remains problematic because it relies on absolute definitions of heritage and cannot evolve at the same pace as fluctuations within that definition. In order to reflect the needs of heritage in an analysis of how it impacts on the recovery processes, the contemporary use and definitions of heritage theory are paramount. The discourse and
interpretation of heritage have a profound effect on the identities of a society (Foucault, 1989 [2002]; Hall, 1999; Smith, 2006), and this narrative functions as the negotiator between a pre-conflict past to a post-conflict reality (Fisher, Ury and Brett, 2004, pp. 6-9). This thesis argues that heritage is a driving force which shapes the way conflict is interpreted and internalised, and can govern whether conflicts can be reconciled or rekindled.

Heritage is viewed in post-conflict studies as an area of interest but not one which has the potential power to govern the outcome of recovery. The lack of appreciation of the complexities of heritage may have contributed to the prioritisation of built cultural heritage over a more holistic approach in previous post-conflict interventions. Heritage as a signifier of cultural identity can be an attributing factor in the causes of conflict (Ascherson, 2007, pp.18-19; Barakat, 2007, p. 16; Judt, 1992, p. 83); it is not a bystander or victim of violence but a rallying point for both unity and division. The violence associated with heritage goes some way to explain why heritage is often a casualty of war, but it also helps interrogate how conflict becomes heritage and also severely alters pre-conflict heritage perceptions (Meskell, 2005, p. 139; Sen, 2006, p. 22, p.103). The attack on Palmyra in Syria in 2015 illustrates the overt connection between heritage and violence, and also further evidences why the reconstruction of these violently impacted cultural sites is not possible without acknowledging that the material properties of heritage were not the only aspect of heritage destroyed by this act of war.

The violent associations between war and heritage do not disappear in the post-conflict arena. The tensions between people and place are mirrored in their intangible connections to culture and heritage (Hall, 1999, p. 14; Kaldor, 2006, pp. 1-5; Coward, 2012, p. 469). Narratives of dissonance and the creation of new negative heritage sites create tension in a post-conflict setting, particularly one under pressure to recover physically and financially as well as emotionally (Macdonald, 2009, pp. 2-3). The recent past is reshaped, distanced and mythologised through heritage in order to recover from conflict, but this should not be mistaken for acceptance, reconciliation, or forgiveness (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007, p. 65; Connerton, 2008, p.59). The socio-political recovery of a post-conflict area may benefit from the physical reconstruction of heritage, and its role in re-stabilising the economy, but a superficial concord based on economic interests may mask a yet-to-be reconciled past in which lingering societal tensions remain. These uses of heritage (physical reconstruction, economic reliance, and socio-political acceptance) are the guiding principles of the methodological framework suggested by this research, and form the basis for its first trial in Dubrovnik, upon which the its viability is assessed.

1.2 Research Questions

Overall, this research project has sought to bridge between cultural heritage studies and post-war recovery studies in order to create a framework for conceptualising the relationship between heritage and post-conflict recovery. This framework has then been applied to the case study of Dubrovnik, to critically explore its applicability and value. Below, the three research questions that have guided the study are introduced. In order for clarity to be maintained, each research question is accompanied by
reflection on the objectives that have guided the research, and have informed responses to each research question.

1. How can the impact of heritage on post-war recovery be conceptualised?

The aim of this question is to interrogate the concept of heritage both in heritage literature, formal charters and conventions, and in post-conflict studies. This exploration of heritage is carried out in order to understand it as a holistic concept and to identify and explain the gap between the ways in which heritage is defined and interpreted in different schools of thought. This interdisciplinary literature review is structured around the use of heritage in different temporal environments, namely, times without conflict, during conflict, and post-conflict, in order to investigate not only how heritage is perceived but also how that definition changes in response to different pressures. The objectives that guide this research question:

- What are the definitions of cultural heritage?
- What protects heritage from war?
- Is heritage presented as passive recipient or active participant in the causation and continuation of conflict?
- How does heritage alter post-conflict society?

2. How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery be assessed?

The question aims to build on the perspective gained from the literature review and suggest a way that the impact of heritage could be assessed that respects both the needs and demands of heritage and those of post-war recovery. The research objectives that guide this question are:

- How can the demands of post-conflict recovery be reconciled with the needs of heritage protection and reconstruction?
- What existing assessment frameworks exist and are they suitable for assessing the impact of heritage on recovery processes?
- What methodological tools are capable of assessing these needs?
- Is this a rigorous methodological framework?

3. What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik?

This research question moves beyond the conceptualisations of heritage assessment in post-conflict recovery that can be gathered from existing literatures, and turns attention towards fieldwork as a means of gaining empirical data and evidence to further explore the effects of heritage on the post-conflict case study (Dubrovnik, Croatia). This question also aims to examine whether the framework has been successful in its attempt to create a robust, reliable, and repeatable methodology based on this assessment.

- Why was Dubrovnik chosen as the case study?
- What is the context for this case study, and can it be assessed by the methodology?
- What is the impact of heritage (as built heritage) on physical recovery?
- What is the impact of heritage (as cultural assets) on economic recovery?
- What is the impact of heritage (as a process) on the socio-political recovery?
- How do these results combine to assess the holistic recovery of the case study?
Detailed responses to the above research questions are provided throughout the main body of the thesis, and a returned to through the analysis and conclusion chapters. At a foundational level, the responses to these questions have led towards the creation and critical application of an Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (hereafter referred to as the IHAF). The IHAF is the product of a bridging between the cultural heritage studies literature and post-conflict studies literature, and provides an analytic tool for gaining traction over the relationship between cultural heritage and post-conflict transitions.’

Measuring the impact of heritage on the recovery from conflict cannot be reduced to assessing the damage done to cultural property and its physical restorations needs. To do so would imply that the profound effects of violent conflict on a society’s identities can be masked and hidden, as with shrapnel marks on stone facades. The relationship between people, place, and their heritage is far too important to not be included in an assessment of a post-war recovery. But, this argument raises a problem; how can a fluid definition be assessed and its impact quantified without losing the complexities introduced in this chapter.

The response to the problem identified in this thesis has been to create an Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework which is capable of exploring the impact of both tangible and intangible heritage through a quantitative and qualitative mixed methodology. Damage to tangible and intangible heritage has profound and long lasting influences over the processes of recovery, and the process of rehabilitation of both contributes to how an area is perceived to be recovered by international neighbours and its own population. This perception of recovery has immediate influence over the economy of an area, particularly one that is known for its cultural heritage. Therefore, it is not enough to look at a split between physical damage to cultural property, and the socio-political recovery of intangible heritage associations; the effect of these recovery areas on the economy also needs to be investigated. In doing so, the integrated heritage assessment can gain an insight into three interdependent and valuable areas of physical, economic and socio-political recovery.

Creating the IHAF relied upon taking existing conflict assessment tools, researching them, and tailoring them to meet the specific needs of heritage. As such, the response to this problem was addressed not only through the wide ranging literature review but also by close attention to the Department for International Development (hereafter DFID) Strategic Conflict Assessments (hereafter SCA) (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002) and the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (hereafter the PCIA), which created the kernel that this methodology has developed from. The IHAF could have been created using the theoretical literature and the research on these frameworks alone, but this would have impaired its reliability and rendered it as untested. This research instead took this framework to Dubrovnik to test it in the field. The result of this was the generation of a case study which looked at the heritage recovery process with intense scrutiny to produce a first trial of this methodology. The results show that the IHAF was a success as the results gained from this case study has provided fresh insights to dissect how the recovery process and heritage intertwine. The Dubrovnik fieldwork has the ability to stand alone as a case study that interrogates the use of heritage.
in recovery, but functions in this thesis as the culmination of the IHAF and the literature review upon which it is based.

Dubrovnik has been chosen as a viable case study and testing ground for this framework for several reasons. First, the attack on the city in 1991 and 1992 was an explicit attack on a town famed for its cultural heritage (ICTY, 31.01.2003). As a UNESCO world heritage centre it had been a demilitarized zone since 1979, and the prosecutions following the attack refer explicitly to cultural factors being a major facet in the choice to attack the city (ICTY, 31.01.2003; UNESCO 2012). Secondly, the town has been recovering for twenty years and as such has built up a great wealth of records to analyse. The abundance of records and information allows the first trial of this methodology to run in a best-case scenario, which will enable the researcher to see the benefits and flaws of this framework. Thirdly, the conflicts in the Balkans are notorious for their use of culture and cultural division during war (Silber and Little, 1996), and it is thought that the assessment of heritage in Dubrovnik will provide a good indication as to whether culture and heritage have helped the reconciliation and recovery of the area. The use of culture and heritage in conflict within the Balkans (particularly Croatia) forms the context for this case study. The trial run of the IHAF presented by this research resulted in an in-depth look at the recovery of Dubrovnik, and yielded results that looked into the physical recovery of the built heritage, the influence of cultural assets over the recovery of the economy, and the way heritage-recovery is perceived by its people in the social and political status of heritage in the town. The culmination of this is a holistic view of Dubrovnik’s recovery processes, one which challenges the perception that the town and its heritage have been completely restored to its pre-war state by identifying cracks, controversies, and contradictions in this narrative. The discussions around Dubrovnik illustrate the integral role heritage plays in recovery from conflict, particularly around the conception of identities, sense of place and ownership of the past, and the negotiation of reconciliation; furthermore, the investigation into the recovery of Dubrovnik have added substantially to debate surrounding memory and identities formed by violence by examining the juxtaposition of public and private conceptions of recovery by those communities who have experienced war.

1.3 Thesis Outline

The thesis is structured around the three research questions. The first part (Chapters Two to Four) focuses on the conceptualisation and protection of heritage in and after conflict offered in legislation and existing literatures, as is highlighted by the first research question. In order to answer the second research question, the central element (Chapter Five) focuses on turning perspectives of the conceptual chapters into a mixed methods research framework, based on the integration of knowledge gained in these first chapters. This section not only presents the IHAF in detail, but also serves as the bridge between the conceptualisation of heritage and the empirical fieldwork that assesses its impact. The latter part (Chapters Six to Nine) focuses on interrogating the results from this empirical case study, and using these to determine the extent that heritage can be considered to have impacted on the post-conflict recovery of Dubrovnik, answering the third research question.
The concluding chapter (Chapter Ten) brings together the results of the case study to analyse the impact heritage has had on the town, what this reveals about the conceptual connection between heritage and post-war recovery, and extrapolates these findings to assess the effectiveness of the IHAF, and its potential application to future cases.

Figure 1.1 Thesis structure flow chart
Chapter Two: The Evolution Legislation to Protect Heritage in Conflict

Cultural heritage has been affected by conflict throughout history: built heritage suffers damage and destruction, cultural property is stolen, and cultures erased from history through the decimation of heritage, but heritage is not considered an intrinsic aspect of warfare that can alter the course of violence and conflict, and neither is this impact recognised in legislation designed to protect heritage. It has been argued that since the time of ancient Greece cultural heritage has been seen to be something that is too precious to be damaged in times of war by an attacking force (Magraw, 2001, p. 1; Kastenberg, 1997, pp. 277–278); nevertheless, it is clear that cultural heritage has faced damage and destruction during war time and time again. Through this chapter, the evolution and shortcomings of cultural heritage protection are identified in existing legislation. By reviewing the evolution of the legislation that has led to the enduring 1954 Hague Convention the interdependencies of cultural heritage classification and its protection are explored. From this comprehensive analysis of these legislative attempts a foundation for an integrated approach to heritage assessment is presented which encompasses both built heritage sites and the cultural context they inhabit in order to fully interrogate the impact of heritage in and after conflict.

The discussions in this chapter focuses on the evolution of the legal protection of heritage, moving from the Lieber Code in 1863 as the first recognisable attempt to codify how heritage should be regarded in conflict, to the present state of protection governed by the 1954 Hague Convention, its 1999 second protocol, and its relationship to the 1972 World Heritage Convention.

There is a historic contradiction in the way heritage is viewed in conflict; cultural heritage is and has been regarded as morally untouchable in war, but it has been purposefully targeted and destroyed since antiquity (Kastenberg, 1997, pp. 281–282). Heritage is simultaneously a structure of society that should never be attacked, and an entity that is always attacked in conflict. This contradiction is at the core of the discussion in this chapter, and is used as a foundation for exploring how heritage protection has evolved and why legislation that cannot recognise the political uses of heritage in conflict remains ill-equipped to deal with modern warfare. Patty Gerstenblith expands on the history of cultural heritage protection in conflict by exploring how cultural heritage has been defined in military terms, and its reliance on cultural property as the definitive feature of heritage (Gerstenblith, 2012, pp. 5–6). This is used in this chapter as an entry point to discuss Western bias in heritage protection and definitions, and the ramifications this simplification of has on the effectiveness of heritage protection in conflict (Merryman, 2006, p. 20).

Different formulations of the significance and political construction of cultural heritage are thrown into sharp relief in war. This chapter examines two ways of understanding how heritage functions in war, and how each is framed or excluded from legislative attempts to protect heritage. A universalist approach to valuing heritage asserts that heritage historically bound feature of a culture that exists as a fixed symbol of society and civilisation; this conception of cultural heritage makes it a universal feature of all cultures and assumes that it will be respected and protected by all but the most deviant of spoilers. This definition features heavily in the legislative attempts to connect built heritage to an
internationally owned concept of heritage that transcends space and time. This essentialist view of heritage is problematised by the power structures that first codified heritage in these terms, and by the behaviour of combatants in conflict which seek to attack heritage to undermine this definition. The second approach seeks to establish heritage in legislation as a socially constructed aspect of a contemporary culture, that will change in response to its environment; in this interpretation heritage is intrinsically bound to its context and the process of creating heritage around sites becomes a highly politicised act with the potential to create and continue violence and conflict. This approach acknowledges two key factors that define heritage; the power structures that authorise heritage narratives (Said, 1994, pp. 335–336), and groupism which determines whether these sites are legitimate, authentic, and acceptable (Moses, 2010, pp.22-23; Sen, 2006, p. 80-82). The clash between essentialist definitions of heritage codified in heritage protection legislation and the social construction of heritage in conflict and its use to undermine heritage protection are discussed in a case study in this chapter relating to the protracted negotiations and eventual destruction of the standing Buddhas in the Bamiyan Valley in Afghanistan by the Taliban in 1999.

The chapter ends by discussing how heritage protection legislation is framed in modern contexts and argues that the 1954 Hague Convention acts not as a deterrent but as a legal framework to prosecute the deliberate damage done to cultural heritage, and to guide emotional international responses to damage and destruction. Musitelli (2005) and Meskell (2010) argue that the destruction of cultural heritage in war is framed internationally as a unique and unexpected act and the perpetrators as deviants, despite the evolution of the protection of heritage illustrating that attempts of cultural destruction are a normalised feature of warfare.

The 1954 Hague Convention (and its 1999 protocol) stands as the leading document to deter deliberate damage to cultural heritage as well as providing a clear set of principles to assist in the prosecution of those who do so, but its approach is based on the universal acceptance of a system that values heritage for its tangibility through the incorporation of Eurocentric prioritisation of culture. In doing so and as an unintentional by-product, the Hague Convention and its relationship to the WHC has created a way for spoilers to identify and classify internationally heritage sites which can attacked and destroyed with maximum impact on an international and local level. The result of this is that cultural heritage is not only targeted as a means to destroy and humiliate different cultures during conflict, it is also used as a means to openly rebel against the international community and reject its laws, agreements, and definitions of heritage.

2.1 The Lieber Code: Protecting the culture of civilians from military vandalism

The first attempt to codify legal and illegal acts of conflict was made in 1863 by Dr Francis Lieber in his publication of the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order № 100 (hereafter the Lieber Code), this legislation sought to provide an ethical code of conduct and laws for combatants to follow in the Civil War in the USA. The high death toll and the number of new non-military recruits into both sides of the civil war resulted in a high number of untrained soldiers entering into combat situations with little or no appreciation for the so-far
unwritten rules of combat. The Lieber code grew out of this necessity to codify acceptable military behaviour in war both to prevent widespread criminality and to ensure that militaries after the conflict could be re-professionalised based on philosophies of acceptable codes of conduct rather than to continue the practices exhibited by untrained commanders and soldiers (Gardner, 1965, p.4). The aim of the Lieber code was to protect humanity (both combatants and civilians) from conflict, although this did not preclude the use of extreme force and violence against civilian populations to ensure conflicts ended swiftly (Meron, 1998, p. 272). This theoretical foundation presents a departure from previous conflict legislation which sought to protect a state’s interests in and after conflict. As such, the Lieber code stands not only as the first attempt to legalise and criminalise behaviours in conflict, but also the first attempt to acknowledge and guard against the negative impact conflict has on ethics and humanity’s ability to function, of which culture is an intrinsic part (Meron, 2000, p. 245).

The Lieber Code focused explicitly on the ethical and humane treatment of civilians, prisoners, and property in conflict (Lieber and Hartigan, 2011, pp. 3–5). In articles 34–37 the Lieber Code specifies that damage to “classical works of art” should be avoided in conflict even if the site is of military importance. The Lieber Code sought to end purposeful and recriminatory violence being levied at civilians on opposing sides of the civil war from returning and transient military groups. The general orders sets heritage alongside intellectual tools and hospitals; both these entities reveal a preoccupation with culture and acceptable use in war that later is echoed in Lemkin’s Genocide definitions which sought to protect the cultural groups and their heritage as imperative for humanity to survive. In the Lieber Code the order to preserve scientific collections and instruments represents the preservation of knowledge, whilst the protection of hospitals represents the protection of vulnerable humans, the preservation of classical works of art represents the preservation of culture; all of these aspects of society are fundamental to the survival and recovery of a conflict affected society:

Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as well as hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.

General Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code, 1863, Article 35

The Lieber Code classified all such places as private property, defining their ownership as separate from the state and protecting them from destruction and theft by soldiers as spoils of war (Hartigan, 1983, p. 51). Consequently, it is argued here that the Lieber Code was the first effort to codify cultural heritage protection in a legal framework, and although it was not internationally adopted, its principles went on to inform the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions with respect to the laws and customs of war on land (Magraw, 2001, p. 2).
2.2 The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions with respect to the laws and customs of war on land

The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions (Laws and Customs of war on land) continued to evolve the humane ethos of the Liber code by seeking to reduce the caveats allowing violence to be used against ex-combatants, prisoners, and civilians if there was no other recourse for military advantage. The 1907 Hague Convention ensured humane treatment of prisoners and civilians by removing caveats which included using starvation of occupied towns as a technique for military advancement, criminalising orders which instructed militaries to give no quarter or take no prisoners, both techniques were defended in the Lieber code through the justification that reducing the length of conflicts would reduce its impact on humanity (Meron, 1998, p. 273). The Lieber Code also allowed some caveats for the use and removal of Cultural property in conflict, allowing it to be removed if there was no risk of damage and claimed on behalf of the state and not the individual, this loophole was closed by article 56 of the 1907 Hague Convention which establishes cultural property as private property, and therefore affords it protection under articles 46 and 50 (Meron, 1998, p. 272-273).

These conventions were the first significant internationally recognised treaties that explicitly protected cultural property from removal and damage during conflict (Techera, 2007b, p. 24). They achieved this by prohibiting the seizure of property by invading forces (articles 23, 28, and 47 of the 1899 Convention) and encouraging action to avoid the seizure, destruction, and wilful damage of “religious, charitable, and educational institutions, and those of arts and science” and “[h]istorical monuments, works of art and science” in article 56 (Gerstenblith, 2012, pp. 5–6). The 1907 Convention expanded and further prohibited the removal of property using stronger terminology, as well as shielding cultural property from deliberate damage in warfare (Gerstenblith, 2012, p. 6). Patty Gerstenblith suggests that careful caveats were put in place in the 1907 Convention that sought to simultaneously increase the efficacy of protection and make space for the military use of cultural property if all other avenues had been explored (Gerstenblith, 2012, p. 7). Both the terminology and these two caveats are echoed in the 1954 Hague Convention (Kastenberg, 1997, p. 281).

Without the inclusion of article 56 into the 1907 Hague Convention, which determines cultural property as private property, occupying militaries could legally seize cultural property in conflict and retain in in the aftermath of conflict regardless of the conflict outcome- reparation agreements notwithstanding (Meron, 1998, p. 272). As such, the 1907 Hague Convention was employed as a key piece of legislation that protected heritage through World War One and Two which witnessed widespread destruction and theft of cultural property. Meron argues that without this definition enshrined in article 56 of the Convention, Nazi Germany would have a legal recourse to remove and retain all moveable property taken during the Second World War from occupied nation states (Meron, 1998, p. 272), furthermore, there would be no legal precedent upon which to base the 1954 Hague Convention.
2.3 The treaty of Versailles: Cultural property as evidence for reparations

Kastenberg notes that the 1907 Convention and its approach to cultural protection was put to the test in the First World War, but ultimately failed to prevent the razing of cultural sites by both sides during both world wars, and it did not halt widespread looting by occupying forces (Kastenberg, 1997, p. 289). In the aftermath of the World War One (and with popular approval) the articles 245–247 in the Treaty of Versailles demanded that German forces return property with cultural significance that had been stolen (Goldrich, 1999, p. 129) based in part on the protection given to cultural property under article 56 of the 1907 Hague Convention (Meron, 1998, 274).

The use of heritage as reparations for conflict set a precedent of culture becoming an economic asset in post-war agreements, which disconnects the cultural value of heritage to a group and instead links its value to its material and economic value. The use of cultural property as economic assets has been seen frequently in conflict wherein heritage has been used as a spoil of war to promote loyalty and increase morale, and in line with the Lieber code allowed cultural property to be considered as national assets after the conflict by allowing sized heritage to legally remain the property of the victorious nation. However, the treaty of Versailles set a precedent of presenting seized cultural property as evidence of transgressions of international codes of combat, and setting monetary recriminations against these acts. Whereas previous discussions on post-war moveable heritage rested on the rights of ownership, the use of cultural heritage in reparations sought to associate material heritage to an economic value. The use of heritage as evidence of barbarism, vandalism, and war-crimes would become a common feature of the use of heritage in future conflicts and reflected in the conventions and prosecutions following these conflicts.

Within six months after the coming into force of the present Treaty the German Government must restore to the French Government the trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or works of art carried away from France by the German authorities in the course of the war of 1870–1871 and during this last war, in accordance with a list which will be communicated to it by the French Government; particularly the French flags taken in the course of the war of 1870–1871 and all the political papers taken by the German authorities on October 10, 1870, at the chateau of Cercay, near Brunoy (Seine-et-Oise) belonging at the time to Mr. Rouher, formerly Minister of State.

Treaty of peace between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan and Poland. Signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, Article 246

The Treaty of Versailles is an important moment in the history of heritage protection in war as it constituted a move away from legislative protection during conflict, and instead (successfully) sought reparations against Germany, who had failed to adhere to the (as yet uncodified) convention of war (Cunning, 2003, p. 216; Kastenberg, 1997, p. 280). The Treaty of Versailles thus represents a move from preventative damage control to reactive and enforceable prosecution.
The First World War was also the first theatre of war to experience the widespread bombing of population centres from the air, and from this time the possibility of deliberate or accidental destruction of cultural property from a distance became a significant threat (Kastenberg, 1997, p. 288; Magraw, 2001, p. 2).

2.4 **Roerich Pact and universalism in heritage protection**

The *Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments* (Roerich Pact) of 1935 sought to push the protection of cultural heritage on from the 1907 Hague Convention to protect against its use for military purposes in conflict and to create an institution capable of enforcing the protection of monuments. The Roerich Pact sought to connect the loss of cultural monuments to the loss of knowledge into past cultures, connecting the value of monumental heritage to its aesthetic and historical importance; this definition values material culture as evidence of historical significance and connects its protection to the preservation of authorised historical discourse. The approach taken to cultural monuments in the Roerich Pact connected their value to their historical significance, and their protection as a duty to preserve them for future generations which is echoed in the conception of the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1972 World Heritage Convention (Schipper and Frank, 2013, p. 14); this constructs heritage as a tangible marker of universal value rather than perceiving heritage as a culturally constructed manifestation of contemporary value (Musitelli, 2005, p. 330).

By perceiving material culture as a static marker of historic value, the Roerich Pact was able to create an institution that could solidify what sites should be protected in conflict, and determine who was responsible for protecting them (Schipper and Frank, 2013, p. 16). The Pact also sought to define sites of significance as neutral zones and therefore exempt from any and all use in conflict. This three-tiered approach was the early precursor that was directly adopted by the 1954 Hague Convention, and further supported by the creation of the international committee of the blue shield in 1954 (Schipper and Frank, 2013, p.15), and cemented by the World Heritage Convention in 1972. Furthermore, the definition of heritage sites as neutral zone has been codified in the 1954 Hague Convention and 1972 WHC which determine World Heritage Sites as demilitarized zones (Schipper and Frank, 2013, p.16). In defining heritage sites as neutral zones the Roerich Pact achieves two aims; first, it sought to make the use of heritage in conflict more difficult by divorcing the site from involvement in conflict by placing it outside of the theatre of conflict, and secondly it removed heritage ownership from its community and placed it under international protection. In theory, these aspects distance heritage from conflict, but is limited in its ability to do so as it cannot alter the physical location of a pre-defined heritage site and thus it is unlikely to avoid damage and destruction, and more importantly, it is incapable of removing the cultural context of heritage from its contemporary surrounding and the influence it has over conflict.

Despite the difficulties faced by a universal approach to material heritage protection, the Roerich Pact formed a basis for future heritage protection- both in and out of conflict- and influenced both the wording and approach of the Hague Convention and the institutions which would be created to enforce it. The perceptions of conflict were drastically altered during and after the second world
war by the technological advancements of the military and their use on a grand scale against civilian populations. The airborne bombing campaigns against urban centres across Europe resulted in an unprecedented level of damage and destruction, of which heritage was both an intended and unintended target. In the aftermath of this conflict, protection for heritage during war moved beyond local occupation and removal of cultural property towards defending it from the perceived threat of mass destruction.

2.5 Influential Military technological advancements

The increased technological abilities of the 1930s enabled military expansion to occur more quickly and on a wider-scale, which resulted in more widespread damage to civilian locations and with it cultural heritage sites (Kastenberg, 1997, pp. 289–290). The 1907 Hague Convention protected heritage as private property, but this did not safeguard it from bombing raids which would attack private property as targets or as collateral damage in the course of military advancement which became apparent in the shelling raids of the First World War. Whereas previous legislative attempts had fought to safeguard against the illegal removal of cultural property and the use of heritage sites as bases for military occupation, they were not able to safeguard against ongoing technological advancement which could destroy and damage urban settlements from a distance without removing or occupying heritage sites. The increasing destructiveness of war and its impact on urban settlements made it necessary to update the legal safeguards in response to the changing dynamics of warfare.

Kramer argues that the changing dynamics of war experienced in the First World War subtly changed the extent to what was considered acceptable and unacceptable destruction in conflict. This is not a departure from the ethos or laws that characterise the Lieber Code and the 1907 Hague Convention, rather, it is a reworking of the basic tenants of the acceptable codes of conduct in conflict that underpins both documents (Kramer, 2007, p. 334). Furthermore, Kramer argues that when the technology did exist, the mental preparedness and experience of using this destructive force had not yet been required, and it was during the course of the First World War that the impetus and willingness to use bombing raids on civilian settlements was tested (Kramer, 2007, p. 334). The First World War presents a change in the cultural acceptance of destruction where the dynamics are shifted away from traditional codes of combat, facilitated in part by technological changes in military capacities, towards more widespread civilian and combatant psychological acceptance of destruction, and a willingness to accept the consequences of widespread destruction. For Kramer, the acceptance of destruction carried out in the First World War assisted in changing the public perception on what was possible and acceptable to destroy in conflict, and enabled the psychological scales of acceptable destruction (both heritage and human terms) to be increased again during the Second World War (Kramer, 2007, p. 334-336).

In response to this changing perception of the destructiveness of war, the safeguards used to protect heritage also had to evolve in response; this dynamism is reflected in the 1954 Hague Convention and its focus on protecting material heritage sites from damage and destruction. The movement towards universalism in heritage protection can be interpreted as a reaction to the changing dynamics
of conflict elicited during and after the second world war which saw violence and destruction visited on civilian populations on an unprecedented scale and in doing so redefined the perception of war and how it could be guarded against in the future.

2.6 The Genocide Convention

Underpinning the definition of heritage in all its legislative uses is an idea of groupism and its expression through culture. This idea is centred on the understanding that all individuals will belong to part of at least one cultural group which will define their patterns of behaviour and traditions (Moses, 2010, p.22). Within these groups, individuals take on the ownership of a shared culture and seek to adhere to these conventions in order to maintain their sense of belonging and identity, which is a fundamental aspect of the processes of creating and maintaining heritage. Lemkin argues that there are four types of basic groups that are able to create culture; national, racial, religious, and ethnic. Lemkin argues that these four groups create intrinsic identities which in turn creates and reinforces culture. In this approach, group identity informs and is informed by the production of heritage, which can be used to determine the place of said group within a national or international society.

Fundamental to groupism and its use in defining heritage is the value placed on culture as the foundation of humanity. The oft quoted coining of the term of genocide highlights the dual aspects that Lemkin considered to be imperative to their term; gene from the Greek meaning race, nation or tribe, and the Latin cide meaning killing (Lemkin, 1947, p. 48). The choice to use of gene rather than homo (meaning human or man) suggests that Lemkin’s description of genocide went beyond murder or mass murder to include the extermination of groups defined by their culture (Moses, 2010, p. 33). The new crimes coined by Lemkin in association with genocide- barbarism and vandalism- correspond to the dual preoccupations of genocide; vandalism to destroy and erase a culture and its heritage (gene), and barbarism to humiliate, ruin, and exterminate humans (cide) (Lemkin, 1947, P.48-56). For Lemkin, universal acknowledgement of culture as a defining aspect of humanity was fundamental to the idea that an attack against culture and expressions of culture in conflict or peace times are acts of violence against humanity (Moses, 2010, p. 31). This philosophical approach underpins the Genocide Convention of 1948, the Geneva Convention of 1949, and the Hague Convention of 1954. However, the tenants of this approach can be traced back further than its formulisation within the Genocide convention to the Lieber Code of 1863 where Cultural property and heritage was explicitly tied to the notion of ethical treatment of civilians during military conflict.

Barbarity and vandalism were proposed by Lemkin as crimes which are utilised in order to commit genocide. Barbarity aimed towards making the victims of genocide less human through degradation, economic poverty, and acts of extreme aggression and violence (Docker 2004, P.4). The result of this was the dehumanisation of victims and their extermination. Barbarity encouraged oppressors to become immune to the plight of the oppressed by enabling oppressors to see them as other or separate (Moses, 2010, pp. 30-31). Though Lemkin explored barbarism in response to the Nazi holocaust, this ‘othering’ is echoed through colonialism and the treatment of indigenous group under imperialism
(Said, 1994, p. 12), and reflects the social construction and manipulation of their cultural groups to appear as inferior, as seen through the balkanisation of Slavic cultures during the 1990’s to explain and distance violence from European cultures (Todorova, 1997, pp. 33–35). In this interpretation, barbarity acts as a facilitator for extreme violence without prejudice based on reconfiguring opposing groups as less than human. If barbarity is the means to denigrate and destroy the person, Vandalism is the method employed to destroy and undermine their culture, the memory of their cultural heritage, and their connection between people, place, and the past (Docker, 2004, p. 4). As Lemkin defined culture as a universal aspect of humanity, vandalism was not just an attack on the heritage of a cultural group, but an attack on the culture of the world (Docker, 2004, p. 4). Consequently, barbarism and vandalism were crimes against humanity which made local attacks on heritage in conflict prosecutable under international law by the International Criminal Court (ICC Rome Statute) and reflected (though culture was not explicitly included) in the Genocide convention and subsequently the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 protocols.

Despite the theories of groupism that have influenced international legislation on the treatment of heritage in conflict, this research argues that the 1954 Hague Convention crystallises a discourse on heritage which prioritises and protects cultural property over cultural heritage in conflict, and in doing so fails to focus on how culturally motivated attacks on heritage create a pervasive atmosphere that allows for escalating violence towards groups and minorities. As discussed previously in this chapter, definitions of heritage have historically been linked to contemporary power structures and perceptions of cultural ownership at material heritage sites rather than contextually bound connections between people, place, and the past. This research argues that despite an evolution in the definition of heritage to become more inclusive toward non-material aspects of cultural heritage intrinsically bound to the formation of group identity and belonging, the key pieces of legislation which protect heritage in conflict remain reliant on definitions of heritage as material property at risk from military damage.

The preoccupation with physical heritage sites put at risk by war is a reflection of a western imbalance in both the power to define heritage internationally using definitions of material value gained from the approach codified in the 1964 Venice Charter, and to protect heritage from known threats in conflict with are predominantly linked to European experiences of conquest and occupation from interstate conflicts rather than the risk posed to heritage from diverse cultural groups who are heavily invested in the meanings associated to the site (Meskell, 2010, p. 191).

At the heart of the Genocide Convention is Raphael Lemkin’s philosophy that individuals are innately part of groups who think and act collectively following cultural patterns (Moses, 2010, 22-23). The cultural patterns performed by groups and expressed in cultural sites are therefore not just reflections of cultural identity, they are cultural identity (Moses, 2010, p. 25). Consequently, an attack resulting in the destruction and suppression of cultural heritage sites in conflict is a targeted act of genocide against a cultural group and their collective identity. This philosophy underpins the formation of the Genocide Conventions which seeks to codify the definition of genocide, and to...
specify protection and punishment measures needed for signatories to protect individuals within their nation state in times of conflict and peace (Short, 2010, p. 837).

Lemkin argued that in order for genocide to occur the complete destruction of people was not necessary, rather, it relies on the destruction of the cultural patterns of oppressed group and the forced imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor (Moses, 2010, p. 21). Consequently, genocide can be considered not as the complete contemporary annihilation of a group of people, but the destruction of their culture both through mass murder and erasing the heritage of survivors (Butcher, 2013, p.257); in doing so, the link between survivors and their past is destroyed, which disrupts their ability to own and legitimise a cultural legacy on which to build cultural identities in the present and future (Bevan, 2016, p. 7). A link can subsequently be made between the purposeful destruction of physical cultural heritage site during conflict with an attempt to destroy the identity and culture of the groups who subscribe to the meaning of heritage, and by extension an attempt to destroy of the group itself (Moses, 2010, p. 25). As argued by this thesis, heritage should be considered as a highly political process of connecting people to place and the past (Smith, 2006, p.58) achieved by determining and controlling legitimate narratives of the past expressed through physical heritage sites (Kaplan 2001, p. 7). In conflict, these links between people and place are violently attacked, and the meaning of sites are eradicated or defaced through the destruction of the site and its associated people (Meskell, 2010, p. 193), and the enforcement of new discourses made by oppressors in support of the violence enacted in conflict or justification for the erasure of other cultures (Sen, 2006, p. 82).

Lemkin expanded the idea of group cultures to a transnational level where all heritage belongs to the whole of humanity shared as a collective culture (Lemkin, 2008, p. 91). In this definition it was not the components of heritage that bore universal value, rather, the concept that cultures had distinct heritage was in itself a universal collective culture. Consequently, and attack against any culture is an attack against all culture (Moses, 2010, p.22-23). This concept is reflected in the universalist approach taken by the World Heritage Convention which seeks to define a universal appreciation to culture, and support the Hague Convention’s codification of protecting internationally pre-determined heritage sites in conflict. In both cases, the primacy of universal ownership of culture allows heritage sites to be defined to transcend its national context and contemporary subjectivities (Francioni, 2011, p. 1). In doing so heritage sites become prioritised according to dominant global powers and their interpretation of value, rather than to accept all heritage as of equal value according to its local contemporary definition (Merryman, 2006, p. 20). Lemkin also argued that disparate cultures should not be prioritised over each other, and ardently argued against the colonial suppression of minority cultures. However, the arguments made earlier in this thesis suggest that the World Heritage Convention’s preoccupation with ascribing outstanding value to built heritage sites creates an intrinsic division between valuable and not-valuable culture, allowing comparison and power imbalances to determine the worth and prioritisation of shared universal cultures (Labadi, 2013, p. 68); this results in the definition of culture used in the WHC becoming the antithesis of the approach Lemkin took towards culture when forming the Genocide Convention.
There is a disjuncture here between the Lemkin’s philosophy of universal culture which underpins the Genocide Convention based on an acceptance of cultural diversity, and the codification of cultural heritage protection in WHC, Hague Convention, and the Geneva Convention which use universal heritage to order the value of cultural groups through the prioritisation of specific heritages. The impact of this disjuncture is that the Hague Convention continues to prioritise the protection of material heritage from purposeful or collateral damage from military occupation as a signifier of cultural value, but is ill-equipped deter acts of aggression which actively seek to destroy cultures through the destruction of cultural property (Labadi, 2013, p. 68; Schipper and Frank, 2013, p. 220.

In protecting cultural property from war the Hague Convention does not focus on the impact that the destruction of heritage has on the safety and security of the culture who created the site, instead, it focuses on the destruction of monumental heritage as a marker of historical and aesthetic significance determined and supported by a universal value system. In the first approach, the loss of heritage is irreplaceable and its meaning forever changed by an attack; in the latter approach the loss of a heritage site can be rebuilt and revalued.

Moses argues that Lemkin’s approach on the cultural foundations of genocide reached a barrier that prevented the philosophy of cultural groups becoming codified in the Genocide Convention (2010, p.37). The inclusion of culture as a fundamental aspect of the definition of genocide was resisted by the international signatories at the Nuremberg trials between 1945 and 1946, which sought to determine and follow a narrower definition of genocide that focussed on the mass murder of Jews, Gypsies, and Polish nationals based on ideological and religious persecution in order to expedite Nazi prosecutions and avoided precedence for prosecutions against the historic assimilation of indigenous cultural groups, rather than to include a broader range of cultural annihilation spanning distinct cultural groups (Moses, 2010, p. 37). This resulted in the prosecution of genocide based primarily on acts of mass murder, rather than on the techniques applied to facilitate the annihilation and suppression of cultures as precursors to mass murder (Moses, 2010, p. 33-34; Docker, 2008, p. 14). The initial reluctance to include culture as a fundamental aspect of genocide allowed the definition to be broken into different areas of Genocide; cultural genocide became a separate and niche aspect of Genocide, and perceived as a consequence of genocide instead of a key factor in the perpetration of genocide (Butcher, 2013, P.253-254). The reluctance to formalise the inclusion of cultural groups in the definitions of genocide impacted on the interpretation of cultural property within the Hague Convention, wherein without a codified precedence of cultural erasure as genocide, the destruction of cultural property is seen as an attack on expressions of culture rather than as an attack on culture itself.

It is possible to argue that based on the spirit of the Genocide Convention that all acts made in conflict to target and destroy heritage could feasibly be determined as acts of genocide. However, as genocide is defined within the Convention as physical acts of murder of national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, attacks on culture and heritage cannot (or are not routinely) invoked as evidence of genocide. Although heritage destruction is used as evidence in International Criminal Court proceedings, it is considered evidence of genocide or of war crimes, not as an act of genocide in itself unless directly
connected to mass murder. This echoes how heritage is regarded in the Hague Convention, as an attack on the physical manifestation of culture, not as an attack on culture itself. In both conventions, heritage becomes a niche category used in support of more serious war crimes rather than as a key factor used in the facilitation of violence.

We see this prioritisation in practice being when heritage is utilised by the ICTY as evidence to prosecute Milošević for culturally motivated attack on Dubrovnik as part of a wider prosecution for genocide. In this instance the attack on culture is seen as a war crime but not necessarily regarded as the enabler needed for genocide to occur; this echoes the move away from Lemkin’s definition of cultural erasure as a pre-requisite for genocide to the condensed definition in the Genocide Convention which focuses primarily on mass murder (O’Lear and Egbert, 2009, p. 2-3). The focus of the convention on the outcome of genocide (mass murder, sterilisation, and brutality), rather than on the ways in which genocide is facilitated (through cultural annihilation, assimilation, and vandalism), divorces the impact of genocide from the processes which enable it to thrive— including the process of creating, distorting, and destroying cultural heritage (Fournet, 2016, p.44).

2.7 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

Joshua Kastenberg notes that 1954 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Hereafter referred to as the Hague Convention) was the result of both a historical trend and philosophy to protect heritage in war, and the failure of this philosophy to prevent the widespread damage, destruction and looting of artefacts in the Second World War (Kastenberg, 1997, p. 281). Whilst it is true that the Hague Convention was the latest convention to tackle the issue of cultural heritage in conflict and that the Second World War drastically changed the dynamics of war by demonstrating what was technological possible in contemporary warfare, the Hague Convention was also created in reaction to a preoccupation with protecting Western definitions of built heritage as markers of ownership, legacy and control. The loss throughout the second world war of cultural heritage sites though purposeful and accidental destruction revealed the precarious state of heritage in conflict, but the post-war period also led to a rise in a preoccupation with preserving heritage from decay and misuse. In the post-war period both the Venice Charter (1964) and the World Heritage Convention (1972) rose to prominence, and whilst neither directly protected heritage against conflict they did lay out prescriptive guidance on how to protect and restore heritage from time and misuse, which cemented the position of built heritage as the primary definition of heritage into future protective legislation.

In this argument, the Hague Convention became an avenue to codify the treatment of built heritage in conflict, and by focusing on built heritage, made it possible for heritage sites to be restored after conflict. Had Lemkin’s cultural genocide approach been adopted by the Geneva or Hague convention the restoration of cultures as a physical activity alone would not be possible as his definition would have meant that an attack on heritage was the destruction of a culture rather than a heritage site alone. Using a more inclusive and holistic definition of heritage which includes an intangible connection
between people and place and a definition of heritage destruction that goes beyond tangible structures requires the recovery of cultural heritage after war to have a more integrated approach beyond restoration and repair; this approach is the foundation to the Integrated Assessment Framework introduced in this research.

In the chronology of heritage protection, the 1954 Hague Convention drew together the tenants of the preceding legislative attempts to control the use of heritage in conflict; from the Lieber code it took forward the idea that certain historical artefacts should be protected due to their significance to past, future, and contemporary society (Lieber, 1863, articles 34-36). The tenants of ownership around cultural property removed during war was taken from the 1907 Hague Convention, and used to assist in criminalising theft and illegal removal of cultural property within the 1954 Hague Convention (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1907, articles 27, 56). Whilst the Roerich Pact was moved almost wholesale into the 1954 Hague Convention to ensure that heritage sites were physically labelled with the Blue Shield insignia to mark them as demilitarized zones of universal significance to be protected during conflict (Roerich, 1935, Preamble; Schipper and Eichberger, 2010 p.170). This approach signified not only that heritage should be protected, but also signalled that the national signatories of the 1954 Hague Convention regarded heritage as outside of the theatre of war. This perspective also reflects an approach to protecting heritage that relies on physical material of heritage sites as the limits that define heritage, as reflected in the chronology of heritage protection and the WHC.

The 1954 Hague Convention made and cemented a link between monuments, property and the built manifestations of culture with the term heritage (Merryman, 2006, p. 20); conflating material culture with cultural heritage. This thesis suggests that the conflation between the material expression of culture and cultural heritage could only have been achieved due to the primacy given to material heritage when defining culture using a Eurocentric perspective (Fairchild Ruggles and Silverman, 2009b, pp. 4–5; Said, 1994, p. 12). In turn, the longevity and international acceptance of the 1954 Hague Convention is intrinsically supported and linked to the prioritisation and significance afforded to material heritage which endures through the World Heritage Convention of 1972.

However, a material centric approach to heritage is at odds with a perspective that puts culture and heritage at the heart of conflict and sees it as a pivotal instrument in the construction of cultural identities, violence, and the context for war and Genocide, as supported by Lemkin’s underpinning of the Genocide Convention and the inclusion of the 1954 Hague Convention in the Geneva Convention (Frank and Schipper, 2013, p. 20), and the theoretical approaches to cultural and heritage taken Sen, Merryman, Said, and Smith outlined in Chapter Three of this thesis. This dichotomy between fixed material heritage and contextually bound definitions reflects two approaches to the definition of heritage taken in the legislative attempts to protect it; the essentialism of heritage as a historical marker of past value which contemporary generations are responsible to protect, and the social-construction of heritage value in the present to signify and justify the existence of contemporary identities.
The essentialist perspective on heritage provides an opportunity to define and protect heritage with minimal interpretation into why heritage sites need to be protected (Högberg, 2016, p. 42); heritage sites need to be protected in conflict to ensure that the historic values they espouse are passed on to future generations and the responsibility to protected heritage is also discharged to this future generation. The meaning of these heritage sites are fixed, and tied to a historical past and can be protected and restored based on their physical existence. This is the definition of heritage that is protected in the WHC and Hague Convention. This type of heritage is determined by its material and limited to a site, it is capable of being damaged and restored, and is attacked as it represents a fixed notion of cultural significance determined by an interpretation of history that transcends contemporary ideology and geo-political boundaries. The codified protection of heritage that culminates in the 1954 Hague Convention reflects this approach, and also reflects the Eurocentric paternalism and ownership of an authorised historical discourse that controls what values are considered significant enough to be defined as universal (world) heritage. The movement of contemporary theories towards the construction of heritage as a process that connects people to places and the past through contextually bound identities, and the lack of movement away from essentialist definitions of heritage in legislation has created a widening gulf between what heritage is understood to represent to a diverse range of individuals and the formal ways it is protected in conflict (Högberg, 2016, p. 41), which has contributed to the continued use of heritage in conflict causation and continuation.

In a social constructivist argument, the meaning of heritage changes in response to its contemporary circumstances and the cultures who have ownership and control over its use. This definition of heritage uses and interprets an imagined past to justify a contemporary cultural ideology, heritage here acts as a contemporary cultural signifier of value that exists only in relation to its present reality and context. This approach extends the value of heritage beyond its material borders to include its context, and the ways it is being interpreted (Smith, 2006, p.58). The use of heritage in this construction is highly politicised, and enables heritage to be used to create inclusion or exclusion, and to promote similarity or cultural division. This definition of heritage is the underlying vandalism factor that creates a pervasive atmosphere for Genocide according to Lemkin, and the currency to ignite and maintain violence in conflict according to Sen. This construction of cultural identities and its link to heritage is harder to protect through legislation as the meaning of heritage will be constantly changing in relation to its contemporary circumstance, furthermore, attempts to solidify the meaning of heritage in order to protect it will present an opportunity for disenfranchised groups to attack heritage sites as places of constructed universal significance in order to signal their difference and rejection of the international community and its value system.

2.8 Standardising Value: The Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage

The Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (referred to as the World Heritage Convention or WHC) of 1972 is the most significant convention governing
the treatment of heritage internationally and, in conjunction with the 1954 Hague Convention, it is of particular importance to the assessment of heritage in war.

The WHC offers both criteria for assessing outstanding universal significance in heritage sites, and the authority to judge and designate world heritage internationally in countries that are signatories (Askew, 2010, p. 19). This convention works on the principle that significant sites can be assessed and protected, and in doing so become the property (in spirit, if not in law) of the international community (Askew, 2010, p. 20). The WHC came into being in relation to the development of heritage sites around the world, most notably the Aswan High Dam development in Egypt (Donnachie, 2010, p. 118). The international heritage community was able to remove an ancient site from danger by carefully moving it to higher ground to avoid flooding, and in doing so successfully intervened in saving heritage despite national borders (Donnachie, 2010, p. 118). The WHC places the impetus to act to save or protect heritage on the national government that owns the site, but has frequently intervened when the national government has failed to do so (Askew, 2010, p. 20; Labadi, 2013, p. 29).

The mainstay of the Convention is to designate sites as universally significant and then encourage and support their protection through conservation programmes and economic support for their upkeep. It discourages inappropriate development and destruction by placing the site on a Heritage in Danger list (if the heritage is threatened) or by using the ultimate sanction of the removal of world heritage designation if the site is altered too much (Askew, 2010, p. 18). The deterrent of losing world heritage status is bound with the perception of heritage as safe places for tourists and the economic benefits they bring (Askew, 2010, pp. 20–21); the loss of world heritage status would show a lack of confidence in the heritage site and its management, and an implication that the site is less valuable than before (Labadi, 2013, p. 69). The use of this status to inspire visitors’ confidence is of particular relevance to heritage in post-conflict zones. Cultural heritage theorist Sophia Labadi argues that world heritage status is not only a marker of national security but also of national stability; that preserving world heritage sites (WHS) is a politically targeted act of ensuring a singular narrative of stability supported by an authentic representation of a unified and fixed past (Labadi, 2010, p. 70).

The tenets of universalism (in regards to culture) and international heritage commonality are clearly at work in the designation of world heritage. The WHC is an effort to protect heritage for the good of all mankind and in doing so creates a standard currency for heritage sites. To be considered universally significant a site must fulfil all the criteria listed in the convention (Labadi, 2013, p. 29). These criteria focus on ancient or existing built heritage sites (Fielden and Jokiletho, 1993, p. 69). The approach to this method of conservation is fixed (adhering to the principles of the Venice Charter) (Jokilehto, 1998b, p. 230); the sites must be kept as they were at the time of their initial inclusion on the list, using minimal intervention strategies and preserving whatever historic fabric is considered authentic and significant. The WHC is limited by its conflation of material culture as cultural heritage; by excluding heritage which is less tangible, and it risks alienating cultures that consider heritage to involve less tangible markers (Labadi, 2013, p. 68). It is argued by the author of this research that in a hypothetical nation with a single uncontested authorised culture this would be
an immensely difficult but achievable goal, in a real-world multicultural global setting it is impossible to condense all definitions of heritage into one set of fixed criteria, and in a conflict situation has the potential to become a dangerous cause of contention and violence.

Maria Starzmann argues that the assumption that an invading force has an almost paternal responsibility for the protection of heritage made early heritage protection problematic in a post-colonial contemporary political landscape (Starzmann, 2008, p. 371). The devastating effects of imperialist invasion and the appropriation and removal of cultural property are often dismissed as ‘spoils of war’, and its arguments for the removal of heritage for its own protection – though accepted and enshrined in early legislative attempts to protect heritage – are highly contentious and problematic contemporary issues (Starzmann, 2008, p. 373).

Maria Starzmann notes that this universal definition favours the promotion of Western history, enabling the perception of non-Western history as “other” (Starzmann, 2008, pp. 369, 371; Said, 1974). The colonisation of non-European countries brought Europe into contact with different cultures with the ensuing commercialisation and paternalist management of their heritage by the colonisers (Starzmann, 2008, p. 372). This allowed the colonisers to create a distinction between a perception of value rather than diversity (Meskell, 2005, p. 139), for example. The lasting legacy of this cultural imperialism was the judgement that European heritage was intrinsically more valuable than non-European heritage, and therefore agents of European culture had the right and responsibility to control other cultures by managing and presentation their heritage using a Eurocentric definition of its (Parry, 1997, p. 227). Benita Parry argues that the very discourses that created the “othering” of cultures are now responsible for denying cultures the space to dispute them by removing such discourses from contemporary historical narratives (Parry, 1997, p. 231). In this view, the notion of heritage (particularly world heritage) is a legacy of cultural imperialism, which is simultaneously attempting to retain Western approaches to heritage and encouraging alternate perspectives to gain a place within this perspective. In doing so the Western-orientated approach becomes a performance of postcolonial heritage inclusion, but is reliant on its imperialist framework.

2.9 Influences of essentialism on codifying universal heritage in the Hague Convention

Universalism prescribes value based on the assumption that all definitions of value can be understood, applied and accepted globally, which links universal definitions of heritage to an essentialism where heritage has an innate value and status which is universally understood if not readily accepted. Value is ascribed to heritage (particularly world heritage) in a check list of authorised UNESCO criteria and processed by a congress of global representatives. These criteria are systems of universalist and essentialist classifications that ignore geo-political context. The aim is to produce a global standard and currency that determines and defines what heritage is and means on a global scale. Universalist categorisations of value seek to transcend temporal realities and to define what humankind finds valuable and ultimately protect it.
However, World heritage designation risks enhancing cultural differences by providing a clear distinction between what may be considered culturally valuable and what may not, and by ignoring its geo-political context and it provides a target for those who oppose this distinction. World heritage site designations in Palestine and Israel have helped to solidify the difference between the two, supporting increasing nationalism and making heritage a central part of the political turmoil in the region (De Cesari, 2010, pp. 302–303). De Cesari argues that this negative effect has come about because the ascription of universal value not only builds on national ideas of heritage, but “reproduces, amplifies, and expands” both the ideas and the political power institutions that support them (De Cesari, 2010, p. 302). In conflict, universal classifications of heritage can become signifiers of Western intervention, and their cultural value is second to symbols of intervention; in this view, a cultural site ceases to be valued as cultural and is instead seen as similar to that of an army base, a school, or a hospital; as a functional part of a conflict landscape. In times of conflict these sites can become significant as markers of international intervention.

John Henry Merryman suggests that despite its global positioning, The Hague Convention has a specifically Western agenda. States may define their own individual approach to cultural property and decide on their actions towards its theft and repatriation but the narrow definitions of acceptable value and culture make it difficult for them to do so (Merryman, 2006, pp. 22–23). By recognising the existence of intangible heritage in non-Western nations a distinction is drawn between highly valuable Western built culture and the less valuable intangible culture (Sullivan, 2003, p. 49). The term “cultural property” in The Hague Convention is therefore political in character, and it prioritises built heritage over intangible heritage so that in times of conflict using heritage to further military aims is rendered a crime, and cultural property may not be removed from the theatres of war or vanquished enemies (UNESCO, 1954).

Merryman argues that universalism in The Hague Convention limits its effectiveness, Merryman suggests that since there is no such thing as a universal value system as different cultures and nations have different ways of ascribing value to their societies and heritage (Merryman, 2005, p. 15). However, Francioni argues that the strength of The Hague Convention is precisely in its universal applicability (Francioni, 2011, p. 1), where the notion of universal ownership of heritage limits the power of nations or states to define heritage, and instead allows cultural value to be decided by (ideally) a politically neutral cross-border panel of decision makers, which, he argues, protects people from the current political leanings of their governments (Francioni, 2004, pp. 1211–1212). In turn, this suggests that the legislation that defines universal value as a concept defends heritage from the political context that it inhabits rather than being defined by it (Francioni, 2004, p. 1214). In this view The Hague Convention protects the cultural heritage of minority or deviant groups from majority groups in power that could threaten it (Guibernau, 2004, p. 1257). In this interpretation, essentialism in The Hague Convention protects culture by preventing its meaning being re-constructed on an international stage.

In this interpretation The Hague Convention becomes an insurance policy discouraging violence against heritage because it is protected by the international community. As the destruction of heritage
in war continues, however, the weakness of Francioni’s argument becomes clear. If the main goal in The Hague Convention was to create a standard of heritage to enable protection though condemnation, it has failed to do so. Rather than create a universal standard and protecting the heritage so identified, the WHC and The Hague Convention have instead created a way to identify and then damage heritage which is universally valued but not contextually or culturally relevant or acceptable.

2.10 Universal classification and the Social Construction of value in the 1954 Hague Convention

Tomlinson argues that the definition of culture is less important than “how people use the term” (Tomlinson, 2002, p. 5). This thesis argues that universal classifications of the significant of heritage create can be considered to be an attempt to formalise what heritage is on a global scale. This universal classification of heritage relies on prioritising its international significance over its local significance, and in doing so making it the shared heritage of an imagined global community. To achieve this, the parameters of universal significance must be set, and a heritage site must be interpreted to sit within these parameters. Both the World Heritage Convention and The Hague Convention use this universalist stance to interpret and protect international heritage sites. Conversely, meaning attached to heritage do not always confine themselves to universally attributed classifications of significance. Instead, meaning is socially-constructed around a heritage site (and narrative) in response to local pressures and tensions. When the socially constructed meanings of heritage collide with the universal classifications of heritage tensions arise. In peaceful context, this can result in disputes and compromise; in a context of conflict this can result in violence. When this collision occurs in conflict the result is often unfavourable to the heritage site in question, as the internationally acclaimed site can be constructed as a place of negative international intervention, and attacked in order to protect a culture from said cultural intervention. This argument is framed in this thesis as a clash between universalism in international classifications of culture, and the social-construction of heritage narratives.

Said (1979, 1994) argues that Western culture is constructed as the universal norm, and non-Western cultures are considered “other” to that universal norm (Said, 1994, p. 12). The consequence is that the notion of the universal becomes synonymous with Western Eurocentric priorities (Said, 1994, p. 268). The idea of universalism is revealed to be a highly exclusive system of categorisation and management that is opposed to an inclusive worldwide system that can legitimise (and delegitimise) claims to a place in the past (Said, 1994, pp. 335–336). For this universal claim to appear legitimate, a constant comparison between Western and non-Western culture is required, with in which Western culture must always be perceived as being culturally superior and timeless, whereas non-Western culture must always be perceived as being inferior and in need of Western protection (Said, 1979, p. 49). Thus, not only are non-Western cultures “othered” by the dominance of the West, that they are also constructed as unable to function or survive without Western intervention.
In a social constructivist approach to attacks on heritage, heritage is constructed as a culturally specific symbol that is identified as something either to be idealised or to be destroyed, depending on the ideology of those involved in conflict (Francioni, 2013). The debate is based on whether heritage is seen as the property of the state or as the property of humankind (Francioni, 2013, p. 3). For Francioni this debate is used to explore the legality of retaining or exporting cultural property (Francioni, 2013, p. 3), but this view can also help us frame the way value is disputed at heritage sites. Universal classifications of value support the view that heritage is the property of all humankind, but for those who are vehemently opposed to international intervention this act can be constructed as an affront on their cultural identity and attacked—either physically through targeting heritage sites, or ideologically by rejecting the value of the site in favour of socially constructed meanings, or both, as in the case of the Bamiyan Buddhas. In accordance with Tomlinson’s earlier argument, the meaning of heritage is less important than the way it is used when constructing or destroying a world heritage site.

Universalist approaches to heritage argue that the unequal relationships between international states (both contemporarily and historically) have both defined heritage and brought them into inevitable conflict. The dominant international value system of heritage is a colonial construct and therefore becomes a target in a post-colonial global society (Meskell, 2002, p. 557; Musitelli, 2005, pp. 325–326). Social constructivist approaches to heritage in war suggest that damage to heritage is not inevitable, but that the construction of heritage in war can become a focal point for reinforcing or rejecting identities (Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 26–27). Ruggie (1998) suggests that international politics influence the construction of identities and force those identities to legitimise themselves through culture (Ruggie, 1998, pp. 864–865). This thesis argues that the political causes of conflict filter down and influence the construction of cultural identities which in turn dictates how cultural heritage (as symbols of identity) is treated in war. The use of religious and cultural symbols in Bosnia as sites of atrocity or targets is an example of the restructuring of cultural spaces into theatres of war in an effort to damage and delegitimise the link between people and place. The use of heritage and culture as tools of war are apparent in examples from the conflicts in Bosnia, including the ethnically motivated massacre of Bosnians in the UN safe space of Srebrenica (Perkins, 2004), and the widespread systematic torture and rape of both Christians and Muslims in places of worship in the Balkan wars between 1990 and 1995 to target religious and cultural identities (Kennedy-Pipe and Stanley, 2007, pp. 73–74). These examples are brutal reminders that heritage in conflict is a tool of war that goes beyond attacks on material cultures, and targets the intangible meaning of such places and the individuals that identify with them.

Heritage can be constructed to justify and perform ideological connections to a place and a preferred interpretation either locally or internationally (Burr, 1995, p. 4). The act of attacking a World Heritage Site is a way to reject acceptance of universal value systems with maximum exposure as the international community will pay attention to such an act. The heritage site is constructed by these attackers not as a place of heritage or historical importance, but as the physical symbol of universalism and a reflection of political unrest. Furthermore, targeting heritage sites with
significance to specific cultures is an act of ethnic cleansing wherein an attacker seeks to erase the
culture of another from the physical and emotional landscape of the past, present, and future.

In this reading a universalist approach to attacks on cultural heritage explain why there is such a
pronounced performance to record destruction and also helps to explain why attacks on UNESCO-
inscribed world heritage sites are frequently targeted during warfare. The construction of value at
heritage sites changes in response to conflict, and the process of ascribing international significance
can have profound consequences for its survival. When heritage is constructed as an ideological
symbol- either by its international acclaim or by its local ownership- it becomes something valuable;
in conflict, it becomes something to be defended or attacked.

2.11 The 1999 Second Protocol of the Hague Convention
The 1999 Second Protocol of the Hague Convention was formed mainly in reaction to the use and
destruction of cultural property in the Balkans in the 1990s (Toman, 2009, p. 96). The protocol’s aim
was to increase the protection for cultural property by making it harder to use heritage for military
advantage (Henckaerts, 1999, p. 21). After the prolonged attack on Vukovar during the break-up of
Yugoslavia it became apparent that not only had cultural property been used for military
advancement through its use as a military base (which transgressed the 1954 convention), the town
had also been purposefully targeted as a place of cultural significance (Toman, 2009, p. 96-97) (as
had many other sites such as the bridge in Mostar and the Old Town in Dubrovnik).

The 1999 second protocol was added in reaction to further weapons development, specifically the
development of weapons of mass destruction and remote attacks and an obligation for states party to
work with archaeologists in peacetime to identify sites of cultural value (Toman, 2009, pp. 21–23).
The conception of heritage used in The Hague Convention remains focused on physical cultural
property, the protection of which is linked to material restoration and recovery as supported by the
WHC and the Venice Charter; this remains the case with the contemporary iteration of the Hague
Convention which does not fully reflect the changing definitions of heritage from a theoretical
perspective or the legislative attempts to diversify the definition of peace-time heritage though the
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), the Burra Charter (1979)
or the Nara Document on Authenticity (1994).

The second protocol focused on article four of the 1954 Hague Convention, and sought to add a
waiver that if the attack would damage or was already damaging cultural property than the military
action should be suspended (O’Keefe, 2010). This waiver was presented to reduce the ambiguity in
the 1954 Hague Convention which allowed cultural property to be used for military advancement if
here was no other recourse; the 1999 protocol urged for fighting to cease if no recourse was available
(O’Keefe, 2010, p. 370). This tried to balance the needs of military advancement with the needs of
heritage protection to avoid places of cultural significance from being destroyed by future conflicts
(Forrest, 2010, p. 116) whilst also offering a more powerful threat of penal sanctions if the 1954
Hague Convention and its 1999 protocols were not adhered to (O’Keefe, 2010, p. 373).
The second protocol of 1999 occurred after the events of the Siege of Dubrovnik 1995, but it remains a useful indication of the tremendous influence that the use of heritage in the Yugoslavian conflicts (particularly the examples mentioned above) had on changing the political and legal landscape of heritage protection in the years following these conflicts.

The Hague Convention and its protocols are currently the most significant and direct piece of legislation on the worldwide protection of cultural property during conflict (Lehman, 1997, p. 532). It not only protects but criminalises the removal from countries of cultural property, which had previously been considered the spoils of war (Lehman, 1997, pp. 531–532). Jennifer Lehman notes that the overall goal of The Hague Convention is to protect cultural property during war as damage to heritage represents damage to all mankind; and this is the defining sentiment of The Hague Convention – that the protection of cultural property should be primarily perceived as an ethical and moral requirement of war (Francioni, 2011, p. 1; Merryman, 1989, pp. 346–347). This is enshrined in the Supra notes that preface the preamble of The Hague Convention, which outlines the responsibility that all nations carry towards cultural heritage:

Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world …

(Supra note 4, UNESCO, 1954, p. 8)

This note shows that The Hague Convention connects cultural property to cultural heritage, thus establishing a link between heritage significance and material definitions of culture. Secondly, it shows its underlying assumption of universalism, that cultural heritage is a universal asset which is the property of “all mankind”.

2.12 Summary: Protecting heritage from Conflict

Although material heritage sites remain the definitive feature of heritage protection in conflict, conceptualisations of world heritage have changed since the first construction of both the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1972 World Heritage Convention (Musitelli, 2005, p. 333). Specifically, UNESCO’s focus has changed from a purely material heritage focus to include the need to identify and designate the outstanding universal value (OUV) of many different types of culture (Musitelli, 2005, p. 324). Musitelli argues that the result is that a diverse range of heritages now face being standardised into the UNESCO method, and world heritage will remain as the “producer of norms and orchestrator of international cooperation” (Musitelli, 2005, p. 325). Jukka Jokilehto notes that the operational guideline definitions of WH have evolved beyond their initial conception and are becoming more accepted as an interpretation of OUV (Jokilehto, 1998a, pp. 17–18, 2006, p. 12). He argues that the result of this is the inclusion of diverse attitudes in the designation of sites but not in changes to The Hague Convention (Jokilehto, 1998a, p. 19).

For Jokilehto it is obvious that what counts as an OUV is a matter of interpretation, which as this chapter has discussed, is difficult for protection legislation to guard against. He argues that the WHC
was meant to be read as a guidance document towards the interpretation of heritage as a diverse range of creative processes (Jokilehto, 2006, p. 2). In this interpretation the management of world heritage falls into the domain of national cultural preferences and reduces the impact of a universal definition of value. This has particular applications for understanding authenticity at heritage sites, how the term is interpreted nationally and globally and the effect it has on the construction of history (Jokilehto, 2006, p. 2). Although this perspective reflects a trend towards inclusivity in heritage legislation, the need to focus on material culture in protection legislation in order to collect evidence of illegal activity in conflict continues to drive definitions and heritage use within conflict and post-conflict protection measures. This focus is furthered by the continued fixation of destroyed heritage sites in international media which reflect an enduring idea of world heritage principally as material heritage, and as such material heritage remains a target in conflict not only because it is an attack on a cultural identity or ideology but also an attack on Western assumptions of universal value.

Simply put, instead of reflecting the social construction of heritage sites as a contextually bound process, The Hague Convention and WHC have created Western-defined heritage sites which are manifested through material heritage. These places can be purposefully interpreted as a process of Western-biased intervention in national and local politics and in doing so world heritage designation becomes a way to identify devastating political and psychological targets with maximum international impact. This construction of heritage also reduces the awareness and acceptance of the extreme damage that cultural vandalism and genocide has on cultures, it also undermines attempts to prosecute the use of heritage destruction as a weapon of war employed to eradicate cultures.

Putting together Meskell’s and Musitelli’s arguments, this thesis suggests that the social construction of sites of heritage provides the foundations from which heritage destroyers can be categorised as cultural deviants. UNESCO provides a framework not only to define what heritage is, but also provides guidance on how to perceive those who transgress or disagree with the definition (Meskell, 2002, p. 567; Musitelli, 2005, p. 330). To some extent this can also be seen in the inclusion of the Nazi death camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau onto the list of world heritage (Meskell, 2002, p. 571); it functions to signal universal condemnation (Meskell, 2002, pp. 570–571). Following Meskell, we might argue that genocide is an abnormal event in history which requires memorialisation, similar to in the way historic architecture is resigned to the past; as something unique that cannot be repeated. However, as Lemkin and Sen argue, the construction and deconstruction of a cultural other is facilitated by heritage interpretation and this is connected to delegitimising their right to exist in a certain place and time, and effectively used in conflict as a means to eradicate a culture as a precursor to mass murder. The WHC and The Hague Convention have become political instruments that govern the way we perceive conflict and its impact on heritage, but it does so by connecting heritage sites to an essentialist conception of fixed historical narratives expressed by material heritage sites that are universally protected and supported, which in turn affords them legislative protection against being forgotten or erasure. The Hague Convention also limits the ability of context to determine why heritage is being attacked as it assumes it is an attack on universal values intrinsically connected to
heritage sites, and cannot protect against the cultural and contextual impacts of heritage destruction, it can only provide a record of attacks on cultural property.
Chapter Three: Conceptual definitions of Cultural Heritage

Defining what is meant by cultural heritage is fraught with difficulties; the fluidity and flexibility of heritage definitions means that it is difficult to generate a working definition of heritage that can be used to frame future arguments involved in the relationship between conflict and heritage (Harrison, 2010, p. 16). Heritage interacts with many spheres of critical thought from politics, sociology, psychology, discourse analysis to memory studies, it is conceptualised as tangible structures, intangible traditions, and its very existence is under discussion (Smith, 2006, p. 11).

Each interrogation and criticism of heritage allows a new angle to shed light on the use and usefulness of heritage in different contexts. This conceptual review will explore the definitions and terminology of heritage based on its conceptualisation, use and its relationship to discourses of conflict; it will address the relationship between heritage and identity (Harvey, 2001; Sen, 2006); heritage and interpretation (Graham and Howard, 2008a; Howard, 2003; Hewison, 1987); heritage as a discourse (Smith, 2006; Hall, 1999); heritage and power (Cheong and Miller, 2000; Clegg, 1993); heritage as cultural significance (Saussure, 2011 [1916]; McManamon, 2000); and heritage as memory (Connerton, 1989; Connerton, 2008; Spillman, 1997). The investigation of heritage here will encompass both theoretical and policy definitions of heritage and show how, for the purposes of this research, heritage is defined as a process that negotiates the connections between people, places and their pasts (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 1–2; Connerton, 2008, pp. 59–60; Macdonald, 2009, p. 2; Smith, 2006, p. 11).

This exploration into the conceptualisation of heritage forms the theoretical foundation to the IHAF which relies on a holistic definition of heritage as a process that connects people to place and to the past. This view takes into account the importance of cultural property in creating and protecting heritage, but goes beyond the material limitations of heritage to argue that heritage is formed by the contemporary cultural narratives and power struggles that surround a cultural site.

3.1 Interpreting the Past

Moving beyond the predominant definitions offered within the practitioner-focused work on cultural heritage, the section below explores the ideas and conceptions from within a broader range of cultural studies. Here, attention is placed on the diverse ways in which history constantly are interpreted and reinterpreted, and explores what effect this has on establishing and legitimising (or destabilising and delegitimising) the past through heritage. The interpretation of the past frames the way that heritage sites are presented and understood in the present (Lowenthal, 1985, p. 264). Society often regards history as set fixed points, or as factual occurrences that do not need to be interrogated (for example timelines in school classrooms, well-known oft repeated events, and notorious historical figures) (Harrison, 2010, p. 9); this thesis (as well as the majority of theorists referenced in this research) argue that history is not fixed or factual but is a subjective interpretation of the past which has been turned into a powerful and practiced grand narrative. This narrative creates an illusion that history is a objective reflection of actual events. Whereas the grand narrative of history can give the illusion of being fixed and objective, the value and meaning of heritage overtly changes over time from
contemporary pressures, and does so at a greater pace than the diversification of the grand narrative of history. In doing so, heritage becomes an avenue to diversify and interpret the grand narrative of history and undermine its claim of objectivity.

For Smith, the way heritage is interpreted relies not only on how an event is interpreted but on who is interpreting. In this sense, the way history is interpreted as heritage relies on the subjective bias and objectives of the interpreter (Smith, 2006, p.58) In a post-conflict setting, wherein the events of the conflict are being reflected upon and turned into a narrative discourse, the interpretation of those events has a direct correlation to how those events are remembered and signified in heritage. This could render the conflict events as a triumphant narrative, supported by memorial and celebratory heritage sites, or it could interpret the events as dissonant narratives supported by heritage sites emphasising atrocity and the barbarity of opponents. Of course, all interpretation rests heavily not only on the events of conflict themselves but also on how the interpreter experiences conflict; for example, the interpretation of a conflict event would be drastically different depending on whether the interpreter was a victim or perpetrator of violence. This construction of conflict narratives is returned to later in this chapter, and is a core argument of this thesis.

The ways in which heritage is interpreted can be used as a means to understand, appreciate and protect heritage by using it to educate and connect ourselves to the past as Tilden has argued (Tilden, 2008 [1957], p. 233); but in doing so, the previously agreed upon narrative of history changes as the present seeks to impose itself on the past (Uzzell, 1989, p. 74; Hewison, 1987, p. 12). For Hewison, the interpretation of the past rests in the imposition of contemporary needs onto the past resulting in the re-imagining of a nostalgic past that can be inauthentic (Hewison, 1987, p. 45). Hewison uses themed ‘living heritage’ museums as a case studies to argue that by turning sites into contemporary heritage places to visit we trivialise the past and traduce its authenticity (Hewison 1987, p. 15). By contrast, for Tilden, heritage offers an unproblematic opportunity to learn from the past where heritage interpretation acts as a way to connect the present to the past and instil them with the need to protect heritage to pass on to future generations (Tilden, 2008 [1957], p. 20). Perhaps a good example of these arguments is in the debates that surround the ongoing legacy of the Nazi concentration camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau (UNESCO, 1979). The camp is a site of mass atrocity, where over a million civilians were brutally murdered and tortured during the Second World War. It is also a contemporary site of large scale tourism, with increasingly high visitor numbers (Dalziel, 2016, p. 186). The camp and museum in no way trivialise the events that occurred there, and it serves as a stark record of the brutality of the Holocaust. However, the site is not robust enough to deal with the foot fall it receives each year and so parts of the camp (including the notorious extermination chambers and showers) have been rebuilt and relocated to make them more accessible for visitors (Donadio, 2015; Williamson and Davis, 2002).

In this (brief) example we can see both Tilden and Hewison’s arguments at work; the heritage site functions as a place of education that needs to be remembered and passed on to future generations (in accordance with Tilden’s arguments on the education merits of heritage), but it is also being re-imagined to suit the needs of the contemporary audience which in turn is altering the site (in
accordance with Hewison’s criticism of changing the past to fit the needs from the present). The altering of the material of the site does not change its interpretation as a place of dissonant heritage, but what has occurred is that the intangible meaning of the site as a whole has been given a higher priority than the material authenticity of the individual buildings.

We can see this use and interpretation of heritage sites in places affected by conflict. The use of Auschwitz-Birkenau as a heritage site is slightly removed from Hewson’s critique of re-creating heritage sites as the camp is most certainly not a nostalgic re-imagining of the atrocities that took place there, it is however a site that functions to provoke emotional responses in order to educate and connect people to a difficult past. Indeed, in many ways the camp is the antithesis of nostalgia; instead of re-creating a past that is familiar and comfortable, the re-creation and continued preservation of Auschwitz-Birkenau is designed to be an emotionally uncomfortable place to visit and far removed from the aims of themed heritage sites. The interpretation and presentation of Auschwitz-Birkenau serves as way to remember the atrocities of the Holocaust through a physical site which seeks to cement these events into the narrative of the Second World War to ensure the events are remembered and cemented. Although this site has become part of that historical narrative, it has also gone through a process of rejection from contemporary ownership. The Polish government petitioned UNESCO to change the name of the world heritage site to make it clear it was a German, not Polish, site (UNESCO, 2006). This was done in an effort to prevent the site from ever being misattributed as a place of Polish blame, and to clearly attribute the responsibility for historic atrocities to the Nazi regime of 1940s Germany.

Ashworth and Tunbridge suggest that the process of interpreting dissonant heritage sites differs from that of beneficial heritage sites; whereas dissonant sites can be distanced or rejected, beneficial heritage is claimed and celebrated (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 94-95). Ashworth and Tunbridge build on this idea by showing how dissonant pasts can be denied or erased or changed into acceptable versions of atrocious events in an effort to distance oneself from the event (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95; Howard, 2003, pp. 31-32). In conflict, this can be seen through the repackaging of war narratives into myths which remove both blame and responsibility from the present. Such interpretations celebrate, commemorate or demonise the event by portraying the agents in the narrative as victors and victims, or evil and good, in a context that no longer exists (Benton, 2010a, pp. 126–128). The point of interpretation here is either to construct conflict in terms of opposing sides and elevate and demonise them through commemoration, or (in the case of mass atrocity) distance the event by making it context specific, unrepeatable, and a facet of objective education rather than subjective blame (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 91–95). There are of course exceptions to this approach, particularly in interpretations offering with ways of forgetting, forgiveness, attributing and accepting blame and reconciliation that will be explored throughout Chapter Four.

Howard extends this line of thinking and argues that the entrenched discrimination between beneficial and dissonant heritage is based on a society’s tendency to remember sanitised versions of the past (Howard, 2003, pp. 205–207). Although societies cannot completely erase dissonance from
their past, they are capable of disavowing responsibility for it (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 105). Thus events in the past that shine a positive light on the group are incorporated into their social identity and events that reflect badly on them are seen as remote from the groups’ identity and are forgotten, distorted or disowned (Benton, 2010a, pp. 129–130; Howard, 2003, p. 99; Uzzell, 1989, p. 77).

Ralph Samuel’s argued that the interpretation of a past event is as important as the event itself because the way an event is remembered will take precedence over the objective facts of its occurrence (Samuel, 2012, p. 246). However, unlike Ashworth, Tunbridge and Howard, Samuel suggests that rewriting history is not an attempt to omit uncomfortable details, but instead is a way of incorporating a greater variety of interpretations and perspectives that otherwise would have been excluded (Samuel, 2012, p. 18). For Samuel, heritage becomes an active tool for democracy, allowing people from all social backgrounds to record and express their interpretation of history (Samuel, 2012, p. 261). Samuel suggests that the official record of the past is flawed because its foundations rest in elite intellectual interpretations of history and do not take into account many other dissenting interpretations that are thus removed from the dominant discourse (Samuel, 2012, p. 17).

This intersects with the arguments that connect heritage to a legacy of cultural imperialism (Said, 1994, p. 44), warping the way heritage is viewed and protected in times of conflict. Samuel constructs heritage as a political force capable of including and excluding narratives of history based on its own preferences and motivations against a background of Western-dominated global history and heritage (Samuel, 2012, p. 17). In this view, heritage narratives become a cacophony of interpretations, which struggle against each other for dominance. This idea of narratives asserting themselves then fading from dominant discourse has a direct bearing on the tensions that arise after conflict when post-conflict narratives of events and experiences surface.

The political implications of using heritage sites to reinterpret and rewrite the past suggest that heritage has the potential to control, own and change the way the past is viewed in contemporary society if it is accepted uncritically (Hall, 2005, p. 5). As the interpretation of the past is likely to be based on the grand narrative of history, the heritage sites chosen to represent history are unlikely to reflect the experiences of minorities whose viewpoints are excluded from official histories (Hall, 2005, p. 9). Thus the histories of minorities will fade from public consciousness unless they are given (or they take) room to exist within historical discourse (Hall, 2005, p. 12). In order to include minority heritage in public perceptions of history, Hall argues that one must interrogate heritage sites not just as history, but assess whose history is being presented and why (Hall, 2005, pp. 32–34).

Often heritage is interpreted to show the ideal and beneficial aspects of a society, taken from a past re-imagined nostalgically (Hewison, 1987, p. 12). A good example of this is the multi-vocal narratives of conflict in Dubrovnik, wherein the conflict was experienced in a myriad of different ways by individual citizens but then communally cemented into an authorised discourse in an attempt to first apportion blame for destruction of their town, and then to create a narrative of recovery to benefit the town. These positive interpretations of heritage serve to distance cultures from the more unsavoury aspects of their past, allowing those in the present to function without having to take
responsibility for past deeds (Benton, 2010a, p. 127). When it is cannot be interpreted positively, it must interpret dissonance in another way; it is displayed as distanced from a present society, blame is either accepted or rejected, and the participants in a dissonant events shown as victims of atrocity or of circumstance. This lifecycle of dissonance in heritage sits can be demonstrated in an anecdote from the old town in Dubrovnik. Croatia was complicit in terrible war crimes during the Second World War (Denitch, 1994, p. 41), and in the communist era in Yugoslavia following the war a memorial plaque was erected at the main Gate in Dubrovnik Old Town which overtly took responsibility for their part in the war. However, during the conflicts in the 1990s the plaque was removed and not replaced. This is not to suggest that Croatia no longer accepts responsibility for its part in the Second World War, rather, it demonstrates that this interpretation has been distanced and removed from is contemporary narrative. The power of heritage to influence political discourse is displayed in this example; the narrative of history may not be truthful or objective, but the ways in which heritage is interpreted certainly help to create the illusion that there is an authorised narrative of the past (Smith 2006, p. 29).

3.2 Heritage Discourse and the Narration of Conflict

The two sections above have reviewed practitioner-focused work on cultural heritage, and mainstream literature within cultural heritage studies and post-war recovery studies that present ‘cultural heritage’ as a relatively accessible and observable social factor. Through the paragraphs below, more critical literatures are engaged with. By problematizing and more explicitly politicising the concept of cultural heritage, these works demonstrate a need for reflexivity and a more inclusive conception of heritage to be used within the IHAF, in order to achieve its goal of holistically bridging between an eclectic range of literatures.

Authorised heritage discourse (AHD) presents a single narrative of history that is based on events occurring in the past. This history is viewed as an objective and truthful account of events, Laurajane Smith argues that this “legitimate” version of history is achieved via the negotiation of the past through heritage (Smith, 2006, p. 29). Although the events themselves may have occurred, they were not objectively recorded as several choices were made during and since the event in question which undermine the notion that such history is an objective account (Foucault, 2002 [1989], p. 62). Michel Foucault argues that discourse is used to give meaning to and to represent a time in history using recognisable and replicable terms, and in doing so it shapes how society perceives history and the present (Foucault, 1991, pp. 63–65). Laurajane Smith uses Foucault’s concept of power discourse to suggest that heritage is a way to support and also to subvert history through an AHD, offering a way to include or exclude minority narratives from a metanarrative of history (Smith, 2006, pp. 29–30). Graham Fairclough argues that narratives are created for and by society to support their own ideals and values, thus heritage a highly politicised and active agent in creating and shaping power in societies, as expressed in the (socio-political) cultural landscape (Fairclough, 1999a, pp. 27–29). Smith, Fairclough and others suggest that understanding heritage as a discourse uncovers the power
structures than underlie heritage, particularly in terms of ownership and narrative control (Fairclough, 1999b, p. 28; Lemke, 2002, p. 50; Smith, 2006, p. 30).

Discourse is the process of producing and displaying knowledge to be disseminated and replicated by society, who will use and replicate the same language and tone when they are speaking about the same subject (Foucault, 1991). If we apply this to the discourse of heritage, it can be argued that heritage creates and replicates a record of the past which dictates the way history should be valued (Smith, 2006, p. 34). In this discourse heritage is both supported by and supports the historical narrative that it embodies and both transmits and receives meaning, value and cultural significance from and to society (McManamon, 2000). In a context of conflict this can be seen in the creation of war narratives, constructed from the interpretation of dissonant events (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 96; Benton, 2010a, p. 128) that are internalised in society through the AHD (Smith, 2006, p. 26) and transmitted to a wider international society, to be perceived as historical fact rather than the negotiated process of heritage (Barthes, 2000, p. 117; Saussure, 2011 [1916], p. 135; McManamon, 2000, pp. 6–7)

Heritage discourse acts as a means to transmit meaning and value from an imagined past to contemporary society, and in doing so authorises particular perspectives of the past, legitimising them and turning them into historic facts or truth to be repeated by future generations (Kessous and Roux, 2008, p. 192; Saussure, 2011 [1916], p. 42). Patrick Wright suggests that heritage reinvestigates the past, and re-writes the narrative of history to include different narratives and perspectives which undermine the authority of historical records (Wright, 1985, p. 58). Wright goes on to note that the inclusion of diverse interpretations of the past into a singular heritage discourse is partly responsible for society’s obsession with heritage and the expansion of the so-called heritage industry (Wright, 1985, p. 61). Wright argues that the obsession with interpreting past events to include individual narratives does not allow a culture to stagnate by trapping it in the past, but instead makes a society more self-reflective and knowledgeable about the contemporary situation (Wright, 1985, p. 65). He goes further to suggest that in order for it to survive heritage must always be seen to be under threat and in need of protection, whether physical or psychological; the notion of heritage decay (and in conflict, damage in warfare) is countered by an impetus to rescue and protect (Wright, 1985, p. 69). By framing heritage in the discourse of danger, loss, and constant threat the need for intervention, management, and its subsequent ability to control and change the past is justified and approved without interrogating why it should be protected.

The source of heritage messages, values and interpretation is usually elites, intellectuals and those in power (McManamon, 2000, p. 6). The past is not objective, truthful nor legitimate, rather it is the collective agreement that the heritage presented is believed to have occurred (Howard, 2003, p. 205). The previous two sections have shown that the past is interpreted from a multitude of perspectives based on the reactions of many individuals to a singular event or stimulus; and the incorporation of these perspectives into the AHD fragment and disrupt the purported singularity of history, and create alternate histories and interpretations which change the value and meaning of heritage. The
conception of the past as neither truthful nor objective was reiterated during the research in Dubrovnik.

David Lowenthal suggests that the increasing global attention to heritage has created a “crusade like obsession with tradition and cultural rights” (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 5), and created a new and complex process of negotiating history that is open to influence and manipulation both for “good and evil” (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 6). Heritage as a source for “good” allows communities to reconnect to the past in the face of present turmoil, offering them an avenue to locate themselves in the narrative of history and legitimise their identities (both in conflict and peacetime), but heritage can also act as a source of “evil” when the narrative that is presented is not seen as inclusive or reflective of those who claim ownership (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 10). In peaceful contexts when the contested heritage it is not always accepted, the outcome is seldom violent. However, in a fragile post-conflict context the contest over heritage narrative, and the perception that it is not reflective of those involved can spill into violence and heritage rejection (Benton, 2010a, p. 129; Clegg, 1993, p. 22). Social pressures and conventions allow individuals, groups, communities and governments to create narratives which are based on events but reworked into acceptable, holistic narratives.

3.3 Heritage, recovery from conflict, and identity

Identities are both shaped by and shape heritage. Heritage is the embodiment or the expression of a communal or individual identity that has been constructed based on an interpretation of their historic identities in the present (Graham and Howard, 2008a, pp. 2–3; Harvey, 2001, p. 319; Uzzell, 1989, p. 32). If this idea is applied to a post-conflict setting then two linked events can be seen to occur; firstly, in the midst of social upheaval, the legitimacy of pre-war identities is challenged (Graham and Howard, 2008a, p. 15); and secondly, the interpretation of history upon which heritage identities are based begins to be problematized as new events occurring during the conflict are incorporated into it (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 90; Sen, 2006, pp. 84–85). Identities undergo crisis in response to social upheaval in the aftermath of war, where the perceived legitimacy of pre-war identities is threatened by a number of factors (changing history, involvement in conflict, changing social power dynamics, loss of the familiar past and ontological security) (Grenville, 2007, p. 449). As the relationship between heritage and identities is interdependent, when identities are in a state of flux, so too is their existing definition of heritage.

Social identities that are connected to a particular heritage site may be may be numerous, diverse and conflicting (Jones, 2005, p. 110). The upheavals resulting from conflict can fracture communities, altering their shared identities. However, if heritage can not only support but actually create identities (Harvey, 2001, pp. 320–321) heritage is an invaluable resource in a post-conflict situation to reconstitute fractured and fragmented identities (Harvey, 2001, pp. 320–321), or it can be used as a vehicle for hardened divisions, violence and hatred (Sen, 2006, p. 82). To use heritage as a tool for reconciliation we need to be aware of the theoretical relationships between heritage and identity and also recognise that heritage can reinforce identity in both positive and negative ways (Sen, 2006, p. 83).
Using heritage to promote social cohesion and community identity is a highly politicised process. Sen states that “the connection between cultural bigotry and political tyranny can be very close” (Sen, 2006, p. 105). He points out the asymmetric relationship between rulers and the ruled, which heightens a sense of contrast between different identities (Sen, 2006, p. 105). The gap between cultural understanding and political decision making must be bridged with great sensitivity for the successful use of heritage in post-conflict recovery. Any perceived misunderstanding and manipulation of heritage by socio-political intervention will affect the ways in which discourses of heritage are received.

3.4 Processes of Remembering and Forgetting Conflict

The argument has been made by many that cultural heritage is a social process rather than a cultural product. As with memories, facets of social history are chosen to memorialise in heritage sites (Smith, 2006, p. 57). The collective memory attempts to establish an acceptable version of an event that simplifies history into an inclusive metanarrative (Misztal, 2003, p. 2). This process works on the assumption that events are remembered in similar ways by many different individuals, but this is rarely the case and so there must be other pressures influencing the creation of collective memory and historical discourse (Benton and Cecil, 2010). This section examines how processes of social remembering influence the creation of heritage, particularly through the use of collective memory, the practices of commemoration and the ways in which forgetting occurs within society.

One strand of heritage studies prioritises the link between remembering and commemorating the past. Heritage acts as an anchor to which memories can be attached, giving both collective and individual memories legitimacy and a sense of place both geographically and historically through imagined traditions of remembrance (Misztal, 2003, p. 60). The collective commemoration that often occurs after times of unrest or great change (particularly conflicts) can be viewed as a way to incorporate social events into a public consciousness or into a collective memory (Misztal, 2003, p. 61). Under a collective memory, individuals who experience a singular event differently will collectively remember it in the same general way, thus creating a definitive history and remembrance of an event (Connerton, 1989, pp. 18–19; Misztal, 2003, pp. 62–64). Collective memory therefore functions to manifest a shared past that relies on reinforcement through festivals, ceremonies and commemoration ceremonies to survive in a present that is constantly rewriting the past (Schudson, 1995, p. 348; Misztal, 2003, p. 17). Schudson argues that claiming that collective memory can distort personal memories implies that there is a correct and incorrect way of remembering an event, and a fixed narrative that can be twisted to fit in the collective memory of a society (Schudson, 1995, p. 346). Since there is no definitive metanarrative of history there can be no true memories, and particularly not a true collective memory (Schudson, 1995, p. 356). Thus, memory should be viewed as fluid interpretational remembrances of a past event that are liable to change through personal as well as collective recall (Schudson, 1995, pp. 355–356).

Paul Connerton (1989, p. 72) agrees with this position to argue that the stimulus that causes memory making is not the only factor that causes memories. The individual’s reaction to the stimulus is as
much part of the memory making process as the event itself (Connerton, 1989, p. 73). Emotional and psychological responses to an event can alter the way an individual remembers it, and in doing so they diversify and influence the collective memory of the event in question significantly altering the way an event is portrayed in history (Connerton, 1989, p. 15). Collective memory can be used as a political tool to prioritise certain narratives that support a particular agenda (Misztal, 2003, p. 11). Although, as Schudson suggests, memories can neither be correct or incorrect (1995, p. 354), the prioritisation and legitimisation of certain memories over others can control belief that memories can be true or false (Clegg, 1993, pp. 20–21). However, some memories are perceived to be more acceptable than others (Warnock, 1989, pp. 70–73) and from this it can be argued that collective memories are based on interpretation and subjective reactions to the event and the legitimisation of these events through authorised discourse and their attractiveness to the power structures in place at the time.

It can be argued that the most important (or at least the most visual) function of cultural heritage in the aftermath of conflict is its role in memory, particularly in commemoration (Ashplant, 2000, p. 363). Paul Connerton’s exploration of collective memory and commemoration suggest that memories are created not only by the event that gives rise to them, but also by the ways in which a society remembers or commemorates an event (Connerton, 1989, p. 26). When societies remember ancient or long-past events, all that is being remembered is the communal re-imagining of the events. In the case of more recent events, individual memories are turned into communal memories in order to create a context of the past event, and to situate oneself in the tapestry of history (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 5–6). The past may be an infinite resource; memories however, are likely to fade and be forgotten. The concept of generational memory is pertinent to the use of memory in conflict (Connerton, 2008, pp. 59–60). Schuman and Scott argue that individual memories of an event have a shelf life of three generations; that is the individual, the generation below (children) and the generation below that (grandchildren) (Schuman and Scott, 1989, p. 364). Schuman and Scott say that not only is the life of a memory generational but it has close ties to family history, and when family and generational ties are broken (by displacement, death or rifts) there is little likelihood of a particular memory being brought to the collective remembrance of an event (Schuman and Scott, 1989, p. 359). This is extremely poignant after the atrocities of war and the effect war has on family and generational ties.

Remembering conflict has two functions; first, to commemorate the conflict itself (Ashplant, 2000, p. 363) and secondly to confront a difficult past (Baddeley, 1989, p. 42). The Truth and Reconciliation commissions in ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda are advocates of this second use of memory and they have attempted to use memories of past atrocities to confront and come to terms with war crimes enacted at different levels of society (from prosecuting those responsible for organising and orchestrating atrocities, to confronting individuals who were party to war crimes). Analysing the success of the Truth and Reconciliation commission is not within the scope of this research, but the investigation of atrocities by using memories has parallels with the aims of this
project, as both seek to emphasise the importance of using the interpretation of past events as a crucial aspect of recovery from conflict (Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, 2003b).

A significant aspect that affects how heritage is formed after conflict is the way it was used in conflict. Connerton argues that there are various ways a dissonant event is forcibly forgotten to ensure that a culture can come to terms and survive an attack on their identities (Connerton, 2008, p. 60-61), and in doing so attempts to distance a present incarnation of culture from a difficult past as victim or victimizer (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95). Lemkin’s theories on genocide argue that the attack on heritage is an attack on culture itself, and an attempt to erase said culture from existence both by destroying culture and people, an also ensuring that survivors cannot reconnect to a destroyed cultural past (Lemkin, 1947, p.48-56). The destruction of heritage here serves to disconnect people from place in order obliterate their connection to a shared identity and replace it with another, and in doing so erase the cultural group from collective memory so that it is not possible for the past to be reclaimed (Fournet, 2016, p.44). It has been argued in this chapter that heritage can survive physical destruction as heritage is capable of living within the memory of its people and physical heritage can be reinstated and restored (albeit in altered form) after their destruction if memories survive (Macdonald, 2009, p. 2); however, where all evidence of heritage is erased by the destruction of those connected to it, the memory of heritage is also destroyed. Bevan argues that the targeted use of heritage in conflict is an active way not only to destroy heritage for future generations, but also to erase past heritage to deny it ever had legitimacy or a right to exist (Bevan, 2016, p. 7).

Andras Riedlmayer accelerated the debate into whether attacks to cultural heritage should be considered as acts of genocide a step further by correlating cultural violence with ethnic cleansing by conducting research into the systematic destruction of Mosques in Bosnia in the 1990s, and presenting this at the ICTY proceedings (Riedlmayer, 2007). Riedlmayer testified before the ICTY that when the destroyed Mosques were plotted on a map, they matched Serb controlled areas which had also been recorded as host to ethnic cleansing (Bevan, 2016, p.45); this gave a tangible and evidentiary correlation between acts of cultural destruction and acts of genocide. Riedlmayer notes that the conflicts in the Balkans were not only characterised by ethnic cleansing and horrific loss of life, but also by a systematic attack on the cultural heritage of all involved (Riedlmayer, 1995, p. 8). The destruction of libraries, museums, and religious sites acted not only to destroy the cultural property, but also the cultural memories they stored. The destruction of written records of culture alongside the erasure of collective memory through the massacre of civilians served to erase these cultures from memory, and reduce what remains to physical structures whose meaning becomes synonymous with destruction of culture rather than remembering what made this cultural heritage significant. Riedlmayer argued that despite the lack of cultural genocide appearing as an aspect of international law, there is growing acceptance that there is a clear link between the destruction of cultural heritage sites, the resulting erasure of knowledge and memory, and its impact on facilitating genocide (Riedlmayer, 2007, p. 128).

Material heritage in this approach plays a dual purpose in the creation of cultural memories; it at once seems fixed and permanent but is capable of having its meaning evolved and changed in order to suit
the needs of its contemporary ownership. In doing so, heritage is expressed through architecture both to create contemporary cultural distinctness form others but to do so based on a legitimate legacy from the past. The result is that heritage and architecture can deepen insular cultural bonds within a group, and ostracise itself of other from inclusion into said culture. By creating difference and distinctiveness, a culture can give rise to an imagined supremacy which provokes a reaction from those who reject or clash with this constructed past and can result in the destruction of the material site which expresses it (Riedlmayer, 2007).

Material heritage or architecture relies on its apparent permanence to connect people to a legitimate past to justify future actions; in appearing to be a fixed entity that controlled history, built heritage is capable of producing cultural norms and traditions that are defended as if they have always existed (Bevan, 2016, p. 12). This masks the impermanence of heritage and the ever changing narratives and memories that shape it; the meaning of a site will evolve and change in response to its contemporary use, but appearing to be a fixed entity allows it to be seen as somehow above and beyond contemporary politics and protected as such in conflict legislation (Bevan, 2016, p.23). Bevan argues that the apparent permanence of architecture is what renders it so malleable to interpretation after conflict, and why damage to architecture is such a manipulative tool in conflict as it can recreate not only the significance of the site but also increase the significance of the attack (Bevan, 2016, p 35). In effect, the attempted destruction of heritage serves to increase its significance in the perceptions of its owners and increase their historic connection to the site by prompting a culture to examine their connection to the site through their collective memory; where a culture is reminded of the value of its heritage through attacks to the physical manifestations of culture, the outrage and reaction to the attack increases proportionally (Bevan, 2016, p. 16). The Buddhas of Bamiyan are an example of this effect, where the outrage generated by the destruction of the Buddhas resulted in their designation as a world heritage sites, whereas their less-well publicised existence prior to destruction did not.

Herscher and Riedlmayer note that the conflicts in the 1990s were a turning point in the use of cultural heritage in conflict and in the political retributions and criminal proceedings following conflict. The use of evidence relating to the illegal treatment of cultural property in the Balkans conflict became a feature of the ICTY trials, and set a precedence for their use in further proceeding (Herscher and Riedlmayer, 2000, p. 108). Herscher and Riedlmayer noted that it was an expected result that with the rise in using of cultural property as evidence for war crimes there was also a rise in its recruitment to support political ambitions following conflict (Herscher and Riedlmayer, 2000, p. 108). Using Kosovo as a case study, Herscher and Riedlmayer investigated how heritage was used to political advantage after the violence has ceased in 1999. To give the discussion into political use of heritage in Kosovo context, this case study is outlined briefly below.

During the conflict in Kosovo in 1998-1999, Mosques were purposefully targeted by Serb forces and resulted in a huge number of these buildings being damaged or destroyed. After the conflict, the majority of Serbian cultural sites within Kosovo were left abandoned, and became targets of retribution after the conflict by returning Albanians. On the basis of these attacks, the Serbian government tried (unsuccessfully) to petition the UN into allowing Serbian troops and police forces
to re-enter Kosovo in an attempt to protect their cultural heritage. Although the petition was denied, the Serbian government continued to press the UN on destruction to Serbian heritage in Kosovo, with no reference to the sustained attack on Kosovan heritage that preceded the retaliation. Herscher and Riedlmayer note that the conclusion of this argument over which party is the victim and victimizer of heritage vandalism has resulted in the events being removed from public discourse, as each party tried to distance themselves from accusations or were unable to produce reliable evidence. In turn, this has resulted in cultural heritage becoming a lesser known aspect of the Kosovo conflict and allowed humanitarian intervention to focus on basic needs rather than incorporating cultural needs into their approaches. This was not reflective of similar interventions made in Bosnia, Serbia, or Croatia where cultural diversity and division were considered as fundamental aspects of the recovery process and discussed at length when determining the causes of the conflict (Herscher and Riedlmayer 2000, p. 110-114).

Herscher and Riedlmayer argue that the lack of reference to culture and heritage in international interventions render the Kosovans as victims, and blocks of any avenue to escape this new cultural categorisation (Herscher and Riedlmayer, 2000, p. 113). From this it is possible to argue that the destruction of Kosovan heritage resulted not only in the loss of the tangible heritage sites, but also the cultural ties to their past and memories, and in doing so facilitated the enforcement of a new culture on the Kosovans which denied them access to their pasts. This concept of enforcing a new culture onto a group has links to the erasure of identities as an aspect needed to facilitate genocide.

The escalating tensions around built heritage, both in constructing and destroying cultural meaning and sites, is particularly relevant to the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s, and the widespread purposeful attacks on cultural heritage that framed the conflict. For Bevan, the use of heritage as a tool in conflict cannot be separated from other genocidal acts made in these conflicts wherein the ethnic violence and retribution between Croat and Serbian hostilities in the 1990s resulted in thousands of deaths, motivated and supported by constructed cultural difference (Bevan, 2016, p. 35). The distinction made between violence and cultural violence in legislation is particularly blurred and absent when considering sites such as Mostar, Vukovar and Dubrovnik. These sites were host to purposeful attacks against culturally significant sites which were made before and alongside mass murder and atrocity in order to dehumanize the cultural groups ascribing to the sites, and to provoke violence in response as justification for continued barbarity (Bevan, 2016, p. 6). The reconstruction of these sites after the wars reflect the new history of violence associated with them.

Similarly to Lemkin (1947, p.48-56), Bevan argues that the attacks on places of cultural significance through the vandalism of the physical sites and the erasure of their cultural meaning through the brutalisation of cultures at these sites renders these attacks as a singular attack on culture, and suggests that diving cultural heritage from the definition of genocide disregards the impact cultural destruction has on laying the foundation for violence and mass murder (Bevan, 2016, p. 8).

For Bevan, a physical cultural site is not only a marker of significance but places where cultural difference can be targeted most effectively and destroyed, in this argument the belligerent must first
create or accept the meaning and significance of heritage before purposefully destroying it (Bevan, 2016, p. 10). This argument is similar to the arguments made by Amayta Sen who suggests that in order to justify and continue violence in conflict, the cultures in contest must be constructed to be incompatible, and can only continue to do so by reinforcing difference through the rejection and othering of opposing cultures, and cementing this imagined incompatibility through violence (Sen, 2006, p. 82) This construction of cultural difference is created both through the acceptance (demonstrated by rejection) of traditional cultural signs and symbols such as historically important monuments and religious iconography, but also can occur through the acceptance and retaliation of designation of significance through legislative attempts to protect it such as the 1954 Hague Convention or the 1972 World Heritage Convention. As this research has argued, Bevan suggests that the protection of heritage in conflict is limited in its ability as it does not fully connect attacks on cultural property to attacks on culture itself (Bevan, 2016 p. 202). Overall, this thesis and the IHAF approach build out from Bevan’s position regarding the inextricable links between cultural property and culture, and seek to develop a means of holistically exploring the links between cultural heritage and post-conflict recovery.

3.5 **Summary: Towards a holistic conceptualisation of cultural heritage**

The objective of this chapter was to explore definitions of cultural heritage across existing literature, and to introduce the understanding that will inform the IHAF. Drawing on insights from across this literature, it is suggested that a holistic conceptualisation must be adopted to allow for the focuses and concerns introduced through existing literature to be bridged between. Specifically, it is suggested that heritage must be considered to be a varied and complex social process, rather than a fixed definition culminating in a physical site. This argument has been carried out by assessing the various ways in which heritage has been regulated in formal conventions and charters, and by investigating some of the key conceptual attributes that define heritage (namely interpretation, discourses of power, identity politics, and processes of remembering and forgetting).

Heritage is a complex process of interpreting history, and using that interpretation to create a powerful narrative of what has occurred and how it should be perceived by its audience. Smith (2006) has argued that heritage is a process, and this chapter has built on this to suggest that the interpretative narrative of heritage influences the cultural identity of an area by encouraging a society to adhere and accept the narrative expressed in physical cultural heritage sites as well as the intangible narratives and traditions around them.

Heritage influences the way the past is perceived in the present, but it also helps to orchestrate what is remembered and how it is remembered for future generations. The applications for this argument in theatres of conflict and in the post-conflict recovery are profound; subsequent chapters will argue that the way conflicts are interpreted, manipulated, and represented by heritage alter not only how the events of a conflict are remembered, but how contemporary society use them to justify their own cultural bias and perceptions.
The formal conventions, agreements, and charters which govern the conservation of heritage show how the definition of heritage has evolved over time shifting from a focus on the material fabric of sites in the Venice charter to the appreciation of intangible practice expressed through physical structures in the Nara Charter. This shift in focus reveals that although the physical heritage site can be considered as a constituent part of heritage, but it cannot be considered to be the definitive aspect of heritage. Instead, heritage is a process of interpretation and narrative creation wherein a site or event is interpreted and turned into a narrative discourse which is dependent on the whims and pressures of the contemporary geo-political climate. The definition of heritage as a process of creating and supporting contemporary cultures is at the core of this thesis, and the arguments of subsequent chapters use this as a foundation for the investigation into the role of heritage in post-conflict recovery. The narratives behind heritage decide what is valuable, who is valuable, what is memorable, how it should be remembered, what should be excluded, and how identities connect to it. This defines heritage as an active process which connects people to places and the past through the interpretation and creation of heritage discourses, which are symbolised and strengthened by physical heritage sites.
Chapter Four: The role of heritage in Conflict

Previous chapters have highlighted importance of interrogating meaning of cultural heritage and practices of cultural heritage protection. Here, attention turns to understanding of the nature and drivers of ‘conflict’, and how heritage influences and interacts with conflict. The previous chapters have argued that the conceptualisation of heritage is not a fixed entity, but a fluid flexible process of creating and supporting identity. Despite the influence heritage has over the cultural identities, heritage in conflict is often regarded as a victim of conflict, and its meaning limited to its material fabric and the damage done to it. This chapter argues that heritage has a huge influence on the causes and consequences of war, and its careful manipulation has the power and the means to alter the course of a conflict to ignite violence or to bolster peace and stability. The use of heritage in any community alters it; the history and identity represented by heritage are changed in response to the needs and wants of its contemporary owner. In conflict, these needs and wants are highly pressured, and the process of creating meaning and narrative are exacerbated, changing the meaning of heritage to support of vilify actions in a conflict. This chapter argues that not only does heritage have the power to alter a conflict, it has the power to create a legacy narrative of conflict which can be used to justify simmering tensions and recriminations after the war. Regarding heritage as the sum of its physical parts in conflict risks lessening the impacts the less tangible aspects of heritage have on the post-conflict landscape. Using the holistic definition of heritage offered by the previous chapters as a foundation, it is argued that that the creation of an authorised historical narrative of conflict has the power to legitimise (and delegitimise) the experiences of all those involved in the conflict, and use these experiences and identities to create a divisive history of cultural difference between combative foes in order to justify past, present, and future violence.

Built heritage and intangible heritage are profoundly affected by conflict; built heritage sustains visible damage that requires attention and conservation for the structure to survive, and the intangible associations between people and places are irrevocably changed to incorporate (or reject) war narratives into the ongoing lifecycle of a heritage site (Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, 2000, p. 4). Although the site often survives the conflict, its meaning and protection in a post-conflict environment remains under threat by a new and altered reality (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95). Intangible heritage without an anchor in the form of a built heritage site can itself decay through processes of forgetting and cultural alienation (Connerton, 2008, pp. 59–60).

Conceptualising heritage as a process of dynamic meaning-making allows it to be perceived as a potential cause of conflict and a tool in recovery programmes (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). Re-imaging heritage as a process, rather than as an object, is at the heart of this research. Heritage serves not only as a record of cultural significance over time and space, but as a record of conflict, imperialism, colonisation and occupation (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 96). Until the rise of postmodern thought, that accepted plural interpretations of history, historical narratives focused on singular and significant upheavals rather than multitudinous small-scale changes (Ashworth, Graham, and Tunbridge, 2007, p. 99). They consisted of accounts of regime change, battles won and lost, artefacts taken as the spoils of war and the colonisation of weaker groups by
stronger nations (Sen, 2006, p. 88). Recently, narratives of war have taken up plural and multi-vocal accounts, undermining the authority of historical meta-narratives (Smith, 2006, pp. 41–42). Triumphalist narratives of war have become undermined by contrary accounts depicting horrific memories and acts (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 35). Simultaneously, narratives of survival and hope in the face of conflict have emerged; diversifying experiences and memories of war (Connerton, 1989, p. 113). In this context, built heritage in the aftermath of a conflict has become imbued with a multitude of meanings and interpretations that may modify or even undermine from the original concept of the site as heritage.

4.1 Understanding Conflict

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines armed conflict as a “contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Uppsala Conflict Development Program, 2012). The Uppsala definition does not help with our understanding of how and why conflicts occur. To improve our grasp of this topic, this section looks at the different conceptualisations of conflict from a cultural perspective.

4.1.1 Cultural Heritage and Violence

Heritage is as an important issue in conflict, but understanding its function remains a subject of much debate. Amartya Sen encapsulates this argument by noting that “the world has come to the conclusion – more defiantly than should have been needed – that culture matters. The world is obviously right-culture does matter, however, the real question is: How does culture matter?” (Sen, 2006, p. 103). Sen goes on to argue that a reductionist view that seeks to understand culture in simplified and polarised terms limits our ability to respond to culture (Sen, 2006, p. 103). Sen argues that by constructing these polarisations we are merely reinforcing structures of opposition and encouraging the polarisation to harden and divide society. Sen sees the hardening division between Western and non-Western cultural attributes as metaphor for the evolution of the hardening of cultural identities leading to violence (Sen, 2006, p. 50). The cultural identities of the West and their impact on non-Western cultures has been explored in Chapter Three, but its acquired its fully negative character when these constructed difference between cultures becomes a defining feature of both (Sen, 2006, pp. 51–52). This definition-by-difference is a fundamental cause of tension and friction; when parties become so reliant on fabricated differences of identity that now define them that they cannot avoid the violence that follows (Said, 1979, p. 12; Sen, 2006, p. 86). The authorised political discourse that enshrines cultural difference encourages the violent protection of culture from outside threats.

Sen cautions that partitioning cultures through the definition-by-difference of cultural identities is destined to fail as it cannot explain or understand either heterogeneity within a culture or similarities between cultures (Sen, 2006, p. 58). The reliance on imagined difference is destabilised by the real similarities – such as similar perceptions and use of science, trade, commerce, and technology (Sen, 2006, pp. 58–59). Thus, cultures that have come to be defined by their difference are constantly under pressure to assert that very difference in order to survive in the face of naturally evolving cultural
similarities. Philip Hammack argues that bolstering and reinforcing cultural identities in tumultuous contexts is a reaction against threats to an individual culture through increased reliance on familiar traditions and the ontological security they provide (Hammack, 2008, p. 225). For Hammock, cultural identities and the way they are perceived and managed in contexts of conflict have a direct influence on local security and local tensions; as the world becomes ever more connected more cultures interact with each other and the ways in which the past is interpreted changes the meaning and connections between people and place (Hammack, 2008, p. 226). The result of this can either be multiculturalism and cultural diversity or cultural division, increased nationalism, culturally defined ‘others’, and the resurfacing of armed conflict (Agnew and Muscarà, 2012, pp. 178–179; Hammack, 2008, p. 226; Said, 1994, p. 12; Sen, 2006, p. 58).

4.1.2 Causes of Conflict: Cultural Identity and Resources

Mary Kaldor’s theory on “new” wars argue that there are distinct changes between how and why wars were fought in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and the new wars of the late-twentieth and twenty-first century (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). She notes that the logic behind the new wars is distinct from old wars in its goals, actors, methods and finance. Old wars were characterised by regimented army units aiming to gain geo-political or ideological advantage, whereas new wars are fought by a combination of both state and non-state combatants and aim to further control or the rights of a particular cultural group in a state (Kaldor, 2013, pp. 1–2). In the face of increased globalisation since the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, wars are now fought with the aim of creating, protecting, and mobilising cultural identities rather than to further a geo-political agenda (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). The wars in the Balkans can be considered to be new war in that many different cultural identities clashed in both state and non-state authorised violence in order to promote their own culture and identity as the sole owner of Slav culture.

In this reading, the Yugoslav conflict focused on creating and maintaining individual national identities by the violent suppression of others (Kaldor, 2006, p. 35). In doing so, Balkan countries created a cultural hatred between themselves based on the imagined animosity in the past. These new wars are thus fought by emerging nationalist identities that are constructed by violent conflicts and in turn perpetuate them (Kaldor, 2004, p. 167). This constructed identity is based on a preconceived idea of the past that is used and manipulated to suit needs and ideologies in the present (Anderson, 2006, p. 16). Thus, violent conflict and the cultural identity that emerges from it is created both by state controlled geo-political aspirations, and the ideologies of disillusioned and disenfranchised communities (Kaldor, 2004, p. 168).

The new war thesis has been criticised. It is argued that as the characteristics of the new wars are also present in the old wars they cannot be new (Berdal, 2003, p. 477) and there is no way to measure the difference and distinction between these two types (Henderson and Singer, 2002, p. 167). Kaldor counters this challenge by suggesting that although some characteristics of violence and culture were present in old wars, they were not used in the same way or to the same degree (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2); that the use of the word new does not create an exclusive division between old and new, but
differentiates between the two (Kaldor, 2013, p. 1). Whereas the success of old wars is measured in geo-political gains, new wars are measured by the damage caused by and to cultural groups, the economic and political benefits of war, and the cementing of cultural identities (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3).

New war theory goes against a grand historical narrative of cultural violence in the Balkans presented by Misha Glenny and others, which suggest that animosity between cultural groups has been slowly constructed over centuries of warfare governed by European powers (Glenny, 2000, p. 27). The use of culture and identity in the creation and continuation of violence is shown here to be an important aspect of conflict as well as a key motivator in the control and subjugation of an area. Kaldor and Sen argue that culture is a driving force of violent conflict through its connection to ideology and identity, and the power these attributes have (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2; Sen, 2006, p. 86).

Economic motivations are a leading cause of conflict. With the rise of neo-liberalism and the power of the free market, economic control was perceived to lie less with political or governmental forces, and more in the hands of the commerce (Collier, 2000, p. 92). In a so-called developing state, different groups compete for access to finance as development is not a unilaterally equal process (Collier, 2000, pp. 98–99). Some parts of society are able to develop more quickly than others; and in this context of economic inequality the developing state is unable to redress the imbalance (Collier, 2000, p. 92). Jacoby notes that when some social groups believe they are worse off than the rest of their society, smouldering social and religious tensions can boil over into conflict (Jacoby, 2008, pp. 78–79). If heritage is conceptualised as an economic resource than it functions as a symbol of cultural disparity wherein ownership of this prized resource denotes the owner’s economic and cultural superiority. It also gives their rivals an incentive to take it away or destroy it so as to negatively affect their financial and cultural stability. In the case of built heritage, this can occur through looting and iconoclasm (Jacoby, 2008, p. 34 as well as by the repression of cultural links to heritage (such as the subjugation of minority religions and making traditional practices illegal) (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3).

4.2 Conflict and Cultural Heritage

As a symbol of national or regional difference heritage can act simultaneously to celebrate society or as to inflame aggression (Jacoby, 2008, p. 79). The primary way that heritage causes conflict is by the close links between heritage and identity (Harvey, 2001, p. 319). If heritage is perceived to be an expression or embodiment of the identity of a community or society, then an attack on their heritage is an attack on their identity (Sen, 2006, p. 86). In times of conflict, where tensions are already heightened, heritage can thus become both a target and rallying point for conflict (Panjabi and Winter, 2009, p. 20), as well as a way to distort and manipulate the past to justify actions in the present (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95), and a means to control the remembrance of the conflict in the future (Connerton, 2008, p. 59).
4.2.1 Contested Narratives and Control
Heritage is often considered as a positive aspect of society: as a common good that benefits all levels of society. However, as heritage can both bind and divide groups (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 7). The clash over interpretations, cultural identities and ownership claims can inspire competition and conflict. When there is contestation over heritage, there are also tensions and the potential for violent conflict (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 21). Silverman and Ruggles note that heritage is neither neutral nor inherently positive. Instead it “can promote self-knowledge, facilitate communication and learning, and guide the stewardship of the present culture and its historic past” (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). It can also be a tool for oppression and it has a difficult and negative relationship with the promotion of universal human rights (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). However, if one considers heritage to be a process (rather than a concept, as Silverman and Ruggles suggest) then the manipulation, use and management of heritage becomes the cause of contention and conflict. Conflict is therefore a contest over the interpretation of heritage rather than over the heritage itself.

Through contestation a single heritage site in times of peace may display multiple histories and identities (Hall, 1999, p. 4). In times of conflict, this multiple significance reveals the fractures in society and such heritage can become a place of contention where several different ideologies clash over its meaning, ownership and history (Smith, 2006, pp. 47–48). Opposing forces may try to gain control of heritage and by doing so gain control over the narrative of history. This could help explain why WHSs are often targeted in war. They mark and reinforce identity as symbols of Western dominance over international heritage (Said, 1994, p. 32; Smith, 2006, p. 26), as symbols of tension between cultures (Sen, 2006, p. 103), as war trophies (Lowenthal, 1998, p. xiv; Rothfield, 2009), as political statements (ICTY, 2003), and as jealously coveted economic markers of superiority (Collier, 2000, p. 25). While the relationship between culture and cultural heritage to the dynamic of conflicts has not yet been fully researched, the literature does assume that culture matters, but does not show why or how (Sen, 2006, p. 103). This question is, however, raised in this literature review which argues that heritage, as a marker of cultural identity, can become imbued with significant but contested meanings (cultural or economic) which are both created by conflict and also create conflict. The next section explores how heritage is conceptualised in the post-conflict arena, and examines the influence of the tensions described here on the creation and negotiation of heritage after conflict.

4.3 Manipulating Culture: The Destruction of Palmyra, Syria
In 2014 heritage took centre stage when it became the target of violence in Daesh’s (ISIL, IS or ISIS) ongoing terror campaign across Syria and Iraq (BBC, 2015). Daesh’s modus operandi originates from their cultural claims as an ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim faction waging war against the West and on Western values and religion (Chulov, 2015). Their interpretation of Islam has allowed them to perpetrate acts of extreme and grotesque violence. Culture and cultural manipulation is a core principle that has allowed Daesh to progress to its contemporary position of power, and to continue to gain dominance in Syria and Iraq (Chulov, 2015). At the core of Daesh’s manipulations is their
creation of culture by division (which has been discussed in this chapter with reference to Sen [2006] and Said [1979]). Daesh is able to function so long as it can create an ‘other’, a lesser entity to push against. For Daesh, this entity is anyone and anything that is not itself; the uncategorised ‘West’ is the primary target, but so is any religion, Muslim, and the Yazidi population, who have been particularly brutalised by Daesh (BBC, 2015). Daesh’s use of culture as a weapon is not uncommon; but what sets Daesh apart is its public celebration of the horrific consequences of their acts (Shaheen, Swann and Levett, 2015). Daesh does not so much claim its terrorist acts, as has been the case for the latter half of the twentieth century, as much as it actively celebrates them (Harrison-Graham, 2015). Cultural heritage (or rather, built heritage) took centre stage in Daesh’s cultural conquest when it began to target and destroy cultural sites whilst carefully filming and broadcasting the destruction in the media (Harrison-Graham, 2015). As Chapter One introduced, heritage sites in conflict areas take on an extra layer of meaning, becoming not just markers of cultural significance but also markers of internationalism and Western intervention (Tomlinson, 2002; Francioni, 2013), such as in the case of the Buddhas in the Bamiyan Valley. Daesh’s widespread destruction of cultural sites since 2013 is both an explicit attack on international cultures and an attempt to use culture to reinforce the ultra-violent identity they have created.

In September 2015 Daesh attached explosives to the ancient columns of the Roman town of Palmyra and destroyed it (Harrison-Graham, 2015). The event was filmed by the perpetrators and widely broadcast on both traditional and new media (Shaheen, Swann, Levett, 2015). The WHS had been under Daesh’s control since May, and there is anecdotal evidence that it may have been destroyed only after it had been thoroughly looted of any moveable property (Shaheen and Black, 2015). The Keeper of Antiquities Khaled al-Asaad was brutally murdered and his body displayed in the town before it was destroyed, and it is believed he was interrogated for months on the location of valuable artefacts (Shaheen, Swann, and Levett, 2015). In destroying Palmyra Daesh have shown the significance of heritage use in conflict. Firstly, it shows that cultural heritage can become a target in conflict. The city had survived for over two thousand years despite its location in an area embroiled in contemporary and historical conflict, but it was destroyed by a (relatively) new terrorist group. Secondly, it has shown that rhetoric of cultural division and difference can be used to justify the destruction of cultural property. In contrast to Dubrovnik, Bamiyan, Mostar, and countless other destroyed heritage sites, the destruction of Palmyra was not justified by arguments about cultural difference or religious icons; no such argument was required. Thirdly, it shows the lack of will of the international community to take action in such cases. Although the attack contravened international law and was anticipated for months no intervention strategy was put in place. And lastly, it shows that heritage is not only the stage for acts of violence, it is also their cause and target.

4.4 Heritage in conflict and post-conflict recovery

It is argued in this chapter that heritage is not a passive bystander in conflict, but is a process that actively contributes to the causes of conflict. Kaldor (2013, pp.1-2) argues that culture and identity can be considered to be the reason what conflicts erupt. She suggests that in ‘new’ wars (post-1990)
the aim of conflict is to dominate the culture of another by prioritising your own identity and forcefully eradicating the other. This chapter investigated how heritage interacted with Kaldor’s new war theory to suggest that heritage is fundamental in creating and transmitting cultural superiority which are symbolised at physical heritage sites (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). In this way heritage either becomes a rallying point or a target depending on which side of a conflict an actor is on. This chapter takes this argument a step further and suggests that heritage is also a way to justify violence, and in doing so escalate and continue conflict. Sen suggests that during war culture and identities violently attack one another; in doing so they alter themselves to become more violent to justify acts they have perpetrated, and to reciprocate similarly violent attacks made towards them (Sen, 2006, p. 103). Sen argues that this creates a spiral violence, wherein cultural identities become increasingly violent based on an imagined past of culture of inherent violence (Sen, 2006, pp. 58–59). This chapter argues that heritage is linked to this construction of violence as it becomes a way to demonstrate cultural superiority (or destruction), which in turn lends legitimacy to the brutal treatment of different cultures and ideology deemed inferior (Meskell, 2010, p. 193). In this way heritage acts as a narrative of cultural dominance that subjugates cultures based on the contemporary needs of a society at war.

Heritage cannot be considered as only a recipient of damage during conflict, instead it must be seen as an active process which shapes the cultural discourse of conflict. Furthermore, it is argued by this thesis that heritage is not a passive place where cultural and ethnic divisions can be seen through different inherited cultural symbols (Kaplan 2001, p. 7); heritage creates cultural difference through the narratives of division it is capable of creating. By the time cultural property is purposefully attacked or destroyed, it can be argued that the violent narratives of cultural dominance and ideological superiority have already become entrenched in the discourses of heritage. From the literature explored in this chapter it is argued that heritage has the potential to change the course of conflict, and is capable of inciting devastating violence and cultural division. It has become clear in this chapter that the influence of heritage on the causes and continuation of violent conflict cannot (or should not) be ignored; from this stance it is argued that understanding the impact of heritage in the post-conflict period is imperative to better understanding how societies recover from conflict.

The inclusion of heritage into our understanding of post-conflict recovery is fundamental to understanding how cultural identities have been affected by conflict, whether they will survive the recovery period and continue to have a legacy to build a future from, and how heritage can influence post-war recovery processes and socio-political relationships with other cultures. Whether heritage is embodied in new heritage sites and commemoration practices, or a pre-war identity and ways of life remerge, focus on cultural heritage will emerge in war-affected communities and understanding how heritage is and can be used by them is paramount in creating a way to better include and use heritage in post-conflict environments.

The remainder of this chapter explores how heritage is framed in conflict and post-conflict studies literatures. This specifically explores conceptualisations of the relationship between heritage and recovery, and how this relationship is altered by conflict and the impact this has for peace and
reconciliatory processes. The following argument describes the three roles heritage has in post-
conflict recovery; restoring established heritage after conflict, in particular the disconnect between
old and new ways of conceptualising heritage (Benton and Cecil, 2010, p. 8) in relation to old and
new wars (Kaldor, 2006, p. 12); the creation of new heritage after war as a reaction to war
(Macdonald, 2008, p. 49). This includes exploring how commemoration functions and its impact
(Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, 2000, pp. 4–5), the inclusion or rejection of dissonance from AHD
(Smith, 2006, p. 29) and the effect war has on the reinterpretation of the past (Howard, 2003, p. 17;
Meskell, 2010, p. 193); and the impact of heritage on several areas of recovery, specifically, tourism
as a signifier of economic recovery and stability (Cavlek, 2002, p. 478), processes of reconciliation
(Bloomfield, 2003, p. 12), the relationship between conflict, heritage and post-conflict nationalism,

4.4.1 Restoring cultural heritage after conflict
Conflict and heritage have a historical link; the commemoration of history into authorised narratives
present conflict as a normalised part of culture, as a defining experience for all types of cultural
groups. In historical discourse conflict is not an anomaly, it is an aspect of cultural normalcy.
Monumental events are used in authorised discourse to bind cultures together, and to create collective
memories of shared experiences and in doing so create an inclusive cultural group defined both
through share memories and through the differentiation and exclusion of other groups who have not
experienced these events. Conflicts act as a means to provide fixed
points in discourse, and to create
the illusion through heritage and commemoration that these are unalterable realities based in the past
which shape and legitimise present and future cultural identities.

Legislative attempts to preserve heritage in times of war take a different approach to the normalcy of
conflict and heritage. Attempts to protect heritage in conflict rely on constructing heritage as
something that has an intrinsic universal value which transcends contemporary political difference,
and subsequently will not be targeted during conflict (Kaldor, 2004, p. 68; Kastenberg, 1997, p. 281). This construction enables heritage to be seen as a resource of value during conflict which can be
stolen and owned by opposing factions, but does not anticipate the destruction of heritage unless it
is to openly destroy a specific culture and attack the universal value and understanding of culture
(Musitelli, 2005, p. 324; Sen, 2006, pp. 14–15, Merryman, 2006, p. 20). In this understanding, heritage functions as a constant connection to the past and historical valuation of culture, which is
supported by the active use of heritage sites in commemoration practices (Schudson, 1995, p. 348).
This understanding also allows for destroyed heritage to be reconstructed in the image of its previous incarnation because the heritage site exists both as a physical entity and a conceptual construct
created through memory, commemoration, and necessity. Mostar bridge in Bosnia serves as a
poignant example of reconstructed heritage where the need to recreate a symbol of reconciled
difference and multicultural tolerance required the heritage site to exist and offered an opportunity
to incorporate destruction into the life cycle of the destroyed bridge. The construction of meaning at
heritage sites can therefore be conceived not as a linear process of cultures beginning and ending
with the creation and destruction of the site, but of a cyclical process of reuse wherein heritage can
be changed, destroyed, and rebuilt to create an illusion of seamless permanence of history, and in doing so give legitimacy to the cultures who accept the meaning of heritage sites both on a local and international scale (Meskell, 2010, p. 199). The process of heritage renewal and continuation is supported through tradition and commemoration which requires a culture to actively embody its heritage by performing rituals and reaffirming their connection to the authorised historical narratives of history by commemorating conflicts (Bevan, 2016, p. 12).

**4.4.2 Strengthening post-conflict heritage thorough commemoration**

Commemoration is an intrinsic aspect of conflict and post-conflict recovery, in which perceptions of a shared experience of war are woven into a collective memory and commemorated as defining events (Spillman, 1997, p. 24). Processes of commemoration are tightly related to the creation of a highly political collective memory and idea of nationhood, or what it is to be part of a community that has a shared experience of war (Spillman, 1997, p. 132). Conflict (and post-conflict) are not discordant events that can be separated from an uninterrupted history of peace, they (and their commemoration) are history, or at least a defining feature of history. Nations are defined not only by their language or ethnicity but by their shared memories of a “political destiny”, of which war, violence and recovery is an essential part (Weber, 1978, pp. 922–3). As Anthony King points out, the experience of war becomes a unifying force around which communal identities and experiences crystallise which are continually supported by commemoration practices (King, 2010, p. 3). Commemoration is now a recognisable aspect of modern warfare, and our recognition of commemoration stems from the First World War, where there was a shift from remembering named fallen commanders to commemorating the mass of the soldiers who died (King, 2010, p. 5). The act of commemorating thousands of fallen soldiers helped to focus the experience of war, creating a singular shared experience that could be reified and remembered as history by the whole nation (Ashplant, 2000, pp. 17–18). Commemoration therefore plays a number of different roles; firstly, to remember a conflict or rather, people in conflict (Spillman, 1997, p. 30); secondly, to produce a shared experience and collective memory (Misztal, 2003), and thirdly, to accept, expect, and to become familiar with the brutal acts of war which will be present in all subsequent wars (Stanley, 2000, p. 240). In all three interpretations of commemoration, the process is highly political and open to manipulation depending on what is being remembered, forgotten or commemorated (Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, 2000, p. 32).

**4.4.2 Creating New Heritage after Conflict**

In relation to conflict, heritage falls into two categories: pre-war heritage and post-war heritage (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 112). Heritage created by conflict reflects the way that societies are forever changed by war. It is possible for the communities affected by conflict to use post-war heritage to become reconciled to the effects of the conflict; alternatively, such communities may instead delete, deny, or forget the war, or indeed may maintain points of conflict within post-war heritage (Connerton, 2008, pp. 65–70). The creation of heritage after conflict can be investigated by looking at how dissonant experiences are turned into heritage and also how conflicts are transmuted...
into a shared understanding of the past through commemoration processes (Ashplant, 2000, p. 270; Winter, 2008, p. 73). The next section investigates these effects by examining the processes of commemoration and the inclusion of dissonant and difficult experiences into AHD.

Dissonant Heritage and the of conflict is the reflection of the ways in which a society has been forever changed by warfare, as demonstrated in the popular familiarity with sites of atrocity (Macdonald, 2009, pp. 1–3).

Dissonant, or difficult heritage, is heritage that has been created by conflict or is existing heritage that has been severely altered by dissonant events and the values and meanings of heritage have changed (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 94–95). Dissonant heritage is also apparent in commemoration ceremonies that remember lives lost and the collective experience of war. The type of dissonant heritage that is created by conflict depends on the site and context that frames the dissonant event; either a site become dissonant or experiences become dissonant (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 99–100). For example, places where genocide or massacres occurred become dissonant sites, and tangible signifiers of atrocity that can be visited and commemorated (Macdonald, 2009, p. 2), whilst dissonant war experiences are carried by individuals and groups and can be turned into commemoration ceremonies to be remembered at sites that can be far from where they occurred, such as war memorials (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz, 1991, p. 376). A third type of dissonance can emerge through the forgotten or hidden narratives of minority groups as humiliated silence (Connerton, 2008, pp. 69–70), who are able to express their dissonant experiences many years after the conflict has ceased, or example narratives from women civilians under the control of Soviet-occupied East Berlin in 1945 (Anonymous, 2005).

Sharon Macdonald explores the notion of a dissonant heritage by looking at how difficult yet meaningful pasts are negotiated to be interpreted, reconciled, and accepted in the present (Macdonald, 2009, pp. 51–53). She notes that the messages we take from conflict are normally the narratives of the victors, such as triumph, success over a foe, and spoils of war (Macdonald, 2009). But what was once perceived as triumph can soon become a source of shame and regret; colonial pasts, empires, and war victories have become difficult memories for societies who once celebrated them. The Allied bombing of Dresden in Germany in the Second World War, for example, which was once seen as a triumph, is now increasingly controversial (Macdonald, 2009, p. 2).

Sites where atrocities have been performed in a conflict eventually turn into dissonant heritage sites, however, their survival as heritage sites suggests that interested parties want to visit them. This demand is known as dark tourism (Stone and Sharpley, 2008, p. 575). Stone says that people wish to visit such places to not only view the information on display but to look for hidden narratives or seek to understand and prove that obliterated narratives exist (Stone, 2009, p. 58). Biran, Poria, and Oren note that people chose to visit dark tourism places so as to accept responsibility for a shared international past, and to see the evidence to experience the existence of such places for themselves (Biran, Poria and Oren, 2011, p. 825). Dissonant heritage is thus only not rejected; it is actually sought after by various groups in society. Dissonant or dark heritage sites are simultaneously places
with a difficult heritage that are hard to accept into the narrative of history (Stone, 2009, pp. 71–72). It is more than a macabre interest that drives people to visit such sites; they wish to understand events that seem distant from their own moral beliefs and values (Stone, 2009, p. 72). By visiting a dissonant heritage site and acknowledging its difficult past one is able to distance oneself from the dissonant event by creating a barrier between the values of the past and your own values (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 96). This distancing can occur when individuals or groups believe they are completely different from those who perpetrated acts of atrocity, and that they are therefore incapable of recreating or understanding the motivations of the aggressors (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 96, Long and Reeves, 2009, p. 69).

4.4.3 The Impact of Heritage on Post-Conflict Recovery

The construction and deconstruction of heritage discourses in and after war has a direct and lasting impact on the ways societies continue function in the post-war landscape. The certainties and securities that heritage embodied prior to conflict are dismantled by conflict, and replaced with uncertainty and identity crises in the post-war period. Heritage is capable of changing the development of societies after conflict by influencing how the conflict is perceived (Tunbridge, 1996, p. 35; Macdonald 2009, p.5), how wounded and aggrieved a party can consider themselves (Sen, 2006, p. 17), and what can be gained from controlling the narratives of history and heritage (Smith, 2006, p.27; Meskell, 2005, p.139). This process of connecting a pre and post war cultural identity through heritage can move an area closer to reconciliation and the re-establishment of infrastructure or towards an exacerbation of tension and the solidification of oppositional ideologies. The IHAF approach and the frameworks that have shaped its creation posit there are three main factors which can help to assess conflict recovery; the physical recovery of an area, its economic recovery and the socio-political recovery of culture. Within these spheres of recovery, heritage influences and is influenced by these three major aspects of a post-war society. The economic reliance on heritage and how the use of heritage-as-a-resource influences the primacy placed on remembering or punishing the conflict. Whilst the use of heritage a tool in reconciliation is dependent on what conflict experiences and narratives are being prioritised through heritage. The role of heritage in creating tension dependent on creating cultural difference through nationalism before and during conflict helps to justify and continue a political stance and action, but the translation and de-escalation of nationalism in the post-war setting is problematised not only by the use of heritage-nationalism in conflict, but also by the reliance on heritage-nationalism to mend or recreate the connections between people and place. Nationalism provides an avenue to promote cultural difference during war to create violence, and is used in post-conflict to reassert national identities; which creates a barrier to long term recovery, stabilisation, security, and reconciliation.

The following sections look in detail at the influence heritage has over these three aspects of recovery to identify what opportunities and threats are presented by using heritage as a tool for recovery in war affected areas.
4.4.4 Economics of heritage and tourism in Post-Conflict recovery

For many communities across the world tourism is an economic cornerstone as well as a leading indicator of stability, security, and development (Cavlek, 2002, p. 478). Tourism is drastically affected and usually brought to an end by conflict, and it takes decades for visitors to recover confidence to return to war-affected regions (Sonmez and Graefe, 1998, p. 118). Of course, it is in the aftermath of war when economies suffer and resources become scarce that communities need tourist income the most (Corak, Mikacic and Ateljevic, 2013, p. 161; Keen, 2000, p. 20). Tourism is a key resource for all cultural heritage sites, and it is an indicator of the safety of cultural heritage (Cavlek, 2002, p. 478).

Beyond these utilitarian economic realities, tourism at heritage sites also acts to cement war narratives and post-conflict stories and experiences, and to give these discourses legitimacy though their consumption by tourists (Meskell, 2005, p. 124). The focus of this research is on what messages and discourses are being presented by heritage sites, what their political motivations are, and what is being left out or obliterated (Cheong and Miller, 2000, p. 371). This concept takes note of Schudson’s analysis of Erving Goffman’s notion of embarrassment, explaining how difficult memories are shaped and manipulated to mitigate embarrassment and shame (Schudson, 1984, p. 634) and Robin Wagner-Pacifici and Barry Schwartz examination of the way societies deal with a “less than glorious” past (1991, p. 376). Whether the dissonance of war is recorded in a site or removed is a choice dictated either by the need to manipulate memories and to create a seamlessly positive narration (to present to tourists), or to present a past that includes conflict, and therefore has to attribute blame and responsibility (Goulding and Domic, 2009, p. 85; McDowell, 2008, p. 407). The situation is further complicated when we consider the source of historical and heritage narratives: victors of conflict will be more lenient about their own history than with that of those who were defeated or who no longer have control over the discourses of warfare (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2000, p. 77).

Heritage sites can reduce and present actors as “good” and “bad” in a post-conflict period, and it is these evaluations which can endure indefinitely among the local, national and international populations (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95). Encouraging tourism in post-conflict areas has many politically charged ramifications; for example, merely by visiting heritage attractions the tourist can be aligned to supporting the site economically and accepting the narrative therein (Stone, 2009, pp. 56–58; Smith, 2006, p. 154). They are legitimising the heritage regardless of their own ethical and moral reaction to it; their mere presence (particularly in international tourists) bolsters the image created by post-conflict powers at post-conflict heritage sites and lends support to its definition as heritage (Sonmez and Graefe, 1998, pp. 118–120).

Dealing with crises such as conflict is an integral part of business activity, but no industry is so negatively affected by conflict as tourism (Leaf, 1995; Cavlek, 2002, p. 450). Peace, safety and security must be met for tourism to continue (Cavlek, 2002, p. 478). Barriers to tourism created by war are more severe than those of natural crises as there is a psychological barrier to be surmounted that discourages potential tourists from visiting war-affected regions (Cavlek, 2002, p. 479). A cycle
of need (or catch-22) is created whereby tourists will not return until an area is perceived to be safe, but the area will not be perceived to be safe until tourists return.

Heritage creates a sense of uninterrupted flowing history, and although the sense of history promoted may not be true or accurate, it engenders a degree of psychological security that tourists and tourism promoters are able to capitalise on (Sonmez and Graefe, 1998, pp. 112–113). The use of pre-war heritage in post-war tourism is focussed on returning the site back to its imagined ‘authentic’ pre-war state (Wang, 1999, p. 365); this is not the case for heritage created by war. War atrocity or destroyed heritage sites create a difficult relationship with the local owners of heritage and tourists from outside on account of the ethical implications of maintaining such sites for tourists (Goulding and Domic, 2009, pp. 85–90; Moscardo, 1996, pp. 376–80)

4.4.5 Reconciliation and heritage connections

Reconciliation is an over-arching process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and so on. At its simplest, it means finding a way to live alongside former enemies – not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately. Politics is a process to deal with the issues that have divided us in the past. Reconciliation is a parallel process that redesigns the relationship between us (Bloomfield, 2003: 12).

A post-conflict situation is one where violent conflict has ceased and a new organisational structure is trying to construct a “new society out of the ashes of the old” (Bloomfield, 2003, p. 12). Part of the success of the newly constructed society will rest on how relationships with previously antagonistic parties are managed and how difference and the past can be reconciled with the present (Batten, 2009, p. 85). Negotiating how the past interacts with the present to form a safe, peaceful and stable society constitutes the intersection between heritage and reconciliation, where heritage and history are used to reconcile a society to its recent war past, to its re-formed populace, their new realities and identities and to post-conflict relationships between the perpetrators and victims of a conflict (McDowell, 2009, p. 218). The negotiation of heritage also seeks to reconcile recent events with an AHD in which conflict is seen as a small part of a national history (Meskell, 2002, pp. 559–561). The process of reconciling people to a traumatic or difficult past mirrors the process where heritage is used to shape national narratives and identities; so it is unsurprising that the factors influencing the shape of heritage also have a bearing on the shape and acceptance of reconciliation (Long and Reeves, 2009, pp. 80–81; Assmann, 1995, pp. 130–132). Bloomfield argues that reconciliation is often both a goal and a process to deliver that goal, and that this dual purpose of reconciliation has led to the term becoming confused and difficult to interpret (Bloomfield, 2003, p. 11). Bloomfield recommends that reconciliation is considered a process; the aspiration to reconcile is something to aim for in the future, while reconciliation is firmly grounded in the present and is an active process rooted in the reality of a post-war environment (Bloomfield, 2003, p. 12).
It could be argued that reconciliation is the goal of a heritage process in a post-conflict context, but meaning and memory-making at heritage sites problematize this straightforward view (McDowell, 2009, pp. 215–216). Heritage is tightly bound to the commemoration of events both in monuments and at intangible and individual levels (Ashplant, 2000, p. 263). The commemoration of events in war, particularly in a recent war, is not wholly conducive to reconciling opposing parties in the often fragile ensuing peace. The questions that have to be asked are why is this event commemorated through cultural heritage, what effect does it have on local relationships and whether heritage is an aid or a barrier to reconciliation (Long and Reeves, 2009, pp. 79–80). Bloomfield notes, “Politics is a process to deal with the issues that have divided us in the past. Reconciliation is a parallel process that redesigns the relationship between us” (2003:12). This study holds that heritage is the process that negotiates and expresses the relationship between places, past and people in recovery.

4.4.6 (De)Constructing Nationalism through heritage

Mary Kaldor suggests that nationalism in and after a war can be a performance, and a justification of violence based on ideology (Kaldor, 2004, p. 170). The idea of nationalism is created in order to legitimise the actions of war based on the interpretation of a national identity derived from the past. This process of creating identities relies not only on the careful manipulation of the past into a desired form, but also on the assessment and adoption of national stereotypes that are beneficial to a cause (Sen, 2006, p. 59). In Kaldor’s view (and her new war perspective), nationalism is not a feature of nation-states; it is a feature of the ideology of specific groups and what they take to be their national identity. This can manifest as ethnic groups, religions, political beliefs or geographical borders (Kaldor, 2004, pp. 174–175). Coward notes that heritage allows not only the construction of nationalist ideology to flourish, but that the destruction of heritage further intensifies and accentuates an idea of ethnic separateness (Coward, 2008, p. 26) or (as referred to in this thesis) cultural difference.

Amartya Sen uses religious fundamentalism to explain the adoption of ideological nationalism by groups. He argues that fundamentalist Islam has adopted an oppositional identity to that of Western Christianity, and in doing so has abandoned the strict tenets of Islam to pursue an identity based on an interpretation of religion that prioritises the violent protection of Islam above Islam itself (Sen, 2006, pp. 14–15). For Sen, national religious identities attempt to bond with other similar fundamentalist identities and form an imagined cross-border nation (Sen, 2006, p. 17; Anderson, 2006, p. 141; Shils, 1981, p. 49). These imagined nationalities can be seen in the formation of terrorist and fundamentalist groups and their identification with and collaboration with each other. A contemporary example of this is the Islamic State (ISIS) that claims ownership of geographical areas based on a shared Islamic heritage and nationality that crosses the country borders of Iraq and Syria, or groups such as Al-Qaeda or the Taliban (Kaldor, 2004, p. 171). Constructed nationalism allows groups to pick and choose desirable national pasts to celebrate and justify their identities based on historical narratives and evidenced by heritage. As explored in this and previous chapters the packaging of memories and pasts into an AHD allows a cultural identity to be simultaneously created and legitimated (Ashworth, Graham, and Tunbridge, 2007, p. 14).
Nationalism can be constructed and used to subjugate others, based on claims of cultural superiority. The process makes use of constructed stereotypes to create traditions and in the case of conflict these become traditions of violence (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4; Sen, 2006, p. 84). The commemoration process has many functions, one of which is to familiarise a population with the brutality of war and teach them to expect deaths and violence in war. Constructed nationalism works on similar principles. For example, Kaplan refers to the “ancient hatred” between Balkan nations (Kaplan 2001, p. 7), which was a widely accepted argument when it was first posited despite being strongly refuted and rejected in contemporary literature (and by this thesis) (Tuastad, 2010, p. 597); however, Kaplan’s argument built on cultural assumptions and pejorative stereotypes went on to reintroduce and reinforce these arguments in popular discourse in the 1990s and assisted in the ‘Balkanisation’ of the conflicts in the 1990s. Maria Todorova argues that the pejorative creation of Balkan stereotypes of savagery is used to simplify and explain the violence of the Balkan wars, and to familiarise a local and global population with the violence in Yugoslavia (Todorova, 1997, pp. 33–35). Moreover, these stereotypes have also been used by Balkan nations to justify their own violence against others, based on the construction of a tradition of an ancient hatred and violence. Thus, nationalism constructed from imagined pasts and evidenced by heritage becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the created identities and their imagined foundations become more real with each attempt to legitimise them. Simply put, the imagined national identity becomes a nationalist reality, is violently supported in conflict, and remains embedded in communities after conflict.

The impact of heritage on recovery processes is explored in the remainder of this thesis through the establishment of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework, and its application to the main case study of Dubrovnik.

4.5 Summary: The impact of heritage on conflict and post conflict recovery

Roland Barthes notes that there is a further process involved in the semiotic interpretation of signs, by which recognisable cultural signs became myths (Barthes, 2000, pp. 109–110). He argues that Saussure’s theory of signs can be pushed a step further to the study of meaning in discourse (Barthes, 2000, p. 111). Myths are the “collective representation” of meaning-making, and can be used not only to examine the ways in which individual narratives become local myths, and then in turn become globalised (Barthes, 2000, p. 9). According to Barthes, myth-making uses cultural meanings and signs that are already understood to be markers of cultural value (Barthes, 2000, p. 110) which are continually reworked into connective process of immediate recognition and subsequent repetition (Barthes, 2000, p. 120). Following this argument, one can see the mythologizing of conflict narratives occurring when local experiences of conflict are turned into discourse in their retelling, and signified as important through heritage sites, which then transmit the mythologies to a wider public. As well as approaching mythologies through Barthes’s theories, the use of myth in culture relies on a vernacular understanding of the term as “a set of ideas that may or may not be true … but which fulfil some need or function that blinds the believers to alternative understandings” (Cowlishaw, 2010, p. 210). For both Barthes and Cowlishaw, myths are both the process that creates a dialogue
as well as the product that is transmitted and supported by those who enter the dialogue (Barthes, 2000, p. 12; Cowlishaw, 2010, pp. 210–211). In the case of post-conflict heritage this involves the creators (signifying value through narratives), the curators (refining narrative value into tangible and intangible heritage sites) and the visitors.

Barthes argues that mythologies in societies are created by connecting commodities to nations (and nationalism), and marketing them as such. Nationalism creates a mythical perception of national identity by the repeated narration of national characteristics and stereotypes (Barthes, 2000, p. 62). Applying this to heritage in post-conflict contexts, national cultures are mythologised and celebrated through post-conflict heritage, and this create the illusion of their cultural superiority through imagined comparisons and competitions. Conflict narratives are instantly recognisable to a populace because they have been formalised into a familiar discourse of expected violence and peaceful outcome. This has occurred in part due to the rhetoric of violence in popular culture (the media, film, etc.) and also by cultural traditions of violence that have become mythologised as heritage (blood sports, for example) (Das, 1987). From this stance it is possible to see that by mythologizing national identities in a world well versed in the rhetoric of violence, conflicts have become part of the expected narrative of local, national, and international culture. This is perhaps why heritage assets hold a prominent position as markers and commemorators of violence and also why they are targeted. Heritage is not only attacked and restored as a marker of value and significance, but because myths of war and violence have taught a contemporary globalised culture that such attacks are expected and required.

This view is supported in part by Kaldor’s argument about the performance of nationalism, which requires the acting out of practiced roles in the commemoration and celebration of national myths of war experience (Kaldor, 2004, p. 68), and in part by the long legacy of violence against cultural heritage in most wars throughout the ages (Kastenberg, 1997, p. 281), the deliberate destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, or the shelling of Dubrovnik Old Town is an example. This position is in direct contrast with the surprise and outrage shown by the media in the wake of attacks to cultural heritage in conflict. As Emberling and Hanson note in their analysis of the looting of the Baghdad National Museum in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the attacks could have been (and were) anticipated and should have been prepared for to avoid the loss and destruction of Iraqi heritage (Emberling and Hanson, 2008, pp. 13–14). Heritage protection usually fails in conflict because if there is a mythology of violence and iconoclasm in war then it is likely that heritage will be targeted, and if heritage legislation works on the assumption that heritage will not be targeted, then damage and recovery approach the issue from two very different perspectives.

The use of cultural imperialism and Eurocentrism in the inscription of WHS might thus be understood as myths posing under the guise of their universal acceptance (Starzmann, 2008, p. 369). In a post-conflict environment mythologies of atrocity are created by connecting narratives of genocide to heritage sites such that the name of the site itself invokes a recognition of mass murder. Auschwitz-Birkenau and Srebrenica, for example, are synonymous with Holocaust and genocide, but the invocation of the names does not necessarily lead to a recall of exact details or events. This semiotic
discourse has created an instantly recognisable connection between sites of atrocity and ideological perceptions of ‘good’; and ‘evil’. In doing so, the acts of violence have become mythologised and commodified to a specific geographical and temporal context (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 98). The result of this context-specific connection is that the violence itself is relegated to the past and distanced from the present (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 95–96). From this, we see that the mythologizing of violence in sites of atrocity (and in other post-conflict contexts) does not diminish the trauma, devastation, and importance of the events but it does limit and constrain them to particular sites and history. This is perhaps one reason why mass violence and genocide always seems so shocking in conflict, despite its frequent appearance in conflicts over several thousand years. However familiar, conflict and atrocity are mythologised as part of a barbaric past that is distant from a civilised present.

The purpose of this chapter has been to interrogate the gap between theories of conflict and theories of heritage and to find commonalities and links between the two fields in order to close this gap. The result is the creation on an integrated perspective on heritage and conflict that has identified key shared issues and areas to investigate. This chapter is the culmination of a wide-ranging literature review carried out in the previous chapters to form the conceptual basis which upon which the remainder of this research is set. The following chapters move on from a purely conceptual exploration of these issues and offer a methodological framework that is able to explore, measure and assess the impact of conflict and heritage on the post-conflict geo-political landscape of Dubrovnik in Croatia.
Chapter Five: Methodology

The methodology used in this study has been framed around the research questions to ensure that the research followed a systematic route, starting with the objectives and finishing with a set of rational and well-supported conclusions (Naoum, 1998). The research strategy evolved in response to the legislative evolution towards the protection and conception of heritage (Chapter Two), the fluctuations and nuanced definitions of heritage (Chapter Three), and the subsequent culmination of an integrated perspective on heritage, conflict, and recovery (Chapter Four). In order to create a methodology capable of studying the facets of heritage explored in the previous chapters, an appreciation of existing post-conflict research methods is needed. While the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework methodology outlined through this chapter takes as its starting point an internationally-recognised strategic conflict assessment tool developed by DFID (Goodhand, Vaux, and Walker, 2002b), to organise the research, the specific needs of heritage (both tangible and intangible) require a nuanced methodological approach. As such this research methodology is populated by a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods in order to address both tangible and intangible conceptions of heritage. The Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (Table 5.1) allows for each of the project’s guiding research question to be systematically addressed. This chapter firstly examines general considerations surrounding mixed-methods research, and then secondly explores the specifics of top down and bottom up approaches to conflict assessments. Finally, and reflecting considerations introduced in the first and second sections, the chapter closes with an outline of the rationale for and the design of the IHAF.

At the beginning of this research it was decided to identify a specific case study to assess the impact of heritage on recovery. The criterion used was that the case had to have significant cultural heritage capital that had suffered in a recent conflict. As a WHS, Dubrovnik in Croatia fulfilled this criterion and so was chosen. The SCA approach requires an understanding of the background and context of conflict; this is described in Chapter Six, with a specific focus on the role of heritage and culture in Croatia’s conflict profile.

The research questions this thesis sought to answer were:

1. How can the impact of heritage on post-war recovery be conceptualised?
2. How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery be assessed?
3. What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik?

These questions are divided into the categories of impact and assessment; the first sought make a contribution to knowledge by linking the concepts of heritage and conflict theory. The second question used these linked concepts in an applied, field-based case study. The first three chapters in this thesis have partially answered the first question by exploring in great detail the theoretical and philosophical links between heritage and war. This chapter addresses the assessment of the impact of heritage in a post-conflict setting. It suggests the use of a methodology that measures that impact, based on the notion that heritage is not an object, but it is a process that affects different disciplines,
and requires a mixed method approach in order to assess it accurately. The methodology proposed here is used to answer the second research question.

Table 5.1: Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework
5.1 Research Approaches: Literature Review

In order to reconcile the demands of post-conflict recovery with the needs of heritage, a mixed methodology must be adopted to enable a researcher to study the impact of heritage on societies recovering from conflict. The following methodological literature review has been carried out to interrogate this position, and is structured in response to the first objective of the second research question.

Table 5.2 Comparisons of Quantitative and Qualitative Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researcher Constraints</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Fact-finding based on evidence or records</td>
<td>Attitude measurements based on opinions, views, and perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between researcher and subject</td>
<td>Distant</td>
<td>Close</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of findings</td>
<td>Nomothetic</td>
<td>Idiographic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relationship between theory, concepts, and research</td>
<td>Testing/Confirmation</td>
<td>Emergent/Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of research</td>
<td>Hard and Reliable</td>
<td>Rich and Deep</td>
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This thesis can be characterised as an exercise in applied research (Creswell, [2003]2015, pp. 10–15); as an empirical investigation into the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery in Dubrovnik. It uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods within a bespoke framework. Benz and Newman, (1998, p. 2) argue that the separation between qualitative and quantitative research is invalid in practice. Whereas quantitative methods rely on a realist philosophy, wherein the world can be objectively measured using hard evidence, qualitative methodologists consider the world to be a social construct, which leads Benz and Newman to the conclusion that it can be subjectively assessed but not objectively measured (Benz and Newman, 1998, p. 3). The pivotal variable in this discussion is the assumptions made by the researcher; they position their research as either a qualitative study of socially constructed reality, or an exercise in the objective collection of facts (Benz and Newman, 1998, pp. 3–4). These authors say that the choice of method is made according to the conceptual preferences of the researcher and their overall research aims (Benz and Newman, 1998, p. 4). While this division between quantitative and qualitative methods may be invalid, it is one that is well established. Nevertheless, it does not lend itself well to a study such as this one, which aims to study the holistic effects of heritage and conflict. This study has accordingly adopted a mixed methods
approach that utilises both approaches to create a more inclusive methodological framework. Bryman and Becker (2012, p. 120) categorise the differences between the two approaches in terms of researcher role, relationship to subject, scope of finding, approach to theory, and the nature of the research (Bryman, 1998), as expressed in Table 5.2.

5.2 Mixed Methods
The nature of cultural heritage and its existence in both tangible and intangible forms lend themselves to a dual quantitative and qualitative research strategy, which come together in a powerful research tool of the mixed methods approach. Mixed methods are used in a pragmatic combination to investigate and explain specific phenomena (Flick, 2009, pp. 32–33).

A mixed methods approach uses and combines different methods either from within a single quantitative or qualitative approach (Brannen, 2004, p. 4), or from both (Brannen, 2008, pp. 53–54). The use of different research strategies creates a complex research design, which in turn may result in a wealth of data that can be difficult to interpret (Bryman, 2012, p. 383). However, Tashakkor and Teddlie argue that the benefits of a mixed method are numerous. For example, the use of several different methodologies increases the scope of the project, whilst also increasing the accuracy and holistic results of the research (Tashakkor and Teddlie 2010, p. 18). The breadth of data resulting acquired in this study was difficult to manage on account of the quantity of information. It took time to analyse this wealth of information but ultimately it resulted in seven key findings which required a variety of methods.

The mixed method approach used in this research was considered to be the most suitable method (i) as a result of the literature review, which conceptualised heritage as both intangible and tangible in character, (ii) as versatile and flexible research strategy, as discussed by Bryman and expressed in Table 5.2 and (iii) in its ability to answer a complex research question from multiple perspectives, thus enhancing the reliability of the findings and ultimately allowing the research to show the complex relationship between cultural heritage and a post-conflict environment. It has been argued that anthropological research cannot be either solely qualitative or quantitative, but that in order offer a valuable contribution to knowledge it must be both (Bernard, 2011, pp. 1–2). By employing a mixed methods perspective, it is possible not only to make these assessments, but also to assess the crossover between them. Mixed methods provides an innovative, flexible, and varied tool for interrogating the holistic impacts of heritage rather than its individual components. This is how this research will link theory, practice, and policy uses of heritage in the post-conflict recovery environment.

5.3 Conflict Assessment and the development of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework
The Strategic Conflict Assessments (SCA) developed by DFID informed the construction of the IHAF through their focus and prioritisation of the dynamics and context of a conflict which are particularly pertinent to both longitudinal studies and to the interrogation of culture and heritage. The
assessments uncover the likely tensions and stressors associated with armed conflict and once identified, these issues can begin to be managed. The purpose of the SCA is to analyse conflict, measure the risks of intervention and develop conflict-sensitive policies and programmes (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, p. 5):

The Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) methodology is intended as a flexible framework that can be adapted as needed, rather than a standardised approach. The conceptual basis for the SCA is the combined use of the following analytical “lenses” …

(Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002b, p. 1)

This was the starting point for the design of this research, and answers the second objective of this research question: What existing assessment frameworks exist and are they suitable for assessing the impact of heritage. The following section will draw heavily on Goodhand, Vaux, and Walker (2002a, 2002b) to dissect the SCA methodology and to suggest ways to adapt it from the analysis of tensions in a conflict environment to the analysis of heritage in post-conflict environments, to produce the IHAF. The SCA methodology falls into broadly three stages: the analysis of the conflict and of the international response, and development strategies and options (Goodhand, Vaux, and Walker, 2002a, p. 6). Although all three are useful analytical tools, this research focuses primarily on adapting the first stage of the framework to analyse heritage in post-conflict recovery, and incorporates some analysis of international responses. The third stage is outside the scope of the present research, but suggestions are made at the end of the thesis on areas of further investigation into the applications of its findings.

Table 5.3: Three stages of DFID Strategic Conflict Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage A Conflict Analysis</th>
<th>Stage B Analysis of Responses</th>
<th>Stage C Strategies/Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures</td>
<td>Mapping external responses</td>
<td>Influencing other responses to conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Mapping development policies and programs</td>
<td>Developing/refining DFID policy and program approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics</td>
<td>Assessing impacts on conflict and peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the three stages shown in table 5.3, most pertinent to the study of heritage after conflict is stage one (table 5.4). Stage one of the SCA includes an analysis of structures which are the long-term underlying factors of conflict in order to contextualise understanding of the conflict. This requires a study of the history of the conflict, historical and contemporary tensions, and the relationship between the two (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, p. 11). In this thesis, this stage is reconceiced as an analysis of the cultural context of conflict through a historical analysis of the cultural causes of conflict. With the analysis of tension completed, the SCA then categorises the risks into themes. The
Thematic tensions are security, political, economic, and social in character (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, pp.9-12), as expressed in table 5.4.

Table 5.4: DFID Conflict Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Analysis of long term factors underlying conflict</th>
<th>Analysis of conflict actors</th>
<th>Analysis of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Security Interests</td>
<td>Security Long term trends of conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political Relations</td>
<td>Political Triggers for increased violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic Capacities</td>
<td>Economic Capacities for managing conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Social Peace agendas</td>
<td>Social Likely future conflict scenarios</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Incentives</td>
<td>Social Incentives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aim of the first step of the SCA is to identify tensions leading to conflict; the aim of the IHAF is to identify the impact of heritage in post-conflict. With this in mind the themes have been adapted as follows:

The political and social themes of the SCA are conflated into a single theme. The social element of the SCA investigates societal issues that lead to tension such as exclusion, ethnic divides and competition, whilst the political element assesses the political manipulation and institutional responses to conflict (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, p. 11). This is reconfigured here as a range of socio-political uses of heritage which may impact positively or negatively on a population, including the assessment of political manipulation of heritage, the social perception of heritage, and the effect and tensions of heritage felt in the local community (such as social exclusion, ethnic divisions and the ways in which the conflict is remembered).

The economic impact of heritage is assessed to ascertain the reliance on the local area on heritage commerce, including livelihoods, employments, and the value of the area (and heritage) to GDP. This part of the analysis closely mirrors that of the SCA (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, p. 11).

An additional category of physical impact (not present in the SCA) reflects the preoccupation with BCH shown in The Hague Convention (1954) and other international agreements and legislation, and incorporates it into an integrated approach to heritage. The physical impact is measured in terms of the damage and reconstruction of the heritage.

The SCA stage one also explores the impact of actors, identifying the interested parties, their influence and possible spoilers (actors trying to disable the process of recovery) (Haider, 2009, p. 12). This element is explored in this thesis in terms of the influence of UNESCO, local heritage organisations and international funding bodies. This section also includes the local population as interested parties. In both the SCA and this research, actors are considered to have highly political motivations and therefore they are of paramount importance as they hold the ability to either assist the processes of recovery or to block them (or even to purposefully disrupt them) (Haider, 2009, p.
In this research, actors are identified in each of the themes outlined above; for the physical impact the influence of UNESCO and funding bodies will be explored; the economic impact will include the analysis of who contributes to and benefits from the finances of heritage; the socio-political impact will be identified through the perceptions of both the local population and the global community of heritage in and after conflict.

Much of the research done in post-war environments is shaped by the need to produce policy applications, thus, most conflict methodology is shaped by a pragmatic and evidence-focused system of research (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, pp. 1–5). The dynamics of a conflict are established in the SCA to analyse the trends and to identify the triggers. This approach is mirrored in this research, which looks at the three forms of impact over a long period of post-war recovery, assessing how they change over time. The forms of impact are long-term economic data, the damage and recovery of physical heritage fabric and the changing associations between people and place based on the analysis of local (interviews) and international (media) perceptions.

Although the SCA has been used as a guide, it is not without its critics. The SCA is geared towards development actors rather than end user needs, which means that the success of SCA applications and proposals can adversely affect the conflict environment (Barakat and Waldman, 2013, p. 260). A joint approach is needed to integrate the needs of actors from all levels to mitigate hostilities and tensions, and increase the chance of a successful, sustainable peace (Barakat and Waldman, 2013, p. 280). Moreover, the top-down system of assessment is actually a barrier to the inclusion of non-development actors in the decision-making process (Baumann and Stengel, 2014, p. 519). Although the focus of these critiques is on tension and conflict, their concerns are pertinent to this research and mirror the issue of the diverse needs of heritage as outlined in earlier chapters. Just as conflict analysis needs an integrated perspective on the actors concerned, so too does the analysis of heritage post-conflict. The result of the methodology used here is to produce three data streams in an integrated perspective on the different impacts of heritage as a physical feature, as an economic resource and as an intangible societal connection to place. This reflects the three arguments on heritage outlined in earlier chapters; as a built environment (UNESCO WHC, 1972b; UNESCO, 1954; Stovel, 1998), heritage as a commodified asset (Hewison, 1987; Ashworth and Goodall, 1990; Cohen, 1988; MacCannell, 1989; Urry, 1990), and heritage as a process of identity and connection (Smith, 2006; Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996; Waterton, 2009; Sen, 2006). These areas are rarely considered together.

The aim of the SCA is a contextualised evaluation of the conflict, the identification of its main actors and tensions, and the policy implications of the assessment. The aims of IHAF developed in this research are: a similar evaluation of the cultural context of the conflict, the impact heritage has had on recovery, the extent to which the post-conflict environment’s heritage can be considered recovered, and the possible implications of the use of heritage in recovery in future projects.

The IHAF has been designed not only to be adapted to the needs of a specific conflict at a specific time, but also to standardise the way information on conflict and heritage is captured to enhance the
knowledge around this relationship through longitudinal studies and conflict comparisons. It is anticipated that these assessments will be utilised by strategy and policy to inform the knowledge base on heritage and conflict to help inform interventions in a more effective way, and in doing so assist with long term peacebuilding. Although this long-term goal may be beyond the limits of this research project, the IHAF has been designed as a framework capable of being utilised in this way.

With this high-level aim in mind, the early conceptualisation stage of IHAF needs to develop a strategic approach to conflict assessments as a starting point before moving on to an implementation phase for a tactical or operational purpose. This approach is replicated in the structure of this thesis that has first identified an appropriate methodology and created a high level framework, before operationalising this framework in Dubrovnik.

The aim set out above lends itself to creating a framework based on current best practice in conflict assessment methodologies, particularly those with a strategic oversight on various conflicts, as such, the widely used and critiqued DfID Strategic Conflict Assessment has been used as a foundation to model the IHAF upon. This grants the IHAF two advantages; first, the SCA is an established strategic tool which has been used and adapted numerous times for field based conflict assessment following a recognisable methodology which are used to inform global policy decisions. Secondly, this approach positions the findings of the IHAF assessment alongside SCA country wide assessments, which will enable the IHAF findings to be augmented to fit within a wider non-heritage based assessments to gain a more holistic view of a conflict. This future collation between the IHAF and SCA justifies why the SCA has been used as a model for this initial research in this thesis, and also give a perspective on why the SCA would suit the long terms goals of the IHAF beyond this research and thesis.

5.4 Comparative Assessment Tools: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment

It is widely acknowledged that it is important to balance between ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches when evaluating post-conflict environments (MacGinty, 2010, p. 392). The IHAF presents an attempt to accomplish this balancing act. By incorporating elements of the Strategic Conflict Analysis approach, which is widely regarded as a ‘top down’ set of frameworks, and the Post-Conflict Impact Assessment approach which is seen as a more ‘bottom up’ approach, IHAF aims to provide a widely-applicable analytic tool that also supplies flexibility to acknowledge and adapt to context-specific factors. The section above has offered an evaluation of SCA and an overview of the manner in which SCA has been incorporated into IHAF. The section below offers an evaluation of PCIA, and an overview of the manner in which both the SCA and PCIA has been incorporated into IHAF.

5.4.1 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Evaluation

The PCIA is a guidance framework that utilises a context-bound tactical approach to impact assessment, rooted in the Do No Harm principle (Anderson, 1999; Bush, 1998). The PCIA approaches conflict assessment from a ground-up perspective, looking at context and culturally
specific issues that affect the sustainability of peace in relation to a specific event or intervention (Bush, 1998). The guidance relies on assessing the success or failure of an initiative based on its contribution towards sustainable peace, rather than following indicators of success of the intervention itself (Bush, 1998, p.22). This enables the PCIA to remain focused on a local context, but generalise the results to assess the impact on broader issues of peace or a return of hostilities (Hoffman, 2003, p. 2).

The PCIA follows three broad thematic steps: context mapping, a risk and opportunity mapping exercise, and a peace and conflict assessment (Bush, 2007, pp7-10). The first phase aims to define and understand the context of conflict and peace, and outline the dynamics and stakeholder interests. This is similar to the first step in the SCA framework, and is also integral to the first stages of the proposed IHAF structure. The second phase of the PCIA seeks to assess how an initiative or intervention could negatively or positively affect the outcome of peace of conflict (Bush, 2007, pp. 7-10). This is achieved through structured scenario mapping with key stakeholders and practitioners. Risk assessment lies beyond the focus of this thesis, and as such this second stage is not directly relevant to the formation of the IHAF methodology. The third PCIA phase is a conflict assessment which further explores the positive and negative impacts of the initiative, and seeks to connect the impact through all phases of the intervention (from before the intervention through to feedback and review) as a way to correlate the impact to the intervention (Hoffman, 2003, p.177). This step is explored in detail below in relation to the strengths and weaknesses of using scenario mapping and risk assessment to correlate interventions to sustainable peace or return to hostilities.

The key strengths of the PCIA rely on its contextually driven approach and ability to bridge the gap between academically focused research approaches and their application to intervention strategies (Bush and Duggan, 2014, p.304). Whilst the SCA relies on creating a high-level strategic framework that can be adapted to different contexts, the PCIA takes a contextually driven approach with the understanding that this may be only utilised in a specific instance or iteration for use in the field (Bush, 2003, p.37). The PCIA appreciation for conflict sensitivities reduces the likelihood of following themes and concepts with may not be relevant to a specific conflict, and as such ensures that work carried out is relevant to the focus of the intervention, with an awareness for the possibility that said initiatives have the potential to negatively affect the post-conflict context (Haider, 2017, p.339-340). A culturally-bound focus aims to reduce the chance that an intervention would cause a negative or harmful reaction by following the ‘Do No Harm’ (DNH) principle. The PCIA seeks to ensure that inventions are culturally sensitive by ensuring that the context is considered first, and that intervention is shape around the context (rather than rolling out intervention strategies that worked elsewhere in different conflicts and contexts) (Bush and Duggan, 2013, pp. 16-17).

Although the DNH Principle and cultural awareness of the PCIA is relevant to the formation of the IHAF, the PCIA is capable only of identifying heritage as an expression of culture and recipient of interventions rather than a controlling process that shapes culture in line with power structures which determine where interventions should be made. In this argument, were the PCIA be applied to heritage interventions, the perception of success would rely on consensus, acceptance and normalisation of heritage narratives rather than an interrogation of what heritage and history was
being promoted and which localised power structures were directing these decisions. To avoid a wholesale reliance on localised perceptions of culture and heritage in the immediate aftermath of conflict and the inherent power struggles to promote the ‘correct’ version of events, a balance needs to be struck between bottom-up approaches and top-down initiatives to ensure the plurality, diversity, and contradictory interpretations of heritage are understood and their impact assessed.

The major weakness the PCIA has regarding its application to heritage-centred recovery is that the model produced would not be transferable to other heritage contexts without changing the core elements of the framework to incorporate the holistic definition of heritage and see it reflected in society. The IHAF is designed to be flexible and transferable, but provide enough structure for heritage assessments to be built across time and space in order to provide a comparable result. The IHAF is flexible and can be adapted to each context, but as it is so heavily focused on heritage there are specific areas that need to be address regardless of how they appear in the context. If a PCIA model is followed, then elements which were not applicable at the time or context may not be included, and will create an incomplete record. The focus of heritage is changeable both through different contexts and time periods and practitioners (as explored in chapters two and three), in order to safeguard against prioritisation of current heritage trends it is imperative that both tangible and intangible elements are prioritised and included. Although the PCIA is capable of capturing this information, it is not reinforced by the framework structure, therefore the context driven approach may give rise to practitioners bias, interpretation and prioritisation and could potentially negatively impact on the assessment being made. To ensure the IHAF is capable of capturing the most accurate and valid information on heritage, it needs to reflect the most up to date heritage theory and practice and this can only be achieved by making this specialism available through a structured strategic approach.

A final drawback which prevents the PCIA being fully utilised in a heritage assessment framework is the reliance of the PCIA on intervention risk assessment and prediction without a clear way to measure their impact where the outcome is not a tangible factor (Achitei, 2014, pp 55-56). A risk assessment predication on the success or failure of interventions relies both on the intervention providing a clear and measurable connection to sustainable peace, and on the assumption impact and risk assessment are capable of predicating outcomes and mitigating uncertainty (Renn, 2017, p. 43). Such a trajectory is unlikely to remain clear in a post-conflict environment, particularly when combined with the expectation and motivations of donors (Hoffman, 2003), which problematises predictive impact assessments. Crucially, the aim of this research and the IHAF is not to make an assessment on the impact of heritage–led interventions, but rather of the impact of heritage itself on post-conflict recovery. As heritage is changed in response to conflict, and conflict reinterpreted by heritage over time there is no way to risk assess or predict how heritage will be altered without understanding how it has been used. Furthermore, the reliance of the PCIA on impact and risk predictive assessments combined with the lack of bespoke heritage progress indicators renders the impact assessment of heritage problematic, as it can only predict a degree of correlation and will be unable to assess whether or not an intervention held transferable value. This is particularly pertinent
to the study and use of heritage conceptualised away from built material as there may be a tendency to prioritise reconstructed built heritage as a marker of success of an intervention and recovery. This would ultimately be at odds with the goal of an IHAF intervention which prioritises intangible connections between people, place, and the past as a marker for heritage recovery.

5.4.2 Benefits of the IHAF: Balancing a top-down strategic conflict assessment against a bottom-up operational use of conflict impact assessment.

The IHAF measures the disruption to heritage caused by conflict, and how its subsequent recovery from disruption affects post-war cultures. This is not a measurement of heritage-led interventions, rather, this is an investigation into the impact of heritage on post war societies recovering from conflict.

In order to achieve this the IHAF utilises a strategic and analytical approach which seeks to understand the impact of conflict on heritage, and how heritage affects the post conflict landscape in a specific context. This a holistic assessment of how heritage is capable of shaping a post-war environment. The IHAF has been designed to gain a critical perspective on how influential heritage can be to guide its use and as such, the IHAF is an assessment tool that is transferable and assumed no pre-existing knowledge of heritage assessment. It also rejects a one size fits all approach by balancing the need to be strategically transferable with the need to be operationally versatile, represented by finding the balance between the SCA and PCIA approaches.

The IHAF becomes strategically transferable by standardising the assessment steps using a rigorous methodology which utilises an SCA approach, this creates the opportunity to transfer the assessment approach to other sites and contexts. The framework is operationally versatile as it requires the assessor to approach each case study with no assumption of prior existing knowledge, and assess each new context from the ground up, which is a similar approach to the PCIA. However, the IHAF deviates away from both approaches as it seeks to be bound to a single theme of heritage, and designed to respond to the nuances involved in defining heritage and its impact over recovery. Neither the SCA nor PCIA is capable of assessing the impact of heritage as they do not have the capacity to define heritage as a process without disrupting the structure of their frameworks. The SCA relies on established areas of conflict recovery as defined by policy, practice and known conventions. It is used heavily in policy and strategic mapping, and requires fixed definitions of recovery areas in order to determine the effectiveness of interventions and the prioritisation of funding (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, p. 764). The PCIA is best suited to the measurement of the impact of interventions on post-conflict contexts, and the subsequent success of these measures (Bush 1998, P.7). For the PCIA impact measuring is symbiotic with risk forecasting and mitigation. Although this presents an opportunity to base the assessments on a close and detailed understanding of the context, it is ill-equipped to measure the impact of an aspect of a post-conflict society over recovery that is not necessarily linked to interventions.

The benefit of using the IHAF over both the SCA and PCIA is that it takes a context specific bottom-up approach to each case it is applied to, but utilises a standardised approach to the assessments,
making the methodology scalable to varying contexts and giving a strategic and comparative overview of how heritage affects conflicts and vice versa. This reflects the nexus between State and policy level decisions and the localised consensus, narratives and interventions in regards to heritage within a post-conflict context, and as such reflects the hybridity of both a top-down and bottom up conflict assessment approach capable of moving with the changeability of a post-conflict society. (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 397). The concept of hybrid peace suggests that the post conflict landscape can be mediated towards peace (or conflict) by balancing local and international needs and wants to ensure the restitution of law, cultural identity and the establishment of a new post-war normality (Mac Ginty, 2010, p.392; Richmond, 2015, p. 51) as with the restoration or recovery of heritage in post conflict, the result of this process is tied to power hierarchies and the perceived legitimacy of decision makers (Richmond, 2015, pp. 62-63). Such hybridity is integral when considering the role of heritage and its ability to shape and alter conceptions of conflict both in the immediate aftermath of conflict and over a longer period of time, and the impact heritage can have on the formation of cultural identities, cessation or escalation of violence, and acceptance or rejection of peace. The formation of the IHAF has been designed to capture the balance between top-down and bottom-up initiatives by putting the influential role that heritage has on this negotiation at the forefront of the assessment.

The formation of the IHAF gives valuable policy insight for the future use of heritage and heritage-led interventions as it will provide more in-depth information on the value and dangers associated with heritage and peacebuilding, and further illuminate the influential role heritage has over recovery to decision and policy makers both locally, nationally and internationally. This approach is designed to equip such practitioners a greater understanding of what heritage is, how it relates to the physical, economic, and socio-political spheres of recovery, and how it can be used to further the effectiveness of recovery and peace-building initiatives.

5.5 Data Analysis Tools Applied to the IHAF

Mixed methods research results in numerous datasets that need to be integrated and interrogated, and as such, a system of data analysis is needed. Creswell notes that either a comparative or a complementary system of interpretation will be needed depending on what the research hopes to achieve (Creswell 2014, 227), and that the theories or approaches used in the research will dictate which for of analysis is used (Creswell, 2015, P.204). In this applied research case study, the results make a significant contribution to collective knowledge and wisdom. This is achieved in this study through the discussion of different interpreted datasets gained from different samples (carried out in Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine) and integrated through the research findings (presented in Chapter Ten). The underpinning data analysis strategy for this study is one that utilises the Data Information Knowledge Wisdom (DIKW) model (Figure 5.1 shows an example of the model, taken from Esterbrook 2012). First presented by Russell Ackoff in 1989, the DIKW model uses a logical chain of system management to organise the way in which data is turned into knowledge (Ackoff, 1989, pp. 3–9); data are gained from a primary source, then interpreted and turned into meaningful
information, then refined into knowledge and given a context, and finally a conclusion where the data and analysis can be applied to a real world problem (Rowley, 2007, pp. 164–165).

Figure 5.1: Model of DIKW hierarchy

The data for this study has been collected using the IHAF outlined in Table 5.1, which has resulted in the generation of three datasets with the raw results of the physical, economic, and social impact of heritage in Dubrovnik. This raw data consisted of photographic surveys of buildings, a large statistical database on Dubrovnik tourism and transcribed interview data. The raw data was then evaluated to turn it into meaningful information. This process involved analysing the building surveys, which were compared with archival photographs to assess the level of damage and recovery of BCH and were mapped on street and building plans to demonstrate the speed and priority of recovery. The economic datasets were explored using Excel, using a set of variables to discover the extent and importance of tourism in Dubrovnik 1992 and showing how the war affected the economic profile of the city through probability modelling. Raw interview transcripts were coded and mapped using NVivo software (which enables the analysis of large, text-based qualitative datasets) to identify themes, trends and patterns, and generate data trees. This analysis resulted in the raw data becoming useable information to be interpreted and discussed in Chapters Nine to Eleven, which in turn has resulted in the generation of knowledge in the form of evidence-based findings that answer the research questions of this study, and have far-reaching applications for the use of cultural heritage in the recovery from conflict.

The final step of the DIKW process is the transformation of knowledge into wisdom. In the case of this research, this stage is found in the final application and generalisation of the outcomes to inform
further research, which is discussed in Chapter Eleven. The knowledge gained from this study of Dubrovnik does not only increase collective understanding of the impact of heritage on this one case study, but also contributes to a shared wisdom of what impact heritage has more generally (both in theory and practice) and how the IHAF can be used in other conflicts.

5.6 Organisation of the Research: Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework

To recap briefly, in this empirical research a mixed methods approach has been employed to generate several datasets on the subject of cultural heritage in conflict environments, in the context of Dubrovnik. The literature reviews in Chapters Two to Four have facilitated a critical understanding of both aspects individually and in collaboration, and they have drawn attention to the vital research objectives of this research, namely:

- What is the definition of heritage?
- What protects heritage from war?
- Is heritage passive recipient or active participant in the causation and continuation of conflict?
- How does heritage alter post-conflict society?

These four areas of literature reviewed have helped refine how this study approaches the question of ‘How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery be assessed?’ (Research Question II), and has resulted in the generation of three research areas (physical, economic, and socio-political) and their different data collection methods. These research areas form the basis of the IHAF, and are interrogated here in response to the third objective (‘What methodological tools are capable of assessing the impact of heritage recovery?’) under Research Question II.

First and foremost, the nature of this research (combined with the lack of data on the issue of heritage in conflict) required empirical data to be collected in field research. The qualitative element of this project required interviews to be carried out, whilst its quantitative aspects required that buildings be measured and mapped using photographic techniques and damage and repair to damage assessed. Fieldwork requires an in-depth and extended involvement of the researcher with the subjects of the study in order to understand and interrogate their social surroundings and the phenomena the researcher wishes to study.

The physical impact of heritage on recovery was chosen as a key theme as it involves both conflict and heritage theory and practice in terms of it being tangible. This focus is reflected in heritage legislation used both in peace time and conflict situations (including the Venice Charter, The Hague Convention, and the WHC) and is concerned primarily with defining, listing, and assessing damage to material sites of culture. The analysis also involves the focus put on heritage destruction in material terms expressed by conflict theory and media reports of conflict. Furthermore, the physical properties of heritage are discussed in detail by heritage theorists, and despite growing concern with the intangible aspects of heritage over the last few decades, tangible culture and its conservation remains the primary focus of all heritage studies. As such, it is impossible to frame this study into the impact of heritage on conflict without assessing the physical heritage of the case study.
The economic impact of heritage on recovery was chosen because it can be addressed using quantifiable data to argue that heritage has a specific and measurable value in post-conflict recovery. To date, the quantitative value of cultural heritage to a post-conflict community has not been assessed (the focus has previously been on quantifying the cost of the damage, rather than its impact on economic recovery), and as such the way heritage is considered in development circles depends on the subjective interest of those involved. Therefore, the role of heritage can be underestimated or overestimated in recovery.

The socio-political impact of heritage was chosen because it directly addresses the intangible impact of heritage on a community. Despite the focus on the material properties of culture, it is often intangible values that determine what heritage is, and how it should be protected and understood in relation to its contemporary culture. This perspective is gained from the literature review carried out in Chapter Two, and its application to the post-conflict setting which is explored in Chapter Four. To examine the intangible value of heritage a qualitative approach was employed.

An immersive ethnographic approach to fieldwork through participant observation is one avenue to qualitative data collection (Delmont, 2012, p. 342). One criticism of this approach is that the by participating in the community the researcher alters the community they wish to study, damaging the objectivity and reliability of their results (Bennett, 1995, p. 257; Flick, 2009, p. 391). Another approach to fieldwork is as an assessor or interviewer. In this approach the researcher is set apart from the culture or society they wish to study, and instead uses a formal system of interviews to gain information from subjects, and so maintain objectivity. In formal interviews the transparency of the research is maintained (since the participants understand what the researcher is there for), although this may skew the reliability of the data (as participants tailor their responses to questions accordingly). A grounded theory approach is better suited to immersive ethnography (albeit ethically problematic) (Benz and Newman, 1998, pp. 78–79), but applied approach (such as this one) is better suited to semi-structured interviews conducted by a non-participant researcher (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 100). To combat the influence of participant bias this research carried out as many interviews as possible, but the author emphasises that the interviews constitute only one (small but extensive) dataset in conjunction with two larger quantitative datasets.

5.6.1 Qualitative Analysis and Data Collection: Socio-political Impact

It was argued above that both heritage and conflict legislation have primarily focused on the tangible aspect of heritage. The reliance on built heritage as the definitive marker of cultural value has prioritised it in studies and policies, and its intangible cultural connections have played a less prominent, less well-researched role. In reflection of the division between tangible and intangible heritage, this research has divided the research methods between the two definitions. Quantitative measurements have been used to assess the tangible facets of BCH, and qualitative methods have been employed to study the intangible connections between people, place and context. This has been achieved by using semi-structured interviews, and through the analysis and interpretation of that data.
In-depth interviews offer a way for a researcher to gain valuable, detailed, and contextually bound information. Semi-structured interviews were employed as the main qualitative technique in this research. The value of these interviews lies not in their number, but in the detailed nature of the testimony of the participants. The interviews allowed the participants to talk freely, under the assurance of complete anonymity, on the effect of cultural heritage in and after the war on their own community. This perspective was used as the unofficial narration of the conflict through heritage; from cultural destruction to cultural economy in Dubrovnik. The semi-structured interviews offered a way to enable the participants to talk freely, but also to follow a standardised line of questioning, which in turn became the basis for person-to-person comparisons and thematic assessment. Both questionnaire and focus groups were considered, but rejected due to the sensitivity of the research topic. Questionnaire and surveys were deemed too impersonal; this was supported by the preliminary research trip upon which the researcher was repeatedly informed by participants that Dubrovnik is a place that functions primarily as an oral culture and that surveys would not be successful. This proved to be the case, but the researcher discovered those who were unwilling to participate in surveys would agree to be interviewed. Focus groups were also rejected as it would be unethical and irresponsible to conduct focus groups asking people to discuss their experiences and trauma of war within their own community without a guarantee that their testimonies would not be shared by other participants. This was proved to be the right course of action in interviews, as several participants asked to speak off the record, or needed to repeatedly be assured of their anonymity and the safety of their testimonies.

The format of the interviews was divided into five sections, with up to five questions per section (see Table 5.5). The average interview took at least 90 minutes, and the researcher officially interviewed ten participants. The questions were open ended to allow the participants to speak freely, and recorded and transcribed by the researcher. Important themes that arose from this data were the narrative trend of exaggerating damage done during the 1991 bombing, the reliance on culture and tourists in post-conflict Dubrovnik.

Table 5.5 Socio-political Impact: Interview Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict background</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How do you think the [town] was affected by the conflict?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think the effects are still apparent today?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-conflict recovery</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was heritage a feature of the recovery process after the war?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How important was heritage considered to be?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were there any specific times when heritage was a main feature in the recovery of the [town]?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future of the town</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What do you think will happen to the [town] over the next 5 to 10 years?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is your opinion of the remaining war damage on the cultural property?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finance and Economics</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important are the cultural assets of the [town] to the economy of the [town]?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Have the cultural assets played a role in the recovery of the [town]?
How do the assets affect tourism and media relations in the [town]?
To what degree do the cultural assets play a financial role in the [town] today?

**Physical Repairs**

| What planning approach did the authorities take to the restoration of the [town]?
| What planning tools were used? |
| What was in charge of the restoration projects?
| What were the difficulties? |
| What provisions are there to safeguard heritage today? |

### 5.6.2 Physical impact: building surveys and mapping physical damage

To expand the data, two datasets were created to assess tangible heritage. The qualitative methods used to assess the impact of heritage on Dubrovnik society have been outlined above and the remaining two data quantitative datasets are discussed here.

The first dataset focused on the physical destruction and reconstruction of the city by mapping its recovery in photographic comparisons, producing a timeline of recovery, analysing the funding for recovery and examining the way in which these were linked. It included archival research of photos taken in the Old Town in the immediate aftermath of the war and the identification of the buildings of interest within these collections. The methods employed included comparing archival pictures of damage taken from official records and UNESCO-sanctioned recovery literature with a comprehensive photographic survey carried out by the researcher. Archival building recovery reports were used to map damage and recovery on (both the original and existing) street plans of Dubrovnik. The written record of damage done to the buildings was also evaluated and compared with a contemporary account to ascertain whether the damage had been repaired, and whether it was still visible or whether repairs were visible. The data was combined to explore the extent of the damage through comparisons of archival and contemporary material, priorities in rebuilding, transparency in the recovery process, and the extent to which Dubrovnik’s BCH can be considered recovered.

In order to map the damage and recovery of Dubrovnik, the buildings were plotted on a street plan of the Old Town. Using architectural survey maps from the Dubrovnik Conservation Institute a new blank street map was created, using Corel-Draw software. The blank street map was then used as a base map to plot damage done to buildings, and the phases to complete recovery of the Old Town. The maps show the extent and pace of recovery, and reveal which buildings received the most attention from 1990 to 2011 and the order in which their repair was prioritised.

Data has been collected from as many sources as possible to ascertain what the order in which the Old Town was repaired. There is a great deal of myth-making and storytelling over the first item to be recovered in the Old Town, and each claim is linked to a claim of cultural significance and cementing a cultural identity of the Dubrovnik residences. Discovering the first item to be restored seems to indicate its importance and cultural significance – to the residents, UNESCO and interested
parties (donors). The order of recovery shows which buildings are deemed most important, and which received the most money and attention to be repaired quickly.

This method revealed some interesting discrepancies between the various narratives of recovery that are extant in the literature and in the collective memory, which are examined in Chapter Nine.

5.6.3 Economic impact: statistical analysis

The economic impact of heritage has been assessed in a statistical analysis of Dubrovnik’s tourist industry, using tourism as a proxy for the economic value of cultural heritage (discussed in Chapter Eight). The economic impact is measured using a set of indicators that show the intensity and changing flows of tourism in Dubrovnik and the effect this has had on Croatian GDP, together with the economic reliance on placed on it. The indicators have been formed using data taken from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS) as the main source. The existence of institutions similar to the CBS around the world makes replicating this data stream accessible to further case studies. The data were explored in Microsoft Excel and used to calculate averages to establish an approximate value for tourism. The data is discussed extensively in Chapter Eight, using the indicators (presented here) to frame the structure of the chapter.

Statistical analysis produces a reliable account of how important tourism (and heritage) are to the economic survival of the city. The conceptual link between tourism and heritage is explored in detail in both Chapter Two and Eight, but is introduced here to argue the simple point that tourism in a WHS is an economic powerhouse capable of generating income, and in the case of Dubrovnik the hinge on which recovery and disaster hung in the balance. A cursory glance at the wealth of hotels and tourists in the city should confirm this assertion, but it is statistical analysis of tourism data from 1991 to 2013 that can demonstrate this more rigorously.

Table 5.6: Economic Impact: Tourism Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Tourist arrivals</td>
<td>To show how many domestic and international tourists arrived in Dubrovnik per year and trends and changes to tourist arrivals via variations in the number of visitors between 1990 and 2012, using data on tourist arrivals from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics from 1990 to 2011. The data covers both the whole of Croatia from 1990 to 2011, and specifically Dubrovnik from 2000 to 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Nights spent</td>
<td>To monitor changes or trends in the number of nights spent in Dubrovnik by national and international tourists from 1990 to 2012. Overnight tourist stays are defined by the nights spent in accommodation facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Duration of stay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Accommodation by type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Available beds (capacity use)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Direct contribution of tourism to GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Direct employment in tourism services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.7 Analysing the Research Data

The qualitative data on the social impact of heritage was analysed using a thematic analysis of the transcripts taken from the interviews. A thematic analysis identifies patterns and themes found in the raw data, and uses these to assess commonalities or differences between research participants (Braun and Clarke, 2006, pp. 78–79). Emerging themes were coded across all participants, and the themes and patterns grouped (using data trees). The datasets were used to establish hypotheses that answered the research questions, and in doing so provided new insights into the impacts on heritage.
Commonalities and themes were also explored in the findings of the quantitative datasets; issues of tourism and destruction were flagged as common themes in the previous dataset and so were expected to play a role in the thematic concerns of the interviews. As all data were collected before any analysis could begin, and the qualitative interviews were not impaired by the expectation that certain themes would arise.

The transcriptions were produced by the researcher after the interviews, and explored using NVivo software to code and generate themes and patterns. The investigation was carried out after the quantitative assessment of the economic and physical impact of heritage. This is a departure from Tashakkor and Teddlie’s mixed method design, which suggests that qualitative datasets should be assessed first. The reversal of order was carried out for two reasons; first, the abundance of physical data on the reconstruction of the town allowed the priorities of heritage and conflict management to be clearly assessed and investigated, establishing how important heritage has been to the city. In doing so, it was possible to ascertain the impact heritage would have on local people and the likelihood that people would remember and share heritage and war narratives. Secondly, the economic impact revealed the reliance of Dubrovnik on tourism, and so indicated that many people would be influenced by their position and employment in the tourist industry. This allowed the researcher to understand the participants’ narratives on tourism in context and acknowledge bias, and to ensure that the testimonies were not taken at face value. As a further note on the order of research, the physical assessment of the BCH took over two years to complete, and accessing and using restricted economic archival data also took a great deal of time. However, despite the small number of interview participants, gaining access to them and winning their trust was the most time-consuming endeavour, and analysing this also had to take place at the end of the study, as it was the final dataset to be completed.

5.8 Methodological Considerations
There are several methodological considerations and limitations to this study, and these are important to address in order to ensure the IHAF is rigorous methodological framework (in accordance with objective four of the second research question). These considerations are discussed below, as well as an outline of factors considered by the researcher in accordance with the Researching Under fire fieldwork methodological checklist.

Language Barriers
Most of this fieldwork was carried out in Dubrovnik, and the researcher does not possess an advanced level of Croatian language skills, and therefore interviews either had to be conducted in English or with a Croatian interpreter. The preliminary fieldwork showed that it was possible to have in-depth and advanced conversations with the residents of Dubrovnik in English. Both the use of English in the educational system in Dubrovnik and its locus as an international tourist market meant that the researcher encountered no problems being understood by or understanding local residents and interview participants. On only one occasion did an interview participant indicate they would not be comfortable conducting an interview in English. The researcher was prepared to employ a local
interpreter to help conduct the interview, however, this particular participant withdrew from the process for personal reasons. At the start of each interview an interpreter was offered, but declined by all participants. Although this was not anticipated the researcher was repeatedly informed that traditionally Dubrovnik functions primarily as oral culture and they would prefer to speak directly to the researcher.

Ethics

To ensure that the risks to interviewees and interviewer were minimalised, the interview questions went through a rigorous ethical evaluation (both by the researcher and through an official panel of academic researchers at the University of York). The interview questions were submitted to this panel and approved by the departmental Ethics Committee. Furthermore, the interviewees were encouraged not to answer questions they did not wish to and informed of their right to withdraw consent and their participation from interviews at any time. The researcher did encounter some issues with participants reliving traumatic memories. However, the participants confirmed that they told their stories to clarify and justify their own perspectives and assured the researcher that they were comfortable doing so.

Assuring Anonymity

Another ethical issue that was anticipated was the need for anonymity. Each and every participant was assured of anonymity. All participants asked to remain anonymous, and accordingly, the participants’ names were removed and each transcript labelled as CH (cultural heritage) and an individual number. To further assure the anonymity of the research participants the transcripts will not be made available in their entirety in this study as per agreement with both the ethical committee and the interview participants.

Institutional Participation

An unanticipated issue arose due to the reluctance of a key cultural heritage institution to participate in the interviews. Despite friendly email exchanges and their willingness to share information and unpublished information relating to BCH recovery, they were unwilling to participate in interviews. Despite repeated offers of interpreters and rearranging interview dates the institution continued to decline an invitation to interview. Although it would have been advantageous to have interviewed someone from this institution, the effect was mitigated by interviewing ex-employees who had been involved in the organisation at the time of the conflict and immediate aftermath.

Number of Interview Participants

Two unforeseen issues were encountered during this study relating to the number of participants: developing trust and reluctance to go on the record. Although there was a great deal of interest in the study, it took a long time to build up trust between the community and the researcher. Speculative (and anecdotal) reasons for this reluctance include a lack of free time in the high tourist season and exhaustion with the city during the low season; not wanting to discuss personal issues with a stranger and not wishing to share war narratives as the city tries to change its reputation (away from war and
towards heritage). The researcher countered this issue by returning to the city for several months each year, building up relationships over time. It was not feasible to stay for longer than two months at a time (due to economic constraints) and repeated visits proved useful as the researcher was recommended to participants by previous participants. The second issue was the reluctance of potential participants to go on the record and join the interview process. These people would initially agree to talk about heritage and the conflict, but would not agree to interviews. This resulted in receiving a great deal of anecdotal data that could not be used in the study. This could be countered to some degree as the anecdotal data helped the researcher to identify important areas of tension in the city (such as tourism), as well as receiving help in identify other more willing participants. The relatively small number of participants was successfully dealt with as (i) the interviews that were carried out were exhaustive and in depth, resulting in a rich variety of information; (ii) commonalities and themes in the interviews suggest that data saturation had occurred to some degree as the trends were found in all interviews, and (iii) due to the mixed methods design of the study the interview/qualitative data were further supported and complemented by a further two datasets.

Testing the feasibility of the IHAF methodology

Sultan Barakat and Sue Ellis suggest a framework for field-based research (1996, p. 149): the methodology for this research has been assessed using Research Under Fire as a checklist for its strengths, weaknesses and feasibility.

In order for fieldwork to be successfully undertaken (that is to yield results and to maintain its flexible and innovative approach) several issues need to be taken into account (Ellis, 1996, p. 149). Robert Chambers notes that there are several biases that can affect the collection (and subsequent analysis) of data in post-war environments (Chambers, 2005, p. 79) in an effort to identify and mitigate the impact of these issues, this research has outlined several of them below in relation to the fieldwork in Dubrovnik. The following issues have been taken from Barakat and Ellis’ paper (based on Chambers’ 1989 paper), and their analysis of bias is used as a framework here

Pre-field preparation

Before undertaking any research, it is paramount that the researcher knows as much about the context of the research as possible (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 151). This also forms part of the DFID SCA which encourages the context analysis of the conflict as a foundation requirement for any assessment (Austin, 2003). This has been achieved in this research by the historical (leading to contemporary) analysis of Dubrovnik, which allowed the researcher to gain an insight into existing cultural tensions (both historic and contemporary), and added support for the need for an exploratory field trip as part of pre-fieldwork preparation.

Project bias

Project bias occurs when “the researcher is drawn towards sites where contacts and information are readily available – inevitably a site that has been investigated before by many other researchers” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 150). Although Dubrovnik and its heritage have been investigated before, the methods used to do so (proposed in the IHAF) have not. Neither has the conceptual approach of
the impact of heritage on recovery (as opposed to the impact of recovery on heritage) been applied to this case study. As both the approach and methodology have not been used it is unlikely that the results gained and discussed in this research have been gained anywhere else at any other time. The fieldwork trips were performed over a number of years, and the data gained from them is both detailed and substantive, again supporting the uniqueness of this study.

**Person**

Person bias is defined as “articulate key informants are not always representative of the typical opinions of a community and yet, because of their position and ability to communicate, they are often the only ones spoken with by the researcher” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 150). This impact was mitigated by the researcher talking to a range of participants—some were approached via pre-arranged appointments with members of government and heritage professionals, whilst other participants were identified and approached in the Old Town and asked to participate, these included shop owners, retirees, students, and restaurateurs.

**Season**

“Researchers have a marked tendency to conduct research in foreign countries only during periods of pleasant weather; thus, many of the most severe problems faced by a community go unobserved” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 151). This is a very pertinent bias to the research undertaken in Dubrovnik as there is a difference in tourism numbers between the summer season (May to September) and the winter season (October to April). The research was carried out in the early summer season in order to assess the impact of tourism as well as talking to local residents. The reasons behind the summer visits were related in part to the ease of access as there were more participants willing to talk in the summer than winter (many closed businesses during the winter and the population moved to winter dwellings outside of the Old Town). This bias is also mitigated by the additional data streams which do not rely on interviews but on alternate fieldwork (photo-surveys) and desk based analysis of economics. The numerous inter-disciplinary data collection avenues minimise bias associated with single data stream collection in one area at a particular time.

**Diplomatic and professional bias**

It is noted that “diplomatic expediency can lead to selectivity over which projects are shown to the researcher” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 151). Although this could have been an influencing factor, the lack of co-operation from some institutions meant that the researcher received no information not in the public domain regarding the cost of recovery of BCH, and other confidential data was received regarding recovery processes from a variety of sources on the same issue (cost of recovery and tourism figures) which diversified the information and would have highlighted selectivity. Professional bias (by which the researcher refers to “Professional specialisation generates a focus that can lead to researchers missing links between processes”) (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 151) has been mitigated in this research by an awareness that this research is looking at only one aspect of recovery, and acknowledging that the focus on heritage is only a constituent part of a larger process.

**Gaining access and identifying gatekeepers (including freedom of movement for fieldwork)**
Access to Dubrovnik was not an issue for this researcher; both diplomatic and transport links were stable and allowed freedom of movement between the UK directly to the Dubrovnik region. Language restrictions were an initial threat to the success of the project but were mitigated by the ease with which the local population spoke English (as a direct result of tourism). Gatekeepers were identified prior to the research in order to speak with those directly involved with heritage management in Dubrovnik, but gatekeepers were also identified through personal recommendations based familiarity and trust gained from participants’ knowledge of the researcher and their work over several years. “Even with inside assistance, the researcher’s passage will not always be as easy as might be envisaged prior to entering the field” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 152), and this proved to be the case in Dubrovnik in terms of gaining and declining interviews. Unfortunately, the number of participants in the research stayed at a low number (ten) as many local residents were willing to talk about the conflict (off the record), but not willing to be interviewed (on the record). On occasion, the integrity of the researcher had to be preserved (over familiarity from participants and recommendations based on promoting family business connections) and invitations to (two) interviews declined. On both of these issues the potential impact of additional data is mitigated by the extensive in-depth research in other data streams (economic and physical in lieu of additional socio-political information).

**Time limits**

The unpredictable nature of research in post-conflict communities means it is difficult (if not impossible) to predict how long research may take (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 152). The research trips were either completely or partially self-funded expeditions and so could not encompass travelling more than once a year for more than six weeks at a time. To mitigate this and to collect as much data as possible the researcher organised annual field trips and used these field trips to create cumulative datasets instead of a singular snapshot of a single year in Dubrovnik. In this way, a time limit based on limited resources became an asset to the research as the results were gained over a long period of time, with time for analysis, reflection, and identification of gaps in the data between each trip.

**Limited information**

Information on post-war recovery is limited and there may be a lack of document sources (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 153). Although this is certainly the case in many contexts, Dubrovnik had a wealth of information available due to its status as a WHS (and documentation being kept in UNESCO archives) and as a tourist centre (tourism statistics kept nationally, not locally). Data that was missing (such as tourism statistics for only Dubrovnik from 1990 to 2000, and recovery cost reports) has been explained in the economic discussions in Chapter Seven. The potential for limited information has been mitigated by the formation of not only a detailed analysis of the context of the conflict (Chapter Six), but also based on a reliance on three modes of investigation opposed to a single line of inquiry. This approach is supported by Hall and Hall who suggest that due to the unpredictable nature of fieldwork it is integral to maintain flexibility and diversity in the methodological approach to the
study (Hall and Hall, 1990, p. 43). Barakat and Ellis argue “A good knowledge of the situation that existed pre-war can address some of these issues, as can the creation of one’s own maps and records of information while in the field using basic survey methods, sketching and photographs” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 153); whilst this approach has proved invaluable to the formation of the contextual knowledge of the conflict, the basic methods proved insufficient and were refined into the generation of detailed maps, rigorous use of photography, and well-kept records of all encounters with willing interview participants. The approach to grounded theory that is taken here is from a Glaserian approach wherein all data collected in Dubrovnik is considered of equal value, and applied to the formation of a conceptualisation of heritage in post-conflict that has wider applications beyond the remit of this research (and its case study) (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, pp. 22–23; Glaser, 1992).

**Impartiality**

All researchers have difficulty maintaining impartiality as they have pre-existing conceptions and theories which will have an impact on the research (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 155). They state that to mitigate impartiality the researcher should maintain “an open-minded and reflective approach” which allows researcher to “constantly to address and adjust their perspective. To travel into the field looking, listening and learning from all possible sides and sources, and constantly assessing the viewpoint, is the closest the researcher can come to impartiality” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 155). Using this as a guideline, the researcher sought to maintain their impartiality and integrity by maintaining professional links with all participants and avoiding the familiarity associated with becoming recognisable to local residents over the course of the research. Furthermore, the researcher drew Maria Todorova’s *Balkanisation* and constantly asked themselves if they were allowing elements of “balkanisation” and any pre-existing assumptions (Todorova, 1997, p. 28) into their work, and by being aware of this concept stop it from occurring.

### 5.9 Summary: The Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework

The research framework presented here links pragmatic approaches to heritage and conflict assessment to design an IHAF that is capable of addressing the needs of a specific context. The creation of an integrated perspective on heritage and post-conflict recovery and assessment has come in part from a review of the contemporary methodologies used to assess conflict and heritage, but is also based on an in-depth investigation into the meaning, use and value of heritage in contemporary post-conflict recovery contexts. The following chapters form the answer to the third research question: What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik? This question is answered by using the IHAF in Dubrovnik to gain empirical evidence to assess how Dubrovnik recovered from conflict between 1992 and 2012, and to discuss these results in the key findings in Chapter Ten.
Chapter Six: Dubrovnik Case Study

The foundations of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (IHAF) have been discussed in the previous chapters. Through the remaining chapters of the thesis, the results from the application of IHAF to the case of Dubrovnik are explored and discussed. The first step in the IHAF is to define the context of the case study in question, and use this context as a basis to determine the suitability of the case study in the operationalisation of the IHAF to carry out this research. The case study of this thesis is Dubrovnik, specifically the recovery of the Old Town of Dubrovnik following the shelling campaign of 1991. This chapter provides a detailed account of the events leading to the conflict in Dubrovnik through a thorough analysis of the geo-politics of the region and the identity politics at work, and discusses how these two factors are inexorably linked not only to the shelling itself, but also to how the local, national, and international community reacted to the attack in the aftermath of the shelling. This chapter focuses on the identity divisions that have come to characterise the conflicts in the Balkans, and discusses not only where these ideas were created, but also how they have become such a defining feature of the region. The chapter then uses this discussion to interrogate the events of the bombing of Dubrovnik, argues that the same key aspects that have been established and used to characterise the violent history of the Balkans- such as cultural identity politics and violence, and the exploitation of these aspects to create cultural norms and expectations in conflict- can be seen at work in the attack on Dubrovnik, and in its recovery in the aftermath of the attack.

In 1991, the Old Town of Dubrovnik became the target for a Serbian-Montenegrin shelling campaign. As a listed World Heritage Site and a demilitarized zone, the shelling gained international attention, and the Old Town was widely regarded to have been destroyed by the war. Several aspects make Dubrovnik an interesting case study for this thesis. Dubrovnik can be considered as an overt attack on cultural heritage but this was not unique to the area; the later destruction of the town of Vukovar or that of the ancient Bosnian town of Počitelj, both famed for their culture and architecture, did not garner the same response from the international community as Dubrovnik. This raises a question into why the attack on Dubrovnik should be so widely condemned and illicit such a wide international response, when other such attacks in the area did not. The answer, explored in this chapter but based on the theories thus far explored, is that Dubrovnik’s status as a World Heritage Site made it a target for non-Croatian troops wanting to damage Croatian (and European) identities, but its world heritage status also made it a vehicle for Croatia to illicit support and sympathy from the world heritage supporting (and western biased) international community. This chapter explores the histories of the Balkans in order to understand how a narrative of violence and ownership formed around Dubrovnik, and the impact these narratives had on the way culture, heritage, and identities were constructed around (and in opposition to) the attack on the Old Town.

6.1 History of Dubrovnik

It is likely that there were several motives for attacking Dubrovnik in 1991, but it is clear that culture and the values associated to culture were fundamental to the attack. The attack often noted as the turning point in the Balkans conflicts when the international community became focused on the
destruction of heritage (Pearson, 2010, p. 201); one that served to crystallise anti-Yugoslav (or anti-Milošević) feeling in the West and ultimately led to the increasing involvement of Europe and the USA in resolving the conflict (Francioni, 2004, p. 1212). The horror stories of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the narratives of conflict in ex-Yugoslavia are significant in the framing of this war to the international community and led to the formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), itself a turning point in academic and intervention approaches to conflict. Later chapters in this thesis fully explore the impact that Dubrovnik had on the ICTY proceedings, but it is introduced here as an example of how the attack on the Old Town became a readily accepted illustration of Yugoslavian brutality, because this pejorative identity trait had been introduced and enforced for centuries prior to the events in Dubrovnik by powerful European countries. The narratives of violence have had a profound impact on the way the conflict is viewed and remembered not only by the international community but also the local communities who experienced the wars, which in turn has shaped, interpreted, and moulded the narratives of history and heritage.

6.1.1 Culture, Nationalism and Conflict in the Balkans

Tracing the historical roots of the 1991 conflict in Dubrovnik and its association with cultural heritage inevitably leads back to the complex history of Yugoslavia. Analysing and interpreting the history of Yugoslavia is far beyond the remit of this research, but without investigating the historical roots of the 1991 conflict it is impossible to explain how the conflict in Dubrovnik was related to a much bigger and long-lasting dispute, and why Dubrovnik is such a landmark case in the long legacy of war, nationalism and cultural politics in the Balkans. What follows here is an interpretation of the history of the Balkans and its influence over the politics and identities in the region, which resulted in the attack on Dubrovnik in 1991.

6.1.2 Contested Histories: The Origins of Dubrovnik

The political conflict over the ownership of heritage and identity of the region is a theme at the core of this thesis, and although it is a complex issue it can be illustrated in the origin story of Dubrovnik. At various points in history Dubrovnik has been claimed by its inhabitants to have originally been Roman, Greek and Byzantine: whichever ancient culture Croatia is aligned in its contemporary state to determines its political status. For example, contemporary Dubrovnik currently aligns itself to an Italian heritage, which is evident through its colloquial use of Italian phrases, an emphasis on Italian culinary culture, architectural heritage, and Roman history in museums. This indicates that Dubrovnik is more likely to claim a Roman ancestry, aligning itself historically to Europe, to support its current status as a European state.

The foundation of Dubrovnik is either Roman, Byzantine or Greek (Dvornik, 1962, p. 139; Harris, 2006, pp. 22–23). The seemingly innocuous origins story of Dubrovnik takes on political connotations in light of how this history is used and how it signals its cultural loyalty. If the contemporary city is Roman in origins, then it can be linked to modern-day Italy and Europe and the connections that come with it. If it claims Byzantium heritage it lends itself to a connection with
Islam and the union with other Balkan states. The claim to a Greek origin avoids major political issues but is at odds with Dubrovnik’s historical and contemporary heritage, which bears less similarity to Greek heritage (either in terms of built heritage or cultural traditions) than to Roman or Byzantine. The conflict between Balkan and European (East and West) interpretations of Dubrovnik’s history emerges from the three myths on the founding of Dubrovnik (Harris, 2006, p. 22). The first is that Romans fleeing from Slavs founded a trading town called Ragusa (Dvornik, 1962, p. 139); the second is that the Byzantine Empire created a trading town on the location in the seventh century; and the third is that the town was founded on an earlier Greek settlement (Van Antwerp Fine, 1991, p. 35). In each case, the settlers’ nationality is associated with the projection of an authentic contemporary identity (Dzino, 2010, p. 232), which has a direct bearing on the independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991, and the claims made about whether Dubrovnik is Croatian (based on its Western history) or Slavic (based on its Eastern history) (Despalatovic, 2000, p. 84).

This interpretation of the founding of Dubrovnik introduces the argument which governs this chapter, is Dubrovnik’s heritage governed by its European or Slavic identity, on what historical grounds were these claims of ownership based, and how did this culminate in the siege of Dubrovnik.

6.1.3 The Republic of Dubrovnik and its reliance on Empires
The Republic of Dubrovnik functioned as an important centre for trade, with control over Adriatic trade routes and situation as a major trading port on the Silk Road (Jelavich, 1983, pp. 97–99). Dubrovnik’s cultural history is heavily influenced by its wars lasting for 400 years with the Venetians from the sixth century onwards, which fought for control of trade routes in the Adriatic. In 1202 Dubrovnik was defeated and lost its status as an autonomous region, remaining under Venetian control until 1358 (when the Austrian-Hungarian Empire first appeared on the political landscape of Dubrovnik) (Faroqhi, 2004, p. 90).

Dubrovnik prospered until 1667, when an earthquake devastated the town, leading to its decline (Lampe and Jackson, 1982, p. 54). During this period Venice began to encroach further into Croatia, whilst the Ottoman Empire also began to advance; caught in the middle of this conflict Dubrovnik, negotiated and colluded with the Ottoman Empire in an effort to gain protection and avoid involvement in open warfare (Sugar, 1996, p. 178).

Between 1816 and 1914 the Austrian-Hungarian Empire maintained its control over Croatia and during this period the cultural characterisation of the Balkans and its people was formed in Western Europe to create pejorative cultural stereotypes that would dictate the Balkan–European relationship from the nineteenth to twenty-first century (Todorova, 1997, p. 119). This Eurocentric rhetoric branded the Balkans as underdeveloped, uncivilised, and in need of imperial rule (Todorova, 1997, pp. 119–120). Maria Todorova argues that the discourse creates a negative stereotype in order to compare it unfavourably to good European values in order to enforce and justify exerting control over these nations, this is referred to Balkanisation, the politically motivated classification of an ethnic group based on socially constructed values (Todorova, 1997, p. 36). The Balkanisation of states by
European powers uses an invented discourse as a fact that delegitimises the political power and self-determination of Balkan states (Todorova, 1997, p. 110). This discourse may not be as overt in politics in the 1990s as it was in the 1800s, but the assumptions made about contemporary wars feature subtle elements of the balkanisation thesis (Simić, 2013, p. 118). For example, a speech justifying intervention in the Balkans made by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to the House of Commons in 1999 characterised the Balkan civil war using the word “barbarian”, while framing the case for international intervention in almost paternalistic terms to protect the people of Kosovo (Blair, 1999). This displays a Balkanised discourse through the characterisation of Yugoslavia (Serbia) as uncivilised and in need of imperial protection:

We must act: to save thousands of innocent men, women and children from humanitarian catastrophe, from death, barbarism and ethnic cleansing by a brutal dictatorship; to save the stability of the Balkan region, where we know chaos can engulf all of Europe. We have no alternative but to act and act we will, unless Milošević even now chooses the path of peace.

House of Commons Debates 23 March 1999, Vol. 328 Col. 162

The justification of military action given by Blair reflects Todorova’s insights, showing that the narratives that characterise the Balkans are deeply politically ingrained in Western society and that no further justification beyond these negative stereotypes of the Balkans are needed, simply because the stereotypes are perceived to be true based on historical discourse (Simić, 2013, p. 132). This characterisation of Balkan states continues to be a theme in discussions on conflicts in the Balkans, and the focus of international attention (Hayden, 2000, pp. 116–117). The conflict in Dubrovnik in 1991 is as an example of how Slavic aggression is framed – as an uncivilised attack from Serbian troops on cultural heritage which required international assistance, controlled by UNESCO, first to resolve the dispute, then to restore the sites. The ground-work for the acceptance of this narrative had already been laid by the Balkanised rhetoric that has been used throughout Europe to characterise the Balkans, and the vocabulary used to make these statements was already familiar to a receptive international audience.

6.1.4 Unification of Yugoslavia and the impact on national identities

The beginning of a unified Yugoslavia can be traced to the late 1890s, with Serbia as the driving force in seeking a strong relationship with neighbouring countries (Mann, 2012, p. 332). However, the desire for unification also revealed a key tension between Serbia and Croatia: Serbia wished to be at the centre of unification based on mutual Slavic cultures, traditions and memories of a joint aggression against the Turks (primarily a Serbian experience); Croatia wanted to form a unification based on the kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, with their own traditions and culture at the forefront of the union (Pašić, 2000, p. 262). John Lampe notes that although Croatia and Serbia wished to create a unified state based on Slavic tradition and culture, both wanted to control the unified state and the interpretation of culture to be used as the foundation to the union (Lampe, 2000, p. 39). Lampe contends that unification based on similar cultural heritage was an idea that grew out of the Slavic states, and was a rejection of the imagined communities created by the rest of Europe
(Lampe, 2000, p. 40). However, as the divide between the two states deepened, both wanted to present their own country as the enlightened centre of south Europe, and in doing so created an antagonistic history of conflict rather than of fraternity (Lampe, 2000, p. 40). If this were the case, it can be argued that in fracturing the narrative of fraternity to become the dominant nation, both countries began to Balkanise the other using the same pejorative rhetoric and vocabulary as the rest of Europe to create a hierarchical distinction. In doing so both created a historical narrative of cultural difference and blame that may have been the foundation (or at least the justification) for the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991.

Between 1890 and 1910 Croatia prospered through trade with the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia was resurrected. The dual monarchy wished to include Dalmatia in this kingdom and sought Hungarian assistance to ensure protection for Dalmatia from Venetian claims (Lampe, 2000, p. 79). Serbia welcomed the union and a state of mutual respect between them was revived. However, Hungarian insistence that the Kingdom of Croatia should include not only Dalmatia but also Bosnia and Herzegovina led to the cooling of Serbian and Croatian cooperation, which in turn led to violence in 1902 and the Balkan wars in 1912 (Grandits and Promitzer, 2000, p. 132; Lampe, 2000, p. 80). In 1904 Stjepan Radić and the Croatian Peasant Party began to argue for power to be removed from foreign powers and given to rural Croatia (where most people lived and worked). It was at this time that Radić publicly recognised “Serbs as Slavs, and as ethnically separate from Croats” and he began to argue that Bosnia had more in common with Croatia than Serbia, based on their mutual traditions of peasant culture (Lampe, 2000, p. 80).

6.1.5 The First World War and The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

The events of the First World War led to the formation of a unified Yugoslavia. The fall of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire after the war opened an avenue for the Balkan states to consolidate power in the region (Lampe, 2000, p. 101). In the face of the ailing Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, Serbia pushed for a unified kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes capable of consolidating power in the region. Croatia had supported the Hungarians through the First World War, and although the peasants were under a great deal of pressure to provide the empire with most (if not all) of their produce (Glenny, 2000, p. 301), general opinion stayed loyal to Hungary until the disintegration of the Empire in 1918. (Lampe, 2000, p. 109)

By 1918 the toll of the First World War on Yugoslavia became apparent; thousands of civilians were homeless, dying, diseased or refugees escaping genocide and relying on the protection of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the wake of the fall of Austria and Hungary (Denitch, 1994, p. 24). In the aftermath of the First World War a new pattern of retributive violence began to emerge, wherein the ethnic minority least able to protect itself received the full force of the majority’s anger in both victorious and defeated counties across Europe (Glenny, 2000, p. 326). This pattern of retributive violence became a particular staple of wars in the Balkans (notably in Croatia in the Second World War) due to the “ethnic patchwork” that had been produced by centuries of shifting geo-political
borders; a focus on cultural and ethnic differences and the economic cost of war (and particularly of defeat) (Glenny, 2000, p. 327).

6.1.6 Nationalism and the Second World War in Croatia
The historic connections between Italy and Germany and Croatia, alongside the growing resentment of Serbian authority, came to a head at the outbreak of the Second World War. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany presented Croatia with a chance to bring about an independent, nationalist Croatia (Lampe, 2000, p. 198). In 1941 Croatia became a Nazi puppet state when the Croatian Ustaše declared Croatia an independent republic, and commenced the brutal internment and execution of thousands of Gypsies, Orthodox Serbs, Jews, and Muslims throughout Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia (Denitch, 1994, p. 41). The Ustaše wrought great and widely recognised violence on these groups (Lampe, 2000; Glenny, 2000; Despalatovic, 2000; Denitch, 1994) which included some of the most brutal acts of genocide of the Second World War. The Nazi-controlled Croatian Ustaše, under the leadership of Ante Pavelić, sought to secure Croat supremacy in Yugoslavia by the systematic, elimination of all non-Croat nationalities and ethnicities (Pavković, 2000, p. 38). Serbia was marked out for particular aggression propagated by Croatian nationalists, based on an imagined history of hate and Serbian dominance in Yugoslavia and the perceived subjugation of the Croat people (Pavković, 2000, p. 38) which had been created by centuries of Balkanisation perpetrated by Western European powers.

The nationalism of Croatia in the 1940s was explicitly linked to Nazism and fascism, and the legacy of Croatian nationalism was tarnished by its association with the Ustaše (Denitch, 1994, pp. 30–31). In the years following the Second World War, Croatia became part of Tito’s communist Yugoslavia and Croatian nationalism was side-lined in favour of a single Yugoslav nationality, authorised and enforced by the state (Silber and Little, 1996). The swing to Nazism and fascism in the 1930s and 1940s has a direct bearing on the reluctance of Croatia to reassert their national identity after the Second World War. The damage caused to the reputation of Croatia by the actions of the Ustaše in the war was long lasting and when war broke out again in 1991 the Croats were instantly framed in Yugoslav propaganda as Nazis and Ustaše. The 1991 conflict was characterised on all sides by the very same extreme violence, genocide and nationalism that was carried out in the Balkans during the Second World War.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Tito’s partisans emerged as not only the Soviet-supported victors of the conflict, but also as its morally superior heroes, compared to the Croatian Ustaše (Bennett, 2000, pp. 206–207). In Yugoslavia the old dichotomies of religion, East and West conflicts, and uneasy Serb-Croat relations were replaced by a Soviet model of communism under the control of a central Serbian government presided over by Croatian born Tito (Lampe, 2000). In 1953 in a departure from Stalin’s Soviet Union, a Constitution was drafted to decentralise power. However, to ensure the survival of the unification, several provisions were put in place. One dictated that the right of succession in Yugoslavia were repealed and that the Yugoslav working-class would choose their own leaders (Lampe, 2000, p. 260). This provision aimed for single, socialist consciousness “to
replace the various nationalisms that had discredited themselves during the Second World War” (Lampe, 2000, p. 261), resulting in a “supra-national identity and the notion of the three named people” (Lampe, 2000, p. 261) of the Jugoslavenstvo.

In 1941 Yugoslavia was locked not only into the Second World War, but also into a civil war. The three sides were the partisans, the Chetnik and the Ustaše (Pavković, 2000, p. 37). The Chetnik, under Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovic, were a resistance army that refused to surrender in the Nazi Germany occupation of Yugoslavia and instead continued to take orders from the government-in-exile (residing in Britain) (Pavković, 2000, p. 38). The Chetnik ideology aimed to return Yugoslavia to its pre-war political state under the rule of the Yugoslav monarchy (Pavković, 2000, p. 38). The Chetnik were celebrated by the allies (particularly Britain) and propaganda portrayed them as resistance fighters and heroes (Pavković, 2000, p. 39). The Chetnik also endorsed a nationalist Serbian ideology by seeking to reaffirm Serb superiority in post-war Yugoslavia through a military dictatorship and the removal and re-education of non-Serb Slavs. The dual ethos of unity forged by returning to a pre-war monarchy and Serbian national authority led to unregulated revenge against the Croats and reduced support for the Chetnik from potential recruits from Bosnia and Croatia (Pavković, 2000, p. 38).

The partisans were opposed to the Nazi control of Yugoslavia. Under Josip Broz Tito and the Communist Party, the partisans sought to remove the Nazi presence and return Yugoslavia to a unified state, but with equal powers invested in all countries (Pavković, 2000, p. 40). The partisans were opposed to revenge and promoted a unified fraternity of Yugoslavia against the Nazi occupiers. This in turn encouraged Yugoslav supporters from non-Serbian countries to join in, with the hope of securing a voice in the new Yugoslavia without fear of reprisals (Pavković, 2000, p. 33).

6.1.7 Reconciling people, places, and the past in communist Yugoslavia

By 1945 the Communist partisans emerged as the dominant power in Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito and with the support of Stalin and the Soviet Union. The partisans also benefited from increased allied support (particularly of Britain, who switched allegiance from the Chetnik to the partisans in 1943), who helped secure international legitimacy for Tito and the communist ruling party in Yugoslavia (Pavković, 2000, p. 41). Aleksandar Pavković argues that the lasting effect of the Ustaše massacres during the war was an unease at the thought of Croats being in a position of power in Yugoslavia and the Chetnik reprisals for Ustaše massacres on Muslims and Croats in Bosnia led to fears of returning to a pre-war (Chetnik nationalist) Yugoslavia. The partisans both capitalised on and allayed this fear by securing Croat and Muslim governments in Croat and Muslim strongholds within the Communist Party, thus providing protection for and against Yugoslav perpetrators of violence in Yugoslavia during the Second World War (Pavković, 2000, p. 42). Furthermore, the partisans held the Nazis and fascist Italy collaborators solely responsible for any and all atrocities committed during the Second World War (Despalatovic, 2000, p. 89). Pavković argues that this effectively made the partisans the only party that was not associated with Second World War crimes.
(as both Chetnik and Ustaše had collaborated with the Nazis) and also enabled them to accuse the
opposition of being collaborators and therefore criminals (Pavković, 2000, p. 43).

The decision the partisans made to not reconcile Croatia with its past by confronting widespread
collaboration with the Nazis had consequences. Because Croatia went from a fascist nationalist
ideology in the war back to a unified fraternal national identity it could not rid itself of the association,
and neither will it ever be able to apologise fully for the Ustaše behaviour (unlike other countries
involved in Nazism in the 1930s and 1940s) because to admit complicity would destabilise the
legitimacy of the Croatian identity (Despalatovic, 2000, pp. 90–92). The Croatian lack of acceptance
of their own role in the war, followed by their immediate incorporation into another, now Yugoslav,
nation has meant that the pre-communist past of Croatia remained unexamined and forcibly repressed
by Tito’s government. This remained an underlying tension between Slavic republics until the fall of
communism in the Balkans. As a result, cultural differences and disagreements were reasserted after
the communist state using cultural repression ceased to control the area. The influence of heritage on
nationalism is discussed in detail in Chapter Two, suggesting that heritage and nationalism remain
an intrinsic part of a culture even when they are erased from official histories and discourse.

When Croatia declared its independence in 1991, the underlying tensions of the unexamined events
of the Second World War resurfaced, appearing to the Serbs as dangerous nationalism, and to
Croatians as a demand to be freed from Serbian dominance. The genocidal levels of violence in the
1990s thus can be seen partly to be a result of continual violence stemming from unresolved Second
World War perceptions of victimhood, guilt, and retributive justice on all sides of Yugoslavia, which
was an important factor which contributed to the violence in the 1990s.

Denitch notes that the lack of reconciliation of previous conflicts in contemporary Balkan countries
can be seen through the manipulation of the records of casualties and deaths during the war. Denitch
argues that records of deaths in Yugoslavia during Second World War are not compatible with the
number of deaths each nation claims (Denitch, 1994, pp. 32–33). Denitch notes that the countries of
the former Yugoslav Republic exaggerate the extent of their own loss to accentuate their own level
of suffering at the hands of neighbouring countries (Denitch, 1994, p. 33). This is a further example
of the political power that heritage and the interpretation of history have over politics and nationalism
in contemporary Croatia, and is particularly pertinent to the records of levels of damage to cultural
heritage in Dubrovnik, explored in the following chapters.

6.2 Dubrovnik Conflict 1991

In 1991 Croatia announced its independence from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia,
which subsequently led to the attack on Dubrovnik known as the Siege of Dubrovnik. From October
1991 until June 1992 Dubrovnik was victim of an unlawful and sustained shelling campaign by the
Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) that killed forty-three Croatian civilians (ICTY, 2003), wounded
numerous others and severely damaged the cultural heritage of the city. As the city had been
demilitarised since 1979 it did not expect an attack as it had no military advantage and was an area
of outstanding cultural significance (WHC, 2012).
The argument used by Serbian leaders to justify the attempted annexation of Dubrovnik was historical, arguing that the land had been settled by the Slavs centuries ago and therefore should remain Slavic, and not part of the European-centred Croatia (BBC News, 2001). Dubrovnik’s borders had shifted countless times over centuries of settlement, and Yugoslavia (particularly Serbia and Montenegro) took advantage of this to argue that their attack in 1991 was legal. Furthermore, the Serbian claims to owning Dubrovnik sought to draw attention to the Ustaše defined geo-political borders (and flag) of Croatia which included Dalmatia to argue that contemporary Croatian nationalism and claim over Dubrovnik was a result of its Nazi past (Bennett, 2000, p. 206).

The national government of Croatia and the local leaders of Dubrovnik disputed the evidence and the historical interpretation and Dubrovnik fought successfully to remain part of Croatia. Despite the historical justification put forward by Yugoslavia, the real reason for the attack on Dubrovnik is debated (Pearson, 2010, p. 197). The ICTY proceedings in 2004 took the view that under the control of Slobodan Milošević, the Yugoslav Army sought to weaken the Croatian army by attacking Dubrovnik, thus distracting Croatian troops from conflicts nearer to Zagreb by forcing them to protect the town (Francioni, 2004, p. 1215).

The argument that has received the most traction in the media, the ICTY trial proceedings, and academia is that while the city was bombed in part to distract Croatian forces (Pearson, 2010, p. 200; ICTY, 2006), its main function was to damage a World Heritage Site. This attack sought to achieve a variety of aims; to show the strength of Milošević’s forces to the international community by defying international laws (ICTY, 2003) and as a show of strength and disrespect to the Croatians by damaging their well-known symbol of pride and cultural identity (Denitch, 1994, p. 136), as well as drawing attention to decades-old geo-political upheavals. However, Silber and Little suggest that the bombing of Dubrovnik may have been a matter of local rivalry and jealousy of the prosperity of Dubrovnik compared to local poverty: “There seemed little or no military rationale to much of the bombardment inflicted on Dubrovnik. It was the revenge of the poor boys from the mountains on one of the richest, most Westward-leaning parts of former Yugoslavia” (Silber and Little, 1996, pp. 203–204). Both Denitch’s perspective and that of Silber and Little suggest that the reason for the attack was politically driven and used history as a justification.

The ICTY started prosecution proceedings in 2001 against Slobodan Milošević, Major General Pavle Strugar (commander of the second operational group, JNA), Vice-Admiral Miodrag Jokić and Captain Vladimir Kovačević (Commander of the Ninth Naval Sector), for their involvement in shelling the Old Town. Strugar, Jokić and Kovačević were charged with the final version of the indictment on 31 May 2003, in case number IT-01–42 Amended. Slobodan Milošević was charged separately in case number IT 02–54-T on 21 July 2005, and Dubrovnik featured alongside accusations of war crimes committed elsewhere. Milan Zec featured only in the original indictment of case number IT-01–42 in 26 July 2002, alongside Strugar, Jokić and Kovačević. Charges against Zec were dropped due to insufficient evidence, and his name does not appear on any subsequent indictments. The trial prosecutions culminated in a conviction for Strugar and Jokić for “Murder, cruel treatment, attacking civilians, illegal attacks on civilian property, and destruction or wilful
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, to charity or education, to art and science, historical monuments and works of art or science” (ICTY, 2005).

Strugar, Jokić, and Kovačević were generals in the JNA and were accused of ordering and participating in the attack on Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991. The attack resulted in the deaths of two people and “damage and destruction” to the Old Town of Dubrovnik (ICTY, 2003). There are fifteen counts relating to Dubrovnik, including “Murder, Cruel Treatment, attacks on Civilians” (counts 1–6), “unjustified devastation, unlawful attacks on civilian objects, destruction or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and the works of arts and sciences” (counts 7–12: 7–9 Dubrovnik; 9–12: Dubrovnik region), and the “wanton destruction of villages, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to education and religion, plunder of public or private property” (counts 13–15). Although the first counts contain the most grievous of the charges, this research is limited to an interest to cultural heritage in Dubrovnik during the shelling, and therefore concentrates on counts 7–9, which are concerned with the destruction and wilful damage of Dubrovnik.

Due to the high profile of Dubrovnik as a WHS when the attack began in October 1991, the Old Town was host to UNESCO observers who recorded the damage, as did the local population (both heritage experts and also local residents) (UNESCO, 1993b). The record of the shelling is extremely detailed. In the ICTY proceedings, the attachments list over 1000 shell hits and their precise location for a single day (6 November 1991). The detailed record of events has meant that the analysis of the conflict and of the post-war period is also exceptionally detailed. The following chapter uses this context to frame its investigation into how the conflict impacted on the heritage of Dubrovnik (and vice versa). Chapter Eight also frames the major investigation of the impact of heritage on Dubrovnik’s post-war recovery process, which has been carried out in Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine.

6.3 Summary: The influence of history on the IHAF

The Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework is founded on the suggestion that history and contested cultural meaning shapes the relationship between cultural heritage and (post-)conflict. In order to gauge the long-term effect that conflict has on the creation and contestation of cultural identities, there is a need to look closely at not only what is reported to have happened, but also who has reported it, what their motivations are, and how it has been manipulated into becoming regarded as a historical fact. The first stage of the IHAF seeks to interrogate and understand the context to the conflict to which it is applied and to use this to understand the scope of analysis in the rest of the research undertaken with the IHAF. By gaining an awareness of the history of the Balkans and the powerful political influences at work on these narratives, the conflict and recovery of Dubrovnik can be contextualised, and the socio-political themes which have influenced (and still influence) Dubrovnik are understood in greater depth and applied to further research in the next stages of the IHAF. This chapter has explored how the historical narratives around the Balkans have shaped the way in which the attack on Dubrovnik was interpreted by the international community and the ICTY
proceedings as a war crime and an attack on Croatian cultural identities. Going forward, the subsequent chapters will argue that the familiarity of the ICTY with these narratives (and the historical assumptions they make on Slavic cultural identities) have blurred the line between objective evidence and subjective interpretations over the extent of damage and destruction in the Old Town. Chapter Seven investigates this argument by evaluating the extent of damage done to the physical fabric of the Old Town through an empirical study of visible damage, and comparing it to the records of Destruction created by local people in the aftermath of the war, supported by UNESCO and used by the ICTY.

6.4 The Scope of the Attack on Cultural Heritage and its Aftermath
The first stage in the application of the IHAF to the Dubrovnik case study involves the creation of an overview of the core events of the conflict, and of their impact on heritage in terms of physical, economic, and socio-political damage. This chapter explores these impacts by analysing the records of damage done to Dubrovnik, and argues that the attack was carefully choreographed to cause significant damage to the fabric of the Old Town, which elicited a huge response from a local, national, and international community. This chapter provides a baseline for the damage caused to the cultural heritage of the Old Town of Dubrovnik, which is used by the subsequent chapters to discuss how the town recovered from the conflict, and to interrogate how the records of damage, explored by this chapter, have influenced the narrative of conflict recovery.

The purpose of this investigation is to identify the extent of the damage done to the Old Town. UNESCO have recorded the damage done to BCH in a damage report, and listed a selection of buildings which were considered culturally significant, and who were damaged in the conflict. This list of damaged sites can be considered as the limit of the damage done to the Old Town, and used to define the scope of the research in this thesis.

The damage done to BCH in the conflict has been the catalyst for restoration projects in the city, as well as providing evidence to ICTY proceedings and shaping the perception of security and tourism in Dubrovnik for local people and tourists alike. Dubrovnik is primarily internationally regarded as a heritage site, and it is because of its BCH that this image survives. The damage sustained by the BCH in the conflict is a defining feature of international responses to the use of cultural heritage in conflict. It is therefore important to attempt an objective assessment of the extent to which the BCH was damaged in the conflict and also to comment on the ways in which the damage has been recorded.

The buildings to be studied were identified using the UNESCO (1993b) damage report; these were then assessed and photographed by the researcher in Dubrovnik in 2012–2014. Existing restoration and ICTY records were also scrutinised. The results of this analysis show that the reports of damage to buildings has been limited to an official set of buildings regarded as culturally significant and that these form the basis for the international reconstruction efforts in Dubrovnik. The results of the survey of damage sustained in the conflict are used as the foundation for Chapter Seven on the physical recovery from conflict.
6.4.1 Physical Impact: The Effect of the Conflict on Built Heritage

Mapping the damage done to the BCH in the Old Town is possible due in part to the UNESCO observers in the town at the time of the shelling, and also to the local community who documented a great deal of the damage themselves. A wealth of documents and photographs has been used to assess the damage, but it is UNESCO’s focus on forty-four sites that frames this research (UNESCO, 1993b). Over 800 buildings were damaged in the Old Town, but by focusing on forty-four significant buildings it is possible to limit the scope of this investigation and examine the extent of the war damage in detail, whilst keeping in mind the scale of the damage.

The damaged buildings are mapped in the following figures to demonstrate the density of the hits, the location of the shells and the level of damage. These are new maps, created for this research by the author, and based on information from UNESCO (1993b) and the Institute for the Restoration of Dubrovnik (IFRD) (2011). The notes on damage for 1993 taken from UNESCO are quite short and reflect the on-the-ground nature of the report. They were taken at the time of the shelling and appear to be accurate field notes. Later sections go into detail about the scale of damage. Most of the 37 buildings that were examined for this research have been selected from the UNESCO (1993b) damage report, and organised using the report’s categories (gutted buildings, damaged buildings, religious buildings, streets and fountains); however, the author also examined some sites that were recorded only by the IFRD as they hold significance either due to damage, or their (non-Christian) religious significance. For each building a photograph was taken during or just after the shelling to record the damage in the UNESCO report. Another photo, taken in 2012 or 2013 by the author of this thesis, has been used to draw a comparison and build a timeline from damage to recovery. The damage information has been used to create a data sheet (also named BCH recovery assessment [BCHRA] – see Appendix 2 onward) for each building, with a brief description of the buildings, damage done during the war, estimated cost of recovery, a set of comparison photos and notes on recovery.

6.4.2 Grades and Records of Recovery

The complex relationship between Dubrovnik and its damaged cultural heritage is reflected in the grading systems used to collate and categorise the damage. This section briefly outlines the grading system used in the 1993 UNESCO report to record significant damage to the BCH. This report is a primary source for this study; it was published soon after the conflict, and is compiled from a collection of photographs taken by residents during the attacks and written records of the damage made by local residents and re-assessed by UNESCO contractors in the aftermath of the conflict.

The damage report identifies forty-four sites of significant damage, grouped into four broad categories: buildings gutted by fire, damaged buildings, religious buildings, and streets and fountains. The report also discusses walls as a separate category. For the purposes of this research, they are considered part of the overall damage and recovery of the city and are discussed in reference to the “fifth façade”, which is elaborated in later chapters. In each UNESCO category, the level of damage ranges from level one (slight damage) to level three (totally destroyed) representing the impact on
the entire structure based on these aspects. Each of the aspects of a structure have also been given a priority listing from A to C, which indicates whether the site needs (A) repairs, (B) partial reconstruction or (C) total reconstruction. The more serious the damage to a structure (for example gutted by fire) the higher grade of damage it receives from UNESCO (level one, two, or three) with an associated priority for recovery (Grade C). This research follows these criteria to structure its parameters around the damaged BCH of the Old Town. The priorities of damage and recovery are also discussed in reference to this UNESCO system.

A second important source is the IFRD set of surveys, which show the damage focusing on a similar array of sites, but also include some additional sites that have been incorporated into this research. IFRD has also recorded the recovery and repairs in these sites with reference to donations and restoration work carried out. As such, IFRD is a vital source of information about the actual work carried out in the city, whilst the UNESCO damage report is an immediate record of harm caused. The information taken from IFRD is discussed at length in the following chapter, with particular reference to how it compares to the 1993 UNESCO report, but it is this UNESCO report that provides the bulk of data used in this chapter. This research has combined all the available data from these two resources and focuses on twenty-one individual sites. This number is formed from sites that are named in both the UNESCO damage report and the IFRD surveys, as well as additional sites of note (discussed later in this chapter). Sites that were excluded from individual evaluation were communal sites (such as the walls, roofs, streets, and fountains), which were considered as part of the overall recovery of the city.

6.4.3 Concentration of Shells

The Old Town was shelled over an eight-month period, with the heaviest shelling taking place on 6 December, 1991. The shells were accurately reported and recorded by UNESCO observers and local people. IFRD and UNESCO were able to record, catalogue, and map the spread of the shell hits across the Old Town. The map of shelling (Figure 6.1) is a composite of the data gathered from both of these sources to produce an accurate and original map of the shelling in the Old Town, this method and data sources has also been used in figures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. Figure 6.1 uses the composite data to divide the city into quarters and log the number of shell hits per quarter. This presentation of data is original to this research and was devised to establish whether there was a pattern to the shelling. The shell hits per quarter are cross-referenced to the density of BCH iconic structures and dwellings, to discover which areas of the city were the preferred targets during the conflict (see Appendix 2–12), and whether population density or the concentration of BCH was a contributing factor.

According to the map, the northern quarters of the Old Town took the highest number of shells, with an estimated 188 hits in the north-east and 296 in the north-west. By comparison, the southern quarters experienced approximately 36 hits in the south-east and 110 in the south-West. The Western quarters of the town were the recipients of more shells than the eastern quarters and the north-West quarter was hit almost as many times as all the other quarters combined.
The density of UNESCO-defined BCH in the city is highest in the north-east and north-west, which suggests that (either by accident or design) the northern half of the city was both recipient of the highest concentration of shells and host to the greatest amount of BCH. The northern quarters of the city are also the site of the highest density of homes and shops or businesses. The JNA artillery that shelled Dubrovnik was stationed in the hills to the north-east overlooking the town (Figure 6.2), and in the sea to the West. The biggest visible BCH landmarks in the Old Town are clearly recognisable from these positions due to their size and their recognisable outlines. These landmarks of the cityscape include the Dominican Convent bell-tower (NE), the Franciscan Monastery bell-tower (NW), the cathedral (SE), the Church of St Blaisius (SE) and the clock tower (SE) and are marked on the photograph of Dubrovnik Old Town from Mount Srđ below (Figure 6.3), which was taken looking south from the vantage point at the top of Mount Srđ. Most of the damaged BCH is in the NW quarter, and the second highest incidence is in the NE quarter. The SE quarter is home to some of the most recognisable BCH landmarks such as the cathedral, the Church of St Blasius and the Rector’s Palace. It also contains the third highest number of damaged BCH sites. The SW quarter contains the least number of BCH sites and received the fewest number of shell hits.
6.4.4 Gutted Houses and Palaces

Houses and palaces gutted by fire are recorded as the most seriously affected buildings in Dubrovnik and are either partially or completely destroyed. The buildings are listed with their reference numbers in Table 6.1, and these reference numbers are referred to throughout this chapter and its maps. Each is mentioned by name in the ICTY proceedings, providing evidence to support charges regarding the deliberate destruction of cultural property in Dubrovnik. The destroyed buildings were used as evidence in the trial of General Pavle Strugar, Admiral Miodrag Jokić and Captain Vladimir Kovačević and were included as the unlawful shelling of civilian objects (ICTY, 2002, p. 31). The damage to these houses was severe and each needed substantial rebuilding.
Table 6.1: Destroyed Building Reference Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Estimated cost (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gutted houses &amp; palaces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate 1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>650 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate 2</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>433 740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Palace Martinusic– Sv. Josipa 1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>443 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Palace od Puca 11</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>641 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Palace Sorkocevic-Miha Pracata 6</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>448 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Palace od Puca 16</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>395 890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Palace Dordic- Maineri- Siroka 5</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>828 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Palace Zlatariceva 9</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>215 080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>House Izmedu Polaca 5</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>130 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The damage to the buildings has, for the most part, been repaired or restored to the extent that severe damage is not a defining feature of the buildings: instead, war damage is noticeable through the yet-to-fade white stonework replacements, replacement window and door frames, smoke damage in the recesses and crevices of the buildings (particularly under balconies) and ricochet and shrapnel damage and repairs, which are a characteristic feature of contemporary Dubrovnik.

Figure 6.4 Map of Houses and Palaces gutted by shelling

These buildings were documented as being shelled and destroyed on 6 December 1991, when the largest number of shells was fired on the city. Buildings adjacent to large visual targets seem to have suffered the brunt of the attack. For example, buildings bordering the Stradun, adjacent to clock towers and near known landmarks, suffered a great deal of damage. The two buildings on Od Sigurate were two of the worst affected. They may have been shelled based on their location rather than being targeted deliberately Looking at the map of the gutted palaces and buildings (Figure 6.4), most of the shelling concentrated on two areas; the two houses on the Stradun (Palaces on od Sigurate, see Appendix 2 and 3) and a set of buildings along Od Puca street (Appendix 4).

6.4.5 Damaged houses and Palaces

These buildings suffered a great deal of damage in the 1991–1992 bombardment, either through direct hits or ricochet damage from neighbouring buildings and the Stradun. There are fifteen buildings in this category (Figure 6.5) and marks of conflict are still apparent on all the buildings to differing degrees with ricochet damage of various kinds and bullet holes peppering the façades.

Figure 6.5 Map of Damaged Houses and Palaces

These buildings were affected in any of four major ways: damage to roofs, damage to their structure by the impact of shells on or adjacent to the buildings, fire and smoke damage and a range of structural and aesthetic damage resulting from shrapnel. Although the impact on these buildings is less severe than those named in section 7.3.3, it is significant as they are sites of historic and cultural importance, including some of Dubrovnik’s most celebrated and iconic buildings, such as Sponza Palace and the Rector’s Palace (Appendix 5). These buildings are also of significance in terms of their recovery. They have been repaired to a high standard, but there is a great deal of war damage evident on the façades of the buildings: the ricochet marks and repairs stand out in contrast with those designated as gutted buildings (which do not feature many marks) and religious buildings discussed below (which show many ricochet marks but there have been hardly any attempts to repair them).
This category of damaged buildings provides a baseline for how far repairs have been made, and the decisions made to repair or leave damage visible.

6.4.6 Damage to religious buildings

Dubrovnik’s Old Town is home to many religious buildings. There are at least eight Catholic churches and cathedrals, a synagogue, a Serb orthodox church, and a mosque within the city walls. UNESCO lists thirteen religious buildings as damaged during the conflict (Figure 6.6). The domed roofs of the churches are reported to have acted as targets during the conflict, and much of the injury they sustained was caused by direct shell hits. The roofs of these buildings have been repaired and the façades restored in most places, with little major damage visible. Repairs to roofs and carvings are not immediately visible except on closer inspection, and they blend in with the original material. However, shell and ricochet marks are still very evident on the façades of buildings, and are immediately noticeable on several of them, particularly the Franciscan Monastery, the cathedral and St Saviour’s Church.

Dubrovnik is famed for its BCH and also as a religious centre. The presence of so many churches, cathedrals, monasteries and convents both active and unused is a reflection of how important religion (particularly Catholicism) is to Dubrovnik in spiritual, historical and iconic terms. The decision by UNESCO to categorise religious buildings as a separate category from house and palaces damaged is interesting because it instantly sets them apart from secular buildings, rather than classifying them on the basis of the damage they sustained. From this it can be suggested that a purposeful decision was made to separate secular and non-secular buildings in order to draw immediate attention and to emphasise the plight of religious buildings in the old town.

Figure 6.6 Map of Damage to Religious Buildings
6.5 Summary: Conflict Profile of Dubrovnik

The damage sustained to the Old Town during the bombardment was on a grand scale and was well documented. The attacking forces had both the technology and the vantage points to destroy the Old Town, but instead they shelled it over the course of several months. The data has shown that, of the forty-four building listed by UNESCO as damaged, nine are considered to be the worst affected. The damage caused to the buildings varies in severity, but all affected houses bear similar characteristics: structural stress, ricochet damage and roof damage, so they can no longer be used as normal.

This research has also revealed the issues faced when trying to assess degrees of damage, and when using appropriate vocabulary to describe the damage. The different categorisations of damage used by UNESCO and the IFRD attempt to use standardised grades of damage, but they made different judgements of the severity of damage based on the same information. This is a useful example of the different ways heritage and heritage interpretation can be used based on the same level of information, but only taking into account a singular definition of heritage. The IHAF and its holistic approach attempts to avoid using a singular definition of heritage as the only indicator of impact and influence over recovery, and instead seeks to widen the definition to better understand the pressures on cultural heritage and determine the role they may play in recovery.

The following chapters build on the initial assessment made in this chapter to identify how heritage had been used to recover from the damage done to the Old Town during the conflict. The following chapters represent the mainstay of this thesis, in which an empirical investigation uses this chapter’s established baseline to assess the impact of heritage on the recovery of Dubrovnik from conflict; it achieves this by adhering to the research and results phase of the IHAF to establish the influence of heritage over the physical, economic, and socio-political recovery of Dubrovnik.
Chapter Seven: Physical Impact of Heritage on Recovery

The physical damage done to heritage by war is the most visual way in which heritage and conflict relate to one another (Merryman, 2005, p. 11; Tomaszewski, 2004, p. 30). The image of destroyed heritage is often used by the media to indicate how serious and barbaric a war has become (Sen, 2006, p. 85; Tuastad, 2010, p. 591), whilst attacks on built heritage are widely regarded in the academic literature, the media and in communities as attacks on individual beliefs and identities (Assmann, 1995, p. 125). The rebuilding of heritage in post-conflict recovery is less well documented but it is often associated with industrious experts from countries with heritage-rich reputations helping to carefully rebuild destroyed heritage (Ashworth and van der Aa, 2002, p. 448). Earlier in this thesis the ramifications of rebuilding physical heritage were discussed in terms of whether those areas are recreating old heritage, or forging a new heritage and identity (see Chapter Four). The extent to and the way in which heritage is recovered has a direct bearing on how events have been remembered (or alternatively, forgotten and removed from history) (Connerton, 2008, pp. 59–60).

This section aims to assess and evaluate the extent to which Dubrovnik Old Town has been physically restored, and using this as a base to discuss what impact physical repairs have on the inhabitants of Dubrovnik.

The buildings that have been mapped, photographed and analysed are limited to those buildings featured in the UNESCO Damage Report (1993b). Both these buildings and the categories of damage have been explored in Chapter Six.

Measuring the impact of the conflict on the built cultural heritage of the Old Town is a major component of the IHAF. As argued in previous chapters, the physical cultural heritage of community acts as a physical signifier of value and identity (Ascherson, 2007, pp.18-19; Judt, 1992, p. 83; Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). When the physical components of culture are purposely damaged during a conflict, this can be interpreted as a direct assault on a particular identity (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 90; Barakat, 2007, p. 16; Sen, 2006, pp. 84–85). The case of Dubrovnik takes this argument a step further and it is suggested here that Dubrovnik was not only attacked as a cultural symbol, but as a major attack on the town’s ability to use heritage as a tourism resource, upon which it heavily relies. In the aftermath of the attack the city was reported by UNESCO as having sustained significant damage; these findings were taken from an assessment it carried out in collaboration with local Dubrovnik heritage professionals and residents, and presented to the ICTY as an objective record of the damage sustained to BCH. The records of damage recorded in the aftermath of the conflict are integral to understanding how damaged the Old Town was by the conflict as they document where, how, and when specific buildings were damaged in the bombardments. Using the methods outlined in the IHAF to follow-up on these records creates a comparative record of not only how far the recovery of the Old Town has progressed, but also provides the evidence to reassess and evaluate whether the records of damage made in 1992 can be considered wholly accurate some twenty years later.
Following the IHAF, three areas are outlined as important aspects to investigate in regards to BCH: structures, actors, and dynamics (see IHAF diagram in Chapter Five). By investigating these aspects, it is possible to determine what was damaged, who took responsibility for its restoration, and what has happened to this record of damage and recovery in response to the conflict. The outcome of this endeavour is that a comparative record of damage and recovery of Dubrovnik’s BCH will be created, and interrogated to establish how physical heritage has been used to interpret and frame the conflict in Dubrovnik to its residents and international community. From the theoretical foundations of this thesis it has been shown that objectivity in regards to heritage is elusive, and subjective interpretation is used when trying to formulate comprehensive narratives around historical events.

In order to follow the IHAF steps, three main objectives have been established to assess the role of heritage in the physical recovery of Dubrovnik. The first objective speaks directly to the determining a baseline for damage in Dubrovnik by investigating what structures were damaged in Dubrovnik. This has been explored in Chapter Seven, and this assessment frames the remainder of this chapter’s assessment of recovery by providing a baseline of damage to use for a comparative investigation.

The second objective speaks directly to the second aspect of the IHAF, and seeks to identify the actors involved in the recovery of Dubrovnik by investigating the priorities and biases of these groups who were involved in the recovery process. This is achieved by establishing a timeframe and scale of heritage-centred reconstruction efforts including (i) the order in which reconstruction took place and (ii) its cost (see section 9.1. It is expected that this investigation will reveal that it will not be the most damaged BCH that elicits the fastest and costliest recovery endeavour, rather, it is expected that the most iconic structures in Dubrovnik will receive the most attention and support. Moreover, it is expected that structures which symbolise Dubrovnik’s dominant identity (which was under threat during the conflict) will also enjoy a high level of support. For example, Catholic churches with iconic status are expected to feature highly on the list as it illustrates Dubrovnik’s strong attachment to Catholicism, and its identification with European (specifically Italian) heritage presented through its architecture.

To investigate the dynamics of recovery since the war, a comparative record from damage to recovery has been created. This third objective uses the interrogation of the UNESCO reports carried out in Chapter Seven to establish a baseline for damage, and creates a comparative recovery report based on evidence of damage and recovery on BCH. The recovery report is determined by empirical assessments of pre-determined BCH sites using the BCH assessment criteria and methods outlined in Chapter Five, and a selection are recorded in the Appendix of this thesis.

The culmination of these three objectives is a comprehensive comparative study that determines the extent of recovery in Dubrovnik, and interrogates how inference, interpretation, and bias have shaped the perception of damage to physical buildings in Dubrovnik in and since the conflict. This original contribution to the study of heritage in post-conflict contexts argues that BCH cannot be used as a factual objective record of damage, as the interpretation of damage is influenced and manipulated in accordance with the perspective and motivations of those recording the damage. Furthermore, the
perspective of recovery of BCH in Dubrovnik changes in response to its contemporary needs and cultural identity rather than actual damage caused by the war. The high level of focus given to sites (in terms of time and funding) reflected their cultural status rather than the damage caused to them, revealing that the recovery of BCH is strongly connected to the socio-political atmosphere of contemporary Dubrovnik, opposed to indiscriminate approach to restoring all BCH to the same level.

7.1  Actors in Recovery: The order, cost, and motivation behind the recovery of Dubrovnik

The order of recovery has been examined by looking at records of recovery from twenty-one damaged BCH sites, the majority of which feature in the UNESCO damage report of forty-four sites. The six houses mentioned in the ICTY trial proceedings feature on this list, as well as several of the churches and iconic BCH sites. The records of recovery are taken from the IFRD’s website and the twenty-one buildings listed there contain information on the date and duration of (physical) recovery and its cost. In some cases, there is additional information on donations and donors of specific sites. This data has been collated into a BCHRA data sheets for each building, based on information retrieved from the UNESCO (1993b) damage report and the IFRD (2004) buildings survey found on their website. A selection of the completed BCHRA can be found in the Appendix of this research and the complete set is available on request from the author via the University of York.

The examination of the BCH records shows that the order of recovery does not match the cost of recovery. If the recovery of BCH focused on the severity of damage, then it would be expected that the buildings with the most damage would be repaired first and that would receive the most funding. This is in line with the literature reviewed in Chapter Three which introduced the argument that BCH in and after conflict needs rapid intervention and attention as its increasingly fragility will only deteriorate more quickly when it has been damaged (Earl, 2003, p. 93). However, the damage sustained was only one of the priorities associated with the order of recovery (as seen in Table 7.1 and 7.2). Similarly, buildings that cost the most to restore were not prioritised and did not receive immediate attention. Thus, the order of recovery is influenced by factors other than need. By comparing two sets of priorities with the order of recovery we indicate what factors may have dictated the order of recovery in Dubrovnik.

7.1.1  The Chronological Order of Recovery

The chronological order of recovery records the order in which 21 BCH received restorative attention. The order of recovery has been explored by mapping the data year by year since 1992. The maps show that the restoration of these twenty-one sites began in 1992 and ended in 2004. Due to the limitations of the data available there are no complete records of recovery after 2004, and the records of repair after this period are scarce. The thesis assumes that because the records seem to end in 2004 most of the repair work on the Old Town had stopped by this date, and the town had been restored to the level now seen in contemporary Dubrovnik. The start of a reconstruction effort is coloured red on the maps, ongoing projects coloured yellow and completed projects coloured blue. The first heritage-centred reconstruction efforts began in 1992, and the first buildings to receive
attention were the city walls, the Franciscan Monastery and the convent of St Claire. Final repairs to
the twenty-one sites listed by IFRD were made in 2004. Table 7.1 and 7.2 shows the order in which
BCH started to receive attention, according to the data gained from the IFRD, and is plotted on the
following maps (The Stages of Recovery: Table 7.2 and Figures 7.1 to 7.9) which present a year-by-
year picture of how the BCH was recovered.

Table 7.1: The Chronology of Recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Sorkočević Palace, Miha Pracata 6 (under restoration pre-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>war, but badly damaged in 1992 by the war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>City Walls- See Attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>The Franciscan Monastery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Convent of St. Claire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Jesuit Steps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate (Festival Building)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Stradun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate (Clasci Palace)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Gučetić-Martinušić Palace in the Street of St.Joseph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Od puća 11 Palace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Chapel in Đorđić-Mayneri Palace (Chapel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Amerling Fountain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>House in Čubranovićeva 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The church of St. Ignatius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Palace od Puca 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Rooftops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The House in Zlatarićeva 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>House Fronts Stradun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The House Od Rupa 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Church of St Blaise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7.2 The Order and Stages of Recovery

**Stages of Recovery: 1992-2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>On-going</th>
<th>Complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>City Walls- See Attached</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jesuit Steps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate (Festival Building)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Stradun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate (Clasci Palace)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Đorđić-Mayneri Palace, Široka 5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gućetić-Martinušić St. Joseph</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Od puća 11 Palace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chapel in Đorđić-Mayneri Palace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Amerling Fountain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>House in Čubranovićeva 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The church of St. Ignatius</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Palace od Puca 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Rooftops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>The House in Zlatarićeva 9</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>House Fronts Stradun</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>The House Od Rupa 7</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Church of St Blaise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sorkočević Palace, Miha Pracata 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>The Franciscan Monastery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Convent of St. Claire</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Figure 7.1 Stages of Recovery (1992).

Figure 7.2 Stages of Recovery (1993)
Figure 7.3 Stages of Recovery (1994)

Figure 7.4 Stages of Recovery (1995)
Figure 7.5 Stages of Recovery (1996)

Figure 7.6 Stages of Recovery (1997)
Figure 7.7 Stages of Recovery (1998)

Figure 7.8 Stages of Recovery (1999–2003)
Figure 7.9 Stages of Recovery (2004)


7.1.2 Cost of Recovery: Most to Least Expensive

The roofs of the Old Town were by far the most expensive item to repair, costing US$ 5,691,104, which is US$ 1,699,124 over the US$ 3,991,980 estimate made by UNESCO. The cost is unsurprising as 68% of buildings were damaged, and thus 68% of all roofs needed to be replaced or repaired. 80% of funds spent on recovery were houses and palaces gutted by fire (the most serious category of damage given by UNESCO), thus; the buildings most affected received most of the funding for recovery, as expressed in Table 7.3 based on data taken from the Institute for the Reconstruction of Dubrovnik (2011).

Table 7.3 Cost of Recovery: most to least expensive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Actual US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Roofs of the inner city</td>
<td>5 691 104.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate 1</td>
<td>634 949.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Palace Sorkocevic-Miha Pracata</td>
<td>658 123.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Palace Dordic- Maineri- Siroka</td>
<td>174 947.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Palace Martinusic Sv. Josipa</td>
<td>133 942.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Od Rupa 7</td>
<td>133 074.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Church of St Blasé</td>
<td>121 190.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>House fronts on Stradun</td>
<td>115 970.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building Name</td>
<td>Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Franciscan Convent</td>
<td>114 389.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Palace od Puca 11</td>
<td>101 999.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Stradun</td>
<td>82 611.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Palace od Puca 16</td>
<td>79 919.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate 2</td>
<td>79 000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Amerling Fountain</td>
<td>60 027.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Palace Zlatariceva 9</td>
<td>11 432.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dordic-Mayneri Palace</td>
<td>8 607.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Jesuit steps</td>
<td>5 903.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>St Claire’s Convent</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Clock tower</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Large Onofrio Fountain</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Walls</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The order of repair shows that religious buildings and the buildings that were gutted during the conflict received attention in the early stages of recovery, and work on the Franciscan Monastery started in the same year as the conflict ended (see table 7.2). Repair on the city walls also started immediately, and the roofs received attention in 1996. Both were completed in 2004 (Rooftops Figure 7.10 and Appendix 7).

Figure 7.10 Old Town Roofs

K Bishop (2012)

The focus on collective BCH (roofs and walls), both the data records and their priority in order of recovery, shows that there was a sustained effort to repair the cityscape as well as individual houses and palaces. Although immediate repair of the roofs would have allowed the buildings to be returned to their normal function, both UNESCO and IFRD include them in a separate category rather than as
a constituent part of each individual building. In this way each of the buildings on the IFRD list underwent at least two phases of recovery; building repairs and a separate roof repair. If 68% of the roofs of Old Town were damaged, and if roof repairs started in 1996, 68% of buildings did not have sound roofs from 1991 to 1996 (although the emergency measures began in 1993). The roofs are seen as a specific and isolated feature of Dubrovnik, the “fifth façade” (UNESCO WHC, 1994), rather than as belonging to individual buildings. Thus, cityscape repairs of Dubrovnik were prioritised over individual buildings. This is further demonstrated by the inclusion of the house fronts of the Stradun as a single entry into both UNESCO and IFRD lists. So buildings on the Stradun, such as Sigurate 1 and 2 (BCHRA Appendix 2 and 3) were the recipients of three different, overlapping or concurrent recovery processes: their own repairs, roof repairs and house front repairs.

### 7.1.3 Donors: Most to Least Number of Donors

Buildings that attracted more donors tended to attract more funds, and also tended to be repaired sooner in the restoration process. This created a hierarchy of buildings with the more attractive famous buildings receiving more funding, and those that are less attractive received less. This may be counterproductive to recovery as some less attractive buildings may require more funding than they receive. The number of Donors for each sites is expressed in Table 7.4, and the data is taken from the IFRD (2011).

**Table 7.4 Priorities: most to least number of donors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Number of Donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Franciscan Monastery</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Roofs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Church of St Blaise</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate 1 (Festival Building)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Amerling Fountain</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Convent of St Claire</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Stradun</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chapel in Đorđić-Mayneri Palace (Chapel of the Choir of Jesus)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Jesuit Steps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Palace od Sigurate 2 (Clasci Palace)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Đorđić-Mayneri Palace, Široka 5.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gučetić-Martinišić Palace in the Street of St.Joseph</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Od Puća 11 Palace</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>House in Ćubranovićeva 8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The church of St Ignatius</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Palace od Puća 16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The House in Zlatarićeva 9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>House fronts Stradun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The house Od Rupa 7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Palace Sorkocevic-Miha Pracata</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Stradun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Walls</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the analysis of these two datasets on the priorities of recovery show that a dramatic difference was found between the estimated and the actual amounts spent in nearly all cases. In most cases the actual amount spent on recovery was well below the estimates, but in a minority of cases it was far more. In some cases, the Ministry for Public Works contributed unspecified funds to the recovery of buildings, but these funds cannot be traced as the then Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and Construction is defunct and has been subsumed under the Ministry of Construction and Planning, and the records are unobtainable. However, IFRD also notes that “According to the data available, we estimate that some 15% of the total amount spent for the restoration of the architectural heritage of Dubrovnik came from donations in the post-war period” (IFRD, 2014). This suggests that the remaining 85% of the funding came from the government and independent or individual donations. If this is extrapolated to each site, then the amount of funding listed in each case should amount to at least 15% of the total estimate. In all but two instances this proves to be the case, but the actual amount spent on each building remains unclear.

The varying differences between estimates and costs in the figures taken from the IFRD indicate that either the UNESCO estimates were too high, the recovery of Dubrovnik is incomplete, or additional funding for these (and other) sites was donated but not used on their allocated sites. This research claims that by a process of elimination, the expert and local knowledge and contributions render the UNESCO report reliable, and that the physical survey of the buildings undertaken by this research shows that most buildings have been repaired to different extents and are in a better condition that they were just after the conflict. Therefore, it is likely and plausible that the extent of funding and the amount of donations is greater than the donations listed on these twenty-one sites which undermines the accuracy of the reports on the cost of recovery made by the IFRD.

The final amounts spent on complete recovery by 2014 are estimated by UNESCO to be US$ 80 million (UNESCO WHC, 2014), of which UNESCO in 1993 estimated US$ 9 million would be the cost of recovery for the forty-four BCH sites listed in the damage report (UNESCO, 1993b). According to IFRD the actual amount spent for the twenty-one sites on the list was approximately US$ 10 million, including the complete repair of the roofs. Various charitable groups have donated to the recovery effort in Dubrovnik, and several groups were also formed for the sole purpose of raising money to help rebuild the Old Town.

UNESCO, the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund (Chicago Sun-Times, 1992) and the Grand Circle Foundation (2011) were three of the biggest contributors to the recovery of the Old Town. According to the Council of Europe parliamentary papers from 1994, UNESCO contributed US$ 200,000 and the World Heritage Committee donated an additional US$50,000 (Council of Europe, 1994). UNESCO was also responsible for drafting and executing a recovery strategy. The Grand Circle Foundation donated US$55,850 between 1991 and 1995 to the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund (Grand Circle Foundation, 2011, p. 26). The Rebuild Dubrovnik fund was established shortly after the war with the sole objective of raising funds to assist the recovery of Dubrovnik’s built heritage.
The Rebuild Dubrovnik fund was established by the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA), under the presidency of Earlene Causey (Groff, 1992). It was passed from ASTA to the IFRD in 1997, to complete the final project: the restoration of the library in the Franciscan Monastery (Godwin, 1997). The ASTA and the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund were created by the tourism industry both in Dubrovnik and in America and their subjective motivations in the restoration of Dubrovnik’s BCH may have put the needs of tourism above the needs of reconciling local tensions. The Grand Circle Foundation and the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund were included in the donations listed in IFRD’s survey of war damage, as are further funds from UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee, in addition to private and individual donations. An estimated total of US$ 8,207,190 is the full amount raised by international bodies, non-profit organisations and charitable donors, and any additional expenses will have been paid by the Croatian government and other governmental sources. In light of UNESCO’s estimation of US$10 million as the absolute value of donations needed to rebuild Dubrovnik, the recovery costs listed by the IFRD (comprising many donors) almost match (with a difference of approximately US$ 1.8 million.).

7.2 Recovery Priorities

Whilst the total amount spent overall on the recovery of the Old Town is difficult to determine, the amount spent on twenty-one buildings and sites is clear. The schedule of recovery reveals that although priority was given to the buildings most affected by the conflict (those gutted or destroyed by fire) and were repaired quickly, equal importance was given to less affected buildings. The repair of these buildings were given priority, as can be seen by on the focus on them in the early stages of recovery and also by the amount spent on them. The less affected buildings that received attention quickly may indicate that priority was given to buildings in the Old Town based on the demands of investors, rather than on the needs of the buildings.

According to IFRD data, the first sites to receive attention and repair in the aftermath of the conflict in 1992 were the city walls, the Franciscan Monastery and the convent of St Claire (see Appendix 10). The city walls were repaired over the next eight years and restoration from war damage was completed in 2004. War repairs to the convent of St Claire and the Franciscan Monastery were completed in 1992. The walls were a priority for restoration due to the danger their instability posed to the rest of the town, and their restoration was organised by the Friends of Dubrovnik society, who are now responsible for their day-to-day maintenance and the paid visitors walking the walls in contemporary Dubrovnik. The Franciscan Monastery was a level one priority for repair, and received funding from eight different bodies (see Appendix 8). The cost of these repairs was at least US$ 114,389, which is US$ 336,975 less than the UNESCO estimate. However, as unspecified funds from the Ministry of Public Works were also allocated, and as the IFRD donations account for only 15% of the total cost; donations to this project constituted 25% of the total estimate. This reflects the priority given to this project by international donors. The convent of St Claire’s has four separate donors as well as funds from the state budget. The total amount given is undisclosed, but the number of identified donors suggests that the building enjoyed high priority. In the twenty-one building and
sites analysed the number of identifiable donors is low; for each case usually few donors are named, and in many cases only the Ministry of Public Works is identified.

The scale of recovery shows that the buildings and site to receive attention first were not necessarily the worst affected, instead they are the sites that received the most amount of interest from donors, even if they did not receive the largest donations. Although there was a coordinated effort to restore the town, organised by UNESCO and the IFRD, restoration opportunities were offered to donors on a site by site basis. Donors could choose which sites it would sponsor, and limit the use of their donations. As such, it is reasonable to suggest that the pressure to begin and complete restorative activities would have multiplied for each additional donor. The structures and processes governing the recovery effort, particularly the role of IFRD, has been discussed in Chapter Seven. Of the top three sites on the order of recovery (Table 7.4) that were repaired most quickly also have the highest number of donors; the city walls, the Franciscan Monastery (eight donors), the convent of St. Claire’s (four donors) (see Appendix 8). Whilst some sites are ranked highly without being associated with many donors (the Jesuit steps ranked fourth with a single donor) (Appendix 12), the overall trend was that the buildings and sites with the most donors received attention more quickly than those with fewer donors. This suggests that funding is a major factor in driving recovery, and that the donors had the power to direct how Dubrovnik was restored.

In terms of funding, the buildings damaged the most during the war received the highest amount of money, and the actual amount spent was greater than the amount estimated. Walls, roofs and buildings gutted by fire received the most amount of money from a variety of donors. The most frequently mentioned donors were the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund (which amalgamates funds from other sources) and the Ministry of Public Works. Other sites that received large donations were those with the highest number of donors. These include the Franciscan Monastery and the Church of St Blasius, which had medium levels of damage and received large donations from a variety and relatively high number of sources (Appendix 9).

The recovery in Dubrovnik encompasses the repair and reconstruction of 563 buildings (UNESCO, 1993a, p. 25) and complete recovery costs are estimated to be between US$50 and US$80 million. The focus on these twenty-one buildings shows how some of the most badly damaged and culturally significant buildings were affected during the war and the post-war recovery. These twenty-one BCH sites feature in the UNESCO damage report encouraging specific donorship by directing attention to individual sites and the cost of restoring them. In its survey of damage and recovery of twenty-one BCH sites IFRD lists specific donors against some of these sites, implying that the targeting donorship was successful. In these cases, the financial cost of recovery can be traced from damage to repair, and a baseline sum for the cost of recovery can be assessed. In cases of named donors, the donation may amount to 100% of the cost of recovery or 15% of recovery, with the Croatian government contributing the most to recovery (UNESCO, 1993a, pp. 46–48; IFRD, 2011). UNESCO has donated materials, training, experts and education programmes to assist recovery, as well as a further US$ 38,000 from the World Heritage Fund to directed recovery programmes outside of the remit of physical repairs (UNESCO WHC, 1994).
7.2.1 UNESCO and the ICTY Definitions of Damage

As discussed in Chapter Seven and the introduction to this chapter, there is a discrepancy between the language used to describe and classify damage in the UNESCO damage report and its use in the ICTY proceedings. The different uses and understanding of heritage by different international bodies has culminated in various classification of damage using different scales to categorise the damage to the Old Town. The changing categories of damage in the UNESCO, ICTY and IFRD assessments reveals that damage is a malleable term, and demonstrates how heritage can influence recovery processes. It is argued here that the damage records created by UNESCO and used by the ICTY were based on local perceptions of damage reported to the IFRD, which may have been affected by an emotional reaction to the perception of damage to the town. The result of this is that an objective level of damage to BCH in Dubrovnik remains unclear and the definitions change in response to contemporary social, political, and economic dynamics which alters the perception on the extent to which BCH has been restored in the Old Town. This reflects a finding by Herscher and Riedlmayer in the assessment of Kosovan heritage that damage to cultural heritage sites can be used for political purposes that are not fully reflective of tangible evidence on cultural heritage sites (Herscher and Riedlmayer, 2000, p. 108).

Within each of the four categories of damage, the UNESCO report makes a sub-categorisation of damage from I to III. The buildings in the category of “gutted” buildings were graded in terms of the severity of the damage they sustained on a scale of I to III by UNESCO, and later categorised on a scale of 1 to 5 by the ICTY. However, the UNESCO damage report and the ICTY do not use the same scale of damage for the secondary categories of “damaged house and palaces”. For UNESCO, houses and palaces in the second category suffered equitable amounts of a different type of damage as the “gutted category”; for the ICTY these buildings were not considered to have suffered equitable damage.

The ICTY damage report works on a scale of Destroyed to Damaged, whereas the UNESCO report works on a scale relating to the structural integrity of the building which does not include destroyed. The highest category of damage changes between these two assessments, the highest level of damage for the ICTY is Level 1: totally destroyed, whereas the highest level of damage for UNESCO is Houses gutted by fire: grade I. This indicates that there is a slightly different scale in use between the two assessors where ICTY includes destruction and UNESCO does not. UNESCO refers to three types of damage:

I. Sustained major damage jeopardizing its existence and/or preventing its normal use
II. Sustained damage seriously affecting the outer aspect or not having deteriorated its structural features and not preventing its use
III. Sustained incidental damage deteriorating its outer aspect and/or its normal use (UNESCO, 1993b, p. 5).

For the sake of clarity in analysing the two systems of damage classification, UNESCO designated damage is written as ‘grade’, whilst the ICTY categories are recorded as ‘level’. This follows the
language and recording system used by these two bodies, and emphasised here to avoid confusion in the following discussion.

The IFRD survey of Dubrovnik’s damaged and restored buildings focuses only on twenty-one buildings (IFRD, 2011), whilst the UNESCO report focuses on forty-four sites (UNESCO, 1993), and the ICTY prosecution used a record of the shelling from UNESCO which listed 450 damaged properties (ICTY, 2003).

The difference between UNESCO grades I and grade II is vast. All the buildings in the UNESCO ‘gutted’ category are given grade I priority, and are reported in the ICTY proceedings as destroyed; hence it is unsurprising that buildings in the most severe category of damage also receive the most severe grade of damage in both the UNESCO and ICTY grading systems. However, it is surprising that six buildings in the less severe “damaged” category also receive grade I in the UNESCO report, which indicates these buildings were in a similar state of disrepair as those in the most severe category of damage.

These UNESCO grade I damaged buildings in the less severe UNESCO category are: Sponza Palace, Rector’s Palace, Stay Palace, Gučetić Palace, Miha Pracata 11 and Miha Pracata 3. Of these six, only two feature in ICTY damage report: Sponza Palace and the Rector’s Palace. The ICTY notes categorise them at damage level 3: “Buildings with damaged structural parts” (ICTY, 2003), a less severe category given by UNESCO. Both the UNESCO and ICTY grades include serious structural damage, but the UNESCO grade I implies the damage to the building is jeopardising its existence and/or preventing its normal use, whilst level 3 in ICTY designation implies that the damage is structural but not critical. If the damage was considered more critical it would have received a level 2: “heavy damage to structural parts” or level one “building completely destroyed”. This difference between UNESCO grades of damage and ICTY records of damage highlights the ability for damage to cultural property to be interpreted in different ways depending on the abilities and grading structure of the assessor.

The varying scales and measurements of damage used by the ICTY and UNESCO results in an inconsistent assessment given to the town by two authoritative sources. UNESCO is regarded as the primary source of knowledge on damage assessments, and it is notable that the definitions used by the ICTY do not rely solely on the UNESCO damage report but instead make use of their own assessments which align more closely to unofficial local records of damage which were made by local residents for the IFRD during and immediately after the conflict.

In summary, this thesis suggests that although the UNESCO Damage Report was used as evidence for the attack on the Old Town by the ICTY proceedings as the primary source, the classifications of damage used by the ICTY align to the locally produced records of damage recorded by the IFRD. The ICTY proceedings designate the most serious damage to a single day- the 6th of December, and have structured their arguments for the severity of attack around this event. During the course of this event 6 buildings designated as severely damaged by UNESCO (both in terms of specific grade and in overall category) and were designated as destroyed by IFRD and reported similarly by ICTY. The
difference between UNESCO and the ITCY is surprising as UNESCO is the international authority on cultural heritage assessment and has the legal mandate to give evidence in these proceedings, and would therefore be expected to act as the primary source of evidence at criminal proceedings and its results and definitions to provide the authoritative level of damage.

The existence of this discrepancy between the UNESCO and ITCY evaluations serves to highlight the contingent and contested nature of post-conflict damage assessment. The IHAF, by incorporating strengths of top down and bottom up approaches to this task, seeks to incorporate an acknowledgement of this contestation and contingency by including an awareness of the fluidity of heritage and the politicisation of its uses as the core foundation of the assessment tool, while also providing an operationalisable framework

7.3 Grades of Recovery: The Extent of Recovery in Dubrovnik

The way in which Dubrovnik was damaged by the shelling campaign has been discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, which interrogated which buildings were damaged, how they were damaged, and what UNESCO grades of damage they received. This section uses the IHAF to analyse how BCH has recovered since this attack. Using the criteria created by the IHAF methodology of this thesis, each building mentioned in the UNESCO and IFRD reports has been assessed and graded by this researcher. What follows here is a discussion into what grades these buildings received and how they compare to the damage they received in 1993. The result of this assessment is the accurate measurement of the extent of recovery of the BCH of Dubrovnik.

7.3.1 Assessment Grades: Averages and Outliers

A selection of detailed assessments of the buildings listed in the UNESCO damage report can be found in the Appendix of this thesis, along with the justification of the grade of recovery they have been given. These assessments were carried out using pro-forma created by this research and its IHAF methodology. The criteria for these assessments were created by the author in an attempt to gain an objective perspective on the extent of damage to cultural heritage. These criteria can be found in the Appendix, as well as some populated examples that are discussed here in great detail. The heritage sites were labelled as BCHRA (Built Cultural Heritage Recovery Assessment) with an assigned number, and graded between one to five (complete recovery to no repairs made) by this research. The assessments made in this research contribute both an original perspective on the damage and recovery in Dubrovnik based on existing photographic records, and also new empirical data gained from the researcher’s survey of all twenty-one sites. All sites are mapped in figure 7.11: 2013 Grades of recovery in Dubrovnik.

7.3.2 The Results of Physical Assessment of Recovery

The grades of recovery for each building assessed in this research are expressed in Figure 7.11 which maps the extent of recovery across Dubrovnik Old Town. Most buildings received a grade three, which indicates that most buildings in Dubrovnik are restored to a good degree of recovery.
The buildings have had some damage to their façades but also show visible signs of repair. This shows that money has been spent on these buildings and, although the funding and sources cannot be traced exactly, they are assumed to fall under the remit of repairs undertaken by the institutions listed in the UNESCO Plan of Action. Physical repairs can be distinguished on the fabric of the buildings and show both levels of expert repair (window, doors and balcony repair) as well as non-
expert repair (different types of concrete repairs on ricochet marks). The average level of recovery for most of the buildings also shows that most buildings in Dubrovnik have been restored to a similar degree, which supports the notion that Dubrovnik has been repaired as a single site; there are no buildings in the city that have not been repaired at all (recovery grade five) but there are also no sites repaired to the extent that there are no noticeable war marks at all (recovery grade one).

The notable exceptions to the average level of repair for buildings and sites in the Old Town are those that are of a higher (recovery grade two) or lower (recovery grade four) extent of repair than the average. Using the scatter graph in Figure 7.12 it can be seen that in the first nine cases of BCH (the gutted palaces and houses) the average is grade three, and the two exceptions have a higher rate of recovery, at recovery grade two. These building are Od Sigurate 1 (BCHRA 1) and Od Puca 16 (BCHRA 2).

Figure 7.12 Grades of recovery for thirty-nine buildings in Old Town 2013 (1, complete recovery; 5, damaged)

The Palace of Od Sigurate 1 (Appendix 2) has undergone repair work and is indistinguishable from its neighbouring and opposing buildings that were less badly damaged during the war. There is ricochet damage on the lower half of the front façade, most likely from fragments hitting the building from nearby shell hits on the Stradun. There is no visible remaining smoke damage despite the fire damage done to the building. The funding of the repairs can be traced back to named sources including the International trust for Croatian Monuments and GBR Rotary Club-Klagenfurt (Austria), as well as funds from the Croatia Government and UNESCO. The actual cost of repairs on this building are US$634,949, which is US$15,601 less than the UNESCO estimate, a difference of approximately 2%. The building is used as a cafe on the ground floor and a residence on the upper floors. The building is rated at recovery grade two: a high level of recovery based on the criteria outlined above. Although the level of repair varies slightly, the palace of Od Sigurate 2 is graded as
recovery grade three (recovered) due to its lack of clear and accessible financial records and its place in the order of recovery. The strength of this assessment framework is that it requires a clear record of how (financially) the building was recovered, as well as the extent of physical recovery.

The Palace of Od Puca 16 (Appendix 6) has also received a recovery grade two, due to its extremely high level of physical repair, its clear record from damage to recovery and an accessible record of financial repair. The building has been repaired and the damage done during the war is not immediately evident. The doors and windows have been replaced and are distinguishable by being cleaner in appearance than neighbouring houses, as is the entire façade of the building (see examples of Od Puca in Appendix 6). There is some evidence of ricochet damage and of repairs done to remedy the damage, but the marks are small in number and size. The cost of recovery was US$658,123, which exceeded its estimate of US$448,510 by 46%. The funds were provided by the Ministry of Public Works and no other specific sources are credited. The building is in use as a post office, but also as a permanent war memorial. The lower sides of the buildings have displays of the war damage done to the building, and information about the role of the building and its resident artist during the war (see Appendix 6). It is one of only five buildings in Dubrovnik to make public and open reference to the siege of the Old Town. The building’s grade of recovery is two: a high level of recovery.

7.3.3 The Recovery of Severely Damaged BCH

The nine buildings given the most serious category of damage in the 1993 UNESCO Damage Report have been restored to a high standard, particularly when considering the severity of the damage done. The buildings have surviving aesthetic war damage, particularly from ricochet damage, and there are signs of obvious repair work. The repairs will fade over time, and it will become increasingly difficult to distinguish the new and old fabric in the Old Town. The fabric of the buildings shows that the recovery from conflict in the nine significantly damaged buildings is almost complete (see Table 6.1 for a list of these houses). The repair work is similar to other non-war related repairs occurring almost continuously in the Old Town. The reminders of conflict are the ricochet marks, which are unlikely to disappear altogether: instead, they are likely to become assimilated into the general history of the building by not being easily or immediately connected with the conflict in 1992.

These nine buildings have the most complete set of data of all categories, and there is a good level of information on the damage some to buildings, the financial cost of recovery and the speed and scheduling of recovery. However, despite the good level of information, not all the data was accessible, meaning that the recovery cannot be considered complete. The lack of data, particularly on the funding for specific buildings and the cost of recovery, means that the transparency of recovery is affected and it is impossible to fully examine whether the cost of recovery met or exceeded the US$ 10 million estimate, and whether individual buildings met or exceeded their own estimates. The financial data available suggests that overall the recovery process did meet the US$ 10 million estimate based on only twenty-one out of forty-four sites. The remaining twenty-three buildings have been restored to some extent. There is a large discrepancy between the known amount spent on twenty-one buildings and the unknown amount spent on the remaining forty-four sites (and beyond).
The status of these buildings as the most badly damaged is not reflected in the scheduling of repair; although six of the nine buildings are present on the IFRD’s damage and recovery survey, they are not the first six to be repaired.

The war damage on these buildings remains evident, and they suffer from the lack of financial data. Each of the buildings has a UNESCO estimate of costs, but most do not have the actual cost of recovery. The average level of recovery for these buildings is grade three: recovered. All but two buildings have a grade three recovery, the two exceptions are the roofs graded 2: a high level of recovery (BCHRA 27) and the Gučetić Palace on Buniceva Polijana (BCHRA 13), which received a grade four (low level of recovery).

The financial data is more traceable in these buildings than in the other categories of damage. While specific costs are not accessible, the sponsors and donors of the repairs are. Furthermore, the recovery of the religious buildings seems to have been financed not only by the Croatia government and UNESCO (and their own donors) but also by direct individual and group partnerships with specific institutions. The information is not available via IFRD or UNESCO but on site in the buildings in memorial and sponsorship plaques (for example, the partnership between the New York Jewish society and the synagogue, memorialised inside the synagogue (see BCHRA 33). The lack of clear information on the restoration work done to the religious buildings combined with the remaining visible damage has resulted in this category attracting various different grades. The average for these buildings is a (low) recovery grade three: recovered. The buildings vary from recovery grade two (high level) to recovery grade four (low level), possibly based on the popularity and centrality of the building. The more famous churches are graded at recovery grade two (Franciscan, St Blasius, the cathedral) based on their high level of repairs, whilst the less popular and more hidden churches have a recovery grade of four (St Roche, St Mary’s and St Saviour’s) based on their comparatively low level of repair.

7.3.4 The Recovery of Damaged BCH Buildings

The UNESCO category of building damage includes buildings 10–24 (see Figure 6.5 for a list of these houses) which were graded by UNESCO as grade II damage. The recovery of these buildings have been graded by this research with an average of grade three. These buildings cannot receive a higher grade of recovery as there is a notable lack of traceable financial data on their cost and rate of recovery. Furthermore, although there are photographic records of the damage done to these buildings they are fewer in number than other categories of damage and not so widely publicised. A lack of data recorded by UNESCO and IFRD for these buildings has resulted in the assessment of their recovery being limited; the lack of photographic evidence from UNESCO also reveals that they did not prioritise these buildings in comparison to the attention shown to those that were damaged more severely, or religious buildings. It is argued by this thesis that this lack of focus shows an inherent bias in the UNESCO records towards recording extreme damage to BCH to be used in later prosecutions, and in recording religious buildings due to their status not due to their damage. It is
argued from this that UNESCO may have had a motive beyond recording damage when the UNESCO Damage Report was compiled in 1993.

As discussed in section 6.4.6, two religious buildings are notably absent from the damage report: The Church of St Ignatius and the Mosque. The Mosque may have been omitted due to its housing in a non-religious building or due to a lack of willingness from the local community to include it as a religious building in an effort to present itself as a singularly Christian community (which is a persuasive argument when considering the ethnic and religious divisions during the conflict and the emphasis contemporary Dubrovnik places on Christianity). The omission of the Church of Ignatius is more difficult to interpret; it was aesthetically damaged, and remains so as it has had little restorative work done. It stands as a large building on top of a hill in the centre of the town, and was one of the only iconic buildings to directly face JNA stronghold in the hills to the North East. An answer to this mystery could not be determined by this research, despite searching the historical records of the town and questioning the IFRD. However, it can be speculated that the active Jesuit religious order may have asked to be excluded from the recovery effort as spending money on the restoration of the church may have been at odds with their religious views. This interpretation is suggested here as a possible reason the church has not been restored, but would require further research to substantiate fully. The omission of the church is notable not only because it cannot be found in the damage reports but also because its exclusion from these reports is not discussed anywhere.

The effect of having less detailed records of damage and the difficulties in accessing data on recovery has meant that, although the buildings have been restored to a good standard (albeit with some remaining war damage) they cannot be regarded as repaired beyond a recovery grade three. As outlined in Chapter Six, this thesis argues that for a BCH site to be considered completely restored it needs to do be able to provide a full record of how it was restored. By providing a financial record of recovery, a site is able to outline what funds were needed (via the damage report), and specify if these targets were met thus ensuring that the level of damage was accurately recorded and the repairs made were able to restore the site. If the financial records are incomplete it cannot be determined if a site is restored, or if the estimates were accurate. If the recovery estimates were inaccurate this may indicate the level of damage was recorded as more or less severe than it may have actually been. If these records are not available then the recovery process cannot be considered to be transparent which in turn leaves the process open to potential accusations of impropriety – either by a lack of accountability for funds not spent, or for neglecting to reassess the levels of damage to BCH in response to the extent of the actual repairs needed.

The exceptions to this grading is BCHRA number 13: Gučetić Palace-Buniceva Polijana (Appendix 6), which are designated at recovery level four and the roofs graded at recovery level two, both of which are pictured below. The palace is used as a commercial unit, with accommodation above. The front façade of the house is noticeably damaged with shell, ricochet and possible bullet holes. The pattern of the marks suggests street level ricochet damage and direct hits or gunfire damage to the first and second floors.
Gučetić Palace has the most noticeable remaining war damage in this damage category, and is equalled by the neighbouring cathedral in the vast quantity of ricochet damage suffered. The contrast between the damage on the façade of Gučetić Palace with that on the Rector’s Palace (Figures 7.13 and 7.14) opposite is vast, suggesting that Gučetić Palace was not sheltered by the direction of the attack. Ricochet and other shell damage has been repaired with cement, although not all marks have been repaired. The cost of recovery was not accessible and it is unclear if the cost of repairs equalled the UNESCO estimate of US$ 30,542. The damage on the building is very obvious. The roof and structure are repaired and intact and the building bears signs of restoration. The building is graded at recovery grade four: low level recovery.

The level of repair of the building is unusual because of its prominent position in conjunction with the highly visible war damage. Most buildings in adjacent Stradun and tourist-heavy areas have received a great deal of attention, particularly to façade repairs (see BCHRA in Appendix 1–12 for examples) but despite this building’s prominent position it is very obviously a recipient of war damage that can be seen by casual observation.

The other outlying grades of two and four are all religious buildings. Of the twelve religious buildings (BCHRA 25–37) listed on the UNESCO damage report, five are recovery grade two, five designated at recovery grade three, and four designated at recovery grade four.

7.3.5 The Recovery of Religious Buildings

The five religious buildings with the highest level of recovery are the Dominican Convent, the Church of St Blasius), St Claire’s Convent, the Synagogue Zudioska and the Orthodox Church (Figure 7.15-716. These buildings are characterised by a high level of physical repair, traceable donors and financial records and their continued use (either as religious buildings, or in the case of St. Claire’s, as a restaurant). Each building also has detailed records of the repair work done on small but important features of the building.
The buildings with a grade three recovery level are the Franciscan Convent, the cathedral, St Mary’s Convent and Church and the Dordic-Mayneri Palace chapel. These buildings are the most well-known and popular religious tourist attractions in the Old Town. As with most of the religious buildings, their façades are characterised by unrepaired ricochet damage, which means that they cannot be considered to have a higher grade of recovery. This is in contrast to the grade two buildings that do not have as many ricochet marks but have similarly complete financial records, and to the grade four religious buildings which have higher or similar quantities of visible façade damage but do not have accessible information on the rate and cost of recovery.

The grade four buildings are St Sigurata Church, the Church of St Joseph, St Saviour’s Church and Church St Roche. This collection of buildings is unusual as it consists of St Saviour’s church in a very prominent position next to the Pile Gate entrance, and (St Joseph’s church on a tourist heavy street, and two that are not on visitors’ routes. All four of these churches are characterised by their small size and their inaccessibility. St Sigurata (Figure 7.15) and St Joseph are active churches but not frequently open, whilst St Saviour’s church is no longer in use as a religious building and the St Roche (Figure 7.18) appears to be unused and uninhabited. This may have a bearing on the level of repair they received and the level of conservation they currently receive.

As established earlier, the restoration of Dubrovnik relied heavily on recreating the city as a single heritage site. This can be seen in the emphasis by many interested parties on restoring the roofs as an early (1992) priority. The tiles were donated by UNESCO and arrived in the city in early 1992, before the shelling of the Old Town had completely ceased. A great deal can be found on the reconstruction price and cost of the roofs at the IFRD and associated literature, the UNESCO publication Dubrovnik 1992–1992 (UNESCO, 1993) and in the State of Conservation Reports (UNESCO, 1991–2014) from the World Heritage Centre at UNESCO. Similarly, the immediate focus on repairing the walls of the city and their continued careful conservation is indicative of both the early protection of the city from further war damage from falling stone debris from the walls and the need to restore the city as a whole as soon as possible. The roofs and walls are among the most iconic features of the Old Town and the Dubrovnik region, and their restoration could be considered an imperative to restoring the city as a cultural icon.
7.4 **Summary: The Physical Recovery of Dubrovnik**

The physical repairs in Dubrovnik have recreated the Old Town as a cultural monument in itself. Repairs to the roofs and the wall made the city appear whole as soon as possible, and by 2004 from afar the city looked as it would have done pre-war. While this study aimed to establish the effect that the post-conflict BCH has on the physical environment of the Old Town by examining the extent to which the BCH has recovered (Figure 7.11), the details of the shelling remain unclear.

In the investigation carried out by this research into the records of damage, the author began to uncover the facts upon which the narrative of the conflict rests. The IHAF was able to uncover these inconsistencies by systematically going through these records, and analysing them not only against other records from this time, but also against a contemporary comparative empirical analysis of surviving damage in modern day Dubrovnik. The IHAF directed the research along this course of action due to the conceptual foundation at its core. The concept the IHAF relies on is an in-depth understanding that heritage cannot be considered static, nor can history be considered objective; both the UNESCO records and ICTY proceedings relied on the reverse being the case.

The classification of these buildings into a separate category may either represent the beginning of the narrative process, using the categories as easily accessible reference points, or it may be seen as supporting an emerging narrative of violence and damage and brutality during the break-up of Yugoslavia (Despalatovic, 2000, p. 84). This perspective could also explain the focus on religious buildings as symbols of cultural affinity wherein Croatia aligns itself with Western Catholicism, and violently protected this identity against Eastern Orthodox Serbs during the conflict, and sought to continue to promote this identity in less violent ways in the aftermath of the conflict. In this perspective the focus on churches in Dubrovnik is a way to reinforce cultural difference and to ensure the conflict is not forgotten (Connerton, 2008, p.60-64). However, other facts used in the grand narrative of the shelling of Dubrovnik are accurate: the worst of the shelling did occur on 6 December, the BCH was very badly damaged and people (civilians and armed defenders) were killed as a direct result of the unprovoked attack.
The information on the donors and contributions to the restoration of BCH are similar to the details concerning damage. The UNESCO estimation of the damage of US$9,657,578 (ICTY, 2003, p. 47) was used as a benchmark for the financial costs of repair, however the details of the actual cost of recovery are more difficult to ascertain. The IFRD lists the actual costs of recovery for twenty-one buildings as (approximately) US$8 million (IFRD, 2011), but does not indicate how the restoration of the other buildings has been financed. We can assume that more repairs have been carried out (because all the buildings show signs of repairs) which would have cost more than US$10 million, but the details of the actual overall cost and the specific costs per building are not accessible. Although the contributors are named on the IFRD website it is difficult to connect donors to buildings, making it difficult to ascertain whether the order in which the buildings were recovered reflected the desires of the donors to repair certain buildings, or whether the prioritisation was controlled by the Croatian government, UNESCO or the IFRD.

The categorisation of the damaged buildings has been followed by this research in order to reflect the UNESCO damage report with an assessment of recovery surrounding the same buildings. The categories strangely record private and public buildings in terms of the severity of damage, but religious buildings are a completely separate type of building, and are not defined by the severity of damage. Furthermore, “objects” (fountains, squares etc.) form a miscellaneous group categorised by object rather than damage (UNESCO, 1993b). The walls fall into another category and are under the jurisdiction of another organisation (The Friends of Dubrovnik Antiquities) and they are not restored by UNESCO and IFRD. The damage to severely damaged buildings and religious building is set out in the greatest detail while minimal details are provided on damaged buildings or the miscellaneous group. In this way, the UNESCO damage report has forced attention onto nine gutted buildings and religious buildings, while not providing public information on the extent of the damage for the whole of Dubrovnik (Van den Wyngaert, 2006, p. 67).

The damage assessment criteria work well in terms of establishing recovery on different platforms, looking at physical repairs, the cost of building repairs and the use of building today in order to grade the level of recovery (Figure 7.12) and gauge the impact BCH has had on recovery. The BCH in the Old Town has been repaired and the cityscape restored to its pre-war state, and the remaining aesthetic damage has been ignored and become part of the fabric of Dubrovnik. The speed of recovery, coupled with the lack of detailed information, could be an indication that Dubrovnik needed to restore its heritage quickly and efficiently to ensure the survival of its tourism economy. The whole restoration process indicates that the recovery of the Old Town to a pre-war state as a single site is more important than the full restoration of its individual components.

The city relies on its cultural assets to give it meaning and relevance and this was one of the reasons why the Old Town was targeted. The post-conflict recovery of the BHC was an exercise in recreating the material fabric as well as the cultural significance of the city as a symbol both for Croatian independence, and also for the success of international assistance in the recovery of culture. However, the restoration process is incomplete, while the surviving war damage and repairs draw attention to the past conflict, making it unclear whether Dubrovnik is celebrating or denying its past.
On the one hand the mythology of the Siege of Dubrovnik has been popularised by celebrating the survival and regrowth of the city, as well as honouring those who died in the conflict; whilst on the other, there has been a sustained effort to minimise the physical damage on the cultural property, which makes it more difficult for casual observers to connect the city to the violence and shelling that happened within living memory.
Chapter Eight: Economic Impact of Heritage on Post-conflict Dubrovnik

The economic impact of heritage on the recovery of Dubrovnik has been assessed in this chapter by using tourism as a key indicator to measure how heritage impacts on the economic security of the region. Tourism- or more specifically cultural tourism- is a major factor in the economic activities of Dubrovnik. Contemporary Dubrovnik has a thriving tourism industry, and pre-war Dubrovnik had a similar industry. When the war started, tourism was badly affected, and took a long time to recover. It has been argued by this thesis that tourism in Dubrovnik is considered synonymous with heritage, that tourism exists primarily because of Dubrovnik’s status as a significant cultural attraction. When the shells damage the city and its reputation as a safe tourist destination, it had a major impact on the ability of post-conflict Dubrovnik to recover and function as it did before. This is an explicit way in which heritage (via tourism) impacted on the economic recovery of the Old Town. This chapter seeks to establish what the value of heritage is to the town of Dubrovnik, and what impact the reduction of heritage tourism had on the economic profile of Dubrovnik during and after the war.

The structures which govern tourism in Dubrovnik have been determined by a set of indicators, which were introduced in Chapter Five and outlined below. These indicators build up a picture of how tourism influences day-to-day Dubrovnik by an analysis of the tourism statistics. The structure of the tourism industry will reveal how tourists use Dubrovnik’s heritage and how heritage is presented to tourists.

The actor that governs control the records of tourism in Dubrovnik is the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS), and this will be the primary source for the investigation in this chapter. As with the previous chapter, the ways in which data is recorded, stored, and used have a direct bearing on their reliability. In the previous chapter the classifications of damage to BCH were shown to be a major factor in objectively determining the extent of damage and recovery in Dubrovnik. Here, the CBS tourism statistics are considered reliable, but they are incapable of accurately reflecting the complexities of war on the tourism industry. Fluctuations in visitor numbers due to resurgence of conflict or influx of refugees are reflected in visitor numbers, but can provide false positives when estimating the influence of tourism spending and value to the tourism industry. For example, a refugee will not act in the same way as a tourist, and the advent of cheaper travel may provide tourism spikes which disrupt averages and estimates. The scarcity of data from the war years (1990 to 1995) also presents a challenge, as it requires estimates to be used in place of actual recorded numbers. The culmination of this is that the data from the CBS cannot be considered to be completely factual, and instead careful interpretations of the data will have to be made in order to gauge the value of tourism in post-conflict Dubrovnik.

The next IHAF step seeks to evaluate how the dynamics of the tourism industry have changed in response to the conflict. This has been accomplished in this chapter by taking a longitudinal view of tourism statistics from 1990 to 2010 based on the indicators that define the heritage tourism industry. This investigation culminates by estimating the value of the tourist to contemporary Dubrovnik, and looking at how this value has fluctuated over the course of twenty years. From this analysis it
becomes clear that the conflict had a major negative impact on the heritage tourism industry, but that tourism has had a major positive impact on the economic recovery of the Old Town. The previous chapter showed that the BCH of the Old Town garnered international attention and was considered a major priority when recovering the area. One such driver for the recovery of the Old Town and its focus on heritage is likely for tourism purposes: this chapter provides the evidence for this assertion based on the reliance Dubrovnik has on the economics of tourism.

This chapter uses tourism indicators to calculate the value of heritage to Dubrovnik by collating and analysing tourism statistics from the CBS, the Ministry of Tourism (Croatia) and the United Nations World Tourism Organisation.

8.1 Tourism During and Immediately after Conflict in Dubrovnik 1990–2000

Calculating how the war affected Dubrovnik financially between 1990 and 2000 is both important and complex, because records for tourism in this time are incomplete due to the difficulties of recording tourism statistics during and immediately after the conflict. This research has a full set of statistics for the period between 2001 and 2012 but the information 1990 to 2000 period was not available. This study was thus obliged to rely on incomplete statistics for this period, which focused on national tourism, and to extrapolate estimates of Dubrovnik’s share of tourism based their average share of visitors from later years. This section restricts its analysis to Dubrovnik, and utilises the definition of tourism argued previously in Chapter Five: that any and all tourist in the Old Town can be considered as cultural tourism and therefore their actions (or their absence) considered to have a direct bearing on the economic profile of Dubrovnik. It is understood that all tourism in the region will have been adversely affected by the conflict, but the definition of tourists in Dubrovnik renders them as unique in this investigation. However, a similar argument could be made for other culturally significant areas.

Between 2001 and 2011 there were altogether 110,267,074 visitors to Croatia (CBS, 2001–2011), with an average annual number of 10,024,279 visitors. There were 4,776,458 visitors to Dubrovnik between 2001 and 2011, an average of 434,223 visitors annually (CBS, 2001–2011). Using these figures, the average share of visitors to Dubrovnik was approximately 4.3% of the total between 2001 and 2011, and this percentage has been used to scale a best-case statistical scenario of tourism in Dubrovnik between 1990-2000 where no data was accessible. CBS show that there were approximately 49,595,000 visitors to Croatia between 1990 and 2000, with an average annual number of 4,508,636 visitors; scaling this to Dubrovnik, this equates to an average of 193,871 visitors annually. This estimated figure provides a statistical marker to begin to examine how Dubrovnik’s tourism was affected by the war, rather than just offering a national perspective.

The graph in Figure 8.1 shows that visitors to Croatia between 1990 and 2000 fell significantly between 1991 and 1992, due to the conflict. We can assume that this drop in numbers was mirrored in Dubrovnik. The lack of tourism data during the war and in its immediate aftermath is a limitation of this calculation, but the wealth and depth of information from 1999 onwards helps to arrive at reasoned and reliable estimates.
To check that 4.3% is an accurate estimation of Dubrovnik visitor numbers, a comparison has been made between the estimated 4.3% share of Croatia’s tourists and the actual number of Dubrovnik tourists from 2001 to 2011. Using the 1990 national figures as a fixed starting point, a 4.3% share of visitors has been calculated year on year until 2011. Between 2001 and 2011 the estimated figures differed from the actual figures by an average of 3,179, which is a 0.3% margin of error between the two datasets. This research suggests this margin of error is acceptable considering the length of time (twenty-one years) it spans, and the data this research has analysed for this estimation. Although conflict will have an obviously detrimental effect to GDP, it is useful to examine the drop in GDP as it provides a benchmark for the general trend of Croatia’s and Dubrovnik’s economic profile, and provides a limit and reference point for the overall state of Croatia’s economy.

Between 1990 and 2000 the number of Travel and Tourism (TT) visitors to Croatia decreased dramatically, from a high of 8,497,000 visitors in 1990 to a low of 2,297,000 in 1992: a loss of over six million visitors. In turn, Dubrovnik’s tourism fell from approximately 764,730 to 206,730 visitors, a loss of approximately 558,000 visitors in a single year. This can be considered a conservative estimate as it is likely to be higher due to the occupation of Southern Dalmatia during the conflict which separated it from Croatia.

Visitor figures can be seen to begin a trend of recovery from 1993 onwards, but with notable spikes and dips. Cross-referencing the dips to political events, as the hostilities along the Dalmatian coast (and wider Croatia) did not cease until 1995, a smooth upward trend does not begin until after this time, and a resurgence of violence in 1995 would have discouraged tourism to the Balkans. The drop in visitor numbers in 1999 could be explained by the end of the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 and the large media presence reporting on the mass atrocities committed throughout the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

The image of a destination as tourist friendly can alter its popularity (Hughes and Allen, 2008. p. 39). When a conflict is connected to a wider context of violence and war (Dubrovnik to Yugoslavia), an
association is made between the brutality and atrocity committed in a single place to the whole of the conflict zone (McManamon, 2000, p. 18); such as Srebrenica to Yugoslavia; and Yugoslavia to Dubrovnik. The effect is to tar the whole conflict area with the same level of violence whether merited or not (Judt, 1992, pp. 83–85). This tarnishes the image of a tourist destination and it ceases to appear to a security-seeking cultural tourist (Cavlek, 2002, p. 478).

Figure 8.2 Estimated Visitor Figures to Dubrovnik between 1990 and 2000

Tourism in Croatia and Dubrovnik followed a general trend between 1990 and 1999 (Figure 8.2). Visitor figures, GDP, consumer price index, employment in tourism and the contribution of TT to GDP, as well as tourism hospitality industries all dramatically fell in 1991 and did not begin to recover smoothly until 1995. All these statistics fluctuated in 1995, with a dip in 1995 and a sharp rise in 1996, and all were affected in 1999 by a (less dramatic) fall and rise. The conclusion of this analysis is twofold; first, that tourism is a prominent factor in the economy of Croatia, and the fall in visitor numbers is directly reflected in the figures documenting income, employment and GDP. And secondly, tourism has been affected by the conflict, as shown in the dramatic dip in tourism figures between 1990 and 1993.

8.2 Measuring Impact: Indicators

According to the CBS data analysed in this chapter, tourism in Dubrovnik is a significant factor in the economic viability of the town. The town’s heritage assets are a commodified product (Cohen, 1988), and their value is confirmed by the number of individuals employed directly in cultural tourism. Moreover, the constant stream of tourists who have heritage experiences in the Old Town (whether by chance or on purpose) confirms a continual demand for cultural outlets and heritage attractions in the Old Town (McKercher and Chan, 2005, p. 22). A self-perpetuating cycle of heritage supply and demand has engulfed the Old Town; and while heritage is valued highly among the residents the market relies on overseas visitors and cannot be sustained without support were these visitors to disappear again, as they did in 1991.
8.3 Indicator One: Tourist Arrivals

Compared with national visitors to Dubrovnik the number of international visitors is extremely high (CBS, 2008, 2012) and the latter generate most of the income from tourists and visitors. As a general trend, the number of international visitors to Croatia crashed during the war in 1991, and did not begin to recover until 1999. From 1999 onwards, visitor numbers to Croatia increase smoothly, and this trend appears to continue beyond 2013/4. International visitor numbers to Croatia recovered in 2008 to 9,415,105, which was 7.5% more than the previous most successful in pre-war Croatia in 1987 of 8,756,000 recorded visitors (CBS, 2011). The graph in figure 8.3 show that both domestic and international visitors follow the same trend and both drop significantly between 1990 and 1992.

The fall in visitor numbers to Dubrovnik in the early 1990s indicates that the war prevented tourism and discouraged tourists, who continued to avoid Croatia until 1996, when numbers began to rise. After the war it is possible to see tourist confidence in safety and confidence in the tourism market grow steadily, year on year as the war recedes into the past confirming Cavlek’s argument that tourism needs a safe environment to flourish (Cavlek, 2002, p. 450).

Figure 8.3 Visitor Arrivals to Croatia (1985–2011)

Between 1990 and 2000 the conflict had a profound effect on the number of international visitors to Croatia, which fell from 7,049,000 to 1,488,000: a reduction of 78.9% in a single year. The figures show that over the next ten years the numbers of international visitors were at their lowest in 1991 and again in 1995. However, despite expectations, the crash in figures did not bottom and level out in 1991 to 1995 (the active war period). Instead, international visitor numbers rose sharply between 1993 and 1994 (1,663,000 to 2,528,000, respectively) before dropping to the lowest number in 1995 (1,485,000). Visitor numbers grew slowly between 1995 and 1998, dropping sharply again in 1999 by 15.4%.

The sharp decrease between 1998 and 1999 is likely to be attributed to a decrease in international visitors who are refugees, which would decrease as the area becomes more stale. In post-conflict Croatia in 1998 it could be assumed that fewer refugees needed accommodation.

During 1991 and 1992 the JNA occupied the surrounding region in Dubrovnik, and an estimated 15,000 people fled these areas (particularly from Cavtat and Konavle), and sought shelter in
Dubrovnik (Fenrick, 1992, p. 24-26; Kaufman, 1992). These refugees were sheltered in the empty hotels, and other accommodation facilities in the Dubrovnik New Town (west of the Old Town) (Fenrick, 1992, p. 16; Kaufman, 1992). It is estimated that 7,000 people (including local Dubrovnik residents) were evacuated by the Croatian Navy from the harbour throughout the siege in 1991 (Fenrick, 1992, p. 16). The data of refugees in Croatia remains scarce, and relies on a UN report, media reports and anecdotal data; therefore, it is noted that although there were approximately 15,000 refugees in Dubrovnik during the siege, the exact number, where they stayed and their length of stay remains unclear.

Although the refugees would have occupied the hotels, their impact on the tourism data gathered from the CBS is minimal as migrants and displaced persons are excluded from their statistics. The CBS define a tourist as:

every person who, outside his/her place of permanent residence, spends at least one night in a hotel or some other tourist accommodation establishment for reasons of rest, recreation, health, study, sport, religion, family, business, public tasks or meeting. Tourists exclude migrants, borderline workers, diplomats, military force members on their regular duties, displaced persons and nomads.

Croatian Bureau of Statistics

Tourist Arrivals and Overnight stays in Rented Accommodation: Notes on Methodology

2015

This definition is extrapolated to the use of tourism facilities, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the CBS statistics on nights spent occupying accommodation facilities are limited to tourists only. Although the refugees would have had an impact on the available capacity of the hotels, it is unlikely that this shortfall in capacity was a major factor on tourism as international tourism plummeted during the war, and available capacity would have been extremely high. Furthermore, this definition of a tourist given by the CBS also excludes relief workers (border workers and diplomats) and military personnel from the definition of tourist, which suggests that UN and UNESCO observers would also not have counted as tourists.

8.4 Indicator Two: Nights Spent

The number of visitors indicates visitor volume, whereas the number of nights spent in Dubrovnik show how long they are visiting (CBS 2008, 2012). The number of nights spent in Dubrovnik has a direct and measurable impact on how much tourists spend on accommodation. In tandem with visitor figures it is clear that accommodation facilities were negatively affected by the war, and there was a huge reduction in overnight visits from tourists.

The difference between the number of visitors and the overnight stays suggest that more international than national visitors stay overnight, but national visitors also staying overnight. The length of visit is significant because an overnight stay implies that the visitors to Dubrovnik may remain in the Old
Town and visit more attractions, which in turn drives employment and wealth generation, which influences focus and protection to material and intangible cultural heritage as a source of income.

Figure 8.4 Overnight Stays in Dubrovnik (2001–2011)

### 8.5 Indicator Three: Duration of Stay

The duration of stay helps to give an understanding of how tourists behave whilst in Dubrovnik, and also forms the basis for how much tourists spend on each trip. The average duration of stay is calculated by dividing the overnight stays by the number of tourist arrivals.

Figure 8.5 Overnight Stays and the Average Duration of Stay in Croatia (1985–2011)

The trend in Figure 8.5 shows from 1985 onwards the duration of stay for a single visitor is falling, whilst the number of nights spent by the total number of visitors is increasing. This shows that there are more people visiting Croatia year on year (as a general trend would suggest), but each visitor is staying for a shorter amount of time. The total number of nights spent by visitors was greatly affected by the war in 1991, and the fall in stays mirrors the fall in visitor numbers.

Unlike total overnight stays by visitors and visitor numbers, the duration of stay has not regained the pre-war highs and the trend indicates that future visits to Croatia and Dubrovnik are unlikely to rise above five (Croatian average) or four nights (Dubrovnik average, Figure 8.6). This may be due to of a lack of recovery in tourism, or a reflection of the way tourism has changed in response to cheaper travel and an increase in shorter trips. The change in the way people visit Dubrovnik as a reason for
the changing tourism trends is supported by interviews with local residents, most of whom talk about
the changing types of tourists, and make a distinction between pre and post war tourists. Although
they see this change as a direct consequence of the war, it could be interpreted as a general world-
wide trend in changing tourism attitudes due to the availability of cheap travel.

Figure 8.6 Overall Nights and the Average Duration of Stay in Dubrovnik (2001 to 2011)

8.6 Indicator Four: Accommodation Facilities by Type
The type of accommodation offered in Dubrovnik reveals how space is divided in the Old Town.
The declining demand for hotels and the growing preference for private apartments suggests that
private spaces (houses and apartments) are being utilised by owners and residents for the use of
tourists. The availability of beds for overnight stays indicates the capacity for Croatia and Dubrovnik
to host national and international overnight tourists, and also indicates how profitable it is as a
sustainable economic activity. From this data the frequency of use of the available accommodation
has been calculated to estimate how efficiently the capacity is being used, this indicator is labelled
as “Capacity Use” and follows after this indicator.

As a general trend it is possible to see that the popularity of hotels in Croatia is declining, although
their number continues to expand (CBS, 2008, 2012). This is shown in the growing number of beds
offered in each type of facility and the average (declining) use of each bed per year. Apartment types
of accommodation have been growing steadily since 1990 and are becoming most popular.

Overnight accommodation in Croatia is divided by the CBS into four main groups: hotels, campsites,
households and others. “Hotels” include hotels, villas and all-suite hotels, tourist resorts, tourist
apartments, boarding houses, guest houses and motels. “Campsites” include campsites, quick-stop
camping and small camps. “Other accommodation” includes overnight accommodation, vacation
facilities, youth hotels and hostels, inns, spas and nautical ports, as well as uncategorised facilities
and any other rented overnight accommodation. These three groups are categorised as collective
accommodation. “Households” includes private apartments, rooms, summer houses, rural
households and private campsites and are categorised as private accommodation.

Between 1990 and 2000 tourists predominantly used collective accommodation, however, from 2001
to 2011 the number of beds offered (and occupied) dropped by 2% and private accommodation
experienced a steady increase of 53%, culminating in nearly equal numbers of beds available in
The war caused dips in both accommodation types, with significant reductions in available beds in 1991 and 1992. Private accommodation was disproportionally affected and did not recover its pre-war highs until 2001 to 2002. Collective accommodation has not regained its pre-war accommodation capacity, but unlike private accommodation it did experience a spike in accommodation in 1994.

The use of The Old Town residences as tourism accommodation presents a challenge to the protection of the intangible and material heritage of Dubrovnik; short stay tourist lettings of Old Town residences offer an economic incentive to residents not to remain in the old town, and by doing so the town become more densely populated with tourists and becomes less attractive to future tourists. This is a similar problem experienced by other cultural destinations popular with tourists, such as Venice.

8.7 Indicator Five: Capacity Use

This indicator assesses the capacity of the tourism sector in Dubrovnik by looking at how many available beds there are in tourist accommodation compared to their use. The graph in figure 8.7 shows how much of the available capacity of accommodation is used and whether the market for accommodation is saturated or insufficient which has a direct impact on how economically valuable built heritage is to the tourism sector. The use of beds also shows that there is a high and low tourist season, and that income is not consistent throughout the year as accommodation is frequently empty (CBS, 2008, 2012).

Figure 8.7 Available Beds in Collective and Private Accommodation 1985–2011

Figure 8.8 Occupied Bed Nights and Frequency of Occupation 1990–2011
The number of nights each bed is occupied per year is relatively low; at around 9–15% capacity over 20 years in the whole of Dubrovnik, and each bed/facility has a turnover of around four to twelve different guests per year (Figure 8.8). Considering the number of accommodation facilities, the high number of arrivals and long duration of stay in Croatia the reliance on the tourism market is clear, but visitor turnover and occupation rates suggest that the accommodation facilities are empty or underused for a considerable period of the year (CBS, 2008, 2012). However, the growing number of tourists and increasing number of facilities each year suggest that the demand for accommodation remains profitable as the number of facilities grows steadily year on year.

8.8 Indicator Six: Direct contribution of Tourism to GDP

This indicator assesses how vital the tourism industry is to the economy of Dubrovnik and Croatia and track changes in the value of tourism from 1990 to 2012. It deals with direct tourism services such as accommodation, culture, recreation and services directly linked to tourism; it excludes employment and government contributions. The information and statistics are taken from Trading Economics and verified against GDP data from the World Bank and the World Travel and Tourism Committee. The data is considered accurate but because it uses the average GDP contribution over a twenty-year period, the final direct contribution of Dubrovnik tourism to GDP is considered to be approximate.

The direct contribution of Dubrovnik’s tourism sector has been calculated by dividing the contribution of travel and tourism to Croatian GDP by Dubrovnik’s share of tourists. Using data from Trading Economics (2013) the direct contribution of travel and tourism to Croatian GDP between 1990 and 2011 was approximately US$ 64.7 billion, which is approximately 8.6% of Croatian GDP (Figure 8.9). Dubrovnik accounted for approximately 4.2% of all tourists in Croatia, and therefore could reasonably be expected to produce 4.2% of income and resources based on this share of tourists. Between 1990 and 2011 4.2% of tourism’s contribution to Croatian GDP was approximately US$ 2.5 billion. However, this assumes that tourists across Croatia spend similar amounts in all regions and Dubrovnik would have the same average prices as other areas. However, the cost of living in Dubrovnik is higher than most other places in Croatia due to its reputation as a cultural centre, its popularity with tourists and its geographical position. Therefore, the estimate given above is a baseline estimate of Dubrovnik’s travel and tourism contribution to Croatia’s GDP.

According to the International Monetary Fund the consumer price index (CPI) for Croatia from 1990 to 2011 shows a sharp increase in 1992 (due to the declaration of Croatian independence, the transition away from communism, and the impact of the conflict on the availability of resources), and a continuous increase has occurred since then in the cost of consumer items (Numbeo, 2013). The graph in Figure 8.10 shows that the sharp rise in the price of consumables occurred between 1992 and 1994, during the closing stages of the war in Croatia. This could be attributed to the return of stability and commerce to war-affected regions of Croatia such as Dubrovnik.
Figure 8.9 Contribution of Travel and Tourism to GDP in Croatia 1992–2011

Figure 8.10 Consumer Price Index in Croatia

8.9 Indicator Seven: Direct Employment in Tourism Services

This indicator assesses how many people are employed directly by tourism in Dubrovnik, and looks at how it has changed between 1990 and 2012. This research has identified four levels of employment in tourism which include cultural tourism. The first level is food, retail and accommodation (employing 72% of the tourism sector). It includes those employed by tourism services indirectly, looking at the needs of tourists rather than tourist attractions. The second level is cultural services (4%), and includes those employed by museums, archives, libraries and other cultural institutions, showing how many people are employed in heritage-centred industries. The third level is recreation activities (8%), which covers people employed in non-cultural attractions such as sport, gambling and other recreational activities. The fourth is other employment (16%), and includes other tourism and heritage services such as specialist construction, travel agents and reservation services and those employed to support a specialist heritage infrastructure.

CBS data shows that employment in tourism industries amounted to approximately 14 to 18% of all employment in Croatia between 2000 and 2011 (Figure 8.11), and cultural services tourism amounted to approximately 0.7% of overall employment in Croatia, which equates between 6000 and 8000 individuals from 2000 to 2011 (CBS, 2008, 2012). Food, retail, and accommodation account for the largest proportion of employees, making up 12% of all employment in Croatia and employing between 100,000 and 140,000 people per year between 2000 and 2011 (CBS, 2008, 2012).
As the pie chart in Figure 8.12 indicates, tourism is the second largest employer at approximately 16%, following manufacturing (21% of the total) (CBS, 2008, 2012). As argued previously, if tourism and heritage can be considered synonymous (or at least very closely intertwined) it is clear that Croatia’s economy relies heavily on the heritage and tourism industry for employment and income from people using tourism amenities and services. Between 2000 and 2011 employment in tourism has followed a steady upward trend with more people being employed in tourism industries and employment evenly dispersed across the four levels of tourism. Employment in tourism is calculated based on national statistics of Croatia, and uses averages over a general eleven-year trend.

**Summary: The economic recovery of Dubrovnik**

From 1990 to 2011 tourism in Croatia and Dubrovnik has followed a general trend: a dramatic decrease of international visitors during the war from 1990 to 1992 leading to a dramatic drastic dip in accommodation facilities, employment in tourism, and tourism’s contribution to GDP. The recovery of tourism occurred between 1999 and 2008 when tourism figures, nights spent in accommodation, employment in tourism, and contribution to GDP recovered to their pre-war (1990) levels. From 2008 to 2011 tourism figures increased, but suffered a dip in 2009, most likely due to
the financial global crisis, but the figures recovered and are now at their highest level, beyond their pre-war levels.

On average, visitors are staying fewer nights in Croatia and Dubrovnik than before the war, and the number of day-trippers is considerably higher than pre-war levels. Accommodation is rarely utilised to capacity in Dubrovnik. Between 2001 and 2011 accommodation was used to capacity for approximately 58 nights of a year. Although this suggests that accommodation is plentiful but underused in Dubrovnik, it is also in keeping with Dubrovnik’s seasonal tourism in most visitors arrive between March and September. The cost of living in Dubrovnik is likely to continue to increase, and although it is not the most expensive in terms of the CPI, Dubrovnik is on average approximately 1% higher than the Croatian average. Other tourist-centred regions in the Dubrovnik region are also higher than the national average, with Dubrovnik-Neretva ranking the fifth most expensive county behind Karlovac, Vukovar-Syrmia, the City of Zagreb, and Split-Dalmatia. Tourism is a significant employer in Dubrovnik, employing on average 14–17% of all employed people in Croatia. Direct employment in heritage-centred occupations accounts for only 4% of all those employed in tourism, but other employment in tourism in Dubrovnik can be seen to support heritage through associated hospitality and entertainment industries.

In 2012, the town was above the average in terms of cost of living, the number of visitors it receives each year, and the number of people employed in tourism services. It attracts a large number of tourists each year, with the highest on record recorded in 2013 with 12.4 million tourists, of which 8.9 million were international (CBS, 2013). The visits to Dubrovnik are higher in the summer, with the highest number of visitors coming in August. The seasonal nature of the visits to Dubrovnik shows that there is a greater demand for tourism and accommodation in the summer, which is why the occupation of all facilities in Dubrovnik averages approximately 16% per year. Another contributory factor for the low occupation rate could be the flooding of the accommodation market with a vast array and quantity of types of accommodation. Both its seasonal tourism and ample accommodation could explain why accommodation in Dubrovnik is rarely full to capacity. Dubrovnik’s industries and services are predominantly tourism based, either relying on accommodation and food services, recreational activities, cultural services or other (administrative) tourism roles. Travel and tourism in Dubrovnik contributed an estimated income of US$ 2.7 billion from 1990 to 2011, and an estimated US$323.73 million for one year in 2012 (CBS, 2013). The primary driver of travel and tourism in Dubrovnik is cultural heritage- either through direct employment in specialist heritage sectors, or through wealth generation through tourism supporting hospitality industries- thus when discussing the economic value of tourism, we can estimate the associated economic value of heritage to both tourism and Dubrovnik as a whole.

The reliance on tourism in contemporary Dubrovnik (which centres on cultural tourism and cultural significance of the old town) as a sustainable source of income is highly likely to affect the degree to which the history of the area is sanitized and influence the prioritisation of peace narratives over war narratives. This will ensure consistently high visitor numbers to the old town, and in doing so increase the ontological distance between Dubrovnik as a war-affected region and Dubrovnik as a
cultural tourism hotspot. This will subsequently affect the way conflict is remembered through cultural heritage and also how Dubrovnik is positioned and broadcast within war narratives to visitors. The economic influence of tourism and heritage is a key factor which alters the way Dubrovnik recovered from conflict, and this economic profile has shown how integral these influences are both to the economy of Croatia as well as the individuals employed within this sector; this analysis enables the researcher to have a better understanding of contemporary Dubrovnik which equips them with the knowledge to better receive and interpret the information being given by interview subjects during the final IHAF stage which interrogates the socio-political impacts of the conflict.
Chapter Nine: The Socio-political Impact of Heritage on Post-conflict Dubrovnik

The treatment of Dubrovnik as a single site has led to the view that the extent of damage to the entire Old Town was severe and the town devastated, whereas records of damage to individual building show there was a greater variety of damage and restoration than had been envisioned by reports. This chapter views heritage from a socio-political perspective to see how the relationship between people and places may have been altered by the conflict, and how people in Dubrovnik define and use heritage. As such, this chapter represents an application of the expanded analytic horizons opened up through IHAF as compared to predominant modes of post-conflict heritage management. The chapter explores ideas of how heritage can be defined, the role of heritage in creating post-conflict cultural identities, the creation of war narratives and the mythologies, and how heritage has affected reconciliation in Dubrovnik both in terms of reconciliation with the past, but also with their contemporary Serbian and Montenegrin neighbours. This chapter operationalises themes introduced through Chapters Two, Three and Four, which explored the theoretical aspects of heritage creation and the way that heritage has been conceptualised in conflict and post-conflict zones. This chapter also uses the discussions of the previous chapters on the physical and economic impact of heritage to establish a link between the physical recovery and the more intangible socio-political recovery, and examines the consequences of envisioning Dubrovnik as a single cultural heritage site with a fixed narrative of recovery.

This chapter culminates by bringing all three IHAF areas of research together to answer the third research question of this thesis: What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik? To answer this question, this chapter integrated the findings of the physical, economic, and socio-political perspectives to develop six key findings in order to illustrate the influence and impact heritage has had on the recovery of Dubrovnik. These key findings are the final step and end product of the IHAF approach; although they are specific to the nuances of Dubrovnik, aspects of these findings can be extrapolated towards a better understanding of some of the key ways in which heritage impacts conflicts more widely.

In order to gauge how heritage is perceived in Old Town, a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted between 2012 and 2014 with participants from a variety of backgrounds, undertaken over three years. The cumulative method of data collection was used, in part, because of the breadth of economic, physical and social data to be collected, but also due to access to interview participants. Data used to explore the social impact of heritage in Dubrovnik is based on ten one-hour to two-hour interviews with local residents (coded for purposes of anonymity as post-conflict cultural heritage informants (PCCH) and numbered 1–10).

The semi-structured questions sought to give individual participants the opportunity to relate their narratives of conflict and recovery, and explain how they perceived heritage in contemporary Dubrovnik, but the standardised questions also allowed the researcher to compare answers and look for common themes in the answers which could be used to discern a collective experience of war and
recovery of the residents of Dubrovnik. The interviews aimed to gauge the perception of the local Dubrovnik participants on the recovery of Dubrovnik and its link to heritage. This chapter links the three major themes of this research together, and using this integrated perspective, together with this research’s theoretical foundation, discover what impact heritage has had on the recovery of Dubrovnik since 1992. Although not repeated here, the methods detailing how the interviews were carried out, participants recruited and their anonymity protected as well as how barriers and linguistics issues were solved, can be found in the methodology chapter of this thesis (Chapter Five).

During the interviews several themes emerged and these are analysed and discussed at length in this chapter. The emergent themes are taken from the interviews and categorised as the perception of conflict and recovery, the relationship between people and place in post-war Dubrovnik, remembering, forgetting and reconciliation, the mythology of conflict in Dubrovnik, and tourism in contemporary Dubrovnik.

9.1 The Perception of Conflict and Recovery in Dubrovnik

The recovery of Dubrovnik has been discussed in economic and physical terms in earlier sections, but the perceptions of the process and result have so far been limited to official accounts, which offer a limited perspective of the conflict and recovery. The conflict was experienced both collectively and individually and this section seeks to explore the overlap between these narratives and ascertain how much influence each has on the other. The theme of the perception of recovery emerged from interviews in a series of recurring concerns and talking points. These sub-themes are: the discourse of damage, recreating pre-war Old Town, and the extent of recovery in the Old Town.

9.1.1 The Discourse of Damage

There is some debate about the extent of damage to the BCH in which the line between “damaged” and “destroyed” has become blurred. These differences in perception are expressed by the residents of Dubrovnik. Most interviewees referred to the buildings as destroyed, rather than damaged. Some go further to describe the damage as destroyed completely or obliterated, for example:

Nine houses were completely destroyed, two [of those] houses was our family [sic].

PCCH1

The reference to nine destroyed buildings echoes the broad narrative of the damage reports discussed in this chapter. The perception that the buildings were destroyed is particularly apparent in residents who were indirectly associated with the rebuilding process. Shop owners, restaurateurs and students frequently referred to the buildings as “destroyed” (the word “destroyed” surfaced fifteen times in the interviews in relation to war-damaged cultural heritage). However, those who were directly involved in the rebuilding process, either through the Ministry of Culture or via IFRD, referred to the buildings as damaged, using more technical and precise language and making the distinction between damage and destruction clear:
Nothing was suppressed [or] crushed down completely, because it’s stone, those are the stone houses, but most of them were without roofs, they were burnt inside and it required a lot of repair.

PCCH6

These contrasting perspectives show that those directly involved in the recovery process have a good understanding of the damage, whilst those were not involved have a less clear understanding of it. It may be the case that those indirectly involved in the repair work did not possess the expertise to differentiate between technical definitions of destroyed and damaged and so based their understanding on the reports and narratives that used the term destroyed rather than damaged.

The ways in which the damage has been remembered and reported can be read as a type of collective memory wherein individual experiences are interpreted and incorporated into a singular authoritative narrative (Misztal, 2003, p. 20). In this case, individual experiences of damaged buildings have been subsumed into a collective understanding that Dubrovnik was destroyed, and it is this narrative that was transmitted to the international community. This can be seen in the violence of the language used by the participants when discussing the extent of the harm, which included the terms “destroyed” (PCCH1, 2, 3, 5), and “obliterated” (PCCH1, 3, 7).

The collective experience is reported of 6 December, agreed by most participants agreed to be the worst day when the city was bombed from the hills and sea:

It was the St Nicholas day in 1991, 6 December, it was bombed throughout the whole day, and lots of houses and palaces were burnt, completely.

PCCH6

Aggression was really hard, with 20,000 soldiers from the aggressors from three sides were coming to Dubrovnik in October 1991, from three sides … and Dubrovnik stayed like an island, surrounded by the aggressors’ army … with army ships, came in front of Dubrovnik and they declared some kind of “do not move any kind of boat or ship or anything like that”. No one could move off from Dubrovnik, or came into Dubrovnik.

PCCH5

… terrible bombardment first in October then in November and then this one in December when they bombed heavily, the 6 December, St Nicholas day.

PCCH6

PCCH8’s recollections were more violent and graphic than those of the other participants. Due to a family tragedy during the war, the participants were initially uneasy about speaking in personal terms and they preferred to talk about the effect of the conflict as a collective experience. Despite this initial reluctance, when they began to talk about their individual experiences they eventually made many references to the violence and the emotional impact of the attacks, rather than focusing (as many of the others did) on the physical effect of the war on their cultural property:
I walked through the town in the early afternoon and there was some houses burned, with firemen outside … so quiet and people were just crying. I had a camera but I couldn’t take any photo, it was for us really unbelievable. Unbelievable.

PCCH8

The influence of emotional trauma in remembering is examined in more detail in section 9.3.3 “Reconciliation”. It is mentioned here as an example of how individual experience is framed within authorised narratives:

I see those days very clearly and I am proud that I can say I was a part of all these happenings but it’s all coloured with a kind of tragedy, a private tragedy and that’s the reason I’m maybe a little bit emotional about all of this.

PCCH7

The tendency to link the grand narrative of the conflict to personal experience was a recurring feature of most of the interviews. For example, PCCH1 spoke of their experience during the war, first by talking about the official narrative of the conflict, and then immediately relating it back to their own experience and how they could be situated within this narrative:

Very early in the morning, about 6 o’clock they started, and one of the first houses, and another one what was also our property on Stradun … they started with that … nine houses were completely destroyed.

PCCH1

The interviews also revealed that another factor that could influence the way the war had been remembered and transmitted may be the interactions with people and their different experiences of the conflict. For example, PCCH5 spoke briefly about a personal connection to the Dubrovnik defenders and gave a detailed account of the involvement of the defenders in the conflict. Unlike the other participants, PCCH5 differentiated between civilians and defenders:

[In] four days, more than 20 civilians and almost 30 Dubrovnik defenders were killed, and Dubrovnik became very known about the bombing at the 6 December.

PCCH5

The Dubrovnik defenders were not discussed by most the other interviewees, and when they were mentioned they were spoken about as part of a collective experience (following the official narrative of their involvement).

9.1.2 Recreating Pre-war Dubrovnik

The interviews also illustrated a key heritage debate, centred on whether to let the marks of the conflict show on the BCH or to completely recreate the town as a mirror image of the pre-war town. The participants all noted that they would like to see the town complete and without war damage, but they also were aware that complete recovery was not possible. PCCH3 said that the marks on the
stones were a symbol of how far the city had recovered and argued that there was little need to repair any surviving damage as the city would naturally weather away the damage over time:

It is a weakness of the past, that when some catastrophic thing [the 1979 earthquake] happened … it is always explainable. But what about weathering with this barbarian damages, with this vandalism? It is called vandalism these mechanical damages. It is best to leave it, to stay as long as it needs to … then it is healed properly. That’s what I think.

PCCH3

PCCH1 has a different perspective and argues that the marks of war damage should not persist in the Old Town because the town will be passed on from past generations to future generations. This echoes many of the theoretical heritage debates outlined in Chapters Three and Four, and is explored in greater detail in section 9.3:

Because we didn’t want to change anything, we would like to have everything the same as it was before the war. Because this is our feeling, yes, and we put the same the same interior, the kitchen. Our bedroom, and our dining room etcetera. In the same place as it was.

PCCH1

9.2 The Relationship between People and Place in Post-war Dubrovnik

Heritage is Dubrovnik is an all-encompassing feature of everyday life, but the relationship between people and place is examined here to show how a sense of belonging in Dubrovnik has been created and what effect notions of exclusivity shape post-war cultural identities. The livelihoods of most of the people in Dubrovnik are tied to heritage, either through the museums, the built heritage or by catering to the thousands of tourists who visit the city every day. But the relationship is more than purely financial. It hinges on the acceptance of the importance of heritage, the overwhelming sense of pride that the local people have in the city and a deep sense of belonging.

The interview participants without exception showed they understood the importance of heritage to Dubrovnik. They not only identified heritage as fundamental to their everyday livelihoods, they noted that Dubrovnik is defined as heritage. When asked directly about the importance of heritage PCCH1 replied “heritage is everything”, whilst another participant (PCCH10) gestured to the building walls and said “We are stone, and stone is Dubrovnik”. The built heritage is invoked not as an economic driver but as a symbol of identity. PCCH10 went on to describe how the locally sourced stones from Ston were part of Dubrovnik’s identity, PCCH1 proudly stated that “If you cut us we are stone inside”. The quote was said more in jest than the aggressive nature of the words would suggest, but the imagery invoked is one that links people intrinsically to the built heritage of Dubrovnik via not only a sense of belonging and history but also of physically being linked to the city. The participants linked themselves to heritage in several ways, but the most frequently recurring link was that of continuous family connections to Dubrovnik, situating their own experiences alongside their ancestors living in the city or being born in the city:
Here in Dalmatian part, in Croatia especially here in Dalmatia, heritage is everything, you know. Here, it’s that kind of culture; people who are born here and live here have a very strong feeling about their culture.

**PCCH1**

People who are born here, and family have lots of families here who are from the Old Town and there are four or five hundred years here, old families. For example, I’m like 13th or 14th generation here.

**PCCH2**

It was very important because this is our culture, and we would like to protect this for many generations for future. It’s very important, this [Dubrovnik] is unique, and the whole town is like one museum and it very important to have something like that … to keep this and to have for our children.

**PCCH9**

The connection to people in the past, as opposed to historic events, is a way to bond to heritage using a personal historical claim to the city that depoliticises the process of defining Dubrovnik heritage. By invoking family relationships to form a bond to the past, the participants are at once claiming a direct and uninterrupted inheritance of the city, whilst bolstering the notion that Dubrovnik can belong only to those born in the city with their own historical claim to it. In this way, Dubrovnik has become the exclusive domain of local people with ancestral roots in the city, whilst excluding those who cannot claim a hereditary place in Dubrovnik. The transmission of heritage was invoked as one of the most important aspects of heritage, but the participants did not expand on exactly what aspects of heritage they had inherited, or what they would safeguard for future generations. Heritage in Dubrovnik is often described simply as undifferentiated heritage: the assumption seems to be the town and its heritage are completely indistinguishable: the function of being Dubrovnik equals the function of being heritage. Laurajane Smith argues that heritage is a discourse that is produced and performed, and an authorised narrative is produced that utilises the built heritage environment to justify its identity as heritage (Smith, 2006); this process appears to be clearly illustrated in this case study. Emma Waterton builds on this argument to note that the discourse of heritage protects its status by directing attention towards signifiers of heritage and encouraging people to continue to mark it out as such (Waterton, 2009, p. 40).

The dual incentive of the economic benefits and the social importance of heritage means that those who work and live in the city have an interest in continuing the heritage rhetoric in the city and encouraging future generations to do likewise. The participants frequently used heritage to signify economic stability, and this illustrates a key theme in the discourses of heritage in the city:

It [cultural assets produced in Dubrovnik] is very good: olives, olive oil, and stone, wine: they are the heritage of Dubrovnik. From the beginning we had this, and this is what the traditional souvenirs we should be selling.
Tourists don’t come to have a sunny day or swim in the sea which is beautiful and clear, they mostly come to see the walls, this precious heritage, the city stones and city walls; to have a walk throughout Old Town. That’s the reason why they come, because Dubrovnik is unique we don’t have such preserved Old Town somewhere else. Heritage definitely has big influence on that.

The importance of heritage in Dubrovnik is tied to feelings of belonging in the city. This goes beyond defining and transmitting a heritage discourse in Dubrovnik to considering the celebration of heritage as normal and the rejection of the celebratory rhetoric as abnormal. This is partly defined in a comparison with family bonds: PCCH2 likened taking care of the city to caring for relatives: “It is normal … to live at your parents and take care of your parents”, adding, “if you have your own house … people begin start wondering why”. The implications for this interpretation in the context of post-war Dubrovnik are significant; the acceptance of heritage in Dubrovnik means an acceptance of the collective heritage narrative and the heritage image created in Dubrovnik: if you deviate from this norm in Dubrovnik you are in the minority.

But this does not suggest that there is no supra-personal, socio-political imperative at work. The identity of the “Dubrovniks” as identifiably “local” was highlighted by a comment on the impact of incomer groups:

The traditions are not possible [to change] quickly. So changes could come with the new people, we don’t know what we are supposed to be after becoming the European Union. Perhaps when other races … you see in England you have a lot of Africans, Indians and Chinese people … we don’t have it still. But everything is possible to change, and I don’t know how it will look. But our protection of the patrimony and the old lives of history, and culture – not only material – is strong. Very traditional.

The comparison between insiders and outsiders allows those with a hereditary attachment to feel more included, and cement their identities against newcomers who will never attain the same level of generational inclusion. Most of the included group are ethnic Croatian Catholics with a family tie to Dubrovnik. Minority groups that have existed in the same space for a long period but are not Croatian or Catholic (the Jewish, Muslim and Orthodox communities) are partially included in the Dubrovnik discourses. Excluded groups are not ethnically Croatian, they are usually migrant workers or foreign visitors, and they are likely to be renters and not home owners.

After the homeland war, the last war, a lot of people came here. Of course, we have lots of people from Bosnia and Herzegovina, from Slovenia, It’s different. Their culture is different. They think different but they mostly live outside of the Old Town. Inside the Old Town is
mostly reserved either for the old people that are from here, or rich foreigners who can afford the house.

**PCCH9**

The comparison between those who belong and those who do not reinforces the sense of belonging in a very exclusive group, but the division between the two groups (Croatian and Not-Croatian) where lingering post-war tensions become distinct, and illustrates the key argument on the bombing of Dubrovnik: to which group does Dubrovnik belong? Milošević claimed Dubrovnik was Slavic and therefore the property of Yugoslavia, whilst Croatia claimed it as Croatian. In 1991 Dubrovnik was Croatian, but only as recently as 1941 had the Croatian borders been defined as such. The annexation of Dalmatia into Croatia in the 1940s gave Croatia its contemporary borders; when Milošević made the argument for Yugoslav control of Dubrovnik he based his claim on pre-Second World War boundaries which delegitimised Croatia’s contemporary borders (see Chapter Six for details). In the outbreak of war Dalmatia and Dubrovnik defined themselves as Croatian, but the cultural history of Dubrovnik is ambiguous, allowing Milošević to bomb the Old Town using the history of Dubrovnik (unsuccessfully) both as justification and as a shield against international criticism. The interview participants mirrored the cultural rhetoric used by Croatia and Yugoslavia to claim Dubrovnik, but with a different result; they identified not only as Croatian, but more centrally as Dubrovnik – with a clear differentiation:

Not only Croatian but we consider ourselves Dubrovnik.

**PCCH2**

It’s a long history, and older history than Croatia, three times as much you know? There’s more history of Dubrovnik than of most of the towns in Europe. Dubrovnik is as old as Rome or Venice. You know, London is new compared to Dubrovnik.

**PCCH9**

[Compared to] Split or Trogir, they have nice heritage too, but Dubrovnik is something special. Like architecture, like everything; and the culture is the main point, it is why the people come. Even if they don’t want to go to the museums, they know they are existing here and everything is full of history and heritage.

**PCCH3**

The comparison between Dubrovnik as a centre for culture with other cultural centres in Croatia is invoked to elevate the status of Dubrovnik and set it apart from the rest of Croatia. Dubrovnik’s status as a cultural symbol (supported by its status as a UNESCO WHS) was considered a key reason for Milošević’s attack on the city, and it was used by the ICTY in the trial. The extracts above echo the rhetoric used by Milošević, but with a different aim; to define themselves firstly as a culturally independent city of Dubrovnik and secondly to define themselves as Croatian (with an associated European bias). The argument made here is that the rhetoric on the national cultural identity of Dubrovnik uses a historically based narrative that can be manipulated and changed according to the goals of the speaker; while the goals of the residents of Dubrovnik and the acts perpetrated by Milošević...
are obviously very different, the rhetoric used is similar. The participants also echo international criticism of the bombing in 1991 and link the bombing explicitly to culture:

The Old Town was most damaged, because it … it was a symbol. They were shelling a symbol.

PCCH5

Both the historical rhetoric used to define sociocultural identities and international (popular) criticism of the bombings make use of Dubrovnik’s elevated cultural status, whilst evading the acknowledgment that Dubrovnik was directly involved in the conflict. If the identity of Dubrovnik is separated from that of Croatia then the former is a victim caught between two warring countries, rather than being complicit in Croatian acts. This is supported by the perception of how Dubrovnik behaved in the conflict:

[Dubrovnik was] like concentration camp surrounded from four sides, even from the air with planes from Mostar. Dubrovnik lost electricity lost liquid water, lost medical supplies or anything like that, and that lasted for almost ten months … [at the] end of 1991 the war luck changed because the Dubrovnik defenders succeed to push back the other army and they didn’t achieve what they wanted to accomplish, that is they wanted to occupy [the] Fort Imperial on top of the Srd.

PCCH5

A contemporary community (nation or city) in the aftermath of war will attempt to distance itself for involvement in the conflict because no side will have an untarnished war record (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996). The authors go on to argue that by framing a post-war nation as a victim or hero in a war, whilst simultaneously avoiding ownership or responsibility of the war, a community can recreate a historical narrative that both includes and distances them from the war (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996). Dubrovnik is just such an example of this rhetoric. In creating an exclusive cultural identity Dubrovnik has created a narrative of belonging that in turn helps to support the mythology of the war in post-war Dubrovnik.

The post-war relationship between people and place in Dubrovnik seems to have strengthened reliance on the rhetoric of heritage in the city. The heritage discourses are considered the most important sign of belonging in the city, but it is often simplified as a generic term for all “heritage” activities and buildings in Dubrovnik. The result of is that the participants are very attached to heritage and see it as a core aspect of their own identities but they do not discuss what heritage is. They define it as the built heritage and traditions of the city, but events since the Second World War are not included in the heritage discourse except to highlight how Dubrovnik suffered in the 1991 attack. The impact of the war on the relationship between people and place led to the cementing of Dubrovnik identities (insiders and outsiders) and the invocation of cultural heritage rhetoric which was used in and after the war to preserve ownership of the city, but ownership claims that are based on family rather than national ties. The cementing of post-war identities and the ways in which memories of the war have been intrinsically linked to the heritage discourse is explored in the following section.
9.3 Remembering Conflict in Dubrovnik: Memory, Reconciliation and Commemoration

Economically and physically the Old Town has recovered since the conflict in 1991. However, the several markers of the conflict in the city include the ricochet marks on the buildings, one memorial in Sponza Palace and a war museum on the hill outside the Old Town. The marks of conflict are not immediately apparent, but they are there. The Dubrovnik residents who were interviewed mirror the city in this way; the conflict was not immediately a talking point, especially not in regards to contemporary Dubrovnik; rather, it was mentioned in passing in relation to other aspects of life in Dubrovnik (such as tourism, the meaning of heritage and the future of the city). When asked directly about conflict the participants were prepared to talk about the effect of conflict on built heritage, and a discourse of conflict and recovery emerged based on a collective experience of conflict during the Siege of Dubrovnik. Discourses of conflict and recovery revealed how Dubrovnik has collectively remembered the conflict, and the effect its memories has had on processes of commemoration and reconciliation. During this section the process of memory making in Dubrovnik is scrutinised, looking how the participants have collectively and individually remembered the conflict, and whether the erasure of war marks on BCH is echoed in the participants’ choice to remember or forget the war. This section will also explore how the residents of Dubrovnik regard their international neighbours and discuss whether these relationships can be considered reconciled or fractious.

9.3.1 Remembering

The way in which the conflict is remembered in Dubrovnik is split between the public commemoration of the attack as a shared experience and personal narratives of individual suffering and loss. The participants spoke about their memories of war as a collective experience, emphasising that the attack on the town meant that all the residents had suffered during the conflict. The aggression against Dubrovnik was framed as a unique experience for the residents of the town and had not been replicated anywhere else in Croatia:

There is no one, no family in Dubrovnik which wasn’t touched in some kind of a war aggression, and people always asked people from Dubrovnik, “How you feel during the aggression, what were you doing” or something like that. Every single citizen in Dubrovnik were at the first line of front. I talk a lot with the defenders who came to liberate this part of Croatia or they were in some other part of our country, and they always say “Yes, but my family stayed in Rijeka, they were safe and I went to war”, and here everyone was in war.

PCCH5

The collective experience of isolation and the uniqueness of the experience separates Dubrovnik narratives of war from a national Croatian narrative of war. The collective experience of war becomes dominant over individual memories of war and individual experiences are often subsumed under the collective narrative (Misztal, 2003, p.23). Misztal goes on to argue that a hierarchy of collective memories exists in which national narratives dominate local community narratives, forcing the latter to exist primarily through their connection with the dominant collective discourse (Misztal, 2003,
In Dubrovnik, however, individual experiences became part of the Dubrovnik collective experience, but the Dubrovnik narrative remains separate from national narratives of conflict. This is shown by the lack of dialogue on the way the Dubrovnik conflict fits into the national narrative (as would be expected from war narratives). Misztal notes that tying individual and local narratives to national ones is a way to increase the importance of a localised experience by associating it to the wider political context (Misztal, 2003, pp.24–25). Nevertheless, during interviews the participants did not assimilate their narratives into a grand narrative, and they mentioned other conflict zones only to differentiate them from their own and highlight the uniqueness of their own experience. For example, PCCH2 speaks at length about the ways in which the Old Town was bombed, but limits the narrative of conflict to Dubrovnik until they draw a distinction between experiences of Dubrovnik and Croatia:

So here, people were still fighting, still hear here the gunshots, fighting, street fighting here until almost 1998, rest of Croatia it was 1994, 95. They freed the northern part of Croatia much faster than here.

PCCH2

There was a pattern in the interviews as participants frequently referenced the Dubrovnik collective narrative (mentioning dates and times of the bombings) in conjunction with an associated individual experience. In the quotations below the associations have been limited to the loss of BCH, but many of the participants mentioned family tragedies:

…very early in the morning, about 6 o’clock they started [bombing] … And one of the first houses, this is one, and another one what was also our property on Stradun, the main street … they started with that. The first two houses to be destroyed in the Old Town.

PCCH1

My family was here in Dubrovnik and I went to Zagreb 15 days before the aggression started and my mother said to me “Go, go, go to university, do your thing, you have to learn war won’t happen here”. And then 15 days after that the bombing started here.

PCCH5

The established collective memory in Dubrovnik functions to fix the chronology of events, and this is supported by the international retelling of events in the ICTY trial proceedings and in the media, as explored in Chapter Eight. The individual experiences fit into the collective narrative with little difficulty; the exclusive nature of the siege experience and the fixed chronology of the events allows the participants’ individual experiences to gain prominence and recognition within a collective narrative. However, there is little deviation from this narrative, and the individual experiences described in the interviews are similar to each other. This may be due to the similarity of experience of those within Dubrovnik or it may be caused by the repetition of a practiced narrative and the assimilation of alternate experiences into a collective experience.
The way the restoration of BCH was done was identified as a source of tension in the interviews. The debate between keeping evidence of damage to remember versus repairing all damage to its pre-war state was raised a number of times. PCCH1 was particularly adamant that the town should be completely restored to be passed onto “many generations in the future”. The process of controlling the narrative of the present to pass it onto the future suggests that the past they would like future generations to inherit would not include this particular period of history. However, PCCH1 went on to explain that each house had an archive stretching back hundreds of years, so it was not necessary for the damage to be seen on the BCH, because the events had been recorded. This argument was echoed by PCCH4, who noted:

Now, when you are coming twenty years after the war, you can’t even, if you know nothing, can’t even see it [war damage]. But we are still seeing in our minds, we are still seeing.

PCCH4

PCCH1 and PCCH4 illustrate the side of the argument that would like to erase the physical presence of the damage, as it is not necessary to have physical reminders as the memories are still vivid. PCCH3 suggests that the war damage and monuments should not exist because “if you make the sign visible and recognisable, then you make a monument to the barbarians”. In PCCH3’s perspective, the damage forms a monument not to commemorate the conflict but to remember the act of aggression. PCCH3’s view falls a mid-way between the two opposing sides, with complete restoration on one side (PCCH1 and PCCH4) and the recommendation to retain the evidence of damage and to create commemorative museums.

Memories are created through a process of collectively selecting the most appropriate events in history and framing (altering) memories to fit into these events (Connerton, 2008, pp. 61–63). The selection process and the collective memory that results from it must be reinforced in the wider society in order for the memory to be internalised and accepted. In the case of Dubrovnik and we can argue that a collective narrative of surviving the conflict and full recovery has been created, but the presence of the war damage acts to derail this history. The war damage therefore either needs to be framed within collective memory (commemorated) to become part of visible heritage of the city, or it needs to be hidden both physically on the BCH and from the collective remembrance of the war experience. That is not to say that the war would be obliterated from the record of Dubrovnik, but the experience to be retold would be one of destruction and complete recovery instead of continued war damage.

There is a disconnection between the way people privately experience their memories, and the public commemoration of the conflict. The participants showed they remain traumatised by the conflict but the public record of the conflict is biased towards a narrative of complete recovery, despite visible reminders of the conflict surviving on the BCH of the Old Town. The public stories of complete recovery can be found in the history of the conflict in the contemporary history museum and associated publications. This is in direct comparison with the private memories of the participants for whom they have not completely recovered or been reconciled with, as demonstrated by the
emotive and personal nature of their interviews, as noted in the quotation cited earlier in this chapter from PCCH8:

From early in the morning until maybe 2.30 in the afternoon, and it was really after that when this stops. I walked through the town in the early afternoon and there was some houses burned with firemen outside. It was terrible, and people were slowly just walking. So quiet and people were just crying. I had a camera but I couldn’t take any photo, it was for us really unbelievable. Unbelievable.  

PCCH8

Despite individual memories deviating from the collective, the recollections (such as those of PCCH8’s) are complicit in the creation and transmission of the collective remembrance of the war, as their own recollections are framed against the context of the conflict. This is consistent with the point made earlier in light of Barbara Misztal’s argument that personal narratives are subsumed into a collective memory, but the collective memory remains prioritised.

Dubrovnik has imbued meaning into all aspects of the Old Town, culminating in a definition of heritage that “Dubrovnik is heritage”, which is to be preserved and passed onto future generations. The creation and transmission of this slogan has been carefully managed, and the inclusion or exclusion of war narratives into Dubrovnik’s history is a point of tension in the Old Town.

The war is seen as an important aspect of Dubrovnik’s recent history, and there is a desire to ensure the war remains in the collective memory of the residents and visitors. For example, PCCH5 noted that the museum plays an important function in educating visitors about what occurred during the war and the history of the region:

I talk to people who came to me in the museum about that [the war] and they are talking like that’s our remembrance. Also came to my museum small children and even students, but they are born after the war and you have to talk to them about communism, socialism, about capitalism today, about when did the republic of Croatia arise, and what’s happening twenty years ago and why the republic of Croatia was established.  

PCCH5

9.3.2 Forgetting

There is an equally strong pull to limit the impact the war has had on the physical and socio-political heritage of Dubrovnik. The participants expressed their desire to commemorate the past without admitting that the marks (visible and invisible) remain, although the same participants later report that they still have difficult memories of the conflict. The way in which Dubrovnik has solved this problem is by placing the war experience outside the walls to the Fortress on Mount Srđ, and a permanent memorial to the Dubrovnik defenders in Sponza Palace. The relationship between heritage and difficult histories is carefully managed in heritage sites, and that in order for the construction of a heritage site to flourish a difficult history is limited to standalone monuments and structures to create a division between the glorious and the difficult history (Panjabi and Winter, 2009, p.20). The
placement of the museums reflects their interaction with tourism; the museum on Mount Srd is located beyond the city walls (as seen in the background on the hills in the background of Figure 9.1), creating distance between the military installation and the civilian city below. The memorial in Sponza palace is in the heart of the city (as seen in figure 9.2), and provides names and faces to the local Dubrovniks who died in the conflict. Although both are focused on the same event, the narratives they espouse are from different perspectives: The Fortress shows Dubrovnik as an overwhelmed military power, whereas the memorial presents a visual narratives of victims-as-heroes to those killed whilst fighting during the conflict.

The War Museum on Srd offers an in-depth look at the Dubrovnik experience and perspective of the conflict, complete with times, dates, local artefacts and experiences, and military history. The memorial in Sponza Palace is a collection of portraits of the defenders with information about their lives, and a small exhibition on the war (Figure 9.2). The Museum on Srd offers a war history, whereas the commemoration room presents the human face and the personal tragedies of Dubrovnik to commemorate the people rather than the event. The memory room in Sponza Palace is a highly politicised monument of the conflict, with a sharp focus on the victimisation of Dubrovnik. This memorial neither forgives nor reconciles local people to the conflict: it is a stark reminder of the human cost of the conflict. While it is not within the remit of this research to fully analyse the curation of the exhibition in Sponza Palace, the narration of the war through the perspective of victimhood and the marginalisation of the context and details of the conflict has been achieved through a process of forgetting and selecting memories.

Figure 9.1 Mount Srd: Fort Imperial War Museum

Figure 9.2 Sponza Palace

In Seven Ways of Forgetting Paul Connerton suggests that there are various ways in which people forget the past, and do so for various reasons. The process of commemoration seen in Dubrovnik though the Sponza Palace exhibit shows that several different types of forgetting have occurred. Prescriptive forgetting is a state-led endeavour that seeks to remove memories from society that are deemed harmful to contemporary society (Connerton, 2008, pp.61–62). In Dubrovnik this is visible in the lack of information on the period of history from 1930 onwards, and particularly in this exhibition that erases the context of the conflict, but retains the loss and tragedy of the war in the memories of the victims. The erasure or repackaging of memories from public discourse can be seen
as an attempt to forge a new identity. This type of forgetting is characterised by a management process where memories are stored and prioritised according to their bearing to contemporary needs (Connerton, 2008, p.64). Connerton remarks that in this type of forgetting a societal agreement is forged where new memories are created through a process of sharing that gently silences memories that are not in-keeping with a new identity (Connerton, 2008, p.63).

In Dubrovnik a new post-war identity has been bolstered by creating a collective memory of the war while silencing the details (at least within the city walls) and preserving the legacy of the war in the commemoration of the victims. In doing so, Dubrovnik has become a place of historic importance that has contemporary relevance as a WHS without the negative associations of active participation in the conflict. Forgetting in Dubrovnik has become part of the Dubrovnik myth, and in order for the memory of the conflict to survive it has been simplified and aspects of it forgotten. The conflict is remembered and commemorated in Dubrovnik but it is a memory of victimhood that requires memories to be tailored to fit into the authorised narrative.

The effect of tailoring narratives on reconciliation is that it is unclear whether the participants have forgiven the attacks on the town. The interviews suggest that the war memories are vivid and have been hidden rather than forgotten. In the future, the hidden and silent memories may be forgotten and the collective memory will be the only dominant memory left, but this has not yet happened. However, it is interesting to note that when the two youngest interview participants (25–35-years old) relayed narratives of the conflict, they did so using the collective narrative of war and focused on damage to BCH. Their narratives tended to focus more on the collective experience of war as they were not present (or were too young) and do not have individual memories of the conflict:

They [the museum and memory room] are necessary because we want to keep a memory of the people who lost their lives defending the city. There are lots of guys that actually, without weapons they stood up and went to fight the enemy and to protect the city … the Fort Imperial. It is a symbol of defence because the little groups of defenders were actually in that fort and they were shooting with the guns and the enemy actually thought it was a whole army inside, so they defended Dubrovnik because we could easily be occupied.

PCCH6

The narrative presented by PCCH6 is referred to again later in this chapter in conjunction with the creation of the myth of Dubrovnik. The absence of personal memories is at once both surprising and unsurprising. The two participants made it clear that they had a strong family connection to the town, and referred to their property in relation to the conflict, but they did not refer to the experiences of the older generations. Perhaps the narrative that will survive in the Old Town will be the collective memory of events and the older generation’s experiences will be subsumed into this authorised discourse. Generational memory suggests that memories (personal memories and experiences of events) survive through three generations, that a child will be interested in their grandparent’s stories as they know the actors, and will retell (with some alterations) these experiences as history or as myths (Huysseen, 1995, p.2). The two youngest interview participants do not retell family war
experiences, although they highlight their family connection to Dubrovnik, instead they retell the collective narrative of events. This is somewhat surprising as personal family stories of ownership are very important to the participants, therefore it would be reasonable to expect a younger generation to be as involved in the family connections to the war. That this has not happened could suggest that personal (generational) aspects of the conflict have been silenced or forgotten. The following quotation from PCCH2 about the conflict illustrates the focus on the collective narrative of events, and the lack of personal connection to the conflict. PCCH2 made no reference in the interview to family ties to the conflict, except when mentioning damage to their family home:

On the 6 December, they tried to take over the Old Town and start a new warning, with bombing and larger forces, special forces going on the hill and starting to enter the city. There were like two times they tried that, it started with a small submarine in the old port.

PCCH2

Whilst the two youngest participants concentrated on the collective narrative of the conflict, the others focused on a collective narrative populated with their own experiences. This results in the details of the conflict (such as local participation and traumatic experience) being erased in favour of presenting the conflict as a single and resolved issue of Dubrovnik’s past. The residents balanced the public commemoration and private suffering by eagerly anticipating the loss of war memories and balancing forgetting with reconciliation:

It was difficult really, and luckily, thank God, memories fade.

PCCH3

It’s my opinion, people doesn’t feel today, anger or something like that, but they can’t forget. Yet.

PCCH5

9.3.3 Reconciliation

The way the war is framed in collective memory has a direct bearing on the process of reconciliation. This can be seen in this quotation from PCCH8, who did not see the mountain men but believed they existed and connected the attack to the barbarism of the JNA soldiers. This process of seeking meaning and looking for reasons behind the war is often repeated amongst the participants, and is a strong feature of reconciliation processes between post-war ex-combatant nations, as outlined by Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse (2003):

You think with your mind and with your head that the people bombing, that they can be aware of the beauty and value of the heritage, but it’s not the case. It was like a conflict of civilisation because you have those fighters from Montenegro and Serbia; after a few months we saw some video tapes from some journalists that we were friends with, so those people sending bombs to us they were toothless, with beards, like mountain people, we didn’t know those people existed so close to us, so it was like a conflict of culture as well.
PCCH8’s vivid memories of the “mountain people” provide an insight into how the aggressors were considered in the conflict (this is echoed by PCCH5 who also refers to “the men in the hills”). The presentation of the aggressors can be seen as a propaganda effort (not necessarily made by the Dubrovniks themselves, but present in the media at the time) which differentiate the cultured Dubrovnik Old Town from the uncultured aggressors. This division is reminiscent of the dichotomy between the cultured Western Croatia and the uncultured eastern Slavic dichotomy discussed in Chapter Six, with particular reference to Todorova’s idea of balkanisation (Todorova, 1997). This rekindling of pre-Tito-era rhetoric to split the Balkans between east and West rather than unifying it through their cultural Slavic similarities reflects the shift in socio-politics in the 1990s from an ethnic similarity to ethnic difference and conflict.

PCCH8’s characterisation does not seem out of place amongst these other depictions, but the context of their categorisation reveals that they did not see the aggressors themselves, but relied on the media and other outlets to create this image. They mention that before they saw these toothless, bearded mountain men they had assumed that even though the attackers were bombing the city they were aware of the beauty of Dubrovnik. It was only after the negative images were shown that they began to think of the aggressors as culturally different from themselves. This differentiation is striking for several reasons. Firstly, it shows the power of propaganda and its effect on the characterisation of the aggressors; secondly, it shows how processes of personal remembrance are affected by public discourses of memory. Thirdly, it shows how the mythologies about the conflict (particularly those on the severity of the conflict) continue to permeate contemporary Dubrovnik society - of both victims and aggressors; both have been mythologised and the narratives streamlined in the post-war years.

Bloomfield, Barns and Huyse (2003a, pp. 19–21) say there are three chronological stages of reconciliation: replacing fear with non-violent coexistence when fear no longer rules; building confidence and trust; and lastly building empathy. This can be seen in the ways in which the relationship between Dubrovnik, Montenegro, and Serbia were mentioned. In most of the interviews, they were referenced as “Neighbours” (PCCH1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9) but they also mentioned that they remained fearful about the participation of their neighbours in the conflict:

I, myself, was once to see my aunt who lives in Korta last year, was very difficult for me to go. Very difficult. I went to see her, but I’m not very keen on going because my memories are maybe stronger than somebody else’s. I never can get this answer why. And when you walk around and have … you can’t stop thinking that maybe some one of them was around. Maybe it wasn’t his will, he had to go, but still it’s rather uneasy. You know, always. I am sure that all behaved very nicely, I don’t know about some sporadic accidents maybe, that’s war.

PCCH3 is afraid that individuals in neighbouring countries may have been complicit in the conflict, or in the bombing of Dubrovnik. Although they try to mitigate their fear by assuring the interviewer
that “they all behaved very nicely”, they cannot forget the involvement of their international neighbours in the war despite their family connection. The experience of PCCH3 is replicated in other interviews, for example:

Today we all want to forget a lot of things, and many people now from Dubrovnik … My sister she don’t want to go to Montenegro and Trebinje. The small towns in the countryside who, we were attacked by them. She still don’t want to go there but some people are going, to make shopping, to go to restaurants and so on, it’s cheaper than here.

PCCH4

Despite the experience and lingering fears displayed by PCCH3, they argue strongly towards reconciliation, and display empathy towards Montenegrins and the perception that they were forced to participate in the conflict (although no such empathy was displayed towards the JNA soldiers). Over the course of the interview they argue that they wish to see more variation in the visitors to Dubrovnik, and show sympathy towards the experience of Montenegrins in the war by referencing their forced involvement in the war and the similar experiences of war:

We were in good contacts with our neighbours, they were our relatives, they were our friends, and many of them were really around the town, like locals. They were locals, and then they ran away to bomb. Though I must tell you, there were very, very decent people who have families and are living here, and they never moved. They were Serbs and Montenegrins, they never moved and they suffered just like us. They suffered in all detail – in food, in water, in scare, in bombardment. In all.

PCCH3

They were residents who were Serbs that led the families, so part of the families they led them to join these attackers. These terrorists, together with Yugoslav army of course, because it’s not only Yugoslav army, it’s the people who were recruited from the places. They were obliged to recruit.

PCCH4

The comments from PCCH3, 4 and 5 show that lingering tensions remain in contemporary Dubrovnik, which manifest as fear of the unknown actions of others. In light of this is it hard to gauge the level of reconciliation as the participants shown that mistrust and suspicion is still relevant in contemporary Dubrovnik, as is reflected in the ways the conflict has been remembered. The commemoration process in the Old Town shows that the conflict has been managed and tailored to fit the collective narrative (and memory) of the war, but that local people are still suffering to reconcile their own memories of the war into the collective narrative. The participants revealed that the two memory types (public and private) sit easily together until they are interrogated: the collective memory turns the conflict into a historic event to be commemorated, whilst the private memory revolves around personal experiences and unreconciled fears:
I think that no court on the earth can compete with this feeling that every morning you need to look in the mirror and see so many terrible things that they did, without any reason…. I see those days very clearly and I am proud that I can say I was a part of all these happenings but it’s all coloured with a kind of tragedy, a private tragedy.

PCCH8

9.4 Cultural Tourism and the Impact on the Socio-politics of the Old Town

Throughout this research tourism is acknowledged as a dominant facet of Dubrovnik’s cultural heritage; it is the main avenue to export culture and commerce from Dubrovnik around the world and it is an opportunity to manage what cultural attributes, messages and products are on sale to visitors. All the participants agreed that tourism is a huge economic force in the Old Town, and this is supported by the economic evaluation of tourism in Dubrovnik in Chapter Eight. The participants’ acknowledgement that heritage is a key component of the economy of Dubrovnik does not lead them to endorse tourism completely; instead they were divided on whether their reliance on tourism had a positive or negative impact on post-war Dubrovnik. The impact of mass and accessible tourism since the war has exposed the Old Town to increasing numbers of visitors. Its visitor numbers are now consistently high year on year after the dramatic fall in 1991. The participants divide tourism broadly into two categories: “good tourism” and “bad tourism” which are applied the types of tourist and the types of vendor.

All tourists to Dubrovnik can be defined as cultural tourists, as they interact with heritage (McKercher and du Cros, 2002, p. 5). As the whole of Dubrovnik is defined as a heritage site, any tourist entering in the city is engaging in the tourist industry directly (visiting the walls, going to museums, engaging in history) or indirectly (going to restaurants, bars, hotels, buying souvenirs). The participants’ acknowledgement of heritage as an all-encompassing feature of life in contemporary Dubrovnik has been explored earlier in this chapter; and tourism is discussed in similar terms:

The museums are the most important thing. You lose the museums and you lose Dubrovnik.

Like we said, Dubrovnik is like one big museum, that our town is one. The town is old, every house, everything that you see, tells a story.

PCCH2

PCCH2 spoke about museums often, and it became apparent that they (amongst others) were eager to present the interviewer with the perspective that they viewed heritage as a culturally significant factor in their everyday life. The objectivity of PCCH2 may be biased by their own connection to the use of heritage in the tourist industry in Dubrovnik, and the invocation of museums as a signifier of cultural identity for the Old Town may have been used in part to present themselves as primarily culturally rather than economically connected to heritage, although they contradicted this view during the interview. The objectivity of the interview participants is a recurring issue seen in many empirical studies, and is discussed in Chapter Five. However, the subjectivity of the participants was
limited in this research by accepting that it was likely that the interviews will contain bias, but due to the in-depth and wide-ranging nature of the interviews, as well as the cumulative collection of data and the trust built between interviewer and interviewee it is hoped that bias will be more easily seen and its impact noted.

PCCH3 showed an awareness of the attraction of cultural heritage to the tourist industry, and emphatically explained that without heritage the tourist industry would suffer:

[Heritage is] very important. Very important. Extremely important. Without it, it would be very difficult to attract visits. Oh yes, cultural heritage is the main magnet.

PCCH3

This view was repeated in all the interviews, and contradicts the claims made by tourism development agencies who seek to capitalise on the tourism market in the area; whose view is that the Old Town is a bonus rather than a magnet.

As well as introducing the importance and connection of heritage and tourism, these two quotes also introduce a key concern in the use of heritage in the Old Town: as an expression of culture and as a product to be consumed. These two ways of viewing heritage are not exclusive and the participants show that, although a concern, they accept that heritage is considered in both ways:

The museum part is good. Everyone loves museums. Everyone respects them. Also galleries, that’s the tradition. Everything else the people consider too many. Too many shops, too many restaurants, too many souvenirs.

PCCH2

If not [for heritage] then the people wouldn’t come. When they are not here there is six months when they is nobody here in the town and it is very sad and hard to live.

PCCH4

PCCH6 refers to the importance of heritage in connection to tourism explicitly by linking income to the city via cultural institutions and visitor numbers:

Dubrovnik has a very large budget for culture. It’s about 13 or 14% of total budget in the city. When you compare it to other cities and to the Ministry of Culture its huge amount of money. We have ten institutions that are actually funded by the city. Those are museums, cinemas, Dubrovnik summer festival, folklore and we have library, I don’t know, what else. We have ten of them and they are mostly financed by the city. Some of them has their own profits and their own incomes and one of them is the museums, definitely, they can of course thank that to the Rector’s Palace because more than 300,000 people visit museums per year. All other museums in Croatia don’t have together that kind of, that high number of visitors.

PCCH6

The commodification of heritage is apparent in the interviews of both supporters and opponents of the mass tourism market. This acceptance and also criticism of the tourist industry is countered by
defining tourists as good or bad on the basis of their economic value and status, and the actions of vendors in terms of good or bad behaviour.

### 9.4.1 Types of Tourist

A distinction between “good” and “bad” tourists was either explicitly or implicitly made by the participants in terms of the economic status of the visitors. PCCH2 says quite bluntly that the tourists are “low to middle-class tourists. We don’t have high class”, they go on to say:

> There are five-star hotels but they do not have five-star guests in the hotels. Maybe once twice a year someone richer like Abramovich [a famous billionaire investor] and they have a lot of money. The hotels here are not so expensive, even those with five-stars so you can afford. What most people do here is they have a holiday for seven days and they take a loan and pay it off for an entire year. People from all types of country say exactly the same thing. Most of the cruise ships have like 200 euros, I think a seven-day trip on cruiser and you can pay it off for 12 months. That kind of guest can’t pay 200 euros on a painting or something, so that’s why you can see a lot of souvenir places, and not so many boutiques [local independent traders], like two or three in the whole town.

PCCH2

PCCH2 explicitly links the influx of less affluent tourists to the increase in souvenir shops and the decrease of boutiques. By linking less affluent tourists to the increase in souvenir they imply that the market in Dubrovnik is controlled by the tourists and not vice versa. They note that Dubrovnik has the capability to host richer tourists, but that they do not come to the Old Town. The demise of the high-class market is also blamed on the cruise visitors who, PCCH2 argues, visit for shorter amounts of time and tend to spend less money as they are on a strict budget. For PCCH2 the distinction between two tourist types is clear; the richer the tourist the more likely they are to buy local cultural (higher priced) products and the more valued they are, and the less likely they are to spend at souvenir shops. PCCH2 goes on to state that in the whole town

> There are like five or six galleries [local commercial art dealers] in the town, so you don’t get a lot of those. Before the war we had more.

PCCH2

PCCH2 links the reduction of galleries to the war, implying the different type of post-war tourist forced the change, rather than the war itself. The war here functions as a fixed event or generalised historical period that caused tourism to change, and but it does not function explicitly as a reason why tourism itself changed. PCCH2’s view of the class of tourists is echoed by other interviews, for example:

> Maybe in one day we have like 10,000 tourists people are here. Maybe too much … but we must be honest, before the war in former Yugoslavia we have tourism here. We have a high quality of tourist, very good hotels with five stars, how to say, and first-class hotels…. I think it would be very good for Dubrovnik to be the same like before.
They want everything. It is good for some aspects because a lot of people are selling – pizzas and something – for 10 euro or I don’t know. But they want also to have the luxury hotels with five, six stars and everything comfort, and everyone who is paying this expensively high classes of hotel, they don’t want to come in the town because of such a huge lot of people. If they want exclusivity it could be exclusivity, but it is not. It was.

You can, by walking through the town, you can always hear “Before the war we have this, we lived like that like this” and lots of people … lost jobs. They were in some other companies, some of them were ruined. People say they used to live better before the war then after the war.

PCCH3 and PCCH5 repeat the argument that the less affluent tourists have led to decline in the standards of the town, but they also argue that a less exclusive tourist industry allows for more visitors, which is beneficial culturally and economically:

If you do not have contacts, then you become xenophobic, and I don’t like that kind of feeling. I don’t like xenophobic, no not at all. And now, even when we talk together it’s something new, and whomever you know and meet, new person, it’s a wealth…. About this kind of mass tourism or elite tourism, I don’t know what to tell you. Let ordinary people come and see Dubrovnik too, not only the rich ones with yachts. Because some of their wealth is problematic. And modest people, ordinary people, really work hard for their living, so when they can afford an eight-day holiday and want to go to Croatia, they are welcome. More than welcome. If you ask me.

There are a lot of discussions in our community about the cruising and the cruising ships, is that good or is that bad. Like everywhere, I think, and about everything, you can a lot of pluses and a lot of minuses. It is good for tourist guide, taxi drivers and fast food, something like that, not very much for museums or institutions like that, because the people from the cruiser come in Dubrovnik at 8 o’clock in the morning and they went and leave in Dubrovnik at 1 pm, just few hours, and they spent time walking on the main street, going to take a cup of coffee or something like that, buy some kind of souvenir.

It is difficult to say with certainty if the claims that pre-war tourism was very different from post-war tourism reflect an actual change in tourism numbers, but the number of tourists in Croatia shown in pre-war tourism records indicates there was as high a level of visitors to Croatia between 1985 and 1990 as there was between 2006 and 209. In 1985 there were just over 10 million visitor arrivals (10,125,000). This dropped to around 2 million (2,297,000), in 1991 and reached 10 million
(10,385,000) in 2006 (CBS, 2007). It is possible that the visitor numbers have been misremembered by the locals and that the lack of tourists during the war followed by high tourist numbers in contemporary Dubrovnik have led to feelings of nostalgia over the perceived better tourism of pre-war Dubrovnik. It is possible that this nostalgia for pre-war tourism is in fact nostalgia for tourism between 1995 and 2006 when tourism was redeveloping in the area, when the number of tourists were lower and their influence over Dubrovnik more valuable because there were fewer tourists to participate in the tourist-based economy. This theory is supported by the nostalgia shown for the pre-war period and the assertion that there used to be better tourists then, and is also supported by the pre-war and post-war visitor figures. However, there is not enough evidence to support this interpretation but it would form an interesting point to investigate in the future. For PCCH3 and PCCH5 bad tourists are signified by their numbers, not by their behaviour. PCCH3 notes that the higher number of tourists are good for the city as this enables more people to visit the heritage of the Old Town. PCCH3 expresses the position of the cultural value of heritage tourism, whilst PCCH2 refers to the commercial aspect of tourism.

The BCH is the main reason for tourists to visit the Old Town, but it was noted in the interviews that there was concern on the effect the amount of tourists may have on the BCH. PCCH3 notes that the creating of the BCH was the result of tourism, and argues that tourism has an important place in the heritage and history that founded Dubrovnik:

When the tourist come everything is different, and a lot of people bring a lot of new good things. It’s always like that. If Dubrovnik wasn’t so aware of contacts with different civilisations, then we probably would have such a nice city. Because all these styles have been bought from somewhere, from Italy because it’s near, let’s say Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque styles: they were all coming some years after, but never mind. And all these beauties were bought because of the contacts.

PCCH3

They go on to suggest there “may be too much” tourism in the Old Town. For PCCH3 the possibility of overcrowding is an acceptable consequence of sharing cultural heritage with tourists, however, PCCH3 also notes that overcrowding may be a threat to the survival of the BCH:

Maybe I am a little conservative according to the monuments. I don’t want them to be overused, that’s all. Otherwise, I like them to be living, and have people around and people to respect them the way they should be respected not to break and not to cause harm. I hope for the best.

PCCH3

It is interesting to note that PCCH3 in this quote sees themselves as too conservative in their desire to protect heritage, suggesting that others are less worried about the threat of overcrowding. The other interviewees note that they also consider overcrowding to be a negative aspect of mass tourism. Unlike PCCH3, many of the other participants say they are concerned by the oversaturation of tourism and the effect it will have on their businesses rather than on heritage itself. For example,
PCCH4 (together with PCCH2) links detrimental mass tourism to the lower class of tourism and speculates that mass tourism will prevent elite tourists from visiting:

The people who stay in the hotels won’t come here to my store to buy because it is so crowded that they don’t want to push with the people.

PCCH4

This is echoes fears in other heritage sites over mass tourism. PCCH9’s mention of Venice is particularly interesting because of the similarities that have been highlighted between the two WHS. A comparison between the two sites sees ‘hit and run ‘tourism as performing a similar function, with all the detrimental social and economic effects short-term mass tourism can have on popular heritage centres (Ruoss and Alfarè, 2013, p. 525). Mass tourism endangers the future prospects of a heritage tourism destination as the host city undergoes a Disneyfication process in order to quickly package and pass on cultural experiences to short-term (day-tripper) tourists and encourage them to spend money (Ruoss and Alfarè, 2013, p. 526). Moreover, ‘hit and run’ tourism leads to a range of negative effects, including increased reliance on tourism flows, rising prices of goods in the site and increasing pressure to develop the heritage site (Ruoss and Alfarè, 2013, pp. 526–527). The participants in this study say that these issues are pertinent to the way tourism has grown in the city in a number of ways. They express concern that they have become over-reliant on tourism and say that cruise ship tourists have become a point of discussion amongst the residents:

My opinion, it’s not very good about the cruiser ships coming in the same moment on the same day. In the high season you have six or seven ships in the same time and it is impossible to walk, to communicate, to do anything. Like Disneyland.

PCCH4

So from the end of the war to the end of the 90s, everything was really, really hard, no jobs, no salaries, no visitors, no tourists, no anything. And in the new millennium, cruisers came!

PCCH5

They are aware that the price of goods in Dubrovnik has risen beyond the means of local residents and that heritage in the Old Town may be for the tourists rather than locals:

It’s too expensive. Dubrovnik is generally too expensive, even for us who are living here, but for domestic tourists we have some, it is expensive. It is not for [us] it is only for the strangers.

PCCH4

Inside the Old Town is mostly reserved either for the old people that are from here, or rich foreigners who can afford the house!

PCCH2

Dubrovnik is also under pressure to develop, as residents discuss whether to install air conditioning units, satellite dishes and internet connections in the Old Town, as well as the (recently stalled) proposal to build a golf course and resort on Mount Srđ. Further threats are the Disneyfication of
heritage and the sense of alienation that results from local people being pushed out of heritage sites in favour of developing tourism (Ruoss and Alfarè, 2013, p. 526).

The two most threatening features of tourism (and tourists) in Dubrovnik are the commodification of culture and the rewriting of history to make it acceptable, and rid it of uncomfortable memories of the conflict, and secondly the alienation of local people from their own heritage through push and pull factors to relocate from the Old Town. The former threat was expressed by PCCH5 when discussing the decision to put the war museum on top of mount Srđ:

Our city politicians decided that in the historical centre of Dubrovnik there is a lot of people and opportunities that tourists can see, visitors something like that, and after we established capitalism a lot of private properties came back to private owners and they rent for some months or to someone who can pay a lot, and the museum can’t pay a rent for 10,000 euros. and they decided to put the museum in the fortress [placing the museum outside of the city walls so as not to take up space that can be more profitably used]. But it is good because it is historical site and I can’t say anything against that decision, but [I] was trying to convince them that we had to establish some kind of small exhibition, or small information point in the historical city to tell the tourists or someone who wants to learn something about the homeland war in Dubrovnik – the main facts or something – on that spot and people who work there can say “If you want to know more you can go up the stairs, up to the hill by cable car or on foot, whatever you want”. I am trying to convince them but it is really hard with the politicians.

PCCH5 suggests that a major factor in the creation of the museum in the fortress outside the city walls was economic, based on a comparison between the amount of revenue bought in by the war museum against other tourist-centred enterprises. The development of tourism as sole an economic driver (as opposed to the development of heritage and tourism) is cited by Ruoss and Alfarè as a negative and unsustainable way to develop tourism. The development of tourism within heritage sites disregards the fact that heritage is the main attraction for tourists, and by tourism itself instead of heritage resources tourism is effectively stifling its possibilities for future growth. This can be seen to some extent in Dubrovnik by the movement of local people away from the Old Town, which is becoming a place of employment rather than a lived-in space.

The second major threat posed by tourism is the alienation of the local population, particularly the older generations. All the participants remarked on the aging population in the Old Town and suggested that the older generations were suffering from the onslaught of mass tourism. The interview participants believed that the older generation was be less comfortable with tourists in the Old Town than younger generations:

The young families would like to be here and to work so they don’t have anything against [tourism], but the older ones, they do, because they were here before any of this happened and they want peace and quiet. And they don’t have anything against the museums or accommodation. But the restaurants and the cruise ships, they don’t like that.
The assumption that PCCH2 is making here is that young families are unable to buy or rent houses in the area as the prices are too high, and are pushed higher by demand to use them for holiday rentals and tourists. This assumption is supported by PCCH6, who notes that there is a drive to bring younger families back to Old Town, suggesting that there is currently a lack of younger people in the town:

The situation [is] that mostly old people are still living in the Old Town and there are some ideas to bring back the young people by building some houses, apartments, little buildings, which will be acceptable for young couples to pay rent or to buy.

Presumably the houses to be built mentioned by PCCH6 will be built outside the Old Town because of the restrictions placed on development within the walls. The solution to the movement away from the Old Town presented by PCCH6 seems to revolve around building more houses, rather than stopping the redevelopment of homes into holiday lets. This reluctance to halt the development of tourism in the Old Town is reflected in the view of PCCH1 of how local people see tourism as positive or negative based on their own experience and relationship to tourism:

If they work in restaurants then they are for restaurants, but otherwise they are too much because there is heat, there is smell, there is steam, you know. It’s nice, grilled fish, it’s nice, for one day, but for a month, it’s not so nice anymore! Tourists, restaurants and shop people are used to it. The old people don’t like it because they are used to normal communication and walking around, and they can’t go on the main street.

There are two serious consequences of this argument. The first is that the older generations have the potential to be removed from decision-making in the Old Town. As the older generations in Dubrovnik are in a minority, their views on tourism in the city will have less influence, which in turn will lessen their influence over heritage decision-making. This suggests that the people (who are involved in the tourism industry) have the power of the majority in the acceptance of tourism in the area, and the potential to influence decisions that may affect the function of heritage in the city. This majority may make decisions based on their own economic interests rather than in the interests of protecting heritage or preserving ways of life. This could be another push factor for older generations to leave the Old Town. The second is that if local politicians are pro-tourism (as they appear to be), this may be both to gain economic benefit for the town but also to increase their political support. In this situation, older generations (and minority groups not involved in tourism) who are opposed to the commercialisation of the town may not have the influence to halt or limit the development of tourism in their local area. This could be seen as excluding the latter from local heritage, and decision-making on collective narratives of events and collective or dissonant memories.
Many of the participants say that the difficulties of living in the Old Town, such as the expense and the problems associated with so many tourists in the Old Town, compared with the relative ease of living outside the Old Town walls is a major push factor to leave the Old Town:

It’s not very easy because people just don’t want to live inside the walls because everything inside is more expensive. If they want to go to the supermarket they can’t use car to get near the apartment; and if they want to rebuild something inside the apartment the, those guys who come to fix it, are twice as expensive as if they do it outside the Old Town. This is all the reason why people are actually going out of the town, and now we have this situation that mostly old people are still living in the Old Town.

PCCH6

PCCH6 voices the push and pull factors for younger people to leave the city, and also shows that it is considered a problem by noting it is a trend that Dubrovnik (the government and the people) wish to halt. The older generation who remain in the Old Town do so because they own their properties and are encouraged to stay by government schemes to make their lives easier. However, this scheme has limited success because it prevents the older generations from leaving the Old Town, and it is only a temporary fix as the generations that inherit property are more likely to sell or develop it than live in it:

Maybe there will be a few more foreigners and other places in Europe than the locals [in Dubrovnik]. More than the locals. Now it’s maybe 50/50, but as the older people die and the younger sell the houses as the rate goes up.

PCCH2

The younger generations were perceived to be more likely than older generation to sell their houses to rent to tourists. The concern expressed by the participants on the plight of the older generations could be interpreted as an anxiety that the loss of older generations would weaken the connection between contemporary Dubrovnik, and the nostalgic heritage upon which contemporary Dubrovnik relies. The older generation, as authentic residents, give the Old Town legitimacy as a living heritage site rather than a tourist attraction. This view is supported in the way the older people are referred to in the interviews. PCCH4 comments suggests that the residents are protected, supporting the notion that the (older) residents are valuable to the Old Town:

The residents in the old city, they are ever year less and less and now they are like, protected, like in a zoo.

PCCH4

PCCH2 also comments on the older generation’s value to Dubrovnik by noting the impact they have on the intangible culture of the Old Town in the transmission of language:

We have a Dubrovnik language, Croatian language mixed with Italian. Even I don’t know everything. So maybe when I, when two older people are talking in real Dubrovnik, I can’t get to understand a lot of it.
Language in Dubrovnik has been shaped by its geo-political history, and contains both Slavic and Italian words and phrases. This is unique to Dalmatia, and particularly to Dubrovnik. It is specific to and survives with the older generations. PCCH2 also notes that the influx of international visitors brings new words to the culture, particularly English slang, which is not part of the cultural heritage of the city. However, it can be argued that the blame for the infiltration of English in the Dubrovnik language comes in part from the education system and the internationalisation of culture, resulting in familiarity with American or English and expressed in everyday life and using different media.

The aging population’s competence in the Dubrovnik language has not been completely passed on to the younger generations (PCCH2), and, combined with an erosion of a single language (Croatian) society, there does not seem to be a functional need to learn the old Dubrovnik but is important in heritage preservation. PCCH1 also notes the use of Dubrovnik language is becoming less frequent: “we lose, we lose our language, our words” (PCCH1). For PCCH1 and PCCH2 the loss of language is a consequence of exposure to other languages through tourism, rather than being linked to the failure to transmit languages between generations.

The way in which people in the Old Town have purchased houses for tourist use and holiday lets was also a point of contention as it deals with both hereditary property and claims to property owned by the Yugoslav state before the war. The movement from Communist Yugoslavia to independent (capitalist) Croatia meant that it was possible for individuals to purchase property. In the aftermath of the conflict when a small Serbian population left Dubrovnik and the surrounding area it is said that some of the empty houses were bought by Croatians for low prices as restitution for war damage. The participants note that properties that were bought after the war are now being used for tourism in contemporary Dubrovnik:

> Before war there were more than 5000 people living inside the Old Town, and now we have some information about 900 people living inside the Old Town. Because a few years ago there was a big increase in the price of the real estate inside of the Old Town and a lot of people used the opportunity to sell their real estates and they, for one house that was inside the Old Town they could buy two more, two big houses, outside the Old Town. So everyone used the opportunity, or the others just transferred to tourism and rented to the foreigners who come because the prices are very high inside the Old Town.

Although an investigation into property rights after the war has a bearing on the use of property in contemporary Dubrovnik, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

In this reading of tourism the war functions as a fixed point in history, as a stop gap between pre-war and post-war tourism. It is the point at which the tourists changed from good to bad, but it is not seen as the cause of the change. This could also reflect a shift from communism to capitalism, when the restraints on state-owned properties vanished and post-war privatisation allowed people to buy and commercialise their properties for personal profit. With the constraints of Tito-era tourism lifted, the
development of the personal tourism industry flourished due to relaxed governmental interference and a drive to capitalise on the surviving tourist industry in the most affluent area in a post-conflict, economically deprived country.

The contemporary reliance on tourism can be seen as a legacy of the industry that was built up and thrived in communist Dubrovnik, but the (over) development of that industry in post-communist Dubrovnik can be seen as a reaction to the lessening of communist (and Serbian-centred) control in the area.

The criticism of mass tourism or tourist numbers (and the bad tourist) was distinguished from negative criticisms of tourists in general. Tourists were seen as an asset to the town both economically and culturally. A good tourist was able to give high economic value to local cultural heritage by buying expensive locally produced cultural assets, but also by engaging in a cultural exchange with the local residents. The good tourist is presented to ensure Dubrovnik is perceived as open to foreign visitors and is not xenophobic. The anxiety of appearing xenophobic was mentioned explicitly by one participant and implicitly by several others to mitigate any negativity towards tourism. This occurred either to justify relying on a tourism industry of which they are also critical, or to lessen the impact of the ethnic homogeneity of the Old Town (98% Catholic Croat) and fight against the historic perception of ethnic intolerance associated with Croatia (originating from the Ustaše during the Second World War and revived in 1990s anti-Croatian propaganda). It is highly likely that mitigating negative criticism of tourists is the main reason why the positive aspects of tourists are highlighted, but countering negative post-war stereotypes may also have been a contextual factor in defending tourism.

### 9.4.2 Types of Tourism

The participants tended to lay blame on positive and negative aspects of tourism, placing the responsibility for beneficial or detrimental tourism on the tourists, rather than the vendors. That is not to say that aspects of the tourist industry were not criticised; indeed, the same category of tourism was characterised as both good and bad. Good tourism involved producing expensive local cultural items and bad tourism sold of internationally produced souvenirs.

A connection is made between good tourism originating from historic Dubrovnik and its local people participating in the tourist industry, and bad tourism as an outsider movement into the tourist industry in the Old Town and the exploitation of its resources:

The locals, we live better than before. Everybody. There are a lot of reasons, but it could be the cruiser ships because lot of people work with them, and a lot of museums are working well, the city walls are always full. Different, so, cable car is going up and down and was restored a few years ago and its always, even in the night after 12 o’clock it is going up and down…. I think, everybody, with such a mass of tourists, everybody [locals] could rent a room or go to catch a fish, or he could in the same moment sell the fish, because there is always somebody who would want it. So, you know, for such a crowd, such a mass is passing. How the tourist is thinking? I think they are satisfied, and it’s very popular to come here.
In this quotation PCCH4 notes that mass tourism is good for the city because it produces employment, commerce and visitor satisfaction. However, they also limit their positive effects to locals. The definition of “locals” as “everybody” suggests that locals can benefit from tourism by utilising their own means within the city – their ability to rent a room in their own property (making use of the cultural heritage of the Old Town) or their ability to catch and sell fish (making use of natural heritage of the area and the market forces created by tourism). The interplay between “everybody” and “locals” excludes non-locals from the definition of “everybody” and, in doing so, excludes them from benefits of good tourism. The question then arises: if only locals are considered everybody, how do migrant workers fit into Dubrovnik? This topic of inclusion and exclusion is discussed in reference to the division between good and bad tourism is reflected in the distinction between local and not local. Local manufacturing and local goods are a sign of good tourism and attract good tourists, whereas non-locally produced goods are a sign of bad tourism and attract bad tourists:

Our customers [in boutique shops] they are coming back. We are not existing by the cruiser population because they don’t come, and if they do they don’t have time, but the people who are coming back, who are in hotels, who are relaxed, who have a confidence that you can’t find any fakes and new things here.

PCCH4 claims that the customers of the local boutique shops are hotel tourists rather than the cruiser tourists (good and bad tourists) and that they survive on the custom of good tourists, characterised by their length of stay and spending behaviour, not the bad tourists from cruise ships who do not shop there. PCCH4 hints that there are two tourist markets (one or good and one for bad tourists) that are only compatible with their corresponding type of tourist.

Thus, the wealthier (good) tourists spend money on locally produced cultural assets in boutiques and galleries (good tourism), stay locally and eat in local restaurants; whilst mass tourism and day-trippers (bad tourists) only buy souvenirs produced globally from tourist shops (bad tourism). The reliance and trust that the participants show in their locally produced tourism positions the Old Town of Dubrovnik as a cultural resource that they can support and use, whilst outside interference or control is less well received.

9.5 IHAF Key Findings: Dubrovnik

The overarching goal of this case study was to assess the value of heritage in the recovery of Dubrovnik from the beginning of the bombardment until 2014, looking at the impact of heritage since the war. The research into each sector has been discussed at length over the last three chapters, and the impact of recovery measured in each instance using three approaches to data collection. The integrated perspective on cultural heritage in Dubrovnik generated by this research has resulted in
six key findings on the contribution of heritage to the post-conflict recovery process which are presented here.

It has been shown that the historical context of Dubrovnik was a key factor in the cause of the conflict and the actions taken in the aftermath of war. The awareness of cultural ties and tensions remain constantly in the foreground of this study, which notes that the socio-political history that has shaped the geo-politics of the region has influenced and continues to influence the relationship between people, place and history in Dubrovnik. The tumultuous history of the Balkans and its complex ethnic and cultural relationships have culminated not only in strengthening national cultural identities but also in the defence and differentiation of these cultural identities from each another. The search for historical causes of the violence in Yugoslav wars is an immensely difficult endeavour, and well beyond the limits of this thesis. The historians who have done so have been faced with by a number of varying perspectives, interpretations and biases, and the knowledge that, while the high-level political causes of the war in the 1990s can be traced historically, the explanations for this are still contested. However, what is clear is the central role played by nationalism and cultural heritage, which was integral in creating the nationalist narrative, and manipulated to affect the dynamics of the war and its aftermath. Furthermore, the influential role of culture on the region has been clearly identified, wherein cultural identities and the heritage that supports them have had profound effect on the exacerbation or reduction of tensions in the area. Cultural heritage in Dubrovnik is not a space where ethnic and cultural tensions can merely be observed: it is where they are caused and mitigated.

Post-war recovery has been defined in this research as the negotiation between the past and the present, in which cultural heritage functions as a tool to discern how the past has been politicised by the present and used as a resource to achieve contemporary aims. This stance has been investigated using the research questions set out in the introduction, and in answer to the third question the following key findings have been identified. The key findings both conclude the investigation into Dubrovnik and also help to demonstrate the effectiveness of the IHAF methodology.

This study discovered that the impact of heritage on the recovery from conflict can be categorised as areas where it supports stability and reconciliation in Dubrovnik, and areas where it enshrines tensions and discourages stability. By examining these areas using an integrated perspective taken from the three data streams, the impact of heritage in post-war recovery in Dubrovnik is shown and the political ramifications of heritage understood more clearly.

9.5.1 Key Finding One: Interpretations of damage influence perceptions of severity
The various interpretations of damage authorised by UNESCO, the ICTY, and the IFRD have influenced perceptions of the severity of the attack both locally and internationally.

Chapter Six discussed at length the use of built heritage in the ICTY prosecutions and suggested that the difference between the grading systems may have influenced the damage assessments made in the aftermath of the conflict, and the semantic use of either “damage” and “destroyed” to describe serious damage is a good example of the fluidity and subjectivity of heritage interpretation and use. In this chapter the repeated appearance of the nine destroyed houses in the interviews has been
discussed, and it has been argued that the destruction of BCH had become the accepted perception of damage in the city, as reflected in the narratives of the conflict. The interviewees drew attention to similar experiences of war that were shared by all civilian residents in the town, and from this, my research suggests that the acceptance of definitions of destruction has occurred because of the societal need to find evidence for the trauma experienced by the civilians trapped in the Old Town. The economic consequences of the destroyed properties were discussed in Chapter Nine, which argued that the drive (headed by UNESCO) to gain funding and support from the international community made use of different definitions of damage to direct and encourage funding. The UNESCO report is the first report published internationally to differentiate the nine most seriously affected buildings from other damaged BCH, and it presented them as such to encourage support and put a monetary value on the damage.

Cultural heritage is used here to demonstrate the severity of the attack on Dubrovnik, and to showcase the attack to an international community. This is done in three ways: the ICTY use of heritage as evidence, the projection of local experience onto built heritage interpretations and the economic agenda for the reconstruction of BCH. The ICTY proceedings, which designated the attack as an unprovoked war crime, increased Dubrovnik’s status and public profile as a target in the break-up of Yugoslavia. The experiences of local residents onto the built heritage supports this framing of the attack and places in the AHD the physical evidence of their versions of events (Smith, 2006, p. 93). In this reciprocal process the damage to BCH influences the severity of the experiences of the residents and the local residents shape their perception of the damage.

Thus, the damage done to BCH in the conflict has played a vital role in framing the conflict in the post-war period both locally and internationally. The implication is that BCH cannot be relied on to be an unbiased source of evidence, however much it is perceived to be an objective physical fact. Although the report has a superficial appearance of objectivity its interpretations have led to lasting recriminations and less-than-transparent drives for funding. Furthermore, these interpretations created a lasting perception of the destruction among local residents, based both on their own views (which are in turn based on official reports) but also that of the international community and subsequently reflected back onto Dubrovnik.

9.5.2 Key Finding Two: Narratives of conflict

The conflict has been shaped into a fixed, authorised historical narrative by the residents of contemporary Dubrovnik.

The impact of the conflict has been minimised in the discourse of history in the Old Town and is not frequently mentioned. The narratives of the conflict have coalesced into a single experience of remembrance. The authorised discourse allows Dubrovnik to celebrate its pre-war past and sell this image to tourists. The economic advantages of an unproblematic past are clear in a town like Dubrovnik, where tourists want to visit a cultural site, not a site of war. Dubrovnik capitalised on the conflict to rebuild its damaged BCH, but it has speedily moved away from its economic reliance on the conflict in order to recreate a tourist industry and relegated this AHD to a distant past. The effect
of this is there is no discussion or variation in the war narratives, and the conflict has been repackaging in mythic terms. This is discussed in Chapter Nine, which shows that in this mythological construction the role of Dubrovnik as the victim and the attackers as barbarians has become fixed. Ashworth and Tunbridge argue that the past is used as a resource to legitimise the present and to create an acceptable version of events by with fixed and unproblematic victors and losers as the actors. The distinction between victims and barbarians, however, polarises the cultures involved. Thus, if Dubrovnik is seen as a cultural icon of international significance (reinforced by its world heritage status and its self-identified importance) then those who attack it are seen as uncultured barbarians.

This formulation allows the dichotomy between the two cultures to be extended to define Croatia (in the shape of the victimised Dubrovnik) as cultured, and Serbia and Montenegro (as the aggressor armies) as uncultured. These fixed binaries permit the interpretation of the conflict as a clash between cultures. The differentiation of Dubrovnik from Slavic culture implicitly renders it impossible for Serbia or Montenegro to own Dubrovnik. The simplified version of history can also be seen in the presentation of BCH, wherein the lack of available information on modern history does little to address the contemporary use of the buildings. The BCH is defined by its historic value and original use as palaces and churches, not by its current use as tourist shops and restaurants. The palaces and buildings are superficially valued for their status as heritage, defined by their age and beauty and existing in a nostalgic past without the complications of the recent conflict. This construction depoliticises these sites and removes them from participation in the conflict (as a cause or aim of the attack) to position them as victim and to be used as immutable evidence of process of war crime. The use of BCH in the Old Town reflects the duality of approaches to heritage in the town; the need for the war to be treated as an attack on a way of life, and the need to reduce the impact of the attack in order to maintain the perception that Dubrovnik is a WHS and a peaceful tourist destination.

The implication is that the official and only narrative of Dubrovnik’s history does not allow alternate narratives to diversify the heritage of the Old Town. Dubrovnik is frozen in an inauthentic, imagined version of the Old Town’s history that is easily marketed for tourism, but that may not have adequately explored individual experiences of the war or the trauma of the conflict. The attempt to freeze-dry an idealised version of the Old Town has had a lasting impact on the performance of heritage and the performance of reconciliation. The residents’ performance of restored heritage in Dubrovnik and the restored BCH has resulted the perception of successful reconciliation but has failed to confront lingering tensions between ex-warring nations. These performances have created a façade of belonging and security for the benefit of visitors, but unreconciled experiences from the conflict have resulted in hidden tensions.

9.5.3 Key Finding Three: Presentations of recovery
Restored BCH is used to showcase Dubrovnik as a city wholly restored for economic gain through tourism. This performance fails to confront or reconcile any persistent tensions between geo-political neighbours.
Chapter Nine explored the performance of heritage in Dubrovnik by discussing the use of older generations as living heritage to be conserved in the Old Town to promote its authenticity. Both the older generations and the BCH signify the connection to an unproblematic past and erase contemporary attempts to modernise perceptions of the Old Town. Older generations function both as tourist attraction and as the focus of nostalgia for the past for local residents. Although the residents suggest that the older generations preferred life before the war, linking the post-war period to the influx of mass tourism, this research has shown that the claim that pre-war was not a period without mass tourism is not accurate. Most of the participants were involved in the tourist industry and were thus unable to criticise it openly, but they were able to connect to the notion of non-commercialised heritage through the older generations who object to the tourist industry. Despite their role in the preservation and promotion of heritage, older generations do not have an influence over the way heritage is managed in the town and their narratives constitute an example of missing narratives absent from the AHD of the conflict in Dubrovnik (Smith, 2006).

The performance and manipulation of the older generations is similar to that of BCH in the Old Town. Chapter Eight discussed the recovery and presentation of BCH after the conflict, arguing that the presentation of heritage in Dubrovnik relies heavily on defining the Old Town as a whole and complete heritage site, rather than a collection of smaller sites (built or otherwise). This allows any and everything in Dubrovnik to be placed under the umbrella term of “heritage” and so strengthens and support the “wholeness” of the Old Town as a WHS. Nevertheless, Dubrovnik cannot be seen as the sum of its parts, it needs to be seen as a single site with a single history; individual sites, experiences and memories that disrupt this ideal are disregarded. This was apparent throughout the interviews, as discussed in Chapter Seven in section 7.2 and in Chapter Nine in regard to prioritising the recovery of the façades of BCH to be restored over the interiors.

The effect of this, and the crux of this key finding in the research, is that the visible recovery of Dubrovnik’s Old Town does not match its invisible socio-political recovery. The restored town is required to perform to visitors that it is wholly recovered in order to attract and sustain high visitor levels; in turn, the presence of visitors support the legitimacy of performance, and in doing so make it a reality. This reflects the process of upscaling and downgrading the damage of the BCH; the damage was recorded as more severe when the town needed to be seen as attacked in order to seek justice for an illegal act of war, but when the town needed tourism to return, the damage to BCH was downplayed and erased form popular culture. The interviewees suggest that remaining tensions exist and are not accounted for in the authorised narrative. This tension manifests as unease (for some) with visiting neighbouring Montenegro as there remains a fear that those in the nearby Montenegrin towns were involved in the attack on the Old Town.

9.5.4 Key Finding Four: Division and priorities

The division of built heritage into categories allowed the recovery process to prioritise religious aspects of the society without interrogation or justification.
In Chapter Seven it was shown that certain aspects of BCH were prioritised over others, with little justification. The UNESCO damage report was separated into three categories: “gutted” (later defined as destroyed), “damaged palaces” and “damaged religious buildings”. The distinction between the damaged buildings and the damaged religious buildings reveals religious buildings are considered a separate category with a different set of priorities. The list of religious buildings consists mostly of Catholic churches and cathedrals, reflecting the contemporary and historical Catholic majority in Dubrovnik. It also includes the Orthodox Church (a religion associated with the Serbian minority) and the synagogue. The mosque is not included as a damaged religious building but as a damaged building. There is no justification for this in the report. While it is probable that, despite its active function in the community, it was not included in the list because it is not a purpose-built structure, the synagogue is also housed in a converted building. Why include the synagogue but not the mosque? Furthermore, nearly all the churches in Dubrovnik were listed as damaged, although some were disused or already in a state of decay pre-war, indicates that they are included on the list as religious monuments rather than as places to practice religion.

This research suggests that the inclusion of so many Christian churches as damaged religious buildings was a politically motivated move to garner economic support for the rebuilding process based on the fraternity of religions across international borders, and to strengthen the image of Dubrovnik (and Croatia) as a Western Christian nation. The ramifications of this distance Dubrovnik from its cultural and historical connection to ex-Yugoslavian Orthodox countries and instead aligns it to Roman history and European Christianity. Excluding the mosque from the list allows the Old Town of Dubrovnik to present itself as a unified Christian culture. The homogenous Catholic majority is presented as the main religion, and the historical links to Islam are not acknowledged in the list of damaged buildings. This is also a way of distancing Dubrovnik from involvement in Christian and Muslim conflicts and atrocities in the Bosnian war during the 1990s and limiting its war experience to Serbian and Montenegrin aggression. The inclusion of other religions in the list would disrupt this hegemony and problematize the history of Dubrovnik, thus exposing an unacceptable challenge to the socio-political construction of the city as victim.

9.5.5 Key Finding Five: Tourism and heritage are interdependent

The commercialisation of heritage for tourism both threatens and protects livelihoods in the Old Town

Chapter Eight looked at the impact of cultural tourism on post-war Dubrovnik and noted that the commodification of heritage has been divided by perceptions of tourists and tourism markets as good and bad. The study focused mainly on the perceptions of the residents who were involved in the tourist trade. These interviewees said that whilst tourism was necessary to their livelihood there was an underlying perception that tourists visiting the Old Town in post-war contemporary Dubrovnik were visiting in the wrong way. Post-war tourists spent less time and money in the city and this had resulted in the cheapening of the tourist market. In this view, the demands of the tourist had shaped what the tourist industry supplied; that is that cheap, non-elite mass tourism had led to a tourist
market relying on selling more affordable, non-local products. The participants showed they distinguished not only between desirable and non-desirable tourists but also between the two separate tourist markets that cater to them. All the interviewees who identified as having links to the tourist industry claimed they were linked to high-brow, local cultural tourism and that they disapproved of low-brow, mass-produced tourism.

The mass-tourism market (consisting of day-trippers and less wealthy tourists) has been attracted to a sanitised Dubrovnik, where an unproblematic restored heritage has been created to support a tourism industry which employs most of the residents (as signposted by the interviewees).

The research has shown that Dubrovnik is extremely reliant on tourism to the Old Town as a place of employment and continued development. However, the impact that post-war tourism is having on the heritage of the Old Town leads to the insight that, although the BCH is protected against overuse, the connections between people and place are damaged as they rely on heritage more for its commercial aspect than for its cultural ties. This is of particular concern when looking at the creation of authorised narratives and power dynamics (see key findings one and two), which seek to simplify the history of the conflict and make it less accessible by the public, then use this produced history as an authentic representation of culture to be sold to tourists.

While the development of tourism relies on heritage, these simplified narratives threaten heritage by weakening its bond to local people and becoming inauthentic. The development of the on-going golf resort and cruise tourism seek to capitalise on an established cultural tourism market, but in doing so damages tourist experiences of heritage in the Old Town (by inauthentic souvenir shops and crowds of tourists) and threaten the sustainability of the cultural tourism market. The more the Old Town relies on tourism, the less authentic it becomes. Dubrovnik’s viability as a tourist attraction is based on its reputation as a heritage site and its UNESCO world heritage status; if the value of heritage decreases through overuse and overdevelopment, it will be less able to attract tourists and the stability of the tourist market and the livelihoods of those who rely on it will be threatened.

9.5.6 Key Finding Six: Public and private perceptions of recovery
The use of heritage in post-war Dubrovnik resulted in the separation of public and private conceptions of recovery in the Old Town

The recovery of Dubrovnik from war has emerged in this thesis as a dual process of public and private action. The BCH in the Old Town has been restored to a high standard, but from the outside in, and this is a good metaphor to use for the framing of the recovery in general in Dubrovnik. The appearance of physical recovery, economic development and performances of socio-political reconciliation has taken precedence over ensuring transparency in BCH restoration, curating the careful management of cultural tourism development and more substantial reconciliation between the people to their past. Heritage has been used in each instance as a means to support actions rather than interrogate the consequences of those actions. Heritage was used in its most visual form as BCH to firstly frame the severity of the conflict and then to distance the Old Town inhabitants from the conflict by presenting it as totally restored. The recovery of the BCH involved repairing the façades
on each property to recreate Dubrovnik as a single heritage site. This is supported by the evidence of
the speed and prioritisation of the restoration process as discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine, and
by the responses made by the interviewees discussed in this chapter. The restoration of BCH placed
heritage at the heart of the recovery of the Old Town, but, the consequences were the exaggeration
of damage in the ICTY proceedings and in international perceptions of destroyed Dubrovnik, and
the prioritisation of restoring BCH to a pre-war norm rather than on restoring BCH to a new post-
war reality. The discussions in the interviews on the remaining war damage reflect this process where
the choice to remove all traces of the war for the prosperity of the town conflicts with a desire to
retain the war damage in the Old Town to memorialise the experience of war. The interviewees were
uncertain which course of action was best; some participants suggested that the marks were not
needed to help them to remember as they had their memories – this suggests that personal
reconciliation has not occurred as there are still traumatic memories in the townspeople. Others
wished to see the damage removed as the war damage had no purpose other than to commemorate a
barbarous attack on culture, and therefore should not be remembered. The experience of the conflict
is set out for public consumption, but lingers as a private memory. One participant who argued for
the removal of all war damage later revealed that they had framed photographs of the war damage
sustained inside their house but did not show these publicly.

The effect of the war on the BCH has been minimalised (and maximised) and the war museums
removed from public access (by physically removing them from the town, or socially by making it
hard for outsiders to fully understand). The result of this is that the heritage of the conflict has been
managed and mitigated. The conflict does not need to be interrogated as, in the public arena, it has
been packaged, mythologised and consigned to the past; in doing so any dissonance or unreconciled
narratives have no platform from which to explore the conflict from diverse points of view.

That is not to suggest that these remaining tensions have no outlet. The memorial in Sponza Palace
presents the faces of the local people who died in the war by not distinguishing between civilians and
combatants, but they are presented with little information or interpretation; their function is not only
to remember the dead but also to remind the casual observer that Dubrovnik suffered. This is a good
example of forgetting but not forgiving the acts perpetrated in war. The memory room exemplifies
some of the arguments made (and discussed in this research in Chapters Two, Three, and Four) by
memory theorists, specifically Barbara Misztal and Paul Connerton, in regard to how collective
memories are formed, and how and why societies choose to forget.

The research notes that Dubrovnik has a personal and private mode of recovery, and that public
recovery occurred at a faster pace than private recovery. The application of this finding is necessary
to the understanding that BCH is not a sole marker for damage or recovery as this does not imply
that a society has recovered. Instead, this finding shows that heritage can be used both to uncover
and conceal tensions in a post-conflict environment. Thus, in Dubrovnik the manipulation of heritage
has crystallised into an authorised and acceptable experience which the town has used to recover
physically and economically.
Heritage can be a means to enable or halt the processes of reconciliation, and the private and public negotiation of the conflict in this case shows that heritage may slow down socio-political (private) reconciliation in favour of encouraging economic (public) development through physical perceptions of BCH recovery. Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (2003) say that reconciliation is a process wherein the negotiation of experiences of conflict are placed within a contemporary setting (as discussed in Chapter Four in the process of reconciliation). This research has argued that this process has occurred in Dubrovnik on the basis of a collective experience of conflict (as discussed in section 9.3 but it is not yet complete.

Reconciliation has taken place in Dubrovnik, but it has been a public performance undertaken for the sake of economic and cultural stability through tourism and reciting acceptable cultural narratives of history (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 12). Failure to reconcile has become privately internalised as the interviews have demonstrated. Drawing on arguments from Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996), Lowenthal (1998) and Shils (1981) regarding the creation of heritage, this research finds that the heritage was not used as a way to interrogate the past but to re-invent an idealised past (Shils, 1981, pp. 31–32) This has been achieved through a lack of negotiation between the past and the present, and the removal of the conflict from both the visible and the narrative heritage of Dubrovnik. This has curtailed a public discussion on the past and allowed the continuation of simmering hostilities. This suggests that although the pre-war and post-war tensions may be currently dormant they are not necessarily erased, which has implications for the sustainability of peace and protection for Dubrovnik in the event of future political upheavals.
Chapter Ten: Conclusion

This research was undertaken to increase our understanding of the role of cultural heritage in post-conflict recovery, with particular emphasis on how the impact of heritage on recovery can be assessed. The result of this was the creation of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (IHAF), which was trailed successfully in the field to analyse the impact of heritage on the recovery of Dubrovnik following conflict. The IHAF is dependent on a strong theoretical foundation, which was gained through a wide ranging and thorough literature review, presented in the first three substantive chapters of this thesis. The conceptual base of this thesis argues that heritage must be perceived as a process of connecting people and places to their pasts in order to fully understand and realise the potential impact heritage has over post-conflict societies.

To undertake this research, three research questions were identified, and have been addressed throughout this thesis. This chapter concludes the research by exploring the findings of each of these questions, which were fully outlined in the introduction.

1. How can the impact of heritage on post-war recovery be conceptualised?
2. How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery be assessed?
3. What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik?

10.1 Research Question One: How can the impact of heritage on post-war recovery be conceptualised?

This question sought to conceptualise the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery and has been answered by an in-depth analysis of the literature relating to heritage and post-conflict recovery. The arguments made by this research concluded that heritage has a long-lasting and significant impact on the way societies recover from conflict, which has previously not been fully explored. Instead of focusing on a single aspect of heritage (its physicality, its economic attributes, or its perception in society), this research has argued that heritage needs to be investigated using a more holistic concept in order to fully understand the relationship of heritage to conflict and recovery.

To answer this research question, four objectives were established to guide the structure of the analyses. These four objectives formed the literature review chapters of this thesis (chapters two to four), and the conclusions that were drawn from them shaped the integrated perspective on heritage, which underpins this research.

The first objective was to create and support a working definition of cultural heritage that could be the foundation of this thesis, and used as a reference point throughout all subsequent chapters. The thesis argued forcibly that a fixed definition of heritage that focused on cultural property would not be sufficient to understanding the impact of heritage on conflict and recovery. Despite the ability of cultural property to show how heritage has been affected through damage to heritage sites, it cannot help us explore why heritage can become such an emotive target, nor can it fully explain how the relationship to people and their heritages changes in response to conflict. Instead, heritage is perceived by this research as a process of creating meaningful connections between people, place,
and their pasts, which is achieved through constant interpretation and re-interpretation of the past by those in power. This connective process relies on an interpretation of events that are turned into accepted narratives, and these are expressed through physical heritage sites (Smith, 2006; Hewison, 1987; Harrison, 2010). This active process of constructing narratives is contextually bound by its contemporary socio-political atmosphere, and contemporary heritage can be used as an avenue to assess contemporary political tensions (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996; Smith, 2006).

From these perspectives, this thesis argued that heritage can be defined as a process that is shaped and morphed according to the needs of the present, and manipulated to favour those in power. The result of this process is the reinforcement of some identities through heritage, and the de-legitimisation of others. The narrative and symbolism of heritage chooses what can be expressed or remembered in society, and as a consequence, what is forgotten or purposefully removed (Connerton, 2006). Using the definition of heritage constructed upon this basis enables the impact of heritage on conflict recovery to be seen on a larger scale, in which heritage is capable of influencing how contemporary society views the past, how they view themselves, and how they view different cultures. The impact of this on societies recovering from conflict has huge potential to either help move a society on from conflict towards reconciliation and recovery, or to become a trigger for violent conflict.

The second objective, explored in Chapter Two, sought to take the definition of heritage as a process and apply this perspective to understanding how heritage protection is formalised internationally. The effects of an authorised narrative of heritage and its impact on post-conflict identities cannot be explored if heritage is limited to only to cultural property, but this is the definition that is widely used in heritage-protection legislation. This thesis argues that the protection offered by these international conventions is hindered because their definition is limited to cultural property, and they do not reflect the intricacies or the legacy of heritage.

International conventions, particularly the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1972 World Heritage Convention, hold massive influence over the way heritage is defined and protected in conflict. These are interrogated in this thesis in several ways; as reflections of the contextually bound definitions of heritage, what this legacy is, and why the documents face difficulties in the contemporary world (Kastenberg, 1997; Toman, 2009). The thesis argued that The Hague Convention was founded as a result of many previous legislative attempts to formalise the treatment of heritage in conflict, but also argues there was a catalytic reaction to the treatment of heritage in Europe during the Second World War, which spurred on the creation of convention. This thesis argued that the urgency with which The Hague Convention was formed came from not only the widespread nature of the damage to heritage during the war, but also its location in Europe (Tomlinson, 2002). This thesis suggests that the Eurocentric nature of heritage protection has hindered its use in other international conflicts. The need of The Hague Convention and World Heritage Convention to universally formalise heritage in order for it to be protected has created a set of international criteria that determine what can be considered as universally significant, and in doing so have constructed world heritage designed to transcend local social constructions of heritage (Meskell, 2010). The thesis argues that this results in
the targeting of world heritage sites as places not only of heritage significance, but also of foreign intervention. This argument is put forward as a major reason why heritage is targeted in war, and why current legislative attempts are struggling to protect heritage in conflict.

The third objective, explored in Chapter Four, took this argument further by establishing that heritage is considered as an active participant in causing conflict, and not a passive bystander or recipient of damage. This objective was therefore explored in regards to how heritage influences and is influenced by conflict. Kaldor (2006) suggests that ‘new’ wars can be understood as an attempt to further an ideological belief, in contrast to the pre-1990s conflicts, which had geo-political expansionist motivations (Kaldor, 2006). This thesis argued that in a ‘new’ conflict, heritage as a process of meaning-making influences how ideology is shaped and symbolised, which has a direct impact on causing and continuing conflict. The presentation of heritage as the manifestation of identity allows it to be used to unify or divide a society depending on who is in control of the cultural narrative (Kaldor, 2013; Sen, 2006); this can result in the re-hashing of history to emphasise a deep-seated ethnic or cultural tension that may not have existed (Meskell, 2005; Sen, 2006; Todorova, 1997). This argument echoes the arguments made in Chapter Three which also argue that the interpretation of heritage has a profound influence on identity. This argument is also particularly relevant to the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, which were explained (and initially accepted by the international community and in Yugoslavia) as the explosion of ethnic hatred that had been simmering as blood feuds for centuries (Kaplan, 2001) and the subsequent rejection of this argument (Todorova, 1997). The artifice of this explanation was not exposed, but the result of this heritage discourse was brutal violent conflict. The targeting of built property in the Balkans is the physical manifestation of a conflict stained by the manipulation of heritage wherein sites, which had remained untouched and respected for centuries, became the epitome of ethnic difference, and targeted as such.

The fourth objective moves beyond the impact of heritage in war, and looks at how the process of heritage alters in the post-conflict era, and discussed in Chapter Two and Four. This thesis argued that heritage is capable of surviving conflict, but also of being created from conflict. MacDonald (2009) suggests that narratives of dissonance are created from conflict and are attached to places previously without this connection (Meskell, 2005); this results in previously unknown places becoming synonymous with atrocity and violence (MacDonald, 2009). These places become the explicit sites of the heritage of war, whereas places considered as heritage before conflict are perceived by their populations as sites whose heritage envelope new conflicts. Ashworth and Tunbridge (1996) argue heritage sites that survive conflict have the conflict added to their historic tapestry as a way to minimise its effect on the grand narrative of history, as well as the effects on the cultural identities of its owners (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996). The interpretation and inclusion (or exclusion) of conflict into existing heritage narratives is an explicit use of the Authorised Historical Discourse (Smith, 2006). The celebration or commemoration of dissonant experiences of conflicts at new sites fulfils two functions; it cements the ideological legitimacy of the survivors of conflict by acknowledging these events occurred, and moves the conflict away from the immediacy of the contemporary society by creating them as separate discourses of a wider historical event.
(Meskell, 2010; Sen, 2006). For example, pre-conflict heritage sites, such as Dubrovnik and Mostar, focus on the timelessness of their cultural heritage, despite the cultural property being brutally demolished or damaged in conflict. The effect the conflict has on their pre-existing designation (from UNESCO and themselves) of heritage is minimised in favour of re-creating their pre-war pasts. In contrast, Srebrenica and Auschwitz-Birkenau are founded as new sites of dissonant heritage after conflict, giving previously unknown places an irreversible connection to murder, torture, and mass atrocity, as well as providing clear evidence that these events happened and cannot be erased (Macdonald, 2009).

The first research question has been answered by these four objectives to conclude that heritage is a process of connecting people to places and their pasts, which has a direct impact on how conflict experiences are interpreted and reconciled in post-conflict societies. From this examination, several interdependent aspects of conflict, recovery, and heritage have become apparent; the physical damage to heritage, the economic value of heritage, and the socio-political influences of heritage over recovery.

The aspects were formed into an integrated perspective which are explored in terms of the physicality of heritage in conflict, with particular emphasis on the limits of defining heritage as cultural property and the consequences this has for its damage and protection (Henckaerts, 1999; Kastenberg, 1997; O’Keefe, 2006; Starzmann, 2008); the relationship between conflict and economics, focusing on the role of heritage as an economic incentive for conflict and recovery (Kaldor 2013; Collier, 2000); and the connection between people and place, addressed through a socio-political interrogation of what heritage means in a post-conflict environment to its people, and how it influences that relationship (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996; Hall, 1999; Kaldor, 2013; Kaldor, 2006; Macdonald, 2009 Meskell, 2010; Sen, 2006; Smith, 2006). The integrated perspective gained through this conceptual review culminated with the argument that heritage is capable of determining how effectively a society will move on from conflict by controlling how the conflict is interpreted, reconciled, and remembered. Furthermore, in order to gain an integrated and holistic understanding of the impact of heritage on post-war recovery, it must be assessed using these three aspects (physical, economic, and socio-political).

The argument generated by this thesis connects the concerns of heritage studies to those of post-war studies. This represents a valuable contribution to literature by attempting to widen the interpretation of heritage in conflict beyond cultural property, and in doing so gaining a greater insight into how heritage influences key aspects of recovery in post-conflict environments.

### 10.2 Research Question Two: How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery be assessed?

In answer to this question, the thesis created the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (IHAF) as a methodological framework capable of assessing the impact of heritage upon recovery. This framework focused on the physical, economic, and socio-political aspects of recovery, which were considered the key aspects of heritage based on the findings from the first research question. In order
to construct this framework and address the second question, four objectives were created to guide
the research; these objectives were explored fully in Chapter Five, and their conclusions discussed
here.

A key issue encountered by this research was reconciling the needs of heritage with those of conflict
recovery. The conceptual answer to this issue was to interrogate how those needs crossed over and
integrated, resulting in the answer to the first research question, which argued that heritage is capable
of controlling the post-conflict narrative and of reconciling or exacerbating ideological differences.
To evidence this relationship, key aspects of society that are damaged by conflict were identified;
these were the impact of conflict on place, economy, and people. These areas lent themselves to the
investigation of records of damage to built heritage, recovery of the tourism industry, and the socio-
political consequences of conflict on its population.

The second objective sought to establish what assessment frameworks existed and how they could
be used as a basis for heritage assessment. This was achieved through an examination of the most
widely used tool in development studies and interventions, the DFID SCA framework (Barakat and
Waldman, 2013; Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002). The framework prioritised the need for
contextually bound assessments, and focused on breaking down the area of assessment into
constituent parts. From this foundation, the thesis identified three key aspects of heritage from the
literature reviewed in Chapters Two to Four, and used these as the foundation for this assessment.
Built heritage, the economy of heritage, and the socio-political aspects of heritage were all shown to
have tremendous influence over post-conflict recovery, but only built heritage had been prioritised
in post-conflict interventions, as evidenced by the many cultural property restoration projects such
as Mostar Bridge. It was concluded that in order to analyse heritage (as defined in the previous
research question) a mixture of qualitative and quantitative assessments would be required.

The third objective sought to establish what methods would be capable of shaping the IHAF into a
robust framework based on integrating the needs of both heritage and recovery. The IHAF has four
main components; the contextual evaluation of conflict, the assessment of built heritage, the
assessment of the economics of heritage, and the socio-political impact of heritage, as determined by
the first research question and previous objectives. In order to cover these diverse research areas a
mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods was used (Brannen, 2008; Tashakkor and Teddlie,
2010). These methods resulted in the generation of photographic records of damage complete with
geo-location information, statistical analysis of tourism statistics to establish financial value to
heritage, and semi-structured interviews to gain an insight into the relationship between people and
heritage in a post-conflict setting. The IHAF was held accountable to the feasibility guidance in
fieldwork methodologies and helped to define the limits of the IHAF.

10.2.1 Evaluation of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework
The guiding principle of the IHAF was that it had to be a robust and repeatable methodological
system that could be applied to the assessment of heritage after any conflict. This set a challenging
goal for the framework as it aspired not only to create a new method of assessing heritage in conflict,
but also of using a previously unquantifiable definition of heritage as its foundation. The intricacies of heritage versus cultural property have been fully explored in this thesis, and will not be repeated here. It is mentioned however to emphasise that the definition of cultural heritage identified by this research has not been used in conflict recovery assessments before, making the IHAF and its trial in Dubrovnik unique, contributing valuable data to the debate on the role of heritage during and after war. However, the IHAF has areas that need careful consideration to mitigate possible weaknesses. These include access to data, data flooding, and contextually bound definitions.

10.2.2 Limitations of the IHAF

The IHAF relies on data collection, and is most effective when it can access complete records and high volumes of data, however this is not always possible after a conflict. In a perfect scenario the IHAF would allow a researcher to structure their research using complete records of physical damage, complete tourism statistics, and have access to a wide variety and large number of interview participants. The fact that these are not always available in their entirety is a fact of post-conflict societies and must be countered for. The IHAF counters this in several ways; first, the reliance on a single incomplete data set is mitigated by relying on the generation of three complementary data types to gain an integrated perspective on the impact of heritage on recovery. Scarcity of data in one area of study will be countered by data from the other constituent areas, but will remain a fundamental part of the research as it will give an indication of how that aspect recovered, or be conspicuous by its absence.

Secondly, the IHAF is not a retrospective assessment and it is capable of carrying out long term assessments. If the data is not available at the start of the research, the IHAF can collect data in real time. For example, if interview participants are unwilling to cooperate with interviews initially due to unfamiliarity with the researcher, they may agree to be interviewed at a later date if the study is run on a long term basis. Equally, photographic records of restoration work can be carried out during said work, and tourism statistics can be measured going forward, creating a baseline and measuring changes in real-time rather than analysing past statistics. The IHAF relies on the quality of data it receives, but it is capable of mitigating this by aiming to collect a varied range of data rather than becoming a reliant on a single data stream.

The amount of data can also cause a separate issue if there is a high volume of data collected. This issue became apparent in the trial run of the IHAF in Dubrovnik, where a great deal of data was collected, which resulted in the time consuming analyses of three large data sets. Although this is a positive issue as it has resulted in the thesis gaining a thorough insight into the impact of heritage on Dubrovnik, in future applications of the IHAF this problem could be anticipated by increasing the number of researchers in the team, enabling faster processing without compromising the volume of data collected.

12.2.3 Benefits of the IHAF

The flexibility of the IHAF to adapt to its context is undoubtedly a positive benefit of this methodology, but it also means that the generalisation of results cannot occur as each context is
different. The definition of heritage and the IHAF structure can be used as they are in future research, but the results gained from Dubrovnik cannot be applied to other contexts. However, this enables the IHAF and its definitions to be used in many locations, and the results directly compared. This will give a wider appreciation for the impact of heritage in different contexts and conflicts, but it will resist universal assumptions into the generalised behaviour of heritage. Within this thesis this is considered to be a positive result as it provides more evidence to the diversity of heritage in different contexts and conflicts, but this may be considered a drawback by those seeking international policy applications from the assessment of heritage using fixed definitions of cultural property.

The IHAF aimed to create a robust methodology, and this has been achieved through an in-depth interrogation of research methods and exploring other existing assessment tools. The mixed methods approach reflects the definition of heritage argued by this research; heritage is a dynamic process that engages many different areas of study, and mixed methodology is a varied approach capable of producing different data types. The analysis of the DFID SCA resulted in modelling the IHAF on an already well established SCA framework, and used this as the foundation to structure the IHAF. The analysis of the SCA resulted in the IHAF benefitting from a similar rigorous structure without compromising the definition of heritage, whilst the mixed methods approach allowed for a varied approach to data collection. A key strength of this framework is the visualisation of the methodology, which was created not only to clarify the process of the IHAF, but also to emphasise how it could be repeated. Each section of the IHAF is linked to a specific aim and methodology in order for the IHAF to be widely used in other contexts and future research.

The flexibility built into the structure of the IHAF allows it to be changed according to the context in question. To this end, the first step in the IHAF is to analyse the context of the conflict, and in doing so uncover specific contextual issues. In the case of Dubrovnik, this required an analysis of the Balkan conflicts, how the Old Town of Dubrovnik was involved, and how culture played a large part in the conflict. The contextual analysis not only outlines what you wish to assess, but highlights the limits of the investigation (both temporal and geographical). The structure of the IHAF follows a logical structure, requiring data from three specific areas of investigation and details how these data sets can be collected, but remains flexible depending on the needs of the researcher and the data available.

10.3 Research Question Three: What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik?

This research question moved beyond the conceptualisation of heritage assessment in post conflict recovery, and carried out a trial run of the IHAF fieldwork in Dubrovnik. This assessment has taken place from Chapter Six, and culminates in the key findings in Chapter Nine. Each objective outlined in the introduction has been answered in order in Chapters Seven to Chapter Ten. In answer to this third research question an overview of the impact of heritage on Dubrovnik is given. The assessment concluded that cultural heritage in Dubrovnik was not a space where ethnic and cultural tensions can merely be observed: it is where they are caused and mitigated.
The conclusions drawn here are based on the six key findings from the case study, which are discussed fully in Chapter Nine. The first key finding argued that the changing interpretations of damage in the official UNESCO records influenced perceptions of the severity of the attack both locally and internationally, which had a direct impact on the ICTY prosecution proceedings. The second finding argued that a fixed narrative of the conflict is present in Dubrovnik that is publically (if not privately) endorsed by its residents, who rely on the economic stability of heritage. The third key finding argues that although the built heritage has been restored on a wide-scale to promote the perception that the town is completely recovered from conflict, individual narratives suggest that the conflict has not been reconciled on a socio-political level. The fourth key finding argues that religious buildings were restored as a separate category to non-religious buildings in an effort to prioritise their recovery. Key finding five argued that the reliance on tourism in the town threatened to damage the perception of heritage on which it relies, but that it was equally difficult not to rely on the saturated tourism market. The final key finding argued that there is a distinct difference between the public perception of recovery endorsed by residents, and their private conceptions of heritage in contemporary Dubrovnik. It is argued that this has resulted in a disjuncture between real and pseudo reconciliation.

These key findings combine to show that the historical context of Dubrovnik was a key factor in the cause of the conflict and the actions taken in the aftermath of war. The awareness of cultural ties and tensions remain constantly in the foreground of this study, which notes that the socio-political history that has shaped the geo-politics of the region has influenced and continues to influence the relationship between people, place, and history in Dubrovnik. The tumultuous history of the Balkans and its complex ethnic and cultural relationships have culminated not only in strengthening national cultural identities, but also in the defence and differentiation of these cultural identities from each another. The search for historical causes of the violence in Yugoslav wars is an immensely difficult endeavour, and well beyond the limits of this thesis. The historians who have done so have been faced with by a number of varying perspectives, interpretations and biases, and the knowledge that, while the high-level political causes of the war in the 1990s can be traced historically, the explosion of violence, ethnic hatred and genocide cannot be rationally explained nor can a consensus be reached. What is resoundingly clear is that culture had a huge influence over the area, and cultural identities and the heritage that supports them have had profound importance in the exacerbation or reduction of tensions in the area.

10.3.1 Limitations of Dubrovnik Case Study
Although this research sought to identify and minimise the impact of limiting factors at the earliest opportunity, some limitations remain. These were either barriers to carrying out the research such as funding and time restraints, or barriers to gathering data, such as lack of access to records or interviews. For further information on the feasibility of this fieldwork, please refer to Chapter Five: 5.5 Testing the feasibility of the IHAF methodology.
The research was conducted under time restraints, which were at odds with the time necessary to recruit interview participants. The research was completed over a course of three fieldtrips to Dubrovnik. The sensitive nature of the qualitative aspects of this research (and, indeed, all research in post-war environments) meant that it was paramount that the interview participants were comfortable sharing their experiences of conflict with the researcher. As such, the participants of this research were approached directly and openly by the researcher and made aware of the extent of their participation. The participants were unwilling to initially participate in interviews as the researcher was not known to them; the return fieldtrips to Dubrovnik over three years built trust between the researcher and participants. Once trust had been established, the participants would recommend the researcher to other potential participants, which resulted in more interviews taking place.

Some of the Dubrovnik residents did not want to participate formally in the research, and instead preferred to be interviewed off the record, which added an ethnographic element to this study. Although the time constraints of this research put pressure on this process, the interviews would not have taken place without building up the required trust. The fieldwork was completed over three consecutive years, with each fieldtrip lasting for up to four weeks. Although it would be efficient to complete the fieldwork in a single extended trip, financial constraints made this impossible, and it would not have resulted in the high quality data sets gained from multiple fieldtrips. The slow build-up of data allowed the researcher to gain more time with interview participants, to survey a high volume of cultural property, and to gain access to high-level interview participants in local government.

The interview participants made it explicitly clear to the researcher that they would only participate in face-to-face interviews. The participants characterised Dubrovnik as oral culture, and because of this it was difficult to gain participation in the research through email or via telephone. The researcher offered a translator to all research participants and potential participants, but none took up this offer. The participants in this research were happy to be interviewed for extended periods of time, and often one interview would lead to the recommendation of the researcher to another participant. Some residents were happy to speak to the researcher about conflict and heritage but would not agree to formal interviews, citing a wish not to record traumatic narratives. The interview schedule was hampered by the tendency of high-level participants (government and museum official) to cancel or rearrange interviews at short notice, which proved difficult to negotiate considering the limited time-frames of fieldwork. Although all cancelled interviews took place, scheduling interviews prior to arrival in Dubrovnik proved inefficient. Most interviews with high-level participants were secured whilst the researcher was in Dubrovnik, at their convenience.

There were also barriers to gaining access to economic data on the recovery of the BCH and on the visitor numbers. The data on the donations and funding of BCH was available publicly from IFRD on a number of damaged BCH properties, but they were unwilling to share more detailed data despite multiple requests. The same data proved difficult to locate from other sources (UNESCO and local government archives) and was met with a similar reception of unwillingness or unresponsiveness. However, the data taken from the IFRD was enough to show how over half of the buildings had
received funding since the conflict, and to allow the researcher to identify and discuss priorities, funding, and the overall reconstruction of the town.

10.4 Applications of the IHAF

The previous chapter outlined six key findings from the application of the IHAF to Dubrovnik, however, these findings can also be generalised to different contexts in order to assist in the creation of a comparative knowledge base on heritage and conflict recovery.

The assessment of heritage recovery in Dubrovnik using the IHAF identified a number of findings which generated some patterns of recovery which can be generalised to other contexts based on historical assessments, and can be further explored though further testing of the IHAF in diverse conflict contexts.

10.4.1 Physical Patterns: Prioritising authorised narratives through material heritage

The assessment of material heritage in Dubrovnik both through desk-based investigation into the extent of damage and funding for recovery, and the contemporary survey of the same buildings in 2012 drew to the conclusion that the order of recovery was not determined by the severity of damage, rather the priorities for recovery were set by available funding granted by donors. Consequently, the buildings that received the highest level of donor interest were repaired as a priority, and these tended to be religious buildings with a wide international community.

This finding reveals a potential prioritisation bias which favours donorship over heritage need. Although this is in itself unsurprising, as heritage cannot be repaired without funding and there is a scarcity of national or international funding for heritage projects, the impact of this prioritisation bias and the emergence of religious groups as key donors to heritage reconstruction is a pattern worthy of tighter scrutiny. This is particularly valid when considering the authorised discourse associated to heritage, and the influence it has over the legitimisation of individual identities and a sense of belonging in a community. In the aftermath of conflict when heritage narratives are challenged by the events of conflict, the way a society prioritises the reconstruction of heritage is likely to be a factor in the ability to move beyond or back to violent conflict. When some aspects of heritage are prioritised beyond others through funding and donorship it is likely to be interpreted as a bias towards certain groups and a rejection of minority or othered heritage. In Dubrovnik, the prioritisation of religious heritage sites from Christian, Jewish, and Muslim international donors has resulted in the reconstruction of religious buildings across the town, and a strong religious connection to the old town from its residents. The reconstructed heritage may not be the reason for the strong cultural links, but the repaired religious heritage sites serve to reinforce and promote the importance of (predominantly Christian) religion to Dubrovnik residents and visitors. The comparison of donor priorities across an array of conflict contexts will serve to determine which aspects of heritage are likely to be recovered more quickly than others, and interrogate how the priorities of donors’ influence and impact on the construction of heritage messages and identities in post-conflict communities. This application of the IHAF will be particularly relevant to post-conflict environments.
with ethnic or religious tensions, particularly those contexts who have experienced genocide with a large international diaspora or with religious connections.

### 10.4.2 Economic Patterns: Public and private reactions to heritage destruction and recovery guided by financial flows at tourist intensive and non-intensive heritage sites

The use of the IHAF in Dubrovnik found that the local community held a public and private view of the damage done to the city and the extent to which it has been recovered. These findings also suggested that an important factor in these perceptions were their reliance on the tourism trade in the town, which in turn relied on the city being presented as a peaceful cultural centre, not a conflict-affected cultural centre. The perspective given through interviews was further supported by the economic profile of Dubrovnik, which revealed a high dependency on external tourism in order for the town to function effectively through hospitality industries of restaurants and hotels, as well as day visits from cruise passengers. The interviewees presented an unease between exploiting heritage for tourism where conflict had to be removed from public view, and a private view of heritage where resentment existed towards tourists who used the old town and a tension was expressed with the need to whitewash the conflict from the public narratives of the city.

The economic profile of the city underlined how fundamental tourism is to the survival of the town and region, and identified how the conflict has been used (or hidden) to create a tourist friendly history. Previous chapters explored how responsibility and blame are driving factors in the need to relegate conflict to past generations to distance oneself from involvement; this research has shown that economic drivers are of equal importance when considering how a conflict is distanced from or included into a local heritage narrative, and how this narrative is performed and transmitted to a national and international tourism market.

The inclusion of recent conflict in heritage sites is likely to differ between tourism intensive and non-intensive site. Where tourism and heritage tourism is a key economic driver it is hypothesised that contested heritage narratives and conflict heritage is less likely to be included or acknowledged in heritage sites; whereas in areas with low tourist turnover, conflict heritage is likely to remain more overt, and it is less likely to be a source of income generation. This is particularly relevant to heritage in conflict zones where heritage is less accessible due to travel and safety restrictions to an international tourist industry. The IHAF is fully capable of carrying out heritages centred economic assessments, and mapping these against socio-political reactions to heritage gained from interviews and determining how prevalent tourism is in the area to assess whether the economics of heritage alters how a context recovers from conflict. This will also begin to inform the threat picture and how situation heritage-led intervention methods. It is likely that the results of these assessments across an economically diverse range of conflict affected regions and cultures will demonstrate varied response to the economics of heritage, and will encompass looking the value heritage has as a feature of the tourism industry and also as a moveable commodity in legitimate and illegitimate markets. This will enable the IHAF to expand into other areas of recover including security and law enforcement and the impact heritage has on criminal financial flows and the organisation or criminal groups. A key
case study for the development of this aspect of the IHAF is illegal archaeological digs in Afghanistan and the looting of the Baghdad National Museum in 2001.

10.4.3 Socio-political Patterns: Cemented authorised narratives of recovery and the erasure of diverse narratives at contested heritage sites.

Conceptually, heritage narratives have been shown to be employed to claim ownership of contested sites based on a degree of historical authority and inheritance. In conflict, this relationship intensifies to the degree where identities become more aligned to an authoritative narrative of history and where contested narratives present a threat to the legitimacy of claims of ownership and belonging. In Dubrovnik, this resulted in the post-war hegemonic reimagining of the old town as a place of uncontested Croatian heritage prior to the war and rebuilt to reflect this homogenous interpretation of heritage after the war through cemented narratives of conflict and recovery (as supported by the Dubrovnik Key Finding One in Chapter Nine). Beyond this contextually bound example, it is possible to see a similar pattern emerging within different contexts wherein diverse heritage identities prior to conflicts are reimagined into singular heritage narratives after conflicts, either through the cementing of authoritative narratives which remove contested pasts from history, or through violent suppression and erasure of cultures through genocide and heritage destruction.

Religious fundamentalism lends itself to heritage erasure through conflict, wherein violent fundamentalism requires suppression to justify and position itself as the only authoritative culture in a particular geo-political space. In order to cement its authority, it needs not only to prevent contested narratives being expressed in a heritage site, but to prevent these narratives existing or to present them as culturally distant and oppositional. In the case of Dubrovnik, the religious hegemony of the old town allowed culturally diverse narratives to be buried in post-conflict narratives without extreme violence of overt heritage destruction. Instead, authoritative accounts of conflict and recovery were reinforced by prioritised heritage recovery funding for religious buildings and the creation of sites and museums celebrating a pre-conflict identity which separated Croatian (Dubrovnik) identities from their Slavic neighbours (as supported by Dubrovnik Key Finding six in Chapter Nine). At sites of conflict in Bosnia- notably Vukovar-, the same hegemonic result was achieved through cultural erasure using the methodologies of genocide, cultural genocide, and violent repression. Extrapolating patterns of cultural erasure and the formation of authorised heritage narratives is a key way in which the findings from Dubrovnik can be used to apply the IHAF to different contexts covering a diverse range of conflicts. This will be of particular use in assessing post-conflict heritage sites across the Balkans covering the long term use of heritage in both tourism intensive and non-intensive areas, which both Dubrovnik and Mostar are examples of, as well as dark tourism sites including Holocaust sites in Germany and Poland, and Genocide sites in Rwanda.

This pattern will also yield a comparative assessment of conflict and heritage narratives from conflicts driven by religious fundamentalism, such as the previously discussed case study of Palmyra and the emerging details of how Daesh used religious and culturally based arguments to justify and encourage the Yazidi genocide and enslavement in Syria. By utilising the integrated perspective of the IHAF (and conceptualising heritage as a process of creating meaning and connecting people to
place), heritage erasure, exploitation, and destruction is recognised a key aspect of conflict, and enables the assessment of post-conflict heritage recovery to focus on the political and economic drivers of heritage narratives as well as damage done to material structures.

10.4.4 Threat mapping and effective interventions
From the key findings and associated thematic applications of the IHAF made in the previous chapter the value of pattern comparative studies across different conflict contexts is clear as it will aid the development of the IHAF itself, its theoretical underpinning, and enhance the knowledge base on the impact of heritage on conflict. But beyond these applications the IHAF is capable of using these findings to start to map similar heritage features of conflicts and start to make judgements on where threats can be anticipated and where effective interventions can be made. Although this aspiration is beyond the remit of a single research project, and will rely on rigorous testing and development of the IHAF as well as the generation of comparative assessments, it is strongly anticipated that the standardised structure of the assessments generated from the IHAF approach will enable a cross-context analysis to take place, and facilitate the identification of trends, patterns, commonalities, and atypical uses of heritage in and after conflict.

10.5 Areas of Further Research
The limits of this thesis have been noted in both the evaluation of the IHAF, and its trial in the field in Dubrovnik. As noted, it would be beneficial to make some considerations to the IHAF based on its successful use in Dubrovnik, but there are also other avenues of investigation that this research could explore. These include incorporating the responsibilities of the military into the conceptual framework of the IHAF, and the use of the IHAF in different contexts.

12.5.1 Comparative Studies
The IHAF has proved to be successful, and the Dubrovnik project produced quantifiable and replicable results that allowed the researcher to detail the impact that heritage has on post-war recovery processes. The key findings have been discussed, and perhaps the most critical lesson is that heritage is actively constructed and used to direct recovery, it is not a passive receiver of damage, and its role is both beneficial and divisive at the same time. As the IHAF has been successfully trialled in Dubrovnik, it would be beneficial to replicate this study in other locations and conflicts. As this thesis has argued, the use of heritage in conflict is a frequent characteristic of war, and it is an unfortunate fact that there is an abundance of modern and historic conflicts that have utilised heritage. There are many possible case studies which could benefit from the IHAF, and these include (but are not limited to): assessing the impact of mural artworks in Northern Ireland, the impact of heritage on over twenty years of recovery in Počitelj, Bosnia; the recovery of Vukovar in Croatia; the historic analysis of Dresden in Germany and Coventry in the UK; the use and influence of heritage in civil disputes in Egypt; and the future possibility of assessing the impact of heritage on conflict and recovery in Libya and Syria (particularly in Aleppo and Palmyra).
12.5.2 Military Responsibilities in Conflict

The conceptual chapters of this thesis sought to link heritage and conflict literature through the integration of key concerns of both fields. Further areas of study to investigate would be to explore the military responsibilities to protect heritage, and to interrogate why these are (or are not) successful. This would involve looking more closely at the 1999 Second Protocol of the Hague Convention and understanding what contemporary pressures are put on militaries within active conflict. Possible case studies for this examination would be the looting of the Iraq National Museum in Baghdad following the US invasion of Iraq, and the occupation of cultural heritage sites in Iraq by US military forces, and the antiquities black market in Afghanistan and its trafficking routes to Europe (Breitkopf, 2007; Emberling and Hanson, 2008; Gibson, 2008; MacGinty, 2004; Rothfield, 2009; P. Stone, 2013).

10.6 Review of IHAF

The implications of this research and the successful testing of the IHAF go beyond the results gained in Dubrovnik. This investigation into cultural heritage in a post-conflict context has added substantially to the understanding of these concepts, and in particular explored how heritage can be conceptualised, how heritage can and is used for political gain, and the impact heritage has on the performance of reconciliation in the fragile aftermath of conflict. These three facets are discussed in this section in regard to extrapolating the findings of this case study to future and further research in this area.

10.6.1 Cultural Heritage, Not Cultural Property

From the outset of this research the use of terminology around heritage has been fraught with difficulties. The problems with implementing initiatives using a complex and fluid definition of heritage led to the breaking up of the term into constituent parts: cultural property is one such compartmentalised term and is preferred and relied on by the legislators (as discussed in Chapter Two), as well as subsequent academic focus of post-war recovery studies and practitioners of post-war recovery in the field (as discussed in Chapters Four). The compartmentalisation of the term allowed the intangible connections of culture to be replaced with the universal term of “cultural property” or BCH. Although the benefit of using this definition is clear as it allows us to understand heritage as a physical and thus a solid object, it lessens the importance of the connection between people, place, and the past, as well as allowing the assumption to permeate that physical heritage is objective and cannot be manipulated. This research has shown that BCH is open to political manipulation on a global scale, and the manipulation is made all the more insidious and successful as it is performed in a context that assumes that its manipulation is unlikely (if not impossible).

10.6.2 Politicisation of Heritage

By aligning this research with contemporary heritage theories which suggest heritage is constantly created through a process of negotiation between people and place (see Chapter Three), this research has shown that heritage in and after conflict is a highly politicised tool that can be used to delegitimise
or legitimise the conflict as history. In the lexicon of conflict, heritage can be a tool or a weapon in recovery depending on how it is acknowledged and used.

In Dubrovnik, this issue arose as the exclusion of dissonant narratives and experiences of war that delegitimise the Dubrovnik myth of the siege which characterised the Old Town as the victim. This biased history is an oft noticed facet of conflict, but emerged here not only in relation to creating an acceptable past, but also in creating a commodified past. This presents a collaboration between re-creating an acceptable past via recovery processes, and a tourism industry based on that past to sell heritage to an international audience, both for profit and to have this past legitimised. The conflict functioned in Dubrovnik as an opportunity to re-create the past and to ensure the survival of heritage as an economic and cultural driver for sustained livelihoods.

10.6.3 Performances of Reconciliation through Heritage

A major application of this research is the performances of reconciliation mediated by heritage. In Dubrovnik, the residents and the tourist industry have created the performance of reconciliation that belies the suppressed underlying tensions between the actors (both Yugoslav and Dubrovnik) during the conflict and their place in society and history. The pressures to restore heritage as a major economic driver in the Old Town led to the need to restore it with speed. Similarly, the reliance on BCH to attract visitors and engender an atmosphere of peace necessitated the swift (and not altogether transparent) recovery of the physical structures. Conversely, although the local population needed to live and work in the Old Town, using heritage as a major factor in their livelihoods, there remain some lingering tensions and anxieties over the conflict.

This research noted that the use of heritage as a tool for reconciliation was not interrogated during the reconstruction of Dubrovnik, subsequently the need for reconciliation was not recognised once the physical presence of BCH had been restored. The result of this is that the physically and economically recovered town effectively imprisons an unresolved socio-political tension, as to reconcile this third factor could threaten the physical and economic stability of the area. As discussed in this thesis, the cracks in this façade are apparent when talking to local individuals and in the museums that seek not only to remember the conflict, but to remember that they were the victims of violence. This is not reconciliation; it is the cementing of a victimised post-war identity that highlights cultural difference instead of cultural similarity with its international neighbours – something that has occurred many times in the history of the region. The application here is that if heritage is not considered in each of the areas outlined, the performances of recovery will become considered as absolute and the anxieties of the local population dismissed, which may culminate in unstable international relationships, decreased security, and the re-emergence of violent conflict.

10.7 Using Cultural Heritage as a Tool in Post-war Recovery

The Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (IHAF) was designed and successfully tested by this research, with the goal of becoming a robust and reliable framework capable of assessing heritage in different conflicts. The application of the IHAF in other conflict settings could occur, and the
results could generate in-depth case studies, structured in the same way as with Dubrovnik, for a multitude of given conflicts. Multiple case studies could begin to create a record of how heritage impacts on post-conflict communities, and the way heritage is perceived before, during, and after conflict could be profoundly changed. This research project demonstrated that the impact of heritage on recovery is far more influential than can be understood by analysing how many cultural properties were damaged. Understanding heritage as a process of creating meaning in post-conflict narratives draws attention to its role as the negotiator of peace or violence, and to place a low priority on heritage recovery risks misunderstanding conflict and mishandling possible intervention strategies.

This thesis has gone beyond investigating the problem with defining heritage in post-conflict, and created an integrated perspective on heritage and conflict studies in order to bridge this conceptual gap. This has added to the literature surrounding this topic, and has contributed a different perspective to the debate on the role and responsibilities of heritage in post-conflict recovery. The research investigated how heritage might be used as a tool for post-conflict recovery, and in doing so designed a transferable method of assessing heritage through the IHAF. This integrated framework has been designed and tested by this research, resulting in unique data from Dubrovnik that challenges the long held assumptions of the town and its heritage. The success of the IHAF design and subsequent implementation has the potential to assist with a better understanding the role of heritage in conflict, which could have a major impact on how heritage is perceived and used to the benefit of post-conflict societies.
Appendix

Appendix 1: BCHRA Example

Ref. Number: Unique identifier given to each building
Photo Refs: If applicable

Damage during War:
In this section establish baseline damage. Specify what was recorded as damaged in the UNESCO 1992 Damage report.

Recovery
Give brief overview of recovery detailing visible damage remaining on the structure.
Smoke Damage (Y/N/NA)
Delete as applicable

Recovery
Record notable repairs on table. See methodology for criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Door</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Comment on repairs

Ricochet Damage
Assess ricochet damage, count number of occurrences and measure marks, work out averages and record as appropriate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ricochet Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small (&lt;25/1-25mm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale/Number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Comment on ricochet damage

Funding
Fill out funding details, see methodology for criteria and sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated USD</th>
<th>Actual USD</th>
<th>% of estimation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>650,550</td>
<td>634,949.30</td>
<td>15,601.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes/ Additional Information (including donors)

Grade of recovery:
Grade of recovery allocated according to criteria specified in methodology based on the data in this BCH Recovery Assessment.

Photos
Comparison photographs from 1992 damage to contemporary recovery

Appendix 2: BCHRA Palace of Sigrane 1

Ref. Number: 1
Photo Refs:

Damage during War:
The second floor has been entirely gutted by fire. The walls on the lower floor still have some stucco work as well as eighteenth-century paintings which have been reused in modern times. (UNESCO, 1993, p. 8)

Recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Repairs not noticeable/ not distinguished from stucco work.

Smoke Damage (Y/N/NA): Notes: No Smoke damage remains

Ricochet damage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small (&lt;25/1-25mm)</th>
<th>Medium (&lt;30/25-50mm)</th>
<th>Large (&gt;50/50mm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale/Number</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Ricochet on lower levels

Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USD</th>
<th>Estimated</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>650,550</td>
<td>634,949.30</td>
<td>15,601.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes/Donors

Republic of Croatia, Mrivo Pupetec – The International trust for Croatian Monuments, GIK Rotary Clubs-Klagenfurt, Austria & UNESCO.

Occupied in use: Yes

Grade of recovery: 2

Figure A: UNESCO. Damage to Palace of Sigrane 1, 1995

Figure B: K. Bishop. Reconstructed Palace of Sigrane

Appendix 3: BCHRA Old Sigrane 2

Ref. Number: 2
Photo Refs:

Damage during War:
Inside, a staircase and the low columns bearing the entry arch have only partly survived; inset in the wall of the first-floor landing is a stone hand basin–fountain (A regular feature in the houses in Dubrovnik) with a severely damaged moulded surround (UNESCO, 1993b, p. 18).

Recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Visually Repaired</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Some shell damage evident at street level (shrapnel and ricochet damage from shells hitting the street, but damage mostly restored. First story windows show visible repairs and smoke damage visible below windows. Roof repaired; no access to interior.

Smoke Damage (Y/N/NA)

Ricochet damage: Notes: On lower half of building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small (&lt;25/1-25mm)</th>
<th>Medium (&lt;30/25-50mm)</th>
<th>Large (&gt;50/50mm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale/Number</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funding

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Actual</th>
<th>Donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>433,740</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>(+funds)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes/ Additional Information

Ministry of public works
Funds and costs cannot be traced
Occupied in use: Yes

Figure D: UNESCO. Damage to Palace of Sigrane 2, 1993

Figure E: K. Bishop. Reconstructed Palace of Sigrane 2, 2013
Appendix 4: BCHRA Palace- Od Puca 16
Ref. Number: 5
Damage during War:
“Some components have survived including the cornices and moldings of a single doorway” (UNESCO, 1993, p. 16). “The house was severely damaged in the fire after the war bombardment of Dubrovnik and it completely destroyed the timber roof and external construction” (Institute Reconstruction).
Recovery
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The building has been repaired and cleared of smoke damage, with the door frames and window frames noticeable cleaner than that of neighboring buildings. There is evidence of some ricochet shell marks, and evidence of patches and repaired shell damage. The building has become a monument to its war damage, with posters on permanent display which depict war damage and scenes of the building burning. The building has undergone major revisions and is now a post office.

Ricochet damage
Small (<25/-25mm) Medium (<50/-50mm) Large 50+<50mm>

Size ✓
Scale/Number ✓

Appendix 5: BCHRA Stonza Palace
Ref. Number: 10
Photo Refs:
Damage during War:
“Seven shells struck the roof, front and central courtyard of this building, though without damaging the archives” (UNESCO, 1993, p. 26)
Recovery
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sponza palace appears to be mostly, if not completely repaired. The roof and interior of the building has been repaired, and although there is still some smoke damage on the façade the stonework is otherwise free of fire and smoke damage. There are many ricochet marks on the building, particularly on the lower aspects. Repairs to ricochet marks are apparent; repairs have been made by covering holes and marks in the stonework with a white filler.
Smoke Damage (Y/ N/ NA)
Notes NO. Discolouring present, but pre-war.

Appendix 6: BCHRA Guetic Palace- Bunjeva Poljana
Ref. Number: 13
Damage during War: “A direct hit seriously damaged the front, roof and interior of the building. The external woodwork has also been damaged” (UNESCO, 1993, p. 30)
Recovery
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The palace is used as a commercial unit, with accommodation above. The front façade of the house is noticeable damaged with shell, ricochet and possible bullet holes. The pattern of the marks suggests street level ricochet damage and direct hits or gunfire damage to the 1st and 2nd floors. The palace should be considered to have the most noticeable remaining war damage in this category, and is qualified in the vast quantity of ricochet damage as the cathedral, which neighbours the building. The contrast between the damage on the façade of this palace compared to that on the façade of the Recto’s palace opposite is vast, suggesting that this palace was not sheltered by the direction of the attack. Ricochet and other shell damage has been repaired in the characteristic fashion with marks ranging from 5mm to 50mm masked with white filler on the pole stonework.

Smoke Damage (Y/ N/ NA)
Notes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimation</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>% of estimation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>448,510</td>
<td>658123.72</td>
<td>100+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes/ Additional Information: Occupied and/or in Use: YES
Grade of recovery: 2

Figure P, K Bishop. Ricochet mark repairs on Guetic Palace- Bunjeva Poljana.
Appendix 7: BCHHA Roofops of the inner city
Ref. Number: 23
Damage during War:
Evaluation of the damage to the rooftops conducted by the Institute for the Renovation of Dubrovnik and the Directorate for the Protection of Cultural Heritage - Conservation Unit Dubrovnik has revealed that 438 roofs or 70% of the roofs representing an overall surface area of 180,000 m² have been damaged in the war from 1991 to 1995. The damage is divided into categories from I to IV. (Institute)
Recovery
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes
Roofs mostly recovered, minimal war damage to any roofs remain, replaced not repaired
Smoke Damage (Y/N/NA) NO
Roocheek damage

Appendix 8: BCHHA Franciscus Convent
Ref. Number: 25
Damage during War:
“This very fine architectural ensemble was hit by 37 shells, one of which pierced the tower. Several other shells severely damaged and partially destroyed the basilica of the cloister terrace” (UNESCO, 1995b, p. 37)
Recovery
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✔</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes
The bottom half of the front façade features prominent shell and ricochet damage, with numerous holes and shell marks which have not been masked or repaired. The extent of the damage to the façade was not mentioned by UNESCO but is obvious to casual observers in 2012. The hill tower has been restored, and the damage is not evident. The repairs made in the cloister are evident but have been completed, some repair work was being undertaken in 2012. In the old pharmacy a direct hit has been preserved and exhibited; the hole in the outer wall, and mark on the opposing wall have been displayed with information on when the shell hit the pharmacy. This is the only conservation attempt made in Dubrovnik Old Town to purposefully draw attention to shell damage, and one of only four institutions to have a permanent display with information and acknowledgement of the shelling in the old town.
Roocheek damage

Appendix 9: BCHHA Church of St. Blasius
Ref. Number: 27
Damage during War:
“The front of the church received five direct hits and the contemporary stained glass windows by Ivo Dellic were badly damaged” (UNESCO, 1995b, p. 41)
Recovery
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✔</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Notes
A lot of damage marks are apparent, and repair work is also visible and distinctive
Levels of funding

Funding
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated</th>
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<tr>
<td>6748.00</td>
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Notes/Additional Information
- The International Trust for Croatian Monuments, GB (statues of Faith, Hope and St. Blaise) - The city of Rex-Malinac, France (front inlet) - Emigrants from Stockton, California, U.S.A. (stone for front inlet) - Catholics from USA and Canada - Ivo Vejvodic, Zagreb, Croatia (builtside)
Occupied and/or in Use: YES
Grade of recovery: 2
Figure V, W, X, K Bishop. Church of St. Blasius. 2013.
### Appendix 10: BCHRA Convent and Church St. Claire

**Ref. Number:** 30  
**Photo Refs:**

**Damage during War:**  
"Four direct hits caused serious damage to the roofing of the north, west, and south wings and to the stone gutters. The decorative features of the wall and the stonework of the facing were badly damaged too." (UNESCO, 1993b, p. 47)

**Recovery**

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

Damage done to the roof and gutters have been repaired, and the convent is now a restaurant and gift shop. No obvious damage to be seen inside or outside of the building. No original decorative features remain. The well in the courtyard has been repaired, and no damage is present. The moulding has been repaired using replaceable material, repair itself is indistinguishable from the original.

**Smoke Damage (Y/N/NA):** N  
**Ricochet damage (Y/N/NA):** N

---

### Appendix 11: BCHRA Church St. Roch

**Ref. Number:** 35  
**Photo Refs:**

**Damage during War:**  
"The roof, lead bearing-wall and portal have all been badly damaged." (UNESCO, 1993b, p. 51)

**Recovery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damaged</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

There is characteristic shell damage evident on front (Roketni) face, and damage to the corners, windows, pillars and surrounding. There are no signs of patching or repairs which characterise the shell damage repair on other buildings. The church does not seem to be in use, and shows signs of neglect (vegetation growing in cracks) as well as little evidence to suggest full repair work was carried out at least on the outer walls. The roof has been repaired.

**Smoke Damage (Y/N/NA):** N  
**Ricochet damage (Y/N/NA):** N

---

### BCHRA 12: Jesuit Steps

**Ref. Number:** 38  
**Photo Refs:**

**Damage during War:**  
The Steps were damaged by two direct shell hits, and countless pieces of shrapnel throughout the war.

**Structure Recovery**

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doors</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
The Steps have been repaired, and every step is intact and usable. The repairs are noticeable as the stone is newer and of a different color. The edges of some steps have had the damage cut out and replaced with new stone work. There are still visible shaped marks to the steps and decorative surround all the way to the Jesuit Church and Seminary. The top of the steps (substrate and tassels) are badly marked by ricochet nudge.

**Smoke Damage (Y/N/NA):** N  
**Ricochet damage (Y/N/NA):** N

---

### BCHRA 13: K. Biskup

**Ref. Number:** 46  
**Photo Refs:**

**Damage during War:**  
The church was hit by indirect fire, and was damaged on the side and roof.

**Recovery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

The church was hit by indirect fire, and was damaged on the side and roof. The church was later repaired.

**Smoke Damage (Y/N/NA):** N  
**Ricochet damage (Y/N/NA):** N
**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHD</td>
<td>authorised heritage discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCH</td>
<td>built cultural heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCHRA</td>
<td>Built cultural heritage recovery assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Croatian Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICH</td>
<td>Intangible cultural heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHAF</td>
<td>Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRD</td>
<td>Institute For the Reconstruction of Dubrovnik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUV</td>
<td>Outstanding Universal Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCH</td>
<td>Post-conflict cultural heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHC</td>
<td>World Heritage Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Heritage Site</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Thosarat, R. (2001). The destruction of the cultural heritage of Thailand and Cambodia. Trade in Illicit Antiquities: the destruction of the world’s archaeological heritage, 7–18.


