Band of Brothers

Kin Dynamics of the Hautevilles and Other Normans

in Southern Italy and Syria, c. 1030–c. 1140

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the kin dynamics, patterns of behaviour, and models of alliance and conflict of Norman families in Southern Italy, Sicily and Syria between circa 1030 and circa 1140, and it establishes a methodological framework for this much under-studied theme. Through an examination of chronicles, charters, material culture and architectural evidence, it maps out the extent of the kin groups, identifies common trends, and investigates possible manifestations of a sense of reciprocal obligation and mutual identity. The main case study are the Hautevilles, as the most numerous and best documented family. The first five chapters are dedicated to them, exploring the reach, members, and modus operandi of the group, and the ways in which its evolution intersected with military, institutional, and political issues to achieve the expansion and maintenance of their dominions. The approach taken is both thematic and chronological: the first chapter examines relationships between Hauteville siblings; the second chapter looks at sons, ersatz sons such as nephews, and the question of inheritance; the third chapter looks at the Hauteville cadet branches; the fourth deals with Hauteville women, both born to the family and married into it, whose discussion as a separate thread of inquiry both highlights and explicits many themes encountered with the men of the family; the fifth chapter looks at the significant changes in kin relations which occurred under the rule of Roger II of Sicily. Chapter 6 contextualises and compares the Hautevilles to other similar Norman kin groups in the South, the princes of Capua and the sons of Amicus. Chapter 7 examines larger questions of Norman identity, contextualising Southern Norman kin relations with those of the Anglo-Normans in the North, and seeking alternative models of comparison with the nobility of imperial Germany and the Kingdom of Jerusalem.
### Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................. iii
Abstract ....................................................................................................... iv
Table of contents ....................................................................................... vi
Abbreviations ............................................................................................. vii
Introduction ................................................................................................ 1
Chapter 1: Brothers and sisters ............................................................... 15
  1.1 De Altavilla: A Clan Name ................................................................. 15
  1.2 The First Hautevilles: A Family Portrait .......................................... 17
  1.3 Natural Born Warband: The Hauteville War Network ....................... 22
  1.4 Family Feeling: The Hauteville Siblings and Emotional History ........ 24
  1.5 Alliance, Rebellion, Forgiveness and Selection .................................. 29
  1.6 Four Brothers: The Beginning of Vertical Hauteville Rule ................. 31
  1.7 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 36
Chapter 2: Sons and Heirs ...................................................................... 38
  2.1 Beginnings: The Shifting Needs for Succession of the Hauteville Clan 38
  2.2 Nephews: Ersatz Sons ...................................................................... 41
  2.3 Bastardy and the Hautevilles .............................................................. 45
  2.4 Underage Heirs: Hauteville Regents .................................................. 51
  2.5 No Boy Left Behind: the Predatory Kinship of the Hautevilles ........... 58
  2.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 61
Chapter 3: Cousins ................................................................................. 63
  3.1 Clan Selection ................................................................................... 63
  3.2 From Main to Collateral: Hauteville Models of Alliance ................. 64
    a. The Loritello-Catanzaro-Loreto Hydra ............................................ 65
    b. The Counts of the Principato .......................................................... 67
    c. The Conversano Exception ............................................................. 70
  3.3 Collateral: Patterns of Behaviour and the Secondary Branches of the
    Hautevilles ......................................................................................... 75
    a. Seniors and Juniors: the Hauteville Power Network ....................... 75
    b. Brothers in Arms ........................................................................... 79
    c. Entitlement, Forgiveness, and Family Bonds ................................. 83
  3.4 Overseas: the Hautevilles in Outremer .............................................. 85
  3.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 94
Chapter 4: Women .................................................................................. 96
  4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 96
  4.2 Women of the Hautevilles ............................................................... 97
    a. Sisters ........................................................................................... 97
    b. Daughters ..................................................................................... 107
  4.3 Women into the Hautevilles ............................................................. 112
    a. All the Prince’s Daughters ........................................................... 113
    b. Alberada ..................................................................................... 117
    c. Sichelgaita ................................................................................... 119
    d. Sichelgaita of Molise, Countess of Conversano ............................... 121
    e. Roger’s Concubine ...................................................................... 122
    f. Roger’s Norman Wives ............................................................... 124
    g. Princesses in the East ................................................................. 126
    h. Elvira of Castile ........................................................................... 132
  4.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 134
Chapter 5: Breakaway: Adelaide and Roger II ......................................... 136
  5.1 Introduction: A King and His Mother .............................................. 136
5.2 Countess: A Pivotal Shift ................................................................. 137
5.3 Roger Ascending: Chronology of A Takeover ............................... 142
   a. Phase 1: count Roger (before 1127) ......................................... 142
   b. Phase 2: The Seizure of the Duchy (1127-1130) ......................... 143
   c. Phase 3: King in the South (1130-1134) ................................ 145
   d. Phase 4: Tabula rasa (1135-1140) ........................................... 147
5.4 Opportunist Predator: Roger’s Ascent in Space, Titles, and Methods 150
5.5 Brothers, Traitors, Allies: The Kin Network under Roger II ........ 155
5.6 After the Storm: Changing and Unchanging Hauteville Kinship ...... 160
5.7 Conclusion .................................................................................. 163
Chapter 6: Other Kin Groups .............................................................. 165
   6.1 Introduction ............................................................................. 165
   6.2 Capua, Amicus, Buonalbergo: A Hauteville Super-kin? .............. 167
   6.3 The Princes of Capua ............................................................... 171
      a. Five Brothers ....................................................................... 171
      b. Richard and Jordan: Princes of Capua .................................. 173
      c. Cousins and Chaos .............................................................. 178
   6.4 Sons of Amicus ....................................................................... 186
   6.5 Conclusion ............................................................................. 192
Chapter 7: The “Norman” Hauteville .................................................. 194
   7.1 Introduction ............................................................................. 194
   7.2 A Norman Fate: Mediterranean Normans in European Perspective 195
   7.3 Without King or Kingdom: Predatory Kinship and the Conquest of the South 206
   7.4 A Useful Chaos: Germany, Jerusalem, and Geramne Networks .... 216
      a. The Bouillon – Ardenes Kin Network ...................................... 217
      b. Brothers of One’s Blood: Siblings in Imperial Germany .......... 222
   7.5 Conclusion ............................................................................. 225
Conclusion ......................................................................................... 227
Genealogical Tables ........................................................................... 232
   Table I – The Children of Tancred ................................................ 232
   Table II – Descendants of Guiscard .............................................. 233
   Table III – Descendants of Roger ................................................ 234
   Table IV – Counts of Loritello, Catanzaro and Loreto .................... 235
   Table V – Counts of the Principato ............................................... 236
   Table VI – Counts of Conversano ............................................... 237
   Table VII – Princes of Capua ...................................................... 238
   Table VIII – Sons of Amicus ....................................................... 239
   Table IX – The Princes of Salerno ............................................... 240
Figures ............................................................................................. 241
Maps .................................................................................................. 242
   Map I – Southern Italy ............................................................... 242
   Map II – Central Southern Italy .................................................. 243
   Map III – Apulia ......................................................................... 244
   Map IV – Sicily .......................................................................... 245
Bibliography ..................................................................................... 246
Abbreviations

ANS: Anglo-Norman Studies
AM: Amatus of Montecassino, Ystoire de li Normands
AT: Alexander of Telese, Ystoria Rogerii
FB: Falco of Benevento, Chronicon Beneventanum
GM: Geoffrey Malaterra, De rebus gestis Roberti Wiscardi et Rogerii
HSJ: Haskins Society Journal
WA: William of Apulia, Gesta Wiscardi
WT: William of Tyre, Chronicon
Introduction

‘The sons of Tancred are by their nature greedy for conquest.’¹ Thus Geoffrey Malaterra, Roger of Sicily’s official chronicler, spoke of his patron’s family in the 1090s.² At that point, what Geoffrey said had been confirmed by about sixty years of unbroken, successful fact. The sons of Tancred, the many children of an obscure Cotentin knight, had first joined the Norman wave of invasion of the Mezzogiorno in the 1030s. They had established themselves rapidly as the most prominent of the military leaders of the mostly but not wholly Norman mercenary force; intermarrying with the local Lombard aristocracy, they accumulated more power and titles, becoming first counts of Apulia and then, with the wildly successful and ambitious Robert Guiscard, papally-enfeoffed dukes. By the time Malaterra was writing, Roger Borsa, Guiscard’s son, was duke; Bohemond, Guiscard’s firstborn, was establishing himself as prince of Antioch in Outremer; Tancred, Guiscard’s grandson, was on the verge of helping conquer Jerusalem; nephews and grandchildren of Guiscard controlled some of the greatest counties in the South; and Roger himself stood victorious at the tail-end of the thirty-years-long conquest of Muslim Sicily. In less than forty years, Roger’s son would be crowned king. Not only were the descendants of Tancred avid for dominance: they had the ability to achieve and maintain it.

Malaterra explicitly presented the Hauteville rise as a family accomplishment: in his history he placed his point of view squarely in line with that of the Hautevilles, unsurprisingly given his patronage and aims.³ But he was not alone in this. Sources from the abbey of Montecassino, such as its chronicle or Amatus’ Ystoire de li Normants, took a wider approach to the Norman conquest, but still acknowledged the self-evident: among the Normans in the South, the vast, complex, not always cohesive kin network of the children and grandchildren of Tancred had risen to the top.⁴ It is the objective of this thesis to analyse how this happened: to study the kin dynamics and patterns of behaviour of the Hautevilles, and the mechanisms through which family members obtained, administered, and expanded their power in cooperation with and sometimes in opposition to each other. In order to do this, the larger history of the Norman conquest of the South will be considered, placing the Hautevilles in context with the complex polities they encountered at their arrival in

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¹ ‘fili denique Tancredi naturaliter […] semper dominationis avidi’, GM, II.38.
³ GM, ‘Epistola’.
⁴ Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, ed. by Hartmut Hoffmann (Hanover, 1980); Aimé du Mont-Cassin, Ystoire de li Normant, ed. by Michèle Guéret- Laferté (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2011).
Italy, the challenges they faced, the struggles they undertook against Lombards, Byzantines, Sicilian Kalbids, imperial Germans, papal troops and fellow Normans, and sometimes, amongst themselves. I shall seek to chart the limits of Hauteville kin, analysing how family ties were identified, maintained, or challenged; how certain branches of the family rose to prominence; how the power balance was negotiated, and sometimes subverted. The thesis shall discuss what emotional ties, and sense of family, the Hautevilles developed, and how the Hautevilles formed themselves into a natural warband to conquer, occupy, administer and expand territories under their control. The timespan of this thesis runs from the 1030s, when William Iron-arm and Drogo became the first Hautevilles to go South, to circa 1140, when Roger II of Sicily achieved control over the whole of the Mezzogiorno and undertook a radical restructuring of its comital hierarchy. The theatres of the study will range from Southern Italy, where the Hautevilles first established themselves, to Sicily, the Balkans, Syria, and North Africa, all places in which they fought and over which they sought to establish their rule. This thesis places itself in a significant gap in the current research, as it is the first kin study explicitly dedicated to the Normans in the South, and the first study to consider Hauteville expansion across the Mediterranean in a unified and coherent manner.

Indeed, the Normans in the South as a whole occupy a unique place in scholarship: they are at once a subject with immense potential for intersectional, interdisciplinary studies, and a very insular one. The conquest of the Italian Mezzogiorno, Muslim Sicily, North Africa, near-constant strife with the Byzantine Empire, and a strong participation in the First Crusade which led to the founding of the principality of Antioch mean that a great number of different scholars in the Anglophone world have need to come into contact with the Southern Normans, their history, and peculiar institutions. At the same time, the field has remained quite isolated: the Normans in the South are a fringe topic on the much wider and better-known field of Anglo-Norman studies, and crusader scholars, when they do write about Southern Normans, tend to do so only once they have crossed East.\footnote{See for example how Jean Flori dedicates only a couple of chapters to Bohemond’s early life in his biography \textit{Bohèmond d’Antioche: Chevalier d’Aventure} (Paris: Payot, 2007).} Scholarship about the Norman South, moreover, tends to be bottom-heavy: much more effort is poured into the later period, with the birth of Kingdom of Sicily and its spectacularly syncretic artistic output. Studies on the beginnings of the Norman occupation, and the development of the duchy of Apulia, moreover, have a tendency to be patchy: after Chalandon’s sweeping but now extremely old work from the beginning of the twentieth century, for quite a while the standard textbook for the beginning of the Norman conquest was Norwich’s well-written but unscholarly \textit{The Normans in the South}.\footnote{Ferdinand Chalandon, \textit{Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile} (Paris: A. Picard, 1907); John Julius Norwich, \textit{The Normans in the South, 1016-1130} (London: Longmans, 1967).} Things were remedied in 2000 with the publication of Loud’s seminal \textit{The Age of Robert Guiscard}, but beside his other wide-ranging work on the church in the Norman
South, most works on the early period of Norman Southern Italy have been far more specialised in their outlook.\(^7\)

Thus we have Feller and Martin’s monumental works on the Abruzzi and on Apulia in the tradition of the *Annales* school, Becker’s recent and very important monograph about Roger I, Tramontana and Metcalfe’s work on pre-Norman Sicily, and works like Johns’ and Takayama’s analysis of the development of the Sicilian chancery, which take their beginning from the comital rule of the island, and Oldfield’s recent geographically wide-ranging but specialised urban study of Norman Italy.\(^8\) There is, as yet, no equivalent for the *Age of Guiscard* for the Norman kingdom of Sicily, for which the go-to textbooks remain either Norwich’s nearly novelistic, but very approachable, *The Kingdom in the Sun*, or Donald Matthew’s unfootnoted *The Norman Kingdom of Sicily*.\(^9\) Southern Italian Norman presence in the crusader East, being mostly limited to Antioch, has been subject to the general paucity of specialised studies on this principality: while very recently Andrew Buck has revived interest in it with his *The Principality of Antioch and its Frontiers in the Twelfth Century*, the fundamental works here remain Cahen’s now quite old but still relevant *La Syrie du Nord à l’époque des croisades* and the now nearly twenty-year-old *The Principality of Antioch* by Tom Asbridge.\(^10\)

In this situation, the study of Norman kin structures in the South has been unsurprisingly fragmented and inconsistent, in stark contrast with the numerous, sophisticated studies dedicated to Norman kin and aristocracy in Normandy and England. While there are numerous, specialised articles on specific comital branches or figures, which shall be integrated in this study, larger studies of Southern Norman kin are almost entirely missing. Discussion of family and power figures prominently in the regional studies quoted above, but it is, inevitably, limited in its time range and approach; kin and aristocracy are, uniquely, the focus of Errico Cuozzo’s *La cavalleria nel Regno*.

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normanno di Sicilia, but this study focuses on the Catalogus Baronum, a mid-twelfth century list of the noblemen and women owing military service to the king of Sicily.\textsuperscript{11} While some of Cuozzo’s findings do apply to the period under consideration here, and as such they are analysed and considered, the fundamental change in the power structure of the South after the establishment of the Regno prevents us from applying Cuozzo’s analysis wholesale to the time of the conquest. Most works on Norman family in the South have been of a prosopographical nature, with an interest in the accumulation and ordering of data rather than its analysis. Thus Ménager’s fundamental Inventaire des familles normandes seeks to identify, as far as possible, all Normans and Frenchmen in the South, and is therefore a precious starting point for the scholar; Wolfgang Jahn’s Untersuchungen zur normannischen Herrschaft gathers together most of the existing documentary information on the major comital kins of the South, drawing family trees and functioning as a point of first recourse for factual inquiries, but it is extremely reluctant to draw any conclusions about the subject of family ties or mechanisms of kinship\textsuperscript{12} While Ménager’s and Jahn’s works are fundamental for the charting out of Southern Italian Norman prosopography, they do not answer the questions which have long been asked of Norman kin in the North.

What consistent analysis of Southern Norman family structures we have comes instead in a form ancillary to a much more fertile topic: kin studies for the Southern Lombards. It is easy to see why the field would be at once much more attractive, and far more easily investigated. Where the Normans descended on Southern Italy in the first twenty years of the eleventh century and had, in less than two hundred years, both accomplished a meteoric rise and just about disappeared as an acknowledged entity, the Lombards endured in Southern Italy from the seventh well into the eleventh century as rulers of extremely well-documented, enduring polities, whose consistent patronage of religious institutions provides the scholar with plentiful material for inquiry. Thus in 1976 Antonio Marongiu compiled his Matrimonio e famiglia nell’Italia meridionale, a painstaking study of marriage, inheritance, and donation customs throughout Southern Italy from the eighth to the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{13} Marongiu was primarily interested in the legal aspects of his topic: he makes a compelling and detailed case for the patchy survival of both Norman and Roman law throughout the Italian South. Patricia Skinner, with her very important 1995 study, Family and Power in Southern Italy, applied sociological methods to the analysis of the economic and social development of kin groups in the neighbouring towns of Gaeta, Amalfi, and Naples, from the ninth

\textsuperscript{11} Errico Cuozzo, La cavalleria nel Regno normanno di Sicilia (Atripalda Avellino: Mephite, 2002).
\textsuperscript{13} Antonio Marongiu, Matrimonio e famiglia nell’Italia meridionale (sec. VIII-XIII), (Bari: 1976); this was the evolution, after thirty years, of his previous work on the topic, La famiglia nell’Italia meridionale (sec.VIII-XIII) (Milan, 1944).
to the twelfth century. Skinner’s work makes a convincing argument for the enduring, deeply interconnected social tissue of the intensely urbanised Mezzogiorno, in whose unbroken history the Normans were but a chapter; however, she is more interested in the family as a ‘unit of power’ defined by economic interests and reciprocal, explicit acknowledgement, than in emotional ties or exercises in kin building.  

As the Lombard principality of Salerno was one of the most powerful entities in the South before the coming of the Normans, it is scarcely surprising that the final three kin studies for the age concern it primarily. Huguette Taviani-Carozzi has written at length about the principality of Salerno, and authored a narrative biography of Robert Guiscard, which makes hers the first study openly to address Norman kin structures in the South. Taviani-Carozzi puts forward compelling evidence for the structure of the Lombard comitatus, an artificially construed and constantly expanded power basis for the rulers of Salerno which was often boosted by marriage alliances. However, her theory that the Hautevilles who married into the princely family were adopted into it, and that the identity of the Normans in the South rested on an ample, pan-Norman ethnic brotherhood, does not hold up to closer scrutiny, and has not been upheld in later scholarship. Joanna Drell’s 2002 Kinship and Conquest: Family Strategies in the Principality of Salerno during the Norman Period, 1077-1194 partially overlaps with the period considered here, and it therefore addresses explicitly many of the issues considered in this thesis, while its conclusions about Norman kin are much more solidly founded than those of Taviani-Carozzi. Drell, however, is primarily concerned with the Lombard point of view: she strengthens the impression, first conveyed by Marongiu, of the endurance and coexistence of both Roman and Lombard law in the Italian South, and of Salerno as fertile ground for a variety of overlapping sources of legal authority, customary precedent, and identity. The closest comparison to the present study is part of a work which was developed in parallel with it, and which I first accessed in late 2017: Aurélie Thomas’s Jeux lombards: alliances, parenté et politique en Italie méridionale du la fin du VIIIe siècle à la conquete normande. The work makes detailed and ample study of the alliances, rivalries, and institutional developments of Salerno, Capua and Benevento, the three Lombard principalities in Campania, from the eighth

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century to the Norman conquest. Thomas’s work is monumental in its development, using a wealth of resources to track the evolution of the three principalities, and in particular the separation in princely inheritance practices which took place in the ninth century, when Salerno began to apply male primogeniture and Capua and Benevento instead preserved a more egalitarian practice of shared power among brothers. Like Taviani-Carozzi, Thomas privileges a view of the Lombards as building a power network through alliances, a view of sophisticated, construed kinship. The final fifth of the book is dedicated to the coming of the Normans, and to both the effects of their arrival on the Lombard kin network, and a quick overview of their inheritance and kinship dynamics. Thomas’s work, like this thesis, picks up on the omnipresent theme of fratrie, brotherhood, which runs through the narrative sources for the conquest in the South, and as I do in this thesis, she calls on Shakespeare to identify the Hautevilles as a ‘bande des frères’: her analysis, however, remains surface-level.21

Inevitably, as the bulk of Thomas’ research focuses on the centuries-long evolution of Lombard kin and power structures, the space she dedicates to the Normans is smaller, and by necessity her research on them is limited and less in-depth than the rest of the work, without living up to the high standard set by her insightful observations on Lombard kin. As shall be seen, for example, in chapter 1 of this thesis, her reading of the relationship between Guiscard and his brother Drogo as one characterized by the inevitable mistrust of ‘demi-frères’ is unsupported by the sources, and while she does pick up on the value of horizontal, brotherly networks of support among the Normans, she fails to follow through with her analysis of them. Another problem with Thomas’s work is her reliance on Eleanor Searle’s seminal Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power in order to explain Norman mechanisms of conquest in the South, without contextualizing or differentiating between the Norman and Southern Italian theatres.22 This methodology is problematic, and it evokes another methodological knot for this thesis: the relationship between the study of the kin structures of the Normans in the South and the wealth of studies already in existence for their brethren in the North.

The idea for this thesis was first developed on the model of Searle’s book, whose complex analysis of the mechanisms through which Normandy constituted itself as a conquering force behind the predatory, harshly self-selective ducal kin-group remains a landmark in the field.23 It

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23 Searle’s work will be problematised and contextualised within the larger field of Anglo-Norman kin studies in chapter 7.
was my first research question to see whether close parallels could be drawn between the expansion and establishment of the ducal kin group and that of the Hautevilles, and whether therefore the same methodologies already developed for the Normans in the North could apply to those in the South. Beyond Searle, therefore, fundamental works on this topic by, among others, Green, Davies, Crouch, Van Houts, Gillingham, Hagger, Le Patourel and Thomas were taken into account. Comparisons between findings for the Anglo-Normans and the Southern Normans, however, quickly show that it would be counterproductive to draw too close parallels between the two, and to rely on the pre-existing scholarship in order to attempt an analysis of the kin structures of the Normans in the South. Le Patourel explicitly acknowledged the political differences between the dominion of the Normans in Northern Europe and Southern Italy: the consequences of such differences for the development of kin structures, and their analysis, are ample, and pose insurmountable difficulties to any attempt to apply findings for the Normans in the North to those in the South, as Thomas does.

Scholarship on the Northern Normans and their nobility and kin structures, inevitably, hinges heavily on the relationship of the magnates with their duke and, consequently, their king. While many works have been dedicated to the complex issue of the coexistence and assimilation of Normans and English, and the conquest of Ireland, they have only dealt with the interplay of more limited ethnicities. As agreed upon by the existing scholarship, the Northern Normans replaced in block the Anglo-Saxon nobility that had preceded them; they acknowledged the existence and authority of a duke and, following the conquest of England, their king; and they brought important changes to the ecclesiastical structures of England and, through their building of castles, its very


25 Le Patourel, Norman Empire, pp. 279-80.

geography. While this is a portrait in very wide brushstrokes, it is meant to fix the framework to convey the radical difference in theatre and timescale between the Norman conquest of England, and its subsequent colonisation, and that of Southern Italy and Sicily. It would be unnecessarily dramatic, and inaccurate, to say that Anglo-Saxon England set with the sun of 14 October 1066; however, the date constitutes the advent of a well-defined invading force, under a recognised leader, laying claim to a pre-existing and widely acknowledged power structure, that of the throne of Edward the Confessor. The Southern Italian situation was, and remained, entirely different, with stark consequences for Norman structures of both kin and power.

The Normans went South in progressive waves from circa the 1000s onward; they came as bands of what were probably mercenaries, later reinforced by family and allies. Searle masterfully argues for the Normans in the North occupying, or making, ‘empty lands’: the ill-defined land of Normandy, and the forcefully vacated land of England. The Normans in the South, however, encountered a completely different, and much more crowded space. At the dawn of Norman power the Italian Mezzogiorno was ruled by a unique mosaic of coexisting powers. Next to the last vestiges of Byzantine control over Italy, there were vast no-man’s lands featuring powerful abbeys and struggling warlords, such as the Abruzzis; sophisticated, centuries-old Lombard principalities; papal and imperial interests; the crumbling Kalbid emirate of Sicily, on the verge of destructive civil war. The territory was densely urbanised, seat of unbroken habitation from before the Roman Empire; while the Normans did found and fortify a few castles, they also occupied and conquered strongly held cities, and could not touch some of them until late into their conquest. The abundance of bishops made impossible the development of the powerful, near-princely bishoprics of Normandy and England. Southern Normans did not meddle, by and large, with the church, and very few of them sought power through it; they ruled over, and often intermarried with, a colourful ethnic landscape of Lombards, Northern Italians, Greeks, and Northern African Muslims.

Far from acknowledging one chief, through whom they received and held land, most Southern Italian Normans acquired their own territories, and held them either from a Lombard overlord, or

28 Searle, Predatory Kinship, p. 165. This concept is one of the most critiqued in her work, and as such it will be discussed in chapter 7.
29 All these will be discussed in greater detail over chapters 1-3.
30 Loud (Age of Guiscard, pp. 144-5) comments on ‘how small an effect [the conquest] had on the larger towns of the region’; Paul Oldfield has expanded on this point, placing emphasis on the Norman ability to negotiate and live with pre-existing cities, the absence of castles, and the scarce numbers of the Southern Normans, all of which led to remarkable continuity within the urban centres’ lives (‘Urban Communities and the Normans in Southern Italy’, in Norman Expansion: Connections, Continuities and Contrasts, ed. by Keith J. Stringer and Andrew Jotischky (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 187-206).
through their own strength. As we shall see, the Hautevilles struggled to impose their power: William Iron-arm, the first of the brothers, was only one among twelve Norman military counts. While Robert Guiscard was invested duke in 1059, his attempts at actually exercising ducal prerogatives met with violent revolt from his fellow Normans into the 1080s. His son Roger Borsa ruled through the joint good offices of his powerful mother, Lombard princess Sichelgaita, and the devastating efficiency of his uncle Roger of Sicily, whose conquest of the island had taken from the late 1050s to the fall of the last Muslim stronghold in 1091. The vacuum of power and the progressive crumbling of ducal power after the death of Roger in 1101 led to a period of centrifugal forces in the South; the establishment of first the dukedom, then the kingdom of Roger II took thirteen years of war, from 1127 to 1140. Green remarks that the Normans in the South could not replace the native Italian aristocracy on the same scale as the Normans in England did; even this extremely brief survey of the Italian situation should show that the very definition of authority in the Mezzogiorno was often up for grabs.\textsuperscript{32} While this does not deny the possibility for research and comparison on an individual level between Norman families which were active in the South and Norman families which were active in the North, these fundamental differences in institutional and political landscape suggested the necessity for establishing first an analysis of the Norman kins in the South independently, without preconceived expectations.

Therefore, as I have looked to the sophisticated studies of the Normans in the North for methodological models of works of a nature similar to the present one, I have sought to develop my analysis of Norman kin dynamics in the South on its own terms, contextualizing it within the larger Norman world and its much more ample studies only after fully establishing it in its own original context in the South. Beside being in many ways the first study of its kind, however, this thesis is also, by necessity, a limited one, which cannot claim to analyse in full the gamut of Norman kin experiences in the Mezzogiorno. This limitation comes from the unique nature of the principal kin in object, that of the Hautevilles. The Hautevilles were well-publicised in contemporary sources, but in a sparse way: a few, prominent members of the kin group were amply celebrated, such as Robert Guiscard, Roger I of Sicily and his son, king Roger II, and Bohemond and Tancred, heroes of the First Crusade. This highlights a trend which will be discussed in this thesis: the selection of the lines of Guiscard and Roger as the leading branches of the kin, who achieved the most prominent roles. Nonetheless, while the Hautevilles are mostly known through their more relevant branches outside of Southern Italy, this thesis will show how their perception of their own kin was both sophisticated, far-reaching, and enduring. Underlying the spectacular conquests of the Hautevilles in the Mezzogiorno, Sicily and Syria there was a complex system of interlocking kinship patterns, strategies of conquest, and models of power which, even as they only rarely emerge in full light,

\textsuperscript{32} Green, \textit{The Aristocracy}, pp. 48-54.
still can be shown to repeat themselves and hold true for almost a hundred years throughout Hauteville dominions.

The greatest part of this thesis, therefore, is dedicated to ordering and identifying the extensive ramifications of Hauteville kin, and the way in which mechanisms of cooperation and rivalry which have been highlighted for well-known members of the family such as Roger II or Bohemond can be found among less publicized but no less fundamental branches such as the counts of Conversano, Loritello, or Catanzaro. While therefore other kin groups in the Norman South are sometimes invoked as comparison to Hauteville mechanisms, the sheer reach of the immensely prolific and relentlessly active kin group means that all their main competing families in the South were either directly related to them, such as the princes of Capua, or rumoured to be so, such as the sons of Amicus. In order to clarify the confusion still surrounding certain branches of the Hautevilles, therefore, the thesis will also engage in the prosopographical work necessary in order to identify and re-order the information available on the members of the kin group, and to a minor extent, the ‘sons of Amicus’ family. While then this study aims to break ground in the study of kinship structures in the Norman South, it does not seek to present itself in any way as generalised, or all-encompassing, as the clearing of the hurdle of identifying and defining the members of the Hautevilles themselves required a great amount of work, which opens up avenues of research into other, less publicized kin groups, and an ampler study of the Normans in the South. In this perspective, this thesis has been organized according to both chronological and thematic criteria, with the first five chapters devoted to the exploration of Hauteville kin itself, and the final two dedicated to contextualisations and comparisons first among the Normans in the South, and then in the larger Norman and European context.

Chapter 1 begins with the arrival of the Hautevilles in the South, and the first establishment of power by the eight sons of Tancred of Hauteville. At the same time as this chapter will explore the unique circumstances which saw a closely knit group of siblings establish their family’s power in one geographical area at one time, the theme of sibling cooperation will be picked up and explored, and examples from later eras will be brought to bear to discuss the enduring relevance of sibling cooperation and horizontal inheritance in the Hauteville kin. Chapter 2 explores the establishment of vertical succession among the Hautevilles, with the fundamental relationship between uncles and nephews which remedied the absence of sons, the ways in which nephews could be used to prop up and expand the Hautevilles’ territorial and institutional reach even in the presence of children, and the ways in which Hauteville masculinity and growth were construed. This chapter will also highlight how the descendants of Robert Guiscard and Roger of Sicily achieved primacy within the kin group in Southern Italy. Chapter 3, then, will deal with their cousins: the development of the secondary Hauteville comital branches of Principato, Loritello, Catanzaro, and Conversano, and the establishment of the principality of Antioch, with a discussion of how the enduring sense of kin kept them tied to, and sometimes in opposition to, the main branches, and how the themes
analysed in chapters 1 and 2 can be found to apply to these separate sections of the kin group. Chapter 4 will focus on women, both those who were born to the Hauteville kin, and those who married into it. Women are discussed throughout the thesis where relevant; however, gathering most of the analysis about them in a central, more substantial chapter has proven to be an efficient way of both highlighting the unique patterns pertaining to female power and agency within the kin, and summing up and further displaying the themes analysed in the first three chapters for their male kin. The men of the Hautevilles are generally, but by no means always, more widely attested in the sources and better documented.

Chapter 5 is the most chronological of the thesis, dealing as it does with the unique developments in both institutional and kin history which took place under the reign of Roger II. This chapter seeks to highlight the importance of the tenure of countess Adelaide, Roger’s mother, whose scarcely attested but fundamental policies radically changed the nature of power and patterns of kinship in Southern Italy, and had far-reaching consequences for her son’s rule. The chapter will then analyse Roger II’s rise to power, and the ways the establishment of his kingdom brought radical, and eventually violent changes to Hauteville self-perception and presence in the Mezzogiorno and Syria. Chapter 6 will focus on contextualizing the Hauteville kin experience in the South, by exploring and comparing to them two influential Norman kins, that of the princes of Capua and that of the sons of Amicus. As anticipated above, however, the sheer reach and enterprise of the Hautevilles means that these kins, too, were either certainly or possibly related to them, and further work will need to be done in order to fully chart the limits of perceived Hauteville kin. Chapter 7, finally, will seek to contextualize this thesis’s findings for Norman kin in the South within the field of Anglo-Norman kin studies, highlighting the differences briefly sketched above which make it necessary to separate the two, and proposing alternative comparisons for the family models of the Normans in the South by looking at Jonathan Lyon’s study of sibling relations in twelfth century Germany, and Alan Murray’s analysis of the kin policies of King Baldwin II of Jerusalem.33

As this thesis shall argue for the existence of a deeply felt sense of reciprocal belonging, obligation, and often implied emotional connections between the Hautevilles, the words ‘kin’ and ‘family’ will often be used together; while ‘clan’ shall be used to refer, more impersonally, to the vaster reaches of the group tied by blood-relation without commenting on their reciprocal relations. Using the terms interchangeably also seems advisable in the face of the mutable ways in which the Hautevilles could and did define their immediate circle of blood relatives. Occasionally, we see the Hautevilles functioning in closest cooperation with what we might term a recognisable nuclear family: the eight siblings who first founded Hauteville power in the South, Robert Guiscard with

his wife Sichelgaita and his son Roger Borsa, were functioning units of immediately related individuals. Even within nuclear families, however, there could be variables: in chapter 3 we will see how Geoffrey of Conversano associated his sons Robert and Alexander to power in his comital seat, while his wife Sichelgaita of Molise ruled in Brindisi with their third son Tancred; Robert Guiscard relied on his firstborn Bohemond, who was not a son of Sichelgaita, and his nephew Robert of Loritello for his duchy’s expansion in the Balkans and in the Abruzzi, rather than on Borsa or on his other two sons Robert and Guy. Roger I of Sicily, meanwhile, cooperated closely with his legitimate wives and his bastard son Jordan in Sicily, and with his brother Robert Guiscard first and his nephew Roger Borsa later on the mainland. Beyond this, we can see more creative permutations in which unmarried individuals, or those who were not close to their siblings, could build their own kin network to rely most closely on. Thus Bohemond took as his right-hand man and heir apparent his nephew Tancred; Tancred relied on his cousins Richard of the Principato and Roger of Salerno after his brother William’s death; Jordan of Capua, son of a sister of Guiscard, refused to cooperate with his father, and relied instead on his uncle and his cousin. Kin networks could also be created by relying on one’s acquired relatives, as Roger II did. In general, the Hautevilles seemed to approach their wide available pool of relations as a reserve for functional alliances which escape a more rigid distinction between immediate and more distant family, and thus this thesis has approached them on a case-by-case basis.

Given the temporal scope and territorial reach of this study, the sources here analysed are manifold, uneven, and of different nature and trustworthiness. I have analysed coinage, art history and architectural patronage when needed, looking from material culture to funerary monuments in order to achieve a more complete outlook on how the Hautevilles displayed and propped up their family power: for instance, discussion of the foundation, endowment, and eventually abandonment of Venosa as a mausoleum for the Hauteville brothers will occupy a prominent position in the first few chapters. The main sources for the Hauteville occupation and development of the South and East, however, are narrative and documentary, with a patchy reach across their territories. The three main narrative sources for the conquest of the South, Amatus of Montecassino Ystoire de li Normant, William of Apulia’s Gesta Roberti Wiscardi, and Geoffrey Malaterra’s De rebus gestis Rogerii et Roberti, were all completed before the year 1100, and all belong closely to the Hauteville sphere of influence, with William and Geoffrey working explicitly for Hauteville patrons (Duke Roger Borsa and Count Roger of Sicily respectively) and Amatus dedicating half of his work to close chronicling of Robert Guiscard’s enterprises up to the year 1080.35 Geoffrey Malaterra in particular is a precious source for the family historian, as he is both detailed and painstaking in his description of family relations. These can be usefully integrated with the Montecassino chronicle,

34 See chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6, for a lengthier discussion of such mechanisms for kin-building.
whose second draft also relied on Amatus, and whose zone of interest in Northern Campania and Abruzzi often touched on, and clashed with, Hauteville interests, and local chronicles such as the *Chronica Casauriense* and the Carpineto *Chronicon* from the Abruzzi, and the *Annales Baresnes* and Lupus Protospatharius from Apulia. In this period we can also find information, with varying degrees of trustworthiness, in Orderic Vitalis, who had a sustained interest in the Normans in the South and was aware of Geoffrey Malaterra’s work.

However, for the period after 1100, narrative histories of the South become more complex. For most of the period 1100-1120 we only have the *Chronicon* of Romuald of Salerno, a chronicle with a complex compilation history, made up from different sources for the period up to 1127, probably assembled in the 1170s, and which briefly deals with the situation in Southern Italy in the years leading up to and including the reign of Roger II. While the *Chronicon* can be integrated with local chronicles such as the *Annales Baresnes*, it remains in many ways our only reference, and a problematic one at that, for the period leading up to the advent of Roger II. Then we have again multiple competing sources: from the ferociously critical Falco of Benevento, a chronicler from one of the Lombard principalities in the South, to the explicitly partisan Alexander of Telesina, whose patron Matilda was Roger’s sister and tasked the writer with a narration of Roger’s coming to power. Thus, for several sections of this thesis, especially when dealing with secondary, sparsely-documented branches of the family, most information will be gleaned from a few documents, rather than from the complex intersection of narrative, documentary, and material evidence which can help investigate the most prominent members of the kin group.

The Hautevilles in the East are touched upon by many of the amply discussed and edited crusader sources, most of which are heavily dependent on the *Gesta Francorum*, written by a member of the Southern Italian contingent; Walter the Chancellor wrote on Antioch starting from the death of Tancred, Ralph of Caen was writing for Tancred after his death, and Albert of Aachen, one of the few crusader sources independent of the *Gesta Francorum*, is keenly interested in the

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40 See for instance chapters 3 and 6.
rulers of Antioch. Non-Latin sources of the Hauteville expansion in the Mediterranean also exist: Matthew of Edessa was an Armenian chronicler on the edge of the Hauteville Outremer territories, but the most important non-Latin narrative source for the family is Byzantine historian Anna Komnene. From Robert Guiscard’s Balkan campaigns, to the First Crusade, Bohemond’s defeat at the hands of her father Alexius, and Tancred’s refusal to submit after the treaty of Devol, Anna identified the troublesome Hautevilles as the enduring Western enemies of the empire, and writes of them with interest and insight, albeit many years after the event.

This wealth and variety of narrative sources must be taken and integrated, with the vast caches of charters existing in an uneven manner throughout the Hauteville zone of interest. Thus the sparse charter survivals for Hauteville Outremer and comital Sicily sit next to the large edited collections for Apulia (Bari, Brindisi, Conversano and Troia chief among them), the edited collection of the charters of Drogo, Humphrey, Guiscard, and the early years of Roger Borsa by Ménager, the charters of donation to the abbey of Venosa, and the partially edited collections of the charters of the Campanian abbey of Cava, whose ample archives have only been lightly used thus far, and whose unedited collections I had access to thanks to the generosity of my supervisor, Professor Loud, who has long been working on them. It is to be highlighted that while there are impressive numbers of charters overall for Southern Italy, especially compared to the exiguous crusader collections, this by no means entails a complete or satisfactory coverage of the period and people studied here: often members of the kin group fall between the cracks, appearing in few sources


43 Documenti latini e greci del conte Ruggero I di Calabria e di Sicilia, ed. by Julia Becker (Rome: Viella, 2013); Registrum Petri diaconi, ed. by Jean-Marie Martin et al. (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medioevo, 2016); Le Pergamene del Duomo di Bari (952-1264), ed. by G.B. Nitto de Rossi and Francesco Nitti (Bari: no publ., 1897); Les chartes de Troia (1024-1266): édition et étude critique des plus anciens documents conservés à l’Archivio Capitolare, ed. by Jean-Marie Martin (Bari: Società di Storia patria per la Puglia, 1972), Léon Robert Ménager, Recueil des actes des ducs normands d’Italie, 1046-1127. 1. Les premier ducs (Bari: Grafica Bigiemo, 1980), was meant to be followed by a second volume, which Ménager could not complete; Le pergamene di Conversano (901-1265), ed. by Giuseppe Coniglio (Bari: Società di storia patria per la Puglia, 1975); Codex diplomatico brindisino, vol.1 (492-1299), ed. by Annibale de Leo, Gennaro Maria Monti and Michela Pastore Doria (Bari: Società di storia patria per la Puglia, 1977); Codice diplomatico del Monastero Benedettino di S. Maria di Tremiti: 1005-1237, ed. by Armando Petrucci (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1960); Hubert Houben, Die Abtei Venosa und das Mönchttum im normannisch-staufischen Südtalien (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1995); Codex Diplomaticus Cavensis, vols. IX-X, ed. by Giovanni Vitolo e Simeone Leone (Salerno: Laveglia 1984-90), vols. XI-XII, ed by Carmine Carlone, Leone Morinelli e Giovanni Vitolo (Salerno: Laveglia, 2015).
which make it necessary to engage in hypothesis for many offshoots of the family tree. Another
problem which will be addressed is that of forgery: numerous charters were either altered or outright
invented by certain religious institutions in the occasion of unsolved disputes about territorial or
patrimonial holdings to suit their interests, and as such they must be either dismissed, or carefully
contextualised.

The sources on the Hauteville period, therefore, are plentiful but varied: it has been one of the
challenges of this thesis to integrate them as far as possible, to produce as complete as achievable
a picture of the extension, mechanisms, and identity of their omnipresent kin, first analyzing their
reach and place within larger Norman structures in the South and in Europe. By contextualising the
kins studied here in the larger Norman world, and suggesting alternative comparisons for them, this
thesis moreover seeks to achieve the first findings within the largely unexplored theme of Norman
family structures in the Mediterranean and lay down methodological bases for future research.
Chapter 1
Brothers and Sisters

While I will henceforth be studying Hauteville family relations thematically, the natural starting point for my study is the first generation of the Hautevilles to be known to us, the sons and daughters of Tancred of Hauteville. It is from these men and women that we see the beginning of the Hauteville dynasty, and the beginning of Hauteville expansion in Southern Italy. As we have no information about the family before this time, we can take the eight Hauteville siblings who came to Italy as a baseline for the clan as examined here.

1.1 De Altavilla: A Clan Name

As I begin to chart the extent of the Hauteville kin group and its dynamics, it is necessary first to clarify that the name by which I and much of the scholarship before me call them is a convention which does not reside in fact. Among the three main narrative sources for the Normans’ coming South only one, Malaterra, informs us that one of the main Norman families to come South hailed from Altavilla. Even then, the information is related as that of their place of origin, not as a title to recognise the group by: like Amatus and William of Apulia, Malaterra identifies the heroes of his narration as ‘filii Tancredi’, not by their title. Nor, indeed, does he apply the title de Altavilla to Tancred himself, or to his son Serlo, who stayed behind in Normandy and apparently inherited the ancestral lands.

The title is not found in any of the extant documents from Southern Italy and Syria until the late eleventh century. It is only after the 1090s that we find three minor members of the kin group referred to as de Altavilla: William de Hauteville, son of Geoffrey, one of the original eight brothers; William de Hauteville, a grandson of Geoffrey, who appears in the 1120s; and a Mauger of Hauteville of whose parentage we are unsure, and who is only attested once, fighting in Antioch. The use of the title by such minor members of the clan, so late after the initial descent South, tells us that the memory of Hauteville had not been lost, but as soon as the brothers acquired titles in the South they used them. Thus while William was known by his sobriquet Iron-arm, Humphrey and Drogo were known as comites, and Guiscard, beside his nickname, as dux. It was possible to belong

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1 GM, I.3.
2 GM, I.4.
3 GM, I.38-40.
4 See chapter 3 for a discussion of these men; documentation on the two William de Hauteville is especially knotty, and needs to be analysed at length.
5 Throughout his history Amatus often refers to Guiscard simply as le duc after his enfeoffment by the pope (IV.19 onward).
to the Hautevilles and have no title at all: thus Tancred, eventually prince regent in Antioch, was known by his name alone in crusader chronicles, being identified at first by his parentage (‘filius marchisi’, or ‘Boamundi nepos’) and then by his name alone.\(^6\)

Many of the Normans in the South preserved the original names of their homes: thus we have Roger of Barnaville, Roger of Bassunvilla, and the des Moulins which probably impressed their Norman name in the region now known as Molise.\(^7\) Conversely, the second most successful Norman kin group in the South, the Quarrells, soon abandoned their name: they first settled territorially as counts of Aversa, and later as princes of Capua.\(^8\) The diversification and the sheer number of descendants of Tancred and his children means, however, that they cannot be simply identified by the titles they acquired in Southern Italy. By the end of the eleventh century we have the dukes of Apulia, counts of Sicily, princes of Antioch, counts of Conversano, counts of Loritello, counts of Principato; the counts of Sicily would later become kings of Sicily. The variety of names available to refer to one closely interconnected kin group can easily explain how later scholarship, has chosen to go back to their place of origin and refer collectively to them as Hautevilles.\(^9\) While wider research would be necessary to pinpoint exactly when the name came in use, it seem fair to say that it must have been late. It is never used in Torquato Tasso’s *Gerusalemme liberata*, which in the late sixteenth century widely established the reputation of Tancred as idealised crusader; nor does it seem to have been used in the seventeenth century, when neither Scipione Mazzella’s *Descrittione del regno di Napoli* nor Ferrante della Marra’s *Discorsi delle famiglie estinte, forastiere o non comprese ne’ Seggi di Napoli* refer to members of the family as such.\(^10\)


\(^8\) Orderic Vitalis, *Ecclesiastical History*, II, pp. 58, 98.

\(^9\) From Ferdinand Chalandon’s *Histoire de la domination Normande*, which was for so long the go-to textbook on the topic, to Loud’s *Age of Robert Guiscard*, modern historiography uses the name Hauteville as a routine.

\(^10\) Torquato Tasso, *Gerusalemme liberata*, ed. by Lanfranco Caretti (Turin: Einaudi, 1993; Scipione Mazzella, *Descrittione del regno di Napoli* (Naples, 1601), refers to members of the Hautevilles as ‘Normanni’ (see p.102 for ‘Rugiero Normanno’, that is Roger II, and p. 706 for ‘Boemondo Normanno’); Ferrante della Marra, *Discorsi delle famiglie estinte, forastiere o non comprese ne’ Seggi di Napoli*, imparentate colla Casa della Marra (Naples, 1641), refers to Tancred and Bohemond with titles remarkably similar to what they would have used themselves, that is ‘Tancred Marchese con Boemondo Principe di Taranto’ (p. 225).
to the afore-mentioned William de Hauteville, which is, entirely correctly. Preliminary inquiries suggest therefore that the use of ‘Hauteville’ as a family name resides with secondary scholarship, and it will thus be employed here as a convention.

While I use the name for reasons of practicality and recognisability, however, it is easy to show that its lack of employment in the charters and chronicles of the Hautevilles in no way diminished their sense of themselves as part of a common family. Indeed, far from idly inheriting a name, the members of the kin group actively invoked their reciprocal relationships, and were known by them: as this thesis will show the family network was both highly developed and well-advertised. It is easy to understand why the sons of Tancred, who as I shall discuss below left Normandy with no apparent expectation to return, and immediately garnered numerous possessions, would have no desire to preserve the name: Drogo, comes Apulieae, no doubt carries a bigger cachet than Drogo de Altavilla. The fact that they did not come from a powerful family was well-advertised, and known to Anna Komnene and William of Malmesbury as well. In general, the mechanisms of inheritance of names and titles throughout the kin group appear haphazard, creating the impression that there was no specific pattern. Thus a younger son might or might not inherit the family name: Tancred of Conversano and Richard of the Principato carried the family name despite not being heirs to it, but the above-mentioned William de Hauteville did not choose, or was not permitted, to use the family title of Loritello, which was used by both his oldest brother Robert and by his other brother Rao, who was also count of Catanzaro.

1.2 The First Hautevilles: A Family Portrait

Nothing certain is known of the Hautevilles before their appearance in Southern Italy. Geoffrey Malaterra, the most interested in Hauteville family history among the Southern Italian chroniclers, depicts the patriarch Tancred as a hunting companion of the duke of Normandy, and his son Serlo as a fighter in the skirmishes against the Bretons, but it is impossible to verify such claims. In all likelihood Tancred was simply a minor knight whose very small landholdings made it impossible for him to provide for his large family. We know that he had two wives: Muriella (mother of William Iron-arm, Drogo, Humphrey, Geoffrey and Serlo) and Fressenda (mother of Robert.

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13 See chapter 3 for a discussion of these branches of the family and their patterns of inheritance.
15 GM, I.5.
The earliest Hautevilles do not seem to have preserved any particular naming patterns: a look at their genealogical tree shows them adopting common Norman names, such as William, Roger, and Robert, with no special regard for giving firstborns the names of their fathers (the only exceptions are Geoffrey and his sons, who will be discussed in chapter 3). To a general disregard for passing on their own names to their sons we can see a lack of commitment to preserving the patriarch’s name too.

The first instances of the name Tancred to appear in Southern Italy are the son of Emma, daughter of Guiscard, Tancred, second son of William the younger and lord of Syracuse, and Tancred of Conversano, second son of Geoffrey of Conversano and an unnamed Hauteville sister, therefore cadet members of secondary branches of the family. The name would only re-occur in the main branches of the family with the kingdom of Sicily (Tancred, son of Roger II) and the last Norman king, Tancred of Lecce, himself a bastard son. While therefore the name Tancred appears to have endured among the Hautevilles as a reliable family name for secondary members of the group, there does not seem to have been any intention to establish a direct line to their common ancestor.

While however the Hauteville siblings do not seem to have been particularly tied to their father’s legacy, the evidence points to a more enduring bond of both an emotional and a practical nature between them, with important distinctions due to their age. Geoffrey Malaterra has it that all the sons of Tancred left for Italy as soon as they came of age and they swore to care for the children of those who stayed back in case they chose to descend to Southern Italy, thus implying that the brothers had precise mechanisms in place for caring for each other’s interests and a common agreement. The statement is born out by the fact that Serlo, son of the Serlo who remained in Normandy, was immediately taken under the wing of his uncle Roger in Sicily when he chose to go South; the Hautevilles could and did go to war early, something which would be confirmed, a generation later, by the youth of Tancred and his brother William at the time of their going on crusade.

The date of birth of most of the children of Tancred is a matter of informed guesswork. William Iron-arm and Drogo were in Italy before 1038, the year in which they took part in the Byzantine expedition to Sicily. As the first Hauteville brothers to go South, who immediately distinguished themselves among the Normans in the Mezzogiorno, they can be expected to have been a little older
than the bare minimum of age. Roger II and Bohemond II, in the early years of the twelfth century, appear to have come of age at 16; assuming that this had been roughly true for the Hautevilles eighty years before, I would put William Iron-arm in his early twenties at most, and Drogo in his late teens, which would mean they had been born sometimes in the late 1010s - early 1020s. The sons of Muriella appear to have been a homogenous and closely interconnected group, which suggests they had grown up together and knew each other well. While not much is known about William, his nickname and the fact that he was chosen as one of the twelve military leaders of the Normans in Southern Italy indicate a certain warrior prowess on his part, something which the sources praise him for. He and Drogo are mentioned together, in a display of closeness and mutual support, up to the point William died of disease circa 1045. Drogo’s succession to William’s power after defeating the only pretender, a man who was probably from outside the family, suggests that he was both able to defend a claim to it, but also that his closeness to his brother was clearly recognised.

But beside being close to his older brother, Drogo appears to have known well and enjoyed a good relationship with his younger full-siblings too. It was under Drogo that the Hautevilles first established their land claims, a work in which he was assisted by Humphrey, who avenged his death and further consolidated the Hauteville land and power. While William and Drogo, and then Drogo and Humphrey appear to have been close collaborators, Geoffrey comes across as a less forceful and more secondary figure, but one who nonetheless acted in accordance with his elder brothers and never appeared to have opposed them or sought their power. Overall, the sons of Muriella seem to be a tightly-knit group with a well-established hierarchy: the first two successions of the Hautevilles in Southern Italy were between brothers who had collaborated closely together. I would say that Humphrey and Geoffrey were born in the 1020s, and they had the chance to know their older siblings and develop a rapport with them.

Things are more complicated for the sons of Fressenda. Malaterra does not specify how long Tancred bided his time after his first wife had died before he married the second; that he declares that the knight was suffering from enforced chastity at an age that did not suit it easily explains how a man who plausibly had begun to conceive children in the 1010s continued well into the 1030s. In general, I would say that a gap of a few years between the two groups is likely. The sons of Fressenda appear to have been a more unruly and less cohesive group, whose members were

22 WA, I, lines 520-6, p. 126; AM, II.28, p. 292.
23 GM, I.10-2.
24 WA, II, lines 27-37, p. 132.
26 See p. 6.
27 GM, I.4.
sometimes at odds (as Guiscard and William the younger were throughout their lives); even those of them who co-operated started from a place of mistrust and lack of reciprocal knowledge (Guiscard and Roger). The fact that according to Malaterra at this point the sons of Tancred were leaving home as soon as they became of age suggests they may simply not have known each other very well, without the time to develop the closely-knit rapport existing between the sons of Muriella, who were quite possibly unknown to them.

Guiscard and Roger, who died in 1085 and 1101 respectively, are both declared to have been seventy at the time of death by the sources.\(^{28}\) This would mean that Geoffrey Malaterra was in error about the sons of Tancred descending to Italy as soon as they became of age, as Robert and Roger would have been in their twenties when they reached Italy (in 1046 and \textit{circa} 1055 respectively).\(^{29}\) But we have no reason to doubt Malaterra, and the symbolic nature of a lifespan of seventy, which rests on the biblical trope of the three score and ten years assigned to the just, makes the declaration of their ages highly suspect and allows for a certain latitude.\(^{30}\) It is very likely that they would have been at least sixteen at the time of their coming to Italy, which puts their births at the very latest in the early to mid-1020s for Guiscard and the late 1030s to early 1040s for Roger, still allowing for a considerable age gap between the two. While Mauger died almost immediately upon coming to Italy, and it is therefore difficult to make inferences about his relationship with his brothers, the younger William certainly felt for Guiscard none of the deference that the sons of Muriella appear to have easily obtained from their younger siblings.\(^{31}\)

If Guiscard was indeed born around 1026, he would have been a child when William Iron-arm and Drogo went South, and quite possibly Roger, who appears to have been the youngest Hauteville, might very well not yet have been born. If Becker is right and Roger only reached Italy in 1055, he would have quite possibly been too small to have known or even remembered Guiscard before he himself went South.\(^{32}\) While the sons of Muriella seem to have been adults who knew each other and had well-established patterns of behaviour, the sons of Fressenda were born and grew up at a time in which the family habit of going to Italy was becoming ingrained, and they may well never have met some of their older siblings, and only met others once they reached the South.

If the sons of Fressenda were not particularly tightly-knit among themselves, their relationship with their half-siblings appear to have been interesting. Upon Guiscard’s arrival in Italy relations between him and Drogo were immediately strained, with Drogo refusing to provide for Guiscard and Guiscard rebelling in response.\(^{33}\) While we can reasonably posit that at this point, early in the

\(^{30}\) The \textit{Holy Bible}, Douay Rheims version, revised by Richard Challoner (Baltimore: John Murphy Company, 1899), Psalm 89.
\(^{31}\) See below, pp. 30-1, 67-8.
\(^{32}\) Julia Becker, \textit{Graf Roger}, p. 38.
\(^{33}\) AM, III.7, p. 313.
Hauteville conquest, Drogo had genuinely no land to give, the relationship between the two still appears to be strained, with Drogo finally getting rid of Guiscard by sending him to take possession of the as-yet-unconquered Calabria. Strained relations continued between Humphrey and Guiscard, with the latter pushing for more power and nibbling at the edges of the former’s dominions. If we consider the context of the Hautevilles’ initial poverty in land and the ambitiousness and rapacity of Guiscard’s bids for power throughout his life, we will see that it would be overstepping the mark to infer that his personal relations with his elder siblings spoke of a larger pattern of mistrust between the sons of Muriella and the sons of Fressenda as Thomas does, rather than simply of Guiscard’s own fraught relationship with those whom he perceived to be his rivals in power.

Indeed, one element suggests the possibility of friendly and even close relationships between the two sibling-groups. Roger’s first lieutenant during the early stages of his conquest of Sicily was Serlo, son of Serlo the firstborn of Tancred and Muriella, who had remained in Normandy. Considering Roger’s direct patronage of his work, Malaterra’s choice to dedicate an otherwise unsubstantiated chapter to Serlo’s fight for Normandy’s freedom from France, and his insistence on the high value placed on Serlo and the heroic circumstances of his untimely death, Roger seems to have been considerate and respectful of this elder brother, whom he may indeed have known growing up, and he seems to have sought to highlight his connection to him and to Normandy.

A continuing bond with Normandy is also suggested by the circumstances of the Hauteville sisters’ marriages. We are aware of two of them who were in Italy sometime in the 1050s, as will be discussed in chapter 4: Fressenda, who was presumably named after her mother and therefore was a product of Tancred’s second marriage, and who married Richard count of Aversa, and the unknown sister who married a certain Roger, founded the line of the counts of Conversano, and thus began their long-lasting and tight if fraught relationship with the rest of the Hauteville clan. We know very little of these two women, of one of whom we do not know even the name, but their importance as dynastic links cannot be underestimated. As the Hautevilles are unlikely to have travelled with sisters of a marriageable age in the early stages of their conquest, the unions they arranged for them imply a lasting link with Normandy, which allowed them to depend on them as possible means of alliance, and the ability to reliably fetch them from Normandy and have them escorted to Italy.

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34 WA, II, lines 297-8, p. 148.
36 Thomas, Jeux Lombards, p. 448.
37 GM, II.46.
38 AM, I.45, p. 112, VII.1, p. 292 and WA, III, lines 637-40, p. 198 clearly speak of this marriage without mentioning Fressenda by name; however, she is several times mentioned in the charters of her son Jordan (see Graham A. Loud, ‘A Calendar of the Diplomas of the Norman Princes of Capua’, Papers of the British School at Rome, 44 (1081), 99-143, n. 21, 26, 27, 30, 31, 36, 38, pp. 123-6); Geoffrey of Conversano is immediately identified as Guiscard’s nephew by his sister (GM, II.39).
1.3 Natural Born Warband: The Hauteville War Network

There is therefore little doubt that the Hautevilles, from the very start, perceived each other as a resource in war and peace, and a natural network to rely upon in their conquest of Southern Italy. We have examined above how the strong partnership between the sons of Muriella formed the first basis for their conquest, with William Iron-arm and Drogo first descending to Italy together and taking part in the early waves of the Norman invasion. The practical nature of such a partnership and its value in war are self-evident when we consider the circumstances of the Norman conquest of the South: the sources talk to us of ragtag bands of warriors, open to all comers, little more than bandits in their fleeting connections as mercenaries to one or the other of the local potentates.\(^{39}\) The title of *comes* first borne by William Iron-arm becomes then more military than administrative, comparable to the classical *dux* in its indication of the power of the head of a group of warriors rather than the lord of an established land dominion.\(^{40}\) In such a context a reliable second-in-command, skilled in war and supportive of one’s leadership, becomes fundamental, and the sons of Muriella bolstered and supported each other’s claims.

Even with the coming of Guiscard and the beginning of more fraught relations among the Hauteville brothers in Italy, the overall sense of family duty and belonging appears clear. Guiscard immediately appealed to Drogo for land, and so too would Mauger and William the younger to Humphrey.\(^{41}\) The younger Hautevilles expected preferential treatment from their older brothers; and to the extent that it was possible, they obtained it. Drogo did reconcile with Guiscard, and while he sent him off to conquer Calabria unaided, once the deed was done the lands were recognised as part of a common Hauteville network and Guiscard related to and sought out his older brothers in good and evil. However rebellious, he recognised the importance of his brother’s approval in the question of his marriage, and could not accept Gerard of Buonalbergo’s offer of an alliance through the hand of his aunt until Drogo consented.\(^{42}\) Humphrey, who had at his disposal much greater lands than Drogo had, entrusted the Principato to William and the Capitanata to Mauger in preference to his full-brother Geoffrey, and while he was often at odds with Guiscard, it was to him that he entrusted the regency of his county at his death.\(^{43}\)

If, however, on the one hand there emerges a clear structure of reciprocal reliance in war and administration, the process appears to be far from automatic and to be taken for granted, as the example of Geoffrey shows. Geoffrey seems to be the least brilliant of the Hauteville brothers, and

\(^{39}\)WA, I, lines 165-8, p. 108.

\(^{40}\) For a discussion of this complex term, see *Medie Latinitatis lexicon* minus, ed. by H.F. Niermeyer and C. van de Kieft (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 1, p. 477.

\(^{41}\) AM, II.45, p. 308; GM, I.15.

\(^{42}\) AM, III.11, p. 316-7.

\(^{43}\) WA, II, lines 367-371, p. 152.
he was passed over several times for preferment. While with the sons of Muriella power appears to have initially passed in order of seniority, Drogo and then Humphrey fought with and eventually relied much more on their half-sibling Guiscard than their full-brother Geoffrey. He did not receive lands as the much more junior William the younger and Mauger did; and at Mauger’s death the Capitanata reverted to William. It was only at this point that William chose to give the Capitanata to him rather than holding it for himself; while Malaterra piously ascribes this to ‘fraternal love’, it is reasonable to assume that William’s resources would have been stretched rather thin by holding both territories, which do not lie geographically close, and that offloading one to Geoffrey would have made better strategic sense. Either way, Geoffrey, whether because of personal preference or a lack of talent, remained a last resource and shows us that the preferential relationship undoubtedly shown by the Hauteville siblings to each other was still subject to practical considerations.

While this will be discussed in greater depth in a following chapter, the value of the Hauteville brotherhood is shown in its employment not only as a source of lieutenants and allies, but also as a source of heirs. In the volatile atmosphere of the early years of the Norman conquest in Southern Italy brothers appear to have been the best bet for keeping one’s inheritance in the family in the absence of adult sons to inherit. This phenomenon, described by Cuozzo as a ‘concezione orizzontale della famiglia’, was by no means unique to the Hautevilles, and indeed Cuozzo theorised it after studying the much later Catalogus Baronum, an 1150s list of fiefs owing military service in the kingdom of Sicily. If however the phenomenon was still strong among the small pool of Norman noblemen a century after the beginning of the conquest, it was all the more important in its early years, in which landholdings still had to be consolidated and the power held was uncertain and still essentially tied to military performance. In such a context the unusually large and competent sibling group they possessed gave the Hautevilles an edge, ensuring that they always had someone to take over their dominions and rely upon in case of emergency despite previous troubles (down to the ever-unlucky Geoffrey). At the same time as they sometimes made their personal relationships a little loose, the disparate ages of the Hauteville brothers ensured an unusually lengthy continuity in their power, as from the coming of William Iron-arm and Drogo in the 1030s to the death of Roger in 1101 there was always at least one Hauteville sibling in a position of authority in Southern Italy.

As we have seen, the Hauteville brothers were by no means a homogenous group, being separated by large age gaps, different mothers, and sometimes strong personal opposition. However,

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44 GM, I.15.
45 GM, I.15.
46 Cuozzo, La cavalleria, p. 198.
they clearly perceived themselves, and to an extent their sisters too, as a kinship network to rely upon in case of trouble and the first port of call when it came to alliance, administration and inheritance. But while all these are eminently practical considerations, which contextualise the Hautevilles as an efficient network of warring and conquering siblings, what can we say about their perception, if any, of themselves as a family in the more emotional and affectionate sense of the word?

1.4 Family Feeling: The Hauteville Siblings and Emotional History

In discussing the emotional history of the Hauteville clan we must keep in mind the danger of entertaining the expectation of family as an emotional unity tied by reciprocal affection on the one hand, and on the other the risk of completely dismissing this possibility of emotional ties among its members, a possibility suggested by the chronicles themselves, and which may help put in context a few of the Hauteville interactions. Such dismissal has long existed in literature about medieval families: for instance, in his article about Eleanor of Aquitaine Turner entirely discounts the possibility of her, and accordingly her society, having cared for her children as infants. However, more recent scholarship, for instance Skinner’s work on motherhood in the Mediterranean, has sought to take a different approach, seeking to make a case for familial affection while still properly evaluating the evidence in its own context. Sifting the evidence available to us does require juggling the dangers of both exaggerating the importance of literary evidence, or conversely underrating that of documentary proof, as underlined by Moore in his discussion of married love in the Anglo-Norman family. Following his proposition, this thesis will never assume an emotional bond, but it will remain open to discussing the appearance or performance of emotion when present in the sources, especially since this appears to be complex and impossible to generalise. We shall

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see through this thesis how, while there are many Hauteville children who do not appear to have had a close relationship with their parents, for several parent-child relationships we can at least strongly posit a lifelong emotional bond. Next to the numerous children of Roger I and Robert Guiscard, many of whom were disposed of in advantageous marriages or minor lordships, we have Count Silvester of Marsico’s nine-month-old daughter, who in the 1160s died and was buried with a beautifully worded gravestone, still extant in Palermo’s church of St Cataldo, which testifies the regard one could nourish for an extremely small child. Both manifestations of regard, or lack thereof, for one’s children exist within our sources for the Hauteville family; and as such they shall be considered here. Given the variety of sources analysed in this thesis, doubtlessly, the material for the emotional history of the Hauteville family will be neither coherent nor comprehensive, but it will be treated and analysed in the manners and loci it will present itself. In particular, when it comes to the wealth of Southern Italian charters, Drell’s warning against attributing too much importance to their often formulaic calling upon family feeling remains relevant, suggesting an approach in which, as far as possible, different kinds of evidence are brought to bear on each other, aiming to gather as complete as possible a picture of the emotional relationship investigated. A useful starting point for this analysis is the natural intersection of emotional and practical dynastic history, the patronage of family funerary architecture.

In Drogo’s charters we see how he founded and began the patronage of the abbey of Venosa, which the Hautevilles would maintain until Robert Guiscard’s death. Drogo donated to the abbey in conjunction with his brothers as did Humphrey after him, despite his embattled relationship with Guiscard. Count William was another major donor, as were his descendants. Guiscard was explicit in offering relief ‘for the souls of his departed brothers’, and his donations are presented in conjunction with William, the most rebellious of Fressenda’s sons and the most loath to accept Guiscard’s overlordship entirely. Venosa clearly functioned as a family mausoleum: in 1069 Guiscard moved there ‘ossa fratrum suorum qui in diversis Apulie locis fuerunt commendata’, ‘his brothers’ bones, scattered around Apulia’, in the presence of both Roger, the younger William, and Robert of Loritello son of Geoffrey. This suggests that Geoffrey was by then already dead, and

52 ‘Matilda, daughter of the illustrious count Sylvester, born on a Tuesday, was taken away on a Tuesday, living she had three times three months, and she died giving her soul to heaven, and the body alone to the ground, in the year of our Lord 1161, she rested under this in the ground’, see fig. 1, p. 241; for the marriage patterns of the daughters of Guiscard and Roger, see chapter 4, section 2.b; for Silvester of Marsico, see pp. 49, 156.


54 Ménager, Recueil, n. 1-3, pp. 20-6. These charters are, in fact, false, but their substance, and the foundation and endowment of the abbey by the Hautevilles, is in fact authentic, as Houben discusses (Die Abtei Venosa, pp. 135-48; n. 1-7, pp. 231-7).

55 Ménager, Recueil, n. 3, pp. 25-6.

56 See chapter 3, pp. 77-9 for a discussion of the counts of Principato’s patterns of patronage.

57 Ménager, Recueil, n. 5, pp. 29-30.

58 Ménager, Recueil, n. 20, pp. 80-2.
that he and Mauger were brought there (though we are unsure whether William Iron-arm, who had died before Drogo founded it, was not already there). Gerd Althoff has argued for the performative nature of public displays of emotion, untethering the shows of grief or sadness of rulers from affect itself, and presenting them rather as the conveyance of information, a public show untied from personal feeling. This idea is certainly relevant here: the Hauteville brothers were clearly putting on a display with the gesture. The survivors were gathered together to honour the dead, conveying at once continuity and legitimacy, more than ten years after the death of William Iron-arm, whom Roger and possibly William had probably never known. The gesture seems to indicate a very material declaration of belonging, the coalescence of an Hauteville family dynasty in the place one of them had founded. And such an initiative had far-reaching, and quite intriguing consequences: Alberada, Guiscard’s repudiated first wife, also lies in Venosa. We do not know when she died, and thus she may have been already there, or she may equally have been buried in the abbey after the fact. Whichever way this happened, it clearly bespeaks a plan: Venosa as the place where the Hauteville kin, blood and acquired, lay, a shrine to family understood both as the result of chance, and that of careful construction.

But if on the one hand, therefore, the translation of the brothers’ bones to Venosa seems to stand as pure performance, a political gesture meant to convey the birth of a stable dynasty, on the other hand its enduring consequences are more complex. William was buried in Venosa, making a bequest to it on his deathbed; and so was Guiscard. Dying in 1085 beyond the sea, Guiscard was borne over a large geographical distance to Venosa, rather than to a closer or more splendid place of rest, such as Bari or Salerno. Despite being terror mundi, according to William of Malmesbury’s report of his tombstone, Guiscard had clearly given orders to be brought back to the family foundation, in a gesture that is symbolic, performative, but also prioritises the brothers’ union over the possible greater splendour of an alternative burial. With Stephen White, we may say therefore that there is an emotional side to Hauteville politics: personal and political overlap in many (though not all) instances of emotion we shall investigate here.

After the death of Guiscard we see both a shift away from Venosa, and a change in family policy: Roger Borsa, jointly with Roger of Sicily, abandoned Basilicata in favour of the patronage

60 For her epitaph, that still identifies her as Guiscardi coniux, see G.Antonucci, Note critiche per la storia dei Normanni nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia. I. Alberada, Archivio Storico per la Calabria e la Lucania, 4(1934), 1-3.
61 Houben, Venosa, n. 34, p. 267.
62 Anna Comnena was well-informed about this process, and the function of Venosa as family church which she highlights confirms the importance of the foundation as dynastic shrine (Annae Comnenae Alexias, 6.6, p. 181).
of Campanian and Sicilian religious houses.\textsuperscript{65} If however the uncle and nephew abandoned the devotion to the family shrine (both were buried where they died, in Mileto and Salerno respectively), it is however clear that they carried forward the family tradition of joint religious donation, underscoring the significance of a spiritual kinship deriving from and enshrining their blood relation.\textsuperscript{66} The burial policy of the Hautevilles allows us both a glimpse into shifting family alliances, and in the significance of the relationships they hint at.

The chronicles which depict them give us no less interesting a view, if one which needs to be properly analysed. While the charters show us the presence of family feeling tied to political convenience and the construction of a legitimizing and ennobling dynastic project, the chroniclers present us with examples of Hauteville familial affection, depicting the brothers to us as people bound not only by blood and convenience but also by love. The caveats against emotional history which I have outlined above still hold true, but an interesting overlap between rhetoric and political necessity and convenience can be seen to take place.

According to the chronicles, at least some of the Hautevilles felt deep regard for their relations. William of Apulia’s description of Humphrey avenging Drogo’s death is loaded with emotional overtones: the Norman count undertakes the razing of the country which betrayed his brother and permitted his assassination.\textsuperscript{67} That this should be interpreted as an emotional and not simply a violent outburst is confirmed by Amatus: for the Normans, he explains, ‘are very sad […]; they don’t cry. They leave everything, and go to avenge their prince’.\textsuperscript{68} Vengeance seems to take the place of weeping, as much for a lord as for a family member. Certainly, a deeply felt conscience of the necessity for family vengeance appears to be pervasive in the text. Guiscard feels compelled to ‘avenge’ the deaths of an uncle and nephew who had died in his service, so we can at least make a case for a cultural imperative for the Hautevilles to avenge their family and allies; and when Roger weeps for the death of their nephew Serlo, Guiscard reminds him that it is women who are allowed to cry, but they can avenge the fallen.\textsuperscript{69} Malaterra, however, attributes Roger’s pain at Guiscard’s captivity not simply to a desire to avenge his brother, much as he prepared for war, but to a tenderer worry which resolved itself in tears when the two were reunited.\textsuperscript{70} Family regard is once more invoked when William of Apulia offers the Capitanata which he has inherited from Mauger to his

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Ménager} Ménager, n°52, 53, 56.
\bibitem{Romuald of Salerno} Romuald of Salerno, \textit{Chronicon}, n. 6, p. 202, and p. 205.
\bibitem{WA} WA, III, line 75-141, pp. 136-8.
\bibitem{GM} GM, II.37, though it is worth noting Guiscard chose to be clement; for a discussion of vengeance among the Normans, see Thomas Roche, ‘The Way Vengeance Comes: Rancorous Deeds and Words in the World of Orderic Vitalis’, in \textit{Vengeance in the Middle Ages: Emotion, Religion and Feud}, ed. by Susanna A. Throop and Paul R. Hyams (London: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 115-36. Roche, however, concludes that eleventh century feuds are too scarcely documented to make inferences about (pp. 121-2). For Serlo’s death, GM, II.46.
\end{thebibliography}
brother Geoffrey, ‘out of affection for his brother’.  

While we might be tempted to dismiss outright such claims as an attempt to soften and domesticate the image of the robber baron Hautevilles on the part of their laudatory chroniclers, a deeper reading is possible. It is worth noting that there is an intriguing overlap between the declared emotional motives and their material rewards. Humphrey’s rampage did not solely avenge Drogo; it also put his succession on safe footing, showed that Hautevilles could not be murdered without punishment to follow, and generally created a shock-and-awe effect he was to benefit from in his takeover.  

Robert and Roger having been allies for years, the captivity of the one might have spelled disaster for the other, who would have been understandably anxious to free him. Finally, as we have said above, it is easy to imagine that the Capitanata, the eternally embattled frontier zone with the Abruzzi, might have stretched William’s resources rather thin, and that it would have been a relief for him to give it to his brother Geoffrey.

What may emerge here, then, is not just the poetic flourish of the chronicler but the testimony of a practical and no less heartfelt practice of family ties: the Hautevilles avenged each other because it strengthened their claims at the same time as it remedied grief. They cared for each other’s captivity because it deprived them of resources in addition to their relatives, and they shared land because it made it easier to administrate. At the same time, they privileged their immediate family in all these transactions because they relied on it: they demonstrated an awareness of and regard for the feeling of reciprocally belonging to the same clan. This is more than enough to make the reasonable hypothesis that men who had to rely on each other for their entire lives, and to look out for each other’s welfare in an atmosphere of perennial war, were likely to develop emotional ties to each other, the same ties that made the sons of Muriella so close-knit and which may have existed even among the sons of Fressenda.

The second generation of the Hautevilles brings us an interesting example of disinterested and indeed damaging family ties: when Abelard, Humphrey’s son whose county Guiscard had usurped as his regent, rebelled, he was blackmailed into surrendering with the capture of his maternal brother Herman, not himself an Hauteville. Abelard’s prompt surrender, and his departure for Byzantium with his brother, suggest that his interest in Herman’s welfare was an example of fraternal affection, a tie which was acknowledged by Guiscard and used to bring the rebellion to its knees. At the intersection between practical and beneficial, but in its manifestations of damage as well, I believe then that a case can be made for the existence of a certain amount of family affection among the

71 GM, I.15.
72 AM, III.22-4, pp. 322-4.
73 If we choose to adopt Searle’s definition of family as those who can reasonably expect to share in the resources (Predatory Kinship, p. 10) then the Hautevilles developed such an expectation often beyond the point where we might term it practical and mutually beneficial.
74GM, III.5-6, pp. 59-60.
75GM, III.6, p. 60.
Hauteville siblings, a network not only of reciprocal obligations but also of emotional attachment, which often overlapped with and strengthened practical considerations and generally informed the building of the Hauteville dynasty from the beginnings of the sibling group examined in this chapter.

1.5 Alliance, Rebellion, Forgiveness and Selection

The numbers and talents of the Hauteville siblings made their network both vast and efficient, but also complex, engineering a multifaceted situation in which alliance and rebellion created patterns of alternating fortunes which shaped Hauteville rule in Southern Italy and eventually determined its future. While Bachrach identified a ‘Norman tradition of family hostility’ lasting unto the reign of the Plantagenets, rebellion in Southern Italy could constitute a fundamental part of ultimate family cooperation.\(^{76}\)

After his differences with Drogo had been solved with the conquest of Calabria, Humphrey’s accession to the county appears to have emboldened Guiscard: we see him raiding at the edges of his brother’s dominions, provoking his ire and eventually being imprisoned.\(^{77}\) As quickly as Humphrey may have lost his temper with the nakedly ambitious Guiscard, he nonetheless chose to associate him to his power, a marked preference which is confirmed by his entrusting the regency to Guiscard at his death.\(^{78}\) William received the Principato, Mauger the Capitanata; Geoffrey, on the other hand, received nothing. In contrast, Humphrey entrusted the county outright in keeping for his son to Guiscard, the most rebellious but also undoubtedly the most promising of the Hauteville brothers. And after all, despite their differences, Guiscard had proven faithful to the larger Norman contingent, playing an important role in the battle of Civitate, and helping strengthen their position on the field.\(^{79}\) While William of Apulia’s understandably pious silence on how the subject he praises went from keeping the county for his nephew to claiming it outright cloaks what expectations Humphrey may reasonably have had of his wishes being respected, what we see is Humphrey’s reliance on the strongest of his younger brothers in order to further the dynasty.\(^{80}\) As ambitious and untrustworthy as Guiscard may have proven, he was still his brother’s best bet for furthering Hauteville rule and in this function he was called to serve. In this we see not only the reconciliation at the end of rebellion because of the necessity of relying on family, but also the development of a pattern of choosing and grooming a junior relative as an heir in the absence of an adult son to serve the function. While their continuous alliance had made the sons of Muriella natural heirs to each other, the more complex relationship between the sons of Fressenda meant there was no obvious


\(^{77}\) WA, II, lines 309-319, p. 148.

\(^{78}\) WA, II, lines 165-174, p. 152.

\(^{79}\) WA, II, lines 216 ff., pp. 144.

\(^{80}\) WA, II, lines 400-5, 452-3, pp. 154-6.
choice for an heir. As we shall see in later chapters, however, the family was able to make up for it by creating their own, efficient mechanism.

Roger’s experience is emblematic of both the usefulness of such a mechanism and of its difficulties for the chosen family member. Having come to Italy to serve the ever-unfortunate Geoffrey, Roger switched to Guiscard’s service to leave it in unhappiness at the lack of landed rewards (which Guiscard, much like Drogo before him, may simply not have had at his disposal).\(^8\) While Malaterra waxes poetic about the difficulties of his unhappy and mistreated hero, so poor that he has to steal horses, Roger appears to indeed have been used as a pawn by his older brothers as William granted him Scalea, on the edges of Guiscard’s dominions, to allow Roger to raid them and thus presumably serve in the power play between himself and Guiscard.\(^9\) This power play actually worked, at least for Roger as we see Guiscard reconciling with him and making him his de facto second.\(^\)\(^9\) The mechanism by which Roger asserted his usefulness and at the same time his potential as a threat that needed to be reconciled was the same which Guiscard had employed with Humphrey: what we may call ‘embattled negotiation’, the very concrete demonstration of a junior’s ability and an assertion of his worthiness. If on the one hand senior members of the family were the gateway to land, men, and administrative power, on the other hand the junior ones provided the necessary stand-ins and aids to delegate power to in the ever-expanding Hauteville dominions. Rebellion on the part of a junior, therefore, should not always be interpreted as a desire to supplant or topple his elder, without whom the junior’s prospects would collapse, but rather as a way of affirming one’s independence and potential, the only useful tool in negotiating with a much stronger counterpart.\(^\)\(^9\)

These patterns of behaviour also helped select and isolate different branches of the kin group and eventually disperse it, a pattern which began with the first Hauteville brothers but would have momentous consequences for their descendants. Unlike the sons of Muriella, who had succeeded each other in rapid succession while building up the first nucleus of the Hauteville dominions, the sons of Fressenda endured for a long time as contemporaries and landed lords in their own right. While Guiscard’s usurpation of the succession from Abelard put him in a strong position as he built his dominions up until he attained the ducal rank, he did not enjoy the same authority among his younger siblings Humphrey appears to have held. As described above, William used Roger as a pawn in his power struggle against his brother, but then he continued to be trouble, harassing the

\(^8\)GM, I.19.
\(^9\)GM, I.20.
\(^\)GM, I.21.

\(^\)This bargaining mechanism makes for one of the sharper contrasts between the patterns of behaviour identified by Searle among the dukes of Normandy and what I have found in my study of the Hautevilles. The much more concrete nature of the ducal holdings made competition between prospective heirs more violent, but the uncertain nature of the Hauteville holdings meant that one’s fortunes were very much tied to the relatives one antagonised, and rebels usually sought and accepted reconciliation (see Searle, *Predatory Kinship*, cf. pp. 121-150, 230-7).
 territories of the Salernitan princes into whom Guiscard married. The relationship between the two appears complex: William continued to witness Guiscard’s charters at this time, hinting at the fact that, rather than fully rebelling, he might have been reaffirming Hauteville superiority by showing the princes of Salerno that other members of the family could be a threat. Alternatively, we could interpret this apparently contradictory relationship as yet another instance of the elasticity and solidity of Hauteville kin: William could continue to nibble at the edges of Guiscard’s zone of influence, never pushing it so far that he could not be reconciled to him. While the far meeker Geoffrey and his son Robert after him were reliable allies to Guiscard, their engagement with the embattled frontier zone of the Abruzzi meant that they were not available as allies for the expansion of Guiscard’s dominions, a role in which he employed the far more junior and landless Roger.

The beginning of Roger and Robert’s co-operation ensured the beginning of the selection of their descendants as the ruling powers of the Italian South, and their continuing relationship, its consequences, and its effects on Guiscard’s son deserve separate analysis as a study in the possibilities and troubles of Hauteville sibling co-operation.

1.6 Four Brothers: The Beginning of Vertical Hauteville Rule

In the shift of power from the sons of Muriella to the sons of Fressenda we can see the beginnings of a more complicated, more delicate balance of power among the sons of Tancred of Hauteville, and at the centre of this is the relationship between Guiscard and his junior Roger. After the power struggle to gain him as an ally Guiscard began using Roger as a second and supporter in his campaign to gain overlordship over Southern Italy, a relationship which was characterised by both mutual interdependence and a wealth of rewards.

While Drogo had sent Guiscard forth to conquer new lands, with a vague guarantee of overlordship in case of success, and William the younger and Geoffrey had obtained their lands from their elders, Guiscard made Roger a partner in his ambitious enterprises in a manner that had not been seen since the coming of William Iron-arm and Drogo to Italy. It is with Roger that Guiscard began the slow process of conquering Sicily, first in a joint position, and later entrusting the whole enterprise to him. This meant on the one hand that Guiscard, unlike Drogo, could actually maintain a modicum of control over his junior’s land, having started on the conquest himself, and indeed the dukes of Apulia maintained possessions in Sicily well into the time of Roger II. On the other hand, however, Roger was thus rewarded with a prestigious independent position

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85 AM, IV. 4, 9, 15, 19, pp. 354, 356-7, 360-1, 363.
87 See chapter 3 for the close cooperation between Guiscard and Robert of Loritello.
88 GM, II.1-3; II.20, though we can still see the painful adjustments of the brothers’ cooperation.
89 See p. 143.
that allowed him to be very free of the mainland and its concerns.

The conquest of Sicily was a continuing concern that would outlive Guiscard and endured almost to the end of Roger’s life with the piecemeal surrender of Sicily’s Arabic strongholds. As the Kalbid emirate disintegrated in its own internecine strife, and the Normans took advantage of it by progressively taking over the weakened Sicilian towns, Roger was put in a position of building up his own geographically isolated holding as a powerbase independent of the rest of Southern Italy. This of course also meant that Roger had no incentive to rebel, and indeed he remained faithful to his brother from the beginning of the conquest of Sicily onward, as Guiscard had no interest or resources in threatening Roger’s powerbase. After a period of continuous skirmishing, during which Roger established that lack of reward would inevitably bring to rebellion from him, and that their alliance also rested on Guiscard keeping him supplied during his conquest of Sicily, the two remained closely allied, and Roger occasionally rushed to his brother’s help during the Mezzogiorno’s rebellions.

It is undoubted that Roger’s fealty to his brother was enduring, as attested by both his coinage and his frequent presence in his brother’s charters. We see Roger not only lending military assistance when required of him, but styling himself as an underling in the Arabic inscriptions of his coinage, adopting the titles of an emir rather than a sultan. We also see him maintaining a foothold on the mainland with his basis in Mileto, therefore in the heartland of Guiscardian influence, surrounded by the faithful Principato on one side and Southern Apulia on the other. All in all, therefore, Roger had neither incentive to rebel, nor a manifest intention of making himself overtly independent from his powerful brother. Much of this of course depended on the sheer nature of his dominions. While Roger died count of the whole of Sicily, having received the surrender of Noto, the last Arab holdout, in 1091, this successful outcome was far from guaranteed when he first landed thirty years earlier. Indeed, somebody who had simply lived a shorter life might have failed in the achievement. Roger poured his every resource in the conquest, occasionally even enlisting his wives, whom he appears to have left in charge at least once when he needed to go to the mainland. Roger expended two juniors in the conquest, losing first his nephew Serlo, then his extremely competent bastard son, and second-in-command, Jordan, of whom I shall speak at length in the next chapter; a third nephew, William of the Principato’s son Tancred, also received land there. If his gambit paid off, it was a project that took up his whole life, and if it granted him

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90GM, from book II onwards, II.45 for the taking of Palermo, which saw the last participation by Guiscard in the endeavour. For a narrative of the Norman takeover of Sicily, see Becker, Graf Roger, pp. 38-65.
91GM, I.15, 23, 25-6-29; II.23-45.
92 Ménager, Recueil, n. 8B, p. 34; n. 11, pp. 45-6; n. 13B, p. 61; n. 23, pp. 87-9.
94GM, IV, 12-13, 15, pp. 92-3.
96 Becker, Graf Roger, p. 78.
immense rewards, it also left him more than understandably unwilling and unable to be anything but supportive of the brother who covered his back on the mainland.

Yet if the conquest of Sicily was an immense undertaking, its result was to make Roger the power to reckon with in Southern Italy at his brother’s passing. This enduring and mutually rewarding relationship ensured Guiscard’s posthumous achievement: the establishment of vertical inheritance for overlordship of the Hauteville land. Because of his investment in Sicily, Roger would have found it taxing and troubling, even had he been minded to be unfaithful, to take over from his brother; but his authority made him the ideal kingmaker at his death. He did this by negotiating between his two nephews, another pair of brothers whose interlocking fortunes very much shaped Southern Italy at the end of the eleventh century.

Bohemond, baptised Mark, was Guiscard’s son from his first marriage to Alberada of Buonalbergo. Alberada, however, was put aside for reason (or pretext) of consanguinity, allowing Guiscard to marry far more prestigiously with Sichelgaita, daughter of the prince of Salerno. It is with Sichelgaita that he fathered the man who would become his heir, Roger Borsa. The situation of Bohemond and Borsa as brothers was to say the least anomalous. While Bohemond’s mother had been repudiated, she remained part of the clan, an acknowledged spouse of Guiscard, eventually buried in the family tomb in Venosa as discussed above. At the same time, Bohemond’s paternity and his right to be fully associated with his father were never challenged. Indeed, we find him the closer son to Guiscard’s schemes, serving as his second in war much like Roger had once done, having command of part of the army entrusted to him, taking part in his Balkan expeditions, and eventually leading the army back to Italy at his death. While therefore probable reasons of policy had caused the putting aside of Bohemond from the inheritance line, he was still very much Guiscard’s son, trusted by him, with a proven record of military prowess and the probable loyalty of the army.

On the other hand, Borsa had on his side the legitimacy of his mother’s kin, the Lombard princes of Salerno. Traditional historiography has been extraordinarily unkind to Borsa, who possessed none of the dash or the glamour of Bohemond, but it is undoubted that he was both the heir designed of Guiscard, and one whose succession was upheld by his family rather than his own talents. With Borsa’s succession we see the anomalous ‘regency’ of his mother, who ruled by his side, jointly issued charters with him, and sometimes even issued them as ‘dux’ in her own right

97 GM, I.30.  
98 AM, IV.18, pp. 362-3.  
99 AM, VII.18, for his first appearance, pp. 457-8.  
100 See p. 117.  
102 Chalandon, Histoire, I, ch.XII, constitutes a factually accurate but extremely uncharitable reading of the reigns of Roger Borsa and his son; for Borsa’s choice as heir, AM, VII.8, p. 447, 20, pp. 458-9.
despite the fact that Borsa was almost certainly considered of age at his father’s death (being around twenty at the time). One can easily see why, as the presence of a brilliant, prestigious, apparently entirely acknowledged son like Bohemond could easily pose a threat to Borsa’s succession.

Orderic Vitalis has it that Bohemond acted as one might have expected of him, landing his army and immediately claiming the dukedom at his father’s death, a difficult situation which took Roger’s help to defuse and uphold Borsa’s claims. The charters, however tell a different story: for the first three years after Guiscard’s death, we have charters issued by Borsa and witnessed by Bohemond, which acknowledge him as the duke’s brother and which could hardly be expected to be issued in times of strife between the two. While one can see the narrative appeal of Orderic’s version of events, it hardly seems to tally with the documentary evidence. And at the same time, we can see how an immediate rebellion might have been strategically unsound: Bohemond might have counted on the support of the army, but he was abroad, having to return and land in ports securely held by Borsa.

If moved by a few years, through the lens of at least a period of successful and peaceful cooperation between the brothers, Bohemond’s rebellion takes on a more interesting character as part of the pattern of embattled negotiation which we have already identified elsewhere among the Hautevilles. This is further proven by the fact that, far from going all out and seeking victory at any cost as Abelard had done in his time attempting to uphold his claim, Bohemond accepted a fruitful reconciliation in the shape of the dominion of Taranto. In securing this, Roger was fundamental, throwing his military might behind his nephew: Malaterra explicitly has it that Borsa used his uncle ‘as a rod’ to intimidate his adversaries. Furthermore, he kept Bohemond employed by using him in his own enterprises, something which must presumably have carried some sort of reward for Bohemond at the same time as it kept him too busy to threaten his brother’s holdings. When Bohemond heeded the call to crusade, he was besieging Amalfi with Roger, yet another junior Hauteville whose warrior prowess was being used by his elders. At the same time, the ease with which Bohemond was able to leave Amalfi for the East, bringing many of the promising men in the army much to Roger’s chagrin, shows us that he was a free agent, who could and would serve whichever cause he thought best.

Roger’s intervention and his dealings with his nephew show us the far-reaching consequences,
in good and evil, of his alliance with Guiscard. On the one hand, Roger backed his brother’s chosen heir, allowing his succession, neither choosing to support Bohemond nor choosing to make his independent bid in the chaos of the rebellion. On the other, Roger proved himself to be a power to be reckoned with, a growing potentate in the South, with the by-then mostly-conquered Sicily behind him as a secure power base. At the same time, Roger was clearly not antagonistic towards Bohemond, finding it convenient to ally himself with him, and remaining in good relations with him.

If Bohemond never threatened again Borsa’s power, the latter appears to have been both careful of and respectful towards his older brother’s legacy. During the long absence of Bohemond in the East, his lands in Southern Italy were preserved, and when he returned to Europe he found himself still in possession of Taranto, a dominion he transmitted, together with the claim to Antioch, to his son.110 Borsa’s carefulness can be attributed to both practical and familial consideration: on the one hand, the lands may as well remain with the Hauteville family, in the hands of a brother who was by that point more or less trusted, and Bohemond may well have enjoyed continuing popularity in the South; on the other, Bohemond was still another son of the same father. Once more, the overlap of family feelings, sheer convenience, and the scarcity of allies in Southern Italy appear to have produced a situation of solid balance in which different members of the same family could and did reconcile competing interests. This equilibrium, completed by Roger’s tenure of Southern Italy, must have owed much to his equanimity: mostly invested in his Sicilian dominions, he remained faithful to the nephew he’d helped enthrone to the end of his life, and his apparent indifference at the title he bore meant that he died as the sole full count of the by-then quite large Sicilian holding.111

With Roger and Guiscard, and then Guiscard’s sons, we see played out in full and on a bigger stage the patterns of family conquest and family reconciliation which we have discussed until now: an elder brother using his junior as a second, heir apparent, and ally; the junior rebelling in an act of embattled negotiation to demonstrate his worth and drive a hard bargain, and being rewarded and reconciled with lands; the difficulties of shifting into vertical inheritance, and the importance of a faithful, well-rewarded uncle in the process. These successful partnerships had far-reaching consequences: chief of all, the establishment of Roger and Robert’s descendants as the rulers of Southern Italy, the greatest potentates in the region, and the ones among whom the stakes would be higher. The success of family, the natural-born warband of the Hauteville, achieved its peak in their tight network, and even beyond them: when Bohemond needed a second-in-command to follow him East, he turned to Tancred and his younger brother William, the sons of his sister

110 The complex inheritance of Bohemond II will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3.
111 The importance of Roger I’s control over Sicily was the subject of the second Giornate Normanno-sveve conference (see Ruggero il Gran Conte e l’inizio dello stato normanno. Atti delle seconde giornate normanno-sveve, 1975 (Bari: 1991)).
While the extraordinary success enjoyed by the eight sons of Tancred of Hauteville was contextual to the fraught, unique situation they found at their arrival in Southern Italy, the patterns of behavior they developed there were anything but coincidental: the sheer breadth and endurance of their kin network allowed for tried and tested repetition.

1.7 Conclusion

In this first chapter I have laid the basis for my inquiry into Hauteville family relations, beginning with the first well-documented generations: the eight sons of Tancred who went to Southern Italy and there accrued a considerable patrimony. After examining practical matters such as the name employed by the clan, any naming patterns employed by its members, and the likely date of the brothers’ birth and voyages South, this chapter has examined their relationship, considering both patterns of alliance and of discord. It has been shown here how the sons of Tancred formed a flexible but ultimately closely-knit group: after the hierarchical, undiscussed relationship between the sons of Muriella, who clearly knew each other well and had firm relationships in place by the time they reached the South, the coming to Italy of the younger, more loosely-tied sons of Fressenda made for shifting alliances within the family group. Ultimately, however, the sources support a view of the sons of Tancred as a group with a clearly acknowledged reciprocal feeling of belonging to the same family, with reciprocal obligations and expectations.

Generally, the brothers referred to each other as links in an extensive, and highly efficient, network for conquest and rule. They also relied on their younger brothers as either heirs, in the absence of sons, and regents for underage children, in an attempt to establish vertical succession in the South. In this perspective, younger brothers developed with older ones a relationship made of checks and balances, whereas rebellion could serve as embattled negotiation for the younger brother to re-establish their value, and ultimately obtain a better deal. In this context, rebellion was never so extreme as to preclude reconciliation, and the relationships thus developed could lead to long-term, reciprocally beneficial relationships, within which we can likely surmise the development of emotionally and affective beside practical bonds. The chapter concluded by studying the long-term development and enduring practicality of these mechanisms by studying two pairs of brothers: I analysed the long, fruitful relationship between Robert Guiscard and his younger brother Roger of Sicily, and its long-term effects on Guiscard’s sons Bohemond and Roger Borsa. After a period of skirmishing, Roger of Sicily obtained both the trust and the support of Guiscard: the two supported

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112 Ralph also mentions another brother, Robert; he is not mentioned or attested elsewhere, which given the fact that the Gesta survives only in one, damaged manuscript, throws his existence into a certain amount of doubt. Nonetheless, his absence can be plausibly explained: presumably a younger brother, he could have simply returned home at some point during the crusade (Tancredus, lines 250-1, p. 13).
each other in the conquest of Sicily and the establishment of Guiscard’s dukedom, with Roger respecting his older brother’s prerogatives, but also obtaining a large amount of independence in his conquest and administration of the island. At Guiscard’s death, Roger functioned as guarantor of his brother’s chosen heir’s succession, negotiating between his nephews when Bohemond rebelled, and ensuring the establishment of another successful, mutually balanced relationship between brothers. Bohemond and Roger Borsa, accordingly, settled into a mutually satisfactory relationship, as part of which Bohemond received land which was held securely for him even during his time on crusade.

Observing the relationship between Bohemond and Borsa, however, allows us to progress from the examination of the first Hauteville generation in the South, and to open another line of inquiry: that into the fathering, raising, and establishing of Hauteville sons in positions of power, and the contextual and often creative solutions employed by the kin group to make up for their lack.
Chapter 2

Sons and Heirs

The preceding chapter has examined how, beginning from a tightly knit group of brothers, the Hautevilles initially organised their succession according to a highly contextual system of horizontal inheritance among siblings. But how did the Hautevilles progress from horizontal inheritance among brothers to vertical inheritance between themselves and their children, establishing a more direct pattern of succession?

2.1. Beginnings: The Shifting Needs for Succession of the Hauteville Clan

The development of the Hauteville succession strategy is tightly entwined with the evolution of the dominions they controlled. In the very beginning Drogo had succeeded to William Iron-arm’s military command, but William had only possessed Ascoli Satriano, the city originally received in the 1042 shareout, which Drogo added to his own Venosa. After Drogo’s expansion, Humphrey had inherited a larger territorial position which he had further consolidated and expanded. By entrusting Guiscard with the conquest of Calabria, Drogo had begun a pattern of dividing peripheral lands among the members of the family which would continue with Humphrey, giving the Capitanata to Mauger and the Principato to William, while retaining control of Basilicata and Apulia himself. The succession of William to the Capitanata upon Mauger’s death, and his subsequent entrusting it to Geoffrey, show how at this stage succession was still happening contextually among the brothers, with land being distributed to those available in an effort to keep it in the family.

Things changed with Humphrey’s death. With Humphrey we see the first effort to transmit one’s legacy to a son, Abelard, then still a child, by choosing a regent for him, in this case Guiscard. The reconciliation that took place between Humphrey and Guiscard, whose relationship had been troubled, shows us how Humphrey sought to ensure the support of the most powerful of his brothers in Italy to protect his son’s legacy, thus demonstrating the intention of beginning vertical succession for the now much more concrete title of count held by the Hautevilles.

In order to understand these succession mechanisms, we need to consider the time elapsed from the coming of the Hautevilles to Southern Italy (sometime in the mid-1030s) to Humphrey’s death in 1057: there had simply been no time for any of the older Hautevilles to father and raise children

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1 AM, II.31, pp. 294-6.
2 See pp. 27-8.
3 See pp. 22 ff.
who would be of age to take over at their deaths. William Iron-arm and Drogo had certainly shown dynastic ambitions by marrying into the Lombard clans, but at William’s death circa 1046 there is no knowledge of a child born to him, and Drogo’s only known son, Richard the Seneschal, was born either shortly before or perhaps even shortly after his death.\(^5\) If on the one hand there had simply been no sons born to the Hautevilles until the last five or six years before Humphrey’s death, his attempt to establish and ensure vertical succession also marks a radical reconception of Hauteville dominance in Southern Italy. William Iron-arm had been purely a military leader; Drogo had left the beginnings of a territorial lordship; Humphrey had presided over the conquests and administration by Guiscard, the younger William, and eventually Geoffrey. Up until then Hauteville expansion and inheritance had been a passage of arms from one fighting man to the next.

In certain contexts, this would remain true for another generation: the Capitanata remained a troubled no-man’s land only held with difficulty by the counts of Loritello, while the Principato was a difficultly defined area whose boundaries William and his heirs had to negotiate with the principalities of Capua and Salerno.\(^6\) By putting forward as future count a child, Humphrey was acknowledging or possibly altogether attempting to establish a claim to the Hauteville lands that rested not on having conquered them, but on a more sophisticated and institutional countship which rested on bloodright and not right of occupation. The premature nature of such a step is bluntly demonstrated by its aftermath: Guiscard promptly usurped and claimed for himself the countship, as described above. At the same time, the feasibility of such an attempt is also demonstrated by its results: while he never succeeded in defeating his uncle, Abelard’s long career of rebellion showed that he could always prove a focal point for Guiscard’s enemies. While it is dubious how much those who rebelled with him wished to uphold his claim, the disinherited nephew of Guiscard undeniably provided a rallying standard for those who opposed him, thus making a reasonable case for the presence of a certain feeling of the right of an Hauteville to hold overlordship of Southern Italy. Abelard led rebellions in 1067-8, 1072-73, 1079-80, and finally 1082-3.\(^7\)

While the first Hautevilles had not lived long enough to see their children reach maturity, Guiscard’s enduring overlordship up to 1080 gave him the chance properly to provide for his sons and marks the full shift from horizontal to vertical inheritance for the overlordship. Once more we need to understand this in the wider context of the evolution of Southern Italian institutions, through which at his death Guiscard held a papally-sanctioned ducal title, and with the co-operation of his

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\(^5\) Having been active until 1115 at least, Richard, who does not appear in any of the chronicles but only in the charter evidence, must have been born shortly before or after Drogo’s death in 1051. His last extant charter dates to 1115 (see *Il Conte normanno Riccardo Siniscalco (1081-1115) e i monasteri benedettini caveesi in terra d’Otranto (sec.XI-XIV)*, ed. by Giovanni Guerrieri, in *Ricerche e Documenti, III* (Trani: Vecchi, 1899).


\(^7\) For a survey of these revolts, see Loud, *Age of Guiscard*, pp. 234-6.
brother Roger controlled much of Southern Italy in the face of numerous rebellions. While on the one hand Guiscard had a much more concrete territory and a consolidated claim to bequeath, he had also taken far greater steps to ensure that his wishes were respected. Through the cultivation of his relationship with his brother Roger, the choice of a prestigious second wife who, as we shall see below, strongly bolstered her son’s claim, and determinate defense of his prerogatives all shored up and consolidated his power. In Guiscard’s matrimonial policy we see a precise design in bolstering his power in Southern Italy, which made it so that his legitimate firstborn was not in fact his heir. Alberada of Buonalbergo, Guiscard’s Norman first wife, was put aside on the pretext of marriage within forbidden degrees of consanguinity. This, however, did not mean the exclusion of her kin from Guiscard’s faction: their presence in his charters confirms that they remained his allies, and Alberada’s burial in the Hauteville family tomb at Venosa hints at the fact that she was still considered part of the clan and provided for. If on the one hand his mother was not abandoned after being put aside, on the other Bohemond, Guiscard’s firstborn, remained very much present in his father’s plans. As he grew he became his father’s effective second-in-command in the army, accompanying him in his Balkan campaigns.

While on the one hand therefore Guiscard maintained and took advantage of the connections produced by his first marriage, on the other he put his legacy on much surer footing by marrying into the princes of Salerno. Sichelgaita, Guiscard’s second wife, appears as a dominant figure in the chronicles of the time, and her connections appear to have greatly ennobled and secured Guiscard’s claims and those of their son Roger Borsa. Guiscard’s clear indication of his second-born as heir during his sickness, when all his knights but Abelard swore fealty to him, shows he intended him to succeed, even if his father should die when he was still a minor. Borsa’s choice of Salerno as his place of burial, the support received by his mother’s kin, and the fact that Sichelgaita features prominently on his charters (once as dux in her own right) point to the fact that his power was built on the basis of his mother’s family connections.

But if on the one hand Borsa was heir to much more solid and tangible territorial and institutional claims than the Hautevilles who had preceded him, and he found fundamental allies in his mother’s kin group, the crucial element in his claim once more came from within the Hauteville clan: his uncle’s Roger’s support. In the previous chapter I have analysed how the alliance between Roger and Guiscard, while strengthening their position within Southern Italy, isolated them from the rest

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8 See chapter 1, section 6 for a discussion of Robert and Roger’s cooperation.
9 WA, II, lines 420-2, p. 154; Loud, Age of Guiscard, pp. 112-4.
10 Ménager, Recueil, n. 12, pp. 47-55.
12 Discussed in detail below, see pp. 52-4.
13 AM, VII.8, p. 447, 20, pp. 458-9. That Abelard was invited to swear fealty at all tells us that Guiscard was determined to make his nephew part of his network.
of their clan. While rebellion plagued Borsa’s reign, his own succession was uncontested: his duchess Adela of Flanders served as regent for their son William, who inherited his father’s title and dominions upon his coming of age, thus showing the progression of the relationships of power in Southern Italy which had brought to the acceptance of the right of a Hauteville to succeed to the ducal title.\textsuperscript{15} At the same time, however, we shall see in chapter 3 that Duke William reigned over a much diminished holding: but his claim and title were uncontested, showing the solidity of their development. The evolution of the succession practices of the Hautevilles were profoundly tied to the evolution of their titles in Southern Italy: while the shakier holdings of the early days demanded the succession of respected, adult members of the family, and there had been no time yet for children to grow, we see the first attempts to make vertical inheritance a reality as these holdings were consolidated. While this was not possible until the 1080s, again we see that succession demanded the support of one’s family networks, even if the fact that Borsa’s contender for the title was his brother, their father’s firstborn, still confirms that the overlordship of Southern Italy was becoming increasingly close to the Hauteville name.

Much like Guiscard, William of the Principato and Geoffrey were succeeded by their sons in their more limited titles and possessions, having lived long enough for them to come of age and acquire a power-base.\textsuperscript{16} What is more, family support in their favour was strong, as Robert of Loritello, Geoffrey’s heir, was a close ally of Guiscard throughout his life, and received his uncle’s help in managing the unruly Abruzzi.\textsuperscript{17} But what was the situation for those who did not yet have sons able to succeed them, and what was the status of illegitimate ones?

2.2. Nephews: Ersatz Sons\textsuperscript{18}

We have seen in the previous chapter that in the early days of the Hauteville dominion it was common practice for the elder brothers to employ their younger siblings as lieutenants, sometimes making them their de facto heirs in the absence of sons of the right age. A similar mechanism of the choice of a junior member of the family as one’s second-in-command can be seen in action with those of the family who had not yet had children, or whose children were too young to be of fighting age. The role these younger relatives occupied was apparently that of ersatz sons, de facto associated with their elder’s power despite their status as a cadet relative.

\textsuperscript{15} Romuald, \emph{Chronicon}, p. 206.
\textsuperscript{16} See below, chapter 3, section 2.a-b; William II of the Principato enjoyed a good relationship with the ducal family, and Robert of Loritello was in his own right a highly efficient ruler.
\textsuperscript{17} Chapter 3, section 2.a, details the reciprocal relationship between Guiscard and the counts of Loritello.
\textsuperscript{18} The research material employed in this section and the following was also used as the basis for an article on Hauteville uncle-nephew relationships, currently under review for the Haskins Society Journal.
I have mentioned in chapter 1 Serlo, the homonymous son of Serlo, one of Tancred of Hauteville’s sons by Muriella.\(^{19}\) Given the age gap between the brothers, Serlo was probably only a little younger than his uncle Roger, as we find him in Italy in 1060, only a few years after Roger’s arrival.\(^{20}\) Serlo’s talent appears to have been a strong military prowess: we see him associated with Roger during the early years of the conquest of Sicily.\(^{21}\) After the enterprise had been left mostly in Roger’s hands, we see Serlo as one of the main commanders of the army, apparently second only to Roger, and by him rewarded with the overlordship of Gerace and several other cities.\(^{22}\) The profile that emerges is that of a member of the family who had ability and the trust of his superiors, and who appeared to be shaping up to become the second highest-ranking figure in Sicily during its conquest. This career was cut short when Serlo was ambushed and killed in 1072. The attention given to his death by Malaterra, who was writing for Roger himself, hints at Serlo’s importance in the family mythology of the Hauteville: a young and promising member of the family who died in his prime, and who was strongly associated with his uncle’s power before his death:

‘Comes amissione nepotis intolerabili dolore angebatur; dux vero, a lamentis fratrem coercere volens, dolorem suum virili more occultare nitebatur: “Feminis, inquit, lamenta permittantur; nos autem in vindictam armis accingamur.”’\(^{23}\)

As Roger did not then have any children of fighting age, it made sense for him to take as his second a younger member of the family, gifted in war (as Geoffrey’s case shows that such appointments were not automatic) to fight for him and be trusted on the virtue of their family association.

The most famous case of such an association comes from the Hautevilles’ most successful collaborating uncle and nephew pair: Bohemond, and his sister’s son Tancred. Tancred was probably born in Sicily, or at least in Roger’s zone of influence: we only find his father, the shadowy Odobonus Marchius, witnessing Roger’s charters, and Tancred was probably fighting for Roger in the siege of Amalfi when he and Bohemond departed together for the First Crusade.\(^{24}\) While Tancred’s younger brother William followed them, it is clear from the sources that Tancred immediately took up a privileged position in his uncle’s army: despite his young age, which is often remarked upon by the chroniclers, Tancred was entrusted with the command of part of Bohemond’s forces during their progress through the Balkans, and appears to have been slowly building his own following.\(^{25}\) In general, his relationship with Bohemond was close but loose, with Tancred being granted considerable initiative so long as this served his uncle’s wider purposes. Tancred acted as

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\(^{19}\) GM, I, 11.

\(^{20}\) GM, II, 13-5.

\(^{21}\) GM, II, 5, 3.

\(^{22}\) GM, II, 46.

\(^{23}\) GM, II, 46.

\(^{24}\) Becker, *Documenti latini e greci*, ‘Introduction to document 6’; pp. 54-6; *Gesta Francorum*, IV.1.

\(^{25}\) Albert of Aachen, II.22, p. 94, calls him ‘tyro’, a young knight; Guibert de Nogent, *Dei gesta per Francos*, lines 763-5, p. 194, remarks on his youthful impatience in interrupting his seniors; *Tancredus*, lines 18-9, p. 6, describes him as an ‘adolescens’ just before his going to crusade; *The Deeds of the Franks*, V.vii, pp. 10-4.
a free agent, raiding and conquering on his own, during the march to Antioch, and he patrolled the mountain passes for the crusader army in exchange for compensation during the siege. While after Antioch was assigned to Bohemond Tancred marched on to Jerusalem in the service of Godfrey of Bouillon, becoming one of his closest associates and being granted the principality of Galilee by him, at Godfrey’s death once more we see that he was still very much Bohemond’s agent. Albert of Aachen credits Tancred and the pro-Norman Patriarch Daimbert of Pisa with a plot to make Bohemond king of Jerusalem instead of Baldwin. This close association was once more invoked when, upon the capture of Bohemond, Tancred was sent for to assume the regency of Antioch.

If on the one hand however we can see that Bohemond and Tancred had a close and continuous relationship and a well-advertised bond of alliance, theirs was also a fraught and mutually charged rapport. From the very beginning we see Tancred defying his uncle’s orders, wriggling out of swearing allegiance to the Byzantine empire, and generally acting in a rebellious manner. Tancred, a rapacious and opportunist warrior who always amassed wealth where he could (his share of the Jerusalem sack was the Temple, the city’s wealthiest quarter, and his raising his flag over Bethlehem caused scandal) failed to ransom his uncle for three years, instead using his position as regent of Antioch to expand his dominions. At the same time, even if his nephew had proved anything but trustworthy, Bohemond’s retaliation was light: having relegated Tancred upon his return, he still summoned his nephew to war when he resumed his campaigns, and finally Bohemond helped install Tancred on the vacant regency of Edessa.

If anything, the fraught relationship between the two throws into sharper relief their mutual dependence: Tancred was the only one to whom Bohemond could entrust Antioch when he returned to Europe, even if he did so after stripping the city of its wealth and men. Still, Tancred, who had been left with a barely tenable position, was rewarded by his uncle arranging his marriage with Cecile, daughter of the king of France, at the same time as he married the princess Constance. Tancred’s independence was finally rewarded at his uncle’s death: the position he had consolidated allowed him to reject the treaty of Devol with which the defeated Bohemond had conceded overlordship of Antioch to the Byzantine emperor, and at his untimely death the following year he

31 *Tancredus*, lines 4229-34, pp. 123-4.
32 *Tancredus*, lines 4077-84, pp. 119-20.
33 WT, 11.1, pp. 495-6, *Tancredus*, lines 4415-4434, p. 129.
34 WT, 11.1, pp. 495-6. Cecile was a daughter of Phillip’s contested marriage to Bertrada de Montfort, though she still carried considerable cachet given her paternity.
left Antioch independent.\textsuperscript{35} While the birth of his cousin Bohemond II had removed Tancred from his role as heir apparent to Bohemond, his arrangements for Antioch at his death bespeak very much his role as de facto ruler.\textsuperscript{36} While in the previous chapter I have spoken of embattled negotiation, Tancred’s attitude towards his uncle was often one of outright rebellion; but their reconciliation in spite of their reciprocal slights bespeaks the importance and uniqueness of their bond. The highest ranking Hautevilles in the crusader states, in a state of frequent hostility with their neighbours at Tripoli and Edessa and with the kings of Jerusalem, Bohemond and Tancred relied on each other and eventually did not fail each other: while it would be hard to make even a cautious case for any warmth between the two, there was clearly a functional, efficient and ultimately mutually beneficial relationship based on their bond as close relatives.

Bohemond’s choice of Tancred as his second suggests the importance of the Hauteville bond on the maternal side: he was as naturally associated to his mother’s kin as Serlo had been through his father, and in general his father is barely mentioned, if at all, in the sources. Both of them nephews, both of them talented in war, Tancred and Serlo were both taken under the protection of their uncles to serve as their seconds, and often appear as their de facto heirs, ersatz sons fulfilling the same functions Bohemond had fulfilled for Guiscard in a time of war.

A less publicised but still important uncle-nephew relationship was that between Guiscard and Robert of Loritello, Geoffrey’s son. The Loritellos and their power in the Abruzzi will be discussed at length in the next chapter; but here it is possible to begin to sketch Guiscard’s close relationship to his nephew. If Geoffrey had been routinely passed over by his brother, his eldest son seems to have abundantly made up for his father’s shortcomings. Far from being lacklustre, Robert emerges from Amatus’ pages as a character of a certain importance: the duke’s ‘beloved’ nephew, immediately distinguished in his service and hungry for more.\textsuperscript{37} Such ambition, joined to undoubted loyalty to his uncle Guiscard, was quickly rewarded: thus Robert spear-headed the conquest campaign north into the Abruzzi, and when the embattled land proved to be too much for his resources, he was supported by Guiscard.\textsuperscript{38} In William of Apulia, who as a writer working for Borsa was in a position to know, it was to Robert of Loritello (and a no-better-identified friend Gerard) that Guiscard entrusted Roger Borsa when he left for his Balkan campaign, revealing once more his trust in his nephew.\textsuperscript{39} While this may appear to clash with Malaterra’s assurance that Guiscard had been relying on Roger of Sicily to guard his inheritance, the two accounts are in fact easily reconciled. The Abruzzi were close enough to Apulia that Robert of Loritello would have made a better agent to throw his weight behind Borsa on the scene; Roger of Sicily, who was farther away

\textsuperscript{35} Annae Comnenae Alexias, 14.2, pp. 427-34.
\textsuperscript{36} WT, 11.18, pp. 522-3.
\textsuperscript{37} AM, VII.25, pp. 462-3.
\textsuperscript{38} AM, VII.30, pp. 467-8.
\textsuperscript{39} WA, IV, lines 190-200, p. 214. It is quite feasible that the Gerard in object was in fact Gerard of Buonalbergo, thus once more underlining the enduring closeness between Guiscard and the kin group.
but also in a stronger position, would and did make a better keeper in the long run in the event of a contested succession. While his powerful, semi-independent brother revealed himself to be, and had probably been envisioned as, the ideal long-term kingmaker, Robert’s good relationship with his homonymous nephew had given him both an efficient and trusted conqueror for one of the more troublesome Hauteville dominions and a good man to entrust his succession to in loco in his absence.

But if a legitimate nephew could be chosen for such a role in the same way younger brothers had been employed previously, what of illegitimate children?

2.3. Bastardy and the Hautevilles

Sara McDougall’s seminal if recent study Royal Bastards has amply demonstrated how, in the eleventh and twelfth century, European attitudes towards bastardy and illegitimacy were much more elastic and less strict than previously supposed. Far from being an indelible stain which would prevent them from inheriting, the illegitimacy of children still entailed certain rights, and bastards had to be explicitly excluded from testaments for these rights to be superseded. Lack of a clear definition of legitimate marriage, the still widespread practice of concubinage, and the easy annulments often granted in this time all contributed to creating a situation in which many acknowledged children came from not necessarily licit marital unions, but this did not always hold them back. This chimes entirely with the situation of the children of the Hautevilles. We have mentioned above how, even after the repudiation of his mother, Bohemond remained associated with his father’s rule, fulfilling the role of lieutenant and finding backing for his claim when he rebelled against his brother Borsa and attempted to seize the duchy. Nowhere is it hinted that the repudiation of his mother in any way changed Bohemond’s status, or that he was somehow considered illegitimate, and indeed his case is mentioned by McDougall to show how annulment did not necessarily make the children of a marriage such.

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42 McDougall, *Royal Bastards*, pp. 190-254 shows how, in circumstances in which the good of embattled kingdoms such as the Iberian kingdoms or the Kingdom of Jerusalem required it, canon law could be quite flexible.

43 GM, IV.4, p. 87.

clearly bore legitimacy enough to rally support for his rebellion, as discussed in chapter 1. While he does not appear in the sources until the Balkan campaign of 1081, by which time he must have been at least in his twenties, Bohemond clearly was close enough to his father to be a known and trusted entity, and he had been shaped for and was experienced in war as well, something which suggests that Guiscard had kept his eldest son close despite having put aside his mother. Indeed, that there was nothing automatic about Roger Borsa’s succession, despite the annulment of his father’s first marriage, is suggested by the fact that he was explicitly selected as the heir when Guiscard was very ill in 1073. Had Bohemond become a bastard by virtue of his mother’s repudiation, it should have been apparent which son was poised to inherit.

A more interesting situation is that of Richard the Seneschal. As we have said above, his being still alive and active in 1115 tells us that he must have been born very near or immediately after his father’s death in 1051. He is undoubtedly ‘magni comitidis Drogonis filius’, and as such he is recorded in the charters. He served in Guiscard’s service, and he is first found in possession of lands after the third rebellion against him, which suggests they were a reward for his loyalty to him at this time. However, he only obtained these lands in what must have been his thirties, well after he had become of fighting age and potentially useful to his relatives. That he was useful and competent at what he did is demonstrated by the charters he repeatedly witnessed with Guiscard and then Borsa, which demonstrate his enduring and positive rapport with his relatives, and the fact that he seems to have accompanied Guiscard on his campaign against Byzantium. But in two of his later charters, Drogo mentions a mother: Altrude, a woman of the same name as his wife. Drogo’s wife at the time of his death had been Gaitelgrima, a princess of Salerno, whom he had married in 1047. Richard calls himself filius Drogonis in his charters: not spurius, nothus, or bastardus, the names usually employed for children of irregular unions. We could theorise that he was the son of a marriage conveniently annulled once a better bride appeared for Drogo, as Guiscard had had his marriage annulled once Sichelgaita became a prospect: a child of such a marriage could have been born as late as 1048, and be conceivably alive in 1118. However, as we shall see below for Jordan son of Roger of Sicily, being son of a concubine did not necessarily mean one had to bear such a title, and Richard might be the son of such a union.

We know nothing about Richard’s early life, but the way he was able to serve successfully as part of the kin group as an adult, and the open way his paternity was acknowledged, suggest that he was a known member of the kin group, and that he had received training for both administration

\[^{45}\text{AM, VII.8, p. 447, 20, pp. 458-9.}\]
\[^{46}\text{Il conte normanno, n. III, pp. 53-4.}\]
\[^{47}\text{Ménager, n. 50, pp. 177-8; Bruno Figliuolo, ‘Ancora sui normanni d’Italia alla Prima Crociata’, Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane, 104 (1986), 1-16, 15-6.}\]
\[^{48}\text{Il conte normanno, n. XXIV-XXV, pp. 100-6.}\]
\[^{49}\text{AM, II.35, pp. 299-300.}\]
\[^{50}\text{McDougall, Royal Bastards, pp. 22-34.}\]
and war. Nonetheless, he clearly had to wait a while, until his thirties, for a lordship. This might strengthen the impression that his mother was low status: Alberada and her kin remained part and parcel of Guiscard’s alliance network, and she was honoured at his death, but the son of a concubine of Drogo would have had no kin to back him up, only the good will of his relatives. That such a good will was granted is shown by Richard’s patently positive and active relationship with his relatives later in life, and by the fact that he had clearly been educated for power and war. His obscurity can be easily explained by political reason: Guiscard had already usurped the inheritance of one nephew on his way to power. Both he and Humphrey before him would have found it convenient to keep a son of Drogo, whatever his mother’s status, on the sidelines. Once Robert’s power was firmly established Richard could be rewarded; and once he had become a man of subordinate but trusted standing he could bear both the title of filius magni comitis and seneschal, and be a threat to no one.

Another child of illegitimate maternity is William, son of Duke Roger Borsa. He is first directly recorded in 1115, witnessing a donation to Cava.\(^{51}\) William then appears in two charters of Troia: he was present at an 1120 judgment in which the duke, and his cousin Robert II of Loritello (whose family will be discussed at length in the next chapter) collared a member of the family who had appropriated land from a monastery and made him give it back.\(^{52}\) Here William is listed as ‘filius duceis’; in an 1123 charter restating the 1120 judgment, he is listed as de Lucera, which implies he had a lordship.\(^{53}\) His presence in a minor lordship and his association to his legitimate brother’s charters suggest that he was an acknowledged son, perhaps of a mother of a certain status, for which provision were made. We know his mother’s name was Maria, a name which suggests Lombard or Greek origins: in 1105, remarkably at the urging of his wife Adela, Roger Borsa donated to her a piece of land in Salerno and the buildings found on it.\(^{54}\) The same charter tells us her husband was named John; taken together, this suggests a woman with interests in an urban environment, for whom a husband was found, and who could actually appeal to the duchess herself, which suggests that her relationship with the duke was well-recognised, as was her having born him a son, but also that neither Maria nor William were in any way a threat to the ducal family. It could be suggested, then, that Maria was a woman of some standing, possibly of a wealthy urban family, or of the minor nobility, who either sought ducal help in augmenting her family wealth, or in remedying financial difficulties. In every way, we are looking at an accepted, and in no way controversial, relationship, as testified by the fact that William grew up to have a fief, be part of the

\(^{51}\) Cava de’ Tirreni, Archivio della Abbazia di S. Trinità, Arm. E.30 (1120), (henceforth, unpublished charters from this archive shall be indicated as Cava, followed by the armarium letter and the charter number); for an introduction to the abbey of Cava, see Graham A. Loud, ‘The Abbey of Cava, Its Property and Benefactors in the Norman Era’, ANS 9 (1987), 143-77.

\(^{52}\) Chartes de Troia, n. 43, pp. 167-71.

\(^{53}\) Chartes de Troia, n. 46, pp. 175-7.

\(^{54}\) Cava, E.1; Chalandon, La domination, pp. 311-2.
ducal court, and witness his legitimate brother’s charters. While it mostly lies outside the purvey of this thesis, it is here useful to draw a parallel between William, son of the duke, and Simon, illegitimate son of Roger II: while we do not know who Simon’s mother might be, and therefore her status, Simon was provided for by his father, who, as we shall see below, made him prince of Taranto once most of his legitimate sons had died.\(^{55}\) While the rewards available to a duke of unstable rule such as Roger Borsa and a newly triumphant king such as Roger II were far different in scale, their attitude to their sons showed that both William and Simon were not thought of in terms of inheritance, but were still acknowledged and provided for with a title.

The question becomes more complicated when we turn our attention to the most successful of the Hauteville bastards: Jordan. There are no doubts as to the status of Jordan’s birth: Malaterra openly calls him ‘*Rogeri filius ex concubina*’, not only therefore born out of wedlock but to a lowborn mother.\(^{56}\) Sons of concubines were usually acknowledged by the names mentioned above, but Jordan is indicated by the same term as a legitimate son, both in Latin and in Greek.\(^{57}\) The position this concubine’s son attained was both remarkable, and apparently entirely meritocratic. Jordan’s co-operation with his father was based on a close military alliance: as his cousin Serlo had done before him, Jordan served as one of Roger’s main commanders in the conquest of Sicily. Malaterra liberally praises his military prowess; but to close military co-operation was added administrative trust.\(^{58}\) Roger left Jordan in charge of affairs in Sicily when he departed to support Guiscard in one of the rebellions on the Continent, a role which he had significantly previously entrusted to his wife.\(^{59}\) Paradoxically, his reliance on Jordan and regard for him are shown in the moment of Jordan’s betrayal: he rebelled with twelve fellow conspirators who were all blinded on Roger’s return, but was himself spared.\(^{60}\) Much like Bohemond with Tancred, Roger kept employing his chosen junior despite his infidelities. Unlike Tancred, Jordan rebelled only once, but his father certainly made sure he got no chance of a repeat: when he left Sicily in the 1080s Roger entrusted the army and the island to Jordan, but he also ordered him to remain in the field and not enter any fortified town.\(^{61}\)

That Jordan was both able and ambitious is shown by the fact that he was enterprising in matters of war, once going into the field against his father’s orders, another by suggesting a daring strategy which, Malaterra acknowledges, would have won the day.\(^{62}\) But in this occasion Roger snapped at his son, reiterating that not even he could give him orders: we could be facing Roger’s short temper.

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55 See p. 160.
56 GM, III.36, p. 78.
57 He is identified as the υἱός of the count in one of the charters he witnessed (*Documenti latini e greci*, n. 6, pp. 53-5).
58 As he does indeed, even in spite of count Roger, in GM, IV.16.
59 GM, II.45.
60 GM, III.37, pp. 79-80.
61 GM, IV.16, pp. 94-6.
as he aged, but also the acknowledgement of the fact that Jordan’s military brilliance and clear leadership in the army might prove a threat to his own power. Nonetheless, Jordan’s status appears as that of an heir apparent. At the same time as Roger married Adelaide del Vasto, Jordan married her sister. Houben theorises that when Adelaide married Roger she obtained the promise that any sons of hers would succeed the throne; but at the time of his untimely death of a fever, as Malaterra carefully explains, ‘Jordanum plures comitis haeredem futurum suspicabantur’. Much like Serlo, Jordan is hotly mourned in the text, which we can expect to have reflected Roger’s wishes as it was written for him. Malaterra shows Roger rushing to his son’s deathbed and crying in grief, affectingly saying that ‘the end of Jordan’s life was faster than his father’, then enshrining in poetry with an epitaph what appears a close and valued relationship. At the same time, it is Malaterra who explicitly describes the status of Jordan’s mother, and who is extremely careful with his wording in indicating Jordan as a possible heir. If Roger had clearly put Jordan in a prime position to succeed him, and it is difficult to imagine him not putting up a fight had he lived to see his father’s death, at the same time the same source who enshrines Jordan’s memory shows that for some reason he could not be outright declared to be the heir.

Jordan’s unique career should be contextualised in the framework of Roger of Sicily’s hotly contested family tree. Roger married three times, to Judith of Évreux, Eremburga of Mortain and Adelaide del Vasto, and he had a number of sons and daughters, but we are uncertain of the status or maternity of most of them, save the children of Adelaide (Simon, who died in childhood, the future Roger II, and his sister Matilda who commissioned Alexander of Telese’s work). Between Jordan, the first son of his mentioned, and Simon and Roger, we know of three other sons: two Godfreys, and a Mauger. One of the Godfreys was due to marry a sister of Adelaide del Vasto at the same time as Roger married her and Jordan married another sister, but he could not because of illness. We have firm evidence that there were two Godfreys, in the shape of a charter signed by both, and Houben is most likely right when he argues that one became lord of Ragusa and the other became sick and died: while we know from Baldwin IV that other medieval rulers could and did reign even with leprosy, Godfrey of Ragusa had a son, Sylvester of Marsico, who was attested until 1162, and it is therefore unlikely that he was conceived before circa 1089, when the del Vasto marriages were contracted.

63 GM, IV.14, p. 93.
67 Roger I’s wives and daughters will be discussed in depth in chapter 4.
68 GM, IV.14, p. 93.
69 Houben, ‘Adelaide del Vasto’, pp. 92 ff.; while Bernard Hamilton (The Leper King and His Heirs: Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 109-11; 138-58) suggests that Baldwin was never meant to rule throughout his life, but to eventually give over the throne, and thus worked to provide her sister with a husband who could command the crusader armies and take his place, Baldwin’s experience certainly shows that contextual rule by a leper could be possible under
We can argue with Houben that he had a Godfrey who was lord of Ragusa, one who would have been his possible heir if he had not been sick, and Mauger who covered some minor role. Or the Godfrey betrothed to Adelaide’s sister and the lord of Ragusa could be the same, and the other Godfrey be a minor figure like Mauger: the evidence supports both theories. One Godfrey was indicated as heir at the same time as Simon in 1095, in a charter he signed with Adelaide, something which implies a certain cordiality between the two; this was a few years after the Godfrey who had been betrothed to Adelaide’s sister was unable to carry through his marriage because of illness.\(^70\) It appears therefore that Mauger was never in the running for the inheritance; that one Godfrey was in a position of favour at the moment of the del Vasto wedding; that he or his brother was still considered heir five years later, at the same time as the infant Simon; that one Godfrey lived to be the count of Ragusa; and at some point, after 1095, Adelaide managed to shift the inheritance back to her sons, or more simply these other sons died. Lack of evidence may well make it possible that one or more of these children rebelled at the time of their father’s death and we simply do not know; but we might expect even scarce evidence such as we have for rebellions in Adelaide’s time to include this information.\(^71\)

We have no reason to believe that any of them was the fruit of an unsanctioned union. Since Judith’s daughters are usually mentioned in association with their mother in Malaterra, I am tempted to think that the Godfrey who was betrothed to Adelaide’s sister was a son of Eremburga of Mortain.\(^72\) Mauger, the other son of Roger, who only appears in a charter, may also have been a son of Eremburga; and since he appears in 1098 and then never again we do not necessarily know that he was alive when his father died, and his children by Adelaide were poised in the line of succession.\(^73\) Even should Mauger and the healthy Godfrey have been alive at his father’s death, this was not the first time a Hauteville eldest son had been put aside in favour of a younger one; and if this had held true for the brilliant Bohemond, we have no reason to think it should not have for more lacklustre ones, who do not appear in the narrative sources.

Becker raises doubts about the authenticity of the 1095 charter in which Godfrey is indicated as heres; should it be original we would have to doubt Houben and Pontieri’s hypothesis, that as part of the negotiations to marry Adelaide del Vasto Roger agreed to put aside any children he already had in favour of hers given Godfrey’s permanence (and it remains doubtful to me whether Jordan, so clearly a strong contender for his father’s succession, would have accepted this had he

\(^{70}\) Becker, Documenti greci e latini, n. 51.
\(^{71}\) See pp. 138-9.
\(^{72}\) GM, IV.23, p. 101. Daughters of Judith are mentioned in III.10, pp. 61-2; III.22, p. 70; IV.8, p. 90.
been alive at the time of Roger’s death). Mauger had clearly never been a contender for the county; it is very possible that the Godfrey who endured was the sick one, unable to make a successful bid for the county but aging in Ragusa; and that the second Godfrey, who had been brought in as a possible heir, died before his father. It seems hard to believe that the Godfrey who had been too sick to consummate his marriage would still be indicated as heir five years after it when he had at least three if not four living brothers, depending on when we place Roger II’s birth. Ultimately, this remains a doubtful knot, as everything from the maternity to the status of Roger I’s three other sons can be cast into doubt.

What it does show us, is that Jordan had been Roger’s firstborn, son of an irregular but acknowledged relationship further discussed in chapter 4; that he was groomed for war, and immediately showed talent for it, coming to cover a powerful and efficient position in his father’s army; that he felt he had enough of a backing to rebel once, and that Roger felt he was enough of a threat to try to neutralise it when he left again. But this powerful son of a lowborn mother, good in war, ambitious, was also clearly favoured enough to be provided with a high-status wife, to be repeatedly left in charge of Sicily, and to be mourned with pain and vengeance at his death, when the Muslim town he had governed rebelled. Whatever the status of the two Godfreys and Mauger, Jordan had clearly been preferred to them all, and had he still been alive at Roger’s death, he might probably have given Adelaide del Vasto and her powerful kin, who will be discussed in chapter 5, a run for their money.

In this, we might be very tempted in comparing Jordan to a Norman bastard of spectacular career – William the Conqueror. However, as David Bates argues at length in his recent biography, while his mother Herleva’s status as an irregular partner of Duke Robert did not necessarily hinder William’s career, and clearly the union was acknowledged and their child well provided for, especially in the absence of any legitimate heirs, this was a very ‘delicate’ point in the sources, and one which was addressed by calling William ‘nothus’ and ‘bastardus’ explicitly. This did not happen in Southern Italy, neither to a bastard poised to inherit such as Jordan, nor to a minor figure such as William of Lucera. The difference may lie in the firmly established nature of the duchy William the Conqueror stood to inherit, as opposed to the county that Jordan had helped conquer himself; in this case, we would find here once more the contextual and flexible attitude shown by the Hautevilles towards kin building shown by the ease with which they could turn nephews into

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75 GM, IV.18, pp. 97-8.
possible heirs. By examining the status and names of the illegitimate children of the Hautevilles, inevitably, we must come to the conclusion that the irregularity of their birth seemed to matter very little to them.

2.4. Underage Heirs: Hauteville Regents

As the dominions of the Hautevilles were consolidated as both territorial entities and titles one could transmit as a legacy, the Southern Italian situation enabled the passage of one’s territories and title even to those who could not already fight for them, underaged heirs whose rule was preserved by regents, overwhelmingly their mothers. We have already examined Abelard’s case, in which his uncle Guiscard took advantage of his position as regent to usurp his title and become count in his stead. The seeming lack of resistance to Guiscard’s takeover, and the fact that Abelard only found support for his cause once he was old enough to lead it, hint that his right to inherit was not acknowledged until he was actually able to fight for it himself. At the same time, the fact that William of Apulia, a source vehemently favourable to Guiscard, found it impossible not to mention that Guiscard had been named as a regent (glibly as he passes over his actual usurpation) tells us that the fact was widely known and regency, if not practical, was at least countenanced. While however Guiscard found himself in a position to take over, having already established himself as the second most powerful Hauteville after Humphrey, the subsequent regencies of the Hautevilles took place in very different circumstances. Sichelgaita, Adelaide del Vasto, Constance of France and Adela of Flanders all in different ways ensured the beginning of their sons’ reign, and they all functioned to the best of our knowledge as correct, faithful regents for them. While we have seen that the horizontal kinship of Southern Italy under the Normans gave some women the chance to inherit in their own right, all the regents here considered were not part of the Hauteville clan, but rather had married into it. They did not pose the same threat to the heirs they held in ward as much as a male Hauteville would have, and they rested their power on a complicated net of family rights, developing inheritance pattern, and a largely unprovable but nonetheless interesting amount of personal influence and personal governance.

Sichelgaita’s is what we might call a ‘faux’ regency, which we might more correctly describe as a form of borderline joint rule with her son Borsa. Marrying into the family of the princes of Salerno had lent Guiscard, until then a successful robber baron, a certain amount of legitimacy in Southern Italy, anchoring his power to one of the long-established Lombard principalities and securing him the support of a powerful kin group.77 This was reflected not only in Guiscard’s prioritizing of Sichelgaita’s offspring over Bohemond, but also in her position during his reign. Sichelgaita is portrayed as an active participant in Guiscard’s power to an extent in which other

77 Though as we shall see below, their usefulness had a term.
spouses of the era were not. While one must certainly take *cum grano salis* Anna Comnena’s account of Sichelgaita’s participation in her husband’s military campaigns, it still suggests to us that the two were perceived by the Byzantines as very much partners in crime.\(^7\) This is borne out by the couple’s jointly issued charters, in which Sichelgaita figures beside her husband as an entity in her own right, *ducissa* not only as his wife but also as the bearer of a certain amount of family influence.\(^7\)

This influence would continue to bear its fruits at Borsa’s accession. Born around 1060, Borsa was either twenty-four or twenty-five when his father died: already abundantly of age for the time, and theoretically more than capable of upholding his own claim.\(^8\) We have seen above, however, how carefully Guiscard had worked to ensure transition for him, variously entrusting Borsa’s rule to Robert of Loritello and Roger of Sicily. Given Bohemond’s popularity and military prowess, and the common revolts endured by Guiscard which will be further discussed in the next chapter, it is scarcely surprising that Borsa would need his capable relatives to buttress his rule. What is peculiar is not, therefore, that his accession to the duchy was protected by his male relatives: but rather the fact that for the first few years of his reign he appears to have issued charters, and most plausibly, ruled, together with his mother.\(^8\)

Not only do we have Sichelgaita still bearing the title of *ducissa* she had enjoyed when her husband was alive in her son’s charters: we twice have her issuing charters under the title ‘Sichelgaita dux’, which suggests rule in her own right rather than vicariously for anybody else.\(^8\) The reason why this happened is at once immediately clear and in need of further exploration. Chalandon’s immensely influential history of the Normans in the South established the predominant view of Roger Borsa as a weak, ever so slightly pathetic man, much inferior to both his brilliant father and his much more dashing brother.\(^8\) It is undoubted that Borsa could not boast the same abilities as them: even William of Apulia, who was writing for him, described as Borsa’s most heroic deed his cool temper during a storm at sea.\(^8\) Malaterra openly claims that Borsa used his uncle Roger as ‘a cudgel’: it is clear that for him Roger’s contribution had been essential to maintaining his power.\(^8\) Discussion of Bohemond II’s troubled history below, and of the counts of Conversano in the next chapter will show that Borsa’s reign was indeed troubled, and that while Guiscard himself had been plagued by revolts, Borsa was far less efficient than his father in putting them down. He had recaptured Troia in 1082, when his father was still alive; but once he reigned,

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\(^7\) Annae Comnenae Alexias, 6.6, p. 180.


\(^8\) Having died at 51 in 1111 (Romuald, *Chronicon*, p. 206).

\(^9\) Ménager, n. 46, pp. 169-70; 49, pp. 175-6.

\(^8\) Ménager, *Recueil*, n. 31, pp. 46-7; see below, p. 54.

\(^8\) Chalandon, *Histoire*, II, chapter XII.

\(^8\) WA, V, lines 156-76, pp. 245-6.

\(^8\) GM, IV.4, p. 87.
while he moved with brutal efficiency at least once, when he reclaimed the territories of Monte Sant’Angelo once those became vacant, it is fair to say that Borsa was not militarily strong, and that better warriors’ help was necessary to keep him in power.  

All this still does not immediately explain why it was necessary for his mother to rule jointly with him. When Guiscard had married her, circa 1058, Sichelgaita had been a member of one of the most important Lombard kin groups, and her brother Gisulf II had been prince of Salerno. But after 1077, when Gisulf went in exile after losing his city to Guiscard (Sichelgaita had unsuccessfully attempted to mediate between the two) this was no longer the case. Borsa himself was the representative of the Lombard princes’ descendence. I would argue that Sichelgaita represented something far closer to home: a direct link to his father’s rule. Sichelgaita was not only a prestigious bride, but someone whom Guiscard had systematically associated to his reign. The two often travelled together; they signed charters together; she was left in charge of the siege of Trani in 1080; she accompanied Guiscard on his final campaign, and brought his body home. At least once, Sichelgaita and Guiscard were jointly acknowledged in a charter as ‘duces’. While these instances do not make a clear enough picture to outright state that Sichelgaita had ruled jointly with Guiscard, her role was both active and well-publicised. The endurance of her power might well have helped with continuity from an administrative point of view, while Roger of Sicily defended the duchy from rebellions. It seems self-evident that Borsa had been chosen as heir because of his mother rather than because of any intrinsic quality, especially given the young age at which he was first indicated as such; Sichelgaita may well have felt that her son’s inheritance was contingent on her own power, and her use of the title dux surely suggests that she was perceived to hold rights of her own. The first regent examined here, therefore, is not a regent as much as somebody enjoying an odd but well-documented position of co-rule with a son who, even if of age, needed her support.

A different and far more conventional case is that of Adela of Flanders, Borsa’s wife, who acted as regent in the four years between Borsa’s death and the end of his son William’s minority (1111-1114). An illustrious bride who had once been queen of Denmark, Adela brought a certain prestige to her marriage, but no local connections that could bolster her son’s claim. Her brief regency, however competent and correct, could not stop the struggles that had embattled Apulia

86 WA, IV, lines 509-523, p.232; Romuald, Chronicon, p. 203.
87 AM, VIII.18-31, pp. 494-508.
89 Ménager, n. 42, pp. 133-6 has both Sichelgaita and Guiscard significantly identified as ‘duces’. While Guiscard did issue charters jointly with both Sichelgaita and Roger Borsa (for example Ménager, n. 31, pp. 101-4; 40, pp. 124-9), Roger never enjoyed the title dux while his father was alive, showing that while his mother was associated to ducal power, he was not.
90 Having died at around fifty in 1111, Roger Borsa had to be in his early teens when he was chosen as heir during his father’s illness in 1073 (AM, VII.8, p. 447, 20, pp. 458-9).
91 Romualdo, Chronicon, p. 200.
during her husband’s lifetime and that would continue under her son’s tenure. When one’s kin was far away there was little a regent, especially a female one, could be but a placeholder. Nonetheless, Adela, who had inherited a weak position for her husband and had an extremely lacklustre son, successfully ensured the transition of power from herself to him.

A far different thing is Adelaide del Vasto’s regency as countess of Sicily, which will be discussed in detail given its long-reaching consequences in chapter 5, but which it is worth first sketching out here. Adelaide reigned for eleven years, from her husband’s death in 1101 to Roger’s accession to the county in 1112, first in the name of his elder brother Simon, who died a child in 1105, and then for Roger himself. While the documentary lapse in this period of Sicilian history refuses to yield much about this time, we know that Adelaide put down two revolts and fostered the beginning of Sicily’s multilingual chancery through her chief advisor Christodoulos, first of Sicily’s emirs. The picture that emerges is that of a regent who was enterprising and firmly in control. Her granting of Paternò to her brother Henry del Vasto, a member of the North Italian group of nobles imported by count Roger to colonise Sicily, suggests that Adelaide kept her kin close and probably used them to buttress her power and fight her wars. Her cultivation of what sounds like the beginning of a multicultural court, and her shrewd administration give us at least the outline of a smart and well-connected regency. Adelaide rested her power on both her family connections and what looks like a good personal ability, steering Sicily successfully through not one but two minorities, and influencing the ways in which her son Roger II perceived and administered power.

A final, successful but troubled regency comes with Constance, wife of Bohemond and mother of Bohemond II. Carrying considerable cachet as the daughter of the king of France, a title she proudly bore in the charters she issued jointly with her son, Constance was engaged in the destructive struggle against the count of Conversano to preserve her husband’s inheritance. Despite managing to escape captivity and scouring Alexander of Conversano’s lands in 1116, in 1119 she was captured by him again, and in order to be released she had to renounce overlordship of Bari. But Constance’s efforts were clearly successful to a degree as, upon his attaining majority, Bohemond II still retained great part of his dominions and for two years he appears to have administered them as ruler of Taranto. Much as Borsa had preserved Bohemond I’s holdings during his sojourn in Outremer, Adela of Flanders first and then Duke William supported Bohemond II’s claim, at least during his minority.

92 Chapter 3 will focus on the progressive crumbling of ducal power in the years before Roger II’s takeover.
93 Johns, Arabic Administration, ch.1: Houben, Roger II of Sicily, p. 25.
94 Houben, Roger II of Sicily, pp. 24-7.
95 Romuald, Chronicon, pp. 208-210, 212-4; Le Pergamene di S. Nicola di Bari, n. 64, pp. 111-2.
96 Romuald, Chronicon, p. 208.
In his double position as heir to Taranto and to Antioch, however, Constance was not Bohemond’s only regent: so may have been his cousins Tancred, and later Roger of Salerno. Both Tancred and Roger, successful military commanders, thousands of miles away from Southern Italy, both young enough to have reasonable expectation of producing heirs before their deaths (Tancred died in his thirties of a sudden illness, Roger died in battle) could probably have successfully seized full power during Bohemond II’s minority. The status of the rule of Antioch is uncertain. The Hystoria de via has it that Bohemond had Tancred swear that he would hand back the principality either to him, or to any legitimate children he might have as he left for Europe. Later however Bohemond submitted to the Byzantines with the treaty of Devol in 1108, but Tancred refused to ratify it, and the Byzantines could not defeat him. It is a moot point whether this technically meant that Bohemond had relinquished power over Antioch: the Hystoria de via insists that Tancred to the end of his life ‘served’ faithfully for his cousin, and certainly, even sources as generally unfavourable to Tancred as Albert of Aachen endorse his rule in Antioch as legitimate. As explained above, Tancred had a long history of rebelling against Bohemond: it is certainly difficult to imagine him simply relinquishing power to his cousin Bohemond II after rescuing Antioch from submission, had he been alive at the attainment of his majority. He styled himself princeps in his surviving charters after the departure of Bohemond for the West, and minted his own coins.

Well-entrenched in Antioch, a powerful warrior with the respect of his enemies and clear ambition, Tancred would have been difficult to dislodge. But that Bohemond II’s claim had some power is demonstrated by the fact that Fulcher of Chartres denounces as usurpation Roger of Salerno’s rule after Tancred’s death. The son of a cousin, Richard of the Principate, who had joined Bohemond and Tancred from the very start and ruled Edessa for them, Roger was the highest ranking Hauteville in the East at Tancred’s death, and his fitness to succeed him was acknowledged by the fact that he married Cecile LeBourcq, sister of Baldwin of Edessa. Roger was acknowledged as ruler of Antioch by the city itself, which rallied behind him, and by Baldwin II, king of Jerusalem, who was in far better relations with him than he had been with Tancred. But

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98 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, XII.8, pp. 834-6; Asbridge, The Principality of Antioch, pp.143-5.
99 Tancred principatum Antiochenum eo tenore sub ieiurando commisit, ut aut sibi redeunti aut heredi eius quem de coniuge legitima habiturus habiturus esset […] restitueretur, Hystoria de via, 21.26, 135
100 Annae Comnenae Alexias, 14.2, pp. 427-34.
101 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, XII.8, pp. 834-6, commemorates Tancred’s valour and the loss his death constituted for the crusaders; Hystoria de via, 21.45, p. 137.
103 Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia (1095-1127), ed. by Heinrich Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1913), III.3.
104 WT, 11.22, pp. 527-9; while this thesis has adopted the Italian form of ‘Principato’ for the family, Richard is known as ‘of the Principate’ in crusader scholarship, and is thus identified here.
105 Asbridge, The Principality of Antioch, pp.139-143.
after Roger’s death in 1119 at the battle of the Ager Sanguinis, the regency of Antioch was taken over by Baldwin II, on the invitation of the council of barons, and explicitly on behalf of Bohemond II. Far from attempting to seize Antioch, Baldwin, who lacked male heirs, would eventually marry his younger daughter Alice to Bohemond, trying to provide his daughters with efficient husbands who might rule after him. Inheritance problems did not plague the Hautevilles alone. We may look at the rule of Antioch as a very contextual situation: a newly established frontier principality under constant military threat, the place was not tenable by anybody who was not actively able to defend it. In this circumstance, possession may have been half the right; and the claim of Bohemond II may have only been really remembered when everyone else had died, and the king of Jerusalem could gain a prospective heir into the bargain (and indeed, he could thus replace the connection he had enjoyed when his sister was ruling in Antioch with her husband). Bohemond II’s coming of age testifies to the continuing importance of Hauteville rulers who could and would personally uphold and defend their territories and titles, as much of the clan’s holdings continued to exist on a conquest edge.

After coming of age, Bohemond II ruled in Italy for two years before leaving for the East never to return. Romuald of Salerno tactfully has it that Bohemund ‘reliquit’ his lands to his ‘consanguineus’ Alexander but it seems doubtful, given the years he had spent attempting to seize Taranto from Bohemond and his mother, whether Bohemond had intended for him to do so. At the same time, to the best of our knowledge he named no placeholder or regent in his stead, which suggests he had left his Italian dominions much as his father had done, trusting in the continuing protection of the duke of Apulia. However, William’s crumbling power failed his cousin as much as himself, and Bohemond’s Italian territories were soon lost. This would collate, at least partially, with William of Tyre’s claim that Bohemond had an agreement with Duke William that whoever died first would inherit the other’s lands: William, himself forever in search of an heir, could have chosen the cousin whose minority he had protected. Therefore the accounts of William of Tyre and Romuald of Salerno can be reconciled fairly easily, with the count of Conversano finishing what he had so often started and taking control of Bohemond’s Italian possessions in spite of William. Baldwin II of Jerusalem was also playing a long game when it came to heirs: he gave his younger daughter Alice to Bohemond, but his eldest Melisende to Fulk of Anjou, another fighting man who could defend the kingdom. On the crusader edge, as in the early times of Southern Italy,

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107 WT, 13. 21, pp. 613-4. Baldwin II took no chances in ensuring his succession. Bohemond married Alice, his second daughter, in 1126; in 1129 the eldest, Melisande, married Fulk V, count of Anjou, who already had a couple of grown sons.
108 Romuald, Chronicon, p.214.
109 WT, 13.21, pp.613-4.
one could never have enough heirs. By ensuring the transition of Antioch to a son of the much-celebrated Bohemond and one of his own daughters, Baldwin II was both ensuring continuing rule on the edge of his embattled kingdom, and providing his own throne with a spare.

While thus far I have spoken of high-stakes Hauteville inheritances, one final example of a mother protecting her son’s inheritance needs mentioning: that of Bertha, widow of Rao of Loritello. A son of Geoffrey, one of the original eight Hauteville brothers, Rao was made count of Catanzaro by Roger of Sicily, for whom he fought, as shall be discussed below. When Rao died, Bertha ‘comitissa’ took up the regency for their children. In this she had to fight first with her husband’s underlings, and then, more significantly, his brother William de Hauteville, of whom more shall be said in the following chapter. William apparently wanted to take over his brother’s county and lands; but he could not, ‘quia comitissa Loretelli terram et filios prudenter regebat’.

This allowed her son Godfrey to happily achieve majority, and thus ‘militiam simul et comitatum patris sui adeptus est’, to take up knighthood and his father’s county. A capable mother to reign prudently as a regent was often the best bet for an underage heir against his predatory uncle.

2.5. No Boy Left Behind: The Predatory Kinship of the Hautevilles

The chapter above has allowed us to see how the Hautevilles established vertical succession, how this tied into the wider institutional developments of their territorial holdings, and what this meant for their highly contextual patterns of succession. This lets us draw a more complete picture of what the Hautevilles looked for in an heir, and how this ties into the wider European context.

Constance Bouchard’s seminal work Those of Our Blood has been fundamental in revising the image of eleventh-century Frankish kinship as one of cognatic groups, with wide networks and both patrilinear and matrilinear succession. Her case study of numerous Carolingian and then Capetian families makes a convincing case that the nobility of Frankia built solid, self-conscious agnatic dynasties, which could develop in parallel bloodlines, but always appear to have had a firm sense of father-to-son descent as key to the unity of the family. But while Bouchard’s case is convincing for what concerns the Franks, nothing could be farther from the Norman Hautevilles of Southern Italy. The evidence clearly shows us that their sense of family was firmly cognatic, although not in an absolutely bilateral way with equal importance on the maternal and paternal kin: Hauteville kinship was traced through both Hauteville men and women, among one’s siblings and cousins and

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111 See below, pp. 65-6.
112 Chronica Trium Tabernarium, p. 40.
113 Chronica Trium Tabernarium, p. 41.
114 Chronica Trium Tabernarium, p. 41.
their descendants, but to varying degrees of equality. With the preceding chapter we saw how the first eight Hauteville brothers firmly conceived of themselves as a family, a close-knit group tied by mutual responsibilities, duties, and an expectation, if not of reciprocal respect, at least of reciprocal obligations. This sense certainly extended to the brothers’ sons: we have seen the close relationship developed by the descendants of Roger and Robert, the support lent Robert by the sons of Drogo and Godfrey, and the regard shown Abelard by his uncle even in the moment of his rebellion. The children of their sisters are a more interesting case. Fressenda, who married into the clan of the princes of Capua, does not appear to have passed a sense of Hauteville legacy to her children: while this issue will be studied in more detail in future chapters, it is fair for now to say that the policies and campaigns of the princes of Capua seldom put them by the side, but rather in opposition, of their Hauteville cousins. The same cannot be said of the nameless sister who married Roger and began the line of the counts of Conversano: for good and evil, her children continued to consider themselves and were considered part of the Hauteville clan, extending claims to family lands and titles, and being repeatedly forgiven by their kin.

While it is fair to expect those Hauteville daughters who married into far-off places and into higher-placed families such as the kings of Hungary and the counts of Burgundy not to have preserved close ties with their motherland, we can see that those who remained in Southern Italy did keep those connections: Emma, daughter of Guiscard, married far less illustriously than her sisters, and her sons Tancred and William are clearly considered part of the Hauteville clan and included in its inheritance patterns. In the absence of a more powerful clan to absorb them or distance to separate them from the main branch of the family, the children of Hauteville women appear to have been considered Hautevilles, and their useful fathers absorbed into the kin group, as I will discuss in chapter 4. At the same time, the importance of matrilinear inheritance is not limited to the Hautevilles alone. The repeated efforts of the Hautevilles to marry into the Salernitan princely family (William Iron-arm, Drogo, Humphrey, Guiscard all having married Lombard women) show that they intended to tie themselves to the local noble families through blood. We have seen how the support of Sichelgaita lent Guiscard and then Borsa legitimacy, and how Alberada’s repudiation did not keep Guiscard from maintaining his ties with his firstborn’s maternal kin and capitalising on them. Nor was this a measure limited to the early times of the Southern Italian conquest: to firm up his ties with the Northern Italian families he had invited to help with the colonisation of Sicily,

117 Indeed, before his final rebellion, Abelard was witnessing a charter for Guiscard in 1080 (Ménager, Recueil, n. 31, pp. 101-4).
118 See chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of the princes of Capua.
119 See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the counts of Conversano.
120 For a close parallel of this female membership of the kin, see Lyon, Princely Brothers, pp. 53-4, 58-9, 206-12, which will be discussed at length in chapter 7.
121 Thus tying into the construed Lombard idea of a comitatus, a kin in arms, discussed by Thomas and Taviani-Carozzi (see Taviani-Carozzi, La principauté, pp. 725-770; 918-30; Thomas, Jeux Lombards, for instance pp. 271-90.
Roger of Sicily married Adelaide del Vasto at the same time as his son and apparent heir Jordan married her sister. At the same time as the Hautevilles considered the children of their sisters and daughters Hautevilles, they relied on and made much of the maternal kin of their own. Nor was such cognatic perception of family ties wholly beneficial: it was his uterine, non-Hauteville brother Herman that proved to be Abelard’s undoing.

While we have certainly seen a case to be made for the emotional value of the extended kin group, what we are confronted with is a highly pragmatic, and highly successful, management of a vast family network: cognatic, mostly bilateral, extensive kinship furnished the Hauteville clan with numbers of warriors, heirs, allies and supporters. If the sheer extension of the Hauteville clan eventually made for their dilution, at the same time it gave them numerous options for the selection of heirs, the grooming of right-hand men, and the development of useful allies. As the embattled but ultimately faithful relationship of Bohemond and Tancred shows, to a large extent Hautevilles could and did trust and prefer other Hautevilles to strangers.

The practicality of such a system, and its high pay-offs, are shown by the cases of marginalised children who were raised in the family, trained to be warriors, employed in its service and eventually rewarded. Richard the Seneschal’s descent may have been dubious, and his rewards might have come late, but he was doubtlessly cared for and eventually achieved a high status in exchange for his services to the family. The good marriage of his sister, which will be discussed in chapter 4, lends more power to the hypothesis of his legitimacy and shows once more that Hauteville kin, even female kin, was powerful and considered useful. His mother’s status may have been a blot on Jordan’s name to the end of his life, but he was clearly acknowledged, raised, trained, and eventually successfully employed by Roger at the death of his legitimate nephew. Tancred, son of a sister, and his younger brother William, were far down the family tree from any real claim to power: their training to and employment in war, if it cost William his life, eventually put Tancred in the position of dying a prince. In the Hauteville cognatic network no boy who could fight was left behind.

The warlike character of Hauteville manhood, and its ultimate employment in conquest, are clear: there are no Hauteville abbots or bishops in the powerful, and often hostile, Southern Italian monasteries. The male children of the Hautevilles in Southern Italy, where fit and able to do so, appear to have been invariably destined to the profession of arms. This pattern appears to me to derive directly from and be a natural development of the model of conquest so successfully deployed by the first generation of brothers: good warriors made for efficient conquerors and successful holders of the family’s often unstable dominions. The uncertain character of the Hauteville conquest into the twelfth century cannot be overstated: the direct result of Jordan’s untimely death was a revolt his father had to suppress. In the volatile atmosphere of Southern

122 GM, IV.18, p.98.
Italy, the Hautevilles could spare no sons to the cloth: every son had to be trained to fight, conquer, defend acquired territories, and serve as a further dynastic link.

While this vast network of variable, bilateral, often matrilinear descendence appears to diverge briskly from Frankish kinship as outlined by Bouchard, it echoes more closely with the model of Norman ducal development studied by Searle. Like the dukes of Normandy, the Hautevilles appear to have been a predatory kinship network: an opportunistic, wide, highly efficient network of able warriors and administrators who supported each other in the acquisition and maintenance of ever more power. The sharp divergence, of course, comes from the ultimate goal: the dukes of Normandy competed for a title, where the Hautevilles were building one as they went along. At least into the 1110s, the uncertain nature of the Hauteville dominions meant that a modicum of co-operation was necessary to the operation of the family, and this was maintained by an enduring sense of reciprocal belonging (as we shall see in the next chapter with the chartering of the descendants of the Principality, Loretello, and Conversano). Moreover, the thickly urbanised Southern Italian context meant that bishoprics were often small and not powerful: a bishop of Capaccio was nothing like an archbishop of York, and there would have been no incentive for management of the kin through direction of certain men into a no less rewarding and powerful ecclesiastical position, as the Normans of the North did. Chapter 5 of this thesis will show how, as the power of the Hautevilles of Sicily strengthened and eventually solidified into the creation of the crown, Hauteville family ties waned and so did the sense of mutual obligation, protection, and forgiveness.

It is hard to establish how far or how thoroughly the other Norman kin groups of Southern Italy reproduced the kind of cognatic kinship the Hautevilles enjoyed and exploited, mostly because no other family was as large and omnipresent as the numerous offshoots of the tremendously fertile Tancred of Hauteville. Chapter 6 will deal especially with this issue, but it is fair to begin to sketch out their situation here. The princes of Capua showed interest in tying their kin group to the Hautevilles through marriage, but their limited descendants stayed mostly tied to Capua and the main branch of the family. The sons of Amicus, whose family tree is complicated by the obscurity of their descent, crop up repeatedly in Apulia, but they do not seem to be nearly as prolific as the Hautevilles. Mostly, just as the Capetians were lucky in the four-hundred years of their unbroken, agnatic descendence, the Hautevilles’ cognatic kin seems to have amply flourished just when the clan needed its members most, making a uniquely successful case study, and one in which it is difficult to find exact comparisons. Nonetheless, Cuozzo’s work shows us that horizontal kinship in Southern Italy was very much a fact and very much contextual: it was not the Hautevilles alone who relied on the matrilineal line to preserve their titles, ensure descendence, or keep the family

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dominions. The del Vastos’s offer of three daughters for Roger and his sons to marry, and the faithfulness of Henry del Vasto to the interests of his sister Adelaide, show that they too acknowledged the importance of female kinship.\(^{124}\) While their Hauteville uncles claimed the sons of Odobonus Marchisus, it was the Conversanos who preyed on the Hautevilles through their unnamed Hauteville ancestress. If nobody else seems to have been lucky or able enough to take advantage of it to the extent the Hautevilles did, contextual, predatory, cognatic kinship seems to have been widespread among the Normans of Southern Italy, at least in the early, embattled stages of their isolated conquest.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the shift from horizontal to vertical Hauteville descendants. As time passed, the institutional nature of the Hauteville holdings evolved, and the brothers fathered and raised sons who would be able to take their place. Nonetheless, circumstance meant that someone who had married late might need an ersatz son to function as his heir, and in this perspective I have looked at the cases of nephews like Serlo and Tancred, who functioned as seconds-in-command and heirs apparent for childless uncles. The chapter has then analysed the situation of marginalised children, both illegitimate or orphaned, and the contextual ways in which the Hautevilles seemed to routinely care and provide for these children, train them, and eventually absorb them in the mechanisms of kin expansion, or, as in Jordan of Sicily’s case, shape them to be possible heirs despite their illegitimacy. The case of regency has then been examined, studying how mothers or cousins could provide more or less effective protection for the reigns of underage heirs, as seen most significantly in the complex case of the inheritance of Bohemond II. Study of the shift to vertical inheritance, moreover, has allowed us to look at the cognatic, bilateral kin-building of the Hautevilles, through which the children of both Hauteville brothers and sisters could be made part of the family endeavours and mechanisms of conquest and rule. While however I have sought to integrate examples from the secondary branches of the family, the bulk of the chapter has inevitably cleaved to the descendants of Guiscard and Roger, and to the complex network of dominions they left their heirs, spanning the Mediterranean from Sicily to Antioch. The passing of the first generations of the Hautevilles South, and the entrenching of the dukes of Apulia and the counts of Sicily in their respective positions, meant both a diversification of the Hauteville kin, and the development of several cadet comital branches. This however, as chapter 3 will show, did not seem to diminish the awareness of the reach of the clan: but rather gave rise to the development of complex relationship and rivalry between its different components.

\(^{124}\) See pp. 137-8, 145, 152 for the importance of Henry in both Adelaide and Roger’s reigns.
Chapter 3

Cousins

3.1 Clan Selection

Thus far I have looked at the first stage of the Hauteville conquest, when the clan consisted of a tightly knit, easily recognisable family of brothers and their direct and closest descendants. The identification of strong familial bonds between the children of Tancred of Hauteville and their children, and the charting of their reciprocal perception as members of the same family is relatively easy; things become more complicated when we look at the diversification of the kin, the development of collateral branches, and their relationship with the more prestigious line of Robert Guiscard and Roger of Sicily. This chapter will seek to identify, chart and examine the patterns of behaviour, feelings of family belonging and relationship to the main branch of the descendants of the other Hauteville siblings, exploring the ramifications and limits of belonging to the clan. A necessary caveat to such a study is the paucity of the sources. The main branches of the family are relatively well documented, which means we can at least make well-informed guesses, if not state outright facts, as to the number of children, wives, and life paths of Guiscard, Roger and their heirs. However, their cousins sometimes spring from and quickly sink back into documentary obscurity. While the collateral branches of the family do appear in the narrative sources, in an inclusion which in itself speaks of their closeness to and alliance with the main branch, information often has to be tracked down across a variety of charters, mapping out their areas of interest in the Southern Italian political landscape. While the picture achieved is intriguing, it is by necessity incomplete, often raising issues which cannot at the present time be satisfactorily solved, in areas where the reach of Hauteville kin fades into the unknown.

While both Robert and Roger produced descendants and ensured the continuation of their line, the fate of their siblings is more complex. William Iron-arm and Mauger both died before they could produce issue. In the previous chapter I have talked about Richard the Seneschal, the possibly illegitimate children of Drogo; but as there shown they remained in a firmly secondary role, as well-rewarded vassals who were clearly part of the family with some title, but who did not produce a very powerful branch of it. Abelard, only known issue of Humphrey, died childless in Byzantium shortly after his flight there.\(^1\) This leaves us with the descendants of William (the counts of the Principato); the princes of Capua, who issued from Fressenda’s marriage; the counts of Conversano

\(^1\) GM, III.6, p. 60, asserts that Hermann also died in Byzantium, but as we shall see below (pp. 85-6) this was not the case; WA, III, lines 655-67, p. 200, has it that emperor Alexius received Abelard with much honour, and that the man died young, still thinking he might one day return to Italy in triumph (‘regressurum se creditit esse potentem […]cum fascibus atque triumphis’ (lines 665-6).
who descended from an unknown sister; and the manifold branches of the descendants of Geoffrey, that is the counts of Loritello, the counts of Catanzaro, and the counts of Loreto.

The children of Fressenda, however, are not considered here. In a pattern which shall be analysed more in-depth in the following chapter, Fressenda, who married into the oldest Norman family to establish itself in Southern Italy, does not appear to have made it closer to the Hautevilles. The princes of Capua were related to the Hautevilles in the same way the princes of Conversano were, but while the latter appear to have considered themselves to be related to and part of the clan, part and parcel of the policies of the dukes of Apulia, even if often in opposition to them, the former do not seem to have felt particularly beholden to them. Pursuing a policy that looked north, to Montecassino and the papacy, the princes of Capua staked out their own territory and area of influence in an entirely different way from the Hautevilles; and while they were related to them, and Amatus of Montecassino in particular stresses the fact that Robert Guiscard and Jordan I were uncle and nephew, their relationship with them was different from that they had with other branches of the family, as we shall analyse in chapter 6. Once we have therefore narrowed down the field of enquiry, this chapter will deal with the counts of the Principato, the counts of Conversano, and the multifaceted Loritello-Catanzaro-Loreto offshoot, and finally, the Antiochene Hautevilles.

What will be conspicuously missing from the analysis, however, will be evidence of cooperation, and rivalry between the collateral branches. Once they had settled themselves in their respective areas of influence, it appears that the Hauteville cousins mostly developed their policies, plans of action, and defined their sense of belonging in relation to the far more influential main branch, and not as part of a more organic network which included them all. While we can make an allowance for the lack of sources, there would certainly be evidence in the charters and chronicles had the different sides of the family banded together against the counts of Apulia; and their geographical distance alone cannot account for their apparent drifting apart. As we shall see, holding their seat in the diagonally opposite direction from the Capitanata did not mean in any way that the counts of Catanzaro lost contact with their mother branch in Loritello; had they wished to, the different strands of the family could easily have kept interacting with each other. It is only with the coming to power of Roger II, and the coalition between the counts of Conversano and the Princes of Capua, that we shall see different Hauteville branches fighting together again.

Increasingly, it looks like the development of the Hauteville kin group was one based on family feeling as defined by relationships of power: the tightly interwoven, closely collaborating and most powerful lines of the dukes of Apulia and counts of Sicily, and everyone else in relation to them.
3.2 From Main to Collateral: Hauteville Models of Alliance

a. The Loritello-Catanzaro-Loreto Hydra

Geoffrey was by far the least impressive of the first eight Hauteville brothers. Having received the Capitanata only when there was no one else to give it to, it is hardly surprising that he never appears to have been very significant in either supporting or opposing Robert Guiscard’s upward trajectory. This lack of decisiveness was amply made up for by his son, the highly competent and very successful Robert of Loritello. Before introducing Robert’s remarkable career it is necessary to give a picture of both his area of influence, its challenges, and the documentary difficulties in studying it. The Abruzzi at the moment of the coming of the Hautevilles were a complex no man’s land of mountains of difficult access and control, where influence was fought over by great monastic foundations on one hand and petty Lombard noblemen on the other. Hauteville control over the area was always sketchy at best, which meant the Abruzzi remained an effective frontier zone throughout the eleventh and twelfth century.\(^2\) This made it, in many ways, an ideal stomping ground for the Loritello-Loreto Hautevilles, whose power in the area went virtually unchecked, and sometimes aided by the dukes of Apulia.

Robert of Loritello’s relationship with Guiscard was a close and mutually supportive one. We find the nephew witnessing his uncle’s charters, keeping in check the Northern border of Apulia, and receiving in exchange military assistance when the Abruzzi rebelled.\(^3\) At the same time, his own situation there is intriguingly complex. Far from being a clear-cut representative of ducal power, after Guiscard’s death Robert of Loritello, and then his son Robert II, were styled in charters as ‘comes comitum’, a resonant title which suggests more independence than what we would expect from mere juniors of the ducal family.\(^4\) While dependency on the dukes was implied in those Loritello charters which are still dated according to ducal regnal years, this by no means happens in all surviving charters from then.\(^5\)

In a way, therefore, it appears that Robert of Loritello found himself in a similarly challenging but rewarding situation to Roger of Sicily: influence in a frontier zone which made his support precious to the main line of the family, but which was isolated enough to grant him more than a modicum of independence. Out of sight, out of mind, Robert could thrive as much as the unprosperous nature of his land would allow him. At the same time, the relationship of the Loritellos


\(^3\)Ménager, *Recueil*, n. 9, pp. 35-7; 12, pp. 47-60; 13, pp. 60-2; AM, III.28, pp. 325-8.


\(^5\)For example there are no ducal regnal years in a charter issued by Robert II in Tremiti, in 1111, *Codice diplomatico delle Tremiti*, n. 90, pp. 262-4; but in 1120 Robert arbitrated a judgment before duke William (*Les Chartes de Troia*, n. 43, pp. 167-71, discussed below, see pp. 77-8, 88-90).
with the dukes does not appear to be simply comfortable, but positively benevolent. The frequent inclusion of Robert in Guiscard’s charters bespeaks the value placed by uncle on nephew, a value strengthened by the bestowal on his line of the Catanzaro countship. His partner in subjugating both the lay and clergy authorities of Abruzzi, Robert was excommunicated together with Guiscard in 1075.\textsuperscript{6} Finally, Guiscard’s support was fundamental to Robert’s final victory over the Lombard aristocracy in the battle of Ortona, where a last ditch attempt was made by Transmund IV in repealing Norman control by calling all Abruzzese noblemen to one last stand.\textsuperscript{7} The Hautevilles were outnumbered but victorious, and their control over the region was thus ensured as far as the nature of the landscape would permit; Robert of Loritello’s ‘anguish for land’, as Amatus calls his anxiety to accumulate in his youth, eventually paid off.\textsuperscript{8}

Faithful to Guiscard’s line and wishes beyond his death, the Loritellos sided with Roger Borsa against Bohemond during his rebellion. Having fought with Roger of Sicily for Borsa, Rao (or Radulf), another younger brother of Robert’s, received Catanzaro when Borsa gave over the area to his uncle Roger of Sicily.\textsuperscript{9} Loyalty paid off: for an offshoot of the troubled Loritellos to receive the granting of the countship appears to be a strong mark of favour, the reward given to a numerous, valued branch of the family, a plum posting to be kept in the clan and entrusted to favoured members. While Robert and Radulf enjoyed ducal protection and rich rewards, their brother Drogo achieved power in a different way. The founder of the Loreto branch of the family settled himself in a more forceful manner, by taking over a castrum and there successfully installing himself.\textsuperscript{10} William de Hauteville, another brother, also enjoyed a career at the comital court: we find him first attested in 1085, in Mileto, witnessing a donation of Roger I; this is the same William who had attempted to take land from his nephews in Catanzaro, and his sojourn in the Holy Land will be discussed below.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{6} Loud, \textit{The Latin Church in Norman Italy}, p.73.
\textsuperscript{7} AM, VII.31, pp. 468-70.
\textsuperscript{8} AM, VII.30, pp. 467-8.
\textsuperscript{9} Evelyn Jamison, ‘Note e documenti per la storia dei conti normanni di Catanzaro’, \textit{Archivio storico per la Calabria e la Lucania}, 1 (1931), 451-470, pp. 453-4; GM, IV.11, pp. 91-2.
\textsuperscript{10}Feller, \textit{Les Abruzzes mediecales}, pp. 730-1.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Documenti latini e greci}, n.9, pp.60-1. William is also present in a charter (\textit{Documenti latini e greci}, n. 6, pp. 53-5) which Becker, and von Falkenhausen before her (in Cristina Rognoni, \textit{Les actes privés grecs de l’Archivo Ducal de Medinaceli} (Toledo): \textit{Les Monastères de Saint-Pancrace de Briatico, de Saint-Philippe-de-Bojoannés, et de Saint-Nicolas-des-Drosi (Calabre, Xle-Xile siècles)}, I (Paris: Association Pierre Belon. 2004), pp. 334-7) tentatively date to 1083, while admitting that the charter, while original, is in very poor condition, and that the date, in Byzantine years of the world, is very hard to read. I would place this charter, rather, as late as 1092, given the presence in it of both Jordan, who died in September 1092 (see pp. 48-9), and Tancred Marchisius (correctly identified by von Falkenhausen, but erroneously indicated as Tancred of Syracuse by Becker). As highlighted in chapter 2 (n. 25, p. 42) Tancred’s youth at the time of the crusade, in 1097, was remarked upon by several chroniclers, and unless he witnessed the charter as a small boy (something which could admittedly happen with Norman charters, see Emily Zack Tabuteau, \textit{Transfers of Property in Eleventh Century Norman Law} (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 149-50) we would expect him to be at least in his teens by the time the document was drawn up. See pp. 88-9.
All in all, it appears very clear how the Loritello-Catanzaro-Loreto branch built and sustained a mutually beneficial relationship with the main branch of the Hautevilles. Careful holders of an unstable boundary that could have caused trouble had the dukes had to look after it themselves, reliably faithful, they offered security in exchange for help when needed, occasional rewards, and what appears to have been ample leeway in their area of influence. If the shocked Casauria chronicle makes out that the Normans in the Abruzzi were brigands and profiteers (which, as the eager conquerors of as much monastery land as they could get their hands on, undoubtedly they were, for them), the information we have paints them as a highly prosperous collateral branch of the Hauteville family; one which offered much, and received much in return from the dukes of Apulia.\textsuperscript{12} The end of the main branch of the Loritello, however, is a matter of guesswork. We only have evidence for a William of Loritello in 1137, when he both welcomed the emperor Lothar, and made a few donations to the Tremiti abbey.\textsuperscript{13} While given the timeline he might easily be construed as a son of Robert II of Loritello, who is last attested as living in 1122, when his brother William de Hauteville of Biccari (different from the William de Hauteville above) mentioned him in a donation as his liege, his lack of usage of the title ‘comes comitum’ as his putative father and grandfather, and lack of reference to his tightly knit kin group, make it likely that he was a local nobleman who had taken over the title once it had become vacant.\textsuperscript{14} We may therefore suggest that Robert II died heirless and that, in the chaos of the civil war against Roger II, somebody stepped into the breach and took the occasion to briefly enjoy the title, while this branch of the descendants of Geoffrey had been extinguished already.

b. The Counts of the Principato

Unlike Geoffrey, William had been a highly active member of the original eight Hauteville brothers. It was to him that the short-lived Mauger had originally bequeathed the Capitanata; by using the newly-arrived Roger as a pawn, William had spent a time harassing Guiscard as he established his dominion.\textsuperscript{15} Once Guiscard’s star was on the rise, however, the relationship between the two appears to have found a good balance. How early the two settled into a comfortable working relationship depends of course on what interpretation one puts on the last of William’s troublesome behaviour – his harrying at the edges of the lands of the Lombard princes of Salerno, Guiscard’s

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\textsuperscript{12}Johannes Berardi, \textit{Chronicon Casauriense}, pp.775-1018. The Carpineto chronicle is a little more positive on Norman presence, as we shall see below.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Les Chartes de Troia}, n. 44, pp. 171-2.
\textsuperscript{15} See above, chapter 1.
kin in marriage. As discussed in chapter one, we can see his act in two lights: one in co-operation with his brother, and on the other against him. On the one hand the princes of Salerno, once one of the most powerful and prestigious among the Lombard families in the Mezzogiorno, were at once very good and very bad potential in-laws for Guiscard: they brought him prestige and support, and a powerful aid in the supremely competent person of his wife Sichelgaita; but on the other Guiscard might easily be imagined wanting to put in them a modicum of awareness of their changed circumstances, and remind them of who was the current top power in the land. While Guiscard in both instances called back William as soon as his father in-law invoked his help (thus easily demonstrating his control over his younger sibling) his ambitious brother might have been an ideal agent to remind the Lombard princes, even at one remove, that while they had brought a precious alliance to their son-in-law he was the rising power in the Southern Italian checkerboard. At once nipping at the heels of his neighbours, doing a favour to his brother and more firmly establishing himself in the Principato, William might well have gone along in such a covert scheme.

On the other hand, while William never showed himself as a direct threat to Guiscard’s rule after his initial power-play with the newly arrived Roger, testing the edges of his power by harrying the princes of Salerno would have been both a way to establish himself and to remind Guiscard that he remained active and vigilant. Having offloaded the Capitanata to the not very brilliant Geoffrey, William seems to have been happier deeply entrenching himself in a circumscribed, securely held territory rather than branching out at the risk of stretching himself too thin. Going up against his brother’s in-laws would have shown William’s will to guard closely the edges of the land he had been given, and if possible to secure it at his neighbour’s expense. That William could be touchy when his interests were encroached upon, and no respecter of persons, is amply demonstrated by the fact that the papacy, too, had taken note of him as a fractious element and excommunicated him in 1067 because of his seizure of property belonging to the archbishopric of Salerno. His willingness to back off as soon as called upon to do so would show this interaction to be part of that pattern of embattled negotiation which we have seen in previous chapters, and through which William and Guiscard had indeed first established their reciprocal balance. William’s burial in Venosa at his death in 1080, followed by Guiscard’s own, shows that the two brothers concluded their lives in good reciprocal terms, and that the fifth and sixth Hautevilles in the South had worked out a mutually rewarding agreement, one in which the Principatos appear to have established themselves in a rich, secure holding, whence they supported Guiscardian rule.

If their relationship with the dukes of Apulia appears different than that of the counts of Loritello, who provided more essential service on the frontier, it also seems that they were content

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16 AM, IV.4, p. 354; 9, pp. 356-7; 15, pp. 360-1.
17 AM, IV.4, pp. 354; 9, pp. 356-7; 15, pp. 360-1; 19, pp. 363.
19 Houben, Venosa, n. 34, pp. 267 for William’s deathbed donation.
to be and let be. Frontiers could be sought out by ambitious members of the family: thus Tancred, William’s third son, served with his uncle Roger in Sicily and was rewarded with the lordship of Syracuse.\textsuperscript{20} And a reunion of the kins of Guiscard and William came at the time of the crusades: Richard, William’s last-born, went on the First Crusade in Bohemond’s service, and served as regent of Edessa for a time, while Richard’s son Roger of Salerno became one of Tancred’s close collaborators, and regent of Antioch at his untimely death.\textsuperscript{21} Given that we know that Bohemond and Tancred had been helping Roger of Sicily besiege Amalfi at the time they heard the call to crusade, it is intriguing to wonder, given the closeness of the city to the Principato, whether Richard was not also there.\textsuperscript{22} The above-mentioned fact that he gave the lordship of Syracuse to Tancred certainly allows us to infer a collaboration between Roger of Sicily and the juniors of the Principato branch of the family, and Richard may have been another of the promising young men the loss of whose service Roger mourned.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, Ralph of Caen suggests that Richard had held Syracuse first, and then left it to his brother; while it is doubtful that he would have had such a free hand of a Sicilian town under Roger I’s close control, it is possible that he was first in line to get it but that, once he chose to depart, his uncle gave it to his younger brother.\textsuperscript{24} Even should Bohemond and Richard not have fought together before their departure for the Holy Land, their co-operation would still suggest a good relationship between the two strands of the clan, and the re-occurrence of what we have seen at the beginning of the conquest: the Hautevilles as natural warband, a network of highly efficient warriors who could and did rely on each other in time of need, and among which a mutually advantageous agreement could be reached for the overall benefit of the clan.

Beyond times of war, the Principato could and did assist the main branch of the family in more administrative and peaceful matters as well. In the 1120s we see the only evidence of cooperation between collateral branches of the family, in a context heavily influenced by the dukes. In 1123 William II of the Principato witnessed a donation made to St Nicholas of Troia by William de Hauteville, a member of the Loreto offshoot.\textsuperscript{25} This would seem to show the Principatos cooperating with their relatives in the heartland of their power. However, the context shows that Count William II was simply assisting the duke: Duke William was also present at the moment of the donation, as was the abbot of Venosa. In 1122, indeed, Count William had witnessed another donation to Troia, this one by Duke William himself: far from independently cooperating with his Loritello cousins, he appears to have been travelling with the ducal court.\textsuperscript{26} Intriguingly, a Ricardus, resident of the Principato, was also conducting business in Troia at this time: we may be tempted

\textsuperscript{20} Becker, Graf Roger, 78.
\textsuperscript{21} Asbridge, The Principality of Antioch, pp. 156 ff.
\textsuperscript{22} Gesta Francorum, I.A.
\textsuperscript{23} Becker, Documenti latini e greci, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{24} Tancredus, lines 1373-5, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{25} Les Chartes de Troia, n. 46, pp. 175-7.
\textsuperscript{26} Les Chartes de Troia, n. 45, pp. 172-5.
to wonder whether he travelled out with his comital overlord, or whether he made it to Troia independently.\textsuperscript{27} In either case, the one possible hint of collateral cooperation between the cadet branches of the Hautevilles reveals, at a closer look, the paramount importance of the main line in negotiating and connecting them with each other, and the closeness and loyalty of the counts of Principato to the ducal household.

c. The Conversano Exception

With the Loritello and the Principato collateral branches we see a comparable evolution: the direct relationship between the Hauteville siblings leading to a division of territory and the development of a relationship based on mutual advantage and the respect of zones of influence. Accounting for the differences resulting from the closeness with Guiscard’s line and the kind of territory they governed, we can easily see the logic through which these two collateral branches developed in relation to the main one, profitably subsiding into a less influential but still prestigious and well-rewarded role. The final collateral branch of the Hautevilles in the South presents a more puzzling alternative.

The counts of Principato and Loritello descended from two of the original brothers who had aided in the conquest of Italy; their power and holdings originated from the land which the heads of their line had received as part of the larger Hauteville bid for control of the Mezzogiorno. The counts of Conversano, however, descended from one of the two sisters which the Hautevilles married off in Southern Italy, and the one whose name has been lost to boot. Where it is easy to see why the Hautevilles would seek to marry off their sister Fressenda into the powerful, well-established clan of the princes of Capua, the reasons for their other sister’s marriage are more obscure. She married a Roger, title unknown, and kin untraceable thanks to the utter commonness of his name; its being a Norman name, and the fact that he was considered worthy of being acquired as an ally by the Hautevilles, suggest that he was part of the Norman wave in Southern Italy, probably a successful warrior who would make a good ally to the clan.\textsuperscript{28} This is also suggested by the Conversano’s area of influence: Northern Apulia, between the Greek cities which Guiscard dedicated part of his career to take over and the Loritello zone of influence in the Abruzzi. Gaining a powerful ally there would have meant bridging the two Hauteville areas of interest, and a marriage link between the two clans would have been mutually advantageous. The name of Roger, ‘of good memory, only survives in the charter issued by his son Geoffrey when making a donation to Cava, and which is possibly a forgery.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} Les Chartes de Troia, n. 49, pp. 180-2.
\textsuperscript{28} Jahn, Untersuchungen, pp. 234-5.
\textsuperscript{29} Cava, B.32, ed. in Jahn, Untersuchungen, pp. 372-4; then re-edited in Codice Diplomaticus Cavensis, CI, n. 48, pp. 130-4, where the editors suggest this to be a thirteenth-century forgery which followed a legal
Geoffrey of Conversano, one of Roger’s sons (the other, Robert, became count of Montescaglioso, and we shall discuss him further later) was a rather exceptional character, and his long, unusual life very much determined the way in which his branch of the family related to the Hautevilles. Geoffrey died in September 1100; in 1068, when he first appears in the sources, he already had several *castra* he had conquered himself (‘*strenuitate sua*, Malaterra has it).\(^{30}\) Even assuming he was as precocious a warrior as Tancred of Antioch, whose youth at the time of the First Crusade was discussed in chapter 2, we would still expect Geoffrey to be at least in his twenties at this point, which would put him in his fifties when he died. We immediately find him rebelling against Guiscard, who was besieging him in Montepeloso to make him render the service of these castles he had himself conquered.\(^{31}\) Even as Malaterra identifies Geoffrey as a troublesome man, he recognises his undoubted valour. Beaten by Guiscard, he appears to have stayed faithful to him, at least for a while: Jahn suggests that the expansion of Geoffrey’s dominions in 1072 was a recompense for services rendered to his uncle in the 1071 siege of Bari, and in 1074 we find Geoffrey witnessing one of Guiscard’s charters, and again in 1076.\(^{32}\) Indeed, the 1072/3 baronial rebellion against Guiscard was the only one Geoffrey of Conversano sat out, and this time appears to have been the zenith of his relationship with his uncle. By 1079 things had changed: Geoffrey rebelled with the other noblemen.\(^{33}\) In 1080, rebellion over, he was forgiven: indeed, he inherited Matera from his brother Robert, who had by this point died.\(^{34}\)

The situation of Montescaglioso is unclear: there is no inkling that the Humphrey, who next held the title, was in any way related to Robert.\(^{35}\) Robert did have two children, William and Robert, but they only inherited small, peripheral holdings on the edge of what had been their father’s county.\(^{36}\) At Robert’s death, then, Geoffrey either seized or inherited Matera. Robert’s children were at this point clearly either minors or unable to hold on to their father’s holdings; it is intriguing to wonder what role their uncle played in their upkeep. Rebelling once more in 1082, Geoffrey lost his lordship of Satriano; but for someone of his inveterate rebelliousness, this certainly looks like light punishment.\(^{37}\) Indeed, by the time of Guiscard’s death Geoffrey was in a rather comfortable position. A strong man on the edges of Roger Borsa’s troubled duchy, Geoffrey ended his life in the kind of powerful position Guiscard had been unwilling to deny him.\(^{38}\) A wealthy man, Geoffrey was able to endow his daughter Sybilla richly enough to attract Robert Curthose, the chronically...

\(^{30}\) GM, II.39.
\(^{31}\) See above, fn. 30.
\(^{32}\) Ménager, *Recueil*, pp. 86, 91.
\(^{34}\) *Lupi Protospatarii*, year 1080. Notably, Lupus thought Geoffrey was Robert’s son.
\(^{36}\) Martin, *La Pouille*, p. 270.
indebted but still prestigious duke of Normandy. Aird suggests that in 1096/7, when Robert passed through Apulia on his way East, he first met her; in 1100, on his way back, he married her. The son of Roger ‘of good memory’ but no surname, and of a woman of no name at all, had gotten his start his life on his own strength and capitalised on it, to great success. The solid power base which allowed his sons Alexander and Tancred to constitute a concrete danger to Roger II’s power (something which will be discussed at length in chapter 5) was first built by Geoffrey.

However successful, Geoffrey had been defeated three times by Guiscard: his forgiveness in the face of such obstinacy bespeaks in itself the fact that Guiscard felt that his troublesome nephew deserved special treatment for his behaviour. Jahn is not wholly convinced that the duke’s forbearance was based on the fact that the two were related. He compares his forgiveness of Geoffrey to that of Henry of Monte Sant’Angelo. Henry, however, was a far different and less dangerous agent than Geoffrey. He had only rebelled once; he was not the kind of man who had efficiently built himself a small but strong power zone. Indeed, later Henry married Adelicia, daughter of Roger I of Sicily, thus voluntarily joining the Hauteville kin group. Conversely, the tolerance of somebody as nakedly ambitious and as good at achieving his goals as Geoffrey seems to sit on the same spectrum as the tolerance, up to a point, of Abelard. Surely, a man like Geoffrey would have been less troublesome with fewer cities to his name, if not outright in prison. That he was permitted to endure, revolt after revolt, until he had his own semi-independent county means that he was being cut a considerable amount of slack. This is especially significant given that Geoffrey was not seemingly fighting as part of the mechanism of embattled negotiation discussed above, and which had served other junior members of the family so well. Unlike Robert of Loritello, or Roger, Geoffrey does not appear to have systematically sought to tie his fortunes to Guiscard’s. If he indeed served in Bari and got his reward for it, this was not enough to keep him from seeking more.

Geoffrey distinguished himself by taking position explicitly against his Hauteville relatives and with the rest of Southern Italian nobility, showing that as much as he was integral part of the family in the same manner as the counts of Loritello and Principato, he could put himself very much outside it when unhappy with its policies. This happened with the first rebellion of 1067/8, when Guiscard attempted to receive military service from the other Normans; and again in the occasion of their third revolt against him, when it was his demanding tribute and presents in occasion of his daughter’s marriage that sparked rebellion once more, therefore attempting to exercise lordly

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39 Sybilla will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.
41 Jahn, Untersuchungen, pp. 240-5.
42 Henry of Monte Sant’Angelo, who was part of the kin network of the princes of Capua, will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.
prerogatives over the rest of Southern Italian noblemen. At that point, when he tried actually to demand what an overlord, as opposed to a *primus inter pares* might have asked for, he found himself confronting the bulk of Southern Italian nobility. Significantly, this was what ended his short honeymoon with Geoffrey: he was happy not to support Abelard again, but he had remained as averse to paying tribute as ten years before. Geoffrey rebelled as part of a larger protest outside the family, and not as a junior seeking redress or advantages within it. This shows him to be in a very different position from that of the other two collateral branches of the family: not a cousin who had entirely accepted the *de facto* overlordship of the Apulian and Sicilian lines, but rather a junior who, while unwilling and unable to vie for leadership himself, could and did buck the authority of the dominant powers within the clan, and got away with it. Nor did their challenge stop at the first generation, when Guiscard’s power was relatively new and the Hauteville overlordship not long established.

Geoffrey had married Sichelgaita, apparently the daughter of count Rao of Molise. The two appear to have had four children in a period between circa 1070 and circa 1080: Robert, Alexander, Tancred, and Sybilla, who shall be discussed in the next chapter. Robert, the eldest, was clearly selected to succeed his father, and he was associated to his charters with the title of *comes* since 1087. The same charter, however, is also signed by Alexander, simply with his name, which suggests that he was being shaped, in some way, as a spare. This found confirmation when Robert died by 1119: he was succeeded by Alexander, and not by his son Hugh. It is possible Hugh was underage when his father died: he took part in none of the Conversano rebellions against Roger II, and we can find him as a royal baron in the *Catalogus Baronum* in 1150-1. In any event, he was certainly sidelined at his father’s death, and the title appears to have passed to Alexander, with the intention of passing it to his own descendant. Sybilla will be discussed in the following chapter; Tancred, the youngest son, owed his career to his mother. Tancred was constantly known as *Tancredus Cupersani*, which means he used the family title, even without expectations of inheriting; his mother associated him with her to the government of Brindisi, where we can see the two lobbying the papacy for a new archbishop in 1122. At the death of his mother before 1130, he appears to have inherited from her, and we can see him make an endowment for her memory, and the memory of his brother Robert, in this year.

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44GM, II.39; Loud, *Age of Guiscard*, p. 245.
45Cava, B.32, edited in Jahn, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 372-4. As discussed above, this charter may be forged; given that the name of Sichelgaita is amply documented elsewhere, as we shall see, she was clearly a distinguished person, and I believe we may trust that the information on her is correct.
48*Codice diplomatico brindisino*, n. 12, pp. 23-4.
50Martin, *La Pouille*, p. 316.
Alexander and Tancred would become, with Robert of Capua and Rainulf of Caiazzo, two of the most prominent opponents to Roger II, as shall be discussed in chapter 5; but their career began in as troublesome a way for the main branch of the Hautevilles. Bohemond II, son of Bohemond and of his wife Constance of France, inherited at his father’s death both his Italian holdings and his Syrian ones. As I have discussed in chapter 2, Bohemond II’s plan for his dominions is not entirely clear: there is an argument to be made that at the time of his death in battle he was set up to inherit the duchy of Apulia, certainly not a feasible territory to hold when he was already fighting on the Outremer frontier. But at the same time as one could make a case that Duke William of Apulia wanted his cousin to succeed him, it is a stark fact that Bohemond in practice lost his Italian holdings the moment he set foot out of them. The new generation of the Conversanos played an interesting role in this. As mentioned above, Tancred of Conversano cooperated with Constance, to whom he was subject for the governance of his quarter of Bari. He appears to have allied himself with her in matters of war, and he was marching with her, Humphrey of Gravina, and 120 knights in 1116 next to the river Bradano when Alexander and his men fell upon them.\footnote{Romuald, \textit{Chronicon}, p. 208.} Tancred escaped; Constance was captured. Alexander held her in Matera, but released her under promise that she would return: an enterprising woman, she returned with a force of two-hundred knights (but not, apparently, Tancred) to ravage his lands.\footnote{Romuald, \textit{Chronicon}, p. 208.} In 1117 Tancred was witnessing a charter for Constance in Taranto, but he was not with her in 1119, when Alexander captured her in Giovenazzo, and if he played a role in her liberation, the chronicles do not mention it.\footnote{Le Pergamene di S. Nicola di Bari, n. 64, pp. 111-2; Romuald, \textit{Chronicon}, p. 210.} In 1120 we find Tancred and Constance together again: together with Duke William they were besieging the castle of S. Trinità.\footnote{Romuald, \textit{Chronicon}, p. 211.} While it might be intriguing to think that Tancred had reconciled himself to William, Constance’s presence suggests the two had by now a working relationship, and she brokered his alliance with the cousin by marriage with whom she clearly got along.

But if Tancred therefore found it convenient to ally himself with Constance, and occasionally with William, seemingly at least once clashing with his brother, in what might at first light look like more compliant behaviour with ducal authority, we need to remember that his territories were more exiguous than his Alexander’s: while Romuald of Salerno acknowledges his importance, we are not looking at an independent count. Alexander’s behaviour was more bellicose, in line with his father’s acquisitive policies: he was fortifying Miglionico in 1110, moving against Constance in 1116 and again in 1120, which tells us that he had designs on Bohemond I’s old Italian dominions.\footnote{Romuald, \textit{Chronicon}, p. 205.} And he did eventually get them: Romuald’s tactful assertion that Bohemond II \textit{reliquit}, ‘left’ his Italian holdings to ‘his relative [Alexander]’ when he left for the East in 1126 is
significant. Given his hostility, it is unlikely Alexander would have been the first caretaker in Bohemond’s mind; but it is quite probable that as soon as he abandoned his cities, Alexander moved into them. The Conversanos had long aimed to expand into Guiscard’s territory, and in 1126 they managed it. If we are to believe the claim, discussed in chapter 2, that Bohemond II intended to succeed to his cousin duke William, we also have to acknowledge that his personal Italian dominions were forfeit the moment he moved out of them. The most predatory counts in Apulia took care of them; the fact that their blood relation to Bohemond allowed the chronicles to paint the takeover somewhat piously (Bohemond II and count Alexander were third cousins) is only testament to the fact of how conveniently their membership of the Hauteville clan could work out for the Conversanos, and how unfortunately for the ducal family, as we shall see in chapter 5.

Once we have therefore charted the extent and evolution of Hauteville collateral kin – how it came to exist, and in what relationship it existed in relation to the main line, we can examine whether the patterns of behaviour that have been described in previous chapters applied to them as well.

3.3 Collateral: Patterns of Behaviour and the Secondary Branches of the Hautevilles

a. Seniors and Juniors: The Hauteville Power Network

In the collateral branches of the Hautevilles no relationship is more typical of the larger habits of the kinship network than that between Robert of Loritello and his uncle Robert Guiscard. While the Hautevilles do not appear, as we have said in chapter 1, to respect any particular naming patterns, the fact that only this uncle and nephew carry the name in the family seems to at least suggest that Robert of Loritello was named after Guiscard, and possibly placed under his protection early on. Geoffrey’s malleable nature means that everything we know of him suggests his going along with what his much more enterprising siblings suggested, and it would be only natural for him to pledge his family’s enduring support to Guiscard by naming his firstborn after him. It is certain that the relationship worked out wonderfully for both sides of the equation: as we have illustrated above, the two offered each other constant support, a modicum of independence, and very material rewards in the shape of the seat of Catanzaro for a cadet Loritello branch. The most fascinating aspect here, however, is the way we can chart the progression and transmission of the pattern between different branches and generations of the same family.

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56 See chapter 2.
57 His naming his second son Drogo, a seldom seen name last used by the first Hauteville Drogo, would seem to suggest Geoffrey made up his own pattern by honouring his brothers.
We begin with Geoffrey himself: a less brilliant brother, he was consistently sidelined until William, in fact younger but in effect far more influential, chose to endow him with his own lordship. This act of patronage was presumably followed, as the rest of the family fell in line, by Geoffrey’s taking a stance behind Guiscard himself, as his overlordship became fact. While one may, as I have, theorise that Geoffrey’s naming of his firstborn was meant as an act of flattery to and invitation of patronage from Guiscard, we have seen that Hauteville alliances were not to be taken for granted: Robert received patronage because he had shown himself to be quite different from his father, an efficient and valuable member of the family. His close relationship with Guiscard, his presence at charters in which his interests were not directly involved, suggest an important personage at the ducal court and one who enjoyed the duke’s particular favour. William of Apulia’s claim that Guiscard entrusted Borsa to Robert of Loritello in his absence in the Balkans, discussed above, certainly seems clinching evidence of the closeness between the two. Such favour is hardly surprising once we consider the role played by Robert I in enlarging and consolidating Guiscard’s dominions. In the Abruzzi, power and land were often held by monastic institutions such as S. Clemente in Casauria and S. Benedetto in Carpineto. Robert’s bid for control involved gradually eroding the monasteries’ control by taking over piecemeal the dependences on which their income depended.\footnote{Feller, 
\textit{Les Abruzzes médiévaux}, pp. 736-8.} While Robert did not do so personally, often acting through the figure of his brother Drogo, discussed below, it is clear that the pope held him responsible. The figurehead of Hauteville expansion in lands that had been traditionally held under church influence was excommunicated together with Guiscard in the Lenten Synod of 1075.\footnote{AM, VIII.33, p. 508; Reg. Greg. VII, II.52a, IX.4.} While the chronicle of Casauria mostly rages against Drogo and the Norman nobleman Hugh of Mamouzet, who had been their immediate tormenters, the papacy had the larger picture clear in mind.\footnote{Iohannes Berardi, \textit{Chronicon Casauriense}, 871, 873-4.}

While on the one hand Robert aided Guiscard in his campaign to gain control over Abruzzese churchland, on the other he enshrined their collaboration in their common patronage of the abbey of St James and St Mary in the Tremiti islands. A small foundation, located in islands just off the coast of the Abruzzi, the abbey was singled out for patronage by the Hauteville family. We find charters by Guiscard in and by Robert of Loritello from 1065 onward, that testify to their enduring interest in patronising the Tremiti, thus staking their claim to a monastery that would be indebted to them, unlike the prouder and more ancient houses on the continent.\footnote{Codice Diplomatico delle Tremiti, II, n. 77, pp. 231-3; III, n. 90, pp. 262-4; n. 94, pp. 267-9; n. 99-100, pp. 284-6; n. 103, pp. 287-91.} At the same time however as the choice of the Tremiti abbey signalled a departure from the continental houses, it was a potentially hostile gesture towards its putative mother house of Montecassino. Montecassino’s abbots played a powerful role in mediating between Guiscard, the princes of Capua,
the papacy, and the Hautevilles. Montecassino claimed a probably spurious but nonetheless voiced right to the Tremiti foundation, and for Guiscard and Robert to endow the abbey meant to take a firm position of independence in their family patronage.

In this we can see a parallel with Venosa and Cava, two foundations which the dukes of Apulia and the counts of the Principato patronised together. While the Hautevilles never chose to take over a foundation by installing one of the family in it, they did either outright found or associate to themselves smaller or lesser known monasteries to patronise and turn into family foundations. By tracking the evolution of the ecclesiastical patronage of the Hautevilles, therefore, we can track both the evolution of their areas of influence and of their relationship with their kin. The joint patronage of the Tremiti foundation by Guiscard and Robert testifies not only to their alliance, but also to the effort made by them to establish their rule over the Abruzzi, appropriate the influence and riches of its more ancient monasteries, and strengthen their claim through the protection of a privileged foundation. This was a pattern reproduced by other Normans as well: Casauria calls Hugh Mamouzet its bane, but he is remembered as a benefactor and a generous donor by the Carpineto chronicle. Beyond taking parts in his uncle’s enterprises and enjoying the rewards of a close relationship with him, however, Robert himself repeated those patterns.

While Rao of Catanzaro and William de Hauteville, both ensconced in Calabria, were geographically as far as possible from their mother branch of Loritello as one can get, we have evidence that the Loritellos kept a close eye on their relatives. When in 1120 the William de Hauteville whom we first met attempting to usurp Catanzaro from his nephews appropriated some church land in the Capitanata, thus showing that the Calabrians still could operate in the North, it was his senior relative Robert II who called him to heel, and brokered the restitution of the lands taken from the monastery of St Nicholas of Troia. This also shows us the adaptability of the counts of Loritello: while as a clan they mostly made up their riches and landholdings from pillaging church property, they knew better than to do it to no heed. The document’s specific mention of Calixtus II’s proclamation of the Truce of God, and of his council with Duke William, tell us that the counts of Loritello were unwilling to pick a fight with both their nominal dukes and the pope, unorthodox as their methods might usually be. This chimes with the fact that enduring tenure of their lands in Troia suggests that the counts of Loritello were able to both collect and hold on to scattered holdings in separate and often distant areas of the duchy, whose possession must have

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64 *Chronicon Carpineto*, 34-9.
65 *Chartes de Troia*, n. 43, pp. 168-71, see pp. 77-8.
66 ‘Cum idem dominus noster papa Calixtus cum archiepiscopis, episcopis, abbatibus et reliquis ecclesiasticis personis apuat Troia, precipue causa componende tregue Dei, et eadem Dei tregua studiose composita et instituta intra episcopium eiusdem civitatis, eodem domino papa presidente, in conspecto multitudinis cleri ac populi, presentibus domino Wilelmo duce’, *Chartes de Troia*, n. 43, p. 168.
therefore been ensured by a continuous and fruitful relationship with the dukes. And indeed, Robert II of Loritello also endowed Venosa, choosing to pay tribute to the traditional family foundation. Exchange with the frontier could also happen the other way round, and thus we find William II of the Principato witnessing a donation by another William de Hauteville, a son of Robert I of Loritello, to St Nicholas of Troia in 1123.

The stable area in which the counts of Principato operated gave them far less scope for upward mobility than the Loritellos, no need of Guiscard’s support, and in general less reason to engage with the ducal family the way the Loritellos did. Moreover, patronage of Venosa petered out for the dukes of Apulia after Guiscard’s death, even if it was continued by the counts of the Principato: against three charters by Roger Borsa, one by Bohemond I, and one by Robert, younger son of Guiscard, we have ten by the counts of the Principato. It is worth saying that patronage of Venosa could come from the most unexpected quarters: in 1118 Robert II of Loritello made a donation, and so, in 1131, Tancred of Conversano, of all people, endowed the abbey with two churches, which testifies to the fact that the abbey’s enduring prestige could give scope for donations outside the usual family mechanisms; nonetheless, the counts of the Principato are clearly the most enduring and frequent donors. But while Venosa was no longer the family tomb of the dukes after Guiscard’s death, and after the succession of Roger Borsa the counts of Loritello grew apart from their ducal relatives, the monastery of Cava testifies to both the shifting territorial objectives of the dukes of Apulia and the role their Principato relatives played in them. Founded in the early eleventh century, Cava began receiving Hauteville patronage after Guiscard’s marriage to the Lombard princess Sichelgaita, and from then on we see a continuous exchange between the abbey and its benefactors, both the counts of the Principato and the dukes. The count of the Principato’s participation in the process suggests a closeness between the counts and the dukes, one made perhaps inevitable by the dukes’ choice of Salerno as a capital, but which appears to have been cordial rather than purely coincidental. The continuation of a Hauteville policy of patronising a common foundation appears to have endured beyond Venosa, also because Richard the Seneschal, the possibly posthumous son of Drogo I discussed in the previous chapter, is also seen endowing the foundation as his more senior relatives had done. The counts of the Principato’s continuing donations to Venosa described above show us that some of the Hautevilles could and did continue

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70 Houben, *Venosa*, n. 95, pp. 330; n. 106, 339-41.
71 Houben, *Venosa*, n. 76, p. 308, shows us that in 1097 Robert of the Principato still honoured the abbey as his father’s place of rest.
72 Loud, _The Latin Church in Southern Italy_, pp. 93-98.
73 WA, V, lines 280-1, p. 250.
to care for their original family foundations; but the shifting needs of the duchy are reflected in their own patterns of patronage.

While therefore the counts of the Principato did not occupy a frontier zone to provide them with fertile ground for expansion and make them independent assets to the dukes’ rule, they appear to have found themselves in the heartlands of their power and to have therefore reaped all the rewards such a relationship could grant them, as testified by their joint patronage of Cava, from whose lands the Normans, in their usual fashion, occasionally stole, but which seems on the whole to have rather benefited from the coming of the new rulers of Campania. While it could be said that this depicts the Principatos as vassals rather than allies in the way of the counts of Loritello, they seem to me to have more benefited than not from finding themselves in an area that was rich, secure, and, if less fruitful of rewards than the Abruzzi, certainly also less fraught with dangers. Nor did the counts of the Principato shy away when new frontier zones were provided for them, as discussed above with the tenure of Tancred of Syracuse in Sicily and Richard of the Principato in Edessa.

But if the careers of the counts of Loritello and of the Principato show how the protection of a senior could and did help shape the career of junior members of the family, Geoffrey of Conversano’s unorthodox path demonstrates that Hauteville juniors could forge a completely different progression for themselves if they chose to. Geoffrey, an able enough warrior to establish his territory for himself, clearly did not want or need his uncle’s support at the beginning of his rise to power. Nonetheless, he was clearly known as a member of the kin group and considered part of it, and at one point he helped shape Guiscard’s reign with the usual mechanism of cooperation followed by reward after the siege of Bari. Geoffrey’s ultimate decision to fight Guiscard twice more, however, demonstrates that his goals lay elsewhere: in the defense of his own autonomy, which brought him to side with the rest of the Southern Italian aristocracy against the ducal family. Not for him the quiet assimilation to de facto vassal lordship of the counts of Principato, while his territory was not such as to give the independent rewards of a frontier zone like the Abruzzi or Sicily. While Geoffrey was always defeated by Guiscard, he kept trying; and the powerful position he left his sons shows that to an extent he succeeded in establishing the Conversanos as a powerful enough branch of the family to be a threat. At the end of the 1070s, Guiscard could clearly not offer him better than what he already had: dominions he had by and large consolidated himself, and which he would jealously defend from the duke’s requests, rather than throw behind him.

b. Brothers in Arms

The Hauteville enterprise had started from a coalition of brothers, and occasionally features such alliances again. A short-lived but significant example of this is the experience of Tancred and
his brother William.  

The sons of Emma, a daughter of Guiscard, and Odobonus the Marquis (probably one of the Northern Italian noblemen the Hautevilles imported to Southern Italy to provide settlers for it), the two undeniably were juniors in the Hauteville clan, but they were employed in its affairs from an early age. In Amalfi at the time of the call to crusade, Tancred was already then fighting for either Roger of Sicily or Bohemond himself. While it is unclear whether William was also there, when Tancred left for the crusade so did William. William offered his services to Hugh of France, and it was with him that he crossed the sea and fought. William and Tancred, however, were known to be brothers: the bond is abundantly mentioned in the sources, and the two clearly kept tabs on each other. While Tancred clearly had from the start a position of responsibility with Bohemond, William may have found it attractive, at least at the beginning, to try and strike out on his own; and Ralph of Caen, Tancred’s biographer, mentions William with him and Bohemond (and the mysterious Robert) as the ‘Wiscardidas’, the descendants of Guiscard all going on crusade together, which shows that William was always perceived as part of the kin group. However, his career was short-lived. It was during the siege of Nicaea that, leading a charge, William found himself surrounded, and eventually succumbed. Tancred’s grief at his death, and his reckless attempt at avenging him, speak of a close emotional bond between the two. Hugh of Vermandois left the crusader army at Antioch, and after attempting to rouse support from emperor Alexius in Byzantium, he returned home; like many did in the crusader ranks, William would probably simply have switched loyalties. As Antioch was very much Bohemond’s siege, it is easy to imagine William would have joined again his kinsmen’s contingent; and after Antioch, when Tancred struck out for Jerusalem with Godfrey of Bouillon, he would have had more opportunities for reward. Had William lived, it is easy to see him filling the role later taken up by Roger of Salerno: that of Tancred’s own second, the third Hauteville man on the ground in Antioch.

While William’s untimely death cut the enterprise short, Tancred and he appear to have set out for the conquest of Outremer much as their great-uncles had done when they descended upon Italy: a warrior unit of two brothers, united in the same enterprise. Despite their different allegiance at the beginning of the crusade, the anonymous Gesta Francorum, Albert of Aachen, Ralph of Caen,

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75 As discussed in chapter 2, they may have been accompanied by another, presumably younger, brother, Robert; but as he is only mentioned once, his role is impossible to analyse to the same extent as that of William.

76 Becker, Documenti latini e greci, p. 56.

77 The Deeds of the Franks, I.iii, pp. 5-7.

78 The Gesta Francorum does not mention their degree of relation to Bohemond, identifying them simply as fili marchisi I.iii-iii, pp. 5-9.

79 Tancredus, lines 250-1, p. 13.

80 Tancredus, pp. 27-8.

81 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, II.39, p. 130; Tancredus, lines 825-8, pp. 28-9.

82 The Deeds of the Franks, X.xxx, p. 72, with the beautifully dramatic ‘iuit, nec postea redit.’
and later the poetic *Chanson d’Antioche* remembered them as such, in the tragic moment in which Tancred attempted, but failed, to rescue his brother in battle.\(^{83}\)

A much more successful and complex sibling enterprise comes from the Abruzzi, the challenging but endlessly interesting no man’s land that made such fruitful Loritello stomping ground. I have talked about the successful, sophisticated role of Robert as a courtier, ally and head of the family; no less successful, in his own chosen field, was his brother Drogo. Drogo, nicknamed Tasso, ‘the Badger’, an appellative that suggests much tenacity and a certain tendency to make trouble for others, was the brawn to Robert’s brain, and took care of the wilder side of the Loritello expansion project.\(^{84}\) Where we see Robert witnessing ducal charters, supporting ducal enterprises, quietly employing resounding titles such as the *comes comitum* discussed above and generally administering the family fortunes, Drogo made the most of the Abruzzi’s status as a frontier zone. His son William endures in the Casauria chronicle as the scourge of church property in the area, a robber baron always ready to grab land and wealth, a professional warrior and highly efficient amasser of extra perks for the family.\(^{85}\) The two roles taken up by the brothers, apparently jarring, are in fact highly complementary: much like the original Drogo had sent the younger Guiscard into the then frontier of Calabria, and Guiscard had encouraged Robert I of Loritello in making the first inroads into the Abruzzi, Drogo Tasso appears to have been employed in pushing the limits of the uncertain Loritello holdings as far as they would go. In Drogo we can see the survival of the original Hauteville takeover methods: a no-holds-barred seeking after the next reward, whose unsavoury origins later prestigious marriages and papal investitures did their best to conceal. Much as Robert ably steered his branch of the family into the good graces of the dukes, his partnership with Drogo ensured the Loritellos kept tightening their hold on the uncertain Abruzzi and continued to reap as much as they would yield. Nor was Tasso’s experience unique to the Hautevilles: I have mentioned above the Hugh Mamouzet that so terrorised Casauria. Just like at the beginning of the expansion into Southern Italy the Hautevilles existed as part of a larger wave of Norman knights, so in the Abruzzi they never entirely controlled, the Hautevilles were not alone in grabbing as much land and power as they could. On the other hand, Robert II of Loritello found a quieter way to provide for his brother William: he is mentioned gratefully in an 1122 charter as the one to endow him with the lordship of Biccari.\(^{86}\)

The relationship between Alexander and Tancred of Conversano is more complex. During the wars against Roger II, as we shall discuss in chapter 5, the two brothers animated together the aristocratic resistance to the establishment of the kingdom of Sicily, which appears to show them

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\(^{83}\) *Chanson d’Antioche*, XCVII, line 2107.


\(^{86}\) *Chartes de Troia*, n. 44, pp. 171-2.
in much the same kind of fighting partnership as the other pairs of brothers discussed here. However, as seen above, their behaviour before Roger’s takeover was quite different, and it deserves to be discussed in more detail. The two are not shown fighting together at any point before 1130, and the way in which their inheritance had been arranged (with Alexander being immediately associated with his father and older brother, and Tancred receiving his mother’s land) seems to suggest that there was no need, and indeed no desire, for the two to cooperate initially, having been endowed separately by their family. In this context it would have been natural, and in no way hostile towards his brother, for Tancred to forge an alliance with Constance. We have no context for the 1116 expedition during which Alexander assaulted Constance and Tancred, but Romuald’s description makes it sound like a sneak attack, which they were not expecting; Tancred, he said, saved his liberty by flight.87

This might mean that Tancred actually fought his brother and fled at the last moment; but it might also mean that Tancred, normally happy to cooperate with Constance, was not expecting the attack, disengaged as soon as his brother’s men appeared, and was allowed to flee. The fact that Tancred seemingly did not engage at Giovenazzo, but helped Constance and Duke William besiege S. Trinità, strengthen this impression: while happy to cooperate with the ducal family in times of peace, Tancred may have been unwilling to fight his own. As we shall see in chapter 5, the brothers did not always pursue the same policy, and while Alexander went in exile with Rainulf of Caiazzo, Tancred had agreed to go to the Holy Land in exchange for a gold ransom from Roger II.88 Loud correctly argues that the brothers had a complex attitude towards Roger in the revolt, first swearing to uphold his rights, then only rebelling after his defeat at Nocera, possibly because some of their lands had remained outside of the king’s control and could still function as their base.89 This information can conceal much: while Alexander of Telese understandably presents them as two-faced traitors, we may be witnessing the collapse of an attempt at developing with Roger II the same kind of fruitful cooperation Tancred of Conversano had enjoyed with Duke William. It is hard to determine whether the two brothers had cooperated before this moment, or if they followed different and distant paths, one under their mother’s aegis, the other their father’s, only coming to deal with each other directly with the 1116 ambush. Certainly it is together, fighting on the same side, that Alexander and Tancred left their clearest mark: following in their father’s footsteps, they led the aristocratic pushback against the establishment of a centralised power.

It is intriguing to wonder whether Robert of Montescaglioso and Geoffrey of Conversano also cooperated during their rise to power. Malaterra’s admiring stress on the fact that Geoffrey conquered his own castles would seem to suggest that it was not so; it is certainly possible that

87 “Tancredus fuge liberaretur presidio”, Romuald, Chronicon, p. 208.
89 Loud, Roger II and the Creation of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, pp. 31-2.
when Robert died Geoffrey simply grabbed for himself Matera from the leftovers of his county. At the same time, it is possible to posit a partial inheritance in the way of the Hautevilles, with one brother stepping in for his sibling. Even if only crumbs of their father’s holdings were left over for William and Robert, Geoffrey had himself clearly been unable to acquire the entirety of the Montescaglioso country, and it is entirely possible that as he grasped Matera for himself he may have provided for his nephews as well. Predatory as he could be towards outsiders, Geoffrey had clearly been keen to make provisions for all of his sons, and it is possible to posit he may have done the same for his nephews.

Much as in the times of the first Hauteville conquest, a sibling unit could be a nuclear, fundamental fall-back in times of war and uncertainty. Already adults, already trained, already with a relationship in place, brothers could function as a good resource in situations too uncertain to allow for the development and mentoring of a much more junior relative, or in cases in which one was too young to already have sons or nephews to take under their wings. The Hauteville warband could provide ready-made peers, or useful seconds-in-command, in occasions in which the family’s predatory methods worked best. That this was not an automatic response is shown by the sons of William of the Principato: Tancred and Richard forged radically different paths, with the first heading for Sicily, and the second leaving on crusade. It is wholly possible that Geoffrey of Conversano simply stepped in to take over part of his dead brother’s dominion, and the complex relationship of his sons leaves space for interpretation. Nonetheless, the examples examined above show us the continuation, at least in some cases, of the first Hautevilles’ essential fighting mechanism: brothers working together for the same quest.

c. Entitlement, Forgiveness, and Family Bonds

I began my study of the Hauteville clan by asking myself whether we could identify among its members a clear sense of family, and at least make a case for an emotional connection among them. It is to be borne in mind that this is often difficult to do with the collateral branches because of the nature of the sources that we possess for them: unlike Guiscard and Roger of Sicily, the counts of Conversano, Loritello, and Principato did not patronise poets and chroniclers to talk about them. Mostly they survive in the chronicles for their warlike exploits, hardly the point in which family feeling would emerge; and when it comes to the Conversanos, they chiefly appear to surface to damage the interests of the main line.

However, if in my chapters about the better documented side of the family weighed the poetic and narrative evidence against the colder reality of what the members of the family actually did, by applying the same kind of analysis to what we know of the dealings of the collateral Hautevilles among themselves and with the main line still render, at this point, an image of a group of people who still thought of themselves very much as part of the same kinship group. Robert of
Loritello’s relationship with Guiscard bespeaks, at the very least, high regard and mutual respect between the two; as for the count and his troublesome brother, they appear to have found if anything a perfectly efficient balance between them, to serve the different aspects of the Loritello dominions. The same can be said of the irregular but ultimately fruitful co-operation between Tancred and Alexander of Conversano. As with the main branch of the family, the close overlap between practical and emotional in constantly changing, uncertain dominions such as the Hautevilles’ meant that a good, powerful alliance and partnership in the family would have been hard to replace, and entailed a very close and practical relationship that it is only reasonable to assume would develop emotional overtones.

But if this seems to assume an Hauteville concept of kinship that is based on a very pragmatic and rewarding loop (where kin is the source of natural allies whose worth in aiding in one’s objectives continually strengthen the inter-family bond) the Conversanos show a much wider and inclusive, less practical conception. If as I have said the first alliance with the otherwise unknown Roger, father of Geoffrey of Conversano, sprang from a desire to bridge the gap in the Hauteville dominions, and therefore from the same kind of practical necessity which underscores many of the dealings among the Hautevilles, the subsequent evolution of the relationship appears more complex. I have shown how the Conversanos showed themselves to be consistent pains for the Hautevilles’ claims and aims, permanently on the warpath to contest the main branches’ policies, oppose their gains, and sometimes straight-up harry their holdings. This was no embattled negotiation such as I have described in the previous chapter, nor the coy, ultimately balanced power play between Guiscard and William the younger: this was full-scale revolt. It would seem much easier, and ultimately much more productive, to just kill or at least ban the Conversanos. While one could argue that Borsa or his son might not have had the necessary strength to do it, Guiscard certainly did; that he did not, when they had repeatedly shown themselves untrustworthy, is in itself significant. It appears that no matter how troublesome and rebellious they might be, they were still considered as untouchable as Abelard had been for him. It is very easy to see that they were considered members of the family, and that even when Guiscard punished others with loss of land or life, he did not do so with them. There appears to have been a sense that even at their worst, the Conversanos, as members of the Hauteville kin group, were better than the alternative; that land kept in the hands of blood and flesh members of the family was safer than that entrusted to a retainer. Where possible, the Hautevilles relied on members of their clan, no matter how problematic; and as shown by Tancred of Conversano’s alternating cooperation with Constance, family alliances could change through time.

Another interesting reflection on Hauteville family feeling can be made when we look at the quiet breakdown of relations among the collateral branches of the family. While we certainly must allow for a certain bias in the sources, which would naturally follow most closely the ducal family, it remains striking that increasingly the secondary lines of the Hautevilles appeared to refer
more to the main line than to each other. This would hint, even in this moment in which we can see the sense of clan belonging was as strong and as binding as ever, at the first breakdown of the Hautevilles as a family unit, and the beginning of their evolution as a more complex and loose, but more symbolically powerful entity, in which it was closeness to the prestigious line of Sicily and Apulia, rather than any actual family bond, that mattered the most.

3.4 Overseas: the Hautevilles in Outremer

The Hauteville expansion in the Middle East during and after the First Crusade seems to model every single behavioural pattern we have seen until now. A band of junior members of the family, headed by displaced firstborn Bohemond, took part in a daring enterprise to start carving out their own lordships in the embattled Middle Eastern theatre. Nor did such an undertaking come from nothing: Bohemond was following into the footsteps of Guiscard, whose lieutenant in the Balkans he had been at the time of his father’s death, and Malaterra very explicitly presents him as taking advantage of the crusade to pursue his father’s war. If as Loud suggests Guiscard had been intending to make provisions beyond the Adriatic for his dispossessed eldest, Bohemond’s abandoning Roger of Sicily’s service to embark on the crusade seems like a natural evolution of his father’s policies. Bohemond’s choice of his sister’s sons and his cousin Richard of the Principato to follow him, his choice of his nephew Tancred as a second-in-command, Tancred going to war at the same time as his younger brother William and looking out for him, Richard bringing his son Roger of Salerno with him: on a smaller scale, the Hauteville contingent on the First Crusade modelled the same family warband behaviour that had ensured the clan’s conquests in Italy. At the same time, it clearly also offered an occasion for simpler vassals like Robert of Sourdeval, whom we find witnessing Roger I’s charters and who would eventually settle in Antioch; Richard son of Rainulf, a son of the count of Caiazzo, a part of the ‘princes of Capua’ kin group who will be discussed in chapter 6; and, surprisingly, Hermann, Abelard’s brother whose capture had ended his rebellion. While Guiscard had used Hermann to get to Abelard, it’s quite possible to posit that after Abelard’s death Hermann returned to Italy, asked for forgiveness, and received it, later choosing to take part in the crusade. What happened to Hermann on crusade is uncertain: he is last seen in Harenc in 1097, having lost his horse. Another family connection, this time on the maternal

90 Annae Comnenae Alexias, 6.6, pp. 180-1; GM, IV.24, p. 102.
91 Loud, Age of Guiscard, pp. 216-7.
92 On the Sourdeval dynasty, see Andrew D. Buck, ‘Dynasty and Diaspora in the Latin East: The Case of the Sourdevals’, Journal of Medieval History, 44 (2018), 151-69; The Deeds of the Franks, I.iii, pp. 5-7; that this Hermann should be identified with Abelard’s brother is confirmed by William of Apulia, who says he held Canne, and because of this duke Robert destroyed the city during the rebellion (WA, III, lines 520-31, p. 192).
93 Hystoria de via, 9.32, p. 41.
side, was Bohemond’s standard-bearer: Robert, son of Gerard of Buonalbergo, and thus his second cousin, who is mentioned among the very first, immediately after Tancred, in the warrior list in the *Hystoria de via*, and who appears to have fought bravely at Nicaea. Finally we have Roger of Barnaville, who, married to a daughter of Rocca, had joined the clan through marriage. While the nucleus of the Southern Italian expedition was constituted by a firm core of Hautevilles, there was clearly space for representatives of other families, and old enemies as well. A final Hauteville is registered in the crusader sources: Guy, one of Guiscard’s sons by Sichelgaita. A *sebastos* of Alexios Comnenos, he is presented in the *Gesta Francorum* still in the emperor’s service, lamenting the inability to see his brother, and the proverbial Byzantine treachery. Later, the two half-brothers would be reunited in Bohemond’s Balkan campaigns: something which goes to show how even a half-sibling one was not particularly close to, and his expertise of the enemy, could be made use of in time-honoured Hauteville fashion.

The ambitious scale of the project is testified by the looseness but at the same time the constancy of the relationship between Tancred and Bohemond. The uncle was willing to allow the nephew to set off on his own expeditions on the way to Antioch, leaving him free to conquer Tarsus and Adana; he seemingly did not object when Tancred sold his services during the siege itself, getting paid by the other crusading leaders to guard the mountain passes around the city; finally, no objection of Bohemond is recorded when Tancred enlisted in the service of Godfrey of Bouillon, going on to Jerusalem while his uncle secured Antioch. Making use of his junior when needed, sending him forth to conquer what he might while he entrenched himself, Bohemond made use of the same mechanisms of family support his father and uncles had so successfully employed: in particular the similarity with Guiscard being sent to as-yet-unconquered Calabria is striking. At the same time as he advanced in this new territory, however, Bohemond kept a firm grip onto his Italian lands, to which he returned in 1105. Hauteville expansion in the East is characterised then by two opposite attitudes: that of Bohemond on the one hand, and that of Tancred on the other.

For Bohemond Antioch was clearly only one step in a much more ambitious plan. According to Albert of Aachen, at Godfrey’s death Tancred and the pro-Norman patriarch conspired to offer Bohemond the crown, a bold step that would have probably meant the entrenchment of Tancred in Antioch as his uncle took control of Jerusalem. Baldwin of Boulogne’s prompt seizure of his brother’s holdings, however, put a stop to the plan; and

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94 *Hystoria de via*, 5.29, 19; 7.16, 31 ‘*fortissimus signifer*’; *Tancredus*, lines 2548-50, p. 76.
96 For Guy’s first appearance, Ménager, *Recueil*, n. 40(III), pp. 127-9 (1082); for his presence at the crusade *The Deeds of the Franks*, IX.xxxvii, pp. 63-5.
98 *The Deeds of the Franks*, X.xxxv, pp. 84-7.
Bohemond’s capture in war meant that Tancred abandoned his holdings in Galilee to look after Antioch as regent, showing that he felt much more secure in his family’s holdings than those granted by Godfrey.\textsuperscript{100} This was hardly surprising: Tancred’s mention as the first of Godfrey’s retainers may hint at the fact that there was a close relationship between the two, but Tancred and Baldwin had quarrelled when the second had taken Tarsus off the first, and Tancred might not have wanted to gamble on the fact that, once crowned, his old enemy might let him keep Galilee.\textsuperscript{101} Nonetheless it is striking to see Tancred, somebody both reliably rebellious, and very able, so easily give up on his principality: weighing his options, he clearly felt he had a better shot at making his fortune in the family principality than in a fief beholden to his old enemy. His convenient delay in ransoming Bohemond until his exasperated neighbour Baldwin LeBourcq decided to do it himself tells us that Tancred was determined in spinning out his freedom from his uncle as far as he could.\textsuperscript{102}

Exchanges between Antioch and the Italian motherland after the First Crusade are both few and complex. We know of at least two Hautevilles in Syria, and one who may or may not have made the journey. William Tassio, the son of Drogo Tasso, was every inch as predatory as his father: he held castles in Loreto and Popoli in the Abruzzi, quite near Casauria, whence he appears to have waged war on all and sundry. He also started appropriating properties from the monastery as his father had done.\textsuperscript{103} In 1103 however William, ‘possessed by I know not which spirit’, dramatically comments the chronicler, decided to go beyond the sea; in order to fund his pilgrimage East, he sold the abbey of S. Clemente, the town of Popoli and the bishopric of Pelino to Count Richard of Manopello (that he did not technically own any of this was apparently no obstacle).\textsuperscript{104} The chronicle goes on to describe the damage inflicted by Richard, and William does not reappear until 1114, when he decided to make amends to the monastery by giving back to it the castle of S.Mauro, which he had previously appropriated.\textsuperscript{105} The restitution is confirmed by a charter from March 1114, in which William declares to make the donation ‘ut omnipotens deus dignetur minuere et dimittere peccatum quod ego habeo de venditione monasterii Sancti Clementis de insula’.\textsuperscript{106} It is not perfectly clear from the chronicle that William did go on pilgrimage; if he went, we have no assurance that he went through, or stopped in, Antioch, even if we would expect him to have been aware of his kin there.

What is certain is that his presence back in the Abruzzi in early 1114 makes him ineligible to be the William de Hauteville who witnessed a charter in the same year in Josaphat, issued by a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{100}Albert of Aachen, \textit{Historia Ierosolimitana}, VIII.33, p. 624.
  \item \textsuperscript{101} \textit{The Deeds of the Franks}, IV.ix, pp.24-5.
  \item \textsuperscript{102} \textit{Tancredus}, lines 4229-34, pp. 123-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{103} Johannes Berardi, \textit{Chronicon Casauriense}, cols. 871-2.
  \item \textsuperscript{104} Johannes Berardi, \textit{Chronicon Casauriense}, cols. 872-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Johannes Berardi, \textit{Chronicon Casauriense}, col. 879.
\end{itemize}
Wido Capriolus. As we shall see below, Josaphat was patronised by the Hautevilles d’Outremer; the presence of a William here strongly suggests that he was staying with his relatives. Ménager identifies him with the William de Hauteville who was part of the retinue of Roger of Sicily, the same William who had been attempting to take lands from his nephews at the end of the eleventh century, and would be back in Italy in time to make mischief in the Capitanata in 1120. The identification is eminently persuasive. William de Hauteville is attested in 1110 witnessing the donation of Countess Adelaide of Sicily to the bishop of Squillace. His brother Rao of Catanzaro was dead by 1111, when his widow Bertha and sons Godfrey and Raimond were making a donation to S. Maria del Patire. I have discussed in the previous chapter how Bertha had to defend her sons from chaos at her husband’s death; placing William’s unsuccessful bid for his brother’s county around the years 1110–2, we can posit that a change of air with a pilgrimage East might have seemed the thing to do for him after losing out to his capable sister-in-law.

What is more, the Wido Capriolus who issued the charter William witnessed was one of the Caprioli who held sway around Bertha’s county, whose brother Jordan took advantage of the unrest to claim for himself a bishop’s prerogatives; the whole family was involved closely with the comital court, with the brothers witnessing several of Roger’s charters, sometimes with the Sourdevals, who had gone on crusade with the Southern Italian contingent and settled there. We do not know when Wido went East. In 1115 he was commanding the Antiochene vanguard at Tell Danith, which tells us he was eminently respected in the principality. On the basis of this, and of the documents he left behind, Johnson and Jotischky posit that he probably went East early. This is possible: as he does not appear in his family’s documents from the time of Roger I, he might have been very young, and have left either with the crusader contingent, in a position too junior to be noticed, or shortly afterwards. After the trouble with his family, a few years overseas might have seemed like a good idea for William de Hauteville, and his Caprioli allies could have despatched him with a reference to their overseas brother; in Outremer in 1114, William could have easily

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107 Reinhold Röhrich, Regesta regni Hierosolymitani (Innsbruck, 1893), n. 73a.
112 See pp. 57-8.
113 Cronica Trium Tabernarum, pp.39-41; Documenti latini e greci, n. 13, pp. 78-81, and n. 51, pp. 201-4, for William Capriolo; n. 51, and n. 54, pp. 212-7, for Jordan Capriolo, who was there present with both Rao of Loritello-Catanzaro, William of Hauteville himself, and Odo the father of Tancred; Guy, however, does not appear in them, suggesting that he was a younger and more expendable son, the perfect man to be tempted to re-settle East.
114 Walter the Chancellor, Bella Antiochena, I.5, p. 91.
returned in time to make the trouble discussed above. At the end of what sounds like quite a vivacious life, he was dead by 1133, when his widow Galana and three sons Robert, Hugo and Richard made a donation for his soul.

Once we are reasonably sure that the troublesome William de Hauteville, son of Geoffrey, was the one witnessing charters in the East, we need to wonder whether he was related to the Mauger de Hauteville who was leading a sortie in Antioch in 1119. Alan Murray reasonably asks whether the name de Hauteville implies that Mauger (and indeed William) were members of the Hautevilles; there was another family later bearing the name in the Principato, registered in the *Catalogus Baronum*, clearly taking their name from Altavilla Salentina, a town near Salerno of which they were lords. However, the strong case for the identification of William de Hauteville, and the fact that Mauger was in Antioch, suggests that the easiest explanation is that Mauger was himself a Hauteville. Where should we place him in the family tree? The fact that only the two William de Hauteville, one the brother of Robert of Loritello, the other his grandson and lord of Biccari, used the name places Mauger firmly in that branch of the family. While however the probable descendants of the lord of Biccari still used the name de Hauteville at the time of the *Catalogus Baronum*, none of William de Hauteville’s sons used it: Robert used the surname Brito, Hugo used Rufus, and Richard simply called himself ‘filius suus’ (of William) in the charter of donation for his father’s soul. It is possible Mauger was a fourth son, who accompanied his father East and settled there; or Mauger could have been a son of William de Hauteville of Biccari, who went East on his own as his cousin William Tassio might have done. However, the most probable explanation seems to me that Mauger de Hauteville was a final son of Geoffrey. As discussed above, Geoffrey was the only one of the eight brothers to follow apparent naming patterns: of his four sons, three (Robert, Drogo, and William) had the same name as his more influential brothers; Mauger was, after all, the one who had indirectly benefited Geoffrey by dying and passing the Capitanata on; and the name is exceedingly unpopular among the Hautevilles, as the only other extant example is that of the once-attested son of Roger I. The sons of Geoffrey clearly had an haphazard and

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116 Moreover, an unpublished charter from Santa Sofia of Benevento from 1120 shows William giving back to the church land he had promised to develop, but could not, in one of the few instances in which we see him act in what looks like a conscientious way (Museo del Sannio, Benevento, *Fondo S. Sofia*, vol. 10, n. 26).
120 *Catalogus Baronum*, n.17; Cuozzo, *Commentario*, p. 10, reasonably suggests this identification; for Robert Brito, Becker, *Documenti greci e latini*, n. 9, pp.60-63, n.40, pp. 165-8; for Hugo Rufus, the previous, n.40; for the one extant charter for Richard, see above, n. 117.
121 See above, p. 50, as we find no other ‘Drogo’ among the Hautevilles either, Geoffrey definitely seems to have been determined to honour his brothers.
personal approach to titles, with Robert and Rao carrying Loritello, Drogo being known by his sobriquet, and William carrying de Hauteville, but not passing it on. In balance, it seems to me quite possible that Mauger was the youngest son, and one who went East, finding a place and some influence with his relatives.

The Loritello-Catanzaro-Loreto branch, then, seems to have been the only one to supply visitors East after the crusade; and at least two of them came back (admitting that William Tassio actually did go). Part of this lack of exchange with Southern Italy, of course, was probably due to sheer numbers: while the first wave of the Hautevilles to go South had benefited from the extraordinary number of children of the original Tancred, following generations were at the same time less numerous and already busy holding positions in the South. A displaced firstborn like Bohemond might find pursuing his father’s old plans attractive; children of a sister might like the idea of going to find their fortune East; Richard of the Principato was a second son in a very peaceful county that did not allow him further expansion; the troublesome William Tassio and William de Hauteville seem to have wanted to disappear for a while, and Mauger of Hauteville is not otherwise attested. The Holy Land was a frontier, one far away and difficult to hold, plagued by in-fighting among the crusaders and by a permanent shortage of men. It is hardly surprising that of the Norman noblemen who went overseas with the First Crusade only the Hautevilles themselves and Robert of Sourdeval, who had originally settled in Sicily, chose to remain; though it is worth mentioning that Robert son of Gerard, despite being such a close relative of Guiscard and Tancred, also elected to go back after the crusade, and became involved with his family’s affairs back in Italy.\footnote{Asbridge, \textit{The Principality of Antioch}, pp. 175-176; Jamison, \textit{‘Some Notes’}, pp. 201-2.}

In general, the scarce involvement of Southern Italy and its nobility in the crusader movement, despite the Italian ports being one of the major routes to the Holy Land, remains a lingering problem in the historiography, and one which goes beyond the Hautevilles themselves to encompass the whole of Southern Italian nobility. While Loud posited that the alternative routes of pilgrimage and chances for patronage in Southern Italy did not make the passage East as attractive to the Southern Italian nobility, Russo has recently suggested that Southern Italians did not preserve the dynastic memory of crusade in the same way as the rest of Europe did, thus not fostering the incentives for carrying on the family tradition of crusading which the rest of the European nobility nurtured.\footnote{Graham A. Loud, ‘Norman Italy and the Holy Land’, in \textit{The Horns of Hattin: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East, Jerusalem and Haifa, 2-6 July 1987}, ed. by Benjamin Z. Kedar (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1992), pp. 49-62; Luigi Russo, ‘Bad Crusaders? The Normans of Southern Italy and the Crusading Movement in the Twelfth Century’, \textit{ANS}, 38 (2016), 169-81.} Both acknowledge the impact of political events, which will be discussed here in chapters 5 and 7, through which Roger II of Sicily tangled with the Kingdom of Jerusalem; here, however, I feel that it is important to highlight several important problems with Russo’s theory, by
examining the deeply familial character of the Hauteville enterprises East. It has been repeatedly underlined in this thesis how the First Crusade constituted in many ways a natural complement to the Hauteville expansion on several frontiers, and how it is possible to see Bohemond’s journey East as a continuation of his father’s policy. The Hautevilles appear to have settled Antioch as they had settled other frontiers within their dominions, such as Sicily and the Abruzzi: the fact that it was Hautevilles with interests in Sicily and the Abruzzi, such as Tancred, Richard of the Principato, and later several members of the Loritello branch, who most consistently went East seems to support this. Likewise, while Jotischky and Johnson’s accent on the Adriatic coast’s importance as a commercial and journeying link with the Holy Land constitutes an intriguing approach, their insistence on divorcing the relationship between Southern Italy and Antioch from Hauteville family policies and influence seems unpersuasive, given the evidence examined here.124

Moreover, the fact that several Hautevilles had settled East in no way meant that they passed out of family memory and family annals, nor that they severed their relationship with Southern Italy. While Tancred, Richard and Roger appear to have decided to settle for good, throwing in their lot with Outremer and working for the rest of their lives to expand and defend Antioch, Bohemond’s attitude was far more mutable, and determined the future of the principality and the family to a large extent. As we have seen above, howing the kind of pragmatic, ruthless ambition that always characterised his relationship with his superiors, Tancred was in no hurry to ransom Bohemond from his captors in 1101, taking advantatge of his captivity to pursue a personal policy of expansion that was so irksome to his neighbours that it was Baldwin of Edessa who finally ransomed Bohemond in exasperation in 110.125 Balancing the mutual treacherousness of their relationship, Bohemond stripped the city of all resources before leaving Tancred in charge of a highly insecure situation.126 While the family had certainly featured a similar fly-or-die attitude with Drogo sending Guiscard off to conquer Calabria, this showed how Bohemond prioritised Europe over his holdings in the East; and indeed when he rustled up support for a renewed attack on Byzantium he did so without involving Antioch.127

Bohemond appears to have been heir to Guiscard’s designs on the Byzantine empire, exerting his charm and prestige as a crusader to obtain not only the hand of the daughter of the king of France in marriage but also a sizable contingent to attempt once more to bring Alexios Komnenos down.128 Just like his father, however, Bohemond failed in the attempt; and it was to Apulia that he retired, there to die in 1111 shortly after his brother Borsa.129 While Bohemond is remembered

125 See p. 87.
126 Tancrdus, lines 4415-4434, pp. 129.
127 While Asbridge favours the idea that Bohemond may have been expecting Tancred’s help at some point he admits the evidence is scant, see The Principality of Antioch, p. 137.
129 Romualdi, Chronicon, p. 206.
mostly as a crusader, the last war he fought was the same one his father had waged; and it was to the lands his brother had held for him that he returned to die, after accepting a subordinate position as sebastos to the empire. If therefore Bohemond showed, in the last instance, that his interests, ambitions, and heartlands had remained the ones set out by his father for him, Tancred and Roger seemed to seek to make good on the Hauteville bridgehead into the East. Like Guiscard before him, Tancred thrived in adversity, rebuilding and expanding Antioch, and refusing to uphold the treaty of Devol his uncle had signed, which was to make the principality a vassal state to the empire. Bohemond and Tancred reliably betrayed each other to the end of their lives; they also managed between them to establish Hauteville control in Syria, something which Roger carried forth, and Bohemond II inherited when he became of age.

The validity of his claim, recognised by both his regent cousins and Baldwin of Jerusalem, did not invalidate his position in Southern Italy, as we have seen when Duke William and he named each other as heirs, which shows how, far from detaching themselves from the main family, the overseas Hautevilles and their lands were still considered to be part of the clan, faraway and difficult but still worth claiming. This impression is confirmed by the fact that, when Bohemond II fell in battle in 1130 leaving behind only an infant daughter, Roger II of Sicily attempted to exercise William’s claim and call for himself the rule of Antioch, going as far as attempting to capture Raymond of Poitou, the heir chosen by the crusader nobility, when he passed through Southern Italy on his way East. Heir to the time-honoured Hauteville habit to stretch oneself as far as one’s resources allowed, Roger II had attempted to exercise influence in the Holy Land before. By marrying off his mother Adelaide del Vasto to king Baldwin I in 1113, Roger tried to get Sicilian influence at the court of Jerusalem, and the marriage agreement, as I will discuss in chapter 5, would have allowed him to become king there should the king have died heirless; but Roger failed when his mother was sent back in 1117. When he tried again in 1130, his ambitions were once more frustrated: Baldwin of Jerusalem wrested the regency of Antioch from his daughter Alice, and Constance was married off at the earliest opportunity to Raymond of Poitiers, who ruled in her stead. We have seen before how Hauteville kinship in Italy could and did sometimes extend through the female line too; the fact that Constance’s firstborn was named Bohemond after his

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130 Anna Comnenae Alexias, 14.2, pp. 427-34. Bohemond’s mausoleum in Canosa evokes his crusader past by featuring a dome similar to that of Jerusalem, and a portrait of Tancred on its doors; but it was to Italy that Bohemond had returned to die. (For a discussion of its features, see Mark Johnson, ‘The Mausoleum of Bohemund in Canosa and the Architectural Setting for Ruler Tombs in Southern Italy’, in Romanesque and the Mediterranean: Points of Contact across the Latin, Greek and Islamic Worlds, c. 1000 to c. 1250, ed. by Rosa Bacile and John McNeill (Leeds: British Archaeological Association, 2015), pp. 151-66.

131 Anna Comnenae Alexias, 14.2, pp. 427-34.


133 WT, 11.15, p. 519; 11.21, pp. 525-7; 11.29, pp. 541-3.

134 For the most recent discussion of Raymond’s tenure in Antioch, see Buck, The Principality of Antioch, pp. 69-80.
mother’s ancestors wrote him firmly into the Antiochene Hauteville dynastic line. The Hauteville name still carried power in Syria.

It is therefore possible to show that, until 1130, Antioch was perceived as part of the Hauteville holdings, that at least some Hautevilles, those familiar with such frontier environments, did spend time in it, and that claims to Antioch could make part and parcel of claims in Southern Italy, stretching across the Mediterranean, in a concrete, and constantly reiterated, dynastic network of reciprocal expectations and duties. At the same time, the infant Constance’s succession to Bohemond II meant the breakdown of the closeness between Southern Italy and Antioch. In the chapter dedicated to Roger II I will examine how his ascension eventually meant a departure from established Hauteville family patterns, a brutal pruning of the family tree, and a definite end to the policy of forgiveness and mutual support of the branches of the clan. After Roger II there would remain an established Hauteville main line at the head of Apulia and Sicily; and after Constance’s turbulent life and rule Antioch would know a long period of diplomacy and peace under Bohemond III. But the two dynasties appear to have been, and to have considered each other, estranged, and there were no further attempts to bridge the gap between Syria and Italy which Bohemond, Tancred, Roger, duke William and Bohemond II had all tried to bypass.

While to debate how far this can explain the lack of enthusiasm for the crusader movement in Southern Italy would necessarily involve a much wider discussion, and one which embraces the kingdom of Sicily throughout its history and lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it is certainly fair to say that in light of the family patterns of conquest and rule of the Hautevilles the First Crusade appears to have been part of the same mechanisms of expansion and settlement which had characterised Southern Italy, and that, in this sense, the inception of the crusader movement in the Norman South was indissolubly tied to larger Hauteville policies, and to a Hauteville family history of pursuit and achievement of power, up until 1130 and the falling away of the last reasonable claims of the Southern Italian Hautevilles on the crusader principality their relatives had settled. The history of Antioch, of course, is plagued by what-ifs: untimely death stalked the family group, and Tancred and Roger both died heirless, while Bohemond II died very young leaving a vulnerable heir in the shape of an infant daughter, doubly subject by her sex and age, to the influence of the crown of Jerusalem. Questions such as whether the eternally rebellious Tancred would have upheld Bohemond II’s claim had he lived longer and had an heir; whether the less rebellious but efficient Roger of Salerno might have done the same; what kind of relationship Bohemond II and Roger II might have enjoyed, and what status the principality could have preserved had its enterprising and warlike prince survived, must all remain unanswered. The dwindling numbers of the Hautevilles in the East, and the problems of inheritance in Southern Italy itself, mean that looking at Hauteville

\[135^{For the most recent treatment of Constance’s life, see Alan V. Murray, ‘Constance, Princess of Antioch (1130-1164): Ancestry, Marriages and Family’, ANS, 38 (2016), 81-97; Buck, The Principality of Antioch, pp. 72-5, 80-4.}\]
rule over Antioch is to look at a series of short-lived projects, in which a scramble for regents and heirs had to make the best of a run of unfortunate events. But the overseas venture of the Hautevilles began under the auspices of tried-and-tested models of family behaviour; it provided ample opportunity for military prowess, rewards for personal enterprise and a theatre for quite a few junior members of the family. Through the adversities of a highly volatile environment, the often difficult relations with the throne of Jerusalem, and the sheer bad luck of numerous early deaths, the Antiochene Hauteville branch and its dominions did not wane from family mechanisms until 1130, and we must therefore look at them as another perhaps overly-ambitious but no less familial offshoot of the clan.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the branching out of the Hauteville clan outside the main line of the counts of Sicily and the dukes of Apulia: I have thus looked at the descendants of three of the original brothers and sisters, and at the complex and contextual dynasty of the Hautevilles in Outremer. We have seen the different ways in which the collateral branches of the Hauteville family related to the main ducal and comital ones: next to the faithful relationship of the counts of the Principato with the dukes of Apulia we see the independent, but correct and well-rewarded rule of the Loritello-Catanzaro-Loreto in frontier Abruzzi. The importance of the frontier experience, be it Sicily or the Abruzzi, fostered highly contextual and independent mechanisms of conquest and rule, and this chapter has looked at the establishment and early life of the principality of Antioch, and the way in which it was from the Abruzzi branch that we see the most regular transit of Hautevilles East after the First Crusade. While in different ways the Principato, Abruzzi and Antioch were all beholden to the ducal line (and indeed Antioch was overwhelmingly ruled by descendants of Robert Guiscard), with the counts of Conversano we see an alternative model of family relationship, through which a cadet offshoot, even if acknowledged as part of the family, and recognising itself as such, stood in consistent defiance from the main branch.

While however we can recognise how different cadet branches of the family interacted with the dukes, we have also seen how several of the family mechanisms analysed in chapters 1 and 2 also held true for them: this chapter has consequently examined relationships of cooperation between juniors and seniors, alliances between brothers, and the omnipresent forgiveness which the Hautevilles seemed to extend even to the most problematic members of the clan, identifying the kind of family feeling and sense of reciprocal belonging and obligation first charted between the original eight brothers. Finally, this chapter has fulfilled a prosopographical function, employing charter evidence to answer several knotty points in the Hauteville family tree, identifying and characterising several poorly documented members of the kin group.
The picture achieved by the first three chapters, therefore, is that of the male members of the Hauteville kin, in the years which preceded Roger II’s of Sicily ascent to power; and I have focused on them given how it was Hauteville men who overwhelmingly ruled in their dominions, shaped family policy, and influenced its kin relations. As seen with the discussion of Hauteville mothers as regents in the previous chapter, and that of Sichelgaita of Molise and Constance of France in this one, women of the Hautevilles could and often did find themselves in a position to exercise independent power, or function as important dynastic links, expanding and rooting the kin group’s reach. The following chapter, consequently, is devoted to them, not in an effort to isolate their history and treat it as an anomaly, but rather seeking to use the analysis of female Hautevilles to probe and highlight several of the kin trends discussed thus far.
Chapter 4
Women

4.1 Introduction

Thus far this thesis has largely focused on the men of the Hauteville clan, examining their relationships in peace and war, analysing the mechanisms through which they enacted conquest and then maintained its results. If the initial Hauteville push rested on the original nucleus of eight brothers, and they relied on their nephews, sons, and younger siblings as seconds-in-command and heirs, the women of the family played no less a role, if one that is inevitably dictated by their sex and often harder to track down in the documentary and narrative evidence. In the unique context of Southern Italy and Syria, in an embattled landscape in which men often do not seem to have lived to a long age, women could and did find themselves in circumstances which entrusted them with great power and responsibility, and were both expected and often eager to take up such responsibility.

We have no great female monastic foundations in Southern Italy, which means that none of the Hauteville women became abbesses, thus playing a role independent from their family or husband. Hauteville women were not the primary subject of laudatory chronicles, and rarely appear as the sole issuers of charters or promoters of endowments; much of my research found them in a tangential role, and a few of them are not even mentioned by name. However, their presence is a constant undercurrent that can and does break to the surface. The roles they played, even as objects rather than actors of Hauteville policy, reveal another aspect of the ever-expanding Hauteville network; Hautevilles conquest policies, political needs, the alternating circumstances of life on the Italian and Syrian frontier and their own ambition brought Hauteville women to the fore, and enabled them to act as free agents rather than accessories to the fortunes of the clan.

Discussion of Hauteville women has been focused in one chapter because of a series of both practical and methodological considerations, chief of which is that the volume of information is overall much smaller than that available for Hauteville men, but also and more importantly the usefulness of treating Hauteville female influence and rule as a parallel history that easily shows family and institutional trends over a long period of time. By considering in one place attitudes to Hauteville wives, daughters and sisters we can more usefully see the emergence of patterns, the development of trends, and consider the female side of the Hauteville clan more completely, both in its own right and as a control group for the family relations examined in the previous chapters. Far from seeking to segregate or diminish the history of Hauteville women, I have sought here to examine it in a coherent fashion as a fundamental, if often far less documented, part of Hauteville family history. As the central chapter of this thesis, this section will seek to clarify and sum up the family patterns of behaviour examined previously and to function as a gateway to the second part
of my analysis, studying the disintegration of traditional Hauteville family ties with the foundation of the kingdom of Sicily and the comparative analysis with other Norman kins in Southern Italy.

As information was gathered for this chapter a consistent distinction appeared between the roles taken on by women who were born to the clan as opposed to those who married into it. While daughters and sisters of the Hautevilles rarely appear to have been able to exercise power beyond their role as vessels of alliances, the men of the family seem to have consistently pursued a policy of marrying advantageously to women with powerful families behind them, and then relying on them for support and continuation of the clan policies, allowing them scope to exercise their own authority. While the appearance on the stage of these women is often wholly bound up with the men who fathered or married them, and I shall often in this chapter divide my sections according to which Hauteville male they were connected, it will be my intention to show the evolution of Hauteville female policies and occasionally rule as a separate strand with its own merits and achievements. While the paucity and nature of the sources has often consigned these women to an obscure and occasionally nameless role, it is possible and necessary to retrace them as a fundamental part of Hauteville family policy, identity, and sense of self.

4.2 Women of the Hautevilles

a. Sisters

The two sisters of the first eight invading brothers set the tone for what would later become a pattern: marriage to both more prestigious and more useful kins. The practice of sending for them in Normandy, as it is unlikely that noblewomen of a marriageable age would have accompanied their brothers during the first, unstable phase of the conquest, finds a parallel in the way in which the abbot of St Euphemia brought from Normandy his sister Judith and had her marry Roger of Sicily.¹ This strengthens the impression that the Normans of Southern Italy kept in close contact with the motherland, an impression already created for the Hautevilles by their agreeing to send and provide for their elder brothers’ sons should they choose to descend on Southern Italy.² The different destinies of the two sisters and their descendants capture on a smaller scale what would become the Hautevilles marriage pattern for women for the rest of the eleventh century. One of the sisters, whose name is not recorded, married a Roger whose dominions lay in Northern Apulia, and whose descendants would bear the title of counts of Conversano.³ We have seen in the previous

¹ GM, II.19. According to Orderic Vitalis (II. 102-104) Judith had been a nun. Given Orderic’s tendency to juicy gossip this may be wholly made up or, more probably, Judith was just a young woman residing in a convent.
² See p. 21.
³ Jahn, Untersuchungen, pp. 234-5.
chapter how the Conversanos never doubted their connection to the Hautevilles, nor their entitlement to share in the family’s fortunes; they also benefited from the Hauteville custom of forgiving family members in case of rebellion. The case created here is very clear: a sister is offered in marriage to an obscure but eminently useful member of the local aristocracy; their descendants are considered in everything members of the clan. The great importance taken on by the Conversanos, their status at the heart of three out of four rebellions against Guiscard, testifies to the very early nature of the alliance: Roger and his descendants, however troublesome they may become, had been part of the Hauteville expansion push from the very start. While no other nobleman who would receive an Hauteville sister or daughter in marriage would ever acquire the position enjoyed by Roger’s son Geoffrey and his descendants, many Hauteville daughters were given away in the same manner as this nameless sister: as links with not particularly prestigious but very useful noblemen, whose sons and grandsons were considered part of the family, and who took on a subordinate but well-rewarded position within the clan, thus showing that Hauteville kinship could also pass through the female line to be inherited by a sister’s or daughter’s son.

The second sister, Fressenda, had a very different betrothal and legacy. In her marriage to Richard of Aversa we see the first, but far from last instance of the Hautevilles punching above their weight and successfully marrying their women into more prestigious kins. While the princes of Capua were themselves part of the invading Norman wave in Southern Italy, they gained power earlier and more stably than the Hautevilles. The marriage took place before they obtained the title of prince, but it remained an impressive coup for the Hautevilles to marry into that family: it was they who probably first established a Norman territorial dominion in Aversa, and it is for them that first the title of comes was not simply a military but also an administrative and territorial one. Persuading one of them to marry a Hauteville sister meant a further legitimisation of the Hauteville status: by choosing to marry into the family the counts of Aversa acknowledged the status of the Hautevilles as a rising power in the Mezzogiorno. While it might have been conceivable for the Hautevilles or the counts of Aversa to have some expectation of returns on the marriage alliance in the form of political or military support, the reality was very different. While the princes of Capua and the counts of Conversano were related to the Hautevilles in the same degree, the second became a clear part of the family while the first kept pursuing very different policies, oriented North towards Montecassino and the papacy. While I will analyse in chapter 6 in more detail the complex relationship between these two clans, there is little doubt that the princes of Capua’s position, and

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4 See chapter 3, section 2.c.
5 See pp. 70 ff.
6 See chapter 6 for thorough discussion of the princes of Capua.
7 AM, II.30, p. 294; see pp. 172-3.
8 Loud, The Latin Church in Norman Italy, pp. 128-145.
own power on the Southern Italian theatre, set them apart from the other kins the Hautevilles married into, and gave the descendants of this union special status.

As we will see even more clearly by looking in detail at their daughters, with the giving away of their sisters the Hautevilles began a clear trend: marrying ‘down’ to acquire potentially useful allies and absorb in the kin network minor houses whose sons would be considered Hautevilles; and marrying ‘up’ to legitimise their position and enrich the family tree without obvious expectations of reward. While at the very beginning the Roger who would originate the Conversanos and Richard of Capua had in common at least being Norman in Southern Italy, with them and the Hautevilles placed on different degrees of power and success on a common spectrum, the divergence would widen in following generations: Guiscard had daughters married to heirs to the Byzantine and Hungarian throne and daughters married to more anonymous Norman or Lombard knights.

A minor but significant addition to the trend of giving sisters in marriage to potential allies was the sister of Abelard, son of Humphrey: her husband Gradilon is numbered among his allies, with the marriage quoted as the main link between the two. After all, Abelard, a disinherited son who spent in life attempting in vain to get back what was his, had an interesting marriage policy himself, having married the daughter of Argiritzos of Trani: I will show below how the kin he had inherited and the kin he acquired were Abelard’s best bet in his losing battle to regain his birthright.

There is another sister to be mentioned but discussing her is problematic: Tancred’s possible sister. In one of his charters Roger of Salerno refers to Tancred as his ‘avunculus’, seemingly implying that he was his maternal uncle, and that therefore a sister of his was given in marriage to Richard of the Principate. This is corroborated by Albert of Aachen, who calls Roger "son of Tancred’s sister", by the Anonymous Syriac chronicler, and by Ibn al-Athir. However, we run into several problems here. The first is that aside from the charter, all the sources here mentioned know of Roger at one remove: Albert through oral sources, and the Arabic sources as an enemy and from afar; indeed, another Arabic source, Ibn al-Qalanisi, has it that Roger is the son of Tancred’s brother, something which we can safely discount as the Gesta Tancredi makes no mention of any

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9 WA, III, lines 519-520, p. 192.
10 WA, III, line 537, p. 194.
son of William, who anyway died quite young.\textsuperscript{13} It is worth saying that \textit{avunculus} is not necessarily indicative of an uncle; that we find no other mention of this sister anywhere, and that her absence from the \textit{Gesta Tancredii}, which lingers on Tancred’s brother, mother, and in general on his family relations, is especially suspect; and that for her to marry Richard, her cousin twice removed, a significant ecclesiastical dispensation would have been necessary.\textsuperscript{14}

However, it is true church dispensations could have been easily acquired by the powerful Hautevilles; and we might say that Ralph of Caen, who was writing a literary text which he did not have time or will to finish, may have simply omitted a dynastic marriage. Cahen and Asbridge both accept the relationship, while Edginton only raises a flag over the problem of close kinship.\textsuperscript{15} However, the greatest objection to this interpretation is one of the sheer lack of necessity of such a marriage. Roger of Salerno died at the battle of the Ager Sanguinis in 1119. He had taken over from Tancred as regent at his death in 1112. Given how nowhere do any chroniclers remark on his young age (a detail repeatedly commented upon for Tancred), given his status as a tried and trusted right-hand man, one might suggest that he was at the very least in his late twenties or early thirties at the time of his death, which puts his birth before the crusade.\textsuperscript{16} This would mean that Richard had married Tancred’s sister before the crusade too. Richard of the Principate was already very closely related to both Tancred and Bohemond; his loyalty to either was never in question. Bohemond’s omnipresence in the Mezzogiorno, his having fought for Roger I of Sicily, and his presence in Amalfi before the crusade all explain his knowledge of his cousin and Richard following him on crusade, even without his having been doubly closely related to him.

The Hautevilles, as I will show in this chapter, made use of their daughters as pieces in an extensive, ambitious, well-thought-out marriage policy. A granddaughter of Guiscard, daughter of a man remarked upon for his wealth, surely constituted a very attractive party. It would be simply unprecedented for her to be married off to such a close relative, one moreover who was a cadet son of a very faithful side branch of the family. We just do not have evidence of the Hautevilles marrying such close relatives. While of course all is possible, and one might go as far as hypothesising a love match in the absence of any strategic necessity for such a union, one is led to doubt the the existence of this sister, let alone her having married her second cousin in Southern Italy.

\textsuperscript{14} Niermeyer, \textit{Medie Latinitatis lexicon minus}, v.1, p. 75. It is to be noted that the lexicon suggests that \textit{avunculus} also implied a cousin, even if usually a maternal one; and while Tancred was indeed related to Roger through his mother, Roger was related to him through his father.
\textsuperscript{15} Cahen, \textit{La Syrie du Nord}, p. 545; Asbridge, \textit{The Creation of the Principality}, p. 165; Susan B. Edginton, \textit{Albert of Aachen}, n. 19, p. 837.
\textsuperscript{16} Albert of Aachen, II.22, p. 94, calls him ‘tyro’, a young knight; Guibert de Nogent, \textit{Dei gesta per Francos}, lines 763-5, p. 194, remarks on his youthful impatience in interrupting his seniors; \textit{Tancredus}, lines 18-9, p. 6, describes him as an ‘adolescens’ just before his going to crusade.
One suspects that we are facing on the one hand a misunderstanding of Tancred and Roger’s relationship, and on the other the fact that the two of them probably played it up considerably. As Asbridge points out even while espousing the existence of this sister, the crusader sources seem keen to emphasise that Roger did indeed have some kind of right to inherit the regency of Antioch from Tancred.¹⁷ Seen from someone familiar with Hauteville family relations, of course, there was no doubt that Tancred had made of Roger a second-in-command in the way Hautevilles routinely employed their juniors: Bohemond having taken Richard with him on crusade, after the death of Tancred’s brother William, Roger was presumably the highest-ranking Hauteville in Outremer. However, seen from outside, the relationship must have seemed fairly loose: Fulcher of Chartres, identifies Roger as a generic ‘Tancredi cognatus’, ‘kinsman of Tancred’ when he succeeded in Antioch, and later as ‘filius Ricardi’; the disconnect between the two denominations makes me think that while Fulcher was aware that in some way Tancred, Richard and Roger were all family, he was not entirely clear on the exact nature of this relationship.¹⁸ This is corroborated by the fact that Fulcher saw Roger as an usurper, claiming that he had deprived Bohemond of his inheritance by reigning in Antioch.¹⁹ In this context, concealing the exact family relationship makes eminent sense.

The importance of a sister, of course, did not necessarily simply depend on the husband she married. When Ralph of Caen set out to write his *Gesta Tancredi* he had praise for his wealthy father, Odobonus the Marquis or Odo the Good Marquis, but the fact that his name is not mentioned here, only his title, confirms that he was secondary in the consideration of the author.²⁰ While it is only natural, given Tancred’s crusading career, that Ralph should place emphasis on his maternal relatives, the one prince of Antioch, the other duke of Apulia, the prominence in which he places the name of Emma, Tancred’s mother, leaves open a window for her influence. It is to be remembered that it is from Tancred himself that Ralph claimed to have acquired his information. Given the value he also places on Tancred’s (presumably) younger brother William, whose career was more obscure and whose early death truncated any hopes for his future, it is to be wondered whether his emphasis on Emma’s name does not bespeak an influential character. Emma, after all, provided her brother or half-brother Bohemond with two (or even possibly three, if we are to indeed believe in the existence of the once-attested Robert) of her children to accompany him on crusade; Tancred, whose young age is remarked upon by several crusader chroniclers, was immediately

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¹⁷ Asbridge, *The Creation of the Principality*, p.139.  
¹⁸ Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia*, II.47, 49.  
¹⁹ Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia*, III.3. Fulcher is intensely sympathetic to Tancred, sometimes taking his side even when he was clearly in the wrong; he does not seem to have had the same misgivings about his Antiochene regency he had about Roger.  
²⁰ Tancredus, lines 1-3, p. 6.
entrusted with half of his uncle’s army. This suggests at the very least that Bohemond was acquainted with his nephew’s ability. Tancred and William may have had a brother who stayed behind, and their going together follows the established pattern of Hauteville warrior brothers examined in the first chapter; but the fact remains that Bohemond appears to have had a successful relationship with this branch of the family. We have proof with the anonymity of the matriarch of the Conversano line that the importance of a kin line transcended the importance of the dynastic link that had initiated it, so the prominence of Emma’s name lets us think that there may have been a closer and more influential relationship between her and Bohemond, and her and her sons, which ensured the continuation of her memory.

What is more, we have evidence that Emma may have also had an active role to play in the Hauteville enterprises. During the Byzantine offensive against Southern Italy and Bohemond in 1105 the Byzantine commander, Konstostephanos, attacked Otranto, the closest port to the Balkans on the Italian peninsula. A woman held the fortress against them: ‘she was, they said, Tancred’s mother, though I do not know whether she was the notorious Bohemond’s sister, for I do not really know whether he was related to him on his brother’s or his sister’s side’. Anna Comnena describes this woman, possibly Emma, buying time by pretending to parley, while sending secret messages to her son, who marched to Otranto to relieve her. If indeed Robert existed, and he came back from crusade, this might have been him. Hauteville women had guarded castles in time of war: Roger I’s wife, Judith, had done so. Bohemond was relying on Tancred to hold Antioch while he raised his army in Europe; he might have enlisted the rest of his family in guarding this port. Anna Comnena, who described Tancred’s campaigns against the empire and praises him as a powerful warrior and talented leader, one of the strongest men of his age, could easily have taken note of the relationship as remarkable. While the historian is not sure about her identification of Emma, we should consider the account at least plausible, thus suggesting that Tancred’s mother may have enjoyed some material, besides dynastic, power.

That Hauteville sisters could be vivacious and active partners to their brothers is attested by Rocca, Drogo’s daughter and Richard the Seneschal’s sister. Given Richard’s probable illegitimacy, which I discussed in chapter 2, we may have the same doubts about her status. She

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21 Tancredus, lines 250-1, p. 13; WT, I.80, The Deeds of the Franks, II.v, pp. 10-1. For discussion of Robert, see chapter 2.
24 GM, II.31.
26 This section on Emma’s possible military activities was first prepared for an article on Tancred’s genealogy currently under revision for the journal Medieval Prosopography.
seems to have been acknowledged as an honoured part of the family, since one of her charters was ratified by Roger Borsa, in which he referred to her as ‘consobrina mea’, my cousin, clearly talking of an acknowledged relationship; that he should make time to confirm her donations seems to imply she had his ear or could solicit his favour. But while Richard the Seneschal gained through first fighting for Robert and then serving Roger Borsa, we may wonder whether a possibly bastard daughter would have the same value and prestige in the family circles. Richard’s two mentions of his mother Altrude in donations late in his life might suggest that she was a woman of some status, and not an anonymous, probably lowborn concubine like Jordan of Sicily’s mother; or it is possible, as discussed in chapter 2, that he and Rocca were children of a marriage later annulled, and therefore subject to the same contextual legitimate status as Bohemond.

We have news of a fille of Drogo given in marriage to a ‘Robert, carnal brother of count Richard’ by Guaimar, which seems to imply strongly that this girl was his responsibility and therefore Gaitelgrima’s daughter. This could be Rocca; the sources, however, suggest that Richard had another sister: Aumburga, who was dead by 1101, the year in which her brother donated the lands he had inherited from her to the cathedral of St Peter in Nicastro, which she had founded.

We are looking here at a complete anomaly: Richard regularly mentioned his ‘cara soror’ Rocca in charters for donations bestowed for his family, but he never mentions Aumburga again. This suggests that we are looking here at the above-mentioned daughter of Drogo and Gaitelgrima, with whom Richard was not close. This seems to be confirmed by the Cronica Trium Tabernarium, according to which a ‘domina Acreburga, neptis Roberti Guiscardi’ gave Nicastro a bishop.

Clearly a lady of means as the title suggests, Aumburga may not have had anybody but her half-brother to function as her executor; and while a lack of intimacy may explain their absence from each other’s charters, a half-brother with standing at the ducal court may have been the ideal

27 Il conte normanno, n. IX, p. 66.
28 AM, III.36, p. 331. In a footnote to the Dunbar translation of Amatus of Montecassino, which he edited, Loud posits that the chapter meant widow rather than daughter of Drogo, as later charter evidence shows Gaitelgrima married to a count Robert (History of the Normans in the South, n. 54, p. 99). However, the question cannot be decided on the base of palaeographical evidence: the manuscript tradition is exiguous, and veuve and fille are quite different words, not easily mistaken for each other. Robert and Richard are extremely common Norman names; and in those early times of the conquest comes was very much a military title, so identification of the husband as well is dubious. One is still inclined to believe that Amatus did indeed refer to a daughter of Gaitelgrima.
29 Il conte normanno, n. XVI, pp. 81-3.
30 Il conte normanno, n. XIX, pp. 87-9; XXI, pp. 92-3; XXIV, pp. 100-2.
31 Cronica Trium Tabernarium, p.40. A newer edition of the chronicle exists as part of a study of the origins of the city of Catanzaro, which are recounted in it (Antonio Macchione, Alle origini di Catanzaro: La Cronica Trium Tabernarium (Bari: Mario Adda Editore, 2012), but it is based on the edition of one, previously unexplored manuscript, rather than to the most ancient one available, as Caspar’s is (Macchione, Alle origini, pp.55-65; Caspar, ‘Die Chronik’, pp.23-4. While the validity of the Cronica, especially for what concerns the papal documents it contains, is discussed, Caspar believes that it is a fundamentally plausible account about the territory it describes (Caspar, ‘Cronik’, pp. 2-10).
go-between for her transaction. Given her wealth and status, it seems most likely that she was the daughter of Drogo and Gaitelgrima mentioned by Amatus.\textsuperscript{32}

Rocca seems to have acquired her own fief through widowhood. In 1104 she made a donation ‘pro mercede et redemptione anime mee atque viri mei Ubberti’; in the same charter she refers to ‘filiorum filiarumque mearum’, suggesting at least four children of both sexes given the plurals employed.\textsuperscript{33} She already had no husband in 1098, when she made a donation with the consent of her sons and brother, and identified herself as ‘domina et residente que sum de castello Ullano’, strongly implying that she held the castle in her own right.\textsuperscript{34} While Rocca always appears, as would be proper for a married woman, to have made the donations with the consent of her sons or son-in-law, one of whom she named as Drogo, her prolific career as a patron attests a personality with interests, favour with the men who had some control over her life, and ease and strength to pursue a personal line of patronage, also given her independent possession of a fortress.\textsuperscript{35} Little as we know of Rocca, she certainly appears to have been a woman with influence in her circle; and it is possible to construct Emma, whose tantalising glimpse makes much of her, as a woman of the same kind, or even more active if we accept Anna Comnena’s testimony.

A final Hauteville sister of resources and character appears to have been Matilda, sister of Roger II. Her marriage to the count of Caiazzo falls very much in the pattern described above: a union within the aristocracy of the Mezzogiorno, meant to secure a local nobleman to the then count of Sicily’s cause.\textsuperscript{36} Matilda’s memory endures mostly thanks to an intriguing act of patronage: her commissioning Alexander of Telese to write of her brother’s wars in Southern Italy.\textsuperscript{37} While Alexander’s work found little favour in its own time, the very fact of its having been written, the peculiar way it presents Roger as God’s chosen instrument to bring His wrath down on the nobles of Italy, and his vilification of the count of Caiazzo, a man from whom Matilda had apparently fled, all point to a sophisticated theme which we might expect the abbot to have discussed with his patroness. At the same time, his narrative of Matilda’s political and emotional character is complex and shaded. On the one hand, Matilda’s role as a catalyst of affection is underlined: Roger is fond of her, and she is close to him, running to him for redress and receiving shelter.\textsuperscript{38} She is also shown having influence over her son Robert, whom she takes with her; at the same time, however, as she is shown as an influential mother and highly valued sister, something which we might be tempted

\textsuperscript{32} Given the probability of this conjecture, therefore, she is thus featured in my genealogical tree for Drogo’s family (see Table I).
\textsuperscript{33} Il conte normanno, n. XVIII, pp. 85-6.
\textsuperscript{34} Il conte normanno, n. VIII, pp. 63-6.
\textsuperscript{36} AT, I.7, pp. 9-10 puts the accent on both Rainulf’s useful prowess which Roger hopes to employ in the conquest of Apulia and Roger’s fondness for Matilda. Despite the convention, used by much of the scholarship, of calling Rainulf of Caiazzo ‘Rainulf of Alife’, I will follow here Loud in using his title (see Creation, n. 88, p. 30).
\textsuperscript{37} AT, Prologus, pp. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{38} AT, I.7, pp. 9-10; II.14, p. 29.
to investigate further given her patronage of the work, her relationship to her husband is cast in an intriguing light.\textsuperscript{39} Matilda did not break with Rainulf over a marital dispute or mistreatment, but rather over the fact that he would not give back her land. Far from having offended her in her role as wife, Rainulf appears to have sinned against her as a landholder in her own right, strengthening the impression of horizontal kinship inclusive of women which has been highlighted in the first three chapters of this work. Matilda repaired to her brother for restitution, not of a personal but a political and landed offence. She does not want vengeance but merely her land back.\textsuperscript{40} On the one hand Matilda fulfilled the traditional role of dynastic link undertaken traditionally as part of Hauteville womanhood: Roger’s lament when Rainulf breaks faith with him by refusing to come when summoned is that he no longer can trust him, even if he was related to him through his sister.\textsuperscript{41} Matilda had served to forge a powerful bond between the two men that made Rainulf’s betrayal more heinous, and therefore strengthened the chronicler’s case that Roger’s wrath against his rebellious counts was at once righteous and reluctant, as their leader was a man who had betrayed the sacred family bond with him.\textsuperscript{42}

On the other hand, however, Matilda was a political and landholding agent in her own right, not simply a sister running to her brother for personal protection but a land-holder seeking redress from her royal overlord. In this, indeed, her personal and political figure are at odds: while her making off with her son, Rainulf’s heir, and seemingly causing Rainulf’s rebellion to escalate seem to place her loyalty firmly with Roger, her relationship with her husband is not altogether that simple. ‘On good advice’ Roger removed Matilda and her son from Southern Italy and sent her to Sicily, in fear that her husband would ‘seduce her back’ to his side.\textsuperscript{43} In this we also find an intriguing assertion on the part of the author: while Alexander is patronised by Matilda, eulogises Roger, and appears of the firm opinion that Rainulf is to blame, he seems to imply that Matilda is not altogether trustworthy. The wording is ambiguous: it is not Roger directly who mistrusts his sister, but someone else. Nonetheless, the advice is ‘good’, so there appears to be some grounding to the fear that Matilda may switch allegiance again. And while her flight to Roger was motivated by political reasons, her return to Rainulf appears to have sentimental, almost sexual connotations.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{39} AT, II.16, pp. 30-2.
\textsuperscript{40} AT, II.14, pp. 29.
\textsuperscript{41} AT, I.7, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{42} Loud (‘History Writing in the Twelfth-Century Kingdom of Sicily’, in Chronicing History: Chroniclers and Historians in Medieval and Renaissance Italy, ed. by S. Dale, A. Williams-Lewin, and D.J. Osheim (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), pp. 29-54, pp. 32-49), interprets Alexander’s presentation of Rainulf as delicate, ‘with kid gloves’, but I would disagree and rather stress how Rainulf is shown to be a man of enduring charm, but also one who has betrayed all those close to him (from wife to brother-in-law cum liege lord).
\textsuperscript{43} ‘sororem suam remotam in Siciliam saniori usus consilio elongaverat; ne quando forte vir eius quolibet modo eam seducens [...] in futurum ingerere posset’, AT, III.34, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{44} AT, III.34, p. 78.
We might then say that Alexander of Telese, who probably conveyed what he wrote in agreement with his patron, immortalised Rainulf of Caiazzo’s political betrayal of his brother-in-law at the same time as he did not indict his role as a husband to Matilda. He also acknowledged her political agency and loyalty at the same time as he recognised her ties to her husband, and credited her with the influence that would make her betrayal a problem at the same time as he removed the shade of doubt from a relationship with her brother that is portrayed as personally affectionate, and politically trustworthy, possibly justifying Matilda herself in the eyes of her brother and vindicating her in her quadruple role as sister, mother, wife, and fief-holder. Indeed, while it is acknowledged that Rainulf rebelled early on, Alexander tries to soften this by saying he was ‘badly advised’, with the same deflective technique he used to frame Roger’s mistrust of Matilda as discussed above. Like Malaterra, Alexander of Telese portrays the Hauteville family link as an intriguing overlap of the personal and political: he acknowledges Matilda as both an emotional and a political character, and one whose loyalties are complex and woven of both aspects of the spectrum. Through her act of patronage she both restated her loyalty to her brother, and re-established her identity as an agent beholden and grateful to, but at least partially independent from him.

A different testimony for Matilda and her marriage comes from Falco of Benevento. The chronicler recounts that, far from Matilda complaining about her husband’s injuries to her personal property, Roger ‘learnt’ that Rainulf had been mistreating her, and since he ‘loved her more than it was possible to imagine, after taking counsel’, he sent her to Sicily with her son for safekeeping. Rainulf’s grief at being deprived of his wife and heir is shown to be another reason for him to dislike and mistrust his brother-in-law, an additional rift between the men. That Matilda and Roger had a close and active relationship is clearly shown by the existence of Alexander of Telese’s work; but one would tend to mistrust the rest of Falco’s account, which has none of the ambiguity shown by Alexander. Falco fully exculpates Matilda from any blame. Surely, had this been the situation, the work she patronised would have said so; but the ambiguity persistent in the Ystoria Rogerii strongly hints that there was more to Matilda’s move to Sicily than a concerned brother’s love, and that Matilda felt her loyalty was somehow in doubt, and needed to be restated.

That a sister could be a force for evil rather than good, and that Hauteville women could and did attempt to capitalise on their family connection, is shown by Guiscard’s daughter Mabilia. Married to William of Grandmesnil, Malaterra casts her as the evil counsel behind William’s revolt.

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45 ‘quamquam male consultus’, AT, I.8, p. 10.
46 ‘rex prefatus deprehedens comitem ipsum Rainulphum convicia multa et afflictiones Matildi uxor suae inferre, eiusdem regis sorori, quam, ultra quam credi potest, diligebat, consilio habito, ipsam suam sororem vocari mandavit, quam honeste accipiens eam dulcibus colloquiis consolatur, et eam Siciliam mandavit’, FB, p. 120.
against Roger Borsa’s rule, a lengthy and contentious rift which was only eventually solved by the husband and wife going in exile. While the closeness of a sister to her brother’s rule could prop it up, it could also lend legitimacy to the aspirations of ambitious men, and be a source of ambition in itself: Malaterra is not Orderic Vitalis, ever ready to cast women in power as poisoners, and his account of Mabilia’s bad faith is believable. We know of at least one of Hauteville sister who, like her brothers, knew how to make a bid for power.

Of some Hauteville sisters we only have the name, of others not even that, and they appear to have served as the dynastic links so many Hauteville daughters fulfilled; on the other hand, those of them who left traces of themselves behind in their own right appear to have enjoyed close relationships with their brothers. This would tie in with the trend in emotional and practical sibling relationships I have described in previous chapters: the Hautevilles may have felt for their sisters the same kind of pragmatic yet deep tie that held them to their brothers. Presumably united by a common childhood, a sense of family, and the width of Hauteville kinship feeling that often enveloped their descendants, Hauteville brothers and sisters appear to have found themselves in a variant of the beneficial yet familial relationship that held together male siblings. If Hauteville fathers, as we will now see, appear to have disposed of their daughters in a routine fashion, there appears to have been scope for them to develop a more active partnership with their brothers, men they may well have grown up being close to, and who may have related to them more as peers and partners when occasion and personal ability supported this.

b. *Daughters: Marrying Up, Marrying Down*

The perfect case study for Hauteville daughters comes from Guiscard and Roger I. Both of them tremendously prolific, the two brothers had a numerous offspring which allowed them to plan a coherent if sprawling marriage campaign across the entirety of the Mediterranean and Europe, extending the reach of the Hauteville kin far beyond their original zone of influence. The Hautevilles were clearly comfortable with and encouraged their wives’ influence in their policies and endeavours; we might be surprised that the Hautevilles did not show the same favour to their daughters, but at the same time, I believe their relationship with gender and rule was very much contextual. In a land in turmoil with conquest underway and a high mortality rate, a powerful wife with useful kin connections was an asset. Guiscard, and especially Roger, consciously encouraged their wives to take an active role in their affairs, shaping them to be efficient rulers and regents in their absence or in case of their death. A powerful countess or duchess was a guarantee of the safe passage of power to the next generation, and Hauteville vertical succession was almost invariably rough business. As I have shown above, and will discuss more thoroughly in this chapter, a powerful

woman like Sichelgaita or Adelaide del Vasto was both an efficient ruler in her own right and a guarantee that a son would succeed.

But with the superabundance of sons trained in the military and inducted into the administration of Hauteville dominions at different levels, there was no need to shape or encourage a daughter for ruling.\(^{49}\) It is to be underlined, however, that their attitude to both daughters and sons was highly practical: just as the Hautevilles made attentive use of their younger brothers and children, shaping them for a task suited to them or occasionally leaving them aside when they did not consider them useful, as had happened to the unfortunate Geoffrey and would happen to some of Roger I’s children, they also disposed of their daughters in ways that suited the family plans. At the same time, the cases of influential sisters discussed above hint at a more complex relationship between siblings of different sexes, one in which heavily implied if unproven emotional bonds and political affinities could develop into long-standing and consequential relationships like that between Rocca and Richard, Roger II and Matilda, and possibly Bohemond I and Emma.

As highlighted above, the marriages contracted by the Hauteville daughters fall into two categories: marriages to relatively minor Southern Italian figures of importance to the family’s policies, and those to major heirs to Mediterranean and European counties and thrones. The marriages to local noblemen are the most easily understood in context, and make sense as part of the wider Hauteville pattern in Southern Italy: as it has been shown in previous chapters, the scarce numbers of the Normans in Southern Italy made it expedient for them to develop a horizontal conception of kin and to develop tightly interconnected networks of familial and political support. Just as the counts of Aversa had seen it as advantageous to marry a sister of the up-and-coming Hautevilles, and the other Hauteville sister had been given to the obscure but self-evidently useful Roger, so Roger and Robert chose to marry their daughters to local, useful men, even if now the balance of power in Italy was firmly tilted in their favour.

The sheer scale and ambition of their European marriages, however, beggar belief. On the one hand we have prestigious marriages brought about by the eternal Hauteville habit of having a finger in every pie, and a fight with everyone. The long deadlock between Robert Guiscard and the Byzantine Empire makes the engagement between his daughter Olympias and Constantinos Doukas a sensible and easily understood piece of policy: the sheer instability of the throne of Byzantium meant that the woman, to the best of our knowledge, ended her life in a convent after the overthrow of her husband’s dynasty, but had she become empress it would have meant a coup for the Hautevilles and peace in the Balkans for the Byzantine throne.\(^{50}\) A number of complex policies

\(^{49}\) The lone exception of a daughter who seems to have, at least once, acted in the role usually reserved for a son is Alferana, the only attested child of Tancred of Conversano: as sons often did, she is found witnessing a charter issued by her father (Houben, Venosa, n. 106, pp. 339-41).

were at stake here: in her translation and discussion of the marriage accord, Bibicou posits that the engagement sat within Michael VII Doukas’ anti-Turkish policy, and that he sought a rapprochement with the Normans as a way of gaining allies against the Turks.\footnote{Bibicou, ‘Une page’, pp. 65-75; AM, VII.26, pp. 463-4.} Bibicou especially stresses the payments agreed by the emperor suggest his need for acquiring allies, even at a price so handsome it led Amatus of Montecassino to claim that the emperor had paid tribute to the duke.\footnote{Bernoldi Chronicon, ed. by Ludomír Emil Havlík et al. (Prague: Statní Pedagogické Nakadatelství, 1966), p. 463.} And in ultima ratione, to place a daughter on the throne of Byzantium would have been a self-evident coup. The same can be said for the marriage of Roger’s daughter with Conrad, king of the Romans, whose additional twist gives us a window into the supreme eligibility of parvenu Hauteville daughters for the wider European aristocracy: the pope and countess Matilda of Tuscany counselled Conrad, who was at the time in rebellion against his father the emperor and without allies, to marry into the Hautevilles and thus access their resources.\footnote{GM, IV.23, p. 101.} Explicitly, Maximilla came ‘cum inaudita pecunia’: Conrad had a powerful incentive to marry her, and it suited Count Roger to bet on the king that the pope and the powerful Matilda protected.\footnote{GM, IV.25, pp. 102-4.} Once more, this prestigious marriage bore no fruit, but it looked like the Hautevilles, besides tangling with European aristocracy, could buy their way into it too.

That the Hautevilles were flush with cash appears to have been something that could backfire: Malaterra has it that Phillip of France asked for Roger’s daughter Emma in marriage with his eyes on the dowry, when his previous marriage had not been annulled.\footnote{GM, IV.8, pp. 90-1.} The indignant Roger of course withdrew the suit, and Emma married a ‘count of Clermont’, but it appears clear that Phillip had not truly intended to marry into the lowborn Hautevilles, but rather to get his hands on their money. No such qualms can be found in Coloman of Hungary, who married another daughter of Roger, from whom he had the son who would succeed him.\footnote{GM, III.22, p. 70; Houben, ‘Adelaide del Vasto’, p. 113, for the possibility of Aldobrandeschi’s wife being Roger’s daughter.} While we can assume that her dowry was just as gorgeous as that of her sisters, her wedding in a far-off kingdom unlikely to ever have bearing on Hauteville affairs still made the family that much more respectable. The attractive combination of portable wealth, the enduring ties of some sort with France, and what clearly was the increasing international renown of the Hautevilles, help to explain the weddings of daughters of Guiscard with Hugh of Maine, Raymond count of Barcelona, Ebles, count of Roucy; while a daughter of Roger married Raymond of Toulouse and another, possibly, Ildebrando Aldobrandeschi.\footnote{GM, III.22, p. 70; Houben, ‘Adelaide del Vasto’, p. 113, for the possibility of Aldobrandeschi’s wife being Roger’s daughter.}
It is unlikely that these were connections the Hautevilles expected to maintain: while a daughter as empress of Byzantium or at the head of the Holy Roman Empire would considerably increase the family cachet at the same time as they helped with thorny and lengthy political relationships, these others were marriages of prestige but with no direct bearing upon Hauteville affairs. While on the one hand the growing power of the Hautevilles put them on the radar of German and Byzantine emperors as a family to make an ally, it seems to me that their cash and fame made their daughters attractive parties all over Europe; and, a family in perpetual search of legitimacy, as we will see below with a discussion of the women they married, and a clear surplus of daughters, it seems that the Hautevilles happily sought out or took up such offers. A final example of a Hauteville woman marrying high comes, unexpectedly, from the Conversano branch: the eternally troublesome cousins of the Hautevilles produced a daughter distinguished by being one of the few Southern Italian women for whom Orderic Vitalis had a few good words. Robert Curthose, duke of Normandy, returning from Jerusalem in the year 1100, asked for and received her in marriage, a circumstance in which both her beauty and her wealth played a part. While grief at her untimely death was widespread, and we may therefore believe Sybilla to have been a charismatic woman, Robert then also owed a significant sum to his brother William, and Orderic explicitly mentions this debt as one of his concerns in receiving his bride’s lavish dowry. Apparently well-beloved of all, the newly-made duchess of Normandy died in 1103. Robert of Torigny praises her administrative virtues, according to him superior to her husband’s; and in her we see realised both the potential for wealth and status of Hauteville women, and a rare example of a woman of the Hauteville achieving an active role. A great-granddaughter of Tancred, the no-name knight that had started an extraordinarily prolific kin, had come back to Normandy as one of its rulers, bringing full circle the family’s ascent.

An entirely different policy is enacted through those daughters who stayed close to home, one in which we see Robert and Roger acting in concert: it is striking that Odobonus, one of the Northern Italian colonists imported into Sicily by Roger, should marry a daughter of Robert when presumably Roger still had women available, though we indeed have examples of Robert promising his nieces as opposed to his daughters in marriage. It may simply have come down to which of the brothers had daughters of marriageable age available at any given moment. This marks also a powerful division among the offspring of the two brothers: with the exception of Emma, Robert’s

61 It is necessary to mention, however, that Robert was not the most efficient or successful of dukes: his biographer, Aird, candidly admits that at the moment of his marriage to Sybilla he was aging, broke, and worn down by the crusade (Aird, *Robert Curthose*, pp. 191-3).
62 GM, III.29, p. 75.
daughters only married up; that the only daughter of his who stayed in Italy should marry someone who to the best of our knowledge was one of Roger’s men suggests that, while his brother harboured greater ambitions, Roger was building a prudent network in Italy itself. Roger’s higher number of daughters, however, meant that his marriage policy was more balanced, serving both the interests of furthering the reach of the family and of more firmly rooting it to the territory. So we have daughters who, like the above-mentioned Matilda with Rainulf of Ciaiazzo, married close to home with men useful to the family: Flandina and Henry of Paternò, as part of the alliance with the Aleramici; Adelisa and Henry of Monte Sant’Angelo, Muriella and Josbert of Lucy, and Judith and Robert of Bassunvilla, an unknown daughter and the Hugh de Gercé to whom Roger entrusted the care of Sicily in his absence; and finally the aforementioned Emma, who, presumably widowed, returned to Italy and married Rudolph of Montescaglioso. All these were locally powerful men, who ruled lordships in Southern Italy; as we will see in the next chapter, some of them provided support for Roger II’s power; Henry was, of course, part of the deal through which Northern Italian men and resources were poured into Sicily. Roger I’s sheer number of daughters meant that he could well spare a few for the purpose of prestige marriages, and the final balance (five daughters who stayed within Hauteville dominions and four away), plus having married his niece Emma to one of his men, suggests that Roger’s thoughts were, on balance, closer to home, with the flashier marriages of Maximilla and the nameless Hungarian daughter taking place in the last decade of his life. All in all, Roger seems to have taken advantage of the number of daughters at his disposal to tie closely to him men who ruled near his home.

If it appears that this section has depicted the vast majority of the daughters of Guiscard and Roger I as expendable, it is because they were treated as such: their marriages were spread thickly over a range of interests, some of them humbler but eminently useful such as marriage to Hauteville men, others ambitious but feasible unions within a larger European policy, and a few of them prestigious, but ultimately not immediately useful unions. Just like their father Tancred, both Guiscard and Roger I were incredibly fertile, and their use of their offspring shows them as both the ambitious and yet careful players that their conquest policies had made them out to be. While we can see, as I have suggested above, hints of a sibling bond between some of their sons and their daughters, it is to be said that there is no equivalent of the tight bond enjoyed by Jordan and Roger I, between Bohemond and Guiscard for their daughters. Guiscard protested when Olympias was put

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63 We may argue whether Mabilia marrying William of Grandmesnil counted as marrying ‘up’ or ‘down’; he was certainly a useful man on the ground, but I would argue that given the prestige of his kin (discussed in chapter 6) this was still a much more prestigious marriage than Emma’s to Odobonus.

aside, but it is just as easy to construe this as the perfect excuse for him to renew his long-standing hostility towards the Byzantine Empire. At the same time, it is to be borne in mind that while we do have evidence of an emotional bond between Roger I, Guiscard, and their heirs, their attitude to their children as a whole could be even more cavalier: we know barely anything about the three male, probably legitimate children of Roger discussed in chapter 2, and very little about Robert, the other son of Guiscard.

While it appears that the Hautevilles chose carefully which relationships to emphasise and which children were closest to them, I feel we can say with confidence that this was not a relationship defined exclusively by gender. Many of the daughters of Guiscard and Roger I appear to have been defined wholly by their status as childbearers and enhancers of the family status, and none of them ever came close to inheriting Hauteville power given the surplus of available sons, the relationships developed by Emma and Matilda with their brothers hints that space was at least left to them for a more equal relationship with their siblings. Naturally, the key difference here lay in the fact that male children, even if not particularly close to their fathers, would be provided for through land, as we have seen with the endowment of Ragusa for Geoffrey son of Roger I, and Lucera for William son of Roger Borsa, thus following a conventional division of wealth according to gender roles. Nonetheless, what is crucial here is while gender certainly seemed to define the kind of provision made for a child, it did not automatically determine their access to or closeness with their parent. On the whole, women born into the Hautevilles seem to have been used as marriage pawns in the very extensive wedding game played by their brothers and fathers; their sheer numbers and availability making their marriages somewhat expendable, the policy varied, and the overall impression of their emotional importance between the family economy scarce, with few exceptions, but on a scale comparable to those of their brothers who had not been designated to inherit.

4.3. *Women into the Hautevilles*

Women who were born to the Hautevilles were consistently used as pawns in alliances, whether strategic or purely prestigious, and most often the agency and influence they may have

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66 Though interestingly he seems to have inherited the nickname ‘Guiscard’. For the charters which attest him (1086-1103), the last three of which feature the name, see: Ménager, *Receuil*, n. 47, pp. 171-2; 49, 175-6; 53-54, pp. 183-6; 61, pp. 215-9; *Registrum Petri Diaconi*, III, no. 421, pp. 1187-89; *Carte latine di abbazie calabresi provenienti dall’Archivio Aldobrandini*, ed. by Alessandro Pratesi (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1958), no. 4, pp. 16-18; *Antiquitates Italicae Medii Aevi*, ed. by Ludovico Antonio Muratori, 6 vols (Milan: Typographia societatis palatinae in regia curia, 1738-42), I, 899-900; Cava, C.42; Houben, *Venosa*, n. 81, pp. 315-16. The latter two were issued by him personally. For Guy see p. 86.
displayed appears to have been highly contextual and is mostly confined to actions undertaken jointly with their husbands or brothers, with the possible exception of Matilda of Sicily. With women who married into the Hauteville clan, however, we see a very different kind of role and attitude. In general, the Hauteville men seem to have pursued a constant policy of marrying up, looking for brides who carried with them a link with a powerful family and increased prestige. What is more, increasingly after their first years in the Mezzogiorno, they expected these women not simply to increase their power base thanks to their dynastic connections, but often they seem to have encouraged them to assume an active role in holding the reins of their dominions in their absence or in case of regency, as discussed above in chapter 2. The horizontal kinship necessary to the Hautevilles in Southern Italy allowed for and sometimes required women to step up, filling the void left by men absent or dead. But such a role itself had an evolution, from the earliest times in the Hauteville conquest, in which a fighting rule and a modest dominion, not to mention a quick succession, allowed for little development in female influence; to a more complex and stable dominion, which granted more scope to women of the Hauteville clan. Here I will discuss the women who married into the Hautevilles in roughly chronological order, by grouping them according to their nationality, the man they married, or by focusing on particular individuals when documentation about them is particularly interesting or plentiful.

a. *All the Prince’s Daughters*

As we have seen, the beginning of Hauteville domination in Southern Italy was very uncertain, with the title of *comes* born by William Iron-arm meaning a solely military and not territorial command. However, ever since these early stages the Hautevilles displayed their remarkable ability for advancing themselves not only through war but also through marriage. It is thus that we see William, the practically landless son of a minor knight, managing to marry Guida, the daughter of the Lombard duke of Sorrento, and immediately enhancing the family status. The uncertain circumstances of the Norman invasion, and our nebulous idea of the actual power wielded by William, make it hard to pinpoint what exact situation made him an attractive prospect for the duke; we may safely say that it may have appeared prudent for the ruler of Sorrento to acquire a link with one of the more enterprising leaders of the Normans in Southern Italy. On his part, William is likely to have jumped at the chance of getting a foot in the door of the Lombard aristocracy. For a man who had departed Normandy a pauper a few years before to marry the daughter of a duke was quite a coup. The evolution of Hauteville power brought at once a tightening and a growth of their relationship with the Lombard powers of the Campania. With Drogo we have seen the very beginnings of Hauteville land power in Southern Italy, and with them came a prestigious marriage.

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67 AM, II.30, p. 294.
68 AM, II.28, p. 292.
into a more powerful branch of the same Lombard family: Drogo married Gaitelgrima, daughter of the prince of Salerno, himself the cousin of the duke of Sorrento. If the Hautevilles had been open from the start to marrying into the Lombard aristocracy, now they were clearly developing a close relationship with the same family, choosing it again and again: Humphrey married another daughter of the duke of Sorrento, and William, who would eventually come to dominate the Principato and therefore the area of influence that had once belonged exclusively to the Lombard dynasty, married Maria, a niece of the prince of Salerno. Taviani-Carozzi clearly frames this policy as the fundamental bedrock of Hauteville power in the South, on which Guiscard’s power would later rest. And below I will examine the most famous of the Hauteville marriages into the ducal and princely Lombard families: that of Guiscard to Sichelgaita, princess of Salerno.

If five out of eight Hauteville brothers married into the same family (Roger, as we shall see below, pursued an entirely different marital strategy; Geoffrey’s wife is never mentioned; and presumably Mauger died too early to acquire a wife) we can see the delineation of a precise plan: the older Lombard dynasty sought some stability in the upheaval of the Norman invasion by forging an alliance with members of one of the more promising forces, while the Hautevilles, as absolute upstarts, capitalised on the legitimacy granted by marrying with such a kin. I have discussed above how closely knit were the children of Muriella were, close in age, ruled by a clear hierarchy, and strongly united in purpose: it is easy to trace the evolution from the early, advantageous marriage of William Iron-arm, to the achievement that was Drogo marrying a princess, and the securing of another ducal daughter for Humphrey. As the Hauteville star was on the rise with the steady evolution of their dominions through the rule of Muriella’s sons, the Normans leant more on the capital offered by a Lombard alliance and the Lombard sought to strengthen their backing of what was proving to be a winning horse.

What is more, Amatus clearly frames the earliest Hauteville marriages into the noble Lombard families as an act of faithful vassalage on one side, of paternal regard on the other: and thus the princes of Salerno are said to ‘make’ the Hauteville counts, endowing their recent dominion with the prestige of their more ancient rule. The whole of Amatus’ chronicle may be said to work towards reconciling Norman violence with a semblance of Southern Italian law and order; in this perspective, we may take with a pinch of salt his portrayal of the Hautevilles as tame dogs-of-war of the princes. Nonetheless, what he shows at bottom is a relationship of mutual advantage: on the one hand established Lombard rule, on the other the danger but also the promise of Norman

69 AM, II.35, pp. 299-300.
70 AM, III.34, pp. 330-1; Houben, Venosa, n. 82, pp. 316-7.
71 Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, 170-8.
72 AM, IV.21, p. 364.
73 See pp. 18-20.
74 AM, II.29, p. 328; 35, pp. 299-300; III.34, pp. 330-1.
75 AM, II.29, p. 293; 35, pp. 299-300; III.34, pp. 330-1; IV.22, p. 364.
military strength, with a mechanism identified first by Taviani-Carozzi and then by Drell and Thomas as a way of reinforcing the Lombard comitatus, integrating into it strong military men useful to the continuation of their rule.\(^\text{76}\) The kin-group of the dukes of Sorrento-princes of Salerno had chosen the Hautevilles to bolster their status in the situation of upheaval following the Normans’ arrival. In her article on the brothers’ strategy of marriage into the Lombard aristocracy, however, Thomas’ interprets the evolution of the Hauteville marriage strategy as one of rivalry, with a first stage in which the sons of Muriella could marry into the Lombard kin group, and only in a second moment, with the advent of the sons of Fressenda, could Guiscard and William of the Principato do the same.\(^\text{77}\) I would greatly disagree with this interpretation given the many interlocking elements of the relationship between the brothers discussed in chapter 1 which complicate such a perspective: Humphrey actively patronised the children of Fressenda; Drogo’s forbidding Guiscard’s marriage to Alberada sat in a wider embattled relationship made of aggression and bargaining; given the age gap between the sons of Muriella and the sons of Fressenda, and the early deaths of William Iron-arm, Drogo and Humphrey, there was a natural change in the heads of the family with whom it would be strategic to marry.\(^\text{78}\)

Discussing the women themselves involved in these unions is a complex matter, despite their apparent similarities. Gaitelgrima’s role is tied to the status of the children she may or may not have had: if she indeed mothered a daughter by Drogo, her father’s interest in looking after her shows how a powerful mother could ensure her offspring’s advantage later in life. If Loud instead is right, after her short marriage to Drogo Gaitelgrima went on to marry again, she continued functioning as a link for her father’s dynastic interests with ensuring close alliance with the coming Normans. Either way, the role she fulfilled is proof of the willingness on the part of the Lombard nobility of Sorrento and Salerno to continue to engage with the Hautevilles, singling them out as the Normans to relate to and with whom to mingle, the up-and-coming men on which the powerful princes of Salerno chose to bet. Rather more can be said about the nameless but intriguing wife of Humphrey. Another daughter of the duke of Sorrento, she was the mother of Abelard, the boy whose regency Guiscard had sworn to uphold only to promptly snatch it away.\(^\text{79}\) That this woman, whose kin was powerful enough to buttress the Hauteville bid for the Mezzogiorno, was unable to exercise herself in the function of regent as many others would do in later years testifies to the instability of the time and of the Hauteville dominions themselves: when Humphrey died the Hauteville

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\(^\text{78}\) See pp. 19 ff.

\(^\text{79}\) WA, IV, lines 451-453, p. 228.
countship was still in the making, to be upheld by the sword and enlarged with it. Humphrey had been an ambitious man who had tried to institute vertical inheritance in Southern Italy, but he simply died too soon for the project to be feasible, leaving behind a son that was too young to defend the county. But if his wife could not protect their son’s rights from her husband’s predatory kin, she could provide him with an entirely separate network which would support him during his attempts to gain back his father’s title.

Abelard and his uterine brother Herman, son of his nameless mother and an entirely unmentioned father, share one of the more overtly emotional kinship bonds in the Hauteville clan: it was emotional blackmail after Guiscard had seized Herman as a hostage that persuaded Abelard to stop his continuous rebellions against his uncle, rescue his brother and quit Southern Italy for good. If therefore Abelard’s weak point hints at a tightly knit family nucleus, with his Lombard mother tying together her sons of different fathers, it also proves the power of the very process of legitimisation the Hautevilles had pursued. Abelard functioned as a rallying standard for those who were unhappy with Guiscard’s growing overlordship because he was perceived as a wronged and therefore legitimate challenger: not simply the obscure son of a count who had still been in the making like Drogo, but the product of the union of someone who held very real institutional power. The legitimising strategy of the parvenu Hautevilles could and did sometimes backfire.

While in the quick succession of William Iron-arm, Drogo and Humphrey we see the breathless rhythm of the early years of the conquest, and with their wives we observe the unfulfilled promise of their unions as they all died before they could be truly capitalised upon, with William the younger we see a far different story. William successfully positioned himself as a subordinate but fairly independent agent throughout his life: after his time of strife against Guiscard he subsided into the comfortable countship of the Principato, where he nipped at the heel of the Lombard princes of Salerno either in connivance with or in the benevolent indifference of his brother. A man who clearly knew and could play his advantage, William secured a prestigious union to a Salernitan princess; what he made of it is entirely contextual to his circumstances. In a secure zone that never rebelled against Guiscard, without a frontier to push like the Loritellos, William reaffirmed his independence but eventually let himself be absorbed within the Lombard group into which he had married. His wife Maria is notable for her several contributions to the abbey of Venosa: the charters attest to a precise policy of patronage. Himself never a contender for the Norman overlordship, William appears to have settled into his dominion; and instead of leaning into the prestige conferred by his wife to gain power, he seems to have permitted and taken part in a campaign of patronage rather than to have engaged with the larger power struggle in Southern Italy. Once overlordship had

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80 Although as we shall soon see Hauteville brides were far from absent from the theatre of war.
81 See chapter 2; 5.
82 AM, IV.9, pp. 356-7.
83 Houben, Venosa, n. 34, pp. 267; 47, pp. 277-9; 82, pp. 316-7.
been secured by someone else, the ennobling effects of a princely marriage could be shown off by the more peaceful activity of patronage, rather than the dangerous one of conquest. In his willingness to follow Maria’s lead, William acknowledged the importance of the bond she had brought to his branch of the family, the prestigious effect lent by her descent, and the legitimisation she offered to his not necessarily easy occupation of part of the province her family had ruled. Like Roccia (whose persistent, prestigious campaign of endowments may be taken as another parallel to patterns employed by Lombard ladies) Maria left her mark with the projects she pursued and persuaded the men of her family to pursue, her strength resting on the value of the connection she had brought to her husband.

With the Lombard wives of William Iron-arm, Drogo, Humphrey and William the younger we see the parallel evolution of two kins: on the one hand the newcomer Hautevilles, scrambling to enlarge and secure their power as they died in quick succession, more than willing to leap at the chance of resting their status of robber barons on the laurels of ancient Lombard families; on the other, the bid of the Lombard aristocracy of the Campania to seize a foothold in the rapidly changing world of the Norman invasion, repeatedly offering and obtaining marriage unions to the Hautevilles, attempting again and again to have a say in the founding of a common dynasty.

b. Alberada

When Guiscard first came to Italy he did so, truly, as a junior brother: the first of the children of Fressenda to head South, immediately distinguishing himself by a fiercely independent and troublesome streak, it is unsurprising that he found himself at odds with his older brothers, and that he was not included either in their landholdings or in their fruitful relationship with the Lombard aristocracy. Guiscard’s first marriage, to the Norman Alberada of Buonalbergo, is in the same spirit as those of many Hauteville daughters: a mutually rewarding alliance between a family which was establishing itself, the Buonalbergos, and an ambitious young knight, in this case Guiscard. His first wife was the means to something he then sorely lacked, being at odds with his brothers: a warband of his own on which to rely in times of strife and isolation. There is at least a chance that the choice was not entirely based on circumstance: Guiscard would eventually repudiate Alberada because of the supposedly too close kinship between them. While this looks like a suspiciously convenient relationship to unearth just as Guiscard was poised to marry a princess of

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84 See chapter 1; 2.
86 AM, IV.18, p. 362.
Salerno, and the ecclesiastical conception of ‘forbidden degrees of consanguinity’ could be rather roomy, this at least leaves the door open for the possibility that even when he fell out with his brothers Guiscard had someone to whom he could turn.

His closeness to the Buonalbergos is beyond question. If we know nothing about Alberada herself, she remains the emblem of a very well-founded alliance: the Buonalbergos never rebelled against Guiscard, and they remained with him even after he had repudiated their kinswoman. But Alberada herself was not cast away: I have discussed in chapter 2 how Bohemond’s legitimacy was never put in question, and that Guiscard continued to care for his first wife is exemplified by her burial in the family foundation of Venosa at her death. This is hardly surprising when we consider how Amatus presents Robert’s dealing with the family: Gerard of Buonalbergo is shown in the sources openly seeking out Guiscard in his moment of greatest dejection, offering him two hundred knights with whom to fight. The importance of the proposal, and the possibilities it unlocked for him, are demonstrated by Robert’s outright begging his brother Drogo to let him marry Alberada, and Drogo’s reluctance to consent. In many ways Robert’s kingmaker, as Amatus openly acknowledges, Gerard appears to have also bestowed on him his nickname ‘Guiscard’, in a final act of long-lasting consequence.

I would also put forward the possibility that Alberada may have been not only Bohemond’s mother, but also the mother of Emma, herself mother of Tancred. While William only records her giving birth to Bohemond, chroniclers are not particularly concerned with announcing the coming of daughters; we have no information directly against it. What is more, William says that Sichelgaita gave Guiscard five daughters, but we know of six: Emma, Olympias, Matilda, Sibilla and Mabilia, and the wife of Hugo of Este. One must be attributed to another mother, we know of no other women of Guiscard’s, nor is illegitimacy suggested anywhere, and it would make sense for a daughter of a previous marriage to have two sons of fighting age once the crusades came around. Moreover, the possibility of Emma and Bohemond being full siblings would explain his closeness to her offspring, even at a time in which Bohemond was just recovering from having rebelled against Roger Borsa. While such a closeness could simply be explained by the fact that both Bohemond and Tancred’s father, who mostly appears in Roger I’s charters, fought under the

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88 See chapter 2, section 2.
89 AM, Ill.11, p. 277.
90 WA, II, line 423, p. 154.
91 WA, II, line 442, p. 154. Bünemann, in gathering the information concerning Guiscard’s daughters, also suggests as his daughter Gaitelgrima (Bünemann, Robert Guiskard, pp. 254-8). Graham Loud proves the one charter attesting Gaitelgrima as daughter of Guiscard (Cava, C.2, n. 26). is a forgery (‘The Abbey of Cava, its Property and Its Benefactors in the Norman Era’, in ANS, 9 (1987), 143-177, p. 156. In their recent edition of the charter collection, the editors Carlone, Morinelli and Vitolo discuss that the charter is a forgery based on an original issued by Gaitelgrima, daughter of Gaimar IV of Salerno (Codex Diplomaticus Cavensis, XI, pp. 105-7).
count of Sicily, the fact that Bohemond immediately trusted his nephew with positions of responsibility despite his young age suggests a longer acquaintanceship with him.\textsuperscript{92} Given Alberada’s enduring respect and honour, and the enduring legitimacy of her son despite her repudiation, it seems to me probable that Bohemond, a sidelined son, would have found it easier to build a rapport with a closer relative, a potential ally in the larger clan created by Guiscard’s second, alienating marriage.

As with the Lombard wives of the sons of Muriella, Alberada is a shadow full of implied meanings: she represents Guiscard’s first attempt at constructing a network of supporters, she embodies a successful alliance which indeed survived her being put aside, and she represents a meaningful emotional connection which is attested by her unique burial. The significance of her lying in Venosa cannot be overstated: while, given the early abandonments and state of destruction of the foundation, it could be suggested that we simply have lost evidence of other Hauteville wives being buried there, the fact remains that Guiscard apparently chose to honour the first wife he had put aside, the mother of his dispossessed eldest, beyond her death.

c. \textit{Sichelgaita}

If it is impossible to gain any perception of Alberada as a person, with Sichelgaita, Guiscard’s second and more famous wife, we have the opposite problem: her figure is clad in legend. Her most famous portrayal is that by Anna Comnena, who depicts her armed and on horse, shaming the Normans who are attempting to flee the battle and inciting them to fight back and gain the day.\textsuperscript{93} In every way, she appears matched to her husband, Robert \textit{terror mundi}.\textsuperscript{94} The accuracy of such a portrayal is of course questionable. The barbarously warlike spirit of Western women is a firm Byzantine stock trope, later trotted out by Niketas Choniates with regards to Eleanor of Aquitaine and her crusading ladies; and William of Apulia depicts Sichelgaita in a diametrically opposite manner, as a ladylike woman who flees battle in terror when she is slightly wounded by a chance arrow.\textsuperscript{95} At the same time, however, he also shows Guiscard leaving her at the siege of Trani in his absence, clearly entrusting her with a position of responsibility.\textsuperscript{96} But on one thing the two radically divergent portrayals agree: on Sichelgaita as a duchess who went to war with her husband.

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\textsuperscript{92} Becker, \textit{Diplomi greci e latini}, p. 56; \textit{The Deeds of the Franks}, II.v, pp. 10-1.
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Annae Comnenae Alexias}, 4.6, pp. 131-6.
\textsuperscript{94} William of Malmesbury, \textit{Gesta Regum Anglorum}, 262, p. 485, reports this appellative as part of Guiscard’s epitaph (while also reporting that Guiscard died poisoned ‘by domestic poison’, thus seemingly suspecting his relatives of foul play).
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{WA}, III, lines 670, p. 200.
the duke. There is very little need to make Sichelgaita into legend: what we know of the historical figure is in itself remarkable enough.97

On its premises, Guiscard’s union with Sichelgaita looks very much like those of his brothers with other Lombard noblewomen: the princely house of Salerno providing yet another bride to the house of Hauteville. But Sichelgaita from the very start appears to have behaved as Guiscard’s partner, far from being his simple duchess. This is apparent in the sheer number of charters the two issued together; in the charter she issued under her own name, without mentioning anyone’s permission; and in the fact that, as mentioned above, Sichelgaita accompanied Robert to war.98 William of Apulia’s description of a fearful lady is as stock as they come: at Robert’s death he puts in Sichelgaita’s mouth the stereotypical lamentation of a widow, wailing that she and her children are now left unprotected and powerless.99 With a clear handle on the duchy and the support of Roger of Sicily, it is unlikely that Sichelgaita ever truly had to fear for her position and that of her sons. Between the virago reviled by Anna Comnena and the frail lady of William’s imagination we can achieve a better portrayal of a woman who worked closely with her husband and whose influence can be seen in many of his dealings. While we could take William’s report of Robert entreatin the prince of Salerno to peace ‘for love of your sister’ as a stock phrase, it is also possible and likely, given Sichelgaita’s strong presence across the board of Guiscardian policy, to see this as a literal reference to her role as negotiator between her Norman husband and her Lombard family.100 An even stronger print of this can be seen in her effect on Guiscard’s policy of patronage: it is under Sichelgaita that we can see Robert progressively shift away from Venosa, towards more traditional Lombard monasteries such as Cava or Montecassino.101 And while Robert did elect to return to his brothers (and his first wife) in being buried in Venosa when he died, Sichelgaita’s choices and her influence on her son’s reveal a different attitude. The very fact that Robert chose to declare Roger Borsa to succeed him hints at Sichelgaita’s influence over her husband: for Guiscard to have put aside from succession the child of his first wife may have been in the marriage terms, but that he stuck by his decision even when the grown Bohemond showed himself to be so well-suited to succeed his father, a popular military leader like the first few Hauteville counts, speak both of Guiscard’s deference to the agreements taken and to his trust in his wife and brother to be able to ensure Borsa’s inheritance.102 The woman who kept her husband on guard against his nephew Abelard might be expected to have his ear when it came to the succession too.103

97 For a discussion of Sichelgaita’s possible fighting, see Valerie Eads, ‘Sichelgaita of Salerno: Amazon or Trophy Wife?’, *Journal of Medieval Military History* 3(2005), 72-87.
99 WA, V, lines 301-322, p. 252.
100 WA, III, lines 419-420, p. 186.
102 See chapter 2; 5.
103 AM, VII.20-1, pp. 458-60.
I have discussed in chapter 2 Sichelgaita’s ‘non-regency’, in which she appeared to rule jointly with her son for the early years of his reign despite the fact that he was already of age at Guiscard’s death. The closeness between Sichelgaita and Robert, her having obtained the replacement of Borsa for Bohemond as Guiscard’s heir, and Borsa’s lack of the warlike attitude that had characterised his father’s achievement and maintenance of power suggest that Sichelgaita acted as an enduring link with Guiscard’s rule, and that she at once represented continuity and endowed her son with her kin’s legitimacy. As far as the sources show, the couple seems to have been genuinely close, from both a political and a personal standpoint: Amatus describes Sichelgaita constantly accompanying her husband around his dominions, depicting two people who were clearly both comfortable with each other’s presence and closely allied in matters of policy. All this evidence about Sichelgaita’s role as an influential and trusted ally of her husband throw into absolute ridicule Orderic Vitalis’ claim that she poisoned Guiscard and attempted to poison Bohemond, condemning him to look mortally pale throughout his life: there would have been nothing to gain for Sichelgaita in poisoning the husband she so successfully worked with, and his firstborn was clearly not a threat to her children’s interests.

Sichelgaita’s marriage and tenure are the culmination of the policy of the Hautevilles marrying into the princely house of Salerno and its related house of Sorrento. Like her predecessors, she brought to the table a longstanding, legitimate dynasty whose support could ennoble and smooth the way for the upstart Hautevilles; unlike them, she played a far larger role in her husband’s policies, and it was she who jointly with Roger of Sicily ensured the beginning of vertical succession in the Hauteville clan and protected her son’s interests against Bohemond’s rebellion. While she is the apex representative of Lombard influence on Norman rule, however, Sichelgaita is also its last one: with her we see the setting of Lombard influence and continued rule in Southern Italy, and her son and grandson would look to Northern Europe for a bride, in a shift of policy away from the pre-existing powers of Southern Italy which is perfectly embodied by Roger of Sicily’s matrimonial policy.

d. Sichelgaita of Molise, Countess of Conversano

Before discussing Roger’s complex and far-reaching marriage policy, it is worth lingering a moment on Sichelgaita, daughter of Rao of Molise, countess of Conversano. She has been partially discussed in the preceding chapter, but her long, successful tenure and her influence on her children are worth considering as another example of the kind of path a woman of some lineage could forge within the Hauteville clan. While Jahn argues that her name does not necessarily imply Lombard

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104 See pp. 52-3.
105 AM, VII.14, p. 453.
106 Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, VII.8, pp. 28-30.
ancestry, it seems to me unlikely not to point to it, on the maternal side at the very least: a Lombard mother would not have been unlikely at this point.\textsuperscript{107} Since her eldest son Robert was witnessing his father’s charters by 1087, he must have been born by 1071 at the latest; assuming that his mother was at least fourteen when she bore him, Sichelgaita was probably born in the mid to late 1050s. At least ten years younger than her husband, she survived him by more than twenty. An active woman, she and her husband had a solid partnership worked out: in 1083 they were endowing churches together.\textsuperscript{108} Just like Geoffrey associated Robert, and to a lesser extent Alexander, to his power, thus Sichelgaita associated the third son, Tancred, to her holdings in Brindisi, which she seems to have held independently after the death of her husband.\textsuperscript{109} Nor was she distant from her older children: when the Bariots kidnapped her in 1113, Robert was fast to avenge her, and the fact that Tancred honoured her together with Robert in one of her donations speaks of a an encompassing sense of family between them.\textsuperscript{110} While we have no details about Robert Curthose’s courtship of Sybilla of Conversano, it is safe to assume Sichelgaita had a hand in it. A woman of substance and in good relations with the church, she was lobbying in the discussion for the decision on whether the see of Brindisi-Oria was to be an archbishopric, and where it was to be based, in 1122, and she was asked by the papacy to assemble a local council a few years later in order to solve a dispute between the archbishopric and the nuns of St Benedict of Brindisi.\textsuperscript{111} At her death it was Tancred, the son she had chosen to rule with her, who inherited her property, as discussed above.

In her ancestry and marriage, Sichelgaita of Molise, countess of Conversano embodied the union of Lombard and Norman aristocracy; she married into one of the most powerful, if controversial, cadet branches of the Hautevilles. Clearly in good relations with her husband, Sichelgaita achieved independent rule in her lifetime, cultivated a powerful relationship with the church, may have helped her daughter become duchess of Normandy, and enjoyed a close, practical and emotional bond with her sons. In many ways she embodies the best possibilities that the Hautevilles could offer to their wives: scope for power, and a tightly knit family within which to exercise it.

\textsuperscript{107} Jahn, \textit{Untersuchungen}, p. 234.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Codice diplomatico brindisino}, n. 11, pp. 20-3, where Sichelgaita does namecheck her husband Godfrey, but she presents herself as ‘comitissa’ and Tancred, ‘comes’. The presence of a ‘Sendus nepos Comitisse’ among the witnesses confirms that Brindisi was the preserve of Sichelgaita and those she chose to associate with it.
\textsuperscript{110} Romuald, \textit{Chronicon}, p. 206; Martin, \textit{La Pouille}, p. 316.
I have discussed in chapter 2 the interesting status of Jordan, Roger of Sicily’s favourite, and openly illegitimate, son. While absolutely nothing is known about his mother, it is worth discussing her shadowy figure to underline an important aspect of writing about women in the Hauteville clan: the extent and importance of implied emotional connections which concern them. Nowhere as with Jordan’s mother do we have as crucially important a missed connection, and yet one which casts a shadow. We might say of her what Thompson says of William the Conqueror’s sister: her ‘career […] resembles nothing quite so much as an archaeological posthole: you can’t see anything, but you know it must have been there.’

When Jordan appears in the pages of Malaterra he is introduced as Roger’s ‘filius ex concubina’, an announcement which immediately places him in no uncertain territory as a bastard son. While the repudiation of Bohemond’s mother did not appear to have affected his claims as his father’s son, Jordan was immediately placed in a position of disadvantage. At the same time, the fact of his parentage being so openly stated in a work sponsored by Roger hints at something more than a chance encounter with a lower-class woman: we may be discussing an illegitimate but lengthy relationship, of which Jordan was the fruit. This is further hinted at by the immediate favour in which Jordan was considered by his father, and his military proficiency, as discussed in chapter 2: he clearly appears to have been given the expensive training for war since an early age, and to have taken up the place of his second-in-command as soon as his age permitted it and his cousin Serlo, who had first occupied the role, died. Jordan was therefore no chance byblow, but rather someone who had been grown by Roger to serve him in war and to be relied upon. Malaterra praises Jordan’s military ability, which doubtlessly made him a precious asset on the Sicilian frontier zone; but we also see the same clemency at work with him that the Hautevilles regularly showed their family members when he rebelled and Roger punished his co-conspirators, but not Jordan himself.

I have discussed above how Malaterra carefully but plainly suggests that Roger had been positioning Jordan to be his heir; while it could be argued to be simply the only logical response, as Jordan was clearly the most competent of Roger’s children then alive, and probably the eldest as far as we know, we also need to acknowledge that Roger chose, grew, and associated Jordan to his power from an early age. Given Roger’s young age when he came to Italy, his generally successful

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112 See chapter 2: 3.
114 GM, III.36, p. 78.
116 GM, III.37, pp. 78-9.
streak of marriages, and the wide availability of junior members of the family to be his second, we cannot say that he chose to favour his bastard child because he had no alternative; that he so clearly preferred him seems to hint that Jordan had emotional associations which suggest more than the casual offshoot of a youthful indiscretion.¹¹⁷ This is especially true when we consider the danger presented by Jordan’s undoubted, troubling ambition: late into his life Roger did not trust his son, forbidding him to enter any city during his tenure as Sicilian regent.¹¹⁸

While the Hautevilles had, as I have shown, a clear talent for recruiting to their ends any and all kinsmen of any fighting ability, we have news of no other Hauteville making as much of their lower-status bastard children as Roger did; indeed, we have no certain news of other Hauteville lower-status bastards at all. Either therefore we posit that no other of the extraordinarily prolific Hauteville brothers had any low-born children that we know of, or we concede that Jordan was extraordinary in his status and association to his father, and more likely to be the child of a relationship of some value. While the term concubina could piously define any chance sexual liaison of Roger’s, it is also possible to take it in its literal sense, and to posit that it described a companion of his of some standing, whose son he cherished to the end of his life, and in this a close parallel to Herleva, mother of William the Conqueror.¹¹⁹

Discussing the ways in which the Hautevilles thought of themselves as family and the emotional nature of their bonds I have constantly faced the problem of discussing such matters in a historically impartial way. Yet in some examples, as with Jordan’s parentage, we encounter striking evidence that such bonds existed, even if we find ourselves hard-pressed to investigate them: in the career of a favoured, brilliant child whose illegitimate birth was no mystery, but whose father chose to acknowledge and groom him as a possible heir from his earliest age. The nameless, faceless concubina of Malaterra’s narration finds unexpected substance through a discussion of the son she gave Roger of Sicily, and embodies the more complicated but nonetheless important aspect of the discussion of Hauteville kin relations.

f. Roger’s Norman Wives

If on the one hand Roger is unique in having fathered, acknowledged, and apparently chosen as heir an illegitimate child, he is all the more remarkable for his marriage policy, entirely divorced from that of his brothers. As the last of the Hauteville brothers to come to Southern Italy, Roger arrived when his brothers were already entrenched there, building their own alliances and territorial zones of influence. An enterprising man who proved himself by handling the long and

¹¹⁷ See pp. 49-50 for a discussion of the status of the two Godfreys and Mauger, his other sons we know of. Whether legitimate or illegitimate, Jordan had clearly been preferred to both of them.
¹¹⁸ GM, IV.16, pp. 94-6.
tiring conquest of Sicily over thirty years, Roger showed himself capable of looking after his own interests in taking care of his first two marriages.

In his marriage to Judith of Évreux we can see an interesting piece of inter-Norman marriage in the style of Guiscard’s to Alberada of Buonalbergo, though on a much higher social scale: Judith was the sister of Robert de Grandmesnil, the influential abbot of Saint Evroult, who fled Normandy in the 1060s after quarrelling with duke William, his cousin, for unspecified reasons. At first greeted by the pope in Rome, Robert sojourned for a time with the influential Richard I of Capua, but then, finding him unable to fulfil his promises to him, he switched to the territories of Robert Guiscard, under whose protection he founded the abbey of St Eufemia in Calabria, and received the grant of Venosa, becoming one of the few representatives of Norman influence on the Southern Italian church. While therefore Robert de Grandmesnil found protection under Robert Guiscard, both the siblings who had accompanied him in exile were settled with Roger of Sicily: Arnold fought for him and was killed in tournament while in his service. Roger, who at this point in his career was relying on much more junior members of the family, like his nephew Serlo, appears not only to have integrated his brother-in-law into the conquest, but to have considered his first wife not simply as a resource in terms of the dynastic connections she brought or the alliance of her brothers, but on her own terms as a companion and partner in his endeavours.

Judith is unique in having a well-defined character arc in Malaterra: she appears at first as a shy, young bride; her husband, however, immediately shows that he wants her to be able to take over in his absence, and encourages her to do so; Judith is then shown taking the initiative, reviewing the defences she has been left in charge of at Troina; and finally becomes a trusted companion to whom Roger can leave command in his absence. This evolution is hardly a stock-type description, like Anna Comnena’s narration of Sichelgaita’s military prowess: it describes someone who, initially inexperienced, grows into the role they have been assigned. It tallies with what Guiscard and Sichelgaita did: clearly Robert and Roger felt comfortable with such a course of

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122 GM, II.23.

123 GM, II. 29, 31, 35.
action and actively encouraged their wives to take part in their enterprises (though it is difficult to imagine Guiscard’s disapproval holding back Sichelgaita in any event).

Like Sichelgaita, Judith is the first of the Hauteville wives to emerge from the shadow of her husband as a ruler and agent in her own right. Her actions do not need to be guessed at, nor reconstructed a posteriori from the outcome of her children’s life: she appears as a player on the Southern Italian stage, assisting in the conquest of Sicily. Judith was short-lived: at her death Roger married another Norman noblewoman, Eremburga of Mortain.\(^\text{124}\) Unlike his brothers, who had founded their base on an alliance with the pre-existing Lombard powers in Southern Italy, Roger chose to engage with France and Normandy looking for both wives and allies to play an active role in the wholly new and unconquered territory of Sicily. At the same time, Eremburga represented well the influx of Norman influence in Southern Italy: she may have been there already, as her father William Werlenc was exiled from Normandy in the 1050s.\(^\text{125}\) What is more, in this case as well Roger seems to have greeted both a new bride and her family: Becker identifies as Eremburga’s brother the Peter of Mortain who joined the comital court, strengthening the impression of Sicily as an open field for the creation of useful kin networks.\(^\text{126}\)

If Judith and Eremburga did not live long, they both fulfilled their role as dynastic links, bore testimony to the highly individual marriage policy pursued by Roger, and Judith achieved the relevant role of ruling in Sicily in Roger’s absence. In his active encouragement of such a role for one of his wives we see his comfort with the possibility and the practice of female rule in his absence; a policy of support and active investment which brought its best and most enduring fruits under his third wife, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

g. **Princesses in the East**

Nowhere is the prodigious Hauteville capacity for marrying up more starkly demonstrated than in their ability to attract for themselves royal brides: Constance and Cecile of France for Bohemond and Tancred, Cecilia Le Bourcq for Roger of Salerno, Alice of Jerusalem for Bohemond II, and Elvira of Castile for Roger II. It appears evident what these marriages have in common, that they all provided prestige and legitimacy for men on the make: just like the princesses of Salerno had been married to the Hautevilles as they swiftly climbed to the top of the Norman hierarchy, what the Hautevilles lacked in pedigree they made up for in resourcefulness and success on the frontiers of Christendom. Such a leap in the quality of their marriages took place at the turn of the twelfth century, when they had established themselves as powers to be reckoned with and fairly

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\(^{124}\) GM, IV.14, p. 93.
\(^{125}\) Orderic Vitalis, *Ecclesiastical History*, II, p.312, IV, p. 98; both William’s life, and the true causes for his exile, are rather obscure, as discussed by Bates (*William the Conqueror*, pp. 155-6).
safe bets for aggrandisement. Nowhere is this more evident than with the first two weddings of this kind.

Having left Antioch in 1104, Bohemond toured Europe drumming up support for his own personal crusade against the Byzantine empire, hawking about the anonymous *Gesta Francorum* which depicted the Southern Italian Normans as the heroes of the crusade. Having left Antioch in 1104, Bohemond toured Europe drumming up support for his own personal crusade against the Byzantine empire, hawking about the anonymous *Gesta Francorum* which depicted the Southern Italian Normans as the heroes of the crusade. Everywhere Bohemond was feted and celebrated, and at the same time as he gathered support he negotiated a sparkling marriage for himself and for his nephew and regent Tancred. Unmarried until then, Bohemond amply made up for lost time by marrying Constance, daughter of Phillip of France, whose first marriage to Hugh count of Blois had been annulled in 1104. At the same time, he negotiated for Tancred a marriage to Cecile. An illegitimate daughter of Phillip and the notorious Bertrade de Montford, Cecile came from a more controversial background, but could hardly be considered a much lesser choice: a daughter of the king of France and of his favourite mistress was hardly unworthy of becoming princess of Antioch, despite her very young age when she was sent over in 1106. Her cachet would only grow in later years, as her half-brother Fulk, son of her mother’s first husband Fulk of Anjou, would become king of Jerusalem, and she would call upon him for help in 1133.

Both Constance and Cecile were well-aware of the prestige of their ancestry, and both of them made ample use of it during their life. Constance followed Bohemond to Apulia, where she gave birth to both Bohemond II and John, a son who died in his infancy. After his death, as discussed in previous chapters, her main aim was to defend her son’s legacy, something which she did employing both her pedigree (in the charter she issued her paternity is listed before her husband’s name) and her diplomatic ability. In particular I have discussed her alliance with Tancred of Conversano, and the way in which she mustered an army to scour Alexander of Conversano’s lands after persuading him to release her. However, this did not help when Bari broke in revolt: Alexander, allied with the usurper Grimoald Alferanites, imprisoned her in

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130 WT, XIV.6.
132 ‘ego Constantia serenissimi Philippi regis francorum filia et qd. Uxor domini Boamundi invictissimi’, and her name at bottom is given as ‘ego Constantia francorum regis filia’, *Le Pergamene di S. Nicola di Bari*, n. 64, pp. 111-2; moreover, she is indicated as ‘nostra domina principissa Constantia’ in an 1109 *affidavit*, showing she was associated to Bohemond’s power in some measure (*Le Pergamene di S. Nicola di Bari*, n. 54, pp. 97-8). She is remembered as the daughter of Phillip, as well, in an 1175 charter concerning property she had once donated (*Codice Diplomatico Brindisino*, n. 20, pp. 38-39).
133 See pp. 74-5.
Giovinazzo in 1119. Constance was only released in 1120 when pope Calixtus II negotiated an agreement, in exchange for which she renounced the dominion of Bari she had inherited from Bohemond. The city passed under control of Grimoald in an example of Duke William’s lack of control over Apulia, and Grimoald’s lordship would continue undisturbed until 1132, when only Roger II could dislodge him from it. Constance died in Southern Italy in 1125; if on the one hand she did not succeed in preserving her husband’s inheritance, as discussed in chapter 2, Bohemond II’s holdings in Southern Italy were virtually forfeit the moment he stepped out of it, and her failure took place against a background of general unrule and instability in which it can fairly be said that she did the very best anyone could have done.

Her sister Cecile had a much more successful run at both life and ruling. Her marriage with Tancred remains one of Antioch’s what-ifs: unsurprisingly, having married so young, Cecile had not borne any children yet at her husband’s death in 1112. Tancred provided for his widow: her dowry was that of the strategically important fortresses of Arcicanum and Rugia, something which, combined with the undeniable prestige that came with her parentage, ensured that Cecile did not remain a widow for long. William of Tyre has Tancred entrusting his bride to his protegé Pons of Tripoli on his deathbed, but even denying this highly affecting (and likely affected) scene it is easy to see how it would be natural for Cecile to turn to one of her husband’s closest allies; Albert of Aachen has it that the marriage happened under the auspices of king Baldwin, something which would make sense on his part in order to control the significant connection embodied by Cecile. Once Tancred was dead, in any event, Baldwin was the unchallenged leader of the Franks in the East, and the remarriage of a French princess would have needed his approval. Cecile’s marriage to Pons brought her new stability: we have to wonder how she factored into Pons’ decision to back Bohemond II’s widow Alice against her and his own brother-in-law Fulk (as I will discuss more extensively below), but as mentioned above later we can also see her invoking Fulk’s help against Zengi of Aleppo when Pons was taken prisoner, so we can assume the relationship between the two was not damaged. At Pons’ death in battle in 1137 Cecile found herself under the the rule of their son Raymond, who safely succeeded his father.

We can compare in many ways her role to that of Cecilia of LeBourq, sister of Baldwin II. After the death of Tancred, with whom Baldwin had had an intermittently hostile and cooperative relationship, the king of Jerusalem sought to build a solid bridge to Antioch through marriage.

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135 AT, II.18-21, pp. 31-2.
136 See pp. 55 ff.
between the new regent and his sister. Roger’s interest in such an advantageous marriage, which could smooth out the troubled relationship between Jerusalem and Antioch, might explain why he did not marry Cecile of France himself at Tancred’s death. Had Tancred ignored Roger by directly arranging for marriage with Pons himself, as William of Tyre has it, we would have a unique case of a Hauteville preferring the advantage of allies not of the family to the interest of the family itself. After all, Roger was clearly interested in weaving closer relationships within the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, as he showed by marrying off his sister to Joscelyn de Courtenay. The hint that Cecilia organised the defenses of Antioch when Roger perished at the Ager Sanguinis point to a princess in the style of Roger I’s wives: an efficient ruler in her own right, though one whose lack of children spelled an end to her rule the moment Antioch was safely recovered by Baldwin. While Cecilia of LeBourcq was never considered for regency in place of the absent Bohemond II, and she disappears from the chronicles after her husband’s death, we do have proof that she kept dwelling within the zone of influence of Antioch as a landowner in her own right through an 1126 charter that describes her as ‘lady of Tarsus’, one of the towns she had received as dowry, and endowing the abbey of Josaphat with the permission of Bohemond II, whose trust she clearly enjoyed. Just as the scarcity of Norman landowners in Southern Italy made it necessary for their women to hold titles in their own right, it appears that Cecilia of LeBourcq benefited from the same situation in Outremer: unmarried seven years after her husband’s death, she was clearly still enjoying a position of prestige and continued power in the place where she had one reigned. While her lack of children with Roger represents another missed connection in the Antiochene dynasty, Cecilia both served as a link in her brother and husband’s dynastic policy and to the best of our knowledge appears to have made the most of it, both providing efficient rule at the time of Roger’s death and enjoying the trust of her subsequent overlord, while being able to hold a city in her own right.

With Alice of Jerusalem, Bohemond II’s bride, we see at once the continuation of a policy of royal marriage, the power with which connections could endow a royal woman with, and at the same time its stark limitations. It is to be prefaced to all this that our main source for Alice’s reign is William of Tyre, and that he treated Alice to the full venom of his poisonous pen. She was, according to him, unnecessarily ambitious, incapable of organising herself or ruling, tyrannical, and malicious. While William can be excoriating when he chooses, his condemnation of Alice is articulated according to strict gender lines, as a woman who sought to rule when she had no business to. Alice, second daughter of Baldwin II of Jerusalem, was married to Bohemond II in the search

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141 WT, 19.4, pp. 868-70.
142 Asbridge, The Formation of the Principality, n. 106, p. 145, on whether Cecilia knighted a number of squires to make up for the losses after the battle of the Ager Sanguinis.
144 WT, 13.27, pp. 623-5; 14.4, pp. 635-6.
for a solution for the king’s eternal problem of the lack of a male heir. Just as he had married his firstborn and designated heiress Melisende to Fulk of Anjou to secure a militarily efficient man for the throne after his death, thus Baldwin appears to have negotiated with Bohemond II in the same terms: I have discussed in chapter 2 how different sources paint Bohemond II as having stood to inherit both the kingdom of Jerusalem, the principality of Antioch and the duchy of Apulia. A young, enterprising ruler with his life ahead of him, Bohemond II certainly could have looked like an attractive possible heir to Baldwin II should something have happened to Fulk, and just like he had done by marrying his sister Cecilia of LeBourcq to Roger of Salerno, this way Baldwin placed someone of his own blood at the head of the Antiochene principality, and this time not in the role of regent but in that of princess. Placing his daughter as princess of Antioch, moreover, squared with his policy of larger unification of the crusader polities, which he pursued by marrying his third daughter to Raymond II of Tripoli.

Having apparently so successfully solved both his own succession and the question of Antioch’s loyalty to Jerusalem, Baldwin II must have been dismayed at the sudden death in battle of Bohemond II in 1130, which orphaned his infant daughter Constance and presented his father-in-law with the problem of yet another female succession. It is easy to understand why the fearful council of Antioch, who had been rescued by the king once after Roger of Salerno’s death, sent for Baldwin at Bohemond’s death; and also why Baldwin, who could rely on Joscelin I in Edessa as an experienced military commander, would have preferred his regency to that of his own untried and untested young daughter for an embattled frontier land such as Antioch. Rule of Antioch and Edessa had been joined before, during Tancred’s time, and was feasible. At the same time, seen without the obfuscating lense of twelfth-century attitudes to female rule, it is natural to see how Alice, daughter of a king, sister of a queen-to-be with a forceful character such as Melisende, would seek to preserve rule for herself and initially refused access to Antioch to Baldwin and Joscelyn. But unlike Adelaide del Vasto, who had been designated for rule by her husband, had reigned with him for ten years and had her own brother close, Alice found herself in a city she had only ruled over for a few years, with her own powerful family hostile to her. She tried to negotiate a truce with the Zengi of Aleppo, essential condition for a peaceful transition in embattled Antioch, but failed; and at Fulk’s arrival Alice was betrayed, and a burgess of the city, William of Aversa, and a monk, Peter Latinator, opened the gates to the king; Asbridge questions whether, in fact, such minor

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145 WT, 13.27, pp. 623-5.
146 See pp. 55 ff.
147 Mayer, Studies, p. 98.
148 WT, XIII.27. While William may as always be exaggerating, his description of the overwhelming grief of the Antiochenes is eminently feasible given the loss of a young and warlike prince.
149 See pp. 55 ff.
150 See p. 43.
151 WT, XIII.27.
figures betraying Alice do not hint that in fact the nobility supported her, as it would presumably have been impossible for her to take control of the city on her own. Baldwin II forgave Alice much as Bohemond I had forgiven Tancred, allowing her to keep her dowry cities of Latakia and Jabala. In the frontier lands of Antioch, where Christian manpower was already thinly stretched, one could not afford to lose a landholder of one’s own family, even if ambitious and rebellious.

However, despite her setback Alice did not abandon her ambitions, as shown by what happened after Baldwin II and Joscelyn I both died in 1131. In the uncertainty following Fulk and Melisende’s accession to the throne, Alice rallied together Pons of Tripoli, Joscelyn II of Edessa and William lord of Saone, an Antiochene, in supporting her bid for Antioch. Far from being a woman despised and alone, as William paints her, Alice clearly enjoyed the influence of a powerful local landowner who could and did rally the aristocracy around her. In fact, her unification of Antioch, Edessa and Tripoli against Jerusalem reclaimed the same independence of these border states against the central crown which Tancred himself had for so long attempted to defend. While her gender made her endeavours wicked in the eyes of the chronicler, Alice fought the same battles with the same means male crusader aristocrats had fought before her. Unlike Tancred, however, Alice could not fight her own battles; she had to rely on Pons, who lost to Fulk in the battle of Rugia. Alice, however, was not done yet. Charters she issued in the years 1132-4 show her an independent landholder in her dowry cities; and as Asbridge points out, William of Saone’s strong position within the principality shows that far from being a woman alone Alice joined to William could command a very powerful position. She made a final attempt in 1135 to rally together her aristocratic support in order to regain control of Antioch through her daughter Constance, marching into the city in 1135 once Fulk had vacated it; William of Tyre recounts with his usual sting that Fulk, recently reconciled with Melisende, was persuaded by her not to intervene.

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153 WT, 13.27, pp. 623-5. Asbridge (‘Alice of Antioch’, p. 36) is not wholly convinced of Baldwin’s generosity, proposing that Baldwin had not disinherited his daughter only because he legally could not deprive her of her dowry cities; in my opinion it is more probable that he simply forgave his daughter, who had after all promptly capitulated and had never rebelled before, and would ensure continued family holdings in the principality.
155 And indeed, this makes William of Tyre’s disapproval of her actions more stark, given that he had forgiven the same in Tancred, a man he describes in such laudatory terms as to lead his translators Babcock and Krey to comment on how William’s ‘faculties cease to function’ when it comes to him (William of Tyre, A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea, transl. and ann. by Emily A. Babcock and August C. Krey (New York: Octagon Books, 1976), n. 24, p. 186).
William’s habitual attitude, it is easy to see that the Alice of 1135, who had established herself firmly and independently within the principality, was a far more suitable regent than the untried newly widowed Alice of 1130; and that Fulk, exhausted by his own fights with his queen, may have concluded it was just as well to leave troublesome Antioch alone in the clearly capable hands of a sister-in-law who appears to have enjoyed the queen’s trust.

Alice was apparently negotiating with the Byzantines for a husband for her daughter; but she was betrayed by the patriarch of Antioch, Ralph de Domfront, who secretly married the still underage Constance (then eight, below the minimum canonical age of 11 for a wedding) to Raymond de Poitiers.\footnote{WT, 14.20, pp. 657-9.} William of Tyre would have Ralph deceiving Alice, persuading her that Raymond had come to marry her to distract her; but the detail seems unnecessarily cruel, and not in keeping with Alice’s independent course of action before, or her by then six-year-old widowhood.\footnote{WT, 14.20, pp. 657-9.} Presumably Ralph preferred a closer relationship with Jerusalem than Byzantium; as the patriarch he probably preferred the Latin church to the Orthodox, and was probably able to muster support for his position and carry through the coup without the need for such petty subterfuges. Either way, Alice departed Antioch for Latakia, never to return.

Far from the reckless woman of William’s imagination, Alice appears to have been a shrewd and determined operator, able to negotiate with her Muslim and Greek neighbours, to rally aristocratic support, and unwilling to give up on her objective to rule through her daughter. Unlike Constance, Cecile and Cecilia, she waged her battle for rule in direct opposition to her kin; at the end of it, she still appears to have held on to her fiefs, showing a parallel between the Hautevilles’ own policy of forgiveness and that of the royal house of Jerusalem. At once protected and hindered by her prestigious family, endowed with the willpower and resourcefulness to make both her cachet and her Hauteville inheritance count, Alice mounted a relentless, continuous effort to hold on to her husband’s principality; and while she ultimately failed, her bid for power made her another predatory Hauteville on the crusader edge, in the style of those who had preceded her: aside from leading her own troops in battle, her aristocratic conspiracies for power were in no way different from those of the men who had come before her.

h. Elvira of Castile

I have discussed above how Adelaide del Vasto’s marriage to Baldwin II, in fact, provided both a new outlet of rule for the regent who had handed over the county to her son and gave a new shine of prestige to Roger II, who later in life claimed that his authority as king also came from the fact that he was a queen’s son.\footnote{Rogerii II. Regis diplomata latina, n. 12, 14.} While the Hautevilles had successfully imposed themselves on
the Southern Italian environment, and their adventurous if unorthodox tenure in the East had made it inevitable for the regnant house of Jerusalem to marry into them, Roger II was at his accession still a count, son of a count and a Northern Italian noblewoman, grandson of a knight with little land and cousin of a duke whose duchy was then falling apart. Roger II’s ambitions, however, far exceeded the by then stagnant power of the Hautevilles in Southern Italy, and he demonstrated it from the beginning by acquiring a royal wife in the person of Elvira, daughter of Alfonso VI of Castile and Leon.

The union between a princess of Castile and the new count of Sicily brought together two very compatible experiences in the matter of co-existence between Muslim and Christian on the edges of Europe. Raised in Toledo, certainly used to a high level of co-existence between Christians and Muslims, daughter of a man who carried the title of ‘emperor of the two religions’, Elvira may have been a descendant of Muslims herself, if her mother Isabel is indeed the converted Muslim Zayda whom Alfonso had long had for a mistress. With this wedding Roger II both gained prestige from marrying a king’s daughter, strengthened the program of coexistence his father had founded and his mother continued, and raised his ambitions within a framework and in a mode that briskly departed from those employed by the other Hautevilles in both the Mezzogiorno and Syria. When aiming for kingship, Roger cast himself in a very different fashion from his predecessors in the family. Elvira provided Roger with both her royal cachet and five sons and a daughter; but what is also significant about her life and death is the striking emotional legacy she left behind. Elvira died of an illness in 1135; according to Alexander of Telese, Roger was so struck at her death that he withdrew in his inner chambers, consenting to speak only to a few faithful servants and causing the spread of a rumour that the king, who had so recently quelled rebellions in the South, had died. This encouraged the rebel barons to rise again, in one violent revolt Roger brutally and efficiently quashed thanks to his Muslim armies.

162 Houben, Roger II of Sicily, p.35. The question of Elvira’s parentage is complex: Reilly, the English-language expert on the reigns of Alfonso VI and his grandson Alfonso VII, believed her to be a daughter of Elizabeth, herself a ‘mysterious person’ given the scarcity of documents on her, once believed to be a daughter of the king of France, but according to him a member of the cadet line of Burgundy (The Kingdom of Léon-Castilla under King Alfonso VI, 1065-1109 (Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 296-8). Reilly excludes that this Elizabeth should be identified with Zaida, though Zaida did take the name Elizabeth once she married the king after converting after 1106, replacing her homonym (The Kingdom of Léon-Castilla under Alfonso VI, pp. 338-9; he attributes to Zaida one son, Sancho Alfonsez (p.240)). Reilly, however, admits that the sources are confusing, and the recurring names of the royal family only increase this, showing for example how José Canal Sánchez-Pagín (‘La Infanta Doña Elvira, hija de Alfonso VI y de Gimena Muñoz a la luz de los diplomas’, Archivos Leoneses, 33 (1979), 271-87) attributed to Elvira, daughter of the king by Jimena Muñoz, a mistress, some charters issued by Elvira, daughter of Elizabeth (The Kingdom of Léon-Castilla under Alfonso VII (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998, n. 23, p. 143). If Reilly therefore is right, Elvira was in fact the legitimate daughter of a Burgundian queen, though one who had been put aside by the time of her marriage to Roger.

163 AT, III.1-2, pp. 59-60.
164 AT, III.2-28, pp. 59-75; Romuald, Chronicon, pp. 221-2.
Violent expressions of grief are not unknown among the Hautevilles: Humphrey avenged Drogo in such a way, and Malaterra swiftly follows the description of Roger I’s tender mourning for Jordan with his quelling of the uprising at his death. But Roger II’s reaction to his wife’s death is unique: while I have shown in this chapter that Hauteville women often embody and imply significant emotional bonds, functioning not only as dynastic but also as affective links, implied affection is never as clearly manifested as in this one case. Roger II’s invalidating grief at his wife’s death, is the only moment in his ascent in which we clearly see the man getting in the way of the politician and conqueror: ‘Alberia regina coniunx ipsius, mox infirmitatis tacta incommodo, ad extrema pervenit; que videlicet mulier, dum vixit religionis gratia atque elemosinarum largitionem fertur plurimum enituisse. Qua defuncta Rex ipsa ita meroris contritus est amaritudine ut multis se diebus intra cameram recludens, exceptis eius privatis obsecutoribus non apparuerit.’ Accounts of Roger’s rule are, as we shall see in the following chapter, highly personalised, endowing him with a determination and a wrath that can be cast as tyrannical or masterful according to the chronicler. However, here we see a different side of him, and this a very personal one. Roger mourns, not an heir or a brother and comrade in arms, but the woman he clearly loved, in the one occasion I have found in my charting of Hauteville family emotion in which there is no apparent overlap between the personal and the practical, the political and the familiar, but what looks to be an inconvenient, deeply felt, strongly expressed outpouring of very intimate grief. While as soon as the kingdom needed it Roger returned to the field even more efficiently and brutally than he had done before, prioritising the needs of his royal project over what he felt, Houben rightfully points out that after Elvira’s death he did not remarry for fifteen years, until the death of all but one of his legitimate sons put his succession in doubt. Elvira’s death did not in itself jeopardise Roger’s descendance, as she had given him four adult sons; nor did it mean the falling off of any alliance; and the newly-crowned king of Sicily would certainly have made an attractive party for any number of highly ambitious European marriages. But the emotional consequences of her death were clearly such that even the eternally ambitious Roger II, son of the serial monogamist Roger I, preferred to remain a widower until his inheritance was in peril. While Elvira of Castile’s arrival in Sicily fits into a pattern of political ambition, the most significant legacy of her life remains her unique, unbound testament of emotion, affection, and enduring grief in the complex mosaic of personal and political that is the Hauteville network of family connections.

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165 See pp. 48-9.
166 AT, III.1, p. 59.
167 Houben, Roger II of Sicily, pp. 65-6.
4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the role of women in the Hauteville kin network, seeking to investigate their more scarcely documented history as a separate, but no less important seam in our understanding of family mechanisms of conquest and rule. A great difference has been highlighted in the Hauteville attitude to women born to the family, as opposed to women who married into it. Daughters of the Hautevilles were overwhelmingly used as pawns in a complex, ambitious, and very fruitful marriage policy, only finding relevant roles as agents within the family as the result of contextual, peerly relationships with their brothers. Their lack of relationship with their fathers and expendability, however, does not appear to be conditioned by their sex, and it is on the whole comparable to that of their brothers who had not been selected for succession and special collaboration with their fathers. Women who married into the Hautevilles, however, appear to have been chosen for the prestige and usefulness of their kins; as such, they were prized for the added legitimacy, prestige and connections they brought their husbands, and we have consistent proof to show that they were often encouraged to cover an active role in their husband’s lifetime, beside functioning as effective regents at their deaths. Consideration of the evolution and growing prestige of Hauteville marriage policy, both in obtaining good matches for their daughters and for themselves, allows us moreover to track the growing importance, ambition, and success of the kin group.

Beside underlining their roles as both objects and agents of Hauteville policy, however, the analysis of the family’s women has allowed us to investigate once more the importance of emotion and affection in the Hauteville kin group, with the often implied, sometimes outright declared importance of the elusive bond between husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, and men and their concubines, that is Hauteville family feeling and family belonging meant not only as political loyalty or pragmatic advantage but also as the tie of affective life. Throughout their multifaceted aspects, and despite the limitations and difficulties pertaining to researching them, Hauteville women have provided both a key to further exploring family patterns of behaviour, and their own unique experience of both the limitations and the possibilities of the Hauteville adventure. By investigating them, therefore, I have both added another layer to our examination of Hauteville kin evolution and dynamics, and completed my investigation of the clan before the coming of Roger II, and the momentous changes he brought to family policies. The next chapter, fittingly, will begin with the examination of a Hauteville wife’s highly successful and deeply innovative regency, and the importance of her choices in briskly and changing Hauteville kin relations forever. By considering together the careers of Adelaide del Vasto, countess of Sicily, and that of her son Roger II, I will at once conclude my examination of Hauteville kin dynamics up to 1140, and chart the effective beginning of their dissolution.
Roger II is a much-written-about member of the Hauteville kin group, for whom a varied bibliography exists.\(^1\) This is hardly surprising given the reach, innovation, and long-term consequences of his achievement: the creation and establishment of the kingdom of Sicily. However, while historical writing about Roger tends to focus on his achievements as king in Sicily, and the unique ways in which he sought to validate his rule through Christian, Muslim and Byzantine accoutrements, in this thesis I shall seek to look at Roger through a different lens: as a member of the Hauteville kin group, one whose achievements I shall contextualise within the same patterns of behaviour which I have analysed thus far. In order to do this, therefore, this chapter shall mostly ignore Roger’s later achievements, or the forms his kingship took after 1140, the date from which Roger exercised control over the whole of the Mezzogiorno, and at which point the timespan of this thesis ends. It will not be my concern to discuss the implications or forms of Roger’s new rule, but rather their seeds and consequences in the larger mechanisms of inter-Hauteville relationships, and the state of the kin-network at the time of Roger’s assumption of control.

In order to do this, I shall not only be tracing Roger’s rule to the evolution of his father’s own, but I shall be looking at him in a previously unexplored light as the product of the rule and policy of his mother, countess regent Adelaide. In order to do that I have split my discussion of Adelaide’s reign from the larger chapter about women, as I believe her work to be fundamental to our understanding of the evolution and attainment of her son’s rule. This chapter shall argue that

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\(^1\) The go-to biography for Roger II remains Hubert Houben, *Roger II: A Ruler Between East and West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). The more recent *Ruggero II: Il drago d’Occidente*, by Francesco Paolo Tocco (Palermo: Flaccovio, 2012), meant as an introductory, student-friendly text, cannot improve on Houben’s ability to both lay out the facts of Roger’s eventful life and to contextualise the rich and different seams of his reign. Several approaches have been taken to the study of Roger’s reign: from study of his unique chancery, which will be discussed below, to the works on ‘Saracens’ in Sicily (see Introduction) to works on the monumental mosaic programs of his foundations in Cefalù and Palermo (see for instance the still seminal *The Mosaics of Norman Sicily* by Otto Demus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950) and Eve Borsook’s *Messages in Mosaic: The Royal Programmes of Norman Sicily, 1130-1197* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)). Fundamental discussion and translation of sources for the period of the establishment of the Kingdom of Sicily has taken place with Graham A. Loud’s recent *Roger II and the Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). By comparison to her son, Adelaide has been object of very little inquiry: the most relevant works on the topic remain Ernesto Pontieri’s 1955 article ‘La madre nella storia’, more recently Vera von Falkenhausen’s thorough ‘Zur Regentschaft des Gräfin Adelasia del Vasto in Kalabrien und Sicilien, 1101-1112’, in Aetos: *Studies in Honour of Cyril Mango Presented to Him on April 14th, 1998*, ed. by Ihor Sevcenko and Irmgard Hutter (Stuttgart: B.G.Teubner, 1998), 87-115; Carmelina Urso, ‘Adelaide “del Vasto”, callida mater e malika di Sicilia e Calabria’, in “Con animo virile”: donne e potere nel Mezzogiorno medievale (secoli XI-XV), ed. by Patrizia Mainoni (Rome: Viella, 2014), 53-84; and the recent PhD thesis by Emily Meade, *Rulership and Authority in Early Norman Sicily under Countess Adelaide* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Lancaster, 2014).
Roger II was at once the culmination of the Hauteville kin policies, the breakaway point where we can claim a dissolution of the Hauteville kin group, and a loosening of that sense of family, clan, and reciprocal obligations which had tied together the numerous, powerful, and ambitious Hautevilles until then. While Roger inherited, and for a time abided by, as rich, complex and binding a kin group as his father, uncles and cousins, he was also able to rule without them, and it was he who broke the continuous cycle of Hauteville rebellions and merciful reconciliations by choosing to deal violently with his own relatives. However, I shall be keen to emphasise that we should not be teleological or needlessly harsh in our view of Roger’s rule: while he was an opportunist and a predatory climber in the best Hauteville style, promptly seizing every occasion to increase and strengthen his title and claim, we should not be tempted to read backward into all of his acts as aiming for kingship; and while he brutally ended the final rebellion against him by imprisoning and dispersing his relatives, Roger II did in fact for a time observe the same mechanisms of forgiveness and reconciliations by which those before him had been bound, before choosing to break with them decisively.

In order to rule Roger relied on a completely different kind of network, one of his own building, and which owed much to two things: on the one hand, the support base which he had inherited from his mother Adelaide and her family; on the other, her fundamental decision to relocate the county’s seat of power from Mileto to Messina and then Palermo, thus divorcing Roger II’s power from the mainland, and making a decisive break with the rule of Roger I. We shall therefore first examine Adelaide’s rule, not simply as a preserver of her husband’s power and a steward for her son, but as a countess in her own right, who made revolutionary and novel choices, whose influence can be found at the base of many of her son’s later policies, and whose reign we can consider fundamental in laying the bases for what would become eventually Roger II’s departure from the obligations and hindrances of Hauteville kinship patterns in both peace and war. Following this, I shall examine how Roger’s modus operandi made his reaction to rebellions inherently different from those who had preceded him; and finally I shall examine what this meant for the members of the Hauteville kin group, and how this changed after the establishment of the monarchy.

5.2. Countess: A Pivotal Shift

With Adelaide del Vasto we see the problem that plagues much of Hauteville family history: a void of sources complicating the interpretation of what looks to be a fundamental moment in familial and institutional history. While much of what Adelaide did during her long and successful rule must be reconstructed through hints, these are enough to paint for us the complex and entirely fascinating picture of a shrewd and highly ambitious, indeed very brilliant regent, whose
rule embodied at once the culmination and continuation of the policy that preceded her, and who was the engineer of some of the change that followed.

There are some very interesting parallels between Adelaide and the Hauteville brothers themselves, in the way she inherited, administered and defended power. On the one hand, her arrival on the Southern Italian scene is very much in line with Roger’s usual policy: Adelaide del Vasto came as part of the wave of Northern Italian colonists to Southern Italy, being the daughter of the marquis of Savona in Liguria. Her arrival was part, as explained above, of a multifaceted alliance in which she married Roger I, her sister married his son Jordan, and her brother Henry removed to Sicily (though we are not entirely certain of the exact date of Henry’s arrival in Southern Italy). We know that she was very young: provisions made for possible children of hers in her marriage contract to Baldwin of Jerusalem in 1112 suggest that she was then still of childbearing age, which puts her in her early to mid-teens at the time of her wedding to the ageing Roger. The exclusion of Roger’s shadowy, very possibly legitimate other sons from succession tells us that hers was considered an important marriage, something which marked a shift in his own policy towards what he considered an alliance with Northern Italy. When he married Adelaide Roger had nearly completed his conquest of Sicily, and during the remainder of his lifetime we have no occasion to see her exercise rule in his absence as Judith had done. At the same time however we can easily imagine a similarly supportive relationship, given the sure way with which Adelaide took control from the start.

It is remarkable of her rule that she steered it safely through not one but two minority successions: that of Simon to Roger I, and Roger II to Simon, when his brother died still in childhood. Minority successions always have the potential of being fraught, but Adelaide carried them off: that she did so in the face of considerable opposition is hinted at by the charters referring to the ‘revolt of the noblemen’ who were ‘crushed like vases’. While as Johns points out we have absolutely no collateral evidence that permits us to evaluate how many revolts there were, how widespread, and who participated in them, from the fact that they are used as a reference in time we must conclude that they were relevant enough to stick in popular memory, and that the countess regent efficiently put them down. From the fact that her brother Henry was part of her entourage and this military success we can draw a picture of Adelaide doing two things the Hautevilles had

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3 See pp. 48-9.
4 WT, 11.21, pp. 525-7.
5 Salvatore Cusa, I diplomi greci ed arabi di Sicilia (Palermo: Stabilimento Tipografico Lao, 1868), n. 471, p. 532.
6 Johns, Arabic Administration, p. 64.
always done: defend their rule with the sword from noblemen’s opposition and using their siblings in order to do so.

In this light Orderic’s assertion that Adelaide, ‘unable to cope with rule’ had invited a ‘Robert from Burgundy’ to rule in her stead only to poison him once her son became of age, becomes particularly irrelevant, another instance of the misogynistic fantasy of the man who had Sichelgaita poisoning both Bohemond and Robert Guiscard. Houben’s identification of this Robert with a misremembered member of the comital court is persuasive, and again represents a woman that, far from being inadequate for her role, fulfilled it by relying on faithful and efficient men. In this we see once more the fil rouge tying together Roger I’s attitude to his wives, instructed by him about and entrusted with military matters. At the same time however as she lived up to Roger’s legacy, Adelaide steered a course of her own, and one which would have fundamental repercussions on her son Roger II. While he had laboured all his life in the conquest of Sicily, attaining it a good ten years before he died in 1101, Roger I’s power base had remained firmly on the continent: he died and was buried in Mileto, whose cathedral church he had founded. However it was Adelaide who moved the comital court to Sicily, first to Messina around 1110, still just beyond the sea from Calabria, and then more decisively to Palermo, where Roger was invested as count in 1112. The importance of such a move cannot be overstated: Roger II’s deep roots in Sicily, which he used as an unassailable power base whence to launch his offensives against the continental noblemen gave him a safe starting point for his campaigns to pacify the entire Mezzogiorno.

While in itself the measure might suggest that Adelaide felt safer with water between herself and the continent at the delicate moment of transition from her own proven regency to her son’s majority, it proved to be a winning strategy, and one which would shift the Hauteville power base to Sicily for the rest of the century. It is impossible to overstate the importance of the fact that, while Roger I had gained Sicily, it was Adelaide who chose it as comital seat, laying the bases for the power that would characterise her children and grandchildren. Adelaide’s second contribution to her son’s legacy is more complex, and its assessment is subject to a certain lack of evidence. The development of a multilingual administration in Norman Sicily has been the subject of numerous books, but the seminal studies are those by Johns and Takayama. According to both, the invading Normans took advantage of the pre-existing complex administration of the Kalbid emirate for tax

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7 Orderic Vitalis, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, V.6, XIII.15; v.4, VII.7.
11 Paul Oldfield (‘An Internal Frontier? The Relationship Between Mainland Southern Italy and Sicily in the “Norman” Kingdom’, *HSI*, 20 (2008), 161-75), probes at the matter of whether one can speak of unity within the kingdom, spread between an island and the mainland, though ultimately recognising the loyalty felt by many of the mainlanders towards Sicily; the sheer geographical fact of an island’s separation, it is to be remarked, had always been felt throughout Norman domination, so much that Guiscard had considered exiling Gisulf of Salerno to Palermo, a fate Sichelgaita protested against (AM, VIII.30, pp. 506-7).
and census purposes; they supplemented it with Greek-trained scribes; and while the evidence dwindles towards the end of the eleventh century, under Adelaide we still have evidence of an enduring Greek-speaking chancery, and of at least one Arabic scribe. All this depicts Adelaide inheriting Roger’s contextual but effective administrative apparatus, sustaining it during her regency, and choosing to employ both Greek and Muslim scribes. If this is a far cry from the fully-fledged apparatus established in Roger II’s reign by his admiral George of Antioch, a Byzantine-born but Islamic-trained, and highly efficient, administrator, it is a tradition of flexibility and multiculturalism in which Roger II grew up, and which he would have found it natural to preserve and later expand. But more than the simple habit of and familiarity with the concept of a multilingual administration, Roger II appears to have inherited from his mother the habit of relying on the figure of an ‘admiral’ to be at its head. Modelled on the function of the Arab ‘emir’, we see Robert Guiscard appointing a Western knight as ‘admiral’ of Palermo during the conquest of Sicily, which suggests that the role was probably that of a lieutenant or temporary commander during military conditions, presumably modelled on an Arabic precursor.

We have some evidence of Greek-born (or at least Greek-named) men occupying a more administrative function under the same name during the later reign of Roger I, which seems to corroborate Johns’ impression of ‘omnicompetent’ functionaries. During Adelaide’s reign, the role of the admiral appears to have been consolidated as that of a trusted individual, in charge of keeping the threads of the complex administration of both insular and continental holdings. It is in this function that we encounter the long-standing Christodoulos, appointed by Adelaide and kept by Roger II during the first period of his reign, to be only supplanted by the all-powerful George of Antioch, originally his protégé. And it is in the context of a multilingual chancery that we find one of Adelaide’s most striking innovations. As remarked above, even in his Arabic coinage Roger I had styled himself as emir, underlining his secondary status to his brother Guiscard. In an 1109 charter in Arabic and Greek, however, Adelaide is styled as malika, that is, queen, a title which Robert Guiscard had also claimed, and Roger II would eventually take up. While it was Roger I

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14 WA, III, lines 340-3, p. 182.


17 See p. 32.

who conquered Sicily, it was his third wife who first in their family assumed the title their son would eventually be known by.

If therefore it is under Roger II that we can see the fullest and most systematic development of a multilingual chancery, it is in Adelaide’s regency that we see the development and consolidation of the contextual arrangements initiated by Roger I, whose influence is evident in the development of Roger II’s conception of the form and instruments of his rule. And indeed, having seen Adelaide’s ability for relying on competent noblemen to aid in the handling of the political and military matters of her regency, it follows naturally that she would rely on handpicked, powerful figures to do the same for administrative ones. What we can garner therefore of Adelaide’s shadowy but striking figure is that of a woman empowered by Roger I’s habitual regard for and trust in his wives, someone who at a young age was able to step into his shoes and preserve his legacy, at the same times as she expanded it and adapted it to her own rule by making choices that would later prove crucial to her son’s reign. If Roger II struck out in a new and more powerful direction, I believe that the origins and means of his rule can be traced back to his mother’s highly efficient example.

It is in this perspective that I think we should discount Houben’s assessment that Adelaide lived all her life ‘in the interest of her son’; I believe we can see in her a far more ambitious partnership with him, especially in the light of her experience as queen of Jerusalem; William of Tyre goes as far as blaming Roger II’s refusal to ever go on crusade on his mother’s humiliation; as we saw above in discussing his wife Elvira and sister Matilda, Roger could and did feel strongly about the women of his family. Beside everything else, Roger II’s appetite for a foothold in Outremer is self-evident: I have described in chapter 3 how he attempted to succeed to Bohemond II, and it is certainly in this light that his bid for the throne of Jerusalem through his mother can also be interpreted. At the very worst, as for the marriage contract, Roger II would find himself brother to the next king or queen of Jerusalem; at the very best he would inherit himself. Far from damning Adelaide as ambitious regardless of Roger or painting her as sacrificing herself in the name of her son, I believe we can see in her wedding the unique but naturally developed partnership between a mother whose rule ensured her son’s succession and a son who sought to expand his dominions at the same time as he honoured her. When she was repudiated she returned to Sicily by her son’s side; but in going off to a troubled land with the potential for the kind of influence she had grown accustomed to exercising. Adelaide was not simply offering herself as a useful pawn for Roger’s project, but also as possible player on an alternate stage after her son’s coming of age meant the decline of her rule in Sicily, while leaving him alone to exercise power in freedom once he was of age.

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19 Indeed, Carlrichard Brühl (Urkunden und Kanzlei König Roger II. von Sizilien (Cologne: Böhlau, 1978), pp. 36-8) shows that before 1127 we have few Latin charters in Sicily, and no real sign of a Latin chancery.
Alexander of Telese called Adelaide ‘mulier prudentissima’, a multifaceted attribute which can entail not only wisdom but also valour (hot-headed Tancred is called ‘prudens’ by the Anonymous author of the *Gesta Francorum*). In the ambiguity of this adjective we can perhaps obtain our best assessment of her life and rule: of a woman at once wise and motherly, a powerful and correct administrator for her two sons, but also a formidable and influential ruler for herself and in her own right. To the end of the mechanisms of Hauteville kinship, her regency meant one thing: the polite but firm divorce of the fortunes of the county of Sicily from the rest of the continent. During the years of upheaval of Roger Borsa’s shrewd but often imperilled rule, the minority of Bohemond II, and the unchecked power of the Conversanos, the county of Sicily remained aloof, to the best of our knowledge, from the strife. While Mead makes a compelling case, through a painstaking analysis of the documents, that Adelaide could only claim safe rule through an area ranging from Calabria to north-eastern Sicily, this area she held on to on her own, thanks to the efforts of herself, her chosen men, and her family, and she was in no way beholden to her husband’s relatives but for the continued overlordship of the Apulian duchy, an overlordship which the embattled Borsa would have been hard-pressed to enforce in any way contrary to her interest. It is in this context, therefore, that we can see the coming of age of Roger II: as the heir to a small but secure and independent county, the son of an ambitious and competent mother, the member of a kin network to which he was not indebted, but which he soon proved ready to take advantage of; and finally, a ruler established off of the Mezzogiorno, in an island that was not perhaps entirely under his control, but not part of the complicated Southern Italian alliances either.

5.3. Roger Ascending: Chronology of A Takeover

Roger’s rise from minority in a small county to kingship in Sicily can be distracting in its wildly successful results, and I opened this chapter by warning of the danger of looking at it teleologically. Nonetheless, given the complex series of events that characterise it, and the number of players involved over quite a large stage and a number of years, it is still worth looking at chronologically before analysing what it meant for the Hauteville kin network. Here I will do so by roughly identifying four phases within it, seeking to stress in each of them the contextual, adaptive nature of Roger’s actions; I will also lay the accent on the role that Roger’s relatives took within it, rather than its more institutional aspects. The purpose here, therefore, is not of merely chronicling Roger’s rise, but rather laying out as clear as possible a picture in order to analyse how the clan shifted and changed during and after his rule.

21 AT, I.3, pp. 7-8; GM, III.9, p. 61.
a. Phase 1: count Roger (before 1127)

In 1112, Roger became of age at sixteen, and presumably set about establishing himself more securely in Sicily. While we lack sources to describe exactly how he went about it, he was quickly installed securely enough to broker successful terms for his mother’s marriage to Baldwin of Jerusalem; at the same time, he established treaties with the Zirid leaders of Ifriqiya. His cachet was also good enough to attract Elvira as a royal bride, and the pair married in 1117, the same year in which Adelaide returned from Outremer after the annulment of his marriage (she died in 1118). In 1122, Roger agreed to help duke William against Jordan of Ariano in exchange for Calabria and the remaining ducal territories in Sicily. His enduring ties with Iberia and investment in seapower were confirmed in 1126, when he was in talks with count Berengar of Barcelona to fight the Balearic pirates; he had also already made his first incursions into North Africa. What we see in this phase is Roger at the beginning of his power, already an ambitious, outward looking, an opportunist ruler, keen to weave cross-Mediterranean contacts, deeply aware of the advantages to be seized from his relatives. In 1127 Roger was around thirty-one, securely established in Sicily and Calabria, with prestigious contacts around the Mediterranean, four legitimate and one illegitimate son to inherit from him, and manpower, vessels and wealth enough to make his position felt in the chaos to come.

b. Phase 2: The Seizure of the Duchy (1127-1130)

Duke William died in July 1127, young and apparently heirless. Alexander of Telese, a source intensely favourable to Roger who could be expected to play up any promise of inheritance should such exist, depicted the count of Sicily lamenting that he had not been named as heir, which seems to confirm that no such arrangement existed. Conversely, Romuald of Salerno accepted Roger as a designated heir; while Falco of Benevento, a source fairly hostile to Roger, had him negotiating the pope’s acceptance of his succession by offering him Campanian cities in fief. With the death of William and with Bohemond II off in Antioch, the direct descendance of Guiscard had

23 Houben, Roger II, pp. 30-1.
25 Pontieri, La madre nella storia, pp.431-2.
26 FB, pp. 88; Romuald, Chronicon, pp.213-4; WT, 13.22, p. 615.
27 AT, I,4, p. 8.
28 Romuald, Chronicon, pp.213-4; Loud, Roger II and the Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily, pp. 13-7.
29 AT, I,4, p. 8.
30 FB, p. 88; Romuald, Chronicon, pp. 213-4; Loud, Roger II and the Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily, pp. 13-7.
been severed and Honorius II may have thought that the duchy reverted to the papacy, who had
granted it. Roger’s swiftness in claiming the duchy seems to hint at an eagerness to establish
himself in an uncertain situation before others could intervene. On the one hand, one could argue
that Roger thought of the duchy as a title granted to the family, which he could claim as a close
relative, and the pope thought of it instead as a privilege only Guiscard’s direct descendants could
inherit without his say-so. On the other it is easy to imagine Roger simply stepping into the breach.
He had himself swiftly ferried to Salerno by his galleys; when the archbishop shied away from it,
he contented himself with having the bishop of Capaccio anoint him prince of Salerno. Under
threat of excommunication from the pope, on his return to the Continent he had his army acclaim
him duke at Reggio Calabria, as Robert Guiscard had done. Calabria was a safe base for Roger;
but it also established a direct line between him and the first, most assertive Hautevilles.

The coalition banded against Roger was both ragtag and significant: next to noblemen keen
to preserve the de facto independence they had enjoyed under Duke William (Grimoald of Bari,
Godfrey of Andria, Roger of Ariano), there was Robert II of Capua, bent on restating his
independence and backing the pope, Alexander of Conversano, whose interest in independence I
have analysed in chapter 3, his brother Tancred, who may have seen an occasion for independence
now that Bohemond II and duke William were gone, and the painful defection of Rainulf of
Caiazzo, Roger’s own brother-in-law, despite Roger’s attempts at keeping him faithful by making
the count of Ariano his vassal. Falco has it that pope Honorius offered remission for their sins to
those who would fight against Roger. The predicament here was much like those that had faced
Guiscard: a pope unwilling to recognise the title to the regnant Hauteville, relatives keen to seize
the moment, and noblemen unwilling to be vassals.

Roger quickly secured the Basilicata, Otranto and Taranto, and finally obtained an uneasy
peace characterised by general forgiveness. In August 1128, Honorius II invested him as duke in
Benevento. Despite the passage of time, the predicament here seemed much that which had faced
his uncle: a strong man attempting to assert power against an ambitious family and an independent
nobility, with part of the family remaining loyal (the counts of Principato and Catanzaro) and part
attempting to seize the advantage. While he was fighting in a different manner than Robert

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31 Houben, Roger II of Sicily, p. 44.
32 AT, I.5-6, pp. 8-9.
33 AT, I.7-9, pp. 9-11; Romuald, Chronicon, p. 214.
34 AT, I.10-1, pp. 11-2.
35 FB, pp. 90-2.
36 AT, I.10-14, pp. 11-4.
38 The counts of Principato and Catanzaro are not mentioned as being explicitly loyal. However, we might
very well expect the chronicles, which so closely detail the rebellions of other members of the family, to
mention them if they had rebelled. Falco of Benevento, both overtly hostile to Roger II and close to the zone
of influence of the Principato, would presumably have reported their rebellion. That Calabria, in fact, stood
behind Roger seems to me to prove that the Calabrians, Catanzaros included, remained faithful.
Guiscard, Roger thus far sat equably in the traditional methods and aims of the Hautevilles, though with a marked regard for his succession: in the 1129 assizes of Melfi, Roger had the noblemen swear allegiance to both himself and his two eldest sons, attempting to both clearly identify his successor, provide him with a close network, and establish once and for all that the supremacy of the Hautevilles in the South was not a fluke dependent on one or the other of them, but an enduring condition there to stay.\(^{39}\)

c. Phase 3: King in the South (1130-1134)

The previous chapters have discussed how Hauteville daughters became queens, and how several Hautevilles had married daughters of kings or former queens. But Roger II was the first Hauteville to achieve kingship, and did so taking advantage of the unusual situation in Rome, when in 1130 a group within the college of cardinals elected Innocent II, but the rest of the cardinals, and most of the nobility and people of Rome supported Anacletus II.\(^{40}\) Fleeing beyond the Alps, Innocent gathered the fundamental support of Bernard of Clairvaux and Archbishop Norbert of Magdeburg, which gained him the support of European rulers; Roger however had already stepped into the breach, offering his support to Anacletus in exchange for investiture as king.\(^{41}\) Alexander of Telese’s highlighting of Henry del Vasto’s suggestion that Roger become king underlines the importance of kin to Roger’s claim, especially in the absence of any historic precedent for a king in Sicily, claiming that the island had already been ruled by them.\(^{42}\) Originally, it seemed that his paternal kin as well was willing to stand behind Roger. At one point, it seemed that Robert of Capua could and would be reconciled to Roger’s rule: as his most important vassal, it was he who had placed the crown on his head at his coronation in 1132.\(^{43}\) In addition to this, the problem of Tancred of Conversano would seemingly be solved by his willingness to relocate to Outremer in exchange for a cash payment.\(^{44}\) The submission of Ariano to Rainulf seemed to have initially calmed him down; but this did not last. The breaking point seems to have been Rainulf’s treatment of Matilda; whether we believe Falco of Benevento, who casts Rainulf as a domestic abuser, or Alexander, who depicts him inveighed in the complex ‘feudal’ and personal relationship described in the previous

\(^{39}\) AT, I.21, pp. 18-9, and FB, p. 104.


\(^{41}\) AT, II.2, pp. 23-5; FB, p. 106; *Chronicon Casinensis*, XIX.309.

\(^{42}\) AT, II.1, p. 23.

\(^{43}\) FB, p. 108. Falco’s suggestion that Robert was not appropriately rewarded for crowning Roger seems to place his dissatisfaction with the king squarely on his head. At the same time, Roger’s special treatment of Robert of Capua to the end suggests he did not despair of the possibility of his reconciliation, potentially capitalising on his short-lived initial support.

\(^{44}\) AT, II.21, p. 32, FB, p. 120.
chapter, Matilda, who had been the link between the two men, was also the occasion of their break. 45 The new revolt against Roger featured at first Rainulf and Robert of Capua. 46 The Conversanos appear to have wavered in their decision: in May 1132 they were swearing, with the faithful Geoffrey of Catanzaro, to uphold the rights of the king in Bari, and Roger shortly after agreed to pay Tancred a generous sum in gold to renounce his lands and go Outremer. 47 The rebels were counting on Emperor Lothar’s help, as he supported Innocent II; but the emperor’s descent into Italy took time. 48 Here, again, Roger seemed to find himself in a similar situation to Guiscard. But it is here that we see Roger’s departure from the ways of fighting and the way of dealing with problems of his ancestor. Roger was defeated at Nocera in July 1132: the Conversanos and Godfrey of Andria took it as their cue to rebel. 49 Far from conceding defeat, he regrouped in Salerno and Bari preparing for a different style of fighting, and lingering on the Continent until December. 50

It is here that we see the first of what Falco calls Roger’s thirst for blood: the thwarted king now resorted to shock and awe tactics, and finally broke the long-sustained patience of Hautevilles for other Hautevilles. 51 In 1133 Venosa was ransacked; Troia punished. 52 Having taken Montepeloso, where Tancred of Conversano was hiding, Roger broke with a century of precedent and imprisoned his kinsman, deporting him to Sicily, whence Tancred was not to return. 53 Alexander, luckier, had escaped to Dalmatia. 54 But Roger’s new shock and awe tactics did not preclude him from showing an opening to the rebels: Sergius of Naples and Hugh of Boiano submitted to him and were forgiven, but Robert of Capua refused, preferring exile in Pisa. 55 In 1134 Rainulf also surrendered and was also forgiven. 56 In this second phase of Roger’s establishment of himself as king we see at once the continuation of old policies and a break with them. Roger’s heavy hand with the rebel cities earned him a reputation as a tyrant; but on the other hand, this was an effective way of instilling fear and quelling revolt for a man without talent for open confrontation, but with the determination to impose himself. It is clear to me that, far from seeking to clear the board from all opponents as Falco seems to imply and his reputation would suggest, Roger was open and willing to keep his family in key positions of power in the South. The counts

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45 See pp. 104 ff.
46 AT, II.36, pp. 40-1.
47 Loud, Roger and the Creation, pp. 32-33. Loud rightfully points out that Roger’s apparent refusal to imprison the Conversanos as he had done with Grimoald is a puzzling decision; surely they would have been less trouble that way. However, as I have shown throughout this thesis, the forgiveness of the troublesome counts of Conversano had been a constant motif of Hauteville rule; AT, II.21, p. 32.
48 AT, II.36-9, pp. 40-2.
49 AT, II.36, pp. 40-1.
50 FB, pp. 130-142.
51 FB, p. 152.
52 AT, II.46-8, pp. 45-6.
53 FB, pp. 152-3.
54 AT, II.45, p. 44.
55 FB, pp. 166-72; AT, II.67, pp. 55-6.
56 AT, II.63, p. 53.
of Catanzaro and Principato had seemingly remained faithful, and so had Robert of Bassunvilla; while Roger had eventually run out of patience with Tancred of Conversano, he had clearly been willing to grant him a golden exit to the Holy Land. Rainulf had been reconciled and indeed further endowed. Things as they stood in 1134, Roger, far from seeming a sovereign hellbent on destroying his kin, seemed determined to achieve lasting peace for his newfound reign and the vassalage of all his relatives.

d. Phase 4: Tabula rasa (1135-1140)

The final shift, and definitive break in Roger’s policy came with the 1135 rebellion. It is very hard to give a dispassioned assessment of Roger’s actions at the time, because all the information we have seems to suggest that his judgment was clouded. We have no reason to contradict Alexander of Telese’s account, discussed in the previous chapter, that at Elvira’s death Roger sank into despondency and isolation, and was believed dead: a rumour that the king had died seems like the best reason for Rainulf to stir once more into rebellion, proving that his recent submission had been such only in name. Rainulf was promptly joined by Robert of Capua, who was returning from exile. Roger promptly mustered his army and met them in Campania, demanding surrender from Rainulf and Robert. He was no longer willing to put up with their rebellion; yet Robert was offered one last chance to submit. The princes of Capua, despite being related to the Hautevilles, had been aloof from them; here Roger was recognising for the last time that their power did not derive from him.

Roger’s own refusal to further put up with his rebellious relatives can be credited to a number of factors: one of them, most importantly in my opinion, having seen what would have happened had he died. His own sons’ inheritance was in danger, and unlike Guiscard he had no brother and now no wife to act as powerful watchdog of his inheritance. In order for his dynasty to continue, the sources of trouble needed to go. Kin dispersal and the thinning of the ranks of the Hautevilles meant that ties were looser, and there were less people available to help. The prince of Capua could be an important accessory to rebellion, but he did not have the rallying possibilities of the king’s brother-in-law, or of the inveterate rousers, the Conversanos. Rainulf had a powerful ally in the German Emperor. Re-establishing Innocent involved putting down Anacletus’ most powerful ally, and in 1136 Lothar III came down through the Abruzzi, while his son-in-law Henry of Bavaria descended through Tuscany, immediately seizing Benevento, then Bari, whose Muslim garrison was slaughtered. Robert was restored in Capua, and Roger, possibly bargaining for time as

57 FB, pp. 172-4; AT, III.20, p. 70.
58 The relationship between the principality of Capua and the duchy of Apulia is in itself a complex knot, which will be examined in chapter 6.
59 Annalista Saxo, Reichschronik, p. 610; Regesta Imperii, IV, n. 571-3; 575-85.
Houben points out, offered the emperor the promptly refused overlordship of Apulia. It would be fair to point out that Roger made a virtue of necessity when he lingered in Sicily: more than a delaying tactic, his strategy can easily be seen as the only logical step for a man who saw himself outnumbered. Nonetheless, whether Roger preferred to wait out the emperor or had to do so, it worked: in 1137 the emperor’s army and resources were exhausted, their Pisan allies had left, and after jointly investing Rainulf duke of Apulia with the pope, he decided to leave Italy.

Scarcely had the dust settled that in October that year Roger marched on Salerno, destroyed Capua, occupied Avellino, obtained the surrender of Benevento and Naples. Another defeat in the open field, this time at Rignano by the Gargano, again left him unfazed. Roger cared for cities, not battles. Roger’s waiting tactics meant that often nature took care of his problems for him: Anacletus’ natural death in 1138 allowed him to make conciliatory overtures to Innocent, who refused them; unable to defeat Rainulf in the field, after a guerrilla tactic campaign Roger withdrew to Sicily again. The situation seemed one of stalemate: Roger was apparently determined to wage war until he had put all rebellion down; Rainulf was determined to hold out; Southern Italy was governed in patches by one or the other. Lothar had never reached home: he died in crossing the Alps, and the civil war between his successor Conrad III and his son-in-law Henry of Bavaria meant there was no chance for the empire to further fight Roger in the immediate future. Roger could afford to hold out. Rainulf, it turned out, could not. In 1139 Rainulf suddenly died of natural causes. All of the pope’s attempts at negotiating failed, and having been captured in an ambush at the river Garigliano, he acknowledged Roger king in July of that year, at the same time enfeoffing Roger (III) his son as duke of Apulia, and Alfonso as prince of Capua. Roger II, finally graced by papal acceptance, proceeded to mop up the resistance, once more reverting to shock and awe tactics: Rainulf’s body was desecrated when he took Troia, and his conquest of Bari was marked by hangings and blindings. This time, punishment would be exemplary: everyone who had rebelled was relieved of their lands, as I shall analyse more in detail in section 5. Robert of Capua fled to the emperor. Roger of Ariano and his wife were imprisoned in Sicily. Roger II had finally and completely broken with tradition. The high effectiveness of his methods is confirmed by the stunned

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60 Annalista Saxo, Reichschronik, p. 610; Houben, Roger II of Sicily, p. 68.
61 Annalista Saxo, Reichschronik, p. 610; FB, pp.188-190; Romuald, pp. 223-4; Otto of Freising, Chronica de duabus civitatibus, ed. by A. Hofmeister (Hanover: Bibliopolius Hahnianus, 1912), VII.20, pp. 338-40.
63 FB, pp. 204-14.
64 Otto of Freising, Chronica de duabus civitatibus, VII.23, pp. 345 ff.
65 Romuald, Chronicon, p.226; FB, p. 216.
66 FB, p. 222; Annales Cavenses, ed. by Fulvio delle Donne (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo, 2011), III.192; Romuald, p. 225.
67 Bull of investiture of Roger II, Italia Pontificia, VII.42, n. 159; FB, pp. 228-230, which adds the poignant detail that Roger in his fury had one of Rainulf’s closest men do it personally.
68 Otto of Freising, Chronica, VII.28.
69 See footnote 37.
impression he leaves in the sources: for Falco of Benevento, he is a monster; Otto of Freising, with no horses in the race, has it that Roger so loved justice he enforced it harshly; the Annals of Cava refer to biblical quotes to say that ‘the Earth is silent before his face’, while the Chronicle of S. Clemente of Casauria has it that Roger’s ferocity was such to make mountains tremble.\textsuperscript{70} Such a reaction is understandable: in 1140, to close the pacification of Southern Italy, Roger sent his sons Roger III and Alfonso to reconquer the Abruzzi, and was at that point the first to actually exercise authority over the whole of the Mezzogiorno and Sicily since the death of Roger I had left Roger Borsa alone.\textsuperscript{71}

It is important to underline that during all these years, Roger had remained active in his contacts with Ifriqiya, conquering Djerba in 1130 and announcing it to the caliph of Egypt, with whom he entertained a felicitous diplomatic relationship; 1130 had seen him both become king and put himself forward to succeed Bohemond II in Antioch; 1135 had been his \textit{annus horribilis}, with Elvira’s death and a new rebellion, but also the year he attempted to stop Raymond of Poitiers from marrying his third cousin Constance; in 1136 he was endowing the Hospitaliters at the same time as he faced an imperial invasion; and in 1139, at the time of his victory in the Mezzogiorno, he was making a deal with the patriarch of Antioch to attempt for the last time to obtain the principality.\textsuperscript{72}

This quick overview of Roger’s ascent to power allows us, once more, to deny any attempt to read it teleologically: his progress was at all times tangential and opportunist; his gains sometimes owed to good luck, when he literally waited out his opponents; while his wealth and organisation allowed him to bide his time, he seemed unable to defeat his adversaries in the field; at any given point in time his interests were diversified and he was active on several fronts. In many ways, Roger II was not like the Hautevilles who had preceded him. At the same time, like them, he attempted to rely on and preserve his family network; and in part, he succeeded. As we shall see in section 5, Roger’s reign was both a point of departure from the Hauteville network that had come before him, and the starting gun for what would come after. Before dealing with this, however, I shall first

\textsuperscript{70} Otto of Freising, \textit{Chronica}, VII.23; \textit{Chronicon Casauriense}, 889; \textit{Annales Cavenses}, 192.

\textsuperscript{71} FB, pp.232-4; \textit{Chronicon Casauriense}, cols. 889.90.

analyse how the progression to power outlined above played into, and eventually changed, Hauteville kin dynamics.

5.4. Opportunist Predator: Roger’s Ascent in Space, Titles, and Methods

While it would be incorrect to read all of Roger’s rule as a preparation for the moment he became king, and cast him as a Machiavellian schemer, it is undeniable that his life and achievement constituted a fundamental watershed in both Hauteville family relations and the larger history of the Mezzogiorno. In order to understand the means and mechanisms of this rule, and its repercussions on the Hauteville kin network, it is important first to draw attention to three fundamental elements of it: its scope, its opportunism, and the mechanisms through which he fought, all elements which at once placed him at the heart of the Hauteville kin network, but also gave him the means to be independent of it, and accomplish the separation of his interests from theirs which neither Guiscard nor Roger I had obtained. This section, therefore, will show how Roger II’s rule constituted a fundamental change in the ways the Hautevilles both administered and expanded their power, and the ways their interests and relationship with their neighbours were articulated.

At the coming of age of Roger in 1112 the Hauteville family possessions were both widely spread out and highly fragmented. Since the death of Robert Guiscard in 1085 there had not been a unifying force in the family affairs, with the different branches of the family focusing on local holdings. Roger I had brokered peace between his nephews, but his life had been mainly taken up by the conquest of Sicily; Borsa first and his son William second spent their lives shoring up the embattled duchy of Apulia; while Bohemond II, as examined in chapter 2, may have possibly been set to inherit both the duchy of Apulia, the principality of Antioch and at one point the kingdom of Jerusalem, Romuald of Salerno attests that whether by will or fact he had effectively forfeited his Southern Italian fiefs to the Conversanos at the moment of his departure for Outremer. Roger II, however, changed all this: he seems to have been acutely aware at all times of both the ramifications and the implications of his numerous familial relations, and at the very least of what he stood to gain as inheritance from all of them. At different times, Roger poised himself as heir to the duchy of Apulia and to the principality of Antioch, with varying degree of success; as we shall see, he was quick to take back fiefs to which he felt entitled through his sisters’ marriages. At the same time as he staked his claim to the extensive Hauteville holdings, he also looked beyond them, establishing his dominion over Ifriqiya (from modern day Tunis to Tripoli) and fighting the pirates in the Balearic Islands. At any given point during his intense career, Roger was likely to be found

73 See pp. 57-8.
fighting or politicking on several fronts, both within and without the family’s usual preserve, something which could sometimes dilute his strengths at the same time as it diversified his interests.

Even as he could easily be said to overstretch himself sometimes, Roger II does not appear to have overreached himself: he never went for the great campaigns engaged by his relatives Guiscard and Bohemond I against the Byzantine empire wholesale, gambling immense resources at one go. During his career, Roger II proved more than effective at holding out against both the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire; but he did so on his own turf, on his own terms, and with the careful fighting methods seen above. And if on the one hand Roger was always active on different fronts, he proved ambitious not simply in the geographical extension of the territories he sought to lay claim to, but also in the opportunist and shrewd way he rushed to claim any title he felt was up for the taking at any given moment. From his father he had inherited the title of count (almost certainly the only ‘true’ count in Sicily at the time, controversial as the history of the title is) and the loose relationship of subjection to the duchy of Apulia.75 His ambitions may be easily read in his royal marriage campaigns, both marrying the daughter of a king and putting his mother at the head of the kingdom of Jerusalem. His eagerness in attempting to claim the Principality of Antioch at Bohemond II’s death proved that distance was no object in his projects, even to an unrealistic amount, as it is doubtful someone who was already embroiled in the dispute over Sicily and the Mezzogiorno could also hold a crusader frontier, but his ascent to kingship in his own dominions was accomplished over a careful seizure of every opportunity that presented itself to him. When his cousin duke William called for his help in 1122, Roger II demonstrated just how perfunctory ducal overlordship of Sicily had become at that point: he negotiated the best deal for himself, receiving a handsome cash payment, and the renunciation of all of the duke’s remaining interests in Sicily.76 It is debatable whether he then also had William choose him as his heir: it is entirely possible that Bohemond had in fact been chosen to inherit from his cousin, being a closer relative than Roger, albeit one that was then beyond the sea.77 At the same time, William died at an unexpectedly young age: he could well have looked forward to having an heir, and any and all promises he made to his collateral relatives might have been highly contextual, even if we might underline that at the time of his death he had already been married for eleven years, so he might have nourished reasonable doubts as to his ability to conceive that way.78

121-2; and Ibn Abi Dinar, Kitab al-Munis, in Amari, Biblioteca arabo-sicula, v.II (1881), pp. 219-20; the final consolidation of his power in North Africa came after 1145.

75 Loud, Age of Guiscard, pp. 172-4; for a discussion of the possible legal implications of Roger’s rule, see Johns, Arabic Administration, ch. 2, and Takayama, The Norman Administration, ch. 1.

76 FB, pp. 66-8. Indeed, the way in which Roger II made his help to a nominal relative hang on sheer profit is remarkably similar to what Roger Borsa and Roger of Sicily did with Richard II of Capua, see pp. 178-9.

77 See pp. 55 ff.

78 Romuald of Salerno, pp. 213-4; Loud, Roger II and the Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily, p.14.
Nonetheless, Bohemond II, then enmeshed in the chronically embattled affairs of the Principality of Antioch, could hardly be expected to drop them to go and claim the duchy of Apulia in 1127, at William’s death, especially now that with his marriage to Alice of Jerusalem he stood poised to inherit a kingdom as well, until Melisende’s 1129 marriage to Fulk of Anjou. While the opposition of the barons to Roger’s takeover was understandable, a continuation of the policy of rebellion that not even Guiscard had ever managed to entirely quell, and which had chiselled away at Borsa and William’s reigns, Roger’s next move was at once entirely in keeping with his previous policy and brilliantly opportunistic, while entirely contextual and unprecedented in Hauteville relations with the Holy See. The county of Sicily lived a difficult relationship with the papacy: Roger I had received the power to act as a legate, something which made sense at the end of the conquest when he was still reclaiming Sicily from both its Muslim phase and the influence of the Greek church. The endeavour was at least once cast as a holy war in Malaterra’s work, and for the count to be the standard-bearer of the Roman church made both practical and ecclesiastical sense. According to Malaterra, the papacy had promised not to appoint any legate to Sicily during Roger I’s lifetime, that of his son Simon, and of any other legitimate heir; understandably, Roger II was keen to defend this grant. Just as well, it is entirely understandable that the papacy was as keen to deny the privilege as the rulers of Sicily were to hold on to it; and that Roger would see the schism of 1130 as a golden moment to seize upon. His support of Anacletus II was crucial, and in the first moment he seemed likely to be the victor of the schism: Honorius died in February 1130, and while his successor Innocent could count on the support of the emperor, the emperor needed to descend on Italy, while Roger was already in place to provide fundamental support for the man who was keen to support whatever claims he might wish to make. Alexander of Telese has Roger claiming the crown on the suggestion of his uncle Henry; not only does this tactfully omit every mention of Anacletus and piously deflects ambition from Roger II, but it also shows him angling for the crown with the support of his mother’s kin. Be that as it may, in 1130 Roger had exploited the crisis of the papacy as far as it would carry him: the throne, fulfilling that royal ambition which had spurred Guiscard and then both Bohemonds.

79 See chapter 7 for a discussion of the royal family of Jerusalem.
81 GM, II.1, explicitly presents the conquest of Sicily as an endeavour to regain the country from “idolatry” (‘terram idolis dedita […] gens a Deo ingrata’); it is however necessary to be careful in our assessment of the conquest of Sicily as a possible Holy War, given on the one hand the tolerant and contextual approach taken by Roger to Sicilian Muslims’ conversion, and Malaterra’s open admission that his conquest was primarily driven by greed. As soon as he had conquered Calabria and gazed across the sea at Sicily, says Malaterra, Roger wanted it (GM, II.28).
82 GM, IV.29, pp. 106-7; for a wider discussion of this issue, see Loud, The Latin Church in Southern Italy, ch. 3.
83 AT, II.1, p. 23.
84 AT, II.2, pp. 23-5.
Finally, opportunism and a broad view of how far his interests could stretch was shown in Roger’s keen interest in both Antiochene succession crises: both at Bohemond II’s death in 1130 and in the crisis when Princess Alice attempted to prevent Constance’s wedding in 1135. Roger attempted to step in, presenting himself as the possible heir for the Antiochene crown. The sheer impracticality of it, his distance from a theatre already fraught with the complex infighting of the Frankish aristocracy, all made the endeavour seem unlikely; nonetheless, Roger did not let the opportunity of another, possible title pass him by. Nor were old rivalries ever in the way for Roger: Anacletus had scarcely died in 1138 that he was proposing peace to Innocent II; and while Innocent was very unwilling to give in, and give up Benevento, by the following year illness, lack of imperial support and Roger’s all but clinched entrenchment in the South had made it expedient and necessary for the pope to accept the compromise and recognise Roger’s royal title and dominion over the Mezzogiorno.

If Roger II was therefore unique in his family in both the way he was ready to seize the occasion and claim any going title, and for the vastness and diversification of the theatres on which his ambition played out, the final distinction of his career was the different methods with which he fought. Roger’s way of conquest was indebted to both Guiscard’s and Roger I’s, and yet different from both: like Guiscard, he was both tolerant of and able to put down a number of rebellions; like Roger I, he was able to sustain his fighting over a long period without hurry, biding his time (fourteen years between 1127, when he made his move for the duchy, and 1140, when he could claim complete submission of the South); unlike them, he relied heavily on shock and awe tactics, regularly lost, but also recovered from, pitched battles, and fielded his army in an effective if novel way. This both enabled him to see through his projects, and to be a much more independent agent than both his father and uncle had been. Criticism of Roger II is heavily based on the way he could deal with rebel cities and rebel people: the same man who forgave his brother-in-law Rainulf of Caiazzo four times is the man who had his body dug up and desecrated; the man who accepted graciously Naples’ submission razed Troia and Aversa to the ground. He sent Muslim soldiers to

85 See above.
86 FB, p. 225; Romuald, Chronicon, p. 222; for a wider discussion see Loud, ‘Innocent II and the Kingdom of Sicily’, in Innocent II (1130-43), ed. by Doran and Smith (2016), pp. 172-180.
87 Roger I had employed shock and awe tactics, but towards Muslims rather than Christians; additionally, if we are to believe Malaterra, his acts of shock and awe tended to be rather, as when he dipped in blood the messages of the homing pigeons the Palermitan Muslims used to send news back, and freed them, so that the inhabitants of Palermo would be shocked at the sight (as indeed they were, see GM, II.42).
88 FB, pp. 224-6, and Romuald, Chronicon, p. 226; FB, pp. 156-8, and AT, II.49-53, pp. 47-8, and III.3-28, pp. 60-75 (to be noted that Roger also had Aversa rebuilt, suggesting once more that his use of violence was strategic, not merely destructive). While it is to be born in mind that the troubled composition of the Romuald chronicle probably means its lurid description of Muslim violence in Bari is used for effect, the mere presence of such unfamiliar garrisons was probably unsettling, and its use meant to be as such. In Northern Europe, however, Roger’s reputation for tyranny was based on his having seized a throne he was felt to have no right to more than on any putative cruelty; see Helene Wieruszowski, ‘Roger II of Sicily. Rex Tyrannus in Twelfth-Century Political Thought’, Speculum, 38 (1963), 46-78.
occupy Bari, probably counting on their foreign nature to terrify the inhabitants, as it did; and acts of mercy such as allowing Robert of Grandmesnil to go in exile were counterbalanced by the firmness with which he imprisoned Tancred of Conversano. Much like his relatives, Roger could be merciful; much like them, he could be extremely patient and forgiving to his own family. More than them, he could strike with great, exemplary violence, replacing patience with unprecedented harshness. Such methods had their advantages: the city of Naples, which had stood independent since the end of the Roman empire, offered voluntary submission to Roger in 1131, hoping to receive kind treatment in exchange for duke Sergius’ act of vassalage. Roger’s shock and awe tactics were coupled with two factors of great weight in their effectiveness: the nature of his army, and his lack of reliance on pitched battles. Robert Guiscard had been plagued by problems when it came to his army: mustering it required the support of his vassals, men who would often rebel; when this happened, and he found himself short of men, he had to sometimes call on his brother for help; rebellions against him threatened his very seat of power.

None of this seemed to apply to Roger II. While we lack evidence to describe the exact mechanisms through which his army was composed, mustered, stationed and supplied, we can say with certainty that whatever army he could field was partly comprised of highly effective Muslim troops; that it could be quickly mustered, enabling him to offer a fast response to the 1135 rebellion; that it was supported by a fleet powerful enough to blockade Bari and Naples and ferry him back and forth to the continent, and to be called upon to be of help against pirates; and that this army, instead of being kept constantly in the field, was brought back yearly to Sicily to winter there, testifying at the very least to Roger’s efficiency in moving, provisioning, and keeping track of his troops. Roger did not wage battle on his own home ground, and if he had inherited a possibly incomplete rule over Sicily and Calabria from his mother, he seemed to have firmly established himself over the whole of the island by the time of duke William’s death in 1127. The value of Sicily to his subsequent military strategy cannot be overstated. It remained his untouchable power base, whence he departed for summer campaigns and to which he retreated to winter, resupply, and regroup. Roger never seemed to have trouble landing an army; if the Southern Italian noblemen took his every departure as an excuse to rebel, they also seemed unable to keep him from wreaking...

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90 AT, II.12, pp. 28-9.
91 As discussed in chapters 1 and 3.
92 See above, section 3, for the high mobility and efficiency of both Roger’s land and sea forces. While Roger appears not to have been a good tactician in the open field, he appears to have been able to field and supply a flexible force efficient in both sieges, guerrilla warfare, and naval blockade, well equipped against the climate, equally able to swiftly retreat to Sicily as to linger in the field. The force was at least partially composed by Muslims, as seen in the Bari garrison, but the fact that it was deployed in pitched battles as well seems to suggest the more traditional Western presence of heavy cavalry. For further discussion of Roger’s military strategy, see Gastone Breccia, “‘Magis consilio quam viribus’: Ruggero II di Sicilia e la guerra’, Medioevo greco: Rivista di storia e filologia bizantina, 3 (2003), 53-67.
havoc when he came to put them down. Roger spent fourteen embattled years establishing his rule; but in those fourteen years he preserved a stable covered rear, while making life a constant struggle for those who opposed him. Even in the bleakest of perspectives, Roger proved he could defend Sicily from everyone; and that while he could be defeated in the open field, he was not fazed by it.

Once more, Roger’s aloofness from the mainland sets him starkly aside from the rest of his family. Sending someone to Sicily seemed, in Roger’s plans, an effective way of rendering them unable to harm him: it is to Sicily, as I described in the chapter above, that he sent his sister Matilda when he did not trust her; in Sicily that he imprisoned Tancred of Conversano; to Sicily, after putting down the final rebellion of 1140, that he deported the counts of Ariano. Sicily was the place where Roger somehow raised, supplied, restored his army; and in Sicily his rule was secured. His ambition may have ranged over a vast theatre from Southern Italy to Syria to Africa, but it had a very firm core in Sicily itself. Adelaide’s choice in relocating the comital seat had proved the starting point in building a power base unshackled from the continent, the ideal starting point for a fighter untroubled by time spent in pursuit of his goal; as stated since the beginning of this chapter, Adelaide’s rule, and her kin group, were fundamental in rooting and consolidating the power Roger inherited and waged, and giving him the instruments he needed in order to expand it. If it would be unfair to depict him as pursuing kingship from the start, it would be entirely objective to say that once Roger had set upon establishing control over the Mezzogiorno he did not abandon the project until completion, expending what seem to have been the considerable resources of Sicily in the endeavour, and remaining able to count on it. But once we have established how wide, effective and predatory were Roger’s campaigns, it is necessary to look at those with whom and against whom he waged them: his own relatives, and what Roger’s way of achieving and preserving power, and theirs of resisting it, meant for both the family dynamics of the Hautevilles, and the very preservation of their kin.

5.5. Brothers, Traitors, Allies: The Kin Network under Roger II

While as shown above in many ways Roger II broke entirely with previously established institutional and military Hauteville patterns, conceptions of kin and the use made of it were fundamental in his exercise, attainment, and preservation of rule. Excepting his endeavours in Ifriqiya, Roger did not spend time in expanding his dominions into new places as much as uniting under his aegis the Hauteville family holdings, finally establishing himself as the head of the clan in the Mezzogiorno and Sicily. While his attempted takeover of Syria failed, we can see that if there is one overarching project in Roger’s work it is the pursuit of every available title to which, as a

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93 See pp. 104 ff.; FB, p. 230; the count of Ariano must have been released, since he was in Würzburg in 1144 at the court of Conrad III with Robert II of Capua, see Conradi III. et filii eius Heinrici Diplomata, ed. by Friedrich Hausmann (Vienna: Böhlau, 1969), n. 99, pp. 176-77, 136, pp. 226-28.
Hauteville, he could lay claim. In this, we can see that his conception of family and kin was both encompassing, elastic, and highly pragmatic. Roger seems to have counted Duke William as close enough kin to rue that he had not been explicitly considered in his testament, at least according to Alexander of Telese, but not so close as not to drive a hard bargain when William required his help in 1122. Likewise, Bohemond II was close kin when it came to positioning himself to inherit at his death, but Roger had ignored Constance’s doings, whether in support or against, when she was tangling with the Alexander of Conversano in Apulia in the 1110s and 1120s.

Relationships of Roger with his continental kin had been loosened by his mother’s reliance on her own brother and Northern Italian and French network, as discussed above; Alexander of Telese’s highlighting of Henry del Vasto’s role at Roger’s coronation suggests that he remained an important personage in his nephew’s reign. What is more, several members of the Aleramici kin group were close to Roger, supported him, and were rewarded in the 1140s restructuring of the nobility. Thus we have the Northern Italian margraves who became counts of Gravina and held Polignano from c.1141, and Simone, son of Henry of Paternò and Flandina, and thus Roger II’s first cousin on both sides, entrusted by him with command during the continental campaign, who was later made count of Policastro. As we saw in preceding chapters, many Hautevilles, like Tancred, Serlo, Richard the Seneschal, and Robert of Loritello had shaped their lives through cooperation with their uncles; but Roger differed in that his own was not a Hauteville. Indeed, Roger’s consideration of other Hautevilles as a clan but not a close family with personal in addition to practical relationships is easily explicable when we see how he had grown up detached from other Hautevilles. Whatever the status of Roger’s brothers, the two Geoffreys and Mauger, they had long disappeared from record and were presumably dead by the time he acceded to the throne; Simon had died in infancy; the only survivor of this network was Silvester, who was Godfrey of Ragusa’s son, apparently stood by Roger and was later rewarded in 1150 with the newly created county of Marsico. Roger I had survived all of his brothers, and the dukes of Apulia, the counts of Conversano, Principato and Loritello were embroiled in their own disputes. Even if Adelaide could probably not claim effective rule over the whole of Sicily, she effectively held and no matter how extensive the revolts that threatened her power, and she appears to have managed both with no help from her husband’s kin, at least to the best of our knowledge.

94 AT, I.4-5, pp. 8-9.
95 See pp. 74 ff.
96 See p. 152.
98 See chapters 2 and 3.
99 See p. 49; Cuozzo, Commentario, n. 597, pp. 159-61.
100 See chapter 3.
If Roger apparently had a very strong sense of what he was entitled to claim as a born Hauteville, this did not seem to depend on his outright interaction with most other Hautevilles. Up until the death of Roger I the relationships between many of the players on the Southern Italian theatre had been personal. The children of Fressenda at least, as shown in previous chapters, had all interacted, and built their power base together. Robert Guiscard had had personal relationships with all of his nephews, from Jordan of Capua to Geoffrey of Conversano; Roger I had done the same. On the continent, as shown in chapter 3, such relationships had endured, and both Borsa and Duke William had personally interacted with all of their relatives, from the faithful counts of the Principato to the troublesome counts of Conversano. Roger II grew apart from his continental relatives, and before his bid for power we have no proof of close or even incidental relationships with them.

The network of relatives Roger most closely relied on, and was often betrayed by, was his acquired rather than his blood kin. As described in chapter 4, Roger I had few sons, and those were of uncertain and possibly illegitimate status, all excluded from power for one reason or another; but he did have a wealth of daughters, several of whom remained in Southern Italy and married locally powerful men. It is with these men, his brothers-in-law, that Roger had the most fraught and most intense of his relationships. As discussed in examining the figure of Matilda, Roger could have intense personal relationships with his sisters; he also considered himself entitled to their fiefs, as he showed in moving on to reclaim his deceased sister Emma’s holdings in Montescaglio in 1124. In the absence of other kin, Roger appeared to strongly feel that he was entitled to what his sisters had possessed. On the other hand, his dealings with his brothers-in-law show what I have examined in the preceding chapters: Hauteville kinship could and did extend in the female line as well. Roger could count on his brother-in-law Robert of Bassunvilla as the kind of ally in war that his father and uncles had found in their brothers and nephews; in Rainulf of Caiazzo and his cousin Robert de Grandmesnil he found instead faithless close relatives despite his repeated attempts to send them in exile or reconcile them. Growing in isolation from his male cousins, losing his brothers and only surrounded by sisters with whom he could apparently entertain close relationships, it seems natural for Roger to have sought to establish with his brothers-in-law the same kind of fruitful exchange Bohemond had had in claiming the help of his sister’s children. As shown in chapter 4, the husbands of Hauteville women could themselves count as Hautevilles. What is more remarkable here is not, therefore, the assimilation of minor noblemen into the Hauteville network already described in chapters 3 and 4, but rather the extent to which such an assimilation was recognised by those who did not belong to the family.

102 See pp. 49-51.
103 Romuald, Chronicon, pp. 211-212.
104 See below, section 4.
Rainulf of Caiazzo functioned as a beacon and rallying standard for rebellion much as Abelard had done; but where Abelard was the son of a count whose title had been usurped by a treacherous regent uncle, Rainulf was merely the brother-in-law of the man with the closest blood claim to the duchy of Apulia after Bohemond II’s departure.\textsuperscript{105} While it could be argued that pope and emperor, by investing Rainulf as duke, were merely backing the man who was objectively the most powerful baron on the ground regardless of any blood claims he might have had, the fact remains that he had clearly been linked to Roger II by close relation and an interpersonal bond; that he fought against the main branch of the family with the backing of the collaterals, as cadet Hautevilles had done in the time of Guiscard; that he was treated like an Hauteville and spared violent punishment to the last.\textsuperscript{106} We can show how the sense of Hauteville kin had largely broken down by the 1130s; but Rainulf’s status seems to confirm that at this point overlordship of the South went hand in hand with the idea of the family, and that the idea of belonging to the Hauteville clan, even by marriage, was strong enough to validate a pretender’s claim. The Hautevilles’ mystique seems to have increased as their sense of themselves as a unified clan was dissolving. This decaying of personal closeness means the ending of the complex overlap of emotional and practical observed in previous chapters, but it also allows us to look at Hauteville family feeling when shorn of layers of interpersonal relationships: a naked feeling of obligation and entitlement, with the loss of that sense of unity and reciprocal belonging that had made Guiscard choose to be buried with his elder brothers in Venosa, and the apparent development of a sense of family as an estate in the most material sense of the word that guided Roger’s grasping policy in attempting to succeed to any Hauteville title going.

At the same time, and most remarkably given the absence of emotional bonds, the state of the kin group under Roger II confirms that sense of mutual obligation and forgiveness that suggests that with the conscience of belonging to the clan, there came a sense that Hautevilles ought to forgive and reconcile other Hautevilles. While Alexander of Telese seems to strongly imply that Roger had relied upon Rainulf of Caiazzo and felt respect and affection for him, and his forgiving him three times may be construed as attempting to reconcile a valued member of the family, and a powerful man whose support was well-worth courting, the same cannot be said for the counts of Conversano: Roger does not appear to have had close ties of any kind with them before their repeated confrontations, and yet he forgave Tancred twice before losing patience and imprisoning him in Sicily, and Alexander was forgiven once before fleeing into exile. A shrewd operator who had taken over Bohemond II’s holdings, and who had been at the heart of every rebellion against Roger, Alexander would surely have been more safely relegated to prison; yet in Roger’s attempt

\textsuperscript{105} See pp. 55 ff.
\textsuperscript{106} See section 4; in chapter 6 I will discuss how, given the loosening of the ties within the kin group of the princes of Capua, Rainulf of Caiazzo does not seem to have claimed any particular closeness with his cousin, Robert II of Capua.
to make him into a faithful vassal we can see the endurance of the sense that Hautevilles did deserve a special treatment. Robert of Capua was a different matter. I have discussed in chapter 3 how, despite being related to the Hauteville clan in the same degree as the counts of Conversano, the princes of Capua held themselves aloof in their dealings with the Hautevilles. Their superior entitlement to a degree of independence, and their different status from the rest of the family was apparently acknowledged by Roger II: Robert of Capua was offered a final occasion to reconcile in 1135, when Roger demanded of Rainulf outright surrender. Even when he had decided to break definitively with his family, Roger appeared to acknowledge that the equally related but more independent princes of Capua deserved different treatment, and that their dominion was not simply in the power of the head of the family, and that the princes of Capua had been so entrenched there they might command loyalty within it that it would be wise to attempt to preserve.

During Roger’s lifetime, therefore, we can see the loosening of personal and emotional family ties; a persistence, up to a point, of the sense of mutual obligations of the Hautevilles towards their fellow Hautevilles; a determined attempt on Roger’s part to reunite under one command the scattered Hauteville holdings; a consolidation of the sense of the Hautevilles as the dominant clan in Southern Italy and the heart of rebellions against pretenders to overlordship. At the same time, it is worth noting that the Hautevilles, while the heart of the rebellions against Roger, were not the only players on the scene: William of Loritello, who ruled in the Abruzzi at the time of Roger’s takeover, was probably not a Hauteville; Grimoald of Bari, who had installed himself with the title of prince, had taken advantage of the void of power during duke Wiliam’s indecisive reign; and Jordan of Ariano had been the cause for William’s summoning of Roger to help, and endured in semi-independent lordship, choosing to support the king in 1132. Nonetheless, much as had been the case for Guiscard, Roger II fought his life’s greatest battles against his own kin; it was his cousins and brothers-in-law who opposed him, and it was against them that he eventually had to enact severe punishment to pacify the whole of Southern Italy. Roger could be and was forgiving of people who were not related to him too, so his willingness to preserve the standing Southern Italian aristocracy went beyond his sense of familial obligation; but it was his family who caused the greatest trouble, and it is from the suppression of his family that he derived the peace he wanted from his kingdom. To forgive Rainulf of Caiazzo was risky, and only justified by family feeling; in his absence, the rest of the nobility was smaller and more manageable fry.

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107 AT, II.54, pp. 48-9.
108 See chapter 6 for a discussion of the independent if uncertain position of the princes of Capua.
109 Hervin Fernández-Aceves, ‘The Re-Arrangement of the Nobility Under the Hauteville Monarchy: The Creation of the South Italian Counties’, Ex Historia, 7 (2016), 58-90, pp. 65-6. For William of Loritello, see p. 67. Romuald, Chronicon, pp. 209-211 and FB, p. 62; FB, pp. 66-8. A son of Altrude of Buonalbergo, Jordan might have been collateral, very distant kin if we do accept that the Buonalbergo were somehow related to Guiscard, and that indeed there was that kinship which had putatively caused the annulment of his marriage to Alberada.
It is interesting to note that, even as Roger II marked the point of dissolution of Hauteville mutual obligations, of the breakdown of the link between Southern Italy and Syria, and the end of the policy of forgiveness for fellow Hautevilles, his reign might have been the starting point for another successful sibling network. As explained above, Roger and Elvira had four sons. His sons Roger and Alfonso were sent to conquer the Abruzzi in 1140, as an example of the kind of useful, competent Hauteville juniors we have often seen throughout this thesis, an affirmation of vertical inheritance, and the final mopping up of the resistance against Roger. Finally acknowledged by the pope as king of Sicily, and de facto master of the Mezzogiorno, Roger II had also distributed the titles he had reacquired by weeding out his relatives to his children: young Roger had been invested duke of Apulia; Alfonso, prince of Capua; Tancred, prince of Bari. Providing for his eldest, well-loved children, Roger was laying out the bases for assimilation of the pre-existing Hauteville titles into his own direct descendance. However, all three men died young, before their father; Simon, a bastard child, made prince of Taranto at duke Roger’s death, was dispossessed by the surviving legitimate son William. Duke Roger had only left behind a bastard son, Tancred of Lecce; while one day he would make good on his claim by succeeding to William II, and he and Simon animated resistance against William I, as I will discuss later, Roger II’s apparently fruitful inheritance was mostly sterile, and there was no second Hauteville brotherhood to reign over Southern Italy. Even with Roger II’s dogged ambition and ability to hold up several different fronts at once, there was simply no accounting for bad luck.

5.6. After the Storm: Changing and Unchanging Hauteville Kinship

Robert Guiscard had not fought his relatives alone; but his relatives had functioned as the rallying point for all the rebellions against him. For Roger II it was the same: he fought Grimoald of Bari, Godfrey of Andria, Roger of Ariano, Hugh of Boiano, Sergius of Naples; but the core of the resistance against him were his brother-in-law Rainulf, the Conversano brothers, and Robert of Capua. By 1127 and his bid for power, willing or not, everyone who counted most in the Mezzogiorno was related to the Hautevilles, and able to capitalise on the fact. If Rainulf was just an acquired relation, after all, his rebellion was kickstarted by seizing his wife’s landed assets, for which she sought redress. Others came and went; real power in the South rested with the

111 AT, III.28, pp. 74-5; Romuald, Chronicon, pp. 221-2; FB, p.222; Annales Cavenses, III.192.
112 Hugo Falcandus, De rebus circa regni Sicilie curiam gestis. Epistola ad Petrum de desolation Sicilie, ed., transl. and comm. by Edoardo d’Angelo (Florence: SISMEL, Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014), 19.18, p. 130; while Hugo says that it was Simon’s illegitimacy that William found problematic (if so, a brisk change of pace from the days of Jordan), it to be wondered whether it was not rather the fact that Simon might command a certain support should he choose to rebel, which he indeed did do.
113 Hugo Falcandus, De rebus circa regni, ch. 19, 20.
Hautevilles, and this would not change, but only increase, after Roger’s definitive seizing of power in 1140. Fernández-Aceves’ painstaking reconstruction of the reordering of Southern Italian nobility after 1139 shows Roger at his most organised and ruthless: someone no longer willing to brook rebellion. Roger went on a campaign of confiscating and redistributing fiefs, clearly making his presence felt in the Mezzogiorno and ensuring that the message came across that power, now, could only come through the king. For the purposes of this thesis, rather than discussing the larger Rogerian administrative policies in general, I am interested in looking at what they meant for the endurance of Hauteville kin networks, and their power in the South. I have discussed in section 5 of this chapter Roger’s division of the more important titles in the Mezzogiorno among his children; I am persuaded by Fernández-Aceves’ claim that the king meant to divorce the power of the counts from their ancestrally inherited lands, making them dependent on his own grace and favour. To this end, it made sense to distribute the highest titles in the newly-founded kingdom to his sons, in order to spread a close network of control over the entire Mezzogiorno. Roger’s devotion to this project was tested when his son Tancred, prince of Taranto, died: the vacant seat was given to his acknowledged bastard son Simon. A royal bastard was better than others by Roger’s reckoning, something with which his father and brother Jordan might very well have agreed. The dispersal of Hauteville kin continued: now that Guiscard’s direct line had become extinct in Italy, the descendants of Roger I were the main branch of the family, and determined to remain such.

The counts of Principato had remained apparently apparently faithful throughout the rebellion, never being mentioned together with the rebels; the same goes for the counts of Catanzaro. Both preserved their dominions. The county of Conversano, crucial link between

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116 See above.
118 Jamison, ‘Note e documenti’, 451-70; E. Cuozzo, “Milites” e “testes” nella contea normanna di Principato’, Bullettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano, 88 (1979), 121-64.
119 The county of the Principato presents a puzzling issue for what concerns inheritance. Count Nicholas of the Principato, son of William II and grandson of the original William the younger, is attested from 1128, confirming a deathbed donation by his father, who had apparently just died (Cava, F.44.) He was still alive in 1141, having patently survived unscathed the reorganisation of the nobility, as the inhabitants of his lands dated their charters by his reign (Syllabus Graecarum membranarum, ed. by Francisco Trinchera (Naples: J. Cataneo, 1865), n. 132, pp. 174-75. However, in 1143 and 1146 the countess Adelicia of Principato, presumably his wife, was making donations independently (Leone Mattei-Ceresoli, ‘Tramutola’, Archivio Storico per la Calabria e la Lucania, 1943, 32-46, n. 6, pp. 43-44, and n. 8, pp.45-6), which leads us to assume Nicholas had died by this point. In 1141 a William of the Principato, ‘comitis heres et quondam filius [...] germano mio’ was confirming a donation of his brother to the archbishop of Salerno (Pergamene dell’Archivio Diocesano di Salerno (814-1193), ed. by Anna Giordano (Battipaglia: Laveglia and Carlone, 2014), n. 102, pp. 195-99). That William, so confidently declared to be the heir in 1141, did not bear the title in 1143 may suggest that Adelicia successfully kept the title from him and ruled in her own right. She had either died herself or been ousted by 1150, when William was making donations to Venosa as a count
the embattled Abruzzi and the Apulian heartland, was entrusted to Robert of Bassunvilla, husband of Judith, and thus kept in the family. Interestingly, a direct descendant of Geoffrey of Conversano endured: we find Hugh, son of count Robert, holding Fraxinetum and Turi in the 1150s as a royal baron, with a fief of only one knight (with an *augmentum* of one, where the *augmentum* is the additional quantity of knights to be provided by a fief in case of war). The small holding was near Bari, which shows Hugh being not far from his more powerful ancestors’ stomping grounds; it is to be wondered whether he had not received this at his father’s death, the way Robert of Montescaglioso’s children had received their own small holdings, discussed in chapter 3. Hugh is never mentioned in the sources; a very minor nobleman, he appears to have remained aloof from his uncles’ rebellions and to have sat them all out. He may well have accepted Roger’s rule, and have been left alone by him. The family endured in Turi, and by the end of the twelfth century John, son of Hugh’s son Thomas, was simply a justiciar, and the last offshoot of the once powerful Conversano branch of the Hautevilles had sunk into obscurity.

As he stood in 1140, Roger II had achieved both kingship, complete overlordship over Mezzogiorno and Sicily, and had made overtures on the other side of the Mediterranean. He had only failed in extending his claim over Antioch as well, and while William of Tyre credited to indignation on behalf of his repudiated mother his refusal to ever go on crusade, it is easy to see how instead it was the frustration of his designs for the Principality of Antioch that pushed him against succouring the kingdom of Jerusalem that had rejected him. The final act of the breakdown of Hauteville kin was not just finally ceasing to forgive them; but also, and most importantly, putting them on the same plane as the rest of the aristocracy. As Roger became king and swept the board clean, as he acquired a royal chancery and accoutrements modelled on those of the Fatimid court, the message seemed clear: while the Hautevilles may have begun their bid on the South as a structured but unsophisticated warband, in which alliance and hierarchy were

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(Houben, *Venosa*, n. 128, pp. 361-62). But in 1161, Romuald recorded a William of the Principato as a prisoner in Palermo, the fate usually reserved to those who challenged the king (*Chronicon*, p. 246). I see no reason, given the dates in question, to doubt his identification: it seems that William did something to run afoul of his powerful relatives, and was taken prisoner because of it.

120 For a discussion of the evidence of the reassignment of the title of Count of Conversano, see Houben, Roger II of Sicily, n. 17, p. 67.


122 *Catalogus Baronum*, n. 10, p. 5; Cuozzo, in *Commentario*, n. 10, p. 8, asserts that Hugh is in fact the son of Robert, camerarius of the count of Conversano; however, the charter he quotes in support of this (*Codice Diplomatico Barese, V*, n. 133, pp. 232-4 (March 1174)) clearly identifies ‘Ugo de Fraxinito f. iamdici comitis Roberti et pater ipsius Thomasi’, a son of the aforementioned count Robert. So while Cuozzo is right in describing the descendence of Hugh as his son Thomas, and his grandsons John the Justiciar, they are the descendants of Robert of Conversano; for the *augmentum* see Evelyn M. Jamison, ‘Additional Work on the *Catalogus Baronum*’, *Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo*, 83 (1971), 1-63, pp. 36-8.

123 See pp. 71-2.


125 WT, 11.29, pp. 541-3.
determined, among others, by military might, Roger sought to establish a kingdom in which power was locked firmly into the hands of his own, victorious branch, and faithful kinsmen were rewarded but kept out of titles reserved for the king and his more immediate family, thus making a firm distinction between the nuclear family and the larger kin which had not heretofore been seen among the Hautevilles. While Robert Guiscard had relied equally on his son Bohemond and his nephew Robert of Loritello, Roger II was clearly intentioned to lock power into the hands of his direct descendants. As described above, Roger’s plan for monopolising the greater titles of the South failed. Bad luck had meant that three out of four of his legitimate sons had died; duke Roger had left behind two bastard sons, Tancred of Lecce and William, and at the coming to power of William I his bastard half-brother Simon held Taranto and Bari. The Hauteville family had ceased to live up to his previous extraordinary fertility, but not to its old kinship tricks: William’s kingship would be troubled by the rebellions prepared by his relatives, no better identified than ‘consanguineos’, as the breakdown of the clan and the affirmation of one branch of them could not hold back the admission of the rest, and Robert of Bassunvilla’s son was himself a conspirator.

While he was not the bloodthirsty tyrant of Falco’s imagination, Roger had eventually succeeded in isolating his own immediate family from the rest of the kin, clinching its victory for his lifetime. The breakdown of this peace at his son’s accession showed that one thing would never change in the Hauteville family tree, however brutally it was cut back: the appetite for rebellion, especially now that, thanks to Roger, a crown could be its reward.

7. Conclusion

This chapter has reached the end of the timespan selected by this thesis for the examination of Hauteville kin relations, and so terminated the analysis of their dynamics with the brisk change of pace and apparent breakdown of family obligations under Roger II’s prolonged takeover. I have been keen, however, to stress a reading of Roger’s power as rooted within the kin relations he had inherited from his father, even if with the fundamental innovations and changes brought about by his mother’s Adelaide lengthy and successful rule. Because of this, I have examined Roger’s acquisition of power chronologically, and lent space to his innovations in military and administrative matters, as well as his important relationship with his maternal kin, seeking to achieve a rounded picture of Roger’s successful trajectory from count of Sicily to king of the entire South. The chapter’s interest, however, has remained close to the overarching theme of Hauteville kinship, and Roger’s takeover allows us to see the final vestiges of Hauteville reciprocal responsibility and forgiveness, especially remarkable given that Roger had had no occasion to form

126 For William, the illegitimate son of Duke Roger, see Houben, Roger II of Sicily, p. 88.
127 Romuald, Chronicon, p. 257; Hugo Falcandus, De rebus circa regni, ch. 7-10, pp. 70-80.
with his continental kin the kind of personal relationship which had coloured Guiscard and Roger I’s dealings with them. Moreover, many of Roger’s attempts at expanding his own territory were not primarily rooted in wars of conquest, but rather in his attempt at capitalising on Hauteville inheritance from Apulia to Antioch, re-iterating for a final time the closely interconnected mechanisms of Hauteville succession. With Roger’s final seizure of power and redistribution of titles in the South we see, at last, the establishment of the descendants of Roger of Sicily as the dominant force in the Mezzogiorno, and the relegation of the rest of the Hauteville clan to the level of the aristocracy, no longer entitled to the privileged mechanisms which had safeguarded rebellious relatives in the past. Thus at the moment in which a member of the Hauteville clan triumphed, the family itself appears to have lost the close connection and firm sense of itself as a unit that had marked its expansion and existence for the previous hundred years in the South.

Despite this breakdown in family relations, however, the trajectory of the Hautevilles as seen from the moment of Roger’s coronation, from their beginnings as landless knights who were part of the Norman wave of invasion of Southern Italy in the 1030s and ‘40s, to their establishment as kings of Sicily and princes of Antioch a century later, is extraordinary. Their importance means that a great number of documents has survived for them; that they left testimony of their relationships and sense of kin in media ranging from architecture, to literature, to material culture. This has made an investigation of their kin structures and family evolution an uneven but altogether wide-ranging and layered pursuit. The Hautevilles, however, despite their success and omnipresence, were by no means the only Norman kin network active in the South. In the following chapter, therefore, I will compare and contrast their kin mechanisms and patterns of behaviour with that of other, more sparsely documented and less successful, but no less interesting kin groups in the Mezzogiorno: the princes of Capua, related to the Hauteville but independent from them, and the ‘sons of Amicus’, the no-better specified but fundamentally important group which animated resistance against Guiscard. In doing so I shall seek to contextualise, normalise and review the Hauteville achievement, and see them not as an isolated and extraordinary clan, but rather as an exceptionally successful but still contextual member of the Norman wave in the South.
Chapter 6

Other Kin Groups

6.1 Introduction

The Hauteville case study in the South is unique in many ways: no other family was as successful in establishing its dominance, nor as sheerly numerous. At the same time however as the Hautevilles are both the most successful and best documented Norman kin group in the South, they were hardly alone or unique in their family patterns of behaviour and kin dynamics, even though their territorial expansion and number of family members allowed them exceptional scope and variety for them to play out. Because of this, it is useful to contextualise the Hautevilles, first within the larger group of the Normans in the South, then among the wider Norman expansion in Europe, seeing both how their family dynamics sat among their peers in Italy and how they were perceived abroad. This chapter in particular will focus on two Norman kins in the South: the princes of Capua and the ‘sons of Amicus’ group.

These two families were chosen for several reasons: they were both very successful, quite well-documented kin groups, they both played an important role in the Norman expansion in the South, and, like the Hautevilles, they either reached or at least aimed for the highest roles in the hierarchy of the Normans in the Mezzogiorno, thus making their behaviour more easily comparable to the Hautevilles’ methods of conquest and mechanisms of family cooperation. This has meant excluding from the comparison other Norman kin groups which are as interesting, but not as immediately similar in profile to the Hautevilles: for example the San Severino clan. The San Severino only achieved comital rank in the 1150s: before that, they were a clan of second-rank barons in the Campania, though notably they witnessed Jordan of Nocera’s oath of non-aggression against Cava in 1111. However intriguing, the San Severino’s more obscure origins do not offer a fully satisfactory term of comparison. In a different way, the study of other prominent Norman families, such as the Mortains or the de Grandmesnils, would have meant instituting a skewed comparison with the Hautevilles.

The de Grandmesnils in particular constitute a fascinating case: when considered with the extended Giroie kin group into which they married, they form an ample network of Norman operators, several of whom were active in Italy. I have discussed Robert de Grandmesnil, with his...
sister Judith and their brother Arnold, and their careers in Calabria and Sicily; William de Grandmesnil, who married Mabilia, Guiscard’s ambitious daughter, was their nephew.\(^3\) William of Montreuil, who will be discussed in this chapter, himself a complex character, first married into the kin group of the princes of Capua, and then rebelled against them, and he was a cousin of the de Grandmesnils, give that his aunt, Hawisa, had mothered both Robert, Judith, and William’s father Hugh; his brother Arnauld d’Echaufflour also went South temporarily while in exile.\(^4\) Doubtlessly, the Giroie-De Grandmesnils are both an intriguing and complex kin group: Hagger has written about the quantity, quality and fluidity of the kin relations of Hugh de Grandmesnil (Robert’s brother and William’s father), and the ways the kin group’s interests were divided between Normandy, England and the South.\(^5\) Indeed, the way Robert de Grandmesnil (son of William de Grandmesnil and Guiscard’s daughter Mabilia) easily told Roger II that, because his Southern Italian fief was insufficient for his needs, he would ‘terrae consanguineorum meorum pergam’, return to the lands of his kinsmen, seems to suggest a rather unique enduring closeness within the De Grandmesnil kin group.\(^6\) The very complexity of the de Grandmesnil-Giroie kin group, and the variety of reasons for which they went South (aggrandisement, marriage, and exile, the latter a complex question when it comes to the Normans, and which will be further discussed in the next chapter) mean that they would need to be examined on their own terms, as they stand rather uniquely in the panorama of Norman kins in the South; something which makes Thomas’s assertion that the de Grandmesnils bear witness to the possibility of enduring, close contact with Normandy problematic.\(^7\) In choosing to which kin groups to compare the Hautevilles, a choice was made within this thesis in order to select the most useful terms of comparisons, thus excluding no less interesting family networks, which require independent, and in-depth, treatment.

Moreover, looking at the princes of Capua allows us to question another important issue which has been pursued throughout the preceding chapters: how should we define the edges of Hauteville kin, and how was belonging or not to the clan determined? The princes of Capua had

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\(^3\) See pp. 125, 106; Jamison posits that William fled Southern Italy and sought refuge with the Byzantines, with whom he was already at the time of the First Crusade (\textit{Annae Comnenae Alexias}, 11.5-6, pp. 335-42); after the crusade, apparently having been pardoned, he returned to Southern Italy (Jamison, ‘Some Notes’, pp. 199-200). While as we will see just below his son was not happy with their patrimony, it remains remarkable, and another sign of Hauteville family policies, that he had a fief to return to at all.


\(^6\) AT, I.17, pp. 15-6

\(^7\) Thomas, \textit{Jeux Lombards}, p.465.
married into the Hautevilles; the sons of Amicus are described at least once as kin, and so are the Buonalbergos, the comital kin group to which Guiscard’s first wife belonged. How did the Hauteville kin end? Before observing the princes of Capua and sons of Amicus in comparison to the Hautevilles, this chapter will deal with this question.

6.2 Capua, Amicus, Buonalbergo: A Hauteville Super-Kin?

The Hautevilles’ ability to maintain a vast and intricate network of relationships with their kinsmen makes it difficult to define in which circumstances somebody who was quite closely related to them did not appear to belong to the network at all. This is, in fact, the case with the princes of Capua. With the counts of Conversano we saw how Hauteville kinship could and did extend in the female line as well: Geoffrey, the son of a sister of Guiscard, benefited from the advantages of being acknowledged as part of the group, including repeated forgiveness in the face of his continuous rebellions.\(^8\) What is more, as shown in the previous chapter, Roger II himself, even while lacking the kind of personal relationship that might have explained otherwise his patience with the Conversano brothers, still thought of them as family close enough to warrant repeated forgiveness.\(^9\)

The princes of Capua were related to the Hautevilles in the same degree as the counts of Conversano. They descended from Richard of Aversa, the powerful Norman warrior to whom Amatus of Montecassino dedicated an equal number of chapters as Guiscard in his *Ystoire*, thus showing his importance, and Fressenda, presumably a daughter of Tancred of Hauteville’s homonymous second wife.\(^10\) Guiscard, however, did not have with Jordan, Richard’s child, the kind of close cooperation he enjoyed with Robert of Loritello; nor was he engaged with him in the sort of wayward succession of rapprochements and flare-ups that kept him involved with Geoffrey of Conversano through the 1070s.\(^11\) While Amatus openly shows that the two are closely related, Jordan’s policies appear to be untied from those of Guiscard, making him unique among his nephews. A first and self-evident reason of this is the importance of Jordan’s kin, and the different sets of prerogatives it granted him, and priorities it set for him. As seen in chapter 4, there was a sharp difference between the children of Hauteville women who had married above and those who had married below their family status, with marriages of useful men on the ground who became part of the Hauteville enterprises producing children who remained associated to the Hautevilles, and more prestigious marriages giving out offspring which was no longer considered as part of Hauteville family policies.\(^12\) As we shall see below, prince Richard was part of a kin group that had

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\(^8\) See chapter 3.
\(^9\) See chapter 5.
\(^11\) See chapter 3.
\(^12\) See chapter 4.
been established in the South for longer than the Hautevilles, and throughout his career he can be considered Guiscard’s equal. While the Hautevilles’ fortunes soared after the achievement of ducal status, as we shall discuss below, when Richard married Fressenda the Hautevilles were still up-and-coming in the South, and might well be said to have married a little above their status, into a kin group with clearly defined and more firmly established territorial interests. In this context, it makes sense that Richard’s son and heir would not have the relationship with Guiscard his other nephews had. Where Abelard challenged Guiscard for supremacy, Richard the Seneschal owed him his advancement, Robert of Loritello enjoyed with him a close and mutually rewarding cooperation, and Geoffrey of Conversano fought with him to maintain his independence and attempt to expand his reach, Jordan of Capua and his descendants were simply not dependent on his favour to the same extent.

Throughout my thesis I have underlined how, while emotional bonds were often implied in family relations, an overlap of the practical and the emotional seems to underwrite many of the Hauteville family relations. Where all his other nephews, and the branches of the family descended from them, simply could not avoid closely interacting with Guiscard and his descendants, the princes of Capua were not in the same situation, and while the family relation was known at least into the second generation, this did not integrate them into the kin group to the same extent as their cousins. This seems to have been acknowledged to an extent by Roger II, as argued in chapter 5: his offer to forgive Robert II of Capua once more in 1135 hints that he recognised that his power and title were not dependent on ducal and then royal favour in the way that those of nominal vassals like the counts of Conversano was.

Another crucial practical factor in this is geography. We have seen how one’s zone of influence could determine to a large extent one’s possibilities: the counts of the Principato, well-entrenched in the heartlands of ducal power, were reduced to effective subjection by the 1100s; the conquest of isolated Sicily had laid the foundations for the independence of Roger and his son Roger II; the counts of Conversano thrived on gnawing at the edges of ducal power in Northern Apulia; while the counts of Loritello ruled, in nominal subjection but with effective ample degrees of independence, in the troubled Abruzzi. The princes of Capua, on the edge of a peaceful region such as the Campania, turned their policies North to the papacy, then within their own borders as their influence waned, as we shall see below; while this still did bring them in contact with their Hauteville relatives, as we shall see below, they also had ample scope for very personal policies.

This brings us to one final, less easily defined but no less influential factor: personal relations and their continuity. With Geoffrey of Conversano living until 1100, and his sons being active up until the 1130s, there were only two generations between the daughter of Tancred who had given birth to the comital branch and the extinction of its influence.13 Geoffrey had dealt with Guiscard

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13 See chapter 3.
first, his son Borsa later, and Robert, Alexander and Tancred had endured throughout the reigns of Borsa, William, and finally Roger II. This meant a very coherent and close-knit, easily recognisable branch of the family, with only two, uncontested, successions. Relationships between the reigning count of Conversano and the rest of the family were both clear and enduring in time. Things were really quite different with the princes of Capua. As we shall see below, the line of the princes of Capua was plagued by early deaths, minority reigns, and complex succession disputes. Jordan I died in 1090; two more generations of princes of Capua separated him from Robert II. It is hardly surprising that it would have been difficult to cultivate an enduring relationship with such a fragmentary line; and while Borsa and Roger I, as we shall see below, did once intervene in the affairs of Capua and obtained nominal overlordship of it, soon the relationship was diluted. If therefore for a series of practical reasons we can see how the princes of Capua, who were as closely related to the Hautevilles as the counts of Conversano, came not to be included in the kin group dynamics and can therefore for all intents and purposes be studied and considered as a separate kin, we have to consider another possibility before moving on: that they were not the only competing kin group which was in fact related to the Hautevilles.

William of Apulia says that Peter, son of Amicus, was ‘consanguinitate propinquus’ to Drogo and Humphrey. This is mentioned in an off-hand way, and not apparently considered in the charters; so we cannot establish for him the same certain degree of kinship as for the princes of Capua. We must also consider that the vagueness of the term allows us to imagine a very loose and very tangential relationship, which makes the exclusion of Peter from the close-knit band of brothers the sons of Tancred constituted unsurprising. We know absolutely nothing of the kin of either Tancred of Hauteville himself, or those of either of his wives: it is perfectly possible that Peter was indeed distantly related to them, some sort of cousin whose degree of relation was known well-enough to be included in such a work, but not so close that they were actively part of Hauteville family life. While Peter, as we shall see below, did attempt to succeed William Iron-arm as military leader of the Normans in the South, he appears to have done so by attempting to gain popular support, rather than on the basis of any relationship. This would be hardly surprising even if the two had been related: Drogo gained the succession by rounding on Peter with the help of Humphrey and by having long been associated to William’s command, not by sheer virtue of his being William’s brother, even if his close association with him originated in their relationship. While it is interesting to suppose that the third most successful and ambitious Norman kin group in the South was also related to the Hautevilles, the relationship was either effectively non-existent, fruit of one chronicler’s misinformation or mistake, or so slight that it did not influence the two kin groups’ relationship to each other.

14 WA, II, line 29, p. 132.
15 See chapter 1.
One final case is that of the Buonalbergos. I have discussed the kin group before, as it was to
the Buonalbergos that Alberada, Guiscard’s first wife and Bohemond’s mother, belonged. Here the
kinship seems to have been acknowledged by the church: it was in virtue of their marriage being
within the forbidden degrees of consanguinity that Guiscard obtained release from it. The timely
discovery of this in close proximity to the high-profile marriage with Sichelgaita, however, makes
us suspicious that this was true; in the eleventh century, as well, marriages were not yet clearly
regulated in canon law, making annulment an easy possibility for divorce. Amatus tells us that it
was Gerard of Buonalbergo who approached Guiscard, offering him his aunt as his wife, when the
latter was still abandoned by his brothers. Given Guiscard’s precocious military exploits, it is very
possible to conjecture that Gerard was trying to gain to his family cause the services of a landless
and unsupported but promising young knight; much as the Hauteville themselves would later offer
their women in marriage to local men who were not necessarily powerful, but were certainly useful
to their cause. Is it possible that Gerard was not simply another local Norman nobleman who had
come to know of Guiscard, but that he was in fact related to him, and this constituted the first link
between them? McDougal’s recent study on the matter of illegitimacy and the dissolution of
marriage shows that church intervention in such matters was mostly in response to a query from the
laity, not fruit of an independent investigation: it is therefore possible to posit that Gerard, related
in some degree to Guiscard, may have used this connection to make the first overture; and that then
the link was conveniently brought to the attention of the church authorities when the marriage itself
was no longer useful. I have described before how Guiscard remained in excellent relations with
his previous in-laws: Alberada was eventually buried in Venosa with him, their son Bohemond was
closely associated to his father throughout his life, the Buonalbergos continued to witness
Guiscard’s charters, and Gerard of Buonalbergo is probably to be identified with the ‘fidissimus
amicus Gerardus’ to whom, jointly with Robert of Loritello, Guiscard entrusted the succession of
Roger Borsa should he fail to return from his Balkan expedition. The term ‘amicus’ is ambiguous;
it can bear the meaning of ‘relative’, but it is by far not the most common. In general, I would take
it to express a relationship of great closeness, since it is striking that William of Apulia, who is not
usually shy about describing blood-relation, should choose it. The impression one gains is that
Gerard and Guiscard may just have been cousins in some distant degree; but after years of close
cooperation, their relationship was defined by their political and military alliance, not any blood
relation.

16 AM, IV.18, p. 362.
17 McDougall, Royal Bastards, pp. 97-9, 130-4.
18 AM, III.11, pp. 316-7.
20 WA, IV, lines 190-200, p. 214.
The way people who were in fact related to the Hautevilles were not part of the family dynamics confirms one of the trends identified throughout the first five chapters of this thesis: kinship as defined not only by blood, but also by a complex intersection of practicality and circumstance. All this, as we can see, held true for another kin group: the princes of Capua. Given the smallness of the Capuan kin as compared to the Hautevilles, and the quick successions and early deaths which often plagued them, their discussion will by necessity have to be chronological at the same time as analytical; this is not done, however, in pursuit of a narrative of the family’s fortunes, but rather as the best method to chart their troubled evolution through the years.

6.3 The Princes of Capua

a. Five Brothers

The origins of the princes of Capua are similar to those of the Hautevilles in one striking detail: both kin groups first made their entrance in Southern Italy as a group of brothers. Where however Malaterra shows the Hautevilles to be frankly ambitious for the glory accumulated by the Normans in the South, and if William and Drogo took part in the 1038 Sicilian expedition they must have been in Italy by the mid-30s, the brothers who would originate the princes of Capua dynasty first appeared earlier, and their coming was motivated by personal issues.22 Gilbert, one of the brothers, had killed a hunting companion of the duke; he fled to Southern Italy in 1016, and he was accompanied there by four brothers, Rudolph, Rainulf, Osmund, and Ascleltin.23 Here we may see implied that confluence of practical and emotional which we have seen underwrite so many Hauteville family transactions: the killing may have been both a stain on the family which made the other brothers also feel unwelcome in Normandy, but we may additionally see them wishing to not let their brother go alone. It is possible that the kin group was known by a family name: Orderic Vitalis says that Rainulf was a son of Ascleltin of Quarrel, while Rainulf used the nickname or surname of Drengot in Southern Italy, and, according to Leo of Ostia, Gilbert used Botanicus as surname, and he used Buatere according to Amatus.24 If these names had been of common use in Normandy, however, they did not catch on in the South: we find no later member of the kin group using them later, as the Hautevilles had done, and the kin group as a whole is not known by it, as the Hautevilles were by their rarely used but nonetheless later famous placename. This thesis, therefore, will refer to the kin group as princes of Capua, going by their later and best-known title.

22 See chapter 1.
23 AM, I.20, p. 255; in Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, II.56 Osmund is indicated as the murderer instead.
24 Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, II.58, 98; Chronicon Casinensis, II.27, p. 239; AM, I.20, p. 255.
The success of the kin group rested with Asclettin and Rainulf, who endured in the South with great success. Rainulf became the leader of a band of the Normans in the South. Success came to him when, following a pattern later undertaken by the Hautevilles, he joined his fortunes to those of local Lombard noblemen. He entered the service of Sergius, duke of independent Naples, who compensated him with the county of Aversa in 1030 and the hand of his sister in marriage. This made Rainulf one of the first Normans to establish a territorial lordship in the South, which means that by the time the Hautevilles first came Italy he was already entrenched there. Rainulf seems to have acted independently of his brother Asclettin: the latter would have to wait until the mid 1040s, with the division among twelve Norman leaders which provided William Iron-arm with his own land, and made him lord of Acerenza. While this seems to tell us that after their first descent South the kin group had not operated as a whole, a second look is important. While certainly Asclettin and Rainulf do not seem to have stuck together as William Iron-arm and Drogo did, their circumstances were also radically different: they probably did not have the same chances to help each other as the Hautevilles had possessed, just like Drogo had not been able to give Guiscard any land when he first came South. Family co-operation hinged crucially on circumstance, and both Rainulf and Asclettin probably simply took whatever best was going.

Rainulf’s title to Aversa was recognised by emperor Conrad II in 1038. As a vassal of Guaimar, Rainulf also briefly ruled Gaeta, bearing the title of duke. Despite being at this point much more powerful than the rest of the Normans, Rainulf did not turn on them: he provided troops at Olivento against the Byzantines in 1041, and in 1042, as mentioned above, his brother received Acerenza from the division of previously Byzantine territories. At the same time Rainulf received Siponto in Apulia: his ability to hold onto territory so far from his powerbase bespeaks his trust in his fellow Normans and his good relationship with them. The first member of the kin group to establish himself in Southern Italy, he does not seem to have acted in concert with his relatives; but the bases of the power he laid served them well.

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25 We are unsure of what happened to the rest of the brothers. Gilbert is last heard from in 1022, in service of Melos (Chronicon Casinensis, II.41, pp. 245-6). For a documentary discussion of the family, Ménager, Inventaire, pp. 323-4.
26 WA, I, lines 125-8, p. 106.
27 AM, I, 41-2, p. 266.
28 Errico Cuozzo, ‘Intorno alla prima contea normanna nell’Italia meridionale’, in Cavalieri alla conquista del Sud: Studi sull’Italia normanna in memoria di Léon-Robert Ménager, ed. by Errico Cuozzo (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1998), pp. 171-93, makes a compelling argument for Ariano, which was eventually under the control of the Buonalbergo kin group, to have been the first Norman county chronologically, but he still underlines the fundamental importance of Aversa, thus stressing the input of the kin group discussed here (‘Intorno alla prima contea’, pp. 178-81).
29 AM, II.30, p. 294.
30 See chapter 1.
31 AM, II.6, pp. 274-5.
32 AM, II.31, pp. 294-6.
33 AM, II.18, p. 281; 31, pp. 294-6; GM, I.9.
34 AM, II.29, p. 293.
b. Richard and Jordan: Princes of Capua

Rainulf left behind no issue that we know of when he died in 1045. This left the succession at his death open to a complex situation. He was succeeded as count of Aversa by his nephew Asclettin, homonymous son of his brother Asclettin, which shows how for the princes of Capua, as well, nephews could be practical heirs; Asclettin was elected by his fellow Normans as count, but could not gain Gaeta, whose inhabitants called the Lombard Atenulf of Aquino to rule them.³⁵ Crowning an eventful year, a few months into his rule Asclettin died, also without issue.³⁶ What happened next testifies to two things: the importance of horizontal kinship among the Normans in the South, and the bad luck of the princes of Capua at the inception of their power. Rainulf Trincanocte, Asclettin’s cousin, took over from him.³⁷ We do not know who Rainulf was son of, just that he was a nephew of Rainulf I by one of his brothers.³⁸ He had the approval of the population, and must therefore have demonstrated the military prowess needed at this time to rule over the Normans. He was elected above the candidate chosen by Guaimar IV of Salerno, showing the degree of Norman independence; in 1047 his titles were confirmed by Emperor Henry III at the same time as those of count Drogo.³⁹

If however Trincanocte appears to have been a shrewd and effective operator, his power was threatened when, in 1045, the younger Asclettin’s brother Richard came from France with forty knights.⁴⁰ Richard would live until 1078: it is just possible that he was fathered by Asclettin before he left for Italy in 1016.⁴¹ This would mean, however, that unlike the Hautevilles he had not come to Italy as soon as he had become of age, but that he had only descended into Italy once a mature man. Lie is given to this fact by his having two further brothers: Rolon, later count of Monte Sant’Angelo, and Rainulf, who died in 1088 and would have therefore been an extremely ancient man by this point.⁴² Either the line of Asclettin was quite long-lived, or his second-born was born in Italy and returned in Normandy for a time; something just about possible given the exchange with Normandy discussed in chapters 1 and 2, but not really attested otherwise.⁴³ Richard is described as a striking, handsome, showy man by Amatus, who depicts him as a tall man who rode a horse small enough for his feet to touch the ground.⁴⁴ Popular and well-liked, Richard was

³⁵ AM, II.31, pp. 294-6; Chronicon Casinensis, II.74, pp. 314-6.
³⁶ AM, II.32, p. 296.
³⁷ AM, II.33, pp. 296-8.
³⁸ AM, II.35, pp. 299-300.
³⁹ AM, II.32, p. 296; III.2, pp. 311-2.
⁴⁰ AM, II.43, pp. 305-6.
⁴¹ AM, VIII.35, p. 509.
⁴² Loud, Age of Guiscard, Table V, p.303.
⁴³ See chapter 1 and 2.
⁴⁴ AM, II.43, pp. 305-6.
perceived as a threat by Trincanocte, who asked him to leave. This Richard did, gaining service with Humphrey of Hauteville. Amatus shows Humphrey treating him well: Richard, after all, came with his own armed band, and unlike his troublesome brother Guiscard, he appears to have given Humphrey no problems. It is significant that it was Richard’s popularity, rather than his relationship to Asclettin, that Trincanocte seems to have feared: with the rapid succession of related, but not closely associated, men Aversa had experienced, it seems closeness of blood was less important than the ability to gain necessary votes from the local Normans.

Because of circumstance, the princes of Capua appear to have had a looser kin group than the Hautevilles: the natural warband of the sons of Muriella did not occur among them. As Jordan, the son of Richard and Fressenda of Hauteville, was old enough to fight in Aquino on his own in 1066, he must have been born in the 1040s: given that Richard was later imprisoned for a while, this suggests that Richard was immediately married to Fressenda.45 This, in its own turn, suggests that she was already in Italy and available for marriage; it is possible, as discussed in chapter 1, that the Hautevilles had already decided on a family policy of having their sisters marry useful men on the ground, and since they had acquired landholdings their position was stable enough to ask their sisters to join them.46 Richard was invited to take over the town of Genzano, which his brother Asclettin had ruled, by its inhabitants; plundering from this base he was successful enough that Trincanocte attempted to make peace with Richard by giving him a grant of land, apparently unable to reject his cousin as Drogo had done with Guiscard when he had become bothersome.47 However, when Richard became a nuisance to Drogo, the Hauteville count did not show him the patience he had shown his own brother, imprisoning him.48 Repeated forgiveness was only reserved for Hautevilles, and so early in the conquest, and despite his marriage to Fressenda, Richard definitely did not rate as one.

Richard’s kin group, however, was the saving of him when Trincanocte died in 1048, leaving behind a child, Herman, as heir. Initially, the regency was held by a William Bellabocca, whom the Montecassino chronicle calls ‘de cognatione Tancredi’, of the kin of Tancred.49 However, the information is not reported elsewhere, and as we have seen above, ‘the kin of Tancred’ could be a loose idea to play with. William was not popular with the Aversans, who threw him out of the town and asked for the popular Richard instead.50 It is possible indeed that this William might have been some sort of vague Hauteville relation, but Drogo does not appear to have objected too hard when Guaimar asked him for the release of Richard, setting him up as regent as the closest unemployed

45 AM, IV.11, pp. 357-8.
46 See chapter 1.
47 AM, II.44, pp. 306-7.
48 AM, III.12, p. 317.
49 Codice Diplomatico normanno di Aversa, ed. by Alfonso Gallo (Naples: Luigi Lubrano Editore, 1926), n. 47, pp. 395-6; Chronicon Casinensis, II.66, pp. 298-301.
50 Chronicon Casinensis, II.66, pp. 298-301.
relative of the defunct Rainulf, so if William was indeed one of the Hautevilles, the other Hautevilles do not seem to have set much store by the fact, and we do not find him again. Once more, the princes of Capua appear to have only rarely had the chance to develop close familial relationships: while ruling might come their way on the nominal strength of someone of their blood having reigned over a certain city, they did not at this stage belong to a well-organised network among which titles and land were distributed. Richard accepted the charge of Herman; but the child is to be heard of no more after 1050. It is possible the child was murdered; it is equally or more possible that he simply died, as many children died at the time (as Simon brother of Roger II, and John brother of Bohemond II, would die later). It is impossible to assess this. It is certain that by 1050 Herman had disappeared, and in 1053 Richard was fighting with his fellow Normans at Civitate as count.

With Richard Aversa found the stability it had lacked in the quick succession of Rainulf I, Asclettin, Rainulf II, and Herman. Amatus dedicates as much space to Richard’s enterprises as to Guiscard’s in his Ystoire: considering he was both a protector of Montecassino and a threat to it, this is hardly surprising. An enterprising man, Richard conquered Capua from the Lombard Landulf in 1058; having attempted to gain back Gaeta from marriage between his daughter and its heir, he saw the plan fail when the child died before the marriage could be celebrated. Having regained all the titles born by Rainulf I, he also took a leaf out of his family practices, having his son Jordan marry Gaitelgrima, a sister of Sichelgaita (thus Guiscard and Jordan were both uncle and nephew, and brothers-in-law, in the kind of tangle that might make later medieval canonists blanch). Being Guiscard’s brother in law did not stop Richard from supporting Abelard’s rebellion in 1071; and the two were not reconciled until 1076.

Richard, however, had problems with his own family. His son-in-law, William of Montreuil, rebelled against him, despite having been hand-picked by Richard, adopted, and put in command of newly acquired Gaeta in 1063. William tried to put aside his wife, Richard’s daughter, but found himself unsupported and outsmarted by Richard, who, however, took him back when William asked for forgiveness, much as Roger II would later do with Rainulf of Caiazzo. Showing exactly
why such forgiveness might be ill-advised, William rebelled again, and Richard, then not yet having broken with Guiscard, called him to help.\textsuperscript{61} Amatus, significantly, stresses that Guiscard wanted to make an example of William for his own men, which leads us to think he was more interested in stability in the Mezzogiorno than in helping out his brother-in-law. Richard appears initially to have thought he could rely on his son. Amatus has him declare that Jordan was his co-ruling prince: the two are attested in charters together from 1058, quite early in Jordan’s life if he was indeed born, as seems likely, in the 1040s.\textsuperscript{62} Where Richard however appears to have thought he could simply rely on his son, the ambitious Jordan had other plans. In a reversal of the patronage of nephews by uncles we have so often seen among the Hautevilles, Jordan conspired with his uncle Rainulf for support in rebelling against his father in 1071, despite having just received Aquino.\textsuperscript{63} The rebellion was put down immediately, but Richard understandably took Aquino away. It is unclear what Jordan hoped to obtain: the fact that he was reconciled suggests that, like the homonymous Jordan of Sicily Jordan of Capua was simply a son too ambitious to bide his time until his father died to seize power and independence, and that as a firstborn he was forgiven and reinstated.\textsuperscript{64} He reacquired Aquino from Montecassino, to which it had been given, on his own strength, demonstrating his effectiveness.\textsuperscript{65} Probably thinking a period away might do him good, Richard sent Jordan to help out Guiscard in Palermo immediately after, but changed his mind and ordered him back.\textsuperscript{66} Jordan defended Lacedonia, near Salerno, from Guiscard, but his cousin Richard of Sant’Angelo was captured and made to swear fealty to Guiscard.\textsuperscript{67}

Jordan, however, was not quite done. 1077 found Jordan disobeying his father again, apparently having claimed Nocera for himself.\textsuperscript{68} Two things happened to bring Jordan in check: first his own men baulked at standing against the prince, and demanded reconciliation, and second Richard appears to have called Guiscard as arbiter. Guiscard’s suggested compromise was that Jordan give Nocera back, but receive instead the county of Marsia in the Abruzzi. Richard seems to have had his hands full with his son, full enough to want Guiscard’s support; Guiscard’s suggested compromise was quite clever, given that the Abruzzi were, as repeatedly stressed, a troubled land, by that point safely in Hauteville hands (nor, as we have seen in chapter 3, were the counts of Loritello displaced from it). Unsurprisingly, however, Jordan did quite well there: plundering on papal property as Robert of Loritello did, he was excommunicated at the same time.\textsuperscript{69} Unwilling to remain under excommunication, Jordan and his uncle Rainulf went together to Rome

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{61} AM, VI.11-2, pp. 425-6; Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, II.58-60, 98.
  \item\textsuperscript{62} AM, VI.1, pp. 415-7; 11, pp. 425-6; Loud, ‘Diplomas of the Norman Princes’, n.1-2, p.119.
  \item\textsuperscript{63} AM, VI.24, pp. 435-6.
  \item\textsuperscript{64} See chapter 2.
  \item\textsuperscript{65} AM, VI.29, p. 438.
  \item\textsuperscript{66} AM, VII.1, p. 442.
  \item\textsuperscript{67} AM, VII.5, pp. 445-6.
  \item\textsuperscript{68} AM, VII.33, pp. 470-2.
  \item\textsuperscript{69} Loud, The Latin Church in Norman Italy, p.73.
\end{itemize}
in 1078 to obtain forgiveness from the papacy.\textsuperscript{70} (Once Jordan was prince, he and Roger Borsa first supervised the election of Desiderius of Montecassino as pope in Capua in 1086, then a year later Jordan marched with his army on Rome to install his chosen pontifex, briskly improving family relations with the Holy See.)\textsuperscript{71} It is possible that having his excommunication lifted may have been another gambit on the part of the ambitious Jordan to gain the upper-hand over his father, but later in the same year Richard fell ill and died before he and Jordan could quarrel again, and Jordan succeeded.\textsuperscript{72} Jordan continued making a team with his uncle Rainulf. Rainulf does not bear a title in Amatus of Montecassino’s chronicle, which suggests he was made count of Caiazzo by his nephew himself. The two fought together against Guiscard in 1079; another of the rebels was Henry of Monte Sant’Angelo, a grandson of Rolon, Richard I’s brother.\textsuperscript{73} The fact that Jordan himself had fought in the Abruzzi, and that the area of interest of Henry of Monte Sant’Angelo overlapped with that Robert of Loritello, may bring us to make an unsupported but feasible hypothesis: that Jordan and Rainulf helped Henry fight in the hope of unseating the counts of Loritello and gaining control over the frontier Abruzzi. Unwilling to submit to his father, Jordan appears to have been more than able of forming fruitful alliances with the rest of his kin.

Either way, Jordan was clearly not fighting Guiscard as a form of embattled negotiation: while his nephew, he had his own title, land, and a paternal kin he had chosen to rely on instead. He was able to make his own brother and uncle counts. There was nothing Guiscard could give Jordan the way he had endowed and advanced Richard the Seneschal or Robert of Loritello; and Jordan had clearly grown up without knowing him, in another demonstration that kinship could rely heavily on circumstance. And unlike Geoffrey of Conversano, Jordan of Capua could not be tamed. Geoffrey Malaterra comments, half-admiringly, that despite Jordan being Guiscard’s nephew the duke never could obtain his submission.\textsuperscript{74} The two were opposed again when Jordan supported the emperor against the pope in 1082.\textsuperscript{75} Guiscard raised an army and marched on Aversa and Capua, but Jordan’s ability in battle forced him to retire without further gains made. Probably hoping to benefit in case he succeeded to the duchy of Apulia, according to Orderic Vitalis Jordan backed Bohemond against Borsa in the 1080s, but could not beat Roger I.\textsuperscript{76} Orderic Vitalis plays up their family relation, but Orderic Vitalis is quite a dramatic writer: Jordan, ambitious enough to oppose

\begin{itemize}
  \item AM, VIII. 33, p.508.
  \item AM, VIII.35, p. 509.
  \item Chronicon Casinensis, III.45, pp. 422-4.
  \item GM, IV.26, pp. 104-5.
  \item GM, III.35, p. 78; Chronicon Casinensis, III.50, pp. 430-3.
  \item Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, IV.32, 168. Orderic also seems a little confused about the two’s relationship, calling Jordan first ‘consobrinus’, which he certainly was, and then ‘sororius’, brother-in-law, of Bohemond, which he certainly was not.
\end{itemize}
his own father, probably simply seized every opportunity going to enlarge his area of influence; and Bohemond had clearly offered him a very good occasion for it. Cousin or not, a valid opponent to the duke of Apulia was probably more than welcome to shelter in Capua. If Orderic shows us that the family connection was known, Jordan had every reason to receive Bohemond anyway. It is in any case necessary to raise a flag here: Orderic Vitalis may be making this up. Geoffrey Malaterra, who was writing of Bohemond’s rebellion shortly after it happened, and was well-informed about both Jordan’s rebelliousness, his death and his succession, does not mention the episode, despite the fact that it would fit in well with his portrayal of him; as discussed in chapter 2, Orderic’s dramatic timeline, with Bohemond rebelling immediately after Guiscard’s death, is also misleading, and the episode is to be treated with great caution.\footnote{GM, IV.26, pp. 104-5. It is also interesting to note that Malaterra referred to Jordan as prince of Aversa rather than Capua.}

c. Cousins and Chaos

The final forty years of rule of the kin group in the South were troubled by the kind of pragmatic kin practices accessory to a number of early deaths and complex successions. That Jordan relied on his paternal rather than maternal kin group became evident at his death: the succession of his then-underage son Richard came under the regency of his cousin Robert of Caiazzo, the son of the Rainulf of Caiazzo alongside whom Jordan had repeatedly fought.\footnote{Loud, \textit{Age of Guiscard}, pp.247-8. Another son of Rainulf, Richard, accompanied the Southern Italian expedition on the First Crusade, though unsurprisingly he does not appear to have enjoyed a particularly close relationship with Bohemond and Tancred. For a discussion of his career see Jamison, ‘Some Notes’, pp. 197-8.} Horizontal kin could prove crucial in ensuring vertical succession. This became more evident when the city of Capua rebelled in 1092: Robert managed to gain it back for his cousin briefly in 1093, but it was quickly lost again.\footnote{Regesto di S. Angelo in Formis, ed. by M. Iguanez (Capua: Pubblicazioni Cassinesi, 1925), n. 28, pp. 84-6; \textit{Chronicon Casinensis, IV.10}, pp. 474-5; \textit{Annales Cavenses, ad anno} 1091. The rebellion is discussed at length in Graham A. Loud, \textit{Church and Society in the Norman Principality of Capua, 1058-1197} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp.88-90.} In order to regain Capua Richard had to turn to Roger I of Sicily and Roger Borsa instead: in 1098 the two agreed to help him, Roger I in exchange for Naples, and Borsa in exchange for the submission of Capua.\footnote{GM, IV.26, pp. 104-5.} While Malaterra does mention that Robert had turned to his relatives, his relatives clearly were not going to help him because of blood relation, much as Roger II would do later with the embattled duke William.\footnote{See chapter 5. The two Roger of Sicily do not appear to ever have been of the inclination of giving something for free.} Richard was reinstated by Roger and Borsa; his cousin Robert of Caiazzo was still acknowledging him as overlord in 1105, the year before Richard died, when Richard donated Pontecorvo to Montecassino on his advice and called
him ‘beloved faithful count and relative’, a very explicit declaration of closeness.\textsuperscript{82} Robert would be count in Caiazzo until c.1114: coupled with his extensive donation campaigns, the fact that he adopted altisonant formulas in his charters, such as ‘divina favente potencia Calacianorum atque aliorum multorum comes’ suggests that he acted and considered himself as an independent agent; what is more, his surviving charters imitated the princely style down to the use of a monogram.\textsuperscript{83} That such an ambitious man should preserve nominal vassalage to a weak ruler like Richard seems to bespeak the kind of undocumented but nonetheless binding emotional tie underlined above for the Hautevilles: clearly Robert felt for his cousin, and remained nominally faithful to him even as he failed to regain his duchy for him. Robert of Caiazzo is notable, finally, for the children he fathered: the Rainulf II of Caiazzo who would marry Roger II’s sister Matilda, and lead the aristocratic resistance against him; and a daughter who married duke William of Apulia, crossing again a different branch of the kin group of the princes of Capua with the Hautevilles.\textsuperscript{84}

Yet another prince of Capua to die without issue, Richard II was succeeded by his brother Robert, who had once rebelled against him.\textsuperscript{85} The succession appears to have been contested: the \textit{Annales Cavenses} dramatically report that in 1106 ‘Robertus filius Iordani invasit Capua, et ex parte igne succendit’, that is he invaded it and set part of it on fire.\textsuperscript{86} Information here is scarce: Robert had rebelled, so we might envision that Richard was not that keen on him to succeed, but on the other hand, from the very start the princes of Capua had been succeeded by their relatives even when they did not have the best of relationships. What is more, had Richard wanted to prevent his brother from seizing Capua, we might imagine him tasking Robert of Caiazzo with enforcing his wishes, and this well-publicised count’s intervention to be registered in the sources. What we might suppose is that Capua, long under the rule of a weak prince, might have undergone the kind of civil unrest which often troubled Gaeta, and that some faction within the city may have attempted to prevent Robert son of Jordan from claiming his brother’s title.\textsuperscript{87} Robert was clearly able to make his claim count: but the fact that in April 1106 he still styled himself ‘procurator’ of the city, rather than prince, suggests that he found it convenient or necessary to undergo a period of transition before fully establishing himself there; indeed, in November 1107 he claimed to be in the first year of his rule, and in May 1108, in the second, which dates his accession to the princely title to late 1106/early 1107.\textsuperscript{88} If we are unsure how Robert I obtained rule over Capua, it is a matter of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} ‘Roberti comitis mei dilecti fidelis atque consanguinei’, \textit{Registrum Petri Diaconi}, III.1399-1401.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Romuald, \textit{Chronicon}, p.207.
\item \textsuperscript{85} \textit{Annales Ceccanenses}, year 1105; Romuald of Salerno, \textit{Chronicon}, p. 203.
\item \textsuperscript{86} \textit{Annales Cavenses}, year 1106. Also discussed in Loud, \textit{Church and Society}, p. 92.
\item \textsuperscript{87} The complex fortunes of Gaeta shall be discussed below, pp. 183ff.
\item \textsuperscript{88} \textit{Regestum Neapolitani Archivii Monumenta}, n. 522, pp. 304-5; Loud, ‘Diplomas of the Norman Princes’, n. 88-93, pp. 134-5.
\end{itemize}
discussion whether he considered himself, or was considered, a vassal of the dukes of Apulia too, and therefore whether Richard II’s concession of independence in exchange for Roger’s help did or did not have consequences lasting in time.

On the one hand, Robert was a fairly enterprising ruler, marrying off an unnamed daughter to king Stephen II of Hungary, and bringing back to the family the vacant rule of Gaeta, as I will discuss below. As Stephen was the son of an unnamed daughter of Roger I of Sicily, bride and groom were in fact fourth cousins; it is to be wondered whether the fact was even taken into consideration. Like his father Coloman before him, Stephen may simply have thought of Southern Italy as a good place to source a bride with a good dowry. Robert could thus gain Capua for himself via what looks like a combination of strength and diplomacy, make prestigious international marriages for his daughters, and affirm himself within the traditional family dominions, which suggests he was very much a free agent. However, he did several times interact with the Hautevilles in their area of influence, something which needs to be discussed. In 1114, he was one of the witnesses to Duke William’s donation to Montecassino, together with Count William II of the Principato, whose family was, as discussed in chapter 3, by this point definitely vassal to the dukes. This in itself means nothing more than the two had a good relationship: the princes of Capua had long been closely involved with the abbey, and it would have been unsurprising for the reigning prince to either broker the concession, happen to be at the abbey on business of his own, or to be called upon to witness the exchange as a gesture of goodwill. Then, in 1116, Robert was in Salerno, functioning as a guarantor for Count William II of the Principato’s oath not to harm the abbey of Cava. This again need not imply subjection: Richard I had called on Robert Guiscard to help him settle down Jordan, so duke William may have called on Prince Robert to do the same. But in 1119, an even more explicit, and intriguing exchange took place: Duke William made a grant to Jordan of Nocera, the final son of Jordan I, at Robert’s request. In the charter, Jordan is ‘dilecti consanguinei’, a beloved kinsman, and Robert ‘dilectissimi consanguinei ac baronis nostri’, the most beloved kinsman and baron, that is, quite explicitly, a vassal.

What I would suggest here is two things: one the one hand, that the dukes and the princes kept interacting, with an awareness of their blood relation, and of the submission given by Richard II; on the other, that if the relationship was acknowledged, it also came with a high degree of latitude. Prince Robert and Duke William seem to me to have interacted on a solid basis of quid

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90 See chapter 4 for Roger’s daughters.
pro quo: we see them interacting in occasions of mutual advantage, in cordiality, and William called Robert his baron at the same time as he gave his brother something Robert had asked for. We have seen in chapter 3 that William was unable to keep the Conversanos quiet in Apulia; I find it doubtful to imagine he could have imposed himself by might on the prince of Capua, a man who clearly carried both cachet and personal ability. It is reasonable to suggest, then, that the two had a workable relationship, made of trust and good-will on both parts, and that the bond of submission was only indicated when it benefited them (it made perfect sense for prince Robert to obtain a grant for his brother from an overlord; but on the other hand, when Robert relied on his personal authority to keep Count William quiet, no such thing was mentioned). It seems that the relationship was nebulous, to be negotiated on a case by case basis; its looseness seems to be attested by the matter of Robert’s succession.

Dying in 1120, Robert I left one son, Richard III; the regency fell once more to an uncle, Jordan II (erstwhile count of Nocera), the final son of Jordan I. Once more, the infant died very early, on 10 June 1120, only a week after his father, and was succeeded by his regent.\(^94\) No chronicle suggests foul play: while it is striking that two members of the kin group succeeded through the death of a child, infant mortality was widespread at the time. At no point does duke William appear to have been involved in this; this is hardly surprising, as this was the same year he was involved in the siege of S. Trinità with Constance of France and Tancred of Conversano.\(^95\) Duke William had other things to do, and the princes of Capua were perfectly able to sort themselves out. Jordan II appeared as an effective ruler in Nocera in 1109, we may easily suggest he was born in the 1080s, and he was in his thirties when he succeeded through fortuitous circumstances to the rule of Capua.\(^96\) His time in Nocera was characterised by occasional donations to Cava, and open acknowledgement of his brother as overlord, which suggest he was a faithful member of the family, and was therefore considered a suitable regent at his death.\(^97\) A third son, who came to the principality unexpectedly and in midlife, inheriting a power already on the wane given the numerous occasions for civil unrest and disruption since the time of Richard II, Jordan II’s reign is not especially remarkable: his numerous donations made in Aversa seem to confirm that the princes of Capua had retreated to their most familiar territory; only an 1123 oath to respect the property of Montecassino and the person of its abbot may suggest that Jordan II had tangled with the abbey.\(^98\) When he died, in 1127, he was succeeded without contest by his son Robert II, who as underlined in chapter 5 immediately found himself, not only establishing his power, but also having to pick a side in the chaos following

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\(^94\) *Annales Cavenses*, year 1120.
\(^95\) See p. 74.
\(^96\) *Cava*, E.8, E.9(1109).
\(^97\) Loud, *Diplomas of the Norman Princes*, n. 117, 118, 120 for the donations to Cava; n. 119 for a donation made, respectfully, in 1113 with the consent of his brother and overlord, pp.138-9.
\(^98\) For donations to Capua, see Loud, *Diplomas of the Norman Princes*, n. 124, 126, 132, 133, pp.139-40; for his dealings with Montecassino, n.131, p.140.
the death of duke William and Roger II’s bid for power. The fact that Roger II, as discussed in chapter 5, definitely seemed to feel that Robert II’s rule rested on a more independent basis than that of the other noblemen who’d rebelled against him, seems to suggest that he did not think of Capua as one of the dominions he had inherited from duke William. This would follow naturally from the lack of involvement of duke William with Jordan II, and his succession to Robert I.

What can be said, then, is that the submission of Richard II to Roger Borsa in exchange for his help originated an ambiguous, highly contextual relationship between the principality of Capua and the duchy of Apulia. Robert I and duke William, the successors to their respective titles, had a relationship of mutual exchange, in which we see this submission invoked only once, and then in occasion of a very favourable grant to Robert’s brother. William was unable, or unwilling, however, to play a role in Robert I’s succession; he had at no point hindered his independent enterprises; and even the highly acquisitive Roger II of Sicily did not seem to think of Capua as a given right of his. So I would suggest that, just like Richard II had called on his blood relation to the duke of Apulia when he needed this to jumpstart an alliance, so Robert I and duke William invoked the bonds of relation and nominal submission which could be considered to bind them when they thought it necessary, but still acted quite independently of each other most of the time, in the kind of contextual arrangement which we have often seen in Southern Italy. Kin networks and networks of power, once more, are to be seen as dependent on the specific circumstance of those who did, or did not, choose to enforce them. And on the other hand, as Robert II eventually found himself consistently allied with his cousin Rainulf II of Caiazzo, we might be tempted to see here the kind of kin alliance that had served the Hautevilles so well; but after the death of Richard II Robert of Caiazzo, as discussed above, had detached himself from the principality, and it is hard to believe that the two cousins grew up with any kind of closeness or relation. Rainulf II of Caiazzo seems to have constantly relied on his own power and network of allies to make his claim for Apulia; neither invoking kin ties with his allies nor his status’ as duke William’s brother-in-law. Context made kinship: and Rainulf’s context sat firmly in his relationship, first of closeness then of rebellion, with his other brother-in-law, Roger II of Sicily.

Thus far I have traced two branches of the kin group, the main one, associated to the title of princes of Capua, and the second one, the very successful counts of Caiazzo. The counts of Monte Sant’Angelo, mentioned above, had become extinct by 1105 or 6: count Henry, who had fought Guiscard, died in 1101, and was succeeded by his younger brother William. But William died heirless a few years later, and with him the line died out. A final branch of the kin group remains

99 See pp. 143ff; that Jordan II and Robert II were in good relations is suggested by an 1123 confirmation of a grant made by Jordan on his son’s advice (Loud, ‘Diplomas of the Norman Princes’, n. 129, p.140).
100 See chapter 5.
102 Jahn, Untersuchungen, pp. 229-30.
to be examined: the counts of Carinola. Jonathan, brother of Jordan I, was made count of Carinola by Jordan I during the latter’s reign as prince. That he thus patronised his brother may suggest that the two had cooperated in war to some extent; Jonathan could be competent militarily, as he showed in 1091 defending Sora from the counts of Aquino. Otherwise, we may simply see this as the enterprising Jordan patronising a brother with the endowment of a county he had acquired. Dying in 1094, Jonathan was succeeded by his brother Bartholomew. That Jordan had not endowed Bartholomew himself with a county may simply mean that there was no county going for him; Bartholomew had fought for him in 1087, which attests to their good relationship. Bartholomew did succeed in producing an heir: Richard, who succeeded him in 1120. Richard of Carinola was by all accounts a much more memorable character than his father.

He got his start in the duchy of Gaeta, a troubled city continually agitated by civil unrest and shifting power. The duchy had been held since at least 1068 by Geoffrey Ridell, a Norman warrior who began his career in the service of the Hautevilles and had commanded the first expedition of Sicily, training the then very young Roger I. Geoffrey was expelled from Gaeta by its inhabitants, who did not like him, but remained in charge of the countryside. Geoffrey was a vassal to the princes of Capua, and so was his son and successor, Raynald. At Jordan I’s death, however, the Gaetans rebelled, Richard II could not hold them down, and Raynald had to go in exile to Pontecorvo, of which he was count. His son Gualganus, who was a trusted man of the princes of Capua, married a daughter of Rainulf I of Caiazzo. Gualganus kept claiming the duchy while in exile, but he died heirless; at his death Pontecorvo reverted to the prince who, despite the widow’s efforts to recover it, gave it to Robert of Caiazzo. In 1103 we find duke in Gaeta a William Blosseville, who either conquered it from Gualganus or received it at his death. William lost the duchy to Richard, count of Aquila, who ousted him in 1105 and reigned until his own death in 1111. Richard of Aquila was again a vassal of the princes of Capua, at least in name: he was succeeded by his son Andrew, but Andrew died in 1113. After this troubled, quick succession of rulers, the duchy appears to have reverted to the princes of Capua: specifically to the then-reigning

103 Chronicon Casinensis, IV.14, pp. 483-4.
104 Chronicon Casinensis, IV.14, pp. 483-4.
105 Loud, Age of Guiscard, p. 248.
107 The best discussion of Norman Gaeta remains Skinner’s in Family and Power, ch.5, pp. 149-209, cf.pp.150-70, for a more thorough narrative of the quick succession of events rapidly sketched here.
112 Loud, Church and Society, p. 91; Chronicon Casinensis, IV.25, pp. 491-2.
113 Loud, Church and Society, n. 36, p. 91.
114 Codex Diplomaticus Caietanus, II, n. 281, pp. 177-8.
115 Chronicon Casinensis, IV.52, pp. 117-8.
Robert I. Robert then gave the duchy to a Jonathan, a member of his family, who was then a minor. The widow of Richard of Aquila, with her new husband, then attempted to seize the city, but Richard, who by that point was count of Carinola, held them off.\(^{116}\)

We are not at all sure whose son Jonathan was. He was in the fourth year of his minority in 1116, which means he must have been born after 1100.\(^{117}\) This means he cannot have been a son of Jonathan I of Carinola, who died in 1094; in order to be a grandson of his, Jonathan would have had to have a son living after he died, and it is unclear why a man old enough to father a son seven years after his father’s death should have been passed over for succession, unless he was somehow incapacitated. All in all, it would seem easiest to believe that Jonathan of Gaeta was a son of Bartholomew of Carinola, who, having gone on to live until 1120, may well have been in condition to father a son in the early 1100s. Expecting his eldest, Richard, to succeed him, Bartholomew could have obtained Gaeta from his cousin prince Robert for his youngest son, setting his eldest as regent for him, in 1113. Problems remain: it is unclear why Gaeta should not have been given outright to Richard, or why the relationship of brotherhood was not mentioned. Hoffmann suggests, and Loud tentatively accepts, that Jonathan may have been the son of an unnamed son of Bartholomew, who died early and on whom information is lost.\(^{118}\) And it may still be possible that for some reason a son of Jonathan I of Carinola simply was not thought fit to inherit the county in 1094, and that the duchy was given to his young son as a sop and a way to rehabilitate that branch of the family. Again, we have the example of the sons of Robert of Conversano being excluded from inheritance, and it is possible that Jonathan I of Carinola’s son was very young when his father died and was excluded from succession, went on to father Jonathan of Gaeta, and then died before 1113.\(^{119}\) It is certain that Jonathan of Gaeta was a member of the family in some degree, and that Richard was set as his regent, in an example of contextual family practice of rule. Jonathan was reigning in his own right by 1119, but in another case of short life, he was dead by 1121.\(^{120}\) At this moment, Richard of Carinola became duke of Gaeta, a title he maintained until his probable death in 1139, the last survivor of a complex game of shifting inheritances, and the last offshoot of this family branch, since he as well died heirless.\(^{121}\) While the counts of Carinola had clearly been patronised by their more powerful relatives, the princes of Capua, they too succumbed eventually to simple bad luck.

This survey of the kin group of the princes of Capua from 1016 to 1127 shows us how, from a beginning similar to that of the Hautevilles (brothers coming to Italy together) the family’s

\(^{116}\) *Chronicon Casinensis*, IV.54, p. 519.

\(^{117}\) *Codex Diplomaticus Caietanus*, n. 289.


\(^{119}\) See chapter 3.

\(^{120}\) *Codice diplomatico di Gaeta*, n. 292, 296.

\(^{121}\) The duchy reverted then to the crown (Houben, *Roger II of Sicily* n. 17, p. 67).
relationships evolved in a completely different, and much looser manner. Plagued by bad luck, early deaths, and minority successions, the princes of Capua were unable to establish the long-lasting, coherent reigns of the Hautevilles: it is unsurprising that the family’s peak was achieved during and after Richard I and Jordan I’s long tenures, which left the principality in a safe position. After the early stages of the kin group’s establishment, in which it was election rather than blood relation to determine succession, we have several untroubled instances of contextual horizontal succession; but this without the kind of cooperation and design which the Hautevilles had shown. Jordan II received Capua after he had successfully set himself up in Nocera, clearly with no reason to expect anything else.

While rare, more creative instances of kin cooperations were possible: I have underlined the striking and successful alliance between Jordan I and his uncle Rainulf I of Caiazzo, and the relationship between Robert of Caiazzo and Richard II of Capua seems to hint at a kind of enduring, quite possibly emotional bond between the sons of two people who had quite clearly been close allies beside close relatives. Unsurprisingly, Jordan I’s stable and ambitious reign may have been the setting for a contextual alliance with his cousin Henry of Monte Sant’Angelo, as discussed above, and showed the patronage of both brothers and uncle. Nonetheless, as their power waned for most of the time we see the Capuans’ kin group only coming to count at the moment of succession, and then not by design but rather through an automatic falling of the inheritance on the closest heir. It is not only chance which determined this, however: the princes of Capua did not have the Hautevilles’ ample possibilities for patronage, nor ready access to frontier zones on which to expand. The kin group did create the comital lines of Caiazzo and Carinola, and the intermittent rule of Gaeta; however, the counts of Caiazzo were mostly independent after the death of Richard II, as shown above, and while Robert I did patronise the counts of Carinola when Gaeta was up for the taking, this was a one-off, fruit of a casual vacancy. There was no equivalent to the dynamic relationship between the dukes of Apulia and their relations on frontier zones, and the rule of Capua was not strong enough to ensure the kind of close de facto vassalage the counts of the Principato offered to their ducal relatives. The overlap between practical and emotional which had led so many Hautevilles to creative, significant alliances with their relatives in pursuit of conquest simply did not come to happen.

Rather than the dynamic warband the Hautevilles fostered until the coming of the crusades, the princes of Capua developed into a slightly unlucky but firmly established group based on one more important title and a small number of less significant but fairly independent cadet branches, with kinship mostly mattering at the moment of succession in the absence of the need of military alliances, save in few cases. Still, the kin group appears to have had a clear sense of who was part of it until the 1120s, with the nominal overlordship of the princes of Capua going unchallenged, and occasional patronage of the comital branches occurring when chance presented itself. But there were simply no occasions for the kind of flashy, well-documented exploits which put the
Hautevilles in charge of the Mezzogiorno and Syria and in complex, lifelong partnerships for the sake of conquest and rule, and as the power of Capua diminished, the relationship with the collateral branches loosened. Even though Robert II of Capua was fighting by the side of his cousin Rainulf of Caiazzo against Roger II, the king of Sicily turned to him not as a member of either kin group, but as the rule of Capua he represented, and the waning but still significant power of the first established but not most successful Norman line in the South.

6.4 Sons of Amicus

The sons of Amicus are the second kin group which will be considered here. There is no family name recorded for them: all the members of the kin group in the South descended from Walter and Peter, the ‘sons of Amicus’ whom we find fighting with the rest of the Norman invaders of the Mezzogiorno in the 1030s.122 While the princes of Capua endured in a position of power, however diminished, to play an important role in the resistance against Roger II, the kin group of the sons of Amicus had undergone what looks like a fraying of their kin and political ties, as we shall see below.

Walter and Peter appear to have been efficient warriors. Amatus portrays Peter having to be restrained from killing the treacherous Argyros in rage; and both shared in the division among the twelve Norman leaders, with Walter receiving Lesina and Peter Trani.123 While Peter had accepted the authority of William Iron-arm, as mentioned above, he attempted to succeed him, and Drogo and Humphrey together had to beat him back.124 While he could not yet take Trani from the Byzantines, Peter spent the 1040s establishing himself in the area around it, fortifying Bisceglie and Barletta, and rooting himself in Andria.125 That he was powerful is attested by both William of Apulia, and by the enduring trouble he and his kin group were able to make for the Hautevilles. Despite their dislike for Hauteville rule in Apulia, however, Walter and Peter still stood with their fellow Normans: we find them fighting in Civitate with count Humphrey against the emperor, and winning.126 While clearly a fellow Norman, however misliked, was better than German interference, the budding expansion of Robert Guiscard was another matter. In 1057 it was to defend his Apulian lands from Peter of Trani that Guiscard had to leave Calabria to his brother Roger, hurrying back to fight Peter.127 Walter was dead by 1056, when we find his son Peter count of

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122 WA, II, lines 1-100, pp. 132-4.
123 AM, II.28, pp. 292-3; II.30, p. 294.
125 Loud, Age of Guiscard, p. 100.
126 WA, II, lines 130-1, p. 138.
127 AM, IV.5, pp. 354-5.
Lesina; but Peter of Trani endured until 1064, the same year his son Godfrey seized Taranto for himself, and his other son Peter inherited Trani and Andria.\textsuperscript{128}

While Peter and Walter were gone, however, what they had left behind was a well-entrenched, well-connected kin group, with Peter son of Walter count of Lesina, his brother Amicus count of Giovenazzo and married to a daughter of count Joscelin of Molfetta, Godfrey son of Peter of Trani count in Taranto, and Peter son of Peter of Trani count of Andria. While the relationships among the members of the kin group of the princes of Capua had pursued different interests and the kin group ties had loosened, the kin group of the sons of Amicus stood united in one endeavour: opposing Guiscard’s power in the South. The kin network of the sons of Amicus was at the heart of three out of four insurrections against Robert Guiscard, almost entirely united in pushing back against his enlargement on the South (more on the exception, Peter of Lesina, below).

Thus in 1067 we find Amicus of Giovenazzo allied with his father-in-law, Joscelin, and Geoffre of Conversano in backing Abelard for his first bid of power.\textsuperscript{129} As mentioned in chapter 3, Geoffre was bent on opposing his uncle who had attempted to impose tribute on him, even though he had not endowed Geoffre with his land.\textsuperscript{130} Amicus and Joscelin may well have hoped for advancement under the new duke should Abelard win. The rebellion, however, was quickly put down. In 1072, the second rebellion saw Peter of Andria leading the games. Together with him were his cousin Amicus, Abelard and his brother Herman, and Richard of Monte Sant’Angelo.\textsuperscript{131} Peter’s importance is underlined by the fact that it was the fall of Trani to spell the failure of the campaign, which was sealed by the capture of Peter himself at Andria shortly after. Peter had reacted in favour of his nephew Richard: when Godfrey of Taranto had died he had left an underaged son, whom Peter was acting as regent for.\textsuperscript{132} When Guiscard demanded Taranto from Peter, Peter understandably refused and rebelled.\textsuperscript{133} This time Guiscard was less lenient, and took Giovenazzo from Amicus, and Trani from Peter.\textsuperscript{134} Ironically, as Loud underlines, Taranto remained with Richard: while Guiscard had usurped the rule of Apulia from his own nephew, he did not touch Peter’s.

When discussing Abelard’s rebellions against his uncle I have underlined how only family relations seemingly kept Guiscard from suppressing such a dangerous claimant to ducal power. It is easily explained, however, how he also felt it important to punish the rebel descendants of Amicus with loss of land rather than imprisonment or death. Between them, they controlled an important

\textsuperscript{128} Jahn, \textit{Untersuchungen}, pp. 79-81.
\textsuperscript{129} AM, V.4, p. 354; WA, II, lines 440-80, p. 156; GM, II.39-40.
\textsuperscript{130} WA, III, lines 348-71, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{131} WA, III, lines 348-71, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{132} Codex Diplomaticus Cavensis, IX, n. 125, pp. 366-9.
\textsuperscript{133} WA, III, lines 348-71, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{i documenti storici di Corato (1046-1327)}, ed. by G. Beltrani (Bari: Società di storia patria per la Puglia, 1923), n. 7, pp. 13-5 for the first attestation of Guiscard’s rule in Trani.
\textsuperscript{135} Loud, \textit{Age of Guiscard}, p. 240.
section of Northern Apulia. They were wealthy, they clearly commanded quite a following in order
to raise armies and local militias time after time, and their suppression might have led to even larger
scale revolt. An attempt of conciliation may have looked like a better bet, transforming them into
vassals rather than destroying their line, while drastic losses of land, much heavier than Geoffreys
of Conversano’s losing of Satriano, let them understand where their interest lay. The kin group,
however, was not amenable to this quite yet. Another five years separated them from their third,
and most dangerous attempt on Guiscard’s power. In 1078, Guiscard’s attempt to demand tribute
in occasion of the marriage of his daughter with Azzo of Este led to a powerful revolt. Abelard
once more, inevitably, featured at the heart of it; with him were his brother Herman, his father in
law Argyritzos, Peter of Andria, his cousin Amicus of Molfetta, Geoffreys of Conversano and his
brother Robert of Montescaglioneo, Jordan of Capua with his uncle Rainulf of Caiazzo and his cousin
Henry of Monte Sant’Angelo. The entire contingent seems a study on practical family alliances,
with several kin groups taking part in the form of closely allied members with interests in common.
Once again, however, the rebellion failed: I have discussed in chapter 1 how it was the threat to his
brother Herman’s safety that made Abelard agree to surrender and go in exile in Byzantium. At
this point Guiscard understandably punished the rebel descendants of Amicus severely: they lost
Taranto and Spinazzola as well.

After three tries, the lesson had been learnt and Guiscard had apparently achieved what he
wanted: submission from the kin group. In 1081, Amicus of Molfetta was part of Guiscard’s
expedition against Byzantium, and in 1087 he was in Calabria with the new duke Roger Borsa,
having clearly been made part of the ducal retinue. Peter of Andria is last attested in 1088,
witnessing a joint ducal charter of Roger Borsa and Sichelgaita to Venosa, having done the same.
In 1089, a Richard of Andria was issuing donations in in Bari, which implies Peter had died, and
this Richard had succeeded. Jahn categorically denies that this could be Richard of Taranto, the
son of Godfrey; but given the documents from Venosa which show Richard making donations for
his father in 1078 and then in 1080 from Andria itself, this seems to strongly suggest that his uncle
had not just defended Richard’s claim to Taranto, but actively associated this orphan nephew to his
own. If Peter was heirless, then taking as his heir the nephew he had clearly been watching over
made eminent sense; and once Taranto was lost, Richard could hold Andria. Richard of Andria was
at the ducal court in Melfi in 1093; he is last attested in 1096, not having made further trouble.

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136 WA, III, lines 539-687, p. 194.
137 See chapter 1.
138 WA, III, lines 688-87, pp. 200-2; Registrum Neapolitani Archivi Monumenta, n. 430, pp. 89-90.
139 WA, IV, lines 506-7, p. 230; Ménager, Recueil, n. 60, pp. 212-5.
143 Ughelli, Italia sacra, I, 923; Jahn, Untersuchungen, p. 212.
The counts of Andria had patently accepted ducal rule. Walter of Lesina and Peter of Trani had attempted to vie with the Hautevilles for overlordship of the South; their children Amicus of Molfetta and Peter of Andria were on the frontline of aristocratic resistance to Guiscard’s encroaching power. Understandably, the two did not want their privileges infringed upon, and would not submit without fighting against Guiscard’s attempt at exacting tribute. Amicus and Peter were joined by the same struggle; Peter, who rose in rebellion to defend his nephew Richard’s inheritance, patently felt in debt to his defunct brother Godfrey, and eventually took his nephew as his heir, an ersatz son as many Hauteville juniors had been. But that this kinship was practical, and the fights chosen by the kin group not necessarily binding, is shown by another member of the clan.

Peter of Lesina appears to have never rebelled against Guiscard. Loud suggests that Peter’s isolation may have led him to feel protected from Guiscard’s interference. Undoubtedly Lesina, on the other side of the thickly forested peninsula of the Gargano, was not as close to the centre of power. However, the fact that in 1081 Peter of Lesina was witnessing charters together with the ever-faithful (and ever well-repaid) Robert of Loritello, while in 1086 he accompanied Roger Borsa to Sicily, and witnessed another charter of his in 1092, suggests something even more well-defined. Because of his geographical position, Peter may have found himself allied, rather than opposed, to the Hautevilles. Guiscard was clearly keen on making allies of the kin group; while Amicus was constantly fighting together with his cousin Peter of Andria, he owed much of his power to Molfetta, which he had acquired in marriage, rather than to his paternal lands. It’s possible that while his younger brother capitalised on his connections by marriage and allied himself with his cousin to resist Guiscardian power, Peter of Lesina was quietly thriving under it.

The behaviour of Peter of Lesina spells out the eventual fate of the sons of Amicus kin group: what looks increasingly like the fragmentation of kin into smaller and separated lordships. Count Amicus of Molfetta is last attested with precision in 1090, witnessing a donation of Duke Roger in Canosa. In August 1093 he was dead, as his son and heir count Godfrey was confirming to S. Maria delle Tremiti a donation previously made by his father, if he should be restored to his power after being in Dalmatia. Godfrey of Molfetta is first seen, in the by now quite familiar role of the up-and-coming nobleman harassing the church, in 1089-90, when Urban II was invoking Roger Borsa and Bohemond against his incursions against S. Maria di Banzi in Basilicata. This, joined with his declaration that he had been beyond the Adriatic, seems to hint that Godfrey was quite troublesome, and as such he may either have been exiled, or to have relocated there as a better alternative while his father was alive, and there received the title of imperial sebastos, serving in

144 Loud, Age of Guiscard, p. 245.
145 Codice Diplomatico delle Tremiti, II, n. 84, pp. 250-3; Ménager, Recueil, n. 52, 54, pp. 181-6.
148 Jahn, Untersuchungen, p. 188.
some capacity under the Byzantine Empire. However, after his first moment of uncertainty, Godfrey would appear to have settled into his role: we find him making donations to local churches in 1098, 1099, and 1100.\footnote{Le pergamene della cattedrale di Terlizzi (971-1300), ed. by Francesco Carabellese (Bari: Società di storia patria per la Puglia, 1960), n. 31, pp. 47-8; Le pergamene di Barletta: archivio capitolare (897-1285), ed. by Francesco de Nitti (Bari: no publ., 1914), n.4, pp. 8-9, and Le pergamene della cattedrale di Terlizzi, n.32, pp.48-9.}

The fact however that none of his surviving donations are from Molfetta is striking, especially joined with the fact that in 1129 his son and heir Roger was styled as ‘dominator’ of Terlizzi, the place where Godfrey had made donations twice, and where he was therefore quite strongly rooted.\footnote{Le pergamene della cattedrale di Terlizzi, n. 45, pp. 62-3. In 1149, the city was in the hands of ‘domnun Rainaldum [...] castellanum’, n. 62, pp. 80-1.} It is possible that Godfrey, clearly a restless member of the family, may have preserved his title but he may have been unable to pass on his lordship, and that his son inherited in a very diminished capacity. Godfrey was count of Canne as well, as apparently confirmed by an 1104 and an 1105 charter.\footnote{Le pergamene della cattedrale di Terlizzi, n. 45, pp. 62-3. In 1149, the city was in the hands of ‘domnun Rainaldum [...] castellanum’, n. 62, pp. 80-1.} Jahn admits that the transfer of a county because its count went on crusade was possible, as happened in Vaccarizza; however, he suspects the charter to be a forgery, given its suspect use of imperial formulae.\footnote{Jahn, Untersuchungen, pp. 221-2; 342-5.} Jamison, in her discussion of the Southern Italian contingent in the First Crusade, posits that the counts of Canne in the 1150s were still descended from Hermann, given the use of the otherwise unattested name of Abelard among them; this might be possible, thought it is worth mentioning that the charters (of which the second one is a forgery) carry the name of Bailardus, to be exact.\footnote{Jahn, Untersuchungen, pp. 221-2; 342-5.} Notably, Bailardus was co-ruler with Pandolfus, who was apparently mentioned as his brother in the forged charter 74.\footnote{Pergamene di Barletta, n. 33, p. 56.}

However, in 1117, we have a donation signed by ‘Willelmus gratia Dei Cannensis comes et imperialis protocuro palatus’, judged ‘senza dubbio autentico’, without doubt authentic, by its editor.\footnote{Pergamene di Barletta, n. 26, pp. 48-9; Ughelli, Italia Sacra VIII, s.790-3.} The coincidence of William using a Byzantine title beside that of count would suggest that he was also a son of Godfrey, who, in possession of diminished properties, left Terlizzi to one son, and Canne and his relationship with the Byzantine empire to the other. Interestingly, there exists a 1234 forged summary of a putative 1138 document issued by William of Canne, in which he is identified as ‘Guilelmus dei gratia Cannarum comes f. et heres domini Roberti bone memorie comitis Cipersani’.\footnote{Jamison, ‘Some Notes’, pp. 198-9; Pergamene di Barletta, n. 73-4, pp. 106-10 (1155). The two had been succeeded by a ‘lord Angoiatis’ in 1157 (n.81, pp. 116-8).} In his commentary to the charter, Nitti both acknowledges its apocryphal nature, but also suggests that it would have been possible for Robert of Bassunvilla, count of Conversano, to have fathered a son, a brother to his son Hugh of Fraxinetum. As discussed above,
Fraxinetum was a very small holding in the 1150s, when the *Catalogus* was first completed; it is unthinkable that a son of Robert of Bassunvilla would have had such a small holding, and would not have been involved with the royal curia (moreover, Nitti identifies Roger and not Thomas as the son of Hugh). As Nitti however also underlines, Robert of Bassunvilla did rule Barletta: which might explain why a thirteenth-century forger might use both the name of the actual count of Canne, and the memory of the counts of Conversano, to make up his charter. It seems therefore possible to posit that Godfrey of Molfetta did father at least one count of Canne, and that the 1155-7 rulers may have also been their descendants.

Tracing the other branches of the family, it is quite possible that Godfrey of Andria, the adversary of Roger II discussed above, rooted in Andria and Barletta, and bearer of a name often found among the sons of Amicus, was a descendant of Richard of Andria; and thus that this particular offshoot of the ‘sons of Amicus’ was eventually cut down by Roger II, to the point that in 1138 in Andria charters issued by him were no longer acknowledged by the judges, as discussed by Nitti, with Godfrey the final member of the kin group to show resistance to the Hautevilles.

Finally, we have the counts of Lesina. Peter was succeeded by his son Rao, who explicitly acknowledged his parentage in a 1119 donation. After Rao, things become more complicated. He was succeeded by a Robert, identified as Robert of Devia, a local nobleman; while it has been suggested that Robert was a brother of Rao by De Francesco, Petrucci, the editor of the Tremiti charters, could not find support for the assertion. It is worth mentioning that if Robert of Lesina is indeed Robert of Devia, he would seem to be, most likely, the homonymous son or grandson of a previous Robert of Devia, son of Constans, attested in 1054. The last bearer of the title William, count of Lesina, whom we find imprisoned in 1156 and 1161, and denounced as a ‘vir atrocissimus’ by Hugo Falcandus, but it is unclear how he might have been related to the earlier counts, if at all: in the abovementioned, probably 1141 charter, he is described as the son-in-law of Robert of Lesina: ‘Robertus Lisinensis comes, socer domini Guidelmi eiusdem civitatis comitis’. At the very best, we could say that William of Lesina had married into the sons of Amicus kin group; but this seems improbable.

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157 See p. 162.
163 Hugo Falcandus, *De rebus circa regni*, 21.6, p. 144; *Codice delle Tremiti*, III, n. 103, pp. 287-91.
The kin group of the descendants of Amicus was thus powerful, but too short-lived, and too localised, to offer numerous examples of kin cooperation. Nonetheless, what we can see here confirms what we have seen among the Hautevilles and the princes of Capua: kin group, and kin group ties, always hung on context and opportunity. Walter of Lesina and Peter of Trani, brothers who had presumably come South together, fought together; the placement of the lands they had received separated the interests of their children. Peter of Andria cared enough about the legacy of his brother Godfrey of Taranto to rebel to defend his nephew Richard; once Amicus had established his interests in Molfetta, he and his brother Peter of Lesina were separated on the issue of Guiscardian power, and Amicus’ natural partner and ally was his cousin, Peter of Andria. As shown in the rebellion of 1078-9, kinship ties were at their tightest when tested; something which had simply not occurred with the count of Lesina. In the absence of a common cause to unite them, with their lands briskly pruned back by ducal repression, the ‘sons of Amicus’ kin group eventually lapsed into smaller and smaller dominions; and the influential beginnings of their rule in Apulia crumbled. If anything, the fate of the kin group’s dominions underlines once more the exceptional treatment of the counts of Conversano: when they wanted to, the Hautevilles could and did brutally repress a comital house’s power, even without necessarily killing or imprisoning its members. That Geoffrey of Conversano and his sons were allowed to thrive, mostly unchecked, until the 1130s, and the descendants of Walter and Peter were not, show us very clearly the line where Hauteville kin ended, and what things were like outside of it.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to contextualise the Hauteville experience of family relations, dominance and rule within the larger theatre of the Norman conquest of the South. I have begun from charting the edges of the Hauteville family group, putting forward a case for their distance from the princes of Capua and examining the possibility that the sons of Amicus and the Buonalbergo may have been related to them as well. The inner kin dynamics of both the sons of Amicus and the princes of Capua have then been analysed in their own right, with necessary recourse to a certain degree of narrative for what concerns the quick successions of the princes of Capua in their dominions. With both kin groups, we have seen how crucial both context and chance were in the development of enduring kin relations. With the remarkable series of early deaths and complex successions of the princes of Capua, it is unsurprising that it is under Jordan I, who had succeeded a long and stable reign and had clearly had the time to mature and cultivate a number of significant family relationships, that we see the greatest flourishing of Capuan family relations. Jordan patronised both his uncle and his brother, fought with his cousin, and established himself ambitiously within his area of influence. His weaker son Richard II felt the benefit of his father’s family policies, as he was served and protected by his cousin Robert of Caiazzo. While Robert I as
well showed an interest in patronising his cousins of Carinola, the loosening of kin ties in further short lives and successions made it impossible for the network to stay as closely involved and focused as the Hautevilles were, and by the time Robert II and Rainulf II of Caiazzo fought together kinship does not seem to have mattered much to their involvement with each other. The importance of context and chance becomes even more evident with the sons of Amicus: low in numbers, separated by geography, losing many of their possessions in war, and dying out early, the kin group’s cooperation is only evident in the first two generations, where a desire to maintain independence in the face of Guiscardian rule brought first brothers and then cousins together in revolt.

A combination of circumstances meant that neither the princes of Capua nor the sons Amicus could equal the fortunes of the Hauteville kin group, their sheer numbers, or the sophistication of their kin dynamics. As I have been keen to stress throughout this thesis, the number and quality of Hauteville kin relationships are unique among the Normans in the South: while talent and work brought the brothers to the forefront, the long and active life of both Guiscard and Roger of Sicily was fundamental in establishing their dominance over the South, and the crusader experience furnished them with yet another frontier to expand upon. Considering the variety and diversification of the theatres of conquest in which the Hautevillies operated with success, it is unsurprising that their name was well-known among the Normans back home as well; and the next and final chapter of this thesis will see to take a look at such a perception, inserting the Hautevilles and the study of their kin dynamics among the larger studies of Norman family relations, Norman expansion in Europe, and possible terms of comparison elsewhere.
Chapter 7

The “Norman” Hautevilles

7.1 Introduction

The first six chapters of this thesis have sought to investigate the kin dynamics of the Hautevilles and other Normans in the South. The Hautevilles came from Normandy; so did the princes of Capua and, most probably, the sons of Amicus, the main two kin groups they have been compared to here. It may therefore be said quite truthfully that this thesis investigated Norman kin dynamics and patterns of behaviour in the South and, as highlighted in the introduction, it did so in a state of research void, almost all other such studies being more concerned with prosopography than family history, concerning a later date, or dealing with family history on a limited regional scale. While however kin studies of the Normans in the South are scant, kin studies of the Normans in the North are numerous and highly sophisticated. As laid out in the introduction, this thesis itself began from the methodological model of Eleanor Searle’s seminal book Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power. The only extant inquiry into Norman kin relations in the South comparable to this thesis’ aims, Aurélie Thomas’ Jeux Lombards, indeed applies Searle’s methods of inquiry and findings to the Norman families in the South.\(^1\) While this thesis set out to fill a gap for kin studies in the Norman South, the question worth asking is whether, eventually, this is but an additional branch of Anglo-Norman kin studies; whether we can find the same kin models of behaviour in the South as in the North; and whether therefore the study of Southern Norman families and their achievement and maintenance of power can be analysed by the same methods, and broadly compared to those of their brethren in the North.

It will be the contention of this chapter to show that this is, in fact, a limiting approach; that the wealth of studies of Norman kins in France and England cannot be unthinkingly applied to the South; that a series of circumstances in the political and ethnographical landscape made different pragmatic approaches to kin and power necessary; and that at the present state it is most useful to think of the Norman kin experience in the South in a broader European and Mediterranean approach. Given the constraints of the present medium, the discussion is by necessity limited; nor is it in any way implied that a close comparison between patterns of emigration, self-identification, and kin-structure between the Normans in the South and in the North would not yield fruitful results, once a series of caveat have been heeded. It is the intention of this chapter, rather, to set out reasons why caution needs to be applied in such a comparison, and why the kin patterns of the Normans in the South might be successfully analysed also in comparison with a broader theatre, not chosen

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\(^1\) See discussion in Introduction, pp. 4-6.
through ethnicity but rather more comparable circumstances, of which two possible case studies are presented here. The final goal, therefore, is to begin probing the possibility of comparisons between Norman kin groups in the South and in the North with an open mind, while laying pathways of more extensive research for the future, and a methodology to approach them.

In order to do this, it will first be necessary to explore how the Hautevilles and their peers related to their homeland of Normandy, and how the Anglo-Normans related to them; in other words, we must ask ourselves whether a unity of identity between the Normans in the South and in the North was extant at all. The first section of this chapter will deal with this, analysing primary sources in both the South and the North, and extant kin studies in the South, to glean what we may of this relationship. This section will, therefore, also deal with the question of normannitas, the concept of unitarian and well-defined identity of all Normans, and the studies done on it, not with a view to answering its questions in any definitive way, but rather to separate the question of ethnic origin and identity from that of behaviour and political development. The second section will then proceed to compare this thesis’ findings for the Hautevilles and the other Norman kins in the South with those for the Normans in the North, highlighting how differences in institutional development, political landscape, and scale of the conquest contributed to a much different panorama and system of behaviours. The third section, finally, will compare the Hauteville kin and its mechanisms for expansion, conquest and rule to the situation in twelfth-century Germany and twelfth-century Outremer, showing how, beyond discussing the Norman kins in the South in the field of Anglo-Norman kin studies, broader inroads can be made by widening our approach to a larger contextual field.

7.2 A Norman Fate: Mediterranean Normans in European Perspective

The Normans in the South have always been considered de facto members of the larger Norman expansion that brought to the takeover of Britain and, later, the foundation of the principality of Antioch. The Mezzogiorno figures as the Southernmost reach of the Norman world in classic works such as Douglas’ The Norman Achievement and Davis’ The Normans and Their Myth, and it has remained an integral part of the conversation, on an equal footing with Britain and Normandy itself, as recently as Nick Webber’s The Evolution of Norman Identity. Marjorie Chibnall credited this in great part to the rediscovery of Orderic Vitalis’ text, whose sustained if not always accurate interest in Southern Italian Norman affairs has made him an important source in this thesis itself. It is not

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this study’s desire to pose itself in complete break to this trend: doubtlessly, as we shall see, the Normans in the South did have an awareness of their origins, they were remembered as having come from Normandy by the Anglo-Normans, and they sometimes preserved a memory of this into the twelfth century. It is, however, my intent to complicate the perception of the Normans of the South as ‘Norman’, with a view to contextualising their kin experience against that of the Anglo-Normans.

As observed by Loud in his important essay on the myth of the gens Normannorum, the truth of the myth lies in its continuous reiteration: there was such a thing as normannitas because the Normans and their historians continually insisted on it. The narrative sources for the conquest of the South are clear on this: there was such a thing as a perception of a Norman invasion and settlement, even if a qualified one. William of Apulia’s claim that the Normans were few, and being few they welcomed among their ranks any ‘bandits’, teaching them their language and accepting them as one of their own, and Geoffrey Malaterra’s ready admission that many from the regions surrounding Normandy also joined in the migration South, at once undermines and strengthens this. The ‘Normans’ in the South may have been few, as shown by Loud, and they may indeed not have all been Normans, as charted by Ménager, but in many ways the very insistence in the sources they patronised on their ethnic identity, however uncertainly it may be proven, may tell us that the importance of stressing it was keenly felt, at least until the turn of the century. The construed identity of the Norman conquest is invoked by writers on either side of the geographical divide. Thus Amatus of Montecassino inscribes the rise of the Southern Normans in the same trend as the conquest of England, even if it preceded it; and Anglo-Norman writers such as William of Malmesbury name-check the conquest of the South in their celebration of the advent and the settlement of Norman England, while Aelred of Rievaulx and Henry of Huntingdon have Walter l’Estec invoke the example of the Normans in the South in defending England from the Scots in his speech before the 1138 Battle of the Standard; Henry also includes Apulia, Calabria, Sicily and Antioch in the least of the ‘terris optimis’ as the lands reduced to ‘pauperiem et uastitatem’ by the Normans, a people ‘prerogatiua seuicie singularis’. The Carmen de Hastingae proelio invokes the

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5 WA, I, lines 165-8, p. 108; GM, I.11.
6 Ménager, Inventaire; Graham A. Loud, ‘Betrachtungen’.
7 William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum Anglorum, III.262, pp. 482-4, though interestingly, when praising Tancred for remaining in Outremer with Godfrey of Bouillon, who was from lower Lotharingia, he called them ‘viri qui ab extremo Europae frigore in importabiles se Orientis calores immerserint’, men of the utmost cold of Europe who sank themselves into the intolerable Eastern heat, as if Tancred were not from Southern Europe, and they shared a common origin; Aelred of Rievaulx, The Historical Works, transl. by Jane Patricia Freeland, ed., intr. and ann. by Marsha L. Dutton (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 2005), p. 253;
example of the Normans in the South at the battle of Hastings, while William of Poitier institutes a parallel between William the Conqueror and the Norman knights of the pope, who conquered the South for him; and Orderic Vitalis’ interest in and awareness of the Normans in the South, especially in the early times of their conquest, do seem to tell us that for an Anglo-Norman writer of the 1130s the Norman conquest of Italy was part and parcel of the larger *epos* of his people.\(^8\) At the same time, the question is more layered than at first appears.

If on the one hand Amatus stressed the foreignness of the Normans, he was also looking at them as a Lombard: the delicate checks and balances of his work, which at once underline the treacherousness of the Lombard princes and tell approvingly of the newcomer Normans marrying into their families, mean that his highlighting the origin and importance of the new rulers of the South is not just an example of *normannitas*, but rather a part of a larger, and more sophisticated, game of historical writing.\(^9\) Amatus was writing on the example of ethnographers such as Paul the Deacon, who had written of the coming of the Lombards to Italy when they had been the invading barbarians: describing them at once as a scourge to a helpless land, but also as the necessary cleanser of a decaying, pre-existing order which needed to be changed.\(^10\) Far from simply construing *normannitas*, Amatus is assembling a semblance of narrative sense for the great upheaval of his times. William of Apulia, too, is less invested in the idea of Norman-ness than we would give him credit for: he borrows heavily from the classical tradition for his ethnonyms and scansion, turning the Normans into *Galli* and this, combined with his candid admittance of their scarce numbers and penchant for swelling their ranks with newcomers, plants the more than reasonable doubt that William, rather than servicing the idea of Norman-ness, is presenting the rulers of the South as the God-chosen new masters in and of the Mezzogiorno.\(^11\) While he often denounces some Byzantines

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\(^9\) See Amatus’ dizzying changes of perspective on the morality of the Lombard princes he discusses, for example in I.34, 43-4; IV.19, III.19, 39-41; IV.23, VIII.

\(^10\) See above, and for the innocent rampaging of the Normans, AM, II.20, pp. 283-4; III.7-9, pp. 313-4; 18, pp. 320-1; Paolo Diacono, *Storia dei longobardi. Testo latino a fronte*, transl. by A. Zanella (Cividale del Friuli: BUR, 1991).

as effete and ineffective, his perspective is firmly focused on the Apulian-Balkan struggle between Guiscard and the emperors: his is an epic history of great chiefs on both sides, military leaders whose personal qualities make them memorable and lead their peoples to victory, and indeed he liberally praises the great Byzantine warrior Diogenes. In this perspective, the ethnicity of Guiscard is less important than his personal qualities as a leader of men, a determination firmly proven when the writer, who has been waxing lyrical about Bohemond’s ability in guerrilla warfare, rustles up his patron Roger Borsa’s bravery when wounded and in a storm to testify to his valour. William of Apulia looks altogether less concerned by his subjects’ ethnicity than their prowess in the field, despite Albu’s assurance that he is ‘a Norman historian […] writing Norman history at a Norman court for a Norman prince’.

Among the histories of the Normans in the South, Geoffrey Malaterra is acknowledged as the most explicitly ‘Norman’ in his outlook by Tounta in her examination of his work. Malaterra’s work sits comfortably next to Dudo of St Quentin’s or Orderic Vitalis’: his is the history of the rise of an explicitly Norman family, one whose patriarch hunts with the dukes and whose eldest son and heir fights against the Bretons. Malaterra is also the only one of the chroniclers to pick on a theme of ethnic strife akin to those which we can see on Norman England: unique is his contention that Roger Borsa privileged his mother’s Lombard kin against his father’s Norman one. Given Malaterra’s closeness to Roger, for whom he was writing, and the wealth and detail of the information he provides about his family, he certainly appears to have been working to his lord’s specifications; however, Geoffrey was also a newcomer to Southern Italy, as he explicitly admits, and possibly, a Norman himself. While he may be serving closely his lord’s vision, we may also expect him to carry the frame of reference and prejudices of his origin. Ewan Johnson, who discussed the picture of normannitas one can gather from the Malaterra and William of Apulia works, highlights how they seem to stress fluid, easily exchangeable marks of ethnic identity, which

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12 WA, III, lines 10-21 and ff., p. 164, describes Diogenes as the warlike emperor of Byzantium in a rare gesture of conciliation with the Byzantines; Melus, one of the original leaders of the then mercenary Normans, is also exalted as a good and worthy leader (WA, I, lines 55-6).
13 WA, V, lines 156-76, p. 244.
17 GM, IV.24, p. 102.

And indeed Lucas-Avenel, with her sophisticated analysis of the vocabulary of ‘\textit{gens}’ in the three main chroniclers of the Southern Norman conquest shows how, while at the beginning of their accounts all three writers underline several times the ethnic origins of their subject, such references become rarer as the narration proceeds, as if acknowledging that the \textit{Normanni} of the early books slowly metamorphosise into a more contextual entity, and one which includes the \textit{transalpini} who have joined their ranks.\footnote{Lucas-Avenel, ‘\textit{La gens Normannorum}’, pp. 253-60.} Moreover, Lucas-Avenel also points out, all three chronicles acknowledge the status of the Norman invaders as \textit{hominest novi}, newcomers who are building their fame and estate as they go, without illustrious ancestors and heroic heritage, seemingly springing from nothingness to take over the South.\footnote{Lucas-Avenel, ‘\textit{La gens Normannorum}’, pp. 248-53.} It is striking that it is Malaterra alone who mentions the town of origin by which the Hauteville clan ultimately became known, and then only once. If their Norman origin was important to the Hautevilles, they certainly did not choose to advertise it through their name, with the exception of the minor members of the Loritello-Catanzaro-Loreto group discussed in chapter 3.

As highlighted several times in this thesis, it is doubtlessly striking that none of the three most successful Norman kin groups in the South, the Hautevilles, the princes of Capua and the sons of Amicus, chose to retain their Norman names and toponyms. They all chose to embrace the titles they won in Southern Italy, titles which, if the information we have on their origins is correct, sound far more altisonant than their original, much more obscure ones. While at the same time they sit next to men who did preserve their Norman or French names, and who were known by them, such as the Grandmesnil, or Mamouzet, or L’Aigle, or de Barnaville discussed in these pages, they show us that for certain, quite prominent Normans who went South, what they found was far more important than what they left behind.\footnote{Something which will be discussed below, in the perspective of exile, see pp. 205-6.} While Drell makes an argument for the resurgence of the name ‘Norman’ in twelfth-century charters, Loud stresses that in these charters we find mostly people who identify themselves as ‘sons of Normans’, rather than Normans themselves: certainly children of immigrants from the North, aware and unashamed of their origins, but not necessarily men and women making a statement about their own identity, but simply the identity of their fathers.\footnote{Drell, \textit{Kinship and Conquest}, pp. 141-2; Graham A. Loud, ‘Norman Traditions in Southern Italy’, in \textit{Norman Tradition and Transcultural Heritage}, ed. by Burkhardt and Foerster (2013), pp. 35-57, pp. 54-6.} These were not Roger of Montgomery, declaring himself proudly ‘\textit{Normannus de Northmannis}’ twenty years after Hastings.\footnote{Thomas, \textit{The English and the Normans}, p. 32.} And indeed, as argued by Van Houts, even Roger of
Montgomery’s apparently untroubled declaration needs contextualisation: it may mean a man descended from Normans, yes, but also a man from Normandy, or a man in Normandy.\textsuperscript{25} If indeed even when it comes to men who remained close to Normandy we have to be careful in assuming, or outright declaring, \textit{normannitas}, it is hardly surprising that for those who remained South things are even more complex: in chapter 6 we met Robert of Devia, ‘ex genere Normannorum’, presumably a first-generation immigrant who, by declaring himself ‘of the people of the Normans’, clearly meant to preserve memory of his ethnic origin even in the South; but eighty years later his homonymous son or grandson, who given the rate of intermarriage between Normans and Lombards in the South was probably partly Lombard, did not stress any such identity markers.\textsuperscript{26}

The progressive dilution of ‘Norman’ influence, however defined, becomes especially glaring in the time of Roger II and the kingdom of Sicily: as systematically charted by Houben in his recent article on this topic, none of the main narrative sources for Roger II’s reign identify him as a Norman; and while there was an influx of men from Francia under his son’s reign, these are identified as ‘transalpini’ rather than Norman themselves.\textsuperscript{27} This becomes especially telling when we consider the kind of sources involved: Alexander of Telese was writing for Roger’s sister, and he may therefore be counted upon to have stressed his subject’s and patron’s Norman origin, should it have been significant to them, but he only mentions ‘Normanni’ when he is quickly recounting their invasion as part of the introduction to Roger’s reign; Falco, writing venomously from enduringly Lombard Benevento, could be expected to make much hay out of Roger’s enemy \textit{normannitas}, should such a thing exist, but he does not.\textsuperscript{28} To him, it’s Roger’s tyranny that makes him a villain; not any enduring foreign-ness of the kind that Amatus had picked up on, half a century before.\textsuperscript{29}

When it comes to the crusader experience, it is also necessary to stress that crusader sources consistently failed to associate Tancred and Bohemond to Robert Curthose and the Norman contingent: while both were honoured, the first as the son of a Marquis and the son of Guiscard

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\textsuperscript{26} Intermarriage will be once more discussed below, p. 203.
\textsuperscript{28} AT, ‘Prologus’, p. 3, III.4, p. 61, which discusses the foundation of Aversa, and thus the early times of the conquest; Falco of Benevento, ‘Introduzione’.
\textsuperscript{29} Alexander of Telese and Hugo Falcandus’s evolution away from the term ‘Normanni’, and the latter’s accent on ‘transalpini’ seems to partly confirm the findings by Rosa Canosa (\textit{Etnogenesi normanne e identità variabili: il retroterra culturale dei Normanni d’Italia fra Scandinavia e Normandia} (Torino: Zamorani, 2009), Conclusione) that as time wore on the Norman identity in Italy became more ‘French’ in its outlook. However, Canosa’s problematic reliance on just narrative evidence, and the lack of contextualisation into the wider European panorama, oversimplifies her findings, and makes them difficult to integrate with the documentary, beside narrative, approach taken by this thesis.
\end{flushleft}
respectively, and the second as a duke, no direct link between the two was inferred.\(^{30}\) Robert Curthose did marry Sybilla of Conversano, and thus become related to the Hautevilles; but this fact is treated quite separately by the chroniclers. At no point did the Southern Italian Normans show special deference to Curthose during the crusade or appear to acknowledge him as an overlord; nor did Curthose appear to have expected or demanded any control over them.\(^{31}\) What is more, the relationship of the Southern Italian crusader contingent to Normanness is complex in general: as discussed by Hodgson in her sophisticated article discussing representations of Normans as crusaders, the \textit{Gesta Francorum}’s attitudes to ethnicity and loyalty are variable, and it is only with the \textit{Gesta Tancredi}, written by a man who served both Bohemond and Tancred, but who was from Caen in Normandy itself and wrote after both had died, that we can fully see both the integration of the Southern Italians into Normanness, and its transmogrification into a viable crusader identity.\(^{32}\)

This is hardly surprising when we look at the way Hauteville crusaders identified themselves. In his only surviving documentary appearance from Southern Italy, Tancred is ‘Tankres Markeses’, thus identified by his father’s title (which we contextually know to be a marker of Odo’s ethnic origin, but is not framed as such); up until the departure of Bohemond for the West he used no titles but only his name in his charters issued in Antioch; he was identified as the ‘son of the Marquis’ and ‘nephew of Bohemond’ by the crusader sources; he is classed with the Southern Normans in most secondary sources for the crusades; and this despite the fact that his biographer, Nicholson, considered him a grandson of Sichelgaita, and thus technically only one quarter Norman.\(^{33}\) While I have demonstrated in chapter 4 that Tancred was a grandson of Alberada, and thus, again, technically half Norman, he was in no way defined by his ethnicity, but rather by the


\(^{31}\) And indeed significantly both Henry of Huntingdon and William of Malmesbury, while praising Bohemond and Tancred, do not associate them to Curthose (\textit{Historia Anglorum}, VII.5-18, pp. 422-42; \textit{Gesta regum Anglorum}, III.262, pp. 482-4).


titles of those he belonged to: he was, to begin with, the son of a marquis, where the most probably Northern Italian origin of the marquis was not remarked upon, and the nephew of Bohemond, one of the most prominent crusaders, to finally rise to princely title and be acknowledged by this alone.\textsuperscript{34} Tancred’s Normanness hinges on both a convention of the secondary sources, and a complex interplay of testimonies which he had no control over, not by any efforts made by either himself or his closest family to investigate his ethnic identity. Ralph of Caen makes him say that he is ‘Christianum, Normannigenam, Wiscardidam’, but in none of his surviving documents did Tancred ever do so, and Ralph was still writing as late as 1130, a full eighteen years after his death.\textsuperscript{35} Half a Northern Italian, half a Norman, probably raised between Sicily and Calabria, a speaker of Arabic, entirely part of the multi-ethnic Hauteville warband, neither Tancred nor his many peers (such as Richard of the Principato, half-Norman, half-Lombard, probably raised in Campania, who had possibly fought in Sicily, and was also an Arabic speaker) seem to have engaged in the kind of sophisticated self-definition through multilingualism which provides such fascinating material for Anglo-Norman studies, and cannot be applied to Southern Italy.\textsuperscript{36}

Unsurprisingly, while much of the scholarship on Anglo-Norman kin structure, and the term ‘Anglo-Norman’ itself, inevitably hinge on the complex question of the intermingling of Normans and English, the joining of their lines, the replacement of English rulers with Norman ones, and the identities of their children, no truly comparable thing can be done for Southern Italy.\textsuperscript{37} As shown from chapter 1 in this thesis, the Normans in the South married among the local Lombard aristocracy, occasionally importing their brides from Normandy to seal marriage alliances: but this neither implied replacement, nor appears to have caused a substantial difference in the identities of their children. When the first Hauteville brothers had married into the family of the princes of Salerno and the dukes of Sorrento, they had done so from a relatively weak position: they were tied to the established Lombard polities by links of vassalage and mercenary hire, and, as discussed in the introduction and in chapter 4, they may have been seen as new, useful warriors to integrate into the pre-existing Lombard comitatus.\textsuperscript{38} Born and raised in Normandy, the Hauteville brothers were certainly Normans, though, as we have seen, they did not seek to stress the fact in their titles and charters. The children of their unions were, technically, half-Norman and half-Lombard, but again, overwhelmingly, this does not seem to have any importance in the majority of cases: Abelard, Richard of the Principate, Tancred of Syracuse were in no way identified by the ethnicity of their parents. Altrude is a Germanic name, which suggests that Richard the Seneschal’s mother may have

\textsuperscript{34} See chapters 2 and 3 for a discussion of Tancred’s career.
\textsuperscript{35} Tancredus, line 3225, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{36} See for example Ian Short’s ‘Tam Angli quam Franci: Self-Definition in Anglo-Norman England’, ANS, 30 (2007), 153-77. For Tancred and Richard speaking Arabic, Hystoria de via, 10.35, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{37} For a very good recent summary of the issues, Thomas, The English and the Normans, pp. 20-55.
\textsuperscript{38} See p.59.
been Norman: but as examined at length in chapters 2 and 4, it was his father’s status that seems to have most influenced his life course, rather than any vice of origin.\textsuperscript{39}

The difference between “full” and “half” Norman could only be suggested to apply in the different treatment between Bohemond and Roger Borsa: but here again we run against both the rooted prejudice against Borsa discussed in preceding chapters in earlier secondary sources about the Mezzogiorno, Malaterra’s standalone claim that Borsa favoured his Lombard relatives, and the demonstrable fact that Guiscard’s marriage alliances were dictated by political and military, not simply ethnic interests, as discussed in chapters 2, 4, and 6. While Sichelgaita certainly represented a link of continuity with the pre-existing Lombard principalities, an issue which could be equated with that of ethnicity, she was also an active cooperator in her husband’s rule, occasionally using the term \textit{dux} together with him, mediating with her brother and then deciding to support her husband, and ensuring the transition of power of her son together with her brother-in-law.\textsuperscript{40} While marriage into an established Lombard principality certainly suited the up-and-coming Guiscard when he married her, at the end of her life Sichelgaita appears to have built her power on her own ability and the personal recognition she commanded as an associate of her husband’s power rather than on the bloodline which had become outdated with the passing of Gisulf. As opposed to the complex, interlocking identifications of English and Norman identity which are the object of much discussion in the sources for Norman England, it seems that ethnic identities in the Norman South were as flexible and free in association as the definitions of kin explored here.\textsuperscript{41} Even while making a case for the endurance of pockets of Lombard identity well into the Norman domination, and for what she terms the ‘autonomy of identity’ within the \textit{de facto} tolerance of Southern Italian Norman rule, Drell acknowledges the overwhelmingly fluid nature of Southern Italian identities, born at an intersection between sometimes conflicting but often ultimately co-existing cultural experiences and interests.\textsuperscript{42} In her study of Norman-Lombard intermarriage, Catherine Heygate strongly supports the idea of a liquid, not easily definable ethnic situation in the exogamous marriages of Southern Italy, and in the identity of their offspring, and she underlines how the English studies of identitarian conflict within such unions do not apply to them.\textsuperscript{43}

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\bibitem{39} See pp. 46ff.
\bibitem{40} See pp. 53-5.
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studied here, what this translates to is not resistant Norman and Lombard identities coexisting, but a highly contextual practice for self-identification, and one in which, as time wears on, insistence on normannitas seems rather to fade away.

The loosening of relations with Normandy on the part of the Normans in the South hinges on several circumstances, of which the most self-evident is sheer geography: as Le Patourel pointed out, it was just about doable, even if complicated, to rule in England and Normandy; to hold territory in both Normandy and the Mezzogiorno seems not to have even been attempted, and Musset pointed to geography as the first reason for the difference in relationship between Normandy and England and Normandy and Southern Italy. Mechanisms of belonging and identity could be highly personal, as we have seen even with Normans who had been born and grown up in the South such as the Loritello branch of the Hautevilles, and while the preservation of a Norman placename may hint to a desire to preserve ties with the memory of one’s homeland, it does not necessarily imply anything more tangible than this. Once someone had chosen to leave Normandy behind, distance itself would make it hard to preserve a unity of purpose or belonging with it. Drell used the twelfth-century narration of a Norman romance heroine who went to appeal to an aunt in Sicily for a problem of love to show the endurance of the idea of the possibility of Norman families spread over Northern and Southern Europe; what I would contend is that the awareness of such a spread does not entail perfect identity of ethnic perception and institutional attitudes, and that the idea of ‘Normans in the South’ in itself needs to be problematised.

The situation becomes even more complex once we analyse the spectrum of reasons for Norman presence in the South, and the choices they engendered: here we have considered principally those who had gone South to stay, out of a desire to acquire more land, and to better what seems to have been an obscure or poor situation. It was possible, however, to belong to an influential family, and to go South in exile: this was the case with Robert de Grandmesnil and his siblings, and William Werlenc and his children. While however these exiles went South, and remained there, some Norman exiles went South for a time, and returned when it was possible: this was the case, for instance, with archbishop Anselm at the end of the eleventh century. As highlighted by Johnson and Van Houts, the Norman mechanism of exile is a complex one: while clearly considered first a ducal and then a royal legitimate act, we are unsure of which, if any, judicial mechanism underpinned it, and it might express both outright banishment, and a temporary or permanent relocation which, however encouraged by political circumstance, did not necessarily

46 See pp. 124, 125-6.
47 Discussed in details by Sally N. Vaughn, ‘Anselm in Italy, 1097-1100’, in ANS, 16 (1993), 245-70
entail any actual sentence passed.\textsuperscript{48} The exile of one member of the family might also prove the occasion for the realisation of the ambitions of his relatives, as seen with the descent South of the original nucleus of the princes of Capua, where only one brother needed to leave, but others followed him and seem to have remained.\textsuperscript{49} Southern Italy could be a gateway to other, further exiles, as with Hugh Bunel, the murderer of Mabel of Bellême, who passed through Southern Italy in his flight across the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{50} Others still, finding themselves in penury, might choose to go South in order to better their fortunes, as Arnaud of Echauffour did in order to propitiate ducal forgiveness, and return to what they clearly still considered home afterwards.\textsuperscript{51}

It was possible, indeed, to be Norman, to have to go in exile, to have a supportive network in the South, and still to remain in the North: when Serlo, the Hauteville brother who inherited their Norman lands, had to go in exile for killing a neighbour, he chose Brittany rather than Italy, and, after appealing in vain for his pardon, he re-entered Normandy \textit{incognito} in order to demonstrate his usefulness and prowess in battle to the duke.\textsuperscript{52} In general, it is once again necessary to underscore that while the Anglo-Normans did routinely own property on both sides of the Channel after the Conquest, no such thing happened with those Normans who went South; and the case of the de Grandmesnils, who straddled the ‘Norman world’ with their presence in Normandy, England and Apulia, and apparently always had an open way back, is rather unique. If one went South with the intention of owning property and rooting themselves there, they stayed South; one could go back to Normandy after amassing portable wealth South, but to own land in both does not seem to have happened. Indeed, Johnson suggests that abbot Robert of Grandmesnil’s choice not to return to Normandy even when he could have was a direct consequence of his having gained more in Italy than he stood to lose back home.\textsuperscript{53} That the South was a unique, and uniquely far away, part of the ‘Norman world’ is underscored by what happened at William the Conqueror’s death: exiles in Rome and the South were explicitly forgiven, which seems to underline the acknowledgement of the special status of such people far away from their land of origin.\textsuperscript{54}


\textsuperscript{49} Orderic Vitalis, \textit{Ecclesiastical History}, II, p. 56, says that Osmund had killed a man who publicly boasted of seducing his daughter, thus making his a very personal murder.

\textsuperscript{50} Orderic Vitalis, \textit{Ecclesiastical History}, V, pp. 157-9. Hugh settled among the Muslims and learnt their customs there.

\textsuperscript{51} Orderic Vitalis, \textit{Ecclesiastical History}, II, p. 122, describes how Arnauld returned to Normandy with silver and a precious mantle.


\textsuperscript{54} Orderic Vitalis, \textit{Ecclesiastical History}, VI, p. 102.
If then we can see that the Southern Italian and Anglo-Normans had a clear sense of themselves as people with a common geographical origin, and a possible common ethnopoiesis to call upon in moments of poetry, rhetoric, and celebration, this did not seem to imply any long-standing political or legal consequence; and the existence of Southern Italy as a ‘Norman space’, available to Northern Normans as refuge in case of exile, or as a chance for self-aggrandisement, is both qualified, contextual, and not open to Normans alone. Robert de Grandmesnil reached Southern Italy only after a lengthy pilgrimage via Cluny and Rome; Arnaud of Echafflour went South to gather a fortune in the way the Northern Italians who helped colonise Sicily did, which does not imply any direct, privileged two-way relationship between Normandy and Southern Italy, closed to anyone else. As highlighted by Murray, the fact that the principality of Antioch had been founded by Southern Italian Normans did not give it a peculiarly ‘Norman’ character; it did not influence its ethnic composition after the first twenty years of its existence; and as we have seen, in the long run it did not keep it tied to the Hautevilles of Southern Italy either.

If therefore the Normans in the South appeared to have had a complex relationship with the Normans in the North and their own normannitas, often heavily dependent on context, which did not imply any real institutional unity, and was framed in a very different awareness and development of ethnicity, how did this translate to any common kin structures they may have exported from Normandy, and which we may equally identify in England and in Southern Italy?

7.3 Without King or Kingdom: Predatory Kinship and the Conquest of the South

Eleanor Searle’s monograph on the foundation of the duchy of Normandy, with her attention to the mechanisms which selected William the Conqueror as its leader and endowed him with the kin support necessary to make a successful bid for England, remains fundamental in the field of both family and institutional history in Northern Europe. The work has been hotly debated since its inception, from Bates’ thorough review, which praised some aspects of the work while profoundly disagreeing with others, to more recent articles which rejected Searle’s model while at the same time accepting its impact and challenging scope. Searle herself qualified the model she

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55 Indeed, while R. Allen Brown strongly underlines the overwhelmingly Norman component of the English Conquest, he still flags up several prominent lords of Breton or Flemish origin (The Normans and the Norman Conquest, pp. 207-10).


proposed, by openly admitting the inevitable simplification in addressing an extremely complex theme in a manageable and streamlined way, and thus, Robin Chapman Stacey in her review acknowledged that Searle herself could have shared many of her concerns over her work. Nevertheless, the work has remained, unsurprisingly so, integral to the field, and Cassandra Potts highlighted it as an important read in her introductory chapter to ducal Normandy. I chose to employ Searle’s work as a term of comparison not with the intention of disregarding the debate surrounding it, but rather because it offers in many ways the most efficient way of comparing two different ‘Norman conquests’, highlighting the broad seams of difference which have made it advisable in this thesis to consider Norman kin structures in the South on their own terms, as contextual responses to a specific environment and events rather than quintessentially ‘Norman’ manifestations.

The attractiveness of the Searle model for this purpose rests primarily on her accent on the family dynamics underlining the Norman conquest of England, family dynamics which are easily comparable to the kind of cooperative kin network for conquest and rule analysed here. Indeed, as anticipated in the introduction, Aurélie Thomas, author of a study of kin structures in Southern Italy which is in part concerned with the Normans, argues for substantial closeness between the kin structures underlying the two conquests. Thomas’ study identifies among the Normans in the South many of the mechanisms found between the Normans in the North: a selection and reward of the most ruthless members of kin, reliance on brothers and cousins for succession and expansion, and carefully chosen marriage alliances to strengthen and enlarge the family group. As already highlighted, Thomas’ findings are superficial in many ways: many of the assumptions she makes about the Hautevilles are wrong, and her main chosen case study, the de Grandmesnil family, are atypical in having been a wealthy family, already entrenched in Normandy, with interests in Britain, some of whose members chose to go South. By focusing on them and the transference of power of the abbot of Evroult, Thomas is biased in privileging the few Normans in the South who can be proven to have had interests in both Normandy and the Mezzogiorno, rather than those springing from the obscurity from which many of the Normans in the South, and indeed the most successful among them, came.

Searle’s model for the construction of the duchy of Normandy hinges on three things: ‘empty places’, whether found in the ill-defined land that became Normandy, or fabricated, as in conquered

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60 See pp. 4-6.
61 Thomas, Jeux Lombards, pp. 441-83; 467-71.
62 Thomas, Jeux Lombards, pp. 455-65.
63 See discussions in chapters 1 and 6.
England, where most of the pre-existing aristocracy was replaced; the stakes of the rewards, in which after the first, however uncertainly defined ‘duke’ Rollo, members of the family are competing for clearly delineated positions of power; finally, a self-conscious, and carefully administered, selection of kin, in which endogamy is practiced and certain branches of the family are willfully made sterile through clerical appointments, and descendants of females have equally valid claims to inheritance. None of these conditions apply to the creation of Norman power in Southern Italy. Both the situation of Italy before the Norman conquest, and the stakes the Normans fought for, were far different from those of Normandy and England, which consequently means a completely different approach to power, and a lack of conditions for a close comparison to points one and two.

As first sketched in the introduction, and consistently shown throughout this thesis, far from presenting an empty space the Mezzogiorno and Sicily presented a number of small, deeply entrenched, and often competing sources of power. Secondary scholarship is divided on when exactly the Normans first came South, but we can narrow this down to a twenty year window between the late 990s and 1017. Employed as mercenaries during the inner strife among the Lombard principalities of Campania, and the struggles among the Byzantines in Apulia, the Normans also served as spearhead for a doomed attempt by the Byzantines to regain Muslim Sicily. Far from moving in empty spaces, the Normans in the South first settled in the service of very local, very ancient powers, in a situation of crumbling and centrifugal forces; even if we accept Bates’ vindication of the lingering Carolingian influence in Normandy making it far fuller than Searle implies, Southern Italy was still by far more crowded. As shown in chapter 6, Rainulf Drengot settled Aversa as a vassal of its local Lombard prince; by the time the Hautevilles appeared in the mid to late 1030s, the Normans had been steadily drifting South for almost two decades at the least, and possibly as many as three, with a slow coalescing of their power.

William Iron-arm’s shareout as one among twelve confirms that, by the end of his life, he was still part of a troublesome group of mostly warrior people who, having started from positions

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66 As seen in chapters 1-3.

of subjection, were beginning to be numerous enough to be identified as a threat and fought as such, itinerant warlords loosely tied by a roughly common geographical origin, but still not so powerful as not to be reabsorbed by the multiplicity of identities and power structures present in Italy. The uncertain position of Drogo, who lived and died by his Lombard allies, and was unable to give his brothers land, is still that of someone who was attempting to entrench himself in a context full of competitors outside and inside his own family. The densely urbanised Italian landscape provided plentiful opportunities for the invading Normans: as seen with the ambitious Geoffrey of Conversano, any able man could collect for himself a number of small but already fortified, highly defensible positions whence to be in a position to negotiate with a much more powerful opponent, in his case Guiscard.  

The Italian situation could only be controlled piecemeal; and the Normans, by and large able to acquire fortified burghs for themselves, were not in need of banding behind a leader. While one could at first be tempted to claim for Guiscard the status of an alter-Rollo, a man to unite the Normans behind him, we have seen in the preceding chapters that this was not so. Far from uniting the Southern Normans behind him, Guiscard found them in open revolt whenever he attempted to exercise rights over them; while we could argue that by rallying around Abelard they were seeking to substitute one figurehead for another, the independence into which most lords in the South subsided as soon as count Roger died shows that the normal state of ducal Southern Italy was one of decentralised power, in which the only rule that could be exercised was one continuously defended and permanently under threat. Indeed, the closest connection between the dukes of Normandy described by Searle and those found in Apulia may be the wearying reality of constant struggle which the title demanded: but where the dukes of Normandy fought to keep a recognised title from the hands of pretenders, the dukes of Apulia fought to establish ducal control at all.  

Robert Guiscard and his grandson William bore the same title and nominally claimed ruled over the same territory; but William’s had devolved into unenforceable anarchy, and he had to bribe his nominal vassal Roger II of Sicily to come to his help. William was not challenged for his title: rather, he was threatened by the constant nibbling at the edges of his power. According to Hugo Falcandus, William I of Sicily was still threatened, not by attempts to replace him as king, but by his noblemen’s requests to return to a state of independence for the nobility last enjoyed under count Roger I (even though, as we have seen in this thesis, Roger I in fact appears to have exercised firm control over Sicily, and to have served to enforce Borsa’s over the Mezzogiorno).

As for the final point, the careful selection of kin highlighted by Searle among the Northern Normans, this simply did not happen in Southern Italy. At the same time as they were creating their power, the Normans in the South appeared in desperate need of support from their kin group. Far from carefully managing a pool of possible heirs, the Southern Normans were keen to lean on as

68 See pp. 71ff.  
69 Searle, Predatory Kinship, pp. 199-206.  
70 Hugo Falcandus, De rebus circa regni, 24.6, p. 156.
many skilled, able-bodied members of their family as possible to further the expansion of an ill-defined territory which could only be held by continuous strife. As we have seen in chapters 1 and 6, the horizontal succession of adult, authoritative, able brothers shored up and expanded Hauteville power, while the lightning-quick turnaround of rulers in Aversa, Capua and Gaeta gravely hindered that kin group’s development and expansion. The decentralised nature of the Southern Italian centres of power, with its need for capillary control, and the ability of anybody entrenched somewhere defensible to wreak havoc (see Roger I’s potential for damage, even at the very beginning of his career, from tiny Scalea, and his prohibiting of for his ambitious son Jordan to enter any cities while he was away from Sicily) meant that in order to efficiently control a territory both continuity and a large network of allies were needed.\(^{71}\) As explored in chapters 1 and 2, the continuity of power from Robert Guiscard’s ascent to the county in the late 1050s to the death of Roger I in 1101 entrenched Hauteville rule in the South; but they relied on an ample, if not always faithful network of collateral relatives. While the Anglo-Normans did fight often on the Scottish and Welsh frontiers, creating a peculiar society of marcher lords to guard them, and though they expanded out of Britain into Ireland, Southern Italy, Sicily and Syria were all often administered as a frontier, and underwent periodic cycles of upheaval which questioned the very existence of a centralised power.\(^ {72}\) The relative calm of the end of the eleventh century, in which ambitious junior Hautevilles such as Tancred or Richard of the Principato went East to seek new territories once Sicily had been conquered, and Southern Italy was fully assimilated under ducal rule, was followed by the centrifugal chaos that followed the death of Roger I of Sicily. At no point was Southern Italian centralised rule really secure.

While both the Normans in the South and in the North can truthfully be said to ‘trust their kinsmen, and build their power on them’, and that for them ‘ties of blood did matter […] kinsmen formed a solidarity,’ the mechanisms of such power building were radically different.\(^ {73}\) The Hauteville situation in an uncertainly held territory meant that even the most faithful members of the ducal family had ample independence, as control over them would have been impossible, and any member of the family needed to be able to both expand and defend their territories while supporting their overlord. Thus we have seen that Roger of Sicily and Robert of Loritello were at once the pillars of Robert Guiscard’s power and Roger Borsa’s transition, remaining faithful and nominally subject to them, and by and large independent rulers in embattled areas at the edge of the duchy.\(^ {74}\) For those with the ability and the willingness to engage in complex border zones,
Hauteville family cooperation brought ample rewards; but it founded itself not on the ability of the overlord to endow his cooperators, in the complex system of checks and balances described by Searle, but rather on an interlocking play of ambitions on a stage whose limits had yet to be defined.

At the same time as they had a need of the members of their family in order to conquer and administer territories, and to function as heirs and father more of them, the Normans in the South could not have fobbed them off with powerful bishoprics or abbeys even had they wanted to. Southern Italy was and remains a mosaic of minuscule urban bishoprics, in which figures such as the bishop of Capaccio were highly local entities subject to the whims of the local lords, rather than rulers in their own right (witness Sichelgaita of Molise and Tancred of Conversano’s successful interference with the archbishopric of Brindisi). While Southern Italy did feature wealthy abbeys, such as Montecassino, or Cava, or Casauria, as shown throughout this work the Normans sought to either predate on them or to patronise them in pursuit of models of legitimacy. The example of Robert of Grandmesnil, where we find a Norman abbot both presiding over already establish foundations such as Venosa, and founding new ones such as St Eufemia, is unique: as seen throughout this thesis, the Hautevilles had a proven record of strengthening their position through the employment of all available resources, and it seems more likely that they endowed Robert with something he, as an already established abbot, could be interested in, rather than deployed him as part of a larger strategy. With the exception of the highly anomalous situation of reconquered Sicily, and its jealously guarded legatine privilege, the Normans in the South were generally too engaged in piecing together a mosaic of minor territorial holdings in which to pour their human resources, and they do not seem to have cultivated particular interest in ecclesiastical power.

The sheer number of entities to control in order to obtain rule over the South, the intersection of ancient princely, episcopal, ecclesiastical, and urban powers, made obtaining and holding power a balancing act. Beyond showing disinterest in joining the church, therefore, the Normans in the South unsurprisingly did not seek to wholly replace the mechanisms of powers which they found in place, and they would probably not have succeeded had they tried. The need for building centralised power from the ground up from a constellation of functional, small, centrifugal centres explains at once the time-consuming nature of the conquest of the South, and the impossibility, and disinterest, in taking it over in a complete and systematic fashion as Anglo-Saxon England was taken over. Marongiu and Drell’s convincing testimony to the endurance of Roman and Lombard

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75 See p. 122.
76 It is to be underlined how rare is the case of Montecassino, which did have troops, and led a wholly unique drive for the building of fortified villages (Loud, ‘Continuity and change in Norman Italy: The Campania during the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries’, Journal of Medieval History 22(1996), 313-43, pp. 321-3.
77 Ménager (‘Les fondations monastiques’, pp. 57-60, argues that Robert de Grandmesnil’s tenure in Southern Italy was part of an effort to ‘Normannize’ its church, but Houben (‘Roberto il Guiscardo e il monachesimo’, in Roberto il Guiscardo tra Europa, Oriente e Mezzogiorno (1990), pp. 223-242, cf. pp. 501-10, argues that instead Guiscard’s policies aimed at a certain balance between the different elements of his dominions, something largely borne out even by the family policies observed in this thesis.
family law throughout the Norman period shows the invaders’ acceptance of at least part of the *status quo* they found: we do not seem to find an equivalent for the struggle between English and Norman law in the South, and indeed Houben remarks on the absence of Norman elements from Roger II’s ‘Assizes’. Cities which had once been under Byzantine control in Apulia preserved their Greek-named functionaries; as soon as the Muslim city of Palermo was conquered, a Christian knight was named as its emir, taking over a pre-existing function which survived into the age of the kingdom of Sicily. What Thomas calls the ‘pragmatic tolerance’ of the Normans in the North was an absolute necessity in the South: there was simply no time, no manpower, and no will at all to completely re-found the situation as it existed.

Indeed, the contextuality of Norman domination in the South runs through the very tissue of the territory: while we do have a surviving Norman motte-and-bailey castle in Scribla, Calabria, this is the only known example; Houben, while lamenting the lack of comprehensive studies of Norman castles in the South, points out how the sources often refer to several kinds of overlapping fortifications, further strengthening the impression of Norman rule as grafted on complex, pre-existing and in many cases enduring environments. Maurici, in his exhaustive history of medieval castles in Sicily, points out that Norman fortifications complete and overlap with the already existing, and quite rich, patrimony of Byzantine and Muslim ones; even following Bresc’s idea of more destructive Norman castle building, we are looking at the subversion and change of a pre-existing infrastructure, one in which the Normans need to find space for their own system. While the Southern Normans could have built castles in the manner of the Anglo-Normans, as they did only once, the environment was such that other solutions were necessary, and *castellani*, with the opportunity for reward the office presents, only appear in Southern Italy with the establishment of the Sicilian kingdom. Both the lack of generalised, Norman-style castle-building, the remarkable continuity in institutions, and the ample possibility for survival for the local, pre-Norman aristocracy, are acknowledged in Loud’s detailed study of the Campania; while we lack as yet

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79 WA, III, lines 340-3, p. 182; see the officials mentioned in charter collections from Bari and Brindisi.


comparable studies for the rest of the Mezzogiorno, many of the trends picked up throughout this thesis strongly hint to a very similar situation throughout the Norman South.  

All these political, institutional circumstances do not simply have an effect on the ways a ruling family could accrue power and redistribute among its members: they influenced the entire relationship of the aristocracy to the ruler, with a cascade effect which influences aristocratic family studies at large. This is the most fundamental difference between Anglo-Norman and Southern Norman kin relations: the role played by patronage from a superior ruler. The studies of Anglo-Norman aristocracy and kin hinge on the relationship between ruler and subjects, and the role played by the king in determining the fortunes of those who held land at his pleasure and by his say. Judith Green’s work on the Anglo-Norman aristocracy shows how important the work of redistribution of land which followed the conquest of England proved for the entrenchment of William’s power: the wholesale attribution of lands to his faithful followers both allowed William to root himself in the territory by systematically eliminating the pre-existing English aristocracy and tie his supporters more closely to him by rewarding their service. Something like this was only achieved in Southern Italy with the redistribution of comital titles executed by Roger II at the time of his pacification of the Mezzogiorno after 1140, as discussed in chapter 5, but even then, as we have seen, the change was not as significant. Many of the pre-existing minor lords survived the restructuring; some of the men who had supported Roger’s takeover would later rebel against his son and, as we see from the above-mentioned Falcandus chronicle, the memory of decentralised aristocratic power in the South endured. The consequences for relationships inside aristocratic kin groups were stark.

As we have seen throughout this thesis, and especially in chapter 6, kin group co-operation could be defined by the enemies against which the group united. Thus Jordan of Capua may well have engaged Guiscard to protect his brother Henry’s interests in the Capitanata against Robert of Loritello; Peter of Andria allied himself to his cousin Amicus of Giovenazzo against the duke of Apulia. At any given moment what was up for grabs was substantial and defensible independence from overarching authority, what Geoffrey of Conversano had essentially achieved after Guiscard’s death. Despite the dukes of Apulia having obtained papal enfeoffment, the nature of power of Southern Italy remained liquid, and rewards, to a very great extent, not given from above but rather conquered through one’s own strength. The problem with Guiscard attempting to enforce his power over his nephew Geoffrey was that Geoffrey had obtained his land strenuitate propria; so had even those who had remained faithful, like Robert of Loritello, who received his uncle’s help at least

84 Loud, ’Continuity and Change’, pp. 313-43.
85 Green, The Aristocracy, pp.143-93.
86 See pp. 160ff.
87 See pp. 178-9, 187.
once, but otherwise could mostly manage on his own.\textsuperscript{88} This made rebelling against one’s overlord a much different proposition than rebelling against one’s king in Anglo-Norman territory.

As a concrete example of this, for instance, we may look at Crouch’s study of the Beaumont twins, Waleran de Meulan and Robert of Leicester, as an expression of the kind of very tangible difference the presence of an acknowledged sovereign could make in matters of kin structure.\textsuperscript{89} Waleran and Robert were the children of Robert de Meulan, one of William the Conqueror’s cousins and supporters, rewarded by him with substantial territories in the Midlands after the Conquest. While Robert the elder was therefore clearly a valued and useful kinsman, what he held he held directly through his overlord. At his death, unsurprisingly, the king organised a joint wardship of their relatives for the twins, and took care to raise them close to the court, as it was in his understandable interest to preserve and look after a rather important fief.\textsuperscript{90} No such thing would have happened in Southern Italy: regency was exercised, or rule usurped by one’s relatives independently even in smaller holdings, as seen in the cases of the children of Robert of Conversano and Robert of Montescagliooso, as no higher authority could claim a title to the land (unless one conquered it outright).\textsuperscript{91} The presence of a king to curry favour from or oppose was fundamental in Waleran’s and Robert’s rather different paths through life. Waleran acted much like a Southern Italian Norman might: he built a powerful support network through marriage and rebelled against his lord. Kings, however, were not to be meddled with: Waleran was thrown in prison for extended periods of time, and his lands were redistributed, in a way which in Southern Italy would not be countenanced even for people who were not members of the ducal kin group, like the sons of Amicus.\textsuperscript{92} While Waleran had the kind of ambition and willingness to fight which so many Southern Italian Normans had, he chose to rebel in a landscape in which a man like him was expendable, and the fundamental authority of the king could not be overturned.

Robert of Leicester’s career is smoother, ultimately more successful, and tightly regimented through royal service. Crouch is extremely critical of Waleran: he credits Robert with better and finer political sense, and tasks Waleran with both the difficulty of his conduct and his inability to achieve true greatness.\textsuperscript{93} Without going into such moral judgments, it is certainly fair to say that Robert enjoyed the rewards of continuous, loyal royal service, where Waleran appears to have consistently backed the wrong horse, both attempting rebelling on his own, and, when he appeared to simply support an alternative royal candidate like Stephen, losing out.\textsuperscript{94} The kind of service Robert provided his kings may be easily equated to that of Richard the Seneschal in the South:

\textsuperscript{88} See pp. 66, 71ff.
\textsuperscript{89} Crouch, \textit{The Beaumont Twins}.
\textsuperscript{90} Crouch, \textit{The Beaumont Twins}, pp. 3-15.
\textsuperscript{91} See pp. 71ff., 162.
\textsuperscript{93} Crouch, \textit{The Beaumont Twins}, pp. 96-8.
\textsuperscript{94} Crouch, \textit{The Beaumont Twins}, pp. 30-3.
administrative and military service, and contentment with a position of trust and prestige within the boundaries set by one’s overlord. But as we have seen in chapter 2, Richard’s choice to not capitalise on his potential for rebelliousness was not common in the South, a context in which a man of Waleran’s inveterate ambitions might have achieved much more. Comparing his own, doomed rebellions to the substantial rewards carried by someone like Geoffrey of Conversano, we may see how Waleran’s inability to escape the framework of royally-granted fiefs sharply limited his chances for aggrandisement. It is very possible, pace Crouch, that the problem was not Waleran himself, but rather the milieu in which he moved.

While the difference in institutional and political developments in Norman England and Southern Italy, however, clearly shaped in very different ways their possibilities for kin cooperation and power building, this does not mean that there are no examples in which the two can be shown to touch. Thus while Waleran could not rely on Robert as a companion in his struggles against the king (a lack of fraternal cooperation which one saw rarely in Italy, as with Peter of Lesina and his brother Amicus of Molfetta) he was assisted on his deathbed by his powerful cousin, Archbishop Rotrou of Rouen, and several other kinsmen who provided him with support in his final, disgraced days; when he was still young, and clearly had hopes to make good on his bid for independence, Waleran had built a support network of fighters out of his brothers-in-law, as Roger II would do. While the kind of relationship which bound William the Conqueror’s kinsmen to him was very different from that between Guiscard and his nephews, the two Norman rulers still shared a desire for capitalising on their own family for resources, and relying on it as a kind of warband whose members could provide support in exchange for rewards. Hagger’s study of the Verdun family shows how between the twelfth and thirteenth century a close network of siblings ensured each other’s prosperity, helped each other administer land, made up each other’s shortfalls, and stood up for each other in a crisis, while a father and sons administered land together. Within the much more rigid parameters of their institutional context, in which a clearly ordained system of overlordship ‘ran from top to bottom, and was ultimately coercive’, the Anglo-Normans could and did rely on their horizontal and vertical systems of relatives for help. The hybrid situation in which many Anglo-Normans possessed territories on either side of the Channel also forced them to make up a few creative systems of inheritance: William the Conqueror himself, Robert de Meulan, and the de Verdun patriarch all had to choose how to parcel out their separate dominions, and they did so in what looks like an extremely contextual manner, arbitrarily determining which child got which holding. (Though William and Robert’s choice to leave their Norman lands to their eldest son is

98 Green, The Aristocracy, p. 194.
certainly suggestive). As underlined by Drell, in Southern Italy itself inheritance traditions could be haphazard: and as seen in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, primogeniture might very well be no assurance of anything.\footnote{Drell, Kinship and Conquest, pp. 113-126.} It is striking that, as highlighted in chapter 3, the cadet branches of the Hautevilles seem not to have related to each other as time wore on, but rather to the ducal and Sicilian comital ones: even within the negotiable relationships of power of the Hautevilles dominion, an acknowledgement seems to have developed that the dukes and counts were the men to beat.

In the dearth of studies of Norman kin in the South there are certainly great avenues of research for in-depth comparisons between families at every level of the aristocracies of Normandy and Southern Italy; it is not my intention, here, to imply in any way that such comparisons are fruitless. As stated in chapter 6, moreover, an effort was made in this thesis to compare the Hautevilles with similar kin groups, which has meant that the family relations examined here are overwhelmingly those of Norman families of obscure origins, who renounced their names for the titles they acquired in the South, and who moved at the highest level of the Norman conquest in the South, competing for the largest control. This means that the sample of ‘Southern Normans’ here examined is both specific and limited in several ways, and there is much still to be investigated. However, given the lack of larger-ranging analyses of Southern-Norman kin structures, I am keen to avoid the mistake of unthinkingly assuming that the frame of reference of Anglo-Norman kin should hold true for the South as well, and lay down wider pathways for future research. It is my contention that the Normans in the South, at least at the highest levels, did not build, divide, and transmit power within families in the way they did because they were Norman, even though they did acknowledge their origins, and their brethren in the North claimed them as part of a common ethnopoiesis; they did so because of the uniquely liquid situation in which they found themselves, one in which no institutional power was to be taken for granted, sustained ambition and independence usually paid off, centralised rule could only be defended with difficulty, and warrior family networks could be one’s best bet for the attainment and maintenance of landed power and administrative influence. In this perspective, therefore, it may be useful to compare the Hautevilles’ achievement to that of noble families in other, unstable political theatres, such as imperial Germany, and the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem.

7.4 A Useful Chaos: Germany, Jerusalem, and Germane Networks

It was a fundamental problem for the Hautevilles in Southern Italy that whatever title they achieved, even if sanctioned by the pope, could only be brought with difficulty to imply the kind of
subjection and vassalage from their fellow Normans it might have implied elsewhere. Guiscard and
William the Conqueror bore the same title, but with substantially different results; so did Henry I
and Roger II, at least in the early years of the latter’s reign. That a title like duke, king and emperor
might not entail control over one’s nominal subjects was hardly rare in the Middle Ages: and the
Hautevilles’ experience with this, and the ways it influenced their kin-relations and power-building,
dovetails with two well-known examples of contemporary institutional trouble in Northern Europe
and the Eastern Mediterranean.

a. The Bouillon – Ardennes Kin Network: Family and Crown in Outremer

The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem’s origins mirror, in certain ways, that of the kingdom of
Sicily: a ragtag band of warrior barons, of varied social extraction, often accompanied by their kin
network, established themselves in a land very distant from their own, already occupied by a variety
of ancient and diverse institutions, ethnicities, and religions, and founded on their own strength a
number of political institutions which often sat uneasily under the overarching umbrella of
kingdom. 101 While we are now used to thinking of Godfrey of Bouillon as the leader of the crusade,
studies of his career make it clear that his achievement of this role was entirely contextual: his most
recent biographer, John, persuasively shows how Godfrey’s attainment of primacy came after other,
more illustrious crusaders like Raymond de St Gilles and Bohemond had fallen out of favour or
withdrawn, and Godfrey himself managed to both capitalise on millennial longings for Jerusalem
among the crusader ranks, and obtain the support of powerful men such as Tancred and Robert
Curthose (and it is interesting to stress once more how, even as both men chose to support the same
leader, no source puts this down to their common ‘Norman-ness’, each being portrayed as a free
political and military agent). 102 A leader by chance, Godfrey’s rule is shadowed by the still-raging
debate over the title he bore, or indeed whether he bore a title at all: while conventionally called
‘defender of the Holy Sepulchre’, we have little evidence that this is how he was known or styled
himself. 103 Dying very early of illness soon after the conquest of Jerusalem, childless and unmarried
at the age of forty, Godfrey is a study in the contextual issues of organising inheritance for a
newfound, uncertainly held kingdom.

Conventional wisdom long underplayed the contextual, highly uncertain development of the
royal dynasty of Jerusalem, portraying an unremarkable transition from Godfrey’s rule, to that of

101 For a wide survey of the institutional developments in the Middle East, see Malcolm Barber, The Crusader
by Joshua Prawer; the accessible yet scholarly work on the crusader movement as a whole remains
102 John, Godfrey of Bouillon, ch. 4.
103 John, Godfrey of Bouillon, ch. 5.
his brother Baldwin, to that of their cousin Baldwin LeBourcq. In fact, a closer look reveals the difficulties and problems of this, based on a fundamental and preconceived misunderstanding of the kin network’s internal mechanisms, and of a series of choices which allow us to make a number of interesting comparisons between the experience of the Hautevilles and that of the Bouillon-Ardennes.\(^{104}\) Like Bohemond himself and many of the Hautevilles before him, duke Godfrey was a man of a certain age with no heir of his own body and no wife, who sought to remedy the situation by choosing as his heir a junior member of his kin group. While Bohemond had chosen his nephew, Godfrey chose his younger brother, Baldwin, as his other brother Eustace was already count of Boulogne and unable to inherit Lotharingia as well.\(^{105}\) In many ways Baldwin can be described as Tancred’s doppelganger during and after the crusade: both chosen as right-hand men to older and more prestigious relatives, both sought to pursue independent lordship in Asia Minor, with Baldwin stealing Tarsus from Tancred and, in virtue of his much higher status, obtaining his own rule in Edessa through marriage.\(^{106}\) Like Tancred in Galilee, Baldwin had successfully gained his own area of influence, when the rule occupied by his older relative became vacant. The conjunction of Godfrey’s death and Bohemond’s capture in 1100 saw Baldwin and Tancred make the same choice: both left behind the rule they had gained to occupy the much more prestigious one left by their relatives. As for Baldwin’s choice to remain East, and not go back to Germany, it is easily explained by another comparison with the choices the Hautevilles themselves had made: what he stood to gain was far greater than what he left behind. While the title of duke of Lower Lotharingia sounds good, the duchy had undergone significant downsizing in both territory and political influence; and by selling his own castle and shutting down his monasteries to finance his crusade Godfrey himself was signalling his intention to invest his resources elsewhere.\(^{107}\) Easily obtaining the investiture to King of Jerusalem, and thus ending the uncertainty about its political institution, Baldwin was turning a ducal and comital dynasty into a royal one.

However, like Godfrey, Bohemond, and Tancred himself, Baldwin had no heir. The steps he took to ensure his succession and rule, once more, parallel those taken by the Hautevilles in Outremer and elsewhere, showing that it was circumstance, and not ethnicity, which often shaped kin-building choices. When he went to take Jerusalem, Baldwin left Edessa behind, but still kept it in the family: by entrusting it to his ‘kinsman’, Baldwin LeBourcq. Long-assumed to be a cousin, Baldwin sits in an extremely interesting, and probably unsolvable dynastic knot. He was related to Baldwin I and Godfrey; but how is a mystery. Murray’s painstaking work in rebuilding his

\(^{104}\) The fundamental work on this complex and long-misunderstood mechanism of succession remains Alan V. Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic History (1099-1125)* (Oxford: Unit for Prosopographical Research, 2000). In general, Murray has produced the most important and up-to-date work on Baldwin I and Baldwin II, and he is therefore amply quoted here.

\(^{105}\) Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom*, pp. 6-36.


\(^{107}\) John, *Godfrey of Bouillon*, ch.3, argues extensively for this.
genealogical tree can only hazard hypotheses, as the Bouillon-Ardennes network is full of holes: he posits that Baldwin LeBourcq was not a very close cousin, and he was related to Ida of Lorraine, Godfrey and Baldwin’s mother. As the crusader sources indeed honestly describe him, Baldwin was a kinsman: in what degree a kinsman was probably not known. Again like Roger of Salerno, whose uncertain connection to the Hautevilles was overplayed by Roger himself in a bid to prove the legitimacy of his rule in Antioch, as seen in chapter 4, Baldwin appears to have been an acknowledged member of the kin group whose usefulness and prestige came contextually, rather than through any preordained family law. Much as Tancred had put his cousin Richard in charge of Edessa, and would leave Richard’s son in charge of Antioch at his death, Baldwin I seems to have chosen to put Baldwin LeBourcq as the head of the principality he was abandoning to become king in virtue of the happy circumstance that Baldwin LeBourcq was the closest kinsman available at the time. While this still shows a premeditated, firm intention of preserving power among one’s relations as possible, the exact mechanism through which this was done depended on context: a context in which Baldwin had no sons, brothers, or nephews left, and some sort of distant relation happened to be on the ground.

Once Baldwin I was king in Jerusalem, and Baldwin LeBourcq prince in Edessa, both men proceeded to do something else which the Hautevilles had often had to do: ensure succession and root their power in an uncertain environment by careful, opportunistic, and often unconventional kin-building. Baldwin I’s failure to father an heir dogged both his kingdom and that of his successor. Having had no children with his first wife Godehilde back home, he had none with his second, Armenian wife Arda either. In 1105 he sought an annulment from her, something for which reasons like adultery are brought to the table, but which was probably motivated by a desire to attempt to father children with another woman. In 1112, when he asked for and obtained the hand of Adelaide of Sicily, as discussed in chapter 5, Baldwin was obtaining both another wife of childbearing age and proven fertility, and the rich dowry one could expect to come from Sicily. Murray’s suggestion that the marriage to Adelaide was hastily annulled in 1118 in order to prevent Roger II from claiming the kingdom of Jerusalem, as laid out in the marriage contract, is eminently persuasive; and this would also explain Roger’s reluctance to be involved with the kingdom of Jerusalem hence. He had not just endured the humiliation of his mother, hastily sent back: he had also been cheated out of a promised kingdom, something which in 1118 Roger had no way of knowing he might build in Southern Italy itself. Roger, then simply count of Sicily, would probably have jumped at the opportunity of being king of Jerusalem instead. It must have dawned on Baldwin

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109 Murray, ‘Dynastic Continuity or Dynastic Change?’ n. 7, pp. 5-6.

110 WT, 11.1, pp. 495-6.

by the mid-1110s that if he had failed to father an heir thus far, he may very well not be able to do so at all. The provisions he had made should die heirless were, once more, pragmatic and akin to what the Hautevilles themselves had often done: in an attempt at horizontal succession, he first envisioned for the crown to be offered to his last surviving brother, Eustace, and, should Eustace be too old to accept it, to his ‘kinsman’ Baldwin LeBourcq instead.\(^{112}\)

It is fundamental to remember that Baldwin was not acting in a vacuum, but rather in concert with the second greatest power of the kingdom: its barons. While the landholders of the Latin Kingdom had united behind the idea of a king far faster than those of Southern Italy had, they remained an important force in the kingdom, and one which would play a fundamental role in Baldwin I’s own succession. At the king’s heirless death, two things became apparent: on the one hand the fact that a certain respect for the idea of dynasty already existed, and on the other, the importance of finding a candidate acceptable to the nobles and able to defend the kingdom. Eustace of Boulogne, Godfrey’s final brother, was first approached: he had long since returned to Europe, was by this point quite old, in his late fifties to early sixties, in possession of a solidly rooted county in Europe, and father to a daughter. Nonetheless, Eustace accepted: he had travelled as far as Apulia when he discovered that another king had already been crowned.\(^{113}\) Sheer luck played a great role in Baldwin’s achievement of the throne.\(^{114}\) According to Albert of Aachen, he was already travelling to Jerusalem for the Easter celebrations when Baldwin I died, and he arrived in ignorance of it just as his body was entering the town; for William of Tyre Baldwin learnt of his kinsman’s death \textit{en route}, and got to the city ready and willing to seize the throne.\(^{115}\) His position was an interesting one. He was count of one of the important border principalities, in excellent relations with neighbouring Antioch, at the time ruled by Roger of Salerno and his wife Cecilia, LeBourcq’s sister whom Roger had married in 1115 in a nifty piece of kin-building on the borders of the kingdom.\(^{116}\) Baldwin LeBourcq had clearly been working to root himself in Edessa; but as Murray underlines, the coincidence of his surviving the rest of his kin network, and the influence of the ruler of Edessa who was brother in law to the ruler of Antioch carried him.\(^{117}\) Unlike Eustace, Baldwin was there, with supporters, and a proven track record in defending the kingdom. It’s unsurprising that older, distant Eustace, who had clearly preferred Europe to Jerusalem, gave up when he learnt he was willing to take on the crown. It was one thing to take up a throne, even at his age; another to fight a kinsman, however distant, for it. Baldwin II seized the opportunity: he promised Joscelin of Courtenay the county of Edessa which he was leaving behind, and learnt on


\(^{113}\) Murray, \textit{The Crusader Kingdom}, pp. 121-3.

\(^{114}\) For a detailed discussion of this, see also Murray, ‘Dynastic Continuity or Dynastic Change?’.

\(^{115}\) \textit{WT}, XII.3; Albert of Aachen, \textit{Historia Ierosolimitana}, XII.30, pp. 872-4.

\(^{116}\) See pp. 128-9.

Arnulf of Chocques, the patriarch.¹¹⁸ (Tancred himself had schemed with the patriarch, Daimbert of Pisa, to have Bohemond crowned king; but Baldwin I’s arrival at the gates of the city and support from his men proved fundamental.¹¹⁹ When a kingdom had to be defended, being there made much more sense than an interregnum waiting for another pretender).

Baldwin II was aware of how circumstantial his rise to the throne was. He moved to reorganise the aristocracy of the kingdom, replacing many of the pre-existing lords with his own family. Murray describes in detail Baldwin’s campaign, during which he called from Europe a few of his own kinsmen, redistributed fiefs to them, and generally sought to buttress his power by filling the council of barons with men who owed him their rise, as Roger II would later do in the Mezzogiorno at his own accession to the crown, while being unable to completely reorganise the aristocracy as William the Conqueror had done.¹²⁰ Having given Edessa to Joscelin of Courtenay in exchange for his support, Baldwin II took over the regency of Antioch at Roger of Salerno’s death, as described in chapter 3. His interest in securing his power proved well-founded when he was captured in 1122: power was taken over by the patriarch and the council of barons, and the crown was offered, first to Eustace, who once more declined, and then to Charles the Good of Flanders, his overlord.¹²¹ Lucky Baldwin was lucky once more: Charles declined. An overlord of Eustace and Baldwin’s own kin, deeply rooted in his own territory, for Charles to accept probably looked like a far less attractive opportunity than saying no.¹²² The council of noblemen saw no choice but to negotiate for the king’s ransom. Opportunity, the conscious construction of kin networks, the cultivating of one’s own relatives on the ground, and a loyal family overlord in Europe protected and enhanced Baldwin’s rule. A consummate player at this game, he then sought to remedy his one weakness: the fact that he had fathered only daughters.

A man with a long history of good relations with Antioch (his feisty incident with Tancred’s takeover lying by then twenty years in the past) Baldwin married his second daughter Alice to Bohemond II, as discussed in chapter 2, thus both tying to him another powerful baron and providing himself with another possible heir. His succession was clinched when, in 1129 Fulk of Anjou married his firstborn Melisende.¹²³ Baldwin had contacted Bohemond II in 1126: by giving him his second daughter, he clearly meant for his grandchildren to rule Antioch, but not necessarily for Bohemond to inherit, despite his promise. Nonetheless, if something was clear in the kingdom

¹¹⁹ Albert of Aachen, Historia Iersolimitana, VII.27, 35-6.
¹²⁰ Murray, The Crusader Kingdom, pp.132-48; Alan V. Murray, Dynastic Continuity or Dynastic Change? In The Franks in Outremer.
¹²² The objection here could be, of course, that the noblemen were, in fact, making contingency plans in case their king did not return.
of Jerusalem, it was the importance of happenstance. Had Baldwin II died in the two and a half years between the marriage of Alice with Bohemond and that of Fulk with Melisende, it would have been extremely difficult to stop the prince of Antioch making a bid for the throne (something which would have made Bohemond II the third king of Jerusalem in a row to rise from the border principalities). Baldwin II had been both lucky and able; the final testament of his ability was the long-lasting repercussions of his installing his kinsmen in the Kingdom. When Fulk attempted to seize power from his wife Melisende, and become sole ruler, Hugh of Jaffa, Baldwin II’s cousin, rebelled in her defense. A kin-network well-construed, as Guiscard’s succession proves, could survive one’s death.

Like the Hautevilles (with whom they intermarried more than once) the kings of Jerusalem ruled over a newly formed kingdom, many of whose barons had attained power by their own strengths and felt they had a powerful say in succession and ruling matters. Like the Hautevilles, the kings of Jerusalem had to compensate for lack of heirs and the weakness of their positions by building shrewdly sophisticated networks of support, enlarging the kin group and relying on a complex interplay of brothers-in-law and distant cousins to ensure their succession. Like the Hautevilles in Outremer, the kings of Jerusalem had to deal with both an extremely unstable frontier with a high mortality rate (Roger of Salerno, Bohemond II and Baldwin I all died of battle wounds) and the need to ensure that someone would inherit it who could defend it. Between the sheer accident of having no children, and that of only having daughters who could not serve in the army, the contingent but ultimately successful dynastic strategies of the house of Jerusalem showed how unsure footing could prove fertile ground for alternative family arrangements, in Outremer like in Southern Italy. Sheer circumstance, and a liquid power situation, also engendered interesting family dynamics in another theatre: that of imperial Germany.

b. *Brothers of One’s Blood: Siblings in Imperial Germany*

It has been one of the efforts of this thesis to track something as hard to prove and to discuss historically as emotional bonds, the ways in which the Hauteville kin group members thought of each other and related to each other through expectations not simply of practical protection and political and military alliance, but affection and a perception of family duty which could and did sometimes trump more pragmatic considerations. Another element of importance in the development of the Hauteville kin, however, is even more difficult to pin down: chance. At several fundamental points we have observed how random survival or death could destroy or enhance the Hautevilles’ position: the high rate of fertility and endurance of the original eight brothers laid the foundation for Hauteville power, but the death of three out of four of Roger II’s sons wrecked his

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124 Murray, ‘Baldwin II and His Nobles’, pp. 82-5.
carefully laid plans to install them in charge of the crucial knots of Southern Italian power. While, as mentioned above, it is sometimes easy to identify the plausible causes behind such chances, such as above with the high mortality rate of the rulers of Outremer, constantly engaged in brutal struggle, sometimes it is necessary to point at what looks like sheer luck: supremely competent warriors like Tancred and Jordan died young, of illness, in their beds, while Roger II, born last and probably posthumous of the many children of Roger I, lived to build a kingdom.

Luck however could be good as well. Men of extraordinary fertility like Tancred of Hauteville, who had both produced and raised to adulthood a very high number of sons, could engender the circumstances for the kind of efficient, natural-born kin network the Hautevilles enjoyed, and the princes of Capua and sons of Amicus did not. In twelfth century Germany, it appears, there were many men with Tancred of Hautevilles’ luck. Jonathan Lyon’s study of sibling relations in twelfth-century Germany rests on an unlikely coincidence: in the period he examines in *Princely Brothers and Sisters* (1100 to 1250) all of the main players on the stage of the Holy Roman empire, with the exception of Henry the Lion, were members of a network of three or more siblings, male and female, on which they could rely for alliances, support, and the extension of their interests.  

While Lyon tries to find answers for this phenomenon in possible changes in conditions of life, overwhelmingly, it seems that the princely brothers and sisters of his monograph simply found themselves in the same kind of serendipitous junction which had enabled the eight able-bodied and ambitious Hautevilles to establish themselves.  

The different kin groups Lyon studies show the variety of permutations which the relationship between powerful, power-hungry siblings could engender; permutations which seem to have at their heart the simple fact that these siblings expected of each other and mutually showed a sense of duty and support. In particular, this is demonstrated in the joint administration of partible inheritance: rather than fighting each other for a piece of the family property, Lyon’s siblings appear to have mostly successfully cooperated with joint ownership and administration of it, thus leaving no member of the kin group without and enabling each to share and build on the family inheritance; the exception being the Welf brothers, separated by the circumstances of civil war.  

Kin cooperation was not uncommon at lower levels of society in Southern Italy: Drell and Skinner show how the middle classes of the great urban centres of Campania did foster contextual arrangements in which pieces of land or trading enterprises existed and were held in common among siblings to avoid fragmentation. The difficulty in assembling and defending centralised power could not encourage the Hautevilles to do the same at the high level of society they occupied: even when

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127 Lyon, *Princely Brothers and Sisters*, pp. 120-45; 231.
people worked together as well as Roger Borsa and Roger of Sicily did, they did so from separate spheres of influence, which allowed each of them to develop independent sets of interests.

A similar kind of arrangement can be seen among the five Wettin brothers: joined by a common service to Barbarossa’s cause and mutual support throughout their lives, the brothers could be brought together in joint enterprises, but each developed a separate area of interest, and each fostered and endowed their own comital line. While the kin network could ensure safe fallback, those who were able to could and should build their own power network. Sibling networks, however, in German politics as among the Hautevilles, were not necessarily automatically created: as we have seen with the conscious selection of brothers for roles of power among the Hautevilles, some brothers could be left outside such agreements. Thus the eldest of the Zähringen brothers Berthold IV and one of his younger siblings, archbishop Rudolf of Mainz, endowed with princely power in the German manner, built a strong rapport, and they supported each other throughout their careers; but the youngest siblings Hugo and Adalbert were excluded from this partnership, for reasons that can only be guessed at. Two of the Andechs brothers, Berthold II and Otto, bishop-elect of Brixen, and later bishop of Bamberg, also cooperated together, supporting each other; but the rest of them did not. Among the Germans, therefore, as among the Hautevilles, kin appears to have been at once inherited and construed: the presence of a pre-existing network of one’s peers could offer extraordinary and unique occasions for the conquest and the holding of power, but it was up to the individual to see how they capitalised on it. Just like William the Younger alone had chosen, among the Hautevilles, to make Geoffrey a part of their power network, so the German princely siblings could and did pick and choose how to associate with each other, if at all. Thus at the death of the count of Wittelsbach in the year 1150, his four younger brothers chose to share both the title and the rule of their family fief, subverting straightforward eldest son inheritance and privileging kin over individual powers. The absence of a sibling network and its resources in such a landscape could be even more keenly felt: thus Conrad III chose to make up for his lack through recourse to his half-brother and cousins, much as Roger II would engage in creative kin building to make up for the absence of a natural born support system. In such a situation, women of the family appear to have been characterised by the same kind of contextual belonging to the network as the women born to the Hautevilles: those who moved away were lost, as they entered

129 Lyon, Princely Brothers and Sisters, pp. 63-8.
130 Lyon, Princely Brothers and Sisters, pp. 74-7.
131 Lyon, Princely Brothers and Sisters, pp. 77-80. Within the powerful ecclesiastical network existent in Germany, there was clearly much to be gained for the brother meant to inherit from cooperating with a brother intent on a success episcopal career.
132 Lyon, Princely Brothers and Sisters, pp. 68-74.
133 Lyon, Princely Brothers and Sisters, pp. 90-7.
different kin group dynamics, but those who remained close to the original family continued to have a privileged relationship with their brothers, and to rely on them for political support.\textsuperscript{134}

The extraordinary abundance of sibling networks in Germany at the time appeared as suddenly as it disappeared: by the mid-thirteenth century Lyon registers that, far from persisting, the fertility of the German aristocracy had diminished to the point that few heirs were making it to adulthood.\textsuperscript{135} The networks of brothers had been able to successfully resist and lobby imperial power, pushing for more independence and obtaining what Lyon calls ‘consensual overlordship’, a kind of relationship to the emperor that benefited them and put them in the position of reaping more rewards.\textsuperscript{136} The combination of the availability of a number of allied political operators on whom to rely, and of the frail nature of German imperial power, means that the coincidental rise of fertile sibling groups and the kind of theatre in which they could bring their force to bear created a contingency in which sibling power was not only advantageous, but positively to be capitalised on. Like the eight sons of Tancred in Italy, the princely siblings of Germany had both the natural human capital to expend, and the perfect situation in which to do it.

\textit{7.5 Conclusion}

The Hautevilles were in many ways unique: to a naturally large and fertile kin group they added their presence in a malleable theatre of operations which allowed them to expand and strengthen their power in a way which would not have been possible elsewhere. This experience, and that of the other kin groups, originally from Normandy, who were with the Hautevilles in the South, needs to be contextualised within its appropriate frame of institutional, geographic, and temporal reference. Because of this, this chapter has sought to highlight a few fundamental differences between Norman kin dynamics in England and in the South; not with the intention of denying possible parallels between them, but rather to affirm, within a dearth of secondary sources for kin groups in the South, that no basic assumptions can be made about the validity of the pre-existing, elaborate studies of Norman kin in the North for their brethren in the South. By examining the ways in which Anglo-Norman and Southern Norman writers thought and spoke of each other’s lands, looking at the different ways in which ethnicity and personal identity were construed in the two areas, and considering the radically different ways in which ducal and ecclesiastical power were built in the South and in the North, this chapter has sought to lay down a frame or reference for possible approaches to the comparison between Anglo-Norman and Southern Norman kin.

\textsuperscript{134} Lyon, \textit{Princely Brothers and Sisters}, pp. 53-4, 58-9, 206-12.
\textsuperscript{135} Lyon, \textit{Princely Brothers and Sisters}, pp. 147-9, 196-9.
studies, and the possibility of wider and more contextual comparisons for the kin structures which appear in the Norman conquest of the South.

To this end, the final section of the chapter has sought to shown how the Hauteville experience can be best understood, not just as that of a Norman kin, but as that of a kin network on a frontier with a coincidental, natural availability of members for conquest and rule, in a similar manner to the royal family of Jerusalem or a number of German princely families in the twelfth century. As much of this thesis was dedicated to charting the complex, layered, and extensive Hauteville kin network, and contextualising it within the larger Norman expansion in the South, I meant to conclude this discussion by not just discussing the Hautevilles and their closest Southern peers as Normans, but as the bearers of a highly effective model of kin relations ideally suited to conquest and rule on embattled theatres rife with opportunity for an ambitious warband.
Conclusion

‘But this must be said for the Wiscardida: truly he has followed in his fathers’ footsteps.’

Thus Arnulf of Chocques, an influential prelate who accompanied Odo of Bayeux on the First Crusade, and became the first patriarch of reconquered Jerusalem, addresses Tancred, thundering against him for his greed in ransacking the Temple quarter during the taking of the city. The man who writes is Ralph of Caen: both Arnulf’s pupil, and Tancred’s chaplain in the time before his death. Ralph was a man with a problem: glorifying the man he had served, while at the same time acknowledging his descendance, at once unsavoury and well-known, and his own less than unambiguous record. Ralph’s solution is a delicate balance between his two loyalties: in the text, Tancred defends the grandfather from whom he takes his patronymic, claiming that Guiscard’s courage is second only to Alexander’s, and that his deeds, well-known throughout the world, may be coloured by rumour black or white; finally, he gives back the gold, thus apparently solving the problem he is being harangued for, and restoring peace to the crusader forces.

Through this episode in the narration of the First Crusade we can see, in synthesis, the quintessential reputation of the Hautevilles: highly efficient but notoriously untrustworthy knights, able, greedy, fundamentally not good. All the best-known Hautevilles, from Guiscard himself to his son and grandson Bohemond and Tancred, and his nephew Roger II, are accompanied by the burnish, or tarnish depending on the speaker, of such a name: they are terrores mundi, a terrible people, if a tremendously successful one. As we have seen throughout this thesis, however, even if in the narrative sources only a few of the Hautevilles emerge in their own right, their kin group was extraordinarily prolific and wide: from the initial eight sons and two daughters of Tancred of Hauteville we can trace the origins not just of the dukes of Apulia, princes of Antioch, and kings of Sicily, but also of the counts of Loritello, Catanzaro, Loreto, Principato, Conversano; a branch of the kin group of the princes of Capua; in short, the upper crust of the rulers of the Norman Mediterranean. Moreover we have seen how, up until 1140 and the brisk change of pace imposed by Roger II, the entirety of the Hauteville clan was articulated according to a deeply felt, mutually acknowledged sense of family obligation: different branches of the clan remained intensely aware of each other, even as the rise of the main line of Apulia and Sicily put other offshoots of the family tree in uneasy but effectively more subordinate positions.

2 ‘Wiscardo, secundae ab Alexandro audaciae, detraxit, tanto principi homo, de cuius sobole quispiam principem non uidit. Wiscardi acta nota sunt orbi, non est qui possit detrahere, nisi qui semper studuit candidum in nigrum, nigrum in candida colorare,’ Tancredus, lines 3882-6, p. 114; pp.114 ff. for the solution.
3 And indeed Tancred himself, in the Ralph narrative, candidly admits that it is not his eloquence to recommend him, but his sword and spear (‘non persusasion nec linguositas me promouit, sed ensis et lancea’, Tancredus, lines 3784-5, p. 114.
The things Arnulf of Chocques held against Tancred, ambition, greed, both ability and ruthlessness in war, can be found throughout Hauteville kin: truly, the family of Guiscard followed in the footsteps of their fathers. We have seen how, beginning from their first generation and up to the establishment of the kingdom of Sicily, the Hautevilles functioned as an effective warband: through the assimilation of junior members of the family into their seniors’ schemes of conquest and rule, the close cooperation of brothers in theatres of war, the embattled negotiations of members of a cognatic kin traced through both the paternal and maternal line, the family could provide conquerors and rulers to expand, administer, and maintain the family holdings, which spanned the Mediterranean from Sicily to Antioch. No Hautevilles pursued ecclesiastical careers, unsurprisingly in a territory such as Southern Italy, where rewards from such posts could not be compared to those in Normandy and England; all were absorbed into the clan’s pursuit of conquest, with a success that has made the achievement of less apparent members of the kin group, such as Geoffrey son of Tancred or Roger Borsa, pale in both the contemporary sources and later scholarship. The systematic, effective use of all able-bodied males within the clan, defined pragmatically but inclusively through both masculine and feminine descendants, is then the most immediately apparent characteristic of Hauteville expansion, as every related male was a potential ally and resources for the others.

Nonetheless, even as Hauteville power was by and large founded on military might and male leadership in war, we have seen how it was possible for at least a few Hauteville brothers to develop close, peer-like relationships with their sisters; and how Hauteville ambition in marriage policy could provide them with prestigious wives, backed by useful kin groups, whose participation in the family affairs was actively encouraged by their husbands, thus presenting us with several cases of women, either born to or who had married into the Hautevilles, in positions of influence and authority. The quick evolution of both Hauteville territories, and the institutions required to hold them, meant the possibility for creative approaches to succession, with the selection of younger brothers or nephews as heirs, but also the chance for wives and mothers to step up to provide a regency for underage sons, and support for either weak rulers, or men who could not inherit from their fathers. Throughout their vast dominions, then, the Hauteville kin has appeared consistently flexible, enduring, bilateral, acquisitive, and resilient. This conception of kin was not limited by agnatic descent, but it stretched in both ways to include creatively any member of kin, mostly male but more than occasionally female, who was necessary and useful to the advantage of the family.

However, while thus far I have highlighted the pragmatic advantage of Hauteville reliance on their kinsmen, who enabled and supported Hauteville expansion, we have seen that Hauteville family feeling was not entirely pragmatic, and could and often did manifest itself in ways contrary to practical interest. The sustained mechanism of Hauteville forgiveness, through which troublesome members of the kin group were repeatedly forgiven, and allowed to continue
to thrive, even when their actions ran counter to the head of the family’s advantage, reiterated over and over the importance of family ties over more concrete, measurable preoccupations. Impractical forgiveness, in its turn, manifests as a feeling of family belonging independent of objective advantage, and cognate to another pursuit of this thesis: the emotional history of the Hauteville kin, and the investigation, as far as allowed by the sources, of affective bonds between members of the family. These we have found, in relationships as disparate as that between siblings, husbands and wives, fathers and sons, cousins who had grown up together; and next to feasible, contextual affective ties between kinsmen who cooperated together, and whose stated affection is underpinned by and overlaps with very objective considerations of alliance and mutual advantage, we have seen the reasonless, by all appearances spontaneous manifestations of affection and emotions, and ones that could be troublesome for those who felt them: witness Roger II’s reaction to Elvira’s death, or Tancred risking his life to save and avenge his brother.

If however the sheer width of Hauteville kin has meant a unique scope for this thesis’ inquiry, it has not been my intention to imply that their highly successful and sophisticated kin dynamics were anomalous to their environment, or limited to them: by examining the second and third most successful Norman kin groups in the South, the princes of Capua and the sons of Amicus, this thesis has charted the limits of Hauteville kinship, and seen how the instances of cooperation, negotiation, and emotion studied for the Hautevilles hold true as well, by and large, for their closest comparable kins among the Normans in the South. At the same time, however, it has been necessary to highlight how different circumstances in these kin groups’ contextual situations spelled far different possibilities and outcomes for their family policies. The sons of Amicus, who could not hold out against the Hautevilles, and were repeatedly punished by them through loss of territory, sank into fragmentation and obscurity after the turn of the twelfth century. The princes of Capua, who were still acknowledged by Roger II to bear an authority independent of him, were plagued by early deaths which made their rule unstable; the same instability stalked the rulers of Antioch, and sabotaged Roger II’s carefully laid-out plan to divide the greatest titles of the Mezzogiorno among his own children. In the study of family history in general, and in that of the kin groups here considered in particular, chance, like emotion, runs like a fil rouge it is hard to debate and discuss, but which has been inevitably acknowledged several times in my inquiry. Through random deaths, or lucky streaks of fertility and survival into adulthood, the evolution of the kins observed here has sometimes taken unexpected turns, which could not be accounted for by the agents of family policy, or the historian herself.

It has been my desire, thus, to stress the highly contextual nature of both Hauteville and more generally Southern Norman kin structures as the precise response of a certain availability of manpower on a specific theatre of action. The complex political, social and ethnic composition of Southern Italy, in which a mosaic of long-established, enduring powers was taken over in piecemeal fashion by the Norman invaders over a period of more than fifty years, made both for a
void of power in which numerous lordships could be carved, and a crowded scene which was
difficult to knit into a coherent, centralised power. In this perspective, the baronial struggles
against Robert Guiscard and his descendants, and the traumatic civil war which led to the
establishment of Roger II’s power, all provided the Hauteville themselves and their peers with
numerous occasions for kin alliance, kin expansion, but also the failing and suppression of kin
groups and their territories. This led to a radically different situation from that of Norman
England, which had been taken over as a unified political entity by a Norman force which stood
compacted behind a recognised head, all in a relatively short period of time. Because of this, even
as the Normans in the South recognised themselves, and were recognised by the Anglo-Normans,
as part of a common ethnopoiesis, I have been keen to highlight the reasons why we cannot
simply think of the Norman kins in the South as an extension, or an exact parallel, to Anglo-
Norman ones, despite the existence of family groups like the Giroie-Grandmesnils who bridged
them. The pursuit of closer comparisons for kin group evolution, therefore, has been sought in
contexts which aligned with Southern Italy’s situation of uncertainty and possibility: for example
the crusader Outremer and twelfth century Germany, thus closing my examination of Southern
Norman kin with the laying down of different pathways of inquiry for the future. At the same
time, by examining Anglo-Norman case studies such as the Beaumont twins and the Verdun
family, I have highlighted how close comparisons on a case by case basis between Normans in the
South and in the North still yield very interesting results, once context is taken into consideration.

This thesis set out to examine Hauteville kin relations, patterns of behaviour, and
mechanisms for conquest and rule. It did so on the original model of Anglo-Norman kin studies,
but with an awareness of the almost complete absence of family analysis for the Normans in the
South. Because of this void, an independent inquiry was developed, the reach of Hauteville kin
investigated, and a certain amount of prosopographical research joined to the examination of kin
patterns helped me assemble as complete a picture as possible of this very wide, closely
interconnected family network. As far as possible, I have integrated my discussion of Hauteville
kin structures with an examination of their peers in the South; and in the limited space allotted, I
both sought to contextualise Hauteville expansion within the wider European Norman reach, and
their own perception of themselves as Normans. Still, given that the sample of kin groups studied
was limited by the reasons laid out in chapter 6, this thesis cannot claim to examine fully Norman
kin relations in the South, nor does it seek to answer definitely the question of how closely we can
identify common patterns of behaviour between Normans in the South and in the North. It stands,
however, as the first systematic inquiry into Norman kin relations in the Mezzogiorno before the
establishment of the Regno; the first examination of the Hauteville crusader adventure through the
lens of their larger territorial and familial campaigns of conquest; and the first attempt at
contextualising the founding of the Norman kingdom of Sicily in a dynastic and not just political
and military perspective.
Norman kin relations in the South are a thickly if unevenly documented field of inquiry. The Hautevilles, and in a smaller way the princes of Capua and sons of Amicus, represented the highest level of Southern Norman rule. This thesis focused on them; but its findings are, by necessity, only a first step in a much larger picture that is yet to be fully explored. Even as the analysis of Hauteville kin structures has allowed me to develop further insight into the Norman Mediterranean expansion and its family mechanisms, the parameters here laid are also meant as a wider avenue into the future. In the words of Ralph of Caen, Tancred hotly defended the vestigia he had been accused of treading; while his own patres were particularly notorious, they were far from alone in laying a trail through the Mediterranean, for both themselves and those who followed them. At the close of our examination of the Hauteville band of brothers, it has seemed most useful to look at them not just as Normans, or even as limited by their still quite wide theatre of operations: rather as the representatives of a larger, porous, and extremely successful push on the Mediterranean edge.
Table I – The Children of Tancred
Robert Guiscard,  
duke of Apulia, Calabria and Sicily (d. 1085)

Gerard of Buonalbergo (fl. 1046-1080s)  
Robert (fl. 1096-1114)  
John (dead in childhood)  
Bohemond II, prince of Antioch (1109-1130)  
= Alice of Jerusalem (d. after 1136)  
Bohemond I, prince of Antioch (1050-1111)  
= Constance of France (d. 1125)  
Emma = Odo The Good Marquis  
= (1) Alberada

Roger Borsa, prince of Antioch (1050-1111)  
Guy (fl. 1082)  
Olympias (fl. 1070s)  
Daughter (fl. 1076) = Hugh of Este  
Matilda = Raimond of Barcelona  
Sibilla = Ebles of Roucy

(2) Sichelgaita, princess of Salerno (d. 1090)

Robert Guiscard (fl. 1067-1103)

Robert Guiscard (d. 1109)  
William, duke of Apulia (1097-1127)  
William of Lucera (fl. 1123)

Robert  
William (d. 1097)  

Table II – Descendants of Guiscard

Sketched by: F. Petizzo  
Digitally drawn by: C. Chinellato
Table III – Descendants of Roger
Table IV – Counts of Loritello, Catanzaro and Loreto

Geoffrey (d. before 1069)

- Robert, count of Loritello (fl. 1070s – 1090s)
  - Robert II, count of Loritello (d. 1122)
  - William de Hauteville, lord of Biccarì (fl. 1122-3)

- Drogo Tassio of Loreto (fl. 1080s)
  - William de Hauteville, lord of Biccarì (fl. 1122-3)

- Rao of Loritello, count of Catanzaro (d. before 1111)
  - = Bertha
  - Godfrey
  - Raimond

- William de Hauteville (d. before 1133)
  - = Galana
  - Robert Brito
  - Hugh Rufus
  - Richard

- Mauger de Hauteville (fl. 1119)

Sketch by: F. Petazzi
Digitally drawn by: C. Chinellato
Table V – Counts of the Principato

William, count of the Principato (d. 1080) = Maria of Sorrento

Robert, count of the Principato (d. after 1096)

William II, count of the Principato (d. 1128)

Richard of the Principato, count of Edessa (d. 1114)

Tancred of Syracuse (fl. 1090s)

Nicholas, count of the Principato (d. 1142)

= Adelicia, countess of the Principato (d. before 1150)

William III, count of the Principato (fl. 1141-1161)

Roger of Salerno (d. 1119)

Maria = Cecilia of LeBourcq

= Joscelyn, count of Edessa

Sketched by: F. Petrizzo
Digitally drawn by: C. Chinellato
Table VI - Counts of Conversano

Roger = Daughter of Tancred

Robert, count of Montescaglione (d. before 1080)

Geoffrey, count of Conversano (d. 1100)

Sichelgaita of Molise (d. after 1125)

Sibilla of Conversano, duchess of Normandy (d. 1103)

Robert Curthose, duke of Normandy

Robert, count of Conversano (d. before 1119)

Alexander, count of Conversano (d. after 1142)

Tancred of Conversano (d. after 1133)

Hug of Praxinetum

Alerana

Sybilla of Conversano, duchess of Normandy (d. 1103)

William Clito

Sketched by: F. Petritzo
Digitally drawn by: C. Chinellato
Table VII - Princes of Capua (from Loud, *Age of Robert Guiscard*, p. 303, courtesy of the author)

2. I have preferred the precise dates of the *Annales Cavense*, ad an. 1120, for the deaths of Robert I and Richard III rather than the vaguer testimony of Falco, who dates their deaths to May.
Table VIII – Sons of Amicus

Amicus

Walter, count of Lesina (d. before 1056)

Peter, count of Lesina

(d. before 1093)

Joscelyn of Molletta

Peter, count of Trani (d. 1064)

Godfrey, count of Taranto (d. before 1072)

Peter II, count of Trani and Andria (d. 1082/3)

Rao, count of Lesina (fl. 1119)

Amicus of Giovenazzo

(d. before 1093)

Daughter

Godfrey, count of Canne, imperial sebastos (fl. 1093-1105)

Richard, count of Andria (d. after 1096)

William, count of Canne (fl. 1117)

Roger, dominator of Terlizzi (fl. 1133)

Godfrey, count of Andria

Sketched by: F. Petrizzo
Digitally drawn by: C. Chinellato
Table IX – The Princes of Salerno (from Loud, *Age of Robert Guiscard*, p.302, courtesy of the author)
Figures

Fig. 1 Gravestone of Matilda, daughter of Sylvester of Marsico
Church of S. Cataldo, Palermo, Sicily (picture by the author)

The inscription reads:

EGREGI COMITIS SILVESTRI NATA MATILDIS
NATA DIE MARTIS, MARTIS ADEMPTA DIE
VIVENS TER TERNOS HABUIT MENSES OBITQUE
DANS ANIMAM COELIS CORPUS INANE SOLO
HEC ANNIS DOMINI CENTUM UNDECIES SEMEL UNO
ET DECIES SENIS HAC REQUIEVIT HUMO

(Matilda, daughter of the illustrious count Sylvester, born on a Tuesday, was taken away on a Tuesday, living she had three times three months, and she died giving her soul to heaven, and the body alone to the ground, in the year of our Lord 1161, she rested under this in the ground.)
Maps

Map 1 – Southern Italy

(from Loud, *Age of Robert Guiscard*, courtesy of the author)
Map II – Central Southern Italy
(from Loud, *Age of Robert Guiscard*, p. 310, courtesy of the author)
Map III – Apulia

(from Loud, *Age of Robert Guiscard*, p. 311, courtesy of the author)
Map IV – Sicily

(from Loud, *Age of Robert Guiscard*, p. 312, courtesy of the author)
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