
John Eugene McLaughlin

Ph.D.

Faculty of Law

April 1990

Sheffield University
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all those friends and colleagues who have suffered from this thesis being a part of their lives whether they wanted it to be or not. Too many people have contributed, helped and supported in too many ways over the years to name them all and there are many people who cannot be named because of the nature of the help that they gave. Consequently, I will refrain from the usual list of names and instead just say thank you to all who helped in any way with this project.
## CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I: THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Theoretical considerations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. The state's response to demands for rights of representation and participation</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii The authoritarian state and the crisis of democracy</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Summary</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### II: POLICING, COMMUNITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: MANCHESTER 1981-1985

| i. The police and the community | 113 |
| ii Model I: Greater Manchester Police Authority and community liaison | 145 |
| iii Model II: Manchester City Council and community monitoring | 207 |
| iv. Summary | 236 |

### III: POLICING, COMMUNITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

| 246 |

### IV: POLICING, COMMUNITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: MANCHESTER 1985-1988

| i. Model I: From community liaison to community relations | 262 |
| ii Model II: From community monitoring to community safety | 299 |
| iii. Summary | 321 |

### V: LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF COMMUNITY

| 324 |

### VI: CONCLUSION

| 361 |

Methodology

| 378 |

Bibliography

| 384 |
INTRODUCTION

If socialists are to develop a form of truly democratic policing which is appropriate for a transformed society, then they must develop, work and experiment with and extend democratic forms within the framework of capitalism. To do anything else, to assume that it will all come right in the end, that the wand will be waved and the state and its agents 'abracadabraed' into being good is ridiculous utopianism (Cain, 1976:165).

When Maureen Cain wrote the above she did so within the context of a review of developments in policing for the year 1976. That review documented the de-democratization trends that had continued apace during the year in terms of the increased autonomy of Chief Constables, the increased control of the Home Office and the amalgamation of forces, all which had taken place under the guise of professionalization. The result of such developments was that any claims that the British police were democratically accountable were rapidly fading. Cain's demands that socialists should give the issue of the democratization of the police, and democracy generally, serious consideration took on a sense of urgency after the election of a radical Conservative government in 1979 on a strong law and order manifesto.

a. The Policing Issues

Within two years of this election serious disturbances in the inner cities forced the issue of the constitutional position of the police in British society onto the formal political agenda. For the first time in the post-war period there was a debate on policing which fully reflected the antagonisms and contradictions that had built up over the decades (see New Community, No 9:3, 1981/82; Race and Class, No 2/3, 1981/82; Cowell, et al., 1982; Benyon et al., 1984). There was a break in the two
party consensus on policing matters with the Conservative government giving full support to the police whilst sections of the Labour Party pressed for reforms. The Police Authorities of the metropolitan county councils attempted to assert their role in relation to the policing of their areas whilst Chief Constables vociferously defended their autonomy from what they saw as political interference (see Simey, 1982; 1988; Loveday, 1985; Spencer, 1985; McCabe, 1988).

There was even a public split in the ranks of senior police officers with one Chief Constable, John Alderson, seemingly betraying his colleagues by his highly publicized statements on the need for community policing (see Alderson, 1982; 1984). The basis of the debate was the nature of the relationship between the police and the community and more specifically the means whereby the police are accountable to the community for their actions. The proposals and demands for change shared a common aim to secure greater powers for the community, or its elected representatives, to influence or direct the process of selection through which a policy of law enforcement is constructed. Hence, such proposals are all attempts to secure a form of 'democratic accountability' (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1982:96).

The Conservative government responded quickly to the riots and the demands being made through the utilization of the Scarman recommendations and the setting up of a statutory model of community representation and participation based upon the notion of local consultation. Critics were scathing in their response to these proposals arguing that such a model was no substitute for real democratic accountability (see Bridges, 1982; Bunyan, 1982; Gordon, 1983; 1987). In response to Scarman certain Labour controlled councils attempted to implement an alternative model.
b. The Theoretical Issues

This thesis locates itself within two inter-related theoretical debates that emerged within the British Left in the 1980s after the election (and subsequent re-elections) of a radical Conservative administration dedicated to the eradication of socialism. First, it is located within the wide ranging debate about how to make sense of how such an extreme Conservativism had achieved power and how the Left could construct a set of policies to preclude such a right wing shift in the future. This debate resulted in a rift between those who attempted to hold on to the old truths of Marxist theorizing and those of the New Left who saw such an analysis as being incapable of challenging Thatcherism (see Hodgson, 1981; Miliband, 1983; 1987; Fine et al., 1985; Hall, 1988; Panitch, 1985; Jessop 1988 et al., 1988). For the New Left what was necessary, if Thatcherism was to be defeated, was the urgent reformulation of Left theorizing concerning advanced capitalism, social formations, the state and civil society. Central to this renewal project was an analysis of democracy and the devising of policies geared towards the democratization of society through popular democratic participation. The New Left took hope from the brief emergence of radical municipal socialist administrations in London and certain large provincial cities which attempted to implement such ideas.

The second, inter-related, theoretical set of debates this thesis is located within relate to those of Left wing criminology. The centrality of law and order within Thatcherism’s political project gave an urgency to debates about the basis for a socialist criminological project. In the 1980s two competing paradigms, new Left realism (see, Taylor, 1980, Lea and Young, 1984; Kinsey, Lea and Young,
1986; Matthews and Young et al., 1986) and critical criminology (see, Scraton et al., 1987) materialized within left criminology differing in their analysis of crime, criminalization, law and order and the state. Central to both paradigms was the issue of the police. The disturbances of the early 1980s generated an intense and at times vitriolic debate concerning racist policing, over-policing/under-policing in the inner cities, ineffective policing, political policing, the prospects for police accountability and how it should be achieved. The fundamental issue that emerged from the debates and proposals about policing was what socialist democratic policing look like. Both paradigms utilized notions of community, participation and representation to give meaning to their demands for democratic police accountability. The new Left realists viewed the issue of crime as one with which to electorally challenge the Conservative government. This again led to engagement with those critical criminologists who were highly critical of the Labour Party’s record on the issue and who were arguing for extra-parliamentary community based strategies. Thus, the debates within Left criminology to a degree mirrored the above mentioned debates that were taking place within the wider socialist movement. It is these overlapping debates about socialist democratic theory and practice that provide the theoretical basis for this thesis in its analysis of attempts in Manchester to realize the democratic accountability of the police.

c. The Empirical Issues
This thesis is empirically concerned with what happened in Manchester between 1981 and 1988, where a situation similar to what Cain demanded took place. The Greater Manchester Police Authority was radicalized after the local elections of 1981 had returned a Labour
administration with the stated intention of furthering the accountability of the police to the local community. Such intentions were strengthened by the serious disturbances in Moss Side during July 1981. In 1984 Manchester City Council came under the control of the Left of the Labour Party with the declared aim of implementing policies to further police accountability to the local community whilst rejecting the proposals implemented by the Police Authority. Thus, there were two Labour councils which were both committed to furthering the accountability of the Greater Manchester police force through greater community representation and participation.

In order to attempt to achieve this they set up alternative structures. The Greater Manchester Police Authority utilized the 1964 Police Act and the Scarman consultation model whilst the Manchester City Council utilized a police monitoring model. At the basis of the two models were alternative conceptions of community participation and representation. This thesis specifically addresses the nature of the structures that the two Labour administrations set up in order to achieve their aims and analyzes them in terms of the difficulties and dilemmas in attempting to bring about community representation and participation.

d. Thesis Outline

Part I of this thesis identifies the theoretical and structural issues which must be addressed by those the democratization of the police. The key concepts that have been evoked in the debate within the Left about police accountability in England, namely community, representation and participation are addressed first. I attempt to demonstrate that whilst the concepts are easily and unquestioningly evoked in political discourse there
are key problematical issues relating to each concept that have to be acknowledged and confronted. These theoretical difficulties, I would argue, have to be faced by any socialist project having as its aim the democratization of social formations, institutions and arrangements. The conceptual issues identified provide an ideal type checklist of what proposals would ideally need to include to bring about perfect community representation and participation.

In addition to the theoretical problems chapter two analyzes how previous demands for representation and participation have been structurally settled by the British state. Three overarching processes are identified as being characteristic of the state forms that have emerged in Britain. First, through continuous struggle and negotiation formal rights of representation and participation were attained by the mass of the population throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. However, such rights took a particular form, a form that emphasized controllable Parliamentary representation as opposed to potentially uncontrollable participation. In addition only certain interests achieved representation within the expanding edifice of citizenship. Second, a process of de-democratization and non-democratization can also be identified. As rights of representation were conceded key domains of governance were removed from the potential influence of the enfranchised masses. Other non-democratic institutions and arrangements were also defended vociferously against the demands for democratization. Hence, demands relating to democratization have not necessarily led to a democratic state form. Third, if the interests of the state were sufficiently threatened coercion was used to suppress the demands of the masses. This routinized coercion was
carried out primarily by the new police forces that were formed during the first half of the nineteenth century.

Therefore, those demanding the democratization of the police through community representation and participation are faced with particular problems arising out of the role of the police. The new forces set up in the early nineteenth century were part of the overall compromise reached between the bourgeoisie and the state and were therefore part of the restructured system of local governance. However, as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries progressed the institution of the police moved from representing the interests of local elites to representing the interests of the state in the maintenance of social order. It is within this context that it is possible to identify a process whereby the institution of the police has been removed from the sphere of local democratic influence.

I attempt to specifically chronicle the nature of community representation and participation that has evolved in the development of the British police to illustrate the nature of the above mentioned problems. This centers on what community was represented and participated in making decisions about policing matters. This necessarily means analyzing the structural position of the police and how community representation and participation in the body politic is reflected or otherwise in the governance of the police. This analysis of how the British state has responded to demands for representation and participation provide an indication of how the demands in the 1980s, and 1990s, concerning policing would be dealt with.

The next section documents the precise social, political
and economic context within which such demands were made and responded to. This dissertation covers one of the most turbulent periods of civil unrest in England in the twentieth century. At the basis of that unrest, as indicated previously, was the final shift, from 1979, from a crisis ridden social democratic state form to what Stuart Hall has defined as a fully fledged authoritarian-populist form. The emergence and consolidation of that state form has had considerable consequences in relation to the overarching process identified above. First, there has been the dramatic restructuring of the edifice of citizenship and redefinition of interests that would be represented. Second, there has been an extensive democratization process implemented to facilitate the strong authoritarian state form. Third, as indicated hither to, the strengthening and utilization of the coercive agencies of the state to deal with the consequences of the restructuring of British society has occurred. This has resulted in the police taking on a key role within the restructuring project - that of containing the consequences. Politically the government has offered unswerving support for the police. It was within this specific context that demands for the democratic accountability of the police emerged and were dealt with.

The above mentioned debates, processes and context constitute the macro-contours shaping this thesis.

Part II of the thesis addresses the struggle over police accountability that took place in Manchester between 1981-85. During the 1980s both the Greater Manchester Police Authority and the Manchester Police Monitoring Committee were at the forefront of the debates about police accountability in Britain. The Chief Constable and police force that they were demanding accountability from, the Greater Manchester Police (GMP), were at the centre of
both local and national scandals and controversies relating to the handling of the 1981 disturbances in Moss Side, their role in the 1984-85 coal dispute and the Stalker Affair. Additionally and intertwined was the outspokenness of the Chief Constable, James Anderton, on social, political and moral issues. This meant that the community became the site of struggle in the battle for police accountability in Manchester.

After describing the overall context within which demands for accountability emerged in Manchester the next sections document and analyze the nature of that struggle to implement community representation and participation. Throughout I attempt to document how the two models, community liaison and community monitoring, first, had to confront the conceptual and structural issues identified in Part I and second, how they attempted to resolve the difficulties arising from such issues.

Part III of the thesis documents the macro changes that took place in the mid 1980s that were of direct relevance to the success or otherwise of the two models in Manchester. First, as part of the final struggle between local democracy and the central state, the Police Authorities were abolished. Second, there was the rise of a powerful discourse concerning the issue of crime prevention which had a considerable impact upon policing and the government's law and order policies. Third, there was the impact of this discourse upon the Labour Party and the ramifications for those sections of the Party campaigning for police accountability. Such changes had a considerable impact upon the two models of police accountability. Hence, part IV of the thesis concentrates upon those changes and analyzes the implications for community representation and participation. This part of
the thesis documents first, the move, within the model one, from community liaison to community relations and second, the dramatic shift, within model two, from community monitoring to community safety. Part V of the thesis chronicles the role that the local newspaper, as the disseminator of information and protector of community interests, played in making sense of the struggles for police accountability in Manchester. In particular the role it played in defining what community interests should be represented in policing matters is analyzed. The final part of the thesis attempts to extract the lessons that can be learned from this study of the attempt to create structures of community representation and participation on policing matters in Manchester.
II

PART I: THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Section II: Theoretical Considerations: Community, Representation and Participation

Philosophers have discussed the notion of families of 'potentially ambiguous concepts' and 'essentially contestable' concepts which need careful theoretical clarification before they can be fully analyzed in practice (Held, 1984a:47; Berki, 1989:12). There could be no more problematical a family of theoretically ambiguous and contestable concepts than community, representation and participation. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight the theoretical difficulties of employing such concepts as the basis for demands for the furtherance of the democratic accountability of the police.

a. Community
Many difficulties have been identified with utilizing this concept as the basis for demands. The first relates to providing a specific definition of community. If one scrutinizes the literature on community, it is possible to identify four main categories of usage: locality, social structure, sentiment and social activity respectively (see Warren, 1957; Nisbet, 1970; Plant, 1974; Thorns, 1976; Midgley 1986; Wilmott, 1988). However, these categories are not capable of neat delineation and have plagued the social theorists who have attempted to define the concept more precisely. Hillering (1955), for example, has identified 94 different definitions. Stacey (1969) argues that community should be treated as a non-concept precisely because it is incapable of exact definition. Jeremy Bentham seems to have been one of the first to deny the existence of the concept arguing that it was a 'fictitious body' (see Arblaster 1987:65). Pahl (1970)
maintains because of its vagueness that it has served more
to confuse than to illuminate whilst Pinker (1981), in a
similar vein, refers to the 'fig leaf' of community, a
device to conceal all kinds of contradictions and
confusions. It is such a problem providing an exact
definition of the word that these theorists have argued
that it is worse than useless.

Second, it is important to note that concern about
community constantly expresses itself in relation to urban
social processes. A fundamental sociological debate has
developed over whether it is possible to discuss the
concept of community, whatever its definition, in the
context of urban industrial societies. Is community
compatible with the city? The 'whither community?' and
'loss of community' debates have continued to dominate
urban sociology at both a theoretical and empirical level.
A third problem, as Williams (1976:66) has pointed out, is
that although difficult to define theoretically and
examine empirically community (unlike other terms of
social organization) is never used in a negative manner.
Titmus has also pointed to the implications of such a
positive concept

All kinds of wild and unlovely weeds are changed by
statutory magic and comforting appellation into the
most attractive flowers that bloom not just in Spring
but all year round (1968:104)

In the course of researching this thesis, a fourth process
has been tentatively identified where concerns about
community and recourse to the utilization of the concept
of community emerge during periods of social crisis.

Another related difficulty in utilizing the concept as the
basis for demands emanating from the Left for community
control and accountability is the possibility that the
community is not progressive in nature. As Plant has
documented, community has a long tradition of
respectability within right-wing thought and such compatibility gives it a dangerous pedigree. The right-wing notion

sees the main emphasis of the descriptive meaning of community to be in terms of locality and cultural and kinship ties, and will be unable to make sense of a multi-racial form of community when 'multi-racial' implies that not all values are shared and not all ends are recognised, and this is why, with perfect if manic consistency, the new conservatives formulated the Volksgemeinschaft idea (1974:46).

This should provide a warning to all those on the Left who naively promote the construction of alternative community control mechanisms. If attention is not paid to issues of representation and participation, the community in control could be extremely reactionary in nature, clearly defining who is and who is not of the community and which interests will be included and which excluded (see, Cousins 1975; Jackson 1968; Stacey 1960; Hoggart 1957; Willis 1977; Corrigan 1979a).

However, despite the lack of agreement about the definition of community and whether its existence can be verified or not, community remains a powerful ideological organizing principle. As a result all political positions have attempted to claim it as their own. It is precisely because of its ideological power and attendant difficulties that it is such a problematical concept upon which to premise socialist demands. Given that policing debates and initiatives concerning accountability, representation and participation are based upon the concept, it is necessary to recognize the problematical status of the concept.

A brief note of caution is needed here on the word 'community' since it conjures up all too many illusions. In everyday usage it means a group of people sharing common interests and living in the same area— even if it does not clearly denote a set of existing social realities, the word nevertheless conveys vague notions of harmonious social relations amongst 'the people'. It is therefore necessary to be entirely clear
on the class positions in all their subtlety and ramifications, that in fact occur in the neighbourhood or locality. To speak of a community when working politically on issues such as housing, health, play or welfare can cause great confusion, since, however one looks at it, no community exists; on the contrary one is confronted with a cluster of class positions, conflicts and interests, some of which are irreconcilable (Cowley et al., 1979:5).

If this critique is extended to include race, gender and age divisions then the concept of the community becomes even more problematical in terms of realizing policies premised upon it. Is it possible to have a conception of community that allows for pluralism, heterogeneity and diversity?

b. Representation

Representation as a concept is virtually synonymous with liberal democratic theory and practice. There are, in very general terms, two broad types of democracy: direct or participatory (a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly involved) and liberal or representative democracy (a system of political rule embracing elected 'officers' who undertake to 'represent' the interests and/or views of citizens) (Held and Pollitt, 1986:7).

The latter has come to characterize the institutions of governance of Western forms of democracy. However, in complex social formations there are considerable difficulties in an individual, institution, political party, government or state claiming to represent the wishes of the community. Theoreticians of all political positions have had to take into account what has been defined as the 'crisis of political representation' which has led to the virtual paralysis of many Western (and effectively all Eastern) political structures and institutions (see Pierson, 1987:1). The question that must be addressed is whether it is possible to create a correspondence between the representatives and the represented, knowing that this cannot be assumed,
especially given an increasingly fragmented British social structure, where sections of society have interests that are not, and possibly cannot be, directly represented by the existing traditional representative institutions (Dahrendorf 1985:109). On the point of correspondence Foucault (1981) has raised the vital question about whether discourses and practices can ever be assumed to correspond and coincide. Building upon this point and utilizing the insights of post-modernist theorizing, Hall (1988) has argued that marxism in the 1990s must confront the problematical issue of the very production of representational subjects. As a consequence, key problems with representative democracy relate to the misrepresentation and non/under/over representation of particular interests and issues.

It is within this context that the fundamental issue of the accountability of the representative individual or institution takes on paramount importance. Accountability assumes central importance because representation necessitates accountability.

Political accountability begins when individuals are given responsibility for carrying out tasks on behalf of their fellow citizens. The division of civic labour, the delegation of particular roles to individual citizens, creates the demand for political as distinct from personal accountability (Day and Klein, 1987:6).

In a situation of partial participation, where the community must depend upon representatives, there must be mechanisms for ensuring 'their continuing obligation to explain and justify their conduct in public' (Day and Klein, 1987:7). This is particularly important if their representative status is open to question. Crucially as far as this thesis is concerned, where there is a crisis of political representation, there must also be a crisis of accountability. It is precisely this crisis in accountability that can be identified in a variety of social formations in the late twentieth century.
Participation is a key concept within Western political theory and, like representation, is universally seen to be an essential component of democracy on two grounds. This is first, because it facilitates the rights of citizens to be involved in the decision making processes which affect their lives, thereby facilitating direct accountability.

That is what democracy was originally understood to mean: the people governing themselves, without mediation through chosen representatives, directly or, if necessary, by the rotation of governing offices among the citizens (Arblaster, 1987:62).

And second because the developmental and educative effects of participation can enable people to discover more about their real needs and interests.

As with the other concepts, a series of key issues has been identified in relation to participation. First, there is the issue of the relationship between participation and representative democracy. During the last twenty years disillusionment with the structures of representation, because of the issues cited previously, has led to renewed demands for direct participation (see Pateman, 1970; Richardson, 1983; Barber, 1984). Rustin (1984:14), for example, has argued for 'face to face deliberative decision, after due discussion' as being 'the proper socialist definition of democracy'. Following Mill (1976:217) the supporters of a fully participatory democracy argue that it is the only fully democratic form representation destroys participation and citizenship...representative democracy is as paradoxical an oxymoron as our language has produced; its confused and failing practice make this ever more obvious (Barber, 1984).

Participatory theorists argue that it is only through direct participation that the problems of accountability and non-accountability can be effectively resolved.
Arblaster (1987:63) has argued that despite claims to the contrary, in the twentieth century concerted efforts have been made to restructure democracy so that 'popular participation is treated with suspicion, if not regarded as positively undesirable'. It is within this context that representative democracy, mentioned above, has become dominant.

Second, there is the issue of active versus passive forms of participation as for many theorists participation necessitates activity.

Active members should gain influence by their [active] ability to persuade others, not merely by their [passive] tenacity in turning up at meetings of all kinds (Rustin, 1984:14).

Third, there is the inter-related issue of mobilized versus voluntary participation. Should activity sponsored by the government or its institutions and agencies be defined as active participation or should its definition be confined to behaviour initiated by citizens in pursuit of their own interests? The fourth problem relates to the structural dimension of power. Pateman (1970) has distinguished between two forms of participation: full, where individuals have equal power and partial where one party/group retains final power. As Richardson (1983:25) has argued effective power, "the combination of resources which groups mobilize in their cause (is) the critical variable determining who gets what in the end". Therefore, the notion of equality of opportunity and ability to participate and equality of power to affect the outcome of that participation must be given serious consideration, because if people do not have any power to affect the outcome of decision making or have their interests represented, then why would they voluntarily and actively participate in a given structure? The fullest possible form of participation therefore necessitates structures and principles of justice that will mediate between power.
imbalances as well as mediating between competing interests (see Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:154-59). Following on from the need to address power imbalances is the need to recognize the possibility that participatory structures can enable the powerful to manipulate and channel the needs, interests and demands of the powerless (Nelson 1975: 395-6).

There must also be a means of influencing decision making, and there must be competence and the capability of articulating views. Furthermore, those participating must be in full and equal possession of the relevant information upon which to base a decision. This also links directly back to the educative effects of participation. Groupings vary in cohesiveness, territorial dispersement, skills and experience, resources (especially money), size, the intensity of feelings of support they engender, and even in their sheer ability to use techniques for their own advantage...Compounding inequalities in the opportunity or ability to participate in the early part of the policy making process is the unequal distribution of information (Spitz, 1984:138).

Arblaster argues that access to information is central to any participatory project it also requires a distribution of the resources for propaganda and persuasion which ensures that the power to influence our minds is distributed roughly in accord with the degree of diversity of opinion within society (Arblaster, 1987:196).

Foucault (1979:27) has demonstrated theoretically the crucial connection between knowledge and power and in these deliberations the work of Habermas (1970; 1976; 1974) on 'rational' and 'undistorted' communication is of direct significance. Habermas recognizes that in any given situation there are inequalities between parties and substantive restraints affecting the capability to participate effectively. The decisive question he asks is: How would the members of a social system, at a given stage in the development of productive forces, have
collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs (and which norms would they have accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on the organization of social intercourse through discursive will formation, with adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and fundamental imperatives of society (Habermas 1976:113).

The critical point of participation is allowing a meaningful and abiding decision to be made through ensuring that all sections of the community are represented in structures that allow equal participation and not the domination or exclusion of particular interests (Habermas, 1976:iiii). Any possibility of people deciding what they want and need can only be reached through participation and rational procedures of argumentation. The possibility of genuine consensus on any given issue can only be brought about through an 'ideal speech situation' which Habermas saw as evolving out of relatively egalitarian social relations between free individuals.

Since many of the points and issues arising out of the discussion about participation are overlapping and difficult to separate, it is necessary to keep in mind always the dangers of evoking the concept in an uncritical manner. Participation does not merely refer to taking part in an activity. The manner in which participation is facilitated and structured must be considered and whether the participatory framework allows for direct or indirect, full or partial, purposeful or purposeless participation. It must also be stressed that for the participatory theorists effective participation can only be achieved in micro democratic structures or situations, such as localities or communities. The whole thrust of their critique is against macro non-democratic structures such as the state.

Thus, the concepts of community, representation and
participation each have a series of problems inherent within them which have bedeviled Western political and social philosophy. When combined in the form of demands for community representation and participation, those making the seemingly unproblematical demands are running together a series of problems which demand close attention as they are not necessarily resolvable. Indeed, as indicated, according to certain theorists, they are running together concepts, most notably representation and participation, that are not necessarily compatible. Nevertheless, this has not stopped the incessant demand for what Held and Pollitt (1986) have referred to as the quest for 'new forms of democracy'. Central to the new forms is the call for community representation and participation in political, social and economic life, whether it be in Western liberal democracies or the socialist democracies. Thus, in addition to the considerable problems identified, the ideological power of these concepts cannot be underestimated.

Discussion
A series of key issues and problems have to be addressed by those on the Left making demands for community representation and participation in policing affairs. If these issues and problems are not addressed satisfactorily the project will be flawed and people will not participate or be adequately represented.

In relation to community, it has to be recognized that there is no homogeneous community but stratification and differentiation systems based upon class, gender, race and age making conflicting demands with no necessary overlap or correspondence of interests. It has also to be acknowledged that groups are further differentiated in terms of access to power and knowledge and to possible resource mobilization in a given situation, or what could
be defined as hierarchies of power. Given the existence such hierarchies the key question is whether it is possible to facilitate community representation and participation that does justice to all the interests and claims. Central to this must be a means of redressing structural power imbalances and recognizing that power imbalances also exist between more or less powerless groups. The basis of the project becomes creating structures of representation and participation that can equalize such power imbalances.

In relation to representation the question has to be addressed, what is the most suitable form of representation, direct or indirect? Is it possible to facilitate the direct representation of the whole community, and if it is not how does one chose community representation that does justice to all sections of the community and will be recognized by the community as legitimate. If one does not address this issue, participation will be seriously jeopardized.

Finally there is the problem of whether it is possible to create structures that bring about the active and meaningful participation of the whole community. It is only through active and meaningful participation in micro structures and situations that there is any possibility of people becoming aware of their true interests and needs. In order to do this power inequalities, dominant ideologies and the possibility of manipulation of the powerless must be neutralized. These are the necessary conditions for any possibility of a lasting consensus on a particular issue.

It must be stressed that some of the theoretical problems inherent in the above-mentioned concepts may be insuperable and it is not expected that any democratic
project can satisfactorily resolve them. However, any such project needs to be aware of the problems and will have to attempt to overcome them. Before discussing how these issues were dealt with in relation to the debates about police accountability, it is necessary to recognize the structural context within which demands for community representation and participation were made. This necessarily involves a summary of how the British state has dealt with demands for rights of representation and participation generally and the implications for those demanding such rights in relation to police accountability.
Section II: The State's Response To Demands For Rights Of Representation and Participation

It is possible to identify three overarching processes in the attempt by the British state to manage demands for democratic representation and participation. First, the British state has shown itself capable of compromising and negotiating with such demands, gradually extending formal rights of representation to the mass of British society. In doing so the British state form has, itself, been subject to change in terms of its representative status. Second, it is possible to identify a process whereby key institutions have been removed or defended from the possible consequences of the extension of such rights of citizenship. The most threatening consequence of the extension of democratic rights concerns the possibility of institutions of the state being held accountable for their actions and decisions. The third strand relates to the utilization of coercive agencies and measures to contain and, in repeated instances, to discipline such demands if deemed to threaten directly the interests of the state. Since the third strand relates directly to the development of the British police it will be discussed in a separate section. As a consequence of the configuration of the three overarching processes, a very tightly structured form of democracy - one that has consistently stressed representation rather than participation - has developed in Britain.

a. The construction of democratic rights of citizenship

The British state has responded continually and comprehensively to demands for political representation and participation (see Parker, 1983). As such the resultant liberal and social democratic state forms can be seen as
the vector of two sets of political forces: 'pressure from below' and 'reform from above'. The first refers to the myriad ways in which class movements together with social and community movements demand social reforms to protect or extend their interests. This may result from pressure group politics within the state at one extreme to direct action and street conflict at the other. 'Reform from above' refers to the various ways in which the state seeks to implement social reform which will serve the long term economic, social and political interests of capital, or certain sections of capital (Gough, 1983:157-8).

The upsurge of demands for political and social reform came at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a consequence of political and economic conflict unleashed by the industrial revolution. The agitation of the middle classes and the working classes for political representation resulted in radicalization, riots, the development of a formal reform movement and a near constitutional crisis (Miliband, 1982:21-22). Through the passing of the 1832 Reform Act and 1835 Municipal Corporations Act the edifice of citizenship was extended to the previously unrepresented areas and interests of the upper middle classes. This legislation created a political alliance between the bourgeoisie and the Whig gentry through which the urban elites were able to establish hegemony over their own communities (Fraser, 1979:14).

The effect of this alliance was to de-couple bourgeois demands from working class demands for political representation and participation. As a consequence, the working classes did not make any political gains. This response was to be characteristic of one of the ways the developing British state would deal with future demands for democratic representation and participation. If pushed to a point where concessions had to be made, the state was capable of absorbing and de-coupling moderate demands from radical ones (Feuchtwanger, 1983:2-3).
Miliband (1982:23) has argued that the key notion of parliamentary representation as the mechanism through which change could be achieved was established in the struggles of the working classes during this period. Consequently, the idea of indirect representation, as opposed to direct participation, was reaffirmed as the demands for mass democracy were effectively crafted onto an elite system of political representation (see Ramussen, 1984). Thus the Chartist movements of 1838-39, 1842 and 1848 had a six point charter demanding universal suffrage, annual parliaments, secret ballots, equal representation, the payment of Members of Parliament and the abolition of property qualifications for Members of Parliament. Although the state did not immediately give way to such demands they were met, in one form or another, during the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a consequence of the struggles and concessions, by the 1860s

the British working class exhibited certain "contradictory" characteristics. If it was increasingly "respectable" it was also increasingly well organized. If it had abandoned its revolutionary ambitions, it had not wholly lost its revolutionary potential. It left no doubt that those potentialities might be speedily developed if it was too long thwarted in its desire to secure political equality. In short, it had attained precisely that level of development at which it was safe to concede its enfranchisement and dangerous to withhold it (Harrison, 1965:133).

The 1867 Reform Act brought about the political representation of the aristocracy of labour, who had property rights within the existing system (see Gray, 1977; Kirk, 1985). During this period the rights of trade union representation were also furthered through the establishment of the Trades Union Council (TUC) in 1868 and the election of the first Lib-Lab Members of Parliament. Moreover, as a result of the enfranchisement
of rural workers in 1884, the 1885 Redistribution Act and the 1888 Local Government Act, the democratic representative basis of the British state was consolidated.

Nevertheless, such reforms could not contain the rising social, political and economic conflict of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The period between the 1880s and the 1920s witnessed a profound crisis which resulted in a dramatic change in the nature of the British state from liberal to representative-interventionist one. Fuelling the change were the demands by the mass of British society for both formal and substantive rights of political, industrial and social representation (see Langan and Schwartz, 1985).

In addition to the organized sections of the working classes finally establishing their own political Party, other demands were made upon the state in relation to representation and participation. After the Women's Enfranchisement Bill had been rejected by Parliament in 1904, the Suffragette movement became more militant in their demands for female political representation. Also during this period the question of Ireland was challenging the whole edifice of the British Imperial state form and in doing so precipitated a rebellion by British army officers and the rejection of the democratic process by the Conservative Party (Hobsbawm, 1969:193). As a consequence

The emergence of mass democracy could not be contained within the limited forms of representation of the liberal state. What the democratic challenge carried was nothing more or less than a new set of claims on the state by the unenfranchised masses, a new conception of citizenship and, indeed, an expansion of the rights of citizenship from the sphere of legal and political to economic and social rights (Hall and
Universal, formal, political representation was finally achieved, for all male and female adults, through the 1918 and 1928 Representation of the People Acts. As a result of the historic compromise between the forces of change and the state, there was the emergence of the 'universalist state, formally representative of the totality of interests which composed the nation' (Hall and Schwartz, 1985:28). It was also within this context that the notion of universal social provision emerged in response to working class demands. Accordingly, the struggles for representation and participation during this period were resolved in a manner which reemphasized representation as opposed to participation.

With universalism too came the triumph of the electoralist version of democracy: the individual voting subject became the linchpin with all official state discourses. In turn the act shaped the conditions which made possible the strategic reassertion of the absolute centrality of parliament and constitutional politics (Hall and Schwartz, 1985:28).

As a consequence

any hopes for a more assertive, radical and popular conception of democracy - either representative or direct - disappeared. Democracy was contained within the confines of electoralism and a very specific variant of national constitutionalism. The political settlement represented an unequivocal victory for the forces of constitutionalism but a much more ambivalent outcome for democracy (ibid:28-29).

The Labour Party received the mantle of official representative of the forces of change and in doing so once more reaffirmed the legitimacy of the two party structure of political representation. Thus, the party of social change had a vested interest in the maintenance of the existing structures of representation (MacPherson, 1977:65-66). There are three other aspects of the advent
of formal mass representative democracy that should be noted. First, there was the possibility of the actions of the state taking on a fully legitimate foundation through being electorally mandated. Second, any active citizen participation increasingly came to be limited to first, channeled through two national parties and second, mobilized once every four years for electoralist purposes. Finally, interests had to gain recognition through the formal two-party system to have any hope of reaching the national political agenda. However, with regard to the issue of representation there are two fundamental problems with such a two-party system. The first problem is that national parties, particularly when there are only two of them, are incapable of representing all the interests the claim they can represent. Therefore, prioritization has to take place and powerful interests inevitably dominate in such prioritization. The second problem overlaps with the first in that there may well be conflict between the interests that the political parties are supposed to be representing and the state interests they are supposed to represent when in government. These factors have important implications for what interests can be represented within the political system.

However, it was not until the end of the second world war that full economic and social representation was consolidated with the implementation of the social democratic welfare state form and the post-war consensus (Marshall, 1950:47). The foundations of that consensus were constructed upon the welfare state, the adaptation of capital and labour to the notion of a mixed economy and a political consensus about the continued existence of capitalism (Hall et al, 1978:228).

The whole idea of the post-war consensus was premised upon
fully representative rights, constructed through notions of universalism and equality of opportunity. In theory an historic settlement had been reached ‘under which all citizens enjoyed certain civil, political and social rights’ (Gamble, 1988:11). Hence, full formal rights of representation were characteristic of the social democratic state form. However, the rights of democratic participation were severely limited to engaging in pressure group politics, joining hierarchically structured national political parties and voting once every four years. Within this context of limited participation there were considerable limitations to the type of accountability that could be exercised.

b. The evisceration of democracy

i. The national context
The second process that can be identified in the response of the British state to demands for representation and participation results from the fact that the state form which has developed in Britain has been fundamentally suspicious of democratic principles, and particularly hostile to the notion of participation by non-experts in the planning, policy making or service delivery of state agencies (Jordan, 1985:341). As a consequence there has been first, the defence of non-democratic institutions such as the House of Lords, the monarchy, the military and the judiciary, from any possibility of democratic accountability being exercised, and second, the removal of other sensitive institutions and agencies from any such process (see Bentley, 1984; Leys, 1984). It must also be borne in mind that key sectors of decision making, most significantly economic ones, have never been subject to democratic processes of accountability (see Hindess, 1983; Hirst, 1988). Thus the challenge for democratic representation and participation
did not result in the democratization of the social formation. At the same time as the state negotiated and compromised over formal institutionalized rights of representation it is possible to identify a concurrent process whereby democracy was eviscerated. As sections of the working classes and other social forces gradually had their demands recognized within highly formalized forms of representation whole areas of social and economic life were removed from the possibility of political influence being exercised (Bunyan, 1977; Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 1988). As such they were made immune to the processes of political accountability (Arblaster, 1987:55).

Central to this process was the emergence of interventionist central state. Even the nineteenth century liberal nightwatchman state form had little hesitation in interceding to regulate and contain aspects of social, economic and political life that were problematical. Complete state centralization was never introduced because of vested interests and because it was not necessary. However, central government did expand administratively throughout the century with the appointment of regulatory commissions and an inspectorate particularly to regulate social matters, most notably in the case of the Poor Law (Roberts, 1969:92-94). That interventionism became pronounced as the century came to an end with the rise of the interventionist collectivist state. As indicated previously both were in response to the political rise of the working classes and necessitated the state intervening directly in all aspects of social and economic life (see Gyford, 1985:3). As Hall has pointed out it is no coincidence that the interventionist state emerged at the same time as the representative one.

A state that can claim to represent everybody can, with legitimacy compel everyone to conform. This was one consequence of the enfranchisement of labour and the
popular classes in the wider sense that occurred in this period. It enabled the state to intervene more extensively because now it could claim to be doing so in the name of the general interest. Representation and intervention were therefore linked: the extension of the state’s democratic base provided the necessary legitimation for its expanded powers of intervention (Hall, 1984:74).

Such interventionist tendencies were strengthened by the development of the strong state during World War One which necessitated for the first time the mass co-ordination of the British people. During the war two more developments had a direct affect upon the possibility of parliament exercising some form of accountability. First, the apparatus of national governance was significantly reshaped through the creation of powerful ministries. As a consequence, there was a shift from parliament to cabinet decision making. And second, there was the rapid expansion of the apparatus of the secret state in the form of its surveillance agencies and secret sub-committees (see Thompson, 1980; Porter, 1987).

Centralist state intervention continued in the 1930s in response to the near collapse of international capitalism. The National government responded by developing a new protectionist economic strategy which represented a fundamental break with liberal Victorian ideologies. Industrial cartels and central agricultural marketing schemes were created and regional planning policies were implemented. In addition there was crucial state intervention through the utilization of emergency powers, to control the industrial conflict which culminated in the 1926 General Strike. Towards the end of the 1930s there was further intervention to control urbanization, relocate industry and construct new towns, as well as in the area of social security. As a consequence, Britain changed from being one of the least controlled economies to one of the
Between 1936-45 two events consolidated the direction and control that was to be characteristic of the post-war period. First, there was the rise of Keynesianism which was premised upon the notion of the co-ordinating and regulatory central state form. And second the management of a total war resulted in all aspects of social and economic life being controlled in an unprecedented manner (see Harris, 1984). There was the implementation of comprehensive authoritarian state control in the areas of security measures, conscription, labour schemes, evacuation measures, the rationing system and the further extension of social welfare statism. As a consequence, by the end of the war, 'British society was subjugated to tighter and more efficient government than that of any other combatant nation except Russia' (Roebuck, 1982:149).

This increase in the extent of the state's activities resulted in dramatic changes to the institutions of governance. The unaccountable power of ministerial officials was enhanced further; civil service departments were expanded and there was the continued consolidation of power in the hands of the prime minister and the cabinet with the resultant weakening of Parliament. Additionally as MacPherson has pointed out (1977:65-66), the main political parties concentrated power in their leadership at the expense of MPs, party members and the electorate. As a consequence of such changes by the time the working classes finally achieved full political, economic and social representation within the state, a structure had been created that precluded their dramatically influencing decision making, even if they had wanted to.

During the post-war period formal democratic rights became
substantively meaningless because of the rise of corporatism and the concentration of decision making powers in the hands of powerful elites. Such corporatist arrangements were the logical consequences of the trends in the development of the central state identified hitherto. The social democratic state, in order to attempt to represent both the interests of the working classes and capitalism, entered into negotiations with those groups whose acquiescence and consent was seen to be decisive. As a consequence, the representatives of these groups, principally trade union and industrial leaders, were given access to state decision-making processes in a manner which effectively by-passed the democratic structures of representation. Whilst such an historic class compromise benefited those powerful groups in society who gained additional and substantive representation the powerless were excluded. Whilst having formal rights of representation their interests were not included in the corporatist arrangements (see Lindblom, 1977; Panitch, 1977; Schmitter, 1977; Jessop, 1980; Offe, 1980; Thompson, 1984).

ii. The local context

The impact of the emergence of the strong central state, and eventual corporatist state, can be illustrated by the effects it had upon the structures of local governance. In the first decades of the nineteenth century in many respects local government was more important than Parliament because the day-to-day governing of the country was carried out by the local ruling elites (see Finlayson, 1969; Foster, 1974; Fraser, 1976; 1979; 1982). In addition there was no expansive national political party structure channelling politics solely towards parliament (see Gyford and James, 1983). However, as the nineteenth century progressed local government, particularly in the cities
and towns, began to come under tighter central state control.

By the time the respectable sections of the working class finally achieved independent formal representation, it was within the tightly controlled council structures set up by the bourgeoisie after the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act. As late as the 1880s local government remained under the control of the middle classes even in cities where there was a working class majority (Blunkett and Jackson 1987:45). It is interesting to note that after 1919, in response to the emergence of the local Labour Party, it began to be asserted that local government was not a suitable place for politics. Central to this ideological de-politization process was the argument that local government was above politics, as it was concerned with the delivery of services for the good of the community (Bulpitt 1967:9; Miliband, 1982:136).

Nevertheless, during the inter-war years certain Labour controlled councils did utilize local government to cope with the consequences of economic recession. As part of the struggle in London, there were demands in the 1920s for 'Home Rule For London' and a 'Parliament for Greater London' (see Saint et al, 1989). The development of such policies culminated in the struggles of the 'Little Moscows' in the 1920s and 1930s to deal with the inadequacy of central government responses to mass unemployment (see Branson, 1979; MacIntyre, 1980). The reaction of the central state to such a direct confrontation was to pass coercive legislation to jail councillors who refused to obey central government edicts, and to appoint commissioners and co-optees to bypass local democracy. This unsuccessful challenge to the central state resulted, from 1926, in sections of the Labour Party
advocating more moderate policies for councils controlled by the party. For other sections of the party it confirmed the importance of gaining control of national power. The eventual hegemony of such centralist ideologies had important consequences. When the Party finally formed a majority government in 1945 structures of local governance, and therefore structures of democratic accountability, were viewed as being anachronistic and potentially troublesome (Blunkett and Jackson, 1987:56-59).

The determination of the Labour government to manage and socialize the economy resulted in the construction of the social democratic corporatist state in the post war period. This resulted in the considerable restructuring of local government to act as an apolitical mechanism for the realization of central government policies (see Corrigan, 1979:207). Dunleavy (1984) argues that this was achieved by three principle means. First, there was the introduction of corporate management in local authorities. This reduced the influence of elected members, removed key areas of policy making from controversial arenas of public debate and facilitated the development of close links between public authorities and private sector interests at the local level. Second, there was the expansion of central administration with the establishment of regional offices to administer policies and supervise programmes. This also resulted in the transfer of fundamental aspects of policy making and implementation from the local electoral arena and effectively closed them off to popular pressure, whilst at the same time opening them to professional experts and private sector interests. The scope for democratic accountability to be exercised was strictly limited as none of the bodies were directly elected and many did not even include local authority
representation. The third dimension was the already mentioned introduction of non-elected forms of local administration which co-existed with local authorities and assumed responsibility for functions that had previously been discharged by the latter. Thus, by the late 1960s, Dunleavy argues that British politics had become bifurcated between a formal sphere of electoral democratic politics and a substantive sphere of corporatist interest representation, in which powerful functional economic interests were directly represented in the decision making process (see Bassett, 1984; Boddy and Fudge, 1984; Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Budge and McKay, 1988; Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1988).

Additional developments inter-connected with the above in the attempt to neutralize further the potentially unpredictable political nature of local government. State policy developed a bias towards the professionalization of local government services reflecting the belief that local government’s role was the implementation as opposed to the formulation of policy. Laffing (1986:30) documents how the central state encouraged ‘outside sources of professional accreditation over locally based training and experience’. As a consequence professionalization set limitations on the control local councils could exercise over their staff.

Concurrent with the rise of local government professionals was the rise of the local social service professions. Taylor (1980:39) argues that from the very moment the Labour Party took power, professional experts were given a key role in the construction of the social democratic welfare state. This role was strengthened throughout the 1960s and 1970s and the ethos of professional autonomy not only undermined local structures of political
accountability, but also drastically reshaped and restructured the local communities within which they worked in an unaccountable manner. Professionals took on the role of articulating and defining needs and as a consequence clients were offered 'few opportunities for participation, criticism or choice' (Jordan, 1985:255).

Therefore, to document the key changes in the nature of local government is to document the growth of the central state and centralizing tendencies which defined local democracy, and by definition accountability, as an anachronism and more importantly, politically dangerous.

c. The corporatist state and the crisis of democracy
At the same time as these changes were taking place various committees and commissions were examining virtually every aspect of local government in Britain with a view to further structural reform (Byrne, 1986:32-44). They were unanimous in the conclusion that because of the changes in the post-war period there were crises of accountability, representation and participation respectively (see Day and Klein, 1987:41-50). However, recommendations to remedy the situation compounded the problems. The Conservative government's 1972 Local Government Act created even larger units of local government. The county council became the basic unit of local government incorporating district councils and Boroughs. This Act also created six massive metropolitan counties encompassing populations ranging from 1 to 2.7 million (see Keith-Lucas and Richards, 1978). Such changes fundamentally challenged the whole idea of local government and local accountability. As Bassett has pointed out

The end results of these developments by the 1970s was a centralized local government system heavily bureaucratized and professionalized, remote from a
local public who often showed so little interest in electoral participation that were warnings of a breakdown in the system of representation (Bassett, 1984: 94).

In addition the unintended consequences of the rise of corporatist modes of representation, both locally and nationally, were three fold. First, seeming favouratism resulted in the erosion of the electoral support of those social groups not represented by the special negotiations. Second, by the prioritization of certain powerful interests, the powerless were systematically marginalized and effectively excluded from the edifice of citizenship (see Held and Krieger, 1982). The third consequence was the erosion of confidence in and acceptability of the political parties and institutions that had implemented such corporatist policies (see Held, 1984). The British state was facing a legitimation crisis in the inner cities.

i. Renewed demands for rights of representation and participation
The response was the revolt of the late 1960s, a wide ranging revolt by those excluded from key decision-making processes against the unaccountable and unresponsive central and local bureaucracies (see Offe, 1982). Although the revolt expressed itself in different forms at the basis of demands was one thing - the demand for power, most straightforwardly expressed in the all embracing slogan, 'power to the people'. The participation of the trade union leadership in corporatist decision making strategies resulted in an upsurge of unofficial localized disputes as the gap between the representatives and their members grew (see Pimlott and Cook, 1982). Scepticism about Party politics resulted in increasing volatility amongst the electorate in terms of voting behaviour. Consequently, the two major political parties attracted an
ever smaller percentage of the total vote cast whilst there was the emergence of other parties. Indeed from the latter half of the 1950s the two parties began to win elections with approximately one third of the electorate's support (see Butler and Stokes, 1974).

Underpinning this crisis of political representation and participation was the dramatic international economic crisis that engulfed Britain in this period (see, Gamble, 1979; Friend and Metcalfe, 1981). Not only were corporatist modes of representation prioritizing certain interests but they were not capable of resolving this economic crisis to the satisfaction of those groups that they were supposed to be representing. It is in this period that both Left and Right of the political spectrum began to develop critiques of social democracy, premised upon the idea that social democracy could not deliver what it had promised.

It was in the inner cities that the crisis began to manifest itself most fully. The re-deployment of transnational capital and the rationalization of the labour process resulted in the emergence of substantial structural unemployment (see Braverman, 1974). The first phase of job losses overwhelmingly affected the large cities who lost over half a million jobs between 1966-71 (McDowell, 1989:162). In addition to the impact of the new international division of labour the inner cities were also subject to constant professionalized redevelopment through slum clearance and the building of high rise mass housing schemes. As a consequence there was an exodus of those who could from the deteriorating inner cities. As Friend and Metcalfe (1981:91) document, it was the unskilled, the semi-skilled, the migrants, the old and one parent families who bore the brunt of the changes in the
inner cities because they could not leave. The result was the an increase in social tensions with the first recognition of the potential phenomenon of an urban underclass emerging consisting of those who were gradually being dispossessed of their social, economic and political rights. As a consequence, they were being defined out of the edifice of formal citizenship, supposedly constructed by the social democratic state.

However, this potential underclass did not readily accept the position it was being allocated in the new economic structure. One of the consequences of the post-war settlement being based on the formal principles of universality and equality of opportunity was that departures from the principles would meet with resistance (Gamble, 1988:13). As a consequence the legitimacy of the state was not only being questioned but also being challenged in these areas.

Fresh demands for participation were put forward, and these generated fresh discussion about this supposedly obsolete concept. Trends towards the centralization and bureaucratization of power, far from being accepted with resignation, generated an opposition which stressed the virtues of smallness, accessibility, openness and decentralization (Arblaster, 1987:157).

It is within this context that the concept of community was first linked to demands for participation. The return to concepts such as community and participation was indicative of the alienation people felt towards the massive and unresponsive bureaucracies that had developed apace in the post-war period. There was the proliferation of localized community struggles and campaigns challenging the existing centralist forms of political representation. In addition to the progressive groupings, there was also the re-emergence of electorally potent reactionary ones, particularly the reassertion of racist political groupings most notably the National Front. Just over two decades
after the creation of the social democratic consensus the whole structure was straining under first, the class contradictions it had supposedly resolved and second, the new social and political contradictions it had unintentionally generated.

ii. The response to the demands
It is in this period that the problematical nature of demands for representation and participation premised upon the notion of community become clear. The state had the problem of attempting to respond to the demands of inner cities differentiated by age, area, class gender and race, where all conventional forms of representation and participation had virtually collapsed, where consent and legitimacy were absent and potential inter-communal and racial conflict present. Precisely because there was no readily identifiable community, as far as the state was concerned, state agencies set about creating one. Only when there was an identifiable community could these agencies construct mechanisms of consultation with representatives of that community and attempt to forge links with that community. In doing so it was also possible to attempt to neutralize and incorporate moderate interests and to define out those radicals interests who did not co-operate with the state-sponsored initiatives, structures and funding. Additionally, through the officially recognized community representatives and initiatives it was possible to educate people concerning the rights to which they were entitled as opposed to the rights they were demanding. Independent initiatives and demands were drawn into such structures for a share of the resources. Therefore, to some degree actual and potential conflict was contained and controlled via official recognition, and legitimacy was given to particular non-democratic supplemental forms of community representation.
As Friend and Metcalfe (1981) have noted

A major strand behind all the projects set up at this time was a bid for the consent of the governed in areas with the highest concentration of the urban poor. Thus councils of community relations were set up in areas with large immigrant populations in an attempt to vocalize the discontent of minorities and channel it into governable forms. Similarly, community groups and pressure organizations were often funded and parallel emphasis on public participation crept into many areas of local government activity (1981:14).

Thus the vacuousness of formal rights and structures of representation, the corporatist de-democratization process, the withdrawal of rights of citizenship and intensification of social divisions had resulted in a crisis of representation and participation, and therefore accountability, in Britain's inner cities. The response of the state was to create additional forms of representation and participation in an attempt to contain and channel conflicting demands into an acceptable format. It is within this context that the concept of community was first used in a manner that became the norm in the 1970s and 1980s, as the basis for the creation of identifiable structures of controlled representation and participation. Such structures were characterized by non-accountable, undemocratically based liaison and consultation and by an emphasis on representation as opposed to participation (see Loney 1983; Cochrane, 1986).

The social group to be subject, initially, to such supplemental non-democratic community structures of representation was that of black migrants. The colour of their skin and the role allocated to them within the post-war British economy, as a reserve army of labour, meant that these migrants were excluded from the post-war settlement (see Hall et al., 1978; Sivanandan, 1983; Ramdin, 1987). As a consequence they were located outside the edifice of citizenship (see Deakin, 1970; Humphrey and
John, 1971; Hill and Issacharoff, 1971). This outsider status was confirmed by their subsequent handling by the agencies of the state through the enforcement of measures which curbed immigration and encouraged integration.

The British state initially left voluntary agencies and local authorities to deal with the welfare of the new migrants and to make contact with them. Liaison officers and consultative committees were appointed in Liverpool and Birmingham in the early 1950s. Little effort was made to bring about the participation of migrants in the liaison and consultative arrangements. Furthermore, many of the independent migrant organizations that quickly developed were not given representation because they were defined as being too political. At the first meeting of the Nottingham Consultative Committee for the Welfare of Coloured People in 1954, for example, no black people were invited whilst at the second meeting three members of the non-political Colonial Social and Cricket Club were invited to represent the West Indian community. It was only after the 1958 disturbances that immigrant groups were invited onto the consultative committee. Therefore, black migrants were subject to liaison and consultative structures and institutions of mediation to represent their interests and to define and articulate their needs without their direct representation or active participation (see Hill and Issacharoff, 1971).

Such liaison and consultative structures were formalized at the highest levels of state policy in the anti-immigration legislation passed in the 1960s. The 1965 White Paper recommended, through the setting up of a National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, joint central and local government support and financial encouragement for local authorities to establish such
structures. Additionally the White Paper laid down formal guidelines on the structures. They were to have the involvement of both the immigrant and host communities and concern themselves with matters concerning integration. Furthermore a new component was introduced as such committees were eligible for grants to cover staffing costs. To qualify for grants the structures and aims for the committees, laid down by the White Paper, had to be tightly adhered to. Thus the committees were subject to central supervision and control.

As a consequence, the White Paper formalized and institutionalized professional liaison and consultative structures that were supposed to facilitate the direct representation of black migrants. As a consequence, channels were created through which immigrant interests were to be represented and their participation facilitated. Through this process, the state was able to create a mediating class of appointed community representatives and a set of organizations with which its institutions and agencies could consult and liaise. In addition, the community representatives and leaders were allocated the role of educating their communities about the need to integrate into British society and their rights as British citizens. Such a process was fully institutionalized when the 1968 Race Relations Act replaced the non-statutory NCCI with a statutory Community Relations Committee. Thus it could be argued that the state was giving recognition to the need to have extra mechanisms of representation to compensate for the under/non-representation of black interests in the formal political structures.

However, critics of these structures (Sivananden, 1983; Dummett, 1968; Hill and Isacaharoff, 1971; Humphries and
John 1971) have argued that there were a series of consequences of the institutionalization of such structures. First, non-democratic liaison and consultation structures were substituted for equal rights of participation and representation. Second, state sponsorship of such structures resulted in the disintegration of independent organizations and groupings, effectively defining out an important strand of black representation. Third, such sponsorship cultivated and encouraged a professional and unaccountable black bourgeois buffer zone of appointed community representatives who accepted state definitions of issues and policies and who had the role of "selling" such definitions to the community. The critics are agreed that the race relations structures and community representatives could not be representative of the community.

Furthermore, the structures of representatives excluded the active participation and direct representation of the black communities on issues of governance affecting their lives.

Thus, it is argued that the community liaison and consultation structures were a means by which the state sought to channel the actions of black people in a non-political direction to prevent the development of an effective protest movement. Funding and state recognition went to the least militant and most multi-racial organizations and community representatives whilst the campaign committees and more radical organizations were
defined out of the structures of representation. Whilst this might have resolved the problem in the short term, two irresolvable long term problems were built into the structures created by the state to deal with its black population. First, the representativeness of the structures and individuals who were involved in them was open to constant questioning and challenges. And second, the representative structures and respectable community leaders could not deliver to the state the consent of the community for the proposals and policies to which they agreed. Within an overall context of institutionalized racism these problems have constantly beset state policies in its relations with its black population, particularly in its relationship with black youth.

Discussion
In addition to the theoretical difficulties posed by the key concepts, those demanding accountability through community representation and participation must be cognizant of how the British state has dealt with such claims previously. The latter has proved itself capable of absorbing such demands by extending to the majority of society formally structured rights of representation. The consequence was the emergence of a highly formalized structure of representative democracy which met moderate demands. However, radical participatory ones were defined out by the development of this structure

Ironically the growth of [representative] democracy helped to curtail public participation in policy making by undermining the foundations of representational theory (Rasmussen, 1984:30).

Additionally, it is possible to identify a concurrent process whereby key institutions of governance have been insulated from the potential consequences of the expansion of representative democracy and the principle of
democratic accountability. This was accomplished through three means. First, there has been the safeguarding of traditional non-democratic institutions. Second, there has been the development and encouragement of unaccountable corporatist structures and processes to counter-balance and neutralize the possible effects of democratic representation. And finally, where it has been deemed necessary, the central state has intervened directly to remove those institutions and agencies subject to the process of democratic accountability. This has been most notable in the domain of local governance. Thus structures of democratic representation have developed which have attempted to minimize the participation of the citizenry and curb tightly the potential influence of their representatives. In this context, mechanisms of accountability became virtually paralysed, particularly in relation to the inner cities.

In the late 1960s when those groups whose interests did not achieve formal representation within the social democratic corporatist structures and/or were excluded from the decision-making processes of unaccountable institutions and agencies demonstrated, the state responded in a manner which reflected an unwillingness and structural incapacity to meet such demands. By acting upon the multiplicity of diverse and fragmented claims, supplemental professional and non-democratic structures of community representation were created. These structures incorporated moderate demands through the recognition of certain community representatives whilst defining out radical participatory ones. The state through these structures liaised and consulted with those demanding community participation. However, it was within strictly defined parameters and did not involve any possibility of the transformation of the existing social order. The
supplemental powerless consultation structures were effectively tagged on to the existing corporatist arrangements and as such they contained and channelled participatory demands. In doing so such structures could not and did not resolve the increasing crisis of democracy in Britain, a crisis that was at its most acute in the inner city areas. It is within this context that it is necessary to consider the other means by which the British state has responded to demands which contest the hierarchies of power and powerlessness.
Section III: The Containment of Democracy and the issue of Police Accountability

The third process that can be identified in the response of the British state to demands for representation and participation has been alluded to in the previous discussion. That response has involved the 'monopolization of the means of violence' (Giddens, 1985:180) by the state in order to check and, in repeated instances, to discipline such demands. It is this third response that leads directly to an analysis of the role of the police in the development of democracy in Britain. The police, in the final instance, have been allocated the role of representing the state in containing demands for changes which threaten the existing order. As part of that function it has, on a daily basis, been given the role of disciplining and controlling those groups who at any given moment are not part of the citizen body. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that whilst the formation of the police was also a part of the embryonic struggle for democracy its ultimate representative role has necessitated its gradual removal from the democratic sphere of governance. By recognizing how the three strands have historically interconnected one can make sense of first, what interests are represented by the police and second, how the state has responded (and is likely to respond) to demands for police accountability in the form of community representation and participation.

a. The accountability of the police to the community
Cain (1976:158) has argued that the notion that the British police are of the community 'is a deeply embedded part of their occupational common sense and of state hegemony'. It has been constantly reiterated within the work of orthodox police historians (Ascoli, 1979; Critchley 1978; Reith, 1948) that the uniqueness of the
British police lies in the symbiotic relationship between the community and its police (Critchley, 1978:52). Whilst acknowledging that the policing arrangements introduced from 1829 onwards were different organizationally from pre-1829 policing arrangements, it is argued that the new forces also embodied the fundamental principles of the communal self-policing arrangements which had existed in England since Saxon times.

This asserted relationship forms the basis for a series of other assumptions. The first assumption is that the police are implicitly accountable to the community and automatically have the consent of the community (Reiner, 1985:15). The second is that the direct representation and participation of the community in policing matters is automatically ensured by this symbiotic relationship and because, through recruitment, the police are drawn from the community (Critchley, 1978:52). The third is that the British police are democratic since they exist within a democratic state form and indeed both facilitated the birth of that democracy and continue to protect it (Critchley, 1978:xiv).

Thus a coherent discourse has been constructed upon the notion of the existence of this symbiotic relationship and it has been forcefully used by those rejecting demands for the political accountability of the police to the elected representatives of the community (see Mark, 1979:157; McNee, 1980:10). Within this discourse any initial conflict that took place between the police and the community disappeared quickly when it was realized that the police were impartial, were not government agents, and had as their aim the protection of all the community from crime (Reiner, 1985: 16-17). Thus a very straight-forward connection is made between the police and the community.
The police directly represent the community and the community support the police through joining the institution. Central to orthodox histories is, therefore, a very important non-political notion of community, one that is given homogeneity through its support for its police force. This also has an important consequence in that it defines those who are critical of the police or who are opposed to the police as being outsiders and not of the community. As Reiner (1985:13) has pointed out, orthodox analysis 'denies the opposition any meaning or rationality that is not venal'. This is an important theme, one which has been reiterated in different forms both by police officers and their political supporters.

There is, however, another analysis that can be drawn upon to give a different analysis of the community who supported the new police and whose interests were represented by the introduction of the new forces.

b. The structural relations of democratic accountability

i. The police and the structures of local governance

The first two forces introduced into the United Kingdom, the Irish Constabulary and the Metropolitan Police, shared the common characteristic of being directly controlled by central government. Despite powerful protests there was no input from the organs of local governance that existed at the time, except from the economically powerful City of London (Young and Garside, 1982:21). When it came to reforming the policing system in the rest of the country central government had to tread carefully as there was little possibility of passing a Bill introducing a national police force (Palmer 1987:521).

An understanding of the democratic political context of
provincial policing can be attained by specifically focusing on urban (borough) policing arrangements in the period before 1856. The precise structure of provincial police forces was the outcome of the intense struggle, already referred to, over the nature of political representation and participation in the early nineteenth century. It is within this context that the new urban police forces were created and they were firmly located within the new structures of bourgeois dominated local governance (Cohen, 1979:116; Brogden, 1982:37; Steedman, 1984:17-19).

It was because of the policing clause included in the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act that working class radicals were divided on whether to support the demands for the reform of local governance. As a consequence the reform struggles took different forms, had different effects in different parts of the country and resulted in a variety of class alliances (see Bailey et al, 1981; Davey, 1983). The radicals were willing to ally with the Whigs in many areas whilst in others they were just as willing to ally themselves with the Tories against municipal reform precisely because they feared that wealthy manufacturers would attempt to discipline and control the working classes with a more efficient police force. In Birmingham, Manchester and Oldham prolonged struggles took place between Tories, Liberals and Radicals over the introduction of new policing arrangements, with Manchester and Birmingham having centrally imposed police forces because of the intensity of the political struggle (Fraser, 1979:89; Tobias, 1979:95; Hewitt, 1979:147-8) and the situation in Oldham demanding constant central government intervention (see Foster 1974).

The newly dominant urban elite had little difficulty in
dealing with the questions: to whom would the new police forces be accountable and whose interests did they represent. They were accountable, through the council Watch Committee, to the political representatives of the ratepaying property owning classes. Whatever independent legal powers police officers, including Head Constables, had, they were distinct from and subordinate to this political relationship with the Watch Committee. The latter that was responsible for policing and had the powers of appointment and dismissal. As a consequence the individual Head Constable was tied to elective local politics; he served his middle class employers, the borough Watch Committee which hired, fired and directed his men. From the time of their origin in 1835, the borough police were a part of the local government system. The Head Constable, a career policeman promoted through the ranks, was the mirror image of the self-made town councillors to whom he answered on a daily basis (Palmer, 1987:532).

The Watch Committee was the most prestigious of the Council's subcommittees not least because control over policing arrangements was one of the few powers that the new Councils had. The mayor was the Committee chairman and the members were chosen on the basis of long service and dedication (Steedman, 1984:43). The Watch Committee had considerable financial and operational autonomy. It was the only committee that met in private and whose discussions were not reported in the local press. Tight daily control of policing matters was exercised initially. Only towards the middle of the century when the bourgeoisie had consolidated its hegemonic position was there a shift in attitudes of the municipal councils towards their forces (Brogden, 1982:65). However, if Head Constables asserted their autonomy in a manner which conflicted with the wishes of the Watch Committee the former ran the risk of being dismissed (Lustgarten, 1986:37-38).
During this period the lack of dispute over who controlled the police was paralleled by the relative lack of dispute over who would be policed. The objective of the middle classes was to establish a stable and orderly environment for the developing market economy and to deal with the problems posed by the dangerous classes. In this context the concern about crime that justified the reform of policing arrangements was a metaphor for a more fundamental fear - the fear of the swelling urban masses.

The process of capitalist industrialization led to increasing economic inequality and exploitation and class stratification. Rioting became an essential political strategy of an underclass (a surplus population) and a working class suffering this increased economic deprivation. The modern system of policing evolved to control this riotous situation. And through the control system of the modern public police, the ruling economic and political elites were able to separate 'constitutional authority' from their own social and economic dominance. It began to appear as though laws, not men and women, ruled. Finally, the police, not the military, emerged as the visible everyday presence representing the central political authority in society (Eitzen and Timmer, 1985:373).

The outright opposition of the working classes to the imposition of the new police forces has been documented extensively elsewhere as has the ultimately unsuccessful attempts to remove them physically from working class localities and the concurrent political demands for their abolition (see Storch, 1975; Fraser, 1979; 1982; Foster, 1974; Cohen, 1979; Tobias, 1979; Bailey, 1981; Jones, 1982; Brogden, 1982).

In relation to the daily policing of working class neighbourhoods, a process has been identified whereby a tentative truce was reached with the police being effectively incorporated into informal forms of social
control (Cohen, 1979: 132). As long as property crime did not encroach excessively upon the middle classes and as long as collective disorder remained within tolerable levels the police used their discretion to not interfere unduly in working class neighbourhoods (see Clarke, 1987). Furthermore, there were certain crimes that could be countenanced if they did not threaten social order. If anything the illegal gin establishments, for example, helped to maintain the social order. On the police side there was the utilization of informal intervention in order to assert their authority whilst the working classes continued to depend upon self-reliance for sorting out their problems. In addition the police did come to have a useful role for the working classes by patrolling working class communities the police also came to act on behalf of individual working people. For the first time working class people gained some protection from attack, robbery on the streets and burglary at home (Bunyan, 1977:68).

The multiplicity of other social roles played by the police did not necessarily infringe upon the interests of the working classes. The gradual stabilization of working class neighbourhoods in the course of the nineteenth century resulted in the development of their own social, political and economic institutions, practices and hierarchies of respectability. Consequently, the negotiated truce with the police was consolidated and the nature of the conflict changed. 'Grumbling dissent' replaced wholesale opposition (Brogden, 1982:180) with being lessened to particular incidents and isolated to particular sections of the working classes (Storch, 1975:89).

Gradually regular conflict with the police became isolated to young males, the disreputable, criminals and immigrants — those outside of 'the primary economy' (Brogden,
1982:181; see also Storch, 1975; Cohen, 1979; Brogden, 1982; White, 1983; Scraton, 1986). Indeed in the policing of these groups the police could rest on the agreement of the more respectable sections of the indigenous working classes (Hobbs, 1988:94-98). This differential policing of marginal outsider groups was a strategy that the police became adept at using to bolster their authority and legitimacy as well as meeting organizational needs (Brogden, 1982:192-195). These outsider groups effectively became 'police property' (see Lee, 1981). Consequently, there was a distinct blurring of the interests that the police were representing on a daily basis (see Scraton, 1987). It is in this context that informal structures of accountability were created.

However, whilst some form of localized negotiation, and accountability, could be begrudgingly reached and a form of order satisfactory to both sides precariously reproduced, conflict continued to characterize the relationship between the working classes and the police concerning the formers' demands for political and industrial rights of representation. There was less room for negotiation in the maintenance of public order by the police and their containment of the working classes and other groups who were demanding access to the body politic. It was in such situations that the more respectable sections of the working classes were sharply reminded of the straightforwardly coercive role of the police in protecting the economic, social and political status quo (Bowden, 1978:221; Bailey, 1981:94-125; Geary, 1985:ch 2-4; Brogden, 1982: 184-189; Scraton, 1987:149).

Furthermore, whether it was in relation to the policing of working class localities or in public order situations any complaints about policing that the working classes had did
not reach the formal political agenda. The exclusion of the latter from political life ensured that on fundamental issues, such as the nature of law enforcement, there was no formal means of having their interests represented (Lustgarten, 1986:40). It was only with the municipalization of working class culture and the rise of the Labour Party that respectable sections of the working class achieved the formal means of having a say in the policing of their neighbourhods. As Reiner (1985) has pointed out

The working class clearly had no possibility of influencing borough Watch Committees until the slow extension of the franchise to them (Reiner, 1985:46).

Additionally there remained disreputable/troublesome and politically marginalized segments of the working classes who were subject to the routine attention of the police and periodic crackdowns (Cohen 1979:120-21; Brogden, 1982:180-81). Such groups had little chance of having their interests included in any formal political settlement between the police and the respectable sections of the working classes.

Anyone who was transient - the common condition of the intermittently unemployed, casual workers and seasonal workers - was also voteless. The political nation was thus comprised of the propertied and the respectable working class and their consensus about public order and public decorum could not be disturbed by dissonant notes from the politically voiceless (Lustgarten, 1986:39-40).

In many situations the more respectable sections of the working class, including their political representatives, virtually condoned the disciplinary actions of the police in relation to such disreputable groups (Cohen, 1979:121). Thus, whilst the latter through their accommodation to respectable values and incorporation into the state did find the police to be useful there were other sections who were excluded from this negotiated order and who in fact
were subject to it. This situation has continued to exist in relation to such outsider groups with the more respectable sections of the working classes only encountering the police periodically in public order situations or as victims of crime. In this sense not only are the police involved in policing social divisions but also acting upon and contributing to those social divisions (Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate, 1988:101-105).

Thus a much more complex and ambivalent picture of the nature of the relationship between the police and the community emerges from an analysis of the class that was subject to the new policing. A negotiated and situational agreement over certain aspects and types of policing was reached informally between sections of the working class and the police. However, the possibility of the working class ever formally having any say over the police was precluded by the fact that by the time this class was in a political position to exercise control formally over the policing it was subject to, events had contrived to remove the urban police from the democratic process. By the beginning of the twentieth century the police had moved from representing the interests of local elites to representing the interests of the emergent state.

c. The removal of the police from democratic control
This removal was realized through a series of processes most notably, routinized state intervention; threats against the state; the existence of a non-democratic model of policing and the emergence of organizationally and legally empowered chief police officers.

i. Routinized state intervention
Throughout the nineteenth century, as a result of the social problems brought about by industrialization and
urbanization, the boroughs and their form of governance became defined as problematical and subject to the attentions of an increasingly interventionist centralizing state. Between 1854 and 1870 the forces of direct centralization were held in check but what was developing was the notion that local government should be the means whereby central government legislation could be implemented (see Redlich and Hirst, 1970; Byrne, 1986). This brought with it demands for rationalization and centralization of services within larger units of local government. Any state intervention with forms of local governance had automatic implications for local policing arrangements.

In addition an increasingly powerful administrative central state began to attempt to intervene, through the Home Office, in the local policing arrangements that had developed in a relatively haphazard way since 1835 (Hart, 1956:406; Steedman, 1984:42). This intervention became routinized as the century progressed in an attempt to ensure standardization, rationalization and efficiency. Successive pieces of legislation infringed upon the powers of the Watch Committee whether through attempting to allocate more powers to the Home Secretary or to the Head Constable. Accountability of the council for adequate policing was moving from the local ratepayer to the central state (Brogden, 1982:97-103).

The central state was also prepared to intervene in order to curb the excesses of local Watch Committees, such as, their refusal or inability to maintain adequate police forces or attempts to expand upon their powers. As indicated previously, central government had no hesitation in intervening in Birmingham, Manchester and Oldham respectively when the struggle over policing was deemed to
have been out of control. Central government also monitored attempts by Watch Committees to expand upon their powers. Thus in some towns the Watch Committee began to take on the role of a judicial body, 'a public semi-legal tribunal' which investigated complaints against the police and compensated, particularly if it involved police damage to personal property (Steedman, 1984:44).

ii. Threats against the state
As the police was gradually allocated the role of being the first line of defence of the state the latter intervened in local policing arrangements in order to co-ordinate threats against it. During the 1880s a highly autonomous and non-accountable Special Branch was developed to deal with the threat initially of Irish nationalism and gradually expanded upon to deal with all those groups defined as politically threatening (see Bunyan, 1977; Porter, 1987). In addition from the last decades of the nineteenth century industrial unrest resulted in direct state intervention in local policing matters. During the 1910 South Wales Colliery strike, for example, direct control of the police rested with the central state for the first time (Geary, 1985:37; Morgan, 1987:44).

The state's co-ordination of the 1914-18 war effort also directly intruded upon local policing arrangements. The Home Office supervised the war time responsibilities of the Chief Constables and facilitated conferences and meetings, for the first time, of Chief Constables and Police Authorities in different formats (Critchley, 1978:183). Brogden (1982:103) argues that as a consequence chief police officers learned that it was possible to consolidate their own power bases through playing the Home Office against local police authorities.
As a consequence of the further expansion of its role during world war one and its role in the industrial conflict of the inter-war years, including that involving the police the Home Office gained unprecedented legal power and administrative capability to influence the evolution of policing throughout England and Wales (Lustgarten, 1987:43).

After world war one there was also the centralization of the state’s contingency planning. In 1919 an Industrial Unrest Committee met to make plans for countering a major industrial dispute. In addition to giving the police draconian powers under the 1920 Emergency Powers Act, a structure of eleven regions was created. Commissioners were to be responsible for the co-ordination of military, police and emergency services, thus by-passing the local democratic structures. It was also in this period that mutual aid arrangements, originating in the late 19th century, were widely utilized for the first time. Again this enabled the Home Office and Chief Constables to by-pass the political process if necessary.

World war two amplified central involvement in provincial policing arrangements and for the first time the Borough Chief Constables came under the formal authority of the Home Secretary through Defence Regulation 39. The Home Secretary also acquired the power to retire Chief Constables. The regionalization arrangements of the General Strike were reactivated and in the case of a national emergency the commissioners would assume executive powers. The General Strike also provided the mutual aid ideas that were implemented in the form of regional reinforcement schemes which gave the Home Secretary and the regional commissioners considerable powers of direction. Amalgamation plans were also a part
of central coordination during the war. In 1942 Parliament agreed to legislation enabling the Home Secretary to amalgamate any two or more areas if he was satisfied it was necessary for military purposes. As a consequence, seven amalgamations took place, reducing the number of county Borough forces by twenty one. As early as December 1944 the Watch Committees involved passed a resolution calling for the revocation of all the amalgamation schemes. Immediately after the war they made a similar demand but it was not forthcoming (see Critchley, ch 6). External and internal threats against the British state had resulted in the central state acquiring powers over policing that were not returned to local government.

iii. A non-democratic model of policing
Of constant concern for the Borough Watch Committees was the existence of an non-democratic model of policing in the Counties, reflective of the continued importance of the gentry (see MacDonough, 1977). The existence of this model had serious implications for any proposed reforms in relation to policing arrangements or local government. First, this model, although adhering to the principle of local control, had no democratic form. Second, the Home Office had more input into policing affairs through the power of approval over the appointment of Chief Constables and the power to enforce uniform standards. Finally, the Chief Constables had more autonomy and powers than their borough counterparts. The Chief Constables held statutory office, and although they were appointed by the magistrates they were empowered to appoint and dismiss the other ranks and to direct the force. Thus the democratic element was completely missing from the County policing model as it was from rural local government generally. In this context the practice was soon established of the Home Secretary and the Chief Constables by-passing the
magistrates and communicating with each other directly (see Steedman, 1984).

It is hardly surprising then that when the 1888 Local Government bill to attempt to democratize the county structure of governance was being debated one of the most controversial aspects concerned the future role of the magistrates. Whilst all their administrative powers were transferred to an elected County Council they were allowed to retain their judicial ones. It should be noted that demands that the office of magistrate be democratized to deprive it of its class character were rejected. In the debates about whether the new councils or the magistrates should be responsible for the police the original proposals were balanced in favour of the latter. The new councils were to have little control over policing matters, there was to be no equivalent of the Watch Committee. Instead there was to be a financially autonomous Standing Joint Committee comprised equally of Council representatives and the magistrates. The magistrates were to be the sole body responsible for the appointment of Chief Constables whilst it was recommended that the Home Secretary should have the power to give directions to ensure the maintenance of proper standards of efficiency, discipline and the number of police employed.

It was argued that responsibility for policing could not be handed over to the new councils because they had no experience of such affairs. However, given the fears expressed in the rest of the bill, it could be argued that the provision was to make sure that representatives of the working classes never gained control of the police even if they happened to gain control of the Council. As a consequence of opposition to the bill the power of
appointment of the Chief Constable was given to the Standing Joint Committees and the proposal to give new powers of direction to the Home Secretary was dropped (Critchley, 1978:133-138; Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:34-35).

The 1888 Local Government Act is important because the democratization of the county police did not occur. A financially autonomous Standing Joint Committee composed equally of magisterial and elected representatives meant that the magistrates, because of their judicial powers, would continue to have a substantial input into the policing of the Counties. Therefore, the act made sure that there was significant undemocratic representation on a committee which was financially autonomous from the council. All the arguments to have them excluded from the process failed; indeed if the government had had its way only the magistrates, the Home Secretary and Chief Constables would have been responsible for policing arrangements. Additionally in the situation of a divided committee with no tight Home Office control the county Chief Constables could consolidate their power bases. Thus the act firmly established the autonomy of county Chief Constables (Critchley 1967:130).

This act consolidated the powers of the non-democratic elements in order to make sure what happened to the Watch Committees could not happen in the Counties. The extent to which the Watch Committees could still control their Head Constables was illustrated by the 1880 disagreement between the Birmingham Watch Committee and its Head Constable. This dispute was resolved by the Home Secretary reminding the Head Constable that under the 1835 Act the Watch Committee had the power to make regulations for all members of the force as well as the power to dismiss
officers (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:39).

iv. The emergence of professional autonomy
All of the above mentioned developments had important long term consequences for the relationship between the Borough Watch Committees and the Head Constables. The latter were the beneficiaries of first, closer state intervention which produced structured police organizations second, the allocation of more independent powers to chief police officers third, the role of the police, as the key 'gatekeepers' in the expanding criminal justice system and the concurrent claiming of a professional mantle (Brogden, 1982:70-71). Of key importance was the fact that the pre-Tudor principle of constabulary independence began to legally challenge the extent to which Watch Committees could control their chief police officers. In the course of the twentieth century a series of civil liability cases and cases relating to the discretion of chief police officers legally affirmed the principle of constabulary independence (Fisher v The Mayor and Corporation of Oldham [1930]; Attorney General for NSW v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1935]). This principle, eventually taking on the guise of 'enshrined orthodoxy' (Lustgarten, 1986:48), firmly asserted that no-one could interfere with operational matters. As a consequence

The Watch Committee in the borough and county areas had by the 1930s lost out to the Chief Constables who were increasingly looking to London for guidance. Moreover, this process occurred during the same period that the majority of the working class were given the vote and Labour Party councillors were beginning to form the majority party on the councils (Bunyan, 1977:72). Reiner (1985:46) and Lustgarten (1986) also make the connection between the rise of constabulary autonomy, the decline of the Watch Committee and the establishment of Labour controlled local councils. As a consequence of the establishment of the primacy of constabulary independence
Intervention by meddlesome Socialist local bodies could be precluded, yet the centre would not incur any opprobrium for politically controversial policing, since responsibility would rest with the independent chief constable (Lustgarten, 1986:46)

Therefore, the period up until the end of World War Two saw growing encroachment upon the principle of local democratic control of policing. As a consequence there was little possibility of the political representatives of the working class, never mind those sections of the population outside of the edifice of citizenship, having a formal say in policing matters (see Brogden, 1982:81)

d. Policing and the corporatist state
Standardization and centralization trends developed apace in the post-war period as did the autonomy of Chief Constables and the expansion of state expenditure upon the police, despite the fact that the Labour Party had become a party of governance (Taylor, 1981:68; Gilroy and Sim, 1987:74). Pay negotiations were nationalized and centralized pay negotiation. Regional training schools, crime records offices and crime squads were also introduced. In its deliberations on these matters the Oaksey Committee also addressed the issue of accountability

The Police Authority has no right to give the Chief Constable orders about the disposition of the police or the way in which police duties should be carried out (Cmd 783, para 183).

This was to set the tone for debates about police accountability in the post-war period, as the Watch Committees were to find out to their cost. The specialization and redefinition of the policing function took place at the expense of the local authorities. Watch Committees were drawn into central committees to discuss national conditions of service. National organizations representing the different ranks within the police gained
more influence in a formal manner. Furthermore, there was more sustained Home Office interest particularly in financial matters. As a result by the end of the first half of the twentieth century precedents had been set in most areas of policing for the developments that were to take place in the 1960s and 1970s.

Symptomatic of the changes that were taking place was the 1950 dispute between the Nottingham Watch Committee and its Chief Constable. The latter, in consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), instigated an inquiry into corruption in the city council. Although the DPP decided that no further action should be taken the Watch Committee asked the Chief Constable for a report on his investigation. He refused on the basis that he was solely responsible for enforcing the law. As a result the Watch Committee suspended him. The Home Office supported the Chief Constable against what it defined as Watch Committee interference in law enforcement and he was subsequently reinstated despite the protests of the committee that they were within their right under the provisions of the 1835 Act. During a House of Lords' debate Lord Chesham, the government spokesman, made the governments position clear.

What I wish to emphasize (it has been said before and I say it again) is that no Police Authority or anyone else has any authority to interfere in relation to the enforcement of the law by the police (213.HL.Deb.5s.c47).

Critchley (1978:272) argues that although there was no difference in principle between this incident and the 1880 Birmingham one the Home Secretary had taken different sides because 'times had changed' and the Home Office was more prepared to intervene in local policing matters. However, it was not just that times had changed; as Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984:44) argue, it was the
political relations that had changed. The political relations were those brought about by the establishment of the social democratic corporatist state form.

The 1964 Police Act
The Royal Commission that led to the passing of the 1964 act had been set up in response to a series of incidents in the 1950s which had focused attention on policing. Disciplinary action and legal proceedings had been taken against the Chief Constables of Cardiganshire, Worcester and Brighton. There had been parliamentary debate and a tribunal set up to look into the behaviour of two members of the Thurso police and a censure motion in the House after an alleged assault by a Metropolitan police officer led to a Home Office settlement (Oliver, 1987:8-9). There had also been the prolonged highly publicized argument between the Watch Committee and Chief Constable of Nottingham mentioned above (Critchley, 1978:271-272; Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:40-41).

This Commission gives an indication of how the issue of the governance of the police would be dealt with in the social democratic corporatist state. It could be argued that the very setting up of a Royal Commission was proof that things had changed as the result of the working classes, through the post-war settlement, finally achieving full representatory rights within the state. However, the recommendations of the commission could also be taken as proof of how concerns could be neutralized through the setting up of inquiries which did not address the basis of such concerns. Lustgarten (1986:48) argues that by the time the commission was set up the 'conceptual boundaries of that inquiry were narrowly defined'. It could be argued that the recommendations were virtually pre-determined by three features of the political context
referred to previously. First, there was the general loss of functions of local authorities in the post war period. Second, various other commissions and committees were recommending further regionalization, centralization and rationalization of local government services. And third, there was the rise of an administrative ideology which was reinforced by corporate managerialism and professionalism. In such circumstances the policing powers of the Watch Committees were in a very precarious position from the onset. There was also the allegation, made most forcefully by Marshall (1960:225-226) and Chester (1960:115) respectively, that after the Nottingham incident a deliberate attempt was being made to depoliticize policing.

The Commission recommended that Watch Committees and Standing Joint Committees should be replaced by Police Authorities which would continue to be responsible for the appointment of Chief Constables. However, they were to lose responsibility for the efficient policing of their areas to the Home Secretary, as well as the power to suspend and dismiss the Chief Constable and his deputy, and powers of appointment, promotion and discipline amongst subordinate ranks. The latter power was to be transferred to the Chief Constable. In addition there was the assertion of the principle of constabulary independence from democratic control.

We entirely accept that it is in the public interest that a Chief Constable...should be free from the conventional processes of democratic control and influence. (report 1962:para 87)

Additionally it was recommended that the distinction between the County and the Borough forces should end and that one third of the new Police Authorities should be composed of magistrates.

the Royal Commission accepted the argument of the
Magistrates' Association that, since local authority decisions were increasingly swayed by political views, it was especially important that a police body contain non-elected persons, and that JPs were suitable because of their close knowledge of police work and problems (Levenson, 1981:46).

The government rejected the Commission's centralization proposals and gave the Police Authorities the duty of securing an adequate and efficient police force in their area. However, the other proposals affecting the Police Authorities were accepted, strengthening the position of the Home Office and Chief Constables at the expense of the Police Authorities. The act formalized the tripartite structure of police governance. The accountability of the police to the local democratic political process was to be virtually non-existent. Any formal powers that the the Police Authority was allocated under the 1964 Police Act were subject to the ultimate approval of the Home Secretary. For example, the new Police Authorities were given the power to call for reports relating to the policing of their areas. However, the qualification was added that the Chief Constable could refer such requests to the Home Secretary if he considered it to be against the public interest or outside the responsibility of the Police Authority (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:19). Hence the 1964 Act laid clear restrictions on access to information about policing matters.

Furthermore, although the Police Authority was to be a committee of the council the statutory duties placed upon the Authority were statutory not delegated. Therefore, in effect the Authority was not accountable to the overall council structure in the way other committees were despite the fact that the council had to pay its share of the police budget. The new arrangements bore a marked resemblance to those which had prevailed in the Counties
since 1888 with democracy being further diluted by the inclusion of the non-elected magistrates. The consequence of having an undemocratic policing system available by which to judge and condemn the Borough arrangements finally made itself apparent. After all the municipal struggles of the nineteenth century to assert independence from the Counties the Boroughs finally lost out, as did the possibility of local democratic control of policing. In addition the Metropolitan police remained exterior to any semblance of democratic control.

The response to the recommendations and the subsequent act was by no means muted. It was claimed that the recommendations would result in the Home Secretary continuing to evade Parliamentary control in policing matters as well as the Chief Constables continuing to evade local control (The Tribune, June 1964). The commission's dismissal of an independent complaints structure was criticized as was the 'recommendations designed to deprive local authorities of nearly all their few remaining powers over the local police forces' (Labour Research, Vol Ll, No 7; see also Okojie and Noble 1980:7). The pointed criticism was that those serving on the commission would not 'spring to mind instantly when thinking of those who have resolutely upheld the liberties of the public when encroached upon by the forces of law and order' (The Spectator, 8.6.62).

The 1964 Act gave the Home Secretary increased powers to amalgamate forces and the population bar contained in the 1946 Act was removed. Thus, the principle of locality was further threatened. The Home Secretary used these powers to create the Northamptonshire force in the mid 1960s. Considerably more amalgamations took place in May 1966 which further complicated matters and reduced local
authority involvement. By 1969 the number of forces had been reduced from 117 to 47. Instead of separate Police Authorities joint ones were established with representation on the Authorities being premised upon the size of the populations of the respective counties involved. Marshall (1973) had no doubt as to the consequences of such arrangements arguing that they were likely to be less rigorous than the Authority of a single council in asserting either their own rights as against the police, or those of the constituent units against the Home Office and central government.

It has no civic spirit to stiffen it, no common interest to unite it and no effective local opinion to support it. The West Midlands or the Thames Valley are geographical expressions not communities. This may not matter for the purpose of administering services but for the purpose of securing participation and accountability it matters a great deal (Marshall, 1973:60).

This reorganization of police forces continued with the 1972 Local Government Act, which resulted in further readjustment of police boundaries to facilitate new county structures. Councillors were virtually excluded even from this seemingly political exercise. Prior to the changeover in April 1974 the majority of the planning was conducted by senior police officers. Many authorities found themselves faced with reorganization schemes that had already been agreed upon by the police forces concerned and in which they had played no active part. This was compounded by the fact that the Home Office had placed severe restrictions upon the Authorities' choice of Chief Constable for the new forces. Where reorganization had occurred Police Authorities could only select from Chief Constables of previously existing forces. In addition prior agreement had often been reached among the Chief Constables involved thus leaving no real choice for the Police Authorities involved (see Oliver 1987: 51-55). The
1974 reorganization plans affected virtually every force outside London in relation to the number of forces, the composition of the Police Authorities and/or the force itself and its police area. Northern forces in particular were affected with the creation of virtually new forces in certain areas. The Greater Manchester Police force was created, for example, through the amalgamation of the whole of the Manchester and Salford forces with parts of the Cheshire, Lancashire and West Yorkshire forces.

e. The crisis of police accountability

The crucial point of the changes was that the Chief Constables finally achieved formal representation within the state. As a consequence the central state did not gain the policing powers taken from the local authorities. As local government lost its powers the Chief Constables asserted theirs. No longer constrained by the Watch Committees, their legal position consolidated by the political and judicial endorsement of the Oldham decision, their professional power augmented by the emergence of large police bureaucracies and their political influence augmented by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), it was the Chief Constables who expropriated the Police Authorities claim that policing was a local matter. It was they who claimed professional autonomy in relation to the determination of local policing needs and policies. As a consequence, Brogden (1982: 74-95) and Lustgarten (1986:52) argue that the Chief Constables were able to assert their independence not only from the Police Authorities but also from the Home Office in the post war period.

The above mentioned changes in policing, as with other state agencies, took place through the crucial ideological variable of professionalization, accompanied and
positively encouraged by the aforementioned corporatist developments. Chief Constables were able to claim successfully a special esoteric knowledge over crime control which was constantly reinforced by a political re-interpretation of the legal position of Chief Constables. The resultant strategic position of the Chief Constables meant that they were in a position not only to play the centre and local off against each other but to accrue, through their participation in national policy making, further powers and definition of their powers vis-a-vis the other participants in the tripartite arrangements. Chief Constables could debate with the Home Office as equals, with each 'side' supported by its own army of professional advisers. Thus professionalization not only penetrated deeply into the reshaped structure but augmented the powers granted to both the Home Office and the Chief Constables under the 1964 Act (Jefferson, 1987:18).

As Cain (1972:231) makes clear professionalization of the senior ranks also disguised ideologically the increasing and unidentifiable growth in central powers. As a consequence accountability was being mystified by the 'language of professionalism'.

1. The crisis in the governance of the police
The few studies that were conducted on the new Police Authorities in this period bear testimony to the worst fears of those who argued that policing had been divested of any pretence of democratic accountability. Concern was expressed about the role of the Police Authorities in the post-reorganization period, particularly as the Chief Constables built their autonomy upon the notion of 'operational independence' in both their actions and public pronouncements. These new Authorities were part of a restructured system of local governance that meant they were far removed from the people they were supposedly representing.
As a consequence of the passing of the 1964 Police Act and the 1972 Local Government Act not only was there a lack of activity within most Police Authorities but a concerted effort was made to ensure the subordination of the Authorities to the Chief Constables. Certain Police Authorities not only fully accepted their subordinate role, but had become virtually moribund in terms of their role of ensuring police accountability and instead concentrated on facilitating the administrative requirements of the Chief Constables. It was repeatedly emphasized that local councillors had no expertise with which to discuss policing matters and this became further justification for Chief Constables to take the lead in discussions. (Marshall, 1973; Banton, 1974; Simey 1976; Judge 1976; Cain 1976; New Society, 25.8.1977; Brogden 1977; Kettle 1980). It is symptomatic of the changes that the only real instances of conflict involving Chief Constables in this period were a result of the implementation of corporate management proposals. Within the new structures the now dominant professionals, that is, the Chief Constables and chief executives of the new councils, clashed over who was in control of the police (see Oliver, 1987:51-53). The elected representatives had, seemingly, no role to play within the new structures. Two other points must be emphasised. First, given the composition of the Police Authorities - white, male, middle class and respectable working class - it is not surprising that they were only capable of representing the interests of those groups who were not in conflict with the police. Second, the participation of the community in police authority matters, as in other areas of local government, was virtually non-existent in terms of closing off meetings to the public whether through not advertising authority meetings or through the development of
subcommittees where the real discussion and decisions took place (see Cox and Morgan, 1973:13; Brogden 1977). Effectively the Police Authorities were closed off to any possibility of public accountability through the public’s participation.

Nevertheless, there is an important qualification that should be made in relation to the position of the Police Authorities. Although the 1964 Act divested the Watch Committees of certain of their powers and they were subject to "the ultimate authority of the Home Office and the immediate professional authority of the Chief Constable" (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:38), the provisions of the Act had been worded in such a manner so as to be suitably vague about what the powers of the Authorities were and what were the exact limits to the powers were.

There is nothing in the Act to preclude Police Authorities discussing and offering advice on matters of policing deemed relevant to the overriding duty of maintaining an 'adequate and efficient' force; nor, for that matter, since a Chief Constables responsibilities of 'direction and control' are not deemed to be exclusive, is there anything to specifically preclude their issuing instructions. On the other hand, there is no specific power to do so, nor any specific duty imposed on Chief Constables in this connection beyond those pertaining to reports (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:16).

Thus there was a grey area if any Police Authority were motivated enough to test the powers allocated to it under the 1964 Act.

ii. The crisis in the policing of the community

ii (a) Dimensions of the crisis
The overall absence of conflict over policing matters in Police Authorities did not mean that there was a consensus
about the policing. In fact there can be no clearer indication of how the structures of police accountability were malfunctioning and how remote and weak the Police Authorities were than to compare what was happening in the Authorities and what was happening on the streets and in the police stations. Just how unrepresentative the Police Authorities were of those sections of the community subject to policing is indicated by the fact that there was no discussion of the complaints of those on the end of the practical professionalized policing practices in this period.

As the 1960s and 1970s progressed policing was placed back on the political agenda as it became more and more controversial. This was virtually inevitable given the changes that had been effected by the 1964 Police Act and the other organizational changes that had taken place in the post-war period. It was specifically because the 1964 Act failed to resolve the problems of lack of police accountability that ensured the issue would resurface. In fact this was virtually inevitable because first, the powers of the police had been expanded second, the structures of accountability had been formally weakened and finally the political and economic climate had changed and the public order role of the police was once more prioritized. Certain sections of the community were particularly vulnerable to such developments.

The growing concern about the nature of policing in the late 1960s and 1970s covered a wide spectrum of issues that can be distinguished at four levels all of which are interrelated (see Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:1-8; see also Reiner, 1985:61-80 Morris, 1989:144-151). First, apprehension was voiced about the increasing gap between the police and the community. Larger, impersonal and
professionalized forces and changes in operational philosophy were the corollary of the structural changes that had taken place in the post war period. These technocratic forces did not feel the need to, negotiate their presence in neighbourhoods, to cultivate the consent of the community or to take into account the needs of the community. Policing strategies were decided upon, implemented and changed without any outside lay consultation. Thus a unit beat system was introduced and then replaced by fire brigade policing at the professional discretion of the Chief Constables and under the sponsorship of the Home Office. Such changes had a considerable impact upon the subculture of the lower ranks and the abrasive manner in which they dealt with the public, particularly in the inner cities.

In this way a variety of valuable and non-crime related contacts with the public were lost to be replaced by those involving a greater possibility of inquisitorial and potentially coercive relationships (Stephens, 1988:9).

This apprehension was fuelled by alarm about the apparently ever increasing crime rate and social disorder which gripped Britain from the late 1960s onwards. Second, there was concern about the growing catalogue of police malpractice in relation to the planting of evidence, instances of extensive police corruption, the policing of public order, the use of specialist troubleshooting units such as the Special Patrol Groups, saturation policing methods, fire-brigade policing methods, anti-subversion and intelligence gathering activities, the application of new control technologies from computers to surveillance equipment and, despite the 1976 Police Act, the continuing inadequacy of the complaints system (see Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:14-8).
Third, the words and actions of senior police officers in the 1970s became more pronounced and controversial (see Reiner, 1980; 1983). Freed from the strictures of political accountability the professional corporate managers of the police service, both as individuals and through ACPO, began to assert their professional autonomy. This expressed itself politically during the decade in their challenging of any encroachment upon their powers and, through the utilization of moral panics about the rising crime rates and social deviance, their exaction of more powers and resources (see Hall et al., 1978; Hough and Heal, 1982). Sir Robert Mark’s well documented intervention in 1973 in the form of the Dimbleby Memorial Lecture (as he himself) admitted was the first time that a senior officer had ‘publicly voiced at length’ his views on law and order (Mark, 1978:148). This was followed by his response to the 1976 Police Act when he resigned as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police rather than implement an act to which he was opposed. Mark’s overtly political interventions set the precedent not just for future Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police but also for provincial counterparts, most notably James Anderton. When finally challenged to account for the behaviour of the forces under their command, they responded in a manner which attempted to define any questioning of the police as an attempt to subvert the democratic process (see Levenson, 1981:43).

However, it was not only chief officers who were intervening in the political process. The Police Federation, as the powerful representative of the junior ranks, became more and more strident in its interventions in a manner which even embarrassed the chief officers. 1965 was the first time that the Federation had attempted to intervene to mobilize the public behind the police by
organizing a fight crime campaign. However, it was in the 1970s that the interventions became more systematic. In 1975, supported by the Superintendents' Association, the Federation launched a law and order campaign. Between 1977-78 it engaged in a wage dispute with the Labour government which resulted in the recommendation of a 40% pay rise. In 1979 the Federation attempted to intervene in the national electoral process through a national press campaign by asking voters to consider where the candidates stood on law and order. It was in this year also that the Police Federation broke with tradition and appointed as its Parliamentary advisor a government rather than an opposition MP (see Reiner, 1980;1983).

The fourth level of concern centred upon the manner in which the main political parties began to focus upon the issue of law and order as a basis upon which to mobilize electoral support. When in opposition in 1977 the Conservatives made an unprecedented intervention by giving full support to the pay claims of the Police Federation. In 1978 the Labour conference saw the party try to wrest the issue of law and order from the Conservatives. As a consequence in the run up to the 1979 election both parties tried to outdo each other in their commitment to law and order expenditure. The Conservative Party committed itself electorally to prioritizing spending on law and order.

As Jefferson and Grimshaw have made clear Crystallizing practically all these controversial causes for concern and providing throughout the most acute and persisting examples for campaigners, has been the issue of police-black relations. Whether in connection with the abuse of police powers, 'reactive' policing, the failure of the complaints system or the use of the Special Patrol Group in both public-order and crime situations, the black community, and especially in the latter half of the period has never
been far from the centre of things (1984:7).

There could be no clearer manifestation of the crisis in police-black relations than the lack of black representation or participation in the various police forces.

When those concerned about the practices and policies of the police demanded accountability from that institution they were faced with chief officers who had been legally, organizationally and politically empowered during the previous twenty years. They also had to face the consequences of the constant redefining of the role and the position of the Police Authorities in that period, formally, substantively and ideologically. The 1964 and 1972 Acts had reshaped them in terms of their composition, powers and the size of the forces for which they were supposed to be responsible. As a consequence they faced empowered Chief Constables who, spurred on by the ideologies of professionalism and corporate management, lost no opportunity both to consolidate and to assert their autonomy from the Authorities. The Police Authorities, like other institutions of local governance, had been restructured and redesigned, as apolitical and powerless committees and many Authorities saw nothing wrong with this state of affairs.

II (b) The response to the crisis
It should also be noted that one of the ways the police attempted to rebut criticisms during this period was by pointing to the work of their professional community relations departments. Premised upon the same principles as the other community liaison and consultative initiatives referred to previously, police forces also appointed liaison and consultation officers (see Merricks, 1970; Dear, 1972; Roach, 1978). The community in question
referred to those groups who were a problem for the police, primarily black migrants and young males of inner city neighbourhoods. Thus, the key target of both the routinized hard policing strategies mentioned above and the community relations policies was young black males (see Institute of Race Relations, 1987; Howe, 1988)

There was a dovetailing between the state’s overall attempts to contain the discontent of the inner cities and the attempts by the police to neutralize their critics. Haphazard approaches first developed by forces in the 1960s came under Home Office direction by the first half of the 1970s with the resultant professionalization of community relations. However, the efforts of the police suffered from the same flaws as the other initiatives. As the HMI of Constabulary astutely noted in 1973

This approach does, however, presuppose that coloured people are to some extent organized and have ‘representatives’ with whom the police may forge links. With the rise of the British “second generation” there is less likelihood of this and the police are now frequently faced with real difficulties in establishing contact with younger coloured people who very often are outside such “representative” organizations (HMI, 1973:57).

However, the Home Office and the police persisted with professional community relations strategies despite mounting evidence that liaison and consultation with community representatives was not easing the tension from the policing of the frontlines of England’s inner cities.

Discussion

A series of important themes can be identified from this discussion of the relationship between the police, democratic accountability and community representation and participation. First, the new police forces developed as a consequence of the settlement of bourgeois demands for
political representation during the first half of the nineteenth century. They had the key role of representing the interests of the newly dominant urban elites through regulating the working classes on a daily basis and containing the latter's demands for rights of representation and participation. In the carrying out of this role the police were directly politically accountable to these local elites.

As the century progressed the respectable sections of the working classes gradually negotiated the informal representation of their interests in the policing of their neighbourhoods. With the recognition of their political demands in the shape of rights of electoral representation came the possibility of formally influencing policing. However, despite the fact that it was the those sections of the working class who accepted the police who had attained representation, this did not happen. This was because concurrent changes were taking place in the interests that the police were being expected to represent. Instead of representing the interests of local elites the police were instead coming to represent the interests of the national state. In order to undertake such a role the attempt was made to insulate this institution from local democratic processes. As a consequence the substantive powers of the old Watch Committees were curbed, significant non-democratic representation was included in the Police Authorities, and the reinterpretation of the legal position and empowerment of chief constables took place (see Brogden, 1982:11-33; Lustgarten, 1986:52). Thus, the police moved from being subordinate to a particular form of political accountability to being professionally autonomous, and senior police officers have vociferously defended that autonomy from those who would reassert localized political
accountability.

Whilst this situation may not have been a pressing problem for those sections of society not in conflict with the police or subject to policing, it was for those who were. As a consequence of the above mentioned developments, the Police Authorities proved to be incapable and, in many instances, unwilling to call the police to account for the type of policing certain groups complained they were being subjected to. In addition to not having their interests represented by the Police Authorities these groups were subject to the setting up of supplemental liaison and consultation structures which, because of their composition, were also incapable of representing their interests. Thus the structure of representation precluded the participation of those sections of society for whom the police were a daily problem in a variety of contexts. In this situation a crisis in police accountability was virtually inevitable.

Therefore, in the latter half of the 1970s the accountability of the police once more became a political issue. This was because the inherent tensions and contradictions of the settlement reached under the social democratic corporatist state form could no longer be contained. In the attempt to resolve the economic crisis an overtly authoritarian-populist state form finally emerged in the 1980s providing the context within which the renewed demands for police accountability emerged and were resolved.
Section IV: The Authoritarian State and the Crisis of Democracy

a. The reconstruction of democratic rights of citizenship
Any semblance of the post-war consensus collapsed by the mid-1970s and between then and the election of 1979 the new right of the Conservative Party was able to construct a series of concerns into first, a coherent anti-statist critique of that social democratic consensus and second, a political manifesto of what needed to be done to reverse that state of affairs. Feelings of powerlessness and resentment as well as the fears and anxieties of sections of the British electorate were finally mobilized and harnessed into a new right electoral bloc. Powerlessness resulted from the creation of the large professionalized, unresponsive, unaccountable and malfunctioning state bureaucracies of the welfare state, the nationalized industries and other public sector bodies. Feelings of resentment stirred against the seeming prioritization of certain interests most notably the trade unions and those dependent on welfare benefits both of which were seemingly holding the country to ransom. Fears and insecurities were expressed about matters ranging from moral decline to the Irish Republican Army, rising crime rates, industrial militancy, immigration and the state of the inner cities (see Hall et al., 1978; Gamble, 1981; Hall and Jacques, 1983; Beynon and McMylor, 1983; Gamble, 1988; Miliband et al., 1987; Hall, 1988; Jessop et al, 1988).

The subsequent election of a radical right Conservative administration on an overtly law and order manifesto, pledging to tackle the ills afflicting British society, had serious consequences for those institutions and sections of society who were identified as being to blame for this state of affairs. The construction of a
monetarist-based new economic order heralded the breakup of the last vestiges of the post-war political consensus. This involved the elimination of the six "poisons" of exorbitant government spending, high direct taxation, egalitarianism, excessive nationalization, a political trade union movement and an anti-enterprise culture. The centrality of mass unemployment as an aspect of economic policy, the construction of a new industrial relations framework, and rolling back the state through de-nationalization, privatization, cutbacks in public expenditure, re-structuring of social security and the shift in government policy to subsidize mortgage relief and tax cuts characterized the resultant restructuring. The stated objective of this hegemonic project was to redefine the role of the state in facilitating the interests of the free market and to create new channels of representation and intervention; to consolidate a new social base through a fundamental recomposition of class forces (Jessop, 1988:20).

Ideologically two key themes can be identified as being the hallmark of what Hall (1983) has defined as the resultant authoritarian-populist state form. First, there was the stated commitment to expanding meaningful participation and representation through individual economic freedom and choice with the state having no role other than as facilitator. Second, the emphasis on law, order, discipline and conviction necessitated a strong state form. If required the state would force people to be free of the nanny state and to participate in the unfettered economy. Whilst economic and consumer rights of participation were to be expanded and existing corporatist arrangements dismantled the authoritarian dimension ensured that there would be no corresponding democratization of the state or civil society. The new right had no hesitation in making it clear that it was
deeply suspicious of democracy making constant reference to the dangers of unlimited democracy (see Skidelsky, 1977; Levitas, 1985).

Consent has now been charged with a new ideological content: authoritarian, dismissive of democratic institutions, anti-union and anti-left; directed not so much to win over the organized Labour movement but its enemies within and without. Consent has increasingly been turned into a formality, as the old forms of public accountability, always minimal at best, have been rejected in the name of opposition to political interference. In their place the public are asked to identify with bureaucratic decisions taken independently of representative institutions (Fine and Miller, 1985:229).

What this project was heralding was the dramatic restructuring of British capitalism and class formations affected by that restructuring. Few sections of the working classes escaped the consequences of the new right project (see Loney, 1986; Pahl, 1984). Those affected by mass unemployment and the restructuring of the welfare state were effectively being excluded from the redefined rights of economic representation and participation. They were joining those marginalized groups who had never achieved full rights of citizenship within the post-war state. As a consequence a two-thirds society was being created in which

There are those who are in and those who are out and not needed...there is no need for them in the scheme of citizenship (Dahrendorf 1985:102-3).

At the most the marginalized would play the historic role of being a reserve army of labour, servicing the new economic order but having no automatic rights within it (see Sivanandan, 1983). In order to bring about this re-ordering of British society and to contain the response of the dispossessed the coercive and authoritarian dimensions of the processes and institutions of the state were strengthened. The notion of 'the enemy within' was constantly expanded, as Hall (1980) had predicted, to
include any group who opposed the restructuring. Thus the three overarching processes identified in the previous discussion about how the state has responded to demands for representation and participation continued to be important for the renewed struggles of the 1980s.

ii. The New Urban Left (NUL)

The Labour Party in opposition attempted to come to terms with the seriousness of its situation. Initially, after the 1979 election, the left of the party gained the upper hand with the election of Michael Foot as leader and the eventual formulation of what has been respectively described as 'perhaps its most left wing programme ever' or 'the longest suicide note in history' (see Kavanagh, 1988). More immediately in the local elections of 1981 a dramatic swing to Labour resulted in the Labour Party taking control of the Greater London Council, the six metropolitan county councils and district councils. These electoral victories were premised on manifestos in many areas, most notably in London, promising the implementation of policies fundamentally opposed to the philosophy of the Conservative government.

The rise of the NUL in local politics was the culmination of an intense struggle to overthrow the old Labour Party machine which the former blamed for presiding over the decline of Britain's inner cities. This NUL viewed local politics as being more important than national and began to develop what became known as the municipal or 'local road to socialism'. (see In and Against the State, 1980). This 'local road' was critical of the national Labour Party's centralist, anti-democratic and monetarist policies and believed that, particularly with the election of a radical right central government, local government offered the only alternative and viable arena wherein to
challenge that Conservative government and to develop radical democratic socialist alternatives.

By 1981 the NUL had gained control of the Greater London Council and the boroughs of Camden, Hackney, Islington, Lambeth and Southwark whilst nationally it subsequently took control, in Sheffield, Edinburgh and Manchester. In each area it is possible to identify different priorities, commitments and power bases which reflecting the local political context and traditions. However, as with the right of the Conservative Party, at the basis of its proposals was a critique of the representatory structures that had developed, primarily under Labour governments, in the post-war period.

Boddy and Fudge (1984) have identified three strands to the resultant proposals. First, there was an attempt to deal with the formal defects and limitations of social democracy and the ways interests are represented. Second, there was the attempt to recognize previously unrepresented/non represented interests within the formal political arena. And finally there was the attempt to shift local governance towards operating in a more open, participatory and democratic manner. The objective was to bring about the representation and participation of the dispossessed, through the creation of the ‘rainbow coalition’. In addition it should also be noted that the NUL wanted to mobilize and channel this alliance by creating an alternative Labour electoral bloc.

To achieve this a series of measures were implemented. In an attempt to make the leadership of the Labour Party accountable to the party members, an emphasis was placed on implementing manifesto commitments and the setting up of working parties to allow the participation of party
members. The NUL also attempted to use what powers local government had left to protect their constituents from the effects of radical new right policies by 'creative accounting' strategies to maintain and expand social services to those in need and to stimulate the local urban economy. It was recognised that in order to implement such strategies local government would have to be restructured. New council committees were set up and old ones recomposed to allow for the representation and participation of the dispossessed. To strengthen this co-optees and advisors from previously excluded groups were appointed to articulate the needs of those groups as well as to challenge the power of the professional council officers. Politically sympathetic and committed council officers were also appointed and promoted. Councillors were expected to work on a full time basis to represent their constituents and to confront the problem of the professional autonomy of council officers.

An attempt was also made to break down the corporatist managerialist arrangements and centralized professional bureaucracies that had excluded certain sections of the community and stifled its participation. Policies were implemented to open up government, to decentralize services and to consult and meet with local communities to involve them in decision making (see Hoggett and Hambelton, 1987). Thus the NUL was placing the interests of the dispossessed sections of the community on the formal political agenda (Campbell, 1987:10). Hence although both the new right and the NUL were implementing proposals premised upon an emphasis on popular representation and participation, very different sets of interests were being prioritized. Hall (1980) defined the difference as being between the popular-
democratic and authoritarian-popular. The key differences identified by Livingstone (1988) were first, populism based on the celebration of cultural and racial difference versus populism based on racism and jingoism; second, intervention in the economy in an attempt to protect the economically vulnerable versus non-intervention to facilitate the survival of the fittest; third, the assertion of the rights of women and homosexuals versus the assertion of the patriarchal Victorian family form, and finally the general recognition of the interests of the dispossessed versus prioritization of the privileged.

The fact that the radical wings of both political parties attained political power with fundamentally opposing ideologies meant that they were on a collision course. For the demands concerning the democratic accountability of the police that collision was fatal. Three identifiable themes overlapped to stifle such demands by the middle of the 1980s. First, there was the inevitable conflict between central government and radical local Labour administrations and the consequences for struggles within the Labour Party as it lost two more national elections. Second, there was the role given to the police within the Conservative government's political project and the manner in which the police utilized such a role to further their own interests. Finally there was the issue of law and order upon which the Conservatives had been elected and which retained a prominent role within government policies through the virtual criminalization of opposition, including the Labour Party. These themes formed the context within which NUL administrations attempted to implement 'their' policies, including demanding democratic accountability of the police.

b. The further evisceration of democracy
i. The national context
As indicated previously, given the deep seated suspicion of democracy in new right thinking it is hardly surprising that the Conservative government, from 1979 onwards paid scant regard to its infringements upon democratic rights. The strong state necessarily infringed upon the democratic rights of individuals but it did so in a just cause—to enable the expansion of economic rights, and therefore individual freedom. The Conservative government throughout the 1980s passed a plethora of legislation which, under the guise of facilitating economic freedom, weakened and, in certain instances, dismantled formal democratic rights of representation and participation (see Leys, 1984; Neuberger, et al., 1987; Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 1988; Pilger, 1990).

ii. The local context
Given the considerable discrepancy in power between the two tiers of government documented previously, the NUL administrations came under intense pressure from central government. As the 1980s progressed it became clear that the final showdown between what was left of local democratic institutions of governance and the central state was taking place. The Conservative government specifically justified its intervention in local governance in terms of 'setting people free' from local bureaucracies and protecting ratepayers from the high spending fantasies of socialist controlled town halls. It is part of a process where, through populist rhetoric, central government appeals to the local populace, bypassing the traditional mediatory structures of local elites and local bureaucracies (Bassett, 1984:96-7).

Legislative coercion was utilized to bring 'creative' local authority expenditure under control by centralizing
financial control and establishing increased control over specific policies. The new system of allocating central government financial support under the 1980 Local Government Planning and Land Act strengthened control over revenue and capital expenditure. It also introduced a new system of targets and penalties to punish overspending. The 1982 Local Government Finance Act banned supplementary rates and set up the Audit Commission. In 1983 a White Paper, Streamlining the Cities, was published outlining the Conservative government's plans to abolish the metropolitan county councils including the Greater London Council, which were under the control of the Labour Party. Legislation was introduced to limit autonomous local government initiatives in the areas of housing (eg, Housing Action Trusts), education (eg, Education Reform Bill) and local economic policy (eg, Urban Development Corporations; Enterprise Zones; Task Forces). This involved the introduction of quasi-markets and the transfer of powers to non-elected bodies (Hambelton, 1989).

The 1984 Rates Act gave central government the power to rate-cap those local authorities whose high spending or high rates were designated as irresponsible (see Blunkett and Jackson 1987:158-165).

There was also the attack on local government through the encouragement to radical Conservative controlled local councils, most notably Wandsworth, to privatize local services. The 1985 Transport Act destroyed the Left's attempts to regulate market forces, most notably in Sheffield and the GLC. The government also announced its intentions to abolish one of the institutions that the Conservatives hated, the Labour controlled Inner London Education Authority (see Gordon and Klug, 1985). The 1985 Local Government Act finally abolished, as from 1st April 1986, the Greater London Council and the six metropolitan
county councils, all of which had continued to be Labour controlled. The Conservative government made no attempt to disguise why it intended to abolish 'the mets'. One government minister made the historical connection when he claimed, in 1984, that "modern Poplarism" was the most serious problem that the Conservative government faced (Blunkett and Jackson, 1987:56). Norman Tebbit made the link even more explicit

The Labour Party is a party of division, in its present form it represents a threat to the democratic values and institutions on which our parliamentary system is based. The GLC is typical of this new, modern divisive version of socialism. It must be defeated. So we shall abolish the GLC (The Guardian, 15.3.83; see also 18.3.83; 27.11.84)

Duncan and Goodwin (1988) have argued that the ratecapping legislation was making it clear to the people of Britain that there were limits to democratic choice. If they voted for Left-wing councils that spent heavily or pursued policies that opposed central government, their vote would be invalidated. If they continued to vote for such councils then the councils would be abolished. In addition local elected representatives who implemented mandated manifesto commitments, in defiance of government wishes, ran the risk of being criminalized and debarred from office, as happened in Lambeth and Liverpool (see Livingstone, 1988; Parkinson 1985; Hatton, 1988).

In addition to legislating to define out the policies and interests represented by the NUL, the new right benefited from and contributed to a systematic media misinformation campaign which defined such policies as the actions of 'loony left' administrations (see Hollingsworth, 1986). The attempt by the NUL to reconstruct the agenda of not only the Labour Party but also the national political agenda to include the interests of the previously under/non-represented brought
a fierce media backlash. This campaign made clear what interests, groups and ideas should be represented in Britain in the 1980s. Those of the 'loony left' were not acceptable. A series of folk devils, Greenham Common peace protestors, gays, lesbians, social security scroungers, blacks, Militant Tendency, Trotskyites, the GLC, the Irish and the miners were linked together to constitute a conspiracy involving the enemy within and the enemy without. The media's campaign and the government's against the 'loony left' were virtually identical. As Hall (1988:263) notes 'once the one liner was launched, the deep symbiosis between Thatcherism and the press guaranteed it an uninterrupted flight'. Both emphasized the same conspiracy.

At the one end of the spectrum are the terrorist gangs within our borders and the terrorist states which finance and arm them. At the other are the hard left, operating inside our system conspiring to use union power and the apparatus of local government to break, defy and subvert the laws (Prime Minister, The Guardian 27.11.84).

As far as the media were concerned the prioritization of the interests of the dispossessed was not acceptable.

The 'Rainbow Coalition' has not even been attacked as a genuine set of proposals. Instead their challenge to the establishment has been portrayed as a sinister, subversive conspiracy of the consensus. For the press, they have ventured outside the traditional structures of society, left the 'normal' area of politics and entered an almost criminal world of disruption and anarchy (Hollingsworth, 1986:4).

It was emphasized that there had been a conspiracy to infiltrate the Labour Party by extreme groups and individuals whose aim was to use the respectable guise of the Party in order to destroy British democracy. Thus there was the constant association of the Labour Party with lawlessness and disorder. This campaign had serious consequences for the Left of the Party and for the electoral chances of the Labour Party both nationally and
locally. The loss of two safe Labour seats in London by-elections in 1981 was blamed on the policies of the GLC 'loony left' and in the Bermondsey Peter Tatchell lost a safe Labour seat as the result of an extremely vitriolic anti-left media campaign. It was vindication as far as the media was concerned that the Labour Party was not fit to govern by the time of the 1983 election campaign, Fleet Street had not changed its mind. Labour, in their eyes, had been taken over by small groups of extremists who had hi-jacked the Party for their own revolutionary ends...In other words Her Majesty’s Opposition was not a legitimate political party (Hollingsworth, 1986:209).

The real consequences of the media campaign were felt in the 1983 election. The right wing press seemed vindicated when the results showed that the Party had its worst showing since 1918 capturing only 28% of the poll. In effect it had lost a quarter of the votes it had in 1979 and a significant percentage of those votes were those of its traditional supporters. With the rise of the Social Democratic Party there was no guarantee that the Party would even continue to be the automatic parliamentary opposition. The point was not lost on the press, nor on the Right wing of the Labour Party - the interests covered by the label 'loony left' were an electoral liability.

c. The containment of the crisis and the issue of police accountability

As documented previously, in the late 1970s the party consensus broke down with the Conservatives making both law and order and the Labour Party's stance on the matter key electoral issues. The Conservative Party and right-wing media, in the run up to the 1979 election, sought to establish in the eyes of the electorate that the Labour Party was weak on law and order (see Phipps, 1988). The traditional weakness of the Labour Party on law and order
(see Taylor, 1981; Kettle, 1982; Gilroy and Sim, 1987) was exaggerated by the near fanatical support the Conservative Party gave to strong law and order measures during this campaign.

i. Renewed demands for democratic accountability of the police

Simultaneously the Left of the Labour Party attempted to place on the political agenda the interests of those subject to the intensified discriminatory policing practices that had been unleashed by the new Conservative government. The resultant campaign for democratic accountability of the police was most intense in London since, as documented previously, there was no semblance of substantive accountability. Concern about racist practices, corruption, deaths in police custody, utilization of weapons and general policing strategies on the streets led to

the development of campaigns around cases directed towards the objective of creating effective participation of communities in the police policies, priorities and practices adopted on the streets (Scranton, Sim and Gilroy, 1987:21).

The outcome of some of the campaigns was the development of community based monitoring groups. Such groups involved themselves in the monitoring of policing practices, providing support and advice for those in difficulties with the police, campaigning for changes in the structure of police accountability and disseminating counter information. Despite the variety of objectives of the different groups they all shared one characteristic to defend the community against police attack, malpractice and ineffectiveness, and the incursion of racists. These two objectives overlap and are prioritized by virtue of the geographic area which the group is in and the nature of their workers. Nearly all the work of monitoring groups can be characterized by the expressions 'community defence' and 'para-legal
This monitoring work linked into a wider political campaign for a Police Authority for London. In November 1979 and March 1980 Jack Straw MP introduced (unsuccessfully) Bills into Parliament proposing amendments to the 1964 Police Act to strengthen the powers of Police Authorities and to set up a Police Authority for London (see Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:150-156; Oliver, 1987:68-70). Between March 1980 and the local government elections of 1981 the issue of police accountability and demands for a Police Authority for London achieved recognition within the electoral manifesto of the London Labour Party (see Bundred 1982). After the victory of the Labour Party the Greater London Council set up a non-statutory Police Committee and support unit as part of its election manifesto promise to campaign for a democratically accountable police force. Within this initiative administrative and financial support was made available to the monitoring groups to enable them to first, act as the eyes and ears of the Police Committee second, articulate the concerns of the community and third, link the Committee to the community (see Walker, 1986). Through the monitoring groups the community would be able to participate in attempts to hold the police accountable.

The disturbances of 1980 and 1981 added impetus to the demands that 'the police should be accountable to the local communities' elected representatives' (Reiner, 1982:470). All the simmering issues and concerns of the 1970s were to take on a new urgency as the inner cities burned. This coincided with the return, after the county council elections of 1981, of radicalized Labour administrations who were determined, like the Labour Party in London, to have an input into the manner in which
policing was carried out in their areas. Most of the Labour Parties in the Metropolitan areas had manifestos which called for changes in the 1964 Police Act to give Police Authorities the right to take decisions on matters of police policy as well as in relation to deployment and senior promotions. Later in the year at the national Labour Party annual conference a motion was supported to give more substantive powers to the Police Authorities (see The Guardian 3.10.81). As Reiner says

1981 was a climactic not only in the debate on criminal procedure. The riots of the spring and summer of that year, and the Scarman Report on the Brixton disorders, were a turning point in the increasingly politicized debate about police organization and strategy, and the accountability and constitutional position of the police (Reiner, 1985:170).

ii. The authoritarian state's response to demands for democratic accountability of the police

ii (a). Community representation through consultation

The response of the government to the disturbances of 1981 and the intense debate about police accountability was formally extensive but geared towards a substantive defence of the status quo. Support was given to the enhancement of the paramilitary response capabilities of the police whilst the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act and 1986 Public Order Act were eventually passed, legislatively empowering the police (see Zander, 1985; LSPU, 1987; Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 1988). In addition, Lord Scarman was appointed 'to inquire urgently into the serious disorder in Brixton on 10 to 12 April 1981 and to report, with the power to make recommendations' (Warrant of Appointment, April 1981). There was no democratically constituted inquiry into the disturbances or the constitutional position of the police. However, even Lord Scarman could not present a report on the disturbances and the breakdown of community-police relations
without confronting the issue of the democratic accountability of the police, particularly given the constitutional position of the Metropolitan Police. Scarman saw accountability as being important and he linked it to the notion of the mythical symbiotic relationship between the police and the community for they [the police] are the servants of the community. They enforce the law on behalf of the community; indeed they cannot effectively enforce it without the support of the community. The community pays them and provides them with resources. So there has to be some way in which to secure that the independent judgement of the police can not only operate within the law but with the support of the community (para 4.60).

Therefore, he made specific proposals to try and bring about community representation on policing matters (see para 5.56). However, he rejected the evidence demanding a Police Authority for London and more powers for the existing Authorities. Instead he argued that what was necessary was community representation through statutory consultation with the police.

Scarman in his analysis of the mechanisms through which the police and representatives of the black community consulted with each other before 1981 noted that such mechanisms were voluntary in nature and as a consequence both the police and community representatives could chose to participate, or not participate. The possibility of withdrawal from the consultation process had resulted in 'the collapse of structural and regular liaison between police and leaders of the local community' between 1978 and 1981 (para. 4.72) In particular, Scarman saw the withdrawal of the Council for Community Relations in Lambeth (CCRL) from the liaison process in 1979 as being of particular importance in the deteriorating relationship between the police and sections of the black community. It meant that as tensions built up there was no means to resolve them. This led him to recommend the
development of a statutory framework which would require local consultation between the Metropolitan Police and the community at Borough or Police District level (see para. 5.69)

Drawing heavily upon the ideas of the proponents of community policing (see Alderson, 1979; 1982; 1984; Schaffer, 1980; Moore and Brown, 1981) Scarman made a series of recommendations to re-establish the supposed symbiotic relationship between the police and the community. He recommended that consultative committees be set up consisting of representatives of the police, the council and the community which would have a specific role in relation to policing in their area. First, in relation to the complaints procedure, he recommended the development of a conciliation process to deal with minor complaints against the police. Each police station was to have a senior officer responsible for dealing with such a process and the consultative committees would provide a list of people who could be involved in this community mediation process. Second, he recommended that members of the consultation committees be allowed to make random checks on the interrogation and detention of suspects in police stations. Finally, the proposed consultative committees would be able to make representations to a recommended Metropolitan Police Advisory Board made up of representatives of the Home Office, the Metropolitan Police and the London boroughs.

However, in return for this input into policing matters by community representatives Scarman cautioned that

Community representatives must seek to appreciate the difficulties (and dilemmas) of the police, and to avoid extravagant language or ill informed criticism (para. 5.57)

Scarman also assessed provincial policing arrangements for community consultation and liaison where, as far as he was
concerned, the police 'are accountable to a committee [the Police Authority] drawn from the community they police' (5.60). He refused to consider the criticisms made concerning the nature of police accountability in the provinces and once more recommended that community consultation arrangements be implemented.

Thus, Scarman's recommendations were firmly located within the response, since the late 1960s, of the British state to demands for representation and participation. The essence of that response, as indicated earlier, was the implementation of non-democratic supplemental community structures which did not alter fundamentally the status quo. The ramifications of Scarman's recommending such structures were serious. First, any further democratization of the police was precluded. Second, in recommending that such structures be statutory he was in effect institutionalizing the problems of representation and participation associated with such structures. There was no democratic basis to the consultative structures. Third, the specific object of consultation was to discuss the development of policing policies and operations against crime (see para 5.56). Thus, there was the shift within Scarman's report from addressing the issue of the racist policing of black neighbourhoods to addressing the difficulties for the police in carrying out their anti-crime operations. Fourth, the object of consultation was to mobilize the active consent of the community to support anti-crime operations (see para 5.46). Fifth, the final decision making power was left with the district police commander. If the consultation committee failed to agree to the proposed police operations/policies the police could ignore their wishes (see para 5.54). Sixth, no obligation was placed upon the police to disclose information to the consultation committees. The police commander retained the discretion to decided what information would be placed before the
committees. Finally, Scarman moved from addressing the concerns of those groups in conflict with the police to those of the whole community (see para. 5.56). It was the whole community that was to be represented in the structures, even though the whole community was not in conflict with the police. As a consequence there was the very real possibility that those in conflict with the police would not have their interests represented in such forums and would not participate in such forums. If the experience of the other community consultation structures was any thing to go by once again only the more moderate and respectable sections of the community would be likely to agree to the structures of representation and be prepared to participate in them.

By the time Scarman's limited recommendations had been processed by Parliament and an intense anti-Scarman campaign orchestrated by the police any radical import, in terms of community representation and participation, was effectively neutralized (see Peirce, 1982; Sim, 1982; Benyon et al., 1984). In December 1981 Parliament debated the report with the Home Secretary welcoming the recommendations for community consultation. After Home Office consultation during the first half of 1982 Home Office Circular 54/1982 on the guidelines for consultation was circulated to Chief Constables and the Police Authorities. The guidelines controlled tightly the proposed role of the consultative groups and reiterated the Chief Constables independence in operational matters. Ideally there would be large, formally constituted, consultative committees which would be based on division/subdivision boundaries. It was made clear that the Home Secretary would look to the Inspectorate of Constabulary "to satisfy himself that appropriate (consultatation) arrangements have been made" with subsequent confirmation by the Chief Inspector.
In addition the four stated aims of consultation were centred upon the education of the community and the mobilization of the community towards concern about crime. The first aim was to identify local concerns about crime in the community and the police response. The second was to educate the public to understand that there were legal, financial and practical limitations to the capability of the police to respond to community demands. Following on from this the third aim was to stress the community’s role in preventing crime. And finally, through identifying community priorities consensual policing would be reestablished.

Central government continued to assert its ideas concerning what shape the arrangements should take. In February 1983 the Home Secretary during a debate about the policing of London stated that consultative committees would have to have a balanced representation of community groups and recognize the operational autonomy of the police. During the following months new paragraphs were included in the Police and Criminal Evidence bill concerning the proposed consultation arrangements. The most important addition was a clause to say that if the Home Secretary considered a particular set of arrangements to be inadequate, he could require the Police Authority to submit a report and if he was still unsatisfied he could require a review of arrangements and the submission of a further report.

The Home Office guidelines of 15 March 1984 on local consultation reiterated that the objective of consultation was to improve the relationship between the police and the community through contributing to crime control (Guidelines, 1984:2). The limitations to consultation were spelt out in detail. Consultation committees could not have a say in first how the criminal law was enforced in their communities. Second they could not have a say in how police officers were
deployed in their communities. Thirdly they could not have a say in how and when police operations were implemented. Finally, they could not have a say in other operational matter such as as criminal investigations and security matters. In addition they consultation committees could not discuss individual cases which might be under investigation, allegations of police malpractice or individual complaints against police officers (see Guidelines, 1984:4-5). Thus, the operational autonomy of the police was enshrined in the consultative guidelines.

The pattern of local consultative arrangements was also laid out in a detailed manner with the general principle being that membership had to be as representative of the community as possible. The committees also had to be large enough to preclude a particular interest from dominating, with a regular turnover to prevent exclusivity. The police were to be members of right as were as local politicians but limitations were placed on the representation of local councils. The community was to achieve representation through 'traditional umbrella organizations' and community notables such as local teachers and the clergy. Additionally, there had to be the involvement of local statutory agencies and local crime prevention panels.

The guidelines specifically addressed, what it viewed as, the problematical issue of ethnic representation

Where there are many small and disparate groups - for example in areas with many ethnic minority organizations but where regular representation on a consultative group will need to be limited - it may be worthwhile to invite such groups to meet together to settle the representation of their interests (Guidelines, 1984:7).

Representative groups from the ethnic minority communities were to be left to agree amongst themselves who would represent their community, if in fact anyone wanted to. This
statement is incredible when it is remembered that the origins of the consultative initiatives lay in the conflict between the police and black people.

The revised Scarman proposals on community consultation were incorporated into the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill and finally became statutory under section 106 of the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Thus the consultative structures were supposed to part of the government's balancing of the rights of citizens and the powers of the police.

(b) Lay visiting

In addition the Home Office drew up provisional guidelines for pilot lay visiting schemes which were to be implemented in Cheshire, Greater Manchester, Humberside, Lambeth, Leicestershire South Yorkshire and the West Midlands in mid 1983. The schemes were assessed positively and the Home Office issued Circular 12/1986 commended the implementation of lay visiting schemes 'wherever local wishes and circumstances might make them appropriate' in February 1986. By the middle of 1988 thirty five out of the forty one provincial Police Authorities had introduced lay visiting schemes and in London thirty out of the thirty eight proposed lay visiting panels were operational (see Kemp and Morgan, 1989).

Thus, the Scarman recommendations by the time they had undergone the parliamentary process had been considerably tightened to focus on issues that were of considerable use to the police and the Home Office. First, the Scarman Report, for all its limitations, had argued that the consultative structures should have real powers and not be just a talking shop. However, no formal powers were given to the consultative structures. Second, the Scarman report stated that community involvement in both the policy and operational
sides of policing was, to a degree, feasible. There was the denial of this feasibility in the final formulation of the consultative proposals by the government. Third, Scarman recommended that the community, through the consultative structures, could also have a role in the complaints procedure. This was not acknowledged in the final formulations. Fourth, Scarman argued that the consultative structures in London should link into a proposed Metropolitan Police Advisory Board made up of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police with Home Office and London Borough representation. This proposed new tier of consultation did not materialize in the final formulations. Fifth, the Scarman Report argued that there had to be consultation with the community before any representative arrangements were formalized. What emerged, after selective consultation, was government guidelines tightly controlling all facets of the proposed consultative committees particularly in relation to the representative and participatory structure and membership. Sixth, the overall emphasis within the Scarman recommendations on consultation was the rebuilding of a relationship of 'mutual trust and respect' between the community and the police. However, within the final formulation the emphasis was shifted to focus upon his ideas in relation to the control and prevention of crime. Finally and allied to the sixth point Scarman recommended the need for a co-ordinated approach with the active participation of the community to tackle the problems of 'inner city decline and minority disadvantage'. However, this was later harnessed to government policies to encourage both a professional multi-agency approach and active community participation geared solely towards the prevention of crime.

This overall tightening of emphasis that the Scarman proposals had undergone during the Parliamentary, and Home Office, process meant that any wider recommendations were
neutralized. Given how moderate and limited those recommendations had been in the first place it is indicative of how concerned the government was to protect the police that it felt it had to neutralize them.

DISCUSSION

It is only possible to make sense of the Scarman proposals within the context of how the British state has responded previously to demands for democratic representation and participation. Characteristic of that response has been the formal recognition of particular rights of representation without such recognition necessarily resulting in democratization or challenging the hierarchies of power/powerlessness. Also characteristic of that response has been, through the police, the coercive containment and disciplining of such demands. In this context, it was decidedly unlikely that the British state, particularly in its authoritarian form, would accede to demands for the democratization of the police.

Hence, although the government did respond formally to community premised demands concerning policing it was in a particular manner. Despite the fact that the Scarman report specifically addressed the relationship between the black community, and in particular black youth, and the police in Brixton his recommendations eventually addressed the whole community encompassed within the geographically divisional boundaries of the Metropolitan Police and the other police forces in Britain. This geographically based conception of the whole community was reaffirmed by subsequent government proposals which stressed that all sections of the community had to be represented.

In relation to the issues of representation, the whole community was to be indirectly represented within the
consultation arrangements and lay visiting by its readily identifiable leaders and organizations. There was to be no democratic basis to the representation. Since there was to be the equal representation of the whole community, all the local professional statutory agencies were also to be involved. The government recognised that ethnic minority representation would be problematical in terms of finding individuals and groups which could take on the mantle of being representative of their community. In order to resolve this problem the representative groups would be expected to pick a representative from amongst themselves. Overall, therefore, there was to be a clear structure of formal indirect representation of the community in the consultation and lay visiting process with the representatives relaying back information and discussions to the community. The crucial point within the proposed structure was that all viewpoints within the community would be represented, with no one interest dominating or being prioritized. The qualification to this was that the overarching interests of the government and Home Office in relation to crime control were being prioritized. Strict limits were therefore being set in relation to the object of consultation.

With regard to participation, the participatory rights of the community were neither automatic nor extensive, being based upon an indirect representatory mode and the acceptance of the rights of others to participate within the process. Participation was to be within a highly formalized structure and the terms of participation were predetermined by participants having to acknowledge what was valid and invalid for legitimate discussion. There was a limited space for direct, if limited, community participation through the public gallery of the proposed consultative arrangements.

Thus structures had been created which embodied all the
problems identified previously in the analysis of the supplemental non-democratic community structures that were utilized by the British state from the late 1960s onwards. Instead of attempting to create structures that specifically addressing the interests, needs and the demands of those sections of the community who had fought with the police the government’s recommendations were aimed at the whole community. Furthermore in addition to promoting better relations between the police and the community the structures were given a specific remit in relation to facilitating consensual crime control and prevention. How could the interests of those for whom the police were the problem possibly achieve satisfactory representation within such structures?

It is a tribute to the power of the concept of community and the vagueness of its meaning that in the aftermath of the 1980/81 disturbances and the Scarman report community policing proposals reached the national political agenda in Britain. Nationwide senior police officers who had been previously hostile to such proposals responded by attempting to show that they were implementing community policing policies (Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982:112). The attempts to relegate policing practices in the inner cities in this period were premised upon the ideological power of community in relation to participation and representation in policing matters. As Weatheritt has astutely noted it illustrates the power of an idea whose time has come...Community policing is a protean concept its strengths lie in its capacity to seem many things to many people and it is an ideal as much as a method (Weatheritt, 1983:3).

The ideal was—something that the British state once more turned to in order to neutralize substantive demands for democratic representation and participation. The key question is which community would achieve representation?
Summary of Part I

The first section of this thesis has attempted to identify the theoretical and structural problems that have to be confronted by the Left in its demands for the police to be made democratically accountable to the community. It has been argued the British state has dealt with demands for rights of democratic representation and participation in a three fold manner. First, there has been the construction of democratic rights of citizenship, premised upon the notion of representation. The mass of British society was eventually endowed with individual political and legal rights which could be exercised within a highly structured and hierarchical constitutional structure. As Hall and Schwartz (1985:28-29) argued demands for a radical participatory democracy were defeated, as were demands for fundamental changes in the hierarchies of power/powerlessness. At the same time as formal representative rights were conceded to the majority of people, a complimentary process of what Leys (1984:62) has described as de-democratization took place. Key areas of decision-making were removed from the possibility of being democratically accountable to the enfranchised masses.

Under post-war corporatist arrangements formal rights of social democratic representation became virtually meaningless as powerful interests ensured that their interests were prioritized in the non-democratic corporatist structures. As a consequence by the end of the 1960s commentators began to identify a crisis in democracy and more specifically a crisis of representation and participation. This key moment provides another example of how the British state dealt with renewed demands for community participation and representation. Supplemental non-democratic community structures were created to give representation to the interests of the powerless. Through acting upon social divisions such structures
contained and channelled moderate community demands whilst radical participatory ones, which would were demanding changes in the distribution of power, were defined out.

The third process identified in the state's response to demands for the extension of democratic rights, involved coercively policing such demands. Hence it is the interests that the police represent that provide particular problems for those demanding the democratization of this institution. Indeed it is a central argument of this thesis that as the police assumed this representative role steps were taken to remove the institution from the possibility of democratic accountability being exercised. It was this weakening in the democratic accountability of the police that resulted in the crisis of policing that developed from the 1960s onwards.

This crisis in democracy and crisis in policing were heightened by the emergence of an increasingly authoritarian state form, from 1974 onwards. The election of a radical right administration in 1979 committed to the prioritization of economic interests over any others resulted in the dramatic restructuring of the edifice of citizenship, further de-democratization of British society and the police being allocated the key role of containing the consequences of the changes. As a consequence the demands for democratic representation and participation in policing matters were not high on the government's agenda. Instead, as in the 1960s and 1970s, supplemental non-democratic structures of community representation were introduced. Given the pivotal interests that the police were representing there was no change in the democratic governance of the police. The next section will examine how the issues of democratic accountability and community representation were dealt with in Manchester.
Section I: The Police and the Community

On 2 April 1976 James Anderton became the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police (GMP), the largest provincial police force in the country. Anderton saw himself as representing 'a new generation of policemen' who were prepared to intervene in public debate and who regarded policing as an 'ideology in its own right' (see Kettle, 1979). This new generation of autonomous chief police officers were the direct beneficiaries of the legal, organizational and political changes documented previously (see pp 65-74). James Anderton’s public pronouncements and his policing philosophy have generated more than a decade of controversy about the policing of Greater Manchester and in doing so provided the context within which debates about police accountability and community representation and participation in policing matters emerged in the county, and particularly in relation to the policing of Manchester.

In order to understand why debates about the democratic accountability of the GMP emerged it is necessary to discuss the policing philosophy of the Chief Constable. At the basis of this philosophy was an unequivocal view of police accountability premised upon the nature of the relationship of the police to the community.

a. The Chief Constable’s conceptualization of the community

The Chief Constable’s controversial views on policing, public order and the state are well known nationally. He has consistently expressed concern about politicians, defended the autonomy of Chief Constables from political
interference, of any kind, and labelled those who demand a strengthening of democratic accountability as subversives. Although national prominence is given to his statements and actions it must be emphasized that in many instances the basis for such comments and actions is the local situation and usually this is where they have most impact. At the core of the Chief Constable's statements is a theory of police and community that provides the structure for the day to day policing of Manchester. There are fundamental themes about the community that underpin this policing philosophy.

First, the Chief Constable has stressed the, 'traditional and unique partnership between the community and its police force' (1982 Annual Report:65-66) and has compared the nature of the relationship 'to that which operates in a well conducted family where there is complete trust and confidence and an absence of any kind of deception whatsoever' (1979 Annual Report:xiv).

Consequently it is a definition of community which is premised on a Victorian notion of the family which is structured hierarchically with one party, the father, unquestioningly in control. Allied to that Victorian notion is one of respectability. Throughout his speeches and statements it is possible to detect a clear idea that, for the Chief Constable, the community is made up of those respectable people, irrespective of class, race, gender and age who both support and respect the police and the law of the land. Thus, the classic Victorian respectable/disreputable distinction has played an important part in the Chief Constable's views of who is and who is not of the community.

Second, as far as he is concerned, the Chief Constable and
the police force are, 'fully accountable to the community both directly and through the business of the police committee' (1977 Annual Report:viii). However, Anderton has always prioritized the direct relationship between the community and its police force and has expressed constant opposition to individuals and structures, particularly politically based ones, that would play the role of mediating in that direct relationship. In order to be fully accountable the Chief Constable, through one of the largest police Public Relations departments in England and Wales, has utilized and cultivated the media in order to explain his policies to the community.

Third, it has been emphasized that the community is in constant moral danger and that there is an organized external conspiracy to subvert stable internal community structures (see Anderton, 1977; 1979a; 1979b; 1981b; 1981c; 1982; 1985a). Fourth, there is a 'loss of community' thesis that has informed his statements about the inner city areas of Greater Manchester. At a general level the Chief Constable has constantly harked back to a time from a senior police officer's, and perhaps a Victorian patriarch's, point of view 'when life was rather less complicated than it is today,' (1985b).

In addition to having to deal with a more complex society the police also had to deal with the 'difficult' inner city urban areas where there is 'a dispirited and trammelled populace', diverse standards of living, large scale unemployment, poor housing and multi-cultural values and where 'crime is endemic with whole communities actively involved' (ibid). Of such pathological communities the Chief Constable asked, 'how on earth do we reach these people?'
Finally, given this analysis of the nature of the relationship between the police and the community and the fact that in certain inner city areas community has all but disappeared and is endangered elsewhere the Chief Constable believes that it is the function of the police to intervene actively to halt the 'drifting morality' and improve 'the quality of community life'. This is particularly the case when those both socially and politically responsible have, as far as he is concerned, reneged on their responsibilities. The belief that the community in many of the inner city areas is falling apart, that people do not trust politicians and the other social agencies means that the police have an obligation to intervene in an attempt to reverse this situation. Thus Anderton, as the concerned patriarch, has argued that it is his duty to intervene if there is the possibility of community discipline slipping (see *The Times*, 27.1.78). He has stated unequivocally that

> It is furthermore my honest belief that our police will be the one body left to erect an umbrella of public confidence and safety under which all social agencies can shelter; the one truly trusted profession attracting the unwavering support of the public (*MEN*, 12.3.82).

Therefore, the Chief Constable's view of the hierarchically structured respectable community and the police is one where both he and his force are of the community, instinctively act on the best interests of the community (even if the community is not aware of it) and are inherently responsive to the needs of the community. Within this scenario those who are critical of the police are not representative of the community and/or are either through naivety or malice are not acting in the best interests of the community. As far as the Chief Constable is concerned they are not of the community.
Such views have provided the framework for the community relations work of the GMP. The Community Contact branch of the force has focused upon those inner city neighbourhoods where there has been a loss of community and those disreputable groups that have been troublesome for the police. This working definition of community recognizes the heterogeneous nature of such inner city areas and that the police do not enjoy the confidence of the people who live there. There is also a belief that GMP had a right to intervene actively in an attempt to rectify the situation and to play a full part in this heterogeneous setting by liaising with various respectable community representatives and being represented on every non-political social/administrative institution.

The Chief Constable's overarching notion of community and the nature of the relationship between that community and the police effectively depoliticized and delegitimized the demands and complaints of the troublesome groups and those outside subversives who would undermine the police. As a consequence, it was the duty of the force to demand participation and representation in any situation deemed to be relevant to its objectives bringing with it clearly articulated ideologies about the nature of community life. In doing so the force could counter the efforts of those troublemakers who would politicize the relationship between the police and the community.

b. The Chief Constable's conceptualization of community representation and participation in policing

Given the Chief Constable's views on mediating structures, prior to the disturbances of 1981, there were no formal forums for community representation and participation on policing matters in Greater Manchester. Representation of the community was achieved through the efforts of the
Community Contact Branch of the force. Thus, with ethnic minorities there was, from 1976, extensive police liaison with the various non-political, respectable committees and organizations that were seen as representing the ethnic minority communities as well as extensive contact with community representatives. In addition there was the representation of those groups on policing matters that concerned them through their co-option onto force training sessions. With regard to young people there was police liaison with schools, colleges and youth clubs. However, there was no direct youth participation or indeed representation on policing matters. They were being represented indirectly by the community elders who would participate in the police proposals. Therefore, through the work of Community Contact there was mutual police and community representation on policing matters.

There were also clear limitations to the nature of community representation. First, there had to be an acceptance of the police role and function in society. Second, there had to be a recognition that operational matters were not a matter for community discussion. Third, representation was confined to non-political organizations and leaders who were community elders. Fourth, in relation to the youth clubs there had to be an acceptance of a particular form of youth work. Consequently, such representation was based on a very strict adherence to police definitions of what was acceptable and what should be the common concern of both the police and the community, namely crime prevention and mobilizing support for the police. In this scenario the community was given a passive role and those sections of the community in conflict or critical of the police had no possibility of having their interests represented.
c. The Chief Constable and democratic accountability

Between 1976-81, the Greater Manchester Police Authority, under the control of the Conservative Party, was practically moribund in terms of challenging the statements and policies of the Chief Constable (see Kettle, 1979). However, during this period it was Anderton who took on the mantle of defending the police from those demanding accountability. The Chief Constable made a series of highly publicized statements linking such demands to part of an extensive Left-wing conspiracy to overthrow British democracy. He argued that in order for such a conspiracy to succeed the police had to be made subordinate to politicians. Thus, criticisms of the police and demands for community representation and participation were part of the strategy to bring about such subordination. Consequently, as far as he was concerned all demands for accountability must be rejected and he called for the state and the community to protect the police from such demands. If the state and community failed to do so the police would not be able to protect it from the conspirators.

In his 1979 annual report, in response to criticisms of his policing of Greater Manchester, he argued that the police were being asked to defend what need not be defended; to answer what did not have to be questioned; to explain what was already known and abundantly clear; and to account for matters to an exceptional and unreasonable degree (1979 Annual Report).

He emphasized, once more, that, 'the paramount truth has to be faced that it is the duty of the state to protect the police'. Between this period and the county council elections of May 1981 Anderton aired his conspiracy theory at every opportunity, most notably on BBC Questiontime (16.10.79). He also claimed that race relations
organizations had been infiltrated by anti-police elements who were determined to create conflict between the police and the ethnic minorities (see The Times, 27.9.80). His response to the police accountability Bills introduced by Jack Straw MP was to argue that seemingly innocuous demands for accountability were a front for those whose real objective was to gain control of the police (see The Guardian, 10.1.81; Police Review, 1981:289). Such accusations linked into further allegations about the corrupt nature of politics in Greater Manchester (see The Guardian, 10.1.81) and his belief that he was the subject of a smear campaign.

There has been a political campaign in the Greater Manchester area, certainly for the past three years ... purposefully engineered and clearly designed to discredit me in the eyes of the public on the one hand to try to persuade responsible people, well meaning people, on the other hand to turn against the police force in general and the Chief Constable in particular (MEN, 12.1.81).

The Chief Constable was undoubtedly aware that if the Labour Party won the 1981 county council elections in Greater Manchester there was the possibility that his critics would be in control of the Police Authority.

d. Policing the community 1976-81
The Chief Constable, has consistently stressed that his policing strategies and philosophies are community based and readily acknowledges that both hard and soft policies and practices are interlinked (see 1979:x-xi).

i. Hard policing
After Anderton became Chief Constable sophisticated computer and surveillance technology was quickly acquired and by 1979 the GMP was reputed to have the most extensive police arsenal in Britain (see Kettle 1979). In July 1976
an elite paramilitary unit, the Tactical Aid Group (TAG) was formed which was to be the source of continual controversy. There were controversial crackdowns on prostitution, pornography, illegal drinking and gay clubs. 'War' was declared on muggers, particularly in Moss Side, and, following the example of the New York Police Department, police decoys were deployed in an attempt to lure muggers into the open. In the autumn of 1977, without informing the Police Authority or residents, a paramilitary anti-terrorist exercise was held in the Collyhurst area of Manchester which effectively sealed the area off for the duration of the exercise. Despite the public concern that was expressed Anderton refused to discuss the operation (see The Guardian, 2.11.77; Morning Star, 3.11.77). To add to public concern it was disclosed by the Chief Constable in 1978 that 95% of TAG officers were trained and authorized to use hand weapons (see Annual Report 1978).

During this period Anderton also dealt with proposed National Front (NF) marches in a controversial manner. In October 1977 after initially banning the proposed NF march he met secretly with leaders of the NF and agreed to a march if the location was kept secret. In order to control anti-fascist demonstrators the force was placed on emergency stand by and helicopters with air to ground cameras were deployed at an estimated cost of £250,000 (The Times, 11.10.77). On 26 January 1978 another massive police operation allowed a public NF meeting to take place in Hyde. On 10 February 1978 the Chief Constable deployed mounted police to enable a NF meeting to take place in Bolton town hall. Concern was expressed about the Chief Constable's seeming connivance in allowing fascist marches to take place in parts of Manchester with considerable ethnic minority populations and the policing styles that
were being implemented to protect such marches. As a consequence Tameside Trades Council organized an 'Anderton Must Go' campaign. In 1979 the behaviour of vice squad officers in Moss Side came under scrutiny when Darcus Howe was arrested for supposedly obstructing police officers. As a consequence of this arrest a group of black organizations started a campaign both to support Howe and to highlight the policing of black people in Manchester. The trial itself brought into the public some unsavory aspects concerning the policing of Moss Side and Howe was found not guilty with costs being awarded against the GMP (see Race Today May 1980).

This incident was indicative of the concern in Moss Side about the type of deeply corrupt and brutal policing that the area was being subjected to. From 1978 onwards that concern was heightened to a such a degree that there was the widespread belief that the police were out of control. In 1978 there was considerable anger at the type of justice black youth was being subjected to - arbitrary arrests, beatings and heavy sentences. This was not helped by the fact that in 1979 the Chief Constable seemingly gave the seal of approval to such policing by saying that he would clean up Moss Side. During this period black youth also built up clear profiles of the type of treatment they could expect to receive from the different police stations surrounding Moss Side. The youth of Moss Side knew that Longsight station was the place where juveniles were beaten up and that Stretford station was notorious for 'nigger bashing'. They also had a deep resentment of the type of treatment that Greenheys station meted out and it is no coincidence that during the disturbances

The youth attacked the station with such ferocity that police officers abandoned ship. Revolts of this kind
always contain within them violence of equal intensity to that experienced by those in revolt. It was proof positive of the intolerable violence that had been heaped upon generations of Irish and black immigrants by officers who manned that station (Race Today, May 1985:3)

Complaints about the policing of the black community continued, particularly from the Manchester Black Parents organization and there was another march and rally on 16 August 1980 in Moss Side complaining about police harassment of black people. Thus the implementation of pro-active hard policing methods brought forth complaints from various groups in Manchester on the receiving end of such a policing policy particularly gays, blacks, the young and trade unionists. However, of fundamental importance is the fact that the Chief Constable rejected all such allegations and complaints and in doing so protected his officers from being called to account.

ii. Preventive policing
Because of the Chief Constable's beliefs about the role of the police in the community, the loss of community in inner city areas and the threat to the community, the community relations aspects of the force were also strengthened 'to compensate for the previous fifteen years in which the police weren't members of the community' (Kettle, 1979). During 1976-77 a fully fledged Community Contact Branch became operational and subsumed within it the traditional focus of police-community relations, young people and members of ethnic minorities living in the inner city. This Community Contact Branch became one of the most innovative in the country and the nature of its work gives an indication as to how the police dealt with groups who were a problem for them.

i. (a) Young People
The Chief Constable laid particular emphasis on making contact with young people as he believed that in many situations society had failed in its duty to provide proper guidance and discipline for its young, particularly those living in the inner cities.

The Police Service in the past has adopted a relatively passive policy in the matter of direct intervention in social affairs, but I am now practically convinced that we are as well equipped as any institution to help in guiding and influencing society in what is best for young people...the police must take such action as appears to them appropriate before it becomes too late (1976).

It became force policy to concentrate on young people because first, they were susceptible to being corrupted by sinister elements and easily led into crime and anti-social activity and second, because through the young people the force was able to make contact with the parents. Community Contact operated summer adventure play grounds, soccer competitions, holidays as well as joint work experience programmes with the Manpower Services Commission for inner city youth. On 6 June 1980 the force opened up a controversial full-time solely police staffed youth club, with a sub-station on the premises, in the north of inner city Manchester. The club was viewed as 'the pinnacle' of 'the most intensive' youth policy of any force in the country. (Scene, 1981:8)

Community Contact had a very clear conception about the function of the youth club. Police involvement was geared towards helping to create a normal environment for young people and compensate for...their home background; to give young officers an opportunity to participate in the community that they worked in but did not live in; to break down the barriers between police and young people and in the long run reduce the crime rate. Another important role was to counter the type of anti-authority...
youth work being practiced in other clubs. Community Contact officers in this youth club expressed, 'distaste for some of youth work's theories and practices, (ibid: 5) and, in classic Victorian manner, stressed discipline amongst youth club members. In addition to their youth work Community Contact had regular contact with schools and colleges presenting lectures on the history of the British police and 'Police Weeks' devoted to explaining the role of the police in society and the duties of the citizenry.

ii (b). Ethnic minorities
Considerable attention was also paid by the Community Contact Branch to ethnic minorities because as the Chief Constable made clear 'occasionally, as a result of language barriers and lack of understanding, problems arise in which the police are involved' (1980:56). Building upon links which had first been established in the late 1960s contact was extended through a special Community Relations Unit. GMP was thus represented on the committees of ethnic minority organizations and community leaders were appointed onto the force training programmes. However, there was a strict qualification in relation to whom the police would liaise with in that special care was taken to avoid any involvement in activity which was politically motivated. Therefore, there were clearly delineated limits to GMP's consultation. There was also considerable overlap between the efforts in relation to ethnic minorities and young people.

In both cases GMP set limits to those who it was prepared to talk to and as a result those youth workers, community workers and community organizations who did not accept that problems between police and blacks and young people were the result of communication and cultural difficulties
were excluded. In addition to being excluded they were publicly identified as central participants in the conspiracy to discredit the Chief Constable.

ii (c). The whole community
Although the key contact groups for the GMP were young people and ethnic minorities under Anderton, its work began to be extended to other members of the community.

Various other groups within the community are catered for and include senior citizens, the blind, the mentally and physically handicapped and youth organizations, by providing outings to places of interest, horse riding and swimming instruction for handicapped groups and every aspect of outdoor activity (1980:56).

In addition open days were held regularly in divisional police stations and contact was made with residents groups, pensioners groups and with parents through the schools. In the case of the latter GMP attempted to foster relations with single parents who were characteristic of the inner city and reported that, 'to the very young children police officers take the role of the father figure’" (Community Contact, 27.7.81).

Furthermore, police contact was maintained with the various district council departments, particularly those of Manchester City Council. In the case of the latter the chief superintendent's of each division were allocated liaison responsibility in relation to each of the key local social service departments. Thus a police initiated professional multi-agency approach was informally established as part of the community work of the GMP.

e. Demands for democratic accountability
The foci of both the hard and soft policing strategies were the same, the young people and black inner city neighbourhoods of Manchester (not the whole of Greater
Manchester). This was the community that the policing strategy had as the object of its attention. Whilst Community Contact officers were making contact with those organizations that they defined as being acceptable and meeting youth who would accept their definition of youth work, their colleagues on ordinary policing duty, including those in TAGs, on the streets were coming into contact with young people and black people in very different circumstances. A piece of research carried out by the Home Office in October 1980 (Tuck and Southgate, 1980) provides evidence about the type of policing that young people and black people were being subjected to in this period. The report notes that first of all the range of anti-police sentiment was more extensive in relation to all West Indian age groups from 16 to 55+ than their white counterparts in the sample (1980:40). Second, there was a statistically significant tendency for West Indians in the 35-54 age group to be stopped, searched and or arrested more often than their white counterparts. Third, among both black and white 16-24 year olds one in three expressed considerable anti-police sentiments (ditto:40). And finally during the previous year to the study one in three of all males between 16-24 had been stopped searched or arrested (see also Walker, 1987).

As indicated previously, in Manchester during this period those who complained about such policing practices ran the risk of being publicly defined as anti-police, therefore not of the community and thus subject to police attention. The group who came to face this risk were inner city youth and community workers who worked with the young people and in the areas where such policing practices were focused. They were having to deal with the consequences of the proactive soft and hard policing strategies in inner city
Manchester. When they began to protest the community became a site of contestation between GMP and those opposed to such policing philosophy and practices. This friction was added to by first, the election of a Labour administration to the Greater Manchester Council in May 1981 which was committed to pushing for more democratic accountability of the police and second, the serious disturbances in Moss Side of July 1981. As a consequence those excluded from the Chief Constable's definition of community and from having active representation and participation on the policing they were being subjected to, finally forced their interests onto the political agenda.

e (i). The May 1981 elections
On 7 May 1981 a Labour administration was returned to the Greater Manchester Council (GMC) with a commitment to pushing for more police accountability. As part of the Labour Party's election campaign in Manchester candidates in those areas where policing was an issue promised that if elected there would be

Support for policies to make the police accountable to locally elected representatives - so that YOUR views on how the police should spend their limited time and resources can have real importance to ensure all members of the community are treated fairly (Moss Side Labour Party).

Labour believes that the locally elected councils shall have strategic responsibility for the policing of their areas (Bradford and Moston Labour Party).

On 9 May 1981 the new leader of the GMC stated that under the new administration the Police Authority would cease to be a 'mutual appreciation society' and that the Chief Constable could expect a more rigorous approach to his accounting for the policing of Greater Manchester. The Chief Constable was also advised to cease making controversial political statements or he would be subject
to the same disciplinary procedures as other senior officers of the Council would be (Manchester Evening News, 9.5.81). At the first meeting of the newly constituted Police Authority the new chair argued for the removal of the magistrates, a widening of powers of the Authority in relation to its jurisdiction and the integration of the Authority into the County Council structure (Manchester Evening News, 3.6.81). One of the first acts of the new Authority was to cut 1% of the police budget for reallocation to other council services (24.6.81). Thus, from the outset the new Police Authority was determined to assert itself in relation to its role in the policing of Greater Manchester. However, no sooner had the newly constituted Authority taken over when the serious disturbances of 1981 took place with Moss Side erupting between 7-11 July 1981.

The policing of the disturbances personified the soft and hard approaches of the GMP documented above. After initial trouble there was discussion between senior officers in Moss Side with the recognized community leaders to control the situation. The purpose of such discussion was to bring together the community and the police so that older members of the various ethnic groups could help the police to influence the younger people and avoid an escalation of violence (Chief Constable, 1981: 1817).

An instructive insight into how the Chief Constable looked upon community representation and participation is provided in the Chief Constable's report on the disturbances in which he recounted that when a group of young blacks demanded access to the meetings as representatives of the black youth of Moss Side the senior police officers in charge could not accommodate the request because it was force procedure to 'have
discussions only with the elders of the community’ (ditto: 1817). Given this procedure it is hardly surprising that the Chief Constable had to report also that despite this community consultation further disturbances took place and demonstrated in a very real way that representatives of the community in the area had little or no influence or control over the people concerned in this rioting (Chief Constable, 1981:3).

The Chief Constable subsequently implied that the fact that the community leaders had no control over the situation was one of the reasons why he decided to use hard policing tactics to re-establish control of Moss Side. The Chief Constable made it clear that the youths of Moss Side had ‘had their chance’ (Manchester Evening News, 10.7.81) and a ‘Force Contingency Plan’ was executed.

24 police wagons, each manned by 10 steel-helmeted riot police, roared around the shopping and housing area pinning black and white youths to the walls and arresting them. Several youths were knocked to the ground by the wagons... The rioters moved on to take up positions in high rise flats and flyovers to hurl down rocks on the wagons. Later snatch squads of police moved into the flats. Youths - black and white - were kicked to the ground before being taken away (Daily Mirror, 10.7.81).

This strategy initially brought praise, including from the Home Secretary who described it as a ‘conspicuous success’, for the way in which the Chief Constable had brought the disturbances to an end (see The Times, 11.7.81). There had been few police casualties and the GMP did not have to face the ignominy of having to retreat as the forces in other cities had to. Crucially, for force morale, the authority of the GMP on the streets had been maintained. Initially certain community leaders emphasized that the disturbances were not race related and nor were they anti-police. However, there were also bitter recriminations from other community leaders and
representatives about the way in which police officers had behaved during the disturbances, the raids that took place afterwards and the summary justice people had been subject to. As a consequence for the first time a political space was created for a critical discussion of the policing of Manchester.

e (iii). Further complaints
Concern was initially expressed by local shopkeepers about the way in which the police, during the first night of the disturbances, had not intervened and seemingly let Moss Side, and their shops, burn. However, this concern was lost amongst widespread allegations about the manner in which police officers had behaved during the second night. A Defence Committee was formed in Moss Side (MSDC) to mobilize community opposition to police brutality and racism and to defend those who had been arrested. Youth and community leaders refused to meet the Home Secretary during his visit to Moss Side in the aftermath of the disturbances and his statements about copy cat disturbances. A proposed 'police week' at a local school in Moss Side had to be cancelled because pupils opposed the presence of police in their school and parents threatened to keep their children at home if the event took place. Community Contact faced considerable obstacles in their concerted attempts to re-establish relations. Considerable anxiety was expressed about their proposals to take as many youngsters as possible from Moss Side on a hastily constructed police holiday to the Lake District. A series of police initiated 'clear-the-air' meetings with local youth had to be cancelled because of allegations that the police were attempting to pressurize local youth to attend the meetings. In addition letters were sent to the Chief Constable from residents of one of the local housing estates where the policing had been heaviest
complaining about the racist and brutal behaviour of officers.

The complaints took on even more force when respectable community leaders and representatives voiced their concern. The Bishop of Manchester, during a service on 19 July 1981, said he believed the allegations that police officers had used 'abusive language and undue force' when dealing with black people. The chair of the Manchester Council of Community Relations (MCCR) also expressed concern about the policing of Moss Side. The vice-chair of the Police Authority, who was the elected representative for the area, made similar allegation and officially complained to the Chief Constable whilst a local doctor released case details of the injuries he had treated and said that in the light of them he now had to recognize that the past allegations of police brutality in Manchester were probably true. The Haldane Society also expressed dissatisfaction about the manner in which magistrates were dealing with cases arising out of the disturbances. Thus considerable pressure was exerted from various respectable quarters for an independent inquiry to be set up into the policing of Moss Side.

The Chief Constable did little to allay the growing concern about the policing the disturbances. Predictably he claimed that people from outside the community had been involved, that there had been a conspiracy to set Moss Side alight and that his officers had to deal with organized guerrilla warfare on the streets of Manchester. He repudiated the allegations that the GMP was in any way racist in its policing of Moss Side and rejected initial demands for an inquiry saying that if he had to hold one every time there were rumours of dissatisfaction with the police
It would be open to anyone with more malicious intent to create severe internal problems for the police. That surely is desperately unfair. There is an established procedure and it is open to members of the public to use it (The Times, 21.7.81).

His only concession was to give his personal assurance that if people used the proper complaints procedure all grievances would be investigated

I will take it on myself to in the absence of formal complaints to look into the general allegations that are now being made (The Times, 21.7.81).

However, as the pressure mounted both locally and nationally the Chief Constable appointed Assistant Chief Constable Stalker to head an internal inquiry into allegations of police misconduct. He also gave the ominous warning that everyone who had made a complaint would be interviewed by the investigative team and those deemed guilty of making unfounded or malicious complaints would be subject to criminal proceedings. It is hardly surprising that this move did little to assuage the intensifying demands for an independent inquiry. Those demanding an independent inquiry turned to Manchester City Council and Greater Manchester Council, the two political councils which had responsibilities for the area of Moss Side.

f. The political response

f (i). The Hytner Inquiry: community representation through consultation

Within Manchester City Council left wing Labour councillors, particularly those representing Moss Side, pressed for a discussion of the policing of the disturbances by the city council. Their demands were initially rebuffed by the right wing Labour leadership and
instead the Council released an all-party statement supporting the police in their efforts to maintain law and order. However, the demands continued with Moss Side Labour party calling for the setting up of an independent joint inquiry between Manchester City Council and the GMC into the causes of the disturbances and complaints of heavy handed policing. After bitter argument between the Left and the Right of the Labour Party, Manchester City Council finally agreed in July 1981 that Lord Scarman should head an inquiry into the causes of the Moss Side disturbances.

The Greater Manchester Council (GMC) hosted a conference (with Greater Manchester Youth Association) of community and political representatives on 15 July 1981 to discuss the disturbances and what could be done to prevent them happening again. On 22 July 1981 it was announced that there would be a GMC sponsored inquiry, made up of representatives of ethnic minorities and youth organizations. The Hytner Inquiry, as it became known, was scheduled to start hearing evidence on 17 August 1981 and its brief was to examine the causes of the disturbances.

Despite the fact that there was widespread agreement that there should be an independent inquiry there was considerable disquiet about the nature of the inquiry that was agreed to by the GMC and the Police Authority. A public meeting of approximately 300 people in Moss Side on 12 August 1981 discussed a boycott of the Hytner inquiry with the MSDC subsequently issuing a statement saying that such a boycott was necessary because the nature and the structure of the inquiry had been agreed on in total disregard of the wishes of the community in Moss Side. It was stressed that the inquiry membership was not representative of the community and that the racist
policing of Moss Side should be the focus of attention not the community.

For the longest while, the Moss Side community has been protesting about the indiscriminate beatings, raids, frameups and harassment laced with racist abuse which the police have been dishing out in this community (MSDC, 13.8.81).

The MSDC warned that any information given to the Hytner Inquiry could find its way to the police and urged that people, including councillors and council officers, give information concerning police attacks on the community to the MSDC. The youth section of Manchester Labour party and the Haldane Society joined the boycott of the inquiry. Thus, because of the manner in which it chose its community representatives the inquiry faced the possibility of the non-participation of those who had fought with the police on the streets of Moss Side.

However, it was not just radical opinion in Manchester that was opposed to the Hytner Inquiry. The local Conservative party questioned the quality and reliability of the evidence that the inquiry was dependent upon. Manchester City Council continued to demand that an inquiry 'with teeth', under Lord Scarman, be set up arguing that the Hytner Inquiry had no formal statutory powers. The Chief Constable stated that he was not prepared to allow any of his officers to give evidence in person or to be subjected to cross questioning. Thus both the Chief Constable and his critics were claiming that there had been insufficient consultation before the Inquiry had been set up. As a consequence the issues of community, participation and representation were raised with the allegation from all sides of the political spectrum that the inquiry was unrepresentative and the refusal of key individuals and groups to participate in the proceedings. Although a considerable amount of
evidence was amassed the public gallery remained empty as the boycott took effect.

Those who did choose to co-operate provided evidence of a considerable breakdown in police community relations in Moss Side. Allegations were made about the heavy handed policing of the area, about the ineffectiveness of the complaints system, about the work of community contact officers being undone by the type of policing being practiced on the streets and about the Chief Constable's unwillingness to accept criticism of his force or policing tactics from community representatives.

When the Report was finally released on 12 October 1981 it confirmed what critics of the Chief Constable's policies had been claiming. It concluded that despite the considerable efforts of Community Contact officers, links had been forged only with the older respectable community representatives in Moss Side. It found widespread evidence that the black youth of Moss Side held deep resentment, and in certain cases feelings of outright hatred, of the police because of the policing they were subjected to.

What is alleged is that over the past few years the police have developed a new style of 'stop and search' operation. It is said that young and inexperienced officers in Panda cars or vans tour areas of Greater Manchester at night stopping youths whether walking singly or in groups; that they physically manhandle them; that in the case of blacks they racially abuse them; that they sometimes are actually physically violent to them; that they not infrequently push or otherwise manhandle them into a police vehicle and that they rudely question them. It is further alleged that in many cases, particularly if the youngster responds to this treatment by 'giving cheek', he is taken to the police station and kept overnight before being released without a charge but a threat that he will 'be got next time' (para 25.9).

The report pointed out that it was not just young people who had made these allegations but that they had also been
given in evidence by respectable members of the community, that is, solicitors, youth leaders, clergy and community leaders. In its conclusions it recommended that the Chief Constable would be well advised to take note of the level of hostility towards the police that had uncovered and to realize 'that in Moss Side among young blacks the feeling is intense' (48.6)

We appreciate that the Chief Constable may believe that such a scenario is a figment of the imagination but we believe that he and the Police Committee should be most concerned that it is a figment of very many people's imaginations and we believe that policing in Manchester will never be wholly effective until young people cease to believe it (49.31).

However, despite these criticisms the report, concluded to the incredulity of the critics, that 'the police force in Greater Manchester is probably better than most in the United Kingdom' and praised the Chief Constable for his leadership.

f (ii). The response to Hytner: community participation through monitoring

The Hytner Report identified the operation of the complaints system as one of the major sources of suspicion and tension between the police and the black community in Moss Side. It was suggested that steps could be taken to improve the existing system without changing its basic structure. There should be the appointment of a 'community representative', whose role it would be to receive and pass on to the police complaints brought to him/her. However, before passing on the complaints to the police the 'community representative' would assess the available evidence and screen the complaints to make sure that only strong cases were submitted to the official complaints (Section 49) procedures. The hope was that, as a result, the proportion of successfully pursued complaints would rise with a resultant improvement in the confidence in the
system. Those complaints defined by the 'community representative' as being too weak for the Section 49 process would be taken up informally in an attempt to alleviate community concern.

It was emphasized that in order for these recommendations to work three things were essential. First, the 'community representative' would have to enjoy the full confidence of the community, especially young people. Second, this confidence could only be sustained through the 'community representative' being able to achieve a real measure of success with any complaints that s/he deflected away from Section 49 status. And third, the Chief Constable would have to agree to the appointment of a special officer with seniority and community awareness who would be located in an office independent of the force structure to receive complaints in Moss Side. This police officer and the 'community representative' would have to work closely together to build up an atmosphere of trust, assist with the informal complaints, help sift out the Section 49s made directly to the police and monitor local conditions and local concerns.

Such conclusion and recommendations confirmed the misgivings of those who had boycotted the Inquiry as they did not address the key issue of the racist policing of Moss Side. In addition the idea of the appointment of another professional community representative, as the community representative, proved to critics that Hytner, and the Police Authority were incapable of learning the lessons of the past. The MSDC released a counter report, 'Hytner Myths', which concluded that

What we have seen from the Hytner Report doesn't give us the confidence to believe that any future official inquiry will unearth the reality of policing in Moss Side (14.10.81).
In the post-disturbances period little effectively changed in relation to the policing of Moss Side and the policing of young people. There continued to be allegations of heavy handed policing as well as rumours about street justice being meted out by police officers in retaliation for the disturbances. An indication of the state of policing in Moss Side in this period is provided in an open letter from local youth and community workers to The Guardian in December 1981. It pointed out that police officers in Moss Side had embarked on a campaign of harassment and intimidation of the young people of the area. Additionally, they argued that this campaign had been extended to youth and community workers and that as a result tensions remained high. As a consequence of the behaviour of these police officers the youth and community workers stated that they were no longer prepared to work or cooperate with the police in any capacity.

We cannot, in all conscience, work with a police force which allowed vans to career through our streets with uniformed hooligans beating their truncheons against the vehicles, and chanting slogans such as 'Nigger, nigger, nigger - Oi, oi, oi' (The Guardian, 9.12.81).

This concern expressed by the workers extended to the work of Community Contact. Not only were police officers harassing youth and community workers on the streets but Community Contact was continuing to make a concentrated effort to move into youth and community work giving resources to those youth and community workers/clubs who accepted their philosophy whilst publicly condemning those youth and community clubs/workers who opposed its work. As far as inner city youth and community workers were concerned the connections between the policing of the streets and the actions of Community Contact were clear. Because of their opposition to Community Contact they were being singled out for harassment and intimidation.
It is within this context that the first independent police monitoring group emerged in Manchester. A series of developments heightened anxieties of youth and community workers as well as those concerned about the policing of Manchester. In March 1982 the Chief Constable, in a speech calling for the abolition of Police Authorities, was highly critical of certain youth and community work which he saw as fermenting anti-police feelings in young people.

For several years now in this country young blacks especially have been brainwashed by an increasingly intense campaign to promote hostility between police and black people. Even well intentioned workers in race relations, whose honest motives were not open to question, unwittingly lent support to this menacing and misled propaganda. Problems were fostered in peaceful places, and discontentment in innocent minds. Such difficulties as there were with ethnic minorities were gradually cultivated, and this insidious work still goes on (1982).

However, the Community Contact work of GMP and the comments of the Chief Constable were coming under increasing scrutiny and complaint. A meeting of approximately 80 youth and community workers took place on 21 July 1982 to discuss how to respond to police involvement in youth and community work. By August 1982 a report, 'Police and Youth Work' had been drawn up by the group that emerged out of the meeting which presented a systematic critique of the work of Community Contact. Drawing upon the work of those critical of community policing strategies (see Bunyan, 1981; Bridges, 1981) this critique argued that GMP's youth and community work was geared towards the more effective policing of the community through the penetration of the community for information gathering purposes by attempting to disguise the true nature of policing in the inner city. A series of demands emerged from this report. It was stressed that
every means possible should be pursued to put a halt to
police involvement in youth and community work and to stop
the harassment of youth and community workers. It was
stated that such demands could only really be effected
through campaigning to bring about real changes in the
policing of Manchester

Community policing cannot be appended to an otherwise
changed police force. There must be real changes in the
balance of power between the various communities and
groups and the police force in a region as socially
diverse as Greater Manchester (1982:7)

Such a critique meant that the central demands of Youth
and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group (YAWPMG) were,
a complete overhaul of the system of police accountability
and the establishment of an independent complaints
procedure (1982:11). In order to push for their demands
the group decided on three courses of action. First, to
withdraw from any form of co-operation with police
community activities and those agencies/authorities who
endorsed multi-agency activities. Second, to place on the
agendas of as many relevant organizations/groups as
possible the issue of police community work and finally to
support the establishment of local community based police
monitoring groups.

The concern of the youth and community workers was
intensified by two further incidents in the latter half of
1982. On 22 September 1982 a black community worker was
stopped for questioning by drug squad officers outside
Moss Side Shopping Precinct. During the ensuing arguments
another well-known black youth worker was arrested and
charged with assault and obstruction. When he was released
from the local police station he had extensive eye
injuries. This caused an outcry and confirmed the worst
fears of those youth and community workers who believed
that they were being targeted for some very special
treatment by GMP.

In October 1982 a youth worker who went to his office on a Sunday afternoon stumbled across what turned out to be an undercover police surveillance team operating video equipment from the vantage of the office. The youth worker was bundled into another room and informed that permission had been obtained to use the offices for an anti-mugging operation. In follow up inquiries it was found that permission had not been obtained and that the real focus of the surveillance was a gay pub directly facing the youth office. Specific concern was generated by the fact that the particular offices that had been broken into belonged to an organization that the police would have defined as being non cooperative and whose confidential files could have been open to police inspection. Such incidents confirmed the worst fears of youth and community workers about the nature of policing Moss Side and the harassment of youth and community workers and provided more evidence for their case that GMP was attempting to penetrate the community for surveillance collecting purposes.

In October 1982 one of the unions approached by the youth and community workers issued a press release criticizing police involvement in youth and community work and asking local authorities to clarify the true extent of such involvement. The Chief Constable replied immediately arguing that criticisms were unfounded and "not worthy of comment" (Manchester Evening News, Oct. 8, 1982). As organizations and groups began to express concern GMP finally agreed to set up a working party to look at the extent and nature of GMP involvement in youth work.

Further meetings of the youth and community workers took
place and in March 1983 a statement was released from YAPMG reiterating that as far as it was concerned police intrusions into youth and community work in Manchester were part of a community policing strategy whose objective was neighbourhood wide surveillance and information gathering. Consequently, community policing should be seen as part of the problem rather than as a solution to the breakdown in police community relations in the inner city. The group reiterated its policy of non-cooperation with community policing operations and multi-agency policies because as far as it was concerned there was no point in entering into dialogue with GMP because the force was not prepared to listen or more importantly take on board any criticisms.

Thus concerns about various aspects of the Chief Constable's policing philosophy coalesced in the space opened up first, by the change in political control of Greater Manchester Council and second, because of the disturbances of 1981. As a consequence police accountability was placed on the local political agenda and brought with it demands for real community participation and representation on policing matters. However, in response to what was seen as the ineffectual response to those demands by the Police Authority and the lack of change in the policing of Moss Side YAWPMG placed independent police monitoring on the agenda through its questioning of the whole nature of community policing in Manchester. The issue was also placed on the agenda of Manchester City Council when enough pressure was brought to bear upon Manchester Education Committee by members of YAWPMG to set up a working party in September 1983 to produce a set of guidelines to govern contact between youth and community workers and the police.
Discussion
The eventual result of the debates, proposals and counter proposals was the emergence of two distinct models in Manchester, both with the stated aim of bringing about community representation and participation in order to facilitate accountability of the police. One model, implemented by the Police Authority, was based upon utilizing the provisions of the 1964 Police Act to make the Chief Constable accountable for the policing of Manchester and utilizing the recommendations of the Hytner and Scarman Reports to facilitate community representation and participation through liaison. The other, placed on the formal political agenda by members of YAWPMG and eventually implemented by Manchester City Council, was based upon a rejection of the Police Authority model. It opted instead, in the absence of the possibility of the constitutional reform of the governance of the police, for community based police monitoring groups. Thus, the community became the site of struggle in the attempts by the Police Authority and Manchester City Council to implement their proposals.
Section II: Model I

Greater Manchester Police Authority and the accountability of the Chief Constable

The Labour Party, upon taking control in May 1981, set about restructuring the Police Authority in its quest for fuller accountability of the Chief Constable. As indicated earlier prior to 1981, under the Conservatives, the Authority made no attempt to make the Chief Constable accountable for the policing of Greater Manchester. According to councillors and officers, the Police Authority was the quietest of the council committees. Symptomatic of the lack of scrutiny that the Chief Constable was subject to was the fact that there had been just one 'rubber stamp' subcommittee concerning itself with finance. However, in the period prior to the elections, through involvement on the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) working Party on accountability and awareness of the struggles in neighbouring Merseyside (see Loveday, 1985), Labour councillors began to formulate ideas on how to counter the pre-May 1981 practice of the Chief Constable setting the agenda and how to get to grips with the organizational structure of the GMP (Cox, 1985).

As a consequence, a structure was implemented which paralleled the organizational structure of the GMP. This involved setting up standing sub-committees composed of eight members of the Authority (five places for the ruling group and three places for the opposition and magistrates) for each of the distinct organizational components of the force where the Chief Constable was represented by his senior management responsible for those components. This allowed first, the Police Authority members to have a more direct relationship with the Assistant Chief Constables; second, the Police Authority to be able to attempt to set
the agenda by requesting reports on items 'not volunteered' by the Chief Constable; third to get away from the dramatic setting of the full Authority meetings where rational discussion was not possible; fourth to facilitate the systematic following up of particular issues and finally to allow members of the Police Authority to develop an expertise on a particular area of the work of the GMP. Through this restructuring the Labour leadership of the Authority was saying to the Chief Constable 'we want to be involved; we want to know what you're doing; we want reports' (Cox, 1985).

In doing so Labour was recognizing that if accountability was to be exercised it was necessary to break the Chief Constable's stranglehold on information concerning the policing of Greater Manchester. The Chief Constable agreed to such structural changes but as the conflict with the Police Authority intensified he began to complain about the amount of time the senior management of the force was having to spend servicing the sub-committees. As to the demands for information the Chief Constable made it clear that he was, when he deemed it necessary, willing to furnish reports to the Authority. However, he gave no undertaking that he was prepared to respond to Police Authority demands for reports.

The ruling Labour group also implemented measures to deal with the issue of representation on the Police Authority. As documented previously, unlike other council committees the Authority did not reflect the electoral composition of the Council because of the numerically significant presence of the non-elected magistrates. As a consequence there was the distinct possibility of the policy proposals of the ruling group being defeated in an open vote. This was particularly problematical because after the
decimation of the Conservatives and Liberals in the elections of May 1981 the magistrates took on the role of being the official opposition to Labour. The magistrates immediately began to vote, as a block, with the Conservatives giving unquestioning support to the Chief Constable. To overcome this problem a strict party whip had to be introduced by the Labour group which demanded that their representatives turn up for all meetings and support the Party line. It was made clear to Labour councillors that the luxury to express individual opinions that was present within other committees was not acceptable within the Police Authority - 'on the Police Authority councillors are there to represent the group and the people' (Cox, 1985).

The Chair was acutely aware of the psychological impact of the fact that the voting on any issue always looked closer than on other committees because of the presence and voting behaviour of the unelected magistrates. It always looked as if the decisions had only just been agreed to and were not democratically reached majority decisions. Furthermore, there was always the possibility that if Labour members did not attend the chair would, on occasions, be forced into the position of having to cast the deciding vote. This was also the reason why representation on the subcommittees was constructed to make sure that the magistrates could not force a crisis through their voting behaviour. Because of the difficulties of the situation, the Party leadership at full Council level, endorsed the use of the party whip and was fully supportive of the actions of the Labour group on the Authority (Cox, 1985).

a. The struggle for accountability

The conflict between the Chief Constable and the Labour
group of the Police Authority manifested itself over a variety of other issues between 1981 and the passing of the Local Government Act in July 1985 which finalized the abolition of the Police Authorities. It is worth documenting this conflict for a series of interrelated reasons. First, it illustrates how extensive and serious the conflict in Greater Manchester was. The monthly meetings of the Police Authority became a media spectacle and were characterized by scenes of disorder, motions of no confidence, crisis adjournments and decisions to abandon meetings. Second, it illustrates how determined the Chief Constable was to defend any perceived encroachment upon his autonomy. Third, it demonstrates how empowered the Chief Constables had become in the post-war period. Fourth, it shows how difficult it was for the Police Authority to achieve any semblance of accountability. Throughout the period, because of the intensity of the conflict, the Authority was effectively reduced to reacting to policies, actions or statements of the Chief Constable and GMP. In this sense the Chief Constable continued to, through his utilization of the media and control of information, set the agenda for the Authority, despite the best efforts of the Labour group to do otherwise. Fifth, it furnished the context within which the Labour group attempted to implement its proposals for community representation and participation. Sixth, the failure of the Police Authority to hold the Chief Constable to account provided the context within which the police monitoring initiative emerged. Finally, given the high local and national media coverage, it supplied the context for the community's understanding of what the struggle over police accountability in Greater Manchester was about.
1. The Disturbances

During the last months of 1981 the degree of conflict between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority over the policing of the disturbances reduced public meetings to scenes never witnessed before. It was to set the tone for the duration of the Police Authority. An important theme in the struggle for accountability within the Police Authority emerged during this period. It involved the Chief Constable's refusal to disclose information about the policing operations that had taken place. After a period of relative calm the Chief Constable made a blistering attack on the Hytner Inquiry at a meeting of the Police Authority on 4 September 1981 when he was asked why he had not co-operated with the proceedings. The Chief Constable replied that it was not acceptable to expect senior police officers to submit themselves to powerless non-statutory tribunals or to be subject to cross examination based upon hearsay and unsubstantiated allegations (see The Times, 5.9.81). He argued that more thought should have been given to the Inquiry and that the Chief Constable should have been consulted 'to discuss the full implications for police and determine acceptable lines of inquiry' (The Times, 5.9.81) before drafting the terms of reference.

At the beginning of this meeting, Labour councillors had refused to allow the Chief Constable to read from his paper on the disturbances as well as a report of his submission to the Scarman inquiry. After this decision had been taken the Chief Constable's aides distributed a document "The Truth about the Moss Side Meeting" in which he claimed that, among others, the deputy Chair of the Authority had asked him, during the disturbances, to make an apology to the black community as well as relieving the Divisional Chief Superintendent for Moss Side of his duty
I was absolutely dismayed by the appalling proposition the like of which I have never previously received in my whole career... We hear a lot nowadays about the much heralded concept of "democratic community policing". Well, if this was a practical example, then all I can say is - God help us (see Police Review, 18.9.81).

The argument continued on the World This Weekend (BBC 6/9/81) when the Chief Constable claimed that there had been a 'calculated attempt', during the monthly Authority meeting to force him to speak against his will to the Hytner inquiry. The Chief Constable claimed that he was being 'gagged' and feared he would be sacked if a Labour government were returned to office. The arguments continued at an Authority meeting convened on 11 September during a discussion of the Chief Constable's report into the policing of the disturbances. Labour councillors stated that Chief Constable's report was deficient because of its lack of detail concerning key aspects of the policing operation. The Chief Constable refused to answer questions about what he defined as operational matters and stated that he had no intention of providing further information (The Times, 12.9.81).

During November and December 1981 the Chief Constable continued to clash with the Labour members of the Authority over issues arising out of his handling of the disturbances. During the November meeting Anderton denied that there was a breakdown in relations between the police and young blacks in Moss Side. In the December edition of the force newspaper, Brief he argued that the critics were seeking to blame the police for the social decay of Britain's inner cities and that 'like birds of prey descending on a corpse the researchers, historians, and analysts are metaphorically tearing us apart' (Brief, Dec. 1981).
He described the Scarman Report as 'unremarkable' in its recommendations and, in response to the Hytner Report, claimed that the majority of the community in Manchester supported the actions of the GMP and that unlike their critics the force worked for 'the benefit of the community'. The Chief Constable caused further controversy by issuing a force statement praising his officers for

in quelling the riotous, disorderly and criminal behaviour widespread in Toxteth, Moss Side and elsewhere in July 1981 and in effectively and speedily restoring the Queen’s Peace throughout the County of Greater Manchester for the benefit and protection of all its citizens (see MEN 7.12.81).

The Leader of GMC attacked the Chief Constable’s statement and questioned the motivation behind it. On 16 December 1981 the Police Authority met to discuss the Chief Constable’s response to the Scarman and Hytner reports. Another controversial meeting ensued with the Chief Constable rejecting both Hytner’s concern about stop and search and Scarman’s proposals concerning ethnic recruitment and racial prejudice. He also stated that the force would continue to use rapid dispersal tactics in future disturbances. The conflict over the policing of Moss Side continued in January 1982 with the Chief Constable claiming that his police officers were not carrying out their duties because they were afraid of allegations of racial harassment being made against them. He also demanded that those making allegations provide proof of discriminatory policing practices.

ii. The Laurence Scott Dispute

During April 1981 a dispute broke out at the Laurence Scott engineering works in Openshaw, Manchester. This became a source of further disagreement between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority because of the dramatic
way in which it was policed. On 26 October 1981 the management attempted to re-open the factory leading to clashes between the police and pickets. Management was unsuccessful in the attempt and complaints were made about the policing tactics used (MEN, 26.10.81). The Chief Constable publicly intervened in the dispute, guaranteeing protection for anyone crossing the official picket line. On 6 November 1981 a large number of police arrived at the factory gates without explanation to the pickets. Later on the same day a joint helicopter operation between police and management, involving the use of masked men, was used to lift out goods and equipment to enable Scott’s to meet their contractual obligations to their customers. This decisive police action, involving three hundred officers on full time duty at the factory, helped to undermine the workers occupation. The Labour group of the Police Authority was highly critical of the Chief Constable for using the force in this manner. As far as the Chair of Authority was concerned the Laurence Scott dispute was in many respects more straightforward than the disturbances, in terms of the accountability issue. Despite police provocation there had been no picket line violence and there was considerable local sympathy for the workers. There was also the feeling in the locality that the Chief Constable had connived in an asset stripping operation. As a consequence local residents had complained to the Police Authority about the dangers posed by the helicopters flying low over homes and the fact that ordinarily it was virtually impossible to locate a police officer. The Chair of the Authority told a hastily convened public meeting that there was nothing that the Authority could do because it was an operational matter. For her the dispute showed up the severe limitations placed upon the Authority in respect of fulfilling its role of making the Chief Constable accountable for his actions under the 1964 Act.
people assume that somewhere there is someone who can say 'you can't do that', they assume that somewhere there is accountability. Laurence Scott showed that there isn't - the Chief Constable is in control (Cox, 1985).

iii. The Quiet Revolution

On 15 March 1982 the Chief Constable released the text of a postponed speech to the press in which he advocated the outright abolition of Police Authorities. It was his most forthright statement and probably the most forthright from any Chief Constable on the subject to date. He stated that the police should be removed completely from the realm of politics. He made a clear distinction between law abiding citizens and the Police Authorities who were fighting an "acrimonious and secretive" battle to gain political control of policing.

I firmly believe there is a long term political strategy to destroy the proven structure of the police and turn them into an executive agency of a one-party state. I am also convinced that the British police service is now a prime target for subversion and demoralization (see MEN, 15.3.82).

Anderton advocated the setting up of eight/ten regional forces under commissioners who would coordinate national campaigns against terrorism, public disorder and international crime. Police Authorities would be replaced by non-political boards and the police would be answerable to a central board in London chaired by the Home Secretary.

The response by the Labour Party to Anderton's statement was unequivocal. Roy Hattersley described it as 'inflammatory nonsense' and called into question the Chief Constable's competence to hold office. In the House of Commons a motion was put forward by Labour MPs expressing...
concern about Chief Constables who were constantly 'denigrating democratically elected police committees and recommending non-elected bodies in their place'. In Manchester the Chair of the Police Authority described Anderton's comments as 'a load of tripe' and said that the Chief Constable would have to face the consequences of such comments (see The Guardian, 17.3.82).

However, Anderton was unrepentant and in an interview reiterated his position

The current concern over policing being expressed by certain political factions has got precious little to do with better community participation in policing affairs or the improvement of democracy—rather it is the first conscious step manifesting itself towards the political control of the police, without which the dream of a totalitarian, one party state in this country cannot be realized (The Times, 18.3.82).

The March 1982 Police Authority meeting discussed both the policing of the Laurence Scott dispute and the statements of the Chief Constable. A resolution that the Chief Constable's deployment of 300 police officers during the dispute was an 'over reaction' was carried. The Chief Constable accused the deputy Chair of fermenting trouble and 'working very hard in the area to canvass opinion against the police'. In this context the Chair demanded that the Chief Constable to clarify the statements that he had made and to indicate whether his allegations about, or derogatory references to, members of Police Authorities referred to members of the Greater Manchester Police Authority. The Chief Constable refused to expand upon his statements (see The Times, 20.3.82).

This led to a vote of confidence in the Chief Constable, tabled by opposition councillors and magistrates, being defeated and Labour members threatening to go to the Home
Secretary if he did not comply with their request for clarification. This was followed up by the Labour Party’s North West regional conference calling for an inquiry into Anderton’s conduct and the passing of an emergency motion condemning his irresponsible statements (see The Times, 20.3.82).

iv. Arming The Force
In September 1981 a row started about the Chief Constable’s seeming determination to turning GMP into a fully paramilitary force. The origins of the row lay with the discovery of the secret acquisition of two modified Heckler and Kock HK33, SAS style, submachine guns (see The Observer, 20.9.81). The Leader of Greater Manchester Council and the deputy Chair of the Police Authority subsequently publicly condemned the Chief Constable’s attitude towards the Police Authority by behaving in such an unaccountable manner. GMP spokespersons had denied that they had purchased the guns and, given that the County Legal Officer, acting on behalf of the Police Authority, had backed them up the GMP had made him ‘look a fool and a liar’. The Leader of the Council stated that if any other officer of the Council had behaved in such an unaccountable manner s/he would have been sacked (see, MEN, 1.10.81). The deputy Chair of the Police Authority made it clear that

Nobody stands in isolation to the community. This worries us immensely. They (the police) stand in isolation and seem to be unwilling to be accountable to the community (MEN, 1.10.89)

Despite this argument in April 1983 the Chief Constable once more made national headlines with the announcement that armed police were patrolling Greater Manchester because of the supposed increase in the number of armed robberies in the region. As far as the Police Authority
was concerned the issuing of firearms without relating to a specific incident represented 'a major change of policy'. However, the Chief Constable made it clear that, for operational reasons, he had no intention of disclosing the number of police vehicles or officers involved (see, Manchester Evening News, 6.4.83).

v. The Police Band

In January 1984 the Police Authority decided to abolish the full time police band and return its members to normal duties. It was one of the few instances where the Police Authority attempted to set the agenda utilizing its responsibilities under the 1964 Police Act to provide an efficient force. This measure, which involved cutting £300,000 from its budget, was part of a £1.5m package of economies put through the Police Authority by Labour members. The Chief Constable claimed that the Authority had abandoned the practice of consulting the Chief Constable on financial matters affecting his force.

There is simply no precedent in this force for a police committee virtually to order or require the chief constable uncompromisingly against his carefully considered opinion and advice and without proper consultation practically to close a long established unit. I view this shift of policy and posture with grave concern (Fieldnotes).

The Chair of the Authority refuted the assertions, stating that the Chief Constable had been informed of the cut backs. She said that the Chief Constable's alternative had been to delete from the budget three new section stations and reduce operational staff by forty. As far as the Police Authority was concerned this was not acceptable as the Authority wanted to maintain operational strength and viewed the section stations as an important part of community policing. After an adjournment the clerk to the
Authority gave a ruling supporting the Labour position.

The Chief Constable subsequently informed the media that this issue raised the constitutional question of whether or not a Police Authority had the right to ignore a Chief Constable’s views on important matters connected with his force. He also stated that he intended to refer the issue to the Inspector of Constabulary and the Home Office and until ‘the question is resolved I must allow myself the discretion to deploy my forces as I please.’ (Fieldnotes).

A further meeting took place between the Chief Constable and the Council on January 9 to discuss the issue and the Chair of the Police Authority subsequently going to the Home Office to discuss the cash crisis facing the force on 11 January 1984.

vi. Policing the Coal Dispute

During April 1984 the policing of the coal dispute was first discussed by the Police Authority. The Chair stated that a working party should be set up to assess whether the scale of the GMP operation to handle problems arising from the dispute was justified. The Chief Constable asked whether it was being suggested that there should be emergency meetings of the Authority members before he could dispatch his officers to trouble spots. The Chair stated that whilst she was not suggesting that the Chief Constable ask permission she wanted him to recognize that the operations were having a detrimental effect on the policing of Greater Manchester and financially bankrupting the Police Authority. Anderson refused to be drawn into this debate.

By the July meeting the full financial implications of the coal dispute were becoming clear. The Chair of the
Authority announced that the overtime budget would be exhausted by August due to police resources being spent on the dispute and that in addition Derbyshire was refusing to pay other Police Authorities. The questions were posed by the Chair as to who was going to pay for the policing of the dispute and what were the implications for the accountability of the police. She stated that too much money was being spent on one particular law and order issue and that the dispute could have been policed in a completely different manner. It was reemphasized that no other chief officer of the council would be able to carry out his/her duty irrespective of cost and demanded that some form of accountability was necessary.

Chief Constables do not have the right to spend, spend and spend when other areas of policy are cut. There is the constitutional anomaly of Chief Constables being able to spend and no body being capable, legally, to stop them (Fieldnotes).

Concern was also expressed, during the course of this meeting, about the implications of the emergence of the National Reporting Centre. Labour councillors stressed that the policing of Manchester had suffered as a consequence of the overriding of the Police Authority by the Chief Constables, the Home Secretary and the National Reporting Centre.

The Chief Constable refused to respond to the statements of the Chair during the meeting. Instead he chose to state his position in the form of a speech at the Institute of Housing conference on 18 June 1984 when he compared mass picketing and violent demonstrations to 'acts of terrorism without the bullet and the bomb'. He also addressed the state of the police by once more expounding his conspiracy theory arguing that, 'certain political ideologues recognize that power over the people requires first that
The police be publicly controlled' (The Guardian, 18.6.84).

The Chair of the Police Authority responded to the speech by putting forward a last minute motion at the July 1984 meeting condemning the Chief Constable’s comments.

It is exceptionally unfortunate when we are in the middle of a difficult industrial dispute that comments are made which aggravate the situation. It does not help this Police Authority or police officers. I propose that this Police Authority deplores the provocative partisan nature of part of the speech. I do not expect officers to intervene into political issues in this bipartisan way as it erodes the idea of police impartiality (Fieldnotes).

As a consequence this meeting ended in scenes of disarray. At a subsequent emergency meeting the motion was again tabled with the Chief Constable attempting to justify his actions. He denied that he was specifically referring to the coal dispute and argued that any comments he had made reflected a balanced and impartial view. However the Chair reiterated the view she had put at the original motion and tabled a motion deploring the provocative and partisan nature of parts of the speech. The Police Authority believes these comments erode the concept of police impartiality and aggravate the already strained relations between police and miners (Fieldnotes).

As magistrates, the opposition members and the Chief Constable attempted to intervene. The Chief Constable was ordered, by the Chair, to remain silent. The Conservative members fuelled the conflict by presenting their own motion fully supporting the Chief Constable. Whilst the latter motion was defeated the motion of censure was carried.
vii. Prisoners rights leaflet

During the September 1984 meeting the Labour proposal to produce a prisoners rights leaflet became the source of conflict. The Chief Constable stated that such a leaflet was unacceptable because it was inaccurate, biased and possibly even legally dangerous. The Labour members were completely perplexed by his opposition as the leaflet had been prepared over the previous five months and incorporated the advice of his own Assistant Chief Constable and the Home Office. This developed into another bitter row. The Chief Constable was asked to develop proper channels of communication with his senior officers so that when they attended meetings as his representatives they would know his views on the issues under discussion. The Chief Constable replied that he could not do this as it would mean that his senior officers would have the authority to bind him to an operational position with which he might not agree.

During this period the various sources of conflict between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority became intermeshed. All of them emerged in an inter-related manner since they were all manifestations of the struggle over how Greater Manchester should be policed and who should be responsible for deciding on policing policies. Hence, the coal dispute again dominated the October meeting and particularly the meeting that had taken place with the Home Secretary to discuss the financial implications of the policing operation. Only the Conservative councillors disagreed with the Chair's stance during that meeting, concerning the need for clarification of the government's position in relation to paying for the policing of the dispute. The Conservatives affirmed their support for the Home Secretary's stand and demanded that the council find the money to maintain the police budget.
including the money to reinstate the police band. As the argument raged the Chief Constable's aides gave out a statement to all present, without the prior knowledge of the Authority, specifically concerning the band. It stated that the Chief Constable had met privately with the Chief Inspector of the Constabulary and the Deputy Under Secretary of State and that they had asked him to request the Authority to defer any decision about the band until I, as Chief Constable, have had a proper and fuller opportunity to appraise them of the implications of the Police Authority's proposals, and of the legal and constitutional points which are of issue (Fieldnotes).

He had advised the Home Office that the Police Authority was intending to use its financial powers of control in order selectively to restrict or prevent the deployment by the Chief Constable of a manpower resource within the force for which budget provision has already been made in respect of which a Home Office grant is paid. According to advice I have received this morning I must seriously inform the Police Authority that the action they now propose to take may well be ultravires and I would suggest they look again at this matter (Fieldnotes).

He concluded by saying until the question had been finally resolved he would continue to allow himself the discretion to deploy his force as he pleased. The meeting was adjourned and the advice of the County Legal Clerk sought to establish the constitutional position. The Clerk reiterated that the band was not within the Chief Constable's operational remit. The magistrate members tried to stop the attacks upon the Chief Constable calling for the meeting to be adjourned until things had calmed down. This motion was defeated with the Chair accusing the Chief Constable of deliberately producing a constitutional crisis. As a consequence the Labour members proposed a resolution expressing dissatisfaction with the behaviour
of the Chief Constable in the matter of the police band. They also stated that they would be demanding discussions with the Home Secretary and the Inspectorate to resolve this issue.

The Chair stated that the Chief Constable was solely responsible for this state of affairs and that he was in breach of the duties of a chief officer of the council. The Chief Constable, upon the invitation of one of the opposition members, replied that it was pure coincidence that he had been in London for a meeting of Chief Constables and was able to visit the Home Office. He stated that the reason he did not discuss the matter earlier was because he did not 'consider it opportune or necessary to explain'. In addition he made it clear that he was decidedly unhappy about the resolution proposing to report him to the Home Secretary.

The magistrates asked for a postponement whilst the Conservatives maintained that the Chief Constable probably had good reasons for acting as he had. However the Labour members viewed the Chief Constable's actions as an act of deliberate provocation. One member lucidly summed up their feelings when he said that the Police Authority seemed to find itself in its dealings with the Chief Constable always in the small print of the law and that there was no spirit of co-operation. The Chief Constable disregarded the work of the sub-committees and was constantly provoking constitutional issues.

we have gone very far from the band to the issue of constitutional control. Now is the time to seek central confirmation of our powers as advised by the Home Office (Fieldnotes).

By the end of the meeting separate resolutions had been
passed to dissolve the police band and to censure the Chief Constable for his behaviour. Both the Chief Constable and the Police Authority appealed to the Home Office for a definitive clarification of the powers of the Chief Constable. On October 9 ACC Stalker went to the Home Office and was advised that the band could not be considered to be necessary to the efficiency of the force. The Chief Constable subsequently agreed, in what he described as the best interests of the relationship between the Police Authority and himself, and in the best interests of the community, to 'accede' to the request to disband the police band. Nevertheless, the Chief Constable reiterated that as far as he was concerned the legal opinion he had obtained confirmed his own view that

the deployment of personnel is the sole prerogative of the Chief Constable and that any decision by the Police Authority to oust his jurisdiction in that matter should be resisted by an application for judicial review (Fieldnotes).

The November 1984 meeting once more reflected the tensions between the Chief Constable and the ruling group on the Authority. No sooner had the public meeting started than it withdrew into private in an attempt to resolve what the Chair referred to as 'the discrepancy between the Chief Constable's understanding of the meeting and the Authority's'. When it resumed in public the first item to be discussed was the effects of the policing of the coal dispute upon the policing of Manchester. The Chief Constable argued that there was no means of establishing what the actual effect was. The deputy Chair of the Authority asked

When is the point at which the Police Authorities can say stop, the policing of our own area is more important? At the moment it is out of our hands because of the operational discretion of the Chief Constables. What about law and order within our own communities?
(Fieldnotes).

On the issue of the police band, the Chief Constable stated that although he had decided to accede to the Police Authority's wishes, the Home Office will agree with me that in certain circumstances it is within the right of a chief constable to seek legal advice, as an individual, from whatever source (Fieldnotes).

On the issue of the proposed prisoners leaflet he reiterated that

whatever the Police Authority chose to do I feel under an obligation to put it back to the Home Office to see what the legal implications are for Chief Constables. It will also be put to Association of Chief Police Officers. There's a long way to go on this yet (Fieldnotes).

viii. The Truce

By the time that the December meeting took place an uneasy pact was reached as a result of a series of private meetings with the Home Office. The Monday prior to the full meeting representatives of the Authority and the Chief Constable met with the Home Office in London. Afterwards the Chief Constable told the media that both he and the Authority would attempt to fulfil their respective duties without acrimony. The meetings of early 1985 were less acrimonious in terms of the relationship between the Labour members and the Chief Constable although the relationship of Labour members with the opposition and the magistrates remained strained.

The January meeting witnessed the Chief Constable supporting the Chair in her complaints about the detrimental effects that the coal dispute was having on the policing of Manchester. She argued that it was time that the people of Manchester were made fully aware of the
seriousness of the situation. Despite the opposition of the magistrates and the Conservatives a motion was passed to the effect that the Authority deplores the lack of control it has over its own force, the loss of service to the people of Greater Manchester and the failure of the government to solve this long and costly dispute (Fieldnotes).

The proposed abolition of the metropolitan county councils also initially unified both the Chief Constable and the Authority in their opposition to the bill. The Chief Constable was particularly concerned with clause 40 which could facilitate the breaking up of the existing police forces by the Home Secretary. During the February meeting the Chief Constable complained about not only the implications of the local government changes but also the legal changes which were being implemented in the form of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, the Data Protection Act and the Criminal Law Act. The Police Authority supported the Chief Constable and agreed that their concern should be voiced to the Home Secretary during his visit in March. The Chief Constable reiterated all these complaints in an article in The Guardian on 29 March 1985 and he even praised his Police Authority for its supportive role in matters to do with improving the effectiveness of the Greater Manchester Police. However, he clearly distinguished this proper role from their demands to have more accountability.

The cry for accountability is incessant and the principle dilemma today is how best to reconcile essentially local policing, requiring public cooperation and support with policing of a very different kind for which only professional police officers are adequately fitted (The Guardian, 29.3.85)

The full Police Authority meeting in March started off by the Chair complaining about the disappointing meeting that they had had with the Home Secretary and that with
reference to the financial costs of the policing of the coal dispute they would have to seek redress through the courts. However, the visit of the Home Secretary had bequeathed another problem for the Police Authority because it had provoked a demonstration against his speaking at the University and subsequent allegations of heavy handed policing. The media once more turned up to the meeting in force to witness the showdown. However, the incident was not included on the public agenda.

ix. The Battle of Brittan

The April 1985 meeting did, however, confront the policing of the visit of the Home Secretary to the University. The Chair expressed concern that the Home Secretary was not prepared to hold a public inquiry into the incident, as had been requested by the Police Authority. The Chief Constable was asked whether he would submit a report to the Authority, not on the specifics, but on the general way that the incident was policed. He replied that

I cannot give you a full report of all that transpired, not even concerning the deployment of police officers because that is germane to the proceedings. What I will do and it is all that I am prepared to do is let you have a brief report containing such information as I deem it proper for you to have (Fieldnotes).

Members of the Authority did not confront the Chief Constable over the issue and this set the tone for dealing with the incident. 'The Battle of Brittan' never became a source of public conflict between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable. The latter did provide a skeleton report for the May 1985 meeting and it was left to the new Police Complaints Authority to deal with the incident.

The uneasy truce even carried over into the discussion of the Chief Constable’s retrospective report on the effects of the coal dispute on the policing of Manchester.
Skirmishes between the Labour members and the opposition were quickly curbed by the Chair as were ones with the Chief Constable when he made clear that he was not prepared to enter into any discussions about the nature of the policing of the dispute. The Chair of the Authority did, however, make the most systematic statement about the consequences of the policing of the dispute for the Authority and for police accountability stating that it has been frustrating, demonstrating the inability of the Police Authority to deal with its own budget and its own area. There is the whole question of accountability and the issues of policing public order situations. A lot of the issues of policing are not about the practicalities and technicalities but how we want our communities to be policed; what liberties and rights do we want upheld and how do we prioritize. There are issues about the preservation of peace being the key concern for the police. These issues are for the community to decide not the police alone; it's not just for the Association of Chief Police Officers. I am concerned that the police force will be demand led and that everything will be secondary to public order in future (Fieldnotes)

She emphasized that she was concerned to see the financial resources of the Authority being "drained" and riot equipment purchased in an unaccountable manner to maintain public order in other parts of the country. Although the Conservative members complained about the Chair's comments the Chief Constable made no reply.

There was a brief confrontation when the deputy Chair asked the Chief Constable whether the newly printed leaflets for detainees would be made available in police stations. The Chief Constable responded by saying that he was disturbed by certain of the paragraphs and intended to refer them to the Home Office, the Inspectorate and Association of Chief Police Officers. The Labour members expressed their disappointment with the Chief Constable's
reply arguing that the leaflets were an important part of the Authority's lay visiting scheme.

x. The Magistrates

The May 1985 meeting did, for the first time since immediately after the 1981 election of the Labour administration, address the issue of the position of magistrates on the Authority. This was the result of a row that had taken place during the previous monthly meeting over the matter of the GMP adopting an anti-discrimination statement as force policy. The statement would have committed all officers to take an oath promising to treat all citizens equally irrespective of race, class or gender. The Conservatives and magistrates condemned the proposal as an insult to the force whilst the Chief Constable argued that the existing oath was satisfactory. Anderton stressed that such a proposal was unprecedented. In the ensuing vote deadlock occurred and the Chair referred the issue for further discussion rather than cast the deciding vote. During the May meeting the re-presented motion concerning the anti-discrimination statement was passed, despite continued Conservative and magistrate opposition. The Chair declared that she 'found it appalling that the magistrates had voted down the policies of the elected Council'. She stated that the anti-discrimination statement would be distributed to all relevant community groups with a letter explaining who voted for it and who voted against it. She added that in future, because of the attitude of the magistrates, the names of those voting for and against would be recorded under the headings elected and non-elected. She said that the role of the magistrates on the Police Authority should be explained to the community and that there was the distinct possibility that after the abolition of the Police Authority the magistrates could hold the balance of
power on the new structure. Other Labour members argued that although the magistrates were supposed to act as individuals they in fact organized themselves as a political faction which supported the Conservatives and politicized every meeting through their actions and voting patterns. This caused a direct confrontation with a magistrate arguing that

Whilst you represent a proportion of the community we are appointed to represent the whole community and we are appointed by statute (Fieldnotes).

Labour retorted that it should be made clear to the community that the magistrates were non-elected, non-accountable and certain of them did not even live in the Greater Manchester area. Despite the accusations being made the Chief Constable did not enter this argument.

The truce with the Chief Constable was short lived when it was discovered that he had instituted a major internal reorganization of the force without consulting the Police Authority. When pressed upon the matter DCC Stalker, deputizing for the Chief Constable, replied

it is not practical or the Chief Constables intention to go back and discuss the matter, these are operational decisions part of the normal senior management where chief officers get on with decision matters. I agree with consultation but when it comes to deployment its operational not administration. When it comes to deployment and movement of men it cannot be done by bargaining and bartering (Fieldnotes).

Consequently, an amendment to accept the Chief Constable’s actions and DCC Stalker’s reasoning by the magistrates was defeated.

Discussion
Thus in the period between May 1981 and May 1985 the efforts by the ruling Labour group to make the Chief
Constable accountable under the provisions of the 1964 Police Act resulted in continual conflict. The Chief Constable rejected all attempts by the Labour members to exercise, what has been defined elsewhere as, retrospective accountability and prospective control (see, Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate, 1988:151-153). All attempts to exercise any form of accountability were met with highly publicized statements by the Chief Constable that they were manifestations of the conspiracy to overthrow British democracy. In doing so the Chief Constable was effectively indicating the lengths he was prepared to go to in order to thwart their intentions to make him accountable. In its efforts the Labour group was hindered by two further factors. First, given the role that the police was given to play within its restructuring of British society, there was the Conservative government’s unswerving support for any Chief Constable in conflict with his Police Authority. In this context there was little chance of the Home Office being sympathetic to the claims of the Labour councillors. And second, there was the unswerving support of the Conservative councillors and magistrates for the Chief Constable during Police Authority meetings. The numerical strength of the non-elected magistrates and their voting in an homogeneous manner meant that every issue was fought out in a crisis situation, particularly if it came to voting. As a consequence the Labour group had little success in representing the interests of those for whom the police were a problem. It was within this context that the Police Authority attempted to implement the second component of its accountability package and it had serious ramifications for the success or otherwise of that component.
Section II: Model I

Community representation and participation through community liaison

The Labour group of the Police Authority combined the recommendations of both the Hytner and Scarman reports to construct consultative arrangements for the facilitation of community representation and participation. It was agreed by the Authority in November 1981 to appoint, under the Hytner recommendations, a community liaison officer (CLO) to act as first, the community representative on the matter of complaints and second, under the Scarman recommendations, to set up community liaison arrangements, initially in Moss Side. Further community representation and participation was to be achieved by the implementation of lay visiting proposals.

The Labour group saw the Scarman and Hytner proposals on community liaison as the basis for the extension of the accountability of the police directly to the community, an essential part of any accountability structure...an attempt to involve the community in making the police more accountable. (Cox: 1985)

For the Chair of the Authority the liaison panels would be an extension of the accountability structures of the Police Authority. The community liaison panels were to act as the 'eyes and ears' of the Authority providing crucial information about the type of policing being carried out in Greater Manchester. They were also viewed as having the potential to be develop into devolved 'mini Police Authorities'. Whilst the Chief Constable and senior ranks were to be made accountable to the Police Authority, local police officers were to be made accountable to the local community via the liaison panels. Additionally, any
demands that the liaison forums might make in relation to policing through the Police Authority would allow the latter to pressurize the Chief Constable for changes as the representatives of the community. The latter was an important role as far as the Labour group was concerned because as the structures were supposed to be representative of the community the Chief Constable could not dismiss their demands in the same way he dismissed the Police Authority's, i.e. as unrepresentative.

Whilst the Labour group saw the initiative as a way of making the GMP more accountable by facilitating community representation and participation on policing matters, the other sections of the Police Authority had different ideas. The Liberal councillors, whilst supporting community liaison, wanted it to be extended to the whole of the community and saw it as contributing to the control of crime and therefore fostering better police community relations. The Conservatives and the magistrates were completely hostile to the whole idea viewing it as a ploy to hinder the police in the fight against crime. The Chief Constable, whilst supporting the appointment of the Community Liaison Officer (CLO), was suspicious of the whole idea precisely because of how the ruling Labour group viewed the initiative. The local Police Federation rejected totally the appointment of the CLO (see, MEN, 7.11.81). In addition the ruling Labour administration in charge of Manchester City Council, which had expressed its dissatisfaction with the Hytner Inquiry eventually publicly rejected the whole idea of community liaison making it an issue in its 1984 election manifesto.

This opposition within the formal structures of governance was mirrored by the outright rejection of the proposals in Moss Side. As was documented previously, the MSDC had
successfully urged the boycott of the Hytner Inquiry precisely because of its unrepresentativeness. Despite this and the fact that the MSDC had also rejected the findings and the recommendations of the Hytner Report the ruling Labour group of the Police Authority implemented the recommendations. Furthermore, to compound its problems, after meeting with the boycott of the post of CLO by key community representatives in Moss Side, the Police Authority appointed a black member of the Inquiry. Thus, someone who had been previously publicly defined as unrepresentative was appointed as the community representative! It could be argued that this perseverance with community liaison, in spite of the opposition, was an indication of the constraints placed upon the Labour group of the Police Authority. However, the outright rejection of the proposals by key sections of Moss Side meant that there was little chance of setting up a community liaison panel in this area. If the radical representatives of the community would not participate in the structure what chance was there of bringing about the participation of the youth who had challenged the policing they were subject to during the summer of 1981?

The work of the CLO was compounded by additional problems. First, his efforts were constantly undermined by the statements of the Chief Constable and the actions of the GMP in relation to the policing of Greater Manchester in general but Moss Side in particular. A series of incidents took place which confirmed the opposition of those opposed to consultation with the police. This was compounded by the fact, documented previously, that the Police Authority seemed to be incapable of calling the Chief Constable to account. Second, the problems that manifested themselves in relation to the type of CLPs set up elsewhere in Greater Manchester confirmed the scepticism of those
opposed to such structures. Third, the general philosophy informing the work of the CLO caused consternation amongst those groups locked into struggle with the police. The overall result was to lend support to those who argued that the Police Authority was incapable of representing the interests of those for whom the police were a problem and that an alternative to community liaison must be set up in Manchester.

The Police Authority sub-committee set up to implement the Scarman consultation proposals and the Chief Constable also agreed to the suggestion concerning lay visiting. However, from the outset the GMP took responsibility for the initiative with the Community Liaison Officer having no role to play in the implementation of this proposal. The Community Contact section of the force produced guidelines for the first provincial experimental scheme which became operational from 1 May 1983. In addition the force took responsibility for the training of the lay visitors. Thus the police were able to exercise tight control over this part of the Scarman recommendations and significantly the CLO did not gain any rights of access to police stations in the force area. In October 1983 it was agreed to expand the pool of lay visitors by including the membership of the liaison panels. Although all members of the panels were to be eligible for lay visitor status, each panel would be restricted to having three who would be shortlisted and agreed to by the Authority's community relations subcommittee and the Chief Constable. Panel members would cease to be lay visitors if they resigned or were removed from the liaison panel, and the Chief Constable had the right to terminate an appointment if conduct fell below the required standard. All visitors had to sign a document promising confidentiality concerning any information collected during the course of the visits,
except in legal proceedings, in any report submitted to the Police Authority or the police or to a police officer investigating a complaint against another police officer. Additionally it was recommended that visits should be undertaken alone and only to police stations in the local area.

Hence the lay visiting scheme was tightly structured and under the virtual control of the GMP. Lay visiting was one of the few real powers of active involvement available to the community liaison panels but the Chief Constable made sure that the GMP retained control over this initiative. In this situation there was little chance of the Labour group’s views on the role of lay visiting being realized or the worries of those concerned about what happened in police stations being assuaged.

a. The Community Liaison Officer (CLO): Representing the Community

The Community Liaison Officer, although based in the heart of Moss Side, had to face a boycott from significant sections of the community that he was supposed to be representing in Moss Side. Thus, when he attempted to attend the first two meetings of Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group (YAWPMG) he was excluded on the grounds that his role and function made it impossible for him to be 'a legitimate member of the group'. This rejection of the representativeness of the community representative was a serious problem because the Hytner Report had emphasized that the proposal could only work if there was active community support and that this could only be achieved through a representative who was acceptable to the community.

There is little doubt that the Community Liaison Officer
took his role of attempting to represent the interests of the black people seriously and that he recognised the necessity of making sure that those needs were prioritized in his work. He focussed specifically on the areas of racial attacks and police response to them, complaints about police malpractice, racism and ethnic minority recruitment to the force. However, the manner in which he dealt with these issues meant that he confirmed the worst fears of those who opposed his work and questioned his representative status.

1. Racial attacks and the response of the police
The CLO held meetings with departments of Manchester City Council and police representatives in order to work out a multi-agency approach to the problem of racist attacks. As a result the council departments involved monitored the problem and passed on all information they had to the police. However, the promotion and adherence to such multi-agency approaches meant that the CLO was acting in direct opposition to those in Moss Side who were critical of such an approach.

As a result of his concern the Chief Constable presented a report to the Police Authority Crime Sub-committee in September 1983 regarding force monitoring of racial incidents. The Police Authority and the Chief Constable agreed to the holding of a conference to produce a joint approach to the problem. However the Chief Constable subsequently decided that the force would hold their own conference with limited participation by community representatives. The CLO was particularly concerned about the nature of the Chief Constable’s proposal because it of its narrow base. He argued that any conference on the issue should be open in terms of representation and participation so that the community could 'be given more
opportunity of understanding the nature of police monitoring being done, and have an opportunity to participate in structuring any changes' (2nd AR:10). However, this did not happen. Thus the CLO was coming up against the problem that the Chief Constable constantly redefined problems in order to exclude those unrepresentative members of the community who would be critical of the police. In agreeing to such redefinitions the CLO confirmed his critics point about the futility of his role.

ii. Ethnic minority recruitment to the police force
The CLO argued that 'all ... institutions should reflect the communities they serve and if black people are part of the community they should be part of the institutions' (1st Annual Report:5). He emphasised that the GMP should realise that they had the key role to play in the recruitment of members of the black communities. As far as he was concerned the police had to recognise that the way their actions were viewed by the black community determined whether black people would join the force. If changes were not forthcoming

it is hard to see that there is going to be a reflection of the black community population in the Greater Manchester Police before the year 2400 (1st Annual Report:5)

To bring about that change the CLO worked to improve the race relations training within GMP. He attempted to move the force policy away from classroom lessons to 'on the job' and 'on the division' training. Additionally he demanded the refocussing of the training content to specifically address racial prejudice and discrimination

This is the central issue that concerns people on the street. I don't care whether the police officer is familiar with the place where my parents were born; I
want the officer to exercise his discretion towards me without being influenced by racially motivated prejudice (1st Annual Report: 7).

In relation to the recruitment of black officers and race relations training the CLO argued that the Greater Manchester Police had to think seriously about two courses of action. First, there had to be an unambiguous statement from the force that they were prepared to act to 'eliminate the use of inappropriate assumptions in the organisation based on national origin or colour' (1st AR: 16). And second, that force orders, training and supervision concerning anti-racism had to be followed up by actions against racist officers and expressions of racism.

unless the profile of the Greater Manchester Police in the eyes of ethnic minority groups, particularly Afro-Caribbean groups, is radically changed, then ethnic minority recruitment, despite the efforts being made by the police will never increase beyond the trickle at which it stands now... The fact that the police may perceive themselves to be neutral or even anti-racist is almost irrelevant because the action of the minority groups and individuals is based on their own perception of the police and not on the police perception of themselves (1st Annual Report: 16).

However, as indicated previously, the Chief Constable rejected all allegations concerning racism in the Greater Manchester Police and there was no attempt to address the criticisms of the CLO. When the Labour group of the Police Authority formulated its anti-discrimination statement for the force the Chief Constable rejected it outright.

iii. Youth workers and the police

The CLO attempted to resolve the conflict between youth and workers and police officers in Manchester despite the fact that the Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group had rejected the liaison initiative and his appointment. However, his attempts to circumvent this
opposition utilised the multi-agency approach that the group opposed. The CLO set up a series of meetings between senior youth officers of all districts of Greater Manchester and senior police officers. Only those youth officers who had good relations with the police or who actively supported police involvement in youth work attended. The difficulty was that no representatives of the youth service at the forefront of the conflict with the police attended. The consequence was that this series of meetings achieved three things that confirmed the worst fears of Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group. First, they promoted a multi-agency approach through the formalisation of contact between youth work representatives and the police. Second because of the type of youth work representatives who attended they agreed to arguments presented by the police officers present and did not pursue the key issue of police intimidation of youth and community workers. Third, the outcome of these deliberations was to suggest that those youth and community workers who continued to oppose police involvement in police work were unrepresentative of the majority views of youth and community workers in Greater Manchester. Thus, those who were in conflict with the police were having their complaints defined out by the policies of the CLO.

iv. Complaints against the police
The CLO took on the role that the Hytner Report had recommended in terms of the complaints procedure. However, the Chief Constable refused to appoint an officer in the manner suggested by the Report to co-operate with the community representative. Hence, the CLO was left to deal with the Complaints Department of the GMP. The CLO only dealt with those complaints submitted directly to him and was not involved with any complaint made directly to the
police under normal statutory arrangements. Thus there were severe limitations placed upon his role in the complaints procedure.

The CLO saw this work as being important, particularly in relation to those complaints which were not strong enough to be dealt with under S49 and which Hytner had recommended be dealt with by informal dispute resolution methods.

The accent is on the achieving of understanding through a personalised focus and not necessarily on the obtaining of testable evidence so as to mete out punishment (1st Annual Report:13).

This case work was viewed as having a crucial role to play within the overall liaison strategy of the Police Authority in relation to Moss Side. If the community could be persuaded that complaints would be resolved in a satisfactory manner they would participate in the liaison panels (1st Annual Report:13).

This informal conciliation process was supposed to allow members of the community with a grievance to come along to the community representative and resolve the matter quickly and satisfactorily without activating the formal complaints procedure. 'Complainant' and 'complained about' were brought together in an attempt to achieve mutually satisfactory reconciliation. If clear complaint patterns emerged these would be taken up by the CLO with the local police commander.

Whilst the CLO expressed satisfaction with how this casework method had developed, he recognised that there were serious issues to be addressed if community concerns were to be assuaged. In his first annual report he noted that half of the total of S49 complaints recorded by him
had been withdrawn as against one quarter of the non-S49 complaints. He had also assumed that the S49 complaints coming through his office would have had a higher rate completion than ones which had gone through the official police complaints department. In fact it turned out that the rate of withdrawal for both was the same. His feedback from complainants indicated that they felt themselves to be under pressure when they were interviewed by police officers. In his second report he noted that the withdrawal rate was down to 25% and he explained this by reference to his being more closely involved in the cases.

I have tried to stay much more closely in contact with the complainants and in doing so have, hopefully, enabled them to feel more confident during the generally long, tedious and often fruitless wait which they endure after having given their statements (2nd Annual Report: 19).

It was precisely because the formal complaints system was so arduous and often pointless in terms of outcome that the CLO put so much emphasis on the informal dispute resolution mechanism. However, even with regard to this mechanism he was worried that 33% of non-S49 complaints were not followed up by the complainant.

This part of the CLO's work took him to the heart of the matter as far as the policing of the black community in Moss Side was concerned. In his last report he concluded that 'the high proportion of complaints from black or brown people may point to the need for an indepth look at policing on the ground' (2nd Annual Report: 19). He once more emphasised that if a CLP was going to be set up in Moss Side complaints would, first, have to remain a priority area of work, and second, (despite the Home Office guidelines to the contrary, [see pp 104-5]) have to be included within the remit of the CLPs. Furthermore, a mechanism would have to be found to address the problems
associated with attempting to use the formal police complaints process.

Thus, the CLO did attempt to represent the interests of the community in Moss Side by addressing the key issues of concern, namely, racist attacks and the inadequacy of the police response, the refusal to join the police force because of the racism within it and the operation of the complaints procedure. However, he did so in such a manner as to confirm the criticism of those who opposed him. He had no powers to challenge the fundamental ways in which the police dealt with these issues and as a consequence the GMP could ignore criticisms that they disagreed with. Furthermore, his suggestion in relation to responding to racist attacks facilitated multi-agency policing. Therefore, not only could he not challenge police policies but he was facilitating multi-agency policing.

In addition there was no identifiable change in the controversial policing of Moss Side. A series of incidents undermined the efforts of the CLO to bring about a dialogue between the police and people in Moss Side. Compounding the routine complaints about the policing of the area were a series of highly publicized incidents continued to fuel the tension. As indicated previously the treatment of youth and community workers in the area caused considerable concern, resulting in the setting up of the Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group. The resultant court cases, during 1983, arising from the incident outside Moss Side Shopping precinct in September 1982 resulted in the two youth workers involved eventually winning their cases against the Chief Constable.

Furthermore, in April 1984 a young black woman, Jackie Berkeley, complained officially that she had been racially
abused, stripped and raped by police officers during her detention in Moss Side police station. She, in turn, had been charged with assaulting police officers and criminal damage. The ramifications of her complaint, the resultant defence campaign and court case for the work of the CLO were staggering.

Here was an allegation, more serious than any so far, being made about Moss Side Police just at the time when the Chief Constable of Manchester, James Anderton, and the police establishment of the city are desperate to prove that since the mass revolts against the police in 1981, all is rosy in the garden (Jackie Berkeley Defence Committee, 1985).

Such incidents also had serious implications for the attempts of the CLO to convince people in Moss Side that community liaison panels should be set up in Moss Side.

b. The Community Liaison Officer: The Facilitation of Community Representation and Participation

In addition to the CLO attempting to represent the black community he also had to attempt to set up community liaison panels in Moss Side and elsewhere in Manchester to bring about the representation and participation of the whole community. The CLO looked to the Lambeth Consultative Committee as being the possible model for the Greater Manchester initiative. His concern about what he viewed as Lambeth's chaotic participatory process convinced him of the necessity to construct structured terms of reference and precise agendas for the Manchester initiative (1st Annual Report:2). The deliberations of the Home Office and the government on the issue of consultation arrangements provided the eventual structure and terms of reference for the CLPs.

There were a series of communities that were to be represented by and participate in the liaison panels, the
black community as well as the whole community. In addition communities were geographically premised on the sub-divisional boundaries of the Greater Manchester Police covering the whole County. Therefore, the community to be consulted was that enclosed within each police subdivision. Thus, the actual geographical boundaries of community being used were police defined ones.

In order to achieve community representation the Police Authority attempted to get as wide as cross section of the community as possible. Although it was recognised that flexibility was important limits were fixed in order to reconcile the need to keep the Panel meetings manageable whilst at the same time ensuring that all relevant sections of the community were represented. In order to set up the liaison structures the Police Authority entered into negotiations with the constituent district Councils and the Council for Voluntary Organizations. As a consequence the Police Authority constructed lists of all community groups and representatives in each police subdivision. The respective groups were sent a letter informing them of the Police Authority’s decision to set up liaison panels and inviting them to a meeting to discuss the constitution of the panels. There was the automatic representation of the Police Authority, the constituent councils and the GMP. Additionally local residents within the subdivision were invited to attend the meeting ‘in order to decide who they wanted to have as members of the liaison panel’. Thus, the meetings were to be open for anyone to attend as observers and after the formal business all present were to have the opportunity to air their views.

Community participation was to take place through invitation within a formalized structure and setting and
would be primarily indirect in nature through the community representatives. Community representation was undoubtedly prioritized over community participation. The type of participation was also very clearly delineated by the definition of consultation:

Consultation is the idea of the police consulting the community or meeting with the community to discuss all aspects of policing so that they will be better informed about public feelings and ideas and as a result be better able to make decisions about policing the community...consultation is not about the community making decisions affecting policing, but it should lead to the police taking better decisions affecting the community (CLO 1983).

Thus, a formal structure of police community liaison was created that was supposed to facilitate community representation and participation not just in Moss Side but in all parts of Greater Manchester. However, it was a structure that prioritized structured representation over participation.

1. Moss Side
The fundamental problem facing the Police Authority and the Community Liaison Officer was how to set up such a panel in Moss Side given the opposition/suspicion/apathy that had been shown to the whole idea of community liaison. Every endeavor was made to overcome this opposition by attempting to establish immediately liaison structures in the area. Between 1 February and 30 March 1983 fourteen meetings were held in ten different venues in the area. Two of the meetings had to be cancelled for lack of interest but the people who had shown enough interest to attend the other meetings were "earmarked" as being the potential core for a liaison panel. These individuals were invited to another meeting which was to discuss what kind of consultative machinery would be appropriate for that subdivision. This meeting was
attended by eighteen people, five police officers and the CLO. A draft proposal suggested that there would not be a formal CLP with a formal membership. Instead liaison was to be premised upon public meetings spawning sub-groups as necessary. There would be a core of individuals who would organise meetings, set the agenda, 'proselytize' and manage the publicity. This core would consist of the elected representatives for the area, those individuals who had been involved through the area meetings and interested others.

Thus, despite the views of the CLO concerning the need for tight structures the urgent political need to try and set up a CLP in Moss Side meant that he, and the ruling Labour group on the Police Authority, were willing to agree to very unstructured arrangements. However, after further discussions no enthusiasm was shown for the proposal and the proposed liaison forum did not materialise. Further meetings took place on 25 January 1984 which only seven people attended and 7 March 1984 with thirty six people turning up. Because some young people turned up it was agreed to have a further meeting between these young people and street officers and a general one between the Chief Constable and the adult community. However, this provided just as difficult to realize.

A meeting of the 17 September 1984 was the third such meeting organised by the CLO where the Chief Constable was supposed to meet the community, as suggested above. However, to the embarrassment of the Police Authority representatives and the CLO, the Chief Constable did not turn up because of other commitments. Instead DCC Stalker and the Chief Superintendent of the division were present to deal with the audience of less than twenty in 'an open and frank way'. DCC Stalker was asked about a wide variety
of issues relating to the policing of Moss Side and Manchester in general. He denied allegations of phone tapping and of police infiltration of the area for political surveillance purposes. He refused to accept the general criticisms that were being made concerning the heavy handed and racist policing of the black community. He said that he was worried that there was 'a feeling of paranoia in Moss Side' and that nothing was to be gained by 'raking up the past'. He also refused to acknowledge that there was anything wrong with the complaints system as it stood and denied the allegations that certain police officers were 'fitting people up' on a regular basis. DCC Stalker argued that in addition to the complaints procedure there was now a community liaison officer and a lay visiting scheme to deal with such matters. A complete stalemate was reached over a whole range of areas and issues with the Chair of the Police Authority and the CLO less than satisfied with the level of openness of the police.

During this meeting the worst suspicions of those opposed to the initiative were confirmed. The Chief Superintendent when discussing the changes in policing that had resulted from the Scarman recommendations said that co-operation was needed to improve the quality of life in the community and that in other areas of Manchester this had been carried out by the setting up of liaison panels. He said however that because the Manchester City Council and certain community groups had refused to co-operate with such an initiative other ways had to be found. First, there was ongoing discussions with community elders. Second, the force had deployed "omnicompetent" community police officers after consultation with the five members of the community who turned up to a meeting in the West Indian Sports and Social Club. Third, monthly meetings
were held between himself, the CLO and the Community Contact Inspector to discuss the general situation in Moss Side. Finally, a multi-agency environmental committee had been set up in Moss Side to co-ordinate a response to the problems of the areas. It became apparent that alternative mechanisms to represent the community and involve the participation of the community were being set up with the help of the CLO to bypass the opposition to the liaison panel.

However, despite sustained efforts by the CLO no community liaison panel was set up in Moss Side. Despite meetings being held in a variety of forums and a variety of flexible ideas being tried the black community was not participating in the proposed structure. Furthermore, whilst respectable community leaders were prepared to continue to meet with the police in other forums they were not prepared to become embroiled publicly on the issue of liaison panels. It could be argued that this was a damning indictment of the representativeness of the community representative and the gap that existed between the Police Authority and the black community. A clear indication of the gap that existed is provided by comparing the paltry turnout to the meetings set up by the CLO and those set up by other groupings in Moss Side. Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group attracted over 80 people to its first public training day on policing and youth work in November 1983. Throughout this period there were also large turnouts to meetings held by the Manchester Campaign Against the Police Bill. Public meetings concerned about the Home Office's illegal immigrant trawls in Moss Side were also well attended and approximately 150 people attended a public meeting to support Jackie Berkeley in December 1984. By comparison the CLO could not muster more than twenty people, including councillors and police
officers, to any of his meetings during this period.

**ii. The Constituent Councils**

In order to establish the liaison panels throughout the force area delicate negotiations had to take place with the local Councils that made up Greater Manchester County Council. Throughout late 1982 and 1983 meetings were held with the individual councils and through the Greater Manchester Association of Metropolitan Authorities (GMAMA). As a matter of principle the recommendation to create CLPs on a police subdivisional basis was accepted by a GMAMA meeting on 29 July 1983. Further discussions then took place between representatives of the Police Authority's community relations subcommittee plus the appropriate GMC members and the representatives of the constituent District Councils to discuss the exact details. By October 1983 the negotiations were complete.

However, two District Councils, Tameside and Manchester, were ideologically opposed to the proposed community liaison structures. The opposition of Manchester City Council was of particular significance because Moss Side lay within the City’s boundaries and, as indicated, the Police Authority’s intention had been to set the first one up in Moss Side. Spurred on by the rejection of liaison panels by the black community on 1 February 1984 Manchester City Council passed a resolution stating that CLPs would not enhance the democratic accountability of the police and that the Council ‘would be unwilling to participate’ in such structures.

There were constant efforts to cajole and persuade the two maverick councils into agreeing to the liaison structures. However, not only did Manchester City Council continue to oppose the proposed structures but eventually decided to
set up an alternative in the form of police monitoring groups. The Police Authority, in an attempt to resolve the conflict, stated that liaison panels could be set up in such a way as to complement the proposed police monitoring groups. However, this was rejected. In September 1984 the Police Authority’s community relations subcommittee resolved to inform the Chief Executives of both councils that the Authority intended to establish the panels with or without the co-operation of the respective councils. In October 1984 it was resolved to set up meetings of the appropriate GMC members and the district Councils as well as representatives from the CVS and CRC to agree to the principle of establishing the panels. By November 1984 it had been decided to set up a meeting in Tameside which would include representatives from the Tameside Volunteer Bureau and the Tameside Council for Racial Equality. Liaison panels were subsequently set up without council representation soon after this because it was seen to be 'a weaker political animal' than Manchester (CLO, 1985). It was also hoped that when the CLPs had been set up and were working elsewhere in Greater Manchester, people in Moss Side and Manchester City Council would change their minds.

iii. The first CLPs (CLPs): Leigh and Salford
The first panels set up in Greater Manchester were in the areas of Leigh on 14 December 1982 and Salford on 2 August 1983, areas of the county where there was no public controversy about policing. The two CLPs came into being utilizing the structure mentioned earlier, having a named membership of twenty six and thirty three respectively. A review of the first year of the operation of the two panels by the CLO identified key problems in relation to the structure of representation and participation that had been set up. In terms of membership it was stated by those
involved that there were too many councillors who exercised undue influence and too few young, unemployed and working class. The CLO's report also showed disproportionate middle aged male participation.

Members of the panels stated that they had no real understanding about what they were supposed to be doing other than representing the organisations and groups that had asked them to attend the meeting. In terms of participation members said that they felt constrained by the agenda, the lecturing manner of the police, the refusal of the police to share information and the size and format of the meetings. The suitability of using the police sub-division as the basis for the CLP was queried as it was felt that the sub-division was too big. General scepticism was also expressed about the effectiveness of such a forum as a means of influencing policing. As one member put it:

"Things might have changed on the street, but I don't think they can put that down to us." (quoted in CLO report 31.7.84:10-11)

Panel members acknowledged that that they were 'not really in touch with those people who are in conflict with the police'. Members also recognised that their positive relationship with the police which had been built up during panel meetings was of little use because it did not affect relations between the police and those sections of the community in conflict with the police.

Thus problems relating to the issues of representation and participation of all sections of the community was a practical dilemma that immediately surfaced in the establishment of the CLPs. The CLO pointed out that there was 'lack of clarity, sometimes confusion and even ignorance' about the responsibilities of panel members and
their understanding of the role of the panels. His conclusion was that unless the Police Authority gave more structured support to the panels the confusions and contradictions mentioned above would result in the panels operating and ultimately degenerating ‘in an isolated void’ (CLO Report 31.7.84:11).

The concerns that were being expressed about just who was participating and being represented within the liaison process were confirmed when the first meeting of representatives from all the CLPs in Greater Manchester took place on 29 September 1984. The majority of those attending were white, male and middle aged. The CLO recognised that, whilst in theory, the whole community was supposed to be represented and participating in the liaison structures certain important sections of the community were not in fact doing so, namely, ethnic minorities, young people and women. Thus, the problem that had to be faced was that key sections of the community were not participating in the area based structures whether it was in terms of Moss Side or elsewhere in the county.

The lack of participation of key groups was reflected in the types of issues that the panels were focusing on. There were demands for more police, queries about victim support, questions concerning crime prevention, demands for neighbourhood watch, and complaints about truancy and juvenile delinquency. Thus, as the Home Office wanted, discussions about the extent of crime, fear of crime and crime prevention dominated the agenda of the CLPs. The issues that had resulted in the initiative being set up in the first place, ie, the breakdown in relations between the police and black people, rapidly disappeared off the liaison agenda. The CLO recognized the dilemmas posed by
the change in focus

Are the CLPs' local machinery where the police are part of a process which addresses and seeks to find ways of tackling policing issues; or are CLPs' local machinery where the police are party to a process which addresses and seeks ways of tackling the police. (CLO Report 31.7.84:11)

However, despite the problems identified, the CLO, with Home Office encouragement, continued to set the panels up elsewhere and by September 1984 there were sixteen panels in various parts of Greater Manchester.

c. Attempts to Resolve Problems of Community Representation and Participation

i. A panel for ethnic minorities
The CLO recognized that the interests of the black community were not being represented within the CLPs. He refused, however, to recognize that non-participation of the black community in liaison structures could be because there was a conscious rejection of such structures. Instead he viewed it as a technical problem that could be remedied through setting up an ethnic minority consultative forum to look at the issues of policing that specifically related to ethnic minorities. Thus, the CLO was fully cognizant that special supplemental arrangements might have to be developed to deal with the policing of ethnic minorities as well as their representation and participation in the consultation structure.

It is possible that issues relating to policing and its effects or implications for ethnic minorities will never be adequately aired or dealt with in a localised forum. The localised forum will have many other pressures on its time and if they are to be adequately aired and dealt with, this might have the effect of making an imbalance in the work of any local or division wide forum (CLO Discussion Paper 21 Dec 1982).
In order to overcome this problem he suggested that a separate CLP be set up for ethnic minority representatives. To this end he had continual discussions with the various community relations councils in Greater Manchester proposing that any such panel should have representatives from all ethnic minority organisations in the County and should be attended by Senior Police Officers. A discussion document was distributed to all the relevant community organisations but there was no positive response to the proposal. Nevertheless he argued that this type of proposal should be borne in mind when the Police Authority decided to establish a liaison panel in Moss Side.

ii. A professional CLP
The CLO effectively attempted to by-pass opposition to community liaison in Moss Side by creating a professional liaison panel which did not require community or political participation and representation. On 17 June 1983 the CLO convened a meeting of area managers of recreation, housing, employment, education and social services departments and the senior police officer who were responsible for Moss Side. The aim of the meeting was to formulate a multi-agency approach to what they defined as the pressing social problems in Moss Side. This group of area managers continued to meet regularly, focussing on one particular housing estate in the area "in order to test whether a co-ordinated approach can have an impact on some of the issues identified as leading to a fear of crime" (CLO May 1984). Relevant data was collated and shared between the agencies involved in order to target their efforts more effectively. Consequently an open day took place on 19 September 1984 "in order to inform the community about the approach that the local services are
taking in trying to coordinate the services better and also to test out the effect of focussing on a well defined area' (2nd Annual Report:16). Although the attendance of the community was 'disappointing' a second day was held on 1/2 March 1985 in the Moss Side Shopping Precinct. However, there was also an apathetic response to this day. This professional liaison panel provoked considerable anger because of the way it was meeting in an unaccountable manner and because it was utilising a multi agency approach. Furthermore, in terms of mobilizing community interest it was conspicuously unsuccessful.

iii. Young People
In July 1984 the CLO once more expressed concern that young people were not being 'picked up' by the CLPs in any large numbers and that in some panels young people were not represented at all. He recognized that it was 'extremely difficult' to involve young people in processes such as CLPs because of the nature of the area based panels (CLO Report:31.7.84). In his second annual report the CLO repeated his concern about 'the almost total lack of young adult involvement in the work of the Panels' and he warned that 'if the panels are to be at all effective, then this section of the community must be enabled to have their say' (2nd AR:22).

The concern of the CLO about the representation and participation of young people was restated by panel representatives during the proceedings of the first two forums for representatives of all the CLPs in Manchester.

Everyone is talking about young people yet look around here there is a lack of youth. There's a lack of cross sectional representation. Where's the young people on the panels - 18 to 25 year olds views should be heard. These meetings are mainly for councillors, there's not enough people from where the problems are (Fieldnotes).
At our first meeting there were 24 young people and we got 6 representatives from youth. However, they didn’t come to the following meetings. There’s a lack of youth. People of our age bracket are identifying the problem of youth yet the youth aren’t here (ibid).

How do you incorporate young people who don’t want to come? How do you incorporate old people who only come to moan about young people?. We must incorporate youth but it can’t be done (ibid).

One CLP representative said that his panel had found an effective, if undemocratic, means of achieving youth representation and participation

We go to the youth clubs and physically get the youth to come to our meetings! (ibid)

The CLO attempted to facilitate 'more consistent involvement of young adults in public consultation about policing' by proposing that a weekend forum be set up with youth representatives from each district, with more places being allocated to Manchester to try and persuade the city council to co-operate. The participants would be young people aged between 16 and 21 who would be contacted through general advertising in the local media as well as through youth officers, community relations councils, councils for voluntary service and voluntary youth organisations.

The Chief Constable immediately intervened to neutralise this proposal. He argued that such a forum should involve all the agencies involved in dealing with young people not just the police. Additionally he asked for first, a change in the focus of the forum from policing matters to one 'allowing the young people to discuss their views of current social issues' and second, a change in location from the CLO’s proposed weekend rural retreat to a one day seminar at the force training school. The Police Authority
opposed the change in focus arguing that the point of the proposed Forum was to enable young people to discuss their relationships and attitudes to, and with, the police, rather than general social issues.

The eventual 'compromise' that was reached reflected the demands of the Chief Constable as it was agreed to hold a one day conference at the force school with the 'emphasis to be put on allowing the young people to identify those issues most important to them.' This was a considerably different proposal from the CLO's original proposal to create a forum to facilitate the participation of young people in policing debates and the CLPs. Once more the power of the Chief Constable to have his demands acceded to was illustrated as well as the powerlessness of the CLO. As a consequence the GMP gained control of the agenda and the location making sure that the issue of young people and policing was not the focus of the discussions, in addition it created another multi-agency forum with the police in control of the discussions.

iv. Women
The Community Liaison Officer also identified the under/non-representation and participation of women as another of the issues that would have to be addressed

If the membership of the Panel offers us any clues as to who they might influence in terms of police/public relationships then relationships between women and the police will be unaffected (2nd Annual Report:5)

He noted with apprehension that within one of the panels the view had been expressed that 'the fact that there are very few women involved is irrelevant and makes no difference' and he was concerned that there had been no real attempt by the panels to 'address the balance and increase the number involved in this work' (2nd Annual
Report:5). Overall out of the initial thirteen CLPs set up there was a total of 445 members of which 102 were women (average of 7.8 out of memberships of 34). Furthermore, at some of the meetings there were no women present.

The CLO also identified the issue of policing and women through his casework. He noted how there seemed to be an increasing tendency within GMP's policework to define cases as 'domestics' in order to not become involved and/or to suggest civil action. As far as the CLO was concerned this was not acceptable because 'the casualties are weak, usually female of sometimes frighteningly violent relationships' (2nd Annual Report:20). This was the first acknowledgement of an issue that was to become a national issue in the mid-1980s (Heidensohn, 1989: 160-170; Walklate, 1979). As a consequence of the CLO's concern, in May 1985, the Police Authority agreed to the idea of having a women only conference on women and policing.

This conference, held on 22 June 1985, provided a further example of how the Authority sought to deal with the question of representation and participation and the problems arising from such a format. A list of all women's groups and organisations was constructed and their participation and representation was invited. The conference was divided into separate workshops on issues relating to black women, domestic violence and sexual offences. With regard to the latter two workshops, splits emerged between the representatives of the more traditional and conservative women's organisations, eg, the National Council of Women and the more radical ones, most notably, Rape Crisis, Women's Aid and Taboo. However, it was during the discussions in the black women's issues workshop that the problems with the Police Authority's
format became apparent. This workshop was abandoned after two of the councillors dismissed the complaints of police racism as exaggeration and hearsay. As a consequence of the arguments a black women’s only workshop was reconvened. The point was made that the very fact that there had to be a separate workshop was indicative of the Police Authority’s inability to address the black community’s complaints about police racism.

During the plenary session of this conference there were further problems when the black women’s workshop attempted to report back. One of the key concerns they raised was how difficult it was for black women, who were victims of domestic violence, to complain to the police, because action would probably be taken because it gave racist police officers a legitimate opportunity to arrest black men. During the ensuing discussion a councillor from GMC’s Equal Opportunities sub-committee stated that she failed to see what relevance race had in the police response to domestic violence. She argued that at one time all human beings had been black but that ‘by the grace of God some of us had lost this pigment from our skin’ (Report to PMC:12.7.85). As a consequence this meeting ended in uproar. At a subsequent women and policing working party meeting, the radical women’s groups withdrew from discussions after a vote of censure against the two councillors was overruled by the Chair of the Police Authority. Thus, although women’s concerns about crime and policing were placed on the agenda of the Police Authority it was in such a manner so as to result in the withdrawal of the radical groupings from the proceedings.

In February 1985, although the CLO resigned, he reaffirmed his belief in CLPs because ‘there is no other existing structure for police/public consultation which has the
capability of delivering the level of involvement for local people' (CLO, Report, 8.3.85). However, he suggested that the whole notion of community liaison should be reviewed as should the future of the post of CLO. He argued that there should be a properly staffed full time community liaison unit to service the panels

Specifically help is needed to increase the confidence of Panel members; help them understand their role, functions, powers and potential; enable them to carry out basic research on police/community issues within their own areas; assist them to understand local police strategies and their place in defining local police priorities; clarify the Panels aims and objectives (ibid).

If this was to be achieved the new unit would have undertake two types of work. First, the unit would have to work with 'community groups of all kinds to publicize and popularize the work and potential of the panels' (ibid). And second, it would have to provide structured links with the Authority and the other panels. As far as he was concerned, if the Police Authority did not accept the idea of having a unit the panels would eventually become defunct. Thus, in response to the difficulties he had encountered the CLO was proposing a process of further professionalization. A professional community liaison unit was to be given the role of articulating what the needs of the panels, and therefore the community, were.

Discussion

The Police Authority, in addition to being in open conflict with the Chief Constable had to confront the problems generated by its attempt to facilitate the accountability of GMP to the community. This chapter has documented the nature of these problems both in relation to the CLO acting as the community representative and his attempts to set up CLPs.
With regard to his role as the community representative a series of problems have been identified. First, the CLO’s ascribed representative status was rejected by significant sections of the community he was supposedly representing. Given that the Hytner Inquiry had specifically cautioned against appointing someone who did not enjoy the full confidence of those sections of the community in conflict with the police, this was a serious defect. As critics of the CLO emphasized, what the appointment indicated was that GMC and the Police Authority had paid no heed to the wishes of the residents of Moss Side. Second, the philosophy underpinning the work of the CLO, and enshrined in the Home Office guidelines, confirmed his unrepresentative status. In particular his enthusiastic support for multi-agency policing strategies and acceptance of the status quo confirmed those who viewed his appointment as, at the very best, sheer tokenism. Third, and interconnected with the second point, was the fact that whilst the CLO was trying to assuage community concerns, the harsh policing of Moss Side had not changed and, as indicated, there were a series of very controversial incidents. In addition the Chief Constable had continued to make well publicized statements, rejecting all allegations of racism, denying that there had been a breakdown in police-community relations in Moss Side and attacking the ‘anti-police’ youth and community workers in the area. What this showed was first, that the CLO was completely powerless in relation to effecting change in the policing of Moss Side and second the incapability of community interests being represented through the Home Office’s community consultation structures.

Such problems had serious ramifications for the attempts
of the CLO to set up a liaison panel in Moss Side. First, the CLO and Police Authority faced the problem of the rejection of community liaison by Manchester City Council on the grounds that it would not enhance police accountability. Opposition of the council could have been overcome if there had been support in Moss Side for the idea. However, the second problem was that the whole idea of community liaison was rejected completely, not least because the terms of reference did not address the issue of the policing of Moss Side. The CLO was not helped by the fact, as indicated above, that all his attempts to implement community liaison were undermined by the arrogance of police officers attending public meetings and the ongoing controversial policing of Moss Side.

Furthermore, the expressed hope of the CLO and the Police Authority that the setting up of CLPs in the rest of Greater Manchester would persuade people in Moss Side to change their minds was hopelessly misplaced. By utilizing the theoretical concepts that are central to this thesis, community, representation and participation and the analysis of the state's previous response to the management of problems of citizenship, it is possible to identify just how problematical the Home Office's consultation structures were. Community referred to first, the geographical entity of the police subdivision. However, as members of the panels made clear, they had a more localized understanding of their community. And second, within the community liaison initiative, community referred to the whole community. The problem with this conception was that although it was not the whole community who had problems with the police their interests were being included on the agendas of the CLPs.

The CLP structure emphasized the representation of the
community as opposed to the participation of the community. As a consequence all formal community organizations and representatives were invited to the CLPs. However, there were a series of problems associated with such an approach. First, there was no recognition that there were power inequalities between the different groups that were supposed to have equal representation. Second, there was no recognition of the problematical nature of the representativeness of many of these community groups and individuals. Third, there was no recognition that certain sections of the community did not have formal community representatives. Fourth, invitations were given to community groups and representatives who had no necessary relevance to the discussions of the CLPs. Finally, GMP, the Police Authority and the local council were given a privileged status in that they enjoyed statutory rights of automatic representation, despite what the other community representatives might think.

A representative structure was created that tightly controlled and limited participation. First, the direct representation of the community was limited to their being able to contribute at the end of the highly formal CLP meetings. In addition, there was a highly formalized structure and accompanying procedures governing the participation of the community representatives. First, their participation was mobilized by the powerful as opposed to being a spontaneous or voluntary decision. Furthermore, through the Home Office guidelines their participation was being mobilized for the purpose of helping the police to control crime. Second, the participation of the community representatives was limited by the tightly structured terms of reference. Third, the CLP meetings were, in Pateman's (1970) terms, situations of partial participation with power residing firmly with
the police representatives who had their operational autonomy enshrined in the terms of reference and who kept control of the information and knowledge that would have been a pre-condition for an open discussion about policing, or indeed about crime.

Thus, the initial community liaison model facilitated the representation and participation of white, middle aged, respectable males. As a consequence the manner in which issues of community, representation and participation had been dealt with, reproduced the existing power inequalities. The CLO did acknowledge that important sections of the community, eg, ethnic minorities, women and young people were non/under-represented in the CLPs and he did attempt to redress the situation to bring about their participation. However, in order to do so the CLO recommended that all-encompassing supplemental structures of representation, based on the notion of the whole community of ethnic minorities, the whole community of young people and the whole community of women, be set up. It is not surprising that even the respectable black community leaders rejected the proposed ethnic minority liaison panel. Effectively what the CLO was suggesting was that representatives of the supplemental community consultation committees set up in the 1960s participate in a supplemental forum to compensate for the fact that the CLPs had failed to represent the interests they had been set up to represent! Even if this forum had been agreed to, the CLO would undoubtedly have had to encounter the problems of the non/under-representation of black youth and black women. The recommendations concerning young people and policing suffered from similar flaws. The CLO recommended that ten young people be selected from the suggestions of those organizations that were involved with respectable young people. These ten respectable youths
were then to be given the mantle of being the representatives of young people in their districts. The problem with such a proposal was that it was not respectable youth who were in conflict with the police. Furthermore, by the time that the Chief Constable had finished restructuring the proposal, not only was the meeting of the youth representatives convened within GMP premises but discussion of policing was not necessarily on the agenda!

The non/under-representation of women was given the most attention by the CLO and the Police Authority. However, the all-encompassing format of structured representation failed to give recognition to the fact that first, there are racial and class inequalities between women's groups and second, certain women's groups articulate dominant ideologies and interpretations of reality. As a consequence the interests of those powerless women's groups who challenged dominant ideologies concerning women and policing were defined out. For example, when the motion of censure of the racist comments made by two of the councillors was overruled by the Chair of the Police Authority the radical women's groups were forced to withdraw from further participation in the proceedings.

Thus, not only did the original structure of community representation reproduce the existing power inequalities and social divisions but the supplemental structures, set up to counter-balance those inequalities and provide justice to all interests, reproduced further divisions between respectable youth and disreputable youth and respectable women and disreputable women. As a consequence the interests of those in conflict with the police were being defined out by the representative structures. How the professional community liaison unit attempted to deal
with these problems will be addressed later in this thesis. Before that it is necessary to analyze how Manchester City Council attempted to create alternative structures of community representation and participation through their police monitoring initiative.
Section III: Model II

Community Representation and participation through community monitoring

a. The Police Monitoring Committee (PMC)

On Thursday 3 May 1984 the Left-wing of the Labour Party finally won control of Manchester City Council in the local government elections. This was a dramatic change because the "old guard"

in charge of the Town Hall virtually uninterruptedly for decades, regarded the City Party as a machine to be wheeled out at election time to rubber stamp the status quo (Labour Leader, MEN, 15.5.84).

The experience of the Left in opposition and, as they viewed it, the constant betrayal of manifesto commitments by the Right of the Labour Party in Manchester, meant that they were determined to implement the radical manifesto that had been presented to the electorate for the May elections. This time there was to be no compromise.

The manifesto is firmly based on the belief that councils in Labour strongholds like Manchester should act, not only as a platform for resistance to the Tory government, but as a real socialist alternative that can show that socialism works in practice. For that reason Labour's manifesto sets its aims high - to begin to build a city of PEACE, EQUALITY and DEMOCRACY, a SOCIALIST CITY (Red Banner, June 1984).

However, after the election results were announced the rest of May was spent in an intense struggle to get the old guard of the Party to finally give up power. In order to do this officials from the regional and national Party had to be called in because 28 of the Right Labour councillors were not adhering to the Party whip and refusing to adhere to the previous agreements. As a consequence it was not until 23 May 1984 that the whole of the 1984 manifesto was adopted as official Council policy. This manifesto promised to: make the services provided by
the City Council more accountable to the community; turn
the City into a nuclear free zone thereby guaranteeing a
peaceful existence for its citizens; create and defend
jobs and 'actively oppose all forms of racism and sexism
and discrimination based on a person's sexuality or
physical ability'. Thus, it reflected the key concerns of
the new urban Left in other parts of Britain at that time.

As Wainwright (1987: 114-26) has pointed out, in exile
from mainstream politics in Manchester the Left
councillors looked to the community to build its power
base and reformulate its alternative policies. There were
alliances with housing groups, public sector unions,
community centres, women's and gay groups in formulating an
anti-cuts campaign. This alliance of the excluded and
dispossessed and the construction of an alternative
manifesto meant that their interests finally reached the
formal political agenda in Manchester when the Left came
to power. It should be noted however that a significant
percentage of Manchester Labour Party remained uncommitted
to these policies and priorities and indeed represented
traditional Labour areas of Manchester where there was
little support for the policies of the NUL urban left.
This was to have important implications for the continued
commitment to such policies.

ea. Honouring The Party Manifesto Commitment
This commitment to implementing all manifesto commitments
meant that the vague proposal concerning police
accountability had to be realized.
We do not believe that community liaison panels will
assist local people in having a greater say in the
operations of police activity. In order to campaign for
real accountability of the police to the communities
they serve, we will set up a police monitoring group.
We will also consider setting up a committee to
establish guidelines for council policy towards and
cooperation with the police (Party Manifesto, 1984). Had the Right of the Party retained power this electoral commitment, along with the other new ones, would probably not have been implemented. They would have been ignored, shelved or neutralised by tokenism. However, it was now on the agenda for implementation despite the fact that many on the Left of the party were not as committed to it as to other manifesto commitments.

b. The Origins of The Police Monitoring Commitment
The origins of this commitment are to be found in the previously documented struggle over police accountability that had taken place in Manchester since the 1981 disturbances. The apparent inability of the Police Authority to exert any form of accountability over the Chief Constable, the unacceptability of the community liaison proposals and the discriminatory nature of both the 'hard' and community policing of Manchester's inner city areas provided the immediate context for the inclusion of the policing proposals in the 1984 manifesto. In effect the conclusion was reached that the Police Authority could not represent the interests of those in Manchester who were in conflict with the police. Consequently, those concerned with police accountability decided that there needed to be another type of structure to try and make the GMP accountable for the policing of Manchester, through exerting pressure both on the Chief Constable and the Police Authority.

c. The Immediate Implications of The Commitment: The Struggle For The Community
The inclusion of the police monitoring proposal signalled potentially serious conflict over policing in Manchester. The assertion that Manchester City Council would be pushing for real accountability of the police in the form
of 'full democratic control over how the city is policed' and that it was rejecting the Police Authority's consultative arrangements meant that the community was going to become a site of struggle not just between the police and the City Council but also between the County Council and the City Council, both of which were Labour controlled. With the implementation of the manifesto Manchester would become the first city in the country with both a statutory Police Authority and a formal City Council Police Monitoring Committee (PMC), both supposedly representing the community on policing issues in Manchester.

In an attempt to neutralize any conflict a meeting took place between representatives of the two Councils, immediately after the election. The City Council representatives reiterated that CLPs were not acceptable because given their origins (in the Scarman report) such panels could not strengthen police accountability. They were merely public relations exercises and talking shops. Additionally it was stressed that they were unrepresentative and 'did not reflect any natural (geographical) communities' in Manchester because they were premised on police sub-divisions. The representatives of the Police Authority, as indicated previously, argued that there was no reason why there could not be both CLPs and police monitoring groups (PMGs) operating in the city. No agreement was reached on the issue other than not to criticize each other in public. Both sets of representatives agreed 'to disagree' whilst pursuing their different strategies. In the immediate debates between the two Councils, the questions of who constituted the community and how to facilitate its representation and participation were central.
d. From Commitment to Committee

The Town Clerk of the City Council made his report on the setting up of the new Police Monitoring Committee on 16 July 1984 warning that detailed consideration would have to be given to the legal and constitutional factors governing both local government and policing outside of London. On 25 July 1984 the Police Monitoring Committee was approved by the policy committee and the council and it met for the first time on 31 July 1984. A standing sub-committee was immediately set up consisting only of Labour members, co-opted members and advisors in order to neutralize any attempt by the opposition to disrupt progress. Throughout August a series of meetings of the standing sub-committee were held and visits were made to London to meet with the Police Committee of the GLC, and those of the Boroughs of Lambeth, Camden, Hackney and Southwark. Therefore, despite the protestations of the Town Clerk that Manchester was constitutionally different to Greater London, the GLC model of police monitoring was adopted. However, terms of reference still had to be found that would be legally and constitutionally acceptable. After seeking the advice of counsel the Town Clerk presented terms of reference (utilizing the Home Office circular on crime prevention) that were more concerned with crime control than police accountability. There was the feeling within the Labour group that the political terms of reference drawn up had been considerably weakened, possibly deliberately, by the Town Clerk. As far as the Labour members were concerned the control of crime was not one of the major roles envisaged for the police monitoring initiative. After the general 'purging' of the Town Clerk's department by the Labour Council, more sympathetic personnel were appointed who were more willing and able to find terms of reference that facilitated the Police Monitoring Committee having a legitimate concern
with police accountability as well as crime control.

From the beginning the police monitoring initiative had to recognize that there was considerable opposition to the initiative. First, not all sections of the Left of the Labour group (never mind the right of the Party) supported the initiative. Second, the Town Clerk’s office was seemingly attempting to place severe limitations upon the Committee’s terms of reference. Third, the local Conservative and Liberal Parties expressed their outright opposition to the initiative making it clear that they would vote for its abolition at the first opportunity. These problems came to dominate initial discussions as they collectively were hindering the establishment the unit and starting the work of police monitoring. Discussions about what the Committee should be doing and how it should proceed became secondary to these practical political problems.

A bureaucratic set of structures was developed in order to implement the manifesto commitment. There was a full committee with a standing sub-committee, constituent sub-committees and pre-meeting meetings, the working party and the police monitoring unit. There was also, in theory, supposed to be community participation through PMGs and the local wards of the Labour Party. Key advisors and co-optees were appointed to provide the expertise on policing matters and the issues concerning the community that the councillors did not possess. In doing so direct representation was supposedly given to those groups in conflict with the police. Whilst in theory there was an impressive level of inputs, access to certain parts of the structure was more important than others, particularly the standing subcommittee, pre-meeting meetings and subcommittees. Through tight control of the latter
structures, the Conservative and Liberal opposition on the PMC, and ultimately the community, were denied access to all of these key areas and their role was effectively limited to participation in monthly full committee meetings. A hard line was taken by the Labour group because of the opposition parties pledge to campaigning for the abolition of the committee. Therefore, Labour was determined that they would be allowed limited participatory and representational rights within the structure. Whether such a position was democratically acceptable is questionable. For those demanding representation and participation in policing matters is it acceptable that they in turn see no problem in placing limitations on the effective participation and representation of those who oppose their views? However, given the context of the embittered ideological struggles of the 1980s and that the aim of the monitoring initiative was to represent previously unrepresented interests it is difficult to see how Labour could have done otherwise.

e. The articulation of the key issues within the Police Monitoring Committee

1. Representation and participation
A pattern of ritualistic exchanges during full meetings was established. Labour councillors would present various items on a pre-constructed agenda with the opposition being reduced to asking for clarification or complaining. The opposition was immediately overruled and Labour members would demand a vote if the opposition persisted. Given the overwhelming majority that the Labour group had and the fact that a strict Party whip was exercised there was no possibility of the Conservatives or the Liberal ever winning a vote. At the initial meetings this situation produced constant arguments about the nature of
representatory and participatory rights. At the first full meeting on 2 November 1984 the initial agenda item concerned the Committee representation on interview panels for recruiting the staff for the proposed research and development unit. Labour proposed an interview panel with no Conservative or Liberal representation or participation in the process. Although the latter opposed the objectives of the initiative they demanded the right of representation and participation in the process.

Con: What about us?
Lab1: Since you did not want this committee we cannot include you.
Con: At least we are accountable to the community the co-opted member isn't. If we make suggestions you resent it.
Lab2: Vote against it
Con: I propose a member of the opposition.
Lib: I don't have an interest in it because I support the democratically elected Police Authority. The establishment of this committee undermines the fight against the abolition of the GMC and the work of the Police Authority.
Lab2: Why are you on this committee if you think we are undermining the Police Authority. We work alongside the GMC.
Lab1: Its that sort of comment that has led us to not inviting the opposition onto committees. How do you expect to be invited onto them?
Lab3: You should resign.
Con: We don't get a chance to participate (Fieldnotes).

Because they were opposed to the initiative the opposition were told that they had no right to demand representation and participation. Only if they accepted the position of the legitimacy of the PMC would they be allowed such participation and representation. This argument became a constant feature of the meetings of the PMC, particularly in relation to the establishment of the overall structure, eg, the establishment of the sub-committees, committee visits, policy formulation. However, in its attempts to achieve representation and participation the opposition
was constantly hindered by first, being in a minority, second, being divided amongst themselves and third, by trying to maintain an oppositional position that was not acceptable to the ruling Labour group. The opposition quickly realized that not only did the Labour group not allow them any participation or representation in the sub-committees but that the non-elected advisor and co-optees were playing a significant role within these sub-committees and indeed the full committee.

Con: Should you not have a member of the opposition on the standing sub-committee?
Lab: No, you didn’t even want a police monitoring committee.
Con: What about the opposition being represented?
Lab: Propose someone.
Con: I propose Councillor Kershaw (Fieldnotes)

This proposal was defeated because neither the Labour group nor the Liberal supported the Conservative councillor’s appointment. To the further consternation of the opposition, Labour then set up another working party with a subcommittee consisting of only Labour members with all the Labour members included and co-opted members

Con: This is undemocratic. We should be represented
Lab: Do you want to move someone?
Con: Myself.

NOT SECONDED
Con: How dare you put co-opted members on this committee. They are not answerable to the general public. They are not democratically elected.
Con: You represent one area. We represent a damned sight more.
Lab: The co-opted members help us. Mrs Hills hinders us (Fieldnotes).

The row over representation and participation continued in March 1985 over the appointments committee with the Liberal councillor demanding access to the standing sub-committee in order to see the agenda and to know who was on it. The Labour chair responded by giving the list of
all those on this sub-committee

Con: No opposition?
Lab: No, that was the decision of the committee. The Tories don't want anything to do with the committee.
Con: Why are you so afraid of having opposition members on?
Lab: We will if you are constructive (Fieldnotes)

The opposition argued that the Police Monitoring Committee was deliberately trying to subvert the work of the County Council Police Authority and the Labour representatives continually argued that it was precisely these type of allegations that had led to the opposition’s exclusion from the decision making process

Lab: If you don’t support the PMC you have no rights.
Con: We have rights as representatives.
Lab: You have no rights (Fieldnotes)

There could be no clearer statement of the attitude of the Labour group towards those who disagreed with their police monitoring initiative. There was to be no sharing of power. During the April 1985 meeting Labour recommended that an emergency sub-committee be set up in order to deal with any urgent business that might emerge between full meetings of the committee. Access to this sub-committee would be crucial for anyone wanting to have their views represented because it effectively would be the means by which the day-to-day decision making of the PMC would be carried out. Labour nominated the chair and deputy plus other Labour nominees that they saw fit to co-opt. The opposition again complained that such a decision and process was totally undemocratic. Labour again responded by arguing that the opposition had ruled out their participation and representation by their continued opposition to the existence of the committee and its work.
These extremely acrid debates and clashes over representation and participation within the PMC meetings reflected a belief amongst councillors that they were the representatives of the community and that the community's participation in council matters was through them. Labour, in particular, had a substantial electoral mandate upon which to base such claims and in the PMC exercised that mandate to the full. The powerless minority opposition parties were reduced to complaining the Labour group was not allowing them to actively participate in the PMC and represent the interests of their communities and were giving non-councillors more rights of participation and representation than them. Whilst willing to have certain interests represented on the Committee the Labour group were not prepared to have opposing interests represented.

ii. The community

The issue of the community was also addressed in exchanges during this period in PMC meetings. During the March 1985 meeting the issue of CLPs emerged when the Liberal councillor made the point that he was opposing the PMC's staffing proposals and the idea of PMGs because the Liberal Party supported the Police Authority and its CLPs. He also stated that whether the PMC liked it or not liaison panels would be set up within Manchester by 1 April 1985. Labour, in response, argued that their monitoring groups would be very different from the liaison panels because the former would represent the needs of 'the community' defined as young people, ethnic minorities and the elderly. They argued that the groups would be able to 'inform the community in general not like CLPs. We have to get down to the grass roots.'

Labour also justified the placing of the research unit (PMU) in accommodation outside of the Town Hall by arguing
that this was because the groups that had been consulted had preferred such a situation and found the Town Hall intimidating. The Liberal member pushed the Labour group on the issue of consultation asking who had been consulted before the making of the decision. The responses elicited by this question gave further confirmation of what community was being consulted

We have working parties and that’s how we consult the people of Manchester. Members of the public come to the working party.

The venue of the working party, tenant associations and community groups. As Chair I was invited to the Campaign against the Police Bill and invited to the Labour Party ward meetings and got cross references back (Fieldnotes)

The Head of the PMU tried to neutralise opposition questioning by saying that he would 'talk to every section of the community including the police'. However, in reality it was not every section of the community that the PMC was set up to represent. The Labour group consistently responded to such questioning in a manner that indicated a concern with those constituencies for whom various aspects of policing was a problem, i.e., the over-policed and/or under-policed community. This was very different to the whole community being supposedly represented by the community liaison panels. This was the reason why the PMC argued that the panels did not represent the community but that monitoring groups would. They were addressing two very different conceptions of community

attempting to respond to indications of concern within the local community. The youth workers police monitoring group and gay police monitoring group will be contacted by the unit in the near future (Fieldnotes).

f. The Articulation of Key Issues Within the Working Party

Each committee of the council had a working party attached
to it. Within the police monitoring structure the working party was given a series of roles. First, it was to be the forum where interested members of the Labour party and interested others could have a practical input in the formulation of committee policy. Second, it was the means whereby councillors on the PMC were to be held accountable for their actions as they had to be present at the meetings to explain what was happening generally and specifically to the proposals put forward by the party. Third, it was supposed to be 'the source of legitimation, within the Labour Party, for the Committee's proposals, because of its representative and participatory status. Fourth, members were supposed to report back to the wards on the work of the committee and to harness support for the proposal within the wards. Fifth, through its role within the council and its relationship to the committees and wards, it was to be the means whereby the community was kept constantly informed as to what was going on and had a means of participating in the police monitoring initiative. The final and allied role that the working party was to play was stated and agreed to at the first meeting. When the PMGs were set up and operating the working party would be the forum for monitoring group members participation within the formal part of the initiative.

Although the meetings of the Working Party were taken up with the internal difficulties relating to the PMC and the PMU, this was the forum where the issue of the community and monitoring groups was initially discussed in most detail as well as issues arising concerning community representation and participation.

1. Community representation and participation in monitoring groups
The first well-attended meetings of the Working Party after the election saw a wide ranging and enthusiastic debate about how to bring about community representation and participation in policing. A sense of optimism concerning the setting up of PMGs informed the first meetings. On 21 June 1984 the first meeting of this Working Party took place in the Town Hall in order to start the process of implementing the manifesto commitment on police monitoring. The chair of the meeting believed, as a consequence of discussions with those involved in the campaign for police accountability in Manchester, that there should be a small PMC with a research facility wherein 'the key would be local groups and community groups'. The concept of community appeared in all its complexity during the ensuing discussions about how to bring about community participation. The points that were made addressed the key issues arising from the evoking of the concept as the basis for the initiative

We have a problem where the police are needed but not wanted. The police are not the answer. We as a council, must build up our communities then the incidence of vandalism will be reduced and the communities will be able to look after themselves.

Communities in Manchester are non-communities they don't have collective strength.

The council must do something about it, for example how much money goes into these areas on what basis. We must help to create the conditions for developing strong communities because the problems of policing lie within the strength of those communities.

I know from my constituency that the difficulty with all this is that they are not a liberal community. Their view of policing and needs might be very different to what you propose (Fieldnotes)

The points addressed were the basis of a discussion about the general concept of community: whether it existed, whether it could be created where it did not, and whether
it should be the basis for policy, given the possibility that the community may hold negative rather than positive views. The discussion was concluded with a resolution that there should be a PMC, with its own research unit and 'a real input from the community'.

The meeting also addressed the pragmatic problems of getting the new initiative off the ground and to a considerable degree such considerations curtailed the debates about the nature of the community. Thus the discussion focused upon issues such as conferring council "status" upon the initiative, making the terms of reference bland enough to make it acceptable to the right of the Labour Party and the Council and making sure that it was set up before the expected confrontation with the Conservative government over local government funding took place in the following Spring. There was agreement that the PMGs could provide additional means through which to mobilize the community in the campaign to save the council.

The issues continued to emerge in subsequent meetings. At the next meeting, for example, questions were raised as to how the community would be consulted, were there concerned community groups already in existence, who could be seen as valid community representatives and the dangers of imposing unwanted structures upon the community. However, pragmatic considerations once more had to be considered with the chair of the meeting halting the discussion by making it clear that the priority was to get the initiative implemented.

In April and May 1985 the issue of setting up PMGs was discussed in great detail and it was agreed that PMGs should not be funded or staffed by the committee because
the groups retention of their autonomy was seen to be important. If it was deemed necessary the PMC should support monitoring group applications to other council committees for funding as required. Direct support from the PMC would be limited to helping with accommodation, phone bills and publicity needs. It was agreed that what should be given was support from the PMU's development workers rather than money. In discussions about the establishment of PMGs, it was recognised that flexibility was the key. Some would be already existing community groups, some would be geographically based whilst others would be issue based. It was agreed that there should be a city wide campaign with public meetings on the issue as well as utilizing the Labour Party wards and other Council Departments. It was also agreed that there would have to be positive vetting of the application of any group or locality wanting to set up a PMG. This latter point came up at the Working Party meeting in May 1985 when a request from a residents association in North Manchester was discussed. After investigation it was discovered that this association was a right wing vigilante group.

It was recognized that the PMC would have to be sensitive in how it went about creating PMGs. It was stressed that if the initiative was to be successful there would have to be real grass roots interest, community participation, the possibility of exerting influence; autonomy and council support. Although the dangers of imposing unwanted structures was recognized a sense of frustration came to characterize meetings when the PMGs failed to emerge. What also became apparent was that many members of the Working Party were operating with an over-arching geographically based notion of community. This was why there was so much concern that community based PMGs were not emerging. There was recognition that a Youth and Allied Workers Police
Monitoring Group and Gay Police Monitoring Group existed but these were perceived as being different, ie, issue based, to the ones that would be set up in the community, particularly in Labour wards.

Discussion
The deliberations about the setting up of alternatives to CLPs in Manchester utilized very different notions of community, representation and participation to those articulated by the Police Authority and the CLO. The PMC did not utilize the notion of the whole community as there was the recognition that there were certain groups within the community whose interests needed to be prioritized in terms of the policing they were subject to. Labour neutralized the political opposition who, as representatives of dominant ideologies and powerful community interests, would have blocked attempts to prioritize, and therefore do justice to, the interests and needs of the under/non-represented. During the initial discussions the key issues of representation were also addressed. The stress was on the setting up of structures that would facilitate the participation of the under/non-represented sections of the community. It was emphasized that there should be voluntary, spontaneous and active participation with the community groups setting their own agendas. There was also recognition of the issue of the power imbalance of different groups and interests. In theory, the PMC was to take on the role of empowering the powerless and neutralizing the power imbalances. This was to be achieved by silencing the political opposition, making sure that right wing community groups did not get access to resources, blocking all attempts to set up CLPs in Manchester and holding the Chief Constable to account for discriminatory policing practices. Furthermore, through the commitment to set up a research and
development unit (PMU) and publish a magazine there was also recognition of the need to challenge the Chief Constable's monopolization of knowledge and information about how Manchester was policed.

Thus, the fundamental issues concerning community, representation and participation were, in theory, addressed by the first deliberations of the PMC. However, that is not to say that there were not problems with the proposed PMC initiative. First, the PMC had no statutory powers to call the Chief Constable to account for the manner in which Manchester was policed. Therefore, although it was attempting to empower the community it was effectively powerless. Second, this initiative was still located within heavily bureaucratic and hierarchical Labour Party and Council structures and, as indicated in the discussion of the Working Party, this meant that very few members of the community participated. Third, the Labour Party was assuming the role of being the representative of those under/non represented groups and interests. Not surprisingly, given their previous experience of Labour councils, those groups and interests were deeply suspicious of the motives of the Party. They were also aware that such a representative role was always vulnerable to internal Labour politics and electoral factors, particularly since a considerable section of the Party was totally opposed to the whole idea. Fourth, there were different ideas within the PMC, and Party, as to the role that the PMGs would play when they were set up. As indicated, it was hoped that the PMGs, like the other initiatives, would harness support for the Party and the Council. It is within this context that the hope was expressed that the PMC was working towards the idea of a multiplicity of community based PMGs, premised on the geographical notion of the Labour Party ward structure.
Finally, there was the assumption that the different under/non-represented groups and interests in the community conceptualized their problems in the same manner as the PMC and therefore viewed PMGs as a solution to their problems. The next sections examine how the PMC attempted to implement alternative structures of community representation and participation.
Section III: Model II
Community representation and participation through community monitoring

From the outset, as indicated, it was agreed that a full time research and development unit was needed if the campaign for police accountability was to have any chance of succeeding. As far back as the disturbances of 1981 those concerned about the policing of Manchester had emphasized to the Labour group on the Police Authority that if the Chief Constable was to be made accountable such a unit had to be set up. It was argued that only through having a unit researching and analysing the policing of Manchester would councillors be able to to challenge the Chief Constable's control of information and begin to set the agenda. The Labour group of the Police Authority rejected the proposal, relying instead on the CLO. The experience of both the Police Authority and the Community Liaison Officer confirmed the belief that a full-time unit was fundamental to the success or otherwise of the monitoring initiative.

The PMU was fully operational by 15 April 1985 with a formal six month work programme committing the unit to a two fold monitoring role. First, it was supposed to represent the community on policing matters through its research and monitoring and second, facilitate community participation in policing matters through setting up PMGs (see PMC Report No 4:1985)

a. The Police Monitoring Unit (PMU): Representing the Community
The PMU was a professional full-time police monitoring unit and a considerable amount of its time was devoted to monitoring the policies and practices of the GMP and national policing trends. This monitoring was devided into very specific tasks. First, it was supposed to monitor the
nature of the policing of Manchester. This involved work in the areas of complaints, policing strategies and crime statistics. Second, it was supposed to monitor contact between the Council and GMP to counter attempts to implement multi-agency policing strategies in Manchester.

The Council as a major service provider has to gather a considerable amount of information about individuals and organisations and, to minimise the possibilities of abuse in a multi-agency context, authorised the preparation of guidelines for the exchange of information between Council staff and the police. The aim of this exercise was to ensure that Council staff operate in the best interests of those Manchester residents with whom they have regular contact and do not unwittingly pass on information which might be used in unacceptable ways (PMU, Final Report, 1988; see also PMC Reports Nos 12; 38; 65; 81; 104; 128).

Third, the PMU was supposed to campaign on civil liberties and public order issues. This involved the unit in the preparation of educational materials on the civil liberties implications of legislative changes (see PMC Reports no, 24; 26; 34; 35; 40; 47; 77; 93; 110; 112 118; 135; 154; 170; 186; 187; 193). Thus, it was given the role of monitoring the consequences of the lack of police accountability to the community in Manchester.

The PMU was fully equipped to take on such a role. It had five full-time staff, administrative backup, and eventually a magazine which was delivered to every household in Manchester. As far as representing the community on policing matters it did not have to ask itself questions about its representative status because that had been conferred on it by the Council and by the fact that, unlike the CLO and CLPs, it had been presented to the community as part of the election manifesto and agreed to by the community at the polls.

The contours of the community it was representing in this monitoring role can be identified through the issues it
became involved in and through the issues and concerns that were articulated in PoliceWatch. That community, as indicated previously (see pp 217–218), was made up of those who were vulnerable to the practices and policies of an unaccountable police force in Manchester. This vulnerable community was made up of those subject to racist attacks and lack of effective police response; those subject to police racism, brutality and intimidation; those suffering from the consequences of the apparent police incapacity to prevent and solve crime; those subject to the Conservative government's law and order policies and paramilitary developments in policing.

The PMU was never able to rationally commit itself to its work programme. It was beset by a series of incidents and events that demanded its constant intervention. As such it was constantly "reacting to the policing crisis in the city" (Wright, 1985). No sooner had the PMU become operational than the policing of the Home Secretary's visit to Manchester University's Students Union on 1st March 1985 demanded attention. Given the nature of the policing tactics and the type of police units used, eg, the infamous Tactical Aid Groups, and the allegations of police brutality demands came from a variety of sources for an inquiry to be set up. After the Police Authority had their request for a public inquiry turned down the PMC set up its own independent inquiry on 22 May 1985. This inquiry began its highly publicized deliberations on 8 June 1985 and the report was published on 31 October 1985 (see Platts-Mills et al., 1985). During this period the PMU was stretched by having to respond to ensuing developments which arose out of the incident and inquiry. It had to provide considerable and prolonged support for two of the students, central to the inquiry, who were allegedly subsequently subject to serious police intimidation and harassment. This role continued
throughout the following year (see Platt-Mills, 1985; Walker, 1986).

b. The Police Monitoring Unit: The Facilitation of Community Representation and Participation

The PMU was also given the role of facilitating the participation of the community in policing matters by setting up police monitoring groups. At the basis of their work was a systematic critique of community liaison and police monitoring which drew upon Left criminologists critique of multi-agency community policing strategies (see Bunyan, 1981; Bridges, 1981; Gordon, 1983). The Head of the Unit identified a series of key differences between the two structures. (Wright, 1985). As far as the PMU was concerned the CLPs were first, part of an attempt to create a much larger overarching policing system which had a nationally set agenda whereas PMGs were to be part of a decentralised police service which would correspond to the needs of the community. Second, CLPs were part of a para-military information gathering exercise which was geared towards furthering political control whereas PMGs would, through their local knowledge and information, set the agenda for local policing needs. Third, CLPs were a component of multi-agency policing geared towards producing social control whereas PMGs would empower local people to challenge policing practices and hold officers accountable. Fourth, CLPs were geared towards calming down and educating community expectations whereas PMGs were attempting to empower communities to demand their rights and justice. Given the nature of the existing political and economic structures and the role of the police within such structures there was a hidden agenda operating behind attempts to introduce community policing into the ghettoes. That hidden agenda was producing a more sophisticated form of social control.
As far as the PMU was concerned community policing would only be possible when decentralised policing arrangements were introduced where the community could decide what type of policing it wanted. There could be no community policing until the police were made accountable to the community. The fundamental difference between the CLPs and the police monitoring initiative was that one represented the needs of the authoritarian state and the other represented the needs of the community. The problem for the monitoring initiative was acting upon its ideal critique to both counter the CLPs and implement a monitoring structure.

A series of pragmatic problems, alluded to previously (see pp 224-225), meant that the above mentioned ideas would be difficult to realise. First, there was the assumption that PMGs would quickly emerge if given the opportunity and encouragement by the Council and the PMC. Second, as it was a Labour Party initiative, PMGs were going to be linked into the Labour Party and Council structure. Third, there was the pressure to produce not just issue based monitoring groups but community based ones. And finally, since the CLP structure had been rejected this model could not be used by the PMU. However, the potential presence of CLPs in Manchester had to be countered by the development of alternative structures that could deal with the problem of crime and the problem of the police. The key issue was how to ensure that any structures that did develop facilitated the participation and representation of the community they were purportedly representing. Two development workers had the specific duty of setting up and servicing PMGs. There were already two issue based monitoring groups, YAWPMG and the Gay PMG, already in existence before the PMU had become operational so there was little problem in making contact with these groups. However, facilitating the setting up of the new community
based ones was always going to be problematical.

There were several petitions addressed to the PMC concerning policing matters and the latter viewed them as the possible basis for spawning PMGs. In the report outlining the proposed six month work programme for the unit it was argued that the unit would achieve the objective of setting up independent police PMGs by linking in to the concerns shown by people like the residents of Longsight and Benchill 'who are actively demanding better policing practices in their area' (29.3.95). It was argued that if PMGs emerged from these meetings they would form the prototypes for other areas. However the Unit had to also respond to a more immediate community petition in April 1985. The resultant meetings provide an insight into the problems facing the police monitoring strategy in Manchester

1. Thornton Road

An incident took place in April 1985 that the monitoring initiative responded to, in the hope that a monitoring group would emerge, but also to attempt to block the Police Authority setting up a liaison panel. On 17 April Liverpool F.C. played Manchester Utd F.C. at the 'neutral' ground of Manchester City F.C. in the semi-final of the FA Cup. Afterwards the police lost control of the crowd and a running battles resulted in which residents of one of the near by streets, Thornton Rd, suffered considerable damage to their cars and houses. There was little doubt that the Thornton Road incident allowed for a real critique of policing in Manchester because the police had operationally mishandled the situation. Thus, it could possibly have provided a basis for the discussion of public order policing in Manchester. The Police Authority organised a public meeting to discuss the issues arising from the incident and there was a panel of three
representatives from the police, the deputy chair of the Police Monitoring Committee, the chair of the Police Authority, a senior representative of Manchester City F.C. and the local Labour councillor. At this meeting there were approximately 150/200 people present. However, the meeting did not focus on the issue of policing. Instead many of those present used the opportunity to complain about the general problems of living so close to a large football ground and the fact that Manchester City refused to take responsibility for the unruly behaviour of its supporters. They were also concerned about who was going to compensate them for the damage they had suffered (see PMC Report no 9)

This was a very heated meeting where the majority of the criticism was addressed to Manchester City F.C. The police representatives calmly deflected attention from themselves with one officer summing up the police position by saying that the police could not be held responsible for society's ills. When one member of the audience made the comment that if there were enough officers for a police band then why was not there enough to put officers on Thornton Rd, he was jeered by the audience. After this people began to leave because of the 'mob' like atmosphere that was developing. The PMC representative argued that residents should be worried by the lack of policing policy and should push to make the police accountable and answerable for their actions in the future. The Chair of the Police Authority argued for the setting up of consultative arrangements to deal with such problems. However, those present at the meeting were not interested in taking the police to task. Any attempt by the PMC representative or the chair of the Police Authority to get the meeting to focus on the policing issues raised by the incident were finally laid to rest when the Manchester City F.C. representative said that what happened outside
the ground was of no concern to him. The meeting exploded. In this situation the police representatives were not challenged to account for how and why they had lost control of the policing situation.

Hence, this meeting did not provide the basis for the setting up of either a community monitoring group or a police-community liaison panel. On the contrary the meeting conferred legitimacy on the police to use harder measures in future when dealing with football supporters. This they duly did and the following Saturday home fans, for the first time, found themselves faced with riot clad officers, police dogs, riot vans and intensive police cordoning and searches outside of the. Ironically no-one from the PMU or the Police Authority was present to witness this.

The PMU was not unduly concerned that a PMG did not emerge. It is certainly questionable whether such a structure would have been a progressive structure. It would have been composed of the middle aged, white and pro-police, and would have been monitoring Manchester City F.C. not policing. This meeting, given the multi-racial nature of Moss Side did not have any representation or participation from black residents who had suffered racial abuse from visiting supporters to the ground and little police protection. It also posed the question about the usefulness of public meetings as a forum for rational discussion. During it only one majority viewpoint was allowed to be articulated by the people present. Alternative views were literally howled down to such a degree that people walked out after being subject to a torrent of abuse because they disagreed with the majority viewpoint. In unstructured public meetings the nature of the discussion may not necessarily focus upon the reason why the meeting was called.
There were two other meetings that the PMC hoped would produce community based PMGs and in doing so prevent the Police Authority from establishing CLPs.

ii. Longsight
The Police Authority took the initiative in convening a public meeting in Longsight on 11 April 1985 in response to demands by residents to do something about burglaries in that area. Representatives of GMP, the Police Authority, the PMC were present along with Gerald Kaufmann, the then Shadow Home Secretary and MP for the area. The Chair of the Police Authority was hopeful that the meeting would generate the first CLP in Manchester, whilst the PMC hoped that a monitoring group would emerge. As it turned out there seemed to be more researchers, politicians and media present than members of the community! Nevertheless, those members that did bother turn up complained about the general hooliganism and burglary they had to put up with and were angry about the response of the police. One resident said that when he reported that his flat had been burgled the police officers laughed in his face. The GMP representatives said that they were doing everything that they could but stated that they could never respond to all calls and had to make a 'value decision as to when to respond with such resources that are available'. Another resident said that when he reported a break-in he was sworn at by the police officer and had the telephone put down on him. One of the GMP representatives replied that he could not understand why people did not use the official complaint system when such incidents happened.

When the discussion turned to how few people had turned up in comparison to the number of people who had signed the petition, residents pointed out that the meeting had been
advertised for the people of Longsight but that it was difficult for people 'to relate to a global area called Longsight'. It was argued that it needed to be broken down into more localised meetings and it was pointed out that the petition was not actually from the people of Longsight but from one particular estate where, in the past, up to 70 people had attended meetings.

The Chair of the Police Authority, in responding, explained the philosophy underpinning community liaison. She defended the decision to have a meeting based on Longsight as opposed to specific neighbourhoods arguing that 'there are occasions when a wider area is needed to balance the communities'.

She went on to argue specifically for the setting up of CLPs claiming that such a structure would allow people to have local meetings where they could discuss the issues they saw to be important and then they could attend the wider geographically based panels to discuss their concerns. The representatives from the PMC attempted to demonstrate the limitations of such an approach by asking questions about the operations of Special Branch in Manchester and the implications of the coal dispute on the policing of Longsight. The GMP representatives refused to answer such questions because they were operational concerns. The PMC took hope from the fact that no CLP had been forthcoming and from the fact that the police, in refusing to answer their questions, had shown that they were not prepared to enter into meaningful discussions. As far as they were concerned the Longsight episode had a profound impact on determining Council Policy on contact between the police and the community and the futility of the Liaison Panel approach (PMC Report no 6).

Although it is certainly true that the Police Authority
had failed in its efforts to promote a CLP there was little evidence to suggest that the meeting would have supported a community PMG. What residents present wanted was a positive response from the police. However, there was no indication from the police that this would be forthcoming either.

iii. Benchill

The other petition awaiting the unit proved to be even more of a dilemma for the PMU and the PMC. In January 1985 a petition was signed by 135 residents of the Benchill area of Manchester stating that they had been terrorized by gangs of youths and demanding that the Council and GMP do something. The petition was presented to the City Council and handed to the PMC who decided to hold a public meeting on 18 July 1985 where the residents could meet with the Committee and the PMU and discuss the setting up of a PMG. This was the first meeting that the PMC had sponsored and there was no GMP or Police Authority presence. The intention of the PMC was to divide people into separate groups in order to facilitate a more detailed discussion of their particular concerns, eg, women and policing, youth and policing, old people and policing (see PMC Report no 20).

However, the reality was dramatically different and illustrated the difficulties facing the PMC in implementing their ideas concerning community participation. Very few young people turned up because they claimed that they thought that it was a police sponsored and controlled meeting and the old people did not attend because of the lack of adequate transport. Therefore, the idea of breaking the meeting up into specific workshops was never implemented and what resulted was a free for all discussion which addressed few areas concerned with policing and certainly not the issue of
police accountability. There were people who complained about the Council giving money to gays and some argued that the meeting was a Labour Party set up because there were so many Labour representatives present whilst others complained about the lack of GMP presence at the meeting. There was also a general air of cynicism about what exactly the PMC could do in relation to crime problems. As a consequence, the meeting did not provide the forum for the setting up of a PMG.

Discussion
Although the PMU encouraged people to think about setting up PMGs the above mentioned meetings indicated that people in the communities involved did not necessarily think on those terms. What had emerged from the meetings during the first half of 1985 was that there was no desire amongst those present to monitor the police in the way envisaged by the PMC. Instead they were demanding an adequate police response and that the council do something about crime and delinquency. It should also be noted that the first meetings had involved traditional Labour voting white neighbourhoods. No similar petitions were forthcoming from black neighbourhoods during this period, despite continuing concern about the policing of their neighbourhoods. The PMC/U found real difficulties in responding to the Jackie Berkeley incident and no public statement or campaign was forthcoming. Thus, the outcome of these first forays into the community and the first attempts to set up PMGs resulted in a considerable rethink of the overall strategy.

Summary of Part II
Part II of this thesis has attempted to document and analyze the struggle for police accountability that took place in Manchester between 1981-85. This struggle resulted in the setting up of two models that had as their stated intention bringing about community representation
and participation in decisions about policing.

a. The Police Authority and Community Liaison

The Police Authority's model had two components. First, the Police Authority attempted to call the Chief Constable to account through utilizing the vague powers of the 1964 Police Act and through setting up a sub-committee structure that paralleled the force structure. As a consequence it was hoped that not only would the Authority have a greater input into policing matters but would also begin to set the agenda for how Greater Manchester should be policed. However, given the position of the Home Office and the overall context of the authoritarian state, the Chief Constable defeated all attempts to make him accountable. As well as utilizing his conspiracy theory to neutralize ideologically the efforts of the Authority he also 'policed' the vague provisions of the 1964 Police Act to make sure any loopholes that might favour the Authority were quickly dealt with. Anderton also pushed the notions of operational independence and professional autonomy to the limit to deny the Police Authority access to the information needed to have a say in the policing of Greater Manchester.

The outcome of the struggles within the Police Authority provide a case study of the major problems in the tripartite structure of police governance documented by McCabe and Wallington (1988). They argue that the struggles between Police Authorities and their Chief Constables of 1981-85 illustrated the limitations of the powers of the Police Authorities. First the operational autonomy of the Chief Constables was expanded so much that they did not have to account to the Police Authorities, in any manner, for policy formulation and implementation. Any discussion that took place between Chief Constables and Police Authorities was at the discretion of the Chief
Constables. Second, the coal dispute showed that although Police Authorities had clearly defined financial responsibilities they could not demand financial accountability. Third, Police Authorities were excluded from involvement in the development, by ACPO and the Home Office, of new policies in riot training and the development of the completely unaccountable National Reporting Centre. Finally, the powers given to the Home Secretary under the 1964 Act were used to overrule the wishes of the Police Authorities and to provide definitive interpretations of the clauses of the 1964 Act.

It was within this context that the Police Authority introduced the second part of its model to make the police accountable. The CLPs were supposed to provide the foundation for the efforts of the Authority to hold the Chief Constable to account. Through the operation of the CLPs the Authority would be, theoretically, able to build up an independent picture of how policing was carried out in Greater Manchester and determine what type of policing the community wanted. However, its attempts were seriously hampered by the Home Office guidelines which limited the purpose of consultation to crime control and enshrined the autonomy of the police (see Cox, 1986). In terms of the issues of community representation and participation there were also serious problems with the Police Authority's model.

An analysis of this model illustrates the difficulties of using a model which prioritizes community representation. A series of problems have been identified. First, the Police Authority appointed Hytner's community representative despite the opposition of significant sections of the community this representative was supposedly representing. Given that the Hytner Inquiry had specifically cautioned against appointing someone who did
not enjoy the full confidence of those sections of the community in conflict with the police, this was a serious defect. Second, the multi-agency and reformist philosophy underpinning the work of the CLO, and enshrined in the Home Office guidelines, confirmed his unrepresentative status. Third, whilst the CLO was trying to assuage community concerns, the controversial policing of Moss Side, and the statements of the Chief Constable, did not change. This demonstrated that the CLO was completely powerless in relation to effecting change in the policing of Moss Side and that the incapability of black interests being represented through the CLPs.

The failure of the Police Authority to resolve the issues of community representation had serious ramifications for the attempts of the CLO to set up a liaison panel in Moss Side. The whole idea of community liaison was rejected completely, not least because the terms of reference did not address the issue of the racially discriminatory policing of Moss Side. The belief of the CLO and the Police Authority that the setting up of CLPs in the rest of Greater Manchester would persuade people in Moss Side to participate also failed.

By utilizing the theoretical concepts that are central to this thesis, community, representation and participation it is possible to identify just how problematical the representative structures were. Community referred to first, the geographical entity of the police subdivision and second, to the whole community. The problem with this conception was that although it was not the whole community who had problems with the police their interests were prioritized on the agendas of the CLPs.

The CLP structure emphasized the representation of the community through representatives of all formal community
organizations and representatives. There was no recognition that there were power inequalities between the different groups that were supposed to have equal representation. A series of problems have been identified with this approach. First, there was no recognition of the problematical nature of the representativeness of many of these community groups and individuals. Second, there was no recognition that certain sections of the community did not have formal community representatives. Third, rights of representation were given to community groups and representatives who had no necessary relevance to the discussions of the CLPs. Finally, GMP, the Police Authority and the local council were given a privileged status in that they enjoyed statutory rights of automatic representation, despite what the other community representatives might think.

A representative structure was created that tightly controlled and limited participation. First, the participation of the community was limited to their being able to contribute at the end of the highly formal CLP meetings. The participation of community representatives was mobilized by the powerful as opposed to being a spontaneous or voluntary decision. Furthermore, through the Home Office guidelines their participation was being mobilized for the purpose of helping the police to control crime. Second, the participation of the community representatives was limited by the structured terms of reference. Third, the CLP meetings were, in Pateman's (1970) terms, situations of partial participation with power residing firmly with the police representatives who had their operational autonomy enshrined in the terms of reference and who kept control of the information and knowledge that would have been a pre-condition for an open discussion about policing, or indeed about crime. Hence, the initial community liaison model facilitated the
representation and participation of white, middle aged, respectable males who accepted such limitations. As a consequence the manner in which issues of community, representation and participation had been dealt with, reproduced the existing power inequalities.

The CLO quickly recognized that important sections of the community, eg, ethnic minorities, women and young people were non/under-represented in the CLPs and did attempt to redress the situation to bring about their participation. However, to bring about their participation the CLO persisted with all-encompassing supplemental structures of representation, based on the notion of the whole community of ethnic minorities, the whole community of young people and the whole community of women. Practically the CLO recommended that additional supplemental liaison arrangements be tagged on to the CLPs. Even if such structures had been set up, the CLO would undoubtedly have had to encounter further problems of the non/under-representation.

What is notable within the initial efforts of the CLO is how one section of the community began to have their interests prioritized. The non/under-representation of women was given the most attention by the CLO and the Police Authority. However, the all-encompassing format of structured representation failed to give recognition to the fact that first, there are racial and class inequalities between women's groups and second, certain women's groups articulate dominant ideologies and interpretations of reality. As a consequence the interests of those powerless women's groups who challenged dominant ideologies concerning women and policing were defined out.

Thus, not only did the original structure of community representation reproduce the existing power inequalities
and social divisions but the supplemental structures, set up to counter-balance those inequalities and provide justice to all interests, reproduced further divisions between respectable youth and disreputable youth and respectable women and disreputable women. As a consequence the interests of those in conflict with the police were being defined out by the representative structures.

Manchester City Council and Community Monitoring

The deliberations about the setting up of alternatives to CLPs in Manchester utilized very different notions of community, representation and participation to those articulated by the Police Authority and the CLO. The PMC did not utilize the notion of the whole community as there was the recognition that there were certain groups within the community whose interests needed to be prioritized in terms of the policing they were subject to. During the initial discussions the key issues of representation were also addressed. The stress was on the setting up of structures that would facilitate the participation of the under/non-represented sections of the community. It was emphasized that there should be voluntary, spontaneous and active participation with the community groups setting their own agendas. There was also recognition of the issue of the power imbalance of different groups and interests. In theory, the PMC was to take on the role of empowering the powerless sections of the community and neutralizing the power imbalances. This was to be achieved by nullifying the political opposition, blocking all attempts to set up CLPs in Manchester and holding the Chief Constable to account for discriminatory policing practices. Furthermore, through the commitment to set up a research and development unit (PMU) and publish a magazine there was also recognition of the need to challenge the Chief Constable's monopolization of knowledge and information about how Manchester was policed.
Thus, the fundamental issues concerning community, representation and participation were, in theory, addressed by the first deliberations of the PMC. However, that is not to say that there were not problems with the proposed PMC initiative. First, the PMC had no statutory powers to call the Chief Constable to account for the manner in which Manchester was policed. Therefore, although it was attempting to empower the community it was effectively powerless. Second, this initiative was still a 'top-down' initiative, located within heavily bureaucratic and hierarchical Labour Party and Council structures. Third, the Labour Party assumed the role of being the representative of those under/non represented groups and interests. Fourth, there were different ideas within the PMC, and Party, as to the role that the PMGs would play when they were set up. As indicated, it was hoped that the PMGs, like the other initiatives, would harness support for the Party and the Council. It is within this context that the hope was expressed that the PMC was working towards the idea of a multiplicity of community based PMGs, premised on the geographical notion of the Labour Party ward structure. The danger with such a plan was that the model of police monitoring referred to previously (see p 97) was being used for a purpose it was not meant for. Finally, there was the assumption that the different under/non-represented groups and interests in the community conceptualized their problems in the same manner as the PMC and therefore viewed PMGs as a solution to their problems.

Such problems manifested themselves in the first attempts by the PMU to set up PMGs in Manchester. Traditional Labour voting white communities began to demand that their interests be represented by the PMC/U. Therefore, under political pressure the PMU was expected to encourage, in
addition to issue based ones, community based PMGs. The PMU found communities who were angry about being neglected by the Council and who wanted something to be done about crime. This meant that they did not necessarily want PMGs, or indeed CLPs. Once more, the difficulties of allowing the whole community representation were illustrated. In addition the PMC was also hindered by the fact that it had no statutory power to effect the policing that these communities received - it was GMP who had that vital power.

Part IV of this thesis will examine how the Police Authority and the PMC models attempted to resolve these difficulties of community representation and participation. However, before this it is necessary to examine the macro developments that were important in determining what sections of the community would achieve representation and participation in Manchester.
a. From Police Authorities to Joint Boards: Changes in the Form of Political Representation

In July 1985, despite ardent opposition, the local government bill became law, abolishing the Labour controlled metropolitan county councils as from 1 April 1986. It was the first time that a layer of government, controlled solely by an opposition political party, had been abolished by a central government. As indicated previously, the reason for abolition was purely political and there had been no Royal Commission, no public inquiry nor financial assessment of the consequences (see Flynn and Leach, 1984; Harris, 1986). The main duties and powers of 'the mets', including the powers of the Police Authorities, were to be transferred to a system of statutory joint boards.

As a result the new Police Authorities were established to discharge the duties of the 1964 Police Act ensuring the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for the districts previously encompassed by the old Authorities. However, strict central government guidelines were laid down concerning the composition and powers of the new boards. The act changed the form of political representation that had previously existed on the Police Authorities. The joint boards were to consist of councillors nominated directly by the constituent councils reflecting, as far as possible, the party balance of power on the respective councils. However, the magistrates continued to be represented, as before, on the boards. The boards were to raise their finance through a precept on the constituent councils whilst also being subject to the financial control laid down in the 1984 Rates Act for
three years. The Home Secretary was given potential control over the day-to-day running of the joint boards through being given a say in decisions concerning staffing and the allocation of resources. In addition, the Home Secretary was allotted the power to restructure joint boards through first, allowing district councils to become separate Police Authorities and second, amalgamating different police areas. Thus, this act gave central government unprecedented formal control over the previously troublesome Police Authorities (see Loveday, 1987a; 1987b; 1988).

In addition, there were a series of other macro developments, in relation to the politics of crime and policing, that were to have a significant impact upon the campaign for police accountability in Manchester. First, there was the emergence within the Conservative governments's law and order project of crime prevention. Second, there was the impact of left new realist criminology within the overall campaign by the Labour Party leadership to prove itself acceptable to the British electorate. This also had as a central concern the control of crime. The result was the re-emergence of a party political consensual discourse on crime and the community which covered crime prevention, fear of crime and victims of crime (see Reiner, 1989). This discourse had serious policy implications for those within the Labour Party demanding police accountability because central to it were ideas concerning community, representation and participation.

b. The Government and the Community: Active Citizenship
As in the first years of the 1980s the government continued to prioritize law and order. There was the substantial allocation of resources to the police; the
augmentation of the court system; a substantial prison-building programme and legislation covering all aspects of the criminal justice system (see Savage, 1989; Pilger 1990). This continuing emphasis on law and order meant that there was no public inquiry into the controversial policing of the coal dispute. In addition when Handsworth and Broadwater Farm erupted there was no repeat of the Scarman inquiry. As far as the government, the police and considerable sections of the British media was concerned it was the work of murderous criminals. The demand for an inquiry suffered a heavy defeat in the Commons and at the subsequent Conservative Party conference the Home Secretary announced the strengthening of public order legislation and the upgrading of the riot capabilities of the police (see Police Review, 18.10.85; 1.11.85). In addition, the Conservative government continued to give unqualified support, as it had during the coal dispute, to the controversial policing of industrial disputes and public order situations such as Wapping and the Peace Convoy (see Graef, 1989: 29-38; LSPU, 1987).

However, the government did have to face the consequences of its prioritization of the issue of crime. Although spending had increased in real terms by 31% it had little effect on the increasing crime rate. The spending had not prevented crime, deterred criminals, protected people, eradicated fears, helped victims or reformed offenders (see Savage, 1989). In this context the limitations of the role of the police in fighting crime were becoming apparent. Criticisms of the government's law and order policies were fuelled by the publication of the first national crime survey (see Hough and Mayhew, 1983) which, for the first time, attempted to provide an accurate picture of the extent of crime and the nature of crime in Britain. This survey demonstrated that although crime was
much more prevalent than indicated by official statistics it was of a petty nature. The survey also emphasized that the fear of crime was out of proportion to the risk of being a victim of crime. The survey concluded that more police officers was not the answer to such fears.

For many sorts of crimes, people themselves, might take effective preventive action, either acting individually or together with others. The police could do more to promote preventive action of this kind while the trend towards putting more officers back on the beat may have the desirable effect of reducing fear of crime (Hough and Mayhew, 1983:34).

Such conclusions stimulated a debate and further studies about the extent of crime, the nature of crime, the fear of crime, the victims of crime and the effectiveness of the police in controlling crime (see Hope and Shaw et al., 1988; Maguire and Pointing et al., 1988; Walklate, 1989).

The response of the government was two fold. First, through the notion of active citizenship the role of the community in taking responsibility for the control of crime was stressed. Ironically, a government that had constantly asserted its opposition to collectivist concepts found it necessary to turn to the concept of community in the attempt to deal with crime. The community, which was made up of active citizens, was to be mobilized to participate actively in the fight against crime. As a consequence, there was the decoupling of the concepts of community and participation from demands for police accountability and their re-articulation in relation to crime prevention, in partnership with the police. The proper role of the community in policing matters was actively participating in consultative arrangements, neighbourhood watch schemes, victim support schemes and the Special Constabulary to help in the fight against crime (see Wilmott et al., 1987; Hope and Shaw et
al., 1988; Maguire and Pointing et al., 1988; Mawby et al., 1988; Heidensohn, 1989; Leon, 1989; Walklate, 1989). Indeed, the very basis of the community was active citizens uniting to fight crime and those not participating were by definition not of the community.

Second, to compliment the efforts of the community, a professional multi-agency based approach to crime prevention was promoted. By the middle of the 1980s a powerful multi-agency approach had emerged not only to harness all the criminal justice and related agencies but also voluntary efforts, central government departments and the media. In April 1986 a ministerial group on crime prevention was set up to co-ordinate the crime prevention strategies of twelve different government departments (see Police Review, 18.4.86). The Education (No 2) Act 1986, in response to the 'loony left' policies of local authorities such as the Inner London Education Authority, proposed placing a obligation upon school governors to liaison with Chief Constables over the role of the police in schools (see Police Review 6.6.86). All the proposals were emphasizing the role that statutory authorities should play, in co-operating with the police in the fight against crime. Thus, a total community policing strategy was being proposed by the government in relation to crime control. Morgan (1989:7-8) has also pointed out that this strategy was useful within the government's overall campaign to curb public expenditure. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary, community crime control was considerably cheaper than allocating unlimited resources to the police.

c. The Police and the Community! Towards a Common Purpose

The potentially damaging critique of policing that could have developed out of the concern about constantly increasing crime rates and the manifest failure of the
police to control crime never happened. Kenneth Newman, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Force, the force which was most vulnerable to such a critique, incorporated the criticisms and public debate to neutralize demands for the democratic accountability of his force. The result was the unveiling, from 1983, of a realist corporatist (multi-agency) community policing strategy aimed at re-establishing the authority and legitimacy of the force. Hence, Newman’s strategy and philosophy neatly dovetailed with the government’s approach to the problem of crime and provided additional direction for the largest of the provincial forces.

Central to this strategy was mobilizing active community consent in the fight against crime and educating the community about the realistic role of the police in that fight. Newman supported the consultative arrangements as forums where the consent of community representatives could be mobilized and where the education of the community could take place. Neighbourhood Watch, crime prevention schemes, victim support schemes and the Special Constabulary were designated as the means through which the community could participate with the police in the fight against crime. Community beat officers were given a key role in forging this new relationship between the force and the community. At the basis of Newman’s ideas was the ‘notional contract’

The contract is...an extension of the concept of ‘policing by consent’ but takes the argument forward from a passive endorsement of policing to an active involvement in a participative venture (Newman, 1983:9).

Newman also pressed for corporatist policing strategies to be implemented, under the aegis of the police, to deal with the problems of difficult inner city areas. To compliment such changes Newman embarked upon the attempted
internal reorganization of the force. In order to put more bobbies back on the beat civilianization of those tasks not requiring the skills and powers of police officers took place. There was the prioritization of particular crimes that were of community concern, through policing by objectives programmes. To compliment the role of the community in taking responsibility for looking after itself the public order capabilities of the force were enhanced through the acquisition of new equipment, the upgrading of training and the re-organization of mobilization procedures to deal with the front lines (symbolic locations) of London's black neighbourhoods. Such a strategy underwent further revision and refinement after the policing disaster in Broadwater Farm in 1985 (see LSPU, 1987)

Thus, there was a redefinition of the role of the police in the fight against crime involving the creation of new channels of information and communication with the community and other statutory agencies. As far as Newman was concerned if the new strategy was successful effectiveness of the force would be improved in three key areas. First, in dealing with the problem of crime through giving the community and other social agencies the primary responsibility for looking after itself. Second, by building the consent of the community through closer police community contact through the consultative committees and neighbourhood watch. And third, in the maintenance of public tranquillity through the creation of a more efficient riot control force, which would have the consent of the community. Central to the latter would be the criminalization of any instance of civil disturbance and targeting this form of crime would be a priority of the Metropolitan Police. Through this strategy, as far as Newman was concerned, the historic social contract between
the police and the community would be re-established. Such a social contract also defined who were of the community and who were not (see, Kettle and Shirley, 1983; Wright, 1985; Policing London, vols 3 & 4, 1986; Gordon, 1987).

c. The Labour Party and the Community: Partners Against Crime

Left local authorities did not just come under pressure from the Conservative government and the police, on the issue of crime prevention. The Labour Party began to take the issue of crime seriously because of first, its electoral vulnerability on the issue of being labelled anti-police and soft on crime and second, the possibility of scoring electoral points as the crime rates officially soared under a law and order government.

It is rarely acknowledged that the ‘loony left’ campaign had a considerable impact upon the Labour Party’s law and order stance. The result was a right wing backlash within the Party resulting in the rapid emergence of what became known as new realism in the attempt to regain lost electoral support, including that of its own traditional supporters. That new realism took on board the issue of the ‘loony left’, extremism and infiltration. The national leadership condemned the irresponsible actions of radical Labour councils. Militant Tendency and the black sections received particular attention, being publicly condemned by Neil Kinnock during the 1985 Party conference. There was a considerable distancing of the national party from controversial issues that its political opponents and the right wing press could use against it, most notably during the coal dispute of 1984-5 (see Howell, 1975) and minority issues which were redefined as fringe issues (see Thatchell, 1983; Wainwright, 1987; Negrine 1989).
Throughout 1986 the electoral implications of the 'loony left', particularly in London, dominated debate within the party. The result was a further distancing of the Party leadership from any actions, policies or issues that could be defined as examples of lunacy/extremism. However, this did not stop the Party from losing the traditionally safe parliamentary seat of Greenwich in an 1987 by-election. Furthermore in the 1987 local elections Labour suffered notable set backs losing control of ten councils. This confirmed to the Right of the party and certain of its trade union backers that fear of extremism and the apparent prioritization of minority interests was continuing to alienate the electorate, including a significant section of its traditional voters (see The Times 9.5.87).

In order to maximize from such an anti-Left atmosphere the Conservative Party and the media continued to expose the antics of the 'loony left' of the party during the election campaign of 1987 (see Harrop, 1988:163-191). In an attempt to counter such a campaign the Labour Party virtually jettisoned the interests of the dispossessed and excluded the leadership cast its vote unflinchingly for the 'traditional' image, in search of the 'traditional Labour voter'. Again, everybody, understood that this, too, was a code. It is a code for 'back to the respectable, moderate, trade unionist, male dominated working class...It signalled the distance of Labour from all those 'fringe issues' and a commitment to rooting Labour political loyalties exclusively through an identification with the traditional culture of the left (Hall, 1988:263).

During this period the Conservatives, the pro-Conservative media and the Police Federation pressed Labour on their new found realism, particularly in relation to law and order. After the 1985 disturbances considerable pressure was exerted upon the Party leadership to expel Bernie
Grant, Leader of Haringey Council, for his statements after Broadwater Farm erupted (see Police Review, 18.10.85). At the Conservative Party conference the Prime Minister’s key note speech denounced the Labour Party’s anti-police stance. In November 1985 the Police Federation renewed its demands for the Labour Party to deal with those members of the party who were anti-police (see Police Review, 29.11.85). In January 1986 the Home Secretary made another attack on those Police Authorities who were in conflict with their Chief Constables stating that

They help to create an atmosphere in which crime can thrive and responsible citizenship is condemned (Police Review, 31.1.86).

This was followed up in March 1986 by a statement accusing Labour politicians of spreading malicious anti-police propaganda (see MEN, 1.3.86).

It is in this period and this context that the leadership of the Party began to highlight publicly its support for the police, its concern about crime, and its apprehension about those members of the Party demanding police accountability. Statements by the Labour leadership promised that future Labour governments would give full support to the police and would promote policies to bring about community support for the police in the fight against crime (see Police Review, 29.11.85; 25.4.86). In May 1986 Neil Kinnock denounced those in his party involved in ‘police bashing’ (see The Guardian, 16.5.86). In June 1986 the Shadow Home Secretary stated that a crime wave was engulfing Britain as a result of the government’s policies. In the same month Sir Kenneth Newman was able to state that the policies of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party on law and order were virtually indistinguishable (see, Sim et al 1987:54-56).
Just how sensitive the Labour Party leadership was to the charge of being anti-police can be gauged by its response to the leaking to *The Times* of its 1987 local election manifesto proposal to place the police under local democratic supervision and the comment by the Home Secretary that the proposal was 'lunacy'. Instead of attempting to defend their manifesto Labour Headquarters rewrote, in a more neutral form, the policing proposal (see *The Times* 4.2.87). However, this did not stop the Home Secretary asking the leadership to denounce publicly the Labour councils, such as Manchester, who were attempting to 'undermine and discourage the police' and to reject proposals to give Police Authorities more powers.

I can imagine no step more dangerous for policing in Britain than to entrust the main decisions on the policing of our cities to the enemies of the police (*The Guardian*, 21.3.87)

The government also pointed to the refusal of 'loony left' councils to participate in the community consultative arrangements as proof that the demands for police accountability were politically motivated (see *The Independent*, 27.5.87). In the electoral battle both parties contributed to the construction of a discourse on community representation and participation in relation to the control of crime. Bolstered by the crime surveys and ideological shift of the new realist criminologists (see Lea and Young, 1984; Kinsey, 1985; Jones, McLean and Young, 1986; Kinsey, Lea and Young, 1986) in the run up to the 1987 election, the party leadership fleetingly confronted the Conservatives on the issue of law and order. Crime prevention was one of the key themes of the 1987 manifesto (see *Protecting Our People*). The manifesto stressed the importance of local authorities and the community, in harmonious partnership with the police,
being part of a coordinated multi-faceted approach to fight crime. In its critique of the failure of the Conservative government to defeat crime the document harked back to the golden days, before Thatcherism, when the community and the police were at one. It was emphasized that unity against crime and criminals would be the basis for re-building communities that had been ravished by Thatcherism. Within this critique and proposals the position of the police was enhanced both in relation to the community and other government and voluntary agencies.

As a consequence, the issue of police accountability was down played to a commitment to first, give more (unspecified) powers to Police Authorities, second, abolish magistrate representation and third, create Community Police Councils whose functions were to be practically indistinguishable from the existing consultation committees (see Reiner, 1989: 5). The only discernible difference between the two parties concerned the respective claims to be the party of law and order. As a consequence, as Reiner (1989: 5) has noted, during the 1987 election on the issue of police accountability 'inter-party conflict was muted by a 'new realism' which seemed to infect all parties'. It could be argued that if the conflict was muted it was an indication of how far the Labour Party had reconstructed its policies to accept the dominant ideologies concerning law and order in Britain.

In effect, the Labour Party is no longer addressed primarily to challenging police power per se but rather to reordering police priorities away from public order and towards crime prevention and control. The difficulty with this approach, on a political level, is that it moves some way towards accepting the Tory agenda of 'law and order' and places Labour spokesmen in open competition with their opponents in bidding up public anxieties about crime, with all the racist
overtones that entails (Bridges, 1986:80).

Thus, there was the prioritization within Labour’s criminal justice proposals of the representation and participation of a particular type of community. That community consisted up of those people who were, living in fear of crime, concerned about preventing crime and victims of crime. Within this prioritization there was little space for the representation and participation of those for whom the police were a problem.

iv. The victims of crime

For the government, the police and the Labour Party, the aim of active individual community and participation in crime prevention and corporatist policing was to make it more difficult to become a victim of crime. Concern with the victim had become ‘a powerful motif’ within the criminal justice system (Rock, 1983:172). Within this new community crime agenda and the prioritization of victims one section of the community came to the fore. The concerns of feminist groups and feminist criminologists suddenly became part of a formal political agenda on victims. As a consequence the concerns of women in relation to crime became a key concern for all agencies and institutions. The impact of the prioritization of this concern had considerable implications for the police accountability debates and indeed for those independent radical women’s groups involved with the issue of violence of male violence against women.

Those concerned with police accountability had to face the fact that the basic problem for women was not the police response (or lack of it) to their needs. As feminist groups have always maintained the fundamental problem for women was/is men. In addition, it began to be recognized that all government departments were guilty of
implementing policies that were detrimental to the safety of women. Such criticisms provided a powerful impetus for corporatist approaches to crime prevention. For those independent radical womens groups the result of the issue of rape, for example, reaching the formal political agenda was a resultant professionalization and medicalization of the issue.

The police were able to reclaim a group of victims and in doing so were defining out radical groups analyses of the issues, premised upon the idea of women being the survivors of male terrorism not the victims of violence. Premised upon Home office circulars 25/1983 and 69/1986, there was the rapid development of specialist training for police officers, the recruitment of women doctors for forensic examinations, specialist police units, publicity on women's safety and the development of rape examination suites. Within these professional medicalized structures there was no necessary place for groups such as Rape Crisis, Taboo and Womens Aid (see, Scott and Dickens, 1989). In a situation very similar to the outcome of the anti-vice campaigns in the nineteenth century, the demands and critiques of radical women's groups were rearticulated in such a manner so as to define them out of the debate (see Walkowitz, 1982).

Summary of Part III
By the mid-1980s the confrontation between the authoritarian state and local institutions of government was finally resolved. As documented previously (see pp 92-94) legislative coercion was used to bring problematrical local authorities under control. The central state brought in measures to regulate revenue and capital expenditure, created QUANGOs to by-pass local political processes and finally decided to abolish the metropolitan county
councils. The increasing subordination of local government to the central state was finally taken to its logical conclusion. As part of the restructuring the Police Authorities were finally abolished with new forms of political representation and tighter central control imposed. As the Home Secretary made clear there would be no repeat of the conflict of the 1980s (see Hurd, 1987). The implications of these changes for those struggling for democratic accountability were profound.

In addition, the overall impact of the emergence of the discourse on community and crime was three fold for those campaigning for police accountability within the Labour Party. First, it made them vulnerable to the accusation of being anti-police by their political opponents outside of the Labour Party. The practical implications for local authorities who were at the forefront of campaigning for police accountability and fundamentally opposed to such corporatist community policing approaches to crime prevention were serious. Non-cooperation was ideologically and financially damaging, particularly in a climate when local authorities were under constant attack from central government.

Second, it made them vulnerable to those sections of the Labour Party, both locally and nationally, who alleged that an anti-police stance was an electoral liability. Third, they had to confront the issues of crime prevention, the fear of crime and the mobilization of the community to actively participate in a co-ordinated fight against crime. As a consequence, considerable pressure was brought to bear on local authorities to participate directly in multi-agency crime prevention projects. This pressure also meant that policies and proposals concerned with police accountability and prioritizing...
of those sections of the community for whom the police were a problem were being defined out. It is now necessary to examine the specific consequences of this discourse for the accountability debates in Manchester.
Section I: Model I

a. The Demise of the Police Authority

The implications of the changes for the Labour group in the run up to abolition of the Police Authority were profound. There were three main inter-connected areas of concern. First, how the group could maintain any semblance of its authority in the run up to abolition, since both the Chief Constable and the opposition could block any proposal they did not agree with by stalling. Second, because of the new form of political representation that was being proposed, there was the distinct possibility that the magistrates and the Chief Constable would be in control of the joint board. If this happened, given the considerable antagonism that existed, it was possible that the CLPs, in their present form, and the other initiatives that Labour group had set up would not survive the change over. Third, there was the issue of Manchester. As Manchester City Council had been allocated the largest representation within the new Police Authority its influence could be significant. This was particularly worrying because, through its PMC and PMU it had a coherent position on policing worked out. If this happened, given Manchester’s opposition to CLPs, it was possible that its representatives would not necessarily oppose any move to abolish them. Thus, for the Labour group of the Authority a priority became ensuring that the community liaison initiative survived the abolition. It is not surprising that in this context in the period between the passing of the Local Government Act and the abolition of the metropolitan county councils the struggle between the Labour group of the Police Authority and the Chief Constable intensified.
Accountability revisited! The prostitution of the British police

In June 1989 the Chief Constable went on the offensive against the Police Authority. Instead of being present at the monthly meeting Anderton addressed the ACPO conference. He argued that developments in the 1980s were threatening the basis of British policing. He attacked the Home Office for interfering with traditional police work through its support for the privatization of policing functions. He attacked the government for failing to provide adequate resources and, referring to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Crown Prosecution Service, for implementing changes that were hindering the police in the fight against crime. Finally, he moved on to attacking the politicization of policing that had occurred in the 1980s through the actions of certain Police Authorities. He stated that as a result the time had come to jettison ‘sentimental attachments to local accountability and management’.

You cannot police a community by Police Authorities. Unless I am very much mistaken the majority of the public would prefer policing at the discretion of their chief constable rather than policing with the consent of the Police Authorities.

He emphasized that the police must never become the willing instruments of unscrupulous politicians. There must be no prostitution of the British police.

The Chair of the Authority responded by stating that she deplored the suggestion that a crisis was being precipitated by the Police Authorities attempting to carry out their statutory duties and she said that the public would have to make up their mind whether they wanted democratic policing or policing on the dictate of one individual. She added that a threat to policing by consent and indeed a threat to democracy was posed by those who refused to accept the outcome of the democratic process.
As a consequence the Chief Constable was asked to explain his remarks and to acknowledge, in writing, the powers given to the Police Authority under the 1964 Act. The Chief Constable claimed that to sign such a document would be both 'inappropriate' and 'legally irregular' under the 1964 Act and that he had no intention of doing so. During the August meeting of the Authority the Chief Constable was asked whether he was prepared to expand upon his comments about the Police Authority but he refused saying that he had discussed the question in the context of an ACPO meeting. He was accused of being tyrannical in his dealings with the Authority and the Chair criticized the manner in which he had publicly denigrated his Police Authority.

I would say to the people of Greater Manchester that the trend of his speech is that the police should not be accountable to democratic structures. Come abolition the semblance of accountability which currently exists will be gone. We are moving down the road to the tyranny of the Chief Constable. There is a substantial minority of people, especially those who have contact with the police, who are not happy with them. I'm not going to demand anything from the Chief Constable—that's like spitting in the wind. We've seen what happens [reference to Merseyside] when the relationship between the police and local representatives breaks down—they are investigated by Special Branch for inciting public disorder.

A motion was passed stating that the Chief Constable's speech showed contempt for the structures of democracy, and the role of the Police Authority.

The Chief Constable said that he would seek legal advice on the accusations made in the resolution. On his report on the policing of the Home Secretary's visit to Manchester University the Chair said that she was not satisfied with such a brief report because she knew of at least one MP who had received more information than the Police Authority. As far as she was concerned the Chief Constable was making it clear that MPs had more rights than his own Police Authority did. This conflict was added
to by the Chief Constable’s decision, in the same month, to refuse the complaints subcommittee access to completed complaints files on the grounds that in the past Authority members had made critical comments about the way that investigating officers had carried out their duties.

ii. Phone tapping
Throughout 1985 there had been rumours circulating in Manchester about the monitoring of all phone calls to the GMP Headquarters. At the September meeting the Chief Constable admitted that between November 1984 and April 1985 he had ordered such monitoring as part of an investigation into the unlawful disclosure of classified information. However, in the public interest he refused to divulge any further information in answer to further questions. As a consequence the Labour group stated that it was going to request that the HMI of Constabulary investigate the affair (see Police Review, 13.9.85).

iii. Plastic bullets
During the same meeting the Chief Constable reported that he had acquired five hundred plastic bullets and four guns for the force. The Chair criticized the Chief Constable for not consulting the Police Authority before the purchase and for his unquestioning support for the use of such technology. In the ensuing row the Labour members demanded that the bullets be returned to their manufacturer whilst the Chief Constable claimed that the Police Authority was ‘trying to intrude into areas of police autonomy’. A deadlock was reached with the Authority demanding that he produce a report justifying need for such weapons as well as providing a demonstration for Authority members and the Chief Constable refusing on the grounds that such demands were infringing upon his operational independence.
iv. Accountability revisited

On 4 November 1985 the Chief Constable addressed a meeting of the Greater Manchester Police Federation saying that he had no intention of returning the plastic bullets. He went on to attack the Police Authority as a disruptive influence and that he would be grateful when the joint board took over.

Much of what has passed for police committee business has been a total sham and of limited value either to the police force or the public we try to serve (MEN, 5.11.85).

The Chief Constable also indicated that there was no possibility of his further co-operation with the Authority.

When, as in Greater Manchester, a police force resents as deeply as I know we do, the stances sometimes taken and public statements made in the name of its police committee, there can be no sensible or lasting basis for trust and confidence between the force and its committee (The Guardian, 6.11.85).

The Chair accused the Chief Constable of trying to deliberately sabotage the work of the Authority and of provoking a constitutional crisis through his decision to keep the plastic bullets. As far as she was concerned the bullets were the property of the Police Authority and the Chief Constable, in ignoring the decision of the Authority, was stating that he was above the law and not prepared to accept the legitimate decision of the Police Authority.

Both the Authority and the Chief Constable sought legal advice on whether the Police Authority had the right to return the plastic bullets. This advice went against the Chief Constable stating that the equipment was the property of the Authority and that it had the right to dispose of it as it thought fit. The Chair went to the Home Office on 18 November to try and resolve the situation. At the November meeting of the Authority the
Chief Constable informed the members that since the argument was about ownership of the bullets he had cancelled the order and instead had obtained the equipment on permanent loan from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police with the approval of the Constabulary (see Police Review, 13.12.85). The Chair responded that the whole tripartite structure of police accountability had been undermined by such a decision. It meant that the Home Secretary

was prepared to impose plastic bullets on a community when its elected representatives have made it clear they do not want them.

The Chief Constable was asked whether he accepted the right of the Police Authority to make the final decision about matters such as the purchase of plastic bullets. The latter refused to be drawn on the matter saying that where it could be shown that an Authority decision was 'firmly and lawfully based' he had a duty to comply. The Authority asked the Clerk to find out what further action could be taken in relation to the plastic bullets that the Chief Constable had acquired and also whether disciplinary action could be taken against the Chief Constable about the remarks he made at the Police Federation meeting. The matter of the plastic bullets was finally resolved when representatives of Greater Manchester and the three other Authorities refusing to sanction the acquisition of such weaponry were told by the Home Secretary at a meeting on 5 December 1985 that if they persisted with their opposition their Chief Constables would be able to acquire them from a central Home Office store.

On 20 March 1986 the Chair of the Police Authority reported on the last five years of the Police Authority's existence. Her statement was a damning indictment of the 1964 Police Act and the supposed tripartite system of governance (see also McCabe and Wallington, 1988; Simey,
1988). She identified a series of issues which illustrated the impossibility of trying to call the Chief Constable to account. First, there issue of levels of establishment

We cannot believe that a matter of this importance should simply be presented to the Police Authority as a fait accompli, and we fail to see how the public can have confidence in a process of reallocation of resources from which elected members are excluded. We wish to see an end to the system where a Chief Constable is able to reduce an area’s establishment without recourse to public consultation and debate (Cox, 1986).

Second, there was the issue of the setting of force objectives and priorities. This again was done without consultation or reference to the wishes of the Police Authority

‘Policing by consent’ needs to be transferred from a cliche into a positive concept of community involvement in the setting and assessment of priorities, the devising and monitoring of policies, and the judgement as to the acceptability of strategies. That is a creative and generative process which we acknowledge is not a simple one. It must start however with a willingness to work with the elected representatives of the people (ibid).

Third, there was the issue of the complaints procedure. She said that the setting up of a specific sub-committee to scrutinise the complaints structures and proceedings had ‘deepened rather than ameliorated’ the Authorities concern about the system. And she also made clear that the Chief Constable’s attempts to obstruct them in this scrutiny was not acceptable

We do not believe public confidence will be enhanced by a system which responds to criticism by shutting down the system to scrutiny by the Police Authority (ibid).

The fourth issue she identified was the lack of Authority involvement in the selection of senior officers for the force. As a consequence of the service selecting its own candidates and the Home Office’s power of approval the
Police Authority found itself with little choice in such matters. The fifth issue was the unaccountable development of public order policing policies.

We are angry that the Chief Constable chose to buy plastic bullets without any consultation, that he would not accept our decision to dispose of them, and that the Home Secretary subsequently used a legal strategem to frustrate the wishes of the Police Authority— the only representatives of the people in policing matters in Greater Manchester (ibid).

The Chair concluded by saying that a frequent criticism of the Police Authorities was that they did not use the powers given to them under the 1964 Act and that was the reason why Chief Constables had been able to exert their autonomy. However, the Greater Manchester Police Authority had attempted to exercise their powers to the full but found the act to be vague, unworkable and the source of conflict rather than enlightenment. It is this fundamental legislative flaw at the heart of the police system which requires urgent attention if we are to maintain a consensual rather than a coercive system of policing (ibid).

b. The New Police Authority.

On 1 April 1986 the Joint Board took over responsibilities of the Police Authority. If the Chief Constable thought that the abolition of the old Authority would bring about the end of the conflict he was mistaken. The degree of turmoil and struggle for control of the new Authority is indicated by the fact that in the first year there were four Chairpersons. This struggle between the Left and Right of the Labour Party for control of the new Authority took place in the context of a continuing struggle with the Chief Constable.

These struggles were fuelled by the fact that in May 1986 the Stalker affair broke catapulting, by proxy, the accountability debate in Manchester onto the national
headlines once more. As far as this thesis is concerned the importance of the Stalker Affair lies in the implications for the accountability debate. According to the official version of events, on 19 May 1986 Anderton lodged a formal complaint that John Stalker, the Deputy Chief Constable of GMP, had committed the disciplinary offence of associating with known criminals in a manner likely to bring discredit to the force. Given that the appointment of an investigating officer could only be made by the Police Authority considerable planning went into making sure that the matter did not reach a full meeting of the Authority for open discussion. As a consequence of discussions between the Chief Constable, the right wing Labour Chair and the Clerk, the Police Authority was informed on 30 May 1986 that the Chair had agreed to the suspension of John Stalker.

The Stalker Affair heightened the conflict within the new Authority and strengthened the determination of certain members that the Chief Constable had to be made accountable for his decisions. The eventual result of the Stalker Affair was the rejection by the Labour group, the magistrates and the Conservatives of the official inquiry into the affair when it was submitted for the Authority's deliberations. Although the Chief Constable's decision was questioned during the course of the meeting he refused to give details about the events that had taken place prior to the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against his Deputy. Thus the Police Authority still failed to break the Chief Constable's monopoly on information (see Taylor, 1987; Stalker, 1988).

The aftermath of Stalker Affair meant that the Police Authority remained in the news. There was a considerable struggle within the Authority as the focus moved onto the Chief Constable's role in the affair. There were demands
to make the Chief Constable accountable over his association with known criminals, misuse of his official police car and his handling of the initial allegations against John Stalker. The latter point related to the well publicized claim that there had been a high level conspiracy to discredit the Stalker inquiries in the North of Ireland (see Doherty, 1986). However, the appointment of a new Chair and the consolidation of the position of the Right of the Labour Party meant that all attempts to get to the bottom of the Stalker Affair or to discipline the Chief Constable failed. This was publicly justified in terms of the majority of the Labour members wanting to build bridges with the Chief Constable.

In December 1986 two controversial issues emerged to rock the seeming calm. First, John Stalker announced that he had decided to retire because he claimed that he had been frozen out by the Chief Constable since returning to duty, and second, on 11 December, the Chief Constable made his infamous statement on Aids. In relation to the latter the Manchester representatives on the Police Authority called for Anderton's resignation whilst the Chair stated that since the old Authority had been abolished every effort had been made to curb the conflict that had previously existed.

Yet in a matter of minutes, Mr. Anderton seems to have demolished all the bridges which have so painstakingly been built between the police and the authority during the past few months (MEN, 16.12.86).

Another intense argument followed between the Labour group and the magistrates and opposition during the full Authority meeting of 19 December. A four point motion was passed stating that the Chief Constable should retract his speech, that the Authority disassociated itself from the homophobic views of the Chief Constable, that moves be instigated to discipline the Chief Constable and that the
Authority backed the Aids awareness campaign (see *The Times*, 20.12.86).

The Chief Constable stated that he would not be silenced and on the 18 January 1987 returned to the issue in a series of interviews on radio, television and in the press. In response to the renewed demands for the Manchester representatives for his resignation Anderton replied, 'am I to be persecuted for my Christian beliefs? Is that it? Is that what people want - if that is the case then God help this country' (ITN, 19.1.87).

The Labour group of the Authority subsequently met with the Home Office for its reassurance that if the Chief Constable did not refrain from such statements he would be forced to resign. As the result of meetings of the Home Office, the Chief Constable and representatives of the Police Authority a compromise, known as the Tripartite Agreement, was reached on 27 January 1987, whereby the Chief Constable and the Chair of the Authority would meet regularly to discuss matter of common interest. However the Chief Constable made it clear that the agreement did not mean that he had been muzzled

I think the Chairman would agree that I have not been gagged and that I am free to speak at my discretion. I shall consider in the future when I wish to speak upon any issue germane to the policing of Greater Manchester whether or not it would be in everyone’s best interest and prudent to discuss my intentions with other persons (The Times, 28.1.87).

Further conflict was muted as a result of, the Chief Constable becoming the President of ACPO for the year and the Right...of the Labour Party consolidated its control of the Authority. In September 1987 in his last major speech as ACPO President Anderton called for the castration of rapists. The Police Authority defended the Chief Constable’s right to make the statement whilst complaining
of media inaccuracy. However, in December the Chief Constable gave interviews supporting the flogging of criminals until they begged for mercy, arguing for the criminalization of homosexual practices and stating that he would not be gagged. As far as many Labour members were concerned this was Anderton's last chance and there were renewed demands for his resignation. In January a special disciplinary committee was set up by the Authority to look at the Chief Constable's speeches and there was a number of courses of action suggested. First, under s5 of the 1964 Police Act he could be called upon to retire in the interests of the efficiency of the force. Second, proceedings could be initiated under the 1985 regulations, governing the discipline of senior officers. And finally the Authority could seek a High Court declaration and injunction relating to his breaking of the January 1988 tripartite agreement. However, at the February meeting, after seeking legal advice, members decided to take no further action. Instead both the Authority and Chief Constable accepted the terms of a letter from the Home Office recording the Chief Constable's assurance that he continued to accept the Tripartite Agreement. It stated that

There is a responsibility, in the interests of the police service and of the force in question, for a chief constable not to jeopardize, knowingly and necessarily, the reputation and efficient functioning of a force by purposely making public statements making public statements or comments calculated or reasonably likely to provoke or produce controversy (Police Review, 26.2.88).

Nonetheless, the letter also stated that the Chief Constable must be free to make public statements about his professional duties and responsibilities and that the prior consent of the Police Authority was not required on such matters. Thus despite the fact that he had breached the prior agreements the autonomy of the Chief Constable was reaffirmed by the Home Office. A sense of new realism
and consensus characterized the proceedings of the Police Authority as the Left members were marginalized. This new realism argued that the conflict of the previous year was the result of 'a carry over of attitudes from the old Police Authority' (First annual report 14). The degree of consensus between the Police Authority and the Chief Constable was indicated by the Chair of the Authority who noted that the only visit to the Home Office was in order to demand more officers for the fight against crime.

Thus, the Chief Constable survived all attempts to make him accountable for his statements and actions. Through the constant assertion of his autonomy and the support of the Home Office the campaign to bring about the democratic accountability of the Chief Constable was finally neutralized. What has to be also analyzed is what effect the changes had upon the the community liaison initiative during this period of conflict.
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH
Boston Spa, Wetherby
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ
www.bl.uk

PAGE MISSING IN ORIGINAL
Section I: Model I

a. From the Community Liaison Officer to The Community Relations Unit

i. Response to the Community Liaison Initiative

As it became apparent that the Police Authorities were going to be abolished the issue of the usefulness and function of the community liaison initiative was once more placed on the political agenda. In March 1985 the position of Manchester City Council was discussed publicly for the first time during the full Police Authority meeting when opposition councillors demanded to know why a CLP had not been set up in Manchester, given that this was where they had been intended for and given the crime problems. Labour councillors argued that panels would not be set up in areas where they were not wanted, admitting that no support had been expressed for the idea. It was also pointed out that there was a problem because sub-divisional boundaries in Manchester did not correspond to communities. Therefore, it was more difficult to set up CLPs. This public questioning of the initiative by the opposition became more pronounced.

Considerable reservations were expressed about the proposals for a unit to support the panels. In April 1985 the Conservative opposition argued against the setting up of the proposed Community Relations Unit (CRU) because of the question of finance and the imminent abolition of the Police Authority. The opposition also expressed concern about where the proposed unit would be located and who would it be accountable to. It was pointed out that although the supposed role of the unit was to work with the police to improve the 'relationship between the community and the police' in terms of responsibility it was to be 'divorced from the Chief Constable' and instead
report to the Police Authority. Additionally the opposition was alarmed, as it had been over the appointment of the CLO, about what the real role of the CRU and the CLPs might be. The fear was expressed that the panels might not just hinder but actively oppose the police in the carrying out of their duties.

The Conservatives and magistrates demanded that the Authority’s proposal be sent to the Home Office. It became apparent that the Chief Constable was also decidedly unhappy with the proposal. He argued the original Home Office idea was that any consultative system should be inexpensive and non-bureaucratic. He argued that what was being suggested was a massive costly bureaucratic expansion of community liaison which would result in an unacceptably heavy burden being placed upon his officers. Consequently, he asked for a deferment on any decision on grounds of cost and until a managerial study had been carried out to determine whether such a unit was justified. He also asked that the Inspectorate and the Home Office be consulted before any final decision was made.

The ruling Labour group rejected such claims, reiterating its commitment to the strengthening of the CLPs. Consequently, on the 23rd April 1985 it was agreed to go ahead and advertise the posts. The post of CLO was to be replaced by a community relations coordinator and three community relations workers.

In June 1985, during an argument about the Chief Constable’s refusal to discuss force reorganization plans with the Authority, further discussion about the CLPs took place. The Labour members argued that if changes affecting local policing arrangements were being considered, proper
consultation with the CLPs and the Police Authority should take place. However, the opposition and magistrates disputed such a position.

Supposing the Community Liaison panels say 'we do not agree with the Chief Constable - we want the most for our patch'. Where does this leave the chief constable? (Fieldnotes).

It was emphasized that if such a scenario developed the CLPs would be interfering with the operational autonomy of the Chief Constable. Labour members argued that if confidence in the police was to be restored it would have to be recognized that the community had the right to be involved in formulating decisions about how they were policed. As far as the magistrates were concerned this was totally unacceptable and unrealistic.

the community liaison panels should not have any say in the deployment of police officers. To give them the idea they have a such a right is frustrating because they do not (ibid).

Although the Chief Constable did not participate in this debate, in the same month he questioned the usefulness of CLPs in bringing about community involvement. He also argued that they were 'wide open to political abuse'.

I became very concerned when I learned that certain persons meeting privately in my area had spoken of the panels as providing a structure to use 'political clout', and as 'power bases in the community' against the kinds of pro-police policies a Tory controlled Joint Board would produce (Police Review, 14.6.85)

Despite this opposition the Labour group pushed through the CRU as quickly as possible because, despite pronouncements to the contrary, they were well aware that abolition was imminent and that there was the very real possibility the Chief Constable would attempt to obstruct the proposal until it became too late to set up the unit. In addition there was the feeling that the Authority was responding to the fact that Manchester City Council had a
the Authority was responding to the fact that Manchester City Council had a full time PMU and that this was how it was able to defend its position on proposed liaison arrangements.

During this period both the Chief Constable and the opposition began to ask questions about situation in Manchester. The Chief Constable attacked the Police Authority’s refusal to set up CLPs in Manchester

I find it strange that in areas where panels would conceivably perform a helpful function none, at present, exist, whereas Police Authorities are being pressed to formulate panels where nobody at all sees a need (Police Review, 14.6.85).

He said that ‘for reasons that remain obscure’ there were no liaison panels in Manchester but a PMU. As a consequence community self-help in the area of crime prevention in the City was solely police activated. He finished off by arguing that if the Police Authority was serious about setting up the CLPs it should have bypassed the City Council and ‘if the Home Office had invested Chief Constables with that duty then problems of this kind would not have arisen’. At the July 1985 meeting there was further discussion about the Manchester situation when the Chief Constable reported that he was reviewing the divisional boundaries in the City. This gave a final spur to the Police Authority to do something about the situation. It was resolved at the meeting of the 16th July 1985 to go ahead with setting up a panel in Wythenshaw and a second one in Longsight with a ‘phased programme for the establishment of the remaining panels in the City of Manchester’.

b. The Community Relations Unit: The Facilitation of Community Representation and Participation
Following on the recommendation of the CLO and the report of the County Legal Officer the Community Relations Policy Coordinator’s appointment was confirmed as from 17 June 1985. Subsequently three Community Relations Officers were appointed. However, the role of the Community Relations Unit differed significantly from the CLO. First, the purpose of the job was changed from finding means to ‘improve relationships between Police and Community, initially in the area of Moss Side’ to working ‘with community liaison panels and other community groups to promote the community relations policies of the Police Authority and develop structures which increase the accountability of the police to local communities’. Thus, any reference to Moss Side was deleted. Second, in terms of the duties and responsibilities associated with the post, there was a considerable down playing of the concerns of black people and the complaints work. Thus, there was to be more concentration on facilitating general community representation and participation. This meant that there was the real possibility that the interests and concerns of Moss Side would no longer be on the agenda of the CRU because the role of the CLO as ‘the community representative’ effectively related to black concerns.

Furthermore, the issue of crime prevention was constantly to the fore in a way that it was not within the work of the CLO. The latter had tried, however unsuccessfully, to include the interests of those for whom the police were the problem through his own work whilst the CLPs had prioritized concerns about crime. Since the CRU concerned itself with the work of the panels concern about crime dominated its work. The three most consistently important issues for the liaison panels were burglary, vandalism and public order incidents (see, Community Liaison, No4 1987). Consequently, the CRU’s work addressed these issues and all
aspects of crime prevention, including the continued promotion of corporatist multi-agency approaches. In this context criticisms of the police could only related to their ineffectiveness in relation to the control of crime and, of course, in this period the dominant police and Home Office discourse emphasized the responsibility of all sections of the community in the fight against crime. There was no formal mention within its work of the controversial issues arising out of the conflict between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority or the policing of Greater Manchester.

However, whilst the crime focused work of the Community Relations Unit was expanded considerably it still had to address the problems of community representation and participation that had been recognised by the CLO during the initial period of community liaison and consultation in Manchester.

1. Moss Side
The efforts to 'sell' community liaison were once more hindered by events relating to the policing of Moss Side. The outcome of the Jacki Berkeley Affair confirmed the arguments of those opposed to having anything to do with the Greater Manchester Police. In March 1985 she was found guilty of all the charges brought against her, including that of wasting police time by falsely claiming that she had been raped by police officers in Moss Side police station. As a result she was given suspended prison sentences of various lengths. This, once more, brought allegations of a cover up and demands for a public inquiry to be set up into the policing of Moss Side (see Race Today, May, 1985; The Guardian, 15.3.85).

In 1986 the case of Viraj Mendis took firm root in Moss
Side. After his final appeal against deportation for being an illegal immigrant was rejected in July 1986 he took sanctuary in a local church, with the full support of the local clergy, in December 1986. This case developed into a powerful campaign in 1987 involving an alliance of local groups determined to prevent any attempt by the Home Office to forcibly remove Mendis from the church. Any issue to do with the policing of immigration was always going to have a detrimental effect on police-community relations in Moss Side. Once more relations with the police were placed under considerable strain as everyone concerned was aware that it would be the GMP who would be used in any assault on the church.

Whilst this case was still progressing towards an inevitable conclusion Moss Side was rocked by the rape and murder of a black woman, Elsa Hannaway, by a black man in October 1987. For possibly the first time co-operation was forthcoming with the police stating that the response to the call for information had been overwhelming. However, the co-operation was short lived with allegations being made that the GMP were using the investigation as the excuse to conduct raids in Moss Side in a manner not seen since 1981 and to question every black male with dreadlocks. The resentment and allegations resulted in public meetings and the forming of Action for Black Justice. The refusal of senior police officers to take any of the allegations seriously once more resulted in a complete breakdown of relations (see New Society, 13.5.88)

It was in this context that the CRU was supposed to set up CLPs in Moss Side. Eventually, a meeting was held on 5 July 1988 to 'launch the E Division North Community Liaison Panel'. Once more a formal approach to the meeting was utilized. The Chair of the meeting was the Chair of
the Police Authority and the membership was to comprise of councillors, nominees of the Divisional GMP Commander and an initial membership nominated by the Police Authority consisting of representatives of the community organizations invited to attend. In addition 'anyone with residential qualifications who attends three consecutive meetings can be a member'. At this meeting approximately eighty people turned up and during the discussions it was reiterated that just because the CLP structure had worked elsewhere in Greater Manchester did not mean that it was suitable for Moss Side. After heated debate it was agreed to delay the setting up of a CLP and instead set up a working party to discuss the issue.

This working party met for the first time on 1 September 1988 and those present were asked to address the question of what would be the 'best sort of arrangements for the Police Authority to obtain the views of the people in the "E" North Sub Division about policing the area and improving police/community relations'. It was stressed that whatever arrangements were established would have to enjoy the confidence of the community and could not be imposed upon the community. With regard to the issue of community representation some interesting points were made. One member felt that

the sub division was large and contained within it a number of very different communities. Unlike other areas they had recognised community leaders. The most suitable forum for the area would be one which was limited to such community leaders (minutes of meeting).

This was reiterated

there should be a number of forums which would report to a panel covering the whole subdivision. Membership of the forums would be open to anyone but initial invitation would limited to the recognised community leaders in the area (ibid).
This was agreed to by those present as well as another meeting in December 'to discuss the proposed structure for consultation'. Prior to this meeting a great deal of ground work was carried out by the CRU. Community organizations, significant groups and local councillors were approached directly. In addition members of the working party were invited to a prior meeting on 15 November 1988 in order to discuss the organization of the full meeting. They were also asked to identify and talk to key individuals in their areas and to construct 'a list of people you feel represent your area and who could offer advice or would have criticisms about the proposed scheme'.

However, all of this ground work and discussion was interrupted by the dramatic end to the Viraj Mendis case. In January 1989 approximately 50 police officers made a dramatic dawn raid on the church forcibly removing Mendis for deportation to Sri Lanka. This caused an uproar both locally and nationally. GMP had not only carried out the wishes of the Home Office but in doing so had violated the sanctity of a church. The anger of local people was fuelled by the rumour that it was a local community police officer who had led the raid on the church. It was agreed after discussions between the community relations worker and local representatives, particularly of the local churches, to postpone further meetings concerning community liaison until the issue calmed down. Thus once more the policing in Moss Side had undermined the efforts to set up CLPs.

ii. Manchester
After the setting up of its Community Relations Unit representatives from the City Council and the Police Authority met on 6 September 1985 to discuss the issue of
CLPs once more. The differences over the panels remained. The Police Authority representatives pointed out that not only were they committed to liaison panels but that, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, there had a legal duty to set them up. They reiterated that liaison panels could extend the accountability of the police because if local support for them was forthcoming and there was adequate resources allocated to them the police would have to 'ignore demands at their peril'.

There is a crying need to do something about policing in Manchester. The County group have held back in deference to Manchester City Council...The County Group want to get on with it urgently and if necessary will go ahead WITHOUT the participation of the City Council (minutes of meeting).

However, the City Council representatives rejected such claims once more emphasizing their views of what community views should be prioritized

there is a commitment to articulating the concerns of sections of the Manchester Community, particularly black people. The City Council’s view is that its role is to assist groups in the Community to make 'informed' demands, hence a team of research and development staff have been established (ibid).

It was made clear that

there is little convincing evidence to persuade the Manchester City Council Police Monitoring Committee to alter its scepticism about liaison panels... The City Council feels therefore that its energies should be channeled into articulating the needs of its many communities and to campaigning for alternatives to the present system (ibid).

A meeting in November discussed the liaison panels as well as the implications of the imminent demise of the Police Authority. It was agreed to set up a working party in order to attempt to resolve their differences and to provide a forum for communication between the two groups. The County group was particularly concerned about the non-
co-operation stance of Manchester City Council on the proposed joint board. Concern was also expressed about the City Council's Labour group wanting no opposition representation on the new joint board, something which was theoretically possible under section 39 of the Local Government Act. Police Authority representatives made it clear that if the CRU was to survive the change over Manchester would have to change its stance on opposition representation.

If Manchester City can agree to allow opposition representation...then the chance of Liberal support for joint servicing is assured. The Labour group needs to consider working with sympathetic opposition members on certain issues (ibid).

As well as agreeing to consider this, it was also agreed that the working party should draw up a report on the achievements of the Police Authority and what elements needed to be preserved to keep the pressure on the Chief Constable. However, on the issue of CLPs no further agreement was reached.

The Police Authority continued with its exertions to set up CLPs in the city. On 10 March 1986 at a public meeting of local voluntary and statutory agencies it was agreed to establish two panels in Wythenshawe to serve a population of 100,000. At the meeting the Chair of the Police Authority said that she hoped that the exercise would be repeated in the rest of Manchester. However, this exercise seems, with hindsight, to have been a publicity stunt to show that the Authority was not prepared to allow Manchester to continue as a 'no-go area' any longer. It was not until late 1988 and early 1989 that the next attempts to introduce CLPs were made. It is no coincidence that this process took place only after the PMC and PMU had been abolished and Manchester City Council was
promoting community safety instead of the accountability of the GMP.

Unlike everywhere else in Greater Manchester the structures that were introduced in Manchester were very flexible. They were not based on the sub-divisional boundaries of the City and covered a wide variety of neighbourhoods. By any definition of community the areas included in each panel had very different demographic profiles. Even within this eclectic structuring of boundaries for CLPs there was still a problem with regard to "E" Division North, covering Moss Side. It was decided not to use the panel format but to use open 'forums' as a way of facilitating community representation and participation. The aim was to have three forums for Rusholme, Fallowfield and Moss Side respectively. Thus to deal with the problems in Manchester very flexible arrangements, reminiscent of the initial efforts of the community liaison officer, were utilized. Indeed, it is questionable, whether under the Home Office guidelines, some of the forums, could be defined as consultative committees.

c. Attempts to Resolve Problems of Community Representation and Participation

The highly structured and formalized CLPs already in existence throughout the rest of Greater Manchester continued to face general issues of representation and participation. The response to the general lack of community participation was based upon the principle that if the community would not come to the panels then the panels would have to go to the community. Thus representatives from the panels went to meet tenants' groups, held public meetings on council estates, set up surgeries. The surgery was suggested for those who might
feel uncomfortable in a police station. In addition to the general community work of the panels specific efforts were initiated by the CRU to bring about the representation and participation of three key groups, ethnic minorities, young people and women.

1. Ethnic Minorities
Various liaison panel working parties were set up by the panels to address issue of the non-participation of young people and ethnic minorities. (Community Liaison, No 3: 1987). However, there were serious problems in trying to bring about ethnic minority representation in other parts of Greater Manchester just as there were in Moss Side. The basic problem concerned the incapability of the CLPs to represent the interests of black people. Thus, the Chair of the Joint Board Community Relations Committee, himself black, explained that CLPs were important because

we have to start rebuilding the shattered trust and confidence the public had in our police force. The miners strike, racial riots in London and Liverpool did not help matters (Community Liaison, No3: 1987).

The most obvious and serious omission was that of the disturbances in Moss Side. How could black people be expected to participate in a structure that did not even acknowledge the problematical history of the relationship between the black neighbourhoods and the police in Manchester? Another example of the difficulties in making the panels aware of the problem of black non-participation was provided by the Bury North CLP. The Press Officer for that panel stated that it had a good relationship with its police officers, "reinforcing the general feeling within the sub-division of trust in and support for the police". However, this officer admitted that

there are sections of the community, especially the black community who would not totally share this view
Hence, there was a considerable difference between the views represented by and on the panel and those of black people which would make their participation and representation difficult. Another disturbing issue was acknowledged when it was noted that two of the panels had agreed to adopt anti-discrimination statements 'as a first step to increasing the awareness of issues important to black and Asian members so that racist comments and attitudes can be examined and changes made' (Community Liaison, No 3).

In comparison with the work of the CLO in representing black interests, there was considerably less emphasis on such work within the CRU. The only issue to be taken up was racial harassment. However, it was the Manchester Council for Community Relations (MCCR) and the GMP who formulated a response not the Police Authority. There was no mention of police racism or monitoring of police training in the MCCR report and at Forum 88 it was the GMP who gave the presentation on racial harassment. When reference was made to racism within the GMP the police officer stated that there were moves to recruit more members of ethnic minorities, to educate officers in social skills and to enable them to respect other cultures. Thus the same answers were being given and accepted by those present that the CLO had been critical of three years previously. When someone brought up the issue of the policing of Moss Side after the murder of Elsa Hannaway the police responded that the claims about over-policing had been exaggerated. Given this type of comment it is not surprising that the problems in facilitating black representation and participation in the panels remained unresolved.
ii. Young People

The importance of securing the representation and participation of young people was re-emphasized during the 1985 Panel forum. The CRU began to address the continuing problems in ensuring representation and participation of young people. It was realized that there was a distinction between ensuring representation and the 'varying degrees of commitment the young people will have to participation' and re-emphasized that there are many and varied ways of involving young people in the debate with regard to policing - if not panels themselves. It is up to the panels to see what input they want from young people (Community Liaison, No 2:1986).

It was argued that if the CLPs were interested solely in youth representation this could be achieved by focussing upon panel proceedings. However, it was emphasized that if active participation was the aim of the panels it would be necessary to take a more active role in meeting young people in the community.

Consequently, some CLPs decided to approach local youth workers in order to see if they could persuade young people to participate in the panels. Salford South, for example, set up a working party on this issue 'to liaise with the City of Salford to see what could be done to support police work with young people' (Community Liaison, No 2:1986). The panel subsequently carried out a survey of young people in two schools on attitudes to the police and youth provision in the area. However, they subsequently reported that they found the whole exercise frustrating because of the negative reaction of the young people. Certain panels evolved a strategy based upon the idea that if young people would not attend CLP meetings, then the panels should go out to the young people. Consequently, panel representatives arranged meetings at local youth
clubs, neighbourhood centres and colleges to find out young people's views on policing. The Swinton and Walkden panel, for example, went to a local youth centre to meet young people. As a consequence a youth committee was formed which was supposed to represent the young people affiliated to the centre and a representative was chosen from this committee to attend the meetings of the CLP.

It is to be hoped that this representative is accorded the same respect as other members of the panel - and that they in turn, ensure that they do speak on behalf of the young people they represent (Community Liaison, No 2:1986).

During 1986/1987 eight of the panels set up working parties to address the issues arising from the lack of youth participation (along with ethnic minority participation), with the head of the Community Relations sub-committee urging the 'need to involve ever more people in the debate' (Community Liaison, No3:1986).

Thus the panels continued with their attempts to reach the young people in their areas, through questionnaires and the youth service with certain of them attempting to set up separate forums for young people. What is notable about these attempts is how little progress was made no matter whether the meetings were highly formalized or informal. Formal meetings were not attended whilst report backs from informal ones noted that 'the meeting was too large and rowdy to be productive. By the end of the meeting little had been achieved' (Community Liaison, No 8:1988). What some of the CLPs had to confront, in their meetings with young people, was the issue of police representation. When the Ashton panel had a meeting in a local college there were no police representatives present.

It may well be that it was a good thing; several young people needed to be assured that there were no police
in the hall before entering, and members speculated that they may not have been so forthcoming if they thought that policemen were there and perhaps noting who said what (Community Liaison, No2: 1986).

The most systematic attempts to deal with the problem of youth participation were made by the Trafford and Salford North CLPs. In January 1988 thirty five young people and eleven youth workers went to a rural retreat 'to learn about decision making and participation' (see, Community Liaison, No8: 1988). The weekend consisted of young people dealing with a series of issues relating to decision making, relations with statutory agencies and the prioritization of community resources. The main issues under discussion related to community problems surrounding the establishment of a youth centre, ranging from dealing with a letter from the local police about the behaviour of youth club members to facilitating wider community participation in the youth centre. There was also discussion, with the councillors present, of the role of councillors in the local community.

Salford North CLP also set up a similar weekend for young people from two local youth clubs. This was the most developed approach and premised upon the notion that 'it is essential that the views of young people are heard with regard to their community and its policing' (Community Liaison, No 11:1989). In order for young people to participate actively in such discussions particular skills were needed. These particular skills were in the areas of the law and the duties of the police; rights and responsibilities of citizens; the ways in which communities operate; decision making processes and communicative processes.

There were four stages to this process of creating 'active participation'. First, meetings were organized at the two
youth centres which focused on the rights and responsibilities of young people in relation to the law and 'discussion about the work of the police and an understanding of reasonable attitudes towards them' (Community Liaison No 11:1989). Second, youth workers issued invitations to the 17 young people (16-19 year olds; 80% males) who were present at the first meeting to attend the weekend. The weekend focussed on issues such as how a community develops; the diversity of needs within it; the causes and consequences of crime; the role of the Council and local councillors in their lives.

This was supposed to develop new skills and confidence 'to participate generally in their community and, in particular in the Salford North Police CLP' (Community Liaison, No 11:1989:9). The third stage was to facilitate a further meeting with police officers present where, with their new knowledge, skills and confidence, the young people would specifically discuss policing, crime and crime prevention. The fourth stage would be the young people finding a representative from amongst themselves to attend regularly meetings of the liaison panel. Thus despite constructing an elaborate structure to encourage participation the overall objective was to enable the choosing of a respectable youth representative.

iii. Women

Within the work of the CRU the concerns of women achieved high prioritization. The safety of women was a major area of work for the CRU. Through the prioritization of crime prevention nationally, women's fears and concerns were addressed in a manner which attempted to incorporate all women's interests. Thus attention was paid to domestic violence against women; child sexual abuse; women and the criminal justice system and kerb crawling. The new Police
Authority also demanded greater protection for women and a complete reorientation of the criminal justice system to reflect such needs and concerns.

In a very changing world women are taking full part in activities. At the same time the world is decreasing for them because of the fear on the street, in public transport, even taxis (Community Liaison, No 10).

CLP were encouraged to promote 'Women Alone' exhibitions to promote awareness of personal safety among women, show women how best to protect themselves and reduce the risk of attack and as reassuring the vulnerable by promoting a multi-agency policing approach. The exhibitions consisted of self-defence displays and self protection tips as well as displays of crime prevention equipment. The 1988 annual CLPs' Forum had a specific workshop on 'Women - their safety and concern' which focussed on crime prevention, victim support services and criminal injuries compensation. Although there were supposed to be representatives present from all womens' organizations and groups, Rape Crisis and Womens Aid were not present. Instead the Women's National Commission dominated the session which resulted in a very conservative analysis of women's concerns and needs which emphasized the importance of the family.

Within the work of the CRU in this area considerable publicity was given to the setting up of St Mary's Sexual Assault Referral Centre. In December 1986 GMP decided to set up a sexual referral centre for women who had been raped or sexually assaulted because

The police were concerned that the aftermath of the attack was left to them to resolve and that the 'back up' services from other agencies were inadequate (Interim report on Centre 1986:2).

As a consequence the GMP proposed their coordination of a multi-agency approach involving, police surgeons, GPs, psychiatrists, gynecologists and venerologists because
public opinion, both as represented by voluntary organizations and by individuals was often highly critical of existing arrangements (ditto:2).

Thus, radical women's groups working in this area, most obviously Rape Crisis, were in danger of effectively being defined out whilst respectable groupings were being mobilized to justify police intervention. The Centre was thus located within a local hospital with the consent of the Area Health Authority, financed by the Police Authority and the Department of the Environment. The CRU gave high profile publicity to the Centre in its publication as proof that it was taking the needs of women seriously. However, Rape Crisis expressed severe reservations about the whole orientation of the Centre as well as the underlying philosophy behind it. Thus, the prioritization of women's concerns took place within a context and took a form which accepted and reinforced dominant ideologies concerning the causes of violence against women. Alternative interpretations were marginalized and excluded.

Discussion

The Police Authority, despite considerable opposition, set up a professional CRU in an attempt to strengthen the work of the CLPs. There were considerable differences between the work of the CLO and the CRU. First, the CRU discarded the community representative work of the CLO and eventually closed the community liaison office in Moss Side. Thus, the concerns of direct relevance to black people were not part of the CRU's terms of reference. Second, reflecting the national developments documented in Part III, there was the prioritization of crime prevention within the work of the CRU. By contrast the work of the CLO had been geared towards addressing the issue of police accountability. There was little mention of the issue of
police accountability in the work of the CRU. Hence any worries that the Chief Constable, the magistrates and Conservative councillors had about the CRU were allayed.

With regard to the problems of community representation and participation within the CLPs, the CRU did address the issue of active participation. This again fitted in with its strategies to mobilize the community to prevent crime. Once the PMC and PMU were disestablished the CRU attempted to move in on the 'no-go' areas of Manchester. As has been documented strenuous efforts were made to set up a CLP in Moss Side. Every effort was made to incorporate community representatives into some form of liaison structure. To this end the CRU and the new Police Authority promised not attempt to impose a CLP and made it clear that if a panel was agreed to, it did not have to operate like those elsewhere in Greater Manchester. However, every time that such efforts seemed to be making some progress, a controversial incident involving the police, eg, the trial of Jackie Berkeley, the murder investigation concerning Elsa Hannaway, the deportation of Viraj Mendis, resulted in respectable community representatives having to withdraw from all negotiations. There could be no clearer indication that police-community liaison was incapable of representing the interests of the people of Moss Side. Flexible community liaison arrangements were used elsewhere in Manchester. An open forum structure, not premised upon community representatives, was used in three areas in an attempt to establish the idea of police-community liaison. Thus, six years after the first efforts had been made to set up CLPs in Manchester there were still no structures comparable to those set up elsewhere in Greater Manchester.

The CRU persevered with its representative model elsewhere
in Greater Manchester. The CRU encouraged the CLPs to take a more active approach to the problems of the under/non-representation of certain sections of the community. However, there remained fundamental problems with this representative model. Despite the innovative methods used to try and mobilize young people to become involved in the CLPs, the objective remained finding youth representatives who would liaise with the police and who would be prepared to discuss the problems that young people caused the community. Those who were suspicious of the police or in conflict with the police did not participate in such exercises. Thus, the exercises resulted in the participation of those respectable young people for whom the police were not a problem. The obvious question is how representative were these youth representatives?

There were similar problems with the CRU's efforts to facilitate female representation and participation. In line with national developments (see pp 258-259), the CRU made the safety interests of women a priority. However, as with the first efforts to address women's concerns (see pp 197-199), the CRU did not address the power imbalances and ideological divisions of interest that existed between women. As a consequence, giving equal representation resulted in the mobilization of respectable women's groups who articulated dominant ideas concerning the causes of domestic violence, rape, child abuse etc. This led to the non-participation of those groups who rejected such idea. Thus, during Forum 1989, it was a conservative women's organization that led the session on women's safety. Such a process also occurred when the Police Authority decided to provide financial support for a professional, GMP controlled, rape examination centre. This resulted in Rape Crisis, and a discourse that was critical of the ideologies which informed police attitudes towards rape,
being ideologically and financially defined out.

Thus, the Police Authority's community representative model continued to facilitate the interests of those sections of the community not in conflict with the police. A CLP was not forthcoming in Moss Side because it could not represent the interests of black people. In addition the CRU did not represent black interests in the way that the CLO had attempted to. Hence, the interests of the section of the community that the community liaison initiative was set up to represent were not represented. Elsewhere the model succeeded in facilitating the interests of those sections of the community whose concern was crime prevention and fear of crime and who accepted the dominant ideas concerning the cause of crime and the role of the police and the community. This process of inclusion/exclusion and prioritization/marginalization seems to be the almost inevitable consequence of setting up representative structures which attempt to mobilize the whole community within tightly defined parameters. The problem with allowing all sections of the community rights of representation is that it can lead to the systematic non-representation and participation of other powerless and marginal sections. And of course the whole idea behind community liaison in Greater Manchester, originally, was to facilitate the representation and participation of the powerless and the marginal sections of the community who were in conflict with the police.
Section II: Model II

From the Police Monitoring Unit To the Community Safety Unit

With regard to the abolition of the Police Authority the public position of the PMC was that it would refuse to have anything to do with the proposed joint board because it represented the attempt by the Conservative government to nullify its democratically mandated political opponents. However, in private, careful thought was given to the implications of the new structures of representation as participation could enhance the work of the PMC. There were a series of possibilities that could be of benefit to the work of the PMC. First, one of the major difficulties that the PMC had encountered since being set up was that since it was non-statutory it had no rights of access to information and, under the old system of representation, no access to the Police Authority. As a consequence the PMC was never in a position to confront the Chief Constable. However, under the new system the PMC had the possibility of gaining access to information and the Chief Constable. Second, the Committee could have a significant influence within the joint board because Manchester had the most representatives and a coherent policy on policing, backed up by a fully operational research and development unit. Third, it could keep CLPs out of Manchester or indeed neutralize them altogether. Fourth, there was the possibility, under clause 40 of the Local Government Act, of challenging the structural form of the GMP. Thus, the government's changes to the form of political representation could, in theory, strengthen the PMC's campaign for police accountability.

In the run up to the abolition of the Police Authority and immediately after the Joint Board took over, the PMC began to move centre stage in the struggle for police
accountability in Manchester. The aftermath of the Battle of Brittan, in the form of the Justice for Steven Shaw Campaign and the report of the Platts-Mills inquiry, and the PMC’s controversial statements on the policing of Manchester ensured that the Committee retained a high public profile. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, in January 1986 a survey into residents perceptions of council policies, 60% of those interviewed supported the police monitoring initiative.

However, during the first half of 1986 the controversy surrounding the PMC, both locally and nationally, reached new heights. In February 1986 the first issue of Policewatch was published and delivered to every household in Manchester. It was immediately denounced by the political opposition in Manchester, by Conservative MPs in the House of Commons and by the Home Secretary. The magazine was condemned as a 'scurrilous and divisive document', as a 'blatant misuse of ratepayer's money for subversive campaigning' and as an example of the 'vicious anti-police propaganda spewed out by various hard left controlled authorities' (see Manchester Evening News, 25.2.86; 1.3.86). Because of the PMC Manchester City Council was being nationally identified as being part of the extremist 'loony left'. The Labour leadership, in the House of Commons, made no attempt to defend the magazine and Gerald Kaufman, the Shadow Home Secretary and Manchester MP, condoned the criticisms. For considerable sections of the Labour Party in Manchester the response of both the Conservative government and the Labour opposition confirmed their misgivings about the police monitoring initiative.

An indication of the local concern is provided by documenting how the Labour Party in Manchester dealt with
the issue during the 1986 local elections. The distribution of Policewatch was delayed until after the election with priority instead being given to a user friendly 'A-Z' of the council's services! The manifesto made no mention of the work of the PMC, instead choosing to focus upon the issue of 'Inner Cities and Crime'.

Tory policies on law and order have failed. Their response to economic and social crises includes giving more powers to the police, yet the numbers of crimes being solved is on the decline. Inner city communities suffer increasing violence. Labour believes that high technology policing is not the solution and that we will only be able to tackle the problems when communities have democratic control over the police.

Individual Labour candidates, in their election literature, either made no mention of law, order and policing or, in certain traditional wards, attempted to distance themselves from the PMC. In Levenshulme, the candidate emphasized that tackling crime, through preventive measures and more bobbies on the beat, would be one of his main concerns. In Moston, the Labour Party stressed that they were 'not extremists' and that they 'supported the police in their attempts to establish better community relations'. In Beswick the candidate stated that he opposed those who were attempting to undermine the police through constant criticism and that he would give his full support to the Chief Constable in the fight against crime. The Labour candidate in Lightbowne gave his full support to neighbourhood watch, CLPs, community policing and multi-agency efforts to fight crime.

The wariness of sections of the Party was complimented by the determination of the Conservatives and Liberals to make the PMC an electoral issue. Conservative candidates referred to the setting up of the PMU and Policewatch as
'madness on the rates' whilst Liberals denounced the Labour Party for its refusal to support CLPs and for setting up a structure that engaged in the 'destructive criticism' of the police. All the opposition candidates promised to campaign for the abolition of the PMC. The fact that the Labour Party strengthened its hold in these elections was proof for some that the cautious policy had succeeded. It also meant that several Labour candidates who opposed the whole initiative had been elected.

The high profile role that the Manchester councillors took on the Joint Board during 1986 and 1987 increased the controversy of the PMC. This was particularly so in relation to the Stalker Affair and the AIDS speeches of the Chief Constable. During this period the PMC also had a high media profile because of the demands of Labour members for the sacking of the Chief Constable, the continued furor over the contents of Policewatch and its stance on the policing of Manchester, including its continued opposition to CLPs and support for the cases of Steven Shaw and Viraj Mendis. For many in the Party the continued controversial publicity was decidedly unwelcome. However, it was the response of the PMC to the issue of neighbourhood watch that finally brought the opprobrium of the Party leadership down on the initiative. Because of this, the issues of crime, the fear of crime and crime prevention were forced onto the agenda of the PMC.

From its inception the PMC had conceptualized the issue of crime within the overall demand for police accountability. It was argued that the issue of crime could only be tackled successfully when the GMP had been called to account (see PMC Report no 58). Additionally an important dimension to the work of unit involved trying to counter multi-agency crime control strategies of the GMP and the
Home Office. This involved research to assess the exact extent of council department's involvement with the GMP and producing guidelines to govern the type of contact council departments should have with the force (see Reports nos 52; 75). This conceptualization of the issue of crime, combined with the Left's traditional difficulties in dealing with the issue, meant that it was not the dominant priority of the PMC or the PMU. Rising crime rates were only one manifestation of the overall crisis in the policing of Manchester, and it was that overall crisis that the PMC was concerned about.

a. The Community and Crime

In December 1986 the PMC, reiterating its position of July 1986, stated its opposition to neighbourhood watch in Manchester by refusing to pay for the erection of 'Homewatch' signs (see PMC Report no 53). The decision was attacked both locally and in the House of Commons as a further example of the extremist anti-police stance of the 'loony left' in control of Manchester City Council. The backlash was so intense that a damage limitation exercise was embarked upon. Discussions took place immediately concerning the need to produce a constructive alternative to 'Homewatch'. As a consequence a series of proposals emerged premised upon the idea that the council would have to give serious consideration to the issues of crime, fear of crime and crime prevention (see PMC Reports nos 102; 103; 104; 105; 106). First, it was decided to upgrade the crime prevention work of the council both at the political and officer levels. Second, all the major service departments of the Council were asked to identify resources that could be used to promote crime prevention policies. Third, the Crime Prevention Working Party had its terms of reference expanded and was redesignated the Community Safety Working Party. Fourth, it was recommended
that a Community Safety Officer be appointed within the Town Clerk's Department, under the control of the Policy and Resources Committee. Fifth, the PMU was directed to organize a series of workshops on community safety for relevant officers of the council. Finally, the Unit was instructed to prepare a report on the production of a community safety booklet for dissemination throughout Manchester.

The speed with which the PMC moved to embrace community safety is indicated by its response to the Council's recommendation concerning the appointment of a community safety officer. In a paper of February 1987, justifying the locating of the post of Community Safety Officer within the PMU, reference was made to the real problem of crime and fear of crime.

The Committee has consistently expressed its view that the local authority is in a position to influence crime and fear of crime, particularly through a community based strategy which does not marginalize these issues from others, such as appropriate policing and service provision. Whilst recognizing that solutions lie primarily in major structural changes, the Committee has accepted that it is possible to create a safer community— noting also that the ultimate success of such an initiative is dependent on adequate resources for investment in services, facilities and the fabric of neighbourhoods (PMC Report no 123).

In addition to the internal reassessment and restructuring of the work of the PMU the Chair of the PMC and the Leader of the Council also publicly attempted to explain their position on 'Homewatch'. The Chair of the PMC felt it necessary to explain in great length why neighbourhood watch schemes were not the answer to crime (see Policewatch, No 5, 1986). This was followed up by the Leader of the Council intervening to assure the community of the Council's concern with crime. He also announced the setting up of the 'Council Initiative On Safety' as an
alternative to neighbourhood watch (see Policewatch No 6, 1987).

It was stated that the Council opposed the 'Homewatch' scheme because it was no substitute for 'effective community policing' and it resulted in the diverting of police resources from 'the less articulate and less organized sections of the community'. Although it was made clear that the Council would not oppose residents who insisted on setting up 'Homewatch' schemes it was also pointed out that there was a Council alternative

Manchester City Council is committed to supporting groups of residents who want to protect themselves, their communities and their homes from crime.

A City Council Community Safety Working Party is to ensure that all Council activities are sensitive to the need to prevent crime and create safer communities.

The Council announced that it would give grants to help groups of residents set up their own community safety schemes; there would be improved locks, doors and windows installed in Council housing; more effective caretaking and park warden schemes; landscape designs that made public play safer for children and security lighting installed in streets and Council property. The dilemma of the Council was made clear:

The City Council has no intention of becoming crime busters. That's the job of the police and our involvement in that area is mainly a matter of persuading the police to give Manchester's communities the effective and sensitive protection they need.

On the other hand we face demands from local community groups to help them make their areas free from such crimes as burglary and assaults and from the fear which such crimes create (Policewatch No 6 1987).

At the same time as this was taking place consideration was being given to two reports that related to the
relationship between the PMC/PMU and the community. The Policy and Resources Committee of the Council, since November 1985, had been monitoring the attempts by the various committees and departments to bring about public involvement in their work. In July 1986 the Committee passed a resolution requesting that all the committees and departments consider its report _Consultation and Participation_. In addition it recommended that every department and committee should take measures to actively involve the community in its work. This particularly affected the PMC as the failure to set up community based PMGs groups meant that it could not meet the committee's demands.

The second report that addressed the relationship between the PMU and the community took the form of an internal review into the work of the unit (see Walker, 1986). This report found serious levels of confusion and lack of direction as far as the attempts to set up PMGs were concerned. It was argued that the PMU had been placed in an impossible position in this respect because there had been no real thought given to the topic and there were a series of assumptions about police monitoring groups that were fallacious. The report argued that a different strategy would have to employed by the unit if PMGs were to be realized. The Unit would have to cease trying to push the idea of monitoring groups and instead actually go out into the community and find out what it wanted and what its needs were. The report was very concerned that, even in comparison with some of the London initiatives, the Manchester PMU seemed to be totally isolated from the community. The report’s assessment and suggestions were reiterated in a ‘Way Forward Strategy Document’ agreed to by the PMC in July 1986 (PMC Report no 63) In order to reach the community and gauge what the community wanted
the document suggested that information be collected to assess community needs and views. The Unit Strategy document also recommended that the PMU should investigate the problems of security and fear of crime in the community, commissioning local surveys as necessary.

Such a community focus had serious implications for the work of the PMU. The PMU had effectively withdrawn from community work when, during the course of a consultation exercise over whether staffed monitoring groups should be set up in Manchester, community groups stated that they preferred to retain their autonomy. As a result, it was decided that instead of funding formalized staffed monitoring groups, the PMU would provide support for any groups that needed it. Consequently, the PMC/U moved from the idea of facilitating PMGs to facilitating single issue meetings as and when demanded by community groups.

We believe that these single issue meetings are one of the best ways of making the police accountable to Manchester people (Policewatch No 5, 1986).

Thus, the role of the unit in terms of its community work was in terms of helping groups organize training days and single issue meetings such as the conference on Black Communities and Inner City Policing, Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group days, a Women and Policing conference meetings in Benchill and in Withington (see PMC Reports nos 44, 61, 68, 73, 81, 94).

However, no sooner had this single issue strategy been worked out than the Unit was placed under considerable pressure to go back into geographically defined communities with a very different remit. In order to reach the community a systematic approach was suggested. The PMU’s development workers were to extend their list of community contacts and networks and to include other...
agencies working in the community, in order to ensure that their knowledge of local requirements and needs was accurate. To achieve this a wide variety of community based groups and organizations, apart from statutory ones, were contacted. This 'Area based Monitoring And Consultation Initiative' was ratified by the PMC on 30 March 1987 (see PMC Report no 137). It must also be noted that during this period the appointment of a more moderate Chair of the PMC strengthened the move to concern about crime and community safety. The new Chair stressed that the PMC was not police bashing, qualified the previous demands for police accountability, specifically relating them to the failure of the force to tackle crime, and stressed the council's concern about crime (see Policewatch, NO 8, 1987).

By July 1987 the mass of the initial consultative work had been completed. It had focused on identifying and making contact with 'relevant and appropriate groups', defined as local neighbourhood and voluntary organizations such as tenant and resident associations, youth and community groups, etc. This contact was made utilizing the Labour Party ward structure with the intention being to contact roughly twelve of these groups in each ward and in order to identify them the Unit had liaised with other council departments 'which have a working brief in the community'. Nineteen groups were identified in North Manchester, sixteen in South Manchester and seventeen in Central Manchester and letters were sent to them as well as to tenants and residents entitled 'Policing and A Safer Community: Obtaining Your Views'.

As you are probably aware, the City Council has for some time taken the view that the promotion of policing of a nature, style and quality which meets the needs of the residents of Manchester is clearly in their interests. In order to respond to these concerns, the
City Council set up a Committee, Police Monitoring. It seeks to achieve the promotion and support of effective policing policies by consulting with residents on policing activities, crime prevention and making communities safer.

As part of this process the council has decided to begin a systematic consultation process with groups in the community, whether they be tenant or issue based (see PMC Report no 137).

It was hoped that these community groups and organizations would participate in the consultation process to have their views represented along with those of others in their community. In addition specific area based crime surveys on a geographical basis were to be organized to meet specific demands by local people such as that on the Nell Lane Estate in Chorlton, South Manchester, Mossbrook Court, Collyhurst, North Manchester and Hulme in Central Manchester (see PMC Report no 137). In these areas there were subsequent meetings between the police, City councillors, the PMC and the community to discuss crime problems with the Monitoring Committee subsequently claiming that

The success of these forums between residents, the Council and the police, where local people are setting the agenda and asking for action, has been obvious (Policewatch, No 9 1987).

Such forums were also used to bolster the PMC's opposition to CLPs, which were through the high profile work of the CLR, increasingly encroaching upon Manchester. In this context it was even suggested by the PMC that their forums could act as the statutory consultative committees in Manchester.

We believe that there is a far more effective system than that favoured by the GMP. We want the public to meet head-on with not only the police but also with people from the Town Hall, to tackle issues of crime in a realistic manner.
By bringing together police, councillors, housing and planning officials, and Community Development workers, who have on-the-ground real liaison with the residents, questions on community safety can be approached by bodies who may be able to do something about it.

Unfortunately these forums will still not make the police truly accountable - only a change in legislation can do this. But at least they will allow the public a chance of saying what they want. (Policewatch No 91 1987)

The PMC also made overtures to the police in a manner which would have been inconceivable in 1984

Let us hope that the police can put aside any prejudices that they have against the PMU and work fully with the City Council in a realistic attempt to tackle crime in our city (Policewatch No 91 1987)

b. Women, Policing and The Fear of Crime

The issue of women's experience of policing, crime and violence also provided a powerful impetus for the prioritization of community safety within the work of the PMC/PMU. At the same time as the PMC came into being so did several other committees and units, reflecting the promises of the 1984 manifesto, including the Equal Opportunities Committee which had a steering group on women's issues. In January 1985 a joint working party was agreed to by the Equal Opportunities Committee and the PMC to consider issues of common interest.

The steering group of Equal Opportunities Committee felt that the issue of women and violence should be prioritized and set up a Women and Violence Working Party. From the outset the Working Party embarked upon a process of consultation with two public meetings being held in different parts of the city during October 1986. A series of issues emerged from these meetings concerning women's fears about violence. Anxiety was expressed with regard to the public transport system, assaults on female children,
safety on estates, the importance of women's refuges, racial harassment, problems with medical care, sexism and advertising, adequate and secure housing provision, and sexual harassment at work. Women were expressing concerns about a wide variety of contexts, all of which left them vulnerable to sexual and racial harassment, and violence. Policing was also mentioned during these meetings with some women wanting to see more police officers on the beat, whilst others, principally black women, said that they did not feel safe with an increased police presence in their communities.

The decisive point was that the meetings articulated the fears and concerns of women over a wide variety of issues relating to sexual violence and fear of violence. Within this context of overall fear of sexual violence policing was just one concern of women and not necessarily the major concern. It was not just the police who were the problem but men. These issues were discussed by the Equal Opportunities Committee in January 1987 where a set of recommendations for future policy was agreed to. As a consequence a report, 'The Safety of Women in Planning the Environment' was produced for November 1987.

During this period the PMU also had a Women and Policing Working Party in operation. This emerged out of the dissatisfaction with the way that the Police Authority had dealt with the issue in one of its conferences and the rows that had emerged with the meeting ending in uproar because of racist comments that were made. The PMC made it clear that the intention was to facilitate the participation of another previously unrepresented section of the community on policing matters.

The PMU is pledged to campaigning for an accountable police force, one that meets the needs of the community
it is supposed to serve. Women as part of that community must have their voices heard to ensure that their needs, their wishes and their priorities are reflected in police practice and in police policy. (Policewatch No 31 1986)

The Working Party arranged two training days for women and police powers in September and October 1987 with workshops on domestic violence, sexual offenses, children’s rights, public order situations, prostitution/kerb crawling, black women, mental health and lesbians. The focus of the workshops was the role of the police in relation to each one of these issues (see PMC Report 172). In addition the working party also pressed for a women’s officer within the PMU (see PMC Report no 127).

The largest project that the Working Party undertook was a survey of violence against women in October 1986 and the aim was to focus on the response of the police to women’s needs. The survey findings were to be the basis for the campaign to make the police accountable to the needs of women. However, 'in the final report the issue that was highlighted was not women and policing but women and male initiated violence. What was most striking in the findings were women’s perception of their vulnerability, their widespread experience of crime and the curtailment affects on their lives. It was not just the response of the police that constituted a problem for women in Manchester. Every department and committee of the Council was responsible for implementing policies that had detrimental effects on the safety of women. Therefore, the report recommended a co-ordinated community safety strategy that involved the various council committees and departments (see PMC report no 164).

The considerable overlap between the work of the PMC’s working party and the work of the Equal Opportunities
Women's Steering Group can be found in the latter's report 'Planning a Safer Environment for Women' of November 1987. This was an important policy document because of the manner in which the issue was approached. Utilizing the national crime surveys, the Merseyside and Islington surveys (see Hough and Mayhew, 1983; 1985; Kinsey, 1984; Jones, McLean, Young, 1986) and the PMC's 'Women and Violence Survey Report' it argued that the police could not provide a comprehensive response to the problems faced by women. It was stressed that whilst real modifications in the level of violence against women could only be achieved by societal change and the redistribution of power, design related changes had the potential to make women feel more secure by reducing the opportunities for crimes against women to take place.

This comprehensive report listed aspects of the environment both in the home and outside that could be practically changed in order to facilitate greater safety and concluded by saying that

Although this report has concentrated on the safety of the environment for women it is obvious that, by improving the environment for women, the proposals will be of advantage to children and men particularly elderly or disabled men. The result will be a city where people of both sexes, of all ages and races, can live in greater safety and enjoyment (Report 1987:19).

The report did not deal with the issue of women and policing because it did not see the police as being part of the solution to the problems that women faced. But neither did it see them as being part of the problem that women faced. For example there was no mention of the fears of black women in this respect. The solutions focused upon multi-agency coordination to create a safer environment for women. This meant that the police still had a role to play in these security conscious environments. This work
on women and violence during 1987 augmented the Council's increasing prioritization of community safety.

The degree of prioritization of community safety, and women's safety within this overall project, is indicated by the centrality of the issue during the 1987 local elections. As with the 1986 elections there were concerns expressed within the Party that the controversial nature of some of the council's policies would be electorally damaging. Labour candidates in their election literature emphasized the Party's concern with crime prevention, community safety measures and women's safety. Except in this context no mention was made of police accountability or the PMC. As part of the campaign a leaflet was produced indicating the main priorities of the Party. This included a section on 'Action Against Male Violence', emphasizing Labour's commitment to make Manchester a safer place for women. Some of the candidates broke ranks completely with the Party and expressed their support for CLPs and neighbourhood watch. The opposition parties continued to condemn the PMC and Policewatch, promising that they would continue to lobby for the abolition of the monitoring initiative. The Conservative candidates stressed their complete support for the GMP whilst the Alliance promised to persist with their campaign for the introduction of CLPs. The latter pointed to the fact that Labour had to reverse its position on 'Homewatch' as being proof that, sooner or later, it would have to do the same in relation to CLPs.

Labour suffered setbacks in these elections with the Party losing nine seats to the opposition. The implications for the police monitoring initiative were significant. First, there were nine more councillors who were committed to voting for its abolition at the first
opportunity. Second, it confirmed the fears of those sections of the Labour Party who had been concerned with the electoral consequences of the controversial policies of the left. In any inquest into the election the PMC would be identified as an electoral liability along with the Council's highly publicized 'loony left' role in relation to the Viraj Mendis Affair and the Burnage incident (see Viraj Mendis Defence Campaign, 1988; MacDonald Inquiry, 1989).

These two factors took on significance in December 1987 when the Council had to decide on how to respond to continued central government imposed limitations on local government spending. Prior to this, the Council had survived by a variety of creative accounting measures and by compromising on its 1984 manifesto promises not to set a rate. However, as a consequence of the continued pressure from the central government a more serious situation was faced by the Labour Party. On 11 December 1987 the Policy Committee of the Council agreed to a £6.5 million package of general cuts. This caused a public outcry and at a meeting of the full Council to discuss where the cuts would be implemented a demonstration took place demanding that the leadership of the Labour Party stick to its 'no cuts' manifesto. Because of the uproar a further meeting took place on 17 December with 28 members of the Labour Party sided with the opposition to defeat the proposed spread of cuts. The opposition forced through a specific agenda of cuts which included the abolition of the PMC. This meeting also witnessed the Council calling in the GMP to deal with demonstrators. Ironically, all the work of the PMC/PMU on public order policing and contact between the police and the Council was ignored by the Council when it came to dealing with those demonstrating against its policies. It is within this context that the
PMC and PMU were abolished. The Liberals threatened to take court action against the Council if the abolition was not carried out immediately whilst the Right of the Labour Party demanded that the staff of the PMU be reallocated and the PMC disbanded as soon as possible. As part of the subsequent negotiations between the right and left of the Labour Party a meeting of the council on 28 January 1988 agreed to a package of cuts that included disestablishment of the PMC and Policewatch.

At the Policy and Resources Committee meeting of the City Council on 16 March 1988 a Community Safety Section was established, incorporating some of the posts from the old PMU and that with immediate effect, recognizing the devastating effect which crime and fear of crime has on the lives of Manchester residents, the focus for the Council's policies on policing and community safety should be the development of practically based policies aimed at supporting community based initiatives (Report 17.6.88).

The justifications for this move were first, the extent of crime in Manchester, second, the consequences and impact of crime, and third, the fear of crime. Utilizing the national Home Office crime surveys and the Merseyside and Islington surveys it was argued that the dramatic crime increases in Manchester were only the tip of the iceberg. Employing the new Left realist perspective it was argued that the financial and emotional impact of crime was greatest amongst the most vulnerable sections of the community in Manchester, eg, the poor, ethnic minorities, women and the elderly. It was also argued that the fear of crime was not just a facet of individual psychology but a social phenomenon involving 'vulnerable and fearful populations', particularly women and the elderly. There was a clear attempt to argue that crime prevention was a
structural or social matter as opposed to being a purely individual one.

In order to respond to this the document argued that the Community Safety Section was being set up by the council to ‘develop the concept of crime prevention from its rather narrow associations with the police and ‘bars and bolts’ to the wider issue of protection and the role of the local authority in the creation of a safer environment’. It was argued that whilst the physical security of estates and residences was useful it would not bring about people’s safety or sense of safety in their homes or neighbourhoods. Community Safety would focus upon the interdependence of types of crime prevention and the social structure of particular areas. The intention was to challenge the dominant idea of crime prevention that had

an inbuilt bias towards individualized personal property protection measures known as ‘target hardening’. Such a narrow approach fails to meet important needs as it is not possible to ‘target harden’ women against rape or ‘design out’ heroin pushing. It particularly fails to recognize the experience of large numbers of women who suffer assault and injury in their homes as well as a result of domestic violence and whose situation no amount of improved street lighting or fencing will alter. Community Safety must recognize that the effectiveness of a policy or approach is influenced by both the relations between offenders and victims and the relations between social groups – as defined by class, race, sex and age within a locality (Report 17.6.88).

Whilst none of the above would have been necessarily outside the remit of the old PMC the next part of the document was in total opposition to one of the basic tenets of that initiative. It was argued that the council should assist the ‘development of communities’ and community based initiatives with four main aims in mind. First, there should be the provision of general community safety improvements across the city, ie, for the whole
community. Second, there should be the provision of specific community safety improvements for those residents known to be particularly vulnerable to fear of crime. Third, policies should be implemented to avoid fuelling the fear of crime and, finally, all recommendations should avoid focusing on 'solutions' which placed restrictions on the activities and lives of vulnerable groups. In order to achieve this:

The Council's developing community safety policy should start from the concerns of the residents, and have as a basic premise the need for the local authority and other agencies, such as the police, to concentrate their resources on those offenses thought by residents to be most problematic (Report 17.6.88).

Hence, the Community Safety initiative acknowledged the integral role of the police within its strategy and accepted that some form of contact would have to be necessary given the aims set out above. Essentially what was being proposed was a Council co-ordinated multi-agency approach utilizing all the Council's service departments as well as building upon existing work by those departments. The crucial departure from previous policy was the recognition of the role, even if limited, that the police had to play and the elimination of police monitoring as a Council concern. Thus, in the dissemination of crime prevention literature it was suggested that the Community Safety section would liaise with crime prevention officers of the Greater Manchester Police as well as make available police and Home Office literature on the issue.

As indicated, the fundamental omission within the new initiative, given that it had effectively taken over from the PMC, was the purging of all reference to monitoring or responding to the behaviour of the police. The police were no longer the primary focus of concern. The only mention
was of the possible use that the police could be. The debates had virtually come full circle from a critique of policing and multi-agency approaches and the dangers of such approaches to the utilization of a multi-agency approach which did not rule out co-operation with the police. In fact the initiatives proposed would have fitted in well with the principles laid out in the various Home Office circulars. What we witness was the neat dovetailing of the 'new Left realist' approach and the Home Office proposals on community crime control and much of that had to do with the emergence of the issues surrounding women and crime in Manchester. Once this issue was prioritized or reached prominence on the political agenda it became apparent that police monitoring and police accountability were not necessarily the issues that concerned women in a straightforward manner. Thus, the move away from the police monitoring initiative was compounded by the debate about women and crime that emerged nationally and which was reflected within various committees and working parties of Manchester City Council.

Discussion
This section has documented the dramatic reorientation that took place in the work of the PMC/PMU between 1985 and 1988. This reorientation was the result of a series of different pressures that bore down upon the PMC. First, there was the increasing political vulnerability of its work. During the transition period from old Police Authority to new Police Authority the PMC moved centre stage in the struggle for police accountability in Manchester. However, its controversy resulted in it becoming both locally and nationally politically vulnerable. In addition to the constant attacks on the initiative by the Conservatives and Liberals in Manchester, it was singled out by government spokespersons
as an example of 'loony Leftism'. This in turn caused electoral concern within the Labour Party both locally and nationally, particularly at a time when the Party was stressing its concern about crime. As a consequence the PMC came under increasing pressure to respond to the political attacks. The emergence of the national discourse on crime prevention provided the second source of pressure. The PMC's controversiality was intensified through its opposition to neighbourhood watch, community consultation and multi agency policing. The third source of pressure issued from demands of the Council that all departments had to become involved in facilitating community participation. The fourth source derived from the PMC's need to respond to an internal report that argued that the PMU had to rethink its strategies for making contact with the community. Both pressures forced the PMU into consultations with the whole community and as a consequence the issue of crime was placed firmly on its agenda. The final source of pressure was the necessity to respond to the increasing local and national concern about women's safety and fear of crime.

The response to these pressures took the form of a shift in the community interests that the PMC/PMU represented. There was a move away from the politically controversial campaign for police accountability to the politically popular promotion of community safety measures. As a consequence, those sections of the community who had problems with the police had their interests marginalized through the political prioritization of the interests of the whole community and the interests of women. In addition such a move also resulted in the facilitation of multi-agency policing arrangements. As a consequence, the interests of those for whom policing was a problem disappeared off the political agenda in Manchester.
Summary of Part IV

Part IV of this thesis has attempted to document and analyze the finale to the struggle for police accountability that took place in Manchester between 1985-1988. The significant changes that took place in the two models of community representation and participation have been chronicled.

a. The Police Authority and Community Liaison

On 1 April 1986 the government abolished the Police Authorities and replaced them with Joint Boards. In addition to changing the form of political representation the central state's control of policing arrangements was enhanced. During the last months of the operation of the old Police Authority all attempts to call the Chief Constable failed, most notably in the case of his unauthorized acquisition of plastic bullets. Ironically, during the first year of the operation of the new Police Authority the conflict with the Chief Constable intensified as a result of the latter's role in the Stalker Affair and his Aids speeches. However, through Anderton's continued assertion of his autonomy, which was supported by the Home Office, and the defeat of the Left on the Police Authority, the campaign to call the Chief Constable to account was finally neutralized.

Although the CRU continued with the work of the CLO there were important qualifications. As documented previously, the CRU discarded the community representative work of the CLO. As a consequence, the interests of black people were not part of the CRU's terms of reference. In addition, unlike the CLO, the CRU prioritized the issue of crime prevention and the issue of police accountability was not a part of its remit.
The CRU did attempt to take a more active approach to the problems of the under/non-representation of certain sections of the community. However, the fundamental problems with this representative model were compounded by the CRU's efforts. The attempts to involve young people resulted in the participation of those respectable young people for whom the police were not a problem. Therefore, the representativeness of the youth representatives was open to question. There were corresponding problems with the CRU's endeavors to facilitate the representation of women's interests. The CRU did not address the power imbalances and ideological divisions of interest that existed between women. By giving equal representation to all women, the CRU mobilized respectable women's groups who articulated dominant ideologies and this resulted in the non-participation of women's groups who questioned such ideologies.

As a consequence, the representative model continued to facilitate the interests of those respectable sections of the community not in conflict with the police. Within the operation of this model a process of defining in/out, inclusion/exclusion and prioritization/marginalization has been identified. The conclusion would seem to be that giving all sections of the community rights of representation within structures concerned with majority interests leads to the systematic non-representation and non-participation of powerless and marginal sections of the community. This is particularly ironic given that the original principle behind community liaison in Greater Manchester, was to enable the representation and participation of the powerless and the marginal sections of the community who were in conflict with the police.
b. Manchester City Council and Police Monitoring

A series of pressures have been identified that resulted in the considerable reorientation of the work of the PMC/PMU. The increasing political vulnerability of its campaign for police accountability, the emergence of the issue of crime prevention, its consultations with the whole community and the increasing concern about women's safety resulted in a considerable shift in the community interests that the PMC/PMU represented. As a result, the politically controversial campaign for police accountability was replaced by a politically popular community safety campaign. Consequently, the marginalization of the interests of those sections of the community subject to unaccountable policing practices occurred. In effect, as a result of the changes within the PMC/PMU, there was a considerable overlap between the work of the Community Safety Unit and the Community Relations Unit and the community interests represented within that work. As a consequence, in addition to being marginalized within the community liaison initiative, the interests of those for whom policing was a problem disappeared off the political agenda in Manchester. The final part of this thesis will examine the role of the local newspaper, the Manchester Evening News, in this marginalization process.
PART V: LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF THE COMMUNITY

A newspaper is ... much more than a business; it is an institution; it reflects and influences the life of a whole community (C.P. Scott, quoted in Cox and Morgan 1973:1).

The role of the media is of pivotal importance for this thesis because as was documented previously (see pp 18-19) participatory theorists have stressed that one of the conditions for effective participation is, at the very minimum, equal access to knowledge and information/communication systems. If this is absent, the possibilities for distortion and manipulation by those groups who do have access are increased considerably. Considerable attention has been paid to the role of newspapers and the media generally in creating a particular consensual concept of community in their reporting of the highly fragmented and differentiated world in which we live (see Cohen and Young, 1973; Glasgow University Media Group, 1976; 1982; Hall et al., 1978; Golding and Elliot, 1979). Central to this creation of consensus has been the documenting of which groups and interests achieve positive representation and which groups and interests are defined out either through being ignored or through negative representation. Whether groups and interests are defined in or defined out is not accidental. Hall et al., (1978:53-60) have argued that journalistic practices

combine to produce a systematically structured over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions. The media thus tend, faithfully and impartially, to reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in society's institutional order (ibid:58).

As a consequence powerful 'primary definers' are accorded the status of community representatives and their
interpretations of reality effectively set the agenda for how issues are discussed. Hall et al. argue that this 'initial interpretative framework' makes it very difficult for alternative arguments to achieve comparable representation. Thus powerless groups have considerable difficulties in having their interests represented in an undistorted manner within such an interpretative framework. As such the media has the influential role of clearly defining what is and what is not acceptable in British society, and articulating the consensual boundaries and contours of the community (Cohen and Young, 1973:342).

It has already been chronicled (see pp 253-254) how the popular press in Britain mobilized in a virtually monolithic manner to define out the 'loony' interests and groups represented by the new urban left during the 1980s. In doing so the contours of the community were powerfully reaffirmed in terms of what interests and groups would achieve representation and what interests would not.

If it is possible to identify a particular notion of community that is being articulated and reproduced at a national level, the question must be asked what notion, if any, does the local media articulate and reproduce? It has been argued that the notion of community is all the more important precisely because of the sense of proximity conveyed within the local dimension (see Williams, 1970; Jackson, 1971; Cox and Morgan, 1973; Hall et al., 1978).

Two key aspects of the relationship between the local press and the community have been identified. First, there is the role of the local paper in representing the community interest. Williams (1970:26) has argued that the uniqueness of the local paper lies in its expression of
'an interest larger than the paper itself: the interest of
the local community'.

Second, there is the role of the local paper in the
delineation and affirmation of community values and
boundaries. Jackson (1971) argues that the predominant
order/disorder features and stories that appear in the
local press exemplify values that are supposedly actively
held by the community and in doing so reaffirm the moral
boundaries of the local community. Thus, the local
newspaper clarifies

the nature of the positive forces in the community life
that the press discerns and which contrast with the
unabating flow of crimes, accidents, disasters and
institutional disorders (Jackson, 1972:120).

Thus, the local press not only attempts to convey
information about what happens in the community but acts
upon the assumption that it represents the community and
reaffirms and defends the moral boundaries of that
community. As such a particular form of reality is
reproduced, one which bolsters

the 'old truths', the old patterns, the old concerns,
the old and tried ways of doing things. It is a deep
affirmation of the social order, underscored by a
rooted popular traditionalism (Hall et al., 1978:114)

Cox and Morgan (1973) argue that local newspapers are
forced into such a role in their reporting of community
affairs. Their very localness imposes restrictions upon
how they operate. First, such a role is necessary because
of the concerns of the readership - concerns that are
important nationally may not be locally. Second, the
relationship with the locality is less anonymous than that
of national papers. The local paper itself is a part of
the local establishment. Whilst this means that it has
patronage to distribute in terms of good media coverage,
it is also dependent upon the goodwill of key local sources, and business interests, and is aware that there are serious social losses to be sustained if it miscalculates in its news coverage and comments. Finally, local papers are forced to emphasize the distinctiveness of their local coverage if they are to survive because they cannot compete with the national press in their coverage of non-local news. As a consequence of these restrictions they operate with an implicit conservative conception of the local community and their role within that community as representative of it. This representative role is geared towards protecting the 'the good of the town' (Cox and Morgan, 1973:108).

The above-mentioned studies illustrate that local newspapers have a crucial role to play in relation to shaping and articulating a particular conception of community. Through the mantle that the local newspaper takes on and its position within that community, a particular conservative consensual conception of community which gives respect to local elites, promotes 'quiet orderly government' (Cox and Morgan, 1973:133) and pride in locality is prominent. Issues and policies that threaten to rupture that notion of community and the assumptions flowing from it are met with considerable opposition. As such the local press

is essentially a conservative communications medium. It strongly upholds family and institutional life; it typically demands discipline in relation to penology and education; it values conventions and traditions. Broadly speaking, it endorses capitalistic assumptions and the Protestant ethic (Jackson, 1971:278).

Community Representation and the Manchester Evening News (MEN)

The Manchester Evening News (MEN) prides itself on having the largest circulation amongst provincial newspapers in
Britain and consequently has a conception of itself as being a key moulder of opinion. Prior to 1966, Jackson (1971:260) has noted that the paper was politically inclined towards the Conservative Party whereas between 1966 and 1970 it adopted a 'more radical outlook with explicit support for Labour, the Liberals and a general Lib-Lab position'. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, MEN totally opposed the increasing prominence of what it viewed as a hard Left both nationally and more importantly locally. As far as the paper was concerned Left extremism had no role to play in the intrinsically moderate political life of Manchester and therefore, its patronage went to community representatives who it defined as personifying sensible and moderate political views. Those who deviated from such values were portrayed as being not of the community.

1. MEN's Definition and Defence of the Community

The possibility of the Left wing of the Labour Party taking control of Manchester City Council deeply disturbed MEN as this would effectively mean, as far as the paper was concerned, the extremists finally coming in from the wilderness. From 1980 the tenor of the reports constantly suggested that a conspiracy had been hatched by extremists to infiltrate and gain control of the local Labour Party and through that to seize control of the City Council. Headlines such as 'Left all out for Town Hall power' (21.5.81) and 'Town Hall facing Left-wing takeover' (22.5.81) set the tone for the reporting of the struggle between the two factions of the Labour Party in Manchester. During this period the paper celebrated the rise of the moderate and sensible Social Democratic Party, warning the local Labour Party of the electoral consequences if it did not retain its moderate leadership (10.11.81). In 1984 MEN revealed to the community that
there was a distinct possibility of the Left taking control in the May elections and warned that if it happened

The spectre of Liverpool’s confrontation with the government will cast a long shadow over Manchester Town Hall (3.4.84).

This warning was repeated before and during the local elections with reports that ‘the Left’s long march to power was about to reach its goal’ (3.5.84) and that ‘Labour’s hard Left was today poised to seize Town Hall power in Manchester’ (3.5.84). In the days after the election results, MEN reported on the split between the moderate Labour councillors who had ruled Manchester for thirteen years and the hard Left lending support to the moderates in their attempts to retain power. After it was confirmed that the Left of the Party had taken control of the Council, the headlines were, ‘Left turn at the Town Hall’ (15.5.84), ‘And a Hard Left at Town Hall’ and ‘Rebels come in from the cold’ (16.5.84). It was also reported that the new leader of the hard Left was ‘so Left wing he made Red Ken Livingstone appear moderate’ (15.5.84).

Manchester Town Hall was firmly in the grip of Labour’s hard Left today. Coun Graham Stringer, new Left wing leader of the new controlling Labour group said their radical no-cuts confrontation-seeking manifesto would now become the policy of the city council (16.5.84).

A concerned editorial ‘The reality of power’ (16.5.84) expressed disappointment that the national Labour Party had allowed the extremists to take control of the Council and that the moderates had effectively been removed from positions of power.

the hard Left have now firmly grasped the reins of power and the city’s doyen of Socialist dogma, Graham Stringer, is in charge.

He has a reputation as a party extremist, but we are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt. We are
prepared to wait and see if he really does have the interests of Manchester - or those of a minority clique after their own political ends - at heart (16.5.84).

**MEN** declared its intention, as the representative of the community, to monitor the actions of the new Council and it urged the hard Left to be reconciliatory in its actions and policies for the good of that community.

The weight of office has a habit of tempering ideological dreams with hard nosed reality. Let us hope this continues to be the case (16.5.84).

This monitoring can be separated into two main areas. First, there was the monitoring of those actions and policies that the paper saw as denigrating the good name of Manchester and therefore not representing the best interests of the community. And second, there was the monitoring of those actions and policies that it defined as promoting sectional interests as opposed to the interests of the whole community. The overall purpose of this monitoring was to defend the good name of Manchester and the community.

i. **Defending the good name of Manchester**

**MEN** saw the takeover of power by the hard Left in itself as denigrating the good name of Manchester which was seen as being moderate and sensible. Concern was expressed about the possible effects on the civic traditions of Manchester of outsiders with extremist ideologies coming to power. As far as **MEN** was concerned, its worse fears were quickly realized as the new Council, unlike previous administrations, began to implement its manifesto commitments.

i (a). **The abolition of the post of Lord Mayor**

As part of its red scare-mongering prior to the elections, **MEN** had emphasized the threat to the Lord Mayor's office from the Left with headlines informing the community that
'Ex-Lord Mayor quits Labour' (10.11.81) and 'Lord Mayor Dropped by Labour' (5.1.82). For MEN such concerns were confirmed by the 1984 Labour manifesto which promised to replace the Lord Mayor with a Chair of Council. After the election, initial attempts to implement this proposal were defeated by the combined efforts of the opposition parties, and crucially by the rebel moderate Labour councillors. This resulted in a Conservative becoming Lord Mayor but with the ruling group committed to abolition of the post at the first opportunity. It was decided to cut back on expenditure on the ritualistic trappings associated with the post. This brought the Council stern censure from MEN for interfering with the civic traditions of Manchester with headlines such as 'Left scraps civic pomp', 'Axe falls on town hall tradition' (10.7.84) and 'New Threat to Lord Mayor' (12.12.84).

The hard Left running Manchester detest the office as a symbol of civic pomp and were only thwarted in their bid to axe the post this year by an alliance between Tories and moderate Labour councillors (12.12.84).

On 24 April 1985 the Left's decision to abolish the post was met with 'The Lord Mayor pageantry axed'. There was a detailed report on the plans of the Left to 'end elitism and outdated custom' and that as a result 'a 94 year tradition was consigned to the history books despite a city wide referendum opposing the view' (24.4.85). When the abolition was affected, considerable coverage was given to the last day of the Lord Mayor. Indignant editorials (16.5.85; 24.5.85) castigated the Left.

An Eastern European-style political "chair" is not wanted in democratic Britain, what we want is a neutral ambassador for Manchester who is bright enough to rise above petty local politics and instead support this great city (24.5.85).

It was stressed that whether the Left liked it or not 'at some point in the future the Lord Mayor will be back'.

After the abolition of the post MEN scrutinized the actions of the 'First Citizen', the new name for the Lord Mayor, very closely as well as reporting on the response of the community to the change. MEN, in an editorial, stated that it would not accept the new title and would continue to refer to him as Lord Mayor (20.5.85). By 24 May 1985 the actions of the First Citizen in appearing on the picket lines of industrial disputes provoked an editorial, 'Lord Mayor's bad start' (24.5.85) about the embarrassment and disgrace he had caused Manchester. The reports after this consistently emphasized how he had broken with tradition and protocol and was causing irreparable damage to the good name of Manchester. On 19 June 1985 extensive prominence was given to the Leader of the Council's admission that the abolition of the post of Lord Mayor had been 'a propaganda disaster'.

However, by December 1985 MEN had to report the possibility that the Left was proposing for first citizen "a female gay rights campaigner" and with relief announced on 9 January 1986 that the Council had backed down and decided on a less controversial choice. In the same edition of the paper a feature, 'Sadness for lost tradition' documented the ex-Lord Mayor's wife sadness at the abolition of the post. This was followed on 30 January 1986 by the demand from a group of elderly citizens 'We want a REAL mayor'. On 8 February 1988 it was reported that the Left was softening in its attitude towards the post of Lord Mayor. On 23 March 1988 MEN reported that a 'Pact For Return of Lord Mayor' was being worked out between moderates and the Left as part of the overall package for the former's support for the Council leadership. On 24 May 1988 the paper was able to report the 'Return of the Lord Mayor' with an editorial welcoming the new woman mayor and attacking the Left for being
foolish enough to attempt to abolish an institution that had been established by a medieval Royal Charter.

(b) The rates rebellion
The Left had to face up to the consequences of its manifesto commitment to a 'no ifs, no buts, no cuts' administration by refusing to set a rate. MEN reported the decision in a suitably dramatic fashion with headlines such as 'City ready to defy the law' (21.1.85); 'City gathers forces to fight Thatcher cuts' (18.1.85); 'City is ready for rates battle' (1.2.85); 'City is set for rate rebellion' (7.3.85); 'Huge Cost of Rates Revolt' (19.3.85); 'Labour set for rates in-fight' (20.3.85). An editorial, 'The cap will have to fit' (7.3.85) noted that the 'whiff of rebellion is in the air' with Labour councils throughout England getting ready to challenge the government and with dreary resignation added 'inevitably, the Left dominated city council in Manchester is among them'.

After the decision of the Left not to set a rate was ratified, MEN warned the Left about playing political games which could 'threaten the bankruptcy of a great and proud city' and reminded them that

The council has a solemn responsibility not only to make the city a proper place in which to live, but to do all in its power to invigorate the community (8.3.85).

This was followed by another Armageddon type editorial 'Tonight's the night' (22.3.85) which whilst conceding that the 'Left' had 'governed' Manchester in a competent manner, demanded, in relation to its refusal to set the rate, that 'council leaders must grow up and act for the good of the city'. When a rate was finally set, an editorial, 'Good sense prevails' (1.4.85) described the
decision as a victory for common sense over the 'fatuous self defeating stance' of the Left.

Had the hard Left stuck to their guns and refused to set a rate they would have made fools of themselves and would have put the well being of a great city in jeopardy.

The fiscal crises of 1987 and 1988 were reported in a similar manner and when the Left was finally forced to compromise with the moderates of the Labour Party to get their proposals through, an editorial 'Working Together' (29.1.88) argued that the Left should have realized that its unpopular 'loony' schemes would eventually have to be jettisoned. As a consequence of the compromise it argued that 'the Labour group will be more representative of the views of the voters of the city'.

ii. Defending the interests of the community

It is worth reiterating that when the Left took control of the council in Manchester, MEN warned in an editorial that it would monitor whether the council would represent the interests of Manchester 'or those of the minority clique after their own political ends' (16.5.84). Since the 1984 manifesto promised to implement structures and policies that would facilitate equal opportunities with the intention of facilitating the representation and participation of previously unrepresented and non-participating constituencies, MEN had no doubt whom the council was representing in terms of the allocation of scarce resources and recruitment practices, i.e., those who did not fit into MEN's conception of the community.

The paper expressed its concern that the Left was conducting a purge both against moderate councillors and senior council officers. A consistent theme in the reporting of internal council politics was that since the Left had come to power it was behaving in a vindictive
manner towards its political opponents, particularly moderate Labour councillors. Considerable coverage was given to the complaints of the moderates that the Left had broken with tradition in refusing reconciliation with its opponents and was instead conducting a witch hunt. Such allegations were accompanied by headlines such as 'Wrath of the Labour Left' (8.5.85); 'Council mods on the mat'; 'Mods stay out in the cold by one vote' (16.5.85) and 'Mean' Labour are rapped' (2.7.85)

Labour moderates have been summoned to attend a 'Star Chamber session' by Left wingers on Manchester City council

Such reporting of the malevolent Left also extended to reports of a conspiracy to remove local moderate MPs who were opposed to extremism. Thus internal reselection struggles were reported under headlines such as 'Left wing threat to oust MP Alf' (10.4.85), 'Left challenges Kaufman' (1.5.85) and 'Kaufman safe after Left threat' (13.5.85).

This conspiracy also extended to high profile coverage of allegations that senior council officials were being singled out for harassment by the victorious Left. 'Forced to quit row' (10.11.84) 'Forced out by the Left wing regime in the Town Hall' (10.11.84); 'Bitter end to top career' (12.1.85); 'I was victim of pub plot' (31.1.85); 'Another chief quits key job' (22.7.85). This was how the allegations were reported. All the resignation and early retirement stories were placed within the context of the previous ones emphasizing that it was because these officials were opposed to the new policies the Left was introducing that they were being forced out.

This purging was placed in the context of the recruitment for posts in the new units created by the Council. There
was constant coverage ('Row over £28,000 city post'); 'Essay is a farce' (11.10.85); 'Town Hall 'jobs for the boys' row' (19.2.85) of opposition allegations that not only were the Left appointing their own people but also outsiders as opposed to Mancunians. Such allegations were linked to opposition claims that ratepayers' money was being wasted on support for 'loony Left' groupings and that the Town Hall was 'Bulging at the seams' (19.7.85) whilst the wishes of other sections of the community were being ignored. Opposition parties' outrage at the financial support of the Left for the setting up of an Equal Opportunity Unit, at the decision to make Manchester a nuclear free city and to twin it with towns in East Germany and Nicaragua was reported in full. 'Labour Backs Aid To Rebels' (14.1.86) was how the proposal of the Council to give financial support to the rebel councils of Liverpool and Lambeth was announced. 'Broadside at War Party' (13.2.86) attacked, via the Conservatives, the council's proposed celebrations to commemorate the Spanish Civil War. The headline 'IRA link grows: Labour plans to twin with Sinn Fein City' (8.2.88) announced the proposals to twin Manchester with Derry.

In focusing on the new appointments by the council, particularly critical attention was paid to the policies of the Council in relation to gays in Manchester. What can only be described as a homophobic campaign was conducted by MEN against what it saw as the Left's support for homosexuality. The headlines, 'City grant to gays raised by £4,500' (26.6.84) and 'More help for gays' (5.7.84) were accompanied with reports that despite 'fierce Tory opposition' the Council had decided to give more financial support to homosexual groups. Prominence was given to a Conservative councillor who claimed that Manchester was becoming 'another Sodom and Gomorrah' and that 'decent
people were being driven out of the city (5.7.84). 'Gay?' The job could be yours' (23.10.84)

people applying for jobs on a council's new equal opportunities unit could be disqualified...unless they are homosexual (23.10.84).

The headlines, 'City prisoner of the gays' (8.11.84); '£140-a week for lesbian worker' (22.11.84); 'Gays back sex roles move' (30.1.85); 'Gay bias blast at Left' (7.2.85) were followed by a complete feature about a moderate Labour councillor complaining about the Left’s attitude towards gays promising that he would not 'let the Left turn Manchester into a gay city like San Francisco' (8.2.85).

The idea that the Left was turning Manchester into a gay city became a constant theme of MEN's reporting with headlines such as 'Alarm over city haven for gays' (22.2.85); 'City's gays run into thousands' (1.3.85)

Manchester is to open its doors to homeless gay couples - sparking fears that the city will be invaded by homosexuals (22.2.85).

This theme appeared at the same time as MEN was reporting the discovery of the first AIDS cases in Manchester. On 25 January 1985 front page headlines reported that 'The killer disease Aids has spread to Manchester' and this was followed by regular reports on the spread of the virus to the city with probably one of the most controversial headlines being 'Gay plague fear sparks action' on 5 July 1985. The link between the stories was finally made in the story, 'Uproar Over Aids Haven' (3.3.85).

This prioritization of marginal and dangerous 'loony Left' groupings, such as gays, was contrasted regularly with the treatment of other sections of the community. In fact in much of the reporting it was inferred that these marginal groupings were not of the community at all and that the
Left's support of them was at the expense of the whole community. Such themes were to the fore in the paper's coverage of the ban on military parades in the City as a result of it being made a nuclear free zone and the Left's promise to support peace groups in the city. MEN took up the claim that this meant that old soldiers would not be allowed their traditional commemoration march. The paper's normal coverage of the commemoration before the Left took over was through high profile dramatic montages with headlines such as 'We Will Remember Them' (7.11.81)

This supposed prioritization of peace groups by the Left led to a direct confrontation with MEN in its role of representing the decent members of the community. A campaign was mounted, utilizing military metaphors and images, against the attitude of the Left to those members of the community who had served in two world wars to safeguard democracy. It was constantly reiterated that the decision of the council was an insult to those who had died. 'Carry on Marching' (29.6.84) was the headline that reported a MEN poll had shown that 88% of Mancunians supported the idea of allowing the old soldiers to parade.

The headlines, 'Left shoot down RAF rescue bid' (5.7.84); 'Cecil's war on military ban' (10.7.84); 'By the Left fall out again' (23.2.85); 'Cruise crusade stunt slammed' (19.3.85); 'Veterans snub peace march' (15.3.85); 'VE Day Uniform ban final insult' (1.5.85); 'Heroes outflank VE Day killjoys' (13.5.85) left no one in doubt where MEN stood on the issue. This campaign continued with 'Cheers for the troops' (15.6.85)

Crowds packed Manchester City Council yesterday to watch the Kings Regiment - dubbed Manchester's own-exercise its freedom of a city whose anti-nuclear council leaders have said the army isn't welcome (15.6.86).
Thus, MEN took on a very vigorous monitoring and campaigning role as the self appointed guardian and watchdog of community values. The paper took the position that the Left had not only somehow usurped power but was out to destroy the institutions of community pride and replace them with ones premised upon alien ideologies. There was also the suggestion that the Left had found it necessary to bring in outsiders literal, like themselves, to do this job since decent Mancunians would not co-operate with such plans. This was the reason why it was prioritizing the interests of groups that the paper did not see as being a legitimate part of the community.

The reporting of the actions of the Left in control of Manchester was very different to the reporting of the Greater Manchester Council (GMC). There was very little critical coverage of the GMC because it was viewed by MEN as being under respectable Labour control as opposed to the hard Left. When it became apparent that the Council was going to be abolished MEN expressed severe reservations about the government’s proposals. On 9 July 1985 MEN asked ‘What now?’ in an editorial which was critical of the attitude of successive governments towards the metropolitan county councils and concluded that abolition could turn out to be a costly mistake.

On 19 July 1985 a feature described how the GMC had enhanced the reputation and pride of the region. This was accompanied by an editorial, ‘Lasting tribute’, about the contribution that the GMC had made and how it had ‘etched its name in the local history books’. This positive reporting of the sensible and moderate policies and actions of the GMC stands in dramatic contrast to the constant criticism of the extremists who had taken control of Manchester Town Hall. The only committee of the GMC
that received considerable coverage and comment in the paper was the Police Authority. The conflict between the Authority and the Chief Constable made the front page headlines on numerous occasions and the shaping of that reporting can only be understood within the context of the above-mentioned role that MEN took in relation to safeguarding the community. It was this role that determined the reporting of policing matters in Manchester generally.

b. MEN's defence of the protectors of the Community

Given that crime, law breaking and disorder have a large part to play in local news stories it is hardly surprising that the custodians of law and order appear as paragons of virtue and the protectors of community values (see Chibnall, 1977; Hall, et al 1978; Cohen, 1980; Reiner, 1985). Additionally, as a powerful local institution Greater Manchester Police (GMP) was accorded respect and courtesy. As emphasized in the opening discussion about the nature of the relationship between the media and 'primary definers' the media perceive some institutions as more important and hence more 'newsworthy' than others and they perpetuate that perception by locating themselves within or near those institutions (Negrine, 1989).

This was not just because of the nature of the relationship between the journalists and the force but also because MEN was proud of the heroic deeds of the institution that protected the community.

Headlines such as 'Naked Courage of Tower Block PC' (6.5.81) 'Our wonderful bobbies' (11.10.84), 'The boys in blue save the day' (18.5.84), 'Gentle arms of the law' (3.4.85) and 'Magnificent 7 foil lager louts' (13.1.89) give an idea of the dramatic context within which policing matters were reported. As well as the stream of stories
about horrific acts of criminality, there were also ones relating to the heroic nature of policing and the dangers associated with the job of protecting the community. Editorials and features constantly affirmed the image of 'the thin blue line' in maintaining order and keeping at bay those forces of evil that would engulf and destroy the community.

The disturbances of 1981 and the 1984 coal dispute provided MEN with a torrent of dramatic images of chaos and disorder, and with bleeding police officers who had been attacked by 'the mob'. When Liverpool 8 exploded and officers from the GMP were sent as reinforcements, the headlines were unequivocal in their support for the police. Headlines such as 'Police: CS gas was our only choice'; 'Terror of Toxteth'; 'My 4 hours of Hell in Hate City' (all, 6.7.81) were accompanied by editorials 'Bloody face of Britain' (6.7.81) and 'Battle which must be won' (7.7.81), supporting the use of police and technology on the grounds that

If the police should lose control, anarchy will reign and no city in Britain will be safe (7.7.81).

When Moss Side erupted the news copy left nothing to the imagination: 'Looting Blitz in Moss Side'; 'Paradise lost...from haven to ghetto'; 'Hooligan army's orgy of looting'; 'Crime orgy' (8.7.81); 'Guerilla war in Moss Side'; 'Like a scene from Dante's inferno'; 'Streets of Blind Fury' (9.7.81). Photographs with 'thin blue line' captions appeared with editorials such as 'Law and Order' (14.7.81) and 'Riots and the Police' (3.9.81) giving full support to the police and demanding the use of appropriate riot control

When mobs go on the rampage, burning, looting and attacking the forces of law and order, what are our policemen supposed to do - withdraw and let anarchy reign or take positive action to protect the rest of
the community? (3.9.81).

As a result of the controversy generated by the setting up of the Hytner Inquiry, MEN in an editorial (17.7.81) initially took the line that it was a waste of time and supported the City Council's demand for Scarman to conduct an investigation into the riots. The testimony of one witness received front page headlines in a manner not accorded to those criticizing the policing of Moss Side. This particular witness agreed with the Chief Constable that there had been a conspiracy to start the riots and his evidence was headed 'The Fine Police Of Moss Side' (24.8.81). When the Hytner report was released, MEN concentrated on the fact that although the Hytner report stated that police-community relations in Moss Side were bad, it was complimentary to the Chief Constable and his approach to the policing of Moss Side. The headline 'New era dawning for police' was accompanied by an editorial 'Bury the hatchet' (12.10.81) stressing that all sections of the community had to work together with the police to ensure that further disturbances did not break out. Community leaders and representatives in Moss Side were also warned that they had a duty to keep 'their' people under control.

During the coal dispute MEN took a similar position. Images and stories of police casualties, 'PCs hurt in pithead battle' (9.11.84); 'Why bullies are out' (10.11.84); 'Pit petrol bomb riot' (12.11.84); 'Murder of a pit innocent' (30.11.84) were accompanied by editorials demanding that the government give extra resources to the 'weary blue line' (10.1.85). In addition the responsibility for the violence was firmly placed with the leadership of the National Union of Mine Workers.

Thus the base line for reporting police affairs, during
the period of this study, was that it was the one
institution that stood between the community and barbarism.
The maintenance of law and order is of paramount
importance to the vast majority of people in this
country...We simply cannot afford to let the mobsters
take over (Editorial: 14.6.85).

Everyone knows the police have a difficult and often
dangerous task to perform in protecting society from
terrorists and other criminals (Editorial: 9.1.86).

It is all too fashionable these days to criticize a
police force which carries out its duties in
increasingly hazardous times. Those of us who look to
the police for protection owe them an immense debt of
gratitude (Editorial: 6.1.89).

The law of the land is sacrosanct. The alternative is
anarchy (Editorial: 18.1.89).

As a consequence stories of police malpractice were played
down. Whilst there were reports of police deviance and
criminality they were not emphasized and did not produce
concerned editorials. Comment was usually absent unless it
was about other police forces, eg, 'Bias, Bullying and
Booze: Police's Own Report Shames the Met'; 'Met's Pride
Shattered by a Hammer Blow' (18.11.83). The malpractice of
officers of the GMP was explained by reference to the
rotten apple theory of police deviance. There was no
question of institutional explanations being utilized by
the paper to make sense of such deviance.

1. MEN and the Police Authority
Another implication of the position of MEN concerning the
police was that those who criticized the police or came
into conflict with them received censorious coverage.
Implicitly since the police were of the community those
who criticized the institution were defined as not being
representative of the community, or indeed of the
community. During the period of the most bitter rows
between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority, this
was the manner in which the conflict was reported. MEN was sympathetic to the Chief Constable's claims that the Authority was attempting to control him politically in order to gain influence over GMP. There was also the inference that this particular GMC committee was controlled by extremists of the Party.

MEN also tended to argue that the conflict was the result of a personality clash between the Chair of the Authority and the Chief Constable. In this personality clash the Chief Constable, as one of Hall et al's 'primary definers', had an unfair advantage. First, the fact that the Chief Constable was a local lad made good ensured MEN's deference and support. Second, the Chief Constable was the community representative in charge of safeguarding the community. This personalization also resulted in MEN referring to the GMP as the Chief Constable's force. There was continual reference to 'Jim's cops'. This provided the context within which the arguments between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority must be understood. The Police Authority, and particularly the Chair, was viewed as trying to interfere with the Chief Constable's force.

When the Labour Party won the 1981 County Council elections, an editorial urged that the government set up an inquiry into the question of police accountability because it recognized that the relationship between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority would change. Concern was expressed about the implications of having a Labour controlled Police Authority which was committed to democratic accountability of the police. This was the only time in MEN's coverage of the conflict over the policing of Greater Manchester that an editorial or story was devoted to the issue in terms of accountability. Given MEN's concern it is not surprising that the resultant
conflict provided striking front page headlines and statements, eg, 'Anderton is warned: stay out of Politics' (9.5.81); 'Tighten grip on police, bid by watchdogs' (3.6.81); 'Riot Storm:Police Probe Starts' (21.7.81); 'Chief Slams Tribunal' (4.9.81); 'Anderton crisis as council chief lashes out' (1.10.81); 'Leave police alone-Anderton' (18.10.83); 'Who is boss? Police Storm' (7.1.84); 'Crisis talks on police budget' (11.1.84); 'Anderton 'snub' storm' (5.4.84); 'Anderton sticks to his guns' (20.7.84); 'Tough talking Anderton slams...Picket line terrorism' (27.6.84); 'Sacked: Rebel who backed Anderton' (27.7.84); 'Anderton's new clash' (8.9.84); 'Anderton storm goes to the top' (6.10.84); 'Don't prostitute the police pleads Jim' (7.6.85); 'Police chief lashes new law' (10.1.85); 'Sign a pledge order to Jim' (8.6.85).

When MEN felt that the conflict had reached intolerable levels editorials would pronounce on the issue. Thus, when the Police Authority decided to abolish the Police Band MEN in 'Harsh notes over band' (9.1.94) presented very forthright views on the nature of the conflict.

What it boils down to is yet another bust-up on the fundamental issue of who should control the police, the Chief Constable or the police committee.

Also involved is a clash of personalities between the outspoken police chief and the determined committee chairman, Mrs Gabrielle Cox, between whom there is no love lost.

The editorial concluded that the 106 year old tradition was being threatened and that 'every effort must be made to ensure that the band plays on'. As the row continued, MEN responded critically to the decision of the Labour group to remove a councillor who had voted against their decision. An editorial supported the rebel Labour councillor against the 'Left-dominated committee'
he had the temerity to abstain when the motion was carried by 13 votes to 11 – the only Labour councillor to defy the party whip. As a result, he has been sacked from the committee. That is democracy in Manchester, 1984 (27.7.84).

Within the overall context of the reporting of police and community affairs in Manchester the conflict between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority was always likely to be reported in a manner which was supportive of the Chief Constable.

ii. MEN and the Police Monitoring Committee

Given that the majority of the conflict over policing in Manchester took place within the meetings of the Police Authority, MEN paid little attention to the setting up of the Police Monitoring Committee (PMC) by Manchester City Council. However, the controversy surrounding the initiative guaranteed that MEN would pay attention to the PMC, eg, 'Watchdog mum fights jail smear' (14.7.84); 'Labour in police bashing row' (1.8.84); 'Check on Policing' (14.9.84); 'Reform or quit, Anderton told' (19.10.84); ‘Anger over cash for police probe’ (20.10.84). The PMC began to provide MEN with a stream of controversial headlines both in terms of statements and actions it was making concerning the Chief Constable and the policing of Manchester, eg, 'City sleuths trail police' (29.5.85); 'Police tactics to be probed' (25.5.85); 'Anderton challenged over cuts' (28.5.85).

Considerable coverage was given to the outrage of the Conservative and Liberal councillors over the setting up of the initiative. When the Police Monitoring Unit (PMU) was set up, MEN reported that the new Head of Unit had 'taken on the hottest job in Manchester' (11.2.85) because police officers and opposition councillors viewed it as, 'police basher number One'. It was emphasized that
Conservative and Liberal councillors would be campaigning for the abolition of the PMC, eg, 'Fight to axe new police unit' (22.2.85), 'Storm over Police groups' (22.2.86). This coverage of the outraged opposition was strengthened by the high profile given to comments by national politicians. 'MP slams 'Watch' magazine' (25.2.86) reported that in the House of Commons Policewatch had been described as 'a scurrilous and divisive document' and 'a blatant misuse of ratepayers money for subversive campaigning' (25.2.86). The headline, 'Hurd slams Police Critics' (1.3.86) reported that the Home Secretary had accused Labour politicians in Manchester of spreading malicious anti-police propaganda.

I have been shocked and angered by vicious anti police propaganda spewed out by various hard Left controlled authorities by supposedly responsible members of the Labour Party.

The statements of the local and national opposition were also given a high profile when the PMC/U decided to oppose neighbourhood watch being introduced.

Labour councillors stunned community leaders by condemning popular Home Watch groups as information gathering exercises.

MEN expressed concern that because of the extremist stance of the PMU on issues such as Policewatch and neighbourhood watch, Manchester was acquiring the unwelcome label of being an anti-police city. The paper also blamed the conflict between the Chief Constable and the joint board on the fact that members of the PMC were Manchester's representatives on the new Police Authority.

Given the extremely hostile attitude of the paper to the PMC, MEN reported the imminent demise of the PMU in dramatic fashion. 'Mods want swift axe on police team' (18.12.88) was the headline that announced the possibility that the PMU would be disbanded. This was followed by
'Police unit pledge as the axe looms' (22.12.87) and 'City's pet unit axe is binding' (29.12.87), reporting that the Liberals were 'cock-a-hoop' with the decision. The headline, 'Axe poised over police watchdog' (23.3.88), announced the final demise of the police monitoring initiative in Manchester and 'City funds crime fight' (26.3.88) heralded the setting up of the Community Safety team to replace the 'controversial' Police Monitoring Committee.

Thus, MEN had little difficulty in locating itself in relation to the arguments between the Chief Constable, the Police Authority and the PMC. However, there was one incident that took place during the course of this thesis that disrupted the normal pattern of the paper's reporting of policing matters in Greater Manchester. From the beginning MEN supported John Stalker, stating bluntly that the allegations were 'totally unwarranted' (26.8.86) and ran a series of exclusives in relation to the latest developments throughout. On the day that the Police Authority finally met to discuss the Sampson Report it ran an editorial 'End the Agony', demanding that the Police Authority should reject the recommendation of West Yorkshire Chief Constable Colin Sampson...they should issue him [Stalker] with a firm reprimand and allow him to return to work forthwith (22.8.86).

MEN argued that the allegations amounted to 'minor misdemeanors' and that there were very few senior police officers in Britain who would emerge with a clean slate if they had been subjected to a similar the type of investigation. When it was announced that Stalker had been cleared by the Police Authority, the paper ran an editorial on 'Anderton and Stalker' expressing its 'delight that John Stalker is back at his desk' (26.8.86).
This editorial was highly critical of the Sampson inquiry the attitude of James Anderton stating that ‘His conduct before and since the inquiry got under way has left much to be desired’. The paper claimed that the Chief Constable had ‘continued to humble his deputy’ and that whilst Stalker had shown ‘immense dignity and fortitude throughout’ the Chief Constable had acted ‘quite shamefully’. This editorial ended by noting that the Chief Constable was to become head of Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in September.

Members of this prestigious body might well question whether he has behaved in a manner which deserves such a high honour.

On the 18 December 1986 the front page was devoted to Stalker’s decision to resign from GMP. It was reported that this decision would plunge GMP into crisis once again since there were rumours of deep splits within the senior ranks of the GMP. This was followed by an editorial ‘Enough is enough’ (22.12.86) which reviewed John Stalker’s career and downfall. MEN blamed the Chief Constable for bringing about the situation because of his response to the reinstatement of Stalker.

His going is to be greatly regretted. And the saddest aspect of the whole sorry affair is that it was totally unnecessary (22.12.86).

As indicated the paper expressed concern about the impact of the affair on force morale and on 29 December 1986 there was one of the most forthright reports, ‘Police in crisis’, about a crisis of confidence within the GMP and in relation to the leadership of the Chief Constable.

No sooner had the Stalker affair quietened down than MEN had to deal with the Chief Constable’s controversial comments on AIDS made during a speech on 11 December 1986 and subsequent comments on Radio 4 on 18 January 1986. This prompted another editorial, ‘Prophet Jim’, which
stated that although he was entitled to his beliefs he had gone too far this time in his 'implacable stance'. **MEN** made it clear that the Chief Constable had been rebuked by the Bishop of Manchester, had caused a row within the Police Federation and 'even those within his own force who have rushed to defend him are becoming increasingly embarrassed by his dogmatism'. It also took a swipe at his supposed Christian beliefs for a man so committed to using his job as an instrument of God's judgement, Mr Anderton appears to lack one important Christian virtue — that of compassion.

He certainly did not allow compassion to cloud his judgement of those suffering from Aids and he displayed precious little of this quality in his dealings with his deputy, John Stalker.

Extensive coverage was given to the criticisms of the Chief Constable with front page headlines such as 'Anderton under fire' (19.1.87); 'Anderton called to crisis talk' (20.1.87) and 'Anderton the Martyr?' (21.1.87). A main article was devoted to the question 'Should Jim go? You have your say' (21.1.87)

Jim Anderton should go — that was the gut reaction of many people on the streets of Manchester today... The Manchester Evening News chose people at random, and most of them said Greater Manchester's police chief should quit now.

There was constant reference to 'the beleaguered Chief Constable' and to the fact that 'he had pulled out of a public engagement involving the visit of Royalty to Manchester in order not to 'subject Her Royal Highness to any embarrassment' because of the 'huge amount of Press and media interest in him in the wake of his controversial Aids speech' (21.1.87). **MEN** emphasized that it was not just the Left wingers of the PMC who were fiercely critical of the Chief Constable but that the Chairman of the Police Authority, Coun. Steve Murphy, regarded as a Labour moderate, has already told
Mr Anderton to shut up or go (21.1.87).

It was also stated, referring to the rifts caused by the Stalker Affair, that his own force was not prepared to continue to give unconditional support to their Chief Constable. One senior officer was quoted as saying 'we rally around him, but then he knocks his own wickets over in another row' (21.1.87).

As a consequence, according to MEN, Anderton was isolated and had become 'a solitary figure who does not discuss his innermost problems' mainly because without John Stalker there was 'no longer a shoulder to lean on' (21.1.87). During the subsequent meetings at the Home Office to resolve the crisis surrounding the Chief Constable's statements, considerable coverage was given to those respectable members of the community who were advising the Chief Constable to take a lower profile. Under the headline 'Police urge: Cool it Jim', (26.1.87) it was reported that ACPO was concerned about the negative publicity the Chief Constable's comments had aroused as well as the ridicule of the officers of GMP. This was reiterated in the accompanying editorial which stated that Anderton's role in the Stalker Affair, his Aids speeches and the 'constant battles with his Police Authority have given the force a high profile it could well do without'. MEN argued that he should 'concentrate his considerable talents on halting the soaring crime rate in Greater Manchester'. However, this editorial also criticized the 'less than diplomatic' comments made by certain left wing members of the Police Authority, warning both sides that language like this helps no-one and it is imperative that Mr Anderton and those who seek to control his words and his deeds, curb their tongues if public respect is to be retained (26.1.87).

The paper also gave extensive coverage to the Chief
Constable's controversial interview to Woman's Own in which he supported flogging. Editorials, particularly 'The Lord's Voice' (14.12.87;) stated that he was continuing to embarrass the force and that the 'public would prefer him to concentrate on policing rather than pontificating' This upset the Chief Constable so much that he gave his tape recordings of the interview to the paper to prove that his views had been distorted.

Thus, MEN's position in relation to the GMP, the Chief Constable and the policing of Manchester was clearly tested by the Stalker Affair and the aftermath of the Chief Constable's AIDS speeches. It supported Stalker openly against the Chief Constable and in relation to the AIDS controversy definitely pushed for the silencing of Anderton in the interests of the community and the GMP. This was the key point for MEN. It had constantly defended Anderton, as the chief officer of a central community institution, from attacks by the Left but it could no longer do so when his actions and words seemingly endangered that institution.

There are two other interconnected reasons why MEN withdrew its support from the Chief Constable over, and after, the Stalker Affair. First, respectable members of the local community and national politicians, ie, other 'primary definers' were decidedly unhappy with what they viewed as the conspiracy to remove John Stalker from his investigations. Therefore, MEN had to take into account the fact that it was not just the 'loony left' of the PMC or the Police Authority who were asking awkward questions. Second, the Affair not only brought negative attention upon the GMP but also upon other key local institutions and individuals. In doing so it opened the proverbial can of worms. The 'establishment' in Manchester came under
intense scrutiny during the Stalker Affair because of allegations made concerning the Conservative Party, the Freemasons and the criminal connections of the local business elite (see Taylor 1987). Thus, the community institutions and respectable Mancunians to which MEN as a matter of course gave its support were suddenly surrounded by decidedly unsavoury allegations. Under such circumstances MEN took on its role as protector of the local interest. It is notable that as soon as the Chief Constable ceased to bring controversy to local institutions MEN once more offered him protection from his critics.

Alternative Newspaper Representation of the Community

a. Alternative community representation on politics

What is rarely documented in studies of the media are attempts to set up alternatives to challenge the dominant forms/means of information dissemination. If all sections of the community are to have equal representation of their interests, the provision of such alternatives is crucial because of how their interests are distorted, manipulated and hence defined out by the dominant media forms. The only alternative media representation to MEN in Manchester before the elections of 1984 was City Life, an independent magazine concerned with all aspects of life in Manchester. This magazine continually monitored the actions of council, the police and MEN as well as reporting on local scandals and controversies. It was broadly sympathetic to the policies of the new Council, including the setting up of the PMC. However, City Life eventually met the fate of all independent alternative under funded publications in it was taken over by MEN.

It was precisely because of the anticipated attitude of
MEN, and to a degree City Life, towards the Left of the Labour Party that the new Council immediately made plans to produce its own magazine, The Manchester Magazine. This magazine was to be part of the new strategy not only to involve but also bring about the participation of the community in the work of the Council. In justifying the setting up of the new publication the council argued that Manchester needs a magazine that strives to serve the whole community (Sept 1984:3).

The magazine enabled the council to explain its policies and to provide an alternative to the possible sensationalist and negative coverage such policies would receive in MEN. As such the magazine had a series of roles to play. First, features explained the Council’s philosophy in relation to nuclear weapons, sexual minorities, ethnic minorities, the disabled and the unemployed and its position in relation to central government policies. Second, it provided information about where to contact councillors, where and when meetings were taking place, how to claim benefits and how to make complaints. Third, it gave space to various community groups and interests to use the magazine to publicize their own events and meetings and to explain their position on pertinent issues. Thus, the magazine gave consistent representation to those under/non-represented groups and issues that it said it would represent in the manifesto. It also meant that these sections of the community were getting a chance to put their case in a manner which MEN would not allow. The general idea conveyed by the magazine was that Manchester was a heterogeneous community and that all sections had a right to have their views represented. This was directly opposite to the notion of community utilized and represented by MEN.
The new magazine not only met with a degree of scepticism from MEN but it also generated a reactionary alternative in the form of Citywatch, which was produced by the Conservative Party. It was stressed that this was an alternative to the propaganda pumped out by the Labour Council. Citywatch argued that hard line Marxists from outside of Manchester had 'stolen the Labour Party’s clothing' and taken control of the Council. As a result it was claimed that the Council had grossly misrepresented central government policies, destroyed Manchester's civic traditions and financed a series of 'mad cap schemes'. With regard to the latter the PMC was specifically identified as well as 'the interests of lesbians, homosexuals, ethnic minorities, women and the disabled' (No2:2).

The magazine stressed that the 'totalitarian Eastern European style administration' in charge of the council would bring rack and ruin to Manchester. What was most striking about Citywatch was its close resemblance to MEN in its portrayal of what had happened in Manchester since the Left had taken over. Thus, the setting up, by the Council, of a magazine to provide alternative definitions of reality resulted in another alternative magazine being launched to reinforce dominant definitions of that reality.

b. Alternative community representation on policing

This process also happened in relation to the struggle over the dissemination of information concerning policing issues in Manchester. As documented, the PMC decided that if it was to reclaim the agenda on policing in Manchester it was necessary to produce an alternative to MEN. Throughout discussions about what format of this magazine should take, it was emphasized that, unlike the GLC's
Policing London, it should be a ‘people’s paper’, going to every household in Manchester and that in doing so its function will be to draw a wider community into policing matters and the policing debate (Proposed work programme:6).

To this end its role was also to ‘contribute much to improving the community’s knowledge and understanding of policing issues’ (Revenue Development Proposals (17.1.86). Given the community that the PMC/U was supposed to be representing Policewatch reflected those community priorities and concerns and hoped for their participation.

Your experiences of how you are policed and your thoughts and ideas on how it can be improved are of interest to us and the Police Monitoring Committee and the Policewatch magazine can be your voice. (No 11 Feb 1986)

It was made clear that Policewatch would monitor and adjudge policing practices and policies in Manchester on the premise that all groups no matter what their background, ethnic origin or sexual orientation receive the same policing (Policing Manchester - the need for a bulletin (31.10.85).

There were three aspects to this role. First, it had an explanatory role in relation to demonstrating why the PMC/U was set up and what its policies were. Second, it had an educative role explaining about developments in policing and developments in the the law through the inclusion of material on legal rights, the structure of police governance, crime levels etc. Finally, it had the role of facilitating the representation and participation of those groups who were subject to unsatisfactory policing practices. Hence, there were articles on the policing of the black people, the policing of women, the policing of young people, the policing of Irish in Manchester, the Battle of Brittan and its aftermath and the Stalker Affair. Policewatch had an uncompromisingly
aggressive approach to its monitoring role, particularly in relation to its coverage of the aftermath of the Battle of Brittan and the Stalker Affair.

As a consequence, it is no surprise that the bulletin was singled out as a prime example of 'loony Left' propaganda, particularly since representatives of the PMC gained national prominence and constant media coverage during the Stalker Affair. The considerable pressure that was brought to bear upon the 'scurrilous' publication has already been documented and provides an indication of how alternative forms of information dissemination can expect to be received. The pressure that was exerted upon the PMC and the magazine meant that Policewatch went through subtle but significant changes. Its logo changed from the initial 'Working for an accountable police force' to the assertive 'Working for a democratically controlled police force' to a weaker 'Working for democratic control of the police' finally to the vague 'Working for democratic policing and a safer Manchester'. Its last issues reflected the change from its monitoring of the police role to its more expansive concern with community safety of which monitoring the police was only a part. However, this change could not save it from abolition in December 1987.

In the same way that the setting up of an alternative to MEN by the Council resulted in the setting up of an alternative to the Council's publication, so the setting up of Policewatch as an alternative to MEN resulted in the setting up by the Police Authority of the alternative Community Liaison. Thus, in addition to having to counter MEN, Policewatch had also to counter a direct alternative. Despite all the negative coverage given to the Police Authority in its conflict with the Chief Constable, the former did not produce an alternative
newsletter attempting to explain its position. It was only when the Community Liaison Office (CLO) reviewed the future of the community liaison structures that producing a bulletin for the CLPs was suggested. A variety of reasons can be put forward as to why this idea was adopted by the Authority. First, it was to be part of the process of strengthening communication and links between the various panels and the Police Authority. Second, it was to allow a means of communication between the panels and the community. Third, it became imperative to counteract the anti-community liaison position being pushed by the PMC in Policewatch. This latter concern was the reason why there was considerable attention paid to upgrading the format of the newsletter after the first very dour issue was produced. Thus, the newsletter was to be the means whereby news concerning the initiative was communicated to other panels and therefore the community.

It is very much YOUR newsletter...to be written BY panel members FOR panel members (Issue 1: Oct 1985:6).

In keeping with the notion of community representation and participation it was distributed not to the community directly but to community representatives, community organizations, and libraries. It specifically reported on the work of the panels, community initiatives in crime prevention, new government, GMP and Police Authority policies and proposals. There was little coverage of policing issues and no mention of controversial ones such as the Battle of Brittan or the Stalker Affair. The differences between Community Liaison and Policewatch is summed up by the former's logo, 'Police and People Working Together'. Any critical comments made by Community Liaison were addressed to the anti-community liaison stance of Manchester City Council. In Issue 8 of Community Liaison reported that the Council had decided to disestablish its
'controversial' anti-police magazine Policewatch. With the abolition of its rival in following issues Community Liaison was able to report that CLPs were finally being set up in Manchester.

Discussion

Part V of this thesis has attempted to document the two key roles that MEN played in conveying information about political changes in Manchester between 1981-1985. The first role that the paper played was in the delineation and affirmation of community boundaries. This was achieved through constantly reproducing what Hall et al., (1978:54) have described as 'maps of meaning' through which people living in Manchester could make events intelligible. This constant mapping powerfully defined which groups and interests were of the community and which were not. As a consequence it reaffirmed which groups and interests (traditional ones) should be represented in local government's policy decisions and allocation of resources. The second role that the paper played was as the defender of community institutions. It is within this context that we can understand its hostile attitude towards those who were critical of GMP. MEN took this role to its logical conclusion when it thought that the Chief Constable by his statements and actions was threatening the good name of GMP and therefore the community. It showed no hesitation in launching a campaign to silence the Chief Constable and in doing so was making clear that community institutions, and therefore the community, were more important than individuals.

This part of the thesis has also documented the fate of attempts to provide alternative interpretations of events in Manchester. Such alternatives not only faced considerable criticism from MEN but also spawned counter-
alternatives directly attacking them. As such the counter-alternatives bolstered the dominant interpretation of reality provided by MEN. Such criticism and attack, again, made it clear which community interests issues and groups had a right to have their views represented and which did not. In doing further confirmation was provided about who was of the community and who was not. The differences between the alternative conceptions of community were demonstrated in the conclusions, made public in December 1987, of a MORI poll commissioned by the Council to assess what the community thought about the Council and its publications, The Manchester Magazine and Policewatch. The poll showed that 40% used MEN for finding out about council affairs as opposed to 24% who used the Council’s publications. The poll also found that dissatisfaction with the policies of the council was highest amongst men, older people, the middle class, owner occupiers and white people whereas dissatisfaction was least amongst women, council tenants, ethnic minorities and the young. Of those polled 55% wanted less in Council’s publications about gays and lesbians and 39% wanted less about ethnic minorities. MEN commented enthusiastically that the poll was a vindication of its position in relation to the policies of Manchester City Council. For the purposes of this thesis there could be no clearer breakdown of the community represented by MEN and the community represented by the Council’s publications. It was the latter community who lost their voice and means of communication and information when the pressure brought to bear upon the Council resulted in the decision to disestablish its publications. Once more the interests of the powerless and dispossessed were defined out of the structures of representation.
PART VI: CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to chronicle the struggle by Greater Manchester Police Authority and Manchester City Council Labour councils to bring about police accountability in Manchester between 1981 and 1988. Central to that struggle was the setting up of two competing models to facilitate community representation and participation in policing matters. The principle aim of both models was to create structures that would give representation to the interests of those sections of the community in conflict with the police. However, as has been documented, the models developed in such a way so as to give representation to sections of the community other than those they were set up to represent. In order to explain how and why this has happened it has been argued that it is first, necessary to understand the problematical nature of the concepts, ie, community, representation and participation, upon which the models were premised and second, necessary to understand how demands for rights of representation and participation have been dealt with by the British state.

The first section of the thesis identified the theoretical and structural problems that have to be confronted by those who demand that the police be made democratically accountable to the community. Theoretically, it has been argued that demands premised upon the concepts of community, representation and participation are intrinsically problematical. With regard to community, it has to be recognized that there is no homogeneous community but stratification and differentiation systems based upon class, gender, race and age making conflicting demands with no necessary overlap or correspondence of interests. It has also to be acknowledged that groups are
further differentiated in terms of their position in hierarchies of power and knowledge. Given the existence of such hierarchies the key question is whether it is possible to facilitate community representation and participation that does justice to all the competing interests and claims. Central to this is the question of whether it is possible to redress structural power imbalances not just between the powerful and the powerless but also between more or less powerless groups.

In relation to representation the question has to be addressed, is it possible to facilitate the direct representation of the whole community, and if it is not how does one chose community representation that does justice to all sections of the community and will be recognized by the community as legitimate. If one does not address this issue, participation will be seriously jeopardized. Finally there is the problem of whether it is possible to create structures that bring about the active and meaningful participation of the whole community. It is only through active and meaningful participation in micro structures and situations that there is any possibility of people becoming aware of their true interests and needs. In order to do this power inequalities, dominant ideologies and the possibility of the interests of the powerless being marginalized must be neutralized. These are the necessary conditions for the participation of the powerless.

Structurally, it has been argued throughout this thesis that the British state has dealt with demands for rights of democratic representation and participation in a three fold manner. First, there has been the construction of democratic rights of citizenship, premised upon the notion
of representation. The mass of British society was eventually endowed with individual political and legal rights which could be exercised within a highly structured and hierarchical constitutional structure. Demands for radical participatory forms of democracy were defeated, as were demands for fundamental changes in the hierarchies of power/powerlessness. Therefore, a process of 'defining out' and 'defining in' of interests has been characteristic of how the state has dealt with demands for democratic rights. At the same time as formal representative rights were conceded, a concurring process of de-democratization took place with principal areas of decision-making being removed from the possibility of being democratically accountable to the enfranchised masses.

It has been argued that in the post-war era the development of corporatist forms of governance resulted in the further evisceration of democracy. The consequence was that formal rights of representation in the social democratic state became virtually meaningless for certain sections of British society as powerful interests ensured that their interests were prioritized in the non-democratic arrangements. Hence, it is possible to detect the process of the 'defining out' and 'defining in' of interests. As a consequence by the end of the 1960s a crisis of democracy and more specifically a crisis of representation and participation was identified. This important conjuncture furnished another example of how the British state 'defined in' and 'defined out' demands for community participation and representation. Supplemental non-democratic community based structures were created to give representation to the interests of the powerless. However, through acting upon social divisions such structures contained and channelled moderate community
demands whilst radical participatory ones, which demanded changes in the distribution of power, were defined out.

The third process identified in the state's response to demands for the extension of democratic rights, involved the coercive policing of such demands. Two key processes were identified in the historical analysis of policing that provide particular problems for those demanding the democratization of this institution. First, certain marginal sections of the community have never had their interests represented in or by policing arrangements. On the contrary these sections have been the very object of policing, constituting 'police property' and even the truces negotiated between respectable sections of the working classes and the police have not covered these marginal groupings. It is no coincidence that they are also the sections of the community whose rights of citizenship either have not been clearly established or, because of the structural inequalities that exist in British society, are substantively meaningless. The second process that compounds the problems created by the first one, concerns the interests that the police represent. It is a central argument of this thesis that as the police assumed the role of representing the interests of the state, steps were taken to remove this institution from the possibility of democratic accountability being exercised. The consequences of both processes for the marginal groupings is that their interests have always been formally and substantively excluded from all settlements concerning policework.

The crisis in democracy and crisis in policing that developed in Britain in the post-war period were heightened by the emergence of an increasingly authoritarian state form, from 1974 onwards. The election
of a radical right administration in 1979, committed to the prioritization of rights of economic representation and participation, resulted in the dramatic restructuring of the edifice of citizenship, further de-democratization of British society and the police being empowered in order to contain the consequences of whole communities being politically and economically 'defined out' by the changes. When the group that was subject most intensely to the resultant marginalization and policing processes revolted in 1980 and 1981 the issue of democratic representation and participation in policing matters reached the political agenda. However, as in the 1960s and 1970s, supplemental non-democratic structures of community representation were introduced to supposedly provide forums for the improvement of police-community relations. Given that there was no change in the structure of police accountability such structures were effectively powerless. The key issues concerning the consultation structures were what community interests would find representation in these powerless structures and which sections of the community would participate in them (see Marshall, 1982; Atkins and Rutherford, 1983; Morgan and Maggs, 1984; 1985; Morgan, 1986; 1987; 1988). Would it be the economically and politically marginalized black youths who were at war with the police on the streets of Britain's ghettos? These were the concerns that governed the analysis of the struggle over police accountability in Manchester after the disturbances of 1981 and the setting up of two alternative models that were supposed to facilitate the representation of the interests of those in conflict with the police.

The Police Authority's model had two components. First, the Police Authority attempted to call the Chief Constable
to account through utilizing the 1964 Police Act and through strengthening its organizational structure. As a consequence, it was hoped that not only would the Authority have a greater input into policing matters but would also begin to set the agenda for how the community should be policed. However, given the position of the Home Office and the overall context of the authoritarian state, the Chief Constable vanquished all attempts to make him accountable.

It was within this context of their own powerlessness to call the Chief Constable to account that the Police Authority introduced a liaison model which was supposed to empower the community. However, this model had serious defects. First, the Home Office guidelines, directing the model, limited the purpose of consultation to crime control and enshrined the operational independence of the police. And second, in terms of the conceptualization of the issues of community, representation and participation referred to above, there were also serious limitations. The analysis of this model has illustrated the difficulties of using a model which prioritizes the representation of the whole community. A series of problems have been identified. First, the Police Authority appointed as the representative of the black community someone whose appointment had been opposed by those sections of the community in conflict with the police in Moss Side. Given that the Hytner Inquiry had specifically counselled against appointing someone who did not enjoy the full confidence of these sections of the community, this was a serious weakness. Second, the multi-agency and reformist philosophy underpinning the work of the CLO, and enshrined in the Home Office guidelines, confirmed his unrepresentative status. Third, whilst the CLO was trying
to alleviate community concerns, the controversial policing of Moss Side, and the statements of the Chief Constable, did not change. This demonstrated first, that the CLO and the Police Authority were completely powerless in relation to effecting change in the policing of Moss Side and second, that black interests could not be represented with the proposed community liaison structures. As a consequence people in Moss Side, despite extensive exhortations, declined to participate in the powerless liaison initiative, not least because the Police Authority had ignored their wishes on the subject in the first place.

It was within this context of the widespread refusal of the section of the community for whom model I was meant to participate in it, that other sections of the community achieved representation. CLPs were set up in communities throughout Greater Manchester which were not in conflict with the police. However, even in the operation of these non-conflictual CLPs there were still problems of non/under participation/representation generated by this model of community representation.

First, there was no recognition that there were power inequalities between the disparate groups that were given equal representation. Second, there was no recognition that certain sections of the community did not have formal community representatives. Third, there was no recognition of the problematical nature of the representativeness of many of these community groups and individuals. Fourth, rights of representation were given to community groups and representatives who had no necessary relevance to the discussions of the CLPs. Finally, GMP, the Police Authority and the local council were given a privileged status in that they enjoyed statutory rights of automatic
representation, despite what the other community representatives might think.

Model I also tightly controlled and limited participation. First, the participation of the community was limited to their being able to contribute at the end of the highly formal CLP meetings. Second, the participation of community representatives was mobilized by the powerful as opposed to being a spontaneous or voluntary decision. Specifically, their participation was mobilized for the purpose of helping the police to control crime. Third, the participation of the community representatives was limited by the structured terms of reference. Fourth, the CLP meetings were, situations of partial participation with power residing firmly with the police representatives who had their operational autonomy enshrined in the terms of reference and who kept control of the information and knowledge that would have been a pre-condition for an open discussion about policing. Hence, the initial phase of model I facilitated the over-representation/participation of white, middle aged, respectable males who accepted the limited terms of reference of the CLPs. As a consequence, the manner in which issues of community, representation and participation had been dealt with, reproduced the existing power inequalities in British society.

Concerted efforts were made to bring about the participation of the non/under represented, eg, ethnic minorities, young people and women. However, to bring about their participation the CLO persisted with homogenizing supplemental structures of representation, based on the notion of the whole community of ethnic minorities, the whole community of young people and the whole community of women.
Within the initial operation of this model one section of the community began to have their interests prioritized. The non/under-representation of women was given the most attention by the CLO and the Police Authority. However, the all-encompassing format of structured representation failed to give recognition to the fact that first, there are racial and class inequalities between women’s groups and second, that certain women’s groups articulate dominant ideologies and interpretations of reality. As a consequence the interests of those powerless women’s groups who challenged dominant ideologies concerning women and policing were defined out. Thus, not only did the original structure of community representation reproduce the existing power inequalities and social divisions but the supplemental structures, set up to counter-balance those inequalities and provide justice to all interests, reproduced further divisions between respectable women and disreputable women. As a consequence, the interests of those in conflict with the police were once more marginalized and ‘defined out’ by the representative structures.

It was in response to the unrepresentativeness of model 1 and the powerlessness of the Police Authority that a PMC was set up in 1984 by Manchester City Council with the remit of representing the interests of those sections of the community in conflict with the police. This model initially utilized very different notions of community, representation and participation. The PMC did not utilize the notion of the whole community as there was the recognition that there were certain marginal sections within the community whose interests needed to be prioritized in terms of the unaccountable policing they were subject to. Thus, there was the crucial acceptance of
the claims of marginal groups that, in terms of police-community relations, the police were the cause of the problems. Hence, the stress was on the setting up of structures that would facilitate the participation of the under/non-represented sections of the community. It was emphasized that there should be voluntary, spontaneous and active participation with community groups setting their own agendas. There was also recognition of the issue of the power imbalances that existed between different groups and interests. In theory, the PMC was to take on the role of empowering the powerless sections of the community and neutralizing the power imbalances. This was to be achieved by nullifying the political opposition, blocking all attempts to set up model I in Manchester and holding the Chief Constable to account for discriminatory policing practices. Furthermore, through the commitment to set up a research and development unit (PMU) and publish a magazine there was also recognition of the need to challenge the Chief Constable's monopolization of knowledge and information about how Manchester was policed.

Thus, the fundamental problematical issues concerning community, representation and participation were, in theory, addressed by the first deliberations of the PMC. However, there were problems with the proposed PMC initiative. First, the PMC had no statutory powers to call the Chief Constable to account for the manner in which marginalized groups were policed. Therefore, although it was attempting to empower those sections the PMC, like the Police Authority, was effectively powerless in relation to how Manchester was policed. Second, this initiative was still a 'top-down' initiative, located within heavily bureaucratic and hierarchical Labour Party and Council structures. Third, the Labour Party assumed the role of being the representative of those under/non represented
groups and interests. Those groups and interests were in many ways just as alienated from the Labour Party and Manchester City Council as they were from the GMP. Fourth, there were different ideas within the PMC, and Party, as to the role that the PMGs would play when they were set up. It was hoped that the PMGs would harness support for the Party and the Council. It is within this context that the hope was expressed that the PMC was working towards the idea of a multiplicity of community based PMGs, premised on the geographical notion of the Labour Party ward structure. The danger with such a plan was that the model of police monitoring was being used for a purpose it was not meant for. Finally, there was the assumption that the different under/non-represented groups and interests in the community conceptualized their problems in the same manner as the PMC and therefore viewed PMGs as a solution to their problems.

Such problems manifested themselves in the first attempts by the PMU to set up its model in Manchester. Traditional Labour voting white communities began to demand that their interests be represented by the PMC/U. Therefore, under political pressure the PMU was expected to encourage, in addition to issue based ones, community based PMGs. The PMU found communities who wanted something to be done about crime. This meant that they did not necessarily want PMGs, or indeed CLPs. Once more, the difficulties of allowing the whole community representation were illustrated.

By 1985 the struggles taking place in Manchester concerning police accountability were effected by national developments. First, the confrontation between the authoritarian state and local institutions of government was finally resolved. Legislative coercion was used to
bring problematical local authorities under central control. As part of the restructuring the Police Authorities were finally abolished with new forms of political representation and tighter central control imposed. The implications of these changes for those struggling for democratic accountability were profound.

Second, the overall impact of the emergence of a powerful discourse on community and crime was three-fold for those campaigning for police accountability within the Labour Party. First, it made them vulnerable to the accusation of being anti-police. The practical implications for local authorities who were at the forefront of campaigning for police accountability and fundamentally opposed to such corporatist community policing approaches to crime prevention were serious. Non-cooperation was ideologically and financially damaging, particularly in a climate when local authorities were under constant attack from central government. Second, it made them vulnerable to those sections of the Labour Party, both locally and nationally, who alleged that an anti-police stance was an electoral liability. Third, they had to confront the issues of crime prevention, the fear of crime and the mobilization of the community by the government to actively participate in a co-ordinated fight against crime. As a consequence, considerable pressure was brought to bear on local authorities to participate directly in multi-agency crime prevention projects. This pressure also meant that policies and proposals concerned with police accountability and prioritizing the concerns of those sections of the community for whom the police were a problem were being 'defined out'.

Significant changes occurred in the two models of community representation and participation between 1985-
1988. In addition to changing the form of political representation on the Police Authorities, the central state's powers over policing arrangements were enhanced. Thus, the Authorities suffered further disempowerment and in the intense conflict that took place before and immediately after the change over, the campaign to call the Chief Constable to account was finally neutralized.

A professional Community Relations Unit replaced the Community Liaison Officer and there were further changes to the community interests that were represented within model I. The CRU discarded the community representative work of the CLO. As a consequence, the interests of black people were not part of the CRU's terms of reference. Moreover, unlike the CLO, the CRU prioritized the issue of crime prevention and the issues relating to police accountability were 'defined out'.

The CRU did attempt to take a more active approach in the attempt to resolve the problems of the under/non-representation of certain sections of the community. However, the fundamental problems of this representative model were compounded by the CRU's efforts. The attempts to involve young people resulted in the participation of those respectable young people for whom the police were not a problem. Therefore, the representativeness of the youth representatives was open to question. There were corresponding problems with the CRU's endeavors to facilitate the representation of women's interests. The CRU did not address the power imbalances and ideological divisions of interest that existed between women. By continuing to give equal representation to all women, the CRU mobilized respectable women's groups who articulated dominant ideologies and this resulted in the non-participation of women's groups who questioned such
ideologies. Thus, even though the interests of women were prioritized it was only the interests of certain women and only in a particular manner.

As a consequence, the representative model continued to facilitate the interests of those respectable sections of the community not in conflict with the police. Within the operation of this model a process of defining in/out, inclusion/exclusion and prioritization/marginalization has been identified. The conclusion would seem to be that giving all sections of the community rights of representation within structures concerned with majority interests leads to the systematic non-representation and non-participation of powerless and marginal sections of the community. This is particularly ironic given that the original principle behind community liaison in Greater Manchester, was to enable the representation and participation of the powerless and the marginal sections of the community who were in conflict with the police.

Even though, in theory, the PMC attempted to address the key issues that model I did not, events conspired to make sure that it was also marginalized and defined out. A series of pressures resulted in the reorientation of the work of the PMC/PMU. The increasing political vulnerability of its campaign for police accountability, the emergence of the issue of crime prevention, its consultations with the whole community and the increasing concern about women’s safety resulted in a considerable shift in the community interests that the PMC/PMU represented. As a result, the electorally unpopular campaign to represent those sections of the community in conflict with the police was replaced by the electorally popular community safety campaign. Consequently, the marginalization of the interests of those sections of the
community subject to unaccountable policing practices occurred. In effect, as a result of the changes within the PMC/PMU, there was a considerable overlap between the work of the Community Safety Unit and the Community Relations Unit and the community interests represented within that work. Most significantly, the boundaries defining who were and who were not of the community were reaffirmed. As a consequence, in addition to being marginalized within model I, the interests of those for whom policing was a problem finally disappeared off the political agenda in Manchester. Such was the intense hostility mobilized against the efforts of the PMC to represent the interests of the marginalized that model II was also replaced by a Community Safety Unit.

Central to the mobilization against efforts to give representation of the under/non-represented was the local newspaper, the Manchester Evening News. Through its delineation and affirmation of community boundaries there was the constant mapping of which groups and interests were of the community and which were not. As a consequence, it reaffirmed which groups and interests should be represented in decision making. In addition as the defender of community institutions, MEN was hostile to those who were critical of GMP. By definition such critics were not of the community. This part of the thesis has also documented the fate of attempts to provide alternative interpretations of events in Manchester. Such alternatives not only faced considerable criticism from MEN but also spawned counteralternatives directly attacking them. As such the counteralternatives bolstered the dominant interpretation of reality provided by MEN. Such criticism and attack, again, made it clear which community interests issues and groups had a right to have
their views represented and which did not. Those subject to the consequences of unaccountable policing practices lost their voice and means of communication and information when the pressure brought to bear upon Manchester City Council resulted in the decision to disestablish its publications. Once more the interests of the powerless and dispossessed had been 'defined out'.

The theme running through this thesis has been how dominant ideologies and practices constantly 'define out' and marginalize the interests of the powerless. And once marginalized they become the routine objective of police work. Thus, a vicious circle is created and recreated and, as this thesis has documented, given existing social arrangements the problem is insoluble. A situation has been created in Britain today where the processes of marginalization have resulted in the powerless, as in the first half of the nineteenth century, having only one means of expressing their discontent. When they riot against their exclusion they face the full force of the police. In this moment both the marginalized and the police fulfil their historic roles, the former's status as police property is confirmed and the symbiotic relationship between the police and the respectable community is reinforced. In her last speech as Chair of the Police Authority Gay Cox stated...

Many of us represent inner-city constituencies where unemployment and poverty have brought real pain and despair to thousands of people. We record the dignity and courage with which they bear evils which are not of their making, but which are indictments of a rich society unwilling to share its riches. We cannot believe that the answers to the frustrations bred in young people in such situations should be to meet them with plastic bullets. Such action would create an unparalleled anger, bitterness and violence which no short-term tactical advantage could possibly justify... We are not prepared to see two-nation...
policing, with the inner cities becoming the subject of 'township policing' (20.3.86).

Until the issues of community, representation and participation raised by this thesis are addressed township policing methods will be needed to contain the anger and frustration of those who are subject to such marginalization processes. If such issues are not given serious consideration I would argue that attempts to set up models that are supposed to improve relations between the police and the policed, to paraphrase the Chair of the Greater Manchester Police Authority, will have as much success as 'spitting in the wind'.
Maurice Punch (1986: 15) has stated that researchers utilizing qualitative research methods still have a professional duty to state, how and where the data was collected, how reliable and valid is it, what successive interpretations have been placed upon it, what was the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the field setting and what was the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the subjects of inquiry. In this appendix I will attempt to address these issues, if not exactly in this order.

This research project was conceived of one year before it was registered for a Ph.D. and it owes its origins to my becoming involved in the debates concerning police accountability in Manchester after the summer of 1981. As a consequence of an invitation I came into contact with Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group (YAWPMG), which was in its formative period and based in Moss Side. I subsequently became a part of that group with everyone being made aware of the fact that I was carrying out research on the policing of Manchester. In the beginning I thought that the object of the research could be this group, ie, documenting and analyzing the workings of a police monitoring group that was involved in defending the community from the police. Consequently, I took meticulous notes of the meetings of this group and spent a great deal of time analyzing group, constructing attendance profiles, making the connections between this group and other community groups in the area and seeing how they dealt with the issues of community, representation and participation. To this end I thought that I had reached achieved a radical action research situation because I was in a position not just to research but to also influence and aid YAWPMG in its campaign for police accountability.
The work of the group forced me to face the issues concerning qualitative research that I had previously only read. First, I found myself more interested in the campaigning work of the YAWPMG than the research. Second, I had to confront the issue of who would benefit from this research. Documenting the inner dynamics of YAWPMG was not going to benefit the group because by the time the research was finished the group would most likely have ceased to exist in that form. Neither was it going to provide a blueprint on how to set up/not set up your own police monitoring group because, as the PMC found out, police monitoring groups cannot be set up according to a format. In reality the only organization that the research could possibly be of interest to was the GMP. The Chief Constable repeatedly asserted that YAWPMG were a central part of the conspiracy to undermine the authority of his force in Manchester. In many senses, my documentation of the work of the group, profiles of the people involved and the campaigning strategies it utilized, if read in a particular manner, would have given substance to his allegations. Throughout the period of my research I also came across a whole range of other groups, individuals and organizations working either directly or indirectly on policing issues in Manchester and I worked with two other groups involved in the debates. Once more I had to face the ethical issue of documenting and divulging the work of such groupings.

This issue also had relevance to the area where many of these groupings were based. I quickly became aware that people in Moss Side were not prepared to be used as the 'research farm' for the nearby institutions of higher education. Repeatedly the complaint was made that the researchers came and went but the conditions of the people
did not change. Indeed for certain people the connections between power/knowledge and social control were clear. The object of such research was to collate information to formulate more effective methods of social control. This issue reached a head with the ESRC funded 'Flashpoints' project that was located within Manchester University. The word went out that there was to be no co-operation with the researcher on this project and, despite claims to the contrary, from my understanding that call was heeded (see Parry, Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987). Moss Side showed itself, as it did throughout the course of this study, to be capable of defending its own interests. Thus, the reader will find little reference to the work and considerable influence of YAWP MG in the debate on police accountability in Manchester. This is also true of the dynamics of community politics in Moss Side and other parts of Manchester. There are few of the 'vignettes' of community life that liberally splice qualitative research - in many senses the reader is reading an edited text and I make no apology for the fact.

As a consequence of my having to confront these issues I refocussed my research upon the Police Authority to analyze how the ruling Labour group was attempting to implement its promise to facilitate more community representation and participation in decisions relating to the policing of Manchester. This took me into contact with the CLO and his unsuccessful attempts to set up a CLP in Moss Side. Attending these meetings gave me the first real insight into how easy it was to utilize rhetorically the concepts of community, representation and participation and how difficult it was to actually realize such a situation. The community in Moss Side refused to participate in the consultative structures. I received every help from the CLO and the Chair of the Police
Authority even though they had more important things to be thinking about.

Fortunately, for this research the Left of the Labour Party finally took control of the City Council after the 1984 local elections with a commitment to setting up a police monitoring initiative as an alternative to community liaison. As a consequence, the issue of the democratic accountability of the GMP was placed on the formal political agenda. This provided an almost perfect research situation because there were in existence in Manchester two distinctive models with the stated shared aim of attempting to bring about community representation and participation in policing matters. Through my connections I was allowed access to the various meetings of the councillors mandated to set up their initiative and was able to monitor, with the cooperation of the members of the PMU, the dilemmas, problems and the PMC/PMU faced. At the same time being a member of YAWPMG allowed me to monitor the impact of the initiative on the ground. The real difficulty was in keeping track of the different meetings that were taking place. This was no easy process especially when issues relating to the policing of Manchester necessitated my presence at other meetings.

To complicate matters even more when the CLO resigned the ruling Labour group decided to appoint a CRU to first, service the panels that were in operation everywhere but Manchester and second, introduce them into Manchester. The consequence of having two full time professionalized units dealing with policing matters in terms of the amount of work they generated was staggering. Although there was a great temptation to analyze what the CRU was doing elsewhere in Greater Manchester it simply was not
possible. In this sense my empirical data on the community liaison initiative has primarily related to Manchester and once again I was given access to the relevant documentation. I may be criticized for this limitation but I did not feel it was possible to do anything else. In any case the police monitoring initiative only related to Manchester. The only area that I wish that I had paid more attention to is Tameside, where the council also opposed community liaison.

By the summer of 1985 I felt that I had enough material to write ten theses on police accountability in Manchester and in September 1985 I moved to Hong Kong. I felt that the research had been completed and that the move would force me to disengage fully and allow the writing up to begin. Fortunately, through friends and colleagues I was able to keep up with the dramatic developments in Manchester that resulted from the aftermath of the abolition of the Police Authority, the Battle of Brittan, the case of John Stalker and the Chief Constable’s speeches on Aids. Such developments necessitated the constant revision of what my thoughts were on the issue of police accountability in Manchester. During the summer of 1986 when I returned to Manchester, given the controversies and developments, I encountered a sense of confusion, disillusionment and fear amongst those working on the issues of police accountability. Martin Walker’s book *With Extreme Prejudice* conveys precisely the atmosphere that I encountered. What exactly had the demands for police accountability in Manchester unleashed?

No sooner had I started to attempt to make sense of these disturbing developments than it all began to change again. What was becoming apparent was that police monitoring was
becoming politically 'too hot to handle' and the dramatic impact of the rise of the discourse on community and crime meant that although my thesis was essentially correct the consequences for the police monitoring initiative were all too depressingly obvious. In one sense it was a great relief to me when the PMC/PMU was abolished as it meant that I had a definitive cut-off date. From that time I have attempted to examine and reexamine every piece of data collected from the struggle to further police accountability in Manchester. Because of this re-examination process and because of the deliberate editing out of the background political work that I was party to this is only one version of what happened in Manchester between 1981 and 1988. However, hopefully this version still conveys the intensity of the struggle that took place.
Bibliography

ACC/AMA. (1975) 'The future development of the role of the police authority', County Councils Gazette, 9.
AFFOR. (1978) Talking Blues, Birmingham: AFFO.
Anderton, J. (1979a) BBC Question Time, October 16.
Anderton, J. (1979b) 'Police practice and political power', Royal Institute of Public Administration, December.
Anderton, J. (1981a) 'The art and economics of policing', Royal Institute of Public Administration, January.
Anderton, J. (1981b) 'Accountable to whom?', Police, 6 February.
Anderton, J. (1985c) 'Constabulary duty should be left as it is', The Guardian, 29 August.
Becker, H.S. (1967) 'Whose side are we on?' Social Problems, 14:3.


Byford, L. (1975) 'Hands off the police authorities - an answer to Banton' Police, March.


Chester, D.N. (1960) 'Some Questions', *Public Administration*, Spring.


Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis for 1983, London: HMSO.
Community Liaison Officer (1983) Address to Jamaican Society, 9 January
Community Liaison Officer (1985) Personal Interview with Author. 27 February.
Cox, G. (1982) 'It should be a two way benefit', Brief.
Davis, J. (1989) 'From 'Rookeries' to 'Communities' Race, poverty and policing in London', History Workshop, 27.
Deakin, N. (1970) Colour, Citizenship and British Society,
London: Panther.
Field, J. (1981) 'Police, power and community in a provincial English town: Portsmouth 1815-75', in V.


Home Office Circulars: 54:1982 Local Consultation Arrangements between the Police and the Community.
-----2/1985 Arrangements for Local Consultation between the Police and the Community Outside London.
Judge, T. (1976a) 'Who gives the orders?', Police, September.
Judge, T. (1976b) 'National police want watching locally', Municipal Review.
Livingstone, K. (1988) If Voting Changed Anything They'd
McDonald, K. (1976) 'A police state in Britain?' New Society, 8 January.
Manchester City Council Planning Department (1987)
Planning a Safer Environment for Women, [Internal Report], November.


University Press.


O'Leary, B. (1987) 'Why was the GLC abolished?', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 11.


Simey, M. (1976) 'All dressed up and no where to go', Police, August.


London: Hogarth.


Williams, R. (1970)


Wright, N. (1986) 'The new Metropolitan Police strategy and its implications for the campaign for police
accountability, Critical Social Policy

Main Reports and documentation Relating to Manchester:

a. Manchester City Council

- Police Monitoring Committee Minutes of Meetings: 1984-88.
- Police Monitoring Unit: Reports 1984-88.
- Policewatch: nos 1-9.

b. Greater Manchester Council

- Police Authority Minutes of Meetings: 1983-86.
- Community Liaison Officer’s Reports: 1982-85.
- Community Liaison: nos 1-11.
- Community Liaison: New Directions.
- Police Authority: Lay Visiting Scheme

c. Greater Manchester Police

d. Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group
   Minutes of meetings: 1982-86.

e. Gay Police Monitoring Group
   Minutes of meetings: 1985.


 g. City Limits: 1982-87.