THE

OFFICERS OF THE IRISH BRIGADE

AND

THE BRITISH ARMY 1789-98.

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.
ABSTRACT.

This is a study of the reaction of the Irish Brigade's officers to the French Revolution and that event's role in ending the restrictions on Catholics holding commissions in the British Army. The eighteenth century had seen considerable strides in Establishment attitudes as well as legislation which mitigated the seventeenth century legal restrictions on Catholics but the ultimate step of commissioning Catholics into the Regular Establishment of the British Army, the guardian of the Protestant Ascendancy, required the trauma of the French Revolution. Ironically, the changed ideological perspective which saw Catholics metamorphosize from the traditional enemy into persecuted ally also produced a coherent body of professional military officers in the guise of the émigrés of the Irish Brigade. Their general reaction to the Revolution, mirroring that of their French brethren, re-enforced and confirmed their intrinsic identification with the established order. This permitted the creation, in October 1794, of the British Army's first established formation of Catholic officered troops in the shape of a re-raised Irish Brigade. Even then, substantive legislative changes were ultimately eschewed in favour of the established practice of not asking awkward questions. That the Brigade was ultimately reduced in December 1797 was due to administrative confusion, financial uncertainty and poor recruitment common to many freshly raised formations throughout the British Army, not to latent denominational prejudices amongst elements in the Ascendancy, at Westminster and at Court. Residual prejudice however ensured that it would only be in the aftermath of the Napoleonic conflict that the formal, if unenforced, statutory prohibitions were finally removed.
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ABBREVIATIONS.

AG  Archives de la Guerre, Paris.
AN  Archives Nationales, Paris.
Add.Mss Additional Manuscript.
BL  British Library.
CO  Colonial Office Papers, Public Records Office.
JSAHR Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research.
HMSC Historical Manuscripts Commission.
HO  Home Office Papers, Public Records Office.
INA  Irish National Archive.
ISPO Irish State Paper Office.
NAM  National Army Museum.
NLI  National Library of Ireland.
NU  Nottingham University.
PRO Public Record Office, London.
SRO Scottish Record Office.
SP  State Papers, Public Record Office.
WO  War Office Papers, Public Records Office.
INTRODUCTION.

The brutal conflicts in Ireland of the seventeenth century, culminating in the Treaty of Limerick and the various Penal Laws, indicate the pinnacle of post Reformation anti-Catholic paranoia. These factors encouraged a pre-existing tradition of foreign military service, as can be seen in the creation of the French Army's Irish Brigade. Nonetheless, the various Franco-Irish regiments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tended to be subject to the simplification implicit in the terms 'Jacobite' and/or 'mercenary'. Their stereotyping in the term 'Wild Geese' led to a romanticised image of adventurers-cum-mercenaries, motivated to leave Ireland both for excitement and to escape repression. This interpretation is inadequate at best and generally highly inaccurate in characterising the Brigade's officer corps. A survey of their family backgrounds, kinship networks and the patterns of military service that evolved in the decades after 1691 demonstrates that the officers were in fact a cohesive caste of professional officers, comparable in terms of values and social standing to their brethren in the British Army. Their consequent socio-political values being dramatically highlighted by the majority's reaction to the events of the French Revolution.

In Britain, from the reign of Charles II, legislation was extant prohibiting Catholics from holding Crown Commissions or even from serving in the ranks of the British Army. These statutory restrictions and associated popular paranoia remained firmly in place well into the eighteenth century. In the aftermath of Culloden however, and with the impact of the Enlightenment, attitudes within the Establishment mellowed. With the added impetus of the growing needs of Empire for manpower, there evolved, within the senior ranks of the Army, an unwritten practice of not asking awkward questions about a potential recruit's faith or place of birth. Throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century, as the cause of reform of the penal laws gathered pace, the recruitment practices of the Army consistently ran somewhat ahead of official, and
consistently ahead of popular, attitudes. By the eve of the French Revolution, few even within the Irish Ascendancy, questioned the desirability of tapping all sources, regardless of faith, for the Army's insatiable needs.
CHAPTER ONE.

CHANGING ATTITUDES AND WAR: THE ROAD TO PITT'S IRISH BRIGADE.
1756-1794.

From the mid-sixteenth century, Englishmen perceived the Catholic Church of Rome not merely as a system of intolerance and cruelty, but as an international conspiracy, directed by the Jesuits and operated through secret agents with the covert sympathy of fellow travellers, the recusants. The Elizabethans added their deep-seated prejudices against the Irish who became identified as the Papacy's key instrument in attempting to subdue England. Deliverance from this, be it in 1588 or 1688, was popularly attributed to divine intervention in favour of Protestant England thereby contributing to the common belief that laws to restrict Catholics were sanctioned by God to secure his Protestant Church. The very concept of allowing Catholics to serve in the British Army, or hold any substantive post in the establishment lay at the heart of events leading to the Glorious Revolution which in turn created the Irish Brigade in French service. The English Act of 1691 excluding Catholics from the Irish Parliament saw in the following decade a plethora of legislation firmly excluding any non-professing Anglican from military or political office and attempted to prevent Catholics from gaining any knowledge of the use of arms. The 1695 Disarming Act made it illegal for Catholics to possess weapons whilst a variety of penal laws circumscribed Catholic worship, land rights and education. While there was no specific prohibition on Catholics serving in the armed forces, the Test Act's requirement of attestation to the Anglican church and declaration against transubstantiation equated to the same thing, albeit equally exclusive of members of the dissenting churches. Initially this legislation was firmly enforced due to pre-existing, deep-seated prejudice against Catholicism and the Irish, and to the more recent, although intimately connected, fear of the eponymous Jacobites. Enforcement was particularly thorough for the military given the perceived need for a loyal English Protestant Army to defend a Protestant
Church and Throne. This in turn ensured not only the creation of an émigré Catholic army in the guise of the Irish Brigade but also, at least for the first few decades of its existence, a satisfactory flow of men and officers to maintain it.

As is well established, the years after Culloden witnessed progress towards the emancipation of both Catholics and Dissenters, albeit spasmodic and uneven. There was furious opposition from the Ascendancy in 1729 to the British government's permission for French recruitment agents openly to recruit for the Irish Brigade during the then brief Anglo-French alliance. By the early 1750s though it was becoming increasingly obvious that the perceived threat of the Jacobites was rapidly becoming a memory, particularly as those in Ireland had been mostly quiescent during both the 1715 and 1745 uprisings in Scotland. Further, anti-Catholicism was ceasing to be fashionable among many in the British Establishment and, by the 1760s, even waning somewhat among the Ascendancy. The Penal Code had obviously proved a complete failure as a mechanism of religious conversion and was increasingly being conveniently ignored in practice. Rising numbers viewed them as more of a hindrance to Ireland's economic needs and social interests. It was an open secret that Ireland's growing Catholic middle class easily avoided restrictions by exploiting various legal loopholes, aided by officials' general lack of interest in enforcing them. Ireland's first Catholic Association was established in 1757 by leading members of the Catholic middle class openly to petition for the mitigation of the Penal Laws whilst working to the strict principle that submission to the system would eventually bring success. They commenced the campaign by presenting the Speaker of the Irish House of Commons and the Lord Lieutenant with a pledge of loyalty to the Crown (1). This and other groups connected to the Catholic aristocracy were permitted to operate, having in 1760 already organised an address of the Catholic nobility and gentry of Meath and Westmeath effusively pledging loyalty to the newly enthroned George III. In addition, in February 1762 Lord Trimleston, both an active and self-important member of the Irish Catholic peerage, presented Lord Halifax, the Lord Lieutenant,
with an address signed by numerous leading Irish Catholics requesting their co-religionists be permitted to enrol in the Crown's service (2). Halifax himself commented the same month favourably on the declaration by Catholic bishops calling for loyalty to the Crown and for a public day of prayer for the success of the King's arms in the war (3).

These developments coincided with the growth of the British Empire and the need to defend it, a demand for manpower British Protestants alone could not meet. Essentially, the prerequisites of the half century following 1689 for a Protestant army to support a Protestant throne began to give way to the need for a British army to defend an evolving British Empire and all sources of potential manpower had to be tapped. The Irish Catholic nobility, gentry and church found themselves pushing at an open door when they expressed a strong desire to demonstrate their community's loyalty. In the event, Catholics commenced entering the army somewhat ahead of the removal of the legal restrictions. As with so much in the story of Catholic Emancipation, the legal restrictions were repealed once they had long ceased to be implemented.

There was not as such an Irish Army, rather, since the seventeenth century, various English regiments, both of foot and horse, had been stationed in Ireland on the Irish Establishment, that is to say, they were paid and maintained as a charge on the Irish Revenue. Regiments served in Ireland on rotation, usually spending four or five years there before either returning to the British mainland, where they were transferred to the British Establishment or were sent overseas. If the latter eventuality occurred it was possible they remained on the Irish Establishment as part of Ireland's financial contribution to the defence of the colonies, the troops based in Ireland being seen as a cheap strategic reserve for use during crises rather than as a garrison. The English Act of 1699 established a single British Army, albeit that those regiments in Ireland were the financial responsibility of the Dublin Parliament. The number of troops
maintained on the Irish Establishment remained fairly constant until 1769 at some 12,000 men, roughly a third of the standing army, of whom 2,000 served in the colonies. Due to growing colonial requirements, particularly the large North American garrison, the British army gradually increased in size so that by 1770 the Irish Establishment was 15,000 of whom 3,000 served abroad. In practice, the War Office in London had very little say in the administration of Ireland's army. Rather, it answered to its own head of state, the Lord Lieutenant, its own Commander-in-Chief and General Staff, and its own Board of Ordnance. The Irish Establishment had its own rates of pay and the Lord Lieutenant, or in his absence the Lords Justices, controlled troop dispositions, models of drill, the disposition of the ranks of cornet and ensign, and in 1755 even authorised a separate corps of Royal Irish Artillery.

While the British military made considerable financial demands of the Irish Revenue, until the mid-eighteenth century, Ireland was not itself a major source of manpower. On 24 November 1701 Lord Lieutenant, the Earl of Rochester, proclaimed, 'no Papist or reputed Papist soldier shall continue or be admitted into any regiment in this kingdom.' He had further required all regiments on the Irish Establishment each year to 'send over officers into England to raise recruits there...said recruits must consist only of English born subjects that are known Protestants.' (4). This prohibition on Irish recruitment extended to Protestants being enrolled. It was feared it would prove impossible to distinguish them from Catholics claiming to be Protestants and that any significant enrolment of Protestants would denude the Crown of loyal subjects in Ireland. Further, two-thirds of the Irish Protestants were Presbyterian and hence as suspect in their loyalty as Catholics. Rochester's 1701 prohibition soon became firmly established practice, remaining official policy for over fifty years. There was even concern at allowing Britain's allies to recruit Catholics in Ireland from fear they would desert to swell the ranks of the Irish regiments in the French and Spanish Armies. Certainly, many deserters did indeed appear in the ranks of the respective Irish Brigades throughout the early eighteenth century. Consequently, until the second half
of the eighteenth century, regiments on the Irish Establishment mostly recruited in England resulting in barely 5% of the rank and file being Irish. Hence regiments in Ireland were maintained at a significantly smaller establishment than those in Britain, being viewed as cadres ready to rapidly expand when needed.

This though was not true for the officer corps in which a strongly established tradition of Anglo-Irish family service existed. Given the Protestant gentry's role since the early seventeenth century in upholding what was essentially a subjugated colony, they maintained a strong military tradition. Rather than being seen as just a useful outlet for younger sons, for many families it was seen as a duty that at least one, if not many more, family members would take up the profession of arms. Given the advantages to the Protestant Ascendancy of this it was relatively easy for the sons of even the most modest gentry to utilise the extensive network of patronage and political influence to gain a commission without purchase. By the 1700s, some 1 in 4 officers in the British army were Irish, a proportion that ultimately rose to 1 in 3 by 1800 (5). These officers played an essentially positive role in the second half of the eighteenth century in regard to the military emancipation of their Catholic countrymen, particularly in their ability to interact with their own brethren and kin in the Irish political establishment. Further, due both to growing competition for commissions and changing attitudes to the military profession, a few prospective Anglo-Irish officers began to attend the growing number of military academies on the Continent. While there is no outright evidence they mixed with those destined for, or indeed serving in, the Irish Brigade, for a young Arthur Wellesley attending in 1786 the Royal School of Equitation at Angers it would have been hard not to have mixed. Angers was the recognised retirement location for the Brigade's officers and home to many émigré families (6).

The first official indication that manpower needs had forced a relaxation in the prohibition on recruitment in Ireland came in September 1745. Lord Lieutenant Lord Chesterfield briefly suspended it to permit 'able bodied men from the northern parts
of this kingdom, who are undoubted Protestants' to be enrolled into the under-strength battalions in Ireland (7). The rule was restored in April 1747 once the perceived Jacobite threat had passed. There is little doubt this had in fact been previously connived at. Prospective Irish recruits were regularly shipped to English or Scottish ports before being officially signed on by English regiments on the Irish Establishment and shipped back to Ireland. In 1728 there had been something of a scandal when the Royal Scots had been caught in just such an act (8). Despite this, the growing manpower demands of the Seven Years War saw the effective and permanent relaxation on the recruitment of Irishmen and Scots Highlanders, albeit with an explicit legal requirement for attestation to the Protestant faith. The benefit for Britain was obvious. During the Seven Years War, Scotland and Ireland both produced recruits for existing corps as well as nine new Scottish and six new Irish regiments raised for its duration. These provided vital manpower for what was in essence the first global war (9).

While only the official prohibition against recruiting Protestant Irishmen was technically lifted, by 1759 Pitt's government was disappointed by the lack of Irish Protestant enrolment. There is considerable anecdotal evidence that Catholics were inevitably recruited instead, being equally well respected by their Protestant officers, grateful for any willing volunteer. In a Parliamentary debate in 1771 it was asserted that, 'a great part of the foot regiments at present in Ireland consisted of Catholics; that they were good soldiers, had always in the late war behaved well, particularly at Quebec, where one of the regiments (Lord Townshend's) was almost entirely Catholics' (10). The regiment referred to here, the 15th Foot, had been maintained on the Irish Establishment from 1749 to 1755 when it may be assumed they had knowingly recruited a considerable body of Catholics. The official line though was still firmly against such an extension and considerable concern was expressed. In 1758 Lord Lieutenant the Duke of Bedford wrote to Pitt expressing his strong reservations at the departure for the colonies of the English manned 58th Foot. He
stressed he would rather trust that regiment, 'than to two of those battalions which have of late been wholly recruited here, and consequently are liable to a suspicion of being full of Irish papists', adding that the regiments of horse and dragoons were 'entirely under this predicament' (11). Yet within the year Bedford apparently accepted the inevitable, for in writing to officers recruiting for the marines in the west of Ireland, he suggested they were 'not to be over nice in their enquiries as to the religion of the persons enlisted'. This attitude though was still not universal as certain senior military officers still claimed to uphold the prohibition. In a letter of 26th June 1762 from the Master General of the Ordnance, Viscount Ligonier, to Secretary of War Charles Townshend, while recommending, in line with England's long standing practice, a suggestion of Chief Secretary William Hamilton's to recruit Irish Catholics for the Portuguese army, he was adamant in stating, 'I never suffer a Man who is suspected to be a Papist to enlist in the Regiment of Artillery' (12).

Despite Lord Halifax's and others expressions of sympathy towards the Catholic merchant and propertied classes, firm opposition to Catholics bearing arms remained focused amongst sections of the Irish peerage. The apparently non-contentious suggestion of Hamilton's in 1762 to raise seven regiments of Irish Catholics for service with Britain's oldest ally, Portugal, despite receiving warm support from various sections of the Ascendancy and Ligonier, still met with firm opposition from such as the Earl of Carrick, Lord Shannon and most vociferously, the Earl of Charlemont. The latter's attitude illustrated the almost schizophrenic approach prevailing at this point. He publicly expressed his dislike of the stereotypical bigoted Protestant squirearchy whose treatment of their Catholic tenants he felt was the cause of much of the agrarian disturbances by groups known as 'Whiteboys', yet he firmly opposed Hamilton's idea on the grounds that it would be highly unpopular amongst the same Protestant gentry, fearing it would arm men who might turn against England and that the estates of Southern and Western Ireland were too thinly populated to spare the population (13). Halifax agreed and wrote to London, '...to assure your
Lordship that if his Majesty should accidentally lay aside the plan of the Roman Catholic corps, he will hear nothing further...' (14).

While the King took his Lord Lieutenant's advice, the balance of evidence is of the gradual decline in anti-Catholicism, both within the army and amongst some of the Dublin MPs, previously its staunchest upholders. Reported comments during a prolonged Commons debate in Dublin on 15 February 1774 over a Bill to allow Catholics to take lots of ground on building leases for any term of years provide evidence of the progressive amelioration in prejudice as well as evidence of pre-existing Irish Catholic service in the army. A Mr. Gardiner commented,

'The oppressive Popery laws have driven many of our countrymen abroad, whose wisdom has been conspicuous in the cabinets of foreign courts, and whose heroism has adorned, with never-dying laurels the armies of foreign princes. I have had the honour of being acquainted with many of those exiles whilst I was abroad, and have lamented that the rigour of our laws had deprived us of them.' (15).

While many other contributors to the debate disagreed, a notable supporter was a Colonel Browne who furthered the implication of Gardiner's comments with evidence from the Seven Years War.

'In my opinion Papists can be, and are, as loyal as any others; of which I will give an instance. In the time of the late war I recruited the regiment in which I served with above two hundred papists raised about Cork. They went to Canada, behaved bravely; and when in garrison, in a Popish town, and surrounded with Papists, whilst many Protestants deserted, not one of these Papists ran away. Nay more; when a report came that Ireland was invaded by the French (who, he kindly informed the House were all Papists) these Papist soldiers expressed the greatest indignation and concern that they could not be present to assist their native country.' (16).
Opposition though remained strong enough to prevent progress in legislative emancipation. A motion proposed in the Commons in 1770 by General John Burgoyne to enable Catholics to enlist was easily rejected. Yet from 1770-71 onwards there was effectively tacit permission to recruit Catholics on the Irish Establishment. The English recruitment crisis emerging at the time of the Falkland Islands dispute caused Lord Weymouth to propose regiments on the British Establishment be permitted to recruit any and all Irishmen. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland strongly objected in a letter of 27 December 1770 to the Earl of Rochford, expressing fears that this risked denuding Ireland of its Protestant minority and instead, as summarised by Rochford's secretary, '...earnestly recommends a levy of Irish Papists, & promises his concurrence & assistance: Upon this, it was determined here to do the thing but avoid the name.' Rochford's reply of 10 January 1771 confirmed the Secretary's last comment, his statement being the by then standard response that while such an official policy would be illegal no one would ask questions on this occasion, concluding, '...in the provinces of Leinster, Munster and Connaught...Orders have been accordingly given for every Regiment to raise one hundred men in those provinces, in which all the lower class of people are Roman Catholics.' (17).

This proved to be the commencement of an official policy of wilful blindness, the 47th and 48th regiments in 1773 being similarly allowed open-ended recruitment in the south and west of Ireland (18). Noticeably, in each case, specific permission had been given and the regiments allowed to do so had been on the British not the Irish Establishment. Essentially, the policy still intended to avoid Catholics serving in Ireland, this having implicitly been the practice since the mid-1750's. Catholics could be recruited for service outside of Ireland, as they had for service in the marines, America and India, but not for regiments maintained in Ireland. Even this though soon changed with the American War of Independence and its insatiable demand for manpower. The period 1775-83 saw general and increasingly indiscriminate
recruitment in Ireland by regiments on both establishments. Further, the war changed perceptions to potential threats to the British Establishment, causing sufficient progress in attitudes to lay the foundation for partial emancipation in the early 1790s. This included permitting Catholics to hold commissions on the Irish Establishment.

While again manpower needs required the recruitment of Irish and Scots Catholics, the political issues affecting perceptions of Catholic loyalty to the British Crown began to alter, even amongst sections of the previously staunchly anti-Catholic Protestant gentry. An often forgotten aspect of the American war was the part played by religion. Since the seventeenth century, anti-Catholic paranoia was even stronger than in Britain, particularly linked to surviving millenarian concepts amongst important sections of the landed community. In Puritan dominated New England and the Calvinist southern colonies, Britain's wars of the 1740s and 50s against France and Spain renewed the identification of the Antichrist with Catholicism and revitalised the old images of Catholic persecution. In 1774 colonial paranoia, especially in New England, maintained by the threatened appointment of an Anglican Bishop in 1764, received an immense boost in the Quebec Act (19). The overwhelming Catholicism of the population in recently conquered French Canada required the Quebec Act to allow Catholic Quebecois both to practice their religion and hold official posts in the colonial government, including the Crown appointment of a new Catholic Bishop (20). Despite considerable disquiet in Britain and a campaign to repeal the Act and enforce Anglicisation, the move was reluctantly accepted. The colonial community took it as proof of an imperial plot to promote Popery. Just two years later, when American Colonial forces from New England attempted to invade Canada, the British government found itself expressing confidence in its loyal Catholic subjects against the rebellious Protestant colonists.

Not only did the war witness Catholic Quebecois defending a British Crown colony, but two Provincial Loyalist Corps were raised with an overtly Catholic character-the
Roman Catholic Volunteers raised by Alfred Clifton in Philadelphia in 1777 and the Volunteers of Ireland raised by Francis Lord Rawdon in 1778. The background to these corps was the effort, after the British occupation of Philadelphia in 1777, by General Sir William Howe to '...form for service, all the well-affected that could be obtained' into Provincial Loyalist Corps.' (21). A leading citizen of the city's Catholic community, Alfred Clifton, convinced General Howe that many loyalist Catholics would serve if he was permitted to raise a specifically Catholic corps (22). Support for this came in a letter from General Howe's Military Secretary, Captain Robert Mackenzie, to Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Clifton on 7 October 1777.

'It is understood that this corps is to consist of Roman Catholicks only on a presumption that they will prefer serving under an officer to whom they are naturally attached, and not interfere with other levies; the Commander-in-Chief therefore means that in raising it you do engage none others but of the Roman Catholick Community...' (23).

A subsequent letter of 14 October from Mackenzie to Clifton approved his recommendations for 13 Catholic gentlemen to receive commissions on the Provincial Establishment 'to serve under your Command in the Regiment of Roman Catholick Volunteers.' (24). The soldiers were raised from inhabitants of Philadelphia and Loyalist who had sought refuge there. By 27 November 1777 the formation returned a full strength of 14 officers and 196 rank and file organised into four companies (25). In England, the irony of these developments was not lost on the London newspapers, even if the specific detail of the facts was slightly exaggerated.

'Three regiments of Catholics are now going to be raised, all volunteers, two infantry and one cavalry, with Catholic commanders.-Oh! strange to tell! to fight battles, support the government, and protect the religion of a Protestant Prince.' (26).
In the event this corps turned out to be something of a liability with a dreadful discipline record and a high level of desertion. Initially the battalion performed useful service foraging around Philadelphia, being described as 'Colonel Clifton's faithful Catholics.' (27). But once Clinton evacuated the city and the soldiers left their homes behind them, there was a rapid decline in the standard of discipline, even amongst its officers. By 4 September 1778, the strength of its five companies revealed a still respectable return of 16 officers and 186 rank and file (28), yet, with the corps failing to increase its strength beyond the 200 mark, the final straw appears to have been its poor discipline revealed by the court martial of two of its officers, Captains John McKinnon and Martin McIvoy, in October 1778. This led to its immediate reduction on the direct order of General Clinton (29).

The activities of MacKinnon and McEvoy may have sealed the fate of the first ever Catholic officered corps to serve in the British army and can have done little to put Irish Catholic officers in a positive light. This though was not the end for many of its officers and men. Eight of its officers were listed as being retained in November 1779 as Seconded Officers of the Provincial forces in New York, with four of these still being so listed as late as 23 January 1783 (30). Meanwhile, parts of the Roman Catholic Volunteers remained together according to an affidavit of John McKinney, 'they were drafted into other Corps; being at liberty to Choose their Corps Captain McCulloch and all his Company Joined the British Legion...' (31). Not only did this suggest at least part of the Regiment developed something of an esprit de corps, it also confirmed other provincial corps accepted known Catholic officers and their men. For the remainder of the ranks, while some were likewise drafted into Lord Cathcart's British Legion, the bulk were transferred by Clinton to a second corps specifically designed to recruit Irish Catholics, The Volunteers of Ireland, 'The Advantages attending this corps led me to strengthen it with near 80 men from the Regiment of Roman Catholic Volunteers, which from the Terms of their warrant and their utter disregard of all Discipline I found necessary to reduce.' (32).
The actual raising and officering of the Volunteers of Ireland by Lord Rawdon was more coherent than the rather hurried commissioning of the Roman Catholic Volunteers. From Clinton's own correspondence he had personally chosen the highly talented twenty-three year old Rawdon for this project, Rawdon himself having served in North America since 1775. Exactly when and where the process of forming the Volunteers of Ireland commenced is ambiguous. While recruiting for its soldiers commenced in New York on 25 May, it may also have begun recruiting at the latter end of Clinton's occupation of Philadelphia, albeit only in a tentative manner (33). To avoid the failings of Clifton's ill-fated corps, particularly amongst its provincial volunteer officers, Rawdon chose a considerable number of other regular army officers of Irish family to be promoted on the Provincial Establishment and appointed. Rawdon also insisted that only provincial officers who had a degree of previous military experience were appointed alongside them. Its lieutenant-colonel, Wilbore Ellis Doyle, had been a captain-lieutenant in the 55th Foot while its major, John Despard, had been a captain in the 7th Foot. Of its five captains and one captain-lieutenant, three had been lieutenants and two ensigns in the regular army, while the fifth, William Barry was probably a Catholic émigré having been a lieutenant in the Prussian army. Of its eight lieutenants, three had been ensigns in the regular army, three in provincial corps with the other two a gentleman volunteer and cadet respectively in the regulars. Finally, the nine ensigns presented a mix of three promoted regular army NCOs, three gentlemen volunteers, two provincial officers and one ex-midshipman (34).

Despite the disruption of the move to New York when the corps was still in its embryonic stage, the Volunteers grew quickly, a general return of Provincial forces of 1 August 1778 recording a strength of 15 officers and 250 rank and file (35). This success coincidentally caused Clinton to demonstrate the rapidly changing perceptions of senior British officers in countenancing not only the recruitment of
Loyalist Irish Catholics in the growing ideological conflict but also the appointment of such as officers. In October 1778 he wrote to Lord George Germain requesting the Volunteers be placed on the regular establishment. In so doing he rehearsed identical arguments and logic which were to be re-applied sixteen years later to justify the re-raising of the Irish Brigade in British service (36). Despite this, Clinton's suggestion was politely yet firmly rejected by Lord Amherst due to fears of causing 'great dissatisfaction amongst the Officers of the Army at large...', particularly if any of the Catholic ranks gained commissions (37).

The Volunteers continued successfully to recruit amongst New York and the surrounding areas Irish Catholic community, achieving by February 1779 a strength of 32 officers, 30 sergeants, 20 drummers and 427 rankers (38). The regiment was undoubtedly assisted in this by being permitted overt expression of their Irish character, most particularly St. Patrick's Day. A New York paper of 17 March 1779 reported, with more than a hint of condescension in respect of their religion, '...that such men, however long they may have remained in the haunts of hypocrisy, cunning, and disaffection, being naturally gallant and loyal, crowd with ardour to stand forth in the cause of their King, of their country, and of real, honest, general liberty, whenever an opportunity offers.' (39). The tone of the report mirrored the reality in the minds of many in the army and establishment willing to support emancipation in respect of Catholics. While they could not forget the age-old prejudice about the religion, they were now beginning, albeit in a most patronising manner, to conceive of at least the possibility of Irish Catholic loyalty to the British throne.

In terms of active service the Volunteers saw little beyond local foraging and skirmishing during 1779, but on 1 December the corps was considered to be sufficiently well founded for all but a small recruiting party to embark from New York as part of Clinton's army for his assault on Charleston. The Volunteers soon proved themselves in action under the stern and resolute leadership of Rawdon.
During the successful siege of Charleston and boasting an overall ration strength of 636 effectives, the Volunteers saw extensive action (40). Their performance was such that they were placed on the American Establishment as the 2nd American Regiment. Subsequently, having received new recruits from New York, the Volunteers saw further extensive service during the South Carolina campaign of 1780-81 at the battles of Camden and Hobkirk's Hill (41). Despite this the regiment was successfully able to maintain a steady flow of replacements and by December 1781 the regiment still boasted a strength of 27 officers and 446 rank and file (42). Apart from a number of minor skirmishes in February and March 1782, the regiment saw no further active service, remaining in South Carolina under the command of Major Doyle (43).

In the aftermath of Yorktown, it was decided to reduce the overall numbers of Provincial Corps and to utilise the better officer and NCO cadres who had proved most successful at recruiting. Consequently, on 21 March 1782, Rawdon, now back in Britain, was commissioned to raise a regular regiment on the Irish Establishment, the 105th Foot, whilst the Volunteers of Ireland back in America were reduced. This caused the rank and file to be drafted to other Provincial Corps while the officers and NCOs, finally rewarded by promotion to the regular establishment, were dispatched to Ireland to recruit Rawdon's new regiment (44). Rawdon's insistence on using professional officers demonstrated the value of such and contributed to the favour in which the Irish Brigades officers were to be viewed. With a logic which would be repeated a decade later in respect of the émigrés, it was reasoned that the officers and NCOs of the Volunteers would be the most likely body to appeal to potential Irish Catholic recruits. The Army was encouraged to such expectations by the expressed willingness of colonial Catholics to enter the Volunteers during its extensive service. This supposition proved correct as the 105th was successfully raised during 1783, only to be rapidly reduced in 1784 when the end of the war brought about the usual round of reductions. This though was not quite the end as a number of its senior officers, particularly Rawdon and Doyle, were freed to enter the Irish Parliament.
where they were to play an important role in one of a number of projects to raise Catholic corps with the coming of war in 1793.

The wartime expression of loyalty by colonial Irish Catholics was crucially matched by similar expressions of loyalty in Ireland where a popular wave of volunteering saw key elements within the Catholic community, particularly its merchant and property owning elements, pledge loyalty to the Crown. The impressive response of the Protestant urban middle class, as well as the landowners and their tenantry in swelling the ranks of the many Volunteer corps from 1778 onwards, gave a powerful boost to a distinctive political voice for Ireland. The vexed question of allowing Catholics to enrol and the subsequent participation of Catholics in a number of these corps contributed to the evolution of the Catholic Emancipation movement in Ireland focused on the Dungannon Conventions of September 1783 (45). While there remained entrenched opposition from many quarters of the Ascendancy, by 1782 there was sufficient political and popular support, even amongst sections of the Protestant gentry, for a limited number of specifically Catholic Volunteer formations to be raised and to bear arms. This was despite the fact that the 1695 Disarming Act remained on the statute book, it not being specifically repealed until a revision of the relevant statutes in 1878. As it was, there was provision within the Act for the Lord Chancellor to grant individual licences to Catholics to bear arms. Rather surprisingly and possibly indicating a continued decline in paranoia about the past, one of the authorised Catholic corps was permitted the title of the 1st Regiment of the Irish Brigade (46).

For the regular army, the period 1776 to 1778 had already seen the first specific Catholic Corps formed in Ireland, albeit under Protestant officers and not without adverse comment. This was raised against a background of earlier failed moves to pass a Catholic Relief Bill for Scotland (47). In 1776 Sir John Dalrymple successfully persuaded the British government, despite considerable opposition from Lord
Barrington, the Secretary at War, to allow his younger brother, Captain William Dalrymple, to raise a Scottish officered Catholic Irish Corps. A then junior Scottish politician who was actively supporting these moves as well as personally campaigning for better treatment for Catholic army pensioners was Henry Dundas. He was to play a key role in the relaxation of the prohibitions against Catholics holding commissions and in establishing the Irish Brigade in 1794. Dalrymple's corps, titled the Loyal Irish Corps and with a strength of four companies, served quietly as part of the Jamaica garrison from late 1776 until its reduction at the end of the war (48). A footnote to this corps illustrating the remarkable kinship links between families with both Catholic and Protestant branches on either side of the Channel is that for a time one of its lieutenants, William Sheldon, a professing Anglican had two Sheldon cousins serving in the Irish Brigade in the Caribbean (49).

It must be stressed that these substantive moves in the direction of a form of military emancipation by elements within the British army were, if anything, running somewhat ahead of public and political opinion and even that of some officers. It required a continuing degree of wilful blindness to the still extant legislation against recruiting Catholics. Repeating many of the previous concerns, a letter published in Freeman's Journal of 29 December 1777 expressed strong reservations about the raising of Catholic regiments in Ireland. The writer feared the issue would not be placed before the Irish Parliament but that such regiments would be raised under the Royal Prerogative with Catholic officers, such being in conflict with existing statutes and, crucially, the King's coronation oath. The author concluded with the well-established line.

'It will be depriving the provinces of Munster and Connaught of many useful hands which are now innocently employed. It will be teaching discipline and the use of arms to numbers of men, who, for the public safety of this realm, ought never to be acquainted with either... what is to be done with the Papist regiments? If they return in
arms they may be very dangerous inmates; two thousand disciplined men may
discipline ten thousand more, and then what will become of the protestant security?...'
(50).

Alongside such private expressions of concern, overt recruitment of Catholics was
still unacceptable. In early 1776 a recruiting officer in Sligo published an
advertisement promising that Catholics who enlisted in his regiment would have their
own chaplain, and told the recruits to bring recommendations from their priest. Both
Lord Lieutenant Lord Harcourt and the colonel of the regiment repudiated this
advertisement as wholly unauthorised and the offending officer was put under arrest
and threatened with dismissal (51). Nothing in the subsequent 1778 Relief Act
specifically allowed the recruitment of Catholics. The statute still required that
recruits attest to being of the Protestant faith, this remaining the strict legal position
until its repeal with the Act of Union. Generally though, there were only isolated
incidents of opposition as elsewhere senior British army officers were unofficially
allowing a form of attestation as early as 1775 which simply omitted five words 'that
I am a Protestant'. This was possible due to an Irish Act of 1774 contemporary with
the Quebec Act. This permitted subjects of any religious persuasion to substitute an
oath of allegiance to attest their loyalty to the crown and a declaration, approved of by
the bishops of Munster, denying any direct or indirect papal jurisdiction in Irish
temporal affairs in place of the attestation as to the Protestant faith (52). This particular
practice enabling the enrolment of Catholics remained effective until 1799 without a
single legal challenge from either side of the Irish Sea.

Despite the continued recruitment of Catholics 1783-89 and the 1774 Act, the legal
situation was still not fully resolved. In 1784 a long overdue post of Inspector of
Recruiting for Ireland was created and in 1787 all regiments, be they on the Irish or
English Establishments, were permitted to raise recruits in Ireland. The continued
ambiguous legality of recruiting Catholics was reflected in a 1787 memorandum of
Ireland's Chief Secretary Thomas Orde to the Secretary at War questioning the legality of Catholic recruits that 'there is at present a necessity of not being very exact in that respect'. This was echoed in a memorandum of the Quartermaster General for Ireland implying it would not be expedient to question the theological character of recruits (53).

Alongside the vexed issue of legality, the significant number of Irish Catholics entering the army from 1770 raised the even more delicate questions of whether they should be permitted to openly practice their faith and what the reaction of their own Church should be. The place of religious observance in the evolution of the British Army had been significant. Since the outset of the New Model Army, regiments had had clergy attached as chaplains to look after the spiritual welfare of soldiers. While the Restoration period had seen something of a decline in the importance of these figures, nonetheless, the provision of chaplains within the army to ensure its theological adherence to the Anglican Church remained intact into the eighteenth century. Until the 1750s it was implicit that only Anglican priests were required, given that all ranks formally attested to that faith upon entry. As Irish Catholics began to enter in growing numbers, two linked issues came to the fore. Firstly, should they be permitted practice of their religion, particularly as attendance at Sunday church service had evolved into a traditional requirement and was effectively compulsory and secondly, how should the Catholic Church react? Ought its priests in Ireland to attempt to dissuade their congregations from serving in the army of a state still constitutionally opposed to its very existence and which maintained vigorously discriminating legislation? Or should it seek an accommodation so as to allow its priests to serve their community's spiritual needs within the ranks?

As with the British government, the Catholic Church hierarchy in Ireland initially chose simply to turn a blind eye but the ever-increasing numbers of their parishioners willingly entering the army during the 1770s forced the issues to be addressed. These
were formally written up in Latin and dispatched to Rome for advice. The author was generally conciliatory, stressing the relaxation in the implementation of the Penal laws by the British state and pointing out that Catholic recruits were only being asked for an oath of allegiance to the state, rather than being required to attest to another faith. This very much conformed with what Rome had always been willing to concede and indeed what it had long conceded in most Catholic nations of Europe, namely that its members were willing to take an oath of loyalty to the Crown in temporal matters provided they were permitted the free and open practice of their religion. Before Rome took an official position, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dublin, John Carpenter, demonstrated that the Irish hierarchy was far from united in this sympathetic line. He articulated his disapproval to Rome on the dual grounds that Catholics were still prohibited from becoming officers and that the lax spiritual mores of the British Army would be damaging to any good Irish Catholic. He was also concerned that many would in effect be apostatised, by having both to hide their faith and attend Anglican services. On this, he pointed to the then response of the government when challenged in the Dublin Parliament on the issuing of enrolling and arming Catholics, to which they answered that such soldiers could be presumed to have conformed (54). Subsequently, suggesting Rome itself preferred the status quo, there was apparently no substantive response to this or any other correspondence on the issue prior to 1789. When Rome did finally issue instructions it was in a world where the previous ideological and theological parameters had been irrevocably altered by the consequences of the French Revolution.

The late 1770s and early 1780s saw considerable legislative action in the general relaxation of the Penal Laws. Pressure from Catholic relief movements in both Britain and Ireland, alongside the gradual diminution of prejudice, resulted in the respective passing of limited English and Irish Catholic Relief Acts in 1778. Partly as a consequence of the rising star of the Irish Parliament, Henry Grattan, a second Irish Catholic Relief Act was passed in 1782 which repealed legislation against Catholic
ownership of land enabling many Catholics to become landlords and middlemen in their own right. This had the effect of placing the rising Catholic middle class and its surviving aristocracy on the same side as the Protestant Ascendancy in opposing moves to reverse the land settlement. During the late 1780s the Catholic Church hierarchy, aristocracy and middle classes moved away from further demands for the restoration of Catholic rights, becoming instead increasingly concerned at popular passions amongst the mass of the Catholic urban and rural lower orders. With the coming of the French Revolution the political interests of the Catholic labouring classes were revived and articulated by leaders of Protestant radicalism rather than Catholic. The older mid-eighteenth century agrarian tradition of the Whiteboys, which had caused such concern at the time, had been in most respects non-political in its demands. The French Revolution brought into being an entirely new political radicalism, the United Irishmen, a radical challenge which united the Catholic and Protestant Establishments, making it possible for the latter to conceive of a suitably officered Catholic corps.

As it was, the decision to permit Catholics to hold commissions on the Irish Establishment and to re-raise the Irish Brigade in British service originated in Whitehall not Dublin Castle. The Irish Parliament, largely as a consequence of Gratton's powerful and articulate campaign, had been permitted complete legislative independence since 1782. Although the cause of emancipation had found a strong voice in Gratton, his challenge to England's still powerful administrative hold over Irish affairs effectively prevented any meaningful alliance between those wishing to bring about further emancipation. As the English aristocracy's anti-Catholicism of the early half of the century lessened and gave way to an almost fashionable tolerance, the general cause of Catholic emancipation in England had inevitably progressed. There were powerful expressions of sympathy and support for the Catholic Committee. This was headed by three peers, Petre, Stourton and Clifford, three baronets, one of whom was Sir William Jerningham, and leading gentry families
including William Sheldon, the latter three named individuals having relations in the Irish Brigade. This support significantly furthered the passing of England's 1791 Relief Act. This included provision for dispensing with the requirement for an oath of attestation for public office, including, by implication, military commissions. Crucially though, it did not refer to the Coronation oath in respect of the King's signature on such documents (55).

The passing of the 1791 Act owed much to William Pitt's sympathy for amelioration, and was supported by key members of his cabinet, particularly Lord Grenville and Henry Dundas. Both had been supporters of the 1778 Relief Act and actively assisted Sir John Dalrymple's efforts to raise Catholic troops for the American War. Despite this, Pitt's Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the Earl of Westmoreland, was content to play the traditional role of chief of state in Dublin, making as few concessions as possible. Grattan's programme of political reform and emancipation meanwhile began to appear more threatening in the context of the French Revolution. Key officials in Dublin Castle, such as John Beresford and the Earl of Clare, had some success in persuading the Protestant interest to turn away from reforms which would offer concessions to the Catholic and Nonconformist lower orders-Westmoreland certainly supported this line. Correspondence dealing with the Protestant Volunteer formations dispatched to Dundas in November 1792 revealed Westmoreland to be supportive, if not exactly strenuous, in continued opposition to Catholics gaining additional political rights or being permitted legal entry to the Volunteers (56). It was only the French victories in late 1792 that briefly convinced many Protestant opponents of the urgency of encouraging their fellow Catholics to support the regime. It still required Pitt's direct order to Westmoreland to ensure that between January and April 1793, he used all his power and influence to propel a Catholic Relief Act through the Irish Parliament. While there was still Protestant opposition ensuring a considerable number of restrictive amendments were made, this Act crucially granted the parliamentary franchise to Catholics, allowed them to sit on juries, hold minor civil posts and, as
would soon become the key issue, apparently permitted them to hold commissioned rank up to Colonel on the Irish Establishment (57). Matching these developments, December 1793 witnessed pro-government speeches by the Catholic bishops at Rathfarnham, essentially marking the Church's decision to make loyalty to the British State a political priority as part of an anti-revolutionary alliance with Pitt's government (58).

Meanwhile, on the other side of the nominal political divide, one of the key spokesmen for the Whigs on the still potentially emotive issue of emancipation was Edmund Burke. While a convinced Protestant like his father, the apparent influence of his Catholic mother ensured he had worked from the early 1760s to support the cause of emancipation. From early in his career he had been involved with efforts to permit Irish Catholics to enter the armed forces. In 1762, as private secretary to William Hamilton, many credited Burke with the proposal for a Foreign Enlistment Bill to raise seven regiments of Irish soldiers for Portuguese service. In 1774 he supported the Act which substituted an oath of allegiance for the Tests and equally supported the revived Catholic Association then under the leadership of Lord Kenmare. 1778 found him supporting Dalrymple's efforts to recruit both Scottish and Irish Catholics, which in turn brought Burke into contact with Bishop Challoner, Vicar Apostolic of the London District and William Sheldon, a key member of the English Catholic Committee as well as being a cousin of the two Sheldons serving in the French Army (59). Consequently, and in light of Burke's post 1789 reputation as a leading opponent of the French Revolution, he was enlisted in September 1791 by John Keogh, the then leader of Ireland's Catholic Committee, to assist in promoting the idea of a new and extensive Irish Relief Bill. Burke played a fundamental role in convincing key government ministers, particularly Dundas and Grenville, that such a measure would materially assist in countering potential linkage between Irish Catholics and radical political reform (60).
Of equal significance, in 1784 Burke became a close friend of, and political tutor to, William Windham, who in turn was to play a fundamental role in the re-establishment of the Irish Brigade. As Burke's political pupil, having gained the seat for Norwich in April 1784, Windham became a supporter of those Whigs who looked to the leadership of the Duke of Portland, and Windham expressed strong support for the cause of emancipation from his earliest days on the back benches. In the same year as his election to Parliament, Windham came to share a close friendship alongside Burke with a fellow Norfolk family, the Jerninghams of Cossey Hall. Not only did this bring him into the circle of English Catholic aristocracy, gentry and the Catholic Committee, it brought him into contact with families with members serving in the Irish Brigade. Sir William Jerningham himself had served in the Chevau-legers de la maison de Louis XV and as a subaltern in the cavalry regiment of Fitzjames before inheriting the baronetcy and returning to England in the 1760s. His younger brother Charles, known as the 'Chevalier' due to his French title of the Chevalier Jerningham de Barfort, had been colonel-en-second of Bulkeley's and then Dillon's Regiment in the 1770s. He subsequently retired with the rank of maréchal de camp just prior to the revolution, emigrating to the family home after the storming of the Tuileries in 1792. Equally, Sir William's own son, William, was a cadet in Dillon's in 1789 before his emigration (61). Sir William's wife was Francis nee Dillon, daughter of the eleventh Viscount and sister of Count Arthur Dillon, the colonel-propriétaire of Dillon's. Not only was Henry Dillon, the younger brother of Arthur, a pre-war visitor to his sister, so were other Brigade officers, the Sheldons, the Cliffords and the Conways (62). The Jerninghams also brought him into contact, albeit vicariously, with members of the French royal family who were occasional visitors to Norfolk (63). Windham's close friendship was evidenced in 1794 when, in support of a testimonial on behalf of the recent émigré Chevalier Jerningham, he wrote, 'Mr. Jerningham is a gentleman whom I have long known, & whose family I am much connected with...' (64). With the Revolution, Windham consequently had direct contact with émigré officers and clergy as they sought refuge with sympathetic English Catholic families. Alongside Cossey,
the Jerningham's London residence in Boulton Row became something of a fashionable location for émigrés, so much so that Sir William's daughter Charlotte became known as 'Her Catholic Majesty' (65). With Windham, certain of these émigrés subsequently played a key role in the debate preceding the re-raising of the Irish Brigade.

A pupil of Burke, the early 1790s found Windham both a powerful opponent of the revolution yet a strong supporter of emancipation. Despite his support for Britain's entry into the conflict in January 1793, as a member of the Portland Whigs he initially rejected offers of office under Pitt. He was though willing to offer informal assistance, particularly in respect of the first contacts with the Papacy. The English Establishment had watched in growing horror as their French counterparts were first toppled from power, stripped of their lands and finally, if they had not already emigrated, executed. A handful of aristocratic and senior clerical refugees started arriving from almost the first day of the Revolution, and as it became ever more radical, their numbers mushroomed. The stream of priests which had increasingly trickled into England as a response to the Civil Constitution in 1791 soon became a torrent with the requirements of the Civil oath and the attack on the monarchy. This culminated in 1793 with the vicious assault of the Jacobins upon the institution of the Church itself (66). This effectively completed the process for the English Establishment of transforming the Papist enemy of the past into the persecuted ally of the moment, to be regarded as a key bulwark and ally against social disintegration. The government itself stood back from openly working with the Catholic Church hierarchy in England. Rather, it encouraged the establishment of semi-official bodies such as John Eardly Wilmot's Committee, constituted from the 'Subscribers to a Fund for the Relief of the Suffering Clergy of France in the British Dominions.' The Duke of Portland, the Marquis of Buckingham, Earl Fitzwilliam, Edmund Burke and even the Bishops of London and Durham were all contributors (67).
While additional measures were taken to accommodate the flood of French clergy amongst England's Catholic community, Pitt's government quietly opened informal links with the Papacy in Rome. Despite claims to the contrary there had always been irregular surreptitious diplomatic intercourse between London and Rome throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Events in France brought a rapid and radical alteration in the relationship as the war spread and Britain and the Catholic Church found themselves on the same side. In October 1793 Admiral Hood found it necessary to obtain vital supplies of food and water for his blockade fleet off Toulon from Rome. Burke took the opportunity of Hood's questioning of whether this was legally permitted to call for 'more distinct and avowed political connections' with the Papacy (68). While any move towards an official exchange of representative had to wait another hundred years, both Pitt and Windham agreed on the need for closer links. Since 1792 Pitt had had an agent in Rome, Sir John Coxe Hippesley MP, an individual personally recommended by Windham who served as the official linkage in procuring the naval supplies for Hood (69). With British troops and warships helping defend the Papal States from the onward sweep of the revolutionary armies of France, Burke and Windham convinced the cabinet to allow a papal mission to quietly arrive in England. Monsignor Erskine was pleasantly surprised upon his arrival in London on 13 November 1793 to be personally meet by Windham and Burke, and rapidly to find himself able to move easily in polite society. He was soon introduced to both the Prince Regent and his Catholic companion, Mrs Maria Fitzherbert, becoming a regular visitor to St.James's (70). The Prince Regent in particular demonstrated a noticeably warm welcome and a general sympathy to toleration that stood in marked contrast to his father's at best lukewarm response. Further, when France subsequently overran Rome, not only did the British government support Erskine with a pension, it gave financial assistance to both the Pope and, most ironically, the penniless and homeless Cardinal York. To complete the circle of history in this matter, in 1799, having just received notice that George III had granted the Cardinal an annual pension of £15,000, his secretary wrote to Secretary of State Dundas to express York's...
'Pleasure to receive letters from the Duke of Portland, Lord Chatham, Lord Spencer, and Mr. Secretary Windham, strongly expressing their satisfaction in acquiescing in any measure that could offer relief to the illustrious and venerable Cardinal York. It was sufficient that the knowledge of his suffering should reach the Throne, to assure both sympathy and relief...' (71). The Cardinal lived out his remaining years in some splendour until his death in 1807, the royal pensioner paying tribute to King George's kindness in 'the noble way of thinking of the generous and beneficent Sovereign.' (72).

This was as symbolic an ending as could be imagined to a hundred years of perceived Jacobite menace. While disaffected elements within British society had turned during the eighteenth century to the symbolic banner of Jacobitism to articulate general grievances, now they turned to the fundamentally greater radicalism of the Jacobins in a far more substantive manner. With the old Catholic and Jacobite enemy already becoming an almost cherished romantic memory, its living survivors in the form of the émigré officers of the Irish Brigade were now to be viewed as valuable allies.
In June 1770, while travelling through France and Italy researching his 'History of Music', Dr. Charles Burney met Captain Seagrave of the Regiment Walsh at Cambray travelling to join his regiment on Corsica with two cadets, Fitzgerald and Keating. Accompanying these officers to Paris and Lyons, Dr. Burney, in recording his impressions of this meeting, observed on the nature of the Irish Brigade,

'Here we took up an officer of the Irish Brigade, Captain Seagrave, who was going to Corsica, a well-bred agreeable man, with whom, by the time we reached Peronne, I became well acquainted. He had been six months in England, being related to many of the catholic nobility there, as well as in Ireland. At first I took him and the officers I saw and heard speak English at Cambray to be in the English service, for their uniform had undergone very little change since they quitted it with James II. At present it is only the officers of these brigades that are Irish; the common men are Liegeois, Germans, and of all countries, except France. But the words of command are still English, though no more intelligible to the men than the beat of the drum. It is the number of syllables with metrical distinctions of long and short in the one, and the strokes of the drumstick in the other, which direct their motions.' (1).

The picture that Burney drew from Seagrave of the rank and file essentially constituting a 'foreign legion' though still officered by English speaking Anglo-Irish Catholics, was not necessarily that of popular image. Despite this, the veracity of Burney's thumb nail sketch was accurate.

Suggestions by writers like MacGeoghegan and O'Callaghan that up to 450,000 Irishmen served in the French army between 1691 to 1789 were fantasy. French
sources gave an absolute maximum of 40,000, including many second-generation French citizens of Irish parentage (2). Further, of this 40,000 around 15,000 were accounted for by the original emigration consequent of the events of 1689-92 in Ireland and the Treaty of Limerick. Essentially, the Brigade had had to rely on non-Irish drafts to maintain its rank and file from 1716. Irish recruitment had continued during the subsequent years of peace between England and France, but fears remained that Irish troops might one day be used in an invasion of Ireland and in support of the Pretender. In 1722 it became a felony to enlist in, or recruit for, foreign service without licence. French requests for permission to recruit in Ireland were rejected and a number of Brigade officers discovered recruiting without licence were indeed hanged (3). This, along with the failure of the '45' and the subsequent relaxation of the Penal Laws in Ireland ensured the flow of fresh Irish recruits declined to a meagre trickle. Between 1716 and 1722 a breakdown of 410 new recruits to the Regiment of Dillon revealed only 134 (33.2%) coming directly from the British Isles: 101 from Ireland, 25 from England and 8 from Scotland, with a further 43 (10.7%) being born to Irish fathers in France. Of the remainder, 44 (10.9%) were nominally French, mostly from Alsace as French nationals were not permitted to enrol in foreign regiments. 120 (29.8%) were from specified German states, with the balance of 69 (15.4) being from across central and Eastern Europe. By 1762, of 722 rank and file, only 106 (15.3%) originated from the British Isles compared to 127 (17.6%) French nationals and 313 (43.4%) Flemings with the balance coming from across Central and Eastern Europe (4). The amalgamation of the Brigade's five infantry regiments down to three by 1776 and the entry of a few British deserters during the American war helped lift the total originating from the British Isles during the early 1780s, Dillon's receiving 28 'British' soldiers between 1 December 1781 and 10 January 1782 while participating in the capture of the Caribbean Islands of St.Eustatius, St.Martin and Saba (5). Yet by 1789, of the 1142 rank and file listed in that years inspection for Dillon's, only 270 (23.6%) originated from the British Isles, with 337 (29.5%) originating from the Low Countries, 222 (19.4%) from Germany, whilst the
remainder were an international mix of Portuguese, Spanish, Swiss, Italians, Hungarians, Poles, Swedes, Russians and even Americans (6). That year's inspection of the Regiment Berwick revealed a similar situation. Only 218 (20.8%) of its 1047 rank and file originated from the British Isles against 371 (35.4%) from the Low Countries, 235 (22.4%) from Germany and even 13 Spaniards amongst the remainder (7). In the last few years prior to the Revolution, the flow from Ireland had all but ceased. The Regimental 'Contrôles' for Walsh's covering the years 1786 to 1789 listed just 13 recruits from the British Isles of which 7 were born in England to English parents (8). By 1789, the heterogeneity of the Brigade was a long established fact and it had long since ceased to be, if it ever really had been, an 'Irish army in waiting', ready to liberate the home country from Protestant rule.

As the flow of Irish recruits declined, so the number of Irish regiments in the French army also inexorably declined. Viscount Mountcashel's original 1689 Brigade and James's post-Limerick Jacobite army had fielded 5-6,000 and 12,000 men respectively in 1692. Initially Mountcashel's Brigade and James' army had been maintained as two separate formations, the regiments of the Brigade being treated as a foreign unit of the French army. The Treaty of Ryswick in 1698, heavy battlefield losses and Louis XIV's recognition of William III as King of England made the maintenance however of a separate 'Jacobite' army both practically awkward and politically unacceptable. While Mountcashel's Brigade was maintained on the French military establishment, James' army was disbanded. Whilst the War of the Spanish Succession saw an increase in the number of Irish Regiments as France called upon the many destitute soldiers of James' old army, the Peace of Utrecht and the general peace after 1715 ensured an inevitable reduction. Henceforth, the Brigade managed to maintain a strength of around 3,500 in an average of six to seven infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment for much of the eighteenth century. The reforms of Count Saint-Germain and Maréchal De Muy, 1775-76, reduced this to just three regiments of infantry, those of Dillon, Berwick and Walsh, each fielding two battalions.
The most senior of the regiments was that of Dillon, reaching back to 1653 when the first Regiment Dillon had been established in French service (9). The second 'Dillon' regiment, formed by the seventh Viscount Dillon in 1688, entered the French army as part of the Irish Brigade in 1690, the family maintaining its English and Irish estates with the various colonel-propriétaires departing England as the need arose. Family links remained close with members regularly travelling between Paris, London and Dublin. Their regiment reflected this with a noticeable English as well as Irish flavour amongst the families of its officers.

That Count Arthur Dillon became propriétaire in 1767 rather than his elder brother Charles also demonstrates the continuing importance of religion in the essence of the Brigade for Charles was the first member of the family to conform to the Protestant faith, doing so in 1767. Whilst he became the twelfth Viscount in 1787, this split the family for the first time, creating a severe schism between the brothers. Despite the division, the family papers of the Jerninghams, cousins of the Dillons, relate fraternal visits to the Jerningham Norfolk home by Catholic members of the Dillons being made regularly in the 1780s and 1790s, including officers of the Brigade before and after the Revolution (10). Arthur Dillon meanwhile married a widow, whose daughter by her first marriage became the wife of the Duke of Fitzjames, Colonel-Propriétaire of Berwick's, the second great family.

The family of the Dukes of Berwick was socially superior to the Dillons, being directly descended from James II. Yet as the family's regiment had only been established in 1698 from a cadre of depleted formations from James II's own army, Berwick's followed that of Dillon's on the French establishment. Unlike the Dillons, the Berwicks had no ties to either Ireland or England. The original James Fitzjames, Duke of Berwick, the illegitimate son of James, Duke of York and Arabella Churchill, had accompanied his father in 1689 to permanent exile abroad. The family itself had
split into two, one side settling in Spain, the other in France. Predictably, this family, alongside that of Walsh-Serrant, maintained strong links to the last Stuart, Cardinal York in Rome. Highlighting the bonds of faith is that much of the correspondence between both families and Cardinal York regarded the welfare and financial support of the various Irish and English Catholic colleges, an integral element of the broader exiled community (11).

The most junior of the regiments and of the three proprietor families, and in many ways the most assertive as to status, was that of Walsh-Serrant. While various branches of the family had served in the French and Spanish armies since the early seventeenth century, none had gained the patent of nobility. Only in 1755 was Antony Vincent Walsh, an ex-naval officer in the French navy and then shipbuilder at Nantes, belatedly created an Earl as a reward for his shipping and banking services during the Prince's failed Scottish adventure. His younger brother, Francis James Walsh, had been created Count Walsh-Serrant for similar reasons, becoming head of the family with his brother's death in 1763. Francis, unlike his elder brother, had never served in the French navy, instead he had inherited a fortune from his uncle which he had increased by entering the shipbuilding trade in Cadiz and following in his father's footsteps by engaging in the slave trade. With large estates in St. Dominque, the family had become one of the wealthiest in France by the late eighteenth century. Yet it was the family's key role in the events of 1745-46 and the subsequent close ties with Prince Charles Edward that gave it the necessary influence to gain one of the three colonelcies in the 1775-76 re-organisation of the Brigade.

Having become the officially accredited representatives of the Prince at the courts of France and Spain after 1746, Francis's sons had, as socially required of aristocracy, entered the military profession. In 1770 his eldest son, Antoine-Joseph-Philippe, had become Colonel-Propriétaire of the Regiment Roscommon upon the death of the last male member of that family. This regiment had, since its creation in 1698, 'passed
down' from the Dorrington family to the Rooth family in 1718 when the male line of that family had died out and, when the Rooth family ran out of male heirs in 1766, to the Roscommon family (12). This development had not occasioned too many raised eyebrows in 1770 as no existing family proprietorship was disturbed. In similar circumstances, when the Seventh Viscount Clare, Colonel-Propriétaire of Clare's, had died unmarried at the age of eighteen in 1774 hence bringing about the extinction of the titles Clare and Thomond, his regiment had been smoothly incorporated with Berwick's (13). Yet when the family of Walsh-Serrant secured one of the three surviving colonelcies in 1776 it was a very different matter.

The 1775-76 reduction in the number of the Brigade's regiments was judged necessary on two grounds. Firstly, in order to save funds all surviving infantry regiments were increased to two battalions under one existing regimental staff. Secondly, with ever fewer recruits from Ireland, or from anywhere else in the British Isles, it was judged reasonable to concentrate those there were (14). For the then five regiments of the Brigade: Dillon, Bulkeley, Berwick, Clare and Walsh, this meant amalgamation to just the regiments of Dillon and Berwick, with initially Walsh being incorporated into the existing Légion Corse and then conversion to the Légion de Dauphine given the brutal mathematics of the recruitment situation (15). Yet Walsh-Serrant's high standing at Court and the considerable financial benefits due to a colonel-proprétaire of an Irish regiment as opposed to a national French regiment ensured a quick reversal (16). Within a year assertive lobbying at Court ensured the re-conversion of the Légion de Dauphine to the Regiment Walsh, much to the consternation of the established propriétaire families. They expressed deep resentment against 'les parvenus'. Count Arthur Dillon's daughter recorded, 'I remember that when Monsieur Walsh was named Colonel of the regiment which took his name, Monsieur de Fitz-James and my father showed a great deal of discontent, on the pretext that he did not belong to any great Irish or English family.' (17). Noticeably, she barely mentioned the Walsh family throughout her memoirs despite serving in the
Royal Court alongside them, while established Court families such as Rothe, Lally-Tollendal, Fitzjames, Jerningham and Sheldon appeared on almost every page.

Further, the politics behind the decisions about which family regiments survived and which were extinguished left feelings of bitterness which re-emerged nearly twenty years later when the question of re-raising the Brigade in British service was discussed. One of the losers in 1775 was François Henri, Comte de Bulkeley whose family regiment, tracing its history back to a regiment of foot commanded by Colonel Butler in 1683, was amalgamated with Dillon’s. Writing in December 1794 to challenge Edward Dillon’s claim to a colonelcy, he related how the Dillon rather than the Bulkeley family had secured the resultant proprietorship back in 1775.

‘...there were five Irish Regiments of one Battalion each, but when Maréchal de Muy was Minister he resolved to have all the Regiments of two battalions so he incorporated Dillon’s Regiment into Bulkeley’s and Clare’s into Berwick’s so I being Senior Colonel and having the oldest Regiment and H.Arthur Dillon being only a Colonel and I already a General Officer he would by this means have been out of employ so as I have before said the Queen of whom monsr. [Edward] Dillon was at that time a kind of Favourite, upon getting me promoted to be Inspector General insisted upon my letting Monsr. Dillon have the Regiment. It was with great reluctance that I did it but I have you to judge Sir if it was possible for me to refuse the pressing request of a Queen.’ (19).

Sadly for Bulkeley he was to lose out again in 1794.

Alongside reducing the size of the Brigade, Saint-Germain’s reforms had also consolidated the range of officer grades thus reducing the number of posts in each battalion and the number of places available to potential officer candidates. Conversely, these reductions ensured its officer corps not only maintained but
enhanced its distinctive character. Whilst the flow of Irish recruits had long ago almost dried up, the number of officer candidates from Ireland and England had not. Such was the flow of new officer candidates both from Ireland and England, as well as from Irish families settled in France, that an increasing number of young gentlemen entered the Brigade as volunteers prior to obtaining any substantive position. The reductions also resulted in a number of long serving officers being attached ‘a la suite’, essentially being listed on the strength of regiments but having no authority or substantive role within them.

The service records certainly demonstrate that entry to the officer corps was restricted to those either born in Ireland or the British Isles or were the direct descendants of those who were, the exception being those posts reserved for promoted ex-rankers. This linked to the contradictions in place of birth recorded for a number of the officers. In several cases certain officers were entered in the Registre des Services as being born in Ireland, whilst in other documents they were recorded as being born in France. A classic example of this being none other than the future Napoleonic Marshal, Alexander Macdonald. His memoirs were quite specific as to his Scottish Jacobite family background and his time and place of birth being 17 November 1765 at Sedan. Yet the entry in his Registre des Services was equally explicit in giving his time and place of birth as 1 July 1765 in Dublin (20). This, as with other such contradictions, could be attributed to clerical error, yet just as likely is that potential officers were choosing to give their place of birth as Ireland to enhance their status and qualification for a post. If so, such French born candidates were still required to speak English, for while French was used for communications between the different regiments of the army, English remained the official language of the Irish regiments until their effective nationalisation in July 1791 (21).

Similar contradictions occurred as regards dates of birth with several officers being listed with variations of a year to eighteen months. There were striking contradictions
with the date of Charles MacCarthy. According to the Pedigree of MacCartie Lyragh's family he was born on 25 February 1768, yet according to his Registre des Services he was born on 19 February 1767. There was though no doubt as to his place of birth, both sources confirming his mother had returned to her family home in Dublin to ensure that her son had an Irish birth. Yet a third date of 15 February 1764 appeared in his original commission into Berwick's in 1785 (22). There were numerous other examples, Luke O'Toole, the brothers Christopher and Patrick Fagan, James-Henry Fitz-Simons, Jean-Bernard Greenlaw and Nicolas-Henry Redmond being but a selection (23). With these there was a distinct pattern that the later dates of birth tended to be recorded in documents later in their careers, it likely being an attempt to make themselves appear younger so enhancing their previous rate of promotion.

Questions of seniority were equally influenced by nationality, with officers of Irish parentage receiving decided preference. As late as May 1791 the Minister of War, General Louis Le Begue Duportail, refused French born Lieutenant Maurice D'Elloy's claim for precedence over Lieutenants Walter Bulger and Daniel O'Meara. He accepted their challenge that, 'officers were supposed to be Irish, or at least the sons of Irishmen retired in France.' In the event, all 3 were simultaneously promoted Capitaine on 21 August 1791 (24).

Moving on to the specific organisation of the Brigade, its regiments had always mirrored that of their native French counterparts and this was no less true on the eve of the French Revolution. Each regiment had two battalions, each with a strength of five companies. The first battalion consisted of the company of grenadiers plus four companies of fusiliers, while the second battalion consisted of the company of chasseurs plus four companies of fusiliers. There were 6 officers per company, the capitaine-commandant, capitaine-en-second, lieutenant-en-premier, lieutenant-en-second and two sous-lieutenants. The regimental staff had 8 officers, the colonel-propriétaire, colonel-commandant, lieutenant-colonel, major, major-en-second,
quartier-maitre-trésorier, who held the equivalent rank of either lieutenant-en-premier or second, and 2 cadets-gentilshommes. The 2 porte-drapeaux, who were part of the regimental staff, were equivalent to senior warrant officers holding substantive rank just above sergeant major although they were given the status of subalterns. This gave a total peacetime establishment of 68 substantive officers to which were added 2 cadet-gentilhommes who, although they were nominally included in the strength of the officer establishment of the first fusilier company of each battalion, were in practice on the regimental staff. While not substantive officers, these cadets were listed as nominal officers pushing the total establishment of such for each regiment to 70. Finally, the regimental staff included 4 appointed posts, which, while not holding substantive officer rank, held the equivalent status of such, the chirurgien-major, aumonier, premier-adjudant and deuxième-adjudant (25).

On the eve of the Revolution, two regiments of the Brigade were stationed in Metropolitan France, Dillon's and Berwick's, while Walsh's had sailed in July 1788 to the Indian Ocean to provide the garrison for the Isle de France (Mauritius). Consequently, Walsh left an eleventh auxiliary recruit company back in France although it was staffed by existing regimental officers. With an official establishment of 210 'gentlemen' across the Brigade the inspection returns and regimental Registre des Services for officers for 1789 recorded that only one of the three regiments were up to establishment, Dillon's listing 68 serving officers, Berwick's a full complement of 70 and Walsh's 68, a total of 206. Equally though, despite these vacancies, they revealed the officers of all three were overwhelmingly from the British Isles, primarily Ireland (26). There were only 2 substantive officers in Dillon's who were not either directly from or born to a parent from the British Isles or Ireland, Sous-Lieutenant Theodore Schenetz of the grenadier company and Lieutenant-en-Premier Maurice D'Elloy. Schenetz, born in Fribourg, Switzerland, had originally joined as a private in 1779, rising rapidly through the ranks to be commissioned a sous-lieutenant in the grenadier company on 3 June 1786. Schenetz's position in the grenadier
company was a French Army tradition as promoted rankers were expected to hold that post. Alongside him was another promoted ex-ranker, Englishman Sous-Lieutenant Edward Worth. D'Elloy was something of an anomaly as his parents were undoubtedly French without any obvious family linkage to the Brigade yet he entered the regiment as an officer (27). A similar situation as to nationality existed in the Regiment Berwick, the quartier-maitre-tresurier Pierre Joseph Tezlaing and sous-lieutenant of the grenadier company Alexis Nicholas Berteau, both French nationals and promoted ex-rankers. It should be added that 1 of the porte-drapeaux, Jacques Joseph Aupick, was also a French national and ex-ranker having enlisted in 1747, although this rank held only the honorary status of officer (28).

It is a revealing comment on the attitudes of the officer corps that only a handful of Irish or English recruits in either regiment were felt suitable for promotion from the ranks, only 4 in Dillon's, Quartier-maitre-trésorier Joseph D'Arcy, Lieutenant-en-Premiers James MacClosky and Michael Walsh, and Sous-Lieutenant Edward Worth, and but 1 in Berwick's, Capitaine-Commandant Thomas Mullens (29). Apart from Michael Walsh, who was exceptional anyway for having taken only a decade to gain a substantive commission, every one of these was either an officer of the grenadier company or held an administrative position on the staff, thus conforming strictly to the established pattern for promoted ex-rankers.

Walsh's had a slightly different balance, possible reflecting its posting to the Isle de France. Despite its auxiliary company in France, which technically gave it eleven companies, it still had 2 officer vacancies in July 1789, wanting 1 lieutenant-en-second and 1 cadet-gentilhomme (30). Further, unlike the other two regiments, there were slightly more officers originating from outside the British Isles, 5 in total, although only 1 was not a promoted ex-ranker. Quartier-maitre-trésorier Pierre Hilaire Deleau, Lieutenant-en-Second Toussaint Misset and Sous-Lieutenant Francois Perot were all French nationals, whilst Capitaine-en-Second Charles Brenck and Sous-
Lieutenant Henry Bertsch were German. Bertsch conformed to the profile of the promoted ex-ranker being the junior sous-lieutenant of the grenadier company as did his colleague Perot, who, until immediately prior to the regiment's departure for the Indian Ocean, had been a porte-drapeau, another post normally reserved for promoted ex-rangers. Deleau, as quartier-maître-trésorier, also filled a post traditionally given to ex-rangers. The original entry point for Brenck was unclear from his regiment's Registre de Service, there being no date of birth and his first rank in the regiment being recorded as Porte-drapeau suggesting a promoted ranker. There were only 2 Irish ex-rangers, Sous-Lieutenants, Denis Marcus and Paul Rogan, who had served forty-three years and thirty-eight years respectively prior to gaining substantive commission's in 1788 and 1789 (31).

Therefore, of the Brigade's 206 actual serving officers on the eve of the French Revolution, only 12 subalterns and 2 capitaines were promoted ex-rankers, 7 of whom were of Flemish, German or French parentage while 7 were of Irish, English or Scottish parentage. In addition, all 6 serving porte-drapeaux were ex-rankers, although the question of their nationality is harder to assess, only 3 of them being undoubtedly of Irish parentage. Hence in the Brigade as a whole, there were only 7 substantive officers and 3 porte-drapeaux (4.8%) who were not of Irish, English or Scottish blood. The only clear exceptions in the entire Brigade of officers either originating in or being born to fathers who had originated in the British Isles or being long serving promoted ex-rankers were Maurice D'Elloy and Toussaint Misset. The latter, who despite having a French father, had entered Berwick's as a sous-lieutenant de remplacement the year before the Revolution was undoubtedly a French national, although possibly his mother was Irish (32).

To understand both the motivation and ethos of the officers who gave the Brigade its distinctive corporate identity it is necessary to reject the romantic and simplistic notions embodied in the phrase 'The Wild Geese'. Traditionally the ranks of the Irish
Brigade were personified as a refuge for oppressed Irish Catholics fleeing the oppression and poverty of seventeenth and eighteenth century Ireland and motivated by a desire to restore the Catholic Stuart claimant. The works of Grainne Henry and Robert Stradling clearly demonstrate that in the seventeenth century the desire to free Ireland from English oppression, regain confiscated lands, free encumbered estates and the general cause of the counter-reformation, all supported the creation of flourishing exiled Irish communities, colloquially the 'Wild Geese' (33). Thus, while there had been an element of truth in its seventeenth century image, with the Stuart cause giving it a slightly new focus in later decades, the predominantly Continental rank and file had long ceased to reflect the concept of an exiled 'army in waiting' by the middle eighteenth century. Nonetheless, there were still a few residual links to the Stuarts, an example of which is the Pretender's choice of Colonel Edmund Ryan of Berwick's deputisation to vet a selection of potential wives, as well as the regular communication between Cardinal York and the Fitzjames and Walsh families (34).

For the vast majority of officers though there was nothing beyond a nominal acknowledgement to the Stuart originating tradition regarding the founding of each regiment. Additionally, the social distinctions between Old Irish and Anglo-Irish families, which had still been marked in the interplay within the Irish regiments in foreign service in the early seventeenth century, had ceased to be of any but peripheral genealogical interest by the late eighteenth century.

What the partial legend of the Wild Geese tends to obscure, or at least down play, was the fact that the families of Irish, Anglo-Irish and English Catholic gentry had established a tradition of service constituting the officer corps of the respective émigré regiments in both the Spanish and French armies during the seventeenth century. Essentially a military caste prefaced on extended family clans had evolved during that century. The balance of this caste had originated from the endogamous body of surviving Catholic gentry families in Ireland who, whilst they had largely lost their outright ownership of property in land during the seventeenth century, were still fairly
prosperous farmers and merchants in the eighteenth. Whilst many were technically just tenant farmers, they were more appropriately termed ex-freeholders or ex-proprietors. They still controlled significant amounts of land (usually over 400 acres), either on 31 year leaseholds or through protection from close family who had conformed and could therefore grant longer de facto agreements (35). Commonly these families were intermarried, with well established lines of communication between them, thus creating a resilient, tight-knit, kinship network with close family ties and allegiance to France and Spain respectively. An indication of the significance of this hereditary pattern was the startling fact that not a single son whose father had previously served in Spanish service entered French service and vice-versa. The vast majority of the officers serving in the Brigade on the eve of the French Revolution were part of a complex family network which not only had brothers, cousins, and fathers who were or had been officers, but also grandfathers, great grandfathers and great-great-grandfathers who had served in the Irish regiments. Essentially, the fundamental mechanism by which prospective officers gained entry to the Brigades officer corps was largely reliant on a variety of family links embedded in this hereditary military caste. Further, this cohesive kin-group structure personified a family tradition of military service which can be singled out as the primary motivation by the late eighteenth century, as much as anything to do with Catholicism or the Stuarts.

This helps explain the apparent near absence of officers of Scottish families in the Brigade. For while a similar pattern of service in foreign armies had evolved, the three regiments of the Scottish Brigade of the Dutch army was their primary point of reference. There had briefly existed three Scottish regiments in the French army as part of the Irish Brigade between 1744-62, but their fleeting existence had been insufficient to counter the long established pattern of service in the Dutch army. Having said this, the reduction of the Scots Brigade in 1782 may have caused a few additional Scots to seek alternative service in the Irish Brigade for the late 1780s saw
a number of young Scots entering as junior officers, such as Cadet Gentilshomme Alexandre Cameron and Sous-Lieutenant Jean-André Forbes in Berwick's, and Sous-Lieutenant Alexandre O'Daly de Douglas in Walsh (36).

An obvious illustration of the heritage imperative and the extended family network were the colonel-propriétaires. The Colonel-Propriétaire of Dillon's, Arthur Dillon, came from a long Anglo-Irish tradition of such service, literally inheriting the right to own it in 1767. Further, he was directly related to 4 officers from old English Catholic families who themselves had a long established tradition of service in Dillon's; his cousins Dominique and William Sheldon, and William Jerningham, and his second cousin Robert Clifford, the latter being in turn first cousin of Jerningham. The former pair, from the Sheldon family of Ditchford in Hampshire, could trace in their own family a continuing line of officers in French service dating back to Dominique Sheldon who accompanied James II to Ireland in 1689. Dominique entered the French army in 1692 and rose to the rank of lieutenant-general by his death in 1721. His son, François-Raphael Sheldon became colonel commandant of Dillon's from 1747-67, and in turn all three of his sons, Dominique, William and François, entered Dillon's. While the youngest, François, died during the American campaign on 28 September 1780, William was a capitaine-commandant in Dillon's by the Revolution. The eldest, Dominique, went on to achieve the rank of general de brigade by 1792 (37).

Alongside these were members of the more extended Dillon family, cousin Théobald Dillon and four second cousins, Thomas, Edward, Robert and François Théobald Dillon (38).

These bonds of kinship were forcibly demonstrated in 1747. Conventionally, having inherited the peerage, the eldest son resided in England even if they had previously held the post of colonel-propriétaire. On 24 October 1741, the tenth Viscount, Charles Dillon died in London without issue and both the title and proprietorship passed to his younger brother Henry. This in itself presented no difficulty until 1744, when, with
moves at Westminster to prevent subjects of the British Crown from entering foreign service, Henry Dillon had to resign as colonel and return to England as the eleventh Viscount to avoid the danger of confiscation. This left two of his younger brothers, John and Edward, as colonel-propriétaire and commandant respectively. John was killed the following year at Fontenoy, Edward subsequently taking his place. Yet at the Battle of Lawfeld in 1747 he too was killed thus leaving only the youngest brother, who, as a Catholic priest (later the Archbishop of Narbonne), was obviously unable to fill the role. As the eleventh Viscount could not depart England without endangering the family’s estates, whilst he again became the colonel-propriétaire from 1747 to 1767, in reality his cousin, François Sheldon (the eleventh Viscount’s mother being Catherine Sheldon), acted as colonel-commandant, implemented the Viscount’s instructions on appointments and promotions. To achieve this rare distinction of being an absentee propriétaire the Viscount had petitioned Louis XV in 1747 that, ‘My Lord Dillon asks for the Command of Colonel for his first cousin, the only near relation who remains in the service and had an uncle of his name a Lieutenant-General in the army and a Mestre de Camp of Cavalry.’ (39). The King’s response was positive, ‘I cannot consent to see, that a proprietorship, cemented by so many good services, and so much blood, should go out of a family, as long as I may entertain a hope of witnessing its renewal.’ (40).

On 25 August 1767 the eleventh Viscount’s second son, Count Arthur Dillon, became Colonel-Propriétaire at seventeen having been a cadet in the Regiment since 13 May 1765. But in practice active command remained in the hands of his direct relations, Colonel Sheldon and Major Jerningham. Arthur Dillon actually fulfilled the role of capitaine-aide-major until authorised by the King to take active command on 24 March 1772 at the slightly more experienced age of twenty-two (41).

This extended family equally illustrates how these kinship links produced a particularly cohesive social circle. The guests at the wedding of Arthur Dillon’s
daughter were a veritable who's who of the various senior Anglo-Catholic families of England, all of whom had members serving in Dillon's.

"On my side, the company included my grandmother, Mme de Rothe; my uncle, Mgr. Dillon, Archbishop of Narbonne; my aunt, Lady Jerningham; her husband, Sir William Jerningham; her daughter, Miss Charlotte Jerningham;...; her eldest son, George William Jerningham, the present Lord Stafford; the Sheldons; their eldest brother Mr Constable, who was my first witness; Sir Charles Jerningham, Sir William's brother...who acted as my second witness." (42).

For those of less exalted social standing, the heritage motivation was explicitly illustrated by Peter Jennings, whose account is all the more revealing for being that of an officer who entered the Brigade subsequent to the events of July 1789. His journal commenced with a heart-felt account of the suffering of his family consequent to the Cromwellian forfeiture and the tenor of his statements were still those of the dispossessed Catholic gentry. In fact, the family tradition of military service he followed derived from his mother's side, the 'French' family.

"...my Brothers David & Patrick, had previously passed over to France &...held Commissions in the Regiment of Berwick of the Irish Brigade composed of their loyal & Catholic Countrymen'..."Having resolved to bend my course towards France in the service of whose Sovereign so many of my Friends and Relatives were at this period engaged, and my mind being of a military turn from my earliest infancy...and there was no receding from that course which appeared shaped out for my by divine Providence." (43).

Driving the heritage factor was the continuing reality that members of the Catholic gentry had few options for suitable careers in Ireland or England. The various Penal Laws ensured that the status-conscious young Catholic gentleman had the stark choice
of remaining in the family home or travel to the Continent seeking a suitable career. If anything, the legal restrictions helped maintain the military caste by offering little alternative to maintaining the tradition of foreign service. The Church and even the sea offered potential employment, but given the status of the military in most Continental nations, being an officer in the Brigade was an attractive alternative to kicking one's heels in legally enforced idleness. Technically, there were legal barriers to holding a foreign commission. An Irish Act of 1746 referred to the numbers of young Catholic gentlemen leaving for France and Spain to obtain commissions and which the government feared would enable them to promote rebellion in Britain and Ireland. The Act directed that with effect from 1747, subjects of the British Crown who were in the French or Spanish service without licence would be disabled from holding lands or money in Ireland whether by descent, purchase, or gift. In practice, the only known individual obliged to return was the eleventh Viscount Dillon (44).

A subsidiary though nonetheless important factor attracting young Catholic gentleman to the Continent was the well established network of Irish, English and Scots Catholic communities, be they clerical, educational, medical or commercial. As well attested in other studies, from the late sixteenth century, the continued flow of émigrés created a series of establishments amongst which a Catholic from Ireland, England or Scotland was secure, free from persecution and amongst fellow nationals. Originally focused in what had been the Spanish Netherlands, by the mid-seventeenth century prolonged service as officers in the Spanish army had ensured hundreds of leading Irish families had transferred people and culture to various centres across the area. Irish merchants had gone on to establish wealthy trading concerns in ports and cities across Europe and had, in some cases, diversified into becoming powerful banking houses, the houses of Walsh-Serrant and the Dillons of Bordeaux being typical examples. The most important of these communities for creating and maintaining a cohesive self-awareness as a separate community were some thirty clerical colleges, many based in Flanders but in particular the seven seminaries in and around Paris. These were
responsible for educating three-quarters of the Irish clergy and were near where the
Irish regiments were normally stationed. In these colleges, partially endowed by the
French Crown, those specifically studying for the priesthood rubbed shoulders with
many young Irish, English and Scots Catholics there to obtain a Catholic education
and to make social contacts (45). At the English College at Douai, of some 870
students who studied there between 1750 and 1794, only 216 (25%) actually became
priests (46). Amongst these students were many close family relations of the Brigade's
officers, the contemporary record being littered with correspondence between the
Brigade and various colleges. For example, the Abbé O'Connor of the College of
Rheims wrote in 1785 to Colonel Count Conway about his nephew, Kitt Conway,
illustrating the continued working of the extended kinship network for gaining entry.

'The reason Mr. Kelleher [Abbe Kelleher, head of the Irish College], alleges for not
granting Kitt the vacant Bourse is that the subject who presents himself for any of
those Bourses must be named by two of the O'Connell families and the Bishop of
Kerry, and consequently that he can do nothing for him, as he did not get their
nomination.' (47).

Further, although half of each regiment's officers were permitted to be absent between
October and June, there were few opportunities for home leave. Consequently, the
exiled communities provided an important social focal point. The strength of this
linkage was revealed in 1764 in a sharp debate about the continued usage of the Irish
language at the College at Lille. The Brigade's officers stationed nearby actively
participated in the debate, urging its retention alongside English in preference to
French (48). This buttressed the fact that English was still very much the working
language of the Brigade, demonstrated as late as 6 May 1755 when the then Secretary
of State for War, Voyer d'Argenson, ordered that the language of command in the six
Irish and two Scottish regiments was to remain English. Louis XV subsequently
authorised that the ordinance on infantry training was to be given in English as well as
German and Italian for its use in foreign regiments (49).

An ironic effect on this community in exile was that it enhanced the isolation of the majority of the Brigade's officers from their French environment just as much as the fact that they commanded an alien rank and file. Originating in the ideological world of the counter-reformation, Spanish Flanders had provided a secure base for the founding of these institutions with their centre at the Franciscan house at Louvain. Their conscious programme remained firmly one of Counter-Reformation indoctrination in both education and social values right up to 1789. It was revealing that the emigration of most clergy and clerical students from these colleges as events unfolded matched that of the Brigade's officers. Both equally rejected the new secular values, rather identifying with the cause of the ancien régime.

Further, whilst the officers' image of themselves as a corps was that of a military caste, their actual day to day service did little to attach them to the men under their command. Apart from the fact that over 75% of the rank and file were from Flanders and Germany, along with a sprinkling from across the rest of Europe, substantive officers spent only a small proportion of their time in actual contact with them. When not on leave for six months of each year their regimental duties were mostly focused on administrative matters. The minutiae of training and arms drill was performed by NCOs, quite literally 'Bas Officiers' in the French army. Only at reviews and on the occasional manoeuvres would officers actually physically supervise. The most frequent personal contact only came in the guise of judging breaches of military discipline, and even here the officers' role was that of judge and jury, the ubiquitous NCO carrying out the actual punishment. Officers even lived apart. While France had a system of barracks in which garrisons were housed, officers normally billeted in the respective town, journeying to barracks strictly as required. Only active service brought a more intimate contact and a lessening of the social divide plus the creation of a slightly greater degree of common identification. Consequently, the fundamental
impact on the attitudes of the officer corps, who were already distanced by nationality and language from an alien rank and file, was that the majority failed to display any significant association with, or much in the way of sympathy towards, their men. Beyond professional duty to the troops under their command, the officers' loyalty and identification was to their fellow officers and nationals, the French Monarchy and the Catholic Church. This left the majority of the officers as alienated from the reactions of their rank and file to the events of the Revolution as were their aristocratic French brethren.

While family tradition evolving from religious persecution were the main motivations for seeking an appointment in the Brigade, the objective was to become a professional officer with the expectation of many years service as such. The process of becoming a career officer in the Brigade was of its self the crucial counter to any lingering historical identity based on social and cultural memories of the counter-reformation and the Cromwellian land forfeitures. Instead, their broader identity and ethos mimicked that of their fellow French officers with a focus on service to the French Crown and royal army. Beyond this, supported by the wider exiled community, they remained firmly inward-looking to the small circle of fellow Brigade officers whose common motivation for seeking such service existed within the set parameters of their particular military caste.

The broader nature of the native French officer corps in the last two decades of the eighteenth century has been fully examined in the works of Samuel F. Scott. The aristocracy dominated the officer corps. By the middle of the century only some 10% of officers were non-nobles and the Segur decree of 1781, which required four generations of nobility in order to qualify for a commission, effectively reduced this to almost zero in native French Regiments (50). By definition though, all but the barest handful of the aspirant officers of the Brigade were inherently unable to conform to the social classifications of the native French officer corps. There were the
handful of senior aristocratic émigré families who were ranked as noblesse présentée, the Dillons, Fitzjames' and Walsh-Serrants, the senior member of each inheriting the rank of 'Colonel-Propriétaire' thus guaranteeing advancement to the grade of general. There was a small intermediate group who claimed a mixture of substantive and dubious Irish titles, such as Count O'Connell, Count Conway, Count Mahony and Count O'Meara. All these were apparently accepted by their French brethren and qualified several to gain the rank of general. For the overwhelming majority however, they equated in social status to un-titled English gentry for which there was no direct French equivalent and no 'book' of nobility to check against. There was though no doubt as to their status as gentlemen, all either bearing the prefix 'Mr' or describing themselves as being 'of' a particular place. Consequently many contemporary French documents seldom omitted out of courtesy, social recognition and protocol, the nobiliary particle 'de'. In the French army, they fell into an exceptional category between that of the French provincial nobility and the un-titled commoners, termed 'officiers de fortune' or 'roturiers' depending upon their route to a commission. They were not though, in French terms, true officiers de fortune as these were by definition the exceptionally fortunate handful of ex-rankers who had gained elevation after long and efficient service, usually in the performance of the more onerous duties such as training and discipline judged to be beneath most nobles (51). While there were normally some five to six of these in each regiment of the Brigade, thereby mirroring the remainder of the French Army, they were mostly limited to their traditional posts in the grenadier company, as adjutants and as quartier-maître-trésorier. An insignificant handful ever progressed beyond this. Neither were the Brigade's cadre of officers definable as roturiers as this referred to the bourgeoisie who had sufficient financial resources to purchase a commission and maintain a company. Such officers generally faced a socially defined glass ceiling of the rank of capitaine and had no previous family background in the army.

For the French then, the bulk of the Brigade's officer corps fell into the specific
category of what might be termed 'famille militaire', a form of acquired honorary
nobility. While there had always been an effective bar to all but a handful of non-
nobles obtaining commissions in the French army, there had equally been a tradition
of gaining an equivalent status through long military service. All prohibitions on non-
nobles gaining commissions, including that of the Segur decree of 22 May 1781, had
specifically excluded the sons of fathers who had become chevaliers de Saint-Louis.
To gain the Croix de Saint Louis, apart from distinguished actions on the field of
battle, it required twenty-six years of service as a captain or twenty-eight as a
lieutenant. Effectively, once an individual had gained this award, subsequent
generations were categorised as coming from a military family which gave them in
the eyes of the substantive nobility the equivalent of a noble's innate military spirit
and hence status. Although not all officers of the Brigade gained the actual award, as
a corporate group they equated to this definition in French eyes (52).

For the Brigade's officers themselves though, whilst some of this identity was indeed
imbued into their mental framework, its broader aspects were not. For them, while
there was not the formalised French system of nobility, they maintained as strict a
system of social classification, with an effective requirement to have been from the
appropriate families of Catholic gentry, even if the lands that had originated that
status were long since confiscated or leased from a sympathetic Protestant. This
system functioned solely on a knowledge of family history and being known to be 'of'
such a family with some form of traditional kinship link to the Brigade. There were
very few officers who did not conform to that distinction and in some respects it made
them more protective of this subtle status than their counterparts amongst the French
officers, the latter buttressed by their formalised status system. It is indicative that,
prior to July 1789, only the 7 ex-rankers who had themselves, or their fathers,
originated from the British Isles, gained a substantive commission.

Clearly distinct from the senior families such as the Dillons and Sheldons, examples
of these more humble military families abounded in the Brigade, although as with their more illustrious senior officers, they also maintained generations of service in the same regiment. Laurence O'Toole of Fairfield, Co. Wexford served in Berwick's during the mid-eighteenth century gaining senior rank and all eight of his sons entered French service. Three sons, Patrick, John and Brian became officers in their father's regiment, Berwick's on the eve of the Revolution, with another, Luke, an ADC to the Prince de Conde. The O'Toole family also had a highly placed uncle, William O'Toole of Edermine, Co. Wexford who had commenced his service in Berwick's, rising to Major of Dillon's by 1789. Another example comes from the various branches of the Mahony family of Co. Kerry. Although born in Calais, Sous-Lieutenant John-François O'Mahony's father was Dillon's lieutenant-colonel, Dermod O'Mahony, from the Dunloe branch of this prolific family. John-François had two uncles serving in the Brigade, Lieutenant-en-Second Bryan-Kean Mahony in Dillon's of the Kilmorna branch and Sous-Lieutenant Daniel Mahony in Walsh's of the Castlequin branch. All three were cousins of the colonel-commandant of Berwick's, Barthelemy Comte des Mahony of Dromore Castle, Co. Kerry and followed in the footsteps of their common forebear, Count Daniel O'Mahony of the Dunloe branch, who had entered French service as an officer of Dillon's back in 1691, John-François being his great, great grandson. Finally, there were entire families serving in the same regiment. All four sons of Valentine Keating, Thomas, William, Edward and John, were serving officers in Walsh's by 1789. Bernard, Francis and Thomas MacDermott, the latter only transferring from Dillon's to Berwick's May 1789, were equally following in their fathers footsteps, as were the brothers Denis and James O'Farrell (53).

One consequence of this network of extended military families was the cross-channel links to highly placed relations back in England and Ireland which subsequently proved crucial when the émigrés came to seek support re-raising the Brigade. Alongside the obvious establishment contacts of some of the senior English officers and those with family at the French Court, some of the less exalted retained
particularly influential kinship links with the Irish Catholic hierarchy. Such a family was the Husseys of Dublin. The family's initial link to the Brigade came with three brothers Walter, who served in Berwick's and settled at Montignac in Perigord, Miles who first served in Bulkeley and then Lally's, and finally John who also served in Bulkeley's. Retired Captain and Chevalier de St.Louis Miles Hussey married Margaret Constance Dempster of Abbeville by whom he had four sons who were all serving in the Brigade on the eve of the French Revolution, Walter-Jean and Justine-Ignace in Dillon's, William and Peter in Berwick's. Their uncle twice removed was Dr. Thomas Hussey of Co. Meath who, as chaplain to the Spanish embassy in London from 1767, established important contacts within the British establishment and, most importantly for the Brigade's future, the friendship of Edmund Burke (54).

The letters of Daniel O'Connell provide evidence as to the vital importance of the kinship network in sponsoring a young Irishman's entry into the French army. O'Connell departed the shores of Ireland in early 1761 with the intention of entering Austrian service in which he had a number of relatives. In the event, while traversing Flanders, he met a 'Captain Fagan' who persuaded him on a career in the French army. With the additional support of O'Connell's cousin, retired Capitaine Robert Conway of Walsh's, Fagan's recommendation to the colonel of the Regiment de Royal Suedois gained O'Connell entry as a cadet. The young teenager participated in the last two campaigns of the Seven Years war in Germany where, in his own words, he learnt 'the soldier's glorious trade' (55). Having risen by 1776 to the rank of capitaine-en-second in Berwick's with consequentially some influence O'Connell was able to assist in his turn. In a letter home of 10 June 1776, he commented in reference to the nineteen year old son of his eldest sister Elizabeth, Eugene MacCarthy, who had arrived in France two years before and had been kicking his heels ever since as an under-employed cadet in Berwick's, 'I have some expection of getting a Commission for Eugene in "Walsh's". ' Having said this, O'Connell went on to indicate that nepotism was not always sufficient, for in regard to his cousin's gambling debts and
drinking, 'I should have him in a Dungeon on bread and water to pay them, was I not apprehensive that it may prevent Serrant [Walsh, Count de Serrant] from giving him an Employment in that Regt.' (56). Despite O'Connell's reservations, MacCarthy was commissioned a sous-lieutenant in Walsh's sixteen days later.

A relative of Eugene MacCarthy was Charles MacCarthy whose entry into the Brigade illustrates a mixture of family connections, particularly his grandmother's. Charles's mother, Charlotte MacCarthy, was the grand-daughter of Charles MacCarthy of Dunmanway who had accompanied James II to France in 1691. Charlotte MacCarthy had married a Charles Gueroult, a French legal official, and it was their son, Charles Gueroult, who, on the suggestion of his elder uncle, Captain John MacCarthy of Berwick's, was adopted by his other uncle Colonel Charles Thadeus MacCarthy, originally of Berwick's Regiment but then an officer in Louis XVI's Life Guards. Consequently, having adopted his mother's family name and with his uncle's considerable assistance, he was able to present the MacCarthy military pedigree. This and the influence of both his uncles, enabled him to enter Berwick's as a sous-lieutenant on 4 April 1785 (57).

Another officer Daniel O'Connell was able to assist was his cousin, Maurice Jeffrey O'Connell from the Ballybrack branch of this extended Kerry family. It appears that Daniel O'Connell entered this young individual, born in 1765, as a cadet on the books of Berwick's on 7 August 1778. He was then promoted to sous-lieutenant on 28 September 1779, yet only departed Ireland for the first time in February 1780. This was not the end of his uncle's care and assistance, for, on 13 June 1784, he transferred to the Regiment Salm-Salm, where Daniel O'Connell was Colonel-Commandant, the Count recording, '...have brought him into my own, in order to attend with more care and success to his conduct and his information...'. By 1789 O'Connell had additionally assisted Marcus O'Sullivan, his sister's son, and his nephews Maurice Charles Phillip O'Connell and Maurice O'Connell. Adding in his cousins, Eugene MacCarthy and
Maurice Jeffrey O'Connell, Daniel O'Connell had used his position to directly gain places for three nephews and two cousins (58).

Jennings provided another account. Having departed Ireland on 21 April 1790 intent on entering Berwick's in which both his elder brothers already held commissions he found his eldest brother David at Gravelines on 1 May, and 'I now with the approbation of my Brother was inscribed a Volunteer or Cadet in Berwicks Regt. It being a rule that no commission should be bestowed ere the Subject had served a certain period as a Cadet.' (59).

While many prospective entrants came directly from Ireland, some, particularly the English Catholics, had already spent several years on the Continent at one of the colleges catering for English and Irish Catholics. Sous-Lieutenant the Hon. Robert Edward Clifford of Dillon's Regiment was the third son of the Catholic fourth Lord Clifford and related by the marriage of his aunt to the Dillon family. He, like his two elder brothers, had been educated from June 1776 at the Academy for English Catholic youths at Liege prior to his appointment in July 1784 as a sous-lieutenant de remplacement in Dillon's. In January 1786, having been promoted sous-lieutenant, he spent time in Paris with his young uncle William Jerningham who, having until recently been schooled at the College of Oratorians at Juilly, soon after entered Dillon's as a cadet. William Jerningham's uncle, Charles Jerningham had been colonel-en-second of Dillon's and Williams father was married to the Hon. Francis Dillon, sister of the regiment's colonel-proprètaire (60).

As to the point of entry, despite any influence a family might have back in Britain and Ireland or at Court in France, other than for the handful of families ranked as noblesse présentée, none of the aspiring officers could enter the French military schools due to their lack of status. Instead, most entered regiments as cadets-gentilshommes where they absorbed both a professional ethos and received training. Attached to a company,
they held the status of gentlemen, living and eating with the officers, and wearing an
officer's uniform minus the rank distinctions, yet they stood in the ranks with a
musket and were expected to perform the less onerous duties of the rank and file
alongside some of those of the junior officers.

A similar, although slightly elevated position to that of cadet-gentilshomme was sous-
lieutenant de remplacement. Prior to 1784, each of the five companies of a battalion
was permitted a cadet on its establishment, but from that date the rank of cadet-
gentilshomme was reserved to just one in each battalion's senior fusilier company.
Instead, the rank of sous-lieutenant de remplacement was instituted, the nearest
English equivalent being a brevet or acting rank. In this post, the aspirant officer,
while wearing the uniform of a junior officer and holding that status, had no
specifically assigned duties or authority and was expected to use this period to learn
the basics of his trade. While cadets and sous-lieutenants de remplacements were only
expected to serve in this position for between a year and eighteen months, if no post
became available an unlucky few would remain at this rank for many years. This was
particularly the case for officers who had transferred from reduced regiments, thereby
losing the network of influence that had originally secured their appointment. Bernard
MacDermott, having originally entered the Cavalry Regiment of Fitzjames in 1759,
he transferred to Dillon's in 1762 when it was reduced and consequently remained a
cadet until 1770. Patrick Lynche entered Fitzjames' in 1760, transferring to Berwick's
in 1762 where he remained a cadet until 1776. A handful even chose to become
NCOs after a while, preferring to serve in that capacity until a suitable appointment
became vacant. John Fennell had entered Fitzjames' in 1751 as a cadet yet transferred
to Dillon's in 1760 as a fourrier. He subsequently rose through the NCO grades,
becoming a grenadier company sous-lieutenant in 1777, a post traditionally reserved
for promoted ex-rankers (61).

In late 1788 the Council of War ordered the abolition of remplacement officers, the
intention being that apart from the two cadets and the direct commissioning of a handful of promoted rankers, all aspiring officers would be required to have attended a military college (62). While this reform had little impact given the outbreak of the Revolution within the year, it was noticeable that the handful of aspiring officers arriving in the prior twelve months either enrolled as private soldiers or as 'volontaires' while waiting for a suitable post to become available, or indeed were entered directly as substantive sous-lieutenants. This was not necessarily a new development, a small number of prospective officers had always taken the option of enrolling in the ranks as a 'volontaire' while waiting for one of the cadet positions to become available. Given that entry into any of the military schools was restricted to those of established nobility, this situation would have potentially caused profound difficulties to a growing number of prospective Brigade officers. As it was, the Revolution intervened to curtail the restriction with the opening of all ranks in the army to all social classes by the National Assembly in February 1790.

A break-down of the entry points for the officers serving in each of the three regiments in early July 1789 reveals the common method of induction. For Dillon's, of its 68 serving officers, 41 had originally enrolled as cadets including its colonel propriétaire back in 1765. One officer commenced as a sous-lieutenant de remplacement then became a cadet, while 11 others began as sous-lieutenants de remplacement before promotion to substantive sous-lieutenant, 1 had entered the Gendarmerie, part of the Royal Guard prior to becoming a cadet and 1 had been a lieutenant in the short lived Légion de Mailleboise before becoming a cadet and subsequently sous-lieutenant de remplacement. Two enrolled as privates but within a year had each obtained a position as a cadet and sous-lieutenant de remplacement respectively as vacancies became available. Four entered directly as sous-lieutenants, while 7 had enrolled as private soldiers and progressed through the ranks, all but 1, Theodore Schenetz, having taken two or even three decades to rise up through the ranks. Taking examples from the above, progression to the prize of a substantive
commission could be convoluted even for gentlemen. Henry Tarleton, having enrolled as a private in 1786, was entered as a sous-lieutenant de remplacement in 1787 and a cadet-gentilshomme in the grenadier company in 1788, being finally made a substantive sous-lieutenant in August 1789. Consequently, out of 68 serving officers, 45 had served at some point as cadets and 12 as sous-lieutenants de remplacements which when added to the 7 who had risen through the ranks meant only 4 officers had entered directly as substantive officers without undergoing some period of training. The average time of service between entry either as a cadet or sous-lieutenant de remplacement was eighteen months, although there were considerable variations and one must be cautious about detailed averages given the significant inconsistencies in some of the various sources as to specific dates of promotion. Fifty-six officers began their military careers in Dillon's, with all but 2 of the remaining 12 transferring into Dillon's from other regiments of the Brigade. Of these 10, 4 had entered in 1762 as cadets when the Cavalry Regiment Fitzjames had been disbanded while 3 others were promoted ex-rankers from Bulkeley's who entered Dillon's with the amalgamation in 1775. The remaining 3 transferred in from Berwick's and Walsh's for individual reasons. Only 2 officers began their military careers outside the Brigade, Maurice D'Elloy in the Gendarmerie and Alexandre Macdonald in the Légion de Mailleboise, both, upon transferring into Dillon's, serving for a year as cadets (63). Broadly, the situation in Berwick's was similar to that in Dillon's. In common with Dillon's, the colonel-propriétaire had first inherited this rank aged fifteen after just one year as a cadet in the cavalry regiment Fitzjames, becoming colonel-commandant of Berwick's in 1762 when Fitzjames' was reduced. Consequently, he is included in the breakdown of 70 serving officers. Thirty-seven made direct entry as cadets, 5 entered first as volunteers before becoming cadets, 1 was a Royal Page, 1 was a child ensign in his father's regiment and 1 entered first as a sous-lieutenant de remplacement before each became cadets, giving a total of 45 officers who served in the rank of cadet. Nine officers entered as sous-lieutenant de remplacements along with 1 who
first enrolled as a volunteer and another who first entered as a cadet before both
became sous-lieutenant de remplacement. Only 8 entered directly as sous-lieutenants
without undergoing some prior period of training and 6 enrolled as private soldiers
taking the usual two to three decades to progress through the ranks. As with Dillon's,
most cadets served an average of eighteen months prior to promotion to substantive
sous-lieutenant, although there were exceptions. Jacques MacSweny served as a cadet
for over six years before promotion to sous-lieutenant, while François Burke, having
served seven years as a cadet, chose to accept the post of sergeant and then porte-
drapeau, finally achieving the rank of sous-lieutenant nineteen years after first
becoming a cadet; both ultimately progressed to the rank of captain. Movement
between regiments, while not common, was not exceptional, Stapleton Lynche began
as a cadet in the Royal Écossais, transferring, still a cadet, to Berwick's seven years
later. Within a year of this he had achieved the rank of lieutenant-en-second, thereby
making up lost ground. In fact, 54 of the regiment's officers began their service in
Berwick's, with all but 1 of the remainder transferring in from one of the other Irish
regiments. Of the 16 who transferred in, only 3, of whom one was the colonel-
proprietaire, entered in 1762 from the disbanded cavalry regiment of Fitzjames. Five
of the remainder came from the amalgamation with Clare's in 1775, whilst 7
transferred from other regiments for individual reasons (64).

It was Walsh's that stood out from the three in terms of entry points. Unlike Dillon's
or Berwick's, the colonel-propriétaire of Walsh's had not gained that position until
after a progression, albeit rapid, through all officer grades. Of its 68 officers only 27
entered directly as cadets, although 1 of these became a substantive sous-lieutenant
the next day and so essentially entered directly as a sous-lieutenant. When added to
the 12 who entered as sous-lieutenants de remplacement, this gives a total of only 37
who underwent some period of training prior to gaining substantive rank. Some of
these served a considerable military apprenticeship, Emmanuel Hay beginning his
career as a fourteen year old sous-lieutenant in the Bretagne garrison before
transferring as a sous-lieutenant de remplacement to Walsh's three years later at the more substantial age of seventeen. In addition, 3 entered as volunteers before progression (after an average of eighteen months service), to sous-lieutenant, 1 began as a royal page and 1 entered as a porte-drapeau before promotion to sous-lieutenant, adding a further 6 who might be identified as having undergone some form of training. This left a substantial total of 18 who entered directly as sous-lieutenants. A notable exception amongst these though was Nicholas O'Rourke who entered as a sous-lieutenant, then, after eleven months, was reduced to sous-lieutenant de remplacement before regaining the rank of sous-lieutenant after three years further service. Seven commenced their military careers in the ranks and took anything from ten to forty years to achieve substantive officer rank. For example, Denis Marcus, having been born to a soldier in de Rothe's, enlisted in 1745 at the tender age of ten, becoming a porte-drapeau thirty-two years later and a sous-lieutenant in April 1788 after forty-three years of continuous service, albeit with an early start. Alternatively, Henry Bertsch, a German by birth, enlisted in 1778, becoming a sergeant within two years and a substantive sous-lieutenant, alongside Denis Marcus, in April 1788 after just ten years service. Unlike Dillon's and Berwick's, which had had a continuous existence, Walsh's had been through a number of changes of families and hence name, Rothe, to Roscomon, to Walsh-Serrant, along with the fact that it was temporarily amalgamated with the Légion Corse and Légion du Dauphine. Nonetheless, 56 of its officers had begun their careers in its officer corps, not one of whom had come from its brief 1776 'foreign' amalgamation. Of the remaining 11, 3, including the colonel-proprâitaire, came from Clare's, 2 came from other regiments of the Brigade and 4 came from outside the Brigade. The origins of the remaining 2 are not recorded (65).

Taking the Brigade as a whole, of its 206 serving officers, 114 (55%) had served as cadets at some point, 36 (17.5%) as sous-lieutenants de remplacement, 6 (3%) had served in an equivalent role as a volunteer, royal page or porte-drapeau and 20 (10%) had risen from the ranks. Only 30 (14.5%) had entered directly as substantive sous-
lieutenants without undergoing any identifiable period of training. Further, only 6 (3%) of these officers can be conclusively identified as having commenced their service outside the Brigade, of which 2 were in Dillon's and 4 in Walsh's. Finally, discounting the considerable transfers between regiments due to reduction and amalgamation, voluntary movement between existing regiments in the Brigade was very rare-only 2 officers in Dillon's transferred in (from Walsh's) and only 2 in Berwick's transferred in, 1 from Dillon's and 1 from Walsh's, and only 1 officer transferred into Walsh's from Dillon's; a total of 5 (2.5%).

These statistics are little affected, even taking into account those officers not appearing in the inspection reports but listed in the regimental Contrôles as being on the strength of each regiment. In Dillon's there were only 2 unattached sous-lieutenants, both having been appointed in August 1789. In Berwick's there were apparently 7 unattached officers, but of these 1 had probably retired, 1 was probably dead, 1 had absented himself, 1 was a newly appointed cadet, 1 a capitaine de remplacement attached to the regiment's staff and the last 2 were respectively a lieutenant and colonel on the army staff only nominally attached to Berwick's. Of these 7, 2 had entered service as cadets, 2 as sous-lieutenants, 1 as a sous-lieutenant de remplacement, 1 as a volunteer and 1 as a private. Of the 4 such officers in Walsh's, 2 unattached officers were majors, 1 being suspended and the other probably retired, both having commenced their service as cadets. The remaining 2 were a capitaine-commandant and capitaine-en-second respectively who were apparently semi-retired, the first being unable to face the rigours of a voyage to the Isle de France, the second due to his elder brother's disgrace at the hands of the Colonel-Propriétaire. The former had commenced his service as a cadet while the latter had gained direct entry as a sous-lieutenant (66).

There were also a number of Irish and English Catholic officers who were neither serving with or even technically listed as being on the strength of any of the Irish
regiments in 1789. Of 20 so identified, 13 had originally entered the French army via the Brigade. Of the remainder, Eugene-Henry Tempest emigrated before leaving military school and Daniel-Charles O'Connell had, subsequent to entering the French army, served for a time in both Clare's and Berwick's. Only Robert and Frank Dillon and Count Maurice MacMahon never served in the Brigade during their military service, although in all 3 cases their families' wealth and connections at Court marked them apart. As to rank, 10 had entered as cadets while of the remaining 10, 2 had entered as volunteers, 3 as sous-lieutenants, 1 as a lieutenant-en-second, 2 as capitaines and 1 as a pupil of the Military School at Pontlevoy, with the original entry point of 1 being unrecorded. As with those serving the Brigade, the factor of military heritage for these 20 individuals was obvious, all being the sons or cousins of senior serving officers. Further, in many respects, their position outside of the Brigade in 1789 was directly related to the factor of nepotism given their respective families influence. Utilising this, the Dillon brothers, the O'Connells, MacMahons, Sutton de Clonards, Tempests and Dominique Sheldon, had gained an accelerated rate of advancement by purposely moving out of the Brigade into the general body of the French army (67).

Having gained entry to the Brigade, there was the question of the age and length of service cadets or sous-lieutenants de remplacement served prior to promotion to the substantive rank of sous-lieutenant. The Registre des Services for all three regiments reveals that of 124 who entered as cadets or sous-lieutenants de remplacement, where the dates of birth and entry to the army were recorded, 79 began service aged between fifteen and eighteen (64.2%), with a further 17 aged nineteen to twenty-one (13.8%). 19 were aged fourteen or less (15.3), while only 9 were aged twenty-two or over (7.3%). Due to ambiguities in the Registres des Services as to specific dates of promotion, it is difficult to be precise on length of service at these grades, although of the above, 71 (57.25%) served for less than two years prior to promotion to substantive sous-lieutenant. It is important to stress that the contemporary records are
not precise. Louis Sherlock, for example, although recorded in the Registre des Services of Walsh's as entering as a cadet on 1 May 1788 was apparently propelled to the rank of sous-lieutenant four weeks later, having possibly previously served as a cadet in the Regiment Lyonnais since March 1784. This earlier service though was only recorded in Sherlock's own letters of 1801 to Bonaparte, asking for this to be taken into account for promotion purposes. Equally, this particular individual was a notorious braggart and liar (68).

Generally, the younger the entrant the longer they served their effective apprenticeship, few gaining the rank of sous-lieutenant prior to their eighteenth birthday. Although Edward Saunders entered Berwick's as a cadet aged twelve, he did not receive promotion to sous-lieutenant until twenty-one, James Swanton and Charles Blake entered Berwick's aged thirteen and fifteen respectively, both having to serve ten years before gaining the rank of sous-lieutenant. Entering at a much older age however was no guarantee of rapid promotion. Francois Plunkett entered Walsh's as a cadet aged twenty-four, but was thirty before gaining promotion to sous-lieutenant. Maurice D'Elloy, having served in the Gendarmerie since he was nineteen, was twenty-seven when he became a cadet in Dillon's, and had to serve a further eighteen months before promotion to sous-lieutenant. The youngest entrants were inevitably the sons of serving officers. The nine year old cadet John-François O'Mahony in Dillon's being the son of Lieutenant-Colonel Dermod O'Mahony of the same regiment, the young man progressing to sous-lieutenant aged just sixteen as was the case of the seven year old cadet in Clare's, William O'Meara, the son of Captain John O'Meara who further gained his son a sous-lieutenant's commission at fifteen. There are only a handful of cases of rapid advancement from cadet to sous-lieutenant, the three months served by William Bulkeley and Terry O'Connor of Walsh's being exceptional (69).

Essentially, the key factor in entry and speed of advancement to the substantive rank
of sous-lieutenant was the eighteenth century's universal qualification, that of having close family amongst the serving officers. The four Hussey brothers and their father were models of how each oiled the way for the next. The eldest brother, Peter, was sponsored by his father, retired Capitaine Miles Hussey, to become a cadet in Berwick's aged eighteen years, becoming a sous-lieutenant at twenty. The next eldest, Walter, entered Dillon's as a cadet aged fifteen, becoming a sous-lieutenant at sixteen. Then came William, who was entered on the books of Berwick's aged just eleven, receiving a sous-lieutenants commission aged twelve, whilst the youngest, Ignatius, entered Dillon's directly as a sous-lieutenant aged fifteen. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the declining age profile of each subsequent entry had everything to do with nepotism, either their father's connections or elder brother's or both (70).

Having gained the rank of sous-lieutenant, generally the promotion criteria appear to have been a mixture of merit, seniority, favouritism and patronage. As with the British army, venality, the purchase of rank, was commonly found in the French army until its technical abolition in 1776, although the practice continued for some time after. This though was not permitted in the Brigade where there was the assumption that prospective officers would not have the necessary funds, given their origin as dispossessed gentlemen. The only Irish officers who purchased rank were the wealthy handful who did so outside the Brigade. One such was Robert Dillon, who, coming from a wealthy banking family based in Bordeaux, was able to buy a capitaine's commission in the Regiment of Lorraine-Dragoons for 3,500 livres in 1777 (71). Rather, the Registre des Services and individual dossiers of the Brigade's officers regularly included observations on the quality and competence of the respective individual along side recommendations from relatives. When Edward Stack was nominated on 13 November 1779 for the rank of capitaine-en-second, his record included several previous entrees on his 'merite' alongside his uncle's recommendation that he was his only nephew, that he had four uncles in the French service-two of whom had been killed at Fontenoy, and two who were wounded at
Culloden and Wandewash respectively. His uncle added, 'il a fait donner toute l'éducation nécessaire'. Similarly, when Patrick O'Keeffe was considered for promotion in 1775 to the rank of lieutenant-en-second his service dossier noted 'Bon sujet, bon officier, exact.' (72). Equally, the service dossier of Daniel-Charles O'Connell included a recommendation for promotion to colonel on the staff by Maréchal Comte de Maillebois, making reference both to his abilities and his family's standing back in Ireland, 'à presque toujours été dans l'état-major, plein de zélé, de talents et d'application à son métier; sa famille est très distinguée et influente en Irlande. Il à particulierement étudie la fortification militaire.' (73). The recommendation succeeded, O'Connell being confirmed a staff colonel on 30 January 1778.

Even when not being immediately considered for promotion, distinction in the field could result in the colonel-propriétaire recording judgements for future reference. Count Walsh-Serrant wrote such a list of comments on 8 August 1785 during his regiment's annual inspection, the document being titled an 'État des Grâces' requesting 'pensions' and 'gratifications'. Of the twelve officers listed, typical entries were for Lieutenant-en-Premier O'Gorman, 'Bonne conduite à fait toute la guerre aux Antilles mérite d'estre en courage.' For Lieutenant-en-Second Brinck, 'Officier très utile et très distingué dans les partier d'instructions dont il est chargé.' (74).

The military career of a Brigade officer could be limited if, by one of the reductions in the number of regiments or by a lack of openings in the grades above, he was left only the opportunity of entering a French speaking regiment. While some officers did transfer out of the Brigade, some were left no option but retirement due to their inability to speak French. This was attested to by the varied fates of the senior officers when the Regiments of Walsh and Bulkeley were removed from the French army lists in 1775 - Lieutenant-Colonel Butler of Walsh's subsequently became lieutenant-colonel of the Regiment of Aquitaine and Count Walsh-Serrant colonel of the
Regiment Bassigny. The Minister of War also confirmed Major Clarke of Bulkeley's as Walsh-Serrant's new major because, 'After what you have said, that it might be reported to me, that Mr. Seagrave, Major of your Regiment, not knowing a word of French could not follow you, I have judged that the interests of the service opposed his being replaced, and as he is an old officer who has served well, I have proposed to His majesty to grant him 1800 'livres' of pay per annum, to serve him as pension, he to enjoy it as Major attached to the Irish Brigade...' (75).

Whilst the promotion criteria were broadly standard across the Brigade, the rate of progression through the officer grades was very much dependent upon which of the three regiments the individual had entered. For a few well connected individuals, promotion could indeed be rapid as nepotism played its contemporary role. For the average young officer though, if their advancement was not to be dominated by waiting to fill dead men's shoes, then the regiment serving abroad was fundamental. Be it active wartime service or just a posting to a colonial station, there was a direct relationship between the noticeably differing lengths served at each rank in the respective regiments.

Dillon's very active participation in the American War of Independence meant that for its officers in July 1789, the average length of service between entering the regiment as a cadet and gaining promotion to lieutenant-en-second was 4.4 years, to lieutenant-en-premier 8.2 years, to capitaine-en-second 11.6 years and finally to capitaine-commandant 27.1 years. The regiment's major and lieutenant-colonel had served for 30 and 33 years respectively before gaining those ranks. Berwick's, apart from a single battalion briefly serving in a static Caribbean garrison in 1783, had remained stationed in Metropolitan France since 1762 seeing no active service. Consequently, in July 1789, the average length of service between entering the regiment as a cadet and gaining promotion to lieutenant-en-second was 9.4 years, to lieutenant-en-premier 13 years, to capitaine-en-second 26.6 years and to capitaine-commandant 34.1 years.
The regiment's major and lieutenant-colonel had served for 30 and 27 years respectively before gaining those ranks. As with points of entry, Walsh's promotion profile was unique, with a qualitatively more rapid rate of promotion directly related to its participation in the Caribbean 1779-83 and its departure for the Isle de France in July 1788. On the eve of the Revolution, the average length of service between entering as a cadet and gaining promotion to lieutenant-en-second was 2.6 years, to lieutenant-en-premier 6.3 years, to capitaine-en-second 11.1 years and to capitaine-commandant 21 years. The regiment's major and lieutenant-colonel were less remarkable, given they had served for 29 and 35 years respectively before gaining those ranks. Further revealing the impetus given by active service, of the regiment's 40 officers ranking from lieutenant-en-second through to capitaine-commandant, 35 had been promoted to that rank in 1788 or 1789, immediately prior to departure for the Isle de France or to replace officers who had retired or died as a result of the rigours of such colonial service.

Ironically, the slow rate of promotion in Berwick's meant in practice that it had the highest proportion of holders of the Chevalier's Croix de Saint Louis. In fact, the number of officers holding this valued award was in inverse proportions to the speed of promotion and overseas service. Officers automatically received the St. Louis after either twenty-six years service if a captain or twenty-eight if a lieutenant. Berwick's, that had seen no active service since the conclusion of the Seven Years War and had therefore the oldest officer corps, had 21 holders. Dillon's, serving in Corsica 1769, North America and the Caribbean 1779-83 with therefore a younger and more rapidly promoted officer corps, had 15 holders. Walsh's, who had served alongside Dillon's in Corsica and the Caribbean, with additional service in the Isle de France and therefore the youngest officer corps (with almost twice the rate of promotion of Berwick's), had only 9 holders. Apart from the three colonel-propriétaires, who had each received theirs' due to status, universally the holders were captains and lieutenants with the necessary length of service to qualify.
The ultimate attainment of colonel-propritétaire was restricted to the noblesse présentée, who, alongside the status, gained an entitlement to a substantial income in return for which they were annually obliged to spend the grand total of four months with their regiment. While the colonel-propriténaires of Berwick's and Walsh's certainly conformed to their French counterparts' attitude in treating the role as a part-time interest, the tone of Count Arthur Dillon's daughter in her memoirs suggests a degree of criticism of this attitude, most likely originating from her father. Commenting on the months leading up to July 1789 she stated, 'The Colonels, obliged to serve with their regiments for only four months of the year, would not have dreamed of staying five minutes longer than the minimum period.' (76).

While technically only the title of each regiment was the property of the respective family, in reality the regiments were effectively the domain of each and they derived considerable financial profits from them. Unlike French Regiments, where venality had only been officially abolished in 1776, the financial reality of most officers in the Brigade was that they did not have the funds to purchase rank or promotion. Rather, as has been elucidated, the influence of family and friends, straightforward nepotism, length of service and even merit, each and collectively played a role. This had been as true in 1689 as it was in 1789. Consequently, the annual income paid to a colonel-propritétaire of an Irish regiment had always been almost three times that of a French Regiment, 12,000 livres as opposed to 4,500, to compensate for a lack of income from the sale of positions. Further, the pay of its soldiers was higher for similar reasons and hence the potential income from what in the British Army would be termed 'off-reckonings' was proportionately greater. What this meant in practice was that the role of favouritism for a propriétaire's family and friends was all the more substantial. Also, as has been previously mentioned, when regiments were reduced, and in one case created, the potential for bitterness amongst the senior families was all the more intense, continuing long after emigration.
When he chose, the colonel-propriétaire's power of patronage in respect of appointments and promotion was almost absolute as illustrated by an incident in Walsh's just prior to its departure for Isle de France. The Regimental Registre des Services recorded 35 promotions amongst the 40 officers ranking above sous-lieutenant at that point. Given that the Regiment would be operationally commanded on this posting by the colonel-commandant, seconded by the major, as both the colonel-propriétaire and lieutenant-colonel remained in France, the major's post was highly prized. On 24 June 1788 Thomas Keating was proposed for the rank of major to fill the vacancy created by the promotion of Lieutenant-Colonel Edward De Sarsfield. Although Keating was one of four brothers then serving in the regiment with a family tradition to support his claim, unfortunately this was initially done without reference to the Count Walsh-Serrant who had his own favourite, Jean O'Neill. The Count displayed immediate hostility to Keating who was soon dismissed on a technicality, enabling O'Neill to be appointed on 6 July, less than a fortnight before the regiment sailed from Brest on 20 July. Keating was left to pursue a lone struggle to clear his name for two years. The influence of the Walsh-Serrant family ensured he received scant attention until the events of the Revolution and the establishment of the National Assembly provided a belated forum for a fair hearing and reinstatement (77).

The re-organisation of the Brigade in 1775-76 provided further insight into the authority of the colonel-propriétaires as sponsors of an officer's career. Daniel O'Connell wrote, when a junior staff captain on the strength of Clare's and hopeful for a captain's company that,

'The approaching and unavoidable Death of Lord Clare will assure his Regiment to the Marquis of FitzJames, Eldest son to the Duke and Colonel of Berwick's, incorporated with ours, of which ten Attendant he remains Colonel Commandant in
the room of Meade, who probably will get, as well as Serrant, a French Regiment. After which the Regiment now called Clare's will take the name of Berwick's. This destroys all my expectations, which I thought sure this winter. Major Conway had called for another Station, which was to be granted, and I was to be Major in his place. Now the two reduced Lt Colonels and Majors will get the first vacancies that shall offer, and I loose Meade, on whose regard and friendship I cu'd for ever rely. The Marquis of FitzJames, with whom I have but a slender acquaintance, will no doubt always prefer the officers of his own Regt, and promote them preferably, so that after all my Services and Expectations, with a Capacity allowed equal to any Station, I may possibly spend the rest of my life a Captain.' (78).

O'Connell's pessimism proved unjustified as he received the much sought after rank of capitaine-en-second in Berwick's Chasseur Company thanks to his uncle, Capitaine-Commandant MacCarthy Mhor, in June 1776.

Finally, the power of patronage was not restricted to just the colonel-propriétaires as there were a number of senior émigré families where a member gained the rank of general with all the influence at Court and in the army that inevitable brought. The Conway family was a typical example. As with so many of the Brigade's military caste, James Conway of the Conway family of Co.Kerry, had entered foreign service in the mid-seventeenth century as a direct consequence of the Cromwellian forfeiture of parts of the family's estates. The events of 1689-91 saw his grandsons by his youngest son, Christopher, enter French service. Meanwhile the family maintained the remains of its Irish estates, producing a generation later James, first Count Conway, born in 1711 at Glenbeigh, who, having entered the Regiment Clare, rose to the rank of brigadier general. A relation of both the MacCarthy and O'Connell families, he became referred to by Irish sources as, 'The Patriarch of the Fighting Band of Kerry Kinsmen on French soil.' Before he died in 1787 he had not only sponsored both his sons' military careers but also those of the O'Connell and MacCarthy family members.
Further, determined to ensure his family's qualification for the highest military office, he submitted to the King a claim that, as the Conway family were of noble descent in Ireland, they were entitled to be enrolled in the French nobility. Supporting this claim with a wealth of documents, such as a genealogy compiled by the Ulster King of Arms, confirmed by the Lancaster Herald and the first Viscount Conway's will, he convinced the King. Hence an 'Arrêt' was issued instructing that James Conway, his brother Edward and their legitimate children be given honours and privileges appropriate to noble status. Consequently, not only did his sons, Thomas and James, rise to the rank of general prior to the Revolution, but so too did Daniel O'Connell. All three were to join the families of the three colonel-propriétaires as colonels of the other three regiments of the Irish Brigade formed in British service in October 1794 (79).
In July 1789 the regiments celebrated the centenary of the Brigade, albeit separated by eight thousand miles. While Dillon's and Berwick's performed garrison duties in north-west France, Walsh's commenced its second year of posting to the Indian Ocean.

Initially, the day-to-day running of Dillon's and Berwick's was minimally affected by the political events in Paris. October 1789 saw almost half of each regiment's officers taking their annual entitlement of six months leave and regimental correspondence continued to focus in the remaining months of 1789 on the mundane day to day running of the internal economy of the respective battalions. It was the rank and file that began to reflect the growing tensions with levels of desertion soaring. As with the rest of the French Army, Dillon's and Berwick's suffered severe loss of personnel, around half their recorded strength between July 1789 and July 1790, and Walsh's, once it had arrived back in France, mirrored this. Officers who had been on leave since October, returned in June 1790 to discover a rapidly changing situation; the first significant departures of officers subsequently commenced.

As with other foreign regiments, Dillon's and Berwick's recorded only a marginal deterioration while French formations rapidly experienced a splintering of the bonds of discipline: the total of soldiers discharged in 1790 was four to five times greater the annual number prior to 1789 (1). Individually, the regiments demonstrated noticeable differences in their internal reactions. In Berwick's, straightforward desertion rather than defiance of the established hierarchy was the order of the day, losing almost 8% of its rank and file. Dillon's did not experience such a dramatic change to its pre-Revolutionary pattern of desertion during the six months immediately following 14th
July. 1790 however saw the ranks of Dillon's devastated by desertion, over 500 (46%) of its 1,038 rank and file were absent without leave compared with just 121 (12%) of Berwick's 1,000 enlisted men (2).

A possible reason for this rapid deterioration in Dillon's was its direct involvement in the suppression of public disorder. The sudden surge in desertion corresponded to the regiment's arrival in Lille in April 1790 to quell swelling public disturbances.

Stationed in that city for the next eighteen months, Dillon's, as with other foreign regiments, was singled out as an object for public hostility. Many in France saw foreign regiments as the personification of royal and aristocratic domination, their intrinsic foreignness setting them apart from the French people. From the initiation of political disturbances and food riots in 1788 some officers and many of the soldiers of the French regiments had increasingly indicated their disaffection with the army's traditional role of internal policing. This first manifested itself in May and June 1788 when detachments of various French line regiments were stationed in Rennes to deal with popular demonstrations in support of the regional parliament's defiance of new royal edicts. Not only did officers refuse to fire on the Breton crowds, others assured local officials they would not intervene in political affairs. Similar sentiments were subsequently expressed by regiments detailed to suppress rioting and lesser disturbances in support of the local parliaments in Grenoble, Toulouse, Bearn and Besancon. This proved equally true with the growing wave of food riots as the impact of two years' meagre harvests made themselves felt early in 1789. The government turned in response to the foreign regiments whom they perceived as more reliable in the suppression of disturbances, particularly in Paris, where the Swiss Guard and a number of German regiments of infantry and cavalry were stationed. This measure contributed to events that ultimately triggered the revolution itself. Whilst soldiers of the French Guard were imprisoned for refusing to carry out policing duties, on 12 July, men of this regiment sided with the Parisiens when the Royal Allemand Cavalry brutally dispersed protesters around the Place Louis XV. Two days later numerous
soldiers of the French Guards took the leading role organising the attack on the Swiss-garrisoned Bastille. This pattern was repeated across France and, mixed with the general antagonism felt towards the Queen, by early 1790 foreign regiments were securely labelled as hired mercenaries of the ancien regime and the most likely source of counter-revolution. The intense civilian hostility and outright antagonism consequently directed at all their ranks produced two reactions, desertion or an increasing identification with the established aristocratic order.

This division between good Frenchmen and evil foreigners subsequently emerged in the ranks of the regiments themselves as vacancies began being filled by French citizens. For the Brigade this process was radically advanced in late 1791 when all three regiments' second battalions were dispatched to St. Domingue, requiring significant drafts of up to two thirds of the ranks (still predominantly foreign), from the first battalions to bring them up to strength. The first battalions were subsequently rebuilt with French recruits, particularly from the gardes nationale (3).

Yet the initial reactions to these events amongst the officers was limited. Immediately following July 1789 most officers seeking to depart preferred to do so legally thus leaving open the option for possible return. Such officers commonly requested a leave of absence, or congé, from their colonel from which they failed to return. Alternatively, they formally resigned or retired prior to emigration. There was only a meagre spattering of such absenteeism, legal departures or outright desertions, during the first eighteen months. July and August 1789 saw but one emigration from each regiment, the first being Count Walsh-Serrant, who had remained at Court while his regiment served in the Indian Ocean. He, along with Edward Dillon, joined the Comte d'Artois within weeks of the storming of the Bastille. Both colonels were close to the Royal family and Court aristocracy, and neither had the distraction of a regiment present in France to focus their attention on such binding responsibilities. While the early months of 1790 saw the Count's younger brother, Viscount Walsh-Serrant, join
them, the role of the Walsh-Serrant family in what was still their personnel regiment was maintained by the youngest brother the Chevalier Walsh-Serrant. Despite being only its major-en-second in 1789, as a consequence of his elder brother's departures he was promoted over the heads of Lieutenant-Colonel Sarsfield and Major O'Neill to briefly hold the colonelcy from late 1790 until his own emigration in early 1791. In Dillon's and Berwick's it was junior officers who departed early. Lieutenant-en-Second John-Charles Power of Dillon's nominally retired within days of the Bastille, although only physically emigrating in July 1791 with various fellow officers who had initially remained at their posts. In Berwick's only Sous-Lieutenant James Fanning physically deserted and emigrated immediately after the storming (4).

Only a trickle of departures followed in 1790 as, unlike their French brethren, the officers of the Brigade were largely unaffected by the abolition of hereditary nobility in June and other moves ending entrenched social privilege. Late 1790 did though bring news of events at Port-Louis in the Ile de France which had specific resonance for all Brigade officers, illustrating as it did the growing difficulties faced by all those identified as foreigners. The officers and men of Walsh found themselves with ringside seats as the two senior Irish officers of the colony, the governor, General Count Thomas Conway and the local naval commander, Commodore Henry Panthaleon Count MacNamara, were subject to a growing wave of radical antagonism resulting in the latter's murder. News of these events arrived in France in early 1791 at about the same time that the returning officers of Walsh's brought their personal experiences of these events home (5). Despite this, there was no noticeable increase in the tiny number of Brigade officers absenting themselves prior to July.

This however did change. As with the majority of French officers originating from the petty nobility, those in the Brigade were professional military officers, reliant on their service income for sustenance, with an intrinsic allegiance to the King and Royal Army. Whilst not equatable to their aristocratic French brethren in social standing,
they were just as imbued with concepts of discipline based on authority and
deferece. The Revolution initiated a political re-definition of the relationship
between officers and men based on ideas of equality that resulted in a concept of
discipline reliant on voluntary compliance. Thus the inevitable collapse in deference
seriously undermined the officers' professional and social identity.

While this began to tip the balance that would turn the trickle of departures into a
torrent, it was a series of specific events in June and July that triggered the first mass
emigration from Dillon's and Berwick's. These commenced on 11 June with a decree
of the National Assembly requiring all serving officers to take a new military oath of
loyalty to 'Le Nation' and a new civil oath for the clergy. For the military, unlike the
previous oath which had been taken orally and collectively, this had to be in written
form and signed by each individual officer. Both oaths struck at the very foundations
of the officers' identity, the military oath omitting any mention of the King's name
while that for the clergy implied a denial of Papal supremacy. Such was the impact
that a deputation of ten officers from Dillon's sought an interview with the then
commander-in-chief of the French army, Maréchal Rochambeau, to express their
concerns. This was closely followed on 20 June by the King's attempted flight and
subsequent seizure at Varennes, an event abruptly focusing many minds. As
demonstrated by Samuel Scott's analysis of the French officer corps' reaction to the
Revolution, it caused thousands of officers to consider their obligation to the army
ended and this sentiment was echoed in the Brigade (6). The recently arrived Cadet
Gentilhomme Peter Jennings identified both the oath and Varennes in his journal as
the fundamental factors in his decision to emigrate, although the former appeared the
key issue. Having expressed indignation at the treatment of the King after his seizure
at Varennes, which Jennings perceived as an honourable attempt to save his family.

'...among other things it was enacted that his name should be omitted in the new form
of oath to be proposed to the Army in which fidelity to the Nation & Constitution was
substituted for the old form of "fidelity to the King". This being a blow to the authority & influence of H.M. with the Army, it was resisted as such by all those of that body in whom, as yet any sparks of loyalty remained alive, the number of whom particularly of the Officers, was great altho. not sufficiently so to oppose with success the efforts of the Multitude who had been seduced from their allegiance. The Berwicks Regt. however manifested at this time the most unshaken loyalty & fidelity to their Sovereign for, when the oath was proposed to them by the Commissioners of the National assembly sent down for that purpose to the Garrison of Landau it was rejected by the great Majority of the Officers & soldiers, & as it woul'd not longer be consistent or compatible with their loyalty to remain in the pay of a Government which they regarded as Rebellious & insurpers of the authority of their lawful King it was resolved to take the earliest opportunity of Emigrating in a body & of joining the Standard of their Royal Highnesses the Kings Brothers...at Coblentz.' (7).

A letter contemporary to these events from the earliest emigrant, Colonel Count Walsh-Serrant, equally expressed the powerful Royalist sentiments of the recently joined cadet and reflected the widespread belief that there was no honourable alternative to emigration after the arrest of the King. Further, an explicit link was made between the events of 1688-89 and the creation of the Brigade with the events of 1789-91 which triggered another emigration, albeit in the reverse direction.

"...among the zealous defenders of all thrones and all governments, those who like myself have, from the 19 July 1789 and before the torrent of emigration, followed the eternal principle of the French monarchy which, when the King is in the hands of the enemy or of the rebels, places the representation of his authority and of obedience where there is the first of the free Princes of his blood. Of English origin, French by the chances of another revolution in the last century, and by the effects of the same fidelity in opposition to the same crimes, I hold strongly.' (8).
Concurrent to this, an additional blow to the identity and loyalty of the Brigades officers came with the degrees of the National Assembly abolishing all distinctions between the native French regiments and the German, Liegiois and Irish regiments. The growing prejudice against the various foreign regiments inevitably witnessed a growing popular clamour for their abolition, articulated in the National Assembly and the government felt compelled to respond. This was highlighted in a lengthy report of Monsieur Felix de Wimpffen, deputy of the Department of Calvados, published by the Assembly in February 1791. It reviewed the history of all foreign regiments in French service, acknowledging their previous loyalty but recommending their distinctions be ended, their propriétaires bought out and the regiments absorbed into the French army (9). The Duke of Fitzjames reacted within days addressing the King with a formal plea to reject such ideas, stressing the monarchist sentiments of the majority of officers and predicting the consequence of moves against that institution as well as the distinct identity of the regiments (10).

In light of the intimate involvement of certain Swiss and German formations in the failure at Varennes, Fitzjames' plea was ignored by the Assembly. Firstly, a decree of 30 June directed the flag of each regiment's first battalion had to be the new national colours whilst that of the second battalion, whilst retaining the traditional distinctive regimental colours, must remove all ancien symbols and inscriptions and add a tricolour cravat. Secondly, a decree of 21 July terminated family proprietorships, each regiment simply being designated by its number in the army lists. Thus Dillon's became the 87e, Berwick's the 88e and Walsh's the 92e (11).

Even before the King signed these decrees into law, the eyes of many officers turned towards Coblenz. Alongside the ever growing level of insubordination from the ranks, the events of June and July, culminating in the massacre of the Champ-de-Mars on 17 July, focused the requirement to formally take the new oath, triggering an unparalleled wave of departures throughout the French army. Scott's study identified
that by December 1791 some 60% of the French officer corps of the army's infantry regiments had consequently emigrated (12). The 87e and 88e perfectly mirrored this pattern. While many officers still chose formal resignation prior to departure as authorities became unwilling to grant leaves of absences from which a growing proportion of officers simply failed to return, there was an avalanche of undisguised emigrations. When, on 3 July, the 87e was paraded in Lille for the ceremonial mass swearing of the new oath, eight officers publicly refused while others did not attend. An État of the 87e for 18 August recorded that nine of those who had not emigrated had still not taken the required oath, and predictably, by October all these had departed (13). Given the challenge to both the Monarchy and the Church in the new civil oath, it was not surprising that the 88e aumonier, L'Abbé André Canvan, was one of those emigrating (14). Essentially, its nationalist wording proved unacceptable to most despite the specific addition for foreign regiments of the phrase, 'sans prejudice de l'obeissance due a nos souverains respectifs ainsi qu'a nos traites et capitulations' (15). As ever though, the officers of the 92e stood out sharply from their brethren. An État of 3 September listed that of 58 officers present, only 14 failed to take the new oath. Despite events in the Indian Ocean, less exposed to events in France, discipline in the 92e did not appear to break down to the degree it did in the 87e or 88e. A detachment of the regiment was praised in October 1791 by the authorities in Cambray for maintaining order, commenting on their 'discipline militaire' and 'saloyale conduite.' (16).

For the 87e and 88e however, matters moved to an inevitable conclusion. On the morning of 15 July 1791 the Duke of Fitzjames led 41 of Berwick's officers, including 3 appointed after July 1789 and 3 who had only been nominally attached to the Regiment in July 1789, along with 125 rank and file, over the French border to join the growing ranks of the Army of the Princes. While the remainder of the regiment made no move physically to prevent this highly organised mass departure, Capitaine-en-Second Oliver Harty refused to participate, instead offering a moral lead to the
undecided by declaring his loyalty to the French people and nation (17). Fitzjames and his compatriots were joined by 4 junior officers who had previously departed, James Fanning, Robert Conway, Dudley Colclough and Edward Bellow. The mass migration of 15 July 1791 apparently left few who wanted to emigrate, only 7 further departures occurring. Colonel-Commandant Count Bartholomew Mahony belatedly joined the others on 25 July, while 3 junior subalterns left in October 1791 and the last 3 in early 1792. Amongst the senior company officers, retirement rather than emigration was the response, a clear reflection of the regiment's generally older age profile with long-serving officers preferring the certainty of a pension to the uncertainty of emigration. By late 1791, 12 officers had formally retired, 6 capitaine-commandants and 6 capitaine-en-seconds. Therefore, the 70 officers holding substantive positions in Berwick's on 14 July 1789 provide what might be treated as a model breakdown of emigration. By May 1792, 43 (61%) officers had emigrated, including its entire État-Major other than the 2 porte-drapeaux, both ex-rankers; 1 colonel-propriétaire, 1 colonel-commandant, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 major's, 2 cadet's 2 capitaine-commandants, 2 capitaine-en-seconds, 8 lieutenant-en-premiers, 7 lieutenant-en-seconds and 17 sous-lieutenants. 12 (17.2%) officers retired, 6 capitaine-commandants and 6 capitaine-en-seconds, whilst 1 (1.4%) officer died of natural causes on leave in Ireland, Lieutenant-en-Premier Thomas Turner. Just 14 (20%) remained to serve the French Republic, 1 of whom was dead within months (Patrick Doyle), 1 quartier-maître-trésurier, 2 porte-drapeaux, 2 capitaine-commandants, 2 capitaine-en-seconds, 1 lieutenant-en-premier, 3 lieutenant-en-seconds and 3 sous-lieutenants. The pattern was broadly similar for the 7 officers listed as attached to Berwick's in July 1789 but holding no substantive post. The first, Richard Elliot, had apparently deserted back in 1788, 3 had departed with their comrades on 15 July 1792, 1 had died of natural causes in 1789, 1 had retired and the fate of 1, Ridore Lynch, was unrecorded. The pattern only varied with the 14 officers appointed after July 1789, 5 who emigrated, 3 sous-lieutenants and 2 cadets, and 5 who remained, 1 capitaine and 4 sous-lieutenants. The fate of 3 is unrecorded while 1
died of natural causes in 1791 (18).

The consequence, as ultimately it was for all three regiments, was that the 88e ceased to have a predominantly Irish officer corps by January 1792 and twelve months later only a handful remained in senior positions despite Irish officers being transferred from the 92e. The État Militaire of 1792 listed 14 officers remaining from that of 1789 with a further 6 who had transferred from the 92e to make up the losses of July 1791; all but 2 of these 20 officers ranked between Colonel and Capitaine. A further Irish officer, Capitaine Andrew MacDonagh, had been imprisoned under the monarchy and had only recently been released and re-appointed. Only 2 of the capitaines, Martin Karst and Joseph De Frey were non-Irish, the former having been a senior warrant officer in July 1789 and the latter a retired officer recently returned from American service. Amongst the lieutenants there were 5 newly appointed officers of Irish parentage, alongside another 2 who had held substantive rank in 1789. Yet 11 lieutenants were of Flemish, German and French parentage, being a mix of ex-rankers and new entrants, as were all but 1 of the 18 sous-lieutenants, the exception being the French born Jean-François-Michel Danflin, of second generation Irish extraction. These new officers were a product of the decree of 29 November 1791 which stipulated that half the vacant sous-lieutenancies would go to NCOs and the other half to suitable candidates from the battalions of volontaires nationaux and gardes nationale. An État of 7 December 1792 listing the 22 sous-lieutenants appointed between 15 September 1791 and 23 October 1792 reflected just that, 11 were serving NCOs while 11 were 'fils des Citoyens actifs'. All 11 of the former were a mixture of Flemish, German and French, while 9 of the latter were French, the remaining 2 being Gerard Nagle and Alexandre Dalton, the French born sons of retired Irish officers (19).

By 1793 further emigration, retirement and death had almost completed the transformation. The État Militaire for that year listed just 16 (24.6%) out of 65
officers with an identifiable Irish surname. Of these only 9 had been serving officers in Berwick's back in July 1789 alongside a further 3 who had transferred from the 92e. This left 49 (75.4%) of Flemish, German and French descent, 15 of whom could be identified as promoted ex-rankers of Berwick's original 1789 rank and file (20).

The pattern of departures from the 87e was not as coherent as that from the 88e, although ultimately just as general, thus ensuring the comprehensive transformation of its officer corps. None of its officers can be identified as having emigrated prior to July 1791, although 4 capitaine-commandants had formally retired and Lieutenant-en-Second John-Charles Power resigned. For the 87e, the key period of emigration was between July and December 1791, 7 departing in July, 3 in August, 4 in September, 9 as an organised body on the 10 October, 1 in November and 1 in December. A further 9 emigrated at unspecified points between July and December, giving a grand total of 34 (49% of the serving officer corps), within a period of five months. The only ones amongst these identifiable as departing in an organised group were the 9 officers garrisoned at Bergues who left on 10 October. They were led by Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Stack, an officer disaffected by his failure to gain the vacant command of the 88e in July. With the retirement of Capitaine Lewis D'Arcy on 26 October to add to the previous 4 retirements at that rank, 55.7% of the officers serving in July 1789 had departed French service by December 1791. An État taken on 26 October 1791 of the regiment's 60 serving officers revealed the consequent changing nature of its officer corps. Discounting those who had not yet emigrated or retired along with both the original colonel-propriétaire and colonel-commandants who were then serving generals, 28 (41%) officers remained from July 1789, while 15 of the new officers were promoted rankers. Despite this, although the balance of nationalities was changing, there was still a significant degree of Irish lineage. Of the 42 where families were recorded, 27 were of Irish parentage, 1 English and 1 Scot, 5 French, 2 Italian, 2 German, 2 Dutch, 1 from Liege and 1 Swiss (21).
The departure of the second battalion 87e for St. Dominque from Le Havre on 7 January 1792 meant its officers were henceforth distanced from events in France. Meanwhile, the first battalion, having been reduced by drafts to the second battalion to just 207 effectives, took up garrison duties at Arras (22). As with the 88e, the 87e first battalion had officers appointed from the apparently loyalist 92e to replace some of those who had emigrated, including Lieutenant-Colonel Richard O'Shee and Colonel Thomas Keating. The first battalion saw only a single emigration during 1792, that of Lieutenant Thomas Waters on 16 April, a significant date given the outbreak of war against Prussia and Austria. The murder of the 87e previous colonel-commandant, Théobald Dillon, on 29 April did not appear to trigger any additional emigrations. The last apparent departure from the 87e was the then lieutenant-colonel, Bernard MacDermott, who was recorded as 'reste avec l'ennemi a Valenciennes' in early October 1793 (23). Consequently, by October 1793, of the 68 officers listed as holding substantive rank in July 1789, 43 (63%) had emigrated, 1 Major, 1 porte-drapeau, 2 cadets, 3 capitaine-commandants, 5 capitaine-en-seconds, 4 lieutenant-en-premiers, 9 lieutenant-en-seconds and 18 sous-lieutenants. Five had retired, all capitaine-commandants, 1 (1.5%) had been murdered, Colonel-Commandant Théobald Dillon, and 17 (25%) remained in French service, 1 colonel-propriétaire, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 porte-drapeau, 2 capitaine-commandants, 4 capitaine-en-seconds, 4 lieutenant-en-premiers, 1 lieutenant-en-second and 2 sous-lieutenants.

There was a similar pattern for those listed as attached to the regiment in July 1789 but holding no substantive position and for those Irish officers appointed after that date. Of the 9 officers in these categories, 4 emigrated, 3 during 1791 and 1 in 1792 (3 sous-lieutenant's and 1 cadet). One remained in French service, Quartier-maître-trésorier Charles Larsomier, 1 died of fever on St. Dominque, Lieutenant James De Sager and the fate of the remaining 3, all sous-lieutenants, went unrecorded (24).

An État of April 1793 for the first battalion 87e stationed at Anvers listed just 10 officers surviving from July 1789, although they filled all senior ranks—the colonel,
lieutenant-colonel and the 8 capitaines respectively. As for the 88e, as a consequence of the decree of 29 November 1791, all listed lieutenants and sous-lieutenants had either been privates or NCOs in 1789 or were newly appointed French 'citoyen' (25).

The pattern of departure and the final statistical breakdown of those emigrating or remaining in the 92e was quantifiably different from that of either the 87e or 88e. Aside from the officers who remained in France in 1789, the multiple pressures of disobedience, indiscipline, internal disorder, desertion and alienation from their brother officers that the other regiments had been subjected to affected the 92e later. Apart from their Colonel-Propriétaire and Colonel-Commandant emigrating in 1789 and 1790 respectively, there were no departures for the first eighteen months after the Bastille. Only with their return from the Indian Ocean was there the first substantive reaction, 11 officers emigrating during 1791. The bulk of these occurred during the summer months including 2 who attached themselves to the body of officers from the 88e crossing the border with Fitzjames. In addition, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Sarsfield chose to retire on 20 September 1791 at the age of 55 after thirty-eight years of active service. In addition to his age, he had also been passed over for the vacant colonelcy, firstly by the junior member of the Walsh family, Major-en-Second Philippe Walsh-Serrat, and, when he emigrated, by Armand O'Connor, an ex-officer of Walsh's who had been commanding the Regiment of Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies when the revolution commenced.

This apparent loyalty to the new regime during 1791 helps explain why several officers of the 92e were promoted to vacancies created by emigrations from both the 87e and 88e. At this point the second battalion departed for St.Dominque (23 November 1791) thus again briefly shielding it from political tumult. Meanwhile, in the first battalion, only a further 2 officers had emigrated by March 1792. The flood from the 92e was ultimately delayed until April 1792 when the declaration of war against Austria confronted many officers with the prospect of fighting their brethren
who had previously emigrated or refusing and triggering an intensification of the
generalised anti-foreign sentiments already directed against them. This latter factor
was viciously brought home for all the remaining foreign officers of the ci-devant
Irish regiments when the recently promoted General Théobald Dillon was murdered
by his own troops at Lille on 29 April, having been blamed for their defeat due to his
being identified as an 'étrangere'. Not only was he murdered, but also his body was
hung by its heels and savagely mutilated, a fact luridly reported in the French
newspapers (26). The impact of these events was obvious; between 22 and 23 May
1792, 16 officers departed as a body, 4 of these being officers appointed since July
1789, a further officer departing in July. Any lingering doubt as to popular prejudice
against foreign troops was swept away in August with the storming of the Tuileries
and massacre of the Swiss Guard. In September another officer departed, whilst 2
officers of the second battalion emigrated from St. Dominique. January 1793 saw 3
further departures, 2 from the first battalion in France and 1 from the second in
St. Dominique. The list of departures ended with the emigrations of John-Daniel
O'Byrne and James O'Connor at unspecified dates (27).

Of the remaining balance of officers, 3 died in St. Dominique during 1792, whilst
another died of natural causes in France. This left 22 officers identifiable as remaining
in French service and 6 whose fate was unrecorded. Hence of the 68 officers serving
in July 1789, 35 (50.5%) emigrated, 1 colonel-propriétaire, 1 colonel-commandant, 1
major-en-second, 1 cadet, 4 capitaine-commandants, 4 capitaine-en-seconds, 4
lieutenant-en-premiers, 7 lieutenant-en-seconds and 12 sous-lieutenants, 3 (4.5%)
died on active service in St. Dominique, 2 capitaine-en-seconds and 1 lieutenant-en-
premier, while 1 (1.5%) was dismissed from the service, Sous-Lieutenant François
Perot. 1 (1.5%) retired (the lowest figure in the Brigade), Lieutenant-Colonel Edward
Sarsfield, whilst 22 (32.5%) remained in French service, the highest proportion in the
Brigade, 1 major, 1 quartier-maître-trésurier, 1 porte-drapeau, 5 capitaine-
commandants, 3 capitaine-en-seconds, 4 lieutenant-en-premiers, 2 lieutenant-en-
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seconds and 5 sous-lieutenants. These last two figures are most likely a reflection of the younger age profile amongst the 92e officers. The fate of the remaining 6 (9%) went unrecorded, 1 porte-drapeau, 1 capitaine-commandant, 1 capitaine-en-second, 1 lieutenant-en-second and 2 sous-lieutenants. Of the 4 officers listed on the regiment's strength in 1789 but holding no substantive position, 2 remained in French service, 1 major and 1 capitaine-en-second, and 2 had in practice retired in 1788, 1 major and 1 capitaine-commandant. The 6 Irish officers appointed after July 1789, all sous-lieutenants, went against the trend of the remainder of the Brigade's officers in that 4 emigrated on 23 May 1792 followed by another on 4 September, leaving only 1 who died of natural causes. What particularly distinguished the 92e from the 87e and 88e was that, apart from Lieutenant-Colonel Sarsfield, not a single serving officer apparently retired due to the events of 1789-93. Again, this can largely be related to the younger age profile of its officer corps, although the regiment's initial isolation from events in Metropolitan France must also have played a part. What retirements there were came in 1794 when 3 of those who had remained made the decision on age grounds (28).

Inexorably, as privates and NCOs were increasingly promoted to be substantive officers the Brigade listed few of any Irish background. The October 1791 return of officers in the 87e listed a single promoted NCO of Irish lineage, Lieutenant Edward Hart. In addition there were 3 newly appointed Irish officers with no apparent previous service, sous-lieutenants Jean Swyny, Thomas Trant and Jacques Manderville. The remaining 23 recently appointed ex-rankers and NCOs were a mixture of Flemish, German and French, thus reflecting the already low pre-revolutionary percentage of any privates of Irish lineage and the fact many of those there were had apparently accompanied their émigré officers. An identical picture existed in the 88e and 92e. For the former, the État of 1792 listed not a single ex-ranker or NCO of Irish lineage although 5 lieutenants of Irish family were freshly appointed in July 1791. The 10 promoted NCOs were all of Flemish or German
origin, while the 19 newly appointed officers were a mixture of Flemish, German and increasingly, French lineage. For the 92e, with its later emigration profile, it was the État of 1793 which revealed the lack of Irish rankers or NCOs eligible for promotion as there was not a single individual in this category listed, neither were there any newly appointed officers of Irish lineage. As with the other two regiments, the 11 promoted privates and NCOs were a mixture of Flemish, German, Swiss and French nationals, as were the 9 newly appointed subalterns (29). Prior to 1789 the long-established families of the Brigade's officer corps had rigorously excluded all but a tiny handful of the Irish rank and file from ever gaining substantive officer rank outside those traditionally reserved for promoted rankers in the generality of the French army: porte-drapeau, quartier-maître-tresorier and the grenadier company. The irony was that with the opening of the officer grades to all by 1791, regardless of social origin, there were few Irish rankers to take advantage. Rather ironically, many emigrated with the selfsame officers who had excluded them and provided the NCO cadre of the émigré Irish regiments in the Army of the Princes. For the ranks of the 87e, 88e and 92e, subsequent to July 1791, the relevant contrôles listed only French citizens being enlisted. This ensured the process of transformation by which these regiments were integrated into the French Army at all levels of the rank structure (30).

Ultimately, of the 206 officers of the Brigade recorded as serving in July 1789, 121 (59%) had either failed to return from a leave of absence, formally resigned and subsequently emigrated or simply deserted. The vast majority entered the émigré Army of the Princes seeking to bring about the counter-revolution. Of the 39 officers either listed as attached to one of the regiments or appointed between July 1789 and early 1792 (discounting Richard Elliot who had in fact deserted in 1788), 18 (46%) are identified as having emigrated with their brother officers. Of those who did not, far from remaining in French service, many retired altogether from any military service, particularly the older capitaines, while the fates of other officers are simply unrecorded. Yet even for the 27 Irish officers appointed after July 1789
(predominantly younger junior officers), 14 (52%) are identified as having emigrated. Hence of the 206 in July 1789, by October 1793 only 52 (25%), over half of whom were from the 92e, can be categorically identified as remaining in the service of the new French Republic, to which were added 2 (15.4%) of the 13 listed as attached at that date and 6 (22%) of the 27 subsequently appointed.

The question then arises as to the balance between common and personal factors in the pattern of emigration. The first factor common to all related to each regiment's age profile. Amongst many of the older company officers, particularly the capitaine-commandants, officers in their fifties and early sixties appear to have reacted to the uncertainty of political events by retiring from active service almost en-masse by October 1791. This was particularly noticeable in the 88e with its older age profile where 6 of its capitaine-commandants followed this course along with 6 capitaine-ens, but not a single officer below that rank. In the 87e, with the next oldest age profile, all 5 senior capitaine-commandants retired by 1791 but only a single capitaine-en-second. For the 92e, with the youngest officer corps, not a single capitaine-commandant retired in the same period. Another factor appears to have been the reduction in officer grades on 1 January 1791. The two ranks of capitaine and lieutenant were each respectively merged into one alongside the reduction in the ranks of each regimental staff, with the abolition of colonel-proprietaires and the merging of the two grades of major. Although this was somewhat offset by the increase in the number of companies from eight to nine, this effectively reduced the total number of officers in each regiment from 70 to 65 and required older senior capitaines and lieutenants to accept younger junior capitaines and lieutenants as equals if they remained. It is therefore not unreasonable to conjecture that this, alongside the rapidly changing political situation, provided a considerable stimulus for older company officer to retire given the apparent lack of any prospects for further advancement.

This though was not true of the senior officers of each regiment of a similar age
profile. Only a single regimental staff officer retired, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Sarsfield of the 92e on 20 September 1791 aged fifty-five. His retirement, as has been previously indicated, had as much to do with being passed over for the full colonelcy as it had with age. Equally, being denied promotion to the regiment of an officer's choice caused certain senior officers to depart. Edward Stack of the 92e expected advancement to the vacant lieutenant-colonel's post in the 88e after the mass emigration from that corps in mid-July 1791. Instead, it was offered to his fellow regimental officer and comrade from the Bonhomme Richard, Eugene MaCarthy, who turned it down. Although Stack was appointed to the vacant post of lieutenant-colonel of the 87e, he implicitly signalled his disaffection at being passed over for that of the 88e by emigrating barely two weeks later with 8 of his officers (31).

Therefore, discounting the exceptional category of the respective colonel-propritaires, emigrating or remaining was a personal decision essentially restricted to younger company officers. Given the younger officers as a cohesive age group had emigrated almost to a man by mid-1792 it can be assumed that, as has been previously argued, their social, political and religious values caused their identification with institutions and symbols of the ancien regime rather than those of the emerging new republic. Certainly, while the factor of growing insubordination left these officers feeling that their authority was being critically undermined, the actual pattern of emigration closely matched specific political events from June 1791 onwards as the tenor of the revolution moved ever more towards the radical. It made little difference that some briefly conformed to the new political requirements. Sous-Lieutenant Christopher Fagan of the 87e was listed as solemnly taking the required 'serment civique' on 3 July 1791, yet ten weeks later emigrated to join his brother officers who had refused the oath (32).

The very nature of the Brigade however provided another factor, that of kinship. Entry into all three regiments had, from their inception, relied on an extended family
network. Whilst it cannot be ascertained with certainty whether having a brother, cousin or nephew emigrate directly caused any given officer to depart, with only a handful of exceptions, if one member of a family emigrated, so did the remainder and, vice-versa, if one remained, so did the others. Examples of this family linkage abound, although trying to narrow it down to a quantifiable statistical figure is impossible given the difficulty of precisely identifying the full network of kinship links.

Of the aristocratic families, there was a clear division between the families of Fitzjames and Walsh, all of whose members, including cadet branches, emigrated, whilst the leading members of the Dillon family remained with the exception of the cadet branch in the guise of Edward and Frank Dillon. As explored later, a potential key determinant here may have equally been shared service in the American War of Independence, a factor for both Dominique and William Sheldon, members of the family most closely related to the Dillons, who remained. Having said this, other relations of the Dillons, the Jerninghams and Cliffords, emigrated. Significantly, the serving members of these families were young junior officers who had not served in the American theatre, while the members of the Dillons and Sheldons who remained were elder senior officers who had served in the American war. For those of less social standing, examples of those remaining were the Keating brothers who were all serving officers in the 92e and the various members of the O'Shee's serving across the Brigade and outside it, all of whom remained regardless of age, rank or previous service. Even related younger officers did occasionally decide to remain, although the case in point is the Dalton brothers in the 88e, both of whom only entered the 88e in July 1791 as freshly appointed sous-lieutenants. The date of their entry and the fact that they were identified as sons of a 'citoyen active' without previous service placed them firmly outside the pre-revolutionary officer cadre. Examples of officers with clearly identified kinship ties who entirely emigrated were legion. The O'Mearas, Jennings, O'Farrells, Barrys, Creaghs, MacMahons, Husseys, O'Connells and
Conways, are all cases in point with members serving across the Brigade and some with members serving elsewhere in the French army. Again, their pattern of emigration cut across all lines of age, rank and previous service. Yet caution must be exercised in suggesting a too generalised pattern for some individuals did break with their relations. Count O'Meara, Daniel O'Meara and Peter Hussey are the exception in their respective extended family, remaining despite all their various relations emigrating. Taking the latter as a case study, despite all four brothers' long service with each other in the Brigade, whilst three emigrated together in 1791, Peter, the eldest brother and the only one born in France (the others having been born at the family home in Dublin), remained. He was killed at the head of his new command, the 58e, in 1793. Additionally, there are a number of examples of straightforward splits. In the 87e, while Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard MacDermott ultimately emigrated to join the Princes (by October 1793), his nephew, Capitaine Francis MacDermott, remained (34).

One group of officers whose pattern of reaction to events was markedly different from the body of the Brigade's officer corps were those distinguished socially from it, namely the ex-rankers promoted to the grade of officer prior to the revolution. On 14 July 1789, including the porte-drapeaux, Dillon's, Berwick's and Walsh's listed 6, 6 and 8 promoted ex-rankers respectively, or 'officiers de fortune' as they were termed in the Royal Army. Scott's study found that in the French infantry regiments these officers, frustrated and resentful at being refused full acceptance as officers and gentlemen and restricted to the limited number of posts traditionally reserved for such individuals, formed the single largest group of pre-Revolutionary officers who remained (35). This was mirrored in the Brigade: of its 20 such officers, discounting 2 killed in action on St.Dominque in 1792 and another dismissed the service, of the remaining 17, 11 (64.8%) remained, 2 (11.7%) retired and only 4 (23.5%) emigrated.

Another distinctive group were the 20 English and Irish officers in the French army
not serving in the Brigade in July 1789. Their pattern of emigration was very similar to that within the Brigade despite their being mostly senior officers of the rank of general and holding high social status. Given his closeness to the Royal Court, Edward Dillon was the first to depart within days of the storming of the Bastille alongside Frank Dillon, Henry Dillon and Vicount Conway. None departed during 1790, the majority doing so in 1791, as in the Brigade, thereby indicating similar reactions to political events, with 2 further officers departing in early 1792. The last emigration from this group was Eugene Tempest in early 1793, the only one of this group not a senior officer, his departure being due to the outbreak of war between Britain and France. This makes a total of 15 (75%) who emigrated from those serving outside of the Brigade. Also from this category there was a single retirement, that of the physically disabled Robert Dillon in 1791. This left just 4 (20%) to continue serving France; Dominique Sheldon, Charles Jennings (Kilmaine), Henry O'Shee and Comte O'Meara (36).

As with their fellow officers in the Brigade, the breakdown in military discipline and deference had a particularly marked effect. Daniel O'Connell, wrote from Paris to his brother on 28 June 1791 just after his promotion to major-General and just prior to his own emigration.

'...I should have declined new honours and quitted the service, which is becoming almost intolerable thro' the changes that have taken place. Necessity alone could determine me to continue in a line of life which exposes a man daily to more than the loss of his life-I mean the loss of his honour. The insubordination of the Army is grown to a degree inexpressible, and nothing less than a Miracle can in my opinion restore order and policy; therefore, I fear, the state of Military Anarchy will finish by a total dissolution of the Army.' (37).

While the subsequent events of June and July had an equally fundamental effect, the
most obvious factor apparently influencing reactions was kinship. Of the 15 non-Brigade officers emigrating, only Count Wall did not have either a father, brother or cousin who had not done so; the Dillons, O'Connells, Conways, Tempests, MacMahons, Sutton de Clonards and Fitzjames' all falling into this category. Of the 4 who remained, the only one with a relative in the Brigade also reacted to events by remaining alongside him, namely Dominique Sheldon's younger brother William Sheldon who continued to serve in the 87e.

Traditionally, a number of historians of the French Revolution have claimed that many of the military officers who served in the American campaigns acquired there the concepts of 'liberté, fraternité et égalité' which they then promoted during the early 1790s. For example, according to Albert Mathiez, 'Les La Fayette, les Custine, les deux Viomenil, les quatre Lameth, les trois Dillon, qui ont mis leur épée au service de la liberté américaine, font à leur retour en France figure d'opposants.' This was equally the judgement of Georges Lefebvre, 'Les officiers ayant combattu aux États-Unis ont forme a leur retour en France le noyau de la noblesse libérale'. According to Jacques Godechot, 'Les Européens qui prirent part à la Guerre d'indépendance se firent, à leur retour, des agents de propagande', while Philippe Sagnac felt the American experience had exercised '...une forte action sur nombre d'officiers et même de soldats.' (38).

There would seem little question that for leading individuals such as La Fayette, Segur and Noailles this was true. Within the Brigade, Arthur Dillon could be counted amongst this liberal aristocratic elite espousing the classical ideals of liberty and reform linked to the perceived model represented by the new American Republic. From the various speeches Dillon made it was these ideas which apparently caused him to break with the other families of the court nobility within the Brigade and to support the concept of a reformed constitutional monarchy and parliament. In addressing the National Assembly just after the outbreak of war in April 1792 he
stated, 'It is most desirable that the majority in a nation should have the right to
decide what form of government it considers best; and consequently that no
individual should shake its resolve. Free and absolutely independent, the French
people have finally determined in exercise of their rights, to change their form of
government.' (39).

It is a moot point though whether the remainder of the subordinate officers equally
adopted these concepts or whether the shared American experience had any form of
bonding effect on how those who had fought there reacted to the Revolution. Gilbert
Bodinier carried out an analysis on the officers of the various French regiments that
had served in America to reconcile how they responded. He found that infantry
officers who had served alongside American troops tended to depart a little less
rapidly than their contemporaries who had not. This included those who had served in
the West Indies but not alongside American troops on the Continent, although the
difference was not sufficient to be significant. The fundamental factor Bodinier
identified was age. Essentially, the younger officers, those aged twenty-eight or less
in 1789, who had served in America emigrated sooner than their contemporaries. The
older 'Américaines', those aged thirty-five or more in 1789, emigrated later or
remained to serve in the new republican army, the latter choice being significantly
greater. He explained this by arguing that far from youth being left with the deepest
impression by their service in America, due to their shorter service with their
respective regiments they were less emotionally attached than older and longer
serving officers. Bodinier also suggested that the Segur degree had ensured the
younger officers were strictly aristocrats while this had been somewhat less true for
those entering the officer corps before them. Bodinier found this analysis was
supported by the reaction of the more plebeian artillery and engineer officers, the
majority of whom remained (40).

On the face of it, the Brigade's involvement in the American War of Independence
was considerable, four of its six battalions (both of Dillon's and one each from Berwick and Walsh), saw service in one or other of the theatres of conflict. The first battalion of Dillon's, some 435 men, and the 40 strong chasseur company from Walsh voyaged to the Windward Islands in early 1779, participating in the capture of Grenada. Reduced to 373 and 27 men respectively, they then took part in the failed siege of Savannah under the direct command of Dillon's propriétaire, Arthur Dillon, and directly alongside American troops. The second battalion of Dillon's embarked at Brest in March 1780 alongside the Légion de Lauzun in which a number of Dillon's officers served on detachment under the overall command of Robert Dillon. The strong presence of Brigade officers in the Legion was another example of the power of the Brigade's family connections. The Duc de Lauzen was an archetypal courtier who had maintained many mistresses in both France and England before the war. Amongst his infatuations was Madame la Comtesse Dillon, née de Rothe, wife of the eleventh Viscount. Four years later, in 1776, he also became a strong friend of Fanny Harland while visiting London and Bath in the company of the Dillons, she going on to become the wife of Edward Dillon, elder brother of Robert Dillon. When Lauzen raised his Legion in 1778, he chose Robert to be its colonel-commandant, who in turn appointed a number of fellow officers from Dillon's (41). Both Dillon's and Lauzen's served together throughout the subsequent amphibious campaign on the American coast alongside American troops, particularly the assault on Gloucester under Robert Dillon. After the fall of Yorktown, both battalions of Dillon were re-united, assisting in the capture of the islands of Tobago and St.Eustache, afterwards remaining to help garrison the Windward Islands until their return to France in late 1783. The second battalion of Berwick's also accompanied the second battalion of Dillon's in 1780 to the Windward Islands, arriving in time to be present at the siege of Saint Christopher although they did not actively participate in it. They saw no active service, being detailed to reinforce the garrisons of the existing French possessions. Significantly, at no point did they serve on or with continental American troops. Finally, both battalions of Walsh helped seize Senegal in West Africa before its second battalion
crossed in 1780 to the Caribbean to be utilised for garrison duty in a similar manner to Berwick's, having no direct contact with events in North America (42).

Taking this service into account, for the Brigade's officers the crucial factor guiding the reactions of certain of them, particularly the older ones, was service directly alongside American troops, just as Bodinier identified for their French comrades in arms. One easily identifiable group was the 17 senior Irish officers who were made members of the Society of the Cincinnati by the American Congress in recognition of their contribution to the victory. Of these, 12 were officers of the Brigade, 2 were officers of Dillon's serving in Lauzun's, another served as an American general whilst another was an ADC. Only 1, Lieutenant de Vaisseau Jean-Baptiste MacCarthy Martaigue, had no service link with the Brigade. Deducting 2 of these who had retired by 1789, of the 15 officers still serving in 1789 who were members of the Society of the Cincinnati, 3 (20%) reacted by retiring, 6 (40%) emigrated and 6 (40%) remained (43). This suggests that service in America had a measurable impact on their reactions as compared to the generality of their subordinates. Certainly, the figure of 40% of the serving Cincinnati who neither retired or emigrated was significantly higher than either the average of about 25% of all officers across the three regiments of the Brigade or the 23% of Irish officers not serving in the Brigade who remained. The most striking and revealing comparison though was with the serving officers of a similar rank in the Brigade, the 14 senior officers from colonel-propriétaire to major-en-second. While only 4 (35.7%) of these remained: Arthur Dillon, Théobald Dillon and James O'Moran of Dillon's, and Major John O'Neill of Walsh's, all had served in America and all but O'Neill were members of the Society of the Cincinnati.

Comparing their service to the other senior officers of the Brigade, none of Berwick's served in North America and all 5 emigrated. In Walsh's the 1 officer who had served in North America remained whilst of the other 4, none of whom had served there, 3 emigrated and 1 retired. Thus service in North America appeared the key factor for identifying who remained and who emigrated amongst senior officers in the Brigade,
especially when the kinship relations who remained often shared such service. For example, amongst Dillon's relations, the American veterans, the Sheldons, remained, whilst the Jernighams and Cliffords, emigrated. This distinguished them from their French counterparts. Bodinier did identify that members of the court nobility and other senior officers who had served in America initially tended to espouse liberal ideas, but eventually, from the events of June and July 1791 onwards, they joined the ever-growing wave of emigration (44).

For the officers of lesser rank, only one regiment of the Brigade actually served alongside the Americans: Dillon's, taking an active part in the siege of Savannah and a number of minor amphibious operations down the East coast. Given that the officers of the Brigade were generally not defined socially by the French as nobles, albeit undoubtedly as gentlemen, Bodinier's analysis might suggest that those officers who served alongside the Americans would have had a noticeably lower rate of emigration comparable to the plebeian French artillery and engineer officers. The officers of Dillon's mirrored this as of its 31 officers of Capitaine-Commandant rank or below who had served in North America, 11 emigrated, 6 retired, 12 remained, whilst the fate of 2 was unrecorded. The 38.7% remaining from this group was thus statistically distinguished from the regiment as a whole although when taking the age profile into account, they were inevitably older officers.

That the significance of the American experience as some form of radicalising process for the younger junior officers was limited was reflected in that not all observers felt relations between the Americans and their French allies were always amicable. At the siege of Savannah, which was the officers of Dillon's major point of contact with their American allies, one contemporary commented that amongst the younger officers the Americans were '...so much despised by the French as not to be allowed to go into their camp.' (45). A further reservation as to the general impact of American service was that given the close family and service ties that characterised the Irish regiments,
the respective lead of each propriétair was of obvious significance in influencing emigration, for while Berwick's and Walsh's emigrated, Dillon's did not. Having said this, to be influenced by Dillon's decision, kinship was required alongside American service. Equally, all those with American service were, by definition, the more senior and older officers by 1789. As previously identified, this group generally had a higher statistical likelihood of remaining, whether they served in the Brigade or elsewhere in the French Army. Finally, focusing on the Irish officers of the Légion de Lauzun, all of whom served directly alongside their American allies, initially outside New York and then at the siege of Yorktown, the actual command of these 600 hussars and grenadiers was exercised by Robert Dillon and it was not surprising that of the other 4 Irish officers with Lauzun's, Frank Dillon, Dominique Sheldon, Charles Jennings and Charles MacMahon, the former two were detached from the family regiment. Of these five, Robert Dillon retired in 1791, Frank Dillon and Charles MacMahon emigrated and Dominique Sheldon and Charles Jennings remained. Yet for one of those remaining, Dominique Sheldon, family factors rather than his American service could suggest itself as the key factor, as would the factor of both Sheldon and Jennings being older officers of senior rank.

The thesis that service alongside the Americans resulted in a radicalising process amongst the French officer corps appears further challenged by the ultimate reactions to the Revolution of two officers of Walsh, Eugene MacCarthy and Edward Stack. Both served with their company as marines on the American vessel Bonhomme Richard under the command of Captain John Paul Jones during 1779, participating in the near legendary combat with HMS Serapis off Flamborough Head. This experience might well be identified as one likely to produce an identification with the cause of liberty, especially as both young subalterns had this experience positively reinforced by promotion to the rank of capitaine followed by subsequent service in the West Indies with the second battalion until 1783. Yet nine years later they emigrated, Stack in the mass departure of the 88e and 87e officers in July 1791 and MacCarthy
alongside his fellow officers of the 92e on 25 May 1792, both going on to become full colonels in the British army by 1801. Revealingly, at the time of their service with Jones both officers made clear in their correspondence that the appreciation of social rank was equal to any notions of adventure. Having said this, another officer of Walsh, John O'Brien, performed similar service as a marine with other vessels of the American Colonial fleet and he did remain to serve the new republic, albeit retiring in November 1794 aged fifty-seven, thus falling into the established pattern for older officers (46). Returning briefly to Eugene MacCarthy and Edward Stack, the power of regimental loyalty and respect for a brother officer, particularly one where they had shared service, appeared greater than any supposed concept of radicalism derived from service alongside the Americans. The former was offered the post of lieutenant-colonel of the 88e in July 1791 after the mass defection of that regiment's officers. This would have meant stepping over Edward Stack who had indicated he wished to have that command rather than that of the 87e he had been given. Although Stack then emigrated, MacCarthy rejected the offer, preferring to remain a capitaine in the 92e, departing the following year as one of the sixteen officers of the 92e emigrating as a cohesive group (47).

Finally, Bodinier identified that officiers de fortune that had served in the American conflict mostly supported the Revolution, a factor matching the findings of Scott (48). While Scott demonstrated that these officers generally supported the Revolution for social reasons, service in North America made it marginally more, rather than less, likely that they remained. Whilst overall four out of the seventeen such officers emigrated from the Brigade, of the ten who had served in North America only one, Edward Worth of the 87e, did so (49).

The patterns and factors influencing the emigration of officers from the Brigade were mirrored by their clerical brethren and the students in the various theological colleges, with those choosing to remain being labelled as disaffected aliens, arrested and
imprisoned. Those institutions based in Paris were the first to feel the impact of events. The Irish College in Paris was attacked by mobs in 1791 causing many of its students rapidly to depart, the subsequent requirements of the Civil Oath ensuring many of their professors soon followed. By August 1793 those who remained were arrested and imprisoned until late 1794 (50). For those institutions outside of Paris the students did not initially appear to have been faced with the same hostility and the direct threats to this group were delayed until the rise of the Jacobins and the war with Britain. Taking the English College at Douai as an example, of the 88 students enrolled for the academic year commencing 1 October 1792, 9 had already departed by 30 October and 3 more the following month. England's declaration of war on 1 January 1793 saw a further 8 immediately depart, then 10 in February and 1 in March. By August 1793, when the college was ordered to close, another 10 students had vanished (51). For those professors and students still remaining anything up to eighteen months of imprisonment lay ahead. At least 50 of the staff and students from Douai were imprisoned at Doullens alongside 6 English Benedictines from St.Gregory's in Douai (52). In effect, the Revolution not only destroyed the Brigade, it effectively obliterated the established network for exiled communities focused around the clerical institutions. A process sealed with the arrest and imprisonment as disaffected aliens of any whom remained.

Whilst events in France ultimately obliterated all institutions of the émigré Irish community, a last fragment survived across the Atlantic in St.Dominique. Between November 1791 and March 1792, the second battalions of each regiment embarked for colonial service thus removing them from the immediate impact of political turmoil in France. The previous two years had already seen tremendous change in the officer corps many of the officers who sailed for the Caribbean being of Flemish, German, Swiss and French parentage and having been NCOs, privates or even civilians back in July 1789. Having said this, the proportion of officers who were Irish or of Irish descent varied considerably between the three battalions, with less than a
third in Berwick's yet in Walsh's almost all remained so. Events in St. Dominique witnessed those who survived the ravages of fever and bitter fighting opting to support the royalist faction amongst the colonial planter society with most of Dillon's surviving cadre entering British service. This 'second' wave of emigration however had as much to do with local factors on the island as it had with any disaffection with the new republic (declared after their arrival), or the execution of the King.

It is difficult to be precise as to the composition of the officer corps of the Irish battalions on the eve of their embarkation for St. Dominique given the continued trickle of primary emigrations right up to departure. The only regiment for which detailed returns survived was that of the 87e that revealed a significant proportion of newly promoted ex-rankers. An État of officers of the second battalion taken on 26 October just prior to departure for Le Havre revealed that of its 27 officers, 12 remained from those of 1789, 7 were promoted rankers of various European nationalities, 1 came from the garde national, one the recently appointed son of an ex-officer, Sous-Lieutenant Jacques Manderville, and 6 had unidentified backgrounds. A second État, taken on 7 January 1792 at embarkation, revealed that the intervening eleven weeks had seen 1 of the remaining veterans emigrate, Lieutenant Daniel MacNemara, as had the recently appointed Lieutenant de la Touche-Treville. They were replaced respectively by the promotions of ex-sergeants Nicholas Ratt and Lallonette to full lieutenants (53).

The first to sail was the second battalion of the 92e that embarked at Lorient 23 November 1791 with a strength of 26 officers and 592 men under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel George Begg. Next came the second battalion of the 87e that embarked at Le Havre 7 January 1792 with a strength of 28 officers and 601 men under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Richard O'Shee. The final departure was the second battalion of the 88e that embarked at Lorient March 1792 with a strength of 26 officers and 491 men under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver Harty.
The purpose of their dispatch to St. Dominque was to re-enforce the under-strength garrison facing increasing revolt from the white planters, the free mulatto and blacks and ultimately the slaves. On 22 August 1791, there had been a general rising of Negro slaves that had exploded throughout the plantations of the wealthy North Plain. In the subsequent fighting every possible combination of conflict took place: white versus Negro and mulatto, white and Negro versus mulatto, white and mulatto versus Negro, with nightmare scenes of carnage and destruction, and every method of killing, torture and mutilation being practised by all sides. Prior to this, the island's existing garde national and regular troops had divided along sectarian lines. In March 1791 the first re-enforcements from France, the regiments of Artois and Normandie had arrived, but their ranks were already imbued with the heady mix of revolutionary fervour and they quickly spread this to the existing garrison. This had resulted in one of the colonial regiments, the Port-au-Prince, staging a mutiny with its colonel's head ending up adorning a symbolic revolutionary pike. This, and the subsequent slave revolt of August 1791, convinced the French government to dispatch a substantial force to restore order and some 4,700 troops arrived in stages between 18 December 1791 and 14 June 1792, amongst which were the Irish battalions.

Almost three-quarters of these troops were composed of newly raised volontaires national with just over a quarter being regulars of the old army, essentially the three battalions of the old Irish Brigade. The volontaires national were the personification of revolutionary fervour in their blue coats, while the soldiers of the 87e, 88e and 92e still looked to a more established order physically reflected in their proudly displayed distinctive red coats and royalist colours. The officers of the 87e in particular were immediately denounced for continuing to parade before their old colour instead of the new 'constitutional' one dispatched from France after the suppression of all royal insignia by the decree of 28 November 1792. Part of an accusation denouncing the
87e officers as aristocrats starkly revealed the growing gap by reference to this colour, '...the former colour on which there still were the marks of despotism, that is to say the fleur-de-lis.' The colour being referred to was that decreed for the second battalion on 30 June 1791 and it remained a revealing symbol of the officers' sentiments, flying at the head of the 87e even after they entered British service (55). In fact, the Irish battalions seemed to have stood apart even from their supposed fellow regulars in the 48e Régiment ci-devant Artois and the 9e Régiment ci-devant Normandie, given that these were mostly newly enrolled volunteers. Although the Irish battalions had also had to fill gaps prior to departure, this had been achieved by drafts from the first battalions. This ensured that the balance of the rank and file were still predominantly non-French, being mostly a mixture of Flemings and Germans recruited prior to the Revolution thus further distinguishing them from their fellow regulars. Equally, for the 90 officers of the three battalions, although only 47 (of whom 29 were originally from the 92e), were survivors of pre-July 1789, 12 had been NCOs or privates then and all of these were of Flemish or German birth. The only identifiable body of French officers was the 11 recently appointed sous-lieutenants and lieutenants in the 88e, a reflection of that officer corps mass departure the year before. The nationality of the remaining 9 officers was not listed, although all appeared to have French names (56). Finally, some of the Irish officers had relations amongst the planter society and the local government. An Edward Plunkett was mayor of Tiburon while there were plantations in the southern province owned by the Walsh, O'Sheill, O'Rourke and MacNamara families. The Walsh family in particular, so strongly linked to the Comte d'Artois and the other Princes at Coblenz, had substantial plantations across the colony. The cousin of Count Walsh-Serrant, Anthony John Baptist Walsh, the titular Earl Walsh, had emigrated with his family at the revolution to his estates in the colony and his eldest son, John Baptist Paul Oliver Walsh, was killed on 6 August 1792 in one of the massacres of whites in the colony. His father meanwhile fled to Kingston, Jamaica, with thousands of other refugees where they were to have an influence on the British decision to occupy the colony (57).
Subsequent to disembarkation, the 87e proved best able to maintain its strength being allotted the static garrison of the Môle St.Nicolas, whilst both the 88e and the 92e were immediately called upon to provide numerous small detachments for service against the various rebel groups. This resulted in their being effectively destroyed as coherent formations by fever and battle casualties within a matter of months. The 92e, stationed in the northern province with its headquarters at Le Cap Français provided the only complete return for any of the three Irish battalions for 1792, that of 8 October. This revealed that of 618 officers and men who had embarked on 23 November 1791 only 393 remained and of these, 57 were in hospital, 71 on sick leave, 101 on detachment, eleven had been left behind in Tenerife and only 153 were present under arms (58). Despite this, all nine companies were still commanded by officers who had been serving in July 1789. Two had been capitaine-commandants, Begg and Leamlary, three had been capitaines-en-second, Keating, O'Riordan and Roche, three lieutenant-en-premier, Clarke, Conway and Hally, and one a lieutenant-en-second, O'Rourke. Of the two who had been capitaine-commandants, Begg was promoted lieutenant-colonel within weeks while Leamlary commanded the grenadier company and it was noticeable that the seniority of the other capitaines was in direct relation to their rank in 1789. This strongly indicated that the determinant factor in regard to promotion remained strict military seniority rather than any variety of political considerations or pragmatic expedience (59).

The 88e, based in the southern provinces with detachments at Jérémie and Port-au-Prince, left no precise return of its complete strength for the same period. Six of its nine companies though, involved in operations against the rebel camp at Les Plantons in August 1792, recorded a reduction in strength to just 217 men (60). When General Fezensac inspected the battalion based in Port-au-Prince on 12 October 1792 he found only 100 men able to walk with another 100 stationed at Jérémie in the west of the province of Grande'Anse. There was no indication as to the proportion physically
Politicallly and militarily, the situation in St. Dominque proved unsustainable for the new French Republic with clandestine links by colonial royalists with Coblenz and the Tuileries in the background. The nominal military commander, General Blanchelande, was mistrusted as a representative of the old regime and did not have a free hand, being directly challenged by the radical Jacobin Civil Commissioners, Sonthonax and Polverel, when they arrived in September 1792. The garde national, instituted to support the revolution, consistently refused to obey Blanchelande's orders. Defeat in a military action against insurgents at Les Plantons provided the necessary excuse for his arrest on 29 September, return to France and to the horror of many colonial whites, the guillotine. The removal of the royalist Blanchelande swung the balance of power dramatically in favour of Sonthonax and Polverel. This was reinforced by receipt of the news of the King's overthrow and execution which shocked the colonists more than any previous event, even the pro-Republican assembly in Port-au-Prince expressing shock. During this period, the military became divided with some regulars and garde national supporting the new Republic, others still proudly displaying Royalist banners. The Jacmel Garde National were still carrying their Royalist banner in May 1793 as were the 87e at the Môle (62).

From his arrival in September 1792 Sonthonax instituted purges of the colonial government, deporting known royalists and ordering back to France a number of military officers, including some from the 92e (63). By December he had absolute control of the Northern Province and January 1793 witnessed efforts to forcibly extend this control over the rest of the colony. Determined to control the colony for the new republic, Sonthonax and Poverel viewed all whites as active or potential counter-revolutionaries and instituted harsh measures against them. Equally, they displayed open favouritism to the mulattos and increasingly the blacks, seeing them as more reliable allies of the new regime. This essentially united all shades of white...
society that had been previously fragmented in its political opinion. They now found their only reliable allies to be the diminishing number of regular white troops, mostly the 87e, 88e and 92e, alongside elements of the colonial garde national. Fearful of what the coming year would bring, representatives of the white planters looked to the Caribbean colonies of Spain and Britain for salvation, both nations having entered the war against France in February.

The linkage to Spain was straightforward given Spain's colony in the western half of the island. The linkage to Britain was via Jamaica where several French planter families already had family members based and to where, since the Revolution, many thousands of refugees, mainly white royalists, had fled. Those arriving included at least two officers from the 92e, capitaines Charles O'Gorman and Chevalier Pierre O'Shiell whom were soon enlisted by the British government to establish links with their remaining comrades (64). While the planters indicated they would prefer salvation by the English, many initially looked to the nearer Spanish for relief, either or both together being acceptable. While February 1793 saw sixty planters approach the government in London, to urge them to occupy the colony, May found Commandant Joseph-François Desombrages of Jérémie writing to the Spanish Governor of Cuba to the effect that St. Dominque would welcome the first armed power to appear (65). Consequently, the period of February to September 1793 saw a number of groups, on and off the island, competing as to who would seize the colony. With the white separatists and royalists united against Sonthonax and Polverel, a series of deputies were sent to London urging intervention, although they hoped this would be possible under the white Bourbon flag rather than the British. Meanwhile, the Princes in Coblentz sent their own representatives with orders to support whoever arrived first, British or Spanish. The British government wavered for a while, wary of involvement in such a potential powder keg and conscious of the potential drain on Britain's limited military reserves. Concerned for the strategic balance if Spain extended its Caribbean empire, the fear of the impact on Jamaica of the slave revolt...
and the assurance that local troops would actively support a British presence finally convinced them of the need for intervention.

The opportunity came on 25 July, when, having despaired of Spanish salvation, Commandant Desombrages at Jérémie dispatched an urgent plea for British aid. Jérémie, the main town of the isolated coffee-growing region of La Grand'Anse at the tip of the southern peninsula, had managed to remain under the control of its white planters, aided by the remains of the 88e and 92e under Colonel Oliver Harty. Back in September 1792, Harty, now the senior Irish officer in the colony, had destroyed the rebel camp at Les Plantons causing Polverel to comment, 'He is a brave and good patriot, this Commandant Harty'. By February 1793, Harty had successfully defeated the remaining threat from the rebels and had been hailed by the colonial assembly of Jérémie as the 'Liberator' and again as a 'brave and good patriot' (66). He was consequently appointed commandant of the southern province with his headquarters at Les Cases. This did not though prevent a massacre of whites in Les Cases in June and by late July an army of mulattos and slaves under André Rigaud, having destroyed Le Cap, was advancing on Jérémie thus triggering Desombrages' desperate plea for aid. The commander of British forces in Jamaica, Major-General Sir Adam Williamson, responded after a considerable exchange of correspondence with Jérémie and Les Cases in order to ensure a friendly welcome, and dispatched a small contingent of 600 troops on 9 September, mostly the 13th Regiment of Foot under the command of its Lieutenant-Colonel John Whitelock. This modest force landed at Jérémie 19-20 September to public acclaim and shouts of 'Vivent le Anglais', all but a handful of the population immediately swearing loyalty to George III (67).

Oliver Harty though was no longer present as an order for his suspension had been issued by Sonthonax and Polverel on 25 July on accusations of being a 'foreigner', the almost inevitable counter-revolutionary label bestowed by French republicans on otherwise loyal members of the Brigade. It is doubtful this suspension was rapidly
implemented for on 30 July Harty was able to write from Les Cayes to the Governor of Jamaica, introducing himself as 'Colonel du 88e Regiment, Commandant du la province du Sud St.Dominique', on the mechanism by which recently captured British sailors were to be exchanged. Harty's personal attitude to the unfolding events in the colony was unclear, although it was likely that the June massacre of whites in Las Cases had coloured his opinion. Whatever his feelings, the very cordial language and generally friendly tone of his letter, assuring Williamson that he had treated the prisoners as 'frères et des amis', was not that of a fanatical Jacobin and he concluded by promising to write again, this time in English, 'Si je n'étois malade' (68). His concern for contracting an illness was, in a way, soon fulfilled, for on 8 August a definitive order for his arrest was issued by the Civil Commissioners on charges of 'incivism' and he subsequently spent seventy days under guard. Ironically, back on 15 May, he, along with Colonels Thomas Keating of the 87e and John O'Neill of the 92e back in France, had been promoted to the rank of major-general, although notification of this promotion did not arrive until after his arrest and imprisonment. He was finally released on 17 October and allowed to return to France to face an inquiry into the events leading up to the British occupation of Jérémie. Ironically, a British privateer from St.George, Bermuda, captured his ship where the authorities briefly imprisoned him until he managed to escape to Charleston and finally return to France. Harty's role was ultimately vindicated and his rank restored on 18 May 1795 (69).

For the remaining effectives of the 88e and 92e, there is no indication that any either returned to France or remained in Republican service in the colony. Instead, a letter of 3 September from Williamson to Whitelock prior to departure for Jérémie giving instructions for the forthcoming expedition, indicated the fate of any remaining members of both battalions.

'Should the Regiments of Berwick or Walsh show a disposition to be taken into British pay, you are to accept of them/ that is to say of such as are Irish, German or
Swiss, but no others/ & either incorporate them with the 13th Regiment or as a separate Corps, as you shall judge best, employing only such officers as may be well affected, & to be depended on.' (70).

After the occupation of Jérémie there is no subsequent suggestion of either corps being taken into British pay, or of any of their men being incorporated into the ranks of the 13th Foot. Meanwhile, Les Cayes remained in republican hands for several more years, protected on the landward side by jungle and mountains and from the seaward by Britain's lack of resources for a sea-borne assault. Apparently, remnants of both the 88e and 92e all but died out in this isolated garrison. The last correspondence relating to troops garrisoning Les Cayes was from Capitaine Ignace Salomon of the 88e, dated 1 December 1795, an ex-ranker still loyal to the republic, recounting a remaining strength of just eighty men (71).

Back in London, the government, as yet unaware of the developments at Jérémie, became far more enthusiastic at the prospect of a British St. Dominique as they were made aware of the likely support such a development would receive from the planters. To further this, a list of French émigré officers resident in London with properties in St. Dominique and prepared to participate in an expedition against the colony was drawn up on 31 August 1793. The nine officers subsequently identified included three from the Brigade, capitaines Charles Thomas O'Gorman and Chevalier Pierre O'Shiell of Walsh's, and Lieutenant Marcel O'Shiell of Dillon's (72). The two officers from Walsh's had been capitaines of the 92e sent to the colony in 1791 although O'Shiell had been appointed lieutenant-colonel of the 9e Regiment ci-devant Normandie already stationed in the colony on 5 February 1792. Both had subsequently emigrated to Jamaica in September 1792 upon learning of the King's overthrow. It is revealing of O'Shiell's allegiance that he listed himself as a capitaine of Walsh's and not as lieutenant-colonel of the 9e, a French formation which declared for the new republic. Further, while Marcel O'Shiell of the 87e, a relative of Pierre, had emigrated back in
1791 while stationed in France when the old regimental names were still extant, all three chose to identify their previous service by reference to the traditional regimental titles rather than by the republican regimental numbers current by 1793 (73).

Meanwhile, for Williamson the next objective was the Môle, the great naval stronghold commanding the Windward Passage. Described as the 'Gibraltar of the Antilles', it offered a superb natural harbour and enormous quantities of military stores. Its military garrison was mostly the 87e, now under the command of its senior capitaine, James O'Farrell, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard O'Shee having returned to France the previous year. Two days after the landing at Jérémie, on 22 September 1793, Commodore Ford, with a small detachment of the 13th and 49th Foot accepted the surrender of the Môle, its capitulation being signed by its commandant, Colonel Deveaux, its ex-commandant, Baron de Valtiere and its senior naval administrator, Sulerand Carles.

The participation of the 87e Regiment's remaining Irish officers in the negotiations prior to capitulation and its operational execution, both from their own subsequent correspondence and that of the British officers involved, appears considerable. As with the commandant of Jérémie, the senior officers of the garrison, especially Carles and O'Farrell, according to Capitaine Plunkett, had originally decided to ask the Spanish for assistance. Consequently, on 15 July, Capitaine John O'Neill of the 87e was dispatched with an offer to surrender the Môle to the Spanish forces in the west of the island. Fate intervened however when the vessel carrying the delegation was captured by a British privateer just after departure and taken to Jamaica. According to O'Neill's own account, confident his senior officers would accept British aid, he used the capture instead to make the offer to Williamson, reluctantly accepting to surrender to the British flag and not the white flag of the Bourbon monarchy as desired. O'Neill's account formed part of a detailed memorandum of O'Farrell's, written in 1800 to support his claim for the right to receive half-pay, which included a detailed...
account of the actual events of the capitulation. Coinciding with the other sources, O'Farrell related that he and his senior officers played a key role in the decision to capitulate. O'Farrell claimed that, having expected a Spanish force, the garrison was taken by surprise when Commodore Ford appeared as a result of O'Neill's interception. Consequently, he and Carles took the lead in convincing both the officers and troops to accept this turn of events. The memorandum included an undated letter, signed by twelve of the 87e officers, confirming their full support for this decision. It can only be speculated as to what impact the fate of Colonel Harty had made, if any (74).

Carles, writing to Williamson on 29 September regarding these events, confirmed the active support of 'M. O'Farell commandant le Bataillon de Dillon' in the ultimate decision to capitulate (75). Again, as with the three émigrés in London, in all Anglo-French correspondence after the British occupation, the traditional regimental title was specifically used in preference to the republican 87e. The last use of the numeral was on 23 September when O'Farrell prepared a complete regimental return in order to identify the significant arrears of pay for which Williamson had indicated a willingness to pay during negotiations. This listed 31 officers and 149 rank and file although, remarkably, not a single soldier was listed as a private; the breakdown, including O'Farrell and using the old royalist rank designations, being 9 capitaine-commandants, 9 lieutenants, 9 sous-lieutenants, 1 Adjudant-major, 1 Adjudant, 1 Chirurgie-major, 1 Chirurgie, 23 grenadiers including 11 NCO's, and 126 fusiliers, all but 5 of whom were listed as NCOs, these 5 being drummers. This brought the arrears of pay for those present to a total of £9,605.12s.6d. Of the 31 listed officers, only the 9 capitaine-commandants and 2 senior lieutenants had been listed as officers six months before in the État Militaire for 1793. In that document only 5 were listed as capitaine, 3 as lieutenant and 3 as sous-lieutenant. Further, only the 6 senior of these 11, O'Farrell, D'Elloy, O'Neill, Plunkett, MontGerald and De Sager, had an Irish father and had been officers in 1789. The balance of the remaining 27 had been
NCOs, privates or even civilians prior to 1789, and were a mixture of Flemish, German and French nationalities. Only 2 of these, Guillaume Collette and Hendrick Manuels, had been substantive officers when the battalion embarked at Le Havre in January 1792. A significant 25 (80.6%) of O'Farrell's 31 officers had thus been appointed such in the previous eighteen months (76).

While undoubtedly this partially reflected the losses all European formations suffered in the Caribbean, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that O'Farrell indulged in some rapid promotions to ensure a higher pay-out for his men to purchase their loyalty. This motivation was indicated in a subsequent letter of 19 October from Williamson to Henry Dundas in which, while relating the events of the capitulation, he stated, 'On taking possession of the Môle the whole garrison took the oaths of allegiance and the Regiment Dillon consisting of about 140 were immediately taken into British pay, and a months pay advanced them; which has very much attached them to the British Government. The officers of the Regiment are rather out of proportion, but they are also in pay.' (77).

This was further confirmed in a subsequent letter of Williamson's to Dundas, dated 25 May 1794, relating the general re-organisation of the British forces on St.Dominque.

'The regiment of Dillon to whom we are much indebted for the possession of the Môle and to brevet Major O'Farrell in particular I have continued in the service. I believe there are several officers who were made up from the ranks at a time when it was necessary for Major O'Farrell to keep them in good humour, the number of officers are more than necessary, and I dare say many of them would gladly retire from the service on a moderate compensation, perhaps a years pay, it would be purchasing them at an easy rate, and no necessity to free up the vacancies.' (78).

As indicated in the letter, O'Farrell, along with two other French officers from
separate corps, were appointed brevet majors in the British Army by General Williamson shortly after the capitulation of the Môle, 'all untill His Majestys pleasure is known & with no additional pay whatever.' Subsequently, brevet Lieutenant-Colonel James Grant of the 49th Foot wrote to Dundas on 19 December as the senior officer at the Môle commenting on the 'jealousies' this triggered amongst the other French officers. This helps explain why O'Farrell and his men, at the time the letter was written, became the garrison of St.Marc some fifty miles to the south. Whether true or not, the letter explained, prudence guided that similar major's brevets were given to Captain Grant of the grenadier company of the 13th Foot and Captain Brisbane of the 49th ensuring their seniority over their new French allies (79). Additionally, writing to Dundas on 26 November to seek retrospective authority for the brevets, Williamson included a letter from O'Farrell requesting all arrears as indicated in the regimental return of 23 September. This suggested that his men had only received to that date the month's pay in advance for the British service indicated in Williamson's previous correspondence (80). This matter of arrears of pay became intimately tied up with their actual status in the British army and ultimately provided a rich crop of correspondence into the early years of the next century. As to the actual strength of brevet Major O'Farrell's command, it was fairly certain that the 180 officers and NCOs listed on 23 September had all entered British service, this despite Williamson's letter of 19 October referring to only 'about 140 men' of Dillon's. Originally, the battalion had been stronger than the 180 referred to by O'Farrell at the time of capitulation, but as he related in his memorandum of 1800, he had to deport 52 men and 4 officers, capitaines O'Meara and Barry, lieutenants D'Hénin and Gruel, for refusing to agree to the capitulation, describing them as 'corrupted' men who he feared would infect others (81). None of these four officers' names appeared in O'Farrell's return of 23 September, which listed a full battalion compliment of 9 capitains and 9 lieutenants. There seems little question that those who had chosen not to enter British service had previously identified themselves and
been excluded, thus allowing O'Farrell to promote two lieutenants and sous-lieutenants respectively, no doubt further securing their loyalty. Additionally, it would seem unlikely that O'Farrell would have listed the arrears owed to the rank and file if some of those included were republicans being deported, particularly as the return was subsequently countersigned as a correct account by the Commissary General for the Môle, James Esten on 26 September. Given that Esten had previously been Commodore Ford's purser, it would appear unlikely he would have signed an obviously false return.

Supporting this from the other side of the hill was the account of the senior officer of these 'corrupted' men, Capitaine Daniel-Joseph O'Meara. Rapidly deported to New York on British ships, he and his men returned to France. Although rewarded for his loyalty by promotion to Chef de Bataillon, he remained unemployed at Brest for over two years, during which time he petitioned both the Committee of Public Safety and the Minister for War (6 December 1795) to rebuild the second battalion of the 87e. In his appeal to the Minister he broadly confirmed O'Farrell's account and numbers, albeit with a very different interpretation on the question of honour. He related how 53 men and 5 officers, including himself, had remained loyal to 'la Patrie'. He specifically listed the other 4 officers as Capitaine Robert Barry and lieutenants Gofinet, D'Henin and Wischer, the later being an officer not mentioned by O'Farrell. O'Meara's petitions were pressing for this small cadre to be made into a new 87e with the many other unemployed officers and men from destroyed formations then waiting in Brest which would then return to St. Dominique. To enhance this suggestion he specifically stressed his six years of experience in colonial warfare, yet if O'Meara hoped this and his willingness to return to the colony would improve the chances of his ideas being taken up he was wrong. He remained unemployed for a further two years until authorised to raise a completely new 'Republican Brigade Irlandaise' (82).

Hence, while O'Farrell bought off the bulk of recently promoted non-Irish subalterns,
there was little to indicate why the remaining professional officers reacted as they did. All 8 surviving senior officers on 22 September 1793 were of pre-1789 vintage, captaînes O'Farrell, O'Neill, Plunkett, O'Meara, Barry, D'Elloy, MontGerald and De Sager, yet the following day, two of these, O'Meara and Barry chose to return to France. Whilst the three officers who accompanied them were promoted NCOs of Flemish and German nationality and thus statistically more obvious candidates for rejecting emigration, they left behind numerous compatriots of an identical status.

As a general comment it may be conjectured that the chaos these professional officers had come to associate with the Republican cause and its assumed hostility to those identified with the ancien regime did little for their loyalty and caused them to look in preference to the salvation of the disciplined British forces. Individual officers' reasons are far harder to assess. For at least one of the officers who entered British service the deciding factor appeared to be local, as John O'Neill was one of two brothers in Dillon's, his younger brother being Joseph O'Neill, who had been born on Martinique and whose family were still planters there. It would seem a logical deduction that his loyalties were to the colonial whites rather than the pro-mulatto and black republic. Additionally, their younger brother had already emigrated on 21 August 1791 (83).

For the other seven it is difficult to find quantifiable factors other than personal preference. Their place of birth can be discounted, O'Meara being born in France and Barry in Ireland. Of those entering British service, three were of Irish birth: O'Farrell, Plunkett and MontGerald, D'Elloy was born in France to affluent Irish parents and De Sager was one of two brothers born to a soldier of Bulkeley's Regiment by a French mother. Neither does prior service offer any clues, for while both O'Meara and Barry had served together in the American War of Independence, so had O'Farrell, D'Elloy and O'Neill, while De Sager had remained in France at the regiment's depot and neither Plunkett or MontGerald entered the army until 1784. Having a close relative...
that had emigrated equally fails to indicate how a veteran officer reacted. Of the six who entered British service, James O'Farrell's elder brother Denis-Emmanuel had emigrated in late 1791 as had his cousins Richard, Dick and James, all in Berwick's. Equally, John O'Neill's younger brother James had also emigrated in late 1791, although none of the other four had relatives who had. Yet both O'Neill and Barry had uncles and cousins who had departed French service in 1791, Thadee and William O'Meara in Berwick's, and David Barry in Walsh's. The only possible factor here was that in both O'Farrell and O'Neill's case there were brothers serving in the same regiment who had previously emigrated which may have carried more significance than the actions of cousins and uncles. Ultimately, the factor of personal preference appears pre-eminent as of the eight, only De Sager had been born outside what one might define as gentry circles, his father being a private soldier while all others had either land-owning fathers back in Ireland or were retired officers of the Brigade. Further, only De Sager had worked his way up through the ranks and not only had the other seven entered as cadets or equivalent, they had inevitably gained higher rank while being generally half De Sager's age. Yet De Sager, having received rapid promotion as a result of the Revolution to the rank of substantive capitaine, had by early 1793 chosen to enter British service. He loyally served King George until his demise by fever sometime after 1795 (his younger brother James had died of fever back in 1793 while the battalion was still serving France) (84).

Finally, for the minority of substantive officers from all six battalions who remained in France preferring loyalty to the new republic, their reward was disappointing. The remaining officers were viewed by many in the new regime as the surviving representatives both of the old order and, as alien nationals, belonging to a country with which France was at war. Far from being viewed as loyalists for remaining at their posts, the very fact that most of their colleagues had emigrated ensured they were viewed as likely candidates to follow or as spies with a ready made network by which to betray France. Some of those who chose to remain made varying attempts to
redefine their origins to conform to the new political requirements. James Maurice of the 88e, disowned his original claim to genteel birth which had gained him the grade of sous-Lieutenant de remplacement back in 1787 and subsequently that of Cadet-Gentilhomme in 1789, insisting his father had first entered Berwick's as a common soldier, gaining a commission only by merit. Unfortunately, this claim was directly contradicted by both his father's and his own surviving service records (85).

The general purge of almost all non-Frenchmen from the army was inevitable, and, as with all such processes, the more senior and higher profile officers suffered the harshest fate. The most illustrious, Count Arthur Dillon was arrested in the summer of 1793, identified as 'étranger noblesse' and guillotined, as was his old lieutenant-colonel, James O'Moran. Meanwhile, in October 1793, Capitaine Crevoisier of the garde nationale, attached to the first battalion 87e as a political commissar, drew up reports on its officers. His comments, judging those held to be politically unreliable and identified as socially 'ci-devant', sealed the fate not only of most of the remaining Irish and English officers but also of some of the promoted ex-rankers of German, Flemish or Italian nationality. Crevoisier's report was shortly followed by a similar exercise by General Hesse under whose command came the first battalion of the 87e. His list of its officers, with almost identical comments and judgements as Crevoisier's, added actual crosses alongside those officers of foreign nationality whom he agreed with Crevoisier ought to be suspended. Consequently, the Minister of War acted on Crevoisier's and Hesse's reports, ordering in December the suspension of the seventeen specified foreign nationals, of whom eight were the last remaining Irish officers in the battalion. The fact that one of these eight was the recently departed Bernard MacDermott simply confirmed the authority's suspicions, directing, 'Les Circonstances ne permettani par d'employia aucun Anglois, Écossois ou Irlandois au service de la Republique; tous les officiers qui les one ses one suspend un et remplacin, d'aprir Ie mode d'avancement du 21 février, par des Français.' The letter containing this order went on to direct similar purges of the 88e and 92e, equally
listing all remaining regiments which had once been 'composition étrangere', news of the defections on St. Domingue coinciding with this (86). Only a handful of officers, such as Colonel John O'Neill of the 92e, escaped the Jacobin purge. This marked the final and irrevocable re-population of the once predominantly Irish and English Catholic officer corps into ones essentially indistinguishable in terms of nationality and social factors from the remainder of the new Republican French Army.
CHAPTER FOUR.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE ÉMIGRÉS AND THE FORMATION OF PITTY'S IRISH
BRIGADE, 1792-1794.

The product of the first wave of emigration was the establishment of an émigré Irish
Brigade in the Army of the Princes. The initial émigrés, led by Count Walsh-Serrant,
joined the Comte d'Artois at Turin in 1790 but as the number of emigrants swelled
they moved to Koblenz to join the Prince de Conde, Count Walsh-Serrant receiving,
on 9 December 1791, the moral support of Cardinal York for the officers' monarchist,
Catholic and counter-revolutionary motivations (1). Early 1791 saw a Royalist Army
begin to assemble which of itself acted as a beacon and motivator for many of that
summer's emigrants. The popular image of the Army of the Princes was of ci-devant
noble officers trudging through the mud as privates with Orders of St.Louis pinned to
their backpacks, confronting generals who had once been their sous-officers. This was
largely a myth. Although the Army of the Princes was significantly over-officered,
most émigré corps, including the Irish regiments, were effectively re-raised. The
Brigade's émigrés set out to recruit new soldiers, often from the same parts of
Flanders and Alsace as before.

Fitzjames, having informed the Princes of his coming through Lieutenant-Colonel
Count Mahony, led 41 officers and 125 other ranks in the mass emigration of 15 July
1791. At Ettenheim on 26 July, Conde directed that a new Regiment Berwick be
formed, an event accompanied by an address stressing loyalty, 'honour and fidelity' to
the King and Princes which left little doubt as to the émigrés sentiments (2). This
expression of group loyalty to the Crown was repeated on an individual basis by the
young émigré cadet, Peter Jennings, who having just been appointed a sous-lieutenant
in Berwick's recorded, 'I had the honour to mount my first guard as an Officer on the
Person of H.R.H. the Prince of Conde & my attachment to that Prince & to the rest of
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his Royal house can only terminate with my Existence.' (3).

At its first roll call on 11 August the new regiment listed 41 officers and 144 other ranks (4). Recruitment then commenced in the countryside around Liege, the source of many of the old Brigade's recruits. Due largely to the active work of Capitaine Antony Egan along with 50 NCO recruiters, by 25 January 1792 the regiment boasted a strength of 51 officers and 375 other ranks (5). On 25 April the Comte D'Espinchal's inspection reported, 'All the original officers have joined, headed by the Duc de Fitz-James...The regiment is in excellent order, and quite ready to take the field.' (6). General Vicomte de la Tour Du Pin-Charce confirmed the regiment's efforts at a review of 15 May at Frederickstein Castle. Berwick's paraded 69 officers and 538 other ranks, the general recording, '...the regiment was excellently composed...The corps of NCOs were very good as were the major part of the recruits.' (7).

The continued influx of émigrés led to the decision to re-raise the Regiment Dillon by 25 October 1791 on a similar basis to Berwick's. 36 émigré officers and 19 NCOs were initially based at Tournai to facilitate further emigration but ultimately the regiment established its recruiting depot at Stavelot under Lieutenant Patrick Doran, focusing its recruiting efforts on the Dutch Netherlands (8). When inspected by Du Pin-Charce on 25 May he recorded 46 officers and just 120 rank and file. Unlike Berwick's, he was not happy with the state of the regiment's arms, clothes or equipment, all of which were in poor condition. Although satisfied with the émigré officers and NCOs he was not happy with the newly raised men, describing the new NCOs as in need of 'education' and the new privates as 'mediocre' (9). Despite this, late July saw this small corps join the Regiment Berwick on the march to Hettange and the French border where the two regiments were billeted with the rest of the Royalist Army between Bingen and Mayence.

Although Count Walsh-Serrant had been one of the earliest officers of the Brigade to
join the Comte d'Artois back in 1789, few of his officers joined him prior to April 1792. The few who had emigrated were found posts in Berwick's and Dillon's, partially accounting for those regiments' top heavy officer cadre. By the time a substantial body of the 92eme officers decided to cross to the Princes, only the first battalion was still in France, the second having departed for St.Dominque. Although over 100 rank and file emigrated alongside their officers from Longwy, almost half deserted before arriving at the designated depot at Hosingen in the Duchy of Luxembourg. This was not that surprising given the high proportion of the 92eme men who came from the Duchy. Those that did arrive were described as being 'in a state of absolute destitution of all objects of armament and equipment which they had been forced to abandon' (10). While further officers arrived, the flow of rank and file, either from Longwy or newly recruited, was disappointing. When the formation was transported on 24 July to Bingen by barge, the fee was for just 22 officers, 44 rank and file and 3 servants (11). On 1 August 1792, Du Pin-Chance reviewed Walsh's, counting just 26 officers and 57 rank and file divided into just a company of grenadiers and two of fusiliers. To find places for the officers, each company had upwards of 9 officers (12). While the spirit of its officers and men was good, Du Pin-Chance was less satisfied with the other aspects of this tiny corps, 'The weapons are mediocre as are the cloths...' (13).

Shortly thereafter, Walsh joined with the battalions of Berwick and Dillon near Treves in preparation for the invasion of France. As with the rest of the Army of the Princes, which numbered 6804 infantry, 6831 cavalry, 244 generals and 370 ADCs, the Brigade's invasion of France in support of the Duke of Brunswick's Army was a brief and traumatic affair. On the eve of departure the effectives of each were recorded as: Berwick's 550, Dillon's 150 and Walsh 120 (14). Entering France near Hettange, the Brigade formed part of the émigré army's reserve under Marshal de Castries which staged a diversion on the right bank of the Moselle, then marched via Dun to Somme-Tourbe which they reached on 20 September (15). Here, the returns of
two of the regiments demonstrated that only Berwick's, with 73 officers and 616 rank and file, remained an effective formation, compared to Dillon's 62 officers and 145 rank and file (16). On 5 October Berwick's participated in a small skirmish in woods near the village of Stonne against detachments of Republican troops. On 11 October, as a consequence of Valmy, the order to retreat was given and the main body of the Brigade marched to Fontaines while the various grenadier companies of the three regiments formed a composite body as part of the rear-guard.

The eight-week campaign devastated the already thin ranks. On 6 November Berwick's returned 61 officers and 256 rank and file, Dillon's 65 officers and 77 rank and file. The last return for Walsh, dated 11 October, recorded just 39 officers and 39 rank and file (17). Along with the rest of the Army of the Princes, the Brigade was disbanded forthwith. The feelings of bitterness and betrayal engendered by this are reflected in the comments of Jennings who, with his brothers, were left to fend for themselves by Prussia and Austria.

In the course of the Winter the Emigrant Army was...totally disbanded and every man left to shift for himself, which cruel & ungenerous conduct on the part of the Allies must ever reflect the greatest discredit on their humanity & liberality & which merited the retribution from the hands of a just God which those two powers met in the discomfiture of all their prospects & plans.' (18).

Such sentiments indicate why surviving officers turned away from their traditional Catholic allies who had effectively abandoned them, whilst their traditional Protestant enemies, Holland and Britain, had entered the war bringing new opportunities for Royalist corps. By April 1793 around 100,000 troops of the First Coalition: Prussians, British, Dutch, Hanoverian, Hessians and Austrians were assembled under the command of Prince of Saxe-Coburg Saafeld along the northern frontiers of the Republic. Concerned at the relatively small size of the Dutch Army, William of
Orange decided to make use of the considerable number of émigrés then residing in Dutch territory. The first such corps to be founded was the Legion of the Comte de Béon, initially formed at Nimue, composed of both horse and foot. Fielding by late May some 100 officers and gentlemen of the disbanded Army of the Princes, it impressed the Statholder by its excellent discipline and bearing. The success of this corps caused the Prince to authorise in May a second such legion commanded by Comte Louis-Étienne de Damas which become the focus for the Brigade's officers.

As the first recruits were mostly veterans of the siege of Maestricht, the corps was originally termed the Régiment de Maestricht although its colonel's name quickly predominated and it officially became the Légion de Damas. Damas asked Edward Stack to be its lieutenant-colonel, appreciating Stack could utilise the cohesive corporate body of professional officers from the Brigade. Jennings commented, 'Count Damas...having adopted the plan of raising his Corps chiefly of Volunteer Gentn. the Officers of the Irish Brigade who had remained on the Continent came to a resolution of joining the Corps of Damas & thereby of giving the World a proof of the Loyalty by which they had ever been actuated when they could now descend in order to serve the common cause, to the rank of Private soldiers & of suffering every hardship & privation which the nature of such situation must expose them to.'... The Officers of Berwick Regt. with as many men as cou'd be must'er'd to join us were formed into two Companies distinct from the others, & only attached in points of Duty & Service to the Body of the Corps.'

Initially composed of two companies of mounted chasseurs and four companies of fusiliers, the two 'Irish' fusilier companies indeed boasted some 40 ex-officer rankers of the Brigade, mostly from Berwick's.
The Légion de Damas first participated in the siege of Maubeuge, but with the French victory at Wattignies in October, the siege was lifted and the Allied Army retired. Winter 1793/4 found Damas' around Liege, still managing to field around 500 men in six companies, but billeted amongst a less than friendly population (23). Significantly, that year's campaign had brought the first contacts with the British forces in Flanders under the Duke of York. This, and the subsequent campaign of 1794, forged links which were to play a crucial role in the ultimate decision to re-raise the Brigade in British service, dominated by the body of officers then serving in the Legion de Damas.

General Dumouriez's victory at Jemappes ensured Pitt took Britain into the war with France in January 1793 over the narrow issue of France's invasion of the Austrian Netherlands. Although the war later became a far deeper ideological struggle, in 1793 the objective was primarily to aid Austria in recovering the Lowlands. The difficulty was, as ever, neither the Navy or Army were on anything approaching a war footing, in fact only nine months before the Army had had its establishment reduced by several thousand men. While the Duke of York was rapidly dispatched to Flanders with the princely total of three battalions, followed by a number of existing regiments rapidly recruited from little more than skeletal cadres, the familiar hunt for manpower re-surfaced. Although orders were issued for the raising of 25,000 soldiers there were scant few volunteers and even the traditional recourse of taking an additional 20,000 Hanoverians and Hessians into British pay left York's forces thin on the ground. To add to the problem of recruitment was the critical lack of any overall guiding direction to the British war effort as there was no commander-in-chief. The Secretary-at-War, Sir George Yonge, was only concerned with equipment and supplies, and although Henry Dundas was given a significant role in operations, he was technically only the Home Secretary and the Treasurer of the Navy. Initially, the war was run by a committee of the King, Pitt, Dundas and the Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville, who collectively had to persuade the rest of the Cabinet as to any course of action. The
lack of any cohesive objective or focus quickly led to a rapid over-extension of Britain's limited military means. Each of the leading figures variously backed expeditions in the Caribbean, raids on the coast of French Brittany and the Vendée in support of Royalist insurgents, operations in the Eastern Mediterranean to support the Royalists of Toulon and the further reinforcement of the Duke of York's Army in Holland. This lack of strategic direction greatly exacerbated the manpower problems.

The need for further troops was most pressing in Flanders where French tactics rapidly revealed that the Duke's scanty force's most serious weakness was its lack of light troops for outpost work and similar duties. To alleviate this speedily, Sir James Murray, the Duke of York's Adjutant-General, urged Dundas in May 1793 to accept offers to raise corps of light infantry from the many émigrés resident in both the Netherlands and Britain. Lord Grenville had already officially acknowledged the arrival of numerous émigré officers in England in a letter to the King of 28 April 1792 (24). Pitt's and Dundas's own sympathy to the cause of the émigrés was materially enhanced by both finding themselves neighbours in Wimbledon of Charles-Alexandre de Calonne, emissary for the Princes at Coblenz. Within eight weeks of Murray's plea an offer by a Captain George Ramsey, previously the captain of the light company of the 30th Foot, had been accepted and he was authorised to raise a corps of riflemen under British officers in Flanders under the title of Ramsey's York Rangers (25). This corps, whose major was Francis Théobald Dillon, younger brother of Edward Dillon, quickly gained a reputation as an 'active and useful' force (26). Almost coincidently, and with the assistance of de Calonne, Burke and Windham proposed on 11th April 1793 to form a French officered émigré corps under the Comte de la Chatre from those émigrés already resident in Britain. This project moved rapidly forward. It was issued 600 stand of arms on 26 April and by 25 May la Chatre received a colonel's commission along with his lieutenant-colonel, major, 7 captains and 20 subalterns. On 27 May the corps, with a total strength of 580 clothed and equipped men, and titled the Loyal Emigrants, departed Greenwich for Ostend (27). By 1 March 1974 it had
demonstrated the apparent potential of émigré formations by achieving a total field strength of 44 officers and 1220 rank and file divided into two battalions, thus encouraging further utilisation of such manpower (28).

Both types of formation, be they raised by French émigrés in Britain or British officers in the Netherlands, were termed 'Black Cockade Corps'. Their officers received a standard military commission from the King and for all purposes counted as regular army formations on the British Establishment. These corps began to proliferate; in October 1793 the Uhlans Britanniques raised by the Comte de Bouille joined the army while the winter and spring of 1794 found Baron Charles Hompesch, the Prince of Salm-Kyrbourg, the Prince of Rohan and the Duc de Choiseul all raising émigré corps (29). This inevitably led to questions as to how the émigrés, given that the vast majority were French, Swiss and German Catholics and technically still subjects of a foreign prince, could hold the King's commission. This resulted in the receipt of the Royal Assent on 9 May 1794 for, 'An Act to enable Subjects of France to enlist as Soldiers in Regiments to serve on the Continent of Europe, and in certain other Places; and to enable His Majesty to grant Commissions to Subjects of France, to serve and receive Pay as Officers in such Regiments, or as Engineers, under certain Restrictions.' (30).

While this Act ensured such soldiers, provided they declared it on enlistment, were not liable as professed Catholics, its two fundamental restrictions were contained in its first article. Firstly, such officers were not entitled to half pay and secondly, Catholic troops could be landed in Britain for health reasons, provided there were no more than 5,000 of them, that they marched no further than five miles inland and, if they stayed longer than fourteen days, both houses of Parliament had to give their explicit approval. This latter restriction related to the requirement to embody these regiments on the Isle of Wight due to serious legal questions respecting such alien Catholic troops setting foot on English soil. While this Act did not itself to apply to
the Brigade's émigrés, a number of its restrictions were to be copied in the Brigade's conditions of service in order, as with the Émigré Act, to reassure real and potential opponents and to partially answer outstanding legal issues.

In early 1794 the situation regarding the direction of the war improved when Dundas was given the new office of Secretary of State for War and Colonies. This turned out to be a strenuous office since it combined the demands of dealing with the colonial governors while simultaneously planning foreign campaigns and drafting legislation for raising recruits, including émigrés. While Dundas sought to avoid further military commitments for Britain, he was obliged to support the existing operations, particularly in Flanders and the Caribbean. One of his first tasks was for capitulations to be organised for the levy of another dozen émigré regiments that were collectively termed 'White Cockade Corps'. These were distinguished from the Black Cockade Corps in that their manner of levying and the conditions under which they served mirrored the French Royal Army more than that of the British. Each formation took its name from a colonel-proprietor who was normally given three months to complete the levying of the corps. The proprietor could nominate candidates for commissions, their names being submitted to the King or Duke of York for confirmation or rejection, the King and the Duke equally having the right to nominate a proportion of the officers. While the officers and men took an oath of fidelity to 'His Britannic Majesty' and were subject to the regulations and discipline of the British Army, some corps agreed to serve where ever sent, others were specifically limited to service only in Europe. The Duke of York rather than the King signed the officers' commissions and once the corps was raised the Duke decided all promotions, the officers only receiving their pay once their company was complete. Finally, when a corps was reduced the officers were not entitled to half-pay or pensions; instead all ranks simply received an additional two months' pay (31). Again, elements of these restrictions appeared in the conditions set for the Brigade later that year.
It was thus in the context of utilising all sources of manpower rather than furthering the interests of British and Irish Catholics that the concept of re-raising the Brigade came into being, although the legal issues relating to the latter came to dominate the project. As with Rawdon's 105th Foot in 1783, the attraction was that such officers offered military professionalism, the right social attributes and a perceived appeal to potential Irish Catholic recruits, particularly as many were still linked by kinship to significant Irish landed interests. Ironically, seeking to utilise the Irish émigrés was to trigger opposition from certain quarters, not only from the Protestant community but from the Irish Catholic Committee, angry and envious as to the sudden promotion of a group they saw as outsiders.

The concept of utilising British professional soldiers who had sought service abroad originated not with the Irish émigrés but with the Scots who had an equally well established tradition in the Dutch army. As religious and political events in the seventeenth century had originally established the Irish Brigade in the French Army, so it had been with the Scots Brigade in the Dutch Army. There were obvious differences: the former essentially served an enemy of Britain whilst the latter maintained a formal linkage with the British Crown, the Brigade remaining technically liable to recall as a Protestant force serving a Protestant ally. Despite this, it had in common with the Irish Brigade established patterns of kinship and traditions of service within its officer corps. Equally, by the 1770s the Scots Brigade's multinational rank and file meant only its officers still gave that title some meaning. As the Dutch were Britain's traditional ally and France her long standing enemy, it was ironic that, given the officers' dual oath of fidelity to both States-General and British Crown, when the Scots officers offered to fight for Britain in North America in 1779, it triggered an inevitable clash of loyalties when Britain and Holland subsequently found themselves at war. The result was that over a third of its officers felt obliged to leave Dutch service between November 1782 and February 1783, triggered by the States General's requirement of an oath abjuring their allegiance to
the British Crown alongside the highly symbolic measures of replacing their red coats, crimson sashes and British colours with Dutch blue (32). At the same moment their still red-coated Irish Brigade counterparts campaigning under their original regimental colours, were secure in the service of Britain's traditional enemy.

Although those officers who resigned had been promised by Lord Grantham in December 1782 that the King would receive them 'into His Gracious Protection' on their arrival in Britain they were obliged to petition the government for either re-employment or half-pay (33). The officers felt this was merited, having in their eyes been an element of the Crown's forces and their unemployment was proof of their loyalty to the British Crown. Lieutenant-Colonel W.P.Colyear-Robertson was a particularly enthusiastic correspondent, his various memorials offering 'advice' to the government as well as assiduously pursuing a pension ultimately filled a small portfolio (34). In 1790 Colyear-Robertson wrote to suggest '...restoring the Remains of that Ancient Corps, consisting in about fifty Officers...'; although there appears to have been a general campaign for some years prior to this by the officers to have it re-established in the Dutch service but in British pay (35). A Memorial subsequently followed this in 1792 to the King from the surviving field officers petitioning that they should re-raise the Scots Brigade in British service (36). The manpower needs of the war ensured this offer fell on receptive ears and planning for such a project was under way throughout the spring and summer of 1793, illustrated by the recommendation of an officer by none other than the prolific Colyear-Robertson. The officer in question was a Captain William Nicolson who incidentally provided a tenuous link between the British Army, the émigré Irish and the new Scots Brigade. His service history commenced as a cornet in the Scots Greys, subsequently selling out to become a captain in Berwick's in the Army of the Princes in 1792. It was a consequence of that corp's reduction that required him to play on his Scots nationality and family connections in an attempt to gain a captaincy in what became Ferrier's battalion of the re-raised Scots Brigade (37).
On 26 September 1793 the initial raising order was issued appointing Lieutenant-Colonels Cunningham, Halket and Ferrier to the command of its three regiments thereby mirroring its nominal organisation back in 1782. Its field officers and captains were restricted to those who had served and held such rank in the Scots Brigade, whilst its subalterns were appointed from the half-pay lists of those who had served in the Brigade or, if this source proved insufficient, suitable young gentlemen at the recommendation of the lieutenant-colonels. All three regiments were restricted to Scotland in beating up for recruits, but in all other respects they were to be treated as a standard regiment of foot on the British Establishment (38). While the conditions stipulated for the subsequently re-raised Irish Brigade contained additional requirements regarding religion, the clauses reserving its commissioned ranks for émigré officers are repeated almost word for word and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the same basic model was utilised. Further, given the success of the Scots Brigade in raising sufficient recruits alongside the arrival, after the fall of Holland, of many Scots officers who had not originally left Dutch service, on 28 October 1794 the original three regiments became one regiment of three battalions whilst a new fourth battalion was authorised (39). This may have assisted in convincing Pitt, Grenville, Dundas and others that the returned Catholic émigrés could obtain similar success in Ireland as these development were contemporaneous with the re-raising of the Irish Brigade.

It is difficult to pinpoint when the first contacts were made between the government and senior Irish Brigade émigrés. An initial indication of official contact and an awareness of this particular body of officers came in a report from Lord Auckland at the Hague to Grenville on 12 February 1793 on the impending defection of General Dumourier, adding, 'The Duc de Berwick was here lately, and talked much about the regiment de Berwick, and received here the news of its being congedie; since which many of the people are gone to Ireland with passes from me at his desire; and I
believe that the others are dispersed.' (40).

Whilst Fitzjames remained at Coblentz with Count Walsh-Serrat and other officers served with Dumas and other émigré corps, numerous officers had arrived in England and Ireland from almost the first days of the Revolution. One of the earliest and most senior arrivals in London was Colonel Edward Dillon visiting his Protestant relative Lord Dillon. Viscount Walsh-Serrat and later Generals O’Connell and the Conway brothers joined him. The Viscount in particular found a home from home, accepting the offer of his uncle, 2nd Viscount Southwell, to stay at Standen Hall, his sister Sophia being Southwell’s wife (41). These officers provided a semi-formal bridge, both to the Princes at Coblenz and the broader net of Brigade officers, be they in Ireland or in émigré formations. Through Burke, Windham met Edward Dillon in 1792 while the latter had been in London with de Calonne acting on behalf of the Princes. Windham had already been active in support of the broader émigré cause from the beginning and had met through the Jerninghams the Viscount Walsh-Serrat amongst others. The Viscount appears to have placed Windham in contact with the Princes at Coblenz (42). Subsequently, having been briefed by Dundas, he journeyed to Flanders to join the Duke of York’s headquarters on campaign in July 1793. Windham’s visit coincided with the siege of Valenciennes during which he visited the trenches and was present at its surrender (43). By a remarkable coincidence part of the garrison was the remains of the first battalion of the 87e, and while there is no evidence Windham met with any of its remaining Irish officers, Captain Thomas Powell of the 14th Foot did.

‘An Irishman Officer, who had been in the Irish brigade in the King’s service and who I had most conversation with, did not seem to like the side he had taken, by any means, and would have deserted with us with pleasure, if his honour would have allowed him.’ (44).
Irrespective of this, while resident with York, Windham strengthened his links with
the émigrés, building on contacts Burke had first established with the Comtes de
Provence and d'Artois, and the Prince de Conde at Coblenz. Burke's fulsome
 correspondence with the Comte d'Artois reveals his existing friendship with Count
Walsh-Sarrant (45). Subsequently, the depth of Windham's involvement with senior
émigré Brigade officers long before he officially entered government is exemplified
by his correspondence of March 1794. Here he referred to both Walsh-Sarrant and
one of the Conway brothers in reference to superior types of cipher codes required in
organising arms shipments and finances to the émigrés fighting in both the Vendée
and Holland (46).

Of these various sources and contacts, the first specific suggestion of utilising the
cadre of professional émigré Irish officers by re-raising the Brigade in British pay
appears from the correspondence almost certainly to have come from the circle of
senior officers resident in London. General O'Connell had, after spending part of 1793
at his family home in Ireland, participated with a number of other Irish émigrés as a
volunteer ADC to Lord Moira in his ill-fated expedition to Brittany in support of the
Vendée Royalists. O'Connell next took up residence in London with a fellow émigré,
his old friend and retired Brigade officer, Christopher Fagan (47). By March 1794
O'Connell was in direct contact with the government, being initially utilised as an
expert adviser in respect of possible operations in support of the various Royalist
factions. In a letter of 12 March to his brother, carried by O'Connell's nephew and
fellow émigré officer Maurice O'Connell (who had also been staying with him and
Fagan in London), he commented in respect of discussions with Pitt, Dundas and
Windham that the concept of raising a Catholic officered Irish corps had been
discussed for some time,

'It has been proposed to raise a Catholick or a mixed Regiment in Ireland at the cost
of the Government...'. These proposals were at first successively listened to with
some appearance of favour, and have been from time to time repeatedly and strongly urged, yet no Determination has been taken on the subject, which makes it probable, considering the advanced period of the season, that it has been condemned to oblivion.' (48).

A month later, despite his doubts and having suggested he might join the Austrian Army serving in Holland, O'Connell prepared for Pitt a memorandum, dated 17 April, where he made the first detailed suggestions as to re-forming the Brigade in British pay. The implication of the memorandum is that O'Connell was already speaking on behalf of a corporate body of the émigré officers rather than just for himself,

'Genl. O'Connell after expressing to his Majesty's principal Minister, in the strongest terms he was capable of the earnest wishes of the officers of the ci-devant Irish Brigade that they may be called into the service of their King & Country... & begs leave to say that the restoring a body of able & experienced officers to their Country & natural connections, will reflect no small honour on his administration; he thinks moreover that the disinterested & unshaken loyalty they so eminently displayed in the cause of Louis 16th, points them out as highly deserving of his Majesty's favour & protection.' (49).

Contemporaneously, Pitt met with Viscount Walsh-Serrant who proposed, on behalf of his brother, Count Walsh-Serrant then resident in Holland with the Comte d'Artois, a similar project to bring the Brigade's officers into British pay. The Viscount's subsequent covering letter of 27 April attaching three letters from his brother of 11, 15 and 18 April, in addition to his own second letter of 8 May, make it clear that the Comte d'Artois, easily the most enthusiastic and eloquent of the Princes, at that moment visiting Berlin in a separate attempt to elicit assistance, had given his permission for the project. Both d'Artois and Count Walsh-Serrant effectively made
the Viscount their agent in the matter of the Brigade as well as more general matters regarding the émigrés, and the correspondence confirms that the Duke of Harcourt and Grenville had already discussed the project in positive terms (50).

The concept was now considerably developed by Justine Ignatius Hussey, an émigré lieutenant of Dillon's and one of three brothers who had served and departed together from the Brigade back in 1791. Writing to Evan Nepean, Dundas' secretary, on 28 April he had commenced by recommending his elder brother 'Lieut.Col. Hussey, late of Dillon's Regiment' to a command in the putative corps, then went on to elaborate that, '...many circumstances have occurred, particularly in the West Indies, which make it not improbable that Government may think it useful to the general welfare of the British Empire, to take the Irish Brigade, late in the French Kings' service, for the purpose of sending them to garrison the West India Islands, lately conquered. This Brigade which have given such proofs of loyalty to a foreign Prince, would undoubtedly become both useful & loyal to their native Prince.

I am not ignorant that such a body of R.Catholics being employed in the Kings' dominion in Europe, would involve a political question, not very seasonable in the present moment; but which I imagine, might be avoided, by employing them abroad. Such a step would at the same time open a door for the expectation of the R.Catholics of Ireland to evaporate the military dispositions of that body, which are put up by the existing laws in G.Britain, not corresponding with those lately passed in Ireland, relative to R.Catholics. These expectations would be the means to keep that body quiet; & surely the connections at home, of such Irish R.Catholic officers abroad, would prove an additional bond of loyalty & affection towards their King, & their native Country.' (51).

Given the subsequent evolution of the Brigade, both in form and deployment, it appears Hussey's suggestions became the model for the project. His letter demonstrates an acute awareness of the likely political and legal difficulties of raising
such a corps and his solution may well have been the key tipping the balance in favour of the project moving forward.

That General O'Connell was meanwhile still occupying a pivotal role is indicated by a subsequent letter of his to Evan Nepean of 30 April, the topic of which was a strong recommendation for Colonel Count Bartholomew Mahony's employment. The subtext of the letter reveals much of the monarchist mentality underlying the motivations of all those who had followed the Colonel and stresses the counter-revolutionary qualifications required for holding high rank amongst the émigrés. Ironically, having stressed Mahony's thirty years of loyal service to France, including service against Britain, O'Connell highlighted his Irish birth, thus technically qualifying him for a substantive British commission (52).

Whether by coincidence or because of rumours as to the tentative moves towards re-raising the Brigade, John Keogh, as Chairman of the Irish Catholic Committee, wrote to the government on 15 April regarding a number of disqualifications to which Irish Catholics were still subject despite the 1793 Relief Act. In the course of this long letter Keogh made specific reference to the continuing failure by Dublin Castle to appoint any Catholic officers despite the provisions of the Act. Keogh urged that if such were encouraged, the result in manpower terms would be spectacular, mentioning in particular Colonel John Doyle and Lord Donoughmore (53). The former was none other than Rawdon's major from the Volunteers of Ireland and 105th Foot. Doyle, who had come to be known in Ireland as 'the soldier's friend', alongside a number of other ex-officers of the 105th, had returned to active service. They raised in September 1793, with the full support of the Catholic Committee, a similar regiment of Irish Catholics, the 87th (Prince of Wales's Irish) Foot. The same support was extended to the Earl of Donoughmore's Regiment, the short-lived 94th Foot, which was drafted the following year (54). Doyle, like Keogh and the Irish Catholic Committee, had in mind that members of the Catholic gentry would raise a series of
specifically Catholic corps and they were, some months later, to be one of the groups vehemently opposing the Brigade, viewing the émigrés as interlopers in their own carefully conceived plans. Having said this, Doyle himself was not without links to at least one Irish émigré officer. In the preface of a memorial of Théobald Dillon suggesting various methods by which recruits could be raised for the Brigade, dated from Dublin, 9 April 1795, he specifically thanked 'Colonel Doyle' for his support. It would be fair to deduce that once the project was launched Doyle at least mitigated his attitude and apparently even encouraged the only Catholic officered corps then extant (55).

Meanwhile, after the flourish of suggestions in April from various émigrés, nothing further appears in the official correspondence to indicate these contacts and suggestions had borne fruit until after the arrival of the Portland Whigs. Burke's 'Reflections' had broken his political links with Fox's Westminster Whigs and those sympathising with Burke looked to the leadership of the Duke of Portland whom Pitt had been attempting to persuade to join him in government. Initially Portland refused all offers, not willing to split the Whigs. Despite this, Pitt and Dundas had meetings with Burke, Windham and Sir Gilbert Elliot from early March 1793, briefing them on military operations (56). This marked the commencement of nine months of talks on a Pitt/Portland coalition. Although these proved abortive, by early 1794, with the flow of the French revolution apparently supporting Burke's thesis, an ever-growing number of Portland's supporters were joining Pitt. Portland finally agreed to a wartime coalition and in July 1794 entered Pitt's government as Home Secretary alongside his closest supporters. The conditions of this alliance were that certain key Whigs would gain office, most contentiously the replacement of Westmoreland by William Fitzwilliam, second Earl of Fitzwilliam as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. This particular appointment was delayed however until December due to Pitt's need first to smooth many feathers within his own Tory ranks at the prospect of this particularly controversial figure filling such an important office.
With his strong support for continuing the war and his links to the émigrés, it was uncontentious logic that Windham became Secretary at War on 11 July 1794. In effect this made him minister for co-operation with the émigrés, a group that the new coalition were ever more eager to utilise. Equally, Portland himself was a strong supporter of the émigré corps, the preceding four months of his correspondence with Windham regularly referring to such. Once in government he was intimately involved alongside Windham and Dundas in its furtherance particularly when, as Home Secretary, he was technically responsible for all 'aliens' resident in Britain (57).

Whether it was the arrival of Portland and Windham in office or that of Dundas, Grenville and Pitt had already developed the project during the early summer after April's correspondence when it was finally decided to pursue the concept to fruition. On 4 August Pitt wrote to the King about the desperate need to raise new troops, particularly for service in the Caribbean, enabling him to raise the most delicate of questions.

'It has also occurred that there could be no impropriety in raising a moderate number of Catholic corps in Ireland (where they are now sanctioned by law) and lending them from Ireland to Great Britain for service in the West Indies, which would avoid what would be otherwise a great drain to the recruiting of this country...Mr.Pitt trusts your Majesty will forgive the anxiety for making every exertion in the present crisis, with a view even to a distant period, which has led him to submit these ideas to your Majesty's consideration,...' (58).

In the hope of avoiding contention, Pitt placed the suggestion in the context of the well-worn formula, established since 1771, that, given urgent manpower needs and the pressure on the Protestant community, Catholic troops could legally be raised provided they were not stationed in Britain or Ireland and that they were only to serve
in the colonies. Pitt's suggestion was also dispatched in the context that it was but one of a number of emigrant corps being raised at that moment. Within five weeks of taking office, Windham directed on 27 August, 'that 8 Regts. shall be raised for the British Service; to be composed of French subjects,...' (59).

The King's reply to Pitt the following day indicated some hesitation at such a development, hedging about the issue when thanking Pitt for,

'...his ideas on the necessity of using every reasonable exertion to increase our present numbers. I shall certainly duly consider it, and by this assistance be able to discuss the subject fully with Lord Amherst to-morrow, that no time may be lost in forming such a plan as may be the least open to objections, at the same time most likely to obtain the desired effect without material inconvenience.' (60).

The fundamental issue to be addressed was whether the King could legally sign the commission of a British subject who was a Catholic. While the Act of May 1794 authorised the commissioning of French subjects, it said nothing in respect of British subjects, which included all but a handful of the Brigade's officers. Equally, whilst the 1793 Irish Relief Act permitted Catholics to hold commissions up to colonel on the Irish Establishment, it did not extend to the British. It had been Pitt's intention to pass similar acts for England and Scotland, but opposition at Westminster and the Palace forced him to curtail this. Consequently, an anomalous situation existed by which the Test Acts still applied in Britain, leaving it a technical offence for any Catholic to hold a commission once they landed on the British mainland or their regiment was transferred to the British Establishment. It was for this reason the Émigrés Act contained such strict limitations as to access to the mainland, requiring French émigré officers to obtain written authorisation for indemnification (61).

The consequent process, taking up much of August, of gaining the King's sanction to
the project appears to have taken place without any reference to those émigré officers resident in London campaigning for the Brigade. One possible reason for this reticence may have been the government's concern that the King would not agree, thereby potentially alienating potential allies. Discretion being the better part of valour, it would thus be politic to wait on the King's definitive answer in case an alternative course of action was required. Despite this, while awaiting the King's decision, planning for the corps did continue, with those ministers involved marking all relevant correspondence as 'secret and confidential'. Although written some years later, in correspondence with Pelham of 9 August 1797, Portland explained the process by which the various suggestions had been woven together to produce the project's final shape,

'About some claim of Lord Dillon's brother, to whom the command of a regiment of Irish Roman Catholics was designed and determined to be given, before it occurred to me to suggest the idea of restoring all the Irish officers that had been in the French Service to that of their own country, and, by obliging them to serve anywhere except in Great Britain and Ireland, to make a provision for the families of the Roman Catholic persuasion, which would not have been liable to any exception on the part of the old Protestant interest... When I found that O'Connell and Dillon were each of them to raise a regiment of Irish Roman Catholicks, and that it was an object to raise two more of the same description to serve in the West Indies, I proposed that an offer should be made to the officers of the French Irish Brigade to enter into the King's service, and that Dillon, whose name one of the three regiments in the Brigade already bore, having already got a regiment, the two which were to be raised should be offered to the Duke of Fitzjames and Walsh de Serrant, who had commanded the two other regiments which, with that of Dillon, composed in the latter times of the monarchy the Irish Brigade.' (62).

Contemporaneously, O'Connell, writing to his brother on 21 August, indicated that he
was still participating in planning discussions with many of the fundamental issues being openly debated and the likely course of deployment predicted. He was not though privy to the on-going legal inquiries on behalf of the King upon which the project hung.

'So far matters seem to have a favourable aspect; but here is the reverse of the medal, Viz. the existing laws of England, and perhaps a degree of distrust lurking within the breast of the leading party in Ireland, determine Government to stipulate that these Corps shall be permanently employed in his Majesty's foreign Dominions, ie. out of Europe, a distinction by which we shall be doomed never to enjoy the comfort of living amongst our friends, and I must confess this clause does away with no small degree of the happiness I should otherwise feel from the prospect of being restored to an honourable Situation in life. However, under our present Circumstances, it must be complied with. The West India Islands will probably be our permanent Station; it is not the most eligible one, yet better than none at all.' (63).

Equally Henry Dillon's letter of 31 August to Windham, part of the former's vigorous campaign to gain the Brigade's 'Dillon' regiment colonelcy, demonstrated that planning had been under way for some time. His comments prove that despite some extremely powerful friends in government, even those who were likely to be given regiments had as yet to be informed of the application to the King or its potential outcome.

'Having some months ago understood that the Irish Brigade, lately in the pay of France, were to be taken into his Majesty's service,... I made my claim to it, through my friend Lord Mulgrave, by whom I received encouragement, that my claim might be attended to, some of my friends spoke to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales upon the same point, who was pleased to signify, that he would rejoice if the proper department of government would encourage the matter, but it is to you Sir, as my
friend, and the friend of my family, that I shall look up for protection on the occasion.'

(64).

As had O'Connell, Dillon buttress his claim by stressing how family connections in Ireland would greatly facilitate recruitment. As it was, a paper and ink battle royal over which part of the extended Dillon family would have claim to the colonelcy raged between Edward, Henry and Lord Dillon. This dispute over the right to inherit the family regiment dated back to the 1767 split in the family when Lord Dillon had conformed to the Anglican faith while his younger Catholic brother Arthur had received the regimental proprietorship. He became permanently resident in France along with the youngest brother Henry. While Henry had emigrated to England in 1791, given Arthur's decision to remain in French service, Lord Dillon, as eldest brother, unsuccessfully attempted to secure nominal command of the remnants of the 87e on St.Dominque when that corps entered British service in September 1793 (65). Subsequently, the spring and summer of 1794 witnessed Edward, Henry and Lord Dillon compete in their respective claims to the right to represent the family in any re-raised Brigade. Henry's array of influential sponsors, including the Prince Regent, apparently tipped the scales decisively in his favour.

The Cabinet meanwhile spent much of August seeking legal advice in respect of the King commissioning Catholics. Awkwardly, evidence continued to emerge suggesting legal difficulties, if not outright objections remained causing some of those most closely involved in the project to express doubts. In correspondence of 26 August regarding a commission in the Dorset Rangers for the son of a Mr Weld, a known Catholic, the Lord Lieutenant of Dorset, Lord Milton, 'Understanding from Lord Fitzwilliam that the difficulties respecting the commission of Roman Catholicks are insurmountable and that he has been obliged to write to Sir Walton Vavasour to that effect...'. The letter went on to express the concern that when the militia commissions were laid before the King at the next sitting of Parliament, it was highly...
unlikely the King's signature would be forthcoming. Consequently, Portland's opinion was sought as to the legality of such a commission being laid before the Duke for signature by the Lord Lieutenant of the County as existing procedure required (66).

In the event, given the opening statement of the subsequent invitations to those offered colonelcies in the Brigade, the King apparently accepted the 1793 Irish Relief Act permitted him to sign the commissions of Catholics provided their regiments were on the Irish Establishment and were at no point transferred to the British. In respect of their presence in Britain at any point, he accepted the long established practice of passing an annual Indemnification Act ensured any potential embarrassment was minimised. The original Test Act had never obliged or empowered any authority to summons an officer to take them, rather it had always been the responsibility of the individual to attend at the Quarter Sessions. Consequently, as individual officers had often simply forgotten to attend, it had long been the practice to pass each March an Act indemnifying from prosecution all such officers until Christmas (67). While subsequent correspondence between London and Dublin demonstrated that Dublin Castle did not yet fully concur that the legal issue was settled, a draft invitation to the prospective colonels was prepared, boldly stating, 'The King being desirous of fulfilling the intentions of the Legislature of Ireland, and of giving his subjects of that Kingdom who profess the Roman Catholic Religion, an early testimony of his affections and confidence, has determined to re-establish the corps, known by the name of the Irish Brigade,...' (68).

The fact that this project originated in London despite Dublin's reluctance explains why awkward funding arrangements were subsequently established by which the Brigade was legally counted as being on the Irish Establishment but paid for by the British. These legal somersaults inevitably come to plague the Brigade's funding and contributed to its ultimate failure.
Having gained the King's permission to initiate the project the immediate requirement was to inform the prospective colonels and receive their formal acceptance before matters could substantively be initiated. Two of these officers, Dillon and O'Connell presented little further legal difficulty as both were still technically subjects of the British Crown, their families being permanently resident in England and Ireland respectively and both had been born at their respective family homes. As they were resident in London, their formal invitations required little beyond a short walk to deliver. The other pair, Fitzjames and Walsh-Serrant, were in a different category given both were subjects of the French Crown. Their families had been resident in France for several generations and they had been born at those family homes (69). As both were resident in Holland, Windham himself was consequently dispatched in early September, meeting Count Walsh-Serant and the Comte d'Artois in Rotterdam, the former to receive the invitation, the latter to offer formal agreement for his nominal subjects to take service in the British Army (70).

Of the four original written invitations, those dispatched to Dillon and O'Connell were written in English and formulated for British subjects, whilst those for the Dukes of Fitzjames and Walsh-Serrant were worded in French and differed slightly in text given their French citizenship, otherwise all four were identical in substance (71). These invitations contained those details as to the Brigade's final formulation. Of the four regiments, the first three under the command of, "...the three Colonels, or their representatives, who commanded the three corps which composed the Irish Brigade in the service of the late most Christian King, and the fourth, it is his Majesty's pleasure to confer on Mr. O'Connell, late a general officer in the French service, and certainly well known to you and to all the Irish gentlemen who served in that corps. His Majesty has also been pleased to determine, that all field and other officers, except the Duke of FitzJames and the Count de Walsh-Serrant, should be such natural born subjects of his Majesty's Kingdom of Ireland, as had distinguished themselves by their services in the same rank, and that if officers should be wanting, as is most likely
to be the case, to fill up the subaltern commissions, they should be chosen out of the families of gentlemen of the same religious persuasion now resident in Ireland.' (72).

The officers were to be counted as holding regular commissions and crucially therefore entitled to half-pay if the corps was reduced, although the invitations specifically stated that it had not yet been finalised on which establishment the completed Brigade would finally be placed. As to appointments, 'His Majesty will be inclined to attend to the recommendations of the colonels in the appointment of the officers, and more particularly of those who have served heretofore in the Irish Brigade: but he will not permit any pecuniary consideration whatever to be given for the commissions, and consequently as no officer of any rank whatever will have been suffered to purchase, he must clearly understand that upon no account whatever, he will be suffered to sell his commission. His Majesty also commands me to signify to you his determination that this corps shall be considered as specially appropriated to serve in His Majesty's West Indian Colonies, or any other of His foreign Dominions,...'. The invitations continued by stressing that while there was no parallel in the British Army to that of the old French Royal Army's family proprietorship in respect of the colonelcies, yet, '...you would in all probability be continued in possession of it during your good behaviour, a term which I consider exactly co-extensive with your life.' Each invitation concluded by requesting the respective colonel contact those officers of their old regiment who each considered suitable and to appraise them of the conditions that the corps was to be raised under (73).

Despite the apparent finality of there being four invitations for four regiments, within weeks other senior Irish émigrés were lobbying hard for inclusion. The most vociferous of these suitors were the Conway brothers, Thomas and James. A letter from Thomas to Windham reveals something of the requirements of appointment, particularly the role of the Princes, '...indeed if I had known six months ago that it was previously necessary to apply to their Royal Highness the Regent and Count
'Artois, I would not have failed to write to them.' (74).

Ultimately the Conways were successful in persuading Windham and Portland to authorise two further regiments, despite their service in the American Army during the War of Independence. Thomas Conway's fawning letter of acceptance of 26 November plumbed depths of doubtful sentiment. Having excused his departure from Ireland by stressing he was 'carried to France in my infancy' and then very briefly alluding to forty-six years of service to 'His Christian Majesty', he concluded by claiming that, '...my wish was to devote the remainder of my days to the service of my lawful King, and of my native Country, which I cherished ever since I came to the age of reason.' (75).

To be fair, Conway was not the only officer to engage in rather disingenuous claims to harbouring lifelong desires to serve the British Crown. More importantly, of all the decisions regarding the Brigade, that to increase the number of regiments from four to six ultimately caused most bitterness given the subsequent failure to find sufficient recruits and thus the inevitable reductions. Reflecting the indignation of the older colonels at the time of the first reductions in 1796, Fitzjames commented on the original decision in respect of the number of regiments,

'But there was no mention made in his Grace the Duke of Portland's Letter of the Plan for adding a fifth, and afterwards a sixth Regiment to be commanded by two Brothers, whose Services, however meritorious they might be in other respects, separated them entirely from the Irish Brigade.' (76).

This bitterness was particularly engendered by these officers (who had little service in the Brigade) gaining colonelcies due only to having been general officers in the French Army and of Irish lineage. This resentment extended not just to the Conway's but equally to Dillon and O'Connell. In December 1794, François Henri Comte de
Bulkeley, the officer who had lost his family proprietorship when his regiment had been amalgamated with Dillon's back in 1775, wrote, 'If there is any question about being out of the line of the Irish Brigade that would sooner fall on two of the Gentlemen who have got the Regiments (viz) M.Edward Dillon and M.O'Connell neither of whom have ever been Colonels in the Irish Regiments if ever they have served in that corps or if they have it must have been a very short time.' (77).

As alluded to, the dispute between the Dillons themselves raged on despite the decision to invite Henry Dillon to accept the colonelcy. As late as 24 October Dublin Castle reported on a long memorial submitted by Lord Dillon relating the family tree to the Regiment's history, concluding that he, rather than his younger brother, had the better claim to command the regiment (78). October also witnessed Edward Dillon furiously protesting to Portland that he had been equally badly treated, claiming in a series of letters and a memorial, that he held seniority in rank from the French Army over Henry (79). Further, Edward's brother Francis wrote in November to Windham protesting that he was the only surviving senior officer of Dillon's from the French 'King's' service. Thus he, rather than others such as Clonard and O'Toole who had only held 'à la suite' positions, was entitled to be lieutenant-colonel (80).

It was recognised that there was some foundation to all three of these challenges. Lord Dillon was the senior surviving member of the family. The agreement respecting Arthur's receipt of the proprietorship in 1767 had been in the context of the family's compact with the French monarchy as regards the religion of the colonel-proprietor; events subsequent to July 1789 appeared to make this redundant. Equally, in making their claims to seniority, both Edward and Francis had some justification as although they came from a cadet branch of the family, Henry Dillon had only entered Dillon's as a Cadet gentilhomme in July 1778, promptly ceasing to serve within the regiment by 1780. He spent the subsequent nine years at Court before emigrating within weeks of the storming of the Bastille (81). While neither Edward or Francis had been
established officers in Dillon's in 1789, Edward had been its colonel-commandant in 1779, subsequently becoming colonel-propriétaire of the Regiment Provence, and after emigrating, colonel-propriétaire of Dillon's in the Army of the Princes. This service record undoubtedly gave him technical military seniority in 1794, yet he still failed to secure the family colonelcy.

The reasons given by Portland and other ministers for rejecting these seemingly substantive points and choosing the youngest and militarily most junior of the Dillon's revealed something of the balance being struck between the competing claims based on family, French military service and the factor of religion. Lord Dillon's claims to both the remains of the 87e and Dillon's in the new Brigade, which he continued to pursue in numerous letters and memorials until 1797, were rejected by both London and Dublin as unsuitable on two fundamental grounds. It was stressed that the objective had been to re-employ the émigré officers of the Brigade and that as he had never served in this he would be unlikely to gain the loyalty of those who had. Equally, as a Protestant, he was no more likely to gain the loyalty of Irish Catholic recruits for whom the corps was designed to appeal. Not only did various government ministers through the years repeat these same points in respect of his continuing claim, the official correspondence also reveals a growing sense of social irritation with this Irish Peer's behaviour and pretensions. It was suggested that he was simultaneously attempting to claim an English peerage whilst at times being less than the most sincere of individuals in the all-important English aristocracy's social setting. This inevitably coloured views respecting his claims to the colonelcy (82). Portland, in his confidential letter to Pelham of 9 August 1797, was less than flattering as to the Peer's character, commenting that in England it 'was such as to occasion his society to be shunned by those who wished to be well thought of, and his conduct had so impeached his reputation for veracity and punctuality that no persons who could avoid it chose to have any transaction with him in private life'. The then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord Camden, subsequently considered these comments

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Edward Dillon's claims produced a revealing communication from Portland to Windham as to the decision-making process, both in respect of colonels and those nominated for commissions. Portland implied Windham had originally supported Edward for the colonelcy despite Fitzwilliam's opposition that Edward's branch of the family, unlike Henry's, had no family links in Ireland. Portland complained of Edward's unreasonable protests, particularly as he would support Windham and Fitzwilliam in ensuring Edward ultimately received a colonelcy, albeit not in the Brigade. Portland emphasised that he did not wish to interfere with the granting of any commissions in the Brigade, this being the prerogative of the appointed colonel, he only wished to 'ensure the regularity of order of succession' in their granting, meaning that no officer should receive a rank granted 'since' the Revolution. His fundamental opposition to Edward was Portland's belief that his formal military precedence over Henry only came from a general's rank granted in the émigré Army of the Princes. He applied the same reservation to Francis Dillon's claim. Portland concluded by confirming these were equally the King's sentiments, thereby indicating the King's discreet but substantive involvement in these delicate decisions (84). Given the fact of Henry's almost complete lack of a military career it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that whatever Portland claimed in respect of military precedence, the actual deciding factors were influence at Court and Henry being the next Catholic Dillon in the family.

However, as indicated by Portland, Edward was subsequently authorised in February 1795 to raise another regiment under the family name, a 'regiment of foreigners' composed of German and Italian recruits, and stationed on Corsica (85). Its first lieutenant-colonel was Francis Théobald Dillon subsequently followed by their relative, the Chevalier Charles Jerningham de Barford as lieutenant-colonel of a second battalion, with Patrick-William Doran becoming its major. The latter two were
émigré officers of Dillon's who had served with Edward Dillon in America whilst
Francis had served alongside in the Légion de Lauzen. As no other émigré officers of
the Brigade participated at its creation or service, it is safe to assume that the afore
mentioned four did so due to previously established factors of kinship and service.
Consequently, this particular 'Regiment Dillon', other than in name, had no
substantive link with either the Brigade, Ireland or the issue of Catholic officers (86).

One potential reason for Edward Dillon's being a foreign regiment is indicated by the
subsequent rejection of another émigré officer, Count Maurice Francis de MacMahon,
who was still serving with the Anglo-Dutch forces. He proposed yet another Irish
émigré corps, which was turned down on the grounds that 'it is not at present the
intention of this government to engage any more corps of the description specified'
(87). There is little doubt that Portland, Windham and other government ministers
were carefully reviewing the potential pool of recruits in relation to the number of
regiments, as were the new colonels. Shortly before Bulkeley's letter of December,
O'Connell in another of his letters to his brother of 29 September, confirmed, in rather
quaint terms, that all the colonels had accepted their invitations, as, 'The Six
Appointed Colonels had the honour of Kissing the King's hand on Wednesday last,
and the Queen's on Thursday.' (88). The reference to the six colonels kissing the King
and Queen's hand is slightly obscure, at least one, Fitzjames, according to a memorial
he wrote in 1797, did not arrive until the 15 October, two weeks after O'Connell wrote
his letter (89). Regardless of this apparent anomaly, O'Connell ominously concluded
his letter,

'Nothing has been hitherto determined on with respect to the Conditions for raising
the Regiments. We had yesterday the honour to wait on Lord Fitzwilliam and Lord
Milton to request they would forward the business, as we have reason to believe the
final arrangement will be left to them, as Lord-Lieut. and Secretary of Ireland....I
Confess to you, my Dr.Brother, that I am under no small apprehensions of our not
being able to raise our men. With respect to me, I fear that the Competition of the General Conways in the County Kerry will prove an additional Obstacle to my succeeding..." (90).
RAISING THE BRIGADE, 1795-1796.

Having finally agreed the preliminary basis upon which the Brigade was to be raised and having received the acceptance of the six colonels, the delicate process of turning the project into a physical reality commenced. The colonels wasted little time in recommending officers once their own appointments had been confirmed. Within weeks of receiving his invitation, and while his elder brother and uncle were still challenging his appointment, Henry Dillon wrote in late September 1794 apologising to Pitt and Portland, '...that by appointing his officers he meant only recommending them under the rules observed in other corps.' (1). The apology was only a gesture of courtesy as on 14 December Portland clearly explained to Windham both his and the King's role in regulating the appointment of the Brigade's officers.

'For myself I have no wish to interfere or I should rather say I wish not to interfere in the distributions of the commissions in any of the Irish Regiments, I only contend for the regularity of the order of succession to carry commission in every one of them and that no rank given to any officer subsequent to the French Revolution shall entitle him to precedence or to the succession to any command in any of the Regiments in preference to an officer of superior rank or older standing prior to that event. I have always understood these to be the Kings sentiments full as much as they are mine...'

(2).

In all six regiments, those initially listed for commissions were émigrés who had served in the Brigade. Each regiment's mix of these officers mirrored, as it had in the French Army, the conscious choice and preference of the respective colonel. Portland's expressed concern that strict seniority might not be observed due to the preferment of the colonels proved correct, a number of officers subsequently lodging
vigorous protests regarding certain appointments. As it was, previous service alongside a given colonel, kinship and straightforward friendship all played a role in dictating which regiment an émigré served with and at what rank. At one remove, these factors equally played a part in selecting young Catholic gentlemen to complete the ranks of the junior subalterns, Jennings explaining, 'The deficiencies of officers were to be filled up by the several Colonels of Battalions from the recommended of the Roman Catholick Nobility and Gentlemen of Ireland with whom they were connected by ties of blood or friendship...' (3).

The original invitations stressed that initially émigrés of the Brigade were to be offered positions prior to filling vacancies from the Catholic gentry of Ireland. Although a substantial, if indeterminate, number of the former were either resident in Ireland, London or existing émigré formations, inevitably, given the previous four years, numbers were spread far afield across Europe. That all these groups, but especially those on the Continent, received prompt notice of the Brigade's re-raising, demonstrates that the network of kinship and corporate identity had survived the trauma and dissolution of the previous few years. This is demonstrated in a letter of 17 February 1795 from Patrick Warren, a recently promoted ensign serving in the Légion de Damas, to James Henry FitzSimon, an émigré sous-lieutenant of Dillon's residing in Ireland. Warren apologised for not responding sooner to the correspondence of '...your letters, Michael's, the Husseys', my sister's, etc.', all informing him of the Brigade's re-raising and his listing for a captaincy in Henry Dillon's corps. Warren had been a lieutenant-en-second in Dillon's in French service and powerful sentiments of friendship, kinship and corporate identity were all expressed in his ready acceptance. 'My dear Fitz, it will be with a full heart and with the pleasure of seeing again everyone dear to me, that I shall again be in the midst of my old comrades: from this moment I regard myself as being again in the regiment, and will count very impatiently the days that will pass...'. Warren also expressed his pleasure at being restored to a rank equivalent to that he had held in French service
having in the interval been reduced at times to serving as a fusilier. He equally indicated his support for the political changes finally permitting Catholics to hold commissions in the British Army which, '*answer too nearly to the wishes I have always had...'. In conclusion, Warren indicated no surprise that Henry Dillon had (as opposed to any of his more martial relatives), received the colonelcy, rather the tone was one of unquestioning acceptance that the next Catholic Dillon in line had received command (4).

A similar process functioned for Jennings and his brothers. Jennings was serving as an officer in the Royal York Fusiliers under Lieutenant-Colonel T.C.Hardy. Upon receiving notice of the Brigade's recreation in August 1795 Peter and his elder brothers, David and Patrick, immediately travelled from their regiment's cantonments in Hanover, first to London and thence to Ireland. They were initially separated, Peter and Patrick receiving captain's commissions in Viscount Conway's whilst David gained the same rank in Fitzjames. Within a short period though Peter successfully engineered an exchange into Fitzjames specifically in order to serve alongside his elder brother and to be with fellow émigrés from his original regiment, Berwick's (5).

While the corporate and kinship network guaranteed those émigré officers still serving abroad were promptly informed of developments, contemporaneous events in the Lowlands ensured that almost the entire body of Irish émigrés serving there were obliged to look to Britain for sustenance. The rapid French advance and the progressive collapse of the Dutch ensured the émigrés sought to enter British service early in the new year (6). Equally, Conde's Army faced dissolution, elements of it only being saved by entry into British service (7). In this context, as early as 17 October the Duke of York at Nijmegen, wrote to Windham on behalf of the Prince of Orange a letter of introduction for Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Stack, he being in Dutch service. As former Colonel-Commandant of Dillon's he wished '*to be reinstated in the corps in which he served during Six and Twenty years..' (8). On 30
October the Duke wrote a similar letter of recommendation on his own behalf for Major Eugene MacCarthy, formerly Lieutenant-Colonel of Walsh, then serving in the Regiment of Irwine Hussars, who had 'served with great Credit during parts of the present campaign.' (9).

While individuals and groups were making their way from the Continent, in London and Dublin the colonels completed their officer lists. That nepotism and previous service operated equally in this choice is illustrated by the second regiment of the Brigade commanded by Colonel Count Walsh-Serrant. The Count's first lieutenant-colonel was his younger brother and previous Colonel-Commandant, Charles-Joseph-Edward-Aguste Viscount Walsh-Serrant, whose own son, John- Marie-Joseph-Gabriel-Barbahe Walsh received the rank of captain. The third and youngest of the brothers, Philippe-Francois-Joseph Chevalier Walsh-Serrant was the regiment's major, as he had been in the French Army. He in turn secured in 1796 an ensign's commission in the regiment for his then nine-year-old son, Alfred Philip Walsh-Serrant. The sister of the three brothers, Sophia-Maria-Joseph Walsh-Serrant had, before the Revolution, married the 2nd Viscount Southwell, and their son, the Honourable Charles Southwell, received a lieutenant's commission in his uncle's regiment. Further, two cousins of the colonel, James Tobin and Anthony Francis Walsh de Chasseron, respectively a lieutenant-en-premier and sous-lieutenant in the family regiment in the French Army, received a captain's and lieutenant's commission. Equally, Viscount James-Henry Conway appointed as his major his cousin once removed, James Conway, who had only been a newly appointed sous-lieutenant of Dillon's in 1789. Count Thomas Conway equally ensured that his cousin-in-law, Corneluis MacGillicuddy, the son of Edward Conway's wife by her previous husband who had been in Austrian service, received a lieutenant's commission. Returning to Count Walsh-Serrant, he displayed a matching concern to ensure the appointment on an equal footing of trusted officers of his old regiment. On 12 June, in writing to replace the deceased John O'Reilly with his nephew Charles Southwell, the
Count also requested that John Cruice, who had only just arrived from the Continent, be added to the original list of eleven company and field officers previously compiled for him by Théobald Dillon. He particularly requested that Cruice's commission be dated as per his fellow officers, 1 October 1794, to prevent his belated arrival prejudicing his status (10).

Colonel O'Connell's appointment of officers, probably more than any other regiment, was dominated by factors of kinship and nepotism. This was partly due to the Count's lack of service in the Brigade offering no foundation for any shared pattern of service with the émigrés, although subsequent events suggested it equally reflected the personal value the colonel placed on nepotism. The Colonel was the youngest son of Daniel O'Connell of Darrynane. His eldest sister, Elizabeth, had married Tim MacCarthy of Ochtermony and their son Eugene, previously a capitaine-commandant in Walsh's, became his uncle's lieutenant-colonel. O'Connell's second sister, Honora, had married Morty O'Sullivan of Couliagh and their son Marcus received a captain's commission. One of the sons of the Colonel's elder brother Morgan O'Connell, Maurice Morgan O'Connell, became first an ensign then a lieutenant in his uncle's regiment. The Colonel's youngest sister had married a distant relative, Maurice Jeffrey O'Connell of Lative, who received a lieutenant's commission. Finally, two of the Colonel's cousins became officers, Maurice Charles Philip O'Connell a captain and Maurice Jeffrey O'Connell of Ballybrack an ensign then a lieutenant (11).

While most appointments relied on previous patterns of service and kinship, some hopeful non-émigrés wrote unannounced, relying on more distant family links and simply being of the Catholic faith. As early as 20 November 1794 Jerico W.J.Preston wrote to Portland proposing himself for a commission in any one of the regiments. He stressed his key qualification was being the nephew of the late Lord Gormanston and that consequently family connections in Ireland would materially assist in recruitment. Preston's petition proved fruitful, being gazetted an ensign in the first list
of officers for Dillon's in March 1795 (12). Another successful self-nomination came from an émigré of Dillon's, John-Francis Mahony. Although a Catholic, he had already gained a lieutenant's commission in a regular regiment on the Irish Establishment, the 107th Foot. He successfully applied to transfer to Fitzjames', gaining the rank of captain-lieutenant (13). In fact, at least one other émigré had also already gained a lieutenant's commission in a regular British regiment, despite his religion, Lieutenant William Hely of the 37th Foot. His arrival and appointment in the Brigade though were delayed by his being a prisoner of war (14).

Portland's initial condition for officers had been that they had to have served in the original Brigade or be Irish Catholics. Immediately the colonels sought to widen this category to Frenchmen who had served in the Army of the Princes. On 27 December all six colonels signed a recommendation, additionally supported by the Comte d'Artois, for 'Monsieur de Faussabay, a French gentleman', who had served in Dillon's during 1792 and subsequently in the Vendée, and who had helped finance both these ventures from his own funds. While the colonels accepted Portland might direct him to another emigrant corps, they expressed the hope Portland would relent and widen the eligible category for the Brigade. Both de Faussabay and the colonels were disappointed in this expectation (15). The initial officer lists of 31 March 1795, with subsequent additions in July, and thereafter subject to regular and substantial variations, reveal a pattern generally consistent with previous Brigade service and kinship being the requirements pre-eminent in their completion (16). All posts between colonel and captain were initially filled by émigrés, whilst the number of émigrés serving as lieutenants varied between the regiments, a proportion of lieutenancies going to respective colonels' close relations and friends. The appointment of ensigns equally varied, the regiments of Fitzjames, Dillon, O'Connell and both Conways appointed relations and friends to the majority of vacancies. The exception was Count Walsh-Serrant who initially appointed just one ensign in his initial officer list. The reason is indicated by the Count's own note on his list that,
'The seven other places of Ensign are intended to be prepared for Gentlemen of the Country who will make recruits.' (17). This was confirmed in a subsequent letter to Camden of 1 August recommending six individuals to be appointed ensigns, the Count requesting their commissions be back-dated to 1 October 1794 as per those of the ensigns in the other five regiments. Camden could have construed the tone as having implied criticism of the other colonels who had all made their appointments whilst still resident in England based only upon factors of kinship, prior service and personal recommendation. Walsh-Serrat excused his delay in choosing, '...because my wish was, to see myself in this country, the young gentlemen who might be proposed to me...who had more hopes and means of raising men for my regiment.' (18). The Count and his younger brother's early concern for officers able to raise recruits suggests a perception of military practicalities which was less focused in their fellow colonels.

While the majority of officers were appointed by December 1795, some vacancies were not filled until early 1796, nonetheless requirements for entry remained constant. Of the Brigade's establishment of 180 officers, 100 were émigrés of the French-Irish Brigade, two had been generals in the French Army and two were Irish officers who had been serving in other French regiments before the Revolution. Additionally, at least eight had first been commissioned into the émigré Irish Brigade of the Army of the Princes. In all six regiments, all captains and above had served in the Brigade, as had almost half of all lieutenants. Conversely, with one exception, none of the ensigns had any previous service with either the French or émigré Brigades. Their appointments were reliant on, depending on the regiment, a combination of kinship, personal contacts and the ability to raise sufficient recruits for rank (19).

Not all these officers actually served. A number while initially appointed subsequently resigned. Lieutenant Alexander Bertheas of Fitzjames preferred a commission in Irvin's Regiment of cavalry. Lieutenant Eugene O'Du Higg of Count
Walsh-Serrant's, having originally entered Imperial Austrian service after emigrating in 1791, chose to return there in November 1795. In O'Connell's regiment, his cousin, Ensign Maurice O'Connell, who had first served in the émigré Regiment Walsh, also resigned in November 1795, apparently finding military life not to his taste. He was replaced by James Hamilton, a sergeant-major of the Monaghan Militia, the only appointment of a serving NCO in the Brigade. Bryan O'Toole, originally a sous-lieutenant in Berwick's, first emigrated into Austrian service, subsequently joining Hompesch's Hussars as a captain in 1794. Initially gazetted a lieutenant then captain-lieutenant in Viscount Conway's, he chose to return to command a company of the Hompesch Hussars in early 1796, later the Prince of Wales Hussars, despite knowing of its dispatch to St.Domingue (20).

Original patterns of emigration are mirrored in the numbers of émigrés ultimately appointed across the six regiments. From the French Army's Brigade, Berwick's contributed most with 46 officers, followed by Walsh's with 33 and finally Dillon's with just 21. The distribution of these émigrés was largely dictated by prior service under or alongside their respective colonel. In Fitzjames', of 18 émigrés, 16 had served in Berwick's, and 1 in Dillon's and Walsh's respectively. Additionally, 2 lieutenants had served in the émigré Regiment Berwick. Subsequently, 3 further émigrés entered the regiment, 2 from Berwick's and 1 from Walsh's. Count Walsh-Serrant's equally commenced with 18 émigrés, 16 having served in Walsh's prior to 1789, 1 in Berwick's and 1 in Dillon's. It equally had 2 lieutenants who had served in the émigrés regiments of Berwick and Walsh respectively. 2 veteran émigrés subsequently entered the Count's regiment, 1 each from Berwick's and Walsh's. Of Dillon's 14 émigrés, 12 had been officers in the old regiment and 2 from Berwick's. Additionally, 1 lieutenant had first served in the émigrés regiment Berwick. 3 veteran émigrés subsequently entered, 2 from Dillon's and 1 from Walsh's. Colonel O'Connell's lack of previous service in the Brigade is revealed by his Regiment having by far the fewest number of émigrés, only 9 falling into this category, 8 from
Walsh's and 1 from Berwick's. In addition, 1 lieutenant, a cousin of O'Connell's, had been a capitaine-en-Second in the Regiment Royal Liegeois and an ensign, another of O'Connell's extended family, had served as an officer in the émigré Regiment Walsh. The Viscount Walsh-Serrant's Regiment, originally the elder Count Thomas Conway's Regiment before his death in February 1795, listed 12 émigrés. Given Conway's lack of recent service in the Brigade, these 12 were from across the spectrum, 5 from Dillon's, 4 from Berwick's and 3 from Walsh's, with an additional Irish émigré who had been a lieutenant in the Regiment Austrasie. There were also 2 lieutenants who had served first in the émigré regiments of Dillon and Walsh, and Captain-Lieutenant John Tempest who had been a pupil of the Military School at Pontlevoy. Finally, Viscount James Conway's Regiment listed 17 émigrés, all from Berwick's, Conway having served in that regiment prior to promotion to general. Equally, the single lieutenant who had only served in the Army of the Princes did so in the émigré Regiment Berwick. The 1 subsequent émigré to enter was also a veteran of Berwick's. The only exception was the lieutenant-colonel, from Walsh's (21).

Whilst the colonels received approval for the projected Brigade from London, Dublin, along with elements of both Catholic and Protestant establishments, was ambiguous at best, voicing outright opposition at worst. Various unresolved issues respecting the Brigade's financing and legal status further muddied this situation. Consequently, as the colonels and their staffs began addressing recruitment, legal, financial and administrative difficulties rapidly crowded in. As previously related, as early as 26 August 1794 Dublin Castle had indicated that in its opinion there were 'insurmountable' legal difficulties regarding the whole question of Catholics receiving the King's commission (22). Whilst this opinion was overruled by the Crown's lawyers in London, it was well into 1795 before the Irish administration ceased questioning the whole legal framework and 1796 before all the administrative details regarding funding were settled. These essentially bureaucratic delays proved immeasurably more damaging in the long term than any political opposition.
London may have believed that replacing Westmorland with Fitzwilliam as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland would ease the way for raising new Catholic regiments. This move was delayed until the closing weeks of 1794 as Westmorland was eased out of office without upsetting the Tory side of the coalition and to reassure the King's expressed concern at the appointment of such a known supporter of Catholic emancipation. Consequently Fitzwilliam only arrived in Dublin on 4 January 1795.

Certainly, Fitzwilliam, who had extensive Irish estates and had for several years been both a friend and political pupil of Burke, was a man of strong convictions but he was impulsive and had little political experience. Vehemently francophobic, he had long believed it vital to encourage the Irish Catholics to obey their conservative instincts and to rally to the established order. He was determined to remove the remaining prohibitions on Irish Catholics in the franchise and to bring about sufficient reform of political and administrative abuses to prevent the further spread of radicalism. Although Fitzwilliam knew he represented a pragmatic alliance between Pitt's Tories and Portland's Whigs he was not comfortable with his new Tory colleagues. Despite this, Gratton and Burke assured wary Tories that Fitzwilliam would act with discretion. At a Downing Street meeting between Pitt, Grenville, Portland, Windham and Fitzwilliam in mid-November 1794 to discuss Irish issues Fitzwilliam promised he intended to proceed with the utmost caution (23). In practice he charged in like the proverbial bull in a china shop in seeking to bring forward Catholic emancipation, include Catholics in a new Yeomanry force and to remove government officials he felt were obstructive. Consequently, Fitzwilliam's period in office was brief (barely six weeks), but colourful. For the officers of the Brigade it was their misfortune to arrive in Ireland almost coincidently with the new Viceroy. His turbulent period in office did little or nothing to settle the many outstanding questions and disputes surrounding the Brigade's inception.

Although Fitzwilliam, who fully supported the raising of the Brigade, expected
opposition from amongst the Ascendancy, his early correspondence expresses
apparent surprise at the source of existing protest. Marked ‘confidential’, his first
mention of the Brigade came just three days after his arrival in a dispatch on the need
to keep the Catholics ‘quiet’, commenting, ‘I am a little uneasy about the success of
the 6 Regts of Brigade: I hear the Roman Catholic gentlemen themselves are not
pleased: they fancy they might themselves as well have been Col’s, if Roman Catholic
Regts were to be raised-this I have heard, but as yet I have had no opportunity of any
communication with any of them.’ (24).

Windham pre-dated the Viceroy’s unease by seven days in a letter to Grenville
expressing concern the officers were finding ill-feeling directed against them which
threatened to inhibit further progress. This briefly caused Windham to suggest the
officers of Fitzjames’ might, along with the officers of a second regiment of the
Brigade, be sent instead to Italy where they would not meet with the same opposition
and could recruit anti-republican French, Italian and Corsican volunteers. Windham
further mused that such a move would improve links to the Pope without risking
scarce British troops. Grenville’s reply confirmed he too foresaw the Brigade would
have difficulties raising troops in Ireland and that to dispatch its elements to Italy
would be advantageous. In the event, Edward Dillon’s regiment fulfilled this role in
Italy whilst opposition in Ireland quickly prove more vocal than substantive. As
previously mentioned respecting Colonel Doyle and Théobald Dillon’s memorial of
April 1795, certain opponents moved to support the project once it became clear it
would be the only Catholic officered corps for a while and that its success was crucial
in the wider context of emancipation. Windham’s expressions though of broader, yet
unspecified, concerns about potential recruitment difficulty proved prophetic (25).

Opposition from within the Catholic hierarchy was not Fitzwilliam’s only concern. He
wrote consecutively to Portland in the days following his arrival expressing concern
at raising any new regiments in Ireland given the difficulties being experienced by
existing corps in attempting to attract recruits and the propensity for new Irish levies to 'melt down to nothing, if they remain in the Kingdom.' (26). By 15 January, the Brigade was included amongst those corps he was concerned about given it was to occupy the same quarters and hence plough the same barren furrow. Despite this, Fitzwilliam stressed, 'I feel much inclined to give the Irish Brigade a fair chance in the outset, and to make the experiment of the effect of the Loyalty and Zeal of the Catholicks, and therefore, within the scope of the Catholick Religion, not to give them any Competition, or in any way to impede their success.' (27). Fitzwilliam did indeed attempt to honour this intention by directing two English regiments to 'the North among the Protestants', while simultaneously expressing concern at the growing tensions between the two communities (28).

By the end of his third week in office, whole rafts of concerns respecting the Brigade emerge in Fitzwilliam's correspondence with Portland. These commenced on 23 January when he requested advice, given, 'I see nothing of the officers of the Irish Brigade; they were to have been here many days ago.' (29). Indeed, many of the senior officers had not yet departed London and the Viceroy discovered only a handful of middle ranking company officers were active due to their having already been resident in Ireland when the project was originally floated. This matter was however a product of two far more substantive issues: that of funding and the legislation regarding 'aliens'.

On 28 January Fitzwilliam opened the financial issue by commenting hopefully on the likelihood of at least some regiments of the Brigade attracting Catholic recruits, although he opined that this might only be due to the high bounty of £20 the colonels intended to offer (£5 in excess of what was normally authorised). This introduced his real concern, which subsequently proved a heated point long after Fitzwilliam's departure, when he questioned whether the Brigade would continue on the Irish Establishment once completed or transfer to the British. While he recognised this
would cause great legal and religious difficulties, it would ease the already problematic mechanism by which Dublin had to reclaim money from London, commencing with the £20 bounties once the Beating Orders were officially issued and recruitment commenced (30). Back in 1794, although Portland, Dundas and other ministers involved in initiating the Brigade, agreed in principle that it would be a corps raised on the Irish Establishment but paid for by that of Britain, they failed to address how this mechanism would work in practice. This point was further clouded by the existing terms of the Irish Establishment that limited the number of troops it was required to finance for service abroad. On the 31 January Fitzwilliam detailed this issue and its implications.

'Though there will be no hesitation or difficulty about advancing the money for the levy and temporary pay of the Irish Brigade, I am not able to induce the Country to undertake this corps, as one of disposable men, in addition to the original quota of 3,232 men, as settled near 20 years ago: when I say so I am almost ready to engage my own word to get Ireland to augment the number of disposable troops to the extent of the Brigade, as a permanent Establishment.'...‘how the Irish Brigade will turn out, is more than I can pretend to say:-I have my doubts-Should it succeed, you must look upon it as a great effort of good will.' (31).

Linking back to the colonels, in his letter of 28 January, Fitzwilliam, in requesting written rather than just verbal Beating Orders, also questioned the nationality of some and hence their legal standing.

'A doubt is started here, whether as aliens they can hold a commission: this doubt can effect but very few of them: the Duc de Fitzjames and the three Serants only occur to me: was this matter ever considered? Again on the other hand, it is said, that the right of a subject is not lost till the 4th generation.' (32).
This was a particularly acute issue, as it would prove difficult to reclaim money once recruitment began if it subsequently transpired that certain of the colonels were aliens and hence illegally appointed. This particular issue exemplified the inadequate preparations made by London when launching the enterprise. Twelve months before, Mathew Lewis had written on this very issue in respect of Canadian Roman Catholics who, while "...not excluded from employments civil or military-How far your Canadians are objects of the Alien Laws depends upon facts...", that is, whether they were born before or after the commencement of British rule. Lewis at that time concluded that if "...there be any legal disability under the alien laws, it can only be cured by a British Act of Parl." (33). While legal opinion settled the issue for Canada without the need for legislation, it was an obvious lapse for London not to have identified that some of the prospective émigrés would potentially fall foul of this. The consequent need for London to seek fresh legal opinion furthered delayed the issue of Beating Orders and hence recruitment to July 1795 and the eve of the Irish harvest.

Meanwhile, after a subsequent silence of three weeks, Fitzwilliam wrote again to Portland on 21 February, sharply complaining he had received no official orders to date regarding the Brigade and would soon be obliged to issue the colonels their Beating Orders on his own authority. He coincidentally confirmed that 'some' of the colonels had belatedly arrived while again repeating his earlier pressing question as to which establishment the Brigade was ultimately to be funded on. While Dublin could temporarily advance the initial levy money, the permanent long term funding of the Brigade, given it was destined to serve abroad, was still an open question (34). An answer of sorts was in transit from Portland, dated from London on 19 February. The Duke assured Fitzwilliam it had never been the intention that the Brigade would in any 'event be a charge to Ireland.' Whilst this enabled Fitzwilliam to inform the colonels of the terms under which they were to raise their regiments, he still lacked sufficient details of the actual method of funding formally to issue Beating Orders (35).
It was not only Fitzwilliam who expressed concern at the apparently unexplained delays in receiving the necessary operational orders from London. The February 1795 correspondence of O'Connell, who had been in Dublin for some time, indicates that the Viceroy kept the senior officers fully informed of the difficulties. O'Connell though felt the finger of blame was equally shared.

'I expected to have long ere now finished our Business in Dublin, but it proves to be quite the reverse. It never occurred to the gentlemen in administration on the other side of the water that an Act of the Irish Parliament was necessary for levying our Regiments, and so little was it thought of by those in power at this side...that it will be the middle or perhaps the end of April before the thing is set agoing. I will not anticipate obstructions that may possibly be thrown in our way by the New Administration.' (36).

The colonel's closing sentence referred to the imminent departure of Fitzwilliam from the scene. The Viceroy's flurry of correspondence through January and February was a sincere effort successfully to launch the Brigade, yet Fitzwilliam's role was now brought to an abrupt end by his forced departure from office. It was a matter not unconnected with the issues affecting the Brigade that brought the well-intentioned, if impetuous, Viceroy down, namely the raising of a new Irish Yeomanry. Fitzwilliam's prime objective had always been the full emancipation of Ireland's Catholics. Alongside moves towards admitting them to the Irish Parliament, his correspondence regarding the Brigade equally expressed the strong wish of the Catholic gentry and Church hierarchy for permission to enter the Yeomanry. Without agreement from London, Fitzwilliam decided Catholic and Protestant should take a single newly drafted oath rather than that provided specifically for Catholics in the 1793 Relief Act, so that, 'the people may be made one people, one Christian people, binding themselves in one common cause by one civil oath.' (37). This, alongside his
apparently unilateral moves to introduce and push through a comprehensive
emancipation bill, proved too much for Pitt's coalition and the King. On 16 February,
having ordered Fitzwilliam to halt any further legislative moves towards Catholic
emancipation, Portland was obliged to advise he surrender his post (38).

Rather than identifying his own impetuosity and wilful blindness as the cause,
Fitzwilliam primarily blamed Pitt, believing he sought to humiliate the Portland
Whigs whilst also feeling betrayed and abandoned by his old friend Portland. With
these sentiments in mind and while he waited for his replacement to arrive, he sent
almost his last dispatch as Lord Lieutenant on 26 February, dealing, amongst other
matters, with the still embryonic Brigade. The dispatch's somewhat bitter justificatory
tone suggests Fitzwilliam felt many of the pressing issues he had raised with Portland
regarding the Brigade had either not been answered or satisfactorily settled, '...saving
only to that which fixes the establishment on which they are to be placed...they are
not to be on this establishment, but to be paid by St.Domingo & Martinique.'
Fitzwilliam concluded by again strongly reiterating the issue that then most vexed
Dublin Castle, namely the legal status of certain of the officers as 'aliens' (39).

Further, the extent of Fitzwilliam's support for the Brigade is revealed in the text of a
bill that he had prepared enabling such individuals to be commissioned by the Crown.
It proved something of an irony that the only two issues he felt he had made progress
on: which establishment was to fund the Brigade and his drafting of a bill for those
officers who were potentially aliens, both proved abortive. Many more months passed
before there was truly a satisfactory settlement of the financial issue and legal opinion
ultimately decided that the 'alien' colonels could receive the King's commission
without the requirement of any of the new Irish legislation.

In fact, Fitzwilliam's expression of hurt as to not receiving what he considered
adequate answers to his questions is as much a reflection of his impatience and his
own doubts as London's reluctance to admit it lacked the answers. Further,
Fitzwilliam neglected the reality of the chain of authority when he questioned Portland on given military matters. Back on 13 February, Dundas had dispatched a long memorandum to Portland dealing with many of the crucial military issues raised by the Viceroy over the preceding weeks. As evidence of London's support for the Brigade, in the context of the dispatch of new Irish and Scottish regiments to Gibraltar, St.Dominque and Martinique, where manpower shortages were becoming critical, Dundas commented, 'Lord Fitzwilliam in his letters makes frequent mention of the Irish Brigade and talks doubtfully as to the success of it. I beg most earnestly to state to your Grace the importance of that Corps, and indeed I wish it were 6,000 as once talked of...all this leads me to hope that your Grace will earnestly urge the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to afford every possible aid in completing this Brigade to its full amount'. Dundas continued with the observation that the Brigade would be dispatched to the Caribbean by autumn 1796 at the latest, directing that whilst the Brigade would, for the time being, be maintained on the Irish Establishment, 'to avoid all legal doubts', eventually the ultimate funding would be from the revenues of Martinique and St.Domingue (40). Subsequently, Fitzwilliam's final dispatch dealing with the Brigade demonstrates he had received at least the broad outline of this answer. Had Fitzwilliam not been pressured into resignation consequent of his own impatience he would have begun to receive the answers he so bitterly perceived he had been denied as a conscious act of betrayal.

Fitzwilliam's departure was regretted by many on both sides of the religious divide, his Viceroyalty being seen as the best chance for a policy of intelligent and measured concession. This feeling was shared by the Brigade's officers who, unaware of Fitzwilliam's doubts regarding their long-term prospects of success, were obviously supportive of his general political objectives. O'Connell wrote on 14 and 25 March respectively regarding '...the removal of Lord Fitzwilliam and his friends was most certainly considered a misfortune, because they were undoubtedly well disposed towards us, and inclined to hold out to us every assistance in their power'...'. A better
nor a more Benevolent man I believe never existed.' He went on to reflect a generally pessimistic expectation regarding the future. This though was prefaced more on the fear that a general peace might be concluded and the Brigade reduced, rather than any concern to there being insufficient recruits or that administrative problems would prejudice future prospects (41).

Fitzwilliam remained in Dublin acting as caretaker Viceroy until 24 March, departing only days before the arrival of his replacement, Lord Camden, a Tory and for several years an up and coming junior minister under Pitt. Thomas Pelham, a Portland Whig, who proved an efficient and decisive administrator, accompanied Camden as Chief Secretary. Both were appointed with the initial objective of halting Fitzwilliam's prospective wave of legislative reform and maintaining the existing order, fearing that any concessions would simply open the floodgates. Yet both were essentially moderates who equally wished to end the practical manifestations of discrimination in forms such as poor wages and high rents, and essentially to improve the quality of Irish life. In this desire they were disappointed as the coming years witnessed the evolution of the crisis culminating in the uprisings of 1798. Both were immersed in not only attempting to maintain law and order, but also to continue Ireland's contribution to the war. It was in this latter context that both individuals held office for the remainder of the Brigade's troubled existence.

After Fitzwilliam's departure there was a gap of some eight weeks (until late May), before the new Viceroy seriously addressed the various outstanding issues highlighted by his predecessor. The ever-prolific correspondent O'Connell expressed profound disappointment at the lack of progress, '...the Beating Orders-still remains undetermined. I really begin to apprehend it may be laid aside for good and all...Our situation is very unpleasant, it must be confessed, if Lord Camden does not bring over positive Instructions on the subject.' (42). Despite this, in March, Dublin Castle had received from Windham (whilst Fitzwilliam was still awaiting Camden's arrival).
apparent confirmation of the official solution to the mechanism by which the British Establishment would fund the Brigade's costs upon the Irish Establishment where its legal status was secure. The Secretary at War identified that to-date it had been the practice for five regiments of the line serving abroad to be maintained on the Irish Establishment, being treated as 'lent by Ireland'. This had often caused administrative difficulties upon return from foreign service, hence they automatically transferred to the British Establishment. Windham proposed the Brigade would remain upon the Irish Establishment as the forces lent by it for foreign service, replacing the five regiments then listed as such (43). No where in this did he allude to Dundas's ultimate expectation that the conquered French islands in the Caribbean were eventually expected to provide the Brigade's funding. This apparently minor conflict between Dundas's earlier suggestion to Portland and Windham's later proposal to Dublin inevitably further clouded the critical funding issue once Camden, having finally arrived in Dublin on 26 March, himself took up the matter some weeks later.

In the few days between Fitzwilliam's departure and Camden's assumption of office, Pelham dealt with a number of matters, including the on-going worry over certain of the officers' nationality. Expressing concern that the Brigade was still not in receipt of Beating Orders and consequently without funds, Portland wrote on 27 March to urge speed in settling the residual issues. Belatedly responding to Fitzwilliam's original letter of 28 January respecting officers who had served the late French Monarch without a licence, the Attorney-General indicated the simple legal formality of a Royal pardon would suffice. Despite this, Portland expressed his fear that those who were technically aliens would require an Act of Parliament to avoid legal difficulty (44). Yet just four days later, on 31 March, Portland retracted this, stating the entire Cabinet were agreed, '...you lay under a mistake respecting the officers of the intended Irish Brigade according to the Law which extends the rights of a natural born subject to the Grand children of every person born within the Realm. We do not conceive that an alien or foreigner is to be found among them...'. Portland though
gave assurances the matter was being referred to the Solicitor General for a final decision, the result of which Dublin would rapidly receive (45).

In the interim, correspondence was dispatched providing an insight into the military hierarchy amongst the émigrés prefaced on their last rank within the French Army. On 14 March, William O'Toole wrote directly to Pitt lodging a furious complaint in respect of the rank offered him by Fitzwilliam. O'Toole's complaint related to being first made a captain and then being offered the rank of major, which, 'I could not accept... without degrading myself in the eyes of all the officers who have known me to be an older officer than any of those who have been appointed Lieutenant Colonels...' (46). O'Toole's was not the only such complaint, Count Sutton-Clonard being in a similar situation. The former's letter was accompanied by a certificate signed by all the colonels, except Henry Dillon, confirming that Sutton-Clonard and O'Toole had been colonels attached to the Brigade since 1777, 'that they derived their rank and pay from it', and had there not been a revolution both would, 'according to the ordinance of 1788', have become general officers. The certificate confirmed they outranked junior regimental colonels in the French Army and, excepting Henry Dillon, all Brigade colonels had gained their rank from similar positions. It concluded, 'that the military conduct of these gentlemen gave them a right to expect that in the measure of bringing the Irish officers into the service of their King and Country they would have been placed according to their rank.' (47).

One of the unspoken factors was that both Sutton-Clonard and O'Toole had been listed in 1789 as officers 'à la suite', holding no substantive position in the regiments their names appeared, both serving as staff colonels. This fact helps explain their initial exclusion from the offer of a higher grade than that of major. Having said this, O'Toole's letter concluded with reference to what in practice was the substantive factor behind the complaint, namely the unexpected death of the elder Conway on 26 February. This suddenly created a vacancy for the colonelcy of his regiment that
O'Toole claimed he was both entitled to by seniority and, 'that I should have more means of raising the men from my commissions in Ireland than most of the other officers.' (48).

Despite heartfelt pleas, both O'Toole and Sutton-Clonard were disappointed in their respective hopes. Within days Camden received confirmation from London that the King had settled the colonelcy on terms of strict military seniority. In what may have been Fitzwilliam's last involvement in the Brigade, the King concurred in the departing Viceroy's recommendations. Both O'Toole and Sutton-Clonard were effectively trumped to the vacancy by ex-Colonel-Commandant Viscount Walsh-Serrant, 'on the presumption that there can be no doubt of the seniority of the Vicomte's rank...'. The letter dealt with both claimants' cases, acknowledging their previous length of service and appointments, but indicating the difficulties caused by their anomalous positions as previously officers 'a la suite' (49). Consequently, Sutton-Clonard was offered the lieutenant-colonelcy vacated by the Viscount, whilst O'Toole was offered the lieutenant-colonelcy of the younger Conway's regiment. The latter was to be vacated by Count Bartholomew Mahony whom he emphasised had tendered his resignation to serve with Marshal Broglie's corps on the continent as a Major-General. Unfortunately for O'Toole, by September Broglie's offer to Mahony had become less certain and Mahony requested that his resignation be cancelled, wishing rather to take a leave of absence to travel to Germany first to ascertain his prospects. Understandably, Colonel Conway vigorously protested such an arrangement and voiced certain reservations regarding O'Toole (50). On 2 June and 21 December 1795, O'Toole wrote again to Pitt in similar vein to his original letter of March, pleading for an appropriate appointment as full colonel. He repeatedly stressed his 'many connections in that Country...besides having a most striking sense of the horror of the French Revolution...' and his deep sense of humiliation at being 'now fourteen months degraded from rank and employment...' (51). The delay caused by questions about whether O'Toole would replace Mahony also delayed the whole
process of appointing Viscount Walsh-Serrat and Sutton-Clonard. On 28 September Camden was still asking London when the process would be completed. This was of particular concern as the acting commander of the late Thomas Conway's Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Stack, was becoming concerned that the continuing uncertainty was threatening prospective recruitment. He voiced fears that whoever the new colonel was, they might subsequently disapprove of the measures he was taking and the expenditure incurred (52).

In the event, it was just fractionally over a year after Conway's death that Viscount Walsh-Serrat was officially gazetted on 3 March 1796 from his brother's regiment to be colonel of the late Conway's. That same day Sutton-Clonard was gazetted to replace Mahony whom, while ceasing to be lieutenant-colonel of Conway's, was nominally retained on the Brigade's strength. In turn, O'Toole received the lieutenant-colonelcy vacated by the Viscount in Count Walsh-Serrat's regiment. This final settlement of the senior field officers had occurred in London in early February where the official correspondence emphasised that the colonels supported this arrangement, 'with the full acquiescence of the whole Corps.' (53).

A key factor in settling the competition between O'Toole and Sutton-Clonard was the fortuitous departure of Mahony. While there was no explicit suggestion that Mahony sought to join Broglie due to his only receiving the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Brigade, he had been Colonel-Commandant of Berwick's in the French Army.

Further, back on 8 May 1795, he had specifically written to Portland to require the correction of his commission to include his title of 'Count...as it may be essential for me, and for my son hereafter, that the commission...should correspond with those which his most Christian Majesty granted me hitherto.' It would seem fair to deduce he felt even the vague offer of an appointment as Major-General by Broglie was a more appropriate rank (54). That it would seem fair to interpret Mahony's course of action as essentially status driven is enhanced in the light of O'Connell's glowing
recommendation of this officer back in April 1794 for the lieutenant-colonelcy. This had partly centred on the claim that Mahony had refused the rank of major-general in the French Army to remain colonel-commandant of Berwick's and hence ensure his and that regiment's emigration to serve against the Republic (55).

Whilst O'Toole and Sutton-Clonard reluctantly accepted lieutenant-colonelcies in the Brigade, another officer who followed Mahony's course of action was Count Patrick Wall. Having been a lieutenant-general in the French service until his retirement in 1789 he also wrote to Portland, on 13 and 20 May 1795, to claim the vacant colonelcy or a similarly ranked appointment. He was rapidly disabused of such hopes, on 28 May writing again to Portland requesting permission to return to Conde's Army, permission he rapidly received by 30 June (56).

This issue of the émigrés receiving ranks commensurate with those they had last held in the French Army extended to those who had initially willingly accepted lower ranks. On 3 September Henry Dillon petitioned Portland on behalf of his senior captain, John Greenlaw, whom he emphasised, had served for thirty-eight years in his elder brother's regiment, holding the rank of lieutenant-colonel prior to emigration. As Dillon delicately phrased it, 'through some unfortunate mistake the rank & service of this gentleman were overlooked in the re-establishment of the Brigade.' The colonel also made something of a sideswipe at Fitzjames whom, 'well knows that there are others of many years less service promoted before him.' The reason for this somewhat abrasive comment was the evolving, if rather esoteric dispute, over which was the Brigade's senior regiment; Dillon's, which had been senior in the French Army or Fitzjames', given the Duke was the socially most advanced. While only simmering at this point it erupted once the question of possible reduction was raised, it being assumed that the lower ranked regiments ran the greatest risk of being drafted and dissolved. For now Dillon concluded by requesting a very French solution to Greenlaw's situation, namely that he be given the brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel.
attached to the Brigade, a near equivalent to 'a la suite' (57). Portland's response of 9 September politely rejected any possibility of altering Greenlaw's existing rank or status (58).

Another captain of Dillon's, Patrick Warren, was as concerned to retain his English rank, for in writing to his fellow émigré Captain James FitzSimon in October, he alluded to the continuing efforts of certain other émigrés of Dillon's to gain appropriate ranks even at the cost of pushing himself and his comrades aside. 'What you tell us about the Chevalier Jerningham astonishes us greatly, and already gives me a glimpse of the movement which the zealous party (to use the word in a more moderate sense than usual) is going to make to get promotion: I hope neither you nor I will be on the list' (59). The author and his friend proved quite safe as Jerningham successfully gained the second Lieutenant Colonelcy of Edward Dillon's regiment in Italy.

Back in spring 1795, for Camden, the first, and without doubt the most pressing, issue regarding the Brigade was the officers' legal status. Once the crucial Beating Orders were issued Dublin would be committed to financial expenditure. While it appeared the question of how the Brigade was to be ultimately funded had been satisfactorily settled, there had to be certainty that the officers beating up for recruits were legally commissioned. That legal uncertainty caused financial distress to the officers and critically delayed recruitment is reflected in Pelham's heartfelt plea to Windham of 17 May, '...it is really a most shocking and disgraceful thing. I have been obliged to advance £1500 upon my own credit for bare subsistence of the officers, who otherwise would have starved, and I very much fear that the opportunity of recruiting is lost, unless some of the rioters in Roscommon should be induced to enlist, to save themselves.' (60).

This plea apparently had some impact as, unlike his predecessor, Camden received
instructions fairly rapidly from London, dated 29 May, in the apparently helpful form of a clear statement of the legal status of the officers. Portland commenced the dispatch with reference to the financial arrangements, asking Camden not to inform the officers of these until the Treasury had opened an account upon which the various regimental agents could claim the officers' pay, due as of 1 October 1794. Meantime, he saw no difficulty in advancing the necessary funds for initial recruitment from the annual Vote of Credit for Ireland, which would subsequently be refunded by London.

Moving to the legal issue, Portland emphasised that the Irish Parliament need not be burdened with any legislation on behalf of those officers born abroad as legally there was strictly not, 'an officer in any of the six regiments of that Brigade who does not come distinctly under the legal description of a natural born subject of the King.' To this legal fiction the only legal exception was an Act of Queen Anne's reign which highlighted subjects of the Crown, born, without the King's licence, in a State which at the time was at war with Britain. Portland though added, 'my answer to that would be this "prove it" ', although he did confirm the matter was to receive a substantive legal opinion from the Attorney General. Portland concluded by again pressing Camden to authorise the regiments' Beating Orders so the officers could proceed with recruitment, it being difficult to avoid the conclusion from Portland's generally dismissive approach to the legal issue that London's primary concern was the pragmatic need for fresh manpower rather than esoteric legal issues (61).

This though did not satisfy Dublin for in late June Portland was obliged to ask for Pitt's advice as Camden still refused formally to issue the crucial beating orders until an Act of Indemnity had been passed in the Irish Parliament, this being the normal measure in cases where the administration was obliged to act without a legal issue's conclusive settlement. Portland's tone was one of exasperation at the continued delay, 'the only object therefore to my mind at present is to satisfy the Lord Lieutenant, so as to prevent his making the distinction between the officers he supposes disqualified and those he concludes to be legally qualified and to induce him to give beating
orders generally to all of these indiscriminately who have or may receive commissions...' (62). This sense of frustration was compounded by Portland having to write to Camden on 28 June explaining he had found it impossible to arrange a meeting of the relevant Cabinet Ministers to discuss the issue, concluding, 'In the mean time I cannot but exhort you to issue the beating orders without distinction of officers, & without any further delay.' (63). Portland felt justified in his irritation for as late as 4 July Camden still refused to issue the beating orders until the Attorney General had given a substantive written opinion on those officers born abroad (64). Even as this dispatch crossed to England, Pitt wrote confirming a definitive legal decision was due within the week. To drive home the point that London considered this a pure technicality, Pitt continued that as the Cabinet had no doubts on the matter, he directly ordered Camden to issue the Beating Orders on his, the Prime Minister's, authority. It seems reasonable to deduce that the Cabinet concluded this was the only way to convince the overly cautious Camden to act, Portland writing the same day echoing Pitt's directive, assuring Camden the Cabinet was agreed on, 'the legality of the measures...' (65). It would appear from the complete lack of any further correspondence on this issue that this final directive settled the question of the officers' legal status.

The focus henceforth moved to the continuing vexed question of finance, a matter brought to the fore as the colonels' agents sought to claim money owed from recruitment due to the belated issue of the Beating Orders. The crux of the financial question was still the mechanism by which the British Establishment was eventually to fund the Brigade on the Irish Establishment. The previously suggested solution of the Brigade replacing the existing five regiments of foot then considered as 'lent by' Ireland now emerged as having a flaw, namely that of consequential half-pay. In a letter of 29 August Windham outlined the issue to Pelham that, if a corps was originally raised in Ireland on the Irish Establishment and then subsequently transferred to the British Establishment, it was far from clear upon whose half-pay list
the officers might one day reside. As most regiments raised in Ireland had predominantly Irish officers, if transferred to the British Establishment prior to entry to the half-pay list, they had the considerable inconvenience of being obliged to claim their monies from London (66). While a satisfactory conclusion to this issue appeared essential, given the need to raise recruits forthwith, the matter was conveniently forgotten. Two years later it re-appeared to haunt both government ministers and the officers as the Brigade was reduced.

Whilst the politicians spent the spring and summer of 1795 settling the outstanding legal and funding issues, in October of the previous year, when the project had been so eagerly welcomed by those involved, at least one of the colonels had speedily turned his thoughts to the practical question of finding recruits. On 29 October 1794 O'Connell wrote to his brother to the effect that he was looking to his family's lands for manpower (67). In the event, O'Connell had been hopelessly optimistic in light of the legal and financial delays. Even with the long delayed receipt of Beating Orders on 1 July 1795, recruitment proper only belatedly commenced at the end of the month, along with the submission of financial claims (68). Certainly Count Walsh-Serrant wasted little time, securing letters of credit in London during September to the sum of £25,000, ensuring his officers had ample funds for recruitment (69). The actual terms of the Beating Orders were based on conditions laid down by the War Office in March which, apart from the usual requirements as to age, height and health, included two crucial provisions which came to have a key bearing on the Brigade's future. Firstly, and Fitzwilliam appears to have had a hand in this, it was stipulated no recruit could be drafted out of the Brigade. Secondly, the six regiments were given just four months to complete their ranks (70). To facilitate this, each regiment was allocated a specific location around which to recruit, Fitzjames in Dublin, Count Walsh-Serrant in Limerick, the deceased Thomas Conway's in New Ross, Dillon in Athlone, O'Connell in Kinsale and Viscount Conway in Kilkenny. The location of family lands and thus expected sources of manpower influenced the choice for the
From the start the crucial consequence of the summer's delays became apparent. Dillon's letter to Portland of 3 September regarding Captain Greenlaw was written from the Dillon estates in Athlone in which the colonel complained that although he had given, 'my unremitting attention to the recruiting service...considering the scarcity of men, & the harvest time which keeps them from enlisting', he had only managed to gather 130 recruits. He therefore requested authorisation to gain 50 men from each regiment being drafted to facilitate the completion of his regiment (71). As with his request for Greenlaw's promotion, Portland politely refused, rhetorically adding '...I can only recommend it to you to proceed with all possible dispatch in raising your corps, & rendering it fit for service.' (72). Writing again from Athlone a month later, Dillon repeated his complaint, 'that the harvest time has been an unfavourable moment to recruit in.' Despite this, he was able to report his regiment's strength had risen to 220 men and boasted how eager he and his officers, 'renowned for their ability in the military line in France', were for active service (73).

That the flow of recruits for Dillon's continued to be slow if steady is equally confirmed by one of its company commanders, Captain Patrick Warren. Writing on 15 October to congratulate his friend Captain FitzSimon, on finally having his commission in Dillon's confirmed, Warren remarked, 'Recruiting goes on fairly well but we shall have much work before we form the Regiment on any footing' (74). Six weeks later, writing again to FitzSimon from Athlone, Warren confirmed that, 'Our recruiting still goes on as well as we can hope, and our men in general have a very good appearance; we drill them in full strength, and I am one of the instructors; in short, we are trying to put ourselves as soon as possible on a military footing.' He continued with reference to further junior appointments from amongst the ranks of the émigré sous-lieutenants of Dillon's, some of who must have been known to the author and hence presumably to the other émigrés. Not all though fell into that category or
had the colonel's approval, "...a certain Fitzgerald has been nominated Ensign without Mr. Dillon's knowing him or having asked for him." The author could though end with the positive news that Dillon had at last received £4,000 in funds thus ending, for the time being, the funding crisis (75).

This welcome turn of events was due to a burst of official correspondence across the Irish Sea through September to November in a determined effort by London and Dublin conclusively to settle the Brigade's funding. Inevitably as one issue was settled another emerged. On 28 September, Camden wrote to Portland confirming that as a direct consequence of the directive from Pitt and "your Grace", he had issued the Beating Orders on 1 July and that consequently £4,000 had been issued to each regiment by Dublin on the understanding it would be repaid by the British Treasury. His concern was that as a consequence of these drafts the Vote of Credit was almost exhausted. To avoid any further financial difficulties he requested Portland establish a permanent method by which the Irish Treasury could "draw upon the Paymaster of the forces in Great Britain." (76). On 10 and 16 October respectively, Dublin and Windham each wrote to confirm that it was the understanding of the War Office that the Brigade was to be raised at the expense of Great Britain. As an annual charge had already been included in that year's army estimates, it was quite proper for the Paymaster General to accept Bills "drawn under direction of the Lord Lieutenant", for the £28,849.0.11d. already spend and "for such further sums as shall be necessary for the completion of the measure" (77). Despite this, Camden expressed his concern to Pelham in early November as to whether the Paymaster had been fully instructed and empowered to honour the various bills about to be presented by the regiments' agents as a result of monies advanced by Dublin. By 13 November though, the Treasury confirmed these arrangements as well as the monies already claimed (78).

Yet even as these arrangements were being settled another wrinkle was identified. Pelham had already observed on 10 November that if, as proposed by London,
Brigade was placed on the Irish Establishment as the forces lent by Ireland for service abroad, in addition to the proposal to increase the number of battalions of Fencibles from nineteen to twenty-one, this would involve a substantive increase in the numbers to be maintained on the Irish Establishment. The number of soldiers of regular battalions would rise from 27,185 to 30,562, which, when the higher number of militia and Fencibles, some 21,369, were added, would give a total of 51,931 men. The problem was that these increases had not been taken into account in calculating the annual funds voted for the Irish Establishment (79). Camden wrote to London on 28 November initially expressing satisfaction at the mechanics of the arrangements as directed by the Treasury. Camden then placed flesh on the bones of Pelham's concerns in a series of highly detailed financial statements respecting the forthcoming financial year's Irish military expenditure. Given the projected increase in the forces to be maintained in Ireland, the Viceroy identified a number of obvious factors: the larger number of regiments of Fencibles stationed in Ireland, larger cavalry establishments and the fact that funds had been calculated only on the number of rank and file. These would cumulatively entail a severe financial shortfall for the Irish Treasury. He particularly highlighted the simple fact that the six regiments of the Brigade were each directed to raise 689 men whilst being treated as the forces lent by Ireland for foreign service in place of the previous five British line regiments, each with an established strength of just 399 men. Consequently, the cost of the Brigade's potential 4134 men would be more than twice that of the previous 1995 of the five British regiments. In blunt financial terms, in 1795 Britain had contributed, via the annual Bill of Supply, for the forces lent by Ireland for foreign service, £48,468.19s. With the Brigade fulfilling this role this sum would rise in 1796 to £99,842.9s. If this was not rectified the Irish Treasury faced a potential financial shortfall of £51,373.9s. This was additionally complicated by the difference in the rates of pay between the British and Irish Establishments, the latter being slightly higher, both further inflating the potential shortfall. Camden consequently submitted that, given that the funds voted in previous decades for the annual Bill of Supply had often been varied as the
need arose, the sum voted for the Irish Establishment for forces lent by Ireland for foreign service for the forthcoming year needed to amount to an additional £69,550, if the financial burden of the Brigade was to be met in full by Britain (80).

In case London was not sufficiently deflated by these figures, Camden further added to that day's correspondence a private letter addressed to Portland, commenting, 'I am sorry to say the raising of the Brigade goes on very slowly & I venture to give an opinion that the measure is not likely to be speedily successful but whilst it is persevered in, your Grace may depend upon its receiving every assistance from me.' (81). An additional cause of disquiet was a clear demonstration that not all the Brigade's officers were as attentive to their duties as they ought. In what ultimately proved to be the least effectively run of the six regiments, one of O'Connell's officers, Lieutenant Hare, seconded by Lieutenant Blake, engaged in a duel. The involvement of two officers in what proved to be a well publicised incident, did little to promote O'Connell's or the Brigade's prestige (82).
CHAPTER SIX.

RUMOURS OF REDUCTION, 1796-1797.

Digesting the identified financial shortfall and the difficulties of recruitment, on 9 December Portland dispatched copies of all relevant correspondence to the Commander-in-Chief, The Duke of York (1). Despite York having been appointed back in February 1795 this was apparently the first occasion Britain's senior military officer had been consulted respecting the Brigade. Partly this was because prior to his appointment, Dundas, Windham, Portland and Pitt had all had a hand in the war's direction. Equally, the Duke had been given the long vacant office of Commander-in-Chief, last held by General Henry Conway in 1783, but this did not mean there was a clear division of responsibility between him and other ministers. Dundas, as Secretary of State for War, was responsible for the direction of strategy whilst it still fell collectively to Windham, Dundas and Portland in their respective ministerial roles to decide upon new military formations, their funding and establishments. Technically, York was responsible for the day to day running of regiments, their supply, general deployment and dispatch on active service, although he shared some of these with the Commissary General, Secretary-at-War and Transport Board (2). It was only when a particular matter arose falling into York's remit that he became involved. As any reduction in the size of the Irish Establishment, in this case the potential strength of the Brigade, directly impacted upon future deployments, the strength and ultimate fate of the Brigade belatedly came before him. Having said this, Portland and other ministers possibly sought to involve York and hence the military hierarchy in a highly contentious issue with political implications in Ireland. Whatever the chain of causation that brought it before York, barely a week later, on 17 December, Colonel Brownrigg, York's military secretary, confirmed his inevitable answer to both issues was a proposal, already communicated to Windham, to reduce the overall strength of the Brigade (3).
Windham wrote the next day comprehensively fleshing out the bones of the whole Irish financial issue for 1796. He doubted Westminster would be willing to vote the additional funds, not only for the Brigade but other excess military costs, and he ventured a series of detailed suggestions as to how financial savings might be found, the essence being a reduction of 6757 in the number of troops stationed in Ireland. This included amongst suggestions to reduce the number of Fencible regiments and companies of Invalids stationed in Ireland, as well as to dismount some cavalry, a proposal to reduce the establishment of the Brigade by 900. This offered a simple method of saving without losing any real soldiers given the existing shortage of recruits. To justify this proposal Windham made it clear that the original decision to have Britain pay for the Brigade, although it was on the Irish Establishment, was 'in a political view to be most desirable.' It hopefully served to encourage additional Catholic recruitment whilst avoiding sectarian disputes in the Irish Parliament. Equally, he made it clear that 'it was not any intention thereby to propose any actual excess of numbers or charge...' and he included an extract of his letter of 12 March 1795 to Lord Milton, the then Irish Chief Secretary. This explicitly stated that the cost of the Brigade to Britain as forces lent by Ireland for foreign service was strictly limited 'only for the sum which that Kingdom would have been required to pay for 5 regiments at the late Peace Establishment.' Concluding, Windham confirmed he had detailed the various choices to '...The Duke of York to whom it properly belongs to prepare the Plan of Military Establishments...' (4).

York wasted little time pursuing his well-worn solution to the Brigade's predicament. He particularly bore in mind that the original four-month period set in the Beating Orders for completion had expired in November 1795. On 14 January 1796 Dundas confirmed to Portland that the details of York's suggestion had been approved by the King, directing two full battalions be created forthwith by drafting the ranks of the weakest four. Given their relative success in recruitment, Dillon's and O'Connell's
regiments were tentatively identified for completion to 1000 effectives each. They would subsequently be transported from Cork at the earliest opportunity to re-enforce the dangerously under-strength garrison of Gibraltar. The officers and NCOs of the four drafted regiments were given a time limit of six months to 'complete themselves to their respective establishments.' If then, upon inspection, they were not sufficiently complete to be assigned for active service, they would be reduced, the officers being placed on half-pay and the existing rank and file drafted as 'His Majesty may then think proper.'

Whilst York's solution was in line with established practice, it is doubtful that there was ever a real intention the completed regiments were destined for Gibraltar. Throughout the preceding year the majority of new regiments raised in Ireland had been identified for Caribbean service. This had resulted in a number of mutinies that had effectively crippled recruitment. As it had always clearly been intended the Brigade was to serve in the Caribbean, the announcement in January that the two regiments were destined for Gibraltar was a device to avoid a repetition of the previous year's disturbances and to encourage additional recruitment. Equally, the military situation in the Caribbean was deteriorating. France had recaptured Guadeloupe and defeated British forces on Grenada and St.Lucia in 1795. The initiative still lay with them in early 1796 with a raid on Anguilla and advances on St.Dominque where British re-enforcements were urgently required.

The directive for drafting and potential reduction drew from Portland, on 17 January, a strongly argued plea that, for both domestic political reasons and in the context of the deteriorating political situation in Ireland, the Brigade needed more time to recruit. Portland buttressed his case by arguing the original reason for raising the Brigade was to secure the services of professional Catholic officers and to offer Irish Catholic rank and file security from religious prosecution. He pointed out that the financial and legal issues had been a result of the decision that to avoid Protestant
opposition, the British Establishment would fund the Brigade. The consequent delay in recruitment until the summer harvest, plus their Caribbean destination being common knowledge, had combined to make the corps unattractive to Irish recruits. While Portland reluctantly agreed a deadline was necessary, in setting it consideration had to be given to the difficulties and obstructions suffered. Further, he feared many Catholics seriously doubted the Protestant Establishment in Ireland would permit the Brigade to succeed. Any reduction would simply confirm these impressions with inevitable political consequences. Having said this, Portland acknowledged the colonels’ apparent lack of enthusiasm had contributed to the situation for reasons not unconnected with the likely dispatch to the Caribbean once regiments were complete. Portland concluded his case by agreeing that those men raised so far ought to be utilised forthwith, an apparent dispatch to Gibraltar being desirable to counter the recruits’ potential fear of the Caribbean. He nonetheless returned to the political imperative, expressing the sincere hope the project would succeed in the long term as it would '...be likely in my opinion to be productive of very beneficial permanent and increasing advantages to this Government.' (8).

York rebutted Portland’s case in a dispatch of 23 January to Pelham. He justified his initiative respecting drafting, not just on the grounds of obtaining manpower, but that on the evidence he had read, '...there was every reason to suppose that the Officers of the Irish Brigade were exceedingly inattentive to the recruiting of their Regiments, from the idea that they wont be sent to the West Indies, as long as they were uncompleted...'. York firmly concluded that while he felt it fair that the remaining four drafted battalions be given four to six months to complete, at that point, '...the weakest Battalions should be drafted into the strongest and then be reduced. By this means at least he shall have a chance of making some use of these Corps, and Government will save a very considerable expense.' (9).

The Treasury confirmed it had, by 1 March, received claims totalling £23,600 for the
Brigade's levy and subsistence monies. This increased pressure to obtain practical return for this expenditure, York commenting bluntly to Pelham in a dispatch of 2 March, requiring news of progress as to, 'how soon the two Batallions of the Irish Brigade will be ready for embarkation.' (10). Dublin wasted little time, Pelham requesting details of the necessary transportation whilst Camden wrote on 3 March to Portland confirming the intended formation by the drafting of two, 600 strong battalions (11). Five days later, Camden wrote again with the initial results of the Brigade's inspection by Major-General Sir James Duff, triggered by the need accurately to identify which two regiments were to receive the drafts. Duff reported Dillon's and Viscount Walsh-Serrant's, the latter chosen in place of O'Connell's, were 'the strongest in point of numbers, the best bodies of men, and most forward in discipline.' Consequently, Camden confirmed the remaining four regiments would be informed they only had six months to find sufficient recruits or be reduced. He was at pains to conclude this would be a highly undesirable eventuality (12).

Within days though, Camden wrote expressing noticeably distinct sentiments to Dundas and Portland respectively. To Portland he conveyed in positive terms the details of General Duff's inspection, identifying only one poorly run regiment and specifying reasons why certain corps were chosen for drafting. Duff recorded the rank and file as fit for service for each regiment as, Fitzjames 162; described as 'a good body of men.' Count Walsh-Serrant, coincidentally, also 162 strong, although described as 'indifferent, several officers absent.' Viscount Walsh-Serrant's, still commanded in practice by Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Stack, as 175, described as 'a good body of men more forward in their drill and discipline than the others.' Dillon's as 420, described as 'a good body of men and being complete with their officers.' O'Connell's 190, described as 'a good body of men, several officers absent.' Finally Conway's with 157 men, described as 'a good body of men, the officers of this regiment are mostly composed of men who have been long with the service.' Consequently, Duff reported 1266 men in the ranks of whom 955 were privates with a
further 160 new recruits in the pipeline. Camden concluded that this would enable the full establishment to be achieved for the two strongest and best disciplined regiments, those of Dillon and Viscount Walsh-Serrat, leaving sufficient cadres to raise recruits for the remaining four (13). It was subsequently revealed that the brief comments regarding the respective readiness of each corps provided the answer to why Viscount Walsh-Serrat's, with a strength of just 175, was chosen in place of O'Connell's with 190. The Viscount had much to thank Lieutenant-Colonel Stack for in ensuring his regiment was found to be qualitatively superior. The King on 16 March subsequently confirmed this choice of corps (14).

Conversely, the generally optimistic tone of the letter to Portland is utterly absent from the Viceroy's communication with Dundas, written the same day, the facts and sentiments expressed standing in marked contrast. Camden observed the actual number of the Brigade's effectives barely amounted to those required for one regiment. Rather than relating Duff's report of March, the Viceroy reproduced that of 1 January, giving Fitzjames only 90 men, Count Walsh-Serrat 116, Stack's viz. Viscount Walsh-Serrat 117, Dillon's 287, O'Connell's 156 and Conway's 135, a total of just 901 enrolled men and only a further 84 recruits awaiting affirmation. Camden's accompanying comments apparently revealed his true feelings, stressing, 'I did not think the measure an advantages one...'. He reasoned this was not only due to the previous year's delays and legal questions, but far more damnably, claimed the colonels were purposely slack in finding sufficient recruits. They were acutely aware that as each regiment was declared complete it would embark forthwith for the Caribbean, an eventuality they keenly wished to avoid (15).

That both Camden and York's suspicions regarding the colonels and the Caribbean had some foundation is demonstrated in a June letter of O'Connell's where he commented, 'With respect to the Brigade, when raised, it is, I think, very probable it will be sent to St. Domingo, and, on the peace, will always be left in the West Indies.
When I consider the very great likelihood that it will turn out so, at my time of life the horrid climate of that Country, so destructive to the human Constitution, the probability of a peace in the course of next winter, the prospects I have of a comfortable Situation in France whenever a regular Government is Established there, and the happy change that is daily gaining ground in that Country towards a better state of things, I confess I feel very reluctant to go out to the West Indies.' (16).

This revealing admission was reinforced by O'Connell's reaction some months later when first informed his regiment was earmarked for reduction. Whilst other colonels vigorously protested, he solely concerned himself with gaining the most advantageous financial settlement for his own future. If true for any other colonel, it reveals something of an about face for those who had originally promoted the project in 1794. They had then specifically stressed the Brigade's previous French service in the Caribbean as one of its attractions. Further, none had questioned the original invitations that specifically identified this as the intended destination. As for Camden, despite his private doubts regarding the Brigade, he did not allowed this to influence his public duty in respect of its promotion. Within days, he moved two of its regiments to new summer quarters near Dublin in order to ease difficulties in finding sufficient billets and food, and thus assist in attracting recruits (17).

Whatever the respective colonels' true feelings and actions in regard to final destinations, the assumption of an inevitable dispatch to the Caribbean was fulfilled on 10 March when London altered the destination of Dillon's and Viscount Walsh-Serrat's from Gibraltar to Jamaica. A decision confirmed on 16 March with the apparently ambiguous words 'the two which have the right to go to the West Indies.' (18). The phrase's explanation related to the reality of the decision making process behind the choices made for embarkation, only revealed in Pelham's dispatch of 15 March to York confirming embarkation. Duff had originally identified Dillon's and Conway's for dispatch, despite the latter being weaker than the Viscount's regiment,
given he had described Conway's officers as 'the best he had ever seen in any service.'
Duff had made these comments verbally to the regimental officers concerned, thus
raising certain expectations. But he had subsequently refused to put this judgement in
written form. This obliged Camden to follow York's original directive and initially
order the completion of the two strongest corps. While Camden felt Lieutenant-
Colonel Stack's efforts merited the choice, Pelham regretted the blow to confidence
this and Duff's actions had caused, 'it is great mortification to Conway's officers, and
brings our discipline into contempt...' (19). York quickly responded on the 22, that
while satisfied in finally having confirmation of which regiments were completed for
Jamaica, 'I thoroughly agree with you in the great impropriety of Sir James Duffs
conduct in refusing to give his opinions of the officers of the different Battalions of
the Brigade in writing.' (20). Despite this, Duff retained responsibility for future
inspections which, it may be surmised, contributed to subsequent complaints made by
Fitzjames and Conway as to the veracity of his findings.

Meanwhile, while the issue of funding still rumbled on, another issue re-emerged,
related both to funding and potential reductions, namely the question of regimental
seniority. On 19 March, in light of the impending embarkation of Dillon's and Walsh-
Serrant's, Camden inquired whether the Irish Treasury should continue remitting its
claims for reimbursement for recruiting monies to London monthly or apply to
discharge the current expenses of the Brigade as they arose until all regiments were
completed and embarked. In respect of financial submissions, Camden added what
appeared a mundane question: as the regiments were not numbered, being rather
identified by their colonel's name, for the purposes of correctly listing the regiments
he requested an authoritative statement as to the priority of their ranking (21).
Camden's financial concerns were particularly triggered by the ad-hoc nature in which
reimbursements for the early period of levying had been claimed by certain officers.
Regardless of their origin, Windham rapidly responded to Camden's initial question
on the lodging of claims by advising Portland on 28 March that an appropriate
solution to Dublin's concerns would be, 'the pay and other charges of the said Regiments should be issued here by the Paymaster General to British Agents, to be appointed by the respective Colonels...'. Though he stressed, that for this method to operate smoothly, Dublin would have to submit monthly returns of each regiment's actual strength to the Adjutant General as well as copies of the original letters of service with details of any alterations subsequently made (22). Given Pelham's closing comments that this had always been the way regiments classified as lent by Ireland had been paid, it would appear that the civil servants in both London and Dublin had previously failed adequately to brief their respective ministers and may thus have been partially responsible for the many months of concern and correspondence. As it was, this method of funding the regiments was normal for those defined as lent by Ireland for foreign service and effectively ended Dublin's concerns respecting future finance. It did initiate however a growing balance of difficulties for the regiments themselves. Forthwith, all monies had to be claimed in London by the respective regimental agents, a procedure reliant on Dublin's efficiency in providing the necessary documents and returns each month.

In respect of Camden's second concern, that of regimental ranking, on 19 April the Treasury confirmed as accurate, with reference to a breakdown by Pelham of 18 April, that when it officially instituted the method of payment indicated by Windham, effective from 1 April, the full annual cost of the Brigade as serving abroad would be £66,317.13s.5d. In so doing, 'in order that upon the usual contracts assignments and certificates', the regiments were specifically numbered one through six as they previously had appeared in all official correspondence, respectively Fitzjames, Count Walsh-Serrant, Viscount Walsh-Serrant, Dillon, O'Connell and Conway (23). This order of ranking the regiments however was apparently in direct contradiction to that related by Portland. On 14 April he had specified to Camden, that the regiments were, 'to rank in the same order as when in the French service, those raised in addition to the old number to rank agreeably to the seniority of their first colonels.' (24).
Windham certainly followed this practice as on 13 May, in a letter to the Apothecary General regarding supplying Dillon's with the necessary medical chest for the Caribbean, he referred to, 'The 1st Regt. of the Irish Brigade...' (25). In attempting to settle the issue, Robert Cunningham of the Adjutant General's office sensibly requested that the colonels themselves indicate what they understood to be the correct method of ranking. From the correspondence it appeared that once each colonel received details of the Treasury's new arrangements for claiming from Windham with its statement of ranking order and then Cunningham's letter, they immediately produced a joint response to the Adjutant General on 9 May, personally signed by all six colonels. This commenced by firmly stating the correct order of ranking was that which derived from the French Army, the first three being respectively Dillon, Fitzjames and Count Walsh-Serrant, as they had been in the original Brigade, followed by the second three in order of the respective colonels' seniority in the French Army, Viscount Walsh-Serrant, Conway and O'Connell. The colonels followed this by reference to an understandable confusion for officers not used to the intricacies of the different national establishments. They queried Windham's letter informing them of the new method of claiming where it first stated that they would receive remuneration as per the higher Irish Establishment and then went on to state they would be paid by the British Establishment (26).

The colonels' letter in turn produced a rapid response from the Adjutant General's office to Pelham, dated 19 May, which acknowledged the colonels' argument as to the principles which ought to have decided the order of ranking and revealed the administration itself thought, wrongly, that it had used such a method. Cunningham requested that clarification on this, as well as which Establishment's subsistence rates applied, be transmitted to the six commanding officers forthwith (27). Given the colonels' arguments regarding the order of ranking apparently matched Portland's understanding of the issue, on 31 May Camden dispatched to Portland a copy of the Colonels' letter of 9 May and Cunningham's response of 19 May. Camden confirmed
he had directed, through York, that the regiments be ranked as indicated by the colonels. Of more immediate substance to the colonels was a demonstration of the Viceroy's sincerity in promising to assist the Brigade despite misgivings. Camden continued that, as it would take time for the colonels to appoint agents in London to claim monies due, he had arranged for them to receive interim funding from Dublin in June for subsistence and recruitment. He was adamant though this would not be repeated given the difficulties Dublin had in securing reimbursement from London (28). The second part of his letter may have acted as a spur to action, as on 30 July the War Office confirmed the appointment of at least two agents, a Mr. Croasdaile for the '2nd Regiment' and a Mr. Armstrong for the '3rd' (29). Despite this, the increasingly irksome Colonel Dillon attempted in June, without success, personally to claim the off-reckonings. In his written refusal, Windham made it clear that only the colonels' duly appointed agents could lodge claims for funds given their legal duty to account for them (30).

Subsequently, Windham dispatched letters on 22 June to the six colonels reassuring them that the British Establishment would make good the difference in pay given the larger size of the Brigade relative to the previous five British regiments. He equally confirmed the order of ranking would be as they had requested, conforming to the French order of precedence. He then promptly demonstrated there was still an incipient dispute by listing them, as understood in London as: Fitzjames, Count Walsh-Serrat's, Dillon's, O'Connell's, Viscount Walsh-Serrat's and Conway's (31). Conversely, the colonels demonstrated they were under the impression their method of ranking had been agreed. In the 14 June legal document appointing Edmund Armstrong as regimental agent for O'Connell's, O'Connell described his as the 'sixth' regiment of the Brigade (32). Equally, on 15 May, Dillon dispatched a memorial to Pitt signing himself as 'Colonel 1st Regiment Irish Brigade', proudly confirming his regiment was complete and embarked for Jamaica. In consequence of this achievement he asked, 'to be recommended to His Majesty by you, to be created a
Baron Peer of the Kingdom of Ireland; by the style and title of Belgard in the County of Dublin.' (33). It became clear to London and Dublin, Dillon, having taken up residence near Windsor whilst his lieutenant-colonel led the regiment to Jamaica, was primarily motivated by concerns of status. Over the course of the next few years he vigorously pursued the vainglorious goal of a peerage regardless of all concerned dismissing such a suggestion out of hand (34).

What ought to have been of far greater concern to Dillon, his regiment having sailed, was his London agent's attempts, given the considerable balance of debt incurred in preparations for departure, to obtain payment for clothing and appointments. Windham immediately rejected this as Dublin had failed to forward any of the necessary documentation, particularly the letters of service, required to settle the claim (35). While Dublin failed to forward the necessary documents for any of the regiments to lodge claims, it managed on 21 May to confirm the sailing from Cork of both Dillon's and Viscount Walsh-Serrant's for Jamaica, having previously confirmed both regiments' receipt of four months subsistence. In so doing, some of the reasons behind Camden's earlier expression of doubt as to the commitment of certain of the Brigade's officers is demonstrated. The embarkation returns reported a number of officers, discounting those left for recruitment purposes, being absent without leave and hence liable to be dismissed and superseded. Walsh-Serrant's listed just three, a major and two lieutenants superseded, it being subsequently revealed the latter two had never joined in the first place. In Dillon's, no less than five subalterns and the Surgeon were absent. Of this total of eight, only Major Edward Rooth of the Viscount's regiment was a senior émigré, the remainder being new entrants. One clue to the junior officers' failure to appear as well as the mechanism for gaining entry was subsequently indicated. In directing that these officers be superseded, Camden recommended two new ensigns on the basis that, as engaged, they had successfully raised the agreed number of recruits (36). Originally, except in Count Walsh-Serrant's, the junior officer grades had been completed by relatives, friends and those
recommended by such to the colonels. Given the desperate shortage of recruits, the other colonels had subsequently adopted Walsh-Serrat's traditional method of offering commissions to those who engaged to raise a given number of recruits.

A further clue to the non-appearance of certain officers came between March and May. This period saw various exchanges and promotions, especially in the two regiments due for embarkation for the Caribbean. As had been the case in the French service, once an initial round of exchanges had occurred in 1795 as officers sought to serve alongside friends and relations, there was subsequently little movement between regiments. At this point though, in common with British regiments, those officers preferring not to risk the uncertainty of the Caribbean eagerly sought exchanges with their more adventurous brethren who viewed such as an opportunity for advancement. This certainly appears to have been the motivation for the exchange between Ensign William O'Falvey of O'Connell's with Ensign Francis White of Dillon's shortly before the latter regiment's departure (37). Another subaltern, Ensign Stopford of Dillon's, despite his Catholicism, successfully gained a lieutenancy in the 61st Foot. Ironically, less than eight weeks later, his replacement, John O'Reilly, was one of those who failed to embark and was consequently dismissed along with his brother, Ensign Bernard O'Reilly (38). Not all those listed as absent without leave at embarkation were dismissed, given, as was common, some were simply delayed by personal circumstances. During September and October, a number of company officers applied through their respective regimental agents to the Adjutant-General's office requesting the transport office arrange passage to Jamaica (39).

Amongst the émigrés, the failure of such a senior regimental officer as Major Rooth to take up his appointment in the Brigade was not unique. As previously alluded to, there were those who had already, despite originally being listed for a commission, chose to remain in, or return to, one of the surviving émigré formations. This appears to have been true of Rooth as back on 16 March Portland had already identified him
as an officer unlikely to ever take up his appointment given his then domicile in Russia (40). Others, somewhat ironically, found alternative service in the Caribbean, particularly on St. Dominque. One such was Major Charles Thomas O’Gorman. He had originally emigrated to Britain in 1792 from the ranks of the second battalion of the 92e whilst stationed in St. Dominque and had been one of those advising the British government in August 1793 on its seizure. With the British occupation, O’Gorman returned to St. Dominque as a captain in the British Legion. His old colonel subsequently listed him as the senior captain in Count Walsh-Serrant’s. As his subsequent memorial explained, having been promoted to major in the Legion, rather than return to Ireland, he, ‘...thought it more officer like not to relinquish a situation which placed him before the enemy and every day in active service...’. Whether it was the rank or the call of honour that caused him to remain, he lived to regret his decision. When both the Legion and the Brigade were reduced in December 1797, whilst the officers of the Brigade were automatically placed on half-pay, as the Legion was a colonial formation, O’Gorman was obliged to petition for a discretionary award. Wishing as ever to be of assistance to his old officers, the memorial was made all the more poignant for the major (assuming its sincerity), by an appended note of Count Walsh-Serrant’s confirming that he would have made O’Gorman major of his regiment if he had chosen to take up his post (41).

The importance of the support given to an émigré by his original colonel is further illustrated by one of the more convoluted of the appointment sagas. This involved a number of officers, including one who, unlike O’Gorman, did ultimately return to the detriment of others. It commenced in April 1796 when Count Walsh-Serrant recommended to Camden that Lieutenant William Hely replace Captain Nicholas Trant who had failed to return from his corps in the Caribbean to take up the commission reserved for him. Camden supported this, and in March, Hely’s commission as captain was received in Dublin. At this point Trant belatedly appeared and Hely’s promotion was cancelled forthwith. The Count though was determined to
gain what he felt was Hely's due and strongly recommended the disappointed lieutenant for another captaincy. This was prefaced on the colonel's claim that Hely had been 'a captain of long standing in the Brigade' and had, when he emigrated, brought the grenadier company of Walsh's with him. While the second element may have been true, certainly in respect of rank, the Count was assisting Hely's career as he had in fact only been a sous-lieutenant in his regiment. The Count's recommendation continued by stressing Hely was originally, 'named for one of the original companies in the Brigade', but he had been serving at the time as a lieutenant in the 37th Foot and been taken prisoner at Nijmegen. This had obviously prevented his taking the company reserved for him. The Count concluded that as Lord Milton had directed that officers who had been prisoners of war should, on their return, receive the first available promotion, Hely was the most appropriate officer to be appointed to the next vacant captaincy (42).

For Hely to be promoted though another officer had to be disappointed and this fate fell to Captain-Lieutenant John Tempest of Viscount Walsh-Serrant's. On 29 February Tempest had been recommended for the post vacated by Captain William O'Shee of the Viscount's regiment who had been promoted major to fill the vacancy caused by the dismissal of Major Rooth (43). Although Tempest was then the only original captain-lieutenant not yet promoted to full captain, now Hely's situation had arisen both the Count and Camden felt the latter should take O'Shee's company, particularly as Tempest had not held a commissioned rank in the Brigade, being a pupil at Pontlevoy when he emigrated. This was indeed what ultimately transpired. On 25 April Hely was appointed captain in place of the promoted Major O'Shee, his commission being backdated, at the Count's request, to 1 October 1794 to avoid his being disadvantaged by his captivity (44). Meanwhile, Tempest's disappointments were far from ended. Promised the next vacant captaincy, two rapidly appeared in succession, firstly in May in Fitzjames' and then in June in the Viscount's regiment. Although Dublin recommended him for both, neither materialised. The vacancy in...
Fitzjames' proved abortive when Captain Thomas Kavanagh's transfer to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay's émigré corps serving in the Caribbean failed to go through. As for the vacancy in Walsh-Serrat's, ironically that disappeared when Captain Nicholas Trant exchanged with Thomas Kavanagh. It is possibly that Tempest's lack of success was due to his lack of influence, never having served in the original Brigade (45). Ultimately Tempest had to rely on the rigours of the Caribbean climate for promotion. He first transferred to Dillon's as a captain-lieutenant to replace the deceased Patrick O'Sullivan. Having subsequently arrived in Jamaica he was confirmed as a captain in that regiment on 18 November due to the death of Captain Henry Redmond (46).

Returning to the issue of the regimental ranking; if Portland, Windham, Dundas or the King believed that the correspondence of May and June had settled the issue of precedence, they were sorely disappointed. Even before Windham's letter of the 22 June, Count Conway, having been informed by his London agent of the King's agreement to the new ranking, had, despite personally signing the original letter, challenged it in Dublin. On Pelham's recommendation, he wrote to Windham on 17 June, angrily demanding his regiment rank as fourth, not fifth, claiming precedence over the Viscount Walsh-Serrat. The substance of Conway's claim rested on the twin pillars of his military seniority to the Viscount and his suggestion that the Viscount was a far from proficient officer. The Count pointed out he had been a general in the French service whilst the Viscount had only been a colonel, that Conway's own French colonelcy pre-dated the Viscount's, and that he additionally outranked Walsh-Serrat in the British Army. (The latter claim rested on the Viscount having come directly from the Continent in 1794 specifically to enter the Brigade whilst Conway was already serving in the British Army in 1793 on the staff of the Deputy Quarter Master General). To these facts Conway added an acidic observation that, 'I can count more years service than this gentleman can years of age.' Respecting the Viscount's abilities, Conway claimed the colonel had never visited his regiment or previously visited that of his elder brother's when he had been its lieutenant-colonel, a somewhat
ironic challenge given the Viscount had been on official leave in London with Conway at that time. Yet it was Conway's third point which possibly gives the real reason for his demand. He pointed out Viscount Walsh-Serrant's regiment had originally been his late elder brother's and its seniority appeared to date from that time. A younger, more junior officer, benefiting from his elder brother's death angered Conway (47).

Regardless of Conway's motives, it initially appeared Dublin supported him. Apart from Pelham having originally suggested Conway write to Windham, the following month Pelham himself wrote in support, suggesting Conway could also claim seniority by his being appointed colonel in October 1794 whilst the Viscount had only been so commissioned in March 1796. Yet, Pelham's letter went on to acknowledge that the officers of Walsh-Serrant's, whose hard work prior to the Viscount's appointment had ensured it had not been drafted, would feel betrayed if now the regiment was numbered fifth instead of fourth. It would, as a consequence, possibly face an earlier reduction (48). Although it had been made clear in January that regiments which individually failed adequately to recruit within four to six months would indeed be reduced, this was the first written suggestion that the problem might alternatively be dealt with by simply reducing the lowest numbered regiments. It would seem a fair explanation of Conway's change of heart, given his initial signature on the colonel's letter as to precedence, that he had become aware of this possibility.

Whatever the reasons, Conway's protest appeared to have had some impact, although not the one he would have wished. Specifically citing Conway's demand for an alteration in the ranking, Portland wrote in some exasperation to Camden on 8 July seeking a final settlement of the issue. Further dispute was ended on the pragmatic basis that as the uniforms were now settled upon and the buttons stamped with the appropriate number as directed by the King, 'The rank of the officers therefore now commanding the regiment has nothing to do with the seniority of the regiments, as
they must rank according to their original institution...' (49). In fact, Portland's exasperation caused him slightly to misrepresent the situation. Six weeks later, on 17 August, he was obliged to write again to Camden admitting he had been in error respecting his assertion regarding buttons and hence the order of ranking. The former had not yet been stamped with any numbers. He now corrected this by giving what proved to be London's final word on the issue, namely that the King's express directive as to ranking was, Fitzjames, Count Walsh-Serrant, Dillon, O'Connell, Viscount Walsh-Serrant and Conway. Additionally, '...that in order to prevent all further application for precedence I am further to direct your Excellency to give Order that the number of each Regiment shall be marked on the Buttons of the Regiments agreeably to the Rank in which they are here placed.' (50). This did not prevent Dillon writing in September to Portland vigorously protesting the Adjutant General had only just informed the colonels of this definitive ranking which placed his third when it had been first in the French service (51). Sounding a note of angry finality Portland responded that the King had agreed this ranking with Camden and himself as being the order of precedence intended back in 1794 when the Brigade was initiated (52). Meanwhile, events in mid-August rendered the heated debate over precedence futile. Although Conway's fears were confirmed regarding London's intention again to draft the Brigade and reduce the remainder, the nominal regimental numbering system had no bearing whatsoever on how regiments were selected.

In August, Dillon's and Viscount Walsh-Serrant's finally arrived in Jamaica. There they remained in garrison until early 1797 recovering from the almost inevitable outbreak of typhus that occurred on the prolonged outward voyage. From the beginning both regiments faced difficulties. Each suffered from not having full compliments of senior officers, several not yet having arrived from Ireland, Lieutenant-Colonel Stack being obliged upon landing to request the governor of Jamaica, Lord Balcarres, to appoint his senior captain, William Hussey, acting major urgently to assist him. Equally, both regiments, already weakened by confinement and
the poor diet on the transports, immediately began losing men to the climate and disease (53). This familiar and predictable pattern made inevitable, six months after the first round of drafting, York's directive on the action to be taken. Dundas directed Portland to inform Dublin that, particularly in view of the desperate need for additional manpower in the Caribbean, a third regiment of the Brigade was to be completed by drafting from the three weakest and the completed regiment embarked without delay. It was the intention that the three drafted regiments would then be reduced (54).

Although Conway's fears about reduction must have been enhanced with his regiment being numbered sixth in the Brigade, London and Dublin followed the previous practice and simply directed the completion of the strongest. Unfortunately for Conway, an inspection report by General Duff of 16 September at New Geneva revealed that Count Walsh-Serrat's was the nearest completion with 465 enrolled, whilst Fitzjames had only 276, O'Connell's 179 and Conway's 292. Consequently, on 20 September, Dublin directed the completion of Count Walsh-Serrat's for immediate embarkation and the reduction of the remainder (55).

That the practical need to maximise manpower was the driving logic behind this as opposed to any desire for financial savings or latent religious prejudice is demonstrated by the efforts made to squeeze every last soldier out of the Brigade. Dublin informed London on 3 September that the regiment being completed had had to be moved from Cork to the barracks of New Geneva, near Waterford in order to reduce desertion. Just four days later Camden suggested that the supernumerary NCOs and drummers of the three regiments to be reduced ought to embark with the completed regiment to re-enforce the two regiments already serving in the Caribbean rather than just have them paid off and lost to the service (56). The reason for this suggestion was the clause in the original letters of service that the men were only liable for duty within the Brigade and could not be drafted outside of its ranks.
Camden's logical solution to this was accepted in London, which, on 8 September, agreed embarkation at Waterford for whichever regiment was identified for completion, confirming all, '...supernumerary sergeants, corporals and drummers of the three regiments to be drafted...' should equally be dispatched (57).

This turn of events ought not to have been unexpected given the clear warnings in January that the four drafted regiments had but six months to succeed or be reduced. Regardless, within days this order produced a howl of protest from Fitzjames directed at Portland. His memorial indicates both a growing bitterness between the colonels in the competition to survive, as well as the taking of some desperate measures. Vigorously articulating that his was the senior regiment, Fitzjames pointedly reminded London that the problems of recruitment were not of his making. Rather, it was the delay in the issue of the Beating Orders and the decision back in 1794 to sanction the additional three regiments. In respect of the latter, Fitzjames bitterly protested that, while he could accept the 'ancient' regiment of Dillon, it had been a 'new regiment', Viscount Walsh-Serrant's, into which 200 of his men had been drafted in March. With this second round of drafting, he now accused Count Walsh-Serrant of cheating. Fitzjames claimed that whilst his had had the greatest number in its ranks on the 15th, '...Count Walsh received an unexpected supply of 180 men the day before the review...'. Yet, possibly the more fundamental point, the practicalities of self-interest never being far from the surface, came in the Duke's conclusion. If reduced, not only would his junior officers suffer on half-pay, he, having abandoned 'every other pursuit, and placed all his hopes in England, he will be reduced to the half-pay of £150 for himself, the Duchess of Fitzjames, and a numerous family.' Having said this, Fitzjames equally recognised he had to offer a solution if there was to be any hope of salvation. This was contained in an accompanying letter suggesting his regiment might be continued on the establishment for the purposes of raising drafts for the remaining three regiments serving abroad. If these proved sufficient and additional recruits were raised, then belatedly he could complete his own regiment.
This, he concluded, would make it four regiments as originally agreed in 1794 (58).

The initial response in London was muted. Brownrigg wrote to Pelham on 7 October conveying York's feeling of almost bemusement at the issue of precedent and further, he did not feel himself competent to intervene in the process by which Fitzjames' had been one of the regiments chosen for reduction. Concern however was expressed at Fitzjames' allegation of Walsh-Serrant's sudden acquisition of 180 recruits intended and paid for by another corps. If true, it was an illegal action. York's concern was re-enforced by receipt of a letter from Fitzjames' lieutenant-colonel, James O'Moore, specifically supporting the allegation. Consequently, Pelham was instructed to ascertain the veracity of the claim (59). A week later Pelham was able to confirm Walsh-Serrant had indeed received a substantial augmentation on the eve of inspection. But the officer supplying the men, Colonel Ogle, had raised them at his own expense for his recently reduced 128th Foot, ironically a victim of insufficient recruits himself. Pelham added that he did not believe Fitzjames' assertion that he would have greater success in raising recruits if given yet further time (60). This must have effectively sealed the matter for York as Brownrigg confirmed in late November his rejection of Fitzjames' project for survival (61). Essentially, Count Walsh-Serrant had again demonstrated his determination to ensure his regiment's survival by successfully identifying a source of available manpower. That the Count's activity marked him out from his compatriots is equally demonstrated by his residence alongside, and his concern for, his men. While several of his compatriots were effectively absentee colonels, usually resident in London, early October witnessed Walsh-Serrant write personally from New Geneva pleading a pardon for one of his men, a James Hicky, imprisoned at Drogheda. This despite the Count having to write in French, his English being inadequate (62).

While proclaiming the same concerns regarding honour and position, the financial realities of reduction appeared uppermost in other colonels' minds. O'Connell's
personal correspondence had suggested in June 1795 a less than fulsome commitment to completing his regiment, he rather treating it as an engine for his extended family's interests. Rather than challenge the prospect of reduction, upon receipt of its notification O'Connell sought only to secure the best deal for his officers. Dispatching in late October a memorial to Camden, he pleaded with him and London that if his regiment was reduced, that its officers be maintained on full pay until the declaration of peace. His first reasoning was somewhat disingenuous in that he claimed they had abandoned secure positions on the Continent in 1794 loyally to answer their countries call. In seeking sympathy, he reminded the Minister the officers had, '...evinced a most unshaken attachment to the cause of religion and monarchy in the service of a foreign prince, they fondly flattered themselves that those principles and conduct would have recommended them to His Majesty's ministers...'. This though led onto the substantive fact that as émigrés they were without other means of support.

Camden appeared sympathetic to this, and with Fitzjames' earlier memorial equally in mind, wrote his own note to accompany O'Connell's memorial. This suggested the officers could act as a valuable replacement pool filling vacancies in other regiments on the Irish Establishment (63).

Any sympathy O'Connell's apparent acceptance of the inevitable may have engendered at this point was tempered by an incident that demonstrated he equated the regiment, as it had been in French service, his personal possession and vehicle for family interest. In late November, Dublin wrote with some concern to Windham relating a transaction by O'Connell, who had reverted to having himself addressed by his French rank of 'general', which was 'certainly discreditable to him'. In light of the regiment's imminent reduction, its quartermaster, Lieutenant Daniel O'Donoghue, had, with O'Connell's approval, resigned his commission in favour of his brother for the purposes of being placed on half-pay. Before the appointment was completed O'Connell withdrew his recommendation and instead named his six-year-old nephew, Derby O'Mahony, as lieutenant and quartermaster (64). O'Donoghue's own letter and
copies of O'Connell's correspondence to him supported this accusation. The latter not only confirmed the details but also revealed the family network that linked the aggrieved lieutenant to his colonel and the turn of events. 'I was under the most positive engagement to my sister Betty McCarthy and to her daughter the widow Mahony to appoint their son and grandson to the first commission that would fall vacant. After providing for O'Connell your cousin and mine I am very reluctantly under a necessity of revoking what I had done for your Brother...because of my prior promise to a sister so justly dear to me.' O'Connell continued by promising to 'serve your family on every occasion' and implying O'Donoghue's interests would ultimately be fulfilled, signing it 'Your truly affectionate Cousin, Count O'Connell.' (65).

Before the matter went further, O'Connell, possibly cognisant that he could not act quite so blatantly, settled the issue by withdrawing the recommendation for his nephew and restoring Daniel O'Donoghue to his original post. This ensured the restored lieutenant withdrew his complaint forthwith, not necessarily wishing to alienate an influential relative. Subsequently, the six year old Mahony was commissioned as ensign and Regimental Quartermaster on 1 May 1797. This enabled the young Mahony to be placed on half-pay in December 1797 thus ensuring sufficient income for his education as a gentleman (66).

Amongst certain officers of Fitzjames' the prospect of reduction was apparently not that unwelcome either. Despite the financial implications, after two rounds of drafting Jennings at least despaired of being, '...not otherwise employed than as mere recruiting Battallns supplying those on service with constant draughts, our minds which had been accustomed to a life of activity soon revolted at the present inactive & inglorious existence to which we were reduced...& altho' it placed many of us under pecuniary embarrassments yet we in general preferred the Reduction to the service on which we were kept employed at home.' (67).
To be fair, not all officers were quite so eager to avoid active service or so fatalistic. As before with Dillon's and Viscount Walsh-Serrant's, prior to embarkation for the Caribbean, there was a flurry of exchanges as more ambitious officers exchanged into the departing Count Walsh-Serrant's. A particularly powerful example of this was the young émigré sous-lieutenant of Berwick's, Charles MacCarthy. Initially he had secured the captain-lieutenant's appointment in Henry Conway's Regiment in 1795. He subsequently gained a full captain's commission in O'Connell's with the death of one of its captains, John O'Brynne. Finally, with O'Connell's obvious lack of enthusiasm and un-likelihood of completion, in late October 1796, he exchanged with Captain William Cruice of Count Walsh-Serrant's just prior to embarkation (68). This, as with similar exchanges, could not be explained simply by younger officers exchanging with older, more infirm officers. Cruice, an émigré sous-lieutenant of Walsh's, was only two years older than MacCarthy. Equally, at the time of Count Walsh-Serrant's sailing, a captain and two lieutenants from O'Connell's, a captain from Fitzjames' and an ensign from Conway's exchanged with six counterparts in Walsh-Serrant's. As with MacCarthy and Cruice, in all cases, age and prior service were broadly similar (69).

One senior officer of Count Walsh-Serrant's chose to resign in November, his own youngest brother, Major Chevalier Philippe Walsh-Serrant. Given the lack of contradictory evidence, it may be surmised that this was due to his failure to secure an exchange, preferring resignation rather than risk the rigours of the Caribbean climate (70). This contrasts to the heroic attempts to join, having just missed the transports, of the belatedly appointed Lieutenant-Colonel O'Toole, despite, 'passing a night in a fishing boat, endeavouring to overtake the vessel...'. Meanwhile, the Count recommended the eldest captain, Edward O'Sheill, should duly replace the health conscious Chevalier. This triggered an interesting request from Pelham to Portland in January 1797. It transpired different rules applied to regiments counted as being on the Irish Establishment once they had embarked on foreign service, namely that
vacancies could be filled at the discretion of the Viceroy. While Pelham assured Portland that Dublin had no intention of interfering in the colonel's recommendations, he requested they, 'give in lists of their captains according to their seniority in the Brigade when it was in the French Kings service from which list in future vacancies may be filled up.' This officially sanctioned what had in practice been the policy of the colonels and Portland ever since the Brigade's foundation back in 1794 (71).

Before the flagged reduction could progress, fate intervened in mid-December in the form of succour, of sorts, from France. Plans to reduce the remaining three regiments were put on hold with the alarm over the appearance of a French fleet in Bantry Bay. The impact of this event can be judged by the sudden cessation of correspondence on the Brigade's future for several months. November and December saw the standard exchanges on mundane financial and administrative matters concerning the regiments, particularly the embarkation of Count Walsh-Serrant's in November. Ironically, the last of this paperwork was dated the day before Lazare Hoche's invasion fleet sailed on 16 December (72). The presence for several days of troop-laden enemy warships off the Irish coast caused consternation in Dublin. Although there were in Ireland approximately 28,500 troops, only some 5600 of these were stationed in the southwest under General Dalrymple and the bulk of these were militia. Ironically, back in early September, Dublin had been forwarded intelligence reports by London indicating French plans for this descent. They had specifically referred to Count Walsh-Serrant, then in Dublin, for his expert opinion as to the reliability of the source and the likelihood of such an event. His response was to question the veracity of the informer and categorically to relate that he had heard that, 'the County of Kerry...were of no consideration.' The Count buttressed these observations by introducing Camden to another émigré, De Latocnaye who confirmed Walsh-Serrant's judgement. These observations were duly reported to London (73).

Despite the expert advice of one of the Brigade's senior officers proving to be fatuous,
Camden recognised their professionalism and immediately utilised their services, ‘...to supply the want of experience in the Officers of Militia by sending to General Dalrymple the best Officers of the Irish Brigade to act as supernumerary Aide de Camp...’ (74). They themselves had, upon news of the French fleet, offered their services, and on 26 December Pelham wrote to Dalrymple confirming Dublin's approval, commenting, ‘...many of them might be usefully employed with the light troops and on the outposts where I fear...Militiamen will be at a loss and...the most intelligent and experienced of them should be employed...’. Pelham went on to particularly recommend one officer, ‘...Captain Mahony of O'Connell's...a very good Partizan ...you may employ him in any manner you like.' (75). General Dalrymple himself was certainly impressed by Major James Conway, making specific mention of his valuable observations of French warships in Bantry Bay (76). Five months later, possibly reflecting Conway's desire not to find himself a victim of proposed reductions and reflecting a clear identification against the forces of domestic insurgence, when Dalrymple reported on growing social unrest he requested that, ‘Major Conway wishes much to serve the Campaign as Aide de Camp and I can with truth say, he will prove a useful one.’ (77). In the event, the subsequent decision to dispatch his regiment to Halifax caused the Major to abandon this request.

Despite the abject failure of Hoche's invasion, the Dublin and Westminster Parliaments were equally vocal in their criticism of the Royal Navy and Army. While the arbitrary nature of the wind could offer the former an excuse, the government had not even that fig leaf in respect of the insufficient number of troops and their general state of unpreparedness, particularly protecting Cork. Alongside these concerns for the military situation in Ireland, Camden's reminder to London about the inability of the Brigade's men to be drafted beyond its ranks appears to have caused the War Office to delay any final decision regarding reduction. Never wishing to lose the services of any soldiers, particularly in the immediate context of Hoche's near coup, the War Office acknowledged, ‘...there was a specific clause in the capitulation for
'That the late threatened invasion and the disturbances in consequence, have materially impeded the progress of the Recruiting Service...and have in each totally suspended their operations for more than a month, by the impossibility of obtaining money for their drafts on the British agents...They conceive this indulgence can be attended with no inconvenience, as the usual season for the embarkation of forces for the West Indies is elapsed.' (79).

Apart from the fact that the colonels were indulging in selective interpretation of recent events to fit their case, any hope they might have had convincing Dublin and London that their failure to raise sufficient men was not their fault was compromised by a complaint that Portland received from Camden. Originating from a Lieutenant-Colonel MacDonnell, although fully echoed by Camden, it directed attention to the 'expediency' being indulged in by recruiters for the Brigade that was damaging recruitment for the general service. Essentially, Fitzjames' desperation was revealed by the offer of a bounty of £20 rather than the £15 originally allowed for in the Beating Orders. Further, this was not the first occasion this complaint had been raised given Camden included a copy of a previous circular letter to all six colonels from York. This ordered the practice to cease forthwith as despite previous directives, 'the Recruiting service in this Kingdom, is materially injured by the Regiments of the Irish Brigade...' (80). In addition, criticism from within the Irish establishment surfaced again in a very public manner when Lord Blaney criticised the émigré officers commanding the Brigade during a debate in the Irish House of Lords in early February. This resulted in a challenge from Fitzjames and consequently a well-publicised duel between the two noble Lords in Phoenix Park. Whilst honour was satisfied and the matter amicably settled, the whole episode reveals a growing debate...
about the prolonged failure to complete the Brigade (81).

It was obvious that, despite a vigorous effort to find men, the original expectations that additional Irish Catholics would be attracted to the project had proved ill founded. The Beating Orders of 1 July 1795 had given the regiments four months to raise their compliment. In light of the initial administrative and financial delays, whilst York had drafted the corps, he had extended the period for the remaining four regiments by another six months beyond harvest time. With the further delay triggered by the Bantry Bay episode, the remaining three regiments had had over twenty months to succeed, far in excess of what was normally allowed. Nonetheless, Fitzjames continued to appoint new officers as if his corps had a future, the War Office acknowledging on 27 February his recommendation for Lieutenant Andrew Mullarcky to become the regimental adjutant (82). However, a brief note, dated 20 February, from General Abercromby in Trinidad to Huskinsson, may well have begun the countdown to the final decision regarding reduction, 'The Irish Brigade is already one half in the hospital, or on the invalid list-It is in vain to send such troops.' (83). Whether it was Abercromby's dispatch or a final loss of patience over the lack of recruits, within weeks, London, with the agreement of Dublin, finally judged that this was time enough and the decision for reduction could no longer be delayed.

While the ultimate fate of the Brigade was about to be settled, another separate element of its troubled existence had just been played out. With the decision to re-raise the Brigade in October 1794, it was understood each regiment, as with the rest of the army, required a regimental chaplain. Technically, the 1793 Irish Relief Act meant there was no formal legal barrier to this. Nonetheless, it was a delicate issue given the Pope was required by the Catholic Church to authorise any priest who acted as a chaplain. At the time it therefore appeared fortunate the trusted individual needed to arrange this existed in the form of Dr. Thomas Hussey, then resident in London. A friend of Burke's since August 1790, he had been closely involved with the work of
the Committee of English Catholics. Equally, he had for many years been chaplain to
the Spanish Embassy in London and had extended family links in Ireland and to
certain émigrés in the Brigade (84). Given Hussey’s vehemently expressed opposition
to Jacobinism and his support for the Crown, he had already established himself as a
lobbyist alongside Burke for various measures of relief. Inevitably, he had also been
involved in 1794 on the periphery of the debate about re-raising the Brigade.

As early as 10 October 1794 Portland requested Hussey procure the necessary qualified chaplains for the Brigade. Hussey immediately responded he would first have to obtain, 'the usual authority to subdelegate to said Chaplains the necessary qualifications.' (85). Hussey also assured Portland that it was a requirement the Pope had to appoint a Chaplain General to the Brigade with the authority to appoint the chaplains. Portland agreed to this, confirming the King would commission Hussey as Chaplain General upon receipt of the Pope's appointment (86). Given the British government still lacked official links to Rome, despite the presence of Monsignor Erskine at St.James, the process of gaining this delegated authority was necessarily convoluted. Hussey essentially acted as an agent on behalf of the British government. All communication originating with Hussey passed through Erskine to Rome and back again, with Hussey finally reporting progress to Portland at the end of this chain, thus ensuring a considerable delay as correspondence was exchanged. The matter was further tied up with the establishment, in late 1795, of the Royal College of Saint Patrick at Maynooth of which Hussey became the first President in January 1796. Apart from the additional correspondence generated with Rome, further delay was added, required as he was, to shuttle between London and Maynooth (87).

Inevitably, this extended chain threw up misunderstandings, not least the Pope's failure fully to comprehend the finesse required of Hussey. Whilst both Portland and Pelham made it clear London and Dublin simply wanted Hussey appointed Chaplain General to the Brigade, thereby limiting his role to its six regiments, Hussey sought a
greater remit. He succeeded, by July 1796, in having Rome dispatch, through Erskine, Hussey's investiture, 'with spiritual authority over [all] the Irish Catholic troops in His Majesty's Service, in every part of the world.' He then presented this fait accompli to Portland for the necessary Royal approval, reminding him of, 'the letter from your Grace's office in November 1794, desiring me to call for this power, expressed that it should be obtained from the "Proper authority"' (88). Essentially, the appointment of chaplains for the Brigade had become tied up with Hussey's determination to extend his role in combating all aspects of discrimination against Irish Catholics. Apparently fighting shy of awarding Hussey the general appointment he and the Pope wished, the King simply confirmed his appointment as 'Chaplain' to the Brigade on 11 July, the day after Portland's receipt of Hussey's commission from the Pope (89).

In fact, Hussey's appointment was largely of symbolic significance. Back in 1795, the spiritual needs of the soldiers were judged of sufficient importance that each regiment had, 'a chaplain appointed by his Majesty like every other Regiment in His service...' (90). As early as April 1795 Peter O'Brien was appointed chaplain by Lieutenant-Colonel Stack on the staff of what had been Thomas Conway's regiment, Daniel McCarthy on that of O'Connell's, Dr. Mackernyne on that of Henry Conway's and by May, James O'Fallon on that of Dillon's (91). Before being confirmed there was some debate between Hussey and Pelham as to whether these appointments ought to be notified in both the English and Irish gazettes. Given legal and religious concerns, the officers' appointments had only been announced in the Irish Gazette. It was therefore agreed in December that the chaplains' appointments would only be officially sanctioned by publication in the Irish Gazette once confirmation of Hussey's status was received (92). This promptly threw up the problem that these Catholic chaplains came under the auspices of the Army's existing chaplain general, an Anglican. An example of the difficulty this caused came in June 1796 when the War Office found it necessary to request the chaplain of Conway's, a Mr. O'Connor, return pay he had improperly drawn in advance up to March 1797. It awkwardly fell, particularly in the
context of the generally delicate political situation then pertaining in Ireland, to an Anglican priest to demand money be returned from a Catholic priest (93). Essentially, until Hussey's formal appointment in July, the chaplains' status remained uncertain. Camden though was still obliged in mid-August to question the King's appointment of Hussey as chaplain as it omitted the word 'General'. This was subsequently corrected (94).

The civil and military administration in Dublin had good reason to be highly sensitive in respect of the issue of Catholic soldiers' right to their own religious service and were correspondingly concerned at both Hussey's title and his willingness to exploit this to extend his role beyond the Brigade. In September, Dublin Castle received a report of growing disaffection and the swearing of United Irishman amongst the Catholic militia of the City of Limerick Regiment at Blaris Camp. At the same moment Camden received allegations that the Catholic rank and file of certain regiments of militia stationed at Ardfinnan had been compelled to attend Protestant Sunday service (95). In fact, there was little evidence of bigotry in this latter event; rather it transpired it was due to certain senior officers' blinkered insistence on the articles of war, originally written on the assumption of a mono-faith army, which required soldiers to attend divine service. After much debate between the officers concerned and Dublin and London, Portland effectively decided the issue by directing on, 5 October, that, regardless of a given camp commander's objections, a Catholic priest had to be present at any camp where Catholic soldiers were billeted (96).

Nonetheless, the matter threatened to become a major political issue as, not by accident, it coincided with another attempt by Gratton to raise the issue of Catholics having the right to sit in the Irish Commons. In a speech in mid-October specifically reported by Pelham to Portland, Gratton pointed to a variety of proofs of Catholic loyalty to the Crown with reference to the government's promotion, '...of Roman Catholic alliances on the continent, had connected themselves even with that Pope,
whose influence on the Irish they used as an argument for withholding their privileges from them...and...the Irish Brigade, had been entrusted with the sword of power in the Kingdom...'. He had then compared these to their refusal to complete the process of emancipation (97). The events at Ardfinnan threatened to add ammunition to Gratton's accusations of double standards. Fortunately for Dublin, the issue of religious observation was closed at that point by the intervention of the October rains. The colonels at Ardfinnan confirmed it was no longer possible to hold the drumhead Sunday parade and all soldiers simply attended their respective churches (98).

Despite the Ardfinnan incident ultimately becoming a proverbial storm in a teacup, Hussey still chose to exploit the situation. Even as the autumn rains literally damped down the affair, Pelham angrily commented to Portland, on 26 October, that the good Dr. Hussey, 'has conducted himself in such a manner as entirely to forfeit my confidence.' Given his official appointment, Pelham was furious that Hussey had apparently used the events at Ardfinnan in anti-government speeches, 'in shops and public places...', promising to warn soldiers, 'against the sin of attending Protestant service and directing them to resist by force any orders they might receive from their officers on that subject.' Accusing Hussey of vanity, impropriety and deformation, Pelham again requested confirmation of Hussey's claim to have been appointed by the Pope, 'Vicar Apostolic over all the Catholic Military of Ireland', given he was using this title to add weight to his accusations (99).

Pelham's apprehension at this blatant challenge to military authority at a time of rising concern at the activities of the United Irishmen was rapidly re-enforced. Having again indignantly attacked, 'the compulsion applied to whip catholic soldier to Protestant worship', in early 1797 Hussey was appointed Bishop of Waterford. He promptly published a passionate pastoral letter directing Catholic soldiers not to attend Protestant services, instructing them that their officers had no legal authority to so order them (100). His belated eagerness to involve himself in this issue, regardless of
the facts, appears to link back to London's refusal to recognise his authority over Catholic soldiers outside of the Brigade. Portland had written on 1 November in response to Pelham in an equally angry manner at the revelation that Hussey had solicited, on his own initiative and without reference to London, the Pope's appointment as 'Vicar Apostalick over all or any of the Catholic Military in Ireland.' Portland stressed that if London had known or suspected that Hussey would make such an 'improper' use of the original request he would never have been approached in the first place. Having said this, Portland accepted Hussey's status precluded London from making it an issue at that point, although official recognition of any appointment in the Army beyond that of Chaplain General to the Brigade was out of the question (101).

Although unconnected to the activities of Hussey, it is something of an irony that, having initiated the whole saga due to the need to appoint Catholic chaplains, during the summer of 1796 it was decided to abolish the post of regimental chaplain throughout the British Army. On 30 September the War Office dispatched a circular to most regiments stating, 'that the office of regimental chaplain shall be gradually abolished.' The reasons were purely practical in that the rapid expansion of the Army had made it impossible to find suitable clergy to fill all posts, particularly given the modest stipend the army provided. There were also a growing number of complaints regarding chaplains who failed to attend upon their regiments, particularly on overseas service. Instead, it was intended that regiments quartered in Britain and Ireland would call upon the services of local parish clergy. For regiments serving abroad the Chaplain General would be responsible for providing chaplains to collectively service regiments on a given station, although he was not to be responsible for the performance of their duties.

This abolition was not immediate or universal though. The Reverend Gamble was appointed by Windham the new Chaplain General to oversee the progressive
dissolution of regimental chaplaincies. Meanwhile, colonels were given until 25 December to confirm existing office holders who would then be permitted to continue their functions until such time as they chose to retire. Upon retirement chaplains would receive a lifelong allowance of four shillings per day (102). As the Brigade was counted as serving abroad on the Irish Establishment it was not initially included in the circular of 30 September (103). This omission was corrected as each colonel was informed of the situation by the War Office (104). Windham separately confirmed that to compensate each colonel for the loss of benefits from the right to grant the post, if the last holder of a chaplaincy died during the lifetime of the colonel, the colonel would receive £500 (105).

The reaction of the colonels to this news diverged from that of their chaplains in a manner that suggested the latter were less than enamoured of their position. With the deadline of 25 December in mind, Conway applied in early December for the appointment of Daniel Bernard Connor as regimental chaplain in place of the Reverend Dr. Mackernyne who had never appeared. Dillon also wrote to ensure a similar appointment, thereby suggesting the colonels' concern at ensuring these posts were filled (106). Yet the day after Camden wrote to confirm Conway's letter, Windham circulated throughout the army a list of regimental chaplains who had voluntarily expressed a wish to retire forthwith; this included all six of the Brigades serving chaplains' (107). Among them was the newly appointed Daniel Connor, and in February 1797 the War Office confirmed he had indeed been placed on the retirement list as of 25 December, two days after confirmation of his appointment (108). Having said this, the War Office equally confirmed that at least one chaplain, Mr. O'Keef of Viscount Walsh-Serrant's, had belatedly chosen to remain in post and was preparing to join his regiment in the Caribbean. This correspondence also directed that all future matters relating to the chaplains of the Brigade were to be directed to the Reverend Gamble, no mention being made of Dr. Hussey whose appointment evaporated with the general abolition of regimental chaplains (109).
At this point, in early 1797, the colonels' concerns for regimental chaplains and the wider question of Catholic soldiers' religious observance was firmly submerged as news of the pending decision to reduce the entire Brigade returned to top the agenda.
ST. DOMINQUE, REDUCTION, DISSOLUTION AND DISPERSAL.

The 180 men of the 87e ci-devant Dillon who entered British service in September 1793 were the last vestiges of the French Army's Brigade who continued loyally serving the Army they had originally been raised to drive from Ireland. Yet these troops were welcome to their old enemy given there were few British troops, not only to provide an adequate garrison for the Môle, but, within days of Whitelock's arrival, the many surrounding towns capitulating to him, who pleaded for protection from Sonthonax's mainly Negro forces who were daily reported as carrying out fresh atrocities. One of the more important of these towns was St. Marc and in mid-December 1793 a force under the command of brevet Major Thomas Brisbane, including a detachment of Dillon's, were dispatched on HMS Magician to secure it. This was as much to prevent it falling into Spanish hands (whose troops were already in the area), as to protecting it from Sonthonax. This proved to be a major test of Dillon's loyalty as on arrival on 18 December there was a tense stand-off when the French garrison of 130 men, '... with National Cockades in their hats & other badges of Republicanism', refused to lay down their arms when drawn up opposite Brisbane's small force in the main square of the town. Brisbane's report praised the steadiness of O'Farrell's men when 'The detachment of the 49th Regt. & Dillons Regiment were ordered to load & march within thirty yards of them', this despite facing two 4lb cannon loaded with grape. From Brisbane's report, his small force's display of resolution both persuaded the garrison to surrender and over 80 to enter British service, the remainder being shipped to Republican territory. Further, this greatly assisted in reaching a modus vivendi with the Spanish (1).

Meanwhile it was decided to extend British control to the town of Bombarde and the parish of Jean Rabel to protect the local planters from raids. Accordingly, on 19
December, a mixed force of local militia, O'Farrell and five officers and seventy men of Dillon's and a small force of British regulars, all under the command of Major Dening, marched first to Bombarde and thence into Jean Rabel. There followed a series of sharp skirmishes with black troops in which O'Farrell and his men were credited with bearing the brunt of the combat in a series of sharp jungle encounters and assaults on various strong points. Again, it is an indication of their standing that O'Farrell's men were given the advanced guard, the local militia being commented upon in highly negative terms. The success of this operation briefly brought much of the northern peninsula under the British flag, an area vital to the Môle which relied on it for food and other supplies, as well as persuading the local black troops to take the oath of loyalty to Britain (2).

January 1794 found a detachment, including two of Dillon's captains, along with eighty men from the 49th plus some Marines, reinforcing various points in Jean Rabelle, the captains apparently being detailed to take command of some of the mulatto troops who had taken the oath of allegiance and required competent leadership. This was confirmed by a subsequent letter of 28 April where reference was made to the suppression, by rebelling mulatto troops, of the small post of Darrai, an appendage of Jean Rabelle, commanded by a captain of Dillon's (3). The bulk of the regiment though was stationed at St. Marc, a key point in what became a major attempt by Whitelocke, although ultimately abortive, to capture Port au Prince with his very mixed bag of regulars, local Royalist militia, and a few black troops. Dillon's appears to have played no active part in subsequent field operations, part remaining at the Môle while the balance garrisoned St. Marc.

Until its final dissolution in 1798, a number of issues continued to plague both Dillon's and its new masters, issues mirroring those of the Brigade in Ireland. The most pressing was the gross over provision of officers linked to the on-going debate over arrears of pay. As previously related, O'Farrell had promoted every member of
the regiment to ensure its loyalty in September 1793. By May 1794 Williamson was determined to sort matters, attempting to buy off surplus officers and re-organise the remaining ranks into a more effective force. His intentions were undoubtedly reinforced by a report of 26 July 1794, drawn-up by Whitelock as to the state of troops in St. Dominique, particularly the garrison of the Môle.

'Dillons Regiment which has been stationed there certainly requires reform and the introduction of a corps of professional officers different from those of which it is now composed. Most of them were brought from the ranks, and appointed by Major O'Farrell more to prevent their being mischievous than as a reward for any merit they possess. Lt-Col: W: is of opinion that scarcely any of the subaltern officers are to be turned and but few of the Captains, and he has formed this opinion from circumstances that happened during his command which too closely proved the adherence of the greater part of the Regt. to the French Revolution.' (4).

With questions over the quality and loyalty of the officers, Williamson sought to appoint Major Spencer of the 13th Foot as brevet lieutenant-colonel of Dillon's, with O'Farrell to be appointed a substantive major and the formation to change its name to the Regiment of the Môle. Although Williamson praised Spencer as a 'gallant & good officer' to Dundas and felt the change of title would help sever the identification of the ranks with their previous loyalty, Dundas apparently rejected all these recommendations. Brevet Major O'Farrell remained in command and Dillon's retained its old name (5).

While Spencer was not appointed, at least one new officer was, a Lieutenant Roderick Maclean. An officer with over twenty years of service, he had been reduced on half-pay in 1784 and was living with relatives in Jamaica. Described as eager to return to active service, he was appointed in Dillon's as a lieutenant by Williamson shortly after it formally entered British service. Sadly for Maclean he did not survive long to enjoy
his new employment as May 1795 found his widow, Christian Maclean, petitioning the Secretary of War for a pension for herself and their two orphan children (6).

Whilst no further new officers were appointed, Williamson suggested, 'The regiment might be recruited in Ireland, & if we are so fortunate as to capture possession of the principal posts of saint Dominque the regiment would be soon complete from the number of Germans who would enlist.' (7). Given the original multinational composition of Dillon's when in French service, it is interesting that the British authorities equally perceived it more a multinational formation than specifically Irish. As with Williamson's other suggestions regarding the future of the corps, Dundas did not allow it to recruit in Ireland as this would have caused unwelcome competition with the new Brigade about to be raised there. Meanwhile, Williamson wrote again on 13 September conveying the proposition of the Marquis de la Roche Jacquelin for 'augmenting' Dillon's from local sources, although he expressed doubts as to the 'character or abilities' of the Marquis (8). As to obtaining local recruits, there is little evidence to suggest this occurred, subsequent returns for Dillon's recording an ever-downward spiral of its strength.

A separate issue that, ironically, did not prove a major issue, was the appointment of a Catholic chaplain. On 8 March 1794, Bishop Douglas 'of Centario-Delegate of the Holy See for Saint Domingo' wrote to Williamson confirming his official appointment by Dundas to deal with spiritual matters in the predominantly Catholic colony. He requested Williamson forward the necessary papers to the King to confirm the appointment of three émigré French priests, one of whom, Monsieur Prevot, was to be chaplain to Dillon's. As with the Brigade in Ireland, Portland wrote to Williamson on 8 August confirming just such a request had been laid before the King and signed, allowing them 'to fulfil their Ecclesiastical functions.' Subsequently, a chaplain was listed on the regiment's plummeting strength (9).
Meanwhile, divided between the Môle and St. Marc, apart from the climate, the brutal nature of the conflict continued sapping the strength of all formations including Dillon's. On 5 September Lieutenant-Colonel Brisbane, writing from St. Marc, reported the massacre of a detachment of 60 men, of whom 12 were Dillon's, at Petite Rivière by Negro troops who had previously taken the oath of allegiance (10).

Williamson continued asking Dundas for recruits to Dillon's, it being one of the more reliable émigré formations in British service. On 20 September Brisbane praised O'Farrell by name '...for the services he rendered me', and Williamson continued pressing Dundas for the arrears owed to Dillon's diminishing ranks (11). Just how diminished is revealed by a general return of 8 December 1794 of all forces available to Williamson on St. Dominique which recorded just 30 effectives for Dillon's (12). At this point, it appears there was a suggestion that these survivors be incorporated into the new Brigade. Indeed, Henry Dillon, designated colonel of the soon to be re-embodied Dillon's, expressed this interest in September 1794, suggesting a second battalion be raised to incorporate these survivors into his new formation (13).

Williamson, whilst acknowledging Dillon's logic, nonetheless felt the corps would be better recruited under its old name, for writing to Dundas on 14 January 1795, '...their number few but have uniformly behaved with a great deal of spirit; if this Regiment is not to be & continue it's name, it might not be amiss to incorporate it into the two catholic Corps, but I really think if the Regiment was completed, & preserve its name, that the Esprit du Corps would be kept up, there are some exceeding good officers in it.' (14).

Williamson's comments were in direct contradiction to his and Whitelock's statements six months prior and it may be surmised that the intervening period had witnessed Dillon's perform sufficiently well to ensure this about face in opinion. Despite this, the continued ebbing away of its strength ensured the suggestion of it becoming the cadre of a second battalion of Henry Dillon's corps re-surfed in June 1795 when O'Farrell received permission to voyage to England to petition for his men's
outstanding arrears. Williamson's warm personal recommendation of O'Farrell and O'Neill aimed to convince Dundas to direct some of the Brigade's expected Irish recruits to its erstwhile ancestor without the original losing its identity or its officers, 'Understanding that one of the Corps to be raised in Ireland is to be commanded by one of the family of Dillon I think it would be of service to establish the regiment here as a second Battalion to it, & in that case I beg to recommend Major O'Farrell to be Lieut: Coll, & captain O'Neil the Eldest captain to be major.' (15).

An effusive letter of O'Farrell's addressed from London on 8 December to Dundas's Secretary, William Huskisson, demonstrates he made the journey (16). Yet the suggestion appears to have fallen on stony ground, most likely due to the difficulties the Brigade had even raising sufficient recruits for its regiments. O'Farrell was back in St.Dominque by early 1796 without the arrears and with his tiny corps continued as a separate formation. The only beneficiary was O'Neill who was breveted major and given additional responsibilities in the defence of St.Marc, a return of 26 November 1795 giving Dillon's an active strength of just 27 men. Yet, either some of those who were sick recovered or there was indeed some local recruitment, for on 12 February 1796 it returned 66 effectives (17). Meanwhile, O'Farrell was quartered at the Môle, receiving there a proportion of the outstanding arrears in June 1796 (18). This brief superfluity of men did not last long for by 1 November a detailed return listed just 16 all told, 1 major, 3 captains, 4 lieutenants, 1 chaplain, 1 quartermaster, 1 masters mate, 1 sergeant, 2 drummers and 2 sick privates (19).

The return of November 1796 was the last such mention of Dillon's as a substantive formation, although not the last mention of O'Farrell and his 10 surviving officers. On 9 July 1797 General John Simcoe dispatched to York a memorial of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas McDermott, commanding the 3rd Regiment 'Dillon's' of the Brigade, protesting vehemently against Simcoe's appointment of Major O'Neill, O'Farrell's senior captain, to a company of the 3rd Regiment. Simcoe enclosed a memorial of
O'Neill's relating his part in the recent defence of St. Marc by defending Fort Churchill with detachments of the 17th Foot, 67th Foot and colonial militia. Simcoe himself bore testimonial, '...to the gallant and spirited conduct of Major O'Neill...' (20). These documents indicate the remaining officers of Dillon's utilisation as reliable commanders of key posts and mixed detachments long after the effective demise of their unit. They also indicate that there was no love lost between those who had chosen emigration prior to 1793 and those who remained to serve the Republic until local colonial factors brought an apparent change of heart. McDermott, a major of Berwick's, had accompanied Fitzjames' mass emigration of 1791 whilst O'Neill remained in French service.

Given the general emphasis on the need to utilise all possible manpower, it is slightly ironic that none of the three regiments of the Brigade dispatched to the Caribbean in 1796 were immediately utilised for active service. Disembarking 491 and 473 effectives respectively at Port Royal on Jamaica in July 1796, both Dillon's and Viscount Walsh-Serrant's took up residence to kick their heels in garrison at Fort Augusta and Spanish Town. By November, climate and disease reduced Dillon's to 15 officers and 395 effectives whilst Walsh-Serrant's recorded 13 officers and 323 effectives. In an attempt to stem the losses, over two tons of medicines were dispatched in early December, with further medical chests departing in January. Local manpower was also utilised with each regiment adding 20 'black pioneers' to their establishment for labouring tasks (21). By February 1797, Viscount Walsh-Serrant's suffered such staggering losses to climate and disease it was effectively destroyed as a coherent formation. Its interminable yet destructive wait appears to have frayed even the most senior officers' nerves as on 19 September 1796 its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Stack, shot dead in a duel his second in command, Major William O'Shea (22). This effectively hamstrung its command structure, the senior captain taking command of the survivors. The ultimate consequence was, without ever having heard a shot fired in anger, 5 of its captains and 3 of its lieutenants were...
transferred to Dillon's on 17 February to fill its vacancies, along with 63 of its remaining effectives. Preparations were then made for the return voyage of its remaining cadre (23). Alongside the transfers, that Dillon's officers had particularly suffered from local conditions is further indicated by the promotion of Quartermaster Sergeant Daniel Roe to the rank of ensign due to the demise of Ensign John McDaniel (24).

Despite wastage, on 11 April 1797, Dillon's reinforced ranks constituted the bulk of some 500 men transferred from Jamaica to St.Dominque in an attempt to stabilise the deteriorating military situation. Inclusive of transfers, Dillon's listed only 336 officers and men, Simcoe describing them on arrival as a `disgrace' (25). Nonetheless, Dillon's ever reducing ranks were soon in action. Its remaining 260 men were part of a 2000 strong British and colonial column under Colonel Des Sources which successfully seized enemy positions on the heights above the Rivière Froide. Elements of the regiment were then engaged at St.Laurent and Bouittilleir on 16 and 17 April (26). This exertion though was effectively its death knell as within months less than twenty percent of its remaining ranks were still listed as being with its colours, the regiment burying 75 men in September alone (27). This sharp decline was reflected in the monthly sums credited back in London by the War Office to Dillon's agent. In August it stood at £600, by October £470 and by November just £230 (28). By December the Times listed 12 of its officers as having died from disease between July and September alone, and that same month, having been reduced to just 16 officers and 45 effectives, Dillon's was embarked on the transport Catherine for England (29).

This dismal pattern was mostly repeated by the third regiment of the Brigade, Count Walsh-Serrant's when it arrived in the Caribbean, the stresses of the outward-bound journey exacerbating the impact of climate and disease. Upon landing in early February 1797, Inspector Young of the Medical Board was immediately obliged to write to Pelham reporting 36 of its men had been buried in passage. A further 246 had
had to be landed due to sickness at Barbados with a further 100 subsequently landed as sick at St.Pierre on Martinique. The Inspector commented disparagingly that the men were, '...very improper objects to be sent out...'. He balanced this though by adding that the regiment had not been provided with any medicines when departing Ireland which, he felt, had significantly contributed to the state of affairs. Nonetheless, this information was subsequently dispatched to Camden in late May with a covering letter from Brownrigg highlighting the regiment's dismal condition (30). It would be fair to surmise that in light of subsequent correspondence, this, along with the fate of the other two regiments, materially contributed to London's final decision on the Brigade's future.

Apart from it failure to recruit, its expense and its losses in the Caribbean, it would be tempting to view the final decision to disband the Brigade in the context of the rising concerns regarding the activities of the United Irishmen amongst certain of the Catholic Yeomanry. There is ample evidence that United Irishmen were attempting subversion: in late 1796 amongst the Tipperary militia stationed outside of Londonderry and in the early months of 1797 within the Monaghan regiment. During 1797, two soldiers each from the Wexford militia and Kildare regiment were court-martialled and shot as United Irishmen, whilst 10 privates of the Louth regiment were sentenced to overseas service (31). Equally, a year later, in August 1798, Dublin informed London that leading figures amongst the United Irishmen, O'Connor, Emmet and McNeven, had expressed the intention to welcome any Irish officer in foreign service, be it French, Spanish or Austrian, who wished to join with them. Dublin though made it clear that there was no indication any officer had, although the suspicion was expressed that Dr. Hussey, 'has sent returns of the state and temper of the Catholics in Ireland to the Spanish Government.' (32). Apart from these vague expressions of concern, before the Brigade's reduction, there was not the least suggestion that such anxieties played any part in its dissolution. In fact, their record of discipline was more than adequate given their expected destination. In September
1795, on being informed they were to be drafted for service in the Caribbean, the 104th, 105th, 111th and 113th Foot all mutinied. Written declarations by certain of the mutineers suggest the infiltration of United Irishmen (33). By 1797, the Brigade had an established record of drafting for the Caribbean, yet there was no indication this caused any ill discipline or rendered its soldiers susceptible to the blandishments of the United Irishmen.

As it was, the first specific indication that the long delayed process of reduction was seriously intended came on 18 March, in a letter from Windham to Pitt. The former angrily protested that, 'I hear from the D. of G. [Duke of Gloucester] that you are going to reduce all foreign Corps, except [those]...remaining in the West Indies.' Windham emphasised his astonishment at the suggestion by rhetorically questioning, 'I don't know, what sort of a war you mean to carry on,...'. Although not revealing the specifics, he linked this move to complaints made against Colonel Dillon, accusations Windham dismissed as, 'wholly without foundation.' (34). Three days later, Portland confirmed that he and Dundas would fulfil a request for additional troops for the garrison of Nova-Scotia from its commander, HRH Prince Edward. Subsequently, on 7 April, Portland wrote to inform the Prince it would be Conway's (35). Between the dates of these two letters, whatever may or may not have transpired in London involving Dillon, although it was most likely linked to his continuing campaign for a peerage, the decision was taken to reduce the Brigade to just two regiments. On 6 April Dundas informed Portland of reduction forthwith to two regiments due to heavy financial costs, the lack of Irish recruits and the prodigious losses in the Caribbean. The effectives still serving in the Caribbean were to be amalgamated into one, whilst those of the three regiments still in Ireland were equally to be incorporated into a single battalion and dispatched with all speed to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Meanwhile, the accounts of the four reduced regiments were to be settled as rapidly as possible to allow all surplus officers to be placed on half-pay. Four days later, Portland forwarded these instructions to Camden ordering him to carry them through with all possible
dispatch. He added a footnote to the effect that the saga of the Brigade demonstrated that in future the quality of regimental inspections required improvement to allow for more effective long-term planning (36). Equally, on 6 April, Dundas had already written to Prince Edward confirming a 700 strong regiment of the Brigade, as yet unspecified, was to be dispatched without delay. As a possible straw in the wind, Dundas added that this corps would be his to command for the summer, implying that come the autumn it might no longer be so (37).

Cognisant of Portland's closing comments, a detailed inspection of the three regiments in Ireland, between 4-15 April, provided Camden with the concrete information required formally to begin the process of drafting and reduction. On 26 and 27 April Camden variously reported back to Portland that of these, Fitzjames fielded a total fit for service of 220 effectives, O'Connell's 85 and Conway's 473. Apart from these returns confirming O'Connell's oft-demonstrated lack of enthusiasm to complete his regiment, it was obvious there were indeed only sufficient men to complete one more regiment. In line with previous practice, Conway's, as the strongest, was completed by drafting the other two. The resulting supernumerary NCOs, drummers and privates being equally prepared for dispatch to reinforce the 'Third regiment', (almost certainly Dillon's), serving in the Caribbean as apparently the regiment chosen to survive there (38). Having said this, as late as 10 May, the War Office was writing to the effect that, "...which two are to stand is not yet determined upon.' Given subsequent correspondence, London's final decision must have been made only days later (39).

Little or no time was wasted in executing the completion of Conway's, although its dispatch was somewhat delayed. As early as 2 May the War Office wrote, in light of York's earlier circular, to query a claim made by the regimental agent, Mr.Armstrong, for a recruitment bounty of £20 when Windham had previously confirmed it was set at £15. The query revealed Conway's had already been brought to a strength of over 700 effectives ready for embarkation (40). Meanwhile, the Prince wrote from Halifax
on 1 June that he had high hopes Conway's would be arriving without delay, as otherwise he would be forced to draft additional local militia during the harvest. Despite this urgency, final departure was prevented by adverse weather and the ever-pervasive administrative delays for almost four months (41). Dublin, having received four months' subsistence from the British Establishment for Conway's, was able to confirm that the entire regiment was finally embarked at Passage for Halifax on 21 June. The embarkation return demonstrated the corps had absorbed every last private soldier left to the Brigade in Ireland; 68 sergeants, 75 corporals, 52 drummers and fife and 818 privates being listed as ultimately boarding the vessels along with 78 women and 89 children. As yet there was no indication this regiment did not have a long-term future as a further 6 sergeants, 4 corporals and 5 privates remained behind for 'recruiting' purposes. Equally demonstrating an expectation of a prolonged posting abroad, the embarkation return reveals that many officers were to follow later, in that, alongside the lieutenant-colonel, only 5 captains, 8 lieutenants and 4 ensigns boarded with their men. Major James Conway was still listed as being on General Dalrymple's staff in Cork, although by early 1798 he had arrived in Halifax (42).

Despite this promising start, further bad weather and administrative failings effectively crippled this regiment, leaving it to arrive considerably below strength and vulnerable to reduction. On 21 June Lieutenant-General Crosbie at Wexford detained the transports at the direction of York when it was discovered that the Board of Ordnance had failed to deliver all the regiment's arms. The troops remained on board for over three weeks despite the delivery of the necessary arms on 26 June and Huskisson's direction to Charles Grenville ordering Conway's to sail on 29 June (43). Grenville himself though queried this order to Pelham on 7 July as, in addition to the wait for arms, he further delayed sailing on the understanding that new orders were due to arrive. Pelham indeed confirmed this on 15 July, indicating a possible new destination was pending from London (44). Before such orders arrived, the five transports, having been joined by their escort, HMS Porcupine, sailed on 5 August,
only to be separated two days later by severe gales, all but one transport being blown back to Waterford by 15 August. It was remarkable that only 33 of these long suffering soldiers were subsequently reported by Lieutenant-General Crosbie to Dublin as having fallen ill and been landed for hospitalisation at New Geneva Barracks (45). By 7 September Portland was obliged to apologise to Prince Edward for the delay in the departure of Conway's due to 'several unforeseen emergencies', regretting the Nova Scotia community would be antagonised by the consequent tying up of militia during harvest (46). Apart from the knock on effect for Prince Edward, the delay also incurred an additional financial burden of £8,083 as the four months' subsistence previously issued was exhausted. This additional burden fell on the Irish Treasury and Camden was obliged personally to petition Portland on 9 October for reimbursement from the British Establishment (47). It ought finally to be added that as with the previous embarkations for foreign service, June and July witnessed a spate of exchanges. Again, the balance was from O'Connell's, 2 of its lieutenants and 1 ensign along with 1 lieutenant from Fitzjames' and 1 ensign from Count Walsh-Serrant's exchanged with their counterparts in Conway's (48).

Meanwhile, unbeknown to Dublin or the officers, London had taken the decision to disband the entire Brigade due to its ever-spiralling cost versus diminishing utility. This decision was not yet made officially known and in the interim Conway's misfortunes were far from over. Pelham was obliged on 10 October to inform Greville that the usual overcrowded transports and the long delay in port had produced the inevitable epidemic. Consequently, as over 300 of Conway's men were now confined on shore with an infectious fever, he posed the question of whether the balance should proceed without them or delay sailing yet further. Pelham stressed that as the men would not be fit for some time to sail, it made a resolution of the additional subsistence which Camden had requested the previous day, additionally pressing (49). The reaction in London, where it was now understood all regiments were to be reduced, was two-fold. Initially, Dundas informed Portland on 16 October that the
King had decided, due to Conway's state of health, that its destination was altered to Bermuda. The real reason for this was the intention to draft Conway's ranks into the 47th Foot. Ironically, Camden was obliged to reply to Portland on 3 November that he had already been informed by Carhampston that Conway's (some of the sick having recovered), had already sailed for Halifax on 18 October before receipt of the new destination (50). Meanwhile, Prince Edward ultimately welcomed this news, writing from Halifax on 7 November expressing his regret at Conway's delay, particularly as he was, 'confident they would have been of far greater utility than any proportion of militia that could have been collected.' (51). Edward subsequently wrote on 16 December to confirm that three of Conway's five transports had at last arrived, although they were in a sorry state. Yet another severe storm had resulted in one transport sinking shortly after its men disembarked, one being beached and one remaining afloat in Halifax harbour; he expressed understandable fears for the remaining two. He added a request that the 200 men still in Ireland be dispatched along with the many officers who had as yet to even contemplate sailing. Subsequently, on 24 December, he was able to confirm the safe arrival of the fourth transport, whilst the fifth remained missing, although the continuing storms made disembarkation of men and stores exceedingly difficult (52). Not that any of this altered the Brigade's impending fate, as back in late October, York confirmed the Brigade's total dissolution. On 2 November Portland consequently wrote to Prince Edward informing him the regiment he had long anticipated and had only just welcomed to port was to be reduced forthwith (53).

The conclusive decision made to reduce the entire Brigade traced back to April when Fitzjames had predictably exploded at the news of the proposed reduction to just two regiments. On 24 April Camden confirmed to Dundas the receipt of yet another memorial from Fitzjames protesting the decision to draft his, the senior regiment. Camden indicated he was more than willing to oblige Fitzjames if London authorised it, but as the original order specified the weakest regiments were to be drafted, as
...Conway's is the strongest by nearly 200 men, I do not see that it is possible that I can make any alteration... (54). Brownrigg in turn responded on 3 May, confirming the receipt of Fitzjames' memorial, although he re-confirmed the original grounds upon which regiments were to be reduced. Having said this, Brownrigg demonstrated some sympathy given Fitzjames' repeated protest that his was the first to emigrate from France and hence the Brigade's senior regiment. Added to which were the favourable comments by Major-General Eustace at his inspection back in early April that his, by right, ought to survive. Brownrigg's hope appears to have been that at least a few of Fitzjames' officers could fill vacancies in regiments abroad caused by deaths, but without a final decision as to the Brigade's future it was impossible to follow even this palliative through (55). Pelham responded a week later by acknowledging the truth of Fitzjames' claims regarding emigration, seniority, quality and the alacrity with which its senior officers had volunteered for service upon news of the French Fleet in Bantry Bay, particularly Lieutenant-Colonel Moore. Pelham concluded that Camden sadly had no discretion in the matter as the same inspection that had commented upon the high state of discipline in Fitzjames' had also revealed Conway's was over twice its strength. All Pelham could suggest was that the King might reconsider the arrangements and keep the original three, Fitzjames, Walsh-Serrant and Dillon, and draft the junior three into them (56).

Salvation for Fitzjames was apparently in the offing when on 9 June York wrote to Pelham confirming he had read the material and, if true, agreed Fitzjames had a right to complain. Fitzjames was apparently claiming sufficient men in April to complete two regiments and that only O'Connell's ought to thus be reduced. Having said this, York acknowledged Portland's denial of such facts and requested Pelham elucidate (57). By 20 June Brownrigg wrote to Pelham regarding Dublin's forthcoming final decision as to which regiments were to be reduced. While accepting it was Dublin's decision and that it ought to be the strongest, given the apparent substance of Fitzjames' claims, London hoped his would be chosen for continuation (58). At that
moment, London's sympathies were decisively changed when, on 12 July, York wrote to inform Pelham that despite acknowledging Fitzjames' complaints as to recent events, information received demonstrated the failings were fundamentally the responsibility of Fitzjames' personal conduct. Despite this, York added that, with the on-going peace negotiations with France being conducted by Lord Malmesbury, a final decision regarding reductions ought again be delayed, the assumption being that if successful the entire Brigade's fate would be sealed (59).

That the Brigade's future hinged on the success or failure of Malmesbury's peace negotiations was reinforced by a subsequent letter to Pelham of 24 July where Brownrigg stressed, 'His Royal Highness has it not in his power yet to give any reply...relating to the Irish Brigade, as it is thought best not to make a determination with respect to that Corps, until it is known what may be the issue of Lord Malmsbury's negotiation.' (60). This in turn caused London to focus on the financial benefits peace would bring. Illustrating this was Camden's report, albeit somewhat later on 27 October, as to the potential savings if Ireland reverted to a peacetime establishment and hence the financial savings to the British Establishment by a reduction to 3000 men counted as lent for service abroad (61).

It is therefore ironic that the Brigade's fate was decided when Malmesbury's negotiations proved abortive, London having focused on the considerable financial savings to be made if they had been successful. With the prospect of an indeterminate war to finance, on 1 October Brownrigg wrote to confirm York had received Pitt's and Dundas's decision, 'To reduce all the Regiments of the Irish Brigade, drafting the two at St. Domingo and Jamaica into the regiments there, and sending a skeleton regiment to Halifax to receive the men of the battalion gone there. To reduce to half-pay, all unattached officers now receiving full pay.' Brownrigg's letter continued by confirming this decision had been made on the basis of military expenditure, namely the high cost of the Brigade versus the limited contribution it had made to the war in
over three years of existence. (62). As so often in the Brigade's short history in the British Army, the question of financial expediency was the fundamental issue. The following day Brownrigg wrote again, confirming Conway's was to be draughted into the 47th Foot in Bermuda to enable that regiment to be divided between the garrisons of that island and the Bahamas (63). As previously related, this resulted in a failed attempt to alter the destination of Conway's long delayed sailing on the purported basis of its men's health. Despite this, the determination ultimately to draft Conway's into the 47th was signalled in late October in correspondence between Huskisson and King (64).

At the time, neither the decision to disband the Brigade nor to draft the ranks of Conway's was officially transmitted to Dublin due to London's need first to settle various outstanding administrative matters. Evidence of this came in correspondence between Brownrigg and General Fox over the ultimate fate of the cadre of 54 surviving NCOs and privates of Viscount Walsh-Serrat's. These men, under the command of the surviving senior captain, Francis Geraghty, having initially departed the Caribbean for Halifax on HMS Experiment, became involved in the role of marines in that vessel's rescue of a British troop transport captured by a Spanish privateer and held at Trujillo. This, and a further delay at Halifax due to adverse weather, meant the War Office was only able to confirm their disembarkation at Portsmouth on 19 October. From there they marched directly to Chatham Barracks for reduction (65). Dundas subsequently wrote to York on 25 October stating that while it was the intention that the effectives of the Brigade were to be drafted into other corps, it was reluctantly accepted that, '...should any express a wish to be discharged...that wish must be complied with.' (66). On 5 November, although Brownrigg acknowledged these 54 men were entitled to be discharged once the Brigade was reduced, he requested of Fox, '...His Royal Highness will be glad if you can suggest any means for their being secured to the service.' (67). Normally an additional bounty of three guineas was paid to soldiers drafted into another corps, and it appears the...
disembarkation at Portsmouth and dispatch to Chatham rather than Ireland was a
conscious attempt further to encourage this. There was equally the possibility that
Chatham was chosen due to concern regarding the domestic situation in Ireland and a
desire to minimise any potential for discharged soldiers being attracted to the ranks of
the United Irishmen, particularly if it also enhanced the possibility they might be
persuaded to accept being drafted. Certainly the decision to disembark at Portsmouth
and utilise Chatham was taken around the time soldiers of the Tipperary and Wexford
Militia and Monaghan and Kildare regiments were court-martialled as United
Irishmen. Regardless of the reasons for their dispatch to Chatham, subsequent
correspondence of Count Walsh-Serrant reveals that, despite considerable efforts at
persuasion and the additional bounty, only 17 accepted a transfer, the Army being
obliged to discharge the rest (68). Ultimately, to London's disappointment, this pattern
was to be repeated throughout the remainder of the Brigade.

By 28 November the various details had been apparently settled, for on that date
Windham wrote to Portland directing him, at the behest of York, to inform Dublin of
the King's decision that as of 25 December the Brigade was to be reduced. An
additional indication of administrative matters causing the delay is contained in two
key points in the dispatch. Firstly, it was acknowledged that, although the Brigade had
been formed on the Irish Establishment, as since 1 April 1796 it counted as being
'...ent by Ireland' and therefore paid for by the British Establishment, the officers were
to be placed on the British half-pay list. Secondly, to replace the Brigade in this
capacity, the 70th, 83rd, 87th, 90th, 98th and 100th Regiments of Foot were to be, as
of 25 December, counted as 'lent by Ireland', although limited to the financial cost
incurred for the Brigade (69). Subsequently, the six colonels were each notified on 5
December in a brief, two sentence letter, that as of 25 December their respective
regiments were reduced and would cease on the Establishment, all officers being
placed on half pay. This process of notification was completed on 18 December by
Windham's dispatch of a similar letter to the Paymaster General (70).
The Brigade was not singled out as the only émigré formation reduced at this time. The Caribbean had become the destination of numerous émigré formations. A number of these, whose recruitment had equally been less than ideal and whose ranks were also devastated by disease, were identified for reduction (71).

Whilst official notification had not been forthcoming until late November/early December, unofficially the decision had already been conveyed to some of the colonels. As already evident from previous brushes with reduction, whilst certain colonels apparently accepted the inevitable, focusing their attention on gaining the most advantageous situation from the circumstances, others fought to the bitter end to save their commands. In this there was a noticeable division between those who had been senior officers in the Brigade in the French Army and those who had not. The former fought to save their regiments and concerned themselves with the future interests of their men whilst the latter tended to focus primarily on their own and their extended families' future. Falling into the latter category was the first to respond, Henry Dillon, whose residence at Datchet, near Windsor, and continued contacts at Court through his relative, Lord Mulgrave, ensured he had prompt news of the decision. On 13 November he wrote directly to Pitt protesting the financial hardship reduction would entail. He reminded Pitt that his was the most successfully recruited of the regiments and had provided the most active and useful service in the Caribbean. Riding on the back of his men's sacrifice, he petitioned Pitt for, 'a word in my favour from you to His Royal Highness the Duke of York', to hopefully ensure his employment with the, 'local', rank of brigadier-general in Ireland. Not for the first or the last time did Dillon's concerns fail to extend beyond his own to include the officers and men still technically under his command. His letter appropriately ended, in respect of his relatives' interests, with the words they and he, 'would be happy in whatever concerns my welfare.' (72).
Whilst O'Connell had earlier expressed similar sentiments to Dillon's, Count Walsh-Serrant, in like manner to Fitzjames, fought to save his command. As with Dillon, Walsh-Serrant received early notification of London's intentions as on 24 November he petitioned Dundas, arguing his regiment be exempted from the general reduction. The ten companies of Count Walsh-Serrant's had originally landed at Barbados, but in September had been transferred wholesale on the orders of Sir Ralph Abercromby to Jamaica (73). The Count now based his case on the fact that with a total strength of 712 men, whilst three companies of the regiment had been dispatched from Jamaica to Honduras, the other seven had recently arrived at Port au Prince. There, General Whyte had promptly drafted the remnants of Dillon's into it before marching them to the Croix des Bouguets. Equally, the Count pointed out that, as over half his officers spoke French, the language of the colony, it would represent the loss of a valuable resource if they were now reduced. He also emphasised the fundamental point about the original recruitment clauses regarding the prohibition on compulsory drafting, stressing the Army would lose most of the ranks, 'because the men, all of the same part of the country as their officers, and attached to a chaplain of their persuasion, have relied on the fulfilling of this condition printed in the recruiting advertisements and handbills.' To prove the point he reminded Dundas that already, only 17 of the 54 men of his brother's regiment reduced at Chatham had accepted transfers to other formations, the rest having chosen discharge. The Count's conclusion demonstrates the degree to which the colonels were aware of on-going developments as he was able to argue that given the final order for reduction had as yet to be sent there was still time suitably to amend it (74).

All these pleas though fell on deaf ears and by late December even Fitzjames came to accept, alongside Count Walsh-Serrant, O'Connell, Dillon and Viscount Walsh-Serrant, the inevitability of reduction. Accordingly, all five jointly forwarded a grandiose memorial to Windham, drawing attention to their considerable sacrifices for both the French and British monarchies, particularly in answering the invitation of the
latter, motivated, they claimed, by nothing more than a desire to serve. They jointly
pleaded therefore, as a 'mark of royal favour', they be distinguished from the
generality of reduced officers and be maintained on full-pay until either alternative
appointments were found or the war ended. Windham responded by simply
forwarding the petition to York (75).

While York considered this petition, Viscount Walsh-Serrant's had already been
reduced and the process of reduction for the two regiments in Ireland was rapidly
progressing. The thorough drafting for Conway's meant their combined ranks
amounted to less than 100 men. Despite this, the full extent of the failure to convince
any significant proportion to accept being drafted is implicit in the sense of irony
conveyed in the words of Brownrigg's letter of 4 January 1798 to General, The Earl of
Balcarres. As the proportion in these regiments seeking discharge matched Walsh-
Serrant's in Chatham, he urged the general to endeavour to use all means to convince
any soldier to remain who, 'unexpectedly...express a wish to be discharged instead of
receiving the Bounty of three guineas...' (76).

The repatriation from the Caribbean and Nova Scotia of Count Walsh-Serrant's,
Dillon's and Conway's was far more protracted, given local operational needs,
distances and weather. The first of the three to be reduced and the regiment that stood
out from the others in terms of drafting was Conway's. Although Prince Edward
received notification of its reduction early in 1798, given the weakness of his garrison
and the winter weather, Conway's remained operational until the official reduction,
for the purposes of the ranks' pay, of 25 June. Then, whilst still barracked at Halifax,
all remaining effectives accepted the three guineas and were drafted. Of 562 privates,
as originally intended 542 were drafted into the 47th Foot whilst 22 entered the Nova
Scotia Regiment. Of 24 drummers, 13 were drafted into the 7th Foot, 7 into the Royal
Navy, 5 into the 47th and 4 into the Nova Scotia's. It appears only 11 sergeants
accepted transfer as 10 were listed as drafted into the 47th and 1 into the Nova
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This low number may have been due to a lack of suitable vacancies, thus confronting the sergeants with a choice of reduction to private or discharge (77).

The physical process of distributing these men took several months, although by 16th August the War Office was arranging for the bounty due to the men of Conway's drafted into the 47th to be credited to the latter regiment's account in London (78). Consequently, it was not until late September that the commanding officer, Major James Conway, finally signed the authorisation for the return to Europe of the remaining 4 captains, 7 lieutenants, 7 ensigns and 2 surgeons. Included were both the staff sergeants, namely the sergeant-major and quartermaster sergeant, 9 sergeants, 5 drummers and 6 privates still serving with the regiment, all of whom were discharged upon their arrival at Chatham in December (79). This did not quite however account for the whole regiment. Between April and June 6 sergeants, 6 corporals, 6 drummers and 56 privates choosing discharge arrived at Chatham, which had effectively become the point of discharge for all returning soldiers of the Brigade. The logic of Chatham as the final paying-off point apparently had some effect as over half these men belatedly accepted drafting, 2 corporals and 11 privates volunteering into the 4th Foot, 1 corporal and 16 privates into the 82nd Foot, 3 privates into the 10th Foot and 2 into the 17th Foot. As before, none of the sergeants or drummers did so, again suggesting the difficulty of finding suitable vacancies (80).

It was not just the ranks of Conway's whose future had finally been settled. On 22 June Prince Edward enquired of Windham if the acting chaplain of Conway's, James Gilman, could be found a local parish by the Catholic Bishop of Lower Canada. This appeal was successful, the final September payroll for Conway's recording his departure for Quebec (81). As for Conway's officers, as with their compatriots in other regiments that had been abroad in December 1797, their entry onto the half-pay list was protracted. Those such as Lieutenant-Colonel Count Clonard, Captain Charles Blake, Lieutenant John Mahony and Ensign Richard Ryan, who, for various reasons,
had all had leave to be resident in Ireland or England on 25 December 1797, were reduced forthwith to half-pay. The remainder continued to receive full pay until their return from Halifax, most doing so with the remaining ranks by September 1798. The need though to settle outstanding administrative issues meant Major Conway, regimental Adjutant Samuel Hamilton and Lieutenant Robert Quigly, only returned in December 1798 (82).

Count Walsh-Serrant's was the last of the regiments to be reduced. With half its ranks consigned immediately to hospital upon its arrival in the Caribbean in February 1797, it remained in garrison on Martinique until late that year recovering its strength. Given London's receipt of its reported losses and the almost simultaneous decision to reduce the Brigade to just two regiments, the original intention was to draft it into Dillon's, then still on Jamaica. As it was, York wrote in August to the Count that his regiment had only survived that eventuality due to Dillon's having already been dispatched from Jamaica to St.Dominique and its subsequent devastation before the Count's had itself reached Jamaica (83). Instead, of its remaining 580 healthy men, seven of its companies were progressively dispatched to St.Domingue between September and December where they absorbed Dillon's survivors. Given the on-going requirement for troops, Walsh-Serrant's survivors were not subsequently withdrawn until July 1798 (84).

Ironically, even after notification of reduction, Count Walsh-Serrant's went on to see the most action of all the Brigade's regiments as the British hold on St.Dominque rapidly collapsed. Captain William Hely, having served with Dillon's the previous year, had remained with the brevet rank of major in La Pointe's colonial corps. By March 1798 he commanded the Cordon at L'Arcahaye, the Cordon being subject to an overwhelming assault by Toussaint between 9 and 15 March. With its collapse, Hely, along with Captain Creagh, Lieutenant Hamill and between 40 and 50 men of Walsh-Serrant's were captured in one of its isolated garrisons. The remainder of Walsh-Serrant's were captured in one of its isolated garrisons. The remainder of Walsh-
Serrant's subsequently found themselves, along with other surviving troops, isolated in the Môle under the forlorn command of Major-General John Whyte (85). The following month, 70 effectives of Walsh-Serrant's were dispatched as part of an 850 strong re-enforcement to Lieutenant-Colonel Spencer at Jérémie in a desperate yet futile attempt to shore up what had become an irretrievable position. While casualties due to action were few, only 1 officer and 3 men being wounded during April, disease took its inevitable toll. By 1 July the regiment recorded just 177 men at the Môle and 66 at Jérémie fit for duty of the nearly 600 who had landed six months earlier (86).

The previous year, Walsh-Serrant's remaining three companies, amounting to some 70 men, under the command of Captain O'Sheill, sailed on 20 September 1797 as part of an expedition to the British colony of Honduras. Threatened by Spanish troops based in the Yucatan, ironically under the command of a General Arturo O'Neill, Portland nonetheless surprisingly criticised the Governor of Jamaica, Earl Balcarres' choice of re-enforcement, 'considering that Corps to be professedly of the Roman Catholic Religion.' (87). Despite loosing 23 men to yellow fever within weeks of arrival, they remained in garrison on the notorious Mosquito Coast until 16 June 1798 when the survivors, many of who were seriously ill, were evacuated (88).

By late July General Maitland had decided there was little option but to evacuate the remaining troops from the Môle and Jérémie. After negotiations with Toussaint and Rigaud to secure an uninterrupted embarkation, Britain's involvement in St. Domingue came to a swift end. On 8 August 17 officers and 72 surviving men of Walsh-Serrant's, including those from Honduras, were divided between two transports for the return to Britain via New York under its two senior captains, Edward O'Shiell and Terence MacMahon (89). Arriving 1 October, as with the survivors of his younger brother's regiment and Conway's, Count Walsh-Serrant's were disembarked at Portsmouth and marched to Chatham Barracks with similar hopes of encouraging the remaining ranks to volunteer for drafting. Meanwhile, the 17 officers were
immediately placed on half-pay (90).

The evacuation also proved to be the final denouement for the surviving officers of the 87e, ci-devant Dillon based at the Môle. As of 24 August 1798 Dillon's was formally disbanded with the final withdrawal of British troops, thereby having nominally survived eight months longer than their erstwhile colleagues in the Brigade. This event though did not go unremarked. Dated 1 September 1798 from the Môle and framed in standard French Army language, 'Major Commandant Dillon Regiment' James O'Farrell and Senior Captain Francis Plunkett appealed to York, rejecting the 'licenciement' issued to the other officers via General Maitland and requesting they be retained in British service (91). One of the fundamental reasons prompting this appeal was the recent revelation to these and other colonial émigrés that they had never been placed on the formal British Establishment. In fact, despite assurances to the contrary, they were treated as provisional colonial corps and were consequently not entitled to half-pay. Shipped via Jamaica to England, Dillon's surviving officers, along with other colonial émigrés, embarked on the well worn path for officers in pursuit of both arrears of pay and half-pay. Ironically, Captain Count O'Gorman had previously requested placement on the Brigade's half-pay list despite having continued to serve in St. Domingue rather than return to Ireland in 1795 to take up the commission initially reserved for him in that corps. Huskisson informed York on 10 January 1798 that such a request had to be refused (92).

While the remnants of Count Walsh-Serrat's were still serving in St. Domingue and Honduras, the ultimate fate of all the Brigade's officers proved far more complex than expected as the issue of their religion re-surfaced as a fundamental consideration. In pursuance of the orders directing reduction, whilst those officers resident in Ireland or Britain were immediately reduced to half-pay, those still serving abroad continued to receive full pay. A major difficulty emerged as a number of senior officers queried which establishment they were meant to receive half-pay from. On 3 April 1798
Lewis forwarded to Windham just such a query from Lieutenant-Colonel James Moore of Fitzjames', dated 23 March, which pointed out that the original circular of 5 December 1797 confirming the Brigade's reduction had failed to specify which establishment the officers were to be placed on for the purposes of half-pay. As the regulations required officers to submit regular certificates to the relevant half pay office, the respective regimental agents could not act without clarification. Lewis's covering letter made clear the reason for the ambiguity in suggesting that, as it remained illegal for Catholics formally to hold commissions on the British Establishment, this extended to half-pay. Yet, as the Brigade had been funded during its service by the British Establishment, as lent by Ireland, it was uncertain if the Irish Establishment had any obligation to accept them on its half-pay list or for the British Establishment to recompense Ireland if placed on its. Lewis requested Windham canvas Portland for his opinion and ascertain from the Crown lawyers if the latter arrangement would be lawful (93). One month later Henry Dillon confirmed this difficulty by writing to Windham on behalf of his officers, a number of whom were still on active service in the Caribbean, in a similar vein (94).

It was not only the officers who required an answer on this point. Prior to Moore's and Dillon's letters, the widow of the late General Thomas Conway, the original colonel of what had become Viscount Walsh-Serrant's, had written on 13 March to Portland begging leave to receive the pension she was due. Windham's expressed opinion was that there was no doubt as to the right of Conway's widow to receive the pension. Within days though, Lewis sought an answer as to which establishment it should therefore be drawn upon, posing the same delicate question as per half-pay (95). While the lawyers considered the position, Windham wrote to Portland on 9 July vigorously protesting at the prospect of the Irish Establishment having to bear the cost of the officer's half-pay. While accepting the difficulty presented by the legal question, he fully supported Camden's point that the Brigade had been a project originated from London and financed by the British Establishment. He urged the
acceptance of Camden's suggestion that this arrangement be effectively continued in respect of half-pay. Windham concluded his letter with reference to the issue of full-pay for the colonels. In response to York's trawl for opinions on the pleas of the colonels on this issue, whilst Portland dismissed the suggestion of full-pay for the bulk of the officers, he argued that the original 1794 invitations had indeed promised the colonels full pay for the duration of the war. The Secretary at War added his support to Portland's argument, an inevitable convergence of opinion given they had jointly participated in drawing up the original document (96). On both these issues York accepted the arguments. The various final returns as to when officers of the respective regiments were placed on half-pay confirmed it was on the Irish list and that all six colonels were to received full pay for the duration of the war (97).

The question of half-pay was not the only issue London had to deal with in relation to the officers' faith. Back on 13 November 1797, Dillon had already petitioned for the local rank of brigadier-general on the Irish Establishment. On 22 January 1798 a number of the Brigade's senior officers sought to petition for the rank of major-general given their seniority as colonels on the Irish Establishment. While the matter of respective half-pay lists required several months to gain a legal opinion, the Attorney and Solicitor Generals' offices produced an almost instant refusal to these petitions. By 27 February the War Office distributed a full transcript of their opinion to the effect that there was no legislative provision for substantive general officers to be appointed by the Irish Establishment. Whilst the 1793 Irish Relief Act permitted Catholics to be given the local rank of brigadier-general over troops in the field, the legislation authorised the appointment of Catholic officers only up to the substantive rank of colonel, prescribing them from holding a position on the staff. All appointments for generals on the staff were under English law and were only placed on the Irish Establishment, 'for the purposes of actual service in that Country.' Consequently, under the provisions in the relevant English statute of, '25 Car. 2.C.2', the rank of major-general and above was restricted to those who, '...conform to the
Church of England...' (98). When the irrepressible Henry Dillon first forwarded his specific claim for promotion to York, Brownrigg requested further guidance. This prompted Lewis to state that, whilst Dillon was entitled to such rank in light of his previous service and seniority, unless he conformed to the Church of England, there was no question of his advancement. In addition, for certain of the colonels, there was the delicate question regarding their technical status as aliens. For them, even if they conformed, they would still be debarred from receiving such a rank (99). A fortnight later Brownrigg wrote to General Lord Mulgrave, confirming that while Dillon was not an alien, his promotion had to be refused by York due to his religion (100).

The root cause of both the issues of half-pay and staff appointments lay at Westminster and the continuing expression, particularly in the Lords, of more than just residual opposition to Catholics holding commissions on the British Establishment. With the passing of the 1793 Irish Relief Act, it had been Pitt's intention to pass a similar measure at Westminster. This failed to transpire thus establishing an anomalous situation. Having permitted Catholics to hold commissions on the Irish Establishment and allowed the ranks to attend Catholic services, Pitt had failed to repeal the relevant legislation permitting the same on the British Establishment. Technically, it meant the moment a regiment was transferred from the Irish to the British Establishment, a Catholic officer would effectively be forced to resign and Catholic soldiers obliged to attend Anglican worship. In fact, it made the very presence of any officer known to be a Catholic on the British mainland technically a criminal offence (101). This had been the reason for the restriction on French émigrés landing on mainland Britain and thus obliged to be based on the Isle of Wight in the Émigré Act of May 1794 (102).

The issue had not previously arisen in relation to the Brigade as during its service none of its regiments served in Britain, only its survivors being landed for immediate reduction. Equally, a traditional blind eye had been turned to the occasional Irish
émigré, particularly the colonels, travelling and residing in London. Having said this, it was a highly contentious issue in relation to the growing number of English Catholics seeking service in the militia and volunteers. This had presented Pitt's government with a conundrum, given its desire to avoid an inevitably damaging battle at Westminster whilst not wishing to alienate the sympathetic English Catholic gentry and aristocracy. An answer of sorts ironically lay with the Test Act itself that had never obliged or even empowered any authority to summons an officer to take it. Rather, it had always been the personal responsibility of the individual officer to attend at the Quarter Sessions or the courts at Westminster (103). As there had always been individual officers and officials who had forgotten, to avoid any embarrassment it had long been the practice to pass each March an annual Indemnification Act. This gave such individuals until Christmas of each year to attest whilst indemnifying them from prosecution. From 1796 onwards it became the practice for the Act to be passed at Christmas, with effect from 1 January, thus giving officers until 31 December to attest. This legislative mechanism gave all Catholic officers, particularly in the Volunteers, absolute legal protection once appointed (104).

That any formal measure of reform was still out of the question was vividly demonstrated by two events. In May 1797 William Wilberforce and Henry Lascelles introduced a Bill to permit Catholics to hold commissions in the Supplementary Militia and Provisional Cavalry. Whilst this passed the Commons it was vigorously attacked and defeated in the Lords at its first reading (105). Despite this, where local commanding officials were sympathetic, Catholic officers were appointed, for example, members of a well-known Catholic family, Captains Richard and Edward Huddleston in the Cambridgeshire Militia (106). Others commanders were not so confident, and in late April 1798, the Earl of Warwick wrote to Portland requesting guidance as to the legality of his appointing Catholics to commissions in his Warwickshire Volunteers (107). Further, although reluctantly agreeing to the 1793 Irish Relief Act and the Brigade itself, the King still proved far from accepting of
commissioned Catholics on the British Establishment. Thus, also in April, whilst admitting there were numerous Catholics holding commissions, the King chose to refuse his signature to that of Lord Petre in the proposed Volunteer corps, the reason stated being that he knew Petre to be a Catholic and thus considered it a breach of his Coronation oath knowingly to sign the commission of a Catholic (108). Lord Petre forthwith sought two legal opinions, one being the government's own Brief, as to the validity of this refusal. To his profound disappointment, both re-confirmed the advice given in relation to the colonels of the Brigade: that for the purposes of the British Establishment the Test Act still applied, the second opinion concluding, 'Upon the same principles we have already given an opinion upon a case stated by the Direction of the Secretary at War, that the officers of the Irish Brigade cannot lawfully have commissions as general officers in Ireland notwithstanding the acts of the Irish parliament in favour of Roman Catholicks.' (109). Ultimately, Huskisson and Dundas, having re-confirmed their own legal advice, were obliged to inform Petre that while the King acknowledged his loyalty, the King's knowledge of his religion forbade his appointment (110). Subsequently, another English Catholic fell foul of being 'known' to the King, Lord Clifford, equally refused for that reason (111).

An application for preferment of another kind, unrelated to faith, was forwarded to Portland in early September 1799. It originated from General Cornwallis, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland since the previous year's insurrection, in the form of a memorial from Count Bartholomew Mahony. As ever, its conclusion demonstrated the power of influence when ministers were able to exercise discretion. The document claimed Mahony was entitled to be placed on the Brigade's half-pay list as a lieutenant-colonel of Conway's despite having vacated the position at his own request in October 1795 to take up the apparent offer as major-general on Marshal Broglie's staff in Germany. With supporting testimonials from the Comte d'Artois and the Earl of Clanricarde, Mahony prefaced his case on his resignation having been cancelled and his only having actually received a leave of absence when he departed in 1795. Whilst
subsequently delayed on his outward-bound journey, he was informed by Broglie that his prospective place on the Marshal's staff had been filled. Before returning, he had been disappointed to read in April 1796 that he had been gazetted as, 'removed to another corps', and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton-Clonard. Mahony argued that at the time this had been carried through on the mistaken assumption he had been provided for in another British corps. Mahony claimed he had been unable to gain an alternative position within the Brigade's ranks as there had been another officer in post in Conway's and, as the Brigade was an active formation, additional senior officers were not required. With the Count thus left without even residual means of financial support, Britain's meagre half-pay consequently appeared most attractive and provided the motivation for his memorial. It was ironic that the Brigade's reduction had opened this potential opportunity for such a case to be made, it being possible to have more than one officer of a given grade listed for a regiment on the half-pay list (112).

Mahony's apparent inventiveness, with the support of both Windham and Portland, Earl Clanricarde, the Comte d'Artois, and backed by powerful appeals at Court, ensured the King was, 'graciously pleased to order that he should be restored to the situation he would have been in had he not been superseded...'. In an attempt to fulfill this directive Cornwallis was obliged to write requesting guidance on 8 November regarding the intricacies of the half-pay list. Essentially, in order for Mahony to lodge a claim for half-pay, should Lieutenant-Colonel O'Toole's March 1796 commission in Count Walsh-Serrant's be cancelled and O'Toole's original 1 October 1794 Captain's commission be restored to enable Mahony to be retrospectively restored to his 1794 lieutenant-colonel's commission? Alternatively, would Mahony simply become a 'secondry' lieutenant-colonel of Conway's alongside Count Clonard? The answer was the latter option with the King further directing Mahony retrospectively receive the pay he would have had as a lieutenant-colonel had he not been superseded in March 1796. He subsequently received his outstanding back pay in full, from April 1796 to
December 1797, alongside his arrears of half-pay (113).

With the final reduction of the Brigade completed by December 1798, the initial fate for all its officers was formal placement on the Irish Half-Pay list. The 1799 Army List initially recorded all 180 of the Brigade's officers, inclusive of the colonels, alongside ten surgeons and their assistants, plus six Quartermasters, being in receipt of half-pay (114). Remarkably, this revealed there was an appointed officer filling every post, despite the substantial losses by the regiments in the Caribbean. The fact was the colonels, as already related regarding O'Connell, once informed of the reductions, ensured all vacancies were filled, be it by promotion of existing officers or by newly appointed relations or other interested parties. In Count Walsh-Serrant's, Lieutenant Teighe McMahon and Quartermaster Richard Gregg were promoted and appointed in December and November 1797 respectively, whilst in Fitzjames', Andrew Mullacky was appointed assistant-surgeon on 14 November 1797 (115).

Whatever the date of their original appointment, whether in October 1794 or the day before reduction in December 1797, for many of the Brigade's officers, their sojourn on half-pay was only a brief transition to further service in the British Army. Immediately their regiments were paid off, 8 officers successfully obtained positions in regular regiments whilst 12 officers found posts in one of the West Indian Regiments. A further 7 gained commissions in some of the remaining émigré corps, such as Hompesch's Hussars, the York Rangers and the York Hussars (116). Whilst certain officers remained on half-pay for over a decade, ultimately 131 gained commissions in serving regiments of one category or another, 44 being original émigrés and 87 new subalterns. Of these, 119 were gazetted into regular line regiments, with a further 2 in Irish and Scottish Fencibles regiments respectively and a single officer in a garrison battalion. A further 7 officers gained rank in colonial fencibles, such as the Cape Regiment and the Nova Scotia Regiment. Purchase and the exploitation of family or personnel interest obtained a number of these posts. For
the majority though, their lack of financial resources and establishment contacts did not permit this option. Rather, as was common practice amongst officers in the British Army, the mechanism utilised to obtain these positions was by exchange of half-pay commissions with older, infirm or simply unenthusiastic serving officers wishing to retire. Consequently, a number of unfamiliar names came to appear on the Brigade's half-pay list (117).

That there was a degree of surviving corporate identity for some of the émigrés was demonstrated by at least two groups managing to remain together when gaining active commissions. 12 provided the cadre of officers for what was effectively a new émigré formation, the Minorca Regiment. This corps began life in November 1798 when Charles Stuart captured Minorca and found there 1000 so-called, 'Swiss', amongst the captured Spanish garrison whom Colonel John Stuart formed into a regiment (118). It can be surmised that the request for officers suitable to command such men arrived in London when the last of the Brigade's officers were placed on half-pay. The Army List for 1799 revealed the regiment's major and all 4 captains were émigrés from the Brigade, and by 1800 it listed no less than 12 ex-Brigade officers (119). Its predominantly German ranks meant it became the 97th Foot (The Queen's German's), gaining distinction in Egypt, ironically alongside Edward Dillon's regiment (120).

As with most officers in the army, few of the 131 rose beyond the rank of captain, establishing respectable if not dramatic service records. Whilst these officers ultimately secured successful careers in an army which had sought to exclude them for over a century, the remaining legal barrier denying promotion beyond the rank of colonel on the Irish Establishment persuaded certain of their comrades to seek advancement elsewhere. Given their continued ideological opposition to the French regime, the logical option was Britain's Catholic ally, Portugal, a path followed by Bryan O'Toole and Nicholas Trant (121).
It was not just the half-pay officers of the Brigade who had to strive for financial security. Three officers of the 87e ci-devant Dillon in particular spent 1800-1802 in pursuit of half-pay, Major James O'Farrell and Captains Francis Plunkett and Peter MontGerald. The voluminous correspondence of O'Farrell and Plunkett stressed their loyalty to the French Crown and how this had been sincerely transferred to the British Crown in September 1793, highlighting that as Irish-born British subjects they were due the status of British-born officers. How much of this was special pleading in hindsight and how much was sincere cannot be judged. Whatever the true motives, the last of these memorials, written by O'Farrell in May 1802, indicates he had met with success, being granted an allowance in lieu of half-pay. The letter specifically referred to O'Farrell's request for permission to return to France given the opportunity offered by the Peace of Amiens in March 1802. Brownrigg confirmed he would be permitted leave to put his private affairs in order but as a consequence of French émigré officers having effectively returned permanently to France whilst still claiming an allowance in England it was necessary, 'to restrict the French officers, receiving an allowance in lieu of half-pay from this government to six months leave' after which funds would cease (122). Finally, correspondence in June, July and August, confirmed that Captains Plunkett and O'Shiell were also belatedly granted an allowance (123).

Meanwhile, for a number of the émigrés of the Brigade who remained, either through choice or circumstances, on half-pay, the Peace of Amiens presented an opportunity, for those who wished, to return to France. At least eighteen officers took the opportunity, all but four with the objective of attempting to reclaim lost properties or compensation and to essentially put their affairs in order rather than with a mind to resume their service in the French Army. For the seven senior officers who crossed the Channel, Colonels Fitzjames, Dillon, O'Connell and both Count and Viscount Walsh-Serrants, alongside lieutenant-colonels Bartholomew Mahony and Edward Stack, the apparent barrier to promotion to general within the British Army offered
little incentive to remain. This motivation in respect of rank was all the greater for five of the colonels for whom peace brought an end to their receipt of full pay, only Conway remaining in England. In contrast, the five colonels and Mahony had significant property interests in France, and for some, plantations in the colonies, worth pursuing. The representatives of the two senior families, Fitzjames and Walsh-Serrat, apparently always intended to return permanently to France, particularly given the former's lack of substantive family in either Ireland or Britain. The Duke of Fitzjames, Edward Fitzjames, Count Walsh-Serrat, and Viscount Walsh-Serrat effectively entered a period of dignified retirement as far as military activities were concerned during the Empire (124). Count O'Connell, Henry Dillon, Bartholomew Mahony and Edward Stack appear not to have intended to prolong their return, focusing rather on simply regaining title to land and estates that could be promptly sold. Unlike Fitzjames or the Walsh-Serrants, O'Connell and Dillon had extensive family in Ireland and Britain to return to. Unfortunately for all four officers, along with three less illustrious émigrés who had returned, Francis O'Heguerty, Terence MacMahon and John-Charles Power, with the resumption of hostilities in May 1803, all were arrested and imprisoned as aliens and as persons liable to service in the British Army; an ironic fate. Designated, 'détenu', they were just 7 of the 493 British males, of who 46 were military officers, confined. Of these, Stack remained incarcerated for the duration of the war, almost being shot in 1804 for complicity in the alleged plotting of his friend the Duc d'Enghien. (125).

Of the less illustrious émigrés, most preferred a quiet retirement in France, serving neither antagonist. John-François Mahony and William O'Meara were the only two officers who could be identified with certainty as having opted to take the opportunity offered by Amiens to return to France to resume their military careers, although Thomas Conway and Anthony-Francis Walsh de Chasseron might also having done so. Whilst they had gained new commissions in the British Army, they individually chose to resign these in 1802 and return. It might be deduced that, as with numerous
returned émigrés at this time, they judged the Empire an ideologically suitable alternative to the Ancien Regime with its firm burial of the Republic. In addition, they may well have weighed their opportunities for advancement as greater in French service than British (126).

O’Meara had a successful career under Napoleon, ultimately gaining the rank of general in 1813. Mahony, despite being relieved of duty as incompetent in 1810, due to the influence of the Bourbonist Minister of War, Henry Clarke, once an officer of Berwick’s himself, was appointed colonel in 1814 of 3e Regiment Étranger (127). Mahony was consequently characterised as, ‘serving with equal readiness for and against France, for and against England, and under Bourbon, Napoleon and Orleans’ (128). While this attitude has been popularly perceived by many later writers as the common attitude of the Brigade’s officers, Mahony, and to a lesser extent O’Meara, were in fact the only such substantive examples. Rather, the essential opposition to the Revolution, with its attack on the Catholic Church and the person of the French Monarchy, remained intact as the motivating force for the overwhelming majority. Of the original 100 émigrés who entered the Brigade between 1794-97, 82 remained in Britain, of whom at least 44 continued to serve in the British Army until 1814. Of the 18 who returned, 7 spent the remainder of the war in prison, counted as British officers and aliens with an eighth under police surveillance. Finally, with the Restoration in 1814, a number of surviving officers, whether they had remained in Britain or returned in 1802, sought service under the Louis XVIII (129).
CONCLUSION.

Were the officers of the Irish Brigade on the eve of the French Revolution simply mercenaries in the pejorative sense selling their services to the highest bidder, that is to say the Wild Geese of popular image? The answer to this would seem to be no. Rather, the officers were members of a hereditary military caste who internalised a professional military ethos highlighting loyalty to the Army, King and Church. Equally, their entry into British service was a consequence of long term changes in the British establishment's view of Catholics and their relationship to the new radicalism of the Jacobines.

One of the key historical issues of recent decades has focused on the military revolution with many military writers linking the development of the modern 'military professional' to the evolution of the nation state and its institutions from the seventeenth century onwards (1). Increasingly however, historians have challenged and discounted the entire concept of there having been a military revolution as such at any distinct chronological point as essentially a product of classical Whig history. Rather, it is argued that military changes throughout history were gradual, deriving from an accumulation of experience (2). Essentially there is a strong case for arguing that there is a long historical continuity of the professional military ethos traceable from the ancient period, and that warfare and the military profession in the eighteenth century were approached with no less serious an attitude by a clearly identifiable body of professional officers of whom those of the Irish Brigade are a prime example. The corporate body of eighteenth century officers entered on lifetime careers with an established body of internalised military values and skills (3).
This in turn has required a rethink of the description and practice of the mercenary soldier. The attribution of 'mercenary' in the eighteenth century dated from the medieval and Renaissance periods, with the hirelings of the Italian Condottieri, German Landsknechts and Swiss. These formations were commanded by a body of officers who clearly embodied the values and skills of professional soldiers in the sense of being military specialists embarking on a career of lifelong service within a standing army, the Condottieri even founding military schools to enhance their officer's competence (4). However, the continuing practice of employing large numbers of foreign troops and officers in eighteenth century armies did not necessarily lead to the latter classifying themselves as mercenaries. Certainly there is scant evidence in both attitudes and behaviour of the officers of the Brigade, their brethren in either Spanish or Austrian service, or that of their Scottish counterparts of the Scots Brigade in Dutch service, to justify the nomenclature 'mercenary' within their own terms of reference. Rather, their identity and character derived from long established patterns of family service in the armies of specific foreign princes originating in the religious and dynastic struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Motivated as much by an intense desire to retain a social status legally denied them by the Protestant Ascendancy, a hereditary caste rapidly evolved where sons, cousins and nephews followed fathers and uncles without question. Far from seeking service abroad for purely financial gain or expectations of excitement, generations of potential officers sought service in the Brigade in the sure knowledge that their place in the network of kinship was sufficient to gain a cadetship, the objective being a lifelong career as a professional officer and its integral social status.

Thus, on the eve of the French Revolution, the officer corps of the Irish Brigade can
be classified as undoubtedly professional. They were a highly cohesive and tightly
knit corporate body that shared a common social, cultural and religious identity linked
to a well-established network of kinship. This was enhanced by a common pattern of
entry and training, where the expectation of serving a long professional career
revolved around the original regiment that a young officer entered. They internalised
a distinct military ethos and learned a clearly defined body of military values and
skills, albeit the latter limited to small arms drill and the company exercise broadly
similar to that of the equivalent rank of ensign in the British Army. Excepting the
senior noble families, the majority subsequently shared the experience of long service
in regional garrisons, punctuated by brief periods of active service, thus producing a
common programme of professional socialisation. Equally, the broader exiled
Catholic community and its institutions, particularly the colleges, re-enforced the
hierarchical and authoritarian values of military life with a view of the world firmly
rooted in the post-reformation mentality of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Both military life and their exiled community also served to ensure isolation from the
mainstream of French civilian society, which deepened the officers, attachment to
both their profession and its titular head, the King. Whilst the religious and land
ownership battles of seventeenth century Ireland had long ceased to be active
considerations, the military community this had created established an hereditary
military caste where concerns for maintaining a privileged social status legally denied
them in Ireland stood alongside considerations of professional advancement in a
foreign army dominated by a nobility ever more conscious of its exclusivity. It is
therefore somewhat ironic that the Segur decree establishing exclusive social
requirements for entry into the officer corps may ultimately have worked to restrict if
not exclude future generations from the Brigade's officer caste if there had not been a
The general reaction to the Revolution of the Brigade's officers essentially mirrored that of their French brethren: emigration. This occurred against a background of growing insubordination with the breakdown of the traditional bonds of military discipline. Matching the pattern demonstrated by Scott for the French officers, the main wave of emigrations was triggered by the events in June and July 1791: the new military and civil oaths, Varennes, the abolition of the propriétaires and regimental distinctions, and the massacre of the Champ-de-Mars. Within forty eight months of the storming of the Bastille, 121 (59%) of the 206 officers serving in July 1789 had either formally resigned or simply deserted prior to emigration, added to which were 14 of the 21 commissioned after July 1789. Of those who remained (generally the older officers), many chose to retire, leaving just 52 officers (25%) still in French service by October 1793. Garrisoned in France since the mid-1780s, the detailed pattern of retirement, resignation and emigration was effectively identical for the 87e and 88e. Due to its relative isolation from the Revolution until its return to France in mid-1790 the 92e was initially less affected by events. Its pattern of departure was rather influenced by developments prior to April 1792.

There were specific factors impacting upon the pattern of emigration for the Brigade's officers, particularly in influencing how certain individuals and sub-groups reacted. Their origins as exiles gave them an identity distinct from their French hosts, especially the popular masses. This distinctive identity was further enhanced as paranoia against all foreigners inexorably increased, ensuring little or no identification with the evolving political situation. Whilst the Royalist and Catholic sentiments of
the bulk of the Brigade's officers were as much a factor in the decision by most to embark on the road of emigration as those of their French brethren, the decree of 21 July abolishing the traditional distinctions of the Irish regiments and family proprietorships sharply reinforced their alienation. The growing xenophobic paranoia and the factor of a distinctive identity had however the greatest alienating impact upon the officers of the 92e given their delay in emigrating, culminating in April 1792 with the Austrian and Prussian declaration of war on France and the subsequent brutal murder of Théobald Dillon. Equally, there was the factor of youth in that the 92e, with the youngest officer corps, emigrated last and in the lowest numbers. Yet within the 87e and 88e, their youngest officers, particularly those who had not served in America, were the first to emigrate and in the greatest numbers. This apparent contradiction evaporates however on closer examination as, overall, the bulk of emigrants from the 92e were also its youngest officers. Equally, in all three regiments, the older and more senior company officers made up the majority of those who remained. Within the older age group of officers remaining was the sub-group of the officiers de fortune, whose distinctive social and career background predictably ensured they had the lowest percentage of emigrations. Finally, although kinship had a quantifiable effect on choices, this was generally weighted in favour of emigration. Only within the extended Dillon and Sheldon family circle did it appear to favour remaining. For those who did remain, the reward was identification as 'étranger noblesse', resulting in fates ranging from simple suspension or expulsion from the Army, through to arrest and execution.

Having emigrated, the bulk of this corporate body of officers ultimately found what, at first sight, might appear a surprising host in the guise of Great Britain. It was a
complex combination of factors, evolving from the mid-1750s, which brought about an eventual form of Catholic emancipation for the British Army, ironically focused on the last of the officers who had travelled the road into foreign military service. Whilst war, the growing parameters of the British Empire and the consequent need by the British military for manpower were the key driving forces, many of the competing issues which fuelled the debate proved contradictory. The main barrier was inevitably the traditional fear of Popery by the Protestant Ascendancy, particularly the prospect of allowing Catholics to bear arms. Yet during the debate there were also those in the Ascendancy who urged the recruitment of Catholics to prevent denuding Ireland of its Protestant minority whilst others urged the recruitment of Protestants for fear of removing Catholic tenants and labourers from their estates. This debate was further complicated by the adoption, between 1755 and 1793 (articulated in various official correspondence), of a policy by which British ministers, when asked if it was legally permissible to recruit Catholics, commenced their replies by initially stating that it was decidedly illegal, but then continued by directing the questioner that it was best not to ask recruits their religious affiliation. This practice of wilful blindness on the part of the government, forced by the needs of the Seven Years' War and American War of Independence, initially only extended to the recruitment of regiments that were specifically not to serve in Ireland, given the then still pervasive fears of the Ascendancy. Yet the ever growing demand for manpower inevitably forced its general extension to regiments serving in Ireland during the American War of Independence, an extension made easier by evolving changes in perceptions of the ideological threat to the Ascendancy.

Consequently, when Britain entered the war against Revolutionary France in January
1793 she joined a conflict for which her armed forces were, as ever, ill-prepared, yet in which the conceptual political stakes were infinitely greater than any previous conflict that century. Lacking a coherent strategy, under-strength regiments were dispatched to various destinations, ranging from Flanders to the Caribbean. As in the century's previous wars, the government's response was promiscuously to authorise the raising of numerous new formations by almost anyone who apparently had the necessary influence to attract recruits. Following the well established practice of beating-up a quota of men in return for a commission, hopeful officers offered bounties to potential soldiers throughout the British Isles, but especially in the Highlands and Ireland whose Catholic populations were viewed as still having much untapped potential. In the Highlands, the surviving elements of the clan system were utilised by commissioning senior members of certain Catholic families. Equally, foreigners were welcome, from the traditional German sources to the new potential of the French émigrés. It was in this broader context that Pitt's government, having already been introduced to the potential of the Scots émigrés from Dutch service, looked with favour on the suggestions placed before it from certain of the Brigade's senior officers. As it had, to a degree, proved true in Scotland, London believed the assurances of émigrés such as O'Connell and Dillon when they promised their family influence in Ireland would assure a flood of new recruits.

Thus the desperate need for additional troops and the realisation that property-owning Catholics and Protestants had equally as much to fear from the godless republic finally tipped the balance in favour of statutory change to permit the legal utilisation of the perceived pool of still untapped Irish Catholic manpower. These two factors, in addition to the complex web of factors which had been operating during the previous
forty years, not only brought about a belated legalisation of Catholic recruitment, but 
underlay the partial removal of the prohibition on Catholics holding military 
commissions on the Irish Establishment. When the Portland Whigs joined with Pitt in 
July 1794, thus bringing together a group of politicians, Pitt, Portland, Dundas and 
Windham, who were sympathetic to the issue of Catholic emancipation, particularly 
in Ireland, this in turn saw the subsequent creation of the British Army's first regular 
Catholic regiments officered by Catholics. That the same revolutionary threat also 
produced a corporate body of professional Catholic military officers who were the 
focus for these efforts was fortuitous coincidence.

The next three years saw continued opposition to the project, both from St.James’s 
and in Dublin, not unexpectedly given the legal ambiguities still surrounding 
commissioning Catholics. Nonetheless, the Brigade's practical difficulties were shared 
by almost all freshly raised formations in the British Army: administrative confusion, 
financial uncertainty and poor recruitment. Although at first glance the decision-
making processes and financial arrangements for the Brigade appear amateurish, in 
the contemporary context they were regarded as normal. There was nothing 
remarkable about the apparent ineptitude of planning in London by the various 
ministers of Pitt's government or the lack of co-ordination between London and 
Dublin. It was accepted practice that financial details were settled after decisions on 
raising new formations and the Treasury in particular always sought to unburden 
itself, if at all possible, of funding at Dublin's expense. Far from being incompetent, 
Dundas, Portland and Windham worked well within the contemporary frame of 
reference where informality regarding the decision-making process in government 
was accepted practice (5).
Another area where the informality of decision-making impacted upon the fate of the Brigade was the lack of broader strategic planning with regard to the war, particularly in respect of manpower, an omission only belatedly addressed by the appointment of the Duke of York to the long vacant post of Commander-in-Chief. It is not coincidental that the questioning of the Brigade's utility, and much else in Britain's war effort, commenced almost forthwith. An additional factor contributing to York's subsequent doubts was the manner in which the senior émigré families carried over into the re-raised Brigade their legacy of personal animosity, advantage-seeking and blatant nepotism which had characterised them in the French Army and the utter failure of both London and Dublin to counter this. However, the project finally failed due to the perception of untapped reserves of Catholic Irish recruits proving illusory for, after almost three years of recruitment, barely four complete regiments were raised. Whilst this was partly due to the months of initial wrangling between London, Dublin and the Treasury over financing and legal issues, the simple reality was that, Catholic officers or not, Irish Catholics had no desire to serve in any corps where the inevitable station was the infamous Caribbean, particularly the fever and war ravaged St.Dominique. Far from latent religious prejudice ultimately extinguishing the Brigade, it was reduced for the most traditional of reasons - a failure to complete. In many ways it was a sign as to just how ordinary the Brigade was that it was first subject to drafting, then final dissolution alongside numerous other newly established corps.

Whilst the Catholic officers failed to attract the expected recruits from their Irish brethren, it is possible that they did act as a stabilising influence on those men they
did raise in terms of the crucial issues of indiscipline, desertion and political
disaffection. Whilst the official correspondence is filled with letters increasingly
despairing of the Brigade ever raising sufficient men, there is no mention of any of
these three issues which were undoubtedly present amongst other contemporary Irish
regiments, the ranks of the Brigade remained quiescent and obedient to their officers.

Equally, whilst potential recruits were put off once the Brigade's Caribbean
destination was revealed, those initially embodied accepted their fate, including being
drafted, once this posting was confirmed. This compares favourably with various
newly raised Irish regiments that had to be reduced in 1795 after they mutinied in
similar circumstances. As for political disaffection being sowed by the Defenders and
United Irishmen, in 1797 several regiments of militia and regular regiments stationed
in Ireland were revealed as having been comprehensively penetrated by them
occasioning numerous purges and trials (6). However, again the Brigade was
apparently free of such influence, the Brigade not once featuring in any dispatches on
the issue. Neither does the Brigade appear to have been plagued by desertion or even
the common occurrence of the traditional scam of bounty hopping. It would seem fair
to conclude that the particular nature of its officer corps must have had some bearing
on these issues, be it possible loyalty to co-religionists or through recruiting on certain
senior officers' family lands, thus retaining a degree of traditional seigniorial loyalty
and obedience absent elsewhere.

In terms of the Catholic officers' identity in respect of the Ascendancy and Irish
society as a whole, neither the émigrés nor the new Catholic subalterns identified
themselves with the emerging Irish nationalism as personified by the United Irishmen.
Rather, the exiled Catholic community, both Irish and English, particularly the
college institutions in Flanders and Paris, had always retained strong links with the extended families and Church hierarchy back across the seas. As expounded by writers such as R.B. McDowell, Eamon O'Flaherty and Patrick Rogers, since the mid-eighteenth century the surviving Catholic aristocracy, Catholic Church and middle class in Ireland had believed that submission to the state's temporal power and expressions of loyalty would bring reform as reflected in the policies of both the English and Irish Catholic Committees, a prime example being the support given to the volunteer movement during the American War of Independence (7). Buttressed particularly by the many extant kinship links, they welcomed the returned émigrés as their own and viewed the commissioning of Catholic officers, alongside other measures of relief, as essentially restoring key elements of social equality with the Protestant land-owning classes thus validating the policy of submission. The original motivation of the various families in seeking foreign service had been to retain a social status denied them by the traumatic schisms of the seventeenth century. Throughout the proceeding century this did not alter. In French service, whilst the respective officers retained a distinct Irish or English Catholic identity, they had closely identified with the prevailing establishment and the majority had rejected the Revolution as firmly as their French brethren had. On entering British service they sincerely pledged loyalty to the British Crown, as they had to that of France, serving alongside members of a Protestant establishment they viewed as social compatriots. Their values and internalised identity was that of Ireland's Catholic Church hierarchy, aristocracy and middle class who turned their back on any reversal of the century old land settlement and agrarian radicalism of the White Boys. Equally, the new radical, nationalistic and republican values of the Defenders and United Irishmen were as alien to them as the self-same values had been when expounded by the French
Jacobins. They were as one with their Protestant brethren in fearing popular enthusiasm for political radicalism engendered by events in France. When Hoche's fleet appeared off Bantry Bay in December 1796 there was no doubt as to where their loyalty lay, a loyalty particularly manifested by the eagerness of those officers of the Brigade then in Ireland to serve and the assured willingness of Dublin to employ them.

Despite disappointment in the Brigade's fate, both in London and for its officers, the bulk of the latter nonetheless continued their careers in the Army, firmly establishing a growing cadre of Catholic officers. When the opportunity arose in 1802 for a return to France, just eighteen of the original émigrés followed this road, mostly for reasons of family and finance. Of the eighteen, only two, John-François Mahony and William O'Meara, can be categorically identified as having re-entered the French Army. The émigrés had previously internalised a set of military values and skills broadly similar to those of their British counterparts that were apparently inculcated into the new Catholic subalterns. This enabled both groups to enter, with little practical difficulty, upon a career in the British Army that extended far beyond the life of the Brigade itself. Essentially, the Brigade operated as a nursery for the British Army's first generation of Catholic officers. However, the failure to match the 1793 Irish Relief Act in Britain and the King's refusal to sign commissions on the British Establishment of Catholics whom he knew remained a very real barrier to senior posts, albeit the only one. Despite this, the legislative mechanism of the annual Indemnification Act, originally established for forgetful Protestants, ensured the number of Catholics from throughout the British Isles and Ireland being gazetted into regiments on both British and Irish Establishments rapidly grew. This mechanism became even more vital.
when, in 1801, the Act of Union abolished the separate Irish Establishment. Whilst there remained firm opposition in Westminster, particularly in the Lords, to Pitt's attempt to integrate the Union with an extensive measure of universal Catholic relief, not a murmur was raised at the continued automatic passage of the annual Indemnification Act. An equilibrium of sorts became established by which there was no longer any suggestion that Catholicism was innately incompatible with service to the state, yet the survival of formal, if token, legislation was still viewed by sufficient members at Westminster and the Palace as a necessary touchstone of national identity. Almost all, including the King, given that there was no incidence after 1800 of his refusing to sign a commission due to the nominee's faith, accepted that the Tests were effectively optional and of only symbolic significance, kept in place to placate residual discrimination on both sides of the Irish Sea. The result was a mushrooming during the opening decade of the nineteenth century in the numbers of Irish, Scots and English Catholic officers, including a select few generals. Ultimately, Wellington, one of whose own ADCs at Seringapatam, Jerrard Strickland, was from an old English Catholic family, expressed not the slightest concern in commanding an army in the Peninsular, almost half of whose officers, some suggested, were Catholics.

Whilst the issue of commissioning Catholics demonstrated that substantive legislation followed rather than led popular attitudes, formal attempts to repeal the Tests continued to remain, effectively, political suicide for another sixteen years after the Act of Union, the fate of Howick's Bill and the Ministry of The Talents in March 1807 being a clear example. It was not until 1817 that the Duke of Norfolk, a Protestant member of England's leading Catholic family, secured a full legislative repeal of the requirement to take the Tests thus permitting the King to appoint
Catholics to all commissions in both the Army and Navy (10).
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(3). Ibid.


(5). Although an apocryphal source, Charles Forman, who held a position in the War Office during the War of the Spanish Succession claimed he '...heard it said that more than a third of the officers with the Duke of Marlborough in Flanders were Irish.' See, Charles Forman, *A Defence of the Courage, Honour and Loyalty of the Irish Nation*, (Dublin 1767).


(7). SP 63/408, 'Chesterfield to Newcastle 7th September 1745.'; SP 63/410, 'Harrington to Newcastle 10th April 1747.'


(11). SP 63/415, 'Bedford to Pitt, 3 January 1758'.


(17). PRO 30/8/84, f.103.


(24). PRO 30/55/6/704.


(27). *The Royal Gazette (New York)*, 14th February 1778.

(28). National Archives of Canada, RG.8, "C" Series, Volume 1900, 'Muster Roll of Roman Catholick Volunteers, Commanded by Lieut. Colonel Alfred Clifton, Flushing Fly, September 4th, 1778.'


25th December 1782 to 23rd January 1783.'


(32). Ibid.

(33). PRO 30/55/36/5, 'Return of the Number of Men, Wagoners, Women & Children victualled at Monmouth the 27th & 28th June 1778.'

(34). PRO 30/55/44/8, 'Officers in the Volunteers of Ireland.'

(35). PRO 30/55/38/24, 'Distribution & Return of the Strength of the following Battns. of His Majesty's Provl. Forces 1st August 1778.'

(36). PRO 30/55/13/1469, 'October 15th to November 30th 1778.'


(38). Huntington Library, American Loyalists Papers, HM 15223, 'State of particular Companies of the Provincial Corps, for a General Return Feby. 1779'.


(40). William L.Clements Library, Frederick Mackenzie Papers, 'Return of the Number of Men, Women and Children of the British and Foreign Regiments...27th February 1780'.


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(51). Correspondence of Harcourt to Weymouth, February 28 1776; Captain Suly to Cunningham, March 13 1776; Blaquiere to North, February 28, 1776, cited in Lecky, *Ireland*, note (2), ii, p.190.


(53). WO 1/611, 'Memorandum of Irish Q.M.G., 1787, Thomas Orde to George Yonge, 4 Aug. 1787'; HO 100/28, f.99.


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(56). BL.Add.Mss.33,118, ff.221-236.


(63). Windham himself noted in his diary for 3rd May 1784 that the Prince and the Duke de Chartres were at Newmarket during one of his visits to Cossey. See, *The Diary of the Right Hon. William Windham, 1784 to 1810*, ed.Mrs Henry Baring, (Longmans 1866), p.9.

(64). PRO 30/8/190, f.187.


**CHAPTER TWO.**


(3). 8 Geo. I, c.9.


(5). AG, 14 YC.124 Regimental Contrôles Dillon 1786-1795, ff.86-92.

(6). AG, Xb.94, 'Inspection faite par M. Le Comte de Cely, Maréchal de Camp le armée du Roy, Régiment de Dillon...Juillet 1789.'

(7). AG, Xb.95, 'Inspection faite par M. Le Comte de Cely, Maréchal de Camp le armée du Roy, Régiment de Berwick...11e Juillet 1789.'

(8). AG, 14 YC.134 Regimental Contrôles Walsh 1786-1795, ff.41-221.


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(19). BL.Add.Mss.37,874, f.185, 'Bulkeley to Windham 22nd December 1794.'
(21). BL. Revolution Française, nos.277 (20), Armée IV, Felix de Wimpffen, 'Rapport sur le remboursement des charges, offices et emplois militaires, Février 1791.'
(23). AG, Yb.451, ff. 4, 14, 28, 41, 58, 62.
(24). AG, Xb.192, various letters of General Duportail with Lieutenant's D'Elloy, O'Meara and Bulger between March-May 1791.
(25). AG, Xb.94 'Livret pour le Revue D'Inspections Dillon 1789.'; Xb.95, 'Livret pour le Revue D'Inspections Berwick 1789.'; Xb.99, 'Livret pour le Revue D'Inspections Walsh Juillet 1788.'
(26). AG, Xb.94; Xb.95.
(27). AG, Yb.451, 'Registre des Services de Messieurs les Officiers du Régiment De Dillon 87e 1789-1793', ff.42, 61, 63.
(28). AG, Yb.452, 'Registre des Services de Messieurs les Officiers du Régiment de Berwick 1789-1793', ff.33, 39, 119.
(29). AG,Yb.451, ff.12, 31, 32, 61; AG, Yb 452, ff.58.
(30). AG, Xb.99; AG, Yb.458, 'Registre des Services de Messieurs les Officiers de Régiment de Walsh 92e 1788-1793.'
(32). AG, Yb.458, ff.100.


(39). AG, Xb.8, f.79.


(51). Scott, Royal, pp.20 & 30.


(53). Hayes, Dictionary, pp.239-242 & 265-266; Samuel Trant McCarthy, Three Kerry Families, (Folkstone 1923), pp.12, 19, 20, 23-29, 31; AG, Yb.451, ff.4, 18, 23, 26, 39,44, 64; AG, Yb.452, ff. 2, 18, 83, 102, 114; AG, Yb.458, f.110; AG, Yb.458, ff.11, 66, 72, 115.

(54). AG, Yb.451, ff.22, 50; AG, Yb.452, ff. 76, 84; McDowell, Imperialism, pp.196-197.

(55). O'Connell, Colonel, i, pp. 70-75.


(58). O'Connell, Colonel, i, pp.252, 256, ii, p.32.

(60). Ravenhill, JSAHR, lxix, pp.81-88; Jerningham, Letters, pp.3, 31 and family genealogical tree; Bence-Jones, Families, p.43; AG, Yb.305, 'Officer Contrôles Dillon 1760-1788.'

(61). AG, Yb.451, ff.18; AG, Yb.452, f.73; AG, Yb.451, f.30.

(62). Scott, Royal, p.31.

(63). AG, Yb.451, ff.1-75.

(64). AG, Yb.452, ff.1-123.


(66). AG, Yb.451, ff.74-75; AG, Yb.452, ff. 55, 68, 71, 78, 99; AG, Yb.458, ff. 11, 17, 55, 66.


(69). AG, Yb.451, ff.42, 64; AG, Yb.452, ff.57, 82, 81; AG, Yb.458, ff. 62, 94-96; AG, Xb 192, 'Contrôle les services des Officiers January 1792.', 'Contrôle 11e Juillet 1792.'

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(71). Brock, IG, xiv, pp.172-173.

(72). Garland, IG, vi, p.776; AG, Yb.458, f.58.

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(74). AG, Xb.99, 'État des Graces Le 8 Aoust 1785'.

(75). Tremoile, Royalist, p.94.

(76). Harcourt, Tour du Pin, p.75.


(78). O'Connell, Colonel, i, pp.183-184.


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(1). Scott, Royal, p.82.

(2). AG,14 YC.124, regimental contrôles Dillon; AG,14 YC.127, regimental contrôles Berwick.


(4). AG, Yb.451, f.43; AG, Yb.452, f.100; AG, Yb.458, ff.1, 2.


(6). Scott, Royal, p.106.

(7). Jennings, Journal, ff.4-5.

(8). Tremoille, Royalist, p.84.

(9). Wimpffen, 'Rapport sur le remboursement des charges, offices et emplois militaires, Février 1791.'

(10). O'Connell, Colonel, ii, pp.97-98.


(14). AG, Xb.192, 'État des Officiers 87e' of 18 August and 6 October 1791.


(16). AG, Xb.194, 'État des Officiers 92e 3e Septembre 1791', 'Copie d'un Certificat de la Municipalité de Cambray, signé Sallier, Secrétaire.'

(17). Harty's loyalty was rewarded on 25 July with promotion to lieutenant-colonel, see AG, Yb.452, ff.12, 6; Hayes, *Irishmen*, p.82.

(18). AG, Yb.452, ff.1-122.


(21). AG, Xb.192, '87ème Régiment d'Infanterie. État des Officiers du dit Régiment par Compagnies du 26ème Octobre 1791.'


(23). AG, Xb.192, 'Notes sur les Officiers du 87e Régiment...6e Octobre 1793.'

(24). AG, Yb.451, ff.1-84.

(25). AG, Xb.192, '1er Bataillon. du 87e regt. d'infanterie Le 22 avril 1793.'


(27). These officers belated departure resulted in their names being included in the État Militaire of 1793, namely, Thomas Kavanagh, John Bourke, André Creagh and Martin MacMahon. See Hennet, *Militaire*, p.160.

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(28). AG, Yb.458, ff.1-128.


(30). AG, 14 YC.124, 127,134, Regimental 'Contrôles' for Dillon, Berwick and Walsh, 1786-95.

(31). AG, Yb.458, ff.10, 58.

(32). AG, Yb.451, f.58.


(35). Scott, Royal, pp.112-113.

(36). For references see Chapter 2, ref. 67.

(37). O'Connell, Colonel, ii, p.95.


1928), pp.61, 157-158, 186-189.

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(45). Lawrence, *Savannah*, p.47.


(47). AG, Yb.458, ff.58, 59.


(49). AG, Yb.451, f.68.


(51). Harris, *RH*, x, p.93.


(53). AG, Xb.192, '87eme Régiment d'Infanterie. État des Officiers du dit Régiment par Compagnies au 26e October 1791.', 'Revue du 2e Bataillon du 87eme d'Infanterie Havre 7e Janvier 1792 pour St.Dominique.'


(58). AG, Xb.194, '92eme Régiment D'Inf. 2e Bataillon. État de Situation du dit bataillon au 8e Octobre 1792.'

(59). AG, Yb.458, ff.52, 60, 72, 74, 77, 86, 88, 91, 87.


(64). AG, Yb.458, ff.65, 67.


(68). CO 137/91, ff.264.


(70). CO 137/91, ff.278.

(71). AG, Xb.192 'Capitaine Ignace Salomon, Les Cayes Saint-Louis 10 frimaire 4e année Republicaine.'

(72). WO 1/58 b, f.365.

(73). AG, Yb.458, f.67.
(74). CO 137/93, f.91; WO 1/73, f.245.
(77). CO 137/91, ff.337.
(78). CO 137/93, ff.91.
(79). CO 137/92, ff.155.
(80). CO 137/92, ff.29.
(81). WO 1/73, ff.245.
(83). AG, Yb.451, ff. 37, 45; AG, Xb.192, 'Proposition pour le remplacement des emploia vacana, Arras le 22.9.1791.'
(84). AG, Yb.451, ff.8, 26, 33, 37, 40, 42, 48, 55; CO. 137/91 ff.363; WO. 1/73 ff. 245.
(85). Hayes, Irishmen, pp.116-117; AG, Yb.452, f.118; Scott, Revolution, p.22.
(86). AG, Xb.192, 'Notes sur les Officiers du 87e Régiment...6e Octobre 1793'; 'Rappori...Par Le General Charles Hesse, General de Division commandais à Orleans sur la situation de 87e Regt.d'Inf.', letter of 'Ministre de la Guerre19e Novembre 1793.'

CHAPTER FOUR.
(1). Tremoille, Royalist, p.83.
(5). Ibid.

(7). Grouvel, _Émigration_, iii, p.134.


(11). Ibid.


(13). Grouvel, _Émigration_, iii, pp.138-139.


(16). Grouvel, _Émigration_, iii, pp.135, 137.

(17). Ibid, pp.135, 137, 139.


(19). This corps must not be confused with the similar formation proposed to Pitt in early 1793 by Comte Roger de Damas but never raised. See _Memoirs of the Comte Roger de Damas (1787-1806)_, ed. and annotated by Jacques Rambaud, translated by Mrs.Rodolph Stawell, (London 1913), pp.206-207, 424-425.

(20). Bittard, _Cocarde_, p.41.


(26). Atkinson, _JSAHR_, xxii, p.3; Robert Gould, _Mercenaries of the Napoleonic_


(30). 34 Geo.III, c.43.


(37). HO 1/2, 'Colonel W.Ph.Colyear Robertson 27th April 1794.'


(40). Fortescue at Dropmore, iii, p.379.

(41). Weiner, *Exiles*, p.50. Causing some confusion at the time in respect of the three Walsh-Serrant brothers, in much official and private correspondence, the Count was referred to as the 'Duke' and the Viscount as 'Count'. To simplify matters, henceforth all references are modified so that the title Count is always used to denote the elder brother, Viscount the middle brother and Chevalier the youngest.


played by loyalty to James II by the original seventeenth century officers of the Brigade, Burke directly compared the loyalty of the English Royalists to Charles I to that of his late eighteenth French contemporaries. See Ibid, 'Burke to Elliot, 22nd September 1793', iv, p.151.


(47). Hayes, Dictionary, p.84.

(48). O'Connell, Colonel, ii, pp.146-147.

(49). PRO 30/8/164, f.18.

(50). PRO 30/8/177, ff.70-72.

(51). HO 1/2 Letter of J.Hussey to Evan Nepean 28th April 1794.

(52). HO 1/2 Letter of General O'Connell 30th April 1794.

(53). HO 100/46, f.154.


(55). HO 100/54, ff.3-18.


(59). The corps concerned were those commanded by Marquis D'Autichamp, Comte de Viomesnil, Comte de Bethisy, Duc de Montmorency-Leval, Duc de Mortemart, Duc de Castries, Marquis Du Dresnay and the Comte d'Hervilly. See WO. 4/154, f.122.


(61). Fortescue at Dropmore, ix, ff.xvi-xvii; 34 Geo.III, c.43.


(63). O'Connell, Colonel, ii, pp.150-151.

(64). BL.Add.Mss.37,874, f.54.

(65). HO/100/62, ff.358-359.
(66). PRO Northern Ireland T2905/11/1.


(68). PRO Northern Ireland T2905/11/3.

(69). HO 100/46, ff.194-195.

(70). Baring, *Diary*, p.316.

(71). HO 100/40, ff.196-208.

(72). WO 43/453, ff.41-42.

(73). Ibid.

(74). BL.Add.Mss.37,874 f.92.


(76). BL.Add.Mss.33,102, f.216.

(77). BL.Add.Mss.37,874, f.185.

(78). HO 100/50, ff.102-104.


(81). Garland, IG, vi, p.773.

(82). HO.100/62, ff.39-43, 81-83, 356-359; PRO 30/8/129, ff.243-257; PRO 30/8/162, ff.58, 63-64,

(83). BL.Add.Mss.33,105, ff.6-7; HO.100/70, ff.97-100.

(84). BL.Add.Mss.37,845, f.63. 'Portland to Windham 14th December 1794.'

(85). HO 50/386, 'Windham to Portland 16th February 1795'.


(89). BL.Add.Mss.33,102, f.216.

CHAPTER FIVE.

(2). BL.Add.Mss.37,845, f.63.

(4). This letter, originally written in French and dated from Nettelen, near Munster, 17 February 1795, is from the present FitzSimon family archive at Glencullen House, Ireland.

(8). BL.Add.Mss.37,842, f.84.

(9). Ibid. f.91.
(12). Portland Collection, NU, PWF 7,874; PRO Northern Ireland, T2905/11/5; HO 123/4, f.111.
(14). HO 100/60, ff.103-104.
(15). Portland Collection, NU, PWF 10073. That there was more than just a nominal requirement to have served in the French Irish Brigade for gaining direct entry at a rank above ensign was indicated by Colonel Dillon's obvious subterfuge in respect of two individuals. Both William McCarthy and J.G.Fitzgerald were recommended by...
Dillon in October 1795 and May 1797 respectively. The former he described as, 'late of Irish Brigade', the latter as, 'Late Count Dillon's'. Both were subsequently gazetted directly to the rank of lieutenant. In fact there is no record of either having ever served in the French army. See WO 35/5; WO 4/339, f.82.

(16). HO 123/4, ff.106-114; HO 100/54, ff.39-49, 98-100
(17). HO 123/4, f.108.
(18). HO 100/55, f.110.
(19). HO 123/4, ff.106-311; HO 100/55, ff.19-365; See Appendix 3 for specific references.
(20). HO 100/61, f.94; HO 123/4, ff.201, 204, 225, 262. The resignation of Maurice O'Connell cannot have come as much of a surprise to the Colonel. When originally appointed he made it clear 'It is not from any personal liking to him', but solely as a favour to his cousin Jeffrey Maurice O'Connell. See O'Connell, Colonel, ii, p.166.
(21). HO 123/4, ff.106-311; HO 100/55, ff.19-365; See Appendix 3 for specific references.
(22). PRO Northern Ireland, T.2905/11/1 (PWF 3,276).
(24). HO 100/40, ff.261b-262, 'Fitzwilliam to Portland, 7th January 1795.'
(26). HO 31/1, f.208.
(27). HO 31/1, f.209; HO 100/40, f.264.
(28). HO 100/56, ff.81-86.
(29). HO 30/1, f.209b.
(30). HO 100/46, ff.269-270b.
(31). HO 30/1, ff.212-214.
(32). HO 100/46, f.270.
(33). HO 50/385, f.187.
(34). HO 100/56, f.298.
(35). ISPO, Rebellion Papers, MSS. 620/24/78.
(40). HO 30/1, ff.200-206.
(47). Ibid. f.194.
(49). HO 100/46, ff.322-323.
(50). ISPO, Rebellion Papers, MSS. 620/18a/5, 'Thomas Pelham to Edward Cooke, Dublin Castle, September 24th. 1795.'
(51). PRO 30/8/164, f.197-200.
(52). HO 100/46, ff.329b-330.
(53). HO 100/66, f.73; HO 100/63, f.129; HO 100/84, ff.295-296; HO 123/4, ff.207-208.
(54). HO 100/66. ff.70-72; HO 100/54, f.96.
(55). PRO, HO 1/2, letter of General O'Connell 30 April 1794.
(56). PRO 30/8/186. For a fuller account of Patrick Wall's career see Marcus de la Poer Beresford, 'Ireland in French Strategy, 1776-83', _Irish Sword_, xii, (1976), p.289.
(59). 'Patrick Warren to James Henry FitzSimon, Athlone 15th October 1795.'
FitzSimon family, Glencullen.

(60). 'Pelham to Windham, May 17th 1795', cited in Lecky, Ireland, iii, p.256.

(61). HO 100/54, ff.183-184.

(62). PRO 30/8/168. f.95.

(63). HO 100/58, f.83.

(64). HO 100/58, f.104.


(69). PRO 30/8/170, f.120.


(72). PRO Northern Ireland, T 2905/11/9.


(74). 'Warren to FitzSimon 15th October 1795', FitzSimon family, Glencullen.

(75). Ibid, 'Patrick Warren to James Henry FitzSimon, Athlone 28th November 1795.'

(76). HO 100/46, f.329.

(77). HO 50/386.


(80). HO 100/55, ff.411-420; HO 100/68, f.27.

(81). HO 100/59, f.131.

(82). The Times, Thursday 29 October 1795, p.2. This was not the only reported duel involving the Brigades officers. See John L.Garland, 'The Wild Geese Return', British History Illustrated, i, (1975), p.10; The Times, Monday 5th September 1796, p.3; WO 35/5; HO 123/4, f.266.
CHAPTER SIX

(1) WO 40/7, 'Lieutenant Colonel King to Mathew Lewis, Whitehall 9th December 1795'.


(3) WO 40/7, 'Colonel Robert Brownrigg, Saville Row, 17th December 1795.'

(4) WO 40/7, 'Windham to Portland, War Office, 18th December 1795.'; WO 4/162, ff.370-375.

(5) HO 30/1, ff.154-155.

(6) Ferguson, Army in Ireland, pp.142-144.


(8) WO 1/768, ff.73-75.


(10) Ibid. f.383; HO 100/63, f.225.

(11) HO 100/60, ff.35, 56.

(12) HO 100/60, f.58b-59.

(13) HO 100/61, f.261; HO 100/62, f.53-55.

(14) HO 100/62, f.65.

(15) WO 1/612, ff.29-33, 37.


(17) HO 100/60, f.68.

(18) HO 30/1, f.135; HO 100/62, f.65.


(20) BL.Add.Mss.33,101, f.390.

(21) HO 100/60, ff.65-66.

(22) HO 50/387, f.69.

(23) WO 8/9, ff.34-40.

(24) NLI, Kilmainham Papers, V3. f.179.

Dillon ultimately returned to France at the Peace of Amiens in 1802, due partly he claimed, to Pitt, Portland and Camden each and jointly refusing to assist him in this matter. Given his record of self-promotion it was unsurprising Napoleon soon found him knocking at his door for employment. Failing in his petition to gain senior rank in the Légion Irlandaise, the good colonel subsequently had a very murky career, possibly operating as a spy for the Emperor amongst British prisoners at Verdun. See Chatham Papers, PRO 30/8/129, f.263; John G.Gallaher, *Napoleon's Irish Legion*, (Southern Illinois University Press1993), p.65; BL.Add.Mss.38,886, ff.97-101, 'The Fortune of War or a ten years captivity in France, 1804-1814, Memoirs of James Robert Barstard.'


(37). HO 123/4, f.218; HO 100/60, f.124.

(38). HO 123/4, f.208; HO 100/60, ff.50-53.


(40). NLI, Kilmainham Papers, V3. f.175.


(42). HO 100/60, ff.103-104.

(43). HO 123/4, f.214.

(44). NLI, Kilmainham Papers, V3. f.183; HO 100/60, ff.103-104.
(45). HO 100/60, ff. 18, 88, 113, 222; HO 123/4, f. 207; WO 35/5, Appointments for '29th February 1796' and 'August 1796'.


(47). HO 100/60, ff. 251-256.

(48). HO 100/60, ff. 257-258.

(49). NLI, Kilmainham Papers, V4. f. 7.


(51). HO 100/61, ff. 90-91.

(52). HO 100/61, f. 98.


(54). HO 30/1, f. 128.

(55). HO 100/61, ff. 103-105.

(56). HO 100/61, ff. 83, 88.


(58). HO 100/61, ff. 269-275.


(60). Ibid. f. 259.

(61). Ibid. f. 348.


(63). HO 100/61, f. 174-178.

(64). BL. Add. Mss. 37, 876, ff. 251-254.

(65). Ibid. ff. 255-259.


(68). HO 123/4, ff. 114, 159; HO 100/60, f. 18.

(69). HO 123/4, ff. 259-261; HO 100/61, ff. 142-143.
(70). HO 100/61, f.221.


(75). Ibid. ff.436-437.

(76). BL.Add.Mss.33,103, ff. 1-2, 44.


(78). WO 133/1, 'Horse Guards, 19th December 1796'.


(81). The Annual Register, 1797, pp.9-10.


(83). HO 30/1, f.88.

(84). Ayling, Edmund Burke, p.234, Fitz-William and Bourke, Correspondence, iii, pp.150-155; Butler, Reformation, iv, pp.39-44.

(85). HO 100/50, f.77.

(86). BL.Add.Mss.33,102, f.296.

(87). HO 100/65, f.243a.

(88). HO 100/64, ff.143-144.

(89). HO 100/60, ff.269-270.

(90). Ibid. f.269b.

(91). HO 100/54, ff.43, 47, 49, 98-100.

(92). ISPO, Rebellion Papers, MSS. 620/18a/5, 'Pelham to Cooke, December 11th, 1795.'


(94). HO 100/61, f.19.

(95). BL.Add.Mss.33,102, f.209.

(97). HO 100/65, f.78.

(98). BL.Add.Mss.33,102, f.257.


(105). Ibid. ff.95-96.


CHAPTER SEVEN.

(1). CO 137/92, ff.154-156, 193-194, 291, 'Major James Grant to Henry Dundas 19th December 1793', and 'Captain Brisbane to Major Grant 21st December 1793.'

(2). CO 137/92, ff.220-221.

(3). CO 137/92, ff.303-304; CO 137/93, ff.62-64.


(5). CO 137/93, ff.91; CO 137/93, ff.133.


(7). CO 137/93, ff.91.

(8). WO 1/60 B, 177.

(9). CO 137/93, ff.120, 125; WO 17/1988, 'State of the Colonial Troops of the Island of St.Domingo for 1st September and 1st November 1796.'


(16). WO 1/63, ff.531.
(17). WO 1/64, ff.101; WO 1/65, ff.73.
(18). WO 1/65, ff.189.
(19). WO 17/1988, 'State of His Majesty's Colonial Forces in St.Domingo, 1st November 1796.'
(20). Devon Record Office, Simcoe Papers, 1038M 01/1, 'Simcoe to Duke of York, Cape Môle, Saint Nicolas, 9th July 1797.'
(26). Devon Record Office, Simcoe Papers, 'Simcoe to Dundas, St.Domingo, Port au Prince, 8th May, 1797.'; WO 1/67, ff.111-119.
(29). *The Times*, Monday 26th December 1796, p.3; WO 40/32, 'List of Officers of the late 3rd Regiment of the Irish Brigade who received full pay beyond the 24th December 1797', and 'Return of Officers of His Majesty's 3rd Regiment of Irish Brigade...and when returned from the West Indies.'
(32). HO 100/78, ff.36, 69, 'Wickham to Castlereagh, 13th August 1798.'
(34). BL.Add.Mss.37,844, f.144.
(36). HO 30/1, ff.90-91; William R. Perkins Library, Melville Papers, letter of Portland to Lord Lieutenant, dated Whitehall, 10th April, 1797.
(37). HO 30/1, ff.86-87.
(40). HO 50/387, f.673.
(41). CO 217/71, ff.146-152.
(42). HO 100/68, ff.3, 71-73.
(43). HO 100/72, ff.98, 102; HO 30/1, f.71.
(44). NLI, Kilmainham Papers, V.13. f.297; HO 100/72, ff.100-107.
(45). NLI, Kilmainham Papers, V.13. ff.327-329; ISPO, Rebellion Papers, 620/31/236; HO 100/68, ff.152-156; HO 100/72, ff.160-162.
(47). HO 100/68, f.208.
(48). HO 100/68, ff.89-90; HO 100/73, ff.233-239; HO 123/4, ff.311-313.
(49). HO 100/68, ff.210-212.
(50). NLI, Kilmainham Papers, V.14. f.36; HO 30/1, f.41; HO 100/68, ff.237-241.
(51). CO 217/71, f.188.
(53). Ibid. f.184.
(56). Ibid. f.30.
(57). Ibid. ff.207-208.
(60). Ibid. ff.394-395.
(61). WO 1/612, ff.45-49.

(62). WO 133/1, 'Robert Brownrigg, Horse Guards, 1st October 1797.'

(63). Ibid. 'Robert Brownrigg, Horse Guards, 2nd October 1797.'

(64). HO 30/1, f.35.


(72). PRO 30/8/129, f.269.

(73). WO 133/1, 'Robert Brownrigg, Horse Guards, 15th September 1797.'


(76). WO 133/4, 'Brownrigg to Balcarres, Horse Guards, 4th January 1798.'

(77). WO 12/10818, 'Paymasters monthly roll of the 6th Regiment of the Irish Brigade from 25th June to the 24th July 1798.'

(78). HO 50/388, 'M.Lewis to John King, War Office, 16th August 1798.'

(79). WO 12/10818, 'Paymasters monthly roll of the 6th Regiment of the Irish Brigade from 25th August to the 24th September 1798.' and 'Pay list of the 6th Regiment of the Irish Brigade for the detachment at Chatham Barracks from the 25th June to 24th December 1798.'

(80). Ibid. 'Pay list of the late 6th I. Brigade for the detachment at Chatham Barracks from 25th April to 24th June.'


(82). WO 40/32, 'Count Conway to Lord Castlereagh, Dublin, 3rd January 1799,
Nominal List of the Officers of the 6th Regiment Irish Brigade, specifying the period, to which they are entitled to full pay.'


(88). NAM. Acc.No. 6612/10/1-16, 'Captain Edward O'Shiell, commanding detachment of 2nd Regt.Irish Brigade, to Colonel Brownrigg, Portsmouth, 22nd September 1798.'

(89). Daly, *JSAHR*, x, pp.145-146; Kup, *Soldier and Administrator*, p.58.


(91). WO 1/70, ff.495-499.


(94). HO 100/73, f.154.


(96). HO 50/388, f.8.


(98). HO 50/388, 'M.Lewis to John King, War Office, 27th February 1798.'


(100). WO 133/4, f.155.

(101). Fortescue at Dropmore, ix, ff.xvi-xvii.
(102). 34 Geo. III, c.43.
(107). HO 50/345, 'Warwick to Portland 24th April 1798.'
(111). HO 50/55, 'Bownas to Portland 17th August 1798.'
(112). HO 100/84, f.293-300.
(113). Ibid. ff.384-385; HO 50/388, 'M.Lewis to John King, War Office, 22nd May, 1800.'


(124). Biographie Universelle, iv, pp.171-173; Tremoile, Royalist, pp.103-104.


(126). AG. Yb.451, f.26; Yb.452, ff.103, 121; Yb.458, ff.67, 79.


(128). Garland, BHI, i, p.10.

(129). O'Callaghan, Brigades, p.634.

CONCLUSION.


pp.28-34.

(3) James Hayes and John Houlding have demonstrated that this was true for the eighteenth century British Army. See James Hayes, *The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army, 1714-63*, (Kings College London MA thesis 1956); John Houlding, *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1714-1795*, (Clarendon Press 1981).


(9) Fortescue at Dropmore, viii, ff.xlvii-xlix; ix, ff.xvi-xxv; Butler, *Reformation*, iv, pp.18-192; *A New History of Ireland*, v, pp.33-35.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX ONE.

Abbreviations: E=Emigrated.
R=Remained.
Rt=Retired.
?=Fate Unrecorded.

SERVING OFFICERS OF THE IRISH BRIGADE 1789.

In preparing these lists from the variety of records in the Archives de la Guerre at Valenciennes there have often been contradictions between the Inspection reports (Xb.94, 95 and 194 for Dillon, Berwick and Walsh respectively) and the Registre des Services for officers (Yb.451, 452 and 458 for Dillon, Berwick and Walsh respectively). The inspections were intended to establish the potential operational status of a given regiment if war occurred and therefore listed officers in given positions at a specific date even when they are marked at 'detached', 'absent' or 'on leave' in practice. The Registre des Services record the actual official detail of each officer's army career regardless of the needs of any given annual inspection. Therefore the following lists reflect the officer's service records rather than the regimental inspection reports where contradictions have occurred. The actual specific date of each list is slightly different due to the fact that each regiment was either undergoing a series of internal promotions subject to annual inspection or, as in the case of Walsh, was overseas and therefore not subject to a detailed annual inspection. Needless to say, there are still ambiguities, and officers' whose status are unclear are listed as 'attached' at the end of each regiment, the overall objective of this list being to identify all Brigade officers in French service during the early years of the Revolution rather than to suggest a series of notionally fixed regimental 'establishments'.

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REGIMENT DILLON 30 AUGUST 1789.*

Colonel Propriétaire, Maréchal-de-Camp Arthur Count Dillon (R).
Colonel-Commandant Théobald Chevalier de Dillon (R).
Lieutenant-Colonel James O'Moran (R).
Major William O'Toole (E).
Major-en-Second, "VACANT".
Quartier-maitre-trésorier Joseph D'Arcy (Rt).
Porte-drapeau Philippe Corkeran (R).
Porte-drapeau Andrew De Sager (E).
Cadet-Gentilhomme William Jerningham (E).
Cadet-Gentilhomme Francis O'Dunne (E).

Capitaine-Commandants.
Lewis D'Arcy (Rt).
Michael O'Berin. (Rt).
John O'Reilly (Rt).
Joseph Commerford (Rt).
Patrick O'Keeffe (R).
James Mandeville (Rt).
John-Bernard Greenlaw (E).
Thomas Dillon (R).
Bernard MacDermott (E).
Arthur Coghlan (E).

Capitaines-en-Second.
John Fennell (R).
Henry Purdon (?).
William Sheldon (R).
William O'Shee (E).
Denis-Emmanuel O'Farrell (E).
Joseph Fitzmaurice (R).
James O'Farrell (E).
Edward FitzGerald (R).
Patrick-Charles Fagan (E).
Walter-Jean Hussey (E).

Lieutenants-en-Premier.
James MacClosky (R).
Maurice D'Elloy (E).
Walter Bulger (R)
"VACANT".
Daniel David O'Meara (R).
Francis MacDermott (R).
Patrick-William Doran (E).
John O'Neill (E).
Michael Walsh (?).
Thomas (William) Hay (E).

Lieutenants-en-Second.
Nicolas Laugton (E).
Robert Barry (R).
Justine Ignatius Hussey (E).
John-Charles Power (E).
Kean Mahony (E).
Peter James Nagle (E).
Joseph O'Neill (E).
Nicolas-Henry Redmond (E).
George Francis Plunkett (E).
Patrick Warren (E).

Sous-Lieutenants.
Edward Worth (E).
Theodore Schenetz (R).
John Warren (E).
Barthelemy Barnewall (E).
Christophe Fagan (E).
Henry Tarleton (E).
James Conway (E).
Patrick-James O'Sullivan (E).
John-François Mahony (E).
Joseph Théobald le Chevalier Walsh (E).
Robert Clifford (E).
John Walsh (E).
Edward Walsh (E).
Michael Bellow (E).
Pierre Aylward (E).
Alexandre Macdonald (R).
Andrew Jordane (E).
Daniel MacNemara (E).
Peter MontGerald (E).
James-Henry FitzSimon (E).

Officers listed in register but holding no position within Regiment, August 1789.

Sous-Lieutenants.
Robert O'Connor (?).
Bernard MacDermott (?).
Irish Officers appointed between September 1789 to August 1791.

Quartier-maitre-trésorier Charles Pierre Larsoimier (R).

Lieutenant James De Sager (died St. Dom.).

Sous-Lieutenants.

Charles-Alphonse Wallut (E).

Edward Harty (?).

Charles O'Shiel (E).

John Makham MacMahon de Thomond (E).

Cadet-Gentilshomme Thomas Waters (E).

*This listing is for 30 August 1789 as there were a considerable number of promotions and retirements in process in July which were not generally complete until the annual inspection.
REGIMENT BERWICK.

Colonel Propriétaire, Maréchal-de-Camp John-Charles Third Duke de Fitzjames (E).
Colonel-Commandant, Count Bartholomew Mahony (E).
Lieutenant-Colonel James O'Moore (E).
Major Thomas MacDermott (E).
Major-en-Second Antoine Edward Joseph Count De Rothe (E).
Quartier-maître-trésorier Pierre Joseph Tezlaing (R).
Porte-drapeau Andrew Joseph Robyne (R).
Cadet-Gentilhomme Thomas Kavanagh (E).
Cadet-Gentilhomme Charles Jean De Fitzjames (E).

Capitaine-Commandants.
Jacques Mac Sweny (Rt).
James Gormocan (R).
John Joseph Reed (R).
Terence Kennedy (Rt).
Edward Saunders (Rt).
William Cruise (Rt).
Antony Egan (E).
Eugene MacSweney (Rt).
Thomas Mullens (Rt).
Thadee O'Meara (E).

Capitaines-en-Second.
Oliver Harty (R).
Patrick Lynche (Rt).
Stapleton Lynch (Rt).
Michael Barrett (Rt).
James Swanton (R).
Walter Grace (E).
John François Geoghegan (E).
James Tuite (Rt).
François Burke (Rt).
Daniel Linck (Rt).

Lieutenants-en-Premier.
James Charles Augustin Gormacon (E).
William O'Meara (E).
William Hussey (E).
Thomas Turner (died).
John Mulhall (E).
Thomas John Luther (E).
Peter Hussey (R).
Charles Blake (E).
William Kennady (E).
Patrick William O'Toole (E).

Lieutenants-en-Second.
Francis Geraphty (E).
Mathiew Meade (E).
Augustin Rothe (E).
Walter Devreaux (E).
Richard O'Byrne (E).
David Jennings (E).
Patrick Doyle (R, died St. Dom.).
Richard MacCormock (R).
James Nagle (R).
Robert Conway (E).

Sous-Lieutenants.
Richard O'Farrell (E).
Alexis Nicholas Joseph Berteau (E).
Charles William O'Connor (E).
"VACANT" (William Stack) (E).
Eugen-Philippe O'Sullivan Bear (E).
Leonard (or Eleonore) Reed (E).
Thomas Conway (E).
Andrew Elliot (R).
Charles MacCarthy (E).
Gregory O'Byrne (E).
James Dalton (R).
James Delany (R).
James O'Farrell (E).
Patrick Jennings (E).
Gerard Pierce (E).
Brian Borrough O'Toole (E).
"VACANT" (James Fannings) (E).
Patrick Pierce (E).
Dick O'Farrell (E).

Officers listed in register but holding no position within Regiment July 1789.
Colonel attached Ridore Lynch (?).
Capitaine-Commandant James O'Doyier (Rt).
Capitaine de Remplacement Thomas Conway (E)
Lieutenant-en-Premier Joseph de Bourguer (died).
Lieutenant-en-Second James Nash (E).
Sous-Lieutenant Richard Elliot (deserted 1788).
Cadet-Gentilhomme François-Louis O'Heguerty (E).

Irish Officers appointed post July 1789
Colonel Armand Hypolite Lambert O'Connor (?).
Capitaine Andrew MacDonagh (R).

Sous-Lieutenants.
John-Andrew-Benjamin Forbes (E).
John Edward Dalton (R).
Edward Michael Joseph Burke (?).
Alexandre Dalton (R).
Pierce Gerard Nagle (R).
Redmond Shee (?).

Sous-Lieutenants de Remplacement.
Dudley Colclough (E).
John O'Toole (died).
Edward Bellow (E).
James Morris/Maurice (R).

Cadet-Gentilshommes.
Alexandre Cameron (E).
Peter Jennings (E).
REGIMENT WALSH 14 JULY 1789*

Colonel-Propriétaire, Maréchal de Camp Antoine-Joseph-Philippe Second Count de Walsh-Serrant (E).

Colonel-Commandant Charles-Joseph-Edward-Auguste Viscount de Walsh-Serrant (E).

Lieutenant-Colonel Edward (Edmund) De Sarsfield (Rt).

Major John O’Neill (R).

Major-en-Second Philippe-François-Joseph Chevalier de Walsh-Serrant (E).

Quartier-maître-trésurier, Capitaine Pierre Hilaire Deleau (R).

Porte-drapeau James Reed (?).

Porte-drapeau Denis Marcus (R).

Cadet-Gentilhomme "VACANT".

Cadet-Gentilhomme James Bourke (E).

Capitaine-Commandants,.

David Barry (E).

John O’Brien (R).

Jacques Charles Augustine Barry Leamlary (R).

Richard O’Shee (R).

Eugene MacCarthy (E).

George Begg (R).

François Plunkett (R).

Richard O’Riordan (?)..

Charles Thomas O’Gorman (E).

Edward Stack (Aux.Coy.) (E).

Capitaines-en-Second.

Pierre Edward O’Shiell (E).
George Meighan (R).
John-Daniel O'Byrne (E).
Edward John Keating (R).
Henry Roche (died St.Dom.).
Jacques Kelly Cruice (?).
Thomas O'Gorman (E).
Laurent O'Riordan (R).
Charles Louis Brenck (died St.Dom.).
Richard Barry (E).

Lieutenants-en-Premier.
Terence-Gaspard MacMahon (E).
James O'Flynn (R).
Charles William Hally or Hely (E).
Jean Charles Clarke (R).
"VACANT".
Christophe Conway (R).
Maurice-Charles O'Connell (E).
Jean Aylmer Richard Hally (R).
James Tobin (E).
Thomas Laffan (died St.Dom.).

Lieutenants-en-Second.
William Cruice (E).
William Bulkeley (E).
Terry O'Connor (E).
Thomas Kavanagh (E).
Toussaint Armand Pierre Misset (E).
Jean Meade (R).
Joseph O'Dunne (E).
Jean François Trotter (?).
Nicolas O'Rourke (R).
Nicholas Trant (E).

Sous-Lieutenants.
Henry George Bertsch (R).
François Perot (dismissed).
Paul François Rogan (R).
Charles O'Neill (E).
John Bourke (E).
Denis Marcus (R).
Daniel Mahony (E).
George O'Byrne (E).
James Richard MacMahon (E).
Louis Sherlock (R).
James O'Connor (E).
Jean Eugene O'Du Higg (E).
Raymond Bourke (R).
Andrew Creagh (E).
Michael Creagh (E).
Dominique O'Farell (E).
Emmanuel Frederick Hay (?).
John Keating (E).
Antony-Francis Walsh de Chasseron (E).
Morgan Kavanagh (?).

Officers listed in register but holding no position within Regiment July 1789.
Major Thomas Redmon Keating (R).

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Major Anselme de Nugent (Rt).
Capitaine-Commandant John O'Driscol (Rt).
Capitaine-en-Second William Keating (R).

Irish Officers appointed after 14 July 1789 up to Regiment's return to France 1790.

Sous-Lieutenants.
François MacMahon (Aux.Coy.) (E).
Martin (Mark) MacMahon (Aux.Coy.) (E).
Alexandre Claude Louis O'Daly de Douglas (E)
John Stuart (died).
Michel Bourke (E).
Jean O'Connell (E).

*This list has had to be reconstructed without the aid of an inspection report for 1789 as the bulk of the regiment was overseas serving as the garrison for the Isle de France (Mauritius) in the Indian Ocean. Certain ambiguities remain, as certain officers were on leave in Metropolitan France along with some who were recruiting the auxiliary company. There also appear to have been a number of spare majors who may have reflected the regiment's overseas posting, but are more likely to have been only nominally attached to the Regiment, being in practice on the Army État-Major.
APPENDIX TWO.

IRISH AND ENGLISH OFFICERS NOT SERVING WITH THE IRISH BRIGADE 1789.

Edward Dillon (E).
Robert Dillon (Rt).
François Théobald (known as Frank) Dillon (E).
Honourable Henry Dillon (E).
Daniel-Charles O'Connell (E).
Maurice Jeffrey O'Connell (E).
Thomas Comte de Conway (E).
James-Henry Vicomte de Conway (E).
Dominique Sheldon (R).
Thomas-Marie Tempest (E).
Eugene-Henry Tempest (E).
Charles Edward Jennings (Kilmaine) (R).
Henry O'Shee (R).
Marquis Charles-Laure, de MacMahon (E).
Count Maurice Francis de MacMahon (E).
Thomas Comte de Baane O'Meara (R).
Count Patrick Wall (E).
Edward-Henry de Fitz-James (E).
John Comte Sutton de Clonard (E).
Richard-Edward Comte Sutton de Clonard (E).
APPENDIX THREE.

OFFICER LISTS FOR PITT'S IRISH BRIGADE, 1795-97.
The following lists are compiled from various entries in HO 123/4, ff.106-311; HO 100/55, ff.19-365; WO 35/5 and WO 4/338.
Entries for officers who had previously served in the French Army commence with their rank and regiment as of July 1789.

DUKE FITZJAMES' REGIMENT.
Colonel Duke of FitzJames (1).
Lt.Col. James O'Moore (2).
Major Anthony Egan (3).

Captains.
John François Geoghegan (4).
Walter Grace (5).
John Mulhall (6).
Garrett FitzSimons (previously Thomas Luther) (7).
David Jennings (8).
Gerard Ferdinand Pierce (9).
Thomas Kavanagh (10).
Captain-Lieutenant John-Francis Mahony (11).

Lieutenants.
Gregory O'Byrne (12).
John O'Farrell (13).
Richard O'Farrell (14).
Alexis Nicholas Joseph Berteau (15).
Alexander Cameron (16).
James Nash (17).
John Sutton (18).
Patrick Sutton (19).
George Langford.
Augustin Rothe (20).
.......Longe.
Edward FitzJames (21).

Ensigns.
.......Devereaux.
.......Masterson.
Maurice Pierce.
Richard Hilliard.
Hugh MacNesen.
Stephen D'Arcey Kelly.
Robert Plunkett.
Peter Saunders (22).
William Fuller.
Thomas Hare.

Chaplain John Fallon.
Adjutant Patrick Sutton.
Quartermaster John Duggan.
Surgeon Hugh MacNevin.

Agent, Messers. Atkinson and Woodward, Dublin.

References.

(1). Émigré, Colonel-Propriétaire, Berwick.
(2). Émigré, Lieutenant-Colonel, Berwick.

(3). Émigré, Capitaine-Commandant, Berwick.

(4). Émigré, Capitaine-en-Second, Berwick.

(5). Émigré, Capitaine-en-Second, Berwick.


(7). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Premier, Berwick.

(8). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Second, Berwick.

(9). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick.

(10). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Second, Walsh. Exchanged with Captain Nicholas Trant of Count Walsh-Serrat's, August 1796 (HO 123/4, f.261; HO 100/61, f.143).


(13). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick.

(14). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick.

(15). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick. Transferred to Colonel Irvin's Regiment of Cavalry, November 1795. Replaced by Ensign Peter Saunders (HO 123/4, f.201; HO 100/61, ff.20, 94).

(16). Émigré, Cadet, Berwick. Exchanged with Lieutenant Charles McCarthy of Conway's, July 1797 (HO 123/4, f.311; HO 100/68, f.89).


(21). Émigré, Cadet, Berwick.

(22). Promoted Lieutenant as eldest Ensign, November 1795, replaced by Gerald O'Farrell (HO 123/4, ff.201, 207, 243; HO 100/60, f.16)
COUNT WALSH-SERRANT'S REGIMENT.

Colonel Count Antoine Walsh-Serrant (1).
Lt-Col. Charles Viscount Walsh-Serrant (2)
Major Chevalier Philippe Walsh-Serrant (3).

Captains.
Edward O'Sheill (4).
James Tobin (5).
Terence MacMahon (6).
William Cruice (7).
John Walsh (8).
Nicholas Trant (9).
Matthew Meade (10).
William Hely (or Haly) (11).
Captain-Lieutenant Ernest Missett (12).

Lieutenants.
Eugene O'Du Higg (13).
Andrew Creagh (14).
Anthony-Francis Walsh de Chasseron (15).
John O'Reilly (16).
Patrick Sutton (17).
Gaston O'Gorman (18).
Mathew Sutton (19).
Patrick Cruice.
Jeffrey O'Connell (20).
James Francis Wyse.
John Cruice.
Hon. Charles Southwell (21).

Ensigns.
James Roche (22).
Edward O'Rourke (23).
James Flood.
John Hamill (24).
Samuel Leonard Mills.
Thomas Hare.
Teige MacMahon.
Richard Ryan (25).
Bartholomy Plunkett.
Alfred-Philippe Walsh (26).
Adam Robinson.

Chaplain Edmund Cruice.
Adjutant Ernst Missett.
Quartermaster Thomas Plunkett.
Surgeon Richard Murray.

Agent, Mr Cane and Son, Dublin.

References.
(1). Émigré, Colonel-Propriétaire Walsh.
(3). Émigré, Major-en-Second, Walsh. Resigned November 1796, replaced by Captain Edward O'Shiell (HO 100/61, f.221).
(4). Émigré, Capitaine-en-Second, Walsh. Promoted Major December 1796 (HO 100/61, f.221).


(6). Émigré, Capitaine-en-Second, Walsh.


(8). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Dillon.

(9). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Second, Walsh. Exchanged with Captain Thomas Kavanagh of Fitzjames (HO 123/4, f.261; HO 100/61, f.143).


(11). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Premier, Walsh. He was only appointed March 1796 (HO 123/4, f.208).

(12). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Walsh. Promoted Captain on death of Mathew Meade November 1796, replaced by Lieutenant Andrew Creagh (HO 123/4, f.266; HO 100/61, f.233).


(20). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Walsh.

(21). Nephew of Count Walsh.

(22). Resigned November 1795, replaced by William Purcell Creagh (HO 123/4, f.202; HO 100/60, f.16).

(23). Promoted Lieutenant November 1796, replaced by Edward Planard (HO 123/4, f.266; HO 100/61, f.233). Planard subsequently exchanged with Ensign Edward Byrne of Conway's the same month (HO 123/4, f.266).


(25). Resigned after fatal duel with Captain Meade August 1796, replaced by Thady Grehaw (HO 123/4, f.263; HO 100/61, f.145).

COLONEL HENRY DILLON'S REGIMENT.

Colonel Hon. Henry Dillon (1).
Lt. Col. Thomas McDermott (2).
Major Walter Hussey (3).

Captains.
George Greenlaw (4).
Denis O'Farrell (5).
Henry Redmond (6).
Patrick Warren (7).
Ignatius Hussey (8).
Christopher Fagan (9).
James Henry Fitz-Simon (10).
Captain-Lieutenant Patrick-James O'Sullivan (11).

Lieutenants.
Henry Tarleton (12).
Charles-Alphonse Wallut (13).
Francis Burke (14).
James Cullen (15).
Thomas Farrell.
Richard Sheill (16).
Peter Butler (17).
Robert Skelton (18).
James Mullone (19).
Henry Hearne (20).
Gerald Keon.
Ensigns.
Barthelemy-Robert Barnewell (21).
Jerich Paston (22).
Edward Brown Mostyn (23).
Patrick Wogan (24).
Laurence Taaffe (25).
Francis White (26).
William Keating (27).
Philip Stafford/Stopford (28).
Andrew McFitzGerald.

Chaplain ......O’Fallon.
Adjutant James Cullen.
Quartermaster Thomas Farrell.
Surgeon William Chambers (29).

Agent, Mr. Cane and Son, Dublin.

References.
(1). Émigré, ex-Sous-Lieutenant, Dillon.
(2). Émigré, Major, Berwick.
(3). Émigré, Capitaine-en-Second, Dillon. Died St. Dominque 4 September 1796 (The Times, 26th December 1796, p.3).
(4). Émigré, Capitaine-Commandant, Dillon.
(5). Émigré, Capitaine-en-Second, Dillon.
(7). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Second, Dillon. Died St. Dominque 9th September 1796
(The Times, 26th December 1796, p.3).


(9). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Dillon. Died St. Dominque 31 July 1796 (The Times, 26th December 1796, p.3).

(10). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Dillon.


(13). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Dillon. Died October 1795, replaced by William McCarthy, described as 'Late of Irish Brigade', although no record of an officer of that name serving in French Army's Irish Brigade (HO 123/4, f.171; HO 100/55, ff.290-291). McCarthy subsequently dismissed the service 22 May 1797, replaced by Lieutenant J.G. Fitzgerald, described as 'late Count Dillon's Regt', although no record of an officer of that name serving in French Army's Regt. Dillon (WO 4/339, f.82).


(16). Transferred to Ramsey's Corps October 1795, replaced by Ensign Robert Barnewall (HO 123/4, f.171; HO 100/55, f.290-291).

(17). Dismissed the service and superseded by Ensign Laurence Taafe 3 July 1796 (WO 4/338, f.228).

(18). Resigned, then entered Conway's October 1795, replaced by Ensign Jericho Preston (HO 123/4, f.171; HO 100/55, f.290-291). Preston subsequently died St. Dominque 3 September 1796 (The Times, 26th December 1796, p.3).

(19). Died St. Dominque 14 July 1796 (The Times, 26th December 1796, p.3).

(20). Died St. Dominque 2 September 1796 (The Times, 26th December 1796, p.3).
(21). Sous-Lieutenant, Dillon. Promoted Lieutenant October 1795, although his commission was backdated to October 1794 (HO 100/55, ff.290-291).

(22). Promoted Lieutenant October 1795, replaced by John McDermott (HO 123/4, f.202; HO 100/60, f.17).


(26). Exchanged with Ensign William O'Falvey of O'Connell's April 1796 (HO 123/4, f.218; HO 100/60, f.124). O'Falvey subsequently died St.Dominque 29 June 1796 (The Times, 26th December 1796, p.3).


(29). Retired February 1795, replaced by John Tighe (HO 123/4, f.215; HO 100/60, f.88). Tighe subsequently died St.Dominque 10 August 1796 (The Times, 26th December 1796, p.3).
COUNT O'CONNELL'S REGIMENT

Colonel Count Daniel O'Connell (1).
Lt-Col. Eugene McCarthy (2).
Major David Barry (3).

Captains.
Richard Sutton-Clonard (4).
Daniel O'Byrne (5).
Richard Barry (6).
John O'Byrne (7).
Maurice O'Sullivan (8).
Maurice Charles O'Connell (9).
William Jeremie O'Connor (10).
Captain-Lieutenant Daniel Mahony (11).

Lieutenants.
John McMahon (12).
James Burke (13).
Mathew O'Toole (14).
Michael O'Crolly (15).
John Dehouse.
Arnold O'Gorman.
Maurice Jeffery O'Connell (16).
Daniel O'Donoghue.
John Brennan (17).
Thomas MacNamara (18).
Charles O'Keeffe.
Ensigns.
Maurice Morgan O'Connell (19).
Jeffery O'Donoghue.
Thomas French (20).
William O'Falvey (21).
Thomas Whyte.
Charles Kearney (22).
Maurice O'Connell (23).
Rick O'Connell (24).
William McVeagh.
John McCarthy.

Chaplain Daniel McCarthy.
Adjutant Maurice O'Connell (23).
Quartermaster Daniel O'Donoghue.
Surgeon Hugh Duggan.
Surgeon-Mate Charles Sughue.

Agent, Mr. Cane and Son, Dublin.

References.
(1). Émigré, General Officer French Army.
(2). Émigré, Capitaine-Commandant, Walsh.
(3). Émigré, Capitaine-Commandant, Walsh.
(4). Émigré, Officer on French Armies État-Major.
(5). Émigré, Capitaine-en-Second, Walsh. Died November 1795, replaced by Captain-Lieutenant Daniel Mahony (HO 123/4, f.202; HO 100/60, f.17).
(6). Émigré, Capitaine-en-Second, Walsh.
(7). Possibility was same officer as (5)? While also listed as dying November 1795,
replaced by Captain-Lieutenant Charles McCarthy of Conway's (HO 123/4, f.203; HO 100/60, f.18). McCarthy subsequently exchanged with Captain William Cruice of Count Walsh-Serrant's October 1796 (HO 123/4, f.259; HO 100/61, f.142).

(8). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Dillon.

(9). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Premier, Walsh.

(10). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Walsh. Exchanged with Captain James Tobin of Count Walsh-Serrant's October 1796 (HO 123/4, f.259; HO 100/61, f.142).


(13). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Walsh. Exchanged with Lieutenant Thomas Conway of Conway's (HO 123/4, f.312; HO 100/68, f.68).

(14). Resigned August 1796, replaced by Ensign Charles O'Kearney (HO 123/4, f.262; HO 100/61, f.144).

(15). Transferred to York Hussars November 1795, replaced by Ensign Maurice Morgan O'Connell (HO 123/4, f.225; HO 100/60, ff.17, 160).


(17). Exchanged with Lieutenant Patrick Sutton of Count Walsh-Serrant's October 1796 (HO 123/4, f.260; HO 100/61, f.142).

(18). Exchanged with Lieutenant Francis O'Hegeurty of Conway's July 1797 (HO 123/4, ff.311-312; HO 100/68, f.89).

(19). Promoted Lieutenant November 1795, replaced by Richard Murphy (HO 123/4, ff.203, 225; HO 100/60, f.17).

(20). Resigned December 1795, replaced by Richard McCartie (HO 123/4, f.225; HO 100/60, f.160).

(21). Exchanged with Ensign Francis White of Dillon's April 1796 (HO 123/4, f.210;
(22). Promoted Lieutenant August 1796, replaced by Daniel O'Connell (HO 100/61, f.144). O'Connell subsequently exchanged with Ensign James Mahony of Conway's July 1797 (HO 123/4, f.312; HO 100/68, f.90).

(23). Resigned November 1795, replaced by Sergeant-Major James Hamilton of Monaghan Militia (HO 123/4, f.204). Hamilton subsequently exchanged with Ensign Thomas Conway of Conway's (HO 123/4, f.313; HO 100/68, f.90).

(24). Resigned August 1795, replaced by John Evans (HO 123/4, f.163).
COUNT THOMAS CONWAY'S REGIMENT, LATER VISCOUNT WALSH-SERRANT'S.

Colonel Count Thomas Conway (1).
Lt-Col. Edward Stack (2).
Major Edward Rooth (3).

Captains.
William O'Shee (4).
John Mahony (5).
Walter Devereux (6).
Charles Fagan (7).
Charles Power (8).
William Hussey (9).
Francis Geraphty (10).
Captain-Lieutenant John Tempest (11).

Lieutenants.
Gerard Pierce (12).
John Bourke (13).
Lawrence/Lucis Corr/Coor (14).
Marcel O'Shiell.
Derby Mahony (15).
Thomas Sutton (16).
William O'Brean on.
Charles Walters.
Derby Falvey.
Corneluis MacGillicuddy (17).
John Blair (18).
Ensigns.
Richard Ferris (19).
Girala Stack.
Thomas Bourke.
Connell O'Connell.
Arthur O'Leary.
Francis Creagh.
John Harold.
Lewis Gordon O'Neill.

Chaplain John O'Brien.
Adjutant Gerard Pierce.
Quartermaster Derby Falvey.
Surgeon Peter Nugent Rorke.

Agent, Mr. Armstrong, Percy Street.

References.
(1). Émigré, General officer French Army. Died February 1795, replaced by Viscount Walsh-Serrant March 1796 (HO 123/4, f.207).
(2). Émigré, Capitaine-Commandant, Walsh.
(3). Émigré, Major-en-Second, Berwick. Dismissed and superseded by Captain William O'Shee February 1796 (HO 100/60, f.88). O'Shee subsequently killed in duel with Lieutenant-Colonel Stack.
(5). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Dillon.
(7). Émigré, Capitaine-en-Second, Dillon.
(8). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Second, Dillon.
(9). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Premier, Dillon.
(10). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Second, Berwick.
(11). Émigré, Student, Military School at Pontlevoy. Promoted Captain February 1796 to replace William O'Shee, but then cancelled, subsequently Captain in Dillon's June 1796, replaced by Lieutenant Gerard Pierce (HO 123/4, f.207; HO 100/60, f.88).
(12). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick. Promoted Captain-Lieutenant February 1796, although it only became effective June 1796 due to delay in Tempest's promotion, replaced by Ensign Richard Ferris (HO 100/60, f.88).
(13). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Walsh.
(15). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Walsh.
(17). Cousin in law of Count Conway.
(18). Émigré, officer in Regt.Austrasie.
(19). Promoted Lieutenant February 1796, although only effective June 1796 due to delay in Tempest's promotion, replaced by Lewis Gordon (HO 100/60, f.88).
VISCOUNT, later COUNT, JAMES CONWAY’S REGIMENT.

Colonel Viscount/Count Henry Conway (1).
Lt-Col. Bartholomy Count O’Mahony (2).
Major James Conway (3).

Captains.
Thadee O’Meara (4).
William O’Kennedy (5).
Charles Gormocan (6).
William O’Meara (7).
Charles Blake (8).
William (or Patrick) O’Toole (9).
Charles O’Connor (10).
Captain-Lieutenant Charles McCarthy (11).

Lieutenants.
Bryan O’Toole (12).
Patrick Jennings (13).
James O’Farrell (15).
Andrew Forbes (16).
Francis O’Hegeurty (17).
Peter Jennings (18).
Eugene Develin (19).
Henry O’Gready.
Richard Coppinger (20).
Ambroise Sutton.
Charles McCarthy* (21).
Ensigns.
Richard Ferris (22).
Charles McCarthy* (23).
Edward Byrne (24).
Charles Mackernyne (25).
Robert Fagan (26).
Pierce Mahony (27).
James Connor (28).
Daniel Conway (29).
Thomas Conway (30).

Chaplain Dr. Mackernyne.
Adjutant Bryan O'Toole (31).
Quartermaster Andrew Forbes (32).
Surgeon Denis MacCashin.

Agent, Messrs Atkinson and Woodward, Dublin.

*=Same officer

References.
(1). Émigré, General Officer French Army.
(2). Émigré, Colonel-Commandant, Berwick. 'Removed to another corps' March 1796, replaced by Count Sutton-Clonard, Émigré, Colonel French Army's État-Major, nominally attached to Walsh (HO 123/4, f.208).
(3). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Dillon.
(4). Émigré, Captaine-Commandant, Berwick.
(5). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Premier, Berwick.
(7). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Premier, Berwick.
(8). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Premier, Berwick.
(9). Émigré, Lieutenant-en-Premier, Berwick.
(10). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick.
(11). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick. Promoted Captain in O'Connell's upon death of John O'Byrne November 1795, replaced by Lieutenant Bryan O'Toole (HO 123/4, f.203; HO 100/60. ff.18, 144). O'Toole subsequently transferred as Captain to company of Prince of Wales Hussars August 1796, replaced by Lieutenant Patrick Jennings (HO 123/4, ff.262, 266).
(13). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick. Promoted Captain-Lieutenant August 1796, replaced by Ensign Richard Ferris (HO 123/4, f.266; HO 100/61, f.233).
(14). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick.
(15). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick. Declined appointment November 1795, replaced by Ensign Thomas Conway (HO 123/4, f.204; HO 100/60, f.18). Conway subsequently exchanged with Lieutenant James Bourke of Conway's July 1797 (HO 123/4, f.312; HO 100/68, f.68).
(17). Émigré, Cadet-Gentilhomme, Berwick. Exchanged with Lieutenant Thomas McNamara of O'Connell's July 1797 (HO 123/4, ff.311-312; HO 100/68, f.89).
(20). Transferred to Colonel-Commandant Irvin's Regiment of Cavalry November 1795, replaced by Ensign John Mahony (HO 123/4, f.205, 262; HO 100/60, f.18, 144).
(21). Promoted Lieutenant in addition to existing lieutenant's November 1795 (see ref.23). Subsequently exchanged with Lieutenant Alexander Cameron of Fitzjames July 1797 (HO 123/4, f.311; HO 100/68, f.89).

(22). Promoted Lieutenant November 1796, replaced by Valentine Francis Blake (HO 123/4, f.266; HO 100/61, f.233). Blake subsequently dismissed and superseded by Giles Rae November 1796 (HO 123/4, f.403).

(23). Promoted Lieutenant November 1795, replaced by Daniel O'Donovan (HO 123/4, f.204; HO 100/60, f.18). O'Donovan subsequently promoted Lieutenant March 1797, replaced by Samuel Hamilton (HO 123/4, f.404)


(25). Resigned August 1796, replaced by Patrick Hayes (HO 100/61, f.144).

(26). Resigned November 1795, replaced by John Mahony (HO 123/4, f.205; HO 100/60, f.19). John Mahony subsequently promoted lieutenant August 1796, replaced by his younger brother James Mahony (HO 123/4, f.205; HO 100/60, f.19). James Mahony subsequently exchanged with Ensign Daniel O'Connell of O'Connell's (HO 123/4, f.312; HO 100/68, f.90).

(27). Exchanged with Ensign Robert Quigly of Count Walsh-Serrant's August 1796 (HO 123/4, f.261; HO 100/61, f.143).

(28). Promoted lieutenant April 1797, replaced by John Calder (HO 123/4, f.403).

(29). Resigned April 1797, replaced by James MacCrohan (HO 123/4, f.404).

(30). Émigré, Sous-Lieutenant, Berwick.

(31). See references (11) and (12) above. O'Toole subsequently replaced by Thomas Conway, who in turn exchanged with Samuel Hamilton of O'Connell's (HO 123/4, f.313; HO 100/68, f.90).

(32). Declined appointment November 1795, replaced by Edward James Tarlow (HO 123/4, ff.205, 263; HO 100/60, ff.19, 144).
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