CONSTRUCTING PLACE: PRESERVATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF FOLK HERITAGE BUILDINGS IN YUNNAN PROVINCE, PRC.

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

This thesis is about preservation of traditional architecture and historical village environments in Yunnan Province, PRC. It asks the question why there has been a surge of interest in preserving and reconstructing historical structures in the reform-era, particularly since the late 1990s. Answering this question involves looking at national-level discourse on cultural heritage, including legislation and ideological reasons for interest in preservation. It argues that state interest in tourism is the main factor motivating preservation, but this interest is also linked to ideology, mainly state ideology on patriotism, cultural inclusion, and creating an image of the PRC as a cultural entity where ethnic, cultural, and religious differences are allowed, but only as long as these differences are played out within the parameters set up by the state, and align themselves with the aspirations of the reform-era state, mainly economic development.

Hence heritage preservation in Yunnan, a poor province of ethnic multitude, needs to be placed within the context of state and provincial interest in tourism, as a way of re-asserting local identity in the reform-era. Heritage resources represent a way of taking part in the market economy for poor communities. How this is done shifts with location, and the actors involved, but the ultimate aim of preservation projects is linked to tourism, and outside recognition, and in this sense this interest is an outcome of state discourse on development, cultural, and local particularity as a way of attracting tourism.

Hence the state has been the pivotal actor driving heritage concerns, and how they are formulated, and interest in heritage is played out within state approved limits, as a response to contemporary discourse on development and capital accumulation.
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Introduction
1. Questions for research

The interest in preserving and reconstructing heritage buildings in both urban and rural environments in the PRC today is striking. Almost all major cities have a reconstructed “historical” section, that conjures up an image of an imagined historical past, a China of tradition and antiquity that serves as background to contemporary leisure pursuits such as tourism, expensive dining and shopping. The same trend can be discerned in how villages and small towns are targeted as preservation objects and marketed as “ancient” for purposes of tourism. Old buildings have increasingly come to be used as stage settings in order to create a notion of history that is far removed from the realities of both everyday urban as well as rural life. This new national value placed on reconstructing the past in the present mirrors international discourse, and places Chinese heritage concerns in a global context according to which cultural heritage resources have come to emerge as immensely useful for attempts to construct tourism based around culture and history.

Tourism has come to emerge as a major industry globally, and cultural tourism has come to pose a serious challenge to more traditional pursuits such as going to the beach. Chinese policy-makers in tandem with the tourist industry have come to realise the potentiality inherent to the nation’s historical resources in constructing sites for tourism, and hence generating wealth. This is true both at national level, but even more so at the local level, where tourism is a strategically important tool for local development, especially in poor regions. This emphasis placed on tourism as a means of economic development has been successful, and tourism now plays a major role in national as well as provincial politics and policy-making. As a result, tourism has already had an impact on many communities and locations. It will undoubtedly continue to play a part in Chinese development, and play an increasingly important part in how Chinese political and economic policy is formulated at all levels of the bureaucracy. Hence we need to pay greater attention to how different aspects of the tourist industry function in practice, both at different levels of the bureaucracy, as well as to the impact it has on local communities, and how they negotiate and make use of tourism.
Cultural heritage is an important aspect of this, as heritage resources have come to be linked to an ever-growing demand for historical and exotic experiences based around culture and tradition.

Other than being part of a wealth generating industry, heritage resources also present the nation with a path towards international legitimacy and acclaim. Cultural heritage is useful for projecting an image of the nation at an international level, but even more so to domestic audiences. Constructing and presenting an image of “China” as a unified nation of diverse cultures with a long history, is a main concern of the PRC state.

Tourism provides a perfect arena for projecting an image that aligns itself with state ideology on how to consider cultural diversity, and how the past should be interpreted in the present. Heritage sites present the state with useful material for installing notions of patriotism which means that many historical sites in the PRC are state approved monuments that have been ascribed with official notions of how to regard the nation’s past. However, since the 1990s, due to growing domestic tourism and a new emphasis on the value of preserving cultural heritage there has been a shift, from the monumental and revolutionary to a new interest in preserving local and ethnic culture according to a perceived idea of “traditional” cultural practices, often emphasising local, ethnic, or regional characteristics. This is useful for tourism as ethnic and locally anchored traditions are easy to market, but also for installing ideas of cultural pride at all levels. By including and approving local customs and traditions as heritage the state places local culture within a state controlled sphere of culture and heritage, there for outside consumption.

In this sense, cultural heritage, especially material heritage such as architecture, aligns itself with state interest in constructing sites for tourism and leisure, sites that simultaneously work as educational models. It could be argued that heritage sites are ideologically saturated realms that are representational of state discourse on the national past, and its place in the present. Cultural heritage conservation is thus part of present day political concerns with ideology, and is intrinsically linked to state sponsored attempts at promoting tourism, whilst also controlling the content of tourist sites. Hence, in the PRC, tourism and heritage preservation are inextricably linked and form an uneasy relationship whereby heritage resources are “protected” but only as a means of capital accumulation, and
ideological control. Of course, there are exceptions to this, and preservation is, at least initially, sometimes undertaken in order to protect important structures or artifacts, but as will be made clear in this thesis, financial gain, political control, and tourism are the overriding concerns affecting how and why material heritage is preserved and/or reconstructed in the PRC.

The aim of this thesis is to explore the role cultural heritage has come to play in a number of localities in Yunnan Province. In order to understand how heritage and tourism functions, it is important to have a broader understanding of what heritage means within the nation-state, and also on a wider, global scale. At local level, it is important to gain an understanding of the importance attached to heritage in the PRC today, especially at provincial and regional level; what motivates heritage preservation, and what agents are involved? Why do localities construct heritage sites, or initiate preservation projects of buildings, artifacts, or customs? By examining the forces and dynamics behind preservation and reconstruction of village-and small town environments in Yunnan Province, heritage as a national and provincial concern will be contrasted with how construction of heritage sites is carried out in local practice. It will be demonstrated why heritage buildings has come to take on a new importance, both to the central state as well as in relation to individual localities, and how this interest has affected local communities.

The examples from Yunnan will be used in order to illustrate the wide range of actors and agendas involved in processes of constructing heritage sites. I will examine how reconstruction and preservation of heritage buildings in individual locations has been carried out by a variety of actors with highly divergent agendas. This includes examining who the main agents driving processes of preservation and reconstruction are, what motivates them, and what functions heritage buildings have come to serve in rural Yunnan. It will be demonstrated how this range of diverse interests influence local practice, how various actors create different outcomes in different contexts, and to what extent they have impacted on local attitudes towards heritage buildings. Ultimately it will be argued that the significance placed on heritage preservation is intrinsically linked to state interest in developing tourism, but also to local
attempts to negotiate and benefit from tourism, as well as re-asserting a new local and regional identity within the marketisation of modern society.

By examining the reasons behind heritage projects in a number of places it will become clear that state discourse on promoting tourism has been crucial to why and how heritage resources are made use of. The case studies will serve to analyse evidence for the main argument that the state has established parameters for how to consider heritage locally by promoting the value of both tourism as well as heritage to the nation. However, it will also be demonstrated that the outcome of these projects at local level is not always very successful in terms of attracting tourism, and also in terms of protecting heritage resources. In fact, tourism and heritage protection are often at odds, and localities often fail at both. As we shall see, heritage preservation or reconstruction of heritage buildings does not always mean increased tourism revenue.

It is also important to remember that heritage often serves an ideological purpose. In the PRC, this usually links in with reform-era emphasis on cultural inclusion as a way of regulating local customs, as well as regulating tourist sites. It is usually the case that heritage site construction is an aspect tourism and capital gain, but it is also a realm that carries strong political overtones and is telling of present day ideological concerns.

What is deemed to be official heritage, local or national, is a category that is the outcome of a process of selection and labelling, of listings and legislation, and hence inevitably linked to the state. This means that increased national emphasis placed on the importance of heritage is telling of how the state regards culture and history, and what type of heritage is deemed to be of national interest. This naturally also presents the state with a means of regulating the content of local heritage, and the content of tourist sites based around heritage resources.

The case studies are all located in rural villages and small towns in different parts of Yunnan Province, most of them in poor and peripheral parts of the province. These villages are all places where provincial policy on tourism and development has had an impact on the way local leaders consider heritage resources, and tourism development has been a motivating factor in all of these cases. However, there are also other reasons for heritage preservation, and, as we shall see, tourism alone does not always account for how and why preservation has been undertaken. In all of these cases, heritage preservation has not been a
static process but a dynamic interaction between a variety of actors with
sometimes highly divergent agendas. By focussing on the rural setting, and cases
where heritage preservation is still an unfolding process, the agendas and
conflicting interests of different stakeholders will be made clear. In smaller
locations, such as a peripheral village in Yunnan where heritage preservation is
still an arena for contestation between stakeholders, it is possible to examine the
factors influencing the shape and outcomes of local heritage concerns more
clearly than in cases where national interests are at stake (such as monuments or
other highly politicised sites), or where massive capital investments have been
made. The concluding case study of Shuhe breaks this pattern in order to
demonstrate more clearly the outcome of heritage preservation for tourism, and
how capital investments and successful tourism serves to render a heritage site
into a national, rather than a local, concern.
The range of actors that have had an impact on heritage projects in these
locations include, at the level of the state, central state agents with an interest in
controlling heritage sites as a means of projecting ideology whilst also boosting
regional and local development, local state agents with an interest in both local
development and prestige, and provincial government agents from different
backgrounds and with different interests at stake, such as heritage bureau staff,
construction and planning bureau officials, and those hoping to promote tourism.
It also includes private actors who might sometimes have strong links to the
state, or who indirectly serve the interests of the state, such as promoting tourism,
as well as transnational actors and local communities who might have an agenda
very different from that of state agents. This entails looking at the role of local
tourism entrepreneurs, outside investors with an interest in heritage as a tourist
resource, international organisations such as UNESCO, and other transnational
actors with an interest in preservation for the sake of conserving culture, and
NGOs who sees heritage and tourism based around cultural resources as a path
towards sustainable development.
It will be argued that one of the main outcomes of elite discourse on heritage
preservation at the local level has been a re-appraisal and shift in attitude towards
local buildings. This is especially true in relation to local state agents with an
interest in development and tourism, but is also true to an extent of local residents
as a group, even if this response is more varied.
Hence, in order to understand the dynamics inherent to heritage projects we need to take a number of actors and their agendas into account. It will be demonstrated that local heritage is a category that is often defined by outside agents, be it NGOs or state agents influenced by other successful heritage projects.

By looking at the motivations for, and outcomes of, a number of local heritage projects the interplay between these actors will become clear and serve to demonstrate how differing ideas on what heritage is and how it should be put to use has affected local attitudes, making outside actors pivotal to how local heritage is considered in Yunnan.

The examples of heritage preservation projects used in this thesis all relate to ordinary residential houses, representing different local house building traditions, or what could be referred to as “folk heritage buildings”, or minju in Chinese.

Minju are the vernacular dwellings of ordinary peoples that have taken on particular shapes and forms due to climate, available building materials, culture, migration and local crafts that have intermingled and shaped place identity in both rural and urban areas.

Well-known examples would be the Naxi merchant houses in Lijiang, the Bai houses of Dali, Dong drum towers, Shaanxi cave dwellings, Hakka roundhouses or the typical Huizhou-style architecture found in Anhui province.

Interest in minju has been particularly strong during recent years, and tourism to places rich in minju has grown tremendously popular, something that could be understood against the background of UNESCO discourse and World Heritage listings of sites such as Lijiang old town, Pingyao and villages in Anhui. What can be discerned here is a re-appraisal of a rural tradition that has taken on a new meaning as part of the capitalist economy in many localities. These buildings have come to serve as markers of both national as well as local distinction due to the recent surge in interest, and have become immersed in a tourist economy that has shifted power balances, and that has sometimes had a profound impact on local life.

This interest in heritage buildings diverges from contemporary discourse on modernity and progress, particularly as it is interpreted and experienced in poor rural communities where old buildings carry something of a poverty stigma, and modernisation is deemed a sign of progress. In many communities, old buildings of the minju type are signs of lagging behind, dwellings in need of renovations,
and lacking modern day conveniences of the most basic type. As will become clear, in locations where outside interest in local architecture has been strong, old buildings have come to take on a new capital, as well as cultural, value within communities. In some places minju have come to function as a way of re-asserting local identity in the present.

Hence this is not just a story of how and why various actors have been driving interest in heritage preservation, but also a story of how elite discourse has trickled down and affected attitudes at the local level. In this sense, the heritage stamp and outside interest in these buildings illustrates the interplay between rural reality, elite discourse and the tourist gaze in search of the exotic. As will be made clear, there is great diversity to be found in how the agenda on the value of heritage is interpreted and made use of, which means that the concept of “heritage” traverses a wide range of meanings, from careful historical preservation to the theme-park variety that has lost all claims to historical legitimacy, depending on who has been driving these processes at local level.

By examining why and how heritage projects are undertaken, who the main actors with the power to formulate and influence local heritage practice are, and what their impact on individual locations has been it will be demonstrated how discourse on the value of cultural heritage is understood, interpreted, and made use of in rural Yunnan.

2. Methodological issues and fieldwork

The thesis is based on extensive fieldwork carried out in Yunnan Province in 2007-08. I was based in the provincial capital Kunming, a city I am familiar with from periods of studying Chinese and working. In fact, it was my prior experiences of Yunnan that led me to my PhD topic. Travelling around the rural backwaters of Yunnan I was fascinated by the plethora of “tourist” sites in the most unexpected places, from “ethnic” displays of all sorts, to sites based around Yunnan’s natural resources – fishing ponds, jungle walks and tree-house hotels in places where hardly any tourists go due to bad roads, poverty, peripheral location, and the sheer wealth of other, competing sites, within the province. More than anything I was struck by the amount of “heritage” villages where village environments of traditional character were marketed as “ancient”, based around
what appeared to be reconstructed buildings for tourism. Mostly, these villages were ordinary Yunnanese villages with local residents going about their business, with no tourists in sight. Sometimes the “historical” buildings were like empty shells, their facades reconstructed to appear vaguely historical, sometimes they were the ordinary dwellings of local families with a plaque outside denoting the building as historically important at local or provincial level. I was intrigued by what these local heritage reconstruction projects mean in different places, and I was curious to find out what the motivating factors were, and to what extent these projects were about “heritage” (and in that case, what kind of heritage), and to what extent they were linked to the tourist industry. I was also interested in a project that focussed on the countryside rather than urban areas, partly due to a strong interest in rural development, partly because of the prior lack of research on rural tourism (with the exception of well-known sites such as Lijiang, and Tim Oakes’ work on Guizhou).

I wanted to explore the process of heritage reconstruction in rural locations not yet on the tourist map, to understand the way cultural heritage, especially the built environment, is made use of in rural locations. In the end, I decided to settle on six sites that in different ways demonstrate the motivations and outcomes of heritage site construction in rural areas, and that could also be used for comparative purposes, as contrasts or reflections of each other. Two of the cases, Tuanshan and Jianshui, are part of the same regional concern with tourism, and two other ones, Heijing and Nuodeng, display locally driven heritage concerns, but with different aspirations, one being tourism, the other a type of pride in local culture, and ethnic reassertion.

I wanted to find out how different sets of actors influence the outcome of heritage projects, and hence my choice of field sites reflect this variety. This was also my reason for deciding on a multi-site approach, rather than a more traditional focus on a single site; in order to compare and contrast motivations and outcomes there had to be a number of sites, with different types of actors involved. In this sense, this thesis aims to place heritage site construction within a broader framework where national, provincial and local ideas intersect and reflect each other. I wanted to know more about what motivates heritage reconstruction as a national, and provincial occurrence, which means a comparative approach was necessary. A multi-site, comparative approach makes it possible to gain a
firmer, more general picture of what motivates heritage projects, and how the built environment is a strategic component in the quest to attract tourism, and also in managing local culture and history.

The field sites were selected on grounds of representing different aspects of how preservation of heritage buildings is undertaken, in order to demonstrate what the outcome might be depending on local conditions and actors involved. Hence my most important criteria for site selection was that the sites were representative of the various actors that have an interest in preservation, in order to illustrate what these interests are, how they are interlinked, and what is the most decisive factor affecting the outcome of preservation.

In the end, I decided to settle on six sites where heritage reconstruction has been the outcome of various forces, ranging from local initiative to UNESCO involvement. The sites are all villages where reconstruction has been successful to the point of having garnered at least some outside attention. I could have picked villages where heritage reconstruction and tourism has been a failure altogether, but it seemed more interesting to compare sites where there has been sufficient funding and backing to get the project started, and have some real effects on both local life and attitudes. I also decided to focus on sites based in different parts of Yunnan, to get some idea of how location might matter.

I did not want sites where local life is on the verge of being eclipsed by mass tourism, but sites where heritage reconstruction is still an ongoing process. In the end, my decision to include the village of Shuhe, where local life has been more or less eclipsed by the forces of mass tourism, was made in order to illustrate how heritage and tourism are interlinked, what the end result might be, and how state ideology on culture and tourism has been pivotal to the shape of heritage tourism in the PRC, particularly in an ethnically sensitive place like Yunnan.

I wanted to illustrate this argument by a conclusive case study that serves as contrast to the other sites, to see how Shuhe (and nearby Lijiang) are models for provincial aspirations, both in a positive as well as negative sense.

I arrived in Yunnan in late August 2007, and had made initial contacts with Dr Yang Qing at the Kunming Technical University (Kunming Ligong Daxue). I knew he would be helpful in setting up interviews with heritage bureau officials in Kunming, and that he had some connections in the village of Heijing, a village I had visited in the past. He has also been involved in preservation efforts
in Lijiang and has extensive knowledge of Yunnan’s architectural heritage. This proved to be helpful, but perhaps less so than initially expected – many of the questions I had remained as most of my first, apprehensive attempts at interviews did not gain much from what I already knew from my background readings. This turned out to be more or less the same throughout fieldwork – provincial officials are hard to get hold of, and when I did they would be forthcoming, sometimes asking me out for dinner but these dinners would be in groups making any real interviewing difficult, and later appointments would often gain little. This initially made me disappointed and frustrated, but later I came to see that the lack of information rather worked as a way of confirming things I knew or suspected from background readings. These interviews were carried out in Kunming, in between intensive stays in the field sites. During the autumn I stayed for about 2-3 weeks in each field site. In late January I left China, and carried out interviews in Bangkok with UNESCO, to return in late February. I then spent another 2-3 weeks in each site, followed by a visit to Beijing for interviews with UNESCO, staff at NGOs and academics.

All in all I spent 8 months doing fieldwork, out of which 6 were spent in rural areas, my visit to each site totalling about 1 month. This method enabled me to make return trips and also spend time in between visits writing, rethinking my research questions, and gain some perspective on what I had learnt whilst in the villages. Never having done fieldwork before, and being more or less left to my own devices, it was a process of trial and error, and in itself as much of a learning experience as the actual research. I did not have a proper research visa, and in most cases, with the exception of Heijing and Shuhe, relied on showing up, displaying interest, and engaging in casual conversation. In most cases, being a foreign female PhD student with an interest in heritage was enough to make me rather interesting, and simply arriving on the doorstep of the local government office was usually enough to gain access to relevant staff and information. This method might even have worked to my advantage, as I found the officials I approached in this way more relaxed and surprised (in a pleased way) than officials I had made prior engagements with, due to connections. These seemed more reserved, and less willing to talk in a relaxed way.

\[1\] For exact dates, see the case studies, and appendix 1 Interviews
My fieldwork was based on close socio-spatial observation of architecture and daily life, especially in relation to reconstructed and preserved sites within villages. I spent an extensive amount of time wandering around, taking notes, observing what buildings looked like, how they were changed, asking questions about the village, or just sitting around in restaurants, the main square or wherever there would be a wide selection of people passing by, making it easy to chat and have informal talks with people. In addition to more informal chats, I carried out random interviewing with a number of local residents, where I would state my purpose more clearly and use a tape recorder. These interviews were often the result of informal chats or with people residing in restored/reconstructed buildings, as well as with local entrepreneurs, from guest house owners to souvenir vendors. Sometimes people were very welcoming and interested, inviting me for a cup of tea or even dinner, sometimes not willing to talk at all, but for the most part people in general would be surprised by my presence and interest, but always forthcoming if sometimes reserved at first. This type of random interviewing was undertaken as a way of garnering a general idea of local opinion, and not in order to systematically gather data. As my topic is to do with buildings, this was a helpful starting point; talking about a house and the life within a house is a very fruitful way of finding out things about the family that resides there, and the history of a place, and these conversations would naturally take on a familiar, intimate tone.

The aim of these conversations, or interviews, was to find out more about attitudes to preservation, and how local residents had been affected, how much people understood about preservation, and what they felt about tourism and official attempts to claim the village as a historical site. Hence my fieldwork was based on a combination of informal talks with local residents and observation of village life and architecture. This method enabled me to collect a number of different opinions and voices that have all been helpful in establishing a clear idea of how heritage as a category is considered in rural Yunnan, and serves to form a picture of village life as a whole, underpinned by more official data on income statistics and livelihoods, as well as formal interviews with local officials and other agents with an interest at stake in
heritage issues such as UNESCO staff, higher level provincial officials, and academics.\(^2\)

When carrying out fieldwork I always attempted not to impose on people when they appeared apprehensive or unwilling to talk. I never entered a courtyard or building without meeting someone outside first, and being invited in when expressing interest in the house and its history. I found the volumes on doing fieldwork in China useful, especially in relation to ethical issues and interviewing (Heimer 2001; Solinger 2001; Gransow 2005), and in relation to qualitative researching in general I found Mason (1996), and Flick (2006) valuable.

Sometimes interviewing was made difficult by language issues, as many residents in rural Yunnan speak little standard Mandarin, especially those of an older generation. However, there would usually be at least someone who could speak some Mandarin present, such as younger family members.

In most cases, officials were forthcoming, but sometimes difficult to get hold of, and in the case of Shuhe, no one from the management group was willing to talk to me, which has limited my impressions to the view of the other main stakeholder, UNESCO. Interviewing officials was sometimes daunting, and I often found it difficult to pose the right questions that would solicit more than the expected, standard response. Eventually I found that meeting people outside of office, perhaps suggesting meeting in the village, was helpful, as I could ask direct questions about buildings and the village which would sometimes garner more interesting information than the standard, official responses I found to be ubiquitous when interviewing officials. This method also worked as a way of being introduced to people in the village, letting them know who I was and what I was doing. This could of course be counter-productive as people would associate me with officials, and might therefore, at least initially, assume I had links to officialdom. However, this was still a good way of getting to know the village and the buildings and made people more interested in talking to me, especially since I always made it clear that I was a student working on a PhD and not in any way linked to any type of organisation, such as an NGO or tourist enterprise.

I always stated that I was interested in finding out more about the village and how it had changed, what old buildings meant, and how people felt about tourism, and

\(^2\) For details, see appendix: Interviews.
that this interest was purely for academic, personal purposes. Apart from interviews, formal and informal, I have also engaged with local history materials and tourist marketing publications.

Hence the methodology used is a combination of formal data, qualitative interviewing, visual observation of the socio-spatial life of villages in order to gain an understanding of the relationship between the everyday human experience and the built environment.

3. Yunnan Province: placing minju preservation in the provincial context

i. Introduction

Yunnan Province is located in the southwest corner of the PRC, bordering Laos, Myanmar, Tibet, and Vietnam. The name, that translates as “south of the clouds” reflects the Chinese idea of Yunnan as a faraway border region on the periphery of the empire and the Chinese world. It is a province dominated by ethnic heterogeneity, where 25 different ethnic minority groups (shaoshu minzu) can be found, making up a third of the population. 3

During Imperial times it was not unusual for officials who fell out of favour to be sent to this part of China. Yunnan has also seen waves of migration during times of internal upheavals. Soldiers that defected from the army escaped here, sometimes troops were sent to Yunnan to defend the Chinese borders and never made it back, and many were sent to work as administrative staff at various times. 4

3 The term minzu means ethnic group. There are 56 ethnic groups in the PRC, which includes the Han-majority (Hanzu). It is sometimes a complicated term as minzu culture, or ethnic culture, could be applied to a broad range of practices and groups, in a similar way to how the English "ethnicity" is a fluid and malleable phrase. The term shaoshu minzu explicitly refers to minority groups (shaoshu means small number), but this phrase is often shortened to just minzu, a practice I will follow in this thesis.

Ethnic minorities make up about 33% of Yunnan’s population of 45 million, 14 million of which reside in urban areas (chengzhen). Most minorities belong to the 30 million rural (cunxiang) residents (National bureau of statistics, Yunnan Province, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongji Ju, Yunnan Sheng 2007, and the 2001 population census, www.stats.gov.cn).

4 The earliest Han settlement in Yunnan was the Dian kingdom ruled over by a Han prince, set up in the 3rd century B.C. In 732 the Nanzhao reign, which became the Dali kingdom, was established. The Mongols conquered this in 1254. The Mongols used Yunnan as a southern base and during this time many soldiers and later administrators arrived. During the Ming dynasty many more Han (3-4 million, with about 300 000 political “enemies” just from Nanjing) from all over China arrived, in search of jobs or as political exiles, which saw a definite sinification of the
The Qing era saw migrants in search of work and life opportunities, mainly from Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces (Gaubatz 1996: 81).

During the Japanese occupation the main seats of national learning were relocated to Yunnan, which led to an intellectual and scholarly migration that saw the growth of present day academic institutions such as Yunnan University. Some of their research activities still reflect the research that northern academics in southern exile engaged in as they came into contact with Yunnan, and its varied ethnic, cultural and ecological make-up.\(^5\)

This is especially true in relation to fields such as botany as Yunnan's rich botanical resources, and the biodiversity of a province that stretches from high altitude mountains to tropical forests, made for unexplored research material. This is also true in relation to Yunnan's many ethnic minorities as early anthropology was influenced by the encounter between this group of academic exiles and the ethnic diversity of the southwest.

Early anthropological research and academic interest in *shaoshu minzu* (or just *minzu*) took its inception at this time, and later CCP policy on *shaoshu minzu* and the post-1950 mapping of ethnic minorities was informed by the time academics spent in this part of the world.\(^6\)

This interest in Yunnan has resulted in an image of the province as a place for the ethnically different and exotic in the minds of many Chinese, and ethnic minorities remain the dominant topic of research related to the province. This was naturally pivotal to how its cultural heritage resources are considered, both at central level but also within the province.

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\(^5\) Yunnan University was the earliest university to be set up in the South West in 1922 (called the Southwest Associated University of Kunming). As professors from Beijing University and Qinghua arrived in the 1930s the university and its collections of books grew. The university library still holds books from this time. This time also saw a wave of migration as soldiers and workers arrived to work on the Burma Road.

\(^6\) And also by CCP cadres own experiences of the southwest during the Long March when the need to integrate and harmonise China and its fragile border regions became clear to Mao Zedong and other leading CCP members (see for example Gladney 1991: 66-67; Oakes 1998: 102-05; Schein 2000:68-100).
It is important to stress that this thesis is not about ethnicity per se, but it is still an important issue to consider when discussing cultural heritage, especially in a place like Yunnan. Officially, there are 25 minority groups residing in Yunnan, some of these groups hiding a more complex reality where ethnic labels have been tagged onto smaller ethnic groups to facilitate organisation. Some wide umbrella terms include small subdivisions with distinct linguistic and cultural traits. As a result, outside observers might not always appreciate the rich fabric of communal rituals and material heritage in small communities (one example being the Lolopo in Eric Mueggler’s account, Mueggler 2000), and many heritage projects aimed at tourism use simplified ethnic labels in order to facilitate marketing. The Yi is the largest minority group, even if this hides a more complex reality, and the Bai comes second, even if Han-Chinese dominates many areas. The fact that minority groups dominate the poorest areas in Yunnan is not a coincidence. It is a fact that many minority groups have been less successful at bargaining and negotiating the conditions and access to development than areas of well linked up and vocal Han groups. In many peripheral, minority dominated regions, links to the state and its agents are weak in terms of having access to channels for negotiating local conditions, which means many areas are left outside of debates concerning development. There is also a prevailing image of ethnic minorities as lacking capacity for progress and modernity, obstacles to the nation’s development, and thus in need of top-down directions.

The ethnic diversity of the province has been pounced upon as a marketing device for promoting Yunnan as a tourist destination. Local policy makers have pounced on the ethnic label as a way of marketing the province, mainly for tourism, but also for the sale of other produce associated with the province such as tea, foods, and handicrafts. This interest in ethnicity could also be inserted within a context of state interest in regulation and control.

At the time of research, the Bai made up 3-4% of Yunnan’s population, whereas some 11% were Yi, and 67% Han. (Yunnan Tongji Nianjian, 2008, National bureau of statistics, Yunnan, www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009). In order for an ethnic group to be considered an official minzu it needs to number at least 5000, and adhere to certain criteria in relation to dialect and customs. There are an estimated 50 minority groups in Yunnan, but most small groups have been registered under umbrella terms, such as Yizu, the largest ethnic group in Yunnan (see for example Mueggler 2000 on the Lolopo, a group that has been labelled as Yi).
It could be argued that the cultural heritage of ethnic groups is a category of special interest to the state, as it presents state agents with an opportunity to control cultural practices that could potentially pose a challenge to the state (such as popular religious practice and local temple politics), practices that are also highly attractive to the tourist industry. Hence state interest in ethnic culture could be understood in a dual way, both ideologically and commercially.

This is another reason for using Yunnan as an example of what heritage reconstruction means in the PRC, and one criteria for the selection of case studies was the ethnic diversity of the province, and a wish to demonstrate how the state has made heritage tourism into a channel for controlling and capitalise upon the cultural diversity of the PRC, especially minority culture. Minority culture is popular in the PRC, something that started during the early reform era in the 1980s when intellectuals slowly rediscovered the richness and heterogeneity of Chinese culture (also called the culture fever, or wenhua re). This interest was picked up by film makers and artists, and later by the tourist industry.

In the present era, there is no shortage of minority theme restaurants, shops, and tourist sites selling an idea of minzu culture that appeals to urban consumers due to its perceived exotic, timeless qualities. Ethnic culture has proved useful for selling a notion of place, and attracting outside visitors.

In this sense, Yunnan serves as a good case study of how cultural heritage is on the one hand linked to tourism and consumption; and hence path towards modernity and development in poor areas; and on the other of how the state aims to portray China's rich regional and ethnic diversity as part of a national culture where cultural differences co-exist in a harmonious way – at least as long as these differences are controlled and managed by the state. Tourism, and development for tourism, is a very useful tool both for controlling local culture, and for selling the idea of the nation as inclusive and stable. Localities are offered state support to develop tourism, and tourists are sold an idea of China as ancient and peaceful, where rural areas offer an alternative to the fast pace of urban development, a respite from the constant changes and challenges of the cities. To residents in rural areas, tourism offers a chance to link the village to the urban world of consumption and modernity. Cultural heritage resources are obviously useful for constructing tourist sites, especially the craze to create ancient village environments for the consumption of the tourist gaze.
Being able to use an ethnic label makes these village environments even more enticing and easy to market, minority culture being considered interesting, different and hence alluring, adding an exotic quality to the perceived ancient qualities of heritage villages.

All of the sites covered in this thesis have ethnic credentials, and are dominated by groups other than the Han. This is very typical of Yunnan, and also very typical of how provincial authorities market tourism in Yunnan. Most tourist sites have some sort of ethnic label attached, not surprising considering how Yunnan is a place characterised by ethnic diversity, and especially in light of provincial attempts to use the ethnic credentials in a beneficial way. In the reform era, ethnicity has emerged as a commodity to be capitalised upon, and this is certainly true in relation to heritage tourism. However, this also works the other way around, as ethnic groups have come to redefine and reassert their ethnic identity as a result of outside interest and state encouragement. Ethnic revival can be seen all around Yunnan, although this is often a response to state discourse on culture, tourism, and the market. Ethnic minorities could be said to use their ethnicity in a way that aligns itself with state interests, rather than going counter to the state. This will become clear in relation to the study of Nuodeng village, where Bai culture is important to how the village presents itself.

iii, Tourism and development in Yunnan.

Yunnan is one of China’s most popular and successful tourist regions, marketed as exotic, sunny, and scenically stunning. However, it is also one of China’s poorest provinces with all the problems associated with poverty such as lack of health care, education, and failing infrastructure in large parts of the province. Pockets of the province are still inaccessible at times, especially after heavy rains, or during the winter, especially so since about one fifth of the terrain is mountainous. The province has the highest numbers of HIV carriers in China. Drugs, especially in the countryside, are a big problem, due to the easy accessibility as much of the trade from South East Asia passes through the province.⁸

⁸ The first cases of HIV in China were discovered in Ruili, Yunnan in 1989. The province still has the highest national rate, especially along the SE Asian borders, and in towns along highways and
This has led to Yunnan’s other, more sinister image as a treasure trove of drugs, an image that in a sense aligns itself with the image of the sexualised minority object, an idea of minorities as backward and less developed and hence prone to “uncivilised” behaviour. This idea is in many ways constructed around a general idea of Yunnan as a place removed from modernity where loose and uninhibited behaviour prevails, a place far removed from central authorities where more relaxed attitudes prevail and hence well-suited for easy leisure pursuits. The gap between this perceived image and the reality of poor communities is of course wide, and much of the constructed image of Yunnan exists only in tourist brochures.

Tourism in Yunnan has grown in an almost explosive way during the past ten years or so, especially since the old town of Lijiang in northwestern Yunnan was listed as a World Heritage Site in 1997, and Kunming’s successful hosting of the World Horticultural Exhibition in 1999. Lijiang old town, and Yunnan as a province, were targeted by the China National Tourist Association (CNTA) as national tourist hot spots of special interest already in the mid-1990s.

In 1996, when Lijiang filed the application for World Heritage status it enjoyed support from the highest levels of government. The Ministry of Construction went behind the application and acted as its patron (Su/Teo 2009: 84). In 1996, Lijiang was hit by a massive earthquake, and following this, UNESCO accepted the application in an unusually speedy fashion, in an attempt to help reconstruction. Ever since, this region has been a tourist hub in Yunnan, and has seen a great transformation from poor, traditional region to a transnational centre for cultural tourism that has nearly eclipsed what the town once was. This has had an enormous impact on the rest of the province, and attempts to develop tourism, and has made the potential for heritage tourism as a development strategy startlingly clear to provincial and regional authorities around the province.

Tourism has been targeted as one of the main provincial industries, as well as an important development strategy by the provincial government, and in this drive, the ethnic and the cultural have been deemed to be of immense significance

Provincial policy on tourism has hence been a major factor in the way the province has reshaped and re-branded its image during the reform era, especially since the early 1990s when tourism as an industry started growing at a greater pace in the PRC. In 1997, a provincial white paper was published that outlined how to promote tourism and how Yunnan should market itself in order to increase visitor numbers (Litzinger 2004: 488-89). This very conscious attempt at marketing was not an isolated Yunnanese phenomenon but something that occurred throughout China at this time, as provincial self-reliance became the norm. Tourism as a development strategy in inland areas was also picked up as part of the 2001 “Open up the West” (kaifaxibu) campaign (China Quarterly 2004:178; Goodman 2004: 322-323). However, as Litzinger has pointed out, this was already policy in Yunnan (Litzinger 2004: 489).10

In 1998, following the 1997 UNESCO World Heritage Listing, the development of heritage tourism to the Lijiang area received funding and backing from the China National Tourism Association as part of a plan to develop the South West (Goodman 2004: 326; Su and Teo 2009:62). This attempt to establish tourism as a main source of provincial revenue has been very successful, and once again places the state and its interest in tourism at the heart of heritage preservation. Income from tourism has increased at a steady pace, and has had a profound impact on the livelihoods of people residing in, or near, the more popular sights.11 This has been facilitated by improved infrastructure, and easier access to all parts of the province, but particularly to areas that have been designated as tourist development zones.

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9 See Litzinger (2004:489-90). Litzinger quotes an unpublished government strategy plan by Yuan Shaolin from 1997 (“Overall plan for the construction of a Great Cultural Province in Yunnan”) that outlines how Yunnan’s ethnic and cultural resources can best be exploited for commercial purposes. Ben Hillman has demonstrated how Zhongdian officially became Shangri-La as an effort on behalf of provincial authorities to develop tourism (Hillman 2003). See also Kolås (2008:5).

10 One example is the lobbying to have Zhongdian change its name to Shangri-La for tourist purposes, a name changed that was approved by the State Council in 2002 (Hillman 2003; Kolås 2008:5).

11 In 2007 some 4.5 million overseas tourists arrived in Yunnan in addition to 89 million domestic arrivals. Tourism revenue from overseas visitors was 8.6 billion yuan, and from domestic around 56 billion yuan. These numbers have seen a steady increase at around 10-15% annually, more in the northwest where the growth has been around 30%. Tourism accounted for about 13% of overall provincial revenue (National Bureau of Statistics of China, Yunnan Province 2007; Yunnan Tourism Bureau 2007).
The idea of tourism as development strategy and path towards modernity has placed the perceived needs of the tourist industry at the top of the provincial development agenda. This has in reality worked in an arbitrary, selective fashion that has created an uneven development whereby certain regions have benefited greatly whereas others have lagged behind. It has also had a profound impact on certain locations where outside entrepreneurs run most tourist ventures, and local populations have lost out, or where those with a level of education and understanding of the workings of tourism have benefitted, whereas the community at large has not. Tourism has also had an adverse effect on certain sensitive and unique natural resources, particularly in the UNESCO listed Sanjiang area in the northwest where road-and dam construction has threatened the biodiversity of the area.12

This, how tourism is a development strategy touted by provincial authorities, also means that tourism in Yunnan is a project that requires provincial support in order to be successful, as provincial authorities wield power over infrastructure, funding and listings of tourist hot spots and cultural resources (such as heritage). This renders links to the state crucial, and places processes of state bargaining and understanding of policy at the heart of tourism. It has created a situation where tourism can mean benefits in terms of development and economic resources for a location – but also creates uneven development. Emphasis on tourism as development strategy has led to failed tourist ventures in many places, where the necessary knowledge, connections and funding have been lacking. This is evident to anyone travelling around the province. It is common to come across various tourist ventures in the most unexpected places – empty tourist hotels and attempts at creating scenic spots for leisure such as jungle walks in Pingbian county, or fishing ponds in Simao, not to mention a plethora of “historical” villages in places most tourists would never have heard of, nor care about. This is another side of provincial policy on tourism and development, and even if tourism seems to have generated increased wealth for the province at large, in reality this has only trickled down to locations with the required backing and connections, and, in cases like the northwest, much of this revenue goes to entrepreneurs from other parts of China, or Taiwan (Su/Teo 2009: 85-86).13

12 Personal interview, Dr Heather Peters, UNESCO Bangkok, February 2008.
13 For more on this, see the concluding case study of Shuhe.
Hence tourism has done little for poverty reduction and development in very poor areas. In Pingbian for instance, one of the poorest counties in the province (with many incomes below the stated poverty line of 785/yuan year), there was a failed venture to set up eco-tourism to help reduce poverty in areas with cash incomes of around 250/yuan annually (in 2000). Now, what remains are some bungalows and a pretty, but deserted, walkway through the jungle (China Development Brief 2000; personal visit 2007).

iv, The role of Lijiang and UNESCO

Perhaps the most important factor driving preservation processes in Yunnan is the success of models such as Lijiang where tourism as based around an architectural heritage that has transformed an entire area into a site for a type of perceived modernity driven by global actors. Lijiang has had a profound impact on other nearby locations and their attitude to heritage preservation and tourism. Since the 1997 World Heritage listing, it is not just Lijiang old town that has been transformed, but also the region surrounding it. This has been especially true since the Sanjiang (Three Rivers) area gained a UNESCO listing in 2003, an outside recognition that has been pivotal to how this once poor region has grown into a centre for tourism, that on the one hand caters to domestic tour groups whilst on the other also being a spot for eco-and cultural tourism, two sectors that are sometimes hard to reconcile.14

Lijiang is one of China’s most popular tourist spots, and forms a centre of tourism-related affluence out of reach for most rural communities in the province, even if it is being upheld as an example to emulate. I would argue that Lijiang has played a central role in how preservation issues and minju as an asset has taken on a new importance in Yunnan. This type of model and its influence might be

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14 The Sanjiang UNESCO listing has been debated and at the 2005 UNESCO conference in Suzhou UNESCO took the unusual step to officially threaten to take it off the list if the Yunnanese authorities went ahead with planned dam-building projects. These were halted but later went ahead on a smaller scale and at a different site, which was claimed to be outside the protected zone. Heather Peters at the UNESCO, who has also worked at the Nature Conservancy in Yunnan, feels this is very typical of the way legislation is interpreted and negotiated by local authorities in the PRC, ultimately rendering it useless. Road-building projects have also ruined much of the scenic landscape around Lijiang, especially the Hu Tiao Xia, or Tiger Leaping Gorge, where roads have been blasted in the mountains to facilitate access for tour buses to scenic spots that used to be reachable only by hiking along the mountain.
less obvious in other, more affluent provinces or places where a site of this magnitude is lacking, but in Yunnan, Lijiang has been crucial as a model for how heritage, ethnicity, and culture are valuable resources in constructing modernity and generating wealth.  

The actors affecting how cultural heritage resources are considered and made use of in Yunnan involve government bureaus at all levels. In addition to provincial, and, in some cases, national actors such as cultural heritage, tourism and construction bureaus, there is also a wealth of independent, transnational organisations that have had a profound impact on heritage politics in Yunnan. The most important of these actors is undoubtedly UNESCO. UNESCO involvement in Yunnan dates from the mid-1990s when Lijiang old town was first considered for a World Heritage listing, a listing that was made official in 1997, following a devastating earthquake in 1996 (see preceding section on tourism). Since then, the Sanjiang area (Three Rivers) in the northwest has also been elevated to a World Heritage site (2003) due to its outstanding landscape, as has the karst landscape of the Shilin stone forest (2007). Sites put on the tentative list for consideration include the Honghe rice terraces at Yuanyang in southwest Yunnan. Lijiang was put on the World Heritage List due to its qualities as a site where unique cultural features remained, both in terms of the town architecture but also as a site for a living ethnic culture, including music and religion.

Lijiang is ethnically a Naxi area, a Tibetan subgroup that has developed distinct cultural features, one important aspect being the architecture of Lijiang old town that up until recently has been remarkably well-preserved with wooden merchant homes, courtyards, narrow alleys and slate covered roofs, and with a system of small canals and wells that criss-cross the settlement. The UNESCO Lijiang listing was of tremendous importance in that it demonstrated a new UNESCO agenda. Along with a few other Asian small towns such as Hoi An in Vietnam and Pingyao in Shanxi province, Lijiang was among the first sites to receive a listing due to its lived-in environment.

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15 This assertion might be less true of sites that have a long and well-established past as national sites for pilgrimage and/or tourism such as, say, the Great Wall, Mount Tai, or Huang Shan (Yellow Mountain). These sites obviously generate income, and fame, but most people do not associate Huang Shan with Anhui culture, but with national culture. Lijiang is a recent addition to China's face in the world, and telling of reform-era concern with minority inclusion, and presenting folk culture as a type of antiquity, and is very much part of Yunnan's image - it is often the one place people has visited in Yunnan, especially for tourist purposes.

Lijiang was both ethnically, as well as culturally, different from mainstream Chinese sites. It was located in an exotic corner of Yunnan, and listed by UNESCO as a World Heritage site due to its living traditions and traditional architecture: it had all the qualities to make a top tourist destination, a symbol of ethnic diversity and China’s historical richness. It was a perfect site for both national as well as provincial purposes, and has been used very successfully. Provincially it has been pivotal to developing tourism, nationally, it has been made into a symbol that attracts even first-time visitors to China, including international leaders and delegations that are taken on the traditional tour of historical China, including the Great Wall and Xi’an - and Lijiang. Lijiang appears to be the perfect contrast to the monumental and archaeological wonders of northern–and central China; a showcase for the ethnic diversity of the PRC. The UNESCO listing, that also includes the nearby villages of Shuhe and Baisha, has hence been of tremendous importance in placing Yunnan on the map of Asian tourist sites, especially domestically and within East Asia.

It has helped generate tourism incomes and along with the 2003 listing of the natural landscape of the Sanjiang area, northwest Yunnan has evolved into an internationally renowned tourist region much due to the attention outside actors have paid to its unique blend of cultural tradition and scenic beauty.

However, UNESCO involvement has been fraught with difficulties, and point to many of the issues that have faced other organisations in Yunnan, and speak volumes of the uneasy relationship between preservation, tourism and capital gain. In fact, Lijiang is so linked to both how the concept of heritage has been widened and to how the tourism market has changed and how the two industries, heritage and tourism, has come to form a tense but also fruitful alliance that sometimes makes it difficult to separate what is heritage preservation and what is tourism development, and how to reconcile the two.

This thesis will demonstrate how they are often one and the same, and that preservation in villages is almost always linked to tourism, and promotion of tourism to a certain region. Lijiang is a good model for how these processes work. Lijiang has also formed a model for successful tourism that other locations within Yunnan wish to emulate. It is arguably true that the success of Lijiang, and the power it has granted the region both in real, political, terms, but also as a type of imagery for surrounding areas, has been affecting how and why both
provincial and local leaders as well as tourist entrepreneurs consider cultural resources and material heritage. The case of Lijiang also points to the interplay between various organisations and the state in the PRC, and how it is ultimately the interests of state agencies that come out in top: in many ways, the UNESCO has been left with little power over developments within the region, and it could be argued that rather than preserving and maintaining the region’s uniqueness, the UNESCO listings have helped in constructing a playground for an urban middle class that is saturated with state ascribed meanings. As a result of this development, some locals have benefitted financially, but many have been left on the periphery of developments, and have seen their homes being colonised and commoditised by the forces of global tourism. In old town Lijiang, it is definitely easier finding a smoothie or a pizza than buying daily necessities and making your way through the maze of streets in the old town could be a time consuming endeavour as the streets are sometimes clogged with tourists. Lijiang does demonstrate how traditional culture could be turned profitable, but also how profit often erodes the culture that feeds it: in the case of Lijiang, and nearby Shuhe, a later case study, this erosion has created a new type of heritage, where the authenticity of the site no longer matters as the site has taken on new meaning and cultural connotations that are linked to its modern guise as tourist site.

In this sense, the “preservation” of heritage that the UNESCO and national government proclaims to advocate is in fact its very antithesis, but that does not mean that the site has lost interest for the tourist market – on the contrary, the site might have increased its touristic value, whilst the initial heritage credentials have

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17 This is also based on personal experience of Lijiang as well as the opinion of Dr Yang Qing at Kunming Ligong Daxue (Kunming Technical University), who was involved in the preservation work of Old Town Lijiang when he was a graduate student with Ruan Sanyi at Tongji University in Shanghai, whose research group was hired to help out with this project. According to him, the well-preserved surfaces of buildings hid interiors in extremely bad shape and lives of extreme poverty that no one cared much about. In most cases these people were left with little choice but to move out when rich entrepreneurs arrived and took over what came to be successful shops and inns. However, it is also true that many locals benefited from leasing houses and relocating to new housing outside the old town, and that many happily did so due to the poor hygiene in the Old Town (especially the younger generation). It is also the case that legislation in relation to the Old Town favours entrepreneurs as buildings used for businesses can be altered so as to facilitate business, by having modern toilets installed for instance. This is not allowed in relation to ordinary residential houses, something that has been crucial to the decisions of many to leave the Old Town. In some cases they might have wanted to stay, and in some cases still live there, but the changes wrought by tourism and the strain on everyday life have made basic everyday life activities difficult. (UNESCO 2000, 2008, McKhann 2001; Su and Teo 2009: 124-25).

18 It is estimated that about 70% of entrepreneurs in Lijiang come from other provinces than Yunnan (Su and Teo 2009:157).
been blotted out by hotels, replicas of traditional cultural practices and commercialisation of handicrafts and rituals, there for the tourist gaze. This development has created an uneasy relationship between the UNESCO, the Cultural Heritage Management Committee in Lijiang, and provincial government, ultimately in charge of local decisions pertaining to Lijiang. At the 2006 UNESCO conference in Suzhou, the UNESCO even threatened to take the Sahjiang area off the list, and it has been outspoken and critical about developments in Lijiang. They see their presence in Lijiang as important as it grants them some power in negotiations over developments, even if they are often left powerless when it comes to new construction and excessive tourism. However, one UNESCO representative claimed that had it not been for Lijiang’s World Heritage inscription the town would be gone, and replaced by tile and cement (Su/Teo 2009: 82). But it is also true that UNESCO in tandem with other global actors, such as Lonely Planet, and international hotel chains have been pivotal to how the town has changed, and demonstrates how the heritage badge in Yunnan to a great extent has been taken over by tourism, and how tourism, when successful, changes what made a site unique. It also demonstrates how successful tourism forms an incentive for other sites to develop heritage resources. In Yunnan, Lijiang and its UNESCO status has been crucial to how tourism and heritage interacts. Right from the beginning Lijiang has been made into both a national emblem for ethnic tourism, as well as model for tourism development in poor regions. It has also been made into an international tourist destination, with a range of transnational actors involved (even if the majority of tourists are domestic). Lijiang’s production as a heritage centre has not been a local affair, and the influence of Lijiang on the rest of the province cannot be underestimated. UNESCO has been a crucial actor in this process, but so has central government action, as well as the World Bank, and other transnational organisations.

This process goes back to 1986 when the State Council awarded Lijiang status as a National Historic and Cultural City. Su and Teo have argued that the central state has in fact been the main actor in the process of transforming Lijiang (Su/Teo 2009:85). Had it not been for support from Beijing, the 1996 World Heritage application might not have been successful.
The 1996 earthquake that ruined some of Lijiang’s heritage structures was also important as it alerted global actors to the fact that the town was in danger of being ruined by haphazard reconstruction efforts (ibid). One reason for strong central support was the realisation that Lijiang was a useful model for how to develop tertiary industries in inland regions, tourism in particular. This interest in Lijiang’s development is further demonstrated by how provincial government, with support from Beijing, has developed infrastructure, a key reason for Lijiang’s success. The construction of an airport in 1996 was important as it facilitated the long trip from Kunming, and made direct flight connections from the East Coast possible, hence making the region a viable weekend getaway. The construction of a new highway, and comfortable luxury buses that make the trip from Kunming in 10 hours has also been important, as it cuts a long 15-20 hour bus ride in half.

These are state-sponsored initiatives, without which Lijiang would never have reached the same type of fame. The state has also upheld Lijiang as a model to emulate in other ways, not least the way the ethnic label has been used as a strength and special characteristic of the region. Here, ethnicity has gone to the market: according to one Lijiang CCP official, Lijiang is a successful case of "cultural industrialisation" (quoted in Su/Teo 2009: 80). For our purposes, Lijiang has also been upheld as a model for successful preservation, and a good example of how tourism and preservation can work in tandem to find a balance between commercial gain and conservation of heritage environments. This is not obvious to anyone that has visited Lijiang in recent years, and UNESCO has criticised the way preservation has been carried out, but Lijiang remains an issue for debate in the PRC; and as we shall see, in some cases it is considered a model by other locations, but there is also an awareness of how Lijiang could be a model for what not to aim for in preservation and tourism development.

In addition to the UNESCO and its influence, there is also a wealth of NGOs and INGOs (international NGOs) operating in Yunnan, mostly in the northwest and greater Lijiang region. The most well-known of these organisations is probably the Nature Conservancy, and the Global Heritage Fund (GHF).

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19 It is quite difficult to get an exact figure of the number of both domestic NGOs (minjian zuzhi) and INGOs even if they have to register with the Ministry for Civil Affairs – some might be
There are also actors such as the World Bank that famously sponsored the reconstruction of Lijiang old town after the 1996 quake, and together with local government, the GHF and UNESCO, funded and formulated the first master plan for the conservation of Lijiang, something that was later carried out by architects and graduate students from Shanghai’s Tongji University (Ebbe/Hankey 2000: 46; Su/Teo 2009:84).20 One aim of this plan was to find a way to make preservation commercially successful, i.e. develop tourism, but it was also a plan that mirrored international discourse on heritage preservation, and brought ideas on culture, development, and conservation to the region. Hence it would be fair to say that the transformation of northwestern Yunnan, Lijiang, and perhaps Shangri-la (Zhongdian) in particular, has been an interplay between the central state, tourism development, UNESCO, and transnational actors with an international agenda for cultural conservation. This wealth of independent actors has obviously had an impact on provincial policy, as they fund many endeavours within the province, both in relation to education, health and environmental concerns, as well as cultural projects (Hillman 2003; Litzinger 2004, 2007; Su/Teo 2009:81-85). As we shall see, this interplay between NGOs/INGOs and authorities has certainly been an important factor in some of the places where preservation projects have taken place.

In richer provinces, such as Zhejiang, reconstruction and preservation of heritage buildings are often informed by other factors, such as lineage elites and a desire to display wealth and local pride in place history.21 In Yunnan, this is not a major factor, if a factor at all. Instead there is the realm of tourism, entrepreneurs, and NGOs that has had a profound impact on, and perhaps lent a different focus to, how the built environment has been reshaped, to a great extent influenced by Yunnan’s northwest, in particular by how Lijiang has been made into a national symbol for ethnic exoticism, as well as site for international tourism.

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20 Personal conversations, Dr Yang Qing, Kunming Technical University, Kunming 2007-08. Dr Yang was a graduate student at Tongji at the time, and worked on the Lijiang project for his PhD. See also Su/Teo (2009: 79-84).

21 See chapter two, on heritage and communal practice in the PRC, for more on this.
4. Chapter outline:

This thesis is divided into two sections. Chapter One forms a general overview of the concept heritage, covering a discussion of how cultural heritage could be understood from different perspectives, both historically, and as a realm for official and communal memory and representation, including in relation to theories on space and planning. It also includes a look at UNESCO, and how it has been driving and formulating what heritage means, not least in relation to the functions of the tourist industry that has, as will be argued, been pivotal to how and why heritage is used in the PRC, and Yunnan Province.

The second chapter is specifically concerned with heritage preservation in the PRC, starting with a general discussion of how interest in heritage has increased in the reform-era, and what factors have been affecting this interest.

This is followed by a look a the legislative framework, and an overview of how heritage and tourism in the PRC are interlinked, also in relation to how heritage buildings are used, and reconstructed and how this might affect their value as "authentic" structures; this is followed by a discussion on communal efforts to preserve and restore buildings as a contrast to commercial interest in heritage for tourism.

The second part of the thesis is devoted to specific case studies of six villages in Yunnan that will serve to demonstrate different motives and outcomes of heritage site construction and historical preservation.

These four chapters cover one village where preservation has been driven by an international agent which has led to conflict with local government, especially over the shape of tourism development. One covers a region where tourism development is high on the regional agenda, and heritage resources deemed to be of great importance, and hence in need of protection. One case study concerns two different cases of communal efforts to promote local heritage in different ways; in one case as part of local government efforts, in another as a way of promoting ethnic culture and local heritage. In the concluding case study we will see what could happen to a heritage site if tourism exceeds the limits of what a place can absorb, and eclipse the original fabric of place; this case study also attempts to explain some of the state interest in heritage as an ideological realm.
Chapter one.

Literature review and theoretical approaches to cultural heritage studies

1. Cultural heritage studies: an overview

Cultural heritage is a way of representing history in the present whereby material artifacts and traditions are made to embody the historical past. However, what constitutes a cultural heritage, who owns the right to represent it, and what functions it carries, are widely debated issues. Interest in cultural heritage, especially as a subject for academic research, is linked to the rise of modernity in the West, and its quest for antiquity as a means of legitimising the modern project. The condition for establishing modernity was centred on an idea of breaking with the past and traditional practices. Interest in cultural heritage was also linked to the construction of modern nation-states; and the projecting of national myths as a way of installing a strong sense of national identity. Cultural artifacts provided evidence of national glory, and a sense of national belonging. It was a type of national nostalgia that provided a sense of roots in an era of rapid change. The explosion of interest in national cultural heritage at the turn of the last century was in many ways an outcome of social change, and of historical rupture. Cultural heritage came to be regarded as part of national cultural identity, a category that placed the nation within a historical context of great antiquity, but in a safe, manageable way that provided evidence of a national past of stability and progress, but at a safe remove from the present (Lowenthal 1998: 126-7; Hall 2000: 4; Mitchell 2001: 212; Rowlands 2002: 105-108; Rowlands/de Jong 2007: 16-17). This is not to say that interest in cultural heritage did not exist prior to the rise of modernity in late 19th century. The idea of heritage as important to national identity has appeared at various times and places in history, and the modern European heritage movement has got roots in the Romantic movement when collecting folk tales and artifacts was a way of establishing the myth of the “Volk” as ancient, and part of an unbroken cultural tradition. David C Harvey has pointed to how all societies at all times have made choices as to how to remember
and locate the past in the present, even if this might sometimes entail forgetting about it altogether (Harvey 2001). This points to how cultural heritage has served the purpose of making sense of national identity; of naming and labelling the past in order to establish a sense of where we came from, especially in times of change. Hence heritage is only heritage in so far as it is under threat; interest in heritage is often linked to social and historical change, a way of clinging to the past, and hence a type of nostalgia for that which is no longer, "a search for lost homelands and ancient Golden Ages, or a promise to redeem the past and revive a sense of authentic being in the modern world" (Rowlands 2002: 106). It would appear that the current interest in heritage has peaked as a result of increased globalisation and interest in asserting cultural rights and emphasising local particularity, in tandem with tourism and other commercial forces.

This is certainly true of modern China, where unprecedented social change has brought about a sense of instability. In China, earlier interest in protecting and documenting cultural heritage resources, can be linked to the rise of modernity and the Enlightenment project based around the May Fourth Movement of the Republican era. Here, like in the West at the same time, the challenges posed by the rise of modernity led to a desire to document and understand the nation’s heritage. This led to a new interest in folk art, archaeological excavations and, as mentioned in relation to Yunnan, a new interest in minority culture, and in understanding and documenting different aspects of Chinese culture.

22 David C Harvey has pointed to how the current trend in heritage research which aims to locate heritage in the present, fails to take the wider scope of heritage as a historical process into account. I agree with Harvey that heritage is not as a-historical as some critics would like to argue when they place “heritage” in a postmodern container of contemporary concerns with no real claims to historicity. Harvey’s premise that “heritage has always been with us and has always been produced by people according to their contemporary concerns and experiences” (2001:320) is an important point that reminds us of the importance to see the long durée of history, and how the history of heritage is longer than its official existence as part of academic study. However, I would also argue that much of the modern obsession with heritage as a way of seeing history is linked to modernity and a perceived need for both a national as well as a global sense of the past as linked to (but distant from) the present, even if it goes without saying that every historical era has had some sort of relationship with its past, and has made choices as how to remember and locate that past in the present.

23 The May Fourth Movement was a student led patriotic movement based around Beijing University. The movement peaked in 1919, as a result of the perceived injustice of the Versaille treaty. The May Fourth students were part of a greater social movement to modernise China that started in the late Qing and ended as a result of war and the ensuing social chaos. Both the CCP and the nationalist Guomindang (GMD) has got roots in the May Fourth Era and the call for democracy, social justice and modernity. For more on this see for example Vera Schwarcz (1984).
Hence interest in cultural heritage share the same roots in the PRC as elsewhere: a perceived need for a shared national past, and a search for roots and authenticity in times of upheaval.

The idea of a place boosting a rich and long heritage, a cultural tradition with tangible signs of ancient history as evidenced by a pattern of unbroken cultural production, came to be synonymous with an idea of a developed and "civilised" society, a notion that arose along with an interest in collecting and documenting history according to scientific principles (Mitchell 2001: 212; Dicks 2003: 119; Hobsbawm/Ranger 2003: 1-15). The modern project and the emphasis on rationality and science, in combination with nostalgia for a perceived loss of tradition made the notion of national heritage crucial to modern ideas of national identity. Much of what is considered as "national culture", or "national heritage" are modern inventions linked to nation-state building and modernity (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm/Ranger 2003: 6-9). This need for national identity was a response to urbanisation, industrialisation and the end of intimate, rural communities; a search for roots and a way for nation-states to establish a shared national past.

In China, like in the West, cultural heritage was linked to the quest for science and rationality, a way of representing the nation according to scientific principles of labelling and documenting historical artifacts and cultural expressions. This was a time of archaeological excavations and field trips, and it is no coincidence that the first attempts to label ethnic minorities, and document their culture were being carried out around this time. After 1949, the revolutionary project of the PRC state halted this interest as the categories of culture and history

24 It has been argued that "heritage" as a category could be dated back to 1882 when the Ancient Monuments Act was introduced in Britain. The National Trust was established in 1895, and the first out-door heritage museum, in Stockholm, was established in 1891. These dates do not mean that interest in heritage prior to this did not exist, as Harvey (2001, see above) has remarked.
25 Benedict Anderson's path breaking study of the nation as an "imagined community" (1991) held together by print media, is particularly suited to throwing light on how modern nation-states rely on a shared, communal myth in order to function. They could be described as entities imagined at the popular level, and held together by a shared set of myths, ideas, and narratives. The idea of cultural heritage as presenting nation-states with tangible, evocative artifacts in order to install patriotism and a shared feeling of nation- hood is well-suited to this description.
26 One example of Republican era interest in the past would be Liang Sicheng, the well-known architect and advocate for protection of old Beijing (Yue Dong 2000:135-36; Broudehoux 2004:120-121; Lu 2005:133), and his wife, Lin Hui who went on exploration trips to document Chinese architecture (Fairbank 1994). Another example would be the general interest in heritage and antiquity in the Republican era, as a way of marking distance to the old order and construct a new national identity – one example being urban reconstruction in Beijing and Hangzhou (Esherick 2000: 2-13; Wang 2000: 107-120; Yue Dong 2000:121-138).
came to be politically charged, and much CCP-policy on culture was aimed at eradicating tradition and creating the nation anew. However, it was still the case that anthropologists and historians were dispatched to ethnically rich areas like Yunnan to categorise and label minorities and their customs, as a way of integrating, and ultimately establish political control over ethnically sensitive border regions. This project, minzu shibie, (ethnic differentiation), or minzu gongzuo (ethnic work), was undertaken in most provinces and the founded the basis for the ethnic labels still in use today (Gladney 1991: 66-67; Oakes 1998: 87; Kaup 2000: 73-111; Schein 2000: 68-100).

Similarly, in Europe, interest in exploring the heritage of other continents arose as part of colonial and imperial projects and their link with the obsession of collecting and making history appear rational and linear. Early anthropology and museum collections took artifacts as evidence of heritage and national character, and hence the level of “civilisation” was measured (Goody 1977: 7; Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983: 6-9; Schildkrout/Keim 1998: 1-37). Thus much of the interest in exploring not only the cultural heritage of Europe, but also that of other continents came to form the cultural backbone of colonial and imperial enterprises in Asia and Africa. In relation to Africa, the perceived lack of cultural artifacts, or what was thought of as the backward, naïve state of much cultural production was used as a way of legitimising colonial exploits (Schildkrout/Keim 1998: 1-37). Based on this, Africans were in need of “enlightenment”. Cultural artefacts and other heritage resources were also often used as a way of making cultural assessments of ethnicity, tribe and national belonging. Colonial administrators in places like the Congo, Nigeria and southern Africa often took artifacts as evidence of tribal links and “national” borders, a practice that helped create ideas of ethnicity in places where there was little basis for categorisation based on Western concepts of racial distinction.

Hence the “discovery” of cultural heritage in various places has been linked to greater societal transformations where change has brought a need to reflect upon, and redefine, national identity, and it has continued to play the role of marker of cultural distinction and marker of national values into the present era. This points to how cultural heritage is a category that changes along with the need to reflect upon and revaluate the past to suit present concerns. This is still the case, and the explosion in heritage related projects that has occurred since the 1980s in Europe,
points to how cultural heritage becomes important at times when established ideas of national cultures and identities are being challenged. Capital flows, transnationalism, and unstable national boundaries have led to an idea of a postmodern society where no values hold, and the grand narratives of modernity have been broken up in favour of Lyotard’s *petit récit*, or micronarratives where reality has been splintered, broken up in fragments and lacks historical continuity (Lyotard 1984).

Jameson regards heritage as evidence that the relationship between past and present can no longer be grasped, an argument that links in with Nora, who has argued that a shift away from intimate communities has led to a rift in historical memory, as has Harvey, who sees interest in heritage as a response to modernity, a desire to escape into mythical times of community and solidarity (Nora 1989, 1996; Harvey 1989: 202-04; Jameson 1991: 1-6). Heritage could hence be regarded as an outcome of the unease created by shifting values. A sense of loss engendered by the forces of globalisation has rendered place identities less stable and communities more vulnerable to outside influence, and has thus created a need for stability that the heritage industry has seized upon.

The increased attention paid to protecting cultural heritage resources, and the rise in heritage tourism seem to have occurred alongside these broader changes. The heritage industry fills this perceived gap between past and present, and provides a sense of cultural and national belonging anchored to a notion of the historical past, no matter how contrived. Rather than making ideas of national identity seem superfluous, it seems that transnationalism and globalisation have created the opposite reaction; an increased need for roots and identity based around nation, regional and local particularity. Heritage is at the heart of this quest, and since the 1980s we have seen the rise of what is now referred to as the heritage "industry", where capitalism, tourism, and cultural identity merge with political and ideological agendas (Lowenthal 1998:xii- xiii; Urry 2002: 99; Dicks 2003: 119).

Berman has suggested that this search for some lost past is "a rejection of the rejection" of oldness that modernity entailed (Berman 1983:129). This suggestion in some ways run counter to most critiques of heritage, that usually suggest that the heritage industry is a facet of postmodernity, and symptomatic of the rupture in historical continuity that characterises contemporary society.
In this view, the heritage industry capitalises on oldness, and displays history that has been manipulated and manufactured for a particular purpose, often in tandem with state agents that have a vested interest in freezing history in manageable and malleable containers of "history". However, this leaves little agency to ordinary people and their interest in preserving historical environments as a way of maintaining links with the past, and living in an agreeable environment. I agree with Berman in the sense that heritage, and interest in preserving heritage, is often an outcome of, and reaction to, the streamlined urban landscape of modern society. However, it is also the case that heritage preservation often lends itself to political agendas and commercial purposes. Hence interest in heritage and preservation is not a one-sided, static process, but rather a dynamic field with a multitude of actors, interests, and motivations, from heartfelt citizen aspirations to protect urban and rural environments, to commercial projects where "oldness" and antiquity are just assets in the capitalist economy. Berman's notion of heritage as a rejection of modernity, or even postmodernity, leaves more agency to ordinary peoples, and their attachment to places and practices. Heritage is not just a state-driven project, but this rejection of modernity, and desire to protect the past, has merged with capitalist projects to create spaces for consumption based around heritage resources. This means there is a tension in ownership of local heritage; heritage is on the one hand a resource for attempts to represent communal history, whilst on the other, a resource for planners and entrepreneurs.

Hence, to me, cultural heritage preservation is an interesting field of contested visions on the past and its uses; of a desire to protect and preserve, of communal meaning and state ascribed official history, not to mention tourism and commodification. These interests blend together and are sometimes difficult to disentangle, and present us with issues of who owns a culture, and the right to represent it, and why we feel this need to cling to the past, no matter how contrived or commodified. The concept has come to include such diverse cultural and social activities as buildings, dance, dress and even dialects: in relation to the PRC, and in particular in relation to ethnic minorities, the label "heritage" has increasingly come to be tagged onto everything that is not mainstream Chinese society, from handicrafts, to accents, and food. This points to how the heritage concept is capable of hiding a multitude of stories and narratives of the past told in the present by everyone from policy-makers, museums, ethnic minorities, the
cultural and social elites, the working class, and everyone in between. The idea of heritage as something in need of salvaging, that heritage is by definition a way of preserving what in fact might be dying traditions, is not necessarily true. It is often the case that the heritage label creates new traditions, as well as salvages old ones by giving them a new meaning, sometimes as financial assets in the tourist economy.

Cultural heritage includes both the physical (tangible) remnants of the past (such as architecture and archaeological sites), as well as non-material (intangible) cultural expressions, such as dance, music, and ritual. By being designated as heritage, an object or practice is placed within an officially recognised realm that is either directly under the supervision of the nation-state, or at least carries strong links to officialdom. Cultural heritage designations are usually carried out by state agents, such as the Ministry of Culture, or local heritage bureaus. In some cases they are carried out by international bodies, such as UNESCO or the World Monuments Fund (WMF), listings that carry international prestige and are often the outcome of intense lobbying at national level. This means that most heritage sites and practices are approved, backed, and ultimately controlled, by the state. In this sense, cultural heritage is a politicised category. In order for something to be designated as heritage, it needs to be approved, to be chosen and elevated: it is important to remember that heritage designations are the outcome of a process of selection, whereby some sites or practices are deemed more worthy than others. This process is telling of current ideological concerns, and global trends, and could tell us something about the way nation-states wish to regard history and its place in the present. At the level of the nation-state, cultural heritage could ultimately be described as national representation. As James Hevia has put it: "Externally states vie for precious development resources and recognition (such as UNESCO listings), internally they police and discipline, invoking ‘multiculturalism’ and official religious tolerance to appease populations" (Hevia 2001: 222).

According to this view, heritage is a type of technology of rule, a container of both past and present that functions as a way of sanitising sites of political or counter-ideological connotations, whilst gaining credibility internationally. However, it also points to another key-function of heritage that becomes apparent in relation to how heritage sites work in practice, namely heritage as mediator for
ethnic and religious difference, a way of negotiating cultural belonging at local level. Despite this, the topic has yet to generate more widespread research. Much literature tends to deal with heritage studies from a management angle, or aims to give generalised explanations of the museum sector, or of heritage tourism. This literature often fails to link heritage to the wider political and social context. The roles and incentives of individual stakeholders are rarely made clear. It is also often focussed solely on Europe or America. There is a vast number of titles within the general “heritage” studies field, most of which are anthologies or concerned with management policy and are aimed at students who wish to manage or curate museum exhibitions, i.e., they are invariably linked to heritage as an industry, to tourism, leisure, and exhibitions, and share the assumption that heritage is charged with a positive value, as a way of restoring the past, conserving historical environments for future generations, and generating both cultural and financial capital at regional and local level.

There is rarely more than a brief mention of the extent to which heritage carries political weight in this collection of works, and in this sense they could be said to be as telling of much of contemporary heritage concerns (as an economic asset, as something to be “managed” and make a career out of) as the field itself.

As Harvey has put it: “it is through understanding the meaning and nature of what people tell each other about their past; about what they forget, remember, memorialise and/or fake, that heritage studies can engage with academic debates beyond the confines of present-centred cultural, leisure or tourism studies” (Harvey 2001:320). This, I would argue, is an important point that needs to be addressed. Cultural heritage, especially material heritage such as buildings, has emerged as a crucial component of image-making and soft power in the contemporary era and hence needs to be examined as a politically charged category that carries immense ideological weight, not least in nations like the PRC where the past remains a highly volatile issue that present policy-makers wish to control. Recently, the concern with space and planning as political categories has begun to take heritage into account as part of a process of gentrification and aestheticisation in (mainly) the city. Some examples include Herzfeld (1991), Ashworth et al (1992; 1996; 2000), Boniface and Fowler (1993), Kearns and Philo (1993), Urry (1995; 2001), Nora (1996), Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (1998), AlSayyad (2001), Dicks (2003), Czaplicka (2003; 2004), Siegenthaler
In this body of works, the general consensus is that heritage is a manipulated category that represents one specific aspect of the past whilst excluding many other, alternative representations, often as a result of market interest; presenting a simple narrative for purposes of tourism and place marketing. It is undoubtedly true that heritage has emerged as a resource for the postmodern, service-oriented economy that relies on place marketing, and "soft" industries such as the ever-expanding tourism sector. In rural areas, the built heritage has been pounced upon as a way of presenting an attractive façade and an air of historicity in a bid for tourism. Much of this current boom in heritage related concerns corresponds to the move away from economies reliant on industry and manufacturing. According to this explanatory model for what motivates the heritage industry, heritage is an aspect of neo-liberal attempts at commercialising cities and regions – little agency is left to ordinary citizens and their attempts to negotiate preservation. In fact, as shall be argued, this is often the case but also reduces and obscures more complex meanings behind cultural heritage preservation, and how it is interpreted at the local level. Viewed from this angle, many heritage projects of the type based around the built environment leave even less agency to "ordinary" residents. They are often seen as victims of authoritarian neo-liberal forces that bring about changes beyond their control.

I would argue that even if this is to some extent true, it is important to look beyond this rather reductive idea and see how the heritage container can be, and often is, deployed and negotiated by local populations and others with a vested interest in how the past is made use of in the present. To the state, especially in a place like the PRC, characterised by unprecedented social change and upheavals on a massive scale, heritage could be made to install a reassuring sense of historical stability and continuity, and present a notion of historical harmony and entity. As argued, heritage is often linked to a search for a sense of roots and authentic being in the modern world. In the PRC, this sense of loss, and search for some stable notion of the past, and of personal, as well as national, identity is

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27 I do not in any way deny or try to gloss over the reality of forced removals in the PRC which is undoubtedly a human rights issue that needs to be taken very seriously, but I do think that the reality of some of those cases might sometimes be more complex, and less a case of state versus individual than is described in many media reports. Sometimes protests at relocations are less to do with relocation per se, and more to do with poor financial compensation, being moved to substandard housing or loss of central location in places like Beijing. For some examples see Broudehoux (2004), Human Rights Watch (2004), Denison (2006).
perhaps more pertinent than in any other place on earth: the velocity with which China has been changing, in particular the urban landscape, has left many urban residents with what a sense of alienation, regardless of higher incomes and luxury consumption.\(^{28}\) This has led to both communal preservation efforts, support for historical preservation, as well as a market for heritage experiences, in particular of the kind this thesis deals with – escaping the city, and looking for the past in rural areas. This means that one important aspect of why and how heritage is being preserved and consumed in the PRC is the tourist industry. Heritage forms an historical backdrop; a sense of history being alive that binds us to a greater national narrative and hence give modern life a more meaningful structure: the sense of roots, of knowing where we came from. This means that most preservation schemes are aimed at giving historical remnants “a second life as exhibitions of themselves” (Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1998:7). In most cases, this means as displays for the tourist gaze.

Hence much of the most relevant literature on heritage preservation and the issues we are confronted with when researching heritage, are related to tourism, and heritage as a type of visual consumption. In relation to this thesis, the most important theoretical contributions are works on heritage tourism and its impact on communities, especially in relation to issues of local understandings of heritage and authenticity, and to what extent heritage preservation and the tourist economy is a field of dynamic interaction between different stakeholders (including local residents). At local level, cultural heritage preservation is bound up with creating local opportunites based around tourism, something that is even more pertinent in relation to rural areas in a province like Yunnan, where tourism has been touted as a development strategy since the late 1990s (Hillman 2003; Litzinger 2004: 488-89; Kolás 2008:11-14).

In China, tourism to heritage sites presents the Party-State with a means of presenting the nation and its past in a favourable light, as well as a resource for attracting international visitors, impressed by the richness of Chinese history and culture. This means that cultural tourism and preservation of heritage sites tend to

\(^{28}\) This assertion is of course difficult to prove: I base this on conversations with Chinese friends, and people I have encountered whilst doing research in the PRC, and on a general sense that more and more people support preservation rather than demolitions and new construction – all Chinese I have met have been fiercely proud of Chinese history and culture, and the state certainly likes to use the greatness of China in order to install patriotism: that this would not lead to a realisation that Chinese culture is threatened by rapid modernisation would be strange.
collapse into the same container of state-sanctioned sphere of ideology. But tourism, and the unavoidable exploitation of heritage resources that often occur as a result, can also present a threat to not just heritage resources, but also to local livelihoods as entrepreneurs move in and dictate the shape of tourism, and might also do irredeemable damage to the fabric of a village or neighbourhood. Hence tourism, heritage, and development are often at odds, and have conflicting aspirations, but ultimately, tourism is the one factor having the most influence on how and why heritage preservation occurs. Of course, tourism is not the only factor driving preservation, and it is important to place preservation in a wider picture of state-society relations, and to be aware of alternative local initiatives to preservation efforts, but as we shall see in relation to the case studies, tourism always figures as one of the driving motivations for efforts to maintain old buildings and village environments.

**ii. Tourism and heritage: commodification and authenticity.**

Tourism has emerged as one of the most important industries in the world, and affects the livelihoods of communities worldwide. Tourism has come to have a profound impact on both natural and cultural resources, and how they are considered by both national governments and local entrepreneurs. In relation to modern day heritage preservation, tourism often forms the most important incentive for preservation and conservation of historical sights and traditional customs. Robert E Wood has argued that "we need to understand tourism in order to understand fully the construction of ethnicity and culture in the contemporary world" (1997: 2). Tourism has led to a new usage of heritage resources, a marketisation of culture and history whereby heritage is taken advantage of for purposes of managing and constructing place identities. Cultural heritage resources are not just historical artifacts deemed worthy of preservation but have come to have a market value as part of the heritage industry (museums, city districts, monuments, theme-parks, and all the related professions, from local level administration and curators, to UNESCO). Heritage as an industry is intrinsically linked to tourism and place marketing, and tourism is often seen as salvaging historical environments by linking them to a new economy.
However, it is also true that tourism and commodification of heritage might sometimes ruin the heritage value, and lead to a flattening of history, or to a colonisation of space whereby original residents are forced to leave as rents rise or tourism makes normal life impossible. In contemporary societies, the PRC being no exception, tourism is often the main factor motivating heritage preservation, and it is certainly the case in Yunnan.

Tourism is also, like heritage, an ideological realm, an often state-backed industry that forms a model for citizen behaviour and moulds desires and aspirations. In this way, heritage tourism is a means of inducing state ideology and forming citizen identities; at least to the state. The later example of the Yuanmingyuan in Beijing will exemplify this.

To the tourists themselves, tourism and travelling are indicators of who we are, and what we aspire to, and a highly commercialised aspect of modern society where place marketing, image-making and state ideology compete for space in the construction of desirable tourist destinations. Travelling is about constructing identity; and about escaping reality, be it on the beach, or by looking for some notion of authenticity in exotic, faraway places. Tourism is about selling desire, and relies on constructing places saturated in tradition and perceived ideas of authenticity. Hence the heritage industry, and the explosion in heritage sites, cannot be separated from the tourism industry, and neither can we think of tourism as being all about leisure; a category to be taken lightly. Tourism is a global industry that affects the livelihoods, environments and everyday life of communities worldwide, and carries immense ideological weight in the construction of ethnicity and culture, not to mention ideas of the nation to a domestic audience.

The heritage industry is, as argued, based around nostalgia, a longing for authenticity and a search for national identity, a response to a sense of upheaval and rupture caused by modernity and globalisation. In a similar fashion, modern day tourism is in many ways about selling and presenting the local, of presenting the authentic and pristine, as a backdrop and alternative to the everyday experience of modernity, a way of escaping, but in doing so, also looking for ourselves and a sense of our own being. MacCannell has argued that "for moderns, reality and authenticity are thought to be elsewhere: in other historical periods and other cultures, in purer, simpler lifestyles" (MacCannell 1989:3).
Tourism and heritage hence share the same concern with authenticity, of presenting places untouched by modernity, a pristine and calming world that has yet to be turned into another shopping mall. It could be argued that the heritage industry is inseparable from the tourist industry. In a world characterised by increased global flows and competition, having a clearly defined place identity and cultural image is crucial. Heritage and tourism are linked partners in this quest, useful for purposes of image-making and presenting a national past to both domestic and global audiences. In the West, there has been a shift towards heritage sites that bring history to life, such as theme parks displaying the Viking Era (as Yorvik in York), or that emphasise the everyday by displaying history from below as represented by working class neighbourhoods, mines, and workshops. Kirschenblatt-Gimblett has argued that heritage can be a way of breathing new life into dying locations, such as mining communities and industrial towns (Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1998:7). In the UK, the heritage industry has breathed new life into northern towns where industrial museums and heritage sites often form the backbone of a new service-oriented economy. Dicks has argued that this functions as a way of making sense of ourselves and our own personal biographies, the idea that our "own personal biography is intertwined with broader social forces" (2003:126-127). However, most sites are of the frozen history version whereby a section of an urban area has been turned into a quaint replica of the 19th century or in the case of Kirschenblatt-Gimblett’s example, where a whole mining town in the US has been turned into a type of ghost town for tourism consumption, there for what Urry has labelled “the tourist gaze”, i.e. reconstructed to suit a preconceived notion of history that entertains more than it challenges (Urry 1990: 11; 2002: 99; Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1998: 6-9). Heritage tourism of this type has proved to be very popular. Hewison has argued that one could, in theory, get off at Heathrow and just step into a never-ending historical showcase (Hewison 1987: 44). Or to follow Lowenthal, it seems any facet of the past is up for grabs (Lowenthal 1985: 13; 1998: xii).

It is true that there are a number of other actors involved in heritage politics other than tourism and the state, but nation-states worldwide have strong interests vested in tourism, both directly, but also indirectly, as a way of attracting other types of investments. In this sense, nation-states have come to take increased interest in heritage resources; like Wood argues, tourism and the marketisation of
culture are crucial to how nation-states regard heritage resources, and to the importance placed on heritage and official recognition of heritage such as UNESCO listings (Wood 1997). I agree with Wood that tourism is undoubtedly always a component in national interest in heritage, and that understanding tourism is essential if we are to understand why and how heritage resources are taken advantage of at both national and local level. Tourism is one aspect of an increasingly transnational world: increased wealth means more people have the resources to travel, both at home and abroad. Early writings on tourism, where the tourist is white, middle class and Western are no longer valid, as many non-Western societies have experienced unprecedented new levels of wealth, and share the same desire to travel as their Western counterparts. However, some of the early writings on tourism are still relevant, like McCannell’s notion of modern tourists as pilgrims in search of authenticity, an authenticity that ultimately failed them as other cultures turned out to be less authentic than hoped for. Instead, being a tourist made them experience a double sense of alienation as they were confronted with what MacCannell labelled “staged authenticity”, displays for the tourist consumer (McCannell 1973:593-598). In these early writings, the tourist is limited to being a modern Western traveller, trying to alleviate the strain of modern life by going looking in a foreign culture. This is still true, but the traveller as a group has been widened to include a new Asian and African middle-class: in the case of the PRC it is often a domestic audience that goes looking for the exotic at home, especially in relation to heritage tourism, particularly in China’s Southwest. Later writings such as Urry’s idea of the tourist gaze follows the same tradition of differing between a (Western) middle class consumer and the ”locals”, with little space for interplay allowed (1990: 11; 2002: 99). However, Urry does leave space for a new awareness of how the tourist experience is not able to offer that illusive ”authentic” feeling, and how the tourists themselves are often savvy enough enough to know this from the start. To Urry, it is the gaze of the tourist that creates the destination, based around prior expectation, like the viewfinder in a camera where you zoom in on what you want to see. Modern day tourists are postmodern subjects that play with the illusion of the authentic and the historical, a touristic breakdown of the grand narrative of modernity in favour of Lyotard’s petit récit, the micronarratives of
postmodernity; or, rather than rejecting consumption and lack of authenticity, the modern tourist knowingly embraces the spectacle of tourism.

However, modern day tourism is arguably more complicated than the experience of the actual traveller, and has a direct bearing and impact on local communities and the livelihood of regions. Tourism involves a wide range of stakeholders, and the more recent literature reflects this. Here, consumers and producers are considered equally important, and the idea of local residents as lacking bargaining power has been rendered void by anthropologists with an interest in power and cultural change in touristic societies. In relation to this thesis, it is the communities and the people that reside in heritage site locations that are of interest, not the consumers, but of course, what is put on display, and how it is done, reflects the desires and needs of the modern tourist; such as historical village environments and "tradition". In this sense, tourism is an interplay between visitors and locals, and in the case of a poor region in China (or other similar regions, be it a Chiang Mai jungle village or a community in Bali or Kenya), an interplay between the (urban) centre and the (rural) periphery.

The increased importance of tourism means that there are socio-economic and environmental issues that needs to addressed in research on tourism. This is especially true in relation to who benefits - local populations are often not the ones to benefit the most from tourism. It is also true that commodification of local culture for tourism might ruin its value, both to the community and to the tourist. However, this need not always be true, and tourism might sometimes save dying traditions, and enhance pride in place, and local heritage.

The notion of tourism as ruining some perceived notion of the "authentic", and forever changing local culture from communally meaningful to just another commodity has changed radically from the early writings of Greenwood and Britton who saw tourism as a commodification of local culture, that ruins any "real" value. Britton has argued that tourism brings about an unequal relationship between developed and undeveloped parts of the world, a type of colonialism whereby transnational corporations and their financial interests in tourism makes undeveloped countries financially dependent on global capital interests, i.e., a way of inserting dependency theory into tourism studies (Britton 1982).

This might to some extent be true, but also obscures how tourism is linked to national politics, and local governments, and ignores the social and communal
dynamics at play at local and national level. Greenwood has argued how local culture loses its meaning as it is put on display for an outside audience, hence making culture into yet another commodity, packaged, priced and sold to the market (Greenwood 1977:135).

I would agree that mass tourism sometimes does ruin the meaning of local culture and turn cultural practices into commodities, but it is important to see the difference between outside display and communal meaning, and how outside influence and communal practice might converge and form a new meaning, adapted to a new setting. The idea that any living, local culture would be static is also questionable – most communities change, and have experienced some type of outside influence, be it trade, missionary activity, colonialism, or migration prior to modern day globalisation and tourism. Some of the more important writings on cultural change and tourism reflect this.

Erik Cohen’s influential writings on cultural change in Thailand highlights how commodification for tourism does not necessarily ruin the value of a tradition but infuses it with new meaning. It could, over time, come to be perceived of as "authentic" to an external audience, but, even more important, to the local community, commodification of local culture could "become a culturally significant self-representation before an external public. Moreover, the two kinds of meanings are not necessarily mutually exclusive but could be additive: new meanings may be added to old ones, which persevere into the new situation" (Cohen 2004:112). This conflict between heritage, tourism, commodification, and authenticity lies at the heart of this thesis and its concern with preservation practice. Hence the concept of authenticity and commodification needs some clarification.

MacCannell’s concept of "staged authenticity" as a surrogate for authentic communal practices, is still the starting point for discussions related to the interplay between market, community and outside visitors (MacCannell 1973). "Staged authenticity" refers to manufactured displays of local culture as a touristic attraction, especially in relation to rituals and practices that are made to appear "authentic", i.e., in situations where locals are made to play the role of "natives" or appear as props in ethnic and cultural manifestations that are staged displays for an outside audience. This in fact means that not only the locals, but also the tourists themselves, are left feeling cheated and with little respect left for
local culture (MacCannell 1973:597-602). Mass tourism has hence created a staged tourist space, or what Picard, in relation to Bali, has referred to as a "touristification of society", whereby the needs of tourism permeates the whole of society and irrevocably changes cultural meanings (Picard 2007:183). This is not a change wrought by outside forces, but is an interplay between various actors, where tourism and culture, inside and outside, become blurred – hence Picard points to how we should not ask what kind of impact tourism has had on local culture, but rather how it has contributed to the shaping of cultural practices. In this sense, ideas of authenticity and commodification are perhaps not the most useful, or relevant, concepts for describing the interplay between heritage and tourism, since they assume the existence of a static local culture there to be exploited and ruined. In fact, tourism is often the outcome of both local and outside initiative and in relation to heritage tourism, it often comes at a time when a culture is in decline, and hence ripe for salvaging as part of the heritage industry and the interconnected sphere of tourism.

Cohen has argued how the commoditisation of a culture enables local culture to survive when it might otherwise have perished; marketisation of a product or custom for tourism might breathe new life into practices that are in decline due to other outside forces, such as migration, new economies, or generational change. Here, the tourist market might provide new incentive for continuing traditional practice, and provide a new market: that cultural meanings would be lost, as argued by Greenwood (1977), is not necessarily the case. Cohen has demonstrated how Thai hill tribes have found both new audiences and new uses for local handicrafts, whilst Fabian has demonstrated how Congolese painting could serve as an alternative way of narrating history in the format of tourist art (Fabian 1997; Cohen 2000).

In relation to China, Schein has made the point that in Guizhou Miao-villages, a popular ethnic tourist destination, there is a distinct difference between rituals for inside and outside consumption, the one not necessarily ruining the value of the other. Tim Oakes has demonstrated how Dong-villagers (also in Guizhou) use tourism as a way of negotiating modernity and finding a new meaning and identity for local culture as part of the transition to a touristic culture. Ruan has shown how traditional architecture in the same Dong-villages has found a new meaning, and niche in the world due to outside interest, in this case due to a
combination of tourism and heritage credentials as made legitimate by academics and officials (Ruan 2000). Hence outside (tourism being the most important factor, but not the only one), and inside forces are equally important in reformulating tradition, and without that interplay, traditional culture might perish as it loses its value in the present, also to the local bearers of tradition. In this sense, tourism could be the saviour of cultural heritage, but it is also true that the two are sometimes difficult to reconcile and, especially in relation to the built environment, could lead to a colonisation of space and place. Tourism and capital gain are often deemed more important than the needs of local inhabitants, and preservation of the historical fabric of place is not always high on the agenda of tourist entrepreneurs as reconstructions, and new buildings in old style is cheaper than conserving old structures.

Commodification of heritage for tourism is arguably a more common motivation for heritage preservation than preservation for the sake of preserving and conserving buildings for their own sake, as historical artifacts that maintain links with the past and enhance local identity. As has been argued by Ashworth, Goodall, Tunbridge and Howard, commodification and tourism often means that historical preservation aims to produce a domesticated version of history that selects and discards what it sees fit (Ashworth/Goodall 1990, Ashworth/Tunbridge 1990; Ashworth 1994; Howard 2003). According to Ashworth and Tunbridge, commodification of, in this case, urban heritage, "reduces the complexity and richness of the urban heritage to a few simple, recognisable and marketable characteristics" (Ashworth/Tunbridge 1990:54).

However, Howard has also argued that heritage preservation is played out at different scales, one local, one national and another global (Howard 2003: 186-211). This argument is useful for understanding the discrepancy between inside and outside, and how outside forces (tourism) could both salvage but also reduce the meaning of heritage, and sometimes breathe new life into dying traditions. This argument is important as it reminds us of how the meaning of heritage preservation travels, and could carry different meanings depending on where and how you look. At global level, it is important to sell an idea of the cultural particularity of one site or location, as being of transnational interest, and, echoing UNESCO, a resource for all of mankind. At national level, it is more important to install a collective national imagery, whereby heritage sites work as
a way of reinforcing ideas of national belonging, not local particularity. At local level, heritage sites help people construct a sense of place and identity, something that works more from the inside than from the outside. This once again brings Picard and Bali to mind, as the Balinese themselves have used tourism to maintain a Balinese identity in an era of "Indonesianisation", although to the central state, tourism is a way to bring the Balinese and other ethnic groups closer to the state by emphasising the Indonesian nation, not ethnic difference (Picard 1993: 92; 1997: 206).

This is in fact similar to how the Chinese state regards ethnicity, tourism and heritage, which will be demonstrated in relation to the case studies, particularly in relation to the concluding one on Shuhe. This also means that the meaning of commodification shifts along with context and personal standing, and might, as Greenwood has argued, appear to ruin local culture, whereas to Cohen, it infuses it with a new type of meaning. In the eyes of an outside observer, it might appear that culture and tradition has gone to the market, like any commodity, but within the community it might have changed its meaning, and hence found a new life that suits the overall context of the marketisation of society at large. Cohen reminds us that it is important to look beyond the first appearance of wholesale marketisation, and be aware of how the producers of culture themselves might perceive of transformations induced by tourism. As he puts it, folk musicians might welcome the chance to perform and get paid. The fact that their music has been turned into a commodity to be consumed does not necessarily mean that they no longer enjoy playing – on the contrary, it means the musical tradition will survive and find a new audience (Cohen 2004: 112). This is true of traditional architecture as well: due to the interest in preservation for tourism and consumption, traditional buildings that otherwise would have been replaced by convenient and cheap tile, steel, and concrete will survive, even if sometimes in a modified, reconstructed shape. At local level, as will be demonstrated in relation to Yunnan and heritage preservation, tourism is a key incentive for heritage preservation, and is perceived of as offering financial opportunities in places where few other options exist. If not for tourism, most locations would probably care little for the preservation of old buildings. Interest in heritage from provincial level authorities in Yunnan is also linked to tourism and hopes for development. Tourism also offers a certain prestige as it links the village to a
wider network of national, and even global flows of people and capital, not to mention outside recognition. Income from tourism might also salvage heritage buildings and village environments from being modernised, as heritage tourism relies on the continued existence of historical and traditional village-or townscapes. However, tourism might also spell an end to the continuity of village life as outside investors arrive. In places where tourism has exceeded the carrying capacity of a small town or village, and where regular life patterns have been drastically changed by the needs of tourism, tourism might be a real threat to cultural heritage resources and local life. In cases such as these, the fabric of place that is made up by both tangible as well as intangible heritage resources, has been replaced by poor replicas, and locals often leave as everyday life is made difficult due to the strains of tourism and/or rents rise as entrepreneurs move in (Lijiang being a good example). Here, tourism might wreak irrevocable damage to material heritage resources as buildings have been changed in order to suit preconceived notions of traditional architecture, and cheap materials used in order to save time and money in order to reconstruct a vague idea of antiquity for the consumption of tourists. This issue, how to reconcile tourism and heritage site preservation in lived-in environments, is central to preservation of villages and minju in the PRC, and I will explore this topic more in depth in chapter two.

iii, The role of UNESCO and World Heritage

When discussing tourism as an intrinsic aspect of heritage, the impact of organisations such as UNESCO, and their role in driving preservation of heritage, needs to be taken into account. The legitimacy offered by UNESCO, and the conscious way the organisation has emphasised the importance of finding a balance between tourism and heritage preservation, has placed UNESCO at the heart of heritage tourism, especially in the developing world. UNESCO, the most important and well-established cultural body at international level, and hence an agent of power that surpasses that of national governments, has proffered a mark of distinction and legitimacy to many heritage sites by listing them as World Heritage. This mark has boosted incomes, turned poor and
peripheral places into well-known tourist sites, and has created a sense of both local and national pride whilst also providing national images for both domestic and international consumption in many places. UNESCO wields enormous power over national policy-making on heritage as nation-states vie for international recognition, funding and tourism revenue. This is certainly true in relation to the PRC, where international discourse and UNESCO guidelines on heritage has had a profound impact on heritage legislation.

In Yunnan, as already argued, UNESCO recognition has been of tremendous importance. The impact of ideas like “soft power” and cultural values as represented by UNESCO and its affiliated bodies like the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the International Centre for the study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural property (ICCROM), and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and other organisations such as the Global Heritage Fund (GHF), World Monuments Fund (WMF), Heritage Without Borders, and World Heritage Watch, can be discerned in how the Chinese state has come to place more importance on UNESCO listings and cultural heritage resources.\(^\text{30}\)

The World Heritage list published annually by UNESCO is of great importance to the individual sites, and to the countries and regions where they are located. They come attached with tremendous political significance and international prestige, and the promise of tourist revenue and investments. This has made governments aware of the power heritage carries, which has seen an increased exploitation of heritage resources in many places as state agents and entrepreneurs attempt to take advantage of various cultural traditions. In this sense, UNESCO has been driving tourism development, whilst also often being critical of mass tourism and being very vocal about the dangers of the exploitation of cultural and natural heritage, also in terms of how this can degrade the tourist value of a site.\(^\text{31}\) This has led to increased restraints on tourist

\(^{30}\) I will return to this in chapter 2.

\(^{31}\) Some examples of this is how the UNESCO have been issuing strong warnings about the Sanjiang area in Yunnan, where dam projects were planned. In relation to Lijiang, they have also expressed strong opinions on how the site has been managed, which has also been the case in Hoi An and Luang Prabang. The organisation sees tourism as a positive thing, a way of saving sites by generating revenue, but also as a threat if it exceeds the carrying capacity of a site, and erodes the "authenticity", a difficult concept employed by UNESCO to describe the fabric of place, the use of materials in buildings, as well as ritual and cultural performance (see for example UNESCO report on Luang Prabang 2004: 55).
development and to what extent a site is allowed to change. A listing not only comes with prestige, but also with responsibility to live up to UNESCO standards of preservation. This is where the contradiction between UNESCO's pledge to protect and local reality becomes most evident. In poor countries the resources to maintain and restore sites might be a financial burden, whilst mass tourism might be a financial asset, but also difficult to control. Revenue might go to outside investors whilst local populations experience a colonisation of private space, and in relation to material heritage such as buildings, heritage legislation might be an imposition and present an obstacle to modernisations.\(^{32}\)

As such, the organisation itself is caught in the contradiction between on the one hand, recognition and rescue of what (in the developing world especially) are often neglected sites of little apparent national value, and on the other, the danger of seeing sites turned into playgrounds for mass tourism, which often entails processes of gentrification that might see the eventual removal of the original inhabitants, due to outside impingement on local life and/or rising rents, in addition to processes of commodification of local culture, new constructions and cultural performances that have been modified for the tourist market that in some ways change the value and content of local culture, as discussed in the previous section.

This contradiction has given rise to concepts such as cultural tourism, eco-tourism and low-scale, sustainable tourism, concepts that are frequently used in relation to heritage sites. As will become clear, it could be argued that this realm has emerged as a political force in its own right, with the power to influence national policymaking and seep into political discourse, not least in relation to the "soft power" exercised in the sphere of cultural politics as a way of making China appear more attractive abroad, a phenomenon that has naturally affected central policy and discourse on cultural heritage and heritage legislation.

The UNESCO convention on protection of cultural heritage was declared in 1972, and is probably the single most important document on heritage legislation (UNESCO 1972). The 1972 convention was the outcome of a process that took its inception in the 1960s, as a result of the realisation that heritage protection had to have a global focus, with internationally agreed standards for protection and

\(^{32}\) One good example of this is Djenné in Mali, where UNESCO policy on building materials and modernisations have frustrated local residents (see Rowlands 2007; Joy 2007; 2011).
conservation of sites and monuments. To UNESCO, preservation of heritage is in the interest of the international community, and should transcend national concerns. The list of World Heritage, later expanded to include natural landscapes and intangible heritage such as ritual, cultural practices such as dance, and even dialects, is of enormous importance and central to UNESCO practice and to the power the organisation has come to have globally. It is a crucial technology of heritage worldwide, and a standard for national systems of listings and documentation of heritage. This means that UNESCO have set standards for preservation that have had an impact on legislation on heritage in most nation-states. Alongside other important, affiliated organisations such as ICOMOS, ICCROM, and IUCN, UNESCO have provided guidelines for how to preserve, and what preservation should mean to the international community. This has impacted on local national heritage bureaus, which often have direct links to the regional (or national) UNESCO office.

This is certainly the case in the PRC, where the State Administration for Cultural Heritage, or Guojia Wenwu Ju, (SACH) and the China UNESCO administration have strong links – at a visit to the UNESCO office in Beijing the secretary could inform me not only of the whereabouts of the member of UNESCO staff I was trying to find, but also of his equivalent at the SACH (they were both on a research trip to Gansu province).

The PRC ratified the World Heritage convention in 1985, and has since been an active UNESCO member state with UNESCO offices in Beijing. Since then the number of World Heritage Sites in the PRC have been growing annually, and in 2011 there were 41 sites in the PRC, out of which 8 were natural, and 4 mixed, with the remaining 29 being sites and monuments including old town environments such as Lijiang and Pingyao. The latest addition, in 2011, was Hangzhou West Lake cultural landscape. A telling sign of the importance of UNESCO listings in the PRC is the number of sites (52) nominated at national level that have been submitted to UNESCO and placed on the tentative list for consideration.\(^3\)

According to the UNESCO declaration, “world heritage” is considered to be heritage that is “of outstanding value to humanity” (UNESCO 1972).

\(^3\) For the complete list, see www.whc.unesco/en/statesparties.org.cn
This could be both cultural and natural heritage, and the categories of heritage are further divided into tangible and intangible heritage. The latter category was added as late as 2003, in an attempt to include cultural practices such as dance, social practices and customs, costume or handicrafts, as part of a general shift in UNESCO attitude and policy towards defining what a cultural heritage is and should be. Intangible heritage is not part of the official World Heritage List of sites, but is split in two parts, intangible heritage in need of urgent rescue, and a representative list of intangible heritage that is akin to the World Heritage List, and is based on what UNESCO previously referred to as "Masterpieces of mankind" (UNESCO 2003). In China, Kunqu opera and Guqin music has been added, along with Uyghur and Mongolian musical traditions, printing techniques and ethnic rituals.34

Starting in the 1990s, UNESCO policy has also been expanded to include heritage environments, especially in relation to the built environment, and heritage sites consisting of a number of buildings in unique environments as opposed to single monuments and individual buildings. This shift saw a crucial change in how heritage has since been regarded in many nation-states, and UNESCO listings of a number of small towns and villages in Asia has changed national attitudes to locations that were previously deemed to be backward and of little value.35 A UNESCO World Heritage listing is the outcome of a long-winded and complicated process that sometimes takes a long time, and involves a concerted effort on behalf of the individual country and region where the site is located. Listings are carried out by the World Heritage Committee, a special administration of the Cultural Heritage Division of UNESCO. It is the responsibility of nation-states to to identify and nominate candidates to the committee. Nominations should include a careful description, documentation and mapping of the "property", in addition to the justification for inclusion. This should also include schemes for how to manage the site, factors that could affect the management such as tourism and environmental issues and a careful

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34 For a complete list see www.unesco.org/culture/ich and go to China.
35 This very conscious shift in policy was confirmed by Heather Peters and Rik Ponne at the UNESCO Asia-Pacific head offices in Bangkok. They have both been very involved in the making and implementing of this policy, and are concerned with the side effects it has had on villages and towns in Asia, such as Luang Prabang and Lijiang. They both think that this shift in general is a good thing, as heritage protection policy needs to embrace wider environments and practices, but were troubled by how to reconcile preservation with the ensuing tourism industry and the quality of life of locals. Personal interview, Bangkok, Feb 2008.
preservation plan for the future. Hence UNESCO does not nominate sites and do not involve themselves in the preservation of sites that have not been submitted – however, as most countries have individual UNESCO offices with links to national heritage bureaus, this obviously means that these nominations are done with the approval of national UNESCO staff, and follow national policy on heritage and heritage preservation. Hence, in the PRC, nominations have to pass through the national UNESCO office, which also means SACH approval. Hence the state carries enormous power over how to represent China, and in making judgements on what national heritage is, and how to present it to the world. Conversely, the value placed on UNESCO approval in the PRC also means the organisation has had a strong influence over national policy and legislation on heritage.36 One example of this is the interest in village – and small town preservation.

The earliest Asian “ancient” villages and small towns to attain UNESCO approval were Luang Prabang in Lao PDR and the villages in Shirakawa-go and Gokayama in Japan (all in 1995), followed by sites like Hoi An in Vietnam (1999), Lijiang and Pingyao (1997), and Xidi and Hongcun (2000) in China. In 2008, Georgetown and Melaka in Malaysia were both awarded World Heritage status.37 These sites have all been tremendously successful as tourist destinations, both domestically and internationally, and have added a new allure to the World Heritage site concept, from isolated monuments and buildings to whole environments of traditional and pretty small towns and villages, replete with atmospheric guesthouses, restaurants and photo-ops. In fact, small town environments and traditional architecture are made for modern day cultural heritage tourism, and places a new responsibility on sites as tourism development is harder to control than in relation to an isolated site.

UNESCO has attempted to solve this by setting up guidelines and policies that aim to alleviate the impact of tourism and help maintain local decision-making power, as well as keeping profits within the community.38 The Hoi An passport scheme was introduced in Hoi An, Viet Nam and has since been a model for

36 For more on this see chapter 2 on legislation.
37 UNESCO World Heritage List (www.unesco.org/en/list)
38 See the UNESCO guidelines Hoi An protocols for best conservation practice in Asia, a document containing guidelines for town preservation modelled on the so-called Nara model for heritage and authenticity in an Asian context (UNESCO 2000).
developing heritage resources and tourism to be beneficial to locals and for helping preserve unique buildings and the life-styles associated with them.

In Hoi An, there is no admission charge. Visitors are free to browse and shopkeepers can make a profit from the occasional coffee or lunch. If you wish to enter any of the actual buildings, museums or other locations of heritage value in the village you have to pay admission, which you do at a little kiosk, and then you are free to enter the various sites. All profits go back to a fund for the preservation of Hoi An, where house owners can get interest-free loans for necessary maintenance or small business ventures. Outside entrepreneurs are not allowed to buy or lease houses, and the profits raised are used to carry out maintenance. Staff at the heritage bureau in Hoi An, in tandem with UNESCO experts trained to help carry out repairs according to traditional building practices, are supposed to carry this responsibility. A Japanese government development scheme, and involvement from Japanese architects has further helped Hoi An preserve its heritage structures (many of the textile workers in Hoi An were of Japanese descent, which further illustrates the nationalist agenda often involved in heritage politics).

This has meant that Hoi An, despite being a popular tourist destination, has maintained much of its original layout and appeal, and that outside interference has remained minimal. It has also meant that many locals have been able to stay in the small town and that many handicrafts and other livelihoods have remained (UNESCO 2000b; 2008). This is not the case in many other places however. In relation to Laos for instance, UNESCO has voiced concern that Luang Prabang is in the process of being turned into a gentrified town where outside investments are slowly forcing the original residents to the outskirts of town as rents are rising due to outside demand and business enterprises.

This has led to a slow erosion of Luang Prabang's unique material heritage and character. One example of this is the daily ritual of young monks collecting alms that has been turned into something of a show for tourists with endless camera snapping, tourists following the monks with handy cams, and film teams setting up camp along the streets. In a paper on the development of Luang Prabang UNESCO heritage experts have pointed to recent developments in the town as the

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39 Interview, Heather Peters Bangkok. For more on Hoi An, see UNESCO (2000b; 2008).
beginnings of a slow process of inevitable erosion of the heritage and identity of the town (UNESCO 2004). This dilemma is very evident in relation to many heritage environments in the PRC, one of the clearest examples being Lijiang, as mentioned in the introductory chapter: this process is a reoccurring problem in other heritage sites of more national character in the PRC, as we shall see.

iv, Heritage and memory

Heritage preservation is a category that carries strong emotional attachments, as buildings, artifacts and customs are part of a social and communal web of memory and belonging. However, official, state-sponsored heritage preservation often comes with national interests at stake, be it ideology or capital gain. Hence heritage has a dual function, as container for both communal and national memory. This points to how heritage preservation needs to be understood in relation to both communal memory and state ideology. Heritage sites could potentially be saturated with alternative memories, which makes heritage preservation into a potentially volatile sphere where historical meanings could be negotiated and contested by different groups. State inscribed meanings are not always static and closed to alternative interpretations, but it is true that the state and its agents, as well as organisations such as UNESCO, wield enormous power over how material and immaterial heritage is presented and conserved. Official heritage narratives often blot out alternative meanings. The heritage industry, and the interconnected realm of tourism, thrives on producing sites that are easily understood and consumed, and hence leave little space for uncomfortable alternatives and more complex histories. As the heritage industry often comes with strong links to the state, it is a feature of present day state ideology and official national history; in this sense, heritage provides a useful educational model for how to consider history and the nation state, whilst containing historical memory within a state-controlled realm. Hence official heritage sites are part of a technology of power over memory and commemoration, a strategy for memorialising, to use Rowland and de Jong’s

40 For more on this see the 2004 UNESCO report on Luang Prabang (UNESCO 2004, especially pp. 61-72 on the impact of tourism).
phrase, even if this could potentially be open for negotiation and alternative readings (Rowland/de Jong 2007: 13).

Hence heritage and memory are bound up; by studying official heritage we can also unravel issues of how the state considers memory, what memories are allowed to emerge, and what memories remain repressed and glossed over in national commemoration. Some of the most important works on memory include those of Halbwachs, Connerton, and Nora. Halbwachs early work places memory within a social setting of kinship, family, community, i.e., memory only exists within this intricate web of social relations, and is the outcome of a collective reworking of the past (1952: 287). Hence memory cannot be detached from its social setting; each individual is linked to a wider, shared web of memory. To Halbwachs, living history is a process of remembrance that he calls collective memory. Paul Connerton followed this and claimed that it is within the realm of communal ritual performances that we can locate what he labels social memory (1989: 6-40). To Connerton, memory is a highly charged category, and argues that "the control of a society’s memory largely conditions the hierarchy of power" (1989: 1). Hence social memory as based around communal reenactments and evocations of the past could serve as a challenge to state hegemony and established hierarchies. Others have followed this and explored how communal and social memory within communities, or certain groups, could be a type of resistance to elite agendas, authoritarian states, and local power holders. Some examples include Zonabend on memories of la résistance in a French village (Zonabend 1984), Herzfeld’s account of heritage preservation in a Cretan village (Herzfeld 1991), James C Scott’s work on peasant resistance (1985; 1991), Rubie S Watson on commemoration (1994:65-87), Katherine Verdery on Romania (1991), and Joanne Rappaport on popular culture and memory in a Latin American Andes community (1990). Here, it becomes clear how popular memory, and alternative commemorations, can co-exist alongside official state history, but also how popular memory interacts with, and is a response to, state sponsored top-down projects that have been imposed on, and profoundly affected local communities.

Hence communal memory and state visions of history are closely interlinked: in fact, communal memory tells a story of the state, and its projects as remembered within the community.
In Erik Mueggler’s account of social memory in Yunnanese village, we can clearly detect the hands of the state. According to Mueggler, the state is a “spectral presence” whose actions informs how the past is remembered. To Mueggler, the state is an aspect of the social imaginary whereby people’s stories of the state has produced ”an alternative mode of history”, but a history that reflects and engages with the state and its technologies for rule, in this case, one in which the state has managed to impose a vision of itself on its subjects, as an imagined entity (Mueggler 2001:1-9). This points to how popular memory and official history are often two sides of the same coin: what is being remembered is a response to national historical events, events that might sometimes be glossed over, or remodelled in order to suit present needs, but that carry different meanings, and are remembered, and commemorated, in alternative ways within local communities. In Mueggler’s account, the story is one about a state that is invisible, but whose actions have had devastating implications. In this account, memories of the recent past are very much a lived reality that haunts the present, and reform-era revival of tradition and ritual are used in order to deal with state inflicted loss and violence. Similarly, Lambek (writing on Madagascar) has pointed to how the past is something more than ”remembered” but rather a presence, something that acts like a burden on the present (Lambek 2002).

Similarly, Samuel has argued that memory is an active, dynamic force that is being constantly reshaped from generation to generation, conditioned by official heritage and discourse on the past. The contrived nature of heritage as defined by the meanings given to objects is an active part of the process of remembering and forgetting at particular historical junctures (Samuel 1994:10).

Hence memory and representation, official history and communal commemoration, are interlinked and correspond to each other, and to claim that one version would be more authentic than the other would be to miss the point: memory, like heritage, is representation and is constantly remoulded by present needs and aspirations, and, like Connerton argued, cannot be separated from the communal and social settings of time and place. This makes notions of popular memory as separate from official memory, and memory as a category for alternative versions of history difficult: memory is conditioned by its social and political context, and has always been an alternative mode for dealing with communal and local representation of history. Others have pointed to how
popular memory is in opposition to the realm of officialdom. Hence the continued existence of communal ritual and social memory as found in families, kinship groups, neighbourhoods and regions, points to how heritage and memory are not necessarily at odds. Rowlands puts it thus: "personal and collective memory pervades the public sphere" (Rowlands/de Jong 2007: 15). In relation to heritage projects, Rowlands and de Jong have argued that memory "attaches itself to heritage in often unexpected ways" (Rowlands/de Jong 2007: 13). According to this view, heritage and memory both share common roots in conflict and loss, and a search for roots and identity. Official memory spawns collective, popular memory rather than eclipse it by reworking how collective memory functions, and the form it takes.

v, Sites of memory and sites of history: social and historical memory. The case of the Yuanmingyuan.

In light of the dual functions of many heritage sites, how they are simultaneously both lived-in spaces as well as markers of antiquity and national history, it is important to distinguish between notions of historical and social memory, and how these relate to heritage sites. The difference between historical and social memory is useful for illuminating the distinction between heritage and the everyday, the official, and the communal. Social memory could be said to denote a changing notion of the past anchored in the present, an ongoing rewriting of the official past that is constantly challenged by how the past is negotiated in the present. In this sense, social memory is part of the everyday lived experience where past and present merge and inform each other. As opposed to this, historical memory is a static idea of the past, and usually a product of elite- and state manipulation and sanitisation, and hence linked to official history writing; official ideological discourse on the past. Put in this way, heritage sites are the embodiments of elite notions of history.41

41 I follow Nora’s definition of historical versus communal memory that has also been taken up by Herzfeld (1991). Mueggler (2000) has demonstrated the difference between official, state history (historical memory) and social, communal memory by demonstrating how communal memory can be a physical embodiment that runs counter to the official narrative on local history in a Yunnanese minority village. Zonabend (1984) has likewise demonstrated how memory is embodied within the community by demonstrating how memories of la résistance colours life in a French village at different levels (home, work, school etc), following the influential works of
Pierre Nora’s work on French history has addressed the realm of heritage and memory, and how official national history (national heritage) differs from communal memory as embodied within communities. To him, heritage is a national project where the creation of what he labels *lieux de mémoire*, or memory sites, are products of the modern nation-state and its rupture with the rural, intimate communities that once were sites for *milieux de mémoire*, or memory settings; an intricate web of communal memory that was maintained through ritual, custom and established everyday practices.

Hence *lieux de mémoire* are state sponsored sites, such as monuments, and other heritage sites that fill the purpose of establishing national identity based around national historical memory, as opposed to local and regional identity. Nora’s work is central to understanding heritage technologies and monumentalisation within the setting of the nation-state, and how nations need to establish sites for commemoration in order to maintain power over popular remembrance. (Nora 1989, 1996; Carrier 2000: 37-57; Radstone 2000; I Huysen 1995). Nora’s distinction between memory sites and memory settings, the monument and the everyday, is also important in order to understand how social and communal memory can challenge political hierarchies; how a heritage site could be a national *lieux de mémoire*, whilst simultaneously being a site charged with communal meaning. This could also be described as the difference between social and historical memory; state sanctioned, official historical memory, and popular, communally anchored memory. In this view, the way memory used to function, as something habitual and natural, is opposed to officially sponsored memory.

In Nora’s view, memory is everything that heritage is not. Heritage is sanitised, fabricated, and official. Memory is a changing, dynamic, and fluid category with the potential of being subversive and hence challenge state-sponsored, official heritage (Nora 1989; 1996). According to Nora, the surge in archives, heritage sites and the like, such as efforts to sanction and make official a particular version of the past by archiving, compiling official standardised text books, and erecting monuments of commemoration, could be explained as a result of the loss

Connerton (1989) and Halbwachs (1992) who demonstrated how memory is charged with meaning within communities and communal ritual, contrary to notions of static state sponsored official history. Jing Jun (1996) has applied this to a Chinese village where communal, social memory is a narrative, a type of myth that affects the community in the present era, similar to Zonabend’s story.
of intimate memory as physically embodied in place due to processes of
globalisation, and the end of small communities. A sense of rupture with the past
has led to a rift in memory, as the very settings for memory (i.e. identity as based
around place and familiarity) has been ripped to shreds. However, he argues that:
"But that rift has stirred memory sufficiently to raise the question of its
embodiment: there are sites, lieux de mémoire, in which a residual sense of
continuity remains. Lieux de mémoire exist because there are no longer any
milieux de mémoire, settings in which memory is a real part of everyday
experience". (Nora 1996: 1).

According to this view, heritage sites are replacements for what have been lost
due to forces of urbanisation, industrialisation and globalisation. The lieux de
mémoire that used to exist in the memories of those inhabiting a place, are slowly
being replaced by official memory based on a residue of what was once there.
Since the fabric of the communal setting (milieux de mémoire) has been ripped
apart by outside forces and societal changes, these new memory sites have little
in common with living memory and have been reduced to pale replicas, frozen in
time, and carriers of an officially sanctioned version of what once made up
communal historical and the social fabric. In this sense, Nora’s definition of
history could be taken to denote a heritage site, if heritage site is taken to mean an
incomplete representation of the past, or what could be labelled a
monumentalised site, following Herzfeld (Herzfeld 1991: 9-10; 58).

One good example of this process is the case of the Yuanmingyuan, the Old
Summer Palace, in Beijing. The debate on how to best reconstruct the
Yuanmingyuan has been ongoing since the late 1990s when plans to restore it
were first approved after intense lobbying from academics, concerned that the site
would be turned into a theme-park for leisure. The gardens, looted by French and
British soldiers in the wake of the second Opium War in 1860, were neglected
and left in ruins during the revolutionary era. During this time, a number of
families moved into the grounds, and others living in the area grew used to going
for strolls in what remained of the former grandeur, surrounded by evocative
ruins that served as reminders of Chinese suffering under foreign aggression and
colonialism. The ruins were instructive enough to form a suitable educational
experience for generations of young Beijingers who were taken to the
Yuanmingyuan for school trips in order to learn about China’s past splendour and
the later injustice suffered at the hands of Europeans. However, in the late 1990s, the gardens were in the process of being turned into a playground with rides for children and vendors of soft drinks and snacks, as young families started coming to the site for a nice day out. During this time a development company bought the rights to open up the gardens as a tourist venture, based around a complete reconstruction of the former Imperial era splendour. This sparked a fierce debate between intellectuals who wished to see the gardens preserved as they were, as the ruins in themselves were felt to be far more evocative than any "gaudy" reconstruction could possible hope to achieve. The most interesting thing about this debate is how both groups saw the gardens as frozen in the past: to both parties it is a site linked to a point in history, either to when it was ruined, or to the grand era prior to that. Both of these reconstructions of history, evocative and suited to present Chinese concerns with a glorious past and great traditions, but also as a reminder of how foreign aggression ruined and put an end to Chinese glory, gloss over the more recent history of the Yuanmingyuan and its present identity as the home of about 615 households, a middle-school, a factory, and other small businesses (Broudehoux 2004: 74). The people residing in the grounds were evicted as the development company moved in to create a heritage site based on a selected aspect of the garden's historical identity with a two-fold political and commercial purpose. The garden's socialist past as a space for living and working, and its reform-era identity as low-key leisure ground and residential area (there was even an artistic community residing in the grounds in the 1980s and 1990s) is of very little interest, a process that mirrors how heritage sites in the PRC are considered and made use of; as leisure sites or as evocative reminders of the distant past (be it glorious or full of suffering). Nowhere is the history of the more recent past of particular interest, unless as sites for commemorating CCP-Party history (such as red tourism to revolutionary sites like Yan'an or the birthplace of Mao Zedong, or Deng Xiaoping's reconstructed mansion in Sichuan).

42 For more on this debate see special issue of China Heritage Quarterly (2006), Broudehoux (2004), Lee (2008).
43 There was a certain amount of outrage being levelled at the way the Yuanmingyuan had changed during the socialist era when plans to recreate and reconstruct the site were first broached in the 1990s (Broudehoux 2004). Many academics and other members of the intellectual elites complained about the gaudiness of the leisure park that had been opened as part of the site and others, like one Beijing Evening News reporter were deeply disturbed by how "motley groups of
In this story, the reasons behind the reconstruction of a site that will serve the purpose of being both a commercial venture (i.e. for tourism), and a site that will manufacture a past with strong political overtones, are very clear. The Yuanmingyuan suits the demands and interests of Chinese heritage policy makers perfectly. But in this process, the everyday is granted no space, and history is embodied in a physical site of memory (*lieu de mémoire*), and thus washed clean of any embarrassing reminders of the more recent past as represented by the present inhabitants and the contemporary function of this site as a place for living and working. It is a site of manufactured history based on the residue of a memory, but washed clean of any embarrassing, lingering memories of the present that could present difficult challenges to the official narrative of the Yuanmingyuan and its place in Chinese history. It is also a commodified site for leisure, tourism and consumption, making it into a good example of the functions of heritage in contemporary China. The Yuanmingyuan of today is of course also something of a *milieu de mémoire* that has been ripped to shreds, but the communal memory represented by the small community of households is not the story the Chinese Party-State wish to commemorate.

vi. *The heritage site as heterotopia*

Instead, the Yuanmingyuan could be described as a heterotopia, Michel Foucault’s concept of a place with the power of “juxtaposing in a single real place different spaces and locations that are incompatible with each other” (Foucault 1997: 352). The heterotopia, to Foucault, is a counter-arrangement of society, a description of the spaces that are somewhat different and outside the reality of everyday society. Here, all the physically real things and phenomena in society are represented but “challenged and over-turned” (ibid: 352).

The idea of the heterotopia is a utopia realised in actual, localised space: a world that is a mirror image of real society (the theatre, a garden, a museum), but one that can only be entered by understanding the conditions for doing so.

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peasant and migrant families have converged. ... All I saw was piles and piles of trash, fly-and mosquito infested ditches... squeezed among these were pigsties... no one with the slightest knowledge of Yuanmingyuan’s history could stand amid such things and hold back their tears. Where were the world-renowned royal gardens? Where were the famed creations of the ingenious Chinese people?” (Wang 1990: 800; 815, quoted in Lee 2008).
In this sense the heterotopia exists outside of real society, in a way reminiscent of how the heritage site as a lieu de mémoire works, a site that has been inscribed with meaning that in a sense represents the real, or a version thereof, but that falls outside the normal arrangements of society. The heterotopia is a representational space that is forged on conditions different from the ordinary relations and arrangements found in official space, but still a mirror image of these relations. In this sense, heritage sites could be described as heterotopias, spaces forged outside the normal arrangements of the everyday, but still a reflection of reality: in a heritage site, things that would normally be irreconcilable can co-exist without seeming contradictions, and those visiting a heritage site, such as a heritage village, participate in this illusory play with reality, in the same way one does when going to see a play. For instance, entering a tourist site or a theme-park is done with the implicit understanding that one enters a world disconnected from present temporality, but that is still attached to the real in its very mimicry of society itself.

One example of this would be the heritage of colonialism in the PRC. Here, the concept of heterotopia could be a way of reading the contemporary usage of China’s foreign concessions. Maurizio Marinelli has argued that they are places of all places, perfect replicas of worlds, an idealised universe, or, in Foucault’s phrasing "not so much a world of illusion but of compensation" (Foucault 1997: 356, also Adams 1996; Lee 2008; Marinelli 2007; 2009). The same could be said of how the grand colonial houses in Shanghai have been bought by developers and the moneyed elite and restored to their former glory in an evocation of a world of illusory value that links Shanghai to selected aspects of its international, glamorous past: these neighbourhoods could be described as places set apart from their everyday settings, but connected to the contemporary project of imagining Shanghai as a city with claims to a wider, global significance. In this process of urban aestheticisation, familiar from many other places, the communal and social memories of socialism are replaced by sites that commemorate the colonial era by making it part of contemporary Shanghai’s bid to international importance, whilst also pandering to tourism and the modern leisure class in search of trendy cafes and art galleries.44

44 For more on this argument, and gentrification processes in Shanghai, see Fan (2000), Pan (2005), Zhang (2005).
In this sense, the heritage of colonialism has been made into an idea of a perfectly ordered society where all things exist at once: jazz age history, trendy Japanese fashion labels, and American coffee shops, whilst still being China. It is an alternative social order that lies outside of society as such, but is still a part of it: a type of spatial contradiction that suspends and neutralises the relationships mirrored and reflected within the enclosed, bounded space of the reconstructed historical neighbourhood, relationships that would normally be contradictory or irreconcilable.

Following this, heritage sites could be described as spatial metaphors for present day social-and political concerns. The idea of the heterotopia, of a perfectly ordered space that neutralises contradictions, is useful for describing how sites like the Yuanmingyuan are used by the state. They are both real and imagined, both part of the everyday whilst remaining apart from the normal arrangements of society. Hence they serve the purpose of neutralising social tension, and levelling ethnic and social difference: they could be read as spatial metaphors for the state project to harmonise, and include. Seeing heritage sites as heterotopias is a possible way of describing the differing stories and aspirations that can be ensconced under the heritage label and made to appear reconcilable and harmonious: enclaves of an imagined China that are both real and unreal at the same time where minorities, religions, and customs rub shoulders with capitalism, imperial history, and even selected aspects of socialism such as Mao memorabilia or kitschy references to the Long March (Hevia 2001: 221).

Within this project of sanitisation and commodification, peasants, ordinary urban dwellers and minorities are allowed place as backdrop, as actors in the reconstruction of heritage sites, but their everyday life is considered to be of little or no general interest. They serve as backdrop to the modern nation, the yardsticks against which to measure progress and modernity. And if, as in the case of the present residents of the Yuanmingyuan, they happen to be reminders of a not too distant past they are denied place and space in which to tell their story and thus, in a sense, denied the right to official recognition of their historical experience and memory, narratives that could potentially disrupt the harmonious, state approved depiction of official history sites. The very presence of individuals or groups with the power to challenge officially sanctioned history by presenting an alternative past is seen as undesirable; perhaps even a threat to
the idea of national historical stability and the image of present prosperity the Chinese state wish to portray. Those with the power to challenge the picture of timelessness, stability, and historical greatness inherent to the very idea of many heritage sites are often unwanted elements as they disturb and disrupt the timeless, bounded quality of the heritage site.

Many heritage sites, especially of the reconstructed historical neighbourhood or village variety, fall into this category, and share many features with the debate concerning the Yuanmingyuan. Heritage could in many ways be described as a subtle means of embodying a hegemonic discourse that excludes large parts of what constitutes historical memory and counter-narratives of the past, in many ways similar to Foucault’s idea of imagined space as an idealised mirror image of society. This issue will be explored in relation to my concluding case study on Shuhe, a site that could be described as a heterotopia, an embodiment of all things co-existing in the same place; a place where social - and spatial contradictions are made to co-exist as metaphors for state concern with harmony and inclusion.

However, this does not mean that this process will always succeed, nor that it is always useful for describing the practical functions of heritage sites, as sites for tourism, leisure, and everyday life, practices that in themselves create a flow of people that will disturb the ideological meaning of many sites. It is indeed the case that the vision behind many heritage sites could be described as attempts to construct heterotopias, but the imagined timelessness of a site is often ripped to shreds by the flow of people and real life that disturbs the image the site is supposed to represent. This is similar to how the Yuanmingyuan is not just a patriotic heritage site of educational value, but also a site for families of all sorts, not always paying heed to the ascribed meaning of the Yuanmingyuan.

To most people, the Yuanmingyuan is a site for leisure, and to some it is a lived-in space with a modern history that jars with the official history of the park as site for Imperial grandeur and/or Chinese suffering and foreign aggression. This is true of most sites covered in this project, where everyday life disturbs the illusion of "heritage". We might also miss some of the dynamics inherent in heritage sites of the Yuanmingyuan variety and their present meaning in an era where tourism and leisure have emerged as crucial components of many people’s hopes for a livelihood, and other people’s pure unadulterated pleasure in sightseeing and having a good time, by falling prey to reductive theories that are inherent
critiques of leisure and tourism by describing these sites as sites state-sponsored sites inscribe with ideology, or sites of Disneyfication with no "real" meaning. Everyday life, and the very ritual of tourism itself can sometimes disrupt the ideological underpinnings of a site, and create new meaning.45

However, this is rarely done with intent. As Haiyan Lee has put it: “Whilst there is no doubt that the official narrative tells a reductive story, it is a stretch to claim that the official memory is contested by visitors just because they pay scant heed to the message bearing plaques and instead take sentimental pleasure in the poetic aura of the ruins” (Lee 2008: 29). This remark does point to how everyday acts, and public behaviour does undermine patriotic, state ascribed meanings, but also that this is rarely intentional. Most people in the PRC visit heritage sites and historical villages for leisure, as an escape from the city, and in search of the exotic at home, be it minority villages or scenic villages in beautiful countryside settings. Hence we have a subtle interplay between state ideology on preservation and heritage sites of patriotic meaning, local residents and their concerns, memories, and right to place, as well as the incoming tourists who rarely consider the ideological or educational content of heritage sites. This, the ability of ordinary residents to challenge and contest top-down projects becomes evident in relation to spatial practices and planning.

vii, Issues of space and planning: a theoretical approach

In order to understand how heritage preservation is often linked to state ideology as examplified by the dual functions of the Yuanmingyuan, we need to consider the political and ideological impact of space, place, and planning. Writers like Foucault, Lefebvre, and Jameson have all, in different ways, criticised spatial politics and the power exercised by the state and its agents in relation to planning and controlling the content of space and place.

45 One example of how tourism manages to undercut the political message inherent to a site like the Yuanmingyuan can be found in this lament by a journalist: “How can we harmonise patriotic education with the need for recreation and relaxation? How can we make visitors remember that this is the former Yuanmingyuan when they are rowing a boat on the lake or gazing at the flowers on the shore?” (Wang 1999:765 quoted in Lee 2009:9). Perhaps in this sense, tourism and commercialism have managed to create a public realm of a certain freedom in its own right where the political messages and patriotic symbols many tourist sites in the PRC are saturated with are rendered less effective and even ridiculous given the setting and state of mind of a relaxed family outing.
Here, space and place are powerful devices for governing and controlling the minds and imagination of the public (Foucault 1977, Jameson 1991, Lefebvre 1991). In Michel Foucault's writings on disciplinary forms of governance, the Panopticon, an imaginary construction for discipline and regulation from whose supervisory powers no one can hide, is regarded as a metaphor for modern society and its regulatory functions. To Foucault, the state and its organs for controlling and governing, such as social services, urban planning, prisons, and hospitals, are what he labels panoptic presences that infiltrate and govern the most intimate recesses of life by means of their power to mould our imagination and desires (Foucault 1977; 1980). In Foucault's view, planning, and the development of modern cities, are central components of what he labels bio-power, the ultimate state device for controlling movements and thoughts at the most intimate level. Hence, according to Foucault's concept of bio-power, city planning is crucial to the state. Modern city planning, with its reduction of the city to grid-like divisions, broad avenues, and open spaces has not only reduced the city, but also our movements within it, and thus our facility for individual creativity. Hence the state controls and limits personal freedom by means of a subtle type of spatial governance whereby the built environment is a technology of rule. Ultimately this "panoptic" society is governed by capitalism, as the city is a space for consumption and controlled by powerful elites (Foucault 1977: 195-228). Foucault's argument mirrors the writings of Henri Lefebvre who pioneered the way of seeing space (and place) as important concepts with the ability to influence society, politics and hence shift power relations (Lefebvre 1991).

Space, to Lefebvre, is not a passive container but a site of struggle that rather than being a static product of political – and social transformations, is in itself instrumental in producing those transformations, i.e., space is not just a factor of socio-economic conditions, but an active agent in shaping those conditions. Lefebvre saw space as a driving force behind the forces of capitalism and modernity, and demonstrated how space can have the power to affect communities and power relations.

46 The Panopticon, an architectural model constructed in a way as to make sure everyone within the building is under constant supervision, was originally devised by Jeremy Bentham as a way of controlling prisoners, and picked up by Foucault as an illustration of how society extorts power over individual citizens as a type of panoptic presence. (Bentham 1843, quoted by Foucault 1977:201).
In this view, space and place are both powerful factors affecting ideas of identity and cultural belonging. Planning and architecture hold the power to profoundly affect society, as extensions, and entrenchments of political discourse, and hence present the state with instruments to infiltrate society due to the all-embracing, ever-present qualities of the spatial. The surroundings and imagery of the everyday are in this sense ultimately manufactured by the state, not by everyday citizen actions, and could hence be seen as an extension of state policy and a profound factor in shaping the desires, ambitions, and imaginations of the citizenry. Lefebvre pointed to how space is produced according to present motivations and needs.

However, Lefebvre also differed between three different types of produced space, and their functions which leaves openings for negotiating space; to Lefebvre, the meanings of space and place varies with context. The first of these is referred to as "spatial practices", where the state has to a great extent circumscribed individual spatial actions by the division of place into zones and regions; the second is "representations of space", i.e. the forms of knowledge that organises and represents space such as planning; and the third is labelled "spaces of representation", the collective experience of space that informs social memory and has a communal function as counter-representation of state sponsored spatial actions. These spaces could be religious, mythical or hold other important local functions.

To Lefebvre, heritage preservation would fall into the category of "representations of space", i.e. the practice of planning, and state sponsored representations of space (Lefebvre 1991: 38-39). Here, the built environment is an instrument for spatial control and governance. In relation to heritage preservation it provides the state with an arena for projecting an image of the past and thus a narrative on the nation. It is also an instrument for harnessing local meanings, and hence control alternative stories of place identity as based around communal nodes such as temples or other locally important landmarks.

I would argue that this usage of cultural heritage is crucial to how and why the Chinese state has approached and embraced preservation of China's built monumental and vernacular heritage. However, there is another side to preservation efforts in the PRC that is community based and related to the realm of ritual and popular culture.
To Lefebvre, this realm is "spaces of representation" (Lefebvre 1991: 39), and runs counter to state ascribed meanings. Hence, to Lefebvre, space is not solely an area of state control, but could also be produced within the community, by ordinary citizens, and as a realm for social memory. Communal preservation and reconstruction of locally important buildings offers both an alternative representation of the past and of local heritage. Hence the spatial narrative offered by the state and its agents could potentially be challenged by communally produced space. This is especially true of neighbourhoods, villages, and sacred places with locally anchored meanings.

To illustrate this discrepancy between communally produced space, and representational space as produced by state agents, Michel de Certeau’s concept of everyday spatial practices as a challenge to state hegemony, is useful (de Certeau 1984; 1998). According to de Certeau’s concept of everyday life as a type of spatial practice, citizens hold the capacity to subvert elite projects simply by going about their daily business, according to long-established patterns of familiarity and custom. These patterns form a type of citizen strategy for resisting top-down regulation and supervision. No matter how unintentional and subtle these tactics might be, they still form a powerful counter-force that manages to undermine state attempts to control spatial practices, echoing how Lynch sees the city as a site for memory (Lynch 1972).47

To de Certeau, the city as a site for everyday life is a living, dynamic entity where people are agents of change rather than subjects defined by the state (as argued by Foucault). By studying the everyday habits of people in ordinary neighbourhoods, de Certeau has argued that it is the personal life strategies devised by ordinary people that define society and the city. By walking, shopping and talking, that is, engaging in everyday living, it is the people inhabiting space that creates it, not the other way around.

If following de Certeau, it becomes clear that any attempts to regulate and order the everyday by planning and administration often fails due to the resilience of everyday acts. In most heritage sites, everyday life continues unabated, and state ideology ascribed to a site (like the Yuanmingyuan) is often undermined by everyday public behaviour. If, in Foucault’s view, the management of society

47 See section on memory in this chapter for more on Lynch.
draws on the redistribution and control over space (from the individual to the state), then, to de Certeau it is the spatial practices that matter.

To him, spatial practices override and subvert the apparatuses that produce what Foucault thinks of as disciplinary space.

These spatial practices are separate from disciplinary power and are in fact, to de Certeau, what structures the determinant conditions of social life, or, as he puts it “the long poem of walking manipulates spatial organization” (de Certeau 1984: 101). In Foucault’s view, the state uses minor but flawless devices for controlling space and the everyday, “the panoptics of the every day” (Foucault 1977: 223). But according to de Certeau, this is never wholly successful. In his view, the system will at some point display its cracks, and open up “spielraum” (de Certeau 1984: 106). This “spielraum” is equal to, and dependent on “local authority”, i.e. the alternative power displayed by religious practice, ritual or custom (ibid). There will always be cracks in the system where the idea of an infallible, flawless mechanism displays its weaknesses and failure to control our most intimate practices and habits.

This crack in the system is to de Certeau what makes place habitable, a void that opens up space for life, which means habits and customs will inevitably re-emerge, despite attempts to control and regulate. In this sense, the state can never hope to wipe out unwanted practices and customs, which means that the grand project of modernity and its ideas of rationality and progress has constantly been challenged by popular religion, communal ritual, and tradition.

I would argue that this assertion is very true in relation to heritage preservation: As long as people remain to hold the fabric of place together by shared memories and customs, state ascribed meanings and visions of an imagined past are always contested. This is where processes of wholesale gentrification and ensuing relocation differ from lived-in village environments. If and when residents remain, so does the web of memory that makes up place identity.

However, it is of course true that in many cases, especially when heritage sites become successful as tourist sites, residents are often forced out due to a combination of financial reasons and the rupture of the everyday; the colonisation of space and place that tourism and commodification of heritage inevitably brings.
This chapter has presented a number of alternative ways of seeing cultural heritage, and outlined the main theoretical implications and ideas that relate to heritage studies, the most important being the interplay between tourism and heritage preservation, and actors such as UNESCO and state agents.

The idea that tourism and heritage are at odds, and that tourism ruin the "authenticity" of heritage needs to be challenged, as traditions and customs have never been static. Tourism could sometimes be a way for communities to redefine and find new meanings for local traditions. However, it is sometimes the case that both tourism as a source of income, and locally anchored traditions are wrestled away from communities by outside entrepreneurs. This is the biggest threat and challenge posed by tourism. It is also important to bear in mind the discrepancy between official and local memory in relation to heritage sites. Heritage is a category that is strongly linked to memory and commemoration; in fact, heritage is a type of commemoration, but one that carries strong links to the state and officialdom. However, these official memories are often bound up with communal and social memory as found in ritual and everyday acts of public behaviour, an intricate web of communal memory that is linked to sites of local significance. In this way, many heritage sites carry dual functions of being both official heritage sites as well as communally meaningful.

The example of the Yuanmingyuan illustrates the double functions of many heritage sites, and how official attempts at ascribing meaning to a site, of turning sites into heterotopia, a bounded enclave that serves to represent a mirror image of society, are challenged by real life. Here, tourism itself can disrupt and challenge the meaning of a site. This is also true in relation to planning and state attempts to regulate space, as people and their everyday acts challenge state regulation. However, the state still holds enormous power over how space is represented and imagined, not least in relation to heritage and tourist sites that could be described as realms for transmitting national ideology, akin to the Yuanmingyuan.

We shall now turn to how heritage has been growing in importance in the PRC, including a look at the institutional and legislative framework.
2. Cultural heritage in the PRC: the contemporary context of heritage politics

i. Introduction: Cultural heritage in China.

The current interest in heritage in the PRC is the outcome of the importance placed on international cultural recognition and is related to the marketing of China worldwide for purposes of tourism, business investments, and the value placed on general international acclaim. But even more so, cultural heritage is there for a domestic audience, for whom cultural heritage is a source of pride in being Chinese, and hence a source of patriotism. In China, good examples of world heritage that has taken on mythical meaning and representative power both to a foreign, as well as domestic, public would be the Great Wall, the panda (the Wolong panda reserve being one of China's more recent additions to the World Heritage list), the sacred mountains Emei and Huangshan and the many sites linked to the greatness of Imperial China, such as the Summer Palace or Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius.

At the national level, the same holds true of other, less renowned heritage sites, with national, or even localised meanings, as exemplified by the Yuanmingyuan in the previous chapter. In China, heritage as a politically useful asset is linked to the state project of "harmonising" (hexie), an attempt to stabilise the nation by emphasising inclusion of cultural difference and ethnic minorities. The national concern with patriotism, harmony, and inclusion can be clearly discerned in sites such as Shuhe in Yunnan, an example that will be explored in depth in the concluding chapter. This aligns perfectly with present Chinese political concerns, particularly domestically, and demonstrates how the content and meaning of heritage sites shifts with the audience; from educational and patriotic to culturally unifying and inclusive.

Heritage sites in the PRC represent a wide range of cultures: from the Potala to the Summer Palace. Hence they could be said to form an inclusive category that, to use Hevia's phrase, functions as a way to appease populations (Hevia 2001: 222). In relation to Yunnan, Lijiang in particular, this appeasement is also a way of mediating ethnic identity at local level, as we shall return to in the case study of Shuhe, in the last chapter. It is important to remember that official heritage
sites are managed, administered, and funded by the central state and its agents, and are hence ultimately state governed sites of cultural representation.

In China, heritage is a sign under which both the Imperial as well as the socialist party state can co-exist without obvious contradictions, and hence present a realm of national representation where both Imperial China and present ethnic diversity can mix with commercialism and market forces. It is both patriotic, exotic, and capitalist whilst, at least superficially, encourages cultural expression and heterogeneity.

But interest in cultural heritage in the PRC is linked to a wider range of socio-economic factors than ideology, international acclaim, and patriotism. It also needs to be placed in the context of other social and political changes that have occurred throughout the reform-era, the most important being the growth of the domestic tourist industry. The emphasis on heritage as a financial and ideological resource means that official attitudes towards cultural heritage have undergone a major shift, from earlier condemnation of many cultural practices and historical artifacts to a more positive, open attitude that has led to changes in policy and legislation, and not least official encouragement to develop heritage for tourism. In 1994, the state announced a Year of Cultural Heritage, something that was closely linked to developing tourism to heritage sites (Su/Teo 2009: 1), and since 2000, the central government made an official stand to prioritize domestic tourism, and urged local governments to develop tourist resources, particularly suited to the domestic market (Nyfri 2006: 5; Su/Teo 2009: 54). This shift has been a major factor in how and why cultural heritage has taken on a new importance in the PRC.

Official encouragement to enjoy China’s famous historical sites has seen a massive increase in visitor numbers to heritage sites as well as increased interest from the general public in the nation’s cultural heritage resources. This has been facilitated by unprecedented levels of wealth and leisure time to travel, in addition to improved infrastructure. Thus it is impossible to discuss how heritage, and perhaps specifically preservation of folk buildings (minju), has changed without placing it in a context of social and political change at all levels, not least in relation to tourism and consumption, but also in relation to legislation as a type of state control over how the past is imagined, and how historical structures such as temples and ancestral halls are made use of in the present.
Heritage policy has shifted in parallel with the ways in which policy on other aspects of cultural politics has shifted, from more highbrow culture to policy on minority culture and religion. The reform-era has seen a general expansion of what cultural expression is and could be. One reason for this is an outcome of increased outside influence; another an increased concern with inclusion of cultural expressions as a way of integrating and harmonising the various ethnic and cultural practices that exist in the PRC, a stark contrast to Mao-era emphasis on eradicating cultural difference, and isolating China from outside cultural influence. However, it is important to bear in mind that the new emphasis on the value of cultural difference is always one played out under the strict supervision of the state and needs to be placed under an umbrella of state regulation: other practices, such as unregistered temples or minority claims to increased political rights belong to a different category of unwanted practices.

Official interest in and promotion of heritage can be detected in many ways, not least by how legislation has been improved throughout the reform era, starting in 1982 with the instigation of the first law on heritage since 1961, a law that aimed to protect and monumentalize sites connected to the revolutionary project of the CCP. However, this law was in effect rendered useless due to the political upheavals of the Cultural Revolution (Gaubatz 1996: 272). Hence state interest in issues of preservation and protection of heritage has only been on the agenda of the state since the reform-era of the 1980s.

During the 1980s, academic interest starting growing in all aspects of heritage. This was connected to general growth of interest in culture, the wenhua re, or culture craze, of this time (Wang 1996; Zhang 1997, Anagnost 1997: 1). This era saw an interest in folk culture, and much art and film was inspired by the exotic at home.

In relation to architecture, and minju in particular, academic interest has been pivotal to official recognition of vernacular forms, and academics have undoubtedly been important agents in the rediscovery of China’s built heritage. Much state discourse on derives from the research carried out by academics and architects, and staff involved in policy-making often have a background in architecture and archaeology. (Knapp 1989, 2000, 2005; Gaubatz 1996: 269, 300-01 Oakes 1998: 136-148; Sun 2004: 646-549; Berliner 2003, 2005; Svensson
This research has often been informed by international discourse on heritage preservation as formulated by a global community of academics, but perhaps especially by organisations like UNESCO. Hence much discourse on heritage in the PRC derives from international discourse and places the quest for rediscovery of heritage resources in an international framework, but one that has been adapted to other Chinese state concerns, such as state regulation of the built environment and interest in installing cultural nationalism.

As already stated in the preceding chapter, discourse on heritage preservation and its value to the nation-state has been growing since the 1990s and the emphasis on restoring heritage environments has seen a worldwide re-assessment of the value of vernacular built forms: many Chinese academics developed a similar interest in these issues during the 1980s and 1990s. This was both urban and rural based: in relation to urban areas, heritage became a resource for shopping districts and urban renewal projects, as well as marketing resource tied to the market economy. In rural areas the issue is more complicated as we have both official state sponsored interest in preserving heritage, often as a resource for tourism, and on the other communal interest in preserving sites of sacred or historical meaning. Hence interest in rural heritage was the result of opening-up, and increased opportunities for domestic travel which gave rise to an interest in the exotic at home. This interest was also linked to research done earlier, that was once again taken up in the reform era (see chapter one for more on Republican and early PRC interest in folk – and minority culture). As travel to locations in far-flung and peripheral provinces once again became possible, the 1990s saw a peak in publishing on traditional architecture, with an emphasis on minju forms. This interest started in the mid-1980s when there were academic conferences arranged on subjects such as cave dwellings and other regional building styles, and books were published on the built heritage of Anhui, Jiangxi and Fujian.

In Yunnan, there was a great deal of interest in the various ethnic dwellings that exist, not least the old Naxi buildings in Lijiang and Bai-courtyard homes in Dali (Knapp 1989; 2000; 2005; Gaubatz 1996: 300-01; Sun 2004: 646-47; Berliner

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48 The current head of the State Administration for Cultural Heritage (SACH, Guojia Wuhua Ju), Shan Jixiang, who took up office in 2002 along with the introduction of the improved legislation, has a long background in preservation work. Prior to the SACH he was the head of the Beijing Cultural Heritage Bureau and has been an advocate for protecting old Beijing. He has been involved in drawing up plans for protecting hutong neighbourhoods, and was involved in drawing up the 2002 legislation, with its new emphasis on neighbourhoods and physical environments.
2003, 2005; Svensson 2006: 22). This interest was picked up by the state (led by the national heritage bureau), and later by the tourist sector, examplified by the way Lijiang enjoyed high-level state support.

Some of these newly discovered "ancient" villages were also used as backdrop in major films such as Raise the red lantern and Judou that sold an idea of traditional China to international audiences. These factors all contributed to the trend to preserve and restore historical villages and urban neighbourhoods into replicas of some notion of ancient China, and also gave a massive boost to tourism in these areas. This is perhaps best exemplified by the canal towns in the Jiangnan area such as Wuzhen or Tongli, easily accessible from the densely populated urban centres of the East Coast. In Yunnan this interest was picked up in the late 1990s as a result of Lijiang’s World Heritage Site status, and later fame as one of China’s most popular tourist destinations. A similar phenomenon can be seen in Anhui where the villages of Xidi and Hongcun both enjoy UNESCO World Heritage status, something that has created a whole new economy in the area focussed on the traditional Huizhou style buildings. In Anhui, tourism to these places is also seen as a development strategy, similar to the role of Lijiang in Yunnan (Ruan 2003; Berliner 2005; Meng/Qin 2005). Today, a plethora of guide books to historical villages and places rich in minju have been published, covering most of China’s provinces, and leisure trips to restored canal towns and other “ancient villages” (gu cun or gu zhen) are immensely popular, something that has led to a veritable flood of restored villages all over China. According to Ricardo Favis at UNESCO, village and county governments are spending millions of yuan each year trying to restore buildings in the hope of attracting tourists and wherever one travels in the PRC one comes across restored villages presenting themselves as locations of great antiquity.49

The idea of the importance of heritage sites as a source of national pride has become such an established feature that in 2006 a national heritage day was held for the first time, with free entry to museums and heritage sites and other activities geared towards teaching citizens how to appreciate various types of

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49 Personal interview, UNESCO offices Bangkok February 2008.
heritage and educating people about the value of heritage, as well as the richness and antiquity of Chinese history.\footnote{This was initiated by the Ministry of Culture in collaboration with the SACHI and is seen as an attempt to educate the general public about the value of cultural heritage resources, something that arguably comes with a patriotic slant. The first day, in June 2006, had the theme “Protect cultural heritage and safeguard the spiritual homeland” (www.culturalink.gov.cn). This tells us something about how heritage is often seen as part of national patriotism, and how it is a useful device for educating the public about the greatness of the nation. That this was initiated in 2006 could be seen as part of the general drive to spur up feelings of patriotism before the 2008 Olympics when campaigns on civilisation (wenming) and quality (suzhi) were intensified (Pramod 2008; Brady 2009; Brownell 2009). This fits well with my argument of heritage as part of an ideological concern with harmony, inclusion and national greatness.}

Cultural heritage could be described as a panacea to forge ahead and forget about years of lost opportunities, political campaigns and personal loss. In this attempt to obliterate much of the recent past, things traditional have been taking on new meanings in telling a patchwork story of the nation where all that jars with official ideas on a stable, harmonious past is left out. Heritage buildings as physical remnants of the past have emerged as important pawns in constructing an idea of this past, as yardsticks against which to measure how far the nation has come and are thus crucial to the very idea of the modern (Mitchell 2001: 43). As Anagnost has put it, the construction of antique style neighbourhoods and buildings (what she refers to as fanggujie, or emulated old streets), serves the purpose of on the one hand being distinctly modern shopping districts, whilst also providing a sense of a "calming certainty of a timeless identity residing within", that is, heritage buildings are both markers of the modern, in the sense that they both mark distance to the past, whilst also providing a sense of national cohesion and identity, crucial to the Chinese state in a time of historical rupture and social upheaval. Heritage both encourages consumption, not only as a tourist, but in Anagnost’s example also of the more mundane type, the ritual of going shopping on a weekend in a nice setting (Anagnost 1993: 590).

The central state has been driving the increased interest in heritage of all sorts, both by discourse and relaxation of policy on cultural practice, but also by actively funding preservation of sites, restoration projects and museums and museum education. This positive attitude to preserving and reconstructing the past has trickled down to provincial and local level, and has affected how provinces regard heritage resources: they have emerged as useful capital resources for attracting tourists and have proved to be invaluable to provincial
identity during the reform era when provincial fiscal responsibility and self-reliance became the norm.  


ii, The legislative framework: the institutional setting of heritage politics

Cultural heritage legislation and policy in the PRC has shifted from a singular concern with revolutionary monuments and sites, to encompass a much greater selection, and its meaning has undergone a radical change of focus, from state-sanctioned monuments to living traditions and urban neighbourhoods, mirroring international changes as advocated by UNESCO. This shift in policy is arguably linked to the opening up of Chinese society since 1978, and the Chinese state has been reviewing policy and amending legislation in order to meet international criteria on heritage protection. It is also the outcome of changes within China, as rapid modernisation has posed an unprecedented threat to heritage resources. The velocity with which China’s built environment has been changing since the 1980s saw the need for adequate legislation on cultural heritage protection in order to protect artifacts and buildings from the onslaught of demolitions and new construction that went in tandem with economic growth and urban renewal. Hence legislation on heritage has been improved, and heritage protection has come to be seen as increasingly important throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

Legislation on heritage in the PRC goes back to 1961, when the first set of laws on national cultural heritage (guojia yichan wenwu) were set up under the jurisdiction of the State Council, and administered by a heritage bureau registered under the umbrella of the Ministry of Culture. These laws aimed to protect isolated, revolutionary monuments, mirroring the political concerns that characterised this era. The first set of heritage listings, from 1962, contained 180 sites, most of which were linked to CCP history and a few, like the Great Wall, to Chinese Imperial history.

51 For examples of this see David S Goodman on Shanxi (2004, 2006), and Fitzgerald (2002). In general, it would be true to say that most provinces are interested in developing tourism and cultural resources such as history and tradition are important in that quest. In Yunnan, as will become clear, this is well-established provincial policy (Hillman 2003; Litzinger 2004).
52 One example of this international impact on legislation is the 2002 collaboration between the SACH, ICOMOS China and the Getty Conservation Institute in establishing clear criteria for heritage site protection in the PRC, a collaboration that resulted in the report Principles for the conservation of heritage sites in China (Zhongguo wenwu guji baohu zhunze), (SACH 2002).
None of these sites were of the type being listed today, such as ethnic culture or traditional buildings, which follows international trends in heritage, but also mirrors how the PRC has changed, and how the CCP-Party State has reinterpreted cultural belonging in the reform-era, from condemnation of difference to its very opposite, whereby inclusion of difference is seen as more effective than eradication of difference, or, what Marina Svensson has referred to as the difference between revolutionary patriotism and a culture-based patriotism that embraces the ethnic, exotic and traditional, at least as long as the state sets the parameters for what is permissible (Svensson 2006: 7).

The Cultural Revolution prevented the 1961 law from taking real effect, even in relation to its limited content, and no further attempts were made to set up a new legal framework until 1982, when the first Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wenwu Baohu Fa) was instigated, as part of the overall revising of laws that occurred as part of the Opening-Up reform program (Chinese Government 1982).

At the same time, a heritage administration bureau under the Ministry of Culture was once again set up, after having been dormant during the years of the Cultural Revolution. The name, the State Bureau of Cultural Relics (Guojia Yichan Wenwu Ju), reflected the early concern with archaeological sites and other antique objects. Since then, legislation, policy, and discourse have shifted radically, as has the independent decision making power of the heritage bureau. In 2002, the name was changed to the State Administration for Cultural Heritage, SACH (Guojia Wuhua Ju), a name change that reflects the change in attitude, and wider meaning of the concept “heritage” in the PRC.

The national law on heritage was revised in 2002, and implementation of the new legislation started in June 2003 (Chinese Government/SACH 2002). The revised law does reflect the changes in heritage concerns (such as protecting village environments), and the re-awakened interests in a broader spectrum of heritage that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. This is also reflected in the name change of the SACH that occurred at this time.

The 2002 law divides heritage into five categories. These are “Revolutionary sites and memorial buildings”, “Archaeological sites”, “Stone caves”, Historic tombs”, and the most relevant for our purposes, “Ancient architecture and historic memorial buildings”, a category that could be interpreted as referring to any type
of historical building, and the emphasis is clearly on individual structures of the monumental type. This category also includes mention of urban heritage, as in urban neighbourhoods of historical character, an inclusion that differs greatly from previous legislation.

This means that a degree of protection is granted to urban neighbourhoods and small towns of heritage character. Hence heritage protection has increasingly come to be granted to whole physical environments, as opposed to isolated buildings, and points to a significant shift and increased sensitivity to the value of preserving not just a house, but the whole environment as such. It demonstrates that the cultural and historical context of buildings has been put on the agenda of the modernising state, and could be read as a response to international discourse on urban and town environments.

Administration of heritage follows the national four-level system of government, whereby the central state sets up general legislation and policy, but overall administration, implementation and policy in relation to individual provinces or locations is handled by the province (sheng), or at the lower tiers of decision-making, local government at city (shi), region (xian), county (zhen) or village (cun) level. In relation to most villages, it is the county government that handles overall decisions on heritage protection or tourism developments within the county, which leaves many villages with little direct decision-making power over developments. The township government is also an important agent in relation to villages, but when it comes to heritage and tourism developments, they often cooperate with county-level government. In the cases covered in this thesis this varies, as we shall see. In for instance Jianshui and Tuanshan, county-level government and township government are both active agents, whereas in Shaxi, county and township is the same, whereas in Heijing and Nuodeng, it is the township that has been the only active agent in promoting heritage.

In order for a building or neighbourhood to be granted protection under the heritage law, it needs to be listed as a cultural heritage property (wenwu baohu danwei). This could be at national, provincial or local level, and administration of the property is funded and managed by the relevant level of government, be it local or provincial.

Provincially listed buildings are funded by the province, whereas local listings should be locally funded.
National sites are allocated funding from the SACHI but managed by the provincial heritage bureau, or, in cases where there is not a special Heritage Bureau, by the provincial Ministry of Culture (provincial and local heritage bureaus are subdivisions of the Ministry of Culture). National level heritage listings are carried out by the SACHI, and enjoy state level protection, or what is referred to as “key-national protection” (guojia zhongdian wenwu baohu danwei). In 2009, there were 2352 national sites in the PRC, natural landscapes as well as monuments and architectural structures. In 2009, there were 2352 national sites in the PRC, natural landscapes as well as monuments and architectural structures.53

Provinces and counties also hold the right to carry out listings of sites at their respective levels. These listings are published by the SACHI but this does not mean that they receive any state funding. Listings at all levels (state, province, and county) adhere to a 1-3 scale depending on their value, and fall into different categories for record purposes such as “Historic tomb”, “Cave painting”, “Tomb” or “Archaeological site” and in relation to minju, historical architecture and buildings. Once a site is listed, it is national property, and cannot be privately owned, changed, demolished or sold.54

The most interesting aspect of heritage legislation is arguably the system of listings: this is how cultural artifacts and practices are selected and elevated to cultural "heritage”, and how heritage is defined by the state. The system of listings is decisive for how agents at the local level negotiate the legal framework, both with the central state, and also with local government. This means that the state carries a lot of power over heritage at all levels, as its stamp of approval is sometimes decisive to local tourism marketing efforts. A heritage listing, particularly at the national level, means legitimacy and is hence of great value for tourism. But even a local listing is a resource, particularly in relation to other, competing localities.

53 See www.sach.gov.cn for listings. There are some 400 000 registered heritage sites in the PRC. Most of these do not receive funding, and are only listed as heritage sites at the most local level. This wealth of listings is due to the fact that individuals or local governments and culture bureaus can register sites for record purposes with the State Council, perhaps in the hope that the SACHI will consider them for a national listing. Often this registering of sites is a first step in lobbying government at all levels for a heritage listing and possible funding. This system is very different from most European countries where individuals cannot register sites as “heritage” on their own initiative. Of these sites, 9396 are provincial level sites, 58 300 at county or municipal level, 103 cities, and 200 villages on the national lists.

54 Cultural Heritage Law of the PRC article 5
However, as a listing does not automatically mean funding (or at least sufficient funding) there will inevitably be a problem if a province or county houses too many sites.

The level of listing is decisive to the amount of funding granted, which means many locally listed sites receive very little, or none as local government might not have the resources. It is also true that funding is granted on an ad-hoc, arbitrary basis, and no legislation stipulates the exact amount, or who is responsible for making sure the funding is granted and used in a proper way. In cases where the property is privately owned, or the property of local authorities (examples being private residences or communal ancestral halls), the responsibility for protection (including financial responsibility for repairs and management) lands with private individuals or local government, which could be a heavy burden in villages, and has sometimes led to local villagers being fined for tearing down parts of houses in order to modernise, or failing to adhere to the cultural heritage law when making repairs.\(^{55}\) This of course means that residing in a listed building can be a burden, and an imposition, and explains why it is so common to see villages with a wealth of local, or even provincial, listings but where no maintenance or repairs have been carried out.

This is why tourism as a source of income could be a valuable resource if there is a heartfelt desire to protect local heritage, as revenue from tourism could be used for maintenance. However, the cynical truth is often the reverse, and listings are not made in order to attract tourism so as to be able to restore crumbling buildings, but rather in order to attract tourism as a means of boosting the revenue of local government, or the profits of entrepreneurs.\(^{56}\)

The Construction Bureau is also an important actor in heritage concerns, and carries enormous power over heritage sites at all levels, in particular architecture and neighbourhoods, but also in relation to other types of heritage, such as monuments and archaeological sites. The Construction Bureau is the main agent in charge over planning and construction, and this involves material heritage of all types.

There is a clause within the City Planning Law (article 14) that states that attention should be paid to protecting what remains of urban, historical

\(^{55}\) Cultural Heritage Law of the PRC, article 21
\(^{56}\) For more on this, see case study number two, on Jianshui old town.
neighbourhoods (Chinese Government 1989), a law that came into effect at an earlier date than the revised heritage law, and works as a complement when discussing preservation of vernacular buildings as opposed to monumental architecture.\textsuperscript{57}

There should also be heritage protection plans made when construction is planned in heritage listed neighbourhoods, or in historical towns and villages. In relation to small town, village, and urban neighbourhood planning, the Construction Bureau is the most important agent, and in cases where the interests of the Construction Bureau and the Heritage Bureau clash, it seems that the Construction Bureau is the more powerful; hence the ruthless demolition of much urban heritage that should be protected according to both the heritage law, and the 1989 Construction Law. In cases like this, the Heritage Bureau can only advise and negotiate.\textsuperscript{58} This means that heritage protection often involves more than one state bureau, which makes legislation complicated to follow. In recent years, the local and provincial tourism bureaus have also emerged as important agents in heritage concerns due to the capital value placed on heritage resources, and the marketing of heritage resources for tourism.

Another important change that has occurred due to tourism is the leasing out of development rights to private companies, a practice that follows the general trend of marketisation and commercialism in the PRC. This means that state agents lose direct decision-making power over heritage resources, even if legislation should still be adhered to. However, in cases such as these (my case study of Shuhe is a good example), legislation is breached on a regular basis and state agents tend to ignore this, hence the often ruthless exploitation and rapid, cheap reconstruction of heritage that counters attempts to preserve and conserve historical environments. Here, it is often financial gain that is the most important, and that takes precedence over other concerns.

\textsuperscript{57} Article 14, City Planning Law of the PRC (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegovu Chengshi Guihua Fa), 1989. Note that there is a new planning law as of 2008, that covers both cities and towns that is more specific when it comes to issues such as illegal construction and demolition. However, the most interesting thing about this law is how it points to the ongoing urbanisation of the countryside in the PRC. By including towns in city planning, local governments need to adhere to stricter regulations. This law also coincides with and corresponds to the ongoing upgrading of villages to towns, which means stricter regulations on land use (Bray 2009; Sargeson 2009). In this law, heritage protection is mentioned briefly along with other things such as protection of natural resources and the environment. (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegovu Chengxiang Guihua Fa, City and town planning law of the PRC) 2007.

\textsuperscript{58} Interview Ms Yang Zehong, Heritage Bureau, Kunming, Sep 2007.
In cases like the case study of Shuhe, legislation has been bypassed altogether, including UNESCO regulations on World Heritage sites administration and management. This is a recent addition to Chinese heritage concerns, and is an outcome of how heritage has become an intrinsic part of tourism and the market economy. However, despite this, it is still true that the Chinese state has been paying increased attention to protection of material heritage, and historical environments. As a telltale sign of this new interest and new importance placed on village environments, a first list specifically devoted to village environments was published by the SACH and the Ministry of Construction in 2003, listing small towns and villages that should enjoy state protection (*Di yi pi Zhongguo lishi wenhua mingzhen/cun, SACII 2003*).

Previously there was a list of historical cities, with new additions made on an annual basis, but villages had never been listed before. Since 2003, new lists have been published and the listings cover the whole of China, but there is a definite focus on East Coast provinces such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang and the particular type of southern Han-culture found in the Jiangnan area (or Wu-Yue culture). These lists, and the attempts at establishing clear criteria for the protection of historical villages and towns, are indicators of how *minju* has gained a new type of prominence in the PRC. This new sensitivity to the value of traditional architecture and historical environments is to a great extent the result of growing awareness of the value of these environments for image-making purposes and overseas tourism. Increased interest on behalf of academics, architects and others with an interest in preserving and maintaining China’s historical fabric, are also motivating factors.

Mirroring this interest, many of China’s best-known heritage sites of recent years have been of the historical village or small town variety, with UNESCO

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59 www.sach.gov.cn/sachwindow/historyvillage (see also historytown; historycity for township and city listings). There are three lists of villages, the first from 2003, the second from 2006 and the last one from 2009.

60 Some examples of this would include how many universities have degrees in cultural heritage protection, especially as part of architecture – Tongji University in Shanghai was the earliest to set up a course, and is, along with the course offered at Qinghua in Beijing, the most prestigious. Graduate students at Tongji were involved in drawing up protection plans for old town Lijiang, and some of the most vocal advocates for historical protection, such as Ruan Sanyi, are academics and architects. Another example would be NGOs such as the Beijing Cultural Heritage Protection Centre that works to save traditional buildings in Beijing, amongst other things offering a program to learn traditional restoration and carpentry techniques.
World Heritage status being granted to Pingyao, Lijiang (both in 1997), and Hongcun and Xidi in Anhui (2000).

At local and provincial level a similar trend in policy-making can be discerned, mirroring central legislation.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, local legislation and policies regarding heritage were set up in many places in the PRC, adhering to the national law. This was often done due to the massive onslaught on old buildings in the wake of modernisation efforts, and the ransacking of various heritage sites where valuable objects were stolen and sold on the antiques market, often to Hong Kong or abroad (e.g. Anonymous 2000). These laws, like the national law, were rather weak, and implementation not very efficient, which meant that the early reform era of the 1980s and 1990s was the time when the lion’s share of China’s cultural heritage resources were destroyed, a process that has only been halted slightly in more recent times. During this time, progress and rapid development was the one overriding concern, which meant other concerns had to take a step back. This has continued into the present era, and even if many Chinese might be increasingly unhappy about their living environments and concerned about the destruction of cultural artifacts and historical sites, it is still the case that rapid development remains the main goal of the Chinese Party-state, and pillaging of cultural and natural resources is seen as a necessary by-product (Ruan 2000; 2003; Bai 2002; Chen 2003; Huang and Wang 2004; Meng and Qin 2005; Cao and Lu 2006).

However, the growth of domestic tourism, and the growing interest in minju and other heritage buildings, has prompted provincial authorities to regard material heritage as a valuable resource not to be squandered. This means that legislation is more widely respected, and local heritage legislation has been improved, especially as a response to objects being stolen and sold, or houses destroyed in order to modernise (Gaubatz 1996: 269-70; Knapp 1996, 2000; Sargeson 2002; Berliner 2003, 2005; China Heritage Quarterly 2005:2; Svensson 2006: 22-23). This can be clearly discerned in regions such as Yunnan, as will become obvious in relation to the case studies. It is also true of richer provinces, such as Zhejiang, where the discrepancy between modernising buildings and protecting heritage is more evident, due to rural development and wealth.
iii, Tourism and cultural heritage in the PRC

Ever since the opening-up policies of the early reform-era started to have an impact on China in the 1980s, tourism has been growing at a steady rate, often facilitated by state attempts at bolstering the industry (Oakes 1998: 159-168; Xu 1999: 57; Wen/Tisdell 2001; Xu/Kruse 2003; Zhang 2003: 26; Nyiri 2006: 5, 71-74; Su/Teo 2009: 50-55). In addition to obvious financial gain, this interest could also be explained along ideological lines as a way of presenting an attractive image internationally and as a way of fostering national identity at home.

The tourist industry has evolved from the state-run bureau in charge of everything from overseas travel to domestic tourism, to a diverse industry involving a range of actors. In 1981, the China National Tourist Administration (CNTA) was set up under direct jurisdiction of the State Council. Since the mid-1980s it no longer owns or manages tourist companies but acts as an umbrella organisation for companies that were formerly under direct state control such as the China Travel Service (CTS) and its affiliates, such as the youth travel service. CTS branches can be found almost anywhere and arranges local tours, bookings and pre-arranged sightseeing service. In theory, they are independent corporate entities with their own decision-making power. However, in reality state links are still very strong. The managers of many local CTS offices are often former cadres or other Party-related staff that either remains from the days of state monopoly or who have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by tourism. Local governments have a tight grip on tourism and tour companies (for matters of "security" it is often said), and strong links to local CTS branches. State tourist bureaus in most localities co-operate with the CTS in promoting local sites, which gives the state a great deal of power over what destinations should be marketed and how. Even if a multitude of independent actors have emerged it is still the case that the state holds the veto, and oversees the business in a strict fashion, sometimes issuing travel restrictions to sensitive areas. In relation to heritage, as mentioned, tourism bureaus have emerged as powerful actors, along with private development companies. However, these companies are leased the rights to develop a site, and this could be revoked by local authorities if not
handled well (see the example of Yuanyang in the second case study). This means that the state is pivotal to how tourism is developed.\textsuperscript{61}

From another angle, it is also true that many Chinese are not very seasoned travellers and might experience a sense of security if taking part in a pre-arranged tour with a well-known outfit such as the CTS, which means that the state wields power over itineraries and destinations. The idea of travelling on your own without a set itinerary is often regarded as quite eccentric, even if this is changing in the younger generation. To most Chinese, going travelling means taking part in a pre-arranged tour with the CTS or its associates. This means that the state, with its power to designate sites as national tourist sites or prime scenic spots (and of course, for our purposes, heritage sites), has been wielding an enormous influence over domestic tourism. In addition to its strong links to the industry, and power over the marketing of destinations, the state has also been an implicit actor in promoting domestic travel by measures such as the five-day workweek and extra holidays. The May break and week-long national day holiday in October were both introduced to make people spend by taking time to travel in the wake of the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{62}

Like heritage sites, tourist sites are malleable, easily manipulated and hence useful projectors of state ideology, a type of model for national behaviour, be it wearing identical outfits on the beach in Hainan or gazing at the sunrise at Emei Shan. Tourism relies on the performance of behavioural replicas, like a set ritual, and is in this sense an easily controlled realm of ideology. Heritage sites are inevitably often turned into tourist sites, hence fulfilling multiple functions of leisure, revenue and projecting ideology. Hence cultural heritage concerns are invariably linked to, and part of, the tourist industry.

Tourism has in this sense been driving reconstruction and aestheticisation of historical environments, a trend that has seen the growth of generic "heritage" enclaves in cities, towns and villages, there to enhance the tourist experience and lend an air of historical authenticity to locations.

\textsuperscript{61} Other Asian examples of this include Picard and Pemberton on tourism development in Bali (Pemberton 1994: 148-161; Picard 1997), Wood (1997); and Laurence Wai-Teng Leong and Joel S Kahn on Malaysia and Singapore (1997).

\textsuperscript{62} The May break, or Golden Week is no longer a weeklong holiday. Instead Qingming (grave sweeping day) has been made into a national holiday, underlining state endorsement of, and new interest in traditional practices long considered part of the old order and only practised in a very low-key fashion during the revolutionary years.
Traditional architecture in picturesque village settings provides an excellent selling device for this purpose, and hence fits the workings of the domestic tourist industry in the PRC perfectly. Hence it needs to be placed in a context of both tourism and state relations, two spheres that often share the same interests, and that the Chinese state has been actively promoting since the 1990s.

This idea of the bounded site that exists solely for tourism, a place cordoned off from the surrounding areas means that tourism to heritage villages provides the state with an ideal arena for projecting ideology, cultural values and establishing parameters for cultural behaviour. The leisure industry provides an important arena for state control, and heritage is by its very nature an easily manipulated category for both projections of state discourse and for the creation of what Pal Nyiri has labelled bounded sites for tourism and consumption (Nyíri 2006: 11-17, 86-96).

This lends an ideological explanation for state interest in promoting and supporting tourism, whilst also attempting to control it by strict regulations, the promotion of tour companies and the involvement of local government officials in various tourism ventures. Tourism provides revenue and could mean development in poor areas but it also provides a sphere of easily controlled cultural authority for both domestic and international audiences.

Cultural heritage is by its very nature part of a selective process, an officially recognised system of state approved listings, such as historical villages, scenic landscapes or monuments. These official designations is an essential element to the workings of the tourist industry as time is scarce and tour companies need to present clearly defined itineraries of well-known scenic and cultural value. Tour groups will descend on a few spots, often designated by the state as being of particular interest or beauty. They are also spots for engaging with others in the favourite past-time of kan renao, of having a loud and good time shopping, eating, drinking and taking lots of photos.

These tours emphasises both pleasure and speed as time restraints mean that stops never last for very long which also means they need to offer immediate

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63 The CNTA has a system of ratings of tourist sites in place, similar to how heritage is listed, whereby sites are classified on a 1-3 scale (A-AAA), at national or provincial level. This works in tandem with heritage listings, that are deemed to be more important, and of greater value. Listings of heritage sites of all kinds tend to be followed by tourist site designations.
value and customer satisfaction: easy to consume visual pleasure and easily digested local culture.

This also puts pressure on localities to develop clearly defined tourist concepts and sites that can be consumed in a speedy fashion whilst also providing some nice photo-ops and local flavour souvenirs. It could be argued that the growth in “traditional” villages and other heritage spots being developed for fun and leisure is a response to the very shape of domestic tourist ritual. This has been further driven and facilitated by state listings of heritage sites, listings that function as badges of credibility to demonstrate official endorsement and thus form the backbone around which to construct an image for purposes of tourist consumption.

Pal Nyiri has argued that the development of “scenic spots” (jingdian) is analogous to Imperial era literati pilgrimages. In this tradition, one travelled to certain scenic spots in imitation of those who had come before (Naquin 1992; Nyiri 2006: 17, 80-96). This was a way of seeing nature through the eyes of culture and hence interacting with history. It was the preserve of those born into privilege, brought up with access to the references linked to each site, and with the education necessary to appreciate nature in a cultured fashion.

In modern China, Nyiri argues, the creation of tourist spots might in some ways be understood in a similar way to how literati travel functioned.

These sites present a hegemonic representation of culture that defines the content of tourism and establishes a representational order. People gather at Huang Shan, West Lake or Jiuzhaigou and by doing so participate in the manufacturing of a type of cultural authority whereby China is in essence reduced to a number of official, scenic and historical spots with representational meaning. Nyiri compares this to the annual New Year’s celebration on national television where China is represented by various carefully sanitised cultural displays that render the nation into a singing and dancing universe of cultural harmony, where minority and local culture is reduced to light entertainment.

This, I would argue is part of the national discourse on culture as a type of inclusive practice, an official representation the state attempts to make universal. Tourism, and the workings of the tourist industry is another facet of this national discourse. Scenic spots and historical villages fulfil similar functions of representation.
Developing historical villages based around vernacular buildings fits very well with this concern with representation and creating clearly defined spots for leisure and tourism that suit the itineraries of tour groups. This is obviously not a unique feature of the PRC – as has been pointed out, interest in heritage as a capital resource and as a means of underlining national identity is a global phenomenon, and caters to a perceived wish to experience "authentic" environments and culture, no matter how contrived and constructed.

iv, Tourism and preservation in the PRC: issues of authenticity and reconstructions

This rapid growth of interest in heritage buildings, in addition to the lure of tourism, has led to a conflict between authenticity, craftsmanship, and tourist development, familiar from many other places. This dilemma is a recurring feature of heritage reconstruction and preservation in almost all of the villages I have visited, and points to how commercial forces and tourism impacts on place identity and local residents. This is an important issue to consider as it raises questions as to the value and meaning of authenticity in heritage preservation, an issue also raised in the first chapter. This debate also links in with how the legislative framework works, and how it is negotiated.

The notion of preserving, and rescuing whatever remains of heritage properties according to their original structure and material is the first principle of Chinese heritage legislation. However, this is not, as argued, always adhered to. Instead, legislation often works as a way of affirming and legitimising oldness for purposes of tourism and local distinction. This dilemma lies at the heart of the relation between authenticity, preservation, and how to reconcile the two, a central issue in heritage studies.

I would argue that reconstructions are inseparable from the functions of vernacular architecture, and that interest in minju and ensuing reconstruction of village architecture has in fact led to a reassertion of village identity and

\[\text{64 Cultural heritage law of the PRC, article 4}\]
reassessment of the value of vernacular buildings in the present era, mirroring Cohen’s argument on how “traditions” might redeem themselves and take on new meaning when faced with social change (Cohen 2004:112).

Due to central, national interest in minju and local heritage, and as a result of tourism, village residents have come to realise a new function for traditional dwellings in the present era, not just as reminders of poverty, and failure to modernise, but as capital assets. Hence I would agree with Cohen that the flurry of reconstructions is part of a reformulation of village identity, and a mark of local distinction. In this sense, the state has been driving interest in heritage and minju, but the local response has been decisive to how these structures are thought of in the present, and how they are being put to use.

However, it is still true that reconstructions raise difficulties in reconciling local building traditions, and the everyday life of local residents, with the aspirations of tourist entrepreneurs and state agents. Many tourist developers, and state agents involved in tourist enterprises, are from an urban, Han-dominated background (Ruan 2000: 46, 2004:29-30; UNESCO 2000; McKhann 2001: 147-166; Nyíri 2006: 71; Su/Teo 2009: 128). More and more often, private enterprises invest in heritage tourism, and hence carry power over developments. Some examples of this include my case studies of Heijing and Shuhe, where Kunming based companies control most of the tourist industry. Another example is found in Shangri-La, where developing companies are in charge of local tourism (Kolás 2008: 17-21), and in Lijiang, as mentioned, most tourist entrepreneurs are outsiders (McKhann; Su/Teo 2009: 63; 85; 157).

This is also the case with NGOs such as the WMF, that have been active agents in Shaxi and Tuanshan, two of my other case studies. Most NGO agents are from urban areas, often with an international background, and come with a preservationist agenda that has been informed by international discourse on the value of local culture, ideas that might clash with local aspirations to modernise and capitalise on heritage.

The impact of outside developers is especially strong in places where tourism is already a well-established feature of local life, such as northwestern Yunnan; Lijiang in particular (UNESCO 2000; McKhann 2001: 147-166; Su/Teo 2009: 75-92, 123-142).
Ruan Sanyi at Shanghai’s Tongji University, one of China’s most influential architects and critics of preservation practices, has pointed out that entrepreneurs from rich areas drive most preservation schemes in the PRC today, and their interest is almost always motivated by tourism.

Hence most preservation is aimed at constructing an identity for tourism (Ruan 2000; 2003; 2004).65 This often entails reconstructions rather than preservation, as reconstruction is incomparably cheaper and quicker. This, Ruan has argued, is in itself as much of a threat to vernacular architecture and village environments of historical value as rapid modernisation and house construction.

These reconstructions do not take craftsmanship or house building traditions into account. The materials used are often cheap and do not adhere to the original construction materials. No idea of the historical meanings of houses exists, and truly unique structures are often demolished in order to build brand new ones. This type of reconstruction is very common in the PRC today, and an ubiquitous feature of many urban neighbourhoods, especially those centred around consumption and entertainment.

It is also common in relation to heritage villages of the more successful type (like Lijiang) where new construction in “old” style often surround the original heritage buildings, sometimes even replacing them in a race to meet the demands of visitors for “authentic” accommodation. Here, it is a perceived flavour of the old and authentic that matters, not the craftsmanship or heritage credentials. Chinese tourists will often claim to enjoy the “yuanzhi yuanwei” (the flavour and feel of authenticity) of a heritage neighbourhood, in the same way many Western tourists might enjoy a vaguely historical environment constructed for leisure pursuits. The authenticity might matter less than a pleasant environment that exudes an age-old air of history.

Hence rapid reconstruction is a common occurrence even in places with UNESCO-support such as Lijiang where many structures have been irrevocably changed and ruined as part of the drive to create hotels. Heather Peters at UNESCO claims that there is not much they can do about this, apart from negotiate with Lijiang authorities but this often fails.

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65 The architecture and urban planning department at Tongji was the earliest to pick up on the value of heritage preservation and has been consulted in a number of places, most famously in Lijiang.
Once she was confronted by the demolition of what used to be a grand Naxi-mansion with unique, ornate woodcarvings. A luxury hotel, built in the same style, sporting new woodcarvings that were rapidly done, bad imitations of the original ones, replaced it. This points to how tourism and preservation of heritage are inevitably linked, in the PRC as elsewhere. In this sense, tourism, and state agents backing tourism set the agenda for how heritage sites are presented, and stand to benefit the most.

As Ruan Sanyi and Heather Peters argue, it is undoubtedly the case that much heritage site construction relies on reconstruction, and is often driven by entrepreneurs and developers that lack local support. In these cases it would be fair to claim, along with Ruan, that China’s built heritage is being diluted and ruined and turned into what, following Jameson, could be described as a postmodern bricolage of imagined antiquity, or, what Jameson has referred to as “wrapping”an old core in new layers (Jameson 1991: 97-129; Ruan 2000, 2003, 2004). This, as we shall see, is true in different ways in a number of the villages that will be used to demonstrate local heritage practice in more detail.

However, it is important to look away from simple explanations of tradition being "lost" and heritage “ruined” when what we witness might be a type of change and remoulding. I would argue that heritage preservation faces the same dilemma as revival of other traditions. It could for example be argued that traditional folk buildings are being reconstructed solely for purposes of financial gain, but sometimes this reconstruction might correspond to present needs and aspirations that are not solely connected to financial gain.

To rural communities, the heritage label is a type of outside, official recognition that makes static notions of communal meaning and outside agendas as being in conflict reductive of more complex and interlinked meanings: state agents and other actors might drive heritage reconstruction but the local community could still negotiate the meanings of reconstruction, and hence benefit.

Viewed from this angle, it is important to see what replaces the old, not just worry about what might be “lost” as traditional buildings become pawns in the capitalist economy.

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66 Personal interview, Bangkok February 2008.
In the eyes of local communities, and in the interest of maintaining building traditions, reconstructions might be as “authentic” as preservation practices, especially as preservation usually entails preserving and conserving some idea of the past, as opposed to creating something that is relevant to present concerns.

Both Ruan and Oakes have broached this topic (Oakes 1998; Ruan 2006). Oakes in particular has argued that state linkages are decisive to the success and shape of tourist development based around heritage. Dong villages for example, tend to use their cultural resources in order to further their credentials and claims to embody “authentic” culture. In less developed villages, where understanding of the system might be lacking, architecture retains much of its communal role, i.e. it is a resource for insiders. However, Oakes has also pointed to how wealth generation and modernisation efforts sometimes mean that tourism becomes less successful, as wealth generated from tourism is invested in improvements (modern buildings) which tend to result in loss of authentic appeal and hence touristic value. In cases where village leaders and entrepreneurs are more savvy, and have a greater understanding of the value of perceived “tradition” to the tourist economy, new constructions pander to the tourist gaze in recycled, reconstructed versions of local building styles.

This type of tourist venture often requires displays of “recycled” tradition, and a construction of place identity based around outside notions of local culture. However, it is still the case that in Dong villages for instance, this could be described as a savvy use of tradition that ensures that building styles remain and fulfil a present purpose, hence countering ideas of tradition as being lost due to commercialisation. This type of usage could also be understood as an indicator of how well local leaders and entrepreneurs understand ideas of heritage and state policy on what heritage means and should be.

Hence location and state linkages are important factors in how and why reconstructions take place and the role reinvention or reformulation of tradition plays within the local community. Bearing this in mind, it is important to see how much vernacular architecture in China (and many other places) has always been a

67 One interesting phenomenon that is very telling of this new take on tradition and its value in the present, and the power discourse on heritage and tourism carries, is the explosion in constructing drum towers in eastern Guizhou, from a handful in the mid-1990s to hundreds ten years later (Ruan 2006: 170).
changing resource where reconstructions is part of the ongoing life of buildings and the building traditions behind them.

This makes notions of "authenticity" tricky. The very definition of vernacular architecture is a building that corresponds to the needs of local residents and that has developed as a response to climate, livelihoods and local culture. This means that change is an intrinsic aspect of the vernacular, the need for an inherent adaptability. In much vernacular architecture, a process of renewal and reconstruction is an intrinsic part of the culture of house building: the essence of buildings resides in this cycle of renewal. In this sense, the site and the craftsmanship matter more than the antiquity of the structure itself.

In fact, that something is old is not necessarily a positive thing. What does remain, and what is cherished, is the form and shape of building, the skills and materials required, as well as the location of a site. This means that houses correspond to a certain form and tradition of house building that carries historical meaning in itself.

This is due to the very materials used when constructing houses, and the climate of many places. Wood, bamboo and mud are all perishable materials: fires, floods and harsh winters will inevitable cause wear and tear. Hence it would be wrong to argue that reconstruction is inevitably linked to the present era and to claim that reconstruction per definition is less "authentic" than a European castle ruin when in fact vernacular house building has always relied on reconstruction.

One example of this would be the Dong-buildings mentioned earlier. This architecture is never very old due to a prevalence of fires. In the reform-era the earlier tradition of constructing new drum towers, opera stages or wind-and rain bridges (ornate, built-in bridges that function as a gathering place for villagers), that used to function as a type of communal honour and celebration of local ritual has taken on a new meaning in many Dong-villages. Drum towers are still constructed on a regular basis but on a much grander scale as villages compete among themselves using the new capital value these structures have come to represent. This is the result of increased outside interest in Dong-architecture and the boom in constructing new drum towers has grown in relation to the number of tourist arrivals.

This is comparable to how villages in Yunnan have started to develop tourism by using minju credentials in a way that was unheard of ten years ago.
According to Ruan Xing, the idea of authenticity and antiquity has changed some of the local tradition in the sense that savvy villagers have grasped the concept of “antiquity” (Ruan 2006: 170-75). Many have picked up on how discourse on heritage, based on European concepts of claims to history as residing in the structure rather than in the tradition, often emphasises an aged appearance. This means that the older a building appears the more attention it will receive. This has led to a trend in making new wood appear old, or sometimes just pretending that something is ancient as new wood very quickly will appear aged due to indoor fire pits, rain and sun (as it is left untreated).

European notions of heritage with its roots in the quest for the antique and its obsession with cataloguing and ordering things in a museum-like fashion, has set the agenda for much heritage and preservation work on a global scale. However, more recent developments and widening of ideas of “cultural heritage” as residing in living traditions and cultures has caused a dilemma in how to label something as “heritage” without inevitably freezing it in a past temporality. This is certainly the case with minju and other vernacular structures such as drum towers. Heritage discourse has affected how these structures have been renewed and adapted according to reform-era emphasis on their capital value to the tourist economy. Rather than remaining as low-key village sites for ritual or festival purposes, or in the case of minju, as simple dwellings, these structures are now key players in how village life in touristic locations have attempted to renew itself in the PRC. But it would be an over-simplification to see these developments as a state sanctioned top-down endeavour as villagers often adopt state discourse and skilfully manipulate structures and practices for the outside, whilst also maintaining the tradition of house building.

In the case of Lijiang, the management bureau attempts to defend the commercialisation of Lijiang and the wealth of tourist shops and hotels by placing it in a historical context: Lijiang has always been a trade centre, a place of merchants. Without merchants and trade the town would never have existed, and tourism is the trade of the 21st century. Lijiang has adapted itself to the new demands and uses its business traditions in a very skillful way.

68 Point made by Heather Peters at UNESCO; Bangkok February 2008.
Whilst this statement might neglect the way Lijiang has changed as a result of mass tourism, it also points to the central dilemma heritage preservation faces. Lijiang is a World Heritage site, and as such it has vowed to protect the historical fabric and customs of place. In essence though, this prevents the town from modernising and developing and using its heritage resources in a beneficial way. It is true that the influx of outside entrepreneurs in Lijiang has driven people away from the old town, but has also made many locals wealthier. To the younger generation, developments in Lijiang have presented them with increased opportunities. It would perhaps be true to say that Lijiang encapsulates the capital value heritage resources have come to represent, and how reconstruction and commodification of heritage resources is a skillful play with reform era modernisation discourse that points to the inherent adaptability of minju and the vernacular tradition.69

The concept of authenticity (zhengxing) is often underlined as being of outmost importance in European debates on heritage is a concept that might not always carry the same meaning in all places and at all times: authenticity is not always equal to what remains, but is, I would argue, a fluid concept. The very fluidity of the concept makes it very difficult for the outsider to judge what is authentic when in fact buildings and sites always undergo historical transformations and adapt to societal changes. Hence they could be described as covered in layers of historical meanings, which makes claims to one “authentic” truth almost impossible.

Heritage agents, regardless of their agendas, are often successful in laying official claim to a site or place for its own purposes, and hence elevating one version of history above other, competing ones. In the latest guise of much heritage preservation this is done in order to create a story for consumption and tourism, and hence add allure and interest to a place, according to the perceived needs of the tourist gaze (like the Dong making their drum towers appear aged).

69 Having said this, it is important to point to how Lijiang is in many ways a unique example of an extreme tourism development. In the Dong-villages of eastern Guizhou this type of development has not occurred, and there are few sites in the PRC, perhaps in Asia, where developments are comparable to those in the Lijiang area. It is of course true that mass tourism in Lijiang has not done much to protect building traditions (in the sense it might have in Dong-villages) but Lijiang as a model has increased interest in vernacular buildings in the rest of Yunnan and might in this sense have had an impact on creating a new role for traditional building styles.
The fact that many locations in China, along with the Dong of eastern Guizhou, have seized upon the idea of authenticity and antiquity points to how discourse travels and how Chinese discourse and legislation has incorporated this European concept of authenticity as a badge of credibility: current legislation underlines that heritage structures should be repaired to appear “old”, in the style of the original.

According to Chinese law, the first principle of heritage protection is to preserve and rescue, the second to restore according to high standards (Chinese Government 2002). However, this is rarely the case as most heritage sites rely on reconstruction. In relation to minju, reconstructions are often limited to restoring facades or rebuilding according to some notion of what is the established local tradition, but sometimes with a modern twist or playful reinvention of for instance ethnic markers. These practices are often frowned upon by European preservationists who argue that attempts at reconstructing rather than preserving heritage buildings are seen as “creation” (i.e. fake) and hence without any claims to authenticity.

A parallel with Japan might be appropriate in order to underline how the cultural concept of what cultural heritage is can differ and embody different meanings in different places. According to Japanese tradition fossilised heritage (toketsu hozon) of the “preserved” type is considered a dead concept that has lost its connections to tradition and hence to the present. In a similar way to much of China’s vernacular tradition of house building, the idea of constant change and renewal is a crucial part of the life of any building (Ehrentraut 1989; Coaldrake 1996; Hendry 2000:166-167; Siegenthaler 2004; Hladik 2005: 259 - 268). Fragile materials are regularly changed and temples often undergo total renovations according to annual cycles.

For instance, the most famous example is the renovation of Japan’s most important Shinto-shrine at Ise that undergoes a change of roof beams and pillars every 20 years, a process that in essence means resembling a whole new temple. However, this is part of Ise’s life as a functioning temple and it is the continuity of the temple in the same site that matters.

70 National law on cultural heritage of the PRC, 2002, article 4 and 21
Here, it is the very practice that is the tradition, the craftsmanship of temple renewal that creates the heritage and not the other way around. Perhaps one could say that the heritage value, or the communal meaning of the heritage value resides in the spatial practice, of engaging with historical forms and traditions in the present and hence continuing their value.

In relation to China it has been pointed out that it is often the site and the symbolic attachments a site conjures up that matters, as well as the date of original construction, not the actual structure (Gaubatz 1996: 271). Therefore the idea of "in-authenticity" is rendered less meaningful as many minju structures belong to a tradition where change and reconstruction is part of the tradition.

In the present era, reconstruction and reinvention of traditional forms are a response to market demands that have in a sense provided a new meaning and function for minju. They have regained their communal role as markers of local tradition and identity in the reform era due to their market value. State legislation and interest in heritage points to same thing: attempting to harness these resources and their value in the present era, for capital purposes and as a way of regulating and establish control over communal practices. In this sense, local uses of minju and other structures engage closely with state discourse, and with the needs of tourism. But in many localities the new capital value placed on heritage has provided a new function and lease of life for traditional house building, and whilst some sites exist solely for tourism, and function like museums, many other villages are still very much lived-in entities where buildings correspond both to reform-era heritage concerns, as well as to an ongoing tradition of communal meaning, with no obvious issues of conflict at stake.

I would argue that tourism has wrapped these houses in yet another layer of meaning that has given them a new sense of value within the community, and presented villages with a new identity in the present, both as a possible livelihood and as markers of distinction. This means that preservation and reconstruction enables villages to engage in a dialogue with an urban audience of tourists and state agents. To claim that heritage projects are always state driven and elite sponsored would be to lose sight of how these processes are negotiated and understood in many villages and regions.

In some places, interest in heritage has led to a revaluation of local culture and its value.
Alongside official, commercial interest in heritage there is another alternative trend that both runs counter to, but also informs and affects, official interest in heritage resources.

As a result of relaxed attitudes to popular culture and religion, in addition to increased wealth, there has occurred something of a re-emergence of traditional practices in many places. This is carried out both in private as people re-discover practices that were condemned during much of the revolutionary era, as well as in public as people gather for various types of communal rituals that might have been carried out in a more low-key way, or secretly, in the past. This is especially true in relation to the countryside as the realm of ritual and local tradition has emerged as an arena for displaying wealth and wielding local power, especially in richer areas along the East Coast.71

This has meant that many localities attempt to restore and reconstruct local sites of meaning such as deity temples and ancestral halls, both sites for ritual and local power, and also sites for demonstrating personal wealth as evidenced by donations. This is often driven by local elites who wish to see ancestral halls or temples restored, sometimes as retribution for bad treatment during the revolutionary era (Jing 1996; Feuchtwang 2001; Yang 2004; Svensson 2006: 16-18).72 Communities have been collecting funds and restoring temples, leading to something of a temple building craze that has not always been treated benevolently by state officials. It does seem that this is more of an East Coast

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71 Mayfair Yang has pointed out how she was struck by the wealth of traditional displays carried out by "prosperous peasants" when doing fieldwork in rural Wenzhou, Zhejiang province (Yang 2004: 93). This is less true in Yunnan, where open and ostentatious displays of wealth are less common, but it is still the case that richer families will donate and host certain events such as funerals and also festivities that are linked to the local ritual calendar. These will be rather low-key but I have been invited to take part in a few. It is also very common to come across other types of ritual such as funeral processions and sometimes other ritual displays based around ethnic costume, dance and performances that are local, communal affairs and not linked to the tourist economy. In comparison, in Zhejiang for instance, open displays of wealth by donations linked to local culture and history are rather common from what I can gather. In one case a peasant who had done well invited a whole group of researchers to set up a project to document local culture, all funded by him (personal visit with the help of Professor Wu Zongjie, Zhejiang University, April 2009).

72 Feuchtwang and Wang (2001) is a particularly good example of how temples and popular religion function as part of the present political life of villages, often informed by the past (in this case in Fujian province).
phenomenon, especially in cases where it is linked to wealth and lineage power (Siu 1989, 1990). The temple building craze in provinces like Fujian, Zhejiang and Guangdong is clearly influenced by how power relations have shifted in the reform era and is linked to increasing wealth; displaying wealth and engaging in communal networking.

Sometimes, like in the well-preserved village of Zhuge in Zhejiang, we can see how preservation straddles traditional village authority and local political power. In Zhuge, a lineage clan that also wields political power has been driving preservation as a way of continuing their ancestral rituals and garnering outside attention for what they consider to be a local heritage of great value. Originally preservation in Zhuge was a stop-start process funded by villagers, and people with ancestral roots in the village. The aim was to restore some of the ancestral halls that had been taken over by the revolutionary state, and to resurrect rituals associated with the halls. However, during the late 1990s this project increasingly came to be linked to tourism, and a younger generation took over preservation work. Whilst the older generation were careful not to alienate villagers with no connection to the Zhuge clan, the younger generation seems more intent on making use of the illustrious surname for purposes of tourism, and have also been successful in village elections; hence this group wields political, Party-sponsored power as well as a type of traditional authority based around the Zhuge-clan and the attempt to revive tradition.

This type of project could divide local residents, as preservation is an exclusive project undertaken by groups of well-connected elites. In Zhuge, local elites have been able to combine traditional power with political power as a way of setting the agenda for preservation of a local heritage that is strongly linked to the Zhuge clan (resembling the Kong clan in Gansu and their temple reconstruction efforts, as described by Jing Jun, 1996). Heritage preservation here has meant an increase in outside attention and interest in the village and its history, and also in tourism revenue (Svensson 2006: 41-50). However, to many villagers this is in a sense

73 Personal conversation, plus visit to Zhuge arranged by Professor Wu Zongjie at Zhejiang University, Hangzhou April 2009. Members of the Zhuge clan also have high posts in the village and township government. See also Svensson (2006: 41-50).

74 The surname Zhuge goes back to the military strategist Zhuge Liang who lived during the Three Kingdoms period (220-280 AD). He has been hailed as a national hero, and one of China’s greatest talents in history. The Zhuge clan claims to have ancestral bonds with Zhuge Liang, in much the same way the Kong clan in Jing Jun’s account have bonds with Kongzi, or Confucius (Jing 1996; Svensson 2006: 41-50).
alienating, as they have no links to the Zhuge clan and have made no profits from tourism. According to Svensson, the older generation were careful to include the whole village, not just those surnamed Zhuge, but during recent years, the name has been put to strategic use in constructing tourism.\(^7^5\)

In a case like this we can see how the state has granted the Zhuge clan an approved heritage label under which to reconstruct and re-establish local clan power, whilst also developing tourism. This has been the outcome of good state links and a straddling of traditional village power and modern day village politics. In Yunnan, this type of occurrence is not that common.\(^7^6\)

There are a few similar cases from poorer regions, like John Flower's study of a village in Sichuan in the 1990s (in an undeveloped part of the province), where reconstruction of a temple was linked to communal involvement, but usually this type of occurrence seems linked to wealth and a degree of development that makes displays of both communal and personal wealth a more relevant issue.

It seems this realm is flexible and its meaning and content depends on the social setting of time and place: it responds to contemporary needs and might be indicative of what Dirlik and Zhang have labelled the "spatial and temporal desynchronisation" of mainland China – extreme uneven development where different historical junctures occur at uneven intervals, creating a nation of many times at once. Dirlik and Zhang argue that this as a type of postmodern society characterised by a national narrative where past and present have been compressed in layers of different time zones that co-exist simultaneously (Dirlik/Zhang 1997: 3).

\(^7^5\) Personal conversation, Professor Wu Zongjje, Zhejiang University Hangzhou, April 2009, plus personal visit to the village arranged by Prof Wu.

\(^7^6\) To exemplify the differences in wealth in order to clarify the disparity in income between provinces and how this might have had an impact on how culture and tradition is considered, average incomes in Yunnan 2007 were 11496 yuan in urban areas, and 2634 in rural, with some 190 000 households falling below the absolute poverty line (juedui pinkun) with less than 785 yuan, and another 400 000 being "poor" (pinkun) with 786-1067 yuan per annum whereas in Zhejiang, something of a model province with the richest countryside in the PRC, incomes were 22727 yuan in urban areas and 9258 yuan in rural. Of course this includes some of China's wealthiest cities such as Hangzhou, and in parts of the interior of the province poverty is an issue, but still not comparable to Yunnan. In Lanxi county, Zhejiang, where there are a number of restored villages (e.g. Zhuge) incomes are around 6-7000 yuan/annually. This can be discerned very clearly just by studying the built environment when travelling around. Rural areas in Zhejiang are full of modern houses something resembling American style mansions, whereas Yunnan mainly consists of older housing and the odd, new tile construction. (National bureau of statistics, Yunnan 2007 and Zhejiang 2008, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongji Ju and on Lanxi, Lanxi bureau of statistics, Lanxi Shi Tongji Ju, 2008, www.stats.lx.gov.cn).
This is an interesting way of thinking of heritage developments in villages where heritage and traditions are still alive, as part of daily life, but where these traditions have been pounced upon by tourist and heritage agents in a display for an outside, urban audience. It also points to how the meanings of heritage preservation and reconstruction in the PRC differs with location, and socio-economic conditions.

In this sense it is important to see that what might be true of a village in Zhejiang might not be true of a village in Yunnan, where interpretations of modernity and concerns with how to model a claim to antiquity in the contemporary context might take a different shape. Hence we have a very different side to heritage, and restoration of heritage structures, within villages where the motivations and meanings behind restoration and preservation might sometimes differ wildly from those of the state.

I would argue that this movement based around the re-emergence of tradition and popular religion as based around deity temples, ancestral halls and other sites of meaning has been pivotal to state interest in taking over heritage sites and turning villages into preservation objects. In tandem with a general interest in heritage as informed by international discourse and the economic resource it presents, there is also an element of control, regulation and assertion of power to be detected in how state agents designate buildings and practices as “cultural heritage” in need of state protection. Sites of local meaning of a ritualistic and religious character could easily be branded as a type of “local heritage” and have often been treated that way by preservationists and state officials who regularly place these phenomena in a category of past temporality with little present meaning. Restored sites such as deity shrines, temples, and ancestral halls are hence often branded as “heritage”, protected, labelled and frozen aspects of local history when in fact they are active sites of communal significance.

At local level this could function as a way of protecting sites that would otherwise be deemed as sites for unlawful superstitious activities (mixin) and thus closed down: putting up a museum plaque and opening up for tourism is a way for the community to get around official condemnation of mixin practices. However, it would be an over-simplification to say that this is a black-and white process of contested space whereby the state represents one thing and the community another. Local and state interests often converge and local elites often
have strong links to, or are representatives of, the political power stratum themselves, as examplified by the Zhuge clan in Zhejiang.\textsuperscript{77}

To local elites heritage resources represent a dual value. Apart from the potential capital income that could be garnered from tourism they also carry a symbolic value, as the prestige of official recognition and outside approval provides status and credibility. Conversely, this outside attention also plays the dual function of at least theoretically protecting local heritage from the threat of state condemnation, destruction, or possible modernisation and new construction.

To the state, the heritage label presents a way of controlling and re-interpreting local meanings according to officially sanctioned history. In this sense, the state has shifted its attitude towards one of inclusion, and even encouragement to pursue traditional practices and restore local buildings, as long as these pursuits stay within the realm of state control. This means presenting themselves as anchored in historical tradition restored for the gaze of tourists, making Nora's idea of \textit{lieux de mémoire} very apt for describing the heritage concerns of the state: museumifying, cataloguing local heritage according to an approved historical context, but less fitting for describing the more complex forces that arise as you probe the surface.

Many heritage sites in Chinese villages play an active role in village life and thus straddle dual roles depending on the position of the viewer. They could be described as the representational spaces Lefebvre has pointed to, or de Certeau's spatially produced spaces of "spielraum": sites endowed with a communal meaning and hence apart from officially regulated space, or ritualistic space that is charged with alternative representations of meaning that often subverts officially ascribed place identity.

\textsuperscript{77} See for instance Mayfair Yang on Wenzhou where the local ancestral hall was designated as heritage at the request of the lineage clan as a way of both protecting the hall but also as a way of gaining credibility for the clan (Yang 2004). A similar story but in a different setting occurred in Leonard and Flower's account of rural Sichuan where turning a deity shrine into a local tourist heritage site was supposed to protect the shrine (but the failure of tourism led to its eventual destruction, Flower/Leonard 1998).
vi, Conclusion

This chapter has placed contemporary heritage concerns in the PRC within a context of tourism, and increased wealth, as well as a more inclusive attitude to culture, and increased interest in national heritage resources as a way of gaining international acclaim. This has been driven by both an academic interest in discovering ethnic and local tradition, as part of the reform-era opening up policy that saw increased mobility and interest in the exotic at home, a rediscovery of China’s cultural diversity, in tandem with a commercial interest in ethnic and local culture for purposes of marketing and cultural production, such as films.

This rediscovery of China in tandem with a realisation that these resources might be threatened by rapid modernisation has led to increased national awareness of cultural heritage as a resource, not least for tourism. This can be discerned in how legislation and policy on heritage has changed throughout the reform-era. Domestically, this is also linked to political ideology on patriotism and cultural inclusion as a way of mediating ethnic and cultural difference; part of the project to create a "harmonious" China.

Hence heritage denominations and listings could be understood as a way of controlling the meaning and content of sites and buildings, whilst also being used for promoting tourism. As a result of the interest in heritage, especially as part of local attempts to promote tourism, the local response has also been a renewed interest in local buildings that have taken on a new meaning as part of the capitalist economy, and sometimes also as communally important markers of local identity and tradition; a way of reviving local tradition based around reconstruction of temples and ancestral halls.

In this way, old buildings and vernacular forms have emerged as local markers of distinction, and carry a new value to localities. This has also seen a flurry of reconstructions, which makes notions of what "heritage" is, and how to understand authenticity, difficult. We shall now turn to specific case studies to see how some of these issues have been played out in local practice in rural Yunnan Province.
Section 2: Heritage site construction in local practice

1. Shaxi: international preservation and local response

Shaxi is one of Yunnan’s more well-known sites for preservation, due to the international acclaim and attention it has garnered. The Shaxi preservation project started in 2001 and was finished in 2004. It was carried out by Swiss architects based at the ETH (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) in Zürich, and mainly funded by the Swiss Development Agency.\(^{78}\) The World Monuments Fund (WMF) was also involved, as was UNESCO and other outside investors, such as American Express. The village has been reconstructed according to strict planning principles and historical research. In tandem with this process, modernisation of the village was undertaken, such as installing electricity and a functioning sewage system. Hence Shaxi is a unique project as it has not only aimed to preserve a surface but has included basic communal needs (such as electricity).

The Shaxi project could be described as a transnational arena for projecting ideas on culture, nature, and heritage according to contemporary heritage discourse on protection as a means of development, and safeguarding local communities from the dangers of modernisation. However, in real terms, the project seems to have had little impact on daily life, and led to a rift between local government agents, Shaxi residents, and the preservation team.

Fieldwork in Shaxi was carried out in the autumn and spring of 2007-08. At the time, the preservation project was completely finished, and no other related work was undertaken apart from the beginnings of a new hotel. I was the only foreign guest in the village, apart from a few backpackers passing through. The village was back to its former self as a small farming community, and you could only guess at what it might have been like prior to preservation in terms of crumbling buildings and lack of repairs.

\(^{78}\) ETH stands for Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule.
I stayed in the village for two periods of about three weeks, including side trips to the county capital of Jianchuan, and other small settlements in the area. Whilst doing fieldwork I stayed with the Yang family in the Ou Yang guesthouse, one of three restored family courtyard homes. I ate most of my meals with the Yang family, as I was usually the only guest, especially during the autumn. Accommodation was very basic, but the Yang family hoped to attract more tourism and were quite used to the needs of foreign and urban Chinese visitors. There was a basic shower with hot water at night, and during my last visit, in the spring of 2008, Mr Yang was busy installing a Western style toilet.

I conducted interviews with relevant staff at the county government in Jianchuan, and talked to people who had been involved in the restoration project, trying to disentangle the motives and aspirations of different actors. Otherwise fieldwork was spent doing informal interviewing and observing village life, trying to assess what the popular opinion on preservation was, how the village might have changed, to what extent tourism has been successful and how international discourse on preservation has been received in a poor rural village in Yunnan: why was preservation of Shaxi considered important, and to what extent has it been "successful"?

Shaxi is a small village hamlet of about 200 households, located in Jianchuan county, Dali Baizu self-governing district (*Dali Baizu zizhi zhou*). Shaxi is about 3 hours from Dali across bumpy mountain roads, and another 3 to Lijiang in the north. The village is nestled in the hills of the Shaxi valley, a fertile piece of land in a landscape that mainly consists of mountains. The surrounding landscape is striking with mountains ranging from small, rounded hills to more dramatic peaks in the distance. In autumn the landscape takes on a yellow and red hue with high skies and fields ploughed dark brown, whereas in the spring the area is filled with fruit trees and fields of yellow rape seeds, making it extraordinarily pretty, especially in the eyes of a temporary visitor. The village itself is very small, just one open square surrounded by wooden buildings, a temple, and a traditional opera stage. Narrow alleys with wooden residential homes of the courtyard variety lead out from the square in all directions.

79 www.dali.gov.cn/jianchuan
The village is a closed, walled-in settlement with three remaining village gates each facing different directions, one east, one west, and one south, whilst the fourth, north one, is missing and leaves the northern section of the village open to the main road and some modern buildings. It is a nucleated settlement and has remained intact, a rare occurrence in modern China. Due to poverty, no modernisation has taken place, nor any attempts to enlarge the village. There is little need as the population has remained fairly static – if anything, the reform-era has seen the younger generation leave in search of more opportunities.

The village, like the landscape, is in fact very ornate, a unitary brown mix of wood and mud with low-slung courtyard houses and the beautiful opera stage. The nearby surroundings are peaceful, with a small creek and some pleasant country roads and hills that could easily be hiked. There are a couple of small deity shrines outside the village gates, and an ornate stone bridge leading to a nearby village hamlet of much more modern character.

Shaxi is a unique village due to its remaining traditional architecture, especially the continued existence of an opera stage and village gates. Compared to the other villages in the area, Shaxi is an exception; an archaic, historical enclave that has escaped the drive to modernise that has occurred in so many other villages where traditional houses have been, if not replaced by modern structures à la rich East Coast provinces, at least radically changed by adding tile and concrete and green glass windows. Shaxi is intact as a planned, structured village entity in stark contrast to many other villages in the Yunnanese countryside that have increasingly come to take on the shape of unplanned, sprawling communities where houses and fields seem to have been added when needed without much thought. One explanation is poverty, another is the relative success of other communities, and how they are newer than Shaxi, have less history, and could be built from scratch as the need arose. In the Shaxi area, some of these newer villages are like satellite villages that have been populated by the original farming community of Shaxi residents, and their children as a way of alleviating the strain on the original village. They all farm the same land, even if land allocation and ownership is strictly divided between individual households. One farmer told me how her parents had originally lived in the "old village" but moved to a newer house in the "new village". Hence there is another explanation than just poverty for Shaxi's remaining buildings and shape, and when talking about
Shaxi village it is important to bear in mind that the village is more than just an old historical core of traditional houses. 

Shaxi is part of Jianchuan county, and the county seat of Jianchuan town is about an hour away, a route that is frequently served by minibuses and less frequently by the local bus. It is a village where the socio-economic conditions are typical of northwestern Yunnan; not desperately poor as in the designation of being "juedui pinkun", or in absolute poverty, but still designated as poor by provincial standards, with the average annual income at the time of research being around 700 yuan. It is a traditional farming community where farmers mainly grow subsistence crops, but also cash crops like rape seed, and a variety of fruit, mostly apples, but also plums, apricots and peaches. Many farmers keep cows and goat as a sideline income, and the village engages in production of goat’s cheese (ru bing), a Yunnanese speciality.

Most people live off agriculture, with a handful of households engaged in other type of enterprises such as running a couple of small shops that sell basic commodities and convenience goods such as dried noodles, cooking oil, rice, and some snacks such as ice lollies, biscuits and sweets. There are two basic restaurants, serving noodles and fried rice to a clientele of mainly those passing through the village or a younger crowd that has yet to be married and have a family. Mostly people eat simple meals at home with the family, consisting of rice, vegetables, tofu, and mushrooms, or spicy Yunnanese rice noodles, or sometimes chicken or on occasion beef or pork.

The main road skirts the village at the upper end where a new section with modern houses has sprung up. This is also where the restaurants and shops can be found, and where there is a small, informal street market held at lunch time where local residents, women mainly, sell fruit and vegetables laid out on basic sheets of plastic. There is also a newer market in this part of the village, under roof with strict divisions where you need a permit to trade. This is where most people come to buy necessities like tofu, certain vegetables, fresh rice noodles, chili and oil.

This means that the historical core of the village is fairly peaceful, and not disturbed by traffic noise. At night, the village is very quiet with no particular entertainments. The village wakes up at around 5am, when the life of the farming

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80 Yunnan Provincial Government (2007), National bureau of statistics (2007). For a village to be designated as very poor, incomes need to fall below 600 yuan/annually.
community starts. During the day the village is fairly lively, but still quiet in comparison to the hustle and bustle of larger towns. To the other side of the village, there are farming fields, a small creek that has given name to the settlement (\textit{xi} in Chinese meaning creek, and \textit{sha} sand). Here, by the river there is another important local sideline, namely the extracting of stones from the river that is crushed to fine sand. This sand is sold and used in order to make bricks in one of the many brick-ovens that dot the landscape in the Jianchuan-area. The brick-ovens resemble huge bee-hives constructed by stones and pebbles, and the machine doing the stone crushing in the Shaxi creek is an old-fashioned steel construction spitting out the crushed stones on the shore. This is the only proper industrial enterprise in the area, and an important local trade that creates cash incomes. Apart from brick making and cheese, the area is also well-known for wood carving (the "\textit{jian}" in Jianchuan means "to carve").

The region has produced generations of skilled carpenters, and carpenters from the area still provide beautifully carved lattice windows, doors, shutters and ornaments. This trade has grown in importance during the last ten years as the region has increasingly been linked to the expanding tourism sector in northwestern Yunnan (centred around Dali and Lijiang), and there has been a surge of interest in traditional crafts, especially in relation to house building and architecture, and reconstruction of architecture.

However, in Shaxi, young people in general claim to have little interest in carpentry, or in training to become a carpenter. Unlike Jianchuan town, there is no local carpenter, or wood carver. Most young people claim that they would rather "go into business", and leave the village to make money. And this is in fact what most young people do. They leave to go to college in towns like Jianchuan, or move to places like Shenzhen to work and save money, even if some still remain in the village to carry on farming. However, life expectations are low, and as in most Chinese villages in this part of China, there are few enterprises, no industries, or other alternatives to farming.

The area is ethnically mixed, but like most of Dali prefecture dominated by Bai people. This is true of most of Jianchuan county.
The Bai ethnic group is the second largest in Yunnan, and dominate Jianchuan county.\textsuperscript{81} The Bai is not an obvious ethnic group, and have to a large extent been difficult to differentiate from the Han. Historically, they were based around the old Dali kingdom, and referred to as "minjia". Post-1949, they came to be labelled "Bai" but have often been treated benevolently compared to other ethnic groups, due to a notion of their high degree of "civilisation". The Bai suffered little abuse during the Cultural Revolution for instance and Dali remained relatively untouched, compared to the Naxi town of Lijiang were Red Guards destroyed temples and artifacts (Rees 2000:33; McCarthy 2009: 59-64; 102-103; Su/Teo 2009:70). The Bai-language is a dialect of Mandarin, but post-1949 the dialect has been labelled Bai-language, and has even got its own alphabet, a phonetic version of the dialect. During the reform-era, Bai-language has taken on a new role in Jianchuan county, and there are even schools that teach in Bai (McCarthy 2009: 118-128). The Bai practice a syncretic mix of religion, that shares a lot with common Chinese beliefs. David Wu has demonstrated how the Bai and the Han often find it difficult to tell who is Bai, and who is Han, and Susan McCarthy has made a similar point, but also argued that Bai ethnic identity has come to take on a new cultural value in the reform-era, as we shall see in the case study of Nuodeng (Wu 1990: 6-8; McCarthy 2009: 59-64, 100-101, 105-107).

In areas like Shaxi, Bai-dialects are spoken by most people, and Bai-traditions such as funerals and festivals can be observed around the area, and are displayed in the region’s built heritage. However, the Bai as a group is fluid, and well integrated and unlike some regions in Yunnan (like Lijiang, Shangri-La, or Xishuangbanna) the ethnic credentials of the region are difficult to discern, and more about regional tradition than ethnic. Most ethnically Han Chinese speak the same dialect, making linguistic traits difficult to assess. However, many rituals and festivals are of Bai-origin, and here the region’s ethnic credentials are quite obvious, even if much Bai-ritual has merged with Han customs; the Bai have been named China’s most well-integrated ethnic minority, and even if the group have left clear marks on Yunnan, especially in Dali prefecture, Bai ethnicity is less pronounced than for instance that of the Naxi to the north (Wu 1990: 6-7; McCarthy 2009: 100-130).

\textsuperscript{81} According to official statistics, 90.5% of Jianchuan county is Bai (www.dali.gov.cn).
As tourism to the region has thus far been sparse, no marketing attempts using the ethnic label have been made, which makes the region's ethnic fluidity even more pronounced. The ways in which Shaxi and Jianchuan are culturally different from other parts of Yunnan seems to be more a case of regional Jianchuan-tradition, and dialect, than a story of ethnicity, even if the two are sometimes difficult to disentangle: the Bai are an intrinsic part of this part of Yunnan, to the point of having merged their own ethnic identity with that of the Han and hence created a low-key but tangible regional tradition that can be discerned in houses, dress, ritual and language.\(^2\)

Historically, Shaxi used to be a trade village. Shaxi was an important stop on the Cha Ma Gu Dao, or the ancient tea-and horse trail that stretched from the tea plantations of southern Yunnan all the way to India, via Lhasa. This trade started in the 14th century, and lasted into the 19th century. In Yunnan, the trade continued until the 1950s, although on a smaller scale. During the Japanese occupation, the trail grew in importance as it provided a means of transportation in and out of China. Caravans of horses and Tibetan traders passed through this way and stopped for the night. The main square used to be the central point for trade, with a locally important daily market, as well as guesthouses and tea houses for the convenience of itinerant travellers. The opera stage and the temple were likewise the results of Shaxi’s status as a place of trade and outside linkages; performances put on were often for an outside audience, and the temple was not a village affair that was anchored in local belief and tradition but a state sponsored, Buddhist temple there for outside visitors. The local population was more prone to visit deity shrines devoted to the pantheon of Chinese gods, such as the Chuan Zhu, the river God, or the local Tudi Huang, the earth, or place, God (Yang 2002: 37-49). This is in fact similar to the current situation, as we shall see. The revolutionary era saw an end to trade, and the village declined. In the reform-era, villagers either left the village or moved to the surrounding settlements where new houses were constructed.

This meant Shaxi was a poor village in a rural backwater, albeit with an astonishing architectural tradition left intact; a Yunnanese trading village that

\(^2\) For more on the fluidity of Bai-ethnicity, see Susan McCarthy (2009: 100-130). I will return to discuss to what extent ethnicity might matter later on, an issue that will also be raised in relation to the case study of Nuodeng, also in Dali prefecture.
seemed to have been preserved the way it used to be, as if time had stopped in 1950 and left an untouched historical artifact. Ironically, this poverty and backwardness has proved useful.

Shaxi’s history as a trade village has come to catch up with the village, making history reappear in the present as an important piece in reformulating reform-era village identity. Shaxi’s architecture and history, as well as the tea-and horse trade as a provincial occurrence has increasingly brought Shaxi back to modernity, and has come to define Shaxi’s place in the modern world as there are few villages left were the original structure of a small trading village still remains. This process is linked to a national, and provincial interest in the old tea-and horse trail, as well as international interest in the remaining architecture. These interests are interlinked, and have both been pivotal to how Shaxi has changed. The history of the tea-and horse trail has grown in importance in Yunnan in recent years, and is linked to the marketing of the province for purposes of tourism. There has been growing interest in the tea trade and the rowing bands of Tibetans that plied this hard trail across often forbidding terrain.

One example of this are the number of documentaries on state television on the tea-and horse trail, and in 2004 there was a well-received film on the trail, focussing on the wild terrain of the Nujiang valley, called the Tea- and horse trail series, or Delamu (Delamu: Cha Ma Gu Dao Xi Lie). This film was made by Tian Zhuangzhuang, one of China’s more well-known film makers, and, perhaps not coincidentally, a specialist in portraying and romanticising the exotic aspects of minzu life on the borders of the empire (for example ”The horse thief”, about Buddhist ritual in Tibet, and ”On the hunting ground”, about the harsh life in Inner Mongolia).

The tea and horse trail is of course useful for tourist marketing purposes, an ancient trail with dangerous connotations and a strong Tibetan link. The increased interest in Yunnanese tea, especially Pu’Er tea, goes some ways towards explaining this interest. Pu’Er tea has grown increasingly important in Yunnan’s economy, making the history of Yunnan’s tea trade even more interesting. Pu’Er has become something of an international health fad. In Kunming, the plethora of tea shops and health stores that specialise in Pu’Er has been exploding during the last ten years, and in Taiwan, Pu’Er is as pricey as the finest locally grown Wulong tea.
I would argue that Pu’Er has become synonymous with Yunnan as a place of nature, ecology, and ethnicity, and the tea trade has been put to use in a clever way where the local and transnational intermingles in the creation of a provincial image. This makes the use of the tea trail into an interesting, transnational phenomenon: the trail was more or less forgotten during 50 years (the trade stopped in the 1950s, as Tibet was occupied, and the CCP-state forbade bands of roaming traders), before being picked up by tourism and tea trading companies alike, for commercial purposes. Shaxi, and its place in the world today, is very much linked to this process, and the village has come to be drawn into a complicated negotiation between national, international, and local interests as a result. In Shaxi, heritage preservation, tourism, and development are issues that merge and intermingle in a small space where an architectural heritage left neglected for 50 years have come to emerge as a pawn in the capitalist economy, whilst also being drawn into international discourse on the value of cultural preservation, sustainable development, and local heritage.

Shaxi’s architectural heritage was left neglected during most of the revolutionary era. The village did not suffer significant damage due to internal upheavals, and poverty and a peripheral location protected Shaxi from modernisations and outside influence. During the reform-era, it has been easier to leave the village and construct new houses outside of the old village nucleus rather than tearing down and constructing anew. The families residing in old village Shaxi are relatively poor and have lacked funds to move out or modernise. The families with houses in the old village number about 50, most of them extended households with family members and their families residing in separate quarters around a communal courtyard. To most people, old village Shaxi represent backwardness and poverty; historical houses that, prior to conservation, were slowly crumbling and falling apart, and of no immediate or particular value. If you had the opportunity and the money, you built a new house outside of the village. There was also, according to some residents, a belief that Shaxi was a special place of special value, and that the village should be kept the way it had always been. Hence modernisation projects, or tearing down the village gates that surround the village in order to open up and enlarge the village was not an option. This type of opinion is interesting, but it is important to bear in mind that this was
after the preservation project took place, and residents might have been
influenced by outside interests, and the explosion of interest in the village.

Pictures from the time before the preservation project began show buildings
covered in weed and grass, badly maintained wooden houses, the main square full
of cracks and potholes, and the opera stage sagging. The temple was closed, and
had been since the 1950s. In 1966 a band of local Red Guards broke into the
temple and destroyed the wall paintings, and smashed Buddhist statues, but other
than that no external damage was made, other than the natural effects of sheer
poverty and neglect.

Had there been funds to restore the village it is very likely that it would have
been done in the same way villages have been modernised all over China, tile and
concrete and green plastic resembling glass windows; houses as emblems of
modernity and a moderate type of wealth. In Yunnan, unlike the richer East
Coast, this type of modern village is rare, and have only recently begun to spring
up in areas surrounding Kunming where villages have benefitted from the
expanding urban zone, and the switch from growing crops to orchids and fruits
and exclusive flowers that are exported overseas. It is also true of the greater
Lijiang area where new housing has sprung up as a response to tourism replacing
the original residents of old town Lijiang. But these are exceptions; mostly, what
you find in rural areas in Yunnan are attempts to modernise and improve that
often leave villages unplanned and chaotic; assemblies of various styles and
upgradings carried out at uneven intervals. These modernisations are
understandable, and often necessary. Buildings in rural areas are damp, dark, and
cold during the winter. Living in an old-style building carries a stigma for many
young people who would much rather move out and construct a modern, foreign
style house. This leaves places like old village Shaxi in a bad position; no money
to modernise, and perhaps also a vague communal sense of residing in what used
to be the central node of local life in the Shaxi valley, a village with historical
credentials that used to have an important function. Like villagers told me, there
is a sense in Shaxi that the village matters, and that its history should be kept
alive. It is also true that the families residing in the courtyard homes in the old
village used to belong to local elites, merchant families who had done well off the
tea-and horse trail and the associated trade.
Most of these families have probably experienced a sense of decline as the tea trade ceased and the village economy underwent drastic changes in the 1950s, from trade to agriculture and land reform. The former status of these families changed as a result, and residing in these old courtyard homes came to equal lack of progress and modernity as Shaxi turned into an impoverished rural backwater (Yang 2002: 17-28; 103-116; Feiner 2004; UNESCO 2005). It is only in recent years, due to the preservation project, that some of the former importance of the village has reemerged, which means local residents can feel a renewed sense of pride in the history of Shaxi and its past. When asked, most residents display a certain amount of pride in their homes, and an attachment to the village and its history. Many claim they would not have liked to move to more modern homes, even if no preservation (and modernisations, such as electricity and sewage) had taken place. They like living in the village. One respondent claimed to enjoy the tranquility and history of the place, so different from Kunming or Shenzhen where he used to work as a migrant construction worker during long periods. Hence it is difficult to say to what extent the lack of maintenance was due to just poverty, and to what extent it is also a case of being protective of local history: both are probably true in different ways, but it is arguably the case that preservation has helped this attitude and increased awareness of local place identity.

The change for Shaxi came in 2001 when the village was nominated by the WMF as an endangered world heritage site. The nomination was made following the "discovery" of the village by people from the ETH along with locally born architect Huang Yinwu, affiliated with the WMF. In 2002 Shaxi was placed on the annual WMF list of world heritage in danger.83

The WMF annually lists heritage sites around the world in an attempt to raise public awareness of the importance of heritage preservation. They hope to make national governments take notice of local and regional heritage assets that are on the verge of disappearing due to lack of funding or impending modernisations. The WMF does not provide funding per se, but in some cases, like Shaxi, they do contribute financially through donations made to the organisations Robert W

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Wilson Challenge fund. In addition to this, the attention a listing brings a site usually works as a way of making policy-makers, private investors, and governments at all levels take notice and take measures to protect the site. The WMF also helps with preservation as an outside consultant – in the case of Shaxi they were involved as part of the ETH team. The WMF does not carry the same legitimacy and same reputation as UNESCO, and work according to a different set of criteria – no lobbying is involved, and there are no special requirements such as future preservation plans. This of course means a certain amount of freedom in selecting sites, and how to work. The WMF trains heritage specialists, and publishes articles, and guidelines for preservation work in an attempt to train local populations and students to become their own heritage agents. They often work closely with UNESCO agents (as well ICCROM and ICOMOS) but they are an independent NGO with global offices, often staffed by volunteers, and co-operate with architects and academics concerned with material heritage preservation on consultancy basis. Their listings of heritage in danger ("The Watch list") is another aspect of this work. In the PRC, the WMF has listed, amongst others, a synagogue in Shanghai, traditional Tianshui houses in Gansu, stone towers in northern Sichuan, a Christian pagoda in Shaanxi, and another village in Yunnan (Tuanshan, to be covered in the next chapter). None of these sites previously ranked particularly high on the national agenda for protection, and in the case of Shaxi and Tuanshan, not at all, even at local level. However, the WMF has brought attention to these sites. This attention has had a significant impact on both Shaxi and Tuanshan, and changed how these sites are regarded by local state agents. In these cases, the attention brought by the WMF has led to a mixture of preservation and tourist developments.

Huang Yinwu from the WMF claims that at the time of the Shaxi WMF nomination, local interest in the village was nil, both from residents as well as from local government who did not see any potential in the village, other than as a burden and strain on an already impoverished county. Local government did not care about Shaxi, and neither did provincial authorities. However, the WMF listing changed this, and alerted local government to the possibilities the village offered in terms of tourism, especially in light of the growing success of Lijiang as a tourist destination.
In 2003, the village was listed as a provincial heritage site, and placed on the list of national historical villages. Huang Yinwu thinks that had local government and provincial heritage agents been left to their own devices, without ETH involvement, developments in Shaxi might have followed a different route of rapid reconstruction and perhaps even removal of residents in an attempt to create a historical village for tourist consumption due to the new outside interest in the village.

The ETH project was originally funded by the national Swiss development agency, and the WMF Robert W Wilson Challenge Fund. Funding was also provided by American Express. A total of 615 000 USD was spent on the restoration, including training of local carpenters, infrastructure and building restoration. Huang Yinwu, the architect with roots in the region, who has been trained at Shanghai’s Tongji University, and at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, was hired as a consultant to work in tandem with the Swiss team led by Dr Jaques Feiner and his wife, Barbara Schultz. Huang Yinwu later came to work on major state sponsored preservation projects such as the 2007-08 restoration of the Potala Palace, and has also been active as a consultant in Tuanshan, the other WMF listed village in Yunnan.

The ETH team had been active in Kunming prior to coming to Shaxi. They had been consulted by the Kunming municipal government to work on a greening-and infrastructure project when they got involved in preservation work as a result of seeing how much of old Kunming was in the process of being destroyed. They had successfully lobbied for a preservation plan of old Kunming, and been active in the preservation and restoration of some landmark buildings such as Kunming’s old pharmacy and some traditional style buildings, including a tea house. They also advocated the establishment of a heritage bureau in Kunming (Stutz 2002). The ETH team had been hoping to work on a similar project in a rural area, trying to combine preservation with development, microcredits, infrastructure and tourism. In this sense, the Shaxi project can be described as a pilot study, or test case for an already existing agenda on how preservation should ideally work.

85 ETH communication, WMF communication, and UNESCO (2005).
They came to Jianchuan county looking for a site and stumbled upon Shaxi, a place that was, in the words of Feiner "closed to foreign visitors and considered of little value, even an embarrassment as it was so poor and decrepit, with tumbleweeds growing all over the place" (Feiner 2004; personal communication 2007). However, the team saw the village from afar when exploring the region, grew curious and insisted on making a visit. They were instantly attracted by the potential of the village, and the obvious historical qualities of the square, the opera stage, and the temple, features that were unique. Hence the preservation of Shaxi was not a project that aimed to develop mass tourism, nor was it state sponsored or linked to do the promotion of national or regional heritage for the consumption of Chinese tourists.

Instead we have a different set of actors, with a different agenda according to which heritage is a resource in developing the local economy, and also a harbinger of communal memory and local history that should be protected for the sake of the community. This type of discourse comes with an elitist slant, and is not always sensitive to local residents. Discourse on heritage as a human right, and local resource often blends with contemporary discourse on culture and development, akin to UNESCO guidelines for sustainable development and heritage as a resource for mankind. Some other examples of this include how UNESCO has approached heritage protection in places like Africa where the intangible, non-material heritage of certain regions and groups has been elevated at the expense of other types of national heritage, often in an attempt to construct community based tourism as a path towards development. This has often been carried out with strong support from national governments, that have internalised UNESCO discourse on heritage (for examples of this see Rowlands/de Jong 2007, especially the introduction and chapter 1; Joy 2007; 2011). This, however, is not quite the case in the PRC where the CCP-Party State has already proved to be successful at national development, and where most local leaders are hell-bent on modernising, not preserving heritage. Slow processes of bargaining with NGOs and setting up eco-tourism aimed at a small groups of backpackers is not necessarily the most obvious path for tourism development. The clash between local interest in tourism as a path towards capital gain and local fame, and international discourse on preservation and development, and the concern with reconciling preservation and tourism, is very evident in the case of Shaxi.
Charging heritage sites with an ideological value is an essential part of how the heritage container works, as a realm for projecting a vision of the value of the past in the present.

In Shaxi, we have an international heritage agent with an agenda influenced by international UNESCO-derived discourse on the value of cultural preservation to the community. This discourse is infused with ideas on local development and community based tourism, projects that would require substantial backing and understanding at communal and regional level in order to be successful. Terms like sustainable development and communal tradition have to come to form a consensus within international organisations, and are used at both local, as well as national and international level in order to establish legitimacy for various projects aimed at developing rural areas, and poor urban neighbourhoods. Ideas on urban renewal and heritage preservation in urban neighbourhoods are in fact often legitimised by using these terms (such as communal involvement and cultural projects), a process that often leads to gentrification and tourism development. According to this discourse, heritage preservation, along with ideas on sustainable development and nature conservancy, has become charged with a positive value that is rarely questioned. This valorisation of heritage means that there exists little space for asking why preservation should take place, and what the alternatives might be; as a result heritage preservation projects of the Shaxi type tend to become sites for projecting outside visions and aspirations for how and why heritage should be preserved, based around elite notions of the value of preservation.

However, these values have increasingly come to have an impact on heritage concerns in the PRC as Western notions of heritage have come to infuse both national discourse, as well as representing coveted legitimacy in the shape of UNESCO-listings, or WMF-recognition. According to these values, the historical past is charged with an emotional and nostalgic type of value that means it needs salvaging when placed under threat from external forces such as modernisation and rapid change carried out by national governments, local populations, or large corporations. According to this notion of the past as always worth saving, it does not really matter why and how modernisation is carried out. This inevitably means that heritage preservation projects tend to disregard local conditions, and project a vision of local heritage that does not necessarily align itself with local
interests. However, to local governments, the idea of capital gain and development is still more important than outside visions of reverting sites back into history, as showcases of themselves. Heritage offers opportunities for tourist gain, and also for local distinction in relation to surrounding areas, but capital interests often come first. 

This means that outside agents such as the ETH and the WMF are welcome in terms of offering legitimacy, but their interests and agendas run counter to local and regional interests in tourism and the commercial aspects of heritage. Shaxi is a very good illustration of this interplay, and how the value and place of heritage in rural Yunnan is negotiated. The Shaxi preservation project was initiated from above, as are most preservation projects. This almost inevitably engenders a process of aestheticisation of heritage resources whereby "rediscovered" and preserved buildings are subjected to perceived notions of "authenticity". This type of monumentalisation is invariably part of most heritage schemes; a process of rendering locally anchored practices and objects into sites for projecting ideas on the value of the past. In the case of Shaxi, heritage preservation has been linked to transnational interests in cultural preservation for the sake of the community and development, but it has also been linked to a mythical past of Shaxi as a trading village, a reversal of Shaxi from reform-era poverty to its former guise as a node on a trade route that has not been actively used for over 50 years. This aspect of Shaxi's history has in fact nothing to do with the present, and most villagers that were active in the tea trade have passed away. Preserving a village like Shaxi according to historical accuracy as a way of maintaining a link with Yunnan's history is akin to Kirschenblatt-Gimblett's assertion that heritage often works as a way of giving new life to sites as "exhibitions of themselves" (Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1998:7). Were it not for the WMF and other heritage agents, Shaxi would have remained a run-down village; as is the case with cultural heritage all over the world, it needs to be almost dead and forgotten due to internal and external changes and later picked up and elevated to "heritage" by external agents in order to survive into the present, in a new role as historical artifact for the gaze of outside observers.

I would argue that preservation in Shaxi has led to local government interest in the village as a tourist site, but in relation to the community the project meant little, apart form the appreciated electricity and the sewage system – but these are
things that could have been done anyway, and have little to do with restoring houses to look like replicas of their historical selves. In poor regions like rural Yunnan, projects based on these understandings often lack underpinnings in communal concerns and interpretations of what modernity and development should mean. In most rural areas, old buildings are regarded as the anti-thesis of the urban, modern, developed world of technical progress. Of course many locals harbour feelings of attachment to the village, and like Mr Yang at my guesthouse, appreciate being able to stay in the village, and are proud of its history. But most villagers do not own a courtyard house of the same historical qualities, and to them, village identity is more likely to be linked to communal sites, not an old house in need of repairs. This means that at local level, the idea that restored houses and sustainable tourism would bring them higher incomes seems far-fetched. This is even more true in relation to local government agents, who would prefer rapid development and revenue as opposed to slower processes of low-scale tourism where incomes might go back into communal economies but might not do much to alleviate deficits at the county level. The actions of local government agents in Jianchuan demonstrate this clash between international heritage discourse and local concerns with development; the interplay between the ETH and government agents are a good illustration of how and why heritage is made use of in rural China, and the misunderstandings that often arise due to conflicting aspirations and agendas for heritage.

Jianchuan local government welcomed the approaches made by the ETH team, and approved their plans to reconstruct and preserve the historical buildings in Shaxi. The first tentative meetings led to successful negotiations and final approval from local government who promised to support the project and agreed to the conditions set up the ETH. These conditions included that developments in Shaxi would be kept small-scale, that no big hotels or outside investors were allowed and that income from tourism should go back into the community, and into continued conservation of the historical environment. The ETH would continue to work with local government as a partner, and consultant in matters concerning conservation and environmental issues, and should be consulted in relation to new developments, especially in relation to tourism. The ETH vowed to stay part of the project, and to train local residents in conservation techniques and how to run responsible tourism in the area. Lu Yuan, a Chinese journalist
who worked with the ETH as a translator thinks that local government were not fully aware of what they agreed to. She thinks they were aware of the growing importance of heritage and tradition in the marketing of tourism and hence agreed to let the ETH team work in Shaxi. However, they did not seem to think that any of the plans were going to work in reality: it all seemed too ambitious, and too much for a small site like Shaxi in a peripheral, poor part of Yunnan where no one really went. She claims they were more or less bemused by the seriousness of the ETH team, and their government funding, but also grateful to be offered help and attention from outside actors. The WMF listing had been something of a surprise, and following the attention this garnered they had considered the possibilities for benefitting from this, but Jianchuan is a poor county and there were no funds to engage in costly reconstruction of a village, and even if Shaxi did receive some funding from the provincial heritage bureau this did not cover anything beyond the most basic repairs. Lu Yuan claims that local officials were fully aware of the publicity a project of this magnitude would garner, even if not successful, and that their promises in relation to small-scale developments were made in the belief that they would be left with some public attention, funding and perhaps some restored houses. This would later turn out to be a problem, and came to create a fraught situation of escalating conflicts between the ETH and local government.

The restoration of Shaxi began in 2002, and was led by Jacques Feiner and Huang Yinwu. They were frequent guests in Shaxi during the two years it took to finish the project. Preservation was carried out in a meticulous way as the ETH team studied old photographs and maps over the village. Most of the work was carried out by local labour which also meant the simultaneous training of local residents in preservation work, and building techniques. The idea was to stick to traditional building materials and keep the original layout, but avoid turning the village into a museum, and avoid any romanticising or reconstruction of some vague idea of antiquity. The village should work as a home, and everyday place for its residents but with the basic idea of historical Shaxi intact, demonstrating how historical preservation and modernisation need not always be at odds.

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86 Personal interview, Ms Lu Yuan, Kunming January 2008.
The main focus of the preservation work was the opera stage, the main square (Sidengjie) and the closed Buddhist temple, the Xingjiao Si. In the end, Shaxi was restored to its original appearance, in an updated, recycled version of its old self: the village was not reconstructed or modernised but carefully restored to what it used to be, using the same materials and colours. It is one of the few preservation projects I have seen in the PRC where restoration has worked according to the principle of preserving the original shape, and in this sense Shaxi is unique.

The project was finished in 2004 when a grand opening ceremony was held in Sidengjie. A host of dignitaries were in attendance, both from provincial government, the SACH, the WMF, journalists, and even a UNESCO representative, Ricardo Favis. The opening attracted the attention local government had hoped for. Central state television attended and lots of newspaper-and magazine articles were published about the restored village. In 2005, Shaxi was awarded the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Award for Cultural Heritage Preservation. However, following this, the relationship between local government and the ETH grew tense. Local government started talking about developing tourism in a very different way from how the ETH had envisaged these development, and there were also conflicts brewing in relation to the restored buildings, funding, and maintenance.

During the opening ceremony, Yang Fubao, the local government official in charge of the project, gave a talk in which he expressed his aspirations for future developments within the village: he hoped Shaxi could become as prosperous, vibrant and successful as Lijiang to the north. In five years, he hoped Shaxi would have bars and hotels and lots of tourists. This talk made the ETH team apprehensive as they felt it went against their own plans for Shaxi, and was a breach with the original agreement. According to Ricardo Favis, the UNESCO representative that attended the ceremony as a way of demonstrating support for the Shaxi project, there were conflicts brewing.

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88 Personal communication with Ricardo Favis at UNESCO Asia-Pacific in Bangkok, Feb 2008. Favis vividly recalled the tense atmosphere between the ETH team and local government representatives, and has notes with the speeches and what was said by whom.
below the surface, but the ETH team were quiet about it, trying not to stir up conflict.

Favis himself gave a speech in which he warned against over-development of the village, using Lijiang as a model for how developments could be difficult to handle if outside investors were allowed too much space and power; he emphasised the importance of low-scale, locally driven developments that could benefit the community at large in the long run. This demonstrates how differing agendas for preservation often clash, and cause conflicts. In the case of Shaxi we have two different motivations for preservation, the international organisation driven by an agenda that aims to restore culture and history, and keep control over cultural ownership within the community, and the very different aspiration of local government to develop tourism. These two agendas are difficult to reconcile, and in the case of Shaxi the misunderstanding or misinterpretation of what the ETH team wished to achieve eventually caused a great deal of conflict and put an end to the co-operation between the ETH and local government.

This conflict is best illustrated by the case of the Xingjiao Si, the Buddhist temple that was a central part of the preservation project. The mural paintings in the temple are considered to be invaluable artifacts depicting the religious life of the tea-and horse trade era. These murals were badly damaged by Red Guards in 1966, and in dire need of restoration. The Xingjiao Si was founded in 1412 and has remained a place of worship since, even if not exactly in the same guise. In modern history, it served an important function in Shaxi village life during the years the tea trade flourished. During the revolutionary era the temple was neglected, and used as an administrative hall and storage space (Yang 2002).

In 2002, when the WMF listed Shaxi, the temple was falling apart. The preservation project restored the facade of the temple, but only made rudimentary repairs inside: there was debate as to what put inside the temple, and how to fund it. The ETH felt that their funding did not stretch to temple decorations, such as replacing statues and restoring the wall paintings that had been ruined. Restoring the temple was part of the overall restoration of Shaxi as a historical facade, an artifact, and in reality the Xingjiao Si has little to do with communal life and tradition, as the temple has been closed for years and does not carry an important local function. Villagers were not that interested; the temple had always been something of an outside resource. Local government wanted to
leave the temple empty, or perhaps as a resource for tourism, as an exhibition hall or possibly restored as a tourist site, with reconstructions rather than expensive, careful restoration of the wall paintings and the prayer halls.

In Shaxi, as local government officials are well aware, religious activity is focussed on a couple of deity shrines outside the village gates, especially the local Tudi Gong Miao (place god), and a shrine to the Chuan Zhu, the river god. These sites are places for active, everyday worship, and form part of everyday village life. They could be described as locally important nodes by which people negotiate and imagine the village. Shaxi, and the other villages in the area are all religiously active places, as are most villages in the Yunnanese countryside. Deity shrines, funeral processions, feng shui masters, and various shamanistic practices are all common occurrences that can be observed when travelling around the province. In the Shaxi area, these practices occur frequently and it could be argued that they form an alternative sphere of "local authority" that informs and shapes spatial practices (de Certeau 1984:106). When asked about this, local officials and those involved in the small tourist industry simply put this down to the overarching idea of "Mixin", or superstition. Mixin is generally used to explain away everything that lacks logical explanation or that could potentially be embarrassing, or perhaps seen as backward, feudal and ignorant, and lack technical progress and modern connotations.

In Shaxi, there seemed to be no campaigns to stop superstitious practices apart from the ubiquitous propaganda to be advanced, modern and developed. In fact, these practices seem to be quite open, which has perhaps not always been the case (see for instance Anagnost 1984; Yang 2004; Yuet Chau 2006 for examples). But there was little official interest, and no willingness to talk more about this, even if it was clear that officials were very aware of most localMixin practice. The ETH, on the other hand, were more interested in restoring the temple in order for it to once again function as a temple. They wished for it to become a communal node for worship once again, despite the fact that its natural role within the community had long since ceased. Here we have a case of preservation for its own sake, informed by an elitist, top-down agenda whereby preservation and authenticity are always "good" things that will restore meaning and cultural practices by rescuing them. However, following Cohen, this need not always be the case as traditions change along with context (Cohen 2004: 111-
113). Restoring the Xingjiao Si would not equal restoring the practices once associated with the site but lead to a monumentalisation of the site, a frozen type of history that would mean little for life in the village, other than as a potential tourist attraction – something the ETH claimed to want to avoid.

The Xingjiao Si shows how preservation is often about freezing history at a certain time and place, and reflect an elite ideology on the value of the past. This means that many preservation projects fails to meet with popular approval, and are constructed on top of popular ideology. The Xingjiao Si is a beautiful facade that lends character and "authenticity" to the village but in reality, the temple carries little or no meaning to most people. The attitude of local government demonstrates a better understanding of local life and the role of the Xingjiao Si within the community: in fact, the temple is an empty shell, and would serve a better purpose as a tourist site, rather than as a restored site for communal worship. The square and the opera stage, that faces the temple in adherence with traditional Chinese culture, are likewise mostly there as decorative reminders of history and most local residents bypass these areas that are more or less deserted for most of the day. Village life is led in the fields, and in the modern section of Shaxi, where the small restaurants and businesses catering to the community can be found.

As it is, the Xingjiao Si remains an empty shell. It hosts a small exhibition on the preservation project, and some history on the tea-and horse trail. It is only open a couple of hours each day at midday, and when tour buses stop by.

The conflict concerning the temple was pivotal in ending the ETH involvement in Shaxi. The conflict concerned both funding, why preservation was important, and how it should be carried out, and eventually led to the ETH deciding that staying would be counter-productive. Their funding was running low, and they were unwilling to ask for more unless their criteria were met. At the time of research, no one was willing to recount the exact details of this decision. Jacques Feiner of the ETH is not willing to say much at all, and is clearly disappointed in the project that lead nowhere other than to a village with a nicely restored facade, and some much needed modernisations. But the other stages of the project, such as low-scale tourism, were never realised. Local government official Yang Fubao

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[89] E-mail contacts in 2007-08.
shrugs, and seems flustered. He claims he really does not understand why they left, but the decision was rather abrupt. However, he did not think that the partnership worked that well, and was in all honestly a bit relieved they left – they created some mafan (trouble), and did not really understand how China "works". Their leaving left more space for local government to set the conditions for the village, especially in terms of investors. But in reality, local government has done little for Shaxi: the village has received little maintenance, and tourism is still very small, even if the project did attract more travellers, but mostly independent backpackers and tourists who make a brief stop, such as Mr Yang’s lunch guests.

No further tourism developments have been taking place, even if a new hotel was being built during my last visit in April 2008, using carpenters who had been trained by the ETH. So in a way the ETH did get their way, at least thus far. Whilst writing this, there has been a new development, a decision to file for a UNESCO listing of whole the tea-and horse trail (stretching over several provinces and great distances, but Yunnan being central), which means new funding is likely to be poured into a site like Shaxi, something that also means there will be greater chances of attracting tourism and investors. In 2010, it was decided that a new highway will be built, linking Shaxi, Dali and Lijiang, which means travel time will be cut in half. The road will be finished in 2014, and might have an impact on tourism to the area, especially in light of how provincial and regional government are actively trying to push tourism in this area.90

Another one of the ETH’s ideas was to restore the old village market, held in Sidengjie. This idea was approved by local authorities who thought it would be a good tourist attraction (once again illustrating the misunderstandings and differing aspirations of these two stakeholders). However, most locals go to the new vegetable market in the modern section of the village that was constructed according to local government decree in the 1980s. Ever since, the old market place in Sidengjie has not been used.

Even if the market has been revived, at least occasionally, it is really a tourist attraction more than a local affair. It is held on Sundays, and is a slow, low-key affair that is the result of local government pressure. During the winter, it does

not open at all, and when I was in Shaxi, it was only properly held once, and at another occasion it was a haphazard affair of a few stalls selling vegetables. There is not an audience for this type of event in Shaxi, and not enough of tourists. The one time the market was properly held it coincided with an official visit from officials in Kunming, along with other tourists.

A very good illustration of the gap between local reality and heritage discourse can be found in the UNESCO motivation for the 2005 heritage award that was granted the Shaxi project. In the UNESCO motivation the square is described as "a civic space filled with local atmosphere and befitting tourists and locals alike to find solace in, or marvel over its honed simplicity, fluid expression, and magnetic appeal. Sales events are occasionally community run with vendors and artisans hawking sundry goods, from knitwear apparel, slippers, and auspicious ornaments, to savoury snacks prepared at home in an array of old-fashioned glass flasks, wooden crates or flat woven-reed baskets" (UNESCO 2005). This sounds a bit like the description of a farmer’s market in Europe, catering to an audience of educated middle-class consumers looking for ecological carrots and sourdough bread, not like a vegetable market in an impoverished Yunnanese village, and in fact, this market does not exist. Sideng Square is empty, perhaps the most quiet part of Shaxi. The only people in Sideng Square are occasional visitors or the odd villager happening to pass this way, but most people go to the fields, and to the modern section of the village. This is where you can find local atmosphere, like in any Chinese village, and this is where people buy and sell daily necessities, such as tofu, rice noodles and oil, not slippers and knitwear. The square is also used for various official events, such as performances when visitors arrive. It is also the site for Shaxi’s New Year’s celebration held in February when a procession with floats take place, and opera performances are held. This is a traditional event that has been taking place for a long time.

In recent years, local government has made use of it in marketing, and I know of people who have travelled from Kunming to watch this event. This means it is now more of an event for outsiders, with local government involvement.
To what extent this has watered down this practice, or changed it, is difficult to say as I have never witnessed it but it is undoubtedly true that this type of event will be drawn into the tourist economy in a place like Shaxi. If this means that it loses meaning, or if it is a case of regaining vitality could be debated, but Shaxi has garnered attention and outside approval as a result. This might lead to a revaluation and new interest in local tradition, as has been the case with other traditional crafts in the region. The type of tourism that Shaxi receives as a result of an event like the Spring Festival will probably enhance local pride and interest in traditional performances rather than dilute them – this is not Lijiang-style mass tourism but small groups of foreign travellers with an interest in Chinese culture, and domestic travellers who likewise take a genuine interest. Of course, you could describe this as exoticism and searching for the different at home, and there is an aspect of this at work in how domestic tourists approach a place like Shaxi and other villages in Yunnan and places like Guizhou, full of ethnic credentials. One difference is that Shaxi lacks much of the self-consciousness the villages described by Tim Oakes in Guizhou seems to possess, to make an example. There is no obvious local elite with education. Preservation has been driven by outsiders, as has the idea of tourism. Of course, Yunnan and Guizhou are similar in that provincial leaders have made very conscious decisions regarding how to use ethnicity in order to enhance tourism, but in a village like Shaxi, the ethnic credentials are much more vague and diluted despite the fact that the village is dominated by Bai people. However, as mentioned, Baining is not a strong feature of life in Shaxi, despite a general sense of increased ethnic identity amongst the Bai. In this sense, any ethnic revival related to tourism, or clever way of negotiating Chinese and ethnic identities are not relevant in this case. In Shaxi, this very open, public reformulation of Bai-identity is not a feature of local life. In guide books, newspaper articles and marketing materials the fact the village is "Bai" is usually mentioned, but most of the emphasis has been placed on the historical connection with the tea trail. Hence ethnic identity has been pushed aside, eclipsed by the connections with the tea trade, Tibet, and Tibetan traders. There seems to be little interest in official Bai-culture; popular religion flourishes but is a locally driven occurrence that appears to be anchored within the community, not driven by local elites.
In neighbouring Jianchuan town, the county seat in Jianchuan county, there are schools that use Bai-language, and a general interest in Bai-culture. This has not trickled down to a village like Shaxi, and outside interest in Shaxi is linked to preservation, but not necessarily as a way of re-asserting ethnic identity, probably due to preservation having been driven by outside actors with little interest in, or understanding of, local ethnic identity. To them, Shaxi is historically interesting due to architecture and the tea trade. This differs from the later study of Nuodeng village, where Bai ethnic identity has been more important. It could be that local government would rather emphasise a vague connection with Tibet due to the tea-and horse trail, akin to Lijiang where the Naxi and the Tibetans appears strangely interlinked in marketing. Tibet does conjure up images of something slightly more dangerous and exotic than "Bai", and this probably plays a part in why the Bai-label in Shaxi is not made use of.

To most residents, the restoration was a welcome change, and the outcome somewhat unexpected. Mr Yang at my guesthouse claims to have been surprised at the result. He has been to Lijiang a number of times and had expected something similar to the restored parts of Lijiang, newer building materials and perhaps more emphasis on business and tourism. But he is pleased at the way the architects has helped him restore his old family home, a nice courtyard building that had been in a state of bad repair prior to the project. He had no money to restore it, and spent long periods away in Shenzhen at construction sites. However, after the preservation project, he was encouraged by the ETH to start a guesthouse in the village to cater to guests passing through, and decided to give it a try. These days the business is doing so well that he can stay at home in the village, as does his son and his family. They make enough to live off, supplemented by farming and cows. Mr Yang has got about 10 beds all in all, and also cooks meals for guests staying the night, as well as lunches for package tourists, the most stable and reliable source of income as he has got a contract with a tour company in Kunming who specialises in Taiwanese tourists.

91 Like Shaxi, Lijiang was an important node on the tea-and horse trail, and the Naxi have always had strong trade links with both Tibetans and Han Chinese. In modern China, the Naxi are sometimes said to be a Tibetan subgroup, and the Tibetan connection is made heavy use of in the marketing of Lijiang. However, the Naxi are a distinct ethnic group, even if the merchant tradition of Lijiang has resulted in a mix of cultural traditions: for instance, Naxi Dongba religion is a mix of both Tibetan Buddhism and Han traditional religions such as Daoism (Ebbe/Hankey 2000; Su/Teo 2009:66; 68-69). For more on this, see the later case study of Shuhe.
Several days a week the tour bus stops by, the Taiwanese tourists spend an hour or so taking in the village, and is then treated to a simple lunch in the courtyard below the pomegranate tree. Mr Yang and his family cooks simple, traditional Yunnanese food, using a lot of chili and vegetables, goat's cheese and tofu and most people appreciate the experience. They tip quite generously and Mr Yang claims to like the Taiwanese a lot, more than he likes the average mainland tourist. He claims to have changed his mind about the Taiwanese since opening his business: he used to think they were snobbish and just interested in making money and doing business, especially the Taiwanese he met in Shenzhen, but the people coming to Shaxi are genuinely interested in the village and behave "civilised". The same holds true of the ETH team – his opinion of foreigners has completely changed, often at the expense of Chinese tourists who lack the civilised behaviour of the Taiwanese, and local government, who, he claims, have done nothing to help him with his business or with repairs and maintenance of Shaxi’s historical buildings.

This appears to be the greatest change in Shaxi; not preservation per se, nor any major tourism developments but a slow reappraisal of the value of the village, and a change in attitude towards outside actors, tourists, and local officials, as well as other, surrounding villages. But still, preservation has not been a great success in terms of tourism or interest in maintaining preservation; most locals have seen little benefits. People like Mr Yang and other, Mr Wu, the local schooltecher, and Mr Li, residing in another of the village’s guesthouses, are proud of their history and background, but also too poor to maintain old courtyard houses. The WMF and the ETH moved in and restored a sense of legitimacy, or pride in being part of Shaxi’s history. Mr Yang and Mr Wu were perhaps the most vocal of the villagers I encountered and both of them have interests at stake in Shaxi, both as house owners, and also as part of the small tourist industry. Mr Wu runs a small guest house and hiking business and caters to mainly foreign tourists who wants to have a cultural experience, such as visiting the region and learning about Jianchuan county. The provincial-level heritage site Shibaoshan, a famous Buddhist cave and temple, that is perhaps Jianchuan county’s most famous site, is located not far from Shaxi, and Mr Wu takes tourists there on hikes.
He also arranges cultural classes and has compiled some materials on the history of Shaxi. People like Mr Wu and Mr Yang have benefitted from preservation. Mr Yang's house was restored and modernised (along with two other residences now functioning as guesthouses, the Li and the Sun family homes), and Mr Wu has grasped the opportunity to make a modest living from tourism with the help of the ETH. In the case of Mr Wu, a schoolteacher with some education, he has made use of his English and understanding of foreign needs. But most of the residents I encountered in Shaxi have not seen any direct benefits: preservation meant better houses and a certain amount of pride even if most of them have noticed no difference in relation to tourism. They still engage in farming or other small enterprises such as making goat's cheese or making bricks. In the settlements surrounding Shaxi most express little interest, even looking perplexed and curious as to what is so remarkable about "those old houses". But of course, they admit, it is about history, about the history of "our China" and Yunnan and it is a good thing the village was rescued by the foreigners. Everyone seems pretty clear about the fact that it was a group from overseas that were responsible for the preservation, and some people admit to be amazed at the fact that foreigners would be so interested in Chinese culture.

However, since the ETH team left nothing much has changed in Shaxi. Local government might have done what they can to find opportunities to promote Shaxi but have thus far not found suitable investors to develop tourism. Neither have they done anything to maintain old town Shaxi – they lack interest in conserving the work the ETH carried out. Provincial heritage agents have an interest in the village, especially since it was listed as an historical village at national level in 2003. However, what little funding they receive is hardly enough. During my second visit in Shaxi I met a Mr Liu from the provincial culture bureau on a brief visit from Kunming. He was not happy about the lack of maintenance, and claims it is the fault of local government who does not take responsibility. They receive about 30 000 yuan annually to carry out maintenance, but most of this never goes into making repairs but is used for other purposes. Yang Fubao at local government claims that this sum is not enough, and only covers basic repairs of the temple and opera stage, and maintaining the sewage system (that actually did break down in the winter of 2008, and flooded the main street with water). This situation has caused a situation where villagers
like Mr Yang distrust local government. His business makes enough to cover some expenses but only the most basic, and he does all the work himself.

Provincial heritage staff, backed by the locals with an interest at stake in tourism, have broached the idea of levelling a small entrance fee but local government said no as it would be too troublesome at this stage, and might deter potential visitors (which seems unlikely seeing the time and effort that is required to travel to Shaxi, a long bus trip on bad roads from Dali or Lijiang and then an hour in a bumpy minibus).

Income from tourism is low; and most of it goes to the few enterprising individuals that cater specifically to tourists, like Mr Yang, Mr Li and Mr Wu. There is also a new guesthouse, the Lao Ma Dian, the Old Horse Inn, that have been leased by an outsider, a female entrepreneur from Lijiang who likes the quiet of Shaxi and sees potential for small-scale tourism in the village, but sneers at local government plans for major tourism developments. Shaxi simply lacks renao, the hot and noisy atmosphere of karaoke bars, restaurants and bars. The lack of renao is the point about Shaxi, the thing that makes it unique; Shaxi is a picturesque, quiet village in a beautiful setting with a strong sense of history. That is why people come, not to sing karaoke. And in this sense the ETH have won. Shaxi attracts visitors of exactly the type they hoped for, and makes a small revenue from tourism, most of which goes back to the village.

Other entrepreneurs in Shaxi makes little from tourism, as tourists live and eat in the guesthouse and spend their time taking in the village and the surrounding landscape. There are no souvenir shops, other than a woman selling embroidered shoes as a sideline to making more practical shoes. The Xingjiao temple is staffed by a local young woman who speaks good Mandarin and some basic English. To her, personally, the project meant a good opportunity. She has received training in tourism, English, and the history of Shaxi, and hopes to one day be able to work with tourism on a more professional level.

There are also a few carpenters that have been trained in preservation techniques, and that have been hired on other projects in the area, where skills in carpentry are required. Hence the project has led to increased life opportunities for a handful of young villagers, and in this sense, and to these individuals, it has of course both been a success and led to a transformation in local livelihoods, albeit on a small scale. Visitor numbers are estimated at around 20 000 per year, but
that is based on local government figures and makes Mr Yang, Mr Wu, and other villagers laugh. Personally I did not see more than a handful and both autumn and spring are peak seasons. Mr Yang, who probably sees the most visitors, make an estimate of 1000 per year.

If you count day trippers, visitors are quite a few, but people spending the night are fewer. Sam Mitchell, an American who runs a Kunming based NGO that arranges trips to Shaxi and plans to set up a small cultural centre in the village, in co-operation with Mr Wu, thinks that it might be around 10 000 per year, peaking at New Year and during the spring which seems more likely. According to UNESCO and WMF visitors numbered around 6000 in 2003, following the WMF listing, and in 2004, after the restoration, this rose to around 10 000 (UNESCO 2005, WMF personal communication). However, this was probably a peak.

This naturally does not generate a lot of revenue, other than to businesses like guesthouses, and perhaps the minibus company who likes charging tourists a couple of yuan extra. According to the ETH, the project generated around 400 jobs in the region, but this seems a lot, and might have been the overall figure for the time the restoration was taking place. This figure is hardly accurate in relation to later, tourist oriented jobs.

People like Mr Yang and Mr Wu are happy to be able to make ends meet and stay in business, and there are no official figures of how many people are engaged in tourism in Shaxi but judging from the structure of most tourist ventures (Kunming or Lijiang based tour operators making a stop for lunch), and the lack of overnight visitors, tourism is hardly a job generating sector. Hence preservation has not changed Shaxi a great deal, and tourism has not been a great success – in this sense, the ETH has been more successful at formulating their agenda and attracting the type of attention they wanted to attract.

Shaxi has been placed on the map of backpackers and cultural tourists, but is not a destination for domestic tour groups. Tourism does not generate a lot of money, but a few locally based individuals are able to make a living from tourism.

The Shaxi project was carried out informed by an international agenda on culture and preservation, closely mirroring UNESCO discourse on the value of the past, especially examplified by attempts to recreate local nodes of meaning such as the Xingjiao Si and the vegetable market.
However, when faced with local reality, this agenda lost out in bargaining with local officials who saw the lure of tourism as more appealing.

But as is often the case with tourism in small villages in peripheral locations, tourism has not been a great success. Compared to the other projects covered in this thesis, with the exception of the rather extreme example of Shuhe, Shaxi is the village that has been the most successful in combining heritage preservation with tourism. Some people in the village do make a living from tourism, and the village has attracted a great deal of attention, even a Lonely Planet entry, invaluable if you are interested in attracting a foreign backpacker crowd. However, local government would rather see lucrative domestic tours. This has not happened, probably due to the lack of *renao* (meaning hot and noisy, i.e. very lively) and the competition from other nearby sites such as Lijiang.

The most interesting thing about preservation in Shaxi is the interplay between local government and the ETH, and how the ETH finally backed out. This demonstrates how heritage discourse in the PRC is often misunderstood by local leaders, and reinterpreted on the ground.

Even if legislation and policy has changed, and advocates protection of historical environments, this is usually seen as a route towards tourism and capital gain: the market value of culture and ethnicity in the PRC is measured by its ability to attract potential consumers. In this sense, local government behaves according to the logic of the market, and the modernising project of the PRC, whereby oldness and antiquity are to be consumed. This is of course not very different from the way heritage is made use of in the West, as facades for shopping districts, or as museums and heritage experiences, dying artifacts and neighbourhoods that are saved as part of capitalist economies.

In this sense, local government in Shaxi think of heritage in a practical, modern way, as a resource to be used not exhibited. However, they have misunderstood how tourism works, and why tourism would visit a place like Shaxi; in this sense, the ETH were more sensitive to local realities and might have been helpful in setting up small-scale tourism that could have been of great benefit.

As it is now, Shaxi balances between a trickle of visitors and local state agents who still envision a different type of future for the village whilst neglecting the resource they do have, the old buildings and the residents that slowly are starting to distrust local state agents and their disinterested attitude.
Peter Howard’s assertion of how heritage is played out at different scales, local, regional, and national is relevant for describing the process that has been unfolding in Shaxi (Howard 2003: 128-155). Shaxi illustrates how the meaning of heritage shifts with locale, standing, and relation to the site. To the WMF, and other international heritage agents, the village is a model and showcase for how heritage preservation should be carried out, and how it could be pivotal to development and poverty reduction; an idea of culture and livelihoods as interlinked. Here, we have an outside actor that has projected a well-intended but perhaps overly ambitious vision on a poor farming community in a peripheral part of Yunnan. At national level, Shaxi is a village of renown due to the international acclaim the village has attracted. It is a showcase for heritage preservation that is useful as an image for both tourism and China’s new commitment to cultural preservation.

However, in real terms, national heritage agents have done little for Shaxi other than listing it as a historical village. From the point of view of provincial and regional government, the village is a tourist asset and has come to emerge as useful in the quest to market the ancient tea-and horse trail. Here, Shaxi is interesting as a tourist resource and generator of possible revenue. At local level, nothing much has changed, and most people maintain a distant attitude to preservation even if there is a certain amount of gratitude expressed at the various modernisations that were carried out.

The village also re-established a new sense of pride and value within the region, especially to its own population but also in relation to other villages in the Shaxi area. Shaxi used to be very poor, and still is, but some of the stigma of being "the old village" fell away as the buildings were restored, and received outside attention; this appears to be felt by all residents in Shaxi, particularly people like Mr Yang and Mr Li, owners of old residences with historical qualities that have now taken on a new value, that has even offered them a new type of livelihood. Hence Howard’s assertion is important as it reminds us to look at different actors, and different outcomes: preservation in Shaxi has had more than one outcome, and means different things to different people. In a case like this, with a number of actors and interests involved, this is perhaps more true than in some other cases where preservation might have been more one-sided, such as my later examples of Heijing and Nuodeng.

Jianshui and Tuanshan are both good examples of the differing motives behind heritage preservation in Yunnan, and demonstrate the interlinkage between tourism and preservation. In Jianshui, heritage reconstruction has been centred on a neighbourhood, and a number of residential buildings, but no overall attempts to change the town have been made. Tuanshan is one of the villages in Yunnan where attempts to develop heritage tourism were relatively early, but the process has been haphazard and demonstrate how heritage tourism is not necessarily of benefit to the community; Tuanshan is also a good contrast to Shaxi as the WMF have been active in protecting the village by putting it on their Watch List (2006), but no active preservation has been taking place.

Jianshui and Tuanshan are both located in the "Karst landscape and Cultural Tourism" region, a label used by provincial authorities to divide Yunnan into tourist development zones; this area is still undeveloped in terms of tourism, but regional authorities have long been aspiring to emulate the more successful regions of Yunnan, such as the north and the far south. Here, heritage is an important asset.

Fieldwork in Jianshui and Tuanshan was carried out in the spring and autumn of 2007-08. I stayed in Jianshui town, in a simple guesthouse and also spent about a week in total in Tuanshan village, in a family home (the Enren House, one of the listed buildings in the village, that provides simple accommodation and meals on request). There are no hotels or guesthouses in Tuanshan village, but local buses and minibuses that connect the village and Jianshui are frequent.

Fieldwork was carried out by informal interviews with local residents, and more formal interviews with relevant staff at the Construction Bureau in Jianshui, as well as the Culture Bureau, and the Tourist Bureau in Jianshui. I also talked to provincial heritage agents in Kunming, as well as staff at the World Monuments Fund (WMF). All information is gathered from these interviews, unless otherwise stated.

92 See appendix 1, Interviews for exact details and dates.
Jianshui and Tuanshan are located in the Honghe region, southwest of Kunming. Dependence on agriculture is less prevalent in the Jianshui area than in Shaxi, and a moderate wealth exists, as evidenced by new construction, and large-scale agricultural enterprises. This is a well-off part of Yunnan, that historically has been wealthier and better connected to the outside than is the case in the north. The Honghe region encompasses some of Yunnan's most fertile land, long used for growing tobacco, Yunnan's foremost cash crop. The Honghe cigarette label is known all over China. There are also tin mines around the towns of Gejiu and Honghe. Tin and tobacco were for a long time two of the main pillars of Yunnan's economy, and crucial assets within this region that has had a profound effect on regional culture. In the early 20th century, the French completed the Indochina railway that facilitated trade with South East Asia and created a certain amount of local wealth in the towns affected by the trade. This heritage can be discerned in the architecture of towns like Jianshui, not to mention in a small village like Tuanshan that came to be linked to the tin economy, and the outside links it fostered. Tuanshan village was originally built during the Ming dynasty (1320-1644), by migrant workers from Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu who built according to the regional traditions of their home provinces. This group had grown wealthy from the tin trade, and villages like Tuanshan are full of grand courtyard mansions with intricate wood carvings and other decorations. Jianshui town is likewise a town of merchants and scholars, a place where there once was a gentry elite that had aspirations to the centre of the empire (Shen 2001: 74; Su 2004: 50; Bin/Zhang 2005: 33). However, this region is also rich with minority culture, and display an array of different ethnic belonging. It is also a region of sometimes forbidding terrain, mountainous and full of rainforest. There are still pockets in the Honghe region that are on the periphery, with bad roads that sometimes close due to torrential rains and landslides. Pockets of strong ethnic culture exist, and ethnicity has taken on increased importance to the region as tourism has come to emerge as a new strategy in the regional economy. However, minority regions are often very poor, and poverty is a widespread issue in the region. Reform-era wealth has been spread in an uneven way, and reflects a disparity between ethnic groups, and location. Most minorities reside in the mountains and have access to less fertile land than is the case in the Han-dominated parts on the plains, where Jianshui and Tunshan are located, along with other wealthy areas such as Gejiu and Shiping.
The Honghe-district is a self-governing region dominated by Yi and Hani minorities (Honghe Yi Hanizu zizhi zhou, or the Honghe Yi and Hani self-governing district). Honghe town is the overall administrative centre for the region. In relation to heritage and planning issues in Jianshui county (including Tuanshan) it is the Jianshui Culture - and Construction Bureaus, along with provincial authorities that handle administration and legal matters. In relation to Tuanshan, the local township government in Xizhuang, the nearest town, is also an important agent.

Infrastructure in this region has been greatly improved in recent years. This is due to the increased emphasis placed on trade relations with South East Asia. This means that the region is much more accessible now than was the case in the past. The new highway linking Kunming and Jinghong in Xishuangbanna, and onto Chiang Rai in Thailand has shortened the trip from Kunming to a mere four hours, compared to the earlier ten-hour trip. This means that the region might once again become a hub for South East Asian trade and cultural interchange; and more important, it has led to a new regional interest in developing tourism, as we shall see in relation to Jianshui and Tuanshan.

John Flower has argued that roads are crucial cultural veins in the rural landscape, with both real and imagined power, symbols of modernity that carries the capacity to affect and change the fate of rural locations (Flower 2004: 652). In Yunnan, provincial authorities endeavour to connect as many rural locations as possible to functioning highways as a way to alleviate poverty, speed up development and increase productivity. One reason for this, at least in some areas like the northwest, is tourism. The planned road that will connect Shaxi directly to Dali and Lijiang is part of this program.³³

³³ See Flower (2004) for the whole story on northern Sichuan. His and Pamela Leonard’s work on temple building and tourism in the same region also touches upon this issue (Flower/Lee 1998; Flower 2004). In Yunnan, this issue has also come to entail relocation of residents to settlements closer to roads, or the removal of whole villages (buildings included) to sites closer to roads. However, this is fraught with difficulties as some villages that cannot, or refuses to be moved, are left without access to infrastructure. Some people who have been moved close to major roads might not be able to afford road tolls, as is the case in Flower's account. In many cases the roads are built too rapidly, in a substandard way and without taking local topography into account which has led to increased problems with landslides. Sometimes roads have been blasted into mountains at great cost and end up useless as they cause too much environmental damage and/or have to be closed during the rainy season. For good examples of this, see China Development Brief on Pingbian county, to the south of Honghe, and also Harwood on the Nujiang Valley (2009).
In the Honghe region, this aspect of road building is not as obvious, and more to
do with trade, but tourism also figures as a driving motivation. The improved
infrastructure has led to increased tourism, and also a new interest from regional
authorities to promote tourism. This has also been backed by provincial
authorities, who see tourism as linked to trade and other enterprises; a cultural
resource and means of marketing the region. Tourism to southern Yunnan, with
the exception of a few locations in Xishuangbanna, is not particularly well-
developed. In fact, Yunnan is one of China’s foremost tourist destinations, but
incoming tourism is focussed around Kunming, mostly as a transport hub, and the
northwest with Lijiang, Dali and Shangri-La (Zhongdian) being obvious magnets.
This has affected surrounding locations, and has had an impact on local
governments in places like Shaxi, but most of Yunnan remains fairly unexplored
due to poverty and bad roads. Hence an area such as Honghe nourishes hope of
forming a southern alternative to the north, with a more pronounced ethnic
culture, subtropical climate and easy access from Kunming. One pawn in this is
traditional and regional culture, and places like Jianshui and Tuanshan form
important sites for heritage tourism to this region, as do some of the region’s
natural landscape. The UNESCO-listed Shilin area, or The Stone Forest, an
astonishing area of karst cliffs in various shapes and variations, is located
halfway between Kunming and Honghe, which means there are both cultural as
well as scenic sites in the region, hence the name "Karst and cultural landscape".
Another scenic, as well as cultural, site in the region are the rice terraces at
Yuanyang. These terraces have emerged as key-assets in the drive to establish
tourism in the Honghe-region.

These rice terraces have been placed on the UNESCO tentative list, and could
become Yunnan’s next World Heritage site. The terraces are still in active use
and have been farmed for generations by Hani-farmers who have carved out
terraces in the mountains for years, expanding over a huge area. They are in fact
one of Yunnan’s more interesting sites, but have not been developed as a tourist
attraction until recently. Many photographers go to great lengths to arrive at the
perfect time of the year and day to catch the sunrise or sunset, especially when
the terraces are filled with water during the early spring. They have become one
of the most photographed images in Yunnan, and are an important piece in selling
and marketing the province.
However, before infrastructure was improved, the trip from Kunming could last for over a day or more due to landslides or accidents, making travelling there time consuming and difficult. This has changed in recent years, and the Yuanyang area is gearing up for another type of tourism that could potentially change the area, or, if handled in a good way, provide much needed revenue in a very poor part of the province.

Yuanyang is not one of my case studies, nor is it connected to architectural heritage, but like Lijiang in the north, this area is central to other regional efforts to construct tourism. Honghe authorities have tried to both benefit from tourism and the increased attention the area has been receiving, whilst also attempting to minimise the impact from tourism. This is important in light of aspirations to World Heritage status: UNESCO demands mean that developing tourism in an aggressive way could harm the application, especially since UNESCO are unhappy about the way Lijiang has been handled. However, a couple of years back one area was leased to a tourist development company that wanted to establish a tourist site. They started levying an entrance fee and paid local Hani farmers to sing and dance for tourists. A grand hotel was built and the area started taking on an air of karaoke bars and ethnic culture for sale. At this stage, Honghe authorities stepped in and withdrew the development rights as the tourist company had breached the understanding that no "exploitation" could take place. This could be due to the pending UNESCO-status, or even due to an understanding that this type of development might do real damage to the site and what made it attractive in the first place. It is also true that this type of development would do little for alleviating local poverty and improving livelihoods, as profits go back to the company. Jonathan Jiang, a researcher at Kunming-based South West Science Academy and a former official in the Honghe government, claims to be a case of not wanting to lose control over developments. As he puts it, incomes in the Honghe region average 150 USD/annum which means poverty is a pressing issue. Finding alternatives to agriculture, particularly in the poorest areas, is important. Low-scale, responsible and community run tourism could be an alternative, but if outside companies move in, this is not likely to happen.

Hence Honghe authorities are not interested in this type of development, and no other ventures of this type have taken place. Instead, there are several NGOs and other organisations that arrange trips to this area (often from Kunming) and arrange food, guides and accommodation in local villages.95

The case of Yuanyang, and the reactions of Honghe government are telling of the new emphasis placed on tourism in the region: immediate financial gain is of less interest than developing a functioning long-term alternative, and UNESCO-status of more relevance to the future of Honghe than short-term profits from leasing out development rights. A similar situation has been unfolding in Tuanshan village, and in Jianshui town, where, as we shall see, cultural heritage has emerged as a way of granting legitimacy to the town for purposes of tourism.

**ii. Jianshui town.**

Jianshui is a very typical southern Yunnanese small town. There is a dusty modern section with new houses constructed in concrete and covered with tiles. Around the bus station, the roads are wide and an array of hotels and restaurants can be found. It is a lively place, with a market town atmosphere, full of buses passing through. Jianshui is a transport hub, and regional centre. Jianshui is the administrative capital of Jianshui county (or Lin’an as it is often referred to, meaning the greater Jianshui urban area, not just the town centre). Jianshui has got its own local administration that handles issues related to construction, tourism, and heritage in Jianshui county. Jianshui is close to Shiping and Honghe, two of the other main towns in the area, but Jianshui carries an air of being slightly bigger, wealthier, and livelier of all the towns in this part of Yunnan.

In central Jianshui, this importance is underlined by the town’s historical connotations. Jianshui has got a remarkable built heritage, and used to be a town of scholarly renown and gentry aspirations, a heritage that can be discerned in both vernacular as well as official, monumental buildings.

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95 One example is the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA) funded, Kunming-based Nordica centre that arranges specially arranged trips to the area, where all revenue goes straight to the local people providing services. All arrangements are made by a group of local Hani-women, who pool the revenue and put into a communal pot of cash incomes, as a supplement to farming (personal communication, Hans-Erik Karlsson, Nordica Institute in Kunming, March 2008).
The old part of Jianshui is located in the centre of town, where a cluster of traditional style buildings can be found. Jianshui is particularly well-known for its Confucian temple complex, where the Changwen academy, the centre of Jianshui's former educational elites, used to be located, and the Chaoyang Lou, a city gate that is a replica of the Beijing Qianmen (the front gate at Tiananmen, or the Gate of Heavenly Peace). The Chaoyang gate is well-preserved and forms a central axis in Jianshui, dividing the new and old sections. There is also a well-preserved Qing-era courtyard mansion, the Zhu Family Gardens (Zhu Jia Hua Yuan), that functions as a hotel, museum, and has been used as the setting for a number of Chinese costume dramas.

The Confucian temple is particularly well-known, and functions both as a park for locals, and as a tourist attraction for outside visitors (who are levied a hefty 60-yuan entrance fee – locals can enter for free). The gardens are used for exercises such as dancing and *taijiquan*, and in the mornings and early evenings it is full of mainly retired Jianshui residents. Surrounding the Qianmen-replica there is a farmers market, and a lively market street where everything from mules, pigs, shoes, and sweets can be bought. This makes old town Jianshui extremely lively in a way that is not the case in a place like Shaxi, or even neighbouring Jianchuan town, the county seat in the Shaxi-region. Jianshui is the central node in the area, and you can tell. The old town here is used for everyday living, and is an incorporated part of the town, that has been growing in circles with the old core intact and still functioning as the centre for daily life, and for commerce and social activities. The old town is also the reason people visit Jianshui, and is the centre for tourism activities. However, tourism has thus far not had a great impact on daily life. For instance, the decision to allow locals to use the Confucian temple grounds for free has created a lively, fun atmosphere of small town life that adds another dimension to the austerity of the great temple complex with its array of halls and official spaces.

The neighbourhoods surrounding the temple and the Zhu family residence are full of Yunnanese traditional architecture with white-washed walls, rounded roofs and screening walls. Even in cases where houses have been modernised, or are in need of repairs due to poverty or neglect, the basic shape of Yunnanese building traditions can be discerned, and very few attempts at wholesale modernisation have been made, which means walking the streets in the neighbourhoods
surrounding the central core of Jianshui is a literal treat for anyone interested in
Yunnanese history. Jianshui exudes an air of historical Kunming, familiar from
old photographs, with two-storey merchant houses and bean-shaped courtyard
homes with rounded roof gables and pointy eaves. However, Jianshui architecture
is also typical of southern Yunnan in that it displays a variety of styles that is
telling of the region's migrant past. Southern Chinese architectural styles, similar
to those found in Zhejiang and Jiangsu, are merged with local materials and
traditions. Jianshui merchants and elites had an aspiration to the centre, and to
central Chinese culture. One example of this is how this small town had the
highest proportion of successful candidates in the Imperial exams in the whole of
Yunnan, and surrounding provinces (Shen 2001: 74; 2003: 22; Su 2004: 50-51;
Bin/Zhang 2005: 33). It is a town with a strong scholarly tradition, as evidenced
by the great Confucian temple complex. This is mirrored in the local architecture,
a nationalised, but also locally rooted built heritage that on the one hand is very
Yunnanese, but on the other also reflects an aspiration to be part of the centre and
national culture. In this sense, Jianshui could be described as a well to-do
Yunnanese merchant town that functions as an enclave of nationalised cultural
norms in a minority-rich region on the periphery of the empire. In this sense it
also a reflection of Yunnan's history as a province of not just ethnic minorities,
but also of migrants from other parts of China.

As tourism had grown in importance in recent years, Jianshui has naturally been
affected by both regional concerns as well as provincial policy on developing
tourism. As a result, Jianshui old town is being marketed as rich with Yunnanese
traditional culture. The town has been featured in travel magazines, and guide
books to old towns in Yunnan. In this type of publication the architectural
heritage is emphasised, as is the making of *doufu*, tofu, a speciality of this part of
China – in towns like Jianshui and Shiping, the making of tofu is an important,
often family run enterprise, that requires hard labour: rising at 4am to get started
and later selling the produce in the market. One aspect of the tofu production is
the special water the region is famous for: Jianshui wells are many and often
decorative. The water from these have traditionally been used for making tofu.

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96 For some examples of this, see Liu and Guo (2007) and Zhou (2003).
Hence traditional crafts and the places associated with them, such as wells, have been important to how Jianshui is sold to the outside. There are some obvious tourist sites, like the Confucian temple, the Chaoyang gate, and a beautifully ornate bridge and a cave on the outskirts of town that have long been visited by regional tourists. There are some comfortable hotels, the Yuanyang rice terraces are a couple of hours away, and the historical village of Tuanshan is within close reach. Jianshui has got a relaxed, friendly pace of life with some nice food, some regional specialities like tofu and guo qiao mixian, "Across the bridge noodles", Yunnan’s most famous dish, that is said to have its origins in Jianshui. In order to further increase visitor numbers, the vernacular heritage of the town has been pounced upon in marketing efforts. Hence tourism is being pushed by both provincial authorities who wish to see more tourism in southern Yunnan as a whole, and regional authorities who wish to develop this slumbering resource. In Jianshui, the construction of a heritage site is instrumental to this quest, and heritage protection here is most definitely linked to the promotion of tourism in the area.

In recent years, one part of old town Jianshui has been reconstructed in the same way many other historical neighbourhoods have been reconstructed all around the PRC. The main street running through the old town, and some of the adjacent streets have undergone "historical" reconstruction to appear vaguely traditional, buildings lavished with red and green paint and ornamental dragons, red lanterns and glazed tiles. This style is not anchored in local tradition, and marks a break with the white-washed walls, and earthen tones of Yunnanese architecture. This street is also the central shopping precinct in town where most expensive department stores and electronic outlets can be found. At night, people often gather in this street for a walk, or to watch a game of football, basketball or some light entertainment shows on the massive plasma-screen televisions displayed in the shop windows.

97 For some examples of this see Shen (2001; 2003: 20-21).
98 There are quite a few other places that compete for this honour, but Jianshui is the most well-known birthplace of this very Yunnanese dish consisting of fresh rice noodles, cooked in chicken broth at the table with a variety of condiments and vegetables. Legend has it that a woman worrying about feeding her husband who was studying for the Imperial exams in isolation on a small island composed this dish as a way of being able to keep the food hot and fresh on the way to his study, hence the name "across the bridge" as she had to cross a small bridge carrying the hot broth to reach him.
There are also some food outlets, such as hamburger restaurants, or milkshake stands (Jianshui being well-known for excellent milkshakes and fruit drinks). In the streets leading out from this central part, there are mostly rather run-down residential homes and plenty of small restaurants, selling noodles or kuai can, cheap dinners with a selection of dishes and rice. According to the heritage bureau, they are aware of the historical inaccuracy and the difficulty in claiming that this street is about preservation or protecting local heritage. In fact, it marks a break from the rest of the old town, and ruptures the feeling of Yunnanese small town and creates an air of faux-China; some vague notion of Qing-era romance that could be the set of a Chinese film.99

However, heritage bureau staff are powerless when it comes to this type of development. Decisions on this type of development are taken by the Construction Bureau, and higher levels of government at provincial and district level, and have got little to do with their work. Heritage bureau staff are very straightforward and honest when they point to how this is not about historical protection, but commercialism, tourism, and ”modernising” Jianshui to satisfy tourists and consumers. Zhang Jiannong, at the heritage and culture bureau, claim that even if this reconstruction is not ”authentic”, it still adds allure to the central shopping area, in a way that consumers appreciate. Perhaps it is important to see the difference between ideas of protection (baohu), and (gengxin), reconstruction.

In Jianshui, we have both, at the same time, in more or less the same site.

Jianshui was listed as a historically important city (lishi wenhua mingcheng) at national level by the SACH in 1994.100 The Confucian temple, and the Chaoyang gate are also listed as national heritage sites (guojia zhongdian yichan wenwu baohu danwei). In addition to this, much of central Jianshui is placed under various degrees of protection under the local - or provincial heritage law. The vast majority of ordinary residences are placed under city-level protection, with a few exceptions placed under provincial-level protection.

Heritage management in Jianshui falls under the jurisdiction of both the Culture Bureau, where there is a subdivision that deals exclusively with heritage protection and management issues, and, as is the case in the whole of the PRC,

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100 www.sach.gov.cn (Zhongguo lishi wenhua mingcheng di san pi, ”The third group of historically and culturally important cities”, 1994).
the Construction Bureau. There are two members of staff devoted to heritage issues, both of them working for the Culture Bureau, but at the Heritage Office branch.

Overall management and legislation in relation to listed heritage buildings of the vernacular type should be handled by the Heritage Office, but in reality falls under the jurisdiction of the Construction Bureau that handles all types of issues related to planning and construction in Jianshui (which is often the case, even if legislation states that the Construction Bureau needs to incorporate heritage protection plans in cases of construction/urban renewal). Hence the Construction Bureau have decision-making power in relation to buildings of all types, including listed buildings. Heritage Office staff can only advise and negotiate in cases where the Construction Bureau acts in ways that might damage old buildings. Here, the Heritage Office works more as advisory consultants, with no real impact. This makes the heritage bureau quite powerless, especially when capital investments are involved.

Heritage agents in the PRC resemble those of Western countries; when it comes to real decisions on urban renewal or construction, they offer advice and guidance, but are rarely more than cultural experts with little real power over ultimate decision-making. However, in Jianshui old town, not much new construction have been taking place up until a couple of years back, when the historical reconstruction project took its inception.

The Heritage Bureau carries other responsibilities, along with the Culture Bureau: one important aspect of their work is to publicise and market Jianshui heritage, and to make sure heritage assets are taken advantage of, often for purposes of tourism and marketing. This is of course different from protecting them, and in many ways this resembles the work of the Tourist Bureau in Jianshui, another important agent in heritage affairs.

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102 In fact, Tourist Bureaus all over China carry more and more power over how heritage resources are handled; another aspect of this process of marketing is of course how development companies are often allowed to lease the rights to develop heritage sites, following the rules of the market, something that was not the case in the past when heritage management was handled by specialist staff at Culture/Heritage Bureaus in addition to the Construction Bureau. This is illustrated by the various cases and actors involved in the sites covered here. This means that management of heritage has grown increasingly complicated and differs from site to site, province to province. I would argue that this is also one reason for legislation not always being adhered to: there are too many actors involved to make it clear, even to those directly involved.
These bureaus, especially the Construction Bureau, also carries overall responsibility in relation to Jianshui county. This points to how heritage, whilst deemed important, is still just a side responsibility of the Culture Bureau, and linked to the work of the Tourist Office, and the marketing of Jianshui. When it comes to real decisions related to construction, demolitions, and reconstructions, responsibility lands with the Construction Bureau. However, when it comes to listings of local level heritage it is the heritage bureau that makes the ultimate decision, and carries responsibility.

Jianshui is a good example of how listings, and the politics of listings work at local level, and how this is interlinked with attracting tourism and constructing heritage sites in practice; an elevating of the local to the echelons of "heritage" in order to be make it more attractive in the eyes of outsiders. Heritage listings, and the way Jianshui has been marketed as a place of tradition and culture is also interesting in its very selective use of a certain type of heritage, much like the old Tea-and Horse Trail has been made use of in the case of Shaxi. This is how heritage works, a selective use of the past that suits present needs, in the case of Yunnan more often than not the needs of marketing for tourism.

In Jianshui, we can see how the legislative framework, and the new emphasis on heritage for purposes of tourism, have been made use of in practice.

In Jianshui, listings have been used in order to enhance the overall historic qualities of the old town, a valuable way of marking "oldness". This is in fact a common use of listings in many places and means that there is a wealth of listings but no funding available, which explains why so many heritage sites in China are seemingly neglected.

In Kunming municipality for instance, there are 216 sites, 66 of which are national sites and receive some basic funding. However, this funding does not stretch far and many sites are in a state of bad repair (Yunnan Province 1995, Fan 2000). If tourism fails to arrive and create enough revenue to maintain sites, localities are left to care for heritage sites without extra funding, often lacking even the most basic funds. This can be seen in villages and towns all around Yunnan.

I would argue that the incentives offered by heritage listings, and official recognition of local heritage, are important factors affecting how local heritage is taken advantage of.
Heritage listings serve a dual purpose, as they are, at least theoretically, meant to protect local heritage from modernisation or other threats, whilst also being crucial for locations that wish to develop tourism due to the legitimacy they offer. In small locations, being granted a heritage listing means credibility in relation to surrounding villages, as well as local pride in being considered a place worthy of distinction. As a listing inevitably means legitimacy and approval of a site, it also provides increased chances of attracting tourism, particularly of the pre-arranged, lucrative tour-agency type. In Yunnan, and other poor provinces, tourism is the main driving force for most local preservation efforts, which places heritage listings at the centre of heritage concerns; listings are ultimately more important than actual preservation.

This means that good links to provincial authorities, and even more so, links to international organisations such as NGOs, or cultural bodies like UNESCO, have come to take on increased importance to localities. The system of listings and the perceived elite approval they offer is crucial for developing tourism and provide invaluable marketing material. Listings could be described as a way for the state to demonstrate what heritage is, and should be.

In this sense, at local level, the legislative framework forms a point of departure for bargaining the conditions for preservation and protection, and how to benefit from local heritage resources in shrewd ways. It is true that legislation on heritage in the PRC is weak, and often quite vague, and knowledge of these laws is not very developed.

Heritage legislation is often eclipsed by more pressing concerns such as urban development, or rural modernisation. However, the legislative framework has been important as a framework around which to negotiate the meaning of local heritage, and has been offering localities benefits, most importantly listings. In this way it could be argued that official discourse and policy has been driving the shape and content of heritage projects in the PRC. Heritage laws do not automatically offer protection, or funding. But listings do grant approval and distinction to sites. This means that the legislative framework is pivotal to interest in listing local buildings and sites as "heritage". The legal framework provides a set of guidelines, and an agenda for preservation, the ultimate aim of which could be interpreted as an aspiration to capital gain based around tourism; a way of attracting attention and legitimacy.
Hence heritage legislation in the PRC functions very much according to Michael Herzfeld's assertion of legislation as an official classification that provides an "uncompromisingly fixed point of reference around which swirls the eddies of intense, volatile negotiation over meaning and interpretation" (Herzfeld 1991:229). Listings are a central tool in this quest: by attaching a label, a plaque, the state and its agents marks a site as officially approved, and hence elevates the site to the echelons of "heritage", whilst simultaneously also placing the site within a framework of state regulation. By designating a site as "heritage", the state places it within a framework of oldness and national tradition, as opposed to a living, local heritage.

This practice could explain some of the emphasis placed on listings in order to make Jianshui Old Town appear more like a tourist site. Old town Jianshui is full of locally listed residential homes, ordinary dwellings that all carry a plaque stating that their home is a locally important heritage site. What this means, in practical terms, is difficult to assess. The plaques seem to be there for the outside observer, more than for real purposes of protection. As a result, old town Jianshui appears vaguely historical; wherever you look there is a plaque stating buildings as being of historical value, although never stating why this is the case. There are also a number of buildings listed at provincial level that receive a certain amount of funding from provincial government for repairs, but for the most part, the buildings in Jianshui are listed at local level and should in theory be funded by local government. However, this is not the case. There are not enough funds to maintain all of the buildings that are listed, with the result that they are more or less in need of maintenance. Provicially listed buildings, of which there are about 10 all in all, are all in much better shape. This shows that funds allocated by provincial government are used to maintain and repair buildings, which is not always the case, one example being Shaxi where funding from provincial government is claimed to be insufficient to make adequate repairs, leaving locals unhappy with local government.

In Jianshui, listings of residential homes in the old part of town seem linked to tourism and constructing a site rich with heritage and history, more than being linked to preservation and protection. But at the same time, seeing that Jianshui is a nationally listed historical town, the historical fabric should be kept intact, and preserved.
At the heritage bureau, this is said to be the foremost reason for making a heritage listing, not tourism. This argument is of course not wrong; Jianshui is one of the few towns in Yunnan (apart from Lijiang and Dali) that have specific legislation in relation to heritage protection, outlining the different heritage assets within town, and their value and right to legal protection. This is due to the fact that Jianshui is listed as historically important at national level – these sites need to establish local legislation that is more specific than the more general national laws, and take local realities into account. This type of local legislation (in Chinese this translates as "guiding", or regulation, not "fali", or law, or, specifically in relation to heritage as wenwu baohu guiding, i.e. regulations for protecting heritage assets). These laws need to adhere to the national law, and reflect the content of national legislation on heritage. In Jianshui, local legislation outlines the various heritage properties and what is protected, and what zones this involves.

Heritage properties are the properties of the state, and should be protected to the highest standards, and unauthorised alterations or commercial activities should not take place, which mirrors national legislation. However, legislation is not specific, only stating that the historical district should be protected and preserved. Legislation does not relate to specific residences, and most of these listings were carried out after these regulations came into effect (most listings are from 2006, and the regulations from 1996).

Hence these listings were not done as part of the overall protection plan for Jianshui, and these residences have not been included in the protection plan, that has not been amended. It appears that these plaques carry little real impact, as they are made at local level, and hence do not receive funding from outside. In fact, this phenomenon has increased in Yunnanese villages and towns, but Jianshui is striking due to the sheer number of listings.

Heritage protection is taken seriously in Jianshui, but it is also the case that much of this interest is linked to tourism. It is undoubtedly the case that the amount of listings have increased radically in recent years.

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104 Legislation on heritage is Wenwu baohu fa.
105 Cultural heritage law of the PRC (2002), article 14.
In comparison, most of the provincial listings are much older, and much more understandable, and also well-maintained. These consist of some courtyard houses such as the Zhu Family Gardens, and others with well-preserved historical features, for instance Jianshui’s old bank, and a local association for the elderly, buildings that in many ways carry historical significance in so far as they are linked to the development and history of the town and its residents, a type of landmark buildings.

But in relation to residential homes this is not the case: these buildings are often ordinary dwellings that happen to be in old town Jianshui, and appear old. In fact, some of the oldness is linked to the bad shape of these houses, crumbling walls, and weeds growing out of the courtyards, windows lacking, and dark, damp interiors with earth- or cement floors. This old part of Jianshui is not the richest part of town, and many of the ordinary people who inhabit these homes lack funds to make adequate repairs, or modernise.

In light of this, the huge amount of heritage listings seems strange, perhaps even like a joke to some of the residents. Some of the listings are so recent that the houses have yet to receive a proper plaque; instead they have a printed piece of paper coated in plastic stating that the house is a locally important cultural heritage asset. At the heritage bureau, these listings are claimed to be about the historical protection of the material fabric of Jianshui old town. They are there to protect, not necessarily to be actively preserved and conserved according to high standards of historical accuracy. They admit that maintenance is lacking, and that houses should receive more care, but that funding is lacking. They do not see this as a major problem, as the idea behind these listings is to raise awareness of the historical importance of Jianshui amongst residents, and to prevent modernisation of buildings.

According to the heritage law, once a building is listed, changes cannot be made without prior legal consent. Of course, the heritage law also states that listed buildings should be preserved, not just protected but this seems to be less of a problem. Listings at least offer some degree of protection, and could hence be said to be a type of preservation, the argument seems to go.

\[106\] Cultural heritage law of the PRC (2002), Article 21 and 26. See also Articles 16-20 on construction and planning issues in relation to heritage properties and areas within cities.
This of course places residents of the old town in a dilemma as the houses are often old and in need of modernisations. This differs radically from Shaxi where the idea was preservation, not protection, and where the overriding idea was to combine modernisations and preservation.

In Jianshui, we have an example of a place where listings are there to remind people of the historical qualities of place, both to the outside (tourists) as well as to the inside (residents). It also means prevention; and could cause conflict as residents might misunderstand their legal responsibilities, or wish to make alterations that are not permitted once the house has been listed.

According to the national heritage law, listings are carried out by the authorities, not by individuals. This means that getting a heritage listing is not optional. Once a building is listed as cultural heritage property, it is also the property of the state: it is a public resource that should be protected.

In Jianshui, residents do not own their own property but lease the houses (which is the case in most places like Jianshui old town where housing was allocated under the socialist system, unlike new properties constructed by private development companies). Listings do mean the right to advice and guidance if the residents wish to make repairs, but also put a hamper on use of materials and how houses can be changed. In a place like Jianshui this is not much of a real issue as most residents are too poor to make changes (or they would have already). But it is still the case that these listings could be understood as a type of colonisation of space, and a process of monumentalisation, akin to Michael Herzfeld's example of Crete where the small town of Rethemnos has been made the object of historical narration, a process that has prevented residents from modernising, and also, to an extent, from following certain traditions.

In Herzfeld's account of Crete, the state and its agents (the local heritage bureau staff), police buildings to make sure residents adhere to heritage legislation. Here, heritage preservation is a way for the state to on the one hand attract tourism, and, on the other, to align Crete with an European heritage as opposed to the competing narrative of a strong Turkish link as evidenced by certain strains in local architecture. It is the island's strong Venetian heritage that is emphasised and underlined in heritage guidelines, and residents can only follow suit as no alterations or repairs are allowed that have not been authorised by heritage staff.
This in fact means a type of colonisation as traditional patterns of life have been interrupted by heritage preservation: no extra floors are allowed to be added when children are married, and windows, traditionally used for storage and demonstrating wealth, are the objects of strict regulations as they are supposed to display a "Venetian" tradition (Herzfeld 1991 esp: 226-259. This has seen a process of constant bargaining and negotiation between residents and heritage staff – clever ways of making alterations at night, or re-interpreting the legislative framework is standard practice. Residents in Rethemnos are not necessarily against preservation, but they are against being made props in a historical drama, or the creation of a mythical time, what Herzfeld refers to as "monumental time", or the "time frame of the nation state" (Herzfeld 1991: 10).

Similarly to how Nora has referred to sites of memory and sites of history, Herzfeld uses the concept of monumental time as a contrast to social time, or "the grist of everyday experience" (Nora 1989; Herzfeld 1991: 10). Social time is the fluctuating, instable time that makes up the experience of everyday life. However, the state in a place like Rethemnos aims to recast and control the everyday usage of space, and the experience of time and the past by making it part of a national mythology, a process that has created a third space, what Herzfeld labels a "discursive chasm" (Herzfeld 1991: 6) where negotiation and bargaining between state agents and residents is carried out.

However, in a place like Jianshui, this space is less easy to define, and heritage agents less likely to carry out policing of buildings. For one thing, knowledge of legislation and understanding of preservation and heritage is lacking. Jianshui is similar to what Rethemnos once used to be, prior to monumentalisation, namely a very poor, backward place that has been preserved in time due to this very poverty. Backwardness hence seems to be the best device for preservation, but also means a double burden for its residents as modernisation and the freedom of making choices as to what role in history one wishes to play, is denied. It also means, as in Shaxi, less power and voice in negotiations concerning local development, particularly in relation to tourism.

In Rethemnos, the lack of a harbour, and an undeveloped industry meant the village lagged behind the modernisation efforts of other towns, closer to the coast (Herzfeld 1991: xi).
In the 1970s, when the economy picked up, the old town was declared a preservation zone and strict regulations put in place which meant that not only residential homes, but also businesses of all sorts where made the objects of state mythology and modernisation was denied as a result of increased attention being paid to heritage preservation and creating a national image; a tangible past to lay claim to Greece's role as a modern nation-state, and as a resource in the tourist economy that grew in importance at the time, much like the domestic tourist industry in the PRC since the 1990s.

In Jianshui, denied modernisation at the expense of creating history for political, as well as commercial, reasons is not really an issue. Most people are so poor that the experience of being blocked from a type of modernity that is enjoyed by other locations is not relevant in the present day. But the way residential homes have been pounced upon for purposes of preservation of the historical fabric, and, perhaps most importantly, for purposes of tourism, resembles that of Crete. Preservation in old town Jianshui is not the outcome of heritage being negotiated, but a preserve of state concerns; this is not linked to notions of freezing the past for any ideological purposes, but is about constructing a local identity for tourism, a way of inserting these buildings in the market economy by emphasising Jianshui's historicity. However, residents have little to say about the increased amount of listings, and their own part in this process.

Herzfeld demonstrates how heritage preservation could work, if taken to an extreme and backed by state agents at all levels, as well as accompanied by a well-functioning strict legislative framework, something that could also be beneficial to residents as legislation offers loop-holes, a starting point for bargaining, and clear directions as to what is allowed. In the PRC, this is more difficult. In for instance Lijiang, an extreme example, none of the negotiation that Herzfeld describes has been taking place. However, the creation of monumental time, a freezing of time in order to create a mythology of place and space is a good way of describing Lijiang as a heritage site – with the one exception that the co-existence of Herzfeld's social space, the everyday process of living, has been eclipsed and the existence of the "discursive chasm" is totally missing from the picture. There is no space to negotiate heritage preservation and the rights to the everyday in a site like Lijiang.
I shall return to this issue in relation to Shuhe, the concluding case study, but suffice to say that in the PRC, heritage is not a field that opens up spaces for negotiating state ascribed meanings. In Jianshui, we can discern the beginnings of this process.

If tourism were to be immensely successful, it is undoubtedly the case that Jianshui could become a Lijiang-case, where heritage tourism eclipses heritage protection, and residents are forced to accept these conditions or move out.

In this sense, the weakness of both national and local legislation on historical cities is demonstrated. In Jianshui, as is the case in Lijiang, residents are not allowed to make alterations to buildings, or to oppose heritage listings of their private abodes. Heritage listings is a top-down process, where historicity is enforced on residents. In Jianshui, this has not had much of an impact on daily life as yet, and hence the listings mean nothing in real terms.

Unlike in Shaxi, it is not even a case of pride or distinction as most residences in the old town are listed, and were listed at about the same time. Residents seem to think that these listings are akin to the system with "five-star households" that has been ongoing in the countryside for a long time – being rewarded a plaque for adhering to policies on being a model citizen (being hygienic, law abiding, productive, scientific and so on). This is actually what a group of local residents told me when I asked about the heritage listings, in a curious, off-hand way, along the lines of "what are these plaques for?". One man told me it was because of history, Jianshui being historically important, but then another man interfered and rebutted this by saying, "ah, it's like the five-star household, it just means we have kept the house historical and the yard clean, and so we are awarded. It's a new thing". Someone else told me he was probably right, but so was the first man – it is interlinked, being a good household, and keeping history alive. When asked how history was being kept alive, no one had an answer and, in fact, they all agreed it would be nice if they had more modern houses.

When asked about funding, or if they were aware that the plaques might mean they had certain responsibilities, no one knew anything about this. At the heritage office, the staff are aware of this, and claims that they would advise rather than fine if someone started a construction project.
But then starting a construction project, even a small one, within the old town would require a permit from the construction bureau. And so, in the eyes of the heritage bureau, the low awareness of these laws is not a problem. As is often the case with officialdom in the PRC, state agents have a tendency to blame the low levels of education and general lack of cultural development for the lack of legal understanding and awareness amongst the populace, as if this would justify the imposition of policies and legal measures that have little, or no, popular support or understanding.

In the case of heritage listings, if the historical qualities of Jianshui were more properly explained and preservation made into a civic affair, it is possible that it would garner local support and pride in local heritage. As it is now, this is not the case, even if most people claim to enjoy the town, and the relaxed pace of life, and to be aware of it being a historical site. But awareness of their own place within this is historical environment appears to be lacking: everyone I talked to displayed a detached, disinterested attitude, especially in relation to the vernacular architecture, and the poor, undeveloped parts of old town Jianshui. The Confucian temple, the Zhu Family mansion and other well-known sites are places they are proud of and associate with Jianshui history. But ordinary dwellings, and the local history and fabric of place are not deemed particularly interesting, just ordinary houses that most people associate with poverty and lack of development.

Jianshui is a very good example of how listings work in practice, and hence illustrate a central feature of Chinese heritage legislation. As argued, the politics of listings is the central feature of legislation; the method by which ordinary sites, objects, and practices are elevated to "heritage". Listings grant an air of legitimacy, a type of distinction that makes what used to be ordinary special, particularly in relation to other, competing sites or objects within the same region or category. Listings and classifications are what makes heritage into heritage – in Jianshui this idea pervades the old town.

These listings could be there in order to protect – Jianshui is a historically important town and hence this type of measure is almost expected. However, these listings are recent, not linked to the promotion of Jianshui as a historically important town.
The interest in developing tourism appears to be the overriding interest in the promotion of Jianshui’s built heritage, the use of listings in order to exude an air of historicity. Zhou Kang at the Tourist Bureau in Jianshui agrees to an extent: making use of the historical resources in Jianshui is pivotal to developing tourism. According to him, the town has been trying to make more advantageous use of the historical qualities the town is endowed with. By listing residential buildings, they appear more interesting to the outside, which is of course true. Listings make people stop and take notice. And in a place with so many listings, it is easy to come away with the impression that there is something special.

However, as these listings apparently are there for the sake of it, with little real meaning in terms of funding or renovation, they also appear to have been made in a thoughtless way without further explanation or reason.

Provincial listings come with a small explanation, such as the old financial institute or the Zhu Family Garden. But in relation to the vernacular heritage in Jianshui, this is not the case. These listings only state "Heritage protected folk residence, Jianshui town". There is an obvious suspicion that if there were enough funds, it is possible that the whole of the old town would undergo some sort of reconstruction project, akin to the one reconstructed section.

This is rebutted by staff I talked to, apart from Zhou Kang from the tourist office who thinks that it could be a good idea to "improve" the shape of the old town, like Lijiang, Dali, or perhaps Pingyao (the UNESCO listed town in Shanxi province) that resembles Jianshui in some ways – the combination of traditional residences and some old institutions and historical structures.

He would not like it if Jianshui was turned into a replica of Lijiang, but improving the shape of the old town would certainly help both tourism and the overall quality of town.

The nearby village of Tuanshan forms an interesting contrast, and further illustrates how heritage preservation and tourism overlaps in this region. Tuanshan is also interesting as a comparison to Shaxi – the same actors were involved, but the outcome has been different.

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Tuanshan village

Tuanshan village is located about 30 minutes away from Jianshui, and is a typical Honghe-district farming community of about 200 households, and 700 residents (Feng/Chang 2003: 33; Bin/Zhang 2005: 150; WMF 2006). It is administered by Xizhuang town, Xizhuang being the closest small town, but overall management is carried out by Jianshui county. It is a poor village, in a poor region, albeit with more fertile land than in the Shaxi-region, and more abundant sideline opportunities such as raising ducks, growing fruits, chestnuts, and raising fish. Many young people, especially males, engage in various labour in the nearby region; migrant workers in Tuanshan tend to come back frequently, and provide most cash incomes from work in construction and other types of manual labour. The region is more densely populated, and the settlements around Jianshui easy to reach, the roads better, and the terrain more accessible than in the north.

However, like most of rural Yunnan, poverty and lack of development is a real issue, and the Tuanshan/Jianshui area is no exception.

Tuanshan village is a Han village, as a result of migration (Feng/Chang 2003: 33-35; Zhang/Bin 2005:150; Ouyang 2006: 47; WMF 2006). Hence ethnicity is not a major issue – here, it is the community at large that matters, and unlike areas like Lijiang or Dali, ethnicity is not part of a regional or local mythology. The ethnic composition of Tuanshan is the outcome of migration, and population flows. That Tuanshan is a Han-village, with historical roots located outside of Yunnan is one of the foremost features of local architecture. Tuanshan is, like Jianshui, a Han-enclave of central Chinese culture, located in an ethnically diverse region in an ethnically diverse province. Hence the village is not typical of the Honghe-region, but it is also part of regional history as it embodies the history of migration that has always been important in this part of Yunnan.

Tuanshan was first populated during the Ming-dynasty when central government dispatched migrants from southern China to the borders to defend the empire. Some of these migrants decided to settle in Tuanshan and built residences resembling the architecture of their home provinces (the Jiangnan area, i.e. Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Jiangsu).

108 The Tuanshan area is dominated by Yi-people, not surprising as the Honghe region is named the Yi and Hani minority district (WMF 2006).
These migrants are said to have come from the southern province of Jiangxi, and was part of a clan named Zhang: hence, according to official history and popular myth, the village was founded by the Zhang clan. Today, traces of the original group of residents remain in the Zhang surname – the main lineage clan is still Zhang. About 80% of Tuanshan’s residents are surnamed Zhang (Bin/Zhang 2005: 150-151).

It was not until the late Qing that the village really prospered, and most of the buildings in the village date from this era. Starting in the late Qing, and continuing into the early Republican era, the village prospered due to the tin mining industry and the French railway from Indochina – trade with South East Asia thrived, and many merchants grew wealthy. Tuanshan village was the home of some of these merchants who constructed ornate mansions, replete with moon gates, gardens, carvings and elaborate decorations of all kinds (Chang/Feng 2003: 33; Bin/Zhang 2005: 150-159; She 2005; Ouyang 2006: 47; WMF 2006). As a result of this, Tuanshan village displays an astonishing array of beautiful architecture. Compared to other villages in the area, Tuanshan is especially rich in architecture. Tuanshan is similar to Shaxi in that it is a nucleated settlement where little new construction has been taking place, and where the traditional buildings have remained intact throughout modern China’s transformations. In some other villages in the area, it is easy to find the odd courtyard building, some decorative lattice windows or fading, crumbling screening walls, but these structures are not part of an intact entity. Tuanshan has historically been the most prosperous of these villages, and a hub in the region, much like Shaxi during the tea-trade era. Hence both of these villages display a merchant tradition long since forgotten and vilified during the revolutionary era, but a tradition that has come to take on a new capital value in the present and changed the fate of these villages.

Tuanshan architecture is a mixture of Yunnanese styles and southern ideals: a local blend of white-washed stone and wood, and a southern outline with moon gates and interior gardens. The decorations are made in reds, blues, and greens, and the wood carvings have often been painted in the same colour scheme as the screening walls and wall paintings. The houses are spacious with flanking side buildings, over two, or even three floors.
The impression is one of wealth, and distinction, a village for a successful extended clan. During the revolutionary era, the original merchants were slowly mixed with, and to some extent replaced by, local farmers, even if the a large proportion of the original residents remained and became part of the increasingly poor farming community. During this time, the mansion buildings became the homes of several extended families, much like was the case in most of China as poor peasants were allocated housing and land that had previously been the property of wealthy landlords. However, due to the connections and power of some of the remaining original elite, many of the structures in the village were saved from radical onslaughts, as they, despite the CCP-takeover, wielded enough respect within the region to be saved from any real damage.

During the fifty-odd years since, the buildings have been badly maintained and the village is in a haphazard state of bad repairs and attempts at modernisation. But the village has remained with the original structures, shapes and houses intact, even if crumbling at the edges.

I stayed in Tuanshan village for about a week, conducting informal fieldwork by chatting to villagers, and more formal interviews with staff at the ticket office, as well as the local tour guides, and members of the village Tourist Management Committee (TMC). The guesthouse I stayed at, The Enren Jia, is an informal home stay in one of the listed buildings. It was a very good place to stay (and recommended to me by Zhou Kang at the Tourist Bureau in Jianshui), as the owner of the house is both the director of the TMC, and a retired schoolteacher with a wealth of knowledge about the village. He was more than happy to share his knowledge. The Enren Jia is formally designated as a "Nong Jia Le", or a guesthouse that is supposed to provide basic accommodation, meals and a cultural experience of rural China, i.e. more of a homestay, or perhaps farmstay which gave me good insight into how tourism functions in the village, and how it has been developed.

Tourism development in Tuanshan started in 2000, when the Construction Bureau in Jianshui, in tandem with provincial heritage agents, local government in Xizhuang, and the Jianshui Tourist Bureau decided that something should be done to prevent villagers from ruining the village by modernising in a thoughtless
way that would harm the original buildings. The village was also considered to be overpopulated, which also posed a danger to heritage resources.

In order to alleviate the strain on the village, there was a plan to construct new housing, and hence relocate about half the households.

One important reason for this was protecting the historical fabric of the village, especially as local government wanted to develop Tuanshan as a tourist site.¹⁰⁹ There had been a trickle of visitors to the village, and it was a well-known regional site, but other than that, tourism was not developed.

If the village was ruined by overpopulation and modernising, this would make the village less attractive for tourism. This is different from Shaxi, where there had been no efforts at modernising, or upgrading, and where tourism was not particularly interesting to local government, prior to the preservation project. But in Tuanshan, locals were attempting to make repairs, and to change old windows and walls to more convenient, cheaper and comfortable ones, in plastic and tile, practices that would have damaged the village and hence the prospects for tourism.

The realisation that Tuanshan might be damaged by this type of project led local-and regional authorities to seek alternatives to the dilemma with bad buildings, modernisations, and, especially, lack of funds. Tuanshan was well-known in the region as a former merchant village of renown, and staff at the heritage bureau was concerned with preserving the architecture of the village.

This coincided with a general realisation in Yunnan that vernacular architecture mattered, and that preserving buildings was in the interest of the province at large, especially for purposes of tourism. Lijiang was already a famous tourist site, as was Dali. Preservation and architectural heritage were emerging as important issues, and to see a resource like Tuanshan be squandered by rapid, bad modernisation was not a positive development.

As a result, measures to protect the village were undertaken, such as a campaign aimed at villagers to stop ruining buildings, and a generally stricter attitude towards alterations of buildings. In 2000, a village-based Tourist Management Committee (TMC) was set up by local government in Xizhuang, with support from higher level authorities in Jianshui.

This would work towards developing tourism, ensuring historical protection (i.e. management of heritage buildings), and that environmental and hygienic issues were taken care of. This original committee was politically appointed, and could almost be described as a type of village police that would prevent new construction and attempt to make Tuanshan into a model tourist village. Some villagers I spoke to were still unhappy about this, and it seems this committee spawned intra-village conflicts due to their role as supervising village maintenance and heritage. Tourism in Tuanshan appears linked to ideas of constructing a new socialist countryside, meaning clean, environmental, and entrepreneurial. The emphasis placed on developing the countryside and the local economy, as a responsibility placed on villagers, can be discerned in relation to Tuanshan, especially in relation to the role of the first TMC. The current TMC director, the owner of the Enren Guesthouse, claims the first TMC was not a civic (minjian) based group, but all to do with local government in Xizhuang and their attempts to benefit from tourism, as a means of regulating the population, and make sure the village was clean, lawful, and "scientific", i.e. advanced, and not backward and superstitious. To what extent this is true is difficult to assess, but it appears to be a case of having appointed outside state agents to control how the village was managed which might have evoked a sense of injustice and unfairness, feelings that would have led to disregard for both tourism and preservation.

This first TMC was something of a failure as it lacked legitimacy and villagers would not co-operate – one example being how some of the residents of historical buildings would charge their own entry fees in addition to the entry fee for the village. This led to small-scale conflict, and a general disregard for the TMC.

Another reason for the lack of co-operation was claimed to be due to financial disagreements – villagers felt the committee was pocketing all tourism related income, which was probably not true: it was more a case of very small incomes and hence not much left to redistribute or use for repairs of buildings.\textsuperscript{110}

The original TMC, had 15 members, out of which about half were linked to local government, the rest being ticket sellers and gate keepers.

\textsuperscript{110} According to the current TMC, incomes from tourism in the first couple of years were around 2-5000 yuan/annually.
At this time the practice of setting up accommodation in the village was established, and the three guesthouses chosen to receive guests were allocated 5000 yuan each to get started. They all still operate, but no one makes enough money to make a living, unlike Mr Yang in Shaxi. There was, and still is, a system with street sweeping, whereby local elderly women are paid 10/yuan per day for cleaning the streets according to a rotating schedule. House owners were also expected to keep their yards clean, for which they were paid 10/yuan month, a practice set up by the first TMC, and later taken up again by the current TMC. The original TMC was disbanded in 2003, and later replaced by the current TMC in 2006, with support from the WMF and regional government in Jianshui.

However, the major problem confronting Tuanshan was, and is, a lack of funds; there was not much to be done apart from stricter regulations and propaganda aimed at protecting heritage, and as for plans to construct new housing and relocate a number of villagers that were crammed together in inadequate housing, they had to be postponed. Making villagers contribute towards the cost was not feasible in a region where incomes are about 150 USD/annum. There were some attempts made at attracting investments in order to develop tourism, for example, a scheme called "Invest in Tuanshan" that was started in 2003, and run by the Jianshui Investment Promotion Bureau, an office linked to the Tourist Bureau, with the aim of marketing Jianshui and develop tourism which would generate revenue. This type of scheme is telling of the importance attached to tourism, and the conscious efforts on behalf of local authorities to realise their plans to turn the Jianshui region into a tourist destination, and the general attitude towards tourism as a saviour.

One good example of how regional state agents have been attempting to develop tourism in Tuanshan is the 2004 case with the Beijing development company, that came to be interested in Tuanshan as a result of the "Invest in Tuanshan" scheme.

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111 Personal communication, Zhou Kang, Tourist Bureau, Jianshui, Pu Meiqing at the Construction Bureau, Jianshui, and Zhang Jiannong, Culture/Heritage Bureau, Jianshui, all in Oct 2007, and Han Xiancheng, official at the Yunnan Province Construction Bureau, Kunming, Jan 2008. The idea of a spa etc. was said by Han Xiancheng with a wry smile, almost mocking the whole idea, an idea that he considered unfeasible. It is true that this scheme in some ways resemble some of the more unrealistic plans for urban planning that you hear of in the PRC from time to time, man-made lakes with sailing boats in Shanghai (see journalist Ola Wong’s funny account, 2004: 189-196), and luxury penthouse apartments in small towns in places like Gansu or Yunnan, schemes that usually never leave the planning stage.
This tourism development scheme was ultimately what made the WMF put Tuanshan on their Watch List. This company wanted to lease the rights to develop tourism in Tuanshan by establishing a "cultural village". The idea was to use an already existing village of heritage credentials and restore it in an upscale way so as to be able to open nice hotels, restaurants, a spa, and all the trappings associated with luxury travel; a heritage experience in Yunnan that would display traditional culture and local flavour but also offer comfort and modern conveniences. The firm wanted to use Tuanshan as an experiment, to see how the concept would work. They did not wish to recreate a Lijiang type site, but rather a site that would not even pretend to be "authentic" or populated by locals. It was to be a tourist enclave with historical connotations in the Yunnanese countryside. The idea was approved by the local Construction Bureau, ultimately in charge of planning and construction. They hoped to see more tourism based around heritage resources in this area, and hoped that a scheme like this would be advantageous. The Heritage-and Culture Bureaus, at both provincial as well as local level, were against this type of development, but their role in this type of project is to advice, and they carry little ultimate decision-making power. This project would have entailed removing most local residents (about 100 households, more than half of the village), and constructing another village, with new houses, some way off. Some locals were guaranteed to be hired by the tourist project, hence increasing local incomes and life opportunities, as well as generating revenue and increased opportunities for tourism in the whole area.¹¹² This would have meant the end of Tuanshan as a lived-in settlement. Some villagers approved this project, whereas the majority claims to have been against when asked. However, at the time, staff at the Construction Bureau claims that most residents liked the idea of new housing, even if it remains unclear to what extent people were aware of exactly what this project entailed, and what this housing would have been like. At the time of research, people in the village claim to have had little interest in being moved elsewhere, and that they opposed the plan. However, 3-4 years had passed, and as the removal never happened, it is difficult to assess what the situation was like at the time.

¹¹² Personal communication, Huang Yinwu (WMF), November 2007, plus e-mail contacts with the WMF in Europe. This plan was confirmed by Zhang Jiannong at the Construction Bureau in Jianshui, as well as Zhou Kang at the tourist bureau, October 2007.
This plan was eventually stopped by the WMF, the same organisation that was behind the preservation scheme in Shaxi. The WMF is an important agent, especially in places that have ambitions to develop tourism. An international actor such as the WMF carries a great deal of weight, and is invaluable for marketing. In the case of Tuanshan we can once again see the importance of international discourse on heritage and preservation for its own sake, and for the sake of community, being more important than local attempts to move on, and up, by modernising. Like in Shaxi, the WMF changed the situation in Tuanshan, and brought the village to a new type of attention that goes beyond the region, and province.

The WMF heard about the plans to depopulate the village, and in 2005 the village was nominated to the Watch List, and was listed as World Heritage in danger in 2006. At this time, negotiations were still underway with the development company, but negotiations were slow as the project required both sufficient funds and political backing. The WMF listing made provincial government aware of the potential of Tuanshan as a heritage site in its own right, and ended negotiations with the development company. Instead, it was decided they would start co-operating with the WMF on how to develop community-based tourism, and was offered some funding from the Robert W Wilson fund, the same fund that helped Shaxi. This mirrors the decision made by Honghe authorities to end co-operation with the development company in Yuanyang; and might be telling of a growing realisation that heritage assets lose their value for tourism if not taken care of.

It is also true that this project encountered resistance from higher levels of government in Yunnan, (Zhang 2003: 52-53; Ouyang 2006: 47). Another important thing about the WMF-listing was that it raised local public awareness of the value of the village, and local resistance to aggressive tourism development grew as a result. Villagers were made aware of the capital value of the village, and how they might lose out if they willingly moved out. The exact details of this story are unclear, and the people involved not so willing to talk about it, but the interesting thing about is how it illustrates how these negotiations work in practice, and what the ultimate factors deciding the fate of a village are.

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113 E-mail contacts WMF 2007, and interviews with Han Xiancheng, Yunnan Province Construction Bureau, Kunming, January 2008.
In this case a WMF-listing, public attention, and the promise of locally based tourist development were deemed more important than pure commercial gain. The end result was a growing awareness of Tuanshan village as a heritage asset, and a great deal of both public awareness as well as attention. WMF-lobbying, and provincial state agents were instrumental in attracting attention to the fate of Tuanshan, and also to tourism.

The tourist bureau in Jianshui have made very active use of the WMF-listing, and of Tuanshan’s historical qualities in promoting regional tourism. One example of this is how the tourist bureau invite photographers and journalists to Tuanshan to write about the village and hence promote it nationally. When I was in Jianshui, there was a CCTV-team (central state television) in town to make a program about culture in Jianshui. The tourist bureau funded accommodation and food and other expenses, and this they told me without hesitation. This is often the case in the PRC (and perhaps elsewhere), and is how destinations are marketed and sold – travel shows and magazine articles are pivotal to constructing and producing heritage sites in the popular imagination. This is how Lijiang has been sold and marketed, the mystical, ancient qualities of the old town reproduced in a million images. And this appears to be important in the case of Jianshui/Tuanshan as well – hence a development that would have seen the end of these ancient qualities might not have been ideal, and so the village remains, protected but poor, and in need of renovations.

The WMF did not attract an outside agent, like the ETH in Shaxi, but helped out with rudimentary repairs and guidance, especially in relation to tourism. A new TMC was set up, again with 15 members of staff, four committee members and the rest local residents hired to act as guides, ticket office staff and gate keepers. This scheme is based on the Hoi An scheme, and revenue is supposed to go back into preservation of the village. The village has been promoted as a tourist site in the Jianshui area, almost as if the village and Jianshui are one and the same, even referring to Tuanshan as ”Tuanshan, Jianshui”, meaning in Jianshui county, but sometimes confusing the two to the point of merging the sites of both places as if they were all in the same place.
In fact, getting to Tuanshan still requires some work as the local bus only stops by the turn-off to the village. Visitors then need to hire a small motorvehicle, a sanlunche, a type of tuk-tuk to get to the village.

This means some extra business opportunities, but still means visitors need to spend some extra time travelling (about 40 minutes, excluding waiting for the bus and so on). However, this also means that going to Tuanshan is not the obvious thing to do in Jianshui, even to the extent people go to Jianshui as tourists in the first place.

There is a small entrance fee levied as you enter the village (about 20 yuan at the time of research). The ticket office is staffed by two local women, and there are also a couple of young guides hired to show visitors around the village and give the historical details of the buildings, and the settlement. Included in the ticket price is a map, and some background information, and there are also some pamphlets with more detail for sale. It is possible to stay the night if you arrange this beforehand with the tourist bureau in Jianshui.

Accommodation is basic, and includes meals and if there is interest villagers will provide some sort of cultural events, or experience such as cooking simple dishes. There are a few tour groups that have Tuanshan included on their itineraries – mostly international ones. When I was in the village, I encountered two French groups, and one Dutch, and I know that some Swedish tour operators have a night in Tuanshan as part of their Yunnan cultural tours. The majority of foreign tourists are French according to locals. Mr Zhang at the Enren Guesthouse, and the head of the TCM, a retired teacher with a deep interest in local history believes this is due to the Indochina link with Vietnam and French history.

These groups are small, and the tours aimed at tourists with "authentic" interest in Chinese culture, perhaps akin to how Michaud has described cultural tours to Thai mountain villages (Michaud 2004: 128-155). However, in Tuanshan, this type of tour is still on such a low level, a trickle of visitors, that issues of authenticity and staged authenticity are difficult to discuss – it is a matter of allowing a few travellers watch as you cook simple meals, more like providing a service than a matter of performing an act for an outside audience.

The most famous heritage site within Tuanshan village, the Zhang family residence, or the Zhang Family Garden (Zhang Jia Hua Yuan), has been a
provincially listed site since 1997 (included as part of the listing of Jianshui as a historical city).

The village is also listed as a county-level heritage site, and so should enjoy some measure of protection, but this is not always implemented in a strict fashion; sometimes as a result of the benevolent attitude of officials and a general understanding of why villagers wish to make alterations to bad houses. It was my impression in all of the villages I visited that there was a degree of understanding and tacit agreement between villagers and local officials on this issue.

This is not the same type of negotiation Herzfeld (1991: ch 6-7) refers to which appears to be a constant state of conflict and bargaining the conditions for preservation, but rather a peaceful implicit agreement that local officials might “close one eye, open another” (*bi yi yan, zheng yi yan*), a common attitude in relation to small legal breaches in rural areas – perhaps due to a combination of sympathy and fear of losing authority if being too harsh when it comes to rather harmless things (this would of course not include major breaches, such as demolition, or, in relation to other issues, engaging in criminal activities or having too many babies). But in relation to other, major changes, and things like keeping the village clean, the TMC is very strict, and supervise the village at even intervals, and make sure laws are adhered to, creating something of an imposition on daily life.

However, to what extent tourism has been successful is, like in Shaxi, not clear. Tourism has not had a great impact on the village, and village life has continued unabated with people working in the fields, or engaging in other types of small-scale production. The village is quiet, with some elderly women and their grandchildren walking about during the day. At night, most people remain in their homes, perhaps watching television. There is, like in all Chinese villages, a small basketball court where most of the younger villagers spend their evenings, and a small shop selling rudimentary goods and some snacks. This shop is located by the main square, where the buildings are still covered in fading Mao-era slogans, these days replaced by newly painted red characters that encourage villagers to take care of, and protect, cultural heritage resources.

114 For some interesting examples regarding the practice of popular religion, see Brunn (2006), and Chau (2006).
The odd group of tourists, domestic or international, do not disturb the quiet of Tuanshan, and there are no obvious shops or attractions aimed at tourists. There is a small shop selling embroidered shoes and some other knick-knacks, and one woman has decided to charge 5-yuan to enter her courtyard house, something the TMC strongly opposes, but do nothing about. As mentioned, this practice was more of a problem with the first TMC.

Other than that, the village is like any small Yunnanese village, albeit very pretty with the old, ornate courtyard residences and the setting peaceful, surrounded by flat fields interspersed with bamboo groves and small ponds for raising fish. The buildings have undergone some basic exterior repairs, but the village is still in need of more thorough restoration. Some villagers are still engaged in small, private modernisation projects, such as changing windows or putting in tile by the cooking and bathroom areas (that are often outside, in the courtyard).

However, the exterior repairs means that the village is still in much better shape than many other settlements in the area I have visited, and the campaigns to protect cultural heritage, as well as the attention from the WMF, and the attempt to attract tourism seems to have created a sense of pride in the village and its value. When asked, villagers say that they care about the houses, and wish to remain in the village rather than to move out to more modern housing, even if they could.

According to the staff in the ticket office, there are about 40 visitors a day. This seems like an exaggeration – I have spent a total of about 10 days in the village, and I only saw a handful of visitors per day, but it could be that numbers increase at holidays, and during certain weekends. At my guesthouse, Mr Zhang, the owner, and also the director of the TMC, said that overnight visitors were about 200 per year, but day visitors a lot more, around 10 000/annum.

However, 40 per day does seem a lot judging from first hand experience of the village. There should be exact numbers of this of course, since there is a ticket office, but I was not allowed to see this type of information, and at the tourist bureau in Jianshui, they would not give me exact figures. Incomes from tourism land at around 160 000 yuan/annum, steadily rising, especially after the WMF-listing in 2005, when it jumped from 75000 yuan to 130 000 in 2006.

Of course, this is also to do with ticket prices, from a humble 3 yuan in 2000 when the ticket system started, to 20 in 2008, there having been a hefty rise after
the new TMC was set up in 2006. As is often the case in the PRC, this type of information is difficult to get access to and could easily be manipulated for various reasons, in this case perhaps to make Tuanshan appear more attractive to investors.

Overall, tourism development in Tuanshan has not had much of an impact, but it is telling of the conflicts and actors involved in cultural heritage contestations in rural areas, and how heritage assets have taken on a new capital value to state agents at local and regional level. This is perhaps also true of locals, but more as a slow grassroots realisation that outsiders might reap more benefits than themselves which leaves locals unhappy, as demonstrated by the first TMC in Tuanshan. However, it is also true that no one benefits from the current situation in Tuanshan either. Life remains undisturbed, even if a few locals have benefitted as they have been hired by the TMC. But no funds have been allocated for proper repairs, or modernisations; for instance, there was talk of installing running water in every household, funded by tourism revenue, but this has not happened, as funds are not enough. Some locals were unhappy about this, and claimed they had been promised water although no one really blamed the TMC for being corrupt or pocketing funds themselves – probably everyone knows that a project like running water is costly and tourism income not enough.

Some local women were also quite reserved and seemed to dislike my presence – after a couple of days one of them told me she did not like tourists being too nosy and taking her picture when she was busy working, an understandable point of view. And this is an issue, even if there are just a few people passing through the village at uneven intervals. Tuanshan is very small, and does not absorb tourists easily. It is difficult hiding from unwanted attention, and the image of local women hanging laundry or laying out corn cobs to dry in the sun is undoubtedly picturesque, no matter how annoying it might be to local residents when outsiders pay too much attention and treat them like props in a play.

This type of conflict could grow more intense if tourism increases. It is also true that even if the WMF listed the village as an entity, there are only 15 buildings that have been listed at provincial level and hence receive funding for repairs, meagre as it may be. Locals who happen to live elsewhere must experience tourism as even more of an imposition as they are required to
maintain their houses in a clean, authentic shape, but only receive the 10 yuan/month in "yard cleaning" fee.

What appears to have changed in Tuanshan is not tourism as an economically successful enterprise, but the overall attitude to cultural heritage resources, not just within Tuanshan village but in the region at large, from villagers to officials.

Keith H Basso has made the argument that it is only when a place is under threat from outside forces that a real sense of place identity emerges as residents are forced to reconsider and re-appreciate familiar surroundings taken for granted (Basso 1996: 56).

In a case like Tuanshan, the new emotional and capital value placed on the village must have changed the overall attitude to local heritage. Outside interest, in tandem with the threat of removal, must have led to a re-evaluation of the village and its place in the modern world. This has spawned increased pride, and awareness of local identity; many locals do express feelings of pride in the architectural heritage. However, there is another side to this new sense of place.

In the case of Tuanshan, it was the actions of villagers that led to outside attention as attempts to modernise and construct new houses led local authorities to pay attention to the village and its heritage resources. Hence preservation in Tuanshan could be described as a way of regulating, and policing the environment, akin to how Foucault has described the Panoptic presence of the state; the internalisation of state discourse on behaviour, and actions at the most intinite level (Foucault 1977: 195-228). Lefebvre’s idea of how the state controls and produces a spatial narrative, a representation of space, by planning practices and attempts to control the production of space is helpful in understanding how heritage discourse might work in a village like Tuanshan where propaganda on heritage has been aimed at villagers for close to ten years. (Lefebvre 1991: 38-39). It is of course true that this spatial narrative on Tuanshan as a place of historical value has left imprints, but this spatial narrative is linked to consumerism, a usage of space and place for purposes of capitalising upon oldness, and a process of citizen regulation has occurred as a result. The TMC, with its regulations on hygiene and cleaning, and maintaining houses has of course been an important part in this.
Today, the modernisations have more or less stopped, even if you can see the odd household carrying out some sort of renovation, or improvement such as adding tiles to sink areas, or putting in plastic windows instead of bad wooden ones that are in danger of going rotten. Most people express pride in the village and are friendly enough, but to what extent this is due to politeness and mimicking official discourse is difficult to assess. Some people would say that the village is still poor, and that heritage might be a good thing, but tourism and visitors have not changed their lives, only made it impossible to make major changes to buildings. This has obviously had an impact, and unlike Herzfeld’s idea of the creation of a space for negotiations, Tuanshan is managed and controlled in way that makes negotiation impossible. Tourism is a top-down endeavour that locals have not benefitted from directly. If they do, that is, if visitor numbers increase, this might lead to a colonisation of space, the beginnings of which could be discerned in the women that were tired of having their pictures taken. Hence we have a mixed image in Tuanshan. On the one hand, the village has been "saved" by outside agency, including state agents. On the other, heritage protection issues were triggered by the actions of residents who were attempting to modernise but were stopped as the were ruining the capital value of the village, i.e. heritage for tourism. In Tuanshan, heritage preservation and tourism have been deemed more important than other local concerns, such as lack of housing and aspirations to modernise. Preservation has become pivotal to formulating local reform-era identity, and become part of the entrepreneurial, market oriented type of modernity the central state aspires to.

Heritage in Tuanshan has become an asset in reaching modernity as formulated by central state policy on development in the countryside; the idea of the TMC and tourism revenue from heritage is a good example of this. Here, the needs of locals have not been the overriding concern, but rather trying to regulate citizen behaviour, and foster law abiding citizens that act according to discourse on heritage preservation, and protection of old buildings.

To further this argument, that ideas of oldness, heritage, and tourism are interlinked, and aspire to a notion of modernity as centred around creating an advanced and entrepreneurial countryside, we shall now turn to the villages of Heijing and Nuodeng, where similar efforts have been made, albeit in different ways.
3. Heijing and Nuodeng: different approaches to locally driven heritage preservation

i, Heijing

The township of Heijing is located in Lufeng county in the Bai-dominated region of Chuxiong, to the east of Dali. Fieldwork in Heijing was carried out during two periods, each about two weeks long, one in November/December of 2007, and the other in April/May 2008. During research I stayed in local guesthouses, the first in a private guesthouse run by a local woman, the second time in the government guesthouse, housed in one of the reconstructed buildings, and run by the Heijing tourist enterprise. I spent my time in Heijing interviewing locals in a random, conversational way, as well as talking to local entrepreneurs and tour guides. I also interviewed the Party Secretary in Heijing.¹¹⁵

The Lufeng-region is mountainous and dominated by minorities, mainly Yi and Bai. This part of Yunnan has not managed to developed successful tourist sites, skirted by the more successful, and perhaps more beautiful areas to the north and west (greater Lijiang area, and Dali). Roads are also bad, and even if there is a new highway linking Chuxiong with Kunming and Dali, beyond Chuxiong roads are in a bad shape, with journeys often being prolonged by landslides or other problems. There are no special enterprises or other reasons for people to travel this way, and hence the region belongs to the least visited in Yunnan.

The railway from Kunming to Chengdu passes this way, but only stops in a few places. Heijing township is one of them, and the railway has been crucial to local attempts to develop tourism, as to the moderate wealth of Heijing. Trade and outside connections have been facilitated, and in comparison with other localities in the area, Heijing is modestly well-off. In 2008, incomes were an average 1640 yuan/annually, which is poor, but not as poor as some places in the region, like neighbouring Yao’an county where incomes land at around half of that (Lufeng County 2009; Yao’an county 2009). Hence Heijing could be described as socio-economically better off than its neighbours, but still lagging behind the province.

¹¹⁵ All information comes from interviews with residents, Yang Limei, the Party Secretary, and Dr Yang Qing ar Kunming Polytechnical Univeristy, unless otherwise stated.
at large, especially richer areas.\textsuperscript{116} However, in relation to the other case studies, it is typical; they are all agricultural communities with low cash incomes but not classified as "poor" (with the exception of Shuhe).

Heijing is a Han-town, but with a sizeable proportion of Yi as well as Bai, Hui and Miao, all some of the most common minorities in Yunnan. The town is surrounded by smaller minority villages, mainly Yi. Like Tuanshan and Shaxi, Heijing was a node for trade, and a town of merchants. This would explain the dominance of Han-people that migrated as a result of trade and settled in the village. Historically, Heijing was a node for Yunnan's salt trade, and grew prosperous as a result. This wealth, and the Han-dominance of the town, is mirrored in the historical structures found scattered around the town. These buildings have to come to form a new type of fame and distinction for Heijing as heritage buildings of tourist value.

Heijing is a township-seat, with its own local administration. The town is small, and Heijing can be navigated in less than an hour. Heijing is located next to a small stream that runs through town, and surrounded on all sides by massive mountains. The town stretches up into the mountains, where you can find a number of temples and deity shrines, burial plots and small farms with vegetable plots and grazing goats. The central part of town is centred around a main street that runs through town. Countless alleys with cobbled stones and old wooden houses lead out from the main street. Along the central stretch of the main street there are some more imposing buildings of architectural interest, an old guest house, a mansion house, and a temple. These buildings form the core of historical Heijing, and are central to promoting tourism. There are also some small, simple restaurants, and shops selling basic goods. Further along the street there is a vegetable market where minority women from the surrounding villages come to buy and sell goods, mainly vegetables and other foods.

Heijing is quite lively, with the train stopping twice a day and people from surrounding areas coming to buy and sell goods, or carry out other errands. People who live in Heijing are also out in the streets, often sitting outside their homes, or at one of the basic noodle restaurants.

\textsuperscript{116} Average incomes in Yunnan in 2007 were 11496 yuan in urban areas, and 2634 in rural. The poverty line is at 785 yuan, below that is absolute poverty (National bureau of statistics, Yunnan Province 2009).
You can tell that it is a township, not a village where life tends to be more quiet and centred around the fields. Many people leave the village to work outside, especially in Chuxiong or Kunming. However, links with the outside are frequent and travelling to Heijing is facilitated by the railway. People working outside Heijing, in Kunming or other parts of Yunnan and Sichuan frequently return home, hence making the town a place of translocal connections that are upheld and maintained by people maintaining family links. When I have been travelling to Heijing, I always encountered people coming back home that would approach me and offer help, or just being curious. They were school teachers or university students, or people doing business (selling clothes, or other goods, one man operating a small store selling construction material in Kunming). All of them claimed they travelled back a lot, to help out with various family obligations or just to visit. One woman, working as a secretary at a school in Kunming, still keeps house in Heijing, currently populated by other family members, but she hopes to be able to return when she retires. Kunming is too noisy, and expensive. She likes the atmosphere and friendliness of Heijing, but admits to it being too poor, and job opportunities not enough.

Heijing’s links with the outside have been important to the attempts to establish cultural heritage tourism, both in the present, but also as part of how local history is packaged and marketed. As an old salt trading town, Heijing has been locally important, and, like in Shaxi, there are a number of historical structures linked to the merchant past, such as temples and guest houses. However, these structures have not been as well-preserved as in Shaxi. In Heijing, there have been more attempts to change and modernise, which means that these buildings have not been preserved in their original shape. In addition to these historically rather interesting nodes of local history, there are also a number of well-preserved private residences of the vernacular type, wooden merchant homes situated along winding, cobble-stoned alleys. These houses are dark, and not at all well-maintained. No attempts to modernise or restore these houses have been made, and people living here are poor, mostly farmers or people engaged in some sort of small trade, such as shoe repairs, selling noodles, making goat’s cheese, or carrying out repairs or small-scale construction. Often one member of the household is engaged in small-scale farming, whereas the other is engaged in small-trade, or some other type of work outside of the village, such as
construction in nearby Chuxiong, or at the modern salt extraction factory outside of town, that still makes use of the ample salt found deep in the mountains surrounding Heijing. Younger family members often leave as migrant workers, but, like in Tuanshan, this tends to be close to home, in Yunnan or neighbouring Sichuan, which means they often return. A number of young people have also left for university in Kunming or Chengdu. 117

This means the village is mostly home to middle-aged and elderly, and there are more women to be seen than men. However, this is probably due to most men working outside, returning for meals in the evening. There would always be groups of men gathering for a smoke and some gossip in the evenings, sitting in the street or by the river.

The fields surrounding Heijing are difficult to farm, as the region is mountainous. Plots have been cut out in the mountainsides, and on flat land high up. Reaching these plots means having to climb steep stairs cut out into the mountain. Mostly people grow vegetables, and there are also fruit orchards. Goats are a common sight, as are buffaloes, used for plowing.

The overall impression of Heijing is that of a typical Yunnanese small town, located in a poor area where difficult terrain has posed certain limitations. However, it is also true that this terrain has been a gold mine, and crucial to producing and selling salt, once one of the more lucrative trades in Yunnan.

Heijing’s name means ”black well” which goes back to the black hue of the salt that was produced locally – salt is extracted by boiling and the water used from these wells (still be seen all over Heijing) always dyed the salt slightly black. The wealth accumulated through the salt trade has also left traces in the grand mansions and residences that make up the core of historical Heijing; the homes of salt mine owners, and tax collecting officials that speak of past wealth, education, and aspirations to the Chinese centre rather than the local vernacular (Yang 2002: 49; Liu 2007: 12-19; Song/Tian 2007). 118

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117 This information is based on interviewing local residents, asking about their families and their livelihoods, hence forming a general, and I think, fair, image of local life, and opportunities.
118 Salt was produced in and around Heijing, and then sold and transported all over the South West by caravans of traders, much like the tea trade in Shaxi. Salt tax was an important source of revenue for the central state in Imperial China, and by controlling the head tax of salt in peripheral places like Yunnan it was possible to exert a measure of control. A small elite in control of salt mines and salt production in places like Heijing, as well as a group of officials collecting this tax, grew extremely wealthy which is mirrored in Heijing’s architecture, grand mansions interspersed amongst the very humble vernacular structures where most people reside.
Heijing as a heritage site is different from the previous case studies, and
demonstrates another side to heritage preservation, and its meaning in Yunnan.
Heritage here is reconstructed, not preserved, and is a way of aligning Heijing
with provincial policy on tourism and development; the outcome of
entrepreneurial efforts carried out by township government.

Heritage and tourism are intrinsically linked, and serves the purpose of making
Heijing modern, a model for rural tourism. At the same time, it is also similar to
the other case studies in its emphasis on tourism, and the way a selected aspect of
the past (the salt trade) has been used as a marketing device.

But in Heijing, the agents involved are different; here, it is local government,
backed by provincial authorities (tourism and heritage) that have been driving
heritage construction, with funding from both provincial authorities, and private
investors. In Heijing, heritage protection is not the main issue. Heritage in
Heijing is centred around reconstruction of a historical era, where buildings have
undergone quite drastic changes to appear historical, and to adhere to a notion of
history. Tourism is run by local government, in the shape of a shareholding
tourist enterprise, where local government is the main shareholder, and decisive
agent in developments. Here, no outside, global actors such as the WMF or
UNESCO have been involved, even if the town is a nationally listed historical
township (2005) which means it should enjoy a degree of protection and
preservation.\footnote{www.sach.gov.cn (Zhongguo lishi wenhua mingzheng di er pi, no 32. Yunnan sheng, Lufeng
xian, Heijing zhen. The second group of Chinese historically important townships, Heijing,
Lufeng county, Yunnan Province), 2005.}

It is also a provincially listed heritage site (in 1996), and as of
2007, an AAA-listed tourist site.\footnote{The system for tourist site listings is administered by the CNTA at national or provincial level
and is similar to that of heritage sites; it follows a 3-grade scale, and could be made at national or
provincial level, i.e. in the case of Heijing, it is a provincial AAA-site, a listing carried out by the
provincial branch of the CNTA (or tourist bureau, as the two are one and the same). You can
improve your grading in this system, depending on how you develop tourism (sites, infrastructure,
marketing etc). Heijing was originally an A-site (in 2004).}

However, despite these listings, protection of the historical fabric has not been
adhered to: in Heijing, heritage is a historical facade for purposes of attracting
tourism, and in this quest, preservation is of little relevance.

In this sense, Heijing demonstrates how these types of listings are not always
adhered to, and the extent to which this type of label could be used as a way of
attracting tourism, and constructing an image of history for consumption.
purposes. Hence we have an example of locally driven heritage site construction where tourism is the main motivation, not a side benefit, or an issue of contestation. Heijing is also different from the other case studies due to the emphasis on reconstruction as opposed to preservation and protection. In both Shaxi and Heijing these are, as demonstrated, important aspects of how heritage is considered. In Heijing, the idea of protecting and preserving for the sake of cultural and historical preservation is entirely lacking: here, we have an example of historical reconstruction that has been undertaken purely for the outside, for tourists and visitors.

Heritage site construction efforts in Heijing started in 2004, when local government officials saw the potential for tourism as based around heritage buildings. In 2005, the town was listed by the SACH as a historical township of national interest, in addition to the prior 1996 provincial-level heritage site listing. This, the 2005 listing by the SACH; and the 2004 A-level tourist site listing (that is now an AAA-listing) were crucial to this decision as it meant provincial level support, and legitimacy. Since, tourism has grown, and the material heritage of the town has undergone reconstructions in order to appear appropriately "historical" and interesting to outsiders.

In practice this means they have been renovated with new facades that adhere to historical photographs of old Heijing, wooden fronts and lattice windows, and sometimes white-washed stone structures and screening walls at the entrance. The insides are often left the way they are, and apart from the changed facades the buildings are often modern concrete and tile at the back, and on the sides, you can even glimpse traces of a modern Chinese small town lingering underneath the layers of make-believe history. In addition to the reconstructed notion of oldness, the salt trade has been pounced upon as a central aspect of the town's past, and there is a small museum devoted to salt where you can see how salt was extracted and produced. There is even a hand-on workshop that sometimes opens during holidays and weekends if there are enough visitors.

This, the narrative of salt, and the "heritage" buildings, form the core of tourism in Heijing.

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121 Interview Ms Yang Limei, Heijing Party Secretary, November 2007. Also information from Dr Yang Qing, Kunming Technical University (personal communications, 2007-08).
Marketing efforts in Heijing are centred around an active production of the town as a centre for Yunnanese history and culture; an idea of rustic town with a long history that is connected to Yunnan as a place and its place in the world. The town is marketed as a Han-town, an enclave of culture, trade and civilisation hidden away amongst mysterious mountains. Efforts to attract tourists are based around the accessibility of Heijing due to the railway: it is a weekend trip from Kunming and hence a perfect destination for people who wants to explore a part of rural Yunnan that is not part of the well-trodden tourist trail.

When I first visited Heijing in the spring of 2006, I was struck by the way the buildings in town were used as stage settings for selling an image of historical Yunnan. Apart from visits to Lijiang and Dali, that are very different due the all-consuming ever-present touristic qualities, Heijing was the first "historical" village or town I visited in Yunnan, and I was intrigued by the mixture of very normal, quiet rural backwater, and the attempts to sell an idea of the past to outside visitors like myself. It seemed a strange place to go to as a tourist, but yet, at the same time, there I was, having heard of the village from friends in Kunming. Heijing, like Shaxi, is one of these little towns that have managed to become well-known by word of mouth and hence attract curiosity and attention. To what extent this is due to clever marketing such as inviting journalists to write about the town, or if it is truly just due to low-key rumours spreading (the "secret" and "authentic" travel destination), is difficult to say. But I was interested in knowing what it was that made Heijing special (when in fact it was much like any other village), and how the idea of oldness was produced.

Heijing has got one thing that facilitates this type of trip, a short adventure, and a break from Kunming – it is easy to reach by rail. Four hours on the train from Kunming, and you are deep in the hills of Chuxiong district. This is something that local government has made use of in their marketing efforts. In 2007, there were posters and marketing leaflets to be found in Kunming that announced the "special tourist train" to Heijing, departing every day at 11 am and going back in the evening the next day, making Heijing into a "perfect weekend destination". This train is in fact the regular slow train to Xichang in Sichuan (from where you can travel to Chengdu). This type of marketing seems to have been backed by provincial level tourist agents, another important factor in selling Heijing.
The town has been selected as one of the sites with potential for tourism, and has hence received both funding and support from the provincial tourist bureau and the Yunnan branch of the CNTA. This also accounts for the 2007 AAA-site listing.

Local government (i.e. township government) have been the main agents in constructing and producing heritage for tourism. In 2005, following the decision to start developing tourism based around Hejing’s historical structures, they established a shareholding investment company called the Heijing Tourism Development Shareholding Company, that is ultimately controlled by local government but open to investments from outside development companies with an interest in developing tourism in Heijing. Local government is the major shareholder, but a large share of the company also belongs to a Kunming-based development company. This is different from cases where local government have leased the rights to develop tourism, such as the example of the Yuanyang rice terraces or my later case study of Shuhe. In Heijing, local government still retains power over developments, and will reap most profits.

Yang Limei, the Heijing Party Secretary, claims this a conscious decision based on how tourism has been developed in other sites, like Lijiang. She thinks this would be a bad development in Heijing, and hopes that tourism will bring revenue to the community, not make people leave, and leave the profits to people from other places.

The tourist company hires about 10 full-time staff, in addition to a number of people working extra as guides or ticket sellers when there is a need. The 10 full-time members of staff are engaged in ticketing, guiding, cleaning, maintenance and gate keeping. There is an imposing entry gate to the village staffed by young women clad in faux-minority style outfits, vaguely resembling Miao-costumes of the type sold or hired at tourist spots all over China for purposes of having tourists masquerade in pictures. This type of outfit has been growing in popularity and many women working in shops, restaurants and at tourist attractions are attired in this costume, regardless of ethnic belonging (this seems to be a gendered attire, the minority female acting as host and guide, slightly exotic but also servile).

122 Called the Yuntian jituan Yunnan boyuan shiye youxian gongsi.
What this costume has got to with Heijing (a Han-town in an Yi-region) is unclear. When asked, the women look confused and giggle. No, they do not know what minzu they are supposed to portray, but both are Han-women. Yang Limei thinks it is a strange question, the costumes are just costumes, there to give some colour to the guides. There is a hefty 50-yuan entrance fee that includes all the sites within the village. The price also includes a map and guided tours at set hours of all the historical structures. If you do not purchase a ticket you cannot enter the town unless you carry a household registration card, or are met and greeted by local family members. This is of course similar to Tuanshan, where tourism is also run by a local company, albeit of very different character. In Shaxi (and also Lijiang) this has not been a popular idea, perhaps due to the lack of a coherent structure for tourism, such as a tourist company.

This practice is facilitated by the trains arrival times: this is when tourists come, and as the train station is a 10-minute walk from the town, most visitors take a mule cart, or small golf car from the station and are left at the ticket gates. This means the ticket gate is only staffed at times when people arrive in the village by train, or as part of pre-arranged tours. This also generates some income for the people willing to cart tourists from the train station, when there are any. The tourist company aims to employ local residents, and use profits from tourism to solve problems with local deficiencies. It is a poor county, and a poor town, and if tourism could help bring about other types of investments this would be attractive – Yang Limei does not see tourism per se as the most important development, but rather tourism as a way of attracting other entrepreneurs and businesses that will help the local economy.

When asked why heritage tourism is interesting, Yang Limei thinks this is obvious. Heijing is a historical township, there are these old buildings that is of interest to the general public and travelling to Heijing is easy. And it is beautiful, with the mountains and the clean air, which means developing tourism is an obvious choice. In fact, the whole venture seems well-considered and well-planned, which is different from some places I have visited where tourism seems unplanned and haphazard, and often tends to stop halfway, nearly finished hotels, or attractions where lack of marketing means no tourists come.
But Heijing tourism development is meticulously planned; the company appears well-run, and the way Heijing has been marketed is very strategic, and the tourist company appears to have created good connections with relevant staff at the Tourist - and Heritage Bureaus in Kunming, as they have functioned as advisors and provided both some financial backing (as Heijing is listed) as well as valuable legitimacy, despite the fact that much "heritage" in Heijing is based around reconstructions to an extent that is not the case in the other sites (apart from the extreme example of Shuhe).

The tourist sites in Heijing are all clearly labelled, and staffed by guides and ticket inspectors. They are arranged to form a loop through central Heijing, also taking in a Buddhist temple perched high on a hill above town. The sites tell the story of Heijing as a capital of the Yunnanese salt trade, emphasising the historical richness of place, and of the salt trade. It does not account for the hard labour involved in extracting salt, or the fact that Heijing was a town of a rich elite that prospered from the trade and the tax revenue collected from salt. It only tells a smooth, streamlined story of the past where everything is harmonious and where the town thrived; an era of greatness and prosperity.

Some of the buildings, reconstructed as they might be, are still interesting, and spending some time in Heijing is pleasant; a small town with a meandering river, some hills to hike and nice views, and the history of salt in Yunnan by no means lacking historical value or interest. The interesting thing about Heijing is the way this aspect of the past has been pounced upon, and marketed in a rather aggressive way, and also how it seems most local residents are completely left outside the project of tourism and heritage reconstruction. This is different from the other sites (apart from Shuhe) where heritage is, at least to an extent, a communal, shared concern where people have been involved and/or affected. In Heijing, heritage reconstruction has occurred as a bounded project, an elite scheme that seems to be going on as a parallel to everyday life.

At local government it is of course claimed that this is not the case, that heritage is a shared concern, and a resource that should be put to use and hopefully be of benefit to the community at large. However, this has not been the case, especially since tourism to Heijing has not been successful to the point where there is much to benefit from.
The number of tourists cannot possibly cover the expenses involved. In 2007, official statistics accounted for 92,000 visitors, with a total revenue of 1.3 million yuan (Guo 2009; Lufeng county 2009). This seems a lot judging from my own experience of Heijing, but I did not visit during the peak season, which is the summer when Heijing offers cool respite and not as much rain as some parts of Yunnan. When asked, local residents agree that this number seems a lot, and my landlady at the private guesthouse looked rather surprised when given this information. However, even if this is the case, incomes do not cover salaries, reconstruction and maintenance, as well as profits to investors. Employees at the tourist venture are paid a monthly salary of a couple of hundred yuan, as well as lunches and other benefits. In relation to other related professions, tourism has not seen great profits.

There are a number of privately run guesthouses in Heijing. Since my first visit in 2006, the numbers have increased dramatically but this also means more competition. The female proprietor of the private guest house I stayed did not see much business. In weekends she might have one or two visitors, and during the peak season, but most weekdays the business is quiet. She is entrepreneurial, going to the train station to meet visitors every day in hope of attracting business; she is one of the few guesthouse owners that would make the effort. Still, most of the family income depends on her husband’s job at the salt factory outside of Heijing. She is positive to the tourist venture, and appeared proud of Heijing and its new status as a site for heritage tourism. She volunteered to take me round town, even climbing up the nearby hills to show me the local Buddhist temple.

Other than private guesthouses (all very simple in ordinary family homes, a room with a bed and shared bathroom facilities), there are a few souvenir shops and restaurants catering to tourists. The souvenir vendors did not see much business at all, and the shops would remain closed for most of the day. The same is true of the restaurants catering to tourists, specialising in local cuisine such as goat’s cheese and chicken hot pot. They would only open during the weekends, or at holidays, and when they did open in the weekend, the menu was usually restricted to a few items as business is slow.

123 The total annual revenue was 15 million, which means tourism accounted for very little (Lufeng County, 2009).
Of course there are a number of ordinary, local restaurants, of the basic noodle-and rice variety and they would happily serve local simple dishes of local cuisine. But as for the more upscale, expensive restaurants that only seems aimed at outside visitors, and the occasional official banquet, business appears unsuccessful. The local government guesthouse, housed in a reconstructed mansion building in the historical section of Heijing, is comfortable and a little expensive for this part of the world. One of the tourist restaurants is housed in this building, and run by the tourist enterprise. This of course means that business here does not need to reap huge benefits as these businesses are subsidised by the tourist enterprise, i.e. local government, an arrangement that demonstrates how old structures of links between state and tourism still survive, despite the general marketisation of tourism: Heijing is a very good example of this, as are the other case studies, with the exception of Shuhe where market forces have been allowed free reign.

The striking thing about Heijing is how most of the residences and historical structures have undergone restoration; changing original materials and surfaces for new ones which creates an odd appearance of being at the stage set of a historical drama about a salt trading merchant town. These reconstructed buildings marks a breach with the overall layout and pattern of Heijing. Yang Qing, at Kunming Technical University, thinks that this has been done in a calculated way, in order to give out an air of what history should be like, not what it really was. Reconstruction is also infinitely cheaper, and most tourists will not care, or even be able to tell the difference. They want an imagined idea of oldness, a rustic notion of the past.

Yang Qing claims that this is typical of Chinese heritage site reconstruction. Sites like Shaxi and Tuanshan are the exceptions, and Heijing is the norm. No one, such as staff from the SACH or the provincial heritage bureau, is going to say anything about this, as it is considered general practice. Tourism is what could potentially make these towns and villages famous and generate local revenue, and state policy on heritage is not just to do with protecting historical structures, but even more so linked to development and tourism. Hence this type of project is deemed appropriate as it will attract tourism and not be too expensive.
In fact, bringing in outside agents like UNESCO or the WMF will hamper this type of development, and might not always be beneficial to developing tourism. In a site like Heijing, that has already got national- and provincial level heritage listings, an outside agent could potentially have been an obstacle to tourist developments based around the heritage experience. Yang Qing, himself an architect specialising in historical preservation, does not consider this to be a problem, quite the opposite. Reconstruction to him is a way of finding new life for buildings, and corresponds to the current social and economic situation in China. History and architecture are commodities that could be used in order to make a profit, "like the salt trade itself, but now it is the idea of the history of the salt trade that matters". In this way heritage site construction could perhaps be described as recycling history in the present and finding new roles and places for local culture, or, to use Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, giving sites as second life as exhibits of themselves (1998: 7).

However, the problem in Heijing is how tourism is driven by elite agents and seems to have divided local residents. In Heijing, the attitude to heritage is about the same as that in Tuanshan and Shaxi. Most local residents appear detached, and not particularly interested. The exception is the group that have a vested interest in heritage tourism such as my landlady or the staff hired by the tourist enterprise, but this is of course to be expected. One man even told me to go to Jianchuan county (where Shaxi is located) if I was interested in old buildings and culture where "they are the real thing, not like here where it's all fake", pointing to the reconstructed facades and telling me how it is all just surface; a wooden exterior hiding the modern building behind.

This is probably how and why heritage is contested; the local feeling of being left outside of developments, paired with a lack of understanding for heritage projects. Outside attention might spawn local pride, but might also lead to distrust and marginalisation as most heritage projects are top-down projects driven by local elites, or outside investors, be it NGOs, UNESCO, or entrepreneurs.

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124 See the case study of Shuhe for more on this, particularly the example of UNESCO and Lugu Hu.
125 Personal communication, Kunming, September 2007.
In Heijing, residents have not been consulted about how local heritage should be put to use – reconstruction has been rapid, and no attention paid to modernisation or other local needs. In Heijing, heritage equals reconstructing a surface that have little bearing on local reality, and since tourism has not been a tremendous success, there has been little impact on everyday life.

It is also true that money has been poured into developing tourism in Heijing by private investors which means that a lot of the profit will be of benefit not to the town, but to outside investors, even if it is local government that is the main agent in charge. And, most important, Heijing is not a dead site, an old deserted mining town in Europe or the US; but a lived-in community where the salt trade still goes on, in a modern extraction factory outside of town.

In this way, local governments has seized upon the new importance of tourism as a source of revenue and path towards development in rural areas; a way of being modern by linking up to the outside and latching onto discourse on tourism, local culture and development. This type of discourse is of course particularly strong in Yunnan, with the strong emphasis on developing tourism, and the successful models of Lijiang and Dali to emulate, aspire to, and also to learn from – we saw how officials in the Honghe region are quite aware of the dangers of granting too much power to outside entrepreneurs. In Heijing, local government also voice a similar concern, which is one of the reasons local government has not leased the tourism development rights, but rather started an investment shareholding enterprise where they remain the ultimate arbiter and powerholder: this means they are in charge of both developments and will reap some of the profits.

In some ways this new emphasis on tourism coupled with state control could be linked to discourse on the new socialist countryside as being entrepreneurial and forward looking. This is a recurring feature in all of the villages, particularly in Heijing, Tuanshan and Nuodeng where interest in developing heritage and tourism has been driven by local forces. The tourist company in Heijing is all about driving local development; here, heritage is not linked to preservation for the sake of protecting historical resources. Heritage in Heijing is about making Heijing attractive and marketable in a new era, according to contemporary ideas on the place of culture as an intrinsic aspect of the market economy. Culture and history are marketable assets, invaluable for creating place identities.
This is a global occurrence, as argued in the introduction, and plays the same role in the Yunnanese countryside as elsewhere.

By using an easily constructed historical label, localities carve out an identity and an image for purposes of selling themselves according to the rules of the market. Yang Limei likes to tell the story of how she and two of her colleagues went on a trip to Zhejiang and Jiangsu in 2004, to get inspiration, and learn from the water villages of the Jiangnan area. She has obviously been to Lijiang and Dali, but she claims to have been particularly inspired by places like Tongli and Wuzhen – they were "historical" and more sophisticated and quiet than the "noise" of Lijiang that she claimed not to like – Lijiang is just too much, and this is not what she wants for Heijing.

This would perhaps explain the entrance gate in Heijing, and the ticket system, and the attempt to find a historical nice museum-like atmosphere, all features of a place like Wuzhen in Zhejiang, a small town by the Grand Canal that is something of a canal-museum with expensive guesthouses that can only be reached by a ferry ride, included in the ticket price that is around 100/yuan, a lot in the PRC. Of course, Wuzhen has been completely depopulated, but this is not what Yang Limei wants for Heijing. She thinks heritage, history, and tourism are good things for the community, but Heijing is a place where people live, not like Wuzhen, as much as she might have liked the museum-like atmosphere.

Yang Limei does not think that Heijing is fake (jiade), but rather "renewed", or restored (gengxin). Salt merchants were important to local history, and the historical residences would not be there were it not for the salt trade. She agrees that maybe some of the reconstruction could have been carried out in a better way, but preservation is expensive, and as long as the buildings adhere to the historical shape, and stand in the same place she thinks there is nothing fake about it. And to be fair, at least Heijing looks like a small Yunnanese town, not like the urban reconstruction zone in Jianshui where the buildings are red and green and covered in golden dragons.

The way heritage has been pounced upon in a place like Heijing speaks volumes of how effective the past as an asset in the market economy has grown in recent years. It appears linked to the idea of developing the countryside; being a modern village or small town in Yunnan almost equals having an identity and a history to sell and market.
This explains much of the interest in, and emphasis on, heritage in Yunnan. Tourism is of course very much linked to this quest, but I would argue that tourism development is not the only driving force, not even in Heijing where tourism appears to be the only driving force at first glance. There is another aspect of this type of development that is linked to a broader aspiration to have an identity, to have local flavour and particularity, not just in order to attract tourism. In an era of wholesale marketisation and rapid change, heritage offers a secure place to stand, a stable idea of the past for both rural and urban dwellers; in this sense heritage fills the same purpose be it in a Shanghai neighbourhood or in a Yunnanese village, a search for the past and ones own place within that past.

Life in the countryside changes as quickly as that in the cities, even if the rapid deconstruction of the built environment has not been as ubiquitous. It is still the case though, as evidenced by the people travelling back to Heijing from other places, or people like Mr Yang in Shaxi, who likes the quiet and familiarity of home, that small towns and villages offer respite from the urban experience. Many of my younger friends in China, originally from smaller towns or villages, seem to have a complicated relationship to home: on the one hand an aspiration to have a successful urban life, and on the other a nostalgic feeling for home.

This also links in with Berman’s idea how heritage could be read as a rejection of modern society, and streamlined modernity, a heartfelt wish to preserve or reconstruct historically interesting environments (Berman 1983: 129).

The interest in heritage is part of that nostalgia, whilst also being linked to tourism, modernity, and financial gain. However, heritage preservation might be part of a national nostalgia, and a wish to experience an ”authentic” China, the exotic at home for an urban audience, but this does not mean these projects are well-received and appreciated by local residents. This aspect of preservation is even more pronounced in the small village of Nuodeng, where preservation, like in Heijing, is linked to the salt trade, and driven by local authorities without outside involvement.

Here though, the emphasis is less on tourism and more on preserving local heritage and place identity as a means of marking local distinction and pride.
Nuodeng village is located to the west of Dali, in Yunlong County, in the Dali Bai self-governing region (Dali Baizu zizhi zhou), where also Shaxi is located, but to the northeast of Dali. It is about four hours from Dali, up in the mountains, on the road leading towards Baoshan and the Nujiang Valley. Yunlong county is a Bai-dominated area, in a poor, peripheral part of Yunnan that has yet to be drawn into the regional tourist economy.\footnote{Incomes in Nuodeng were an average 1380/yuan annually in 2007 (Yunlong county 2008).}

It is an agricultural area, where incomes are supplemented by migrant work in Xiaguan (the modern town in Dali), or Baoshan. There are also job opportunities in the county seat of Yunlong, such as small-scale businesses of all sorts, construction and repairs. Yunlong is a friendly small town and functions as the transport hub in this area, and as the service centre for the surrounding villages. This is where people come to buy and sell goods in this agricultural and undeveloped part of the Dali region.

Nuodeng village is about 20-minutes drive from the county-seat of Yunlong. The village is situated up in the mountains surrounding Yunlong town, and is a small nucleated settlement perched up in the hills, a unitary brown of houses in mud and wattle where no new construction has been taking place, nor any attempts to enlarge the village. There are about 100 households in the village, and it is quite large for being a village, about the same size as Heijing and definitely much bigger than Shaxi and Tuanshan, that are very small settlements, surrounded by more villages of the same type. Nuodeng is more isolated, and there are fewer surrounding villages, probably due to location and its limitations. This is the central settlement, and to the extent that there are other houses in the area, they are solitary farmer’s houses.

The village stretches up into the hills, divided into two sections by a small ravine. From afar it looks like a a single mass of brown low-slung houses huddled together. Life opportunities here are limited to farming, mainly raising pigs and keeping goats. Farming is tough, with small plots where mainly subsistence crops are grown, such as corn and wheat, as well as chili and some fruits like apples.
However, villagers are reliant on migrant work and incomes from outside the village for cash incomes. Most young people leave to work outside the village, or to attend high school in Yunlong. Further college education is in Xiaguan, but very few local children ever reach that level, according to the local elementary school teacher in the village.

In many ways, the socio-economic situation is similar to the other case studies, particularly Shaxi and Tuanshan. Tuanshan is slightly better off due to location and climate, but both Shaxi and Nuodeng are located in similar regions, peripheral with a sometimes harsh winter climate, even if the Shaxi valley is infinitely more fertile and offer more opportunities than Nuodeng. Nuodeng is very peripheral, and in a location where agriculture is limited and very few sideline businesses exist, such as brick-making (Shaxi) or raising ducks (Tuanshan). Here, the elderly and the very young have remained but most young people work elsewhere, mainly in Xiaguan or the Baoshan region. The village is quiet, with mainly elderly women and their grandchildren being seen, as well as some other younger women engaged in household chores, and some elderly men gossiping. In the hills surrounding the village there are a number of middle-aged both men and women tending the fields, but the overall impression is quiet and sleepy.

This impression is further underlined by the layout and architecture of the village. It is the most unitary, and architecturally coherent of the sites covered, and is a good example of a type of Bai-architecture with courtyard homes, screening walls, and sky wells. However, the houses in Nuodeng are not examples of the most typical Bai-style architecture as found in Dali, and surrounding villages (the village of Xizhou outside of Dali is perhaps the best example of this). In the Dali-style, houses are whitewashed with colourful screening walls. In Nuodeng, houses adhere to the same style as those in Dali, but the materials used are different and speak of regional limitations in the use of materials.

Houses are built in mud and wattle, and they are all brown, with some plain wooden decorations. In cases of richer homes, they have nice carvings, and sometimes massive and rather impressive wooden pillars supporting the roofs of the inner courtyard.
One reason for the impression of quiet is the very tradition of building: houses face inwards, with life on the inside hidden from outside curiosity. This is a bit different from many other villages, where more modern buildings are more open, sometimes even on purpose as a way of displaying wealth (in for instance Zhejiang, some of the more impressive rural houses have the ground floor doors opened up during the day which means bypassers are free to observe family life). But in Nuodeng, all the houses are shielded by massive walls, which means wandering the village with its narrow alleys leading up-or down winding paths leaves a quiet, lonely impression, like walking a labyrinth with more houses of the same type appearing round every corner, but all of them closed to the outside. In some places this impression leaves way for more open spaces, openings in the maze of houses where there are some trees and a view of the mountains, often at uneven intervals in the steep climb from the village gateway to the elementary school and local temple that are located at the very top of the village. This is where the richer, more imposing houses, can be found, built in a more impressive style and with decorations such as carvings.

The inner courtyards of these buildings are more spacious, and the families residing in them often keep the gates open, sometimes due to visitors like myself. These are the historically more important and interesting houses in Nuodeng, and some of them function like basic guesthouses and restaurants as a result of the recent attempts to turn the village into a site for heritage tourism and heritage preservation.

The village is remarkably well-preserved, and not just due to recent efforts on behalf of heritage agents, but in a thorough way that speaks of ongoing maintenance at the communal level; no modernisations have been taking place, but neither are the houses in a bad shape or in obvious need of repairs. Of course this is a poor village, and this is obvious, but the houses are in moderately good shape, comparatively speaking. It was explained to me by local residents, and also by officials in Yunlong, that the village has been kept in good shape according to an annual cycle of overhaul, when villagers help each other out with repairs to protect buildings from cold and rain during the winter. This is done in a simple way by using local building materials (such as mud to make bricks, or pigs manure for isolation).
Even if the buildings in Nuodeng are not modern, or as well-preserved as the ones in Shaxi (after the preservation project), or places like Xizhōu near Dali, where historical reconstruction for tourism was very early, it is still quite striking how well-tended the village is in light of its being so poor and peripheral. But, like one villager told me, it is a survival strategy and the cheapest way of keeping the village in good shape. If not for building maintenance, the village would most likely be falling apart and as the materials used are perishable, the village needs annual overhaul (bricks and isolation made from mud and wattle are not particularly long-lasting. The practice of annual overhaul could perhaps be compared to places where buildings are constructed in bamboo or light wood that needs frequent changing). However, in addition to the communal practice of preservation, official preservation efforts have been ongoing for some time; these two practices now intersect and mingle in an officially sponsored interest in the village as a site for history, and the long-standing communal practice of building maintenance and pride in place.

Nuodeng’s location is not particularly well-suited for tourism – it requires a long side-trip from Dali, and the only other place you can travel is perhaps Tengchong near Baoshan, or the Nujiang Valley and neither place is particularly popular for tourism. Shaxi and Tuanshan are both convenient stops on a longer itinerary, and Heijing has got the railway from Kunming. But Nuodeng is not suited for tourism in the same way, and it seems local officials have realised this.

There are no real attempts to market the village for tourism, but rather a low-key type of place marketing based around the village as a site for archaeology, architecture, and culture. This is of course true to an extent of the other sites – they are heritage sites of course – but this aspect is never emphasised in quite the same way. Nuodeng is portrayed as being mysterious, a Bai-village with "1000 years of history", and a site for archaeological and architectural specialists (Huang 2004). In the village the same holds true. There are places to sleep, but these guesthouses are regular family homes that operate as guesthouses when there are visitors.

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127 One example of this is the grand gate that has been constructed by the turn-off to the mountain road leading towards Nuodeng with a banner reading "Nuodeng, a Bai-village of 1000 years", the only discernable tourist marketing effort in both Yunlong and Nuodeng.
They also provide meals as there are no restaurants, not even a shop selling
snacks. There are no souvenir vendors, and no entrance fee. The village has got
no obvious tourist sites, the only thing being a salt workshop, where you can see
how salt was boiled and extracted the traditional way, and a small museum
devoted to local history, that has in many ways been crucial to preservation
efforts in Nuodeng, as well as to the image of Nuodeng as a traditional Bai-
village.

The salt work-shop is housed in a regular building, and only opens for a little
while each day if there are tourists or other visitors, or on request. It is operated
by a local family, and they receive a small sum of funding from local government
in Yunlong. This is not exactly a tourist museum, or tourist workshop, as there
are so few visitors, but seems to be an experiment, or attempt to have something
to display other than just houses.

The demonstration is rather interesting, and the salt extracted is used by the
family, or you could buy it for a small sum. The history of salt and its production
is part of official local history in Nuodeng as well as in Heijing. However,
Nuodeng was not a trading village in the same sense as Heijing, and the wealth
generated by the salt trade is not a feature of local history, but historically
villagers mined for, and produced salt that was transported and sold elsewhere.
This aspect has been made part of local history, but not to the extent that is the
case in Heijing where the salt production, and its history have been made a
central feature of how heritage has been constructed, and local history narrated;
in Heijing, salt is the narrative, in Nuodeng, it is just a low-key aspect of local
history that is commemorated in a simple way, seemingly due to a vague notion
that the village should have an attraction. When asked, the family in charge of the
salt-workshop claims that they were approached by officials since their house
used to be a small salt factory, and they agreed to open the workshop. The family
carries no direct connection to salt production, but extracting a small amount of
salt requires no particular skills. It is not hard work, and provides some extra
income; the husband usually works as a local carpenter and engages in general
repairs and maintenance of all sorts, whereas the woman works the fields.

Yu Wuhong, at local government in Yunlong, claims that the idea was to
display some aspect of local history, and likes the way it functions; salt was
important in Nuodeng, and should be made part of local heritage.
However, apart from the buildings themselves, it is the only official attempt to construct a display for outsiders; there are no attempts akin to the re-establishment of the market in Shaxi, or the sponsorship of guesthouses in Tuanshan. There are a few signs in the village leading you towards the "salt museum", and also to the museum, but other than that, signs and maps are lacking, apart from the plaques with heritage listings.

Efforts to promote the village as a heritage site started in 2004 when Yunlong county started listing local residences as "folk buildings" (minju). This was followed by attention from provincial government and provincial heritage agents, and many of the residences in Nuodeng are listed at provincial level. In 2006, the village was put on the national list of historically important villages.\(^{128}\) This demonstrates an active outside interest in the village, that has trickled from local to regional, and onto national level; here Nuodeng is a good example of the interest in vernacular architecture as both a local, regional, and national resource that operates at different scales (Howard 2003: 186-211). At local and regional level, Nuodeng represents an attempt to preserve local history as a way of gaining legitimacy and distinction, a concern that is also linked to national interest in heritage as a resource for historical greatness and patriotism. However, in Nuodeng this patriotism is linked to local and regional concerns that comes with an ethnic slant, namely that of reasserting Bai cultural identity. Hence, in Nuodeng, there is another side to preservation that is linked to both national concerns with preservation, as well as ethnic identity.

This is of course also linked to tourism and place marketing to an extent, but unlike Heijing and Shaxi, also listed at national level, there are no obvious attempts to develop tourism in Nuodeng, nor has it garnered a lot of outside attention or received funding or investments. The village has been kept the way it is, and there are no obvious efforts to change or reconstruct, rather to protect and preserve the village following a long-established communal tradition of maintenance. This interest in Bai-identity is a recent reform-era phenomenon that has occurred as a result of the new emphasis on ethnic identity in Yunnan; being ethnic has come to equal a new sense of self-consciousness and pride that has surfaced in attempts to underline ethnic markers and belonging by language,

\(^{128}\) SACH (2006), The third list of historically important villages (Di san pi Zhongguo lishi wenhua mingcun).
ritual and compiling history (McCarthy 2009: 100-102). The Bai in the Dali-region have been particularly good at this, and interest in Nuodeng should be placed within this context, as well as the broader context of national discourse on heritage protection and provincial policy on culture and ethnicity as marketing devices, and crucial to tourism. Hence I would argue that Nuodeng has been a strategic village in these regional attempts to benefit from heritage and establish a strong Bai-identity in the Dali region.

This is different from the other case studies in that ethnic identity has been made use of in an active way, and not just as a colourful costume for marketing purposes. The attempts to construct a new meaning and role for Bai-identity that can be seen across the Dali-region have had an impact on how material heritage is considered. Shaxi is also a Bai-village, in a region where Bai-people are a majority (Jianchuan county), but no attempts to capitalise upon, or reassert Bai-identity can be seen in Shaxi, probably due to the outside agency of the ETH and the WMF.

However, in Nuodeng, this new importance attached to culture, language, and religion in Bai-regions can be discerned in a different way. The "discovery" of Nuodeng as a heritage site seems to have been linked to this movement. I would argue that Nuodeng carries the function of marking local distinction and regional pride in an ethnic label; a new meaning and importance attached to being Bai that has been spreading throughout the region in recent years. Nuodeng as a heritage site, and the way the village has been marketed, is quite telling of this interest, and the role heritage plays in the quest to reformulate ethnic culture.

The motivations behind preservation in Nuodeng hence differs quite radically from the other sites, partly because it is locally driven, partly because tourism is not the main factor behind preservation.

The fact that preservation practice in Nuodeng is not mainly to do with developing tourism has also led to a different attitude in relation to how preservation is carried out, and how local heritage as a resource is considered. Nuodeng resembles Shaxi and Tuanshan, but unlike these sites, preservation here has not been driven by international actors with a UNESCO-derived agenda on the value of heritage. But like in these sites, the emphasis is on protecting and preserving the historical fabric in a careful, meticulous way that also involves taking local life into account.
I would argue that even if preservation has not been driven by the community itself, it is still true that local practice of house building and maintenance has formed the core of preservation. No attempts to wrestle place meaning away from the community, nor inscribe the site with an official, or elite-sponsored idea of history, like in Heijing or Shaxi, have been made.

Of course, the idea of the village representing Bai culture and history is an elite driven project, but also one that is anchored within the community. There are no obvious displays of ethnic culture, but then again, as has been pointed out, the Bai as an ethnic group are not very distinct. In many ways, they are almost inseparable from the Han (Wu 1990: 6; McCarthy 2009: 59). And Nuodeng is not a tourist site; to the extent that there is tourism to the village, it is low-key and on a scale that does not interrupt local life in any way.

It would be wrong to say that heritage preservation in Nuodeng follows the pattern from the East Coast where communal efforts have been important to preservation, such as the examples made by Yang (2004), and Siu's (1989; 1991) idea of recycled traditions as part of the capitalist economy, it would also be wrong to say that any of these sites follow the pattern of Jing's Gansu Confucian temple (Jing 1996). In Yunnan, this type of communal concern seems entirely missing, probably due to the very socio-economic situation that I would argue is crucial to how heritage is considered – preserving houses is not the most important thing in a place where cash incomes are very low.

In Nuodeng, preserving houses has historically been due to poverty and climate, as a way of keeping warm in the cheapest and most convenient way possible, made more acute due to the building materials used. The village has remained unaffected from revolution and modernisation alike. Here, old buildings remain as a result of poverty, and this poverty also seems to have led to communal efforts to maintain. In other locations, like Shaxi, that are equally poor, it is still the case that villagers have to an extent left to modern settlements surrounding the village core. In Tuanshan, modernisation was deemed a threat to local heritage resources. If local heritage was ruined, the touristic value would be as well, in addition to local credibility which meant villagers had to be stopped from ruining the village. But in Nuodeng, local efforts to modernise have not occurred. In Nuodeng, preservation has been equal to maintenance, and then later picked up by local and regional elites that have promoted the village as a site for Bai
heritage. Preservation in Nuodeng has not been the outcome of communal efforts to restore local pride and place identity, based around communal nodes such as temples, or ancestral halls, like in Yang’s account of Wenzhou elites, the earlier example of Zhuge village in Zhejiang, or Jing’s Kong clan (Jing 1996; Yang 2004; Svensson 2006: 41-50).

However, it is arguably true that there are traces of the cultural renewal familiar from other parts of the PRC to be found in the Bai renaissance that has been ongoing in the Dali region. This elite movement, that has occurred amongst other ethnic groups as well, like the Hui (Muslim Chinese, see Gladney 1991; McCarthy 2009:131-166), or the Dai in Xishuangbanna (McCarthy 2009: 70-99), is similar to other local groups in the PRC and their efforts to promote themselves. Being ethnic could be beneficial in this quest; a well-defined cultural identity based around cultural tradition is a strength in a place characterised by competition, a search for the unique, and local flavour, at least as long as these unique qualities adhere to national aspirations rather than challenge them.

Ethnic cultural revival based around culture and tradition, especially when inserted in a state-approved project such as heritage, is of course not a challenge, but rather a way of aligning ethnic aspirations with national interests.

In this sense, this low-key Bai ethnic revival is as much a response to the modern nation as that of local communities along the East Coast that aim to restore local heritage, but in the case of Yunnan it is less to do with displays of wealth, and financial benefits than is the case in rich places like Wenzhou.

One of Nuodeng’s more imposing, and interesting old buildings is one of the elite mansions, that now functions as a guesthouse and is the home of a small museum devoted to local tradition. It is referred to as an "ecological" (shengtai) museum and is called the "Fu Jia Liu Fang Yuan".\footnote{The usage of the phrase "shengtai" (ecological) has grown in popularity in Yunnan in recent years but no one seems to be able to account for what it really means. I have seen it tagged onto everything from ethnic dance performances in Lijiang to teashops, museums, and village environments that are anything but "ecological". It is probably part of discourse on Yunnan as a place of nature, sustainability, and the exotic, natural qualities of minority culture, and could also be seen as a response to how discourse on environmental issues have trickled down to local level and offers a sense of legitimacy, much in the same way many things are "heritage".}

This place is run by a local family with elite connections, and is very place as it is central to how and why heritage in Nuodeng has been pounced upon by Bai-elites. This family is an old local elite family; the father, Huang Jinding, of the
woman now residing in the impressive courtyard home (Huang Wenguang), perched up a hill a little bit out of the way from the more ordinary low-slung buildings, was a local scholar of some renown, that used to teach history at college in Dali/Xiaguan, but still kept his house in the village. He was devoted to Bai-history, and belonged to a group of Bai academics who have been driving interest in ethnic identity, and Bai culture in the reform-era. He passed away in 2001, but his daughter decided to keep his legacy alive by starting the museum. He published books on Bai-history, and on local history, collecting folk tales and compiling gazeteers, materials that are now housed in the museum.

All this is information gathered from the daughter, as well as from other villagers and Wu Yuhong at local government in Yunlong; this family has been driving interest in the village, and efforts to preserve local tradition for quite some time.

The Fu Jia Liu Fang Yuan operates a small guesthouse businesses, and charges 5-yuan for entry to the museum. The museum houses old manuscripts and various artifacts connected to local history, collected by the old Mr Huang.

Ms Huang is informative and welcoming, but acknowledges that she by no means possesses the same amount of knowledge on the village, and the region as did her father. She claims to have liked the idea of keeping the artifacts after her father passed away, and likes the idea of having something to display, especially since there are tourists and other outside visitors, often people like myself with a specific interest in the village.

The museum is small, and nothing special, but the manuscripts, and poems, and folk songs that old Mr Huang have collected are interesting, and an unusual addition to this type of heritage site. In for instance Heijing, there is a similar display connected to Heijing's place within the Yunnanese salt trade, but this is carried out in an official way, by local government and the tourist enterprise. The Nuodeng museum is less professional, but does say something about local pride and place identity, and also how Nuodeng preservation is less connected to tourism, and more to an idea of re-establishing ethnic pride, and local distinction by adhering to national discourse on civilisation, heritage, and cultural achievement, a discourse that also includes being entrepreneurial and part of the market economy: Nuodeng is of course also something of a tourist site, albeit in a low-key way.
Whilst doing fieldwork, I was intrigued by the rediscovery of Bai-history that was evident in language schools, street signs, shop signs and the number of publications on Bai culture and language to be found in bookshops around Kunming and Dali. In Dali especially, but also in Jianchuan, this ethnic revival is quite obvious to anyone with more than a passing interest in Yunnan and ethnic culture. Nuodeng, and the way the village has been brought to outside attention, is part of this, and hence demonstrates a different side to heritage preservation in Yunnan, namely that of heritage as an aspect of ethnic and local identity; a way of marking and laying claim to an ethnic heritage that has taken on a new value in the reform-era. Being ethnic, in this case being Bai, is no longer a source of embarrassment, but rather a way of gaining credibility, and establishing a strong sense of ethnic awareness in an era characterised by discourse on ethnic multitude as being of positive value (as opposed to the revolutionary era, when ethnicity was stigmatised).

The Bai are, as already argued in the chapter on Shaxi, a fluid group that have suffered little abuse during the revolutionary era. They are also well-respected, and considered to be literate and civilised – almost like the Han, but with an ethnic slant, and a separate history based around the perceived greatness of the Dali kingdom (McCarthy 2009: 59). The idea of the Dali kingdom, and the way it has been marketed in the reform-era is of course linked to tourism, perhaps especially in light of how successful Lijiang, and the idea of the Naxi has been for purposes of attracting tourism. Old town Dali is of equal fame, but not as well-preserved or well-visited as Lijiang.

Dali old town is listed as a historical city at national level, but it does not carry the international renown of Lijiang. Efforts have been made in Dali to make old houses appear more "traditional" and there have been some aggressive attempts to benefit from the ethnic credentials of Dali, but the Bai are not as easy to market as the Naxi.

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130 McCarthy quotes Francis L.K. Hsu's classical account of the Bai, or minjia, where he portrays them as being almost inseparable from the Han (Hsu 1948; McCarthy 2009:59).
131 Dali is usually quoted as Yunnan's tourist destination number two, after Lijiang. One major difference between Dali and Lijiang is Lijiang's more peripheral location and the poverty of this region prior to tourism. The Naxi have also been more stigmatised and many Naxi practices were condemned during the Cultural Revolution, in a way that was not the case with the Bai. Dali has always been more modern and prosperous, with the exception of the last decade when tourism has transformed the Lijiang region (Rees 2000: 33; McCarthy 2009: 64).
Susan McCarthy has demonstrated how Bai ethnic revival is linked to what it means to be Chinese today; ethnic awareness and attempts to glorify and elevate ethnic culture, such as making Bai history appear long and illustrious, is part of the general idea of advancement and civilisation that are crucial components of what the Chinese state at large aspires to. Bai cultural revival could be seen as part of this aspiration, but with an ethnic slant that is also coloured by Chinese reform-era policy on ethnicity and the role of minorities, as positive but backward and in need of advancement; history, culture, and heritage are useful in this quest, and in the context of Yunnan, even more so. Provincial policy on minorities as a positive aspect of the market economy, especially tourism, has obviously left a mark on how ethnic minorities think of themselves and their culture.

In the case of the Bai, there is an elite, and the Bai as a group share an idea of being advanced, at least for being a minzu. This is displayed in Bai language and musical revivals, and also in architecture and intangible heritage such as the dyeing of batik (McCarthy 2009:105-112). The idea of cultural advancement, civilisation, and history is at the core of Bai-ethnic revival (McCarthy 2009: 100-101; 128). Hence heritage agents, and college teachers like Mr Huang, with Bai-backgrounds have come to take an increasing interest in restoring historical tradition and forging a strong identity, despite (or because of) their fluid ethnic identity and general assimilation with the Han (Wu 1990: 6).

If placed in this context, Nuodeng village and its place within heritage concerns, lends a different focus to the meaning of heritage preservation than is the case in most sites in Yunnan; here, heritage is tied to a low-key type of ethnic revival. This is further underlined by official support at county and regional level for preservation in Nuodeng, and the way preservation has been carried out is even more telling of this. Here, we have a very careful labelling and documenting of history.

In this sense Nuodeng is reminiscent of early European heritage concerns, the careful labelling of objects and practices as a way of establishing an idea of a long and glorious past. By making Bai-history appear long and civilised, the Bai as a group will appear more advanced.

This is also akin to how Chinese heritage in general works, the idea of a great civilisation as evidenced by artifacts. Hence ethnic revival and national concerns with history are part of the same story; or rather, the ethnic response placed
within the national framework of how and why heritage matters – as an economic resource, and as evidence of a great civilisation where cultural and ethnic difference are included in the national story, albeit with local and ethnic markers of distinction. The story of Bai history does not compete with that of the Han, but rather aspires to be on a par with, and part of, official history on China as civilised and advanced.

Perhaps as a result of this cultural renaissance, there is a definite sense of place identity and pride in the village, that is missing in the other sites. In Nuodeng, villagers display pride in local heritage. This could also be due to the close-knit community, and the consistency of the local building tradition, as well as recent interest in the village from an outside elite. When asked, local residents would tell me that they were proud to have outside visitors come, especially as so many were what they referred to as "experts" (zhuanjia). There really had to be something quite special about the village since so many outsiders with an interest in local history, archaeology and architecture would come.

And this is true. The early interest in the village as a site for history has spawned continued interest of the same type; when I was in Nuodeng, there were two groups of graduate students, one from Kunming and one from Anhui province in the village, on excursions to gather materials for their MA-dissertations. Another young woman from Shanghai was working on a PhD in archaeology. Her supervisor had advised her to go to Nuodeng in order to write about local mythologies and Bai-archaeology.

In Nuodeng, many houses are, as stated, listed at different levels. Nuodeng resembles Jianshui and Tuanshan in the way listings are ubiquitous, and placed on virtually all the buildings in the village. This does of course create an air of history that is almost museum-like due to the unitary design of the village, and the maze-like alleys, but these plaques do not carry the same sense of having been imposed on residents as a way of enforcing regulations, and helping tourism.

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132 In Shaxi and Heijing, listings are not common; in Shaxi, the temple is listed at provincial level, and the village as a whole, but none of the individual residences. In Heijing, there are listings, but only of the officially designated (and reconstructed) tourist sites. In Jianchuan town, the Shaxi county seat, there are a number of local-level listings that have recently been made, in a very similar way to Jianshui. Apparently this is linked to a new plan to recreate Jianchuan old town as a heritage site based around local architecture. Jianchuan old town is full of local wooden vernacular residences, all in very bad shape, and the idea (according to rumour and not based on fact) is probably to tear down and reconstruct.
Listings in Nuodeng have been made in a coherent, informative way, and they have all been made at around the same time, with most of them dating from 2004, and 2006. They have been made in consultation with heritage agents at both regional and provincial level. The plaques are all made in the same design, and state why the building is listed, the year, what type of building it is (such as a sanheyuan or siheyuan, or if it has got a skywell or screening wall of particular value).\textsuperscript{133} This practice lends an air of seriousness that is not so common to these type of listings. This is most likely linked to the village as a site for Bai history, and the interest from Bai-elites in preserving this type of material heritage.

The difference between this and Heijing, where local efforts have also been crucial to heritage site construction, is striking. These two sites are in many ways similar, located in poor, mountainous districts, with provincial and national listings, and a similar history as places where salt and the extraction of salt have been important factors in local history, but how and why heritage have been made use of differs radically, from the tourist venture in Heijing, to the locally and regionally anchored interest in Nuodeng as a place for local and regional history.

Local pride in heritage is strong in Nuodeng; villagers would all be happy to show me their homes. The best example of this was perhaps the Long Wang Miao, or the Dragon King temple, a small deity shrine tucked away in one of the many alleys. This place was once attacked by local Red Guards, one of the few places in Nuodeng to have suffered this type of treatment. Today though, the shrine houses a heritage plaque, with its name and some historical background.

The shrine is housed in a very decrepit old building, and looked after by the elderly couple that resides in the building. They were immensely proud to show me the shrine, and offered me some tea whilst we chatted. This couple used to be among the poorer of the villages, but claimed that the new interest in the shrine, and the official interest in, and acknowledgement of, the shrine made them feel happy and content, as if old feelings of being looked down upon had disappeared. This is of course one function of heritage as well; making people take renewed pride in their own background, and heal old wounds.

\textsuperscript{133} A building with three or four walls surrounding and shielding the inner courtyard. A skywell, or tianjing, is an opening in the roof of the courtyard that could vary in size.
This has been the case in places like South Africa where heritage has taken on a political hue of healing by taking various alternative histories into account (one example being Cape Town’s District 6 museum, see Ashworth/Tunbridge 1996; Coombes 2003: 116-149; Rowlands 2007). In a small village like Nuodeng this works in a very direct, personal way, that resembles how old town Shaxi residents got their old houses restored and a new sense of pride in relation to surrounding settlements. However, this process has been linked to a great deal of outside attention. In Nuodeng, a place like the Dragon King temple works at a communal, intimate level. Nuodeng in general shares a sense of communal belonging based around building traditions: the sameness, and closeness of the village has probably helped this local attachment to the vernacular tradition. Listings in Nuodeng have been sensitive to this, and efforts to attract tourism have not affected how and why heritage has been listed: the deity shrine for instance has been left the way it is, with no changes, which would not have been the case in for instance Heijing or Shaxi. Nuodeng has also been very isolated, which has led to a historical sense of being a close-knit community, and the built heritage has been pivotal to this idea of community.

However, this type of preservation could be problematic. Currently it enjoys strong communal support, but there is also a top-down, elite slant to this type of preservation that aims to conserve history for purposes of documenting cultural history. This demonstrates how discourse on heritage derived from Western ideas on preservation and conservation of historical, often dead, practices and sites has trickled down to village level, and affected how preservation is considered by a certain group of local and regional elites. In this case, the idea of preserving and conserving the village comes from an interest in cultural preservation that resembles UNESCO discourse on conservation as a resource, and buildings as something to be protected from forces of modernisation, as artifacts and markers of cultural history. This jars with the original meaning of preservation in Nuodeng, that is a response to poverty; in Nuodeng, this historical past is the present.
In Chinese vernacular building tradition, as argued in chapter two, it is often the original date of a settlement or building that matters, not the age of the actual present structure. In Nuodeng, this constant cycle of change and renewal that is an intrinsic part of much vernacular building traditions, is very evident. This is different from the historical reconstruction of Heijing and Tuanshan, where heritage preservation has been imposed from the outside, not due to cycles of renewal as a result of wear and tear. In for instance Tuanshan, there is not a communal tradition of annual overhaul, and in Heijing, houses have been changed solely due to capitalist purposes that have been imposed from the outside. In Nuodeng, we have an example of what this tradition and cycle of change really means. In Nuodeng, it is the building tradition per se that is the heritage, not the oldness of the houses. This could be seen as a material representation of local identity that has got a long history, and that would account for much of the local pride in heritage.

John Czaplicka’s ideas on building materials as instrumental to constituting a local or regional identity fit well with how buildings in Nuodeng work, as a type of communal glue (Czaplicka 2003: 2004). This forms a sharp contrast to Heijing, where local attitude to heritage was detached, almost hostile at times, and Tuanshan, were people felt that preservation was forced from top-down, and stopped them from modernising, whilst also not being financially beneficial. In Nuodeng, this type of attitude is not discernable. The continued use of local building materials has seemingly forged a strong sense of communal identity, in line with how Czaplicka has described communal attachment to certain building materials. In Nuodeng, heritage preservation is in many ways just a continuation of a communal practice, but now elevated to "heritage". This also interestingly enough follows Western notions of conservation, and conservation practice, the idea of keeping historical environments alive. However, Nuodeng is of course not a historical environment but a lived-in village.

\[\text{134 Czaplicka has worked on the former Soviet Union, and especially the Baltic states where material heritage has taken on a new meaning, as marking distance to the former occupying force, and also for tourism (Czaplicka 2003; 2004).}\]
This is what sometimes makes heritage concerns in places like Yunnanese villages different: the fact that these sites are not dying communities, but sites for everyday life, sometimes, like in Tuanshan, with aspirations to become less poor, and more modern. This paradox is also evident in Japan, where Western ideas of heritage as frozen (*toketsu hozon*), as something to be put in a museum, has never been part of domestic tradition, where heritage should be practiced and kept alive. Japanese old buildings and temples are, like the houses in Nuodeng, part of a long-standing process of change and renewal where tatami-mats, paper doors and windows are changed on an annual basis, and in some cases, like the famous Ise-temple, the whole building undergoes reconstruction on a 20-year cycle, in order to purify and renew the sacred qualities (Ehrentraut 1989; Hendry 2000: 166-67; Hladik 2005: 257-259). However, the way these changes are made is crucial. They need to adhere to specific techniques, as do the materials used.

This is also true of a place like Nuodeng, and perhaps to an extent of other villages in Yunnan as well: Western discourse on heritage as something to be protected and labelled is not part of local practice, which would explain the sometimes uncomprehending attitude of officials and tourist bureaus, or even architects like Yang Qing when asked about reconstructions. However, in Nuodeng, materials and technique still follow a set traditional pattern; but this is due to poverty and lack of access to cheap tile and concrete. In the present era, due to outside interest and acclaim, it might be that traditional practices are a source of local pride, but it is important to see the difference between what is building renewal and what is active historical preservation. In a village like Nuodeng, the roots to other types of modern heritage reconstruction could be seen albeit in these cases there is easy access to modern materials, hence merging traditional renewal with modern materials.

Nuodeng is not reconstructed, but the idea of local heritage as something to be elevated and lauded, frozen in time is questionable: heritage here is locally anchored and the result of poverty, a survival strategy. In this sense, official interest has of course spawned local pride in the village and its building practices, but it could be a bad thing if elite discourse on heritage and preservation wrestle away place meaning and turn the village into a museum of local Bai-culture. As it is now, tourism is very low and manageable, and officials claim to like it this way. If Nuodeng was turned into a tourist site much like Weishan or Xizhou,
other Bai-villages where tourism has been very successful (or of course Dali old town), this would ruin the "authenticity" of the village. However, this is also a problem as this means that Nuodeng should be kept in a primitive state as a display of a glorious Bai-past – how this might affect villagers in the long run is difficult to assess. Nuodeng is a slightly different case as tourism here is not crucial – rather it is part of an ethnic renaissance re-evaluation of ethnic identity. This is driven by a combination of local government, local elites, and regional interest in Bai history. Like in Heijing, this interest is communally and regionally driven, but as we have seen, this could mean very different things, and provide very different answers as to why heritage matters, and what it means in Yunnan today.

Now we shall turn to the last case study that demonstrates a very different side to, and outcome of, heritage reconstruction. Shuhe village, part of the Lijiang UNESCO-inscription, is perhaps the most commercialised heritage site in the province, and forms a stark contrast to the other case studies, whilst also providing us with some clues as to what heritage tourism might be transformed into if taken to an extreme.

4. Shuhe: heritage as theme-park

Shuhe village, part of the Lijiang World Heritage inscription, is located about half an hour away from Lijiang Old Town. Shuhe village, along with Basha, another small Naxi village, was included in the 1997 World Heritage inscription as a complement to the listing of Dayan, the old town in Lijiang. The village was claimed to have a strong local character and culture, evidenced in both architectural heritage, as well as in crafts and local tradition.

The Naxi ethnic group resides in the Lijiang area; the origins of the Naxi are unclear, but the history of Naxi people in northwest Yunnan goes back to the late Song-dynasty (960-1279). The old Naxi kingdom was focussed around Lijiang, a merchant and trading centre in the region. Han-influence has been strong, one example being education in written Chinese, even if many Naxi did not speak Chinese prior to Liberation in 1949, when PRC policy on minorities came to have a great impact on life in Lijiang. The Cultural Revolution saw destruction of traditional culture and artifacts, and many religious and cultural practices associated with the Naxi were banned, such as musical performances and Naxi-religion, called Dongba, a mix of Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism with local influences (Rees 2000: 28-58, McKhann 2005: 147-166; Su/Teo 2009: 64-71). Some of these traditions have taken on a new role in the tourist economy and Naxi culture has seen a renaissance, but often aimed at outsiders; as a result Dongba religion and script have seen a massive commercial transformation.
This case study differs from the rest as Shuhe is a well-developed tourist site in one of China’s foremost tourist regions. Shuhe is not a case of attempting to develop heritage resources, but the finished product. Here, we can clearly discern the different factors that come into play when discussing heritage in the PRC, as a political and financial concern focussed around tourism, both in terms of the general marketisation of China, but also in an ideological way, as a sphere for producing and transmitting cultural authority based around ideas of patriotism and cultural harmony.

Fieldwork in Shuhe was conducted in two periods, one in late November of 2007, the other in late April/May of 2008. Fieldwork here was slightly different as the site is so developed, and so few original residents remain; most interviews were with shopkeepers, guesthouse owners, and others with a vested interest in tourism. Most background on developments in Shuhe was gathered from secondary readings, and Heather Peters at UNESCO. Lijiang officials were not willing to see me, and the same is true of the development company active in Shuhe, the Dingjie Group, which has limited my understanding to the point of view of one major stakeholder, namely UNESCO. However, Shuhe as a case study serves the purpose of demonstrating the extent to which tourism and heritage are interlinked in Yunnan, and how space can be transformed, and the meaning of place wrested away as a result of excessive tourism, and capital investments.

Shuhe village was once a small sleepy Naxi village called Longquan. The name Longquan still exists, but only refers to the original settlement. The site that is referred to as Shuhe is an enlarged tourist theme-park with a Naxi heritage theme. Longquan village has been included in this enlargement of the original settlement, and remains tucked away in a corner of the new development, an enclave of traditional cobbled alleys and Naxi-style vernacular architecture. Hence it is important to underline that Shuhe is not a village in the traditional sense; there are a few remaining locals residing in the original village, but most have left due to rising rents, lucrative offers of leasing their homes to outside tourist entrepreneurs, or simply due to the difficulty of having a normal life due to the restraints posed by tourism.

Longquan village was traditionally closely linked to Lijiang Old Town, the trade centre in the Naxi region. Longquan was famous for crafts, mainly leather works,
an important craft in Naxi culture, both for clothing but also for horse apparel. Longquan craftsmen supplied leather to Naxi traders, and the village also functioned as a stop on the tea trail, much like Shaxi and Lijiang old town; in fact, most of these old villages have in some sense been connected to Yunnan’s historical trade routes. The village is small, but with a central square, a brook meandering through the village, and protected by a small mountain at the back. In the distance the Yulong Xueshan (Jade Dragon Snow Mountain, one of the region’s foremost sites) can be detected and in spring, the fields are filled with rape and fruit blossoms, making it immensely pretty. The village consists of about 50 traditional wooden houses, most of them fairly large with nice courtyards. The village exudes an air of once having been wealthy, and resembles old town Lijiang in many ways, but smaller and with more spacious houses.

About a decade ago, this village was the sort of place people went to on day-excursions from Lijiang – a friend who used to be a tour guide in this area was very surprised to hear about the Shuhe-development as he recalls taking tourists for cycle trips from Lijiang to Longquan, this very quiet, nice, traditional village that was such a contrast to Lijiang: no souvenir shops, no backpacker cafes and a glimpse of what this region must have been like prior to tourist developments in Lijiang. However, this has all changed, and Shuhe/Longquan is an extreme case of how heritage can be pounced upon by state agents and entrepreneurs alike; this is heritage taken to the level of theme-park display purely for the purpose of the tourist gaze with no interest in preservation or conservation – in Shuhe, tourism is the only driving factor, and developments here point to what could happen in the other sites if market forces were allowed to rampage freely, or if tourism was enough of a success. In this sense, Shuhe (and Lijiang) forms an interesting contrast to developments in the other sites, as these sites have been models for heritage and tourist development in Yunnan, but this does not necessarily always mean that they are positive models to emulate, or aspire to.

As we have seen, in the Honghe district, officials are cautious of this type of development, and the same is true of Nuodeng were heritage has taken on a different meaning. In Heijing, local government has made sure to be in control over developments, and retain ultimate decision-making power by starting an investment company where they are in charge.
A case like Shuhe shows why this is the case – here, both local government and UNESCO have lost decision-making power over developments. This is different from Lijiang Old Town itself, where UNESCO and the local heritage management committee still retain ultimate decision-making power, even if these two agents are at odds, and have often envisaged very different futures for Lijiang. In Shuhe, even the Lijiang Cultural Heritage Management Committee (CHMC) admits that tourist developments have ruined some of the original value of Longquan for both heritage and tourism purposes.136

Tourism development on a large scale started in 2004 when the development rights of Longquan village were leased to an outside company called the Dingjie Group. The Dingjie Group is a Kunming-based development company specialising in construction and real-estate; they are behind some of the recent real-estate developments in Kunming, such as new complexes of apartment buildings, enclaves of middle-class luxury that combine the socialist danwei (work-unit) housing of self-contained, gated, housing communities with a new type of exclusiveness that can only be obtained if you have the money. In fact, Shuhe is reminiscent of this type of urban development, the enclosed, bounded space of upscale apartments.

In the case of Shuhe, it is not real-estate, but tourism development with a pronounced ethnic theme, carried out in what is supposedly a World Heritage site, and surrounding a rather poor, and traditional village settlement that has, without much consultation, been drawn into a global tourist market. In some ways, this type of development is mirrored in urban developments of the same type; the gentrified, bounded neighbourhoods in places like Xintiandi (Shanghai), the new Qianmen “heritage” area of Beijing, or the construction of an ”old” Kunming, to replace the recently demolished real old Kunming.

This type of heritage development favours a new version of the old, a recycled heritage that carries strong postmodern qualities of the type Jameson has referred to as all times at once, a kitschy reconstruction of oldness that, in fact, is more modern than the present in its play with history, the antique, and present day capitalism. The idea of "wrapping", i.e. a building layered in different historical eras, is a good way of describing this type of development; it is heritage wrapped for the needs of the market, a shopping mall version of history (Jameson 1991: 101).

The Dingjie group were allowed to develop Longquan as a cultural heritage site in order to promote tourism. The original plan, as endorsed by the Lijiang CHMC, was to develop the site into an alternative to the aggressive tourism development in Lijiang Old Town, as a way to alleviate some of the strain on Lijiang and spread tourism in a wider geographical area. This would mean that more tourists would stay overnight in Longquan instead of Lijiang, and that the tourism carrying capacity of Lijiang would not be exceeded.

UNESCO staff advised against this, but Heather Peters at UNESCO admits that there was not much they could do to prevent this development. The idea to develop tourism in Longquan was not bad per se, but UNESCO do not approve of private individuals or enterprises being allowed free reign in a heritage site, as this usually leads to developments that are not in the interest of local populations. In light of this, they strongly advised against leasing the development rights to the Dingjie group, but in the end, their advice was ignored. This demonstrates the weakness of UNESCO in relation to how tourism is developed in heritage sites, and how state agents and capital are more important in formulating development agendas; UNESCO can only advice and criticise.

The Dingjie group development has seen a massive transformation of Shuhe, and today, according to Heather Peters at UNESCO, even the Lijiang CIIMC admits that this was something of a mistake, and that developments have gone out of hand. This is perhaps a strange thing to admit to, and since they would not see me due to "time restraints", I find it difficult to elaborate on this statement. It is true that Lijiang is as "bad" as Shuhe in many ways, and the areas surrounding the UNESCO-listed Lijiang Old Town are perhaps even worse; here, we have an aggressive type of new construction made to appear old mixed with entrepreneurs, ethnic shows, karaoke bars and all sorts of invented heritage that
has led to an almost chaotic appearance of new and old, rich and poor in a limited space, that has in many ways reduced Old Town Lijiang to circus entertainment in a way that was less prevalent, at least in some places, only a few years ago.

Shuhe has followed a similar path to Lijiang, but the actors involved have been different as market interests have been the sole agent. In Lijiang, we have an ongoing dialogue between a range of interests, especially UNESCO, that have managed to control some of the changes planned for the old town (such as construction of buildings), even if only to a limited extent (UNESCO 2005). In Lijiang old town there is also a range of entrepreneurs active, and the CIIMC maintains ultimate responsibility and power, which is not the case in Shuhe.

Shuhe today is a theme-park village, with hotels, restaurants, and souvenir shops. There is an entrance gate (but no entrance fee), modelled after a native American style totem-pole, a striking and surprising choice in a supposedly Naxi-region, that has been listed as World Heritage. There is also another gate, in ubiquitous Chinese style, red with green and blue dragons and phoenixes.

The native American theme is mirrored in places within the settlement, and also merged with Tibetan cultural markers, almost as if taking some notion of the ethnic Wild West as theme for the whole venture. This theme-park has of course nothing to do with local cultural heritage, and nothing to do with the UNESCO-listed Longquan village. Longquan village does of course remain, but it is very difficult to find within this maze of faux-heritage, hotels, cafés, shops, tourists, Tibetan ponies, and cowboy hats. The first time I visited I was lost for over an hour, looking for signs saying "Longquan" and then getting lost again, taking a wrong turn, or missing the small bridge that leads from Shuhe to Longquan, a clear marker between the new and the old, the theme-park construction and the heritage site.

Shuhe consists of about 100 different guesthouses, ranging from big hotels to small family-run inns. There are plenty of food outlets, a stage for performances surrounding an open plaza, and souvenir shops wherever you look, most of them selling the same type of merchandise: hats, scarfs, carvings, and tea, and most of the products appear to be exactly the same in all the shops, mass-produced "ethnic" items. There are very few shops selling more convenient things, like food or snacks, or proper clothes.
In the old Longquan section there is a small shop, and a little farther from the tourist area, there are a few small convenience stores on the outskirts of Longquan village.

However, the theme-park village is striking with its mass of identical rustic-looking new houses. It is all new construction, spread across a fairly large area. In 2008, there was still new construction taking place on the outskirts of Shuhe, more identical wooden houses being built, to adhere to the style of Shuhe. All the buildings in Shuhe are built in pale wood, with some decorations such as carvings. It resembles a toy-city, akin to Disney World, or Japanese theme-parks with a European theme, with one major difference – Shuhe is an integrated part of a World Heritage Site in a poor location in Yunnan.

The settlement is sprawling, and full of little plazas and open spaces for various tourist pursuits, such as horse riding, turning prayer wheels, and open-air cafés in European style selling expensive coffee, ice cream, and snacks. Most restaurants are expensive, with international menues. There is also a Tibetan cultural centre, built to resemble a Tibetan mansion, with a small temple. There is an entrance fee to the centre, and Tibetan cultural displays, such as religious paraphernalia and music. Why this place is Tibetan, and why there are rows of prayer wheels in Shuhe, is a mystery seeing the area is Naxi, but the Tibetan connection, and Tibetan cultural markers, are common occurrences in the Lijiang area, perhaps underlining the history of trade (such as the tea trail) with Tibet, and also pandering to a general interest in Tibetan culture, as mysterious, exotic and romantic: Tibet inevitably carries these connotations in mainland China, as well as in the West, but Tibet is perhaps even more exoticised in the PRC, especially since there is a general idea of Tibet as being a backward part of China that needs to be developed. These cultural markers, and the exoticism inherent to things Tibetan help this image; the superstitious, nearly feudal characteristics of Tibet and Tibetan culture. Apart from the Tibetan theme, there is little direct use of ethnicity; Shuhe is of course Naxi but this is not very obvious in architecture or any other displays apart from souvenirs.

Longquan village itself has also been taken over by tourism. There are families still residing in their old homes, but only a handful; about three households from the information I gathered. Of these, two reside in nice old courtyard buildings that have been transformed into guesthouses.
There is also a family from Singapore that arrived in Longquan very early to start up a small café and still remain, even if Mr Li, the owner, is critical of the way Longquan has been ruined, and wonders if UNESCO could not have done more to prevent this type of development. He still cares for Longquan, and sometimes, during the winter, he thinks it is still just a small Naxi-village. He is an avid painter and photographer, and likes to sit by the brook or on his roof terrace but these days this is only possible when "the weather is freezing, and I'd rather stay indoors". He smiles when saying this, but the irony is dampened by the throng of people in the street.

Why other families have left is a combination of financial reasons (lucrative offers of leases), and an unwillingness to engage in the tourist economy, and of course due to the fact that normal life is more or less impossible.137

Tourism has also put a strain on the village: the once quiet main street is now a street with cafés and bars. Longquan is more quiet than Lijiang, there is no noisy drinking, and no karaoke. Some of these things can be found in the new Shuhe-section, but not in Longquan. But it is still true that the village is taken over by photographers and tourists; especially couples on honeymoon, and young people on a weekend break. Longquan is more expensive than Lijiang, and the inns are all quite luxurious with jacuzzis, plasma screen televisions, and the rooms often come with some sort of theme. The courtyards of the buildings are pretty and comfortable, with rocking chairs, plants, and lounge chaises. All in all, Longquan is an upscale, luxury version of Lijiang that caters to a well-off clientele looking for a rural respite, a weekend away without the crowds. However, during peak season, Longquan is clogged during the day, and finding a place to sit in one of the cafés is difficult. The well-preserved old Naxi architecture, the main reason the village was listed by UNESCO, has been remodelled to suit the needs of tourism, something UNESCO has criticised in strong terms. The practice of opening up old shops fronts to the street has been particularly criticised; in Naxi culture, shops remain closed, with only a window open to the street, leaving the interior out of sight and closed for private life.138

137 Heather Peters at UNESCO claims that this process had started prior to the Dingjie Group takeover, but since 2004 there has been a mass exodus of residents, something she finds understandable but still regrets; the everyday lives of local residents was what made Longquan unique.

However, these days most café owners prefer to change these houses to facilitate business. In Longquan, there is one café that remains unchanged. It is owned by a couple from Hunan, who moved to Longquan in the late 1990s since it was so quiet, pretty and came with some good, but low-scale business opportunities. They are very fond of local culture, and hope to preserve some of what made Longquan unique, but business is not doing as well as that of other café owners, which is understandable as the other cafés catch more sun, and get more of a view. The practice of changing some of what the old architecture used to be is not necessarily a bad thing, but rather an adaptation of tradition to meet the needs of present day concerns. This is an intrinsic quality of much vernacular tradition, particularly in a merchant culture like Longquan. In fact, the houses as such remain, albeit slightly modernised. However, Longquan is of course a World Heritage Site, and this means that this type of practice becomes more complicated.

Longquan's status as a World Heritage Site is linked to its architectural heritage, and the fabric of place, and if this is changed the heritage value is degraded, as the very reason for its uniqueness has evaporated. This is an issue that is at the very core of heritage politics and tourism development, particularly in relation to UNESCO sites, and also points to how World Heritage status might sometimes be a burden, and limitation for how heritage is used as a living practice or artifact, not just as frozen, museumified culture. In the case of Longquan, the houses have been changed as an indirect result of UNESCO-involvement, as this has led to tourism, and hence local buildings now house businesses catering to tourists.

Some business entrepreneurs do not like the way UNESCO have been criticising the way they have changed houses, and the commercial activities in Longquan; they feel it is their right, and what tourists want. This points to a central dilemma in relations between UNESCO and localities; local governments and residents: the UNESCO badge does inevitably lead to tourism, and this creates a new meaning, and new usage of local resources. In Yunnan, this realisation of how UNESCO World Heritage status can put a hamper on tourist developments has led other locations in the northwest to bypass UNESCO.

This also points to the importance of location; in the Honghe region, UNESCO status is important, and would provide a boost to regional tourism.
In the northwest, this is not necessarily the case. One example of this is the Lugu Hu region, to the north of Lijiang, on the border to Sichuan. Here, regional authorities, with support from provincial government decided to withdraw their tentative UNESCO application for the intangible heritage of the Mosuo ethnic group.139

Lugu Hu is already a well-known tourist site, with tours coming from both Yunnan and Sichuan. The area is pretty, and famous for Mosuo culture. Traditionally, this is a matriarchal society, and Mosuo women have practised open marriages, so called “walking” marriages, where women alternate husbands for the night, a practice that has come to brand the Mosou with a promiscuous tag, and has led to Han men coming to his area in search of women, often Han-prostitutes masquerading as Mosuo.140 A couple of years back, provincial authorities decided to apply for UNESCO-status for this area, but later, due to the restrictions on tourism development in the Lijiang and Sanjiang areas, and perhaps due to being tired of negotiating with UNESCO, the application was dropped, and tourism has since been developed in a ruthless fashion, with big hotels, and ethnic displays of Mosuo culture, that reduces this complex ethnic group to nothing but an idea of free sex, something of a taboo in mainstream Chinese Han-culture. Here we can see how UNESCO can function as a deterrent, and the way UNESCO has attempted to control tourism in the Lijiang area has been pivotal to this. There is of course some truth to the idea that UNESCO have a tendency to freeze ideas of local tradition, one example being Joy’s study of Djenné in Mali (Joy 2011). But in a case like Lijiang and Shuhe it is more complex as the commercialisation of these places has ruined local culture and colonised residential areas; UNESCO have been left powerless, but it is also true that were it not for UNESCO status, some of these developments might have been less dramatic, and state attempts to promote Lijiang as a national tourist hot spot less successful.

Lijiang received World Heritage Status in a rapid fashion, as a result of efforts to preserve and reconstruct damage after the 1996 earthquake. The application for World Heritage Status was only submitted in the same year, and in 1997 Lijiang

139 Ibid.
140 Ibid; Interview John Lombard, Mosuo cultural association, Beijing, May 2008. Also own experiences of the area. For more on the Mosuo see Walsh (2001; 2005).
was placed on the World Heritage list, which is unique, seeing the normal process of site selection (see chapter 1). Hence the process of the Lijiang application was speedier than in some other cases. Lijiang was also one of the first lived-in environments to receive World Heritage Status, and UNESCO might not have been prepared for the ensuing tourist development that occurred (UNESCO 2000a, 2008; Su/Teo 2009: 11, 82-85). Developments in Longquan and Shuhe have proceeded without UNESCO being able to do much – as Heather Peters at UNESCO in Bangkok puts it, they can only hope to advise and offer guidance, and attempt to negotiate with governments and local authorities.

In the case of Shuhe, they are left even more helpless as Shuhe is not a World Heritage Site in its own right, but part of the Lijiang inscription. Hence it would be very difficult to remove Longquan from the World Heritage List, as it is only a small part of the listing. There have of course been similar problems in relation to Lijiang Old Town, and both UNESCO and the Lijiang CIIMC have suffered critique for the way management of the site has been handled (McKhann 2001: 147-166; UNESCO 2000a, 2008; Su/Teo 2009: 86-88, 112-115, 140-42). However, even if Heather Peters agrees that Lijiang is a problem in many ways, she still thinks it is important that UNESCO stays in Lijiang. If UNESCO can do anything to protect the old town from being ruined, she thinks it is worth staying in order to have some sort of impact on developments.

In Longquan, the same is true. She hopes UNESCO will be able to work with the few locals remaining, in an attempt to save and preserve some of the old fabric of place. Some examples of this is the café owner already mentioned.

Another is a local family that owns one of the nicer courtyard houses, and that have been living in Longquan for generations. This family is interested in maintaining some notion of what Longquan once was, and have tried to establish a local museum, and to open their traditional home for tourists as a way of displaying what Longquan Naxi-architecture used to look like, before the arrival of jacuzzis. This type of venture is unusual in Longquan; this family is an exception, and they admit to sometimes being very tired of tourism, and the rampant commercialisation of the village. In their case, the son in the family runs a successful business in Kunming, and can afford to remit money to the family in order to maintain the family house and preserve some idea of what home used to
be – we met up for dinner in Kunming and he claims to care a great deal for his Naxi-background. He thinks the way the village has changed is shameful, and hates having to wander through toy-streets of reconstructed history when he goes back to visit, and he does not like the way the once quiet village has been turned into a fun fair for East Coast and Taiwanese tourists. He is very concerned about how power over developments in the village have been taken away from residents; and would not like this to happen to his family, as long as he can prevent it. But then, he also admits that the situation in Longquan is not too good, and that life is difficult in many ways due to the strain posed by tourism.\(^{141}\)

And this is of course a real concern in a place like Shuhe/Longquan. Normal life is not possible when tourism reaches the level that fare exceeds the carrying capacity of a small village. This demonstrates what could potentially happen in a place like Shaxi or Heijing if local authorities had it their way. This is an example of how tourism takes over, and eclipses the original heritage site identity of a place, or rather, when historical preservation becomes part of the commercialised heritage industry where artifacts, architecture, and practices become nothing but a display for the tourist gaze.

Heather Peters at UNESCO has worked on a project that aims to preserve some of Shuhe’s craft traditions, based around leather works. There is a group of old men that used to be leather craftsmen, some of them residing on the outskirts of the village, some of them in other nearby villages, but all with strong links to Longquan village. She has attempted to hire them as leaders of a workshop for the younger generation, to maintain and transmit some of the skills these men have; a type of apprenticeship. But there simply is not enough money, and no one is willing to fund the project. The group of old men, originally very enthusiastic at the prospect, are disappointed, especially since they find it strange that there is enough money to fund the construction of Shuhe, and the bars, and the noise but none to fund a project that would help the village maintain some of its long-standing history.

Meanwhile, there are plenty of leather works for sale in the souvenir shops, and the history of leather crafts has been pounced upon for marketing purposes, but these goods are not handmade crafts, but cheap, manufactured and identical

\(^{141}\) Interview, Li Hong, Kunming March 2008.
copies that could be found almost anywhere, handbags in "ethnic" style made in fake leather. There is not a market for expensive handmade leather products any more – it might be that if there was money and someone willing to take responsibility, a project like this could function if the products were sold outside of Longquan, perhaps to buyers from Shanghai or Taiwan that specialises in ethnic goods. But this has yet to happen, and instead the local crafts have been taken over by copies that are sold to tourists keen on a cheap souvenir.

It is not that there is not a sense of pride in Longquan village, and a local willingness to preserve and protect. There have been protests at the way developments have been handled, and residents have not been happy about the way capital and tourism have taken over place identity, and wrestled away power over the future of the village. Many people were angry at the way the Lijiang CHMC leased the development rights to the Dingjie Group, and they have been vocal about the way the Dingjie Group have handled Shuhe. People wrote letters and signed petitions, and lobbied the town council. But ultimately this was ignored, as was the protests of UNESCO, and the Dingjie Group moved in. Following this, there have been similar protests aimed at the Dingjie Group but there is not much people can do, and eventually most original residents left in pure exasperation with the whole venture. And this is understandable; perhaps especially if you do care about a place, and feel sadness at seeing it being transformed into something that bears little resemblance to what you used to know. Today, most Longquan residents are outsiders and do not care about the village, other than as a site for tourism and commerce. Most people in Longquan and Shuhe are part of the tourist business, and arrived in the village due to the opportunities for business. Most people I interviewed were café owners and guest house proprietors and were, for obvious reasons, content with how Longquan has changed, and the hordes of tourists attracted by the Shuhe development. They do good business; it is difficult to give out exact numbers as I have not seen official statistics for Shuhe per se, but arrivals to Lijiang in 2008 were about 5 million domestic tourists and an additional 400 000 international visitors (Lijiang Bureau of statistics 2008; Su/Teo 2009:96), and it would be a fair guess to say that about half of these made it to Shuhe.

Some tourists I spoke to never even went to old town Lijiang as they had been before and do not like the crowds. Friends in Kunming were of the same opinion, that Longquan is prettier, and the guesthouses nicer, and that the area offers a more relaxed atmosphere. This might be true, the village is more quiet than Lijiang, and much smaller which means it is easier to navigate.

There are spacious cafés where you can relax in rocking chairs, and read books all day long like one of my Chinese friends put it, and it is still really rural. And Longquan offers a rural village environment but with cappuccino and rocking chairs and jacuzzis: if you bypass the hectic Shuhe area, and stay within Longquan it is a type of rural retreat. But this is of course detached from normal village life, and has little to do with the original way of life in the village, and region.

Shuhe is not a case of reconstructing a fake replica of Holland with wind mills, canals and tulips (one famous example from Japan, the Huis Ten Bosch theme-park), charging a fee and calling it “Little Holland” (Hendry 2000: 19-49). In the case of Shuhe, the theme-park is meant to be anchored in, and a display of, local culture whilst also mirroring national concerns with inclusion; a way of mediating and appeasing ethnicity, to use Hevia’s phrase (Hevia 2001: 222). In Shuhe, this display is built surrounding a lived-in traditional village of World Heritage credentials. It could perhaps be argued that this is a case of playing with reality, and constructing a theme-park for fun and pleasure, but this comes with a very different slant as people in Longquan, a poor village on the periphery of the nation-state, have been profoundly affected by this theme-park that has been built surrounding their homes, and their village.

In fact, it is almost impossible to leave the Longquan settlement without first having to traipse through the new settlement with its throngs of tourists and identical streets. This is an extreme case of colonisation of private space in the interest of tourism, based around a vague notion of heritage. It is also true that the Shuhe theme-park lacks a clearly defined theme in many ways, and has been rapidly constructed as a means of providing fun for tourists, and does not share the sometimes baffling meticulousness of Japanese theme-parks that are postmodern versions of history where tourists are well aware of being part of a show, akin to Urry’s description of tourists as postmodern subjects (Urry 1990: 11).
These sites are so detached from reality that they are in a sense true tourist displays, like entering into an entirely fake universe, a sort of Disney World based around history and culture. In Shuhe, tourists might be aware of the inauthenticity of the site, but describing Shuhe as "postmodern", and simply about fun and leisure shrouds some of the more important issues at stake, such as lack of democracy, citizen rights to space, and the unfair treatment of original residents (a similar occurrence has of course taken place in Old Town Lijiang as well). In Longquan, very few locals have benefitted from tourism, even if a few still remain, and attempt to make the best of the situation, and of their local heritage.

Shuhe is an example of how cultural heritage tourism, and a cultural heritage site like Longquan can be pounced upon, and made use of in a way that is suited to, and aligned with the needs of the market. This is hyper-commercialism, a marketisation of history that has little to do with memory or commemoration of the past. Urry has differed between what is history, and what is heritage based around the idea that heritage is always about commercialism, whereas history, and historical preservation, are there for a number of reasons, not least as containers for social memory, and open to a multitude of narratives (Urry 2002: 99). Historical preservation is not necessarily always linked to tourist site construction, or a strategy for urban renewal, but is sometimes allowed to exist on its own terms, as part of a living tradition, and hence forms an important contribution to communal identity. Preservation could be about making environments more liveable, and often enjoys strong civic support; it could also be part of maintaining living traditions of house building, like in Nuodeng. Heritage site construction on the other hand is often linked to invention, saving already dying traditions as part of tourism development, or, like in Shuhe, making use of an aspect of local history for commercial purposes.

I would agree that historical preservation matters, and that people in a place like Longquan have a vested interest in maintaining traditional livelihoods, and a sense of place. But in a case like Shuhe, heritage site construction has ruined the very fabric of local history and turned it into a fake replica of itself that has also led to the removal of residents. Like Urry has argued, heritage site construction often masks social and spatial inequalities; a shallow commercialism of space based around what is often a fake idea of history (Urry 2002: 99).
This of course links in with Nora and de Certeau, and the idea of communally based historical memory as opposed to state sponsored attempts to control narratives on the past by constructing "heritage" sites. The discrepancy between heritage and history is also based around heritage being dead, or dying, and hence in need of rescue, and living history based around communal memory as something that is kept alive within the community, and in communal practice.

However, in a case like Shuhei/Longquan, it is wrong to claim that this type of development is about constructing heritage by rescuing a dying tradition, as is often the case with displays based around heritage in the West (such as mines or mills, or old neighbourhoods that used to be poor and neglected).

In a place like Yunnan, these villages are not dying, but attempting to find a way of negotiating local identity, modernity, and the market. People still live in these villages, and in places like Longquan, or Shaxi, traditional ways of life persist, often as a result of poverty. People in these villages do not engage in hard labour in the fields, using near medieval methods to amuse tourists, nor do they live in decr epit houses to appear "quaint"; this is perhaps where these concerns are very different in a place like Yunnan from Western countries, where heritage might be fake, or commercialised, but also an issue that can be openly debated, and contested, at least to a degree. In developed countries, historical theme-parks have often been a response to the end of an era, a commercialisation of nostalgia, a sense of unease created by shifting values, and dying traditions.

The first open-air museum, Skansen in Sweden, was (and is) a good business plan that catered to the needs of a bourgeoisie that longed for national values. In Korea, the Korean Folk Village is another good example of re-assembling past tradition in a closed-in space (Pred/Watts 1992: 146-7; Horne 1992: 200). In villages like Nuodeng, Shaxi, and even Heijing, heritage is a way of reformulating reform-era identity, a way of finding a place in the world, and engaging with the market economy using the resources at hand, as defined by state discourse on the value of heritage and tourism. There is an understandable logic as to why these villages have developed an interest in heritage, even if the local circumstances, actors, and motivations might differ to a degree. But Shuhe is not about reformulating local identity, and engaging with state discourse on the market; here, place has been colonised by the market.
When place meaning, and power over developments are wrested away, and local residents to a large degree disappear due to the strains on everyday life, or financial reasons, or because they are forced to, we have a situation where the market has taken over what heritage preservation means, and how it is used. In Shuhe, heritage serves as a means of capital accumulation, and carries little wider meaning to local residents. In this sense, a site like Shuhe is the heritage version of Chinese hyper-commercialism; and also a site that is inscribed with ideological meanings on culture, commerce, and the modern nation. Hence Shuhe has got very little to do with history, but a lot to do with the present; in fact, it could be read as a metaphor for modern Chinese society.

It could be argued that Shuhe is a demonstration of Dirlik and Zhang’s assertion that Chinese society could be described as postmodern, a site where “all times exist at once” (Jameson 1991:1-6). Dirlik and Zhang have pointed to the “spatial and temporal desynchronisation” of Chinese society, how the hyper-modern rub shoulders with the medieval, all within the same national boundaries (Dirlik/Zhang 1997:3). This is one way of understanding Shuhe: the terms for heritage development in Shuhe have not been set by local residents and their needs, and everyday life aspirations, but by an East Coast, urban elite.

To many of the tourists who visit Shuhe, the rural experience is as far removed from their lives and experiences as it was to the people who visited Skansen a hundred years ago. In 1891, when Skansen was established, Sweden was similar to China; urban areas were developing and industrialising, whilst rural were lagging behind. In rural areas people still led “traditional” lives, defined by hard labour and poverty. But this experience was not shared by the Stockholm bourgeoisie, who could take pleasure in a quaint experience of rural tradition they had long since left behind. However, Skansen was not constructed in the midst of a rural area, enclosing a real lived-in village, and neither was it capitalising upon World Heritage status. Hence it is arguably true that in the case of Shuhe/Longquan, UNESCO status has indirectly led to the destruction of Longquan village, which does say something of how weak UNESCO is when faced with national governments. They provide a listing, a label, but how this is made use of is decided by individual nation-states and regions, and here, it is often tourism and commercial gain that is the overriding concern.
In addition to this, there is a strong ideological slant to sites like Shuhe, and also Lijiang. Tourism sites of this magnitude are, like the Yuanmingyuan, saturated in national ideology and patriotism, and are often emblems of the nation-state where many current social and political concerns are mediated and levelled out in a process of making the nation appear harmonious, stable, and inclusive. This is very true of the PRC.

Michel Picard has made this point in relation to Indonesia, where tourism has been based around an idea of Indonesia as a nation, as opposed to regional culture, something he has referred to as "Indonesiaization", part of a general construction of a touristic culture. He points to how cultural traits have been sieved out to preserve only what serves the needs of the nation, filtering out all that is too regional, or deemed too "backward" (Picard 1993: 92-93). The "Beautiful Indonesia" theme-park near Jakarta is another example of this levelling out of cultural difference; the creation of an imagined nation in a closed-in space (Pemberton 1994: 241-262). Shuhe does not quite work in this way; it is not a theme-park displaying national culture in the same way as the "Splendid China" (Jinxiu Zhonghua) in Shenzhen where China is displayed in all its diversity and cultural richness in a very sanitised, ideologic miniature way; like a tourist brochure come alive. Shuhe is about local culture, but in such an air-brushed way that it is impossible to tell what local culture.

Michel Foucault's concept of the heterotopia is useful for understanding the deeper implications of how heritage space could function as an ideological mirror of social and political concerns, space as a cultural representation of the nation. In chapter one, it was argued that the Yuanmingyuan could be read as a heterotopia, as well as the regenerated, gentrified colonial neighbourhoods of Shanghai. According to Foucault, the heterotopia is a site that juxtaposes spaces and locations that are incompatible; a site where real things are challenged and overturned in a mirror-image of the everyday (Foucault 1997: 352). This could be a museum, a theatre, or a cruise ship, places that somehow remain apart from real society, but is still a representation of reality. Usually, a heterotopia is entered on the condition that you understand the rules for doing so, and play along according to these rules. For instance, in a heritage site, visitors play along according to the rules of the site, being tourists and observers.
However, this logic is broken by sites like the Yuanmingyuan where tourists are not always the patriotic subjects they are supposed to be, and rather behave like consumers, modern-day tourists on a nice day out, and hence subvert some of the illusion of the Yuanmingyuan as a site for national glory and patriotism by engaging in loud chatter, and picknicking on the grounds that are supposed to represent national humiliation (Lee 2008: 29). This is perhaps what de Certeau means by everyday behaviour inverting state-inscribed spatial narratives (de Certeau 1984: 101). However, a site like Shuhe differs from the Yuanmingyuan in that the message is not patriotism of the old socialist type, based around a revolutionary monument or an evocative ruin, but rather a site inscribed with present concerns that is linked to consumption, the market, and tourism as a way of mediating cultural and ethnic tension.

These concerns all come together in Shuhe, this closed-in, bounded space that has been constructed solely for tourism, as a make-believe heritage site enclosing the real heritage site and nearly eclipsing it. As argued in the introduction, the Chinese state has a vested interest in heritage that goes beyond tourism and capital accumulation. Heritage is also, like tourism, a site for projecting ideology, a hegemonic representation of space whereby social values and cultural ideology on the nation are transmitted. Like Hevia has argued, heritage aimed at a domestic audience is often a means of policing and installing discipline, by "invoking 'multiculturalism' and official religious tolerance to appease populations" (Hevia 2001:222).

In the Lijiang area, and in Yunnan, as a province of great ethnic diversity, this is of course a relevant issue. In 2008, as I was carrying out fieldwork, there were riots in Lhasa, and in Shangri-La, the tourist region to the north of Lijiang, there were also demonstrations and protests aimed at Han-entrepreneurs which led to temporal closure of the region. Tourists were not allowed to enter the area for a couple of weeks. I went there as the restrictions were lifted, and it was eerily quiet. Hence ethnic tension, levelled at perceived unfairness and a general feeling of being left on the margins of development, is a real threat, and fear the Chinese state attempts to negotiate, mediate, and dampen. One important concern here is to install a sense of cultural openness and respect for ethnic tradition, both to minorities themselves, and also to the Han as a way of legitimising the Chinese Party-State and feelings of Han superiority.
Heritage tourism, and ethnic exoticism are important ingredients in this; the way ethnic culture has been pounced upon, and commercialised was made startlingly clear by how Han-tourists visited the "Tibetan" Culture Hall, and turned prayer wheels in Shuhe whilst the Lhasa riots were taking place to the north.

In Shuhe, ethnic difference is levelled out, and cultural traditions made into stage props in a space where things that normally would be irreconcilable are neutralised, and made to co-exist at the same time, in the same place regardless of how tense their relationships (Foucault 1997: 356). The heritage site as heterotopia is a site where real society is reflected, and mirrored but turned upside-down; a world not of illusion but of compensation for all that is wrong with reality, such as social tension, and cultural difference. Here, ethnic minorities and Han-people, consumerism and socialism, can co-exist in a mirror image of China, but without contradictions or conflict. These social tensions are mediated and played out in a real space, but one that is disconnected from the world outside. This is not so much the case in Lijiang Old Town, where the everyday is constantly present, and the tensions that exist are difficult to blank out due to flow of people, the lingering reminders of real Naxi-life, and the constant remarks and reminders of how this place has been going through a tremendous transformation, that is still not finished.

But Shuhe is constructed. Real life is only there in the shape of tourists, and the only site within the settlement where people remain is Longquan, but Longquan has been enveloped by Shuhe, and most people have left and given up their homes to entrepreneurs. This has of course happened in Lijiang as well, but not to the same degree. People still remain, and Lijiang has been spreading and incorporating too much of modern China to be able to give out an illusion of entering a bounded site. Lijiang is modern China with all its noise, change, tension, and energy, or at least a very apt metaphor for Chinese society, and how commercialism has often eclipsed many other concerns.

When the Lijiang CHMC claim that Lijiang is laying claim to its merchant past, and changing along with context, according to contemporary norms, and commerce (i.e. tourism), they do have a point, regardless of this being
irreconcilable with being a World Heritage site. Shuhe on the other hand is an illusion that shares little of the energy, bustle and renao of urban China.

Shuhe is a theme-park that caters to a clientele looking for an escape, a rocking chair, a jacuzzi and some notion of "tradition", a way of marking social distinction through consumption.

But at the same time, the concept of heterotopia is broken by Shuhe's political and ideological content; the heterotopia as a site for compensation, a place apart from society does not quite describe the overt political overtones implicit to the attempt to make ethnicity appear harmonious, and consumption a cultural pursuit that equals being a model citizen, two major priorities of the contemporary Chinese state.

Henri Lefebvre has made the important point that space is produced according to social and political agendas, and is not a static container that is the outcome of socio-economic conditions. Rather, space is an active agent in shaping these (Lefebvre 1991). This is not the same as Foucault's idea on space as being regulated and part of a state regime of surveillance, and control (Foucault 1977: 195-228). Rather, to Lefebvre, space is dynamic and can change its meaning according to social setting, and the agents involved. But in cases of state-sponsored planning, construction, and mapping of space, the state and its agents (such as capital, i.e. development companies like the Dingjie Group), are in charge of how space is represented.

Lefebvre calls this "representations of space" (Lefebvre 1991: 38-39), and proceeds to demonstrate how this is a hegemonic way of controlling space as a way of installing images, and mould desires, and hence control the citizenry.

This is very different from what he refers to as "spaces of representation", which would be community based nodes of meaning, that runs counter to state inscribed meaning (Lefebvre 1991: 39). Of course, like Rowlands and de Jong have pointed to, sometimes this type of dichotomy between state and community, social memory and official history is not always so easy to disentangle and often inform each other, which means that communal memory often attaches itself to the public sphere in unexpected ways (Rowlands/deJong 2007: 13-15).

Hence all notions of space as being purely regulated, and a realm for state hegemony needs to be questioned, but in the construction of a heritage site like Shuhe, space has been colonised in a way that leaves little space for alternative
narratives, and memories. This is especially true since so many original residents have left; and with them most of what made of the communal web of memory, and the fabric of place.

In Longquan, the few remaining families, like the Li family with the small museum, are reminders of the not too distant past, and they do represent an attempt to counter the narrative produced by capital interests, but this attempt has in itself been reduced to memorialising the past, a small museum tucked away in an alley and as much a response to the tourist economy as many of the cafés. They do not charge an entrance fee, but it is still the case that rather than maintaining a private space, and an everyday life, they have made the decision to save a dying tradition by making it into local "heritage".

Like Li Hong, the son of the family who funds maintenance of the house, and museum, says, his response is a response to the way his home village has been ruined without anyone consulting local residents. He aims to save some of what the village used to be like, which is the same as admitting that Longquan as a lived-in settlement is already past being saved. He is not trying to capitalise upon this, but at the same time his response is linked to tourism, and discourse on heritage. This is not the same as spatial representation based around communal tradition and activity, quite the opposite.

Shuhe and Longquan are what Lefebvre refers to as "representations of space", state-sponsored socially produced space that serves as a spatial narrative on the nation, and hence as a sphere for cultural authority, what Nyiri has referred to as the construction of tourist spaces saturated in ideology (Nyiri 2006:11, 71, 86-97). Sites like Shuhe are educational models for regulating citizen behaviour according to contemporary political discourse. They are curiously detached from their own local, and regional context. They are "Chinese", and this could be taken to mean anything, from Qing-costume, to Ming-style buildings and ethnic markers ranging from Tibet to Hakka. They are in a sense true postmodern sites, places where cultural particularity and historical context are ripped to shreds, and mixed up in a tourist display aimed at consumers, but also, in a subtle way, sending out a message on cultural homogeneity.

In this display, history and culture carry none of the usual poignant reminders of past violence, conflict, poverty or other unpleasant truths that jar with the image of modern China as a cultural entity of great civilisation.
Heritage as important to ideas of cultural achievement has taken on a new value-laden meaning, and even if the state is not the main investor in places like Shuhe, it is still true that state officials have been responsible for this type of development, which means the state remains the ultimate arbiter in heritage and tourist site construction. In the case of Shuhe, state agents have raised concerns, but have done nothing to stop developments.

Pal Nyiri has used the phrase "visual centralism" to describe this process, whereby development companies move in and construct an easy to market version of historical and ethnic China (Nyiri 2006: 72). However, where it not for state support, and state approval, this would be difficult, especially in a site like Shuhe/Longquan. Hence it would be fair to say that heritage developments of the Shuhe type is state-sponsored, and a type of visual production of state ideology. Tourists come to Shuhe and enter a site of visual markers on ethnicity, culture, and consumption, sipping cappuccinos and turning prayer wheels, taking in Naxi-costumes and soaking up the sun in reconstructed "historical" buildings, all in a space that has been labelled "World Heritage". Shuhe could be understood as a hegemonic representation of space and place, and hence provides us with some explanations as to why heritage matters to the CCP Party-State, other than as a way of accumulating capital, and developing rural areas.

Longquan village was originally not much different from the other sites covered in this thesis, but as a result of UNESCO-status, massive capital investments, and state support the village has been transformed into a site for an urban middle-class of consumers that come to play in a site saturated in ideology: here, unlike the Yuanmingyuan, tourists do little to subvert the message by being "unpatriotic"; Shuhe is made for having fun, not for being educated in patriotism. Shuhe is a modern Chinese heritage site that is equal with modern Chinese concerns on consumption, leisure, and fun, and in this sense it aligns itself perfectly with the ideological concerns of the Chinese state. This type of touristification of space and local tradition could potentially be the outcome in other sites as well if heritage site construction is successful in attracting tourism. Hence Shuhe is a good illustration of this interplay, and the way heritage and tourism form an uneasy alliance, charged with ideology.
5. Conclusion

Historical preservation, even in terms of gentrified projects of urban renewal, often come with a desire to protect the past, and to counter the sleek sameness of much modern architecture, the feeling of not knowing for sure whether you are in Stockholm, Berlin, or Tokyo; a sense of all places being full of the same shopping malls and food outlets no matter where you go. This is of course only true to an extent, and Tokyo working-class neighbourhoods linger everywhere in the modern capital, as does German coffeehouses in Berlin. Most people prefer to keep urban (and rural) environments this way. However, in the PRC, the rapid change, and thoughtless destruction of much urban heritage, has led to cities losing much of their character in less than two decades. Old Kunming is no longer to be found. Much of old Beijing has been demolished, and what remains is more or less there for tourism. In the PRC, Berman’s notion of heritage protection being “a rejection of the rejection of oldness” could be understood in a very direct way; it is a case of normal, poor neighbourhoods being labelled “heritage” in an almost desperate way of both clinging to the lingering reminders of the past, as well as attempting to find a niche for this past in the capitalist economy (Berman 1983: 129).

Heritage concerns in the PRC are contradictory; the simultaneous destruction and ”protection”, the desperate search for modernity paired with how officials in places like Jianshui plaster what remains of poor, working-class neighbourhoods with heritage plaques. What emerge as you probe the surface of the frantic interest in restoring an image of oldness is a mixed image of heritage for tourism, and a search for a new identity, a way of aligning localities with national aspirations to both capital gain as well as ideas of the antique, historical, and value-laden.

This is mirrored in how localities in Yunnan have come to think of heritage in the reform-era: their attitude to local material culture has come to change, from old buildings as embarrassing reminders of poverty, to pawns in the capitalist economy. Old buildings have come to emerge as a way of marking local distinction, and are hence part of the national concern with restoring “oldness”, even if this oldness is sometimes ruined in the process, like in Shuhe.
Heritage buildings and historical village environments could be said to function according to Anagnost’s assertion of the Splendid China theme-park in Shenzhen (see Shuhe chapter); they are calming reminders of a timeless national identity (Anagnost 1996: 195). They offer a different time of the nation whilst, to local populations in rural areas, they are the present time, and hence offer an identity and possible route towards development by being capital resources. To Anagnost, these sites are there to be consumed by domestic tourists, as calming markers of a different time and place, akin to how heritage sites could be understood as heterotopias, a place at a safe remove from the present, but where all the friction and tension of modern society is levelled out, and made to co-exist: normally contradictory relationships are suspended and neutralised, blanked out by the presentation of a seamless unity (Foucault 1997: 352). But to locals, as we have seen, these “heritage” sites are part of everyday life; villages in Yunnan have preserved these sites as a result of poverty. Hence we can see how preservation and heritage also speaks of national inequality, and uneven development, and how heritage resources could be used as a way of attempting to catch up, by being part of the capitalist economy that has come to take an interest in oldness, as a result of the very modernity it embraces. Tourism, capital gain, and modernity are all important factors influencing these sites, and the state has been an important agent in formulating how and why heritage is made use of, by driving interest in tourism, and demonstrating agendas for preservation by improved legislation, and heritage listings. Interest in rescuing the old has also been driven by outside agents, such as UNESCO and the WMF, organisations that offer a badge of legitimacy and hence an air of modernity to locations.

Hence historical preservation in the PRC is contradictory and demonstrates the need to look at local conditions. From the urban angle, heritage preservation is a rejection of how the old is on the verge of vanishing, from the the rural angle, heritage could be a way of catching up. This has been demonstrated by the way localities in Yunnan think of local material heritage, and how preservation and reconstruction of heritage has been taking place.

These case studies have in different ways demonstrated how and why historical buildings and traditional village environments have been preserved and reconstructed in Yunnan Province.
They cover a wide range of meanings and actors, from UNESCO and international organisations, to local elites and officials. In all of these cases, tourism has formed an important incentive, perhaps with the exception of Nuodeng where tourism is a concern, but not the most important. However, even in Nuodeng, heritage preservation is a way of displaying the village to an outside audience.

Tourism and heritage are interlinked concerns, especially in a place like Yunnan where provincial policy has been driving interest in tourism as a way of furthering development and modernising the province according to central state concerns with capital accumulation, and the market. In this way, interest in heritage in rural areas in Yunnan is an attempt to become part of the modern Chinese nation, a way of reformulating local identity to suit the needs of the modernising state and the market. In Yunnan, locations like Shuhe and Lijiang have been important in demonstrating the capital value of heritage.

Discourse on heritage as a cultural resource, and national concern, has also been important in formulating ideas on local history as a way of reasserting and redefining place identity. To poor villages on the margins of development, heritage resources represent a way of linking up to the nation at large, and marking local distinction in relation to other villages. Developing heritage sites and tourism needs to be placed within this context; in all of the villages this was a major concern in one way or another. Heritage agents in these villages, be it local government, regional authorities, or NGOs and locals, were all trying to make use of local resources in order to market local particularity, usually as a means of attracting tourism, sometimes, like in Nuodeng, in order to appear historically interesting and advanced.

We have also seen how it is ultimately state agents that are in charge of both heritage and tourism. In cases like Shaxi and Tuanshan, NGOs have had a strong impact, and the legitimacy offered by international organisations is deemed important, but ultimately it is the state and its agents that make decisions on heritage and tourism, and how to reconcile and make use of the two.

However, alongside this interest in heritage as a capital resource, there is also a growing realisation that this is not always a positive thing. In Yunnan, Lijiang, Shuhe and Dali have formed important models for successful heritage tourism, but they have also worked as deterrents in terms of loss of local revenue and local
benefits. This can be discerned in official attitudes to heritage in both the Honghe-region, and in Beijing.

Heritage is also important as a way of negotiating and formulating reform-era identity for ethnic groups as seen in the case of Nuodeng, where interest in local heritage can be traced to the general Bai-renaissance in the Dali region; here, state interest in heritage as a way of underlining Chinese historical greatness has been incorporated in ethnic attempts to appear advanced, a concern that is less to do with displaying ethnic identity as opposed to Chinese, but should perhaps rather be understood as an attempt to align ethnic concerns with those of the state at large.

This usage of heritage resources also means that localities correspond, and aspire to, the goals of the state. Heritage has been a national concern for a number of years, both as a way of attracting international acclaim, and also as a domestic concern with tourism, patriotism and cultural inclusion. This has trickled down to regional and local level, and has had a great impact on how villages think of their material heritage, perhaps especially architecture following national interest in historical village environments.

This is ultimately what heritage concerns in the PRC are about; tourism and consumerism as a means of installing ideology on the nation as harmonious and stable; here heritage is a way of both encouraging tourism as well as flattening cultural and ethnic difference. This points to how heritage preservation in the PRC is a state-sponsored realm, that aligns itself with both the ideological and capitalist concerns of the reform-era state. Heritage is about regulating culture, whilst including a wide range of cultural practices within national culture; from Tibetan religious practice to old Beijing neighbourhoods. Traditions, ethnicity and history can all be ensconced under the heritage label and appear to co-exist without friction and contradictions. This is examplified by the extreme example of Shuhe where massive capital investments have been made in the construction of a heritage site that encloses, and eclipses the original World Heritage Site. If tourism is successful, this is a possible outcome of heritage site construction in other sites as well. However, as we have seen, these heritage projects are rarely very successful, and tourism very manageable. To most local residents, heritage preservation has not had a great impact, positive or negative. To the few locals that have benefitted, and to local officials and heritage agents at regional or
provincial level, heritage resources present a way of participating in the market economy, and in the provincial tourist industry. Heritage preservation and tourist site construction based around heritage resources seems to have spawned some increased life opportunities for a handful of entrepreneurial locals, an increased pride in place, and sometimes a vague distrust for officials and heritage agents, especially in places where heritage preservation has been carried out without strong local support, like in Tuanshan, or in places like Shaxi where local officials have to an extent neglected heritage resources. Hence the impact on local life has not been great, and everyday life continues unabated in all of the sites, with the exception of Shuhe.

This points to how heritage preservation and reconstruction is not about local culture and communal memory as an alternative, or opposition to state and elite concerns with presenting history, but rather a response to state discourse on heritage, tourism and development. This ultimately demonstrates how the state regulates and controls cultural concerns in villages. Hence the foremost factor affecting how and why heritage resources are taken advantage of in rural locations in Yunnan is tourism, as defined by state policy on development, and a general marketisation of culture; i.e. heritage as a capital resource. This interest in tourism is arguably also what has been driving improved legislation on heritage at all levels, well illustrated by the case of Jianshui. This interest in heritage as capital resource is coated in a layer of how to represent culture, and national history, an ideological realm that aligns itself with the market; heritage hence serves a dual purpose of tourist resource and ideological realm.

At local level, this ideological aspect of heritage site construction is telling of an aspiration to appear modern and advanced by presenting the village as historically interesting, and culturally advanced with a long civilisation, as evidenced by how heritage and tourist agents in localities make use of local history such as the tea trade, salt production, or Bai-culture in order to market themselves. This demonstrates a shrewd understanding of how heritage works, and how it could be of benefit to the community, both for tourism and as a way of redefining local identity in relation to surrounding area, and is telling of how ideas on culture, tourism, and capital accumulation, as driven by the central state, have come to affect how and why heritage is preserved, reconstructed and made use of in reform-era China.
Appendix 1: Interviews

Mr Ricardo Favis
UNESCO Asia-Pacific Bangkok. Visited the “opening” ceremony of old town Shaxi in 2006 and is an expert on heritage issues in the PRC. Interview in Bangkok February 2008.

Dr Jacques Feiner
ETH Zürich. Responsible for architectural preservation in Shaxi and also involved in the WMF listing of Tuanshan village. E-mail contacts.

Mr Han Xiancheng
Official at the Yunnan Province Construction Bureau, with expertise on provincial town-and village planning. Interview Kunming January 2007.

Dr Jonathan Jiang

Mr Li Yongsheng
Head of the Jianshui construction bureau. Interview Jianshui October 2007.

Mr Liu Liang

Mr John Lombard
Director of the Mosuo cultural development association, Lugu Hu. Interview in Beijing, June 2008 on tourism developments in the Lugu Hu area.

Dr Heather Peters
UNESCO Asia-Pacific Bangkok. UNESCO contact person for social and cultural issues in Yunnan, including Lijiang old town preservation. Interviews in Bangkok February 2008 and in Kunming March 2008.

Mr Pu Meiqing

Dr Wang Yajun
WMF representative Tuanshan and Shaxi. E-mail contacts.
Professor Wu Zongjie
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou. Professor Wu helped arrange visits to villages around Zhejiang, such as the village of Zhuge.
Personal conversations, Hangzhou April 2009 as part of a research exchange.

Mr Yang Fubao
Jianchuan county local government official, contact person for Shaxi old town development.

Ms Yang Limei
Party Secretary, Heijing township local government.
Interview Heijing December 2007

Dr Yang Qing
Kunming technical university, lecturer in architectural preservation and involved in preservation work in Lijiang old town as a graduate student at Tongji University, Shanghai.

Ms Yang Zehong

Mr Yu Wuhong
Local Party secretary, Nuodeng township.
Interview Nuodeng May 2008.

Mr Zhang Jiannong
Head of the culture bureau, Jianshui.
Interview Jianshui October 2007.

Ms Zhang Yanlin
Official at the Yunnan provincial cultural heritage bureau.

Mr Zhou Kang
Tourist bureau official, Jianshui.
Interview Jianshui October 2007.

Fieldwork interviews:
Shaxi and Jianchuan old town (Nov 2007, April 2008)
Jianshui and Tuanshan (October 2007 and February/March 2008)
Heijing (December 2007)
Nuodeng (May 2008)
Shuhe (November 2007 and April/May 2008)

Note 1: This list only contains names of officials, and other experts, not private individuals I interviewed in a more casual, informal way.
Note 2: At the time of research, 1 GBP was about 11.6 Chinese RMB (yuan).
Appendix 2: Chinese glossary
(in order of appearance):

**Introduction:**

Minju 民居
Shaoshu minzu 少数民族
Minzu 民族
Hanzu 汉族
Yizu 彝族
Wenhua re 文化热
Kaifa xibu 开发西部
Chengzhen 城镇
Cunxiang 村乡
Minjian zuzhi 民间组织

**Chapter one:**

Minzu shibie 民族识别
Minzu gongzuo 民族工作
Guojia wenwu ju 国家 文物局

**Chapter two:**

Hexie 和谐
Gu cun 古村
Gu zhen 古镇
Fanggujie 仿古街
Guojia yichan wenwu 国家遗产文物
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wenwu Baohu Fa 中华人民共和国文物保护法
Sheng 省 Shi 市 Xian 县 Zhen 镇 Cun 村
Wenming 文明
Suzhi 素质
Guojia zhongdian wenwu 国家重点文物
Baohu danwei 保护单位
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo chengshi/chengxiang guihua fa 中华人民共和国城市城乡规划法
Zhongguo lishi wenhua mingzhen mingcun 国历史文化名镇名村
Kan renao 看热闹
Jingdian 京点

Case studies:
Shaxi: 沙溪
Jianchuan 剑川
Juedui pinkun 绝对贫困
Pinkun 贫困
Ru bing 碌
Jian 剑
Cha Ma Gu Dao 茶马古道
Pu' Er 普洱
Xingjiao Si 兴教寺
Sidengjie 寺登街
Baizu 白族
Minjia 民家
Mafan 麻烦
Mixin 迷信

Jianshui & Tuanshan: 建水 & 团山
Honghe Yi Hanizu zizhi zhou 红河彝哈尼族洲
Guo qiao mixian 过桥米线
Baohu 保护
Gengxin 更新
Lishi wenhua mingcheng 历史文化名城
Guojia zhongdian yichan wenwu baohu danwei 国家重点遗产文物保护单位
Guiding 规定
Falu 法律
Wenwu baohu guiding 文物保护规定
Xizhuang 喜庄
Nong jia le 农家乐
Minjian 民间
Bi yi yan zheng yi yan 闭一眼睁一眼

Heijing & Nuodeng 黑井 & 诺邓
Jiade 假的
Yuntian jituan Yunnan boyuan shiye youxian gongsi 云天集团
博源事业有限公司
Yunlong 云龙
Dali Baizu zizhi zhou 大理白族自治州
Shengtai 生态
Zhuanjia 专家
Tianjing 天井
Siheyuan/Sanheyuan 四合院/三合院

Shuhe/Longquan 竺河/龙泉
Dingjie jituan 鼎结集团
Naxi 纳西

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