Atonement as Reunion:
The Atonement and the Beatific Vision

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Abstract

There is no doctrine more central to Christianity than the doctrine of the Atonement. However, there is also no doctrine more contested. I claim that these disputations stem from a failure to attend to what the Atonement is supposed to achieve, namely, maximal union with God at the beatific vision. I therefore argue that understanding the Christian doctrine of the beatific vision is key to understanding the nature of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement.

I start by analysing the connection between union with God and the Doctrine of the Beatific Vision. On one recent model of union, Eleonore Stump’s, maximal union requires full knowledge of the other. At the beatific vision, it is supposed that we come to know God as God knows us, thereby meeting this criterion for union.

I then explore an account of the problem the doctrine of the Atonement is supposed to resolve, namely, the problem of ‘willed loneliness’, where willed loneliness includes (1) the reflexive inability to share attention with the other, and (2) the sort of psychological fragmentation that makes it difficult or impossible to be fully known by someone else, where (1) and (2) are inimical to beholding the beatific vision.

I use recent work in ethics to provide a plausible solution to this general problem of willed loneliness; however, I suggest the Christian doctrine of the Atonement must explain a particularly intractable case of willed loneliness, and therefore that this general framework is, by itself, explanatorily insufficient.

I conclude by demonstrating one way the work of Christ might fit into this framework, and how one might avail of this work. I argue that maximal union with God can be achieved through a certain kind of union with Christ, and I outline one candidate for such union.
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I would also like thank my family, particularly my father, for his infectious enthusiasm for both philosophy and theology. No doubt I would have taken a different path had it not been for his influence. I would also like to thank members of the St Benedict’s Society for the Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology at the University of York for their help proof reading many of my ill-thought through papers over the course of my time at York. In particular, I would like to thank Joshua Cockayne, who has been a valued friend and colleague.

Finally, I owe an incalculable debt to my supervisor, David Efird. His selfless support and tireless encouragement have been both fundamentally formative and thoroughly exemplary.
Author’s Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References. Some of the material in this thesis has previously been presented in different formats. I list the relevant sources here:

**Introduction:** Some of the material in this chapter is shared with the paper Worsley, D., (2017) ‘Experiencing the Word of God: Reading as Wrestling’ forthcoming in *TheoLogica*.

**Chapter 1:** Some of the material in this chapter is shared with the paper Worsley, D., (2016) ‘Could there be Suffering in Paradise? On the Primal Sin, the Beatific Vision, and Suffering in Paradise’ published in *The Journal of Analytic Theology* 4: 87-105 and also with the paper Worsley, D., ‘Augustine on Beatific Enjoyment’ forthcoming in the Heythrop Journal. Some material is also shared with two papers co-authored with David Efird, ‘Divine Action and Operative Grace’ forthcoming in *The Heythrop Journal* and ‘What Can an Apophaticist Know?: Divine Ineffability and the Beatific Vision’ forthcoming in *Philosophy and Theology*. I can confirm that the material taken from those papers and presented in this thesis is my own work.

**Chapter 2:** Some of the material in this chapter is shared with the paper Worsley, D., (2016) ‘Could there be Suffering in Paradise? On the Primal Sin, the Beatific Vision, and Suffering in Paradise’ published in *The Journal of Analytic Theology* 4: 87-105 and also with the manuscript Worsley, D., ‘(Affective) Union in Hell’.

Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering’ in *The Philosophical Quarterly*. I can confirm that the material taken from this paper and presented in this thesis is my own work.

**Chapter 4:** Some of the material in this chapter is shared the manuscript Worsley, D., ‘Is Christian Perfection Possible? On the Problem of Suffering and the Completion of Sanctification’.
There is no doctrine more central to Christianity than the doctrine of the Atonement.\(^1\) However, there is also no doctrine more contested.\(^2\) For, whilst church councils have been relatively clear on what the Atonement generally secures, namely, the Christian’s salvation, they have been decidedly unclear on either what such salvation looks like, or how the Atonement secures it.

Trying to resolve this long-established problem by motivating a further underexplored model seems, on the face of it, doomed to fail. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why, despite this, this project has continued. First, I am convinced that there is more to be said, philosophically, about the thing the Atonement is supposed to secure, namely, a person’s union with God at the beatific vision, and I believe that reflection on the beatific vision can provide an underexplored angle at which to view the Atonement. Second, I am convinced recent philosophical work on the nature of Atonement in general, that is, the everyday making of amends we all engage in, can be fruitfully brought into dialogue with the lineaments of the Christian doctrine, such as they are. Therefore, in addition to work on the nature of the beatific vision, I also intend to employ recent philosophical work in ethics to explore what I will call a reunion account of the Atonement.

Before I begin either task, however, it is important to note that the Christian doctrine of the Atonement is motivated by and derived from revealed theology, rather than from natural theology. That is to say, without reference to purported divine revelation, it is not at all apparent that the Atonement is either necessary, or

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1. Atonement could refer to either the Christian doctrine, that is, to the specific work of Christ, or to the general making of amends between persons. Throughout this thesis I will use ‘the Atonement’ or ‘Atonement’ (with the ‘A’ capitalised) to refer the specific work of Christ, as laid out in the Christian doctrine of the Atonement, and the lower case ‘atonement’ to refer to the general making of amends.

2. Richard Cross, for instance, notes that ‘[f]inding a theory to explain how Christ’s life, death, and resurrection can bring about human redemption has long been one of the more intractable tasks faced by the theologian.’ (Cross, 2001: 397)
that it is somehow secured through the work of Christ, whatever that work might be. Given this, it is necessary that the revelation that motivates it, that is, the various passages of Christian scripture that refer to the doctrine, be critically engaged with. Thus, scriptural coherence, alongside ethical and logical coherence, will form the desiderata for any successful account of the Christian doctrine of Atonement. Whilst I shall later address relevant scriptural desiderata, in this introductory section I will explore one recent methodology for laying out how a philosopher might reasonably engage with scripture, namely, the methodology present in what has become known as ‘analytic theology’.

**Analytic Theology: A Brief History**

Attempts to integrate philosophy and (revealed) theology are not new. Exemplars include Augustine’s use of Plato, and Aquinas’s use of Aristotle. More recently, too, philosophers such as Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Adams, and William Alston have used developments in analytic philosophy (particularly, analytic metaphysics and epistemology) to address longstanding historical problems in philosophy of religion. Nevertheless, in at least the post-logical positivist Anglo-American tradition, interdisciplinary analytic engagement with theology has been limited to a relatively small number of analytic philosophers. However, with the advent of what has become known as ‘analytic theology’, this relatively small number of analytic philosophers has begun to grow, and, over the last ten years, the number of those claiming to engage in analytical approaches to theology has reached unprecedented levels.

The term ‘analytic theology’ comes from Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea’s 2009 edited volume *Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology*. The

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3 At least, the Platonism of Plotinus (204 – 270) and Porphyry (233 – 305).
5 I will not attempt to explain why interest in analytic theology has grown. I am sure the generosity of the Templeton Foundation has something to do with it, but this cannot be the only reason.
6 See Crisp and Rea 2009. As far as I can gather, the inspiration for the book, and for the title, emerged from Michael Rea’s 2006 Metaphysics and Christian Theology graduate class at the University of Notre Dame.
publication of that anthology marked something of a watershed in analytic approaches to theology. That same year, the University of Notre Dame began the annual Logos Workshop with a view to fostering interactions between analytic philosophers and theologians. In 2010, a major Templeton Foundation grant was awarded to the University of Notre Dame, the University of Innsbruck, and the Shalem Centre in Israel to run a four-year project in Analytic Theology. This formative project hosted several fully funded summer schools for younger scholars, employed post-doctoral and senior researchers, and organised essay prizes encouraging practitioners in both analytic philosophy and theology to engage in the area. In addition, this grant included further funding for course development and cluster group awards, broadening the reach of the analytic theology project. In 2011, the inaugural annual Analytic Theology Lecture was given at the Conference for the American Academy of Religion, and in 2013, four years after the inaugural anthology was published, a new annual journal devoted to analytic theology, *The Journal for Analytic Theology*, was established.

In more recent years, the John Templeton Foundation (and the Templeton Religion Trust) has awarded additional funding for major multi-year projects in analytic theology to the Herzl Institute (Analytic Theology: Philosophical Investigation of the Hebrew Scriptures, Talmud and Midrash), Fuller Theological Seminar (Prayer, Love, and Human Nature: Analytic Theology for Theological Formation), the University of St Andrews (Analytic and Exegetical Theology), the University of Innsbruck (Analytic Theology and the Nature of God: Integrating Insights from Science and Philosophy into Theology), and the Kalam Research and Media Centre (Islamic Analytic Theology). In addition to these major awards, Oxford University Press has recently started a series in *Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology*, and a new European journal dedicated to the publication of work within analytic theology in different European languages, *TheoLogica*, has also been established. Outside of specialist venues for analytic theology, there have been numerous special editions devoted to the rise of
analytic theology, and even more papers claiming to be works of analytic theology published in established philosophical and theological journals.\(^7\)

In sum, over the last eight years, analytic theology has established itself as a distinct area of research, with many researchers claiming the subject as one of their areas of specialisation or competency. Despite so positioning itself, however, it is still not entirely clear how analytic theology contrasts itself from existing projects in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion. So, what is analytic theology? And more pointedly, what exactly is meant when someone claims to be doing analytic theology?

**What is Analytic Theology?**

Whatever the subject matter of analytic theology is, there is at least consensus that those engaging in analytic theology do so in broad accordance with the general methodological style of analytic philosophy, which is very roughly taken to be characterised by the following five prescriptions:

- **P1.** Write as if philosophical positions and conclusions can be adequately formulated in sentences that can be formalized and logically manipulated.
- **P2.** Prioritize precision, clarity, and logical coherence.
- **P3.** Avoid substantive (non-decorative) use of metaphor and other tropes whose semantic content outstrips their propositional content.
- **P4.** Work as much as possible with well-understood primitive concepts, and concepts that can be analyzed in terms of those
- **P5.** Treat conceptual analysis (insofar as it is possible) as a source of evidence.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) Rea, 2009: 5.
As well as prizing terminological clarity and argumentative rigor, analytic theologians see themselves as (where appropriate) applying the conceptual tools and practices developed in analytic philosophy into the study of theology.\(^9\)

However, this definition brings with it an immediate concern, aptly captured by William Wood, who writes:

> Analytic theology as currently practiced has an ambiguous character. It may be understood either formally, as any instance of theology that draws on analytic philosophy, or substantively, as a cohesive theological school that draws on analytic philosophy in defense of traditional Christian orthodoxy. Both conceptions assume that analytic philosophy furnishes ‘tools and methods’ to the analytic theologian. Yet on the best recent accounts of analytic philosophy, analytic philosophy has no unique tools and methods.\(^10\)

This is not, of course, to say that analytic philosophy has no generally distinctive style (the distinctive style is, I venture, the general commitment to the above prescriptions), more that its methodology and conceptual tools can also be found at use in other disciplines, including, in theory, theology. However, since the mere use of these conceptual tools or of these prescriptions is not sufficient to distinguish analytic theology from other forms of theology, so too the commitment to these tools and to these prescriptions cannot distinguish analytic theology from, for instance, analytic philosophy of religion. So, it is not apparent that either use or commitment to these prescriptions or these conceptual tools necessarily sets the practitioner of analytic theology apart from either theologians or philosophers of religion, who seem equally capable of such use and such commitment. Thus, whilst

\(^9\) See, for instance, Abraham 2009, who writes:

> Analytic theology can be usefully defined as follows: ... systematic theology attuned to the deployment of the skills, resources, and virtues of analytic philosophy. It is the articulation of the central themes of Christian teaching illuminated by the best insights of analytic philosophy. (54)

For a self-identified example of this in action in an attempt to explain the Christian Doctrine of Atonement, see Crisp 2016.

this methodological style might typify analytic theology, it cannot clearly distinguish it.

What does distinguish analytic theology from other forms of analytic engagement with religion, however, is the subject matter that this methodological style, and these conceptual tools, are brought to bear upon; namely, anything that could lend itself to constructive theology. On this point, Andrew Chignell writes:

Philosophy of religion involves arguments about religiously pertinent philosophical issues, of course, but these arguments are customarily constructed in such a way that, ideally, anyone will be able to feel their probative force on the basis of ‘reason alone’. Analytic theology, by contrast, appeals to sources of topics and evidence that go well beyond our collective heritage as rational beings with the standard complement of cognitive faculties.

But, because it is the subject matter that distinguishes analytic theology from, say, analytic philosophy of religion, it is far from clear that analytic theology can stand as a completely independent discipline, for the problems analytic theologians work on, and the sources that analytic theologians work with, are (or, perhaps, ought to be) directly derived from an existing branch of theology. Analytic theology is, therefore, both a kind of applied philosophy and also a methodological style of doing theology, and as inasmuch as it is a style of theology, it should be best viewed

11 In a recent paper, Oliver Crisp (2017) has suggested for this reason analytic theology is best viewed as a species of systematic theology, but I am not convinced this view is necessary. Rather, I side with Sarah Coakley’s view (2013) that analytic theologians bare a family resemblance to each other, and as such, analytic theologians can engage with systematic theology, but they can also engage with mystical theology, or exegetical theology and still be doing analytic theology. Coakley writes:

rather than hoping to find the essence of Analytic Theology in a club with certain defined rules and requirements for admission, it would seem more profitable, in the spirit of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, to speak of us analytic theologians as a ‘family resemblance’ group who share some, but not all, of a range of overlapping and related goals and aspirations... And if this is right, it is pointless to look for one essentialist definition of our project. (602-603)

For more on the distinction between analytic theology and analytic philosophy of religion, see Baker-Hytch 2016.


13 By this I mean to say that analytic theology is not a new independent branch of theology.
as a helpmeet to other areas of ‘data-providing’ theology (exegetical, systematic, biblical, natural etc.) in just the same way as mathematical physics, taught as it is in mathematics departments, acts as a helpmeet to the ‘data-providing’ study of physics (astro-, particle, atomic, etc.).

On this view, and contrary to positions taken up by Oliver Crisp and William Abraham, analytic theology can be paired with any type of theology; natural theology, systematic theology, biblical theology, exegetical theology, and so forth. But in each pairing, the analytic theologian brings to the discipline no further aim than the intention to conduct their investigations (either procedurally or instrumentally) in line with the prescriptions outlined above.

This view helps to distinguish analytic theology from, say, analytic philosophy of religion. Whilst the pairing of analytic theology and natural theology (which includes attempts to explore the nature of the divine without any reference to particular divine revelation) neatly coheres with some of the subject matter of analytic philosophy of religion, the pairing of analytic theology with, say, systematic theology (which includes attempts to rearrange divine revelation into a self-consistent whole) or exegetical theology is evidently something that does not fall within the purview of analytic philosophy of religion.

Furthermore, there is nothing in these methodological prescriptions about either historicity, reason or truth. As I see it, analytic theologians are not committed to explaining why previous thinkers viewed the world as they did, or how we should view the world now, or even how the world actually is. Rather, they are committed to explaining how the world could possibly be, and given a plurality of possibilities, how the world most likely is (given the parameters of whichever type of theology they are engaging with). And whilst many analytic theologians also happen to sign

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14 I thank my supervisor, David Efird, for this analogy. It is worth noting that just as mathematical physics is taught in mathematics departments, and philosophy of physics is taught in philosophy departments, so too, I suggest, analytic theology finds itself a natural home in a department of philosophy.

15 See Crisp, 2017.

16 See Abraham, 2009. Both Crisp and Abraham think analytic theology is a species of systematic theology.

17 It would seem that the prioritization of precision, clarity, and logical coherence comes at the expense of prioritizing truth, although the hope is that the former are all compatible with the latter.
up to the correspondence theory of truth, such a view is compatible with the thought that we cannot know whether propositions do in fact correspond to facts about the world. It is enough to say that they possibly do, or necessarily do not.

Concerning this view of truth, Oliver Crisp writes:

A much more satisfactory way of thinking about analytic theology is in the context of a correspondence theory of truth, according to which a proposition is true just in case it corresponds to a fact about the world to which it refers. Such theories of truth are commonly called ‘realist’. This theory of truth appears compatible with the ‘understanding is independent of believing’ criterion of the procedural use of reason. It is also consistent with analytic theology as a descriptive, rather than prescriptive, method in theology. Finally, the correspondence theory is commensurate with the notion that there is such a thing as truth (about Christian doctrine) and that human beings are capable of apprehending what that truth is. It may be that we cannot apprehend all there is to know about a particular matter. But there is nothing inconsistent in saying that analytic theology uses a correspondence theory of truth and that there are limits to the use of reason in theology. One could hold both of these things together with a robust doctrine of divine mystery and be engaged in an internally consistent theological method.

It may be that one could hold to a rather austere version of the correspondence theory as an analytic theologian. In which case, one might think that there are truths of the matter, but that we may not be in a position to know the truth in every instance. Applied to theology, one might say ‘the Chalcedonian “definition” of the person of Christ is the best way we have of thinking about the Incarnation’. But this is consistent with saying ‘whether the Chalcedonian definition gives us the truth of the matter or not, we cannot say’.18

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18 Crisp, 2009: 50.
And this focus on precision, clarity and logical coherence, settling for possibility at the expense of ‘truth’, along with its ability to engage with different branches of theology (and particularly, its ability to engage with scripture and tradition at face value), are, I venture, two major reasons why interest in analytic theology has increased in recent years.\textsuperscript{19} For, in doing so, it has ‘legitimized’ the expanding of analytic philosophy of religion’s traditional focus on natural theology into areas of revealed theology, and particularly, Christian systematic theology.

But this expansion into revealed theology has not been universally welcomed. Many people who now call themselves analytic theologians are typically either trained philosophers and not trained theologians, or else, trained theologians but not trained philosophers. Setting the latter aside for the moment, there is no doubt that many attempts by theologically untrained analytic philosophers to navigate both revealed theology and tradition have been taken to be somewhat ham-fisted by those with the relevant theological expertise. Consider, for instance, what Sarah Coakley has to say:

The philosophical theologian who has a respect for analytic philosophy may find herself in something of a methodological bind. On the one hand, the fierce clarity and apologetic incisiveness of the analytic tradition offers philosophical deliverances which the continental tradition, even at its best, is hard put to rival. On the other hand, the analytic approach can on occasion display a certain hermeneutical blindness which is nothing less than embarrassing to those trained in continental ways of reading.\textsuperscript{20}

Although (supposedly) acting as a helpmeet to other branches of theology, there is a general concern that in ‘giving up on truth’, analytic theologians have given themselves license to ride roughshod over carefully nuanced texts and historically informed positions. Whilst taking tradition and scripture at face value on the guise of possibility is attractive to some, it is also an anathema to those who are trying to reconstruct the biblical data as it ought to be interpreted, not merely how it could

\textsuperscript{19} Undoubtedly the generosity of the John Templeton Foundation is another important reason.
\textsuperscript{20} Coakley, 2009: 280.
be. So, whilst there seems to be no problem with the analytic theologian choosing to engage with existing problems in various branches of revealed theology, how careful do they need to be whilst engaging with these problems?

Is, for instance, the analytic theologian, trained as a philosopher, competent to interpret divine revelation themselves, without reference to what specialists in systematic theology, exegetical theology, or biblical studies might have to say on the matter? Even though the analytic theologian may only be interested in possibility, developing a possible response to an existing problem that uses a misreading of historical or revealed theology is likely to turn out to be an answer nobody from that branch of theology is willing to accept.\(^\text{21}\)

This task is perhaps a little easier for the analytic theologian wanting to engage with systematic theology. For the most part, there are relatively clear ecumenical creeds that determine the bounds of doctrinal heresy. However, as the creeds typically trace the boundary of heresy, they often do not offer a tightly worked explanation for theological doctrine itself. In particular, as I will expand upon in the fourth chapter of this thesis, the ecumenical creeds offer very little by way of guidance on how we are to actually explain the doctrine of the Atonement. And so, it seems that the analytic theologian, in engaging in systematic theology in an attempt to develop just such a tightly worked explanation of the Atonement, a doctrine as mentioned, beyond the purview of the natural theologian, must at some level engage with divine revelation directly.\(^\text{22}\)

However, divine revelation is often complex, and it is especially complex when it comes to passages that relate to the doctrine of the Atonement. Such passages are full of metaphors and similes and complex literary tropes that do not lend

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\(^{21}\) Responding to this concern, I take it, was the reasoning behind the Analytic and Exegetical Theology project in St Andrews.

\(^{22}\) That something like the Atonement is required is, plausibly, available to the natural theologian. However, how the Atonement is secured, namely, through something to do with the life, passion, death or resurrection of Christ is evidently not.
themselves to easy analysis, especially not analysis that confirms to the above five prescriptions.\textsuperscript{23}

There are therefore two moves open to the analytic theologian who seeks to engage with systematic theology. Either they can endeavour to gain theological training so that they can ‘correctly’ interpret the scriptural data, where this ‘correct’ interpretation can be stated clearly, precisely and coherently (if it cannot be stated clearly, precisely and coherently, one might think it has no place in \textit{analytic} theology). Such training would include engaging with the best work of exegetical and biblical scholars on the relevant pieces of revelation, as well as familiarising oneself with contemporary hermeneutic theory.

Alternatively, the analytic theologian can forego this theological training and simply deny that either (i) theological training is necessary for interpretation (after all, if scripture is divinely inspired, one might think it unlikely that the Christian God would only allow only those certain people with the time and resources available to study it, for instance, academics at a top Western university, to correctly interpret it) or (ii) that their interpretation has to be the best interpretation, so long as it is a plausible one.\textsuperscript{24} On either (i) or (ii), nothing about the analytic prescriptions mentioned above commit the analytic theologian to looking for what is true (at least, true in this world); rather, that they merely need to commit to look for what is possible (or, perhaps, plausible). Certainly, if the analytic theologian wanted to engage in exegetical or biblical theology, they would have to take the first route very seriously, but, it seems to me, the second route is open to the analytic theologian engaging in systematic theology.

Either way, however, the analytic theologian wanting to engage in systematic, exegetical, or biblical theology will have to engage with at least some texts that do not lend themselves to easy analysis. In the next section, I will address one method for engaging with such difficult texts, and one problem I see this method facing, before in the final section of this introduction, addressing how I intend to use such

\textsuperscript{23} See, for instance, Isaiah 53, one of the most important descriptions of the Atonement in the Old Testament.

\textsuperscript{24} For more on this line of argument, see Westphal 2009.
an analytic theology methodology in this thesis on the Christian doctrine of the Atonement.

Analytic Theology and Divine Revelation

As already mentioned, in the introduction to Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, Michael Rea characterises analytic philosophy (and by extension, analytic theology\textsuperscript{25}) as ‘avoiding substantive use of metaphor and other tropes whose semantic content outstrips their propositional content.’\textsuperscript{26} Rea’s idea was not that metaphor and other literary tropes (like typology or analogy) should be avoided completely – to do so would severely limit the primary source material available to the analytic theologian wanting to engage with exegetical or biblical theology – rather, as Thomas McCall puts it, that analytic theologians ‘are not at liberty to trade loosely in metaphor without ever being able to specify just what is meant by those metaphors. They are not, then, free to make claims the meaning of which cannot be specified or spelled out.’\textsuperscript{27} In essence, although they can be identified as such, metaphors (and other literary tropes) should only be utilised by the analytic theologian if they can be rendered in some sense propositionally unambiguous.

Such an expectation certainly seems fitting for work produced by so-called analytic theologians. However, the question remains: how are analytic theologians to deal with the ambiguities of the metaphors, typologies and similar tropes already present in their primary texts? Should Christian or Jewish analytic theologians, for instance, gloss over the parts of the Biblical text that do not lend themselves to straightforward propositional analysis, or are they at liberty to assume that beyond the metaphors and other literary tropes the authors or final editors of the Biblical

\textsuperscript{25} There are, of course, philosophers working within the analytic tradition that do use literary narrative, for example Eleonore Stump and Martha Nussbaum, but for present purposes I will treat these as non-representative.
\textsuperscript{26} Rea, 2009: 6
\textsuperscript{27} McCall, 2015: 20
texts were (at the very least far more often than not) engaging in some coherent work that can be teased out and rendered propositionally unambiguous? 

One analytic theologian who has engaged at length with this question is Yoram Hazony. Hazony affirms the latter position and in his book *The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture* he sets out a methodological framework for how this work might be undertaken (at least, in Jewish analytic theology). Hazony argues that the Biblical prophets were engaging in works of reason, works at least comparable to the Greek philosophers, and that their work should be considered authoritative because it is reasonable, and not (just) because their work is taken on faith to have been revealed to them by God. Expanding upon this claim, Hazony begins his book’s conclusion with the following words:

Not too long from now it may be possible to write a comprehensive work on the ideas of the Hebrew Scriptures. [This book suggests] a methodological framework [which] I believe can permit a more rapid advance in the direction of a well-articulated understanding of the philosophical content of the Hebrew Scripture than we’ve seen so far.

Reason, Hazony says, has traditionally involved ‘deducing propositions from other propositions.’ What he proposes instead is to extend this understanding of reason to include abductively inferring propositions from what he calls ‘non-propositional’ analogy, metaphor, and typology found in the Hebrew bible. In essence, Hazony is proposing to take the very literary tropes at question, reduce them to what he sees as their *approximate* propositional content and then set them to work in analytic arguments to articulate what he sees as the philosophy of Hebrew scripture.

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28 This is not to say that analytic theologians of the former persuasion are unable to say anything about such non-propositional content; as I hope to show, they can attempt to articulate why, in general terms, such non-propositional content might have been included.

29 Although I am looking at Hazony’s work (his work is the most substantive attempt to engage with this question that I have come across), I think the concerns I raise would be common to any attempt by an analytic theologian to propositionally analyse the literary tropes in a religious text. Hazony is one of the beneficiaries of the original John Templeton Foundation analytic theology grant, and currently the recipient of a further Templeton grant to study Jewish analytic theology at the Herzl Institute in Jerusalem.

30 Hazony, 2012: 265

31 See also Hazony, 2012: 27, 272.
The methodological framework that Hazony develops requires his inquirer to first learn how to reliably ‘recognize a given general cause or nature in experience’ as only once this is done ‘is it then possible to begin trying to establish a partial description of it in propositions’. Hazony follows this up by suggesting that as soon as one recognises that

metaphor, analogy, and typology are in fact means by which the author of a work can establish positions with respect to general causes or natures, it becomes much easier to see that the great majority of the biblical authors, and perhaps all of them, are indeed engaged in reason; and that it is the exercise of reason they hope for, as well, in their readers.

I find Hazony’s suggestion that metaphor, analogy, and typology can be used by an author to establish positions with respect to general causes or natures a deeply plausible one. However, I foresee a problem with this line of thought. For, metaphor, analogy, and typology are all modes of narrative and following a line of argument developed by Eleonore Stump, I will argue that narratives (including metaphor, analogy, and typology) might convey knowledge that cannot be communicated in non-narrative propositional form. As a result, there is a real risk of losing something in trying to convey in non-narrative propositional form the ideas present in divine revelation in a work of analytic theology.

On page 21 of *The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture* Hazony cites Stump’s book, *Wandering in Darkness*, as being the first book by a prominent philosopher to argue for the need to incorporate the biblical narrative into the discipline of philosophy.

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32 Hazony, 2012: 272.
34 Although this view is not uncontroversial. See for instance Brinks (2015: 247).
35 Of course, even if this is Yoram Hazony’s position, it is evidently not the case that all analytic theologians are committed to conveying every idea of the Bible in non-narrative prose. Rather, as I will suggest, the analytic theologian needs merely (if needs anything at all) to identify areas irreducible to non-narrative prose and explain why (and perhaps how) such passages are irreducible to non-narrative prose.
In *Wandering in Darkness* Stump makes a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, what she calls propositional knowledge (or Dominican knowledge) and what she calls knowledge of persons (or Franciscan knowledge):³⁶

Propositional knowledge is knowledge *that* X, and as such, propositional knowledge can always be reduced to and conveyed by propositions.

Knowledge of persons, on the other hand, is knowledge irreducible to propositional form. Unlike propositional knowledge, knowledge of persons can only be conveyed through second-personal experience or, and crucially for present purposes, narrative.³⁷

This is how Stump describes, or more precisely, does not describe knowledge of persons:

At this point, it is worth considering how this question [what is the nature of knowledge of persons?] could be answered. Here is how it could not be answered. It could not be answered by trying to spell out what exactly is known in the Franciscan knowledge of persons, contrasting it with knowledge that, and considering whether the distinctive elements of that Franciscan knowledge are philosophically significant. The objector’s question could not be answered in this way because then the position being defended would be incoherent... I would be trying to describe in the familiar

³⁶ Stump, 2010: 59.
³⁷ See Stump 2010 (77-80) for an explanation for how an account can be second-personal. Stump writes:

While we cannot express the distinctive knowledge of such an experience as a matter of knowing that, we can do something to re-present the experience itself in such a way that we can share the second-person experience to some degree with others who were not part of it, so that at least some of the Franciscan knowledge garnered from the experience is also available to them. This is generally what we do when we tell a story. A story takes a real or imagined set of second-person experiences of one sort or another and makes it available to a wider audience to share. It does so by making it possible, to one degree or another, for a person to experience some of what she would have experienced if she had been an onlooker in the second-person experience represented in the story. That is, a story gives a person some of what she would have had if she had had unmediated personal interaction with the characters in the story while they were conscious and interacting with each other, without actually making her part of the story itself. The re-presenting of a second-person experience in a story thus constitutes a second-person account. It is a report of a set of second-person experiences that does not lose (at least does not lose entirely) the distinctively second-person character of the experiences. (78)
terms of knowing that the Franciscan knowledge which I have claimed cannot be formulated in that way.\textsuperscript{38}

To support the distinction between these two types of knowledge Stump reworks Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument. Stump asks us to imagine some Mary who has been locked in a room since birth. Mary has never experienced a second-personal encounter with her mother, and does not have access to any narrative account of her mother. Nevertheless, in Mary’s room Mary has access (through encyclopaedias and computers) to all relevant non-narrative propositional information about the existence of her loving mother, along with all that science can teach about her. Stump writes:

When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that Mary will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about her mother that could be made available to her in non-narrative propositional form, including her mother’s psychological states. Although Mary knew that her mother loved her before she met her, when she is united with her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. And this will be new for her, even if in her isolated state she had as complete a scientific description as possible of what a human being feels like when she senses that she is loved by someone else.\textsuperscript{39}

On my reading of this claim, what Stump is committing to in this account of knowledge is at odds with, for instance, a traditional analysis of Jackson’s original thought experiment that suggests Mary merely learns something old in a new way.\textsuperscript{40} In other words, knowledge of persons (the something new) is in some sense

\textsuperscript{38} Stump, 2010: 59. And again a little earlier Stump writes:

\begin{quote}

I want to claim, however, that there is a kind of knowledge of persons, a Franciscan knowledge, which is non-propositional and which is not reducible to knowledge that. What could that possibly be?, a skeptical objector may ask. But, of course, if I give an answer to the skeptic’s question, I will have an incoherent position: in answering the question, I will be presenting in terms of knowledge that what I am claiming could not be presented that way. (52)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{39} Stump, 2010: 52.  
\textsuperscript{40} Churchland writes, for instance, that
captured by what was previously known, namely, pertinent propositional knowledge (the something old). For Stump, on the other hand, what Mary learns is not something old in a new way, but something entirely new altogether.\textsuperscript{41}

So why might this matter? Stump argues that knowledge of persons transmitted in her narrative studies can be used to ‘soften the blow’ or ‘prepare the ground’ for the arguments that follow.\textsuperscript{42} Of course, for the reasons she mentioned above, she cannot explain exactly how this knowledge of persons does this, nevertheless Stump writes

\begin{quote}
I [have] argued that a story, which is a second-person account, can give us something of what we would have had if we ourselves had been participants, even just as bystanders, in the second-person experiences that the story describes. In the same way, ... biblical narratives ... constitute a way of sharing and passing on interpersonal experiences, including interpersonal experiences (whether real or imagined) with God, in all their messy richness. These narratively shared experiences can inform in subtle ways our intuitions and judgments, just as real-life experiences do.

... I cannot explain exactly what way that is, but it is not necessary for me to do so...\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{41} See Stump 2010 (52-59) for more details. Stump distinguishes ‘knowledge-of-persons’ from the ‘knowledge-how’ ability hypothesis that Laurence Nemirow (1990), David Lewis (2004) and Paul Churchill (1989) discuss. The knowledge-how ability hypothesis suggests that experience gives us an ability and nothing more; an ability to remember, imagine or recognize what it is like to have that experience. There is no new knowledge gained at all in this process. The position that Stump takes up, then, is closer to Earl Conee’s ‘acquaintance’ hypothesis (1994). For Conee, there is no new propositional knowledge gained by experience, but there is something gained beyond mere know-how, namely, acquaintance with the thing known. (Churchland, 1989: 24)

\textsuperscript{42} It is worth noting that in Stump’s case, she uses the first four chapters of \textit{Wandering in Darkness} to first explain her methodology (i.e., stressing the importance of narrative alongside propositional knowledge), then she uses the next four chapters to develop a conceptual framework (worked out in propositions), then, with that framework in view, she spends four chapters presenting the narratives. Only once this is done does she present her final argument. In many respects, this thesis follows a similar structure.

\textsuperscript{43} Further from Stump on this point:
I think, therefore, that the best way to make use of ... biblical narratives ... is to let ... reflection on them ... serve as the equivalent of experience, not the experience of traveling through a country but rather something like the experience of immersion in a worldview. To experience this worldview is, of course, not the same thing as approving of it or being willing to adopt and accept as one's own the things peculiar to it. But, even if one rejects it, the as-it-were travel experience of it will broaden and enrich one's perceptions and judgments of things, altering them in subtle and not-so-subtle ways, much as travel to a very different culture will do even if one is alienated from that culture.

... I will [therefore] treat the stories as one treats the experience of travel. ... I will let the memory of the preceding readings of the stories inform inchoately or tacitly the reflections in this and subsequent chapters ... In effect, I will count on the stories as a common store of experience shared by readers, in the way one might share with others the experience of having been to China, even if one disagrees with one's fellow travelers about the assessment of what one has seen, even if one disputes what the others take to be the facts with regard to the country and its people.44

What an American learns after numerous extended trips to China cannot be reduced to particular claims about the country, the culture, and the people; the experienced traveller will not be able to explain in numbered propositions what his previous trips have taught him. But, nonetheless, what virtually all of us believe is that, on his next trip to China, he will be readily distinguishable from his colleagues who are visiting China for the first time. He will be able to bridge the gap between American and Chinese cultures by myriad small or large insights hard to summarize or to express at all in any propositional way. Because of his previous experience with China, he will have an understanding of China and its culture and people that his colleagues on their first trip to China will lack; and he will not be able to convey to them in terms of knowledge that what he himself has learned. His inexperienced colleagues will have to learn it for themselves through experience on their own trips to China. Or they might learn some of it in advance through stories, which lets them participate vicariously to some extent in the experiences their colleague, the experienced traveller to China, has had. (Stump, 2010: 374)

44 Stump, 2010: 374.
Now, it might be the case that Hazony is right, and with sufficient study we can extract all non-narrative propositional knowledge from the analogies, metaphors, and typologies in the Bible (although I am not altogether clear on how we would judge what qualifies as true typology and what a false typology). In presenting this information, however, there is a real risk that analytic theologians will fail to transmit the sort of knowledge of persons that the authors or final editors of the Hebrew Bible were at least in part concerned with passing on.\textsuperscript{45} On this view, then, metaphor, analogy, and typology are not mere rhetorical flair, nor are they merely a device for ‘softening the blow’ of an argument, rather, the knowledge of persons gathered from them is necessary for, or at the very least conducive to, full understanding of the point under consideration.\textsuperscript{46}

If this knowledge of persons cannot (by necessity) be reduced to non-narrative propositional form, the methodology for engaging in a project to map out the ideas present in divine revelation must be carefully revised, with consideration given, at the very least, for (ambiguous) narrative’s role\textsuperscript{47} in analytic theology.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{45} This, of course, assumes that there is such a thing as propositionally irreducible Franciscan knowledge of persons, and this is by no means an uncontroversial assumption. Even assuming this, though, Hazony (or the putative analytic theologian) could respond to this by suggesting that the propositional content he extracts is merely a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, the Biblical text itself (‘like a travel guide book is a supplement to, by not a replacement for, the tour itself’ - I thank one anonymous referee for pressing this point). However, this move (conceding that second-personal content in the Bible is there, but cannot be marshalled for use in argument) demonstrates one limitation of analytic theology, for in making this move the analytic theologian is ignoring something that might otherwise prove pertinent to the topic at hand. Such a concession is of course neither good nor bad for analytic theology (nor should it really come as a surprise), but is, I suggest, usefully illustrative of the fact that analytic theology ‘cannot go it alone’.

\textsuperscript{46} Like in Stump’s earlier attempt to explain Franciscan knowledge of persons, I am unable to show exactly how Franciscan knowledge might do this (for to do so would require setting out what it achieves in propositional form, which, of course, would then render such knowledge propositional rather than knowledge of persons). At best, I can point to the Mary thought experiment and use the intuition that some may have that Mary really does learn something new when she sees her mother to show that knowledge of persons is real, and can be communicated in narrative.

\textsuperscript{47} I am here referring to whatever it is about narrative that I am claiming is in some sense propositionally irreducible.

\textsuperscript{48} To this end Stump’s Wandering in Darkness provides an excellent model for how such biblically informed analytic theology might be done, with a full quarter of the book devoted letting the biblical narrative speak for itself, if you will (albeit after her propositional framework has been established, so reader comes to the narrative with an informed structure already present).
**Narrative and Methodology**

I have so far suggested that analytic theology is perhaps best understood as a style of constructive theology done in the tradition, and using the tools, of analytic philosophy. I suggested that analytic theology therefore serves as a helpmeet to an existing type of theology, but that, contra Crisp and Abraham, its exercise is not necessarily limited to a particular type of theology.

In this thesis, I intend to engage in a work of analytic theology on the Christian doctrine of the Atonement. But given what I have said about analytic theology acting as a helpmeet to another type of theology, it is important to reiterate that explanations for the Christian doctrine of the Atonement cannot be established from natural theology. Rather, the lineaments for the Christian doctrine of the Atonement are only available through divine revelation.\(^{49}\) As a result, in engaging in a work of analytic theology on the Christian doctrine of the Atonement, I will, of necessity, be engaging with the Christian tradition, particularly the work of Augustine, Anselm, Abelard, and Aquinas (although, as with Scripture, they are introduced to help solve a problem, rather than to be engaged with in a piece of serious reconstructive intellectual history\(^{50}\)), as well as relevant scriptural and conciliar texts, including scriptural texts that do not lend themselves to easy and straightforward analysis. Where appropriate, I will use, as Hazony suggests, abductive inference from these narratives to offer plausible lineaments for the Christian doctrine of the Atonement, but in addition to doing so, I will, as Stump suggests, also present the relevant narratival contexts.\(^{51}\) In addition, when appropriate, I will quote verses or short passages from scripture with only the

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\(^{49}\) Although we can, of course, explore how two persons might make amends, the Christian doctrine of the Atonement has a very specific framework in which this takes place, namely, through something to do with Christ’s life, passion, death, resurrection or ascension.

\(^{50}\) I will then, for instance, attempt to use Aquinas in much the same way that Aquinas used Aristotle, and so forth.

\(^{51}\) There is, of course, a tension between the claim that the knowledge conveyed in narrative is (at least in part) irreducible to propositional knowledge, and then offering a commentary or exegesis on the narratives in question that tries to point out just how to read a passage in order to access such knowledge. If the (propositional) commentary actually captures all of what is being conveyed, why bother with the narrative in the first place? At best, then, a commentary can only gesture away from a misreading of the narrative, or prompt a fresh rereading of an old narrative. Given this, my commentary on the biblical texts in question will be, necessarily, minimal, leaving room for a fuller reflection on the text.
slightest abductive inference or commentary, letting the text, for the most part, speak for itself.

Before I turn the biblical narratives on the Atonement, I will first outline a framework (from scripture, tradition, and reason) into which the Atonement can be situated. After setting out this framework, I will provide conceptual analysis of what I take to be the most promising account of the nature of atonement in general, before finally turning to the biblical narratives with a view to defending the theological plausibility of this general analysis, and also gesturing towards an explanation for the special case of the Christian doctrine of Atonement, an explanation that fits both within the general framework previously outlined, with this understanding of atonement in general, and with the specific (abductively inferred) scriptural desiderata for the doctrine.⁵²

I will begin the first chapter of this thesis by looking in some depth at one of the two motivating reasons I have for pursuing this topic, namely, by exploring the thing the Atonement is supposed to secure, that is, a person’s union with God at the beatific vision. With this framework for union with God in view, in the second chapter, I will explore the inhibitors to such union that the Atonement is supposed to overcome, namely, inhibitors to dyadic attention, and psychological integration. In the third chapter I will, using recent work in moral philosophy, propose a framework for overcoming such inhibitors in everyday relationships. In the fourth chapter, I will offer a survey of the biblical data on Atonement, suggesting that whilst such everyday solutions provide a helpful framework for thinking about atonement in general, when applied to the Christian doctrine of Atonement, each solution faces an apparently intractable theological obstacle. Given these apparently intractable theological obstacles, I will unpack one of the major problems facing current attempts to explain the Christian doctrine of the Atonement, namely, the problem of transaction. After exploring every permutation of this transaction problem (that the Atonement is secured in part due to some

⁵² In this way, I will have two standards for success for any Atonement theory. Firstly, whether the theory coheres with the biblical data on Atonement (and how that data has been traditionally interpreted) and secondly, whether the theory is intelligible, non-arbitrary, logically valid and moral.
transfer between God and God, between God and humanity, between humanity and God, or between God and some third party), I will suggest that we can avoid the transaction problem entirely through an account of the Atonement as reunion. In the fifth and final chapter, I will show how this reunion account of Atonement, an account that is informed by the work done in the first four chapters, might map onto the life, passion, and death of Christ. Finally, I will conclude this thesis by summarising and assessing the viability of this Atonement-as-reunion model, alongside providing brief analysis of how this model might fit into the order of salvation.
Chapter 1

Union with God and the Beatific Vision

The Atonement presents itself as the solution to a problem. But, before we can talk sensibly about what this solution might be, whatever it may be, we must identify what exactly the problem is, and also what the problem inhibits. As I see it, the main reason for disagreement amongst Atonement theorists stems from a failure to adequately engage with these two issues, and in particular, a failure to engage with the latter. What exactly does the Atonement make possible that would, without it, remain out of reach? This chapter will therefore focus on this latter question whilst the next chapter will focus on the former.

What, then, does the Atonement secure? In brief, I will argue that something about the Atonement secures union with God at what has become known in the Christian tradition as ‘the beatific vision’, that is, the vision of God.

In this chapter, I will both motivate and explore the mechanics of this final union, but I will begin by looking at how this doctrine of the beatific vision has been dealt with in scripture and situated in church tradition, particularly, in the works of Augustine and Aquinas on joy, peace, and love.\(^{53}\)

This chapter will make and defend the following theological claims, introducing, where appropriate, conceptual tools that will then be called upon throughout the remainder of the thesis:

1. The greatest real union with God is necessary for a person’s joy and peace, that is, for the blessed life.
2. Real union with God requires knowledge of God; the greater the knowledge the greater the union.
3. The greatest knowledge of God is attainable only at the beatific vision, by those who can and do behold it.

\(^{53}\) Although these are the first three ‘fruits of the Spirit’, I will leave off any discussion of the Spirit’s role in their production. For further details on their status as fruits, see, for instance, Pinsent 2012.
4. From (1), (2), and (3), beholding the beatific vision is necessary for the greatest real union with God, and so necessary for achieving joy and peace, that is, for the blessed life.

In the next chapter, I will explore possible inhibitors to the beholding of the beatific vision, and, therefore, the possible problems which an account of the Atonement will need to address. These inhibitors will include, namely, (i) an unwillingness to behold the vision,\(^54\) (ii) an inability to wholeheartedly will to behold the vision,\(^55\) and (iii) an inability to behold the vision at all.\(^56\)

As with the doctrine of the Atonement, it is difficult (although, surprisingly, perhaps not impossible)\(^57\) to motivate the doctrine of the beatific vision from natural theology alone. Given this, and given the relative lack of attention the doctrine has received in recent years, it will prove prudent to motivate, from revealed theology, that is, from scripture, the very possibility of a future beholding of the beatific vision (i.e., of in some sense beholding God).

In one of the most famous public discourses of Jesus Christ, the Sermon on the Mount, the following beatitude was given:

> Matthew 5:8 ‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God.’\(^58\)

And John, the ‘disciple whom Jesus loved’\(^59\), later wrote:

> 1 John 3:2 ‘Beloved, we are God’s children now, and what we will be has not yet appeared; but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.’

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\(^54\) Typically, the preference for one’s own power and pleasure over the greater goods of union with God is understood to be a consequence of original sin.

\(^55\) Through the sort of (inevitable) psychological fragmentation that leaves you both unable to wholeheartedly desire to behold the vision, and also makes it impossible for another to be as close to you as they might otherwise be.

\(^56\) That is, an inability to be significantly present to God, through an inability to dyadically share attention with God.

\(^57\) See, for instance, ST I-II, Q 3 A 8. However, this view is controversial. For the wider debate on this view, see Feingold, 2010: 397–428.

\(^58\) All biblical references are taken from the English Standard Version (ESV).

This ‘seeing God’ is explained through the metaphor of ‘seeing face to face’ or ‘seeing God’s face’, terms employed used in both in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. For instance, the apostle Paul wrote:

1 Corinthians 13:12 ‘For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I have been fully known.’

Whilst in the Old Testament, Job is taken to have said:

Job 19:25-27 ‘For I know that my Redeemer lives, and at the last he will stand upon the earth. And after my skin has been thus destroyed, yet in my flesh I shall see God, whom I shall see for myself, and my eyes shall behold, and not another.’

And again in the Old Testament, David writes:

Psalm 15:11 ‘As for me, I shall behold your face in righteousness; when I awake, I shall be satisfied with your likeness.’

And in the final picture of humanity at the end of the book of Revelation, the author records:

Revelation 22:3-5 ‘No longer will there be anything accursed, but the throne of God and of the Lamb will be in it, and his servants will worship him. They will see his face, and his name will be on their foreheads. And night will be no more. They will need no light of lamp or sun, for the Lord God will be their light, and they will reign forever and ever.’

Taken together, the scriptural data suggests that (i) the pure in heart will have a vision of God, and that (ii) this vision is in some way connected to their blessed state in the afterlife. But why might this be the case? And more pointedly, how might this relate to the Atonement?

Augustine explained that this blessed state was one of eternal joy (with the alternative involving a state of eternal torment), and at the start of his *On Christian Doctrine*, he presented what was to become one of the most influential accounts of the nature of joy in the Christian tradition. As unpacking Augustine’s account of joy
offers an insight into this final state of union with God, it is to his account that this thesis now turns.

Augustine on Use and Enjoyment

In book one of *On Christian Doctrine*, Augustine states that all things (*res*) can either make us blessed (i.e., *for frui*, or enjoyment) or can help us attain that which makes us blessed (for *uti*, or use). However, he warns, to enjoy what one should merely use, or to use some thing to attain an improper object of desire, is to abuse that thing.

It seems, then, that on Augustine’s account, joy emerges from the relationship between a person and a thing; joy is a systems-level feature based upon a person’s (affective) desire for the object, their intention in having the object (whether it is desired for enjoyment, for its own sake, or for use), and, to some extent, their having (or laying hold, or resting in, or uniting with) that object. Furthermore, whilst joy could emerge from the relationship between a person and any thing, Augustine thinks there are in fact proper and improper objects of enjoyment. Essentially, proper enjoyment leads to a person’s flourishing, and therefore, to peace and the good life, whilst improper enjoyment, on both counts, does not. To make his point more clearly, Augustine invites his reader to consider the story of a wayward wanderer:

Suppose, then, we were wanderers in a strange country, and could not live happily away from our fatherland, and that we felt wretched in our wandering, and wishing to put an end to our misery, determined to return home. We find, however, that we must make use of some mode of conveyance, either by land or water, in order to reach that fatherland where our enjoyment is to commence. But the beauty of the country through which we pass, and the very pleasure of the motion, charm our hearts, and turning these things which we ought to use into objects of enjoyment, we become unwilling to hasten the end

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60 DDC Book 1 Chapter 2.
of our journey; and becoming engrossed in a factitious delight, our thoughts are
diverted from that home whose delights would make us truly happy.\textsuperscript{61}

In this story, of course, we are represented by the wayward traveller, and in
enjoying what we should only use, we become engrossed in ‘factitious delight’,
missing that which ‘would make us truly blessed.’ However, mere counsel against
enjoying what we should but use is of little use in helping us to flourish. For it to be
prove valuable, we must know what things are proper to seek enjoyment in.
Somewhat unsurprisingly, Augustine thinks that for all people the proper object of
enjoyment is God in Trinity. Echoing the opening of his \textit{Confessions}, he writes:

\begin{quote}
Wherefore, since it is our duty fully to enjoy the truth which lives unchangeably,
and since the triune God takes counsel in this truth for the things which He has
made, the soul must be purified that it may have power to perceive that light,
and to rest in it when it is perceived. And let us look upon this purification as a
kind of journey or voyage to our native land. For it is not by change of place that
we can come nearer to Him who is in every place, but by the cultivation of pure
desires and virtuous habits.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

Unpacking Augustine’s thought, it seems only God can be wholly enjoyed, with this
enjoyment fulfilled as a person first perceives God ‘as He is’ and then, once so
perceiving, finds their ‘rest’ in Him. To ‘perceive’ clearly, Augustine suggests a
person must go through a process of purification (namely, sanctification), whereby
they come to have a pure, or wholehearted, desire for God. And, in another work,
Augustine connects this moment of clear perception to the beatific vision, where, in
the eschaton, God blesses sanctified human persons by manifesting Himself to
them.\textsuperscript{63}

Thus, on Augustine’s account, it seems joy can only properly emerge from the
relationship a person has with God; it is a systems-level feature (that is to say, joy
has necessary and sufficient conditions, which, when present, lead to its

\textsuperscript{61} DDC Book I, Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{62} DDC Book I, Chapter 10.
\textsuperscript{63} DCD, Book XXII, Chapter 29. See also Letter 147 ‘On Seeing God’.
emergence) emerging from (i) a person’s pure (or wholehearted) desire for God, where (ii) this desire for God is for no further reason but for God’s own sake, and where (iii) this desire is fully realised, in other words, where a person in some sense has God. And for the person to whom (i) and (ii) apply, (iii) is in some sense secured at the beatific vision, and therefore, for the person to whom (i) and (ii) apply, at the beatific vision, joy properly emerges and full flourishing ensues.64

Even given this cursory summary, it should be apparent that Augustine’s account of proper enjoyment is by no means uncontroversial. For one, his account seems excessively severe. If God alone is to be wholly enjoyed, and if this enjoyment is indeed reserved until the eschaton, it looks like all pre-eschaton joy will be a product of abuse, and therefore unconducive to flourishing. This general concern can be cashed out in three ways.

We might call the first way the severity concern:

> If only God is to be wholly enjoyed, and if God can only be wholly enjoyed in the eschaton, it looks like any joy that emerges before the eschaton must be a product of abuse.

And the second way, the exclusivity concern:

> If only God is to be wholly enjoyed, what of those who do not know God or do not desire God? It looks like such people are incapable of proper enjoyment, and incapable of flourishing.

And the third way, the friendship concern:

> If only God is to be wholly enjoyed, all other things must be used. So, it looks like other people, including our friends and family, are to be used but not enjoyed.

If any of these concerns are indeed entailments of Augustine’s account it would be to me, at least, a strike against its plausibility. However, I will suggest that

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64 Commenting on this Augustinian account of enjoyment, St Bonaventure, noted that ‘Enjoyment includes those three namely, vision, love, laying hold.’ SC, Book 4, Distinction 49, Question 5.
appearances are deceiving, and in fact Augustine’s account has within it the resources to address each concern.

Regarding the severity concern, Augustine later introduces a distinction in the passions between desire (cupiditas), which is consent to chase after what we want, and delight (laetitia), which is consent to enjoy what we wish for. On at least Peter Lombard’s reading of Augustine, it is proper to enjoy what we delight in, even if what we delight in is not yet fulfilled. Thus, we can actually enjoy anticipation of the beatific vision, and thus, we can ‘use with delight’ any of those things we might use to enable us to receive it. Given this distinction, so long as joy emerges from delight in either anticipation of the beatific vision, or from using with delight that which will help us secure the beatific vision, joy can still properly emerge prior to the eschaton. So, it seems the severity concern can be deflated.

Regarding the exclusivity concern, given Augustine’s belief in divine ineffability, even those who purport to know of God’s existence will, in doing so, come to rely on some non-propositional, non-conceptual knowledge of God. I will suggest that this non-propositional, non-conceptual knowledge (what I think Aquinas calls ‘connatural knowledge’) may be shared even by those who would deny that God exists.

Regarding the friendship concern, it will become clear that although for Augustine only God can be wholly enjoyed, because human persons are made in the image of God, they can be both used and enjoyed, so long as their enjoyment does not supersede the enjoyment of God.

On the account presented so far, joy properly emerges as a systems-level feature when something like the following three conditions are met, or anticipated, or moved towards:

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68 It is interesting to note that Augustine does not make room for enjoyment of nature, either of non-human animals, or inanimate objects, or abstract ideas. The limits of space prevent me from addressing whether his account could be extended to include enjoyment of such non-human things, however suffice it to say that such things can still be ‘used with delight’ as mentioned above.
(i) a person desires God,
(ii) this desire for God is for no further reason, and
(iii) this desire is fully realised, in other words, that a person in some sense has God.

Now, it seems clear enough to me how (i) and (ii) might be met; however, it is not at all clear how (iii) might be met. What would it mean for a person to ‘have’ God (or for that matter, to ‘have’ another human person)? To get a grip on what Augustine is gesturing towards, it is important to note that the beatific vision is not merely God’s self-manifestation; Augustine also believed that through this vision the beholders are also (and in some sense finally) united with the One in whom their ‘restless hearts find rest’. 69

For Augustine, enjoying God requires love (i.e., caritas) of God, where such love is understood as an ‘affection of the mind’ aimed towards God. 70 Following Augustine, both Bonaventure and Aquinas understood ‘affection’ to involve a ‘desire’ or a ‘movement’. But a desire or a movement must have some end, and so Aquinas proposed that love of God required the desire both for the good of God, and also for union with Him. 71 If the general desire for God is understood as including a desire for union with God, it is clearer to see how (iii) might be realised: a person who desires union with God, and is in fact united with God, has, in that sense, what they desire. It is in uniting with God, and not (just) in beholding God’s self-manifestation, that a person’s restless heart finds rest.

But this response has not answered the initial question, it has only moved the goalposts. What, then, is required for union with God? Aquinas, quoting Augustine, offers an illuminating insight, distinguishing as he does between real and affective union:

69 “You move us to delight in praising You; for You have formed us for Yourself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in You.” Confessions, Book I, Chapter 1
70 ‘I mean by charity that affection of the mind which aims at the enjoyment of God for His own sake, and the enjoyment of one’s self and one’s neighbor in subordination to God’ DDC, Book III, Chapter 10.
71 See ST II-II Q 23 A 2, also ST II-II Q 25 A 3, ST I-II Q 26 A 2-4, ST I-II Q 28 A 1, 4. This is also loosely alluded to in Augustine himself. See, DCD, Book I, Chapter 16.
The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover...

The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.72

As I shall later unpack, real union, the object of desire in desire for God, requires both our presence to God (for God, being omnipresent, is presumably already present to us), and also an ‘apprehension’ of God; a knowledge of who God is. In recent work, Stump has interpreted this ‘apprehension’ as (comprehensive) knowledge of the other person’s mind.73 This being the case, it follows that knowledge of God is necessary for real union with Him. And, if real union with God is necessary for, in some sense, ‘having’ Him, and in some sense ‘having’ Him is necessary for the emergence of proper enjoyment, by the transitivity of causation, it seems knowledge of God is necessary for the emergence of proper enjoyment, and so for flourishing and the good life.

Earlier, I outlined one concern for Augustine’s view, namely, that it seemed to entail that joy could never properly emerge in those who do not know of God. However, upon reflection, this requirement looks problematic even for those who claim

72 ST I-II Q 28 A 1.
knowledge of God. For, if Augustine is right, God is in some significant sense ineffable. Augustine writes:

Have I spoken of God, or uttered His praise, in any worthy way? Nay, I feel that I have done nothing more than desire to speak; and if I have said anything, it is not what I desired to say. How do I know this, except from the fact that God is unspeakable? But what I have said, if it had been unspeakable, could not have been spoken. And so God is not even to be called unspeakable, because to say even this is to speak of Him. Thus there arises a curious contradiction of words, because if the unspeakable is what cannot be spoken of, it is not unspeakable if it can be called unspeakable. And this opposition of words is rather to be avoided by silence than to be explained away by speech. And yet God, although nothing worthy of His greatness can be said of Him, has condescended to accept the worship of men's mouths, and has desired us through the medium of our own words to rejoice in His praise. For on this principle it is that He is called Deus (God). For the sound of those two syllables in itself conveys no true knowledge of His nature; but yet all who know the Latin tongue are led, when that sound reaches their ears, to think of a nature supreme in excellence and eternal in existence.

But if God is indeed ineffable, if He is in some sense beyond knowledge, how can anyone have knowledge of Him? And if knowledge is required for union with Him, without knowledge how can anyone unite with Him? And if they cannot unite with Him, they cannot ‘have’ Him, and in not ‘having’ Him, joy cannot properly emerge. But once again, all is not lost, for, it seems, not all knowledge can be captured by propositions and by concepts. Connatural knowledge, something akin to a knowledge of persons or objects that is irreducible to propositional and conceptual knowledge is also available. If things can be known connaturally, it seems

74 For a recent attempt to show how the sentence ‘God is ineffable’ does not entail a contradiction, see Jacobs 2015.
75 See, DDC, Book I, Chapter 6.
76 See Maritain 1951 and Stump 2010 (64-81) for more on connatural knowledge and knowledge of persons respectively.
compatible with God’s ineffability that we can nevertheless connaturally know God and God’s goodness without ever being able to comprehend, or conceptualise or commit to propositions anything about God’s nature or mind.  

And this view has some interesting consequences for the exclusivity concern, for, if the only knowledge we can have of God is connatural, enjoyment of God cannot be reserved for those who have the most (propositionally) true beliefs about God. Indeed, it cannot be reserved for those who have any (propositionally) true beliefs about God. It cannot for the simple reason that there are no such beliefs to be had.

But, this raises a further question. Certainly, it seems that if connatural knowledge of God is possible, such knowledge might be available at the beatific vision. But could such knowledge be available before the eschaton, too? If not, it seems difficult to know what one would be delighting in anticipation of. However, here too there is a straightforward answer. For Aquinas, goodness, and beauty, and truth, both through the theological and the moral virtues, can also be known connaturally. Aquinas writes:

The theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are

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77 And Aquinas, for instance, seems committed to this thought, see ST II-II Q 45 A 2. On this point, Stump writes:

On Aquinas’s account, the generation of faith is followed by the next step in the process of faith’s leading to wisdom. When the intellect of a person, Paula, assents to the propositions of faith under the influence of her will’s desire for God and God’s goodness, the resulting faith, informed by love of God’s goodness, brings about a mutual second-personal relation between Paula and God. In this relationship, personal interaction characterized by trust in God and openness to God grows in Paula. In consequence, Paula develops some degree of what Aquinas calls ‘connaturality’ or ‘sympathy’ with God. When Paula is in a mutual second-personal relation with God, then Paula’s mind is attuned to God’s, to one degree or another; and so there is a resonance, a sympathy, between Paula and God. This sympathy enables the development of certain dispositions of intellect in Paula. Because she is open to God as she is, she understands things and has insight into things in ways she otherwise would not have. In the mutual loving relationship between God and Paula resulting from Paula’s faith, then, Paula develops certain intellectual dispositions in virtue of her being open to the mind of God. In Aquinas’s view, these dispositions are the real or most important of the intellectual virtues. (Stump, 2014: 214)
known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's
starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly,
through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by
reason.

...[as to the former] First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain
supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light: these are
the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this
end, both as to that end as something attainable--and this pertains to hope-
-and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak,
transformed into that end--and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a
thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this
movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end. 78

Thus, in as much as being, goodness, and beauty are in some sense coreferential (as
Aquinas argued they are79) and inasmuch as God is the greatest being, God
resembles goodness and beauty. And so, irrespective of the propositional beliefs a
person might hold about God, a person who cultivates virtue can attain (at least)
some dim connatural knowledge of God. If this is correct, it seems plausible that a
virtuous person who has never seen a religious text may nevertheless have more
connatural knowledge of God than a vicious person who has memorised lengthy
passages of scripture. Thus, the virtuous person, in conatively desiring those
connaturally perceived God-resembling-transcendentals, may be thereby also
(inadvertently) desiring union with God. So, even on Augustine’s seemingly limiting
account of joy, proper enjoyment is not and cannot be reserved for the lucky few
who, perhaps through mere happenstance of birth, happen to believe a certain set
of propositions about God. In delighting in the use of those things that bring a
person closer to goodness or beauty, or truth, joy can still, it would seem, properly
emerge.

78 See ST I-II Q 62 A 3.
79 See ST I Q 5 A 1, 4.
This connection between love and joy can be developed further, too. Recall that for Aquinas, love is the product of two desires; the desire for union with the beloved, but also the desire for the good of the beloved. If God desires union with all human persons, in desiring what is good for God, that is, in loving God, one must desire that others also come to union with God, and therefore that you also come into union with others. Consider the following from Augustine:

> Whoever, then, loves his neighbor aright, ought to urge upon him that he too should love God with his whole heart, and soul, and mind. For in this way, loving his neighbor as himself, a man turns the whole current of his love both for himself and his neighbor into the channel of the love of God, which suffers no stream to be drawn off from itself by whose diversion its own volume would be diminished.\(^8^0\)

Even so, this desire for such union with others remains inextricably bound up in the language of use. However, it is worth noting Augustine’s nuanced account of use is better understood as ‘rightly ordered love’ than it is some form of instrumentalization. Not only are all persons things (res), they are also signs (signum) pointing to God, in whom only is a sign of nothing else. To love a person (res) for their own sake, without qualification, is both to incorrectly indicate they are capable of making me finally blessed, and also to ignore the fact they are a sign of their maker, thereby taking something from that person’s ‘actual ontological complexity and dignity’.\(^8^1\) Given this, inasmuch as use with delight can lead to the emergence of proper joy, so might we properly enjoy the rightly ordered use of complete human relationships. And indeed, this is the position Augustine takes:

> But when you have joy of a man in God, it is God rather than man that you enjoy. For you enjoy Him by whom you are made happy, and you rejoice to have come to Him in whose presence you place your hope of joy. And accordingly, Paul says to Philemon, Yea, brother, let me have joy of you in the Lord. For if he had not added in the Lord, but had only said, Let me have joy of

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\(^{8^0}\) DDC, Book I, Chapter 22.  
\(^{8^1}\) See Williams, 2016: 196.
you, he would have implied that he fixed his hope of happiness upon him, although even in the immediate context to enjoy is used in the sense of to use with delight. For when the thing that we love is near us, it is a matter of course that it should bring delight with it. And if you pass beyond this delight, and make it a means to that which you are permanently to rest in, you are using it, and it is an abuse of language to say that you enjoy it. But if you cling to it, and rest in it, finding your happiness complete in it, then you may be truly and properly said to enjoy it. And this we must never do except in the case of the Blessed Trinity, who is the Supreme and Unchangeable Good.\textsuperscript{82}

Might this mean, however, that relationships not so intentionally used with delight necessarily fail to lead to a person’s flourishing? Perhaps not. For, plausibly, just as one might have knowledge of God and desire for God without propositional knowledge of God, so, too, I suspect one might be able to love someone ‘in the Lord’, noting in them the sign of goodness and beauty, without having propositional knowledge ‘of the Lord.’

In the following sections I will engage in more depth with what I have outlined here; however, for now it is sufficient to note that on Augustine’s account of joy, joy is a systems-level feature properly emerging when the following conditions are met, or anticipated, or worked towards: (i) a person desires God, where (ii) this desire for God is for no further reason, and where (iii) this desire is fully realised, or in other words, when a person in some sense is united with God.

I suggested that despite framing proper enjoyment in the context of a relationship with God, joy can properly emerge from relationships shared between human persons, if it is the case that such enjoyment is also done in the context of the desire for God (even if one is not fully aware of such context). Furthermore, granting God’s ineffability, propositional knowledge of God cannot be required for union with God Himself (for such knowledge is impossible), and therefore, joy may also properly emerge in the relationships of those who profess no knowledge of God.

\textsuperscript{82} DDC, Book I, Chapter 33.
Aquinas on Peace and the Will

So, for Augustine, proper joy emerges when one has (or anticipates) what one should appropriately desire, namely, union with God.

This much being said, as I shall argue, to actually unite with God, in order for this desire to be efficacious, this desire must be unconflicted, that is, it must be wholehearted. On Aquinas’s account, this state of psychological integration, alongside the attaining of what one desires, are the twin components from which inner peace emerges. And, like Augustine’s account of joy, Aquinas’s celebrated account of peace offers a further insight into the nature of union with God.

Concerning peace, Aquinas writes:

Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.

For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Galatians 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit." Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons,
while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even in one man.\footnote{ST II-II Q 29 A 1.}

And then again:

Peace implies a twofold union... The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbors’ will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sallust, Catilin.)\footnote{ST II-II Q 29 A 3.}

On this view, attaining inner peace requires not only getting what you desire, or being in concord with others, but also possessing an integrated mind. And given this focus on the mind, it will prove prudent to turn to Aquinas's own account of mind, an account, as already alluded to, that builds upon Augustine’s own, and an account, too, that has proven to be influential within the Christian tradition.\footnote{I will be primarily approaching Aquinas account of the mind through the work of Stump. There is some debate as to whether Stump’s account is an accurate representation of Aquinas’s position (Stump thinks, for instance, that Aquinas is a libertarian about free will). Regardless of whether her interpretation is historically faithful, I take the position she sets out to be both compelling and instructive.}

According to Aquinas, the mind consists of an intellect (the power of apprehension) and will (the power of intellectual appetite).\footnote{For Aquinas on the will see ST I Q 82 A 4.} The will, however, is not neutral,\footnote{By neutral I mean acting in some capacity as an independent arbitrator, with only the capacity to toggle between “accept”, “reject” and “off” (Stump, 2002: 280). Neutrality implies that the strength of desires and volitions must come from somewhere other than the will. A non-neutral will, on the other hand, is capable of willing one course of action more strongly than another course.} but is rather an appetite or inclination for goodness in general (where goodness is used in an attributive rather than referential sense). However, although the will is
capable of being disposed\textsuperscript{88} to certain kinds of goods over other kinds of goods, Aquinas states that the will cannot determine what is good \textit{on its own}.\textsuperscript{89} It is the role of the intellect to determine what is good,\textsuperscript{90} and then present to the will this apprehension of what is good under some certain description, at a given time or circumstance. Stump writes:

> On Aquinas’s account, the will wills only what the intellect presents at that time as good under some description. Acts of will, then, are for something apprehended or cognized as good at a particular time in particular circumstances, as distinct from something which is good considered

\textsuperscript{88} Stump writes,

> If we remember this part of Aquinas’s account and take seriously his identification of the will as a hunger or appetite, we will be less likely to identify the will on his account as nothing more than a toggle switch with three positions: accept, reject, and off. Aquinas’s account of the will is more complicated than such an identification implies. Because it is an appetite, the will can have dispositions, so that it can be readily inclined to want something; it can will something with more or less strength." (Stump, 2002: 280)

So, for instance, presented with the choice of paying to enter an art gallery or giving money to a homeless family (two good things), the will might be disposed to enter the art gallery rather than give money to the homeless family. Because the will is a disposition and not a toggle switch, it can will one thing more strongly than another thing, therefore allowing for ineffective (mere desires) and effective desires (volitions). Furthermore, the intellect can present various actions as being comparatively more good or less good than other actions. The intellect need not have a rational reason for its presentation of the relative goodness of certain actions. Stump suggests that the intellect is merely a computational process. She states,

> By ‘an agent’s intellect’ I just mean the computing faculty of an agent. So understood, an agent’s intellect may formulate a reason for an action in a manner that is hasty, thoughtless, ill-informed, invalid, or in any other way irrational. (Stump, 1988: 399)

\textsuperscript{89} Stump states that ‘By itself, the will makes no determinations of goodness; apprehending or judging things as good is the business of the intellect.’ (Stump, 2002: 276) It should be noted that this ‘apprehension’ need not capture in propositions the fundamental essence of goodness (if God is both good and propositionally ineffable, what goodness refers to, just like what God refers to, must be in some important sense also propositionally ineffable).

\textsuperscript{90} Stump suggests that this can be done either consciously or subconsciously. She writes,

> It is important to understand that an agent’s reason for an action may also be only implicit and not an explicit or conscious feature of his thought....On this view, then, it is possible that an agent’s intellect have gone through some process which contributes to a certain action on the agent’s part, without the agent’s being aware of that process as it is occurring....So to hold, as Aquinas does, that an agent wills to do some action $p$ only if his intellect represents $p$ as the good to be pursued does not entail that an agent does an action willingly only in case he first engages in a conscious process of reasoning about the action. Aquinas’s view requires only that some chain of reasoning (even if invalid and irrational reasoning) representing $p$ as the good to be pursued would figure in the agent’s own explanation of his action. (Stump, 1988: 400)
unconditionally or abstractly. Besides happiness and the vision of God, all other things are such that they can in principle be considered good under some descriptions and not good under others, so that there is nothing about them which must constrain the will of any agent always to want them. So, for example, the further acquisition of money can be considered good under some descriptions in some circumstances—e.g., the means of sending the children to school—and not good under others—e.g., wages from an immoral and disgusting job.” 91

It is only when the intellect has presented to the will some course of action as being good that the will will be inclined to act in that way at that time.92

With this in view, an act of will is only ever an efficient cause to some state of affairs.93 The final cause of a state of affairs is always the intellect. In other words, every act of will is necessarily preceded by a (voluntary or involuntary) act of

In general, then, Aquinas sees the hierarchically ordered interaction between will and intellect involved in producing a voluntary human action in this way:

11 The intellect’s determination that a particular end, under a certain description, is good now in these circumstances.
W1 A simple volition for that end.
12 The intellect’s determination that that end can be achieved by the willer, that the achievement of the end through some means is now and in these circumstances in the power of the willer.
W2 Intention: an act of will to try to achieve the end through some means.
13 Counsel: the intellect’s determination of the means suitable to achieve the end wanted. [If there is only one such means, then W3 collapses into W4, and I4 is omitted.]
W3 Consent: an act of will accepting the means the intellect proposes.
14 The intellect’s determination that this means is the best at this time in these circumstances.
W4 Electio: an act of will selecting the means the intellect proposes as best.
15 Command: the intellect’s imperative, “Do this!”
W5 Use: an act of will to exercise control over one of the things subject to the will, for example, a part of the body, the intellect, or the will itself.” (Stump, 2003: 290).

It is worth noting that this process is often entirely tacitly processed, and only discernible upon introspection.
intellect. However, although the intellect alone presents to the will what is good, the intellect can be moved to do this in several ways. Firstly, the intellect can reflect on some knowledge it has of what is good. Secondly, the intellect can reflect on some revelation that it has received to determine what is good. Thirdly, the passions (what Aquinas describes as the ‘sensitive appetite’) can present the intellect some action to be considered, which the intellect can choose to affirm as good (and pass on to the will), or can choose to reject. Fourthly, reflection on the ‘natural appetites’ (as Aquinas describes them) can inform the intellect of what is good. Finally, the will itself can direct the intellect to reflect on certain things and ignore other things.

This last ability of the will is very important. By this ability, the will can turn itself off to certain desires or strengthen others. If the will directs the intellect’s attention

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94 Aquinas describes this natural knowledge as the ‘sensitive appetite’ and the reflection on the sensitive appetite the ‘rational appetite.’

95 Stump defines natural and sensory appetites in the following way:

Because all things are created by a good God who wills what is good for his creatures, all things are created with an inclination of their own to the good, but of very different sorts. Some, like plants or even inanimate things, have a built-in inclination to the good apart from any cognition of the good. Aquinas sometimes calls this inclination a natural appetite. (The sort of thing he has in mind is exemplified by plants naturally turning toward sunlight.) Higher up the ladder of being are animals of certain sorts which are naturally inclined to the good but with some (sensory) cognition. They can cognize particular goods, although they lack the ability to reflect on them or to think of them as good. Inclination dependent on limited cognition of this sort Aquinas calls ‘sensory appetite.’ Higher still are human beings whose inclination to the good is dependent on intellect, which allows them not only to cognize particular goods but to think about them reflectively as good. This inclination is rational appetite, and it is what Aquinas takes the will to be. So close is the association between intellect and will for Aquinas that he often speaks of the will as being in the intellect, and he thinks that anything which has intellect must also have will.” (Stump, 2002: 278)

96 This is possible when the will is disposed to certain kinds of goods over other kinds of goods, and it is presented with multiple goods by the intellect. Aquinas describes this function as the will’s “efficient causality” of the intellect and explains that the will is a “moved mover”. (Stump, 2002: 277)

97 Stump writes,

Most important for our purposes, the will exercises some degree of efficient causality over the intellect. In some circumstances, it can command the intellect directly to adopt or to reject a particular belief. It can also move the intellect by directing it to attend to some things and to neglect others, or even to stop thinking about something altogether. So, for example, -while you are reading a magazine, you come across an advertisement asking for money for children, with an emotionally powerful picture of a starving child. Your intellect recognizes that if you look at the ad for very long, you are likely to succumb to its emotional force. Intellect sees the goodness of contributing to the charity, but it also recognizes that if
away from one good to another, or directs it to reconsider whether the good is in fact good, or directs the intellect to stop considering the matter at hand, then the intellect will not present that action to the will as being good, and therefore the will will not will it. However, as Stump makes clear, this is only a limited ability on behalf of the will. Whilst all acts of will require an act of intellect, not all acts of intellect require an act of will, and some outside stimuli might compel the intellect to continue to present to the will that action as being good, even if the will tries to will the intellect not to do so.98

According to Aquinas’s account, if the intellect presents to the will some action as being good (under some description, at that time), then the will will be inclined to will that action.99 Human experience, however, suggests that the intellect is often double-minded.100 Because the intellect presents the will something as good at that time, under some description, it could well be the case that under some other description that same action is also not good, and therefore that an opposing action

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98 Stump writes,

This is only a limited ability on the part of the will, however, since the apprehensions of the intellect can occur without any preceding act of will and so in some cases may force the issue back on the agent's attention. That is why, for example, the prisoner who wants not to think about what is happening next door where other prisoners are being tortured will find that their screams make him recur to what he wants to stop thinking about.” (Stump, 2002: 278)

99 This will may present itself as either a mere desire or a volition (an effective desire). The fact that one may have conflicting desires will be addressed fully in chapter two.

100 Stump affirms this intuition writing,

Cases of incontinence illustrate the further complicating fact that intellect need not present one simple, unified result to will. Sometimes an agent is entirely of one mind about something, and what intellect presents to will is one unified message that a particular thing is good. But what is no doubt also often the case is that an agent's intellect is not entirely unified. The doctor has recommended x‐raying the agent's head to check for a sinus infection. On the one hand, the agent's intellect may recognize, the doctor is an expert in her field, and her advice for that reason should be followed. On the other hand, the intellect may be aware that even lowlevel x‐rays are carcinogenic, and the intellect may wonder whether the doctor’s ordering the x‐ray reflects her concern to avoid malpractice lawsuits rather than her own view about what is necessary for the health of her patient.” (Stump, 2002: 281)
is, under some other description, also presented to the will as being good. For instance, imagine Jim, an obese man on a doctor imposed diet. If Jim were to walk past a bakery, he might see a cake he wants to eat, and his intellect might present to his will the goodness of eating the cake under the description of ‘being delicious’ or ‘satisfying hunger’; however, his intellect, recollecting his doctor’s instruction, might also present to his will the goodness of refraining from eating the cake, under the description of ‘being healthy’.

According to Aquinas, this double-mindedness has several causes. Firstly, the intellect could simply have made a mistake in its deliberations. Secondly, either the natural knowledge it has may have been wrong, or the revelation of the good it had received have been deceitful or misunderstood, or the passions may have caused some irrational desire to be presented, or the will may have prevented the intellect from fully reflecting on the matter. Alternatively, it really could be the case that both conflicting courses of action are good, such that the will must incline itself more toward that which it deems the greater good.

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101 One assumes that ethical thought experiments often fall into this category, where both courses of action seem good and bad dependent on their corresponding description. For instance, it is presumably good under one description to push an obese man under a moving trolley to save the lives of five people who would otherwise be killed by the trolley. However, under another description, it would be good not to push the obese man under the trolley.

102 Stump writes concerning the passions,

Furthermore, the influence of the passions may also complicate the case. It might be that a patient’s intellect supposes some medical tests are in fact medically required, but his passions might recoil strongly from the tests. In that case, his aversion may influence the intellect to give a divided verdict: on the one hand, it would be good to undergo the tests, because they are important for health; on the other hand, it would be bad to undergo the tests because they are painful or disgusting. In such cases, there may be considerable interaction among intellect, will, and passions, until, in consequence of such iterated interaction, one side or another of the divided intellect becomes strong enough to override the other. This is a process familiar enough to anyone who has had to talk himself into doing something he originally feared or disliked. (Stump, 2002: 282)

103 Stump writes,

For this reason, too, although Aquinas’s account of the will assigns a large role to intellect, he isn’t committed to seeing immoral actions simply as instances of mistakes in deliberation, since intellect’s deliberations are in many cases dependent on the will’s influence. In cases of incontinence, where the intellect seems to be representing something as good which the will isn’t willing, Aquinas would say that the intellect, influenced by the will, is in fact being moved by opposed desires to represent the thing in question as both good (under one description) and not good (under a different description), so that the intellect is double-minded). (Stump, 2002: 281)
Obviously, where the intellect is double-minded, the will cannot *effectively* will both of the conflicting ‘good’ actions same time. As a result, a distinction is required between a mere inclination and an effective inclination in the will. In her representation of Aquinas’s account of the will, Stump describes the will’s mere inclination toward some good as a ‘desire’. However, it is quite clear that just because someone desires to do something, this does not mean that desire will actually be acted upon. One might desire to stop smoking and also desire to smoke at the same time. Clearly, only one of these desires can be effective at a given time. Stump labelled an effective desire, that is, a desire which is *actually* acted upon, a ‘volition.’ If one *actually* smokes, even if one really did have a concurrent desire to stop smoking, one *actually has* a volition to smoke. One’s intellect can theoretically present to the will the goodness of a limitless array of conflicting actions concerning a certain situation, but despite the fact that each of these would form a desire of some strength in the will, on any given decision, a person can only have a maximum of one volition.\(^{104}\)

A desire becomes a volition when that desire is sufficiently stronger than any other conflicting desire, such that the will is sufficiently inclined to act on that desire, moving ‘the agent all the way to action’.\(^{105}\) The strength of the desire is a product of the comparative goodness the intellect places on an action, and the inclination of the will toward the description of the goodness of that kind of action. Therefore, a desire can be strengthened or weakened by altering the disposition of the will, or by causing the intellect to reassess the ‘goodness’ of a certain position (or ignoring / reassessing the badness of another position).\(^{106}\)

Although in recent years Frankfurt has reintroduced the idea of a hierarchy in the will, Aquinas articulated the idea well before him.\(^{107}\) Because the will has the

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104 One may also fail to decide between desires. In such a case, one is indecisive and will have *no* volition.


106 Stump suggests than on Aquinas’s account, the intellect can ‘rank’ certain options such that the will is more inclined to the higher ranked ones. She writes, “If there is more than one means that the will consents to, then the intellect ranks the alternatives and calculates which of these means would be best now in these circumstances.” (Stump, 2003: 288)

107 The principal difference between Frankfurt’s account and Aquinas’s account is Aquinas’s stress on the role of intellect in the process of willing. (Stump, 1988: 400)
capacity to move the intellect, which can in turn move the will, Aquinas proposed the existence of different orders of the will (wanting something, wanting to want something, and wanting to want to want something). 108

First-order desires (or volitions) occur when the intellect presents some good to the will, which the will desires (or effectively desires). A first-order desire is the desire to do some action. A first-order volition (of which there can be a maximum of one for any decision) is an effective desire to do some action.

So, a first-order volition looks like this:

(some stimuli) -> Intellect -> Will -> Action

Second-order desires (or volitions) occur when the intellect presents to the will some previously established first-order desire as good. 109 The will responds to this presentation by desiring (or effectively desiring) to move the intellect to ‘upgrade’ its estimation of the goodness of this first-order desire, or downgrade or ignore conflicting first-order desires, and present this reassessed good to the will to act upon. 110 A second-order desire is the desire to (somehow) strengthen a first-order desire. A second-order volition is an effective desire to strengthen a first-order

108 Stump writes,

In fact, Aquinas confronts a problem that has troubled some contemporary hierarchical accounts of the will, namely, that there may be an infinite regress of higher-order willings. I can will that I will something, and I can also will that I will that I will something, and so on, apparently ad infinitum. But in such an apparently infinite series, the will is not actually taking ever-higher orders of volition as its object. At some point, Aquinas thinks, the apparently higher-order volitions collapse, and the object of the will is just whatever action was at issue at the beginning of the series of volitions. (Stump, 2002: 280)

109 Stump writes,

An agent has a second-order volition V2 to bring about some first-order volition V1 in himself only if the agent’s intellect at the time of the willing represents V1, under some description, as the good to be pursued. A second-order volition, then, is a volition formed as a result of some reasoning (even when the reasoning is neither rational nor conscious) about one’s first-order desires. (Stump, 1988: 400)

110 Stump writes,

An agent forms a second-order desire by reasoning (rationally or otherwise, consciously or not) about his first-order desires; and a second-order desire is a direct result of an agent’s intellect representing a certain first-order desire as the good to be pursued. Given this connection between intellect and second-order desires, an agent cannot be a passive bystander to his second-order volitions. To be a second-order volition, a volition must be the result of reasoning on the agent’s part. (Stump, 1988: 403)
desire. Like first-order volitions, there can only be one second-order volition for a given decision. A second-order volition does not necessarily entail a first-order volition, it merely entails the strengthening of a first-order desire (which may lead to a first-order volition).

So, a second-order volition looks like this:

\[ \text{(some stimuli)} \rightarrow \text{Intellect} \rightarrow \text{Will} \rightarrow \text{Intellect} \rightarrow \text{Will} \rightarrow \text{Action (or mere strengthened desire)} \]

Third-order desires (or volitions) only occur when one has conflicting second-order desires, and involve the intellect presenting some second-order desire as good to the will, which in turn moves the intellect to reassess or ignore previously considered goods. This third-order volition will either produce a strengthened second-order desire, or a second-order volition (by sufficiently strengthening a second-order desire, or by removing some conflicting second-order desire). If the third-order volition produces a second-order volition, this new presentation of the

111 Stump writes that “second-order desires represent an agent’s reasoning since they stem from the reflection of an agent’s intellect on her state of will. Therefore, an agent is to be identified with her second-order desires as much as with her reasoning; her second-order desires represent what her intellect assents to (and so what she assents to) among her first-order desires Consequently…it is correct...to hold that second-order desires represent what an agent really wants. [this is because] the second-order volition stems from [the] reasoning faculty and, in virtue of that connection, indicates what [that person] really wants.” (Stump, 1988: 411)

112 Stump writes, in forming a third-order volition, the agent is not reiterating the process gone through to formulate a second-order volition...forming a third-order volition consists in reasoning about and either accepting or rejecting a second-order volition. So an agent has a third-order volition V3 to bring about some second-order volition V2 in himself only if his intellect at the time of the willing represents V2 , under some description, as the good to be pursued. But since V2 is a desire for a first-order volition V1 generated by a reason’s representing V1 at that time as the good to be pursued, V3 will consist just in reaffirming the original reasoning about V1 which led to V2. In forming a third-order volition and considering whether he wants to have the relevant second-order volition, the agent will consider whether a desire for a desire for some action p (or state of affairs q) is the good to be pursued. But a desire for a desire for for p (or q) will be a good to be pursued just in case the desire for p (or q) is a good to be pursued, and that in turn will depend on whether the agent considers p (or q), under some description, at that time, a good to be pursued. So a third-order volition that supports a currently held second-order volition is in effect just the expression of a reevaluating and affirming of the reasoning that originally led to V1. And, in the same way, a third-order volition that rejects a currently held second-order volition will just be an expression of the reevaluation and rejection of the reasoning that led to the second-order volition. A third-order volition, then, is a result of a recalculation of the reasoning that originally underlay a second-order volition. (Stump, 1988: 405)
goodness of a first-order desire moves the will to reassess or ignore previously considered goods, which leads either to the strengthening of a first-order desire, or a first-order volition. A third-order desire is a desire to strengthen a second-order desire whilst a third-order volition is an effective desire to strengthen a second-order desire. This does not necessarily entail the forming of a second-order volition, it merely entails the strengthening of a second-order desire (which may lead to a second-order volition). Third-order desires typically are the product of some new revelation or some deep reflection about conflicting second-order desires, and are in this way distinguished from mere second-order desires.

So, a third-order volition looks like this:

\[
\text{(some stimuli)} \rightarrow \text{Intelect} \rightarrow \text{Will} \rightarrow \text{Intelect} \rightarrow \text{Will} \rightarrow \text{Intelect} \rightarrow \text{Will} \rightarrow \text{Action}
\]

Could there be further orders of volition? Well, there appears to be a qualitative difference between a first and second-order volition (or desire), and a qualitative difference between a second and third-order volition (or desire),\(^{113}\) however there is only a quantitative difference between a third-order and a (hypothetical) fourth-order volition (or desire).\(^{114}\) As a result, Aquinas can avoid the possibility of an

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\(^{113}\) As I shall suggest, first-order volitions ground moral responsibility, second-order volitions ground freedom of the will, and third-order volitions are necessary to ground what Stump describes as ‘strenuous freedom of the will’. Stump writes,

"I do not mean to suggest that third-order volitions must always collapse into second-order volitions. It is possible for an agent to have third-order desires that are not only distinct from, but even discordant with, his second-order desires. This is so because volitions and desires, like emotions, are not always immediately responsive to reasoning. Even after we are quite sure that a danger is entirely past, we may nonetheless continue to feel some fear; and for a while, until the emotion subsides, we may need to remind ourselves recurrently that there is no cause for fear. Similarly, a second-order desire may take time to fade even when the agent has repudiated the reasoning that generated it. (Stump, 1988: 405)"

On this account, we identify with our second-order volitions, however we may identify with things we do not agree with, or know to be false. A person who has just found out the religion he has followed since childhood is false, it is unlikely he will be able to give up all his second-order desires that relate to his previous religious practice immediately. Such giving up might take time. During this time, a person’s second-order desires might be in conflict with his recently acquired third-order desires.

\(^{114}\) Third-order volitions and (hypothetical) fourth-order volitions would both contribute to grounding strenuous freedom of the will.
infinite regress in the will, as the reasoning behind fourth and higher order volitions collapse into second or third-order desires and volitions.\textsuperscript{115}

One useful consequence of this hierarchy of the will is its ability to separate freedom of the will from moral responsibility. On Aquinas’s account, one is morally responsible for one’s actions if and only if there is no internal coercion between intellect and one’s first-order volitions.

On this account, even if one’s second-order volitions conflict with one’s first-order volitions, one remains morally responsible for one’s actions. For example, imagine a man, Sam, who is normally very peaceful and has a second-order volition to reject violence. Imagine if Sam comes home and finds his wife is cheating on him. In the heat of the moment, Sam’s passions take over and his intellect presents as good to the will some violent action toward the lover. This passion is so strong that Sam forms a first-order volition to attack his wife’s lover. In such a situation, he may still have a second-order volition to reject violence, and yet form a first-order volition to accept violence. It ought to be clear, however, that even if Sam has some excuse for his action, he nevertheless remains morally responsible for it.\textsuperscript{116}

Alternatively, freedom of the will emerges from a specific series of interactions between the intellect and will. For Aquinas, a person only acts with freedom of the

\textsuperscript{115} Stump writes, apart from [cases where a second-order desire lingers after the reasoning behind it has been repudiated], a third-order (or any higher order) desire or volition will collapse into a second-order desire or volition...any attempt, then, to describe his state in terms of a fourth-order (or even higher-order) volition will collapse into the formulation of a second-order volition. So, on the revised Frankfurt account, the number of levels of higher-order desires is not infinite but is rather limited to two or three. (Stump, 1988: 406)

\textsuperscript{116} Stump uses the example of a man beating his wife. She writes, Consider, for instance, some Christian Patricius who beats his wife Monica. On the revised Frankfurt account, we will say that, because Patricius believes it is wrong for him to beat Monica, he forms a second-order desire to make the first-order desire not to beat his wife his will. But when the fit of wrath is on him, he acts on his first-order desire to beat her. When the fit has passed, he laments his action and recognizes that by his own lights he should have acted on his general prohibition to himself not to beat her. Patricius does not have control of himself; he does not have the strength of will to make his first-order desires conform to his second-order desires, and he is not able to make himself have the will he wants to have. (Stump, 1988: 412)
will if their second-order volitions translate to first-order volitions, and their second-order volitions are not externally coerced.\(^\text{117}\)

This claim needs some qualification, however. Although second-order desires and volitions are those things that, all things considered, you choose to identify with (and therefore freely acting on what you choose to identify with qualifies as free will), what is meant by ‘second-order volition’ in this context must be made very clear.\(^\text{118}\) The will is, after all, only ever an efficient cause, rather than a final cause, of any volition. It is the intellect’s presentation to the will of some good under some description that reflects the final cause of some action.\(^\text{119}\) Thus, it is only when second-order volitions are seen as a product of intellect and will that second-volitions (and desires) can be said to represent what you choose to identify with.\(^\text{120}\)

\(^{117}\) Stump interprets this in the following way,

we should say that an individual has freedom of the will just in case he has second-order desires, his first-order volitions are not discordant with his second-order desires, and he has the first-order volitions he has because of his second-order volitions. (Stump, 1988: 401)

\(^{118}\) Stump defends this point by writing,

It will not be quite right to say that an agent is to be identified with his second-order volitions. An agent wills what he really wants and is thus free when his first-order volitions are not discordant with his second-order desires, not because the agent is simply declared to be more truly identified with his second-order than with his first-order desires, but rather because the agent’s second-order desires are the expressions of his intellect’s reflection on his will, and the agent is to be identified with his intellect….In this sense of identification, then, for an agent to identify herself with some part of herself, such as certain of her first-order desires, is for her to form a second-order volition that accepts or assents to that part of herself. On this sense of identification, it is clear that an agent may identify herself with any of her first-order desires, no matter how savage or irrational they may in fact be; and what an agent identifies herself with is clearly up to her and depends on her reason and will. But it is important to see that…this conclusion in no way undermines the hierarchical account of the self. (Stump, 1988: 407)

\(^{119}\) Stump writes,

An agent wills what he really wants and is thus free when his first-order volitions are not discordant with his second-order desires, not because the agent is simply declared to be more truly identified with his second-order than with his first-order desires, but rather because the agent’s second-order desires are the expressions of his intellect’s reflection on his will, and the agent is to be identified with his intellect.” (Stump, 1988: 408)

\(^{120}\) Stump continues,

second-order desires represent an agent’s reasoning since they stem from the reflection of an agent’s intellect on her state of will. Therefore, an agent is to be identified with her second-order desires as much as with her reasoning; her second-order desires represent what her intellect assents to (and so what she assents to) among her first-order desires. (Stump, 1988: 411)
Second-order desires are not just your desires, they are first-order desires your intellect has reflected on and has presented to your will as good to desire. They are desires you desire to desire in virtue of some affirming position your intellect takes up with respect to them.

There are two consequences to this account of free will. Firstly, it is possible that one can be morally responsible for one’s actions and yet not act with freedom of the will. In certain cases, for instance, acts of passion or of nature, one might not have time to reflect upon whether you desire to desire a certain course of action.

Secondly, it is possible for one not to produce any second-order volitions at all. If you are so internally fragmented and your second-order desires are so conflicted, you may be incapable of producing second-order volitions. Frankfurt described such an individual as a ‘wanton’. I’m not certain whether Stump would agree with this description, but she would certainly agree that a person incapable of second-order volitions was also incapable of acting with freedom of the will.121

Finally, Stump draws a distinction between ordinary freedom of the will (which occurs when any second-order volition translates to a first-order volition) and what she describes as ‘strenuous freedom of the will’.122 According to Stump, one acts with strenuous freedom of will if one has a wholehearted second-order volition. In other words, one has a second-order volition that has no conflicting second-order desires.

If second-order desires are those desires you identify with in intellect and will, and you have conflicting second-order desires, then it is the case that a part of you desires a certain action, and a part of you desires some conflicting action. If you are in such a situation, Stump suggests, you are internally fragmented and unable to wholeheartedly desire either action. No matter how weak the conflicting desire, or

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121 Stump writes, ‘If [a person] were incapable of emotion, or if she were to become apathetic through depression, it would still be possible to consider [her] a person.’ (Stump, 1988: 410)
how strong the volition is, if there are conflicting second-order desires also present, one cannot act with strenuous freedom of the will. 123

In most circumstances, there is no practical difference between acting with ordinary freedom of the will and acting with strenuous freedom of the will. However, as I shall suggest, not only is perfect peace only possible in the case of strenuous freedom of the will, so too is union with God only possible if willed strenuously.

So, in summing up, the Thomist theory of mind can be explained in the following way. A person’s mind is composed of a will and an intellect. The will is an appetite or inclination for (attributive) goodness in general; however, the will cannot apprehend what is good on its own. Apprehending something as being (referentially) ‘good for x’ is the responsibility of the intellect. Every act of will is, therefore, necessarily preceded by an act of intellect, such that the will (the ‘moved mover’) is always an efficient cause and the intellect is always the final cause. Because it is also possible for the will to move the intellect (so long as there is a preceding act of intellect), this Thomist account of the mind fits well with Harry Frankfurt’s account of the hierarchy of the will, such that there are first-order intellect-will moves, second-order intellect-will-intellect-will moves and (quite rarely) third-order intellect-will-intellect-will-intellect-will moves.

The intellect is capable of, and in fact does, apprehend numerous actions as being ‘good for x’ at any given time. The will, naturally, will incline itself toward anything apprehended by the intellect as being ‘good for x’. However, the will is not a digital on / off switch. As an appetite, the will can incline itself further towards those desires to which it is most disposed, and to act on the desire it is most disposed toward to form an effective desire (i.e., a volition). A first-order volition produces action, a second-order volition strengthens or weakens the first-order act of intellect, and a third-order volition strengthens or weakens a second-order act of intellect.

123 If one has conflicting second-order desires, and one desires to have strenuous freedom of the will, then one must form a third-order volition that somehow removes a conflicting second-order desire.
On this account, first-order desires are always apprehended by the intellect (a first-order act of intellect), but they can be involuntarily prompted by a whole series of causes external to either the intellect’s reflection on some knowledge or a second-order act of will. For instance, the intellect’s involuntary apprehension of the sensitive appetites (for Aquinas, passions) or the natural appetites can also prompt a first-order desire in the will. Second-order desires, however, cannot be involuntarily apprehended, for they represent an act of reason concerning first-order desires (namely, a second-order act of intellect). As a result, these second-order desires represent the desires with which a person would choose to identify.

Given this account of the mind, for a person to will strenuously (i.e., wholeheartedly), they must be psychologically integrated, and for that, two conditions must obtain:

1. all their second-order desires must be internally integrated around the good, and
2. all their first- and second-order volitions must align.

Regarding the first condition, as the will is an inclination for the good in general, these second-order desires cannot be integrated around evil, but can only ever be integrated around the good. Furthermore, because (so says Aquinas) goodness and being are convertible, and because God is the greatest being, and because the greatest goods for humans involve relationships, union with God is the greatest good for a person. Given the evident possibility that two good desires might conflict without some unifying reason for decisively choosing between them, and given that unifying reasons are themselves capable of being more or less good than other unifying reasons (and thereby that unifying reasons are also liable to fragmentation), a person’s mind can only ever be unchangeably integrated around a desire for their greatest good, that is, their union with God. Furthermore, on

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124 According to Frankfurt, the will is capable of integrating around evil; however, Frankfurt does not employ the same intellect / will distinction Stump uses, and so on Frankfurt’s account, the will is more than just an inclination for the good for it is also responsible for apprehending the content of its desires. See Stump (2010: 138) for further discussion.

125 For instance, a person could become internally fragmented over the ‘desire to go to Africa to save orphans’, or ‘the desire to go Asia to save orphans’, given neither one is obviously better than the other. In his commentary on Buridan’s ass F.T.C. Moore (1990), suggested that so long as there is a
Aquinas’s account, desire for union with another is an integral element of love (along with the desire for their good). Therefore, the desire for one’s greatest good (viz., union with God) is always commensurate with a desire for loving God. Finally, given that God desires to unite with all people, desiring God’s good also entails desiring that other people, (i.e., your neighbours), come to union with God. Given that this desire that your neighbours come into union with God is akin to the desire that your neighbours attain their greatest good, and given that such a desire entails love for your neighbour, a desire for union with God encapsulates love for your neighbour.

With regard to the second condition, freedom of the will is only possible when first- and second-order volitions agree (and strenuous freedom of the will when a first- and an psychologically integrated (i.e., ‘wholehearted’) second-order desire agree); however, so long as your first-order intellect, first-order will and the connection between the two are not internally manipulated by a third party, you remain morally responsible, and therefore prima facie blameworthy or praiseworthy for all first-order volitions.\textsuperscript{126} If you have an unconflicted second-order volition for union with God,\textsuperscript{127} but do not act on it, how can you be united with God? On this account, you cannot, and you are indeed blameworthy for this state of affairs.

**Love and Real Union**

So, joy emerges when one gets what one (appropriately) desires and peace emerges when one gets what one (appropriately) desires, and one is wholehearted unifying reason for action, two conflicting desires can be conflated into one desire, namely, a ‘desire to go to Africa or Asia to save orphans’, as this singular desire can satisfy the unifying desire. However, any unifying reason for action that is less good than another reason for action will always remain liable to internal fragmentation. As a result, to remain internally integrated, a person requires a unifying reason for action that is also their greatest good.\textsuperscript{126} Importantly, given that first-order desires can be involuntary, a person cannot be morally responsible for having conflicting first-order desires. A person is, however, morally responsible for their action if one of these first-order desires becomes a first-order volition.\textsuperscript{127} Stump describes such an unconflicted second-order desire as a ‘wholehearted’ desire and explains to act on such would be to act with ‘strenuous freedom of the will’ (Stump, 2010: 131). Second-order volitions can only ever strengthen or weaken a first-order desire. As a result, they do not necessarily result in first-order volitions (as a first-order might still prove stronger, or the will might just be more inclined to another first-order desire).
in this desire. In both cases, the appropriate object of desire is the desire for union with God, and it is to this desire, one of what Aquinas’s describes as the twin desires of love, that this thesis will now turn. To be clear, whilst there are, of course, many alternative accounts of love available, not only is Aquinas’s account one of the most influential in the (western) Christian tradition, I also, as with his theory of mind, happen to find it deeply plausible.

On the Thomist account, love has what Stump calls different ‘offices’.\textsuperscript{128} The love I might have for my wife is necessarily different from the love I might have for family, or friends, or humanity in general. What is appropriate in one office of love may be entirely inappropriate in another. Furthermore, as an ‘office’ is merely the function of the extrinsic relational characteristics of the lover and the beloved, so long as the different offices are clearly labelled, love has a place in all personal and group relationships.

Furthermore, love (in whatever office it is found) just is the function of two desires: the desire for the good of the beloved and the desire for union with the beloved.\textsuperscript{129} If Peter desires the good for Jack, and Peter desires union of some sort with Jack, then, Peter loves Jack. But note here that what can be shared within an office of love is contingent on the intrinsic features of the beloved – the reason Peter loves Jack is not because Peter shares that office of love with Jack. And so, both what is in fact good for the beloved, and the nature and extent of the union possible with the beloved might change with time, even if the office of love does not.

On this Thomist account, the relationship shared between a person and God falls under one such office of love. When this office of love is fulfilled, God and his beloved desire the good for each other and they desire union with each other. The fulfilment of this love in union, purportedly completed at the beatific vision, also happens to be the very best thing for a person.\textsuperscript{130}

As mentioned previously, desiring the (all things considered) good for the beloved is straightforward to understand. If union with God is the greatest good for a person,

\textsuperscript{128} Stump, 2010: 98.
\textsuperscript{129} ST II-I Q 28 A 1.
\textsuperscript{130} ST I-II Q 3 A 8.
desiring that which will lead to their union with God just is desiring the good for that person. However, understanding the other desire of love, the desire for union with the beloved, is by no means as straightforward.

Concerning such union, recall what Aquinas wrote:

The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."

The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.131

The most developed attempt to explore the nature of (Thomist) union can be found, again, in the work of Stump. She suggests union is best understood as a product of two wills each desiring union with the other, where the desire for union is outworked in a desire for personal closeness with the other (a union of minds

131 ST II-I Q 28 A 1.
built upon (i) personal need for and ii) personal revelation to the other) and a desire for significant personal presence with the other (comprised of (iii) unmediated causal and cognitive contact, (iv) some second personal encounter, and (v) joint attention).\textsuperscript{132} If significant personal presence is inhibited (due, for instance, to (literal) distance, or due to something inhibiting the possibility of joint attention, for instance, psychological or physical pain), only affective union is possible. However, if personal presence is not inhibited, then the union between persons can be real. And it is this ‘real’ union that is desired when it comes to union with God at the beatific vision.

With respect to possible inhibitors to such union, to the extent that a person is (metaphorically) distant from themselves, or from someone else, to the extent that they refrain from revealing their mind to the other, or to the extent that their mind is conflicted, and so difficult to be close to, to that extent will union between this person and the other be limited. Likewise, to the extent that a person refrains from second-person encounter or joint attention with the other, to that same extent is real union between such persons limited. On this account, then, if Peter’s desire for union with Jack is unrequited, there will be no (real) union between Peter and Jack (and the same is true for a person and God).\textsuperscript{133} Likewise, if Peter’s will is conflicted about the desire for union with Jack, to the extent that Peter’s will is conflicted, to that extent will union with Jack be limited (or indeed, impossible).\textsuperscript{134} With this in

\textsuperscript{132} Stump, 2010: 109-128. Concerning the importance of dyadic attention, Stump writes:

In my view, for mentally fully functional adult human beings, full-fledged dyadic joint attention is required for significant, as distinct from minimal, personal presence. If Jerome were to say of Paula, “She was distracted all through dinner and was never really present to me,” one of the things he would be complaining about would be Paula’s failure to share her attention with him. Conversely, if Paula was more present to her daughter Julia after she had given away her fortune than she was while she was wealthy, then Paula in her poor state would be more often or more deeply attentive to Julia, where the attentiveness in question requires shared attention of the dyadic sort. Finally, once we see that shared attention is required for personal presence, we can see why someone’s having direct and unmediated cognitive and causal connection with another person is insufficient for her being present to him... (117)

\textsuperscript{133} On Aquinas’s account, unrequited desire can lead to affective (formal) union, but I take it this is not the sort of union sought in Atonement.

\textsuperscript{134} Any desire Peter has that conflicts with his desire for union with Jack entails that part of Peter does not want to unite with Jack. So long as that desire persists, no matter what else happens, that part of Peter cannot be united with Jack.
mind, there are precisely four ways a person’s union with another, or with God, can be limited or prevented. If:

1. that person does not desire union with the other, or
2. that person has a desire that conflicts with the desire for union with the other, or
3. that person is unable to (dyadically or triadically) share attention with the other, or
4. the other person remains hidden (i.e., they refrain from revealing their mind to the other), such that another person cannot be (maximally) personally close to them.

It is part of orthodox Christian belief that sinful action necessarily entails either (1), (2) or (3) with respect to God, and that prior sin can also act as a catalyst for both (1), (2) and (3), limiting or preventing union with God, even when no sinful action is currently being undertaken. It is also part of Christian tradition that, whilst (partially) hidden now, at the beatific vision, God will be fully revealed, such that (4) no longer obtains with respect to God.

The first way is fairly easy to understand. If someone does not want union with God, they cannot be united to God. Likewise, with the second way, it is fairly easy to see how (at least conceptually) psychological fragmentation might lead to an ordinary, rather than wholehearted, second-order desire for union with God. The third way, however, requires a little more explanation.

Recall for Stump, shared or joint attention is an integral part of significant personal presence. It is therefore, in theory, possible to be wholehearted in your desire for union with another (i.e., that it be the case that (1) and (2) do not apply to you) and yet still fail to (dyadically) attend to the person you wholeheartedly desire union with (for instance, due to psychological or psychical pain, or even due to distance, say, being in a different room to them!).

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135 See, for instance, 1 John 1:5-6.
136 See, for instance, Genesis 3:8.
So, what exactly is joint attention, and why is it so important? According to Peter Hobson, joint attention involves ‘sharing an awareness of the sharing of focus’. 137 This is the sort of phenomena that happens when I know that you know that I know that you are looking at me (dyadic attention) or when I know that you know that I am focusing on the same object (triadic attention). Adam Green notes that

Shared attention occurs when one is engaged in an act of attending to something and in doing so one is consciously coordinating with another on what both will attend to. As such, shared attention involves coordinated ‘attention-focusing’. Shared attention can be dyadic or triadic. In dyadic shared attention, both participants focus attention on the other, and in triadic shared attention, both participants focus on an independent object. Take the following three-stage example of a ten-month old and its mother interacting. First, the child looks the mother in the eye. Second, the child turns and points to a bright object. Third, the child looks back at the mother to see that she has followed the direction of the point. If the mother has cooperated with the gaze-direction of the child, then the child and the mother had dyadic shared attention at stage 1, and achieved triadic shared attention at stage 2. As Ingar Brinck points out, shared attention is more than ‘mutual object-focusing’ because ‘the subjects will have to attend to each other as capable of attending in a goal-intended way, that is, in a way that is not controlled by the object of attention’. In the pointing example, the awareness of the bright object is evidenced by the point, and the mother attends to the bright object because the child manifested a desire for both persons to attend to the bright object. If the child tries to check the gaze of the mother in stage 3 only to find that the mother has silently left the room, the child’s experience of attending to the object in stage 2 will seem to have been a different experience than it initially appeared to be. The co-operation of the other in attending is a felt part of the experience itself. 138

137 Hobson, 2005: 185.
138 Green, 2009: 460.
Although dyadic attention requires two people actively attend to each other, the doctrine of divine omnipresence suggests that God is always ready to (dyadically or triadically) attend to us. Thus, whether or not we (dyadically or triadically) attend to God is squarely up to us. Stump writes again:

> Given divine omnipresence, the only thing that makes a difference to the kind of personal presence, significant or minimal, that God has to a human person is the condition of the human person herself. If Paula wants Jerome to be significantly present to her, she alone will not be able to bring about what she wants, because the relationship she wants is up to Jerome as much as it is up to her, and, for one reason or another, Jerome may fail to meet the conditions requisite for significant personal presence. But, on the doctrine of omnipresence, things are different when it comes to God's being significantly present to a human person. If Paula wants God to be significantly present to her, what is needed to bring about what she wants depends only on her, on her being able and willing to share attention with God. Because God is omnipresent, then, if Paula is able and willing to share attention with God, the presence omnipresent God has to her will be significant personal presence. If she is not able and willing, then God will have only minimal personal presence with respect to her...139

However, it is one thing for two material beings to jointly attend to each other. It is a lot harder to see how a material being might jointly attend to an immaterial being. Nevertheless, Stump writes:

> It is not surprising that Donne (and many others) point to interlocked gaze as the prime indicator and vehicle of shared attention in memorable romantic encounters. For adults as for infants, mutual gaze is a powerful mechanism for producing shared attention. Although vision is the most common or the ordinary mode of sharing attention, however, it is obviously not the only mode, since congenitally blind children can learn to share attention, too. Plainly, for mentally fully functioning adults, as well as for

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139 Stump, 2010: 118.
infants, shared attention can occur through modes of perception other than vision. In appropriate circumstances, any of the other senses can also be employed for the sharing of attention. In fact... it is even possible that one person be presently aware of another and sharing attention with that other without having perception of him. As far as that goes, whatever means God uses to achieve shared attention with human beings, on theological views of God’s presence to human beings, it presumably does not involve mutual gaze in any literal sense either. So shared attention does not require mutual gaze; but it does require mutual awareness among persons, whether or not it is awareness through a particular sensory modality.¹⁴⁰

So, if sin entails (1), (2), and (3), and (1), (2), and (3) inhibit union with God, the Christian doctrine of the Atonement must explain how (1), (2), and (3) are dealt with such that the person for whom (1), (2) and (3) previously applied can come to full and complete union with God at the beatific vision.

Whatever the explanatory mechanics, something about the Atonement makes it possible for a sinful person to both wholeheartedly desire union with God, and to engage in dyadic attention with God, and therefore make it possible for that same person to enter such union with God.

**Freely Willed Union and Grace**

The desire for, and attainment of, union with God is therefore essential to (proper) joy, peace, and love, and in as much as this is true, is also essential for maximal personal flourishing and thriving.¹⁴¹

However, it is also part of the Christian tradition that such union is the product of two wills willing in unison. If only one will is operative, that is, if God somehow forces us to desire union with Him, the sort of personal union wanted between God and us cannot obtain. Furthermore, it is part of the Christian tradition that God is

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¹⁴⁰ Stump, 2010: 118.
¹⁴¹ Union with God is, after all, on the model provided, the best thing for a person.
love, and as love, is always open to union with us, but as love, will not force us against our will to desire union with Him. Instead, God can motivate us, or encourage us, to desire union with Him. In the Christian tradition, this motivation or encouragement comes in the form of the gift first of operative and subsequently, cooperative grace. In later chapters I will show how this gift of grace might fit into an account of the Atonement, but for now, I will briefly address the nature of such grace.

Given that on the Thomist account of mind we have been discussing, a person’s will is already inclined to goodness in general, and, given that most theists (and certainly all Thomists) are committed to the belief that God is good, and that union with God is the greatest good for a person, it seems that all God needs to do to motivate a desire for Him in a person is simply to reveal, partially or fully, His goodness to them.142 If a person appropriately attends to God’s revelation of goodness, there is reason to think this person would come to desire union with God, that is, they will come to have saving faith.143

This view of the nature of operative grace has an interesting implication for the doctrine of the beatific vision. From at least the mid thirteenth century onwards, the Western Christian tradition has asserted that at the beatific vision humankind will see God in His essence, that is, that he will be fully revealed. As the greatest being, and so, the greatest good, His great goodness will be seen fully and completely. If operative and cooperative grace typically involves the partial, veiled revelation of God’s goodness, which motivates an (initially non-wholehearted)

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142 If God is good, and God is fundamentally (propositionally) ineffable, whatever it is that goodness refers to must be in some sense fundamentally (propositionally) ineffable, that is, goodness is therefore propositionally undefinable, too. See the next section for more on this point.
143 For an account of saving faith as a second-order desire for union with God, see Efird and Worsley 2015. Although, of course, such a revelation might come through a divine encounter, or through reading divine revelation, such a revelation of divine goodness need not require an instance of special divine action. According to the Apostle Paul in Romans 1:19-20, God placed evidence of His divine nature, that is to say, His goodness, into His creation at the point of creation, and that this revelation can still be seen. He writes,

For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without excuse.
desire for union with God, it is very possible that the full revelation of God’s goodness will lead to the beholder’s wholehearted desire for union with God (thereby seemingly rendering moot the first, second and fourth ways in which union with God could be thwarted).  

Divine Ineffability and the Beatific Vision

But why think we will see God fully and completely? The Eastern Church, which has adopted the apophatic belief in divine ineffability, has long rejected this belief, opting instead for a vision of God’s energies (i.e., the activity of God), rather than God’s essence. According to the doctrine of divine ineffability, God is, broadly speaking, beyond description and comprehension. The belief in this doctrine is one of the hallmarks of apophatic theology, a system of negative theology endorsed during the Synod of Side in 383, reaffirmed, at least in the Eastern Church, at the Fifth Council of Constantinople between 1341 and 1351 (the ‘Hesychast’ or ‘Palamite’ councils), and common to most major Church theologians during the early years of the Church.

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144 In a paper published in the Journal of Analytic Theology I develop this argument further, suggesting that this vision of the divine essence is the basis for heavenly impeccability, and also, coupled with the necessity of two-willed union, the reason why God could not reveal Himself fully and completely today. See Worsley (2016) for more details.

145 Commonly referred to as the Messalian (or Euchite) Condemnation (the Messalians thought that God could be perceived through the carnal senses, a thought formally rejected at the Synod of Side).

146 For a fuller defence of this claim, see John Hick, 2000: 36. This view was adopted by Western Fathers, including St. Ambrose (c. 340-397), St. Jerome (c. 347-420), Primasius (d. 560) and Isidore of Seville (c. 560-636). Amongst the Greek Fathers only Origen (c. 183/4-253/4), St. Gregory Nazianzus (329-390), the ascetic mystic Evagrius of Ponticus (c. 345 - 399) and St. Cyril of Alexandria (c. 378-444) argued that a person could know God as He is at the vision of God. However, after the Messalian (or Euchite) condemnation of 383, condemning, amongst other beliefs, the belief that the essence (or ousia) of the Trinity could be perceived by the carnal senses, St. John Chrysostom (c. 349 - 407), St. Basil (c. 330-379), St. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-394), Theodoret of Cyrhus (c. 393-457) and many others argued for the unknowable nature of the essence of God. What was eventually settled upon, at least in the Eastern Church, was a position initially described by St. Basil and St Gregory of Nyssa, before being developed by Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite in the 5th and 6th centuries and further codified by Maximus the Confessor (c. 580 - 662), St. John Damascene (c. 676-749) and St. Gregory Palamas (c. 1296-1359); namely, the distinction between God’s supposedly unknowable essence (his ousia), and his knowable energies (attributes and actions). Although the Western Church took adopting this position to come at the cost of rejecting a robust account of divine simplicity, this position, that the essence of God cannot ever be the object knowledge or vision, was confirmed at the Fifth Council of Constantinople between 1341 and 1351 (and then again in 1368).
So, for example, one of the most influential apophatic theologians, the fifth century Neo-Platonist Pseudo-Dionysius, referred to God (‘the Transcendent One’) in the following way:

It is not soul or mind, nor does it possess imagination, conviction, speech, or understanding. It cannot be spoken of and it cannot be grasped by understanding. It has no power, it is not power, nor is it light. It does not live nor is it life. It is not a substance, nor is it eternity or time. It is neither one nor oneness, divinity nor goodness. It is not sonship or fatherhood and it is nothing known to us or to any other being. It falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of being. There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it. It is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it... for it is ... free of every limitation, beyond every limitation: it is also beyond denial.\textsuperscript{147}

And on the same theme, the fourth-century theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, wrote in his \textit{Against Eunomius},

The simplicity of the True Faith assumes God to be that which He is, namely, incapable of being grasped by any term, or any idea, or any other device of our apprehension, remaining beyond the reach not only of the human but of the angelic and all supramundane intelligence, unthinkable, unutterable,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item To believe that one could know the essence of God at the beatific vision was, in the East, to hold to what had now became known as the Messalianist heresy.
\item On this point, St. Damascene would write:

Neither men, nor the celestial powers, nor the cherubim and the seraphim can know God other than in his revelations. By nature he is above being and therefore above knowledge. We can only designate his nature apophatically, by negations. What we say of God affirmatively does not indicate his nature, but his attributes - that which is near to his nature. (Lossky, 1971: 112)

Whilst St. Gregory Palamas wrote:

The divine nature must be called at the same time incommunicable and, in a sense, communicable; we attain participation in the nature of God and yet he remains totally inaccessible. We must affirm both things at once and must preserve the antimony as the criterion of piety...while saying that the divine nature is communicable not in itself but in its energies, we remain within the limits of piety.’ (\textit{Theophanes}, PG. 150, col. 932D & 937D)
\end{enumerate}
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\textsuperscript{147} Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987: 141.
above all expression in words, having but one name that can represent His proper nature, the single name being 'Above Every Name'.

Drawing upon 1 Timothy 6:16 (‘God dwells in unapproachable light, whom no one has ever seen or can see’), St. Didymus the Blind (another fourth century theologian) wrote that God’s essence (ousia) is:

invisible, incomprehensible even in the eyes of the seraphim, not to be contained either in a thought or a place, in no way divided in its powers, intangible, without dimensions, without depth, without amplitude, without form... far surpassing in brilliance the whole light of the heavens, how much more sublime than all that is on high, infinitely passing also all spirit by its spiritual nature.

Whilst a further fourth-century theologian, St. Hilary of Poitiers, wrote:

This a true statement of the mystery of that unfathomable nature which is expressed in the Name ‘Father’: God invisible, ineffable, infinite. Let us confess our silence that words cannot describe him, let sense admit that it is foiled in the attempt to apprehend, and reason in the effort to define.

And according to the fifth century liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, God is

ineffable, inconceivable, invisible, incomprehensible, ever existing and eternally the same, thou and thine Only-begotten Son and thy Holy Spirit.

Moreover, Augustine wrote that ‘God transcends the mind’ whilst Aquinas noted that ‘by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches. Thus, we are unable to apprehend it by knowing what it is’. Indeed, it is supposed that prior to either writing or preaching, Aquinas would recite a prayer that began with the line ‘O creator ineffable...’ And, of course, this brief survey barely scratches the surface of the support this position has received.

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149 St Hilary, De Trin. 2.6.
150 St Augustine, 1953: 259.
152 See, for instance, Ayers, 2004 on the place of divine incomprehension in Orthodox tradition.
However, despite such protestations, according to the doctrine of the beatific vision, a doctrine also accepted by many (but not all) of these same apophatic theologians, we will, as already alluded to, one day know God as God knows us.

Contra to the position taken by the previously quoted Church fathers, Eunomius of Cyzicus, writing in the fourth century, argued for the full comprehensibility of God’s essence (ousia) by the human intellect during this vision (although it must be noted this was a position he was soon after condemned for holding). According to Eunomius, God’s simplicity ruled out partial knowledge of him. Either he can be known fully, or not at all. Commenting on Eunomius the sixteenth-century Jesuit scholar, Gabriel Vasquez, wrote:

Eunomius was after all not mad in maintaining that the idea he could have of God was equal to the idea and knowledge God has of Himself. The equality of knowledge which he upheld as opposed to the Fathers was related solely to the object of this knowledge. He meant that the whole formal content of the divine nature, since it formed the object of divine knowledge, could also be seen by himself, Eunomius. But this must necessarily be conceded to the blessed who see God as He is, for all that is in God formally is God, being identical with his essence; therefore nothing that is in God and forms the object of His knowledge can remain hidden to the blessed.\(^{153}\)

Fast-forwarding to a few centuries after the Schism of 1054, talk about the nature of the beatific vision (at least in the Western Church) was once again brought into sharp focus when, in 1223, Alexander of Hales adopted Peter Lombard’s Sentences (written between 1155 and 1158) as the basic textbook for theological teaching at the University of Paris.\(^{154}\) For the next three centuries, Lombard’s compilation of material from the Church Fathers remained there, and in Oxford, the standard theological textbook. And, as Lombard began his Sentences with a discussion of

\(^{153}\) Vasquez, 1621: 195
\(^{154}\) Alexander was not alone in doing this; the Dominican Richard Fishacre soon did the same at Oxford.
Augustine’s account of beatific enjoyment,\textsuperscript{155} theological reflection on the beatific vision blossomed.\textsuperscript{156}

Indeed, by 1241, less than 20 years after Lombard’s book had been adopted in Paris, the view that the divine essence could not be seen was, at least amongst the Western Churches, decisively condemned. The first of ten propositions in what became known as the Parisian Condemnation of 1241 read:

This first [error] is, that the divine essence itself will not be seen by either a man or an angel. We condemn and we excommunicate those who assert or defend it by authority of William, the Bishop. We firmly believe and assert that God in His essence or substance will be seen by angels and all the saints, and it is seen now by all glorified souls.\textsuperscript{157}

Indeed, by the mid-fourteenth century, around the same time as the Palamite Councils of Constantinople (1341-1351), the same councils in which the Eastern Church condemned all those that believe that one could know the essence of God at the beatific vision as Messalianist heretics, the Western Church had settled upon the seemingly opposite position. In 1336 the Western Pope Benedict XII wrote:

after the passion and death of our Lord Jesus Christ, they (the elect) will see and do see the divine essence (\textit{ousia}) in an intuitive and face to face vision, without any created intermediary which would interpose itself as an object of vision, the divine essence appearing to them immediately, without a veil,

\textsuperscript{155} Augustine famously starts his \textit{On Christian Doctrine} with a distinction between use (\textit{uti}) and enjoyment (\textit{frui}), where he argues that beatific enjoyment, that is, the beatific vision, is the only proper object of enjoyment.

\textsuperscript{156} Kitanov writes:

Once the Sentences themselves became the theologian’s proper object of study, the topics and problems addressed in them became the theologian’s main concern. The topic of beatific enjoyment, in particular, since it was one of the first topics of examination in Lombard’s Sentences and was closely related to the question of the status of theology as an academic and scientific discipline, became the focus of vigorous dialectical investigation and the source of one of the greatest and most enduring debates in medieval scholastic theology. (Kitanov, 2014: 16)

\textsuperscript{157} In a complete reversal of an earlier view attributed to them both, Guerric of St. Quentin (Albert the Great’s master at the University of Paris) and Alexander of Hales both helped write the condemnation.
clearly and openly; so that in this vision they might enjoy the divine essence itself.\textsuperscript{158}

Amid this theological milieu, Aquinas, a later regent master in Theology at the University of Paris, and the same scholar who, before writing or preaching would recite his \textit{Creator Ineffabilis} prayer, wrote the following concerning the knowledge we have of God at the beatific vision:

...final and perfect beatitude can consist in nothing else than the vision of the divine essence. To make this clear, two things must be considered. First, man is not perfectly happy so long as something remains for him to desire and seek. Secondly, the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. The object of the intellect is ‘what a thing is,’ i.e. the essence of a thing, as is stated in \textit{De anima}, book 3 (ch. 6). It follows that the intellect attains perfection, insofar as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause ‘what it is’; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge that the cause exists. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, ‘what it is.’ And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the \textit{Metaphysics} (1.2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, considers that it must be due to some cause, and yet not know what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrives at knowledge of the essence of the cause. If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than ‘that He is’; the perfection of his intellect has not yet directly \textit{[simpliciter]} attained the First Cause, and so the natural desire to seek the cause still remains for him. On account of which he is not yet perfectly happy.

\textsuperscript{158} Lossky, 1971.
Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to attain to the very essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists.\textsuperscript{159}

Following this same line of reasoning, Aquinas wrote in his \textit{Summa Contra Gentiles}:

No desire leads so high as the desire to understand the truth. For all our other desires, whether of delight or anything else that is desired by man, can come to rest in other things. However, the afore-mentioned desire does not come to rest until it reaches God, the supreme foundation and maker of all things. For this reason Wisdom aptly says: “I dwelt in high places, and my throne was in a pillar of cloud” (Sir 24:4). And in Prov 9:3 it is said that “She has sent out her maids to call from the highest places in the town.” Let them therefore be ashamed who seek the beatitude of man, so highly situated, in base things.\textsuperscript{160}

And finally, drawing from Augustine, Aquinas (or his redactor) concluded the supplement to his \textit{Summa Theologica} with the following:

Now all knowledge by which the created intellect is perfected is directed to the knowledge of God as its end. Wherefore he who sees God in His essence, even though he know nothing else, would have a perfect intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect through knowing something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees Him more fully. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v.): "Unhappy is he who knoweth all these" (namely, creatures), "and knoweth not Thee: but happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them but for Thee only."\textsuperscript{161}

In essence, Aquinas thought God invested humans with a natural ability to seek an explanation for the things they perceive, which, when followed through, inevitably leads them to inquire about the First Cause, namely, God. If this desire for full

\textsuperscript{159} ST I-II Q 3 A 8.
\textsuperscript{160} SCG Book 3 Chapter 50.
\textsuperscript{161} ST Suppl. Q 92 A 3.
knowledge of the First Cause was incapable of fulfilment, God would have created humans with a natural desire that could never be met – and this is something (Aquinas thought) a good God would not do.

However, despite this *prima facie* tension, I think the apophaticist *can* reconcile the doctrine of divine ineffability with the doctrine of the beatific vision, and do so, I think, without needing to abandon divine simplicity, but only if the doctrine of divine ineffability is qualified in a certain way. A qualification that based on the distinction between what we referred to in the introduction as ‘Franciscan knowledge’ and ‘Dominican knowledge’.

It is easy enough to say roughly what it is to be ineffable, namely, to be ineffable is to be beyond description, or beyond human concepts. However, saying precisely what it is to be ineffable is notoriously difficult, since even in saying that something is beyond human concepts we have described it and applied a human concept to it. This insight is, of course, not new. As we have already seen, Augustine, for instance, made this point in *On Christian Doctrine*, writing:

> God should not be said to be ineffable, for when this is said something is said. And a contradiction in terms is created, since if that is ineffable which cannot be spoken, then that is not ineffable which is called ineffable.

Nevertheless, by employing this distinction between Dominican knowledge and Franciscan knowledge, I will tentatively propose two different ways in which we can think about what it is to be ineffable.

If we recall that according to Stump, Dominican knowledge is propositional knowledge, that is, knowledge-*that*. Franciscan knowledge, on the other hand, is neither propositional knowledge nor is reducible to propositional knowledge.

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162 DDC Book 1, Chapter 6.
164 As a terminological aside, I am unsure why Stump does not use the available category of ‘connatural’ knowledge in her discussion here, as it seems that connatural knowledge does almost all the work Franciscan knowledge is supposed to do. See, for instance, Aquinas in ST II-II, Q 45 A 2. See also Maritain 1951, Suto 2004, and White 1944. In addition, it seems to me as though Franciscan knowledge can help explain the phenomena of ideasthesia, the idea that concepts can somehow be sensed or perceived. See, for instance, Nikolic (2009).
Such knowledge might include knowledge gained from phenomenal experience and from experience of persons, or so she suggests.\textsuperscript{165} This much is easy to say. However, in virtue of the irreducibility of Franciscan knowledge to Dominican knowledge, finding a way to \textit{illustrate} the differences between each kind of knowledge is challenging, since, while Dominican knowledge can be expressed propositionally, for example, Donald Trump knows that Barack Obama was his predecessor, Franciscan knowledge cannot be expressed propositionally – that is the very point of Franciscan knowledge. Stump explains this thought in the following way:

\begin{quote}
I want to claim [she writes] that there is a kind of knowledge of persons, a Franciscan knowledge, which is non-propositional and which is not reducible to knowledge that. What could that possibly be?, a skeptical objector may ask. But, of course, if I give an answer to the skeptic's question, I will have an incoherent position: in answering the question, I will be presenting in terms of knowledge that what I am claiming could not be presented that way.\textsuperscript{166}
\end{quote}

But although she cannot answer the sceptical objectors question, she \textit{can} present some thought experiments in which Franciscan knowledge is manifested – she can show the distinction, but she cannot describe it, in other words.

To begin, phenomenal knowledge, according to Stump, falls under an aspect of Franciscan knowledge. She illustrates this with Frank Jackson’s (in)famous thought experiment about Mary, the super smart colour scientist:

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us

\textsuperscript{165} Stump distinguishes ‘knowledge-of-persons’ from the ‘knowledge-how’ ability hypothesis that Laurence Nemirow (1990), David Lewis (2004) and Paul Churchill (1989) discuss. The knowledge-how ability hypothesis suggests that experience gives us an ability and nothing more; an ability to remember, imagine or recognize what it is like to have that experience. There is no new knowledge gained at all in this process. The position that Stump takes up, then, is closer to Earl Conee’s ‘acquaintance’ hypothesis (1994). For Conee, there is no new propositional knowledge gained by experience, but there is something gained beyond mere know-how, namely, acquaintance with the thing known.

\textsuperscript{166} Stump, 2010: 52.
suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'...

What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false.167

What is important for Stump’s purposes is that, controversially, Mary’s epistemic position is improved on her departure from her black and white room, when she sees colour for the first time. Either she learns something new or she learns something old in a new way.168 And this improvement in her epistemic position is the Franciscan knowledge she gains by experiencing colour for the first time, this phenomenal knowledge she now has.

Modifying Jackson’s thought experiment, as already noted in the introduction, Stump asks us to imagine another Mary who has been locked in a room since birth. Whilst Mary has with her encyclopaedias containing every piece of non-narrative propositional information about her mother, she has neither shared a second-

167 Jackson, 1982: 130.
168 On Paul Churchland’s view, Mary merely learns something old in a new way (Churchland, 1985). In other words, Churchland would want to say that Franciscan knowledge (the something new) is in some sense captured by what was previously known, namely, pertinent propositional knowledge (the something old). Churchland writes, for instance,

the difference between a person who knows all about the visual cortex but has never enjoyed a sensation of red, and a person who knows no neuroscience but knows well the sensation of red, may reside not in what is respectively known by each (brain states by the former, qualia by the latter), but rather in the different type of knowledge each has of exactly the same thing. The difference is in the manner of the knowing, not in the nature(s) of the thing known. (Churchland, 1989: 24)
personal encounter with her, nor accessed any narrative account of her mother. Stump writes:

When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that Mary will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about her mother that could be made available to her in non-narrative propositional form, including her mother’s psychological states. Although Mary knew that her mother loved her before she met her, when she is united with her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. And this will be new for her, even if in her isolated state she had as complete a scientific description as possible of what a human being feels like when she senses that she is loved by someone else.\textsuperscript{169}

Just as the super smart colour scientist Mary’s epistemic position is improved upon leaving her black and white room, so is the daughter Mary’s epistemic position improved upon leaving her lonely room: either daughter Mary learns something new or she learns something old in a new way upon meeting her mother. With these thought experiments in hand, we have a way of showing what Franciscan knowledge is, even if we cannot describe it. Now, on my view, this kind of knowledge, and its distinction from Dominican knowledge, is crucial for understanding the doctrine of divine ineffability and how it can be held consistently with the doctrine of the beatific vision. To show this, I turn to explaining the nature of divine ineffability using this distinction.

If Franciscan knowledge is indeed by its very nature beyond description, and if, roughly speaking, to be ineffable is to be beyond description, all Franciscan knowledge must be in some sense ineffable. Let us call this sort of ineffability ‘propositional ineffability’ – the impossibility of capturing something through propositional description. Divine ineffability, where ‘ineffability’ is understood as ‘propositional ineffability’, seems fairly straightforward. If knowledge of other persons can be propositionally ineffable, (in Stump’s modified thought experiment, the knowledge Mary gains as she learns what it is like for her mother to love her

\textsuperscript{169} Stump, 2010: 52.
would be propositionally ineffable), it is easy to see how God, too, could be, in some comparable sense, propositionally ineffable (we can simply replace Mary’s mother with God in Stump’s modified thought experiment).\(^{170}\)

Now, there is one important difference between knowledge of God and knowledge of persons. On Stump’s thought experiment of daughter Mary, Franciscan knowledge could lie in her learning something old in a new way. But, for the apophaticist, that is simply not possible for our knowledge of God. It cannot be the case that what we learn of God at the beatific vision is something old in a new way, for if the doctrine of divine ineffability is correct, there is a sense in which we can know nothing old (i.e., nothing fundamental that is reducible to propositional form) about God.\(^{171}\) And this usefulness, I think, gives us one reason to at least pay serious consideration to Stump’s account.\(^{172}\)

But at this point a putative objector might respond: surely divine ineffability is all or nothing, at least with respect to propositions. It is not just that there are aspects of God that are propositionally ineffable. If the doctrine of divine ineffability is true, unlike Mary’s mother, God is (at the very least) entirely propositionally ineffable. And yet, surely we do want to attribute to God certain propositional claims. Does divine ineffability require that we jettison propositional beliefs such as ‘God is good’ or ‘God is three in hypostasis, one in ousia’? Jonathan Jacobs tackled this objection in a recent paper, arguing that these beliefs need not in fact be jettisoned. Indeed, Jacobs argued, we can, without contradiction, believe that it is literally, mind-independently true that God is good, and at the same time believe that it is true...

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\(^{170}\) Given this, it is only a matter of degree that separates total propositional ineffability (supposed in God) from partial propositional ineffability (in you or me). One could, for instance, imagine a world where some (and perhaps all) propositionally effable knowledge of some person is subtracted.

\(^{171}\) In this case, it might be true in one sense that Mary knows all propositionally reducible knowledge of God whilst in confinement, it just so happens there is no (fundamental) propositional knowledge of God to be had. Of course, Stump has a story about how Franciscan knowledge can be transferred through testimony, and through narrative, so Stump requires the qualification that all information she has be in non-narrative propositional form. Were Mary to have access to narrative, for instance, biblical narrative, she might possess certain limited (or ‘dim’, as certain older translations of 1 Corinthians 13:12 read) Franciscan knowledge of God, but that this is possible serves only to reinforce the argument we are presenting.

\(^{172}\) For a further defence of Stump’s position, see Wolterstorff (2016). Note that Wolterstorff describes ‘Franciscan’ knowledge as ‘object-knowledge’, and he too distinguishes ‘object-knowledge’ from ‘know-how’.
that God is ineffable. How can this be so? Well, a proposition, he argued, can be fundamentally true (actually carving reality at its joints) or non-fundamentally true (representing an artificial or gerrymandered structure of reality). On Jacobs’s view, any positive claims we might make about God can only ever be non-fundamentally true.

Jacobs, following Sider, thinks all truths have two elements, a truth-bearer and a truth-maker. A truth-bearer represents supposed metaphysical structure, whilst a truth-maker is the feature(s) of reality that make the truth bearer correct. Truths thus consist in the relationship between these two elements. Having said this much, Jacobs suggests that truth-bearers can be made true in more than one way. If a truth-bearer actually does ‘carve reality at its joints’ it is a fundamental truth-bearer. If it proposes an artificial or gerrymandered structure on reality (if it is ‘ontologically imperspicuous’) it is a non-fundamental truth-bearer. So, for instance, when we describe God in propositional terms, Jacobs concludes, all our descriptions are grounded in God (as an object), but they also all fall into the latter category. With this in mind he writes:

We can, using non-fundamental propositions, describe God correctly. We can say lots of true things about how God is intrinsically. He is wise, loving. He is three in hypostasis, one in ousia. Such propositions need not be metaphorical. They can be strictly, literally true. And they can be importantly true. We can know them, and understand them. Some may be more fundamental than others, but God is ineffable because no matter what we say truly, we have failed to assert a perfectly fundamental truth. God is non-fundamentally effable, and fundamentally ineffable.\(^{173}\)

Having said this much, might Jacob’s solution resolve our initial tension between divine ineffability and the beatific vision? Could this artificial or gerrymandered propositional knowledge of God be sufficient for the sort of knowledge wanted at the beatific vision? There is at least one good reason to think not. Recall that at the beatific vision, it seems that the Apostle Paul teaches that we will come to know

God as God knows us. Whilst it might seem plausibly the case that we can only come to artificial or gerrymandered knowledge of God, it seems very strange indeed to say that God’s knowledge of us, His creation, is only artificial or gerrymandered, however these terms are to be understood. But if God’s knowledge of us captures fundamental truths about us, whilst our knowledge of God captures only non-fundamental truths about Him, I do not see how it could be the case that we would know God as God knows us.\footnote{One might quibble that I am putting too much weight on one verse; however, I also feel the force of Aquinas’ argument here as well (see SCG Book 3 Chapter 50). Could our desire to know the essence of God, our cause, be satisfied with only non-fundamental truths about him? I am not sure it would.}

However, even if we can sensibly talk about God being (non-fundamentally) propositionally ineffable, there is another sort of ineffability, reserved for those who do not (or cannot) make themselves open to any sort of second-personal interaction. For want of a better expression, I will call this ‘personal ineffability’.\footnote{Note that I recognise this personal effability sounds quite strange, given that what is personally effable cannot be communicated propositionally; however, we take it to be that what is personally effable can still be communicated, albeit communicated non-propositionally.}

Could God be personally ineffable? Simply put, to qualify for personal ineffability God would have to refrain from making himself open to any second-personal experience (or more strongly, that God’s creation would be necessarily incapable of second-personal experience of God). Furthermore, God would have to refrain from any revelation of Himself through narrative (or again more strongly, that it is impossible for God to reveal Himself through narrative), for, Stump argues, Franciscan knowledge can be conveyed through narrative as it can through unmediated second-personal experience.\footnote{Stump makes clear to qualify in her recasting of the Mary thought experiment that it is for this reason, that is, that Franciscan knowledge can be transmitted through narrative, it is essential all previous information Mary has of her mother is presented in non-narrative propositional form.}

With respect to the divine, in both propositional and personal ineffability, ineffability involves propositional (or ‘Dominican’) ineffability.\footnote{There is, of course, a third option: where something is effable in a Dominican sense but ineffable in a Franciscan sense (this might apply, for instance, in the case of an atom or quark); however, it is difficult to see how propositional effability could ever sensibly cohere with the doctrine of divine ineffability, so we mention this only to leave it to one side.} The difference between them is that in the case of propositional ineffability, what it is to be
ineffable does not include ‘Franciscan’ ineffability, whilst in the case of personal ineffability, it does.

So, I have proposed two kinds of ineffability. Certainly, there is nothing logically preventing God from being both propositionally and personally ineffable. However, if God was indeed personally ineffable, it seems difficult to see how we could come to know God as God knows us (or at least, without suggesting that God does not know us very well), and so the doctrine of the beatific vision would remain in tension with the doctrine of divine ineffability.

Preserving the doctrine of the beatific vision certainly seems like a good reason to favour propositional ineffability over personal ineffability; however, is this reason alone sufficient to defend the idea that God is in fact personally effable? Perhaps, but it need not do all the work. To the doctrine of divine ineffability may be added the doctrine of divine revelation, that is, the doctrine that through creation, the incarnation and through scripture, God has in fact revealed something of Himself to humankind. If Franciscan knowledge can be transmitted through second-personal experience and narrative as Stump maintains, and if God has indeed revealed something, indeed anything, of Himself in a creation we can experience, through second-personal interaction in the incarnation, or through the narratives in scripture, it looks like God cannot be personally ineffable. The cost of defending personal ineffability is seemingly, therefore, that both the doctrine of the beatific vision and the doctrine of divine revelation are false – and this is, to my mind, a substantial enough cost to justify associating divine ineffability with mere propositional ineffability alone.

178 See John 14:9: ‘Jesus answered: “Don’t you know me, Philip, even after I have been among you such a long time? Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father…”’ Note that if the doctrine of divine ineffability is true, it may be the case that all such revelation is Franciscan in character. In the case of the incarnation, one might have to concede that all pieces of seemingly Dominican knowledge we have of Christ pertain to his human and not his divine nature. What such a concession entails, or whether this concession even makes sense, is beyond the scope of this paper.

179 Adding to doctrine of the beatific vision and the doctrine of divine revelation, are the testimonies of those who claim to know God (even if the knowledge is presently ‘dim’). If divine ineffability entailed personal ineffability, such people could not, in fact, know God, and would therefore be mistaken in their claims.

180 I recognise that this is not a particularly strong argument; however, I cannot see any other way around this. As I see it, given the seeming logical possibility of each, arbitration between these two
If we say that God is (fundamentally) propositionally ineffable but personally effable, God remains both beyond (fundamental) description and beyond (fundamental) human concepts, in that knowledge of him can never be fully comprehended by or captured in (fundamental) descriptions or concepts, and in this way, the doctrine of divine ineffability can be upheld (and, if Jacobs is correct, this remains true even if we can speak truthfully of God in non-fundamental ways). Nevertheless, through some sort of intense second-personal experience at the beatific vision, God can still be personally known, fully and completely, just as we are taught in the doctrine of the beatific vision. To see how this might be the case, recall Stump’s previously mentioned Mary thought experiment. When it comes to Mary’s knowledge of her mother, both Franciscan and Dominican knowledge ally together. However, both kinds of knowledge are not simultaneously required for Mary to have some knowledge of her mother. We can see that this is the case as prior to meeting her, I take it that Mary had only Dominican knowledge of her mother. But Mary’s knowledge need not be limited to Dominican/Franciscan or Dominican only. Nothing in this thought experiment requires that Mary has access to every piece of Dominican knowledge about her mother. And, if the thought experiment still works (albeit without some of its rhetorical force) if one of Mary’s encyclopedias was missing a few pages, it can also work if we subtract from Mary’s room all of Mary’s encyclopedias. Mary now has no Dominican knowledge of her mother. If we substitute Mary’s mother for a (fundamentally) propositionally ineffable God, and have this (fundamentally) propositionally ineffable God somehow reveal Himself to Mary, we might say that Mary now knows God, but her knowledge is purely Franciscan. And so, if this limited conception of divine

positions comes down to which position incurs the greatest cost, where the cost is measured in terms of accepted doctrines one must sacrifice, and the route we are defending sees us sacrifice the fewest accepted doctrines.

181 See Worsley (2016) for one way in which to view the form such intense second-personal experience might take. Somewhat analogously, this second-person experience would be a more intense version of Mary’s initial meeting with her mother in Stump’s earlier described thought experiment.

182 Besides, perhaps, a vague inkling that her existence was probably caused by something.

183 Of course, Mary may have an inkling that God caused her to be, and so she might come to have some (non-fundamental) propositional knowledge of God before the fact, but we could also imagine that she is completely ignorant of this fact. One does wonder what sort of experience she would have of God in this case, the sort of experience that left her (at least to begin with) with no
ineffability is accepted, the doctrines of divine ineffability and of the beatific vision can be both simultaneously upheld and indeed therefore reconciled by the apophatic theologian.

If what I have argued about how to interpret divine ineffability is correct, then even in the beatific vision God remains ineffable, in that, our full and complete knowledge of Him will not be stateable propositionally. But that is no great objection to the (merely propositional) view of divine ineffability I am proposing, since (i) it is part of the beauty of our richest and most intimate relationships that they go beyond what we can say in words, and (ii) just as God remains ineffable in the beatific vision, so do we, since even God cannot fundamentally capture what it is to know us propositionally. Thus, on this view of ineffability, persons are, in some sense, perhaps, essentially ineffable, both God and us. ‘There are then’, Stump suggests,

more things in heaven and earth than are captured by analytic philosophy. The knowledge of persons conveyed to us through our own second-person experiences and narratives about such experiences can, however, help us to apprehend them. There is a story told about Aquinas that seems to me just right here. Aquinas is the quintessential Dominican, in the literal as well as the typological sense, and he was one of the greatest philosophers and theologians in the Western tradition. But after a religious vision he quit writing. He said that, by comparison with what he had seen of God, the theories and arguments in his work were nothing but straw. This Dominican is contrasting (typologically understood) Dominican and Franciscan kinds of knowledge and decidedly privileging the Franciscan as regards the deity.

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184 This raises an interesting question: if a fundamental truth ‘carves nature at its joints’, and if all propositional truths about God do not (being instead ‘ontologically imperspicuous’, see Jacobs 2015), how are we to think about the ‘natural’ joints at which fundamental propositionless personal knowledge of God carve? Do such joints exist? If they do, what must they be like? And if they do not, can this position escape the label of theological anti-realism?

185 Stump, 2010: 61.
The Requirements for Union with God

In this chapter, I have suggested that the attainment of (theologically appropriate) joy, peace, and love all require a person to have a desire for union with God, that this desire be wholehearted, and that this desire be fulfilled. I then suggested that, given the Thomist account of mind, all three can be satisfied at the beatific vision, when a person sees God face to face, and God’s full goodness is revealed to them. As I see it, and as I shall argue in the following chapter, the Atonement makes this union possible by enabling a person to behold the beatific vision.

However, I have also suggested that any union with God must be freely willed if real union is indeed to obtain. Given what I have suggested about the relationship between the revelation of God’s goodness and operative grace, assuming the Thomist account of mind I have been using, should God reveal His full goodness to someone who is either neutral to the idea, or does not want union with Him, all things being equal, they will inevitably come to desire union with Him. But this sort of inevitable union cannot be freely willed, and so cannot be the sort looked for by a loving God. God revealing His full goodness to a person who is either neutral or resistant to union with Him is in many ways analogous to a person creating a robot that will say ‘I love you’ if a certain pre-programmed button is pushed. If that button is pushed, the robot will say ‘I love you’, but clearly the robot has had no choice in the matter. Even if this robot was complex enough that it could mimic the sort of things a person who is in love does, given that these things are done at the push of a preprogrammed button, whatever relationship subsequently ensues cannot be a serious relationship.

As a result, in order for the beholder to see God fact to face and come out with the sort of union that can be taken seriously, they must at the very least first freely form an effective higher-order desire for union with God. Although to be united with Him, this desire must be wholehearted, I have suggested that seeing God’s essence, that is, his full goodness, may be sufficient to change an ordinary desire for
union with God into a wholehearted desire for union with Him, and do so whilst preserving the free will of the beholder.

So, one requirement for union with God involves having an ordinary effective higher-order desire for such union, with the thought that this ordinary desire will become wholehearted when one sees God’s unveiled goodness.

However, as mentioned, we can unpack this desire for union a little further. On the Thomist account of union, union requires both significant personal presence and also personal closeness with the other. When it comes to significant personal presence, in addition to freely desiring union with God, a person must be able to dyadically share attention with God. Likewise, when it comes to personal closeness, a person must be able to reveal who they are to God, and to do this, they cannot be psychologically fragmented. For if God is to unite with them, and they are psychologically fragmented, with what or with whom would God be uniting?

In the next chapter, I will look at possible inhibitors to union with God, and therefore inhibitors that any account of the Atonement must overcome. Specifically, I will focus on those things that:

1. prevent freely willed desire for union with God (namely, the consequence of original sin; a disordered mind whereby one comes to prefer one’s own power and pleasure to the greater good of union with God), and
2. prevent shared attention with God (namely, those things that cause sufficient psychological or psychical pain, that might prevent a person from sharing attention with God, such as the self-reflexive reactive attitudes of guilt and shame).

In chapter three, I will address ways in which each of these inhibitors might be dealt with through a general account of atonement, before, in chapter five, developing one way in which Christ’s life, passion, death and resurrection might be used to remove these inhibitors.
Chapter 2

Separation: God and Humanity

In the previous chapter, I suggested that real union with God was both the end-point of the Christian faith, and the focus of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement. Furthermore, I suggested that as beholding the beatific vision was necessary for the greatest real union with God, and so, necessary for achieving joy and peace, that is, for the blessed life, the Christian doctrine of the Atonement must also focus on making possible a person’s beholding of the beatific vision.

In this chapter, I will explore what I take to be the inhibitors to union with God (and specifically, inhibitors to beholding the beatific vision) that any account of the Atonement must therefore address. These will include the following:

1. an unwillingness to behold the vision (connected to the doctrine of original sin),
2. an inability to wholeheartedly will to behold the vision (caused by psychological fragmentation), and
3. an inability to behold the vision at all (caused by an inability to dyadically share attention with God).

Once again, I will be calling upon both scripture and tradition in addition to reason in isolating and examining these inhibitors. I will look first at the nature of psychological fragmentation and its connection with sin, particularly both primal and original sin. I will then look at how reflection on past sin can promote self-reflexive attitudes that can both prevent dyadic attention and serve as a source of psychological fragmentation. I will conclude by suggesting that each of the inhibitors mentioned at the end of the previous chapter do in fact prevent union with God. In the following chapters, I will address how each of these inhibitors might be dealt with.
Psychological Fragmentation and Sin: Primal and Original

In the previous chapter I suggested psychological integration was necessary for union with God. I suggested this was the case because for God to unite with you, you must be psychologically integrated, for if your mind is divided, with which mind will God be uniting?

As mentioned, psychological fragmentation refers to the fragmentation of the mind. Given the Thomist account of the mind outlined in the previous chapter, for a person to be psychologically integrated, two conditions must obtain:

1. all their second-order desires must be psychologically integrated around the good, and
2. their first- and second-order volitions must align.\(^{186}\)

And so, given this, if a person has conflicting second-order desires, or acts on a first-order volition that conflicts with a second-order volition (but, importantly, not if they merely have conflicting first-order desires), then that person is psychologically fragmented, and that person’s complete union with God prevented.

In establishing the inhibitors to union that the Atonement is supposed to deal with, it will prove helpful to analyse in a little detail the first instance of psychological fragmentation, namely, the primal sin.

In looking at the primal sin, I mean to refer only to the first instance of internal fragmentation. Whilst I will use the traditionally accepted story of Lucifer’s fall in exploring explanations of the primal sin, whether or not the primal sin was in fact coincident with Lucifer’s fall as traditionally understood is not relevant to the strength of the proceeding analysis. What is relevant is whether we can explain the primal sin in a way that satisfies a certain set of desiderata without suggesting that it was in some way inexplicably arbitrary; for if the primal sin was arbitrary, what

\(^{186}\) Although I will not address this any further here, in Religion within the bounds of mere reason (6: 32) Kant also discusses the problem of psychological fragmentation, suggesting that it only takes one evil action to demonstrate a fragmentation of the will.
guarantee do we have the Atonement can secure permanent psychological integration?

The desiderata for any explanation of primal sin must (a) render God blameless for Lucifer’s internal fragmentation, and (b) put the blame for that internal fragmentation on Lucifer.¹⁸⁷ The most obvious way of satisfying these desiderata is to hold that Lucifer has what Richard Swinburne describes as ‘serious free will’,¹⁸⁸ such that he had the ability to freely will some lesser good, but that this free choice was in no way influenced by some defect created in him by God (i.e., God created Lucifer morally good, intellectually flawless and supremely happy prior to the primal sin).¹⁸⁹ Such ‘serious free will’ requires that even when Lucifer was internally integrated around the good, Lucifer was capable of choosing between conflicting desires.¹⁹⁰ But how could Lucifer have had conflicting desires if his mind was integrated around the good and he was morally good, intellectually flawless, and supremely happy?

Traditionally, there have been two schools of thought that attempt to explain how this internal fragmentation happened in the pre-primal sin paradisiacal state without holding God blameworthy for its happening.¹⁹¹ Both approaches suggest

¹⁸⁷ If (a) obtains but (b) does not, then internal fragmentation looks like it can only be explained by some random chance event, and is therefore arbitrary.
¹⁸⁸ Swinburne writes,

...if reasons alone influence action, an agent inevitably does what he believes to be the best, so if desires alone influence action, an agent will inevitably follow his strongest desire. Free choice of action therefore arises only in two situations. One is where there is a choice between two actions which the agent regards as equal best which the agent desires to do equally; which . . . is the situation of very unserious free will. The other is where there is a choice between two actions, one of which the agent desires to do more and the other of which he believes it better to do . . . the more serious the free will and the stronger the contrary temptation, the better it is when the good action is done. (Swinburne, 1998: 86-87)

¹⁸⁹ See Pini 2011 (62) for discussion of why it is important to affirm this. Note that the claim ‘supremely happy’ is highly contentious and open for interpretation (Anselm, for instance, did not believe Lucifer was supremely happy, Aquinas thought he was only supremely happy according to a natural, but not supernatural order, whilst Scotus believed him to be supremely happy in a natural and supernatural order). However, the assumption of Lucifer’s ‘supreme happiness’ sets the problem of primal sin in its strongest form.
¹⁹⁰ That is, Lucifer must be created not just to have one desire (where the best option, by that desire, is always chosen), but to have more than one desire (where the best options for each desire might seemingly conflict).
¹⁹¹ For slightly different variants on these two, see John Pecham on the will corrupting the intellect, Giles of Rome and Peter Auriol on the indirect self-specification of the will, Godfrey of Fontaines on
that Lucifer was created with an integrated second-order desire for justice\(^{192}\) (i.e., the second-order desire that his first-order desires were properly ordered) and a first-order desire for benefit (i.e., the desire for those things that will lead to his happiness).\(^{193}\)

The first explanatory approach to the primal sin suggests that the cause of Lucifer’s internal fragmentation occurred in Lucifer’s will (the ‘voluntarist account’, suggested by Anselm in *De casu diaboli* and most recently advocated by Katherin Rogers.\(^{194}\) The second explanatory account suggests that the cause of Lucifer’s internal fragmentation occurred in Lucifer’s intellect (the ‘intellectualist account’, best typified by Scott MacDonald’s interpretation of Augustine’s account of primal sin).\(^{195}\) According to Kevin Timpe, however, both responses are susceptible to the charge of arbitrariness.\(^{196}\) And again, if the primal sin was arbitrary, what might prevent those benefiting from Christ’s Atoning work from committing a similarly arbitrary, yet internally fragmenting, sin?

On the voluntarist account, although Lucifer’s second-order desire for justice remained integrated, for some reason he was more disposed to a (perhaps involuntary) first-order desire for his own perceived benefit than a conflicting first-order desire for the greater good of union with God.\(^{197}\) But why would Lucifer’s morally good will be inclined to a sub-optimal first-order desire? Now, the will can

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\(^{192}\) Also described as ‘rectitude’, although given Stump’s previous account, this can perhaps more usefully be considered a second-order desire for union with God, which entails a desire for ‘justice’ or ‘rectitude’.

\(^{193}\) As I explore these two positions, please note that this is not an attempt to do serious historical scholarship, rather, for the purposes of this paper, I am more interested in the arguments as presented.

\(^{194}\) See Rogers, 2008: 98. For further treatments of Anselm’s work, see also Adams 1992, King 2012, and Williams 2002.

\(^{195}\) See MacDonald 1998. See also King 2012.

\(^{196}\) See Timpe 2014.

\(^{197}\) It is worth mentioning that on Stump’s account, one acts with freedom of the will if and only if one’s first-order volition corresponds to a second-order volition. As a result, Lucifer could not (on Stump’s account) be said to have acted with freedom of the will. Nevertheless, Stump believes that one can act with the moral responsibility required to be blameworthy if one acts on a first-order volition (but only so long as the connection between first-order intellect and will, or the disposition of the will is not internally manipulated).
be changed by habit, such that over time it prefers lesser goods than greater goods, but prior to the primal sin, Lucifer had presumably always opted for the greater good. So, what can explain this change in the will’s disposition, beyond either a fault in the will created by God (at which point God is perhaps blameworthy for Lucifer’s actions) or a sheer, inexplicable (and seemingly random) act of will? And if it is a sheer, inexplicable act of the will, what is to prevent it happening again? Given the inexplicability of a change in the will, the inability to distinguish Lucifer’s morally good will from the likewise morally good will of those redeemed in paradise, and given that, on the Thomist account of the mind, every act of will is preceded by an act of the intellect, an intellectualist explanation for the primal sin is much more promising, or so I argue.

On the intellectualist account, at some point in time Lucifer failed to think through fully the reasons for desiring justice (a failure in the second-order intellect). By omitting to fully consider the reasons for desiring justice, some (perhaps involuntary) first-order desire for a misperceived benefit was allowed to grow stronger than it would otherwise have been allowed to grow, because the second-order desire that would otherwise weaken such a desire was itself too weak to weaken it sufficiently. As a result of this ‘carelessness in practical reasoning’, Lucifer’s (first-order) intellect presented to his (first-order) will this misperceived lesser good as being the best perceived benefit for Lucifer, and Lucifer’s will quite naturally inclined itself to this good. Just as with the

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198 Indeed, is it right to hold Lucifer blameworthy for this seemingly random change in his will?
199 For all we know, Lucifer could have involuntary passions (via an angelic sensitive appetite).
200 On Stump’s account, first-order acts of intellect can be involuntary (an involuntary apprehension of a passion, for instance), and so Lucifer cannot be blamed for having such first-order-desires. He can be blamed for letting that first-order desire become a first-order volition, however.
201 It is important to note that second-order volitions only strengthen or weaken a first-order desire. A mere second-order volition is not enough to ensure a corresponding first-order volition, as any addict could tell you. What is required is a particularly strong second-order volition to ensure the second-order desire’s object become a first-order volition. The intellectualist suggestion is not that there is internal fragmentation in the second-order will, just that through inattention (or some such occurrence) the second-order volition is not sufficiently strong to deal with a, potentially involuntary, first-order desire.
202 MacDonald, 1998: 121.
203 One tradition holds that Lucifer was given a glimpse of the incarnation, and received the revelation that he would be asked to serve creatures (i.e. humans) lowlier than himself. In failing to sufficiently consider God’s love and goodness, Lucifer chose that which seemed more fitting to him at the time; rejecting the call to what he saw as servility. Whether this first-order volition can be
voluntarist account, however, what caused Lucifer to omit sufficient consideration for justice? Was it a lapse in memory or some other created fault in himself (at which point perhaps God is perhaps blameworthy for Lucifer’s fall)? Or was it just an arbitrary act of the intellect? And again, if it was an arbitrary act of intellect, what is to prevent it happening again?

So, it would seem that the charge of arbitrariness can be leveled at some point in either the voluntarist or intellectualist explanations. In a previously published paper, however, I argued that the primal sin can be best explained by Lucifer acting on a desire for that which was his greatest good, namely, obtaining the knowledge of God available at the beatific vision, before God wanted (or was able) to reveal it to him. And this explanation, I think, can also help to explain the original sin, which, as I read the Genesis narrative, mirrors the traditional account of the primal sin. Furthermore, I will suggest that by looking at the original sin narrative (as before, taking it to be an instructive narrative, rather than a historical truth), it becomes clear that the problem of both primal and original sin can be better explained by the intellectualist account rather than by the voluntarist account.

My claim, then, is that there are many background similarities between the primal and the original sin. I previously suggested that in the case of the primal sin, the most plausible fragmentary desires are those that pertain to the primal sinner’s desire for the beatific vision, that is, for knowledge of God not currently held (be that desire naturally achievable, as Anselm thought, only supernaturally achievable, as Aquinas thought, or even supernaturally impossible, as Scotus thought). And with that in mind, notice, too, how the story of the original sin unfolds (Genesis 3:1-6):

Now the serpent was more crafty than any other beast of the field that the Lord God had made.

attributed to pride, or lust, or envy or some other such passion (or even, whether angelic beings are capable of passions) is left for others to discuss.

204 See Worsley 2016. Plausibly, as suggested at the end of the previous chapter, God could not give the beatific vision immediately without rendering whatever relationship that then ensued unserious.
He said to the woman, “Did God actually say, ‘You shall not eat of any tree in the garden’?” And the woman said to the serpent, “We may eat of the fruit of the trees in the garden, but God said, ‘You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of the garden, neither shall you touch it, lest you die.’” But the serpent said to the woman, “You will not surely die. For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate, and she also gave some to her husband who was with her, and he ate.”

According to the Genesis account, the serpent promised Eve that her eyes would be opened, and that that she would be like God, knowing good and evil. And, we are led to presume, it was this desire for knowledge, knowledge that would make her like God, knowledge that is not wrong in itself (for, we are told, it is knowledge God possesses), that caused the fragmentary desires that eventually led to the original sin. Just as the primal sinner might have inappropriately desired knowledge of God they did not have, so too did Eve inappropriately desire knowledge (of God, for we are told, God is good) she did not have.

But, we can say more than just this. For, how was it that Eve’s (natural first-order) desire became a volition? In my previously published paper on the primal sin, I argued that the primal sinner came to what we might describe as a wanton omission to consider their second-order desires for rectitude (i.e., for justice), that then allowed for the primal sinner’s first-order desire for knowledge of God to become a first-order volition for knowledge of God, but I could not go any further than this. Without any further information on the primal sin, I could not explain this wanton omission. But, in the case of the original sin, we can go one better, for we do have access to further information; we have access to the narrative account of the fall.

\(^{205}\) See Worsley 2016.
According to this narrative account of the fall (before which Adam and Eve were presumably psychologically integrated, and remained so through sanctifying grace, that is, appropriate reflection on the revealed (if partial) goodness of God), the serpent probed Eve's intellectual understanding of God's commands by misrepresenting the command God gave to Adam; ‘did God actually say you must not eat the fruit of any tree in the garden?’ In response to the serpent’s obvious misrepresentation, Eve subtly misinterpreted what Adam had presumably told her about God's command (for it appears in Genesis 2:17 that God told only Adam not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil). Eve adds ‘you must not touch it’ to the command God gave Adam not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. As a result, when Eve touched it (the touching of which was nowhere prohibited by God, but either misunderstood by Eve or incorrectly passed on by Adam) and did not die, she might well have believed the serpent’s claim that eating from the tree would also not kill her, but make her ‘like God’. This intellectual misinterpretation, combined with the desire to be like God in knowledge, could, plausibly, have been the root cause of Eve’s internal fragmentation, inasmuch as it aroused a natural desire for knowledge obtainable in the beatific vision, and also caused her to think God's command was odd (…”so eating the fruit can only be done deliberately, but what if I accidentally brushed the fruit? Would God really kill me? That seems too harsh!”…).

We might, of course, suppose that some similar intellectual misinterpretation could have happened to the primal sinner (albeit without anyone tempting them), and this might have been why the primal sinner knew to exploit this in his temptation of Eve. However, this explanation is still susceptible to the arbitrariness claim since we now need some explanation for how a perfect intellect would come to such an intellectual misinterpretation. However, without access to a narrative account of the primal sin, I am not sure such an explanation will ever be forthcoming.

Having said so much, inasmuch as this plausible solution to the primal sin might shed light on the cause of original sin, further reflection on the original sin can shed light on the primal sin, too. Specifically, it can help us understand how both the primal sin and the original sin lead to further internal fragmentation. According to
Aquinas, the original sin was an occasion for God to withdraw his grace from the original sinners, grace with had hitherto integrated their wills. Aquinas writes:

Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice... was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the pronoeness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.\textsuperscript{206}

In the previous chapter I discussed how God’s grace can be understood in terms of the revelation of God’s goodness, either as revealed through God’s creation, or through some form of second-personal encounter with Him. In as much as appropriately attending to God’s grace can integrate a person’s will, the removal of this grace, or no longer attending to it, can cause the sort of psychological fragmentation and an unwillingness to dyadically attend to God that leads to the preference for personal power and pleasure over the greater good of union with God. And indeed, this seems exactly what is recorded in the Genesis passage that follows (Genesis 3:7-13, 22-24):

And they heard the sound of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day, and the man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God among the trees of the garden. But the Lord God called to the man and said to him, “Where are you?” And he said, “I heard the sound of you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself.” He said, “Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten of the tree of which I commanded you not to eat?” The man said, “The woman whom you

\textsuperscript{206} ST I-II Q 82 A 2.
gave to be with me, she gave me fruit of the tree, and I ate.” Then the Lord God said to the woman, “What is this that you have done?” The woman said, “The serpent deceived me, and I ate.” Then the Lord God said, “Behold, the man has become like one of us in knowing good and evil. Now, lest he reach out his hand and take also of the tree of life and eat, and live forever—” therefore the Lord God sent him out from the garden of Eden to work the ground from which he was taken. He drove out the man, and at the east of the garden of Eden he placed the cherubim and a flaming sword that turned every way to guard the way to the tree of life.

The original sinners are recorded as withdrawing and hiding from God’s presence in shame, and God’s response is likewise to send them out from His garden. Inasmuch as shame causes a person not to attend to the revelation of God’s goodness, and inasmuch as God sends a person away from His revealed presence, the integrating effect of grace will be weakened, and it becomes easier and easier for the will to become disordered.207 This withdrawal, coupled with their supposedly new knowledge of good and evil (which suggests that there are more decisions one can become fragmented over than merely whether one eats from a tree), perhaps helps explain the progression from Genesis 4:1-7, where God tells Cain that whilst sin is crouching at the door, he can control his fragmentary desires to murder his brother:

Now Cain knew his wife, and she conceived and bore Cain, saying, “I have gotten a man with the help of the Lord.” And again, she bore his brother Abel. Now Abel was a keeper of sheep, and Cain was a worker of the ground. [In the course of time], Cain brought to the Lord an offering of the fruit of the ground, and Abel also brought of the firstborn of his flock and of their fat portions. And the Lord had regard for Abel and his offering, but for Cain and his offering he had no regard. So Cain was very angry, and his face fell. The Lord said to Cain, “Why are you angry, and why has your face fallen? If you do well, will you not be accepted? And if you do not do well,

207 This phenomenon is not just limited to the story of the fall. We see it reappear time and again in both Old and New Testaments. For instance, in Isaiah 6, we see Isaiah fall on his face before a vision of God, because, he says, he recognises his guilt before God.
sin is crouching at the door. Its desire is contrary to you, but you must rule over it.”

To the interaction God and Cain have after Abel’s murder (Genesis 4:8-16):

Cain spoke to Abel his brother. And when they were in the field, Cain rose up against his brother Abel and killed him. Then the Lord said to Cain, “Where is Abel your brother?” He said, “I do not know; am I my brother’s keeper?” And the Lord said, “What have you done? The voice of your brother's blood is crying to me from the ground. And now you are cursed from the ground, which has opened its mouth to receive your brother’s blood from your hand. When you work the ground, it shall no longer yield to you its strength. You shall be a fugitive and a wanderer on the earth.” Cain said to the Lord, “My punishment is greater than I can bear. Behold, you have driven me today away from the ground, and from your face I shall be hidden. I shall be a fugitive and a wanderer on the earth, and whoever finds me will kill me.” Then the Lord said to him, “Not so! If anyone kills Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold.” And the Lord put a mark on Cain, lest any who found him should attack him. Then Cain went away from the presence of the Lord and settled in the land of Nod, east of Eden.

Where God withdraws further and further from Cain (note in verse 14 that Cain is now hidden from God’s face, the partial revelation of God’s goodness, and in verse 16, he is also sent away from the presence of the Lord). And how, after this divine withdrawal, Cain’s descendants grow progressively worse and worse, until we find written in Genesis 6:5-6:

The Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intention of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And the Lord regretted that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart.

Thus, the disordering of the will leads to the further withdrawal from God’s presence, as those who have sinned hide themselves from God, and how God, in response, withdraws his presence from them. But, in turn, this withdrawal only
prompts the further disordering of the will until the ‘intention of the thoughts of [a person’s] heart was only evil continually’. To rephrase that in terms familiar to the Thomist moral psychology we have been using, this mutual withdrawal prompts ever more conflicting second-order desires, and also prevents second-order desires aligning with first-order desires.

The corruption that follows original sin, then, can be explained in terms of the withdrawal of God’s grace (i.e., the revelation of His goodness), in response to man’s shame and guilt, combined with the knowledge of good and evil that presents more occasions for fragmentary desires (for, prior to both the primal and the original sin, it seems the only occasion for fragmentary desire was in response to a desire for knowledge pertaining to God). Without appropriate attendance to God’s grace, the revelation of His goodness, helping the correct ordering of a person’s will, I suggest that it is inevitable a postlapsarian person will come to desire their personal power and pleasure over the greater good of union with God. And inasmuch as this might be true for the original sinners, it is likely also true for the primal sinner, too.

Given this, there is an obvious dilemma present. As I suggested at the end of the previous chapter, if a person is to behold the beatific vision and be united with God, they must, at the very least, act on a desire to behold this vision. If such a person does not desire to do so, whatever union that might subsequently follow cannot satisfy the two-will requirement for real union. However, the further God withdraws from a person, or the further a person withdraws from God, the less likely it is a person will ever have that desire.

One helpful way to understand this process of internal fragmentation is through an analogy to seed germination. Though we may be born internally integrated, continued integration requires continued openness to the grace of God. However, this grace is, necessarily, partial. Without adequate reflection (possible due to the fact this revelation is partial), our wills will become disordered. If we live long

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208 This analogy was inspired by personal correspondence with Stump.
209 If it were complete, we would remain impeccable, and so, incapable of making a serious free choice to be united with God.
enough, as happened with the primal and original sinners, this will happen. The seed will germinate and take root. And like a kudzu plant, once it has taken root, it is invasive, difficult to control, and grows rapidly, damaging everything around it. Eventually, it takes over, and we become internally fragmented: no longer desiring what is ultimately good for us, or even desiring to desire what is ultimately good for us, but rather desiring the lesser goods of power and pleasure. Because we lack this second-order desire, that is, because we fail to desire to desire union with God, we are incapable of the mutual closeness required for that union. In consequence, scriptural revelation suggests that all that is left for us is the worst thing possible for us, namely, our permanent separation from God.

Furthermore, this same defect in the will that results in internal fragmentation also prevents humans from willing their own internal integration. And because humans do not want to become internally integrated, they also do not want to accept further gifts of grace that might help them become psychologically integrated.

So, if we are to provide an account of union with God, we must explain how it is that such an internally fragmented person can come to desire union with God (i.e., to behold the beatific vision), without God interfering with their free will.

Shame, Guilt and ‘Willed Loneliness’

In addition to this lack of desire, in the previous section, I mentioned that shame and guilt over previous wrongdoing was also problem, causing further distance between God and a person. Concerning this guilt and shame the theologian T.F. Torrance writes of the Genesis narrative:

> Then we discover that the bond of fellowship between God and man is broken by rebellion and sin. It belongs to the nature of sin to divide, to create disorder, to disrupt, to destroy fellowship. What are the consequences of sin? Not only is the bond of communion between God and

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210 If a person really did want to be internally integrated, she would be, and this problem would be moot.
man broken, issuing in man’s guilty fear of God, but the bond between man and woman is impaired: guilt and shame come in between them, and even the symbol of wearing clothes is interpreted in terms of the hiddenness of man from woman and of woman from man. The man-woman relationship is involved in the broken relation with God. With the bond between them broken, man and woman are individualised, and each is turned in upon himself or herself. But even the unity of man as male, and the unity of woman as female, within the individual heart is disrupted, in the knowledge of good and evil. Each knows that he or she is no longer what he or she ought to be.211

In an influential paper on the nature of the Atonement, Stump suggests that guilt and shame should each be taken to focus on the belief in the appropriateness of the other repudiating, with respect to you, one of the twin desires that together form the Thomist account of love.212 Shame, she says, contrasts with the desire for union with the beloved, whilst guilt with the desire for the good of the beloved. Shame and guilt can limit or prevent union inasmuch as if Peter believes it is appropriate for Jack to reject him, or for Jack to desire something Peter thinks is in some sense bad for him, Peter is motivated to withdraw himself from Jack; to avoid second-personal encounter or dyadic joint attention, and to refrain from personal closeness with him, and perhaps to an extent with himself, too. In as much as this happens, Peter’s union with Jack is limited or prevented entirely.213 These union-defeating consequences of guilt and shame therefore motivate Peter’s ‘willed loneliness’.214

213 Stump, 2012: 132. Note that ‘appropriate’ is distinct from ‘ought’. If I forgive you, it very well might be the case that I ought not desire to reject you, but this does not imply that it would have been inappropriate for me to do so.
214 Stump writes:

The love Aquinas describes, and the union desired in that love, with the closeness requisite for union, can have its full actualization only in case the person who loves is internally integrated. This is union, closeness, and love in the strenuous mode; and the lack of internal integration around the good undermines or destroys it. Shame is an obstacle to it as well. (Stump, 2010: 150)
Furthermore, Stump suggests that whilst there might be an objective fact of the matter about whether it would be appropriate for another to reject you, or desire your hard treatment, there is also a subjective state of feeling shame or feeling guilt, where this subjective state actually leads to an inclination away from or an inability to dyadically attend to the other.

In the case of both objective and subjective shame, shame stems from a failure to meet a standard you accept as being in some sense authoritative over you. In the case of subjective shame, this is a standard that you believe a community that you take yourself to be a member of holds, and that you, as a member of that community, can be judged against. So, the person experiencing subjective shame recognises the standard they judge themselves to have fallen short of as being in some sense authoritative over them, such that they come to believe it would be appropriate for other members of this community to (in some sense) reject them, because they have not met this standard.

Consider, for instance, the guest who absentmindedly turns up to a wedding in a white dress, or the lawyer who turns up to their first day at a prestigious new job wearing jeans and a tee-shirt. In each case, we can imagine them realising they have failed to meet a certain standard upheld by the (perhaps very local) community they are in, a standard they nevertheless take to be authoritative on them (for instance, that wedding guests in certain communities in England avoid white dresses, and that lawyers working at a certain prestigious company wear suits to work). In such an instance, we can imagine the wedding attendee wanting to avoid the bride, and the lawyer avoiding their colleagues, believing in each case that it would be appropriate for the other(s) to reject them (in some sense of ‘reject’).

However, there is no necessary connection between the standard a subjectively shamed person thinks they have failed to meet, and an actual standard held by the community. A person can think they have failed to meet a certain community standard without having actually done so. For instance, among some

\[215\] With this being the case regardless of the merits of the standard.

\[216\] Clearly, I do not mean to imply that those who feel subjective shame have in fact done something wrong, or are to be blamed. ‘Subjective shame’ is merely a descriptive label, not a normative claim.
communities in Indonesia, it is polite to leave food on one’s plate at the end of the meal, to show you are full, whilst among some communities in England, it is polite to finish one’s meal. We can imagine that, due to feeling full, an English person on a first-time business trip to Indonesia feeling subjective shame over failing to clear their plate at a dinner held in their honour. What matters for the experience of subjective shame is that the person concerned accepts what they take to be a community standard as being in some sense authoritative over them (regardless of what this standard turns out to be, regardless of whether the community in fact endorses said standard). Subjective shame is therefore descriptive, tracking the experience of shame, rather than normative, tracking whether one ought to feel shame.

Objective shame, on the other hand, occurs only when one fails to meet an actual (typically, morally justified) community standard, that is, it occurs when it is in fact appropriate for another to reject you. Unlike subjective shame, however, one can be objectively shamed without realising it, and so, shamed without immediately coming to the belief that it is appropriate that another reject you as a person. Likewise, one can think one is objectively shamed when one is in fact merely subjectively shamed. And, of course, one can be both objectively and subjectively shamed at the same time.\footnote{217}

Whilst these objective and subject states do not always necessarily match up (as suggested, one might feel subjective shame without being objectively shamed, or one might not feel subjective guilt whilst being objectively guilty), I will assume that, when presented with the beatific vision, when all the facts of the matter are known such that one has ideal information, subjective shame and guilt will align with objective shame and guilt.\footnote{218}

\footnote{217}{A helpful way to think about objective shame is to consider whether a person would feel subjective shame given all relevant information, from behind something like a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. If they would, they are also objectively shamed. If they would not, it is likely objective shame and subjective shame have come apart in this instance. It might be the case that, given these conditions, nobody can be objectively shamed, for there are, in fact, no actual morally justifiable community standards. I take up this possibility a little later in this chapter.}

\footnote{218}{As a result, I will be focusing primarily on ways of defeating objective shame, as given these circumstances, if objective shame and subjective shame always align, and one’s objective shame is...}
As well as there being objective and subjective shame, Stump offers a further taxonomy. Shame, she suggests, is an existential problem that arises from reflection on one of four states of affairs:

(1) reflection on one’s own individual moral wrongdoing,

(2) reflection upon wrongs that have been done to you,

(3) reflection upon some impairment or defect of nature, and

(4), reflection on your communal participation in a certain community that has perpetrated significant wrongdoing.\(^{219}\)

By way of a brief justification for this division; with respect to (1), Linda Radzik suggests that wrongdoing is communicative.\(^{220}\) A person who wrongs another communicates disrespect for that person. Whilst that communication of disrespect continues, it is appropriate for the other to reject the wrongdoer as a person.

With respect to (2) and (3) Stump notes that victims of serious crime and those who have been born (or later developed) certain impediments often talk of the helpless shame they feel over what has happened to them.

With respect to (4), Stump notes that communal shame is often felt by those associated with serious wrongdoers. Parents may feel shame over the actions of their child, citizens of a country (say, Germany during the Nazi regime) may feel shame over the association with their nationality. And perhaps, too, Stump suggests, there is a certain kind of shame that arises from membership in the human race.\(^{221}\)

defeated, then one’s subjective shame will also be defeated. Were I not starting with this set of ideal circumstances, this alignment could not be taken for granted, as I am doing.

\(^{219}\) Stump, 2016: 111-129.

\(^{220}\) Radzik writes,

To wrong another person is to insult and threaten that person. To do nothing (or to fail to do enough) to correct that action is to allow the insult and the threat to stand. It is to condone their continued influence. When one fails to atone, one suggests that one still views the victim as inferior and that one remains a threat to the victim. The obligation to atone, then, amounts to an obligation to cease wrongdoing the victim. (Radzik, 2008: 77).

\(^{221}\) Stump, 2016: 111-129.
As I shall later argue, whilst one can feel subjective shame with respect to (1), (2), (3), or (4), objective shame is typically limited to (1) (and, although this is not as clear cut, plausibly (4), too). Nevertheless, unless rectified, subjective shame has the same effect as objective shame, namely, willed loneliness, and so, whilst it may be the case that ways of rectifying subjective shame are radically different to ways of rectifying objective shame, the relational damage caused by subjective shame still requires undoing.

Contrasted with shame, guilt is explained as a moral attitude directly stemming from reflection upon the damage caused by one’s wrongdoing. Similar to shame, guilt is objective just in case one truly wronged the other person, and it is subjective to the extent that you believe you have wronged the other person (regardless of whether you have in fact done so).

As I shall use them, shame will serve as a placeholder for the belief, however it arises, that it would be appropriate for the other to reject you as a person, that is, appropriate for the other not to desire union with you.

Guilt, on the other hand, will serve as a placeholder for the belief that it would be appropriate for the other to desire something that is in one sense bad for you, namely, some reparation for the damage caused by your wrongdoing.

In using these as placeholder terms, I am deliberately avoiding the question of whether ‘guilt’ and ‘shame’, as I use them, map on to the way guilt and shame are put to everyday use. No doubt guilt and shame are significantly more complex, and the boundaries between them far more blurred, than I am giving credit for. However, accurate definitions of guilt and shame are unavailable, and I do not have the expertise to fill in this gap. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that there is significant enough overlap between the placeholder definitions and the theological (and also, real world) definitions to warrant their use in such a manner.

Both guilt and shame, as I use them, then, can be thought of as in some sense self-reflexive reactive attitudes. Whilst original sin leads to psychological fragmentation through the disordering of the higher-order desires, guilt and shame can lead to psychological fragmentation through contrary first-order desires for what Stump
describes as a state of ‘willed loneliness’. And inasmuch as guilt and shame might both cause fragmentary first-order desires, they can also inhibit joint attention. A person who is subjectively guilty or shamed is liable to avoid sharing significant personal presence with the one with respect to whom they are guilty or shamed, just we saw alluded to in the biblical narrative of the fall, and as we see elsewhere in the scriptural text, for instance:

1 John 2:28 ‘And now, little children, abide in him, so that when he appears we may have confidence and not shrink from him in shame at his coming.’

Daniel 12:2 ‘And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.’

Concerning this connection between joint (or shared) attention and shame, Stump writes:

Many different things can disrupt or prevent shared attention. Obviously, simple physical distance between mutually close persons can have this result. To take a small and homely example, when a loving father sends his misbehaved two-year old to her room, she and he are in this condition. There is mutual closeness between them, but, momentarily anyway, there is no shared attention and therefore no personal presence or union either. Distraction can have the same effect. If the father and daughter were together but the father’s attention was only on his work and not on his daughter, shared attention would be precluded then too.

In fact, anything that diminishes or takes away one person’s ability or willingness to meet another person face-to-face will hinder shared attention. Shame, for example, will do so. A shamed person typically finds it very difficult to meet the gaze of others, even if the shamed person is in no

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222 For more references about shame, see Jeremiah 17:13, Isaiah 45:17, Revelation 6:15-16, and Ezra 9:6; for more about guilt, see Isaiah 6:1-6 and Ezra 9:15,
way culpable for her shamed state; and so shared attention can fail to occur in such cases too.

Great pain, physical or psychological, can have the same effect. A person in great pain might be unable to meet another person face-to-face, with shared attention, because it is difficult for her to focus on anything besides her pain. Instructions to labor coaches helping women during the pain of childbirth emphasize that if a laboring woman is in great pain, shared attention between her and her coach may be interrupted unless there is insistent intervention on the part of the coach. As these instructions imply, a person in pain may find it difficult to attend to another, even with the help of that other, even if she had antecedently planned on attending to that other. In cases such as this, there can be mutual closeness between two persons, but the normal manifestation of this closeness in significant personal presence is blocked because shared attention is disrupted by something external, such as pain, which gets in the way.223

So, as I take it, unless a person’s (objective) guilt and shame are dealt with, that person will be unable to unite with God, for, I suggest, they will be unable to jointly attend to God at the beatific vision.224 Likewise, unless a person freely wills union with God, that person cannot unite with God. So, if either of those two circumstances obtain, it is part of the Christian tradition that for such a person, they are unable to behold the beatific vision, and so, they are consigned to the worst thing for them, permanent separation from God, that is, to hell.

In the next section of this chapter I will articulate one consequence this view has on the doctrine of hell, namely, that those in hell may be there because they are unable to dyadically share attention with God, that is, they unable to behold the beatific vision, and that in fact, given this, hell could, despite being in one sense the worst place for them, also be the most loving place God could place them.

223 Stump, 2012a: 3.
224 In this way, a parallel can be drawn to something like spiritual autism. For more on the analogy with spiritual autism, see Pinsent, 2016.
The Doctrine of Hell

In the Gospel according to Matthew (13:49-50), Jesus appears to tell his disciples that hell will be a ‘grim’ place filled with what we might describe as ‘maximally bad suffering’ – suffering that in some sense constitutes the worst thing for the sufferer. The Gospel author records Jesus as saying, ‘So it will be at the end of the age; the angels will come forth and take out the wicked from among the righteous, and will throw them into the furnace of fire; in that place there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.’

Such suffering is evidently not of garden-variety ‘toe-stubbing’ form. Rather, it is part of the orthodox tradition that the sufferings of hell – whatever it is that causes the weeping and gnashing of teeth – are exactly the kinds of suffering proponents of the argument from evil might point to as exemplar defeaters for the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good God.

And inasmuch as this argument from evil is persuasive when one considers suffering in this earthly life, it seems it ought to be similarly persuasive when one considers the reported possibility of maximally bad suffering in the life to come. And so, there is a problem of hell that follows the model of the problem of evil.

Consider, then, the following grim-hell-modified version of the argument from evil:

1. If an omni-God exists and there is maximally bad suffering in hell, then God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing this maximally bad suffering in hell.

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225 I use ‘grim’ here in a technical sense, as opposed to ‘mild’ varieties of hell employed in various degrees of ‘mild’ by Swinburne 1983, Stump 1986, and Walls 1992. ‘Grim’ is used to refer to the fact that such a hell truly is (or is among) the worst thing(s) that could happen to you.

226 Adams (1999: 32), uses the term ‘horrendous evil’ to refer to suffering which ‘constitutes a prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could (given their inclusion in it) have positive meaning for him/her on the whole.’ This is, perhaps, reflective include maximally bad suffering.

227 See, for instance, van Inwagen 2000.

228 Of course, this is not a new observation. See Craig 1989 or Adams 1993 for further discussion on forms ‘the problem of hell’ might take. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the problem I define below.
2. There is no morally sufficient reason for allowing maximally bad suffering in hell.
3. So, either an omni-God does not exist or there is no maximally bad suffering in hell.
4. There is maximally bad suffering in hell.
5. So, an omni-God does not exist.

Premise one is a conceptual truth, and premise three and five are conclusions based upon trivial rules of inference. There are, therefore, two moves the classical theist can make in response to this argument. They can deny premise four, that there is maximally bad suffering in hell (citing either the plausibly mild nature of hell, as Stump has done, or proposing some form of universalism, like Marilyn McCord Adams has done, or annihilationism, like Kelly James Clark has done), or alternatively, they can reject premise two by providing a plausible morally sufficient reason for why God might allow maximally bad suffering in hell.

However, I want to focus on analysis of the second option, that is, to attempts to provide a plausible morally sufficient reason as to why God might allow maximally bad suffering in a ‘grim’ hell. I will start by transposing and evaluating what I consider to be the most plausible morally-sufficient-reason responses that have been used to counter the argument from evil in this earthly life. These responses are namely:

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229 Note that this argument does not show that there could be no God, only that an omni-God, the God of classical theism, could not exist.
231 See, for instance, Adams 1999.
232 See, for instance, Clark 2001. Note that Thomists reject annihilationism because on the Thomistic account, being and goodness are coreferential (see ST I Q 5 A 1). Destroying being (as would happen if a person is annihilated) is therefore necessarily bad, and God, being perfectly good (namely, the greatest possible being), cannot do that which is bad.
233 Alternatively, rather than provide a plausible morally sufficient reason, they could also appeal to skeptical theism and claim that God does have a reason, but it beyond our ability to discern God’s reasons in this matter. I will not address this response at all.
234 If a response can be found that works in a ‘grim’ hell, a response in the same genus is likely also to work in the case of a ‘mild’ hell.
235 Following Adams 1993, I will suggest that each reason as-used in contemporary literature is still unable to account for the possibility of maximally bad suffering in a ‘grim’ hell, and so traditional-‘grim’-hell-believing theists remain vulnerable to the modified version of the argument from evil. I will then propose a modified morally-sufficient-reason response that I think might be able to account for such suffering in hell.
(1) an appeal to the justice of such maximally bad suffering in hell,

(2) an appeal to some positive benefit – that is, some future reward - that accrues to the sufferer as a result of their maximally bad suffering, or

(3) an appeal to some negative benefit – that is, some harm prevented - that accrues to the sufferer as a result of their maximally bad suffering.

The first morally-sufficient-reason response is fairly straight-forward. If one has broken a just law, and there is a just punishment set for breaking that law, it is just for one to suffer said punishment, even if no other benefit is afforded to you. This sort of response can be found, in part, in Augustine’s work on the Fall. However, this response to the problem of suffering in hell seems on the face of it deeply inappropriate. After all, on this story, God is either the author and executor of both law and punishment, or else he is bound by some external constraint on what is just. An appeal to the justice of the law and the justice of the punishment will not absolve God from setting the world up in such a way that justice demands such eternal and maximally bad suffering (for if God did set the world up like that, can God be perfectly good?), nor can an appeal to some external constraints on justice solve the dilemma, at least, not without raising a whole host of other intractable questions (for if God is externally constrained by something besides himself, is God truly omnipotent?).

Now, there may be more to say about this first approach, but I mention it only to put it to one side. Instead, for the remainder of this paper, I want to look at the other two morally-sufficient-reason responses, and in particular, the way they have been employed in what I consider to be the most successful theodicy for the problem of evil, the theodicy found in Stump’s *Wandering in Darkness*. In *Wandering in Darkness*, Stump offers what we might call a ‘theodicy of union’. In short, Stump argues that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing suffering if the suffering (1) primarily benefits the sufferer and (2) the benefit of the suffering

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236 See Augustine, *DCD*, Book 14, Chapter 3.

237 For more on these objections, see Lewis 2007.

238 Stump, 2010.
sufficiently outweighs or defeats the suffering endured. Stump suggests that God is always justified in allowing a person to suffer if by allowing it either the sufferer’s permanent separation from God, what she describes as the objectively and subjectively worst thing that can happen to a person, can be prevented or if their deeper union with God, what she describes as their objectively and subjectively greatest good, can be motivated.

In her theodicy, Stump explicitly connects the avoidance of permanent separation from God with negative benefit and the securing of a deeper union with God with positive benefit. Whilst suffering might also bring with it other benefits, such as positive character development or a demonstration of human freedom, it is unclear whether the benefit gained really does outweigh the sort of (close to) maximally bad suffering typically showcased in evidential arguments. To get around this, Stump limits suffering to motivating what she takes from Aquinas to be the absolute best thing for a person and avoiding its negation, the absolute worst thing for a person. Finally, Stump notes that at least minimal consent (where such suffering is only involuntary secundum quid) is necessary for suffering for positive benefit, and so suffering for future reward is a morally-sufficient-reason only in case the sufferer has in some sense consented to it.

So far, so good; however, Stump’s account runs into a serious problem when faced with the traditional doctrine of a ‘grim’ hell. Not only does it seem unlikely that an inhabitant of a ‘grim’ hell would ever consent to their maximally bad suffering (seemingly ruling out their suffering for positive benefit), that inhabitant of hell

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239 See Stump, 2010: 13. According to Adams 1993, suffering is outweighed when the quantity of benefit vastly exceeds the quantity of suffering. Suffering is defeated when the suffering is logically related to some great good the person experiences.


244 And even if they could, it may be that they are unable to give competent consent, given the human mind’s inability to comprehend suffering for eternity.
would already be permanently separated from God (seemingly ruling out their suffering for negative benefit).\textsuperscript{245}

Now for Stump, following Aquinas,\textsuperscript{246} the desire for union, along with the desire for good, are the two interconnected desires that together are required for love.\textsuperscript{247} The desire for union is itself a function of what she calls ‘personal closeness’ and ‘significant personal presence’, where personal closeness involves a need for the beloved and some sort of self-revelation and subsequent indwelling of mind, whilst significant personal presence involves direct and unmediated causal and cognitive contact, second-personal experience and dyadic joint-attention.\textsuperscript{248} Stump suggests an omnipresent God is always significantly present to His creation; however to the extent that significant personal presence or personal closeness are impeded on the creature’s side, to that extent will union between them and God be likewise limited.\textsuperscript{249}

Furthermore, Stump argues that to the extent that you are yourself psychologically fragmented, to the extent that you have conflicting desires for, for instance, union with God and for some conflicting power or pleasure, to that extent will you be distanced from yourself, and to that extent will it be difficult or impossible for another to become close to you.\textsuperscript{250} For these reasons Stump argues that union with God in the life to come must be wholeheartedly desired by a psychologically integrated person. If it cannot or will not be wholeheartedly desired, union will be impossible, and such a half-hearted or psychologically fragmented person will find themselves permanently separated from God.\textsuperscript{251}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{245} A similar point can be made with respect to Adams’ account (‘Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God’). For Adams, there are certain kinds of horrendous suffering that can only be defeated in a positive afterlife. But for those in hell, those already in a negative afterlife, there just is no positive afterlife available to defeat their suffering.
\textsuperscript{246} See ST I-II Q 28.
\textsuperscript{247} See Stump, 2010: 85-128.
\textsuperscript{248} Stump, 2010: 109-128.
\textsuperscript{249} For in this life, union can come in degrees. Whilst it can be desired wholeheartedly, it can also be desired half-heartedly. And to the extent that there is a part of you that does not desire union with another, to that same extent will union between each be constrained. See Stump, 2010: 117 for more details.
\textsuperscript{250} Stump, 2010: 130-150 for more details on this line of argument.
\textsuperscript{251} Stump, 2010: 150.
\end{footnotes}
So, the essence of the problem is this: on the traditional account, once in hell the worst thing for a person is certain, and the best thing impossible, so what possible morally sufficient reason could there be for that person’s suffering? Before I propose an answer to that question, I want to address another one. Besides tradition, what reason do we have to think that those in hell might be permanently separated from God? Why not opt for an ‘escapist’ model like the one suggested by Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug? For if an inhabitant of hell can escape (even if they never do), might not Stump’s theodicy work in hell just as it might on earth?

One attempt to respond to this question is ably summarised by C.S. Lewis in The Great Divorce: the inhabitants of hell are those who through their own pride are so stubbornly set in their fragmentary desires they will not change their will to choose union with God over their own power and pleasure. Lewis writes,

> There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, in the end, ‘Thy will be done.’ All that are in hell, choose it.

We can call this the free-will response. In essence, the damned choose both to be sent to hell and then continuously choose to remain in hell. They choose to suffer in a way that is maximally bad, and God so values their freewill that he respects and preserves their freedom by honouring that choice.

This sort of a response is, however, deeply problematic. Marilyn McCord Adams likens this situation to parent leaving a bowl of poisoned candy in front of their child, telling the child not to eat any, then leaving the room. Adams writes, if the child were to eat the poisoned candy and die ‘surely the child is at most marginally

252 See Buckareff and Plug 2005.
253 From Lewis, 2015a: 85. See also Lewis, 2015b: 130:

I willingly believe that the damned are, in one sense, successful, rebels to the end; that the doors of hell are locked on the inside. I do not mean that the ghosts may not wish to come out of hell, in the vague fashion wherein an envious man “wishes” to be happy: but they certainly do not will even the first preliminary states of that self-abandonment through which alone the soul can reach any good. They enjoy forever the horrible freedom they have demanded, and are therefore self-enslaved just as the blessed, forever submitting to obedience, become through all eternity more and more free.
to blame, even though it knew enough to obey the parent, while the parent is both primarily responsible and highly culpable.’ Adams concludes that ‘the value of human freedom, however great, is not enough to justify God’s allowing creatures to make decisions that bring about their own final, irrevocable ruin.’ Keith DeRose is likewise sceptical of this freewill response. DeRose is concerned that God could hardly be considered victorious over sin and death if some of his creation manage to frustrate him for all eternity. Surely, DeRose suggests, an all-knowing all-powerful God would have the ingenuity to bring it to be that these stubborn individuals eventually relent and choose to be united with Him.

As it happens, I find both Adams’ and DeRose’s responses persuasive; however, their next move, advocating universalism, sidesteps the morally-sufficient-response route I am interested in exploring. So instead of following their move to universalism, I am going to propose another response, a response based on preserving the integrity of a person’s moral psychology rather than on the value of their continued free choice. If instead of stubbornly refusing to desire union with God, what if those in hell are, for some other reason, unable to wholeheartedly desire union with God?

In this earthly life, the biggest obstacle to union with God, Stump argues, is a kind of willed loneliness brought about by what she describes as ‘the backward-looking problem’. As a person appropriately reflects upon their previous wrongdoings they experience guilt (where ‘guilt’ is a placeholder for ‘the belief it is appropriate for God or another to desire some hard treatment for you’) and shame (where ‘shame’ is a placeholder for ‘the belief that it is appropriate for God or another to reject you as a person’). These self-reflexive reactive attitudes, Stump suggests,

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255 On this point, Talbott 2004 suggests the only way this is possible is if God, in fact, interferes with the freedom of those in hell to ensure they continue to eternally reject Him.
256 Taken from personal correspondence with him at the 2016 St Thomas Summer Seminar. See also his website (accessed November 2016): ‘Universalism and the Bible’ particularly Appendix B http://campuspress.yale.edu/keithderose/1129-2/ . Note that unlike Adam’s view, DeRose’s position is undermined by Aquinas’s claim that after death a person’s disembodied soul is irreversibly fixed on a certain course of action (either desire for union with God, or desire for something else one considers better for you), such that even when the disembodied soul is re-bodied, so to speak, it can no longer change its orientation. See SCG Book 4, Chapter 95 for more details.
inevitably cause union-defeating distance between the appropriately reflecting wrongdoer and God.\textsuperscript{258}

A person appropriately reflecting on their shame and guilt will, typically, desire to avoid those whom they feel could appropriately reject them or desire their hard treatment, that is, those who might reject either of the twin desires of love towards them (where by ‘avoid’ I include avoiding dyadic joint attention). Such avoidance will inevitably limit a desire for significant personal presence with that person, and to the extent that it causes such psychologically fragmentary desires, it will also limit the capacity for others to become close to them.\textsuperscript{259} And indeed, such responses are found repeatedly in scripture in the accounts of those who met God (or visions of God) face to face. We read, for instance, that upon experiencing a vision of God Isaiah fell on his face and wished himself dead until God told him his guilt had been atoned for,\textsuperscript{260} whilst the prophet Daniel writes:

\begin{quote}
And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.\textsuperscript{261}
\end{quote}

Now, Stump argues that in this life we are able to (and through suffering motivated to) take advantage of the unique shame-and-guilt-defeating provisions made available to us through the life, death, and resurrection of Christ.\textsuperscript{262} But what if, as plausibly appears to be the case, these provisions are not available in the life to come for those who did not avail of them in this earthly life?\textsuperscript{263} In some sense compelled to attend to their (objective) shame and (objective) guilt in the presence of God, yet unable to deal with either, such persons would be condemned to an eternity of willed loneliness. If Isaiah’s response generalises, it may indeed be in

\textsuperscript{258} See Stump, 2010: 141-144.
\textsuperscript{259} Stump, 2010: 144-150.
\textsuperscript{261} See Daniel 12:2.
\textsuperscript{262} See Stump, 2012: 129-130.
\textsuperscript{263} That is, that such provisions are one-off and time-limited. See, for instance, Hebrews 6:4-6, 2 Thessalonians 1:9, Matthew 25:46. A full analysis of whether this is in fact the case would require knowledge of the correct account of Atonement. Given that no such account has been settled upon, it remains possible that the provisions of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection are unavailable post-mortem to those who have not availed of them in this life, and, at least in this chapter, I will assume this is the case.
some sense better for such a person to be away from God’s revealed presence, even for them to be in hell, than for them to be significantly present to God.

But, a putative objector might respond:

How does this moral psychology route avoid Adams’s poisoned candy thought experiment? After all, it was (presumably) the exercise of their human freedom that eventuated in that person feeling guilt and shame, and in turn, their own ‘final, irrevocable ruin’. If Adams’s point is troubling for the free-will route, should it not be troubling for the moral psychology route also?

At this point, the moral-psychology route can offer us something the free-will response cannot. Unlike the free-will response, guilt and shame are self-reflexive reactive attitudes relying on appropriate reflection on one’s actions. It is only when one believes that it is appropriate for another to reject you, or when one believes that it is appropriate for another to desire you undergo some hard treatment, that guilt and shame will reflexively cause union defeating distance. But, if it is the case that we truly are like the three-year-old candy lover in Adams’ thought experiment, appropriate reflection upon one’s action would lead one to believe it is in fact not appropriate for God to reject you or for God to desire some hard treatment for you, and as a result you will not feel guilt and shame.265 This being said, if, given all relevant information, appropriate reflection does in fact lead one to believe that guilt and shame are appropriate, then Adams’s thought experiment (and variations on the theme) will not work, for although we might think, in our current state of ignorance, that we are like three-year-old candy lovers, it may turn out that we are in fact not. This conclusion, of course, might mean that the actual population of hell is very small indeed (perhaps, if we are all like Adams’s three-year-old candy lovers,

264 By using the term ‘appropriate reflection’ I do not mean to imply that people who are, for instance, neuro atypical will become neuro-typical in the life to come.

265 I assume that, if we are like the three-year-old candy lover, God would provide us with all the relevant information to assess whether it is appropriate for us to feel guilt and shame. If God does not, that is, He hides some piece of pertinent information from us, and we conclude it is appropriate for us to feel guilt and shame when this is not actually the case, then God would be engaging in the sort of deception incompatible with a perfectly just, perfectly good omni-God. This is, I think, the point of Jesus’ comment in John 9:41, where he says ‘“If you were blind, you would have no guilt; but now that you say, ‘We see,’ your guilt remains.’
even nil), but it need not. So, inasmuch as the moral psychology response has the resources to navigate both Adams’s and DeRose’s objections, it explains more plausibly why those in hell might be permanently separated from God. However, this response does not yet explain whether God actually has a morally sufficient reason to allow those in hell to suffer in a way that is maximally bad.

Consider, then, the following possible morally sufficient reason: although it looks as though union with God is no longer naturally possible, for those in hell there might be new naturally possible states that become that person’s objective and subjective greatest good, and new naturally possible states that become the worst objective and subjective thing for them. If suffering to avoid the worst thing for a person, or to secure the best thing for that person, can be morally justified in this life, there is no reason why suffering might not also be justified if it can be used to avoid what might become the worst thing for a person, given the possibilities open to them, or to secure what has now become the best thing for them, given the possibilities open to them. In what remains of this section, I will identify and briefly analyse what I consider to be two such plausible ‘new states’, namely, (1) an alternate best/worst state (namely, an acquired second nature) and (2) an adapted best/worst state. I will take each in turn.

Once the possibility of union with God has gone, a person can still attempt to psychologically integrate themselves around what has become what Stump describes a person’s ‘acquired second nature’. 266 On the Thomist account Stump employs, after death a person’s disembodied soul is irreversibly fixed on a certain ‘ultimate end’ (either the desire for union with God, or desire for something else one considers preferable), such that even when the disembodied soul is re-bodied, so to speak, it can no longer change the orientation of this desire. 267 Aquinas writes:

In the same way, also, the souls which immediately after death are made miserable in punishment become unchangeable in their wills...

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266 See Stump 1986.
267 See SCG, Book 4, Chapters 93 and 95 for more details.
Now, on the ultimate end the entire goodness or wickedness of the will depends, for whatever goods one wills in an order toward a good end he wills well; whatever evil he wills in an order toward an evil end he wills badly. Therefore, there is not in the separated soul a will changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from this object of will to that so long as the order to the same ultimate end is preserved.

It is now apparent that such immutability is not in conflict with the power of free will whose act it is to choose, for choice is of the things for the end; choice is not of the ultimate end. Therefore, just as there is now no conflict with free will in the fact that with an immutable will we desire beatitude and fly from misery in general, so there will be no contrariety to free will in the fact that the will is unchangeably fixed upon some definite thing as upon an ultimate end. The reason: just as there now inheres in us unchangeably that common nature by which we desire beatitude in general, so then there will persist in us unchangeably that special disposition by which this thing or that is desired as ultimate end.268

Although this second-best state, namely, having a desire for some other ultimate end, might pale in comparison to union with God, securing, or getting as close to, that ultimate end may nevertheless be in some sense better than all other alternative states now open to that person.

Whilst it may not be possible to wholeheartedly psychologically integrate around a desire for such a second nature (and therefore may be harder to keep such a desire motivated), such a unifying desire might preserve the greatest possible degree of psychological integration for that inhabitant of hell.269 If we can tell a story about how God allows a person to suffer to encourage as much psychological integration as possible, and how allowing them to fulfil (as best they can) this ultimate end might in fact be the best thing for them (given the options open to them), we may

268 SCG Book 4, Chapters 93 and 95.
269 Contra Frankfurt, Stump suggests wholehearted psychological integration is only possible around the (supernatural) greatest good, namely, union with God. See Stump 2010 (125-6) for Stump’s engagement with Frankfurt.
be able to provide a morally sufficient reason for their suffering, perhaps even their maximally bad suffering, in hell.

This is all the more the case when one considers what appears to be the alternatives available to them. The alternative to such suffering appears, given their fragmentary second nature, certainly not to be ‘no suffering’ (especially when those with fragmentary second natures are likely to tend toward ever increasing self-inflicted suffering, as one finds in Dante’s Inferno). Rather, it looks like the alternative involves total psychological fragmentation. Given that total psychological fragmentation is often considered the effect of truly horrendous suffering, it seems fair to consider apparently maximally bad suffering that is designed to prevent total psychological fragmentation as in some sense better for that person. ²⁷⁰

So, if it were the case that suffering, even maximally bad self-inflicted suffering, was necessary to motivate psychological integration around this newly acquired ‘ultimate end’ (or ‘second nature’), just as it may be the case in this earthly life, God may have a morally sufficient reason to allow such suffering to occur in hell.

Having said this much, there is a serious issue with this type of response (at least, an issue if you want to preserve premise four, the maximally bad suffering of hell, by denying premise two in the opening argument). Whatever one thinks of the merits or demerits of this view, it looks like it cannot help but turn into a ‘mild’ hell. If one accepts the Thomist view that motivates this account, it looks like the mechanism that irreversibly fixes the will on a certain ultimate end might also prevent the will from total fragmentation. If this is the case, subsequent suffering cannot motivate the best thing for a person, or help that person avoid the worst thing. Rather, whatever suffering is endured is caused by the sufferer themselves as they try and reach their warped ultimate end. So, it looks like this view ends up always collapsing back into Stump’s ‘mild’ hell account. ²⁷¹ The only ways to read

²⁷⁰ Note that total psychological fragmentation in essence destroys the person (or at least, what makes the person a person).
²⁷¹ Stump writes:
maximally bad suffering into this account would involve either lowering the bar for what counts as maximally bad suffering, or, alternatively, including some element of ‘just’ maximally bad divine punishment, but I am not sure either response is worth pursuing, especially given the merits the ‘adapted’ nature account I will now turn to.

One of the motivations for the Thomist view is, of course, a defence of the free will of the inhabitant of hell, that is, their freely willed decision to remain in hell. However, by adopting the moral psychology response to explain the permanent separation from God of those in hell, it does not matter to my account whether a person is steadfast in desiring an alternative ultimate end, or whether they in fact do still retain (or come to have) a partial desire union with God.

And why might this be important? Well, at this juncture it will be helpful to recall a further way Aquinas qualifies union between persons. Union, Aquinas notes, can be real or affective. Real union occurs when two people are significantly present to

On Dante’s view, what God does with the damned is treat them according to their second nature, the acquired nature they have chosen for themselves. He confines them within a place where they can do no more harm to the innocent. In this way he recognizes their evil nature and shows that he has a care for it, because by keeping the damned from doing further evil, he prevents their further disintegration, their further loss of goodness and of being. He cannot increase or fulfil the being of the damned; but by putting restraints on the evil they can do, he can maximise their being by keeping them from additional decay. In this way, then, he shows love – Aquinas’s sort of love – for the damned.

And in the second place, in hell God provides for the damned a place in which they may still act and will in accordance with their nature, their second, self-chosen nature...[by granting the damned] a place in which to exercise [their second-nature], God allows [them] as much being, and thus, as much goodness, [as they are] capable of...In doing so God treats the damned according to their nature and promotes their good; and because He is goodness itself, by maximising the good of the damned, he comes as close as he can to uniting them with himself – that is to say, he loves them. (1986, 179)

272 ST I-II Q 28 A 1. See also Pruss 2010 (31-33) (although Pruss talks about ‘formal’ rather than ‘affective’ union, he is referring to the same thing), and Cleveland and Cleveland 2016 (13-14). Pruss writes, for instance:

But love and formal union can exist without any reciprocation, physical presence, or real union. I can love someone halfway around the world, with whom I will never have any contact, simply because I have read something about this person. (Such a love need not be entirely cheap; it might, for instance, include a commitment in favor of this person.) But we know that when we love, we are not satisfied with absence, even though we can love just as truly in absentia. Absence makes the heart fonder, but it does so precisely by making the lover long for presence. This is another way of seeing that love is not about its own growth: while absence makes love grow, what the lover desires is not absence, but presence. Formal union can be had even with those who are completely absent (note that absence is
each other, and are personally close. In this way, real union is necessarily reciprocal—the union of the saints and God in heaven, or of a close husband and wife might suffice as examples of real union. Affective union, on the other hand, only requires a limited kind of personal closeness. Affective union is a union of one mind with another; one person needing the other for who they are, and that same person somehow inhabiting or indwelling the mind of that other. In this way, then, affective union can occur without proximity, and can be unrequited. It is possible, for instance, to be affectively united with a distant friend, a pen pal you have never met, or even a character in a book (fictional or otherwise).

Given the psychological barriers of guilt and shame previously mentioned, real union between God and an inhabitant of hell looks impossible (even if it is half-heartedly, or even if, somehow, wholeheartedly, desired by those in hell). Real union must be wholeheartedly (at least with respect to God\textsuperscript{273}) reciprocally desired to obtain, but it must also be accompanied by significant personal presence, which includes dyadic attention with the other. A person with objective guilt and shame can, however, never wholeheartedly desire significant personal presence with God \textit{and be} (maximally) significant present to God, as there will always be a part of them that either wants to shy away from His presence, or reflexively does so anyway.\textsuperscript{274}

\begin{quote}
not just a physical distance; there is a sense in which a comatose beloved is largely absent), but love impels us toward real union. (33)
\end{quote}

Whilst Cleveland and Cleveland write:

Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of union characteristic of love: affective and real. Affective union is the union of the lover and the beloved in intellect and in will. Alexander Pruss explains that in affective union the lover strives to ‘enter’ the intellect of the beloved in order to understand the beloved from the beloved’s point of view. Such understanding leads to the union of will wherein the lover shares in the beloved’s joys and sorrows and wills her good. Real union is an additional union that lovers achieve through shared activity. The appropriate form of shared activity depends upon the form of love, e.g. the love of friends, spouses, etc. Since such shared activity involves cooperative interaction between the lovers, real union, unlike affective union, requires reciprocity. (14)

\textsuperscript{273} See Stump, 2010: 130-150.
\textsuperscript{274} Stump writes:

[N]othing about human beings can separate them from the powerful, providential, ever-present love of God. But what is desired in love is union. And even omnipotent God cannot unilaterally fulfill this desire of love. Even God cannot be united to Jerome if Jerome is alienated from himself. Insofar as Jerome is resistant to internal integration, he is in effect also resistant to union with God. (2010: 156)
But, even though real union might be impossible,\textsuperscript{275} affective union between God and that inhabitant might remain a possibility (even if unrequited). Recall, for instance, that on Stump’s account of omnipresence, God is always and everywhere – even in hell – available for union with his creation.\textsuperscript{276} However, the more psychologically fragmented a person becomes, the more distant they are from themselves, and the harder it becomes to affectively unite with ‘them’ (For who would God be uniting with, and which mind would He be indwelling?).\textsuperscript{277}

In desiring that a person is as integrated as they can be, God is desiring both that person’s now greatest good \textit{and} desiring as much union as is possible with that person; in sum, God is loving them as far as it is possible for Him to do so. So, God has a reason to want the inhabitant of hell to be as psychologically integrated as they can be. But, it also appears in some sense better for that person in hell to be as psychologically integrated as they can be, even if this means they endure perhaps (self-inflicted) maximally bad suffering.\textsuperscript{278}

For, why think God desires affective union with those in hell unrequitedly? Nothing in the account I have suggested precludes the possibility that those in hell actually do desire affective union with God (i.e., desire personal closeness, where personal closeness involves a need for the beloved and a desire to, in some sense, indwell in the mind of the beloved), and that a significant part of them really does desire real union with God (i.e., where they are close to wholeheartedly wanting personal closeness with God and where a part of them does in fact want to be significantly personally present to God).

\textsuperscript{275} Recall on Stump’s account, union with God must be desired wholeheartedly and be accompanied by significant personal presence. Anything less than wholehearted desire will not lead to union with God. (Stump, 2010: 130-150).

\textsuperscript{276} And on Zagzebski’s account of omnisubjectivity, God is always and everywhere capable of knowing the mind of a person as from that person’s perspective. See Zagzebski 2008.

\textsuperscript{277} See Stump, 2010: 156.

\textsuperscript{278} This is not only so they can be as (subjectively) good as they can be, but also more objectively, in as much as it is good to be loved by God, so that God can love them as fully as it is possible for them to be loved.
After seeing the goodness of God prior to inhabiting hell, such a person might now both desire and also, perhaps reflexively, not desire union with God. They are in this sense perhaps necessarily psychologically fragmented; those in hell might only have guilt and shame preventing them from dyadically attending to God (all other ‘parts’ of them might desire union with God, or at least, can be motivated through suffering to desire union with God), where either their fragmentation or their inability to dyadically attend to God is sufficient to permanently prevent them from real union with God. Indeed, given this possibility, I wonder whether those hell-bound (if indeed there are any) choose (if indeed they have to presence of mind to choose anything in God’s presence) to go to hell, rather than being forced to leave God’s revealed presence, knowing that hell, as a place where God’s revealed presence is not, is in some sense better for them. Recognising, perhaps, that the fact that it exists is an expression of God’s love for them, as it means they do not need to remain in God’s presence in unending (and perhaps more severe) psychological distress. After all, in this earthly life, we are told we cannot see God and live (and to that extent we are unable to wholeheartedly unite with God in this life). Might not the inhabitants of hell be in a state similar to the one we are in presently? The only difference being that they are without the future ability to engage in complete dyadic attention with God, yet with the (partial or perhaps even wholehearted) desire that they do so, and with the knowledge that such union is now impossible.

Given this, I suggest that the inhabitant of hell’s ‘weeping and gnashing of teeth’ that Jesus refers in the verse I opened with, that is, the very thing that makes the sufferings of hell maximally bad, might come from the knowledge that real union with God no longer possible for them, that they are to blame for this state of

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279 According to Romans 14:11, ‘every knee will bow before [Christ]; every tongue will acknowledge God.’ Perhaps at this point all person’s will come to have some desire for union with God, whilst at the same time recognising, through the psychological anguish caused by their guilt and shame, that they can never be significantly present to God.
280 To cite an example Stump uses, it is more loving for the abused spouse to leave (or in this case, to send away) the abusive husband than it is for her to remain, and thereby enable and worsen his continued psychological fragmentation (2006: 40).
281 See Exodus 33:20.
282 To the best of my knowledge, all variants of the ‘mild’ hell thesis reject one or more of these three claims.
affairs, and therefore that they will be forever frustrated, having lost that desire of their heart, a desire they have come to realise was the greatest good for them, and the fulfilment of their natural ultimate end.

Note now that this account of the maximally bad sufferings of hell has a significant advantage over the previously discussed second nature account. If Stump and Aquinas are right about the worst thing for a person being their separation from God (even if it is a willed separation), further physical punishment or torture would serve no practical purpose for those so separated; it would be otiose, and as such, completely unnecessary. Although traditional hell has been associated with a pain of loss and a pain of sense, the pain of sense seems, on this account, redundant. Whereas on the second-nature account, those in hell do not want to be united with God, and so cannot be tormented by that impossibility (and so require some further explanation for how and why they suffer), on this adapted-nature account, those in hell do (at least partially) want exactly that. The maximally bad sufferings of hell, then, might be best understood as a sort of self-inflicted mental anguish. The anguish and depression that accompanies the knowledge that the best thing for you is unattainable. That you can never experience the joy and peace that accompanies real union with God, never satisfied with what you achieve, consigned to forever having lost your heart’s desire. Condemned to the knowledge that your life, devoid of its ultimate purpose, may now not be worth living. This sort of anguish may well cause weeping and gnashing of teeth.

283 The ‘punishment’ of hell just is banishment from God’s revealed presence. However, this banishment might also be the most loving thing to do to a person psychologically incapable of being in the revealed presence of God. And so even this ‘punishment’ looks like it might serve to emphasize the love of God.

284 In this life, shame and guilt can lead to mental illness, especially depression. In the life to come, this same process might be amplified, only with the knowledge that there is no possibility of relief.

285 Especially if, upon fleetingly seeing God, a person realizes that union with Him, although now impossible, is in fact, the greatest of their heart’s desires.

286 Note here that the worst thing for a person is not permanent separation from God (there is a sense in which many people feel separated from God, not even recognising His existence, and seem to live lives that do not look like they are full of maximally bad suffering); the worst thing for a person is, perhaps, knowing that they are permanently separated from God coupled with the knowledge that that union with God was the best thing for them. This is something the second-nature view cannot accommodate, for on the second nature view, those in hell do not consider union with God a good thing, so must be ‘punished’ some other way in if they are at all to suffer in a way which is maximally bad (which is, I think, the reason why the second nature view tends towards a ‘mild’ hell variant).
Nevertheless, it may also be this same anguish, induced by the knowledge that real union with God is impossible, that, somehow, may, perhaps, yet encourage a reciprocal desire for affective union with God through the remembrance of His goodness, and so in this way motivate an inhabitant of hell away from their further and total psychological fragmentation.

On this account, the maximally bad suffering of hell, then, involves the (partial or indeed perhaps even wholehearted) desire for real union with God, accompanied by the knowledge that real union is impossible. Nevertheless, affective union (even wholeheartedly willed affective union) with God might remain within an inhabitant of hell’s grasp, and this suffering (the mental anguish over the aforementioned) that they experience may be justified in as much as it prevents their further fragmentation (allowing God to more effectively affectively unite with them, but also preventing their total psychological fragmentation and the destruction of their personhood) and also inasmuch as it might motivate the desire for their affective union with God, just as suffering does for us now on Stump’s theodicy, by causing them to recall the bittersweet memory of God’s goodness as it was revealed to them.

Before moving on, there is a general worry for this argument that I want to address. I have been trying to preserve a ‘grim’ account of hell, a hell in which maximally bad suffering does occur. To do this, I have suggested that those in hell really do suffer the worst thing possible for them, their permanent separation from God. But, to explain why God might have a morally sufficient reason for permitting such suffering, it looks like the justification for this suffering has to involve avoiding

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287 To see how this might be the case, note that such suffering would consist in the inhabitant of hell’s memory of their wrongdoing, and the guilt and shame that follow this recollection. But guilt and shame also drive people to reflect upon the goodness of God (for it is in recognition of God’s goodness that their wrongdoing produces guilt and shame), where this reflection on the goodness of God is sufficient to motivate desire for affective union with Him.

288 Sweet as God revealed His goodness to them and the nature of their creator was revealed to them, bitter as this prompted the mental anguish that necessitated their habitation of hell.

289 This ‘memory’ (or, perhaps, working of the conscience) could be ‘the worm that never dies’ of Isaiah 66:24 and Mark 9:48. Likewise ‘their fire’ of Isaiah 66:24 could constitute the desire for God, a desire that can never be fully quenched. A desire caused and bolstered by the remembrance of God’s goodness (an aspect, perhaps, of the ‘worm that never dies’). See Talbott 2004 (218) for more on how this might be the case.
something even worse for them.\textsuperscript{290} If this is the case, it looks like their suffering is not, in fact, the worst thing for them. And without that, it looks like my account might collapse into a ‘mild’ hell. Nevertheless, I can respond to this concern. Inasmuch as such suffering might prompt a desire for affective union with God (a future benefit that may or may not be consented to), it also wards off that person’s total psychological fragmentation (a negative benefit that requires no such consent, at least on Stump’s account). Certainly, total psychological fragmentation looks like it would be worse for a person, but in this instance, looks are deceiving. For total psychological fragmentation in fact \textit{annihilates} that which makes that person a person.\textsuperscript{291} If we posit that, for an inhabitant of hell, remaining in God’s revealed presence would accelerate their total psychological fragmentation, and that God not prompting an unfulfillable desire for union with Him through recollection of His goodness would also inevitably lead to total psychological fragmentation, we can suggest that hell really is the worst thing \textit{for that person, as a person}. In each of the other two cases, total psychological fragmentation removes that person’s personhood. And in so removing, in each case, perhaps, there is then no \textit{person} that suffers total psychological fragmentation, for there is no person left at all.\textsuperscript{292}

On this account, then, hell is a place where its inhabitants are motivated to be as good (i.e., as psychologically integrated) as they can be, namely, psychologically integrated around an adapted desire for affective union with God,\textsuperscript{293} and as close as it is possible for God to be to them. Already permanently separated from real union

\textsuperscript{290} Suffering for future benefit alone, as mentioned earlier, requires some form of consent. And it is far from clear such consent would be given, or even could be given, by those in a ‘grim’ hell.

\textsuperscript{291} See, for instance, Frankfurt 1971 on why this might be the case.

\textsuperscript{292} There are two further responses that could be levelled at this account. Firstly, is this making room for the possibility of a species of annihilationism (the annihilation of a person)? If so, why think that is less preferable to continuous experience of the worst thing for a person? Secondly, it looks like the prospect of total psychological fragmentation is in fact the worst thing for a person, not permanent separation from a God you desire union with. As a result, it looks like hell is no longer as ‘grim’ as first thought. But, if the latter does now not constitute maximally bad suffering (i.e., if hell is no longer ‘grim’), there can be no maximally bad suffering in this life either, for in this life we cannot be permanently separated from God whilst desiring union with Him.

\textsuperscript{293} ‘Adapted’ in as much as, on the Stump/Aquinas account, the only desire you can wholeheartedly integrate around is the desire for real union with God. The desire for affective union with God is a pale second-best, but it is still within the genus of desire for union with God, and so the work Stump has done to motivate union with God as the objective/subjective greatest good for a person still applies, and as such, is very likely using this desire as a unifying desire is as close as an inhabitant of hell might come to total psychological integration.
with God, I suggested that the maximally bad suffering of hell’s inhabitants (the mental anguish that accompanies reflection on that very fact) may be sufficiently morally justified through an appeal to the negative benefit of avoiding that which would destroy their personhood, their further alienation from God and from themselves through their total psychological fragmentation, and, perhaps, through an appeal to the positive benefit of securing what is now naturally the best thing for them, namely, their affective union with God.

On this model, God can demonstrate his goodness by showing his love for those in hell by doing all He can to help them in their fragmentary adapted nature. It may well be the case that, in doing this, prima facie maximally bad self-inflicted (mental) suffering is inevitable. Such suffering, however, may be necessary to preserve or maintain whatever psychological integration remains possible for the inhabitant of hell. For in so preserving, that person is able lead a life as worthwhile as it is possible for a life to be that has lost its original and ultimate purpose.  

I have argued that there might be a morally sufficient reason for an omniscient, omnipotent perfectly good God to allow the maximally bad suffering of a person in hell, namely, for the negative benefit of avoiding further alienation from God and from themselves, and possibly, with consent, the limited future benefit of affective union with God.  

To defend this account, I have suggested the reason the inhabitants of hell remain where they are, unable to wholeheartedly desire union with God, is not due to the value of their continued free choice, rather, it is down to a respect for their moral psychology. This claim requires a very high estimation of Christ’s atoning work, treating it not only as a one-off, but also limiting the ability of a person to make use of the provisions of Christ’s work to this earthly life – a point I will return to in the final chapter of this thesis.  

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294 What such a life might look like, and how similar that life might be to our earthly lives, is left an open question.
295 In this case, both negative and future benefit appear to refer to the same thing, so whether or not consent is given for their suffering for future benefit, the point is moot.
296 But as I have mentioned, there is scriptural support for this estimation.
presented is successful, it goes a long way to preserving the goodness of an omni-
God, even, I think, if one accepts the traditional account of a ‘grim’ hell.297

Resurrection and the Beatific Vision

Before I conclude this chapter, it is also worth asking why the beholding of the
beatific vision is available only in the life to come? Why not make it available now?
Several previously introduced ideas are at play in the answer to this question.

First, on Aquinas’s account of mind, a person has both a will and an intellect, where
the will is an appetite or inclination for goodness in general (but cannot alone
determine what is in fact good), and where the intellect apprehends what it takes
to be good and presents this to the will as such.

Second, on Aquinas’s metaphysics, being and goodness are coreferential. If God is
the greatest being, then, God is also the greatest good.

Third, on Aquinas’s account of love, love consists in the desire for (at best, real)
union with the beloved, and the desire for the ultimate good of the beloved. If the
greatest good is God, then union with God is the greatest good for a person, whilst
real union, as mentioned requires mutual personal revelation (such that it is
theoretically possible, in empathy, to be ‘moved’ by the other such that one comes
to ‘inhabit’ their mind, in order to see the world as they see it) and, among other
things, dyadic attention with the other (the sort of unmediated shared attention (or
meeting of minds) experienced when I know that you know that I know that you are
looking at me looking at you, looking at me, and so on).

297 Hell is, therefore, a place where God shows as much love to a person as He can, both wanting the
best for them, and wanting to be united as best He can with them. My view, then, requires that all
come to desire union with God, but only some are capable of wholehearted desire (i.e., those who
have dealt with guilt and shame in this life), whilst others (i.e., those who did not deal with their
guilt and shame in this life) are only capable of half-hearted desire (and therefore, like Isaiah found
himself, unable to remain in God’s presence), and so are consigned to hell. But make no mistake, on
this account hell remains a desperate place of willed loneliness, of maximally bad mental suffering,
of weeping and gnashing of teeth in the knowledge that one can never have the desire of one’s
heart, and that the best thing for you, real union with God, is forever lost.
Fourth, and finally: in order for a union of love to be worth something, in order for it to be valuable, it has to be the product of what Swinburne calls ‘serious free will’. According to Swinburne:

...if reasons alone influence action, an agent inevitably does what he believes to be the best, if desires alone influence action, an agent will inevitably follow his strongest desire. Free choice of action therefore arises only in two situations. One is where there is a choice between two actions which the agent regards as equal best which the agent desires to do equally; which...is the situation of very unserious free will. The other is where there is a choice between two actions, one of which the agent desires to do more and the other of which he believes it better to do...the more serious the free will and the stronger the contrary temptation, the better it is when the good action is done.298

Given Aquinas’s moral psychology, were God, the greatest good, to reveal Himself to a person He had just created, there is no question that that person would reflexively desire union with Him – why would they chose otherwise? However, the resulting union could never be the product of serious free will. Such a person would be acting no differently to the way an automaton would act. Rather, for a person to exercise serious free will, they must be placed into a situation where they have two truly competing desires, such that they might come to develop an effective higher-order (or second-order) desire299 for union with God, rather than for the alternative. In the case of both the primal and original sin, I have suggested, somewhat paradoxically, that this competing desire is for knowledge of God in one’s own time (i.e., with more immediacy), rather than on God’s timing.

So, at least initially, God cannot fully reveal the beatific vision to a person. Rather, He would need to engineer a situation whereby that person would come to exercise their serious free will to choose between union with Him or to choose something opposed to Him, namely, something desirable but bad. Unfortunately, a situation

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299 That is, an intellect-will-intellect-will move.
that genuinely allows for the exercise of serious free will also then allow for the possibility of that person’s rejecting God (namely, desiring knowledge of God before God is ready to give it). And this rejection brings with it two separate but equally intractable issues that militate against the future possibility of a person’s beholding the beatific vision.

Willed rejection of God is taken to lead to a general sort of willed loneliness in a person. This loneliness is caused in two ways: First, that a person’s ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ over their past bad actions cause their present psychological fragmentation, that is, the dividing of their mind against itself in such a way that it is then impossible for God to be personally close to them, for they are not even close with themselves. Second, that ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ inhibit dyadic attention. Someone who is shamed, or guilty, will, so the theory goes, reflexively avoid sharing eye contact, and indeed, where possible, will exhibit a tendency to avoid the other person entirely. Given this, it is supposed such reflexive avoidance is sufficient to prevent someone from also beholding the beatific vision. So, before a person with shame and guilt can behold the beatific vision, each must be dealt with. And whilst this process, if it is to obtain at all, must begin in this life, Aquinas thought it could only be completed in the life to come.

So, for these reasons, I suggest, the beatific vision is both the key to a person’s final and perfect happiness, but also, that this vision, and therefore that happiness, must also wait for the life to come.

What is therefore minimally required for access to the beatific vision in the life to come is that a person in this life (1) forms a serious higher-order desire to behold this vision (i.e., to unite with God), and (2) that they, based upon this freely-willed higher-order desire, start the process of dealing with their guilt and shame. For, if a person does not deal with their guilt or shame, or they do not have a desire to behold the beatific vision, it seems that person cannot behold the vision of God,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{300}}\text{Where, as mentioned, ‘shame’ is taken as a placeholder for ‘the belief that it would be appropriate that another reject you as a person’ and ‘guilt’ is taken as a placeholder for ‘the belief that it would be appropriate that another desire your hard treatment’.}\]
and so the best place for them to be is somewhere where God’s presence is not manifest, namely, hell.\textsuperscript{301}

Leaving the second of these requirements to one side for the moment\textsuperscript{302}, if this higher-order desire is to be effective post-mortem, however the Christian conceives of their resurrection, this resurrection must, therefore, minimally require some form of volitional continuity.

Although Aquinas does not explicitly make this connection himself, he clearly has the resources to have done so.\textsuperscript{303}

Love, for Aquinas, goes two-ways. It is not just that we might love God; God also loves us, and desires union with us – that is, to indwell in our minds as we might desire to indwell in His.\textsuperscript{304} Unlike us, however, Aquinas’s God is both omnipresent and omniscient, and therefore, has complete knowledge of and access to a person’s volitional complex at the point of their death.\textsuperscript{305} He has ever before Him something like the human version of the beatific vision with respect to us: God knows us fully and completely long before we have the opportunity to know Him in the same way.

And not only does God know whether a person, at the point of their death, has a second-order desire for union with Him, He also knows whether they have started to deal with their guilt and shame, too. Thus, as I see it given Aquinas’s account, all God needs to do ensure that the requirements of minimal resurrection are met is reanimate a person’s volitional complex, the complex He has already known completely and fully indwelt.

But, the object of this reanimation need not necessarily be the person’s \textit{original} body, at least, not with just the foregoing in mind.\textsuperscript{306} On this minimal account, it

\textsuperscript{301} As suggested, such a place would, arguably, be better for that person.
\textsuperscript{302} It is worth noting here that guilt and shame also require significant memory retention of past indiscretions, so these, too would need to be preserved.
\textsuperscript{303} It must be noted, Aquinas is emphatically \textit{not} a materialist, believing the soul to be the (necessarily immaterial) substantial form of the body.
\textsuperscript{304} ST I-II Q 28 A 2.
\textsuperscript{305} ST I Q 14 A 9.
\textsuperscript{306} Although, of course, it could, if such a body, like Christ’s, were still available. Alternatively, as van Inwagen proposes, God could just miraculously preserve a person’s brain stem, and so preserve their brain states until the resurrection.
seems volitional continuity is all that is necessary for beholding the beatific vision, and this can be kept safe inside the mind of God, without needing to invoke Thomas’s strange theory of hylomorphic disembodiment. Even without the presence of a physical body, God has full knowledge of who you are in a far superior, but mechanistically similar way to the way we might, through well written biographies, and the like, come to partially indwell the minds of long-dead historical figures, or even, through reading well written fiction, come to inhabit the mind of a fictional character. On this model, then, God remains affectively united with you post-mortem, and all He needs to do to secure your resurrection is reanimate your previous volitional complex into a hunk of flesh that may or may not look roughly like you do, or did.

Again, all that is required to meet the criteria for beholding the beatific vision is that a person’s volitional complex, kept in, or ‘downloaded’ into, at death, the mind of God, be ‘uploaded’ into a body (be it old or new) and reanimated.

This view that I am proposing looks, on the face of it, a close cousin to Lynne Rudder-Baker’s ‘first-person perspective’ constitution model. On her view, ‘What makes a person a person’ she writes:

Is having a first-person perspective. What makes a human person human is being constituted by a human body... the sameness of pre- and post-mortem person is the sameness of first-person perspective.

Thus, in resurrection, the same person is resurrected, but they can be constituted by a different body.

As I see it, however, there are two major differences between my account and Rudder-Baker’s. First, I do not claim to provide an explanation of the persistence of

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307 For more on the problems with Aquinas’s account of hylomorphic disembodiment, see Van Dyke 2014a.
308 A ‘hunk of flesh’ that nevertheless has roughly the same brain states (and so forth) as I had before I died.
309 If one is a reductionist, one must concede that it is at least possible to preserve this sort of snapshot of a person’s general volitional complex immediately prior to their death because this volitional complex must be materially represented in one’s body somehow anyway.
personal identity over time, something her account purports to do, but seem unable to provide.\textsuperscript{311} Instead, I am merely giving an account of what is minimally necessary in an explanation of resurrection for the beholding of the beatific vision.\textsuperscript{312} Second, my minimalist account does not require the reanimation or ‘uploading’ of the full first-person perspective (whatever that is\textsuperscript{313}) in order for the beatific vision to be beheld – the full first-person perspective is in that sense surplus to my requirements, although, of course, this minimalist account does not rule it out.\textsuperscript{314}

So, although physical continuity might not be necessary, I have suggested that volitional continuity is in fact necessary in order to behold the beatific vision.\textsuperscript{315}

In the final chapters of this thesis, I will, through reflection on the work of Christ, look at these requirements for beholding the beatific vision, namely, that a person form a freely willed desire to behold it, and that they (at least start to) deal with whatever objective guilt and shame they may have. In addition, I will look at the possibility that availing of Christ’s work might be a limited one-off, as necessitated by the account of hell discussed above.

Before I get there, however, I will focus on establishing the general lineaments for exactly how an account of the Atonement might deal with guilt and shame, and how it might deal with the propensity to prefer one’s power and pleasure over the

\textsuperscript{311} See, for instance, van Inwagen 2017.
\textsuperscript{312} To my account might be added any number of further requirements in order to preserve personal identity. See, for instance, van Inwagen 1978, or Zimmermann 1999.
\textsuperscript{313} I am not convinced that I fully understand what a ‘first-person perspective’ is, at least in the way that would allow for it to be preserved over time. I am, however, much happier with understanding what a desire is, and also what self-reflexive reactive attitudes (like guilt and shame) might be.
\textsuperscript{314} In fact, it may be that the full first-person perspective is required to preserve a person’s guilt and shame – I am not sure about this, though. Either way, I think it is plausible that the full first-person perspective is contained in God’s mind.
\textsuperscript{315} Although, oddly, it may not be sufficient for maintaining personal identity in the resurrection, such that what is necessary for beholding the beatific vision is not sufficient for maintaining personal identity. See van Inwagen 2017. However, van Inwagen must, on the account I have given, provide an account for volitional continuity if his resurrected persons are to behold the beatific vision. I cannot see how he can do this without the sort of move I have made, that is, keeping a person’s volitional complex in the mind of God until such a time as that person’s ‘naked kernel’ is resurrected. Furthermore, this is not completely alien to Christian theology. Certain accounts of deification also include the resurrected losing their personhood in their union with Christ.
greater good of union with God that the doctrine of original sin teaches that we all now share.
Chapter 3

A Framework for Atonement

In chapter one, I suggested that whatever problems the Atonement resolves, the outcome of this resolution allows a person to unite with God, at the beatific vision. In chapter two, I identified three inhibitors to beholding the beatific vision, and therefore, inhibitors to union with God, and I suggested that whatever else the Atonement does, that the Atonement must therefore also remove these inhibitors.

The inhibitors I identified included:

(i) a disordering in the mind that causes a person to prefer lesser goods like power and pleasure over greater goods like union with God,

(ii) psychological fragmentation of the mind that prevents God becoming close to you, and

(iii) guilt and shame, which can cause both psychological fragmentation and also inhibit the sort of dyadic joint attention necessary for real union with God.

In this chapter, I will look, in general terms, at how each of these three inhibitors to union with God might be dealt with. I will suggest one way in which the view of grace I earlier outlined in chapter one might help us understand how to deal with (i) (through operative grace) and (ii) (through cooperative grace). I will then address various methods for dealing with both shame and guilt, before turning finally to the question of forgiveness.

In the two chapters that follow, I will develop a more pointedly theological account of how the life, passion, death and resurrection of Christ might be used by the believer to deal with each of these inhibitors, using the general psychological framework developed in this chapter.
Grace and the Will of Justification

In chapter two I suggested that it is a consequence of the doctrine of original sin that orthodox Christian belief about union with God is tempered by what Kevin Timpe has called ‘an Anti-Pelagian Constraint’ (APC):

(APC) No fallen human individual is able to cause or will any good, including the will of her coming to have the will of justification [that is, saving faith], apart from a unique grace.\(^{316}\)

This unique, or operative, grace is taken to be a gift from God. Aquinas, for example, defines operative grace as:

An operation which is part of an effect is attributed to the mover, not to the thing moved. The operation is therefore attributed to God when God is the sole mover, and when the mind is moved but not a mover. We then speak of ‘operative grace.’\(^{317}\)

On the Thomist account of moral psychology I have been working with, a person is said to act with freedom of the will if their first-order and second-order volitions align, that is, if that person does what they want to want to do. However, that person remains morally responsible for their first-order volitions regardless of whether first- and second-order volitions align, assuming there has been no internal manipulation between the first-order intellect, will, and action.\(^{318}\) As noted in chapter one, for real union to obtain it must be freely willed, that is, God cannot internally manipulate either a person’s second-order desires, or the connection between their first- and second-order volitions. And so, operative grace, if it is to lead to real union, must likewise do so without such internal manipulation. So, how can grace be operative and yet not violate a person’s freedom of the will?

Well, given that on this Thomist account of mind, a person’s will is already inclined to goodness in general, and, given that most theists (and certainly all Thomists) are committed to the belief that God is good, and that union with God is the greatest

\(^{316}\) Timpe, 2007: 285.
\(^{317}\) ST I-II A 111 Q 2.
\(^{318}\) For instance, the sort of manipulation wrought by some future mad neuroscientist.
good for a person, it seems that all God needs to do to motivate a desire for Him in a person is, as previously mentioned, to simply to reveal, partially or fully, His goodness to them. If this person appropriately attends to this revelation of goodness, such a person would come to desire union with God, that is, they would come to have saving faith.\textsuperscript{319}

This revelation of goodness could come through some supernatural second personal encounter with God (including, for instance, at the beatific vision), or a (perhaps triadic) encounter with God through scripture and other instances of special divine action; however, this revelation could also come through more natural means. According to the Apostle Paul in Romans 1:19-20, God placed evidence of His divine nature, that is to say, His goodness, into His creation at the point of creation, and that this revelation can still be seen. Paul writes,

> For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without excuse.

So, perhaps, reflecting on the beauty of a spectacular sunset on the ocean, or the grandeur of a Himalayan mountain range, or even just the beauty of a tree, or a mathematical proof, or one’s spouse, might be sufficient to perceive the goodness of their creator. If operative grace can be explained as the revelation of God’s goodness, and, if this revelation is readily available to all in God’s creation, then operative grace is always and everywhere available to all.

If operative grace can be explained by the mere revelation of God’s goodness, can we offer an account of freely willed union that is compatible with APC?

Perhaps not just yet. According to the Anti-Pelagian Constraint, no fallen human individual can cause or will any good, including the will of her coming to saving faith, apart from a unique grace. There is a crucial step between God’s revelation of His goodness in creation and a person coming to have saving faith, namely, that

\textsuperscript{319} For an account of saving faith as a second-order desire for union with God, see Efird and Worsley 2015.
person appropriately attending to this revelation. Since the Anti-Pelagian Constraint prevents a person from coming to saving faith by themselves, it would also seem to prevent a person from coming to appropriately attend to this revelation. Rather than accept such a revelation as being from God, and reflecting His goodness, the fallen human individual looks set to reject this revelation. The Anti-Pelagian Constraint, then, entails a sort of willed blindness or deafness to God’s goodness by the fallen human individual.

The Thomist account, however, has the resources to respond to this difficulty, too. Recall that on Aquinas’s account of the will, the will is not just a binary switch between ‘accepting something’ and ‘rejecting something’, for the will is more akin to an appetite, and as such, can also be quiescent with respect to something, neither accepting it or rejecting it, but rather, neutral to it, that is to say, having no attitude toward it. If it is the case that quiescence with respect to God’s in-creation revelation of goodness is sufficient for ‘appropriate attendance’, that is, omitting to reject that this is a revelation of God’s goodness, all that is needed for Anti-Pelagian Constraint compatible saving faith is for the will to become quiescent with respect to this operative grace.320

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320 There is a debate in the secondary literature over the level of control one has over coming to quiescence. For Stump (2003, 389-404), coming to quiescence is not necessarily something that can be controlled (that is to say, quiescence is not intentional, not a product of a second-order volition). However, Timpe (2007) argues if it cannot be controlled, strictly speaking one cannot be said to have had any control over whether one comes to saving faith. For Timpe (and Ragland 2006), therefore, coming to quiescence is a state that you have some sort of quasi-control over (i.e., that quiescence is intentional, it is the product of a second-order volition). Responding to Timpe’s claim, Simon Kittle (2015) argues that, if one can control (quasi or directly) whether one is quiescent or not, then, however this is explained, such a view cannot be compatible with the Anti-Pelagian Constraint set out at the start of this paper (for if quiescence is intentional, if it is the product of a second-order volition, and if one knows one will come to saving faith if one is quiescent, coming to quiescence looks very similar indeed to APC incompatible ‘acceptance’). In response to Kittle’s concern, we follow Stump’s initial position: you are not in control over whether you are quiescent with respect to God’s operative grace. By that we mean that you do not form an intentional second-order volition to become quiescent, so quiescence is best considered a first-order wanton omission (first-order because one has not formed a second-order volition motivating this desire). However, it may be the case that your actions might, unintentionally, make it easier or harder to for God (or natural sufferings and blessing) to motivate you to such a wanton first-order omission, and you do have control over that. The difference between our position and Stump’s comes in the nature of grace. For Stump, grace is infused into a person’s will by God. On our account, grace inspires a quiescent person’s intellect to move their will to desire union with God. On our account, it is your intellect that presents to your will the goodness of union with God, and the will which then desires this. Unlike on Stump’s (and Timpe’s) infusion account, there is no internal manipulation present, there is only mere external motivation or inspiration. Although this movement from intellect to will might be a
However, if the Anti-Pelagian Constraint entails that a fallen human individual’s will’s natural state is to reject this operative grace, either (1) God must internally manipulate a person’s will to a state of quiescence, or (2) that person’s will must be externally motivated towards such quiescence. Clearly (1) seems to jeopardise the possibility of freely willed union. So, might (2) get us what we want?

Elsewhere, Stump argues that external motivation to quiescence takes the form of ‘melting’ or ‘cracking’ a person’s heart. Stump argues that (natural or supernaturally inspired) suffering, along with the experience of (natural or supernaturally inspired) blessings and love, is an important part of this melting or cracking process. Such natural suffering and blessing, coupled with instances of supernatural suffering and blessing might then be sufficient to motivate quiescence; however, I will return to how this might be the case in a little more detail in the next section.

A more difficult objection to avoid comes from tradition, where grace is considered operative on the will (through ‘infusion’) as well as on the intellect. In the subconscious process, it is a process contained entirely within the agent, and recall that on Aquinas’s account, one therefore remains morally responsible for this action. Inasmuch as unintentionally falling in love with another person does not look problematic to the seriousness of whatever relationship ensues (so long as the other has not internally manipulated your brain to so fall in love), neither is unintentionally falling in love with God problematic, at least as far as we can see it. Just as one’s prior action, action one does in fact control, might influence the sort of person one falls in love with, even if one never intends nor foresees this outcome, so it may be with coming to desire union (i.e., coming to love) God. Interestingly, coming to have saving faith looks like it might mirror almost exactly the primal sin. Whilst the primal sinner had a second-order volition for justice that should have made willing lesser goods impossible, they nevertheless somehow still managed a first-order volition for a lesser good. For the fallen person coming to saving faith, whilst they have a second-order volition for lesser goods that should have made willing greater goods impossible, they nevertheless somehow still manage to some sort of first-order volition for a greater good. We suspect whatever solution we have for the primal sin (for instance, that it occurred due to an omission to reflect on second-order volitions) will also come to bear on this problem.

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The notion of a heart’s cracking or melting is, of course, a metaphor. To speak of something’s cracking or melting is to describe something’s giving way to an external force after (or in spite of) some internal resistance or disinclination. To say that a heart cracks or melts, then, is to imply that a will which previously was resistant or disinclined towards something urged on it by someone (or something) else gives over its dissent and leaves off its resistance. (387)

322 One problem with this ‘infusion’ account comes when one thinks about the nature of union. Serious sorts of union must be product of two wills, but on this infusion account, unless one intentionally acts to permit such an infusion (the position Timpe (2007) argues must be the case), union can only ever be the product of one will, namely, Gods. For God infuses in you the desire to
account so far provided, operative grace seems operative on the intellect alone (through what we might call ‘inspiration’ or ‘motivation’). It seems less that the will changes its disposition and more that it is overpowered by the intellect. The concern here, then, is that unless supernaturally changed, the will will just revert to its ‘default’ fallen dispositions once the revelatory stimuli is removed, or lessens.

But note that Stump’s version of Thomist moral psychology has the resources to deal with this objection, too. On the Thomist account, whilst both are appetites for goodness in general, we can offer a more fine-grained distinction between the dispositions of the first- and second-order will. The second-order will is (was) ordered around a desire for goodness as justice (‘rectitude’) whilst the first is (was) around the desire for pleasurable good (‘concupiscence’). As alluded to in chapter two, Aquinas believed that the correct ordering of the second-order will for justice was a gift of grace given to Adam by God, and that this was lost after the fall.323 With justice now un-guided, Adam and those who follow him would do what was right in their own eyes, and in such a confused state, their first-order volitions would no longer necessarily align with their (now confused) second-order desires.324

With that in mind, we can draw out two responses. The first is just this: if the correct ordering of Adam’s second-order will was a gift of grace, such that when it

will union with Him. On our account, God merely inspires this desire, and so there is no such internal manipulation in a person’s moral psychology. Without this internal manipulation, intentional control is less important for us than it is for Timpe. In as much as Jack unintentionally falling in love with Jill does not reduce the seriousness of whatever union then follows between them, neither would Jack unintentionally falling in love with God reduce the seriousness of whatever union then follows between them.

323 See ST I- II Q 82 A 2.

Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.

324 See Genesis 5:7, 6:5 and Judges 17:6. Aquinas would go on to liken such a state to one as being like a wine barrel with the hoops removed. See QDM Q 4, A 2, ad 4.
was removed, Adam could no longer correctly order his desires, how is that any
different to the account proposed here? On this account, when appropriately
attended to, God’s gift of grace (the revelation of his goodness), is also sufficient to
correctly order desires. The only difference is, perhaps, in degree. The revelation of
God’s goodness that Adam received might have been in some way clearer than the
revelation we receive, and so the revelation we receive might have a weaker effect
on our intellect and will. But, just as Adam’s will became disordered when this grace
was removed, so might a person’s will become likewise disordered should grace,
this revelatory stimulus, be removed or weakened.

Secondly, note that on Stump’s account, there are both first-, second-, and,
crucially third-order desires possible.\(^{325}\) Third-order desires have the capacity to
move second-order acts of intellect and will.\(^{326}\) In being able to move the will, third-
order volitions also have the capacity to affect the disposition of the will. Thus,
these third-order volitions look like they have the capacity to affect the disposition
of the second-order will, as a third-order act of will can act on the second-order will
directly. Just as first-order habits can be formed by second-order acts of will,

\(^{325}\) Stump writes,

[In forming a third-order volition, the agent is not reiterating the process gone through to
formulate a second-order volition... forming a third-order volition consists in reasoning
about and either accepting or rejecting a second-order volition. So an agent has a third-
order volition V3 to bring about some second-order volition V2 in himself only if his intellect
at the time of the willing represents V2, under some description, as the good to be pursued.
But since V2 is a desire for a first-order volition V1 generated by a reason’s representing V1
(at that time) as the good to be pursued, V3 will consist just in reaffirming the original
reasoning about V1 which led to V2. In forming a third-order volition and considering
whether he wants to have the relevant second-order volition, the agent will consider
whether a desire for a desire for some action p (or state of affairs q) is the good to be
pursued. But a desire for a desire for p (or q) will be a good to be pursued just in case the
desire for p (or q) is a good to be pursued, and that in turn will depend on whether the
agent considers p (or q), under some description, at that time, a good to be pursued. So a
third-order volition that supports a currently held second-order volition is in effect just the
expression of a re-evaluating and affirming of the reasoning that originally led to V1. And, in
the same way, a third-order volition that rejects a currently held second-order volition will
just be an expression of the re-evaluation and rejection of the reasoning that led to the
second-order volition. A third-order volition, then, is a result of a recalculation of the
reasoning that originally underlay a second-order volition. (Stump, 1988: 405)

\(^{326}\) Stump writes regarding third-order desires, ‘There are also cases in which an agent’s reasoning is
confused and warrants conflicting second-order desires. An agent who notices such a conflict in his
second-order desires and who reflects on it may then sort out the confusion in his reasoning and
form a third-order volition in consequence.’ (1988: 406)
perhaps third-order acts of will can forge second-order habits, directly affecting the dispositions of the second-order will in a way second-order acts of intellect alone were unable to do.

Imagine a drug addict, John, who is unable to form second-order volitons. He wants to want to quit, and he wants to want to continue to take heroin. Now, whilst in this state, John hears that his former partner has late stage cancer and is not long for this world. Shortly thereafter, John wakes up in the emergency room; he had (inadvertently) taken an overdose. Whilst still in the emergency room, his doctor, a childhood friend and someone familiar with his situation, reprimands him seriously:

Look, John. You could easily have died tonight. Had you been found five minutes later, you would not have made it. Think of your daughter. If you died, your child would soon be an orphan. You have no other family – your child would be put into the foster system. Have you thought about what might happen to her?

With this, the doctor turns and leaves the room. John is stunned. The doctor’s reprimand cuts him to the core. This event is an occasion for him to see afresh the cost his wanting to want to remain an addict might have on his child, and in so reasoning about what he now wants to want to want, he is able to weaken his second-order desire to remain an addict, and strengthen his second-order desire to quit such that it forms a second-order volition. His addiction has not disappeared, but John now has the strength of will to start to fight against it. Over time, through repeated reflection on the doctor’s comments, and through habitual rejection of drugs, John is now, perhaps, able to strengthen his will to the place where he can control his drug use.

Returning to this account of grace; all we need now to do is posit that God’s revelation of goodness motivates an analogous second-order habit forming third-order desire. When appropriately attended to, such a revelation of God’s goodness could, then, in some indirect sense, be operative on the dispositions of the second-
order will. So, if either one of these responses gains traction, it looks like this objection from tradition can be addressed as well.

If this is plausible, it seems the revelation of God’s goodness can in fact motivate a person to (an ordinary, non-wholehearted second-order) desire union with God, namely, to the will of justification, even given the Anti-Pelagian Constraint. So, that might be one response to the first inhibitor to union, but what about the second, that it is impossible to be personally close to a person who remains in some sense psychologically fragmented?

**Suffering and Sanctification**

In the previous section, I equated the will of justification (i.e., saving faith) with an ordinary (non-wholehearted) second-order desire for union with God. In chapter one, I suggested that an ordinary second-order desire was not sufficient for union with God, as the presence of conflicting second-order desires entailed the presence of psychological fragmentation, and that it is impossible even for God to be sufficiently close enough for maximal real union with a person who is so psychologically fragmented. It is therefore also part of the Christian tradition that a person who has the will of justification also goes through the process of sanctification, a process that both preserves the will of justification and integrates other second-order desires around the desire for union with God. The process of sanctification, then fulfills the following two desiderata:

1. integrating all second-order desires around the desire for union with God, and
2. aligning a person’s first-order volition around the second-order volition for union with God.

However, once a person has the will of justification, that is, they have a second-order desire for union with God, grace no longer needs to be operative, for it can now be cooperative. Nevertheless, in virtue of the fact this second-order desire for union with God is not wholehearted, such cooperation is only a possibility, and by
no means guaranteed. As a result, God must still externally motivate the believer to ensure psychological integration around this desire for union with God. The necessity of this external motivation, which as I will indicate, is most often associated with suffering, is one reason why, for instance, Gregory the Great would write that it is mysterious:

when things go well with good people here, and ill with bad people... 327

And John Chrysostom would write:

to have these sufferings is the privilege of those especially dear to God. 328

In her book, *Wandering in Darkness*, Stump teases out the way suffering can aid in the process of sanctification (and in its close neighbour, perseverance), that is, in the process of psychological integration. For Stump, suffering is, in some ways, like medicine that God administers to us to heal the disease of internal fragmentation. Just as we can understand the process of our becoming internally fragmented on the model of seed germination, as mentioned in chapter two, we can also understand it on the model of HIV viral infection. 329 We are born with the ‘HIV’ virus of original sin, and this virus soon comes to take over its host, replicate, and damage the will, like a disease damages the human body. Suffering is then (analogous antiretroviral) medicine which God, as our medical doctor, uses to fight this disease and heal the damage done to our wills so that we might be well again, that is, internally integrated. Now, this medicine need not come in a single, transformative dose. Rather, it may come in many small doses, which, over time, has the desired effect. Therefore, minor suffering which does not immediately lead to spiritual transformation is not a counter-example to the defence. For, just as physical health can take a long time to achieve, so can spiritual health. Similarly, we may need to keep taking the medicine to keep us from becoming ill again, even if we cannot get any healthier. Therefore suffering, even great suffering, which does not lead to spiritual growth is also not a counter-example to the defence. Just as some are as physically healthy as they can be yet need to take medicine, sometimes

329 These analogies were provided through personal correspondence with Stump.
powerful medicine, to stay that way, so are some as spiritually healthy as they can be yet need to suffer, sometimes greatly, to stay that way.

In other ways, suffering is not like medicine that God administers to us to heal the disease of internal fragmentation. Like all analogies, this analogy is limited. It is limited primarily because it relies on a first- and third-person account of health: from a first-person point of view, a person experiences the illness of internal fragmentation, and God, as a medical doctor, from a third-person point of view, administers the medicine of suffering; it is then the medicine of suffering which is doing the work of fighting the disease and healing the damage of internal fragmentation. But this first- and third-person model of suffering is very much not what Stump has in mind. Rather, on her defence, suffering is second-personal: it is a mode of, and an occasion for, a second-person experience of God, and the revelation of God’s goodness, and it is this second-person experience of God which is doing the work of fighting the disease and healing the damage of internal fragmentation.

To see this, recall that the ultimate good for a human being is being in a union of love with God. Such a union requires mutual closeness, a closeness which, in turn, requires an openness to the other, an openness borne out of a desire to be in union with the other. Now, for two people come to become open in this way, there must be interaction between them, each having a second-person experience of the other, where their life-stories come to be woven together. Such second-person experiences do not naturally happen to us, for we do not naturally open ourselves up to others. Suffering provides a context for this sort of second-person experience to occur. For example, think about the last time you took an airplane flight and sat next to a stranger. You might have exchanged some pleasantries with the person sitting next to you, but it is not likely you took the conversation much deeper than that. And so, you probably ended the flight strangers to one another, just as you were when you began the flight. Now, say that something terrible happens on the airplane, a traumatic ordeal that forces you to drop your guard and open to the

330 This example is due to Stump from her (unpublished) response to Paul Draper at the St Thomas Summer School session on the Problem of Evil in 2012.
other person. Such an occasion is an occasion for your life-story to be interwoven with the life-story of the person who was once a stranger but now no more. For the two of you are then dealing with one another in a second-person way, focusing not merely on yourself (a first-person experience) but rather on the other person, and not merely as a ‘he’ or ‘she’ but rather as ‘you’. Suffering is like this. Suffering provides a context for God to interact with us in a second-person way, where we become open to God in a way that we would not ordinarily open up to him, just like we would not ordinarily open up to strangers, and in the trauma, our life-story becomes interwoven with God’s. By being open to God, we allow him to enter us, which, in turn, gives him the opportunity to fight the disease and heal the damage of internal fragmentation. This, then, begins the process of justification and continues in the process of sanctification.

Now, as long as the suffering a mentally fully functioning adult experiences contributes either to the process of her justification or the process of her sanctification, or prevents a person from becoming worse by losing the will of justification, God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing her to suffer in this way, since her suffering contributes to her internal integration, which is necessary for her to avoid the worst thing for her, namely, permanent separation from God. This is the negative benefit of suffering, and, importantly, such suffering does not require the sufferer’s consent, since it is always justifiable to cause a person to suffer, even without their consent, if that suffering can contribute to preventing an even worse outcome for that person in the future. In contrast, the positive benefit of suffering has to do with what happens after the processes of justification and sanctification are complete, namely, union with God, the greatest thing that can happen to a person; this is the positive benefit of suffering, and it does require the person’s consent. Now, union with God comes in varying degrees, such that one person may be capable of a deeper union with God than another. Consider an Olympic powerlifter, John, and a philosophy professor, Peter. Both John and Peter are asked to lift the heaviest weight they can lift. Even though both John and Peter

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331 This last disjunct is due to Stump (in personal correspondence), for, as she rightly points out, it is always possible for a person to return to the original state before justification occurred, and God may use suffering to prevent this backsliding from happening.
give their maximum effort and so lift the heaviest weights they can lift, John will be able to lift a much a heavier weight than Peter can lift. So, Stump says, it is with union with God. Even though two individuals might have as deep a union with God as it is possible for them to have, one of them might be capable of a much deeper union than the other. And so just as John suffers a strict diet, a demanding exercise regime, and the inevitable injuries that come with powerlifting to become stronger, so a person might suffer to become capable of a deeper union with God. However, just as it would be morally unjustifiable to force Peter, that is, without his consent, to suffer what John suffers, namely, the strict diet, demanding exercise regime, and inevitable injuries, no matter how good we thought becoming stronger would be for Peter, so it would be morally unjustifiable to force a person, that is, without her consent, to suffer so that she would be capable of a deeper union with God, no matter how good we thought a deeper union with God would be for her. Consequently, Stump maintains that any suffering for future benefit must be consensual if it is to be morally justifiable. In summary, according to Stump, suffering for negative benefit is morally justified if it is involuntary simpliciter, and suffering for positive benefit is morally justified if it is involuntary secundum quid, that is, the suffering is justified if and only if the sufferer either explicitly or tacitly consents to such suffering.

Paul Draper, however, argues that Stump’s single morally sufficient reason for God’s allowing suffering does not account for all incidents of the suffering of mentally fully functioning adults, namely, suffering which is for future benefit but not consented to.\(^\text{332}\)

For the sake of argument, Draper concedes that any suffering that both meets Stump’s two constraints and is justified by the negative benefit of harm prevention is sufficiently morally justified, even if the suffering is involuntary simpliciter. Draper then focuses on the fact that suffering that meets Stump’s two constraints, and is justified by some future positive benefit, is only sufficiently morally justified if the

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\(^{332}\) See Draper 2011. Stump writes, that Draper’s review, which is ‘the toughest review the book has received, is also in my view the deepest and most insightful of all the responses to the book.’ (2012: 212 f. 12).
suffering is involuntary *secundum quid*. He then suggests that there could be a certain group of people whose suffering cannot be justified by the negative benefit of harm prevention (because they are sufficiently far along the process of sanctification that the threat of permanent separation with God is not a tenable one) and who also do not (or cannot competently) consent to suffer for the future benefit of deeper union with God. If it were the case that someone in this group of people was to suffer, then Stump’s morally sufficient reason would not apply to them and Stump’s defence would fail.

For this objection to hold, Draper must show that there is that some suffering that both cannot be justified by the negative benefit of harm prevention, and is not, or cannot be consented to. To see how Draper argues for this, it is important to recall again Stump’s account of the will and Stump’s account of internal integration. Stump suggests that there is a hierarchy in the will. An individual can have first-order desires (those things she wants to do) and second-order desires (those things she wants to want to do). At any one time an individual can have numerous first- and second-order desires. Those desires the will is most inclined toward at time will become volitions at that time. If a second-order volition has no conflicting second-order desires, it is a ‘wholehearted’ volition. If a second-order volition has conflicting second-order desires, it is an ordinary volition. First-order volitions result in action, whilst second-order volitions result in the strengthening (or weakening) of some first-order desire. Assuming no internal manipulation, a person is morally responsible for her first-order volitions (regardless of whether she has a corresponding second-order volition), but she only acts with freedom of the will if her first-order volitions also correspond to a second-order volition. Furthermore, freedom of the will comes in two kinds: ordinary and strenuous. If a person acts with ordinary freedom of the will, her first-order volition corresponds with an ordinary second-order volition, whilst if she acts with strenuous freedom of the will, her first-order volition corresponds with a wholehearted second-order volition.

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333 In other words, John acts with freedom of the will if John does what he wants to want to do. If John does not do what he wants to want to do, his second-order volition is frustrated and not freely acted upon.
According to Stump’s account, permanent union with God requires strenuous freedom of the will, and acting with strenuous freedom of the will, in this respect, requires internal integration around the good. Given Stump’s account of the hierarchy in the will, internal integration consists in two separate processes:

- integrating all second-order desires around the good, and
- aligning first-order volitions with second-order volitions.

Draper takes Stump to mean that the operative grace given in process of justification secures the first whilst the cooperative grace given in the process of sanctification secures the second. Because an individual who is not justified cannot join in permanent union with God, Draper concedes that suffering that occurs for the sake of justification can always be justified on grounds of negative benefit. However, in order for suffering that occurs for the sake of sanctification to be justified under the auspices of negative benefit, the following three criteria must be fulfilled at every point along the process of sanctification:

I. Sanctification is required to avoid permanent separation with God
II. Sanctification is ongoing throughout the life of justified individual
III. Sanctification is difficult to accomplish without suffering

It is easy to see how Stump’s account of sanctification could meet criterion (I). One remains morally responsible for one’s actions even if one’s first- and second-order volitions conflict. If John has a wholehearted second-order desire for union with God, yet a first-order volition for something contrary to union with God, John will not act on his second-order volition for union with God.

However, it is less clear that criteria (II) and (III) are met. With regard to (II) there is at least a sizable Protestant community that believes in the doctrine of ‘entire sanctification’ or ‘Christian perfection’, that is, that it is possible for the process of sanctification to be completed in this life. If they are correct, Stump’s account is

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334 Stump suggests that the will is in fact an inclination or disposition toward the good (where the good is presented to it being as good for x by the intellect), and because the will is disposed to the good, it can never be integrated around, for instance, evil.

335 Perhaps the most famous exponent of the doctrine of Christian perfection is John Wesley, who wrote;
vulnerable to Draper’s objection. With regard to (III), by Stump’s own account, harmonizing first- and second-order volitions is slowly achieved by cooperative grace, through growth in the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But if sanctification only requires growth in the gifts of the spirit, it is not obvious how such growth can be meaningfully aided by suffering. If such growth is not meaningfully aided by suffering, and, if that person still suffers, the only other way to justify morally that suffering is under the guise of some future positive benefit.

So, Draper would appear to have shown that the suffering of at least some justified individuals cannot be justified by the negative benefit of harm prevention, and so, if

Some thoughts occurred to my mind this morning concerning Christian perfection, and the manner and time of receiving it, which I believe may be useful to set down.

1. By perfection I mean the humble, gentle, patient love of God, and our neighbour, ruling our tempers, words, and actions.
I do not include an impossibility of falling from it, either in part or in whole. Therefore, I retract several expressions in our Hymns, which partly express, partly imply, such an impossibility.
And I do not contend for the term sinless, though I do not object against it.
2. As to the manner. I believe this perfection is always wrought in the soul by a simple act of faith; consequently, in an instant.
But I believe a gradual work, both preceding and following that instant.
3. As to the time. I believe this instant generally is the instant of death, the moment before the soul leaves the body. But I believe it may be ten, twenty, or forty years before.

I believe it is usually many years after justification; but that it may be within five years or five months after it, I know no conclusive argument to the contrary. If it must be many years after justification, I would be glad to know how many. **Pretium quotus arroget annus?**
And how many days or months, or even years, can any one allow to be between perfection and death? How far from justification must it be; and how near to death? (Wesley, 1872: 446).

Although Wesley’s view had changed from the much more radical belief he held through the 1740s and 1750s, that Christian perfection entailed sinlessness, and could be secured instantly at the point of conversion, we can surmise that by 1767 Wesley had settled on what would become his all-things-considered belief, namely:

- All persons are born, or swiftly become, morally imperfect.
- A work of God is required to make a person morally perfect again.
- This work of God can be completed well in advance of a person’s death.
- Therefore, it is possible for a person be morally perfect, that is, it is possible for a person to attain Christian perfection in this life.
one such person does not (or cannot)\textsuperscript{336} consent to some suffering she undergoes, it appears as though there is no morally sufficient reason for her suffering.\textsuperscript{337}

However, Stump has an easy response to this objection. Draper’s objection is based on a misunderstanding over the line between the explanatory work done by justification and the explanatory work done by sanctification, and all Stump has to do to preserve the comprehensiveness of her single morally sufficient reason for suffering is to deny that justification integrates all second-order desires around the good. On this understanding of Stump’s account, operative grace is sufficient to produce an ordinary second-order volition for union with God, but it is not sufficient to produce a similar wholehearted second-order volition.\textsuperscript{338}

On this new understanding, sanctification does not just involve the integration of first-order and second-order volitions. Sanctification also completes the process of integrating second-order desires around the good. Just as in the process of justification, this requires God’s external motivation to do so, and, just like in the process of justification, the motivating role suffering can play is evident.\textsuperscript{339} In the same way that beginning the process of justification is difficult without suffering, so

\textsuperscript{336} We say ‘cannot’ because a person cannot be expected to give acceptable consent to something she cannot even comprehend before the fact (as, we suspect, some particularly horrendous suffering cannot be).

\textsuperscript{337} Stump could respond by suggesting that suffering could be morally justified since such suffering is likely to prevent a person losing the will of justification. However, the only instance where this would affect our conclusion (i.e., there is no morally justifiable reason for some suffering for persons who have completed the process of sanctification) is in the case of a person who is already internally integrated, and it is difficult to see how an internally integrated person would be likely to lose the will of justification without first becoming internally fragmented (thereby preserving our conclusion). If suffering to prevent the loss of the will of justification is morally justified without it being likely that a person will lose the will of justification, what is to stop, for instance, suffering in heaven?

\textsuperscript{338} There is a further reason why this is a good move for Stump to make: operative grace is not sufficient to produce a wholehearted second-order volition for union with God, as to do so would require removing God to remove all conflicting second-order desires. And to do this would be to destroy that individual’s freewill, rendering a union between the two wills impossible. On Stump’s account, internal integration is possible if a person wants it. The problem is just that part of that person does not want to be internally integrated around the good. As far as both Stump and Aquinas are concerned, to change a person’s desire against their will is to take their freewill away.

\textsuperscript{339} Integrating second-order desires around the good requires the removal of errant second-order desires through God’s giving of cooperative grace. The fact that you want to want to do these errant second-order desires also entails that part of you wants to reject God’s cooperative grace. Bringing you to a place where you accept, or are quiescent toward God’s cooperative grace (and therefore come to give up these errant second-order desires) is analogous to God’s bringing you to a place where you are quiescent toward God’s operative grace. Just as suffering can be used by God for the latter, so suffering can be used by God for the former.
is completing the process of sanctification, that is, integrating all one’s desires around the good, difficult without suffering. And so, if suffering can be justified inasmuch as it motivates the process of justification (i.e., motivating a person’s will to quiescence with respect to operative grace), then suffering can also be justified in motivating at least aspects of sanctification, as suffering is used for an almost identical purpose (i.e., motivating a change in second-order desires by acceptance or quiescence with respect to God’s cooperative grace). Furthermore, this move reinforces the fragility of the will of justification. If it is not (at least initially) a wholehearted desire, justification might very well be considered fragile, and the will of justification easy to lose. Preventing this loss, just as much as motivating the completion of sanctification, may well prove sufficient explanation for suffering.

Nevertheless, only suffering that motivates the integration of second-order desires is likely to meet criteria (I), (II), and (III) needed for moral justification. Given this, if Stump’s harm-preventing, morally sufficient reason is to justify all suffering of mentally fully functioning adults, she must hold that specifically second-order integration is not possible in this life. (For if such integration is possible, Stump’s account remains vulnerable to Draper’s objection.) Now, if these clarifications are made, Stump can meet criterion (II) by claiming that all people are either being motivated toward justification or are going through the process of sanctification and criterion (III) by claiming that suffering has a valuable contribution to make in motivating both processes. On the assumption that all suffering can be morally justified by harm prevention, even if consent cannot be given for such suffering, Draper’s objection is obviated.\(^{340}\)

\(^{340}\) See Vitale 2013 for a similar comment:

Another way Stump could respond is by dropping her focus on consent altogether and instead claiming that all suffering is harm-preventing. Stump assumes that once someone is united to God in loving relationship, suffering can no longer be hell-preventing. But why think that? She could say instead that even for those currently united to God, suffering best enables them to avoid falling out of union with God and thus to avoid hell. In fact, Stump already suggests in her discussion of Abraham that lapses in faith are possible even after one has previously shown ‘whole-hearted trust in God’s promises’ (pp. 303–4; cf. p. 405). I have raised doubts about Stump’s use of harm-prevention, but, given that she is already committed to it, I see no insurmountable obstacle to extending its use to the justification of the suffering of those already in union with God, thereby negating the need for consent to play a justificatory role. (1198)
So, Draper’s objection concerned the possible lack (or sheer impossibility) of consent in suffering for future benefit. To respond to this objection, Stump can justify all suffering under the auspices the negative benefit of harm prevention alone. Because humans are internally fragmented, and because to remain in such a condition would lead to the worst thing for them (i.e., permanent separation from God), all suffering must contribute to motivating an individual’s internal integration around the good.

On Stump’s account, justification and sanctification (into which I shall include perseverance in the will of justification) form either side of this process of internal integration, and there is a line between where justification finishes and sanctification begins. Both Stump and Draper accept that justification occurs at the moment of conversion and then sanctification continues thereafter. However, Draper’s objection requires that the line between the work done by justification and the work required from sanctification be much further along the process of internal integration than is actually the case on Stump’s account. As a result, for Draper, the process of sanctification does far less work than the same process does for Stump. By correcting this misinterpretation, it is much easier to see how on Stump’s account, the process of sanctification is both difficult to accomplish without suffering, and could require at least a lifetime to complete.

The consequence of requiring an increase in sanctification’s explanatory work is interesting for Stump’s account inasmuch as it would seem to commit her to the following five claims about justification and sanctification:

1. Completing the process of justification is necessary but not sufficient for union with God.
2. Completing the process of sanctification is necessary for union with God.
3. Justification produces an ordinary second-order volition for union with God.

341 Stump could also argue that it is impossible for someone who is so far along the process of sanctification that she is in no danger from permanent separation with God to refrain from giving consent; however, this argument is both much more complicated to prove, and does not account for the possibility that for some particularly horrendous suffering, consent may not be possible.

342 This is more the case given the evident capacity for errant second-order desires to arise at any point in one’s life.
4. Sanctification requires the integration of second-order desires around the
good, as well as the integration of first- and second-order volitions.

5. Completing the process of sanctification before death is not possible.

Operative grace is therefore the name given to grace that actually motivates a
person to effectively desire union with God for the first time (which, I have argued
elsewhere, culminates the process of justification). Likewise, cooperative grace is
just the grace that continues to motivate a person to desire union with God once
they already have a second-order volition for union with God (which I have
described as the process of sanctification). The only difference between operative
and cooperative grace is that in the latter case, the recipient of grace already has a
second-order volition for union with God. Cooperative grace is considered
cooperative because the recipient accepts the gift of grace (i.e., the effect of
operative grace is to leave them with a second-order volition to accept future
revelation of God’s goodness), rather than being merely quiescent with respect to
it. The only difference between the two is the in the recipient of such grace, and not
in either the grace itself or the giver of the grace, and this difference in the recipient
of grace is explained by the effect of operative grace.

In the case of both operative and cooperative grace, a person’s will can be
strengthened by reflection upon the revelation of the goodness of God revealed
through God’s general act of creation or through His subsequent supernatural acts.
Operative grace requires our quiescence to this general revelation or to these acts
(but not our cooperative acceptance of these as being revelations from God), whilst
cooperative grace includes our cooperation with this general revelation (i.e., the
second-order volition we now have to desire union with God, and therefore, the
willingness to see and to appropriately reflect upon the revelation of God’s
goodness in creation).

I suspect, too, that normal grace, the general motivating or strengthening of the
will, is either operative or cooperative, with no remainder. For this to be the case,

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343 Perhaps this is best explained as integration around the ordinary second-order volition for union
with God produced by justification.
grace must always ultimately motivate a desire for union with God. But here note that the desire for union with God is an ultimate end, and often worked out through a complex system of secondary desires. For instance, the desire for union with God is incompatible with a desire to leave the naked unclothed, and the hungry unfed. As a result, this desire for union with God prompted by grace could also prompt (or strengthen) the desire to feed the hungry and clothe the naked, and indeed, this desire for union with God may only even manifest itself in this desire to clothe and feed.

So, on this account, through both suffering and blessings, a person can be motivated toward psychological integration around this desire for union with God in a way that is compatible with the APC and in a way that preserves a person’s moral responsibly and freedom of the will.

A Framework for Dealing with Shame

In the previous chapter, I indicated that (aligned\(^{344}\)) shame might inhibit union with God both since such shame can cause internal fragmentation (preventing personal closeness), and also since such shame can inhibit joint attention with God (preventing significant personal presence). In that section, I also outlined a general four-fold taxonomy in which different causes of (subjective) shame could be categorized, namely, shame arising due to

1. reflection on one’s own individual moral wrongdoing,
2. reflection upon wrongs that have been done to you,
3. reflection upon depredations of nature that might have befallen you, and
4. reflection on your communal participation in a certain community that has perpetrated significant wrongdoing.

\(^{344}\) By aligned, I refer to an instance of shame that is both subjective (descriptive) and objective (normative).
In each case, such reflection causes a person to believe it to be appropriate for the other to reject them as a person, that is, on Aquinas’s account of love, that it is appropriate for them to reject the desire for union with them that forms one of the twin desires of love.

In thinking about how to deal with shame it is worth reflecting on one approach that seems, from the outset, doomed to fail. Paying the victim of a crime a sum of money, or some other form of compensation, for instance, will not take away the fact that the crime happened to them, that they were disrespected, and that therefore, that it would be appropriate for them to reject you (in some sense). Rather, it seems this sort of shame must be defeated, rather than compensated for.

So, what can defeat shame? It is helpful to think back to the general cause of (subjective) shame, namely, the belief that one has failed to meet what one takes to be a community standard, a standard that one also takes to be in some sense authoritative. Now, one might initially think that the way to defeat shame involves coming to meet this original community standard. However, such a view seems problematic. For one, doing so does not alter the fact that at one point, you failed to meet this standard. The fact I turn up to the office in a suit tomorrow doesn’t make it any the less the case that I turned up in jeans and a tee-shirt yesterday. For another, it may be impossible. For instance, if (for whatever reason) meeting the standard involves possessing some physical characteristic, one might just not have said characteristic. Alternatively, if meeting the standard involves not having done action x in the past, and if it is a matter of historical fact that you have done action x, you can never meet said standard.

A more promising route, then, might involve undermining or changing the community standard that you do not meet. Indeed, Stump suggests that all instances of shame can be defeated by ‘trumping’ a previous community standard. And such can be done by any person who meets a new, higher standard (given that this standard that is also accepted by the community as trumping the previous standard). So, if this new trumping standard is accepted by the community, demonstrably meeting this new higher standard, and especially, meeting it in a way
that is connected to the way in which you did not meet the original standard, will defeat the cause of previously felt shame.

How might this occur? Stump suggests defeating could involve something akin to a celebration of your life, where this celebration picks out those parts of your life that meet this trumping standard, and so do deserve honour. And, as mentioned, this is particularly the case where what is being celebrated are those aspects of you that are in some way connected the initial cause of shame. Were such a celebration to occur, Stump argues it would be made clear to you that it is no longer appropriate for others to reject you, and so the belief that it is appropriate that they reject you can be undermined. Stump writes:

The natural remedy for shame is honor or admiration. A person who is honored or admired has something attractive about him, and those who are attracted to him have some desire for him. To the extent that others have a warranted desire for him, they have the second desire of love for him, namely, the desire for union (of one sort or another). And if others are drawn to him and desire union with him, the shamed person’s shame is lifted...

So, for the first three kinds of shame, personal shame, a full remedy for shame will consist in two things. First, the shamed person will have something beautiful, something admirable or honorable, about him on a standard of value more important than the standard by which he is shamed. And, second, this admirable or beautiful element in the shamed person’s life will defeat the shame. That is, it will be greater and more worth having than what is lost through the shame, and the defects that are the source of the shame will be somehow inextricably interwoven into that greater good.345

However, whilst it is possible to see this sort of antidote to shame as being able to deal with subjective shame in (2) and (3), it is harder to see how this could deal with

345 See Stump 2016.
communal shame (4), and, contra Stump, to my mind impossible to see how it might deal with the (objective) shame caused by one’s own wrongdoing (1).

With respect to (2) and (3), Stump cites both Harriet Tubman and Joseph Merrick as exemplars of people whose subjective shame was defeated by a public celebration of their life.346 With respect to (4), it seems that if the community that you are part of is shamed due to some action of a few of its members, it is plausible to think that it can be honoured by the actions of some of its members, too. So, for instance, a nation is honoured when its football team wins the world cup, or (in centuries past) when it conquers other nations. I will, however, return to (2), (3), and (4) in the final chapter. For now, I want to focus a little further on the (objective) shame that comes from one’s own wrongdoing.

The (objective) shame that emerges upon reflection on one’s wrongdoing appears to be a direct relational consequence of sin.347 If Peter believes it is appropriate for Jack to desire to reject him as a person, whatever it was about Peter’s sinful action that caused this relational damage needs to be righted. But what might have caused such damage? It helps here to draw from a common intuition that wrongdoing is an expressive act. As well as causing harm, wrongdoing also communicates disrespect. Consider, then, the following from Linda Radzik:

In wronging others, the offenders treat those whom they harm as having lower value than they, and the wrongful acts express this false and insulting view.348

Peter’s wronging Jack communicates the false belief that he, Peter, is in some sense more valuable than Jack. Given this insulting communication, it is understandable that Peter might believe it appropriate that Jack desire to reject him as a person.

347 ‘A relational conception of sin conceives of it in terms of broken or alienated relationships; sin, on this view, consists in the fact that our relationship with God and each other is not what it ought to be.’ (Bayne and Restall, 2009: 151).
348 Linda Radzik, 2008: 76.
Furthermore, so long as this communication is not retracted, it continues to be broadcast long after the wrong action was committed. So long as this broadcast continues uninterrupted, it remains just as appropriate for Jack to reject Peter as a person as it did as Peter was in the very act of wronging Jack. So if it is appropriate that Jack reject Peter as a person (i.e., that Jack refrain from desiring union with Peter), it is also appropriate that Peter feel shame. The way to remove this communication, then, is for Peter to offer a retraction; an apology that indicates a correctly appraised respect for Jack, and indicates clearly that Peter distances himself from his original communication.

Of course, this apology must be sincere, that is, the apology must appropriately reflect and communicate an actual change of heart. An insincere apology will not heal the relational damage caused by wrongdoing; indeed, it will most likely make it worse. So, what can ground the sincerity of an apology? Following Griswold and Swinburne, I propose that in all cases, repentance, and associated remorse, are required to do this. Imagine if Peter had punched Jack in the arm. If Peter apologises, but then continues to punch Jack in the arm, it is quite evident his apology is insincere. Peter evidently did not mean to retract or distance himself from his initial communication of disrespect because he is re-broadcasting that same message at regular and ongoing intervals. However, if Peter apologises, and then refrains from physically assaulting Jack, this might just be enough to ground the sincerity of Peter’s apology.

In some cases, then repentance is both necessary and sufficient to ground the sincerity of an apology. In other cases, however, repentance alone is evidently insufficient to do this. Imagine if, instead of punching Jack, Peter deliberately cut off Jack’s arm. It seems to me quite unlikely that Peter’s refraining from cutting off any

349 Radzik, 2008: 75-78, 123.
350 Radzik writes, ‘To wrong another person is to insult and threaten that person. To do nothing (or to fail to do enough) to correct that action is to allow the insult and the threat to stand. It is to condone their continued influence. When one fails to atone, one suggests that one still views the victim as inferior and that one remains a threat to the victim. The obligation to atone, then, amounts to an obligation to cease wrongdoing the victim.’ (Radzik, 2008: 77).
351 I take repentance to include believing that you wronged the other and refraining from further wrongdoing. See Griswold 2007 and Swinburne 1989.
other parts of Jack’s anatomy will be enough to ground the sincerity of his apology (and if it does not seem so to you, escalate Peter’s action until repentance alone does seem entirely insufficient!).

To repentance and apology, then, a third action may also be required: the offering of some supererogatory penance. To ground the sincerity of an apology it is, in certain cases, necessary to offer something both personally costly and suitably acceptable to one’s victim; a gift that goes above and beyond whatever reparation is required. If Peter deliberately cut off Jack’s arm, it would not be sufficient for him to buy Jack a box of chocolates (an insufficient penance), or for Peter to pay for Jack’s prosthetic arm (arguably, what is owed in reparations), rather, Peter should (and this is only one of a myriad possibilities) see to it that he does what he can to make Jack’s recovery as smooth and as easy as possible, both for Jack and perhaps for his family, too. If this is within his power, Peter might consider setting up a college fund for Jack’s children. Peter may volunteer his services at an amputee clinic, or invest heavily in companies that develop prosthetic hands. Upon doing this, it should be apparent that whatever apology Peter offers, even if it is not accepted by a resentful Jack, is nevertheless sincere. When Peter’s sincere apology is offered, I suggest that it is no longer appropriate for Jack to reject him as a person (although, of course, Jack may continue to do so, just as Peter may continue to feel subjective shame), and so it is possible for Peter’s shame to be defeated.

However, when it comes to wrongdoing done with respect to God, it seems this account runs into a problem. Even granting that the doctrine of original sin leaves apology and repentance within our power (which, as I shall discuss in chapter five, is itself far from clear), the scriptural text (certainly in the Old Testament) seems quite clear that repentance alone is not sufficient to ground the sincerity of any

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352 Swinburne, 1989: 149.
353 Although forgiveness might have a role in securing union (unless Jack forgives Peter, Jack will be unable to wholeheartedly desire union with Peter), forgiveness has no role to play in defeating shame. Jack’s forswearing resentment, even if he now desires union with Peter, does not remove the appropriateness of his rejection of Peter, and therefore does not deal with the cause of Peter’s shame.
apology we might give.\(^{354}\) And so, to deal with shame over wrongdoing, some offering of penance is required. However, it is not the case that God demands this offering – as I will explain later on in this chapter, God could (and does) forgive without it – rather, that without our offering of penance, we cannot deal with our belief that it would be appropriate for God to reject us, even if He in fact does not.

The problem with owing God penance, however, is that penance is necessarily supererogatory, and yet on accepted Christian doctrine, we already owe God everything.\(^{355}\) There is no possibility for supererogatory action, and so nothing we can do to ground the sincerity of any apology we might offer God. We owe God our money, our time, our bodies and our lives. Giving any of these back as an attempt at some supererogatory penance will not make my apology seem any sincerer. Peter’s offering Jack a $50 token penance (with no reparative payment) after Peter has stolen $60 from him is very unlikely to ground the sincerity of Peter’s apology. Indeed, it could well make the apology less sincere than it initially would have been with repentance alone.

So, however we deal with the problem of shame, something about Christ’s life, passion, death and resurrection is required to deal with, at least, (1) and (4). How Christ’s life passion and death might do this, I will address in the final chapter.

**A Framework for Dealing with Guilt**

In many respects, the problems of guilt and shame are quite similar. In both cases it is the *belief* that *it would be appropriate* that is the nexus of the problem. It is this belief that motivates a person’s willed loneliness through their psychological fragmentation and their inability to engage in dyadic attention with God, and therefore, it is this belief that must be changed if (full and complete) union between persons is to occur.\(^{356}\)

\(^{354}\) See Exodus 29 on God instructing the Israelites to prepare sacrifice as a penance for their wrongdoing.  
\(^{355}\) See Psalm 24:1 and Romans 11:36.  
\(^{356}\) If they do not feel guilt or shame now, if presented all pertinent information, they would.
However, the two are distinct in other respects. Whereas shame is clearly relational and references an existential dimension, guilt is deontic and references a moral one. Nevertheless, in the case of guilt, there is a very straightforward remedy for Peter’s belief that it is appropriate for Jack to desire he undergo some hard treatment: Peter must simply undergo this hard treatment. Once undergone, it is no longer appropriate for Peter to undergo it again, and, in recognising this, Peter can (but, subjectively speaking, by no means will) overcome his objective guilt. Here is one way to think about this: Peter’s wrongdoing produces a certain sort of (moral) debt, and this debt requires a certain sort of reparative payment to clear it. It is appropriate to pay unpaid debt, and Peter’s recognition of this in the light of his unpaid debt is captured in his feeling guilt. Peter’s guilt, therefore, can be dealt with merely through his full payment of reparations appropriate to his wrongdoing.357

Although guilt can prevent the union necessary for fully functioning relationships, it is a common intuition that relationships cannot be fixed by mere payment alone.358 Given that I am suggesting guilt can be dealt with through mere payment alone, guilt, then, is only indirectly a relational consequence of sin. Guilt is therefore best described as a deontic consequence of sin, with its solution being likewise deontic in nature.359

According to this deontic consequence, sin results in the build of up of a moral debt. The way to deal with this debt, then, is simply to repay it. In the same manner, dealing with one’s guilt involves (voluntarily or otherwise) undergoing the sort of hard treatment it is appropriate for your victim to desire for you. In ordinary cases, determining what hard treatment is owed is relatively straightforward. Monetary compensation can be worked out and offered, or a generally proportional penal (be it prison, corporal or even capital) sentence can be served.

357 Swinburne, 1989: 149.
358 See, for instance, Swinburne, 1989: 152.
359 This problem of guilt can be closely mapped onto the deontic consequence of sin identified by Bayne and Restall. They write, ‘A deontic conception of sin conceives of sin in terms of a failure to fulfill our moral obligations. Sin, on this view, is immoral behaviour, and it results in a moral debt; it involves a debit in our moral ledger.’ (Bayne and Restall, 2009: 151).
According to the scriptural data we have, the reparations that we owe God, however, are not pecuniary. Neither indeed are they described in terms that have any understandably limited timeline for payment. Rather, the reparations appear to take the form of everlasting banishment from God’s revealed presence. And so it would seem that any attempt to deal with one’s guilt by removing one’s moral debt through the paying of reparations leads to exactly the same outcome as living with one’s guilt. In both cases, separation from God is permanent and union with God is impossible.

So, each of the three inhibitors to union has a general solution. The problems associated with original sin and psychological fragmentation can be overcome through an externally motivated quiescence to grace, the problem of guilt can be resolved through the payment some appropriate reparations, and the problem of shame can be resolved by offering an apology made sincere by repentance and in some cases, penance.

However, it is still far from clear how each of these inhibitors might be overcome with respect to union with God, or how the life, passion, death and resurrection of Christ might be efficacious in securing Atonement.

In the case of guilt, sin builds up a moral debt that only reparative payment can clear. Whilst this debt remains, a person’s guilt can prevent them from (at least) wholeheartedly desiring union with God, or from being able to dyadically join attention with Him. Furthermore, attempts to make reparative payment to deal with guilt requires indefinite separation from God.

In the case of shame, sin is expressive and communicates disrespect to the victim of the wrongful action. This communication continues to be broadcast until retracted and replaced by a sincere apology. Whilst it goes unretracted, it is appropriate that God reject a person (even if He in fact does not). Reflection on the appropriateness of this belief is, like guilt, sufficient to prevent dyadic joint attention with God or wholehearted desire for God. However, one of the necessary constituent actions

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360 Whilst this became more apparent post-reformation, there seems to be some scriptural precedent for this view. See Isaiah 66:24, Daniel 12:1-2, Matthew 25:43, Mark 9:48, 2 Thessalonians 1:5-10, Jude 13, and Revelation 14: 9-11.
that would ground the sincerity of an apology to God, the offering of some supererogatory penance, cannot be offered by a sinful person for there is, seemingly, *nothing at all* supererogatory that this person can offer God.

It is into these seemingly intractable situations that the Christian tradition teaches the life, passion, death and resurrection of Christ can be appropriated by a penitent sinner. But exactly how Christ’s passion is to be appropriated remains quite unclear.

In the next chapter, I intend to survey previous attempts to explain how such appropriation might occur, whilst in the final chapter I intend to develop an alternative account of how each problem might be dealt with.

Before I get there, however I want to deal very briefly with the question of forgiveness.

**The Question of Forgiveness**

As I have now framed it, there are three problems the Atonement must overcome. First, the problem of original sin and the disordering of the mind, initially preventing and subsequently limiting a person’s desire for union with God. Second, the problem of shame, the belief it would be appropriate for the other to reject them as a person. Third, the problem of guilt, the belief that it would be appropriate for the other to desire some hard treatment for them. At this point, it is interesting to note that, structurally, the source of each of these problems is in the person requiring atonement. But given that the source of each problem is located (in some sense) in the person requiring atonement, what role might the ‘other’ (in this case, God) play in atonement?

It is often thought that forgiveness plays some role in atonement. However, on standard accounts forgiveness (for instance, Haber’s view of forgiveness as a normative power, Nussbaum’s view of forgiveness as expressing grief, or

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361 See Haber 2009.
362 Nussbaum, 2009. See also Garrard and McNaughton 2002 on forgiveness as expressing solidarity with humankind.
Butler’s view of forgiveness as forswearing resentment\textsuperscript{363} it seems difficult to see what role it could play, or, in the case of the Christian doctrine, if forgiveness does play a role, how God could forgive prior to the incarnation. Take, for example, the view attributed to Bishop Butler that forgiveness involves the forswearing of resentment.\textsuperscript{364}

Even if God forswears resentment (and its corollary desires for vengeance), it is difficult to see how that might help deal with any of the problems the Atonement is supposed to overcome. Take either guilt or shame, for instance. Someone forswearing to do what it would have been appropriate for them to do (i.e., forswearing to demand some hard treatment, or forswearing the rejection of the other) does not make what it would have been appropriate for them to do, inappropriate.\textsuperscript{365}

Could forgiveness can help motivate a person’s quiescence? Perhaps. But so, too, might a lack of forgiveness motivate someone to try and get right with the other, or God. Furthermore, the fact that either God (or the other) forswears anything does not make it appropriate that He (or they) should not have had those feelings. It simply does not follow that, should someone immediately forgive you after you have committed some truly horrendous wrong, you should feel no guilt or shame over what you have done. If anything, the expression of such forgiveness might make the problems of guilt and shame more intractable.

Take, for instance, Jeffrie Murphy’s view that unwarranted forgiveness harms the forgiver. Murphy writes:

\begin{quote}
A failure to resent moral injuries done to me is a failure to care about the moral value incarnate in my own person (that I am in Kantian language, an end in myself) and thus a failure to care about myself.\textsuperscript{366}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{363} See Garcia 2011.
\textsuperscript{364} See Garcia 2011.
\textsuperscript{365} At least, inappropriate \textit{qua} the forgiven. Of course, the forgiver might now be breaking a promise (or something similar) were they to recant on their forswearing, but this only renders their recanting inappropriate for them, not for the forgiven, in the view of the forgiven.
\textsuperscript{366} Murphy and Hampton, 1988: 18.
It may be that in such circumstances (namely, being immediately forgiven after some serious wrongdoing) you come to recognise that the other’s forgiving action has, in fact, further harmed them.

So, forgiveness has, perhaps, no necessary role to play in defeating either shame or guilt. Jack’s forswearing resentment, even if he now desires union with Peter, does not remove the **appropriateness** of his rejection of Peter, or the **appropriateness** of his desire for Peter’s hard treatment, and therefore, Jack’s forgiveness does not deal with the cause of either Peter’s shame or guilt.

So, if the attitudes or actions of a victim, including their forgiveness, cannot change the appropriateness of a wrongdoer’s guilt or shame, why discuss forgiveness at all?

Well, as mentioned in chapter one, union between persons requires two wills to be operative. If you, as a wrongdoer, do in fact deal with your guilt and shame, and you do somehow come to have a wholehearted desire for union with the other, there is still no guarantee that real union between you and your victim will obtain, for your victim may not desire union with you.

Forgiveness, then, removes an impediment to union on the side of the victim – it does not effect a change in the wrongdoer (beyond, perhaps, motivating them to make amends[^367]). Forgiveness is, therefore, essential for union between persons, but it is one sided. And given this, it might seem, securing God’s forgiveness might not require Christ’s atoning sacrifice. Indeed, plausibly, there might be no problem on God’s side, no barriers to God’s desire to really unite with you, that the Atonement must overcome. At least, it seems to me that there is no obvious iron clad reason that would prevent an omnibenevolent, omnipresent God from immediately forgiving any wrongdoing done against him. And granting this, it is far

[^367]: This thought about motivation could explain why Hebrews 9:22 states ‘In fact, the law requires that nearly everything be cleansed with blood, and without the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness.’ Recognising that you must make amends before God forswears vengeance is a very good motivation to go ahead and make amends, and may, ultimately, prove more loving than simply forgiving and letting a person continue their life. Swinburne writes concerning this point, ‘it is good that if we do wrong, we should take proper steps to cancel our actions, to pay out debts, as far as logically can be done.’ (Swinburne, 1989: 150).
from obvious that such a God would necessarily withhold forgiveness until a suitable penance or reparation was paid.\textsuperscript{368}

With this much said, I will now turn to the final two chapters of this thesis, in an attempt first to survey and then address how Christ’s life, passion, death and resurrection might aid in the process of securing union with God.

\textsuperscript{368} I take it that this point is at the heart of the disagreement between Stump and Swinburne over the nature of the Atonement. On Swinburne’s account (1989), it is fitting for God to wait until penance or reparation are paid before offering forgiveness, indicating that at least some of what happens during the Atonement is aimed at removing at something preventing God from uniting with us. On Stump’s account (2012), there is nothing prevent God from uniting with us, and so, the Atonement is squarely focused on removing something prevent us from uniting with God.
Chapter 4

Atonement and Transaction

I began the first chapter of this thesis by suggesting that the Atonement presents itself as the solution to a problem, and that, over the course of the first three chapters of this thesis, I would try to identify both what exactly this problem is, and also what the problem inhibits, that is, what the Atonement is supposed to secure.

In chapter one, I suggested that the Atonement secures a person’s real union with God, a union uniquely made possible at the beatific vision. In chapter two, I addressed three possible inhibitors to beholding the beatific vision, and so, inhibitors to uniting with God, namely, an unwillingness to behold the vision, an inability to wholeheartedly desire to behold the vision, and a (twofold) inability to behold the vision. In chapter three, I outlined ways in which these inhibitors could be overcome. I suggested that the first two inhibitors could be overcome through the revelation of the goodness of union with God, alongside external motivation to appropriately reflect upon this goodness. The last inhibitor, the inability to behold the beatific vision, was broken down into the problem of shame and the problem of guilt. I suggested in the case of the former, shame, that the offering of some supererogatory penance, alongside a repentant apology, was necessary in order to remove objective shame. In the case of the latter, guilt, I suggested the payment of some appropriate reparation was required to remove objective guilt. Furthermore, I suggested that only when objective guilt and objective shame are dealt with in these ways can a person behold the beatific vision. Unfortunately, however, it seems as though both the sinner’s offering of some supererogatory penance, and their payment of appropriate reparations are hopelessly beyond them. These, then, are precisely the problems any account of the Atonement must resolve. But

369 If it was not, it would seem Christ’s life, death, and passion (and so forth) are not necessary for a person’s salvation.
how? How is it, as Richard Cross puts it, ‘that Christ’s life and death...can be appropriated by us?’

Before, in the final chapter, I offer my solution to these problems, it will prove instructive to first survey historical attempts explain the Atonement, a task that will form the focus of this fourth chapter. Of particular interest will be the way in which guilt and shame (or close substitutes for guilt and shame) are dealt with, for, it seems most accounts involve some form of a transaction or a transfer between Jesus and the penitent sinner, and so are susceptible to the following argument:

1. You say you are guilty (or shamed).

2. You say Christ Saves you only if Jesus takes away your guilt (or shame).

3. But guilt (and shame) does not transfer from person to person.

4. So, Jesus cannot take away your guilt (or shame), and so Jesus cannot save you.

5. So, Christianity is false.

Before I look at the different ways this transfer has been explained, I want first to provide an overview of the scriptural desiderata for an account of the Atonement. Naturally, any attempt at establishing the lineaments of such a transaction must, necessarily, also engage with divine revelation, along with major interpretations of such revelation. However, because this is a project in analytic theology, and because I am engaging in systematic theology and not exegetical or biblical theology, it is enough for this thesis to capture what I take to be the most plausible plain and straightforward interpretations of the text.

**Divine Data: Ecumenical Tradition and Divine Revelation**

Reading through the seven ecumenical creeds it is relatively clear that the Christian doctrine of the Atonement is linked, somehow, to Christ. The Chalcedonian Creed

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affirms that Christ became incarnate ‘for us and for our salvation’. The Athanasian
Creed affirms that ‘Christ suffered for our salvation’ whilst the Nicene Creed affirms
that Christ ‘was crucified for us’. However, none of these ecumenical creeds spell
out exactly what this ‘for us’ or ‘for our salvation’ amounts to. Neither, indeed, do
they settle upon what it is about Christ that secures this Atonement.371

The biblical text, too, offers little more to help narrow down the explanatory
possibilities. It is quite apparent the New Testament authors believed that Jesus
gave himself to save us from our sins.372 And that in saving us from our sin, Christ
reconciled us back to God, restoring a relationship that sin had damaged.373
However, it seems the biblical text does not come to a consensus over how Christ’s
giving himself up for our sins secured this reconciliation. For instance, Jesus, Paul,
and John all refer to the Atonement as a work of ransom, as though the giving of
Christ’s life served as a payment to someone.374

In places, it appears as though this ransom is paid in Christ’s blood.375 However,
both Jesus and some New Testament authors also specify that Christ’s blood has

371 The Nicene creed, for instance, references Jesus’s incarnation, birth, life, passion, death,
resurrection and ascension.
372 For instance:
1 Peter 3:18 ‘For Christ also died for sins once for all, the just for the unjust, so that He might bring
us to God, having been put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit’
1 Corinthians 15:3 ‘For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received, that Christ died
for our sins according to the Scriptures,’
John 1:29 ‘The next day he saw Jesus coming to him and said, “Behold, the Lamb of God who takes
away the sin of the world!”
Matthew 1:21 ‘She will bear a Son; and you shall call His name Jesus, for He will save His people
from their sins.’
373 For instance:
2 Corinthians 5:18-19 ‘Now all these things are from God, who reconciled us to Himself through
Christ and gave us the ministry of reconciliation, namely, that God was in Christ reconciling the
world to Himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and He has committed to us the word
of reconciliation.’
Romans 5:10-11 ‘For if while we were enemies we were reconciled to God through the death of His
Son, much more, having been reconciled, we shall be saved by His life. And not only this, but we also
exult in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received the reconciliation,’
374 Mark 10:45 ‘For even the Son of Man did not come to
be served, but to serve, and to give His life
a ransom for many.’
1 Timothy 2:5-6 ‘For there is one God, and one mediator also between God and men, the man Christ
Jesus, who gave Himself as a ransom for all, the testimony given at the proper time.’
Revelation 5:9 ‘And they sang a new song, saying, “Worthy are You to take the book and to break its
seals; for You were slain, and purchased for God with Your blood men from every tribe and tongue
and people and nation.’
375 So, for instance, both Peter and Paul write:
some transformative effect (the blood, of course, could still serve as a ransom, but then in addition it also seems to have a transformative affect). And, in addition to the payment of this ransom, the author of Hebrews also presents Jesus’ life as a sacrifice. However, it is not explicitly mentioned to whom this ransom might be paid, or to whom this sacrifice might be offered. Nevertheless, that someone is appeased by Christ’s propitiation seems evident.

In addition, it appears Christ’s atoning work also involved the defeat of the devil, and the release from slavery and into ‘adoption as sons’ of those availing of his work.

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1 Peter 1:18-19 ‘knowing that you were not redeemed with perishable things like silver or gold from your futile way of life inherited from your forefathers, but with precious blood, as of a lamb unblemished and spotless, the blood of Christ.’

Colossians 1:20 ‘and through Him to reconcile all things to Himself, having made peace through the blood of His cross; through Him, I say, whether things on earth or things in heaven.’

Ephesians 1:7 ‘In Him we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of His grace.’

Matthew 26:28 ‘for this is My blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for forgiveness of sins.’

Hebrews 9:14 ‘how much more will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without blemish to God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?’

1 John 1:7 ‘but if we walk in the Light as He Himself is in the Light, we have fellowship with one another, and the blood of Jesus His Son cleanses us from all sin.’

Hebrews 7:27 ‘who does not need daily, like those high priests, to offer up sacrifices, first for His own sins and then for the sins of the people, because this He did once for all when He offered up Himself.’

Hebrews 10:12-14 ‘But when Christ had offered for all time a single sacrifice for sins, he sat down at the right hand of God, waiting from that time until his enemies should be made a footstool for his feet. For by a single offering he has perfected for all time those who are being sanctified.’

Romans 3:25 ‘whom God displayed publicly as a propitiation in His blood through faith This was to demonstrate His righteousness, because in the forbearance of God He passed over the sins previously committed’

1 John 2:2 ‘and He Himself is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.’

1 John 4:10 ‘In this is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins.’

1 John 3:8 ‘The reason the Son of God appeared was to destroy the works of the devil.’

Hebrews 2:14 ‘through death [Christ] might destroy him who has the power of death, that is, the devil.’

Revelation 12:11 ‘And they have conquered him by the blood of the Lamb and by the word of their testimony, for they loved not their lives even unto death.’

Hebrews 4:3-5 ‘in the same way we also, when we were children, were enslaved to the elementary principles of the world. But when the fullness of time had come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons.’
Aside from these battle/ransom/sacrifice motifs, Paul also portrays the death of Christ as having some legal, that is, deontic ramifications for those who avail of it. With both Peter and Paul indicating that Christ also underwent some ontological change becoming, somehow, sin on our behalf.

Peter, in alluding to the passage in Isaiah that details the suffering of the messiah, also indicates that Jesus’s suffering has a role to play in the Atonement. Whilst Paul, in Galatians, indicates that Christ ‘became a curse’ for us in order to redeem us.

Nevertheless, despite these differences, there does appear to be a consensus that Christ’s suffering was necessary, not just sufficient, for some aspect of our salvation.

So even from this cursory glance at the scriptural data, it is evident that the data does not lend itself to an obvious model for the Atonement. At the very least, the passages referring to Christ’s Atonement appear to discuss (at least) ontological, deontic, and relational effects of his work – all gesturing towards ‘solutions’ to

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381 Romans 5:18 ‘So then as through one transgression there resulted condemnation to all men, even so through one act of righteousness there resulted justification of life to all men.’
382 2 Corinthians 5:21 ‘He made Him who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf, so that we might become the righteousness of God in Him.’
1 Peter 2:24 ‘and He Himself bore our sins in His body on the cross, so that we might die to sin and live to righteousness; for by His wounds you were healed.’
Hebrews 9:27-28 ‘And just as it is appointed for man to die once, and after that comes judgment, so Christ, having been offered once to bear the sins of many, will appear a second time, not to deal with sin but to save those who are eagerly waiting for him.’
383 The passage in Isaiah he quotes from reads:
Isaiah 53:4-6 ‘Surely our griefs He Himself bore, And our sorrows He carried; Yet we ourselves esteemed Him stricken, Smitten of God, and afflicted. But He was pierced through for our transgressions, He was crushed for our iniquities; The chastening for our well-being fell upon Him, And by His scourging we are healed. All of us like sheep have gone astray, Each of us has turned to his own way; But the LORD has caused the iniquity of us all To fall on Him.’
384 Galatians 3:13 ‘Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us—for it is written, “Cursed is everyone who is hanged on a tree”.’
385 Acts 17:2-3 ‘And Paul went in, as was his custom, and on three Sabbath days he reasoned with them from the Scriptures, explaining and proving that it was necessary for the Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead…’
Luke 24:25-26 ‘And he said to them, “O foolish ones, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer these things and enter into his glory?”’
Hebrews 9:22-23 ‘Indeed, under the law almost everything is purified with blood, and without the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness of sins. Thus it was necessary for the copies of the heavenly things to be purified with these rites, but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these.’
structurally different problems. So, with this in mind, it should come as no surprise to learn that the subsequent Christian tradition saw the development of numerous very different models in an attempt to make sense of these apparently contradictory passages. Nevertheless, I suggest that despite their differences, these general models all share a similar feature, namely, they all seem to involve a transaction of some sort. In each case, the one in need of Atonement requires the transactional involvement of at least one further person to secure their Atonement.

In the case of the earliest models of the Atonement, those following the ransom motif, whatever it is about Christ’s work that is valuable is offered as (literal or symbolic) ransom, typically to the devil, in order secure human reconciliation with God.

In Anselm’s satisfaction model, the reason Atonement cannot be secured without Christ’s crucifixion is because of something to do with God the Father. And so, God the Son offers whatever is causing this impasse to God the Father on behalf of us.

In Abelard’s exemplar model (a model in many respects similar to the Thomist model), the reason Atonement cannot be secured without Christ’s crucifixion has something to do with us. And so, Christ offers us a solution to whatever it is that prevents us from reconciliation with, namely, the moving image of a heroic self-sacrifice.

In both the Thomistic and the reformed tradition, traditions typically associated with the doctrine of substitution (formerly) and penal substitution (latterly), our sin, or our guilt, or our punishment, or our hard treatment are transferred from us onto Christ, with him then doing what is necessary to deal with whatever it was that was transferred onto him (such that once this takes place, on at least the reformed tradition, Christ’s righteousness is then somehow transferred, or imputed, back to us, with this double transfer then securing the possibility of our reconciliation with God).

386 For more on the biblical data pointing to an ontological, deontic and relational Atonement, see Bayne and Restall 2009.
So, in all these explanations, there is a transaction taking place, a transaction either between God and some third party (often, but by no means always, either death or the devil), between God and God, between God and humanity, or between humanity and God. And in each case, as I will illustrate, it is the transaction that is the weak link in the explanation.\textsuperscript{387} As I see it, however, beyond an inability to satisfactorily explain the transfer problem, there are no definitive philosophical arguments against each of the theories I will survey, rather, it is the case that these theories, in one way or another, fail to meet all the scriptural desiderata. Given that this is a work of analytic theology, these failings are perhaps not to be thought of as catastrophic for the theory, but rather, as serving as a mere consideration against the theory. Nevertheless, in the final chapter, I will, by employing the work I have done on the beatific vision, offer a theory that can I take to both adequately deal with the transfer problem, and also meet all relevant scriptural desiderata.

\textbf{Transaction: God to Some Third Party}

For much of the first thousand years of Church history, the major Atonement motif was that of ransom. This is not to say that there was one universally accepted account of this ransom – there was not – rather, that the idea of (literal or non-literal) ransom was one key family resemblance shared by most attempts to explain the Atonement.\textsuperscript{388} We see evidence of this view in Ignatius of Antioch (c. 35 – 108)\textsuperscript{389} and the first full development of this view in Irenaeus (c. 130 – 202).\textsuperscript{390} In the third centuries the view is championed by both Origin and Tertullian, whilst in the fourth century it is defended by (amongst many others) Eusebius of Caesarea,
Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine.\textsuperscript{391}

The motivation behind the ransom model is not, as one might initially have been thought, that God has to do a deal with the devil to redeem humanity. Rather, the thought is that whilst God could, in his power, defeat the devil without any difficulty, God instead opts to, overcome the devil through his (poetic) justice, his goodness and his wisdom.\textsuperscript{392} On this line of thinking Gregory of Nyssa writes:

> All God’s attributes are at once displayed in this – his goodness, his wisdom, and his justice. That he decided to save us is proof of his goodness. That he struck a bargain to redeem the captive indicates his justice. And it is evidence of his transcendent wisdom that he contrived to make accessible to the enemy what was [otherwise] inaccessible.\textsuperscript{393}

In an excellent chapter, Nicholas Lombardo explains that advocates of this ransom model can be split into two categories. Those who think of the ransom as a literal transaction between God and the devil (or God and death), and those who think of it as being a metaphorical transaction. Of the former, he writes, their view looks something like this:

> Through sin, the devil obtains legal authority over humanity, and God can only redeem humanity if the devil crucifies Christ, someone over whom he does not have any legal rights. So God allows the devil to crucify Christ, and as a result humanity is set free from the power of sin and death.\textsuperscript{394}

> Christ allows the powers of evil to crucify him, but their malice backfires in this supreme act of overreaching, so that, through his acceptance of death, Christ ends up conquering the devil and liberating humanity from sin and death. The ransom, then, consists in Jesus handing himself over to be crucified.\textsuperscript{395}

\textsuperscript{391} See Lombardo, 2013: 188.
\textsuperscript{392} See, for instance, Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, 13.17.
\textsuperscript{393} Catechetical Oration, 23, 300.
\textsuperscript{394} Lombardo, 2013: 229.
\textsuperscript{395} Lombardo, 2013: 187.
However, this literal ransom view was not defended by all, indeed, perhaps even most of the patristic fathers. Certainly, Gregory of Nazianzus, John Damascene and Adamantius, all reject the thought that a literal ransom took place (although they seem happy to use language that suggests they are happy with a non-literal, metaphorical ransom motif). Criticising the literal ransom view, Gregory of Nazianzus writes:

> Now, then, we will examine an issue and doctrine overlooked by many but in my view very much to be examined. To whom was the blood poured out for us, and why was it poured out, that great and renowned blood of God, who is both high priest and victim? For we were held in bondage by the Evil One, sold under sin, and received pleasure in exchange for evil. But if the ransom is not given to anyone except the one holding us in bondage, I ask to whom this was paid, and for what cause? If to the Evil One, what an outrage! For the robber would receive not only a ransom from God, but God himself as a ransom, and a reward so greatly surpassing his own tyranny that for its sake he would rightly have spared us altogether. But if it was given to the Father, in the first place how? For we were not conquered by him. And secondly, on what principle would the blood of the Only-begotten delight the Father, who would not receive Isaac when he was offered by his father but switched the sacrifice, giving a ram in place of the reason endowed victim? It is clear that the Father accepts him, though he neither asked for this nor needed it, because of the divine plan, and because the human being must be sanctified by the humanity of God, that God might himself set us free and conquer the tyrant by force and lead us back to himself by the mediation of the Son, who also planned this to the honor of the Father, to whom it is manifest he yields all things.

As Lombardo goes on to note:

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396 See Lombardo, 2012: 207.
397 Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations, 45.22, in Festal Orations, 182.
legalistic reconstructions of the devil’s ransom are theologically unattractive and even ridiculous, but they make sense and they work logically, so it is easy to think that they accurately represent the patristic consensus. But patristic authors are not telling a legal story of redemption. They are telling an ontological story, and they think the pivotal moment of salvation is the resurrection, not the crucifixion. 398

So, what about the alternative metaphorical transaction view? Well, rather than the devil having any legal authority over humanity, Christ merely draws out the power of evil, taking it upon himself in full force on the cross, overcoming death and all evil through his resurrection. After Christ’s resurrection, we are allowed, through association and through the sacraments, to participate in this victory. 399

In essence, God draws out evil to himself to defeat it. However, this view of Christ’s death is only one small aspect of salvation crucifixion. Lombardo writes:

Since Anselm, soteriological reflection in the West has focused on the crucifixion, and when that same narrow focus is brought anachronistically to the writings of the patristic era, distortion necessary results, because patristic authors do not focus on the cross in the same way. For patristic authors, salvation comes through the resurrection and the sacraments. The crucifixion is necessary and crucial, but it is not the locus of salvation; it is only the ransom, the price of salvation. Patristic authors give little attention to the devil’s ransom in their writings, because it is Christ’s resurrection, not his crucifixion, that brings about our resurrection. Contrary to Anselm, for patristic authors redemption is not above making forgiveness possible, it is

398 Lombardo, 2013: 231.
399 This is how Lombardo explains it:

Through sin, humanity becomes subject to evil, suffering, and death. In order to restore humanity, God becomes man, so that he can draw out the power of evil in all its various manifestations and take it upon himself. Then, after absorbing the full force of evil in his crucifixion, Christ overcomes death by his resurrection and makes it possible for us to share in his victory by being joining to his Person through the sacraments. The devil does not have any true rights over humanity, nor is any literal ransom paid to him. The language of rights and ransom serves only as a way of praising God’s wisdom and justice in bringing about our salvation through Christ’s crucifixion; it does not ascribe any true legal authority to the devil. (2013: 229).
about making possible the purification and restoration of human nature. There is no sense in which God could not, or would not, forgive humanity unless Christ died on the cross – which is why, unlike many theologians after Anselm, patristic authors are completely untroubled by stories of Jesus forgiving sins before his crucifixion.\footnote{Lombardo, 2013: 230.}

This focus on the purification and restoration of human nature is certainly laudable. However, if there is no literal transaction at work, if it is all a metaphor and symbolic language, it is very difficult to see how Christ’s death can be anything more than metaphorically, but not literally, efficacious. Certainly, we can concede that, as Lombardo puts it, ‘God sends his Son to absorb the malicious fury of evil and then conquer death through his resurrection’,\footnote{Lombardo, 2013: 231} but how exactly does this lead purification or restoration? On the framework I have proposed, how could this possibly take away a person’s guilt and shame?

So, on the one hand, the literal ransom view proposes an ethically unacceptable transaction between God and devil. On the other, the metaphorical ransom view proposes what is essentially a metaphorical transaction. But a metaphorical transaction seems like it will be entirely inefficacious. And this was the very dilemma that Anselm discovered, a discovery which caused first major shift in Atonement thinking.

**Transaction: God to God**

Anselm, it seems, read the patristics literally. Like Gregory of Nazianzus before him, Anselm thought the ransom theory quite inappropriately presented the devil as the *de jure* (rather than, at best, *de facto*) ruler of humanity. Although there is little evidence the patristic defenders of the ransom theory really did think this the devil had *actual* (rather than metaphorical) rights over humanity, this straw man was the position that Anselm reacted against. Anselm writes in *Cur Deus homo*:
Now we are also accustomed to say that in order to liberate humanity God was obligated to act against the devil through justice before he acted through force, so that when the devil killed him who did not deserve death and who was God, he would justly lose the power that he held over sinners... But I do not see how this has any cogency. If either the devil or human beings were their own, or belonged to anyone other than God, or remained in the power of anyone other than God, then maybe this would be the right thing to say. But since in fact neither the devil nor human beings belong to anyone other than God or stand outside God’s power, on what grounds was God obligated to do anything with his own, about his own, or in his own, other than to punish his own slave who had persuaded a fellow slave to abandon their common master and transfer allegiance to him, a traitor harbouring a fugitive, a thief who received a thief along with what he had stolen from his master?  

But if all humanity already belongs to God, what possible purpose could Christ’s sacrifice have? As Anselm famously presented this dilemma:

If God could not save sinners except by condemning a just man, where is his omnipotence? If, on the other hand, he was capable of doing so, but did not will it, how shall we defend his wisdom and justice? 

In grappling with this dilemma, Anselm rejected the first horn, suggesting that only Jesus could redeem us through his heroic self-sacrifice, because, given his divine nature, his self-sacrifice is of infinite value. This infinitely valuable self-sacrifice could then be offered to God by way of compensation for the infinite offense caused by the sin of humanity. The crucifixion is therefore, for Anselm, ‘a transaction between God the Father and God the Son, where the beauty of Christ’s heroism makes the restitution required by God for the ugliness of sin.’ However, there is quite an obvious problem with this account. Why would God the Father

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403 Williams, 2007: 275
404 Lombardo, 2013: 166.
want this heroic self-sacrifice? It is easy enough to see why the devil might have wanted it, but why God? As Lombardo notes:

Anselm’s account of redemption shares an important structural feature with the one he criticizes in Book I.6.7 of *Cur Deus homo*: each interprets the crucifixion as a transaction. Every transaction involves someone who gives and someone who receives. When the crucifixion is interpreted as a transaction, the Son, in his humanity, is obviously the one who gives. But who receives? In the interpretation Anselm criticises in Book I.6.7, the recipient is both ambiguous and plausible. In Anselm’s theory, however the recipient is neither unambiguous nor plausible. Is the recipient the triune God, God the Father, or God’s honor? It is not clear, and none of the alternatives are very plausible...In the end Anselm trades the devil’s ransom for the Father’s ransom.\(^{405}\)

So, it seems as though on this Anselmian view, the problem the crucifixion is designed to solve is a problem on God’s side. God must be satisfied. For whatever reason, God’s honour must be restored before reconciliation between humanity and God can occur. Nevertheless, it is still not clear how I, a sinner, might benefit from this self-sacrifice.

In recent years, Richard Swinburne has tried to develop Anselm’s position to show how a sinner might avail of this self-sacrifice.\(^{406}\) To do this, Swinburne draws a distinction between obligatory and supererogatory acts. He suggests that failure to do what is obligatory, that is, sin, leads to guilt, whilst doing what is supererogatory leads to merit. Guilt, however, carries with it an additional stigma of being ‘unclean’. Swinburne suggests that as moral agents, we are responsible for dealing with our guilt and removing its stain. Contingent on the severity of what we have done, Swinburne thinks this removal takes the form of some combination of the following necessary and contingent acts:

\(^{405}\) Lombardo, 2013: 165.

\(^{406}\) Whilst Swinburne differs from Anselm’s view in as much as he grapples with the second horn of Anselm’s dilemma, arguing that Christ’s death was not necessary – a perfect angel could, plausibly, have stood in for Christ – it was fitting.
Necessary acts:

- **Repentance.** The public and private disavowal of one’s bad action.

- **Apology.** Expressing to the victim remorse for one’s actions.

Contingent acts:

- **Reparation.** If required by the victim, restoring as best possible the state of affairs as it existed prior to the wrongdoing.

- **Penance.** Somehow thoughtfully related to the wrongdoing, this costly act affirms the strength of apology and goes beyond what reparation requires, to thereby – if required - remove the stain of guilt.

- **Forgiveness.** On behalf of the victim, accepting the aforementioned acts and no longer holding the wrongdoer as ‘originator of the wrong act’, thereby removing the wrongdoer’s guilt stain.\(^{407}\) Forgiveness, however, is contingent upon the aforementioned act’s appropriateness in the light of the wrongdoing.\(^{408}\)

Swinburne thinks that a victim cannot be obliged to perform an action because a wrongdoing was perpetrated against them, and so there can be nothing obligatory about forgiveness. With the same logic, there is nothing necessarily obliging the victim to demand reparation or penance.\(^{409}\) This being the case, God can remove our guilt by forgiving those who repent and apologize for their sin (i.e., there living of a second-rate life, despite the obligation to live a first-rate one\(^{410}\)). So why does God not do so? Swinburne remarks:

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\(^{408}\) To forgive when insufficient atonement has been made is - arguably - akin to not taking seriously the wrongdoing of the wrongdoer. There is something (Swinburne argues) intuitively wrong about accepting a token reparative show from a wrongdoer, e.g. forgiving a mass murderer on the basis that he sent each family of his victims $1, or forgiving someone who refuses to apologize.

\(^{409}\) Imagine a very rich victim and very poor wrongdoer who broke (with no malice intended, i.e. merely objectively guilty) one of the rich man’s many expensive vases, it seems intuitively unfair for the rich victim to force the poor wrongdoer to work for, say, twenty years, to pay back full reparation for his vase and thereby expunge his guilt.

\(^{410}\) See Porter, 2004: 232.
God could have forgiven us without demanding reparation and penance, if he had chosen; and it would not have been wrong of him so to choose. Nevertheless, because, on Swinburne’s account, it is important for us to understand both the consequences and seriousness of our actions, and important for us atone as best we can to expunge the stain of guilt, he continues

it is good that if we do wrong, we should take proper steps to cancel our actions, to pay out debts, as far as logically can be done.

And this is where Christ’s sacrifice comes in. Swinburne sees Christ as dying a supererogatory death, and thereby accumulating merit. Swinburne thinks Christ’s meritorious death can therefore be offered by the Christian as an acceptable sacrifice for God, and that this offering ‘can be used by us as a reparation for sin.’ In essence, then, Swinburne thinks that the Christian’s offering Christ’s death as reparations for one’s sin is appropriate to secure God’s forgiveness, and so to remove one’s guilt.

Swinburne’s view does offer a more nuanced view than Anselm’s satisfaction account. However, they both face the same fundamental problem. Even if Christ’s death is supererogatory, why would God want this as something tantamount to a present? The difficult here is twofold. Firstly, it seems God is at least initially unwilling to be reconciled with us, that is, the reason we are not reconciled is something to do with God (be this due to his honour, or his justice, or some other reason). Secondly, it seems that the solution provided to this problem makes no sense. How could God’s honour, or God’s justice, be satisfied with what is tantamount to the gift of a mangled corpse? Were such a gift to indeed prove efficacious, it would imply this was something God wanted or needed. God, the

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411 Swinburne, 1989: 149. See also Swinburne, 1989: 160.
412 Swinburne, 1989: 149
413 Cross, 2001: 401
415 In private correspondence, Stump has compared this transaction to giving someone who loves cats a mangled, tortured cat as a satisfactory gift.
designer of the universe, could, in theory, have created any number of alternative ways of satisfying his honour or justice, and yet He chose instead the brutal torture of His son. Why would this be considered fitting? How is this view compatible with the idea of God as love? Such questions, are, of course, not new. And indeed, it was reflection on these considerations that helped motivate the emergence of our next major Atonement model, what has become known as Abelard’s ‘moral influence’ model.

**Transaction: God to Humanity**

Writing shortly after Anselm, Abelard also rejected Anselm’s straw man, the literal reading of the ransom theory. As far as Abelard was concerned, ransoms are only paid to masters, and as God is our master, it seems absurd that God would want a ransom paid to himself. However, Abelard also rejected Anselm’s position, too, viewing it also as a violation of the moral order; for, as he saw it, the Anselmian position denied the love of God. For Abelard, our sins are directed to God, and so, God could forgive us at any time. That God could forgive people before the crucifixion went to show, as far as he was concerned, that the crucifixion was not necessary for forgiveness. So, if God were to withhold his forgiveness, for any reason, God’s love would be undermined. Rather than Christ’s death offering something to either the devil or God, Abelard suggested that Christ’s sacrifice was necessary because it offers us something instead; Christ’s self-sacrifice offers us the witness of his heroic embrace of death. Abelard writes:

> Now it seems to us that we have been justified by the blood of Christ and reconciled to God in this way: through this unique act of grace manifested to us – in that his Son has taken upon himself our nature and persevered therein in teaching us by word and example even unto death – he has more fully bound us to himself by love; with the result that our hearts should be

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416 For more on Abelard’s view, see Quinn 1993.
417 See Lombardo, 2013: 171.
418 Or the part of Anselm’s account he was exposed to.
enkindled by such a gift of divine grace, and true charity should not now shrink from enduring anything for him.\footnote{Abelard, 1956: 283.}

In this way, reflection on Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice, a self-sacrifice in some sense made on our behalf, should motivate us to love God.\footnote{As Nicholas Lombardo writes, on Abelard’s account: “Christ’s death is redemptive because it reveals God’s love and because this revelation of God’s love inspires charity in us. We are justified by the blood of Christ, but it is not Christ’s death or even his heroic embrace of death that justifies us. We are justified by witnessing Christ’s death, because this witnessing inspires “that deeper affection in us which not only frees us from slavery to sin, but also wins for us the true liberty of sons of God, so that we do all things out of love rather than fear.” (Lombardo, 2013: 178).”} The problem that the Atonement is designed to solve is therefore on our side, namely, the fact we do not desire to love God. This reflection on Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice, repeated every eucharist, therefore either prompts or strengthens in us a desire to love, and therefore to be united with union with, God. And inasmuch as it does this, Abelard’s account does seem to avoid the pitfalls of Anselm’s account. However, Abelard’s account also faces a significant problem. According to the biblical data, it seems as though Christ’s suffering was necessary for the Atonement, not merely sufficient for it. Unfortunately, Abelard’s account cannot accommodate for this.\footnote{Lombardo notes that Abelard’s account ‘cannot give a plausible rationale for New Testament affirmations about the salvific necessity of the crucifixion.’ (Lombardo, 2013: 178).}

There are many alternative ways in which a person could be motivated to love God (one could, for instance, read stories about other acts of providence, or, as mentioned, one could marvel at the beauty of creation). Certainly, Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice might be a particularly apt motivator (even, perhaps, the most apt) however, it seems reflection on the story of Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice would, for those not living in the first century, have (broadly) the same effect whether or not the story had any historical truth to it.

Nevertheless, both Abelard and Anselm explain, in the words of Lombardo, the salvific value of the crucifixion with respect to a spectator. For Anselm, the spectator is God the Father, and the spectacle is the beauty of Christ’s
heroism. For Abelard, the spectator is fallen humanity, and the spectacle is Christ’s selfless love, which inspires charity.\textsuperscript{422}

However, in both cases, each account fails to meet one of desiderata for a successful account. The ethical implications of Anselm’s view, that God is not perfectly loving, serve to render it, at best, incomplete, whilst the failure to account for key scriptural passages renders Abelard’s view likewise incomplete.

\textbf{Transaction: Humanity to God}

Aquinas, writing after both Anselm and Abelard, shows surprising sensitivity to Abelard’s general position. Like Abelard, Aquinas puts the problem of the Atonement on the side of the human, with Christ’s sacrificial death doing something to sort this out. For Aquinas, like Abelard, reflection on the death of Christ can have a morally transformative effect on a person’s life, motivating them toward a life of grace. However, Aquinas adds something distinctive to Abelard’s view. Aquinas suggests that this moral transformation is aided by a transfer of penalty from humanity to Christ; Christ acts, in this sense, as a sort of substitute. Aquinas writes:

\begin{quote}
[Christ] willed to suffer that he might make satisfaction for our sins. And he suffered for us those things which we deserved to suffer because of the sin of our first parent. The chief of these is death, to which all other human sufferings are ordered as to their end … Accordingly, Christ also willed to suffer death for our sins so that, without any fault of His own by himself bearing the penalty we owed, he might free us from the sentence of death, in the way that anyone would be freed from a penalty he owed if another person undertook the penalty for him.\textsuperscript{423}
\end{quote}

So, beyond Anselm’s suggestion that Christ’s sacrifice might be a fitting offering to God, Aquinas thinks there is some sort of transfer of punishment that takes place, a

\textsuperscript{422} Lombardo, 2013: 179.
\textsuperscript{423} CT 227. Also, ST III Q 46 A 1 and SCG Book 4 Chapter 55.
transaction from sinful humanity to the sinless Christ. But how might we explain this transfer? Speaking of its possibility, Aquinas suggests that

the penalty of satisfaction is in a certain sense voluntary. It can happen that those who differ with respect to guilt [worthy of] penalty are one with respect to the will in a union of love. For this reason, sometimes someone who has not sinned voluntarily bears the penalty for another person.\footnote{ST I-II Q 87 A 7.}

Here, Aquinas suggests that a transfer of penalty is possible when the one paying the penalty is willing to do so, out of love for the other, and the other is willing to let them do so, because they cannot do it themselves.\footnote{This position, that of vicarious punishment, is one advocated by Murphy 2011.}

Aquinas thought that reflection on this transaction, and the thought that Christ’s substitutionary self-sacrifice was done out of love, was the most fitting way to begin the process of transformation in the life of a sinner, and so, more fitting than mere self-sacrifice alone. But, like Abelard before him, despite being the most fitting way to do this, Aquinas thinks that God’s omnipotence allows for other ways, and so, that this transfer of penalty was not strictly necessary. He writes:

\begin{quote}
\begin{verbatim}
a judge who has to punish a fault committed against another ... cannot remit the fault or penalty without injustice. But God has no one superior to him; rather he himself is the highest and universal good of the whole world. And for this reason, if [God] remits sin, which is defined as a fault from its being committed against [God] himself, he does no one an injury, just as any human being who, without [requiring] satisfaction, remits an offense committed against himself does not act unjustly but is merciful.\footnote{ST III Q 46 A 2 ad. 3.}
\end{verbatim}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, Aquinas does think it was the most fitting way of healing our corrupted human nature, and because it was the most fitting way, it was the way God determined to achieve it.

However, just as was the case with Abelard, Aquinas’s account seems incompatible with some of the biblical data on the crucifixion. To begin with, it is not obvious that
Christ in fact bears human sin. Nor is it obvious why Christ so dreaded the cross.\textsuperscript{427} Reflection on the inadequacy of Aquinas’s account to explain the biblical data lead the reformation’s development of his substitutionary account into what has become known as penal substitution. On this point, Stump writes:

There is, however, one idea important in theories of the Atonement found, for example, in the Reformation which is not mentioned in this chapter because, as far as I can see, it is not in Aquinas. Luther, for example, in his explanation of the Atonement, emphasizes the idea that Christ somehow actually bears all human sin; that is, in some way all the sins ever committed in human history are transferred to Christ’s soul in his suffering on the cross. There is no similar or analogous claim in Aquinas’s account. There is consequently some problem for Aquinas in squaring his account with the New Testament story of the passion. At any rate, the cry of dereliction from the cross is certainly easier to explain on Luther’s view than on Aquinas’s interpretation; and so is Christ’s agony in the garden of Gethsemane. For Aquinas, it is difficult to explain why the incarnate deity should have been in such torment over his death when so many of the merely human martyrs went gladly, even cheerfully, to death by tortures worse than crucifixion.\textsuperscript{428}

Rather than the mere penalty for sin, it is sin itself which is transferred from a person to Christ. And whilst this view does accord more closely with the biblical texts, it too, is ethically troubling. For one, it is far from clear that there is any mechanism for transferring sin from one person to another. Secondly, even if our sin was transferred, it is far from clear that such a move is either just, or that we are now innocent. Furthermore, it is not clear at all that, even if possible, transferring sin from one person to another would entail the transfer of guilt and shame over one’s prior sinful action.

\textsuperscript{427} In recent years, Stump has tried to rectify this lack in the Thomist account by suggesting that at the cry of dereliction Jesus opened himself up to all the psyches of every person, past, present and future, and that the psychological pain of experiencing what it might be like to sin in the ways such people have sinned was sufficient to prevent Christ from dyadically attending to God the Father, thereby (in some sense) causing a break in the Trinity. It was this ‘break’ that Christ was afraid of prior to the crucifixion. For more, see Stump, 2012a: 4-7.

\textsuperscript{428} Stump, 2003: 453.
There are, of course, other major models of the Atonement available. However, each of these models seems to require some form of transaction or another, too, and in each case, this transaction raises ethical and theological concerns.

Given this, rather than offering a further transaction model, I will, in the final chapter, outline a possible non-transactional model of the Atonement, but importantly, a non-transactional model that nevertheless that can satisfy the requisite scriptural desiderata.

**Non-Transaction and Union**

Over the last two millennia there have been many differing attempts to try and explain the Atonement in transactional terms. In my estimation, all prior attempts have failed to completely explain how Christ’s work can aid our Atonement either because they do not satisfy the scriptural desiderata, or because they are unable to adequately (i.e., they are unable to provide a coherent ethically and metaphysically viable account) account for the transaction itself. Rather than continuing to focus on trying to find an explanation for this transaction, I propose instead to explore what a transactionless, union account of the Atonement might look like.

In the final chapter, I will develop the thought that our ultimate union with God (the Father) at the beatific vision is secured through our prior union with God the Son (which is itself preceded by union with the God the Spirit). That is to say, something about our union with God the Son deals with our present inability to behold the beatific vision. The general lineaments of such a union view are not without scriptural warrant, either. The apostle Paul, for instance, writes:

Ephesians 5:29-32 ‘For no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, just as Christ does the church, because we are members of his body. “Therefore a man shall leave his father and mother and hold fast to

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429 See for instance, Grotius’s governmental theory (1617) recently reinterpreted by Oliver Crisp as ‘penal non-substitution’ (Crisp, 2008).

430 Taking a leaf from John McDowell, if A looks like it entails either B or C, and neither B nor C are good, you should not focus on which is the least bad. Rather, you should “look for a different picture” and focus on getting rid of A. And in this case, A is a transactional account of Atonement.
his wife, and the two shall become one flesh.” This mystery is profound, and I am saying that it refers to Christ and the church.’

Romans 12:4-5 ‘For as in one body we have many members, and the members do not all have the same function, so we, though many, are one body in Christ, and individually members one of another.’

1 Corinthians 12:12 ‘For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ.’

Furthermore, as already alluded to, the idea of union with Christ has already been teased in the work of many of the church fathers, as well as in the work of Anselm, Abelard and Aquinas.

So, for instance, Gregory of Nyssa writes:

[Christ] united himself with our nature, in order that by its union with the Divine it might become divine, being rescued from death and freed from the tyranny of the adversary. For with his return from death, our mortal race begins its return to immortal life. (Catechetical Oration, 25, 302).

To which Lombardo comments:

Since our problem is more ontological than epistemological, it follows that the solution must likewise be more ontological than epistemological... Baptism joins us spiritually to Christ, but we are comprised of body and soul and so our bodies, as well as our souls, must be joined to Christ. Therefore, something else is needed: the Eucharist. The soul is joined to Christ through faith and baptism, and the body is joined to Christ through reception of the Eucharist. By our union with Christ’s incorruptible body, our bodies also become immortal. (Lombardo, 2013: 225).

So, concerning this mystical body, Stump writes of Aquinas:

According to Aquinas, Christ is the head of the Church; and since all human beings are potentially members of the Church, Christ is (at least potentially) the head of the whole human race. By saying that Christ is the head, Aquinas means that he is first among human beings in order, perfection, and power; but, more importantly, he also means that together Christ and human beings form one mystical body, analogous to the physical body formed by the head and other members of a human body. All human beings are potentially, and believers are actually, part of this mystical body. In his passion Christ merits grace sufficient to cure all human sin; and as head of the body of the Church, he infuses the grace he has merited into those persons actually united with him in this mystical body. (Stump, 2003: 443).

And discussing Aquinas’s account of the Eucharist, she writes:

Furthermore, the nature of the Eucharist is such that when a believer partakes of it, he does not turn the sacrament into his substance, as happens when he eats other food, but instead he becomes part of the body of Christ and is incorporated into the body of Christ. Aquinas
However, with the help of the previously established framework, I intend, in the next and final chapter, to develop this union account of the Atonement further than these previous accounts. For, unlike prior accounts, I will suggest that this sort of non-transactional account is primarily metaphysical in nature, and I will tease out a possible metaphysical account of union that might make sense of such a transactionless view.

says, “there is this difference between corporeal and spiritual food: corporeal food is converted into the substance of the human being who is nourished [by it] . . . but spiritual food converts a human being into itself”. (Stump, 2003: 446).
I began the first chapter by arguing that however the Atonement achieves it, the goal of the Atonement involves securing a person’s union with God at the beatific vision. In chapter two, suggested several general inhibitors to such union that any account of the Atonement must purport to overcome if it is to provide a plausible explanation for the doctrine. In the third chapter, I identified a general framework for dealing with each of these inhibitors; however, I noted that there were particular problems generated by orthodox Christian belief that make finding an orthodox account of the Atonement particularly intractable. In the previous chapter, I surveyed some (what I took to be) unsatisfactory ways in which previous theologians and philosophers have tried to address some of these issues.

Whilst I take what has come before to be helpful in its own right, as a prolegomena for (what I take to be) any future successful account of atonement, in this final chapter, I intend to gesture towards one (what I take to be) possible model for the Atonement that meets the desiderata so outlined, that is, an alternative account of the way in which Christ’s life, passion, death, and resurrection might be used by the penitent sinner in order that they might be able to behold the beatific vision and so be united with God. The (transactionless) union model that I will propose, as I see it, both makes sense of the biblical data, and avoids some of the ethical pitfalls previous accounts of Atonement have fallen into.

Specifically, I will look at both how the work of Christ can fit into the framework set out in chapter three, and how we might, through union, avail of such work. That is, how the work of Christ (and our availing of it) can help motivate a person’s quiescence to grace, and how the work of Christ can help a person deal with their objective guilt and their objective shame, such that they can both wholeheartedly desire union with God, and also come to share attention with God at the beatific vision.
Grace and the Sufferings of Christ

In chapter three, I suggested that the problem of psychological fragmentation can be dealt with when a person comes to quiescence with respect to God’s self-revelatory gift of grace, and so, reflects on God’s goodness and comes to desire union with Him. However, I also suggested that in addition to giving this self-revelatory gift of grace, God can also externally motivate a person to quiescence through, for instance, suffering, such that for a person who would otherwise be resistant to grace, this resistance ‘cracks’ or ‘melts’ into quiescence.

I propose, then, that there are two ways that Christ’s life, passion, death and resurrection can be used to motivate this desire for union with God. First, by standing as an example of grace (i.e., as an example of God’s great goodness), and second, as a form of external motivation toward quiescence with respect to this grace.

With respect to the first way, Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice demonstrates, as Abelard explained, God’s great love and goodness. If we recall Abelard’s view:

Christ’s death is redemptive because it reveals God’s love and because this revelation of God’s love inspires charity in us. We are justified by the blood of Christ, but it is not Christ’s death or even his heroic embrace of death that justifies us. We are justified by witnessing Christ’s death, because this witnessing inspires “that deeper affection in us which not only frees us from slavery to sin, but also wins for us the true liberty of sons of God, so that we do all things out of love rather than fear.”

On this view, Christ’s life, passion, death, and resurrection all reveal an aspect of God’s goodness, where appropriate reflection on this goodness can motivate a

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person to desire union with God, in much the same way that reflecting on a beautiful sunset might also motivate a desire for God.\(^{434}\)

With respect to the second point, Christ’s suffering also provides a form of external motivation to quiescence, both in as much as it demonstrates love, and also in as much as one’s heart might be moved as one hears someone has sacrificed something great \textit{for you}. A person hearing, for instance, of the tremendous sacrifice of an army unit in order to save their life, or of a person being vicariously punished on their behalf,\(^{435}\) might at once be both full of gratitude, but it could also bring about something like survivor’s syndrome in the hearer,\(^{436}\) with both of these aiding in the process of bringing them to quiescence. Likewise, reflection on the fact that a lover went out their way to do something romantic or special for their beloved can motivate love in the reflecting beloved.

So, as well as demonstrating God’s goodness, inasmuch as one recognises that Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice was exemplary of love (Jesus himself said ‘Greater love has no one than this, that they lay down their life for their friends’\(^{437}\)), reflection on this act of love has the capacity to externally motivate (but will, of course, not inevitably lead to) quiescence with respect to God’s operative grace. In a similar manner, sombre reflection on the nature of Christ’s sacrificial death might also move a person to quiescence through something akin to survivor’s syndrome.

And this second position is echoed in Aquinas’s account of the Atonement.

Concerning this account, Stump comments:

\begin{quote}
When a person has been readied by past experience and grace, the passion and death of Christ are the means for subduing the sinner’s final resistance to such a volition. The internal opposition to undergoing the wholesale
\end{quote}

\(^{434}\) Clearly, however, Christ’s life, passion, death, and resurrection can’t just reveal an aspect of God’s goodness. If the goodness revealed these is due to their atoning work, there is a very real threat of circularity if this is the only way in which said events contribute to the Atonement.

\(^{435}\) See, for instance, Murphy 2009.

\(^{436}\) That is, something like survivor’s guilt; why did I survive and they, these good people, die?

\(^{437}\) John 15:13. See also Hebrews 12:3.
changes and the humbling entailed by such a volition is broken by the suffering of Christ and the love it shows.\footnote{Stump, 2003: 387.}

However, there is a worry with this sort of analysis. In what way is this self-sacrifice in fact good? If it is good because it reveals God’s goodness, or if it is good only in virtue of motivating us to quiescence, it seems we are presenting a purely circular argument for its either being good or being exemplary.\footnote{That is, if it is only a demonstration of goodness, it is unclear to me what it is about an innocent person being crucified that might count as a demonstration of goodness, or might motivate me to quiescence (besides, perhaps, confusion).} If it is good in some other respect, what respect might that be? Well, it is helpful at this point to note that the exemplarist account seems unable to address either the problem of guilt or the problem of shame. And since it cannot do so, whatever a successful account of atonement might look like, it cannot be purely exemplary. So long as whatever it is that deals with the problem of guilt and the problem of shame are in some way tied to Christ’s self-sacrifice, such self-sacrifice could be considered good (and so, both heroic and exemplary) with respect to that.

And so, whilst this account can provide a slightly fuller explanation of Abelard’s exemplarist account, it cannot, by itself, explain either why the Atonement is necessary, or the full body of scriptural data. Indeed, as mentioned, it also does not offer any explanation for how either (aligned) guilt or shame might be dealt with. However, this is not problematic. As I argued in the third chapter, it is very plausible that guilt and shame require distinct solutions, and so it should come as no surprise that a one-size-fits-all account of the Atonement fails to adequately explain all the desiderata. So long as the problems of objective guilt and objective shame can be explained in a way compatible with this exemplarist account, and in a way that does fit the remaining scriptural desiderata, this supposed deficiency is, in fact, understandable.
Atonement and Shame

In the second and third chapters, I drew a distinction between objective and subjective shame. I suggested that one might experience subjective shame without being objectively shamed, and that one might be objectively shamed without experiencing subjective shame. I noted that whilst it was the experience of subjective shame that inhibits union between others, I did not think an account of the Atonement needed to account for subjective shame that was not aligned with objective shame, as, I suggested, a person might deal with their subjective shame through coming to realise that their subjective shame does not track objective shame, that is, by being presented with all relevant information demonstrating that the two are unaligned.440

In either case, I said that shame stemmed from a failure (merely perceived, in the case of subjective shame, necessarily actual in case of objective shame) to meet a community standard that the shamed person either considered to be (in the case of subjective shame) or in fact was (in the case of objective shame) in some sense authoritative over them, such that either they believed it to be appropriate (i.e., subjective shame), or it in fact was appropriate (i.e., objective shame) for others to reject them. Furthermore, I suggested that there were four general causes of shame, namely, shame caused by:

1. reflection on one’s own individual moral wrongdoing,
2. reflection upon wrongs that have been done to you,
3. reflection upon depredations of nature that might have befallen you, and
4. reflection on your communal participation in a certain community that has perpetrated significant wrongdoing.

In that chapter, I suggested that in each case, the cause of shame had to be dealt with, so, given these four causes, finding one single solution to the problem of

440 However, even if this were not the case, the solution to the presence subjective shame unaligned with objective shame would very likely be identical to subjective shame that was aligned with objective shame. If I have a working explanation for the latter, it will also cover the former, and so no further explanation would be required.
shame was unlikely. Developing Stump’s own account, I suggested that the antidote to (2), (3), and (4) might be explained by something akin to the celebration of the shamed person’s life. Whilst I noted (2) and (3) were unlikely to apply to shame with respect to God (and so, in this case, that subjective and objective shame were unaligned, and did not need explaining in an account of the Atonement), I nevertheless suggested that, generally and for each, a celebration that focused upon their subsequently meeting a trumping community standard, one that in some way related to the initial source of shame, might defeat the shame that stemmed from the trumped community standard by which a person had judged themselves to have fallen short. However, I suggested it was difficult to see how this might help us deal with shame stemming from (1), and it was not altogether obvious that this solution extended to (4).

Nevertheless, I think (2) and (3) do share sufficient similarity with (4) to warrant extending a similar sort of explanation to this latter cause, too. In each case, the shamed person is not to blame for their experience of shame (and to the extent that they can be blamed, can that experience be captured by (1)). Following Stump, I therefore suggested that in the case of (2), (3) and (4), the trumping standard that defeats their shame involves some form of communal honour. Thus, for (2) and (3), a person who is truly honoured (due to their possession of something intrinsically valuable), may no longer feel it is appropriate for another to reject them as a person, so long as the honour is in some way connected to the original cause of shame. In the case of (4), this meant celebrating something intrinsically valuable that is in, or has happened to, the community itself.441

With this in view, we can think about in the specific case of (what might constitute) objective shame at being a member of the human race, and, indeed, how such shame might be defeated.442 Consider, then, the following: In becoming incarnate, Christ honoured the human race, and so, every human person can take pride in the

441 For one such example, consider Germany’s recent acceptance of Syrian refuges.
442 I take this to be a theological consequence of the doctrine of original sin, and offer no further defence of this. Unlike other examples of communal subjective shame (for instance, the shame one might experience when one’s football team is humiliated), the shame that stems from membership of the sinful human race is, plausibly, aligned to objective shame with respect to God.
fact that God chose to become incarnate as a human person. Furthermore, every human person can take pride in the fact that not only did Christ become incarnate, he also did so with them in mind, with a view to both friendship and love with them. Finally, the incarnation, it seems, was in some way directly motivated by the fallen condition of humanity, that is, it was connected to the original cause of shame, namely, sin and the fall. In this way, reflection on Christ’s incarnate life can, plausibly, deal with this fourth cause of shame, at least, with respect to being a member of humanity in general.

What about the shame that stems from one’s own wrongdoing? I take this to be the most forceful element of the problem of shame. On the face of it, it seems difficult to reconcile this sort of shame with a celebration of what is intrinsically honourable in a person (or in a community, as in (4)). It seems absurd to suppose that, in 1945, a Nazi concentration camp guard should feel as though it was no longer appropriate for others to reject him in virtue of the celebration of some morally upstanding aspect of his character. Instead, in chapter three, I suggested that the source of this shame stemmed from the communicative nature of his wrongdoing, and so, to deal with this shame, that he himself must work to remove the communication of disrespect issued by his wrongdoing. I suggested, however, that removing this communication required a sincere retraction and expression of remorse; namely, an apology, where the sincerity of this apology was grounded in some supererogatory act – a supererogatory act of penance which, with respect to God, was, I suggested, impossible for him to offer.

So, how might Christ’s life, passion, death, or resurrection help him with this offering of penance? Well, in the first place, the same grace that can bring a person to a general desire for union with God also has within it the resources to motive a person to apology and repentance, but as mentioned earlier, even if such unique grace could motivate a person to penance as well, what penance could that person

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443 I recognise, of course, that Christ could not represent every specific community. He was, for instance, a male carpenter living in first century Judaism, however this does not preclude him from representing humanity as a whole, in the same way that humanity can be proud of world record holders, or great (historical) explorers that are unconnected to the communities in which you consider yourself a member.
offer? I suggested that, even if they wanted to, there is *nothing* a fallen human can offer God that God does not already demand from them.

There is, however, one thing that God does not demand of an *innocent* person. It would appear that God does not demand the sacrifice of their *innocent* life. So, for instance, in the biblical narrative, the lives of Adam and Eve were not required of them until they had sinned.\(^{444}\) However, once no longer innocent, their lives (and following the doctrine of original sin, the lives of all who followed them) were indeed demanded from them.\(^{445}\)

It is seemingly for this reason that God required the Israelites to engage in the sacrifice of animals without blemish or spot,\(^{446}\) signifying the supererogatory sacrifice of an innocent life.\(^{447}\) Indeed, paralleling this, the book of Hebrews indicates that Christ’s blemish free life\(^ {448}\) and sacrificial death also secured an appropriate, and fully sufficient penance. A penance both supererogatory, and also costly enough such that its pleading by a penitent sinner is sufficient for it to be appropriate that God no longer desire to reject them as a person.\(^{449}\)

The penance Christ provides the penitent sinner to plead is referred to in Hebrews 9:11-15 using the Mosaic imagery of an offering of Christ’s blood (in place of a blemish free animal) in something akin to God’s heavenly temple. This shocking imagery is, I think, designed to remind the penitent sinner of the seriousness, solemnity and horror which ought to grip them as they plead this as penance. Once pled, however, the writer of Hebrews explains (10:19), the sinner may confidently enter God’s presence, no longer ashamed.\(^{450}\) This pleading, then, could be seen in

\(^{444}\) The implication of Genesis 3:19-22 given Romans 5: 12-21 is that Adam would have had everlasting life had he not sinned. After Adam fell, his (and every subsequent) life was required by God.

\(^{445}\) Romans 6:23.

\(^{446}\) John Hare connects the shed blood of a sacrificial animal with a ‘ransom for lives’ mentioned in Exodus 30:12 and Numbers 35:31-3. (Hare, 2011: 135)

\(^{447}\) See Exodus 12:5, Leviticus 1:10.

\(^{448}\) 1 Peter 1:19.

\(^{449}\) On this account, God could have forgiven us without demanding reparation and penance; however, we could not have dealt with our shame, even with God’s forgiveness, without offering a suitable penance.

\(^{450}\) See also Romans 3:23-25, Romans 5:9, 1 Corinthians 10:16, Ephesians 1:7, 2:3, Colossians 1:20, Hebrews 13:12, 1 Peter 1:19, and Revelation 1:5.
the same vein as the playground version of ‘swearing on someone’s life’. Only to be done if really meant – and it should be costly to the swearer. The swearer must, as Aquinas suggested, ally themselves to Christ first, such that this pleading is not done lightly (as, for instance, swearing on the life of someone you do not know, or do not care for, might be done).

To be clear, on this account, the unblemished Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice is not something desired by God, rather it is representative of the magnitude of sin, and is (plausibly) both supererogatory (inasmuch as it is not required by God) and significant enough to ensure the sincerity of the penitent pleader when reflectively pled, and is thereby when so pled sufficient for the sinner to overcome their belief that it is appropriate for God to reject them as a person.\(^{451}\) Rather than on Swinburne’s account, where Christ’s life is offered by way of reparation, Christ’s sacrifice is here offered by the penitent sinner as the only form of supererogatory penance available to them.\(^{452}\)

A person who is quiescent to God’s operative grace has, then, the capacity to desire union with God, and also the capacity to offer an apology made sincere by their repentance and also the pled penance of Christ’s innocent and voluntary supererogatory self-sacrifice. In so doing, the penitent person can thereby defeat the objective shame caused by their own wrongdoing. In offering a sincere apology, it is no longer appropriate for God to reject them as a person.

In addition, through reflection on both the incarnation (and its cause) and this self-sacrifice, it seems plausible to think that a person can come to see that God has ‘allied’ Himself with humankind, and has invited us to ally with Him. Through reflection on the great honour that this could be taken to be, it is plausible that such a person would come to defeat the God-directed objective that may result from membership in a fallen humanity, where such objective shame is not necessarily the result of their own individual wrongdoing.

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\(^{451}\) Recognising that an innocent person died for you might cause shame; however, it is either inappropriate shame, else this shame can be defeated by something akin to a celebration of your life.

\(^{452}\) Cross, 2001: 401
Atonement and Guilt

Like shame, I have suggested that guilt, the belief that it is appropriate for another to desire your hard treatment, can also cause psychological fragmentation, and can also prevent joint attention with God. In this way, even if a person has a (even wholehearted) desire for union with God, and has dealt with their shame, unless their (objective) guilt is dealt with, they cannot enjoy real union with God.

In chapter three, I presented the most obvious solution to the moral problem of guilt, namely, the payment of whatever hard treatment is owed by way of reparations for one’s wrongdoing. However, it seems, at least part of what we owe God, the traditional consequence for our sin, involves everlasting separation from God’s revealed presence (either as a consequence, as I argued might be the case in chapter two, or explicitly as a punishment, as is often traditionally understood). So, whether a person tries to deal with their guilt or not, the outcome is the same: full and complete real union with God will be impossible for them.

As alluded to in the previous chapter, typical attempts to explain this problem either involve some appeal to vicarious punishment\(^\text{453}\) or to the transfer of guilt or punishment from the sinner onto Christ. However, as Richard Cross points out, there just does not seem to be any transfer mechanism available to us that can explain how we might come to appropriate the work of Christ.\(^\text{454}\) Likewise, Oliver Crisp notes that whilst we might find examples of hard treatment paid for by others,

\[...\text{we find no examples of legislation allowing substitution when the crime is a serious felony, such as murder. In such cases, the one guilty must meet the penal consequences of that crime, and we would consider it a terrible miscarriage of justice were a substitute punished in place of the perpetrator.}\(^\text{455}\)

\(^{453}\) Murphy, 2009.

\(^{454}\) Cross, 2001: 401. This point was also noted by Kant, see Hare, 1996: 243-58.

\(^{455}\) Crisp, 2016: 130
So how can we make headway on this issue? What about the (seemingly) finite life, passion, death, or resurrection of Jesus might constitute an equivalent offering? Well, we can start by looking at what else Christ might have achieved during the crucifixion that has hitherto remained unexplored.

As well as demonstrating his love, and shedding his blood as a penance, the scriptural data suggests Christ also paid the penalty of sin, that is, separation from the revealed presence of God, in himself during the crucifixion. Taking the cry of dereliction at face value, it would seem apparent that Jesus felt in some sense separated from God the Father. Following Abelard, and using a face value reading of Deuteronomy 21:23 and Galatians 3:12-14, I will offer one reason to think this separation was neither arbitrary nor indicative of sin, namely, that in virtue of sinlessly ‘hanging on a tree’, Jesus was subject to the ‘curse’ of God, a ‘curse’ that involved the withdrawal of the divine presence.

Of course, such a view raises more questions than it answers. How could this happen? Why was not this separation permanent? How might this be efficacious in our Atonement? I will get to these questions in turn, but before, I do, it is worth surveying the scriptural and contextual support for this position.

Quoting from Deuteronomy 21:23 Paul writes in Galatians 3:13:

> Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us, for it is written: “Cursed is everyone who is hung on a pole.”

We find written in the work of both Josephus (who connected Deuteronomy 21:23 to crucifixion) and also writers from the pre-Christ Essene community that

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456 Abelard, too, argued that Christ was literally cursed for hanging on a cross. See Lombardo, 2013: 176, quoting from Abelard’s Sermon 12.

457 Either due to an inability for the cursed person to dyadically attend to God, or due an actual withdrawal of God’s manifest presence. Furthermore, if God the Son understands what it is like for the man Jesus to experience being forsaken by God; this experience of being forsaken would be eternally understood by the divine nature of Christ, and though in one sense finite, perhaps in another, may thus correspond to something like an everlasting separation from God’s revealed presence.


459 ‘This refers to the Lion of Wrath [...ven]geance against the ones who look for smooth things, because he used to hang men alive, [as it was done] in Israel in former times, for to anyone hanging alive on the tree, [the verse applies: “Behold, I am against [you],[says] the Lord of Hosts.” (2.13a)’ Commentary on Nahum, frags. 3-4 1.6-9 [WAC, 218].

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crucifixion was interpreted by at least certain contemporaneous members of the Jewish faith as fulfilling the conditions for being cursed by God as laid out in Deuteronomy 21:23. As James VanderKam, puts it, ‘understanding Deuteronomy 21:23 to mean hanging to execute [was] common to them [the Essenes] and to Paul.’

If this interpretation is correct, in being crucified, quite independent from his blood being shed, or his demonstration of exemplary love, Christ received a curse from God as he hung on the cross. Following Abelard, I venture to suggest that this curse was equivalent to banishment (in some sense) from God’s revealed presence, and was, perhaps, the motivation for Christ’s cry of dereliction; ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’

This passage in Deuteronomy is the only place in the Christian scriptures where the ‘curse’ of sin is set apart from an act of sin, and it only appears in the covenant God made with Moses. This Mosaic covenant was set out as something akin to God’s marriage covenant with Israel, and unlike other covenants God had previously made (for instance, the Noahide or the Abrahamic covenant), it appears this covenant was subject to nullification upon the dissolution of the God/Israel ‘relationship’. The book of Jude suggests that early Christians read Christ himself as one of the parties in this covenant, and Paul, in Romans 7:1-2, suggests that upon Christ’s death the covenant through which Christ had been cursed was no longer in effect on Christ. Taking this together, it looks as though a case can be made for Christ paying in full the penalty for sin – the ‘curse’ of God, that is, experiencing the withdrawal of God’s presence – without sinning himself. And, because the covenant this ‘curse’ was contained within was dissolved by his death, Christ could pay this penalty without the effects of this curse remaining everlastingly upon him.

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460 VanderKam and Flint, 2004: 356.
461 Abelard, too, argued that Christ was literally cursed for hanging on a cross. See Lombardo, 2013: 176.
462 Matthew 27:46.
463 See Exodus 19:5-8 and particularly Jeremiah 2:2, Ezekiel 16:1-63.
464 Jeremiah 3:8, for instance, describes God divorcing Israel (but not Judah).
465 Jude 5.
Having said this much, nothing about this explanation explains how a penitent sinner could come to appropriate this reparative payment in a way sufficient to deal with their objective guilt. All we have so far is an account of Christ receiving the curse of God for sin, and then paying it in full in himself. Indeed, Paul, recognising this, suggests that ‘if Christ had not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins.’ On Paul’s view, there is something about the resurrection of Christ that is essential to our appropriation of this aspect of Christ’s work, namely, some future interaction between the penitent sinner and the risen Christ. As I see it, high on the list of possible interactions is the future union of the Church with Christ (either as friends, or as lovers, or both) as described by Paul in Ephesians 5:25-32.

Paul sees the penitent sinner, in the church, uniting with Christ ‘in one flesh’ in something analogous to a marital union, an analogy carried over from the covenant God made with Moses into the ‘new covenant’ Paul suggests Christ established after his resurrection.

So, how might this union view help us make headway on the problem of objective guilt? Before we can answer this question, it is worth noting that there are two generally competing views on what such union might involve. On the one hand, we have something like an organic whole account of union (a position associated with Augustinian realism) wherein we literally become part of Christ (much like Jesus of Nazareth might have become ‘part of’ the Son of God), and on the other, there is an account of union where we enter into something closer to a federal union. These general models, however, are really representative poles on a continuum that stretches from something like ‘I am on Christ’s team’ to ‘I am Christ’.

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466 1 Corinthians 15:17. As already discussed, this was very much the view of the early church fathers, too.  
468 See, for instance, Meconi 2013 for a development of the metaphysics of deification as participation (either by methexis or koinonia) in the totus Christus of Christ’s mystical body.  
469 In the case of the organic whole model, a person uniting with Christ might end up uniting with one who paid in full the hard treatment for sin. Given a certain type of union, it may be the case that such union is sufficient to make it the case that it is no longer appropriate for God to desire their hard treatment, for they are, in some sense, (dependent on the model of union, perhaps merely a part of) Christ, and Christ has already repaid this hard treatment in full.
Although finding an ‘I am Christ’ model that explains the problem of objective guilt does not seem outside of the bounds of possibility (for one, this sort of model has been used previously by Michael Rea to explain the transmission of original guilt;\textsuperscript{470} for another, there is something mysterious about the hypostatic union in the Incarnation, and about the union shared between members of the Trinity, so why not here, too?\textsuperscript{471}), trying to solve one problem, namely, the Atonement, by posing an even larger, more metaphysically obscure one does seem somewhat counter-productive. As a result, I will focus only upon a particular federalist solution, namely, what I will call a marriage-bond federalist union.\textsuperscript{472}

The motivation for a marriage-bond style federalist approach comes from the only passage in the Bible I know of that deals with anything like a transfer of hard treatment, Numbers 30:15. Detailing what happens when a spouse binds themselves to a particular course of action and then fails to act on their promise, the author of Numbers 30 writes:

>If, however, [a husband] nullifies [his wife’s vows] some time after he hears about them, then he must bear the שָׁוָן [’avn̄, guilt] of her wrongdoing.

I will take it that this new covenant which Christ set up after his resurrection is, like the Mosaic covenant, set up as a marriage covenant between himself and what is described in the New Testament as his bride, the church.\textsuperscript{473} Given this, if there’s a plausible way in which Christ can nullify any tacit or explicit agreement ‘his bride’ might have made to obey God, whilst the sinful actions of the members of the bride remain in some sense bad, they are (perhaps) no longer wrong. If punishment is connected to wrongdoing, such actions are therefore no longer deserving of

\textsuperscript{470} See Rea 2007.
\textsuperscript{471} Something like ‘Soteriological Perichoresis’, or ‘Soteriological Nestorianism’.
\textsuperscript{472} Although I am titling this a ‘marriage-bond’ union, nothing precludes this from reinterpreted as a ‘friendship-bond’. As far as I can see, the practical differences between these two accounts would be almost entirely semantic (although, semantically, as Andrew Pinsent noted in conversation, the ‘friendship-bond’ might more neatly mirror what God was after (and failed to get) in the stories of both primal and original sin).
punishment, and, therefore, that objective guilt over them is no longer appropriate.474

A sly move perhaps, but Paul writes in Romans 5:13 that ‘[s]in is not counted where there is no law.’ And then in 1 Corinthians 10:23 Paul essentially admits that whilst not all things are helpful, all things might be lawful for a Christian. Thus, it could be the case that in some future (federalist) union with Christ, Christ could (somehow475) annul any obligations a penitent sinner has to obey God’s commands. In so doing, it would, in some sense, be no longer be appropriate for God to demand hard treatment from them, for they would not be objectively guilty.476

Summing up this attempt to deal with objective guilt: Paul, in Galatians 3:13, suggests that Christ received the curse of God when he was crucified. Romans 7:1-2 can be read as indicating that Christ’s death annulled the covenant through which this curse was active, thereby cancelling the curse and rendering it the case that Christ paid the penalty of the curse in full. According to Ephesians 5:25-32, at some future point in time the Church will join in union with Christ, and when it does, if Numbers 30:15 can be applied, just like taking on a spouse’s pre-nuptial debt, Christ can annul any obligations members of the church have to God’s commands, thereby rendering it inappropriate for God to desire that they undergo some hard treatment (this does not render the sinner’s actions good, they remain bad, they are just no longer prohibited bad actions477). By removing these obligations and making it inappropriate for God to demand some hard treatment from the sinner, the penitent sinner’s belief that it is appropriate that God desires they undergo some hard treatment is overcome, and the union-inhibiting problems associated with their objective guilt can, in theory, be dealt with.

474 One metaethical model that might make sense of this is Darwall’s second-person perspective (2006 and 2012). On Darwall’s model, we, through what he calls recognition respect, create something akin to tacit pacts with each other, to treat each other in certain ways. These tacit pacts are then the ground of our normative obligations to others, however, if these tacit pacts could be in some sense cancelled, our normative obligations would, theoretically, also disappear.
475 See Hare 1996 (243-258) for one ‘incorporative union’ model.
476 In perhaps the same sense, it may have been inappropriate for God to have, in the Genesis narrative, demanded hard treatment from Adam before the primal sin, for anything other than eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, before his knowledge of good and evil.
477 Romans 5:13.
One interesting consequence of the model is this: if the Atonement is based upon some future (or present) union with Christ, the idea of there being a limited Atonement, that is, that only a specific pre-determined number of people who can be atoned for, is made redundant. For, there is, in which ever way this union is cashed out, presumably no upper limit to the number of people who can unite to Christ.

In addition to the lack of an upper limit, if God is ineffable, as I suggested in chapter one, God’s self-revelation (in operative grace) must also be (propositionally) ineffable. And so, whatever or however the intellect processes this ineffable self-revelation, the intellect cannot process it propositionally. It cannot for, if the doctrine of divine ineffability is true, there is no true propositional knowledge of God to be had at all. If operative grace is indeed the divine self-revelation, such grace must consist in something akin to non-propositional, connatural knowledge of God’s goodness or beauty (and so on). If saving faith is prompted by operative grace (as on the traditional order of salvation it is), saving faith also cannot involve belief in a certain series of propositions about God for the simple reason that there are no such true propositions to be believed. And, with this in mind, it seems possible for people of different faiths, and even of no faith, to ultimately experience union with the same God.\textsuperscript{478}

Finally, in chapter two, I suggested that those in hell may be unable to take advantage of the provisions of Christ’s work. If this is indeed the case, it seems unlikely that the reason for this inability is due to them being unable to reflect on Christ’s life, passion, death, and resurrection, or due to them being unable to plead

\textsuperscript{478} On this point, it seems Aquinas concurs:

\begin{quote}
If, however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine providence… (ST II-II Q 2 Q7).
\end{quote}

Taking this a step further; if, due to God’s ineffability, it is the case that operative grace only consists in something akin to connatural knowledge of God, we may have no trustworthy way of (propositionally) adjudicating between those who profess knowledge of God. Accepting both conclusions should lead to a position of significant religious humility; we are simply unable to comment on the salvation of others. But in taking up this position, the Christian is in good company. In his Sermon on the Mount, Jesus made clear: Judge not, that you be not judged. (Matthew 7:1)
Christ’s blood as a penance. Instead, if there are indeed any inhabitants of hell, it is more likely the case that this union with Christ is a one-time only affair, and that such inhabitants missed out on it. Why might this be the case? I can only think of two possibilities. Either due to

1. some arbitrary decision; on this view, it is, in fact, possible for there to be an additional future union with Christ for those who did not unite with Christ the first time around, only, God has decided that this will not happen, or
2. some metaphysical limit; on this view, it is in fact metaphysically impossible for there to be a future additional union with Christ, for those who did not unite with Christ the first time around.

As (2) seems, to my mind, more palatable than (1), I suggest this might be a plumb line by which to measure the viability of possible accounts of union (federalist or otherwise). By this measure, those that can provide a one-time only account of union might be preferred over those that require (1) as an explanation for why those in hell remain in hell, unable to dyadically share attention with God due to an inability to deal with their objective guilt.

**Atonement and Forgiveness**

So far, I have presented an account of the Atonement that has made no reference to divine forgiveness. So, what role (if any) might forgiveness play in this account?

As I mentioned at the end of chapter three, atonement accounts can be split into two general ‘types’: those that see the Atonement as somehow permitting God to unite with us, and that that see the Atonement as allowing us to unite with God. In the former, whatever it is that inhibits union is on God’s side. In the latter, whatever it is that inhibits union is on our side.479

On, for instance, Richard Swinburne’s account of the Atonement, divine forgiveness lies right at the heart of what the Atonement is trying to secure. So, whilst God could forgive at any time, Swinburne thinks it is good for us for God to withhold

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479 And, of course, these are not mutually exclusive.
forgiveness until we have taken ‘proper steps to cancel our actions, to pay our debts, as far as logically can be done’. Thus, for Swinburne, the Atonement must remove an obstacle on God’s side, for, we cannot be united with God until he first forgives us, and his forgiveness is neither immediate, nor guaranteed.

On the account I have presented, however, every inhibitor to union with God is on our side. We do not need an account of divine withholding in order to explain why we are not (and why some may never be) really united with an omnibenevolent, omnipresent God. No doubt, forgiveness is, even on the account I have presented, essential for union with God. As on Swinburne’s account, if God does not forgive, there can be no union with him. However, unlike on Swinburne’s account, I see no reason for why an omnibenevolent God would not forgive immediately (and certainly, why God would not immediately forgive those who ask for his forgiveness), and do so without adding any extra requirements.

Thus, because my account falls into the latter ‘type’ of atonement accounts, whilst forgiveness is evidently important for union, I can see no reason why it would not be given immediately. Furthermore, although God might be quick to forgive, God’s forgiveness does not unilaterally secure our union with him: for the reasons I have given, union with God is something we, through availing of the inhibitor-defeating elements of the Atonement, must also be active participants in.

The Christian Doctrine of the Atonement

On the account of the Atonement that I have presented, Christ’s life, passion, death, and resurrection all play their own key roles in the Atonement. At the end of chapter four, I indicated that union with God at the beatific vision might be secured through a further union, namely, the union of a person with Christ. I mentioned in

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480 Swinburne 1989: 150.
481 It is also worth reiterating what I said in chapter three: forgiveness is fundamentally relational. As such, forgiving someone does not imply that one no longer demands reparation from them. It is compatible with forgiving someone that one still requires punishment from them. Consider, for instance, the naughty pupil who mocks the teacher in class. The teacher might forgive the pupil and yet still put them in detention.
chapter one that in order for union with God to obtain, a person must have a wholehearted desire for such union, and they must be able to be significantly personally present to God at the beatific vision. In chapter two, I suggested that guilt, shame, and the psychological fragmentation that inevitably stems from original sin all inhibit union with God in their own ways, and therefore, that any account of Atonement must deal with these three problems. In chapter three, I discussed the various ways these problems might be dealt with, whilst in this final chapter, I gestured towards one way the life, passion, death, and resurrection of Christ might be efficacious at securing this Atonement, whilst at the same time trying to keep my presentation sensitive to the scriptural data.

In chapter four, I surveyed various major traditional attempts to explain the Atonement, and looking back at each account I surveyed, I note that each is broadly represented in the account I have proposed in this chapter.

The ransom theorists posited a (often) metaphorical transaction between Christ and some third party that allowed for union with God. As I see it, this metaphorical transaction just is the believer’s union with Christ. After this union, no transaction is needed, for there is, in one sense, only one remaining party transacting, so to speak, with itself.

On Anselm’s satisfaction theory, the payment of some penalty really was required. Likewise, on the account I presented, a penalty is also required. However, I suggested that this penalty was not for God’s benefit (for instance, to satisfy his honour, or his justice), but for the benefit of the one who would otherwise experience guilt. As I explained it, this penalty is indeed paid by Christ, however he pays in full the penalty of his own curse (at the time of his cry of dereliction) whilst ‘hanging on a tree’, with us availing of this payment through our subsequent union with him.

Additionally, just as on Abelard’s moral influence view, I have argued that reflection on Christ’s death can move a person to quiescence, as well as motivating the desire for union with God.
And, like as on Aquinas’ account, I have argued that when we ally ourselves to Christ, Christ’s death can be pled by us to God to ground the sincerity of our apology.

So, on the account I have presented, each aspect of the Christian doctrine of Atonement has its theologically driven resolution. Full and complete union with God is securable, and it is the life, passion, death, and resurrection of Christ that secures each aspect of the Atonement required for such union. Furthermore, on this account, to deal with guilt, Christ’s death had to have been by crucifixion, Christ must have risen from the dead, and it had to have been Christ that suffered and died.
Conclusion

Over the course of this thesis I have tried to show how reflection on the doctrine of the beatific vision can shed new light on the doctrine of the Atonement. I have suggested that the end-point of the Atonement is a person’s real union with God at the beatific vision, and that whatever else the Atonement secures, it must also remove any inhibitors to the beholding of this vision, and therefore, inhibitors to real union with God.

In chapter two, I suggested that the following three inhibitors would need to be dealt with:

1. An unwillingness to behold the beatific vision
2. An inability to wholeheartedly desire the beatific vision
3. An inability to behold the beatific vision

In chapter three, I proposed a framework for analysing how these inhibitors might be overcome, as well as outlining specific obstacles to their removal present in the Christian tradition. In chapter four, I examined previous attempts to explain the Atonement, showing how each faced its own version of what I called the problem of transaction, whilst in chapter five, I presented my own attempt to explain how, through appropriate reflection on the heroic self-sacrifice of Christ, through pleading the blood of Christ, and through transaction-avoiding union with Christ, the Atonement might overcome each of these inhibitors to beholding the beatific vision, so securing a person’s union with God.

Thus, on the account I have provided, it is the case that union with God the Father is, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, possible only through union with Christ (which is itself, at least in this life, possible only through union with God the Spirit). This, then, is the reunion account of the Atonement.

Throughout, I have suggested that as well as being ethically reasonable, a satisfactory account of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement needs to make sense of the scriptural data, whilst also engaging with the major Atonement
interpretative traditions, and I believe the account I have gestured towards in chapter five does indeed meet each of these criteria.

There is, of course, much more work to be done, both in exploring the possible implications of the beatific vision and also fleshing out this reunion account of the Atonement. As I see it, there are numerous other plausible models of union with Christ available, and I foresee fruitful work being done both in the developing of alternative accounts of such union, and also the honing (and possible discounting) of current models, especially with respect to accounts of union that can explain how and why union with Christ might be, at some future point, impossible for those not already so united.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Compendium theologiae</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCD</td>
<td>De civitate Dei</td>
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<td>DDC</td>
<td>De doctrina christiana</td>
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<td>QDM</td>
<td>Quaestiones disputatae De malo</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Sentence Commentary</td>
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<td>SCG</td>
<td>Summa contra gentiles</td>
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