

**Islamism and *Dakwah* in Late Modern Indonesia: Official
Discourses and Lived Experiences of Leaders and Members of the
Tarbiyah Movement**

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Abstract

This thesis contributes to the analysis of the *dakwah* (Islamic preaching and mission) of contemporary Islamist movements with a case study of the Indonesian *Tarbiyah* movement. My analysis borrows from aspects of social movement theory and conceptions of lived religion to illuminate both the official discourses and everyday experiences of the movement in a novel way. I begin by providing an historical framework for understanding *dakwah* and Islamist movements in modernity (Chapter 1) and by locating Islam(ism) and *dakwah* in terms of the changing social, political and religious dynamics of colonial and postcolonial Indonesia (Chapter 2). To investigate the *Tarbiyah* movement, I collected qualitative interviews and fieldwork data in Jakarta during 2012–13 (Chapter 3). In the key chapters of this thesis, I focus on three main arguments: i) that the gradual transition of the *Tarbiyah* movement from a politically repressed network of religious purists in the 1970-80s into a fully-fledged *dakwah* political party (the Prosperous Justice Party/*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS) was the outcome of new ‘political opportunities’ which emerged during a period of democratisation 1990-97 (Chapter 4); ii) that the movement’s weekly *Liqo* (circle of religious teaching) illuminates both the synergies and tensions between official, top-down framing by increasingly formal, outward-looking and pragmatic PKS leaders and the more informal and more conservative networks, the latter remaining a key resource for mobilisation (Chapter 5); and, finally, that the lived experiences of female trainees in the *Liqo* suggest that this is a space where *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS norms, lifestyles and dispositions are more or less successfully taught, learned and reproduced principally through the disciplined and repeated performances of embodied piety (Chapter 6).

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Introduction

In this thesis I examine the *dakwah* (Islamic preaching and mission) of an Indonesian Islamist group named the *Tarbiyah* movement. In particular, I study the synergies and discrepancies between official discourses and lived experiences in the movement and the extent to which this reflects relations and tensions between leaders and other members. By way of Introduction here, I firstly establish the connections between Islamism, Islamisation, and *dakwah* strategies in the contemporary Muslim world. This section introduces Islamism as a general political discourse in a modern global context and highlights the ways in which various *dakwah* strategies are related to Islamisation projects. The second part of this Introduction outlines Islamism in the Indonesian context, highlighting in particular certain gaps in the existing literature with regard to the *Tarbiyah* movement. The third part of this Introduction explains the theoretical driving force of this thesis, while finally I present an overview of the structure of this thesis and underline its overall argument. In short, I maintain that although perceptions of the *Tarbiyah* movement are often associated with the increasingly formal and very public *dakwah* managed by the Prosperous and Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS), members in middle and lower levels of the movement which have their roots in informal networks mainly emphasise the personal impact of a more private *dakwah* and embodied religious training in strengthening their individual piety and sense of belonging.

Islamism, Islamisation and *Dakwah* Strategies in the Modern Muslim World

The processes of globalised modernity that have been taking place in Muslim countries since the nineteenth century and earlier have changed the relationship

between Islam and the state. The reformulation of laws as a consequence of modernisation, and the adoption of a largely Westernised legal system, has had a profound impact on Islamic courts and the position of the *ulama*. Although they have not been eliminated from postcolonial nation-states like Egypt and Indonesia, the courts are now often restricted to dealing with family law, and have been reformed in order to be more accommodating to social change (Asad, 2003). Modern, Western-influenced, ‘secular’ law has occupied a more dominant position in these states, often replacing the role of Islamic law with respect to matters of regulation and punishment. The limiting of the role of such *shari’ah* related institutions in the colonial and now the postcolonial public sphere, and the restriction of Islamic authority in modern nation-states that typically followed at independence, is perhaps the main way in which so-called ‘Islamists’ – who struggle through various political means to re-Islamise the public sphere - have encountered ‘the downfall of the hegemony of the symbolic Muslim system’ (Burgat, 2003:44). While many Islamists accommodated themselves to the idea of the nation-state, at least in the sense that it became the focus of their projects of Islamisation, secular Western ideologies, from atheism to consumer capitalism, have been seen as the key factor in undermining the normative Muslim systems of authority in the modern world. As Burgat again points out:

It was secularism that spawned the idea that the inherited normative capital of nearly 14 centuries of civilisation was suddenly no longer the right way to run the whole society. It was secularism that strongly believed in regulating the sphere of personal status (marriages, inheritances etc) and more than this, the relationship of society to its external environment or to its non-Muslim components (2003:44).

Despite its potency as a vehicle of political resistance to the colonial powers, it was in reaction to ‘the secularism of the postcolonial Muslim state’ that the Islamists

formulated a response to the rapid loss of the political authority of Islam and its legal institutions (Burgat, 2003:44).

As Roy (2004) and Mandaville (2007; 2014) suggest, Islamism is a modern political ideology that emerged as a new phenomenon during the Twentieth century. This ideology was in many ways inspired and influenced by pre-modern revivalist figures like Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 CE) and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787 CE) (Rippin, 2005; Commins 2009). As revivalists, such figures attributed the political decline of Muslims to the increasing heterodoxy of the everyday practice of Islam. Revivalists believe that if Muslims return to 'pure' Islam as found in the Qur'an and Sunna, they will be able to restore the 'glory' of the past. Hence, the ideology of Islamism is related to revivalism and related complex and criss-crossing orientations in terms of a basic emphasis on seeking to purify and revitalize Islam (cf. Wiktorowicz 2006 and Meijer 2009 on Wahhabi inspired Salafism in the global age). However, while inevitably a convenient 'catch-all' category encompassing diverse orientations, Islamism is also a direct political response to the specific context of encounter with Western modernity (Mandaville, 2007; 2014).

Islamists are also to some extent influenced and inspired by the reformist ideas of Egyptian scholars such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-1897 CE), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905 CE), and Rashid Rida (1865-1935 CE) who are considered amongst the most influential modernist figures.¹ However, Islamism's reformist ideas have a complex relationship to such modernist figures (Rahman 1979). The modernists' reformist ideas generally attempted to reinterpret Islam in such a way so

¹ These figures have a key position in between modernism and revivalism/Islamism. Al-Afghani, for instance, through his idea of pan-Islamism, attempted to unite Islam politically against the power of Europe, while Rida became a key figure in early Salafism (see Rahman 1979; Rippin, 2005).

as to support modernity, while the Islamists came to focus more on Islamising modernity (Rippin, 2005). Richard Mitchell, writing of the first mass Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which was founded in 1920s Egypt, explains: “the Islamist movements aimed at a total reform of the political, economic, and social life of the country” (1993: xv). Thus a general characteristic of Islamism is the belief that Islamic teachings should encompass all aspects of life, from the private to the public domain.

Although its origins can be found in the colonial period, as an ideology and a movement, Islamism has consolidated and most strongly marked itself out in the post-independence era of Muslim nation-states, as Peter Mandaville (2007) has argued. Islamism was a response to the formation of secular nation-states that emerged in postcolonial Muslim countries, replacing the Islamic dynasty and Islamic imperium (*khilafah*) in the period after Western colonialism (Mandaville, 2007). Indeed, movements in the Muslim Middle East such as the MB mentioned above, have had a strong global influence on Islamist movements worldwide, including in Indonesia.

As noted above, conflict between Islam and the West has been a defining response to modernity for many Islamist movements and thinkers. In the Twentieth century, Islamist movements came to represent ideological opposition to the influence of other Western ‘isms’, such as liberalism, Zionism, and secularism. One concept that has been particularly important in articulating this Islamist critique of the impact of modernity is *Ghazwul Fikri* (‘the war of ideas’) (Hirschkind, 2009). While it evokes the clash of civilisations thesis (Huntington, 1996), this concept can also be understood as closely related to the idea of “cultural imperialism”. For Islamist

movements, the increasing global hegemony of Western culture (as well as its continuing economic and political power) is said to have undermined Islamic culture in Muslims' everyday lives. Islamists have argued that Western cultural hegemony has attacked Islam and Muslim lives through the mass-media, popular culture such as films and music, and the secular education system (Hirschkind, 2009).

In response to such a situation, Islamist activists typically presented *dakwah* (Islamic preaching and mission) as a necessity for countering the 'dangerous' cultural imperialism of the West. They believe that this has caused the spread of distorted understandings of Islamic values and a loss of Islamic identity amongst Muslims worldwide. The *dakwah* of the Islamist movements is thus crucial for building up consciousness of why Islam and Muslims find themselves in the circumstances they do in modernity and how they can hope to overturn this situation through a religio-political revival. This global Islamist discourse, and in particular its emphasis on the war of ideas is evident in Sayyid Qutb's (1906-1966 CE) work (Kepel, 2003; Burgat, 2003; Mandaville, 2007). For the Islamists, *dakwah* is part of their struggle to keep Islamic values alive, and retain Islamic identities. For this purpose, then, the MB in Egypt developed an Islamisation strategy which included the following stages: (i) the Islamisation of individuals, (ii) the Islamisation of families, (iii) the Islamisation of society, and (iv) the Islamisation of the political system or the state (Mitchell, 1993: 236-245).

This Islamisation scheme aims to create, in time, both individual piety and public piety. The step-by-step approach of such a 'gradual' Islamisation strategy is considered as starting logically from the pious individual who will then build up from a pious family to a pious society that will eventually see the emergence of

pious public norms including ultimately the very state itself. For the MB and Islamists in general, then, it is not enough simply to be a good Muslim just in the personal or private sphere; Muslims also need to actively shape the society or state they live in by seeking to make it more Islamic. Thus through this schema, Islamist movements not only focus on disciplining the self via *dakwah* focused on individual piety, but also (eventually) on creating and controlling public piety via public *dakwah*.² The former may be considered private Islamisation and the latter public or state Islamisation (cf. Mahmood, 2005; Rinaldo, 2013). By ‘individual piety’ here scholars typically mean the commitment to perform obligatory rituals such as the five-times-daily-prayers, reciting the Qur’an, fasting in the month of Ramadan, giving alms, and dressing and behaving in an ‘Islamic’ way. Strengthening individual piety, for the Islamist, is not only an obligation for Muslims, but also aims to protect them from being influenced by Western modernity. In the debate concerning the private versus the public role of religion (see Casanova, 1994), this can be referred to as ‘interiorisation’, which focuses on individualised religion often with an emphasis on self-discipline (cf. Mahmood 2005).

When they talk about ‘public piety’, scholars like Benjamin F. Soares (2004) mean particular behaviour or practice performed in the public sphere that comes to have political significance. The concept of public piety also implies that there may be (often highly contested) attempts at the regulation and standardisation of practices that are regarded by particular constituencies as appropriately ‘pious’. Islamists, in particular, are typically viewed as wanting to control and discipline Muslim societies in terms of their behaviours and attitudes through the use of (often authoritarian) public norms and state regulations. This discussion on individual piety and public

² For some revolutionary Islamist movements, *dakwah* itself is not enough.

piety will be taken forward in my thesis, examining when, how and why both sorts of piety have been developed through the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS in Indonesia. It also recognises that official ideologies of and individual appetites for different sorts of public/private *dakwah* are changing e.g. in terms of recent debates about ‘post-Islamism’ (Kepel 2003; Bayat 2007; Mandaville 2007/2014).

Islamism in Indonesia and Perspectives on the *Tarbiyah* Movement

Islamist movements in Indonesia, like Islamism in other countries, emerged and grew mainly in big cities as a response to social change and emerging political opportunities (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012). They were initially focused typically on improving the private piety of individuals but then attempted to develop more public agendas to Islamise society and the state. Since the pre-independence period of Indonesian history, which ran from the beginning until the middle of the twentieth century, Islam was used as an ideological means for campaigning against colonialism and establishing the ‘Muslim’ character of the nation-state (Latif, 2008; Effendy, 2006; Laffan, 2003). However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that Islamism emerged more visibly in Indonesia, through the *Tarbiyah* movement and other competing Islamist movements. This was also a decade of very public re-Islamisation of Muslim public spheres worldwide, for example in terms of events such as the Iranian revolution (1979) and the Afghan jihad against the Russians, as well as the global spread of Wahhabi and Salafi ideology through Saudi-sponsored organisations and publications (Commins 2009; Meijer 2009; Mandaville, 2007/2014; Wiktorowicz 2006; Burgat, 2003).

The *Tarbiyah* movement, in its early phase of development and during a period of the state repression of Islamists, focused mainly on strengthening individual or private piety and was composed only of small study circles (*Halaqah; Ligo*) of students interested in religious mentoring/training. Most circles were held in mosques located in 'secular' universities such as the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) and The Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB); these were the starting points and epicentres of the emergent *Tarbiyah* movement. However, the movement then developed and consolidated when President Soeharto (who ruled from 1966-1998) sought to recognise Islamic organisations in the public sphere in an effort to shore up his legitimacy during the final period of his government – from 1989 to 1998.

The changing political climate and a more democratic state in the post-New Order era from the end of 1998 encouraged the emergence in the public sphere of various revivalist Islamic groups such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), the Hizb ut-Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI), and the Forum of Communication of Ahl us-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah (FKAWJ) (Hilmy, 2010; Hasan, 2006; Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004). In addition, new Islamic political parties based on revivalist ideologies (including the Crescent Moon Party (PBB) and New Masyumi Party) were founded following the liberalisation of the Indonesian political system, which guaranteed people's rights to establish parties and social organisations (Platzdasch, 2009; Mietzner, 2009).

In this context, the emergence of a democratic state was also seen by the *Tarbiyah* movement as an opportunity for strengthening and expanding its *dakwah* movement beyond the private to the public sphere and the state domain. Therefore, they established a formal political party named the Justice Party/*Partai Keadilan* (PK) in

Jakarta in 1998.³ The decision to establish the party caused the *Tarbiyah* movement's orientation to combine a focus on strengthening the individual piety of its cadres and more actively attracting wider constituencies. Since the 2004 general election, in particular, the party has attempted to attract wider audiences by campaigning on 'secular' social justice issues (Plazdasch, 2009). It has focused more on education for poor people, anti-corruption and clean governance, instead of the formalisation of *shari'ah* and the other Islamic identity issues that were central to their campaign in the previous election (1999) (Permata, 2008; Muhtadi, 2012). The party even declared itself to be a pluralist party by accommodating non-Muslim members and promoting them as candidates for parliament (Plazdasch, 2009).⁴ This 'shifting' political pragmatism disappointed some of the cadres of the *Tarbiyah* movement. However, this disappointment did not significantly affect the organisation as most cadres, tended to obey the party. Although the *Tarbiyah* movement and the party still seem organisationally solid, this does not mean that their respective leaders' perceptions of political issues is always in line with each other (Permata, 2008; 2013). According to Permata (2008; 2013) the different perceptions and characters of the two organisations – the *Tarbiyah* movement which is more religiously purist and informal, and the party which is more pragmatic and formal - has led to internal debates and tensions between key figures.

There are a number of books, doctoral and master's theses, and academic articles published on the *Tarbiyah* movement and the PKS, which have been written by both the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS and non-*Tarbiyah* movement/PKS writers. However,

³ The PK 'rebranded' and changed its name to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in 2004 because as the PK it had failed to meet the electoral threshold requiring all parties to get more than 2% of national votes. In the 1999 election, the PK only got 1.7% (see further in section 2.5).

⁴ We can also see this attempt in the case of the MB in Egypt who accommodated Christians. The MB has also formed electoral alliances with nationalists, secularists and liberals (see Leiken and Brooke, 2007).

none of these has undertaken a holistic in-depth study of the complex official discourse of the elites and its relation to the lived experience of members of *Tarbiyah* movement-PKS. Some ‘insider’ researchers – such as Ali Said Damanik (2002) and Yon Machmudi (2006) – have studied the development of the *Tarbiyah* movement-PKS in comparison to other Islamic political parties or Islamic movements. They debate whether it is an entirely new group or a new branch of older Islamic groups from Indonesia, such as the Masyumi Party (e.1945) and the Indonesian Islamic *Dakwah* Assembly/DDII (e.1967), or from the Middle East, such as the MB and HTI (see Taji-Farouki, 1996).

Rahmat (2001) argues that the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS is merely the continuation of modernist movements like the Masyumi party and the DDII.⁵ Unlike Rahmat, Damanik (2002) rejects the idea that the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS evolved from previous Islamic groups in Indonesia, arguing that it is a new group inspired by the MB in Egypt. Mahmudi criticises both positions and argues that the *Tarbiyah* movement-PKS is a combination of the ‘foreign’ influence of the MB and the convergence of earlier Islamic organisations from Indonesia, such as the Muhammadiyah and the NU.⁶ These studies contribute to uncovering the

⁵ Masyumi or (*Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* – the ‘Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims’ (Masyumi) was the first Islamic political party in Indonesia, established in 1945. The objective was to unite Islamic organisations, including the Muhammadiyah and PERSIS (*Persatuan Islam*-The Unity of Islam) and the NU (*Nahdhatul Ulama*). These Islamic organizations joined the Masyumi to win the election from secular-nationalist parties. They came second in the 1955 election, won 20.9 % of the popular vote, and got 57 seats in parliament. DDII or *Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*-the Indonesian Board on Islamic *Dakwah* is a non-political organization established by Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993) in 1967. It was established in the context where President Soeharto started to domesticate/incorporate Islam and Islamic organizations in the public sphere as part of his strategy to gain people support for his final period of his leadership. The objective was to develop *dakwah* in Indonesia, that is to call Muslims to be better Muslims and in general to spread Islamic beliefs and practices throughout Indonesia.

⁶ The Muhammadiyah was founded by KH Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta in 1912. It is widely associated with the first ‘modernist’ movement because it chose a modern approach to *dakwah* programmes, mainly through education and social services (see Bruinessen, 2013; Nakamura, 2012). Unlike the Muhammadiyah, the NU, has very strong roots in traditional Islam. It was founded by KH. Hasyim Asy’ari in 1926 and commonly associated with village dwellers and the Islamic boarding

relationship between the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS and other Islamic movements in Indonesia and abroad. However, they pay more attention to the movement's elites, looking at the ideology of the movement, the official discourse promoted by its leaders, and the connections between the leaders of this movement and those from other Islamic movements.

Other 'outsider' scholars, like Bubalo and Fealy (2005) and Imdadun Rahmat (2005) have also explored the official discourse of the *Tarbiyah* movement and its leaders. Bubalo and Fealy (2005) found that books by MB leaders such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Sa'id Hawwa (1935-1989), and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b.1926) have been the greatest influence on the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS. Bubalo and Fealy argue that these books "formed the cornerstones of the *Tarbiyah* movement teachings of the PKS" (2005:54). Moreover, Rahmat's thesis (2005:163) argues that the *Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS simply reproduces the ideology of the MB without any modifications or adaptations to make it fit the Indonesian context. Like the previous studies mentioned, however, such research has paid little attention to ordinary members' experiences and discourses. Although my work still includes a focus on official discourses, which also accounts for the vast majority of work on Islamism per se, I pay attention to ordinary members' lived experiences and discourses too.

Other researchers have investigated whether the PKS attempts to contextualise or reconcile its ideology with modern Indonesian values. Masdar Hilmy (2010) who studied the PKS in comparison to two other Islamist movements, HTI and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), for instance, classifies the PKS as those who accept modern Indonesian values, but attempt to Islamize them.

school (*pesantren*) community (see Barton, 2002).

The PKS is an example of ‘meliorist’ Islamism namely “those who occupy the in-between position; on the one hand these Islamists stand firm on their Islamic identity but on the other hand they try to accommodate democracy as a means of political struggle” (2010:7).⁷ Platzdasch (2009) argues, however, that their reception of modern values is in fact more symbolic in nature than substantive. Platzdasch (2009), who compared three Islamist parties in modern Indonesia (PKS, the United Development Party/PPP and The Star Crescent Party/PBB), suggests that their promotion of ‘secular’ agendas such as political and social reform, economic justice, anti-corruption, and human rights are played for external political audiences. This ‘secular’ agenda contrasts with their internal discourses which were overtly Islamist and more focused on *shari’ah*-based agendas.

Dhume (2005), in contrast to Hilmy (2010), categorises the PKS as a ‘radical’ organisation and considers it to be similar to the *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI)⁸ in Indonesia which used violence in the past.⁹ He argues that while the PKS wants to take part in the democratisation process as a peaceful political organisation, it still wants to Islamise Indonesian politics. Dhume therefore concludes that the difference between

⁷ Masdar Hilmy (2010) in studying the PKS, MMI and HTI, divides Islamism into two categories: 1) Utopian Islamism i.e. those who reject existing systems and modern values and obsess about establishing an ideal state and community based on Islam e.g. the MMI and the HTI; and 2) Meliorist Islamism i.e. those who accept modern systems and values but attempt to control over them through Islamizing them, for example, the PKS.

⁸ *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) is a *Salafi* jihadist group, inspired by the same ideology as al-Qa’ida (AQ), which regards the Indonesian government, along with other nations in the region, to be illegitimate. The JI seeks to revive a pure form of Islam and establish a Pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia, governed by the tenets of *shari’ah* (Islamic law). The JI was founded in Malaysia on 1 January 1993 by Indonesian Islamic clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The movement represents an evolutionary development of the Indonesian Islamic movement, Darul Islam (DI), which fought a violent insurgency to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s. However, in the last decade their focus on the Islamic state shifted to a concern for the implementation of *shari’ah* from below (Hasan, 2013).

⁹ When these researchers say that the PKS is ‘radical’ they mean that the PKS wants to Islamise the state. They suggest that it is not satisfied with the secular system implemented by the government in political, economic, social, judicial and other terms. However, they have not tried to ‘bring down’ the existing government. Rather, through participation in elections they have become involved with the process of government, aiming to change society from inside. So, they are radical in terms of their opinions and political views, but not radical in terms of their actions.

these two groups is only one relating to their methods: *Jemaah Islamiyah* uses revolutionary violent methods to seek their Islamic goals, while the PKS employs conventional and non-violent ones.

To a certain extent, Dhume (2005) is correct in claiming that the PKS wants to Islamise the Indonesian state and society. Nevertheless, it is a simplification and exaggeration to equate the PKS with *Jemaah Islamiyah*. Furthermore, Dhume ignores the complexity of the PKS, which has been influenced by both its leaders and its ordinary members, as well as by the social and political changes that have occurred in Indonesia. Machmudi's research (2006) responds to Dhume's opinion. He argues that even though the PKS tries to Islamise Indonesia, it is flexible and rational in its Islamic interpretations (Machmudi, 2006). According to Machmudi, the Islamist agenda of the PKS is not a cause for concern because the party is flexible in implementing its ideas. Syahrul Hidayat strengthens Machmudi's argument. Hidayat categorized the PKS "as a party of moderation" (2012:8). He saw that the party has revised their 'radical goals along with substantive commitment to democratic principles' (cf. Wickham, 2004:206). Machmudi's responses and argument cannot be separated from his 'insider' position as a founding member of the PKS and a senior *Liqo* mentor of the *Tarbiyah* movement. Machmudi's arguments must be contrasted with William Liddle and Saiful Mujani (2004)'s study on the attitudes of Indonesian Islamists (the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS) in relation to democratic norms. They found that Islamists in Indonesia tend to have negative views about democracy and generally disagree with notions of popular sovereignty, religious freedom, and the recognition of minority rights. Nevertheless, Liddle and Mujani do not investigate the complexity of the relationship between its leaders and its ordinary members.

Many researchers, including Syahrul Hidayat (2012), Ahmad Norma Permata (2008) and Ahmad Ali Nurdin (2009), have found the PKS an interesting party to study due to its pragmatic behaviour since the 2004 General Election. In this period, the PKS has behaved differently in terms of its political agendas and ideologies. Permata (2008) investigated how the elite members of the party maintained the ideology of the party within a more established democratic state, arguing that the more stable and democratic a political system is, the more the leaders of the PKS are encouraged to seek compromises between their Islamist ideology and the democratic system. Regarding this change in political behaviour, Nurdin (2009) argues that this shows the PKS' ability to reconcile Islam with democracy. Thus, according to Nurdin, the PKS is not a threat to the future of democracy in Indonesia. However, instead of arguing that the PKS has been ideologically flexible and accommodating to political changes since its inception, as Machmudi (2006) argued, both Permata and Nurdin contend that the shift has occurred since the 2004 General Election, and was influenced by changing social and political opportunities.¹⁰ As the result of this shift, Hidayat (2012) points out that the PKS is facing member criticism for their pragmatism. He recognises that there are internal tensions caused by pragmatic policies taken by the party leaders, but he differs from Permata (2008) in suggesting that internal tensions have not led to internal divisions or splits. Permata believes that there is real internal division.

This body of literature shows the diversity of the recent research on the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS which has mainly been inspired by the rising political profile of the

¹⁰ There have been discussions in Indonesia that suggest this simply represents a PKS strategy to get power at which point they will reveal their true colours (see Rahmat, 2005; Shihab and Nugroho, 2008). This is a common critique of Islamism worldwide.

PK (PKS) in the last fifteen years. These studies have shown that scholars' interests are primarily based on official, formal and party leaders' discourses. As a result, there has been relative neglect of internal variations within the movement, especially in terms of ordinary members' experiences. In particular, no research has as yet been conducted specifically on the concept and ideology of the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement and its weekly *Liqo* sessions as the core *dakwah* activity of the movement.

Official Discourses and Lived Experiences: The Structure and Argument of this Thesis

This thesis addresses the imbalance in the existing studies outlined above. In particular, it aims to examine the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement from the perspective of both official discourses and the lived experiences of its leaders and members. Every organisation has an official vision of how it will operate and an official and often utopian ideology.¹¹ This is conceptualised, voiced, and spread by its leaders, who hope and expect that the movement will run more or less effectively according to these official designs. Those members that hold leadership positions within the wider movement and senior mentors of the *Liqo* have typically been members of the *Tarbiyah* movement for more than ten years. They have also generally been elite members of the formal political party, the PKS, since 1998. However, as in any institution, the leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement/the PKS must also keep developing, re-positioning and transforming their *dakwah* strategy as a result of changing social and political contexts and related opportunities (Fox,

¹¹ By 'official discourse' in the context of contemporary Islamic movements I mean in particular the movement's stated conception of its *dakwah* ideology and vision, its formal membership structure and recruitment techniques, its leadership and religious authority, and other official prescriptions, as they are formulated, developed and transformed by leaders at the top levels of the movement (see Chapters 4 and 5).

2012).¹² Leaders may or may not seek to take account of the everyday lived experiences of ordinary members at the grass roots level, who typically consist of members who have been trainees and mentors of the *Liqo* for between approximately five years and ten years and also newer recruits with less than one to two years of experience. Through addressing both top-down and bottom-up perspectives on the *Tarbiyah* movement I aim to advance a new account that is more holistic and complementary.

Central to my analysis of official discourses and everyday lived experiences here are two key conceptual frameworks: i) social movement theory (SMT); and ii) the concept of lived religion. Although my research is situated principally in the fields of Islamic studies and ethnography, I have borrowed aspects of these theories from Political Science and Sociology of Religion/Religious studies respectively. SMT is an interdisciplinary approach within the social sciences more generally and seeks to explain collective action in general and social movements in particular. It is concerned with how social movements identify social problems, formulate their response in terms of goals for social change, constructs a common identity amongst its members, and mobilizes their support, also taking account of how changing political contexts and dynamics influence movements. However, SMT has mostly been studied in relation to Western societies (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 4). This has encouraged scholars such as David Snow and Susan Marshall (1984), and more recently, Quintan Wiktorowicz (2001; 2004), to examine SMT in the context of Muslim societies. While in Western contexts social movements are often formal

¹² Fox (2012) explores how the resources and opportunities available to key political actors in society influence their ability to organize and mobilize. He also explains that religion is used by these leaders (e.g. states, religious institutions, movements, and so on) to legitimize their political agendas, dependent on different political opportunities and resources available to them.

organizations, based on his study of the Salafi movement in Jordan, Wiktorowicz (2001) found that Islamist movements facing state repression are more likely to utilize less formal and informal networks or communities for collective action. Thus, they may also use less publicly ‘visible’ means to mobilize supporters and build movements.¹³ Examples of other studies that have drawn on SMT to examine Islamism in the last decade or so are Carrie Wickham (2002) and Abdullah al-Arian (2014) on Egypt and outside Egypt Jenny White (2002) and Jenny Clark (2004). However, in Indonesia, while SMT has been used to analyse the PKS it has not been used to analyse the *Tarbiyah* movement/*Liqo*.¹⁴

My research draws upon SMT to better illuminate how the *Tarbiyah* movement maintains different scales of formality and informality. It can still be regarded as a less formal movement in some ways because it is constituted by dynamic networks that began their existence beyond the parameters of formal political organizations. It did not originally have the structure and boards of formal organizations now associated with the PKS. The movement consisted mainly, and to some extent still, consists of small groups or ‘cells’ called *Liqo*.¹⁵ These each comprise just a small number of people not unlike the base structure of the ‘prototypical’ Islamist

¹³ According to Wiktorowicz (2004; 2001), formal SMOs are often utilized in the West because formal, centralized and bureaucratic organizations are considered the most effective mechanisms. In contrast, decentralized, less formal, and less bureaucratic organizations are likely to succeed in the Muslim world where authoritarian secular states have typically sought to repress/co-opt efforts at Islamisation ‘from below’ (Mandaville 2014).

¹⁴ An article written by Hamayotsu (2011) used two key strands of SMT (resource mobilization and opportunity structure theories) to study the recruitment and mobilization patterns of the PKS. He, however, only focuses his study on the recruitment aspect of the PKS and did not relate them to the *Tarbiyah* movement in general or the *Liqo* in particular. The article “argues that the PKS’s relative success in recruiting committed Muslim youth is explained by two interrelated factors: (1) merit-based cadre recruitment and promotion which offers young and ambitious Muslim youth fair and institutionalized political career opportunities and thus incentives to commit themselves to the party’s collective interests; and (2) the timing of organizational expansion that coincided with a rapid increase of state office -both executive and legislative- at the sub-national levels as a result of localized democratic elections” (Hamayotsu, 2011: 227).

¹⁵ The *Liqo* is a small unit of religious activity held informally on a weekly basis by the *Tarbiyah* movement. The *Liqo* is a loose gathering activity held in a trainee’s house.

movement, the MB in Egypt (Mandaville 2007; 2014). The political situation during the time of the *Tarbiyah* movement's emergence in the early 1980s saw state repression of Islamic movements and this constraint on political opportunity structures (Wiktorowicz 2001; 2004) was one of the main factors causing the *Liqo* to be informally organised (see Damanik, 2002; Machmudi, 2005; Permata, 2008). Only in the post-New Order period (begun in 1998) did the movement start to generate its formal organizational structure in the shape of a political party named the PK(S). At this point the movement had to begin to think about how to maintain its formal, less formal and informal aspects (cf. Wiktorowicz 2001; 2004). The move towards formality aimed to take advantage of the 'political opportunity' provided by a more democratic government, while the less formal and the informal aspects of their organisation supports the party in recruiting new members and mobilizing its sympathisers. However, although SMT can help to explain such general processes, it does not really help in an analysis of how particular members perceive, experience and engage with the movement's *dakwah* ideology and vision. This is influenced and shaped by an individual's social location and subjectivities which may or may not vary significantly from what has been formally conceptualised and negotiated by leaders. So, SMT has its limits. It is to a conceptual framework that will allow me to better discuss members' perceptions and experiences that I now turn.

The everyday aspects of the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement can be explained with reference to the concept of lived religion. This relates especially to the experience of lower level cadres and trainees. While the experience of these constituencies is framed by the more formal religious and political agendas designed by the leaders of the political party, the PKS, a key claim made by this thesis is that the lived

experiences of ordinary members is neglected in previous studies of the PKS/*Tarbiyah* movement. Reviewing the literature on contemporary Islamic movements, I saw the general importance of providing a more balanced and nuanced perspective on official discourses about *dakwah* by researching the more informal lived experiences of members. The intention of my thesis is not to reject the findings and conclusions of studies concerned with formal, official, and institutionalised forms of *dakwah*, but to look at them together with a study of informal everyday lived *dakwah* and to describe and analyse some of the inherent tensions and linkages therein. The aim is thus to provide a more complete picture of this Islamist *dakwah* movement in Indonesia.

Among the pioneers of the concept of ‘everyday’ and ‘lived religion’ in the sociology of religion are Nancy T. Ammerman and Meredith McGuire. Neither has been concerned with the study of Muslim societies. Nevertheless, not unlike key contributions to the Anthropology of Islam (e.g. Mahmood 2005, see below), Ammerman (2014) points out that studying the perceptions of members of organisations aims to listen to their daily experiences. For Ammerman, researching the everyday means privileging “the experience of non-experts” (2007:5). Thus the perspective of lived religion helps researchers to build an understanding of the multi-layered nature of religious movements and the everyday realities of its members (Ammerman, 2014). In line with Ammerman’s argument, Berglund (2014), who has studied Muslims in Europe, also highlights that discussing only official discourses presents Islamic movements as stereotypical, monolithic institutions, with all who belong to such movements having the same perspectives and attitudes.

Sociologist of religion, McGuire, invokes the concept of ‘lived religion’ to research “religion as expressed and experienced in the lives of individuals” (2008:3). She aims to distinguish “the actual experience of religious persons from the prescribed religion of institutionally defined beliefs and practices”, focusing on religion “as practiced, experienced and expressed by ordinary people” (McGuire, 2008:12).¹⁶ Lived religion as explained by Ammerman and McGuire is, in particular, the embodied and enacted forms of religion and spirituality that occur in everyday life. Dwelling on women’s experiences, McGuire argues that religiosity and gender self-identity are expressed and transformed in an ongoing process of mind-body-spirit practice. She shows that “concrete body practices are involved in how gendered selves are socially developed, maintained, and changed throughout life” (McGuire, 2008: 182). Thus, gender roles and identities in society are reproduced (and contested) in large part through the enactment of norms through bodily practices. Modern religious groups often ask their members to commit to developing “new” selves in related ways (no matter how this process is understood – for instance as ‘spirituality’, ‘healing’, ‘conversion’): “all religious groups (at least for some members) promote a measure of transformation of self toward a spiritual ideal” (2008:172). McGuire gives examples of movements requiring members to wear uniform clothing, assume certain gestures and so on to diminish the old or affirm the new self. So, for many who join a religious movement and desire or experience such personal transformation, new religious and spiritual practices may also be key pathways to new gender roles and literally becoming a new kind of person.

¹⁶ Woodhead (2013) similarly mentions the religious practices of laymen and women.

However, McGuire's work tends to focus on Western women and more individualistic forms of lived religion and spirituality at some distance from official religion. Paying more attention to the relationship between the latter and the former in the context of Muslim societies, Saba Mahmood (2005) studies the lived religion of women in the revivalist mosque movement in modern Egypt, taking inspiration from debates about performativity in feminist studies and applying them to the Anthropology of Islam (cf. Butler 1997; Asad 1986).¹⁷ Going beyond a focus on identity politics in the literature on Islamism, the women she studied seek to transform themselves by donning more modest dress and more concealing veils, by praying frequently, by attending all-female religious sessions in mosques where they are exhorted to adhere to Qur'anic teachings and to act in line with the will of Allah. According to these women, the performance of ritualized behavior is one among a continuum of practices that serve as the necessary means to the realization of a pious self. Thus, disciplining and training their bodies through everyday practices is considered as the most effective way to transform their identity. Compared to McGuire's study on women in mixed and 'unofficial' religious contexts within the context of liberal America, Mahmood's ethnographic account of the lives of pious Salafi-oriented women in contemporary Egypt is closer to my study of the *Tarbiyah* women. It also suggests that lived religion can play a key role in reproducing official religion.

¹⁷ Mahmood discusses how Muslim women's lived experience of *dakwah* circles evidences their agency even while it reproduces the official discourses associated with Islamic tradition. Engaging with Judith Butler's discussion of the way that all social formations are reproduced performatively, that is, via a "reiterated enactment of norms" (1997:14), she shows how the "structure of society comes to be lived in human experience" (Butler 1990: 73; Mahmood 2005: 138). Seemingly 'stable' social formations like Islamic traditions are "vulnerable because each re-enactment [or performance] can fail" (2005:19). Thus, for the women Mahmood studied in Egypt's mosques "ritual performances are understood to be disciplinary practices through which pious dispositions are formed" (2005:128). Their bodies become "the necessary tool through which the embodied subject is formed" (2005:29).

Thus, the present study explores and reveals the complexity of *dakwah* perspectives and practices within the *Tarbiyah* movement, both as they are formally and officially framed and organised by its leaders and as they are understood, experienced and performed more informally by its members. It examines three important research questions which relate directly to the three fieldwork based chapters which make up the second half of my thesis: 1) how is *dakwah* formally conceptualised and how has it been developed and transformed by the leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement within the changing social and political dynamics of Indonesian society and how do members respond to this in more and less formal settings?; 2) how does the *Liqo*, as the main vehicle for the *dakwah* activities in the *Tarbiyah* movement, but as a less formal network and or informal community, fit into the more formal overall structure and ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement, and how do its members at the lower levels of the organisational hierarchy perceive the relationship between the *Liqo*, the *Tarbiyah* movement, and the PKS party?; and 3) how do female *Liqo* members experience, and to what extent do they subsequently practice, the *dakwah* and discipline received through weekly sessions? In this study I thus attempt to provide a holistic picture of the *Tarbiyah* movement's approach to *dakwah*, not only showing how and for what purpose the movement's leaders design and shape this formal *dakwah* ideology, but also examining how its ordinary members deal with and experience joining this movement. In this thesis, I will therefore argue that the cadres of the *Tarbiyah* movement in the middle and lower levels focus mainly on the impact of their *dakwah* activities in strengthening individual piety, even though the perceptions of the movement are often dominated by public *dakwah* agendas managed by the party.

Overview of the Thesis: Chapter Summaries

This thesis is divided into six main chapters. The first chapter explains the significance of *dakwah* (Islamic preaching and mission) within the Islamic world, with a particular focus on the modern period. I briefly explain how *dakwah* was performed by the Prophet Muhammad (7th Century) and by his successors in the Classical period (7th–13th Century) and the Medieval period (14th–18th Century). The periods of the prophet Muhammad and the four Caliphs are especially important because they are the reference point for the development and contemporary formulation of Islamist *dakwah* ideology, which sees Islam as having existed in its purest and truest form during these eras. This exploration of *dakwah* will thus enable me to explore how its meaning has altered in the modern period, particularly among Islamists. Islamist groups are regarded as the most prominent practitioners of *dakwah*, believing it to be necessary to be active (and sometimes aggressive) in Islamising both the private and public domains. The explication of the significance and meaning of *dakwah* in the modern period, particularly within contemporary Islamist movements, will help to ground my investigation of the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement. In this chapter I argue that although both *dakwah* Islamising the self and *dakwah* Islamising society were performed in the era of the Prophet as well as in the classical and medieval periods, these concepts – and especially public *dakwah* – have acquired different meanings and orientations for contemporary Islamist movements.

The second chapter examines how context has influenced the dynamics of Islamism in Indonesia, where the *Tarbiyah* community emerged and developed during the 1980s. As in other Muslim countries, the emergence of Islamist movements in Indonesia was influenced by a response to the forms of modernity established by

leaders who envisioned a secular-nationalist state and society. Continuing processes begun in the colonial period, their reforms led to the removal of Islam from the state. In this chapter I argue that, in Indonesia, Islamism arose among revivalist Muslims in the early stages of modern nation-state formation, but then Islamism and particularly the public project of Islamisation gained strength given the new political opportunities that emerged following democratisation after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998.

The third chapter explains the methodologies used to collect qualitative interview and fieldwork data for my project between September 2012 and January 2013 in Jakarta. It also reflects upon the challenges that I faced and the lessons that I learned. The chapter is organised around five main discussion areas: 1) research process and methods, 2) data collection techniques, 3) ethical issues, 4) researcher subjectivity and positionality, and 5) data analysis and interpretation. Jakarta is the capital city of Indonesia and was chosen as my fieldwork site as the birth-place of both the *Tarbiyah* movement and the PKS. The members of the *Tarbiyah* movement, the majority of whom are neo-urban, well-educated, young professionals, can easily be met in Jakarta. I interviewed 45 respondents from the top, middle and lower levels of the *Tarbiyah* movement and conducted observations of their *dakwah* activities through their *Liqo* (small religious mentoring) sessions and *dawrah* (religious lectures).¹⁸

In chapter four I explore the history, ideology and development of the *Tarbiyah*

¹⁸ The explanation of what and who is meant by ‘top, middle and lower’ levels of the movement are discussed in Chapter 3 on Research Methodology (see Section 3.3.2.). I categorised them as such to help me cluster them easily; ‘top’ refers to the current leaders who hold the highest leadership positions, while ‘middle’ refers to the mentors or trainers of the *Liqo*, and ‘lower’ refers to trainees at the grassroots who are engaged with the weekly *dakwah* sessions (the *Liqo*).

movement, the reasons for its eventual establishment of a political party, and the impact of this on their *dakwah* concept. The chapter investigates the official discourse of *Tarbiyah* elites, given that Indonesia's shift to a more democratic political system encouraged *Tarbiyah* elites to shift from an informal to a more formal movement structure and organisation. These elites expected that the *Tarbiyah* movement could achieve its *dakwah* more effectively through a party. As a result, its *dakwah* concept expanded to a focus on public piety as well as individual piety. The private aspect of *dakwah* has been important since the movement's birth in the early 1980s to the present day. However, during the 1990s, and a post-New Order period (1998-now) in particular, they had the opportunity to develop their private *dakwah* in accordance with the social and political aspects of their ideology. Therefore, the three stages of the *dakwah* process articulated by the MB – personal, social and political – now co-exist in the work of the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS. Nevertheless, I argue that the private and public concepts of *dakwah* are emphasised differently by the more and less senior members involved in the movement. I saw that although the movement claims that establishing individual piety remains the main concept of *dakwah* for the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement, the coexistence of individual piety, public piety, and political interests produced tensions when the movement started to preach more overtly. This chapter extends the existing literature reviewed above in regard to the internal tensions within the movement. In my research, the tensions are caused by the coexistence of different *dakwah* orientations; private piety and public piety along with political interests.¹⁹ This chapter seeks to answer research question 1) i.e. how is *dakwah* conceptualised and how has it been developed and transformed by the leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement within the changing social and political

¹⁹ In previous research (Permata, 2008; 2013) it mainly referred to tensions among leaders caused by their political attitudes.

dynamics of Indonesian society and how do members respond to this?

Chapter five explains and analyses the significance of the *Liqo* as a weekly religious training session attended by all the *Tarbiyah* cadres, something that has never been studied in-depth before. The chapter investigates the structure, position, function, and the lessons of the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* as the official curricula of the weekly *Liqo* for both the *Tarbiyah* movement and the party (PKS). The *Liqo* consists of many groups – from beginners and intermediate right the way up to the highest levels of the movement. I found that the *Liqo* is used as a means for recruiting new members to the *Tarbiyah* movement, to strengthen its members' ideology, and to connect the *Tarbiyah* movement with the PKS' goals. I argue that the structure, recruitment, management, and hierarchy of religious authority in the *Liqo* became more political with the emergence of the PKS. This chapter seeks to answer research question 2) i.e. how does the *Liqo*, as the main vehicle for the *dakwah* activities in the *Tarbiyah* movement, fit into the overall structure and ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement, and how do its members at the lower levels of the organisational hierarchy perceive the relationship between the *Liqo*, the *Tarbiyah* movement, and the PKS party?

Finally, in chapter 6 I examine the extent to which female *Liqo* members experience, receive, and practice the *dakwah* designed and campaigned for by *Tarbiyah* leaders. I focus on cadres' stories about their lived religious experiences through joining the *Liqo*, with special reference to the female *Liqo* group that I observed during my fieldwork. My observations focused on these women's thoughts and experiences, particularly on why they joined the *Liqo*, how they moved from being outside the *Liqo* to being a part of it, how their journey into the *Liqo* continues, and the ideas they receive in the lessons that are developed and designed by their *Tarbiyah*

leaders. I found that although the experiences of these women revealed a heterogeneity and complexity in the range of meanings that being a *Liqo* member has for them, lived religion and piety was actually a key means of reproducing the official Islam(ism) promoted by the movement and its leaders. This chapter thus seeks to answer research question 3) i.e. how do female *Liqo* members experience, and to what extent do they subsequently practice, the *dakwah* received through weekly sessions?

My conclusion summarises the three main arguments of this thesis: i) that the gradual transition of the *Tarbiyah* movement from a politically repressed network of religious purists in the 1970-80s into a fully-fledged *dakwah* political party (the Prosperous Justice Party / *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS) was the outcome of new ‘political opportunities’ which emerged during a period of democratisation 1990-97; ii) that the movement’s weekly *Liqo* (circle of religious teaching) illuminates both the synergies and tensions between official, top-down framing by increasingly formal, outward-looking and pragmatic PKS leaders and the more informal and more conservative networks, the latter remaining a key resource for mobilisation; and, finally, that the lived experiences of female trainees in the *Liqo* suggest that this is a space where Islamist norms, lifestyles and dispositions are more or less successfully taught, learned and reproduced principally through the disciplined and repeated performances of embodied piety.

So, although leaders seek to emphasise the official/formal *dakwah* ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement through *Liqo* structures, it is members’ own subjective and informal, repeated and embodied practice of *dakwah* that creates the dispositions that are at the heart of the movement’s reproduction and success (cf. Mahmood

2005). While this study therefore highlights the gap between the official/formal discourses and lived/informal experiences of leaders and members of the *Tarbiyah* movement regarding *dakwah*, it also points to their intimate and necessary interconnection. In my conclusion I also suggest possibilities for further work in this field. Examples might include comparing the lived experiences of female and male *Liqo* trainees or examining the extent to which the gaps and linkages between official and lived experiences can also be found in other aspects of the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Chapter 1

Dakwah, Modernity, and Contemporary Islamist Movements

1.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the significance of *dakwah* within the Islamic world, with particular focus on the modern period. I briefly explain how *dakwah* was performed by the Prophet Muhammad (7th Century) and by his successors in the classical (7th–13th Century) and medieval periods (14th–18th Century). These periods—as I mentioned earlier in Introduction—are especially important because they are regarded as the basis for the contemporary formulation of *dakwah* ideology, including for the Islamists. The eras of the Prophet and the Caliphs have provided sources of inspiration for Islamists because they see pure and true Islam as having existed during these eras. This exploration of the performance of *dakwah* will thus enable me to explore how its meaning has altered in the modern period, particularly among Islamists, including the *Tarbiyah* movement – an Islamist *dakwah* group that emerged at the beginning of the 1980s in Indonesia.

Islamist groups are regarded as the most prominent adherents of *dakwah* in both Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. Modern Islamists, having a stronger commitment to *dakwah* than was the case historically, believe it necessary to be especially active (and even sometimes aggressive) in preaching and Islamising both the private and public domains. In this chapter I argue that although both private *dakwah* (which concerns the Islamisation of the self to create pious individuals) and public *dakwah* (which concerns the Islamisation of society to create a pious society) were performed in the era of the Prophet, as well as in the classical

and medieval periods, these concepts, especially public *dakwah*, have different meanings and orientations for contemporary Islamist movements. This focus on public *dakwah* has resulted in large part from the disappointment that Islamists have confronted regarding the relative absence of *shari'ah* (together with the lack of religious values) within the public sphere in the modern period.

In this chapter I begin by examining *dakwah* within Islamic history, before exploring the impact that modernity has had on the Muslim world and outlining three basic 'types' of Muslim response to the impact of globalised modernity. In the final two sections I will focus on the contemporary Islamist movement, with special reference to the MB in Egypt – a movement that (as we saw in the Introduction) has significantly influenced and shaped the Islamist *Tarbiyah* movement/the PKS in Indonesia.

1.2 *Dakwah* in the history of Islam

1.2.1 The early period of Islam

Dakwah is a noun that comes from the Arabic verb *da'a*, meaning 'to invite' or 'to call'. In a religious sense, it is the invitation addressed to humans by God and the Prophets to believe in the true religion of Islam: "God summons to the Abode of Peace" (Q 10:25).²⁰ This Quranic verse invites humankind to live in accordance with the will of God or the sacred law. In Indonesia, a Muslim who conducts *dakwah* (*dakwah* in the Indonesian language) is commonly called a *da'i* (plural: *du'at*) when

²⁰ All the monotheistic prophets' religions are considered part of Islam and each prophet conducted *dakwah* in various ways. The Prophet Muhammad's mission was to repeat and act as the final seal of the previous *dakwah* of the prophets that went before him

he is a male preacher, or a *da'iya* (plural: *da'iyat*) when female. A *da'i* or *da'iya* is one who calls, who invites, or is a propagandist.

Islam is a faith in the monotheistic (*tawhid*) tradition, and the messages of Islam are 'universalist' – open to all people, regardless of ethnicity, nationality, and race (Mandaville, 2007:277). Islam's openness to people beyond Western Arabia is emphasised in texts such as the Quran (49:13) and the Hadith of the Prophet. *Dakwah* has been conducted under this monotheistic and universalist outlook since the beginning of Muhammad's prophecy (610 CE),²¹ which he used to invite his family and close friends to join Islam soon after receiving a revelation from God (Lapidus, 2002:21). However, the way in which the Prophet invited people to join Islam shifted during his lifetime. In the first three years following his initial revelations, he conducted *dakwah* covertly, and the scope of his audience was limited to his close family and friends (Lapidus, 2002:21). However, he began to publicly declare his prophetic message in the fourth year after his revelation (Rippin, 2005), visiting different tribes to introduce the messages of *dakwah* and to call on the people to join Islam more publicly, as seen in the *dakwah* he delivered during his *hajj* (pilgrimage) period, and to the people of Ta'if (Janson, 2003). The Prophet thus changed his approach to *dakwah* from its covert beginnings to its overt nature in His later prophecy. According to Lapidus (2002:22), this change in the *dakwah* approach arose because God instructed the Prophet to preach overtly and publicly, as revealed in the Quran.

²¹ According to Muslim tradition Muhammad was born in Mecca in 571 CE and was appointed as a Prophet in 610. For the history and life of the prophet Muhammad, amongst many others, see Haykal (1976) for instance.

The central focus of the *dakwah* message of the Prophet was *tawhid* (monotheism) (Lapidus, 2002; Poston, 1992), and social reforms such as the freeing of slaves and the protection of orphans. Some scholars see these as two separate aspects: the Meccan society's concept of God and the reformation of its society (cf. Hodgson 1974). However, I prefer to see social reform as the main message and monotheism as the theological foundation of its reformation agenda (cf. Reza Aslan 2006). The Prophet's message of social reform attracted the lower-class members of Meccan society and, after conducting *dakwah* for around thirteen years in Mecca, most of his followers came from marginal tribes and oppressed social classes, including slaves (Aslan, 2006), with the Prophet only gradually calling for Meccan society to join this new religious group.

However, the *dakwah* of the Prophet angered Meccan elites, who felt disturbed by his movement. For them, Islam represented a threat to their old religions and beliefs and, perhaps most crucially, to their economic and political dominance (see Poston, 1992). Their pre-Islamic religions had a significant link to both economics and politics, and the *dakwah* of the Prophet was a direct challenge to the social and economic order of the society (Janson, 2003). Engineer (1990) has also argued that the Prophet's *dakwah* changed the economic monopoly and political leadership of the elites of the Quraish.²²

Even though the Prophet faced resistance from Meccan elites, many of whom came from his clan²³ – the Banu Hashim – he insisted in continuing to deliver Islamic

²² Mecca, at that time, was a trade and business centre, and the Quraishi economy was dependent on 'rites' which people performed in order to get a blessing, especially Arab traders visiting the *ka'ba* (a holy place where many idols for worship were placed). Disturbing the dominance of these 'rites' would affect the two other sides (economy and politics) (Haykal, 1976).

²³ A clan is a smaller group of a tribe.

messages to the wider society (Janson, 2003). The resistance of those elites increased after the death of the Prophet's uncle, Abu Talib, who was the leader of the Banu Hashim clan and the key figure protecting the Prophet's *dakwah* movement from the Quraish elites. Abu Talib's position in the clan was taken by Abu Lahab who, unlike his predecessor, was hostile to the Prophet's movement, and thus the Prophet and his disciples became much more vulnerable after his uncle's death. Facing strong resistance in Mecca led the Prophet and his followers to look for other cities that would accept them and tolerate their beliefs. Medina was finally chosen, and they moved to the city in the thirteenth year of his prophecy (622 CE). He continued his *dakwah* to Medinan people for ten years (622-632) – the rest of his life.²⁴

There was less resistance from non-Muslim groups and individuals to the Prophet's *dakwah* in Medina than there was in Mecca, and this enabled the Prophet to start to institutionalise the *dakwah* movement publicly through the establishment of mosques. Following his emigration (*hijrah*) from Mecca to Medina in 622, he established the first mosque, called the Quba mosque.²⁵ He then built other mosques in which Muslims could not only perform their prayers or other acts of worship (*ibadah*), but could also conduct and attend religious meetings. Moreover, as Islam had spread to several places outside Mecca and Medina, such as Yemen, the Prophet also sent trained teachers to these new Muslim communities. As Rippin (2005:42) states, Muhammad emerged as both a forceful religious and political leader in this period – Prophet and statesman. For instance, in addition to calling for salvation in

²⁴ Several tribes, such as the Aws and Khazraj, supported the Prophet's *dakwah*, and offered Medina as the centre for his *dakwah* movement (Haykal, 1976).

²⁵ The Quba mosque is well known among Muslims as the first mosque in Islamic history, whose first stone was placed by the Prophet Muhammad soon after his arrival in Medina. The building of the mosque was later completed by the Prophet's companions. The mosque is mentioned in both the *Quran* (At-Tawba: 108) and the *Hadith* (Sahih Bukhari, 2:21:284 and 2:21:285).

the Friday sermons, the Prophet Muhammad also started to enunciate public policies and messages. According to Antoun (1989:186), attendance at his sermons at Friday prayer became a political as well as a religious obligation, since it marked the newly formed *umma* (community).

1.2.2 The classical period of Islam

The *dakwah* project of Islam continued after the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, and came to be led by his four companions, referred to as *al-Khulafa' ar-Rashidun* (the Rightly Guided Caliphs): Abu Bakr (ruled 632-634), Umar ibn al-Khattab (ruled 634-644), Usman ibn Affan (ruled 644-655), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (ruled 655-661) (Poston, 1992). Although the leadership of the Muslim community became a controversial issue after the death of Muhammad, these companions, in turn, replaced the Prophet's position as leader of the Muslim community.²⁶ This is why they were called Caliphs (*khalifa*), which means successors (though not, according to Muslim tradition, 'successors' in relation to prophet-hood, but in terms of political and religious leadership).

When the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 and Abu Bakr took over as the first Caliph of the community, "the Arab[s] controlled no territory outside Arabia" (Rippin, 2005:58), but under their leadership, they conquered other places outside the Arabic peninsula, including Iraq (in 633), Syria (in 634-638), Damascus, Palestine and Persia (in 638) and Egypt (in 639) (Rippin, 2005; Lapidus, 2002). However, this territorial expansion did not necessarily mean that non-Muslims were forced to convert to Islam. Many wars or military aggressions occurred under these

²⁶ A group later known as Shi'a argued that fourth Caliph 'Ali was the rightful Caliph and must be appointed as the first leader after the death of Muhammad'. However, Abu Bakr was selected by a group of elders as the most qualified person to rule at that time (see Rippin 2005:58).

Caliphs' leaderships, and most of them were successful (Poston, 1992) but conversion was not always a high priority in early times not least because of the taxes paid by non-Muslims and the fact that any emergent Islamic ideology was most likely associated with the Arabs (Rippin 2005).

The territorial expansions continued under the first two dynasties of Islam – the Umayyad caliphate (661-750) and the Abbasid caliphate (750-1258) – which ruled after 'the Rightly Guided Caliphs'. During both periods, the military expansion continued – into North Africa, Eastern Europe, Spain (Western Europe), and central Asia (Rippin, 2005). Scholars such as Lapidus (2002), Rippin (2005) and Poston (1992) regarded the caliphates after 'the Rightly Guided Caliphs' as dynasties because the transfer of leadership was primarily based on family ties.²⁷ In the period of the Abbasid dynasty especially, the intensity of military aggression decreased with the emergence of a cosmopolitan urban peace economy based on Baghdad and the spread of Islam mainly through transnational scholarly and Sufi networks (cf. Mandaville, 2007), but military expansion increased again under the Ottoman caliphate. Unlike the capital cities of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, which were located in Damascus (Syria) and Baghdad (Iraq) respectively, the Ottoman caliphate's capital was centralised in Constantinople (Istanbul), which was the capital city of the Eastern Roman Empire and was near to Europe. The Ottoman caliphate conquered many Eastern and Western European states and, as a result, its territory extended, stretching from the Middle East, through Africa, Asia, and Europe.

²⁷ It is worth noting that these two dynasties originated from the Quraish tribe. They were thus from the same tribe as the Prophet Muhammad, albeit from a different clan.

Dakwah messages in these classical and medieval periods (632–1700) were more complex than those in the era of the Prophet. Muslims in this period were no longer dominated by members of lower class society, but came from the upper, middle, and lower classes and from a much wider range of ethnic groups (Poston, 1992). In these periods, although monotheism and social reform were still one of the concerns of Muslim *dakwah*, justifications for power expansion and political contestation also marked the *dakwah* rhetoric. The former motivation (power expansion) could be found among Islamic rulers, while the latter (political contestation) could be found among both rulers and other Islamic dynasties in Muslim societies such as the Abbasids.

The legitimation of power expansion can be seen in Islamic rulers' ideological claims that their aggressions aimed to liberate indigenous (local) people from the oppression of the Byzantine and Persian empires (Lapidus, 2002) – a position supported by Thomas Walker Arnold (1965). They stated that non-Muslim rulers must be offered a number of options before being attacked: 1) to convert to Islam or 2) if they rejected conversion, to pay a *jizyah* or tax to the Islamic authorities. Only 'if they refused both these choices would they be attacked by Muslim soldiers' (Janson, 2003:67). Thus *dakwah* was part of the ideology justifying the political expansion of the Caliphate's territory.

Political contestation within Islamic societies, both at the state and the grass roots levels, also influenced the development of the *dakwah* concept during this period. The Abbasids, for instance, oversaw a period of increasing equality among Muslims of different origins with the faith open to all, and utilised this as part of their *dakwah* message. Appeals to principles of equality were used by the Abbasids 'to undermine

the political authority of the Umayyad dynasty as the latter's more parochial policies privileged Arabs over other ethnicities, thus denying the universalising potential of Islam' (Janson, 2003:70).²⁸

In this classical period, however, the Caliphs did not dominate the development of *dakwah*. There were also *ulama*, or religious scholars, who became the agents of *dakwah*. *Ulama* is an Arabic word (sing. *Alim*), which refers to "a class of scholars with privileged access to texts, methods, and traditions of knowledge that create their capacity to speak authoritatively on religious issues" (Mandaville, 2007:307). These *ulama* engaged in preaching Islam to their societies, either as an official part of state institutions or outside of them contributing to an emerging Muslim civil society. According to Janson (2003), ordinary people preferred to obey *ulama* or religious scholars who were mostly outside the state's authority. Moreover, the Islamic views of the *ulama* were not monolithic, varying for instance between the five main schools of law in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) – Ja'fari, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali (Hodgson, 1974).

Sufis from a variety of networks or orders (*tariqa*, pl. *turuq*) were also concerned with the development of *dakwah* after the era of the Prophet. They were primarily (though never exclusively) interested in esoteric issues concerning religion, with a focus on purifying the soul away from secular or worldly affairs and building up pious individuals. Sufi orders such as the *Naqshbandiyya* and the *Qadiriyya* are associated with a traditional form of *dakwah*, and their religious authority is closely

²⁸ Similarly, the Shi'a conceptualised their *dakwah* in a way that enabled them to fight against both Umayyad and Abbasid political authority. The Shi'a developed the notion of *ahl al-bayt* (the family of the Prophet) as the most authoritative for being both a religious and a political leader (see Janson, 2003).

related to the leadership of charismatic Sufi *Shaykhs*, who dispense spiritual blessings and wisdom (*baraka*) (Mandaville, 2007). Branches of the Sufi orders have spread Islam to many countries throughout the centuries (Mandaville, 2007).

In contrast to the early period of Islamic history, during which the main agent of *dakwah* was the prophet Muhammad, these classical and medieval periods had a range of *dakwah* practitioners who offered a variety of *dakwah* approaches for Muslims, including: 1) the caliphs, sultans, or kings, who held political power; 2) the travelling traditional *ulama* or religious experts and their students, who had religious training; and 3) the *Shaykhs* and followers of sufi *tariqahs*. It can therefore be seen that the development of *dakwah* throughout Islamic history was dominated by traditional forms of *dakwah*.²⁹

1.3 Muslims' responses to modernity and *dakwah* in the modern period

1.3.1 Modernity and its impact on the Muslim world

From the Sixteenth century through to the Nineteenth, European society gradually acquired and expanded its cultural, economic, and political supremacy (Lapidus, 2002). This growth was marked by the rise of the natural sciences, new technology which enabled industrial capitalism and new forms of communication (such as the printing press), as well as a new political stability. The structural transformations that Europe witnessed in these areas is often collectively known as ‘modernity’ (Lapidus, 2002).

²⁹ In this context, ‘traditional forms of *dakwah*’ means that practitioners are well-trained as traditional religious trainers or scholars.

The modern period was also the period during which Muslim supremacy declined as European economic and political strength increased (Lapidus, 2002). Thus the European conquest of Muslim lands also occurred in this period, with Britain, France, and the Netherlands having conquered and colonised numerous Muslim countries by the end of eighteenth century (Rippin, 2005). One by one, the Ottoman caliphate's territories were occupied, and the caliphate itself – which was the only remaining symbol of Muslim political supremacy – started to decline, with its final collapse occurring in 1924 (Lapidus, 2002). The collapse of the Ottoman caliphate – ‘the sick man of Europe’ - was widely taken as the key symbol of Muslim political stagnation.

European colonisation pushed Muslims into an intense encounter with modernity. Napoleon Bonaparte’s occupation of Egypt in 1799 not only brought French troops armed with guns, but also modern science, administration, and technology (Lapidus, 2002). Later, Egypt was colonised by the British, who built modern hospitals, schools, and scientific laboratories (Lapidus, 2002). Egypt’s Muslim leaders and religious scholars were amazed by these European modern scientific developments, and these encounters made them realise how much Islamic countries had declined compared to European (non-Muslim) countries. Within this period, then, Muslims came to acknowledge the superiority of European society and the end of their own supremacy. They felt that the Europeans had left them too far behind in the fields of modern education, economics, politics, and military power, and this loss of power produced a deep psychological impact on Muslims.

Realising their ‘backwardness’, many Muslim leaders adopted modernity, particularly within the arena of politics. They built freedom movements which

aspired to indigenous modern nation-states, often leaving the idea of the caliphate and other traditional Islamic political systems behind. Nation-state building began after World War I, and during this period, Muslim elites in countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia endeavoured to establish modern political and social systems (Lapidus, 2002). These modernisation programmes transformed the structures of political systems in Muslim societies, with Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, becoming the first Muslim country to reject the Islamic caliphate and become a modern, secular state (Lapidus, 2002). For Attaturk, to develop the state required Turkey to become westernised and Islam largely privatised (Lapidus, 2002), and such thinking led to similar modifications soon following in other Muslim states.

This 'modernisation' agenda challenged many Muslims' convictions, particularly those who disagreed with the marginalisation of Islamic systems (Milton-Edwards, 2005). In the face of such challenges, many Muslims felt it necessary to defend Islam and to object to the adoption of secular concepts such as rationalism, parliamentary institutions, and the replacement of Islamic law with European law. Many regarded this reform as being incompatible with Islamic principles requiring Muslims to use *shari'ah* as the central source of Muslim social life, and saw it as removing Islam from Muslims' public lives. As a result, heated debate emerged during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries among Muslims, concerning how best to respond to modernity.

1.3.2 Muslims' responses to modernity

Many scholars including Wiktorowicz (2006), Rippin (2005), Roy (2004), Kurzman (2002; 1998) and Rahman (1982) have come up with different but related typologies to classify Muslim responses to modernity. As Rippin (2005) points out, typologies are theoretical categories that can help to identify tendencies, but social realities can rarely be fitted neatly into one position or another. For the sake of simplicity, I will examine three basic types of Muslim response to modernity suggested by these scholars – the traditionalist; the modernist (and related secularist position); and the Islamist.

The first basic type of response is traditionalism. Traditionalists have historically been the main Islamic groups to be concerned with *dakwah* or preaching. In responding to modernity, 'they refer to the traditionally well-trained *ulama*, sufis, or other religious experts, maintaining a strong commitment to the religious beliefs and practices that they have inherited from the past' (Rippin, 2005:192). They believe in 'time-honoured' ways of gradually dealing with changes (Rippin, 2005), holding that the changes brought about by modernity should not ultimately unsettle the tradition of the past.

Their *dakwah* seeks to renew piety and assure the correct devotional practice of individual Muslims. Their *dakwah* encourages Muslims to observe the tenets of belief and practice. As with Sufi networks, this *dakwah* movement is rarely involved in overt political activities, but Mandaville (2007) is right to hold that although it considers itself to be apolitical, in renewing the religious consciousness of Muslims, its *dakwah* activities can nonetheless encourage the emergence of Islamist-related

dakwah movements. An example of a traditionalist *dakwah* movement in Indonesia is the *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU), which was established in 1926.

Whilst traditionalism represents maintaining the status quo in Islamic history, other ideal types, such as modernism, promote various changes. Modernists hold to the idea of going ‘back to the sources’ of Islam, but tend to produce radically modern interpretations of them (Rippin, 2005:195). In contrast to traditionalists, modernists do not view the authority of the past as being entirely fixed or binding and may question key notions such as revelation (Burgat, 2003, Hefner, 2005, Rippin, 2005). The modernists perceive the need to reinterpret Islam in light of contemporary needs because most parts of Islamic teaching consist of following the interpretations of classical and medieval *ulama*.

Modernist Muslims argue that there is no necessary contradiction between modernity and Islam and that the two are thus essentially compatible. They adopt modern and ‘Western’ ideas, such as equality, liberty, democracy, tolerance, and justice, viewing modern knowledge and the use of reason to be necessary for bringing vitality back to Islam. Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838–1897 CE), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905 CE), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935 CE), Indian scholars Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898 CE) and Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938 CE) are considered amongst the most influential modernist Islamic figures (Rippin, 2005:195) although interestingly some can be seen as pointing forward to more Islamist approaches (Rahman, 1982).³⁰ An example of a modernist *dakwah* movement in Indonesia is the Muhammadiyah, which was established in 1912.³¹

³⁰ For an account of the work and life of Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, see Hourani (1983), Keddie (1972), Kedourie (1965, 1966, 1997), Kudsi-Zadeh (1971) and Milson (1968); and

The secularist type of Muslim response to modernity adopts a similar approach to the modernist one. Given that modernist and secularist Muslims stand together in a number of ways regarding modernity, I have not categorised secularism as a separate ideal type, but rather as being attached to the modernist one. However, most notably, Muslims who seek to privatise Islam are classified as secularists. For them, although Islam has a significant role to play in society, it should not be used either as a basis for a state or for state law. According to Rippin (2005), Albania exemplified this typology in the mid-twentieth as it replaced all Islamic values with modern ones. This also happened in Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), who founded the Republic of Turkey in 1924. Turkey separated Islam from the state and public life entirely, with modern laws and modern education replacing Islamic law and Islamic traditional education. The Turkish government abolished *shari'ah* law, the practice of polygamy and Sufi orders, and closed traditional Islamic schools (*madrassahs*).

Both traditionalist and modernist/secularist points of views on responding to modernity are rejected by Islamism, which is characterised by its key ideology that 'Islam(ism) is the solution'. In this regard, Islam is not only seen as a religion, but also as a political ideology that should reformulate all aspects of society, including politics, economics, social life, the law, and so forth (Roy, 2004), with Islamists emphasising 'the absolute character of the source of authority of Islam; Quran and Sunna' (Rippin, 2005:183,192). In contrast with traditionalists, modernists and

for an account of the work and life of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal, see Ashraf (1975), Malik (1980), Schimmel (1989), Sheikh (1972) and Troll (1978).

³¹ The Muhammadiyah is recognised as a modernist or reformist movement. On the Muhammadiyah's reformism/modernism, see Federspiel 1970, Nakamura 1980, and Peacock 1978; on the Muhammadiyah's attitudes to Javanese culture, see Burhani 2005, Nakamura 1983. The Muhammadiyah is called modernist because it allowed its members to follow *ijtihad* (independent reasoning to interpret the Qur'an and the Sunna) and they were thus not restricted to following a certain school of thought. See www.muhammadiyah.or.id (Accessed and up-dated on 5 April 2017).

secularists, Islamists tend to accept changes in a ‘controlled’ fashion (Rippin, 2005:183,192). They accept more restricted changes than modernists, and use the two authoritative sources of the Quran and the Sunna to accept or legitimate changes in the modern era.

Islamists have often responded to modernisation in a complex fashion by rejecting Westernisation but rooting certain aspects of modernity in the ‘pure’ Islam of the Quran and Sunna. Thus, Islamists have ‘indigenised and Islamised’ many concepts and structures from Western political sciences, including ideology, revolution, organisation, democracy, and political parties (Roy, 2004:447). Islamists use political actions to attempt to re-create a ‘true’ and ‘pure’ Islamic society utilising *shari’ah* (Islamic law) to govern the state as well as public life (Roy, 2004). The key message of their *dakwah* is that Islam should be strongly present not only in the private sphere, but in the public sphere as well. Islamists also believe that the state should aim to unite the *ummah* (global Muslim community), and that the *ummah* should not be restricted to a specific nation (Roy, 2004). Most Islamists have sought to establish political parties and have participated in democratic procedures such as general elections whilst trying to show that Islam represents the best form of ‘democracy’ (Nasr, 1996). Islamists have claimed that *shura* (consultation), as mentioned in the Qur’an and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad, is a principle of democracy in Islam, but have accepted democracy per se in order to support their goal of establishing an Islamic society.

Rippin (2005), Roy (2004) and Nasr (1996) consider Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903–1979), Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) to be amongst the earliest Islamist ideologues. They are founding fathers and intellectuals of

Islamist *dakwah* movements, namely the MB in Egypt (e.1928) and the Jamaat-i Islami (JI) in Pakistan (e.1941).³² Through these *dakwah* organisations, the aforementioned Islamist figures advocated a more ‘authentic’ Islamic framework for Muslim society. Also, whilst Mawdudi and al-Banna believed that the use of persuasion and gradual changes was best suited for achieving Islamic goals, Qutb believed in the need for more radical change.

These three figures had a significant impact on Muslims worldwide, especially young educated Muslims in urban areas with secular educational backgrounds (Roy, 2004, Mandaville, 2007). The MB attracted Muslims in the Middle East especially, and some of their branches became prominent parties in the Sudan, Palestine and Tunisia. By contrast, the JI became more prevalent among South Asian Muslims, and their immigrant and diaspora communities in Pakistan, India, East Africa, the UK, and the Caribbean (Mandaville, 2007:283). However, the MB also attracted Muslims in Indonesia, and became the inspiration for an Islamist *dakwah* party, whilst the influence of the JI is not prevalent among Indonesian Muslims.

The Islamists’ ideology is inspired by revivalist or ‘fundamentalist’ ideas.³³ For the revivalist, there is only one ultimate source of Muslim authority – that found in the Quran and the Sunna. Revivalists believe that if Muslims return to ‘pure’ Islam, they will be able to restore the ‘glory’ of the past, and they thus reject Sufism, philosophy, and the use of rationality in interpreting the Quran and Sunna.³⁴

³² For key studies on the Pakistani Jama’at Islami and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its key ideologues see, for instance, Nasr (1996), Zollner (2009), Al-Hudaybi (1969), Mitchell (1993), Lia (1998), Kepel (1985) and Gilson (2000).

³³ Islamists, as a consequence, are sometimes referred to as ‘revivalists’ or ‘fundamentalists’, with many scholars using these terms interchangeably.

³⁴ This is regarded by Rippin (2005) as one of the key points for distinguishing Islamists from modernists.

Revivalism has a long history in Islam and emerged before the modern period, for instance in the figures of Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1787) – the founder of the Saudi Wahhabi movement (Commins 2009). Thus, according to Rahman (1982), revivalist or fundamentalist movements can be divided into pre-modern and the modern manifestations.³⁵ Nevertheless, both pre-modern and modern revivalist ideas focus on purifying Muslims from non-Islamic faiths and any innovations (*bid'a*) that have entered their religious practices, including local beliefs, customs, and superstitions. The spirit of purification among revivalists holds that the essence of ‘true Islam’ will be corrupted by these innovations.

Islamists have adopted and developed many ideas from revivalists, such as the emphasis on erasing popular or traditional Muslim beliefs and practices, which Islamists also consider to be contradictory to ‘pure’ Islam. The difference between the two movements is that the revivalists’ focus on Islamising society through purifying faith and rites, while Islamists are not only interested in this spirit of purification, but also in Islamising the modern nation-state and the public sphere through ‘active’ *dakwah* and politics. Islamists regard politics as the crucial arena to occupy in order for Islamist leaders to create a more Islamic society and an Islamic public sphere.³⁶

³⁵ Rahman (1982) mentions other characteristics of pre-modernism, namely a deep concern with the socio-moral degeneration of Muslim society and a call to carry out revivalist reforms through Jihad. Some pre-modern revivalist movements had a Sufi orientation.

³⁶ There is an important relationship too between Islamists and the politico-Salafists of Wictorowicz’s (2006) typology (see also Wahid, 2014; Rasheed, 2007; Hasan, 2005). Wiktowicz divides Salafists into three factions: ‘purists’, ‘politicos’ and ‘jihadis’. All observe strict monotheism, returning to the Qur’an and the Sunna, and following the examples of the *salafus shalih* (the pious ancestors i.e. companions (*Sahabah*), their followers (*Tabi’un*), and the follower’s followers). The difference between these orientations lies in their strategies in promoting their ideas: 1) the purists: through peaceful means such as *dakwah* for purification and education but largely disengaged from politics and maintaining unconditional obedience to the ruler; 2) the politicos: who is engaged with politics and typically pursues this through peaceful political means (like reformist Islamism); and 3) the

The debate concerning Islam and modernity indicates that there is a range of ways in which Muslims have dealt with modernity. They differ in approaches regarding the extent to which modernity and its transformations should be accommodated. Most Muslims realise that Islam has been declining – in politics, economics, the military, and sciences – and for revivalists or Islamists, this decline has been caused by Muslims breaking with Islamic values and traditions. They view most Muslims as failing to practice the ‘true’ Islam revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and contend that the best way to solve this problem is to return to living by the Qur’an and Sunna. By contrast, modernists consider conservatism as the key factor that led to Islam’s decline and hold that in order to develop Islamic civilisations, Muslims should adopt modern culture and the sciences.

1.4 The Islamist notion of ‘active’ *dakwah* in the modern period

Modernity’s reshaping of Muslims’ lives (see Section 1.3) led Islamists to worry about the decreasing role that Islam was playing in society and in the state. The modernisation undertaken by Muslim rulers brought a shift in Islamic worlds in terms of culture, social life, economics, and politics, including the marginalisation of the *shari’ah* court, the *ulama*'s role in society, and traditional Islamic schools (see Section 1.3).

Their worry about the absence of Islam in the public sphere led Islamists to become the front-line *dakwah* group, intensively countering the impact of modernisation in the Islamic world by seeking to speak their truth to power (Hirschkind 2006).

jihadists: who engages in physical struggle against the unbeliever (*kafir*) even if that is a Muslim ruler who does not apply Islamic laws (Wiktorowicz, 2006:217).

Although, they use modern technologies such as transportation, telecommunications, and medical technology, the Islamists' *dakwah* is especially active in countering Western culture, politics, and economics (Mandaville, 2007). Unlike modern technology, which they perceive to be 'neutral', Western culture, economics, and politics are regarded as reflecting 'Western' values, which are characterised as 'atheistic', secular, and anti-religion (Roy, 2004; 1994).

Islamism is the most 'active' Islamic *dakwah* movement in the modern period. Activism is the key identity of this globally diverse movement, which routinely calls on Muslims to respond to the impact of Western power. The ideas of criticising 'Western' modernity and emphasising Islamic identity are most attractive to urban, lower middle-class Muslims (Burgat, 2003; Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996), who believe that modernisation programmes in Muslim countries cannot succeed in transforming these societies into prosperous ones. For them, religious authenticity is the key for this transformation (Rippin, 2005, Mandaville, 2007), and this is one of the central factors that generates their interest in the 'alternative' to the state system offered by Islamists (Hirschkind 2006). Their *dakwah*, as an activist ideology, therefore represents a new or reinvented approach.³⁷

Islamist *dakwah* movements see Islam as a comprehensive and active ideology whose role is not only to transform their selves but also their society. During the beginning of twentieth century, these *dakwah* movements emerged rapidly in countries such as Egypt and India where Islamic organisations such as the neo-Salafi

³⁷ I use the term 'active' or 'activist' *dakwah* in this thesis to reflect what I heard from daily conversations in Indonesia in referring to the *Tarbiyah* community and also to reflect what I inferred from the literature of Islamist movements. From this literature, I understood that Islamist groups are regarded as the most prominent practitioners of *dakwah*, believing it to be necessary to be active (and sometimes aggressive) in Islamising both the private and public domains (see Introduction).

movement, the mystical orders, and Islamic reformism were established (Meuleman, 2011). Examples of these groups include the MB, founded in Egypt in 1928 and the *Jama'ati Islami* (JI), founded in India in 1941. Their *dakwah* emphasises the promotion of Islamic teachings and the provision of information on Islam for both Muslims and non-Muslims (Mandaville, 2007:285).

These organisations propagate *dakwah* messages, not only focusing on private *dakwah* or seeking to Islamise individuals, but also focusing on public *dakwah* with the aim of Islamising the society and the state. For them, *dakwah* not only serves the purpose of educating people, but should also be used for correcting their religiosity and behaviour (Mahmood 2005). The focus of *dakwah*, for them, should go beyond the level of the individual, and be instrumental in creating an Islamic society, either through establishing Islamic political parties or producing impacts on the social and spiritual aspects of society through some other media or 'counter-public' (Hirschkind 2006). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the core *dakwah* agenda of these organisations is the same – to transform individual Muslims and their society based on Islamic teachings.

In transforming their societies, these organisations developed a variety of *dakwah* models, including religious edification, religious education or training, and Islamic charity or social activity, building educational centres, religious places, and social and public services such as hospitals and clinics to support their agenda. They also travelled to many countries around the world to promote their *dakwah* ideology and, as a result, transnational *dakwah* activities and *dakwah* organisations have been established in many parts of the Muslim world (Mandaville, 2007:283). These organisations have adopted various new forms of *dakwah*, with new aims based on

their religious interpretations, their responses to public issues, and their involvement in social and political activities.

Key Islamist figures such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A'la Mawdudi have greatly influenced contemporary Islamist *dakwah* movements by strengthening their focus on locating Islamic identity within the public sphere and critiquing modernity. They also exemplify more 'gradualist' (al-Banna and Mawdudi) and more 'radical' / 'revolutionary' (Qutb) forms of Islamism. Al-Banna, the founder of the MB, was deeply concerned about the impact of Westernisation on the Islamic beliefs and practices of Egyptian Muslims, perceiving Western culture and thought to have had a significant influence on Muslims in Egypt (Mitchell, 1993). He regarded this influence as a cause of the moral and political decline of Muslims, and created a new model of *dakwah* that called on Muslims to perform Islamic teachings in their daily life to address this, ranging from issues regarding domestic affairs to public matters. For al-Banna, Islam needed to provide the key guidance for Muslim societies, and his influence is clear in the MB's political views that Islam: 1) is a comprehensive, self-evolving system providing the ultimate path to life; 2) emanates from, and is based on, two fundamental sources – the Qur'an and the Sunna; and 3) is applicable at all times and places (Mitchell, 1993). However, although he, like other Islamists, promoted the establishment of a better Islamic state, he did not propose violence as a means for achieving this goal. The ideas of al-Banna regarding 'active' *dakwah* will be elaborated further in next section (Section 1.5).

Like al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, who was born in 1906 in Asyut-Egypt and was hanged by Gamal Abd al-Nasser in 1966 for his denunciation of the Egyptian regime, also

criticised modern cultures and thoughts.³⁸ These criticisms are mostly presented in his books, *al-Adala al-Ijtima'iyya fi al-Islam* (Social Justice in Islam) which was written in 1949 and *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones) which was first published in 1964. The first book explains that the separation of religion and politics is a characteristic of Western societies and thus would be inappropriate for Islamic societies. He argued that 'there is no hierarchy among believers and the ultimate authority lies with God alone and Islam is the basis for social equality and true justice' (Zollner, 2009:51). The second book deals with the key concept of *jahiliyya* (ignorance).³⁹ According to Qutb, although current Muslim societies proclaim themselves to be Muslim, they do not practice worship (*ibadah*), and they erroneously believe in sovereignty (*hakimiyya*) other than God. For Qutb, Muslims in these societies are also living in *jahiliyya* (Kepel, 2005)⁴⁰ – they are living in the same condition as the Arabian people in the pre-Islamic *jahiliyya* before the Prophet Muhammad proselytised Islam.⁴¹

According to Qutb, any society that is not Muslim is an instance of *jahiliyya* (Kepel, 2005:47), and everything outside Islam must also be included in the category of *Jahiliyya* as it is derived from the spirit of barbarism and is contrary to Islamic teachings (Rippin, 2005). For Qutb, although contemporary Muslim governments remain, they can be categorised as 'infidel' governments when they do not

³⁸ Qutb is well known as one of the leading figures of the MB. He became a member of this MB in 1951, then head of its department for spreading Islam (*Qism nashr al-dakwah*) in 1952, and an editor of the weekly newspaper *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* in 1954 (Zollner, 2009)

³⁹ Qutb, divided *jahiliyya* society, in which people are ignorant of divine guidance, into three types. First, there is Communist or Atheist society, which denies God, and in which sovereignty (*hakimiyya*) is exercised in the name of the people or parties; second there is Jewish and Christian society; and lastly there is contemporary Muslim society (Kepel, 2005:47). This book is considered to be the key text for the *dakwah* ideology of radical Islamists (Zollner, 2009; Qutb, 1992; Kepel, 2005).

⁴⁰ Qutb's critique of the modern *jahiliyya* "stems from his identification of Islam with the dynamic unity of the universe and his assertion of the autonomous character of human actions" (Lee, 1997:100).

⁴¹ Qutb drew on Mawdudi for the terms and interpretations of *hakimiyya* and *jahiliyya* (see Zollner, 2009)

implement *shari'ah*. Muslim rulers, as they existed in the history of Islam are, therefore, not enough for Qutb and his followers: Muslim rulers must have a commitment to implementing *shari'ah* and Islamic values in their countries. A Muslim society, according to Qutb, must apply Islam across the board, letting it guide their faith, worship, legislation, social organisations and modes of behaviour.

As a result of these views, Qutb, unlike al-Banna, stated that Muslims are allowed to fight against such 'infidel' governments (Haddad, 1983). Qutb therefore promoted a new model of *dakwah* that emphasised the need for activism and political *jihad* in order to turn Islam into a global power (Zollner, 2009). This shows Qutb's goal of making Islam the basis of a state – an orientation that demands a total human submission to God (Khatab, 2006). Qutb thus rejected democracy, rationalism and secularism, and held that Islam needed to be purified from Western influences. For instance, he rejected the Western banking system, which he considered to be contrary to Islamic law. He also criticised Western behaviour, in particular that associated with a concern for material goods (Lee, 1997). Likewise, he rejected Western ideas about separating religious from secular matters, and the West's adherence to rationalism. He thus refused to reconcile Islamic teachings with European outlooks, viewing Islam as a comprehensive ideology that regulates all aspects of human life (see Khatab, 2006; Moussalli, 1992; Shepard, 1992).

Giles Kepel (2005), who studied Islamic radical movements in Egypt, found that many contemporary radical Islamist activists are influenced by Qutb's ideas and, like Kepel, Rippin (2005) classified Qutb and other Muslims who oppose their governments as 'radical' Islamists. Qutb was also considered to be responsible for the shift in the outlook of at least some of the MB's members from holding

moderate views under al-Banna's leadership to becoming a radical splinter movement. His concept of *Jahiliyya* marks an obvious fission in the MB's ideology, as al-Banna never accused the Egyptian regime of his day of being non-Islamic (Kepel, 2005).

Mawdudi was another key Islamist figure. He was regarded as an Islamist because of his beliefs about God's unique sovereignty, the universal application and implementation of *shari'ah*, and the need for a democratic caliphate (Nasr, 1996). According to Mawdudi, sovereignty over any aspect of life is only for God, since God is the creator and the ruler of the universe.⁴² He criticised the concept of democracy because he believed that it misleads people about the true concept of sovereignty (Mawdudi, 1960). Furthermore, governments that are elected by people should consider their position as being *amanah* (in trust) from God. Therefore, they have to implement God's commands – *shari'ah* – in the state and in all Muslim society.

Appealing to such an understanding of sovereignty, Mawdudi argued that political sovereignty also belongs to God alone. If there are human agents that seek to constitute the sovereignty of God through implementing the political system of Islam in a state, they will never succeed because of the limitations of their power.⁴³

A democratic caliphate, for Mawdudi, means that the government is the only

⁴² Mawdudi elaborated his idea of sovereignty in his book, *First Principle of Islamic State*, published in 1960. Sovereignty is that which *de jure* belongs to Allah, and *de facto* is manifested in the working of all parts of the universe. Mawdudi refers to some verses of al-Qur'an (7:3, 12:40, 5:44) in which it is insisted that the acceptance of the *de jure* sovereignty of God is the meaning of Islam, while denying such sovereignty is *kufir* (unbelief). In other words, there is no space for any other sovereignty in the world, particularly in a state. The sovereignty can be defined as the source of power and law and, for Mawdudi, such a source is only found in God. Although people elect government representatives, sovereignty does not *come* from people.

⁴³ The agents are called 'caliphates', which means that they are not sovereigns in-themselves. Such agents are the representatives of the real sovereignty. The agents or systems they construct are under the sovereignty of God, who is the owner of the sovereignty both *de jure* and *de facto*.

institution that is responsible for establishing *shari'ah*. The Islamic caliphate is certainly not a 'theocratic' system. It is the antithesis of monarchy, and fundamentally different from the Western democratic system, which is based on the sovereignty of the people, whereas the caliphate system is tied to the sovereignty of God.

1.5 The contemporary Islamist *dakwah* movement: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

To understand how contemporary Islamists apply their *dakwah* strategy, I will now examine the MB movement in Egypt in greater detail. The MB has been chosen because it has influenced the establishment and the development of the *Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS in Indonesia, the *dakwah* movement that I am focusing on in this thesis. Here, the MB is explored in terms of its strategy of utilising private *dakwah* to Islamise individuals, and the public and political use of *dakwah* to Islamise the public sphere. Founded in Ismailia in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, the MB endeavoured to establish a greater religiosity among Egyptian Muslims. The MB hoped that it would be able make Egyptian society more Islamic through influencing individual outlooks, and concentrated its movement first on changing the attitudes of individuals, then families, and finally society (Mitchell, 1993, Gilsenan, 1982). This indicates that the MB started with individual *dakwah*, and then extended this to public *dakwah*.⁴⁴

Given that the aims this movement adopted were to reform individual and social morality, *Tarbiyah* (training, education) became the core 'indoctrination unit' that it

⁴⁴ For further accounts of the *dakwah* strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Indonesian language, see Hasan al-Banna (2001), *Risalah Pergerakan 2* and Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud (2004), *Perangkat-Perangkat Tarbiyah Ikhwanul Muslimin*. trans. Wahid Ahmadi et al. Both books are published in Solo, Intermedia.

employed (and continues to use) to achieve this objective (Mitchell, 1993:195). These *Tarbiyah* activities were (and continue to be) supported by the ‘family’ system (*nizam al-usra*), with each family system being composed of no more than ten active members, one of whom is chosen to be a leader or mentor representing a family (Mitchell, 1993:197). This family system conducts regular lectures and classes on Islamic teachings, which focus on building the commitment of each ‘family’ member. This *Tarbiyah* instrument is still the main *dakwah* activity and ideological link that MB branches worldwide share.

The MB's character and ideology in its early period was influenced by al-Banna's background as a teacher and follower of a traditionalist Sufi network (Mandaville, 2007:59). According to Gilsean (1982), this Sufi background had an influence on the way in which al-Banna managed the MB movements in relation to individual piety. For al-Banna, education (*Tarbiyah*) represented the best approach for making the views and attitudes of Muslims more pious and disciplined. The movement was then called *Tarbiyah* (education), and its main activities were to educate adults and children through increasing their religious consciousness. In addition to the religious education that was chosen by al-Banna as a method for achieving the MB's ideals, worship activities (*ibadah*), such as the practice of *dhikr* (mentioning God's names and other recitations), were also used to establish religious awareness among members. In line with al-Banna's revivalist views, the MB called on Muslims to return to the ‘true’ Islam of the Quran and the Prophet's traditions (*Sunnah*).

A part of the MB's focus on public *dakwah* was concerned with countering secular ideas from the West that had started to emerge in Egypt. As Gilsean (1982) notes, external powers in the form of colonialism, Zionism and communism changed Egypt

radically, and represented the major impetus that led to the MB's objective to change Egyptian society. The MB believed that a society based on 'true Islam' provided the best model for a modern Egyptian state, in contrast to the ideas of secular nationalism that were widely professed by Egyptian elites at that time. It is worth noting that the MB accepted nationalism, conceiving of it as an effective medium through which to fight against colonialism and imperialism in Egypt. However, the MB endeavoured to establish a form of nationalism based on Islamic morality. Moreover, the MB preferred to build Islamic social order within the framework of the modern nation state instead of through adopting an Islamic caliphate (Mandaville, 2007:60).

Nevertheless, the MB was not only concerned with colonialism, but also with cultural imperialism. The MB's leaders wanted to raise people's consciousness of materialism, individualism, atheism and democracy being the destructive forces that these great powers have unleashed on individuals and societies. Cultural imperialism, according to Hassan Al-Hudaybi (1891-1973), a key MB figure as leadership successor to al-Banna as "General Guide", "entered the minds of the people with its teachings and thoughts and tried to dominate [the] social situation in Egypt" (Gilsenan, 2000:229-230; Al-Hudaybi, 1969). For Qutb, this 'spiritual and mental invasion' presented the true danger to Muslims. As a result, the MB's active *dakwah* was designed to counter the impact of this cultural imperialism, and to raise Muslims' consciousness – something they thought that traditionalist Muslim leaders were failing to do.

The MB's ideology appeared in a context where the discourse concerning the necessity of reviving the caliphate (after its abolition by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in

Turkey in 1924) was being pushed by Muslim leaders. Rashid Rida and Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966) were the most prominent Egyptian Muslim intellectuals discussing this issue at the time (see Salvatore, 1997). For Rida, the caliphate is authorised by the Qur'an, and plays an important and central role in the history of Islamic society. Although Rida realised that it would be unrealistic to rejuvenate the caliphate due to the contemporary political conditions at that time, he emphasised the importance of *ulama* in providing guidance for a state, together with the establishment of Islamic social order (Mandaville, 2007:51-52). Abd al-Razik disagreed with this outlook, arguing that the Quran never takes a stand on the kind of state that Muslims should establish, and argued that the existence of the caliphate in Islamic society engendered repressive attitudes by the state towards its citizens (Mandaville, 2007:52). However, there is a strong case to be made that the MB was most concerned with shaping an Islamic social order through Islamising society, and that it was largely ambivalent about whether this was done within the structure of an Islamic caliphate or a modern secular nation state, so long as this primary goal could be achieved.

As Kepel (1985:26) has observed, although the MB in Egypt was “officially a social organization and not a political party, it represented the largest organised popular force in the country”. Within a short period of time, the MB became a significant Islamic movement in the political constellation of Egypt, having 2,000 branches and half a million active members by the early 1930s (Mandaville, 2007:69). Perhaps most impressive is the fact that its supporters came from a considerable range of social milieus and professional sectors. Mitchell describes how “its membership became so diversified as to be virtually representative of every group in Egyptian society”, from students and civil servants to urban labourers and peasants (1993:12).

According to Gilsenan (1982:220), this wide social range of MB members was “an organizational and ideological response to, and a proffered resolution of their own and the collective crisis”.

In its earlier incarnation, capturing political power at the state level was not one of the MB’s goals, with al-Banna even prohibiting Muslims from establishing political parties (Mandaville, 2007:60). The MB required the state to play its role in Islamising society through such means as increasing the quantity and quality of religious education in schools and encouraging religious and spiritual behaviour within society (Mandaville, 2007:61). However, the repressive political system of the Egyptian government led the MB to shift their approach in Islamising society during the next periods of its development. During the middle to the end of the 1930s, ‘the MB’s political concerns began to increase’ (Mitchell, 1993:9). Given that one of its objectives was to drive out colonialism, the MB began to take a more direct role in criticising the government and other political authorities in relation to British interference with the Egyptian government. As a result, the relation between the MB and the government became increasingly strained, and an eventual conflict was inevitable.

In the 1940s, the MB experienced suppression from the state, and some of MB’s leaders were imprisoned (Mitchell, 1993). Moreover, the government was involved in preventing al-Banna from holding public office. He was asked by the government to withdraw his parliamentary candidacy, and his followers believed that the government had manipulated the polling process to cause al-Banna to lose in the election (Mandaville, 2007:72). It was undeniable that this strained relationship with the government encouraged the MB to become more critical of them and to lead

protests against policies that ignored British intrusions in Egypt. On the other side, the government suspected that the MB was involved in several violent local attacks.⁴⁵ This combination of factors led the Egyptian government to finally ban the MB in Egypt in 1954 (Gilsenan, 1982:223).

For the MB, public *dakwah*, public affairs, and politics cannot be separated. Given their belief that *dakwah* permeates all aspects of a Muslim's life, 'the MB still operated even though the government had repressed the movement, and during the 1970s it began to transform its political movement' (El-Ghobashy, 2005:377). From this period on, the MB began to gradually exist again in the public life of Egypt (Mandaville, 2007:107). El-Ghobashy (2005:376) contends that the details of its establishment and its early history indicate that the MB has the capability to adapt to changing political situations. She points to evidence such as al-Banna's participation in the general elections of 1942 and 1945, observing that although the government had prevented him from being elected, the MB did not undertake any radical retaliation in response. It is worth noting that under the rule of Anwar Sadat (ruled 1970-1981), who succeeded Nasser, the MB had been given a space to re-enter the public sphere, but Sadat signalled that he would only welcome the "moderate" MB into the public life of Egypt. This led to a conflict within the MB, with the 'radicals' (a Qutb-influenced splinter group of the MB) accusing the 'moderate' figures of having been co-opted by the government. The divide between the radical wing and the moderate wing of the MB thus became sharper in this period.

⁴⁵ However, the MB countered 'this regime's charge of conspiracy by claiming that the attack had been a police provocation' (see Kepel, 1985:27).

However, the moderate wing, which was the mainstream of the MB movement, came to have an increasingly significant public role during the 1980s and 1990s (Kepel 2003; Mandaville 2007). It targeted social and professional organisations, such as student unions and councils, as mediums through which to plant its influence. It succeeded in taking over the engineering, pharmaceutical, and medical professional associations (Mandaville, 2007:110), and its activists undertook public welfare activities, such as providing aid to the victims of disasters. This social role, which is viewed as part of their *dakwah* strategy, attracted wider public popularity and sympathy from the Egyptian people.

Its increased popularity encouraged the MB to participate in the 1984 election, in which it established an alliance with the *al-Wafd* party (El-Ghobashy, 2005:378). This alliance secured approximately 15% of the vote – around 58 seats. However, the MB was only given 8 seats, while *al-Wafd* obtained 48. This allocation was not beneficial for the MB since, while it was responsible for the political movement of the alliance, it only got few seats in parliament. Thus, in the following election in 1987, the MB instead built an alliance with the Labour party and the *Ahror* (Liberation) party. This alliance obtained 17% of the national vote, and 56 seats, with the MB receiving 36 of these seats (El-Ghobashy, 2005:379).

The MB's engagement in politics caused a shift in its ideological orientation. An indication of this was seen when the MB reinterpreted verses relating to gender equality and women's roles in public spaces (El-Ghobashy, 2005:382). Moreover, the MB movement also began to give higher priority to political issues relating to freedom, democracy, culture, education, and the economy, and put the application of *shari'ah* to one side.

As has been suggested earlier, branches of the MB can be found in Arab and Middle Eastern countries, Asia, Africa and Europe (Mandaville, 2007, 2014). Although the movements in these various countries have different historical stories and experiences, they are, according to Wiktorowicz, “connected through [a] shared symbolic and ideological linkage” (2001:4). For instance, one of their key similarities is a shared *dakwah* purpose – a focus on Islamising society – although they hold different attitudes regarding certain issues, based on the particular social, cultural, moral and political dynamics and norms of each country. Regardless of their differences in responding to specific issues, they all share the same basic ideologies of the Egyptian MB, including: (1) establishing a unity of religion and politics, (2) the need to apply *shari’ah* in public life, and (3) the need for purification. They also share the basic strategy of the Egyptian MB, which starts by creating Muslim individuals, then Muslim ‘families’, then finally Muslim societies.

Although most of the MB’s branches have been transformed into Islamic political parties, and their broader political significance has grown as a challenge to secular leadership (especially in Muslim societies), they have all still implemented its private ‘educational’ (*Tarbiyah*) instrument. Despite the fact that the MB has parties that are prominent in several countries, including Indonesia, the *Tarbiyah* instrument is still the main *dakwah* activity of the movement, and its ideological linkage is shared between MB branches throughout the world.

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the significance of *dakwah* among Muslims, particularly in contemporary Islamist movements. I have argued that although private and public

concepts of *dakwah* have existed and been practised in the history of Islam, these concepts – especially the public concept of *dakwah* – have different meanings for contemporary Islamists. In the past, *dakwah* was primarily concerned with Islam as a monotheistic faith (*tawhid*), and had a universalist message that could be spread to other people, regardless of race, ethnicity, and nationality. In the era of the Prophet, Muhammad was an agent of *dakwah* who received the holy task of spreading the message of Islam. In the periods of the Caliphs and the dynasties of Umayyad and Abbasid, the *dakwah* was not conducted by Caliphs and kings alone, but also (and mainly) by well trained, traditional *ulama*, sufis, and other religious experts.

The role that traditional *ulama*, sufis and religious scholars had in conducting *dakwah* changed in the modern period as a result of the impact of modernisation and secularisation brought by colonialism. With the developments of new media, the printing press and information technologies, Muslims became exposed to new religious discourses from *ulama* old and new, as well as modernists and Islamists. Modernists and Islamists challenged and criticised the traditionalists' approach to *dakwah* through their *dakwah* movements. Modern Islamists strongly believe in the need for Muslims to be active in Islamising the public sphere and the state, and the absence of Islamic states, Muslim rulers, and public Islamic teaching are their main concerns.

Islamist *dakwah* movements have played an important role in responding to the absence of Islam from public life that colonialism and secularism led to in Muslim countries. These movements have come to have an influence in both Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries in Europe and America, as well as in other countries that Muslim immigrant and diaspora communities have spread to. The

Islamist *dakwah* ideology concerning the strengthening of Islamic identity and the piety of Muslims, together with the creation of a more Islamic form of society, have attracted young people from the urban lower and middle classes. These young urban Muslims perceive this ideology as representing a revision of Islam that is more responsive to the modern period, and that provides a 'better modernity' – one that is more Islamic, religious, spiritual, just and humane. As an Islamist movement, the MB in Egypt has had an impact on the development of contemporary Islamist movements worldwide, attracting large numbers of young Muslims in Egypt and the Middle East as well as in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The MB movements in these countries have similar concerns and ideologies regarding the Islamisation of society and the public sphere.

Chapter 2

Islam, the State, and *Dakwah* in Indonesia

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I investigated how the concept and practice of *dakwah* has been influenced by modernity, particularly the *dakwah* of contemporary Islamist movements. I showed how Islamist movements throughout the world are very concerned with the Islamisation of the public sphere, and gave particular attention to the MB in Egypt. I argued that although both individual and public conceptions of *dakwah* informed the practice of Muslims in the era of the Prophet, as well as in the classical and medieval periods, Islamists have developed a different concept of *dakwah* in a different age– the Islamisation of the public sphere. The global impact of modernisation on the secularised public space, together with the competition between Islam and other Western or modern ideologies, are the factors that have led to Islamists adopting this agenda regarding the public sphere and the state.

The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the context that influenced the dynamics of Islamism in Indonesia, where the *Tarbiyah* community emerged and developed during the 1980s. As in other Muslim countries, the emergence of Islamist movements in Indonesia was influenced by a response to the form of modernity brought to Indonesia during the colonial and postcolonial periods. Numerous Indonesian leaders that graduated from Western educational institutions, and holding visions of a modern and secular-nationalist Indonesian state and society, were part of the structure of the state established in modernity. Their visions and reforms led to the gradual removal of Islam from the state, which led Islamic leaders to respond critically to these changes. In this chapter I argue that the original idea of

Islamism in Indonesia arose among revivalist Muslims during a period in which early Indonesian leaders were competing to form a nation-state, and then gained strength in the more democratic political system that came into being after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998.

In the first section of the chapter I explore Islamic movements in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. Dutch colonialism had contributed to a breakdown of the Islamic kingdoms that had been established a hundred years earlier, and I argue that the repressive character of the colonial government and the decline in Islam's political role encouraged Islamic leaders to establish Islamic organisations and a campaign for nationalism and independence. In this period, Islamic leaders focused on uniting Muslims and fighting against the Dutch regime.

The next section explains how Indonesian leaders came to formulate the concept of the Indonesian modern state. I argue that the secularist ideology promoted by Indonesian leaders graduating from Dutch institutions led to the idea of Islamism gaining strength among Islamic leaders, especially those who were part of revivalist groups. The state's marginalisation of *shari'ah*, as expressed in the idea of the nation-state, was the main factor in leading these Islamic leaders to seriously campaign for bringing *shari'ah* into the state constitution. The pivotal point of their demand was that the structure of the state should be based on Islamic teachings.

The next part of this chapter investigates the attitudes that the New Order government (1966-1998) had towards Islamist groups. I argue that during the first period of the New Order, the government preferred to prevent the growth and spread of Islamist ideology among Islamic movements through 'restriction' policies, while

in the second period, the regime tended to ‘domesticate’ Islamists in order to gain their support. The *dakwah* message of Islamism – to position Islam within the state and public life – was regarded by the New Order regime as a threat to national ideology, and the government thus prevented Islamist movements and their leaders from having public roles in order to restrict the spread of their ideology to wider audiences. Nevertheless, in the last period of their leadership, the New Order tended to adopt an approach of cooperation with Islamist groups, which the regime had come to need to support their quest to retain power.

In the last part of this chapter I will elucidate how the Islamist movement developed in the post New Order era (1998–present day), at which point the political system became more democratic. I argue that new regulations relating to political liberalisation were seen by Islamist groups as providing a good opportunity to widen their *dakwah* audiences. They used this chance to establish new Islamic organisations and parties to campaign for their *dakwah* message on implementing *shari’ah* within the state and the public sphere.

2.2 Muslim campaigns for Indonesian state independence

There is a historical precedent for the contemporary Islamist struggle to implement *shari’ah* and Islamic symbols both through private *dakwah* in the individual sphere and through public *dakwah* in the public sphere and at the state level. However, although it did not suddenly emerge after the social and political reformation of 1998, these reforms did open the door for Islamic political parties and various religious organisations to establish themselves. Indeed, these groups benefited enormously from this political change, but the roots of the struggle for *shari’ah* and

Islamic values date back to the colonial period.

Ricklefs (1993) observes that Muslim traders from the Middle East, China and India had been present in some Indonesian islands for several centuries before Islam became established in the Thirteenth Century. These Muslim traders played an important role as a channel for disseminating Islam (*'dakwah'*) to the Indonesian archipelago through sea routes (Eliraz, 2004).⁴⁶ Although it is not possible to give a precise date for when Muslim traders first entered Indonesia, it is believed that it was sometime between the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Century that there was a shift in the traders' role in disseminating Islam or in conducting *dakwah*. After sultanates (Islamic kingdoms)⁴⁷ were established in this period, sultans (kings) played a significant role in the spread of Islam. At the end of Thirteenth Century, travellers that passed through Indonesia, including Marco Polo (1254–1324) and Ibn Battuta (1304–1377), found that it was not only ordinary Sumatran people that had become Muslims, but that the ruler of Sumatra had done so as well. By the Fourteenth Century Islam had started to develop in Northern Sumatra, and was gradually adopted by other parts of Sumatra and Java. By the end of the Sixteenth Century it had become the dominant religion in several Indonesian islands (Demant, 2006).

The development of Islam in Indonesia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries was influenced by the scholarly networks of Indonesian-Malays and the Middle East (Azra, 2004). According to Azra (2004), scholars (*ulama*) who came from different

⁴⁶ According to Eliraz (2004), the spread of Islam within Indonesia in these periods was dominated by traders from the Middle East. These traders introduced the Islamic teachings and knowledge that spread in the Middle East countries, and when it first arrived in Indonesia, this teaching and knowledge was not only influenced by Indian but also by Middle Eastern traders, especially the Hadramis (immigrants from Hadramaut-Yemen).

⁴⁷ Some Islamic kingdoms were established between the thirteenth and the fifteenth Century, such as Samudera Pasai (13th century), Aceh (15th century), and Demak (15th century).

parts of the Muslim world, met and built extensive networks especially through the annual pilgrimage (*hajj*) in Mecca and Medina. They produced a scholarly discourse and shared their common spirit to reform and renew their societies. Their ideas of reformism and renewal then spread and transmitted to many part of the Muslim world including Indonesia.

Indonesia continued to be dominated by Islamic kingdoms until the Netherlands colonised the region in the Seventeenth Century, where they remained in charge until the middle of the Twentieth Century (Ricklefs, 1993). Islamic kingdoms gradually declined and fell under the control of the Dutch colonial government. This colonialism was the main factor that led Indonesian leaders – especially Islamic leaders – to unite in the pursuit of Indonesian independence (Latif, 2008). These leaders utilised religious doctrines or messages to campaign for Muslim independence from ‘infidel’ rulers. The Islamic leaders said that it was the obligation of all Muslims to resist the Dutch because they were infidels (Laffan, 2003), and that Muslims should be led and controlled by a Muslim government.

In the next section, I will show, in greater detail, the important role that Islamic leaders played in campaigning for nationalism and for Indonesia’s independence from the Western colonial state during this period through establishing Islamic organisations and publishing newspapers and periodicals. Islamic leaders utilised these organisations and newspapers or periodicals as a vehicle for supporting their goal of ‘Muslim nationalism’, which involved calling Muslims to unite in order to free themselves from colonialism (Laffan, 2003).

2.2.1 Muslims' nationalist campaigns

It is not an exaggeration to say that Muslims played an integral role in the development of the nationalist movement in Indonesia around the end of Nineteenth and the beginning of Twentieth Century (Laffan, 2003:4). Nationalism was propagated, and new Islamic ideas spread with the help of journalists and the technological innovation of the printing press. Newspapers such as *Wazir Indie and Al-Imam* spread Islamic ideas. *Wazir Indie*, first published in 1878, claims to be the first Muslim newspaper (Laffan, 2003:146), and built a printing press and publication houses in Indonesia to disseminate Islamic issues to engage with readers.

Likewise, *Al-Imam*, which was published in 1906–1908, played important roles in disseminating ideas to the Malay-Indonesian community. *Al-Imam*'s idea of a Malay nation (*umat Melayu*) invokes what Benedict Anderson (2006) has referred to as an 'imagined community', and the newspaper promoted this as the ideal homeland from its very first publication. The development of the printing press and the spread of national consciousness allowed the emergence of this 'imagined community' among Indonesian Muslims (Anderson, 2006), and *Al Imam* was regarded as one of the most important vehicles for the *dakwah* of revivalism, pan-Islamism and, to a lesser extent, modernism. Although this newspaper was based in Singapore, the highest proportion of its correspondence came from Indonesia.

A few years after *al-Imam* was published, the use of its printing press was expanded to not only produce newspapers, but also periodicals, and by the 1920s new newspapers such as *al-Munir, Seruan Azhar and Pilehan Timur* were also being published (Laffan, 2003; Eliraz, 2004). The development of these periodicals was

significantly influenced by Rashid Rida's *al-Manar*. It is worth mentioning here given Rida's shift towards revivalism and turning *al-Manar* into a major vehicle for transnational *dakwah*. All of these periodicals contributed to the transmission of Islamic teaching within Indonesia, especially in the form of Islamic revivalist voices, and can be seen as part of *dakwah* agenda of revivalists. This is not surprising, given that Muslim revivalists have been the quickest in using almost all forms of modern technology, including the printing press, social media, and the internet (see Mandaville, 2007; Eickelman and Anderson, 2003).

Moreover, these newspapers also improved the literacy rates in Indonesia, aided in the growth of a new vision of education and teaching, and contributed to the increasing interest of Muslims in learning about events and situations in other parts of the Islamic world. Thus, the idea of pan-Islamism – an issue close to the revivalist's heart – spread among literate Indonesian Muslims in this period. The pan-Islamist ideas of al-Afghani discussed in the journal of *Al-Manar* were disseminated through a variety of the publications listed above, including *Al Munir* and *Seruan Azhar* (Laffan, 2003).

Furthermore, the two earliest Muslim newspapers – *Wazier Indie* and *al-Imam* – promoted nationalism through Islamic 'phrases' such as "love of the homeland is a part of faith"⁴⁸ (and other relevant Quranic verses) in order to raise the national consciousness of Muslims. According to Laffan (2003), these newspapers were not only concerned with community-building and religious reform, but also with the

⁴⁸ This phrase – "love of the homeland is a part of faith" (*Hubb al-wathan min al-iman*) – is very popular phrase among Indonesian Muslims. Muslims in the pre-colonial and colonial periods tended to assume this phrase to be a *Hadith* (a collected saying or anecdote reporting the Prophet's words or deeds), and used it in the hope that early modern Indonesian people would struggle to defend their country against colonialism. In fact, this phrase is not a *Hadith* from the Prophet Muhammad, as it was generally assumed. This phrase as declared by al-Saghany and al-Albany is fabricated (*mawdu*).

independence of their homeland. They promoted a shared feeling of suffering and struggle against the colonisers, and became a unifying source for nationalism through Islam.

2.2.2 The establishment of Islamic organisations

During the beginning of the Twentieth Century Islamic leaders established several organisations that aimed to empower and enlighten Muslims in terms of their political rights, economic opportunities and education. These included the ‘proto-Islamist’ *Sarekat Islam* (SI) in 1911,⁴⁹ the modernist Muhammadiyah in 1912, the modernist *Persatuan Islam* (PERSIS) in 1923,⁵⁰ and the traditionalist NU in 1926.⁵¹ These organisations also implicitly demanded and mobilised support for Indonesian independence from colonial rule (Latif, 2008). Muslims played an important role in the social movements of these organisations and, in this period, Islam was important for establishing national unity. Effendy argues that “Islam served as a link which tied together the sentiment of national unity against Dutch colonialism” (2003:15).

A political agenda demanding the independence of the Indonesian state was most strongly expressed by the *Sarekat Islam* (SI) movement (Latif, 2008; Saleh, 2004), with the main objective of SI during 1912-1929 being to spread an Islamic form of nationalism (Saleh, 2004; Laffan, 2003). This organisation developed from *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (the Islamic Trading Association), which was established in Solo-

⁴⁹ *Sarekat Islam* (SI) was co-founded by Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934) and Agus Salim (1884-1954) (see Saleh, 2001).

⁵⁰ There is a very comprehensive and detailed study on PERSIS written by Federspiel (2001).

⁵¹ The NU was established to protect Islamic boarding schools and Islamic traditionalism from modernism. It is categorised as traditionalist because it refers only to standards set by the Syafi'i school of thought for all of its decision-making (www.nu.or.id, accessed on 5 November 2014). The NU was established by traditionalist *ulama* K H Hasyim Asy'ari (1875-1947), and focused on Islamic traditional learning and countering revivalist ideas. It was a response to Muhammadiyah's attempts to develop modern educational systems (see Barton, 2002; Bruinessen, 1994).

Central Java in 1911. The SI was able to attract mass attention from religious leaders to Muslim traders, and from both urban and rural areas in Indonesia, and ‘succeeded in uniting almost all levels of Indonesian society against Dutch colonialism’ (Effendy, 2003:16).

The success of this organisation was, however, short-lived. *Sarekat Islam* failed to continue their efforts towards establishing independence because the leaders of the organisation could not maintain solidarity in the face of internal differences regarding political idealism (Latif, 2008). The internal conflicts between the leaders emerged in the mid-1920s, and ‘increased after Marxism was introduced to the organisation’ (Noer, 1978:119-126). After its sixth congress in 1921, the SI experienced further internal conflict and fragmentation between its leaders and its activists (Saleh, 2001; Noer, 1978).⁵²

In contrast to the SI, the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist NU were more concerned with purification and Islamic education than with politics (See Saleh, 2001; Barton and Fealy, 1996). Their concentration on the fields of purification and education is relevant to this thesis’s interest in private *dakwah* although as noted in the Introduction and elsewhere the overwhelming focus of the literature is on public *dakwah*. The Muhammadiyah was established by Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1923) in Yogyakarta, and its objectives were to bring modern education to Indonesian (Javanese) Muslims and to purify their Islamic rituals from

⁵² The conflict in *Sarekat Islam* emerged as a result of the different orientations of the leaders and activists. Some were influenced by Marxism, and wanted to develop the organisation into a socialist-oriented movement, whilst others were influenced by Pan-Islamism and wanted to develop the organisation as a political Islam movement. During this period, Marxism was not only opposed by the supporters of Pan-Islamism in *Sarekat Islam*, but also resisted by many other Islamic organisations, such as the NU and the *Muhammadiyah*. They considered Marxism as communism, and part of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (see Noer, 1978).

syncretism (Nakamura, 2012; Saleh, 2001). This meant that its organisation's messages placed an emphasis on both the modernisation of education and the purification of rituals. Thus the puritanical influences in the Muhammadiyah have also led it to being seen as a form of revivalism. The organisation has focused on building modern educational systems, and combining them with Western modern subjects and Islamic themes in order to allow its students to take advantage of both colonial and traditional educational systems (Alfian, 1989). It should be noted that the establishment of the Muhammadiyah was inspired by Egyptian modernist thinkers Muhammad Abduh (1845-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) (see Chapter 1; (Shihab, 1995; Alfian, 1989).

Since their inception, the leaders of the NU and Muhammadiyah – the two largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia – were covertly involved in campaigning for nationalism, either within their respective organisations or through the SI. Many of the Muhammadiyah's leaders, including Ahmad Dahlan (the founder and first chairman of Muhammadiyah) participated in the SI (Alfian, 1989). Through their educational institutions, which spread throughout the country, the leaders of both organisations emphasised Islamic teachings which informed Muslims that '*love [for] the country is part of the faith*' (Laffan, 2003). The Muhammadiyah and the NU were therefore part of the Muslim struggle in pre-independence Indonesia, and both organisations are widely known for their roles in social and religious arenas (Barton, 2006).⁵³

⁵³ The *Muhammadiyah*, with its modernist vision of combining spiritual and intellectual reform, is actively involved in work on education and social welfare in Indonesian society. This organisation has hundreds of modern educational institutions, from kindergartens to universities, which are spread throughout Indonesia. It embraces a modern secular curriculum in schools and avoids traditional approaches to education, including the rejection of Sufism as a subject (see Nakamura, 2012).

2.3 The consolidation of Islamism during Indonesian independence

In this section I argue that the secularist ideology promoted by post-colonial Indonesian leaders with Dutch education, and expressed in the ideas of the nation-state and nationalism, led to the consolidation of Islamism among Islamic leaders, in particular among the revivalists. The idea of the nation-state insisted on the separation of Islam from the state (e.g. the rejection of making Islam the foundation of the state, Islam as the state law, and the requirement for a state leader/President to be a Muslim) and Indonesian leaders thus refused the formalisation of *shari'ah* as state law. Soekarno (1901–1970)⁵⁴ and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980)⁵⁵ were the most prominent secularist leaders of this time, becoming the first President and Vice President of Indonesia respectively in 1945. They asserted that the nation-state should be based on a national identity that accommodates all ethnic and religious values.

Soekarno and Hatta were the leaders of the nationalist-secular party – the Indonesian National Party (PNI) – which was established in 1927. The main visions of this party were the establishment of a nation-state and nationalism. Soekarno had modern political ideas, believing that the ‘backwardness’ of Indonesia was the result of Dutch colonialism, which had led to poverty and a low-level of education amongst the Indonesian people. Soekarno emphasised that his party’s objective was to secure complete independence for Indonesian people, including for non-Muslims. According to Soekarno, it was not necessary for the party to have an Islamic basis

⁵⁴ After graduating from the *Europeesche Lagere* School (the Dutch-Medium Junior Secondary School), Soekarno studied in the *Hogere Burger* School (the Dutch-Medium Secondary School) and the *Technische Hoge* School (the Technical Institute Bandung). During 1916–1926, he was actively involved in student organisations (Latif, 2008; Ismail, 1995).

⁵⁵ Hatta studied administrative laws in Rotterdam University in the Netherlands (Latif, 2008; Ismail, 1995).

(Ismail, 1995), as its two main aims were to oppose imperialism and capitalism and to create an independent nation-state with unity among Indonesian people per se. Soekarno, with other Western-educated intellectuals such as Mohammad Hatta and Sjahrir (1909–1966),⁵⁶ formed a circle of secularist-nationalist intellectuals.⁵⁷ From the 1930s onwards, Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir promoted nationalism as a key tool for establishing independence (Mrazek, 1994).

Ideological debates between nationalist and Islamic revivalist leaders were thus unavoidable. The debates initially focused on the nature of nationalism, with the Islamic revivalists believing that it should be based on Islamic teachings, while the nationalist group thought that the diversity and heterogeneity of national values should be accommodated. Nationalism, for Soekarno, involved the people's consciousness of being united in one group and one nation, while leaders of Islamic organizations such as the leader of the more pan-Islamic oriented Sarekat Islam or "Islamic Union" Agus Salim (1884–1954) and the founder of the *Persatuan Islam* (PERSIS) or "Islamic Association" Ahmad Hasan (1883–1956) believed that nationalism should be placed in the framework of Muslims' service to Allah. Mohamad Natsir (1908–1993), the leader of the largest Islamic political party in the 1940s and 1950s called the Masyumi stressed Salim and Hasan's opinion that nationalism should be perceived as a medium for gaining the transcendental consent (*ridha*) of Allah (Noer, 1978:276). Effendy (2003:20) points out that these two different groups emerged within a certain political context in which Islamic leaders

⁵⁶ Sjahrir studied law in the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands (see Mrazek, 1994; Sjahrir, 1990; Latif, 2008; Ismail, 1995).

⁵⁷ By 'these secularist-nationalists' I mean intellectuals who frequently published their opinions on social, political and economic issues. They were also concerned with long-term strategies for educating the Indonesian people using modern educational systems. Mrazek (1994)'s lengthy and detailed study of Sjahrir, however, offers a more subtle insight than the simple conclusion that he was a secularist. The same can be learned from his memoir "*Renungan dan Perjuangan*" (1990).

were not only united to fight against colonial rule and engaged in a struggle for nationalism and independence, but were also struggling in a debate with nationalist figures about what the constitution and foundation of the country should be.

In the early 1940s, the debate between these two groups shifted to the nature of the relationship between Islam and the state – a debate that represented the key disagreement and tension between Islamic and nationalist groups. In an article published in 1940, Soekarno argued for the separation of Islam from the state (1964:369–500), on the basis that the formal-legal relationship between Islam and the state (Effendy, 2003:23) is a likely factor in increasing discrimination, given Indonesia's composition of many different religious groups. In contrast to Soekarno, Natsir – a founder and leader of the Masyumi – promoted the idea of unity between religion and the state (Kahin, 2012; Effendy, 2003). Since the beginning of the 1930s, Natsir had been very active in propagating the idea that the state and religion were indivisible (Effendy, 2003) – an idea that is typical of the general ideology of Islamists in other Islamic countries, such as the MB in Egypt, and *Jama'ati Islami* (JI) in India and Pakistan (See Chapter 1). Natsir's Islamist ideas on the state and religion cannot be separated from his international network both in Pakistan through the Muslim World Congress (*Mutamar al-'Alam al-Islami*) and Saudi Arabia through the Muslim World League (*Rabitah al-'Alam al-Islam*) (Kahin, 2012).

The momentum in the debate between these two groups increased in the run-up to Indonesian independence in 1945, as well as in the post-colonial period during 1956–1959. The first gain in momentum came at a time when Indonesians were formulating the state constitution in preparation for independence in 1945, while the second came in the formative years of the Republic of Indonesia, when they were

completing and revising the constitution after the first general election in 1955.

The first meeting of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, BPUPKI) was held on 29 May 1945, and at it Islamic and nationalist groups discussed the philosophical basis and ideology of the state (Ismail, 1995). During the meeting, the Islamic faction argued for the importance of inserting the clause ‘*with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practice shari’ah (Islamic law)*’ into the constitution, while the secularist group rejected this (Effendy, 2003, Latif, 2008). This Islamic clause became referred to as ‘the seven words’ in the so called Piagam Jakarta or “Jakarta Charter”, referring to the original Indonesian translation: ‘*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*’.⁵⁸

At this meeting, the Islamic representatives argued that Islam should be mentioned clearly in the constitution because Muslims contributed to the independence of Indonesia. Moreover, Natsir contended that the Muslim majority had taken the greatest role in the struggle for Indonesia’s independence, and that an integral part of this struggle involved the objective of implementing Islamic teachings and *shari’ah* in the country (Kahin, 2012; Mahendra, 1995). Moreover, the Islamic groups appealed to the fact that Muslims made up the majority of the Indonesian population, constituting 90% of it in 1945 (Ismail, 1995:51). In this period, the spirit to strengthen Islamic identity among Muslims was very high, and the Islamic leaders insisted that the constitution of the state should clearly mention the application of *shari’ah* to Muslims, believing that this would guarantee that the state would

⁵⁸ This clause was a key part of the content of the *Piagam Jakarta* or the ‘Jakarta Charter’ (see Latif, 2008; Effendy, 2003; Ismail, 1995).

formalise it as official state law. This idea coloured the political thinking of the Islamic figures in both the Investigating Body's (1945)⁵⁹ and the Constitutional Assembly's (1956)⁶⁰ meetings (Ismail, 1995:42).

The nationalists, on the contrary, proposed that Indonesia should be a modern nation-state, "neutral" with respect to religious identity, but accommodating various religions, ethnicities and traditions. They argued that the constitution should not prioritise a particular religion, ethnicity or tradition and dropped the 'seven words' of the Islamic clause from the constitution's preamble, arguing that Indonesia was different from Saudi Arabia and Egypt because it was unique in terms of its population, culture and traditions, as well as in historical and geographical aspects (Ismail, 1995). In addition, Soepomo – the leading representative of the secularist-nationalists – doubted whether *shari'ah* could meet the demands of a modern nation-state (Ismail, 1995). Instead, the secular-nationalists, led by Soekarno, promoted the idea of the *Pancasila* or 'Five Principle Doctrines', whose first doctrine referred to 'the belief in one God' (*Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa*) (Ismail, 1995, Effendy, 2003). Even though the Islamic faction was unable to achieve its goal of having the '*shari'ah* clause' in the constitution, this polemic had strengthened the idea of 'Islamism' (the use of Islam as a political ideology to Islamise the state) among Muslim leaders – the unity between Islam, politics, and law – and the urgency for all Muslim factions, including traditionalism and the NU, to unite (Platzdasch, 2009).

⁵⁹ This investigating body was established on 29 April 1945 for the preparation of Indonesian independence with the agenda of formulating the philosophy of the state. The outcome of the meeting was the Jakarta Charter, which includes an obligation for the state to implement *shari'ah* as state law for Muslims. However, in another meeting, the chapter was changed by removing the Islamic clause. The committee then agreed to use this amendment of the chapter (see Nasution, 2001).

⁶⁰ The Constitutional Assembly was a body elected in 1955 to make decisions regarding a permanent constitution for the republic of Indonesia. They held meetings on 10 November 1956 and 2 July 1959. After these, they decided on the constitution. Soekarno ended their duty on 5 July 1959 (see Herbert, 2007; Ricklefs, 1991).

The Islamic organisations such as the Muhammadiyah, *Persatuan Islam* or PERSIS and the NU, established an oppositional Islamic political party in 1945 named the *Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* – the ‘Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims’ (*Masyumi*) – whose objective was to unite as many Islamic organisations as possible and to aid the mobilization of Muslims against Western allies (Platzdasch, 2009; Saleh, 2001; Noer, 1987). These Islamic organisations joined the *Masyumi* to win the election from secular-nationalist parties in 1955 election (Effendy, 2003), and their struggle in this period thus shifted its focus from a fight against colonialism and a struggle for independence to the fight to become the strongest Islamic political party. Despite the strong legitimacy of its initial emergence and becoming a crucial participant in Indonesian politics during 1940s-1950s, *Masyumi* only survived until 1960 (Platzdasch, 2009; Saleh, 2001; Noer 1987). *Masyumi* was a breeding ground for the key Islamic politician, Mohammad Natsir, who later continued as a founding leader of DDII (Kahin, 2012).

Most Islamic organisations in Indonesia at this time were reformist Islamist, including the Muhammadiyah, which was powerful during this period.⁶¹ Therefore, the participation of the traditionalist NU in Islamism was odd. I argue that the NU’s identity as an ‘Islamist’ group only represented a kind of expression of its solidarity as an Islamic organisation. As seen by its development, the NU later separated itself from the ‘Islamists’ and established its own political party, called the NU party in 1952. Moreover, after 1959, the NU preferred to ally with the government’s secularist party, the PNI, and left the ‘Islamist’ group. The traditionalists believed

⁶¹ I categorized Muhammadiyah as reformist Islamist because of the Muhammadiyah’s stance on the relationship between religion and politics and in particular on the role of Islam in the Indonesian state on one hand, and on the other hand, the Muhammadiyah’s focus on education, social work, and management of organisations (see Burhani, 2000; Mulkhan, 2000; Noer, 1978).

that the government had to be supported so long as Muslims were free to perform their worship. This view contradicted the more clearly 'Islamist' (*Masyumi*) position that insisted on the implementation of *shari'ah* within the arenas of politics, law, and the economy. As a result, the NU became closely allied with the government, entering into a coalition with them, and its leader occupied the position of Minister of Religious Affairs during the Old Order Soekarno regime (Kahin, 2012; Barton, 2002).

For Islamic leaders, winning in a general election and dominating the parliament and government represented another way to pursue a *shari'ah*-based state. Although the NU resigned from the *Masyumi* and created a new political party as noted above, Islamic leaders were united on a common issue: to introduce *shari'ah* into the constitution. In total, these Islamic parties gained 230 seats in parliament, while the secularists gained 280 seats (Effendy, 2003:33-34). From 1956 until 1959, the polemic on the relation between Islam and the state rose again, and the parliament was deadlocked. The polemic ended after the President disbanded parliament in 1959, arguing that the state had become endangered by the conflict of ideology within parliament (Latif, 2008).

2.4 The Islamists in the New Order period (1966-1997)

During the New Order period (1966-1997), the Indonesian government demonstrated two different approaches towards Islamic political parties and organisations. Based on these different attitudes towards Islam, the New Order government under Soeharto was divided into two periods: the early and the late period. In this section I show that, in the earlier period, the New Order government

sought to prevent the growth and spread of Islamist ideology among religious movements through various restrictions and regulations, while in the later period, the regime sought to domesticate Islamist groups in order to gain their support and sustain the New Order government. Recalling my comments about SMT in the Introduction (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012), I argue that these different political opportunity structures in the early and late periods of Soeharto's presidency impacted on the *dakwah* activities and strategies chosen by both Muslim leaders and Islamic organisations.

In the early period of the New Order (1966-1985), Islamic movements and political parties were considered to be a potential threat to national ideology, unity, and the survival of the New Order regime. In this period, the government ideology of Pancasila was reaffirmed, with Soeharto using it as a vehicle for uniting Indonesian people regardless of their religious affiliations or ethnic backgrounds (Jahar, 2006:360). During this period, Soeharto also 'refused to incorporate the Jakarta Charter' (Kersten, 2011:53), which led to it being commonly referred to as the 'authoritarian period' of Soeharto's rule.

The regime attempted to restrict Islamic groups from having public (political) roles, with Soeharto creating limitations for and depoliticising the roles of Islamic movements and political parties. Moreover, Soeharto sustained the ban on *Masyumi*, considering it to be in the pursuit of a propagandist agenda for formalising *shari'ah* that challenged the modern nation-state, and also considered what so-called later 'Islamism' as a threat (Effendy, 2003). Although, he allowed old Islamic organisations such as the Muhammadiyah and the NU to remain active, their religious and social programmes were closely monitored, and had to be kept in line

with government ideology. As a result of such government policy, the *dakwah* activities of both Islamic leaders and organisations went ‘underground’, ceasing to hold any overt political agendas.

Soeharto prevented Islamic movements from engaging in political matters through a number of regulations. In 1970, the constituents of the Islamic party were disempowered through a government regulation (PP No.6/1970) requiring all civil servants to be loyal to the government. The regulation was issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and required civil servants to swear allegiance to the government (Porter, 2006:26), which included an obligation to vote for Golkar⁶² as the official government party. During this period, many Muslims coming from *Masyumi*'s families worked as civil servants, and thus the regulation had a significant impact on the vote that the Islamic party received in the general elections at that time. In 1973 a regulation was made to consolidate Islamic political parties into one single party – the United Development Party (PPP) (Kingsbury, 2002). It was thought that this merger would support the government in controlling and preventing ‘Islamism’ from growing within the Islamic party. For Muslim activists, of course, this government regulation created very limited opportunities to organise overt political movements. The government also passed Law No. 3 as late as 1985 which forced Islamic organisations and political parties to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideology and ideological basis, which meant that they had to reject Islam as their philosophical foundation (Abbas, 2005:56). Failure to comply with this law resulted in the dissolution of the organisation or party by the government (Ismail, 1996:17). The

⁶² The GOLKAR (*Golongan Karya*, the Functional party) was formed in 1964 to counteract the growing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). It was the ruling party during the Soeharto (1966-1998) and the Habibie period (1998-1999). In the latest period – the Yudhoyono period – this party has been part of the ruling coalition (2004-2014).

regime also punished those who criticised or reacted against this rule. For instance, in Tanjung Priok-Jakarta in 1984, the regime ordered the military to shoot hundreds of Muslim demonstrators who were protesting against the regulation to adopt Pancasila as the ideology for their Islamic organisations and parties (Porter, 2006:2).

The government tightly controlled Islamic political organisations and ideologies, repressing any signs of Islamism. In 1968, it changed the leaders of the *Partai Muslim Indonesia* or the ‘Indonesian Muslim Party’ (Parmusi) – a new Islamic party endorsed by the government and run by former leaders of the *Masyumi*. Moreover, the involvement of Islamists (such as former leaders of *Masyumi*) in political arenas was strongly restricted by the President. The Soeharto regime removed ‘Islamist’ figures from leadership positions in Islamic parties, as Soeharto had experience of instances in the early history of Indonesia – in 1945 and 1959 – in which Islamists had tried to replace Pancasila (Saleh, 2001; Hefner, 2000).

Through these regulations and other authoritarian de-politicisation strategies, the government prevented the growth of Islamist ideology spread by either Islamic *dakwah* movements or Islamic political parties. The government believed that Islamism would lead to disharmony and instability in the secular nation-state and disunity among the people. In these first two decades of the Soeharto leadership, Islamist groups were thus seen as a threat to the state (Latif, 2008), and Islamism was regarded as being opposed to state ideology (Effendy, 2003:194). Within such a climate, many Muslim activists withdrew from party politics entirely (Latif, 2008), choosing instead to disseminate their political views through educational, social, and religious activities. For instance, Natsir shifted his political activities towards *dakwah* activities (Kahin, 2012; Mahendra, 1995). Islamist *dakwah* can be

conducted either through cultural or political approaches, so the restrictions in the political domain led Islamist figures to transform their *dakwah* movement through cultural aspects such as education and training. Because of the suspicious attitude adopted by the government, the Islamist leaders also tried to deflect attention away from these practices by putting a greater emphasis on *dakwah* messages relating to individual piety.

Several Islamist organisations also emerged within this political context, including the Indonesian Islamic *Dakwah* Assembly (DDII/*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*),⁶³ the Institution of Islamic *Dakwah* of Indonesia (LDII/*Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia*),⁶⁴ Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the *Tarbiyah* movement (Hilmy, 2010; Platzdasch, 2009). They emerged during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s when there was no context for doing political activity. Their emergence marked the moment of new Islamist discourse of *dakwah* which I am focusing on in this thesis.

The emergence of these Islamic social movements, however, cannot be separated from the development of *dakwah* in international Muslim society. For instance, the establishment of the DDII in 1967 and the LDII in 1972 in Indonesia related to the momentum of the oil boom in Saudi Arabia (Kahin, 2012; Hasan, 2008).⁶⁵ Outcomes of the wealth generated by this oil boom included the diffusion of Islamic

⁶³ The DDII was founded on 9 May 1967 to continue the mission of the *Masyumi* party, which had been banned by the Soekarno government. The key individual behind the establishment of DDII was Natsir, the former leader of Masyumi (Kahin, 2012; Platzdasch, 2009). The official website of the DDII is <http://www.dewandakwah.com/> (Accessed on 4 November 2014).

⁶⁴ LDII was founded by H. Nurhasan Ubaidillah Lubis (d.1982) after his return from Mecca (living there for ten years). As its name implies, it is a *dakwah* organization. It has revivalist character (Ricklefs, 2012). I found two official websites of the LDII: <http://www.ldii.or.id/> and <http://ldii-online.com/> (Accessed on 4 November 2014).

⁶⁵ They established close contacts and often received financial support from Saudi authorities (Hasan, 2008).

(and more particularly Wahhabi and Salafi) beliefs and practices through the export of religious literature, the sponsorship of international conferences or seminars and the establishment of Islamic organisations in many parts of the world.⁶⁶ In Indonesia, Saudi Arabian authorities give grants for various *dakwah* activities such as building mosques and the training of preachers (*da'i*) (Kahin, 2012). Thus, the 'trans-national' movements travelled easily to Indonesia in this period with various degrees of negotiation with local political, economic, social and cultural circumstances.

Social and political stabilisation became the main concern of the government at this time (Eliraz, 2004), and this resulted in the *dakwah* activities of Islamic organisations being excluded from the public sphere. *Dakwah* and other religious activities were held for limited audiences and held in private places such as members' own houses. According to the leaders of the HTI and the *Tarbiyah* movement, this 'underground' phenomenon of *dakwah* was experienced by both these groups though there is limited documentation of this period in the literature (see Section 2.5; Chapter 4).

The late period of the New-Order government (1986-1997) showed a more accommodating policy towards Islamic activists than the early period, not only towards those who had Islamic modernist and traditionalist orientations, but also towards those who expressed an 'Islamist' character. Islamic movements had, to some extent, found ways to integrate themselves into the New Order's policy

⁶⁶ See, for instance Mandaville, 2007. McLoughlin (2005:527) points out that the circulation of money, people, goods, and ideas have facilitated 'trans-national' movements across the borders of nation states. Kersten (2011) adds that, in this circulation of ideas or money, there was an ongoing creative process or negotiation between foreign ideas and local political, cultural, and religious ones.

(Effendy, 2003:195). The fact that the Muslim population comprised more than 85% of the overall population of Indonesia was seen as having a new significance for the state. In this phase, the government thus tried to 'accommodate' Islamists. The policy was regarded as representing a 'turn to Islam', a process started by mobilising Islamists at the end of the 1980s (Hefner, 2000:167), and was indeed very different from the approach of the regime in its early period.

In this late period of the Soeharto government, a *gerakan pembaharuan* or 'renewal movement' emerged led by Nurcholish Madjid, known as Cak Nur. Cak Nur's movement took inspiration from early-twentieth century modernism, but was critical of both reformists and traditionalists-conservatives in Indonesia. They instead appreciated the intellectual dimensions of the Islamic tradition that had been rejected by earlier modernist figures or movements (Bruinessen, 2013). Cak Nur also rejected primordial Muslim politics with his famous slogan "Islam yes, Partai Islam, no!" (Kersten, 2011). This movement emphasized understanding the essence of God and the Prophet's message while also paying attention to context. In the 1980s, this movement received positive coverage from the media because they gave an Islamic legitimization to the New Order. The toleration of 'accommodationists' applied not only to Cak Nur, but also to his mentors Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution (see Munhanif, 1996; Muzani, 1994; Hassan, 1980). This renewal movement led to an emerging, more modernist or progressive influence among middle-class Muslims.

There were also other key figures that spread similar ideas to Cak Nur. Gusdur, with his traditionalist background, was one of them. He did not join the renewal's Nurcholish, but he actively spread 'liberal' Islam and influenced many young generations of NU (Barton, 2000). Another key figure is Munawir Syadzali (the

former Minister of Religious Affairs 1983-1993) with his 're-actualisation' agenda; he emphasized the need of contextual interpretation of Quranic verses. One of the issues that attracted a public response was women's share in inheritance i.e. According to Syadzali, women should receive an equal share with men. He argues that the stipulation of the Qur'an that a son should inherit twice that of a daughter is contradictory to the notion of justice (Hefner, 2000; Effendy, 1995).

These 'liberal' ideas, especially those promoted by Cak Nur, were rejected by those in former Masyumi circles who later became key leaders of DDII. The main ideas rejected by Masyumi and DDII circles were: a defense of secularization, a legitimation of the New Order, openness toward other religions, respect for 'local Islam' (Saleh, 2001; Platzsdach, 2009). These ideas were also unacceptable to the *Tarbiyah* movement and they kept up the struggle against such ideas as we shall see in Chapters 4 and 6.

The 'accommodative' attitude toward Islamists was shown by the government's approval of the foundation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia / ICMI*) in December 1990 in Jakarta (Latif, 2008; Hefner, 2000). The establishment of the ICMI showed that the government had neutralised their previous attitudes towards Islamism or at least viewed support for the ICMI as a means of balancing other Islamic forces. In this regard, the ICMI gained advantage from this regime's shift (Platzdasch, 2009). The ICMI members were composed of new middle-class modernist and Islamist figures from the *Masyumi* family, who still favoured the idea of a *shari'ah*-based state and voiced this discourse of the Islamisation of the public sphere. Platzdasch (2009:34) points out that the ICMI is 'one of organizations that have continued the Masyumi

tradition'. The ICMI was intended to improve the contributions that Muslim intellectuals could make to the government's development programmes.

Another sign that the government was accommodating Islamists was the close relations that they built with conservative Islamist *dakwah* organisations such as the DDII and the Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity (*Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam/KISDI*)⁶⁷ during 1995–1996. Soeharto's regime sought support from these two *dakwah* organisations and, according to Hefner (2000), both groups happily responded to the invitation and supported the regime. These movements engaged so readily because it was necessary for their own survival and they believed that the regime would not support their *dakwah* activities (Effendy, 2003).

This change in the political context and opportunities also led to the emergence of new Islamic social and *dakwah* movements and the diversification of *dakwah* approaches. Instead of focusing on formal political activities, many Muslim activists began to engage in socially and culturally-oriented Islam not unlike the MB in 1980s and 1990s Egypt. According to Feener (2007), various discourses on the actualisation or implementation of Islam in daily lives started to gain popularity in this period, and thus *dakwah* at the individual or private level started to grow again and diversify in this period. These social and *dakwah* movements were primarily initiated by educated, middle-class Muslims from secular universities and, by the 1990s, they were actively promoting the idea of Islamisation and calling for the return to pristine Islam (Hilmy, 2010). Their *dakwah* and other social and religious

⁶⁷ KISDI was formed by Muslim activists who were also involved in The Indonesian Council for Islamic preaching (DDII), and who had mostly graduated from Middle Eastern Universities. This organization called for militant action in the defense of Islam (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004; Fox, 2004).

activities – which focused on the dissemination of Islamic principles and practices within the wider society – could now be performed in this political context.

However, although Islamists had come to be viewed as a source of potential support for the Soeharto regime rather than as a threat during this later period, the policies that Soeharto's regime created to accommodate them were based in his belief that they would support him in the 1997 election. Effendy (2003) referred to this policy as a 'partial' effort to accommodate Islam, in which Islamic legitimacy was being experimented with by the regime in order for it to retain control. The Soeharto regime used more Islamic symbols itself and issued more 'Islamic' policies. This strategy was also used in many other Muslim-majority countries in which the governments were happy to play with both Islamist and nationalist-secular movements as sources of legitimation.⁶⁸

In this second period of its rule, the Soeharto government strategy was thus to domesticate Islamists rather than to restrict their practices as they had during the first period, and the 1990s were considered as a crucial phase for Soeharto's regime to secure its political power. Islamic organisations and leaders, including Islamists, were expected to be new allies to support and sustain the government. However, many experts, such as Robert W. Hefner (2000) and William Liddle (1992), contend that the military, which had been the New Order's partner for two decades, had come

⁶⁸ Studies have found that Muslims' governments in numerous countries have turned to Islam to enhance their political legitimacy and authority, as well as to mobilize popular support for their programmes (Esposito, 1998). Rulers such as Qaddafi (1969) in Lybia, Sadat (1970-81) in Egypt, Khomeini (1979-89) in Iran, al-Numayri (1968-85) in Sudan, and Zia ul-Haq (1977-88) in Pakistan are among those have used Islam in a variety of forms (through monarchs, military and the clergy) to strengthen their policies (see also, for instance, Esposito, 1998).

into conflict with the President.⁶⁹ The President regarded this source of conflict as a threat that endangered his position. In addition to this threat, many people began to criticise the practices of Soeharto and his family for their corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN) (Effendy, 1995). The government's decision to behave more accommodatingly towards the Islamists was thus driven by the weakness of Soeharto's regime, and the regime's need to curtail the growing criticism of its corrupt, collusive, and nepotistic practices (see Hilmy, 2010; Platzdasch, 2009).

2.5 New opportunities for Islamist movements

President Habibie, who was appointed after Soeharto's fall in 1998, announced the liberalisation of Indonesia's political system (Mietzner, 2009:252).⁷⁰ This represented a new change in direction from the New Order government that had run a very tightly controlled and centralised political system. This new political liberalisation partially resulted from the fact that Habibie was a civilian president who lacked strong support from the military, and thus needed support from the Muslim population and its various interest groups to retain his power (Mietzner, 2009). His policy created a political atmosphere conducive towards a free and democratic political system. The Habibie regime allowed all political and ideological groups to participate and compete in open political processes. As a result, numerous political parties with varying ideologies and objectives sprang up between June and August in 1998, only a month after the fall of the Soeharto regime in May (Hilmy, 2010).

⁶⁹ The relation between Soeharto, the military and Islamists can also be found in Mietzner (2009) and Sidel (2006).

⁷⁰ Habibie was the Vice President of the New Order government in 1997-1998. He replaced Soeharto as President when the latter resigned from his position in 1998 due to the severe economic and political crisis that had gripped Indonesia.

Islamist groups saw this new political system as a great opportunity to establish a variety of *dakwah* organisations and political parties with Islamism as their main ideology. These social organisations and political parties played a role in implementing their religious and political programmes and thus, in this era, the Islamist presence within the public sphere was much more obvious than it had been in the final period of the New Order. Their emergence indicated that they already had the agenda to be involved in public affairs and politics in either direct or indirect ways (Meitzner, 2009). Some of these Islamists engaged in political struggles through Islamic political parties such as the Star Crescent Party (PBB) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), while others did so through Islamic organisations such as FPI, HTI, MMI, the Communication Forum of *Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah* (FKAWJ), and the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World (KISDI) (see Hilmy, 2010; Platzdasch, 2009; Latif, 2008).

The afore-mentioned Islamic non-government organisations were very active in developing their *dakwah* programmes, primarily in campaigning for the formalisation of *shari'ah* in the state. For instance, the main aim of the establishment of the FPI soon after the collapse of the regime in 1998 was to conduct *dakwah*. They claim to seek 'to command the truth and prevent sin or *al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa an-nahy 'an al-munkar*' (Bamualim, 2011:272). The founder of the FPI–Habib Rizieq Syihab – stated that 'it was primarily founded for the purpose of supporting the implementation of *shari'ah*' (Bamualim, 2011:273). The FPI approached members of parliament and Islamic political parties to implement *shari'ah* and other Islamic teachings in public life, and their *dakwah* movements within Indonesia's public sphere became highly visible, being frequently covered by the national media. They attracted the media and people's attention because public

places that were considered as being against *shari'ah* (such as cafes and night clubs) were attacked and destroyed by the violent and puritanical FPI (Bamualim, 2011). In addition, other Islamic groups – such as the *Ahmadiyah*, *Syi'ah*, and the Islam Liberal Network⁷¹ – also became the targets of their public, disciplinary form of *dakwah*, as these groups were regarded as being ‘deviants’ and ‘non-Islamic’. The FPI believe that all Muslims are obliged to implement *shari'ah* in every aspect of their lives.

Like the FPI, the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) was re-launched publicly in this transitional era.⁷² The spokesperson of HTI – Ismail Yusanto – reported that the HTI has conducted *dakwah* activities and programmes since the 1980s, but because of the limitations and regulations that the New Order regime imposed during the 1980s, this revolutionary but non-violent organisation arranged their programmes secretly for their loyal members during this period (see Section 2.4), only beginning public activities after the fall of the authoritarian regime (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004). The core idea behind the establishment of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia was the same as that behind Hizb ut-Tahrir per se – to re-build the Islamic caliphate (*khilafah Islamiyah*) (see Taji-Farouki, 1996). Masdar Hilmy --who focuses his study on three Islamic organizations in Indonesia, namely (1) MMI; (2) HTI; and (3) PKS --, categorises the HTI as utopian Islamism because “they are obsessed with establishing an ideal state of being and an ideal community based on religion. Yet utopia is more than mere imagination”. (2010:7-8). The HTI believes that Islam, as practiced by the Prophet and his companions (*sahabat*), is the system that should be

⁷¹The Islam Liberal Network (JIL) represents the most outspoken critical opposition to a literalist interpretation of Islam. Research on this organization has been conducted by Ali Nurdin (2005).

⁷² HTI is a political movement founded in 1982. It connected to the international Hizbut Tahrir founded by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (1909-1977) (see Hilmy, 2010).

implemented by all Muslims in the world, including in Indonesia (Hilmy, 2010).

Another Islamic organisation that was founded after Soeharto's fall was the Communication Forum of *Ahl Sunnah wa Al Jama'ah* (FKAWJ). FKAWJ was founded by Ja'far Umar Talib in February 1999, and its creation was motivated by the political and economic crisis in 1998. The forum promoted Islamic doctrines, in particular *shari'ah*, as the solution for this multi-layered crisis. FKAWJ was also concerned with supporting Muslims who were engaged in conflict with Christians in areas like Ambon (Hilmy, 2010; Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004).

In August 1999 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (b. 1938) launched MMI, which was based on his ideology. He was widely known in Indonesia for actively opposing the government for being secular and anti-Islam, and he was banned from forming any political organisations by the Soeharto government because of his criticisms of them (Hilmy, 2010). After this, he left for Malaysia, claiming that Indonesia was no longer conducive to his *dakwah* movement. Soon after the fall of the Soeharto regime, Ba'asyir returned to Indonesia and established a new organisation for continuing his *dakwah* movement, and he criticises the government for its 'secular' status to this day (Hilmy, 2010). The previous government, led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), considered Ba'asyir to be involved in many radical Islam movements,⁷³ and maintained that they had enough evidence to prove his involvement in terrorist actions.

Although these organisations have different characters, they share the *dakwah*

⁷³ On 6 June 2011, Ba'asyir was re-sentenced to 15 years in prison, being convicted of supporting a *Jihadi* training camp was actively involved in al-Qaeda activities in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia. (www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/09, accessed on 5 January 2013).

tendency to Islamise the state, from promoting the formalisation of *shari'ah* to adopting a literal understanding of Islam. They believe that Muslims should practise only the pure and pristine form of Islam implemented by the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions (*Salaf*), and thus use Islam in the Indonesian public sphere to promote this end.

As Meuleman (2011) has pointed out, a variety of *dakwah* movements and *dakwah* activities performed by Islamic organisations address different groups of Muslims.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, according to Azyumardi Azra (2010), these organisations exert only a limited influence among Indonesian Muslims. The new type of *dakwah* movement which is more active and aggressive has attracted only small numbers of Muslims, who are generally young and from urban and secular educational backgrounds. Older organisations, such as the Muhammadiyah, PERSIS (*Persatuan Islam*) and the NU, have very strong ties with their large numbers of followers.

The new Islamic organisations above are only some examples of institutions, organisations and political parties that were established in Indonesia after the fall of the Soeharto regime. These groups have sought to create a better climate for their political, social and religious expressions based on their religious interpretations. They thus came to regard the Habibie period as the time for them to speak up for their rights and freedoms, and did so through their organisations and political parties. These organisations competed, not only with each other in spreading their *dakwah* messages and influence in the public sphere, but also with old *dakwah* organisations such as the Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, and the NU. Moreover, they not

⁷⁴ See Johan Meuleman's article "*Dakwah, Competition for Authority and Development*" (2011).

only competed in seeking sympathetic ears from Indonesian Muslims in general, but also from the international Muslim community (Meuleman, 2011).

The *Tarbiyah* movement, to which we turn our attention in Chapter 4, was one of the organisations that took advantage of the 1998 change of power as a political opportunity to build an Islamist party, which it named the Prosperous Party (PK). (It then changed its name to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in 2004.) This more democratic political setting provided the movement and many others with an enlarged public space in which to advance its religious and political views and communicate its *dakwah* messages to Indonesian audiences.

2.6 Conclusion

The idea of Islamism arose among revivalist Muslims in a period in which Indonesian leaders were competing to establish a nation-state. The rising voices of those campaigning for ‘secular’ nation-states in the pre-independence period caused the crystallisation of Islamist ideas. Islamic leaders were concerned with the place of *shari’ah* and Islamic identity in the state, and inevitably there were contests between secularist and Islamic groups over the appropriate form that the state should take.

The emergence of Islamism in Indonesia had a similar pattern to that which it showed within other parts of the Islamic world. In Turkey and Egypt, for instance, Islamism appeared as a response that revivalist groups took to the modernisation programmes of the government, which they perceived to be replacing *shari’ah* with Western political, legal and economic systems.

The relationship between Islam and the state has continued to be the most important of issues contested by Islamists, from the Old Order through to the New Order government. The Islamists remain committed to the necessity of applying *shari'ah* as state law and this, indeed, has become their main *dakwah* message. For Islamists, the formalisation of *shari'ah* is regarded as a Muslim political right in Indonesia. According to Islamists, this is because Muslims represent the majority of the Indonesian population and, as such, have made the most significant contributions to the development of the country since its early history. Islamists believe that in the colonial period, Islam became the main symbol of resistance to the oppressors. Many experts, such as Noer (1978), have asserted that the pivotal *dakwah* message of the Islamic movement in the colonial period was the call for Indonesian Muslims to be united under the concept of Islamic nationhood and to fight against the colonial state.

Islamist figures preferred to use a cultural approach to deliver their *dakwah* messages under the repressive New Order government as they were forbidden to conduct their *dakwah* in the political domain. The government was suspicious of them, regarding Islamism in any form as a threat to the Indonesian modern nation-state. For this reason, many Islamist figures not only changed their political approaches, but also transformed the *dakwah* message to individual piety in place of the formalisation of *shari'ah*. However, the Islamic social organisations established by these Islamic figures received more space within the public sphere when the New Order government needed their political support to counter the threats from military figures that they faced at the end of the 1980s.

Islamist ideologies were developed and implemented more thoroughly within the

more democratic political system that emerged after the downfall of the New Order in Indonesia in 1998, with the ‘reform era’⁷⁵ marking the beginning of the democratisation process in Indonesia. In this period, many significant changes in Indonesia’s social and political systems were brought about through the introduction of political policies that supported the emergence of new organisations and political parties.

Democracy provided people with freedom of expression, and Islamists saw it as an opportunity to play a more significant role in public life. As a result, many Islamic organisations and parties emerged in this period, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The PKS was established by the *Tarbiyah* community, which had existed since the beginning of the 1980s, and believed that Islam should govern both individuals’ ways of lives and behaviours and the running of the state. The PKS wanted to implement *shari’ah*, not only in relation to the social and cultural aspects of lives, but also within the political arena of Indonesia. They thus decided to pursue the Islamisation of Indonesia from the individual, family, and societal level through to the state level.

⁷⁵ In the history of Indonesia, ‘the reform era’ (Indonesian: *reformasi*) is the term widely used for the post 1998 era. It was called the ‘reform’ era due to the more liberal social and political conditions that it introduced into Indonesia.

Chapter 3

Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapters developed a conceptual and historical contextual framework for exploring Islamism and *dakwah* in Indonesia. This chapter describes the methodological approaches used and issues arising from this project. The main research questions this project asks are: 1) how is *dakwah* conceptualised and how has it been developed and transformed by the leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement within the changing social and political dynamics of Indonesian society and how do members respond to this?; 2) how does the *Liqo*, as the main vehicle for the *dakwah* activities in the *Tarbiyah* movement, fit into the overall structure and ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement, and how do its members at the lower levels of the organisational hierarchy perceive the relationship between the *Liqo*, the *Tarbiyah* movement, and the PKS party?; and 3) how do female *Liqo* members experience, and to what extent do they subsequently practice, the *dakwah* received through weekly sessions? This chapter explains the choice of the research methods selected to collect the data to answer these questions, as well as the processes used to analyse that data. It also engages with other relevant issues thrown up by this study in relation to questions of researcher reflexivity and research ethics.

The Introduction provided a general outline of the methodology used in this thesis, and this chapter elaborates on that discussion whilst showing that appropriate procedures and processes were followed. I provide my reflections not only on the methods that I used, but also on the challenges that I faced and the lessons that I learned in my five months of ethnographic fieldwork, conducted between September

2012 and January 2013 in Jakarta. To elucidate on this fieldwork experience, the chapter has been organised around four main discussion areas: 1) research processes and methods, 2) data collection techniques, 3) ethical issues and subjectivity, and 4) data analysis and interpretation.

I will begin by discussing the methodology in relation to my research questions. An account detailing which research methods were selected for data collection and why will then be provided. This will be followed by a discussion of how my own perspective may have influenced my investigations and interpretations of the data, and an examination of the ethical issues that arose in conducting the study. Finally, a discussion of the use of reflexivity in analysing and interpreting the data during the conducting and writing up of the research will be provided.

3.2 Research processes and methods

I decided that this research would be best undertaken using both inductive and deductive methods. Its inductive component involved leaving the research open-ended in order to capture any new concepts and understandings that emerged during the data analysis, which can help to bring new insights to studies (Merriam, 1998). It is deductive in the sense that it started with a theoretical framework on Islamism and *dakwah* and a list of research questions to keep the research focused on the case study and the research topic, as well as to capture any contrasting views between the existing literature and the perspectives provided by the participants (Yin, 2009).

An ethnographic approach was chosen in order to capture the social meanings and activities of people involved in the *dakwah* movement under study.⁷⁶ This ethnographic approach also allowed me to observe people in their *dakwah* settings and to participate in their *dakwah* activities. As I planned to study the *dakwah* of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement and, as McGuire (2008), Mahmood (2005) or Blaxter et al. (2001) might put it, the ‘lived or felt’ religious experiences of its members, a qualitative methodology seemed the most appropriate one to adopt. Qualitative methods are useful for exploring areas “where previous understanding appears inadequate or insufficient to make sense of complex situations and shifting phenomena” (Richards and Morse, 2007:29), or where people’s constructions of meanings have not previously been explored (Hassard, 1990). This research method is also appropriate for generating in-depth data (Bryman, 2008). Thus, this method was adopted because it was deemed to be suitable for uncovering the values, opinions, attitudes and beliefs of the *dakwah* community of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement.

Ethnographic research uses case studies to produce focused and natural research,⁷⁷ and the current research involves a case study of female *Liqo* activists, using both the more informally-organised *Liqo* group that I studied and other *Liqo* groups that I interviewed, together with a study of more formal and official perspectives (cf. Wiktorowicz 2001; 2004). The *Liqo* group that I studied was one for new recruits, and it was important to observe such a group as I wanted to examine the lived experiences of members in terms of how they became interested in joining the *Liqo*,

⁷⁶ According to Brewer, “Ethnography is the study of people in naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by methods of data collection which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher participating directly in the setting, if not also the activities, in order to collect data in a systematic manner but without meaning being imposed on them externally” (2000:6).

⁷⁷ The case study approach is one of the five basic research approaches outlined by Bryman (2008:33–55).

how they moved from being outside the *Liqo* to its core, and how their ‘*dakwah* journey’ continued within the movement.

The appropriateness of my choice of the case study approach is further supported by Yin (2009), who argues that such approaches are very useful for describing, understanding, and explaining contemporary phenomena within their real-life contexts. Moreover, Gerring (2007) claims that it is generally more suitable for a piece of qualitative research to employ a single case study than multiple ones. While I still needed to put the PKS *dakwah* in its wider religious and political context in Indonesia, a single case study allowed me to examine also one element of the PKS *dakwah* – the weekly *Liqo* sessions. Furthermore, this was an exploratory study to answer questions of the form ‘what is going on’ and ‘is there any relationship between one variable and another’ (Bouma and Atkinson, 1995).⁷⁸

Case studies are frequently criticised on the grounds of “the credibility of generalizations made from their findings” (Denscombe, 2003:39). However, my research does not claim to represent *all* the *Liqo* programmes of the PKS in Indonesia. Gerring (2007) has criticised the case study method for not perfectly representing the population but, nevertheless, a case study can be seen as a single representation of a wider group (Denscombe, 2003). In my opinion, it is important to see the case study as an approach that is concerned with in-depth research into a particular event or organisation. The approach that I have adopted does not aim to generalise findings, but rather focuses on the way a specific group of people see particular issues. By engaging with the general discourse of the *dakwah* movement

⁷⁸ According to Merriam (1998), a case study should be understood as an analysis of defined single units or systems. Gerring (2007) says that studying a single case in a research project is more intensive than studying multiple cases.

and using publicly available literature, my research adopts an approach that has been referred to by Stake (1995:8) as ‘particularisation’. Thus, in terms of the debate on methodological divides in the social-scientific study of religion, I adopt a ‘particulariser’ rather than a ‘generaliser’ position (Spickard and Landres, 2002).

My research explores the meaning of *dakwah*, both conceptually and practically, “to the particular individuals I interview, [in terms of] how they make sense of it, and how they use it to make sense of their world” (Spickard and Landres, 2002:2). I seek to understand the *Liqo* community of the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS concerning particular issues that they teach in their weekly *Liqo* sessions and encounter during their interactions with other *Liqo* cadres. Using this framework, I did not attempt to understand their whole society, but instead “listened, watched, questioned, thought and listened again to make sense of my informants’ lives” (Spickard and Landres, 2002:3). As McGuire (2008) observes individuals’ lived religious experiences, expressions and practices are complex and dynamic. I concur with her claim that, “at the level of individual, religion is not fixed, unitary, or even coherent” (McGuire, 2008: 210). Thus, part of this research involves examining how the *dakwah* ideologies of the *Tarbiyah* movement are understood, practised, experienced, and expressed by the female cadres in the context of their everyday lives in the wider context of Indonesia. The case study is expected to provide an analytical point of view for comparing empirical findings in which propositions and theories are revised and/or rejected (Yin, 2009), and thus aims to contribute to the accumulation of knowledge within a given field (Collins, 2003).

The ‘weaknesses’ of the case study approach outlined above can be mitigated through well-planned research and sampling. For example, I chose purposive

sampling to produce the primary data for my case study. According to Rubin and Rubin (2005), it is necessary for the researcher to select a good sampling strategy in order for the chosen sample to accurately reflect the lived reality of those she is studying, and to ensure that the full range of relevant views and experiences are accounted for. Qualitative researchers frequently choose purposive sampling because they can select their respondents based on their research needs. Bouma and Atkinson (2005) stress that purposive sampling allows the researcher to select 'typical' samples for his or her research project, and it was employed here to identify respondents who could provide multiple perspectives on the research topics under study. Thus, the interviewees and participants selected for this study were chosen on the basis of their ability to give relevant and valuable information on the concept and practice of the *dakwah* adopted by the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS in Jakarta.

The sampling targeted mentors and students from the weekly *Liqo* sessions to give information on lived experiences, as well as high-ranking members of the PKS, including the Head of the *shari'ah* council (DSP), the Head of the Advisory Council (MPP), other influential figures from the *Liqo*-PKS and first generation *Liqo* activists (*as-Saabiquun al-Awwaluun*), to provide me with first-hand information on official aspects of the movement's *dakwah*. However, because accessing and making appointments with these high-ranking officials involved a long and difficult process, requiring recommendations from third parties, I decided to use snowball sampling as well. This was employed to identify potential interviewees who were unknown to me through recommendations.⁷⁹ However, I did not identify participants merely on

⁷⁹ According to Patton (1990), snowball sampling is one of the various types of purposive sampling, along with convenience sampling and critical case sampling.

the basis of recommendations, but after consideration of the criteria of my research (see Section 3.3.2).

3.3 The application of research methods

Having outlined the design of the research process and the methods adopted to carry the research out, this section will now explain how each method was applied within my research. As interview and observation are the most effective and well-established techniques for generating qualitative data, these were the main tools used for data collection in this research. Using these techniques, I aimed to understand the official perspectives and lived experiential aspects of those involved in the research – the leaders, mentors, and trainees of the weekly *Liqo* sessions – and to construct explanations and understandings of the weekly *Liqo* sessions and other *dakwah* events, such as *dawrah* (lectures) (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). To investigate the discrepancies between official and lived experience of *dakwah* discourse and practice, I also reviewed official texts associated with the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement and conducted focus group discussions (FGDs; see section 3.3.4 below). The triangulation of methods, namely interviews, observation, reviewing texts, and focus group discussions, was used to corroborate my findings across different sorts of data and also to spot gaps in the evidence base. As Bryman (2008:379) maintains: “ethnographers often check out their observations with interview questions”. As we shall see in 3.3.4 below triangulation made my research more robust, validating the data gathered from a variety of sources in response to the possible limitations that could emerge from using only one approach.

3.3.1 Review of written sources

As my project aimed to locate any differences between the official discourse of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS and the lived religious experiences of its members, the official documents and publications of the movement were used as a source of data. These official discourses can be found in books that collect leaders' speeches from a variety of *dakwah* events. Examples of such books that I accessed are: *Dari Qiyadah untuk Para Kader; KH Hilmy Aminuddin* (DPP PKS, 2007a), *Seri Pemikiran Anis Matta; Integrasi Politik dan Dakwah* (DPP PKS, 2007b); *Dakwah adalah Perubahan ke arah yang Lebih Baik; and Bunga Rampai Pemikiran Tiffatul Sembiring* (DPP PKS, 2007c). Official discourse can also be found in other official records, publications, and public forms of discourse that include the vision, ideologies, structure, and objectives of *Tarbiyah/PKS dakwah*. Moreover, the discourse and conceptual foundations of this *dakwah* movement is contained in a variety of archives, such as *dakwah* syllabi (*Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005*), the official religious guidance and decisions of the movement (*fatawa*); and in party guideline books, brochures, posters, and pamphlets. However, not all archives were open to me, especially those relating to the early periods of *Tarbiyah* movement in the 1980s and 1990s. My thesis is limited in this way because the *Tarbiyah* movement has not yet produced or published any official texts about their movement in that early period. The archives that can be accessed relate only to the period of the PK(S), i.e. after 1998. This includes the version of the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* (2005) manual that I have used as the main reference for explaining the weekly *Liqo* ideology and its *Liqo* lessons in Section 5.3. These contemporary publications are produced by the PKS to (retrospectively) narrate and position the history of their *dakwah* movement in relation to its current development. Various academic research projects, such as

journal articles and theses or dissertations written by ‘insiders’ of the movement have also helped to build my understanding of the movement but based on a limited archive this remains a partial account.

Given the importance that these official written resources have for my research, I started analysing them from the beginning of my study. My review of this written literature provided me with relevant information and the ‘clues’ that I needed to explore and examine the movement further during my fieldwork (Stake, 1995). Together with a background knowledge on the topic, this helped in understanding the development of *dakwah* in the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS, including its private and public dimensions. This background knowledge on the subject area helped my fieldwork to become more productive, providing many opportunities to actively respond to the participants’ answers during interviews, observation and focus group discussions. During the review of these written sources, I took every opportunity to check the information on *dakwah* events organised by the PKS through their website and through newspaper coverage.⁸⁰ This media coverage provided a useful and relevant resource to use for engaging its members during interviews. For example, in several interviews, I opened the conversation by asking the participants about the latest newspaper coverage of the PKS’s *dakwah* movement. This helped me, as a researcher, to overcome the formal structure of the ‘questions and answers’ session. I used these written data sources for researching the official aspects of the movement’s *dakwah*. The purpose of analysing these written texts was also to expand my personal horizons on the research topic (Bryman, 2008). This was necessary for enabling me to develop a wide knowledge

⁸⁰ The official website of the PKS is www.pk-sejahtera.com. An example of newspaper coverage is www.thejakartapost.com/channel/national, accessed in 20 September 2012.

and a good understanding of the topic and the local setting of the research (Holstein and Gubrium 1995).

It is worth mentioning finally, here, that all these primary texts were written in the Indonesian language. Quotations from these texts were all my own translations and not those of the authors. This raises a methodological question about the extent to which my translations provide a full and accurate sense of the intended meaning of their original statements, a point on which there is some relevant literature in other fields of qualitative research (see, for example, Temple and Young 2004; van Nes et al 2010).⁸¹ In general, my approach was to rigorously double-check words and their meanings with other publications and going back to the original fieldwork record and sometimes back to my respondents as necessary. Overall, I feel confident that I have accurately reflected the meaning of the original statements.

3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews

My research aims to discover how the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS was conceptualised, and how the movement practises and organises its *dakwah* ideology and strategy. As the interview is the most popular and effective technique used for qualitative research, I adopted it to examine the worldviews of the PKS members (Bouma and Atkinson, 1995). I chose to conduct semi-structured

⁸¹ According to this literature, the key problem of translating non-English data into English is the loss of the meaning of the original statements (van Nes et al, 2010). To try to avoid this and keep the research valid, some procedures are suggested: (1) To keep the record of all fieldwork data in the source language. Thus, in the situation where the choice of words is not fully suitable to express the intended meaning, this retained record of the original words would be useful, especially when in later phases the translation need to be adapted. So, in my case of analysing the data, I kept going back to the original words in Indonesian so I can get the meaning and the feeling of the word. (2) To be supported by a professional translator or proofreader. In my case, I did use a professional proofreader to cover myself for two situations: firstly, to discuss some points in the text when I was not really sure about whether an English word was suitable or not and secondly, to check the validity of my own interpretation.

interviews as they facilitated a fully open discussion with the interviewees, whilst allowing me to focus on the main research themes (Bryman, 2008). This technique enabled me to gather official statements from the leaders of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement as well as to develop the perspectives of members of the movement based on their particular lived experiences. Both the official and lived experiences' aspects of the data gathered from the interviews are important for my research.

In order to elicit diverse responses and perspectives from both the official and lived experiential discourses, I interviewed people from a range of different positions in the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement's hierarchy, comprising the top rank (ten past and present leaders of PKS/the *Liqo*), the middle rank (twelve mentors or *murabbi* of the *Liqo* that trained the students in the weekly *dakwah* sessions) and the lower rank (twelve trainees or *mutarabbi* who regularly joined the *Liqo* sessions), together with nine PKS and non-PKS 'public' scholars/activists and two *ex-Liqo/PKS* trainees. These different ranks and positions marked one of the criteria for selecting the participants, apart from gender and locality. My reviews of the written resources on the movement and the broader literature on global Islamism informed me that the activists of almost all the Islamist *dakwah* movements are typically young graduates from non-religious educational backgrounds (*non-shar'i*) (see Chapter 5). However, because I knew from my reading that gender segregation is practised within their *dakwah* activity, I tried to strike a balance between male (19 respondents) and female respondents (26 respondents), as their experiences in attending the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* sessions were likely to raise different issues.

Table 1: Different positions/ranks of respondents

No	Roles	Number
1.	Leaders	10
2.	Mentors	12
3.	Trainees	12
4.	Ex-trainees	2
5.	Public scholars/activists	9
	TOTAL	45 Respondents (Female: 26; Male:19)

Source, Author, 2015.

Out of the forty-five interviewees, most of the leaders and scholars were ones that I had identified at the beginning of my study, while half of the mentors and participants of the *Liqa* were suggested by the *Liqa*-PKS leaders or mentors as being appropriate for my research, and the other half were identified and recruited by me, mainly on the basis of their involvement in the *Liqa* programmes. Although the majority of the *Tarbiyah* community are typically from secular educational backgrounds, I managed to interview leaders and mentors with both secular educational backgrounds (16 with non-*shar'i* educational backgrounds) and Islamic educational backgrounds (6 with *shar'i* educational backgrounds).⁸²

The trainees of the *Liqa* programmes (*Mutarabbi*) were identified on the basis of two main criteria – amount of experience working in the *Liqa* programmes and holding a college or university level education. For the female trainees of the *Liqa* group that I observed, the first criterion could not be applied because they had only

⁸² The *shar'i* education mentors had mainly graduated from Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Indonesia. The non-*shar'i* education mentors had graduated from 'secular' campuses in the West and Indonesia (see Chapter 5).

just joined the *Liqo*. Most of the trainees I interviewed, however, were very active in the *Liqo*, with at least ten years' experience. I also met two trainees with only two years' experience in the *Liqo* programmes, and three female trainees who had quit *Liqo* programmes as a result of dissatisfaction (see Chapters 5 and 6). The majority of *Liqo* trainees had completed undergraduate degrees at universities, and only one of them had not gone beyond senior high school. They mostly came from 'secular' universities, with only five having religious school backgrounds from Islamic state schools or universities or Islamic traditional boarding schools (*Pesantren*).

During the interviews, I was also concerned with the economic and social status of the trainees. This factor was taken into consideration in examining whether they had social or economic motivations apart from their religious interests (see Chapters 5 and 6). During my fieldwork planning I attempted to balance the number of women and men I would interview so that I could explore whether women had the same level of access to religious education as men, in particular to the weekly *Liqo* religious programmes run by the PKS (see Chapter 6). During the actual fieldwork, however, women were more accessible to me than men because of my own gender. I successfully interviewed nine women (*Murabbiyah*) but only three men (*Murabbi*) from the mentor level, and eleven women (*Mutarabbiyah*) and one man (*Mutarabbi*) from the trainee level. Nevertheless, these figures were useful, as I was mainly interested in exploring the women's experiences and feelings regarding the *Liqo*.

Scholars were identified and recruited as participants because of their knowledge of the *Tarbiyah* movement's *dakwah* or the *dakwah* ideology of the PKS. Their expertise was assessed from their academic achievements and publications, such as books, journal articles and PhD dissertations. These contributors gave me useful

insights not only into my research themes but also into practical issues based on their research experience. It was easier to make appointments with scholars and ex-*Liqo* trainees as they responded positively after initial contact was made via email or Short Messages Services (SMS).

Figure 1 The *dakwah* centre or *Markaz Dakwah* (MD) of DPP-PKS, Jakarta



Source: A female respondent, used with her permission, October 2014.

The interviews with the leaders and senior mentors of the *Liqo* took place mainly in the PKS central office (DPP-PKS)⁸³ and the PKS Fraction Office at Parliament House.⁸⁴ The interviews with the PKS *Liqo* trainees were mostly held either in their

⁸³ The DPP-PKS is often referred to as the *Markaz ad-Dakwah* (MD), or the *Dakwah* Centre. It is the national head quarters of the PKS, and is located on the main road of Simatupang in South-Jakarta. During my fieldwork, I visited this office once or twice a week to meet PKS/*Tarbiyah* activists and leaders.

⁸⁴ The PKS Fraction Office is located on the 3rd and 4th floor of the Indonesian Parliament House in Jakarta. The PKS has participated in four general elections – in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. In the most recent election in 2014, they received 6.92 % of the popular vote. This represented a decline in votes from the 2009 general election, which saw them receive 7.88% of the popular vote. In 2014, they came fourth out of all the parties (nationalist-secular and Islamist parties) that participated in the election, and first among Islamist parties. There are 59 PKS parliament members working in this Fraction Office, and a large number of staff assists each member. In the 2004 general election, the party tripled its votes from the previous election to 7.34%, receiving almost seven times as many

local *dakwah* offices or their houses, while the interviews with scholars were mostly held at their campuses in Jakarta. However, I also visited smaller cities near Jakarta – such as Bekasi, Tangerang, and Depok (‘dormitory towns’) – to interview scholars and trainees.⁸⁵

Jakarta was chosen as the main field site because it is distinctive in terms of its *Liqo-Tarbiyah* populations and PKS cadre configurations in general. Jakarta is well known for *Tarbiyah* population growth compared to other cities in Indonesia. Rural migrants move from their hometown to Jakarta for studying or work. As a result, it provided me with a good resource for securing accounts of lived experiences of religion from female members of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS, particularly in terms of respondents who were able to comment on modern and secular issues, and on how to combine such outlooks with their Islamic identities (see Chapter 6). Because the National Headquarters (DPP) of the PKS is located in Jakarta, this also gave me the opportunity to attempt to elicit an official perspective about *dakwah* from high-ranking members of the movement. Jakarta’s status as a multicultural, heterogenous, and complex city impacted on my research. Given its status as the centre for public discourses on religion, politics, and *dakwah* in Indonesia, this enabled me to relatively easily up-date my information regarding such issues. From a practical point of view, Jakarta also represented a good choice, because it is where I live and work, which made my fieldwork easier and more manageable.

seats in parliament as they won in 1999, with three ministry positions. In 1999, the PK (the previous name of PKS) only received 1.36 % of the vote and failed to achieve the parliamentary electoral threshold. (The results of the general election are provided by the General Election Committee at www.kpu.go.id, accessed in December 2014; Platzdasch, 2009).

⁸⁵ A dormitory town is a place from which many people travel in order to work in a bigger town or city.

Although the fieldwork was concentrated in Jakarta, ‘neighbouring’ cities such as Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi were also visited when required.⁸⁶ For example, I visited these cities to interview five senior activists and leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement, either at their houses or at public *dakwah* events that they were holding in these cities. Although these three cities are smaller than Jakarta, they are very popular for religious activities, showing an increasing use of symbols representing Islamic identity within the public sphere, such as the application of the regulation called the formalisation of *shari’ah*, which requires women to wear a headscarf. These cities were thus helpful in terms of providing an understanding of the main field site, and the wider context of *dakwah* in the *Tarbiyah* movement.

All forty-five interviews were conducted face-to-face. I had initially planned to conduct all the interviews on a one-to-one basis, but six of the interviewees with senior leaders were accompanied by an additional person, usually the interviewee’s secretary or staff. In each case this was to satisfy Islamic/ist norms of gender *adab* (manners/propriety/ethics) (see also section 3.5 below). As the interviewee’s junior the secretary or staff were not involved in the exchange apart from one instance of an unrelated and non-confidential conversation between an interviewee and a member of his staff. I did not record or transcribe this and have made no use of it in my thesis. The duration of each interview varied depending on interviewees’ responses and availability, ranging from 45 minutes to 2 hours. Approximately half of the interviewees were very open and happy to carry on talking,⁸⁷ while the other half were more restricted in the answers they gave. The latter sometimes claimed to

⁸⁶ These three cities contain a variety of religions and ethnicities. However, Muslims are still the most dominant religious group in each. The PKS has significant influence in these cities, as shown by the fact that its local leaders came from the PKS *dakwah* party background.

⁸⁷ The interviews that contained the best responses were mostly followed up by an informal discussion about my research topic and a conversation about family or academic life.

be ‘very busy’ but were also slow or unwilling to answer my questions the particulars of *dakwah* approaches and the relatively ‘closed’ and ‘committed’ culture of the *Liqo*.

The interview questions covered three broad areas: the *dakwah* history and ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement and its transition into a political party (PKS); the role of the *Liqo* in the structure and *dakwah* ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement; and the lived experiences of female *Liqo* members, including their reception of the themes taught in the weekly *Liqo* sessions with reference to the discussion of private religiosity and how it links to public or political issues. These three areas were drawn from the main research questions on the private and public dimensions of the *dakwah* adopted by the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS, together with the discussion on official and lived religion. Before the interviews, I rehearsed the main research question and the three broad areas of questions numerous times, and developed them into detailed questions both prior to and during the interviews.⁸⁸

There were different emphases in the questions that were directed at those who held leadership positions as compared to mentors or trainees. For example, I posed detailed questions concerning policy, ideology, history, organisational structure, religious decisions (*fatawa*), and other issues relating to official discourses to the leaders of the movement. With *Liqo* activists (mentors and trainees), I focused on their religious experiences of joining the *Liqo*, and their understanding and reception of *dakwah* ideology and *Liqo* lessons.

⁸⁸ For each group of interviewees, I prepared ten questions using the main research questions and the three broad areas of questions. However, there were about five questions in common for all interviewee groups, such as those concerning their personal experiences and opinions about *dakwah*. I assumed that every interviewee had a particular opinion of *dakwah* based on her own experiences that differed from the official conceptualisation of *dakwah* provided in the *dakwah* manuals (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005).

Several relevant themes emerged through the broad range of questions utilised for the semi-structured interviews. This allowed other issues to come to the fore, such as questions about the political strategies the PKS adopted as a response to the election of Jakarta's governor and the Presidential election.⁸⁹ Questions on this topic were relevant to my research because many ideological issues arose during the 2012 election period in Jakarta regarding how their *dakwah* appeared to the public (see Chapter 6).

I started each interview session by trying to put the participants at ease through discussing their current jobs and responsibilities, their educational and family backgrounds, their stories of how they became involved with the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement, and their opinions on certain public issues related to both their *dakwah* and political movements. This strategy was useful for helping the respondents to feel relaxed and to feel that they could express their opinions in a natural way. However, for the leaders, who were familiar with public discourses, I decided to go straight into my questions out of consideration for their time limitations. During the interviews, I was aware of being sensitive about the sentiments of the interviewees. I carefully chose suitable phrases for the questions for different interviewees in different situations, being aware of the need to be very humble, polite, formal and wise on some occasions, but more relaxed and flexible on others.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ The latest 'hot' issue was about an allegation of corruption that had been made about the President of the PKS. LHI, the president of PKS, was arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commissions (KPK) for using his position and influence to secure a lucrative government contract for the import of Australian beef for a private company (see the article written by Endy Bayuni: "Can Indonesia's main Islamist Party Recover from Scandal?"). Many debates and discussions emerged in response to the case that was reported in January 2013. As the well-known PKS slogan 'clean, caring and professional' suggests, the PKS is very active in campaigning against corruption in Indonesia. Moreover, they have a very strong agenda on Islamising the society and the state. This corruption case shocked the PKS party as well as the wider Indonesian people.

⁹⁰ The phrases used in the interviews with older interviewees were different to those used with younger ones. I used different phrases because this is part of the ethics (*adab*) of how to show respect

I recorded all except two of the interviews digitally, with the exceptions being the result of a noisy background, and for these I took notes manually. These interviews were all conducted in the Indonesian language (*bahasa*) of which I am a native speaker. I also took notes when appropriate during the other interviews. I found note-taking was very convenient, time-saving and straightforward for me and, of course, it was seen as respectful by some interviewees (Blaxter et al., 2001). The notes were not only used to write up my research question-related themes, but also to record my personal reflexive feelings about the events, circumstances and people that I interviewed, for example, when I was upset about the attitude of particular leaders to the fact I had studied at a Western university (see section 3.5 below). Not all notes, however, were taken in full during interviews as it would have distracted the flow of the interview. Rather, some additional and more expansive notes were also written up afterwards. Notes were also helpful to me in preparing ideas and questions to follow up in the next interviews. I also conducted two follow-up email interviews after returning to Leeds in order to seek clarification on particular issues and to ask emerging questions that I had not begun to formulate during the fieldwork. In order to secure my fieldwork data, in accordance with the University of Leeds' data protection procedure, I saved all the digital recordings of interviews to my password-protected University folder and the interview notes were re-written and stored on my own password-protected laptop and external hard drive.

3.3.3 Participant observation

Participant observation is a qualitative research technique for documenting and analysing what is happening in a particular setting. Observation is also the key to

to older people. However, for both formal and relaxed occasions, I maintained my key position as a researcher.

ethnographic research, as the ethnographic researcher is the main instrument for watching, listening, talking and thinking. Bryman (2008:369) notes that during participant observation, “the researcher is immersed for some time in order to observe and listen with a view to gaining an appreciation of the culture of a social group”. In order to understand and appreciate the culture of the *Liqo* community of the PKS, I established a good relationship with them and observed their ‘everyday practice of Islam’. I used this technique for my research as it provided flexibility for my investigations in terms of the research design and the details of the approach (Bouma and Atkinson, 1995). However, I also needed to prepare for my investigations, and spent a considerable amount of time reading through resources to develop ideas for responding to any events that may occur during my observation.

Most of the observations took place in Jakarta between October 2012 and January 2013, and during this period I successfully attended about 15 *Liqo* meetings. Each meeting ran for a length of two to four hours in the trainees’ (*Mutarabbi*) homes (see Chapter 6). The observations were more difficult than the interviews in terms of approaching people and gaining their trust through attending their weekly *Liqo*.

Apart from the weekly *Liqo* sessions, I attended a range of PKS *dakwah* training events (*daurah*), which included: a) *daurah* (training) on ‘the evaluation of the Jakartan governor election’, b) *daurah* on Islamic entrepreneurship and Islamic economy, and 3) *daurah* on leadership.⁹¹ I also attended a number of *dakwah* events

⁹¹ The *daurah* is one of the religious programmes run by the PKS under the umbrella of the *Tarbiyah* movement (see also Chapter 5). The *daurah* programme also relates to the *Liqo*, as both are used for spreading the *Tarbiyah* messages of *dakwah*. This is shown by the lessons in the *daurah* and *Liqo*, which are mixed together in one manual book, called *Manhaj Tarbiyah* (2006, 2008). During my observation, however, I discovered that these two programmes have differences, especially in terms of their audiences and lessons. The audiences taught through the *daurah* are larger than those of the *Liqo*. The audience of the *daurah* can also be of mixed gender, including both male and female

held by other *dakwah* institutions (such as the Muhammadiyah and the NU) to help me to understand the distinctive role that the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS plays in the wider context of *dakwah* in Indonesia. Observations were also made during my visit to the headquarters of PKS (DPP-PKS) and at the PKS fraction office at Parliament House, for instance, checking their posters and flyers on upcoming events and the newspaper coverage of their previous *dakwah* activities.⁹²

Figure 2 Posters at the PKS office in Parliament House (DPR), Jakarta



Source: A female respondent used by permission, November 2012.

Upcoming events were notified on the display walls of the ground floor in the DPP-PKS building, and also on the 3rd and 4th floors where I conducted the interviews. During my interview schedule I read a banner advertising *Haditsul Khamis* (Thursday talk) on Thursday afternoons – an activity that includes learning the exegesis of certain verses of the Qur’an (*Tafsir*). Eleven observations of *Liqos* were

Tarbiyah activists, and there are no limitations about which members can attend. The *daurah* lessons also cover larger and more up-to-date materials and agendas, including issues arising in the elections, other political discourses, and developing peoples’ skills. Thus, *daurah* can be seen as being more concerned with issues relating to public life than the *Liqo* is.

⁹² Within this PKS office, at the time where I conducted my interviews/observations, there are 59 PKS legislators in the People’s Representative Council (DPR) for the period (2009-2015), <http://www.pk-sejahtera.org>, accessed on 15 November 2014.

recorded manually through note taking and four were recorded electronically. The note taking was mostly conducted during the events to avoid misunderstandings and to prevent information from being forgotten, with some notes being made after *dakwah* events so that the natural flow of the events was not interrupted. My decisions on whether to take notes during or after the *dakwah* events were made after I had learned the whole circumstances of the *dakwah* events. Before the events, I attempted to engage in informal conversations with *Liqo* mentors and trainees on my research topic, while gave them and explained to them of participant Information sheets.

I also made informal observations about the daily religious and social lives of the *Liqo* community in my neighbourhood, in the shopping centre, and in other public places. It was thus my habit to write down the ‘research’ information I acquired during these informal observations, and to undertake some basic analysis of it by comparing and contrasting it with what I learned from formal *dakwah* events and interviews, from asking questions about the participants’ daily experiences and through my observations of their daily experiences.

3.3.4 Focus group discussions (FGDs)

In addition to reviewing written sources, conducting interviews and participant observation, I also held two FGDs. Focus groups are “a form of group interview which consists of several participants and a moderator” (Bryman, 2008:474). FGDs are also considered as being complementary to semi-structured interviews and other qualitative methods (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Mason, 2002). Therefore this method was chosen to provide more evidence to support the data gathered from

other methods, particularly the interviews. One of the strengths of FGDs is that, whilst researchers may be reluctant to point out contradictions in a conventional interview, participants will argue and challenge each other's opinions in a group discussion, as they provide "the opportunity of allowing people to probe each other's reasons for holding a certain view" (Bryman, 2008:348). As I found discrepancies in the information given by interviewees on the private and public dimensions of *dakwah* among different levels of the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS *dakwah* community, this research method helped me to 'fill in the gaps'. Therefore data gathered from the FGDs were useful to triangulate (clarify, strengthen, compare, and contrast) the data collected from other methods (see also section 3.3 above). For example, the FGDs helped me clarify the culture of polygamy and the ideology of 'enemies of Islam'/*ghazwul fikri* among the *Tarbiyah* activists. These issues were not often mentioned during the interviews and observations. Using FGDs to triangulate my research enabled me "to see the same thing from different perspectives and thus be able to confirm or challenge the findings of one method with those of another" (Bell, 2005:116).

I identified and recruited participants purposively for the group sessions based on either their level of experience in *Liqo* sessions or their familiarity with my research topic. The participants had come from a variety of different Islamic organisations (The Muhammadiyah, the NU, and the *Tarbiyah* movement) and covered an age range of 30-45 years of age. Using this research method, I allowed each participant in a group session to discuss their own views and their reasons for holding them. I provided some direction to the discussion as the researcher, and the participants' emphasised issues that they felt were significant to my main research topic. This

method thus helped me to gather more realistic and accurate views of what the participants thought about the *Liqo*'s understanding and practice of *dakwah*.

I arranged two FGDs in different locations, with participants from different backgrounds. The first was at my home university – the University of Muhammadiyah of Prof. Dr. HAMKA (UHAMKA) – in Jakarta with the main aim being to generate outsider perspectives on the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement. I invited a mixture of scholars, University lecturers, NGO activists and one senior *Tarbiyah* activist. I decided to invite this senior *Liqo* activist as he was also a researcher on Islam and Middle Eastern issues and had a doctoral study background. In addition, I thought that it would be useful to invite participants that were senior lecturers, and thus had well established interactions with the *dakwah* community of the PKS that had been formed over a period of time. Fifteen participants attended, most of who were lecturers at UHAMKA, and the majority were Muhammadiyah activists, while the rest of the group came from different backgrounds of Islamic activism, comprising the NU (1 participant), PERSIS (2 participants), and PKS (1 participant).

The discussion was moderated by a young lecturer who was a Muhammadiyah activist, and he was involved in a number of the discussions on Islamism. He started the discussion with a short introduction about the *dakwah* of the PKS in Indonesia, and then gave the first speaker time to talk about his opinions on the *Liqo-dakwah* of the PKS. The first speaker was a senior *dakwah* activist of the PKS, but he preferred to see himself as an academic. During the discussion, all the participants projected a spirit of knowledge and enthusiasm, sharing their knowledge about the *Liqo* of the PKS *dakwah* and their experiences of interactions with *Liqo*-PKS activists. They

also raised questions and comments on their *dakwah* concepts and practices, and I was very aware of the sensitivity of some of the issues raised, such as the widespread practice of polygamy among the *dakwah* community of the PKS and their rigid social interactions with the wider society (see Chapter 6).

The second FGD was conducted in Tangerang – the closest neighbouring city to Jakarta. In order to fill in the gaps that existed in the previous discussion, whose audience was dominated by male contributors, I invited six female activists only to this focus group, all from the lower *Liqo* level. The core aim of this second FGD was to generate insider perspectives/perceptions and their lived experiences of joining the *Liqo*. I expected that they would be able to share their opinions and feelings on their lived religion before and after joining the weekly *Liqo* sessions. I thus decided to use this group session to focus more on a particular issue. As Bryman (2008) explains, there are two types of focus group discussion – the group interview, which often spans a number of topics; and the focus group, which generally emphasises single themes. Unlike the first FGD, which spanned a number of research themes concerning the *Liqo*'s conception and practice of *dakwah*, this FGD focused solely on how joining the weekly *Liqo* sessions affected the participants' lived religious experiences, opinions and feelings.

Although I had only had three months of interaction with the participants, they agreed to take part in the discussion after I explained my research project in detail verbally and via the Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix B). The discussion was arranged in a more relaxed and informal way than for the first focus group, with the participants being asked from the beginning to talk about their personal, religious and social life before and after joining the *Liqo* of the PKS. As they started

to express their feelings and views, I then made sure to let the discussion flow as much as possible without making any unnecessary interruptions.

I asked the participants at the beginning to try to talk straightforwardly on the topic, and reminded them of this during the discussion where possible. A small number of the participants expressed their opinions on the media coverage of the PKS or on certain election issues relating to the PKS, before sharing their experiences and perceptions of their weekly *Liqo*. They highlighted that the *Liqo* of the PKS had transformed their perspectives on Islam and its practice within their society and, accordingly, had transformed the way that they behave (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). The maturity of participants, both in terms of their involvement in the *Liqo* and their academic experience came through in their discussion of the *dakwah* practice of the PKS through their subjective opinions and experiences. I made an audio recording of the whole discussion, including the presentation and question-and-answer sessions.⁹³

Methodological and practical issues both emerged during the data collection using the methods above, and I learnt two key lessons. Firstly, it is difficult to control the data given by respondents during fieldwork, particularly data collected through observation and discussion. However, I could not judge whether some data was insignificant or irrelevant to my research during the data collection, as relevant data was sometimes only revealed during the analysis stage. Thus, what I classified as significant during the analysis was sometimes different from my assumptions about what would be significant. Secondly, I learnt that it is hard to stick to schedules in

⁹³ Like the recordings of the interviews, this recording was transcribed and later coded and analysed based mainly upon my key research themes (see Section 3.5).

this type of research, as the influence that the participants and the field site have on undertaking the research cannot be accurately predicted. Nevertheless, the schedule was still manageable when I restricted the interviews to a maximum of two per day, leaving it more flexible by having a good interval between the two interviews, which also allowed for the fact that working in the very busy and hot climate of Jakarta was very tiring.

3.4 Ethical issues

As Bryman (2008:113) notes, researchers have ethical responsibilities in conducting their research that relate directly to its integrity. Ethical issues might arise at a variety of research phases, with many emerging during the data collection phase. The topic of concern is the ethical issues that are generated from the relationship between the researcher and research participants. For example, two ethical questions that it was pertinent to answer prior to conducting my fieldwork were “how should I treat my participants? and “how do I anticipate the impact of my research on my participants in terms of the possible harms or stresses their participation could produce?”

In this section, I will discuss the ethical procedures and issues that are outlined in the research ethics forms used by the University of Leeds. The key ethical standards that I needed to ensure were adhered to during my fieldwork were: 1) that interviewees’ participation in this project was voluntary, and that they provided informed consent to take part; 2) that all interviewees were offered anonymity to ensure their privacy was protected; 3) that no participants came to any harm as a result of this project; and 4) that all the interviewees and participants of the FGDs were appropriately

informed about the nature and purpose of my research through clear, simple and transparent explanation of it (see Appendix B and Appendix C).

In terms of seeking informed consent, I tried to anticipate obstacles or barriers that may exist for my participants' understanding, such as language barriers. I was aware that the participants needed to understand their rights from the outset. Because I was aware about this issue, and I knew that the majority of my participants use the Indonesian language in their daily reading and conversation, I translated the Information Sheet and the Consent Form into Indonesian. The advantage of translating these forms is that it maximised the participants' capabilities to understand the topic of my research and the implications of their participation in my research as much as possible.

Regarding the privacy of participants and the confidentiality of the information that they would provide, the Information Sheet that I gave them provided details about the whole process that I would use to maintain their confidentiality and keep their identities anonymous. I gave them a guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality by hiding their true names and hiding the most significant identifying data such as their main work (e.g. nurse, engineer) in writing up my research (see Appendix C for a list of anonymised signifiers used, however I excluded two public intellectuals from this list because they are well-known public writers on the PKS). There is also the question of whether this research may cause harm to any participants. I made every effort to make sure the participants enjoyed their contributions to and participation in my research, and to reduce possible stresses. However, it was not always possible to prevent participants feeling uncomfortable when questioned on sensitive issues, such as certain beliefs and daily norms.

The last issue was to avoid any possible deception or misinformation being propagated by this research. I believe that the Information Sheet and Consent Forms that I gave to my participants were made as transparent as possible. In observing the weekly *Liqo* sessions and *dawrah* activities, I explained my role to the *Liqo* mentor and trainees and to key individuals of the *dawrah* (lecturer and some participants), but not to all *dawrah* participants as this was not practical given that *dawrah* was attended by large number of participants, and would have disrupted the activities. Thus, the informed consent was negotiated in *dawrah* sessions. However, this did not involve misinforming them or deceiving them about my role, and my permission to participate in the activities had already been granted by leaders of the PKS.

3.5 Subjectivity and positionality

As “both researchers and respondents ‘speak’ from a variety of subject positions all of which are context bound” (McLoughlin, 1998:5), I also needed to consider what impact my subject positions had upon this research. This section, therefore, provides my reflections on the extent to which my own identities impacted upon the research that I undertook among the *dakwah* community of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement within the PKS in Indonesia. Given that social scientists accept that no knowledge is ‘value-free’, researchers need to be aware of their subjective biases and outlooks during their research, and also of how their respondents view their positions and outlooks. This section discusses how my positionality in this research was constructed through my identities as a young female Indonesian Muslim, a lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University, and a student at a Western University.

Respondents ascribed these different identities to me during my research in relation to different situations.

Prior to my fieldwork, I considered whether my identity as a young female researcher would be an obstacle to conducting the fieldwork, especially during interviews with male leaders and male *Liqo* mentors and trainees. I knew that a few other female researchers were studying aspects of the *Tarbiyah* movement or the PKS.⁹⁴ However, given the religio-cultural expectation of having a companion present during meetings with men,⁹⁵ I provided male interviewees with a choice of the most appropriate interview situation for them – accompanied or unaccompanied. It was their free choice. In fact only three male leaders chose to be accompanied by another male activist (see discussion in section 3.3.2 above).

There was also the question of my organisational affiliation with the Muhammadiyah. I had been associated with the Muhammadiyah organisation since my employment as a lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University of Prof. Dr. HAMKA in Jakarta in 2004, and was a member of the women's wing of Muhammadiyah (*Nasyiatul Aisyiah*) two years before.⁹⁶ At some points, I felt that

⁹⁴ See, for instance, the work of Rachel Rinaldo (2008a, 2008b, 2013) from the National University of Singapore.

⁹⁵ The *Liqo*-PKS activists believe in the concept of *ghadd al-bashr* which requires both male and female Muslims to “lower their gaze” in each others’ presence. The idea of *ikhtilath* forbids Muslims of different genders from meeting or gathering in one place (see Section 5.3). These beliefs are based on the Prophetic tradition (*Hadith*), which suggests that it is forbidden for a man and a woman to be alone together because ‘Satan would be their companion’. We can easily find the *Liqo*-PKS activists practicing this teaching in their daily life. This teaching led the PKS leaders to separate their programmes for women and men. For instance, the *Liqo* programmes never mix two genders in one *Liqo* group (see Chapter 6). Unlike the PKS activists, most Indonesian Muslims, including activists of Islamic organisations such as the NU and *Muhammadiyah*, are very flexible regarding this issue, and conduct religious programmes (*Pengajian*) and meetings which gather men and women in one place where they can talk to members of different genders as well as look at them. In my opinion, this is the wider norm that is practiced by Muslims in Indonesia.

⁹⁶ Along with other young activists, I was also involved in a series of workshops, discussions and seminars on Islam and the new social movements of the ‘Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity’ during 2003–2006. *Muhammadiyah* has many organisational wings and educational institutions,

my affiliation with the University of Muhammadiyah would help me to approach respondents, especially PKS leaders and senior activists from *Liqo*, as I assumed in Indonesia academics (even those at universities affiliated to Islamic movements) are still regarded as having neutral and independent opinions concerning their research. At other points, however, I worried that this position would lead to some questions about the neutrality of my work.

Being a female Muhammadiyah activist, I am aware that I have my own opinions about the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement, such as that their *dakwah* is too strict and that they too often adopt a polarised ‘black and white’ or ‘enemies and friends’ position. However, I attempted to put these views to one side and focus on the evidence that I collected in my fieldwork. A few years ago, there was some discussion about the ‘soft conflict’ between Muhammadiyah and the PKS. Several assets of the Muhammadiyah, including mosques and schools, were used, taken over, and finally dominated by *Liqo*-PKS activists (see Chapter 6). I thought that this ‘conflict’ would have some influence on the respondents’ willingness to give their opinions on my research topic, as it related closely to their commitment and obedience to *dakwah*. However, I found that none of the interviewees raised this issue, instead simply responding to my questions and sharing their opinions and experiences about their *dakwah* movement.

The last identity that respondents frequently ascribed to me was that of a student at a Western University. The majority of respondents asked me about my reasons for choosing to study Islam in the West, and nine respondents even reminded me to be

reaching from the lowest to the highest levels of education, and is the second largest Islamic mass organisation in Indonesia, with branches concerned with educational, social and religious aspects of Indonesian Muslim life (Alfian, 1989).

cautious of studying religions in the West. They argued that it would influence my perspective on my own beliefs or the practice of my faith, something which has never happened to me. They also asked me about my reasons for undertaking research on their *dakwah* movement. They related this query to the issue of “selling data on Islam or Islamic movements to the West so that the West [is] able to understand the weakness of Muslims”.⁹⁷ This query was an example of an old and ingrained stigma that I often heard. They related this query closely to the concept of *ghazwul fikri* (war of ideas) or the idea of a Western conspiracy against Islam. As McLoughlin (1998:5) has pointed out, there is often a need to re-negotiate our role in the research process by talking about our own experiences, and this query drove me to make clarifications based on my own experiences and knowledge. However, it was not appropriate to reply to such opinions in all interview situations. While some discussions and interactions facilitated further dialogue, others just required my willingness to listen to participants before asking them my interview questions.

Although my respondents ascribed these identities to me, I did not “choose to represent myself in any one way consistently throughout my research” (1998:6), as McLoughlin reflects about his research experience with Bradford-UK Muslims. Rather, I tried to build a point of connection with my respondents by talking about the broad topics of *dakwah* and Islam in Indonesia, which had become the major concern of their movement. However, I concur with McLoughlin (1998:6) that such connections are only partial, because “the relationship between the researchers and

⁹⁷ The issue of ‘selling research data to the West’ was raised by respondents from all levels, including one leader, three *Liqo* mentors and two *Liqo* students. These issues were indeed closely related to the idea of *ghazwul fikri* (war of ideas) that is spread among the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS community (see Chapters 4 and 6).

their respondents is always cross-cut by social divisions, of gender, 'race', and class".

Indeed, the multiple identities I discussed above generated outsider images of me, producing limitations to the research that I could conduct. For example, restricted access to high-ranking members of the PKS and to official *dakwah* documents impacted on the data I could acquire about the *dakwah* movement before 1998. However, I made regular contact with *Liqo* activists by telephone or email to identify the correct official documents to analyse, the right persons to interview, and the right *dakwah* events to observe. I also tried to establish a friendly relationship with respondents by discussing *dakwah*, as this not only represented a topic that we had a mutual interest in, but was a practice that we shared as well. I talked to them about my long involvement in *dakwah* practice in my institution and my neighbourhood, as well as my motivation to contribute to the development of *dakwah* in Indonesia. In my opinion, this introduction gave the respondents a more balanced idea of my status as an outsider, my reflexive understandings as a scholar in the Study of Religion, and my identity as a mosque activist (*ustadzah/da'iyah*, teacher/preacher). In response to my introduction, many *Tarbiyah* activists became willing to talk to me and to provide me with the relevant documents, while few of them rejected my requests.

Although my outsider status vis-à-vis the *Tarbiyah* movement produced limitations to my research, my critical distance also generated benefits for it. Knott (2010) claims that the aim of a religious studies scholar should be to build upon the benefits of critical distance to explain a religious phenomenon from the outside. Having all the different identities listed above for researching the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah*

movement of the PKS enabled me to adopt a critical distance within this research process.

3.6 Analysing and interpreting data

After returning to Leeds from my fieldwork at the end of January 2013, I started to focus on the process of analysing and interpreting the data. In order to analyse the data gathered from interviews, observations and FGDs, it was first necessary to separate the data gathered using each method. As discussed in relation to the analysis of textual sources (see section 3.3.1), the data recorded through interviews, observations and discussions in *Bahasa Indonesia* (the Indonesian language) were all transcribed and analysed (in Indonesian).⁹⁸ Only later when I selected the most relevant examples of data to illustrate a particular point or topic did I translate from Indonesian into English. Therefore, to be clear, I did not translate all data gathered from my fieldwork into English but left some parts in *Bahasa Indonesia* without translation. Although this transcribing and translating was a very time-consuming process, it enabled me to become more familiar with the data, and to gradually start identifying key themes. As noted above (section 3.3.1) relevant literature on the question of translating data (for example, Temple and Young 2004; van Nes et al 2010) suggests that ‘qualitative research is considered valid when the distance between the meaning as expressed by the participants and the meaning as interpreted in the findings is as close as possible’ (van Nes et al 2010:314).⁹⁹

⁹⁸ The reflective notes that were written manually in my fieldwork diary (written sometimes in English and sometimes in Indonesian) were also organised and typed out in a document on my laptop to secure against the possibility of my diary being misplaced or lost.

⁹⁹ Translating the ‘Indonesian’ data into English, the key challenge for me was to find the most suitable word to describe the participants’ comments or statements. The translation process involved interpretation as well. The better I was at interpreting the participants’ comments or participants, the better the English translation can be understood by readers. My approach was check this ‘feeling’ or meaning with my proofreader until I felt confident with the chosen meaning in my analysis and

As May (2008:138) notes, understanding data gathered from interviews involves “the coding of open-ended replies in order to permit comparison” and, with this in mind, I started the systematic coding by re-reading through these transcripts and my own reflexive notes. After this I coded the data into categories and themes based on the main research questions (and semi-structured interview questions), which together provided the main tools for guiding the extraction (‘cutting and pasting’) of these themes. As I wanted to locate the distinctions between the official discourses and the lived experiences of *dakwah*, as well as between the private and public aspects of the *dakwah* of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement, it was key to capture the responses of the different levels of respondents – the elites, the activists (the mentors and trainees of the *Liqo*), and the scholars – during this process. In the next step of the analysis, these themes were simultaneously organised, compared and contrasted to interpret the information. Then key parts of the data were highlighted, and this determined the focus of the chapters as well as the sections of each fieldwork-based chapter.

The process of analysis used the whole set of data produced through my ethnographic fieldwork. The semi-structured interviews, however, generated the most detailed data, allowing me to critique the official discourses of the elites through the first-hand information about the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* sessions from the early generation of mentors and their trainees. Preparing the interview guide before entering the field proved to be very useful, both for conducting the interviews and for analysing the data they produced. It ensured that the key interview questions

interpretation of the data. I also checked my work against that of other researchers on the same subject, so that I could further clarify the ‘feeling’ and meaning of a certain word or term.

were always asked, allowed other themes to also be addressed during each interview, and helped me to categorise or cluster the themes during the analysis. The reflexive notes from participant observation and two group discussions were also very useful, although the data these produced lacked the depth of that generated by the interviews. The data from observations mainly exposed me to the living *dakwah* practices of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* community, while that gathered from discussion sessions primarily exposed me to public opinion on the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement.

The data gathered from this case study helped me to contextualise my research themes. As Blaxter et al. (2001:72) stress, “the detailed study of one or a small number of cases does not mean that the context of those cases can be ignored”. Despite the earlier discussion of the fact that the findings of a single case study cannot be generalised (see Section 3.2), the findings of single case studies do have significant value in producing evidence in a research context. Given that the process of contextualising and interpreting data should be reflexive, I located my research project in the wider context of my field of study. I reflected upon the key themes in my research, such as: private *dakwah*; public *dakwah*; lived experience and lived religion; official discourses; Islamism; politics; identity and modernity with reference to the wider discourses of *dakwah*; and Islam and politics in the sociology and anthropology of Islam.

To address the concern that case studies can be structured by the interests and perspectives of their researchers, thus producing findings that lack validity (Hakim, 2000), I paid attention to the role of the qualitative researcher as an interpreter. As Geertz (2000) emphasises, an interpretative researcher should give their own version of how they understand the subject they are studying. As an ‘interpreter’ of this

project, I was constantly reminding myself that my interpretations should be based on strong evidence drawn from the opinions and events that I observed during my fieldwork. This evidence should be seen as being based on a continuous process of clarification and validation. For instance, the process of writing-up the research exposed me to ‘gaps’ in information, which led me to carefully revisit the fieldwork materials and to clarify issues with respondents through emails.

The final step of the writing-up process involved re-assessing the themes and presenting them within a rounded explanation. Continuous brainstorming was used to generate the main analytical ideas, to connect the chapters together and to line them up with the research questions. Finally, the overall work of transcription, translation, analysis, interpretation and writing-up was carried out at the Leeds Humanity Research Institute (LHRI) office (or the Cavendish Road office) using the University’s M drive, and a daily backup of the research was made on my external hard disk.

3.7 Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter has been to present and justify, as well as reflect upon, the research methods used for this project. This ethnographic research utilises a single case study of weekly *Liqo* sessions in Jakarta, and analyses the history, ideology and structure of the *Tarbiyah* movement in relation to the discussion of private and public dimensions of *dakwah* and the official discourses and lived experiences of the *Tarbiyah* community. The study integrates both primary and secondary data to investigate the key research question that has been asked about the conception of *dakwah* adopted by the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement and the lived

religious experiences of its members. This chapter has explained the rationale for using both deductive and inductive methods in carrying out this case study, as well as the reasons for selecting the case study, and the three main data collection techniques – the literature review, the semi-structured interview and participant observation – together with one complementary method – the focus group discussion. The ethical procedures for data collection that are outlined by the University of Leeds Ethics Committee were discussed, and the impact of my multiple identities on the research were explained in regard to my position as an outsider researcher vis-à-vis my respondents. The limitations that I encountered as an outsider were also identified, together with the strategies that I adopted to address them. Conducting ethnographic fieldwork amongst the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* community in Jakarta was a hugely rewarding experience for me. It was enjoyable to meet new people who were willing to talk and share information about their ideologies and religious experiences, and to build new friendships ‘between the researcher and the researched’ afterwards.

Chapter 4

The *Dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* Movement: Official Discourses, Leaders, and Transformation

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I am going to explore the historical development of the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement that emerged in Indonesia in 1983, the reasons for its establishment of a political party in 1998, and how this has impacted on its *dakwah* concept and strategies. The official discourses among the *Tarbiyah* movement elites will be examined through the interviews that I conducted with them, and through reviews of the texts published by the movement and its cadres. This chapter therefore focuses on my first research questions: 1) how has *dakwah* been developed, transformed, and conceptualised by the *Tarbiyah* movement leaders during the changing religious and political climate in Indonesia? Recalling aspects of SMT discussed in the Introduction (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012), my argument is that the gradual transition of the *Tarbiyah* movement from a politically repressed network of religious purists in the 1970-80s into a fully-fledged *dakwah* political party by the late 1990s was the outcome of new ‘political opportunity’ structures which emerged during a period of democratisation.

A review of the existing literature in Chapter 2 has already revealed that the more democratic climate that has recently emerged in Indonesian politics was crucial in this regard. Indeed, my research shows that the elites thought that the *Tarbiyah* movement could be extended and developed through this party and its *dakwah* movement. As a result, its *dakwah* focus has expanded to be concerned with not only building individual piety through individual religious training, but also building

public piety within civil society. The private aspect of *dakwah* has also continued to be important, from the movement's establishment to the present day. Therefore, the personal, social and political stages of *dakwah* now co-exist. Nevertheless, I maintain that private and public concepts of *dakwah* are emphasised differently by members that are positioned at different points in the movement's hierarchy. I argue that although establishing individual piety remains the main commitment of the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement it now coexists with public piety and political interests, particularly since the movement began performing more overt preaching, and after it established its political party in 1998.

This chapter starts by profiling the *Tarbiyah* movement in Indonesia, its emergence in 1983, and its *dakwah* ideology. This is followed by a section that describes the *dakwah* movement in this formative period. Although their *dakwah* during this period focused on reforming individual religiosity to create a better Islamic lifestyle, the idea to reform society was also part of their long-term *dakwah* agenda from the start. The focus on this private aspect of *dakwah* was based on the movement's belief that reforming individual piety is the foundation from which to establish a better Islamic society. However, as noted above, I argue that the political conditions and constraints that repressed Islamist movements in Indonesia during the 1970s and early 1980s also led the *Tarbiyah* movement to spread their *dakwah* messages covertly, preventing them from having the opportunity to spread their *dakwah* more publicly.

In the section that follows, I then explain the development of the movement's *dakwah* with reference to the changing political climate in Indonesia, in which the government began to become more accommodating of Islamist groups at the end of

the 1980s. I argue that the shift in the government's attitude led *Tarbiyah* activists to perform their *dakwah* more overtly, although their *dakwah* orientation still focused on the reformation of individual piety. I also show why the *Tarbiyah* movement decided to establish an Islamic political party in 1998, and what the implications of this were for their *dakwah* movement.

My research revealed that the main reason for establishing this party was the belief in the integration of Islam and politics combined with the expectation that the party could significantly support their *dakwah*. In the next section, I discuss the more complex elements of the *Tarbiyah* movement's concept of *dakwah*. I argue that the movement not only focuses on strengthening the individual piety of its members, but also urges them (through the party) to be involved in public matters and state institutions in order to control public morality. In the final section, I explore the challenges for, and debates on, the *Liqo* in the different periods of the evolution of the *Tarbiyah* movement and the PKS. In particular, I investigate leadership and authority issues relating to the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement after the establishment of the PKS. I argue that although its leadership and authority exist on multiple levels, in which the Consultative Assembly (*Dewan Shura*) of the PKS is the highest authority, the mentors (*murabbi*) are regarded as the main reference point for the *Liqo* trainees (*mutarabbi*), especially at the *Liqo*'s lower levels.

4.2 *Dakwah* and the Islamist ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement: the concept of *Ghazwul Fikri* (ideological conquest)

Gerakan Tarbiyah (the *Tarbiyah* movement) or *Jamaah Tarbiyah* (the Society of *Tarbiyah*) is an Islamist movement in modern Indonesia.¹⁰⁰ It was officially founded by Hilmy Aminuddin,¹⁰¹ Salim Segaf al-Jufri,¹⁰² Abdullah Baharmus, and Encep Abdusyukur (a.k.a Acep Abdussyukur) in 1983, and is dedicated to *dakwah* (Permata, 2013). Although 1983 is cited as the official date of its establishment in my interviews with its leaders, its history can actually be traced back to 1968, when the Indonesian Islamic *Dakwah* Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, DDII), which was led by Natsir, focused their efforts on *dakwah* programs in university campuses through a program called *Bina Masjid Kampus* (Campus-Mosque Building) and organised the *dakwah* training called *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* (*Training for Dakwah Fighters*, LMD). Two key figures and founders of the *Tarbiyah* movement – Abu Ridho and Mashadi – were among the participants in this ‘LMD’ training (Luthfi, 2002). During my observation and interviews I often heard the names of two influential figures mentioned, who the members always referred to as the ‘founding fathers’ of the *Tarbiyah* movement – Abdi Sumaiti (a.k.a Abu Ridho) and Hilmy Aminuddin.

The LMD programme focused on training new cadres among university students throughout Indonesia to undertake *dakwah* activities (Platzdasch, 2009). The most

¹⁰⁰ Some scholars of the PKS/the *Tarbiyah* movement use *Jemaah Tarbiyah* or *Jamaah Tarbiyah* to refer to it – see Machmudi (2006) and Permata (2008; 2013) – whilst others refer to it as the *Tarbiyah* movement. I will refer to it as the *Tarbiyah* movement or the *Jamaah Tarbiyah* throughout the thesis.

¹⁰¹ Hilmy Aminuddin is the current Head of the *Majlis Shura* of the PKS, and is a graduate from the University of Islam, Medina (source: *Bayan DSP-PKS*, 21 Syawwal 1429/21 October 2008, accessed from official website www.pk-sejahtera.org in 10 August 2012).

¹⁰² Salim Segaf Al-Jufri is a grandson of the founder of a well-known educational institution – “al-Khairat” – in Makassar, Sulawesi (source: *Bayan DSP-PKS*, 21 Syawwal 1429/21 October 2008, accessed from official website www.pk-sejahtera.org in 10 August 2012)

influential figure in the LMD program was a senior leader of DDII, Imaduddin Abdurrachim.¹⁰³ Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Imaduddin Abdurrachim -better known as Bang Imad- was a key figure who first introduced the concept of an Islamic religious gathering or *pengajian* among Muslim student activists and this *pengajian* became a model for similar gatherings at other campus mosques in Indonesia (Damanik, 2002). One of the foremost universities that successfully attracted many students to join this programme was the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) where Bang Imad became a leading figure at the ITB's Salman Mosque. The *Tarbiyah* movement started their *pengajian*, *usrah*, or *halaqah* in this campus mosque (Hilmy, 2010).

The relationship between the DDII and the rise of the *Tarbiyah* movement can be measured not only through the training of the LMD but also through various other means such as sending students to study in Saudi Arabian and Egyptian universities, facilitating its graduates to be the mentors or teachers involved in teaching Islam and spreading Islamist ideas in university mosques or boarding schools, and translating, publishing and circulating books written by Islamist ideologues such as Qutb, al-Banna and Mawdudi (See Kahin, 2012). These programmes were funded by the Saudi Arabia government as part of its project of exporting Wahhabi/Salafi ideas, the two conservative creeds having been “cross bred” when MB activists from Egypt were exiled in the kingdom (see Chapter 2 and also Hasan, 2005). As the result of those programmes, the DDII has a great impact on changing Islamic discourse in Indonesia (Bruinessen, 2013).

¹⁰³ In establishing and running this LMD, Bang Imad, together with Endang Saefuddin Anshari (1938-1996), was personally supported by DDII's figurehead, Natsir. He also had been appointed general secretary of the Kuwait-based International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO) and later become a founder of ICMI (Latif, 2008; Hefner, 2000).

The four key *Tarbiyah* movement founders listed at the beginning of this section were worried about Indonesian Muslims living outside Islamic values, and created a *dakwah* movement to invite Muslims to return to living in accordance with Islam. In creating and developing their *dakwah* movement, they were inspired and influenced by the *dakwah* of the Egyptian MB. Scholars such as Permata (2013:241) have called the movement ‘the Indonesian branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’.¹⁰⁴

Concrete evidence that the *Tarbiyah* movement was influenced by the MB is the popular usage of the terms *ikhwan* (sing. *akhi*, brothers) and *akhawat* (sing. *ukhti*, sisters) to refer to fellow cadres; the former for male cadres and the latter for female cadres. The term ‘cadre’ refers to disciplined and committed members of an organisation. As much of the literature on Islamic activism by scholars such as Wiktorowicz (2001) notes, the ‘cadre’ is one of the most powerful aspects of Islamist *dakwah* movements. It is used in the MB tradition and other Islamist movements. The terms *mutarabbi* and *murabbi* are also roots of the term *Tarbiyah* (education). The use of the terms *mutarabbi* and *murabbi* among the *Liqo* community are the result of the influence of the MB in Egypt too. The founder of the MB, Hasan al-Banna, and the MB’s community, use these terms as they come from the Sufi *shaykh-murid* tradition (Lia, 1998). *Mutarabbi* is the Arabic term for a male trainee, and *mutarabbiyah* the term for a female trainee of the *Liqo*, whilst a *murabbi* is a male mentor and a *murabbiyah* is a female mentor.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ However, my interviews with both leaders and members suggested that they never clearly declared the *Tarbiyah* movement to be a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

¹⁰⁵ This relational model of the *Liqo* community was confirmed by a senior *Liqo* activist, who notes that (ideally) the relationship between trainees and their mentors in the *Liqo* goes beyond the formal

The founders of the *Tarbiyah* movement successfully attracted a certain demographic of people to join their movement – neo-urbanites, students and professional, well-educated individuals. They are mostly migrants who come to the city to study at higher educational institutions or to work as professionals. Because they generally live far from their families, joining the *Tarbiyah* movement gives them the benefits of a type of family support, as well as new friendships and networks. Although these new recruits come from a variety of backgrounds in terms of their religious and social affiliations – such as the Salafi group, NU, Muhammadiyah, DDII, and HMI – they are bound by the same benefits mentioned above (See Machmudi, 2006). During the *Tarbiyah* movement’s early stages, its leaders created small groups for regular religious training sessions, called *Liqo* or *Halaqah*. These cell-like groupings consist of one mentor or trainer who recruits, trains and supervises 6-10 trainees (Permata, 2013). Although a *Liqo* group is small, its members meet ‘socially’ every week. The movement gradually expanded the *Liqo* numbers through inviting members of the wider society to join the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement. As a result, by the 1990s the *Tarbiyah* movement “had stable networks in many universities in major cities across the country, and it started taking over intra-curricular and extra-curricular student organizations” (Permata, 2013:252).

In 1998 the *Tarbiyah* movement established a political party called the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*, PK), which was then renamed the Prosperous and Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS) in 2003. The emergence of the *Tarbiyah*

relation between teachers and students in other classes, as they are (ideally) very close both inside and outside the *Liqo* sessions (see section 5.4).

movement and their ‘active’ *dakwah* cannot be separated from their critiques of the modern phenomena that have influenced Muslim’s lives. They believe in the need to be active in conducting *dakwah* so that Muslims can avoid being influenced by non-Islamic (Western) ideologies and cultures.

A concept that has been particularly important in articulating the critical stance toward modern social phenomena put forward by the *Tarbiyah* movement in Indonesia is that of *ghazwul fikri*.¹⁰⁶ The importance of this concept can be seen through the way it has shaped their *dakwah* and its criticisms of modern social changes in both the Indonesian context and the global Muslim world. This concept, which literally means “ideological conquest” (Hirschkind, 2009), is used by the *Tarbiyah* movement to refer to the conquest of Muslim countries by the West, and indeed to any social, cultural, economic or political changes that are believed to have been intentionally designed by the West to influence people in Muslim countries to adopt Western cultural values (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005:174). This concept can therefore be translated as “cultural imperialism” (Al-Hudaybi, 1969; Gilsenan, 2000; Hirschkind, 2009).

The clear explanation about their perception of *ghazwul fikri* is described in their manual of *dakwah*:

Physical wars that have been carried out by the enemies of Islam are always failure[s]. They change their strategy by using a very soft attack through economics, politics, and culture. They expect[ed] that Muslims would follow them. This threat was conducted professionally until Muslims did not notice about them (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005:173).

¹⁰⁶ The concept of *ghazwul fikri* was already used by the Muhammadiyah scholar Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (HAMKA) in 1969 in his article “Beberapa tantangan terhadap Islam di masa kini”, *Pandji Masyarakat* 4:50 (1970). Unfortunately, due to lack of access to the *Tarbiyah* movements’ literature of the 1980s and 1990s, I cannot trace its initial use by the *Tarbiyah* leaders.

Even though this book is a contemporary document written after they established a party, the idea of *ghazwul fikri* has been taught since the beginning of the movement in the early 1980s (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta). There was a perception among the *Tarbiyah* movement that although the occupation and colonisation of Muslim countries by the West ended in the middle of the Twentieth Century, the domination of the West in the post-colonial world has continued through the invasion of their ideas and cultures in the globalised Muslim world. The issue of Western cultural domination, therefore, has influenced the *dakwah* concerns of the *Tarbiyah* movement in Indonesia since its inception. Thus, avoiding dressing in Western styles was considered by them to be one way of fighting against the domination of Western culture. The idea of *ghazwul fikri* also shaped the movement in strengthening other Islamic ‘communal’ identities among its members.

For the *Tarbiyah* movement, the increasing hegemony of Western cultures has led to the loss of Islamic culture from Muslims’ everyday lives. They argue that Western cultural hegemony has attacked both Islam and Muslim lives through the mass media, films, and secular education systems. Both the leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement and the mentors of the *Liqo (murabbi)* often ground *dakwah* in the need to counter the ‘dangers’ that have emerged for Muslims as a result of *ghazwul fikri*. They believe that this Western project has caused the spread of distorted or false understandings of Islamic values among Indonesian Muslims in particular, and among Muslims in other parts of the world also. Their *dakwah*, then, is central to their struggle ‘to save Islam and Muslims’.

This concept grounds the criticism of modern society and is spread widely among the *Tarbiyah* community, from the top to the lower levels of its hierarchy. A variety

of lessons delivered in the weekly *Liqo* (religious circle) sessions are often linked to this concept (see Section 5.3 and Chapter 6). For example, the lessons of *Akhlaq* (morality) or *Adab* (etiquette) are linked to the increasing moral degradation of young Muslims. The movement sees their moral degradation in the clothes worn by Muslim youth to the behaviours shown in their everyday lives. They believe that this represents the impact of globalised Western cultures among Muslim youth. A senior *Liqo* mentor put it thus:

Let's see the reality. There is much evidence supporting this suspicion. As an example, let us take a look at teenagers' phenomena here [in Jakarta and Bekasi]. Most of them no longer have a respect for the Prophet Muhammad. They also do not know their life's aim [based on Islamic teachings] (Ridho, 40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi, Staff to a PKS legislator).¹⁰⁷

Another example is the lesson of *akidah* (faith), which is linked to political issues. For the *Tarbiyah* movement choosing a pious Muslim leader is one important step for directing the government towards applying *shari'ah* to the public sphere, whilst choosing non-Muslims as political leaders will lead to the government failing to apply *shari'ah*. They also believe that government policies will be easily dictated and influenced by Western governments if non-Muslim leaders are selected. The official leaders of the *Liqo* and the PKS consider the true *akidah* to be the most important aspect in choosing local and national leaders. A leader of the PKS who was a senior *murabbi* explained to me how the community considered *akidah* to be very important for making political decisions related to the election of Jakarta's governor, which was conducted during my fieldwork in 2012:

The process of selecting a candidate [as Jakarta's governor] supported by the PKS was very long. Why do we reject Jokowi for the governor and support

¹⁰⁷ Interviewed on 17/10/2012.

[the] other candidate named Foke?¹⁰⁸ We are very concerned about the aspect of *akidah*, because the success or failure of leadership in a democratic system is very biased. For instance, when Jokowi is considered as one among the best city mayors [in a survey], it is a biased assessment. There is also an indication that he is involved in corruption, and the evidence was hidden by the Committee for Corruption Eradication (KPK). In addition to that, from the study of a statistics body, it is mentioned that the percentage of poverty increased about 11% in the city that he governed before. We, then, concluded that the standard of his achievement is biased. There is always a position who agree and disagree with this achievement's standard. This also happens to other candidates for governor. We, therefore, made an objective and valid standard, which is the aspect of *akidah* (Muhammad, 30s, young leader, male, Bekasi, local preacher and school teacher).¹⁰⁹

This explanation indicates that leaders of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement attempt to connect religious piety with political affairs. Whether a candidate for the role of the governor has a good track record in leadership is not considered as being relevant by the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement. As long as his *akidah* is in line with the 'true' *akidah*, they will vote for the candidate. In my opinion, this suggests that the *dakwah* ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement requires all its cadres to link *akidah* (belief) to politics, and this is in line with their general aim to expand their focus from individual religiosity to public morality in general. Choosing a leader with a strong background in *akidah* will, in turn, facilitate public morality because the leader will represent a key symbol and model for the people. This shows that the typical *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement seeks to discipline other people, and requires them to follow their set of beliefs. My informal conversations with the majority of the *Liqo* trainees and mentors revealed that those who cannot be elected as leaders

¹⁰⁸ Jokowi (original name; Joko Widodo) and Ahok (original name; Basuki Cahaya Purnama) were supported by two secular-nationalist parties – The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P) and Gerindra, while the incumbent governor, Foke (original name: Fauzi Bowo), and his vice candidate, Nachrowi, were supported by the rest of the big parties, including nationalist and Islamist parties such as GOLKAR, The Democrat party, The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), The National Awakening Party (PKB) and The United Development Party (PPP), amongst others. From my observations during their campaign period, the incumbent candidate was convinced that he would win the election due to the massive political support he had from these parties. However, Jokowi and Ahok ultimately received a very significant majority of votes to become Jakarta's governor and vice governor for the period 2012–2017 (www.thejakartapost.com/channel/nasional, accessed in 20 September 2012).

¹⁰⁹ Interviewed on 08/09/2012.

due to their ‘distorted’ *akidah* include non-Muslims, Muslim secularists/liberalists, and Muslim syncretises (*abangan*).¹¹⁰

However, the attitude that the PKS has to this issue seems to have changed prior to the 2004 election. They have tried to be ‘open’ to non-Muslims joining the party and being party candidates for certain political positions. Scholars including Shihab and Nugroho (2008) and Permata (2008; 2013) see this as a political strategy to gain more votes. I think this suddenly more ‘open’ attitude can not only be seen as a political strategy, but also as part of their *dakwah* strategy to gain wider popularity among Indonesian Muslims.

The lesson of *akidah* is also strongly linked to the concept of *ghazwul fikri* in terms of ‘unjust’ Western dealings with Muslims beyond Indonesia, in Syria, Egypt and, primarily, Palestine. The term tends to be connected with Zionism instead of referring to the West *per se*. For the *Liqo-Jamaah Tarbiyah*, Zionism refers to the movement that aims to return Jews to their homeland in Palestine (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005:175). This definition can be found in their book, *Manhaj Tarbiyah* (2005):

One of the groups that keep fighting against Islam is Zionism which spread its organizational branches throughout the world. The main project of Zionism is to establish the Israel state in the land of Palestine. Moreover, there are still many crimes planned by Zionism to harm Islam and Muslims (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005:175-176).

¹¹⁰ In the election for Jakarta’s governor, Jokowi was perceived as not being a pious Muslim since he came from an *abangan* background (syncretic), while Ahok was a Chinese Christian. Jokowi was also a member of the PDI-P (The Indonesian Democratic Party), which declared a secularist-nationalist ideology, and was supported mostly by those from *abangan* backgrounds.

Here, it is implicitly suggested that Zionism infiltrates many countries. Under the concept of *ghazwul fikri*, the *Tarbiyah* movement widely believes that the unjust attitudes taken towards Muslims in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, amongst other countries, represent the core of a Jewish and Christian conspiracy against Muslim power (see Chapter 6). That is why the *Tarbiyah* community is the most active movement in Indonesia in terms of its protests against American support for Israel, and in its campaign to promote and encourage the distrust of Western countries (Bubalo and Fealy, 2005). The Palestine-Israel conflict is indeed one of the core issues among Islamist movements throughout the Middle East and the wider Muslim world, as it is considered to be the manifestation of Muslims' experiences of the injustice experienced by the global *ummah* (Mandaville, 2007).

The movement's claims implicitly suggest that Christians as well as Jews are proponents of Zionism. In Islamist discourse, both Christians and Jews are connected with Western colonialism and Zionism (Esposito, 2010), being regarded as 'unbelievers', and seen as partners in a conspiracy against Islam. Van Bruinessen's (2003) research on the PKS supports this position. He argues that the PKS strongly believes in anti-Islamic conspiracies, and that they are comprised of anti-Zionist, anti-Western, anti-liberal and anti-secularist Muslims (Bruinessen, 2003). This characterisation is supported by quotes in the *Liqo's dakwah* manual from the *al-Baqarah* (the Cow) – a chapter of the Qur'an – which are used to justify the PKS's belief on Jews and Christians:

The battle between the right (*Haq*) and wrong (*bathil*) is continuous all the time as the Qur'an mentioned in Al-Baqarah: 120 '*Neither the Jews, nor the*

Christians, will accept you unless you follow their religion’ (Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005:175).¹¹¹

The *dakwah* manual explains that the lesson of *ghazwul fikri* in the weekly *Liqo* sessions aims to make members aware that there are numerous movements seeking to defeat and harm Muslims:

To be aware of very soft ... anti-Islam movements, especially international Zionism, to know various projects of these anti-Islam groups in defeating Muslims, to avoid ... being trapped in a heated debate carried out by these groups, and to know that Israel is a Zionist state (*Manhaj Tarbiyah, 2005: 175*).¹¹²

The leaders of the movement, therefore, aim to teach and spread this concept to their members in as close a way to that which is written in this *dakwah* manual book as possible. As a result, this concept has spread widely among the *Tarbiyah* community in Indonesia.

This idea of *ghazwul fikri* evokes the classic Islamist rhetoric about the battle or clash between Islam and the West, which is a defining theme of modernity for many Islamist movements and thinkers. In the Twentieth Century, Islamism represented the response or opposition to the influence of other ‘isms’ from the West, such as colonialism and secularism (see Chapter 1). The *dakwah* ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement and the strategies it adopts in its Islamisation project are borrowed from the ideology of MB in Egypt and include: (i) the Islamisation of individuals, (ii) the Islamisation of families, (iii) the Islamisation of society, and (iv) the Islamisation of the political system or state (Mitchell, 1993). These strategies are thus shaped by the

¹¹¹ The translation of this verse of the Qur’an is also referenced in their manual: ‘*Neither the Jews, nor the Christians, will accept you unless you follow their religion*’. This verse was originally written in Indonesian, but I use one of the English translations provided by Yusuf Ali (2006).

¹¹² I summarised and translated this statement into English from the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* (2005:175).

founder and leaders of the movement to respond to other ideologies, such as secularism, liberalism and Zionism. My research and observations revealed that their *dakwah* ideology emerged and was shaped by the concept of *ghazwul fikri* in order to prevent Western influences on Muslims, being developed in different *dakwah* phases of the *Tarbiyah* movement, as the next sections show.

4.3 The *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement in the repressive political period (1970s-1980s)

The 1970s–1980s was an era in which the Indonesian government issued strict policies for controlling political Islam (see Chapter 2). It was a difficult and challenging era for the Islamists in Indonesia to conduct overt *dakwah* activities. The government prohibited Muslim leaders from being involved in political affairs, such as forming Islamic parties or discussing political issues in the public sphere (Effendy, 2003). Prominent leaders of the *Masyumi* – the biggest Islamic political party in the period of the Old Order (1945–1965) – were one well-known example of those forbidden to engage in politics during this period. Similarly, the *Masyumi* party was not permitted to be active (Effendy, 2003). This had not been expected by the *Masyumi*'s leaders who, at the beginning of the New Order (the end of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1970s) had hoped that the party would be able to participate in political contests again after being disbanded by the Old Order government in the previous period of leadership. In addition, other Muslim leaders who spoke about political issues in public spaces, such as in mosques, schools, and campuses, were also strictly monitored by the government (see Chapter 2). According to Yudi Latif (2008:369), Muslim leaders in this era, especially Islamists, experienced 'acute socio-political dislocation' driven by state repression.

In such a socio-political context, many Islamist leaders, and particularly those who were involved in *Masyumi*, attempted to establish new religious movements that did not have political orientations (Latif, 2008). DDII was a new vehicle for their religious movement (See Chapter 2). They used campus mosques as places for training and educating young people, constructing and strengthening their Islamic identity and collective solidarity (see Section 4.2). Thus the programs of *Bina Masjid Kampus* and *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* (LMD) provided an alternative for the would-be Muslim campus activists (Hilmy, 2010; Platzdasch, 2009). The selection of these mosques indicates that the movement was targeting well-educated middle-class society. The Islamist leaders gradually played a significant role in establishing the new phenomenon of *dakwah*-oriented students at secular universities. This phenomenon spread from one major city to another, and created the so-called ‘Islamic turn’ (Latif, 2008).

The early *Tarbiyah* movement emerged from this broader range of Islamic movement activity. In the early *dakwah* movement, this community was unnamed, as a young leader of the *Tarbiyah* movement explained during an interview (Darmanto, 30s, senior mentor, male, Jakarta, staff to at PKS legislator).¹¹³ Later, the movement gradually came to be known among the internal members as the community of *usrah* (family) which invokes a MB inspiration.¹¹⁴ The term *usrah* was not familiar yet to the wider society and Noura, an early female *Tarbiyah*

¹¹³ Interviewed on 04/09/2012.

¹¹⁴ The concept of *usrah* was taken from the term used by the MB in Egypt. The MB officially uses this term to refer to its system for recruiting and developing its trainees (Mitchell, 1993). They use the family system (*nizam al-usrah*) in their *Tarbiyah* activities, which were composed of groups with 6-10 members each, in which one person is chosen to be the leader of the group, representing a ‘family’. This system gathers many people bound by the same religious interests in order to educate (*Tarbiyah*) them and prepare their *dakwah* to Islamise society and the state.

activist that I interviewed at headquarters of the PKS (the *Markaz ad-Dakwah*) emphasised that:

The wider society still did not have any idea what to call this *Jamaah Tarbiyah* in the early 1980s. At that time, it was widely regarded as an underground organisation called OTB (*Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk*/Organisation without Form) or OBT (*Organisasi Bawah Tanah*/ Underground Organisation) (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta).¹¹⁵

Through my interviews with the leaders, I saw that, as an impact of the repressive attitude of the government, *Tarbiyah* activists in the early 1980s limited the scope of their *dakwah* activities to a narrow audience. A key female leader of the *Tarbiyah* who introduced herself as a member of the first generation of the *Tarbiyah* community, explained when I interviewed her in the *Markaz Dakwah* (centre of *dakwah*) of the PKS:

During the *mihwar tanzimi* (the formation period), the programmes of the *Liqo* were conducted in very ‘narrow’ [or marginal] places, such as kitchens, corners of *mushalla* [small mosques], and other places that enabled them to sit or *melingkar* [to sit within a circle].¹¹⁶ (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta).¹¹⁷

Likewise, they hid the structure of the organisation and the trainers, mentors and coordinators of the *Tarbiyah* movement and its weekly training programme. During this repressive regime, they held that ‘the structural organisation [of *dakwah*] is secret and the *dakwah* is open’ (*Sirriyah al-Tanzim wa ‘Alamiyah al-Dakwah*, DPP-PKS, 2003:27). The impact of this idea is still seen in the attitudes of some current *Tarbiyah* activists, especially those at the grassroots level. In my fieldwork diary, I

¹¹⁵ Interviewed on 18/10/2012.

¹¹⁶ *Melingkar* (making a circle) is one of the characteristics of their religious meetings or study circles. Sitting in a circle formation made it easier for the teacher to deliver and discuss the religious materials, and to deepen and intensify the interactions among members of the *Halaqah* group.

¹¹⁷ Interviewed on 18/10/2012.

wrote about how my interview and observation requests were rejected by six *dakwah* activists on the basis that they were unable to share their opinions (mainly about the hierarchy or the contents of the *Liqo*) with outsiders. They said that they were worried about making statements that were factually mistaken or that misrepresented the movement, and suggested that I meet their *Liqo* seniors instead. Nevertheless, Siddik – a key figure of the *Tarbiyah* movement – once said that this secrecy only applied at the beginning of the *Tarbiyah* movement, under the Soeharto regime. According to one of my respondents, the secret nature of their *dakwah* hierarchy was no longer applied by the current *Tarbiyah* activists, because today's situation is different to that in the past, and there is no longer any need to hide their *dakwah* structure (Machmudi, 40s, founding members of the PKS/senior mentor of the *Tarbiyah* movement, Depok, University lecturer).¹¹⁸

When I interviewed him, Machmudi explained that this secret nature of the organisation led to a secret process for recruiting new *Tarbiyah* cadres in the past. He said that the recruitment of new members for the weekly training sessions was at the time only undertaken among people close to existing members, and not openly among the wider society. Later, the weekly training session was gradually known as the *Liqo* (small religious circle).¹¹⁹ According to the majority of my respondents, this *Liqo* programme had a very limited number of trainees (*mutarabbi*) and mentors (*murabbi*) at the very beginning of the 1980s, but by the middle of the 1980s, they had been successful in recruiting a large number of students from the young

¹¹⁸ Interviewed on 03/08/2012.

¹¹⁹ This weekly training was also called *Halaqah* (Arabic for religious circle). The term *Liqo* (meeting) and *Halaqah* (religious circle) refer to the same weekly religious mentoring developed for the purpose of teaching the religious doctrine and ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement. Although the term *Halaqah* is mainly used in the *Tarbiyah* movement's official books, I prefer to use the term *Liqo* because my observations and interviews revealed that it is more widely used by the *Liqo* community than the term *Halaqah*.

generations, including many educated people who were attracted towards studying Islam (Machmudi, 2006; Damanik, 2002; Rahmat, 2005; 2008).

According to leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement, including Noura, Machmudi, and Abdullah, there were no well-structured or well-organised materials and methods used in the *Liqo* or *dakwah* training during this early phase, or in the *Tarbiyah* movement as a whole. This is understandable given the fact that it was then an informally structured movement. The unstructured beginnings of the *Liqo* of *Tarbiyah* movement mean that the teaching materials at this point were taken from various sources that accommodated many different strands of Islamic thought. Neither were there any standard or enforced methods for delivering their religious messages, which were largely left to the expertise of each individual mentor. These initial cadres obtained their *dakwah* skills from their interactions with people and books that have links with the *dakwah* ideologies of the Egyptian MB. The *Liqo* training and the *dakwah* activities as a whole were later gradually developed by key leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement by developing both the knowledge and skills of the mentors, considering the interests of the members, and providing religious materials (the *Tarbiyah* manual 2005) for the mentors.

The early 1980s was the period in which the reforming of individual religiosity was emphasised as the *Tarbiyah* movement's *dakwah* message. This era was known among the activists as 'the period of *Tarbiyah* training' (Abdurrahim, 2005:140). As written in one of the official books I reviewed, the development of individual religiosity was the main goal of the *Tarbiyah* movement in this period.

After joining the *Liqo* or other *dakwah* activities, trainees are expected [by the *Tarbiyah* movement] able to develop their individual religiosity, which includes: 1) having understanding of the basics of Islam; 2) having good

akhlaq/moral; 3) having no influence from any idolatry or polytheism (*kemusyrikan*); and 4) having no relationships with enemies of Islam [individuals or institutions] (DPP-PKS, 2003:5).

Moreover, the leaders and senior activists of the *Tarbiyah* that I interviewed emphasised that their goal was to create individuals with certain *Tarbiyah*-designed ‘characteristics’ known as *al-Muwashafat al-Tarbawiyah* (PKS, 2003:5-9).

Tarbiyah-based individual religiosity is created and developed through weekly *Liqo* training (see Chapter 5). The training is intentionally directed by the *Tarbiyah* activists in a way that aims to develop *Syakhsiyah Islamiyah* (Islamic personality), which covers beliefs (*akidah*), rituals (*ibadah*), and the behavioural ethics and lifestyles (*akhlaq*) of Muslims (see Chapter 6). In order to strengthen the formation of individual religiosity, the weekly training during the early phases of the *Liqo* primarily discussed the issue of Islamic personality. Subjects of *Tafsir*, *Hadith*, *Fiqh* and *Sirah* were taught to *Tarbiyah* activists with the aim of making them better Muslims in their daily lives.

The *Tarbiyah* movement’s emphasis on individual religiosity in their *dakwah* movement was driven by their strong belief that to turn inwards towards the self is the best solution for Muslims’ problems. This idea of individual religiosity endeavoured to establish a better religious understanding within Muslim individuals and the skills to apply this understanding to their daily lives (PKS, 2003: 1-3). The idea of Islamising the self was the concern of young students not only in Indonesia, but globally in the 1970s and 80s. In this period, Muslims around the world were also concerned with the idea of an Islamic state, which was a global trend that travelled to many Muslim countries (Mandaville, 2007).

One of the important lessons of individual piety preached by the *Tarbiyah* movement leaders is to encourage all of their members, particularly the male ones, to be individuals who are closely ‘connected with mosques’ in their daily lives. Ahmad, one of the top leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement, and head of the *Shari’ah* Council (*Dewan Syariah Pusat/DSP*) of the PKS, who is responsible for giving guidance on religious matters, explained that *Tarbiyah* activists’ regular attendance of public mosques for prayer, reciting the Qur’an, and other religious activities is part of the requirement relating to personal character building that must be fulfilled by all *Tarbiyah* cadres. Ahmad believed that this represents the basis for building many other aspects of a pious Muslims’ character and activism:

[If they follow this guidance to come to the mosques frequently], they should be ready and active to offer any help in mosques, for instance for becoming a leader of prayer (*Imam*); delivering religious sermons (*khutbah* or *dakwah*); or assisting other religious and social services at the mosques, such as giving alms (*sadaqah*). The *Tarbiyah* movement’s doctrine that we really emphasised to the activists is that they work – just work with feelings of *ikhlas* (sincerity) and *itqan* (being well-structured and professional), as has been taught by Islam (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).¹²⁰

Another means of building individual piety that is widely known, and has been practised by *Tarbiyah* activists, is related to dress code. In an interview with a young leader, he informed me that during its early phase, it was easy to recognise *Tarbiyah* activists simply by looking at their dress (see Chapter 6). He emphasised that the Islamic identity of the *Tarbiyah* community at that time was very strong, explaining that:

¹²⁰ Interviewed twice on 27/08/2012 and 17/10/2012. He also said that because of the ‘moderate’ nature of the Islamic messages delivered by the *Tarbiyah* movement’s preachers and leaders of prayer, many audiences listen to them. This, in some cases, has led to the emergence of jealousy among people from different mass organisations. A study conducted by Zuhrie (2013) reveals that this very strong connection and commitment to the mosque led the *Tarbiyah* activists in Klaten (Central Java) to occupy a *Muhammadiyah* mosque, *Al-Muttaqun*, which then led to conflict between *Tarbiyah* movement and *Muhammadiyah* activists (see Chapter 5).

They have specific dress for both men and women [that are] considered to be more representative of Islam. For instance, the *koko* [a *Tarbiyah* style of religious clothes] for men and the *baju terusan panjang*, *jubah* or *abaya* [a long dress] and long headscarf for women were mostly practiced in their daily life. Apart from that, both men and women were also forbidden to wear jeans (Salim, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta).¹²¹

Wearing jeans was forbidden for both men and women because it was perceived to be a form of Western clothing style. This provides further evidence that the *Tarbiyah* movement has an anti-Western ideology (see Section 4.2). Moreover, for women, wearing jeans was regarded as being un-Islamic because it is a common form of male clothing (see Chapter 6).

The *dakwah* orientation of the *Tarbiyah* movement was influenced by the ideology of *ghazwul fikri*. The community perceived the West as being the enemy of Muslims, who could not defeat Muslims through a physical war, and so changed their strategy to a 'soft war' using cultural imperialism (see Section 4.2). The overall *dakwah* ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement attracted more students to enter the weekly religious *Liqo*. Machmudi, a leader of the *Tarbiyah*, explained this further in an interview:

The *Tarbiyah*'s focus on improving individual religiosity attracted university students to join the *Liqo*. They found the *Tarbiyah* offered them a more individual approach that is concerned with their personal development of religiosity. This approach cannot be found in other Islamic organisations such as HMI [*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*/Islamic Student Association], PII [*Pelajar Islam Indonesia*/Indonesian Islamic Student], and PMII [*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*/Indonesian Islamic Student Union], which are regarded as too focused on [the] political or economic issues of the country (Machmudi, founding members of PKS/senior mentor of the *Tarbiyah*, 40s, Depok, University lecturer).¹²²

¹²¹ Interviewed on 09/10/2012. For a description of the typical dress of the women's *Liqo* community, see Chapter 6.

¹²² Interviewed on 03/08/2012.

Machmudi (2006) argued in his PhD thesis that the process of Islamisation at secular campuses was successful in this period and continued to grow during the 1990s:

The prestigious state universities in Java, such as the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), [the] University of Indonesia (UI), Gadjah Mada University (UGM), [the] Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), Airlangga University (Unair) and the Sepuluh November Institute of Technology (ITS) have become strongholds of [the] *Tarbiyah* movement (Machmudi, 2006:112).

The students' interest in attending the *Liqo* and learning the *dakwah* ideologies of the *Tarbiyah* was driven by the same motives as the movement itself. They worried about the attitudes of the Indonesian government towards political Islam and the global political tendency that has led to the absence of Islam from the public sphere (see Chapter 1). They feel the need to pay attention to this phenomenon and to Islamise the self and then society through their involvement in the *Liqo* (see Chapters 5 and 6).

4.4 The *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement in the 'more accommodative' political period (1990-1997)

Unlike in the previous decade, from the end of the 1980s, the New Order government (1986-1997) started to accommodate Islamic movements (see Chapter 2). In this period, the government supported Islamic organisations in establishing mosques (Effendy, 2003). Around one hundred new mosques were established by the government, which also allowed civil servants to express their religious (Islamic) identity in state offices through conducting Friday prayers, giving lectures on Islamic subjects, and wearing Islamic dress – a factor that was important for Muslim women in particular (Latif, 2008). Such religious allowances were not made during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Furthermore, in 1992, the government

supported and even subsidised Islamist leaders and neo-revivalist figures in establishing an Islamic organisation named ICMI (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars) (Hefner, 2000).¹²³ Regardless, the shift of the government's attitude was also a political strategy for domesticating and gaining political support and legitimacy from Muslims through providing more freedom and privilege for Islamic organisations.

I argue that the shift in the government's political attitude, which was welcomed by Islamic movements, encouraged the *Tarbiyah* movement to take advantage of opportunities to expand the scope of their *dakwah* and its audience. Whilst the *Tarbiyah* movement had previously focused on campuses and disseminated its ideas covertly, the movement now began to target wider social groups from various backgrounds, as well as institutions, and spread its ideas overtly. Noura gave me a brief account of the *Tarbiyah's* shift from an 'underground' movement conducting its *dakwah* activities in small and marginal places to a more open movement promoting its ideas in public areas. She said: "then, after [the] political conditions [became] more conducive, the scope of our *dakwah* broadened into wider society". Noura thus states that the shift in political opportunities (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012) was the factor that led the movement to preach their messages overtly, and to target wider society.

¹²³ There was a debate among Muslim leaders about whether this organisation (ICMI) was initiated to give Muslim leaders a 'space' for aggregating and articulating Muslim political interests due to their position as a majority of the population, or whether it was only used by the government to domesticate Islamic organisations and gain more legitimacy from them (Latif, 2008). For me, however, both purposes could have been pursued at the same time. The shift in the Government's attitude to Islamic movements might have been based on taking and giving or on mutual benefit. The organisation itself was chaired by Habibie, one of the influential ministers in the cabinet, and well known for having close relationships with Islamic figures.

The *dakwah* activities were performed by senior *Tarbiyah* activists.¹²⁴ As Noura explained further:

The *Tarbiyah* activists entered the mosques and religious institutions, and most of the activists were known as *ustadz* [religious teacher] or *muballigh* [preachers]. *Ustadz* or *muballigh*, trained not only the younger activists in [the] groups, but also gave lectures at various public places overtly, such as campuses, offices, and mosques (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta).¹²⁵

From interviews I held with the early activists of the *Tarbiyah* movement, I concluded that the senior cadres of the *Tarbiyah* movement played a significant role in spreading their *dakwah* ideologies from private to public places, such as offices, large mosques, schools or other educational institutions, and other public places. These senior cadres also established social and educational services, such as Islamic schools and religious institutions. These educational and social activities supported the *Tarbiyah* movement in enlarging their *dakwah* audiences beyond university mosques.

The senior members of the *Tarbiyah* movement referred to this period as *mihwar sha'bi* (the popular phase). From the interviews I held with the leaders of *Tarbiyah* movement and by examining their official texts, I found that this term meant that the *Tarbiyah* members who were trained in the previous period were now required to interact with the wider society and to take part in educating it (*al-irsyad al-mujtama'*) (MPP PKS, 2008a: 57). A statement from a key leader of the *Tarbiyah* movement, for instance, makes it clear that:

¹²⁴ During the early development of the *Liqo* in the 1980s and the early and middle part of the 1990s, this movement had numerous *Liqo* figures, with different sorts of expertise in Islamic studies. They were well known among the *Liqo* community, and widely referred to using the title '*ustadz*', which means teachers of religious or Islamic subjects. The title '*ustadz*' was not a formal or official appointment, but established through an informal process of recognition. This recognition developed over years of interactions between the *Liqo* and the *Tarbiyah* community through various opportunities provided by both formal and informal activities.

¹²⁵ Interviewed on 08/10/2012.

After having a *mihwar tanzimi*, we then have a *mihwar sha'bi*. *Sha'bi* means society. We have indeed many instruments and activities in reaching our society [in this phase] (Fatih, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta).¹²⁶

In this period, *Tarbiyah* members who already had distinctive *Tarbiyah* characteristics (*tamayuz*) were expected by the leaders to spread and conduct non-verbal *dakwah* among Indonesian society. Verbal *dakwah* here involves a call to religious piety which, according to the movement, is achieved by members providing themselves as role models for society, as indicated by a statement from a leader of the *Tarbiyah* movement:

There is guidance (*kaidah*) that [members] should always be reminded [of]: all of us [*Tarbiyah* members] must interact with anybody with our Islamic 'uniqueness' (*fa-l yakhtalithuun wa-laakin yatamayyazuun*). This guidance does not require the members to be exclusive, but [to be] blended within the society without losing their 'uniqueness'. However, we are aware that, as a consequence of our social interaction (*mu'amalah*), people might say that we are very exclusive, strange or something else (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).¹²⁷

In my observations of their behaviour and attitudes, however, this guidance not only created the 'uniqueness' of its members, but also their distinctive characters – in the sense of their ideologies and practices. Three interviewees from non-*Tarbiyah*/PKS backgrounds, for instance, strongly opined that “the *Liqo* members' ways of thinking and behaviours are 'strange' or 'odd' as compared to the wider Indonesian Muslims” (Fachruddin, Muiz and Masdar, age group 40s-50s, Jakarta, university lecturers).¹²⁸ Fachruddin, for instance, gives an example:

My neighbour who is a cadre of the *Tarbiyah* movement –whenever he has a chance to talk with me-- is continuously condemning the activists of democracy and human rights (*Hak Azasi Manusia*, HAM) as having no contribution at all to Muslims both in Indonesia and Palestine [overseas].

¹²⁶ Interviewed on 21/11/2012.

¹²⁷ Interviewed on 27/08/2012 and 17/10/2012.

¹²⁸ Interviewed on 08/11/2012, 12/11/2012 and 12/11/2012.

Rather, they are bad influences in terms of the adoption of Western ideas or cultures among Muslim youth (40s, male, Jakarta, university lecturer).¹²⁹

The *Liqo* members were required by the leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement to participate in a variety of public outreach events, such as community events. The public events aimed to disseminate the movement's ideology and also to draw in new members. Like other Islamist movements, any social interaction is seen by the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement as an opportunity for *dakwah* (see Chapter 5.3).¹³⁰

In addition, *Tarbiyah* activists started to mobilise their public *dakwah* activities through training and education centres, charity centres, cultural activities, free medical services, and so on. Fatih, a key leader of the *Tarbiyah* movement, explained various activities in this period (1990-1998) as follows:

We started to develop publishing institutions such as Rabbani Press, *asy-Shamil*, Intermedia, and many more. We have many social, educational, and cultural institutions, such as the council for giving alms [*zakat*], the Integrated Islamic Primary School [*Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu/SDIT*], the School *Dakwah* Union [*Lembaga Dakwah Sekolah/LDS*], the Campus *Dakwah* Union [*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/LDK*], and other smaller *dakwah* movements, as managed by *Tarbiyah* female activists for women in the society (Fatih, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta).¹³¹

These institutions were established by the *Tarbiyah* cadres to promote their *dakwah* messages to wider audiences and to help people understand these messages. These centres are the main medium of interaction between the *Tarbiyah* community and wider communities. Through my observations and interviews with the majority of the *Tarbiyah* movement leaders, I found that through these centres, the *Tarbiyah*

¹²⁹ Interviewed on 08/11/2012.

¹³⁰ This can be seen in other studies of Islamist movements, such as Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (Wiktorowicz, 2001), the Muslim Brotherhood and the female mosque movement in Egypt (Gilsenan, 1973; Mahmood, 2005), and Al-Muhajirun in the UK (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

¹³¹ Interviewed on 21/11/2012.

movement not only provides basic goods and free services to the wider community, but also promotes their ideological values. In many cases, through providing services and programmes, the *Tarbiyah* movement aimed to spread their public *dakwah* messages and foster a more religious Indonesian society.¹³² This range of centres, from charities to educational institutions, is part of the *Tarbiyah* movement's main *dakwah* ideology and strategy (see Chapter 5.3.2).

4.5 The *Tarbiyah* movement as a political party during the democratic period (1998-present day)

Although the Indonesian political system had been more 'accommodating' of Islamic groups at the end of the New Order government (from the end of 1980s until 1998), the rise of the new regime in 1998 evoked new and greater expectations amongst the *Tarbiyah* movement's senior members, and enabled them to further strengthen involvement in the public arena. From 1998, it was open for any group, whether Islamic or secularist, to participate in the general elections that are conducted every five years.

1998 was thus considered by the *Tarbiyah* movement as marking the beginning of the new *dakwah* phase – which is often called *mihwar mu'assasi* (the political penetration phase) or *al-'am al-intikhabi* (the election period).¹³³ A leader of the *Tarbiyah* movement and the head of cadre development's division of the PKS, for instance, explained in one of the official documents that this period refers to:

¹³² This is similar to the MB in Egypt, which built various centres to support their *dakwah* movement (Mitchell, 1993; Mandaville 2007/2014).

¹³³ For further discussion of this phase, see MPP-PKS (2008a; 2008b); Abdurrahim (2005).

These years are years for struggle to strengthen the existence of our political movement for the sake of *dakwah*, *al wujud al-siyasi li al-dakwah* (translate) In this era, all cadres should become voters and constituents in the wider society. The cadres should perform their *dakwah* and politics in order to gain love and sympathy [of the society] so that they are able join the *Tarbiyah* movement [and support the party] (Abdurrahim, 2005: 56).

Although a female leader highlighted that the *Tarbiyah* community had not initially planned to transform their *dakwah* activities into a political movement – “[from the beginning] there was no planning to establish a political party” (Noura, 50s, female, Jakarta, the *Tarbiyah* movement leader) – the gradualist Islamisation ideology of the movement strongly suggested that their *dakwah* would enter the political sphere at some point.

By the end of 1998, a discourse among the leaders and members of the *Tarbiyah* movement had emerged about the need for a political party. Noura shared her experience of these events as follows:

In 1998, Anis Matta, a key leader of the *Tarbiyah* movement [and the current President of the PKS], asked me and other *Tarbiyah* activists whether or not they wanted to enter the political arena. There was a voting process to see the interests of activists in politics. The vote showed that about 76% wanted to struggle through politics, while the rest wanted to remain with their *dakwah* movement. The majority agreed to enter politics because they wanted to contribute [to developing] a better society – *ishlah al-ummah*. We held an internal meeting among the *Tarbiyah* cadres in order to review this result and to decide the next plan. *Alhamdulillah* (praise to Allah) through *takbirullah* (Allah’s guidance) and *takdirullah* (Allah’s predestination), we entered the political arena. This moment, for us, was a stage of our maturity to understand the *manhaj* (the overall ideology) of our *dakwah* (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta).¹³⁴

Noura’s explanation shows that there was internal debate between senior *Tarbiyah* members about the decision to establish the party. Whilst some wanted to keep the

¹³⁴ However, some of the literature notes that the voting process was carried out via questionnaires that were distributed to approximately 6,000 *Tarbiyah* activists, and that 68% of those who returned the questionnaires agreed to create a political party (Hilmy, 2010; Collins, 2003).

Tarbiyah movement away from the political domain, after the party was established all of them accepted the decision that had been made. Nevertheless, these differences of opinions and further dynamics and developments in the party caused internal conflicts and tensions to emerge among the senior members of the *Tarbiyah* movement (Permata, 2013).

The unification of religion and politics was one of the goals that drove the *Tarbiyah* movement to establish the political party. The majority of the leaders that I interviewed held strongly to the view that there is no separation between *dakwah* and politics. This idea involves the implementation of the concept of ‘total Islam’ (*Islam kaafah*) that was talked about widely among this community, and stated in their official documents, and involves applying Islam to both the secular and religious aspects of life (see Chapter 1).¹³⁵ The establishment of the *dakwah* party by the *Tarbiyah* activists was, therefore, regarded as a continuation of their *dakwah* activities more broadly. Based on my reading of it, their official book, called ‘The Platform of PKS Development’s Policy’ (*Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PKS*) holds that the purpose of their *dakwah* in this phase should be understood as follows:

Islam cannot be separated from politics as the manifestation of Islamic consultation (*shura*), ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’ (*amar ma’ruf nahi munkar*) and struggling for justice. The PKS, therefore, has chosen politics to implement Islamic values, not only at individual and family levels, but also at society and state level (MPP-PKS, 2008a:52).

The founders, key leaders and senior activists of the party thus sought to show that their political movement cannot be separated from *dakwah*. My interview with Noura, who is responsible for the official archives and history of the DPP-PKS,

¹³⁵ The PKS’s engagement with wider society through political means was part of the idea of ‘total Islam’, which was inspired by the founders and ideologues of the MB in Egypt – Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.

shows that “the PKS leaders and founders of the *Tarbiyah* movement frequently used the term *dakwah*, and that they refer to it numerous times in their speeches” (Noura, 50s, female, leader, Jakarta). This suggests that the leaders want to emphasise that *dakwah* is still their main concern, and that they are strongly attached to it, even though they have established the political party. Noura explained that, “in order to transfer and spread the ideas of the leaders on their *dakwah* ideologies to the wider society, their speech collections were published officially by the PKS under my division [of archives]”. Furthermore, she argued that these publications are significant for disseminating the idea of the integration of *dakwah* and politics to all *dakwah* activists, from senior members to those at the grass roots level. Backing this up, another leader said during an interview:

The *dakwah* that is held by PKS is a comprehensive *dakwah* that covers all aspects of life, including the private and public. Basically, one aspect of life cannot be left alone by *dakwah*. What we [the PKS] do right now is not a moving process [from *dakwah* to politics], because politics is only one aspect of this comprehensive *dakwah*. Therefore, we did not leave anything by establishing a political party, but we did all things together under the idea of comprehensive *dakwah* (Fatih, 50s, leader and a founding member of the PK/PKS, male, Jakarta).

The PKS, therefore, can be seen as an outcome of the *Tarbiyah's* *dakwah* movement, which, in widening its *dakwah* into this political movement, appointed *Tarbiyah* activists to run the party.

In order to strengthen the argument for integrating *dakwah* and politics, the founders of the movement placed *dakwah* as the party’s central identity and purpose in the articles of the party. No. 2, Article 5 – on ‘the objective of the party’ - asserts: “the PKS is a *dakwah* party which aims to establish a just and prosperous society blessed

by Allah within the Republic of Indonesia based on the principles of Pancasila” (MPP-PKS 2008).

During this phase, the image of the PKS as a *dakwah* party was also strengthened through growing publications of books concerning the PKS and *dakwah* written by both leaders and cadres. They used the term *dakwah* as the title of the books, and as the keyword for its contents.¹³⁶ ‘*Dakwah*’, therefore, became closely associated with the party’s image, both by the community of the party itself (the party’s leaders and cadres), and also by those external to it, such as the media and wider society. The PKS’s use of the term ‘*dakwah*’ is understandable as it distinguishes it from other Islamic parties and organisations. Five PKS leaders that I interviewed emphasised the idea that attaching and associating the term ‘*dakwah*’ with the party was not only done for the purpose of reassuring *Tarbiyah* activists of the continuity of the party and their *dakwah* movement, but also for differentiating the party from other Islamic parties (Abdullah, Noura, Rahman, Fatih and Mona).

The PKS is a *dakwah* party (*partai dakwah*) which means that for the PKS victory in elections (politics) is a victory for *dakwah*. However, there is a different perception of how to win elections and how to ‘win’ *dakwah* projects among its leaders and members (Hidayat, 2012). Party leaders such as former PKS president Anis Matta (2011), as quoted by Hidayat (2012:234), says that “the project of the PKS is to grab a chance to lead the country with capability and quality to the benefit of all society, and politics is part of the implementation of that. Offering the best cadres for the

¹³⁶ The word ‘*dakwah*’ has been used as the keyword of the majority of books written by both *dakwah* activists and leaders of the PKS, both those published institutionally by the PKS and by publishers affiliated to it. There are more than thirty books using the keyword ‘*dakwah*’, and this keyword is also frequently used in the party’s pamphlets, bulletins, articles and banners.

country to give their best is the way to lead the path to this vision". This official vision is rejected by some members who argue that political projects would have a negative impact on both the party and the cadres because of its pragmatic political attitude.

Nevertheless, there is a strong perception among the community – as revealed by the interviews with grass-roots activists and party leaders – that the *Tarbiyah* movement and the party (PKS) are sharing a common ideology. They are perceived as having a close relationship because they have the same ideological and organisational roots. In addition, the same activists manage these two institutions, as the *Tarbiyah* movement and the PKS are composed of the same people (Permata, 2013), with most of the party's leaders being senior members and leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement (see Chapter 5).¹³⁷

There has been much discussion of whether these political and *dakwah* institutions should work together as equals in different arenas, or whether one of them should be subordinate to the other, and different perceptions about the hierarchical relationship between these two institutions can be found in the opinions of different *Tarbiyah* leaders. One of the key figures of the *Tarbiyah* movement emphasised that “the *Tarbiyah* movement and the party are complementary [to] each other” (Salim, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta). This means that these two institutions were ‘ranked’ equally, with the hope that they would support each other. However, Ahmad (60s, leader, male, Jakarta) thought otherwise, emphasising that “the party was founded as a means of [supporting] our *dakwah* movements”. The other two senior figures of the

¹³⁷ Permata explains that ‘basically members of the *Tarbiyah* movement are PKS members’ (2013:249). However, the increasingly pragmatic behavior of the PKS separates PKS members from the *Tarbiyah* members who do not get involved in party activities.

Tarbiyah movement articulated the idea that “politics, for us, is only one of the ways of widening the *dakwah* territory (*mihwar dakwah*)” (Noura and Fatih, 50s, leaders, Jakarta). This indicates that the party is supposed to be part of the *Tarbiyah* movement, and support the *Tarbiyah* movement’s goals, and hence that it should be subordinate to it in the big picture.

Given that the party was established by the *Tarbiyah* community, it is logical to assume that the *Tarbiyah* movement should control the party and have executive authority. Furthermore, the *Tarbiyah* movement is much older, and thus seeing the party as the means for supporting the *dakwah* of the movement should be the logical understanding of their relationship. This was the expectation held by senior *Tarbiyah* activists. The leaders of the party tried to convey a clear message to all cadres about the unity of religion and politics, and the necessity of using politics for upholding religion. The majority of cadres, therefore, believed that the transformation to a political movement was a great idea for promoting their *Tarbiyah* ideologies through a legal and formal political approach. Machmudi, a lecturer at the state University in Jakarta emphasised:

Through the integration of politics and [the] *dakwah* movement, we expected to be able to change the conditions of Muslims from all aspects of life, and of course to be able to return to the victory of Islam in the past. This point was the key spirit that has been transferred by the early leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement to the next generation of the *Tarbiyah* activists since the early 1980s (Machmudi, 40s, founding members of PKS/senior mentor of the *Tarbiyah* movement, Depok).

However, my findings suggest that this is not how the relationship has developed in reality. Although the party was established by the *Tarbiyah* movement, there are two

examples that demonstrate how the party in fact attempts to control or to subordinate the *Tarbiyah* movement.

First, the weekly *Liqo* sessions, which have been the main activity of *Tarbiyah* since the movement's inception, are conceptualised and managed by the Cadre Division of the party (see Chapter 5). This means that the *Liqo* is no longer independent of the influence of other institutions within the movement as it was in the past. Likewise, the *Liqo* programmes are the party's central way of recruiting, mobilising, and shaping the ideology of cadres (see Chapter 5). Apart from the *Liqo*, the party also controls other *Tarbiyah* programmes, such as *Dawrah* (religious lectures), *Rihlah* (tours to any tourism centres),¹³⁸ *Mabit* (staying overnight for ritual activities such as reciting the Qur'an, praying and thinking of Allah/*dhikr*), and *Mukhayyam* (religious camps). Even though all these activities are conducted by the *Tarbiyah* community, the content and design of the programmes are determined and managed by the party's division (MPP-PKS, 2008b).

Second, the topics or lessons (*mawad*) that they have to deliver in the weekly *Liqo* sessions should refer to the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* book, which was prepared and written by the party (see Chapter 5). The *murabbi* (mentors) of the *Liqo* are mainly managed by the party. It is possible that the *murabbi* of the *Liqo* at the beginner level are not formally members of the party, but at the higher levels, most of them are members of the party. Given that the *murabbi* at the lower levels are *mutarabbi* (trainees) of the *Liqo* at higher levels as well, all *murabbi* are cadres of the party (see Chapter 5).

¹³⁸ Tours are designed for spiritual purposes, through which individuals can reflect on their spirituality outside of the *dakwah* classes.

My research, however, revealed that the *Tarbiyah* movement has been utilised as a 'medium' for enlarging and strengthening support for the party. By declaring it to be a *dakwah* party, the leaders of the party – who are also senior members and leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement - intended to construct an emotional connection between the party and all the *Tarbiyah's* cadres. The founders expected that all the *Tarbiyah's* cadres would have the same sense of belonging and views about their responsibilities to the party, and to encourage this the PKS promoted a tenet among the *Tarbiyah* community that runs: “the (*Tarbiyah*) community is the party and the party itself is the (*Tarbiyah*) community” (*al-jama'ah hiya al-hizb, wa al-hizb huwa al-jama'ah*) (DPP-PKS, 2003: 33). This principle was used to encourage the *Tarbiyah* cadres to see themselves as having obligations to become involved in politics and to support the party in addition to their involvement in *Tarbiyah* activities.

4.6 The *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement and the domination of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (2004–present day)

Even though the *Tarbiyah* movement still placed the focus of *dakwah* on improving individual piety, it attempted to synchronise this objective with the PKS party's goal to place their cadres within state institutions. There have been many cases in which the *Tarbiyah* community has been intensively involved in supporting candidates of the party for positions as parliamentarians, governors, and as President, in both local and national elections. Leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement and *murabbi* of the *Liqo* mobilised their cadres to participate in influencing public opinion in order to aid their candidates in winning elections.

The party has participated in the Indonesian general elections since 1999, and its popularity has increased significantly, from receiving 1.36% of the vote in the 1999 general election to 7.88% in 2009, although this decreased by about 1% in the last election in 2014. The party has been successful in convincing Indonesian people to not only commit to private *dakwah*, hence reforming individual and social religiosity (Damanik, 2002; Rahmat, 2008), but also to accept public *dakwah*, leading to a focus on eradicating poverty and corruption, providing better education and helping victims of disasters (Shihab and Nugroho, 2008; Muhtadi, 2012). In the 1999 election, the PKS were very strict in focusing their campaign on Islamic *shari'ah*. It seems that they became aware of the fact that establishing *shari'ah* was not 'enough' of an agenda for Indonesian Muslims to back, and transformed the issues that they addressed from Islamic *shari'ah* oriented issues to issues oriented towards humanity and national concerns in order to attract public attention. Many observers have suggested that this transformation was at the root of its significant achievements in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections.

During my fieldwork in Jakarta at the end of 2012, I observed how the *Tarbiyah* community was involved in campaigning for a PKS candidate for governor in the *Pilkada* (the local election). The most recent political events that I observed (from Leeds) were the parliamentary and Presidential elections conducted in April and July 2014. The leaders of the community frequently reminded members of the *Liqo* to choose candidates based on their 'true' *akidah*, and those who will support Islam (see also Section 6.5). This rhetoric elegantly prevented them from directly mentioning the PKS candidates, whilst the implication of their encouragement was clear. Religious arguments were consistently invoked to 'remind' the members who

the appropriate candidates were. This promotion of candidates and encouragement for voting has been practised since the establishment of the PKS.

The *Tarbiyah* movement leaders who are also PKS leaders regard this *dakwah* phase as being *al-mihwar al-dauli* (a state institutional phase). This phase involves ‘vertical mobility’, aiming to gradually penetrate state institutions and other public organisations (DPP-PKS, 2003:47). The idea behind this phase is to spread their best cadres into state institutions, so that they can ‘reform’ or Islamise them from within. A key leader of the *Tarbiyah* movement and the party explained this *dakwah* phase as follows:

This stage is the continuation of the previous stages. Nothing is stopped in this stage because the development of individual religiosity remains the focus. The thing that differs from other stages is the spread of these individuals to influence their work places through their *dakwah* values, such as in government offices, the parliament, private offices, and companies (Abdullah, 40s, leader, male, Jakarta).

According to Abdullah, the distribution of cadres to offices within state organisations as well as within other public institutions was regarded as a vital step in creating a more Islamic society and state. Those cadres are expected to play a significant role in influencing institutions to become more in line with Islamic teachings and to spread Islamic values to society at large. Islamising the public sphere through spreading their *dakwah* ideologies is, therefore, the most significant goal of the *dakwah* movement in this phase.

One of the roles that the *Tarbiyah*’s cadres have in ‘reforming’ (Islamising) the state can be seen through the position that the PKS’s parliamentary members adopted in a debate of the parliament (MPR) during 2000–2002. It concerned the amendment of

Article 29 of the Constitution of Indonesia (UUD 1945), which contains clauses about the relationship between religions and the state. The PKS proposed the Madinah Charter (*piagam Madinah*), instead of the Jakarta Charter, as the main inspiration for the amendment to the state constitution (Hilmy, 2010).¹³⁹ The *Tarbiyah*–PKS cadres demanded that Article 29 be amended, stating that it was “obligatory [for the state] to implement religious teachings for its respective followers”.¹⁴⁰ They attempted to convince parliament that the state should be involved in maintaining the religiosity of its believers. In the final debates on this clause the PKS was one of the two Islamic political parties that insisted that article 29 be amended, while most parties revoked their objections (Hilmy, 2010). Most Islamist parties favour the insertion of the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter (see Chapter 2; Hilmy, 2010). The reasons behind the PKS’s choice are: ‘first, to uphold the religious values espoused by the preamble of the UUD 1945, and second, ‘to emphasize the equal position of religions in Indonesia’ (Hilmy, 2010: 202-203).

Although the PKS’ subscription to the Madinah Charter was criticized by many Islamists groups and they were accused of having betrayed its commitment to implement *shari’ah* (Hilmy, 2010), in my opinion, however, this still indicates that a central aim of the *Tarbiyah* movement’s *dakwah* is to strengthen the Islamic character of the state through its cadres in the parliament.¹⁴¹ As mentioned in a book

¹³⁹ The Madinah charter (*Piagam Madinah*) ‘is a constitution that essentially established the Madinah city-state under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. The charter was the first written constitution in Islam and arguably the first constitutional law in society’ (See Hasan, 2012:24-25; a further account of the Madinah charter can be found in Watt, 1956)

¹⁴⁰ Islamic parties such as the PKS, the United Development Party (PPP), and the Star and Crescent Party (PBB), as well as Muslim supporter-based parties like the PAN (supported by members of the Muhammadiyah) and the PKB (supported by the NU) held that this article should be revised through adding a sentence stating that it is “obligatory to implement *shari’ah* for Muslims” (offered by PPP and PBB) or that it is “obligatory to implement religious teachings for its respective followers” (offered by PAN, PKB, and PKS).

¹⁴¹ I argue that their rejection of the Jakarta Charter cannot be separated from its context as the ‘new face’ of the political party in 2002 when they were facing new challenges and battling to influence

written by three *Tarbiyah* leaders, who are also foremost leaders of the PKS – Balda, Rida, and Wahono (2000) – the key task of *Tarbiyah* activists in parliament is to control, monitor and issue legislation that is in line with the central Islamic teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunna. In an official statement (*Bayanat*) of the party, it was also mentioned that:

Through the parliament, the PK [PKS] struggles to implement Islamic teachings and Islamic laws. This struggle focused to insert Islamic elements on the legislation products at the parliament, such as the law of giving alms (*Zakat*), the law of banking, the law of marriage, and so on (DPP-PK, 1999).

Given that the *Tarbiyah* movement and the party are intertwined in their visions, this suggests that the *dakwah* movement is, at this stage, more challenging for members of the *Tarbiyah* movement than it has been at previous stages. The *Tarbiyah* movement needs to tolerate as well as to justify the pragmatic attitudes of the party. However, it is worth noting that, as a political party in a democratic state, the PKS has to attract as many voters from different social groups as possible,¹⁴² and the 1999 General Election proved that their stance on the *shari'ah* issue did not create a good impression on the wider society, with the party receiving less than 2% of the national vote.

constituencies with nationalist parties. I agree also with Hasan's (2012) opinion that this strategy was 'an elegant manoeuvre' by the PKS because they were aware of the previous failure of the first generation of Islamists who attempted to give *shari'ah* a constitutional status in the seven words of the Jakarta charter.

¹⁴² Shihab and Nugroho (2008) said that these changes in the political and *dakwah* strategy were intentionally designed to gain more national voters. Studies by Muhtadi (2012) and Permata (2008) stated that this changing strategy showed the dilemmas they were facing and the pragmatic compromise they had ultimately chosen to make between retaining their *dakwah* ideology and responding to political realities.

Thus, in the 2004 General Election,¹⁴³ the party moved away from campaigning for *shari'ah*, preferring to fight for more 'secular' issues, such as education for poor people and an anti-corruption agenda (Muhtadi, 2012; Permata, 2008; Shihab and Nugroho, 2008). In 2007, the party even publicly declared its support for a policy of religious pluralism, selecting some non-Muslims for its parliamentary candidates in the 2009 election (Permata, 2008). Furthermore, my interview with a founding member of the PKS (Hafidz, 60s, male, Jakarta) revealed that the party built a close relationship with a liberal Muslim scholar, Nurcholish Madjid, who had previously been condemned as a figure who was corroding Islam from within.¹⁴⁴ According to Hilmy, it is not surprising that the PKS eclectically adopt many intellectual viewpoints from different sources including 'liberal' ones if 'they help enhance the soft power of the party' (2010:204). Even though the issue of religious pluralism was very controversial for the *Tarbiyah* community, most of them complied with and supported the pragmatic political choices that the party made.

However, there were also significant criticisms of the party's pragmatic choices from key leaders within the *Tarbiyah* community and a founding member of the PKS, such as Daud Rasyid, a lecturer in an Islamic State University, and Yusuf Supendi, a well-known preacher (*da'i*) within the *Tarbiyah* community. The party's openness to religious pluralism and liberal Muslim figures disappointed these leaders and other activists of the *Tarbiyah* movement, who supported the establishment of the PKS, but were keen to maintain the original *dakwah* ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement. These figures were, however, marginalised by the party as a result of

¹⁴³ In the 2004 General Election, the party tripled its votes to 7.34% and received almost seven-fold the number of seats in the parliament, as well as three ministerial positions (www.kpu.go.id accessed 8 September 2012).

¹⁴⁴ Interviewed on 15/08/2012.

their criticisms (Permata, 2013). Other members preferred to be ‘loyal’ to the *Tarbiyah* movement and obey the party, even though they disagreed with its pragmatic approach.¹⁴⁵

4.7 The *Liqo* in the periods of the *Tarbiyah* movement and the PKS: leadership and authority

Liqo-Tarbiyah activists and PKS cadres are bound by the same authority, as they are part of the same *dakwah* community and ideology. In practice, there are differences in the leadership structure, as the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement uses an ‘informal structure of leadership inspired by the MB in Egypt, whilst the PKS follows the formal structure of the political party system in Indonesia’ (Permata, 2013:271; see also my discussion in Chapter 5). In the literature on the MB, however, the MB reflects the Western political party system too (Mitchell, 1993). From the *Tarbiyah* movement’s emergence in 1983 until the late 1990s, both *Liqo* sessions and other *Tarbiyah* activities were organised by a supreme leader (*muraqib ‘am*), holding both religious and organisational authority, and assisted by deputies responsible for different tasks and duties.¹⁴⁶ This leadership, however, changed after the establishment of the PKS political party in 1998.¹⁴⁷ As a political party, the PKS follows the party’s president under the guidance of the *Shura* Council (*Majlis*

¹⁴⁵ In my interviews with three ex-activists of the *Tarbiyah* movement – two from Jakarta and one from Tangerang – they expressed their disagreement with the pragmatic approach adopted by the party. However, a leader of the *Tarbiyah* movement opined that it is better for them to stay inside the *Tarbiyah* community and the party and critique it. He said that their critiques will be better listened to by the PKS elites if they are delivered from within (Abdullah, 40s, leader, male, Jakarta).

¹⁴⁶ It is adopted from the MB structure too (Mitchell, 1993).

¹⁴⁷ From 1998 onwards, there was a shift in leadership. In their early political period, the highest authority of the PKS was the National Assembly, which was responsible for many tasks, including the selection of the Party’s central leadership. But later on, the leadership of The National Assembly was moved to the *Shura* Council (*Majlis Shura*) (Permata, 2013).


Shura).¹⁴⁸ This shift in leadership, as Permata (2013:244) notes, has led to changing internal dynamics and tensions between the *Tarbiyah* movement and the PKS.

From 1998 onwards, the *Liqo* has become more centralised under the structure of the PKS. This centralisation reflects the fact that the *Liqo* sessions and other religious activities of the *Tarbiyah* movement are managed by the Cadre Division of the PKS (see Table 2: Diagram of the *Liqo* within wider structure of the PKS). Thus, the Cadre Division of the Party Central Office determines the direction of the *Liqo* movement, including preparing, monitoring, and reviewing the manual of the *Liqo*, together with *Tarbiyah* activities in general (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005). This division is responsible for the overall concepts, practices, and strategies of the *Liqo's dakwah* and the *Tarbiyah* movement.¹⁴⁹ The Cadre Division exists at every level of the structure of the PKS – from the highest to the lowest levels – and plays a significant role within the *Liqo* community.¹⁵⁰ Although the strategic role that the Cadre Division plays is plain to see, especially in the Party Central Office (DPP), they are still required to follow the general directions and organisational decisions of the higher level leadership of the PKS, namely the Advisory Council (*Majlis Pertimbangan Partai/MPP*), the Party Central Office (*Dewan Pengurus Pusat/DPP*), and the *Shari'ah* Council (*Dewan Syariah Pusat/DSP*), which is second only to the *Shura* Assembly (*Majlis Shura*) as the highest structure within the PKS (MPP PKS, 2008a; Permata, 2013).

¹⁴⁸*Majlis Shura* has 99 members, 65 of whom are elected from 33 provinces, based on the approximate numbers of the *Tarbiyah* members in each province; 2 special members (the current and former chairmen of this council); and 32 additional members selected by the council based on their professional expertise (Permata, 2013:266). This is similar to the MB structure.

¹⁴⁹ Based on Interview with Fatih, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta on 21/11/2012.

¹⁵⁰ Based on Interview with Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta on 17/1/2012.

Table 2 The *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement within the wider structure of the PKS

Source: Adapted from the official website of the PKS, www.pk-sejahtera.org. Accessed in August 2014, used with permission.

Abdullah, one of the PKS leaders, refers to this structure as a ‘mechanism system’, formulated to manage both the religious and political activities of the PKS. Abdullah, who is also a former head of the Cadre Division, explained that this division, or the ‘Council of cadre training programmes’, is not only concerned with internal cadre development in the *Liqo*, but also in the wider society.¹⁵¹ Abdullah’s explanation above was strengthened by claims made by a leader of the PKS structure, who says that the *Liqo* has been better organised and developed since being under the party’s control:

There is a regular monitoring process of the *Liqo* conducted by the PKS structure. The weekly training sessions of the *Liqo*, from its top to its lowest levels, are managed to conduct [them on] different days for each *Liqo* level. Such monitoring is designed for the effectiveness of evaluation and dissemination of information (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).¹⁵²

However, the cadres that I interviewed from the *Liqo* – Thifa, Fadila, Nabil, and Nuriah – held that in terms of direction the *Liqo* was better before the PKS was established. They saw the PKS’s control of the *Liqo* as negatively impacting upon their *dakwah* and the *Tarbiyah* movement. There is now a greater focus on the political aspect of the party than on the religious aspect of the *Tarbiyah* movement, and these cadres were generally unhappy about the fact that the political activities of the PKS have moved them further away from their original *dakwah* activities. Thifa, Fadila, Nabil, and Nuriah all expressed the same sentiment that “the *Liqo* has been used to support the party’s activities, especially in the elections period”.

¹⁵¹ According to Abdullah, this structure of the party is responsible for both the internal development of cadres through education and training and for attracting external sympathisers or members of the wider society. For discharging its internal responsibilities, the PKS has the Council of Cadres Training (*Badan Pembinaan Kader-BPK*), while to carry out its external remit, it has a structure called the Council of *Umat* Training (*Badan Pembinaan Umat-BPU*). Each council has its own leader or head of council.

¹⁵² Interviewed on 27/08/2012.

In his Doctoral dissertation, Permata (2008) also points to the changing attitudes of the party's leaders. In the 1999 legislative election, its leaders asked *Liqo* activists to focus more on their *dakwah* activities while, in the 2004 elections, the leaders issued a *fatwa* calling on activists to mobilise the people around them to vote for the PKS. In my opinion, criticism of the PKS in this regard comes only from those who are dissatisfied with the shift of the movement's *dakwah* focus from aiming to improve individual cadres' religiosities to a more political concern with Islamising the public sphere. However, the majority of trainees and members accepted this shift and regarded it as part of the leaders' policy and as part of the evolving *dakwah* stages. They also emphasized that the *Liqo* is still largely focused on reproducing purist religiosity, the same aim as at the beginning of the movement.

Given that there are multiple levels within the *Liqo*'s hierarchy, there are also multiple levels of religious authority within the *Liqo* community, and a chain of ideological authority for *Liqo* trainees. Apart from the cadre's division of the DPP, the *Shari'ah* Council (DSP) plays a significant role in giving religious advice to both *Liqo* and PKS cadres. The DSP provides useful considerations for the political policies of the party through interpreting how to apply Islam to various issues. The DSP's role is not just to provide a religious reference point for the *Liqo* community and the wider society, however, but also to maintain the religiosity of all *Liqo* and PKS cadres, from the elite to the grassroots members. One of the PKS leaders emphasised this point as follows:

The major role of DSP-PKS is to put *shari'ah* as the foundation of the party. The DSP has a responsibility to control and to maintain the obedience and compliance to *shari'ah* for both the party and its individuals. The individuals include elites and cadres from the highest to the lowest level of the party's membership. All leaders and activists [of the *Liqo*] are required to have

commitment to use *shari'ah* as the way of guiding their lives. For the party, the DSP needs to give guidance so that all policies or strategies do not deviate from the principles of *shari'ah* (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).¹⁵³

The fact that the DSP requires the full obedience of all the different structures of the party, including the *Liqa* cadres, suggests that the PKS/*Tarbiyah* movement is an authoritarian religious movement. The DSP is the central body of the *dakwah* party that is responsible for its *shari'ah* compliance and, as explained by Ahmad (60s) it frequently gives *shari'ah* rulings under various names, such as *fatwa* (legal opinion), *bayanat* (explanation), *tadzkirah* (reminder), *qadla* (decision), *taushiyah* (religious advice) and *ittijah fiqh* (*fiqh* guidance). These *shari'ah* / religious recommendations or rulings are issued to respond to the discourses or phenomena that occur within the movement/party. Through my observations, I found that this 'advice' is issued in letters about decisions, and is disseminated through the PKS official website.

In order to make appropriate legal opinions and decisions, "the key figures of DSP should be experts on *shari'ah* who [have] graduated from a faculty of *Shari'ah* of any Islamic institution following postgraduate studies" (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta). For example, Ahmad (60s, leader, male, Jakarta), studied *Shari'ah* during his undergraduate and postgraduate degrees. His masters and doctoral degrees were obtained from the faculty of Islamic law (*shari'ah*) of the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo, Egypt. Other members of the DSP are also experts on *Shari'ah*, with the majority of them having graduated from Middle Eastern universities (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta). However, as a female national leader admitted, the PKS has

¹⁵³ Interviewed on 27/08/2012. According to Barbara Metcalf, controlling the cadres' religiosity and public behaviour is one of the characteristics of Islamic activism (see Metcalf, 2001).

a very limited number of members with a background in *shari'ah* (*shar'i* activists). This is in line with the typical background of the *Liqo* community, who are mostly 'lay' people rather than Islamically educated members or leaders. A senior *shar'i* activist of the PKS who graduated from Al-Azhar University confirmed this:

The most dominant activists of the *Liqo* are non-*shar'i* background. There are of course some [members with a] *shar'i* background from Medina, LIPIA-Jakarta, and Al-Azhar University. However, it is very rare to find activists from the universities in Medina or Egypt. The most dominant and very active in mentoring new trainees are those who graduated from LIPIA. When Medina or Egypt graduates return to Indonesia, it is very difficult for them to be 're-educated' through [the] *Halaqah* system and to join this *dakwah* community, as they may feel their superiority over others in terms of religious knowledge (Arif, 40s, leader, male, Jakarta).¹⁵⁴

The *shari'ah* rulings issued by the DSP thus provide guidance on how to live for all the *Liqo* and PKS cadres. The DSP also fully supports and strengthens the *Majlis shura* (the Consultative Assembly) – the highest organisational structure in the PKS hierarchy. Although the *Majlis Shura* is above the DSP in the chain of command, and has the responsibility of reporting their religious activities and decisions to the *Majlis Shura*, the DSP is regarded as the key 'think tank' of the *Majlis Shura* (see Figure of the structure of the PKS).¹⁵⁵ The purpose of the DSP's involvement in the *Majlis Shura* is to maintain and fit together all the political and *dakwah* policies and ideologies with the *shari'ah* system (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).

The *Majlis Shura* is the highest religious authority within the *Liqo* community as it is the highest religious and political entity in the PKS hierarchy. It has the power to control both the leadership and the ideology of the PKS, and is responsible for constructing ideological (theological) views. The *Majlis Shura* frequently issues

¹⁵⁴ Interviewed on 18/10/2012.

¹⁵⁵ Statute of the PKS (Anggaran Dasar/ Anggaran Rumah Tangga -AD/ART), MPP- PKS, 2008b.

rulings or advice related to the position of the party on the national stage, in terms of the party's theological and political views.

The religious authority that is most frequently referred to by *Liqo* trainees is that of their *Liqo* mentor. These *murabbi* also have their religious references in their *Liqo* groups (the mentors of these mentors), and the same pattern of authority works its way up to the highest level of authority in the hierarchy. One of the national leaders of the PKS that I interviewed informed me that “all top leaders of PKS also have *Liqo* groups, and they still manage to conduct or to attend their own *Liqo* meetings during their busy time as public political leaders” (Abdullah, leader, Jakarta). This shows the importance of both cadre discipline within the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement and maintaining regular contact with members at the grassroots level, as well as in the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* network in general.

Given that a mentor (*murabbi*) at one level is subordinate to mentors at the next level up, they should ask their *murabbi* if they do not understand issues concerning ritual or Islamic jurisprudence. Thus, each *murabbi's* interpretation of Islam is expected to have an ideological coherence with higher-level *murabbi*. In order to make higher level *murabbi's* interpretations of Islam available, and thus enable this ideological coherence, the ideas of senior *murabbi* or key figures in the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* are disseminated and published on their official website, and in their books and pamphlets.¹⁵⁶ The overall leadership of the *Liqo* movement is, therefore, centralised by ‘unity’ on religious doctrines and practices. However, disagreements

¹⁵⁶ Books on the ideas of the top figures of the *Liqo*/PKS community were published in 2007 by the DPP PKS. The top figures include Anis Matta, Hilmy Aminuddin, and Tiffatul Sembiring (see Bibliography).

on particular issues regarding doctrines, practices, or the tactics to be used to achieve *Liqo* goals can also be identified within the *Liqo* community at any level of the hierarchy.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has explained the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement, its ideology and how it has developed its *dakwah* messages and strategies in relation to different political opportunities (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012). I argue that although the official discourse of the movement's leaders suggests that their main *dakwah* message initially emphasised individual piety, they also had a public Islamisation project, and were simply awaiting the right political climate to implement it. They have thus used different *dakwah* strategies to deliver their messages in different political climates in Indonesia. The change in their *dakwah* strategies can be seen in the case of the *Liqo*, as the focus of their main *dakwah* activity. They first developed the *Liqo* based on the situation and challenges faced in the early period of the *Tarbiyah* movement and then subsequently developed it again as opportunities changed during the period of the PKS. The overall *dakwah* message attempts to reform individual religiosity and to produce better Islamic lifestyles, with the aim of gradually producing reform and leading to the creation of an Islamic society.

In the repressive conditions of the authoritarian regime of the early 1980s, the *Tarbiyah* community used covert *dakwah* approaches to prevent the movement being shut down by the regime, which was hostile to political Islam. Given such a difficult climate, their weekly training programme, called the *Liqo* or *Halaqah*, was conducted informally and indeed secretly in the corners of mosques on campuses

located in urban areas. A more overt *dakwah* approach started to be practised from the end of the 1980s, when the regime began to become more accommodating of political Islam in order to gain support from Muslims. The *Tarbiyah* movement started to reach wider audiences and to convey its *dakwah* messages through conducting a variety of more formal activities in bigger public spaces, for example, through giving lectures, sermons, running a variety of religious classes, and building publishing companies, educational and social centres. Through these programmes, they attempted to attract new potential audiences in order to improve their religious knowledge and develop their religiosity.

With the fall of the authoritarian government in 1998 and the subsequent rise of the post-New Order government, the *Tarbiyah* community took its opportunity to establish an Islamic political party named the Justice Party (PK). The party was re-named the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) in 2003. The *Tarbiyah* leaders argued that the party would be utilised as their means for spreading their *dakwah* messages. The purpose of *dakwah*, in this period, was to push out their ideologies via greater access to political power and influence and to build up a strong foundation for spreading their Islamic messages within various state related institutions.

Due to the overlapping roles and leadership of the two organisations that emerged (the *Tarbiyah* movement and the PKS) (Permata, 2008; 2013), tensions increased among the leaders regarding *dakwah* and politics, and a greater complexity in the set of structures, goals and issues that the movement had to deal with. The informal *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement was increasingly subordinated to the more formal party, which was itself rapidly growing and pragmatic in pursuing its goals. This is not how the *Tarbiyah* movement leaders originally envisaged the *Tarbiyah*

movement being managed and directed. Before the establishment of the party, the leaders were only really concerned with *dakwah*, but now *dakwah* is used as the 'medium' for the political purposes of the party.

I argue that the interests and goals of the *Tarbiyah* movement and the party (PKS) are, to some degree, intertwined. The *Tarbiyah* movement is still focused on strengthening the individual piety of its members, but it has started to become involved in mobilising the members of the movement to support the party's goal. Therefore, the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement in this period (including the *Liqo*), has a mixed focus on both developing individual piety and mobilising the cadres for more formal political purposes, such as gaining political positions in the parliament and government.

Due to its present position as a political party within a democratic state, the PKS has publicly adopted pragmatic policies on religious pluralism, human rights and so on. These commitments have displaced the party's commitment to establishing *shari'ah* governance – something that the *Tarbiyah* community has sought since its outset. The *Tarbiyah* community has been impacted by the changing structure of the *Liqo*, changing strategies and its orientation of *dakwah* in each period of the *Tarbiyah* Movement and the PKS. As a result, the *Tarbiyah* community members actively involved in the weekly *Liqo* sessions have found themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, they have to be committed to being assertive on the importance of Islamising individuals, whilst on the other they have become subordinate to the political interests of the party.

Chapter 5

Locating the *Liqo* within the *Tarbiyah* Movement's Approach to *Dakwah*

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter looked at the historical development of the *Tarbiyah* movement and the emergence of the PKS. It showed that different stages or dimensions of *dakwah* typical of Islamist movements such as the MB were developed in relation to the changing social and political opportunities that have existed for Islamist movements in Indonesia (see Chapter 4). The role of the first stage or dimension (private *dakwah*) is to build the self-awareness of individuals in order to reform their religiosity and Islamic piety. This was developed within the context of repressive and restricted political opportunities (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004; Mandaville 2007/2014; Fox 2012). The latter stages or dimensions (public *dakwah*) broadened the focus of *dakwah* to include public awareness (which is built gradually from self-awareness), its role being to Islamise the wider society and eventually the state. These latter stages or dimensions of *dakwah* were developed in a more open and accommodating climate of political opportunity.

Chapter 4 concluded that although the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement initially focused on the private dimension of *dakwah*, the idea of public *dakwah* was certainly in their minds from the start, and represented the *dakwah* agenda of its founders and leaders. They developed private *dakwah* because they saw it as the appropriate way to begin building social change but also because there was no opportunity to pursue public *dakwah*. However, when the political climate in Indonesia changed at the end of 1980s, and the *Tarbiyah* movement saw the

opportunity, they started to push their *dakwah* messages out to wider public audiences (see Chapters 2 and 4). This also meant that that purist ideology and political pragmatism had to be negotiated.

This chapter explicates the official *Tarbiyah* movement discourse surrounding the *Liqo* – a weekly religious form of training for members. I examine the second of my three key research questions: 2) how has the *Liqo* – the main *dakwah* activity of the *Tarbiyah* movement – been designed by the movement’s leaders to fit with the structure and ideology of the movement? Again, with reference to aspects of SMT discussed in the Introduction, I will argue that the *Liqo* illuminates both the synergies and tensions between official, top-down framing by increasingly formal, outward-looking and pragmatic PKS leaders and the more informal and more conservative networks of the *Tarbiyah* movement, the latter remaining a key resource for mobilisation.

In seeking to answer my research question I investigate the importance of the *Liqo* in terms of its position and function within the *Tarbiyah* movement and the party (PKS), as well as its key role in the movement’s recruitment and ‘indoctrination’ strategies.¹⁵⁷ As we shall see the small, *informal* networks of young, committed,

¹⁵⁷ The term ‘indoctrination’ is used in my thesis to refer to ideological indoctrination that occurs mainly in the weekly *Liqo* sessions of the *Tarbiyah* movement. I use this term because during the *Liqo*, Islamic subjects such as *Akidah*, *Ibadah*, *Dakwah*, and other subjects are taught from the exclusive point of view of the. The ideas and values of the *Tarbiyah* Movement are disseminated and taught by the *Liqo* mentors to their trainees, who are expected to understand and to practice these ideas during their *Liqo* sessions and to implement them in their daily lives. The *Liqo* mentors are instructed to use the official teaching modules and syllabus provided by the leaders of the *Tarbiyah* Movement/PKS. This module and syllabus are influenced by the ideology of the MB as can be seen from the literature on each subject. It is mostly written by ideologues such as Hasan al-Banna, Said Hawwa, Fathi Yakan, etc. There is very little exposure to other scholars or ideologues of non-MB background. The other reason that I used the term indoctrination is because the *Liqo* I observed focuses extensively on the enforcement of discipline, loyalty and commitment of each trainee to their group/movement. This term was also used in his classic study by Richard Mitchell (1993) to describe the MB’s religious training.

well-educated cadres it builds and seeks to extend as part of increasingly *formal* PKS structures is a key resource to be mobilised by this *dakwah* movement (cf. Wiktorowicz 2001; Mandaville 2007/2014; Fox 2012). However, there are also tensions between these two quite different organisational structures.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, each *Liqo* group is attended by a limited number of permanent trainees, comprising 6-10 people (see Chapter 4.2). There are many *Liqo* groups, and three levels of groups – *Pemula* and *Muda* (‘beginner’), *Madya* (‘intermediate’), and *Dewasa* (‘advanced’). The levels relate to the progress of trainees after joining the *Liqo*. The *Liqo* is used by the *Tarbiyah* movement/the PKS as a means for recruiting new members, to strengthen its current members’ *dakwah* ideologies, and to connect the private *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement with the public goals of the PKS. The *Liqo* is carried out within a network of groups inside the *Tarbiyah* movement, which are led and connected to one another by mentors and supervised by the highest institution of the PKS.

This chapter begins by outlining the official structure of the *Liqo*, as framed and organised as a weekly religious lecture by the *Tarbiyah* movement. The second section focuses on the presentation of the *Liqo* lessons in the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* manual and why and how these lessons are designed as they are by the *Tarbiyah* movement. In the next section, I examine how the movement recruits people into the *Liqo*, arguing that personal and social networks are a key resource for movement mobilisation, and so play an important role in growing the *Liqo*’s membership. In the next part of the chapter, I explain the *mutarabbi-murabbi* (trainee-mentor) relationship, and how it has become the most important tie for the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* community. I argue that mentors who are also trainees in lower levels of the *Liqo* are

the ‘cogs’ in the machinery of the movement, connecting one group to another and to the party.

5.2 The *Liqo* (Islamic circle) of the *Tarbiyah* movement

The *Liqo* is an intensive religious lesson conducted by the *Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS. Interviews with twenty-five leaders and senior mentors from within the *Tarbiyah* movement and observations of the *Liqo* sessions revealed that the *Liqo* is the *Tarbiyah* movement’s most powerful religious activity for disseminating and strengthening the *dakwah* ideology of its community. The Head of the *Shura* Council (*majlis shura*), Hilmy Aminuddin, in one of the official texts published by the PKS, writes that ‘the *Liqo*’s status as a *tandzim nukhbawi* (cadre organisation) is the key feature of the *Tarbiyah* movement’ (DPP PKS, 2007a:7). He argues that this ‘cadre’ aspect clearly distinguishes the *Tarbiyah* movement from other mass organisations.¹⁵⁸

Each *Liqo* is a small training cluster consisting of 6 to 10 trainees held under the supervision of a mentor or trainer. As the *Liqo* lessons (*mawad* [pl.], *madah* [sing.]) revolve around *Tarbiyah* ideology, the trainee of the *Liqo* is called a *mutarabbi* (a male trainee) or *mutarabbiyah* (a female trainee), while the mentor or trainer is called a *murabbi* (a male mentor) or *murabbiyah* (a female mentor). The *Liqo* is designed for single gender classes, with male and female *Liqo* groups being

¹⁵⁸ This term is adopted from Western political ideologies and parties by Islamist movements. This is ironic in light of their concept of *ghazwul fikri* (ideological conquest) (see Chapters 4).

segregated. Gender segregation is typical of almost all *dakwah* movements among modern Islamists.¹⁵⁹

An interview with a senior mentor in Pondok Aren-Tangerang revealed that *Liqo* mentors are advised to recruit trainees from their neighbourhood areas (Arifin, 40s, trainees, male, Jakarta).¹⁶⁰ Arifin who is a state employee in the Ministry of Finance added that all trainees in his *Liqo* group live in Pondok Aren or Ciputat – two districts that are very close to each other.¹⁶¹ This guideline aims to make it easier for both trainers and trainees to attend their routine meetings.

The *Liqo* sessions are conducted every week, with the day and time of the sessions being discussed and chosen by the trainees (*mutarabbi*) in conjunction with the mentor (*murabbi*) of each *Liqo* group based on their availability. However, sessions are commonly arranged for weekends, as the majority of both trainees and trainers are young working men and women. The *Liqo* is scheduled to last two hours, and can be run in the morning, afternoon, or evening, again depending on each group's preferences.

Although the official texts stipulate that the *Liqo* sessions must remain small to allow intensive learning and indoctrination, together with routine individual assessment of the trainees by their mentors (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005), in reality this

¹⁵⁹These include Al-Muhajirun in the UK (Wictorowicz, 2005), Salafis and the M B in Jordan (Wictorowicz, 2001), the mosque or piety movement in Egypt (Mahmood, 2005), and the Hizb al-Tahrir (Taji-Farouki, 1996).

¹⁶⁰ Interviewed on 14/10/2012.

¹⁶¹ Pondok Aren and Ciputat are two districts in the city of South Tangerang in Indonesia. Both districts are located very close to ('inside') the greater Jakarta metropolitan area, on the border area between Jakarta and Tangerang.

depends on each situation and each mentor. The official *Manhaj Tarbiyah* book says that each *Liqo* group should hold six-ten trainees, but the trainees and mentors that I interviewed told me that the number of trainees in a group is not always in this range. For instance, four *Liqo* mentors said that the number of trainees in their groups varies between eight-twelve. According to one male mentor, who leads a *Liqo* group in the district of Bekasi:

In regard to the restriction issue, I think it is hard to restrict the number of *Liqo* trainees when there are many requests to join. As they want to learn about Islam from us, it is difficult for us [mentors] to reject them (Ridho, 40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi).¹⁶²

Another female mentor (Ranti: 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang) said that she is flexible about the number of trainees that she accepts in a *Liqo* group when it is formed because three to five trainees usually drop out after the *Liqo* meetings have run for a few weeks as their commitment is not strong enough.¹⁶³ My interviews suggested that this often happens, as individuals do not know exactly what the lessons given in the *Liqo* involve until they experience them.

Nevertheless, the small number of trainees per group produced by the restrictions on *Liqo* group size are broadly adhered to, and enable mentors and trainees to pass on and receive *Liqo* messages effectively.¹⁶⁴ A young female mentor who is a member of staff to a PKS legislator, argues that:

The *Liqo* is different [from] other *pengajian* (religious learning or lecturing groups) such as *Majelis Taklim*, particularly in terms of [its] audience and its

¹⁶² Interviewed on 17/10/2012.

¹⁶³ Interviewed on 14/10/2012.

¹⁶⁴ Restrictions on the number of trainees (*mutarabbi*) in religious circles are also used in the Egyptian MB (Mitchell, 1993).

effectiveness.¹⁶⁵ The *Majelis Taklim* is attended by more than 20 [people], so ... it tends to be one-way speaking. Unlike the *Majelis Taklim*, the audience of the *Liqo* is very limited, to an audience of about 6 to 10 persons. [This] causes the learning conditions [to be] more effective and interactive. It means that the study is not a one-way process in which the audience are discouraged to ask and express their ideas. In a small group, the audience are more comfortable in asking questions. The mentors are also encouraged to stimulate the audience to raise questions and to be involved in ... discussion (Rahima, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).¹⁶⁶

5.3 Manhaj Tarbiyah: The official curricula of the *Liqo*

During the weekly *Liqo* sessions, the mentors (*murabbi/murabbiyah*) are required to follow the guidance from the *Manhaj Tarbiyah*. This book, first published in 2005, contains 566 pages, and is one of the PKS's key texts on movement ideology. Produced by Media Insani Press, it is managed by the PKS' Division of Cadres. The PKS leadership expects that it will be the key volume used for the instruction and guidance of members in all lessons taught among the *Tarbiyah* cadres. The back cover of the book confirms that the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* is 'developed to be a *dakwah* curricula for cadres' training' (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005: back cover). One of the *Tarbiyah* mentors told me:

I am very happy to have this book because [it] contains very detailed curricula, and has learning steps for every stage of the *Liqo* (Muhammad, 30s, young leader, male, Bekasi).¹⁶⁷

The *Manhaj Tarbiyah* explains the *madah* (subject or lesson), *sarana* (methods of teaching) and *maraji'* (literature or texts used as key sources for each subject). This curriculum is the main reference point, particularly for the *Liqo/Halaqah*, and also other *dakwah* and religious training (*tarbiyah*) related activities such as *Dawrah or Taujih* (religious lectures), *Mabit* (reciting the Qur'an overnight), praying and

¹⁶⁵ *Pengajian* (Indonesian) is a religious learning group whose members specifically learn about the Qur'an, Sunna and other key Islamic subjects. *Pengajian* is usually attended by more than twenty people. It currently has several names, including *Majlis Taklim* (learning session).

¹⁶⁶ Interviewed on 04/09/2012.

¹⁶⁷ Interviewed on 08/09/2012. The translation of this interview is my own.

thinking of Allah (*dhikr*) and *Mukhayam* (religious camps). The book is designed for training and teaching all different levels of trainees within the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement; the beginner level (*Kader Pemula*), youth level (*Kader Muda*), intermediate level (*Kader Madya*), mature level (*Kader Dewasa*).¹⁶⁸ Although the main topics/lessons of each level are the same, the detail in terms of sub-topics does vary. Even so, in the general style of ‘pamphlet Islamism’, the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* does not provide very detailed elaboration on the subjects at any point. The book is not for experts. Two other *dakwah* manuals published by the DPP-PKS (2003 and 2008)¹⁶⁹ are used as more detailed reference works by *Tarbiyah* movement mentors.

Subjects such as *Aqidah* (faith), *Fiqh* (Islamic Jurisprudence) and *Akhlak* (moral) in the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* are similar to those in the curricula of most Islamic educational organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah.¹⁷⁰ However, the aims and references given for the subjects frame the text differently. Under the subject of *Akidah*, for instance, the trainees are expected:

- 1) to understand the comprehensiveness of Islam compared to other religions;
- 2) to believe that Islam is a perfect way of life; and 3) to fully accept and obey Islam so as not to practice any other way of life except Islam (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005: 46).¹⁷¹

This emphasizes that Islam is a complete doctrine and way of life including social, economic, and political as well as religious dimensions in the style of classic statements of Islamist ideology. Again in a style typical of classic Islamism, it also draws sharp boundaries between Muslims and others, warning *Tarbiyah* members

¹⁶⁸ Thus the contents of the book contain 4 Parts (*Seri I-IV*) and each part contains its own chapters; *Kader Pemula* includes 4 chapters, *Kader Muda* includes 3 Chapters, *Kader Madya* includes 4 chapters, and *Kader Dewasa* includes 4 chapters.

¹⁶⁹ Both editions are published by the same publisher (DPP-PKS) and have the same author (Cadres Division of the PKS).

¹⁷⁰ These key subjects are taught to the *Liqo* trainees from the lowest level (*Kader Pemula*) to the highest level (*Kader Dewasa*).

¹⁷¹ The translation of this text is my own.

not to adopt other ways of life. Such emphases are more marked as compared to traditionalist or modernist educational and religious sessions organised by the Muhammadiyah and the NU.

This is also the case in the subject of *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). Firstly, it focuses on purification issues typical of Salafists (cf. Meijer 2009); this is mentioned in its purpose “to avoid any *bid’ah* (innovation) in each *Ibadah* that is not taught by the Prophet” (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005: 82-83),¹⁷² Topics in this subject area also discuss how to dress and behave in an Islamic fashion, aiming to reject the Western dress and Western lifestyle that hugely influences Indonesian Muslims, especially the urban youth. For women, wearing a headscarf and avoiding mixing with males in a class or a common room (*ikhtilath*) are some of the issues taught.

In the subject of *Akhlak* (morality) is also found a similar tone. In general, this subject covers various topics such as attitudes to fellow Muslims, fulfilling promises, and other related topics (see Chapter 6). For instance, there is a topic emphasizing that *Tarbiyah* members should not make friends with those who have a ‘bad personality’. This means ‘those whose way of life is not in accordance with Islam, enemies of Islam, and *kafir* (an infidel)’ (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005:111). Based on my own observations, this topic is also often referred to in supporting the movement’s harsh attitudes to those who hold liberal interpretations of Islam.

Furthermore, the texts (*maraji’*) used for teaching these subjects are mainly the works of *ulama* and ideologues whose backgrounds and orientations link closely to the Islamist ideas of the MB in Egypt and related movements. Some of those cited

¹⁷² The translation of this text is my own.

most routinely are: Sa'id Hawa (1935-1989) (*Al-Islam*), Abdul Karim Zaidan (1917-2014) (*Ushul ad-Dakwah translate*), Mawdudi (1903-1979) (*Islamic Principles*), Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (b.1926) (*Characteristics of Islam*), Abdullah Muslih and Shalah al-Ashmawi (*Islamic Principles for Life*), and Abu Bakar al-Jazairi, (*The Guidance of Muslims' Lives*). Thus, repeated reference to the works of these Islamist ideologues in the *Liqo* constructs an ideological framing that connects the leadership, mentors and members of the *Tarbiyah* movement to the global Islamist movement in general and the MB in particular.

The most distinctive subject in the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* compared to curriculum developed by the NU and the Muhammadiyah is the subject of *Dakwah*.¹⁷³ This subject covers *Fiqh ad-Dakwah*, *Sirah* and Islamic history, the contemporary Islamic world, Islamic reform movements, as well as Comparative Religions and Sects. Through this lesson, the trainees are expected:

- (1) to understand factors that led to the weakness of Muslims and make every effort to solve the problem; 2) to understand the role of *Tarbiyah* (education) and *harakah* (movement) in solving this problem; and 3) to believe that the only way to solve this problem is through joining the *Hizbullah* (warrior of Allah), that is through joining the *Tarbiyah* movement (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005: 161-173).¹⁷⁴

The key content of this subject area is the concept of *Ghazwul fikri* (ideological conquest). It is the core ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement and frequently expressed in the text of the *Manhaj Tarbiyah*. One of the issues explained in terms of *ghazwul fikri* is the issue of 'the Enemies of Islam'. The purposes of this subject as written in the text are that the trainees are able:

¹⁷³ *Dakwah* is part of a traditional education in Indonesia taught in both traditional and modern schools. *Dakwah* in these schools is taught in a general sense for nurturing Islamic virtue among its students. However, in the hands of modern Islamist *dakwah* activists such as the *Tarbiyah* movement, this subject has a new significance and a more powerful meaning as an active *dakwah* particularly focused on rejecting Western culture and strengthening weakened Islamic identities.

¹⁷⁴ This is the core revivalist discourse that is frequently related to the concept of ideological conquest or so called *Ghazwul fikri* (see Chapters 4 and 6). The translation of this text is my own.

1) to recognize various groups or organizations that aim to destroy Islam from both inside or outside Islam, 2) to understand the purposes, strategies and activities of these organizations, and 3) to explain the danger of these organizations to Muslim fellows and to respond to these organizations effectively. (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005:545-546)

Key literature (*maraji'*) used for this subject are *Ghazwul fikri* (Hasan al-Banna), *Ghazwul fikri* (Mawdudi), *70 years of Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Yusuf al-Qaradawi), *Invasi Pemikiran or the Invasion of Thought* (Abdus Sattar), *Du'at la Qudhat/Preachers not Judges* (Hasan al-Hudaibi), and *Manhaj Haraky* (Mustafa Munir Ghadban). Although most of these references in the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* are mentioned by name in Arabic, the movement typically uses translations of the originals in Indonesian for teaching and learning. This indicates that only a small number of the *Liqo* community knows Arabic. Moreover, Arabic is not taught much and even mentors do not necessarily know Arabic.

The *Manhaj Tarbiyah* mentions that 'a cadre, whether he/she is a mentor or a trainee, must own a copy of it' (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005: back cover). However, I discovered during my fieldwork that only those in higher leadership positions typically have their own copies of the manual. Mentors and trainees that I interviewed did not generally have access to it, and most had not even read it.


I got this [*Manhaj Tarbiyah*] book from a top leader of the PKS [*Tarbiyah*]. He gave it to me in a very special moment. I know that not everyone actively involved [in] and [a member of] the PKS [*Tarbiyah*] has this book (Muhammad, 30s, young leader, male, Bekasi).¹⁷⁵

This lack of circulation of the book is one indication that the *Tarbiyah* movement/the PKS may not be well linked up from the top to the bottom of the movement/the party. There is a gap between the formal instructions and expectations of the party leaders and everyday circulation of the book among *Tarbiyah* cadres.

¹⁷⁵ Interviewed on 08/09/2012. The translation of this interview is my own.

Furthermore, although the community of the *Tarbiyah* movement (like other activists in Islamist movements) are very active in spreading their *dakwah* ideologies online, this book cannot be accessed on their public website or from cadres' more private access.¹⁷⁶ This manual is, therefore, not widely available and cannot be purchased in any public or Islamic bookshops. The lessons received by the trainees of the *Liqo* are thus largely dependent on what is delivered by the mentors in each *Liqo* group.

Figure 3 The book cover of the training manual *Manhaj Tarbiyah* (2005)



Source: Author, April 2013.

¹⁷⁶ www.pks.or.id and www.pkspiungan.org.

5.4 The role of social networks in recruitment and 'conversion' to *Liqo* membership

As Wiktorowicz (2001:133) argues, “social networks play a critical role in social movement recruitment”, and this is also true for the *Liqo* movement. Their social networks are mainly built through kinship and personal relationships. Although *Liqo* activists target all Muslims, regardless of their backgrounds or organisational affiliations, they see that a prior personal relationship makes it easier to invite individuals to join the movement. Family members, friends, and people living in the same location, like neighbours, are those that are considered as personal relationships.

The *Liqo* trainees that I interviewed typically cited the ‘intervention’ of family members or friends who had already joined the *Liqo* as the reason for their conversion. Tania (32), from Depok, initially joined the weekly *Liqo* sessions through being encouraged to attend by her classmate in the *Nurul Fikri* education centre.¹⁷⁷ She shared her story during an interview:

In the last stage of my SMA (*Sekolah Menengah Atas*/Senior high School), I joined the *Nurul Fikri* training centre to prepare in pursuing higher education at the University of Indonesia (UI). In this centre I found new close friends as we met every day for about three hours at a minimum to learn various school subjects. I made even closer relationships with my classmate, who invited me to join her ‘religious’ learning group that later on I knew as *Liqo*

¹⁷⁷The *Nurul Fikri* learning centre is widely associated with the *Tarbiyah* movement, and was founded by *Tarbiyah* activists in 1985. Although officially still in the private *dakwah* period, this centre was starting to reach public audiences. The literature and the official website of the centre mentions that their motivation and purpose is to help students to develop their skills in order to enter top state universities after graduating from senior high school (see Damanik, 2002). However, I observed that this institution as part of the *dakwah* strategy of the *Tarbiyah* movement. Evidence for this can be seen in the topics discussed among students of *Nurul Fikri*, the ‘typical’ books on Islam used by the *Tarbiyah* movement that are widely circulated among them (such as books written by the key figures of the M B) and, of course, in the rules for behaviour and their physical performances of them, which all strongly relate to the *Tarbiyah* movement. This learning centre has grown, and now has more than eighty-seven branches spread across Jakarta and other cities in Indonesia (<http://www.bimbelnurulfikri.com/>, accessed on 10 December 2013).

or *Halaqah* group. She said that it is important not to forget religious subjects as well as school subjects, such as Maths, Physics etc. (Tania, 30s, trainees, female, Depok).¹⁷⁸

Rina from Lombok (West Sumatra) – who moved to Jakarta to pursue her Master’s Degree at the University of Indonesia (UI), and then worked to earn money to support herself – reported that her older brother was involved in her decision to join the *Liqo*:

I was initially asked by my brother to attend one of the religious programmes in Bogor, managed by the *Tarbiyah* community in my new campus. It was a very intensive religious training for one full week. I [had to] attend the overall programme over the week, and was not allowed to go outside the training venue during the whole week. During the training, I was told that this one-week training was an introductory programme for the potential trainees before they officially join the weekly *Liqo* sessions. In my opinion, this training was significant in building my understanding on Islamic teaching, as taught by the *Tarbiyah*, [and] it attracted me to attend the regular *Liqo* sessions afterwards (Rina, 40s, trainees, female, Jakarta).¹⁷⁹

In my opinion, this training represented an important ‘indoctrination’ phase for Rina, as well as aiming to test her interest and engagement. Although Rina’s explanation shows that her decision to join the *Liqo* came gradually, it was clearly influenced by the one-week ‘indoctrination’ training that she attended. This training and experience made her aware of the importance of participating in such an Islamic group, and the advantages she would accrue from doing so. As Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson contend, “people seldom initially join movements per se; rather, they typically participate in movement activities and only gradually became members” (1980:795).¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Interviewed on 05/09/2012.

¹⁷⁹ Interviewed on 28/10/2012.

¹⁸⁰ See also Clark’s discussion in Wiktorowicz (2004:171).

Moreover, Rina's brother played a very important role, not only in introducing her to the movement, but also in persuading her to participate and to join a group. In this regard, the role of families and friends, or so-called social networks, is to introduce, promote, and persuade potential members to join the movement. Therefore, candidates' decisions about whether they should join or decline are not only influenced by their own considerations, but also by the support, encouragement and 'pressure' of their relatives or friends. This trend will be discussed in further detail later, based on my observations of the women's *Liqo* group in which I participated in Jakarta (see Section 6.3).

Based on official documents published by the PKS and my interviews with leaders, I found that the 'approaching familiars' strategy, or recruitment through personal relationships, was most used by the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement during its emergence in the 1980s and through until the 1990s. However, this approach has recently been used in tandem with other 'public' approaches that will be explored below. The leaders of the movement, however, still consider the 'private' recruitment pattern as being more successful than 'public' recruitment in pulling individuals to the *Liqo*.

5.5 Expanding the social networks

The use of social networks for recruitment both increased and came to coexist alongside other approaches when the Indonesian political climate became more accommodating towards the Islamist movement during the 1990s, and after the emergence of the more democratic state in the post New Order (1998 – present day) in particular (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4). The movement started to approach strangers, which comprises a more public form of recruitment, and began to actively build up

new social ties. A statement by a national female leader, Noura, who is also a *Liqo* mentor (*mutarabbiyah*), describes the expansion in the approaches for recruiting new members:

The recruitment process [has] become much easier and bigger now because we are recruiting through [a] range of institutions and activities. In the past, we recruited members only through personal relationships (Noura, 50s, leader, female, Jakarta).¹⁸¹

The success of recruitment through social networks is driven mainly by the belief among members of the *Liqo* that recruiting new members into their community is part of their *dakwah*. For them, *dakwah* is seen as obligatory for every Muslim. Through my interviews and observations, I saw that the *Tarbiyah* community invite new members more actively in the periods of public *dakwah* through a variety of educational and social centres. They believe that their work places are part of their *dakwah* for promoting Islamic values. This belief is very widespread amongst loyal activists (*ikhwan* and *akhawat*). Through their belief in uniting the religious and secular aspects of their lives, they combine serving God, religion, and society. During conversations with two *Tarbiyah* activists during my fieldwork in Jakarta, I asked them how providing social services or teaching children secular subjects, such as sports or maths, could be considered as a religious activity. They responded that the factor that determines whether a particular activity should be classified as religious or non-religious is the intention of each individual in teaching these subjects. Nabil (40s) and Rahima (30s) declared: “we all did these teaching activities with the intention of serving God and Islam, thus everything we did is religious or part of *dakwah* activity”.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Interviewed on 18/10/2012.

¹⁸² Interviewed Nabil on 23/09/2012 and Rahima on 04/09/2012.

Observations and interviews revealed that the community is always encouraged to present themselves as good examples of Muslims and to behave in ways that exemplify the ideals of their community (*Tarbiyah* movement). They invite relatives, friends and ‘strangers’ to join their community and break with their un-Islamic (or less Islamic) practices and communities.

5.5.1 Controlling campuses, student organisations, and mosques

When the *Tarbiyah* movement started to realise that they could begin promoting ‘public *dakwah*’ at the beginning of the 1990s, they started to see the importance of capturing and controlling student organisations in big universities, as well as mosques in campuses and big cities. As previous scholars have shown, they began to take over student organisations in campuses across Indonesia, including at the University of Indonesia (UI) in Depok (near to Jakarta), the University of Gajah Mada (UGM) in Yogyakarta, and the Institute of Technology of Bandung (ITB) in Bandung (Permata, 2008; Machmudi, 2006; Rahmat, 2005; Damanik, 2002). This suggests that the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* movement tried to build new social networks by dominating institutions in which young Muslim students could be persuaded to join the movement.

This ‘recruitment’ through student organisations, in which many potential members are located, is still conducted by the *Tarbiyah* movement. As a result, the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* network tends to grow in these places. A young male leader voiced his opinion regarding this issue as follows:

My *dakwah* struggle at that time [of being appointed as a mentor] was very hard because there was no cadre in this small town [in Bekasi]. It was very

difficult and challenging for me to find new cadres. [The] first step I took was to recruit them through the University students' network, especially the students who are living in Bekasi, but studying at the Universities in Jakarta. *Alhamdulillah* (praise to Allah), I got two cadres from the Jakarta State University (Ridho, 40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi).¹⁸³

The mosques on the big campuses mentioned above are also dominated by *Liqo* activists, who actively participate in them more than members from other religious movements, such as Muhammadiyah and the NU. An activist of a university mosque in Jakarta told me that he has seen how *Liqo* activists have become increasingly involved in mosque activities, covertly recruiting new *Liqo* trainees, and then gradually coming to dominate the board of the mosque (Masdar, 40s, non-*Tarbiyah*/PKS activists, Jakarta).¹⁸⁴

Moreover, the domination of mosques by *Liqo* activists is not limited to campus mosques, but is also seen in some city mosques. Two respondents (non-*Tarbiyah* scholars/activists) from different mosques in Jakarta (Fachruddin, 40s and Muiz, 50s) explained that they had experienced being marginalised from mosques activities by *Liqo* activists (*ikhwan*). Research conducted by Syaifudin Zuhri (2013) also revealed that the Muhammadiyah mosque (Al-Muttaqun mosque) in Klaten-Central Java was taken over by PKS/*Tarbiyah* activists in 2006. Such experiences underline the active *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement and its aggressive penetration into the assets of established Muslim organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and NU. The attitudes and actions of *Tarbiyah* activists in this regard have provoked resistance from both Muhammadiyah and NU.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Interviewed on 17/10/2012.

¹⁸⁴ Interviewed on 12/11/2012.

¹⁸⁵ Muhammadiyah former chairman, Din Syamsuddin, issued a letter circulated among its members about the necessity to control and monitor their organizations' assets and to close the *Tarbiyah*

The expansion of the numbers of *Liqo* activists in mosques, and their subsequent domination of some of them has enabled them to approach more strangers, as Ridho explains:

In recruiting new trainees, I mainly tried to be active in a mosque. And then I become a [member of the] board of the mosque. Through my activities in the mosque [especially] with the position as the board of the mosque, I can identify who are potential individuals who can be recruited into the *Liqo* through mosque activities (40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi).

Liqo activists typically develop new personal relationships with strangers by building new friendships and trust through various methods, including inviting them to their social events, helping them, or listening to their concerns. This approach of being nice, friendly, and helpful, but covering up their primary intentions in doing so, is sometimes known in the New Religious Movements literature as ‘love bombing’ (see Clarke, 2006; Barker, 1984). ‘Love bombing’ appears to be a part of the *Liqo* community’s *dakwah* strategy for attracting wider public attention. As Wiktorowicz notes, “the formation of new social ties is common for Islamist movements” (2005:23).

Through my observation and participation in the *dawrah* sessions, I witnessed new social ties being established and growing through institutional networks that offered a range of activities, including study circles; charities and cultural activities; and professional training for improving a range of skills. These activities, in turn, facilitated points of interaction between the targeted audiences and the *Liqo*-

Movement/PKS’s access to mosques and schools (The letter is titled: *Surat Keputusan PP Muhammadiyah No 149 Kep/1.0/b/2006 tentang Kebijakan PP Muhammadiyah tentang Konsolidasi Organisasi dan Amal Usaha*). According to Hasan (2012) the NU leaders also warned his members to protect their educational institutions and mosques from being infiltrated by the Tarbiyah Movement/PKS and warned them of the *Tarbiyah* Movement/PKS’s ideological influence and threat against NU’s *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah*. The *Tarbiyah* Movement/PKS has been criticized for introducing neo-Wahhabism among NU people.

Tarbiyah movement. The leaders and senior mentors such as Ahmad (60s), Fatih (50s), Abdullah (40s), Salim (50s), Rania (30s) told me in interviews that this formation process is referred to within the *Liqa* community as establishing ‘*robthul ‘am*’ (public ties).

My observations revealed that *Liqa* activists usually avoid talking on religious issues during this initial stage, including about their interpretations of Islam. This seems to represent a kind of *dakwah* strategy, which I will refer to as ‘*dakwah* by deception’, as the activists try to influence the people they are approaching but hide their real intentions and beliefs.¹⁸⁶ They do not reveal their religious views or their *dakwah* until they feel confident that the individuals they are approaching are interested in learning about Islam through the *Liqa* sessions.

5.5.2 ‘Lay’ people as potential targets

Although the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS leaders stated through the interviews with me that the *Liqa* does not prioritise any particular group of strangers to approach, I observed that *Liqa* activists tend to target young Muslims who study in secular universities and that have a ‘religious’ and ‘pious’ tendency (see Chapter 4).¹⁸⁷ According to them, people from this group are easier to attract and to persuade to join the *Liqa*. Like other activists who are drawn into Islamist movements, these

¹⁸⁶ ‘*Dakwah* by deception’ occurs when cadres of the *Tarbiyah* Movement do not provide new recruits/targets with a complete account of what their *dakwah* is about. They want to limit the recruits/targets’ understanding of their *dakwah* so that they respond more naturally to their ‘invitation to join’ to their *dakwah* movement. It is a strategy of gradual *dakwah* that is chosen by the cadres/movement/party. They do not want to reveal to recruits/targets the key ideology of their *dakwah* at the outset, but only later, after they join their weekly *Liqa* and get sufficient understanding about their *dakwah* movement.

¹⁸⁷ As has been observed and noted by Hasan (2012), targeting young people for the *Tarbiyah* Movement /PKS is like planting seeds.

young students are in the process of searching for ‘Islamic authenticity’ or the ‘roots of Islam’, as they feel that Muslims are living far away from an ‘authentic’ form of it (see Chapter 1).¹⁸⁸ Targeting this demographic is in line with the approaches seen in other Islamic activist and revivalist groups studied by researchers including Esposito (2010) and Wiktorowicz (2001; 2005). These young Muslims typically socialise in friendship circles in which Islam plays a central role, and the groups of individuals that are formed thus have a predisposition to search for a particular, ‘non-mainstream’ form of Islam, but are still in the process of ‘searching for meaning’ (see Wiktorowicz, 2001; Mandaville, 2007). This is in line with a statement from a female mentor (*murabbiyah*) in Tangerang, who asserted that:

In recruiting new *Liqo* trainees (*mutarabbiyah*), we look at those who have tendency to be pious or having ‘*benih-benih kehanifan*’ (the seeds of the straight path to Islam) (Athya, 40s, mentor, female, Jakarta).¹⁸⁹

Although these ‘pious’ individuals might come from different professions, social levels, and family backgrounds, and include professionals, students, workers, and traders, the most predominant groups are those of young students and professionals.

My observations and interviews show that these targeted groups can be identified through information shared among senior and ordinary *Liqo* members. The initial ways used for identifying potential *Liqo* trainees was explained by a senior mentor of the *Liqo*, Ridho, who described the process during an interview in his office in Jakarta:

¹⁸⁸ Mitchell (1993) also explained that young activists from the MB in Egypt had been searching for ‘meaning’ and ‘authenticity’. Similar accounts can also be found in Wiktorowicz (2004; 2005) and other scholars who study New Religious Movements and trends in the ‘conversion’ of young people to these movements. (See, for instance, *The Encyclopaedia of New Religious Movements*, edited by Peter Clarke, 2006.)

¹⁸⁹ Interviewed on 22/10/2012.

Initially, I asked my friends who live in Jakarta, including my friends in the same *Liqo* group with me. From them, I got information about potential cadres that I could recruit to be trainees [of the *Liqo*] (Ridho, 40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi).¹⁹⁰

As part of their *dakwah* obligations, the *Liqo* cadres will invite these individuals to attend the weekly *Liqo* sessions. The acceptance of these invitations is not always straightforward and unconditional, however. In some cases, it takes a longer period of time than in others, and requires multiple interactions. Such individuals are usually involved in debate and discussion with *Liqo* members before they become convinced that the *Liqo*-PKS perspective of Islam is 'the straight path' and join the weekly sessions as a result (see Chapter 6).

Almost all the participants in the *Liqo* group and *dawah* programmes in which I participated as an observer came from non-Islamic educational backgrounds. The widespread nature of this phenomenon was confirmed by one of the mentors:

Those who are interested to join the *Liqo* are mostly from 'lay people'. Their enthusiasm to study Islam is indicated by their eagerness in asking many questions to the *Murabbi* (Muhammad, 30s, young leader, male, Bekasi).¹⁹¹

Based on the information I received from activists and leaders of the *Liqo*, most trainees lack a knowledge of Islamic subjects, particularly those in Jakarta and nearby cities such as Bekasi and Tangerang. There are several reasons why these 'lay people' are so keen to join the *Liqo*. First, they want to improve their knowledge of Islam; second, they want to 'refresh their faith'; and third they want to share and learn from each other about how to live their lives in an Islamic way.

¹⁹⁰ Interviewed on 17/10/2012.

¹⁹¹ Interviewed on 08/09/2012.

These three reasons can be seen in the explanation that a female *Liqo* participant (*mutarabbiyah*) who lives in Tangerang and works in Jakarta gave for joining:

Sometimes, when I did not attend the *Liqo* meeting, I felt that I missed ‘something’ valuable. Therefore, the most important reason to join the *Liqo* [was] to refresh my soul. Through the *Liqo* I can study Islamic principles. We also can learn [from] other trainees in the same *Liqo* group. For example, I can learn from my *Liqo* friends, who are better in terms of self-discipline. I am really aware about this. Through joining the *Liqo*, we can improve our loyalty and commitment to our religion. How to dress properly, as taught by Islam, is the best example to mention [as part of our loyalty and commitment to the religion] (Tika, 40s, trainees, female, Jakarta).¹⁹²

Thus, ‘refreshing the soul’ is a key motivation of trainees for improving their private piety through the *Liqo*. Furthermore, trainees also need a good environment to support them in becoming better Muslims. Another female *Liqo* participant voiced her point of view as follows:

It is necessary to have a [learning] group. We need to have a conducive environment [for] supporting us in implementing Islamic teachings, on how we should behave ... in line with Islamic teachings, and how we should keep maintaining the spirit of Islam in our everyday life. These are the reasons why I decided to join the weekly *Liqo* mentoring. The influence of the *Liqo* is really significant to me. It changes my mind extensively (Miya, 30s, trainees, female, Tangerang).¹⁹³

5.5.3 *Liqo* members with Islamic educational backgrounds

The fact that most *Liqo* trainees do not have a background in Islamic education does not mean that urban, Islamically educated graduates are not interested in joining the *Tarbiyah* movement. *Liqo* activists do also come from Islamic educational backgrounds, including graduates from Middle Eastern institutions. The founders and current leaders of the movement are also graduates from prominent Middle Eastern universities, such as Al-Azhar in Egypt and Medina University in Saudi

¹⁹² Interviewed on 07/10/2012.

¹⁹³ Interviewed on 15/10/2012.

Arabia. However, they experience a different kind of engagement with the *Liqo* than those who do not have Islamic backgrounds. Their learning experiences, together with their developed knowledge on Islamic subjects, mean that they are less keen than ‘lay people’ to receive *Liqo* messages. This was clearly articulated by a member of the *Liqo* who graduated from an Islamic institution:

In the beginning, when the mentor taught me about *Tawhid* in the early meetings of the *Liqo*, I think there was nothing new. It [was] just like what I had studied in *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school in junior and senior high school levels). How female Muslims should dress in Islamic ways is the part that I think the mentor gave different knowledge to me. It was mentioned that we have to wear a long *jilbab* (headscarf) and socks anywhere outside [the] home. Initially, it was not too hard for me to perform what the mentors said. However, it is often boring to listen to mentors' presentations, because I need new information [about Islam]. I am sure that you [referring to interviewer] knew ... our feeling. [It] is [as] if we are taught basic lessons of Islam [after learning for years in *Pesantren*]. We have already studied these subjects intensively during our junior or senior high schools and university. These subjects are the most often delivered in the *Liqo* meetings. Probably for those who do not have Islamic educational backgrounds, these subjects are interesting, but it is not for us (Nabila, 30s, female, trainee, mother, Tangerang).¹⁹⁴

Those with a knowledge of Islamic subjects generally have privileged positions in the movement, as revealed by one of the *murabbi*: “While the lay people become students, those who [have] graduated from Islamic universities like Al-Azhar can be appointed as the mentors (*murabbi*)” (Muhammad, 30s, male, Bekasi). Although they are ordinary trainees as well, as indicated by their membership in *Liqo* groups, they are grouped with counterparts who also have previous experience of studying Islam. As revealed by Arif – a *Liqo* mentor and a young leader of the PKS – those who have advanced knowledge in Islamic subjects tend to be grouped with those at a similar level:

¹⁹⁴ Interviewed on 11/09/2012.

When I finished my study from Al-Azhar University, I joined the *Liqo* [in Jakarta]. I was grouped with other trainees (*mutarabbi*) who had the same background [as] me in terms of their Islamic educations. I can say that those who have deep knowledge in Islam – called *ustadz* – prefer to be grouped with [those at] the same level (Arif, 40s, male, Jakarta).¹⁹⁵

This ‘streaming’ of people in the *Liqo* represents a natural division as they have different levels of knowledge on Islamic subjects. Therefore, although there are fewer people with Islamic educational backgrounds than those without, they are usually appointed mentors or as elites of the movement or party soon after they join. As a result, some leadership positions in the *Tarbiyah* movement (and also within the PKS party) are held by individuals that have graduated from Islamic educational institutions, both abroad and in Indonesia, and these appointments are based on their expertise in Islam. This can be seen from the current structure of the PKS, with the Head of the *Syuro* Council, the Head of the *Shari’ah* Council, the President of the PKS, and the Head of the Archive Division all having Islamic backgrounds. Within the *Tarbiyah* movement/the PKS, there are two kinds of cadres or activists: those with an education background in *shari’ah* or Islamic law, who are called *shar’i* cadres or activists, and those who have a secular education background, who are called non-*shar’i* cadres or activists.

5.6 The *Mutarabbi-Murabbi* (trainee-mentor) relationship

The *mutarabbi-murabbi* (trainee-mentor) relationship is the most important tie in the *Liqo* community since it connects *Liqo* groups to one another and perpetuates not only the *Tarbiyah* movement, but also the PKS. Based on my interviews and observations, I found that the restrictions in the number of members of *Liqo* groups is not only to make study more effective (see Chapter 5.3), but also for establishing

¹⁹⁵ Interviewed on 18/10/2012.

a close connection between members of the *Liqo* community – a ‘familial relationship’ that crosses beyond the kinship boundary. A female mentor explained: “this condition creates a very close relationship between the mentors and their trainees, and among the trainees” (Rahima, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta). This is why, in the past, the *Liqo* was called *usrah* (an Arabic term meaning family) (see Section 4.3). Machmudi (2006) is thus right to claim that a small family is established through the *Liqo* groups, within which a sense of belonging, solidarity, and togetherness is built. My interviews with trainees revealed that the weekly mentoring group is regarded by them as their ‘second family’. This is one of the reasons why trainees stay in one *Liqo* group for many years, and are often not keen to move to the next *Liqo* group level, which provides more advanced Islamic subjects. As one mentor put it:

I have been mentoring one group of the *Liqo*. Most of them [the *Liqo* trainees] do not want to move to other groups, although I asked them to do so. They already feel comfortable with this group, so ... they rejected ... [being] joined to other groups. I advised them to move to other *Liqo* levels, considering that different *murabbi* will have different expertise, so that moving into other groups will be good for enriching their insight on Islam (Athyia, 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang).

The mentors play the role of ‘heads of families’, being perceived as the teachers, educators, parents and role models for the trainees of each group. As Machmudi (2006) argues in his thesis, and my female interviewees attested to, when *Liqo* members get married, their mentors even play a significant role in the marriage process (Rania, Rifa, Rahima, and Tania). During an interview, a young female mentor told me about her *murabbi* when she was an ordinary trainee:

Personally, I felt respect to my *murabbi*, due to her position as my teacher. Of course, I felt that the figure of *murabbi* is different [to that of] ordinary trainees. She is a role model for me. I preferred to consult and ask advice

from my *murabbi* rather than from other *Liqo* trainees or my family (Rifa, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).¹⁹⁶

Her statement also supports the idea that religious authority is mainly invested at the local level amongst the trainees – that is, with the mentor rather than the organisation *per se* (see Chapter 6.3).

The *Liqo* group I participated in clearly acted as one ‘family’, sharing their own life experiences and problems. Furthermore, they also asked and told each other about difficulties and problems concerning their families and daily activities. During my participation in the *Liqo*, one of the trainees (Mona, 30s, mother, female, Tangerang) told the group about her child’s sicknesses and overactive behaviour, and the other trainees then shared their personal experiences of dealing with such problems. In another case, one of the *Liqo* trainees (Saida, 30s, female, Jakarta) became severely ill and required hospitalisation. In the following *Liqo* meeting, the trainees and the mentor all discussed how to help her. We then agreed to visit her in her house after she was back from the hospital and to give her a small donation that we gathered between us. Such relationships facilitate the development of close and firm bonds among trainees, between the trainees and the mentor, and also between the trainees, the mentor and the movement. For these trainees, who are mostly migrants and live away from their close families, the *Liqo* provides many benefits, especially in terms of therapy, support, and local community.

Through their roles as teachers, parents, and role models, every mentor (*Murabbi*) attempts to encourage their *Liqo* trainees to be more committed to Islamic teachings,

¹⁹⁶ Interviewed on 05/09/2012.


both during and outside the *Liqo* sessions. They motivate the trainees to conduct prayers – not only the obligatory *salat* (five daily prayers: *Fajr*, *Duhr*, *Asr*, *Maghrib*, and *Isha*), but also the recommended optional prayers (*Salat Nawafil*). The mentors also give the trainees tasks, such as reciting more than ten verses of the Qur'an (*Ashru ayah*) every day (see Section 6.4). Moreover, as heads of the 'families', the *murabbi* arrange other activities outside of *Liqo* time. One *murabbiyah* commented:

We (*murabbi*) have to think how to make the trainees of our group not to feel bored. We offer to arrange activities [for them] that can make them fresh. Therefore, the programme of gathering, eating together, and travelling were sometimes conducted. These are some of the cultural as well as personal approaches that are important to be done (Athya, 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang).¹⁹⁷

Given that the majority of the *Liqo* trainees belong to two *Liqo* groups at the same time – as a mentor of one group and a trainee in another – the *Liqo* network will continuously grow, because *Liqo* trainees become mentors who share the same belief systems as new recruits.

The *Liqo* is thus a 'multilevel organism', connecting, growing, and constantly building a network from its highest levels to its lowest. The highest levels are composed of those who have the longest experience in attending the *Liqo*, and the lowest ones consist of those who have just joined. The *murabbi* play an important role in connecting one level to another through their double position as both mentors of a lower *Liqo* group and trainees in a higher group. In turn, the lowest level produces more *Liqo* groups, because each trainee is encouraged to invite new trainees as part of their *dakwah* responsibility.

¹⁹⁷ Interviewed on 22/10/2012.

Table 3: ‘Multilevel organism’ of the *Liqo*

Source, Author, 2014.

When selecting a trainee to become a mentor (*murabbi*), the mentor of a group will consider the capacity of the trainees in his or her group, and their familiarity with the *Liqo* belief system. The *murabbi* thus emerge from the bottom of the *Liqo* group – they are ordinary but experienced trainees, appointed by their own mentors. A commitment to behaving in an Islamic way and significant experience in the *Liqo* are two of the main requirements to be selected as a *murabbi*. These requirements were explicitly mentioned by a few respondents, and most *murabbi* have been involved in the *Liqo* longer than regular trainees (*mutarabbi*). There is an assumption among the *Liqo* community that the longer they participate in the *Liqo*, the more they will come to know about Islam. Consequently, those who have been in the *Liqo* for a long period will be likely to be appointed as new *murabbi*. Ten of the *murabbi* that I met for interviews told me that they have been involved in the

Liqo for more than five years, including the female mentor (*murabbiyah*) in the *Liqo* group that I joined.

The *Liqo* population is mainly comprised of well-educated neo-urban members of Indonesian society (see Chapter 5.3), and thus most mentors are university graduates. However, only a few of these mentors have been educated in Islamic studies. Based on my reflections on what I saw during my fieldwork, a formal educational background in Islamic studies is not regarded as a key requirement for being appointed as a mentor. Nevertheless, those who have more Islamic knowledge and have a strong sense of and connection to the ideology of the movement will be more likely to be seen as potential mentors. This indicates that knowing the principles of Islam is one of the important requirements for becoming a *murabbi*, as one of the female mentors explained:

I believe that when someone is selected to be a *murabbi*, he must be competent and capable in that position. It is not possible that he will be selected as a *murabbi* if he does not know much about Islamic subjects. As far as I am aware, there are certain criteria required, such as those who are competent and capable in terms of their knowledge in Islamic subjects. [It] is possible [for anyone] to be a *murabbi*, regardless of their educational background. A *murabbi* is part of a role in a group of *Liqo*. I mean that everyone has the same chance to be a *murabbi*. However, they are required to [meet] certain criteria (Rahima, 30s, female, Jakarta).¹⁹⁸

Because the *Liqo* is multi-layered, when members are appointed as mentors this does not mean that they cannot continue their learning within the *Liqo*. Rather, they move to a *Liqo* group with other mentors who are at the same level in terms of their participation and experience within the *Liqo*, and are then taught by a more senior mentor. The same pattern also runs among senior mentors at the next level, and this

¹⁹⁸ Interviewed on 04/09/2012.

pattern continues until the highest *Liqo* level is reached. Each *Liqo* member learns about the *Liqo* belief system through a more informed and experienced mentor, and the *Tarbiyah* network continues to grow.

For these mentors, to be a *murabi* gives them the opportunity to deepen and strengthen their knowledge of Islam. The higher the level in the *Liqo*, the more advanced the subjects will be, and every time a topic is delivered in the weekly activity, the mentor has to prepare it. As a result, they might learn additional information that was not imparted to them previously by their own mentors. Furthermore, by delivering the topic, they strengthen their understanding of the subject:

When my position was [as] a participant or a student, I enjoyed receiving as many lessons as possible. It is not the case when my role is a mentor like now. I have to obtain the [Islamic] subjects by reading as much as I can from many sources. This role supports me to get a deeper and wider understanding on Islam (Aliyah, 40s, mentor, female, Jakarta).¹⁹⁹

This ‘cell’ model, and the *mutarabbi-murabbi* relationship it involves are effective in spreading the *dakwah* ideology among the *Liqo* community because it connects the groups to each other. A common ideological orientation and its practice thus connect all *Liqo* individuals, and has led to a high level of unity in the *Liqo* community.

However, it has also produced segmentation among the internal community. The differences in personal views and religious interpretations, together with the *Liqo*’s

¹⁹⁹ Interviewed on 23/09/2012.

development strategies sometimes cause divisions within the movement. Research conducted by Permata (2013) explains the internal dynamics of the *Tarbiyah* community and the PKS, which are caused by the different nature of the two institutions. Recalling the contrast I identified in the Introduction with respect to SMT (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004), he contends that the *Tarbiyah* movement is a secretive religious movement, managed *informally* under a supreme leader. The PKS, however, is a political party, managed under a party president who follows the *formal* political regulations and dynamics of the Indonesian system.

Indeed, I found that mentors and trainees preferred to talk about their feelings and lived experiences during the *Liqo* rather than share their knowledge on the concepts or ideologies of their *dakwah*. The majority had very little abstract knowledge of the concept or ideology of their *dakwah*. Instead I saw that practising *dakwah* values such as daily rituals, wearing particular clothing styles, and inviting others to join the weekly *Liqo* sessions was more significant embodied ‘knowledge’. This, of course, was different for the elites, who are the individuals most responsible for the ideology and official discourse and concepts within and behind the movement. As we shall see in more detail in the next chapter my fieldwork revealed that the *Liqo* sessions impart only a small amount of knowledge on the ideology or concept of *dakwah*. Rather building the discipline and commitment necessary for implementing the religious knowledge delivered in the *Liqo* within their daily lives is key.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter discusses the development of the *Liqo* during periods of the *Tarbiyah* movement and then the PKS, in particular its related debates and challenges. The

weekly *Liqo* sessions have been designed and developed by the *Tarbiyah* movement of the PKS. From the early 1980s, the *Liqo* focused on improving private piety *informally* through *dakwah*, but was transformed in 1998 to focus on creating public piety via the more *formal* framework of a political party (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004; Mandaville 2007/2014; Fox 2012). This new formality in the context of changing political opportunities led to the reformulation of the *Tarbiyah* movement's official structure, official curricula (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*) and recruitment system. Membership associated with the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement thus became more political with the emergence of the PKS.

The drive to promote their *dakwah* messages to the Indonesian society as a whole from the end of 1990s built 'a mutual relationship' between the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* community and the PKS, but also moved the *Liqo* away somewhat from its original *dakwah* activities and orientations. From the point of view of the leaders of the party (or the movement), the informal structures associated with the *Liqo* significantly contributes to the growth and mobilisation of the PKS's cadres and develops the quality of the *dakwah* party, as the PKS has appointed senior *Liqo* activists as the party elites. They also consider it to be the case that the PKS enables the *Liqo* to expand and mobilise its *dakwah* network through its various activities. For the cadres at the middle and lower levels of the movement, however, especially at the grassroots level, the formalisation and pragmatism of the party has mixed and thus diluted their 'pure' *dakwah* ideologies and orientations through its focus on political interests and strategies.

The *Liqo* community's growth occurs via personal networks, social networks and institutional networks. However, networks created through informal personal

relationships still represent the strongest and most common way of attracting people to join the *Liqo* community. *Liqo* groups grow over time as every mentor and trainee, as part of their *dakwah*, tries to ‘convert’ friends, family and neighbours to the *Liqo* community. This doubling-up of friendships and religious sessions establishes a high degree of group solidarity and loyalty within the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* community. Thus, informal social networks remain an absolutely key resource for the movement.

The *Liqo* community mainly spreads and grows on secular campuses, in mosques and at other educational institutions in big cities, and has created a *Liqo* population that is largely composed of neo-urban individuals who are students or professionals, and are thus well-educated individuals. They are mostly migrants to the city, who have come to study at higher education institutions or to work as professionals. They thus generally live far away from their families and, as a result, although each *Liqo* is composed of a very small group of people, the trainees treat each other like family members, providing informal support, friendship and new networks that can be mobilised both for each other and for the general purposes of the movement (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012). The *Liqo* thus proves to be an invaluable resource for many of its members, and strong bonds develop between trainees and the *Liqo*, as well as between trainees and their mentors.

Chapter 6

The Lived Experience of Female *Liqo* Members

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I showed how the *Liqo* – the main vehicle for *dakwah* in the *Tarbiyah* movement – is designed by *Tarbiyah* movement leaders to fit into the structure and ideology of the movement. Although each *Liqo* is attended by six to ten permanent trainees, I found that it seeks to use *Tarbiyah* movement leaders in a number of ways: as a means for recruiting new members to the *Tarbiyah* movement and to the party; for seeking to strengthen its current members' *dakwah* ideologies; and for seeking to connect the *Tarbiyah* movement with the political goals of the PKS. In this chapter I seek to answer my third and final research question: 3) how do female *Liqo* members experience, and to what extent do they subsequently practice, the *dakwah* and discipline received through weekly sessions? My argument will be that the *Liqo* is a space where *Tarbiyah* movement / PKS norms, lifestyles and dispositions are more or less successfully taught, learned and reproduced principally through the disciplined and repeated performances of embodied piety.

I examine the extent to which women *Liqo* members experience, receive, and practice the *dakwah* designed and campaigned for by *Tarbiyah* movement leaders. I focus on trainees and cadres' stories about the lived religious experiences they have had through joining the *Liqo*, with special reference to the female *Liqo* group that I observed in Jakarta during my fieldwork. My observation focused on these women's experiences, particularly concerning why they joined the *Liqo*, how they moved from being outside the *Liqo* to being a part of it, how their journey into the *Liqo* continues, and how they receive and enact ideas and lessons developed and designed

by *Tarbiyah* movement leaders. I found that although the experiences and practices of these women revealed a heterogeneity of meanings, it is through the everyday lived, practiced and embodied cultivation of pious norms in this informal institutional setting that the official religion promoted by the movement and its leaders (see Chapter 5), is most successfully reproduced (cf. Mahmood 2005)

McGuire (2008) argues that individuals' religious experiences, expressions, and practices are complex and dynamic.²⁰⁰ I agree with McGuire that "at the level of the individual, religion is not fixed, unitary, or even coherent" (2008:12), and this means that it is impossible to understand individuals' religiosity and identity based only upon the official viewpoint of the organisations of which they are members even when those organisations put an emphasis on party/movement discipline. Thus, this chapter examines how *Liqo* lessons and ideologies are understood, practiced, experienced, and expressed by middle and low-level trainees and cadres in the context of their everyday lives, rather than simply through the official ideology of the *Tarbiyah* movement. However, as Mahmood's (2005) study of the women's mosque movement in Egypt also underlines, becoming pious means learning adherence to norms of religiosity especially through the performance of acts of worship (*ibadah*), attention to Islamic dress and other ways of practicing Muslim self-identity. Thus, official and lived religion are intimately interconnected.

In this chapter, I will explore how these 'norms of proper religiosity' and Islamic piety are practised and experienced by the *Liqo* cadres, examining how this personal

²⁰⁰ McGuire uses the term 'lived religion' for "distinguishing the actual experiences of religious persons from [the] prescribed religion of institutionally defined beliefs and practices" (2008:12). She highlights the idea that an "individual's lived religion is experienced and expressed in everyday practices – concrete ways of engaging their bodies and emotions in being religious" (2008:208).

religiosity is framed both by the movements and actively created by individuals in their everyday lives. Firstly, I will describe the workings of the women's *Liqo* group that I joined for observation, including who the mentor and the trainees are, and why they were drawn to the *Liqo* circle in the first place. This is followed by an exposition and discussion of the teaching/reception of the four main lessons of the *Liqo*: *ghazwul fikri*, *akidah* (beliefs), *ibadah* (worship), *adab* (Islamic ethics) and aspects of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) which are related to women's dress codes and their public roles. During my attendance at the *Liqo* group, I observed how the lessons were delivered by the mentor, and how they were received and the extent to which they were put into practice by the trainees. In order to discover how the trainees combined the learning from these lessons with their previous knowledge and experience, as well as with existing practices in the wider society, I spent time interacting with the trainees outside the *Liqo* sessions as well.

The first section provides details about the profile of the members of the *Liqo* group that I participated in as a trainee. The next section then goes on to investigate the motivations of the trainees – mostly those from the group I participated in – for joining the *Liqo*. I found that the trainees had a range of reasons and motives for joining the *Liqo*, including obeying their husbands who are movement/party members but also expanding their own social networks and finding new friends. I then go on to discuss mentors' and trainees' perceptions about the concept of *ghazwul fikri* (ideological conquest). *Ghazwul fikri* is perceived by the mentors and trainees as a 'soft' cultural war that is carried out by Western countries (European and American) with the purpose of defeating Muslims. The *Liqo* community opposes Western culture due to its potential imperialistic threat to the Muslim faith.

In the next part of the chapter, I explore mentor and trainee reception of the topic of *akidah*. The trainees were genuinely shocked to discover that many of the customs practised by their families and members of their village communities are apparently ‘un-Islamic’. However, the reasons that they accept this critique are not always in accordance with those provided in the official discourse. The chapter then goes on to investigate the understanding of the trainees and the mentor regarding the issue of *ibadah* (worship). The female trainees felt that the *Liqo*’s attempts to improve their commitment to performing both obligatory and recommended daily worship are very strictly pursued, but while this caused some to drop out the majority accepted that this was an important part of the self-disciplining programme.

The last section of this chapter explores the female *Liqo* members’ reception of women’s dress codes and their public roles. The mentor and trainees believe that wearing a long headscarf, modest clothes, and socks is required by God. In addition, although women are allowed to be active in the public domain, they again accept that their main role is a domestic one, and that they need to get permission from their husbands if they want to be active in public.

6.2 A women’s *Liqo* group in Jakarta

My observations of the women’s *Liqo* group that I joined supported and strengthened Arifin’s statement in Chapter 5 that *Liqo* groups typically consist of trainees and a mentor from a local neighbourhood area. During my observations, I was allocated by my respondent (a female senior mentor) to a *Liqo* cluster whose members were comprised of people from a neighbourhood in the district of Pondok Aren, near Jakarta. In its first session, my *Liqo* group was composed of nine women

within an age range of approximately 30–40 years.²⁰¹ However, two of the group left after the first two *Liqo* sessions.²⁰² The initial group was made up of seven married women, who all had children, and two unmarried women. Five of the trainees were working women, three were housewives, and one was a college student. All of us met at the *Liqo* meeting place which was a trainee's house. The majority of the trainees travelled to the weekly *Liqo* session on their own motorcycles, whilst some travelled by car and were either dropped off by their husbands or drove themselves. Two trainees travelled to the *Liqo* sessions on public transportation. Our mentor sometimes drove to the *Liqo* venue in her private car, and sometimes came on her motorcycle.

All the trainees came dressed in soft-coloured long dresses, with thick *kerudung* or *jilbab* (both types of headscarves) covering their neck and extending over their chest. This is the most commonly adhered to Islamic dress code among the *Liqo* women's community. My close observations revealed that it is almost impossible to find *Liqo* trainees dressing in jeans or cotton trousers and tops, with face make-up or with up-to-date styles of *kerudung* (headscarves).²⁰³ Such clothes are regarded as 'non-Islamic' and as an influence of Westernisation. The absence of *Liqo* women activists wearing such clothes or make-up is one of the characteristics of those that the *Liqo* lessons attract.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ A similar number of *Liqo* members were also found in other *Liqo* groups that my interviewees (who are *Liqo* trainees (*mutarabbi*) in Jakarta and other cities such as Tangerang and Bekasi) were members of.

²⁰² I explain in the next section why these two women left the *Liqo*, and only seven trainees thus remained in the group.

²⁰³ My reflection is that this dress code and its performance represent a 'marker of difference' that makes it easy to identify *Liqo* women in Jakarta public areas, such as malls or shopping centres, hospitals, street and offices, where their style of dress does not represent the mainstream clothing style for Muslim women. A similar type of women's dress code is seen in the offices of Islamic organisations, such as those of the NU and *Muhammadiyah*.

²⁰⁴ See Chapter 6.5 on the *Liqo* community's perspective on women's dress codes, including the veil and headscarves, and the doctrinal reasoning that lies behind their choices and commitments.

Although the *Liqo* sessions are scheduled to last for two hours, my observations and interviews with my trainees revealed that they usually last much longer than this. The *Liqo* that I joined during my fieldwork was conducted every Saturday morning for about three hours, from 09.00 am until 12.00 pm. The *Liqo* was held in the living room of a different trainee's house each week so that the trainees got to know each other and became closer. All of us were relatively new members, and before joining this group none of us had any experiences related to *Liqo* lessons or *Jamaah Tarbiyah*. We met each other at the first *Liqo* mentoring session, and each of us joined this group through recommendations from senior mentors that lived in the same district. New mentors (*murabbiyah*) are chosen to establish new *Liqo* groups by their former mentors, who also manage these new mentors (see section 5.4).²⁰⁵

Given that all trainees are new recruits to the *Liqo* network, we were advised to learn basic Islamic topics, such as *Shahadat* and other *Akidah* or *Tawhid*-related topics. We were given basic topics on Islam because we were classified as beginners in this community, with none of the learning experiences that we had outside the *Liqo* being taken into account, and the lessons were delivered in *Bahasa* (the Indonesian language). Both my experience of attending 'my own' *Liqo* and my conversations with members of other *Liqos* revealed that it is common to commence the *Liqo* sessions with one of the trainees reading two or more selected Qur'anic verses out while the mentor and the other trainees listen. After this, the trainees remain seated on the thinly carpeted floor and listen attentively in silence as the mentor explains the topic for the day. The mentor then relates the topic to everyday life with practical

²⁰⁵ This system of shifting in role from a trainee (*mutarabbi*) to a mentor (*Murabbi*) is employed whenever a new small *Liqo* group is established, with trainees always chosen to be new mentors by their *Liqo* mentors (see section 5.4).

examples, and invites questions from the trainees. A serious atmosphere was maintained throughout the session, with very little joking or chatting.

However, in the *Liqo* group that I joined, this silent and serious atmosphere only occurred when none of the trainees brought their children. Most of the *Liqo* meetings that I attended were noisy, with children crying and screaming. Consequently, the lessons were often stopped for a number of short periods whilst the mothers calmed their children down and got them back playing with their toys or else took them away from the circle. The *Liqo* allows mothers to bring their children as it aims to accommodate mothers' responsibilities. The movement believes that women members, just like men, are obliged to attend the weekly *Liqo*, and because caring for children is perceived to be the woman's responsibility (see also chapter 6.7.2), it is thus accepted that women must be allowed to bring their children when they attend the *Liqo*. My interviews with male *Liqo* members and mentors indicated that it is less common for men to bring their children to *Liqo* sessions, which indicates that women get little help from their family in looking after their children.

It is common for new recruits to leave their groups when they cannot find what they are looking for. My observations during the four months that I attended the *Liqo* group confirmed this phenomenon. Two of the nine *Liqo* trainees did not come again after the first two sessions, but the majority (seven trainees) continued with the weekly meetings. I could see that those who came were very enthusiastic and committed to improving their skill in reciting the Qur'an and to learning other basic Islamic knowledge.

Such small ‘family’ groups are expected to make it easier for mentors to build the ethos of the groups and to discipline each *Liqo* trainee (see section 5.2). During my observations, however, I rarely found a situation in which the mentor built a good learning environment that encouraged the trainees to raise questions. In many cases, the trainees were passive, and tended to be afraid to express their opinions. Such experiences were supported by the women’s statements during the interviews that I conducted with them. Thus, the way the mentors delivered the lessons did not constitute an exploratory approach in which trainees had the opportunity to reflect on their lessons, but was mostly instructive, consisting of guidance to create an ethos of discipline.

6.3 Social networks among female *Liqo* activists

As I argue in section 5.3, my observation of the women’s *Liqo* group that I joined during my fieldwork also supported the hypothesis that social networks play a significant role in women’s decisions to join the *Liqo*. The female *Liqo* trainees from my group described the influence exerted by *Liqo* members who were husbands, other family members (sisters or brothers), or friends and neighbours on their decision-making. Within my *Liqo* group, three female trainees (*mutarabbiyah*) were sisters from the same family, and during an informal conversation with one of the female trainees who had graduated from the school of design at a state university in Solo-Central Java, she explained:

I come from Central Java for working in Jakarta. My two older sisters have been working here [a] few years before me. Following my arrival in Jakarta, I saw them every week [and] came to a religious meeting [the *Liqo*]. I think that it would be good for me if I joined them as well. Besides learning religious subjects, I can also find new friends from this meeting. So, three of us gathered in one *Liqo* group. However, not too long after I joined this *Liqo*,

one of my sisters moved to another *Liqo* group in [a] different part of Jakarta following her husband (Mona, 30s, trainees, female, Tangerang).²⁰⁶

A female trainee named Fathya said that she attended a *Liqo* group in the Pondok Aren-Tangerang district through an invitation from her friend and neighbour. Such experiences were not unique to Rina (40s), Tania (30s), and Fathya (40s), but were shared by my other interviewees, who were friends or neighbours with one another, or who had *Liqo* members in their families before they joined their groups. The interventions of family members, friends, or neighbours that are more senior members in the *Liqo* encourages others not only to join, but to ‘convert’ to the *Liqo* perspective or ideology.²⁰⁷ They ‘convert’ in the sense that they change their perspective on particular issues in Islam, and shift their daily attitudes or practices to ones that they consider to be superior to those that they held before becoming involved in the *Liqo*.

My interviews also revealed that marriages to *Liqo* activists have supported the process of conversion to the *Liqo* ideology and perspective. For instance, Retno (30s), a *Liqo* trainee, told me that she was encouraged to attend the *Liqo* by her

²⁰⁶ Interviewed on 16/12/2012.

²⁰⁷ The discourse of ‘conversion’ is common in Western sociology of religion. It does not always involve literal conversion to a different religion, but can often be about changes of ideology, mind, and practice. In Britain, people become ‘born again Christians’, which refers to a change in their religious beliefs and attitudes and/or practices. In the United States in the 1970s, a growing number of young well-educated people began converting to the ‘New Religious Movements (NRMs)’ and they were very visible in public places – on the streets – where they sold flowers and candles and invited young people to their centres. The growing trends of conversion amongst young people led to the idea that the trainees of various NRMs were being ‘brainwashed’ through various techniques. For further discussion of ‘conversion’ in the Western context see, for instance, Barker (1984). Conversion in the West also includes conversion to Islam, of course. Nehemia Levtzion in “Conversion to Islam (1979)”, however, differentiates between conversion and adhesion. Conversion usually involves individuals in a ‘reorientation of the soul’ and in a commitment to a new way of life and adhesion, typically a communal process entailing ‘the acceptance of new worship as useful supplements and not as substitutes’ to what went before. Thus, according to Levtzion: ‘Islamisation of a social group is not a single act of conversion but a long process toward greater conformity and orthodoxy’ (1979: 21). In my opinion, the discourse of conversion is similar to the spirit of *dakwah* in Islam, which aims to make the beliefs and practices of Muslims better, and includes the *dakwah* of the *Tarbiyah* movement / the PKS in Indonesia. See, for instance, Poston (1992) and Janson (2003).

husband, who had been a *Liqo* activist long before they were married, as did Nuriyah (30s), whose husband is a young local leader in the PKS and a senior mentor of the *Liqo*. Two other female interviewees (Tania and Nisya; 30s) also told me that their husbands had been involved in their conversion to the *Liqo* perspective.

These stories suggested to me that these women's 'conversions' to *Liqo* beliefs and practices were not merely driven by their own free choices, but also by the 'encouragement' and 'advice' of their husbands. Both encouragement and advice can be difficult for Indonesian wives to refuse, particularly those who come from rural backgrounds, where husbands have stronger voices and wives are expected to follow their instructions, especially on religious matters. Close observations and informal conversations with these female *Liqo* activists revealed that there is a growing trend of family 'conversion', in which husbands that have already adopted the *Liqo* perspective transmit it to their wives.

Liqo activists expose their families and friends to the religious lessons taught in the *Liqo* through their everyday interactions with them. The interviewees said that the process that their friends and family used to approach them was straightforward, involving informal discussions about Islam. In many cases, various religious issues were discussed, and the *Liqo* activists took the opportunity to explain their *Liqo* perspectives on Islam. They made Islam a common topic of their daily conversations, discussing it in public places, whilst having lunch at the office, or during social visits. The conversations about religious issues were reported as being more intense by trainees that were converted by family living in the same house. This is partly because a sister or a brother who has either younger or older siblings

has many chances to discuss Islam with them – whilst cooking and eating dinner, watching television, talking before bed-time, etc.

6.4 Women’s perception of *Ghazwul Fikri* (ideological conquest)

My interviews with the majority of the leaders revealed that the idea of *ghazwul fikri* (ideological conquest) is seen as having an important role for members of the *Liqo*, from the beginner levels (*anggota pemula*) through to the more advanced levels. During my observation at the women’s *Liqo* group, the issue of *ghazwul fikri* was often raised by the mentor, and used to analyse any topic she was teaching. In interviews with mentors from different and more advanced *Liqo* groups, I found that this is something that is done with senior members as well as beginners. This was indicated by the fact that interviewees often responded to my questions by making connections to *ghazwul fikri*, even though I did not ask them about its connection with the topics they were talking about. This suggests that the concept of *ghazwul fikri* has been very successfully reproduced and is a significant influence on the community of the *Tarbiyah* movement as a whole.

The female mentor (*murabbiyah*) of my *Liqo* group contended that Muslims’ enemies find it easier to contaminate the Muslim faith through importing Western culture (Siti, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta), adding that “when Muslims adopt Western culture, it indicates that Muslims have been implicitly defeated by the West”. Siti’s opinions emerged when she provided examples of ‘Western’ phenomena in contemporary Indonesian culture, such as in women’s fashion and behaviours and attitudes in public places that she regarded as ‘un-Islamic or less-Islamic’, for example, the relationships of young male and female Muslims and their

impolite attitudes to older people. Such perceptions are commonly found amongst revivalists and/or Islamists, who believe that Muslims should avoid imitating non-Muslim culture and worry that the cultural domination of the West will make them lose their ‘authenticity’ and identity as ‘true’ Muslims (see Chapter 1). From my own observations during fieldwork, as well as my informal conversations with the mentor and all six trainees from my *Liqo* group, I found that on the ground the West is in practice as well as in theory considered to be a potential enemy of Islam. In several *Liqo* sessions that I attended, the mentor used *ghazwul fikri* to construct and define Western culture and politics as a threat. The *murabbiyah* perceived *ghazwul fikri* to be an unconventional type of war – a ‘soft war’ – that the enemies of Muslims adopted because they could not defeat them in a physical war.

For this reason, even though the content of *ghazwul fikri* is related to Westernisation, the mentor often connected the issue with Zionism instead (see Chapter 4). However, my mentor, like other senior *Liqo* members, failed to clearly explain how or why Zionism has had such a significant influence in constructing Western civilisation and ideology, and it seemed to me that they could not clearly understand why and how Zionism is put into a single package with the West.

The mentor of my group believed that Zionism was the agent behind *ghazwul fikri*, and that its purpose is not only to take Palestine from Muslims, but also to defeat Muslims anywhere and everywhere by infiltrating and contaminating their faith, ideology, and culture. The *murabbiyah* put it as follows when I interviewed her:

Zionism is the source of *ghazwul fikri*. Zionism influences [the] global world (European and American states), not only [seeking] to control Palestine, but

also all Islamic countries. Zionism wants to defeat Muslims by infiltrating our Islamic ideology.

Thus, for the mentor, *dakwah* is seen as necessary for counteracting Western propaganda:

Young Muslims have been exposed to the globalised cultures that are completely far from the teachings of Islam. The changing directions of Muslims can be seen, for instance, in terms of dress, behaviour, and other lifestyles (Siti, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).²⁰⁸

This view is typical of the ideas held by Islamists. Similarly, the *murabbiyah* also highlighted the conflict between Palestine and Israel, the American invasion of Iraq, and the conflict in Afghanistan as examples of Western conspiracies to undermine Muslim power (see Chapter 4). Through my interviews with mentors and trainees from different *Liqo* groups I concluded that this perception is strong among the *Liqo* community.

The mentor's claims above implicitly suggest that Christians as well as Jews are proponents of Zionism. However, the female mentor of a *Liqo* group who I interviewed argued that she does not consider all Jews and Christians to be the enemies of Muslims:

The global picture of *ghazwul fikri* – that Muslims should be aware of Zionism – does not mean that all non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) are the enemy of Islam or part of the Zionist [movement].

This information was further confirmed by mentors from different groups.

Darmanto, a staff to a PKS legislator, for instance, said:

²⁰⁸ Interviewed on 28/10/2012.

The trainees of the *Liqo (mutarabbi)*, later, will also be taught other Qur'anic verses clarifying this issue in the next levels of their *Liqo* sessions in order to make them not ... generalise that all of Jews and Christians are the enemy of Islam.

I did not hear this claim being made in the *Liqo* of the beginner level that I participated in. As a new member, I was not allowed to participate in the intermediate or advanced *Liqo* level classes. However, through my interviews and interactions with trainees studying at the more advanced levels, I found that they did express a more flexible understanding of the discourse of *ghazwul fikri*. Their flexibility, however, can be seen as part of the more 'progressive' *dakwah* strategy promoted for public consumption at the political and the state level (Chapter 4). Pragmatic rhetoric presented a moderate face of the movement to the outside, while a stricter version of the ideology of *ghazwul fikri* was maintained within the movement.

One likely impact of *ghazwul fikri* is that it encourages the *Liqo* trainees to believe that they have enemies that are attempting to separate them from Islamic teachings. This hypothesis was confirmed by the experience of one of the trainees from Jakarta, who shared her experiences of beginning her *Liqo* participation:

When I was invited to attend a *dawrah* [a larger religious class conducted by the *Tarbiyah* movement] at a villa in Gunung Salak-West Java, I got many interesting subjects. The event has opened my mind that Islam is an incredible and honourable religion so that, having [been] born as Muslims, we have to be happy. From this training, I just realised that Muslims nowadays are in [a] dangerous situation. Through the topic of *ghazwul fikri*, I realised that we (Muslims) have a huge enemy who are attacking us softly in many aspects. Let's see the reality. There are many evidences supporting this suspicion. As [an] example, let us take a look at teenagers ... here. Most of them no longer have respect for the Prophet Muhammad. They also do not

know their life's aim [based on Islamic teachings] (Tika, 40s, trainee, female, Jakarta).²⁰⁹

This testimony fits with the *dakwah* manual's explanation that the purpose of teaching *ghazwul fikri* is to make members aware that there are numerous movements seeking to defeat and harm Muslims (see Chapter 4). This lesson of *ghazwul fikri* is frequently linked by the mentor to the wider context of wars in Muslim lands, Western double-standards and global inequalities --as also written in the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* (2005: 302).

Thus, the concept of *ghazwul fikri* was perceived by the mentor and the trainees in this *Liqo* group as cleaving people into two groups: 'friends' and 'enemies'. The mentor appealed to such characterisations in order to strengthen the Islamic identities of the *Liqo* trainees in an attempt to 'de-westernise' them, both culturally and ideologically. This bifurcation of people and cultures into friends and enemies appears to be driven by the worry that living in a globalised modern society in which Western culture and its values dominate could reduce the commitment that Muslims have to their religion.

6.5 The *Liqo* women's reception of *Akidah* (Faith)

Akidah is one of the topics taught in the *Liqo*. The *akidah* is related to the basis of faith in which Muslims conceptualise their perception of God. For instance, *akidah* explains the tenet of the oneness of God as *Tawhid* (the unity of God). *Tawhid* is the belief that distinguishes Muslims from non-Muslims, such as Christians, Jews, and

²⁰⁹ Interviewed on 17/10/2012.

Hindus. The importance of this topic is confirmed in statements by *Liqo* activists from all levels of seniority, including mentors (*Murabbi*):

The materials at the beginning of the *Liqo* mostly talk about the very basic and important topics such as *Tawhid* (the concept of the unity of God), *Shahadatain* (the two phrases of the testimony of faith),²¹⁰ and *Qada* and *Qadar*²¹¹ (God's decree) (Thifa, 30s, mentor, female, Tangerang).²¹²

The three subjects mentioned by Thifa here are all parts of *akidah*. The *Liqo* community believes that the 'true' *akidah* should refer to the interpretations made by the early generations of Muslims, comprising the first generation – the *sahabah* (the Prophet's companions); the second generation – the *tabi'un* (those who lived one generation after the Prophet's companions); and the third generation – the *tabi' at- tabi'in* (the generation after the *tabi'in*). The *Liqo* community perceives the interpretations of the Quran that were made during these periods as being the most authoritative, and regards these three generations of Muslims as being the most committed to Islam. As Abdullah (40s) – a senior *Murabbi* who was appointed as one of the leaders of the PKS – revealed, a “Muslim's faith should be based on the true *akidah*. We call it *salafiyatul akidah* – the belief of the Salaf people, the early pious companions”.²¹³ For me, this is the factor that appears to lead many people in Indonesia to label the *Liqo* community as Salafi.²¹⁴ Although the *Liqo* community

²¹⁰*Shahadatain* or *shahada* is the testimony of faith that is required to become a Muslim, and consists of the two phrases: “I testify that there is no god but God (*la ilahaila-llah*)” and “Muhammad is the messenger of God” (*Muhammadun Rasul Allah*). These phrases are recited in order to have one's faith to Islam witnessed, or in order to convert to Islam.

²¹¹*Qada* and *Qadar* describe God's capability in terms of controlling and managing human life in the world (Rippin, 2005).

²¹² Interviewed on 05/09/2012.

²¹³ *Salaf* is taken from the Arabic root which means 'to precede'. In the Islamic lexicon, this word refers to *al-Salaf al-Salih* – the virtuous companions of the Prophet Muhammad – i.e. the three generations of Muslims that followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad: the companions (*sahabah*), their followers (*tabi'un*), and their follower's followers (*tabi' at- tabi'un*) (Al-Rasheed, 2007).

²¹⁴ In an interview that I conducted with a senior mentor (*murabbi*) and local leader, he noted that people around him frequently label him and his *Liqo* group as the Salafi (Muhammad, 38, Bekasi). He said that he responded to this label by saying: “In fact, all Islamic activists are involved in the

rejects this label, they share one common key characteristic with the *Salafi* network – the idea that *akidah* and rituals are based on these three generations of Muslims. The concept of *akidah* is also embraced by many Islamic revivalist movements, who purify it by purging it of anything that they consider to comprise ‘non-Islamic’ belief. Thus, by adopting *akidah*, the *Liqa* clearly shows its revivalist character.

The subject of *akidah* is used to unite the *Liqa* community during the *Liqa* sessions through the promotion of the concept of ‘a true *akidah*’. A senior mentor who is experienced in leading *Liqa* activities said that the distinctive feature that unifies all *Liqa* members – from the beginning of its establishment to its current incarnation – is their concept of *akidah*: “the unchangeable aspect (*tsawabit*) among us [all *Liqa* generations from its inception to the present day] is the true *akidah*” (Abdullah, 40s, male, Jakarta).²¹⁵

This concept of the ‘true’ *akidah* was also mentioned by the mentor and the trainees in my *Liqa* group. They held that the Muslim faith has to be saved from any deviations, arguing that *klenik* (Javanese mysticism) is one such deviation commonly found among Indonesian Muslims.²¹⁶ A female trainee who migrated from a small village in Central Java to Jakarta explained her experience of *klenik*’s influence on her family and neighbours in the village:

PKS/*Liqa* community]. We have NU [activists], we have *Muhammadiyah* [activists], and we have also PERSIS [activists]. This fact is similar to *Masyumi* party. *Masyumi* had Kyai Noer Ali from [an] NU background and M. Natsir from [a] PERSIS background. So, we [The *Liqa*/PKS] have all organisations [as our] background”.

²¹⁵ Interviewed on 09/10/2012. When I asked him further about this point, he replied that “*akidah* is the point when we must keep all the time without any change. It is different with *ijtihadat* [debatable and changeable] aspects”. He argued that: “the *ijtihadat* points can be seen and can be discussed. The PKS has all mechanisms about this *ijtihadat*. We have the *Shari’ah* council ... [and] every question or problem should be referred to them”.

²¹⁶ For the *Liqa* community, *klenik* refers to cultural ‘deviations’ that influence the Islamic beliefs of Muslims. For other people, *klenik* refers to Javanese mysticism, which is heavily influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism.

The cultural practices in my village ... [in] central Java are very much coloured by *klenik*. For instance, before the harvest, people must bring *sesajen* (foods provided for God) to the rice field. When ... a neighbour passes away, we should commemorate him or her with the recitation of ... ‘*Laailaahaila-llah*’ (there is no god but God) called *tahlilan*, particularly in the 3rd, 7th, and 40th days [after] their death. Also, when there is someone marrying or delivering a new baby in the family, we need to conduct particular traditions.²¹⁷ All these occasions should be accompanied by providing certain foods (*sesajen*). Another practice is sort of giving alms, well known as *sedekah punden*, that is arranged once a year. In my village, there is an ancestral grave (*makam leluhur*) called *Punden*. People of this village arrange to visit and gather at this grave and bring many main foods and side dishes (*lauk pauk*), pray together (led by a charismatic village leader), and then eat together in this place (Miya, 30s, trainees, female, Tangerang).²¹⁸

For the *Tarbiyah* movement and the PKS, visiting graves and praying for saintly intercessions are both regarded as being close to idolatry. As the leaders of the movement in the *Manhaj Tarbiyah* (2005) stated, these two ‘beliefs’ are the main actions for so-called ‘grievous crime’ (*zulmun ‘azimun or zalalun ba’idun*).²¹⁹ In addition, the book asserted that these actions “could annul the witness to the faith (*shahadatain*)” (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005:62). These ‘*klenik*’ cultural practices represent everything that is considered to be un-Islamic by the *Liqo* community. The conception of faith (*akidah*) developed by the *Liqo* is very critical of the traditional culture (*klenik*-based) faiths practiced by particular societies in Indonesia. Moreover, these critiques of *klenik* practices are not only made by the *Liqo* community in Indonesia, but by the Muhammadiyah community as well. Since its establishment (and particularly between the 1930s and the 1970s) the Muhammadiyah has fought against *klenik* practices, and is well known for actively campaigning against any forms of ‘superstition’ or cultural ‘innovation’, referred to as *takhayul*

²¹⁷ *Tahlilan* is the recitation of the creed ‘*laailaahaila-llah*’ (‘There is no god but God’) at ceremonies to commemorate the dead.

²¹⁸ Interviewed on 15/10/2012.

²¹⁹ Both are Qur’anic (Q. 31:13 and Q. 4:60; 116) words that imply the same meaning: “a grievous crime”.

(‘superstition’), *bid’ah* (innovation) and *churafat* (practices similar to ‘superstitions’). The abbreviation that the Muhammadiyah community uses to refer to these three practices is ‘TBC’.²²⁰ The *Liqo* community shares common concerns with other revivalist organisations such as the Muhammadiyah about *akidah* being free from *klenik*, and this fits with the core revivalist belief that “the rejuvenation of Islam was to be achieved through a return to the universal core teachings [of Islam], free from distorting influences of socio-cultural innovation” (Mandaville, 2007:44).

Some of the official reasons the *Liqo* mentors give for the positions they adopt do not always accord with the perceptions of ordinary members at the grass-roots level of the community; Miya's views on *klenik* rituals being one such example. In contrast to the official discourse, Miya states that she disagrees with the *klenik* rituals because of the waste of food they produce:

What I am disappointed [with] was the fact that the food used for rituals is really *mubadzir* (superfluous or waste of foods), because it is too much and not provided for eating (Miya, 30s, trainees, female, Tangerang).²²¹

Miya's expression of her views shows that ordinary members have their own outlooks about why particular traditional rituals are bad for Muslims.

The concept of ‘true *akidah*’, as it was taught in my *Liqo* group, encouraged the trainees to think that many Muslims in Indonesia practice distorted versions of *akidah*. Given that the majority of *Liqo* trainees, particularly those that I interviewed in my *Liqo* group, had only encountered this concept of *akidah* for the first time at

²²⁰ TBC = *Takhayul, Bid’ah and Churafat*. In my opinion, however, there is a different tone between the ‘traditional *ulama*’ and the ‘modern *ulama*’ who have graduated from higher education within the *Muhammadiyah* in relation to the way they fight against *klenik* practices. The former placed a strong emphasis on this issue, while the latter express a softer tone on it.

²²¹ Interviewed on 15/10/2012.

the *Liqo* sessions, they were shocked that the religious traditions in their society were not in line with the Islamic faith:

When I was studying the topic of *akidah*, it was so tempestuous (*bergejolak*) indeed. I found that there were so many ‘Islamic traditions’ that are not fitted with Islamic teachings. Why could our society practice this tradition that completely contradicts Islamic teachings? (Miya, 30s, trainees, female, Tangerang)

Miya, a mother in her early thirties, had no knowledge of the concept of *akidah* or the issues surrounding it when she lived in her small town in Central Java. After moving to Jakarta, attending the *Liqo* sessions and finding a new community, she was surprised to discover that many of the customs practised by her relatives and villagers are apparently ‘un-Islamic’ (though she was not unsympathetic to their ‘ignorance’). She continued:

Furthermore, when reflecting [on] the issues of *akidah* in my closest society, I am very sad because it is very far from the tenets of Islam. The sadness increases when I notice that my grandma also strongly believes in un-Islamic traditions. She strongly believes if we do not do certain ‘rituals’, something bad will be happening. For instance, if she sees a neighbour building his house without a *sesajen* (providing certain services i.e. foods), she will speak that something bad will be happening to their family.²²² I am very sad about her. She is already old and she still believes in this un-Islamic practice. In a month she is very busy to come to her neighbour and gives ‘special’ prayers (based on her traditional/cultural beliefs) for any birth, death or any occasion of a family member (Miya, 30s, trainees, female, Tangerang).

The *Liqo* mentors had a strong influence on the trainees’ acceptance of the concept of ‘true’ *akidah* (faith) through exemplifying good standards of behaviour and commitment to their Islamic teaching. The trainees thus saw their *murabbi* as good practitioners of Islam. This commitment to their values is very important for the trust that trainees have in their mentors – perhaps more than other qualities or

²²² Her grandmother’s belief here is basically seen as a ‘superstition’ – an ‘irrational’ belief in supernatural powers relating to receiving good and bad luck.

characteristics such as having a good Islamic education, as a statement from a female trainee (*mutarabbi*) at a different *Liqo* group suggested:

The mentors of the *Liqo* are very simple. They learn something very basic about Islam, so that they know only little religious knowledge. However, they practised this knowledge in their daily life, for example on learning and practising the five times daily prayers and reading the Qur'an. This is sometimes very different with those who have deep knowledge on religious matters ... [who do] not prioritise implementing their knowledge due to their busyness with other activities (Fadila, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta).²²³

A similar view was expressed by another female trainee – a graduate from an Islamic modern boarding school that had joined a number of different *Liqos* both in Indonesia and while she was overseas. She was attracted to the *Liqo* lessons because of their practical or applied aspects, stating:

Actually, I did not find new Islamic knowledge from the *Liqo* lessons. What I got more was the advantages of the spirit or ethos in implementing the rituals in our daily life (Nabila, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta, university lecturer).²²⁴

Sometimes trainees had difficulty in accepting and practicing *akidah*, especially at the beginning of the courses, as their traditional faiths or cultures clashed with 'the true *akidah*' offered by the *Liqo*. This was more common in trainees who came from rural family backgrounds that were strongly influenced by local traditions. Thus, different trainees have different levels of acceptance, and experience different amounts of resistance to accepting and understanding new information on *akidah*. During my observations, a range of experiences were communicated by the *murabbiyah* and *mutarabbiyah* about their parents' rejections of *akidah*. The parents regarded the *akidah* as too strict and rigid. However, some parents would gradually understand and come to accept the *Liqo*'s concept of 'true' *akidah*. Thus, these

²²³ Interviewed on 17/09/2012.

²²⁴ Interviewed on 11/09/2012.

akidah lessons are also sometimes successful in ‘converting’ trainees’ parents as well.

Liqo trainees, when they come to accept that ‘un-Islamic’ traditions have to be eliminated, not only reform themselves, but are also eager to change their families’ beliefs. Inviting other Muslims – especially one’s family – to reform themselves is a practice that is strongly encouraged by the mentors. Based on the observations and interviews, I concluded that this is a part of the *Liqo*’s *dakwah* strategy – to encourage students to go back to their families and advise them to do what the *Liqo* teaches. Moreover, this is also used as a strategy for encouraging new members to join the *Liqo* sessions, and a part of the more general *dakwah* strategy designed by the *Tarbiyah* to create preachers (*da’i*) who are able to conduct *dakwah* for everyone and everywhere.

In addition to building Islamic personality or religiosity through right belief and practice, the main purpose of the *Liqo* and other *Tarbiyah* activities is to train individuals to provide *dakwah* – i.e. to tell other people about the *Liqo*’s interpretation of Islam. A female trainee (*mutarabbiyah*) who used to be a member of a *Liqo* group in the Kemanggisan area of Jakarta but moved to my *Liqo* group in Pondok Aren-Tangerang shared her *dakwah* experience as follows:

I have been trying to remind them about this wrong tradition, because many of the village people are still my big family. Usually, after that, I leave them to think. I do not really care about their response. The most important thing for me is to do what I have to do, which is to give them true Islamic understandings [on such practices] (Retno, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta).²²⁵

²²⁵ Interviewed on 13/10/2012.

6.6 *Liqo* women's perceptions of *Ibadah* (Worship)

Following *akidah*, the topic of *ibadah* (worship) was one of the next issues to be prioritised in the *Liqo* sessions.²²⁶ My research revealed that a strong emphasis is placed on embodied ritual activities within the *Liqo* community, with almost all the respondents (both female and male) that I worked with during my fieldwork citing *ibadah* as an important topic. A female mentor (*mutarabbiyah*) voiced her concerns as follows:

The subject of *ibadah* in the *Liqo* is very crucial in order to remind Muslims about their obligations towards God, especially in [the] modern era. Sometimes we find a situation where we are very busy or [too] lazy to perform our daily *ibadah*, such as five-time obligatory prayers, reading the Qur'an, and the *Tahajud* prayer (Athyah, 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang).²²⁷

The variety of pious ritual activities or acts of worship in a *Liqo* group depends on the agreements made between the mentor and the trainees of each *Liqo* group. One *Liqo* group could pursue different types of *ibadah* acts or have different targets concerning the quantity of acts to perform in relation to another group. A *Liqo* trainee who works at Indonesia's Ministry of Finance and has been a member of the *Liqo* for about seven years shared her experiences:

In the beginning of each *Liqo* meeting, usually both mentors and trainees will discuss and decide together on how many and what kind of rituals ... should be monitored through the evaluation sheet (*sofhah mutaba'ah*). For my current mentor and group, we have three key rituals to put in our *sofhah mutaba'ah*. The first is to pray voluntary, *Dhuha*; the second is to perform obligatory prayers (*shalat wajib*) in the mosque collectively (*secara berjamaah*); and the last is to read the Qur'an on an everyday basis so that one *juz* of the Qur'an can be finished in one month.²²⁸ Since all rituals are our own decision with the

²²⁶ *Ibadah* means 'ritual', and refers to the codified procedures that express human beings' relationship with God. In Islam, *Ibadah* involves the profession of faith, prayer (*shalat*), fasting (*shaum*), the giving of alms (*zakah*), and pilgrimage (*hajj*) (Rippin, 2005).

²²⁷ Interviewed on 22/10/2012.

²²⁸ *Juz* (Arabic, plural: *ajza*) literally means 'part'. The Qur'an is divided into thirty parts.

mentor, we do not need to have difficulty or burden in doing all of these activities (Miya, 30s, trainee, female, Tangerang).²²⁹

Although the trainees have a chance to ‘negotiate’ concerning the rituals they perform, the *Liqo* does set certain requirements. For example, a young female mentor of a *Liqo* who taught a mixed group of junior and senior high school students explained:

The standard of *ibadah* recommended and monitored by the *Liqo* is Monday and Thursday’s voluntary fasting (*shaum sunnah*), which is twice in a week, or it is also allowed [to be] the three days voluntary fasting in a month for those who have difficulty in performing two days fasting in a week.²³⁰ Another activity is reading one page of the Qur’an per day and doing the *Dhuha* prayer and the voluntary prayers before or after the five-time obligatory prayers (Thifa, 30s, mentor, female, Tangerang).²³¹

These *ibadah* activities – as interviewees stated and my observations attested – are fully planned and monitored through a regular review and evaluation sheet called *sofah mutaba’ah*. This evaluation sheet is a way for mentors to keep track of their trainees’ performance, and the same evaluation sheet is provided for both male and female *Liqo* groups. It is designed to ensure that the objectives of the *Liqo* are achieved. For many of the trainees that I interacted with, both during and outside the *Liqo* sessions, the *Liqo* was seen as the place for training in a variety of *ibadah*. The greatest advantage they received was to improve the quality and routine of their *ibadah*. A neighbour of mine who had been a member of the *Liqo* for more than fifteen years acknowledged that she found herself “sometimes lazy for doing the daily rituals such as *Tahajud* prayer and reading al-Qur’an” (Athya, 40s, mentor,

²²⁹ Interviewed on 15/10/2012.

²³⁰ *Shaum* (Ar), *puasa* (Ind) is fasting or the abstention from all food, drink and sexual intercourse during daylight hours. There is an obligatory form of *shaum*, which includes fasting during Ramadan, and a non-obligatory form of *shaum*, which involves choices such as fasting on Mondays and Thursdays.

²³¹ Interviewed on 05/09/2012. *Shalat* (Arabic and Indonesian) means ‘prayer’. The ritual required in Islam is that of five specific periods of prayer a day.

female, Tangerang).²³² She thus saw it as a benefit to have her rituals checked by the mentors through the *sofhah mutaba'ah*.

The *sofhah mutaba'ah* review system shows the extent to which the *Liqo* pays attention to the lesson of *ibadah* and its practice. This was evident in the advice that I witnessed the mentor of our group giving trainees concerning becoming accustomed to ritual practices, such as conducting prayers five times a day collectively at the mosques (*as-sholat al-jama'ah fi al-masajid*), performing voluntary prayers (*as-sholat as-sunnah*), reading the Qur'an (*tilawah*), and performing voluntary fasting (*As-shaum as-sunnah*). Under the mentors' monitoring and the *sofhah mutaba'ah* system, a trainee who does not perform one of these rituals will likely feel shame in the presence of other more disciplined trainees.

However, this monitoring system is perceived as a burden by some of the trainees. I met a former female trainee of the *Liqo* who was disappointed with this strict rule of *ibadah*, and quit the *Liqo* sessions, saying: "the *ibadah* that I must perform in a day is too many for me, because I need also to consider other work that I should fulfil to raise money for the family" (Fathya, 40s, Ex-trainees, female, Jakarta).²³³

According to leaders of the *Liqo-Tarbiyah*, the objective of this lesson is to build an in-depth consciousness for practising ritual activities consistently and regularly. The movement wants to train all *Liqo* members to perform these rituals habitually and, in my experience, this was something most members embraced. According to one of the most influential leaders among the *Tarbiyah* community, the 'notification'

²³²*Tahajud* prayer is a voluntary nightly prayer that Muslims perform in addition to their five obligatory prayers.

²³³ Interviewed twice on 28/10/2012 and 16/12/2012.

(*taklimat*) is given to all levels of the *Liqo* community – from its leaders, to its mentors, to its trainees – in order to make the rituals or acts of worship a habit. He provided the example below to make this clearer:

[A] few days prior to the month of *Dzulhijjah*, the *taklimat* will be spread among the *Liqo* community asking them to struggle in ten days to finish reading all parts of the Al-Qur'an, to conduct the five daily prayers at the Mosques, and to perform the sacrifice (*Qurban*) [of] at least one buffalo (*kerbau*) for one family.²³⁴ This *taklimat* aims to [make] routines [of] these rituals among the community. For other Muslims, it is only *mubah* which is flexible – to be done or to be left.²³⁵ However, we want to practice these rituals because this is a good opportunity for us. Apart from *Dzulhijjah*'s rituals, we also recommend all of the members to fast in *Yaum al-Arafah* (the final day of *hajj* in Mecca) and to spread this habit to their surroundings (Ahmad, 60s, leader, male, Jakarta).²³⁶

My interviews and observations revealed that *Ibadah* activities on a daily basis are regarded by the *Liqo* community as the symbol or indication of true Muslims. *Ibadah* activities are the genuine expression of their piety and obedience to God's commands as individual Muslims. Moreover, these rituals represent the complete manifestation of the character of Islam for them, which needs to be adhered to and implemented by its followers. In other words, these rituals or acts of worship are regarded by the *Tarbiyah* movement as the key characteristics of pious Muslims. Thus, this analysis reveals that as well as matters of belief the *Liqo* aims to strengthen the Islamic identity of its trainees through improving individuals' performance of religious rituals. Living in urban and modern society can cause Muslims to become less concerned with their daily *ibadah*, but tackling this is

²³⁴ Dzulhijjah is the last month in the Islamic calendar. The name of the month refers to the annual worship of Muslims 'Hajj' (pilgrimage).

²³⁵ *Mubah* is an Arabic term that refers to an action that is neither recommended nor forbidden. It is, therefore, religiously neutral.

²³⁶ Interviewed twice on 27/08/2012 and 17/10/2012. *Al-Yaum al-Arafah* (the day of Arafah) is the day of 9th Dzulhijjah, on which it is recommended that Muslims fast.

central for the *Liqa*, regardless of its trainees' other commitments. This focus thus shows that the *Liqa*'s attempts to Islamise its trainees are largely successful.

6.7 *Liqa* women's reception of *Adab* (Islamic ethics) and *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence)

Issues regarding women's dress and their role in public life are symbolically very important for Islamist movements (Mahmood, 2005; Rinaldo, 2013; Roald, 2001), with their primary concern being to 'maintain' the Islamic identity of women and their roles in the family and in society. This section examines these issues as they are taught in the weekly *Liqa* sessions.

6.7.1 Muslim women's dress

The *Liqa* of the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS is concerned with maintaining a traditional Islamic women's dress code. Wearing the veil or headscarf together with proper clothes is seen as central for an Islamic dress code, and the topic is frequently talked about in the *Liqa* sessions. A mentor from a different *Liqa* group shared her first experience of wearing the veil and joining her *Liqa* group where she was trained in how to do this 'properly':

My first experience ... [of wearing] the veil and *Muslimah* [Muslim woman] clothes was when I entered the *Nurul Fikri* learning consultation centre. It was at my final year at the senior high school (*Sekolah Menengah Atas-SMA*). All female students at the *Nurul Fikri* at that time were required to wear the veil. I never wore the veil before, so ... I attended the *Nurul Fikri*'s session without the veil. When looking at me, my teacher said: "*wearing the veil is not difficult and why you do not want to wear it?*" Then, my classmate [at the *Nurul Fikri*] asked me to join the regular *Liqa* sessions. My first *madah* [lesson] I received from my first *Liqa* session was on Islamic obligations for Muslim women [*kewajiban Muslimah*], one of them is wearing the 'long' veil that extends over the breast and proper *Muslimah*

clothes. I felt afterwards that this is my first experience learning and knowing the true Islamic teachings (Rifa, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).²³⁷

Rinaldo (2013) found that the majority of female activists who were influenced by Islamist ideas began wearing the *jilbab* or *kerudung* (headscarf) in high school or college when they joined Muslim student organisations. Female *Liqo* activists considered modest clothing for women (*al-zhiyy al-Islamy*) to comprise wearing a ‘complete’ dress that obscures the shape of their bodies from top to the bottom, and a veil to cover the hair and the breast. A female mentor who has been involved in the *Liqo* for more than thirteen years expressed her understanding of the full requirements of wearing Islamic modest dress as follows:

Apart from the proper *Muslimah* clothes, we also wear socks. The socks are important for us because we tend to use the school of thought (*madzhab*) which says that we need to cover all required parts of the body (‘*aurat*’) except the face and the edge of hand (*telapak tangan*).²³⁸ So we believe in this idea and hold firmly the concept of ‘*aurat*’, which says that the foot is part of the [women’s] ‘*aurat*’. We therefore wear socks to cover our feet. For us, the usage of socks is as important as the veil, so ... we need to wear it in both formal and informal events. We also commonly wear ladies’ blouses (*rok*) but not trousers. Trousers are rarely worn by female *Liqo* activists. We believe that the trousers can shape some parts of our body. However, I see that these trousers can be worn as long as they are made from thick materials, [are] not transparent, and [do] not show off the shape of the foot (Rahima, 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta).²³⁹

Her statement reflected the reality of my observations of the female *Liqo* group I attended, where all the *Liqo* trainees were instructed to cover their hair with the long veil and all their bodies with long clothes and heavy socks during the first *Liqo* session.

²³⁷ Interviewed on 05/09/2012.

²³⁸ ‘*Aurat*’ (Ind; Awra-Arabic) implies that all parts of the woman’s body should be covered, with the exception of the face and the edge of the hand (*telapak tangan*). The *madzhab* that Rahima (30, trainee, Jakarta) refers to is Madzhab Hanbali.

²³⁹ Interviewed on 04/09/2012.

In addition to covering the body and hair, the community also recommends that all women's clothing should be symbolically different to that worn by men. A female trainee told me the following story during an interview again underlining how the women have to learn how to dress Islamically:

One day, when I attended the first few *Liqo* sessions, I wore what I considered as *Muslimah* clothes – wearing the veil, a long modest top, and long jean trousers. When the *Liqo* mentor looked at me, she said harshly that women should never wear clothes that are similar to men's [trousers] (Tania, 30s, trainees, female, Depok).²⁴⁰

Hence, it is unusual to see female *Liqo* activists wearing trousers, and one of the female interviewees commented, “we are mostly wearing *Gamis* (long clothes) in dark or soft colour” (Fadila, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta).²⁴¹

The *Liqo* women's adoption of this model of Islamic dress and veiling is promoted in both direct and indirect guidance from their mentors, as well as by senior *Liqo* members. The evidence for this direct guidance has been mentioned above, and I will now provide the evidence for the indirect guidance and precedents set by senior *Liqo* members. A former *Liqo* trainee recounted her experience about her mentor guiding her to a particular dress code as follows, something she was entirely open to:

Based on my own experience, the clothing and the veil styles were naturally and gradually formed when I joined the *Liqo*. There was no direct instruction from my mentor to follow particular requirements. I think that the need to adapt [to] the new environment is the key thing that led me and my other *Liqo* friends at that time [to] following the clothing style of the previous activists and the mentor. We felt inconvenient to dress differently, so it was for me part of my adaptation (Rina, 40s, ex-trainee, female, Jakarta).²⁴²

²⁴⁰ Interviewed on 05/09/2012.

²⁴¹ Interviewed on 17/09/2012.

²⁴² Interviewed on 28/10/2012.

Rina's experience was similar to experiences I had during the *Liqo* sessions I participated in. At the beginning of the *Liqo*, I tried to dress like other female *Liqo* activists that I knew. But the dress of the other members of my group was not exactly the same as what I chose. The veil that I wore was one that I am used to wearing (which was not as long as their veils), and my clothes were also a bit more colourful and modern in style compared to theirs. Although my mentor and my *Liqo* friends never commented on or complained about my dress, or my performance as a whole, I began to get the feeling that it was inappropriate for me to dress 'differently' than other members after the first few sessions (see Chapter 3). This feeling led me to adopt the same clothing styles as the other members of the group. This was my own decision, and represented part of my adaptation so that I could enjoy the *Liqo* sessions. However, evidence was provided in the form of trainees' experiences in other *Liqo* groups that their mentors had given them particular guidance and recommendations regarding the proper clothing style to adopt so that they conformed willingly with the *Liqo* women's community as a whole.

Moreover, the *dakwah* manual discussed in Chapter 5 (the *Manhaj Tarbiyah*) also contained information about *Liqo* lessons, including the appropriate dress code for Muslim women, and its relation to '*aurat*:

Islam obliges Muslim women to cover their '*aurat*. There is no distinction between covering the '*aurat* during prayers and during the interaction with people (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005:98).²⁴³

These clothing styles are the most obvious visible characteristic of female *Liqo* activists in the Indonesian public sphere, and through my long interactions with

²⁴³ This lesson in the book explains the '*aurat*, clothing styles and colours based on *shari'ah*, and the impact that ignoring Islam's teaching about covering their '*aurat* will have for women (*Manhaj Tarbiyah*, 2005:98).

them, as well as my observations of several events managed by these women, I noticed that this clothing style is used as one sign for identifying them as *Liqo* activists.²⁴⁴

By dressing differently from Muslim women in general, female *Liqo* members often received negative responses from both close family such as parents, sisters, and brothers, as well as from their wider community, such as friends and neighbours. One senior female mentor (Athya, 40s) related her experience when her parents first saw her wearing her new clothing style as a *Liqo* trainee:

My parents said to me that there is no need to wear such dress and a very long veil because we do not live in an Arab country. [They said] “Just wear the veil that is commonly worn by the mainstream Muslim women [in this country], it had already covered the hair”.

Moreover, she reported receiving such a response from her neighbour as well. Both her parents and her neighbour reacted with an explicit dislike to her choice of dress. Athya (40s) commented on this reaction: “I thought that it was because I had changed my attitudes and clothes drastically”. A female trainee, Tika – who was in the same *Liqo* group as me and works in Jakarta – told me that she had been asked about her clothing several times by people she met in public places. They asked her: “What religious group did you join that required you to change your clothing style?”. She said that she was fully aware that such questions emerged because of her different dress code. Even though I have recently seen many *Tarbiyah* activists wearing such clothing, this style of dress is different from what other Muslim

²⁴⁴ This particular style of female *Liqo* activist is recognisable and obvious in the Indonesian public sphere. Overseas researchers that study Islamist movement are also familiar with this *Liqo* Islamic clothing. For example, Rachel Rinaldo (2008b) wrote an article about Muslim women activists in Indonesia, and described the female PKS (*Liqo*) activists as the women wearing a “uniform [of] long white *jilbabs*” and noted that these women are the most visible protesters [against the pornography bill in Indonesia] (Rinaldo, 2008a:8).

women wear in mainstream Islamic organisations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah. The stories from Athya and Tika are two of many instances of ‘conversion’, as was explored in Chapter 5. They willingly changed their clothes along with their understanding and interpretation of Islam through the *Liqo* of the *Jamaah Tarbiyah*.

Despite people responding suspiciously towards their dress choices, many activists maintain these dress codes, believing that they are obliged by Islam to do so. However, a number of female activists have recently stopped adhering to these strict dress styles. There has been a slight shift in terms of the colour and style of clothes, as a female *Liqo* activist who works at the state Islamic University notes: “nowadays we can easily find *Tarbiyah* activists wearing bright colourful dress and various clothes styles” (Fadila, 30s, trainees, female, Jakarta). According to one of my respondents, “Their change of style was affected by their understanding of the *dakwah* strategies (*Fiqh ad-dakwah*)” (Arif, 40s, mentor, male, Jakarta), that is, seeing value in appearing more ‘normal’ and ‘mainstream’ as opposed to ‘set apart’.²⁴⁵

The *Liqo* community has linked the issue of the dress choices of Muslim women to the idea of how Islam respects women. A *Liqo* mentor voiced her experience of this as follows:

[After attending the *Liqo*], I [was] amazed how Islam teaches and honours its female followers by asking them to wear the proper and modest Islamic dress. I understand that many women are being harassed due to their careless and laziness to wear such Islamic clothes. This obligation is given to Muslim women in order to be respected (Athya, 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang).²⁴⁶

²⁴⁵ Interviewed on 18/10/2012.

²⁴⁶ Interviewed on 22/10/2012.

This point of view, which has spread among female *Liqo* activists, has led them to criticise the women's liberation movement – both in Indonesia and in other parts of the Muslim world – for being part of the project of *ghazwul fikri*. That is, they see it as a Western strategy for undermining Muslims (see Chapter 4).²⁴⁷

6.7.2. Women's roles in the private and public spheres

In addition to the discourse on women's dress that is outlined above, the *Liqo* community is also very concerned with the issue of women's private and public roles. I observed that there is a greater emphasis on women's roles in domestic areas rather than in the public sphere. The community believes that Islam emphasises the importance of women performing a domestic role, and the *Liqo* sessions thus trains these women to have a good Islamic personality, practice and knowledge with which to educate their families and bring up their children.

During my informal conversations with the female *Liqo* activists, I frequently heard them use the sayings '*al-ummu huwa al-madrasat al-ula*' (the mother is the first school [for their children]) and '*al-marrah hiya al-madrasah al-ula*' (the woman is the first school [for their children]). Both statements were frequently used when they were talking about their families and their children, and the challenges they faced in raising them. They explained that every Muslim woman has a responsibility to raise their children and family in accordance with Islamic teachings, arguing that the future of Muslim children is in the hands of their mothers. According to Tania, a female trainee from a different *Liqo* group, her mentor always reminds all the

²⁴⁷ See Haddad (1991), who explains that this liberation issue is one of the identifiable elements of the discourse on women among revivalist or Islamist movements throughout the world.

trainees in the group that this domestic task involves the struggle for Allah's blessing and rewards, which are greater than the rewards they will receive from having a position involving a public role.

The *Tarbiyah* movement is, however, aware of the necessity for Muslim women to have public roles because of their *dakwah* strategies in the public sphere (see Chapter 1). Various *dakwah* activities of the *Tarbiyah* movement have led female activists to participate in Islamising the Indonesian society and the state. Their view is in line with the theological bases for the participation of Muslim women in public roles through *dakwah* (Mahmood, 2005), and they believe that the religious task for 'commanding right (*amar ma'ruf*) and forbidding wrong (*nahi munkar*)' is given to both men and women. My observations, however, suggest that their *dakwah* roles are mostly conducted with other women within their own groups and other women's groups in the wider society.

The *Liqo* movement urges its female activists to take part in other public roles, as I found in my interviews with the female *Liqo* activists and my observations of the *Liqo* sessions. One of the trainees, a young mother from Depok, reported:

My mentor really motivated us [the *Liqo* trainees] to get involved in our society. The activities are not only restricted to *dakwah* but also to the party's programmes. For instance, we are requested to help our neighbour and to perform our *dakwah* duty to the closest society (Tania, 30s, trainee, female, Depok).²⁴⁸

As a result of such motivation and encouragement, a number of female *Liqo* activists are active in the political arena, and have been appointed as legislative members, policy makers, and to other public roles. Their participation in the public arena is in

²⁴⁸ Interviewed on 05/09/2012.

line with Rinaldo's (2008) view of Islamic revivalism as a phenomenon that can contribute to new forms of women's agency in the Indonesian public sphere.

However, the public role for women promoted by the *Liqo* community is nonetheless subsidiary to male control, particularly women's subordination to their husbands. As one of my female interviewees noted, there are several limits and requirements that need to be kept in mind when a woman wants to enter the public sphere:

If we go out from home, for either *dakwah* or other activities, we must get our husband's permission. This is related to [the] husband's responsibility if ... something happens to us. The mentor always reminds us that [the] husband is a family leader who has the right to say what he allows or forbids to his wife (Saida, 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta).²⁴⁹

This indicates that the *Liqo* community's view concerning women is relatively conservative in that they still adopt a traditional Islamic interpretation under which men are leaders of women, and women's power is subordinate to men's. Permata supports this interpretation, arguing that 'the *Liqo-Jamaah Tarbiyah* holds a misogynistic gender conception in which men are superior to women' (2013: 262). Azyumardi Azra,²⁵⁰ one of the scholars I interviewed in his office (the Postgraduate School of the Jakarta State Islamic University), highlighted the fact that although the *Liqo* is progressive in terms of the motivation and encouragement it gives to women in relation to taking part in public roles, it also teaches its members to practice a

²⁴⁹ Interviewed on 03/10/2012.

²⁵⁰ Azyumardi Azra is a professor in History and was the rector of IAIN (the Jakarta State Islamic Institute), with Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta-Indonesia (1998-2006), taking over again as director of the Postgraduate School in 2006. He is one of the most productive writers on Indonesian Islam, and is an active intellectual in both national and international forums. The interview was held on 19 November 2012 in his office in Jakarta.

very rigid religious life, particularly in terms of the relationships between men and women:

I call them Islamic Neo-conservatives. The neo-conservatism maybe did not fit into the overall aspects of PKS [*Liqo* community] because we can see that [the] women of [the] PKS are actively involved in the political arena, such as in the parliament as legislative members. But, they are practicing very strict and rigid family life. For instance, if a man comes to one of the PKS family [homes], he will be welcomed and served a cup of tea only by the husband. The wife will stay behind and there is no need to welcome the guest. This practice is, of course, [a great] contrast compared to the Muhammadiyah and NU [conception of the] family (Azra, male, public scholar, Jakarta).²⁵¹

Azra's point of view is in line with what I saw in the day-to-day life of the community. This was also confirmed by information provided by a female interviewee from a different *Liqo* group in Pondok Aren-Tangerang, who explained to me what she heard from her mentor regarding the requirement for women's participation in public activities:

There is a regulation for being an active Muslim woman in [the] public sphere. For instance, we are not allowed to shake hands with men. We are also taught not to speak with them without any purpose (*sekedar menyapa*) and not to look into their eyes based on the concept of *Ghaddul bashar*.²⁵² From the *Liqo*, I understand that there is a restriction in the interaction between men and women (Athya, 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang).²⁵³

Thus, although the *Tarbiyah* movement / PKS has numerous female activists with high levels of education, the concept of women's '*aurat*' and their roles tend to prevent them from being (fully) involved in public roles. This confirms Permata's (2013) findings – although the *Tarbiyah* / PKS movement provides opportunities for women to participate in the party and public positions, the movement or the party in

²⁵¹ Interviewed on 19/11/2012.

²⁵² See chapter 5.2 on *ghaddul bashar*.

²⁵³ Interviewed on 22/10/2012.

fact limits female members' roles in the public sphere, especially within political arenas.²⁵⁴

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the extent to which female members at the lower level of the *Liqo* experience and receive *dakwah* subjects designed and disseminated by *Tarbiyah* leaders. Particular attention has been given to the *Liqo* group that I participated in for four months. I focused on mentors and trainees' stories about their lived religious experiences of joining the *Liqo* and receiving its lessons.

I found that while the lived experiences of female *Liqo* members are of course heterogeneous and complex, and not always entirely in accordance with the official discourse of the *Tarbiyah* leaders', overall, through their pious lived religion and everyday cultivation of right belief and practice, they reproduced the movement's ideology to a greater or lesser extent (cf. Mahmood 2005). Their motivations for joining the *Liqo* are principally to improve their religiosity as the leaders hope and expect. But this is a process they have to actively negotiate in the course of their developing engagement with the movement. Also, other significant reasons for members joining these groups include expanding their social networks (finding new friends), strengthening existing friendships, though they may also be obeying their husbands. In Islamist and other social movements, informal networks are a resource for extending discipline into private and personal lives. The organization's explanations about the 'deviation' of *klenik* rituals like *sesajen* (foods provided for

²⁵⁴ Permata (2013) reveals that although women in the PKS hold positions within the organisational structure, and there is a separate division for women to deal specifically with issues regarding women's rights, status and empowerment, they only received three seats in parliament out of the fifty-seven held by the party during 2009–2014.

God) from the true *akidah* are generally accepted. However, there is also some empathy for family members associated with this ‘cultural ignorance’.

The members of the group that I participated in were generally young, professional, educated Muslim women living in modern urban society. They still had family in rural areas, were upwardly mobile, and wanted to do the right thing in religious terms as well as to be respectable. However, as suggested in Chapter 5, they and others like them were not primarily drawn to the *Liqo* by concerns for public *dakwah*, as the formal movement’s leaders increasingly expect them to be. Receiving support from the helpful and reliable people in their networks was rather more important. The range of motivations and interpretations that the *Liqo* women have in joining and experiencing the *Liqo* reflects their ‘lived religion’. Their ‘lived’ religion is centrally defined in terms of their own agency and choices to have more organized and ordered Islamic beliefs and practice within the setting of the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement. In this context, the lived religion of women in the *Liqo* is very different from the ‘pick and mix’ lived religion of women studied by McGuire (2008). Lived Islam and official Islam are quite intimately interconnected in the same way that Mahmood (2005) talks about tradition being reproduced performatively.

Even though the lived religion and experiences of these members indicate the complexity of their engagement with the *Liqo*, the lessons given in the weekly sessions are relatively effective in transmitting and reproducing the official discourse of its leaders. These lessons not only improve their knowledge of Islam, but do also forge a common Islamic cultural and political identity among the members. The lessons emphasising particular perspectives and practices regarding

ghazwul fikri (ideological conquest), *akidah* (faith), *ibadah* (acts of worship), and issues regarding women's rights, roles, statuses etc are designed to create piety, obedience, and commitment in the *Liqo* members. Their repeated bodily practices in terms of dress, prayer and so on ultimately create the disposition to receive the pious ideology of the original *Tarbiyah* movement. Similar to the women studied by Mahmood (2005), it is the pious everyday and embodied performance of the lessons learned in the *Liqo* that is crucial to the reproduction of the movement. At the same time as reproducing common symbolic expressions unifying the *Liqo* community and differentiating it from other religious communities within the Indonesian public sphere, the women of the *Liqo* also take an active role in making, re-making and giving expression to their own distinctive Islamic self-identities.

Through the weekly training lessons, the *Liqo* aims to introduce a common set of shared Islamic norms, which include all aspects of life (such as beliefs, worship, family lifestyles, women's dress codes, and social interactions). In theory, these represent a distinctive form of Islamic 'totalism' that is widely adopted by modern Islamists. Indeed, the *Liqo* provides its trainees with a regular and monitored form of training that creates the framework for them but they themselves actively negotiate and apply all these aspects of Islam in their everyday lives.

Conclusion

This thesis is the first ethnographic study of a contemporary Islamist group in Indonesia to focus on the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement. It has investigated the private and public *dakwah* of the movement within the changing religious, social, economic, and political context of Indonesia since its emergence in 1983. Particular attention has been given to analysing the movement's official discourse and the lived experiences of its members. These two related elements are analysed with the help of aspects of social movement theory (SMT) (Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012) and the concept of lived religion (McGuire 2008; cf. Mahmood 2005). SMT is concerned with how movements like the *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS identify social problems, articulate their response in terms of goals for societal change, and mobilize their constituencies based on formal/informal networks, as well as how they take advantage of changing political opportunities. Lived religion is a concept which has enabled me to give more attention than SMT typically allows to the everyday lived experiences of members of Islamist movements (cf. Tuğal, 2009).

The use of ideas associated with SMT and lived religion in framing the Indonesian *Tarbiyah* movement is novel because these theories have not been used together before in previous studies. In the key chapters of this thesis, I focus on three main arguments: i) that the gradual transition of the *Tarbiyah* movement from a politically repressed network of religious purists in the 1970-80s into a fully-fledged *dakwah* political party (the Prosperous Justice Party/*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS) was the outcome of new 'political opportunities' which emerged during a period of democratisation 1990-97 (Chapter 4); ii) that the movement's weekly *Liqo* illuminates both the synergies and tensions between official, top-down framing by

increasingly formal, outward-looking and pragmatic PKS leaders and the more informal and more conservative networks, the latter remaining a key resource for mobilisation (Chapter 5); and, finally, that the lived experiences of female trainees in the *Liqo* suggest that this is a space where *Tarbiyah* movement/PKS norms, lifestyles and dispositions are more or less successfully taught, learned and reproduced principally through the disciplined and repeated performances of embodied piety (Chapter 6).

My study has demonstrated, in the first instance, the continuing importance that conducting public *dakwah* has for the PKS, whose focus is on a more active (sometimes aggressive) and powerful form of *dakwah*. They are inspired by *dakwah* in the early period of Islamic history, but they developed it in responding to new social, political, economic and cultural contexts. As I explained in Chapter 1, although Islamists in the modern age use the history of *dakwah* of the Prophet and the early generations of Muslims as a key reference point, they have developed a new significance for the concept (cf. Hirschkind 2006). They began to pay more attention to its public ideological form as a way of combating the influence of Western modernity, which restructured Muslim societies and led to the absence of Islam from the public sphere (Salvatore, 1997). In a clearly delineated programme of stages, they have tried to Islamise society and the state beginning with the individual and building up cadres through ‘family’ cells, flexibly exploiting conducive political conditions as and when opportunities arise.

The relation of Islam or *shari’ah* and the state as one of the key issues of modernity in Muslim countries became the impetus crystalizing Islamist ideology within Islamic movements, especially among the Islamic reformists. As I showed in

Chapter 2, the relationship between Islam and the state has continued to be one of the most important issues for ‘Islamists’ in Indonesia. From the time of the Old Order (*Orde Lama*, 1950-1965) to the New Order (*Orde Baru*, 1966-1998) government they remain committed to applying *shari’ah* in the public sphere. Thus, the application of *shari’ah* – the formalisation of *shari’ah* (*formalisasi syariat*) – in Indonesia, has indeed become the main *dakwah* message of the ‘Islamists’. Oppression under Dutch colonial government encouraged Islamic leaders at the beginning of the 20th century to establish organisations such as the first ‘Islamist’ political party – *Sarekat Islam* (1911–1929) to campaign for national independence and *Masyumi* in 1945 to respond to the modernisation programmes of the secular-nationalist government. However, influenced by the wider global Islamist movement including the MB, contemporary Islamism in Indonesia emerged only at the beginning of the 1980s. Islamists in this period limited their focus to private *dakwah* due to the repressive nature of the New Order government. They were forbidden from conducting their *dakwah* publicly as the government regarded Islamism as a threat to the Indonesian nation-state. However, by the end of the 1980s, Islamist organisations started to have more access to ‘public’ spaces because the government sought their political support and legitimation to ‘protect’ itself from ideological and military threats. Since 1998 and the period of democratic transition, a variety of Islamic organisations – especially Islamist *dakwah* movements – have had the opportunity to conduct public *dakwah*, participate in mainstream politics and so to ‘Islamise’ culture, society and to some extent the nation-state.

In Chapter 3 I reflected on the methodological issues emerging from the process of researching the *Tarbiyah* movement in Jakarta during 2012–13. This chapter set out the methodological tools that would be used for collecting the data for my

ethnographic accounts in Chapters 4–6 and reflected upon the challenges I faced and lessons I learned. I discussed: 1) research process and methods, 2) data collection techniques, 3) ethical issues, 4) researcher subjectivity and positionality, and 5) data analysis and interpretation. I explained that Jakarta is the capital city of Indonesia and was chosen as my fieldwork site as the birth-place of both the *Tarbiyah* movement and the PKS. The members of the *Tarbiyah* movement, the majority of whom are neo-urban, well-educated, young professionals, were easy to meet in Jakarta. I interviewed 45 respondents from the top, middle and lower levels of the *Tarbiyah* movement and conducted observations of their *dakwah* activities through their *Liqo* and *dawrah* sessions.

In Chapter 4 I advanced a detailed analysis of the changing political opportunities for the *Tarbiyah* movement in Indonesia. Due to the ‘New Order’ government’s repressive approach to Islamic movements with political interests, the *Tarbiyah* activists limited the scope of their activities away from wider audiences for most of the 1980s, focusing on campaigning informally for individual piety in terms of their *dakwah*. However, the shift of the (‘New Order’) government’s political attitude in the 1990s, which was welcomed by Islamic movements, encouraged the *Tarbiyah* movement to expand their *dakwah* scope and audience, although it was still mainly orientated towards individual piety. The shift of the regime from the ‘New Order’ to the ‘Reform’ government in 1998 brought with it a new, more democratising political system, which was seen by the *Tarbiyah* movement as a good opportunity to establish a formal political party named the Justice Party (PK) or Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). They argued publicly that there should be no separation between *dakwah* and politics but sought to expand their *dakwah*, Islamisation and the party’s influence by placing their cadres in public and state institutions. Today,

the private and public *dakwah* agendas of the movement and party co-exist in a complex relationship, with tensions having existed between leaders and members further down the hierarchy since 1998.

As I argued in Chapter 5, the official structure and recruitment system associated with the *Liqo* became more formalised and political with the emergence of the PKS. The *Tarbiyah* movement was transformed to focus in a new way on the creation of public piety. The drive to promote *dakwah* messages to Indonesian society as a whole built ‘a mutual relationship’ between the *Liqo-Tarbiyah* community and the PKS. From the point of view of the leaders of the party (or the movement), the informal networks of the *Liqo* significantly contribute to the growth in PKS cadres and is a major resource for mobilisation of the *dakwah* party. The senior members also believe that the more formal political networks of the PKS enables the *Liqo* to expand its more informal *dakwah* network through various activities. For the cadres at the middle and lower levels of the movement, however – especially those at the grassroots level – the party has compromised their ‘pure’ *dakwah* ideologies and orientations (private *dakwah*) through its increasingly pragmatic focus on political interests and strategies (public *dakwah*). This recalls Wiktorowicz’s (2006) distinction (and tensions) between (Salafi) ‘politicos’ and ‘purists’. For instance, in the *Liqo*, I saw how the trainees expressed their ‘disappointment’ at being required to participate in the ‘grassroots’ election campaigning process. This turned them into ‘human resources’ who devoted their time to simple practical tasks for the party (such as handing out pamphlets), rather than the lessons of the *Liqo*. At the other end of the spectrum, I saw how genuinely excited the leaders were in contesting elections.

Although (like the literature) the official discourses of the *Tarbiyah* movement have often been dominated by the public *dakwah* agenda of the PKS, the lived religious experiences of female members of the *Liqo*, as shown in Chapter 6, still tend to emphasise personal piety and religiosity. While this may in part reflect a patriarchal division of labour in the movement, I argue that the *Liqo* is a space where movement norms, lifestyles and dispositions are successfully taught learned and reproduced through women's agency, most especially in terms of the disciplined, embodied and repeated 'performances' of individual piety (cf. Mahmood 2005). Thus, my overall argument is that official and lived religion are structurally and analytically distinguishable but remain intimately connected.

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List of abbreviations

BMKI: Bina Masjid Kampus Indonesia or Indonesia Campus Mosques Supervision

BPUPKI: Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or the
Investigating Body for the Preparation for Indonesian Independence

BPK (PKS): Badan Pembinaan Kader or the Council of Cadres Training

BPU (PKS): Badan Pembinaan Umat or the Council of *Umat* Training

DDII: Dewan *Dakwah* Islamiyah Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic *Dakwah*
Assembly

DI: Darul Islam or the House of Islam.

DPP (PKS): Dewan Pengurus Pusat or Central Board or the National Headquarters

DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People Representative Council

DSP (PKS): Dewan Syariah Pusat or *Shari'ah* Council

FIS: The Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria

FKAWJ: Forum Komunikasi *Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah* or The Communication
Forum of *Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah*

FPI: Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defender Front

GOLKAR: Golongan Karya or The Party of the Functional Groups

HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or Indonesian Students Muslim Association

HTI: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Intellectual Muslim
Association

IPB: Institut Pertanian Bogor or Bogor Institute of Agriculture

ITB: Institut Teknologi Bandung or Bandung Institute of Technology

ITS: Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November or the Sepuluh November Institute of Technology

JI: Jama'at Islami

JII: Jamaah Islamiyah

JIL: Jaringan Islam Liberal or Islamic Liberal Network

KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union

KISDI: Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam or the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World

KKN: Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme or Corruption, Nepotism and Collusion

KPK: Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or the Corruption Eradication Commission

LDII: Lembaga *Dakwah* Islam Indonesia or the Institution of Islamic Da'wa of Indonesia

LDK: Lembaga *Dakwah* Kampus or Campus *Dakwah* Union

LDS: Lembaga *Dakwah* Sekolah or School *Dakwah* Union

LMD: Latihan Mujahid *Dakwah* or *Dakwah* Trainings for *Dakwah* Fighters

LIPIA: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam or Arab or Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabic

Masyumi: Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia or the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

MMI: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or the Indonesian Council of Jihad/Fighters
Movement

MPP (PKS): Majelis Pertimbangan Partai or Party's Consultative Council

NII: Negara Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Islamic State

NKK: Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/ Normalisation of Campus Life

NU: *Nahdlatul Ulama* or Renaissance of Islamic Scholars

OTB/OBT: Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk/Organisasi Bawah Tanah or Organization
without Form/Underground Organization

PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional or Party of National Mandate

PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang or Party of Moon and Crescent

PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or the Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle

PDS: Partai Damai Sejahtera or Party of Prosperity and Peace.

PERSIS: Persatuan Islam or Islamic Union

PII: Pelajar Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Pupils

PK: Partai Keadilan or Justice Party

PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia or the Indonesian Communist Party

PNI: Partai Nasional Indonesia or the Indonesian National Party

PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Party of National Renaissance

PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or the Prosperous and Justice Party

PMI: Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) or Indonesia Muslims' Party

PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Islamic Students

PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or Unity and Development Party

SDI: Sarekat Dagang Islam or the Islamic Trading Association

SDIT (PKS): Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu or the Integrated Islamic Primary School

SI: Sarekat Islam

SMA: Sekolah Menengah Atas or Senior High School

SMS: Short Messages Services

UGM: Universitas Gadjah Madah or Gadjah Madah University

UHAMKA: Universitas Muhammadiyah Prof. Dr. HAMKA or the University of Muhammadiyah of Prof. Dr. HAMKA

UI: Universitas Indonesia or University of Indonesia

UNAIR: Universitas Airlangga or Airlangga University

UOIF: The Union des Organisations Islamiques de France

UUD: Undang Undang Dasar or Indonesia Constitution

WAMY: The World Assembly of Muslim Youth

WMY: The Muslim World League

Notes on Transliterations

For the transliteration of terms, words and phrases in Arabic, I have adapted the style used in a variety of international journals on Islamic Studies or Religious Studies and the book *A Popular Dictionary of Islam* (1992), written by Ian Richard Netton. I have used them as simply as possible to prevent any confusion. The only attempt to Arabicise the transliteration in the text itself, however, is the presence of the left facing apostrophe (') referring to the letter 'ayn (ع - e.g. *bid'ah*, *mu'assasi* and *shari'ah*). Other letters such as ث – th (*hadith*), ذ – dh (*dhikr*); and ش – sh (*shaykh*) have been used as counterparts in English in this way.

For Indonesian versions of religious terms originally coming from Arabic, such as *dakwah*, *liqo*, *halaqah*, *tawhid*, *akidah* and *ibadah*, etc., I prefer to use them as they are used in Indonesia in everyday speech, unless when they are used in direct quotations from the literature. Regarding the pluralising of these terms, I use Arabic plural forms such as *ulama* and *fatawa*.

Glossary

Below is a glossary of the words in Arabic (Ar) and Indonesian (Ind) that appear in my thesis.

Abangan (Ind): A ‘nominal’ Muslim in dominant discourse. Syncretic Javanese culture; its beliefs and practices combine Hindu-Buddhist, Animistic-Javanese, and Muslim elements.

Adab (Ar): A word with a wide variety of meanings, such as ‘*culture*’ and ‘*good-manners*’. The Basic Arabic root indicates the possession or refinement of good habits bequeathed down the ages.

Adat (Ind): Customary law.

Ahl al-bayt (Ar): The family of the Prophet.

Akhawat (Ind, from Ar): Sisters.

Akhlaq (Ar, sing. *Khulq* or *khuluq*): Morals, ethics, virtues.

Akidah (Ind, from Ar. ‘*Aqida*. Pl. ‘*aqaid*): Doctrine, dogma, faith, belief, creed.

Al-‘am al-intikhabi (Ar): The election period.

Al-Khulafa al-Rashidun (Ar): The Rightly Guided Caliphs.

Al-Qur’an (Ar): Often spelled in English as Koran. Literally this word means: ‘Recitation’. The Qur’an is Islam’s holiest book, being the uncreated word of God revealed through Jibril (Angel Gabriel) to the Prophet Muhammad.

Al-Wafd (Ar): Delegation Party in Egypt.

Al-ziyy al-Islami (Ar): Islamic modest clothing for women.

Amanah (Ind): Trust.

Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar (Ind, from Ar. *Amr bi al-Ma’ruf wa Nahy ‘an al-Munkar*): Enjoining good and preventing evil.

Al-Sabiqun al-Awwalun (Ar): Used by the *Tarbiyah* leaders to refer to the first generation of the *Liqa* activists.

Aurat (Ind, from Ar. *Awra*): Implies all parts of the women's body that should be covered with the exception of the face and the edge of hand (*telapak tangan*).

Bahasa (Ind): The Indonesian language.

Baraka (Ar): Blessing. It is a quality possessed especially by holy people in Islam, who can impart it to others. Baraka may also be attached to places and objects.

Bayanat (Ar): Explanation.

Benih-benih kehanifan' (Ind): The seeds of the straight path to Islam.

Bid'ah (Ind. From Ar *Bid'a*): Literally, 'innovation'. Its proper opposite is *sunna*. However, in popular speech, *bid'a* has come to indicate 'heresy'.

Churafat or Khurafat (Ind. from Ar. *al-Khurafah*): Similar practices to 'superstition'.

Da'i (Ar. plural *du'at*): 'Caller' (i.e. to Islam), propagandist, one who preaches a (sometimes esoteric) missionary movement's summons or calls.

Da'iyah (Ind, from Ar. plural *da'iyat*): Used to refer to a female preacher or religious teacher.

Dakwah (Ind. from Ar, *da'wa* plural *da'awat*): Call, invitation, preaching, mission, dialogue.

Dawrah (Ar): Name for a religious circle conducted by the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Dewan Shura (Ind, used interchangeably [Ar] *Majlis Shura*): Consultative Assembly.

Din wa daulah (Ar): Religion and State.

Dhikr (Ar) or **Zikr** (in Egyptian Colloquial Arabic): Literally, remembrance, recollection, mention.

Dhu'l-Hijja (Ar): The month of *Hajj* (pilgrimage), which is the last month of the Islamic calendar.

Duhr (Ar): Morning voluntary prayer.

Fardhiyah (Ar. *al-Farziyyah*): Personal, individual.

Fatwa (Ar. Pl. *al-Fatawa*): A technical term used in Islamic law to indicate a formal legal judgement or view.

Fiqh (Ind and Ar): In its technical sense, the word means 'Islamic Jurisprudence'. Originally the word meant 'understanding' or 'knowledge'.

Fiqh al-dakwah (Ar): Used by the *Tarbiyah* movement to refer to the strategy of the *dakwah*.

Gamis (Ind, from Ar. *Qamis*): Long clothes originating from Arab usually worn by female Muslims and also known as tunic.

Ghazwul fikri (Ar): ideological conquest; cultural imperialism.

Hadith (Ar, plural *ahadith*): This Arabic word has a large number of meanings, including 'speech', 'report' and 'narrative'. It also has the very important specialist sense of *tradition*, i.e. a record of the sayings and doings of the prophet Muhammad and his companions, and as such is regarded by Muslims as a source of Islamic law, dogma and ritual, second only in importance to the Qur'an itself.

Haditsul Khamis (Ar): 'Thursday talk', a learning activity among the *Tarbiyah*/PKS activists held every Thursday afternoon.

Hajj (Ar): Pilgrimage. This is the one of the five *Arkan* or pillars of Islam. All Muslims, provided that a number of conditions, including good health and financial ability are present, have a duty to make a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their lifetimes.

Hakimiyyah (Ar): Sovereignty.

Halal (Ar): Allowable.

Halaqah (Ind, from Ar. *Halqa*, pl. *halaqat*): Study circle.

Haq (Ind, from Ar. *al-Haqq*): The truth/Divine Truth. This is a word of immense significance in the intellectual and linguistic development of Islam. Haqq can be both a noun and an adjective, meaning ‘truth’ and ‘rightness’ and also ‘true’, ‘right’ and ‘correct’.

Haram (Ar): Prohibited.

Hijab (Ar, pl. *hujub*): Veil. Worn by many Muslim women out of modesty, the veil is also a striking symbol of pride in being a Muslim, which many younger Muslims, as well as the older generation, are pleased to wear (contrary to popular belief).

Hijrah (Ar, *al-hijra*): The Migration – specifically in Islamic religious history, the migration or emigration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in AD 622, which became Year 1 of the Muslim lunar calendar.

Hizb (Ar. *al-Hizb*): The party, group.

Hizbut Tahrir (Ar. *al-Hizb al-Tahrir*): A trans-national movement founded by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani in Palestine in 1953.

Ibadah (Ind, from Ar. *ibada*, pl. ‘*ibadat*): Worship, devotional action or observance required by the Islamic faith, e.g. *salat*.

Ijtihad (Ar): In jurisprudence this term means ‘the exercise of independent judgement’ unfettered by case law or past precedent.

Ikhlas (Ind, from Ar): Sincerity.

Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Ar): Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928.

Imam (Ind, from Ar): Leader of prayer.

Irsyad al-mujtama' (Ar): Educating the society.

Itqan (Ar): Well-structured and professional.

Ittijah fiqh (Ar): *Fiqh* guidance.

Jahiliyya (Ar): State of ignorance. The Arabic word is used to designate the pre-Islamic period.

Jama'ah Tarbiyah (Ind, from Ar. *al-Jama'ah at-Tarbiyyah*): The education community.

Jihad: (Ind, from Ar. *al-Jihad*): Strife, Struggle.

Jizya (Ar): Poll tax imposed in mediaeval times on non-Muslims who were *Ahl al-Kitab* in areas ruled by Muslims.

Juz (Ar, pl. *ajza*): Literally meaning 'part'. The Qur'an is divided into thirty parts (30 Juz).

Ka'ba (Ar): Literally 'cube'. It is in Mecca, is a cube-shaped building within the precincts of the Great Mosque of Mecca.

Kafah (Ar. *al-Kaffah*): Total and comprehensive.

Kerudung or Jilbab (Ind): Headscarves for Muslim women.

Khalifa (Ar, pl. *Khulafa*): Caliph, Head of the Islamic Community.

Khilafah: (Ar. *al-Khilafah*): Caliphate.

Khilafiyah (Ar. *al-Khilafiyyah*): Disputes concerning religious matters.

Khutbah (Ind, from Ar. *khutba*, pl. *khutab*): Sermons, address; in particular the sermon delivered during the Friday prayer in the mosque.

Klenik (Ind): Javanese mysticism.

Kufr (Ar): Infidelity, unbelief, atheism.

Lauk pauk (Ind): Side dishes that should be provided with main foods for *sesajen*.

Liqo (Ind, from Ar. *Liqo*): Small religious training session conducted on a weekly basis by the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Ma'alim fi al-Tariq (Ar): Means 'Milestones', and refers to a book written by Sayyid Qutb and published in 1964.

Mabit (Ind, from Ar): Staying overnight for religious purposes, a training of the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Madah (Ar): Lessons [refers to lessons delivered in the weekly *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah*].

Madrasah (Ind. From Ar, *madrasa* pl. *madaris*): School, college or place of education, often linked to, or associated with, a mosque. The *madrasa* was a primary focus for the study of the Islamic sciences.

Majelis Taklim (Ind): Pengajian (religious lecture).

Makam leluhur (Ind): An ancestral grave.

Manhaj Tarbiyah (Ar): The *Tarbiyah*'s manual book of their *dakwah* activities.

Markaz Dakwah (Ind. from Ar. *al-Markaz al-Dakwah*): Centre of *dakwah*, refers to the building of the Headquarters of the PKS in Jakarta.

Maslahat Dakwah (Ar. *Maslahah al-Dakwah*): Benefit of the common good for *dakwah*.

Mazhab (Ar. *al-Madhhab*, pl. *madhahib*): This Arabic word has a range of meanings, including 'ideology', 'doctrine', 'creed', and 'movement'. In Fiqh it indicates one of the four major schools of law.

Melingkar (Ind): Sitting within a religious circle or *Liqo*.

Mihwar (Ar. *al-Mihwar*): Stage.

Mihwar al-dauli (Ar): a state institutional phase.

Mihwar mu'assasi (Ar): Political penetration phase.

Mihwar tanzimi (Ar): The formation period.

Minhajul Hayah (Ar. *Al-Minhaj al-Hayah*): Way of life.

Mu'amalah (Ind, from Ar): Social interaction (see under '*ibada*').

Mu'assasi (Ar. *al-Mu'assasy*): 'Political period'.

Mualim (Ar. *al-Mu'allim*): Teacher.

Mubadzir (Ar): Superfluous food or waste of food – something forbidden in Islam.

Mubah (Ar): Refers to an action neither recommended nor forbidden (by Islam). It is religiously neutral.

Muballigh (Ind, from Ar): Preacher.

Muhammadiyah: A modernist group association influenced by the ideas of Muhammad Abduh, founded in Yogyakarta in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan.

Mukhayam (Ar. *al-mukhayyam*): Camp.

Murabbi (Ar. *al-Murabb*): Male trainer or mentor of the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Murabbiyah (Ar. *al-Murabbiyat*): Female trainer or mentor of the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Mushalla (Ar. *al-Mushalla*): A place for prayer.

Musholla (Ind, from Ar): Small mosque, a place for prayer.

Muslimah (Ind): Female Muslim.

Musyarakah (Ar. *al-Musharakah*): Cooperation, coalition.

Mutarabbi (Ar. *al-Mutarabb*): Male trainee of the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Mutarabbiyah (Ar. *al-Mutarabbiyah*): Female trainee of the *Liqo* of the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Mu'tazila (Ar): Literally, 'seceders'.

Nadwah (Ar. *al-Nadwah*): Seminar.

Nashr al-dakwah (Ar): Refers to a department for the spreading of Islam in the structure of MB in Qutb's period.

Nizam al-usra (Ar): The family system.

Nizham Islami (Ar. *al-Nizam al-Islamiy*): The Islamic system.

Pengajian (Ind): Religious learning or lecturing groups such as *Majelis Taklim*.

Pesantren (Ind): Islamic boarding schools.

Piagam Jakarta (Ind): The Jakarta Charter.

Piagam Madinah (Ind): The Medina Charter – an agreement between Muslims and non-Muslims in Medina under the rule of the Prophet Muhammad.

Pilkada (Ind): A local election.

Priyayi (Ind): A Javanese aristocrat.

Qada (Ar): Divine decree, divine judgment, divine will, or the function of God as judge.

Qadar (Ar): Often translated as 'destiny', 'fate', 'divine predestination', 'divine determination' – *qadar* specifically is the divine application of *qa'da* in time, according to the most widespread interpretations.

Qiyadah (Ar): Refers to the *Tarbiyah* or PKS leaders.

Qurban (Ar): To perform the sacrifice required by Islam.

Rabthul 'am (Ar, *al-Rabth al 'am*): Public ties – part of *dakwah* strategy conducted by the *Tarbiyah*/PKS.

Rihlah (Ar): Recreation – part of a *dakwah* activity conducted by the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Sadaqah (Ind, from Ar. *sadaqa*, pl. *sadaqat*): Voluntary almsgiving.

Sahaba (Ar, sing. *sahib*): Companions, i.e. the Prophet Muhammad. The word is used variously to denote both the Prophet's close friends and associates, and, more loosely, anyone who saw the Prophet while the latter was alive.

Salafi (Ar. *al-Salaf*): Old, ancient. A movement that claims to follow the teachings of *salafus salih*.

Salafiyatul akidah (Ar): The belief of the *Salaf* people, the early pious companions.

Salafus Salih (Ar. *al-Salaf al-Salih*): The virtuous companions of the Prophet Muhammad. It refers to three generations of Muslim after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, companions (*Sahabah*), their followers (*Tabi'un*), and the follower's followers (*Tabi' at-Tabi'un*)

Santri (Ind): A devout Muslim.

Sesajen (Ind): Foods provided for God. A local tradition in which people should bring foods to accompany their 'rituals' or traditions.

Shahadat (Ind, from Ar. *Shahada*): Profession of faith.

Shahadatain (Ar): The two phrases of the testimony of faith in Islam.

Shalat (Ind, from Ar. *al-Salah*): Ritual prayers. Five specific periods of prayer a day is the ritual required in Islam.

Shalat Sunnah (Ind, from Ar. *as-shalat as-sunnah*): Voluntary prayers.

Shalat wajib (Ind, from Ar. *as-shalat al-wajib*): Obligatory prayers.

Shari'ah (Ar): The Islamic law.

Shaum (Ar): Fasting or the abstention from all food and drink as well as sexual intercourse during daylight hours.

Shaum Sunnah (Ind, from Ar *As-shaum as-sunnah*): Voluntary fasting or non-obligatory fasting, such as fasting on Monday and Thursday.

Shaum wajib (Ind, from Ar *As-shaum as-wajib*): Obligatory fasting such as Ramadan fasting.

Shaykh (Ar, pl. *shuyukh*): Old man, chief – title of respect for Islamic religious leader, tribal head, master of *sufi* order.

Shaykh-murid (Ar): Refers to teacher-pupil in Sufi networks.

Shi'a (Ar): Party, i.e. of 'Ali b. Abi Thalib – those who follow and accept the claims of 'Ali b. Abi Thalib.

Shura (Ar): Consultation, consultative body, council.

Sirah (Ind, Ar. *Sira*): Biography, particularly that of the Prophet Muhammad.

Sofhah mutaba'ah (Ar): The evaluation sheet used to 'monitor' or to check list ritual performances of the *Liqo* trainees of the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Sya'bi (Ar. *al-Sha'biy*): Society, community or socialisation.

Tabi' at-tabi'in (Ar): The Muslims generation after the *Tabi'in*.

Tabi'un (Ar, sing. *tabi'*): Followers – the next generation after the *sahaba* or companions (who actually knew the Prophet Muhammad).

Tadzkirah (Ar): Reminder.

Tafsir (Ar, pl. *Tafasir*): Exegesis, interpretation, commentary, especially relating to the *Qur'an*.

Tahajud (Ar): A voluntary night prayer done by Muslims apart from their five obligatory prayers.

Tahlilan (Ind): Recitation of the creed, *La ilaha Illa Allah* (There is no god but God), at ceremonies to commemorate the dead.

Takhayul (Ind): Superstition.

Taklimat (Ar): Notification.

Tamayuz (Ar): The distinctiveness of *Tarbiyah's* characteristics.

Tandzim nukhbawi (Ar): Cadre organisation.

Tanzim (Ar. *al-Tanzim*): Organisation.

Tarbiyah (Ind, from Ar *al-Tarbiyyah*): Education or training model of *Jamaah Tarbiyah*.

Tariqa (Ar, Plural *Turuq*): The word is very frequently used to designate a *sufi* order.

Tasawwuf (Ar. *al-Tasawwuf*): Islamic mysticism.

Taushiyah (Ar): Religious advices.

Tawhid (Ar): Declaration of the oneness. Belief in that Oneness or Unity, monotheism. This is one of the most fundamental Islamic doctrines.

Tilawah (Ar): Reading the Qur'an.

Tsawabit (Ar): The unchangeable aspect [of *akidah*].

Ukhuwah (Ar. *al-Ukhuwwah*): Brotherhood.

Ulama (Ar) (sing. '*alim*): Religious scholars, jurists (loosely), learned men, imams, judges and similar people.

Umma (Ar): Community, people, nation.

Ushul Fiqh (Ar. *al-'Usul al-Fiqh*): Jurisprudential basis.

Usrah (Ar. *al-Usrah*): Family.

Ustadz (Ar): Teacher.

Wahabi: A movement influenced by Muhammad Abd al-Wahab in Saudi Arabia.

Wirid (Ind, from Ar. *al-Aurad*): Set of prayer formula recited regularly. It is also called *wadzifah*.

Yaum al-Arafah (Ar, means the day of Arafa): The final day of *hajj* in Mecca or the day of 9th Dzulhijjah, where Muslims were recommended to fast.

Zakat (Ar): Often transliterated *Zakah* (plural. *Zakawat*) – obligatory alms tax which constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam.

Zulmun'adimun or zalalun ba'idun (Ar): 'Huge or grievous crime' performed by believers of Islam.

Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet (22 May 2012)

Title of the Research Project:

Islamic Preaching (*dakwah*) in Contemporary Indonesia; A Study of the *Dakwah* Movement of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

1. Invitation

You are being invited to take part in a research project about the *dakwah* (Islamic preaching) movement of the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/ PKS*). My name is Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, currently a Ph.D student in Religion and Public Life at the University of Leeds. My Ph.D is funded by the ministry of education of Indonesia (DIKTI scholarship). I am a lecturer at the University of Muhammadiyah of HAMKA (UHAMKA) in Jakarta. I have also graduated from Al-Azhar University in Cairo-Egypt (Lc.), University of Indonesia (M.Si) in Jakarta and University of Leeds (MA) in England. My academic background and my research interests are Islamic studies specifically concerned with Islamic movements.

Before you decide whether to participate it is important to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take the time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

Thank you for reading this sheet.

2. What is the project's purpose?

The aim of this project is to analyse a case study of the *dakwah* as performed and developed by the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS*) in Indonesia. Several aspects to explore are: the meanings of *dakwah* and its significance for the PKS, the nature and objectives of the PKS *dakwah*, and the development of the concepts and practices of the PKS *dakwah*.

I want to research this topic because I have been focusing my study on various Islamic organizations for about ten years. My focus, however, relied mostly on literature. Therefore, my current concern is to understand the PKS *dakwah* in terms of both its literature and its practices. Apart from that, I have been involved in delivering *dakwah* materials in my campus, in some Islamic organizations and in my neighbourhood for many years. In the future, I will continue to pay attention to *dakwah* in these places and wider Indonesian society. These factors all led me to study various *dakwah* movements, including the PKS *dakwah*.

3. Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen as the *dakwah* mentors and trainees/students who are actively involved in the *dakwah* movements of the party. You have been approached also as the leaders of the party, intellectuals and officials who are concerned with the Indonesian Islamic *dakwah* movements in general and the *dakwah* of the PKS in particular.

You are also being invited to participate because you live in the selected regions in Indonesia; Jakarta, Bekasi and Depok. It is your own experiences in your own words that the project is most concerned to document.

4. Do I have to take part?

It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep. You will also be asked to sign a general consent form.

N.B. You can withdraw from the research at any time and you do not have to give a reason.

5. What do I have to do?

You will be asked to give one continuous interview at an agreed time and date to me as the project researcher in a relaxed, quiet place, and free from background noise. The place you decide to conduct the interview will be mutually agreed. The interview will last about 1 to 1,5 hours. The researcher would ideally like to record your answers to various questions on a MP3 or a voice recorder. It is also possible for me just to listen or to take some key notes from your answers.

Some questions require only short factual responses concerning your background, while others are intended to allow you to give more in-depth accounts of personal experiences when involved in *dakwah* activities of the PKS. The personal experiences may be explored on several levels such as on the religious topics discussed in the *dakwah* meetings, the reference books of *dakwah*, the websites/bulletins which are used to support the dissemination of *dakwah* messages, the advantages of being involved in *dakwah* activities and so on.

6. What are the possible benefits of taking part?

Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is expected that this work will improve the knowledge of Indonesian Muslims on the developments and the shifts of Islamic preaching movements in the global Muslim society, especially in Indonesia.

7. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

My research will carefully protect the anonymity and confidentiality of all participants and their data. The access to the information collected from you

will be restricted to me and my supervisor. I will store, protect and destroy the data I have gathered appropriately.

8. Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used?

Your permission will be requested to make a MP3/voice recording of your interview. The anonymised recordings will be used only for analysis and for illustration in conferences or presentations. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed to access the original recordings.

9. What will happen to the result of the research project?

The final outputs of the research will be my Ph.D thesis and probably a book or a journal article.

10. Who is organising and funding the research?

This is my Ph. D research funded by the Ministry of Education of Indonesia (DIKTI scholarships).

11. Contact for further information

Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad

Ph.D Student in Religion and Public Life

Theology and Religious Studies, School of Humanities, The University of Leeds,

The United Kingdom, LS2 9JT.

Email address: tr08afnf@leeds.ac.uk

Appendix B: Participant Consent Form

Title of Research Project: Islamic Preaching (*dakwah*) in Contemporary Indonesia; a Study of the *dakwah* Movement of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS)

Name of Researcher: Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad

Initial the box if you agree with the statement to the left

- 1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated [22 Mei 2012] explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.
- 2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline (If you want to withdraw, please contact the researcher through email; tr08afnf@leeds.ac.uk).
- 3 I understand that my responses will be kept confidential. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.
- 4 I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research. I agree to give my permission to the researcher to record audio voices during the interview and use accordingly as mentioned in the information sheet.
- 5 I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the principal investigator should my contact details change.

Name of participant

Date

Signature

(or legal representative)

Lead researcher

Date

Signature

To be signed and dated in presence of the participant

Copies:

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/pre-written script/information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project's main documents which must be kept in a secure location.

Appendix C: Interviewees Information

Anonymised signifiers for interviewees and date(s) interviewed:

A. Leaders (top rank of the movement)

1. Ahmad: 60s, leader, male, Jakarta. 27/08/2012 and 17/10/2012.
2. Noura: 50s, leader, female, Jakarta. 18/10/2012.
3. Fatih, 50s, leader, male, Jakarta. 21/11/2012.
4. Salim: 50s, leader, male, Jakarta. 09/10/2012.
5. Nadia: 40s, leader, female, Jakarta. 19/10/2012
6. Abdullah: 40s, leader, male, Jakarta. 09/10/2012.
7. Arif: 40s, leader and mentor, male, Jakarta. 18/10/2012.
8. Iffah: 40s, leader, female, Bogor. 20/12/2012.
9. Hafidz: 60s, male, Jakarta.15/08/2012.
10. Muhammad: 30s, young leader, male, Bekasi. 08/09/2012.

B. Mentors or trainers (middle rank of the movement)

1. Darmanto: 30s, senior mentor, male, Jakarta. 04/09/2012.
2. Rahima: 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 04/09/2012.
3. Aliyah: 40s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 23/09/2012.
4. Ranti: 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang.14/10/2012.
5. Athya: 40s, mentor, female, Tangerang. 22/10/2012.
6. Ridho: 40s, senior mentor, male, Bekasi. 17/10/2012.
7. Siti: 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 28/10/2012.
8. Rania: 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 07/09/2012 and 23/09/2012.
9. Rifa: 30s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 05/09/2012.
10. Thifa: 30s, mentor, female, Tangerang. 05/09/2012.

11. Arifin: 40s, mentor, male, Jakarta. 14/10/2012.

12. Emma: 40s, mentor, female, Jakarta. 19/11/2012.

C. Trainees and ex-trainees (lower level of the movement)

1. Miya: 30s, trainee, female, Tangerang. 15/10/2012.

2. Tika: 40s, trainee, female, Jakarta, 07/10/2012.

3. Fadila: 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 17/09/2012.

4. Nabila: 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 11/09/2012.

5. Nabil: 40s, trainee, male, Jakarta. 23/09/2012.

6. Nisya: 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 03/08/2012.

7. Nuriyah: 30s, trainee, female, Bekasi. 08/09/2012.

8. Retno, 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 13/10/2012.

9. Tania: 30s, trainee, female, Depok. 05/09/2012.

10. Mona: 30s, trainee, female, Tangerang. 16/12/2012.

11. Rina: 40s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 28/10/2012.

12. Saida, 30s, trainee, female, Jakarta. 03/10/2012.

D. Ex-trainees

1. Fathya: 40s, Ex-trainee, female, Jakarta. 28/10/2012 and 16/12/2012.

2. Laila: 30s, Ex-trainee, female, Jakarta. 14/12/2012.

E. *Tarbiyah*/PKS and non-*Tarbiyah*/PKS scholars/activists

1. Prof. Dr. Azyumardi Azra, 50s, male, Jakarta. 19/11/2012.

2. Dr. Yon Machmudi, 40s, male, Depok. 03/08/2012 and 01/09/2012.

3. Rahim, 60s, male, Jakarta. 06/11/2012.

4. Zubaidah, 40s, female, Jakarta. 24/09/2012.

5. Fachrudin, 40s, male, Jakarta. 08/11/2012.
6. Masdar, 40s, male, Jakarta. 12/11/2012.
7. Muiz, 50s, male, Jakarta. 12/11/2012.
8. Najih, 30s, male, Jakarta. 18/12/2012.
9. Mulyo, 40s, male, Jakarta. 18/10/2012.

Note: Two public figures are not anonymised because they are public scholars and also because their books are used as references in this thesis.

Appendix D: Permission Letter submitted to DPP-PKS

Jakarta, 10 Agustus 2012

Perihal: **Pengantar penelitian mengenai *Dakwah* gerakan *Tarbiyah/*PKS di Indonesia**

Lampiran:

- Lembar keterangan mengenai penelitian,
- Surat persetujuan dari University of Leeds
- Surat pengantar dari pembimbing Disertasi S3.

Kepada Yang Terhormat,

Pengurus DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

di

Tempat

Assalamu ‘alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh,

Semoga surat ini menjumpai bapak dan ibu seluruh pengurus PKS dalam keadaan sehat wal’afiyat dan selalu dalam lindungan-Nya.

Bersama surat ini, saya bermaksud memberitahukan penelitian saya mengenai “Gerakan *Dakwah* di Indonesia; Kajian mengenai *Dakwah* PKS”. Penelitian saya lebih memperhatikan aspek *dakwah* dari PKS, baik yang terkait dengan *dakwah* internal yaitu Liqo/kaderisasi ataupun *dakwah* eksternal dalam bentuk *tarbiyatul ummat*. Metode penelitian yang saya ambil selain meneliti dokumen/buku/arsip terkait *dakwah* adalah melalui wawancara dan observasi langsung pengajian/*dakwah* PKS, terutama di wilayah Jakarta dan Tangerang.

Penelitian ini dilakukan dalam rangka menyelesaikan disertasi S3 saya di University of Leeds, Inggris. Saya akan sangat bergembira dan berterimakasih bila mendapat dukungan dari pengurus yang membidangi bagian *dakwah* di PKS dalam membantu saya, baik untuk mengakses dokumen-dokumen atau arsip-arsip partai yang terkait kebijakan *dakwah*, dalam menghadiri kegiatan2 *dakwah*, dan dalam melaksanakan wawancara.

Berikut adalah data lengkap saya:

Nama : **Hj. Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, Lc., MA.**

Tempat, Tanggal Lahir : Ciamis, 5 Agustus 1976

Program/Universitas : Ph.D/ University of Leeds, Inggris

Alamat rumah di Jakarta : Jl. H. Syatiri no.21 Ulujami Kebayoran Baru
Jakarta Selatan, 12250

Demikian pengantar dan permohonan dukungan terkait penelitian saya mengenai *Dakwah* PKS.

Terimakasih atas perhatian bapak/Ibu dan seluruh pengurus DPP PKS.

Wassalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh,

Jakarta, 10 September 2012

Hj. Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, Lc., MA.