Implications of the ‘War on Terror’ for Muslim women in Britain; Narratives of resistance and resilience

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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This thesis troubles the deafening silence, surrounding South Asian Muslim women’s (SAMW) experience, of the collateral damage from the ‘War on Terror’ as prolonged adversity and harm. It identifies forms of adversity to which SAMW are exposed and their resilience responses in the ‘War on Terror’.

This thesis offers a radical critique, of adversity, resistance, and resilience through the frames of temporality and hegemony. It exposes interrelated tensions inherent in resilience as survival/ coping, or as transformation/ adaptation. Hegemony brings power and resistance, to the centre of the concept in new ways; problematizing accepted notions of resilience as the capacity to ‘bounce back’ to a former state of equilibrium. It identifies the past in the present; in this frame the ‘War on Terror’, is a present day manifestation of past patterns of ideological struggle with roots in empire.

Ethnographic research was undertaken with SAMW, in a neighbourhood in the north of England, to gather information on SAMW’s experience of adversity, resistance, and resilience to the effects of the ‘War on Terror’. The research identified mechanisms in community, neighbourhood, and through state institutions, that support SAMW’s resilience.

The findings, unequivocally identified links between SAMW’s fear of assault/adversity and the ‘War on Terror’; as signified in 9/11. SAMW had little, if any, recourse to material resources as insulators from adversity, and, civil and civic institutions failed to offer SAMW adequate support. Social capital, generated in relationships and social networks, insulated SAMW, and enabled them to build hybrid ‘resistant identities’.

This thesis identifies new ways of thinking about the ‘War on Terror’, adversity and resilience; it presents new knowledge to highlight the urgency for further investigation into adversity and resilience in conditions of prolonged trauma. The imperative is to address dislocations between SAMW and local and national state institution.
# Table of Contents

**Part I** Through the lens of power – South Asian Muslim women’s continuing struggle with adversity; resistance and resilience ...... 1

**Chapter One:**

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 2

1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 2

1.2 The aims of this thesis ...................................................................................... 7

1.3 Focus on South Asian Muslim women in Britain ........................................... 10

1.4 Conceptual frames ............................................................................................ 12

1.4.1 Adversity, resilience and adaptation .................................................... 12

1.4.2 Hegemony as ideological struggle ...................................................... 13

1.4.3 Islamophobia ......................................................................................... 16

1.4.4 Feminist and anti-imperialist frames .................................................... 19

1.5 The structure of this thesis ............................................................................... 21

1.5.1 Thesis Part I – Through the lens of power – South Asian Muslim women’s continuing struggle with adversity; their resistance and resilience .................................................... 21

1.5.2 Thesis Part II – research methods, tensions and positioning.................. 24

1.5.3 Thesis Part III – Research findings and analysis. Women’s narratives: adversity and resilience .................. 27

1.5.4 Thesis Part IV – Conclusion - extending knowledge ..................... 31

**Chapter Two:**

The problem of resilience .................................................................................... 35

2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 35

2.2 Developments in resilience thinking ............................................................ 37

2.2.1 The genealogy of resilience: from static structures to dynamic systems .................................................................................... 37

2.2.2 The problem of risk and protective factors .......................................... 42

2.3 Social structure, place and governance ......................................................... 45

2.3.1 Social interaction .................................................................................... 46

2.3.2 Social capital .......................................................................................... 49

2.4 The problem and possibility of neighbourhood .......................................... 56

2.5 Resistance and resilience ................................................................................ 60

2.6 Conclusion; do we better understand resilience? ....................................... 64
Chapter Three: British/South Asian Muslim relations:
Hegemony, power, and resistance.................................................. 66
  3.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 66
  3.2 Coercion and consent ................................................................... 67
    Early contact ....................................................................... 68
    Transformation in Indian ..................................................... 71
    The struggle for Indian independence..................................... 74
  3.2.1 The ‘India question’ ............................................................. 77
  3.2.2 Gender and empire ............................................................ 79
  3.2.3 The end of empire .............................................................. 84
  3.2.4 Religious implications of global change ......................... 86
  3.3 The Present .................................................................................. 89
    3.3.1 The ‘War on Terror’ ............................................................ 89
    3.3.2 The UK government response to ‘new terrorism’ .......... 94
  3.4 CONTEST – the UK’s counter terrorism strategy ................. 96
    3.4.1 Prevent ............................................................................... 99
    3.4.2 The notion of ‘shared values’ ........................................... 103
  3.5 Gender and counter-terrorism ..................................................... 105
    3.5.1 Muslim women – pawns in the struggle for ideological
    supremacy? ................................................................................ 107
    3.5.2 Constraints on Muslim women of political visibility ........ 107
    3.5.3 Opportunities for women in political visibility .......... 111
    3.5.4 Women’s invisibility in counter-terrorism .................. 114
  3.6 Conclusion .................................................................................. 117

Part II Research methodology
Research involving South Asian Muslim women......................... 120

Chapter Four:
Research involving South Asian Muslim women....................... 121
  4.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 121
  4.2 Epistemologies of South Asian Muslim women.................... 123
  4.3 Methodology and research design ............................................ 125
    4.3.1 A narrative approach ....................................................... 130
  4.4 Research design ....................................................................... 131
    4.4.1 Neighbourhood selection ............................................... 131
    4.4.2 Sampling; research participants .................................... 132
  4.5 From design to practice ............................................................ 135
4.5.1 Getting started; access to, and recruitment of, Muslim women ................................................................. 135
4.5.2 Access to, and recruitment of, community leaders and representatives of the local state ........................................ 139
4.5.3 The importance of trust .................................................... 140
4.5.4 Confidentiality, information and consent .......................... 142
4.5.5 Analysing data ................................................................. 143
4.6 Conclusion .................................................................................. 145

Part III
Women’s narratives: Adversity and resilience ............................. 147

Chapter Five: Adversity ................................................................. 148
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................. 148
5.2 Context; material resources and relational equality .................. 150
  5.2.1 Inequality, racism and Islamophobia ................................. 151
5.3 Women’s fear and the spread of fear ...................................... 160
  5.3.1 Islamophobic attack on women: the national data .......... 160
  5.3.2 Fear generated by Islamophobic assault: women in Fieldway ........................................................................ 164
5.4 Insulation from adversity; the role of local state institutions ...... 169
5.5. Insulation from adversity; the role of civil society institutions .... 177
5.6 Conclusion .................................................................................. 182

Chapter Six - resilience .................................................................. 185
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................. 185
6.2 Resistant identities - women’s behaviours ............................... 186
  6.2.1 Contesting ascribed identity ............................................. 187
  6.2.2 Formulating counter narratives ........................................ 197
  6.2.3 Creating spaces for faith capital ....................................... 206
6.3 Resilience, relationships and social assets ............................... 211
  6.3.1 Resilience – family and neighbourhood networks .......... 211
  6.3.2 Resilience - the question of neighbourhood .................... 216
  6.3.3 The role of women’s centres in generating social capital. 220
6.4 Resilience - adapting in conditions of prolonged adversity and retaining fundamental characteristics ............................. 224
  6.4.1 Resilience in conditions of prolonged adversity .......... 225
  6.4.2 Did adaptation compromise fundamental aspects of women’s Islamic identity? .......................... 228
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part IV Conclusion: Extending knowledge</th>
<th>231</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seven: Conclusion – extending knowledge</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Introduction</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 New frames or ways of thinking about the ‘War on Terror’, adversity and resilience</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 New knowledge</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 Gaps in existing knowledge; further study</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 Policy implications for Muslim women’s human rights</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6 Conclusion</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible framework for focus groups and interviews with women</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible framework for interviews with professionals</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience enhancing resources in Fieldway</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4 Analysis</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Domains of social capital and neighbourhood policies to support them</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Sample size, anticipated and actual participant numbers</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Participants by gender</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Inductive thematic analysis</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Themes and issues to emerge from inductive analysis</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Thematic analysis - key issues for adversity</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Thematic analysis - key issues for resilience</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1a</td>
<td>Network without closure</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1b</td>
<td>Network with Closure</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Multi-level social capital framework</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Influences and sensitivities in research design</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Closed networks with porous boundary; wider influences</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Images

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Image 3.1</td>
<td>Pre-partition map of India</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 3.2</td>
<td>European mistress with her ayahs (1842)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 3.3</td>
<td>The Ayah’s Home</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.1</td>
<td>Hijab</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.2</td>
<td>Burka</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image 5.3</td>
<td>Dupatta</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part I
Through the lens of power – South Asian Muslim women’s continuing struggle with adversity; resistance and resilience
Chapter One:
Introduction

1.1 Introduction

‘…some Muslim women experience victimisations on multiple fronts: they face violent anti-Muslim attacks at the hands of racist bigots, and encounter gender discrimination from within their own communities…...it is disheartening to hear the deafening silence on gender issues’ (Khan, 2013)

The quote above from Khan offers an unusually precise understanding of the situation of Muslim women in Britain; it acknowledges Muslim women’s vulnerability to gender and faith discrimination in society, and their unequal power relations in Muslim communities. This thesis adds hatred and assault to this list of indignities, as the ‘collateral damage’ inflicted on South Asian Muslim women by the ‘War on Terror’ (Lambert, 2011). This thesis makes the case that Khan’s (2013) ‘deafening silence’ is not new; it is historic. Its temporal dimension places the present in a historic past that brings the past into the present. This thesis breaks the silence surrounding South Asian Muslim women’s experiences of adversity in offering a radical critique of adversity, resistance and resilience under the lens of hegemony. Importantly, in highlighting Muslim women’s experience of adversity, this thesis identifies the resistance and resilience strategies adopted by South Asian Muslim women, and the challenges these raise for the theory of resilience.

This thesis makes the case that periods’ of heightened anxiety exist, and have existed for centuries, in the struggle for ideological supremacy (hegemony), between Western ideology and Islam. From this reading the ‘War on Terror’ is a present day manifestation of a well-established pattern replicating the rhetoric and struggle for ideological hegemony evident from the time of empire (Jackson, 2005; Nechtman, 2006; Salter, 2002; Spalek, 2013). The discourse of colonial domination was muted during the decades of the Cold War, but did not disappear, it continued to resonate in discourses of the ‘Third World’ (Slater, 2002), to be resurrected in 1993, by Huntington in the ‘Clash of Civilizations’
thesis.¹ Huntington’s thesis was published just eight years before the al Qaeda attack on mainland America on 11th September 2001 (9/11), giving prominence to the notion of ‘cultural clash’ between the West and Islam. This is evident in the American government response to 9/11, triggering the second² ‘War on Terror’. Scholars have argued that the ‘Clash’ thesis is neither straightforward nor new; it is rooted in constructs of the ‘the two worlds thesis’³ (Salter, 2002: 129), based on imperial distinctions between the civilized West, and its uncivilized periphery. The importance of the ‘Clash’ hypothesis, to this thesis, is in its contribution to the hegemonic post-9/11 discursive practices adopted by American and British governments (explored in detail in Chapter Three), with the consent of the ‘subaltern’ American public. In adopting hegemony as the lens to explicate the implications of the ‘War on Terror’ for South Asian Muslim women in Britain this thesis offers a distinctive intervention.

The outcome of 9/11 cannot be understated; it is viewed, in its most extreme representation, as the Fourth World War encompassing all parts of the globe (Rogers, 2008; Morris, 2012). It is rooted, this thesis argues, in an ongoing temporal struggle for supremacy based on a constructed threat to Western liberal democracy by Islam (Jackson, 2005; Slater, 2002). From the perspective of American and British governments, the destruction of the World Trade Centre and the attack on the Pentagon (9/11), were seen as enactments of the cultural/ideological clash predicted by Huntington. However, scholars argue that the leader of al Qaeda, Oslama Bin Laden, was not interested in disrupting Western ideology or culture; the attacks were, in this frame, an ‘old fashioned’, if more lethal, form of terrorism aimed at changing America’s policies in the Middle East (Jackson, 2005). From the perspective of hegemony, the interweaving of ideological threat into actual physical threat, indicates a

¹ Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis is discussed in Chapter Three.
² The first War on Terror was proclaimed in 1993 by the Reagan administration (see 3.3.1).
³ A colonial trope the ‘two world’ thesis held that the developed West was peaceful and the developing non-West was a zone of conflict (Slater, 2002: 128, 129).
⁴ There are two points to be made here. Firstly, the term subaltern was coined by Gramsci to describe a subordinate class whose consent is maintained to the ideology of the dominant class without the use of force (Gramsci, 1971). Secondly, in this reading the American (and British public can be read as a subaltern class in the larger political structure of government.
‘hegemonizing’ process on the part of American and British governments. It set in train discourses of the superiority of one ideology (Western liberal democracy), over another (Islam), (Jackson, 2011). In these representations Islam, and by implication Muslims, are signified as uncivilized and barbaric (Lambert, 2011; Slater, 2002). As will become evident, representations of South Asian Muslim women are constituted by, and contingent upon, these signifiers.

Representations of Islam as a threat to Western liberal democracy have continued since 2001, evidencing heightened anxiety, and the prolonged nature of this period of ideological struggle. As recently as 2015, American presidential candidate, Donald Trump, repeatedly articulated the view that Muslims hate Americans, and the American way of life (Pilkington, 2015). Trump’s anxious rhetoric represents, and thereby constitutes and positions, Muslims as a threat to America. Trumps discursive practice, equating Islamic terrorism (criminal activity) with being Muslim, laid the ground for a recent expression of pre-emptive policy; a ban on Muslims’ travelling to America from seven majority Muslim countries. Trump, as president, promised to keep America safe by keeping Muslims out, in proposed legislation in January and March 2017.\(^6\) The struggle for ideological supremacy was also present in Trump’s speech in Warsaw, on 6\(^{th}\) July 2017, in which Trump reiterated that Islam is to be feared by the West because ‘radical Islam…reject[s] our values’ (CCN Politics, 2017).

There are two points to be made here, firstly, the rhetoric of Islam and Muslims as a threat to Western values, reiterates historic discourses of Muslims as ‘barbarian’ and ‘other’ (Jackson, 2011; Slater, 2002). Secondly, the ‘Muslim ban’ fails to discriminate between individual Muslims who pose a criminal threat and those who do not. Through the lens of hegemony, this tactic (by the dominant group), can be seen to create conditions in which the American (and British) publics, as subaltern groups, buy into, or accept, the ideology of Gramsci’s ‘superstructure’ (i.e. government). The use of pre-emptive policy by the UK government is explicated in Chapter Three. In Gramsci’s conception of

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\(^5\) The term ‘hegemonizing’ refers to the process by which groups come to accept the values of the dominant group and embody its practices and rhetoric’s (James, 2006: 61).

\(^6\) In June 2017 the American Supreme Court allowed a revised and limited version of the legislation to pass onto the American statute.
hegemony it is essential for the dominant group to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the populous.

This thesis, argues that the ‘War on Terror’ and counter-terrorism measures, affect Muslim women negatively. That Muslim women’s capacity to cope with, or overcome, these adversities has had little academic or political attention; South Asian Muslim women’s resistance to the ‘collateral damage’ inflicted by the ‘War on Terror’ (Lambert, 2011: 85,) is the focus of this thesis. There is ample evidence that, since 9/11, Muslim women have been, and continue to be, targets of Islamophobic attack/hate crime (Allen, 2011; Copsey, 2012; Hussain, 2012; Littler, 2015). The research conducted for this thesis found that, since 9/11, South Asian Muslim women experience high levels of fear for their safety. Additionally, there is the potential anxiety caused by, or the fear of, ‘hard’ security measures, such as home searches (Ni Aolgáin, 2014). Yet, as noted by Khan (2013), amidst the ‘noise’ of counter terrorism, there is a ‘deafening silence’ surrounding the adverse effects of the ‘War on Terror’. This thesis breaks this ‘deafening silence’ by identifying how the state and civil society failed to support Muslim women’s resilience.

Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony is the lens through which this interrogation of resilience is conducted. In investigating resilience, through the lens of hegemony, this thesis brings power and resistance to the centre of resilience theory. It enables new ways of thinking, identifying problems in understanding resilience; it questions whether, survival and/or transformation, in conditions of prolonged harm is resilience. It questions whether forms of resilience that manifest as resistance, causing further disruption in the system, can be termed resilience. It raises questions about the ways in which resilience can be scaled up, from the individual to the group, with reference to structures and group processes. These questions move resilience between micro and macro

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7 This deliberate reference to ‘winning the hearts and minds’ picks up on rhetoric in the UK government’s 2007 Prevent.
8 ‘Potential’ is used to indicate the relative absence of published academic studies to evidence harm resulting from ‘hard’ counter-terrorism. Chapter Three, 3.5.3 draws comparisons with women’s experiences in Northern Ireland under emergency powers to suggest negative effects as a result of emergency powers in counter-terrorism in Britain.
contexts, from closely bonded local social networks to, national and transnational ‘superstructures’. It incorporates, thinking related to social network analysis, and, social capital9 to understand the mechanisms that support collective resistance and resilience, in conditions of prolonged adversity. A temporal lens questions the function of resilience: Is resilience about ‘coping’? Is resilience about having a regulatory effect? Or, is resilience about resistance that has a ‘transformative’ adaptive effect? These questions arise from locating hegemony in resilience. This framing of resilience positions South Asian Muslim women’s resistances as counter-hegemonic actions, as will be made clear in this thesis. The findings from this thesis indicate, that South Asian Muslim women’s resistance disrupts their position in systems within, and beyond, their immediate communities. This thesis evidences the ripple effects of these disruptions. This thesis argues that the mutually constitutive movement, of micro to macro level disturbances, function to regulate micro level resistances in order to retain macro level power structures.

In arguing that the ‘War on Terror’ has the hallmarks of a period of heightened anxiety, in the struggle for ideological supremacy, this thesis makes explicit the effects of macro events on micro communities, with specific reference to South Asian Muslim women. This thesis argues that structural inequalities; political, social and economic disadvantages, make the management of adversity more complex. Chapter Five, (5.2), and Appendix 3 provide, neighbourhood and national data, to evidence structural inequalities experienced by South Asian Muslim women involved in the research conducted for this thesis. In interrogating the apparently self-evident, but insufficiently studied, claim that the ‘War on Terror’ is experienced as adversity by Muslim women in Britain (Huckerby, 2012; Ni Aolàni, 2013), this thesis joins South Asian, and other, Muslim women in ‘breaking the silence’ noted by Khan 2013.

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9 Social capital refers to the social (as opposed to material) assets realised by individuals working together to achieve outcomes that are good for themselves and that also have wider benefits for others.
1.2 The aims of this thesis

Premised on the claim, that the ‘War on Terror’ is experienced by South Asian Muslim women as adversity, this thesis examines responses to this adversity. The idea of prolonged adversity is particularly interrogated, in the frame of resilience, where the ‘prolonged’ brings in the temporal dimension and ‘resilience’ brings in hegemony and power. Hegemony introduces the dynamic of resistance, and its manifestations, such as hybridity.

**The significance of temporality to the study of resilience**

A key aim of this thesis is to trouble resilience as the ability of an affected object, individual, group or system to ‘bounce back’ quickly, after harm/trauma/disruption, to a former state of equilibrium. This thesis asks if, in the process of adapting to prolonged adversity, changes are made to fundamental pre-trauma characteristics of the individual or group; if adaptation constitutes resilience. This thesis argues that, under a temporal lens, adversity has a complex temporality of the immediate, and enduring, as a mutually constitutive, non-linear dynamic. For South Asian Muslim women in Britain, for example, this thesis examines transformation and change (adaptation) in the ‘War on Terror’ in relation to fundamental pre-trauma/disturbance faith characteristics\(^{10}\).

Additionally, and importantly, this thesis argues that, under the lens of hegemony resilience is enacted as/in a prolonged ‘war of position’\(^{11}\) by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. In this frame resilience (by the subaltern group) is defiance (resistance) to the hegemonizing processes of the dominant group (the state and/or civil society) to win, and maintain, their consent for its values/ideology. This reading of prolonged adversity is inherently political. This political reading of resilience, removes the neutrality of resilience; it places it firmly in the field of relations of power, domination and resistance.

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\(^{10}\) Hardy’s (2015) definition is premised on the affected individual, group or system retaining pre-trauma characteristics in the process of adaption in conditions of prolonged adversity.

\(^{11}\) For Gramsci, the classical model of revolution through military insurrection (war of manoeuvre) has been supplanted within advanced capitalism by a cultural struggle of much longer duration and complexity (war of position) (Egan, 2014).
The significance of hegemony; identifying resistance and prolonged struggle

A further aim of this thesis is to interrogate the ‘War on Terror’ through the lens of hegemony. This thesis traces the history of ‘othering’ South Asian Muslim women in Britain. In tracing resistance and resilience, and where women’ narratives are missing, this thesis shows how active resistance and silencing embody the prolonged dynamic of hegemony. Hegemony locates the ‘War on Terror’ as historic and continuous; from this perspective there is no equilibrium for South Asian Muslim women in Britain to bounce back to. This thesis understands the ‘War on Terror’ as rooted in an imperial past (Jackson, 2011; Slater, 2002). Understood in this frame, the ‘War on Terror’, is part of a deeper, and longer, process of ‘othering’ than its sixteen years of enactment. From this perspective the struggle of South Asian Muslim women in Britain is a resistance against a powerful historic tidal wave of adversity.

Hegemony enables the articulation of ‘othering’ in the lives of South Asian Muslim women in Britain; the construction of how they are positioned and represented. In this frame, representations of South Asian Muslim women in Britain are constituted in, and contingent on, British imperial history; the past is brought into the present. From this perspective subaltern status as ‘other’, is not only a statement of hegemony, it is stitched into the daily lives of South Asian Muslim women in Britain. ‘Othering’ is articulated, and rearticulated, every time a visibly identifiable Muslim woman is assaulted, or spat at, or verbally abused on the streets of Britain. Hegemony also holds the tension of voice and silence, as noted by Khan in the beginning of this thesis, and, also here by Spivak:

…within the effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual difference is doubly effaced…[i]f in the colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow (1998: 287)

Hegemony enables an articulation of the effects of dominant narratives on the subordinate; effacing is itself, a powerful act of invisibilising the experience of the subaltern. Through the temporal lens of the past, it is possible to see that South Asian Muslim women in Britain, and their experiences, remain effaced in the present, on the grounds of race and gender. The silence and/or invisibility of
women, in imperial historiography, is echoed in the ‘deafening’ silence, that ‘shadows’ South Asian Muslim women’s experience in the present; in the ‘War on Terror’.

In this thesis, temporality, and, hegemony provide the wider frames for understanding adversity inflicted by the ‘War on Terror’ for South Asian Muslim women in Britain. An empirical investigation was undertaken to bring these South Asian Muslim women ‘out of the shadows’ (Spivak, 1988). This investigation was conducted over eight months in a neighbourhood in the North of England.

**Aims of the field study**

The aims of the field investigation were distinct from, but contributed to, the overall aims of the thesis. Their purpose was to guide, but not direct, information gathering. Whilst adversity and resilience are separated in these aims there was no such separation in women’s testimonies.

The field investigation sought to understand adversity and resilience responses. To gather evidence of the resources, network, and neighbourhood mechanisms available to women, including the function of civic and civil society institutions to support women’s capacity and opportunity to develop social capital, and, built resilience. The aims of the investigation were to:

- gather women’s testimonies of experiences of harm/adversity pre and post 9/11;
- identify the places, spaces and people women turned to at times of hardship, such as family members, friends, faith and other social networks;
- understand the situations in which forms of social capital were generated;
- identify neighbourhood resources, mechanisms, and wider community networks, including generic community centres and women’s centres; and
identify formal institutions and networks that were accessible to, and used by, women, such as local councillors, local government officials, local community leaders and neighbourhood police officers.

The field investigation also sought wider perspectives, through semi-structured interviews, from civil society and representatives of the local state, who were familiar with the study neighbourhood and its residents. These interviews sought to identify the challenges and opportunities for residents in the study neighbourhood. To do this the field investigation sought to:

- identify the extent to which, community leaders and representatives of the local state engaged with, and understood, adversity experienced by South Asian Muslim women in the study neighbourhood;
- understand the mechanisms used, by community leaders and representatives of the state, to insulate South Asian Muslim women in the study neighbourhood, from the harm/adversity of the ‘War on Terror’.

1.3 Focus on South Asian Muslim women in Britain

The field study specifically sought the experiences of Pakistani and Bangladeshi South Asian Muslim women in Britain. The specificity of this ethnic selection requires explanation, and contextualization in order, to locate the particularity of these women’s’ experiences of prolonged adversity in the ‘War on Terror’ as historic and continuous. It also requires explanation in terms of why Pakistani and Bangladeshi women as opposed other Muslim women in Britain.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are generally recognised as constituting South Asia. Of these the first three countries are, self-defined, majority Muslim countries, and India is not. Whilst India has a large Muslim population it was founded (on independence in 1947) as a nation for Hindu’s. The ‘War on Terror’ prioritises Muslim or Islamist groups, and as such, Afghani, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi, populations are the most obvious South Asian migrant groups to be identified in the ‘War on Terror’. Pakistani and Bangladeshi South Asian Muslims remain the largest ethnic groups in Britain (Ali, 2015: 24)
and (as evidenced in Chapter Three), the most established migrant Muslim communities in the UK. In other words, they are amongst the most visible Muslim ethnic minority groups in the UK. The inclusion of Pakistani women, is perhaps, more obvious, given the links made between Pakistan, al-Qaeda and Islamist activity in the north-western tribal areas of Pakistan (Crilly, 2010). This connection was made explicit by the former British Prime Minister, David Cameron, in 2010, when Cameron ‘accused elements of the Pakistani state of promoting the export of terrorism’ (Watt, 2010). Three, of the four, (7/7) London bombers were also of Pakistani descent (Anwar, 2014), adding strength to links between Pakistan and terrorism. These facts support the view that some British Pakistani’s pose a risk as ‘legitimate’ potential terrorists. However, this is not the case for Bangladeshi’s. Bangladeshi women are vulnerable to Islamophobic assault, in the context of Islamist terrorism, partly because the British public, and state, have difficulty in differentiating between people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin. This leaves Bangladeshi women at risk of being misidentified as Pakistani (Pantazis, 2009), with the attendant dangers of being linked to terrorism. Additionally, Bangladeshis are visibly identifiable as South Asian Muslims by their skin colour and traditional dress (Ibid.). Bangladeshi women live with the fear, and risk, as do Pakistani women, of being targeted as Islamist sympathisers. Rashid argues that:

whilst Muslim men are explicitly regarded as dangerous for their susceptibility to violent extremism, the Muslim woman as silenced victim, by contrast, has implicitly come to symbolise the dangerous consequences of “too much multiculturalism” (Rashid, 2013:2; see also Ahmad, 2013; Francois-Cerrah, 2011).

There are numerous examples of Muslim women who wear hijab, being attacked on the streets of Britain; the largest numbers of whom are Asian or South Asian (Faith Matters, 2016). As recently as June 2017, following the suicide bombing in Manchester, Islamophobic hate crime spiked with visibly identifiable Muslim women bearing the brunt. In Peterborough, for example, a hate crime incident involved the assault of a Muslim woman, while she was crossing the road, with her three year old daughter. The woman was pushed from behind, knocked to the ground and her hijab ripped off and thrown back at her (Peterborough Telegraph, 2017). The incident powerfully inscribes the significance of hijab, it
sends clear signals to Muslim women that hijab, is not accepted on the streets of Britain. Events such as these evidence, the symbolic importance of hijab as a signifier of, the threat of ‘too much multiculturalism’ for some parts of the British public. Furthermore, this incident is a prime example of how heightened anxiety, on a macro level, is felt at the micro level in the daily lives of South Asian Muslim women in Britain. It is a prime example of the necessity of temporality for understanding this outpouring of hatred of South Asian Muslims’ that the ‘War on Terror’ (Lambert 2011) appears to have given licence to.

1.4. Conceptual frames

Movement between abstraction, and grounding in reality, is central to this thesis mirroring the effects of macro (abstract and distant) phenomenon at the micro level (the lived experience). To orient the reader a brief introduction is offered to the conceptual frames utilized in this thesis. The two primary frames are ‘resilience’ and, Gramsci’s conception of, ‘hegemony’ (2007). Resilience is important because it is the focus of this thesis, and hegemony, because it is the lens through which resilience is interrogated. The term ‘Islamophobia’ is used, as a conceptual frame, within the discursive practices integral to the ‘War on Terror’. Feminism and anti-imperial theory, including Bhabha’s (1994) concept of hybridity, enable understandings of South Asian Muslim women’s resistance to adversity in the ‘War on Terror’ constructed within patriarchal and colonial power structures. These themes and frames also require explanation.

1.4.1 Adversity, resilience and adaptation

Resilience and adversity are intrinsically linked; resilience is contingent on adversity, and vice versa. Problematically these interconnected concepts remain attached to conditions of immediate, ephemeral, harm. Most significantly these concepts fail to acknowledge the possibility of resistance as a manifestation of resilience. The inclusion of resistance (particularly in relation to prolonged adversity), troubles the apparent political neutrality of resilience (see Mackinnon, 2012); in this frame, the political neutrality of resilience, can be read
as ‘coping’ with/in adverse conditions. Conceptually, this is an important point for a political reading of resilience, through the lens of hegemony. Hegemony identifies the struggle of the dominant and subordinate in relation to ideological supremacy. Hegemony’s challenge to resilience is addressed in 1.5.1 of this chapter and in Chapter Two. The point is that, resilience through the lens of hegemony, has to accommodate resistance and power; offering the possibility of a new reading of resilience.

Despite its difficulties, the concept ‘resilience’ is ubiquitous, as a solution to problems, in contemporary political and social contexts. Resilience is used in issues as varied as, child development, natural disaster, mental health, crime and terrorism (Ball, 2011; Hardy, 2015; Masten, 2001; Walklate, 2011). The widespread use of resilience dilutes its understanding, making it essential, and urgent, to interrogate the use of the concept in the resistance and resilience of South Asian Muslim in Britain in the ‘War on Terror’.

1.4.2 Hegemony as ideological struggle

This is not an immediate transfer of Gramsci’s ideas; the complex notion of hegemony brings a distinctive theoretical perspective to bear on British/South Asian Muslim relations. This thesis utilizes Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony, as ideologies in struggle; in this frame ideology is in search for domination that it can never fully achieve; hence ideology is always searching. It is in the search of one ideology for hegemony, and another to resist hegemony (domination; being hegemonized), that spaces of interchange and hybridity are created.

It is important to understand Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony because of its centrality in this thesis. Femia (1981) defines hegemony as ‘an order in which a common social-moral language is spoken, in which one concept of reality is dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of though and behaviour’ (p. 24, emphasis added). Hall’s (1996) definition of hegemony illustrates how the state and civil society produce, and maintain, consent to the class hierarchies of
capitalist society. These definitions have in common the all-pervading effects of hegemony on subaltern groups.

Hegemony is a state of striving and constant struggle; it distinguishes between the use of coercion and consent as mechanisms of social power. In the use of consent Gramsci notes, the importance of the intellectuals’ role, in training people to fulfil their assigned role. Socialisation means discipline linked to education; Davidson suggests that ‘the move from savage to civilized being comes through education’ (2005: 8). Hegemonic power seeks to win people over to the social norms of the dominant group, whilst coercion refers to the state’s capacity for violence against those who refuse to accept the dominant ideology (Stoddard, 2007: 200. 201). Gramsci problematizes the conception of ‘hegemony’ as absolute power by including the possibility of resistance (Hall, 1986; Hardy, 2013; MacLeod, 1992). In societies characterized by the exercise of hegemony, Gramsci suggests, a prolonged ‘war of positions’ is evident (Gramsci, 2007: 229). This thesis argues that, the ‘War on Terror’ exemplifies a period in the prolonged ‘war of positions’ in British/South Asian Muslim relations of heightened anxiety. This thesis argues, that historic/prolonged struggles shape present struggles for hegemony. In prolonged struggle, Gramsci suggests, it is the interface of ideology and social experience, that spaces of contradiction are realised; it is in these spaces that the subordinate subject resists domination. Bhabha articulates these spaces as holding the potential for hybrid identities in ‘the third space’12. Hybridity is produced in, and through, the interrelationship of struggle between the dominant and the subjugated (Gramsci, 2007.; Hall, 1986; Mallon, 1994).

This thesis argues that the ‘War on Terror’ exemplifies a contemporary moment of heightened struggle for ideological hegemony. Hegemony warns us that the struggle is on-going, as dominant groups seek continuously, to contain the

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12 The significance of the third space lies in its recognition that new meanings are not created in binaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘secular’. The creation of discursive ‘third spaces’ accommodates the complexity of multiple positions.
subordinate group/s in their ideological spaces, until the dominant ideology appears ‘permanent and natural’ (Hebdige, 1993: 366). The notion of continuity reminds us that present patterns are repetitions of past patterns of struggle for hegemony; for British/South Asian Muslim relations they are constructed in, and shaped by, imperial history.

In keeping with Gramsci’s ‘war of positions’, this thesis places foremost importance on the location of the ‘War on Terror’ in centuries of struggle (Jackson, 2011; Spalek, 2013; Slater, 2002) for domination in British/South Asian Muslim relations. In this temporal framing, South Asian Muslim women’s resilience and adaptation is located in, and contingent on, history and power. Temporality acknowledges women’s already-known (historic) understanding of adversity, structurally, in forms of inequality, and experientially, in forms of daily struggle to resist dominant ideologies. In short, meanings are secured through past knowledge and filtered through the experience of subjugation. The past influences and shapes behaviours, relations, and meanings in the present for both dominant and subordinate groups. Gramsci suggests that total transformation (of consciousness and therefore behaviour) is not possible, because chains of connection between the dominant and the subordinate are never permanently secured, in the struggle for hegemony (Gramsci, 2007; Hall, 1996). In this reading of hegemony the agency, the resistance, the counter-hegemonic actions, of the subordinate group insures that ideology cannot be wholly replaced (Hall, 1996: 26).

Hegemony is not universal; ‘it has to be won, reproduced, sustained’ (Hebdige, 1993, quoting Hall and Jefferson 1976). It is a long-term, on-going and repeated struggle. This reading of hegemony returns us to the temporal, long-term echo of imperialism in the ‘War on Terror’. Hegemony, as ‘war of positions’, exposes the inadequacy of resilience as ‘bounce back’ from immediate trauma or crisis to a former equilibrium. The lens of hegemony requires resilience to extend its reach to incorporate prolonged adversity, and processes of adaptation and
change; hegemony requires resilience to incorporate the survival of the subaltern who has no previous equilibrium to ‘bounce back’ to.

### 1.4.3 Islamophobia

The history of British/South Asian Muslim relations, as evidenced in Chapter Three, exposes a long struggle for hegemony along the lines of race and faith, which are expressed as hatred of Muslims (Richardson, 1997). However, the term Islamophobia is relatively new; coined in the late 1980s, it first appeared in print in 1991 (Allen, 2004; Sheridan, 2006). This is important because the term Islamophobia is legitimized, in and through, the temporal frame of its history.

The term is problematic, as will be made clear, but first, it is necessary to understand some of the arguments that surround the label. Scholars suggest, as does this thesis, that hatred of Muslims has existed for centuries (Allen, 2004; Lambert, 2011; Spalek, 2013); that it has become ‘more explicit, more extreme and more dangerous’ since the late 1970’s (Richardson, 1997: 1); and that hatred of Muslims has escalated post-9/11 and become more acceptable (Allen, 2004). Through the lens of hegemony, Islamophobia has been embedded in the consciousness of the wider, non-Muslim, British public via the dominant narrative of the state, and elements of civil society, such as, the Far Right (Eatwell, 2010; Goodwin, 2010; Lambert, 2011). These readings of Islamophobia indicate the continuity of faith hate against Muslims, and, its ascendance at particular times; notably when faith hate is given licence, as in the post 9/11 era (Lambert, 2011). Importantly, in relation to hegemony, it demonstrates the acceptance of a dominant narrative, by growing numbers of people, who are not coerced into hating Muslims, but who have accepted the idea that Muslims pose a threat to be feared.

The term is commonly used to refer to the treatment of people who identify as Muslim, whether or not they observe religious practice. The setting up of the
Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, in 1996, is further testament to the fact that prejudice against Muslims was evident prior to the events of 9/11 (Allen 2004). Additionally, the United Nations formally recognised the proliferation of anti-Muslim ‘prejudice, discrimination, and hatred’ in 2001, just days before 9/11, again evidencing the presence of hatred towards Muslims before 9/11 (Allen, 2004). Knowing that hatred towards Muslims exists does not explain the term Islamophobia; it is, therefore, useful to address definitions as the combination of the words ‘Islam’ and ‘phobia’ are a potent mix suggesting irrational fear of Islam.

Definitions of Islamophobia tend to include the presence of fear of Islam. The Oxford English dictionary (2010), defines Islamophobia as the "intense dislike or fear of Islam, esp. as a political force; hostility or prejudice towards Muslims" (emphasis added). A fuller definition is offered by Berkeley University, Islamophobia Research & Documentation Project:

a contrived fear or prejudice fomented by the existing Eurocentric and Orientalist global power structure. It is directed at a perceived or real Muslim threat through the maintenance and extension of existing disparities in economic, political, social and cultural relations, while rationalizing the necessity to deploy violence as a tool to achieve ‘civilizational rehab’ of the target communities (Muslim or otherwise). Islamophobia reintroduces and reaffirms a global racial structure through which resource distribution disparities are maintained and extended. (Berkley University, 2013, emphasis added)

This is a hugely political definition rooted in the history of European supremacy; it reaffirms the idea of the past in the present, and the construction of a supremacist reality. Both definitions refer to majority Christian populations ‘fear’ of Islam. They suggest loss of ‘civilization’ or ideology. The Runnymede Trust report (1997), also takes a broad view of Islamophobia, suggesting that, it includes prejudice against Muslims structurally, through exclusion from the labour market, violence directed at people, or material symbols of Islam, prejudice by the media, or in conversation, and discrimination in the provision of services or employment practice (Richardson, 1997). The report questions, as
does this thesis, if links can be made with anti-Muslim views that date back to the Crusades; when Pope Urban II urged his audience to undertake a ‘just war’ against Muslims. The report acknowledges that human being ‘make selective use of the past in order to understand, and to justify, aspects of the present’ (p. 5). Nevertheless, the power of, stories of Muslim barbarians has embedded in the psyche of the Christian West, leading to Islamophobia (Salter, 2002).

In the present day, the Manchester arena suicide bombing on 22nd May 2017, and the London bridge attack on 3rd June 2017, have again, heightened anxiety; spreading fear amongst British Muslim, and non-Muslim, populations. Fear, and/or hatred, of Muslims were expressed, in the week after the Manchester bombing, by a sharp increase in attacks on Muslims. Statistics, from Tell MAMA, show that anti-Muslim hate crime increased by 500% in the week after the bombing. Anti-Muslim hate crime dropped the following week, and increased again, after the London bridge attack (Dodd, 2017). Figures released by the mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, show a fivefold increase in Islamophobic attacks, in the city of London, in the days following the London bridge attack (Ibid.). The steep rise in anti-Muslim hate crime targeting Muslims, who are not responsible for the atrocities, evidences a form of irrational fear, or phobia of Muslims, by some members of the public. Islamophobia enables Muslims to be marked out ‘as distinct from the larger political, social and cultural landscape of 21st –century Britain’ (Alexander, 2013: 3). From this perspective, differences amongst Muslims, on the lines of gender, class, religious difference, and criminal behaviour, are flattened out, homogenizing Muslims into a single category of community on the basis of faith. The point is that Islamic identity is granted centrality, without consideration of difference or complicity.

The effect, of these acts, is to spread fear amongst all populations in Britain, including Muslim populations, as they are acts of indiscriminate violence. Lambert et al. suggest the concept of Islamophobia is ‘deficient in adequately or accurately describing the phenomenon of anti-Muslim bigotry, discrimination and violence’ (2011: 54). The authors suggest it conflates ‘lawful fear or phobia
towards a religion and an unlawful disregard for the rights of a religious minority’ (Ibid.). This thesis uses the term Islamophobia, recognizing the inherent problems with the term, and also uses the term, anti-Muslim hate.

1.4.4 Feminist and anti-imperialist frames

Feminist and anti-imperialist frames provide a focus on patriarchal and racial hegemonies. These theories disrupt oppressive sexist, racist and imperialist discourses; they provide lens through which gender and racial oppression are made visible. They acknowledge the unique situated histories, and stand points, of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, who are constitutes in, and through, patriarchal and colonial structures and history.

While Feminist and anti-imperialist scholarship are concerned with the investigation, and the defence, of the marginalised ‘other’ in structures of domination; they have inherent tensions. Each ‘confronts its limits and exclusion in the other’ (Gandhi, 1998: 83, see also Mohanty, 1995). Black and post-colonial feminists, and post-colonial scholars, challenge Western feminisms to move beyond a homogenized view of the oppression of woman as subaltern; to insist on recognition of the conflicts inherent in the lives of women, on the basis of, class, religion, culture, race and caste. Anti-imperialist theory argues that liberal feminisms are a new form of ‘Orientalism’. Black feminists charge them with representing the ‘Third-World woman’, through a Western lens, thereby silencing her claim to her-story, in ‘pious attempts to represent or speak for her’ (Gandhi, 1988: 88, 89; Mohantry, 1995). These frames enable the identification of why, and where, narratives are missing in processes of ‘othering’ South Asian Muslim women in Britain. The gendered subaltern is caught, to quote Spivak, ‘between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but a violent

13 ‘The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the other.’ (Said, 1978).
shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the “third-world woman”” (1988: 306).

Placing Gramsci’s hegemony under Spivak’s Black feminist, post-colonial, lens deconstructs hegemonic power relations in terms of ‘patriarchy’ and ‘imperialism’. This thesis, examines the potential of South Asian Muslim women’s resilience in the face of their ‘subject-constitution and object-formation’ in the ‘War on Terror’ to create identities of resistance. Thus, amidst the ‘noise’ of counter terrorism, the possibility of South Asian Muslim women’s resilience interrupting the ‘deafening silence’, noted by Khan (2013), opens up.

This is not a comfortable position for the subaltern woman, who metaphorically ‘disappears’ (Spivak, 1988); she becomes the subject through whom competing discourses represent their claims, and their meanings, of who she is. In this research it is precisely the issue of hearing South Asian Muslim women’s voices that is the issue of concern; hearing and understanding the meanings placed by them on their knowledge and their agency. Herein lies the challenge for the state, and for civil society; to support South Asian Muslim women’s resilience these institutions are required to hear the South Asian Muslim women subaltern speak (Spivak, 1988).

Anti-imperialist theory contests Western Eurocentric interpretations of history. Britain’s ‘civilising mission’\(^\text{14}\), at the time of empire, is rearticulated as a clear statement of hegemony. Anti-imperialist theory exposes the intent of the dominant culture/ideology to enforce a Christian ‘truth’ on Indian Muslims and Hindu’s, in India. In the context of the ‘war on Terror’, the ‘civilising mission’ in regard to South Asian Muslim women in Britain is, to enforce counter-terrorism’s ‘truth’ of Islam. Anti-imperialist theory challenges the term ‘post-colonial’

\(^{14}\) Colonialism’s civilising mission is explored in detail in chapter three as an indication of the ascendency of hegemony in struggle for power. It denotes the claim of the empire that empire brought progress and modernity to India, as such it is described as the most powerful tool for embedding the idea of superior and inferior peoples (Fischer-Tine, 2004)
suggests that it falsely ascribes the end of colonial rule, and, by implication, that there is an end to colonial effect (Ashcroft, 1995: 117; Gandhi, 1998: 3). The point is that dominant and subordinate relations continue long after national independence. Memmi (1986), elaborates the psychic impact, suggesting that, the term ‘post-colonial’ underestimates the ‘tenacious hold of a colonial past on the post-colonial present’ (p. 88). Memmi states that:

…the day oppression ceases, the new man is supposed to emerge before our eyes immediately….Now, I do not like to say so, but I must, since decolonization has demonstrated it: this is not the way it happens. The colonised lives for a long time before we see that really new man. (Ibid)

1.5. The structure of this thesis

This thesis is structured in four parts, sub divided, in seven chapters. It remains for this introduction to orientate the reader; to explain how this thesis lays out its argument, its analysis and its findings.

1.5.1 Thesis Part I – Through the lens of power – South Asian Muslim women’s continuing struggle with adversity; their resistance and resilience

Part I of this thesis lays the foundations for the conceptual frames of resilience, hegemony, and temporality. Part I includes this introduction, and Chapters Two and Three. Chapter Two utilizes existing theory, and academic literature, to ground knowledge and understanding of the concept ‘resilience’ by tracking its development. It argues that definitions of ‘bounce back’, to former states of equilibrium, are inadequate in explaining the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, to prolonged adversity. In tracking the development of the concept, this thesis asks if resilience can be scaled up from the individual to groups or communities. It does this by introducing social network analysis, social capital and neighbourhood theory to the scrutiny. It argues for a fuller picture of resilience at the level of neighbourhood. In this frame places, spaces and relationships matter; together they (metaphorically) form barriers to adversity and create ‘defensible spaces’ by ‘circling’ the protective ‘waggons’ (Hall, 2010:
Chapter Two asks if the concept can be stretched from immediate, single trauma, adversity to encompass temporality; to incorporate change and adaptation, whilst retaining fundamental pre-trauma characteristics (Hardy, 2015). This is important for acknowledging prolonged adversity; historic and present in the lives of South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Theories of resilience, social networks, social capital, and neighbourhood effects, provided the basis for the field investigation. Social group, and social capital, analysis were instrumental in making apparent the resistances of South Asian Muslim women, in the creation of resistant identities, through resilience (Bottrell, 2009).

Chapter Three provides, through the lens of hegemony, a temporal geo-political overview of British/South Asian Muslim contact over a period of four hundred years, to the present day. Chapter Three foregrounds the temporal struggle, evidencing South Asian Muslim women’s history of struggle in hegemony. It notes the silences, and the noise, historically, and in the present, to demonstrate the powerful ways in which South Asian Muslim women’s history has been effaced.

Chapter Three offers a selective view of historic events, to make visible the continuity of the past, in the present. It acknowledges that the past, and the present, are continually being redefined and reinvented. Unearthing the missing narratives of British/South Asian Muslim relations is important, as it offers a glimpse of what can be known, in the otherwise effaced experiences of South Asian Muslim women. In tracing this history, the chapter highlights moments, from the 17th century, in which heightened struggle for, ideological hegemony is evident either through consent or coercion. For example, an early example is the coercion of Muslim mothers to have their dual heritage ‘Eurasian’ babies, christened into the Protestant church. Chapter Three traces the invisibility of South Asian Muslim women’s story of service, as ayahs (servants), to the British in India, and in Britain; their disruption of the purity of the British home in India, and their abandonment by British families, once they returned to Britain. Chapter Three addresses the issues of Britain’s ‘civilizing mission’, and the ‘India
question’, as moments in the struggle for hegemony. The hybrid position adopted by some powerful British men, is also made evident, in their embrace of India. Equally powerfully, the rejection of hybridity by the British state and public is echoed in the rejection of the resistant, hybrid identities, of South Asian Muslim women in Britain today.

Chapter Three changes tempo, as it shifts from historic, to the present day struggle of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, in the ‘War on Terror’. The change reflects the increase in studies related to counter-terrorism generally, in comparison to the study of South Asian Muslim women’s historic, experiences. The paucity of study, specifically related to Muslim women, in counter-terrorism, is a further reminder of the ‘deafening silence’ (Khan, 2013) surrounding the experiences of South Asian Muslim women. In moving to present day contexts, Chapter Three foregrounds, the political and ideological character of South Asian Muslim women’s struggle, in the ‘War on Terror’. This reinforces questions, raised in Chapter Two, of the adequacy of ‘bounce back’ resilience theory for the study of South Asian Muslim women’s resilience.

Chapter Three highlights the influence of academic and political analysts’, such as Huntington, in heightening the fear of Islam in modern times, through the publication of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (1993). It traces the influence of the ‘Clash’ thesis, on the ‘War on Terror’, following the al Qaeda attack on mainland America, on the 11th September 2001 (9/11). The ‘War on Terror’, and the UK government response, through counter-terrorism measures bring the temporal tracing of hegemony to the present. Particular attention is paid, in Chapter Three, to the UK government response; to the three iterations of CONTEST and to the Prevent strand of the strategy. In response to the central argument of this thesis Chapter Three addresses, the little scrutinized, effects of UK counter-terrorism on Muslim women in Britain, whilst interrogating wider literature, to offer deductions about the impacts of ‘hard’ security measures on South Asian Muslim women in Britain in the present ‘War on Terror’. Chapter Three identifies that the ‘War on Terror’ is contingent on, and constituted in,
imperial history. From the perspective of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, this intervention breaks the silences that invisibilizes them. Chapter Three sets the scene for the empirical investigation, to ascertain the claim that the ‘War on Terror’ is experienced, by South Asian Muslim women in Britain, as prolonged adversity, and, to understand how they demonstrate resilience through resistance.

1.5.2 Thesis Part II – research methods, tensions and positioning

Part II incorporates Chapter Four. This chapter has two primary objectives; firstly, it addresses the relationship of content and method, and secondly, it leads the reader into the study neighbourhood. These aspects are interrelated, and not separate, as content and method are coproduced. For example the use of a flexible framework enabled the co-production of the research.

Feminist and anti-imperialist epistemology, informed the research method; the nuts and bolts, design, planning, analysis, and content; placing South Asian Muslim women’s gender, race and faith identities at the centre. Feminist and anti-imperialist theory provides important checks on researcher power, paying tribute to South Asian Muslim Women in Britain, as ‘situated knowers’ (Haraway, 1988). From this perspective, the researcher is the ‘situated’ learner. The conditions of gender, race and faith subjugation become important forms of knowledge that the research is seeking. Feminist and anti-imperialist theories, remind the research strategy, design and method, of the power imbalances evident in anthropology; the tradition in which ethnography is rooted. Anthropologists have investigated ‘native’ peoples for colonial powers, to better control their cultures and behaviours (Brewer, 2000; Smith, 1999, 2012). As Denzin et al., note ethnography has served as a metaphor through which ‘research becomes the objective of representing the dark-skinned to the white world’ (2005: 1). The danger, Denzin et al., alert this thesis to, is the research speaking for, or silencing, South Asian Muslim women, to break the silence
imposed on them. From anti-imperialist and feminist stand points, the tension inherent in method and content is, in method shaping content.

In keeping with ethnographic tradition, Chapter Four leads the reader into the field linking design and practice. It foregrounds the importance of trust, in gaining access to, and working with, South Asian Muslim women in Britain who are deemed to be ‘hard to reach’. It outlines the importance of trust between the researcher and a known South Asian Muslim male community leader, whose endorsement of the research was essential to gaining access to South Asian Muslim women, in ‘closed settings’ (Hammersley, 1993; Bryman, 2001; Garland, 2006). It incorporates trust in ethnography; ‘dispositional’ or social trust, for engaging with, and gaining the confidence of, South Asian Muslim women participants, in the research. It addresses the importance of ‘contextual’, or political trust, for engaging with South Asian Muslim women in Britain, in conversations, on political processes in the ‘War on Terror’ (Spalek, 2010; 2013).

Data presented in Appendix 3, is important to methodological considerations; they provide statistical, and qualitative, information to illustrate the high level of economic and environmental poverty experienced by residents, in the neighbourhood, in which the field study was conducted. This is important because, resilience theory indicates that, financial and environmental resources insulate individuals, and communities, from adversity. Data presented in Appendix 3, illustrate the lack of financial and physical resource available to residents in the study neighbourhood. Qualitative, national studies supplement local data to, provide further evidence of poverty experienced by Asian and South Asian communities in Britain. National studies make causal links between mental health distress, and economic, gender, race, and faith discrimination, experienced by South Asian, and, South Asian Muslim women in Britain. A high level of mental health distress was also identified amongst Bangladeshi women in the study neighbourhood. 90% of the women who used the services of the Bangladeshi women’s centre, in the study neighbourhood, experienced mental
health distress, reportedly, resulting from gender, race and faith discrimination (Bangladeshi women’s centre, 2009).

The chapter introduces Boyatzis’s (1998) approach to the systematic analysis of qualitative data. It explains that all data generated, or studies, in this thesis (qualitative and quantitative) were scrutinized using the inductive thematic analysis approach (see Table 4.3 in Chapter Four, 4.5.5). Chapter Four explains how data were coded and analysed, using the stages outlined by Boyatzis. This enabled the thesis to move, from the production of a ‘long list’ of patterns, through stages of interrogation, to summarise the patterns that emerged in data as key themes and issues in this thesis. Appendix 4 provides an example of coding at stage 4 of data analysis.

Chapter Four, identifies tensions that became apparent, at the stages of planning the research/field study, and in analysing the data generated and gathered. The chapter explains the challenges, and benefits, of using a flexible structure for gathering information from South Asian Muslim women in the field (the framework is attached as Appendix 1). The flexible framework enabled women to shape their contribution, and the research, in ways that a tightly structured, objectives based, framework might not have done. Consideration was given to content shaping method and outcome; women shaping, and coproducing the research. The other tension, relates to the inherent dialectics of using ethnography; a research methodology rooted in classical social anthropology. The dialectic lies in using research tools located in methodologies that appropriated voice, and silenced, ‘native’ people, to engage a community of women; South Asian Muslim women in Britain, whose histories are rooted in colonial occupation. These paradoxes did not go unnoticed or unchallenged in the design of this research as is evidenced in Chapter Four.
1.5.3. Thesis Part III – Research findings and analysis. Women’s narratives: adversity and resilience

Part III comprises two findings and analysis chapters; Chapter Five provides a focus on findings, and analysis, in relation to the adversities identified in the lives of the South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Chapter Six identifies forms of resilience, manifest as the resistances, engaged by the South Asian Muslim women in the field study. Chapters Five and Six clearly demonstrate the role of data analysis based on Boyatzis’s (1998) inductive analytic approach. These chapters, combine theory, design, research implementation and findings in relation to the aims of this thesis.

Chapter Five responds to the aims, of the field investigation, to evidence women’s experience of harm/adversity in the ‘War on Terror’ (linked to 9/11). It identifies the engagement of community leaders, and representatives of the local state, with South Asian Muslim women, in the study neighbourhood, including, women’s access to neighbourhood resources. The chapter identifies that the findings from the investigation are stark; women’s narratives identified high levels of fear post 9/11; fear of physical and verbal assault and abuse. It identifies that women’s fear increased after 7/7, and that women gave testimony to the spread of fear for their safety; in their families and communities. The findings highlighted in Chapter Five, particularly link Islamophobic assault of women, to their visible identification as Muslim; because they wore hijab. The chapter also references national statistics, by the independent monitoring group, Tell MAMA. These data verify increases in physical and verbal assaults on visibly identifiable Muslim women, especially following an Islamist related terrorist attack, anywhere in the world. It offers evidence of a sharp rise nationally, in assaults of visibly identifiable Muslim women, after incidents, such as, the Manchester and London atrocities, in May and June 2017 mentioned earlier. The analysis offered in Chapter Five suggests that, publicising attacks on innocent Muslims could increase levels of fear, and the spread of fear, within Muslim communities.
Additionally, the field investigation found a complete dislocation between women’s narratives of adversity and fear, and understanding of women’s adversity and fear, by local state institutions. This dislocation indicates a lack of engagement, by local state institutions, with South Asian Muslim women, in the study neighbourhood. These findings suggest an entrenched separation between South Asian Muslim women from local state institutions. In this separation local state representatives appeared to have no idea of the daily life experience of fear of South Asian Muslim women. Additional, there was evidence of women’s exclusion from potentially protective civil society networks, on the grounds of their sex.

Economic and environmental context was cited by representatives of the state, and community leaders, as powerful factors, affecting the lives of all South Asian Muslims in the study neighbourhood. Poverty, Islamophobia and gender subjugation, were raised by representatives of the state in the field study. The investigation also found high levels of gender, race and faith stereotyping of South Asian Muslim women in the neighbourhood, amongst non-Muslim representatives of the local state. These attitudes suggest that, the dominant narrative, of the oppression of Muslim women, in hyper-patriarchal Islam, had become part of the accepted vocabulary, of the majority, of local state representatives interviewed in this research. These contextual findings present a powerful backdrop of, a lack of, material resources to insulate South Asian Muslim women from adversity. Chapter Five foregrounds women’s missing narratives, to express their fear, separation, and isolation from neighbourhood resources.

Chapter Six responds to the aims of the field investigation in relation to resilience; it includes an understanding of the places, spaces, and people South Asian Muslim women turned to for support; the situations in which social capital was generated, and the neighbourhood resources and mechanisms available to South Asian Muslim women.
The neighbourhood investigation found that, in the absence of material resources, and limited support from civil and civic institutions, relationships were central to South Asian Muslim women’s resistance, resilience and wellbeing. The places, spaces and people South Asian Muslim women turned to, at times of hardship, were family, Muslim women friends, and women’s centres. The complexity of family emerged, through the findings, as a site of coexisting contradictions; as both places of safety and danger. Family was described as problematic by South Asian Muslim women community leaders, who described family as perpetuating gender inequality (as in other ethnic and faith communities), forms of cultural constraint, and inflicting domestic violence (again as in other ethnic and faith communities) against women. Chapter Six articulates that women clearly stated the importance of family to their wellbeing, and also Muslim women friends. Women in this study, had contact with women of other ethnic and faith orientations, but these relations were different, to the close friendship bonds they enjoyed with other South Asian Muslim women. This reflects the findings of work by Dwyer (2010) in which South Asian Muslim women’s friendship networks are central to their sense of wellbeing. The findings of this thesis indicate that South Asian Muslim women generated bonding social capital in these close networks.

Additionally, in undertaking this investigation, it became clear that particularly vulnerable South Asian Muslim women, like members of other vulnerable groups, require high levels of bonding social capital before they are able to engage in bridging social capital, or are able to link to other networks. This finding suggests that more work is required to investigate if this is the case (see Chapter Two, 2.2.2).

Chapter Six identifies that, in relation to neighbourhood, two effects were identified; firstly, that South Asian Muslim women benefited, from shared ethnic and faith identity, in the neighbourhood. Neighbourhood protected South Asian Muslim women from Islamophobic assault and hatred; they described feeling relaxed in their neighbourhood, and comfortable, in their choice of dress.
Secondly, that neighbourhood, failed to offer South Asian Muslim women access to all resources, and denied them access to potential networks of support.

In terms of the wider neighbourhood, South Asian Muslim women felt exposed, vulnerable, unsafe and uncomfortable, when they moved beyond the boundary of the home neighbourhood. Another perspective of neighbourhood was provided in the life story of one participant, who had grown up in an apparently cohesive multi-ethnic neighbourhood in Birmingham, and moved to the study neighbourhood as an adult. The experience of this participant, and her family, who continued to have good relations with white neighbours after 9/11 and 7/7, suggests positive effects in relation to levels of fear of Islamophobic assault. Good relations with white neighbours, appear to have, protected this participant from the fear of Islamophobia. This participant expressed less fear, and anxiety, as a hijab wearing Muslim woman, than women who had grown up in, or lived for many years in, the mono-ethnic study neighbourhood. As a single case, and without further investigation, it is not possible to state definitively that there is a causal relationship. However, the stark contrast suggests the need for further investigation. It is clear, from these data, that family, friends and neighbourhood appear to have had positive effects on women’s sense of wellbeing. However, the investigation found that, in terms of the generation of social capital, women’s centres played a central role. Women’s centres engendered human capital (skills and confidence), bonding capital (trust and reciprocity), bridging capital (linking to other networks and new opportunities) and linking capital (access to the local state and institutional resources). Women’s centres also provided spaces, conversations, dialogue and discourse that can be viewed as ‘dissident’ (Scott, 1990), in traditional Islam and by the state. For example, the Pakistani women’s centre, ran a series of workshops on women and Islam, challenging traditional perspectives on women’s role in Islam (see Chapter Two, 2.2.3).

Perhaps, most importantly, the field investigation found that social capital, generated in social relations enabled, South Asian Muslim women, in this research, to engage in resistant behaviours. Three forms of resistance were
identified in the research. Women contested ascribed identity, they formulated counter narratives, and they created spaces in which they could generate faith capital. Viewed in the context of prolonged adversities, these are significant resistances. The first and third resistance are identified as forms of everyday resistance (Scott, 1985), as they have become etched into women’s daily routines. Counter narratives, appear to have a different and complex function; whilst women expressed a loss of faith in government, to promote the best interests of Muslims, they also displayed a degree of ambivalence and uncertainty. Uncertainty suggests that the counter-narratives, whilst challenging the dominant narrative, have not become embedded as part of women’s consciousness. It could be argued that this ambivalence is because the chains of connection between the dominant and the subordinate are never permanently secured in the struggle for hegemony (Gramsci, 2007; Hall, 1996).

Part III of this thesis is, in most part, focused on sharing the findings and analysis of the empirical investigation conducted in the study neighbourhood. The field study was centrally important to understanding the ways in which South Asian Muslim women’s resilience interrupted the ‘deafening silence’, amidst the ‘noise’, of counter terrorism (Khan 2013), and in unearthing women’s resilience as resistance to prolonged adversity. It also raised fundamental questions about accepted understandings resilience.

1.5.4 Thesis Part IV – Conclusion - extending knowledge

Part IV concludes this thesis, in Chapter Seven; it draws together the main strands of learning in relation to the aims. Chapter Seven articulates the contribution of this thesis in several ways, importantly, in evidencing clear links between the ‘War on Terror’ and South Asian Muslim women’s fear of being assaulted because of they are Muslim. Additionally, and also importantly, by noting the yawning chasm between the reality of women’s fear and the knowledge of local state institutions. This is important because it reflects, at the micro, local level, the invisibility of the ‘collateral damage’ inflicted on South
Asian Muslim women in Britain by the ‘War on Terror’; at the macro, national level it reflects through women’s invisibility in counter-terrorism policy (Scheinin, 2013). This thesis recommends an urgent review of counter-terrorism policy from the perspective of gender, to identify and address, the short falls in current counter-terrorism policy with regard to South Asian Muslim women in Britain.

In breaking the ‘deafening silence’ around South Asian Muslim women’s experience of adversity in the ‘War on Terror’, at the local level, this thesis has generated new understandings of resilience, including; the relationship between adversity and resilience, and insights into collective resilience at the neighbourhood level. Significantly, this thesis has identified gaps in the potential to stretch the concept ‘resilience’ to incorporate conditions of prolonged adversity and resistance. This thesis notes the need to develop the theory of adversity and resilience to, incorporate these extensions, without losing its meaning. In particular, under the lens of hegemony, the thesis generates a political reading of resilience placing it firmly in the field of relations of power, domination and resistance; specifically enacted in a prolonged ‘war of position’ by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Chapter Seven summaries key areas of learning that have been uncovered in this interrogation.

Firstly, Chapter Seven outlines how the interrogation of the ‘War on Terror’ through the lens ‘temporality’ and ‘hegemony’ enabled new understandings of South Asian Muslim women as gendered subalterns in the ‘War on Terror’. These lenses place the concepts of adversity and resilience within colonial relations of power; through these frames adversity and resilience take on different forms. Adversity takes on a form that incorporates prolonged or continuous conditions of harm, and resilience takes on a form that incorporates adaptation, change and transformation. These new understandings problematize adversity and resilience; they insist on the inclusion of a temporal dimension to adversity and a political dimension to resilience. This thesis is a study of resilience incorporating resistance, with the possibility, of change by South Asian Muslim Women in Britain.
Secondly, Chapter Seven outlines the new knowledge unearthed in this thesis in ‘fine tuning’ the theory of social capital and social networks. The study conducted for this thesis identified the importance, for some South Asian Muslim women in Britain, and presumably, this applies to individuals from other marginalised groups, of bonding social capital, in closely bonded networks. The significance of bonding social capital, in closely bonded networks, enabled women to develop sufficient confidence to engage with other networks with which they had weaker bonds. Using Granovetter’s (1973) ideas in, ‘the strength of weak ties,’ this thesis found that, engagement in networks with strong bonds had positive effects on South Asian Muslim women’s confidence, enabling them to move out from strongly bonded networks to other networks. The neighbourhood interrogation identified the practical application of neighbourhood effects in generating social capital\(^\text{15}\) (resilience) at a collective level.

Thirdly, Chapter Seven suggests that, some aspects of new learning unearthed in this thesis would benefit from further research. In particular, it notes the fear of South Asian Muslim women and, the spread of fear for women’s safety, amongst the communities in the study neighbourhood. This was not a focus of this study, but emerged as a recurrent theme in the field interrogation. Fear, and the spread of fear, amongst communities, has debilitating effects on those who are affected, and serious negative consequences for polices related to community cohesion. These facts make it imperative that further study is undertaken, to inform policy, to address, and to minimise, fear. Relatedly, further academic rigor is required in testing the capacity of the concepts adversity and resilience to incorporate exposure to prolonged adversity, adaptation, change, and transformation. The imperative is that, a political dynamic, in the form of resistance in resilience, is important to extending resilience theory.

Fourthly, Chapter Seven outlines the contribution of this thesis to national and local policy. The thesis brings women’s experience into counter-terrorism; highlighting the effects of the collateral damage inflicted on South Asian Muslim
women in Britain. The findings, in this thesis, reflect, at the local level, what experts have indicated at the national level; evidence of the gendered violation of human rights in counter-terrorism policy. This is apparent in the denial by government, and consequently, in government’s failure to intervene to address the conditions that generate fear and assault of South Asian Muslim women in Britain (see Scheinin, 2013). At the local level, this thesis questions the dislocation of the local state from South Asian Muslim women. This thesis insists that greater, and closer, contact between local state institutions and South Asian Muslim women are urgently required. Additionally, when the local state was aware of South Asian Muslim women’s exclusion from local resources, such as community centres, no action was taken to rectify this. This failure of local state institutions, to intervene on behalf of women, further signals the dislocation, of the state from its citizens.

This thesis also found that whilst South Asian Muslim women in Britain are subject to high levels of victimization on the grounds of gender, race and faith the women involved in the study neighbourhood had not taken on the cloak of ‘victim’, instead they proudly and courageously created identities of resistance in their networks of trust.
Chapter Two: 
The problem of resilience

2.1 Introduction

Most fundamentally, the concept [resilience] describes the capacity of an individual, community or ecosystem to survive an external shock or disturbance by maintaining its fundamental characteristics through a process of change and transformation (Hardy, 2015: 82)

This chapter interrogates resilience through the frames of temporality and hegemony. These frames expose a number of interrelated tensions inherent in resilience as survival/coping with adversity or resilience as transformation/adapting in conditions of adversity. This chapter does two important things; firstly, it charts the genealogy, of the concept; and secondly, it interrogates resilience under different lenses. This examination problematizes accepted definitions of the concept. Hardy’s (2015) definition indicates the requirement of resilience, for the individual, group or system, to retain fundamental pre-trauma characteristics, post, or through, the condition of adversity/external shock. In this definition, the individual, group or system, does not change beyond recognition, as a result of adversity. Hardy’s definition unhelpful, because, it confuses single shock (associated with the theory of ‘bounce back’ resilience), with processes of transformation and change, that suggest prolonged trauma or shock. Furthermore, Hardy’s definition assumes that trauma or disturbance is caused by factors external to the system; it fails to incorporate the complexity of internal unequal group dynamics. The point is, the notion of disturbance within disturbance has to be acknowledged.

This thesis argues that, the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain is conditioned by temporality, in an ongoing struggle to resist hegemony. The struggle is to retain ideology and identity. In this frame, accepted notions of resilience are challenged; adversity is prolonged and there is no pre-trauma state of equilibrium for women to bounce back to. A further problem lies in scaling up resilience from the individual to the group or community. Under the lens of hegemony, the struggle to resist domination by a class or group could be
framed as collective resilience as resistance. Firstly, this is central to the argument that South Asian Muslim women’s resistance is understood as group behaviour as opposed to individual unconnected acts of survival; and secondly, it positions resilience in the frame of power, contestation and change.

These are important markers for this investigation into resilience and adversity; Firstly, in the objective, to explore the claim that, South Asian Muslim women in Britain experience prolonged adversity as the ‘collateral damage’ (Lambert, 2011) of the ‘War on Terror’. Secondly, in the objective, to explore the claim that, under the lens of hegemony, resilience is enacted as/in a prolonged ‘war of positions’ by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Central to these objectives are the conceptual lenses of temporality and hegemony.

New readings of resilience are important in the current political and social climate in which resilience ‘is fast becoming the favoured solution for a range of contemporary policy problems including natural disasters, mental health issues and terrorism’ (Hardy, 2015: 77). In contemporary political contexts, resilience is viewed as largely positive; implying an inherent good. This is evident in its use for understanding the effects of adversity, such as crime, on marginalised groups (Hardy, 2015; Walklate, 2011). Other perspectives suggest that, the contemporary political use of resilience, has the potential to inculcate government control, through self-regulation (Ball, 2011: 108). This reading of resilience has overtures of hegemony, in which a subordinate citizenry is influenced, or coerced, to accept the wishes of the dominant group. From this perspective, resilience is used, by government, to place increasing responsibility on communities, to manage risk, whilst at the same time, shrinking its responsibility to protect populations (Bracke, 2016; Bottrell, 2009; Hardy, 2015; Spalek, 2009; 2013 Ungar, 2005). These perspectives offer vastly different ways of understanding resilience; on the one hand the concept suggests that resilience processes are empowering, and on the other, its use suggests regulation and control. These contrasting approaches to resilience make it, particularly, important to trace the evolution of resilience as regulation and resilience as empowerment.
2.2 Developments in resilience thinking

Tracing the genealogy of the concept, resilience, in relation to transformation, opens up a range of tensions that question established ways of theorising resilience. (Hardy, 2015) For example, how does established resilience theory incorporate and explain, how and why, transformation is both a process and outcome in resilience as resistance for South Asian Muslim women in Britain who live in adverse conditions? The point is that any theory of resilience must be able to be applied to, and resonate with, the lived experiences and contexts it seeks to explain; it has to be fit for purpose. Herein lies the important intervention of this thesis; it proposes a radical political re-framing of accepted notions of resilience, a necessary reframing that emerges from the lived experiences of South Asian Muslim women in Britain in the ‘War on Terror’.

This tracing of the genealogy of resilience challenges other, taken for granted foundational building blocks and established theories of resilience; in doing so important complexities in resilience are revealed. For example, scrutiny of the issue of time in the concept ‘resilience’ throws up particular challenges, which are important for, the ‘fit for purpose’ question, in the application of resilience theory to lived experience. The lens of temporality enables understanding of the mutually constitutive relationship, of the past and present; it offers markers that point to ways of thinking about how resilience needs to be re-framed. The point of starting with the genealogy of resilience is to use the foundations laid by existing knowledge to formulate new approaches. Temporality itself is an important tool in this thesis; it is used in the parallel process of grounding resilience in regard to transformation, and, in grounding South Asian Muslim/British relations in a history of prolonged ‘war of position’ struggle evidenced in the following chapter.

2.2.1 The genealogy of resilience: from static structures to dynamic systems

Resilience as a concept is derived from the Latin ‘resilire’ (to recoil or leap back). In the natural sciences, for example in engineering, resilience is conceptualised
as, the capacity of material under stress, to bend and bounce back quickly to its former state (equilibrium or homeostasis), rather than break (Holling, 1973; Masten, 2006). At its simplest ‘bounce back’ is a straightforward equation; material + stress = quickly regained equilibrium. This definition of the resilience of materials, such as metal or concrete, is instrumental in the construction of buildings or bridges, to ensure that they withstand adverse conditions, such as natural disasters, and return quickly to their former shape. However, this thesis questions the appropriateness of the ‘bounce back’ equation in resilience, when applied to contexts such as the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain as a social group.

Despite developments in the theory of resilience, from its early definition and wide usage, the idea of resilience as bounce back has retained its potency. It appears that resilience is usually considered in terms of bounce back regardless of what, or to whom, the concept is applied (Van Breda, 2001; Martin-Breen, 2011; Holling, 1973; Norris, 2007; Henley, 2010; Maclean, 2004; Masten, 2006). Norris et al., (2007) challenged the use of resilience in the human condition, describing resilience as a metaphor, suggesting that it may have been useful for, the social and psychological sciences, to create a different language altogether; one free from the inherent (bounce back) qualities associated with classical interpretations. Despite this challenge resilience has retained, and increased its currency, if not its clarity, in contemporary society (Bracke, 2016; Hardy, 2015; Neocleous, 2013).

The evolution of the theory of resilience is relatively new; starting with the expansion of its use in ecological science and child development studies, in the early 1970s. A paper published by Holling titled ‘Resilience & Stability of Ecological Systems’ (1973), problematized the notion of bounce back, by arguing that, if ecosystems are dynamic, and in constant flux, there is no state of homeostasis for eco systems to return to. Additionally, Holling identified the interconnected and symbiotic nature of organisms within systems. From this perspective, it is the quality of the relationships between the organisms in the system that determines the capacity, of the system as a whole, to adapt to conditions of disruption, or, to fail to adapt. This is known as the ‘whole system’
approach to resilience; all aspects life within the system has a dynamic and symbiotic relationship with other aspects; they survive or fail to survive together. This is an important development on many levels, and is absolutely crucial to analyses of hegemony, in relations between South Asian Muslim women in Britain, living with adversity in the ‘War on Terror’. An important intervention of this thesis lies in transposing a ‘whole eco system’ approach onto social networks; revealing both the potential and underdevelopment or gaps in knowledge of this transposition. This intervention highlights the interconnections and fissures in human societies, from the individual, the group, society, government and international actors; on multiple, intersecting micro/macro, local/global, spatial and temporal dimensions. From this perspective, for any group, including South Asian Muslim women in Britain, the strength of their relationships, to other elements within the system, such as family, community, society and government are pivotal.

Whole system thinking has influenced the application of resilience theory in relation to children who live with adversity. Whole system resilience thinking shifted the resilience paradigm, from the idea of resilience as an inherent quality in a material, or an individual, to a wider frame of interdependence and mutual responsibility. Holling’s work went further, in separating whole system resilience from bounce back resilience, by coining the term ‘engineering resilience’ to describe the quality of resilience in inanimate material. The development of whole system thinking shifted the gaze outward, from the individual, to the quality of relationships between individuals in the system, and the interdependence of individuals with others. Significantly, it enables consideration of the complexity of internal and external dynamics to include processes at all levels in the societal system; political, ideological, social and economic. This new resilience paradigm had a profound effect on studies of resilience in some children who, until this point, had been viewed as special because of their, apparent, innate quality of resilience. Whole system approaches transformed the study of child development and exposed ‘bounce back’ theory as over simplistic.
Whole system resilience thinking led to the articulation of ‘risks’ to positive child development, and ways of ‘protecting’ children from not adopting socially sanctioned norms and values. The transposition of whole system resilience approaches to human social system points to the necessity of incorporating and attending to political dimensions in the thinking and application of whole system resilience (Mackinnon, 2013). Under the lens of hegemony, the political dimension requires thinking about how resilience functions as a tool of regulation by governments. Whilst some forms of regulation, may be desirable, or beneficial, for coherence and forms of social order, the question of unequal power differentials, and the capacity of individuals in the social system to retain distinct cultural values, expose questions about the issue of equilibrium, within social systems. In this thesis, these questions are central to the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain. The important point is that, in this frame, adversity, conflict and disruption is caused by factors internal to the system. In turn, this raises further questions about cohesion within society (the human system), and the quality of symbiotic relationships in the system; for example between, government, Muslim communities and South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Under the lens of hegemony, the apparently straight forward transition of whole system approaches to social groups changes the pattern, or shape, of resilience entirely. Under the lens of hegemony, there is nothing neutral about resilience; interrogating resilience through hegemony brings in the dynamic of relations of power, domination, regulation and control.

Resilience as a tool, for the management of behaviours and social regulation, is evident in the emergence of its application in child development, as a response to social disruption and disorder in America in the 1970s. In the 1970s and 80s benign discourses of care for children’s mental and physical health ran concurrent with discourses of a decline in social order (Dryfoos, 1990; Hamburg, 1992; Huston, 1991; Lerner, 1995; Masten, 1992, 2001). It is perhaps, no coincidence that, in the conditions of rapidly growing economic and social inequality the distinction between support and regulation were blurred. This raises questions about the nature of disturbance with implications for how disturbance managed; is disturbance caused by reactions to conditions of inequality within the system (by those who resist) or by inequality within the
system? Where, when, how and why does resilience become a tool for reinstating a dominant ideology? These questions point to slippage between resilience as interdependence with the potential for empowerment and resilience as interdependence for regulation. Under the lens of hegemony, this slippage is an inevitable aspect of the ‘war of positions’ in which there is no clear separation or distinction between the dynamics of domination/subjugation, consent/coercion resistance/conformity; they co-exist and are co-produced in the slippage. In this framing, the slippage, between the function of resilience as regulation, and the function of resilience as resistance to regulation, could be thought of as a space of hybridity; a space for the potential of transformation. The issue of slippage in relation to resilience theory is underdeveloped, warranting further research and scholarship.

The question of resilience, as a tool for social regulation (the system protecting itself), or as a way of understanding protection and risk to children (the system seeking to protect children from harm by others within the system), was not a particular consideration of child development professionals in the 1970s and 1980s. At this time, child development professions increased the range and scope of studies to understand the resilience ‘competencies’ in children (Luthar, 2000). Studies began to identify contextual factors such as family, environmental and social structures, alongside internal qualities, such as inherent genetic and personality qualities, that were seen to contribute to resilience and positive development, in children (Masten, 2001; 2007; Luthar, 2003; Cicchetti, 2011). These studies posed challenged bounce back theories of resilience. Masten, noted that there was no special magic possessed by children who display the capacity for resilience; that there are a series of factors protect children from adversity, or that, place them at risk of failing to adapt (Masten, 2001; Neenan, 2009; Cicchetti; 2011). Masten (2001) writes that:

> Resilience appears to be a common phenomenon that results in most cases from the operation of basic human adaptation if those systems [that enable resilience] are protected and in good working order (p. 227) (emphasis added).

This is important for understanding the trajectory of resilience, as the studies clearly identified the interdependence of the parts that make up whole systems,
in the immediate and proximate life of a child, as important to positive child development. Masten referred to wider influences in the system, such as material resources, shifting the focus from the individual, to a wider system-based, approach. From this perspective, the difficulty for resilience scholars lay in their attempts to establish equilibrium for children in a system that might be the cause of the disruption. In the context of the whole system, that South Asian Muslim women in Britain in the ‘War on Terror’, find themselves in, the question is, how can the macro systems (local and national government) that are generating adversity (i.e. the collateral damage counter-terrorism policies and discourses) be the same macro systems that protect South Asian Muslim women in Britain from this adversity? Furthermore, in this frame, the ‘good working order’ of local, national and international macro systems would require the realization of liberal democratic values of equal rights to material resources and cultural freedoms (Brown, 2015; Neoclaus, 2013).

2.2.2 The problem of risk and protective factors

Risk and protective factors assume that parts of the social system are in need of support, or control, depending on the perspective from which they are viewed. In the support and protective (empowering) frame, the assumption is that, the life chances of children who fail to achieve healthy adaptation are poor; typically, these children are said to experience problems through the life course, such as mental health distress, criminality, anti-social behaviour, drug and substance abuse, suicidal behaviours, and underachievement in education (Fergusson, 2003). Paternalistic discourses of empowerment function to maintain the social norms of the system; where failure to achieve the societal normative standards is constituted as disruptive to social order, the cause of adversity in the social system and in need of regulation. The work of social scientists, such as Botterell (2009) and Ungar (2005), critically examine the constructions of risky relationships and behaviours, amongst young people represented as disruptive and anti-social. Botterell (2009) and Ungar (2005) offer alternative constructions of these same, so called ‘risky’ relationships and behaviours amongst young people, as demonstrating resilience as resistance to identities ascribed to them which they find intolerable. In this frame risk becomes resilience; where ascribed...
‘intolerable’ identity constructions generate ‘resistant identities’ Botterell (2009), or, the transformation of ‘intolerable’ identities to ‘resistant identities’ (Ibid: 329). Thus, the creation of ‘resistant identities’ is contingent upon the construction of ‘intolerable’ identities. Under the lens of hegemony, this complex relationship between ‘intolerable’ and ‘resistant’ identities, points to Gramsci’s suggestion that total transformation in is not possible; in some shape or form, the discourses, ideology and constructions of the dominant remain embedded (Gramsci, 1971; Hall, 1996).

These are crucial points for this thesis because; firstly, it questions the standpoint, within parts of the system that create and impose the label of acceptable or unacceptable behaviour, belief or ideology. From this perspective, the demonstrations of resilience, by South Asian Muslim women in Britain; that is their embrace of Islam, is constructed as unacceptable, disruptive and in need of regulation. South Asian Muslim women in Britain are punished for not conforming to the dominant view of their ascribed position. Secondly, in the frame of, resilience as resistance, by South Asian Muslim women in Britain, to identities ascribed to them which they find intolerable; South Asian Muslim women in Britain generate identities of resistance, clearly evidenced in the field study of this thesis. Thus, it could be argued that, the emergence of ‘resistant identities’, for example in wearing the hijab is a manifestation of resistance in hegemony in terms of hybridity; a symbolic representation of refusal and acceptance of dominant ideology on simultaneous multiple levels. Thirdly, the equation of; risk as resilience – resilience as resistance – resistance as risk, raises fundamental questions about the construction of resistance risk as a negative and the possibilities of the construction of resistance as risk for positive adaptation.

In theories of child development, protection is overwhelmingly identified as the foundations of resilient emotional well-being, including self-esteem, provided by secure attachments. The secure attachment characteristics of flexibility, creativity, frustration management, tolerance, emotional regulation and positive affect (Garmezy, 1985); can be translated to the conditions for resilient neighbourhoods. The work of Forrest et al., (2001) raises important questions
about how neighbourhoods might be transformed into nurturing spaces. The field study, conducted for this thesis, identified positive and negative effects in family and neighbourhood, which affirm the work of Forrest et al.; additionally, the field study raised important questions, related to South Asian Muslim women’s access to social resources and social capital. These important points, concerning the scaling up of resilience from the individual to the group, pick up the question of resilience as empowerment (through equal access to resources) or resilience as regulation (through denial of access). Furthermore, in whole systems approaches, the scaling up of characteristics such as secure attachment, to the conditions required for resilient, nurturing neighbourhood spaces, is a reminder that the factors of adversity and resilience are simultaneously internal and external to the system; South Asian Muslim women’s lived environment.

By the late 1990s and early 2000’s, the resilience paradigm was extended in its application to cohesion, and neighbourhood resilience (Forrest, 2001; Sampson, 1999; O’Sullivan, 2012). The concept was extended beyond the notion of the cohesive family, in the private sphere, to widening social and economic contexts, bringing into focus the interdependency of individual, community and society, in resilience building (O’Sullivan, 2012). Theoretically, from this perspective, community, neighbourhood, city, and nation are interconnected in a whole system. However, the concept appears to have remained neutral in respect of a political or power dimension. The field study in this thesis, with South Asian Muslim women in Britain, begins to address this gap in knowledge.

Adversities through the life course, and social and economic disadvantages, are seen to hold the greatest risks to resilience in children (Garmezy, 1985; Rutter, 1985). There are two important points to be made here; firstly, that continuity of risk evokes the idea of extended periods of exposure to harm, and this is a difficult concept, for bounce back resilience, to hold. Yet, little work has been undertaken on resilience in conditions of prolonged harm (Hardy 2015). Secondly, that if this rule is applied to South Asian Muslim women, in struggle to resist hegemony, both temporality and multiple disadvantage (see Appendix 3) are stacked against their chances of survival/resilience.
Earvolino-Ramirez’s (2007) examination of studies of resilience, indicate a lack of gender and race perspectives in existing resilience scholarship. Earvolino-Ramirez compiled a table, defining twenty-eight protective factors that have been studies (to varying degrees), by resilience scholars. Earvolino-Ramirez was not looking for gender and race specific or related studies; however, there is little evidence that, the important studies analysed addressed gender or ethnicity. Thus, whilst resilience scholars were focused on extending the reach of resilience, beyond inherent individual characteristics, to include social and economic dimensions, they appear not be ready, at this time, to include these dimensions of social power. Tracing the development of the concept of resilience uncovers, the invisibility of ethnicity and gender, thereby universalising the function and production of protective and risk factors. Feminist and anti-imperialist theoretical lenses on resilience as resistance by South Asian Muslim women in Britain clearly demonstrates that their lived experiences of the intersections of sexism and racism within the hegemony of patriarchy are factors that cannot be ignored. This points to need for resilience to be fit for purpose.

2.3 Social structure, place and governance

Hall (2010) notes that:

[p]eople need the structure of a coherent organized physical environment that affords them basic goods. They want to live within communities that support their needs for social connection and psychological growth. Resilient community structures build on peoples’ hopes, as well as provide a means of circling the wagons to provide a “defensible space”’ (p. 352).

The quote from Hall, is reminiscent of Masten’s (2001) writing notes the necessity to, ‘protect and keep[ing] in good working order’ (2001: 227), the systems that support resilience. Hall extends Masten’s idea of a coherent and cohesive family structure, to a coherent organised physical environment. Hall implies, that coherent community structures support the ‘needs and social connections and psychological growth’ (Hall, 2010: 352) (read resilience) of individuals and groups in neighbourhoods. Here, cohesion is relational; described as social connection and psychological growth. However, the inherent
tension is formulated in the question: cohesive from whose standpoint? Or, to pick up on the work of Ungar (2005) and Bottrell (2009), the questions are: when does, resistance as resilience for one group, become an adversity for another? What is the relationship between, ‘intolerable’ and ‘resistant’ identities, and enforced dominant norms? These questions require resilience to be scrutinized under the lens of power.

In order to fine grain our understanding of resilience, it is helpful to amplify the theoretical lens of social networks and social capital, as mechanisms in neighbourhoods that have important implications for resilience.

**2.3.1 Social interaction**

In this section, the thesis takes a closer look at studies of the formation of relationships; to better understand how social networks perform the functions of support and psychological growth, described by Hall (2010). An important development, in social network analysis, involved the publication of the paper titled, ‘[The strength of weak ties]’ by Granovetter (1973). Granovetter defines interpersonal ties as: ‘the combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and [the] reciprocal services’ shared by individuals’ (1973: 1361). This description of interpersonal ties as: time, emotional intensity and intimacy in relationships, between individuals, can also be viewed as support, for the psychological growth and resilience of, community members. Inter-personal relations and networks of relations, generate trust, establish expectations, and create and enforce norms (Ibid.). This is important for understanding how values are enforced, and reinforced, in community. Granovetter concludes that, weak ties are indispensable to the opportunities accessed by individuals, as well as to their integration into society, and conversely, that strong ties, within groups, can lead to social fragmentation and isolation (p. 1378). This may be true in relation to resource opportunity, but may not be the case in terms of psychological support. Close family and kinship ties, mutual aid and voluntarism are often strong features of the relationships of economically poor people, in poor neighbourhoods. These characteristics might be viewed as, offering psychological support, enabling people to cope with
poverty. They may produce considerable social capital, but members of these networks seldom realise the assets and resources that enable improved lives economically, and movement out of poverty. Put another way, coping with social problems is not the same thing as overcoming them (Forrest, 2001: 2141; Woolcock, 2001). In this frame, social capital generated in close relationship ties, are essential to the survival/resilience of members of the community.

Granovetter’s (1973) thesis contends that, network structures of strong ties, are likely to lead to inward looking isolationism, which is negative for members of the network and for wider society, in terms of social cohesion. Coleman’s thesis (1988) demonstrates something different; that strong ties, in closed network structures, are likely to develop strong social norms (that might be either positive or negative for wider social order). For Coleman, strong ties are essential for the development of social norms and behaviours. Coleman suggests that, all social relations and structures facilitate some form of social benefit, and that some social structures are particularly important for imposing ‘external effects’ (1988: 105); norms. Coleman uses the term ‘closure’ to describe the social structure necessary for norms to come into existence. He used diagrams to depict open network structures and network structures with closure. These are replicated in Figures 2.1a and Figure 2.1b on the following page.

**Figure 2.1a Network without closure**

![Network without closure diagram](Coleman. 1988:106)

Coleman contends that networks with open structures (figure 2.1a) are able to exert controls on either figures B or figure C or both, since they have a direct relationship but A cannot carry out this duty in relation to figures D or E where there is no direct relationship and vice versa.
In structures with closure (figure 2.1b), B and C can combine to provide collective sanction in relation to figure A, and indeed in any combination, demonstrating that the closed structure (with strong ties) is the most effective in developing collective agency and facilitating trust and social norms.

For Coleman, the point is that relationships are central to determining and retaining social norms and social controls. Coleman acknowledges that in situations of intergenerational relations there are likely to be other influences, on children, than family alone (Sampson, 1999), such as school. Coleman’s work on social relations is raised here as, it provides one way of understanding how social order is conceived, and its function maintained, through social relations. In this frame, state coercion is unnecessary, as cultural norms are upheld by, and within, family groups, demonstrating the importance of interpersonal relations, in upholding, accepted notions, of cohesion and social order. A challenge to Coleman’s notion of closed structure (Figure 2.1b) was realised, in the field study, conducted for this thesis. In the field investigation, there were no totally sealed units of relations apparent; they were close family structures. However, these structures were influenced by, South Asian Muslim women’s membership of other social networks beyond the family, as in Coleman’s intergenerational model (see Figure 6.1). Additionally, the field investigation found that norms, within close family networks, were themselves, challenged by South Asian Muslim women, leading this thesis to note that, a more nuance understanding of the complexity of interrelationships, needs to be considered than suggested in Figure 2.1b.
This is important for two reasons: firstly, because this thesis places central importance on relationships; and secondly, because in whole system resilience, the insulation of Coleman’s (1988) closed family network (Figure 2.1b) is intrinsically linked, by social values, to the macro social structure. There appears to be a contradiction, the idea of a tightly closed unit being also inherently linked to social values is only possible if the unit is imbued with the dominant ideology/value or hegemony. Under the lens of hegemony, the (family) unit is not only a construction of hegemony, but also, has either been hegemonized into the values of society, or is engaged in anti-hegemonic resistance. Either way Gramsci’s notion of consent and coercion (Gramsci, 2007) is present.

Social network theory is important to the investigation of the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, because it provides a basis for understanding the generation and maintenance of social relations, norms and power. Coleman (1988; 1990) referred to ‘social good’ as the social capital outcome of social networks. In this frame, Coleman suggests that, the continuity of community structure is key to the emergence of social capital (Ibid.), leading to the questions of: what is social capital? What is the function of social capital? How is social capital related/ relevant to the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain?

### 2.3.2 Social capital

The terms generally used to describe social good derived in relational associations are; ‘social assets’ and ‘social capital’ (Field, 2008; Fukuyama, 1998; Putnam, 2001; Woolcock, 1998; 2001). Social capital refers to the non-tangible benefits that are generated in connections between people; when they come together in common purpose. The result is that, they achieve outcomes that are good for themselves (confidence, self-esteem and agency) and also have wider benefits for society (for example crime reduction through neighbourhood watch schemes) (Field, 2008; Fukuyama, 1999). According to Crawford:

social capital lies between individuals and organisations in relationships. It is not reducible to individual possession. This relational quality of social
capital means that it is believed to operate as a form of social glue that fosters integration, cohesion and order (2006: 959).

If social capital is a form of social glue, its outcomes include, hard to measure social good, such as ‘integration, cohesion and order’ (Crawford, 2006) and resilience. Social capital can, therefore, be viewed as a tool to measure the value derived from individuals working together. However, measuring the economic and social value of social contracts, integration, cohesion and social order has proved difficult (Field, 2008). The concept of social capital builds on Hall’s (2010) notion of resilient communities, requiring networks of support for their members to grow psychologically. These are networks of trust, in which the social capital generated serves to motivate members to act together. Social capital is produced, for example, when network members support each other to cope with crisis and shock (Woolcock, 2001). From this perspective, group/community resilience is a social capital, accrued through cooperation by individuals, in groups, to overcome stress and hardship.

Two forms of social capital have been identified; bonding and bridging social capital, along the lines of Granovetter (1973), and Coleman’s (1988) conception of bonds within, and between, social and other networks. Social capital theory initially lacked an analysis of the importance of social structure, power and authority. This deficit was addressed by Woolcock (1998), in the incorporation of a vertical dimension to social capital. ‘Linking’ social capital (p. 186) adds a third dimension to the two horizontal forms of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital. It enables the concept to explicitly incorporate the notion of power and links to institutions with power.

Linking social capital offers the potential for civil society networks to accrue benefits through relations with political and business power. The concepts of bonding and bridging capital, draw on work to identify the importance of ties within and between networks horizontally; linking social capital, exposes the remoteness of powerless networks, from centres of power. Woolcock contends that, structural issues, such as poverty, are largely a function of exclusion (a structural issue). Therefore, the activities of the poor require to, not only to be,
related to ‘reaching in’ to each other, for psychological support, and ‘reaching out’ to bridge with other networks (for resource opportunities), but also in terms of ‘reaching up’ to link to networks with power, resources and information (Woolcock, 2001). Halpern (2002) developed the theory methodologically producing a multi-dimensional diagram to depict bonding, bridging, and linking social capital as dynamic processes that allow combinations of change. The diagram (replicated in Figure 2.2 on the following page), provides a way of understanding how social capital and resilience can be scaled up from the level of the individual to the transnational. At all spatial levels there is potential for community and/or state institutions, to work together to generate the conditions in which social capital, and social cohesion and resilience can be realised (Woolcock, 2001). This theory is important because, it offers a way to articulate whole system approaches and interconnections.

Figure 2.2. Multi-level social capital framework

(Halpern, 2002: slide 4)

Detailed investigation, of the attributes identified in the framework, expose difficulties in the implementation of this ambitious model. Taking South Asian Muslim women in Britain, as the group against which to test specific aspects
such as, the individual level bonding social capital attribute of ‘love and care’ and scaling it up to the meso level of ‘identification’ it is difficult to relate the aspiration to the reality. South Asian Muslim women, in the field study, expressed close bonds and strong links with family networks, but also expressed contestation within family; whilst this does not negate ‘love and care’, for some it questions if this is the case for all. At the meso level, women recorded feeling unsafe in their identification as Muslim, beyond the home neighbourhood level. Thus, the model fits to some extent; it enables fractures in social relations to be identified, as well as highlighting cohesion through the fragility of the lived experience. This interrogation suggests that, the lived dynamic is more complex than the model. It also raises questions, about the role of the state and civil society in generating the conditions, in which the best outcomes of social capital can be realised. These are important questions for the safety, wellbeing and resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, because the field interrogation found dislocations in the relationship of women to local and national state institutions, as well as dislocations within their own communities.

There is general agreement, among scholars (Field, 2008), that the contemporary significance of social capital derives from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam in the 1980s and 1990s. In tracing the developments of resilience, social capital theory plays an important part in the development of thinking about communities. Social capital theory identifies another step in the development of whole system resilience thinking. Social capital is central to the notion of trusting connections and interaction (network structures) between people and to the notion of a shared set of values (social norms) (Ibid.). On a general level and specifically in relation to South Asian Muslim women in Britain, question is whose social norms?

Putnam is perhaps the best known proponent of social capital theory; and arguably, the most influential in relation to government policy. Putnam’s investigation of regional government in Italy, in 1993, identified that the relative success of the northern administration was due to the reciprocal relationship between government and civil society. Here, Putnam extended the idea that
relations of trust, between civil society and state institutions, have positive effects. This is important to the situation of South Asian Muslim women Britain, and Muslim communities in Britain in general, in the context of the ‘War on Terror’; in which trust between communities and the government is seen to be in short supply (Kundnani, 2009; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2010; 2013). Putnam’s definition of social capital comprises the components of: ‘networks’, ‘norms’ and ‘trust’, has remained constant, over the decades, in which he refined the concept. However, scholars suggest that, over time Putnam’s theory has strayed from incorporating a structural component (Boggs, 2002; Schultz, 2002). Schultz writes: ‘Putnam lacks a theory of the state and the role it plays in fostering the conditions that make it possible for voluntary associations to form, exist, and interact’ (2002: 75). This point is well made and central to the analysis, in this thesis, of the resilience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain in the ‘War on Terror’. Social networks function within wider social structures and exit in conditions of economic inequality, class, caste, gender, race and faith. Therefore, it is essential that social capital/resilience theory incorporates these dynamics of structural power differences. Voluntary/civil society networks and associations, struggle within structures of exclusion and difference, to find their place between consensus and contestation, and empowerment and regulation.

Although Putnam made the case that trust is an essential aspect of collective action, he refused to accept that declining trust and social capital might be affected by the structural condition of racism (Field, 2008). Breakdown in social relations, along the lines of race, is a structural issue that has ramifications, at the micro level for social relations across ethnic communities, and for community cohesion. Scholars suggest that examples such as this highlight, Putnam’s difficulty in distinguishing between trust as a product of social capital and trust as a component of it (Woolcock, 2001). Woolcock argues that people invest in networks and social institutions that produce trust, not in trust in, and of, itself (p. 7). The important point here, is that, in the history of struggle in British/South Asian Muslim relations, trust has been eroded over prolonged struggle for ideological domination; and further eroded in the ‘War on Terror’. The implications of loss of trust for whole system resilience are grave, because it
denotes further fissures in the interdependence of all people, in the whole social system. From this perspective, and under the lens of feminist and anti-imperialist theory, it is woefully insufficient for social capital theory to refuse to accept the effects of racial division.

Fukuyama (1999) suggests that social capital cannot be understood independently of broader structural and institutional arrangements. Communities, from this perspective, can either be mistreated, or ignored, by public institutions, or enjoy complimentary relations with the state (1999), with connotations of linking social capital. Fukuyama warns that excessive state intervention ‘can lead to serious negative impacts on social capital’ (2001: 18), indicating that the generation of social assets (social capital) should be left to civil society actors with government playing an indirect facilitative role. Yet, social capital has, and continues to, influence government policy in a number of countries including Finland, Australia, Canada and Britain (Field, 2008). In the UK, New Labour argued that, ‘the creation of social capital could balance growing individualism with the need for interdependence, serving as a glue to prevent modernisation from driving societal disintegration’ (Ferragina, 2015: 2). Thus, it could be argued that, in different manifestations, the discourse of social capital is embedded the relationship between macro and micro dimensions at every level of the wider system; international, national, local, neighbourhood, civil and state. In this framing, questions about how social capital is used, in terms of risk, disruption, the positioning of responsibility become important, particularly when placed under the lens of hegemony in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. More specifically, in regards to South Asian Muslim women in Britain, the question is, how do hegemonic productions of social capital function, to place responsibility on them, to prevent ‘societal disintegration’? This thesis contents that resilience as resistance is social capital and in doing so, the work of this thesis exposes and challenges the commandeering of social capital for the use of hegemony.

Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’, is said to represent the apex in the political ascendance of social capital; with (amongst other objectives) a belief in, the value of community and cooperation between civil society and government (Giddens,
Ferragina (2015), suggests that the Conservative government’s (2010) ‘Big Society’ was a continuation of Third Way politics at a time of growing inequalities. In the context of irreconcilable tensions between growing inequality (felt sharply at the micro level), and the suggestion (from the state, on the macro level) that disadvantaged communities use social assets, such as trust, to manage risk brings to the fore the responsibility placed on communities. Changing political systems continue to use the discourse of social solidarity for different purposes; in relation to poverty it is mooted as important for societal wellbeing, and in relation to counter-terrorism to the management of risk (Spalek 2013). Woolcock (2001) notes that for the poor, and the argument applies to other marginalized groups, social networks are, one ‘asset they can potentially draw upon to help negotiate their way through an unpredictable and unforgiving world…..the very poor have “something left to lose,” namely each other’ (p. 77). Social networks, and the social capital they engender, are crucial in the survival of people in marginalized communities. From this perspective, it appears wholly inappropriate for the state to call on marginalized communities to generate social capital, to address structural issues, which lie beyond personal interdependencies and reside at macro levels of responsibility.

Forrest (2001) brings the discussion from theory to practice in suggesting that theorists observation of macro processes such as, disorder and social and economic dislocation ‘may underestimate the importance of the lived experience of the dull routine of everyday life and its role in undertaking “ongoing ‘repair’ work to normalise social relations” (Turner, 1991: 18, 21, 27). This ‘ongoing repair work’ is essential for South Asian Muslim women in Britain in their struggles in the prolonged adversity of the ‘War on Terror’. The quote from Forrest focuses attention on the importance of family, locale and community, in dealing with the effects of structural adversity. The work of this thesis demonstrates how social capital is generated in neighbourhoods; the field work with South Asian Muslim women took place in a study neighbourhood; their neighbourhood.
2.4 The problem and possibility of neighbourhood

It might first be helpful to orient the reader with a brief exploration of how neighbourhood is conceived in theory. This is important, not only, because the findings of this thesis are based on a neighbourhood study, but also, because neighbourhood, proximity and relationships, as has been pointed out throughout this chapter, are important to, and form the basis of, resilience. Scholars have found it difficult to secure a single interpretation of neighbourhood. The broad definition of neighbourhood as place (spatial), as people (relational), or both, or where social identity and life chances are shaped (Forrest, 2001; 2004; Macintyre, 2002) is adopted in this thesis. In this thesis, neighbourhood is seen to exist at different scales; the home area, the locality, and the urban district or region. The home area is the smallest unit and is typically defined as an area of walking distance from home. At this level the strongest purpose of neighbourhood relate to the psycho-social benefits for residents. This reference is a reminder of Hall’s (2010) statement; of the importance of relationships for psychological growth and resilience (see 2.2). Home neighbourhood is also the scale of geography of interest to this thesis. It is the scale at which the empirical investigation was undertaken.

In connecting social capital and disadvantage in urban neighbourhoods, Sampson (2004a) opens his paper on ‘Networks and neighbourhoods’ with wry comment on the idealised manner, in which tight-knit neighbourhoods have been depicted as safe because of their ‘rich supply of social networks’ (p. 157). Sampson suggests that this idealization bears little resemblance to reality, and fails to account for neighbourhoods, as places in which the stresses of power differentials and issues such as racial segregation, and poverty, are managed. It is within frames of inequality and survival, that the assets accrued from social capital, in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, must be considered. This perspective describes neighbourhood as a place of survival; dense social networks in this frame take on a different meaning; they represent mechanisms for getting by.
Forrest et al., (2001) suggest that, at its best, neighbourhood serves the functions of relaxation, re-creation of self and connection with others; fostering attachment and belonging, and reflects personal values. In other words, it is where identity is formed and repair work undertaken, for members to cope with the unpredictability of the wider urban environment. Place is about ‘dwelling in nearness’ to others, with face-to-face contact that can bring about reciprocal relations (Shonkoff, 2000: 328). From this perspective, relationships, rather than place, are central to ‘nearness’. Neighbourhood cannot be separated from structural issues of power, and inequality within communities, or, in wider society. The dimension of power must inform an understanding of the mechanisms of reciprocity within neighbourhoods in, for example, the equitable share of neighbourhood resources. Micro level differences, amongst individuals in communities, are important for exposing power inequality in hegemonic gender and race relations in neighbourhoods. For the South Asian Muslim women, in the investigation conducted for this thesis, the home neighbourhood (as spatial and relational) held both possibilities and problems, whilst the wider urban neighbourhood largely presented unpredictability and threat. The findings of this thesis indicate that whilst neighbourhood is, theoretically, difficult to define, the home neighbourhood remains an important site for South Asian Muslim women’s resilience building.

To better understand the ways in which neighbourhood can develop social capital, Forrest et al., identify eight domains of social capital at the neighbourhood level. The domains are summarised in Table 2.1 (on the following page). The domains are helpful in translating, the concept of social capital, to the practice of generating social capital, in neighbourhoods. It offers suggestions for government support for social capital in neighbourhoods. This thesis returns to these domains in Chapter Six, in the identification of the potential benefits of cohesive, ethnically mixed, neighbourhoods in findings from this research.
Table 2.1: Domains of social capital and neighbourhood policies to support them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Policy support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>People feel they have a voice, are listened to; and are involved</td>
<td>Provide support to community groups, giving people a role in policy processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>People take part in social and community activities; local events</td>
<td>Establishing, and/or, supporting local activities and publicising events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association &amp; common purpose</td>
<td>People co-operate with one another, have information of groups</td>
<td>Developing and supporting networks between organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting networks and Reciprocity</td>
<td>Individuals &amp; organisations co-operate to support one another for either mutual or one-sided gain; an expectation that help would be given to or received from others when needed</td>
<td>Creating, developing and/or supporting an ethos of cooperation between individuals and organisations, developing ideas of community support; good neighbour award schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective norms and values</td>
<td>That people share common values and norms of behaviour</td>
<td>Promulgating an ethos which residents recognise and accept;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>That people feel they can trust their co-residents and local organisations responsible for governing or serving their area</td>
<td>Encouraging trust in residents with one another; delivering on policy promises; bringing groups together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>That people feel safe in their neighbourhood and are not restricted in their use of public space by fear</td>
<td>Encouraging a sense of safety; involvement in local crime prevention; providing visible evidence of security measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging</td>
<td>That people feel connected to their co-residents, their home area, have a sense of belonging to the place and its people</td>
<td>Creating, developing and/or supporting a sense of belonging in residents; boosting the identity of a place via design.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Forrest and Kearns, 2001, Table 5: 2140

Interestingly, the ‘success’ of social capital in the domains table requires support from the state at arm’s length to delivery. This reflects Fukuyama’s warning of the dangers of government intervention (1999). The terms used by Forrest and Kearns, include the word ‘support’, ‘encourage’ and ‘promulgate’ as indications
that government policy has a supportive role in the generation of social capital. The table does not, and was not intended, to raise questions about how policy suggestions would come about. The table is replicated (in summarised form) as Table 2.1 on the following page.

Forrest et al., (2001), make the case that poor neighbourhoods have been viewed, by governments, as receptacles for encouraging the generation of the informal social resources, necessary for government policy, such as in the Third Way. Mutual aid, self-help and loose ties are seen to provide ‘solutions, springboards and alternatives’ (p. 2139) to social and economic isolation. These suggestions reflect the benign intentions by government mentioned earlier (see 2.2.1), but there is also the suggestion that increasing resources in disadvantaged neighbourhoods is cost effective for government. In this frame, the success of neighbourhood social capital is measured by the extent to which individuals are empowered to participate in reciprocal association (the first four domains), the development of shared norms (domain five) that have the outcome of trust (domain six), safety (domain seven) and a sense of belonging (domain eight). This thesis argues that while these are useful approaches, there is a need to address neighbourhood social capital through the lens of power and hegemony.

Halpern’s (2002) diagram (figure, 2.3) then, provides a model for, conceptualising the horizontal and vertical reach of social capital from micro communities to macro (national and transnational) phenomenon, while Forrest et al., (2001) focus on the intricacies of social capital at the neighbourhood level. The connection of social capital and resilience with social cohesion offers a reminder of the earlier work of child development scientists. This work identified that, resilience is nurtured by multiple factors and actors at different levels; parents, neighbours and neighbourhoods, community and wider society, as well as government policy. This is important learning in scaling up resilience from the individual/family level to community/neighbourhood/society level.
In summary, neighbourhood literature definitively points to the importance of neighbourhood as local, proximate spaces for relationship building and the production of social assets and social capital. It is also the case that, neighbourhoods exist in wider social and political realities of power and this cannot be ignored in examining social capital in neighbourhoods; as macro level inequalities are replicated, if differently, at this level. In tracing, the genealogy of resilience, it is possible to attach the concept to social capital, and to acknowledge the importance of home neighbourhood geographies as the places and spaces in which the work to repair adversity is undertaken; that is to build resilience. The chapter has argued that the dimension of hegemony/power is vital in the study of marginalised groups such as South Asian Muslim women in Britain; bringing in the issue of hegemony/power and resistance into the frame of resilience.

### 2.5 Resistance and resilience

Michael Foucault (1978) claimed that, ‘where there is power, there is resistance’ (pp. 95-96). The proposition is that, where power is a dominating force there is a countervailing force; resistance. In this frame, power and resistance are intrinsically linked; they are mutually constitutive and contingent. Thus, the resistance of the powerless is itself a form of power. Existing scholarship on social networks, social cohesion, and the inter-relationship of local contexts with national policy and structural issues remain largely neutral on the effects of inequality, power imbalance and processes of domination. The concept of resistance replaces neutrality with power; it indicates a process of resisting rather than absorbing adversity. Resilience, from a power neutral stand point describes processes by which objects, individuals, groups or systems cope with pressure or adversity; whilst resistance describes the refusal to absorb adversity and press back against it. Importantly, resistance is derived from resilience; it can therefore be viewed as resilience’s agentic aspect (Ungar, 2005; Rutter, 2006).
Ungar (2005) explicitly makes the case for cultural, contextual, and political sensitivity in understanding resistance and resilience. Resilient individuals, in this frame, resist cultural, contextual and political systems that have failed them. From this perspective, resilience is a prerequisite for the capacity to resist. The terms resilience and resistance are also used interchangeably. Bottrell (2009) for example suggests that resistances can be framed as resilience; in using the term ‘[r]esistance based resilience’ (p. 321), suggesting that resilience is based in resistance rather than the opposite. There is no doubt that the terms are closely connected, but they are also distinct; Rutter (2006) for example suggests that (in child development) resistance is an outcome of the presence of resilience. Rutter notes that resilience ‘implies relative resistance to environmental risk experiences’ (pp. 1, 2) indicating that resistance is an effect of the presence of resilience. Ungar (2005) and Bottrell (2009) agree that resistance is a response to the social construction of individuals and groups as unequal in society.

Resistance as a concept has wide usage; it describes actions and behaviours at individual, collective, and institutional levels and incorporates class revolution and dress code (the hijab) and hairstyle (Hollander, 2004). It is not surprising that there is little consensus amongst scholars on a definition of resistance (Hollander, 2004; Vinthagen, 2007a), other than it has entangled and intersecting relations to power. When viewed as mutually constituted; relations of power and subjugation become central to understanding group responses to inequality and injustice as adversity. In the context of power it is possible to view resistance as a response to, but also integrated with, power at macro and micro levels; the traditional view of resistance for example refers to social movements, or protest, as responses to repressive structural relations. Actions traditionally include protest marches, pickets, and the formation of organisations to rebalance power relations (Howe, 1998). However, resistance is also increasingly used to describe individual, micro level, behaviours such as resistance to acts of violence, resistance to authority, the social construction of identity or resistance to forms of ideological domination, as in this thesis.
Howe (1998), like Gramsci, identifies hegemony and resistance nested together in a complex web of intersecting relations. Power and subjugation are not static; resistance and power are dependent on the standpoint of the subject’s (changing) position, of subjugation, or domination. This reading of the relationship suggests that the stand points of domination and subjugation are dynamic; that resistance offers the potential for interchange. Struggle leads to interaction, and exchange, that can lead to the formation of hybrid positions in some contexts, as evidenced in Chapters Three and Six.

One form of resistance is challenge, to the identities constructed and ascribed in hegemony, to particular groups (which these groups find intolerable) for the purpose of domination. Here is where the work of Bottrell on intolerable and resistant identities is extremely useful (2009). Bottrell’s work, in showing how relations formed through resisting, became an important part of the resisters ability, not only to resist, but also, to cope with resistance. This has important implications for South Asian Muslim women’s resistance of the intolerable identities ascribed to them as identified in the field work for this thesis. Bottrell (2009) demonstrates that, the social capital and trust, generated within the resister group, enabled the resisters to cope with the discomfort involved in resisting. Acceptance of, and trust in, one another can be seen as comparable to the function of family. Bottrell points out, and this is important in regard to South Asian Muslim women in the study neighbourhood, that ‘resistant identities’, or alternative identities, that are more bearable were identity relations formed in the margins. In the frame of resistance, it becomes possible to view ‘patterns of deviance [as] healthy adaptations that permit them [people] to survive unhealthy circumstances’ (Ungar, 2005: 6). Resistance implies refuge from intolerable conditions; it offers respite from the intolerable, to resisters. In the frame ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott, 1985), resistant behaviours become interwoven in the daily activities of resisters. Resistance, in this frame, is made possible through the creation of spaces for in which ‘dissident sub-culture’ (Scott, 1990) is created. Discourse and annunciation are central to the acts of resistance. The notion of ‘everyday resistance’ offers useful insights into the
investigation of South Asian Muslim women’s resistance to the identities ascribed to them in the ‘War on Terror’, evidenced in Chapters Five and Six.

Resistance is inseparable from resilience even while its function is different. The important point here is that resistance is centred in power relations, and, in the social and political construction of adversity. Resistance offers a different understanding of resilience; the former offers the potential for an active and collective response, while the latter suggests individualized coping, with the support of community, in intolerable conditions (Ungar, 2005; Woolcock 2001; 2001). In this frame, resistance has agentic qualities and is collective.

Another purpose of incorporating resistance in resilience is the transformative dimension of resistance. In this frame, it is possible to raise questions about processes of adaptation through resistance. Little academic attention has been paid to the idea of adaptation in prolonged resilience (Hardy, 2015). This is interesting as ‘whole system’ approaches, and much of human resilience literature, makes some reference to adaptation. MacKinnon’s (2013), for example, in one of few studies that emphasise the importance of incorporating a political dimension in resilience research, notes that the discourse:

of resilience presents something of a paradox of change: emphasising the prevalence of turbulence and crisis, yet accepting them passively and placing the onus on communities to get on with the business of adapting. (p. 259, emphasis added).

Herein lays the core of the difference between the two forms of ‘resilience’. Coping is defined as ‘getting by’ or surviving in conditions of adversity (Woolcock, 2001), whilst the concept of adaptation (Hardy, 2015) suggests change or transformation in adverse conditions. Adaptation then, leads to the consideration that active processes are at play as with resistance; that trauma or disruption activates processes of change/adaptation. Importantly, for resilience, the ‘organism’ that is in the process of adapting, is required to retain fundamental pre-trauma/disturbance characteristics, and not transfigure into a
different entity. For example, in the work of Ungar (2005) and Bottrell (2009), the young people who found ascribed identity intolerable adapted giving rise to new ‘resilient identities’ (Bottrell, 2005: 321, 329). We do not know, in these cases, if the new resistant identities retained pre-trauma characteristics. The field interrogation, undertaken for this thesis, found that South Asian Muslim women created resistant hybrid identities, whilst retaining, and strengthening, the pre-trauma characteristic of Islamic belief. These examples clearly place adaptation, in the form of identity formation, in the frame of resilience as resistance.

2.6 Conclusion; do we better understand resilience?

This scrutiny of resilience and related concepts, under the lens of temporality and hegemony, has led to greater understandings of the concept, and also uncovered a number of challenges. Fundamentally, the chapter has identified that, resilience has been through processes of transformation that extend its use to a range of phenomena that may explain its current ubiquity. In moving from bounce back theory to whole system approaches, a number of challenges emerge. In the context of the ‘War on Terror’, there is no equilibrium for South Asian Muslim women in Britain to bounce back to. This investigation identified that it is not a simple matter of transposing the ‘whole system’ approach, wholesale form the plant, to human systems. In particular, it found weaknesses and fissures in the interrelations of parts of the human social system as problematic for its transference. In particular, the failure of established resilience and social capital theory to incorporate the dimension of political and power dynamics, in human relations, need to be addressed. In exposing the fissures, fractures and dislocations between government and South Asian Muslim women in Britain, it is possible to consider that pressure/adversity/disruption is caused within the system and not just externally to it, as in the eco system (whole system) model. This thesis argues that political and power dynamics must be incorporated in the frame of resilience, for it to be meaningful to human whole system resilience.
This investigation also found that resilience is transferable (scaled up) from the individual to groups or communities. It found, that it is possible to protect micro system disturbance, for example, by introducing government policy, addressing neighbourhood effects and building social capital. Under the lens of hegemony, the question that remains unanswered is the capacity, and intent, of the dominant group to address disruption that is the cause of domination itself.

In considering group or community resilience, the concept ‘social capital’, of which resilience is itself an outcome, is central. This led the investigation to consider how; social capital is engendered through psychological wellbeing and growth in strongly bonded relations at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods are essential for ‘repairing’ (Forrest, 2001) the damage inflicted by adversity. Nurturing and supportive relationships are facilitated by positive and nurturing neighbourhoods at the micro scale of the home neighbourhood. The work of Forrest et al., (2001) is seen as important in grounding the abstract concept of social capital in neighbourhood. However, Granovetter’s (1973) work alerts us to the potentially damaging effects of closely bonded networks in restricting resource opportunities. Thus, people in poor communities help each other to survive, but not to move out of poverty; the effect, Granovetter and Coleman (1988) inform us, is negative for wider social cohesion. This is important for understanding the intricacies of the breaks in whole system resilience. Thus strongly bonded relations have both positive and negative effects, as is evident in the work Bottrell (2009).
Chapter Three: British/South Asian Muslim relations: Hegemony, power, and resistance

3.1 Introduction

This chapter contextualizes adversity and resilience as a prolonged process. The previous chapter traced the transformation of the concept ‘resilience’; it argued, that the concept requires the incorporation of power/hegemony to be meaningful for the study of resilience by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. This chapter explains the significance of prolonged harm to adversity/resilience, and its central role in resurrecting anti-Muslim sentiments, in the present ‘War on Terror’. In tracing the struggle for ideological domination/hegemony, in British/South Asian Muslim relations, this chapter builds on the notion of prolonged harm. Importantly, historic information offered in this chapter, provides context to explain, the apparent ease with which, Islamophobia has been given licence, in the ‘War on Terror’ (Lambert, 2011).

Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony is used to expose the production, function, and maintenance of consent, by subaltern Indian groups (Gramsci, 2007; Hall, 1996) (see Chapter One, 1.4.2.). This chapter traces the historic implications of the meta-narrative; of British colonial power that caused significant harm and displacement to, micro South Asian communities, including women. This historic meta-narrative, of power and superiority, constitutively resonates in the present day rhetoric of Muslims as the ‘other’, and, ‘barbarian’ (Said, 1978; Jackson, 2005; Salter, 2002). In particular, this chapter draws on distinct historic occurrences, which exemplify heightened anxiety in the struggle for ideological supremacy, between Islam and the ‘West’. For example, in the ‘India question’ (see 3.2.1) and, in the ‘ayahs home’ in London in the late 19th century (se 3.2.2). This chapter picks up on the complex ways in which spaces for hybridity, emerge and are feared, within the search for hegemony. These spaces of hybridity represent the potential for resistance and transformation through intersecting simultaneous pluralities that challenge binary positions; for example transcultural relations/pollination.
Attention is paid, to the ‘War on Terror’ by setting the global, post – Cold War context, in Huntington’s (1993) ‘Clash of civilizations’ thesis, and, in the UK government’s counter terrorism policies, post the al Qaeda attack on mainland America, in 2001. This chapter provides a particular focus on the implications of the ‘War on Terror’ for Muslim women, including South Asian Muslim women, in Britain. It responds to the temporal aims of this thesis, by exposing the mutually constitutive, non-linear, dynamic of past and present; it locates the harm inflicted on South Asian Muslim in Britain, in the ‘War on Terror’, in the frame of hegemony. In tracing this history through hegemony, the thesis looked for studies and information on Muslim women’s experience of harm. The search was met with considerable silence, if not, a ‘deafening silence’ (Khan, 2013; Krishnamurthy, 1989). However, it has been possible to locate feminist, and other, academic writings that identify the need for studies of Muslim women’s experience in the ‘War on Terror’ (Huckerby, 2012; Ni Aolàni, 2013). It has been very difficult to find actual accounts of South Asian Muslim women’s experiences in the ‘War on Terror’\textsuperscript{16}. Through the lens of hegemony, Muslim women’s invisibility in academia, and the state, further signals their subordination as a subaltern group. As stated by Krishnamurthy (1989), in writing about women in colonial India: ‘the invisibility of women is a major point…..and some part of that invisibility cannot be remedied’ (p. ix). The tension is between having a focus on generic issues whilst foregrounding an understanding of the complex position of women.

\subsection*{3.2 Coercion and consent}

For Gramsci, hegemony is rooted in distinctions between, coercion and consent, as ‘alternative mechanism of social power. Coercion refers to the state’s capacity for violence, which it can use against those who refuse to participate in capitalist relations of production’ (Stoddart, 2007: 200, 201). Hegemony is about gaining consent without the use of force; it includes the power of dialectic

\textsuperscript{16} There is data available on the assault of visibly identifiable Muslim women from Tell MAMA, Faith Matters and police hate crime statistics; but it has been impossible to identify any qualitative studies of women’s experiences of being Muslim in Britain today.
(Gramsci, 2007: 343). In this thesis, hegemony is used to articulate the complexity, and rootedness, of power in British/South Asian Muslim relations. This section, traces the patterns of ‘coercion and consent’ (Gramsci, 2007: 12-13), in the struggle for ideological supremacy in British/South Asian Muslim relations. To do this, it draws on selective events, to demonstrate the presence of coercion, and/or, consent/hegemony, as they have been played out in British/South Asian Muslim relations (with the caveats outlined above).

Beginning, with early 17th century British settlement in India, the first part of this chapter traces the history of early contact for trade, rule by the crown, to the independence of India in 1947.

**Early contact**

Modern British history in India started, not as an imperial project by the crown to occupy land that was deemed, ‘terra nullius’ 17 (Nechtman, 2006), but for trade. The first East India Company (the Company) 18 ship docked in Surat, Gujarat in 1608 and by 1612 the Muslim Mughal Emperor had granted the Company the ‘firam’ or mandate to trade with India (Visram, 1986: 2; Nechtman, 2006). This is important, because at the time, the British were visitors in India and sought to live with the cultures of the host, rather than impose British values and ideology, as was the case in future centuries (Dalrymple, 2002; Fischer-Tiné, 2004; Visram, 2002). This is an important point, in terms of hybridity, as it signals the potential for two cultures/ideologies to live side by side. Initial contact was made in regions of India that had well established Muslim populations; the provinces of Sind (now Pakistan) and Gujarat. Image 3.1 shows key Indian provinces and the regions that became ‘British India’ as the Company, and later the crown, extended control over territory. It also shows how Islam spread from Kabul in Afghanistan over the western border of Sind.

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17 British colonisation policies and subsequent land laws were framed in the belief that land was being occupied because it was ‘terra nullius’ (land without owners) (Council for Aboriginal reconciliation, 1998).

18 The EIC was a joint-stock venture made up of a group of commercial investors.
Company officials in India, were initially encouraged to integrate and to marry ‘native women’. Financial inducements were offered in 1687, to encourage inter-racial coupling, with a fee paid, on the day a racially-mixed, ‘Eurasian’, child, was christened into the Protestant religion (Carton 2007: 146). These, apparently, contradictory approaches, could be read as the Company wanting to foster good relations to facilitate trade, whilst also wishing to preserve British tradition and belief through Christianity. Under the lens of hegemony, it is possible to read the contradiction, as an early indication of cultural coercion; as inter-racial coupling was accepted, only if the next generation retained Christian faith. This early act to preserve Britishness, can be viewed as the antecedence of the discourse of ‘Britishness,’ that is prevalent in discourses in the ‘War on Terror’. The mandate can be seen to serve the purpose of signalling separation along the lines of faith. Under the lens of hegemony, this is an act of the dominant class seeking to retain ideological control, through separation; by creating rifts between the ‘native’ and the British. Separation signalled a change from integration, to supremacy, highlighting difference, rather than cohesion. In this early act of separation, it is possible to see the construction of Muslims’ as ‘other’; a discourse that, continues today, through phobia or hatred of Muslims, and the violence that is attached to it; Islamophobia (Richardson, 1997).
To emphasise separation, along the lines of race and faith, and to extend the separation, the Company proclaimed that mixed-race children ‘would not inherit the primary social and cultural affiliations of their mothers’, thereby ensuring British paternal rights over racially-mixed children (Carton, 2007: 146, 147). Under the lens of hegemony, this action functioned to embed a particular ideology of difference, through prioritising Christianity. This was, perhaps, a response to the numbers of Company representatives (British men), who had openly accepted Indian tradition; living as ‘White Mughals’ (Dalrymple, 2002), married to, or settled with, an Indian wife or ‘bibi’ (companion). These Company representatives are said to have become so ‘Indianised’ that some converted to Islam19 (Dalrymple, 2002; Nechtman, 2006; Visram, 2002). By the mid-eighteenth century, up to ninety per cent of British men in India were married to Indian women (Blunt, 1999). India Muslim women played a large part in the lives of British men in India, in intimate relations, as their teachers of Indian culture and Islam (Dalrymple, 2002) embedding British men in Indian life. It is the dual heritage children, of the ‘White Moghuls’ who would have been subject to baptism into Christianity. From the perspective of current socio-political thinking, it is difficult to understand these acts as anything other than signalling, hegemony.

Trade involved a huge British civilian and military presence; whilst trade was the primary purpose for the British, a military presence sent clear signals of authority, strength and the potential for coercion if required. Thus, from the beginning, consent and coercion co-existed. Working-class, and better-off, Britons travelled to India, playing a critical role, through correspondence home, in bolstering the belief that India needed the presence of the British. Whilst admitting to the presence of a great Indian civilization, these correspondences suggested, this was the result of nature (the abundance of the land), rather than the agency of the people (Nechtman, 2006). These messages to the British public, portrayed Indian Muslims as lacking agency and scientific rationality; qualities that were seen as important in Enlightenment Europe (Gandhi, 1998; 1998).

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19 Hindus were less accessible to the British than Muslims, partly because of the strict Hindu caste system restricting opportunities for social interaction (Dalrymple, 2002). We can therefore assume that Islam was more generally adopted by early British officials in India.
Jackson, 2005; Nechtman, 2006). In these correspondences, we can see the beginning of a discourse of Muslims as irrational ‘others’, which laid the foundations for later portrayals of Muslims as heathens and barbarians (Salter, 2002). Here, lies the antecedence of contemporary Islamophobic discursive representations (intolerable identities) of South Asian Muslim women in Britain.

**Transformation in Indian**

By the middle of the 18th century, inter racial marriage had almost completely ended; greater distancing from Indians, and an increased emphasis on Christian values was evident. Dalrymple (2002) notes, that at this time, a ‘new breed of Evangelical Christians’ arrived in India (p. 46) openly proclaiming the supremacy of the British way of life, with a confidence in the coercive capabilities open to them20 (Dalrymple, 2002; Visram, 1986). In these developments, we can see that military might and force was ready for use.

Coercion and hegemony were enacted in numerous ways in attempts to dispossess Indian’s of traditional ways of life; economic and political systems were restructured (Sharpe, 1989). Muslim women would have been affected by these changes as land workers, wives, and mothers; in Bengal for example Muslim women traditionally worked in the fields (Krishnamurthy, 1989). These processes of change, or ‘transformation’, did not pass without struggle and contestation (Guha, 1996) by peasant farmers, as will be explored later. In these reforms we can see Gramsci’s notion of the ‘super structure’ in action. Economic, political, judicial formations/powers were used in attempts to regulate Indian social relations with the intent, according to Hall 1986, of: ‘define[ing] the horizon of possibilities’ (p. 13; Gramsci, 1971). Hall argues that in Gramsci’s conception of hegemony these regulatory forces cannot guarantee dominant outcomes become of subaltern struggle and resistance.

20 At this point Christian missionaries were still not allowed to travel to India or to set up missionary schools. However, increasing numbers of high ranking Company officials were agitating for this legislation to be changed. In the absence of missionaries these Company officials voiced supremacist Christian attitudes.
Gramsci’s dialectic of consent and coercion, by the dominant group in search of hegemony, is evident in the reorganisation of traditional, economic, and farming practices, which changed the lives of peasant farmers. Counter-hegemonic resistance was evident in Bengal; by peasant farmers dispossessed of their land rebelled. These processes indicate the growing confidence of new evangelical Company officials, to overturn traditional Indian systems with impunity, as the separation between the British in India and Indian’s increased. They mark changes in British/South Asian relations at the macro level, that transmute from working with the grain of Indian culture, to explicit cultural and racial separation, supremacy and domination (Dalrymple, 2002; Visram, 1986). At the micro level, separation was different for ‘White Moghuls’ and working class British men, who had embraced Indian culture and Islam and were embedded in racially mixed family life and relations (Dalrymple, 2002). Confirming Gramsci’s thinking about the complexity of relations of power, they retained aspects of their Britishness, for example they returned to Britain with their families, whilst retaining aspects of Indian culture. For first generation British in India, for whom inter-cultural contact was encouraged, cross-culturation was a fact of life (Ibid.). For the generations that followed, distancing and separation appears to have engendered fear of loss of culture and identity. 18th century ‘White Moghuls’, and 21st century second generation Muslim women, appear to have cross-culturation in common. This is evident in their shared experience of adopting hybrid identities. In this frame they share a refusal to accept the binary of Muslim or Western. This is important because it demonstrates the potential for creative, non-binary, ‘third space’ responses (Bhabha, 1994) in the struggle for hegemony. In this frame, hybridity is a space of resistance and transformation. In the contemporary context of UK counter-terrorism the binary position (Muslim or Western/British) is evident in the insistence (via consent and coercion) that forms of Islam change to be more acceptable to the West (see 3.4).

In order to manage, at the micro level, economic, judicial and other reforms the Company exploited religious differences amongst Hindu and Muslim India’s. Hindu landowners became rent collectors for the British in exchange for a presence in the Bengal Congress and direct lines of communication to the colonial government established by the Company. This arrangement is said to
have worked well for the British, who were seeking ‘loyal allies’ among the Indian population, whilst it also supported the aspirations of upper-caste Hindu’s to acquire power. The process of co-opting subaltern classes is highlighted by Gramsci in the role of the ‘intellectual’. The role of this group was, described by Gramsci, to carry out ‘the immediate execution of the production plan’ (Gramsci, 2007: 14). In other words, the ‘intellectual’ group worked with the dominant group, to achieve its objectives/plan. It is important to note that a smaller, Muslim landlord, elite, formed the Praja Party that was later to become the Muslim League (Chatterjee, 2012). This point is raised because it demonstrates the complex, non-linear, multiple dynamic of struggle in hegemony configured on consent and coercion. The Muslim League (on independence) agitated for the creation of Pakistan that is now implicated in the ‘War on Terror’.

Coercion incubated grievances amongst Muslim peasant farmers; grievances that were acted out in counter-hegemonic protests and uprisings (Guha, 1983; Visram, 1986). Peasant movements were crushed by the military might of the Company supported by, predominately Hindu, landowning classes (Chatterjee, 2010; Guha, 1983). Given these hardships it is not surprising that dispossessed, lower class, Indian Muslims sought any employment that was open to them including employment as lascars (for men) on board Company ships, despite appalling conditions and lower wages than for British sailors, and as ayah’s (servants) to British families (Visram, 1986). Little is written about the gender effects of these changes, but it is unimaginable that Indian women were not affected by these hardships. This, ‘deafening silence on gender issues’ (Khan, 2013) is a prolonged dynamic of hegemony; it is harm.

Counter-hegemonic revolts to the Company’s reorganisations, and cultural insensitivity, are recorded from the late 18th century. The 19th century witnessed an increase in uprisings against the exercise of British power. Guha (1983) notes that ‘the instances [of defiance] are far too numerous to cite’ (p. 2). Counter-hegemonic actions indicate that the dominant, if still a visiting group had not

21 Praja means tenant – the Praja Party was the tenant’s party
achieved hegemony, had not won the consent of, the Indian Muslim peasant classes despite two centuries of coercive presence in India.

19th century Europe saw the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars in 1803, these led to shortages of men to crew the Company’s cargo ships. These shortages crucially shifted the employment pattern of Indian merchant sea men; lascars were recruited in larger numbers than before. Growth in lascar labour did not signal an improvement in the Company’s (or indeed the British public’s) attitude of Indians’. Legislation was passed, at the end of the Napoleonic wars, to exclude Indian seamen from British citizenship, or employment, on British bound ships (Visram, 2002). Indian Muslim women were employed, in growing numbers in India, as ayahs, as larger numbers of British women travelled to India. Letters sent home by British women, provide another narrative of Indian Muslim women. Correspondences painted India servants as lazy, because they rested in the afternoon, lacking in intelligence, because they didn’t understand English, dirty and immoral (Chaudhuri, 1994: 553). These correspondences are important; they built on the 17th and 18th century depictions of Indians as lacking agency and rationality. These discursive representations of Indian Muslims and Hindu’s, including women, embedded the idea of Indian Muslim women as different, ‘other’. These discursive practices are the foundations of present day ‘phobia’ (as in Islamophobia) of Muslims. These metanarrative processes of subjectification in counter-terrorism ‘echo the imperial mind-set in the age of colonialism and taps into the narrative of the “civilising mission” towards the colonial savages’ (Jackson, 2005:49). Under the twin lenses of hegemony and temporality, the persistent ‘intolerable identities’ (Bottrell, 2001) ascribed to South Asian Muslim women in Britain, in the prolonged adversity of the ‘War on Terror’, exemplifies that ‘where discourse is mobilized to reinforce systems of social power it functions as ideology...ideology is discursive’ (Stoddart, 2007:193).

The struggle for Indian independence

Uprisings against the Company, by Indians in 1857-58, by Indian peasant classes, are the best known resistance to Company rule. The Company’s Indian
infantrymen, ‘sepoys’, rose-up in violent clashes against Company garrisons and personnel. Referred to as the ‘sepoy mutiny’, in Western discourse, the dominant narrative affirmed the view of unruly and untrustworthy natives (Abbas, 2005: 8; Chaudhuri, 2006; Tickell 2012: 6). Chaudhuri (2006) notes that, letters sent home by British women in India at this time, expressed increased hostility to Indians and further strained relationships between British women and Indian, male and female, servants (p.556). The ‘sepoy mutiny’ is important in tracing British/South Asian Muslim relations, through the lens of hegemony, because it shifted dominant representations of Indian’s as lazy, incapable or irrational, to one of people capable of organised savagery and brutality in the massacre of British women and children. For anti-imperialist scholars, the uprisings are recognised as the beginning of the Indian War of Independence (Guha, 1983; Visram, 1986; 2002). Guha (1983) notes that Western texts omitted the agency of subaltern groups: ‘protagonists in each case had tried petitions, deputations or other forms of supplication before actually declaring war on their oppressors’ (pp. 46; see also Prakash, 1994). Guha depicts the conscious agency of Indians’ in counter-hegemonic struggle to retain traditional values; a markedly different perspective to the dominant (Western) discourse. Representations of Indian’s as ‘wild’ confirmed the idea that they needed to be civilised. The trigger for the uprisings was the Company’s insistence that sepoys bite off the paper cartridges for their rifles; cartridges that had been soaked in pig or cow22 fat to lubricate them (Streets, 2001: 90). Company, still visitors in India, were familiar with Muslim and Hindu belief systems. This is evident from correspondence from British women indicated that Muslim servants refused to touch pork and serve wine (Chaudhuri, 2006: 551).

The response was the use of the military force available to the Company; the rebellion was crushed. The rebellions’ led to the transfer of power from the Company to the crown. Other changes, at this time, such as Darwinian science, affected views of Indians adding a racialized characteristic to representations of Indian’s. Chaudhuri’s study shows that letters from British women in India, at

22 Touching, or consumption of, beef is against the religious beliefs of Hindus as is the consumption of pork by Muslims
this time, demonstrate the promotion of racial hierarchy (2006). This view was made explicit in 1849, when Disraeli claimed that: ‘[r]ace implies difference and difference implies superiority, and superiority leads to predominance’ (Ibid.). Chaudhuri notes that, for the first time, in the 1860s and 70s the predominance of faith and racial supremacy led British women to portray Indian servants as sub-human: one letter, quoted by Chaudhuri, describes an ayah as: ‘very small, and very black, and she sat in her low chair, or on the ground, with her skinny arms round the fair child, she looked exactly like a monkey wrapped in white muslin’ (p. 558).

Depictions, such as the one above, indicate that racial superiority had become an acceptable part of imperial discourse, layered over, already present hegemonic discourses. Tracing the increasing dehumanisation of Indian Muslims historically is important in firmly embedding today’s Islamophobia in a history of hatred. Without this backdrop it is difficult to understand how the violence perpetrated against South Asian Muslims in Britain can be explained. In a temporal frame, the psychological build-up of hatred, exposes it as an ever present phenomenon; ready, waiting to be ignited at particular times.

The embeddedness of anti-Muslim Indian sentiment is expressed clearly in responses to the close relationship of Queen Victoria with Abdul Karim, her Indian Muslim ‘munshi’ (teacher), over a period of ten years. Victoria liked and protected Karim, at a time of an ‘acutely race- and class-conscious’ Britain (Ballard, 2002: 46). When Karim was dismissed from Victoria’s services, he was stripped of the many gifts and titles Victoria bestowed on him, and on her death Edward VII ordered all papers, paintings, letters, and communications between his mother and Karim to be burnt; a gesture aimed at obliterating all evidence of the relationship between the Queen and her Muslim teacher (Ballard, 2002; Visram, 1986). This friendship, across cultures and ideologies, and at the heart of empire, had the power to disrupt the binaries of supremacy. The potential in this friendship, of hybridity, was a risk and threat to hegemonic structures of dominance, located at the highest level of monarchy. Bhabha explains that the ‘margin of hybridity, where cultural differences “contingently” and conflictually touch, becomes the moment of panic’ (Bhabha, 1994: 207). In this frame, ‘the
moment of panic’, manifest in the eradication of evidence of hybridity between Queen Victoria and Karim, is a powerful act of invisibilization: an expression of absolute unacceptability. On a symbolic level, the act of burning all evidence of the relationship, represented the reinstatement of the power of the crown as untouched by Muslim culture. The case of Abdul Karim is a single, extreme, case that provides a counter narrative to a largely negative colonial relational dynamic. It brings to mind the ‘White Moghuls’ embrace of Indian tradition; both situations elicited responses of deep anxiety and fear that ‘the British nation itself, like the nabobs\(^{23}\), could be – and perhaps [were] being – transformed’ by India (Nechtman, 2006: 659) rather than transforming the colony. This is the nub of the ‘India question’.

3.2.1 The ‘India question’

In tracing the struggle for domination in British/South Asian Muslim relations particular times and events stand out; the period of the late 18\(^{th}\) century and 19\(^{th}\) centuries is important in this regard. As has been demonstrated, significant reforms of Indian tradition had taken place during the 18\(^{th}\) century leading to counter-hegemonic resistance by Indian subalterns. The early 19\(^{th}\) century led to further changes, these changes form the basis of the civilizing mission and the Indian question.

In 1813 legislative change opened the way for Christian missionaries, and later British women, to travel to India. The struggle for domination is crystallised, in 19\(^{th}\) century relations, in the role of missionaries to instil the civilizing influence of Christianity, by converting the ‘heathen’ Hindu and Muslim populations (Dalrymple, 2002; Fischer-Tine, 2004; Visram, 2002). British women bolstered empire, by upholding Britishness, in returning the homes of British men to British tradition and Christian morals. British women taught Indian women servants’ British household protocol and Christian morals (Blunt, 1999, see 3.3.2). Missionaries railed against Hinduism and Islam, as morally bankrupt and inferior

\(^{23}\)‘White Moghuls’ were powerful representatives of the Company who converted to Islam and adopted Indian life styles (Dalrymple, 2003). They were hated by the contemporary British public and state and pejoratively called ‘nabobs’.
to Christianity, and promulgating the supremacy of Christian morality; legitimizing political and economic reform. They accelerated hegemony through religious teaching and religious discipline. Here we can see the equivalent of Gramsci’s ‘intellectuals’ (1971: 5-23) working to uphold the dominant system. Thus far, economic, judicial and political coercion, and the use of military force, to quell uprisings had not led to British hegemony; the consent of the people. The British public and political elite were troubled about this and the influence, they believed, that India was having/might have on Britain.

The ‘India question’ flows from the idea of Britain’s mission to ‘civilise’ India; to hegemonize India. The ‘civilising mission’ and the attendant ‘India question’ clearly demonstrate the struggle to impose British culture, faith and political values on Indian Muslims and Hindu’s. The imperative to civilize; to tame, to bring rational thought to, apparently, irrational Indians, and to save the souls of the ‘natives’ are embedded in beliefs of cultural, faith and race superiority (Fischer-Tiné, 2004; Gandhi, 1998; Nechtman, 2002; Salter, 2002). In this frame, there is no space for the ‘third position’ of hybridity (Bhabha, 1994: 36-9), making the hybrid position of the ‘White Moghuls’ dangerous to the project of hegemony.

The ‘India question’ embodies exactly the struggle for cultural/ideological domination; it asks, which ideology is dominant; ‘Indianess’, or, ‘Britishness’? Which culture/ideology has influenced the other most? Early British settlers in India were encouraged to accept Indian tradition and many high ranking Company officials did this; they lived as ‘White Moghals’. Dalrymple writes that:

> a great many Europeans at this period [who] responded to India....by crossing over from one culture to the other, and whole heartedly embrac[ed] the great diversity of late Moghul India (2002: 10).

On their return to Britain, nabobs ‘made the Indian empire visible’ (Nechtman, 2006: 659) by bringing Indian fashion, food and architecture to Britain. These Company employees left Britain as Britons, and returned as something else; they represented a hybrid culture at the heart of empire. They were described as ‘a species of viceroys to the Grand Mogul, grown almost independent, in their
several provinces’ (Ibid: 646). Nabob’s generated fear, as holders of immense wealth and power that was independent of empire. Nabob’s represented a permeable boundary between British and Indian ways of life, with the potential to infuse Indian values in the British political establishment. In 1760, for example, at a time when the British viewed themselves ‘to be in possession of a superior state of body, mind and soul’ (Nechtman, 2006: 646) Robert Clive was the first nabob to use his Indian fortune to purchase a seat in British Parliament. This example, of a powerful ‘White Moghul’ returning to Britain, and engaging in British political processes, raised fears that the superiority of the British system might be undermined; that Britain might be influenced by the colony (Ibid, 647). There were many ways in which Indian language, food, and clothing were changing traditional British life; the power of the nabobs most clearly identifies the idea of hybridity as dangerous to ideological supremacy.

The fear of the hybrid positions adopted by the nabobs, exemplifies the struggle to both retain, and disavow, the binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’, for ideological hegemony. Ideology in search of hegemony is unable to accept the possibilities of hybridity; hybridity is feared because it signals that the subordinate group might influence, or change, the dominant; generating high levels of anxiety. This point is central to exposing the fear generated by ideological difference, and also the possibility of a different, pluralistic, response rather than the polarization of domination and subordination.

3.2.2 Gender and empire

This section clearly evidences the ways in which the struggle for hegemony translates and functions on the micro level, in the domestic, day to day encounters of power relations between women. In this frame, gender, race, class and caste structures of social power are ‘[a] lived hegemony…It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits’ (Williams, 1977:112, cited in Stoddart, 2007:202). On a temporal dimension, the implications of ‘gender and empire’, for ‘gender and counter-terrorism’ become clear as this chapter develops and is again specifically addressed in section 3.5. In the late nineteenth century, British
women were called on to reinstate British values in Indian colonial homes. Through imperial domesticity, British wives and mothers, helped to create homes that were ‘superior to Indian domesticity’ (Blunt, 1999: 422; Chaudhuri, 2006), in this process they returned errant British men to the British way of life. From the perspective of hegemony; power equilibrium was restored. The home was endowed with the potential to reflect the power of the empire, and British women enlisted to enforce British values. They took up the call in large numbers, and British officials were encouraged to marry them and, to distance themselves from Indians and Anglo-Indians (Ibid: 426). Studies describe ‘British homes in India as “a space of racial purity that the colonial house wife guard[ed] against contamination from the outsider”’ (Ibid: 425), painting a picture of British women living in separate enclaves. Chaudhuri (2006), confirms, that British women in India had little contact with Indians, other than those who worked in their homes as servants. British homes were both the nexus of British power and the places in which encounters between British women and Indian’s took place. They were the site of a greater level of ambivalence and transculturation than might be suggested from British women’s correspondence. ‘[F]emale imperialists’ (Gandhi, 1998: 92) enjoyed an incomparably lavish life in India (Blunt, 1999; Chaudhuri, 2006) with numerous servants.

Image 3.2 illustrates the lavish life of the memsahib and also the disruption of racial purity by the presence of Indians in the colonial home. British women symbolically and actually returned colonial homes to Britishness in style and order and in so doing British ‘memsahibs’ reproduced the moral (Christian), social, and domestic (British) values that legitimated imperial rule within and beyond the home.

Their duties were acted out primarily through their management of Indian servants, by retaining British traditions, and also by re-enforcing the racial status of Britain (Blunt, 1999: 432, 433). As already mentioned their correspondences home largely painted a picture of Indian servants as untrustworthy and lacking in intelligence. Under the lens of the struggle for hegemony, it is no coincidence that Indian women were constructed as lacking in intelligence; the reproduction of unequal social power relations means that ‘not all [women] have in society
the function of intellectuals' (Gramsci, 2007: 9). In the conceptual frame of Foucault’s ‘power/knowledge’ relation (1980) and ‘order of discourse’, the construction of Indian women as lacking in intelligence, is an aspect of regulating; what is to be known and who knows it. Thus, the correspondences sent home by British women, were instrumental in the transportation of representations of India, through their descriptions of Indian women; an example of how, ‘in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures’ (Foucault, 1981:52).

As workers in British households, carers, and in exceptional circumstances, wet nurses for British children, ayahs transgressed the rule of distancing. The presence of Indian women in British homes highlights the complex intersection of gender, race, and power in the domestic sphere. Children developed strong emotional bonds with their ayahs, who through daily contact and care transmitted Muslim and Hindu traditions and behaviours. It is not surprising that Ayahs occupied an ambivalent position with their mistresses; they were valued, and feared, as ‘domesticated outsiders’ (Ibid: 430). They were depicted as both ‘devotional and devious, trust-worthy and lascivious’ (p. 430). Ayahs became indispensable as they engaged in the most intimate contact with their imperial mistresses (Ibid.). This description of the close relationship between ayahs and their memsahibs is different to the picture painted by Chaudhuri (2006) in the
study of correspondence from British women to family back home. It is very likely that both were true. It is also particularly likely that during this time, with heightened anxiety and unrest between the crown and Indians, that these stresses would have been played out in the British home in India between British mistresses and Indian servants.

The ambivalence in the relationship between British mistresses and Indian servants is perhaps well illustrated in Indian women accompanying their British mistresses and children back to England. On these journeys ayahs took charge of the baggage, the children, and the care of memsahib’s on board ship (Ballard, 2002; Visram, 1986). Once in England, their duties were often on longer required; they were discharged, with no way to return home other than to beg or wait for a return engagement which could take days or months. The wait required former servants to take overcrowded and overcharged lodgings until they could secure their home return. Some ayah’s found shelter in the Ayah’s home in London, depicted in Image 3.3.

The ayah’s home was set up in the late 19th century by concerned Christians and later transferred to the London City Mission (as depicted in image 3.3). British families came to the ayah’s home to secure the services of nannies for their journey to India. We have no way of knowing how many stayed in the service of their mistresses, but missionaries estimated that every year between one hundred and two hundred ayahs came to London, with about one hundred being housed at the home.

The home was ‘more than just a hostel. The chief object….was to bring the ayah’s under Christian influence’ (Visram, 2002: 52). Indian women were taught hymns and taken to church and engaged in “chats on religion” that the matron though “productive” (Ibid). Visram (2002), states that it is impossible to measure the success of these processes as there is no data available. It would seem that in offering shelter to destitute ayahs, engagement with Christian ideology was the price they were asked to pay. We are left with no way to understand why the remaining destitute Indian women servants in London did not use the home, leaving us to speculate if they were resisting assimilation by rejecting the
‘civilizing’ processes engaged in the home. It is also possible that they did not know of the existence of the hostel or were prevented for other reasons from using it.

![Image 3.3. The ayah’s home](image)

**Image 3.3. The ayah’s home**
Museum of London. (c. 1901)

These depictions of British and Indian women served to bolster relations of domination and subjugation. British women came to symbolise the civilized ‘mother land’ in colonial India whilst, in the ‘mother land’, Indian women were taken under the wing of the same Christian mission that vigorously denounced their faith and cultural identity. Conversely, we remain unaware of the impact of India on British women and children who were exposed to life with Indian servants in India. These examples provide a glimpse of the complex intersections of gender, race, power, and ideology, illustrating that British women were enlisted in the struggle to return errant British men to Britishness, and to control and bring discipline, and British order, to British households in Indian. Indian women were also enmeshed, in important ways, in their care for British families and rearing of British children. These intimate connections demonstrate the possibility of transculturation, as well as power and domination in the relations between women. This struggle for ideological hegemony was taking place even as British global power was in decline from around 1875 (Cox, 1983) and, this thesis argues, is continued today in South Asian Muslim/British relations; a process of prolonged adversity in a prolonged ‘war of positions’.
3.2.3 The end of empire

In tracing the genealogy of hegemony in British/South Asian Muslim relations this far, the history has indicated the use of forms of coercion and hegemony in British rule of India. The main purpose of tracing this history is to root present day Islamophobia in the struggle by the British in the insistence on a relationship of superiority. The question this raises is, did this change with Indian independence?

The 20th century saw Britain involved in two World Wars, to which, India made massive contributions of men, money and materials. During the First World War, Indian soldiers were excluded from holding commissions as it was believed that ‘a British private soldier will never follow a half-caste or native officer’ (Visram, 2002: 172); thus, continuing the dominant narrative of British supremacy. The Second World War left Britain too weak to rebuild its domestic industry and also manage the colonies, creating an opening for the Indian political elite to agitate for independence and the Muslim league to argue for an independent state for Indian Muslims; Pakistan. Acute labour shortages, at the end of the Second World War, led to an estimated 7,000 Indian’s working and living in England by (Ballard, 2002; Visram, 2002). Working class, male, settlement patterns reflect demands for labour in the UK; sailors who had settled in port towns moved to the Midlands to work in factories and British employers’ continued to invite Muslims to fill labour shortages in the textile industries in Lancashire and Yorkshire (Ballard, 2002). Described as the ‘first wave’ of Muslim migration to the UK (Ali, 2008; Ballard, 1982; FAIR, 2002; Modood, 2005, 2006), this period also witnessed considerable turbulence in British/South Asian relations. The end of colonial rule in 1947 did not (and could not) overturn three and a half centuries of superiorist mind set, nor restructure traditional Indian economic systems (Ballard, 2002; Guha, 1983). Migration was not singularly working-class; by the 1960’s Muslim medics were responding to appeals for their services by the then health minister, Enoch Powell; with more than 18,000 medics arriving to underpin healthcare provision (Butler, 2008; Esmail, 2007). The embedded roots of race and faith superiority did not make life easy for any class of Indian or Pakistani in Britain.
Indians and Pakistanis were tolerated but not welcome, as indicated by legislation restricting primary immigration. The 1971 Immigration Act led to a large increase in Indian migration, before its enforcement in 1973, due to concerns by Indians in Britain that they would be separated from their families in South Asia, leading to family members joining fathers and male relatives (Alexander 2010: 9) here in Britain. The reunification of families led to changes in the settlement patterns of South Asian’s; from a largely male transnational population to settled family life. This period, known as the ‘second wave’ of migration, signified permanent residence. Migrants, from Pakistani Kashmir and Bangladesh, were amongst the earliest settlers; they remain largely located in inner-city areas and are amongst the most economically impoverished communities in Britain (Modood 2006; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2009). Under the lens of hegemony, the history of South Asian Muslim migration ‘corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for the development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes [dominant group]’ (Gramsci, 2007; 258). Hall (1986) elaborates on the implications of this, the repercussions of which find resonance in the struggle against adversity of South Asian Muslims in Britain in the ‘War on Terror’: ‘Gramsci foregrounds new dimensions of power and politics, new areas of antagonism and struggle – the ethical, the cultural, the moral’ (p. 18).

20th century patterns of inequality reflect earlier divisions along the lines of ethnicity, race, faith and ideology that are embedded in British superiority. A PSI investigation into ethnic minorities in Britain (Modood, 1997), for example, evidenced that communities that wear traditional clothing, speak their `mother tongue’ (the language of their country of origin), and place a high premium on religion in day to day life, experience higher levels of poverty. The investigation found that assimilation may help reduce poverty. This evidence suggests that, nativist anxieties, apparent in 19th century Britain, have become embedded; difference of way of life and belief system continues to affect acceptance by the host community. From this perspective, well established patterns of domination in British/South Asian-Muslim relations continue to effect economic opportunity. The Urban disturbances in the spring and summer of 21st century (also called
the riots of 2001), involving (mainly) South-Asian Muslim young men, have been attributed to lack of opportunity. Ballard notes that it was:

precisely those cities in the Pennine region of northern Britain where Mirpuri and Syhelti settlers have established ethic colonies in which violent clashes between the members of these communities and the police erupted during the summer of 2001 (2002: 206)

The 21st century witnessed the convergence of micro-level unrest amongst Muslims in the UK, alongside the al Qaida attacks on main land America that unleashed the macro-level response of the ‘War on Terror’. The UK government responded to the urban unrest by initiating policies related to community cohesion and the integration of Muslims into British society. The government responded to the macro-level ‘War on Terror’ by initiating counter-terrorism policies. These are important markers in the debate on hegemonic struggle at both levels (micro/macro), with implications for ethno-religious policy as Muslims were increasingly put under the spotlight evidenced in 3.3.1 in this chapter. However, before addressing the ‘War on Terror’ there is further important context to be addressed in relation to British/South Asian Muslim relations; the influence of global events and interpretations by influential scholars such as Samuel Huntington.

3.2.4 Religious implications of global change

It is important to note, that the following discussion is focused on a wide ideological backdrop, which is relevant to British/South Asian Muslim communities, but is not specifically focused on them. It is focused on the effects of changes in the global order at the end of the Cold War because of its direct effect on the ‘War on Terror’.

The end of the Cold War (from 1989 - 1991), represents a major change in the politics of the world order; liberal democracy was seen to represent what communism did not - the ideology of the ‘free world’ (Hardt, 2004: 231). The former President of America, George HW Bush, was able to categorically state that ‘the Soviet Union did not simply lose the Cold War, western democracies won it’ (Salla, 1997: 731).
In response the respected ‘intellectual’, political scientist, and US Government advisor, Samuel Huntington, published the controversial, but influential, article ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ in 1993. The article predicted that, in the absence of the Cold War, ‘a central focus of conflict for the immediate future would be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states’ (p. 48). The end of old hostilities did not reduce the idea of threat to Western ideology; communism was replaced with Islam (Salter, 2002). In terms of the role of ‘intellectuals’ in Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony, the trajectory, critiques and influence of Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis, can be seen to give ‘form and expression to the moral, philosophical, ideological and scientific values that are elaborated into a hegemonic project’ (Jones, 2006: 81; Gramsci, 2007: 5-23).

Huntington argued, that the ‘fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed’ (1993: 31); that ‘the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will be cultural…the principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations’ (1993: 22). There is no innuendo in this statement, the ‘battle’ or struggle is designated as ‘civilizational’ which can be read as based on politics, social order, religious belief, and culture; namely ‘all forms of social thinking’ (Hall, 1983: 60, Salter, 2002) or ideology.

The ideological battle, Huntington predicted, would be between Judeo/Christian nations and ‘the rest’; that the new axis, of world politics and conflict, would be based on religious and cultural difference. It is important to note, Huntington’s rhetoric is configured, and contingent upon, the logics of binary positions: in stark contrast to the logics of hybridity, simultaneous intersecting multiplicity of position and plurality; absolutely in keeping with the ideological hegemony. At the micro-level, between groups, and at the macro-level between states, civilizations compete for military and economic power, control over international institutions, and promote their political and religious values. Huntington did not advocate that conflict between civilizations was desirable; his stated aim was to inform policy in preparation for potential clashes, but his thesis had a significant effect on the, yet to be realised, ‘War on Terror’ (Slater, 2002). Huntington was

Huntington’s rationalisation is that conflict based on cultural and civilizational difference is intrinsic to humans. Locating conflict-enhancing factors in cultural identities has been criticised, by scholars, as primordial and unhelpful, in its disregard for the nature of dispute (Henderson, 2001: 320). Said (2001) argued that the ‘Clash’ thesis was reckless in promoting a populist view resonating calls of the ‘crusades, good versus evil, freedom against fear etc.’ (Ibid: 4). The argument that conflict, based on identity, is less likely to be open to compromise serves to compound the notion of Muslims as unreasonable, unlike us, and as the ‘other’ (Salter, 2002).

The idea, that post-Cold War conflict, based on civilizational difference is inevitable has been challenged by a number of scholars (Bruce, 2000; Chiozza, 2002; Henderson, 2001; Inglehart, 2003; Said, 1993; Salter, 2002). On the basis of data generated in the World Values Survey (WVS), al-Braizat (2003) suggests that, the claim that Islam is resistant to modernity does not hold up. The important point here is that Huntington, as ‘traditional intellectual’ (Gramsci, 2007: 5-10) and political advisor to the remaining global super power, promoted a thesis of the incompatibility of Islamic and Christian ideology. In articulating ideological difference as oppositional; ‘Clash’ rhetoric replaced communism with Islamic fundamentalism (Poynting, 2012: 239; Nicholls, 2009) igniting fears of a new threat to Western political belief systems. Gay (2009) for example notes that the mantra of 9/11; ‘the “war on terrorism” meant keeping terrorists from attacking democratic government and capitalist economic interests’ (p. 29). Regardless of whether or not we accept Gay’s political logic, the re-emergence of 18th century fears and anxieties (the ‘Indian question’) are again apparent in the 20th and 21st centuries.

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24 Huntington defines civilization as the ‘highest cultural grouping …. defined by common objective elements such as, language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people’ (2002: 24).
3.3 The Present

Thus far, this chapter has traced the struggle for domination through coercion and hegemony in British South Asian Muslim relations. In doing so, it has evidenced the ubiquity of British supremacy over a long history of contact, and despite considerable pressure, the retention of faith, culture and ideology by South Asian Muslims. The following sections changes from an historic, to a present-day perspective; this step change allows a detailed focus on the ‘War on Terror’ as the response by liberal democratic nations (broadly called the ‘West’) to the perceived threat of Islam (Allen, 2011, 2012, Jackson, 2005). Beginning by making the case for the ‘War on Terror’ as a further manifestation of ideology in struggle, the chapter narrows its focus to UK government policy to this perceived threat. It then further drills down to, identify the effects of counter-terrorism (‘War on Terror’), on South Asian Muslim women living in Britain, returning the focus from ideology to lived experiences in hegemony.

3.3.1 The ‘War on Terror’

The struggle for ideological hegemony is clear in the rhetoric and actions of the UK government, in support of America’s second ‘War on Terror’. Events that led to the proclamation of the so called ‘War’ in 2001 did not ‘suddenly become a crucial issue’ (Chomsky, 2012: 81). However, the ‘success’ of the 9/11/2001 attacks (9/11) are generally accepted as changing American and British (amongst other nations) response to terrorism dramatically. It presented the world to ‘a new and frightening “age of Terror”’ (Ibid: 69), that was seen to require a military response (coercion). In its most extreme representation, the ‘War on Terror’ is seen as ‘the Fourth World War’, following the ‘Third World War’ against the Soviet Union’ (Rogers, 2008: 172, see also Morris, 2012). The escalation of terrorist violence, to the status of war, heightened anxiety and tensions in British/Muslim relations.

9/11 took place eight years after the publication of Huntington’s ‘Clash’ thesis, and could be seen to validate the prediction of civilizational conflict, between Islam and the West. Huntington’s book ‘soared to the top of the best sellers list
and became a salient source for explaining the attacks’ (Vertigans, 2010: 27). Important political markers such as the State of the Union address by George W. Bush, in 2002, picked up themes in the ‘Clash’ thesis, such as the notion of ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ nations (The Washington Post, 2002); indicating that Huntington’s thesis had become intertwined in political rhetoric (Jackson, 2007) and public thinking.

Huntington’s belief in the exclusivity of Islam and democracy (1996) appears to have been accepted into the lexicon of the ‘War on Terror’, by those nations that have taken up the call (Eatwell, 2010) to engage in this strange ‘war’ (Maria, 2014). Huntington further argued, controversially, that democracies seldom, if ever, fight each other; a claim that has not been substantiated (Midlarsky, 1998; Salter, 2002). The WVS concluded that democracy and Islam are not mutually exclusive, finding equal levels of interest and belief in democratic ideals, in both Islamic and non-Islamic societies (2003: 68, 69). The findings indicate that, both Islamic and Judeo-Christian societies see democracy as the best form of government. Despite these findings, notions of the incompatibility of Islam and democracy continue to dominate public and political discourse, as exemplified in the speech given by Donald Trump, the President of the United States, in Warsaw 2017 (CNN Politics, 2017, quoted in Chapter One, 1.1). Huntington’s thesis had become intertwined in political rhetoric (Jackson, 2007) and public thinking. Using a temporal lens, the embeddedness of early discourses of power, representing Muslims as irrational savages, find resonance in the minds of the British and Western publics (Salter, 2002).

Huntington’s belief in the exclusivity of Islam and democracy (1996) appears to have been accepted into the lexicon of the ‘War on Terror’ by those nations that

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25 Neither can, the influence of Middle East historian Bernard Lewis be underestimated. Not only were Lewis’ views sought after 9/11, and his book viewed as a handbook in the war against Islamist terrorism, it is also suggested that, American policy-makers had no other perspective to balance this view (Chomsky, 2003).

26 Midlarsky provides a wide range of examples of findings from studies that verify this point, however she also makes the point that other studies challenge the universality of democratic peace.

27 The WVS is an extensive body of evidence involving more than seventy countries conducted over 2 years (2000-2002).
have taken up the call (Eatwell, 2010) to engage in this strange ‘war’ (Maria, 2014). The WVS (2003) disputes this pronouncement concluding that democracy and Islam are not mutually exclusive. The survey found, equal levels of interest and belief in, democratic ideals in both Islamic and non-Islamic societies (2003: 68, 69). The findings indicate that both Islamic, and Judeo-Christian, societies see democracy as the best form of government. Despite findings such as these, notions of the incompatibility of Islam and democracy continue to dominate public and political discourse, indicating another way in which the separation between Muslim and Christian countries is being played out. This is another example of the production, and function, of binary thinking in ideological hegemony.

The ‘Clash’ thesis has left a legacy in the form of American and British foreign and security policy (Chomsky, 2003; Erden, 2002; Hardt, 2004; Naugle, 2002; Said 2001; Salter, 2002). George Bush’s (2002) address has been seen, by statesmen in America, as signalling the current generation’s ‘Pearl Harbour’, triggering a fundamental reorientation of foreign and security policy (Connor, 2012; Scott, 2008). The idea of civilizational conflict continues to resonate, in the language used by Western politicians, despite disclaimers from the White House and UK government (Salter, 2002). The president’s 2002 address can be seen to set the tone; the speech opened with the line ‘the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers’ – suggesting un-paralleled threat to ‘our’ civilized world from an uncivilized ‘other’ (The Washington Post, 2002). In the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s speech to the Labour Party conference just a month after 9/11 resonated a similar rhetoric. Blair said: ‘[t]hey have no moral inhibition on the slaughter of the innocent…. There is no compromise possible with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such terror’ (BBC News, 2001). This rhetoric is remarkably similar to that of the time of empire, emphasising the brutality of the subordinate cultural entity, and therefore the superiority of ‘our’ cultural mores (Said, 1978, Jackson, 2005; Salter, 2002).

9/11 ushered in the discourse of ‘new terrorism’, promoting a new threat from Islam, and a further period of struggle. The notion of ‘new threat’ is seen by scholars as being precautionary; Pantazis (2009), for example, evidences a shift
in government security focus from the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Irish citizens, to Islamic terrorists, and Muslim citizens. There can be no question of any government taking seriously the security of its citizens, however questions have been raised about securitising all Muslims rather than targeting those who pose a threat to the state and to the public (Hickman, 2011; Mythen, 2012; Pantazis, 2009). The bombings on the London transport system on 7th of July 2005 (7/7) strengthened the UK government’s resolve for national security, because the bombers were British citizens. At the policy level, the bombings have shifted government’s focus away from international to “home-grown” terrorism (Githens-Mazer, 2010: 789, see also Briggs, 2006; 2010; Thomas, 2009; 2010). From the perspective of survivors and family members of the atrocities, the case that they had ‘endured unimaginable suffering in physical and emotional terms’ (BBC News, 2007), continued to be made two years after the bombings in 2007. It is not surprising, given that 52 people were killed and 800 injured, that those closely affected by the bombings remained dissatisfied with public investigations.

Political rhetoric and policy direction, generate ‘cultural scripts’ (Furedi, 2007), that shape public perceptions of fear, as does the media (see also Jackson, 2009). Representations of Muslim’s in the British press, at best, generate confusion and, at worst, fear by codifying Muslim communities ambiguously; as ‘allies in the struggle against “extremists”, victims or potential victims of the terrorists’ violence and of potential backlash, [and] under suspicion as they may be harbouring or supporting extremists’ (Hickman, 2011: 3, see also Jackson 2009). We are reminded of Furedi’s (2007: no pagination) argument that, fear ‘does not just happen; it is socially constructed’, shaping anxieties, as well as responses, to perceived threat. At worst, the juxtaposition of the ‘moderate Muslim’ with the ‘Muslim extremist’ blurs the boundary between the law abiding and the ‘extremist’ citizen shaping public perceptions and emotions about all Muslims (Hickman, 2011; Jackson, 2009; Nickels, 2012; Spalek, 2008). Poynting (2012) offers a different perspective on the cultural script, in suggesting that new terrorism is abstracted from historic locations or contexts; it is dislocated and decontextualized from ‘formative conditions of violence….eradicat[ing] its socio-economic and political content’ (p. 6). In the
process of depoliticising and de-historicising new terrorism it is rendered devoid of history, context, or cause making it possible to represent perpetrators of new terrorism ‘as occupying entirely different moral universes’ (Ibid.). This cultural script constructs Islamic terrorism (and by proxy all Muslims), as frightening ‘others’ who engage in mindless violence for its own sake (Jackson, 2005; Salter, 2002). The rhetoric of threat can be seen ‘in equal measure to unite and divide’ (Guerrero, 2009). From this perspective, the popular (native) imagination is united through the imagery of external threat, whilst simultaneously divided from those who are perceived to present the threat. Put simply we ‘have a victim (the West), a villain (terrorists), and a hero (the United States)’ (Gay, 2009). We can replace the United States, in the quote from Gay, with the British state in the UK context. Under the lens of temporality, in terms of the genealogy of British/South Asian Muslim relations we can, not only hear echoes of imperial discourse but, see the actuality of past fears in the present.

It may also be useful at this point to note Maria’s (2014) reminder that the ‘War on Terror’ is no conventional war. It:

> evokes a battle against an emotion or sentiment ….the figure of the terrorist, like that of the monstrous other is “a regulatory construct of modernity” deeply interwoven with “questions of culture and race” and an “implicit index of civilizational development” (p. 61 citing Puar and Rai 2002: 119).

Maria’s depiction reminds us of the cultural script, and also of connotations of the imperial ‘civilizing mission’, to regulate the belief systems of Muslims and Hindu’s in India. In the present-day context, the public’s perception of the ‘War on Terror’ is, at least in part, shaped by political and public depictions of Islam as non-democratic and non-modern (Gay, 2009). It is in this national and international context of Islam as ideologically different, and therefore perceived as a threat, that the UK government responses to new terrorism has been produced and reproduced.
3.3.2 The UK government response to ‘new terrorism’

When viewed from the standpoint of post-War Europe, ‘new terrorism’ provides an explicit focus on ideology. New terrorism is viewed as different from earlier forms of terrorism, such as nationalist-separatist extremism, that were not seen to threaten, or de-stabilise, Western politics and values (Eatwell, 2010; Pointing, 2012); however, new terrorism is seen to do just this, leading to questions about how to respond to the new threat.

At 20:03 hours UK time on 9/11/2001, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, made a speech in which he said, we ‘here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we like them will not rest until this evil is driven from our world’ (BBC, 2001). This statement, and subsequent government actions, committed Britain to George Bush’s stated ‘War on Terror’. The strategy included, passing terrorism-related legislation in 2001, 2005, 2006 and 2008 (Bleich, 2010; Brown, 2010). However, ‘new terrorism’ was seen to require a more complex response, one that Morris (2012), suggests makes it noteworthy, because it has integrated counter-insurgency theory and techniques. This may well be because security experts declared Islamist terrorism an unprecedented, and unpredictable, danger (Brown, 2010; Heath-Kelly, 2012; Miller, 2012; Mythen, 2006; Poynting, 2012; Spalek, 2009).

The perceived nature of the threat required, for the first time, the coercive power of military action (Rogers, 2008) as well as emergency powers; rather than criminal and judicial responses alone. Under the lens of hegemony the balance of coercion and consent weighted toward coercion.

The UK’s response is nevertheless played out at different levels, in public and private, domains. At the micro level, counter-terrorisms reach has extended beyond the public into the private sphere (Brown, 2010; Miller, 2012); at the macro level it includes military action. The convergence, in the UK, of global and local events; 9/11 and the earlier 2001 urban disturbances, precipitated concern for organized ethno- and religious discontent, placing Muslims at the centre of counter-terrorism responses. Critique of the disturbances led to an assessment
of the ‘parallel lives’ of British Muslims (Cantel, 2001; 2004) and of the ‘social apartheid’ experienced by Muslims who constitute the ‘poorest, large, single minority group in Britain’ (Eatwell, 2010: 3). This realisation led to the adoption of policies aimed at community cohesion through engagement; an approach that continued after 9/11 and the London bombings in July 2005 (7/7) alongside increased security based policies (Eatwell, 2010; O’Toole, 2012; Thomas, 2009; 2010). Counter-insurgency strategies also view community engagement as essential for intelligence gathering in order to pre-empt grievances developing into ‘terrorist-linked subversion’ (Miller, 2012). Whilst no direct link has been made between the 2001 disturbances and 9/11 more recent studies have evidenced the discontent of young Muslims as strong ‘push’ factors for joining violent Islamist groups such as ISIS (Islamic State in Syria) (Briggs, 2014; Saltman, 2015).

The UK response is complex, involving the pursuit of terrorists; stopping terrorist attacks from taking place, as well as preventing terrorism; winning the ‘hearts and minds’ (CLG, 2007) of the Muslim community. Problematically these measures affect Muslim communities indiscriminately, rather than targeting those who might be involved in terrorists activities (Miller, 2012). Miller et al., suggest that this is not an ‘unpleasant by-product of mistakes, ignorance or arrogance’ (Ibid: 13) on the part of government. Miller et al. (2012) argue that the targeting of all Muslims has been ‘created intentionally and purposefully to coerce and instil fear within the Muslim community... based on the theory and practice of counter-insurgency’28 (Ibid: 13). Here the intermixing of coercion and consent at the heart of UK government counter-terrorism policy is evident.

Interestingly, this is not how thinking about counter-terrorism in the UK started. Singh (2016) notes that David Omand, the ‘instigator of the original version of

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28 Counter-insurgency is a military doctrine developed to deal with small wars and insurgency or guerrilla campaigns. It emphasises military-civilian cooperation, communications/intelligence gathering, exceptional and emergency legislation and pre-emptive controls.
CONTEST’ (p. 22) saw the UK strategy as contrasting with the US approach premised on America being ‘at war’, while the British team “contended the opposite, that for the UK, the strategic objective – in 2002-03 and for the next 5 years …was normality” (Ibid.). Omand is also noted to say that, notions of the need to promote “British values”, including equality for women, however justified, were not an explicit part of the CONTEST strategy to prevent violent extremism…Policing is about upholding the criminal law, not about policing some concept of "Britishness” (Ibid.). Returning briefly to Omand’s suggestion of ‘normality’; from the historic tracing undertaken for this thesis, normality might not be as benign as it seems. Normality suggests the uninterrupted undercurrent of faith and race/hate, if not an escalation of anxiety about faith and race difference. Additionally, it is possible to see that, whilst counter-insurgency theorists suggest, a more deliberate focus on control over people and environments, counter-terrorism experts (such as Omand) do not. Policy appears, if Omand was correct, to have slipped from the objective of multicultural ‘normality’ to hegemonic notions of imposed British values and Britishness, as will become apparent, in the policy slippage explored in the following section, on the UK’s CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy.

3.4 CONTEST – the UK’s counter terrorism strategy

From its inception, it is possible to identify tensions in the design and implementation of CONTEST, between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ outcomes. Produced in 2003, and made public in 2006, (Briggs, 2006; Birt, 2009; Brown, 2010; Singh, 2016) the strategy can be seen to reflect the insurgency theory approach, in that it addresses macro level security issues alongside micro level intelligence gathering, in communities. The point made earlier, that CONTEST has extended the boundary of counter-terrorism policy into the private sphere, has largely been undertaken through its ‘Prevent’ strand (Miller, 2012: 15; see also Brown, 2010: 173; Singh, 2016: 34). The overall strategy is complex, comprising dual objectives; to repress violence and to accommodate ‘moderate’ or ‘acceptable’ forms of Islam (Bleich, 2010). The latter of these has clear roots in imperialist
hegemonic thinking. The strategy has a broad base encompassing four themes (also known as the 4Ps) to:

- **Prevent** terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals;
- **Pursue** terrorists (and those who sponsor them);
- **Protect** the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas; and
- **Prepare** for the consequences of terrorism (Briggs, 2006: 24).

Described by Bleich (2010) as a ‘stick and carrot’ approach; the ‘stick’ or ‘hard/security’ aspect is embodied in the Pursue strand, whilst the ‘carrot’ or ‘soft/accommodation’ aspect is embodied in Prevent (Ibid: 76). The Prevent aspect is particularly interesting because it positions all Muslims, including South Asian Muslim women, as members of ‘risky’ or, in counter-insurgency parlance as, ‘subversive’ communities. It is the construction of Islam (and therefore of its believers) as ‘risky’ and ‘subversive’ that this investigation contributes to South Asian Muslim women’s experience of the ‘War on Terror’ as adversity as will be evidenced in 3.5.

Successive governments’ have retained the dual objectives, and the 4Ps through three iterations of CONTEST, rather than treat the threat of terrorism as a matter for policing and for the criminal justice system (Miller, 2012; Singh, 2016). The rationale for this was stated in the first countering terrorism strategy which noted the importance of:

…understanding how terrorist groups recruit new members […] and that radicalising factors include the development of a sense of grievance and injustice…. Another potential factor is a sense of personal alienation or community disadvantage, arising from socioeconomic factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and lack of opportunity (HM Government, 2006: 9, 10).

Thus, from its inception CONTEST has recognised potential links between grievances, perceived injustices, alienation and vulnerability to recruitment by terrorist groups. However, a counter-insurgency approach is not focused on addressing grievances and perceived injustices, whilst a cohesion and
integration approach could be. It could be argued that at the centre of CONTEST there lies a tension between governments knowing about, and addressing, the grievances of British Muslims.

It is also argued, that a dual objective strategy, requires balance between both aspects of the duality (Birt, 2009). This was found to be missing in the early implementation of CONTEST. The House of Commons, Home Affairs Select Committee (April 2005), found that too much emphasis had been placed on Pursue; ‘hard’ (police and judicial powers), at the expense of community engagement and prevention. The outcome Miller (2012) suggests is to instil fear in the Muslim community, whilst Briggs (2006) and Spalek (2009) suggest that government had failed to learn the importance of community intelligence gathering from previous counter-terrorism experiences, such as those in Northern Ireland. The neglect of community engagement and integration, as functions of counter-terrorism, as well as functions in their own right, has been voiced as a matter of concern by a number of scholars including Birt (2009), Spalek (2008; 2009; 2010a), and Thomas (2010).

Additionally, it is argued that the failure of CONTEST to address non-Islamic forms of violent extremism, such as that promoted by the British National Party, (BNP) (Thomas. 2009; 2010; Birt, 2009; Bleich, 2010; Goodwin, 2010; Spalek, 2010a) may contribute to the perception of Muslims as terrorists. Eatwell et al., for example note that the BNP has enjoyed growing electoral success even as, since 2001, it ‘has increasingly sought to demonise Islam’ (2010: 6) with little intervention from government. CONTEST 3 (2011) has made some changes to address this short-fall however, its stated focus remains on Islamist terrorism (Heath-Kelly, 2013). The following section focuses on the role of the Prevent strand of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, as the main policy vehicle for integration, and through which, the struggle for ideological supremacy is most apparent. It is worthy of note that in CONTEST, Gramsci’s notion of the dominant class seeking to extend its ideology through means of coercion and/or consent, is writ large.
3.4.1 Prevent

Bartlett (2010), suggests that ‘[c]ompared with other countries’ counter-terrorism strategies, Prevent is unique in its extensiveness and level of ambition’ (p. 10). This quote sets the context for a complex and iterative response to preventing the threat posed by ‘new terrorism’. Prevent has faced criticism throughout its implementation (Briggs, 2006; Singh, 2016; Thomas, 2010). A year after the launch of Preventing Extremism Together (PET) initiative, a report by Briggs (2006) indicated that PET may have worsened relations between government and Muslim communities, rather than build bridges (p. 26). It was found to be ill thought through, rushed (consultation was completed in three months), and demonstrated a lack of understanding by civil servants of Islam (meetings with community members were scheduled during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan). Questions were also raised about the capacity of the (largely older male) community members engaged in PET, to represent all members of Muslim communities, particularly women and young people.

Prevent was first mentioned in the 2006 CONTEST strategy concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals through three key objectives; tackling disadvantage, deterring those who facilitate terrorism, and challenging the use of extremist or violent ideologies (HM Government, 2006). The relaunch of Prevent in April 2007, by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG), as the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds’ (PVE) strategy, addressed earlier operational concerns. For example, to develop engagement structures through which Muslim women’s, young peoples and religious leader’s views could be heard (Harding, 2008; Kundnani, 2009; Lowndes, 2010; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2010a). The PVE action plan was accompanied by a PVE fund, as the prototype for future years. The fund sought to deliver community based programmes, to achieve the objectives of, promoting shared values, supporting local solutions, building civic capacity and leadership, and strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders. Significantly, the focus of Prevent shifted from, ‘inequality, discrimination and deprivation’, to ‘an ideological campaign’ (Kundnani, 2009: 11). Indeed, scholars
have made the case that a focus on winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of British Muslims, can be viewed as a strategy to reform the attitudes and practices of British Muslims, rather than a strategy to build cohesive pluralism (O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2009a; Thomas 2009). This point is important to this thesis, as it epitomises the struggle for ideological dominance, rather than allowing space for differences (as opposed to terrorism) to coexist.

The novelty of an engagement approach, alongside a focus on ‘Islamic extremism’, led Thomas to describe Prevent as ‘failed and friendless’, but also as a ‘flawed but arguably [a] constructive British approach’ to the complex problem of ‘new terrorism’ (2010: 455). It is, for example, interesting to note that, other European nations (France, Spain, and Portugal) have not incorporated community engagement to the same extent in counter-terrorism strategies (O’Toole, 2012). ‘Flawed’ aspects of the strategy include the targeting of Prevent funding geographically, at areas with Muslim populations of 4,000 or more (Thomas, 2010). Spatial, as opposed to threat or intelligence based, targeting exposes the danger of conflating security and cohesion/integration activity. Kundnani (2009) acknowledges that, it is appropriate to place Muslim individuals who are suspected of engagement in criminality under surveillance, but that it is less clear why Prevent-funded organisations have been required to provide intelligence that is not always of a criminal nature. The blurring of boundaries between the Protect and Prevent aspects of CONTEST has been criticised as counter-productive, partly because it perpetuates the idea that all Muslims form a risk to security (Kundnani, 2009; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2009a). A further difficulty involves, neglect by successive governments’ to address the key issues of poverty experienced by Muslim communities or their concerns for foreign policy.

In these objectives we can see the further embedding of an ideological emphasis in the ill-defined notion of Islamic ‘extremism’. The CLG, House of Commons Committee (2010), recommended that ‘the Government take steps to clarify its understanding of the terms “violent extremism”, “extremism and “radicalisation””
noting that ‘holding extreme views is not illegal’ (p. 64). Findings from research, undertaken by Spalek et al., (2009a) indicate that, under Prevent a wide range of factors fall within notions of ‘radical’. The authors found, for example, that ‘political activism, narrow interpretations of the Qur’an, travelling abroad, glorification of martyrdom and martyrs, alongside other factors’ (Spalek, 2009: 128), were being propagated as signs of individual’s movement towards violent extremism. The authors add that, it is ‘possible to cast suspicion over any individual as the range of factors is so broad and encompasses majority rather than minority Muslim and other populations’ (p. 218). In particular these scholars suggest, that CONTEST 2 has created a new dichotomy ‘in which Muslims are subject to categorisation into “moderates” and “radicals”’ (p.129). The danger, they suggest, lies in making judgements over which Islamic practices are deemed to constitute legitimate (‘moderate’) or illegitimate (‘radical’) practice. The effect being, that government ‘appears to be attempting to control and influence the ways in which Muslim identities and practices are to be expressed in British society’ (p. 130). Githens-Mazer et al., (2010), also express concern that term’s such as ‘radicalisation’, in counter-terrorism discourse, have been accepted as popular ‘conventional wisdom’ without clarification of their meaning. These are important points for the objective of this investigation, as they suggest a deepening of intent, by a Christian host, to manage Islamic identity.

In July 2011 the new coalition government, announced a new Prevent strategy. The strategy was heralded by Allen (2011) as ‘regurgitated ideas’ that did not instil confidence that the new government had engaged in new thinking (2011). The overhaul of Prevent led to the following three strategic objectives to:

(i) respond to ‘the ideological challenge of terrorism’;
(ii) prevent ‘people from being drawn into terrorism’; and
(iii) work with ‘sectors and institutions’ (H.M. Government, 2011a: 6).

The first objective of Prevent is of particular interest, as it formally extends the reach of Prevent to forms of non-violent religious-cultural activities. Githens-Mazer et al., (2010) suggest that the conventional wisdom of radicalization, boils down, largely, to the assertion that Islamic difference ‘among Muslim communities has the dangerous potential to mutate issues of differing identities
into support for violent “Islamo-fascism”’ (p. 890). The explicit incorporation of non-violent ‘extremism’ in the remit of Prevent can be seen, at best, to use Prevent to encourage, and at worst to enforce, assimilation to Western norms and behaviours, intimating a binary rather than pluralistic politic (Spalek, 2009) and a shrinking or ‘hollowing out’ of aspects of democratic values (Brown, 2015). Indeed, the strategy states that government: ‘will not work with extremist organisations that oppose our values of universal human rights, equality before the law and democracy and full participation in our society’ (HM Government, 2011a, emphasis added) reinforcing the binary of ‘with us’ or ‘against us’.

The importance of promoting human rights values cannot be disputed, however, questions remain about the basis on which value judgements are made by state institutions. A robust assimilationist approach raises concerns over the potential of exclusivity based on Western/Christian normative values; values that lead to the stigmatisation of other (Muslim) identities and normative behaviours, as anti-social and extreme (Spalek, 2009; Githens-Mazer, 2010). Singh (2016) makes the socio-legal case that ‘[p]revents overly broad and vague definition of “non-violent extremism” creates the potential for systemic human rights abuses’ (p.16). Hence, analysts suggest that, in the name of upholding the principles of democracy and human rights, the UK government may be in danger of violating the human rights of Muslim’s in Britain.

Questions have also been raised about the potentially negative effects of extending the label of ‘threat’ to non-violent Muslim groups, as it reduces opportunities for the state to engage with Islamic organisations (Githens-Mazer, 2010; O’Toole, 2012; Spalek, 2010). Evidence suggests that, the opposite may be the case; that ‘[t]errorism decreases as the potential for radical collective action increases’. (Crenshaw, 2011: 15; Githens-Mazer, 2010; Spalek, 2009).
Indeed Spalek et al., indicate that involving groups deemed to be ‘extreme’, but non-violent, should be ‘a logical continuum of the post 7/7 drive to support community led’ approaches (2009: 126) to counter terrorism. Githens-Mazer et al., found that policy ‘[a]pproaches that emphasize specific forms of Islamic ideology or theology as causal “mood music” for terrorism are, at best, existentializing red herrings that are prone to miss the point’ (2010: 899). The point being that, counter-terrorism policy should counter the threat of terrorism rather than ‘reshap[e] the cultural identities of Muslims to be more pro-Western’ (Kundnani, 2009: 39).

The analysis outlined above suggests that, security policy, views Islam itself as a threat, requiring the state to control the cultural practices of Muslims. In relation to countering-terrorism, the question becomes one of the effectiveness of apparently ideologically driven policy. Whilst the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategy is not the focus of this thesis, the discussion emphasises the deployment of ideology in counter-terrorism, to strengthen the case that the ‘War on Terror’ has a clearly ideological dimension. In doing so it highlights a further moment in which ideological domination and struggle in British/South Asian-Muslim relations is apparent.

3.4.2 The notion of ‘shared values’

The idea of ‘shared values’ has become a central theme in Prevent; it highlights the battle for ideological superiority. British values are describes as, ‘universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy and full participation in our society’ (HM Government, 2011a). In analysing the concept of shared values, (on which the normative notion of radicalisation is premised), Spalek (2009), suggests that CONTEST 2 might be viewed as constructed in the West’s project of globalisation and war on pluralism. This is worrying, as it suggests, that UK

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29 The research investigation was titled ‘An examination of partnership approaches to challenging religiously-endorsed violence involving Muslims groups and police’ (cited in Spalek, 2010 and 2013).
counter-terrorism policy is failing to reach its (and the West’s), ambition of plural liberal democracy (Brown, 2015). The ‘War on Terror’, in this frame, can be seen to: ‘target and alienate those communities viewed as being opposed to [the] Western modernisation’ project (p. 128). The effect, at the micro level, is to construct normative Muslim behaviours as radical, anti-social and extreme (Ibid: 124).

An example of the imposition of Western ideological assumption, is evident in the aim of the fund in the guidance; to support work that produces a ‘demonstrable change in attitudes among Muslims’ (CLG, 2007). This objective could be viewed as, governance seeking to reform the values and attitudes of British Muslims, as a whole; suggesting the need to change them, and, alienate Muslim citizens who object to being ‘changed’ (O’Toole, 2012: 377). Here, again, it is possible to see the struggle for domination through coercion in government policy. And, the explicit intent to win British Muslims over to forms of Islam that is acceptable to the government.

Ideologically loaded language, such as ‘radical’, and ‘extreme’, in relation to Islam (Richards, 2011), serve to emphasise difference between Islamic and British values, in counter-terrorism. Heath-Kelly (2012), makes the case that the term ‘radicalisation’, viewed as the (yet unproven) driver of terrorism, can be used to underpin the governance of risk pre-emptively, making it ‘possible for British counter-terrorism to act upon futurity’ (Ibid: 398). Guilty before proven, renders all Muslims as dangerous. The discourse of ‘prevention’, in this frame, presumes risk on the basis of difference. It adds weight to the perception of Muslims as ‘risky’ because they do not appear to share British ways, and values.

The exclusion of non-Islamic extremists, such as, the Far Right, from Prevent, might be seen to reinforce the focus of Prevent on ‘Islamic terrorism’. This focus has remained consistent, with a ‘cursory’ reference to ‘other’ forms of extremism (Kundnani, 2009: 24). Commentators suggest that, the challenge of, Far Right
extremism can be viewed as damaging to democracy (Eatwell, 2010: 1); a modernized BNP has been ‘careful to publicly reject violence and downplay links with the extremist fringe’ (Bleich, 2010; Eatwell, 2010). A culture of violence surrounds the party, with numerous examples of BNP involvement in incidents of terror. These include nail bomb attacks that have killed people, the discovery of a haul of 300 weapons, 80 bombs in 2007, and reports of physical attacks on Asian people. Bleich (2010) suggests, that despite the BNPs ‘claims of sidelining extremist elements [it] simply cannot, for organizational reasons, fully purge its membership base’ (p. 183). Eatwell et al., suggest the risk of ‘cumulative extremism….the way in which one form of extremist [activity] could spark off a spiral’ (2010: 7), a potential, the authors suggest should not be overlooked, in relation to the extreme right, and one that has been evidenced in relation to attacks on Muslim women (Littler, 2015). Nor should, the transnational links of Far Right organisations, to groups in Europe, American, and South Africa such, be underestimated, (Bleich, 2010; Eatwell, 2010). These scholars suggest that, the extreme right and Islamists pose notable threats to liberal democratic political order, as we know it. The British state, has found it difficult to include BNP incidents, intents, and plans as terrorism.

This exploration of ‘British values’, in counter-terrorism, emphasises the political and ideological emphasis in counter-terrorism. In doing so, it foregrounds heightened anxiety about the loss of British values and ideology by the state.

3.5 Gender and counter-terrorism

It is accepted, amongst feminist and other scholars, that counter-terrorism policy is focused on Muslim men, and Muslim women are left outside this policy frame (Brown, 2016; Huckerby, 2012; Ni Aoláinn, 2013). This does not mean that Muslim women are not affected by, or implicated in, the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy. The ‘oft-unspoken assumption that counter-terrorism disproportionately affects men’ (Huckerby, 2012: 1), obscures women’s experience of terrorism, and counter-terrorism (Brown, 2016; Ni Aoláinn, 2013).
Counter-terrorism policy, at the national level, largely ignores women (Brown, 2013; Huckerby, 2012; Lewicki, 2016; Ni Aoláin, 2013). Ni Aoláin (2013) notes that, women remain in the margin of ‘the conversations in which definitions of security are agreed’, and peripheral to the institutional settings in which security frameworks are implemented as policy and law (p. 1086). Framing women in the margin of counter-terrorisms concerns, may explain why women are constructed, in counter-terrorism, simultaneously, as having the capacity, and power, to influence men (to save them from radicalization), and as having no power, in a fiercely patriarchal, or hyper-patriarchal culture (needing to be saved from them) (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Brown, 2016; Huckerby, 2012; Lewicki, 2016; Pratt, 2012; Rashid, 2013). If we accept these representations, Muslim women’s visibility is fundamentally contradictory, and their invisibility troublesome. When viewed through the lens of hegemony, it is possible to see this contradiction as serving a purpose; to reinforce the supremacy of Western/British ideology over Islam.

These representations divert attention from, or obscure, the adverse effects of the ‘War on Terror’ and counter-terrorism, on Muslim women in Britain. These representations signal that women’s equality is symptomatic of British values, and inequality is ‘indicative of dangerous [Islamic] ideologies’ (Huckerby, 2012: 6). In these representations, Muslim women are either denied a subjective experience of counter terrorism, or objectified, to endorse Western ideological supremacist tropes of gender equality. Furthermore, Ni Aoláin (2013) contends, that little attention has been paid, by either national security, or feminist scholars, to the ‘gendered hue’ of apparently neutral antiterrorist laws, and their effects on women (p.1087, Jackson, 2005). This omission makes it particularly important to address the impacts of the ‘War on Terror’, and counter-terrorism, on South Asian Muslim women.

The following paragraphs uncover ways in which Muslim women are directly, implicated in, and affected by, counter-terrorism. The argument is that the absence, and/or misrepresentation, of Muslim women in counter-terrorism,
symbolises processes of hegemony. Under the lens of hegemony, representations by the dominant group are given primacy, to influence, and win over, the thinking/consent of the populace.

**3.5.1 Muslim women – pawns in the struggle for ideological supremacy?**

This section of the thesis draws, firstly, on information related to the UK government’s insistence on ‘moderating’ Islam, and its attempts to draw Muslim women in Britain into the counter-terrorism policy frame through its ‘de-radicalizing’ project. Secondly, it uses data from counter-terrorism experiences in Northern Ireland, alongside UK statistics, to suggest that Muslim women are directly affected by the use of emergency powers, directed at men, in home searches. These affects, this thesis argues, add to the fear, and spread of fear, experienced by Muslim women.

Muslim women’s visibility in the political frame of counter-terrorism; to join the state to de-radicalize Muslim men, can be viewed as constraining, and as offering opportunities, to Muslim women in Britain. Two important points are made clear in the following text; firstly, that under the lens of hegemony, coercion and consent are apparent in government’s attempts to co-opt Muslim women into its imperative to ‘modernise’ or ‘moderate’ Islam; and, secondly, that Muslim women are affected by coercive emergency powers enacted in the ‘War on Terror’. The following sections address the constraints first, and then opportunities for Muslim women in visibility in counter-terrorism.

**3.5.2 Constraints on Muslim women of political visibility**

The notion of ‘radicalization’ plays a central part in positioning Muslim women in the ‘radical’ or ‘moderate’ Muslim debate. The earlier discussion, on shared values (3.4.2), notes that state intervention is based on the premise that ‘radicalization’ is constructed as, an almost inevitable, facilitator of terrorism’ (Brown, 2014: 37; Githens-Mazer, 2010”), legitimizing intervention in public and
private spheres. Women have been enlisted in counter-terrorism through, ‘soft’ counter-radicalization measures, in the Prevent strand of counter-terrorism, to work with the UK government to manage the risk of radicalization. Through capacity, and resilience building, programmes in Prevent, Muslim women are invited to ‘engage in generalized social regulation in attempts to minimise risks to the state’ (Brown, 2014: 38); that is, to reduce radicalization. Whilst women are not singularly called on in the strategy, there is ample evidence of political leaders calling specifically on Muslim women to use their femininity, to regulate Muslim men’s behaviours. New Labour, in 2008, for example, viewed women as ‘an untapped potential’ on which it could draw to counter the radicalization of young men (Allen, 2012; Brown, 2008; Crown Copyright, 2008; Winnett, 2008).

Whilst Lord Carlile, independent overseer of the Prevent review 2011, is noted to have said that ‘women are more moderate, non-violent and have the appearance of more neutrality in ways that make them “safe friends” for government’ (Huckerby, 2012: 7), and in 2014, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, called on British Muslim women to challenge extremism. May stated that she ‘truly believed that as women, as mothers, sisters and daughters [Muslim women] have a unique and powerful role to play in helping to combat the extremist challenge’ (Sanghani, 2014). In framing Muslim women as safe de-radicalizing friends of government, Muslim women become ‘the litmus test of British values’ (Huckerby, 2012: 6); bringing a gender stereotypical view of Muslims women (as expressed by Lord Carlile in 2011) to the centre of this, ideologically driven aspect, of counter-terrorism policy (Brown, 2008; 2013; Huckerby, 2012; Ni Aolqlin, 2014). Thus, amidst the ‘noise’ of counter-terrorism, the visibility and purpose afforded to Muslim women has a regulatory function in service of others; women’s visibility in counter-terrorism does not, in this frame, bring their concerns into the political frame.

The ‘War on Terror’, then, has been, and continues to be, enacted in the wider political frame of ‘responsibilizing’ communities to manage risk (Bracke, 2016; Bottrell, 2009; Hardy, 2015; Spalek, 2009; 2013 Ungar, 2005). In this frame, responsibility is transferred for de-radicalizing Muslim men, to Muslim women,
as part of the increasing shift from ‘governing’ to ‘governance’ (Bracke, 2016). Additionally, and importantly, from a modern-imperialist perspective, it is argued that the dominant group requires ‘the support of native informers’ (Akbar, 2014: 166; Bhaba, 1994). In this frame, government requires ‘native informers’ to denounce radical Islam and to model modern, secular and Westernized Islam (Akbar, 2014). Under the lens of hegemony, the enlistment of women, to join the hegemonic project of modernising Islam, requires a class or group similar to Gramsci’s ‘intellectual’ (2007: 5-25) to teach the new, and acceptable behaviour.

Enlisting Muslim women in Britain, in the states de-radicalization, or civilizing, project raises complex issues for women; it juxtaposes their perceived vulnerability to extreme Islamic patriarch, with the liberal freedoms of Western democracy, whilst linking their inequality with radicalisation. A clear demonstration of this thinking is evident in a speech given by Prime Minister, David Cameron, in January 2016. In the speech, Cameron links Muslim women’s lack of equality, and specifically, their failure to speak English, with Muslim men’s ‘slide towards radicalisation and extremism’ (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016). Cameron said ‘it is necessary to confront the Muslim men, whose “backward attitudes” exert “damaging control” over women in their families’ (Ibid.). Lewicki and O’Toole (2016), interpret these views as ‘echo[ing] dominant themes that characterize Muslim women as especially vulnerable to patriarchal practices and manipulation by terrorist ideologies’ (2016: 1, 2).

Linking English language with Islamist radicalization, has been challenged as conflating separate issues, and at the same time reinforcing British values; the suggestion being, that learning English will make women more British. Brown (2014) suggests that the underlying assumption is that, once ‘liberated’ (by speaking English), Muslim women will join the state to save Muslim males from radicalization. There is a dual assumption at play; of women’s disempowerment (in Muslim communities), and their loyalty (to the British state) (Ibid.).

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30 In the case of managing economic reform in India in the 18th and 18th centuries upper cast Hindu’s played this role (see 3.2)
assumption is made, at least in part, on the perception that Muslim women bear witness, in their day-to-day lives, to a liberal ‘Britishness’ in their educational success. The resulting logic is that, ‘[t]hey, more than their male relatives have benefited from becoming “British,” which is interpreted [by the state] to mean that they have been liberated from primitive cultural practices’ (Ibid: 42). From this perspective, ‘liberated’ Muslim women have a shared interest, with the British state, in ‘modernising’ and ‘liberating’ Islam (Akbar, 2014; Brown, 2014). This binary denies Muslim women’s positions of hybridity; of being engaged in ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ ways of thought, behaviour and ideology. It denies Muslim women’s various positions; between the labels of ‘saviour’ and ‘victim’. In total it denies Muslim women’s right to be themselves.

Additionally, the notion of Islam as an illiberal and gender constraining social order, powerfully characterises Islam as ‘bad’ (radical) requiring, in this logic, to be liberated by Muslim women to generate ‘good’ (moderate) Islam. A number of tensions flow from this logic; firstly, there is a lack of clarity in the terminology used. Secondly, there is the assumption of women’s intent to change Islam (Birt, 2009; Brown, 2008; Jackson, 2011; Mamdani, 2002). Thirdly, the explicit hegemonic binary logics of good/bad, radical/moderate, constrained/liberated characterise the very opposite of the logics of hybridity; in terms of resistance and transformation, under the lens of hegemony, the tension is in the inhabitation of both sets of logic or the central dialectic of hegemony, namely the dialectic of domination and subjugation.

Muslim women’s visibility in counter-terrorism, positions them between ill-defined ‘bad’ Islam and ‘good’ liberal democracy, with little consideration of the multiple positions in-between that they occupy. Furthermore, Muslim women’s positioning is based on Western hegemonic assumptions rather than being developed in dialogue with Muslim women. As one Muslim woman community leader said in interview ‘we want to do something about these things [radicalization], it isn’t like we don’t, but we don’t want to be separated’ (Shazia, research participant, 2013).
3.5.3 Opportunities for women in political visibility

Within the constraints outlined in the previous section, Muslim women’s visibility in policy, also offers opportunities, through Prevent, for funding women’s projects, and, to decision makers. State funding to build community capacity is however not ‘without controversy’ (Briggs, 2010: 274; see also Brown, 2013). Not least, because it securitizes state/Muslim relations rather building relations to address social justice needs (Briggs, 2010). Additionally, acceptance of state funding, in the context of the ‘War on Terror’, has raised question of trust within Muslim communities. There is, for example, evidence of state funded groups losing the confidence of the communities they serve, because they are seen to have a ‘parallel agenda’ (Ibid: 60), in the ‘surveillance of Muslim populations’ (O’Toole, 2012: 374; Birt, 2009; Kundnani, 2009). The perception that Prevent encourages Muslims to spy on other Muslims has not been uncommon, as articulated by the Muslim Council of Britain: ‘[t]he government first wanted our imams to act as spies on young British Muslims and now they seem to want Muslim women to do the same’ (Winnett, 2008). Similar points have been made by Huckerby, 2012, Spalek, 2013, and Thompson, 2010. From this perspective, opportunities for Muslim women’s organisations to gain state funding, through Prevent, places them in the dilemma of being seen to be co-opted into the state’s counter-terrorism strategy.

The benefits for women include the growth in women’s organisations; in 2005 there were few formally constituted Muslim women’s organisations in the UK (Briggs, 2010: 274). This has changed, at least in part, as a result of state funding. Through Prevent 103 payments were made between 2007 and 2009 to counter-radicalization projects (Ibid; see also Brown, 2014; Huckerby, 2012). Funding for women’s empowerment and leadership programmes can therefore be viewed as expanding women’s formal networks (Brown, 2014; see also Lewicki, 2016). Blurred boundaries, between integration and radicalization, in CONTEST appear to have opened up opportunities for women. Huckerby, quotes a former Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Prevent officer, who said that: ‘a small number of women’s projects have successfully discussed some Prevent issues and the root causes of radicalization [but] the majority of
women’s projects have tended to focus on areas such as community barriers, access to services, education and the arts’ (Huckerby, 2012: 4). These activities strengthen women’s networks, but appear to do little directly non-radicalization work.

There is general agreement, amongst scholars, that Prevent has promoted Muslim women’s empowerment and inclusion (Brown, 2014; Huckerby, 2012; Lewicki, 2012), whilst failing to realise full representation of either Muslim women’s concerns, or Muslim women’s engagement (Huckerby, 2012: 11). This echoes the point made in the last section; that Muslim women in Britain remain in the margin of policy. Additionally, funding through counter-terrorism policy, reinforces the idea that Muslim women are vulnerable in extreme Islamic patriarchy, requiring them to be supported, through capacity and empowerment programmes. This raises the dilemma for Muslim women of accepting state funding, which may be essential to their work in Muslim communities, and risk being seen to be disloyal to communities, or refusing state funding with the potential for the work not taking place.

Lewicki (2016), notes that Prevent can be seen to bring a ‘significant number of [Muslim] women into civic and political life’ (p. 8; see also Huckerby, 2012). This has enabled some women to ‘challenge both “the political strictures imposed by male community leaders” and their exclusion from mainstream institutions’ (Lewicki, 2016: 8). It would appear, that some Muslim women, aware of the essentialised identity ascribed to them, accept state funding and political engagement, as a way to challenge the constraints imposed by the institutions funding them. These data suggest that, whilst counter-terrorism continues to portray Muslim women in abstract and malleable forms, Prevent offers the opportunity for Muslim women to refute these constructions. The strategies adopted by women demonstrate, under a Gramscian conception of hegemony, the inability of the dominant structure to fully win over the subaltern. This is an important point; it positions Muslim women between ideologies, rather than fully
embedded in one or the other; a position of hybridity as resistance and transformation.

Prevent offered opportunities for Muslim women to have direct access to government officials and departments, specifically to CLG and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Funding also enabled Muslim women to access local state institutions such as the police and local government. However, the narrowing of funding criteria, under Prevent in 2011, marked a shift in Prevent's funding, from integration and resilience building, in the separation of cohesion and integration work from the prevention of violent extremism. This was not a 'strict requirement' of Prevent (Hardy, 2015), suggesting that some funding remains available for Muslim women to access, to undertake work on community cohesion.

There is general agreement, Prevent has promoted work on Muslim women's empowerment and inclusion (Brown, 2014; Huckerby, 2012; Lewicki, 2012), whilst, failing to realise Muslim women's representation, engagement, or concerns (Huckerby, 2012: 11). Counter-terrorism continues to reinforce the idea, that Muslim women are vulnerable to extreme oppression, in extreme Islamic patriarchy. The lack of change, in the state’s representation of Muslim women, suggests that Muslim women’s engagement with the state, through funding, has not brought them to the centre; it has not influenced policy. From this perspective, Muslim women remain in the margin of counter-terrorism policy. There are two important points to be made in summary; firstly, at the level of engagement and empowerment, Muslim women appear to have benefitted from Prevent funding. Secondly, engagement with the state appears not, at this stage, to have changed dominant perceptions and views of Muslim women, nor has engagement brought women, in their own right, into the counter-terrorism policy frame. From the perspective of hegemony, the dominant narrative continues to influence Christian, or non-Muslim, populations. However, as noted by Brown (2013) even as this thesis is being written, perceptions of Muslim women in Britain are changing, through other representations of Muslim women,
such as the Muslim women’s power list, that presents Muslim women as ‘“more than” victims of patriarchal communities… [or] pawns of the state’ (np.).

3.5.4 Women’s invisibility in counter-terrorism

The discussion thus far, has highlighted, the complex position of Muslim women, including South Asian Muslim women, in the margins of soft counter-terrorism. Muslim women are also affected by hard counter-terrorism ‘creating further insecurity in women’s lives’ (Ní Aolarrivée, 2016: 284). For example, from a human rights perspective, it is possible to see an overwhelmingly male focus in ‘hard’ counter-terrorism, such as the detention of male terrorism suspects, with little or no attention to the ordeals endured by spouses and families. This thesis, is not suggesting a direct comparison between, the terrorism and security-related experiences of Muslim women in Britain and Muslim women in other parts of the world. It is suggesting, that there are things that could be learnt in the UK mainland counter-terrorism context, from the experiences of women in securitized Northern Ireland.

At the global level, Kaseem (2014), notes that US human rights activism, and legal counsel, has focused on the rights of men who have been subject to rendition, interrogation, and detention. Human rights interventions at the global, and national (UK), levels have failed to address the ‘concrete and indisputable impact on women’ (p. 17; Ní Aolarrivée, 2014). Kaseem makes the case that, the ordeals endured by women, who are affected by security and emergency powers, are ‘comparable – and intimately related – to that of their spouses’ (2014: 15). Women are, for example, present when their husband, son or relative is apprehended, and they share the ‘trauma, terror, and anxiety of that experience’ (Ibid.). Like-wise, Ní Aolarrivée, notes that there is much to be learned from experiences closer to home; in Northern Ireland, where the population has ‘undergone long-term exposure to [UK] emergency regulation’ (2014: 242).

It is noteworthy that, the UK government extended emergency powers under the Northern Ireland, Emergency Provisions Act, (1973) to the whole of the UK in
2000 (before the 9/11 attack on mainland America). Emergency powers, since this time, have included home and property stop and search, of suspected terrorists’, in mainland Britain. Home searches follow a consistent pattern; operations take place early in the mornings; ‘when individuals and families were likely to be off-guard and would be disoriented’ (Ni Aoláin, 2014: 243). During the search, forms of house arrest contain family members to one room, or one portion of the house. Ni Aoláin notes that ‘the intimacy of presence in the home and the destruction and vulnerability associated with home stops and searches clearly fell more acutely on women and children than on men’ (ibid.).

The harms created by violations, in private spaces, are largely ignored in counter-terrorism, although women describe experiences in private settings, as increasing their sense of vulnerability, and lack of security. Srinivasan (1990) notes, that when violation is internally incorporated, its effect can far exceed the time/moment of the violence (Ni Aoláin, 2014: 243, 244). These violations also serves to create a culture of fear, spreading fear in the wider Muslim community (see Furedi, 2007). There are two points to be made here; firstly, that there is no reason to believe that the pattern of home searches is different in mainland England, to Northern Ireland; and secondly, that in the UK context, women’s experiences have been almost entirely ignored. In this sense the violations women experience can be written off, as inadvertent ‘collator damage’, in the interests of national security.

This argument, might be accepted if the violations were rare. In the UK, there is reason to believe this is not the case, despite the lack of research evidence to verify this proposition. It is possible to state, with some certainty, that between September 2001 and the end of August 2012, terrorism-related powers were invoked to make 2,297 arrests. Of these, 838 led to charges, and 241 to convictions (Anderson, 2016). In 2015, 280 arrests were made, 83 of which led to charges, and 38 (7.3%) to terrorist related convictions (Crown copyright,

31 The caveat with this data is the difficulty to secure precise figures for arrests through home searches
2016: 10). Data provided by Anderson (2016), indicate that not all those arrested and charged were Muslim, however, given the focus of counter-terrorism on Islam, it is very likely that the majority were.

Statistics cannot offer a sense of the insecurity, fear, and anxiety experienced by women when their home is raided, or family member arrested. Nor can they explain the infection, or spread, of fear they generate amongst the wider Muslim community (Furedi, 2007; Jackson, 2008; Stanko, 1995). But, these experiences remain largely unrecorded, as little work has been undertaken to identify the impacts of home searches on Muslim women in the UK.

In summary, the evidence presented in this section establishes that, Muslim women are affected in a number of ways by the ‘War on Terror’. Muslim women are affected, whether they are visible, or invisible in counter-terrorism policy. Visibility, in counter-terrorism, relegates them to feminised stereotypical roles, which suggest they are amenable to ‘moderate’ forms of Islam; potentially pitching them against members of their communities. Acceptance of state funding has different outcomes; women’s groups either view acceptance of funding as a risk to their community credentials, or as necessary to achieve their own outcomes. Within the constraints of counter-terrorism, Prevent funding has enabled women to develop networks that extend beyond themselves, to institutions of the state. The result, of Muslim women’s contact/engagement with state institutions, appears, at the national level, not to have changed the dominant narrative of Islam, or of Muslim women. This suggests that Muslim women remain in the margin, and peripheral to counter-terrorism’s discourses in Britain.

It has been highlighted that Muslim women, including South Asian Muslim women in Britain, experience prolonged adversity in the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, and the ‘War on Terror’. Muslim women in Britain, have benefited from, and are also constrained in, their engagement with the Prevent strand, of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy. Muslim women, in relatively large numbers,
experience distress resulting from the execution of ‘hard’ counter-terrorisms, emergency powers. These effects are little understood through academic study or in counter-terrorism policy. This has necessitated placing a caveat on terrorism related arrests that result from home search violations because the evidence provided is not direct.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter set out to trace the temporal progress of British/South Asian Muslim relations; to demonstrate hegemonic struggle over a prolonged period of time. It has located the ‘War on Terror’ in its historical context, to make the case for the ‘War on Terror’ as the current manifestation, in a prolonged struggle/adversity. Prolonged adversity has two dimensions; the past and the present. In a temporal frame, the present is constituted in the past, locating the past in the present.

The past gives meaning to present actions and reactions; it explains how brutal and difficult action, such as the assault of innocent Muslim women, is legitimised by those who undertake these actions. In tracing the history of hegemonic struggle it becomes possible to understand how dehumanising tropes of Muslims as ‘other’ have taken root. From this perspective, it is possible to understand how hatred and representations of Muslims as a threat are easily resurrected. These tropes have a long legacy in the psyche of the dominant group (Memmi, 1986; Salter, 2002). This thesis concurs with scholars who locate Islamophobic hate crime in this history; giving licence, to its re-emerge in the ‘War on Terror’; (Jackson, 2005; Lambert, 2011).

In tracing the temporal dimension of ideological hegemony, this chapter provides an essential building block on which to interrogate adversity, resistance and resilience. The interpretation of hegemony applied in this thesis, offers the opportunity to tease out the complexities and spaces that are created in the struggle of domination/resistance, in the form of plurality, mixing and hybridity. The possibility of living with/between/in two cultures was evidenced in the lives
of the ‘White Moghuls’ in the 17th century. They transgressed the boundary of acceptable mixing, and they were made to pay the price. They were vilified for this transgression, because the dominant group was unable to co-exist with the culture/ideology that it believed to be subordinate. This is useful learning for this thesis, as similar positions of hybridity are being adopted by South Asian Muslim women, in the ‘War on Terror’, as will be made clear in Chapter Six.

This chapter has demonstrated that the struggle for domination, and to resist ideological loss is, in Gramscian terms, a prolonged ‘war of positions’. In this frame the group in search of hegemony; the dominant group, has the options of coercion and consent at its disposal. Over time, coercion was used in British/South Asian Muslim relations, in the reform of Indian judiciary/legal systems, political systems, and the use of military might to quell Indian uprisings. Attempts to win consent were also evident, in arrangements to manage change between the dominant group and its allies; upper caste Hindu land owners. The 20th century equivalent is the ‘War on Terror’; in which extra-ordinary judicial/legal powers are invoked and military force used. Additionally, Muslim women can be seen to occupy the role of ‘trusted ally’, in the invitation by the government, to join its project to moderate/regulate Islam.

The chapter has identified the difficulty of access to studies about South Asian Muslim women’s experiences throughout this period, with glimpses into specific times and contexts, from the perspective of the dominant group (Krishnamurthy, 1989). History has repeated itself in this regard; there is little evidence of qualitative enquiry into the effects of the ‘War on Terror on the lives of Muslim women, and South Asian Muslim women, in Britain. Feminist scholars note the assumption that counter-terrorism disproportionately affects men; it obscures, and denies, Muslim women’s experience of counter-terrorism. The denial of Muslim women’s experience silences their experience and invisibilizes them.

This chapter has identified the possibility of the co-existence of cultures and ideologies, at the micro level, and the inability of the dominant group to accept co-existence. This raises important questions for the capacity of liberal
democratic political ideologies, such as that in Britain, to live up to the ideals of acceptance of difference, equality and plurality (Brown, 2015).
Part II
Research methodology
Research involving South Asian Muslim women
Chapter Four:
Research involving South Asian Muslim women

4.1 Introduction

Humanistic qualitative research situates the subject historically and culturally (Foley, 2000), echoed in the previous chapter and in the temporal aims of this thesis. Locating South Asian Muslim women in Britain historically, and culturally, is essential to understanding South Asian Muslim women as the subject of this thesis (Hall, 1996: 448). South Asian Muslim women are situated in a history of ideological struggle; experience that informs (internally) their knowledge of, and response to, current struggles in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. Thus, portrayals of Muslims, and Muslim women, as ‘outsiders’ and the ‘enemy within’ (Allen, 2012: 9; Moore, 2008), are ‘intolerable’ positions that shape South Asian Muslim women’s responses in all situations, including this research. From this perspective, past struggle generates experiential patterns that form, and inform, current experience, and in turn, informs the method of this research. In this sense, research content (women’s experiences) and research method are mutually constitutive. Reflexive sensitivity to this constitutive dynamic, between method and content, should alert the researcher to the ways in which methodological approaches collude and re-inscribe power relations; for example, the research objective of enabling the missing/silenced voices and experiences, of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, requires methodologies designed to enable voice and seek silence.

Chapters Two and Three constitute the conceptual and temporal contextual frames of the research in terms of ‘subject’ and ‘purpose’. Chapter Two develops and problematizes understandings of adversity, resilience, social networks and social capital in terms of resistance to prolonged adversity. These foundations have led to the articulation of specific research aims that the field study set out to address. Chapter Three uses a temporal frame to set the historic context for South Asian Muslim women as ‘situated knowers’ (Haraway, 1988) and alerted the research to the outsider/insider dichotomy of South Asian Muslim women in Britain. This is a hybrid position; neither in, nor out; the researcher shares, in
different forms, the experience of hybridity with South Asian Muslim women, as
dual heritage South Asian Indian; neither Asian, nor English. The researcher’s
occupation of hybrid spaces has influenced, and shaped, this research by
bringing the experience of hybridity to this thesis. Additionally, shared ethnic
background and experience of hybridity may have influenced research access,
as will be explored later. In terms of the mutually constitutive relation of content
and method; hybridity, is both content and method: content in regard to
simultaneous multiple positions (in and out) and method in regard to the refusal
to use the tool of binary logics (in terms of negotiation of spaces, conceptual
frames, and analysis). The inherent tension is that there, ‘remains the question
as to whether it even really makes sense or is useful to talk about a dichotomy
of “insiders” and “outsiders”, particularly given that the positionality of both may
change through and across such categories over time or depending upon what
attributes of each one’s identities are stressed” (Herod 1999:325).

The implication is that, for the researcher, positions of insider and outsider,
whether configured along the logics of binary or, in the logics of hybridity are
always in transition. Keeping hold of these multiple spatial, temporal and
subjective dynamics within the frame of hybridity is a continual task and
challenge, both in terms of method and content. In this frame, it was the task
and challenge for the research in this thesis, to occupy rather than attempt to
resolve these tensions (see 4.3).

Feminist and anti-imperialist, theory alerts this research to the harm of ‘epistemic
In other words, the construction of South Asian Muslim women’s gender, race,
and colonial experiences (past and present; past in present) are constituted in,
and through, hegemonic epistemologies. Anti-imperial and Black feminist
scholars, alert the research to the role of intersections of sexism, racism and
colonization as important epistemic considerations (Ashcroft, 1995; Gandhi,
1998; Memmi, 1986; Spivak, 1988). Knowledge, and understanding, of the
‘subjective positions of South Asian Muslim women in their prolonged ‘war of
position’ was essential to the design and practice of this research. Sprague
(2006) offers a useful reminder in writing that: ‘epistemology directs us in how to approach an understanding of a phenomenon’ (p. 26, emphasis added).

There are two further important points to be raised: firstly, with regard to the issue of inclusion/exclusion and its relation to trust in this research methodology. Chapter Three, identified exclusion the impacts of exclusion in counter-terrorism on women at the national policy level, (Huckerby, 2010; Ni Aolàni, 2013, see Chapter Three, 3.5). In addition, the failure to include South Asian Muslim women in Britain’s in the ‘War on Terror’, this thesis identified difficulty in finding academic studies into women’s experience of adversity. In this research methodology, the issue of inclusion was pivotal to the negotiation of trust with research participants. Trust is constituted by, and contingent upon, inclusion. The negotiation of trust was fundamental to inclusive exchanges with South Asian Muslim women, enabling them to share (include) their narratives/testimonies (predominantly excluded in policy and academic spaces); in turn, the inclusion of these narrative/testimonial findings are central to this thesis in a direct challenge to their exclusion elsewhere.

Secondly, it is important to acknowledge, at the outset, that this research starts from the perspective that South Asian Muslim women have individual subjectivities; they are not a homogeneous group. The use of generalised ethnic terminology, such as, ‘Pakistani’, and ‘Bangladeshi’ women, are used in this chapter but should not distract from the individual subjectivities of individual women.

4.2 Epistemologies of South Asian Muslim women

Chapter Three, alerts this research to the prolonged denial of voice experienced by South Asian Muslim women, historically. The experience, and, repeated experiences, of invisibility, shapes the epistemology of South Asian Muslim women, making it important to address the implications of this experience in research design and practice. It was essential for the researcher to understand, and respond to, concerns of culture and power as they relate to Pakistani and
Bangladeshi women participants in this research. In ‘Reading Antonio Gramsci as a Methodologist’, Jubas (2010), demonstrates the relevance of Gramsci’s epistemology to humanistic methodological research approaches. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony questions the production and function of knowledge from the perspective of power relations. The focus on hegemony, and the conceptual lens of hegemony, is fundamental to this thesis and also informs the participatory, inclusive, power sensitive methodological approach of the research design and practice. In addition to Gramsci’s insistence on the importance of context, dialectics and analysis of plural, divergent social relations of knowledge production, in the following quote he adds proximity of feeling:

The intellectual’s error consists in believing that one can know without understanding and even more without feeling and being impassioned... in other words that the intellectual can be an intellectual (and not a pure pedant) if distinct and separate from the nation-people, that is, without feeling the elementary passions of the people, understanding them and therefore explaining and justifying them in the particular historical situation and connecting them dialectically to the laws of history and to a superior conception of the world, scientifically and coherently elaborated—i.e. knowledge. (Gramsci, 2007: 418)

The implication here, in conjunction with feminist and anti-imperialist frames, is the imperative for liberatory research approaches to check researcher domination in ‘believing that one can know without understanding’; this necessitates the opening up of spaces for women’s voices to be heard (Ashcroft, 1995: 249). Feminist theories of knowledge are centrally concerned with the concept of the ‘situated knower’ (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1987; Sarantakos, 2005; Kralik, 2008), and that, situated knowledge reflects the experiences (epistemologies) of women as marginalised people (Gandhi, 1998: 3). Anti-imperialist theory is concerned to make accessible the complex condition of peoples associated with the ‘aftermath of colonial occupation’ with its continuing and ‘tenacious hold’ (Memmi, 1968) on ‘post-colonial’ ethnic communities socially, politically, and culturally. Both of these theoretical examples seek to understand, and to contest, the biases of dominant cultural conceptions and practices of knowledge (Anderson, 2014: 1); they offer potentially useful insights into the generalised situation of South Asian Muslim women. The design of this research investigation is predicated on understanding and accommodating these sensitivities. Feminist research principles encourage a research style that
is open; in which, all the facts are made known to women participants to facilitate trust building, and encourage cooperation and co-production on the basis of ‘equality of intellectual authority’ (Sarantakos, 2005: 56) and anti-sexist, anti-racist and anti-imperialist practices. Feminist research principles insist:

‘that the inquirer her/himself be placed in the same critical plane as the overt subject matter, thereby recovering the entire research process for scrutiny in the results of research. That is, the class, race, culture and gender assumptions, beliefs and behaviours of the researcher her/himself must be placed within the frame of the picture that she/he attempts to paint. (Harding, 1987: 9)

Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of the flow, and inter-relationship, of theory and practice are envisaged in this investigation

**Figure 4.1 Influences and sensitivities in research design**

![Diagram of research design](source-image)

Source – author (2013)

**4.3 Methodology and research design**

These sections addresses how the epistemological frames, outlined above in Figure 4.1 are applied to methodology and design of the research. The unambiguous interpretative nature of this investigation indicated that a
qualitative methodology would be most appropriate. Qualitative methodologies explore dynamic, social phenomena, whilst quantitative methodology, is frequently viewed as presenting a static image of social reality, with an emphasis on numbers (Brewer, 2000). Quantitative approaches are concerned with behaviour, as opposed to ‘the meaning of [their] actions’ (Brewer, 2000; Bryman 1984, 2008). Qualitative methodology differs in its commitment to seeing the world from the point of view of the ‘actor’. It focuses on the perspectives of the ‘subject’ to generate in-depth data (Brewer, 2000; Flick 2006). Research into the social world, informed by the principles of the epistemology of qualitative research, requires methodology to facilitate an ‘insider’ view. This is complex, raising questions of research ethics, as well as tensions; for example, in regard to the use of qualitative methodology, such as ethnography that is implicated in colonial silencing through its genealogy in classical anthropology\(^{32}\).

An inherent tension in the relation between ethics and ethnographic research approaches concerns the issue of positionality, therefore, ‘[i]t is critical to pay attention to positionality, reflexivity, the production of knowledge and the power relations that are inherent in research processes in order to undertake ethical research’ (Sultana 2007:380). The issue is that, there is no neutral position; therefore all positions are implicated. Positions constantly shift, in turn ethical consideration constantly shift in ‘a continuum with multiple dimensions’ in which all aspects of the research process ‘constantly move back and forth along a number of axes, depending upon time, location, participants and topic’ (Mercer, 2007: 1). In ‘Learning from the Outsider Within’(1991), the Black feminist Collins locates women’s positionality of race and gender in ‘the matrix of domination’ (2000: 228). Thus, engagement with ‘situated knowledge’ becomes multi-dimensional; both in terms of macro knowledge/power relations, situated in the matrix of domination, and in terms of micro knowledge/power relations, situated in shifting, reciprocal, subjective encounters between researcher and participant.

\(^{32}\) Scholars argue that anthropologists’ investigated ‘native’ peoples largely in order that a colonial power better understood the cultures and groups it ruled (Brewer, 2000: 11., Smith, 1999, 2012).
Feminist, Black feminist and anti-imperialist epistemology alerted this research to the question of, what is fitting what? Colonizing research tools produce colonizing processes that appropriate voice and experiences to fit a dominant script, set of objectives and predetermined outcomes. In other words, colonizing research tools fit the research content (participants, contexts, conceptual frames, relations of knowledge/power) into fixed outcomes, for fixed purposes. In stark contrast to this, an open, flexible research design for the ethnography was adopted (Appendix 1 and 2).

There was not a definitive statement of how the research investigation would be managed. Although this partly responded to the challenges of ethnography, as it was not possible to know the degree to which the research would have access to women participants, it primarily responded to, an acute awareness of the position, and context, of the research participants: the experiences of the ‘war of position’ by South Asian Muslim women in the ‘War on Terror’. On the one hand, the flexible framework did precisely what it was expected to do; provided an open, largely unstructured framework, through which South Asian Muslim women participants, could select the aspects of their experience and knowledge they wished to share. In this regard, women were engaged in co-producing the findings of the research; they provided the knowledge they felt comfortable to offer, and that they felt was required.

In terms of the mutually constitutive relationship between content and method, it became increasingly clear that, the open flexible framework; allowing the free flow of South Asian Muslim women’s experiences, voice, ideas and aspirations for past, present and the future, shaped and reshaped the research temporal aims in terms of past (pre 9/11), present (now) and future (hopes). On the other hand, in analysing the fieldwork transcripts, there were a number of occasions, in reading the transcripts and listening to the tapes, where it was difficult to understand why a follow-up question had not been asked. This issue is raised, as an inherent tension in qualitative research; tighter and clear aims could also have risked framing questions in ways that led to sought after responses.
In determining methodology, the lens of hegemony highlighted questions in the use of an ethnographic approach in this research with South Asian Muslim women. Ethnography is rooted in anthropology (as expressed in Chapter One), alerting the research to the dangers of the research process itself further colonising South Asian Muslim women’s experiences. The response to this challenge was to ground the research in feminist and anti-imperialist approaches. Recent interpretations of ethnography, for example by the Chicago School, have shifted the focus of ethnography in urban North American studies to research without a priori knowledge-claims of the subject. Notwithstanding the fact that all knowledge-claims (with or without a priori knowledge) exist in hegemony; it is the Chicago School approach to ethnographic research that this investigation adopted (Sampson, 1991, 2004) inhabiting the inherent tensions.

Positive aspects of ethnography include, the opportunity for research participants to meet the researcher on their terms, in their environment, creating opportunities to build trust between the researcher and the participant, before engaging in focus groups and interviews that have a formal dimension and are recorded dialogues. The ‘humanistic’ inference of ethnography allows the investigation of social life in real, naturally occurring settings, independent of manipulation or staged encounters. This is wholly appropriate to this investigation, in that it acknowledges that participants are meaning-endowed (Haraway, 1988); they have the capacity to interpret, and construct, their social world; to articulate knowledge, and ascribe meaning to experience and situation. The ethnographic process allows researchers to understand social processes from the ‘inside’ (Silverman 2000:30-33; Flick 2005; Snow 2003).

A central objective, of some ethnographers, is to uncover the structure of rules that enable one to behave as a member of a particular group. Ethnography, when it is done well, suspends judgements, as with the Chicago School model; it spends time getting to know participants environment. A criticism of ethnography is its tendency towards analytic neglect; that too often ethnographers enter the field with the goal of describing and interpreting a social situation, at the risk of ‘getting too close to one’s informants, side-stepping
relevant theory, in favour of accenting popular assumptions about one’s informants” (Emerson, 1987: 72-3). Description alone can lead to dismissal such as ‘this is very interesting, but so what?’ This investigation sought to avoid dismissal on the grounds of description, with no analytic content, by situating the investigation in academic traditions and by recognising the importance of analysis and interpretation to ‘thick description’ or ‘intellectual effort’ (Geertz, 1973). In this frame it is the role of the ethnographer to provide ‘thick description’, not simply to describe the action, or interaction, but to interpret the meaning of the action.

It is also necessary to address the problem of ethnography from the perspective of the ‘subaltern’ participant. A history of marginalisation, and ‘othering’, in the lives of South Asian Muslim women, traced in the previous chapter, was (and is) unlikely to engender trust of members of outsider groups such as a University researcher. This challenge to ethnographic methodology amplified the importance of liberatory epistemological frames; of power relations, as the basis for building trust between researcher and participants. Starting with Black feminist and anti-imperial theory, the process of building trust was a continual process throughout the research; aspects of how trust was built during the research process are addressed later in this chapter (see 4.5.3). There is also the problem of time in doctoral research; in which time to undertake an ethnographic investigation is limited. Atkinson (2001) suggests a ‘middle place’ namely ethnographic interview. Ethnographic interview is differentiated from other forms of interview by the:

established, respectful, on-going relationships with [their] interviewees, including enough rapport for there to be genuine exchange of views and enough time and openness in the interviews for the interviewees to explore purposefully with the researcher the meanings they place on events in their worlds. (Heyl, 2001: 369)

Additionally, ethnographic methods are defined by the ethnographer’s role in the activities of the research group; levels of involvement can range from full (covert or overt) membership of the group, to the role of being a non-participating observer, or involvement in which interviews and documents are the main
source of data gathering. In this investigation, participants were fully aware of the aims of the research, of researcher observation, group work exercises, and in semi-structured interviews. The range of methods offered women participants the choice of being involved individually or as part of a collective group.

This was a small, in-depth, qualitative investigation, which made it possible to use a flexible research framework (referred to earlier) to aid data gathering in the field. Gathering participant's testimonies were the central aspects of this research. This required women to feel sufficiently confident in the research to share personal narratives, experiences, feelings, and perceptions of government policy. To do this trust, and trust building became central aspects of research design and shaped, along with women’s epistemologies, the methodology and design of this investigation. The field study also sought data, from representatives of the state and from male and female community leaders; a qualitative design was also selected for these interventions.

4.3.1 A narrative approach

Narrative might be viewed as implicit to ethnographic research; it opens up challenges and opportunities for data interpretation. Whilst there is nothing new in qualitative studies, in the researcher telling participant’s story, there are ethical issues, for example, through whose lens or stand point is the story being told. Scholars, such as Mitchell (2003), argue that narrative analysis differs from ethnography, in the ‘interpretive thrust’ (Ibid.) of narrative analysis. However, the separation of participant’s accounts, from researcher interpretation, was not the intention of this research; it was to bring them together. This research used a hybridity of, aspects of an ethnographic approach, with aspects of a narrative approach; being with participant’s in their spaces, to gain a sense of their world, with interpretations formulated through women’s words, language and behaviours. Insights into a narrative approach are helpful because this investigation concurs with Fleetwood’s observation that narratives are ‘selective

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33 Chapter Four explains the purpose of adopting an ethnographic approach to (neighbourhood based) data collection.
account[s] of past events, oriented to the present listener (whether real or imagined), which make some point about the narrator’ (2015: 4). Women’s narratives, in this sense, are viewed as much more than the stories they contain, they are viewed as discourses that make women’s experience knowable to the researcher. It is then the task, of the researcher, to interpret women’s knowledge in the context of historic and present day socio-political frames in which women participants are situated.

4.4 Research design

The design of this research outlines aspects of the mechanics of making the field study happen. It explains pre-field work preparation, in the form of establishing criteria for the selection of the neighbourhood, in which the field study was undertaken. It also involved decisions on research sampling. These are explained in the following sections.

4.4.1 Neighbourhood selection

An essential aspect of the research design lay in identifying the neighbourhood in which to conduct the research. A rigorous process was followed to select the neighbourhood in which to undertake the field study/investigation. Whilst the process was rigorous the framework, or criteria, for selection was simple; neighbourhood selection criterion undertaken included the following broad themes:

i. must have a majority Muslim population;
ii. Muslim population must have a sizeable South Asian Pakistani and Bangladeshi population; and
iii. must be located in the north of England.

The selection process began with the study of national data/desk research, to identify the location of South Asian ethnic minority populations, in cities and towns in Yorkshire and the Humber and the North West of England. Having identified several cities and towns with sizeable South Asian populations, the
search was refined to identify populations at the Middle Super Output Area level (MSOA).\textsuperscript{34} Seven MSOA’s met the selection criteria for this research investigation. With a focus on the selection of one neighbourhood, the process was further refined, through in-depth investigation of available ‘hard’ demographic, and socio-economic, neighbourhood level data, as well as other locally, and nationally produced documents where they were available.

Having gathered a short-list of seven possible neighbourhoods, the final consideration in choosing a neighbourhood for the research, was made on the basis of pragmatism. The final consideration came down to access to South Asian Muslim women and this decision was made as the research moved from design to practice; resulting from a meeting between the researcher and a known male, Muslim, contact. The support of this contact for access to Muslim women was central to determining the neighbourhood in which the study would to be conducted. The final decision on neighbourhood meant the field study was conducted in a neighbourhood in the North of England; for the purpose of anonymity the neighbourhood has been called ‘Fieldway’ and the city/town in which it is located is called ‘Northend’; pseudonyms created by the research for the purpose of anonymity. Details of the process for choosing Fieldway as the research neighbourhood are described in 4.5.1, as part of the process of gaining access to South Asian Muslim women in the North of England.

\textbf{4.4.2 Sampling; research participants}

A purposive, as opposed to random, sampling model is evident from the specificity of the research and the women whose testimonies this research was interested in gaining. The sampling process therefore required, of necessity, a pro-active approach to specific group/s of South Asian Muslim women in a specific neighbourhood (Denzin & Lincoln 2005: 378). Recruitment of participants was originally anticipated to be realised through seeking out community organisations that engaged women residents of Muslim faith.

\textsuperscript{34} Super Output Areas (SOA’s) are a national methodology for assessing the level of deprivation in neighbourhoods introduced in 2004. MSOA have an average population of 7,500 and 4,000 households (NHS. 2011).
However, until the research neighbourhood had been identified, it was difficult to know which organisations would be contacted, or the number, if any, of community organisations in the neighbourhood. Consideration was given to meeting women in formal, open settings, but this was not the priority of the investigation; access to women in closed, private, or semi-private, settings was the preferred option. Additional difficulties that affected neighbourhood selection included time, and cost, for example for travelling to the selected neighbourhood.

An ethnographic approach entails entering the field, and working with conditions as they are encountered; there was, in any event, no way of determining a priori the types of activities that the ethnographer would be given access to. The strategy adopted to manage this uncertainty was to prepare a broad, flexible framework for use in informal discussion, focus group or interviews, the framework could also guide note taking when observing. The framework is attached as Appendix 1.

At the design stage, a total target sample size of 36 participants was deemed a reasonable number for this investigation; this was envisaged to involve 26 women, 5 community leaders and 5 representatives of local state institutions. In actuality, these numbers differed as is evident in Table 4.1. Total participant numbers increased to 57, of whom 46 were women residents, 4 community leaders and 7 participants represented the local state. Table 4.1, on the following page, illustrates anticipated and actual participant size by group. It also identifies the ways in which participants were involved in the research, i.e. the research method.
Table 4.1. Sample size – anticipated and actual participant numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant group</th>
<th>Women (observed)</th>
<th>Women – (focus group &amp; interview)</th>
<th>Professionals (interview)</th>
<th>Community Leaders (interview)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anticipated</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Women residents of Fieldway formed the largest group, professionals the second largest, and community leaders the smallest group. This is perhaps not surprising; women are the largest group because they are the focus of this investigation, and representatives of the local state the second largest because there are more paid professionals than community leaders, who form the smallest group. It is also helpful to understand the breakdown of all participants by gender; Table 4.2 illustrates participants by gender. This table shows that 50 of the 57 participants in this investigation were female and that 7 were male.

Table 4.2. Participants by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant group</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leader</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 indicates that equal numbers of male and female community leaders were involved in this research and that 60% of the participants who represented the local state were male, and 40% were female.

The sections that follow shift attention from research planning and design, to the process of starting the field work. This is complex, as a pivotal point was precisely the moment between planning and practice, in which key decisions were made about where to locate the research and to begin to find ways of gaining access to South Asian Muslim women in closed settings.
4.5 From design to practice

4.5.1 Getting started; access to, and recruitment of, Muslim women

Gaining access to closed social settings is recognised as one of the most important, but also one of the most difficult, steps in ethnographic investigation. It is described as: ‘not a matter to be taken lightly but one that involves some combination of strategic planning, hard work and dumb luck’ (Bryman. 2001:435). Access to closed settings is seen as particularly difficult (Hammersley, 1993, 1995; Bryman, 2001: 433), making the issue of access particularly important in the selection of the investigation neighbourhood. Bryman (2001), notes that researchers have developed a range of tactics ‘many of which may seem rather unsystematic’, such as using friends, contacts, and colleague, trying to get the support of someone within the organisation, or neighbourhood, to ‘champion’ (p. 435) the research, others have resorted to offering something in return to help gain access.

In this research access was a key consideration, and as noted by Bryman (2001), the research used a known contact to decide the research neighbourhood, primarily in response to access to South Asian Muslim women. The ‘insider’ knowledge of this contact, called Shahid in this research to retain his anonymity, was a person with whom the researcher had worked in the past in a professional capacity, and with whom there was a level of trust capital that the researcher was able to draw on. Additionally, Shahid was in the unique position of working with Muslim communities, professionally through Prevent, and also in the voluntary sector, giving his access to groups that the researcher did not have access to. The assumption made, was that prior knowledge, and trust in the researcher, would lead to support for the research with Muslim women.

The first meeting with Shahid was held in December 2012, some three months before the field investigation started. The meeting was held in a community setting; a confidential space, in which it was hoped frank and open views could be aired, the research topic was explored and Shahid’s support discussed. The first meeting opened the discussion on the current socio-political position of
Muslims in Britain, and the idea of UK Muslims as the ‘new suspect community’ (Pantazis, 2009; Spalek, 2010). Additionally, Shahid was asked for his view on a non-Muslim researcher conducting this investigation. It was important to know if Shahid felt, that being non-Muslim would form too much of a barrier for the research to be accepted. This was important in view of the multiple vulnerabilities, and sensitivities, of conducting ethnographic research with South Asian Muslim women. It was important to know, at the outset, if Shahid felt able to support the investigation, and, if he was sufficiently confident in a non-community member researching this sensitive topic.

Exploring a range of socio-policy issues of relevance to British Muslims, Shahid expressed concern about the pressures faced by the Muslim groups he knew, stating that: ‘Muslim groups are going against each other….and that] the Mosques are not leading on this.’ The implication being; Mosques should be, and could be, doing more to bring disparate Muslim groups together. Thus, from the first meeting there appeared to be little anxiety about sharing potentially damming ‘in-community’ information with an outsider. The question of trust was indirectly addressed by Shahid, when he added personal experiences of Islamophobia, to the community level information he had shared, before talking, in some detail, about the research investigation itself. It would appear, in terms of trust, that the relationship moved quickly beyond, what is termed ‘thin trust’ in trust theory to substantive communication (see Giddens, 1990), suggesting a degree of trust capital between the researcher and Shahid.

Shahid said that he felt the current position for Muslim young men was intolerable, reflecting views within his networks, of Muslims as the ‘new suspect’ community. To reinforce this fact, Shahid noted the disproportionately high numbers of Muslims in prison; nearly 10% of the prison population is Muslim, when Muslims constitute less than 5% of the population. This belief was, not only verified by 2011 Census data, but showed an even larger percentage of Muslims in prison that the 5% noted by Shahid. Population Census for England and Wales (ONS, 2013), show that Muslim prisoners comprised 13.1% of the prison population, and 4.0% of the general population (Berman, 2013: 10).
Shahid also expressed anxiety about what he termed ‘the gaze’ of the public, and his belief in the disproportionate focus of law enforcement agencies on Muslims. Public gaze and law enforcement attention on Muslims, Shahid said had led him to change his behaviours and his dress code: ‘before 9/11, I used to wear salwar kameez\textsuperscript{35}, and also go into town in these clothes, but I stopped after 9/11 because I just felt eyes on me’. The phrase ‘eyes on me’ was one that would be repeated often by women during the field investigation. In relation to trust, Goffman’s (1969), investigation of behaviour in public places identified that strangers signal their intent, to one another non-verbally. In this frame, Goffman notes, the difference between ‘civic inattention’ when people passing on the street signal no ill intent or ill will, and the ‘hate stare’ (Giddens, 1990: 80).

It appeared that before the field investigation had formally started, post-9/11, Islamophobic experiences were being shared with the research. The distress caused by recalling experiences of hate for Shahid, was also to become a familiar pattern in conversations with Muslim women. Shahid confirmed that an investigation aimed at understanding the, unacknowledged impact of the ‘War on Terror’ on South Asian Muslim women, may be helpful in raising awareness of the distress experienced by Muslim women. He indicated support for the research, and agreed to do what he could to introduce the research to potential participants. The implication of this meeting, and Shahid’s agreement to support the research was that he had sufficient faith, confidence, or trust in the research to recommend it to South Asian Muslim women in communities that he had ties with.

It may therefore be helpful to explain the professional history shared by the researcher and Shahid. Having worked together (over sixteen years earlier), and having had occasional contact since then, it could be argued that the relationship between the researcher and Shahid had continuity. They shared a history of work, rather than identity, which generated sufficient confidence in Shahid. A second meeting with Shahid was arranged before the research was to get under

\textsuperscript{35} Salwar kameez is also known as kurta pyjama and is the traditional South Asian dress for men.
way. This meeting was held at the end of February 2013, in Fieldway, the neighbourhood that had been selected for the field study. This meeting was to introduce the researcher to Fieldway; to walk the streets of the neighbourhood together. Shahid offered an orientation introduction for the researcher. From the perspective of the research, the walk-about was important for gaining contextual information, and getting to know, the area. The importance of Shahid’s endorsement of the research cannot be understated; his belief in the research influenced the Pakistani women’s centre in Fieldway to accept the research. The process of acceptance, by the women’s centre, was an unexpected outcome of the orientation walkabout. At one point, in the walk about, Shahid entered the gateway to a large Mosque in which the Pakistani community centre was located. The Pakistani women’s centre, called Ashiana (for the purpose of anonymity in this research), was located in the centre.

On entering Ashiana, Shahid introduced the research, and stepped back to observe the conversation between the researcher and centre workers. The atmosphere was welcoming, with centre staff asking questions about the investigation, and sharing information about the work of the centre. The meeting lasted for almost two hours, on reflection, it is fairly clear that this was a form of interview, for centre staff to determine if they felt able to invite the researcher into their space. In terms of trust theory, Stoneman (2008), uses the interview metaphor to note, that in first meetings a character assessment is made using ‘particular clues, the tone of the interviewee’s voice; the level of eye contact; the posture of the applicant’ (p. 107). To continue the interview metaphor, it is possible to think of Shahid, as a trusted friend of the women’s centre, providing a form of reference for the research in brokering the introduction and endorsing it.

The interview was ‘successful’; Ashiana’s manager extended an invitation for the research to, immediately, join a Prevent funded Muslim women’s empowerment workshop at the centre. The research was accepted, and invested with a high level of freedom in that the researcher was offered virtually open access to the women’s centre.
4.5.2 Access to, and recruitment of, community leaders and representatives of the local state

The approach adopted for gathering data from community leaders and representatives of the state, as participants in the research was different to that adopted for access to women residents. Meetings with representatives from these groups were limited, largely due to lack of time, but also because they did not make up the primary group. Semi-structured interviews was the method for data gathering; using a similar broad three part framework to that prepared for work with women participants. The framework is attached as Appendix 2.

Representatives of the local state and community leaders were selected as participants in the research because they embody ‘leadership’ on the one hand and ‘authority’ on the other. Authority and leadership are important in understanding resilience, particularly in relation to civic and civil society institutions and their potential role in supporting resilience. It was therefore important to ensure that participants knew and understood Fieldway. This was a key criterion for selection of these participants. It is perhaps useful to state briefly, how the research understood the distinction between leadership and authority. Authority is distinct from leadership as described by Gastil (1994): ‘democratic authorities do not necessarily serve as leaders, and [popular] non-democratic leaders sometimes lack formal authority, as was the case with Mohandas Gandhi’ (p. 957). Both have an influence on the support available to residents of Fieldway and for South Asian Muslim women.

The strategy for access to representatives of the state, and community leaders was also purposive. The process of access started by working through known contacts; however, ‘snowballing’ proved to be effective in access to these groups as participants freely offered contact details of colleagues, they felt it may be useful for the research to contact. The strategy targeted representatives of the state, as holders of operational or strategic neighbourhood portfolios; they knew and understood the neighbourhood from a professional perspective. These participants were selected because of the service delivery, and resource perspective, as opposed, to a resident perspective they could offer to the research. This perspective was anticipated to provide a further, rich vein, of
information to supplement the community focused information from community leaders and personal experience from women. Initially, a list of service areas was drawn up and key individuals targeted for interview. Professionals were asked to share their knowledge of the issues and concerns for Fieldway as a whole, and for women residents in particular. It was anticipated that professionals would provide data related to local services, Muslim women’s access, and to an understanding of the role of public services in supporting Muslim women at difficult times, such as 9/11 and 7/7. Seven professionals participated in this investigation (see Table 4.1). Ward councillors, local government officers (senior managers and neighbourhood workers), and neighbourhood police officers at constable and inspector ranks were particularly targeted as participants. Four community leaders also participated; two Muslim women managers of Asian women’s community centres, and two male leaders, neither of whom directly managed community work in Fieldway, and both of whom had close relationships with the neighbourhood.

4.5.3 The importance of trust

Trust, or loss of trust, is implicated at all levels of knowledge in this thesis. At the macro level, trust is implicated in the relationship of struggle between the dominant group (for hegemony), and the subaltern group (to resist being hegemonized); at the micro level, in the dynamic of power relations between the researcher and participant. Feminist and anti-imperialist theory demonstrate the importance of the researcher modelling trust in acknowledging the participant as the ‘situated knower’ (Haraway, 1988); as the holders of knowledge. In this dynamic the relation of power/knowledge changes; the researcher is the ‘situated learner’. The changed dynamic of power/knowledge, as reflected in feminist and anti-imperialist frames, lays the basis for reciprocity; it reflects Haraway’s “informatics of domination” (quoted in Stoddart, 2007: 212) in which power is a property of the relationship, rather than being top-down. The idea that, trust builds trust was instrumental in laying the foundation, and sustaining the process, for the exchanges between researcher and South Asian Muslim women, that enabled women to share their narratives/testimonies.
Trust is a social conceptualisation of the relationship of vulnerability and risk; it is premised on ‘the intention to accept vulnerability to a trustee based on positive expectations of his or her actions’ (Colquitt, 2007: 909). This definition reflects Haraway’s (1988) conception of the researcher trusting that participants are holders of their situated knowledge; in this frame the researcher is raising expectations that she can be trusted and processes of reciprocity are possible. This is central to understanding the researcher/participant relationship; as women participants were required to trust the researcher with their personal narratives. This is particularly important because trust, as a cognitive process is based on evidence of trustworthiness (Lewis, 1985). Trust theory also suggests that familiarity is a precondition of trust or distrust (Stoneman, 2008). As mentioned earlier, in this research trust building was premised on familiarity through access by Shahid, a contact known to the researcher.

Trust is important to social relations (Putnam, 2000; 2007; Stanley 2011; Stoneman, 2008), and therefore to social science research, and particularly to ethnographic research. Trust, has been central to the design of the field investigation. Two dimensions of trust are particularly relevant to this research; dispositional or social trust (between researcher and participant) and political trust (between participants and government) (Branzei, 2003). These forms of trust were crucial to the research methodology (ethnography) and the topic of the investigation (the ‘War on Terror’). The former, is essential for access to a population group, often described as ‘hard to reach’ (Garland, 2006; Hooks, 1984). The latter, to understanding the political context of, and in which, the research was undertaken; a context that Spalek (2009) describes as ‘highly sensitive’ (p. 24).

Because ethnographic methodology is relational, trust is critical to the process of developing social interactions (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, 2000; Wood, 2010). This places trust at the centre of this research; without trust the ethnography would not be possible, and women would not participate. Trust, as a cognitive process, discerns between people and institutions that are trustworthy, distrusted, and unknown, on the basis of evidence of
trustworthiness. In this frame, familiarity is a precondition, for trust and distrust (Lewis, 1985: 970); and reciprocity is an important aspect of building trust (Fukuyama, 1988; Harding, 1986; Putnam, 2000). However, experiences of social, economic, and political marginality can influence groups’ ability to trust that state institutions, including academic institutions and researchers, have their best interests at heart. Limits in both forms of trust, formed potential difficulty for this research; there was limited prior knowledge on which participants could form a judgement, or know the intent, of the potential trusted (researcher). Stoneman (2008) suggests that the starting point for any relationship of trust is information regarding the ‘relevant other’ (p. 30), in the case of research participants, this crucially includes, information about the research itself, about confidentiality and anonymity, as well as intent. The fact that the research had the confidence of a known friend of the women’s centre, and the endorsement of centre staff would also have influenced women’s levels of trust in the research. The juxtaposition of the prerequisites for the production and function of trust in the research, with the prerequisites of, suspending judgements and a priori knowledge-claims of the subject, was an inherent tension, which the researcher was aware of and inhabited in the methodology. The following paragraphs outline how the mechanics of building trust were addressed.

### 4.5.4 Confidentiality, information and consent

An important part of building trust, and encouraging participants to share their experiences and meanings, lies in participants being certain that their testimonies would remain confidential. Their narratives would not expose them, or their community, in written texts or announcements. For this reason Fieldway is the pseudonym given to the neighbourhood and, Northend the pseudonym given to the urban area in which the neighbourhood is located. Participant names have been changed and coded; participants were assured that the codes would be securely filed. Participants were also assured that consent forms would be scanned and saved on a secure encrypted computer system in the
University. Original signed documents would be destroyed immediately after they were saved electronically.

Two consent forms were produced prior to the field investigation; one for focus group, and the other for interview participants. Consent forms were accompanied by a sheet of A4 information explaining the objectives of the research. Additionally, women were given an email address, generated specifically for the research, to enable women to contact the researcher at any time that women chose. A mobile phone number, specific to the research, was also set up for the duration of the research, as a second means of communication between the researcher and participants. The consent form reiterated participant confidentiality, and explained that participants were free to withdraw their contribution to the investigation up to three days after the day of involvement, without any explanation.

4.5.5 Analysing data

Data analysis was based on an inductive thematic approach (Brewer, 2000; Boyatzis, 1998). The stages of analysis are described in Table 4.3, although in practice, new data was being analysed and added to existing data and literature, throughout the research process. The addition of new information, in fact played a more important part in data analysis, than is suggested in the linear process described in the table. It was also the case that the stages outlined in Table 4.3 were rigorously followed. This approach allowed meanings to emerge as the field notes, transcripts, and other data were read and re-read and tapes listened to repeatedly.

Table 4.3 Inductive thematic analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Familiarisation with texts: reading and re-reading all data texts and listening to audio tapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Identification of recurring themes in the texts (without interpretation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>Identification of patterns across themes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>Interpretive selection of themes and sub-themes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>Check for inconsistencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Within each of these stages, there was learning and realignment, as new information was generated in the field, it at times focused and refocused the attention of the research; learning, analysis and interpretation were a continuous process in which theory played as important a part as fieldwork transcripts.

Analysis took into consideration existing literature on gender in the ‘War on terror’, (Chapter Three, 3.5) and data generated in Fieldway; including data from the three participant groups already mentioned, as well as documents collected in the field. Using Boyatzis (1998) inductive thematic approach the analysis followed the five steps or stages outlined in Table 4.3.

A mechanical as opposed to computer aided system was applied to data analysis, including the (old fashioned) use of stick-it note comments, coding with coloured highlighter pens, and notes in the margins of text. Every page of each transcript, and every page of the field notes, was subject to the same detailed scrutiny, to identify themes in the data. This, pre-analytic, process involved writing comments on each page and colour coding words and/or sentences; the overall effect led to the creation of what Emerson (1995) terms ‘scenes on the page’ (1995, see also Miles, 1994). The ‘scenes’ became clearer each time the comments and colour coding were refined. Qualitative data analysis programmes such as NVIVO were not used, as the process of coding itself, further embedded the researcher in the relationship with data, allowing in Boyatzis (1998) terms, ‘codable moments’ to occur through ‘sensing a pattern or “occurrence”’ (p. 4), based on the overall knowledge gained through the research process. However, coding also included deduction; the importance of an issue was identified, for example, through the frequent occurrence of particular words.

Sixty themes, without interpretation, were identified at stage 2. These were then further analyses to identify eighteen un-interpreted patterns. The penultimate stage was informed by all the knowledge and data encountered before, during, and in the field, with the outcome of a list of six issues that are termed ‘themes’. Four issues were identified under the heading adversity, and four under the heading, resilience. These have not been called themes, as each heading
included issues related to context; context is broader than a ‘theme’. Context emerged as important, to both adversity, and to resilience. One theme was identified under each heading, with three sub-themes under adversity, and three sub-themes under resilience. Interpretive analysis, identified as stage 4 of the analysis process (see Table 4.3), is attached as Appendix 4. Table 4.4, on the following page, provides a summary of the issues identified.

### Table 4.4 Themes and issues to emerge from inductive analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme/issue</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adversity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Material and relational resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme 1 adversity</td>
<td>Women’s fear and the spread of fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub-theme 1a</td>
<td>Failure of civic institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub-theme 1b</td>
<td>Failure of civil society institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resilience</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme 2 resilience</td>
<td>Relationships and social assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-theme 2a</td>
<td>Resistant identities and behaviours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- claiming space for faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- contesting ascribed identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- formulating counter narratives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub-theme 2b</td>
<td>Resilience building networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Family and neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Friendship networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Women’s centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-theme 2c</td>
<td>Resilience - adapting in conditions of prolonged adversity and retaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fundamental characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Hybrid identities and new positions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The key issues are explored in detail in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.

### 4.6 Conclusion

This chapter had three primary purposes; firstly, to explain the rationale and process for the design of the research and implications of the mutually constitutive relation between content and method; secondly, to link research design to research practice by providing an outline of how research was implemented; and thirdly to foreground the ways in which feminist, Black feminist
and anti-imperialist epistemological principles alerted the research to inherent tensions concerning, power, positionality, voice and knowledge production. Knowledge of, and sensitivity to, the subject group was imperative to the research design and practice. Epistemology informed the research design and practice in several ways; primarily through developing trust and demonstrating that the research was trustworthy. The design of the field investigation can be viewed as a continual, shifting ‘process-to-create-a-process’ (Sandelowski, 2003: 796), with the inherent tensions of insider/outside hybridity. Most importantly, the research design and practice, with and about South Asian Muslim women, in the ‘War on Terror’, could not replicate any aspect of the harm these women experience as/in the Islamophobic search for ideological hegemony.
Part II
Women’s narratives: Adversity and resilience
Chapter Five: Adversity

5.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the findings of the investigation undertaken for this thesis in relation to adversity. It addresses the micro level, lived realities of the effects of the ‘War on Terror’ on the lives of South Asian Muslim women in the North of England. Adversity is defined as disturbance that generates harm (Hardy 2015). For South Asian Muslim women in Britain, the ‘War on Terror’, is known to have generated significant disturbance through the ‘collateral damage’ of Islamophobic violence inflicted on them. (see Chapter Three, 3.5; Lambert, 2011). This investigation identified, harm directly related to the ‘War on Terror’, as well as other forms of harm not attributable to the ‘War on Terror’. Adversity creates harm and multiple, intersecting adversities create multiple, intersecting harms. Placed under the lens of temporality, to bring in the feature of ‘prolonged’; prolonged multiple intersecting adversities have the potential to create prolonged multiple intersecting adversities and multiple harms. Adversity is the condition in which harm is produced and functions. The experience of harm has implications for how adversity is experienced, particularly in terms of prolonged multiple intersecting adversity and harm. These are important frames in locating adversity, and the harm it creates, in terms of the past in the present and the present in the past with implications for future repair, for resilience as resistance and transformation. This mutually constitutive relationship between adversity and harm is evident in the subaltern positions of the communities to which South Asian women belong, such as inequality, as stated in Chapter Three (3.2.3). Adversity and harm are inevitable dynamics in the ongoing struggle for hegemony, and, as explored in Chapter Two, resilience.

This chapter responds to the aim of this thesis to expose, to identify, adversity pre, and post-9/11; to fill the knowledge gap of South Asian Muslim women’s micro level, ‘lived hegemony’ in the ‘War on Terror’. This research moves beyond currently available knowledge of forms of adversity and the harm produced; such as framing Muslims as the new suspect community. Specifically, it provides, micro level instances, of harm experienced by South Asian Muslim
women in conditions of adversity, which exemplify how the ‘collateral damage’ of the ‘War on Terror’ is manifest in the lives of South Asian Muslim women in Britain. Fear of assault, was the most significant finding of this research, and additionally, that in whole system resilience analysis, South Asian Muslim women in Britain, experienced multiple, intersecting dislocations in relations with other parts of the system. This research indicates that these dislocations have led to the failure, of civil and civic institutions, to protect South Asian Muslim women in Britain from the harm caused by adversity. These findings suggest that adversity and harm, exists at multiple levels in the lives of the South Asian Muslim women. Thematic analysis and coding of data, as explained in the previous chapter, identified the following key themes/issues in relation to adversity. These are presented in Table 5.1.

### Table 5.1 Thematic analysis - key issues for adversity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adversity</th>
<th>Context 1</th>
<th>Theme 1 adversity</th>
<th>Sub-theme 1a</th>
<th>Sub-theme 1b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- material and relational resources</td>
<td>- fear and the spread of fear</td>
<td>- the failure of civic institutions</td>
<td>- failure of civil society institutions</td>
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The following sections use selected quotes, from participants in this investigation, to substantiate these conclusions. As outlined in the previous chapter, sixty themes were identified in the first (non-interpretive) coding of data. These were refined and further refined to arrive at the issues identified above.

This chapter provides evidence to substantiate the issues, themes and sub-themes outlined in Table 5.1. Poverty and inequality were emphasised by participants (and particularly by representatives of the state and community leaders), in this field investigation. Resilience literature alerts us to the important role of material resources and material wellbeing, as protective factors, which insulate individuals and communities from adversity and support resilience (O’Sullivan, 2012; Woolcock, 2001). South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway
shared structural inequality; poverty, racism and Islamophobia with members of their community. However, they also experienced Islamophobia differently to men, as well as experiencing gender inequality, within, and beyond their communities.

5.2 Context; material resources and relational equality

This thesis has stressed the importance of context; the intersection of the macro and micro through the lens of temporality and hegemony. The research conducted for this thesis identified the importance context at the micro level (home neighbourhood), in the form of environment and the resources, in Fieldway, that South Asian Muslim women had access to. At the micro level of neighbourhood, it evidenced the effects of macro-level structural inequality, it exposed negative gender stereotyping by some representatives of local state institutions and in communities in Fieldway. These findings indicate that civic and civil society institutions, in their failure to offer South Asian Muslim women the support they required, or to insulate them from harm, exacerbated further forms of adversity. These factors, with the violence inflicted on South Asian Muslim women in the ‘War on Terror’, indicate multiple adversities producing multiple harms, in the lives of South Asian Muslim women. From this perspective, it was difficult, given the evidence available to this research, to see how local civic and civil society structures were able to offer support to, protect, South Asian Muslim women from adversity and the harm created. From the perspective of whole system approaches to resilience, it is difficult to see how, with these breaks in relations, South Asian women are able to be resilient; as interconnection between them, and other parts of the system, are dislocated (Holling, 1973).

Material resources are viewed as important protectors from adversity (Halpern, 2002; O’Sullivan, 2012; Woolcock, 2010). In the frame of whole system resilience, the lack of material resources forms risk to resilience; a further adversity, creating further harm. Lack of material resources was a further issue for Fieldway residents, and therefore, for its South Asian Muslim women
residents. Evidence of the paucity of economic, social and environmental resources is provided in Appendix 3. It outlines high levels of deprivation in Fieldway; it also highlights national studies that evidence the effects of deprivation on the mental health of the poor. For example, poverty more than doubles an individual’s chance of experiencing depression (WHO 1995). Evidence, offered in Appendix 3, indicates that poverty alongside discrimination, such as sexism, racism and Islamophobia add to the mental health distress of Asian, and, South Asian Muslim women. Data, provided in Appendix 3, are important because studies indicate that poverty can have a direct, and indirect, effect on emotional, behavioural and psychological wellbeing and profoundly impact on individual’s ability to cope, or to be resilient. People in lower socio-economic groups are exposed to greater stresses, and have fewer resources to manage them, than people who are better off. Links between psychiatric disorder and poverty, for example, have been found to demonstrate that poverty more than doubles the chance of depression and anxiety disorder (Muarli, 2004:3, Anand, 2005:205, Rowlingson, 2011:16). It is the absence of resilience building assets, such as structural equality and economic wellbeing, that led this analysis to incorporate this backdrop to the prolonged adversity experienced by South Asian Muslim women in the ‘War on Terror’. Structural inequality is itself a symptom of hegemony as explored in Chapter Three.

5.2.1 Inequality, racism and Islamophobia

The following section substantiates the first issue identified in the thematic analysis of all data in this thesis. It builds on the introduction above by grounding the statistical and high level data in Appendix 3, in the evidence gathered in Fieldway. It starts with a quote from a senior local government officer, with strategic responsibility in Northend, including Fieldway. In talking about the main pressures and issues for residents of Fieldway, this participant, called Robert said:
Robert identified himself as, over 60 years of age, white British, and as having responsibility for Fieldway over the past five years. Robert’s statement about the inequality experienced by South Asian Muslim communities was not unusual; social and economic deprivation was raised by all representatives of the local state, and also by all community leaders, who participated in this investigation. Leila, the Muslim woman councillor for the electoral ward, voiced the same concerns when she said “the main issues for Fieldway hit you in the face when you come into the area; poor condition of housing, lack of employment, young people stood on the corners not having enough to do in terms of employment, training, a lot of drug dealing” (Leila, 40 years old had represented Fieldway on the local council for three years). The scale of inequality voiced by Robert and Leila was overwhelming, the enormity of the problem was described by both participants, but neither suggested that they had any idea about solutions, and indeed there may not have been any immediate, or easy, solutions. Robert’s detailed description of the effects of contexts of inequality and poverty, on the lives of residents of Fieldway, is both seductive and distracting. The detail of the description is seductive, in that it draws the listener/reader into the dialogue in sympathy with the overwhelming nature of the problems. It is distracting because it masks, and thereby disavows, the dislocation of the speaker (and therefore the institution) from the reality of the lives and experiences of the people (including South Asian Muslim women) about whom it is speaking. From the perspective of Gramsci’s writing, Robert can be seen as the equivalent of

‘I strongly believe most of the pressures are related to inequality and poverty and that if we [the local state] can really get to grips with inequality and poverty we would start to erase some of the symptoms that manifest themselves in all kinds of ways in the area…pressures like unequal relationships between men and women, distrust between different Mosques, distrust between the Asian community and authority ermm, high levels of domestic violence, poor educational attainment, poorer health, ermm and a deteriorating physical environment, poorer housing, pretty much the spectrum of the indices’ of deprivation; the indicators are not good’ (Robert, senior local government manager).
the ‘intellectual’ who fulfils the role of the dominant group to achieve its plan (Gramsci, 2007: 14). Under the lens of hegemony, the dynamic of seduction and distraction, present in Robert’s description, could be seen as a manifestation of consent and coercion.

The quotes from Robert and Leila confirmed that poverty was an issue of concern that has impacts on intra and inter-community relations; but South Asian Muslim women participants did not raise the issue of poverty. There was, in fact, a marked silence from women; an absence of any mention of poverty, and to a lesser degree of gender inequality. This may not be surprising as poverty and inequality were not the focus of the research; women’s focus was on the effects of 9/11 and 7/7, but women’s silence indicates another dynamic of dislocation; internal, psychic dislocation on the micro level that resonate macro level dislocations in hegemony. This was different for women community leaders, whose experiences concurred with existing studies that the adversity of structural inequality produces far reaching harms on South Asian Muslim women’s mental health.

Numerous references were made by women community leaders to the mental health distress experienced by South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway. Two quotes are offered in the following text; the first is a statement from Shazia, who described herself as 50-55 years old, of Bangladeshi origin and a Muslim. Shazia managed the Bangladeshi women’s centre. Shazia said:

we’ve got a large community here who are quite deprived and who’s got a lot of issues around deprivation, not accessing the service, and inequality in accessing services. Most of people are living below the poverty level and are on benefits, we’ve got issues that are underlying such as domestic violence, the role of women. Recently we carried out a piece of research and we found out that 90% of our users have got some mental health issues in some way or other and it’s because of the oppression they feel within the community, within the wider community. (Shazia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)
In this statement, Shazia began with structural issues related to deprivation, then like Robert, she drilled down into talking about the impacts on women’s lives; the response from the Bangladeshi women’s centre was to commission, or undertakes, research to identify the impacts of deprivation on its user’s mental health. The important point here is that, this community leader was aware of the adversity faced by users of the centre, and took steps to identify the harms. In another part of this interview Shazia described the work of the centre in relation to domestic violence and mental health indicating responsiveness, as opposed to remoteness, of the centre to women’s needs.

Shazia also said that, in some parts of the Bangladeshi and South Asian communities, psychosis or distress is not recognised. Many families associate mental health distress in negative and traditional ways with perceptions that the individual who is ill, is ‘possessed’, and used the term ‘voodoo’ to describe the belief system that suggests the individual is possessed by an evil spirit. Mental ill health is, therefore, often discussed in affected families in terms of traditional responses within their cultural ideological frame of belief. In the frame of temporality, the past is in the present, thus, we can assume that when families are confronted with something that they, firstly, don’t understand, and secondly, causes them shame, they bring to the fore belief systems and ideologies that are trusted/familiar to them. Additionally, as Shazia and Rizwana (the manager of Ashiana) made clear, mainstream health care services do not understand Asian cultures (lack of understanding then becomes the basis of lack of service provision). The struggle between cultures/ideologies and the dynamic of consent and coercion are clear in this example, as the dominant group exercises forms of exclusion on the basis of race, and the subordinate group, turns to its familiar past, in the present, for sustenance.

On three separate occasions, when the researcher was present at Ashiana (Pakistani women’s centre), members of staff were called out of arranged events to support women in mental health distress. One such situation, that is worthy of note, arose after the field investigation had come to an end. On a return visit
to Ashiana, at a time when the centre was not open to users, the researcher made an impromptu visit to the centre. Whilst in the office, a call was received by Ashiana staff notifying them that two women would be arriving at the centre shortly; one woman was in a very bad state of distress. A centre user had attempted suicide, and her friend had rung the centre, not knowing what else to do. The two women arrived at the centre, and were taken into another room where staff could talk to them privately. Staying in the office, it was difficult for the researcher not to overhear parts of the conversation, between Rizwana and the woman, who was weeping and in a very distressed state. An ambulance was called, and the woman’s health care needs were transferred to health care services. There are three reasons for raising this incident; firstly, it demonstrates the actuality of women’s mental health distress; in this instance the woman wanted to end her life, and secondly, it amplifies that for this woman, and no doubt many others, there was nowhere else to turn; the services just were not available to them. Thirdly, it points to the existence, and importance, of trust between the women’s centre and its users.

As with poverty, the issue of mental health wellbeing was largely not raised by women in conversations, focus groups or in interview. This may be because of the stigma attached to mental health distress generally and, particularly, as has been demonstrated, in South Asian communities. The stigma of mental health distress is configured on constructions of risk, thus, in the context where South Asian communities themselves are socially constructed as signifying risk, the difficulties of members of this community to expose and access support for their mental health distress is exacerbated. One participant, Tazeem, in response to being asked where she would go, and who she would turn to, if she felt bad, talked openly about a time in her life when she was depressed. Tazeem described herself as being of Mirpur/Pakistani origin, 33 years of age; Tazeem said she came to Fieldway to marry. Tazeem was unusual at Ashiana; she wore Western jeans and shirt. Tazeem said:

hmm. Don’t know. Lady you get help or my doctor. Once upon a time I was really depressed and I talked to my, she used to take my blood, I don’t know what you call them, to check their [baby] weight and that. And
I was really close to her. I used to talk to her or you can talk to anyone like here at the [Ashiana] centre. I don’t really open up to anyone. I deal with my problems. (Tazeem, interview Ashiana)

Tazeem moved from Mirpur to marry her first cousin, who lived in Fieldway, fifteen years earlier. It was not clear, from the interview with Tazeem, what had caused her depression, however, in the interview a number of issues related to her disillusionment with Britain emerged; some of these are raised later. Whilst Tazeem appeared confident; she wore Western style clothes and was looking to further her education, it is highly likely that Tazeem would have been subject to the issues of oppression raised by Shazia earlier. During the interview, Tazeem made it clear that her choice of dress was deliberately part of her personal safety strategy as is expressed later in this chapter. The point here is that, Tazeem rarely opened up to anyone, other than very trusted people such as her, (we can assume) community midwife and the women’s centre.

While it is not possible to know the precise reasons for Tazeem’s period of depression, Shazia’s earlier analysis, about the impact of the intersectional experiences of gender and racial oppression on women’s mental health, form an important backdrop. When Shazia’s concern about the, ‘collateral damage’, of Islamophobic violence, is added to these, earlier stated anxieties, it is possible to see that adversities are layering on each other. Here, the Black feminist concept of intersectionality is a highly relevant epistemological lens; Crenshaw explains that,

‘[b]ecause the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism [and collateral damage of Islamophobic violence], any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which [South Asian Muslim women] are subordinated’ (Crenshaw, 1989: 140).

The lens of intersectionality insists on, and enables, the connections between vectors of lived experience and identity, in stark contrast to the dynamic of dislocation and logics of binary. This lens is particularly relevant for the analysis
of power structures of sexism and racism in hegemony, and specifically in terms of the prolonged ‘war of position’ in the ‘War on Terror’, the lens of intersectionality enables conceptualizations of hybridity.

Shazia shared a conversation with a user of the Bangladeshi centre that raises similar concerns for personal safety, differently. Shazia talked about the anxieties and concerns of a user of the Bangladeshi women’s centre, uncovering issues of the complexity of belonging, or not belonging, being accepted, or not accepted. The experience expresses the complexity of the identity negotiations that South Asian Muslim women were required to engage in after 9/11. It is clear from the conversation, that Shazia relayed, that the woman concerned was, in post-9/11 Britain, negotiating fear of the consequences of the ‘War on Terror’. Shazia said:

I was talking to her [centre user] after 9/11, and after receiving all these things, she said ‘do you know I’m not British; do you remember that I told you a couple of days ago [before 9/11] that I’m British? My skin colour tells me that I’m not British and especially I’m going to wear hijab so they’re not going to accept me, so I feel that I’m going to, well we’re buying a house in Bangladesh in case they’re not going to accept me here’ and that’s how they [women] feel threatened. (Shazia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

In this statement, Shazia highlights the confusion experienced by many of the centre users, regarding, not only, their ‘British’ identity but also their place in Britain. It is difficult to tell, from this quote, if the woman concerned had been subject to direct violence. Shazia said: ‘and after receiving all those things’, suggesting that the woman had either been personally assaulted, or was affected in some other way post 9/11; possibly by anti-Muslim images and rhetoric. The woman expressed fear of the ramifications of not being accepted after 9/11 when, she felt, being ‘British’ would be different to before; the relation between temporal and spatial dimensions actively constitute this woman’s position of dislocation/displacement. The pre/post 9/11 contrast is vivid, as is the connection between skin colour and hijab; both are symbolic of and (re) produce ‘otherness’. This quote places fear and re-negotiation squarely in the frame of post -9/11 ‘War on Terror’ Britain.
Anti-Asian racism was raised, in the quote above, interchangeably with Islamophobia by Shazia, making it difficult to separate the two forms of hate. The reality for women (and also for men interviewed in this investigation), who share both South Asian and Muslim identity, was the difficulty of knowing if they were subject to race or faith hate. The logics, of dislocation and binary in hegemony, produce psychic fragmentation and confusion; the implications, in terms of resistance to subjugation, requires the transformation of dislocation into connection; collective resistance, contingent on, collective consciousness of forms of hatred as adversity and harm. The centre user also said ‘I’m going to wear hijab so they’re not going to accept me’ emphasising her fear of not being accepted as a Muslim. Several participants described being treated differently because they were identified as, or identified themselves as, Muslim.

In focus group 3, at the Bangladeshi women’s centre, participant A0 made the following comment:

I do feel let down by other members of my Muslim community when they do really, really stupid things. We are constantly apologising which I refuse to do – that’s not me, I don’t do that; and I don’t see why I should apologise for someone because I don’t see other people apologising for something that is nothing to do with them, and I don’t expect them to either. So that kind of weight does get me down; the fact that I do belong to something that is the latest hated religion. (participant A0, focus group 3, Bangladeshi women’s centre)

Participant A0 identified that being Muslim means being treated differently, because she was Muslim, she said she was made to feel responsible for the actions of all Muslims, in a way that she doesn’t see others being made responsible. This quote is interesting because firstly, it paints a picture of Muslims as a homogenous group; of all being responsible for the actions of a few. It also identifies that a different standard is used for Muslims, than for other communities. Participant A0 is also clear that, from her perspective, Muslims are ‘the latest hated religion’. This statement confirms the process of ‘othering’ Muslims, and identifies this process through the temporal frame of ‘latest’. This
was repeated several times by both women and community leaders. Shazia, for example said:

you know it’s true, because you’re a Muslim people ask ‘what are you going to do?’….you never ask those things, but, if you are Muslim you always have to say why you do that, or what you think about that; always about so many different things. Even when I drive I think I have to be an advocate; if I drive badly they will say ‘Muslim woman, bad driver, all Muslim women are bad drives; they drive rough’….It’s really sad that because we are Muslim we have to carry that burden. It’s really sad. (Interview, Bangladeshi women’s centre)

Shazia said ‘because we are Muslim we have to carry this burden. It’s really sad’. One reading of Shazia’s statement is that she is really fed up with being made to feel responsible, another might be that, in stating ‘It’s really sad’, Shazia informs us of her longing to belong; in effect Shazia is occupying the space of hybridity; a desire for multiple positions of belonging. The statement appears to sum up the additional responsibility, that Muslim women and men, felt because they are Muslim; a manifestation of the strategic positioning of responsibility in hegemonic power relations. Both male and female leaders voiced the belief that ‘Islamophobia is here to stay; unfortunately’ (Abdul, interview community centre Northend). Abdul is of Pakistani origin, was in his early fifty’s at the time of the interview, and manages a community centre in another part of Northend. He was born and grew up in Fieldway and many members of his family continue live in Fieldway.

The quotes in this section, on context, offer a sense of the despair of the structural issues of inequality endemic in Fieldway, they also, begin to describe the mental health effects of poverty and inequality on South Asian Muslim women in Britain. These are important contextual pointers for this investigation, setting the backdrop of poverty and inequality, on multiple simultaneous intersecting levels, and their effects on South Asian Muslim women. Additionally, these quotes indicate direct causal effects between South Asian Muslim women’s fear, consequent behaviour change, and the ‘War on Terror’; 9/11. It is within this wider context that South Asian Muslim women’s access to potential
protection from adversity is located. The following section presents findings that South Asian Muslim women, and their close family and kinship networks, live in fear for women’s safety. Fear and the spread of fear, in Fieldway were palpable in this research.

5.3 Women’s fear and the spread of fear

In adversity, ‘fear and the spread of fear’, is the result of deductive and inductive analytic processes outlined in the previous chapter. The inductive processes included observation and insights gathered during the ethnography. Boyatzis (1998) refers to this process as ‘sensing a pattern’ on the basis of all knowledge gathered during the research. Data presented in this section start with national data related to Islamophobic hate crimes reported by Muslim women to Tell MAMA. National data sets the context for Muslim women’s vulnerability to Islamophobic assault, serving as the backdrop for South Asian Muslim women’s narratives in Fieldway. The bringing together of national and local data, helps to explain the spread of fear for Muslim women’s safety amongst Muslim communities. Tell MAMA data alludes to fear as a result of assault, but are not explicit on the experience of fear. Data from the Fieldway investigation makes this link explicit and clear.

5.3.1 Islamophobic attack on women: the national data

The contradictory constructions of Muslim women’s visibility and invisibility in counter-terrorism, within hegemonic power relations of patriarchy and Islamophobia, are elucidated in Chapter Three (3.5). In the context of the ‘war on terror’, the term ‘hyper-visible Muslim woman’ adds a further layer of complexity in the production and function of visibility/invisibility in Islamophobia; Muslim woman as a visible threat, risk, disruption; and hyper as in heightened/hyper anxiety to a heightened/hyper threat. Muslim women, how they look, what they wear; in all aspects of their identity come to embody and signify threat on ‘hyper’ levels. The juxtaposition of Muslim women’s invisibility in counter-terrorism (Chapter Three, 3.5) with Muslim women’s vulnerability to
assault on the streets of Britain, because they wear hijab (Middle Eastern Muslim head covering), or burka, (Muslim head and body cover), exemplifies how they are positioned in the struggle for ideological domination, between Islamic and Christian/Western systems of belief, and ideologies in the ‘War on Terror’. Hijab is illustrated in image 5.1.

![Image 5.1 Hijab](source: google images)

Newspaper accounts of incidents, such as, in the Peterborough Times (2017, see Chapter One, 1.3), report assaults on Muslim women, by members of the British public, who have dehumanised visibly identifiable Muslim women sufficiently, to assault them for no apparent reason, other than, that they symbolise a threat to British values (Allen, 2007; 2011; Rashid, 2013). Rashid (2013) argues that the depiction of Muslim men, in counter-terrorism, is of men posing a potential threat to the physical security of the nation, whilst the presence of Muslim women, is perceived as a potential threat to the ideological security of liberal democracy, and, to the Western way of life. In this analysis, Muslim women as hyper-visible manifestations of Islam, become triggers of the threat, to those who feel endangered by a perceived Islamic challenge.

‘Othering’ in the context of counter-terrorism depicts Islam (and Muslim men in particular) as fundamentalist; part of the ‘discursive terrain, that uncritically
collapses Islam (or certain imagined practices of Islam) with illiberalism’ (Akbar, 2014: 152, see also Spalek, 2009). This generates a climate in which Muslims (and Muslim women) are viewed as legitimate targets. It brings into focus the physical and psychological insecurity of being viewed as the ‘Other’, and, being targeted as the ‘Other’. Women’s bodies in this depiction become the battle ground of challenge (wearing Islamic dress) and counter-challenge (Islamophobic assault).

Evidence indicates that the hyper-visibility of British Muslim women, of whom South Asian Muslim women are the largest group, places them at increased risk of assault, in reprisal for Islamist related atrocities, that take place anywhere in the world, and to which they have no connection. This is a prime example of how, what is happening on the macro level, impacts on what is happening at the micro level; lived hegemony. Islamophobic hate crime data compiled by Tell MAMA\textsuperscript{36} are helpful in building a picture of assaults reported by Muslim women. Hate crime records show that women, who are identifiable as Muslims, face the greatest risk of physical and verbal Islamophobic assault. Reports of assault increase immediately after a national or international incident, of perceived or actual, Islamist-related violence. For example, in the two months following the 13\textsuperscript{th} November 2015 attacks in Paris, hate crime against Muslim women in Britain increased by 328%, compared to the three weeks prior to the attacks (Faith Matters, 2016: 21). Over this period, 61% of all (in-person) assaults targeted Muslim women; 75% of whom were identifiable as Muslim because they wore hijab or burka (Ibid: 32) as illustrated in image 5.2, on the following page.

\textsuperscript{36}Tell MAMA is a nationally recognised monitoring project for anti-Muslim hatred (Faith Matters, 2016)
Perpetrators of Islamophobic assault are identified as overwhelmingly white, male, with the single largest age demographic of 40+ years (Littler, 2015). Increase in assaults on Muslim women, following an Islamist related attack; suggest reprisal, by one ideological group, against another. Eatwell’s (2006) ‘cumulative extremism’ hypothesis, suggests that one form of extremism sparks an escalation or ‘spiral’ (see Chapter Three, 3.4.2). The ‘cumulative extremism’ hypothesis, was tested by Littler (2015), by comparing reports of anti-Muslim assault immediately before, and after, Islamist attacks in Sydney (December 2014), Paris (January 2015), and Copenhagen (February 2015). The investigation found evidence to substantiate the hypothesis, revealing ‘a spike in the number of reported anti-Muslim cases in the periods immediately following each high-profile jihadi Islamist attack’ (p. 13). Increased on-line assaults, largely reported by Muslim men, were also recorded during these periods. National data indicate that, male and female Muslims’ are targeted for attack, but that attacks increase massively at particular times, and also that Muslim women, who are identifiably Muslim, are most at risk of physical and verbal assault.
The Tell MAMA annual report (2016), notes that hate crime work needs to account for the ‘banal and everyday nature of incidents and crimes’ (p. 18) that affect and blight the every-day lives and mobility of victims’ (Ibid.). This was true for South Asian Muslim women who participated in the Fieldway investigation. National data, clusters in-person hate crime by place of attack, indicate that Muslim women are most at risk in public spaces, and on public transport (Ibid: 38). These sites of risk were raised by women in the Fieldway investigation also. These data, alongside information about women’s vulnerability to ‘hard’ counter-terrorism (see 3.5.2), though not raised in the form of home searches in the Fieldway investigation, validate women’s fears and anxieties of victimization. They contribute to the spread, or ‘culture of fear’, (Furedi, 2007; Jackson, 2008; Stanko, 1995) generated in Muslim communities for Muslim women’s safety.

### 5.3.2 Fear generated by Islamophobic assault: women in Fieldway

Throughout the field investigation, South Asian Muslim women spoke of attacks on themselves, or of attacks on other Muslim women, suggesting the prevalence of a ‘culture’ of fear amongst women participants. Quoting Garland (2001), Furedi notes that: ‘fears and resentments, but also our commonsense narratives and understandings, become settled cultural facts, that are sustained, and reproduced by cultural scripts’ (2007: no pagination). A powerful ‘cultural script’, presented by women in Fieldway, was one of fear of the world beyond the home neighbourhood; particularly for women who wore hijab. The quote (in the text box) from Shafia, who was thirty-five years of age at the time of the interview, and who was born in Fieldway, illustrates the fear of her parents’ for her safety, as a daughter who chose to wear hijab, against their wishes.

‘I think that when I went out and about and stuff, because I was wearing a hijab my parents were really worried that if I was in a particular area of if I was alone that I’d need to be really careful because there may be attacks, there was a real fear not to be in a particular place you know and not to be alone, so always be in groups. Families and elderly were worried about what’s going to happen now if somebody tries to hurt another person because of what has happened’ (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre).
The anxiety and fear of parents, expressed by Shafia, was not unusual; a number of participants spoke of their parents, brothers and sisters worrying about their, or other hijab wearing women’s, safety. The, often voiced, cultural script was of family members’ anxiety, and fear, for women’s safety. The association of hijab with attacks on the wearer were repeated. In generational terms, this is perhaps not surprising, as many first generation migrant Bangladeshi and Pakistani women (mothers), tended not to wear hijab, but to wear traditional, South Asian, salwar kameez. This was the case with Shafia’s mother, who wore a dupatta; a loose fabric worn over the shoulders that also easily serves as a head cover when required, as illustrated in Image 5.3. It was also the case that older women, at Ashiana, and in the Bangladeshi women’s centre, wore traditional South Asian dress and not hijab, that originates from the Muslim Easter.

Image 5.3 Dupatta

Many women recalled events, following 7/7 with surprising clarity; almost as if recalling recent incidents, rather than events that had taken place eight years ago. Under the lens of temporality and in regards to prolonged adversity, this suggests that the wounds of fear inflicted at the time, had not healed, and this could well be the case, as the reality, and the script of anti-Muslim hate, continued beyond 7/7/2005. Anxiety was both a personal and a collective experience (as in the quote from Shafia above). For example, Ishmael, who was 30 years old, of Pakistani descent, and a regular attender at Ashiana, displayed deep emotion as she recalled the anxiety in her kinship network after 7/7:
‘everyone was looking out for each other, everyone was saying “tell your daughters to be careful because they could be, for example, attacked”, it was horrible’ (Ishmael, interview Ashiana).

In a discussion of 7/7, in focus group 3, at the Bangladeshi women’s centre, the conversation also reflected fear and the spread of fear. Participants in this focus group are coded A1, A2 and so on to indicate the flow of conversation. The conversation went as follows, starting with participant A5, who said:

7/7 was the first time where – I’ve been here for a few years, 10 years, that was the first time someone actually shouted racist abuses you know, never, ever had before had I had anything like that…. (participant A5) I’ve grown up with racist abuse – I live in XXX and I’ve grown up with racist abuse from a young age. Because I’ve grown up with racist abuse, but I’ve not felt much impact personally from 7/7 or from the Woolwich one’ (participant A3) (focus group 3, Bangladeshi centre).

Both participants A3 and A5 wear hijab. When asked to elaborate, the following conversation took place:

I think everybody was a little more wary, shocked after the London thing (participant A1) yeah, you were a bit more careful, more girls…. (participant, A2) yeah shocked, you’d be a bit more careful, be more vigilant you know when you’re wearing a hijab and stuff like that…. (participant, A3) that’s right, I think people were worried about their own safety (participant, A6) when that happened I was going into town and I thought ‘oh my God what if someone goes for me’ because I had my hijab on, I actually thought that and that was like…….. (participant, A5) (focus group 3, Bangladeshi women’s centre).

In the same focus group, a further discussion elaborated the cultural script of fear, or transference of fear, when participant A1 said:

I think there was one lady on XXX Lane, she was driving and a lady pulled her scarf off and stuff like that. They did as she was parking. She was taking driving lessons that time she got attack on XXX Lane. Then just like there used to be XXX supermarket there was a lady who was attacked there as well and one of the ladies took off her….. (participant, A1) (focus group 3, Bangladeshi women’s centre).
Participant A1 did not have first-hand knowledge of either of the incidents she shared; they were part of the script of attacks on women who wear hijab, which appeared to have become embedded in the discourses of the networks that these women belonged to. Women’s fear appears to have been grounded in these events and also in attacks experienced by members of their group. Tazeem (quoted earlier), shared the following story:

after 7/7 my friends; she covers face, guys they say bad stuff. A few of my friends they say that they go on bus but I go in car. My friend – she wears full scarf and stuff [burka]. You know she was on bus and these boys say stuff to her she got scared and she came home. I drive, I don’t go on buses….maybe because of the way I dress; Western style and stuff I never had any bad comments or bad stuff (Tazeem, interview Ashiana).

Women, who had not experienced assault themselves, noted the vulnerability of other Muslim women; a dynamic of fear spreading fear. Tazeem was clear that she will not put herself at risk by wearing hijab; as mentioned earlier Tazeem dressed in Western style clothing. Tazeem was also clear that she would not travel on buses choosing to drive. Information about attacks on Muslim women nationally, knowledge of assaults on women locally and the perception of hatred of Muslims combine to make women fearful and feel insecure. For example, Aisha, who is thirty-three years old, of Pakistani descent, and was born in Northend said: ‘I remember a lot of hatred at the time [9/11]; friends and colleagues were affected by it; Islamophobia. And when 7/7 happened I thought not again! Is there some sort of conspiracy? Do they, whoever is responsible, really want us to be hated that much?’ (Aisha, interview Ashiana).

Media portrayals’ of Muslims were another issue raised as fuelling Islamophobia in many interviews; Shafia asked, ‘why would the media have this campaign target Muslims as well, and they don’t even understand the religion as well…I tried to get them [younger brothers] to try to understand as well that what they hear in the media they shouldn’t take at face value’ (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre). The sense of Muslim’s as ‘Others’ and not accepted was also often apparent. Talking about hopes for the future, some
participants again expressed fear that was generated by hatred of Muslims. The added fear was that this was not going to change soon. Hakeem, a forty year old community leader, who had grown up in Fieldway said:

> my fear is that I don’t want them (my daughters) to be seen as some people see Muslims; as part of the enemy, as part of this cult, Muslim cult that promotes terrorism….because the last thing I want for my daughters is for them to be attacked or them to be abused, verbally or physically abused because of the colour of their skin. (Hakeem, community leader)

Hakeem, as a father, voiced fears for the safety of his daughters now and into the future. The sentiment was, ironically, strikingly like, the fears expressed by the ‘White Moghuls’ in late 17th century India for the concern for their Eurasian children. Hakeem’s statement clearly links the perception, by some members of the public, that Islam promotes terrorism and the backlash of physical retribution and abuse of Muslim women. Under the lenses of temporality and hegemony, the comparison with the fears of 17th century British men in India are a reminder that the binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’ has been acted out violently, over centuries, creating anxiety and fear for dominant and subaltern groups.

The narratives of women in Fieldway, as well as statements by others, such as Hakeem, confirm that women’s fear of hatred, directed at them, as well as the reality of their vulnerability to being attacked, was linked to 9/11 and the triggering of current heightened anxiety about loss of ideology, in the ‘War on Terror’. Women in this research clearly identified heightened fear and anxiety after the 7/7 London bombings in 2005. Additionally, although women in Fieldway, did not talk directly about vulnerability linked to police and security service home searchers (see Chapter Three, 3.5.2), several comments were made about the vulnerability of male family members, for example those with beards; a further layer of vulnerability to their already insecure position. It is also highly likely that, the sense of being singled out by the state for negative treatment would be further exacerbated by reports that a minority of Muslims arrested, using terrorism-related powers, were found guilty of terrorism related offences (Anderson, 2016; Ni Aoláin, 2013).
Within the wider context of inequality outlined at 5.2, increased Islamophobic assault on women, the spread of fear amongst women, and in family and kinship networks, the field investigation, found little support for women from institutions of the state. The sub-theme 1a outlines what the investigation identified in relation to state institutions responses to women’s insecurity.

5.4 Insulation from adversity; the role of local state institutions

The following text outlines findings that indicate, that representatives of the local state institutions involved in this investigation, had little knowledge of South Asian Muslim women’s anxiety for their personal safety. It is useful to start with a brief outline of the three democratically elected councillors who represented Fieldway at the time of the investigation. Harry was a White British male, aged over 55 years, Harry had represented Fieldway for eleven years, Harry did not live in Fieldway; Leila was a female of Pakistani descent, 40 years of age, Leila had represented Fieldway for three years, Leila was born in Northend but did not live in Fieldway; Wahid, was also of Pakistani origin, male, aged around 45 years, Wahid moved to Fieldway 18 years ago from Kashmir, he has represented Fieldway for six years, Wahid lived in Fieldway. Having represented Fieldway for eleven years, Harry knew the neighbourhood well, Leila understood, subjectively, as a hijab wearing Muslim woman, the pressures on Muslim women, and Wahid said he had two daughters, but we have no way of knowing if they wore hijab, and he knew the neighbourhood well from the perspective of being a resident. The combination, of knowledge and subjectivities of these three representatives, of local state institutions, in terms of experience, and with gender, ethnicity and faith subjectivity, might suggest a deeper understanding of, or a stronger connection with, South Asian Muslim women in the neighbourhood, than appeared to be the case in this research. In interview, Leila expressed concern about the repercussions of 9/11 on ‘innocent parties’ and also shared a personal experience of Islamophobic abuse as a hijab wearing South Asian Muslim women. Leila said she thought the:
Leila also spoke of her fears for her family; children, siblings and parents and particularly stressed her concern for her brother who she said is in the ‘police force, and he’s still in the police force, and the thought that every day when he’s arresting people; it’s just awful’. These statements suggest that Leila, not only shared gender, faith and ethnic identity with women in Fieldway, but also the experience of Islamophobic assault, as well as anxiety about the welfare of family members. Leila’s position of authority within local government, might suggest that post-9/11 anxieties, such as South Asian Muslim women’s fear for their safety, would be understood and acknowledged within local government and partner organisations. Leila was located in dual positions simultaneously; insider and an outsider, in Fieldway and in local government; a position of hybridity within hegemony. Leila’s words testify to the complexity of hybrid positions; a continuously (inter)changing position of ambivalence, conflict and disquiet (Bhabha, 1994).

The two male councillors for Fieldway, Harry and Wahid, clearly stated that they had not been aware of the effects of 9/11, or 7/7, on women in their constituency. In response to the question by the researcher: ‘were you aware of any issues for Muslim women?’ Wahid said: ‘no, no, not one single resident’. We can assume that not one single resident contacted Wahid after 7/7 (Wahid was not an elected member for Fieldway in 2001); the response was one of certainty. Wahid was certain that there had been no effect on any resident, leaving no scope for confusion for Wahid, but his response opens up questions about the function of his unqualified certainty, in the contexts of Islamophobia, counter-

‘repercussions [of 9/11] are going to be for all Asian people, because people are ignorant, and don’t differentiate. You’re all tarred with the same brush, and what’s going to happen now?, because the lash-out; I’ve worn my scarf since I was about the age of 18, and never have I felt uncomfortable before about wearing it, but after that [9/11] I felt uncomfortable, because I was approached and said ‘you Pakis get out of our country’ – it was awful’ (Leila, interview, Ashiana)
terrorism, social inequality and prolonged adversity of the ‘War on terror’. In other words, what is the function of dislocation in terms of what can be thought, voiced and seen in the search for ideological hegemony in the ‘War on Terror’? How do binary logics (unqualified certainty) function, as a psychic defence mechanism, in the face of overwhelming and prolonged adversity in ‘War on Terror’? How does hybridity function in the ‘war of position’ in the struggle for ideological hegemony in the context of the ‘War on Terror’?

When Harry was asked about the impact of 9/11 and 7/7 on the neighbourhood (and by implication on Muslim women) his response was:

No, because the strongest feeling was caused by the Iraq war, and I and XXX [labour councillor at the time]; he was the candidate the year after me in 2003. It was a question of making it clear that although the Labour party in the shape of Mr Blair, had agreed with this approach to the problem, but we did not. Not that it did us any good, still, the XXX got in, but there were feelings, and I know there were feelings, and I know XXX (Labour MP), although he didn’t turn up, at one of his surgeries lots of people turned up to criticise him. It was much more of an issue than July 2005 (Harry, interview Ashiana).

For Harry it was clear that 7/7 had no repercussions for his female Muslim constituents; this is equally as surprising as Wahid’s statement. Harry’s deflection of the question is much the same as Robert’s (mentioned earlier in relation to pressures on the communities in Fieldway). Harry, went on to talk about the holy books of Christianity and Islam, and how the council had miss-informedly, in his opinion, given space to Asian councillors to talk about Islam in full council, and agreement for a procession through Fieldway organised by an anti-war campaign group. Harry said: ‘so, when I think about tensions, I do not remember tensions coming up about July 2005’. On being pressed to recall any impact at all, Harry’s response was: ‘No, the police were probably extra vigilant and maybe just checking out places, but you didn’t know. You didn’t know; you couldn’t pick up anything that there had been horrific acts in London. Well, I didn’t know and I didn’t pick up anything’.
Leila, had not been elected to democratic office in 2005, but was working near the neighbourhood at the time she said:

I wasn’t closely linked at the time but the rumours were that they [women] were withdrawing, and they weren’t going [out] because of fears that there might be lash back from the other communities (Leila, interview Ashiana).

In response to a question about the recent (in terms of the interview) murder of the soldier Lee Rigby, in 2013, during the time Leila was a local councillor, she said: ‘I didn’t get any calls…I think that again people went on as normal’. This statement correlates with women’s responses; police reassurance appears to have functioned differently on this occasion, perhaps because the local police community engagement processes were better established by 2013, than was the case in 2005, as was made clear by Ali, the neighbourhood constable for Fieldway.

Returning to the responses from Wahid, Harry and Leila about the impacts of 9/11 and 7/7 on Fieldway residents: Wahid clearly said that he had no knowledge of impacts for any, not one single, resident; Harry also said, after a long distraction, that he didn’t remember ‘tensions coming up’; Leila, who was not an elected member for Fieldway in 2005, but worked nearby said, she was aware that South Asian Muslim women had become ‘withdrawn’. Leila’s insight is the closest, to the narratives of fear shared by women in this research. These responses are hugely significant as they indicate an almost total disconnect between the lived experiences of South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway, as expressed to this research, and the understanding of the elected members who represented their interests in the local state.

This was different in relation to the police. Following the 2005 London bombings, there was general positive feedback of neighbourhood policing responses; the immediacy of the response and the effectiveness of police reassurance. The swift response was viewed positively by most participants, including women. However Ali, the neighbourhood police officer, who was mentioned earlier, offered a different perspective: Ali said:
in terms of the police response, as I can remember, I got a call, I was at home at the time; can you come in? It was about going out there and giving reassurance and walking the Fieldway area on patrol, really just to reassure people. You had a lot of bravado from young people, boys, you know 'London deserved what it got' and all that but I remember the police response was good. But, to be honest I found it to be fake, and when I say fake, I mean the community engagement at the time was fake. We had no relationships built with the community, we had no engagement with the community, and it was very much a reaction, so you know, people also saw it as, you know, what we were trying to do. Ermm, that in itself doesn’t build trust (Ali, interview police station).

Ali described himself as a 35 years old South Asian Muslim, he had been a neighbourhood officer in Fieldway for the past seven years. It was perhaps understandable, in light of the profile of the bombers (young Muslim males), that young Muslim men might be particularly sought out, or engaged, by police officers, but it was surprising that Ali volunteered no information about the impact of 7/7 on Muslim women, either immediately after 7/7, or in the following months. Women reported a positive response from the police, in terms of community reassurance, but there was no mention, by this neighbourhood officer, of specific work to support women after 7/7.

The independent Muslim hate crime reporting organisation; Tell MAMA, had not yet been established and there is evidence that many women did not report hate crime to the police (Faith Matters, 2016; also the findings of this investigation). It could be argued, that the police were unaware of assaults on South Asian Muslim women. The police may not, at this time, have had either community, or hate crime intelligence, through which to understand the vulnerability of Muslim women, and neither did they have engagement processes through which they could gather this information. Women participants, in the research, also reflected a reluctance to turn to neighbourhood police officers in times of trouble. When focus group 1 participants were asked if they would turn to their local neighbourhood police, they said “no, no way”. This was also the case for some, but not all, interview participants. Lack of trust, and therefore communication between, South Asian Muslim women and the police, may explain Ali’s silence on the issue of women’s vulnerability. It could well be that the police, at the
institutional level, did not understand women’s vulnerability. This is deeply worrying and suggests another dislocation in the relationships between South Asian Muslim women and representatives of the local state.

From a whole system resilience perspective, these dislocations indicate the further loss of potential protection for South Asian Muslim women in this neighbourhood (and in Britain) in the face of prolonged adversity. Despite this dislocation, women participants clearly indicated that from 7/7, relations with the police had improved. Given the apparent lack of knowledge of the police about women’s fears, if not their vulnerability to assault, it is difficult to reconcile these findings. Through the lens of feminism and hegemony, it is possible to state that; women might have been hegemonized, placing their needs in a subordinate position to those of their communities. The conflictual and contradictory positions, in the face of adversity produced by ideological struggle, points to hybridity as a complex position/space of consent and coercion.

It was difficult to gauge, the extent to which relations between the police and women, and women’s organisations, had progressed from the responses in this investigation. From the perspective of the presence of the research in the neighbourhood, it was noticeable that, over the eight months the researcher spent largely at the Ashiana centre, in Fieldway, no officer voluntarily visited the centre. It may have been that the time spent, by the researcher in the centre, did not coincide with police visits, but this is highly unlikely, as police presence was not mentioned by women or Ashiana staff. Operational issues, or cuts in neighbourhood policing services, might also have led to the apparent neglect of relationship building between the police and Ashiana. It has not been possible to conclude this, as this was not a key line of research interest and further study would be required to evidence levels of engagement. What was clear is, the need for greater interaction, contact, and engagement between public services, such as the police, and local government, and women in Fieldway (see Spalek, 2013).

Local policy is enacted in the context of national government. The critique of counter-terrorism, presented in Chapter Three, offers some insights into the
complex, and contradictory aspects of counter-terrorism’s dual aims. At the level of the local state, officials involved in this investigation, noted this complexity and its effects on local actions. Echoing the work of academic Thomas (2010), Robert was explicit about the difficulty of local implementation of national policy. Robert said:

Some of the social policy changes around at the time [2001], were for a greater push for community cohesion initiatives, but I also found that those involved in social policy (and not just the council), others involved in social policy, were a little bit, and have been for many years, double thinking. They’d talk about celebrating diversity, but they haven’t really intellectually squared that. They talk of integration, and they talk of multiculturalism, but then they talk in weird terms of what the culture of England is. You wonder whether or not, you should be taking forward initiatives in increasing peoples chances of English classes, or if you should be putting information out in different languages. It’s that kind of dichotomy and schizophrenia, in social policy, in this field that’s very reflective of policy makers being very unsure of themselves in this new environment. (Robert, interview local government office)

Robert’s comment most clearly highlighted a pattern of hesitancy apparent in interviews with representatives of local government; a sense of uncertainty about how best to deal with, the complexity of a rapidly changing demographic, in what Robert called a ‘schizophrenic’ policy environment; to build cohesion or encourage British values. The analysis offered in Chapter Three (3.4) of the national counter-terrorism strategy may explain the ‘schizophrenia’ experienced in the delivery of CONTEST at the local level. This point reiterates the importance of strong relations in all parts of the social system for the coherence and survival of the system, as in whole system resilience theory. It paints a picture of dislocation between national and local policy, and between national and local policy and South Asian Muslim women citizens.

Again, Robert’s input is seductive; it is difficult not to have a degree of sympathy with the position of being between government and community, of the enormity of the issues faced (as stated in the first comment from Robert), and confusing policy initiatives to address them. In this complex mix of issues, Muslim women’s experience of fear and anxiety for their safety was missing. Women’s experience of fear, post 9/11 and 7/7, was not raised as a concern by a single participant in this group. As a consequence, it was not possible to note one support
intervention, or programme, aimed at South Asian Muslim women. It is important to note that Robert, in local government, and Ali in the police did mention the particular needs of South Asian Muslim women, if not their fear of Islamophobic assault; Robert recognised the valuable work of women’s centres, and Ali described police support for South Asian Muslim women who experience domestic violence from South Asian Muslim men.

From a research perspective, the failure of participants representing state institutions, to mention the effects of 9/11 and 7/7 on South Asian Muslim women, was particularly troubling. All participants were contacted prior to involvement in the research, all were told that this was a study of South Asian Muslim women’s resilience, all were asked direct questions about women’s experiences during interviews, and a number of the interviews were held at Ashiana, the Pakistani women’s centre. Hegemony, in relation to gender appeared, from this perspective to be almost total; there appeared to be little struggle from the perspective of these participants to question the invisibility of women. The invisibility of women’s experience of fear, in local state institutions, questions the role of the local state in protecting South Asian Muslim women from adversity and fear for their safety. Women’s invisibility at the level of the local state, adds to their absence in national state considerations, as expressed in Chapter Three, 3.5. These deficits demonstrate a lack of policy intervention to protect women at macro (governmental), and meso (local state), levels.

The absence of specific state support for women is telling, as resilience literature indicates the importance of ‘protective factors’ at all spatial levels (Halpern, 2002, see also France 2010). Resilience literature also warns that a singular focus on risk (the ‘radicalisation’ of Muslim men), is insufficient for community resilience; protective processes (support for the community) is essential for resilience building (Rutter, 1987). These findings suggest that a protective counter-balance to national risk biased counter-terrorism policy is lacking at the local level. This research also found that Prevent funding was used to support women’s empowerment at Ashiana, this indicates that there is a complex presence of women in counter-terrorism, as addressed in Chapter Three (3.5). The point here is that, there appeared to be no on-going, systematic,
engagement with South Asian Muslim women by state institutions. This investigation found that some civil society institutions, also acted as barriers to support for South Asian Muslim women; rather than including women in existing networks, or providing opportunities for women to build networks of support, women were excluded. The following section addresses the issue of civil society institutions failings to offer women protection from adversity.

5.5. Insulation from adversity; the role of civil society institutions

Two types of civil society institutions, in Fieldway, were particularly identified as offering little, if any, support to South Asian Muslim women; local Mosques and generic community centres. It is important to note that this was not the case for all Mosques in Northend, or all community centres. The centres identified were local to Fieldway. The issue of women’s access to, and use of facilities, in the neighbourhood, was amplified by the lack of public meeting places and spaces, in the neighbourhood, reducing women’s opportunity to develop social networks and collective action (Kilpatrick, 2005). This was evident in the lack of local facilities identified in neighbourhood data in Appendix 3. Meeting places and spaces are particularly important to building social networks and social capital; Forrest et al., (2001) suggest that support from individuals, and organisations, in neighbourhoods are essential to developing social capital and reciprocity (see Table 2.2). Exclusion suggests that communities are not working together, to generate reciprocal benefit and social good, with serious failings in terms of protecting and maintaining community in ‘good working order’ (Masten 2001: 227, see also Chapter Two, 2.3),

Issues related to Mosques in Fieldway, emerged frequently in the field investigation, as potential places and spaces of faith, and social support. However, this investigation identified a number of problems for South Asian Muslim women’s inclusion in these networks. Two examples exemplify women’s formal exclusion. The first is a quote from Fathema, who identified herself as 36 years of age and a second generation Bangladeshi Muslim woman. Fathema
said she was born, and grew up in, Fieldway. The second statement was made by Shahid, who was the contact known to the researcher; the statement was made during the walk about in Fieldway, as the start of to the field investigation. Fathema said:

‘The Mosque that my father and brothers go to, that is next to my house, the XXX Mosque, they don’t have facilities for ladies, but they do have different days with speeches and things. [if I needed support] I would do it through my dad if there was an issue that I wanted an answer from the Mosque. I would give it to my dad, because I couldn’t go there myself. One of the things that we do have is that we have this two way radio so that if there is anything, let’s say for example a death in the community, they’ll announce it, [or] if someone is ill. Someone needs praying [for] too, if there is an incident in the Mosque they’ll announce it in the tannoy’. (Fathema, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

Fathema’s experience of her local Mosque was not unusual in women talking about access to the Mosque. In this narrative, Fathema appeared to be working out the ways in which, as a woman, she could be engaged with her local Mosque. Fathema begins by saying that there are special days for ladies, then if she had a need to contact the Imam she would use her father as her proxy, and finally she says there’s a tannoy and radio system that keeps her linked into the Mosque. The quote signifies that Fathema was working through a process of realisation, allowing her to ‘locate herself’ (Bamberg, 2004: 354) in her narrative, or story of her access to the Mosque that is next door to her home. This Mosque exercises a code of exclusion of women, except on particular occasions; this Mosque is attended by male members of Fathema’s family. This is an important point in terms of the counter-balance to adversity and exclusion explored in the following chapter.
Women in Fieldway were also excluded from the Pakistani Mosque that, during the walk about of Fieldway, Shahid had called ‘the largest Mosque in the neighbourhood’. This Mosque also managed the community centre in which the Pakistani women’s centre, Ashiana, was housed during the time of the field investigation\(^3\). The mosque was noted for its orthodox stance in relation to women; it exercised a total exclusion of women, and had refused to negotiate with women, for their access to the community centre that is adjacent to it.

Shahid said:

\[
\text{this Mosque offers no services or facilities to women, or families. The committee is, well, it’s made up of older, and they’re very traditional in relation to women. To get access to the community centre Abdul [community leader], did a lot of work. Less traditional young Muslims had to join the committee to negotiate women’s access, and it’s not certain how long they [Ashiana], will be able to stay. (Shahid, walk about introduction to Fieldway)}
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Shahid’s comment can be interpreted either as progress because Ashiana gained access to the community centre, or as a lack of progress, as women were excluded from the negotiation process. The male to male negotiation, and its outcome of enabling women access to the community centre, might suggest movement from absolute refusal to another, mid-way point; allowing women access though the mediation of men. The Pakistani community centre, is owned by the local state, and managed by the Mosque Committee, offering a different perspective of women’s complex negotiations to gain access. This experience exemplifies the complexity of ‘the war of position’ in hegemony; struggles of ideological power relations, of position and space; issues of access, negotiation, gender and management. It also exemplifies the complex web of relations of consent and coercion within hybridity; so much more than different ideologies sitting side by side. In this context, the failure of to the local state to intervene on women’s behalf might be read as the local state being sensitive to its dominant, ideologically hegemonic position and working in a way that was not about enforcing/coercing the hegemonic ideology of equal access.

\(^3\) Ashiana closed months after the field investigation ended due to lack of resources at least in part related to high rental charges
Under the lens of feminism, the failure of the state to intervene can be read as
gender hegemony; retaining unchallenged the subaltern status of women in the
dominant ideology. This was a different issue to women’s exclusion from the
Mosque. The Mosque was self-financing; the local state had no coercive
influence over its use. The intersection of state sponsored, and locally owned,
facilities raises challenges in state/civil society negotiations that are rooted in
power and history in complex ways. There is also the additional issue, of the
willingness of local state institutions to intervene on behalf of excluded women
citizens, in terms of influencing change. The issue of state owned, and
community managed, facilities was also raised, in this research, in relation to
the Bangladeshi community centre in Fieldway; this issue is addressed later in
this chapter. The next paragraphs provide an insight into women’s perspectives
of exclusion from the Pakistani Mosque.

The Pakistani community centre, in which Ashiana was located, was in close
proximity to the Pakistani Mosque. The women at Ashiana, were well placed to
know of any incidents related to women’s access, should they arise. A rare event
of a woman, visitor to Fieldway, coming to pray at the Mosque to find that she
was excluded, occurred during the field investigation. The incident is presented
in these findings because it exemplifies women’s exclusion, and also because
the incident raised questions for women at Ashiana. The incident occurred one
Friday before focus group 1 was due to be held on the following Monday; it was
still fresh in the minds of women participants. Women said:

a man from London, and his wife from Algeria, they came for
prayers and his wife went with him. There were lots of mens’, but
no women. She didn’t know what to do, her husband went in
Mosque. She was looking for the door for women. She was really
not believing that she couldn’t go in Mosque. One of the men said
she should come here. She came here to do namaz. We told
her, tell your husband to go back and tell them that he can’t

38 Participants in focus group 1 were not code because the group was large, women joined at
different times. These disruptions made it difficult to gather women’s individual details on
arrival and the size of the group made it difficult to separate voices in the transcribing the
recording.

39 Namaz is the ritual prayer performed 5 times a day by Muslims
believe that his wife can’t go in Mosque. (Focus group 1, held at Ashiana)

This focus group was very mixed in terms of age with the majority of women being over the age of forty years. The incident was relayed with some excitement; as if women in the focus group really felt that it symbolised something important. The incident itself indicates that the formal code of exclusion of Muslim women was a local code; the couple had arrived for Friday prayer expecting that they would both gain access. The incident sparked discussion in the focus group, with women stating their discontent; as one focus group member put it ‘if womens’ take complaint to Mosque they don’t listen’ and another said: ‘it’s not Islam, its culture’. Women spoke of the futility they felt in trying to change tradition; one participant added that a nearby Mosque (not in Fieldway) was: ‘isolated, locked up and not feeling open’. The last statement articulates women’s outsider position and their isolation from the Mosque.

The two local Mosques mentioned, were not the only spaces of exclusion for women; women also appeared to have limited access to generic community centres. This was particularly mentioned in relation to the two large community centres in Fieldway. This is important because, as stated earlier, there are few public meeting places and facilities in the neighbourhood. Thus, the slightest restriction on women’s use of any building is a major setback to building networks, social capital and resilience. The clearest statement of women’s exclusion was made by Harry, a councillor for Fieldway. Harry was clear that the local authority was aware of Muslim women’s exclusion from the Bangladeshi centre, despite a peppercorn rent subsidy for fifty years, by the local authority for community use of the centre. Harry noted that:

the Bangladeshi centre management committee, all male; tensions between them and Bangladeshi women’s centre, who of course, are all female. It looks to me like they have been abominable towards women; Shazia [women’s centre manager] in particular, about how they [women]
could be allowed to use the building, and so on and so forth. So, for example, when they said they wanted an advice worker, I said yeah we might explore that. One of the ways that it might be worth doing, obviously the women’s centre is an organisation that already exists to provide the right advice to local women and they’re used to trying to get money, to get the right person in post. Perhaps we could try and get a joint application together? It became very clear they didn’t want anything to do with the women’s centre at all. ‘Oh, no, no it isn’t anything to do with them being women’ [male response]; well of course it blooming well is. (Harry, local councillor for Fieldway, interview Ashiana)

Nor was this the only situation of women’s exclusion from, or difficulty in accessing, generic facilities. The account given earlier, of Ashiana’s difficulty in gaining access to space in the Pakistani centre, is a further example. As described earlier, in the quote from Shahid, the centre was managed by the local Mosque with an all- male committee, who had refused to negotiate women’s access to the centre with women. Additionally, while Ashiana was offered a one year lease for space in the building, the research was informed that the rent was high and likely to be unaffordable in the longer-term. Lack of support from the Mosque, that manages the Pakistani community centre, had in part led to the closure of Ashiana not long after this field investigation was completed. As far as this research is aware the building remains unoccupied.

5.6 Conclusion

In the context of the foundations laid in previous chapters in the thesis, this chapter draws together data from resilience studies, counter-terrorism policy, the ‘War on Terror’ and national anti- Muslim hate-crime statistics. Importantly, it adds new data from the empirical research. It demonstrates that Muslim women, and South Asian Muslim women in Britain, narrate the experience of fear; of the multiple, intersecting prolonged adversity of being vilified and vulnerable to, and/or fearful of, hatred directed towards them. Women linked the experience of fear to the rise in Islamophobia in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ after 9/11.
Firstly, the structural issues of poverty, relational inequality and lack of access to generic community resources can be seen as prolonged adversity and harm for women. Rather than offering respite, or shelter, from adversity, the dislocation of local mechanisms from Muslim women represents the failure of these mechanisms to acknowledge, understand and respond coherently to the needs of South Asian Muslim women in the research. Poverty and disadvantage are risks to resilience (O’Sullivan, 2012); poverty increases stress levels and mental health distress. Responses to the adversity, and consequent harms, experienced by South Asian Muslim women have to move beyond stereotypes of South Asian Muslim women raising the question, in these situations; where is the protection from the ravages of adversity and the consequent harms? Factors that promote resilience to adversity, such as social networks, can be seen to be fractured, prohibited and constrained. Women’s exclusion, from limited resources in the neighbourhood can be seen as the failure of the neighbourhood to protect women. At all levels and in all directions, these findings demonstrate the ways in which the search for hegemony/power is played out on the micro level; lived hegemony, including patriarchy. These failures produce, and reproduce, adversity and harm for women; limiting the psychological, physical and social places in which they are able to ‘defend’ themselves or undertake the repair work, collectively required to build social capital.

Failures at the level of the local state reflect failure outlined in Chapter Three (3.5) at the level of national counter-terrorism policy. These data indicate that protective approaches, as a counter-balance to state, risk based, counter-terrorism policy, are in short supply for South Asian Muslim women. Data from Tell MAMA, and, the narratives of women in Fieldway, indicate a correlation between perceived or actual Islamist atrocities world-wide and increased attacks on visibly identifiable Muslim women (Littler, 2015). At the national level Islamophobic hate crime data confirm the vulnerability of Muslim women to assault. This investigation suggests that this knowledge might add to already existing ‘cultural scripts’ of vulnerability to assault amongst women. The scripts formed, informed and re-informed the day-to-day lived experiences of multiple,
intersecting prolonged adversity and harm of women in this investigation, leading them to develop coping strategies and take protective actions.

The Fieldway investigation found that fear of assaults, for hijab wearing Muslim women, extended into women’s networks and included family and kinship networks, fear extended beyond these immediate networks to wider community networks. Individual women’s vulnerabilities appear to have affected most people in the communities in Fieldway investigation. Whilst it was not the role of this investigation to explore the extent of the spread of fear, or its effect, on South Asian Muslim communities, this might form a line of inquiry in a future investigation. These data suggest that it is important to understand the lived hegemony; fear has the effect of containing citizens in their views, movements and behaviours and should therefore offer insights for policy responses (Furedi, 2002).

The overall picture to emerge from these data is one of the extreme adversities; simultaneous, multiple and prolonged, that create simultaneous, multiple and prolonged harms. When considered in relation to whole system resilience thinking it indicates that there are many fissures in the interconnections of parts of the social system. Individuals, environment, intra and inter-community relations appear to be fractured. From the perspective of this investigation, it is difficult to see the symbiotic relationship of support and counter support, which engenders a protective shield in the system. Nor could this investigation understand all aspects of the totality of South Asian Muslim women’s relationships, and inter-dependencies, in family and kinship networks and in the faith networks they engaged with. With these caveats, the investigation found that South Asian Muslim women occupied marginal positions, making it difficult to understand how they survived the multiple shocks and disruptions described in their narratives. This is a bleak picture of adversity and one that leads to the questions, how were these South Asian Muslim able to be resilient? What were the mechanisms and processes that served to protect and enable them to adapt to multiple, intersecting and prolonged adversity and consequent harms?
Chapter Six - resilience

6.1 Introduction

This chapter shares the findings of this research, in relation to South Asian Muslim women’s, resistant and resilient responses to the, already highlighted, adversities demonstrated in the previous chapter. It responds to the aim in this research; to identify forms of resistance and resilience to adversity, and how they are manifest in South Asian Muslim women’s behaviours and actions. Of particular importance are the findings, that South Asian Muslim women, in Fieldway, experienced multiple intersecting prolonged forms of adversity, and have limited protection from local civic or civil society institutions to respond to adversity. Additionally, data, highlighted in the previous chapter, identified the paucity of material resources to insulate women from adversity. These combined conditions make it particularly important to identify the mechanisms in communities that make it possible for women to be resilient.

Rigorous thematic analysis of data gathered in this research, found that amidst women’s narratives of fear, behaviours of resistance were discernible; for example, the significance of women’s social relations for building resilience, was evident. Table 6.1 (on the following page) outlines the themes and sub-themes that were identified in relation to South Asian Muslim women’s resilience. These themes form the framework for this chapter; the structure through which the findings are substantiated and given analytic meaning.

The key issues identified in Table 6.1 are in three parts; resistance behaviours and actions that indicate the presence of resilience, the social mechanisms that contribute to women’s resilience, and South Asian Muslim women’s creation of hybrid identities and positions in their communities and in society.
Table 6.1 Thematic analysis - key issues for resilience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resilience</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theme 2</td>
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| Resistant identities and behaviours | - Contesting ascribed identity  
- Formulating counter narratives  
- Creating spaces for faith capital |
| Sub-theme 2a |             |
| Resilience building networks | - Family and neighbourhood  
- Women’s friendship networks  
- Women’s centres |
| Sub-theme 2c |             |
| Resilience - adapting in conditions of prolonged adversity and retaining fundamental characteristics | - Hybrid identities and new positions |

6.2 Resistant identities - women’s behaviours

It is useful to start with a reminder that whilst resistance and resilience describe distinct forms of behaviour they are intrinsically connected as described in Chapter Two, 2.4. However, it is also important to remember that acts of resistance come into existence in the presence of resilience; resistance is the agentic response to hegemony/power and inequality by a resilient individual, group or system. From this perspective resilience is the capacity to absorb adversity and ‘bounce back’ to pre-trauma functioning and resistance is the challenge to disruption. Resistance, when seen as a response to an ‘intolerable’ condition (Bottrell, 2009: 329), in this instance when South Asian Muslim women find the identity ascribed to them intolerable, causes further disturbance.

Analysis suggests that South Asian Muslim women, in Fieldway, subverted the dominant construction of identity, through forming new identities, which more clearly reflected their identity needs, and more clearly described who they see themselves to be. The following sections offer detail from women’s narratives to substantiate these findings.
6.2.1 Contesting ascribed identity

This section focuses on hijab as resistance, rather than restriction. However, it is useful first, to clarify the identity of Muslim woman that women in the Fieldway study contested. Dominant, counter-terrorism, discourses construct South Asian Muslim women as passive; oppressed by hyper-patriarchal Islam, or, as sufficiently malleable to be co-opted into the state’s project to moderate Islam (see Chapter Three, 3.5). In the everyday lives of the Muslim women residents involved in this investigation, women located themselves in a range of positions that demonstrate resistance, rather than acceptance, of these dominant constructions.

Hijab has become a universal signifier of Islamic faith; a dress code for Muslim women, regardless of ethnic origin, or traditional dress (Afshar, 2005). For younger South Asian Muslim women, it has displaced the traditional salwar kameez and dupatta; the loose scarf depicted in image 5.3. The image depicts a garment that is easy to adorn and to remove, and that is considerably easier to apply than the hijab (see image 5.1). It is suggested, that wearing hijab is not accidental; it is a deliberate and conscious decision made by the wearer. During the field investigation, it was noticeable that women who wore traditional South Asian dress, had their head uncovered (with the dupatta worn as depicted in Image 5.3) most of the time, while women who wore hijab, retained the head cover continuously. This observation is of significance, because, it indicates deliberation on the part of the hijab wearer.

Western observers view hijab in primarily binary terms; as a symbol of agency by women, or a symbol of their oppression. The latter view suggests that Muslim women do not exercise choice; they are told, or instructed, to cover their heads (Diffendal, 2006; Woldesemait, 2013). This investigation concurs with the former view; that women, in the Fieldway investigation, chose to wear hijab rather than being instructed to do so. However, the findings trouble binary framings of Muslim women’s relation to hijab; suggesting a more complex relation to
hybridity. The investigation found, concurring with studies by Woldesemait (2013), Ruby (2006), and MacLeod (1992), that, some South Asian Muslim women wore hijab against the wishes of their parents. The choice to wear hijab might be viewed as paradoxical, as the vast majority of women who participated in this investigation, expressed fear for their vulnerability to Islamophobic abuse, because they were identified as Muslim (see Chapter Five, 5.3.1). South Asian Muslim women in this study, spoke of the displeasure of their families, who viewed hijab as placing them at increased risk of Islamophobic assault.

Nor were all the hijab’s worn by women participants ‘shy’, or ‘retiring’, items of clothing; some were elaborate, eye-catching, and attention generating garments. Women who wore elaborate hijab, appeared to choose to put time, and effort, into creating complex head covers, and talked of the importance of hijab, as a symbol of their faith. Thus, women’s embrace of hijab, as a marker of Islamic faith, appears to have been undertaken with pride, and in the knowledge of the risk of Islamophobic assault, and the fear wearing hijab generated; creating a complex dynamic, for South Asian Muslim women. Hijab made these women visible to individuals, and groups, who posed the greatest risk to their safety. Hijab wearing, in the context of fear, reflects the complexity of women’s Muslim identity positions; between their solidarity with Islam, and, fear for their safety. Fahim’s description of what wearing hijab meant to her, provides an insight into one woman’s subjective experience of hijab. Fahim was 29 years old at the time of the interview, she described herself as being of Pakistani origin, was born and grew up in Birmingham, and moved to Fieldway four years before the interview for this research was conducted. Fahim said:
Fahim offered the most ‘positive’, and lest fearful expression of wearing hijab, amongst all the Muslim women participants in the Fieldway investigation. Her intention was clear; she wanted to be a better Muslim, and that would enable Fahim to progress, from, what she described as being ‘a part-timer’, to being a full time, hijab wearer. Fahim went on to say:

I feel quite confident and comfortable wearing it. I’ve never really, ever, had any comments, or had anyone looking at me in that kind of way just because I got a head scarf on. No, I’ve never had anything like that just because I got a head scarf on. No, I’ve had nothing like that; I still live a normal life. I’ve not been wearing it for long, no, and I wear it fashionably as well. I think if I was wearing the whole outfit it would be different, because I just wear it in a completely different way.

The first part of Fahim’s narrative (in the text box), demonstrates that wearing hijab was a matter of faith. In the second quote, it is more a matter of identity representation; Fahim was clear that she was comfortable wearing hijab, which she wore with style and elegance. The juxtaposition of wearing hijab ‘fashionably’ and feeling comfortable, with hijab as a symbol of faith practice, suggest that Fahim considered the acceptability of hijab to others, to herself, and to her faith. It might also be possible, that Fahim considered wearing hijab stylishly, as offering her protection from Islamophobic attention. In this frame, Fahim’s form of protection of herself could be seen as resilience. Fahim went on to state that if she was wearing the ‘full outfit’ (burka) it would be different, suggesting that she might be more likely to be targeted for assault. Fahim did

‘I don’t want to be forced into it [wearing hijab], because I’ve never been forced into it; it’s something I wanna do from the heart. I do my prayers and stuff, and when I do my prayers, I should be wearing a scarf because we should be covering our head, and it’s something I want to do [full time] only faster. It’s just to make myself a better Muslim, for myself, in myself, not for anybody [else] – NO’ (Fahim, interview Ashiana).
not talk about fear, instead she took action to avoid the fear of being targeted; this indicates that personal safety was a consideration for Fahim in what she wore and how she wore it. Caught between representing her faith; Islam, and phobia of her faith, Fahim made clear choices about how to represent her identity. She was Muslim, but not a burka wearing Muslim, she wore hijab as a symbol of her faith, but also in ways that were acceptable to her faith and to society. This is a complex mix of negotiations; undertaken, with personal safety in mind, reflecting a complex relationship between hijab and resilience.

Fahim’s story was markedly different to those of other participants; if there is no ‘special magic’ (Masten, 2001, see 2.2.1) in resilience, then it is necessary to try to understand why Fahim’s narrative was so different to that of the majority of hijab, or salwar kameez wearers, who had grown up in Fieldway. The primary difference is that Fieldway consists of mono-ethnic (Pakistani or Bangladeshi), and mono-faith (Muslim), streets whilst Fahim’s neighbourhood in Birmingham appeared to be ethnically mixed (and therefore presumably mixed in terms of faith). These differences make Fahim’s story sufficiently interesting to warrant attention. Fahim was born, and grew up, in a multi-ethnic neighbourhood in Birmingham. She was a teenager in 2001 and still at school when the al-Qaeda attack on mainland America occurred. She remembered 9/11 being bought up in school, but had no recollection of its impact on herself or her family. She was at college at the time of the London bombings in 2005, but again, remembered little about 2005, and again, did not recall any negative impact on herself or her family. When asked about her life in Birmingham, Fahim presented a picture of a mixed and apparently cohesive neighbourhood. Fahim said:

Here I do live mostly with Muslim’s, but I didn’t in Birmingham; there’s a lot of white people [where I lived] in XXX in Birmingham. But here, I don’t live far from here, it’s mostly Asian’s. It’s all right, yeah. It was quite different in Birmingham yeah, but I didn’t have anything; we had lovely neighbours there, and we still [live] in the same house, so it’s not really [changed] much (Fahim, interview Ashiana).
Looking over Fahim’s interview transcript, it is possible to see that Fahim might have replaced the sentence ‘but I didn’t have anything’ (in italics), with, ‘I didn’t have, or experience, anything bad’; to pick up connotations to Islamophobia. On questioning Fahim about the response of her white neighbours to 9/11, and 7/7, she said ‘nothing changed, yeah, as normal, as normal, friendly’. This is a very different picture to the one painted by women who grew up in mono-ethnic communities in Fieldway, with no white neighbours as a point of reference. It is possible to see Forrest’s (2001), positive neighbourhood effects for building social capital, in the neighbourhood in which Fahim grew up (see Table 2.1). Forrest suggests that, supportive networks, reciprocity, collective norms and values, and a sense of belonging, are aspects of neighbourhood that generate social asset. It is possible that these neighbourhood qualities existed in the multi-ethnic neighbourhood in which Fahim grew up. The social capital generated in positive multi-ethnic contact may have had a protective effect for Fahim, protecting her from the ‘cultural script’ of fear of white Islamophobic assault because she had another point of reference. After 9/11 and 7/7 she said that relationships with her white neighbours did not change it continued ‘as normal’ (Fahim, interview Ashiana).

This is particularly important as national statistics indicate, that the single largest group of people who assault Muslim women are white, male, and over 40 years of age (Littler, 2015). It cannot be stated with certainty, from this research, that growing up in a cohesive, ethnically mixed, neighbourhood offered Fahim protection from fear, as it is not possible to know if, and what, other protective factors were also at play in Fahim’s life. Fahim, did however, also state that in Fieldway she was ‘mostly surrounded by Asian people, and mostly worked with Asian people’ but that she also attended a community centre in another area of Northend that ‘gets a lot of white people who come and they all really get on with one another’. This statement indicates that Fahim wished to continue to have contact with groups other than her immediate family, kinship and neighbourhood groups and that she continued to engage in wider, ethnically diverse, networks. Fahim’s narrative offers a potential example of protection from the ‘cultural script’ of fear that South Asian Muslim women who grew up in, or lived for many
years in, Fieldway appeared not to have.

Mostly, South Asian Muslim women, in the investigation, expressed fear for their safety when they moved beyond the immediate home neighbourhood. Fahim’s story brings into focus the potential protective features of a cohesive ethnically mixed neighbourhood, suggesting a form of psychological protection from the fear of Islamophobic assault. Fahim’s experience is important because it offers a different, and less corrosive, example of fear generated by hijab wearing. Fahim was interviewed in June 2013, just one month after the murder of soldier Lee Rigby in May 2013. At the time of the interview, anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK soared in all parts of the country, as illustrated by statistics from London that showed a 147.5% increase in anti-Muslim hate crime from the previous year (Copsey, 2013). This appears not to have been the case in Northend, where reported hate crime appeared to have been less steep, although figures for the region indicate that hate crime had more than doubled (Wright, December 2013). As indicated by Ali, the neighbourhood constable, local police were out and about in Fieldway immediately after Lee Rigby was murdered to reassure the public, and to prevent retaliatory hate (see Chapter Five, 5.4). However, Shahid (the known contact) questioned local hate crime data for Northend suggesting that the figures were higher than those published. He said:

it [anti-Muslim hate crime] went through the roof, but I think it was being played down nationally, and locally; how that had caused increased concerns and tensions among Muslim communities was being played down; it’s not so much of a big problem kind of thing. So Tell MAMA, which was this national [project] measuring anti-Muslim attacks, they came up with, I think three days after the attack, they came up with 200 reports and that was both physical, verbal, and on-line, and the on-line kind of stuff was almost dismissed. (Shahid, known contact)

Neither Fahim, nor other women participants, indicated an increase in fear of assault in Northend at this time; most commented positively on increased police presence in Fieldway. This should not down play the effects of hate crime nationally or regionally, nor on-going anti-Muslim hate crime that has remained largely consistent since 9/11 (Copsey, 2012; Hussain, 2012; Lambert, 2011).
It may, at this point, be useful to try to get a sense of when, South Asian Muslim women involved in this research, started to wear hijab; the questions being, was it before, or after 9/11? Was hijab wearing affected by events that increased assaults and fear? The following extracts from conversations with women offer some insights; the quotes from focus group 3 participants, were framed in discussion about the effects of 9/11. Participants in this focus group are coded, as in the previous chapter:

I didn’t used to wear a headscarf [hijab] that much before, and now I do have my head scarf, and certain people do, you know, it’s the people who make you feel uncomfortable…but then you think “ah whatever” and you just get on with it…’ (participant A2). It’s the way they look at you’… (participant A5). ‘Yeah, do you know the expressions that come across to you like you got to change your image, yeah?’ (participant A2, Focus group 3, Bangladeshi centre)

This discussion suggests that participants A2 and A5, started to wear hijab after 9/11, as participant A2 said she didn’t use to wear hijab then (9/11). Both participants A2 and A5 voiced the discomfort they felt from the expressions of non-Muslims. A2 stated that she felt she was being summoned, by the way people looked at her, to ‘change [her] image’; presumably to renounce hijab. These quotes locate women’s decision to wear hijab in the frame of post -9/11 Britain; these participants described that their decisions to wear hijab were based on issues that go beyond being made to feel uncomfortable; their decisions took into consideration uncertainty about how, and if, they would be accepted. However, what is clear is that they chose to continue to wear hijab. Read in terms of Goffman’s studies into stranger interaction, in which non-verbal signals of intent, are relayed through eye contact and body language; the experiences of women in focus group 3 indicate the presence of, what Goffman terms, the ‘hate stare’ (Giddens, 1990: 80). This is important to understanding the resilience of focus group 3 participants, who continued to wear hijab, as the symbol of their Muslim identity, in the face of uncertainty, discomfort and hate.

These South Asian Muslim women were resisting the hatred of Muslims directed towards them and, in the process, demonstrating resilience as resistance. Under
the lens of temporality and hegemony, the crucial point is that, the ‘hate stare’ arises out of, and is constituted in, centuries of struggle for colonial domination. In this frame the ‘hate stare’ is continuing a process of humiliating South Asian Muslim women (see Chapter Three).

It was also the case that Fathema, quoted in the previous chapter, started to wear hijab after 9/11. Fathema’s story is different to that of focus group 3 participants; it is also different to Fahim’s, quoted in the text box, at the start of this section. Fathema stated that her decision to wear hijab was a direct response to 9/11. Fathema’s disclosure of her decision, to wear hijab, was made in the context of Fathema talking about conspiracy theories and her awareness of Islamophobic hatred towards Muslim’s after 9/11. This is important as it places Fathema’s decision to wear hijab in the context of known hatred towards Muslims. Fathema said:

No, no, I wasn’t wearing hijab at that time; it was something that I wanted to do, but I didn’t - it was in October, one month after [9/11 that I started to wear hijab]. It was when I was at the women’s centre (Fathema, Bangladeshi women’s centre).

9/11 was clearly the trigger, the motivation, for Fathema to start wearing hijab. Rather than drive Fathema away from Islam; Islamophobic hatred had the opposite effect, it drew her into Islam. Fathema’s experience clearly indicates that, for her, hijab was a symbol of solidarity with her faith and her people, at a time of their vilification. Fathema’s words: ‘when I was at the women’s centre’ (in italics) provides a clue to the social mechanism that gave her the confidence to wear hijab; this was not something she did on her own. This suggests the centrality of the women’s centre, and social networks in her decision to wear hijab; this point is picked up later in this chapter. Fathema’s solidarity with Islam and expression of her religiosity became clear as the interview progressed, Fathema said:
what changed for me [after 9/11 and 7/7], was for me to understand my religion a bit more as well, and I’m doing that. Anyway, I was doing groups and I think it got me to think about things. How can I change people’s perception about Muslims? (Fathema, Interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

9/11 and 7/7 led Fathema to become more interested in learning about her faith; she attended classes at the women’s centre. The knowledge she gained helped her to understand the significance of hijab in the Qur’an, and, appeared to have generated faith capital that may have contributed to her ability to demonstrate resistance to the hatred of Muslims that she perceived in society. Fathema was aware of the Islamophobic hate that would be directed to her as a Muslim, and that hijab wearing would leave her vulnerable to assault, despite these fears she chose to wear hijab at a time of heightened anxiety and increased Islamophobia. Fathema made more than one reference to the anxiety, her choice to wear hijab, caused her family. In one such statement she said:

when I went out and about and stuff, because I was wearing a hijab, my parents were really, really, worried, because there may be attacks [on me]; there was a real fear. (Fathema, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

As a second generation Muslim woman from Bangladesh, Fathema was different to her mother who dressed in traditional South Asian salwar kameez, and, did not wear hijab. A few months after the field investigation had ended Fathema got in touch with the researcher, to share the story of an Islamophobic attack that she and her sister had been subject to. The two women were shopping, on a Sunday, in a supermarket in Northend when they were assaulted. The police were called and there was some confusion about whether or not the assault of the two women was caught on camera, as it occurred outside the supermarket, in the car park when they were leaving. Statements were taken from Fathema and her sister by the police, but Fathema was uncertain about what further action would be taken, if any, against the men who pushed these women, shouted abuse at them and pulled their hijabs in an
attempt to remove them. Fathema and her sister were unhurt physically, but they were both psychologically shaken by the incident. We can only imagine that the violence perpetrated against these sisters would become a further part of the already-existing cultural script of fear that was already widespread in Fieldway.

So what do women’s narratives about wearing hijab tell us about contestation? First, this research offers a significantly different view, to the dominant narrative, of South Asian Muslim women as oppressed in hyper-patriarchal Islam. The women in this research were self-determined; they made choices to wear hijab. Women, like Fathema, challenged the wishes of their families with regard to wearing hijab. These were not acts of submission to patriarchs; husbands, fathers and brothers, instead hijab wearing was a challenge. This finding challenges the construction of South Asian Muslim women as hyper-oppressed under a hyper-patriarchal system. Additionally, women chose to present themselves as emblematic of Islam, in a society in which they knew hatred and hostility to Islam was present; they were made to feel uncomfortable and were attacked but continued to wear hijab. This does not suggest passivity, wearing hijab in these conditions, suggests South Asian Muslim women were enacting resilience as resistance. Here, there is nothing neutral about the resilience of these women; it places their resilience in the context of the struggle for hegemony – a highly political field of relations of power.

Secondly, the intolerable identity ascribed to South Asian Muslim women portrays them as malleable, for example to the UK government’s project to moderate Islam. Aside from the day to day behaviours of Muslim women proudly proclaiming that they are Muslim, there is also evidence, from feminist scholars (Lewicki, 2016), that some Muslim women’s groups, actively challenge the dominant identity ascribed to Muslim women (see Chapter Three, 3.5). Feminist scholars have identified ways in which Muslim women’s groups have appropriated Prevent funding, to challenge these perceptions within their communities and in institutions of the state (Ibid.). Women’s choice to wear
hijab, in the face of violence against them, and against the wishes of their family, clearly indicates their self-determination rather than malleability.

In negotiating the boundaries of dress, women exercised judgement on a daily basis, about how to represent themselves. Tazeem for example (see 5.3.2), determined that Western dress was preferable to clothing that identified her as Muslim. For the majority of women, who participated in this investigation, hijab was the limit of their wish to signal their religiosity to a hostile secular society. Women’s appropriation of the hijab has been explored as a pattern that identifies women’s re-formulation of identity; securing new identity positions required South Asian Muslim women, in Fieldway, to negotiate, or re-negotiate, social relations in their families and in wider society. Women’s re-formulation of identity is explored in 6.4 as expressing hybrid identities. In making the claim that, hijab has been appropriated as a symbol of South Asian Muslim women’s liberation, this investigation adds to a small, but growing, body of literature that recognises hijab wearing as a form of resistance. For example Afshar (2005) argues that:

Far from an indication of submission or docility the decision to wear the hijab makes a public statement that places the mohajabehs in the full light of the public gaze; something the parents and kin groups do not necessarily wish to see. It may even be seen as a clear indication of their new radical interpretation of the faith that they define as liberating rather than constraining. (p. 277)

6.2.2 Formulating counter narratives

The formulation of ‘the counter narrative’ follows a similar logic to other forms of resistance; counter-narratives exist as a response to inequality in the frame of the ‘master’ or ‘dominant’ narrative that they challenge (Bamberg, 2004; Stanley, 2007). Counter narratives are discursive responses that run counter to hegemonic discourses (Bamberg, 2004). Actions and behaviours that contest dominant narratives are rooted in counter narratives; discourses that take place in resister groups. In everyday resistance theory, all forms of contestation are formed in such networks; safe spaces are required for the generation of the sub-culture that challenges the dominant culture (Scott, 1990). The focus of this
section is on women’s discursive narratives that counter the dominant narrative in the ‘War on Terror’. In this frame the dominant narrative views Islam as a threat to Western liberal democracy and engenders terrorist activity (Jackson, 2005). This was expressed clearly by participant A0, in focus group 3, when A0 said: ‘Islam is the latest hated religion’ and Fathema questioned: ‘why would the media have this campaign target Muslims as well; and they don’t even understand the religion’. These views are also evident in the data presented in the previous chapter and in wider literature (Briggs, 2010; Lambert, 2011).

The dominant narrative was not acceptable to, nor did it reflect women’s reality, knowledge and experience of Islam or of the Muslims they knew. Women’s counter narratives, therefore, were based in their subjective experience of themselves and members of their communities; the image presented in the dominant narrative was intolerable to them. For some women loss of trust in government was central to their re-framing. For most the experience of everyday life was no different to that of any other group, as expressed by Shafia who is of Bangladeshi origin and 36 years of age. Shafia was born and grew up in Fieldway. In the quote (in the text box below), Shafia was sharing an experience of being questioned by colleagues, in 2001 immediately after the destruction of the twin towers:

‘my colleagues and stuff ermm, they were asking questions [after 9/11] because they knew I was Muslim and stuff, and there was somebody else in the organisation who was also Muslim, another lady as well. She was kind of ermm, really horrified as well. She said things, we would have discussion about you know ermm, Islam for example, is it a peaceful religion, and there was few other people within work who felt that religion was the cause of all evil. (embarrassed laugh) That’s what they used to say, and I’m like, well no it isn’t! We’ve lived in this country peacefully and there’s other people who kind of have these things themselves. They’re not Muslim and not practicing you know, not many go to church’ (Shafia, interview, Bangladeshi women’s centre).

40 The full quote can be found in Chapter Five, 5.3.1
The master narrative in this instance: ‘that religion is the cause of all evil’. (italic removed) does not reflect the reality of the subordinate narrative; as Shafia points out, her Islam is not the root of all evil and it is ‘other people’, who are not Muslim, as she understands Islam, who do these things. The quote demonstrates that Shafia did not recognise the statement relating to the religion, or the people, she knew. Secondly, Shafia actively counters the master narrative in presenting an alternative view to the dominant narrative, in insisting that Islam is a peaceful religion. In the aftermath of 9/11, there appeared to be, an almost universal disbelief, expressed by participants, that Muslims could have been involved in the destruction of the twin towers. Disbelief led women to reframe the dominant narrative to include the complicity of others, including the American government.

Aisha, a thirty-three year old interviewee of Pakistani origin, was one of many women who talked about the prevalence of conspiracy theories within her networks. Aisha associated these theories to a political environment of ‘a lot of hatred towards us even before 9/11’. Aisha’s reframing of the al Qaida attack is located in her knowledge of the history of hatred towards Muslims that she recalled in media reports of 9/11. These reports appeared to have led Aisha to be ‘very sceptical about it all’. Aisha added that, she and her friends ‘didn’t really believe what we were being told’. When asked how she felt the ‘War on Terror’ had affected her life Aisha said:

I continue to do what I want to do; I have been to University and got my degree. I am very sceptical though, even the events of last week; Lee Rigby murder in Woolwich – I wonder what’s behind it, what caused it to happen? There is a lot of hatred towards Muslims. I am very worried about the American government; hence I don’t trust any of the governments. (Aisha, interviewed at Ashiana)

Aisha managed to get on with life despite the rise in Islamophobia and a sense of being in a world in which she wasn’t welcome. Her response was to counter the dominant narrative, not necessarily with a ready-made counter story, but with her scepticism. She just didn’t trust ‘them’, and so, whatever ‘they’ said she
would not trust. In the quote, Aisha appears to link hatred of Muslims to anxieties about government, and a deep distrust in the state and its intent to protect all citizens. As described in Chapter Two, loss of trust in government has huge implications for social cohesion, the generation of trust capital and resilience. This suggests that, the individual or community affected, views the state as failing to protect them, or their people, from adversity (see Figure 2.2). From Aisha’s point of view, mutual respect was lacking, leaving a vacuum in the relationship of Muslim women with government. Whilst Aisha was unusual in expressing little doubt or uncertainty in her scepticism, the statement also suggests, that in wanting to understand ‘what’s behind’ these events, there might be an indication of ambivalence; ambivalence that was apparent in the narratives of other participants.

Shafia (quoted earlier), for example, also found it difficult to believe media reports of 9/11. However, Shafia’s position changed over the course of the interview; starting from the position of negating government and official explanations of Muslims as the perpetrators of 9/11, Shafia changed her position. Conspiracy theories initially enabled Shafia to believe that, the master narrative presented about Muslims; her people were false. Shafia said that in her networks:

we were watching it on the news someone said, I think it was someone from work, said it was the Israeli’s. I don’t know why he said it, someone had blowed up, it was a terrorist attack and I thought America as well. America’s not know for something like that kind of - well you know there’s been other attacks and I was thinking is it really? You would hear conspiracy theories and listen to other news and stuff. So I wanted strong evidence, not just the media saying there’s a Qur’an in their car you know – that evidence isn’t in itself enough….people were saying it wasn’t al-Qaeda but someone internally [to the American government] who did it and they were saying it was al-Qaeda’. (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

In Shafia’s networks, both in her Saturday job and social networks, there appears to have been a search for an explanation; any explanation to exact responsibility elsewhere. To view the attack as possibly perpetrated by the
Israeli’s or possibly the American government, in some unspecified way, shifts the focus from other Muslims. What is clear is that, Shafia did not believe the master narrative, for her, the Qur’an in the car was insufficient evidence of a link to Muslim perpetrators. Shafia went on to say that it was when:

\[
\text{al-Qaeda themselves said they done it as well so then we realised that actually it's Muslims that done it.....when there was more evidence that al-Qaeda did it then it isn't disputable.}
\]

Thus, on the one hand, Shafia appeared to have shifted her position from negating official reports, to one of accepting them, whilst, on the other hand, at the same time, she appeared still to be connected to conspiracy theories. It is noticeable that Shafia, for example, did not say that the conspiracy theorists were wrong, nor did she challenge the counter theories. This omission suggests that, she remained uncertain and confused about what to believe and who to believe.

A different view was presented by Ishmael, who had come to Fieldway from Mirpur in Kashmiri; having grown up in Mirpur, Ishmael had a different view of government. She voiced disappointment with the British Government and although Ishmael didn’t indicate that she thought that 9/11 was orchestrated or influenced by the American Government, she simply could not believe that the atrocities were perpetrated by Muslims; she said ‘I still don’t believe a Muslim did it. I still don’t’. Instead, Ishmael talked of feeling let down by the British Government in terms of foreign policy, adding that, when she arrived in the UK from Pakistan she:

\[
\text{thought this country was like perfect, but when they went for Iraq war, after 9/11 happened, I thought this country [is] not that perfect; you can’t trust them [politicians]; they do their own thing, they don’t listen, and that [is] not right. (Ishmael, interview Ashiana)}
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Ishmael had high expectations of the British government; nonetheless, her faith in democratic government had been shattered, by the realisation that she expressed as: ‘you can’t trust them’ and ‘they don’t listen’. The narrative that Ishmael countered was the narrative (and for her the reality) that Muslim’s were responsible for the atrocities of 9/11 and 7/7. Ishmael’s counter-narrative is
strongly based in her sense of Islam and Muslims being different to the dominant narrative in the ‘War on Terror’; a narrative that she did not trust and therefore did not believe.

It is also noteworthy, that there was a marked difference amongst women participants, in how they viewed the role of the American and British governments in relation to the atrocities of 9/11 and 7/7. No participant suggested that the British government was involved in the London bombings in 2005, despite a delay of six days in the names of three of the bombers being released. This is surprising as findings from a survey conducted by Channel 4 News in 2007 (GfK, 2007), found that 24% of Muslims, who participated in the survey, said that they believed that the British government was involved in some way in the London bombings. It is difficult to know why this group of Muslim women, at the time this investigation was conducted in 2013, felt differently. It is also difficult from these data, to state with certainty, that women felt differently; whilst no woman categorically stated that she believed the British government was directly involved, or implicated, in the London bombings, women indicated loss of trust or ambivalence and uncertainty in government. Women talked about indirect responsibility; the British government’s failure, for example, to recognise the impact of foreign policies on Muslims in Britain, was not only stated by Ishmael, but also by other women. Shafia for example said that in her opinion 7/7:

brought to our attention that these Muslims, you know, that they may have been influenced by other people, who have hatred to certain things. A lot of people don’t like what’s happened with Palestine and the Israeli’s. (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

Shafia’s statement suggests that Muslims, feel hatred as a result of Israel’s occupation of Palestine. This perspective shifts responsibility for the bombings in London, to the grievances of the bombers. In this logic, the ultimate responsibility lies with the governments’ that support Israel’s occupation of Palestine. It is not the intention of this investigation to engage in debate about the probity of this sentiment, only to note that it is used in defence of the
perpetrators. Global solidarity, with other Muslims and with the situation of Muslims in Palestine, was also raised by Fathema who specifically pointed to the position of Palestinians as a real worry that she linked to conspiracy theories. 

Fathema said:

I think some people, well I know a lot of people, don’t like what’s happened with Palestine and Israeli’s as well. It’s always here in the news and so, because these young people, what they hear on the news, it might be a third article, or a fifth article headline and we get that a lot. Young people feel that there are other Muslim people who are being suppressed, or seen as second class citizens, and they want to do something, which was what, *I think that what they did was wrong, clearly it was totally wrong.* (Fathema, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

One could add the word, ‘but’, to the end of Fathema’s sentence (in italics), ‘I think that what they did was wrong, clearly it was totally wrong...but...? This is not entirely speculative; Fathema clearly felt that violence is wrong, but also alluded to understanding why ‘young people’, as she put it, might be driven to such actions. In this frame, it is possible to see how the counter-narrative might come about as a response to feeling wronged. It is important to stress that, this point of view was not stated by any participant; the more general issue of Muslim grievance of UK foreign policy was, as in Ishmael’s statement (mentioned earlier) about Iraq.

In relation to the British government’s domestic counter-terrorism strategy participants, in focus group 3, were unanimous (see Chapter Three, 3.4.1 for details of the strategy). Many women in this group felt that the introduction of the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ strategy, after the London bombings, was unhelpful, leading women in the group to voice high levels of distrust in the motives of the British government. This group, were of the view, that the strategy was designed to pitch Muslim against Muslim, and that the only effect of the policy would be, to erode trust between Muslims as described by participant A1:

*that trust that you build within yourself and with your communities that you live in; certain policies [prevent] are entering into issues and gonna make you question who can you trust? [adding that prevent] wasn’t helpful coming in and then*
asking people to spy on each other. (participant A1, focus group 3, Bangladeshi women's centre)

Alongside hostility towards Prevent, there was also uncertainty voiced in this group; women’s ambivalence was crystalized in a statement that appeared to lessen government’s responsibility with regard to domestic counter-terrorism policy. Participant A0 voiced the view (with which others in the group agreed) that ‘Prevent [was] not anti-Muslim; it’s more misguided against us’.

This statement shifted the discussion from one of essentialised, anti-Muslim intent from government, to a less absolute and abrasive view of government policy; as misguidedly adopting the wrong approach. The implication appeared to be, that it is perhaps a forgivable misjudgement. However, participant A0 also retained the view that the misguided strategy was ‘against us’. Thus, it could be argued that, for this group there was an acceptance that Prevent, as part of the policy landscape of the ‘War on Terror’, was against Muslims, even if it was misguided, rather than intentionally anti-Muslim.

The range of views identified in these quotes can be seen as the confused and, at times, defensive positions adopted by women, but fundamentally, they depict a separation from the dominant narrative. For some women the refusal to accept the reality of the actions of terrorists, who are also Muslim, can be seen as women defending their community, through denial and thereby disassociating themselves from acts of terrorism, as would any people in any community. Refusal to accept the dominant narrative, can be viewed as the start of a, resilience as resistance, process in which women (along with other Muslims) build counter-narratives, that serve to negate the effects unleashed by the acts of violence in the form of state, media and civil society responses; responses that have given licence to Islamophobia (Lambert, 2011), increasing violence against Muslim women, and generating fear amongst them. It is however, also possible that, when viewed through the prism of resistance, counter-narratives, become forms of defiance to the narrative presented by the dominant group. These forms of resilience as resistance are neither singular nor static; they are multiple and dynamic; women simultaneously expressed mistrust of the British
state and hope that government policies were ‘misguided’ rather than calculatedly targeted at them. Ambiguity and doubt emerged in these dialogues, making it possible to speculate that it is possible for cynicism and hope to coexist. What was clear was that the dominant narrative did not reflect women’s reality. These counter-narratives are a clear indication of women’s struggle in hegemony.

The counter-narrative exists in those places where it is safe for it to be voiced; in those spaces, in which dissident conversations can be voiced (Scott, 1990). We can imagine that, by exempting their people from association with hideous acts of terrorism, South Asian Muslim women (in the world of negation) were exempting their people from being singled out, separated, and targeted by the state. Thus, it is possible to construe that the counter narrative as a mechanism of resilience as resistance to neutralise the caustic psychological effects of adversity (Scott, 1990). Denial that Muslim’s enacted atrocity enabled the production of a different rhetoric, to position Muslims away from terrorism. However, this strategy alone appeared to have been insufficient; South Asian Muslim women also spoke of the actions, they engage in, to protect themselves physically, through considering how they dressed (see 6.2.2), the size of the bag they carried (as emerged in interview and focus groups), in not using buses (as stated by Tazeem (5.3.2)) or staying in the neighbourhood as much as possible (see 5.3.2). South Asian Muslim women also described how they kept in touch with one another, through texting and phoning, if one of them had to travel beyond the immediate home neighbourhood.

The dissident spaces, away from the places of the master narrative that Scott (1990) theorised, are formed in different ways, in relation, to different master narratives. The two forms of challenge, described this far, by women in Fieldway, respond to dominant narratives imposed on South Asian Muslim women from the state and through public discourse. The next example of resilience as resistance through contestation, by women is different, because women were contesting the hegemony of gender inequality within their communities. Contestation and dissidence, in this part of the research, are framed within Islamic orthodoxy in Muslim community settings.
6.2.3 Creating spaces for faith capital

The previous chapter (5.5) identified the exclusionary gender codes of local Mosques in Fieldway as limiting women’s access to faith networks and capital. Exclusionary practices run counter to women’s expression of Islam, and their intent to know, and to represent, Islam. Despite the barriers of exclusion, women in the Fieldway investigation, demonstrated their determination to search for what one participant (Nazreen, quoted towards the end of this section) termed ‘their Islam’; to identify theological learning and practice to enable Muslim women to take their place in Islam. This section begins with a quote from Fathema (quoted earlier) about women’s exclusion and how women have responded to exclusion in finding their place in Islam. Fathema said:

‘I think with the Mosque itself, ermm, there are different Mosques and they have different religions in different Mosques. So in that Mosque [next door to Fathema’s house] they don’t have the capacity, but just a few streets away the Mosque does have space for women, so they [women] can. That’s where I get to go to do prayers in the Mosques. I know some of my friends have gone to the XXX Mosque because they have much more dialogue with the Sheik as well, and he gives the Q & A with them as well. My friends they would go and even have places where they can have children in there as well. Sometimes when we find that one Mosque doesn’t have that facility then we can go to another Mosque as well, to have, to get, some more participation as well’ (Fathema, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre).

The quote from Fathema, in the box above, is a continuation of the quote in the text box in Chapter Five, 5.5, in which Fathema appeared to be working out her position in relation to exclusion from her local Mosque. In this part of her story, Fathema appears to be clearer that if there isn’t a facility for women in one Mosque, she and her friends go to another Mosque. The statement appears to
offer a simple and pragmatic solution, but one, that, on closer consideration, raises a number of questions. Fathema was breaking the female exclusionary code accepted by her father and brothers, raising questions about, their views of this challenge. In addition, it raises questions about the negotiations, around contestation, which Fathema and her family must have been engaged in, for Fathema to be able to attend a different Mosque. This would also be true in relation to breaking the tradition, accepted by her mother, of women praying in the home. The research is aware of these differences, because Fathema invited the researcher into her home at a time when her mother was preparing for prayer. These questions suggest that, behind Fathema’s apparently, straightforward and pragmatic statement, there lays the possibility of a complex set of negotiations undertaken in the family. The investigation did not secure answers to these questions; however, these examples demonstrate South Asian Muslim women making choices that involve contestation and demonstrate a determination that exclusion from one faith facility did not deter women from finding space for their faith elsewhere. As Fathema put it, if she and her friends can’t go to one Mosque they go to another. This comment rebuts the idea of the Muslim family as hyper-patriarchal; Fathema did not suggest any form of struggle between herself and male members of her family. Again, it is not possible to state, with certainty, that there had been no struggle at any time. However, at the time of the investigation Fathema appeared relaxed about her decision to attend a different mosque, which appeared, at the time of interview, as a part of Fathema’s daily routine.

For many participants, the starting point of finding their faith was to understand the Qur’an and Islamic texts. Fathema for example made this clear when she said that 9/11 presented:

an opportunity for us to build our knowledge, so that we can kind of answer other people’s questions. It got me to think that I can help people understand [Islam]; it’s like our duty to try and educate them. (Fathema, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)
Fathema, like a number of women, formed a determination to know their religion and to realise their place in Islam after 9/11. Fathema, like other women sought out those places where she was able to be educated about Islam. The search to find Islam by women is intrinsically linked to their public proclamations of faith and religiosity, such as choosing to wear hijab and the wish to be good Muslims (see 6.2). Women set about to find interpretations of the Qur’an by, for instance, attending the ‘dars’ circles and Quranic discussion groups, set up in both women’s centres engaged in the Fieldway investigation. On Fridays, in particular, while men were in the Mosque for Friday prayer, women gathered in the centre’s to read the Qur’an and to discuss its texts. Ashiana also used Prevent funding to run a series of workshops on women’s empowerment and women’s role in Islam. These networks signal women’s attempts to understand, and re-interpret, the texts of their faith. This reflects studies by other scholars such as Brown (2006) who found that ‘young Muslim women are often better educated about Islam than their parents, and are battling against a cultural type of Islam…the desire to manage faith and culture suggests the beginning of positions which may accommodate new forms of discourse, identity and rights’ (p. 419). Fathema, for example, said that she was engaged in faith related discussions in various ways:

[with] younger groups we would have a discussion about, young ladies as well, about their views about certain things like hurting others and what Islam says about hurting another human being even Muslim and non-Muslims as well and why their actions was wrong. Sometimes even XXX [the Bangladeshi women’s centre] they used to have discussions, sometimes they talk about religion and the Qur’an. They used to have discussions, sometimes they talk about religion and sometimes they talk about other things as well so those groups they try to get you involved. Sometimes people who are knowledgeable as well, so not like conferences, but have a session on death and what happens when you die and what the Muslim perspective is. (Fathema, interviewee Bangladeshi women’s centre)

Brown’s (2006) statement is reflected in other narratives told by women in Fieldway; Shafia, for example, talked of attending evening classes at a mainstream learning institution and its effects on her and her friends. She said:
I did a course at XXX, it was called women in Islam, so I started getting into learning a little more about my religion and learnt about the benefits of wearing hijab and why we wear it, so I thought oh, I'll start wearing it so that's when it started……I think that with my friends it got us to talk about it and want to make sense of it; help each other to make sense of our religion and how it fits and it got us to think about how we can educate other people and try and help them to understand that Islam is not like the religion in the media……It was an opportunity for us to build our knowledge. (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

Women’s attempts to find ‘their Islam’ were not only undertaken individually; as already stated; women met in groups, went to the Mosque together and joined classes. Where these activities were based in known centres, and in existing networks, such as in women’s centres and through friendship networks, they will have had the effect of strengthening bonds between women and strengthening social capital assets such as trust and reciprocity (Coleman, 1988).

When women attended formal classes outside their neighbourhoods, they engaged in new networks of like-minded individuals, to generate other forms of social capital, such as bridging capital. Additionally, these networks offered women the opportunity to share their views and to develop shared norms of faith solidarity (such as wearing hijab), as well as personal spirituality that could be described as spaces for a dissident sub-culture (Scott, 1990). This is different to the traditional situation for Muslim women praying at home without theological guidance. According to Coleman (1988), all social relations and structures facilitate some form of social benefit (see Chapter Two, 2.2.2). In this frame, where ever women met in groups, they generated social capital; either bonding (personal support), bridging (resource opportunities), or faith (spiritual) capital. All forms of social capital are important to social cohesion and resilience.

For second generation Muslim women in this research, the spotlight placed on their faith by the ‘War on Terror’, appears to have led them to become more absorbed in their faith than they were before. For some women in the investigation, faith literacy led them to question Mullah’s and Mosque
committee’s interpretations of Islamic texts. Nazreen, the manager of Ashiana, for example alluded to orthodox interpretation of Islam, by Mosque leaders, needing to be rethought when she said:

there are issues about understanding Islam itself and how that’s portrayed and perceived [by the Mullah’s]. I think women need to take hold of their own role and sort of understand their Islam. (Nazreen, interview Ashiana)

This statement is a call to Muslim women to develop a gendered interpretation of their faith; it draws together the various ways in which women described their attempts to find ‘their Islam’. This was apparent in Ishmael’s defiance when she said: ‘women are told, and they accept, what’s not always right. I’ve often been told to cover my head’, and she went on to say that she did not believe that covering her head would make her a better Muslim. Ishmael wears traditional South Asian dress and dupatta (thus covering her head would not be difficult); keeping her head uncovered signalled defiance to the accepted orthodoxy. These statements are expressions of women’s movement from acceptance to challenge in their everyday thinking and actions; resilience as resistance in hegemony.

In the context of women’s exclusion from local Mosques, expressions of South Asian Muslim women’s intent, to find spaces and places to explore and understand their faith, take on a political meaning. They cannot be viewed as individual forms of agency; they demonstrate women engaging in wider networks, or movements, to change traditional thinking and actions. In doing this they are disrupting the existing order and traditional patterns; replacing them with new orders and patterns. The implication here is that the transformations caused by the disruption of resilience as resistance (by these South Asian Muslim women) irrevocably alter states of equilibrium. This problematizes the notion of ‘bounce back’ in resilience theory.
6.3 Resilience, relationships and social assets

In the absence of material resources to insulate South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway from adversity it was clear that women generated strength (social assets) through relationships and (faith assets) through religiosity. These forms of capital are inter-connected strengthening each other. However, women in the study particularly emphasised family and neighbourhood networks as important to their sense of wellbeing. Any group’s capacity to demonstrate resistance is aided by positive family relations to family member’s ability to cope with, or adapt in, adverse conditions. Studies of child development in particular, direct the study of resilience to consider the importance of family as nurturing and cohesive unit’s (Masten, 2001, see also Chapter Two, 2.1.3). The following paragraphs draw on learning from the empirical research that articulate the role of cohesive social networks. It starts with women’s claims of the importance of family and neighbourhood networks. The following section incorporates wider networks in the form of women’s centres as important sites for forming relational social capital assets.

6.3.1 Resilience – family and neighbourhood networks

Women portrayed a largely positive picture of family, and friendships with other Muslim women, as sources of support and comfort. These networks appeared to offer women valuable insulation or protection from the negative effects of adversity. Relational assets within Fieldway communities can be viewed as offering protection developed through social connection as in the faith networks already mentioned (6.2.4). In interview and focus group discussions women shared their narratives about the networks they trusted and would turn to for support in times of hardship. These discussions exposed that women would (generally) not turn to either local state institutions or their local Mosques (see Chapter Five, 5.4 and 5.5); instead women profiled trust in family and friends. The sense of ‘family first’ (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre) was confirmed by other women as well as male community leader Hakeem. Hakeem, a 40 year old community leader of Bangladeshi origin said:
The perception of family first was repeated often by women, underscoring the importance placed on family, as women’s primary locus of support. However, Rizwana, manager of Ashiana, and Shazia, manager of the Bangladeshi women’s centre suggested that family relations may be more complex for some women than the narratives offered to this research suggest. Taking both perspectives into account the following text begins with reflecting positive experiences of family. Shafia’s story is unequivocal in relation to the importance of family and friendship networks. Shafia said:

family first, always my family - my friends are like sisters….beyond family women’s community centre….[I would look for support] within our family itself because I live with my parents I know that if I have any issues then they’re always there….so I kind of relax. (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

Similarly, Fazaleeth who was older than Shafia (over 60 years old), and who also lives with her husband and extended family, shared similar views. Fazaleeth said:

my family is central – I live with my husband and children, my sister and her husband and her children and my grandchildren; there are twelve of us in the house. I feel very lucky that god blessed me with a good husband; I don’t need to go outside, sometimes I go to the doctor. (Fazaleeth, interview Ashiana)
The interview with Fazaleeth was a short interview and it was noticeable that she did not mention friendship networks at Ashiana. Over the period of the field study (and regular visits to Ashiana by the researcher) Fazaleeth was usually at the centre talking to, and laughing with, women or in sewing classes. Fazaleeth appeared to be embedded in networks with other women and staff at the centre. The omission might have been an oversight, or that Fazaleeth had taken for granted that the research would know the importance of Ashiana, or it may have been the result of language barriers as Fazaleeth was bi-lingual but not confidently so in English. It might also have been a combination of all, or none, of these factors. This observation is made as testament the barriers and imperfections of cross-cultural and bi-lingual research.

Fazaleeth said that she came to the UK in 1979 to marry her husband; that he taught her English and that he took care of her. This interview in particular, served as a reminder of the journey made by women centuries earlier from India to Britain as ayahs (see Chapter Three. 3.3.2); they shared with Fazaleeth, the vulnerability of the unknown new cultural context they were entering. Fazaleeth, as she put it, was ‘blessed’ to have the support of her husband and this was not the case for many ayahs. This point is raised to highlight the importance of family, other social networks and external support mechanisms such as Ashiana for first generation women migrants. Tazeem, for example had a good relationship with her mother-in-law who was a member of her extended family. Tazeem shared that:

when I first came from Pakistan my mother-in-law, she used to run a shop. She knows that English is really important so she took me to XXX women’s centre [now closed]. I try to avoid family, I don’t tell anything to my mum [in Mirpur] because she get upset, so I don’t talk to her’. (Tazeem, interview Ashiana)

These narratives extenuate the importance of social networks for building women’s capacity to cope and thrive in their new home country. Later in the interview Tazeem went on to say that she was frustrated because her husband and children (aged 12, 10, 7 and 6 years), don’t listen to her, she said: ‘they just
play games all the time’. This frustration is likely to be shared with many parents however, in the new cultural context of Britain Tazeem appeared a confident and independent but lonely figure within the family. It is also important to note that Tazeem had the support of her family in undertaking activities to develop her skills. Her deepest wish was to go to University and graduate. It is possible to see in Tazeem’s story that while she chose not to contact her mother (in Mirpur) for emotional support and comfort she was offered opportunities in her marital family to pursue her ambitions.

These quotes are included because they offer a sense of the complexity of family life as it was described by women. However, the overriding sense was one of support and wellbeing as in the quote from Shafia at the beginning of this section and Aisha’s story when she said that amid her scepticism of government that: ‘I feel very lucky I have a lot of support from my family and from friends…my family thinks education is very important’ (interview Ashiana). Overall women painted a picture of family as nurturing, supportive and offering a sense of security. Narratives of close knit family ties are reminiscent of Coleman’s (1988) work on networks ‘with closure’ (see Chapter Two, 2.2.2). The effect of closed networks, Coleman suggests, is the creation of social controls, norms and social order. From the perspective of the women involved in this study family networks offered women the support and security denied to them by civic institutions or generic civil society institutions but they also enabled women to bridge to other networks. These data suggest that Coleman’s thesis of networks with closure (Figure 2.1) is inadequate for explaining the situation of women in the study; women described supportive and close family ties and also other relations that influenced their social and faith norms. The point is that family and friendship networks were rated high for support and trust capital by women who were also influenced by other networks as described in 6.2.4. The narratives shared with this study suggest that Coleman’s networks with closure might be viewed as porous rather than tightly closed as illustrated in Figure 6.1 on the following page.
Figure 6.1 Closed networks with porous boundary; wider influences

![Diagram of networks with porous boundary]

Figure 6.1 illustrates a porous (broken-line) boundary around family networks. From this perspective family remains important but is not the singular influence on women’s capacity to generate norms, to build social capital and overcome adversity. Other influences, namely faith, friends, and women’s centres influenced women’s thinking and their creation of social norms and assets.

Whilst family was described by women as positive a different picture emerged from the female community leaders; Rizwana and Shazia. Family, from this perspective, inculcated inequality in gender relations and risk for some women; it added to the exclusion of women, at the community or neighbourhood level, as explored in the previous chapter (5.5). In relation to family, Shazia explained a complex reality, as in other ethnic and faith communities. Shazia said:

>[there are] certain things embedded within the community, that are so deep that we have to work on [them]…I'll give you an example; one is domestic violence, so women are subordinate. You know all the men in the family have seen these norms [they think] “if my father can do it, I can do it”. (Shazia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

Shazia’s words highlight the ‘dark side’ of bonding social capital within some family networks exposing the tensions between family as protection and family as risk in which women are subject to gender hegemony; inequality is accepted as a normative position. Thus whilst women spoke of the subjective experience of family and neighbourhood as protective from the adversity of Islamophobia,
women community leaders presented family as potential environments of risk to gender hegemony. Gender hegemony questions if the social good generated in networks with close ties are beneficial to all network members. Or do unequal positions within a network restrict the subordinate group, women’s, access to positive benefits?

Families exist within home neighbourhood boundaries (Forrest, 2001); members are affected by, and affect, the norms prevalent in these geographies. These norms are also the case for male family members who participated in the exclusion of women from local Mosques. This link is important to demonstrate the interconnection of family and neighbourhood norms. This is also the case for women who attended women’s centre activities that increased their independence and empowerment. The interconnection of the individual, family and neighbourhood makes it necessary to understand the role of neighbourhood in Fieldway.

**6.3.2 Resilience - the question of neighbourhood**

Forrest et al., (2001) work on the potential for neighbourhoods to generate social capital benefits is helpful in understanding the role of neighbourhood in creating spaces that influence family and that also have the capacity to ‘circle the wagons’ to create defensible spaces (Hall, 2010). Fahim’s story, for example (6.2.1), offers the potential for positive effects when neighbourhood is cohesive and offers support in times of hardship. Forrest et al., identify the importance of a ‘sense of belonging’ and ‘trust and reciprocity’ as important mechanisms for building social capital (see Table 2.1). It leads this study to question how, and if some, or all, of these qualities were apparent in Fieldway. In articulating fear of Islamophobia women cited neighbourhood as engendering feelings of security. Shafia expressed that the home neighbourhood offered a sense of safety and feeling protected from external harm when she said:
Juxtaposing the ‘supportive’ neighbours to the bus journey is highly suggestive of the bus journey being anything but comfortable and supportive as was clarified when Shafia describes her sister’s relief at being back in home territory where she felt safe from Islamophobic attack. Participants also suggested that some women were not able to overcome their fear of the world outside their home and their neighbourhood and had stayed at home for some time after the 7/7 London bombings. As participant AA in focus group 3 put it women stayed ‘just within their own families, they were just protected in their own families’. Shafia also expressed similar views; amongst the families’ in her networks; she explained that some people at the time believed that women should stay at home for their safety because their ‘parents were thinking about [them] not going out and about and asked them to stay at home as much as they could’ (Shafia, interview, Bangladeshi women’s centre).

The majority of women who participated in the study lived in streets that were populated by other Asian Muslim families. As focus group 3 participant, A4, put it ‘Asian’s tend to live together’ and indeed few women in this study lived in racially mixed or predominately white neighbourhoods other than the women’s centre managers; neither of whom were residents of Fieldway. Women’s focus on close, micro level, immediate (family) networks, (with ‘people like us’) brings to mind Putnam’s (1993) notion of bonding social capital. Bonding social capital was apparent in the emphasis women placed on relations that engendered a sense of safety in the neighbourhood. The presence of other’s who women

Because of where we live – there is a large Muslim community – everyone was looking out for each other, everyone just kind of knows everyone and if you came in at different times – like my sister sometimes she works late as well and gets the bus back about half-past eight or nine o’clock and when she gets to our street, or where the XXX bank used to be, she has to walk a straight road and she feels safe because she knows that there are other people about and they see her and they are supportive as well” (Shafia, interview, Bangladeshi women’s centre)
viewed as ‘our people’ appeared to have a positive effect on women’s sense of wellbeing as participant A2, in focus group 3, put it:

‘when I’m here I feel comfortable, I can walk out in a salwar kameez and its bright red or green or orange and it’s all right, but like in XXX if I walk out in a salwar kameez and its bright red or orange it’s like “whatever?” and because you do feel more uncomfortable and it’s like about respect’ (participant A2, focus group 3, Bangladeshi women’s centre).

Participant A2 alludes to feeling that she was not respected if she wore clothes of her choice in neighbourhoods other than Fieldway. In Fieldway she could be who she wants to be (at least in terms of her choice of dress); she describes feeling comfortable and accepted. Participant A2 went on to say: ‘[there’s a] great feeling of belonging….one community, one part of a whole’. Shafia echoed these views when she said: ‘where I live and stuff everyone just kind of knows everyone and if you come home at different times [someone notices]’ (Shafia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre).

The extracts from women’s narratives presented above suggest neighbourhood relations rich in social capital; assets generated between individuals in relations of mutual respect and trust in which social norms are shared and support is reciprocated as in Forrest et al., (2001) neighbourhood domains of social capital. We are also reminded of Granovetter’s (1973) analysis of the limitations of strong social bonds. In this frame women’s positive sense of security in the neighbourhood remains limited by lack of access to wider networks in other neighbourhoods. As discussed in Chapter Five, neighbourhood resources were not equally shared between men and women, in Fieldway. Rizwana, the manager of Ashiana, explained women’s position in Pakistani Muslim communities in Fieldway. She said:

women from Muslim community don’t tend to progress as quickly; for example ladies from India they’re a bit more ehhh confident, a bit more ready to go. They’re a bit more educated from back home, they’re more geared towards the working life and when they come here they want to further their education, go straight into work and studying – a bit more family support I think. Mind-set is more so in that way than Muslim community. With Muslim they tend to be a little bit more protected and a
little bit of honour comes in - you won’t want to get your wife into work immediately and this and that. Women are protected by their husband, by their father, by their brothers, by the family...that’s why we [women’s centres] have a massive role to play in the community and especially for women. (Rizwana, interview Ashiana)

In talking about families ‘protecting’ women from the outside world two issues come to mind. The first is protection from Islamophobia and the second, as alluded to by Rizwana is the family failing to prepare women for life outside the family and community. Specifically in reference to work and education Rizwana suggests that ‘ladies from India they’re a bit more confident, a bit more ready to go’ adding that they have more family support. This sentence suggests support for women’s independence from family was a social norm for ladies from India but less so for the Pakistani women who use the services of Ashiana.

Shazia, manager of the Bangladeshi women’s centre, expressed women’s normative position in the communities she worked with in Fieldway differently. She said:

women are oppressed across the board, when I talk to Hindu women she will say the same and Muslim women because it’s cultural more cultural because we share the same culture from India and Bangladesh, even Sri Lanka and Malaysia. So women are subordinate so therefore some of the domestic violence takes place. We’re talking [at the women’s centre] about behavioural change; you need to respect women. These are the deep rooted problems. (Shazia, interview Bangladeshi women’s centre)

Shazia’s statement clearly locates all women, regardless of ethnic or faith origin in positions of subordination to men. She also clearly states that, in her view, women’s subordination leads to lack of respect for them and the risk of domestic violence. The point here is that both centre managers describe, differently, the normative position of women in both ethnic communities. Together these responses suggest that family and community norms support each other either in their intent to protect women from eternal (Islamophobic) harm, and also accept women’s subordination in family and community.
Rizwana and Shazia’s statements link normative behaviours in family with normative behaviour in community as processes of hegemony and control. Nevertheless, for women neighbourhood offered security and protection from Islamophobic assault. These findings echo Granovetter and Putnam’s argument that strong personal relations (embeddedness) generate trust, establish expectations and create and enforce positive or negative social norms. Putnam also made the case that social capital increases social benefit beyond individuals for others; this appears to have been the case for South Asian Muslim women if feeling secure is viewed as a collective benefit. Social capital and resilience literature offers few observations of the distribution of social benefits in the context of unequal power relations. The Fieldway study indicates that the benefit of feeling safe and sharing identity had positive effects on women as did safety from the threat of Islamophobia. At the same time women’s exclusion from community facilities may also have restricted women’s access to resource opportunities available through wider networks within the neighbourhood.

6.3.3 The role of women’s centres in generating social capital

This far analysis has identified positive and negative effects in women’s strong ties in family, friendship and neighbourhood networks. It has also identified that the reality was more complex than theories of networks with closure (Coleman, 1988) might indicate. Women in this study had access to wider networks, created spaces for the generation of social and faith capital and engaged in wider educational and learning networks. However, women’s centres appeared to be particularly important structures and social mechanisms for women’s wellbeing.

Women’s empowerment workshops, mentioned in Chapter Four (4.4.1), and in women’s search for answers to questions of faith (6.2.4), are useful examples of the role played by the centres to bridge their users to expert knowledge. The empowerment workshops sought to build women’s confidence through increased knowledge of their role in Islam, and in the Muslim family, through
interpretations of Qur’anic texts. In the context of traditional and exclusionary forms of Islam, the workshops were spaces for the generation of dissidence, to traditional interpretations of the Qur’an. In the language of everyday resistance they formed the spaces in which the subaltern group was able to respond to the indignities of exclusion. For women at Ashiana the workshops offered the opportunity to gain knowledge, exchange views and develop networks. Formal evaluation of the workshops noted the view of one participant who was quoted as saying: ‘If I knew this information ten years ago when my children were teenagers, I would have taught them about the issues raised in this course. This is the first time I’ve been educated on such a crucial and important topic’ (Inspire Women, 2013: 29).

It is highly unlikely that women would have had access to the knowledge that was shared, and the discussion that took place, without Ashiana providing the opportunity. It is also interesting to note that a few months after the empowerment workshops, in discussion with Rizwana, the centre’s relationship with the local Mosque was raised. Rizwana said: ‘it’s the women thing, they [the Mosque elders], think we’re empowering women to sort of be independent and perhaps that not seen in the best light by the older people in the Mosque’. The statement confirms that, to the dominant male group, in the local Mosque discourse that challenged their perspective of women’s role in Islam was not welcome confirming the notion of dissidence outlined above. Through the lens of hegemony the workshops constituted counter-hegemonic actions. The workshops increased women’s knowledge of Islamic texts and challenged women’s subordinate role in forms of traditional Islam. They can be seen to extend opportunities to women to build knowledge as well as networks of faith capital.

Workshops, such as the empowerment workshops, were not the day-to-day routine of the centres’. Daily work involved women dropping in, networking, seeking advice and advocacy support from centre workers or attending sewing, language or computer classes. The daily routine at Ashiana was largely built
around confidence and skill building; human and social capital. The types of activities that generate trust capital between women at the centre, as well as between women and centre workers, creating opportunities for women to engage in a range of networks. Rita, a 50 year old, White British, worker at Ashiana described women who were not regular users of the centre hiring space during the holy month of Ramadhan for Qur’anic reading circles. The women organisers were known as the ‘dars wallah’s’ indicating that this was an important role for these women and the wider sphere of influence of the centre.

As women developed skills and confidence the centres encouraged women to move on to work experience placements, in mainstream organisations, with access to networks beyond the immediate community. These forms of bridging capital were predicated on women’s confidence to engage in wider networks. The accumulation of sufficient human and bonding social capital were essential precursors to moving out from trusted women’s networks to wider networks. In this sense the role of women’s centres’ was markedly different to the role of ‘protective’ families, described earlier, in which protecting women could also be seen as constraining women. Rizwana, the manager of Ashiana, described first generation migrant women users of the centre as ‘just not ready’ to use mainstream services. When pressed to explain what she meant by this she said:

In the sense of [low] self-esteem, confidence, language barriers, child care – everything. Even when they have been in the country for a number of years they still tend not to go into the mainstream; they [women] want something that’s more linked to their communities. (Rizwana, interview Ashiana)

Rizwana added that when women had completed various courses and were more confident the centre:

used to send our ladies out to work placements in the hospitals and they would get employment within these other statutory agencies...one lady has been working there [in a school] for 15 years. Another lady is still working in school setting and while they were in the school setting they clearly got staff development and got further training...so not only did they get employment, and long-term employment, but they also got further training and higher qualifications. (Rizwana, interview Ashiana)
Through access to wider networks women’s centres opened opportunities for women resident’s to accrue forms of social capital that they would otherwise be unlikely to access. Trust was evident in the centres in the willingness of women to accept, and cooperate with, this research on the recommendation of centre staff. Reciprocity was also evident during the research in bi-lingual women translating for non-English speakers without being asked to do so, and with the intent of including less confident women, in group discussion. As far as it has been possible for this study to ascertain there appeared to be a genuine wiliness from women to support each other. This sense of interdependence between women and the centre was reinforced by the incident (raised in 5.2.1), during a return visit to Ashiana, when centre staff were called to deal with a woman who was in considerable emotional distress. The incident reinforced the importance of the centre as a physical place, and emotional space, to which women felt able to turn at times of deep pain and sense of personal harm. The incident indicates the presence of a high level of trust associated with bonding social capital.

The instances described suggest that strong (internal) bonds do not have to be constraining; strong bonds can act as the precursor to bridging social capital; linking women to other networks and opportunities outside their immediate communities. The presence of multiple forms of social capital, generated through the women’s centres, suggests a tension in social network analysis theory. Granovetter’s important (1973) theory ‘the strength of weak ties’ (see Chapter Two 2.2.2) posits that weak, rather than strong, network ties are helpful to increased resource opportunities, remains important knowledge. However, the work of the women’s centres suggests that, for women from marginalised groups to benefit from resource opportunities (bridging social capital), bonding social capital and confidence building are important first steps.

The experience of women’s centres in this study exposes a more complex relationship between strong internal ties and bridging social capital. The centres engendered strong bonds amongst women and also links to other networks; the ‘social glue’ function of bonding social capital (Crawford, 2006) appeared to be
essential in these contexts for building women’s confidence sufficiently for them to bridge to other networks outside their strongly bonded and trusted networks. It is possible therefore to suggest, from these findings, that networks of strong social bonds do not necessarily constrain members, if the network has the capacity to adopt inward (bonding), and outward (bridging), orientations simultaneously. This should not be seen to imply that all members of a network are collectively able to engage in both strong internal bonding and outward facing orientations at the same time. Rather it suggests that bonding social capital is required before women are able to engage in bridging activities.

Additionally, the interpretation offered here is that the family provided a layer of protection from adversity, as did relations within the wider community in Fieldway; the former in relation to emotional wellbeing (protection) although this may not be the case in all families (as stated by Shazia; family was also identified as a site of inequality and suppression), and in relation to identity security for the latter (also a protective feature). Both therefore have a role to play in women’s sense of wellbeing and the generation of the social assets that support women to adapt in times of hardship. It is however also important to note that social capital refers to the potential for action as identified, not least through networks generated in women’s centres. The next section widens the research focus from the generation of forms of social capital that insulate or protect women from adversity to address the issue of women’s adaptation to prolonged harm.

6.4 Resilience - adapting in conditions of prolonged adversity and retaining fundamental characteristics

This section draws on information presented so far; on resilience literature, on the roots of Islamophobia in imperial history, and on the empirical investigation. It draws on resilience thinking, in the frame of hegemony, and it deploys Bhabha’s (1994) theory of cultural hybridity to interpret/analyse South Asian Muslim women’s resistant behaviours and adaptation. It begins with a reminder
of the prolonged nature of the ‘War on Terror’, that is itself rooted in a longer history of adversity as evidenced in Chapter Three.

The ‘War on Terror’, was initiated in response to the al-Qaeda attacks on mainland America in 2001, it is now (at the time of writing) in its sixteenth year of enactment, and it is highly unlikely that it will end in the near future (Jackson, 2005). Scholars have made the case that the ‘War on Terror’ has played a pivotal role in increasing anti-Muslim hate and Islamophobia (Lambert, 2011). Academic studies, have identified that South Asian Muslim women are affected by counter-terrorism policy (see Chapter Three, 3.5), and, the empirical investigation conducted for this thesis, found that South Asian Muslim women in Britain experienced heightened levels of fear of assault after 9/11 and 7/7. Fear, has debilitating effects on the lives of the fearful, influencing their sense of vulnerability, as Furedi (1997) suggests in writing about the culture of fear. Fear and assault, was evidenced as multiple intersecting adversity by women, in the research conducted for this thesis, making it possible to state with certainty, that the women involved in this investigation experienced prolonged multiple intersecting adversity. These insights raise two important questions: firstly, what are the social mechanisms that enabled women to adapt in conditions of prolonged adversity, and, secondly, do women’s adaptation compromise fundamental aspects of their Islamic identity?

6.4.1 Resilience in conditions of prolonged adversity

The adaptation of social groups in conditions of prolonged harm has received little academic attention (Hardy, 2015). It is apparent from this research that the primary sources of protection, or support for women to overcome prolonged adversity; to be resilient, lay in the strength of their relationships. Family, and friendships networks, and wider network support from women’s centres, provided protection to South Asian Muslim women.
Evidence of the strength of women’s friendships, is interspersed in the text already presented; Shafia’s comment that ‘my friends are like sisters’ (6.3.1). The majority of Muslim women, in the Fieldway investigation, spoke of having contact with non-Asian Muslim women, but described their primary friendships with other Asian Muslim women. Tazeem expressed this when asked if she had non-Asian-Muslim friends, Tazeem said:

I go to the pictures with my girlfriends, where ever I go, we go to college, or wherever I go I talk to people, but no, I don’t have English friends, all Asian ’cause I don’t know any English girls and we have our differences as well. I don’t know. We have our differences. (Tazeem, interview Ashiana)

This was not an unusual statement from women in the investigation. It indicates that, South Asian Muslim women, trust other South Asian Muslim women, confide in them and turn to them to repair the damage/harm caused by adversity. These relationships are particularly important for resilience in conditions of protracted adversity. This finding locates resilience in the social capital assets generated in trusted networks because they enabled women, in this study, to engage in discussion, cooperation, (reciprocity) and joint action.

Social capital theory, indicates that cooperation and support amongst women, generates the ‘social glue’ (Crawford, 2006) that contributes to resilience. Building on this theoretical knowledge, it is possible to view collective contestation, agency and resistance as outcomes of social capital. As explained in Chapter Two (2.4), resistance redefines resilience from a power neutral concept, to one that places resilience in the context of inequality, struggle, and hegemony; prolonged adversity. It is the on-going struggle of South Asian Muslim women in Britain to contest the identity ascribed to them, in counter-terrorism, and to assert their place in Islam, that leads this research to the question of processes of transmutation in adaptation to prolonged adversity in hegemony. Under the lens of temporality, the processes of transmutation in prolonged adversity are enduring, situated in the dynamic of the past in the present, and the present in the past. The processes of transmutation for the
South Asian Muslim women in this study, demonstrate irrevocable change in terms of their identity and cultural script, triggered by 9/11; an example of which is in relation to their faith. The question of the longer term impacts of processes of transmutation focuses attention on future possibilities; that these women are laying the foundations of change for future generations of Muslim people, communities, and in particular, for Muslim women.

Bhabha’s (1994), theory of hybridity, offers a useful frame in which to position women in prolonged adversity; the ‘third space’ offers a way to consider if adaptation enables the retention of fundamental, pre-trauma characteristics. For South Asian Muslim women, the fundamental pre-trauma characteristic is equated to their religiosity; belief in Islam. It may be helpful to explain why Bhabha’s theory of hybridity is useful to the search to understand adaptation. In describing how colonised people have resisted power, Bhabha’s theory offers the possibility of a new dynamic; a ‘third position’ or ‘third space’. The third position, is not located in historic subjugation, or in co-option into the dominant narrative; it is a different cultural position ‘in-between the designations of identity’ (1994: 4). For South Asian Muslim women, the hybrid position, in the third space, lies in the intersection of Islamic and Western identities. In this frame, South Asian Muslim women have inhabited a ‘third space’ that contests their historic subjugation in dominant representations, and exclusion in faith; evident in women’s search for resistant identities, and ‘their Islam’.

In their rejection, of counter-terrorism’s construction of Muslim women (see Chapter Three, 3.5 and 6.2.1), and in their re-articulation of Islam, women in the Fieldway investigation, generated new identity positions. At one level this is evident in women’s choice of dress; wearing hijab, or wearing hijab with jeans and shirts can be seen as a physical manifestation of hybridity. The women who wore hijab and also jeans were neither buying into Western ideology, nor into traditional Islam; they had created a new, independent, identity. They were neither the daughters/wives of orthodox Islam, nor had they become the Western image of woman; they had adopted new positions. Their new positions
contest the boundaries of both South Asian tradition and Western hegemony. However it remains unclear if women who embraced hybridity retained pre-trauma characteristics or if in the process of transformation they changed unrecognisably. The question of loss of pre-trauma religiosity is the focus of the following section.

6.4.2 Did adaptation compromise fundamental aspects of women’s Islamic identity?

The empirical investigation identified that, far from denouncing Islam and having no faith or taking another faith, South Asian Muslim women’s interest in Islam increased as a result of the ‘War on Terror’. This was evident in women’s choice to wear hijab, as symbolic of their religiosity, and in their search to find ‘their Islam’ (see 6.2.1 and 6.2.3 in this chapter). Secondly, ‘third space’ theory and, in particular, the concept of hybridity (Bhabha, 1994), suggests that hybridity embodies both former positions, whilst representing neither, in the creation of the new and different (hybrid) position. In the frame of ‘the third space’ women had not rejected Islam; they had positioned themselves differently to, and in, Islam. The important point for this investigation is in women’s re-articulation of their position in Islam, as opposed to, a rejection of Islam (see 6.2.3). Data, from the empirical investigation, indicate that adaptation and transformation, in conditions of prolonged adversity, led women not only to retain, but also to, strengthen pre-trauma religious characteristics.

Women who adopted hybrid positions strengthened, rather than relinquished, pre-trauma faith characteristics despite hegemonic pressures to conform to the dominant ideology. Hatred of Muslims in wider society was not sufficient, for the women in the Fieldway study, to be hegemonized. In retaining, and strengthening, religiosity, South Asian Muslim women demonstrated resistance in resilience to the dominant narrative and to hegemonic pressure. In resisting dominant narratives South Asian Muslim women were/are modelling a new ‘third
way’, a refusal to accept the binary of ‘Muslim’ or ‘Western’. This process of transmutation is hugely important as they were asserting their rights in both.

South Asian Muslim women’s new positions challenged orthodox Islam, in terms of women’s identity and in terms of women’s position; it involved them in complex negotiations and interactions with family, community and society as indicated by Fathema (quoted in 6.2.3) and her friends, in their challenge to the formal code of the local Mosque, by attending different Mosques. Women’s adaptive strategies of attending other Mosques required them to engage in negotiations that caused disruptions in the existing order; the new order appeared to have been accepted by family members and became part of the daily routines of South Asian Muslim women. The disruption was also felt by traditional Mosque leaders. Rizwana, for example noted that women’s new ‘independent’ positions were not welcomed by some Mosque elders who did not see them ‘in the best light’. These examples demonstrate that women’s adaptation, in lived hegemony, were themselves creating disruptions to established orders and systems.

The complexity of hybridity, for South Asian Muslim women, is in the loss of certainty; certainty provided by tradition, even dynamic tradition. In subverting and reforming, re-formulating and transmuting meanings, in hybrid positions, women created alliances in new networks; in social and faith networks and in new ways of thinking. For South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway, this included families accepting that women’s rejection of traditional South Asian dress was not a rejection of South Asian tradition and values such as faith. Hybridity is constituted of ambivalence; negotiating new ways of understanding women’s new place in old and new social orders.

This investigation suggests that South Asian Muslim women who adopted hybrid positions affirmed rather than diminished their affiliation to Islam; this does not suggest that they changed beyond recognition from the women they were to
new Muslim women. In terms of the pre-trauma characteristic of Islamic religiosity, their processes of adaptation lead to change but not change beyond recognition. Many women engaged in Islam in ways that they had not prior to the ‘War on Terror’, disrupting the dominant narrative, by rejecting it. Women also rejected the binary of either traditional South Asian OR Western dress. This rejection, played out in dress code, symbolizing women’s rejection of the binary of either Muslim or Western. In these rejections South Asian Muslim women disrupted the equilibrium of family, community and societal order, pre-9/11. Hybridity, enabled women to select, aspects of both ideologies, rather than totally reject or total accept either. The fundamentally important point to make, in relation to resilience, is that in these processes of change there was no place to ‘bounce back’ to. The trajectory is one of movement in which there is no equilibrium.
Part IV
Conclusion: Extending knowledge
Chapter Seven: Conclusion – extending knowledge

7.1 Introduction

This research set out to trouble the ‘deafening silence’ (Khan, 2013) surrounding Muslim women’s experience of adversity in the ‘War on Terror’. It set two overarching aims and a series of sub aims to guide the thesis in this task. The aims and sub aims focused attention on the application of new approaches to understanding the ‘War on Terror’ as a new invocation of struggle for hegemony rooted in empire. Salter (2002), in making the case that the terms ‘barbarian’ and ‘civilized’ have been resurrected in the ‘War on Terror’, exposes that the violence associated with the ‘barbarian’ ‘is open to the violence of the “civilized”’ (p. 163). The imagery used by Salter, in describing forms of national violence and violation in Afghanistan and Iraq, can be used to describe the violence and abuse of South Asian and other Muslim women on the streets of Britain by the so-called ‘civilized’ minority who abuse Muslim women.

This thesis has argued that the indignities of fear and violence experienced by South Asian Muslim women is directly linked to the rhetoric and actions of the ‘War on Terror’ and counter-terrorism. Yet it has also been difficult to find evidence to indicate that national and local governments are aware of, understand or respond to, the collateral damage caused to women, by government setting in train specific protective measures. Indeed the opposite was found to be the case; local state institutions were unaware of South Asian Muslim women’s fear, of Islamophobic abuse, in this empirical study. This is a huge indictment of democratic processes that purport to protect all citizens equally. It is in the context, of failure by the state, to put in place specific measures to support South Asian, and other, Muslim women that this thesis concludes. New knowledge unearthed in this thesis provides imperatives for urgent policy reform. Learning from this thesis is grouped under four heading that are considered separately in the following text. The chapter concludes with returning to Fieldway to provide an update of the work of the Ashiana centre that was largely used by Pakistani women, during the field research.
7.2 New frames or ways of thinking about the ‘War on Terror’, adversity and resilience

This thesis offers a new approach to the study of the ‘War on Terror’ and the concept ‘resilience’ under the lenses of hegemony and temporality. In addition, feminist, Black feminist and anti-imperialist epistemological frames were crucial in terms of the intersectionality of sexism, racism and colonization. Placing the ‘War on Terror’ and resilience under these analytic lenses exposed present manifestation of adversity as already existing and rooted in a colonial past. This view opened up new ways of approaching the study of resilience; as prolonged and continuous, the ‘war of position’ (Gramsci, 1971: 108). In this reading, the experiences of adversity in the ‘War on Terror’ for South Asian Muslim women in Britain, are rooted in a long history of struggle against co-option into a master narrative that presents Islam as uncivilized and Muslim women as subject to extreme/hyper patriarchal oppression (Brown, 2016). Yet this thesis has evidenced resistance to state and civil society hegemony by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. The notion of resistance as ongoing struggle for power and domination problematizes accepted definitions of resilience; there is no pre-trauma state of equilibrium for South Asian Muslim women in Britain to ‘bounce back’ to. The dynamic of hegemony and temporality are always in transition.

Under the lens of hegemony and temporality the shape or structure of adversity and resilience are changed; there is an insistence that adversity and resilience cannot remain politically neutral. The lenses of hegemony and temporality sharpen the focus on time in adversity to expose the presence of prolonged adversity. The lenses of hegemony and temporality sharpen the focus on resistance in resilience to expose the presence of resistance to domination. These foci bring in the political dynamic to make visible individual, group and collective resilience as resistance to conditions of prolonged adversity in the struggle for ideological power.
7.3 New knowledge

Secondly, this thesis offers new knowledge. Most importantly it has evidenced a high level of fear amongst South Asian Muslim women in Britain for their safety that can be directly linked to the ‘War on Terror’, 9/11 and 7/7. In doing this the thesis moves beyond general ideas of Muslims as the new ‘suspect community’ (Pantazis, 2009; Spalek, 2010) and presumptions of adversity; it identified the presence of specific multiple, intersecting prolonged forms of adversity and consequent harms endured by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. It has uncovered fear, and the spread of fear, amongst Muslim communities. These are important findings academically as they drill down into the nuanced and specific ways in which South Asian Muslim women in Britain are affected by the ‘War on Terror’. The empirical research findings offers a new knowledge, on the ‘lived hegemony’ of South Asian Muslim women in Britain (Williams, 1977:112, cited in Stoddart, 2007:202) that expose short comings in social justice for Muslim women at local and national policy levels.

In providing new data/information about South Asian Muslim women’s experience of adversity and, importantly, their everyday strategies of resistance in the ‘War on Terror’; this thesis provides a counter-balance to the ‘deafening silence’ noted by Khan (2013) at the beginning of this thesis. In articulating South Asian Muslim women’s everyday resistances and their adaptation in building hybrid ‘resistant identities’; this thesis highlights South Asian Muslim women’s agency and courage in the ‘War on Terror’. Women’s resistant identities are a rejection of dominant representations of themselves as ‘intolerable’ (Bottrell, 2009) to them and identifies women’s on-going search for an identity that meets their needs and more accurately represents them.

The thesis also identified that strong social bonds and bonding capital was an important pre-requisite for women to engage in bridging activities; joining or

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41 This point is picked up in relation to policy learning in 7.4 of this chapter.
engaging with other networks. In this regard, and through the lens of hegemony, the thesis asks if Granovetter’s (1973) important work on the ‘strength of weak ties’ is different for different groups. The work in Fieldway indicated that South Asian Muslim women (a marginalised group) required the confidence of bonding social capital, in networks with strong ties, before they were able to engage in bridging activities that require weak network ties.

Additionally, this thesis exposes the deafness, failure, or inability, of the local state in Britain, to hear, understand, or respond to, South Asian Muslim women’s experiences of fear/adversity. In the Fieldway study, for example, it was apparent in the interviews with local state representatives that they just did not know that South Asian Muslim women lived with fear; therefore they were unable to offer specific responses to reduce women’s fear. This finding adds weight to the isolation of South Asian, and other, Muslim women that was also identified in national policy. Feminist and human rights studies (Huckerby, 2012; Ní Aolàin, 2013) identify that Muslim women remain in the margin of national counter-terrorism policy; this thesis found that South Asian Muslim women in Fieldway were not even in the margin of local policy; they were invisible, their issues were unknown and unheard by local state institutions. This raises serious concerns for policy related to social cohesion and for the social justice and human rights of South Asian Muslim women in Britain.

This thesis identified the central role of relationships and bonding social capital in enabling, the collective resilience as resistance, of South Asian Muslim women in Britain. In doing so, this thesis adds to resilience literature, by articulating the ways in which social networks play an important part in building social capital. Resilience itself is a form of social capital in this frame; bonding relationships generate the trust and reciprocity (Coleman, 1988; Putnam; 1996; 2000) that enable resistance in conditions of prolonged adversity characterized by fear. However, this thesis also questions Coleman’s (1988) work on closed network structures. The empirical investigation conducted for this thesis found that South Asian Muslim women’s family networks were ‘close’ rather than
‘closed’ leading this thesis to question if Coleman’s networks with closure are in fact porous (see Chapter Six, 6.3.1, Figure 6.1). The Fieldway study found that influences on South Asian Muslim women’s social norms were wider than family alone and, at times, led these women to contest norms within their family such as wearing hijab against the expressed wishes of elders in the family.

Finally, in relation to neighbourhood as the place in which the work to ‘repair’ (Forrest, 2001) the harmful effects of prolonged adversity is carried out; this thesis observed that ethnically mixed and cohesive neighbourhood structures have the potential to insulate South Asian Muslim women in Britain, from the harmful adversity of fear of Islamophobic assault by white males. It is not possible from the findings of this thesis to state with certainty that this is the case. However, this finding raises the issue of the need for further study to ascertain if there are protective values, in relation to adversity and resilience, of mixed ethnic and faith neighbourhoods and the characteristics required for social cohesion.

7.4 Gaps in existing knowledge; further study

Thirdly, this thesis identified gaps in existing knowledge raising the potential for future study. Most importantly, and urgently, further study is required to understand adversity and resilience in conditions of prolonged trauma or disruption. The experience of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, in the ‘War on Terror’, provides an example of processes of adaptation, yet adaptation is understudied in resilience. An important gap in existing knowledge in this regard concerns the question of whether adaptation and change lead to the loss of fundamental pre-trauma/disruption characteristics.42

42 The idea of adaptation in conditions of prolonged harm builds on the definition of resilience at the beginning of Chapter Two frames by Hardy (2015).
The adaptation of the South Asian Muslim women, in this thesis, suggests not, but the thesis did not set out to test processes of adaptation in conditions of prolonged harm. This thesis did, however, uncover that processes of adaptation and change create further disturbance in the system, leading to questions about the effects of change, caused by adaptation itself, to the system. For example, in creating resilient identities and in finding their Islam, women in the Fieldway study, disrupted existing codes of behaviour and meaning. Hybridity required women to renegotiate all the parameters of all social relations, negotiate new behaviours, meanings and new forms of knowing. New positions raise question about further disruption in the system/s that require academic attention. In the case of South Asian Muslim women the answer was no, adaptation did not lead to fundamental change in women themselves, but the unanswered question remains, do women’s resistances lead to fundamental disruptions/changes in the community (or system) as a whole?

This thesis also found that, for South Asian Muslim women in the field investigation, the home neighbourhood area provided benefits and was the place in which the work to ‘repair’ (Forrest, 2001) the damage inflicted by adversity was carried out. However, it also found that, for one participant, growing up in a neighbourhood that was ethnically mixed and appeared to be cohesive, may have reduced the participant’s fear of Islamophobia. Whist cause and effect could not be determined in this thesis; the experience raises questions about the role of neighbourhood as protector from adversity or exacerbating adversity through, for example, the spread of fear. A study of neighbourhood effects might build on the work of Forrest et al., (2001) to provide greater detail of the effects of a cohesive neighbourhood on South Asian Muslim women’s fear of Islamophobic assault.

7.5 Policy implications for Muslim women’s human rights

The greatest social policy concern identified in this thesis was the dislocation between Muslim women and national and local policy, and dislocation between
women and local state actors. At the national level feminist scholars suggest that Muslim women remain in the margin of security policy and peripheral to the institutional settings of policy (Ni Aolàni, 2013, see Chapter Three, 3.5). However, where Muslim women are mentioned, as in the Casey review into opportunity and integration (2016), Muslim women’s specific needs are lost; despite the stated aim of the report to consider ‘what divides communities and gives rise to anxiety, prejudice, alienation and a sense of grievance’ (p. 5). Despite the report acknowledging anti-Muslim violence experienced by women, its recommendation for stronger community cohesion, that this thesis supports, is reduced in terms of ethnic minority (and Muslim) women to the promotion of English language and the ‘emancipation of marginalised groups of women’ (p. 167). This thesis takes issue with generalised recommendations such as these because the issue of violence against Muslim women, is now know and well document, but not addressed. The findings from this thesis argue that there is a clear and urgent need to establish specific programmes aimed at building relations between Muslim women and local state institutions. This is particularly urgent and important given the on-going indignity and injustice experienced by visibly identifiable Muslim women.

At the level of the local state, this thesis identified an alarming lack of knowledge by local state representatives of South Asian Muslim women’s fear. There may be reasons for this that were unknown to the research, however the total silence of representatives of the state indicates a further silencing or invisibilising of South Asian Muslim women’s reality. This was perhaps most evident in the ways in which representatives of the local state who participated in the study were silent about, and thereby invisibilized, the harm inflicted by the ‘War on Terror’ on South Asian Muslim women. The articulations of these local state representatives re-inscribed gender and faith stereotypes such as Muslim’s women’s experience of domestic violence within in Muslim communities in Fieldway (as described in Chapter Five, 5,4). Failures at national and local state levels to engage with, and understand, Muslim women’s lived experience indicate fissures between state institutions and Muslim women. Viewed from the perspective of Halpern’s multi-level social capital diagram (Chapter Two, 2.2.2
Figure 2.3) these failures indicate a lack of protection for South Asian Muslim women at both levels. In terms of resilience theory related to risk and protective factors, the failure of the local state reflects its inability to adopt a protective counter-balance to risk based national counter-terrorism policy. The issue of the dislocation of South Asian Muslim women, from local and national state, raises questions about the rights of Muslim women to live free of intimidation and fear and their rights to religious freedom as citizens in democratic British society. The recommendation from this finding must stress the urgent need for local state institutions to actively engage with South Asian Muslim women in Britain, to build sufficient trust with them for them to make their concerns known to local state actors.  

Additionally, this thesis suggests, in relation to local policy, that it is essential for the local state to work towards women’s equal use of local facilities as one way of demonstrating concern for women and to help build trust between local state institutions and South Asian Muslim women. This is particularly the case in relation to buildings that are owned by local state institutions and managed by male civil society groups. This may involve long and complex negotiations; however it would send a clear signal to South Asian women’s groups, such as Ashiana, that the local state was concerned about issues that are pertinent to them. The Fieldway investigation found, for example, that some representatives of the local authority were aware of, and concerned about, South Asian Muslim women’s unequal access, but there appeared to be difficulty in addressing the problem (see Chapter Five, 5.4). This is worrying as exclusion denied South Asian Muslim women access to limited public space in Fieldway, and resilience literature identifies that material resources, such as access to meeting places is important for building social networks, social capital and resilience.  

43 This finding reflects the findings of Spalek related to the importance of trust building between Muslim communities and institutions of the state, such as the police, in counter-terrorism (Spalek, 2010; 2013).
7.6 Conclusion

This thesis set out to trouble the unacceptable ‘deafening’ silence surrounding adversity experienced by South Asian Muslim women in Britain. It has done this by tracing current struggles for hegemony to British imperialism. This approach has illuminated the deep roots of the ‘War on Terror’ in British imperial history. In this frame, Islamophobia is a manifestation of prolonged adversity, in the ‘war of position’ embedded in the historical, intergenerational collective consciousness of colonial British/South Asian Muslim relations. Historical amnesia, as an aspect of consent and coercion in hegemony, must not only be named but also resisted.

On a finishing note the importance of breaking the silence surrounding the indignity experienced by South Asian Muslim women, in the ‘War on Terror’ cannot be underestimated. It is essential to achieving their right to live a life free of fear and also to clearly articulate that the women in this study were not passive victims. The courage and strength of women in the face of incredible fear is a story that requires to be told repeatedly to dispel the construction of South Asian Muslim women in Britain as inactive, oppressed and malleable.

In women’s everyday resistance and in their adoption of hybrid positions South Asian Muslim women in Britain are adopting a long tradition of challenge; challenge to the binary of power and subjugation, enacted, ironically, by white men when they converted to Islam three hundred years ago\textsuperscript{44}. 18\textsuperscript{th} century British state and population were unable to accept hybridity, as it was seen to pose a challenge to the superiority of the dominant ideology, it would seem that this remains the case in 21\textsuperscript{st} century Britain, for Muslim women, who symbolise hybrid identities. South Asian Muslim women, who represent hybrid identities, face anger and hatred on the streets of Britain; the failure of the state to offer

\textsuperscript{44} Known as the ‘White Moghuls’ powerful representatives of the East India Company converted to Islam and adopted Indian life styles (Dalrymple, 2003). They were hated by the contemporary British public and state and pejoratively called the ‘nabobs’ (See Chapter Three, 3.2.1)
them specific protection from this vilification might also be viewed as the dominant group’s failure to accept hybridity. Importantly, in refusing to accept the binary of ‘Muslim’ or ‘British’ South Asian Muslim women in Britain are engaged in generating creative alternatives; identities of resistance constituted of, and within, hybridity. There is an urgent need for public policy to hear, understand, learn from, and incorporate these South Asian Muslim women’s creativity to their adversity. Public policy, this thesis suggests, could be improved if it engaged the notion of plurality and hybridity.
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**Note** – Documents marked with * have been anonymised. Full reference of articles and documents are available on request from the researcher.
Appendices
Appendix 1

Flexible framework for focus groups and interviews with women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research aims and objectives - themes</th>
<th>Focus group/interview process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adversity</td>
<td>Introduction to research project</td>
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<td>Introduction to focus group/interview process – 2 parts:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1st part looking back/remembering</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2nd part about social assets</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3rd part hopes for the future</td>
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</table>

**Part 1 – looking back – feeling secure/insecure?**

2. Resilience

“It is especially after Sep: 11 it has got worse....everywhere you go people are disrespecting us.....I was scared....I have heard that people have pulled girls’ scarves off....I didn’t tend to go out alone & I remember I went to town a few weeks after it had happened people were just giving me mucky looks....”

Shabnam Ishaq (aged 21)
(Bagguley & Hussain 2005: 218)

Resilience to what? Identifying adversity?

- This is what ‘Shabnam’ said about Sep: 11 2001. Can you remember how you felt when you heard about the Al-Qaeda attack in America or the 7/7/2005 London bombings?

Prompts

- Where were you?
- Who told you/how did you find out?
- What were your first thoughts?

- Which of these events do you remember most Sep: 11 or 7/7?
Can you explain why you remember one more than the other?

- Did either of these events make any difference to the things you did or how you felt?

Prompts

- About going out
- About your parents?
- About your children?
- About your non-Muslim neighbours?

3. Social networks/social capital/trust and reciprocity

Who did you turn to/share your thoughts and feeling with?

Prompts

- Family & friends?
- Community group?
- Mosque?
- Local Councillors?
- Someone else?

Why?
Prompts
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part 2 – NOW – what has changed?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Social capital bridging and linking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you tell me what has changed for you and for your community since you first heard about these atrocities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prompts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Less/more able to move around and talk to people in Harehills?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Less/more able to travel around and talk to people in the city?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Talk to fewer/more non-Muslim people?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Nothing has changed?</td>
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<tr>
<th>Part 3 – the future</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Hopes and realities - transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are your hopes for yourself for the future?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are your hopes for your community in the future?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is this different to your hopes 13 years ago (2001) or 8 years ago (2005)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 6. The role of social networks/social capital |
| Can you describe the ONE thing/person/group that has helped most in making this change? |

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<th>7. nishing off/closure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Summary of key points</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Reassure participants of confidentiality and anonymity</td>
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<tr>
<td>- There will be a chance to read the transcript if wished</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Thank you for your time and for speaking to me</td>
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</table>
Appendix 2

Flexible framework for interviews with professionals

Introduction

This research is interested in taking a closer look at the role of social and political networks in generating adaptive community resilience. Adaptive resilience is a term that I use to describe the capacity of a ‘community’ (or group of people who share common spaces, issues, or bonds) to rise above on-going adversity.

I differentiate adaptive resilience from recovery resilience in as much as recovery is often used to describe how a community returns to ‘normal function’ after a disaster. Adaptive resilience is about how a community adapts over time to on-going problems and issues.

Research aim and objectives

The aim of this investigation is to better understand the social dynamics that make communities resilient to on-going adversity. The research assumes that social mechanisms and civil society infrastructure play a part in ‘protecting’ group members to thrive under negative conditions.

I am particularly interested in talking to you about your views and perspectives, as a professional working in this neighbourhood with people who identify as Muslim or are part of one or many communities of Muslims living in this area.

I would like to begin by asking a few questions about your professional relationship with the neighbourhood.

The professional relationship

- How long have you worked with Muslim residents in this area?
- Is it your view or understanding that this group of people live with specific pressures/issues/stresses?
  - If yes, can you describe the pressures?
  - …..and what about women?

PART 1.

I am particularly interested in understanding how Muslim people who live in this neighbourhood cope with the stigma of ‘terrorism’ post 9/11/2001 and the London bombings on 7/7/2005.

If appropriate:
• Looking back at these events are you able to recall any anxieties in this group? Can you describe how these anxieties were played out?

• Can you recall the role of the profession you represent in addressing anxieties? If required – for example relationship building between community members and your profession, special services, additional support?

• Can you recall if any changes (positive or negative) that occurred as a result? These might be within the community or between the community and the profession you represent

• Were you aware of anything that happened within the local Muslim community to address anxieties?
   If required – can you describe these?

• Can you recall responses to anxiety in the community from your profession?
   If required – can you describe these?

Thank you – I know it’s difficult to recall the past, and especially such a long time ago so let’s move to the present.

PART 2.
• As you think about this neighbourhood and this group of people today what would you say has been the most significant change?
   If required – more/less inward looking?
   More/less contact with your, and/or other formal agencies?

• Might you describe any of these changes as transformative? If required – For individuals or for a wider group?
   Expand on the nature of the changes and the group affected

• What about the question of trust between members of this community and formal agencies – how do you see this?
   If required – why?
• Are you able to describe any positive or negative impacts of the recent brutal murder of the soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich?
  If required – how were the implications of this tragedy for social cohesion handled?

Thank you, I would now like to turn to the last part of the interview – the future

PART 3.
• Do members of this group of people have hopes and aspirations for the future?
  If required – please describe these, and explain what makes you think that?

Before finishing I would like to ask you if you think there are other professionals or people in the community who you think it may be useful for me to speak to.
Appendix 3
Resilience enhancing resources in Fieldway

This appendix provides contextual information related to the resources available to Muslim women in Fieldway. It is generally accepted that material resources can serve to insulate individuals and communities from adversity (Zautra, 2010; O’Sullivan, 2012) making it important to determine the extent to which the investigation community in Fieldway had access to insulating factors.

It may be useful to begin with understanding the ethnic and faith demographic of Fieldway and the electoral ward in which it is located:

- At ward level the single largest group is ‘White British’ at 37%, followed by Pakistani at 22%, African at 8% and Bangladeshi at 17% of the population (West Yorkshire Observatory, 2012)
- At the neighbourhood level the ‘White British’ population falls to 25%, and African to 1%
- At the neighbourhood level the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations increase to 32% and 17% respectively (West Yorkshire Observatory, 20102)
- Neighbourhood data demonstrate a concentration of South Asian Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in Fieldway representing 49% of the total neighbourhood population
- At the ward level Christian is closely followed by Islam as the faith of the populations at 39% and 33% respectively
- At the neighbourhood level Islam represents 52% and Christianity 26% of the faith of the populations (Northend City Council, 2012 ward data and West Yorkshire Observatory, 2012 for neighbourhood data).

Fieldway; structural challenges

- Fieldway is ranked amongst the 10% most deprived neighbourhoods nationally against all indices of deprivation
- Low income and environmental quality are the worst45
- Health and housing also rank amongst the worst nationally

Note – data relate to total ward or neighbourhood populations and are not separated by religion or ethnic group. These data indicate that Muslims share high levels of poverty with other population groups.

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45 The count for low income in the neighbourhood stands at -60% and -50% for quality of environment of the average count for the city in 2012
**Economic activity**

The ward had the highest unemployment count in city/town and the second highest Job Seekers Allowance claimant count (JSA In 2012).

- Benefit claimants data (as a proxy for unemployment as well as low wage) indicate both high levels of unemployment and high levels of in-work poverty (JSNA 2012).

- Twice as many children in Fieldway live in homes in which no adult is working with the attendant effects for child development, educational attainment and inter-generational social mobility (Hirsch, 2007).

- Unemployment level in Fieldway are 2.5 times higher than the city/town average (Northend City Council, 2014).

- Low income levels are 3 times higher than city/town averages (Northend City Council, 2010).

- Resident on forms of welfare benefit is also double city/town averages standing at 22.05% (Northend City Council, 2010).

**Crime and community safety**

- Has the highest levels for burglary in the regional Police Force area (Northend City Council, 2013 (a)).

- Youth nuisance and burglary are the top community safety priorities by residents (Northend City Council, 2014).

- 25% of reported crime and anti-social behaviour related to young people.

- Drug dealing is highlighted in the Council’s 2013 survey.

- The need to improve relationships between young people and the police highlighted in the Council’s 2013 survey.

- The Council’s neighbourhood improvement plans for 2013/14 and 2014/15 make reference to the need to improve community confidence in the police.

- Fieldway has among the lowest levels of confidence in the police in the city/town.

**Fieldway; the physical environment**

- Has a population of 7,400 people who live in 2,605 properties (Council tax listing 2011).

- Population density comprises 74.2 people per hectare compared to an average of 13.6 people in the city/town (Northend City Council, 2012).

- 31.7% of housing in the electoral ward is deemed to be over-occupied (re’new, 2010).

- ‘Entrenched “homeless sub-culture”’ with high numbers of young people on housing waiting lists with little chance of needs being met in the neighbourhood (re’new, 2010).
- 70% of housing stock comprises smaller back-to-back and small terraced houses with no or small gardens (Re’new, 2010)
- 90% of housing is classified in Council tax band ‘A’
- streets and almost all houses are poorly maintained with broken paving slabs and weed-ridden gutters
- 2 primary schools, and no high schools
- 4 established Mosques
- 2 community centres (one Pakistani and one Bangladeshi); a Bangladeshi women’s centre, and a privately run enterprise centre
- 2 lively main road shopping streets
- 1 small-ish park for green space with a few very small pocket parks where houses have been demolished
- a number of households shared an external space for storing rubbish bins; called bin yards
- litter, street cleanliness, graffiti, fly tipping, bin yards and dog fouling have been raised by residents as issues of concern (Northend City Council, 2014).

Mental health effects of gender and race - beyond Fieldway

Being female and South Asian make a difference to health and life opportunities that are not apparent at neighbourhood level. While the socio-economic implications of poverty are grave for all women (Moosa, 2009), the combination of (female) gender and (South Asian) race increase the risk of poor mental health. Women from these ethnic groups have the lowest income of any group of women experiencing the largest ‘employment penalty’ as Muslims (Bagguley, 2007: 1; Moosa, 2009: 14).

The World Health Organisation (WHO) states that the world’s most ruthless killer and the greatest cause of suffering on earth is extreme poverty (1995). While BME communities in the UK cannot be deemed to experience extreme poverty they can be deemed to experience high levels of relative poverty with its associated distress and suffering. Poverty can have a direct or indirect effect on emotional, behavioural and psychiatric health and a profound impact on an individual’s ability to cope with day-to-day problems.

- Poverty more than doubles the chance of experiencing depression and generalised anxiety disorder (Muarli, 2004:3, Anand, 2005:205, Rowlingson, 2011:16)
- national studies indicate a higher prevalence of mental health problems among South Asian women (defined as Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi,
and Sri Lankan) in terms of depression, suicide, deliberate self-harm and eating disorders (Anand, 2005: 196)
- Pakistani Muslim women are particularly vulnerable to depression and anxiety (Sonuga-Barke, 2000)
- Pakistani and white women who are in employment have lower anxiety and depression scores than those who were house bound
- suicide rate of young Asian women is more than double that of their white counterparts (Anand, 2005; Kumari, 2004; Soni, 1990).

Despite the danger of over-simplifying causal effects these data offer additional information about the mental health wellbeing of women in Fieldway. Along-side data generated by women community leaders during the field investigation these data suggest that levels of mental health distress may be considerably higher in this population than is recognised in official data for the neighbourhood.

In relation to resilience enhancing resources this brief overview of some conditions in Fieldway indicate that Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim women who live in Fieldway have few material resources to insulate them from adversity.

Note - data sources that are attributed to Northend and Fieldway are from anonymised sources. A coding log of actual/anonymised references has been retained and is available on request.
## Appendix 4

### Stage 4 Analysis

**Interpretive selection of key issues - adversity and resilience**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adversity</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **Context** – structural issues:  
- poverty  
- racism  
- Islamophobia (including gendered stereotypes of Muslim women)  
- 9/11 and 7/7 spotlight Muslims. | **Resistant identities – behaviours and actions**  
- contesting ascribed identity  
- formulating counter narratives  
- creating spaces for faith capital |
| **1 Theme: fear and spread of fear**  
- hatred of Muslims; escalation of attacks visibly identifiable Muslim women following an Islamist related incident (including 7/7)  
- effects of hard counter-terrorism | **Resilience, relationships and social assets**  
- complexity of family and neighbourhood networks  
- women’s friendship networks  
- women’s centres, social capital |
| **1a Sub theme: the failure of civic institutions to recognise women’s vulnerabilities:**  
- confusion, lack of preparedness for 9/11 included lack of specific support for Muslim women  
- failure of local state institutions to recognise the heightened level of women’s fear particularly after 7/7 | **Resilience - adapting in conditions of prolonged adversity and retaining fundamental characteristics**  
- hybrid identities and new positions |
| **1b Sub theme: failure of civil society institutions to recognise women’s vulnerabilities:**  
- mosques in particular  
- also generic community centres |  |