On the genealogy of power, truth-telling and self-care: 
(Neo)governmentality and globalisation

Dimitrios Lais
Ph.D.
University of York
Politics
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Abstract

This thesis considers Foucault’s political value with respect to ‘governmentality’. It does this by attending to Foucault as an ethical philosopher, drawing on Foucault’s progressive use of genealogy as three interrelated axes (power, truth, and ethics). The ‘governmentality concept’ and Foucault’s political value can be fully realized only on this basis.

‘Governmentality’ is a critical concept that initially appears in a discussion of instrumentally rational power tied to a genealogy of power, but becomes more nuanced and, perhaps, relevant to contemporary forms of democratic governance when Foucault discusses ancient ethics and the Enlightenment. Therefore, the concern with how to govern the freedom of others interlinks with the problematisation of how to govern the self. Instead of reading Foucault’s discussion of parrhesia and enlightenment as merely sources that contribute to contemporary theories of democratic emancipation, I suggest that both Foucault’s preference for the Phaedo-Laches/Cynic parrhesia over the Alcibiades’ version—with its Neoplatonic connotations—and his condemnation of the Enlightenment as a project of man leading to a telos, generates both a genealogical critique of the present and an ethos of living. To put it differently, a genealogy of ethics is identified and further realised in this thesis. Genealogy driven by the ethical axis contemplates how power, truth-telling and self-care interact to interrupt ‘games of power’ by leading to ‘games of knowledge’ rather than ‘games of truth’.

Building on David Owen’s ‘legislation versus orientation in thinking’, Thomas Osborne’s ‘scientific/therapeutic enlightenment versus aesthetic enlightenment’ and Nikolas Rose’s ‘ethopolitics’, I forge a twofold ‘neogovernmentality critique’. Thus, I give an overview of Foucault’s theory before laying the groundwork for a ‘neogovernmentality critique’. This overview attempts to bring the genealogy of antiquity and the genealogy of instrumental rationality together for the sake of understanding the present. The ‘critique’ contributes to the established Habermas-Foucault debate with respect to parrhesia and enlightenment, while focussing on the less discussed connection between governmentality and deliberative democracy. It also illuminates the discussion between Foucault and the reflexive sociology of Beck and Giddens with respect to the ideas of parrhesia and enlightenment, while elaborating the connections between governmentality and cosmopolitanism.
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I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as references.
Structure of the thesis and outline

Introduction

The thesis features an extended introduction. The ‘Aims’ section acts as the basic expected introduction of a thesis by introducing the main themes and concepts of the thesis. However, despite the foundational elements of Part I, the thesis needs to further engage with Foucault’s life work. In order to do this without interrupting the substantive argument, the ‘Perspectives and methodology’ section of the introduction offers a thorough account of those aspects of Foucault’s life and thought that are relevant for the argument that follows. The ‘Establishing the hypothesis’ section, which ends the introduction, bridges the two main sections that preceded it, and paves the ground for the body of the thesis.

Part I

In chapter 1, I introduce the Foucauldian concept of ‘parrhesia’ to highlight two distinct lines of philosophical development in the West. My aim is to crystallise Foucault’s ethics, while setting the foundations for tracing an alternative to his ethics’ trajectory to the present. In this context, there is a discussion of ethics tied to the problematisation of how to govern the self. A ‘governmentality critique’ concerned with the interaction between power, knowledge and the subject emerges from here in connection with the problematisation of how to govern the self which is tied to the ethical axis of genealogy.

The second chapter explains how both accounts of parrhesia were marginalized, but the Alcibiades one remained more prominent. I explicitly focus on the shift in the West from the ethics of antiquity to the rise of instrumental rationality. The latter is explored via Foucault’s account of pastoral power, liberal and neoliberal governmentality. I particularly focus on the conditions of producing freedom within liberal and neoliberal governmentality. At the same time, this chapter can be seen as the stepping stone from a ‘governmentality critique’, focusing exclusively on the governing of the freedom of persons, to the re-emergence of the problematisation of how to govern the self. In this way, I set the context for applying a governmentality critique to contemporary forms of power relations tied to the interaction between neoliberalism and theories of democratic emancipation in conditions of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation.

This governmentality critique remains bound to both the concern with how to govern the freedom of persons and to the problematisation of how to govern the self. In this context, it remains in the realm of a critical analysis as any account of reality is linked to a close contemplation of forms of governmental regulation tied to how to govern the self in relation to how to govern the freedom of persons. In this context, with the problematisation of how to govern the self becoming prominent, it becomes apparent how governmentality becomes the point that technologies of
governing the others and technologies of governing the self meet, or else the point that the concern with how to govern the freedom of others meets the problematisation of how to govern the self. Here, the argument that the discussion of ancient ethics can be perceived as genealogy (i.e. talking for the present) comes to the forefront.

To clarify, as will become evident throughout the thesis, the problematisation of the self refers to the ability of the individual to contemplate her own formation in connection with governing the self. Enlightenment, modernity or globalisation, are, for example, characterized on occasions as ‘a problematisation’ in the sense that they are connected to the problematisation of how to govern the self. Therefore, I distinguish between the ‘concern’ with how to govern the freedom of others and the ‘problematisation’ of how to govern the self. This distinction is loose. One can argue that governing the others is also a problematisation in the sense that the latter Foucault acknowledged that he had to be able to problematise in order to be able to identify how different thoughts of how to govern the others emerged. At the same time, these individuals concerned with how to govern the freedom of persons had to be able to think, to some extent, at the level of the milieu which is a space of invention (see Chapter 2). Then, the problematisation of the self can lead to both a concern with governing others through the governance of the self and to an orientation of others with respect to how to govern the self. But, as is established in the introduction and Chapter 1, there is a point in making a distinction between Foucault’s focus on marginalisation tied to a genealogy of power (i.e., how to govern others) and Foucault’s focus on problematisation tied to a genealogy of ethics (i.e., how to govern the self).

It is also worth noting that a discussion of enlightenment could fit in the foundational discussions of Part I. However: (1) Foucault’s account of enlightenment is much discussed by others. Therefore, this thesis focusses on Foucault’s account of ancient ethics, which essentially provides the foundations of the ethical differentiation that has been highlighted between Foucault and others with respect to enlightenment. In this thesis, the connection between parrhesia and enlightenment is first considered in the introduction and is integrated in the discussion of how we ought to govern the self and others that takes place in Parts II and III. (2) Foucault’s choice to perceive the French revolutionary spirit as less significant in terms of governance of freedom in the West, along with the way that the problematisation of how to govern the self, tied to ancient ethics, is marginalised, ‘forces’ me to focus on this design. This design perceives the problematisation of enlightenment and how to govern the self as less significant in a discussion of instrumental rationality in connection with liberalism and neoliberalism.

In this context, it can be argued that even if techniques of how to govern the self can be traced from the rise of pastoral power onwards, the focus on the problematisation of the self tied to ancient ethics and enlightenment was not too prominent in Foucault’s early analysis. It seems then that the problematisation of how to govern the self belongs to Foucault’s era, where it has gradually re-emerged. Foucault’s ideas are not yet fully formed in the *History of Sexuality Volume 1*, so his
account of confession was clearly linked to the mode of how to govern others. For the most part one could observe how practises of governance of others develop techniques of internalisation rather than a clear shift to the problematisation of the governance of the self. But, it is such a shift that can reformulate the issue of governance of freedom in the sense of tracing self-legislating techniques tied to structures that evolve to accommodate a governance of others via a certain governance of the self.

The thesis does not attempt to grapple with all of Foucault’s work, or even with all of the themes within it. However, it does claim an underlying unity in Foucault as an ethical philosopher. This is consistent with the late Foucault of the History of Sexuality Volume 2 and 3 and the lectures discussed in Chapter 1, who when acknowledging that a discussion of ethics was somewhat lacking in some of his writings, was referring to the overall arrangement of his work. This does not mean that there were not periods that the power axis played a more prominent role when, for example, the focus was on the governance of others. When one mentions that Foucault should be understood as an ethical philosopher one should mean that the entirety of his work should be perceived in connection to the problematisation of how to govern the self. The concern with how to govern others is significant for Foucault himself only in this context.

Therefore, the design of this part emerges from the above understanding. My aim is to indicate a shift in the problematisation from the governance of the self to the governance of others to the re-emergence of the issue of the governance of the self. The latter is linked to neoliberalism and, mainly, the return in prominence of the problematisation of enlightenment that here is linked to the ethical differentiation of two forms of parrhesia.

Part II

Part II navigates some illustrative philosophical differences between Habermas and Foucault. The main themes here are connected to historicity and ethics. Having established a difference in ethics as legislation vs. ethics as orientation, a third theme appears. This is Habermas’s legalism, which is tied to issues of transcendentalism and the ‘polis’ in relation to existing structures of domination. As noted before, Foucault attempted to explore the possibilities of self-emancipation via the connection between power, knowledge, and ethics. My aim here is to evaluate whether such a connection operates in Habermas in a manner that could lead to structures of domination and technologies of the self.

Chapter 3 is pivotal for the rest of the thesis in the sense that it utilizes the early discussion of the ethics of parrhesia from Chapter 1 in order to highlight the difference between Foucault and Habermas, and it advances the ethical differentiation that is put forward in the introduction with respect to enlightenment. This is important for establishing Habermas’s critique as an instance of
neogovermental conduct. Moreover, it further facilitates my discussions of Giddens and Beck in Part III.

In chapter 3 I use Foucault’s critical ethos powered by genealogy as a means to expose Habermas’s lack of historicity. The purpose is neither to engage in a clear ‘philosopher versus philosopher’ discussion nor in some sort of polemic. I simply elaborate the differences in the way that Foucault and Habermas perceive enlightenment, while drawing parallels with the two distinct lines of philosophical development in the West tied to parrhesia. Therefore, the chapter essentially contributes to the concerns of enlightenment and methodology raised in the introduction. This contribution attempts to substantiate how Foucault’s methodology is linked to a critical ethos as a means to envision self-care, while Habermas’s methodology attempts to draft a solid moral doctrinal basis tied to ‘public spheres’ consisting of moral rational subjects. As a result, Habermas crafts a ‘project of men’ on the basis of envisioning a transcendental account of reason. By this token, Habermas’s way of setting the problematisation of how to govern the self leads to a legislative account of how to govern the freedom of others. At the same time, his account of self-care tied to the transcendentality of reason leads to an imposing self-care that again legislates the self rather than orientates it.

Chapter 4 navigates Habermas’s accounts of rights in connection with deliberative democracy and its post-national connotations, while reinforcing the three themes stated above. The chapter establishes this dynamic in the thesis in which the second chapters of Parts II and III (i.e. Chapters 4 and 6) focus more explicitly on providing a governmentality critique at a more empirical level, dealing with concrete political rationales/mentalities with respect to how our present is governed. Each of the first chapters of Parts II and III explicitly try to decode the link between thoughts and ways of governing by focusing on a purely theoretical discussion, whereas the second chapters are concerned with monitoring the manifestation of political regulation tied to technologies of governance (i.e., technologies of the self in relation to structures of domination).

**Part III:**

Two main themes underpin the critique offered in Part III. The first relates to ethics. I focus on defining the reflexive sociological analysis of Giddens and Beck with regard to modernity. The premise is that such an analysis can be connected to the ‘Alcibiades’ type of parrhesia concerned with morality and the ‘polis’. This, in Foucault, is in conflict with the type of parrhesia that is concerned with first taking care of the self and is free from solid moral and doctrinal structures.

The second theme concerns structures. I focus on the problems of a misguided understanding of structures. Regardless of what kind of parrhesia or ethics one wants to establish in an ideal situation, limitations are imposed by what Foucault outlines as dispositif (apparatus). All in
all, Foucault acknowledges that reality can be interpreted only through a genealogy that focuses on the interaction between technologies of domination of others and technologies of the self, in contrast to Beck and Giddens, who claim a descriptive outline of modernity as a means of crafting a reality that needs a universality of values. In other words, once again, Foucault suggests that any critique of reality depends on the ethical outlook that one formulates when one monitors how the interaction between ethics, knowledge, and power shapes the concern with how to govern the freedom of others and the problematisation of how to govern the self. By contrast, Beck and Giddens claim an objective account of reality as a means of proposing a definitive route to emancipation.

Lastly, from the above two themes emerges a third concerned with the interaction – at the level of the structure of the social reproduction – of reflexive subjectivity or institutions of reflexive sociology and the capitalist apparatus tied to a neoliberal governmentality. This theme is stronger and more distinct here in relation to Part II. A number of individual critical points emerge from these themes that bring cosmopolitan morality and neoliberal capitalism together in connection with structures/technologies of domination of others and technologies of the self.

In chapter 5, I attempt to highlight how the descriptive coincides with the analytical in the reflexive sociology of Beck and Giddens. To clarify the terms as they are used in this thesis: ‘descriptive’ relates to an explicit argument that attempts to explain reality, while ‘analytical’ refers to an engagement with reality that attempts both to explain and, at the same time, shape reality from a certain ethical point of view. So, the descriptive is not the same as the analytical when contrasted with a normative argument. In this context, Beck’s and Giddens’s accounts of a reflexivity operating in conditions of high modernity add descriptively to the account of neoliberal regulation. This descriptive addition is supported by an analytical account of the interaction between structures and the formation of subjectivity tied to their utopian realist premise which confirms that their description of reality is directly influenced by how they envision reality. Reflexive sociology constructs in its analysis a positive account of the formation of subjectivity via the emergence of reflexive political engagement by the individual, morally re-appropriating capitalism. Again, the problem that emerges here is the one that is also raised by postmodernist literature. We are dealing with moral theories that in many respects have abandoned absolutist meta-narrative claims while at the same time still using a loose meta-narrative utopian vision as a means to assert a form of moral superiority.

I critically contemplate this analysis by drawing from Foucault’s ‘dispositif’ and ‘technologies of the self’ that are rooted in the ‘governability’ of the subject in order to forge a governmentality critique concerned with how governing the freedom of persons coincides with the question of how to govern the self. As a result, Foucault’s apheretic ethics of self-care, tied to taking care of the self as a means to take care of the other, are contrasted with the transcendentality of reflexive sociology. Such a transcendentality is expressed in a morally unifying multiculturalism
tied to the ethics of self-care that are in turn tied to taking care of others as a means to take care of the self. All in all, the ethical differentiation with respect to self-care between Foucault and Beck and Foucault and Giddens becomes the prominent source of a governmentality critique applied to the way that Beck and Giddens attempt to govern the freedom of others and/or to connect the governance of the freedom of others with their account of how one ought to govern the self.

At the same time, the engagement with Giddens’s discussion of Habermas, which appears in this chapter, advances the connection between Habermas’s politics of emancipation discussed in Part II and the reflexive sociology discussed here. This connection, put forward in this thesis, crystallises the two as two distinct but also complementary neogovernmental conducts.

Chapter 6 focusses on the relationship between sub-politics and life-politics as analytical concepts and the manifestation of the political discourses that are third way politics and cosmopolitanism. My aim is to contemplate an ethopolitical governmentality in the present by dwelling explicitly on issues of politics, social action and regulation. In this way, I highlight an emerging moral regulation that intertwines with a neoliberal economic approach to globalisation. The problematisation of globalisation is tied to the problematisation of what modernity is, which is explored in the previous chapter with respect to how to govern the freedom of others and how to govern the self.

**Conclusion**

The thesis features a brief conclusion that reiterates the work that has been done in the thesis. It also puts the contributions of the thesis into perspective in terms of the governmentality suggested and the use of Foucault put forward. Finally, it addresses the future implications of this project in connection with further research.
Introduction

Aims

Governmentality studies and the use of Foucault

The term ‘governmentality’ becomes important in Foucault’s lectures ‘Security, Territory, Population’. It is concerned with the liberal art of government in terms of governing the freedom of the population. I want to highlight the philosophical, and specifically ethical, dimension of governmentality studies tied to the governance of the self as a means of setting the foundations for my engagement with Foucault.

My two core aims in focussing on Foucault are (1) to avoid a certain type of empirical application of the concept of ‘governmentality’ tied to the organized practices of governance of subjects and (2) to put into focus this more recent shift in the perception of Foucault from a relativist theoretician of postmodern tendencies to a democratic theorist. Two related questions drive the thesis: What was the later Foucault attempting to achieve? And, how do those later attempts separate him from other critical thinkers engaged with issues of democracy? In this context, a very careful discussion of Foucault’s account of the Enlightenment and antiquity is needed in order to focus on crystallising Foucault’s differences with democratic theories of justice and cosmopolitanism.

More specifically, I attempt to distinguish between a concern with empirics, understood as a will to truth via an engagement with reality through concepts, and a more technical use of governmentality that, in a way, engages analytic philosophy. I also attempt to indicate that Foucault, although a firm supporter of the effort to use enlightenment as a hereustic source and not a postmodernist, should be perceived as a standalone thinker in his concern with ethics. Through this understanding, a governmentality critique can be put forward that will be informed by the three-fold (i.e., power, truth, and ethics) use of genealogy from Foucault.

One should not use Foucault in order merely to trace liberal techniques of governance at their operational level for the sake of correcting public policies by means of reforming liberal institutions or achieving some kind of democratic emancipation. Rather, one has to grasp the continuities in Foucault’s work, contemplate any deviations, and argue in favour of an overall continuity that emerges even through any deviations. The political value of Foucault’s thought lies in the critical concepts or ethos that can be extracted from his work, rather than in a solid counter-suggestion in favour of a more democratic liberal democracy.
By this token, I wish to challenge especially the use of the later Foucault (i.e., Foucault as an advocate of enlightenment and parrhesia) as a latent democratic theorist (e.g., Dyrbek, 2014, 2016; Sauter & Kendall, 2011). Obviously, what type of democracy one links with Foucault is a factor. In this context, to the extent that Foucault’s affiliation with democracy is not limited to the promotion of a cosmopolitan multiculturalism, there is room to debate Foucault’s contribution to democratic theories on the basis of the controversy that surrounds Foucault’s late explorations of new formations of subjectivity (see Tully, 1999; Milchman and Rosenberg, 2011). In other words, I am not focused here on excluding any comparisons between Foucault and the likes of Zygmunt Bauman, Slavoy Žižek or the ‘Essex School’.

In this context, I target certain accounts of democracy that can be considered new forms of governmentality, rather than making merely theoretical comparisons between Foucault and other radical theorists. However, the way that I present Foucault in this thesis, namely as an ethical philosopher, separates my use of Foucault from such radical theorists that have used Foucault, among others, in a post-structuralist context as a means of trying to envision concrete systemic political changes in the West. For I am inclined to believe that what Foucault explored during the final years of his life, although it could be linked with agonistic (radical) democracy, is essentially beyond expanding subjectivities within the scope of envisioning democracy by means of either moderate reflection or agonism. Moreover, it is crucial for one to be careful to move beyond more conventional accounts of civil society in order to avoid linking a collective consisting of autonomous individuals with collective action at the level of citizenship (i.e., civil society as public sphere or community) within the liberal democratic paradigm.

Therefore, my thesis proposes a critique of democratic theories of justice and cosmopolitan accounts of civil society and subjectivity. My ethical position, then, should be linked to the philosophical advancement of the notion of autonomy. There are grey areas; for example, Bauman (2000) and Castoriadis (1991) present examples of writing in favour of both autonomy and the public sphere. Still, I am invested in interpreting Foucault’s self-care as a philosophical exercise centred on the individual. The premise of making social theory or philosophy a hub of critique as a means of achieving an ongoing self-realisation which can be projected onto others is what interests me.

This concern is engaged by creating the right type of philosophers or by making a philosopher out of each individual. The latter is not quite plausible at the level of citizenship. But, instead of focussing on enlightened citizens that can ‘forge’ the right type of governor or choose between good and less good accounts of how to live, one should merely put the issue of governance into the right perspective, leaving open the question of what is the best constitution.

As Gros puts it in his remarks on the as yet infrequently discussed *Courage of Truth* lectures:
It has always been said that the political philosophy of the Ancients was obsessed with the search for the ‘best regime.’ … Foucault attempts here a different reading: to show that the search for the ‘best constitution’ does not confirm a moral quest, but constitutes the insertion of a principle of ethical differentiation within the problem of the government of men… But Foucault’s contribution is crucial in that he points out that this ethical differentiation is not in fact the moral quality of a leader, or even the singularity of a stylization of existence which would mark out an exceptional individual from the anonymous mass. Rather, it presupposes bringing the difference of the truth into play in the construction of the relation to self, or rather the truth as difference, as distance taken from public opinion and common certainties. Hence the structural fragility of democracy, for if it is possible to think of an individual or small group managing to carry out this ethically differentiating work on themselves, it seems improbable that an entire people will succeed in doing so. It remains that ethical difference, which allows the best politeia to exist, is only the effect of the difference of truth itself in a subject (Gros, 2011:345-346).

The above overlaps with Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s account of the public in Foucault’s discussion of the Enlightenment. The individual should exercise her freedom in terms of confronting existing norms and re-envisioning herself in public rather than in private. The private sphere is for restriction in the sense of ‘ascesis’, and the public for exercising ‘unlimited freedom’ (see more below in my discussion of enlightenment). This distinction presents a unique take on the ‘public’ that should not be confused with various democratic accounts of the public sphere tied to civil society.

To use Rorty’s account as it appears in Gutting:

Rorty begins with a rough distinction between “philosophers...whose work fulfills primarily public purposes, and those whose work fulfills primarily private purposes”. He cites Mill, Dewey, and Rawls as public philosophers and Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida as private philosophers. The work of public philosophers has direct applications to the discussion of political problems (capital punishment, education, distributive justice), whereas that of private philosophers “produce[s] private satisfactions to people who are deeply involved with philosophy (and therefore, necessarily, with metaphysics) but not as politically consequential, except in a very indirect and long-term way” (Gutting, 2011:133-134).

But, when one works on the self as a means of being able to shape one’s own surroundings in a manner that such self-care would always remain possible this private type of philosophy becomes
public. Still, it is only in this context that one can find a concern with the public in the late Foucault.

In other words, no clear agenda for reformulating the political system towards more democracy arises in Foucault—not because such an agenda merely remained underdeveloped (e.g., Milchman and Rosenberg, 2012:12)—but because that was not Foucault’s purpose. Given that Foucault points towards the dead ends that the ancient Greeks faced, embracing democracy would align him with declarations suggesting that some type of democracy is the least bad regime or the only acceptable foundation for building something emancipatory. Foucault would not want to reappropriate these types of questionable ‘truths’, for then his purpose would not be the ongoing exploration of what are truth and/or the best regime. Foucault instead attempts to gradually build upon the premise that ‘what matters is the effect of the difference of truth itself in a subject’, an account of the relationship between knowledge and the self that is far away from the power relations of his time. Foucault hints at how ‘the difference of truth in a subject’ can become meaningful and potentially emancipatory. This is the account that Gutting (2011:144) suggests. But, I want to note now that this relationship between the subject and truth that Foucault places in antiquity can also enrich our understanding of contemporary perceptions of power; something that potentially goes beyond what Gutting and Veyne have explicitly acknowledged.

No school of thought understands Foucault in this manner. However, my suggestion aligns with a certain understanding of philosophy that Foucault advocates, and that is developed in this thesis. Again, as Gros puts it:

Finally, this is why, to those who might say (we have heard this, and will do so again) that a ‘true’ philosophy of knowledge or a ‘true’ political or moral philosophy cannot be found in Foucault, he means to reply: thank goodness, for to claim that epistemology, morality, and politics could ever constitute autonomous, juxtaposed domains, that each of them must be worked out methodically and separately, would mean leaving behind philosophy in its original inspiration (Gros, 2011:346-347).

The issue, then, is what scholars work in this type of philosophy. Samantha Ashenden has raised concerns with respect to linking Foucault’s account of emancipation to civil society. Similarly, authors such as Mitchell Dean, Nikolas Rose, David Owen, Barry Hindness and Thomas Osborne have, at stages, remained faithful to this use of Foucault. As noted above, such a use aims to extract a more overarching account from Foucault that is both a mode of self-care and, in its effort to orient others, a critique of other leftist and/or postmodernist accounts of self-care.

Similarly, the publication Dits and Ecrits, or Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, (1997) edited by Rabinow, presents an overall account of Foucault’s progression (see next section). Also, Stuart
Elden in his public lecture (2014) on themes from his book, *Foucault’s Last Decade* (2016) points towards the continuity of Foucault’s writings. I subscribe to such an account in the sense of acknowledging that each new project was rather Foucault’s reaction to problems that had arisen in his analysis. In other words, Foucault was attempting to deal with a problem by deciding that there was the need to transition to a new arena or to reformulate the way that a problematisation presents itself. Obviously, this continuity does not mean that Foucault was executing a master plan. Veyne and Gutting have both ‘reluctantly’ acknowledged that Foucault achieves a notable shift in his late engagement with ancient ethics. I say reluctantly for they remain sceptical in terms of whether Foucault’s later work simply put his early work into perspective or is even genealogical in terms of tracing power relations that have something to say to the present. When I refer to continuity I suggest that Foucault was striving towards a certain understanding of how freedom is produced, and how it can be produced differently. This vague striving for a critical ethos is what existed in Foucault from the beginning.

As elaborated in the next section, Foucault went from a neutral use of archaeology, which was structuralist and objective in its claims of contingency, to a power oriented genealogy, which increased Foucault’s relativism, to a more complex use of genealogy in relation to ethics. However, shifting from relativism to an apheretic ethical position is not an impossible leap therefore it is not impossible for one to revisit certain early genealogical observations by Foucault in conjunction with his late use of genealogy.

Therefore, my main concern is to advance Foucault’s critical accounts of modernity and the West by focussing on certain allegedly emancipatory democratic theories. In doing this, I attempt to further explore Rose’s account of ‘ethopolitics’ in connection with Osborne’s ‘therapeutic enlightenment’ in regard to governmentality, since Rose and Osborne have more appropriately connected governmentality to a certain critical ethos of enlightenment. An ongoing self-realisation tied to enlightenment aims to deal with the fundamental issue of how one should engage with truth as a means of taking care of both the self and the other.

I do recognise of course, that although Owen, Osborne, Rose, and Dean contributed, in stages, to establishing an interesting use of Foucault as an ethical philosopher. Dean, Rose, Hindness, Osborne and Andrew Barry, in their various independent and collaborative writings, have most notably established or broadened the field of governmentality in the Anglo-Saxon world. Initially, a primary concern was to illuminate the political value of Foucault (see Barry, Osborne & Rose, 1996) at the level of contemplating how political rationales manifest into techniques of governance. This manifestation is how the ‘governmentality industry’ emerged. Dean, in particular, has focussed on monitoring the reproduction of power at the level of public policies and how people respond to them. There is an effort to explore the ability of public policies to really cater to the people by understanding how the expectations of the people are built and how such policies

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1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abdLEdnZ_kQ
accord with their agenda. Dean, of course, also pays attention to how people think about the way that they are governed. The thought of Barry Hindness provides a rather similar case, and Rose is also focussed on linking Foucauldian accounts of power with the way that the medical field operates.

Moreover, Rose’s collaboration with Miller, a management scholar, has empirically scrutinised neoliberal practices in a way that gives new value to the suggestion that Foucault’s is a fieldwork philosophy (see Rabinow & Rose, 2003), specifically in the sense of attempting to connect rationales of governance to a variety of regulatory fields.

A nodal point for such an attempt remains Foucault’s notion of the ‘dispositif’. Briefly, the ‘dispositif’ is the political-juridical matrices that form the institutionalised apparatus of governance. It derives from Foucault’s account of the Reformation–Counter-reformation processes (see also the next section). In this context, the ‘dispositif’ carries a set of scientific rationales reflected in ‘meditating instruments’. These ‘instruments’ both represent the subject and intervene in the process of formulating the subject. Therefore, the possibility to become understood as ‘instruments’ that can assist the object/subject whom the intervention targets to escape from the imposition of power is inherently hindered (Miller & Rose, 2010:1161).

Of course, some expect a much heavier ethnographical and empirical substantiation of such conceptual claims as the above (e.g., Alan McKinlay review of Rose & Miller, 2010). Rose responds in defence of his collaboration with Miller:

This can, we suggest, assist scholars of organizations, for at least some of the governmentality literature has focused on rather abstract conceptions of modes of governing drawn from political philosophy, rather than the conceptions of those seeking to design individual entities or sets of entities, processes or regulations (Miller & Rose, 2010:1161).

Rose has also stated on other occasions that he is content with not being considered a Foucauldian in his analysis in the sense of keeping the level of the enquiry clearly at the level of how the conduct of people is directed. Still, rather than his analysis of administrative rationales being a notable deviation from a genuine Foucauldian engagement, it is essentially a contribution to an understanding of how freedom is produced and of how reality is shaped through governmental concepts.

Therefore, Rose’s use of Foucault still differs from other uses which portray Foucault as, in a sense, a latent (neo)liberal (as discussed in Dean, 2014). A critique of Foucault, which neglects how genealogy works in Foucault, is that Foucault’s engagement with liberalism can be seen as a ‘legal positivism’ (as discussed in Dean, 1999:184). Habermas himself has attempted to highlight the positivist and empirical aspects of both archaeology and genealogy. Fraser (1989:17-34) has,
similarly, suggested that Foucault could be an empirically useful, but normatively confusing or confused theorist of Taylorism (i.e., scientific management). Surprisingly, such an account reflects a rather significant portion of his political use in certain Anglo-Saxon literature. For, although, Foucault was interested in the thoughts that created the practices, it is easy for many to neglect this premise and start focusing on all sort of practices; particularly within the more mono-dimensional genealogy of power. But Foucault in both his genealogies of power and, later, ethics cannot be narrowed down to a theoretician concerned with producing empirically useful theoretical frameworks that merely depict and/or suggest the reformation of liberal institutions.

In *Powers of Freedom* (1999), Rose is more concerned with ethics and the philosophical dimension of Foucault in relation to a discussion of political governance. Here, Rose does not merely continue the use of governmentality tied to Foucault’s genealogies of power. Rather, he suggests how the problematisation of the self is turned, itself, into governmentality. That should switch how one understands Foucault’s discussion of enlightenment, and ancient ethics in particular. These discussions do not only entail a source of ‘otherness’ that can lead to personal transgression, but they also describe how without focusing explicitly on the power relations of the era per se, certain relationships between truth and the subject are also inevitably power relations, and, as such, they lead, in some cases, to structures and, now, technologies of domination. Rose does not explicitly spell this out, but he clearly points towards a governmentality tied to self-care. This approach is also informed by some interesting papers that bring together biosciences, ethics and governmentality (e.g. Rose, 2001) and that apply a more sophisticated governmentality critique to cosmopolitan ‘third way politics’ (see Rose, 2000).

Similarly, Osborne in *Aspects of Enlightenment* (1998) is concerned with crystallising enlightenment as a critical ethos. In this context, he interestingly connects governmentality, ethics and freedom with a discussion of enlightenment that brings philosophy closer to social theory. In this way, he rather paves the way for future critical engagement via a social theory rooted in the neo-Kantian contribution of concepts and genealogy as an orientation in thinking (see below). Osborne (1998) states that the ethics of critique or ethics of truth become the responsibility of social theory. These ethics of critique are tied to an aesthetic enlightenment vis-à-vis a therapeutic and scientific one. This contrast is largely built around the issue of the problematisation of how to govern the self.

From the above, it becomes apparent that governmentality is not merely a critical concept bound to focus on how power operates in instrumental rationality with respect to the governing of the freedom of others. Power is only one of the axes of genealogy. Governmentality is an overarching concept that captures the relationships between power, knowledge/truth and ethics (i.e. the three axes of genealogy as the later Foucault put them forward) with respect to governing the freedom of the population and governing the self. Foucault’s account of an ‘aesthetic enlightenment’ (see Osborne, 1998) and of a Socratic (i.e., Laches) or Cynic parrhesia crystallises
an ethical dimension vis-à-vis another one tied to a therapeutic enlightenment (see Osborne, 1998) and a Platonic (i.e. Alcibiades) ‘parrhesia’. This comparison stems from Foucault’s account during the later stages of his research of two distinct lines of philosophical development in the West (i.e., Laches and Alcibiades). Focussing on this two-fold philosophical development can allow us to point towards the rise of new ‘structures of domination’ in which power is filtered by a quest for knowledge tied to the ethical concern for the ‘polis’. Such a concern is, in turn, powered by the crafting of moral doctrines that claim their validation from a transcendental account of truth.

I connect the ‘Alcibiades’ line of philosophy with that approach to the question of ‘what is enlightenment’ that attempts to craft universal projects of man tied to a moral, rational doctrine rooted in subjectivity. Hence, as in the case of the neoliberal subjectivity of homo-economicus (i.e., direct biopolitics) (see Chapter 2) we operate at the level of ‘technologies of the self’, namely at the level of the internalisation of conducts that are powered by a ‘dispositif’.

Opposite Alcibiades’ is the line of philosophy tied to ‘Laches’, which approaches the question of enlightenment as an ongoing ethos of self-realisation. Such an ethos is tied to an apheretic ethics that moves beyond subjectivity (i.e., technologies of living and/or aesthetics of existence).

To clarify, we have genealogy as a methodology of studying the past in order to unmask certainties for the purpose of rethinking the present. Genealogy has three domains, which run as follows: the way that we use truth in order to construct knowledge as the domain of truth; the way that we act towards each other as the domain of power; and the way that we use ethics to understand ourselves as moral agents as the domain of ethics (see Foucault, 1997:263) (see more on this in ‘Perpsectives and Methodology’: Navigating Foucault’ below).

In this context, there are three axes: truth, power, and ethics, that are all incorporated into a governmentality critique, but this critique is essentially driven by the ethical axis. The ethical axis is the one that provides the foundations which suggest that power and knowledge or truth interact in a manner that creates ‘structures/technologies of domination’. Without this ‘axis’ Foucault’s work remains mono-dimensional in the sense of focusing only on the governance of the freedom of others from the point of view of how knowledge and power interact. Furthermore, this mono-dimensional account is mistakenly perceived as a neutral attempt (archaeology) and/or as a power struggle (genealogy) to unmask certainties with respect to reality. Therefore, it is open to that type of critique which suggests it lacks proper empirical substantiation or a guiding purpose, since one does not focus on the ethical point of reference that justifies a critique of governance, but rather on whether the account of governance is empirically accurate or useful.

So, Foucault should be perceived as an ethical thinker, for Foucault’s problem was not power. As discussed below, freedom cannot exist without power. It is the structural manifestation of power that leads to the domination that Foucault tries to oppose from an ethical point of view.
this context, Foucault’s parrhesia and aesthetic enlightenment are the ethical concepts that can substantiate a governmentality critique and governmentality as a critical concept tied to the contemplation of the governance of the freedom of others and the governance of the self.

By this token, I pay particular emphasis to the concept of parrhesia (introduced later in this introduction and discussed fully in Chapter 1). My main focus is Foucault’s thus far rarely discussed lectures *The Courage of Truth* (Foucault, 2011). For, predominantly, the most notable literature on the topic is either more introductory in nature and, again, enlightenment-oriented (i.e. Osborne), or it is explicitly concerned with certain regulatory fields that are rather loosely connected to the literature that embodies an ‘ethopolitical’ governmentality (i.e., Rose’s engagement with third way politics in regard to issues of bio-ethical regulation). Similarly, the concept of parrhesia is not itself prominent in the discussion of a governmentality critique of ‘ethopolitics’ supported by a crystallisation of Foucauldian ethics.

As noted before, this lack of engagement with ‘parrhesia’, might again have to do with Gutting’s (2011) premise, that I properly develop in the next sub-section, that Foucault’s engagement with ancient ethics is too far removed from today. This thesis attempts to acknowledge Foucault’s engagement with ancient ethics as genealogical and to contemplate how it interlinks with Foucault’s genealogy of instrumental rationality. The aim is to crystallize a certain ethos and put forward a governmentality critique in the present. I explicitly try to connect in both individual and complementary ways Habermas’s account of deliberative democratic politics in relation to his method of critique as ‘legislation’ (see Part II) and Giddens’s and Beck’s account of ‘cosmopolitan’ ‘reflexive’ ‘life-politics’ tied to the pivotal use of ‘risk’ (see Part III) with the ‘Alcibiades’ trajectory of parrhesia. This trajectory reflects what Osborne has characterized as therapeutic enlightenment and Rose as ‘ethopolitics’.

Comparative studies between Habermas and Foucault do exist, but not all are guided by this ethical concern to interpret enlightenment as a means of self-realisation (see Part II). Those who are guided by such a premise (most notably David Owen and Osborne) do not trace that premise at the level of presenting Habermas’s critique as a form of governmentality. The ‘ethopolitics’ of Rose are mainly concerned with the reflexive sociology of Beck and primarily Giddens, rather than with Habermas (see Part III).

Comparative studies between Beck or Giddens and Foucault are rare. A notable connection appears in Dean (i.e., 2010) and Rose (i.e., 1999; 2001), which consider how a governmentality critique of neoliberalism should acquire an ethopolitical dimension in the era of risk and volatility. Contrary to the case of Habermas, the existing comparisons of such comparative studies operate more at the level of utilising governmentality in relation to ‘technologies of the self’ as a means of navigating contemporary issues of political regulation and the formation of subjectivities. Hence, the importance of a governmentality critique that pays attention to the issue of the governance of the self becomes clearer with this critical comparison of Beck and Giddens with Foucault.
This thesis also contributes to discussions of ethopolitical governmental regulation; however, in addition it places a particular emphasis on integrating a theoretical and methodological comparison between a reflexive sociological approach and the ethics of Foucault with respect to the Enlightenment and modernity and, of course, parrhesia as a mode of truth-telling and self-care (see Part III). In the process, I uniquely highlight the connection of such an ethopolitical governmentality to neoliberalism with respect to Deleuze’s mode of deterritorialised societies of ‘control’.

Hence, I am concerned with explicating how the discussion of the Enlightenment can be directly related to Foucault’s genealogy of ethics in relation to truth-telling that leads back to concerns of political philosophy in ancient Greece. For it is possible to use such concerns in order to give innovative accounts of contemporary practices of governance tied to the governance of the self. At the same time, we can remain faithful to the origins of the governmentality concept dealing with ethics and freedom or the ethics of freedom (see also Osborne, 1998:126). Governmentality is merely a way to approach the construction of freedom or else of discourses of freedom at the embryonic stage of their formation (the milieu), while linking such discourses to rationales, strategies, or techniques for how to govern a population (see also Osborne, 1998:132).

**Governmentality and the problematisation of the self**

My aim here is to highlight this more ethical dimension of governmentality, which is directly linked to the discussion of the enlightenment and parrhesia above, as a means to add to the new ways that governmentality can be used in the present.

A first issue is why Foucault produced a genealogical enquiry revolving around instrumental rationality in regard to contemporary forms of governance, but did not do the same for the alternatives that could derive from his genealogy of ethics. Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism had, indeed, this glimpse of futurism. But, he treated neoliberalism as an intensification or rearrangement of the same mentalities or rationales, and he only hinted at ‘deterritoriality’. In a similar period, Deleuze and Guattari (1972) did come up with the concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation as a means to approach globalisation and the new relationship among subjectivity, culture, capitalism and territory.

However, it was still only later that Deleuze (1992) also focussed on critical engagement with deterritorial discourses, thereby updating Foucault’s work on neoliberal governmentality and marking a shift from ‘discipline’ to ‘control’. Similarly, Foucault’s primary concern was his present. His initial take must have been that, at least in his era (i.e. up to the early 80s), these globalist ‘therapeutic ethopolitics’ had not, first of all, properly appeared or moved from
contributing to an open-ended game of power and truth (power relations) to possibly reinforcing ‘states of domination’.

More importantly, Foucault first needed to put forward this genealogy of ethics to see governmentality in a different light. Foucault, whose analysis had always been tied to long processes of socio-cultural unfolding, decided in the late 70s to rethink his existing claims. Gutting has questioned the relationship of contemporary issues with Foucault’s discussion of antiquity. As he puts it: ‘Ancient ways can serve only as heuristic guides for own projects of self-creation’ (Gutting, 2005:106). That said, Gutting also suggests that Foucault had to move further back in order to understand the concern with sexuality with respect to how to govern self:

Foucault’s way of engaging with ancient problematisations of sexuality does involve a major change in his historical methodology. He first requires a careful exploration of the structures of ancient discourses about sexuality, for which archaeology is, of course, the primary instrument. At the same time, he has little concern with the power relations that are entwined with ancient knowledge of sexuality. The Use of Pleasure refers, as we have noted, to the political roots of the ‘problem of the boy’, and The Care of the Self has a brief (and, by Foucault’s own admission, quite derivative) chapter on the social forces behind the transition from Greek to Roman views of sexuality. But the genealogy of power, in the sense of Foucault’s earlier work, is muted in these two books (Gutting, 2005:104).

Gutting’s explanation is that:

This is because genealogy is concerned with the lines of power connected to our present system of domination. It is, as Foucault said in Discipline and Punish, a history of the present. But the power regimes of ancient Greece and Rome are too distant to figure in our understanding of our present power structures. When only these structures were Foucault’s concern, he needed, as he originally planned, to go no further back than medieval notions of pastoral care. But once the topic became problematisations and self-creative responses to them – matters that develop in the interstices of a power regime – the ancients immediately became interesting. Not, however, because of the specific origin of their problems, which would require a genealogical study, but because of the kinds of creative responses the ancients gave to these problems (Gutting, 2005:105).

In this context, Gutting suggests:

Foucault is reluctant to give up the term ‘genealogy’, perhaps because it keeps him connected to Nietzsche. But he no longer presents it as an instrument of suspicion, following the pervasive tracks of modern power. Instead, it is a (generally appreciative) account of the ancient world’s ‘arts of existence’; that is, of ‘those intentional and
voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to make their life an *oeuvre* that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria’ (UP, 10–11). Beyond the word, there is little that remains here except the generic idea of a causal account of the self’s formation. But this account is no longer a reconstruction of complex external lines of power but of internal programmes for ethical transformation. It is, in fact, much closer to history of philosophy than genealogy in Foucault’s original sense. Or, perhaps better, it is philosophy itself done in an historical mode (Gutting, 2005:105).

Even if one can distinguish in Foucault between genealogies of power and a separate engagement with ancient Greece one has to accept that they are related. I accept that Foucault’s account of instrumental rationality tied to the governmentality lectures operate as a genealogy of power. The issue is that the marginalisation of the problematisation of how to govern the self in the West could allow one to approach Western history from medieval times until recently from the point of view of power. However, by observing a re-emergence of the concern with the self – not only in Foucault but in others – one can acknowledge Foucault’s discussion of ancient ethics as a genealogy.

Granted, one can still object to this discussion as ‘genealogical’ for no direct influence can be traced from that past to the present other than a concern to create a heuristic source for creation in the present. This is Gutting’s issue, as otherwise he could accept that even though Foucault focuses on the relationship between truth-telling and self-care, one can get a grasp of the power relations of antiquity through this relationship. The impositions of power and our attempts to move beyond them are simply posed from the viewpoint of ethics. However, the ancient past introduces an understanding of the problematisation of the self that appears to be useful for grasping the governance and freedom struggle that operate in the present. Having established this, one can then focus on the idea that genealogy can indeed act as a type of philosophy that works through history, and that, in this way, Foucault can act as a philosopher. The heuristic use of the past can move beyond the dilemma of how one can become a revolutionary when one is also a traditionalist by means of reinventing the past. But, even more so in the Foucault of parrhesia this reinvention is not a relativist one that essentially pulverizes the past, but one that legitimately tries to strike a balance between understanding past wisdom and inventing new modes of life.

As Veyne puts it:

According to Foucault, what is understood to be philosophy could from now on consist, at every moment, not in producing a scientific exegesis of the past, not in contemplating totality or the future, but in describing actuality and, in default of doing any better, even characterizing it in a negative fashion and ‘diagnosing the present, saying what the present
is and explaining how our present is different, absolutely different from everything else'. Foucault could now conceive of no possible philosophy except such a historical critique. Nothing else would be of any value in this epoch of ours: ‘What does philosophy amount to today - I mean philosophical activity - if not thought working critically upon itself? (2010:117)

In other words, Gutting cites Fraser’s critique:

“‘Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it”'(1989:281).

He also adds that: ‘The question is where Foucault's philosophical project finds the justification for its own norms and how it shows these norms to be preferable to those that it criticizes’ (Gutting, 1989:281).

The answer to the above is that the ethical axis of genealogy both rejects and counter-proposes. The ethical domain of genealogy emerges to focus on the self. This ethical axis of genealogy (amid the other two: truth or knowledge, and power) is the one that can be linked to indirect critical interaction with the likes of Habermas (see Part II). As a result, this axis of genealogy, although it does not offer a direct critique of other visions of the modern, does offer the critical ethos with which one can put forward such critical analysis. Such ethos is linked to the ethical genealogical trajectories that one should trace in order to decode contemporary power relations.

The governmentality concept is vital in this process. In terms of its specific initial definition governmentality is,

the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by ‘governmentality’ I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power-sovereignty, discipline, and so on—of the type of power that we can call ‘government’ and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by ‘governmentality’ I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually ‘governmentalized’ (Foucault, 2007:108-9).
Foucault’s first and third point here state a specificity with respect to governmentality, but it is the second point that highlights the issue of knowledge. Therefore, it allows one to reformulate the first and the third point in order not only to give to any discussion of knowledge a governmentality undertone, but also to formulate an alternative mode of governmentality.

Hence, I suggest that a new form of governmentality can be described as following: A form of power that has the self as its target, sociopolitical theory as its major form of knowledge and apparatuses of control as its essential technical instrument; a form of power that is concerned with those processes by which the neoliberalised liberal state can be democratised, and gradually deterritorialised. These processes invoke liberalism in their understanding of individualism and continuous reflection on how to govern people. But, they also aim to tie this liberalism to a deliberative democratic-cosmopolitan re-appropriation tied to self-care in a manner that brings reason and the civil society, life-style and community together.

Still, in order for the above to be valid, the more nuanced character of governmentality should further elaborated. Hence, we should not linger on the governmentality presented in the lectures on liberalism and neoliberalism. In Subjectivity and Truth, Foucault poses the question of governance clearly from the point of the self. The importance of ‘Alcibiades’ in discussion of governmentality becomes even more explicit below:

Plato’s Alcibiades can be taken as the starting point: the question of the “care of oneself”—epimeleia heautou—appears in this text as the general framework within which the imperative of self-knowledge acquires its significance. The series of studies that can be envisaged starting from there could form a history of the “care of oneself,” understood as an experience, and thus also as a technique elaborating and transforming that experience. Such a project is at the intersection of two themes treated previously: a history of subjectivity and an analysis of the forms of “governmentality.”... The history of the “care” and the “techniques” of the self would thus be a way of doing the history of subjectivity; no longer, however, through the divisions between the mad and the nonmad, the sick and nonsick, delinquents and nondelinquents, nor through the constitution of fields of scientific objectivity giving a place to the living, speaking, laboring subject; but, rather, through the putting in place, and the transformations in our culture, of “relations with oneself,” with their technical armature and their knowledge effects. And in this way one could take up the question of governmentality from a different angle: the government of the self by oneself in its articulation with relations with others (such as one finds in pedagogy, behavior counseling, spiritual direction, the prescription of models for living, and so on) (Foucault, 1997:88).
Taking account of these reflections, governmentality now becomes ‘this encounter between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self’ (Foucault, 1997:225). Foucault suggests that he has insisted on the relation between ‘the technology of domination and power’, but that his interest has shifted, and it now lies,

in the interaction between oneself and others, and in the technologies of individual domination, in the mode of action that an individual exercises upon himself by means of the technologies of the self (Foucault, 1997:225).

Individual domination is linked to power relations. This shift reflects the ethical domain of genealogy which is in turn better tied to an approach based on the history of thought.

In other words, as Rabinow summarises,

During the courses [Foucault’s courses at the Collège de France] of the late seventies, Foucault further refined his view of power relations. Simply and schematically, he concluded: ‘It seems to me we must distinguish between power relations understood as strategic games between liberties—in which some try to control the conduct of others, who in turn try to avoid allowing their conduct to be controlled or try to control the conduct of others—and the states of domination that people ordinarily call “power”. And between the two, between games of power and states of domination, you have technologies of government—understood, of course, in a very broad sense...’ To denote this broad understanding of government, Foucault used the term governmentality. It implies, he continued, ‘the relationship of the self to itself, and ...[covers] the range of practices that constitute, define, organize and instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other. I believe that the concept of governmentality makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject and its relationship to others—which constitutes the very stuff [matiere] of ethics.’ Beginning from this premise, Foucault understands thought as the exercise of freedom (Rabinow, 1997: XVII).

Similarly, as Gros puts it, Foucault

arrives in fact at the following result: ancient philosophy makes the problem of the government of men (politeia) dependent upon an ethical elaboration of the subject (éthos) that is able to bring out in him and in front of others the difference of a discourse of truth (alētheia). The three dimensions of Knowledge, Power, and the Subject (or rather, of veridiction, governmentality, and subjectivation), by which Foucault had characterized his undertaking, are thus present here (Gros, 2011:346).
Hence, governmentality in Foucault is initially reflected in structures of domination (dispositif), and it progressively focusses on how the individual internalises and reproduces power at the level of self-governance. Even in the lectures on neoliberalism, Foucault’s account of ‘direct biopolitics’ with respect to American neoliberalism suggests this interactive relationship between power and economic knowledge which is internalised at the level of self-governance (ethics). When it becomes understood, though, that governmentality is not an account of the economic governmental rationales of neoliberalism, but is a critique of interaction among power, knowledge and self-governance, it becomes obvious that political rationales other than liberalism and neoliberalism could exhibit types of interaction capable of being considered ‘governmental’. In this way, governmentality brings together the genealogies of power with the genealogy of ancient ethics. After all, a governmentality critique can be applied to any interaction among power, knowledge or truth, and ethics to which a structural apparatus can be traced and subsequently tied to technologies of internalisation at the level of self-governance.

And, where a governmentality critique can be applied, the ‘games of power’ stop being open-ended. In other words, my understanding is that when the ‘game of truth or knowledge’ comes to a standstill, the ‘games of power’ interact with knowledge in a manner that freezes the movement of self-realisation. Foucault’s ethics suggest that it is the quest for knowledge, namely for a moral doctrine and for an experts’ account of reality that can lead to further distinction between the ‘games of knowledge’ bound to bring the ‘games of power’ to a standstill and the ‘games of truth’ that leave the ‘games of power’ open-ended. In the first case, when the ‘games of power’ stop being open-ended, we enter into ‘structures of domination’ in which the rules of the game are set in stone and their historicity fades. At that stage, the individual has to become a subject who internalises and reproduces this ‘frozen’ game.

With the dynamics of these games in mind, I want to emphasise that only a form of governance which concerns itself with the notion of the population or the self in relation to its freedoms qualifies as governmentality. For this reason, it is essentially the ethical axis of genealogy which justifies a critical account of its connection with power and knowledge. The philosophical ethical concern with truth-telling is deeply embedded in governmental analysis. This embeddedness blends the empirical with the theoretical and blurs the distinction between disciplines without leading to a grand scale holistic framework. Therefore, any discussion of public policy and management strategies, of the empirical sciences, and even of a history of science and ideas should be understood in this ethical context of governing our own freedom and the freedom of others. This discussion is possible by offering a history of thought.

As such, the sparring of critical theory, reflexive modernity, and postmodernism with instrumental rationality in relation to modernity as an epoch that should be replaced or further evolve can operate at the level of ‘governmentalities’. This ‘sparring’ should be perceived as a ‘game of truth’ that can always become a ‘game of knowledge’ that halts ‘games of power’, since a
contemporary history of our present suggests that postmodernists’ and reflexive (new) modernists’ concerns regarding the contingency of instrumental rationality—concerns which are a byproduct of their own contribution to the ‘game of truth’—have influenced the way that the social is reproduced. Hence, there is the need for an updated analysis of power relations tied to the interaction of power, knowledge and ethics in regard to contemplating possible ‘states of domination’.

My focus falls on a certain practice of truth-telling as it manifests into a certain governance of freedom in relation to Rose’s ethopolitics (e.g., 1999, 2000, 2001) and Osborne’s (1998) therapeutic enlightenment. These entwined concepts interact with existing accounts of neoliberal governmentality and its respective trajectory under the umbrella of Deleuze’s deterritorialised societies of ‘control’.

To elaborate, my aim is to make explicit how my discussion of ethics contributes to an understanding of contemporary relations of power through a certain conceptualisation. Thus, I will make the following analogies which to my knowledge do not appear in this exact way in the existing literature on ethopolitics or globalisation.

Foucault did not argue that neoliberalism is a unified political rationale of governance. He attributed different practices to ordo-liberalism and to anarcho-liberalism. Hence, although there is a common thread of enquiry, namely the re-appropriation of classical liberalism, there is also divergence in how the problematisation of how one should govern freedom is posed. What, in Part II, I call ‘deliberative democratic governmentality’ (that arises out of cognitive ethics/communicative reason) is analogous to ordo-liberalism. What I call, in Part III, ‘cosmopolitan governmentality’ (which arises out of the ethopolitics of reflexive modernity and the global third) is analogous to anarcho-liberalism.

Together they formulate what I call ‘neogovernmentality’. Such an account is alternative or complementary to the governmental trajectory of neoliberalism under the umbrella of ‘control’. It attempts to re-evaluate in its own terms neoliberalism in the era of ‘high modernity’. In this context, the two genealogies interlink. This staging that penetrates the structure of the thesis is the first distinctive characteristic of neogovernmentality. Then, neogovernmentality is somewhat distinct from ‘ethopolitics’ because it pays particular attention to Habermasean ethics and their governmental potential and to the ethical background of the reflexive sociology of Beck and Giddens vis-à-vis Foucault. Neogovernmentality as ‘ethopolitics’ adds to the concept of therapeutic enlightenment because it manifests a governmentality critique of socio-political theories tied to therapeutic enlightenment.
Then, there is the issue of operating at the level of the structure of social production. This issue is clarified by Foucault’s understanding of how neoliberalism emerged. Foucault suggests that neoliberalism penetrates the structure of social reproduction thereby re-appropriating capitalism. In liberal governmentality, the structure was dominated by legal frameworks tied to politico-juridical matrices. Their aim has been to produce such legislation that will lead to economic regulation of the social. In neoliberalism, certain preconceived economic laws penetrate the structure, thereby reproducing themselves in the form of social regulation. For this reason Foucault has argued that neoliberalism is less laissez-faire than classical liberalism (see Chapter 2).

My argument is that a certain trajectory of ethics also penetrates this structure in the form of moral and cognitive norms. This argument has not been framed in this exact manner before. As a result, a ‘neogovernmentality’ account remains tied to the governability of the subject in relation to the structural apparatus. It thus envisions new relationships between self-governance and structures of domination under the mode of ‘control’, where the ability to observe a social reproduction that reflects both neoliberal governmentality and neogovernmentality is increased. However, to the extent that those governmentalities are semi-autonomous, different forms of regulation that reflect more the one than the other can arise. In other words, if the interaction at the level of the structure is not always harmonious, the one trajectory can try to antagonise the other at the level of the structure (i.e., production of forms of initial regulation) and meta-structure (i.e., interaction with existing forms of regulation). Still, a tendency to complementary co-existence is discernible, and such co-existence leads back to the mode of ‘control’.

To conclude, governmentality is essentially tied to an ethical discussion constructed around the question of governing the others and the self. Conceiving governmentality in this manner supports the aim of the thesis, which is to connect governmentality with a genealogical account of ancient ethics. My further exploration of such an account enriches existing concepts (i.e. ethopolitics and therapeutic enlightenment) that attempt to navigate the present. This contribution manifests in the sense of formulating the neogovernmentality concept as a means of further exploring the governmental regulation derived from Habermas’s ‘critique’; the theoretical and methodological differences between Foucault, on the one hand, and Beck and Giddens, on the other, that point towards a governmental regulation deriving from the latter; and the connection between such governmental regulations and neoliberal governmentality. Such exploration is guided by the ethical axis of genealogy as the methodology that supports a governmentality critique that focusses on the governance of the self in connection to the governance of the freedom of others. This axis is put forward in my thesis by focusing on both Foucault’s discussion of enlightenment and parrhesia as a means to crystallize the ethical differentiation that makes governmentality critique possible.
Perspectives and Methodology

Navigating Foucault

My aim is to present schematically the evolution in the thought of Foucault. I briefly guide us through Foucault’s various works, and then I crystallise the shifts and re-appropriations in Foucault’s work in regard to genealogy as a method, his account of power, and the concept of governmentality.

To start with Foucault’s words: ‘My objective has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault, 1997: VIII). With this stated objective, Foucault makes clear that what he does is a history neither of ideas nor of science, but a history of knowledge. He fociusses on how a specific problematisation occurs and then constitutes forms of actions and ideas:

For a long time, I have been trying to see if it would be possible to describe the history of thought as distinct both from the history of ideas (by which I mean the analysis of systems of representation) and from the history of mentalities (by which I mean the analysis of attitudes and types of action [schemas de comportement]). It seemed to me there was one element that was capable of describing the history of thought—this was what one could call the element of problems or, more exactly, problematizations (Foucault, 1997:117).

The problematisation is the original point of the Foucauldian enquiry. It is the epistemological ‘milieu’ in which ‘this’ something possibly ‘universally true’ is forged into a socially constructed existence (i.e., ideas; mentalities).

This manifestation of certain notions into existence becomes clearer by understanding what dispositif (apparatus) is. As Rabinow and Rose (2013) explain,

The apparatus was ‘a resolutely heterogeneous grouping composing discourses, institutions, architectural arrangements, policy decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic, moral and philanthropic propositions; in sum, the said and the not-said, these are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these elements.’ The elements composing or taken up in a network apparently could be anything. Foucault saw the elements in an apparatus as joined and disjoined by a strategic logic and a tactical economy of domination operating against a background of discursive formations. He identified the apparatus as characterized by changes in the position of its elements, the multiplying modifications of its functions, and an overall articulated strategic intent, albeit an appropriately flexible one. The apparatus
embodied a kind of strategic *bricolage* articulated by an identifiable social collectivity. It functioned to define and to regulate targets constituted through a mixed economy of power and knowledge (10-1).

The ‘dispositif’ is essential to Foucault’s understanding of how knowledge—including institutions and science—evolves.

Yet, this sort of unification of heterogeneous elements should not be confused with the reductionism of specialisation rooted in firm scientific laws or the humility of science in the sense of avoiding overarching concepts altogether. It is a reduction on the basis of contingency. It suggests a focus on a certain trajectory of rationales in connection with social action with the aim of building a conceptual understanding of this action or function. This conceptual understanding can in turn be tied to a network of other similar concepts.

In this context, the aim is the critical understanding of an epoch, an ideology or a project. Genealogy is the practice that is concerned with the present without *ipsa facto* endorsing a metanarrative, including fixed epochs, but also without condemning them altogether. Such metanarratives have simply to be part of the conceptual analysis.

The aim is not to grasp reality *per se* rather than the genesis of certain rationales of freedom; the analysis is holistic only in the sense that it connects a certain genesis with an entire apparatus. As Osborne (see 1998:134) puts it, there are no limits to what the political incorporates. It is a question of freedom rather than of reality; or else it is a question of governing men rather than an objectivist account of the social (see Osborne, 1999:133).

Genealogy is the practice behind understanding this process. In effect, genealogy is a semiotic or hermeneutical unpacking of dominant discourses for understanding how freedom is produced on the basis that facts are discourses. Genealogy has to study the history of the well-known concepts of freedom and morality at a level where different interpretations are traceable (see Foucault, 1977:152). Rather than forging rational or theological continuities emerging from one single event, we should reverse this event to find the powers exercised over us as also the discourse that has been formulated to that end (i.e. effective history) (see Foucault, 1977:154).

Those who employ genealogy, away from the abstract, turn the enquiry to the body, the nervous system, digestion, and energies. Such enquiry aims to focus on those well-established facts or information (i.e. the actual body of knowledge) in order to contemplate the certainties that other historians try to confirm via events that they can never really fully grasp. Genealogy challenges this effort of reinforcing certainties by pointing out on what grounds the understanding of such historians is open to dispute (see Foucault, 1977:155).

Genealogy is the practice that allows one to study the history of thought in order to break free from the influence of the historian (see Foucault, 1977:160). In this context, thought is
freedom, namely the freedom that we have to detach ourselves from processes that transform thought into something like knowledge (see Foucault, 1977:117). Understanding ‘reality’ in such a manner leads to the issue of truth-telling in regard to the game of truth. The latter is essential in this thesis.

Hence, one should be careful when one emphasises the role of politics in Foucault, for as Foucault put it, ‘I have never tried to analyze anything whatsoever from the point of view of politics, but always to ask politics what it had to say about the problems with which it was confronted’ (Foucault, 1977:115).

Still, the ‘messy’ way in which Foucault’s lectures Collège de France were published in English has caused various confusions for those who do not have a systematic interest in Foucault. Not published in English until 2013, the lectures Will to Know, that is, Foucault’s first lectures, stress the importance for any systems of thought, and ‘the West’ in particular, to deal with the value of the act of knowing. As Foucault puts it, ‘Systems of thought ...are the forms in which, during a given period of time, knowledges [savoirs] individualize, achieve an equilibrium, and enter into communication’ (Foucault, 1997:x).

Foucault rather suggests how the problematisation stage is forgotten, and the meta-structures that are built upon it self-validate their claims in their quest for solid perpetual knowledge. These lectures are underlined by the difference between the ‘will to know’ and ‘the will to truth’. The role of truth becomes evident; nevertheless, the difference between knowledge and truth is not yet clear (see Foucault, 1997: xiii). Foucault is still bound by Nietzsche’s understanding of power.

However, the more realised Foucault suggests that

Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. So, three axes are possible for genealogy. All three were present, albeit in a somewhat confused fashion, in Madness and Civilization. The truth axis was studied in The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things. The power axis was studied in Discipline and Punish, and the ethical axis in The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1997:262-3).

At root, however, they all revolve around one concern:

In fact, there were practices—essentially the widespread use of incarceration which had been developed starting at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and had been the
condition for the insertion of the mad subject in this type of truth game—that sent me back to the problem of institutions of power much more than to the problem of ideology. This is what led me to pose the problem of knowledge and power, which for me is not the fundamental problem but an instrument that makes it possible to analyze the problem of the relationship between subject and truth in what seems to me the most precise way (Foucault, 1997:290).

Yet, this is not quite the Foucault of the early 70s. Foucault has argued in an interview that he was wrong in many things in the first volume of the History of Sexuality (see Foucault, 1997:259). What should concern us here is that he suggested that in both sexuality and psychiatry his framing of power may have been misleading:

When I was studying asylums, prisons, and so on, I perhaps insisted too much on the techniques of domination. What we call ‘discipline’ is something really important in this kind of institution; but it is only one aspect of the art of governing people in our societies. Having studied the field of power relations taking techniques of domination as a point of departure, I would like, in the years to come, to study power relations starting from the techniques of the self (Foucault, 1997:117).

It is here we can see that Foucault does not understand power either as Sartre, namely as something evil (see Foucault, 1997:298), or exactly as Nietzsche in the ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’, namely as something inevitable, and, at the same time, desirable as such. Power exists and will always exist in the interaction of any human with another. Furthermore, Foucault barely uses the word. When he does so, he refers to power relations (see Foucault, 1997:292), and as such, power is everywhere, but so is freedom (see Foucault, 1997:292).

The concept of ‘domination’ suggests that power relations can be tied to ‘states of domination’. Therefore, liberation is concerned with ‘states of domination’ rather than with power relations (see Foucault, 1997:283). Power relations are not ipso facto negative, so when Foucault connects power relations to techniques of self, he attempts to give a more nuanced character to power.

In this context,

when I talk about power relations and games of truth, I am absolutely not saying that games of truth are just concealed power relations—that would be a horrible exaggeration. My problem, as I have already said, is in understanding how truth games are set up and how they are connected with power relations (Foucault, 1997:296).

And, by ‘game’ Foucault means
The word “game” can lead you astray: when I say “game”, I mean a set of rules by which truth is produced. It is not a game in the sense of an amusement; it is a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its principles and rules of procedure, may be considered valid or invalid, winning or losing (Foucault, 1997:297).

The concern is to introduce such a historical analysis that allows one to take full advantage of the fact that in the West there is a ‘game of truth’. Foucault mentions that in contrast to other possible systems of knowledge in which the game is already lost in the sense of being forgotten, in the West there is the possibility of a critique of the ‘existing’. This possibility leads to a perpetual struggle between power and freedom (see Foucault, 1997:297). His critique aims to make sure that this game of truth exists against all the humanist and universalist discourses of reason and man. In the process, he provides us with strong historical accounts of institutions and practices in order to suggest how a problematisation is forged into forms and structures that then govern freedom.

Understanding the definition of a ‘game of truth’ is very important for this thesis. As Gutting suggests:

We can readily identify the study of games of truth in their own right, as systems of discourse, with archaeology, and the analysis of their relation to power with genealogy. Here ‘games of truth’ refers to the various bodies of knowledge (real or would-be) that were the concern of Foucault’s histories. It might seem natural to extend this sense of ‘games of truth’ to Foucault’s connection of them with problematizations, taking as the relevant games the philosophical theories that the ancient Greeks developed as solutions to the problems of human existence. However, although Foucault does indeed see philosophy as the Greek response to problematizations, he does not see philosophy in this sense as a matter of developing a body of theoretical knowledge. Rather, following on the work of Pierre Hadot, his colleague at the College de France, he sees ancient philosophy as fundamentally a way of life rather than a search for theoretical truth. ‘Games of truth’, in this context refers not to systems of thought but to practices of telling the truth. The Use of Pleasure discusses Plato’s appeal to the love of truth as the purified ideal behind the homoerotic love of boys. Plato, however, has at least a strong tendency to treat philosophy as a theoretical vision rather than just a way of life, and Foucault is careful to keep his distance from this sort of Platonism (2005:108-109).

In this context, it becomes understood that ‘games of truth’ are not merely any interaction between truth and the subject. There is a distinction here between knowledge and truth. Hence, not all interactions with truth that Foucault describes in antiquity are truthful to him. The antithesis between games of knowledge and games of truth tied to two distinct forms of telling the truth as a means to take care of the self emerges here.
In his discussion of enlightenment, Foucault recognises that it is not quite possible for one to stop being a byproduct of one’s era. He closes the discussion, however, by mentioning that the aesthetic ethos that he describes can be strengthened by a historic-critical academic practice that focusses on the following: first, grasping the ‘homogeneity of practical systems concerned with already naturalised human activity in which change is linked to the intensification of normalising practices; second, grasping the ‘systematicity’ that derives from the way that relations of control over things, relations of action upon others, and relations with oneself, interact or do not interact (this concern with ‘systematicity’ is linked to pondering how one is constituted as a subject of knowledge); third, grasping the ‘generality’, namely the recurring character of a certain problematisation. The aim is to overcome the challenge that arises when the investigation progressively ties the problematisation to a certain apparatus. This apparatus takes, in turn, the form of an epoch or of a fully-fledged naturalised material reality (see Foucault, 1997:317-8). These three characteristics of the historic-critical academic practice are tied to the open-ended ‘game of truth’ in ‘the West’.

But, as I said, this is not the Foucault of the 70s. Foucault in the beginning of the Society Must Be Defended lectures recognises that his quest was lacking direction. Moreover, that was the same year that Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality were published (i.e. 1976-1977) (see Foucault, 1997: xv).

The lectures published as Society Must Be Defended disclose Foucault’s embracing of Nietzsche’s account of power as a means to oppose the legalism of the social contract (Foucault, 1997: xv). Foucault focusses on how the subject of law does not emerge from an embracing of its aggressive nature. On the contrary, the subject of law is a product of an embrace of the social contract. People accept conflict not because they want to build a war society, but because they want to protect themselves from the possibility of war that derives from their polemical instincts. In this context, a number of politico-juridical policies emerge to protect society on the basis that any of its subjects can be potentially dangerous. This account entails a critique of concealing the fact that the social contract is a state of domination in which the subject denounces its individual will or ability for self-governance in exchange for peace.

But, the following year Foucault decided to call the whole issue of power-as-warfare, and Nietzsche himself, into question (Foucault, 1997: xvi). This decision came at the same time that Foucault refined his account of the genealogy of Nietzsche in his essay ‘On Genealogy’ (1977).

In this context, in Security Territory Population, there is a genealogical elaboration on the relationship between knowledge and conflict in an effort to provide a more nuanced background story of the processes that structure the West. Foucault focusses on the re-examination of knowledge and the conditions of knowledge with respect to the interaction of power and truth.
Hence, Foucault focuses on pastoral power and its transfiguration through the processes of Reformation and Counter-Reformation (see also ‘The History of Sexuality: Volume I’). These processes led to the rise of the state, and subsequently, of liberalism.

*The Birth of Biopolitics* introduces an economic regulatory intervention for the purpose of nurturing the market tied to the German–ordo-liberalism. American neoliberalism, for its part, faces Foucault’s decoding of the focus on human capital as direct biopolitics. The American neoliberal rationale appears to envision capitalism as a living thought which is internalised and reproduced by the subject as a biological homo-economicus entity. Also, liberalism itself is presented via the analysis of a governmental reason as an endless form of critique on governance (see Part I).

The lectures *On the Government of Living* that followed afterwards build on the importance of the counter-reformation through the pivotal role of confession that has been also discussed in *The History of Sexuality: Volume I*. The Foucauldian take on the dominant problematisation that has structured the West becomes more and more nuanced. Also, the issue of truth-telling becomes vital, and the first parallel discussion between antiquity and pastoral power in regard to this issue is put forward.

However, this focus on forms of truth-telling does not quite bring ethics into the discussion in the way that they appear in the subsequent lectures. There is still no real discussion of the way in which ancient Greece formulates its own problematisation of governance and freedom other than what we have already found in *Security Territory Population*. There, we find reference to the absence of this oriental pastoral power from ancient Greece, and the existence of a Platonic one (see Part I).

But the seeds are planted. In this context, up to these lectures, governmentality is concerned with strategies of governance and the processes of institutionalisation. The pivotal concept of the ‘technologies of the self’ does appear. However, even though the lectures on governmentality do bring power and knowledge, and subjectivity and truth together, this confluence is obscured by the emphasis on a certain trajectory that still highlights ‘states of domination’ tied to structures. The concern remains how to govern the freedom of others without an explicit link to how to govern the self.

Foucault has reformulated his understanding of power, but this rather matures later, namely in his third volume of lectures, from the beginning of the 80s. It is then that he starts crystallising the relationship between knowledge and the subject. The lectures *Subjectivity and Truth, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, The Government of the Self and Others*, and *The Courage of Truth*, which informed his publication of the next two volumes of the *History of Sexuality*, represent a matured Foucault.

As Rabinow suggests:
Foucault divided his work on the history of systems of thought into three interrelated parts, the ‘re-examination of knowledge, the conditions of knowledge, and the knowing subject.’ Faithful to the broad contours of this program, he moved increasingly in the last decade or so of his life toward an emphasis on the third term, the knowing subject (Foucault, 1997: x).

Also, as Gutting puts it:

In every case, Foucault’s ethical objection to modern practices seems to have been broadly existentialist: they make people be something they have not chosen for themselves. But he rejected any comprehensive philosophical account (for example, of the “nature of man”) supporting this moral stance and simply began from his intense pre-philosophical conviction that the practices were morally intolerable...This, however, began to change when Foucault’s historical study of modern sexuality made explicit the central role of the subject or self in the network of social constraints...As a result, the first volume of Foucault’s history of sexuality (intended as an introductory overview of four further projected volumes on children, women, perverts, and couples) highlighted the role of the individual subject (self) for the understanding of modern sexuality.

Extending his studies to the self led, however, to a corresponding extension of the historical scope of Foucault’s studies (2011:141).

This had a serious impact:

It is not just that the move to Greece and Rome broadened Foucault’s historical scope; it also led to a new conception of his topic. His original project, previewed in volume I, was to tell in detail the story of how individual subjects internalized the normalizing structures of society’s power–knowledge. But Foucault found in the ancients the possibility of a meaningful self-construction of the self. This meant not just internalizing external norms or resisting them through counter-power. Rather, it meant the possibility of forging, even if in the interstices left by social constraints, an autonomous self-identity, a project that could, even in a traditional sense, be called ethical (Gutting, 2011:142).

It is then that Foucault increasingly recognises how his different genealogies can come together as a genealogy of ethics and truth-telling. Therefore, he subsequently focusses on ancient Greece. This focus is interesting because he now turns to processes that reach back to before the rise of an instrumental rationality tied to Christianity, allowing us to observe other ways in which reason can manifest itself.

Here, Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals is grasped at the level of a genealogy of ethics which suggests Christian morality has much more nuanced origins than those that Nietzsche cares
Gutting, as noted before, acknowledges the very different function that genealogy has in Foucault, contemplates the value of this genealogy. Again, as noted before, Gutting suggests that, although a history of the present cannot emerge from this genealogy a source for alternative self-creation can be found in it:

What is the point of Foucault’s excursions into the ancient history of sexual ethics?...The ancient world is too far removed from ours for such a history to sustain sufficient connection to contemporary concerns; it cannot be what Foucault called a “history of the present”. But Foucault thinks he can find in the ancient world a model for an ethics of self-creation that will be relatively independent of the power–knowledge structures of our society. This is by no means a matter of “going back to the Greeks” and reviving their way of ethical life. Apart from the historical impossibility of doing any such thing, there are many central features of their ethics that we would not want to emulate (2011:144).

Veyne has previously described the early Foucault as following:

I shall not tell you that this is the fight in which you must engage, for I cannot see on what basis I could say that, except possibly as an aesthetic criterion...On the other hand, what I shall do is describe the actual 'discourse' of power, in the same way as I would set a strategic map before you. If you wish to fight and depending on what battle you choose, you will see from this 'map' where the points of resistance lie and where there are possible ways to breach them (2010:119-120).

But, in the context that Gutting creates, regardless of whether Foucault’s discussion is relevant to contemporary concerns, Foucault substantiates his relativist aesthetic choices with an aesthetic ethos. This is a shift from relativism to parrhesia as his detestation of judging becomes a will to pivot into the mode in which one will work on the self by refraining from certainties. The latter is a truth in the sense of the Socratic ‘I know that I know nothing’.

These conceptions become possible when Foucault comes up with the concept of problematisation. As Gutting puts it:

There is an implied contrast – although Foucault never makes it explicit – between problematization and marginalization. In the ancient context where he introduces the term, it is the lives of free Greek males that are problematized, not those of marginalized groups such as women and slaves…My suggestion is that, in moving to the history of the subject (and to the history of ancient sexuality), Foucault implicitly switches his primary
focus from those whose lives are marginalized to those whose lives are merely problematized (2005:104).

In this context, an aesthetics of existence can be derived from the ancients by those who are not marginalised and, therefore, trapped between submission and resistance (see Gutting, 2011:144). By focusing on problematising, Foucault does not merely engage in an elitist enquiry of self-transgression limited to only a few. He rather contemplates the ethical qualities of values and practices that have emerged at the level of problematisation. For example, if in ancient Greece free males were capable to problematise that did not ipso facto led to creative self-transgression in the way that Foucault would hope. It also led to an attachment to the ‘polis’ and to transcendental values. Therefore, Foucault is interested in identifying the possibility to problematise. He is also interested in pondering how one should act at the level of problematisation and/or in order to be able to keep problematising.

Therefore, one has to recognise that Foucault’s genealogy of ethics opens the door to a nuanced critique of the West as a system of knowledge. Thus Foucault, by the end of his life, through his various ways of communicating the progression and re-appropriation of his work, provides us with a philosophical ethos that is in turn an ethos of living. His projects are full of provocations for connecting the dots. Such provocations are addressed to both him and anyone else willing to take on the job, but one should embrace a certain critical ethos tied to a certain methodology in order to connect these dots.

Maybe Veyne’s account of how archaeology blends with genealogy ‘reconciles’ Gutting’s unwillingness to perceive Foucault’s discussion of antiquity as genealogical with those who find the ability to retain this description useful:

Foucault's project was: to 'problematize' an object, find out how a human being was envisaged in a particular epoch...and describe the various social practices - scientific, ethical, punitive, medical and so on - that determined how a human being was envisaged. His archaeology seeks not to distinguish any universal structure or a priori, but instead to reduce everything to events that cannot be universalized. And his genealogy traces everything back to an empirical occurrence: contingency has always made us be what we were or are (2010:106).

Gutting himself has also mentioned that:

It seems, then, that Foucault's development of a genealogical approach to history is a matter of (1) returning archaeology to its role of describing both discursive and nondiscursive practices, (2) thereby exhibiting an essential tie between knowledge and power, and (3) exploiting this tie to provide a causal explanation of changes in discursive
formations and epistemes. Accordingly, genealogy does not replace or even seriously revise Foucault's archaeological method. It rather combines it with a complementary technique of causal analysis. If the above account is essentially correct, then archaeology continues to hold a central place even in Foucault's genealogical work. This would strongly support our claim that archaeology is compatible with Foucault's later formulation of his philosophical project (1989:271-272).

A more ‘neutral’ use of Foucault tied to archaeology could probably be as functional or not functional as Weber’s objectivism tied to the sociology of culture and religion. However, such use can deprive Foucault’s contributions of its whole essence. As Rabinow puts it,

Max Weber, Foucault argued, had placed the following question on the historical, sociological, and ethical agenda: ‘If one wants to behave rationally and regulate one’s action according to true principles, what part of one’s self should one renounce? What is the ascetic price of reason?’ He continued, ‘For my part, I have posed the opposite question: How have certain kinds of interdictions become the price required for attaining certain kinds of knowledge [savoir] about oneself? What must one know [connaitre] about oneself in order to be willing to accept such renunciation?’ (Rabinow, 1997:xxiv).

In this context, Gutting (see 1989:265-266) raises the issue that archaeology cannot be connected to the critical analysis that Foucault’s philosophical project requires as a rationalist but also historical and critical one. Foucault’s project also needs to be situated in the practices of a certain era. Archaeology per se is associated to neutral, ahistorical, theoretical, knowledge (see Gutting, 1989:266). And, Foucault was indeed fascinated by structuralism which appeared as capable of producing scientific results that could shed light to essential features of human existence (see Gutting, 1989:266-267).

If one accepts this account of archaeology, one will have to conclude ‘that Foucault's archaeology succumbs to the structuralist temptation and is indeed incompatible with his philosophical project’ (Gutting, 1989:267). In that case, Foucault’s aesthetic relativism could be deriving from an objectivist and/or positivist account of the relevancy of human phenomena and nature tied to archaeology.

Gutting does not quite suggest that though for as he puts it:

It is striking, however, that even here Foucault insists that the new structuralist countersciences cannot be regarded as bodies of neutral scientific knowledge...

Accordingly, even if archaeology is viewed in relation to Foucault's enthusiasm for structuralism, it can at best be regarded as another counterscience, just as limited as the others in its scientific significance (1989:267-268).
Hence, Foucault’s late endeavours if they are to acquire further value should be somehow perceived as genealogical and archaeology must be attached to genealogy, even if, as noted before, according to Gutting, genealogy becomes a certain type of philosophy tied to history.

As a matter of fact, I find Gutting’s following description of Foucault’s philosophy to be quite interesting:

Foucault proposes, in the end, a twofold transformation of the traditional concept of philosophy. First, he turns it away from the effort at an a priori determination of the essential limits of human thought and action and instead makes it a historical demonstration of the contingency of what present themselves as necessary restrictions. Second, he no longer asks it to provide the justification for the values that guide our lives but instead employs it to clear the path of intellectual obstacles to the achievement of those values. This reconception of philosophy is particularly significant for those of us who see scant prospects for a fulfillment of philosophy’s traditional goal of legitimating knowledge claims and actions via a body of fundamental truths. While eschewing this goal, Foucault is still able to assign philosophy an important role in the enlightenment and liberation of human beings (1989:285).

In this context, Foucault's project can be regarded as a new, more modest (and realistic) way of seeking these traditional philosophical goals (see Gutting, 1989:286-287). But, Gutting does not stay at that. He explicitly suggests (see Gutting, 1989 285-287) that there is no ‘rule’ for those who engage with Foucault that can prevent them from contemplating traditional philosophical investigations tied to the ‘big’ questions. If such a prevention were to exist, it would have to rely on a universalising and positivist account of relativity that would make Foucault’s philosophy philosophical in the traditional sense.

In this context, one should not neglect Foucault’s relation to Spinoza in connection to ‘immanence’ vis-à-vis transcendentalty. Foucault never really deviates from the view that every action does reflect ‘naturalness’. Foucault’s relativism can be understood in this manner which explains why he could never come in terms with Plato. Hence, the only way to reconcile truth and contingency is by accepting the naturalness in all actions, while evaluating the extent to which social organization allows or does not allow all sorts of naturalness. There are no unnatural actions, but there are unnatural structures or all structures are bound to be unnatural for they have to freeze and isolate certain understandings.

This account could be a postmodernist one tied to a ‘scientific enlightenment’, identity politics or even nihilism. Therefore, I would add that by truth one should not mean ‘naturalness’ vis-à-vis not truth/not naturalness. One should tie truth to balance. The Cynics might have also somewhat confused naturalness with truth. But, Foucault is not a Cynic. If we take Socrates, Stoics
and the Cynics all together as Foucault does in connection to a philosophy tied to life, then truth would mean living one’s life in a manner in which one could organize one’s actions, aspirations and desires from an internal rather than an external point of view. The transcendental does not disappear in the materialist obsessed sense that a transcendental realm with its truths is absolutely impossible and so one should only focus on now. One should not use this life in order to discover a pre-existing truth that will teach one how to live this life and/or reward one in another. One has to envision truth through one’s own life. In other words, one can easily contrast the duality between protestant materialism and a catholic transcendentality with the Buddhist and Taoist philosophies/traditions that reconcile the two. The insertion of these traditions in the West has again blurred this distinction, but in all cases there is an interesting connection between immanence and transcendentality tied to these philosophies. This connection is rather reflected in this line of philosophy that Foucault came to advocate.

The above leads to the premise that this thesis finds useful. Foucault’s reconception of philosophy as a historical critique of reason in the service of human freedom enables us to maintain the ideals and utilize the distinctive intellectual virtues of traditional philosophizing, although we remain dubious regarding the grand claims of this enterprise. Through this new conception of philosophy he offers our skeptical age the hope that, even without the Truth, we may still be made free (Gutting, 1999:288).

By this token, as Veyne further suggests:

A historian who is a genealogist cannot avoid the realization that his analysis of the 'discourse' on love in the ancient world will one day be superseded by a better one. (2010:84).

Hence this type of historian:

Stepping back from the space from which he was speaking, he positions himself, ipso facto, within another 'discourse' with which he is not familiar and which will recede as fast as he discovers it’ (Veyne, 2010: 84-85).

By the same token, as Rose (1999:13) has argued, Foucault in a way writes ‘fictions’, in the sense that he suggests that we create stories which can make us consider history at the level of problematisation (i.e. history of thought). Foucault on different occasions has indeed argued that his account of the history of certain institutions is more accurate than the one that these institutions give for themselves (see Foucault, 1997). However, this conviction does not derive from a firm belief that his account provides an objective (positivist) outlook on such institutions. The fact that Foucault, although bound by his subjectivity, is able to problematise suggests that essentially it is this problematisation of the self that has allowed his whole work to emerge in the first place, and it
is also what makes it useful. Genealogy is only an attempt to move beyond subjectivity in the sense of fixed identities offered to us. One works to envision what subjectivity can be rather than to expand its options. A permanent self beyond subjectivity does not exist in Foucault, but Foucault attempts to construct a self that is not bound to subjectivity as offered by any given social structure. Therefore, in Veyne’s (2005) terms one rather is the fish inside the fishbowl. But, one can also become the observer as long as the games of power are not permanently frozen and one is able to rise above attempts at freezing them (c.f. Gutting 2005:110).

This leads back to the value of problematisations:

Readers of Foucault’s previous histories might well wonder how his picture of individuals formed by the social power–knowledge nexus can allow room for any project of ethical self-formation. I suggest that the answer lies in his (implicit) move from a focus on marginalization to a focus on problematization. Although Foucault’s ethical emphasis is on an individual’s construction of a self (an identity), he does recognize the role of ethical codes (rules of behavior), the force of which will vary depending on the manner in which a given individual is “subjected” to it (see below). Although Foucault says little about ethical codes, it is reasonable to suppose that he would see them as general frameworks required for life within a given social structure but not necessarily the central concern of ethical life, which is instead the construction of a self (Gutting, 2011:142).

In other words, Foucault acts as a doctor or physician who examines modernity, while remaining a philosopher of ethics or truth to the core (see Osborne, 1998:9). This understanding of Foucault gives us a straight reference to Foucault’s (1977) understanding of Nietzsche’s effective history. Philosophy here acts as a medicine, and even when it looks close, it still knows that it writes fictions or narratives. History in genealogy is a concerted carnival (Foucault, 1977:161). These fictions, however, show that the other historians write also their own fictions, but without ever acknowledging it (Foucault, 1977:156).

Effective history doubts the ability of the historian as a subject to objectively outline history. It rather focuses on the effect that a certain limited historical understanding has in forging historical certainties. Effective history turns against the historian as a subject who attempts to establish any past as an earlier stage of an evolutionary progress. On this view of history, the present is always better than the ‘evil’ past, and history has a hidden continuity. Foucault is both against reintroducing a romantically past and against the idea of a complete deviation from ‘something’, since one has to know what this ‘something’ is to know if one needs to deviate from it. In Foucault this ‘something’ is not a fixed epoch of domination. Foucault did not suggest a transvaluation of all values in the sense of abolishing all existing values. Such abolition is irrelevant. He uses genealogy in order merely to suggest the ways that domination is built and reproduced.
Thus, any opposition to structures of domination should not be fundamentalist in its ‘anti’ objectives, thereby nullifying the present and simply waiting for a time to come (see Rose, 1999:13). Rose endorses the use of concepts for ‘weak’ generalisation in opposition to holistic approaches, and in favour of an action on the present rooted in a self-realisation that can translate into political action. This approach allows us to embark on a theoretical contemplation of ‘enlightenment’ that transcends epochal interpretations tied to competing interpretations that lead to winners and losers. The focus is on the examination of different interpretations of truth on the basis of their functionality and their governmentality. This focus, in turn, requires a certain critical ethos.

To sum up, it has become clear so far that there is a notable progression in Foucault’s thinking of the interaction between power and freedom in the West. When we look back at Foucault’s literature and lectures, we can indeed see a continuity emerging. However, this recognition is possible only when one pays close attention both to notable semiotic shifts in the understanding of power in relation to interpreting ‘true’ discourses and to the way a ‘problematisation’ is set.

As a result, governmentality is concerned with the relations between power, knowledge and ethics. The later Foucault focussed explicitly on ethics in the sense of grasping how the subject is formulated and governs itself in relation to knowing or being forced to know in such manner that power, knowledge and self-governance interlink.

‘What is enlightenment?’: Aspects of enlightenment

I explicitly connect the above discussion on the governing of freedom on the basis of interpreting (knowledge), enforcing (power) and internalising (ethics) ‘true’ discourses with the Enlightenment. Foucault suggests that contemporary philosophy tries to identify itself by answering the question of the Enlightenment (see Foucault, 1997:304). Foucault finds in Kant’s brief essay ‘Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’ (1784) the intention of Kant to reflect in his own present:

The way that Kant poses the question of *Aufklärung* is entirely different: it is neither a world era to which one belongs, nor an event whose signs are perceived, nor the dawning of an accomplishment. Kant defines *Aufklärung* in an almost entirely negative way, as an *Aussgang*, an "exit," a "way out." In his other texts on history, Kant occasionally raises questions of origin or defines the internal teleology of a historical process. In the text on *Aufklärung*, he deals with the question of contemporary reality alone. He is not seeking to understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future achievement. He is looking for a difference: What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday? (Foucault, 1997:305).
This is the Kant that Foucault attempts to discuss. Kant argues that enlightenment is an exit from immaturity. Foucault tries to break through Kant’s ambiguous emphasis on mankind. The question is whether we are talking again about a historical process that involves all humankind or for or a shift in the way that one understands humanity (see Foucault, 1997:306). Kant defines maturity as an escape from obedience. By this token, he condemns the kind of reason that derives from reason itself (see Foucault, 1997:308). Kant surprisingly twists the already existing freedom of conscience by arguing that it is in public and not in private that one should exercise this freedom (see Foucault, 1997:307).

Enlightenment becomes a political problem in the sense of contemplating how the individual can exercise this type of thinking when he has to conform to social norms in his daily activity (see Foucault, 1997:308). The public is connected to the ethics of critique, and the private to a form of ‘ascesis’. The private reason concerns the individual within the social reality, but the public is related to the individual’s ability as a human being to think beyond that individual’s existing subjectivity by exercising ‘pure thinking’. Navigating both the private and the public reflects this political problem that enlightenment becomes.

In this context, according to Foucault,

Kant, in conclusion, proposes to Frederick II, in scarcely veiled terms, a sort of contract—what might be called the contract of rational despotism with free reason: the public and free use of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee of obedience, on condition, however, that the political principle which must be obeyed itself be in conformity with universal reason (Foucault, 1997:308).

The last statement above is not really different from the way that Habermas reads Kant (see Chapter 3). Foucault suggests a connection with Kant’s three critiques, though, which allows us to put their function into a new light. As a result, there is a departure from a deterministic historiological transformation. The independence of reason from authority suggests that the ‘critiques’ should play the determining role in how reason should manifest, not in the sense of perceiving reason as a form of authority, but in the sense of making it a form of critique on its own merits. The individual becomes responsible for setting things in motion rather than someone who is caught up in the process. The philosopher, even more so, has the task of illustrating this individual responsibility that we all have in regard to setting things in motion.

Still, Habermas and his dialectic of progress could also attest to that responsibility. So, to put it differently, Foucault explicitly condemns the epochal in favour of a certain attitude towards contemporary reality. It is here that Foucault brings the word ‘ethos’ (a way of living) from ancient Greece on the table (1997:309), also turning his focus to Baudelaire. Modernity is again an ongoing movement that therefore cannot be replaced, since any change is part of being modern, but grasping this movement is pivotal in the sense that it empowers one’s own position in regard to this
movement. One can find cause to celebrating life, and one can trigger shifts in the movement. The modern man turns to the self in an ascetic way not in order to merely understand his true essence, but in order to invent it (see Foucault 1997:312). Here, there is a break with the transcendent.

By this token, any cognitive creation should be linked to a conscious engagement with the ‘game of truth’. In this case, any understanding, theoretical or empirical, critical or not, holistic or epochal, should be understood in relation to the different attempts to answer the question of what enlightenment is at a given period (see also Osborne, 1998: 21-23). Moreover, any general observation should focus on how different understandings interact with each other as they play the ‘game of truth’.

Semiotic analysis can be employed here. Enlightenment is the nodal discourse, and there are various sub-discourses as signs of the discourse that attempt to come together and exclude other signs in an effort to monopolise enlightenment. Alternatively, enlightenment can act as the nodal point of broader discourses of freedom in the West. Such account suggests a pact made at the level of the ‘milieu’ which establishes enlightenment as the project on which we should all focus in order to contemplate how to govern freedom.

In this sense, it is not an issue of arguing whether a scientific modernity never actually envisioned itself (i.e. Latour’s non-modernity) or never envisioned itself properly (i.e. the new modernists) or is over (i.e. proponents of a postmodern condition). The issue is to perceive all the above as understandings of the project of enlightenment in regard to governing our own freedom. Therefore, enlightenment is linked to the problematisation of the self or it becomes itself a problematisation of self-care in the sense that one problematises via enlightenment how one ought to live and/or govern the self.

It is in the various efforts to envision modernity via enlightenment that one can situate a deterritorial instrumental rationality, new modernity, and what escapes from both categories, which is usually labelled postmodernism. Foucault obviously acknowledged that the structures of modernity are a manifestation of enlightenment in regard to liberty and the way that truth progresses. But, by pointing towards the critique that derives from this connection, he aims to escape from the argument that a critique of enlightenment is a condemnation of enlightenment and of all the structures of modernity (Foucault, 1997:313). Foucault’s critique has to avoid the humanist theme in the sense of a naturalist understanding of a universal project of man. Such understanding has rather removed from all Christianity, science, and Marxism the possibility of a critique independent from doctrinal knowledge.

As Foucault puts it,
Once the historical perspective is mastered by a supra-historical perspective, metaphysics can bend it to its own purpose and, by aligning it to the demands of objective science, it can impose its own ‘Egyptianism’\(^2\) (Foucault, 1977:152).

A critique of such ‘Egyptianism’ can be found in genealogy in which there are no clear origins. For origins always might become stepping stones for identifying the eternal essence of things whose realisation becomes a telos. Such identification is the worst form of a supra-historical perspective, as it refuses to see humanity as a series of interpretations (see Foucault, 1977:152). Genealogy proposes that cognition creates its own knowledge rather than being subordinated to an ideal of what cognition is and what it can create (see Foucault, 1977:157). Genealogy’s attempt to expose the relationships between knowledge and ethics and, in turn, power, forged by certain discourses, opens the possibility of a set of ethics that break free from the subject of knowledge.

In this regard, Foucault explicitly focusses on the scientific discourse tied to instrumental rationality in an effort to expose its contingency. Foucault in the preface of *The History of Sexuality, Volume Two*, explains better what he attempted to do in *Madness and Civilization*:

The work was directed along two lines: first, in the ‘vertical’ dimension, taking the example of sickness, and studying how an institutional organization for therapy, instruction, and research is related to the constitution of a clinical medicine articulated on the development of pathological anatomy. The object was to bring out the complex causalities and reciprocal determinations affecting, on the one hand, the development of a certain kind of medical knowledge \([savoir]\) and, on the other, the transformations of an institutional field linked directly to social and political changes. Then, once scientific knowledge \([savoir]\) was endowed with its own rules for which external determinations could not account—its own structure as discursive practice—I tried to show what common, but transformable, criteria—what epistemes \([epistemes]\)—governed those bodies of knowledge which, from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries, had been charged with explaining certain aspects of human activity or existence: the wealth men produce, exchange, and circulate; the linguistic signs they use to communicate; and the collectivity of living things to which they belong (Foucault, 1997:202-3).

Of course, Foucault also states in another interview that although he maintains that a relation between relations of power and games of truth exists and that it can furnish an account of the evolution of any discipline or science, ‘one simply cannot say that games of truth are nothing but games of power’ (Foucault, 1997:296).

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\(^2\) ‘Egyptianism’ refers to the way that philosophy mummifies ideas by removing them from their essence. Nietzsche introduced the term in the *Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer* (1990).
As such, the crisis in the institutions of psychiatry that Foucault mentions above is not tied to a merely exhaustive understanding of power. Foucault’s concern is that it is one thing for philosophy to act like a medicine and another for medicine to enter the realm of philosophy. The critique should be turned on the interpretations of science or on their use for establishing governmental rationales, since science should already be a form of critique. Kuhn (1996) also acknowledges this feature of science in the sense that paradigm shifts emerge through the continuous self-realisation of science. Hence, Foucault is not at this stage concerned with disputing science. He is concerned with cutting the ties between scientific knowledge and the governance of others and of the self.

Osborne (see 1998:166), too, emphasises the initial humility that has characterised empiricism itself as an ethos of developing judgment. Here, ‘scientific enlightenment’ differs from the structures of domination based on an instrumentally rational scienticism. The initial judgment based on empirical facts was also supposed to entail an ascetic, labour-expensive, understanding of history that would limit absolutism. But, in the process, empiricism has become more often than not a naturalisation of certain rationalism; the essential point is that science should not be bound by the politico-juridical model in order a certain critique of enlightenment’ to emerge (i.e., scientific enlightenment) (see Osborne, 1998:11-13).

Still, science can be problematic even when it is dissociated from an explicit project of man tied to politico-juridical matrices. The scientific drive to understand in the service of ‘human needs’ can be an ‘anti-human’ one. Humans do not use necessarily scientific knowledge to emancipate themselves from a false governance. More importantly, a type of knowledge constructed in isolated scientific conditions (i.e. black-boxed science) is instrumentalised by centralised forms of governance, forging a mono-dimensional naturalisation of certain notions.

To put it simply, as becomes more evident in Chapter 1, scientific enlightenment is unsuitable for self-care. All in all, one can learn from the historical epistemology and the Latourian anti-foundationalism to perceive natural science as fieldwork concerned with exercising anti-simplicity (see Osborne, 1998:68). Science, though, should remain ‘ethically meaningless’ (see Osborne, 1998:69). An ethos of living tied to science should not be formulated on the basis either that instrumental rationality has never been fully or appropriately applied or that some other form of black-boxed scientific knowledge can ipso facto teach the individuals how to live their lives.

By this token, the ethos proposed by Foucault is not about Durkheim’s approach of the pedagogical nature of science, on which science appears as systematic reasoning that might celebrate unnecessary complexity and is oppressive in the sense that, as in Latour, it asks us to celebrate a humility in our creative process of understanding (see Osborne, 1998:68).
However, ‘humility’ and ‘ascecsis’ are not the same thing. Therefore, Foucault’s contempt for the humanist projects can be summarised as follows: First, there is the scientific channelling of ‘the disciplines’ or science as a field of experimentation that suggests that it is also the only worthy discipline. Schumpeter’s and Eucken’s fears for the undermining of innovation by a socialist takeover of ‘the disciplines’ that will put an end to the ‘creative destruction’ of economy is, in my mind, a notable example of making a transgressive science in relation to economics the sole source of regulation via the institution and against intervention. Foucault (2008) links this relationship to the rise of neoliberalism (see Chapter 2).

Second, there is an absolutist humanism that deprives the subject of a pluralism tied to a variety of different forms of self-realisation by means of its own cognition via the quest of the transcendental (i.e. Habermas) or a reflexive engagement with a black-boxed scientific knowledge (i.e. Beck’s sub-politics and Giddens’s life-politics).

Hence, the attack on both absolutism and anti-humanism remains incomplete. The use of philosophy as medicine takes a rather twisted turn as scientific knowledge tied to an overall moral absolutism attempts to construct subjectivities (i.e. Osborne’s account of therapeutic enlightenment). Subjectivity acts, in this case, as a power mechanism that is formulated on the basis of urging the individuals to ‘heal’ themselves from ‘irrational’ alternative ways of being, since those are envisioned not only by postmodernist chaos but also by apheretic ethical conduct tied to technologies of living.

As a result, ‘therapeutics’ become an issue. Foucault as a philosopher of ethics was as concerned with this ‘art of living’ as much as he was concerned with an academic practice. This type of philosophy, as acknowledged in his essay ‘On Genealogy’, is a form of medicine. Therefore, therapeutics is not the problem, *per se*. The problem’s location becomes clear in Osborne, who points out that there is an inward internalisation of conduct tied to the governability of the subject which dictates how a certain account of enlightenment operates at the level of the technologies of the self. It is this inwardness that deprives the subject of its autonomous power of ‘innovation’ that is worth criticising. Osborne coins such an account ‘therapeutic enlightenment’.

Both therapeutic enlightenment and scientific enlightenment appear to be contrastingly mono-dimensional. The first appears to be ‘introspective’, ‘caring’, ‘defusing’ and ‘receptive’, while becoming ‘dogmatic’ in enforcing doctrinal manifestations of such qualities. The second shares the same qualities of instrumentally rational science as it is ‘youthfully curious’, ‘competitive’, ‘initiating’, ‘reasonable’, ‘analytic’ and ‘pragmatic’ in its quest for knowledge. However, it manages to be less ‘dogmatic’. The point remains, however, that neither of these accounts of ‘Enlightenment’ manage individually to strike a balance between these two sets of opposing qualities, without also being dogmatic. The next section maps the grounds on which Foucault's account of enlightenment is more successful in this regard.
To sum up, I have established an initial understanding of how Foucault conceives enlightenment as a problematisation that revolves around the ways that freedom poses to individuals the question of how they ought to realise themselves (i.e. ethics). At the same time, there is a parallel elaboration of alternative problematisations. The interaction between such problematisations with the main focus here, which is how Foucault links his problematisation of enlightenment to the cultivation of a certain set of ethics, points towards the emergence of a Foucauldian ethos. This ethos is important in navigating the connection between science, reason, and morality in relation to contemporary re-appropriations of power relations that are potentially prone to lead to structures of domination.

**What is enlightenment?: Aesthetic enlightenment and enlightenment as a critical ethos**

This section discusses how enlightenment can act as a certain set of ethics which Foucault connects to the ‘game of truth’. This connection is rooted in the premise that enlightenment is tied to a will to truth as a means to achieve an ongoing self-realisation rather than a will to know as a means to construct overarching ideas of how humans are ought to be governed.

Foucault enriches the understanding of the place from which a critical ethos should derive by discussing not only what it negatively is not (negatively), but what it can positively be (positively). In Foucault’s words,

But if the Kantian question was that of knowing *savoir* what limits knowledge *connaissance* must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over *franchissement*...In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological—and not transcendental—in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge *connaissance* or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom (Foucault, 1997:315-6).
Hence, Kant is understood via Nietzsche. Nietzsche wants to overthrow a certain modernity rooted in an absolutism that Kant has already condemned. Since this condemnation is a given, Foucault uses genealogy to reach a philosophy that engages with reality. Empirics become an affirmation of life. The identity of the individual should not be crystallised but debunked. People should do without a subjectivity rooted in knowledge.

The issue then, concerns not merely decomposing (i.e. nihilism) or constructing knowledge (i.e. will to knowledge), but accepting the opening of Pandora’s box. It is about accepting it as a means of engaging in an ‘ocean of information’ in order not to denounce life (i.e. will to life). However, the aim behind such engagement is to eventually reduce this information to the bare essentials that one needs to know in order to ‘invent’ or ‘produce’ his own path to truth or ‘invent’, in a sense, truth (i.e. will to truth). Such ‘will to truth’ becomes both an ongoing self-realisation of truth and also a breaking of doctrinal walls that have marginalised ancient forms of wisdom, balancing Foucault’s embracing of enlightenment as this ongoing self-realisation with his later account of antiquity as a source of inspiration in regard to valid attempts to live truthfully (see next sub-section).

The ‘will to truth’ also clarifies both the role of the allegedly unsubstantiated empirics and the overarching and, at the same time, seemingly ‘reductive’ character of genealogy and philosophy as concept formation. For, the will to understand becomes a ‘will to truth’ (see Foucault, 1977:163-164). This ‘will to truth’, in contrast to what those who support a ‘will to knowledge’ would suggest, escapes the pessimism of the likes of Rorty and Baudrillard, since it ties contingency to an affirmation of life. In effect, it derives from engaging in empirics in order to play the ‘game of truth’ rather than an exit from the ‘game’ on the basis of the abstract acknowledgment that everything can be true. ‘Inventing’ or ‘producing’ yourself is not tied to an ‘anything goes’ mentality. Deleuze’s ‘body without organs’ lives on after all (the body remains alive) and ‘the nomads’ should still seek something. Even Latour argued something similar. By removing the fear of the chaos, he suggested, one is forced to dive into the real due to one’s thirst to navigate the unknown itself (see Osborne, 1998: 60, 64). Foucault talks about rethinking our destiny with dignity and clarity (see Osborne, 1998:135).

The above outlines the background of concept formation. The concept, in contrast to a postmodernist view (see Osborne, 1998:184), still has some restricting value. Yet, the aesthetics of existence as they appear in the later Foucault suggest that a concept is indeterminate (see Osborne, 1998:103-104). Philosophical concepts do not deal with the issue of generating knowledge; rather, they focus on interacting with emerging phenomena.

The neo-Kantianism of concept formation is celebrated by contemporary social theory readers of both Foucault and Deleuze. The apparatus (dispositif) also points towards how concepts
can formulate a network of heterogeneous elements. It is here that these contemporary scholars celebrate philosophy as fieldwork:

that is to say, by a meticulous investigation of particular practices, technologies, sites where power was articulated on bodies, where knowledge of human individuals became possible, and where souls were produced, reformed, and even, sometimes ‘liberated’. In inventing the tools and the insights that made these relations visible, the very words themselves which are now so familiar – truth, knowledge, power, technology, discourse, practice – were given a new sense and made to do conceptual work that they had not done – that had not been done – before. And in anatomising the detailed ways of thinking and acting that made up our present, and constituted ourselves in that present, Foucault asked us to consider the possibility that we might invent different ways of thinking about and acting on ourselves in relation to our pleasures, our labors, our troubles and those who trouble us, our hopes and aspirations for freedom (Rabinow & Rose, 2003:3-4).

Osborne (see 1998:35-36) connects philosophical anthropology concerned with the plasticity of man to a Kantian pragmatic anthropology focussed on dealing with what the subject should do with this plasticity. Social theory becomes a utopian anthropology rooted in the notion that human nature should not be defined in a manner that ends the game of different realisations of truth. The Kantian critique forwards an obligation to formulate an ethos that is not guided by existing contingent moral codes, but comes from within to the extent that choice becomes something like an ethics of conviction (see Osborne, 1998:129). It is in this context, that one can grasp the double value of Foucault as an ethical thinker with political implications in the sense of both highlighting dominating ways of governing ourselves and others and a way for evaluating the grounds on which one can escape from such domination.

In this context, Owen (1994), Osborne (1998), and Nicholas Gane (2002, 2012) all have something to say about the connection between Weber and Foucault in terms of genealogy and concept formation. It can be argued that Weber’s analysis, as it appears in his sociology of religion, offers a form of genealogy, since his hermeneutics seem to use history in order to rethink the certainties of our present.

Foucault, though, also wants to make this ethos something more explicitly active. He wants to ‘fill’ freedom with creativity against totalising projects:

I shall thus characterize the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings (Foucault, 1997:316).

Thus, enlightenment is this game of competing views on truth that suggests a direct experience of living with an aesthetic quality. This genealogical critique does not establish its concepts via new
forms of expertise; new legal frameworks; alternative charismatic authorities; or veridical knowledge for authority. It establishes them via a transfiguration of values on the basis of illuminating all sort of contradictions lying within our beliefs or between our beliefs and the way that we are governed (see Rose, 1998:282).

As Gutting puts it, Foucault ultimately presented his intellectual enterprise as a self-critical continuation of the Enlightenment project of seeking autonomy through reason. Like Kant, he accepts reason as the key to freedom and autonomy. But, in characteristic postmodern fashion, he also sees the ways in which reason itself can tyrannize rather than liberate and sets himself the task of employing reason to overcome its own destructive tendencies (1989:262).

Rose himself connects his understanding to Osborne’s emphasis on what Foucault’s aesthetic politics are. They are not politics of aesthetics tied to a certain morality. They are not a manifestation of the bourgeoisie art as an autonomous sphere of irrationality that stands against fixed understanding of certain rationality for the sake of a mystical new. They do not link the action in the present to an ‘endist’ teleological modification of the new in the name of an ideal future to come. These aesthetics envision a volatile future rooted in the impermanent nature of humans as a will to life (see Rose, 1999:283).

Rose acknowledges that such aesthetics are themselves a form of governance that ipso facto entails a political vitalism and an opposition to everything that opposes such an active art of living (see Rose, 1999:283). His argument here resolves the paradox of celebrating differences that are bound to exclude any difference, a paradox that can be found in both postmodernism and the multicultural cosmopolitans. The paradox of cosmopolitanism is the multiculturalism of assimilation. The paradox of postmodernism as an umbrella of contingency is that it sanctions discourses that, themselves, might have zero tolerance for contingency. Yet, this sort of governmentality critique that is rooted in such aesthetic ethics; rather than legislating a forthcoming future, it attempts to envision what it takes for a certain desirable future to emerge as a will to life (see Rose, 1999:283).

In this context, by learning the processes of ‘coding’ we position ourselves outside from the matrices of an imposed disenchantment or a false enchantment. This drive to escape something is again a self-imposing truth, but it strives to be exactly that, namely self-imposed and always in motion rather than in need of mediations; for if external mediations do exist, truth is rather bound to remain still. It is in this context that an ethos of responsibility for a self-explanatory and purely original creativity should be understood (see also Osborne, 1998:119). Moreover, it is here that intuitive and reflective forces and qualities strike a balance with active, initiating and analytic ones, while staying away from both passive nihilism and aggressive polemics or dogmatism. This
balance is aptly summarised by Foucault: ‘So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper and pessimistic activism’ (Foucault, 1997:256).

Hence, the use of the word ‘art’ suggests an analogy that aims to highlight a certain self-governance rooted in a quest for ‘the other’. This art should not be *ipso facto* related to art or the aesthetic sphere as defined in layman’s terms (see also Osborne, 1998:123). This recognition circles back to the issue of freedom, as freedom has to be produced as a conviction (i.e., Weber) or a work of art (i.e., Foucault) by the individual. In this context, there is a suggestion for emancipatory governance of the self. The philosophers, when they engage in a critique of enlightenment, become the ones who enable this possibility by taking care of themselves and others. Therefore, the governance of the self leads to an orientation of how the others also have to govern themselves thereby governing the freedom of others does not lead to states of domination. This role is further detailed in the discussion of parrhesia below.

Overall, I have continued here to contemplate aspects of enlightenment concerning the problematisation of enlightenment, which is in turn linked to the broader problematisation of freedom and governance. As a result, I have linked philosophy, politics, and art to these different aspects of enlightenment, while highlighting their connections to Foucault. Hence, I have further characterised a Foucauldian ethos.
Establishing the hypothesis

Parrhesia, ethics and self-governance

This section focusses on how a Foucauldian ethical perspective is directly linked to the formation of a certain concept (i.e., parrhesia) via the use of genealogy. Hence, it becomes clearer how genealogy as a methodology works in Foucault, and I evidence the grounds on which Foucault has put forward a genealogy of ethics. Such a genealogy tracks two strands of ethics that can give us an account of contemporary power relations and emerging ‘structures of domination’.

Therefore, I have avoided parrhesia in the discussion of enlightenment above, in contrast to Osborne (1998), in favour of a more systematic treatment of the concept. Foucault in a sense makes a shift from an aesthetic ethos of enlightenment to the type of philosophy that is tied to ‘aesthetics of existence’. Foucault’s essay on enlightenment obviously reflects a philosophical ethos related to a certain vision of enlightenment. By this time, Foucault’s re-appropriation of Nietzsche is already evident. Foucault, does the same with Kant. Still, there was no systematic attempt to outline a new ethics, aside from sporadic and suggestive essays and interviews. The critique of enlightenment is something very ethereal and deliberately independent from arguments on what else enlightenment has meant in practice, but if we turn our attention to Foucault’s last lectures focussing on a genealogy of ethics in relation to philosophy, we find a more nuanced substantiation of both a critique of the present and a description of the past that led to this present.

Hence, it is useful to focus on a genealogy of parrhesia. Very schematically, ‘parrhesia’ has its origins in ancient Greece, and it refers to the courage of telling the truth to yourself and others as a means of taking care of both the self and the other. A genealogy of parrhesia highlights that the relationship between self-care, politics and philosophy is a permanent one in the West. This account is not at all in the sense of a direct involvement in politics in relation to the governance of the ‘polis’, the state or the institution, per se. The definition philosophy in regard to that of enlightenment, nevertheless, reflects the ancient Greek struggles of philosophy in relation to practicing the truth by taking care of the self and others.

Foucault does not position parrhesia outside power relations, as those are directly linked to freedom. The philosopher remains a subject of his society and an individual in his quest for truth rather than a pure ascetic scientist. As such, as discussed above, Foucault shares something with Weber. But, Foucault does not quite accept the objectivism of science as a vocation. In Rose’s words, what unifies us in the critical quest is not the various contested beliefs of human nature, but that we are all governable subjects governed in the name of such beliefs (1999:284). Therefore, the critique is based on the grounds ‘that nothing is bad, but everything can be dangerous’ (Foucault, 1997: 256) if not analysed at the embryonic stage of its formation. This conceit is related to the
‘game of truth’ and to Foucault’s critical ethos of enlightenment, itself informed by his discussion of ancient Greece.

Of course, as becomes evident through his various interviews (see Foucault, 1997), Foucault is an admirer neither of the Greeks nor of antiquity. He does not believe in ‘alternatives’. Seeking alternatives might as well mean an acknowledgment that things are set in stone. He also detests ‘revitalisations’. One should not seek something fixed or ideal that has been lost, and that can be recaptured as such. The past is a way to put the present into perspective and perhaps to create something new from the old.

Therefore, Foucault in his critique might become one of the major ethical thinkers of modernity (see Rabinow, 1997: xxxvi). He favours a certain kind of therapeutic parrhesia as an art of living vis-à-vis another one that has structured Western philosophy around the transcendental. The therapeutic mode is central in Foucault’s philosophical enquiries in relation to his discussion of truth telling.

In response to the question of whether it is possible to have the problematisation of the care of the self at the centre of a new politics, Foucault welcomes this problematisation. It is this problematisation that the thesis wants to explicitly contemplate. What kind of theory of ethics has picked up this problematisation as a means of a new governance of the self and the other, and what kind of theory of ethics keeps the problematisation open?

To clarify, the thesis does not try to answer the question of whether a politics of the self is possible. The thesis attempts to indicate the power relations that operate around such a question. The aim is to indicate the grounds on which the politics of the self are emancipatory, in which case establishing a Foucauldian ethos is necessary, and the grounds on which the politics of the self becomes a form of governing the freedom of persons via technologies of the self, tied to structures of domination that facilitate such technologies. The latter is linked to the theories of Habermas, Beck and Giddens.

As I discuss in Part I, it is possible to grasp how the therapeutic care of the self has created the two different approaches of philosophy in the West. There is the Socrates in Plato’s ‘Alcibiades’, who is concerned with transcendental reason and care of the self for the sake of the ‘polis’. Caring for one’s own self here is constituent of knowing oneself. Then, there is the Socrates in Plato’s ‘Laches’, who points towards an art of living in which parrhesia appears as a way of telling the truth to the self and the other as a means of practicing a fully autonomous art of existence.

Hence, in ‘Laches’ one takes care of the self and ‘asks’ others to do the same:
When we compare the *Laches* and the *Alcibiades*, we have the starting point for two great lines of development of philosophical reflection and practice: on the one hand, philosophy as that which, by prompting and encouraging men to take care of themselves, leads them to the metaphysical reality of the soul, and, on the other, philosophy as a test of life, a test of existence, and the elaboration of a particular kind of form and modality of life (Foucault, 2011:127).

In this context, Foucault attempts to dissociate philosophy from the issue of the ‘polis’ and the discussion of the soul, since self-care in relation to one’s soul was always paired in both the Platonic and Christian themes. In addition, it is possible to substantiate contemporary notions on individualism around this idea that by taking care the ‘polis’ one also takes care of the self.

The decline of the ‘polis’ during the Hellenistic era that gives birth to the philosophy of the Cynics and the Stoics provides Foucault with the dissociation from the transcendental that he seeks. Parrhesia is not merely self-care aligned with an existing political apparatus. Foucault discusses extensively on what grounds the Cynics and the Stoics create an art of existence that can be acquired through ‘ascesis’ (practice). The importance in this kind of life is the absence of a concrete moral doctrine, and the existence of modes of practice:

In the analysis of the Cynic life I have pointed out the unconcealed life, the independent life, the straight life, and the sovereign life, master of itself. I have tried to show how by basing themselves on these themes and putting them to work, Cynic practice and the Cynic life consisted precisely in turning them round, to the point of making them scandalous (Foucault, 2011:251).

This is Foucault’s interpretation of the expression ‘parakharattein to nomisma’ (i.e. change the currency) in regard to bringing the Socrates of ‘Laches’ and ‘Phaedo’ into a hypertrophy. For the Cynic, scandal breaks free of any affiliation with transcendental knowledge, suggesting what self-care is and how one can exercise parrhesia on oneself and others radically, but not ignorantly or recklessly.

As Gutting (2011:142) suggests, Foucault in his discussion of antiquity introduces four modes of subjectification ‘that characterize an individual’s relations to an ethical code’. These are: *ethical substance* concerned with the relation between aspects of life and ethical behaviour; the mode of subjection concerned with the ways that the ‘an individual is subject to the ethical code’; the forms of elaboration concerned with the ways that one accepts the ethical code; and the telos as the ultimate goal that guides the whole process.

Gutting claims that Foucault finds here a possibility for emancipation:
Like moral codes themselves, the modes of subjectification that relate individuals to their societies’ codes are not the free creation of individuals. But, in contrast to the code, a given mode of subjectification allows a significant range of choice for some individuals. A particular mode will typically offer alternatives (e.g., celibate vs married life) for its implementation and any alternative will be underdetermined as to its specific form (e.g., active vs contemplative religious orders). This allows for individual choice in self-formation, based, for example, on personal standards of aesthetic value, corresponding to what Foucault calls an aesthetics of existence (Gutting, 2011:143).

By this token, the ascetic ethical limitations for ‘producing’ ourselves beyond subjectivity become clearer in the Foucault of parrhesia. Foucault (2011) does go through the possible faults of the Cynic and the Stoic practice, but it is the ‘ethos’ (way of living) in relation to a value-free ‘ascesis’ that he cares for. Hence, it is in the Cynics and early Stoics that Foucault finds ‘the other life’ as something that is neither the life that the average citizen lives nor the afterlife. Again, his later discussion on ‘other spaces’ (heterotopias) is rather related to this ‘other life’:

This blaze of the naturalness which scandalizes, which transforms into scandal the non-concealment of existence limited by traditional propriety, manifests itself in the famous Cynic behavior...As a result, the philosophical life appears as radically other than all other forms of life (Foucault, 2011: 254-5).

It is in this otherness that the artistic life is praised, and Foucault praises this acceptance of otherness that art also embraces. The artist is the one who lives ‘the other life’. So, it is the life of the artist and not the artistic product that is praised. However, the ‘other life’, although it has been embraced by art, it is not an invention of art. Hence, we need not be artists to access it. Foucault searches for an ‘art of living’ accessible to anyone tied to a certain philosophical practice.

As Veyne, puts it

The affinity between Foucault and ancient morality is based on a single detail: the work of the self upon the self, or a 'style'. Here, 'style' does not mean distinction or dandyism. 'Style' takes on the meaning that the word held for the Greeks, for whom an artist was first and foremost an artisan or craftsman. The idea of a style of existence, and therefore of the self working on the self, played a key role in the conversations and, no doubt, the inner life of Foucault, in the last months of a life that only he knew was threatened. The human subject, taking himself as the oeuvre upon which to work, gave himself a morality that was no longer upheld by God or tradition or reason (2010:106-107).
In this context, according to Gros, parrhesia in Foucault is used as a means of highlighting two approaches to philosophy:

With Kant it was a matter of distinguishing two domains of research: defining either the formal conditions of truth or the conditions of the governmentality of men. This time it will be a question of contrasting, on the one hand, a spiritual task which is fulfilled in a *logos*, in the formation of a system of knowledge with, on the other, a different task embodied in the effectiveness of concrete existence and ascesis. One gets the impression in fact that in 1984 Foucault put in the balance philosophy as discursive domain, as constituted knowledge, and philosophy as test and attitude, rather than two possible types of study (transcendental or historical-critical) (Gros in Foucault, 2011:350).

The Foucault of the 80s then describes how philosophy as test and attitude has almost disappeared from the West, while philosophy as constituted knowledge has been gradually re-appropriated by Christian pastoral power (see Part I). Here, one can gradually find the Foucault of the governmentality lectures. But, this Foucault continues focussing on tracing the ancient Greek philosophical practices and their account of reason in the West. In this way, the concern with how govern the freedom of others is linked to the problematisation of how to govern the self.

Foucault (see 1997:264, 266, 267, 268) suggests how the turn of the late Stoics to universality through reason solidifies what Western philosophy could address within the interaction between Neoplatonism and Christianity. It is the quest for the transcendental truth through reason.

This quest has been possible only to the extent that this kind of philosophy as well has not been dominated by the processes of Reformation and Counter-Reformation and the rise of Cartesian philosophy, empiricism, utilitarianism and physiocratism, in which reason has been linked to evidence (see Part I). For this connection represented the end of philosophy and the rise of science. The progressive disappearance of a religious framework led to a competition between science and the juridical (see Foucault, 1997:267), leading back to previous discussion of science and the disciplines. This transition is obviously captured by governmentality studies.

However, my concern here is what constitutes governmentality now and what constitutes a governmentality critique. As I mentioned, the Cynics and the Stoics emerged in an era in which the ‘polis’ was in decline. One cannot quite argue that the Foucauldian ethics of critique, postmodernism in general and various anti-globalisation movements merely reflect the decline of the state. For Foucault’s definition of modernity as a perpetual movement and liberalism as an ongoing reflection on governance not really related to the state suggests that any transformation of modernity is inherent in modernity. As for the state, it has been always sort of ‘irrelevant’ in liberalism (see Part I). Still, within this transformative process, the further decline of the state and
the revolution in communication technologies have undoubtedly played a role in how the problematisation of freedom in regard to modernity or enlightenment is posed. In other words, along with the problematisation of what modernity should be, another problematisation has been gradually tied to it, which is what globalisation should be. And, both these problematisations are tied to the more fundamental issue of how to govern the freedom of others and how to govern the self.

By this token, there is now a class between the ethics of critique and new ethics of governance with a global dimension (i.e., ethopolitics). The contrast between these two set of ethics is obvious in Foucault (see Part I). I have already discussed his preference for a certain kind of truth-telling that is dissociated from the concerns of the ‘polis’ and the quest for the transcendental truth which links reason with the universals of a permanent soul and its metaphysical plane.

It is for this reason that, in his various interviews and monographs (see Foucault, 1997), Foucault, has clearly stated that he opposes Sartre’s ideal subjectivity; Habermas’s utopia of a communication place outside of relations of power; any forms of humanism on the basis of crafting ‘projects of man’; and the way that ecological movements re-appropriate scientific absolutism. Those are all programs of certain type of humanism (see before).

As Foucault put it, in terms of the supra-historical perspective, if there is a belief in eternal truth, the immortality of the soul, or the nature of consciousness as always identical to the self, then a certain theme of philosophy, with its quest for the transcendent truth that in turn becomes knowledge, is the one that is in play.

This understanding of Foucault can be linked, of course, to a dangerous form of revolutionary spirit that can easily add to the fragility of any conquest. If people want simply to rebel against something, then soon after the moment that something novel rises, it can become a new target of critique. For example, at some point the enchanted societies believed in energies, spirits, etc. If one had a problem this could be an energetic or spiritual imbalance. Gradually, via the processes of instrumental rationalisation comes the new and profound premise of a ‘chemical imbalance’. For, a while a certain account of rationalisation dominates that makes people perceive the ‘chemical imbalance’ premise as the revolutionary power of reason against metaphysical mythologies. Progressively with the evolution of the governmentality of instrumental rationality and/or the rise of a new form of governmentality, which this thesis traces, this rationalism that asserts the premise now mutates into one that attacks the dogmatism of the premise which is perceived as limited, systemic and dogmatic. ‘Chemical imbalance’ via the critique posed by Foucault and various postmodernist, leftist and even oriental discourses tied to the anti-psychiatric movement became itself something that needs to be questioned. More profoundly, homosexuality existed in ancient Greece within a certain value system, while it has re-emerged in the present...
within a quite different one. But, it can always be marginalised again. Similarly, any type of conquest can be re-appropriated within the options of freedom offered or it can be marginalised.

Therefore, we come to the Foucault of the ‘problematisation’. This Foucault also had to believe even more than before that power games can be open-ended. But, this Foucault that links problematisation to parrhesia is rather one who wishes to orientate. If Foucault was always raising the question ‘Is it any safer to believe in human rights than it was to believe in the god Jupiter?’, given his late shift, he would want in the era that human rights attempt to be as universal as god to work towards highlighting their contingency. At the same time, he would want to move beyond such certainties not only via incoherent anti-modern and/or post-modern inventions, but through his provision of a certain orientation.

For, in the moral philosophies of reason (e.g., Habermas) (see Part II), there is a definite quest for an eternal truth (i.e., cognitive ethics). Their particular concern resembles what we find in ‘Alcibiades’. The self-cultivation on the basis of finding ‘the original bond of the immortal psukhe—and transcendent truth’ (Gros in Foucault, 2011:350) in relation to the issue of governing the “polis”.

Similarly, reflexive sociology links its new politics (see Part III) to a utopian realism. It attempts to envision a critical ethos of enlightenment tied to subjectivity. This attempt is made on the basis that subjectivity, as such, is not an aspect of the ‘structures of domination’. Hence, subjectivity cannot become a vehicle of re-appropriation of the already weakened politico-juridical matrices and the capitalism that such matrices regulate. Here, it is rather hard to distinguish where the descriptive estimation of what constitutes reality ends and the utopian analysis of the concepts that actually constitute reality in a certain manner begins.

In actuality, in reflexive sociology we are dealing with a more reflexive attitude towards envisioning the transcendent truth. A connection can be made with the ethics of truth that Foucault describes in ‘Alcibiades’ in the sense of the emphasis on the ‘polis’. The ‘polis’, due to the emergence of the problematisation of globalisation, is now understood and put forward as a deterritorial crisscross of communities that form the global civil society (i.e. cosmo-‘polis’).

Such a reflexivity also has ties to Platonic pastoral power. In Foucault, Platonic pastoral power is separated from the Christian pastoral power (see Chapter 2). The latter is linked to a dominatory relationship between the shepherd and the flock. Platonic pastoral power is concerned with passing on ‘tekhnē’ (skills). By this token, Platonic pastoral power can be tied to reflexive engagement with transferable expertise, which is in turn linked to inwardly oriented conducts tied to a reflexive subjectivity.
Hence, it should be by now evident the way in which the project of defining modernity can be linked to the ethical concerns of the ancient world. The problematisation now concerns modernity and globalisation, but it is linked to the issue of how to govern the self and others. This connection is made on the basis of reintroducing ethics in philosophy and social theory whose novelty derives from a creative interaction with the ‘old’.

By this token, the intellectual sparring to define modernity, which has emerged with enlightenment and has yet to find its philosophical fulfilment (see Rabinow in Foucault, 1997: xxvi), comes back into the fore. On the one hand, there is a therapeutic ethos tied to universality, morality and politics that operates at the level of the technologies of the self (i.e., ethopolitics). On the other hand, there is the critical ethos tied to the ‘art of living’. This ethos is not concerned with structuring subjectivities. It, therefore, operates at the level of ‘technologies of living and existence’.

In conclusion, a new form of understanding present governmentality can emerge, tied to establishing the Foucauldian ethics of critique. This sub-section has worked towards presenting this clash of ethics that appears in antiquity and re-appears with the question of enlightenment. It allows one better to distinguish between forms of resistance and new forms of control with respect to the governance of the self and others.
Introduction to Chapter I

This first chapter attempts to set the context of a philosophical discussion tied to truth-telling and self-care. Such a discussion brings the ethical axis and the truth axis of genealogy together. The discussion revolves around two distinct accounts of parrhesia. These two accounts are tied to the development of two lines of philosophy in the West. The chapter focusses on the parallel interaction between these two lines as a means to set the conditions for using the one (i.e. ‘Laches’, Cynics) as a critical approach towards the other (i.e. ‘Alcibiades’, Neoplatonism).

At the same time, this foundational background of Western ethics, which includes a discussion of early Christianity, establishes the background of the interaction between power, knowledge and ethics in the West. The problematisation of self-care is at the centre of Foucault’s discussion of the ancient Greece and through that discussion the issue of how power is understood via the connection of truth to subjectivity tied to the ethical concern of self-care becomes clear.

This context enables the presentation, in the next chapter, of Foucault’s account of power relations focusing on the sense of the governance of others as only one of the aspects of Foucault’s account of the West. As stated before, Foucault chooses to focus on a genealogy of power primarily because he did not fully realise the importance of the problematisation of the self. At the same time, this can be justified as an analytic choice in the sense that the problematisation of the governance of the freedom of others is more prominent in the function of instrumental rationality. Foucault’s genealogical account of instrumental rationality leading to the conceptualisation of governmentality shifts the line of argumentation from pure theory to genealogical fictions that offer an explanation of how reality has been shaped through governmental reason. And, in the end, such a distinction between the governance of the self and the governance of others fades in Foucault’s discussion of neoliberalism.

Thus, the discussion put forward here allows the reader to understand how, with the rise of neoliberalism and its evolution through processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, the problematisation of the governance of the self re-emerges in connection with the conflict between these two different ethical positions. The foundations of this conflict, which are essential for putting forward a ‘governmentality critique’ of the present, are set here through the introduction of parrhesia and the modes of truth-telling of antiquity in section 1.1., and the subsequent connection to self-care in section 1.2..
1. The ancient background of the West

1.1. The archetypes of truth-telling

1.1.1. Four modes of truth-telling

Here, I aim to establish the theme of ‘parrhesia’. This theme is essential for the thesis since in Foucault it is rather progressively shaped as a concept that encompasses two important ethical discourses. I suggest that the interaction of these discourses can offer us a better understanding of contemporary relations of power.

Foucault attempts to distinguish between four different types of opinion-expression, each trying to envision truth. First, there is the prophet. The prophet vocalises a truth revealed to him. The truth of the claim is associated with a transcendental force that the person channels; the person is merely the vehicle that manifests the claim. Second, there is the sage, the person of wisdom. His truth is related to intense observation of both self and other. His truth is a mode of being. However, these strong observational skills lead to an understanding of the complexity of truth. As a result, the person becomes unwilling to communicate the ‘truth’ to others. Then, there is the technician or teacher, concerned with passing practical knowledge (i.e. knowing how) to the others on the basis of cultivating skills (tekhnē). Finally, there is the person who exercises parrhesia. This is the person that does not necessarily firmly believe that he possesses the truth but he makes it his goal to set the possibilities for obtaining some kind of ‘truth’ by living in a ‘truthful’ way.

In this context, the person who exercises parrhesia can be characterized as follows:

Rather, inasmuch as he takes the risk of provoking war with others, rather than solidifying the traditional bond, like the teacher, by [speaking] in his own name and perfectly clearly, [unlike the] prophet who speaks in the name of someone else, [inasmuch as] finally [he tells] the truth of what is in the singular form of individuals and situations, and not the truth of being and the nature of things, the parrhesiast brings into play the true discourse of what the Greeks called êthos. Fate has a modality of veridiction which is found in prophecy. Being has a modality of veridiction found in the sage. Tekhnē has a modality of veridiction found in the technician, the professor, the teacher, the expert. And finally, ethos has its veridiction in the speech of the parrhesiast and the game of parrhēsia (Foucault, 2011:25).
By this token, the game of parrhesia is the ‘game of truth’ tied to an engagement to life (i.e. the truth axis of genealogy). The parrhesiast has the individual responsibility to cultivate himself as his development is rooted in reflecting on experiences. There is no higher power that passes to him some sort of divine knowledge, as with the prophet. However, opposite the sage, the parrhesiast does not maintain the belief that his assumption about the complexity of truth can be so firm that he should merely take it for granted, thereby withdrawing from a continuous engagement with the social.

The fundamental principles of the ethics of taking care of the self as a means to take care of others emerge here. In other words, there is an oxymoronic attitude reflected in the ethical calling to enlighten others which is tied to a firmer belief in one’s own ‘ignorance’, as compared to the sage’s belief. Foucault clearly associates this ignorance with Socrates’ characteristic statement that he knows that he does not know (see Foucault, 2011:27). This acknowledgment of one’s own ignorance calls for sympathy in the face of the ignorance of others. It also calls for the need to interact with others as a means to navigate better one’s own ignorance. The parrhesiast has to interact with the social in order to test again and again his assumptions as a means to take care of the self (see the ethical axis of genealogy in introduction). By this token, his truth-telling (see the truth axis of genealogy in the introduction) has to strike the right balance between the silence of the sage and the ethical duty to challenge others by speaking (see Foucault, 2011:27). Therefore, he also takes care of others (i.e., ethics).

So, in this sub-section we have seen the core characteristics of parrhesia and of the person who exercises it. An associated introductory connection has also been made between self-care (i.e., the ethical axis of genealogy) and the courage of free-spokeness or else the courage of telling the truth (i.e., the truth axis of genealogy).
1.2. Parrhesia

1.2.1. Highlighting two types of parrhesia

The discussion above in regard to the emergence of a culture of the self tied to parrhesia will here undergo a genealogical unfolding tied to the ethical axis of genealogy. In other words, what is important in this thesis is how in Foucault’s effort to crystallise parrhesia, he highlighted two parallel trajectories of truth-telling and self-care with distinctive aims and characteristics. I propose to trace the nuances of this culture of the self, from Plato to Christianity, in order to trace the role of earlier ethical themes in the evolution of the ‘West’ as a system of knowledge. This premise works on a bigger scale of the genealogical unfolding of the thesis as the setting of a certain past which, in the subsequent parts of the thesis, will be used to contemplate the present.

First of all, Foucault establishes that in Plato it becomes obvious that *parrhēsía*, namely the courage of free-spokeness, is not really a notion that can flourish in a democracy. In the case of democracy, [on the other hand], the reason why *parrhēsía* was not welcomed or listened to, and why anyone who had the courage to employ *parrhēsía* was eliminated rather than honored, was precisely that the structure of democracy could not acknowledge or make room for ethical differentiation. The absence of a place for *êthos* in democracy means that truth has no place and cannot be heard in democracy. On the other hand, it is because the Prince’s *êthos* is the principle and matrix of his government that *parrhēsía* is possible, precious, and useful in the case of [autocratic] government (Foucault, 2011:64).

A shift takes place here, from the community itself to the individual and his soul, tied to this critique of democracy:

First thing: we move from the polis to the *psukhe* as the essential correlate of *parrhēsía*. Second...The objective of truth-telling is therefore less the city’s salvation than the individual’s *êthos*. Third, this double determination of the *psukhe* as correlate of truth-telling, and of *êthos* as the objective of parrhesiastic practice, means that *parrhēsía*, while being organized around the principle of truth-telling, now takes shape in a set of operations which enable veridiction to induce transformations in the soul (Foucault, 2011:64-5).

Foucault then sets the ancient background of the connection between knowledge, power, and ethics as also the role of subjectivity and truth in ethics as follows:

With these shifts and changes in *parrhēsía* we are confronted with basically three realities, or at any rate three poles: the pole of *alētheia* and truth-telling; the pole of *politeia* and
government; and finally the pole of what, in late Greek texts, is called *ethopoiesis* (the formation of *êthos* or of the subject). Conditions for and forms of truth-telling on the one hand; structures and rules of the *politeia* (that is to say, of the organization of relations of power) on the other; and finally, modalities of formation of the *êthos* in which the individual constitutes himself as moral subject of his conduct: these are the three poles which are both irreducible and irreducibly linked to each other. *Alêtheia, politeia, êthos*: the essential irreducibility of these three poles, their necessary and mutual relationship, and the structure of the reciprocal appeal of one to the other, has underpinned, I believe, the very existence of all philosophical discourse from Greece to the present (Foucault, 2011:66).

The fundamental issue that concerns us here is when and on what grounds we transition from truth to knowledge; from structures of governance to structures of domination; and from ethics to subjectivity. As Foucault puts it, ‘Connecting together modes of veridiction, techniques of governmentality, and practices of the self is basically what I have always been trying to do’ (Foucault, 2011:8).

In other words, Foucault suggests that in certain Platonic texts there is a shift to a culture of the self. In such culture, knowing ourselves in connection to taking care of ourselves becomes a priority. The question that arises is what is the end of such self-knowledge and self-care? There is the Socrates that appears in Plato’s texts ‘Phaedo’ and ‘Laches’, in which Foucault develops a set of ethics that does not present the death of Socrates as a mere sacrifice for the sake of the ‘polis’. The sacrifice is rather an act of faith in individual ethical conduct tied to the courage of free-spokeness. It is the courage of one willing to undermine the good will of others to hear one, by not holding back from attempting to speak truthfully. It is also the courage of one’s alignment with one’s own ethical conduct.

To elaborate, ‘Laches’ is pivotal in Foucault’s analysis of the ethics of truth (see Foucault, 2011:125). Foucault chooses to compare ‘Laches’ to ‘Alcibiades’ in order to highlight two different understandings of self-care and truth-seeking/truth-telling. In ‘Alcibiades’ the importance of education in relation to self-care is directly connected to the question of what should one take care of. The response is the soul (see Foucault, 2011:126). The concern with the soul and the divine suggests a permanent feature of the self. In this respect, ‘*epimeleia*’ (care of the self) becomes connected not to an apheretic ethos, but to morality. And the characteristics of the self become solidified in an account of subjectivity.

In ‘Laches’ on the other hand, Foucault suggests that the question of what one should take care of is never really raised. The theme that appears here is that of self-care *per se*. Young people should learn to take care of themselves. What taking care of oneself consists of is deliberately left
unclear (see Foucault, 2011:126). In this context, any concern for the soul slowly fades into the background. What replaces this concern is life (bios), which one should take care of rather than the soul (see Foucault, 2011:127).

Foucault projects this distinction in self-care onto two different modes of philosophy in the West:

When we compare the *Laches* and the *Alcibiades*, we have the starting point for two great lines of development of philosophical reflection and practice: on the one hand, philosophy as that which, by prompting and encouraging men to take care of themselves, leads them to the metaphysical reality of the soul, and, on the other, philosophy as a test of life, a test of existence, and the elaboration of a particular kind of form and modality of life. Of course, there is no incompatibility between these two themes of philosophy as test of life and philosophy as knowledge of the soul. However, although there is no incompatibility, and although in Plato, in particular, the two things are profoundly linked, I think nevertheless that we have here the starting point of two aspects, two profiles, as it were, of philosophical activity, of philosophical practice in the West. On the one hand, a philosophy whose dominant theme is knowledge of the soul and which from this knowledge produces an ontology of the self. And then, on the other hand, a philosophy as test of life, of *bios*, which is the ethical material and object of an art of oneself. These two major profiles of Platonic philosophy, of Greek philosophy, of Western philosophy, are fairly easily decipherable when we compare the dialogues of the *Laches* and the *Alcibiades* with each other (Foucault, 2011:127).

This thesis is concerned with the ethics of self-care of ‘Alcibiades’ in terms of a critical evaluation of such ethics as modes of power over the individual. Understanding the kind of truth-telling that manifests and the way that power operates in regard to ‘politeia’ is, again, an instrument that assist in the evaluation of self-care. This evaluation forms two distinct forms of ‘ethopoiesis’, and the preference to the one of these two forms is what justifies an overarching critique of the truth-telling, power relations and self-care of the other. By this token, a critique of ‘Alcibiades’ seems to emerge on the basis of the possibility of a different self-care focussing on ‘*bios*’ (life). Foucault traces the origin point of such trajectory in the theme of ‘*bios*’ that is pivotal in ‘Laches’, which he connects to the philosophical practice and activity of the Cynics (see Foucault, 2011:128). Once more, the care of the self is achieved in the Cynics by testing life rather than by knowing the soul (see Foucault, 2011:128).

In ‘Laches’, Stesilaus, an arms and combat teacher, is about to demonstrate his knowledge in front of others. Laches and Nicias as prominent and personally successful Athenians are invited by Lysimachus and Melesias (the other two characters of the dialogue) to observe the
demonstration (see Foucault, 2011: 130). The conditions of truth-telling are secured by the fact that they do not know that they are there to judge the teacher. The reason that they have been asked to give their judgment is on the basis that they have achieved personal greatness according to the standards of the city-state (i.e., polis).

Nicolas finds value in the lesson, while Laches attends to its inefficiencies. Foucault suggests that there is a political dispute going on in this dialogue in terms of what sort of education the youngsters should receive to achieve greatness in the ‘polis’. It is an issue of whether what a teacher has to teach has value if he cannot show the benefits of his teachings in his own life. Laches rather points towards that latter issue as well, but it is Socrates who clearly shifts the discussion to the issue of tekhnē. It is an issue of the conditions under which knowledge can be passed on.

Foucault, of course, is not concerned with tekhnē. He is concerned with how Socrates exercises parrhesia in order to set the proper conditions of evaluation that can, in turn, give an account of the quality of the teacher (see Foucault, 2011:127-138). By this token, the scene presents neither a political issue nor an issue of tekhnē per se, but an issue of identifying the proper conditions to search for any given truth as a means to take care of one’s life. To see the importance of this issue, one can simply bear in mind the common saying: ‘give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime’.

By this token, we find here this game of parrhesia and ethics (see Foucault, 2011:138) or else the ‘game of truth’. In this game, one speaks freely and another agrees not to take any offense. More importantly, the parrhesiast—in this case Socrates—has the right to apply pressure until the other person is able to explain herself (see Foucault, 2011: 144). This explanation is not concerned with qualifications or declarations but with a way of living.

Socrates tests the rationality of the opposing argument by exploring whether the acts of a person demonstrate the opinions that person vocalises (see Foucault, 2011:144). For, if such thing does not occur, then the person is not only a hypocrite, but also ignorant or irrational. In other words, one’s own account of truth can be questioned on the basis that one has failed to live by this truth, and thereby such a way of living might as well be false or impossible.

Mode of life, then, is the object of parrhesia (see Foucault, 2011: 145). Hence, since the parrhesiastic test concerns one’s own life, it is something should be applied at any stage of one’s own life rather than only when one is young (see Foucault, 2011:146). Therefore, as Foucault makes clear, the verdiction of parrhesia exceeds by far the technical knowledge that the technician teaches (see Foucault, 2011:146).
Finally, the last concern is what makes it appropriate for a certain person to exercise parrhesia. In other words, why is Socrates authorised to exercise parrhesia, namely to speak freely in order to test his life in relation to his own beliefs? Foucault suggests that the answer is given by Laches. Laches praises Socrates for his courage. However, Foucault stresses that Laches does not merely point towards the courage that Socrates has shown in battle. Foucault suggests that the dialogue indicates that Laches talks about the courage and virtue that derive from aligning one’s discourse with one’s life (bios) (see Foucault, 2011:148).

Having made the above points, Foucault concludes:

This passage is rather important and significant precisely for two things in which I am interested this year. First, the link between epimeleia (care) and a certain modality of Socratic discourse. Socratic discourse is a discourse which can deal with men’s care for themselves inasmuch as Socratic parrhēsia is precisely a discourse joined to and ordered by the principle ‘attend to yourself.’ When men are taking care of themselves and their children, Socrates is basically the true expert. Neither the political nor the technical form can answer to this fundamental need and care. Only Socratic concern, application, zeal, epimeleia is able to answer to the care of men. [Second], what will Socratic parrhēsia speak about? It will not speak of competence; it will not speak of tekhnē. It will speak of something else: of the mode of existence, the mode of life. The mode of life appears as the essential, fundamental correlative of the practice of truth-telling’ (Foucault, 2011:148-149).

Hence, self-care is tied to the notion of self-knowledge, which in turn makes truth-telling an aspect of self-care. Foucault further explains that everyone has failed to define courage (see Foucault, 2011:149-153). However, Socrates was the one who set the conditions which reveal that no one—including himself—was in a position to provide such definition. As such, Socrates was entrusted by Lysimachus the role of teacher to his children. Nevertheless, this role of the teacher does not involve passing tekhnē, but rather teaching epimeleia. Socrates was the one who indicated the necessity for all, including himself, to turn again and again to ‘logos’ in order to take care of the self and the others. Therefore, Socrates was the one who could teach to the children that mindset which would allow them to take care of themselves by being in touch with ‘logos’.

So far, it has been established that the importance of life (bios) is the measure for one’s own values, so self-care as epimeleia becomes pivotal. A first distinction can be made here between taking care of the self as a means to take care of others and taking of others as a means to take care of the self.

Therefore, here we are dealing with a particular self-care that is not quite concerned with others. Socrates suggests that we should take care of ourselves and take care of others. This ethical
parrhesia that Foucault distinguishes from the political in its ‘form, objectives, domain of application, and its procedures’ is useful for the ‘polis’, but its primary concern is the individual (see Foucault, 2011:157).

Foucault emphasises in ‘Laches’ that this self-care is tied to the ‘bios’ (life) rather than the ‘psukhe’ (soul) as it is the case in ‘Alcibiades’. From that, as I mentioned before, he traces the origins of two distinct approaches of philosophy in the West.

Foucault’s words,

So, in one case we have a mode of giving an account of oneself which leads to the psukhe—and which, in doing this, marks out the site of a possible metaphysical discourse. In the other case, we have a giving an account of oneself, an ‘accounting for oneself,’ which is directed towards bios as existence, towards [a] mode of existence which is to be examined and tested throughout its life…In this comparison of the Alcibiades and the Laches we have the point of departure of the two great lines of development of Socratic veridiction in Western philosophy. From this first, fundamental, and common theme of didonai logon (giving an account of oneself), a [first] line will go to the being of the soul (the Alcibiades), and the other two forms of existence (the Laches). One goes towards the metaphysics of the soul (Alcibiades), the other towards a stylistics of existence (Laches). And this famous ‘accounting for self’ which constitutes the objective stubbornly pursued by Socratic parrhēsia —and here is its fundamental ambiguity, which will leave its mark in the entire history of our thought—may be and has been understood as the task of having to discover and tell of the soul’s being, or as the task and work which consists in giving some kind of style to existence. I think this duality of ‘being of the soul’ and ‘style of existence’ signals something important for Western philosophy (Foucault, 2011:161).

Foucault, of course, recognises that the theme of ‘stylistics of existence’ existed in various archaic texts, as for example in Homer. Therefore, Foucault wants to explicitly point out via ‘Laches’ the connection between these ‘stylistics of existence’ and self-care (see Foucault, 2011:163). This connection becomes clearer in Foucault’s account of the Cynics. The fact that epimeleia is concerned with ‘basanos’ (a form of pain) points towards the connection between asceticism, self-care, and truth-telling that Foucault contemplates via the Cynics, the Stoics and early Christianity.

In other words, the point that Foucault attempts to make starting with ‘Laches’, and before he moves his focus to the Cynics, is not that the theme of the ‘stylistics of existence’ is something utterly distinct from several beliefs structured around the metaphysical. It is that it is possible despite the fact that the ‘stylistics of existence’ do change in relation to metaphysics, to also claim a
certain autonomy. Foucault here traces the possibility of structuring a way of living separate from the metaphysical which will, at the same time, maintain a basic core structure. For one, he mentions how the Stoics existed in both a polytheist and a monotheist Roman empire, an example of how a certain core of ethics could exist relatively independently from any specific metaphysical discourse (see Foucault, 2011:165). With regard to the Cynics, Foucault suggests that there is a more explicit connection between living in a certain way and telling the truth which, more importantly, reveals a minimum doctrinal affiliation (see Foucault, 2011:165).

As a matter of fact, parrhesia as free-spokeness plays a major role in Cynicism (see Foucault, 2011:166). Foucault mentions Diogenes Laertius as the one who linked beautiful existence to the ability to exercise parrhesia (see Foucault, 2011:166). He also refers to Epictetus’s account of the Cynics, where the Cynic is the scout (kataskopos) sent in advance of the rest of humanity to determine what might be harmful for all (see Foucault, 2011:167). Furthermore, the Cynics can never remain silent, as they are the advocates of parrhesia (see Foucault, 2011:169).

What is more, this lack of a specific theoretical framework is contrasted with Platonism, Stoicism and Epicureanism, and it is particularly important to understand the core rationale behind Foucaudian ethics and their connection to a certain truth-telling:

This connecting up of truth-telling and mode of life, this fundamental, essential connection in Cynicism between living in a certain way and dedicating oneself to telling the truth is all the more noteworthy for taking place immediately as it were, without doctrinal mediation, or at any rate within a fairly rudimentary theoretical framework. Here again we must be clear. I am presently giving you a simple overview, a simple indication of problems. There is, in fact, a theoretical framework, but it is clear that this framework is infinitely less important, less developed, and less essential in Cynic practice than it may be in Platonism, of course, or even in Stoicism or Epicureanism (see Foucault, 2011:165).

Moreover, despite the lack of a concrete doctrinal affiliation, Cynicism is much more precise than the ethics described in ‘Laches’. It is here that Foucault wishes to place emphasis. In ‘Laches’, the notion of living in accordance with your words as an indication of virtues of ‘courage, wisdom, and temperance’ is introduced. In Cynics, Foucault suggests that there is a more explicit mode of life which they found necessary for those wishing to exercise parrhesia. It is the mode of the outcast which has an instrumental value for exercising parrhesia (see Foucault, 2011:170). In contrast to ‘Alcibiades’, not only is self-care not tied to defining the soul, but life is reduced to living as do the Cynics (see Foucault, 2011:171). Hence, a harmony between one’s own words and actions is not enough. In Cynicism, a certain mode of existence is directly linked to truth-telling (see Foucault, 2011:172).
Or as Gros puts it in his evaluation of Foucault’s *The Courage of Truth* lectures,

Like the Platonists trying to discern the essential knowledge through the thick fog of received opinions, the Cynics track down the elementary in the undergrowth of conventions and social artifice: that which absolutely resists in the concreteness of existence (Gros, 2011:352).

From the above one can begin deriving a Foucaudian ethos. Foucault clearly finds value in the contingency of ‘Laches’ in the sense that any mode of life could be valuable as long as one was true to it. However, he instead attempts to extract from the Cynics a certain set of ascetic practices which could promote a certain style of life as more suitable for those who wish to play ‘the game(s) of truth’.

One might get confused about how such a rudimentary set of ethics as that of the Cynics can align with an explicit mode of conduct. In other words, on what grounds is there something of further value in Cynics than in ‘Laches’?

Foucault gives the example of Gregory the Nazianzus, a Christian who praised the provocative attitude towards God displayed by Cynicism exactly because he was able to find value in the Cynic’s way of doing things:

‘After having thus defined or characterized this Christian ascetic as a philosophical hero, a true Cynic who, independently of all Cynicism’s false beliefs or false disbeliefs, has taken up its most important and valuable core, namely its frugality and mode of life, Gregory of Nazianzus continues, now addressing Maximus directly: I liken you to a dog (the comparison with the dog obviously refers to that part of true Cynicism for which Gregory praises Maximus) not because you are impudent, but because of your frankness (parrhesia); not because you are greedy, but because you live openly; not because you bark, but because you mount guard over souls for their salvation. A bit further on he adds: You are the best and most perfect philosopher, the martyr, the witness of the truth (*marturōn* *tes* *aletheias*). Here, of course, *marturōn* ([from the verb] marturein) does not designate martyr in the sense we usually give to the word. Bearing witness to the truth is the sense here. But you can see that in Gregory’s mouth, it is not a question of just the verbal testimony of someone who speaks the truth. It involves someone who, in his very life, his dog’s life, from the moment of embracing asceticism until the present, in his body, his life, his acts, his frugality, his renunciations, and his ascesis, has never ceased being the living witness of the truth. He has suffered, endured, and deprived himself so that the truth takes shape in his own life, as it were, in his own existence, his own body’ (Foucault, 2011:173).
This explanation makes explicit how a style of existence can co-exist with different metaphysical doctrines, and Foucault suggests that there is in the Cynics a certain mode of truth-telling that, although not a dominant discourse in a particular shape and form, has been an important historical category in the West (see Foucault, 2011:174).

Foucault devotes much time to outlining the connection between Cynic and Christian asceticism in regard to living in truth. He also points towards the connection of Cynic asceticism with various spiritual movements of the Middle Ages (see Foucault, 2011:180-182), suggesting too that such Christian Cynicism managed to maintain its presence through all the processes of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation which, as becomes evident Chapter 2, gave birth to a particular kind of rationalisation (see Foucault, 2011:183).

So, even though Foucault suggests that that kind of Cynic parrhesia is the one type of truth-telling that has been considerably marginalised in the West, it does exist to some extent in several of the principles of science as enquiry into the very possibilities of truth (see Foucault, 2011:28-29). Foucault rather pinpoints the science that does not fall into the traps of the empiricist and, in many ways, fundamentalist account of science (see Foucault, 2011:30).

This ‘scientific enlightenment’ is not enough, however, in terms of individual self-care. As noted in the introduction, the humility of a black-boxed scientific knowledge cannot replace personal ascesis. Science remains mono-dimensional in its qualities. Its concern with knowing oneself does not quite meet the care for oneself (see also Chapter 2). Scientific truth-telling, when not connected to instrumentally rational technologies of domination, is rooted in technologies of the self tied to the internalisation of expert knowledge. Hence, in the ethics of science truth becomes knowledge that leads to subjectivity.

So, scientific curiosity is not in our day the main source of liberation from imposed limitations. Foucault connects this survival of Cynicism to the subsequent rise of the revolutionary life connected to a militancy concerned with the revolutionary spirit of breaking free from social habits and conventions (see Foucault, 2011:184). That spirit, it is suggested, also characterises modern art, or at least art in its tactical use (see Foucault, 2011:189).

In other words, Foucault stresses the fact that Cynicism is a rudimentary doctrine working more as a way of being. In effect, the Cynical philosophical approach emerges with the decline of the ancient Greek ‘polis’; Cynic individualism has been perceived in some ways as a reaction to the decline of the social structures of antiquity (see Foucault, 2011:180). Therefore, once more it becomes obvious that Foucault is concerned with a rudimentary doctrine that focusses on self-care, not a doctrine structured around care for the polis.
Foucault is careful, however, to set the proper conditions for perceiving this Cynical individualism:

By basing the analysis of Cynicism on this theme of individualism, however, we are in danger of missing what from my point of view is one [of its] fundamental dimensions, that is to say, the problem, which is at the core of Cynicism, of establishing a relationship between forms of existence and manifestation of the truth. It seems to me that it is the form of existence as living scandal of the truth that is at the heart of Cynicism, at least as much as the famous individualism we are in the habit of finding so frequently with regard to everything and anything (Foucault, 2011:180).

Foucault thus reiterates the importance of connecting a mode of existence with the scandal of searching for the truth.

In other words, Cynicism is a purposely ‘poor’ doctrine for accessibility and individual training. ‘In fact’, writes Foucault,

for the Cynics, the function of philosophical teaching was not essentially to pass on knowledge but, especially and before all else, to give both an intellectual and moral training to the individuals one formed. It was a matter of arming them for life so that they were thus able to confront events (Foucault, 2011:204).

In a rather Buddhist fashion, I would add, the Cynics offer according to Foucault a shortcut to virtue, as they try not to be concerned with complicated issues such as the origins of things (see Buddhism). Hence, the Cynics tried to ‘build’ wisdom on the basis of what could easily be observed around them. One, of course, could point out that science has exactly managed to make common knowledge a variety of things that once were inaccessible via observation. However, in defence of the Cynics and in favour of what Foucault draws out in studying them, one could suggest that much of this scientific information remains worthless in regard to how one should live one’s life. As a matter of fact, it becomes apparent via Foucault, among others, that the more science attempts to dictate such ethical issues by producing knowledge, the more severe the power structures that emerge (see also the introduction and Part III).

I have attempted in this sub-section to establish two types of truth-telling tied to parrhesia, as a means to point towards the rise of two philosophical approaches to self-care. My main focus was the difference between rudimentary ethics tied to ‘stylistics of existence’ and a transcendental morality tied to understanding the nature of the soul. This ethical differentiation between these approaches is particularly important for grasping newly emerging ‘structures of domination’ and possibilities of freedom in the present.
1.2.2. Self-care and the philosophical experience in the West

This section further characterises a certain individualism in regard to the Cynical mode of life. While I above focussed on how a certain truth-telling leads to a particular mode of self-governance, I now want to reverse this enquiry by focussing explicitly on different manifestations of self-governance as a means to highlight Foucauldian ethics, and thus prepare to criticise the other trajectory of ethics discussed here. I offer such critique progressively over the course of the next chapters with respect to the present for the sake of illustrating how the problematisation of how to govern the self can also be linked to a form of governmentality.

A major focus here is, again, the Cynics. I have mentioned already in the introduction that it is very important to explain properly the individualism that Foucault attempts to extract via his genealogy of truth-telling. The Cynics’ views do not at all lead to the utilitarian account that the ends justify the means. The essence of the Cynical philosophy is to achieve a ‘shortcut’ to the truth. The Cynics suggest that something needs to be known for the sake of a certain end. In other words, it is an issue of living by the drive to envision, without any superfluous activities, a truthful way of living. The Cynics’ end is tied to a sort mental victory rather than to concerns of temporary pleasure.

As Gutting puts it:

An aesthetics of existence has, as Foucault sees it, a significant advantage because it makes ethics an essentially private enterprise, rather than the imposition of public (universally binding) rules for how we should live. He acknowledges that we need a minimal universal ethical code to maintain a stable social context for our lives. But this is little except the core injunctions that humans have endorsed for millennia. The remainder of ethical life is a matter for private choice, with in particular no role for public moralities derived from allegedly scientific sources such as sociobiology or psychoanalysis. This privatization provides an alternative to the normalizing characteristic of modern society, since it replaces universal (“scientifically” underwritten) standards of moral perfection with personalized ideals of a “beautiful life”. This allows a separate space in which ethics can be practiced in relative independence of “the great political and social and economic structures”. This does not mean, however, that an aesthetics of existence cannot include a concern—lacking in ancient Greece—for the marginalized of one’s society. Activism on their behalf can be, as it was for Foucault, an integral part of creating a beautiful life...

Nothing he says rejects these projects, but he finds the ethical center of gravity elsewhere, in the private sphere of aesthetic self-formation (2011:145-146).
Gutting (2011:145) then acknowledges that: ‘A natural objection is that such a self-centred project should hardly be called ethical’.

But,

It is, however, ethical in its concern with the fundamental values that guide an individual’s life. The worry, presumably, is that, since these values concern self-formation, they lack the directedness to others characteristic of ethics. But to this Foucault would have two responses. First, there is a moral code that constrains self-formative behavior that would harm others. Second, given that there is no harm to others, it would seem that perfecting oneself is an essential aspect of a good human life. It might be suggested that the perfection in question is tied only to individual preferences (taste) and so lacks the universal quality of ethical goods. But to this Foucault can plausibly reply that, on his view, it is a universal human good that each individual engage in a project of aesthetic self-creation. This, indeed, is Foucault’s ethical reason for supporting the struggles of marginalized people (Gutting, 2011: 145).

Hence, it is evident that liberal individualism is a completely different animal. In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault discusses a denouncement of any effort to act while having the collective good in mind:

The collective good must not be an objective. It must not be an objective because it cannot be calculated, at least, not within an economic strategy (Foucault, 2008:279).

The collective good, he thinks, derives from pursuing individual interest. This is the core of the principle of invisibility. Foucault notes that

Invisibility is not just a fact arising from the imperfect nature of human intelligence which prevents people from realizing that here is a hand behind them which arranges or connects everything that each individual does on their own account. Invisibility is absolutely indispensable. It is an invisibility which means that no economic agent should or can pursue the collective good (Foucault, 2008:280).

Foucault also mentions Condorcet’s account of individualism, on which one does not aim to isolate the individual from society (see Foucault, 2008:288). As Foucault puts it: ‘we see nonetheless through a general law of the moral world, the effort each make for himself serve the good of all’ (Foucault, 2008: 277).

In the present day, we have to choose between either this utilitarian self-centred approach or ‘Alcibiades’ concern for the greater good (i.e. take care of others as a means of taking care of the self). The latter might show a concern for self-care (i.e., epimeleisthai heauto), but such a concern is subordinated by knowing oneself (i.e. gnōthi seauton) (see Foucault, 1998:226-228) (see also
Chapter 2). It is subordinated because self-care is tied to the quest to find that knowledge that will lead to this transcendental account of a universally applicable governance as all moral, reasonable, and effective. The third choice which is a more modest and ascetic concern for the self as a means to envision the greater good is marginalised (i.e. taking care of the self as means of taking care of others). In this way, the problematisation of how to govern the self is linked to the concern of how to govern others in a manner that freezes the games of power.

In this context, I suggest the notion that characterises a rudimentary doctrine like the one of the Cynics is volatility. Volatility differs from both utility and reflexivity. Volatility interacts with ends and means such that utility disappears because on many occasions the end drastically changes. In addition, the amount of effort that one imposes on the self is tied not to utility but to ‘ascetics’. In this context, the end does not justify the means; instead the means, namely daily practices and experiences, are those that allow to the individual to envision what that end might be. Similarly, volatility is not reflexivity. Reflexivity is reflective on those systematic means that can lead to a certain end (see more in Part III). Volatility allows such levels of reflection on the nature and pursuit of the means that can lead to a re-evaluation of the end itself. Lastly, volatility is not a postmodernist chaos, as a certain end does continue to exist. Hence, volatility in the sense of a fluctuation in choices and actions limited only by some rudimentary boundaries is the term that captures a Cynic-like parrhesiastic self-care. Such a volatility is as opposed to an unlimited volatility like chaos as to the systematic efforts of striking a golden balance tied to a certain account of a materialist naturalism or the metaphysics of another world.

I would also suggest that we might have here two different accounts of the well-known ancient Greek saying pan metron ariston (everything in moderation). Fluctuation, rather than the more Aristotelian ‘golden mean’, would be the Cynics’ spin on ‘everything in moderation’. The moderation of the Greeks was not linked to an enlightened utopia. Rather, it derived from the acceptance that the transcendental cannot be grasped. The ‘golden mean’ appears to be transcendental, but ‘metron’ (moderation) can also be achieved via a fluctuating balance tied to the bios (life).

The above obviously connects to the poem ‘Ithaka’ by C.P. Cavafy (2009:13-4), with the most notable line of the poem suggesting, ‘As you set on the way to Ithaca hope that the road will be a long one’. This advice rather suggests that the end should not predetermine your journey. It also reads, ‘Always in your mind keep Ithaca. To arrive there is your destiny’, adding ‘But do not hurry your trip in any way’. The poem reinforces the idea that the end does not disappear, but that it should not again dictate the journey. For if the end disappears, then the journey might as well be one of an engagement with doctrines rather than one of ascetic experiences. Without the end and a purpose, we might as well embark on a superfluous quest for knowledge. However, when the end
guides all actions, we also return to metaphysical obsession with identifying this one thing (e.g., the nature of the soul) as a means to live our lives.

If there is a guidebook for how one should live (i.e., a book of truth), it should not be a pre-written doctrine. Such doctrinal rules must ‘break’. One should live one’s life on the basis of making the lines of such a ‘book of truth’ appear as one makes this journey guided by self-care. As noted before, Gutting suggested that Foucault’s philosophy cannot and should not prevent us from pondering the big questions of life. Hence, some kind of ‘transcendental truth’ might appear from one’s own viewpoint or from the viewpoint of a collective of self-guided individuals. This collective transcendentalism might help the ‘polis’ to thrive, but it might also point towards completely different forms of social organisation.

The above observations can be linked directly to the Cynics. For the Cynics, there is the choice between two different paths which one finds in the mythical Greek hero Hercules. This theme of choice is also very present in Christianity. Foucault points out that the difference in the Cynics lies in the sort of paradox that the hard ascetic way is the short rather than the long way, as the long road is full of encounters with various forms of knowledge through logos (i.e. the way of the discourse). The length of the road has to do with the superfluous engagement in unnecessary knowledge which for the most part does not teach one how to live. On the other hand, the short road is based on ascesis and is thereby shorter but harder (i.e. the way of the exercise) (see Foucault, 2011:207).

The Cynic ‘shortcut’ seems to strike the balance that we also find in ‘Ithaca’. This volatile balance suggests that we should focus on a way of life (i.e. the journey), while trying to reach to the destination. Only, in this sense, the journey itself is the destination, providing that one has managed to avoid any unnecessary and superfluous experience. In other words, a journey with the right experiences is this Cynic ‘shortcut’ to the ‘true’ destination.

Moreover, in continuing this parallel attempt to, on the one hand, clarify the lack of any concrete knowledge in the Cynic doctrine and, on the other, find the purpose behind this lack, Foucault points towards a rather genealogical practice followed by the Cynics themselves. As noted in the introduction, Foucault (1971) offered his account of the genealogy of Nietzsche as an effective history that escapes the truth of the historian. Such practice is found in the Cynics as well in the sense of studying the mythical and the historical as a means to contemplate 000 stories, themes and characters. In this context, one can see, for example, on what grounds studying Shakespeare or the Iliad is considered an important source of wisdom in regard to understanding the human condition. For the artistry of such literature in its own apheretic way also manages to highlight the essence of the human condition. The specifics of a certain socio-political era are
reduced to a background role for the sake of highlighting the universality and diachronicity of certain stories, themes and characters.

In this way, Foucault links Cynicism to a ‘traditionality of existence’. The latter is not concerned with shaping new forms of knowledge in the present. Instead, it focusses on extracting wisdom from observing past events and episodes of life, real or mythological, as a means of acting on the present (see Foucault, 2011:209).

Foucault then once more comments, as is pivotal for this thesis, that Platonism and Aristotelianism were based primarily on a ‘traditionality of discourse’ rather than of ‘existence’. This is, I recall, of particular importance, as my thesis traces contemporary forms of democratic governance back to a connection with Platonism. In other words, Foucault building on his earlier analysis of the difference between the prophet, the sage and the parrhesiast, argues that it is the latter, the parrhesiast, that reflects the Cynic practice. With this argument, I suggest, Foucault indirectly criticises much of the kind of philosophy that gave birth to democratic theories of justice, even if they can claim the ‘Alcibiades’ type of parrhesia. For such theories are rather tied to philosophy as a profession in which even such concern with self-care for the sake of the ‘polis’ becomes a directly legalistic concern of the professional political philosopher for the ‘polis’. The ethics of self-care are subordinated to modes of subjectivity tied to a truth-telling rooted in doctrinal discourses.

In Foucault’s words,

When philosophy becomes a teaching profession, the philosophical life disappears. Unless one were to want to recommence this history of the philosophical life, of philosophical heroism, in exactly the same period, but in a completely different, displaced form. Philosophical heroism, philosophical ethics will no longer find a place in the practice of philosophy as a teaching profession, but in that other, displaced and transformed form of philosophical life in the political field: the revolutionary life. Exit Faust, and enter the revolutionary (Foucault, 2011:211).

For, as he has by this point noted,

Obviously, this history of philosophy as ethics and heroism would come to a halt when, as you know, philosophy became a teaching profession, that is to say, at the beginning of the nineteenth century’ (Foucault, 2011:210).

In this context, Foucault adds that in the same period that heroic philosophy had its swan song it also found the best literary depiction of its essence:
But even so, we should note that when philosophy becomes a teaching profession, with the result that the philosophical life, philosophical ethics, philosophical heroism, and the philosophical legend no longer have a raison d’être, the moment when philosophy can no longer be entertained except as an historical set of doctrines, is also the moment when the legend of the philosophical life receives its highest and last literary expression (see, Foucault, 2011:210-211).

That philosophical life that Foucault praises was not fully present in Platonism and Christian Platonism. As a matter of fact, as noted in the Introduction, Foucault had discussed Nietzsche’s term ‘Egyptianism’ in his essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (1977) as capturing the way that a certain kind of philosophy brings metaphysics and objective science together thereby mummifying, and also naturalising, ideas.

The philosophical life which is an important aspect of Foucauldian ethics vis-à-vis the democratic theories that are concerned with the ‘polis’ can become further understood by exploring what the ‘true life’ is. Foucault analyses a certain aspect of the true life in relation to the Platonic true love. Foucault presents the four characteristics of truth: ‘the unconcealed, the unalloyed, the straight, and the unchanging and incorruptible’ (see Foucault, 2011: 219). Foucault correlates the Platonic definition of true love with the true life ‘alhthes bios’ of the Cynics, who explicitly orient these four principles of truth tied to love towards life.

In this context, such a true life is achieved by altering the ‘currency’. Foucault suggests that the ‘currency’ represents the customary or else the rule of law. In this case, the customary is reflected in the existing account of ‘alhthes bios’ (true life). Diogenes had to change his stance towards the conventional belief. The alteration is not achieved by actually changing the value of the ‘currency’ rather than by bringing this value into a hypertrophy. To explain, Foucault mentions Diogenes as the man who was bestowed by the Oracle at Delphi with his own mission, as was also once the case with Socrates. Diogenes had to change the ‘currency’. Foucault clarifies that Diogenes did not devalue the ‘currency’, but rather changed its effigy (see Foucault, 2011:227-228). As such, the theme of the true life, rather than being abolished, is taken to an extreme.

Therefore, Foucault suggests that Cynicism is a reversed eclecticism. By eclecticism Foucault means that there is the tendency to pick and choose from various philosophies in order to create something acceptable to everyone. However, the Cynics reversed this acceptability by pushing certain features to an extreme. Therefore, instead of acceptability, Cynicism manifests a certain approach to philosophy as old as philosophy itself, which becomes polemical, radical and scandalous (see Foucault, 2011:232-33).
Foucault explains that his focus is the Cynical account of the courage of truth, which, he suggests, is a step forward from political bravery and even Socratic irony. In Foucault’s words,

Cynic courage of the truth consists in getting people to condemn, reject, despise, and insult the very manifestation of what they accept, or claim to accept at the level of principles. It involves facing up to their anger when presenting them with the image of what they accept and value in thought, and at the same time reject and despise in their life. This is the Cynic scandal. After political bravery and Socratic irony we have, if you like, Cynic scandal (Foucault, 2011:234).

Foucault derives from the above the most important aspect of Cynical truth-telling which leads to his notable concept of ‘technologies of living’. These technologies, tied to the theme of ‘stylistics of existence’, reflect the Cynic’s will to make the courage of truth a way of life. Ethics (i.e. self-care) and truth-telling come together in this specific manner:

In the case of Cynic scandal—and this is what seems to me to be important and worth holding on to, isolating—one risks one’s life, not just by telling the truth, and in order to tell it, but by the very way in which one lives. In all the meanings of the word, one ‘exposes’ one’s life. That is to say, one displays it and risks it. One risks it by displaying it; and it is because one displays it that one risks it. One exposes one’s life, not through one’s discourses, but through one’s life itself (Foucault, 2011:234).

Foucault increases the scope of this kind of truth-telling in order to include the philosophical life, suggesting that

If we take up the problem and theme of Cynicism on the basis of this great history of parrhesia and truth-telling, we can say that whereas all philosophy increasingly tends to pose the question of truth-telling in terms of the conditions under which a statement can be recognized as true, Cynicism is the form of philosophy which constantly raises the question: what can the form of life be such that it practices truth-telling? (Foucault, 2011:235).

Foucault then makes the important argument that such philosophical life has been absorbed, in a sense, by religious spirituality, while it has been marginalised by science. Science is a way of approaching things rather than a way of living (see Foucault, 2011:235-237). By this token, Foucault reiterates the absence of such a philosophical approach from the core philosophical tradition of the West. Goethe’s Faust rather reflects the definitive end of such a philosophical truth-telling, but even before that, there are only few notable moments that such philosophy has appeared
in ‘the West’. Foucault points only to Spinoza (see Foucault, 2011: 236) and possibly the ‘brief’ period of the Renaissance.

Hence, the absence of this kind of philosophical life tied to Cynical truth-telling has direct consequences for self-care. The concept of self-care is of fundamental importance in this thesis with respect to critically contemplating different ways of governing oneself (i.e. ethics). In this context, it is important to dwell further on the value of the Cynics in terms of grasping what has been ‘lost’ or marginalised.

Foucault suggests that in Cynicism self-care becomes self-knowledge as a means of altering the value of the ‘currency’ which is the ‘true life’ (see Foucault, 2011:242). In other words, Foucault connects this alteration of the ‘currency’ with altering the true life itself. By this token, the ‘true life’ is not the life that the majority of the people live, but the ‘other life’. The concept of otherness emerges here as an important factor in Foucault’s philosophy. Foucault reiterates here that ‘otherness’ entails these two distinct forms of self-care. On the one hand, there is the Platonic ‘other world’ tied to the transcendental and the universality of logos. On the other hand, starting with Socrates and the Socratic model that the Cynics took upon them, there is the ‘other life’ tied to certain ‘practices of living’ (see Foucault, 2011: 245).

The ‘practices of living’ are concerned with a sovereign self-care, namely the life with no external imposition on the self. In this context, in antiquity one is responsible to live a sovereign life, while acting as an inspiration via his life and even his writings to the others. Foucault refers here to the Stoic account provided by Seneca (see Foucault, 2011: 272). This inspiring of others is an obligation to them. However, this obligation derives directly from the obligation to live accordingly to one’s own nature and the nature of things. Hence, one has the responsibility to society to take care of oneself in a sovereign matter and pave the ground for the rest in order that they to do the same (see Foucault, 2011: 272-3).

For the Cynics, of course, that mode of self-care reaches an extreme point. Against the advisory relationship between the monarch and the philosopher that we find in Plato and the Stoics, in which the philosopher is essentially above the king, in the Cynics the philosopher is the king. The philosopher is the king of himself and of all men’s souls. He is the king of poverty, who has a much more intense mission than the Stoic sage. That mission, which we find only to some extent in Socrates, is that the Cynic has to sacrifice his life in order to ‘aggressively’ (i.e. in a polemical manner) indicate to the others that they do not take care of themselves properly.

Hence, the Cynic has to take responsibility for never deviating from the self-care tied to sovereignty over himself as a means to become an active example for the others. The notion of taking care of oneself as a means of taking care of others, however, takes an extreme route due to
the fact that the Cynic has to devote his life in a polemic, immense, and healing manner to his self-care as a means to teach others how to take care of themselves (see Foucault, 2011:278-279).

Of course, this extremism can raise again the question, on what grounds is Cynicism useful for Foucault? Foucault here does not explicitly give these lectures in order to outline his personal ethos; he attempts to outline distinct forms of truth-telling as a means to make more explicit the grounds on which the philosophy of antiquity can be an alternative to contemporary forms of governance in the West.

In this context, we can reiterate here Foucault’s account of the two different lines of development in Western philosophy:

But with the Socratic care of self, with the epimeleia heautou I have been talking to you about for so long, we see two great lines of development emerging along which Western philosophy stretches out. On the one hand, on the line which, as all the Neo-Platonists recognized, starts from the Alcibiades, the care of self leads to the question of the truth and specific being of that which one must be concerned about…now from the Laches rather than the Alcibiades, taking the Laches as the point of departure, the care of self does not lead to the question of what this being I must care for is in its reality and truth, but to the question of what this care must be and what a life must be which claims to care about self. And what this sets off is not the movement towards the other world, but the questioning of what, in relation to all other forms of life, precisely that form of life which takes care of self must and can be in truth (Foucault, 2011: 246).

Once more, these two lines of development do overlap. Foucault stresses again the example of Christian asceticism as one in which we can find both a concern for an ‘other world’ as also a set of distinct practices that outline an ‘other life’ here on earth. The two lines are also distinct though. It is in this context of distinctiveness that one can begin to perceive the origins of a contemporary conflict of ethics which has re-emerged with the question, ‘what is enlightenment?’

In his final remarks on the lectures, Gros nicely ties the ethical dilemmas of the ancient Greeks to the question of enlightenment:

From the end of the seventies, on several occasions Foucault had in fact distinguished two Kantian legacies: the transcendental legacy (with the question: what can I know?) and the critical legacy (with the question: how are we governed?). In the eighties he enriched that distinction, adding the courage of the truth ethical dimension to the study of power relations, the question becoming: what modes of subjectivation are articulated with forms of the government of men, either in order to resist them or to inhabit them? In 1984
Foucault takes things well upstream, since he now derives two major spiritual directions of philosophy from Plato: on one side, drawing inspiration from the Alcibiades, a metaphysics of the soul which, in discourse and by theoretical contemplation, endeavours to found the original bond of the immortal psukhe—and transcendent truth; on the other, problematized in the Laches, an aesthetics of existence pursuing the task of giving a visible, harmonious, beautiful form to life (to the bios). The alternative derived from Plato is strongly distinguished from the Kantian alternative (Gros, 2011:349-350).

As established in the Introduction, and as discussed in Parts II and III, there is the quest of this permanent ‘other world’ as a means to outline a concrete life here tied to a democratic context. This other world is found in the writings of Habermas and the reflexive sociologists. By contrast, there is the interpretation of enlightenment from the likes of Foucault, in which philosophy emerges again as an ‘art of living’ that is not concerned with the ‘other world’ but with the ‘other life’. It is the ‘other life’ that creates ‘heterotopias’, namely those other non-hegemonic spaces in this life that entail the possibility of escaping the structures of domination.

More explicitly, if one wants to focus on what can further shed light on Foucauldian ethics, then one should take into account how Foucault attempts to draw some parallels between a certain form of Stoicism and a certain form of Cynicism. Foucault mentions how Epictetus combines Cynic militancy with the Stoic virtue of decency to attract the audience (see Foucault, 2011: 292). More importantly, Epictetus suggests that one should abandon altogether the secular life and its obligations. The vital point is that one has to use philosophy as that type of choice that would allow one to engage with one’s obligations in a certain way (see Foucault, 2011:292). So, we still have philosophy as a way of life. We still talk about technologies of living that are apheretic in the sense that they do not dictate what should be pursued (i.e., moral doctrine) but how it should be pursued (i.e., ethics).

I suggest that these apheretic ethics are pivotal in understanding Foucault’s guidance of the discussion. For example, he mentions again Epictetus and the incident of someone who believed that in order to live the Cynic life he had to do certain superficial things such as wearing a cloak, begging and so forth. Epictetus suggests that none of these actions, as such, lead one (or fail to lead one) to the Cynical life (see Foucault, 2011: 293).

To elaborate, Foucault indirectly addresses his relationship to philosophy in contrast to other approaches (e.g., Habermas) by further explaining the Cynic’s mission. Foucault suggests that Epictetus has also tried to explain that one has to be destined by the gods to live the Cynical life. Epictetus does not at all suggests that one has to be selected by the gods in order to live the philosophical life. Yet, one has to be bestowed the mission to experience life and philosophy Cynically. In other words, Foucault might state indirectly here that in a sense his approach to
philosophy as this sort of militant life tied to genealogy as an orientation in thinking is one way of living the philosophical life, which happens to be his own mission.

Moreover, Foucault connects to self-knowledge this evaluation of whether one has been charged with this philosophical mission of putting oneself to the test (see Foucault, 2011: 296). The test is, according to Epictetus, to live the unconcealed life in modesty rather than in provocation (see Foucault, 2011: 297); to live the independent life tied to material poverty as a means to take care the soul; and to live the diacritical life, namely the one that can distinguish between what is valid and what is not.

The philosophical life outlined above clearly relates to ‘games of truth’ rooted in taking care of the self as a means to take care of others (as discussed in the Introduction). And this self-care is directly connected to the practice of ascecsis. By moving further from the notion that the Gods chose Socrates to put forward his mission, in the Cynics, it is how one responds to the tests that leads to the ‘unconcealed, independent, and diacritical life’. The test is what indicates whether one has the mission to live this certain philosophical life (see Foucault, 2011:298). In this context, there is also not a specific predetermined action that one should take, but rather a way of approaching anything as a test for the sake of envisioning what one should do.

Therefore, from this account of the Cynics by the Stoic Epictetus, we can further define how Foucault outlines an individualism that is not utilitarian and a universality that is not homogenising. Here, we find an even clearer account of the difference between taking care of the self as a means of taking care of others, and taking care of others as a means of taking care of the self, along with a further clarification of the difference between such a universality and cosmopolitanism. In regard care of the self, we find Epictetus claiming the Cynic should accept his misfortunes not only as a test to himself but also as an opportunity to exercise his mission to be the watchman of the others by understanding their contradictions. The Cynic should develop the highest capacity for empathy in order to develop ‘an intense bond with the human kind’ (Foucault, 2011: 300). Furthermore, in regard to the second, by developing this bond he becomes the watchman and physician of all humanity well beyond any city-state separation. In other words, in contemporary terms, the Cynic is neither a cosmopolitan nor a humanist concerned with the governmental projects of men. The Cynic is an individualist who believes in the universality of human existence.

By this token, the Cynic is concerned with pivotal issues of human existence (i.e. happiness and unhappiness, good and ill fortune, slavery and freedom) rather than with the affairs of the city-state (i.e. taxes, income, peace and war, etc.). Hence, he is a healer who teaches the individual how to take care of the self, rather than one who attempts to engender a fixed therapeutic doctrine.
The Cynic is not a ‘polypragmon’ (someone concerned with many things) who takes inappropriate interest in other people’s affairs. One could argue that Foucault here makes a rather indirect distinction between an immature intervention in others’ lives, rooted in a confidence deriving from social status or skills and the Cynic’s parrhesia. Such a distinction becomes understood in connection to Foucault’s rather positive account of renaissance. To my understanding, the ‘homo universalis’ is not a polypragmon. He is rather the individual who attempts to break free from classifications of human activity for the sake of engaging with whatever he considers meaningful. The aim is not multiplicity, per se, but the ability to see oneself as holistic entity needing to know whatever is necessary for self-governance.

Lastly, the Cynic is concerned with human existence; thereby as a member of humanity she is concerned with herself (see Foucault, 2011: 312). This last assumption reiterates the two points I submit here: first, self-care and the care of others are being blurred to the point that they become one and the same thing; second, there is a universality tied to the invitation by the Cynics to all men to find the true life in ‘otherness’, namely in a life other than the one that they live (see Foucault, 2011:314). Reforming the individual means reforming the world (see Foucault, 2011: 314).

In relation to the suppositions, Foucault reiterates these two modes of philosophical experience, while he concludes his take on the Cynics:

Metaphysical experience of the world, historico-critical experience of life: these are two fundamental cores in the genesis of European or Western philosophical experience. Anyway, it seems to me that what we see emerging through Cynicism is the matrix of what has been a significant form of life throughout the Christian and modern tradition, that is to say, the matrix of a life dedicated to the truth, dedicated to the manifestation of the truth in fact (ergo-) and, at the same time, to veridiction, truth-telling, the manifestation of the truth through discourse (logo-). And the aim of this practice of the truth characterizing the Cynic life is not just to say and show what the world is in its truth. Its aim, its final aim, is to show that the world will be able to get back to its truth, will be able to transfigure itself and become other in order to get back to what it is in its truth, only at the price of a change, a complete alteration, the complete change and alteration in the relation one has to self. And the source of the transition to that other world promised by Cynicism is found in this return of self to self, in this care of self (Foucault, 2011:315).

This sub-section has indicated more explicitly the connection between truth-telling and self-care within two different philosophical approaches. As a result, I have aimed to extract a critique, from Foucault’s discussion of these ancient texts, of certain philosophical ethics. At the
same time, I have discussed on what grounds the Cynics can give us an account of what can be characterised as Foucauldian ethics.
Conclusion to Chapter 1

Chapter 1 has introduced the term ‘parrhesia’ as a means to present a certain philosophical culture tied to the courage of telling the truth and self-care. I put particular emphasis on Foucault’s distinction between the Socratic parrhesia that appears in ‘Laches’ and that which appears in ‘Alcibiades’. The origins of Foucault’s account of two different lines of philosophical development in the West have been outlined. The type of parrhesia that appears in ‘Laches’ I have developed via an in-depth account of the Cynics, aiming to connect that type of parrhesia to what can be considered a Foucauldian ethics. At the same time, I have provided the conceptual or thematic tools by which one can forge a governmentality critique of the ‘Alcibiades’ line of philosophical development in the West.

The one thing that one should keep from the above is that there is a crucial difference in the way that the problematisation of how to govern the self can be posed via the two distinct accounts of parrhesia. Taking care of the self as a means of taking care of others seems to emerge as the theme that underlines a Foucauldian ethos of self-care. Taking care of others as a means of taking care of the self is linked to dealing with transcendental discourses and focusing on the ‘polis’. This latter account of self-care is understood as creating a non-emancipatory relationship between the governance of the self and the governance of others.

The next chapter highlights the marginalisation of both accounts of parrhesia and focuses on the governance of others for the sake of creating a loose linear pattern of how the West has evolved only to return to the issue of how the problematisation of the governance of the self reappears. This return is highlighted towards the end of the chapter and it becomes prominent in the rest of the thesis.
Introduction to Chapter 2

This chapter argues that in the lectures ‘Security, Territory, Population’ and the ‘Birth of Biopolitics’ Foucault outlines a certain genealogical trajectory which schematically covers a period from the 12th century to the 1980s through a governmentality critique. As noted in the introduction, in these lectures Foucault mainly targets power and the relationship of power with knowledge. The ethical axis of the genealogy is rather underdeveloped, although it seems to emerge from Foucault’s account of the American neoliberal mentalities of governance. The aim of this chapter is to introduce such a governmentality critique via Foucault’s own elaboration.

The chapter initially focusses on the transition from the themes of ancient Greek philosophy discussed in the previous chapter to the rise of institutionalised Christianity. The latter is linked to the question of ‘how to govern freedom or the freedom of persons’. The chapter provides an account of pastoral power as a new governmental force in the West which, through the Reformation and Counter-Reformation processes, initiates a particular kind of rationalisation of the West as a system of knowledge. The chapter unfolds a certain governmental trajectory from pastoral power to raison d’état to liberalism to neoliberalism. I attempt to introduce and define certain key terms in regard to the issue of governing freedom in the West in a manner that can halt ‘games of power’.

At the same time, I highlight how Foucault uses neoliberalism to introduce the problematisation of governing the self as complementary to the one concerned with governing the freedom of persons. With this aim, at the end of the chapter, I broaden the discussion of contemporary forms of governance, bringing together the ethical themes presented in Chapter 1 and those around governmentality presented here. In this context, I anticipate the subsequent governmentality critique of the interaction between power and freedom in the present in a manner in which ethics become prominent in their interaction with knowledge and truth. By the end of the chapter, the ground has been set for a ‘governmentality critique’ concerned with both the governing of freedom (i.e., structures of domination) and the government of the self (i.e., technologies of the self).
2. Governmentality

We can construct the genealogy of the modern state and its different apparatuses on the basis of a history of governmental reason. Society, economy, population, security, and freedom are the elements of the new governmentality whose forms we can still recognize in its contemporary modifications (Foucault, 2007: 354).

2.1. The modernisation of the West

2.1.1. Pastoral power

As we saw in the previous chapter, The Courage of Truth lectures propose a genealogy of ‘parrhesia’. Foucault’s premise is that the parrhesia outlined previously in regard to the trajectory ‘Phaedo/Laches -Cynics’ has rather disappeared in the West. However, Foucault has also followed the type of parrhesia that is concerned with the ‘polis’, which in its Neoplatonic form overlapped with certain notions of Christianity. The assumption is that such a culture of the self exists in the West in the form of the Platonic self-care tied to the concern of the ‘polis’, and Plato’s account of pastoral power with respect to passing skills (tekhnē).

However, this Platonic trajectory has not been the dominant one. Chapter 1 highlights this Platonic trajectory in order to establish a certain layer of the Western system of knowledge which I consider to produce notable power relations in the present. At this point, I focus on that shift from ancient Greek philosophy and the early Christian spirit of self-care to the rise of a particular type of pastoral power. The latter is acknowledged as the significant factor for shaping power relations in the West.

In other words, previously I discussed these two distinct lines of development of philosophy in the West. I will now focus on the processes of modernisation of the West. My aim is to indicate the conditions that significantly marginalised both these lines of philosophy, the ‘Laches’ line almost indefinitely and the ‘Alcibiades’ line for at least a significant period of time.

As Foucault puts it,

And it is this relation between an other life and the other world—so profoundly marked within Christian asceticism by the principle that it is an other life which leads to the other world—which is radically challenged in Protestant ethics, and by Luther, when access to the other world will be defined by a form of life absolutely conformable to existence in this
world here. The formula of Protestantism is, to lead the same life in order to arrive at the other world. It was at that point that Christianity became modern (Foucault, 2011:247).

Foucault stresses the importance of this shift, which took place as the West moved progressively away from the parrhesiatic confidence tied to an individual’s relationship to god, and the courage to use this relationship in order to speak truly to other men (i.e., fourth, fifth and sixth century A.D.), to a strict obedience to the word of god (see Foucault, 2011: 333). In the latter state, one develops a mistrust of oneself and chooses silence over free-spokeness (see Foucault, 2011:333).

Gutting has also conveyed this contrast that Foucault illustrates between ancient ethics and Christianity:

Based on the schema of the four modes of subjectification, Foucault offers case studies of the ancients’ problematizations of sexual ethics. These studies are essentially archaeological, looking at the underlying conceptual structures of the ethical thought of the ancient world—first that of the fourth-century Greeks, second that of the Latin and Greek world around the time of Christ. A constant benchmark is the contrast with Christian ethics, which in fact Foucault sees as emerging in the later ancient period from non-Christian sources. The ethical substance of ancient sexual behavior comprises desires, acts, and pleasures (ta aphrodisia) viewed as natural goods, though subject to some dangers and concerns (primarily because of their ties to our lower, animal nature and their exceptional intensity). By contrast, Christians, according to Foucault, see sex as in itself intrinsically evil. As a result, the ancients’ mode of subjection to the ethical code regarding sexual behavior is careful use (chresis) of pleasures, in contrast to the Christians’ denial (austerity), effected either through complete celibacy or through restriction of sexuality to monogamous marriage, directed to procreation...For the ancients, the telos is moderation (sophrysune), achieved by the proper use of pleasures to attain the ideal of human freedom in both its negative and its positive forms (freedom from domination by passions, freedom for rational mastery of self and others). For the Christians the telos is total subjection of self to God—the negative freedom of denial of self for the sake of a positive freedom achieved only by living entirely in and through God (2011:143-144).

More importantly, this emerging disciplinary moral code leads, according to Foucault, to institutional structures of authority tied to church officials such as pastors, priests or bishops (see Foucault, 2011:333). That reversal of parrhesia separates Christianity and ascetic practices from the ancient Greek parrhesia in both the Cynical form and the Platonic one. The self becomes the source of evil, so obedience and the renunciation of the self secure salvation (see Foucault, 2011:334). According to Foucault, ‘Parrhesia as confidence is foreign to the principle of the fear of God’
(Foucault, 2011:334), and ‘This is what characterizes parrhesia: non-fear of God, non-mistrust of self, and non-mistrust of the world. It is arrogant confidence’ (Foucault, 2011:336).

As noted in the previous chapter, in ancient Greece, even in Alcibiades’ parrhesia, more concerned with a transcendental knowledge, there was a link between knowledge and self-care which separated parrhesia from Platonic pastoral power concerned with passing skills (tekhnē). For the Delphic principle ‘know thyself’ might be critical in antiquity, though, ‘one had to occupy oneself with oneself’ before the Delphic principle could be brought into action. However, according to Foucault,

There has been an inversion in the hierarchy of the two principles of antiquity, ‘Take care of yourself’ and ‘Know yourself’. In Greco-Roman culture, knowledge of oneself appeared as the consequence of the care of the self. In the modern world, knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle (Foucault, 1997:228).

Foucault traces this marginalisation of self-care in this shift in truth-telling:

Only by deciphering the truth of self in this world, deciphering oneself with mistrust of oneself and the world, and in fear and trembling before God, will enable us to have access to the true life. It was by this reversal, which put the truth of life before the true life that Christian asceticism fundamentally modified an ancient asceticism which always aspired to lead both the true life and the life of truth at the same time, and which, in Cynicism at least, affirmed the possibility of leading this true life of truth (Foucault, 2011:338).

Earlier in Security, Territory, Population, Foucault discusses ancient Greek literature in order to illustrate these different dynamics in governance between an oriental pastoral model and ancient Greece. The Foucault of these lectures, as noted in the intro, has not yet fully envisioned the ethical axis of genealogy, so he does not explain how Christians govern their own conduct from the point of view of ethics (i.e., technologies of the self). He rather focusses on structures of domination. However, as is evident from the above, the control over the faithful flock was so exhaustive that it is justifiable to use these lectures in order to focus more on an examination of the imposed knowledge and on the conditions of knowledge with respect to power.

To elaborate, in this early discussion of ancient Greece, Foucault acknowledges that it is difficult to argue that the pastoral model was something completely absent from the Greeks. Foucault mentions the Homeric vocabulary in which the King is described as the shepherd. This description is explained by the fact that in the Indo-European literature ‘it is a ritual title consisting in addressing oneself to the sovereign by calling him shepherd of peoples’ (Foucault, 2007:136). Moreover, there is also the Pythagorean tradition in which Zeus is the god-shepherd, and the
magistrate is not defined by its power, but by its philanthropy. This tradition, however, was limited (see Foucault, 2007:137).

In terms of the texts of classical political vocabulary, only in Plato do we have a whole series of texts in which the ideal magistrate is the good shepherd. Thrasymachus argues that the shepherd is troubled with the flock only for profit. But, as is evident in Plato, the response to this is that the good shepherd is entirely devoted to his flock (Foucault, 2007:140). Such an account, as Foucault points out, goes back to the Pythagorean theme. This is exactly what is debated in The Statesman: ‘Can politics really correspond to this form of the shepherd-flock relationship?...The whole text answers “no” to this question’ (Foucault, 2007:140).

In this context, Plato did not indicate that the theme of the pastorate should be abolished. He did clearly illustrate, though, that this kind of activity is not that which cultivates the necessary qualities for being a citizen or an official in the ‘polis’. Hence, Foucault suggests that the theme is useful to be exercised by doctors, teachers, farmers, gymnasts, and the like (i.e., this is the Platonic pastoral power). Nevertheless, it is not the one that characterises how politics are conducted (see Foucault, 2007: 147). The Platonic pastoral theme is concerned with passing tekhnē or knowledge not for the sake of technocratic education but for the sake of enriching the qualities of the citizens. In terms of political leadership, as we saw in ‘Alcibiades’, one should exercise that kind of parrhesia that is concerned with the nature of the soul in the sense of establishing some moral doctrinal permanence as a means to take care of others (i.e. the ‘polis’) and oneself. The skills of the citizens are contemplated by a solid ethical moral doctrine for the sake of the ‘polis’.

Therefore, the pastoral theme is not present in the Greek thought as far as the organisation of the city-state is concerned. It appears in the Hebrews, and it spreads via Christianity. It is imported from the East and dominates the Hellenic world. As Foucault puts it,

Given this, in the Western world I think the real history of the pastorate as the source of a specific type of power over men, as a model and matrix of procedures for the government of men, really only begins with Christianity (Foucault, 2007:147).

It begins a unique way, however, since this religious community constitutes itself as a Church, that is to say, as an institution that claims to govern men in their daily life on the grounds of leading them to eternal life in the other world, and to do this not only on the scale of a definite group, of a city or a state, but of the whole of humanity. The Church is a religion that thus lays claim to the daily government of men in their real life on the grounds of their salvation and on the scale of humanity, and we have no other example of this in the history of societies (Foucault, 2007:148).
Christianity took the oriental pastoral themes and institutionalised them, thereby creating pastoral mechanisms of power. A web of themes that are structures in their own merit penetrate the West and initiate the Western structural universe via the institutionalisation of the Church. Among the Hebrews, there was no pastoral institution:

There is no shepherd outside of God. On the other hand, in the Christian Church we see the...autonomization of the shepherd theme in relation to other themes, as not merely one of the dimensions or aspects of God’s Relationship to men. It will become the fundamental essential relationship...that will, of course, be institutionalized in a pastorate with its laws, rules, techniques, and procedures (Foucault, 2007:152).

The first pastor is Christ, and this theme that was one only among other elements in the story of Moses will become the dominant one. The apostles are also pastors, while the bishops are those who guard the flock (see Foucault, 2007:150, 158). In this context,

In any case...we can say that the whole organization of the Church, from Christ to the abbots and bishops, presents itself as a pastoral organization (Foucault, 2007:153).

In other words, what the Christian Church did was the following:

It organized a pastoral power that was both specific and autonomous, it implanted its apparatuses within the Roman Empire, and at the heart of the Empire it organized a type of power that it was unknown to any other civilization...over millennia Western man has learned to see himself as a sheep in a flock, something that assuredly no Greek would have been prepared to accept. Over millennia he has learned to ask for his salvation from a shepherd who sacrifices himself for him. The strangest form of power, the form of power that is most typical of the West, and that will also have the greatest and most durable fortune...was born, or at least took its model from the fold, from politics seen as the matter of the sheep-fold (Foucault, 2007:130).

Hence, in Foucault, the overall assumption of the Christian pastorate is that due to its pastoral-flock relationship its focus is not on the relationship of the individual to salvation, law, and truth. What it does is to introduce a form of power that, ‘taking the problem of salvation in its general set of themes, inserts into this global, general relationship an entire economy and technique of the circulation, transfer, and reversal of merits’ (Foucault, 2007: 182). In terms of the law, Christianity ‘establishes a kind of exhaustive, total, and permanent relationship of individual obedience’ (Foucault, 2007:183). This relationship embodies one of the fundamental points that allow us to argue for the birth of an entirely new form of power.

In addition, there is the issue of the modes of individualisation which Christianity has introduced. Foucault breaks it down into three key characteristics which all differ from an individualisation related to social status, birth rights and remarkable achievements. The focus will
be on calculating in each time the balance between actions of merit and actions of fault. Moreover, the individuals will not claim recognition based on their position in some kind of hierarchy. They should not also seek mastery of self. The individuals or else the subjects are perceived as such when they are part of an interacting network in which the one serves the other within a spirit that has denounced ego and embraced humility. Finally, the truth for the subject derives from the relationship to god. It is an internal, secret, and hidden truth rather than an existing recognised truth (see Foucault, 2007:183).

Therefore, the scientific method secularises god as god governs now through natural principles. The scientific method is something new that derives from a specific monotheistic natural order (see Section 2.1.2), leading to the assumption that there is an end in the dichotomy between the pastorate and the sovereign, as the sovereign becomes responsible to govern the pastorate. In order to do so, it builds on the institutionalisation processes of the church that shape the state and on the practices of conduct revolving around the issue of governing men:

I think this is where we should look for the origin, the point of formation, of crystallization, the embryonic point of the governmentality whose entry into politics, at the end of the sixteenth and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, marks the threshold of the modern state. The modern state is born, I think, when governmentality became a calculated and reflected practice. The Christian pastorate seems to me to be the background of this process, it is being understood that, on the one hand, there was a huge gap between the Hebraic theme of the shepherd and Christian pastorate and, on the other, that there will of course be a no less important and wide gap between government or pastoral direction of individuals and communities, and the development of arts of government, the specification of a field of political intervention, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Foucault, 2007:164).

This is essentially a ‘process of invention’. However, it is one that emerges in a rather imposing way, suggesting that in Foucault institutionalised Christianity, as the source of Western rationalism, is inherently a discourse of domination. At this stage, it becomes obvious that in Foucault subjectivity, as such, derives from observations concerned with how power produces knowledge. The history of subjectivity presented here is tied to pastoral power as those techniques that govern the conducts of others (the power axis of genealogy) in a manner that imposes on the subject a certain interaction with knowledge (the truth axis). The ethical axis tied to the problematisation of the self is absent.

Foucault summarizes this as follows:

What the history of the pastorate involves, therefore, is the entire history of procedures of human individualization in the West. Let’s say also that it involves the history of the
subject. The pastorate seems to me to sketch out, or is the prelude to what I have called
governmentality as this is deployed from the sixteenth century…Well, I think this typical
constitution of the modern Western subject makes the pastorate one of the decisive
moments in the history of power in Western societies (Foucault, 2007:184-185).

This sub-section has distinguished Platonic pastoral power in regard to the discussion of
parrhesia from that of oriental Judeo-Christianity. The latter originated a new mentality of
governance in the West that led to a certain process of rationalisation and modernisation. Both
forms are very important for applying a governmentality critique to the present. Pastoral power is
the root of an instrumentally rational trajectory which is very important for critically understanding
the liberal value system. At the same time, it is interesting to focus on the ways that contemporary
democratic theories interact with Platonic pastoral power and the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia.

2.1.2. From pastoral power to ‘governmentality’

Here, I try to depict more explicitly the processes that led from pastoral power to a certain
mentality of governing the freedom of persons, meanwhile setting the context by which such a
governmental trajectory unfolded.

In Foucault, both the Reformation and Counter-Reformation are seen as great battles over
pastorship rather than doctrinal battles:

The Western and Eastern Christian pastorate developed against everything that,
retrospectively, might be called disorder. So, we can say that there was an immediate and
founding correlation between conduct and counter-conduct (Foucault, 2007:196).

On such development, says Foucault,

this transition from the pastoral of souls to the political government of men should be
situated in this general context of resistances, revolts, and insurrections of conduct
(Foucault, 2007:228).

He also mentions something important appears around the eleventh and twelfth century,
the introduction of the judicial model into the usual pastoral practice. Similar practices occurred
from the seventh century on; however, the introduction of compulsory confession in 1215 as a
permanent court in which every faithful man had to answer led to the emergence of a judicial
model that generated anti-pastoral struggles.

Therefore, Foucault suggests that

if we do not take the problem of the pastorate, of the structures of pastoral power, as the
hinge of pivot of these different elements external to each other—the economic crises on
one side and religious themes on the other…then I think we are forced to return to the old
conceptions of ideology, [and] to say that the aspirations of a group, a class, and so forth, are translated, reflected, and expressed in something like a religious belief. The point of view of pastoral power, of this analysis of the structures of power, enables us, I think, to take up these things and analyze them, no longer in the form of reflection and transcription, but in the form of strategies and tactics (Foucault, 2007: 215-216).

Then, as noted in the introduction, when Foucault starts being concerned with ethics, he has to revisit his early account of pastoral power in order to revaluate power relations from the point of self-governance. ‘Technologies of the self’ are connected with mentalities of governance. Foucault suggested that confession progressively became the catalyst for the modernisation of the Catholic conduct (i.e. counter-reformation), as it reinforced curiosity about the biological urges of people while establishing new ways of judging and regulating such urges.

In any case, Foucault presents an interactive evolution. Theories of governance produce the structures. Whether the structures are perceived as technologies of domination or technologies of the self, they are bound to intensify techniques of governance and to re-imagine them within the boundaries of a certain system of knowledge.

Pastoral techniques’ mutation into an overarching governmental rationale emerges through various governance challenges. According to Foucault, in the 16th century a series of governance fields emerged: government of oneself (return to Stoicism); government of souls (Catholic or Protestant pastoral doctrine); government of children (development of pedagogy); and the government of the state by the prince. In this context, 16th century saw the Reformation and Counter-reformation, namely state centralisation on the one hand and religious dispersion on the other (Foucault, 2007:88-9). Foucault explains,

I think it is at the meeting point of these two movements that the problem arises, with particular intensity in the sixteenth century, of how to be governed, by whom, to what extent, to what ends, and by what methods (Foucault, 2007: 89).

As a result, raison d’état constitutes a further appropriation of governmentality, since it is described as an innovation in exercising power. By the same token, Foucault embraces the importance of the scientific method reflected in scientific breakthroughs such as the astronomy of Copernicus and Kepler, Galileo’s physics, the natural history of John Ray and the Port Royal grammar (see Foucault, 2007:234). Hence, the premise of governing men and, more specifically, the pastoral subject now transitions to the scientific arena.

However, two problems remain, according to Foucault:

what rationality, calculation, or type of thought can one govern men within the framework of sovereignty?...What the specific objects and domains of application of a government of men that is not a government of the Church, of the religious pastorate, and is not
government in the private domain, but which is the task and responsibility of the political sovereign? (Foucault, 2007:232).

Hence, in Foucault’s words, the ‘ratio pastoralis’ has to become the ‘ratio gubernatorial’. It is at this point, that the entirely fatalist world, an anthropocentric world of pastoral power, disappears, namely between 1580 and 1650, at the same time as the foundation of classical episteme (see Foucault, 2007:236).

The state exists for itself and is sustained by itself indefinitely. There is no issue of origins, as we are in a world of government. The state does not discover a truth, but it is based on observing history and nature in order to construct truth. It is knowledge of things that will allow the state to thrive. This view is how positivism in relation to the scientific method is projected to the social via the birth of statistics as the knowledge of the state at any given moment.

I have here attempted to highlight how Foucault outlines the conduct–counter-conduct struggles of pastorship as a means to set pastoral power as a notable emerging technique of governing the population that solidifies a shift in the way that freedom is produced. I have highlighted the emphasis on how certain power mechanisms produce the possibilities of freedom, while acknowledging that the way that people respond to power is still underdeveloped in Foucault. I have also attempted to indicate that by addressing the problem of how to govern people from the point of view of those who govern (i.e., the power axis of genealogy), Foucault referred to a conduct–counter-conduct struggle at the level of technologies of domination.
2.2. Liberal governmentality

2.2.1. The anatomy of liberalism

Navigating liberalism is necessary if we want to further solidify the interaction between capitalism, liberalism and modernity in regard to governing freedom, for it is by crystallising this instrumentally rational trajectory first that it can then become clear on what grounds liberalism is tied to structures of domination. The premise is that freedom in liberalism is carefully produced.

Foucault has made the argument that a governmentality critique progresses by observing the intensification of techniques via a re-arrangement or re-envisioning prior techniques:

We should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism (Foucault, 2007:107-108).

My focus here is this transition to government with respect to security and the population.

As Foucault indicates, mentioning Rousseau’s first article for the Encyclopédie, economy—or political economy—cannot be related to family economy. Foucault uses that reference to argue that the social contract theorists aim to establish the coexistence between the art of governance and the sovereign which is responsible for managing economy. Such an approach to governance marks a continuity between the earlier natural law theorists in the seventeenth century, such as Hobbes, and eighteenth century, such as Locke and Rousseau.

The liberal governmental rationale, however, does not derive from law, but from governmental practice itself. Such practice seeks a de facto scope to set the sites of veridiction of a specific ‘naturalism’. This aim indicates that the issue of the sovereign is still crucial, but not the dominant one. The power is in the sovereign, but the sovereign is essentially concerned with economy.

Hence, in terms of discipline and security, we should understand this new art of governing as a synthesis of the two in which the emphasis has been shifted towards the last:

Let’s say then that sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the major problem of the seat of government, whereas discipline structures a space and address the essential problem of a hierarchical and functional distribution of elements, and security will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events or possible elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework. The specific space of security
refers then to a series of possible events; it refers to the temporal and the uncertain which have to be inserted within a given space. The space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold is, I think, roughly what one call the milieu (Foucault, 2007:20).

This issue of space and security becomes initially understood with the problem of the town:

It seems to me that with this technical problem posed by the town...we see sudden emergence of the problem of the ‘naturalness’ of the human species within an artificial milieu. It seems to me that this sudden emergence of the naturalness of the species within the political artifice of a power relation is something fundamental…what we could call biopolitics, biopower (Foucault, 2007:21).

To clarify the above, we should focus on what constitutes a ‘milieu’. Foucault suggests that the term appears only in the biology of Lamarck. It is, however, something that existed already in Newton:

It is therefore the medium of an action and the element in which it circulates. It is therefore the problem of circulation and causality that is at stake in this notion of the milieu (Foucault, 2007:21).

Foucault suggests that this notion must not have been employed for the initial town planning. He argues, however, that this schema is present in the way that town planners ‘reflect and modify urban space’ (Foucault, 2007:36). Hence, the ‘milieu’ is the point at which the apparatuses of security unfold (i.e. a space or the space of invention):

The apparatuses of security work, fabricate, organize, and plan a milieu even before the notion was formed and isolated. The milieu, then, will be that in which circulation is carried out. The milieu is a set of natural givens...It is an element in which a circular link is produced between effects and causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another (2007:21).

Furthermore, the milieu is the embryonic point of a new form of governmentality:

the sovereign will be someone who will have to exercise power at that point of connection where nature, in the sense of physical elements, interferes with nature in the sense of the nature of the human species, at that point of articulation where the milieu becomes the determining factor of nature. This is where the sovereign will have to intervene, and if he wants to change the human species…it will be by acting on the milieu (Foucault, 2007:23).

Hence, managing the population based on the idea of the naturalness of the desire of the subject leads to a shift from the sovereign of jurists and theorists of natural law (i.e. Hobbes or Rousseau) to something different. These social contract or natural law theorists focussed on saying ‘no’ to certain desires on the basis of a certain naturalism. With this refusal in mind, Foucault
argues that law works in the imaginary, since laws are formulated on the basis of preventing what could happen. The law imagines the ‘negative’ (see Foucault, 2007:47). This shift leads to a form of governance that focuses on how to say ‘yes’ to desires on the basis of the same re-appropriated naturalism (i.e., utilitarianism) (see Foucault, 2007:73).

Therefore, liberal governmentality derives from the physiocrats and the economists who established it, not from the natural law theorists. Put simply, natural desires are restricted to the minimum of securing in legal terms the existence of the subject. However, the main question in liberalism is whether something is useful and on what grounds. Hence, English radicalism and the problem of utility, rather than the French revolutionary quest to define natural rights and establish their protection from sovereignty, are what can describe liberal governmental thinking (see Foucault, 2008:40). A discussion of enlightenment is clearly absent from these lectures. Foucault finds the French revolutionary spirit to be not that significant in terms of governmentality and/or he chooses not focus on it. In this context, given this ‘absence’ and the way that Foucault perceives the function of utilitarianism, it once more becomes clear that Foucault deals with the problematisation of how to govern the freedom of others.

Hence, physiocratism does interact with utilitarianism vis-à-vis the French revolutionary spirit, but in a sense they are complementary biopolitical conducts. Thus Foucault suggests that utilitarianism is more a technology of governance (see Foucault, 2007:74).

This account of Foucault is further reflected in the manner that he discusses the ‘panopticon’:

The idea of the panopticon is a modern idea in one sense, but we can also say that it is completely archaic, since the panoptic mechanism basically involves putting someone in the center—an eye, a gaze, a principle of surveillance—who will be able to make its sovereignty function over all the individuals [placed] within this machine of power. To that extent we can say that the panopticon is the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign: None of my subjects can escape and none of their actions is unknown to me. The central point of the panopticon still functions, as it were, as a perfect sovereign. On the other hand, what we now see is [not] the idea of a power that takes the form of an exhaustive surveillance of individuals so that they are all constantly under the eyes of the sovereign in everything they do, but the set of mechanisms that, for the government and those who govern, attach pertinence to quite specific phenomena that are not exactly individual phenomena, even if individuals do appear in a way, and there are specific processes of individualization…The relation between the individual and the collective, between the totality of the social body and its elementary fragments, is made to function in a completely different way; it will function differently in what we call population. The government of populations is, I think, completely different from the exercise of sovereignty over the fine grain of individual
behaviors. It seems to me that we have two completely different systems of power (Foucault, 2007:66).

This is where the panopticon meets laissez-faire as the rationale of governing as things occur. It is also where it becomes clear how modernity appears as a biopolitical or instrumentally rational discourse. ‘Naturalness’ does not suggest an order-out-of-chaos self-correction. It suggests how certain notions of naturalness make the sole purpose of governance the facilitation of this naturalness.

This account of naturalness is a cornerstone of a modern approach, including those who criticise aspects of modernity, vis-à-vis the order-out-of-chaos premise of postmodern accounts of human progress. Such accounts suggest that liberalism can be understood within the premise of war in which forces uncontrollable, conflicting and far from reflecting socially constructed concepts produce reality.

The postmodern chaos discourse that we find in scholars such as Thrift (2005) replaces the postmodernist pessimism with a vitality tied to capitalism. Thrift speaks of a shift from the ‘Joshua discourse… a discourse that is founded on the idea of transcendental rationality, on the notion of a single, correct, God’s-eye view of reason which transcends… the way human beings… think, and which imparts the idea of a world that is “centrally organised, rigidly bounded, and hysterically concerned with impenetrable boundaries” (Jowitt, 1992,p. 306)” (Thrift 2005:24) to the ‘Genesis discourse’ (i.e., eastern and western spiritual traditions but also quantum physics, cybernetics, cognitive science and chaos theory, see Thrift 2005:41).

In the latter discourse, capitalist activity is not necessarily linked with the idea that we work as we do out of a duty derived from an imposed calling. Work is linked with consumption for the sake of bringing vitality into capitalism. The aim is to convince us that our reality is not socially imposed on the basis of a superior morality or the harmony of economics. There is no necessary harmony in the sense that economic theorists and social contract theorists envision it. Capitalism is not a matter of self-correcting progress. Furthermore, the rule of law does not mirror natural or divine justice. There premise is that, although there is no harmony, there is order out of this chaos.

I would ‘dare’ to argue that Thrift’s account rather ‘describes’ a postmodernist governmentality. Addressing this issue is beyond the scope of the thesis. What interests me here is to indicate that postmodernism in this case would not act as a reminder of the contradictory nature of contemporary moral discourses that, on the one hand, have abandoned meta-narratives but, on the other, still use such narratives to substantiate themselves as morally superior. Postmodernism would become this chaotic metanarrative that would pulverize everything within its identity politics. This vital capitalism that manages to use oriental discourse for both new more exotic
accounts of the transcendental tied to self-care and for a new hardcore vitalist materialism would lead to the ultimate pulverization.

Such an account of how order is established diverges from Foucault, who is for this reason not a postmodern thinker. Foucault acknowledges an order out of chaos within power relations. He suggests though that such relations can ‘freeze’. For reasons explored in this thesis, Thrift’s account does not escape from this freezing. Through the three-fold use of genealogy, we see that there are various structures – both existing and emerging – that do not allow this transition to a chaos discourse. There are tendencies but they can still be interpreted through a non-chaos discourse. And, in any case, the Foucault concerned with self-care would characterize such a transition as a non-emancipatory freezing of power relations tied to chaos as the one truth.

The point is that, as noted in the introduction, ‘games of power’ can come to a standstill within socially constructed structures of domination. So, Foucault’s account of the ‘naturalness’ of liberalism verifies his conviction that such naturalism is socially constructed. Thrift’s account rather obscures this observation. But, it is important to understand that the counter-discourses of modernity – including the likes of Habermas, Giddens, Beck and even Foucault – have emerged within an ongoing struggle of power relations tied to an effort to oppose a certain liberal naturalism rather than because chaos ‘let’ them be.

So, I will turn again my focus on how Foucault exposes this liberal naturalness. In Foucault’s account of this utilitarian liberal governmentality, the law is the border between public authorities and individual freedom (see Foucault, 2007:73, 74). Freedom now becomes the space that remains independent from bureaucratic governance. ‘Naturalness’ is the economic activity that is exercised by the subject in conditions of a governmentally produced freedom. The freedom to act naturally as an economic subject produces the liberal ‘pacts of security’, namely the spaces in which there is no governance intervention for the sake of economic freedom. The governance is there to ‘secure’ that these spaces of freedom will be utilised for economic activities. In this context, freedom, economics and security come all together.

By this token, these heterogeneous liberal perceptions of law, governance and ‘doing things’ are obviously not mutually exclusive. However, the distinction is important because, Foucault observes in the ‘Birth of Biopolitics’: ‘Since, the beginning of the nineteenth century we have been living in an age in which the problem of utility increasingly encompasses all the traditional problems of law’ (Foucault, 2008: 44).

So, Foucault’s analysis suggests that liberalism, as it unfolds further, is neither contractual nor now physiocratic, but laissez-faire. Economic freedom and absolute despotism cannot go together. As Foucault notes, the physiocrats were against strict administrative rules in economic activity. They supported, however, that the sovereign is a co-owner of the land of the country and therefore a co-producer. Hence, it was entitled to ask for significant taxes. They also indicated that
the sovereign has a good knowledge of the total economic activity within it. Hence, when the sovereign leaves economic agents free, this is an informed decision. In other words, the sovereign will share this knowledge with the economic agents.

Foucault acknowledges that despite the fact that economics is an atheistic discipline (see Foucault, 2008:282), Adam’s Smith ‘invisible hand’ suggests not only economic optimism, but also the remains of the belief that god lives within the natural order (see Foucault, 2008:278). Hence, economic calculation in a sense sustains some levels of theological presence. This sustenance is a sign that we are not in some sort of an order-out-of-chaos discourse. In this context, ‘irrationality’ replaces the evil spirit as a sin against nature.

However, the transcendental is neither god nor the sovereign. In Adam Smith’s invisible hand, things are quite different, as there cannot be fully measurable economic evidence, and, therefore, there cannot be a sovereign controlling authority. Hence, as it derives from Foucault, liberal governmentality in a way re-appropriates raison d’état. The state becomes a means to the ends of economy rather than economy a means to the ends of the state. By the same token, political economy cannot be a science of governing, and government should not be concerned with governing economics. However, political economy is an art of governing. But, of governing what? It is or should be an art of governing civil society (see Foucault, 2008:286).

A first account of how Foucault elaborated a liberal governmentality has been presented here. Foucault favours the English account of utility and the principle of laissez-faire as the more appropriate ones for setting the sites of veridiction that produces this liberal freedom. Understanding liberalism through these terms is very important for contemporary discussions of power and freedom, as those are still by and large tied to the liberal or liberal democratic state paradigms.

2.2.2. Liberalism and civil society

I have outlined the importance of the ‘milieu’ as a space of invention, along with the grounds on which political economy in Foucault is essentially concerned with governing the civil society. This sub-section clarifies why a distinction between ‘milieu’ and the civil society is very important in terms of contemplating the relationship between power and freedom. Moreover, this distinction is very important in terms of critically contemplating later on in the thesis those other approaches that attempt to further reconcile democracy with liberalism.

To start with, Foucault’s choice not to progressively accommodate Marxism within the presented governmental elaboration indicates that Marxism is not quite perceived as a technique of government but rather as an ideology. If Marxism is a counter-conduct, then it should be one in the following terms that entail the ‘misunderstanding’ that civil -society
can free itself of the constraints and controls of the state, when the power of the state can finally be reabsorbed into this civil society...There must be a moment, when breaking all bonds of obedience, the population will really have the right, not in juridical terms, but in terms of essential and fundamental rights, to break any bonds of obedience it has with the state and, rising up against it to say: My law, the law, of my own requirements, the law, of my very nature as population, the law of my basic needs, must replace the rules of obedience. Consequently, there is an eschatology that will take the form of the absolute right to revolt, to insurrection, and to breaking all the bonds of obedience: the right to revolution itself. This is the second great form of counter-conduct (Foucault, 2007:356).

The same applies to nationalisms:

In any case, the truth of society, the truth of the state, of *raison d'état*, is no longer to be possessed by the state itself; the whole nation is entitled to it. I think this is the third major form of counter-conduct, which you can see is opposed term for term to what characterized *raison d'état* in the sixteenth century, but which gets support from those different notions, those different elements that appeared in the transformations of *raison d'état* (2007:357).

In other words, Foucault apparently believes that Marxism as both a set of doctrines and an ideology does not act at the level of the ‘milieu’. It emerges from civil society. In this context, Foucault rather perceives civil society as a ‘deluded’ entity that mistakenly believes it can generate counter-conducts when it is inherently deprived of such potential:

Civil Society is, I believe, a concept of governmental technology, or rather, it is the correlate of a technology of government the rational measure of which must be juridically pegged to an economy understood as process of production and exchange. Civil Society is the concrete ensemble within which these ideal points, economic men, must be placed so that they can be appropriately managed. So, homo economicus and civil society belong to the same ensemble of the technology of liberal governmentality (Foucault, 2008: 296).

The emancipation that many seek in civil society could exist only in the milieu as the initial ‘space of invention’ that produces civil society. This is the only in principle ‘space of invention’. Utilitarianism, physiocrats and social contract theories within the processes described above formulate the major liberal conduct that has full control over the milieu and, as an extension, of the civil society. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Marxism and nationalism (and later, fascism) as ideologies that derive from or are substantiated by civil society are unable to formulate techniques of governance. Foucault suggests that a socialist governmentality is needed for that end, but since it does not exist, it has to be invented (Foucault, 2008:92-4).

One should not fail to notice that certain alternative understandings of liberalism are not discussed by Foucault. There are several criticisms of Foucault for his one-dimensional
understanding of classical liberalism, which focusses mainly on Bentham and utilitarianism (see for example Gane, 2012; 2014). This criticism is partly true.

The above suggests, though, that Foucault does contemplate physiocrats and social contract theorists as conduits of instrumental rationality. Social contract theories are rather taken into account as also a conduct of instrumental rationality, and Marxism appears a less elegant critical analysis of materialist structures of instrumental rationality that paradoxically maintains the belief that emancipation can derive from these very same structures. In this sense, Marxism is also an alternative manifestation of biopolitics or instrumental rationality.

I have here differentiated milieu from civil society, and given that contemporary democratic theories perceive the civil society as a source of emancipation, it is paramount to clarify that within a liberal democratic paradigm, civil society as such is tightly bound by liberal economic governance. It is bound by liberalism as an economic rationale that leads a civil society to consist of an economically oriented population or, as becomes more evident next, economic subjects.
2.3. Neoliberal governmentality

2.3.1. Ordo-liberalism

In this sub-section, by discussing Foucault’s lectures ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’, I highlight the rise of a neoliberal governmental rationale with respect to German ordo-liberalism. I focus on the conditions that gave birth to it and its distinctive characteristics. Focussing on ordo-liberalism allows a more concrete understanding of the way that an instrumentally rational governmentality has unfolded in regard both to neoliberalism and to contemporary forms of governance.

To begin with, Foucault mentions Counselor Ludwig Erhad’s argument that: ‘we must free the economy from state controls while avoiding anarchy and the termite state’ (Foucault, 2008:81). According to Foucault, such a statement entails that the counsellor wanted to make clear that the German people are not responsible for Nazism because it violated fundamental natural rights such as freedom. Thus, Nazism cannot be representative of the people. Foucault suggest that Erhad’s claim was that ‘only a state that recognises economic freedom and thus makes way for the freedom and responsibility of individuals can speak in the name of the people’ (Foucault, 2008:82), indicating that there was no foundation for a legitimate German state during the war, as Germany was essentially under internal occupation.

The importance of the above in the elaboration of Foucault is that in Germany there is essentially an effort to legitimise the post-war state on the basis of economic freedom (see Foucault, 2008:83). There is an analogy with Weber here that Foucault himself observes. As in the Protestant Europe of the sixteenth century wealth signified god’s election in Germany, it became a sign of good governance (see Foucault, 2008:85). The state rediscovers its law, its juridical law, and its real foundation in the existence and practice of economic freedom (see Foucault 2008:85, 86). In other words, in the liberal governmentality of the physiocrats the issue was to limit an already established massive police and administrative state. In Germany, the issue is to reformulate the state ‘on the basis of this non-state space of economic freedom’ (Foucault, 2008:87).

Foucault identifies the question that German neoliberalism poses:

What is involved in fact is a new programming of liberal governmentality. It is an internal reorganization that, once again, does not ask the state what freedom it will leave to the economy, but asks the economy how its freedom can have a state-creating function and role, in the sense that it will really make possible the foundation of state’s legitimacy?’ (Foucault, 2008:94-5).

Foucault thus notes we should avoid thinking that neoliberalism is the same as classical liberalism. Neoliberalism has to address the challenge of having a market able to formalise both the state and the society (see Foucault, 2008:117).
A crucial point arises here with respect to the issue of competition. The ‘ordo-liberals’ call this classic liberal economic idea a bad ‘naturalism’. It presupposes that competition is simply derived from human nature. Thus, the only necessity in creating and maintaining competition is to leave the market free. However, in neoliberalism, competition is perceived as a formal mechanism with certain qualities which should be related to such governmental practices that allow it to thrive.

So, by making this observation, neoliberal economic thought emphasises the following:

what type of delimitation of government follows from this principle, or rather, what will be the effect on the art of government of this general principle that the market is what ultimately must be produced in government? (see Foucault, 2008:121).

By this token, ordo-liberalism combines the market economy with an intense interventionist social policy. This intervention is not for protection from market economy:

On the contrary, this interventionism is pursued as the historical and social condition of possibility for a market economy, as the condition enabling the formal mechanism of competition to function so that the regulation the competitive market must ensure can take place correctly without the negative effects that the absence of competition would produce (Foucault, 2008:161).

Hence, the one very important contribution of the ordo-liberals is modelling society as an enterprise. The second is their redefinition of the juridical order, namely of the law. The neoliberals attempt to re-invent liberalism by directly attacking the Marxist premise that there is only one form of capitalism, namely a single capitalism related to specific capital accumulation. The ordo-liberals put forward the powerful point that the juridical is not part of the superstructure. Rather, it coexists with the economy at the level of the structure. This means that shifts in economic thought can significantly change the capitalist system by producing different regulatory frameworks.

Foucault describes ordo-liberal reasoning:

If, on the other hand, what economists call ‘capital’ is actually only a process which falls within the domain of pure economic theory and which only has, and can only have, historical reality within an economic – institutional capitalism, then you can see that the historical capitalism we know is not deducible as the only possible and necessary figure of the logic of capital. In actual fact, historically, we have a capitalism with its singularity, but which, in virtue of this very singularity, may give rise to institutional and consequently economic transformations, to economic-institutional transformations, which open up a field of possibilities for it’ (Foucault, 2008:165).

This line of reasoning suggests, crucially, that neoliberalism is the continuation of an instrumentally rational trajectory. Hence, capitalism might be a unique way of organising
socioeconomic activity, but it can be re-appropriated (i.e., varieties of capitalism). It neither evolves linearly nor stagnates.

Hence, the aim of this neoliberal ordo-liberalism for Foucault is to deal with competition and monopoly in economic theory, and with Weber’s issues in economic history and sociology. This goal has to do with separating capitalism from its irrationalities. Capitalism had to be reinvented via economic legislation (see Foucault, 2008:166). This legislation will translate into a series of social interventions that aim to make sure that the market will be ‘supported, managed, and “ordered”’ (Foucault, 2008:323).

In other words, the problem of competition-building is at stake. To create this kind of institutions, a legal theory approach is needed in relation to the rule of law. This approach should not stifle economic freedom. In Germany, this type of necessary regulation was associated with opposing despotism and the police state. So, the ordo-liberals introduce the idea that the rule of law is the possibility of this kind of juridical arbitration (see Foucault, 2008:171). As a result, the ordo-liberals built upon that premise as a means to reinvent capitalism by introducing the rule of law into economic legislation.

As a result, the management of ‘risk’ becomes pivotal in terms of using economic regulation as a means to respond to the risks that could prevent human capital from acting in a desirable way. In addition, a highly profitable economic industry emerges built around services that make profit by estimating ‘risk’ (i.e. insurance industry). And, this notion of ‘risk’ that appears in neoliberalism is also important in leftist or democratic accounts of contemporary forms of governance within a deterritorialised liberal democratic paradigm, as will become evident.

To conclude, what comes out from this sub-section is an important re-appropriation. The argument that the juridical is not part of the superstructure suggests that neoliberalism as an alternative manifestation of instrumental rationality has actually managed to become the dominant rationale that re-appropriates classical liberalism. Legal frameworks do not facilitate economics; instead, economic law produces regulatory frameworks. Economic law operates at the level of the structure, thereby directly producing all regulation. Therefore, it models society as an enterprise. This last assumption obviously remains important in applying a governmentality critique to contemporary power relations. It suggests that there is a powerful neoliberal dispositif (i.e. structures of domination) that can stagnate power relations.

2.3.2. US anarcho-liberalism

The discussion of neoliberalism in this section focusses on the development of a set of neoliberal rationales in the US. In the US the three elements that provoked neoliberal thinking to emerge were Keynesian policy, the social pacts of war, and the growth of the federal administration through economic and social programs (see Foucault, 2008:217). This development was similar to
France’s in the sense that neoliberalism found its articulation by opposing the Popular Front and the post-war Keynesian policies of central planning. However, in the US, as in 1948 Germany, liberalism was appealed to as the founding and legitimizing principle of the state. The demand for liberalism founds the state rather than the state limiting itself through liberalism (Foucault, 2008:217).

Liberalism was always at the centre of all political debates in the US, shaping both the right and the left. The right focussed on economic freedom, while the left on keeping a non-imperialist and military state. ‘Liberalism in America’, states Foucault, ‘is a whole way of being and thinking. It is a type of relation between the governors with respect to the governed’ (Foucault, 2008:218).

In light of this comment, Foucault’s discussion of Hayek becomes interesting:

We need a liberalism that is a living thought. Liberalism has always left it to the socialists to produce utopias, and socialism owes much of its vigor and historical dynamism to this utopian or utopia-creating activity. Well, liberalism also needs utopia. It is up to us to create liberal utopias, to think in a liberal mode, rather than presenting liberalism as a technical alternative for government. Liberalism must be a general style of thought, analysis, and imagination (Foucault, 2008:219).

US anarcho-liberalism makes modelling society as an enterprise a utopia via the internalisation by the subject of the dream of competition. Competition should be stimulated by modelling the enterprise unit (i.e. the entrepreneurial spirit and the economic activity of the corporation). American neoliberalism does not nurture the market by merely legislating it; it projects the market to areas that were not primarily economic (see Foucault, 1997:79). All social sectors and various government policies are regulated to act more as businesses and less as welfare services (see Foucault, 1997:79).

Who is exactly though the target of this measure for stimulating competition? Here is the vital contribution of the American neoliberal school. As Foucault observed, the Americans criticised classical economics because they did not analyse human labour in a way that would escape Ricardo’s quantitative perspective on the relation between labour and time (see Foucault, 2008:219-20). On this perspective, the issue of employment has to do with finding the right balance between the number of workers and the amount of hours that the employers need the labourers to work. In Keynes, labour, although a productive force, is also passive in the sense that it depends on the investment policies made. In other words, as mentioned, in liberalism competition and this struggle to work and be productive are considered intrinsic characteristics of human nature. Hence, the issue is not how to cultivate this drive, but how to accommodate it. For in classical liberalism there is the presupposition that if there is work offered or if there are opportunities, then labour will always be there to take it.
As such, American neoliberalism appears, in Foucault’s words, ‘much more radical or much more complete and exhaustive’ (2008: 243). The reason is that it still aims to generalise the economic form of the market throughout the social body, ‘including the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges’ (Foucault, 2008:243). In this context, building competition went from a governmental policy to a biopolitical strategy.

At the same time, as Foucault indicates the neoliberal economics focus on the allocation of scarce means to alternative ends. This allocation suggests that human behaviour and the internal rationality of this human behaviour should be taken into account (see Foucault, 2008: 222,223). Economics will now study directly human activity. As such, I believe that there has been a boom in marketing strategies in neoliberalism. The focus of economic governance is now ‘work’ and the ‘worker’ (i.e. labour power) as an active economic subject. The focus is placed on the workers as consuming and entrepreneurial machines whose skills and attitudes must be cultivated (see Foucault, 2008: 225).

In connection to this conception, Foucault paraphrases Gary Becker and his approach to consumption as holding that:

We should not think at all that consumption simply consists in being someone in a process of exchange who buys and makes a monetary exchange in order to obtain some products. The man of consumption is not one of the terms of exchange. The man of consumption, insofar as he consumes, is a producer. What does he produce? Well, quite simply, he produces his own satisfaction. And we should think of consumption as an enterprise activity by which the individual, precisely on the basis of the capital he has at his disposal, will produce something that will be his own satisfaction (Foucault, 2008: 226, discussing Becker 1973:375-395).

All these, according to Foucault, reconceptualise ‘homo economicus’:

The characteristic feature of the classical conception of homo economicus is the partner of exchange and the theory of utility based on a problematic of needs (Foucault, 2008:225).

In neoliberalism, homo economicus is himself an enterprise (see Foucault, 2008:226). It is in this context, that we can see the operation of entrepreneurship within neoliberalism. In other words, the classic homo economicus was someone that should be left alone (i.e. laissez-faire), as the pursuit of individual interest would lead to the collective good. Foucault argues that in essence the foundations of the governability of homo economicus have been set since the eighteenth century. Homo economicus was a certain type of subject that allowed a specific art of government to emerge related to political economy, self-limitation and the frugality of government (see Foucault, 2008:271). In neoliberalism, though, homo economicus is the person who accepts reality and can respond systematically to government modifications as a means to produce his own
satisfaction. Hence, homo economicus is manageable and governable via the internalisation of the entrepreneurial spirit (see Foucault, 2008:270).

Foucault has accordingly observed that the neoliberal premise is that we must not touch the economic actor because we simply cannot. According to Foucault, as Kant made apparent to men that they cannot know the totality of the world, political economy makes apparent to the sovereign not only that there is no totality in the economic process, but that there is no economic sovereign (see Foucault, 2008:283). Political economy emerged in consequence. But, neoliberalism—and socialism—has to deal with how political economy can function within an economic sovereign when it emerged from its absence (see Foucault, 2008:283).

In this context, this direct focus of American anarcho-liberalism, and of what can be perceived as neoliberalism in general, on human capital takes biopolitical control to another level. Human capital becomes the main target of analysis (see Foucault, 2008: 226-232). In other words, a belief manifests in the heredity of genetics that determines skills, drive and abilities combined with the proper training and education. In this context, investment in human capital becomes vital. Human capital should be healthy, trained and cultivated in order to want to use its skills for economic activity.

Here, for the first time, we see a more interactive relation between governmental rationales tied to the problematisation of how to govern the others (i.e., technologies of domination) and the internalisation of such rationales tied to the problematisation of how to govern the self (i.e., technologies of the self). Foucault, as noted in the introduction, is still concerned with ‘technologies of domination’, but I believe that the stage is set via this account of direct biopolitics, which emerge from the American capitalism as ‘a living thought’, to bring ‘technologies of domination’ and ‘technologies of self’ together. That connection between the two might have been possible here because governance itself within American neoliberalism focussed more on the governability of the subject. Given, though, that Foucault writes ‘fictions’, it might also be his own ability to start envisioning this ethical axis (i.e., how we govern ourselves) that allowed him to decode these processes of internalisation.

I have here presented Foucault’s account of the core rationales of the US anarcho-liberals, with the view to further clarify neoliberal governmentality. US anarcho-liberalism introduced this notion of a self-produced capitalist utopia. I suggest that such a notion has become vital in discussing contemporary capitalist processes as a means of applying a governmentality critique to the way that freedom is currently produced.

2.3.3. Neoliberal governmentality and late modernity

As noted in the introduction, Foucault does not elaborate on the following enquiry which is important for the thesis. Where do the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, the emerging
cosmopolitan scholars, and even postmodernism stand with respect to the project of modernity or the Enlightenment? To what extent do they channel rationales outside of these processes of instrumental rationalisation, and how do they insert such rationales into the social? My aim in this sub-section is to link these questions to the discussion offered subsequently, drawing also on discussion put forward in Chapter 1.

Unanswered questions such as the above led Fraser to call Foucault a theorist of modernity. Fraser’s argument (2003) was that neoliberal governmentality captures accurately the rise and operation of Fordism. However, it neglects other socioeconomic dynamics that have shaped what neoliberalism and governmentality are today.

Leaving aside the fact that, as noted in the introduction, Foucault’s account of neoliberalism was not descriptive in its analysis because he was essentially concerned with the possibilities of freedom, I would still not agree with Fraser; neoliberal governmentality even as a descriptive framework is not limited to what Fraser (2003) suggests: no, neoliberal governmentality is not limited to the Fordist model or the emphasis on discipline rather than security or control. The engagement of Foucault with the state indicates that the state is the major macro-structure that binds the microphysics of power together. Far from the Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, the state is just an episode in government (see Foucault, 2007:246). Government does not exist for the sake of the state. This idea has been corrected that of human progress, placing the population as the focal point of government, thereby leading to an eternal world of governmentality (see Foucault, 2007:260).

In other words, liberal and neoliberal governmentality suggest that with the rise of liberalism, the state is in constant decline. In liberal governmentality, the state exists only in a passive way. It exists to remove obstacles to a free economy. In neoliberal governmentality there is a very clear depiction of how economic regulation penetrates every aspect of the social, thereby leading to an almost direct self-regulation of structures and subjects (see chapter 1). In this context, it is possible to identify how these mechanisms of producing the social further disassociate themselves from the state, as they start operating as deterritorial governmentality structures. If towns and cities once toppled their walls for the sake of the laissez-faire, the world might as well get rid of its borders.

Such deterritorialis closely aligns neoliberal governmentality with Deleuze’s societies of ‘control’ (1992). Deleuze (1992) has claimed that he has followed Foucault’s insight and that he has extracted such insight from Foucault. In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, it becomes somewhat evident that in neoliberalism freedom is not produced inside the space given to the subject to act free in order to unfold his economic nature (i.e., pacts of security). Civil society is not where the ‘pacts of security’ are established as a means of producing economic freedom for the population. Neoliberalism further focusses on direct governance of the subject. Civil society is merely the sum of individuals who have internalised direct economic regulation of their subjectivity. This
conception is supported by the spill-over of economic regulation, which could be what Deleuze also refers to (see also Rose, 1999:ch.7). In other words, an inherent ‘control’ of freedom through regulation of the market (i.e., German ordo-liberalism) or marketisation of society (i.e., American anarcho-liberalism) is what characterises contemporary governmental rationales.

This spill-over becomes more interesting when connected to Deleuze’s notion of ‘deteriorisation’ (i.e. desire of difference, flows and lines of flight). I suggest that Deleuze’s account of a ‘relative reterritorialisation’ presents a neoliberal governmentality-informed approach to the governing of freedom in the more reflexive late modernity. There is a reterritorialisation/deteriorisation in which scholars such as Paton (2000) and Reid (2003) identify the class of globalisation (Burchill in Devetak 2005:181-182). This process is perceived in the discourse of the thesis as a class of ‘relative reterritorialisation’ reflected in the battle of conducts of late modernity.

Interestingly, in late modernity the postmodern appears as an overarching epistemological attempt whose aim is to call modernity on its preconceived absolutist assumptions. At the same time, one can use ‘relative reterritorialisation’ in order to mark how neoliberalism governs a volatile world beyond the traditional state-centric modernity. Plurality takes the form of an aesthetic choice that derives from commodifying such pluralism, which makes neoliberal rationales a mutation of biopolitics or instrumental rationality that move beyond such modernity. However, in this context, any claim that neoliberalism is now connected to global rationales of governance remains faithful both to the modern rather than postmodern character of Foucault’s critique and to the Foucaudian premise that instrumental rationality survives today.

Such claims, though, need to be enriched by a more nuanced examination of the interaction between power, knowledge and ethics in the West. Hence, at this point, one should turn one’s focus to the important methodological conflict among genealogy, Habermas’ critical theory and reflexive sociology. Whether the Foucaudian ethos of self-realisation is about a postmodernist body without organs or one that seeks to forge an understanding of parrhesia that can accommodate Kant and the Enlightenment is not really debatable. Foucault has clearly taken a different approach to how language can liberate. Language aims at indicating how knowledge is constructed rather than at creating knowledge (see Foucault, 2008:36). Also, parrhesia as truth telling via self-realisation should not appear as a negation of itself in a forced effort to forge a pluralist moral and aesthetic subjectivity as citizenship (see also Osborne, 1998; Rose, 2000).

In other words, one can extract from Foucault an individual critical contemplation of an alternative rationalism or truth-telling. This was clearer in the late Foucault discussed in Chapter 1 with respect to ancient ethics and philosophy. It also derives from Foucault’s engagement with enlightenment and it further unfolds in the rest of thesis.

What Foucault does not provide is systematic elaboration of how this alternative presently manifests. That would enrich a governmentality critique, and it would clarify a Foucauldian
account of this alternative, while reinforcing a Foucauldian ethos. The only mention that we can find in *The Birth of Biopolitics* lectures regarding this trajectory is that in Germany the irrationalities of Weberian modernity were resolved in two ways: the neoliberal and the critical theory one. Still, this acknowledgment of the second way does suggest that by drawing from Foucault’s discussion of ethics one can apply a governmentality critique to other accounts of modernity.

In this context, Parts II and III build upon the way the thesis has brought together Foucault’s genealogies of ancient ethics – also in connection with the problematisation of enlightenment – and instrumental rationality as a means to critically contemplate these other accounts of modernity. In the volatile late modernity, there is a more concrete realisation of certain ancient ethical discourses. My aim, much like Foucault’s account of neoliberalism, leads to an alternative and complementary account of two slightly distinct conducts or periods (i.e., deliberative democracy and reflexive sociology). In their own analyses, we currently experience the efforts of enlightenment to encompass modernity. They are part of this re-envisioning of modernity through their own account of enlightenment or an attempt to stop instrumental rationality from continuing to govern enlightenment.

In this thesis such a narrative does not replace neoliberalism as the continuation of the dominant rational trajectory of modernity. Reflexivity also derives from the spill-over of neoliberal regulation. What needs further elaboration is the overall anatomy of this new governmental regulation that emerges in the era of ‘late modernity’ with respect to the mode of ‘control’. The thesis points towards a certain vision of the rationalism of antiquity and the Enlightenment tied to the ‘Alcibiades’ line of philosophical development that also has the ability to pause ‘games of power’. At the same time, this vision, in its present form, is not really antagonistic to neoliberalism, so it becomes another aspect of this ‘relative reterritorialisation’.
Conclusion to Chapter 2

Chapter 2 attends to the shift from the ethics of antiquity to a new form of rationalisation concerned with governing persons and progressively with governing explicitly freedom or the freedom of persons (i.e. governmentality). The aim is to highlight how knowledge and power interacted in a manner that gave birth to a governmental trajectory tied to an ongoing re-appropriation of techniques of governance leading to structures of domination. I referred to pastoral power in relation to the institutionalisation of the church. I provided an account of raison d’état as a product of the Reformation–Counter-reformation struggle of conducts. I gave a coherent account of liberalism with respect to its approach to freedom, while crystallising its relationship to social contract theory, physiocratism, and utilitarianism. Finally, I focussed on how two distinct manifestations of neoliberalism have been a by-product of modernity and of the inefficiencies of modernity. I have dwelled on the explicit problematisations that they set with respect to governing freedom as a means to re-envision a society based on economic activity.

In other words, in Chapter 1 there was a foundational discussion of Western ethics. In Chapter 2 there was a transition to a discussion of how these ethics merged with Christianity and how the institutionalisation of Christianity produced such knowledge that led to discourses of power that progressively became governmental (i.e., in the sense of establishing structures of domination tied to the governance of others). For the most part Chapter two is concerned with the problematisation of governing the freedom of persons without really incorporating into this problematisation the further issue of governing the self. It is in this context that the power axis of genealogy is the most prominent. However, in the birth of biopolitics the governance of the self becomes an emerging theme. This emergence is very important for the development of the rest of the thesis. It leads to this shift that places the ethical axis of genealogy concerned with self-care at the centre of both a ‘governmentality critique’ and of a quest for emancipation.

In this context, towards the end, Chapter 2 has also attempted to introduce the issue of the grounds on which a certain account of ancient Greek ethics and the project of enlightenment can exist beyond instrumental rationality, but still produce structures and technologies of domination in the present. Part II and Part III follow up on this groundwork by exploring the interactive relationship between the ‘Alcibiades’ philosophical line and the instrumentally rational one in the present. The governmentality critiques put forward there explicitly address how the concern with how to govern the freedom of people interacts with the problematisation of how to govern the self.
Introduction to Chapter 3

Chapter 3 deals with the relevant philosophical ideas of Habermas vis-à-vis Foucault on the basis of contemplating two different types of parrhesia in connection with the issue of the problematisation of the self. I will more explicitly connect the interrelated themes (i.e., historicity, ethics, transcendentality) that I stated in the introduction to three main points of critique that underpin my account of Habermas: 1) lack of historicity; 2) inter-subjective recognition; 3) proceduralist/legalistic approach to social organization and self-care.

In Section 3.1, I provide a critical overview of Habermas within a certain historical context focussing on the connection between language, reason and ethics in structuring a certain form of subjectivity (i.e. cognitive ethics). This first section takes into account the comparison between Foucault’s genealogy of power and Habermas’s historical analysis for the purpose of highlighting Habermas’s historicity and pointing towards the fundamental differences between the two with respect to liberalism, democracy and law. In Section 3.2, I explore more systematically the differences between ‘genealogy’ (Foucault) and ‘critique’ (Habermas). This exploration focusses on their character as methodologically critical or transgressive approaches tied to the ethical concerns of how one should think or live. Subsequently, the issue of ethics in regard to these two distinct critical approaches is further illuminated via a discussion of aesthetics. The chapter ends by justifying the application of a governmentality critique to Habermas.
3. Cognitive ethics

3.1. Habermas: A critical overview

3.1.1. Key terms and ideas within their historical context

My first aim is to give an introductory account of Habermas’s approach to philosophy, enlightenment and social evolution. I also draw from Held’s useful introductory guide to critical theory and Habermas’s work in particular. At this stage, I do not focus on the analytical/theoretical connection between Habermas and Held but rather on critically utilising the more descriptive characteristics of Held’s account of Habermas in order to present a first sketch of the themes that characterise Habermas’s work in relation to the West as a system of knowledge; enlightenment as a project; and the different periods of Habermas’s works within the historical context that his writings have appeared.

I give an account of the historicity of Habermas’s critique, while pointing towards the lack of acknowledgment by Habermas himself of this historicity of his own ideas. I suggest that, despite the fact that Habermas accepts that at the philosophical level of rational debates there is room for contingency, his quest to envision a transcendental universality tied to a certain moral rationalism prevents him from fully understanding such historicity.

Therefore, I will start by situating Habermas’s account within a historical context. For as Mitchell Dean has pointed out, the best way to ‘defend’ Foucault against Habermas is indeed by establishing that Habermas fails to understand the historicity of his own ideas:

I shall argue here that Foucault’s genealogies of forms of power and government can help make intelligible the unacknowledged historical conditions of Habermas’ project of a proceduralist theory of democracy and law. One way of understanding these conditions, I contend, is to be found in Foucault’s account of the emergence of ‘biopower’, a power over life that aims at the regulation of populations, and its consequences for the transformation of law in advanced liberal democracies. Broadly, Foucault’s genealogy of biopower suggests that law is transformed from a ‘juridical system’ allied with the theory and practice of sovereignty to one that partakes of the regulatory functions of norms. From this perspective, Habermas’ proceduralist theory of democracy can be understood as (1) having this transformation as its historical condition and (2) misunderstanding this set of historical conditions as providing a universal set of norms of law and democracy’ (Dean, 1999:168).

In order to defend the idea of a critical theory of society, Habermas has been systematically concerned with developing the philosophical underpinning of such theory. This concern:

involves a reconstruction of some of the central theses of classical Greek and German philosophy: the inseparability of truth and virtue, of facts and values, of theory and
practice. The project is defined as a ‘struggle for the critical soul of science’ and the ‘scientific soul of criticism’ (Held, 1989:250).

Initially Habermas essentially responded to Stalinism; the failure of the social movements of the 60s to become prominent in the long term; and the statist character that liberal democracies took (see Held, 1989:250). As was established in the previous part of the thesis, Foucault has suggested that the failure of classical liberalism gave birth to two different approaches with respect to what one should do with liberalism in Germany (i.e. The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and ordo-liberalism). In this context, before the recent processes of globalisation become an important variable for the problematisation of how to govern freedom, Habermas’s initial concern in the era of Keynesianism was statism. In other words, his concern was the impact that centralisation had on the rise of an administrative technocratic bureaucracy, and the impact that the latter had in turn on the public sphere (see Held, 1989:251).

Hence Habermas, on the one hand, is not as optimistic as Marcuse in regard to social transformation (see Held, 1989:252). But, on the other hand, his desirable social transformation appears to be rather limited, as it operates within the liberal democratic paradigm. Habermas’s political invention for emancipation in regard to the project of the Enlightenment is rooted in those aspects of Western rationalism (see Part I) that channel Neoplatonic reason/ethics and German idealism as a means to transform a liberal capitalist dispositif.

After his inability to agree with the student movements of the 60s, Habermas appears to have put less emphasis on the practical-political aspects of his programme (see Held, 1989:251). However, in his earlier, politically oriented book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Habermas particularly examines the dominating role of instrumental rationality. This domination is linked to perpetuating class conflict by monopolising human pursuits, and such human pursuits are tied to a capitalist society along the Weberian lines (see Held, 1989:254).

Habermas connects instrumental rationality with an overall scientific positivism, accepting that several assumptions about human nature are structured by overarching rationales. Those in Foucault’s governmentality critique of instrumental rationality forge the liberal dispositif. In Habermas, this acceptance leads to his own enquiries into the nature of human interests, actions and knowledge (see Held, 1989:254). Habermas thus contributes to forming an alternative objectivism concerning the essence of human capabilities. Such objectivism essentially seeks predetermined rational cognitive interests as the driving force of humanity.

Habermas, despite acknowledging the historicity of knowledge, the quest for knowledge and what can constitute the possibility of knowledge, links human nature to the cognitive subject, and, by extension, to subjectivity (see Held, 1989:254). This conception conflicts Foucault’s
reading of Kant, which celebrates the Kantian perception that cognition is linked to the ahistorical transcendental subject.

As explained in Held:

Rather, starting with an essential tenet of historical materialism – that history, social reality and nature (as known) are all a product of the constituting labour of the human species – Habermas understands knowledge in light of the problems man encounters in his efforts to ‘produce his existence and reproduce his species being’. The conditions of the constitution of knowledge which determine ‘the structure of objects of possible experience’ are the historical material conditions in which the development of the species has occurred (Held, 1989:255).

This kind of historicity manages to maintain a cognitive transcendental materialism that resembles the Platonic theory of forms. It, therefore, wishes to explicitly define what it can pursue.

By analogy, any ‘invention’ is essentially a ‘discovery’. That premise might be valid in Foucault as well. When one engages in ‘practices of living’ to the extent that he can transcend power structures he (i.e. one) takes whatever exists around him (i.e. one) as a means to transgress it. The ‘game of truth’ is rooted in discovering the truth by attempting to ‘invent’ ways of living that can lead to a truthful existence.

The difference in Habermas is that ‘invention’ and ‘discovery’ become one and the same. The Habermasean subject ‘discovers’ what exists around him in the natural ‘milieu’, and he ‘invents’ any manifestation of this natural milieu into the social context. By this token, the ‘invention’ of such subjectivity reflects the envisioning or ‘discovery’ of a pre-existing order that leads back to the Platonic theory of forms in the sense of a connection with the transcendental (i.e., the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia).

Habermas then borrows from ‘scientific enlightenment’ by suggesting that a part of the cognitive interests that reaffirm materialism (e.g. tool making) and reason (e.g. language) entails the idea of self-reflection. Self-reflection, rather than a quest for imagining and actualising new possibilities, is the reflection that leads to a better realisation of what a certain scientific discourse suggests is the predefined starting point of the human quest (see Held, 1989:255). As such, instead of a historically produced dispositif, Habermas attempts to change the existing manifestations of human activity by drawing from his own account of a universal trichotomous dispositif (i.e. cognitive interest, media and sciences) that operates as a model for organising human species (see Held, 1989:255).

In this context, my account of Habermas is that he suggests that differences among human behaviour, interests and beliefs is a result of one or a combination of the following: imposed conflicting interests; aesthetic variety, a psychological condition; and an ideological delusion.
Hence, I suggest that the underlying quality of his interpretation suggests a failure of living in truth as a failure of ‘logos’. The verdict derives from putting difference into some kind of ‘ideal speech’ evaluation that leads to cognitive ethics or secular humanism as sites of veridiction.

These sites of veridiction suggest a new merging of science, morality and art or culture that opposes their dissolution into three independent spheres bound by instrumental rationality or open to postmodern influence. Habermas in ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’ (see Section 3.1.2) explicitly argues that the processes of economic modernisation unfolding along conservative practices of instrumental rationality brought the moral and cultural demise which conservatives have attributed to more leftist accounts of cultural modernisation.

Moreover, he emphasises that because of a lack of proper understanding, those neoconservative practices have been progressively used as a means to formulate an agenda that is adaptable to such a demise (i.e., neoconservative governing of the postmodern). Habermas rather suggests that modernity is trapped between scientism and the postmodernists. Scientism wants to monopolise the way that knowledge is produced, while postmodernists consider such a monopolisation a core characteristic of modernity, thereby abandoning modernity to scientism.

Habermas’s not only suggests governing risk differently through traditional political institutions or even communitarian rationales (see Part III), but putting cognitive action through the ‘public sphere ‘at the centre of governance’, leading to a humanism that imprisons itself in a peculiar cognitive bios. In some ways, Habermas subscribes to the Hegelian overcoming of subject-centred reason, but in the process he crafts again a subjectivity powered by his own account of reason tied to ‘communicative rationality’. My claim is that he replaces the iron cage of instrumental rationality with an alternate constraint deriving from a certain naturalism directly applied to the mind of the subject itself (i.e., technologies of the self). This exchange points towards those transcendental ethics that, although powered by the individual, are concerned with the ‘polis’, namely the social.

Therefore, we have here not an *ipso facto* attempt to reinforce centralised rationales (this is one of Habermas’s issues with Hegel), but an attempt to forge a therapeutic governance tied to the autonomous individual and powered by ‘logos’ or reason. As a result, Held suggests that Habermas’s interest in psychoanalysis seems to be mainly methodological. However, Habermas develops the psychological dimension of critical theory by drawing on and integrating a range of contributions to contemporary individual and social psychology, including the symbolic interactionist theory of action (Mead, Goffman); role theory (Parsons); and cognitive developmental psychology (Piaget, Kohlberg) (see Held, 1989:252). This sort of therapeutic governance (see ‘therapeutic enlightenment’ in the introduction) endorses inwardly directed expertise when aligned with a pre-existing internal universal truth. This inwardness manifests through a reflection operating in an ‘ideal speech’ situation.
As a result, ‘ideal speech’ leads to cognitive moral absolutism. For even if truth derives from language and hermeneutics, what is allowed to be an object of a hermeneutic analysis and the level of certainty that can derive from such an analysis are part of the debate. It is this kind of linguistics and moral philosophy that Foucault has associated with ‘projects of man’ in his own understanding of Kant’s enlightenment. In this immanent rational space (ideal speech), religion, spirituality, ideology, and the imagination of the subconscious are excommunicated with the aim of establishing boundaries to reflexivity via subjectivity.

Habermas does search for the ultimate foundations of knowledge and values on the basis of projecting an inner nature into universally valid language structures which aim at identity formation (see Held, 1989:252, 253). This again Platonic function contrasts Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s antipathy of systemic thought (see Held, 1989:253), and, I would add, opposes the Foucauldian ethics of detachment from doctrines of universality.

This section has initially indicated the ‘absolutism’ of Habermas’s core ideas. This indication has been linked with contemplating the historicity of his ideas as a means to suggest that what Habermas perceives as a transcendent immanent place of reason is merely an account of reason tied to certain philosophical ethical trajectories.

3.1.2. Key terms and ideas: Crystallising cognitive ethics

This sub-section continues putting Habermas’s ideas into historical context. However, I now explicitly connect reason and language with ethics, while contemplating again its connection’s historicity. In other words, although, the issue of language is only important in regard to understanding Habermas’s philosophy rather than in terms of engaging in linguistics, I do pay attention to how linguistics are tied to Habermas’s ethics.

An important concern for Habermas is to establish the value of reason in a manner distinct from the processes that have forged instrumental rationality. His disagreement with Foucault and Weber has not obviously been over the domination of instrumental rationality. For Habermas, there are indeed dominating instrumentally rational structures from which the individual should be emancipated. The difference is that Habermas attempts to establish a concrete alternative of rationalism rooted in communication tied to a universalist approach to truth’s status in regard to human action.

A first analogy with the parrhesia of ‘Alcibiades’, in which reason is manifested into a verbal expression that is in turn used to dictate ethical action or behaviour for the subject, can be traced to Habermas’s understanding of truth in connection to reason. As Habermas establishes early on in *The Theory of Communicative Action* (see 1984:8), reason can be traced in the way that we acquire and use knowledge. This ‘acquisition’ concerns speaking and acting subjects. The use of the word ‘subject’ in this context immediately connects, in a sense, reason with subjectivity. Also,
the connection of ‘action’ to ‘speech’ points towards the linguistic undertone of Habermas’s efforts to define reason through language.

Of course, even Habermas, who is the most prominent advocate of using language as a means to channel a universally valid rationalism, has also acknowledged a variety of situations in which what is rational cannot be straightforwardly defined, specifically when communication is hindered by (existing) knowledge (see Habermas, 1984:8). Knowledge can always be unreliable if it has not been produced within the proper context.

In any case, my framing here aims to highlight that indeed there is this congruence between Habermas’s and Foucault’s approach in terms of questioning existing knowledge. This congruence becomes more evident in the next section. However, Habermas seeks to set the proper conditions of knowledge production. Foucault questions the ability of knowledge to be universal, and he finds such a quest for universality to limit for oneself the search for what truth is.

Still, Habermas does suggest that reason can be captured by the rational speaker’s ability to identify the limitation of his own understanding (see Habermas, 1984:9). As such, it becomes clear that Habermas’s universality does not quite suggest from the beginning a definite set of universal doctrines. Habermas outlines an ethics of communication founded on reason (i.e. ‘cognitive ethics’) which can lead to such doctrines.

By this token, these ethics do have to eventually lead to a congruence between opposing views (see Habermas, 1984:11). This congruence essentially nullifies the value of accepting the limitations of one’s own understanding. This conclusion appears paradoxical, but is not. For if one has to reach a consensus through communication, this consensus cannot be conclusive. In the best case scenario, one can see the merits of others arguments. These merits do not ipso facto lead to an overarching understanding of the world associated with a liberal democracy, however, even if liberal democracies rely on such public spheres of communication.

Therefore, ‘congruence’ in Habermas suggests more the ability of both speakers to grasp through their interaction a pre-existing universal truth for their topics of concern. The limitations of their individual understanding and the value of maintaining a distinct point of view are supplemented by an ability to grasp universally valid claims:

An assertion can be called rational only if the speaker satisfies the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about something in the world with at least another participant in communication (Habermas, 1984:11).

But, in order for one to reach to such an understanding, language should be the vehicle of a universal reason that two individuals are able through their interaction to channel.
In this context, ‘communicative action’ signals a quest for universality rather than a transgressive experience. Again, one can identify here the Platonism of the ‘Republic’ and its ‘theory of forms’. Habermas presupposes that there is an ideal emancipatory space in which two individuals can come to meaningful agreement. One can obviously suggest that the individuals who use any kind of formal Western language are always subjects of the Western system of knowledge who (i.e. the subjects) merely express different nuances of their own knowledge via cultural variations reflected in different languages. Hence, knowledge maintains its power over the subject within the well-established so far Foucauldian connection between knowledge, power, and ethics. The congruence in communication that two subjects may reach will most likely re-appropriate existing power structures (i.e., ‘structures of domination’).

It is in this context, that it is suggested in this thesis that one should not try to evade a certain manifestation of knowledge (instrumental rationality) on the basis that it does not allow the subject to govern itself. For, if the individual remains tied to its subjectivity, it will always maintain ties to ‘games of knowledge’ that are, in turn, rather inherently tied to ‘structures of domination’.

By this token, given its connection with subjectivity and ‘games of knowledge’, ‘communicative action’ itself becomes the source of a ‘governmentality’. It is concerned with producing knowledge in order to govern the freedom of others and of oneself through a misleading ‘ideal space’ that is presented as being beyond ‘structures of domination’, although it is not, since the ‘actor’ in this ‘space’ is the subject. And, subjectivity is a product of ‘games of knowledge’, which are prone to stopping ‘games of power’ (i.e., structures of domination’).

One can extend this power structure account to the ‘public sphere’. Civil society also appears to be this ‘ideal space’ beyond power structures, when it essentially consists of the subject of power that operates within the ‘structure of domination’ that is the ‘civil society’. For I remind that in Foucault civil society is not a milieu, as the power relations operating within it are inherently guided by the dispositif (see introduction and Part I).

Still, a better understanding of whether Habermas endorses a pre-existing form of universality is needed. For Habermas suggests that ‘A goal directed action can be rational only if the actor satisfies the conditions necessary for achieving his intention to intervene successfully in the world’ (Habermas, 1984:11). At the same time, though, Habermas also suggests that success is not the main condition for rationality. The intention is the criterion of such rationality. In addition, one could also argue, for example, that fundamentalist subjects and other radicals do fulfil those criteria. They, after all, also have an intention and a plan to materialise that intention.

In this context, I shall turn to Habermas’s distinction between the ‘realistic’ and the ‘phenomenological’:

The first, which for the sake of simplicity I shall call the ‘realistic’, starts from the ontological presupposition of the world as the sum total of what is the case and clarifies the
conditions of rational behavior on this basis. The other, which we can call, the phenomenological, gives a transcendental twist to the question and reflects on the fact that those who ‘behave rationally must themselves presuppose an objective world (1984:11).

In the first case, one can identify a pragmatically narrowed goal-directed action concerned with how the subject can influence their reality within the constraints of existing structures (instrumental rationality). In the second case, a Platonic transcendental realm sees emancipation in capturing an objective universalist real that is ‘hidden’. In the first case, reason is bound by existing power structures. In the second, the individual is bound by this universalist mentality that also gives birth to power structures within interaction of the knowledge, power, and ethics.

Habermas, of course, clarifies that the phenomenological does critique the objective on the grounds of identifying the good for a certain cultural community. Still, in that case, an effort is made to treat the West as such a ‘community’. This effort sets fixed parameters or sites of veridiction for the West as a system of knowledge thereby contradicting Foucault’s open-ended account of the West as a system knowledge tied to the premise that in the West these parameters are somewhat loose, so room exists for ongoing transgression.

Habermas’s view on how to universalise the project of modernity clearly tries to set explicit parameters (i.e., sites of veridiction) under a certain use of reason. Habermas explicitly uses the words ‘intersubjectivity’ (see Habermas,1984:13) to refer to an issue of interpretation that I would connect to the ‘game of knowledge’. This use is no different from Plato’s aim to identify ideal reason for governance of a Greek ‘polis’, while in the process hinting that this ideal reason derives from an overarching universality.

All in all, Habermas attempts to bring together these two functions of rationality (i.e. realistic and phenomenological) in ‘a theory of communicative action’. The latter is to become this desirable function of reason that derives from intersubjective relations. This reason can evade the strict limitations of the instrumentally rational environment and successfully define the objective through its the ability to bring rational exchange to an end by reaching to intersubjectively defined validity claims.

Habermas reiterates the quest for the objective or universal as a goal. He accepts that various forms of irrationality (i.e., hallucination, paranoia, bias, blindness, deafness, false consciousness [see Habermas, 1984:14]) should be taken into account by the rational speaker rather than merely disregarded. This acceptance happens on the basis that, although they do not entail a different truth, they can be an indication that there is an inadequacy on behalf of all interlocutors to determine and communicate the truth. Such forms of ‘irrationality’ might indicate that the ‘validity claims’ need further work to reach the objective. Still, Habermas’s take on ‘irrationality’ differs significantly from Foucault’s (1964) take on how madness was treated in the Renaissance. During that period, many embraced the wisdom of the mad, which according to Foucault indicates an
acceptance of the limitations of disregarding outlooks on life on the basis of a transcendental account of reason.

Hence, Habermas’s dialectic interaction does resonate with Socrates’ parrhesia, which, on many occasions, had Socrates accepting his own inability to articulate the truth after debunking a false belief. However, the interaction between reason and forms that challenge reason is, in Habermas, underpinned by a ‘dialectic of progress’. The ability to progressively reach, within by and large the same structures, an objective universal truth with doctrinal affiliations is not questioned. Therefore, ‘communication’ becomes an alternative to the progressive enlightenment found in the scientific method. A ‘communication community’ emerges here as the basis of Habermas’s notions of the public sphere supported by communicative rationality (see Habermas, 1984:15).

In other words, Habermas does not suggest that ‘there is no right but there is wrong’ in the sense that we should never become concerned with finding an absolute right. He suggests that we should use the wrong to find that right. We should interpret the wrong in order to reach the right. But, when finding that kind of ‘right’ becomes the goal, new ‘structures of domination’ are inevitably built. Instead of decomposing ‘wrongs’ in order to find the possibilities of what might be true for one self, one decomposes ‘wrongs’ to build one universal truth that can be recognised only by the subject of reason.

Moreover, there is a more obvious issue with Habermas not taking seriously into account the reasoning behind ‘deviant’ behaviour. It can be argued that Habermas ultimately suggests that any strong beliefs rooted in very unique understandings of the world connected to cultural values—which he probably associates with traditional discourses—are not rational behaviour (see Habermas, 1984:17). Habermas, as a matter of fact, connects tradition to the mythical as a means to roundly devalue the possibility of other rational valid types of social organisational values. According to Habermas, the ‘enchanted’, mythical, traditional societies exhibit the ability to execute reasonable tasks such as ‘work’ and ‘communication’. In that case, however, such tasks are connected to distorted values that fortunately do not at least prevent the execution of these ‘reasonable’ human tasks that define human nature:

To sum up, we can say that actions regulated by norms, expressive self-representations, and also evaluative expressions, supplement constative speech acts in constituting a communicative practice which, against the background of a life-world, is oriented to achieving, sustaining, and renewing consensus—and indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims. The rationality inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons…Thus the rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue communicative action with other means when disagreements can no longer be
repaired with every-day routines and yet not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force. For this reason I believe that the concept of communicative rationality, which refers to an unclarified systematic interconnection of universal validity claims, can be adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation (Habermas, 1984:17-18).

Subsequently, Habermas makes an important distinction that eventually suggests that his methodology is still a matter of ‘choice’. Habermas suggests that validity claims are not necessarily truth claims when one reflects at the philosophical level. The debate of what kind of ethics or parrhesia one wants to choose is tied to a critique of the other side of parrhesia as non-emancipatory. However, both sides have to accept that in the end it is a matter of choice and perspective. One can assume that Foucault does acknowledge that genealogy is also, in a sense, a form of governing oneself. And, the ‘game of truth’ that genealogy engages in suggests how genealogy cannot criticise something without maintaining this quest for alternative points of reference within a loose historicity that has no clear beginnings and endings. Habermas’s philosophical ethics, however, promote an interaction between individuals that do try to channel existing normative values, while assuming that they are able to identify the falsifiability of such norms and transcend it through ‘communicative interaction’.

Habermas connects the transcendental with the empirical (see 1987:297-298). By changing the paradigm from sub-centred to communicative reason Habermas allegedly cancels the critique of subjectivity posed by Foucault (see 1987:301) and he moves beyond absolutism and relativism (see 1987:300). Habermas believes that communicative action does not strip reason down to being merely purposive-rational (as in Weber’s account of the processes of disenchantment in the West). Habermas suggests that ‘communicative reason’ is directly implicated in social life-processes insofar as it makes mutual understanding a mechanism for coordinating action. As Habermas (1987:316) puts it: ‘The network of communicative actions is nourished by the resources of the lifeworld and is, at the same time, the medium by which concrete forms of life are reproduced’.

In other words, Habermas insists that reason can be envisioned through inter-subjective communication: ‘Communicative reason makes itself felt in the binding force of inter-subjective understanding and reciprocal recognition’ (1987:324). Habermas explicitly talks about a communal responsibility (see 1987:316). He also pays tribute to Judeo-Christian morality by means of a certain notion of betrayal. Habermas replaces the betrayal of the covenant with god, which is related to betraying both the self and others, with a betrayal of enlightenment (see 1987:325). Habermas inevitably argues in favour of taking care of others as a means of taking care of the self. He also talks about ‘a potentially universal confederation against betrayal’ (1987:325). This account leads back to a concern with the ‘polis’ and its universals. Moreover, Habermas’s emphasis on this type of betrayal reveals a mistrust of the self which Foucault identified that came about when Christianity switched from a parrhesiatic relationship with god to the ‘fear of god’ (see Chapter 2).
At the same time, Habermas appears to perceive the lifeworld as a ‘milieu’. This is problematic in the sense that it is unclear whether the contingency of a certain lifeworld is taken into account. Habermas is not troubled by the contingencies of the lifeworld. Overall, he acknowledges an instrumental rational dispositif, but removing such a dispositif does not equate to having a pure lifeworld as a milieu. For a start, Habermas himself does not allow a value free lifeworld to exist as he focusses on arguing that communication also shapes the lifeworld. This argument suggests a transcendental account of communication in which communication can supersede existing structures in order to re-appropriate the lifeworld.

It is in this way that Habermas fails to understand that ‘the communicative potential’ of reason is not merely distorted ‘in the course of capitalist modernization’ (1987:315). It may be, but this does not mean that there is a transcendental potential of communication that has been merely distorted. An ideal communication is not one and the same as a value free lifeworld. Here, it becomes clear that both Habermas and Foucault do not believe in a preexisting transcendental, per se, but in the envisioning of plausible transcendentals. But, in Foucault identifying the parameters that allow such envisioning is a work in progress, while in Habermas there is a legislation that sets the conditions that will ipso facto lead to a certain envisioning. Hence, Habermas’s argument that he moved beyond relativism and absolutism fails for his legislative efforts are powered by a transcendental notion of communication. The transcendental comes back. Habermas, by discarding the importance of power and its interaction with knowledge and ethics (see more in 3.2.1), does not claim that communication can shape reality as a certain ethical conduct due to the fact that the games of power are open-ended. He rather suggests that he liberates the true power of reason tied to communicative reason. This transcendental and universalised reason is set free to shape the lifeworld.

In addition:

A second set of problems concerns the question of the ontology of reason in communication. While Habermas would clearly recognise his own theory of law and democracy as a historically specific, context-dependent one, he also claims it reveals that there are universal normative principles in the actual conditions of democratic and legal practice, even if these can only be stated in terms that are open to revision. Such a position depends, as Kelly (1994b: 388–90) has argued, on the positing of a ‘context-transcending’ aspect of critical reflection in the face of the historicity of reason that in turn depends on the acceptance of Habermas’ claim about the ontology of reason in communicative action. If the latter cannot be justified, then it can only be accepted as a particular ontology and the context transcending powers of reason become a matter of faith. As for that ontology, there seems to be at least one point at which Habermas is caught in what he would call a ‘performative contradiction’ (Chambers, 1996: 234). Habermas admits that his notion of an
ideal speech situation can only operate as a regulative counterfactual (Dean, 1999:186).

This argument is further developed in the next chapter, but it is important to note here that individuals reach for validity claims within the very same reality that any other social interaction takes place. The place of ‘ideal speech’ becomes here clearer as something not outside the system of knowledge. It is a cognitive place that merely allows the subject better to contemplate what has been already instilled in her own mind, which can be either systemic or intuitive. Under the conditions of a certain social construction of subjectivity, the intuitive might as well be the systemic rather than the natural. Hence, the distinction between the two is difficult to define, especially, as mentioned before, when the subject is restricted by a certain language (an amalgam of Greco-Latin characters) tied to certain norms. Validity claims are linked to a discussion operating within a certain value charged language.

Habermas chooses to act within a predominantly set reality (modernity). Such a reality can be dialectically transgressed via the cognitivist position that operates at the practical level tied to communicative interaction. The cognitivist position aims to resolve the philosophical disputes by the way of argumentation in response to practical questions (see Habermas, 1984:19).

A certain use of language powered by a philosophical approach that suggests that subjectivity should be put to the test of argumentation leads to a certain kind of ‘therapeutics’. Habermas interprets psychoanalysis as a rational emancipatory action that calls the subject to rationally reflect on its own subjectivity. This conception contrasts with those psychoanalytic approaches closer to Foucauldian ethics on the basis that they try to question subjectivity as such.

In addition, the therapeutics operating at the intersubjective level manifests in the necessity of communication to reach understanding in order to be considered valid. Habermas recognises strategic thought as rational, as the subject might be deliberately concealing certain facts from his communicator (Habermas, 1984:22). However, he promotes such communication in which both interlocutors genuinely want to reach an agreement tied to validity claims. In that case, both speakers should be able to be ‘cured’ of their potential ‘irrationality’.

Granted, Habermas’s account of irrationality is not something that is in stark contrast with reason. Habermas characterizes irrationality an inversion of reason. Still, if one cannot identify something more in irrationality rather than mere inversion one does more or less place irrationality in opposition to reason. And, once more the quest of Habermas (1987:324) to identify rationality is directly linked to communal responsibility: ‘Any violation of the structures of rational life together, to which all lay claim, affects everyone equally’.

In other words, Habermas’s communication is a form of parrhesia. Socrates also engaged in his own dialectics via his famous ‘dialectical method’. But, as Foucault interestingly suggests,
the purpose of the parrhesia that one finds in ‘Phaedo’ and ‘Laches’ is not necessarily to point to irrationality on the basis of something else better understood as the truth. It is concerned with pointing to the limitations of a certain understanding of truth. Such limitations do not necessarily coincide with irrationality, and parrhesia is also concerned with opening the possibilities for another possible truth (as discussed in the introduction and Chapter 1). At the same time, irrationality, although not a bearer of some sort of mystical truth, is more than a mere inversion of reason (see also in 3.2.1). More importantly, in Socrates, inter-subjective communication does not have the value that we find in Habermas. Socrates puts his understanding and the understanding of others to the test of life. His dialogues are a vocalization of this test. He uses the connection between the bios and logos in order to lead his interlocutor to a certain problematisation. And, this problematisation will then unfold individually by a return to an encounter with logos. There is no inter-subjective recognition of a validity claim. It is the opposite of that. Ones should have already recognized something about the situation and the other by measuring in his mind the connection between the bios and the logos.

But in Habermas validity claims operate differently:

Thus rather than the test of successful universalisation being found in the ‘monological’ Kantian categorical imperative which asks whether a world regulated by my maxim would be logically consistent, Habermas claims that the question we ask ourselves would be a ‘dialogical’ one closer to ‘would everyone agree to be regulated by my maxim?’ (ibid.). Habermas cites McCarthy on this shift: Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be a universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively testing its claim to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will without contradiction to be a general law to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm. (Habermas, 1990: 72; discussed in Dean, 1999: 178).

All in all, it becomes clear that establishing ‘validity claims’ is key in Habermas, specifically their use in a manner that is at least open to the possibility of trying to reach a consensus which can produce universal truths graspable at the level of the social (i.e. knowledge). ‘Grounding’ different kind of arguments is what Habermas does in order to indicate on what grounds a defining argument can be made in all sort of argumentation:

What grounding means, can be explained only in connection with the conditions for discursively redeeming validity claims. Because descriptive, normative, evaluative, explicative, and, moreover, expressive sentences are distinguished by their form, semantic analysis makes us aware that the meaning of ‘grounding’ changes in specific ways with changes in the sentence form. ‘Grounding’ descriptive statements means establishing the existence of states of affairs; ‘grounding’ normative statements, establishing the acceptability of actions or norms of action; ‘grounding’ evaluative statements, establishing
the preferability of values; ‘grounding’ expressive statements, establishing the transparency of self-presentations; and ‘grounding’ explicative statements establishing that symbolic expressions have been produced correctly. The meaning of the correspondingly differentiated validity claims can be explicated through specifying in each case the logical (in the sense of the logical of argumentation) conditions under which these can be established (Habermas, 1984: 39-40).

By his own admission, Habermas does not want to further engage in establishing ‘formal-semantic points of connection for systematising validity claims’ (see Habermas, 1984:40). Hence, the problematic element of this ‘grounding’ is entailed in defining these logical points of argumentation, leading back to the doubtfulness of the ability to establish rules for an ‘ideal speech’ situation outside power structures.

In this context, to the extent that one recognises that these logical points of argumentation operate within structures of domination, as Foucault suggests with his genealogy, then one should not be bothered with validity claims. Validity claims are produced within conditions that are rather controlled by power as definitive knowledge on how to govern one’s own self. By engaging in practices of living, validity claims are neither applied to reality nor tested by reality. Any claim to grasp some kind of truth is tied to what could be valid for oneself under conditions of a parrhesiatic self-examination. Subsequently, any general claim acts as a ‘knowing how’ to find the truth rather than as an attempt to produce doctrinal truths tied to validity claims.

To conclude, I have focussed on Habermas’s engagement with language as a means of establishing Habermas’s philosophical ethos. At the same time, I have drawn comparisons with Foucault in order to highlight an ethical difference, supported by their distinct methodologies and modes of conduct.
3.2. Foucault’s genealogy contra Habermas’s critique: Methodology and ethics

3.2.1. Methodologies as orientation in thinking

Here I provide a more thorough understanding of Foucault’s ‘genealogy’ and Habermas’s ‘critique’ as both academic approaches and modes of conduct. The further aim of this sub-section is to highlight from this comparison two different orientations in thinking. Habermas’s lack of historicity will be developed more in the next chapter with respect to understanding his institutionalism and legalism in connection to concrete concerns of democratic governance. At the moment, my aim is to focus on the foundational level of Habermas’s lack of historicity. It might be said that there are two layers of ‘Foucault contra Habermas’ discussions. The one is concerned with the struggle for emancipation from instrumental rationality that revolves around how liberalism, democracy and law should be perceived (that is, how the conditions of domination should be set). The other is concerned with the philosophical enquiry of enlightenment tied to the concern of how one ought to live. These interlink but they are also separate. My main aim is to contemplate how this failure of Habermas to understand his own historicity turns a certain ‘orientation in thinking’ (in David Owen’s terminology) in the direction of governmentality rather than emancipation. To do that, I will mainly focus on critically engaging with Habermas’s account of Foucault.

Habermas suggests (1987:247) that Foucault gets ‘caught in the aporias of this self-referential understanding’ in his efforts to achieve a ‘radical critique of reason in the form of a historiography of the human sciences, which starts as archaeology and is expanded into genealogy’. Indeed, Habermas goes further and argues that genealogy – with its focuses on pertinent practises – is even more positivist than the archaeology of knowledge ever was (see 1987:248). If archaeology uncovers ‘the truth-constitutive rules of exclusion in any discourse’ (1987:248) thereby at least dealing with normative understanding, genealogy explicitly tries to decode empirical practices from an objectivist point of view. Habermas argues that ‘Foucault (a) wants to leave behind modernity’s presentist consciousness of time (1987:249) which has to do with (b) the methodological parting with hermeneutics’ (1987:250). Similarly, he suggests that ‘Foucault above all wants to (c) put an end to global historiography that covertly conceives history as macroconsciousness (Habermas, 1987:251).

In this context, Habermas suggests that Foucault’s radical historicism leads Foucault to a transcendental historicism (see 1987:252). This is a weak transcendentalism that is tied to the notion that there are fixed constituted meanings which can be grasped objectively by structuralist methods (see Habermas, 1987:252). Therefore, there is no room for ‘overarching meaning’ as there is only observation of this ‘chaotic multitude of past totalities of discourse’ (Habermas, 1987:253). Through genealogy, the transcendental historian studies the constant reappropriations of power in the sense of the ‘reversal of forces’. The subject disappears in this force of nature that is the
'subjectless will of a power effective in the contingent and disordered to-and-fro of discursive formation' (Habermas, 1987:254). Habermas suggests that this is a historiography that ‘appears as antiscience’ by means of an epochal understanding of Being or ‘the formation rules for a given discourse’ (1987:254). Habermas accuses Foucault of a nominalist, materialist, and empiricist approach. This is in the sense that Foucault suggests that the transcendental practises of power are against all universals. And if that is the case such practises cancel everything intelligible while forcing one to realize that, since they supersede regulation, they can always manifest differently (see 1987:256-257).

Habermas briefly mentions Foucault’s will to truth. He does not refer though to a will to truth as heuristic concept. Instead of discussing the difference that appears in the late Foucault between truth and knowledge he rather uses will to truth to show the relationship between power and knowledge in Foucault. This use would be more appropriately tied to a will to knowledge in which any failure to establish knowledge leads to the production of new knowledge (see Habermas, 1987:281). This process tied knowledge to power (see Habermas, 1987:281). Habermas here is concerned with Foucault’s condemnation of the philosophy of the subject that is tied to ‘his basic idea that modernity is characterized by the self-contradictory and anthropocentric form of knowledge proper to a structurally overloaded subject’ (1987:261). This is the aporia of the knowing subject who emerges from the ruins of metaphysics in order in his finite power to solve an infinite problem (Habermas, 1987:261). According to Habermas, Foucault finds here no longer a will to understand the infinite but an effort to turn a certain understanding of the infinite into ‘the’ understanding of the infinite. The will to knowledge and truth as a self-mastery becomes a will to power per se. Habermas rhetorically ponders if this marks the shift from archaeology to genealogy (see, 1987:265). He then clearly criticizes Foucault that the basis of his understanding can exist only by not ‘thinking genealogically’ for his own account (see Habermas, 1987:269). Habermas emphasizes again how Foucault subordinates the will to knowledge – with all its nuances tied to the history of metaphysics – to a theory of power (see 1987:269-270).

When Habermas finally addresses Foucault’s self-correction he hardly recognizes any positive rectification. Habermas acknowledges that Foucault stated that the genealogy of the subject is tied to both technologies of the self and technologies of domination. But, Habermas suggests that with this account:

‘Foucault’s genealogy of the human sciences enters on the scene in an irritating double role. On the one hand, it plays the empirical role of an analysis of technologies of power that are meant to explain the functional social context of the science of man…On the other hand, the same genealogy plays the transcendental role of an analysis of technologies of power that are meant to explain how scientific discourse about man is possible at all (1987:273-274).
Hence, ‘genealogical historiography is supposed to be both at once – functionalist social science and at the same time historical research into constitutive conditions’ (Habermas, 1987:274).

Habermas then argues that ‘this approach cannot lead to a way out of the philosophy of the subject’ (see 1987:274). Foucault allegedly merely ‘reverses power’s truth dependency into the power-dependency of truth’ (1987:274). Hence, Foucault cannot escape from all the aporias that he attributes to the philosophy of the subject by means of reversing its concepts (see Habermas, 1987:274).

It is in this way that Habermas sets the conflict in the terrain of who is more able to claim an objectivist historicity by focusing on Foucault’s attempt to construct his own objectivity. For this reason he rather ignores the Foucault that attempts to identify different possibilities in order to move beyond existing potentially limiting understandings. This Foucault exists even in the genealogy of power and more so in the genealogy of ethics. Habermas, although meticulous in trying to understand the early Foucault, simply discards the late Foucault as caught in a self-contradiction. Habermas last effort to understand Foucault tied to his final verdict is that the attempt to ‘imagine the unimaginable’ connects a radical historicism with an aesthetic modernity. This connection suggests that Foucault’s historicism tries objectively to establish relativism (see Habermas, 1987:275-276). Habermas (1987:275) mentions Veyne and it is Veyne and Gutting indeed who, as noted in the introduction, pointed to Foucault’s flirtation with both objectivism and fully aesthetic relativism. However, they have also indicated how attempting to refute Foucault in this manner is indicative of an ill-informed intention. For, it was the late Foucault that not only highlighted that his early work was an attempt to contemplate what could be different by taking advantage of the space that not fully frozen power relations gave him, but who later acknowledged that it depends on an ethical preference tied to orientation.

Foucault remained within reason. He did not claim emancipation from reason itself. He merely suggested that there are different ways of envisioning reason than mere intellectualization, that are actually more in touch with the nature of things and thereby more emancipatory. And, he was always attempting to contemplate on what grounds knowledge, and even thinking itself, can be tied to external and/or internalized impositions.

In this context, one does not need to validate any superiority of one’s knowledge, as Habermas accuses Foucault of doing (see 1987:281), rather one needs an ethical preference towards knowledge. This is no longer a pure relativism for in the end it all comes down to the following: One should beware of both those that claim that they possess the truth and those who say that there is no truth.

Habermas claims that he can somehow indentify a more truthful way of living tied to the very fixed historical paradigm that is the liberal society that emerged from the French revolution, while accusing Foucault of suggesting that there is no truth outside power in any past, present or future social paradigm. But, Foucault tried to move beyond this imposed liberal paradigm by
putting forward a quest of truth. There is nothing wrong with not wanting to take sides or not wanting to legitimize any of the existing norms. Once again, Foucault’s political value lies in how to govern the self, while trying to decode how we ought not to govern the self.

Foucault is not beyond subjectivity because he is beyond reason. The knowing subject does not carry an absolute knowledge nor is she (i.e., the knowing subject) the evil opposite of vitality. Foucault does not seek the ‘other’ which is different to reason in an instinctive mode tied to the body (see Habermas, 1987:308). The problem with the knowing subject is that it has to know. When Foucault criticizes the connection of reason to the knowing subject he criticizes neither reason nor any connection between reason and subjectivity. He simply searches for a type of connection that will lead not only to an envisioning or an expansion of subjectivity through communication, but to one that will allow the subject to be self-critical. The subject does not need to know how she ought to envision herself. The subject needs to be able to problematise her own formation. The ability of self-critique is what allows one to always move beyond the boundaries of one’s own subjectivity. It is this ability that makes one both a fish in the fishbowl and an observer of the fishbowl who can understand how one can live within the fishbowl in a truthful way.

Hence, despite Habermas’s premise that Foucault engages with mystical ideas, it is evident that no esoteric ideas are needed that will call for a liberation from the ‘fishbowl’. The fishbowl is not a fixed state and/or place like the platonic cave vis-à-vis a transcendental space outside the fishbowl. There is no alternative platonic transcendentality envisioned tied to vitality. For Foucault the fishbowl is not necessarily a prison. As noted before, if power is everywhere then so is freedom. The fishbowl example has to do with the dichotomy between observer and subject. The point is how one can observe one’s own situation within the fishbowl as a means of transgressing one’s experience; not in the sense of turning the fishbowl into an aquarium or an ocean, but in the sense of changing the limiting connotations associated with the fishbowl. The fishbowl might become a heterotopia that gives to each individual their own space to transgress their experience of life. This transgression may or may not transform the fishbowl into an aquarium or may or may not lead the person to the ocean. But, the point is that no-one can say for sure what the aquarium is or what the ocean is. Those may or may not be the end points of transgression. One should still try to observe one’s conditions as means of envisioning a truth-full way of being.

All in all, Habermas’s critique is based on Foucault’s genealogies of power rather than of ethics. Still, Foucault does not only need his discussion of ethics to defend himself from Habermas’s accusations. For, even though many perceive his archaeology and genealogy as positivist and empirical attempts to deconstruct knowledge for the sake of crafting an alternative to reason - and none can exclude that Foucault has flirted with these premises - he never officially suggested that.

As Dean puts it in Habermas:
Instead of liberal democratic rights and freedoms being means for the legitimation of a fundamentally unjust and unequal social order, they are rendered ‘formal’ by the insidious mechanisms that operate at the level of individual bodies and ensure the docility and usefulness of citizens. The point is that individuals can be understood both as bearers of democratic rights and liberties and, at the same time, as subjects formed by mechanisms of power such as discipline (Dean, 1999:171).

In other words:

In brief, Foucault is concerned with the formation of society, the economy and the population as governmental artefacts and not with the social determination of political forms, which will be Habermas' concern (Dean, 1999:175).

In terms of a charge of legal positivism that separates democracy from all ethical considerations one can argue that in Foucault the analysis of the law is connected to analyses of ‘regimes of practises and truth’ tied to critical reflection. Then, any judgment made by Foucault on the transformation of the law is connected to the ‘self-directed use and development of capacities’ (see Dean, 1987:184). All in all, one must understand that Foucault's engagement with law and democracy is tied to a critical reflection aiming at a ‘self-legislated existence’ (Dean, 1987:184).

In any case, if one perceives genealogy as a fictitious unmasking, although one may deprive it of direct scientific and philosophical value, one actually achieves the main genealogical task which Foucault latter on crystallized. Philosophy becomes again a practice and a pondering rather than a normative construction. So, genealogy was from the very beginning open to criticism only on the basis that it cannot be considered an academic practice in the traditional sense. Foucault wrote in a way that academic value could be found, but genealogy, as Habermas proves, cannot stand an academic scrutiny in the sense of achieving an unquestionable point of external critique. Genealogy can be a hub of critique for those that find this practice as a truthful way to engage with reality which, in an open-ended debate with respect to emancipation and reason, can hold its own ground. If genealogy has to prove that it can stand as a methodology that achieves full neutrality it will fail because it will then have to construct norms that ipso facto lead to neutrality in the same way in which Habermas attempts to suggest that communication can lead to a certain type of linguistically driven normative universality. And, that is the exact opposite of what genealogy attempt to achieve.

This leads back to Habermas own failure to understand the historicity of his account. Habermas’s proposes a philosophy of language instead of the philosophy of the all powerful knowing subject that is clearly linked to transcendentality. This philosophy of language is allegedly not concerned with morality per se. But, this philosophy of language needs very specific historical and moral grounds in order to operate; grounds which Habermas finds by discussing the liberal
paradigm. Habermas has been very understanding of the nuances and the contingences of the liberal tradition. However, he has not considered whether one needs to escape fully from this paradigm. Rather, he equates any attempt of liberal subjects to think beyond liberalism as invoking a mystical account of irrationality. His concern is only for the grounds on which the other must be included and so with debates of the rights of others to maintain alternative values against the dominant liberal democratic paradigm (see also chapter 4). When he accuses Foucault of exploring the contingency of reason he confuses a questioning of the very core of the liberal paradigm with the questioning of reason, per se. It is like accusing Socrates and the Cynics of being sophists just because they were attempting to think beyond the communal paradigm of the ‘polis’.

Once again, the philosophy of language that Habermas advocates is deeply connected to a concern with the ‘polis’. Inter-subjective recognition, and an organized communal paradigm tied to procedural and institutionalized forms of inter-subjective communication and complementary to economic structures, are at the core of Habermas’s ideas. Habermas’s claim that his account is not morally driven is tied to an artificially staged neutrality. Leaving aside the liberal tradition of individual rights, the question can be posed like this: do we establish a moral basis that drives the inter-subjective relations of the community (i.e., republicanism) or do we structure a certain institutionalized network of inter-subjective relations that will produce a certain morality (see also chapter 4)?

Habermas accusation of Foucault can be understood only under the premise that Foucault has to exercise philosophy as a profession or engage in this public philosophy (see Introduction). This is in the sense that Foucault has to either indicate in an explicit manner how his account of self-transgression can be linked to society or, alternatively, to make a revolutionary claim that will bring his account of emancipation vis-à-vis reason.

Judging Foucault by such standards is pointless. Foucault searches for a truthful way of exercising reason that, rather than being excommunicated as literary writing, can be perceived as a philosophical exercise tied to self-care. In other words, insisting that one is irrational when one attempts to say that reason can be envisioned in different ways makes little sense.

It is here that one can understand Foucault’s point about the alternative wisdom of the mad which was appreciated in the Renaissance period. It seems like that in that period there was an open approach to the view that truth cannot be established through an inter-subjective communication that will lead to solid normative validity claims. Each person has its own life experiences which, even if they have led them to certain less desirable outcomes, could possibly indicate something about the human condition in an interaction with existing norms. In other words, it is true that Foucault perceived madness as a potential heuristic source of otherness which was stopped being tolerated with the emergence of certain institutions (see Habermas, 1987:244). But, this does not mean that Foucault embraced mystical irrationality.
Owen puts the distinction between genealogy and Habermas’s critique into an interesting perspective regarding the issue of ‘orientation’:

critique legislates an orientation in thinking in which thinking is oriented to a transcendental ideal and...it articulates this orientation in terms of the project of striving to reconcile the real and the ideal through the lawful use of reason...genealogy exemplifies an orientation in thinking in which thinking is oriented to an immanent ideal and...it articulates this orientation in terms of the process of becoming otherwise than we are through the agonic use of reason (Owen, 1999:21).

This agonic use of reason does not operate between mere alternatives in the sense of different formations of subjectivity manifesting as political expression. Habermas has been concerned with ‘emancipating’ subjectivity, but it is my view that genealogical practice is an experiment of ‘emancipating’ the subject from subjectivity itself. ‘Agonism’ in Foucault should be perceived as an agonic struggle with power structures and their connection to subjectivity. This connection subsists in the interaction between knowledge, power, and ethics. Foucault is concerned with the experiment of disassociating the latter (ethics) from the other two.

In the introduction I gave an account of different approaches to enlightenment. In the process, I made Kant’s essay ‘What is enlightenment?’ (1784) the focal point of different interpretations of enlightenment. Those interpretations attempt to decode Kant to extract different orientations in thinking. Another important essay that is linked to the above essay is ‘What is Orientation in thinking?’ (1786). Owen uses this essay to describe how both forms of critique (Foucault’s genealogy and Habermas’s critique) are essentially exactly that, namely orientations in thinking.

Kant mentions the lawless use of reason (see Owen, 1999:23) that leads to this ‘libertinism’ that can be perceived as a self-absorbed free rider utilitarian ethical conduct (see Owen, 1999:24). The utilitarian spirit might be concerned with maximum utility for the entire society, but such concern is essentially a quest to secure the interests of as many people as possible. Majority rule operates here, linking the interests of the many to utility. Nevertheless, individualism is key. For the measurement of satisfaction is how many individuals are satisfied. Additionally, in a qualitative manner, certain principles related to a pleasure and satisfaction rooted in a materialist capitalist society overpower communitarian and individual ascetic ethical fulfilment. In this context, utilitarianism is linked to the premise that the end justifies the means (see Part I). And, as a result, this ‘libertinism’ leads in turn to new impositions by institutions.

Kant also finds the lawful use of reason to be a threat to enlightenment, as it undermines moral law. The latter clearly leads to an issue of ethics which Habermas builds upon. This discussion of Kantian ethics does not constitute a monopoly on Kant by Habermas’s critique. Kant favours the lawful use of reason in an effort to reconcile, in Owen’s words, ‘the real with the ideal’
via reason (see Owen, 1999:24). Kantian reason in connection to ethics does not presuppose a Habermasean interpretation of this reconciliation. Kant connects criticism and communication from the point of view of a transcendental reflection in which the subject interacts with himself, allowing Foucault to use Kant in a way complementary to genealogical practice under the common grounds of self-transformation.

As well, then, such ethics of enlightenment obviously connect with Foucauldian parrhesia: the type of truth-telling that takes the form of such communication which leads to the care of others and of the self. This communication turns to the self for answers to transform the self. I want to emphasise that it is this transformed self that engages in a ‘communication’ with others. Such communication operates along the line of Socrates’ ‘dialectics’ as they appear in ‘Laches’. None seeks here a transcendental truth to be revealed through the communication of subjects of reason. The aim is rather to push the interlocutor to achieve a self-transformation. At the same time, in this process, this transformed individual, the parrhesiast, tests the validity and the limitations of her self-understanding. This account leads to a reiteration of the core principle of the type of parrhesia that Foucault endorses, namely the one which suggests taking care of the self as a means to take care of the others rather than vice versa.

By contrast, Owen comment,

Habermas shifts this understanding of critique from a metaphysical philosophy of the subject focused on the rational internal structure of individual consciousness to a fallibilist conception of intersubjectivity focused on the reconstruction of the rational internal structure of communication oriented to understanding/agreement (Verständigung) (Owen, 1999:24).

Owen emphasises the above in order to explain how Habermas connects the real with the ideal. I add here that there is a connection with the Platonic theory of forms, as mentioned before, in the sense that Habermas’s critique examines empirical reality by comparing it to an ideal place of theoretical knowledge. The competent speaker should access that ideal place in order to determine what is to be criticised as invalid (see Owen, 1999:25). Therefore Habermas offers emancipation through an idealist rationalism.

The importance in all the above is, remember, the issue of ‘orientation’ which is connected to the key term of the thesis, namely ‘governmentality’. If governmentality is a form of governing freedom in such manner that emancipation becomes a form of an imposed governance, the way that Habermas and Foucault, with their critiques, orient this struggle for freedom is vital.

Habermas has introduced the rules of rational argumentation (linguistic-semantic rules; procedural rules of mutual recognition; and procedural rules of reciprocity that lead to the universalisation principle [U]):
a moral norm cannot be valid unless ‘all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the interests of each individual’ (1990:93) (Owen, 1999:26).

Habermas builds upon this principle his critique which eventually leads to his notions of emancipation (see Owen, 1999:26). That is, he claims that he offers an avenue for emancipation in liberating reason from the domination of only one of its aspects, namely the one linked to the ‘natural’ activities of work and production. For that aspect of reason has led to the one-sided instrumental rationalisation of modernity. Hence, enlightenment can be achieved by reintroducing ‘communicative action’ as the other ‘natural’ manifestation of reason which has been subordinated (see Owen, 1999:27).

At this point, it is necessary to understand what in Habermas could possibly constitute the ‘dispositif’, and on what grounds ‘communicative action’ constitutes emancipation. It is an issue of structures and action in which the one natural human activity, as mentioned before, has dominated the other by forging a dominant instrumentally rational dispositif.

In *The theory of communicative action vol.1*, Habermas offers an account of structures as a form of ‘dispositif’, while suggesting that communication is linked to heuristics, namely to the ability to reflect on those structures:

When cultural systems of action like science, law, and art are differentiated out, arguments that are institutionally stabilized and professionally organized, carried out by experts, relate to such higher-level validity claims, which are attached not to individual communicative utterances but to cultural objectivations—to works of art, to moral and legal norms, to theories. It is at this level of culturally stored and objectivated knowledge that we also find technologies and strategies in which theoretical or professional knowledge is organized with a view to specific practical contexts such as medicine and public health, military technology, business management, and the like. Despite this difference in level, the analysis of individual expressions uttered with communicative intent remains a heuristically productive starting point for systematizing validity claims, since no validity claim appears at the level of cultural objectivations that would not also be contained in communicative utterances (Habermas, 1984:40).

As Owen puts it,

On the one hand the thesis of colonisation argues that the lifeworld (the realm of communicative action) has become subject to systemic imperatives via the media of money and power (Habermas, 1987a:185-208)...On the other hand, the thesis of cultural impoverishment argues that the lifeworld is characterised ‘by the elitist splitting off of expert cultures from the contexts of everyday practice’ (Owen, 1999:28).
In his essay ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’, Habermas argues that as a result the distance has grown between the culture of the experts and that of the larger public...With cultural rationalization of this sort, the threat increases that the life-world, whose traditional substance has already been devalued, will become more and more impoverished (Habermas: 1981:8-9).

Finally, there is the lawless use of reason as a threat to enlightenment, which Habermas takes from Kant. At a first glance, the issue of cultural impoverishment is not what casts critique in a stark contrast with genealogy. It is the lawless use of reason that Habermas uses against Foucault in order to establish his own critique of instrumental rationality as the only legitimate one.

‘Genealogy’, according to Habermas, falls into performative contradiction, entailing poor use of reason, which undermines morality (see Owen, 1999:29). Briefly, for Habermas, genealogy falls into the same category as postmodernist cultural demise (see also next Section 3.2.2):

Habermas’s concern here is that ‘genealogy as a practice, that is, as an exercise of the right to communicative freedom, seduces and corrupts youth through its promotion of an aesthetic language of transgression which replaces rational argument with subjective judgements of taste’ (Owen, 1999:29).

In other words, Habermas fails to recognise that Foucault’s contingency is also rooted in acknowledging a choice between different philosophical ethics rather than in the absence of such ethics. For, against the anything goes culture of postmodernist identity politics, Foucault’s claim through his genealogical ‘fictions’ was to set that rudimentary ethical conduct that can lead to an emancipatory way of living.

I have here explicitly elaborated on Owen’s suggestion that the difference between Habermas and Foucault, between ‘critique’ and ‘genealogy’, lies in the legalistic aspect of Habermas’s orientation in thinking. Habermas philosophical critique attempts to use reason as a means to forge new legal frameworks. His quest is for linguistically produced validity claims able to be organised as new moral doctrines of universality to govern the aesthetic experience within a culture produced and/or governed by ‘communicative reason’.

3.2.2. Aesthetics

This sub-section builds upon the above argument about ‘cultural demise’ in order to highlight an essential conflict between Foucault and Habermas regarding ‘aesthetics’. This conflict will further crystallize their notable differences concerning the kind of ethics that guide their methodologies, and, as an extension, their emancipatory suggestions. In other words, this discussion of aesthetics clarifies the grounds on which Habermas condemns ‘genealogy’, while at
the same time indicating why this condemnation verifies Habermas’s subscription to an ‘orientation in thinking’ that ‘legislates’.

To start with, Habermas correctly suggests that cultural values are not universal values, meaning one cannot simply justify her taste based on her culture such that culture would legitimise once and for all this taste (see Owen, 1999:42). Habermas uses ‘communicative interaction’ as the measurement of a plausible universalisation of human behaviour that can dictate that certain cultural tastes might be indeed oppressive for the individual and the community.

Therefore, there is a stark contrast between Habermas and postmodernists, who draw from ideological and cultural differences either to connect emancipation to an ‘anything goes’ chaos or, via identity politics, to the ability to escape from an overarching culture that has been naturalised and universalised.

Somewhere in between Habermas and postmodernist epistemology, one can find the reduction of life to expressions of taste. Such expressions of taste are, in turn, tied to subjects acting within a capitalist universe. This capitalist context is rather the ‘trap’ set by reflexive sociology in connection to a certain cosmopolitanism and the trap into which it falls. Beck and Giddens, as I discuss in Part III of the thesis, are the champions of such rationales. Held, as well, has raised the problem of accepting the possibility of certain distorted communications, while building a theory upon communication that promotes an ideal and universalist form of communication (see Held, 1989:286). In this context, Held also embraces a certain reflexivity along the lines of Beck’s and Giddens’s cosmopolitanism (see Chapter 6).

As a matter of fact, a certain group of authors who attempt to merge Habermas with Foucault rather propose as a middle ground a reflexive subjectivity. Tully, for example, is particularly interested in such connection between Habermas and Foucault, aiming ‘to determine how it is possible to establish relationships of intersubjective recognition which balance both communion and distance, and equality and difference’ (Tully, 1999:196).

By this token, Tully, instead of perceiving ‘agonism’ as a battle with the mode of subjectivity itself, rather perceives the formation of subjectivity as a field open to ‘agonism’. As a result, ‘agonism’ leads to politics of life-style—within a mostly reflexive dispositif—rather than an ethos of thinking beyond the limitations of subjectivity (see Part III). Tully’s interest in cultural recognition, civic freedom, and global citizenship clearly matches reflexive cosmopolitanism and its life-politics and sub-politics, which I develop as this other sub-conduct of neogovernmental conduct.

This brief discussion on reflexivity helps me to pave the ground for the conceptual analysis next offered in the Habermas-Foucault debate. In other words, I want it to make clear, for the purposes of Part II, that Habermas is against any kind of metamodernist cultural ambiguity, a factor
that distances Habermas not only from postmodernism but, in many ways, even from cosmopolitan scholars (see Part III and Chapter 4).

The issue is that Habermas perceives a certain kind of pluralism as cultural demise. In regard to postmodernism in particular he argues that this pluralism has nothing to do with social democracy and leftist culture, since it has rejected modernity altogether. As far as neoconservativism is concerned, it acts as a contributing factor to this postmodern condition, appearing in many ways to be content with the further technocratic governing of such pluralism.

Habermas, then, discusses the cultural aporias that the avant-garde movement of modernity has created as it attempts to move from a critique for the sake of human betterment that remains modern to a postmodern stage which critiques notions of betterness per se. Habermas is wary of the neoconservatives who in the midst of these processes leading to cultural ambiguity attempt to reinvigorate the ethics of individualism within a new monetarist calling.

Now, as has been established in the introduction, ‘aesthetic enlightenment’ is the basis of the Foucauldian ‘ethics of enlightenment’ which Foucault enriched with the discussion of self-care and truth-telling in ancient Greece. As Osborne puts it, ‘Indeed, the idea of aesthetics of existence could be glossed simply as stylisation of existence without recourse to moral codes or epistemological norms (Osborne, 1999:46).

Furthermore, he claims, these aesthetics of existence do reflect Foucault’s account of antiquity:

So, in antiquity, in contrast to the world of early Christianity, it was not a question of the fabrication of identity through moral codes but rather an ethical fabrication of existence (Osborne, 1999:46).

Hence, ‘aesthetic enlightenment’ is not merely philosophy operating as art. It is not introspective as a means of merely becoming arrogantly aggressive towards everything. The artists, in the generic sense of the term, should maintain responsibility as individuals for the artwork that they create rather than presenting themselves in a peculiar anti-humanist manner, as the tormented medium of art. Foucault comments, ‘What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something which is specialised or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?’ (Foucault, 1997:xxx).

Thus, Foucault’s account is not about an aesthetic asceticism in the sense of making art the only reaction to the puritanical forces of modernity, and the artist a creative force of nature who stands alone outside of structures of domination. For the critique put forward by the artist remains bound by his epoch (see Osborne, 1998:107). Thus, such critique can create various teratogeneses
(i.e. monstrosities). For instance, one can link god to creativity. The vitality of creation meets the idea of the creator god. In this context, as science once was linked to the effort to understand the mind of god, art becomes the expression of the creativity of god. Moreover, as the Protestant ethos was tied to working as a means to live within the divine order, creating products that in turn become commodities can also play such role.

In addition, as Baudrillard (2005:83) wrote, ‘contemporary art is only contemporary to itself…its only reality is that of its operation in real time and its confusion with that reality’. Art claims a rather false autonomy that justifies Habermas’s critique that art has become independent from the other social spheres, but it essentially leads back to the Foucauldian account that sees art as a byproduct of the politico-juridical matrices, specifically in the sense that artists are oblivious to their own limited understanding of history.

Therefore, art and artist should work in parallel (see also Osborne, 1998:120) as a means to escape from the Hegelian idea of subjectivity in relation to ‘recognition’ which the artist, as this tormented figure who wants to produce in order to be recognised pushes into a hypertrophy. The same could also apply to the ‘megalothymic individual’ of Nietzsche. For Nietzsche also fell victim to misguided perception of creativity. He praised his intellectual work as the ‘product’ that will remain intact in order to comfort himself for his physical demise. Furthermore, there is also his perception of avant-garde art, which although tied to a philosophical background (see his connection between Schopenhauer and Wagner ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’) as a means to merge the Apollonian with the Dionysian, yet suggests a certain mysticism in regard to the artistic practice.

In both cases, in Nietzsche, his account of art can be an indication of conviction, but it can also be a reversed Dorian Grey case. Artists are trapped in a reversed ‘Dorian Grey’ situation in which the picture—social status or some kind of commodity—remains intact, while the artists—or the workers in instrumental rationality—are those who are distorted. Art is rather narrowed down here to the production of material objects, which can lead to the Marxist criticism of ‘commodification of aesthetics’ that presents art as a capitalist superstructure. Hence, as art was in the past tied to spiritual practices, it now becomes tied to capitalist ones.

Therefore, the idea that art is about the production of objects (i.e., products) should be replaced by art as a project of living (see Osborne, 1998:106). Art should be a refuge from normalisation rather than a pretentious state of existence (see Osborne, 1998:110). Art is an avenue for attempting to produce ourselves while possibly identifying the limits to such production.

By this token, art should essentially be an attempt to grasp ‘otherness’. Foucault’s lecture (1967) later published as ‘Of Other Spaces: Utopias and heterotopias’ (see Miskowiec’s 1986 translation), indicates those pacts that operate in non-hegemonic conditions. But, rather than a mere

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3 The example is linked to main theme of the Oscar Wilde book with the same title.
territorial reference, in Foucault, ‘heterotopias’ are linked to both a metaphorical and physical otherness, leading to a will to power as understanding what something is and what else it could be. For this purpose, one has to act at the level of the milieu, which is a space of invention. Otherwise, one operates within the pacts of security or else within false ‘heterotopias’ consisting of simulacra (i.e. symbolic representations that have lost all connection to what they originally represented).

However, despite the ethics behind Foucault’s aesthetics, Habermas directly criticises an aesthetic enlightenment. In the essay ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’ Habermas argues that:

In the mid-19th century, in painting and literature, a movement began which Octavio Paz finds epitomized already in the art criticism of Baudelaire. Color, lines, sounds and movement ceased to serve primarily the cause of representation; the media of expression and the techniques of production themselves became the aesthetic object...But all those attempts to level art and life, fiction and praxis, appearance and reality to one plan; the attempts to remove the distinction between artifact and object of use, between conscious staging and spontaneous excitement; the attempt to declare everything to be art and everyone to be artist, to retract all criteria and to equate aesthetic judgment with the expression of subjective experiences—all these undertakings have proved themselves to be sort of nonsense experiments (Habermas, 1981:9-10).

In this context, it is apparent that aesthetic enlightenment and postmodernism are one and the same in Habermas, on the basis of relativism, so Habermas treats aesthetic enlightenment as borderline modern as it has lost any connection to the view that the modern is an attempt to achieve continuous moral betterment and to improve the quality of life through science and politics.

Again, along the lines of his argument that a radical critique of reason is bound by the philosophy of the subject Habermas has suggested that:

Since, early Romanticism, limit experiences of an aesthetic and mystical kind have always been claimed for the purpose of a rapturous transcendence of the subject…In this constellation, which persists from Nietzsche to Heidegger and Foucault, there arises a readiness for excitement without any proper object; in its wake, subcultures are formed with simultaneously allay and keep alive their excitement in the face of future of truths…by means of cultic actions without any cultic object. This scurrilous game with religiously and aesthetically toned ecstasy finds an audience especially in circles of intellectuals who are prepared to make their sacrificium intellectus on the altar of their needs of orientation (Habermas, 1987:309-310).

As Osborne has argued, Habermas’s work involves a mixture of scientific and therapeutic enlightenment in which aspects of Neoplatonic rationalism can merge with instrumental rationality. This congruence arises, I suggest, in order humanity to capture better the natural order of reason as both instrumental and communicative.
Habermas expands his critique by suggesting how things ought to be. Those suggestions are rooted in the overarching role that communicative rationality needs to assume by preventing the dissolution of culture into different spheres:

In everyday communication, cognitive meanings, moral expectations, subjective expressions and evaluations must relate to one another. Communication processes need a cultural tradition covering all spheres—cognitive, moral-practical and expressive (Habermas, 1981:10-11).

Habermas attempts to bring together science, art and morality at the level of the structure of social production. In tradition, culture and religions go hand in hand, so religious transcendental metaphysics are the regulators of all social spheres. In modernity, according to Habermas a transcendental reason, but not only the instrumentally rational one, needs to be the regulator and legislator of the processes of social and cultural production. This premise leads to the manifestation of one of the two neogovernmental conducts (see introduction). Such conduct attempts to meet economic law and its scientism at the level of the structure.

In other words, one could argue that Habermas attempts to ‘invent’ a new form of governmentality tied to the project of modernity against the ethics of critique, which he attributes to the postmodern aestheticism and its cultural aporias. By this token, Habermas’s approach is essentially an aspect of the dispositif of ‘control’ that emerges from the processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation as it legislates (controls) enlightenment as a constantly self-renewed project from a cognitive ethical point of view.

Therefore, Habermas’s account rather fails to capture the value of a non-scientific knowledge of the self that, as Osborne suggests, opposes this modern obsession with ‘once and for all’ kinds of truths (see Osborne, 1999:47). The condemnation of the notion that one’s life is a work of art rejects Kant’s will for an autonomy of the value of the artistic object, and it disputes Foucault’s reformulation of Nietzsche’s aesthetics in which art as self-transformation becomes a mode of life and life a work of art (see Osborne, 1999:47).

There is once more here a direct connection between this aesthetic understanding of enlightenment and the replacement of morality with the ‘aesthetics of existence’ (i.e. ethics and parrhesia) which Foucault extracts from antiquity (see Osborne, 1999:47).

More explicitly,

What is at stake is an aestheticisation of life...Foucault is thinking here of the *techne ton biou* of classical antiquity, a *techne* not exactly of the self as such, but of life (only later, with the Stoics, and the Epicureans, did the arts of existence begin to centre upon the self). Once again there is a Nietzschean echo (Osborne, 1999:48)
Habermas fails, however, in that he perceives the ‘aesthetic’ as only one of the cultural spheres rather than a possible heterotopia or other space (see introduction) in which certain ethics are developed. As Osborne writes, ‘what is sure is that the idea of an aesthetic morality is most certainly not an injunction to become aestheticist in a narrow sense’ (Osborne, 1999:48).

Moreover,

No doubt, the development in modernity of a form of power centered precisely on the forces of life – namely biopower – served to undermine or discredit the idea that life might be the object of an art... Foucault elaborates on this theme, implying that the aesthetics of existence in the modern world – as it reappears in the Renaissance – appears as a kind of implicit affront to the pastoral power that had been developing in the Christian Middle Ages (1984a:629-30; cf, Foucault, 1984:370). Later from the end of the eighteenth century, the notion of the ‘life of the artist’ took on a certain importance as against the ideologies of ‘interest’ and egoism that were characteristic of bourgeois techniques of the self; ‘the "artistic life", "dandyism" were constituted from the techniques of self that were characteristic of bourgeois culture (Foucault, 1984a:629) (Osborne, 1999:48).

In this context, Habermas, when he condemns the aesthetic sphere, essentially takes the problem of bourgeois art, in which there is a distinction between the artist and the consumer, and makes it a problem of art and of the aesthetic per se. For there is indeed the issue of a capitalism that overlaps with art (i.e. commodification of aesthetics). This overlap gives us the ‘tormented artist’ who is beyond any kind of rational regulation. Habermas credits the surrealist use of the aesthetics for setting the norm of aesthetic creativity. Such aesthetic creativity is rooted in a consumerist society that needs to take aesthetic education in order to understand just enough about art in order to consume it. However, art should be understood as a mode of being rather than as a bourgeois manifestation of culture as an aesthetic sphere. By narrowing down artistic practice from a mode of existence to a cultural aporia, Habermas refuses the possibility of a morality that derives from non–subject-driven self-care.

In other words, the aesthetic ethics that Habermas criticises as leading to a nonsensical relativism highlight the fundamental difference between critique and genealogy in terms of orientation in thinking. Osborne explains,

an aesthetic of existence does not necessarily imply what one might describe as a self-indulgent form of existence, although it might be so: A Greek citizen of the 4th or 5th Century would have felt that his techne for life was to take care of the city, of his companions. But for Seneca, for instance, the problem is to take care of himself (Foucault, 1984d: 348). In short, there is no reason why questions of aesthetic morality should not map on to questions of political morality, and the conduct of the intellectual in the public life (Osborne, 1999:49).
The above quoted piece is very important as an extension of the discussion of the political use of Foucault tied to democratic emancipation discussed in the introduction. Habermas recognises that Foucault’s ethics do not quite lead to issues of democratisation of the state, which does not mean that, (1) such ethics are solely individualistic, and (2) that they cannot in some ways be concerned with the ‘polis’. However, as Osborne states above, and as it is evident in Aspects of Enlightenment, questions of political morality in Foucault are rather tied to the role of philosophy and social theory and the intellectual in the public life. They are also tied to the ways that such concerns can be mirrored by the individual. However, for the most part, they do not reflect an actual political quest.

Habermas here disputes such ethics by the same means that he disputes instrumental rationality. In contrast to the other neogovernmental conduct (see Part III) that uses reflexivity as a middle ground between the ‘modern’ and what Habermas names the ‘anti-modern’ or ‘postmodern’, namely the negation of universality and progress, Habermas is concerned with something else. Here, he no longer explicitly battles instrumental rationality, per se, but the way that such rationality merges with the anti-modern tendencies of young conservatism, or neo-conservatism, or neoaristotelianism.

‘The Young conservatives’, he says,

recapitulate the basic experience of aesthetic modernity. They claim as their own the revelations of a decentered subjectivity, emancipated from the imperatives of work and usefulness, and with this experience they step outside the modern world. On the basis of the modernistic attitudes they justify an irreconcilable anti-modernism. They remove into the sphere of the far away and the archaic the spontaneous powers of imagination, of self-experience and of emotionality. To instrumental reason, they juxtapose in manichean fashion a principle only accessible through evocation, be it the will to power or sovereignty, Being the or the dionysiac force of the poetical. In France this line leads from Bataille via Foucault to Derrida (Habermas, 1981:13).

‘The old conservatives’, he claims,

do not allow themselves to be contaminated by cultural modernism. They observe the decline of substantive reason, the differentiation of science, morality and art, the modern world view and its merely procedural rationality, with sadness and recommend a withdrawal to a position anterior to modernity (Habermas, 1981:13).

‘Neo-Aristotelianism, in particular’, he comments,

enjoys a certain success today. In view of the problematic of ecology, it allows itself to call for a cosmological ethic. As belonging to this school, which originates with Leo Strauss,
one can count for example the interesting works of Hans Jonas and Robert Spaemann (Habermas, 1981:13).

‘Finally, the Neoconservatives’, he offers,

welcome the development of modern science, as long as this only goes beyond its sphere to carry forward technical progress, capitalist growth and rational administration. Moreover, they recommend a politics of defusing the explosive content of cultural modernity. According to one thesis, science, when properly understood, has become irrevocably meaningless for the orientation of the life-world. A further thesis is that politics must be kept as far aloof as possible from the demands of moral-practical justification. And a third thesis asserts the pure immanence of art, disputes that it has a utopian content, and points to its illusory character in order to limit the aesthetic experience to privacy. One could name here the early Wittgenstein, Carl Schmitt of the middle period, and Gottfried Benn of the late period (Habermas, 1981:13-14).

In sum, Habermas places Foucault’s aesthetics in the same category of postmodernist anti-Enlightenment or anti-modernity account. This attack of Habermas on an aesthetic enlightenment and its ethics of personal experimentation points towards the issue of ‘orientation as legislation’ tied to concerns of political morality in regard to the polis.

3.2.3. Governing freedom

At this point, I want to focus explicitly on how each methodology is linked to a certain kind of truth-telling and self-care in regard to governing freedom. I clarify the grounds on which Habermas outlines a form of ‘governmentality’. This argument leads back to Owen’s emphasis that ‘critique’ is an orientation in thinking that legislates: ‘I want to emphasize the fact that the conception of enlightenment advocated by Habermas is generated by the orientation in thinking in which critique legislates’ (Owen, 1999:30).

The use of the word ‘legislates’ brings full-circle the issue of an orientation in thinking. It becomes evident that what makes Habermas’s ‘critique’ non-emancipatory and ‘genealogy’ a more genuine attempt to grasp the power-freedom relationship in manner that can escape structures of domination is this aim of critique not to orientate but to legislate. Habermas’s critique turns out to be explicitly limited in its inventiveness, as it is tied primarily to an ethical reformation of institutions and the cultivation of procedural forms of deliberation. It is based on forms of regulation. As Owen puts it, ‘genealogy contests this conception of enlightenment’ (Owen, 1999:30)

This other set of ethics gives the possibility to envision enlightenment by engaging in genealogical practice. Rather than using language to reveal universality, genealogical practice merely poses the limitations of certain norms only to suggest that such norms might have to be
overcome for the sake of exploring the limits of individual transgression and the ways to possibly transcend such limits.

Two kinds of parrhesia again appear: first, ‘critique’ as the revelation of validity claims capable of becoming universal within a system of knowledge that expands to include the entire globe; second, ‘genealogy’ as the practice of truth-telling by being in a quest for what truth is for our own self as a means to take care of ourselves.

As Owen puts it,

Foucault also argues that Kant’s critical philosophy introduces a slippage which tipped enlightenment as a critical attitude in which we have the courage to question the limits to which we are subject into the question of critique as reason’s transcendental judging of its own limits in which we submit to its law (1996:386-7). This slippage has typically resulted in the subordination of the expression of the critical attitude to the practice of critique (as, for example, in the work of Habermas) and, concomitantly, to the conception of enlightenment as the project of reconciling the real and the ideal through the lawful use of reason (Owen, 1999:32).

Habermas’s critique fails to provide an emancipation from the interwoven relationship between knowledge, power, and ethics. Habermas with the ideal role of a pre-existing naturalising form of communication debunks the constituent subject, which, as in Foucault, is a product of the historical framework. He replaces that, however, with the limits posed by a naturalised and universalised notion (i.e. communication) (see Owen, 1999:33).

I now discuss the following on the basis of what Owen (1999:33-34) has suggested. The historical framework is depicted by Foucault as the conceptual apparatus tied to the construction of subjectivity. Foucault attempts by outlining that apparatus to expose any form of subjectivity, including Habermas’s conception of it, in order to open the possibilities for transgression. The very method of Foucault’s articulation answers why this transgression is desirable on the grounds that any form of subjectivity can be limiting, in which case emancipation is the understanding that we have internalised an unnecessary self-limitation. Owen emphasises, drawing on Paul Patton, that we are talking here about the necessity of ‘a minimal account of human subjectivity’ (Owen, 1999:34).

In this context, any form of subjectivity leads to subjects of power within the interaction among knowledge, power, and ethics. Power is concerned with governing the conduct of others, which leads back to the issue of the governability of the individual on the basis that he is a free subject on whom power is exercised by other free subjects (see Owen, 1999:34).
Any subject of power, however, has the inherent ability to act in such ways that he can resist to power (see Owen, 1999:34). Domination exists only when the power relations are so asymmetrical that any possibility for resistance has been lost (see Owen, 1999:35).

However (as discussed in the introduction), Foucault argues that in the West, engaging in ‘games of truth’ is still plausible. The ‘games of power’ or power relations have not yet come to standstill. If power is everywhere, then so is freedom. This is where Foucault’s ‘agonism’ emerges, not as a political struggle among different ideologies or identities, but as an individual struggle with power.

The parrhesiatic ethics of self-care overlap with this ‘agonism’ to the extent that we, as subjects of power, struggle to reflect on the power that is exercised over us in a self-directed way. In that case the possibility opens to separate the ethics of self-care from knowledge and power, thereby allowing its escape from apparatuses of domination in which subjectivity becomes the vehicle of imposed internalisation (technologies of the self).

In other words,

Thus genealogy exemplifies the conception of enlightenment as a critical ethos – precisely because genealogy is nothing other than the performance of an agonic engagement with a given limit or form of subjectivity which is experienced as problematic...Genealogy is a practice of freedom, an ethical labour of the self on the self, directed to enhancing our capacity to engage in practices of freedom—or, to put it negatively directed to allowing us ‘to play these games of power with as little domination as possible’ (1997:298). Thus considered as an ethical practice, genealogy orients our thinking to an immanent ideal which is nothing other than the (endless) process of developing and exercising our capacity for self-government (Owen, 1999:36).

Genealogy is oriented towards orienting the conduct of others in the sense of creating a ‘community of self-governed beings’. The word ‘beings’, rather than ‘subjects’ (although it can appear in Habermas as well) has particular importance here, I think. This importance derives from its indication of the effort to move beyond subjectivity. Of course, given that genealogy does not operate in an ‘ideal space’ outside of reality, it recognises that it is the subjects or the citizens who will have, individually, to move in that direction.

One should still, of course, not fail to recognise that genealogy also orients thinking. Genealogy can be a form of critique that is concerned with exercising a certain power over freedom (see Owen, 1999:37).By this token, the difference that leads to the one side of parrhesia that is concerned with the game of truth is as follows:

So while both genealogy qua human beings as practitioners of criticism and any given genealogy qua human beings as citizens call for the assent of others and, in this respect,
make a claim on them, both exhibit a commitment to others as self-governing precisely because both only claim and do not command their assent (see Owen, 1999:37).

‘Claiming’ and not ‘commanding’ makes all the difference in regard to universality and non-universality, the game of truth and the game of knowledge.

In other words,

genealogy articulates both a different relationship to orienting thinking than critique – exemplification rather than legislation—and a distinct conception of enlightenment – the process of becoming otherwise than we are through the agonic use of reason rather than the project of reconciling the real and the ideal through the lawful use of reason (see Owen, 1999:37).

Habermas fails to put ‘critique’ to the test of reason in contrast to genealogy which acknowledges that it, itself, is one of the possible practices of critical reflection as this attempt to write fictions (see introduction) in order to unmask the allegedly non-fictitious certainties. This acknowledgment is connected to a plurality of ways that one can act in connection to a preference among different ethics. By this token, I suggest that genealogy is tied to games of truth in which orientation is concerned with creating the possibilities of an ongoing self-realisation, while crafting those ethics that can possibly create a loose way of conduct substantiated by claiming a certain understanding of truth. In this context, Habermas’s critique should also be under critical reflection within the practices in which the subject uses his reason to contemplate on what grounds it (i.e. the subject) is governed by certain notions on how it should act (see Owen, 1999:39).

Therefore, Habermas, in the best case, namely the one that is championed by all of his readers who attempt to find a ‘reflexive’ character in the function of ‘communicative interaction’, plays ‘the game of knowledge’. The ‘game of knowledge’ suggests a ‘fixation’ with keeping knowledge, power and ethics tied together in a certain manner. This is rather evident in Habermas that, if he does not try to identify a universal form of subjectivity, then he definitely, as I said in the ‘best’ case, tries to identify a ‘universal’ way to formulate subjectivity within certain parameters (i.e. ideal speech).

As a result, critical theory is an extension of the emancipatory role of language. Ideology is a distortion of that role of language which remains unrealised. ‘Ideal speech’ is the nodal point of Habermas’s theory of communicative competence. Habermas goes explicitly as far as to argue that all speech is inherently linked to a consensus with universal validity as the genuine rational consensus. That consensus, according to Habermas, encloses the possibility of truth, justice, and freedom (see Held, 1989:256).

Habermas explicitly links his dialectic of progress with accumulation of knowledge. Against Foucault’s examination of knowledge as such, which is linked to ascetic exercises as
practices of living (technologies of living), Habermas fully engages in a game of knowledge. In other words, accumulation of information and a reflection on that information is the form of emancipation (see Held, 1989:257). It is a connection between enlightenment and ancient Greek notions of democracy. It is a mixture of Neoplatonism with aspects of Christian morality. Foucault perceives that such a mixture parallels the Reformation–Counter-Reformation instrumentally rational reason and morality in the West (see Chapter 2). Such reason and morality attempts to envision a different manifestation of knowledge-driven activity in regard to ‘the technical mastery of the natural and social world and the organisation and alteration of social relations’ (Held, 1989:257).

The rationalism of ‘communicative interaction’ is concerned with norms emerging via interaction. Instrumental or purposive rational action with its technical knowledge, rules and procedures revolves around ‘work’ (see Held, 1989:257). Work, I would add, to draw a direct reference to the Protestant ethos, signalises the instrumentally rational ‘calling’ as the representative of human activity. Habermas suggests, however, that these distinct types of action pre-date modern capitalism, thereby he makes a universalist claim that his typologies capture diachronic human activities. In other words, he does not accept the Weberian or Foucauldian premises that what one can loosely define as instrumentally rational ethics are products of culture. They have been shaped within a certain culture, but his account of the rationality of work that is the foundation of such ethics appears to be a diachronic characteristic of human nature.

By this token, Habermas’s concern is rather that capitalism, being primarily rooted in the first category of rational human activities, faces increasing legitimisation issues, since it attempts to take over concerns of morality and communication through its own rationality and technical language (i.e. the Protestant ethic, utilitarianism, and overall commodification of human interaction).

Returning to the Foucauldian point of view, to the extent that one recognises that similar mentalities gave birth to such ethics that characterise work, economy, and the scientific method itself as a technical rational procedure leading to an absolutist knowledge, instrumental rationality is also a cultural product. It is a cultural product rather than an intrinsic characteristic of human rationality (see introduction and Part I).

Nevertheless, when Habermas disputes instrumental rationality, it is on the basis not of cultural contingency but of also introducing a normative approach to communication that can reveal the intrinsic morality of human interaction. On this basis, he attempts to prevent instrumental reason from interfering with issues of norms and morality which are none of its business (see Held, 1989:259). On the contrary, it is the morality deriving from communication that should interfere with the structuring of the instrumentally rational pursuits. ‘Communicative interaction’ should envision those cognitive moral norms that will guide the organisation of work and economic activity (see Held, 1989:259).
Still, the one dimension of the evolution of human species cannot merely be reduced to the other (see Held, 1989:259). It becomes evident that the cognitive morality proposed by Habermas should in reality aim to meet instrumentally rational conduct at the level of the structure of social reproduction, as a means to achieve a governmental invention through which norms are not merely capitalist meta-structures (see also introduction).

Habermas, after all, favours institutions that embody the spirit of not treating norms as cultural meta-structures. He also explicitly suggests that art should also be susceptible to cognitive moral regulation, or it remains exposed to irrationalism or its commodification. Hence, the relations of production are instilled with a morality that emerges from normative discussions at the level of communicative interaction as the absolutism of a positivistic science interacts with Habermas’s transcendental ethics of reason. In this way, such morality is connected to this dialectic of progress in which communicative interaction as a concrete ahistoric and naturalised depiction of human interaction acts as a complementary avenue for universalist normative beliefs.

Again, on the one hand, we have the Foucauldian ethics of ‘practices of living’ aiming at reaching possibly universally valid, from one point of view, ways of being or of reasoning. It is an issue of identifying ancient wisdom and further envisioning it via ongoing self-realisation. On the other hand, in Habermas, there is a normative definition of acceptable ways of being and reasoning, as another theory-of-forms type of approach, where the universal is clearly defined within the constraints of liberal democracy and of the naturalisation of Western rationalism as an amalgam of instrumental rationality and Neoplatonism.

Therefore, in Habermas’s case, the only perpetual movement of self-realisation is the possibly better realisation of similar things. This account is connected to the limited use of hermeneutics. Habermas attempts to connect hermeneutics to the concrete reimaging of the same norms. As noted before in this Chapter, this understanding of hermeneutics leads him to criticise Foucault (see 1987:250) for abandoning hermeneutics. However, Foucault has rather used hermeneutics in order to extract loosely valid assumptions about how one should search for the truth. Foucault linked his hermeneutical search to a fruitful ‘practice of living’ instead of trying to extract truth in the form of normative moral statements.

The fundamental issue with conceiving linguistic expression as a form of emancipation concerns the necessity for one to be forced to express specific opinions with a certain fixed end point within brief and regulated periods of time (i.e. conversations or public debates), instead of perpetual experimentation operating at the level of more abstract thoughts that become occasionally concrete in a variety of ways, from language to practices. Habermas narrows to merely linguistic expression the complexity of translating thought into action.

Such expression is inherently linked to subjectivity, for the very conditions of this expression suggests that we should identify ourselves within our subjectivity as liberal democratic
subjects. As such subjects we have to envision our existential emancipation within already fixed liberal democratic parameters. These parameters set the terms that the subject has to communicate in a condition of ideal speech as a means to envision modernity better within this dialectic progression of a liberal democratic dispositif.

In the ‘Alcibiades’ type of parrhesia, this ideal rational consensus is based on the one subject ‘correcting’ the other. One takes care of the other as a means to take care of the self. One attempts to take care of the other subject or the polis, which in that case is a universal community, as a means to structure properly one’s own subjectivity.

It is this ‘universal way’ that certain scholars who seek to reconcile Foucault with Habermas attempt to utilise on the grounds of merging Foucault’s ethics of experimentation with the reflective ways that the subject interacts with its own subjectivity. This attempt opens the door for another misuse of Foucauldian ethics tied to the reflexive sociology of Beck and Giddens, linking reflexive experimentation to an explicit governmental invention (see Part III).

For in the other type of parrhesia, the dialectic relationship between the parrhesiast and his interlocutor is a form of ‘practice of living’ along the lines of ascetic practices of experimenting with what truth is. It was not an activity designed to reach something universally valid. Socrates was interested in that sense with what is not true rather than with what it is true (see Part I).

Owen has more appropriately suggested that we are dealing with two different orientations in thinking (see before). Therefore, after we debunk Habermas’s notion that he poses the only valid critique, it is essentially a matter choosing which critical reflection is preferable for what purposes.

I close this section, and the chapter, by emphasising Owen’s account of having Habermas in dialogue with Foucault. In this case the definition of what is a legitimate dialogue guided by reason that aims at emancipation as a certain orientation in thinking is the debate.

Habermas maintains an ‘ideal speech’–driven dialogue of mutual respect. However, in his attempt to establish this possibility, he becomes polemical in his encounter with alternatives (i.e., performative contradiction). Habermas’s dialogue with genealogy entails, according to Owen (see Owen, 1999), a juridical kind of polemics in which Habermas collects the proof of the ‘guilt’ of genealogy.

So, even if Habermas does envision a certain type of parrhesia, it is only the type of parrhesia that we find in ‘Laches’ that can avoid a performative contradiction. ‘Communicative interaction’ suggests that, first, one should accept what the others argue. Allowing to one to argue from a distinct point of view within one’s own system of description is vital. Second, one has the right to try to correct the other, namely to orient him. But, when the orientation is tied to a transcendental account of reason and morality it rather fails to respect others’ opinions. The second function cancels the first. However, on a looser conception tied to the apheretic experimental ethics
of living concerned with what is not true and what it might be true but not what it is true, such contradiction is avoided.

I reiterate once more this difference between the ethics of Habermas and Foucault with recourse to Owen:

On the one hand, for Foucault, mutual respect is understood as an attitude in which we acknowledge each other in thought and action as the self governing beings that we are. This understanding accounts for, and is exhibited by, Foucault’s concern with the topic of the care of the self and the government of others addressed in his work on ancient and modern forms of government (Foucault, 1986, 1988b, 1988c, 1988d). On the other hand, for Habermas, mutual respect is reconstructed as a set of procedures through which we recognize each other in thought and action as members of the class of self-governing beings. This understanding of mutual respect accounts for, and is exhibited by, Habermas’ concern with law and the form of the constitutional democratic state (Habermas, 1996a). In this regard, what is at stake in the encounter is the character of our ethical understanding of ourselves and of our relations to each other as self-governing beings, which is simply to say that what is at stake is the very concept of enlightenment (see Owen, 1999:42).

To conclude, my aim here was to pay particular attention to the issue of governing freedom. I attempted to highlight how the previous discussion of orientations in thinking translates into two distinct ways of governing our own freedom. By this token, I focussed on the way Habermas has envisioned the governance of our own freedom with regard to his method of ‘critique’ as a legislation in thinking vis-à-vis ‘genealogy’ as a looser orientation in thinking. This comparison has led to a governmentality critique directed at Habermas.
Conclusion to Chapter 3

Chapter 3 introduced Habermas’s key ideas within a certain historical context. It focussed on three points of critique relating to lack of historicity, inter-subjective recognition, and proceduralist transcendentalism. These critiques unfolded within Foucault’s distinction between knowledge and truth, which revolves around ancient forms of truth-telling and the debate of enlightenment.

The chapter moved from introducing Habermas’s key ideas to contemplating the differences between Foucault and Habermas organised around the idea of orientation vs. legislation, a discussion of aesthetics, and the governing of freedom. By contrasting two different forms of parrhesia and two different forms of critiquing modernity, the argument highlighted a certain legislative orientation in thinking as a form of governmentality (Habermas) in opposition to a more apheretic and loose orientation in thinking tied to the aesthetics of existence (Foucault). In doing this, I attempted to add to the argument that Habermas fails to understand the historicity of his own ideas.
Introduction to Chapter 4

The second chapters in both Part II and Part III (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, respectively) are meant to be more policy-oriented ones. Chapter 4 presents Habermas’s account of legal rights and deliberative democracy in relation to international politics. I aim to highlight the legalistic, proceduralist, and institutionalist character of his approach, which is concerned with democratic reforms tied to the ‘neutrality’ of communicative legal rights.

I explicitly connect Habermas to forms of democratising regulation tied to particular types of activism as a means of envisioning contemporary developments that could attest to a Habermas-like governing of freedom. This connection is made always from the Foucauldian point of view of a governmentality critique that recognises its own historicity, and it thereby acknowledges the ‘fictitious’ character of its critique, valid only at the level of an ethical preference. Such an ethical preference vis-à-vis others is tied to the ethical axis of genealogy that operates at the level of a history of thought.

In this context, the emphasis on a Habermasean democracy in a civil society operating within a liberal democratic paradigm is stressed as a means to suggest that emancipation is still bound by the liberal democratic paradigm. Habermas’s democracy struggles again to reconcile the market with the public sphere. I highlight a supra-national universality tied to a certain further democratisation of liberal states. A more democratic state along these lines consists of subjects of cognitive ethics that forge democratic public spheres capable of forcing this democratisation of the state internally, while pushing towards various forms of post-national federation at the level of institutions, publics and information structures.
4. The ‘governmentality’ of a ‘world domestic policy’

4.1. Deliberative democracy

4.1.1. A foundational understanding: from communicative action to legal rights

This section attempts to establish a transition from the theoretical level of Habermas’s theory of communicative action to his definitions of legal rights. The latter gradually build towards a certain proceduralist institutionalisation tied to Habermas’s deliberative democracy.

As noted before, Habermas has attempted to distinguish between the purely morally driven aspect of his theory and his philosophy of language to which he attributes certain neutrality tied to communicative reason and its communal responsibilities. In this context, although communicative reason is not the manifestation of a certain morality it does align with a certain morality. As Gronin and De Greiff put it in their editors’ introduction to Habemas’s *Inclusion of the Other*:

Habermas argues that law and morality stand in a complementary relation. The basic human rights enshrined in modern legal orders are essentially *legal* rights, not moral rights that are imposed as an external constraint on the constitution-founding practice of the citizens, though moral considerations enter into the justification of basic rights (1998:xii).

Hence,

Habermas construes morality in broadly Kantian terms as a system of duties grounded in the unconditional claim to respect and consideration of all persons. Moral duties are binding on all beings capable of speech and action and hence have unrestricted or universal scope. However, the very nature of morality means that it is limited as a mechanism for regulating social interaction. The unrestricted universality of moral principles, their highly abstract, cognitive claim to validity, and the unconditional character of the duties they impose create a rift between moral judgment and reasoning, on the one hand, and motivation, on the other. Moral norms provide agents with weak cognitive motives grounded in the knowledge that they have no good reason to act otherwise, but provide them with no rational motives to act accordingly. Moreover, the justification and application of moral norms calls for practical discourses whose highly exacting conditions can at best be approximated by real discourses. Thus moral norms are unsuitable for regulating social interactions between strangers where the practical costs in time and effort of establishing and maintaining the relations of mutual trust required for practical discourses are too high (Gronin and De Greiff, 1998:xii).
In this context,

If we are to do justice to the distinctive mode of legitimacy of positive legal orders, Habermas argues, we should begin by asking what basic rights free and equal citizens must confer on one another if they are to regulate their common life by means of positive law (Gronin and De Greiff, 1998:xiii).

For:

Contrary to classical liberalism, which treats liberty rights as prepolitical endowments and interprets them as negative rights of noninterference, Habermas argues that liberty rights cannot be implemented without broad popular participation in the processes of political opinion-formation of an inclusive public sphere, through which the citizens can influence the definitions of their needs and interests that are embodied in the law. Viewed from this perspective, political rights can be represented as necessary conditions for the realization of the artificial status of legal subject as bearer of rights, because they regulate the implementation of the liberty rights. However, the relation between private and public autonomy can also be interpreted in light of the conception of legitimacy expressed in the principle of discourse (Gronin and De Greiff, 1998:xiii).

The above should be understood in connection to Habermas’s belief that his theory does not depend on a transcendent account of reason. As Gronin and De Greiff put it:

The normative principle on the basis of which participants must decide which rights to grant one another is not grounded in transcendent ideals of reason and the person but is implicit in the presuppositions of communicative action and practical discourse. Thus rights are not treated as moral givens which are imposed as an external constraint on the citizens’ political deliberations but are represented as the result of a process of construction, and hence as an expression of the reason and will of the citizens themselves (1998:xiv)

Habermas believes that identifying the common good is tied to rational debate. He attempts, of course, to clarify that, although a political community must align with these basic rights tied to a major political culture, there should not be a mere assimilation.

All in all, as it will become evident throughout this chapter, Habermas attempts to reconcile liberalism and republicanism within his own legalism. As Gronin and De Greiff put it:

Thus the internal relation between the rule of law and popular sovereignty calls for a proceduralist model of deliberative democracy in which all political decision making, from constitutional amendments to the drafting and enactment of legislation, is bound to discursive processes of a political public sphere (1998:xvi).
Habermas’s account not only distances him from the liberal and republican tradition but also from scholars such as Rawls. I won’t dwell on the Habermas contra Rawls debate. But, I will highlight the importance of their difference as an attempt to further my point that the issue in Foucault vis-à-vis Habermas is not one between a public and a private philosophy that are both concerned with different forms of orientation, but between a public philosophy tied to a transcendental legalism and a private philosophy tied to orientation.

One can attribute to Rawls as well the Alcibiades parrhesia. But, the neo-platonic connotations are more difficult to establish, since Rawls presents his account as an orientation. But, Habermas, as noted before, believes that he escapes a transcendental morality by means of arguing in favour of a transcendental communication when it is obvious that such communication rooted in the liberal public sphere is historically bound.

As Gronin and De Greiff put it:

Such a perspective, he argues, is implicit in the presuppositions that speakers unavoidably make when they engage in practical argumentation, so that the appropriate normative principles can be grounded in a purely procedural manner. Rawls, by contrast, rejects this approach on the grounds that a political theory of justice must be freestanding, and hence can have no part of theories of reason grounded in comprehensive philosophical doctrines such as Habermas’s theory of communicative action (1998:xviii).

Habermas’s need for universality is apparent in his explicit critique of Rawls:

The problem is that the overlapping consensus is not based on shared reasons: citizens simply observe that their fellows accept the political conception for their own reasons but cannot judge whether this acceptance has a genuine rational basis. This attenuated conception of public justification means that Rawls must restrict the validity claim publicly associated with the basic constitutional principles to the weak claim to "reasonableness" (Gronin and De Greiff, 1998:xix-xx).

According to Habermas this leaves Rawls

in the—for Habermas, highly paradoxical—position of holding that publicly defensible reasons can only support a weak claim to “reasonableness,” whereas the private reasons mobilized in defence of comprehensive doctrines can ground the stronger claim to “moral truth” (Gronin and De Greiff, 1998:xx).

Although it is at the ‘cost’ of extensive quotation, it is important at this point to give a clear account of how Habermas understands the connection of reason and morality. As he puts it:
“No reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert:
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens, or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.” Neutrality means, to begin with, the priority of justice over the good, and hence the fact that questions of the good life recede behind questions of justice. However, if neutrality were in addition to require that ethical questions be bracketed out of political discourse in general, then such discourse would forfeit its power to rationally change prepolitical attitudes, need interpretations, and value orientations (Habermas, 1996:309).

Habermas (as discussed in the next sub-section), attempts to reconcile liberalism with communitarianism and/or move beyond them:

From the communitarian side, one hears the radical objection that standards for an impartial judgment of practical questions in general cannot be separated from the context of specific worldviews and life projects: on this view, no presumptively neutral principle can ever be neutral in fact. Every apparently neutral procedure reflects a specific—in Ackerman's case, liberal—conception of the good life. Furthermore, a neutral procedure must not implicitly serve to realize preferred values or goals that prove to have priority from the vantage point, say, of a liberal understanding of law and politics; otherwise, it would discriminate against citizens with different conceptions and value orientations (Habermas, 1996:310).

Hence,

Once an ethical disagreement is uncovered, "neutral dialogue" requires a transition to that higher level of abstraction characteristic of justice discourses, where participants examine what lies in the equal interest of all concerned. In Larmore's approach, this transition appears as a special case of a more general postulate of rational discourse (Habermas, 1996:311).

By this token,

the communitarian objection can be radicalized still further. Even if the neutrality principle could be traced back to a universal rule of argumentation, it is objected, the reconstruction of such rules must rely on the intuitive knowledge of individual participants in rational discourse, normally our own knowledge… One need not expect that this knowledge itself, which is always already intuitively employed, will take as many diverse forms as there are
perspectives. The ever fallible and possibly even false *reconstruction* does not touch the always already *functioning* knowledge. For this reason, we may assume that the know-how informing argumentative practices represents a point of convergence where participants, however diverse their backgrounds, can at least intuitively meet in their efforts to reach an understanding (Habermas, 1996:312).

I believe that there are quite a few problems with the above account of the neutrality of reason as a form of democratic deliberation. As Dean (1999:167) puts it, Foucault makes it clear that one should not tie the function of an allegedly neutral reason to democracy. More so, a project of reconstructing democratic principles as a means of identifying this ‘true democracy’ that facilitates the neutrality of reason is not an end goal. Once again, the historicity of democracy and the way that freedom is produced should filter our conviction that a certain type of democracy needs to be realised.

This account of Foucault ‘exposes’ Habermas in the following sense:

The consequence of these different perspectives is that Foucault adopts a substantive analysis of modern forms of rule as an ongoing and necessary critical task where Habermas seeks to uncover the normative contents of their operation in order to clarify such norms and to contribute to a debate about the development and reformation of democratic procedures and deliberative structures (Dean, 1999:167-168).

In other words,

Foucault's genealogies of forms of power and government can help make intelligible the unacknowledged historical conditions of Habermas' project of a proceduralist theory of democracy and law. One way of understanding these conditions, I contend, is to be found in Foucault's account of the emergence of ‘biopower’, a power over life that aims at the regulation of populations, and its consequences for the transformation of law in advanced liberal democracies...From this perspective, Habermas' proceduralist theory of democracy can be understood as (1) having this transformation as its historical condition and (2) misunderstanding this set of historical conditions as providing a universal set of norms of law and democracy (Dean, 1999:168).

In addition, Dean suggests that ‘in reconstructing the normativity of law and democracy, Habermas leads us to the normativity found in communication itself’ (Dean, 1999:176). This suggestion leads back to the issue of universality as the purpose of legislation is to mirror universalistic principles of justice, while rights ‘are mutually conferred in acts of intersubjective
recognition’ (Dean, 1999:179-180). Therefore, there is an inevitable connection between democracy and law which appears as a necessity (see Dean, 1999:179-180).

In the end, Dean also suggests what has been already highlighted in the previous chapter, namely that Habermas does not engage in a legitimate inter-subjective dialogue with his adversaries as he chooses to charge them ‘with a wide variety of pathological phenomena...from insufficiently elaborated normative grounds, and problems of formal logic to, above all, political dangerousness (Strong and Sposito, 1995: 279–80) (Dean, 1999:189).

To conclude, the three points of my critique of Habermas all reappear. 1) Habermas replaces the philosophy of the subject with a subject of rights tied to a philosophy of language. 2) This subject of rights acquires its recognition through inter-subjective communication. 3) Habermas attributes to this communication a transcendental character. These points lead to Habermas’s lack of historicity; his concern with the ‘polis’; and his inability to break free from transcendentalism. It is the inevitable interaction of each one of the above with the others that create the problem in Habermas’s theory. These foundational issues are directly related to Habermas’s effort to move beyond liberalism and republicanism through his account of deliberative democracy.

4.1.2. Beyond liberalism and republicanism: deliberative politics

I present Habermas’s account of deliberative democracy through his effort to move beyond liberal and republican approaches to law. In the process, I restate my points of critique of Habermas particularly in regard to the contradictory role that civil society has in Habermas’s argument. This contradiction is further pursued critically in the next section with respect to the function of public spheres within an increasingly less state-centric environment.

Habermas ‘starting point’ is the rights citizens must accord one another if they want to legitimately regulate their common life by means of positive law. This formulation already indicates that the system of rights as a whole is shot through with that internal tension between facticity and validity manifest in the ambivalent mode of legal validity (Habermas, 1996:82).

He then outlines his account of civil rights:

In the following I will limit my comments to the four absolutely justified categories of civil rights; the category of social and ecological rights, which can be justified only in relative terms...(1) Norms appearing in the form of law entitle actors to exercise their rights or liberties. However, one cannot determine which of these laws are legitimate simply by looking at the form of individual rights. Only by bringing in the discourse principle can one show that each person is owed a right to the greatest possible measure of equal liberties that are mutually compatible...(2) Unlike moral rules, legal rules do not norm possible
interactions between communicatively competent subjects in general but the interaction contexts of a concrete society... (3) The legal institutionalization of the legal code requires, finally, guaranteed legal remedies through which any person who feels her rights have been infringed can assert her claims. The coercive character of law requires in cases of conflict special procedures for interpreting and applying existing law in a binding manner (Habermas, 1996:125).

Habermas’s account of rights – indeed, the entire web of legal connections that he outlines – is problematic. Let’s say that, as noted before, if it is not subjectivity as such the vehicle of domination, then it is this subjectivity tied to the subject of rights. Habermas uses a theory of communication to establish rights as an inherently inter-subjective relationship that suggests that a person can understand herself and acquire her own freedom only through interaction with others. In this sense, the turn from negative to positive rights ends up being more restrictive for the individual. Habermas would suggest that the subject escapes the trap of acting on some questionable primary/private rights, but there is a concrete construction of what her rights ought to be. Granted this does not come from a direct external imposition. Hence, we are talking mainly of ‘technologies of the self’. In this context, there is a very clear connection between the inter-subjective rights and the Alcibiades parrhesia as taking care of others as a means of taking care of the self. All in all, the subject limits itself by its own cognition in relation to the cognition of others.

Habermas, of course, explicitly says that he overcomes the limitations of both liberalism and republicanism:

According to the liberal view, the democratic process takes place exclusively in the form of compromises between competing interests...According to the republican view, by contrast, democratic will-formation is supposed to take the form of an ethical discourse of self-understanding...Discourse theory takes elements from both sides and integrates them into the concept of an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision making (Habermas, 1998:246).

And:

This understanding of democracy leads to the normative demand for a new balance between the three resources of money, administrative power, and solidarity from which modern societies meet their need for integration and regulation. The normative implications are obvious: the integrative force of solidarity, which can no longer be drawn solely from sources of communicative action, should develop through widely expanded autonomous public spheres as well as through legally institutionalized procedures of democratic deliberation and decision making and gain sufficient strength to hold its own against the other two social forces—money and administrative power (Habermas, 1998:249).
In this context, Habermas insists on the distinct role of civil society:

Popular sovereignty, even though it has become anonymous, retreats into democratic procedures and the legal implementation of their demanding communicative presuppositions only to be able to make itself felt as communicatively generated power. Strictly speaking, this communicative power springs from the interactions between legally institutionalized will-formation and culturally mobilized publics. The latter for their part find a basis in the associations of a civil society distinct from the state and the economy alike (Habermas, 1998:251).

In the next sub-section it becomes clear that Habermas finds civil society to be limited as it is tied to a certain historical sociological paradigm (liberal bourgeoisie) and is thus not equivalent to the public sphere. But, if civil society is the main source of the public sphere it is hard to understand how one can expect a subject tied to a certain historical and sociological paradigm to exercise an ideal of communication tied to public reason and the public sphere. Habermas deals with this issue by emphasizing the importance of an egalitarian liberal background which leads to this contradiction (see more in section 4.2.).

Moreover, as Dean puts it:

Finally, let me mention at least one sense in which Habermas is contra Habermas, and indeed admits it. In the 1980s Habermas tended to oppose the ‘peripheral’ processes of communication in civil society manifested by social movements to the system-steering mechanisms of the state bureaucracy and the economy (1987b, 1996b). In more recent work, as we have seen, he tries to link the process of opinion formation by citizens in diverse public spheres with the institutions of parliament, the judiciary, and administration by a conception of law as the transformation of communicative into administrative power. This shift is encapsulated in a shift from a ‘siege’ metaphor of the relation between communicative action and administrative power into a ‘sluice-gate’ model entailing a more comprehensive process of democratisation in which an element of democratic will formation has to enter administration (Carleheden and Gabriëls, 1996x: 3–4). Perhaps Habermas’ more recent work marks the point where critical theory has finally shed the last vestiges of Marxist critique and become liberal (1999:182).

This liberal character of Habermas’s work becomes evident when he suggests that deliberative mechanisms spread across the social can cooperate with a fundamentally capable to encompass public reason lifeworld:
Deliberatively filtered political communications are especially dependent on the resources of the lifeworld—on a free and open political culture and an enlightened political socialization, and above all on the initiatives of opinion-shaping associations. These resources emerge and regenerate themselves spontaneously for the most part—at any rate, they can only with difficulty be subjected to political control (Habermas, 1998:252).

In this context:

Discourse theory reckons with the higher-level intersubjectivity of processes of reaching understanding that take place through democratic procedures or in the communicative network of public spheres. Both inside and outside the parliamentary complex and its deliberative bodies, these subjectless communications form arenas in which a more or less rational opinion- and will-formation can take place for political matters, that is, matters relevant to the entire society and in need of regulation. The flow of communication between public opinion-formation, institutionalized elections, and legislative decisions is meant to guarantee that influence and communicative power are transformed through legislation into administrative power. Like the liberal model, discourse theory respects the boundaries between “state” and “society,” but it distinguishes civil society, as the social basis of autonomous public spheres, from both the economic system and public administration. From a normative standpoint, this understanding of democracy requires a realignment in the relative importance of the three resources from which modern societies satisfy their needs for integration and steering: money, administration, and solidarity. The normative implications are obvious: the socially integrating force of solidarity, which can no longer be drawn solely from sources of communicative action, must develop through widely diversified and more or less autonomous public spheres, as well as, through procedures of democratic opinion- and will-formation institutionalized within a constitutional framework. In addition, it should be able to hold its own against the two other mechanisms of social integration, money and administrative power (Habermas, 1996:299).

One can trace in this institutionalised framework the rise of a new dispositif that, due to Habermas’s overall lack of historicity, is merely complementary to a liberal instrumentally rationally one.

Therefore, as Dean puts it

‘practical reason no longer resides in universal human rights, or in the ethical substance of a specific community, but in the rules of discourse and in the forms of argumentation that
Once again, it becomes evident that Habermas does not evade universality, while his self-governance rather manifests as technologies of the self due to this connection to a universality which is only inter-subjectively accessed.

Similarly, Dean states again how close together deliberative politics and liberalism are as:

‘Habermas presupposes, contra Foucault, a necessary relation between the rule of law, democracy and liberalism (Habermas, 1996a: 110) (see Dean, 1999:182). This critique once again leads back to Habermas’s lack of historicity that leads in turn inevitably to normalisation.

Dean (see 1999:190), of course, suggests that Habermas claims that he is ‘identifying norms already existing’. But the more fundamental problem is that:

Habermas’ model of deliberative politics presupposes specific kinds of communicating subjects replete with certain individual capacities...It also presupposes political attributes of members of democratic polities such as the will to participate and to reach agreement over basic issues (Dean, 1999:191).

Dean contrasts the above with Foucault by suggesting that:

On Foucault's reading of liberalism, the imperative towards the active participation of the governed in their own government is not, however, particularly new. Indeed proponents of his ‘governmentality’ approach have repeatedly noted that the individual and communal participation of free subjects in their own government is a feature of contemporary liberal styles of rule (e.g. Rose, 1996). What Foucault's account of the normalising practices of biopower or of government can do, which Habermas cannot, is provide an analysis of those forms of reason and practices that attempt to address the question of how to make subjects act discursively (1999:191-192).

Granted the above points mainly concern Foucault’s genealogy of power tied to liberalism, but still this genealogy unravels historically contingent aspects of liberalism that Habermas fails to take into account. And, this unravelling is important because my thesis not only attempts to draft a more specific critique of Habermas from the point of view of ethics/self-care, but also to indicate how a governmental account of self-care is tied to liberal instrumentally rational structures of domination. As noted in the introduction, the genealogy of power and the genealogy of ethics are suppose to come together in an overarching understanding of the West. But, even if and/or when they do not interlink one could argue that a genealogy of ethics does not merely replace a genealogy of power for the latter could be valid in approaching function of the instrumental
rationality tied to liberalism. The genealogy of power is itself a philosophical exercise as well that struggles with identifying the conditions that can make orientation possible.

All in all, as Dean (see 1999:183-84) suggests, although both Foucault and Habermas have used historical analysis as a means of approaching the connection between liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law, their incentives were very different. Foucault’s genealogy as a form of historical analysis acts as a philosophical exercise that problematises all sorts of values (including the democratic ones). By contrast, Habermas extracts a universality of conditions of rational argumentation from the actual conditions of communicative action. In this way, he attempts to link this universality to normative conditions of democracy. By the same token, both liberalism and civic republicanism appear as normatively failed cases of democracy and the rule of law.

To conclude, it has become clear how Habermas’s efforts to move beyond liberalism and republicanism are not really successful in terms of emancipation. The connections to the liberal paradigm along with Habermas’s transcendental account of communicative reason lead to a dubious institutionalism that regulates power games and self-care.
4.2. Deliberative democracy and the post-national federation

4.2.1. Towards the post-national federation

This section concerns Habermas’s understanding of contemporary International Relations (IR). In exploring this understanding, it becomes evident that Habermas is an advocate of a certain kind of institutionalism which is in turn substantiated by deliberative democratic procedures as a means to structure his own view of a supranational rather than fully global ‘world policy’. I suggest that such supra-national account of a global policy as the sum of further democratised liberal institutions can forge a universality tied to democratic emancipation. My aim is to pave the ground for establishing such democratic emancipation as a form of a ‘governmentality’ at the level of policy and regulation.

To start with, Habermas’s account of deliberative democratic publics, in contrast to Rawls’s more modest approach, is meant to be projected into the international sphere. Habermas is in favour of a cosmopolitan law. He attempts to include the other (i.e., other cultures), but at the same time, there are legal barriers imposed to different cultural values tied to the subject of rights.

More specifically:

On Habermas's approach there is no such theoretical break between the application of liberal principles of justice to the national and to the international domains...Habermas advocates a model of cosmopolitan law which would supersede international law, confer actionable legal rights directly on individuals, and mandate the creation of supranational political agencies and institutions to ensure the implementation of human rights on a global scale. While nation-states would retain limited sovereignty, their citizens would be able to appeal to the coercive legal authority of regional or global agencies, against their own governments if necessary. This extension of the theory of rights and procedural democracy in a cosmopolitan direction raises far-reaching questions concerning the future of the nation-state (Gronin and De Greiff, 1998:xxi).

For,

if the idea of the nation was historically important in the formation of democratically ordered societies, for Habermas it seems to have outlived its usefulness, at least as traditionally conceived and enshrined in international law (Gronin and De Greiff, 1998: xxii).

Hence, Habermas inclusion of the other, although it tries to accommodate the contingency of values deriving from this other, it suggests that other cultures should be included in a liberal democratic paradigm tied to liberal supranational institutions. As Gronin and De Greiff put it:
Habermas's main target in this discussion is the position that regards a culturally or ethnically homogeneous population as a necessary condition of the effective operation of a constitutional democracy. For Habermas, insisting on this condition implies a failure to acknowledge the importance of legal institutions in the formation of national identities. He reminds us that modern consciousness is not merely a result of membership in prepolitical ancestral communities based on kinship, but is at least in part a function of politics, of the active enjoyment of the status of citizen within a political community. (1998:xxiii)

By this token,

Attention to the role of legal structures—as opposed to inherited loyalties—in the constitution of national identity helps Habermas to meet one of the objections raised against supranational regimes such as the European Union (Gronin and De Greiff 1998:xxiii).

Habermas rather attempts to establish homogeneity tied to the subject of rights who exercises communicative reason. As Gronin and De Greiff summarize ‘Habermas thinks that a supranational identity might evolve around an agreement about political principles and procedures rather than about culture more generally’ (1998:xxiv).

Habermas suggests that: ‘The nation-state suffers three sorts of weaknesses, which are unlikely to be overcome by the nation-state alone’ (Gronin and De Greiff, 1998:xxv). These are the lack of resources in terms of dealing with global problems; the pressures of a globalized economy; and the tension between nationalism and republicanism (see Gronin and De Greiff, 1998:xxv).

In this context, Habermas acknowledges the need for a supra-national institutionalisation:

Critical events in the international financial markets point to the need for institutionalization. Moreover, globalized market commerce demands legal certainty, i.e. transnationally effective equivalents to the familiar guarantees of the private rights of citizens, which states grant to investors and trading partners within the national framework. “Deregulation can be seen as negotiating on the one hand the fact of globalization, and on the other, the ongoing need for guarantees of contracts and property rights for which the state remains as the guarantor of last instance” (see Habermas, 2003:542).

In other words,
Supranational regimes, according to Habermas, are more likely to succeed where sovereign states fail. For this reason, he supports supranational institutions with greater executive and judicial powers, so long as these institutions are also more democratic than present international organizations (Gronin and De Greiff, 1998:xxv-xxvi).

Similarly as Habermas puts it:
For the present, a politics still operating within the framework of the nation-state limits itself to adapting its own society in the least costly way to the systemic imperatives and side-effects of a global economic dynamic that operates largely free from political constraints. But instead it should make the heroic effort to overcome its own limitations and construct political institutions capable of acting at the supranational level. Moreover, the latter would have to be connected to processes of democratic will-formation if the normative heritage of the democratic constitutional state is to function as a break on the at present unfettered dynamic of globalized capitalist production (Habermas, 1998:124).

My first remark in regard to the above is that it is clear that there is a depiction of the deterritorialising character of neoliberal regulation which Deleuze, building upon Foucault, associated to the mode of ‘control’. The latter emerges from the deterritorisation and reterritorialisation processes of globalisation.

As Habermas puts it:
What is important in the present context is that this made the citizens themselves more keenly aware of the priority of the issue of the implementation of basic rights—of the priority that the real nation of citizens must maintain over the imagined ethnic-cultural nation. The system of rights was extended under the economically favorable conditions of a comparatively long period of economic growth. Each individual could come to recognize and appreciate citizenship status as that which links her with the other members of the political community and makes her at the same time dependent upon and co-responsible for them. It became clear to all that private and public autonomy presuppose one another in the circuit of reproduction and improvement of the conditions of preferred ways of life. At any rate, the citizens intuitively realized that they could succeed in regulating their private autonomy fairly only by making an appropriate use of their civic autonomy, and that an intact private sphere is in turn a necessary precondition of such political participation The constitution confirmed itself as the institutional framework for a dialectic of legal and factual equality that simultaneously reinforces the private and the civic autonomy of the citizens. But this dialectic has in the interim ground to a halt quite independently of local causes. If we are to explain this fact, we must turn our attention to the trends that are currently receiving attention under the heading of "globalization" (1998:119-120).
Habermas captures these deterritorialization/reterritorialisation processes, while anticipating the instrumentally rational character of neoliberal deterritorialisation as a spill-over of regulation, and engaging in the debate about what kinds of institutions should achieve a relative reterritorialisation. His willingness to promote some kind of reterritorialised democratic institutions places him within the deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation processes leading to globalised forms of freedom. The fact that these institutions are not merely neoliberal does not change that Habermas champions an institutionalist supra-national democratic approach. On this approach, such democratic institutions have to interact with existing supra-national neoliberal institutions within relative reterritorialisation processes.

Again, Habermas does not put too great a distance between himself and traditional republicanism, since there is a concrete inclusion of the other that, even if it is not tied to morality and culture, is tied to the allegedly neutral communicative rights:

Given the challenges that confront us today, I want to argue, the communicative account of republicanism is more appropriate than either an ethnonational or even a communitarian conception of the nation, the rule of law, and democracy (Habermas, 1998:139-40).

Having said that, still, Habermas’s suggestion of a relative reterritorialisation is limited as compared to other cosmopolitan advocates. Gronin and De Greif do not quite agree in the following sense:

The suggestions for international institutional reform that Habermas offers are provocative, but the focus of his work lies on the normative dimension of cosmopolitanism….Since for Habermas the legitimation of law requires sensitivity both to the concrete context of application and to the universalistic thrust of impartial reason, the universality of basic rights, far from thwarting the expression and development of concrete forms of life, actually promotes them (1998:xvii).

As Habermas further explains:

The tension between the universalism of an egalitarian legal community and the particularism of a community united by historical destiny is built in to the very concept of the national state. This ambivalence remains harmless as long as a cosmopolitan understanding of the nation of citizens is accorded priority over an ethnocentric interpretation of the nation as in a permanent state of war (1998:115).

However, as noted before, Habermas appears to be sceptical of the ability of a universalist morality per se to unite global populations:

The self-referential concept of collective self-determination demarcates a logical space for democratically united citizens who are members of a particular political community. Even
if such a community is grounded in the universalist principles of a democratic constitutional state, it still forms a collective identity, in the sense that it interprets and realizes these principles in light of its own history and in the context of its own particular form of life. This ethical-political self-understanding of citizens of a particular democratic life is missing in the inclusive community of world-citizens...even a worldwide consensus on human rights could not serve as the basis for a strong equivalent to the civic solidarity that emerged in the framework of the nation-state. Civic solidarity is rooted in particular collective identities; cosmopolitan solidarity has to support itself on the moral universalism of human rights alone (see Habermas, 2003:544).

Therefore, Habermas needs a more state-centric cosmopolitan view. Habermas cares more about instilling a cosmopolitan democratic public reason into the neoliberal IR approach and its institutionalism. In other words, it is by further democratizing the liberal state that the international can become more democratic. For if democratic practices flourish internally at the level of citizenship, officials and institutions, then the supra-national institutions will rather have to follow.

Habermas verifies his institutionalism, as he uses internal democratisation at the level of the civil society as a vehicle not to forge a global civil society but to establish non–state-centric supra-national institutions. As such, still, a major role in forging a more democratic world domestic policy would be negotiation among institutions characterised by non-realist, state-centric approaches to issues of global concern:

A functioning public sphere, the quality of discussion, accessibility, and the discursive structure of opinion— and will—formation: all these could never entirely replace conventional procedures for decision-making processes. And this loosens the conceptual ties between democratic legitimacy and the familiar forms of state organization...Of course, a renewed political closure of an economically unmastered world society would be possible only if global powers also involve themselves in the institutionalized procedures for building a transnational will-formation regarding the preservation of social standards and the redress of extreme social inequities (Habermas, 2003:546).

At this point, I want to further highlight the type of legalism or institutionalism associated with Habermas’s democratic procedures. Understanding the type of theory that underpins his account of democracy helps us to link such democracy to an institutionalist or legalistic account of IR, with a view to grasp better how the two overlap in contemporary social transformations as discussed in the sub-sections that follow.

Habermas particularly refers to international negotiation systems substantiated by deliberative democratic procedures, perceiving a relative deterritorialisation as a post-national federation. Hence, we are somewhere beyond the utter domination of global powers operating
within a state-centric world, but not yet at a cosmopolitan universality. We are near what Habermas calls ‘an emerging world domestic politics’ (see Habermas, 2003:545).

In this context, Habermas’s legalism is informed by his account of Kant:

Both the liberal and the republican traditions understand the political participation of citizens in an essentially voluntaristic sense: all should have the same chance to voice their own preferences or their political will in an effective way, be it in pursuit of their private interests (Locke), or in the exercise of their political autonomy (Mill). But if we also ascribe an epistemic function to democratic will-formation, the pursuit of self-interest and the realization of political freedom are supplemented by a further dimension, the public use of reason (Kant) (Habermas, 2003:546).

Habermas suggests that:

A fundamental conceptual revision of Kant's proposal must focus on three aspects: (1) the external sovereignty of states and the altered character of relations among them; (2) the internal sovereignty of states and the normative limitations of classical power politics; and (3) the stratification of world society and the globalization of dangers that necessitate a reconceptualization of what is meant by "peace" (1998:179).

Habermas suggests that the reformation of the UN under Kantian cosmopolitan premises has failed because human rights’ connection to politics, law and morality has not been properly understood (see 1998:186). He calls again on his account of rights as allegedly beyond morality:

Human rights should not be confused with moral rights. But neither does the distinction between law and morality which Günther upholds imply that positive law has no moral content. Through the democratic procedure of political legislation, moral arguments (among other sorts) also flow into the justification of enacted norms and thereby into law itself... Human rights fundamentalism is avoided not by renouncing the politics of human rights, but only through a cosmopolitan transformation of the state of nature among states into a legal order (Habermas, 1998:201).

In other words, Habermas evades a certain liberal legalism tied to instrumental rationality only in the following sense:

Habermas views himself as undertaking a project that is different from American political theory, which he characterizes as seeking to ‘design basic norms of a well-ordered society on the drafting table’ (1994b:101). By contrast, he conceives of his project as revealing the actual normative conditions encountered in the contents of practices. Thus his ‘reconstructive’ theory of law and democracy is concerned to uncover the normative
content of democracy and legitimate lawmaking. The legitimacy of democratic procedures rests, he further insists, on the character of the processes of communication that secure political opinion and will formation (e.g. Habermas, 1996a:448-9). The legitimising force of democratic procedures, in other words, is found in the normative contents of what Habermas calls ‘communicative action’, that is, action oriented to mutual understanding (Dean, 1999:167).

As Dean notes, one has to extract from Foucault’s account of liberalism and enlightenment an understanding of the problems and potentials of democratic institutions within the liberal or liberal democratic paradigm (see Chapter 3). But, in Habermas, it is obvious that he is deeply concerned with the connection between democracy and law. Such a connection obviously aligns with Habermas’s critique as a legislation of thinking vis-à-vis Foucault’s genealogy as an orientation in thinking.

Still, Habermas would see limits in the kind of parrhesia that is concerned with the polis in regard to its ability to forge a post-national global polis. Therefore, he retreats back to liberal legalism:

A legal community of world citizens that is all-inclusive yet organized in time and space certainly would be different from a universal community of moral persons, for which any such organization would be neither possible nor necessary. On the other hand, however, such a legal community of world citizens could not demand the comparatively firm levels of integration of state-organized communities with their own collective identities. I see no structural obstacles to expanding national civic solidarity and welfare-state policies to the scale of a post-national federation. But the political culture of world society lacks the common ethical-political dimension that would be necessary for a corresponding global community—and its identity formation (Habermas, 2003:544-545).

In the end, the issue is that Habermas treats ‘cognitive ethics’ leading to ‘communicative action’ as the basis for a possible liberal democratic universality. He does not explicitly structure a certain subjectivity of universality tied to globalisation per se, as I believe reflexive sociologists and cosmopolitans attempt to do (see Part III). Habermas focusses on interim structures that can establish those democratic procedures which will allow to such subjectivity to emerge.

This new republicanism, tied to reflexive sociologists such as Giddens, perceives this difference with Habermas as one between ‘emancipatory politics’ and politics post ‘emancipation’. By this token, Giddens ties the actual envisioning emancipation to how one should conduct oneself post-emancipation. This vision presents a means of making ‘emancipation’ something that is not static, but rather derives from the continuous engagement of the subject with the social (see Part III).
This sub-section has introduced Habermas’s ‘world policy’ as an account rooted in Habermas’s institutionalism. Habermas aims to use ‘communicative action’ manifested by subjects of cognitive ethics as a means to democratise the institutions of the liberal state, and, as a consequence, international institutions. Thus, instead of the more globalist cosmopolitanism of reflexive sociology, we have in Habermas an attempt to forge a global ‘polis’ as the sum of democratised states capable of supporting more democratic supra-national institutions, relations, and policies.

4.2.2. Deliberative democracy and the supra-national: regulation and social action

This sub-section situates the above discussion on ‘world policy’, supranational democratic institutions, and deliberative democratic procedures within examples of entities and procedures that seem to attempt to move the world towards a Habermasean post-national federation. My aim is to pivot from sketching Habermas’s legalism to plausible connections with contemporary ‘technologies of the self’ and regulations tied to a re-appropriated dispositif.

Habermas aims to combine the democratisation of institutions with his well-known deliberative democratic suggestions. This account of democracy sees the individual, as a subject of this democracy, taking responsibility to engage in true dialogues with the other subjects with the view to reach to a consensus.

Habermas, however, does not attempt to use democracy as means of escaping issues of legal regulation at the institutional level. It is in Habermas’s effort to ‘contribute to a debate about the development and reformation of democratic procedures and deliberative structures’ (Dean, 1999:168) that one can find this double-operation of a project of democratic emancipation rooted in institutions and new forms of democratic procedures.

As Habermas puts it:

Deliberative politics thus lives off the interplay between democratically institutionalized will-formation and informal opinion-formation (1996:308).

Therefore,

Whereas the growth of systems and networks multiplies possible contacts and exchanges of information, it does not lead per se to the expansion of an intersubjectively shared world and to the discursive interweaving of conceptions of relevance, themes, and contributions from which political public spheres arise. The consciousness of planning, communicating, and acting subjects seems to have simultaneously expanded and fragmented. The publics produced by the internet remain closed off from one another like global villages. For the present it remains unclear whether an expanding public consciousness, though centered
in the lifeworld, nevertheless has the ability to span systemically differentiated contexts, or whether the systemic processes, having become independent, have long since severed their ties with all contexts produced by political communication (Habermas, 1998:120-121).

Hence, one should focus on the corporate practices focusing on the de-anonymisation of the internet tied to a neoliberal governmentality which treat the individual as data, a practice that projects the biopolitical use of statistics in the information era. This practice of trafficking the tastes of the individual is already capitalised by advertisers as the navigational choices of the users’ accounts are matched with advertisement content. Additionally, synchronisation of multiple accounts via Google or Facebook increases the ability of marketers to monitor the user. At the same time, in the wake of new terrorism and anti-globalization concerns new authoritarian practises emerge that invade privacy.

Form the liberal laissez faire we fall back to a neoliberal authoritarianism that, although it leaves things free, monitors everything as a means to regulate. In addition, it is rather evident that the state apparatus has been indeed slightly resurrected post 9/11 in cases like the US. The first feelings of insecurity have been evoked by the US state apparatus, in turn counter-generating scepticism about measures of security that violate individual freedoms and make technology an instrument of authoritarianism or otherwise ‘illiberal practices’. The term ‘illiberal’ can be interpreted in various ways. In this case, it increasingly encompasses not only authoritarian practices, but practices of state control as such.

Deliberative democracy fights such ‘illiberal’ regulation, but in the end it does not fall too far from it. Fighting this illiberal tendency is what ‘hactivism’ is all about, as it is reflected in cases like those of Snowden and Assange who both ‘hacked’ and made accessible to the general public highly confidential information held by the US military (see for example Crowley, 2012). Platforms such as ‘WikiLeaks’ that publish confidential information pose severe obstacles to traditional autocratic bureaucracies and to new security practices tied to the Western governmental state apparatus.

Habermas explicitly mentions the egalitarian character of the public thereby blending an allegedly ‘neutral’ public reason into an egalitarian bourgeois civil society:

Only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the confines of class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation can the potential of an unleashed cultural pluralism fully develop—a potential that no doubt abounds just as much in conflicts as in meaning-generating forms of life. But in a secularized society that has learned to deal with its complexity consciously and deliberately, the communicative mastery of these conflicts constitutes the sole source of
solidarity among strangers—strangers who renounce violence and, in the cooperative regulation of their common life, also concede one another the right to remain strangers. (1996:308).

He reiterates this conviction in the following way:

But the political influence that the actors gain through public communication must ultimately rest on the resonance and indeed the approval of a lay public whose composition is egalitarian. The public of citizens must be convinced by comprehensible and broadly interesting contributions to issues it finds relevant. The public audience possesses final authority, because it is constitutive for the internal structure and reproduction of the public sphere, the only place where actors can appear. There can be no public sphere without a public (1996:364).

In the end, it becomes clear that:

Only in liberal public spheres, of course, do subinstitutional political movements—which abandon the conventional paths of interest politics in order to boost the constitutionally regulated circulation of power in the political system—take this direction. By contrast, an authoritarian, distorted public sphere that is brought into alignment merely provides a forum for plebiscitary legitimation (1996:382).

The above leads back to this problematic distinction of a ‘neutral’ public reason and a liberal civil society for essentially this ‘neutral’ public reason can only operate within the liberal civil society.

In this context, one can also suggest that all the policies which increasingly force users to provide their real identification set the sites of veridiction for the freedom of expression that anonymity offers, thereby leading the user to express less radical views, namely views that do not deviate from an inclusion to the liberal civil society. This is a more concrete example of Habermas’s public reason as a means of regulation. As Habermas puts it:

In multicultural societies the national constitution can tolerate only forms of life articulated within the medium of such nonfundamentalist traditions, because coexistence with equal rights for these forms of life requires the mutual recognition of the different cultural memberships: all persons must also be recognized as members of ethical communities integrated around different conceptions of the good. Hence the ethical integration of groups and subcultures with their own collective identities must be uncoupled from the abstract political integration that includes all citizens equally (1998:225).

The current state of social media indicates, to some extent, that anonymity leads to more radical conversations, beyond current liberal morality. This kind of use might be for liberal democrats a sign of ‘incompetent communication’. By contrast, however, many anonymous
comments seem to be connected to a tactical use of various online platforms which is exactly something that multicultural societies have to regulate.

Rogal (2013) discusses how US legal frameworks attempt to overcome anonymity when such a need is identified, thereby hindering freedom of expression. Therefore, encouraging and implementing non-anonymity might further exemplify establishing communication networks operating along lines that can lead to forging subjects capable of embodying a deliberative use of communication, while these subjects exercise self-regulation. In this context, ‘ideal speech’ can be seen as a discourse of power that regulates by setting the sites of veridiction of what can be argued. De-anonymisation as a form regulation leads to the self-governance of freedom.

Habermas does care about the rights of equal participation per se:

Rights of equal participation for each person thus result from a symmetrical juridification of the communicative freedom of all citizens. And this freedom in turn requires forms of discursive opinion- and will-formation that enable an exercise of political autonomy in accordance with political rights (1996:127).

But, he uses again a historical contingency of human rights in its favour as means of not measuring freedom of expression in connection to the moral universality of human rights but in connection to the legal rights of the subject of right:

The principle that all “governmental authority derives from the people” must be specified according to circumstances in the form of freedoms of opinion and information; the freedoms of assembly and association; the freedoms of belief, conscience, and religious confession; entitlements to participate in political elections and voting processes; entitlements to work in political parties or citizens' movements, and so forth. In the constitution-making acts of a legally binding interpretation of the system of rights, citizens make an originary use of a civic autonomy that thereby constitutes itself in a performatively self-referential manner. Thus we can understand the catalogs of human and civil rights found in our historic constitutions as context-dependent readings of the same system of rights (1996:128).

I think that it is evident that one can deduce from the above the rise of technologies of the self in connection to a universalisation of rights.

Habermas suggests that:

It would be naive to overlook the fact that the constitutionally regulated circulation of power in the political system itself is likewise subject to the pressure of social complexity. However, the objections that systems theory and decisions theory raise against the
presupposition of a discursive mode of sociation in the legal community take on a different status once one considers that the institutions of the constitutional state, viewed sociologically, have the character of a countersteering preservation of complexity (1996:327-328).

And, he eventually explicitly argues that inclusion is not as such a measure of communicative success:

Thus the success of public communication is not intrinsically measured by the requirement of inclusion either but by the formal criteria governing how a qualified public opinion comes about. The structures of a power-ridden, oppressed public sphere exclude fruitful and clarifying discussions. The “quality” of public opinion, insofar as it is measured by the procedural properties of its process of generation, is an empirical variable. From a normative perspective, this provides a basis for measuring the legitimacy of the influence that public opinion has on the political system (Habermas, 1996:362).

In this context, an even more interesting case of communicative regulation is the recent strategy that Facebook has attempted to implement in the aftermath of the US elections. Facebook partners with fact-checking organizations with the aim to check the ‘factual’ accuracy of the news which appears on its site (see online source⁴). Granted, there is a broad consensus in that we enter a ‘post-truth’ era in which various parties feel that there is too much unsubstantiated and even ‘unreasonable’ information. What matters are emotionally charged discourses easily tied to aesthetic preferences. Such discourses are to be regulated by a legislative public reason or they can be integrated into the reflexivity tied to the neogovernmental sub-conduct of ethopolitics (see Part III). At the same time, it is through these questionable truths that one attempts to ‘imagine the unimaginable’. There might were targeted conspiracy stories against the US Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, but there can also be a genuine out of the box thinking associated with the suspicions raised, which if one fully mutes, leaves little room for keeping the games of power open. In this context, there is already a backlash against such strategy concerning both the efficiency of the whole service as also the premise behind it (see online source⁵).

Hence, Facebook rather attacks the conservative establishment with its postmodernist tendencies that might generate anti-Clinton news or questioning issues such as environmental change and/or anything that challenge a liberal democratic structural design via such strategies. It seems evident that Facebook as a democratic entity and/or a public sphere puts forward practices that legislate rather orientate the way that the individual will choose to engage with information and express her opinion. A governmentality of public reason is rather traceable here not so much in the overall structural design of the Facebook, which along with other social media can be

⁴ http://www.theverge.com/2016/12/15/13960062/facebook-fact-check-partnerships-fake-news
⁵ https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/16/facebook-fake-news-tools-not-working
considered a facilitator of the reflexivity of ethopolitical governmentality, but in several explicit strategies that come directly from the top of the medium such as the one mentioned above. In other words, there is an attempt to govern the freedom of users by limiting the choices of information that one can utilise in order to govern the self. The aim is not linked to narrowing down information to aesthetic choices, but rather is an attempt to impose a public reason mentality that will lead to more controllable self governance powered by a Habermasian account of reason. In such an account certain information becomes clearly ‘untrue’ on the basis not only of the lack of facts in the traditional scientific sense but also in the sense of ‘irrationality’.

On the other hand, I suggest that in some respects ‘WikiLeaks’ is, for example, a case of a deliberative democratic platform with activist premises that challenges the factual accuracy of allegedly respected institutions. Habermas’s ‘sociological model that focuses on the empirical weight of the constitutionally prescribed...circulation of power’ (Habermas, 1996:330) contemplates ‘whether civil society, through resonant and autonomous public spheres, develops impulses with enough vitality to bring conflicts from the periphery into the center of the political system’ (Habermas, 1996:330). Hence, when or to the extent that WikiLeaks takes advantage of existing anonymity, it does so in order to make sure that in conditions in which all subjects will be ‘registered’ subjects interacting within cyberspace that space will not be controlled by other authoritarian forms of power. As Habermas puts it: ‘The tight connection between an autonomous civil society and an integral private sphere stands out even more clearly when contrasted with totalitarian societies of bureaucratic socialism’ (1996:369).

WikiLeaks then is an example of whistleblowing in which one uses anonymity in order to cultivate non-anonymity. One does not violate the spirit of the law, but violates the law in its corrupt operation. In other words, if the way that a law is enforced no longer captures the spirit behind the creation of such a law (i.e., non-anonymity as responsible exercise of freedom of speech), then one can act illegally (i.e., one can try to act anonymously) for the sake of establishing what the law was supposed to establish in the first place (i.e., a public sphere with access to genuine freedom of speech and information).

WikiLeaks of course does not attempt to become an institution that directly influences policy. As Habermas puts it:

I would like to defend the claim that under certain circumstances civil society can acquire influence in the public sphere, have an effect on the parliamentary complex (and the courts) through its own public opinions, and compel the political system to switch over to the official circulation of power. Naturally, the sociology of mass communication conveys a skeptical impression of the power-ridden, mass-media-dominated public spheres of Western democracies. Social movements, citizen initiatives and forums, political and other associations, in short, the groupings of civil society, are indeed sensitive to problems, but
the signals they send out and the impulses they give are generally too weak to initiate learning processes or redirect decision making in the political system in the short run. In complex societies, the public sphere consists of an intermediary structure between the political system, on the one hand, and the private sectors of the lifeworld and functional systems, on the other. It represents a highly complex network that branches out into a multitude of overlapping international, national, regional, local, and subcultural arenas (1996:373-374).

Hence, WikiLeaks is not against de-anonymisation, as it ideally strives towards a democratic public sphere in which citizens take responsibility for their actions. However, WikiLeaks can use anonymity in order to forge the structures that can eventually establish such a democratic public sphere. It is not directly this ‘enlightened’ institution that cooperates with the ‘enlightened’ citizen, but it can be one of the platforms of a democratic cyber public-sphere in which the ‘enlightened’ citizen will envision democracy.

Such an account of the ‘public sphere’ makes sense within Habermas’s understanding of democracy, in which civil society and the subjects that constitute it are the source of democratic emancipation. As established in Chapter 3, in Foucault, on the other hand, civil society, as exactly the sum of subjects created within the interaction of knowledge, power and ethics, cannot be considered a ‘milieu’, namely a space of invention.

Samantha Ashenden elucidates:

Habermas’ normative theory is premised on the possibility of determining a ‘proper’ relation between state and civil society. In this way, Habermas’ account replicates the tensions between the natural and the managed found within liberalism. The idea of the lifeworld and of civil society as a realm outside of and standing in opposition to the state is inadequate to address the political problems presented by contemporary state-society relations. This way of framing the issues misses the constituted character of private autonomy, civil society and the state, suggesting instead a ‘no-place’ outside of power from which to practice criticism...These comments are not to suggest that the concept ‘civil society’ has no value, but it is to suggest that forms of political identification and mobilisation organised around this concept face the problem of confronting issues of government which are specific and irreducible to, for example, questions of the legal codification of rights and citizenship (Ashenden, 1999:157-158).

In this context, I disagree with Sauter and Kendal (2011) who make the argument that WikiLeaks could be an example of parrhesia that can attest to Foucault, even if he might have been sceptical about such quests of emancipation due to his alleged ‘neglect’ of the democratic roots of the liberal West. This account, namely that Foucault has paid attention to the liberal but not to the democratic, fails to understand Foucault’s parrhesiatic discussion, for Foucault clearly condemns a
certain kind of parrhesia (i.e., Alcibiades). Furthermore, it is this ‘condemned’ parrhesia that Foucault has connected to Neoplatonic notions of the polis vis-à-vis a concern for the duty of the philosopher and the emancipatory ethics of the individual (see introduction and Part I) that, in one way or another, democratic theories of emancipation utilise. They utilise it in order to move beyond the instrumentally rational dispositif.

As a result, such democratic theories explicitly try to argue that public reason can meet parrhesia. Such connection perceives as plausible a model of democratic governance tied to the ethics of truth-telling and self-care that suggests that governance and its subjects can or should act on the basis of ‘taking care of the others as means of taking care of the self’.

In this thesis, building upon the studies of new forms of governmentality, such accounts are perceived as governmental. As far as the discussion of this aspect of the thesis is concerned, as established in the Chapter 3, how an orientation in thinking operates is fundamentally important to whether it is emancipatory or governmental.

By the same token, the parrhesia associated with platforms such as WikiLeaks is rather a manifestation of ‘ideal speech’ in the sense that the purpose of parrhesia is not to push the limits of what can be thought into a hypertrophy, but to act as a means to the cognitive realisation of ‘the truth’. This parrhesia places its trust in the self-legislation of the subject of reason. Therefore, this parrhesia indicates how the democratic aims to shape the juridical within the constraints of the liberal democratic paradigm.

The first thing that becomes apparent here is that Assange (the founder of Wikileaks) repeatedly emphasises that his main target is the state acting either as raison d’état entity or as an entity that emphasises security mechanisms, while engaging in a neorealist or neoliberal state-centric competition game (see before). A human rights violation could in that sense now be synonymous to certain practices of governance that are legitimised by raison d’état rationales and their amoral politics. But, this is not necessarily a defence of the morality tied to human rights as in ethopolitical cosmopolitanism. It may be (see chapter 6), but, one can also assume that there is an aim to defend the connection between law, rights and democracy. This view, in essence, is related to a form of ‘whistleblowing’ or a manifestation of Chomsky-like ‘civil disobedience’ as individuals defend liberal democracy from non-democratic state practices (see also before).

As Habermas puts it:

Independent of the current object of controversy, civil disobedience is also always an implicit appeal to connect organized political will formation with the communicative processes of the public sphere. The message of this subtext is aimed at a political system that, as constitutionally organized, may not detach itself from civil society and make itself independent vis-à-vis the periphery. Civil disobedience thereby refers to its own origins in a civil society that in crisis situations actualizes the normative contents of constitutional
democracy in the medium of public opinion and summons it against the systemic inertia of institutional politics (1996:383).

Moreover Habermas quotes the definition that Cohen and Arato suggested in connection to his, Rawls’s and Dworkin’s accounts:

Collective actors involved in civil disobedience invoke the Utopian principles of constitutional democracies, appealing to the ideas of fundamental rights or democratic legitimacy. Civil disobedience is thus a means for reasserting the link between civil and political society…when legal attempts at exerting the influence of the former on the latter have failed and other avenues have been exhausted (1996:383).

Finally:

Beyond this, the justification of civil disobedience relies on a dynamic understanding of the constitution as an unfinished project. From this long-term perspective, the constitutional state does not represent a finished structure but a delicate and sensitive—above all fallible and reversible—enterprise, whose purpose is to realize the system of rights anew in changing circumstances, that is, to interpret the system of rights better, to institutionalize it more appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically. This is the perspective of citizens who are actively engaged in realizing the system of rights. Aware of, and referring to, changed contexts, such citizens want to overcome in practice the tension between social facticity and validity. Although legal theory cannot adopt this participant perspective as its own, it can reconstruct the paradigmatic understanding of law and democracy that guides citizens whenever they form an idea of the structural constraints on the self organization of the legal community in their society (Habermas,1996:384).

‘Civil disobedience’ is the equivalent of coup in raison d’état. The liberal governmental state apparatus can have its own coup in the sense of military or technocrat whistleblowers as bureaucratic actors who aim to correct inefficiencies for the sake of the equilibrium of governance. In our case, drawing from Sauter and Kendal (2011), one can perceive WikiLeaks as an example of a ‘parrhesiatic coup’ as the democratic vocalises certain violations that channel ideas of democracy which exist within the culture or even the legal systems of the West, but are violated by the authorities themselves.

In other words, cases such as WikiLeaks set certain democratic norms as a core function of the right equilibrium of governance in conditions of liberal democracy. In this context, there is an effort to stop the governmental apparatus tied to the liberal state from considering the democratic as a factor of the equilibrium at the point only that there is a ‘disturbance’, namely an attempt to
move beyond the ‘pacts of security’. Neoliberal governmentality in Foucault’s estimation was a further imposition of the economy on the state. Its deterritorialisation leads to a pluralism in relation to the inclusion of any ‘homo economicus’ subject and the commodification of everything (modelling the social as an enterprise). This particular Neoplatonic democracy that Foucault has indeed taken into account also contributes to the further deterritorialising evolution of the liberal conduct. It battles against state hierarchy while interacting at the level of networks with a deterritorial neoliberalism in order to shape the deterritorial apparatus.

Habermas recognizes that:

Influence develops in the public sphere and becomes the object of struggle there. This struggle involves not only the political influence that has already been acquired (such as that enjoyed by experienced political leaders and officeholders, established parties, and well-known groups like Greenpeace and Amnesty International). The reputation of groups of persons and experts who have acquired their influence in special public spheres also comes into play (for example, the authority of religious leaders, the public visibility of literary figures and artists, the reputation of scientists, and the popularity of sports figures and movie stars). For as soon as the public sphere has expanded beyond the context of simple interactions, a differentiation sets in among organizers, speakers, and hearers; arenas and galleries; stage and viewing space (1996:363).

In this context, Julian Assange, as an individual, is a self-declared libertarian. His main targets are the conservative state and big corporations located in major liberal states with multinational capabilities to exercise economic power as a part of the same neoconservative apparatus. Accordingly, Assange does not quite perceive control in the decentralised manner described here.

As Robert Galloway puts it,

In recent decades the primary conflict between organizational designs has been between hierarchies and networks, an asymmetrical war. However, in the future the world is likely to experience a general shift downward into a new bilateral organizational conflict—networks fighting networks (Galloway, 2004:205).

Habermas suggests that we should be cautious in the following sense:

To be sure, we must distinguish the actors who, so to speak, emerge from the public and take part in the reproduction of the public sphere itself from actors who occupy an already constituted public domain in order to use it (1996:364).

Assange and WikiLeaks might be one of the platforms that facilitate a transition to a network society that allows actors to emerge from the public. However, as established in this thesis,
this decentralisation is inherent to the evolution of governmentalities. WikiLeaks might be a part of the process, but its target remains the state apparatus. This target rather reduces the scope of hactivism to a limited Habermasean democratic emancipation tied to a liberal democratic paradigm.

Hence, with WikiLeaks established as a neogovernmental entity, tied to deliberative democracy it can be argued that such neogovernmental entities fail to target deterritorial governmental networks, since they cannot really perceive them outside of the state. This inability leads back to the issue that there is or there will be a battle of networks, in which case WikiLeaks is part of the emergence of a broader liberal democratic deterritorial governmental apparatus of ‘control’.

WikiLeaks is concerned with liberating capitalism from the raison d’état apparatus, while infusing democracy and social justice into this new deterritorial capitalism. However, knowing is not enough. Hence, WikiLeaks cannot facilitate the unfiltered flow of information. This inability leads back to the notion of public reason. Knowing something should make a difference because there is an inherent or established public morality that dictates a specific reaction to such revelations. This fact becomes evident from the struggle of participation in other similar attempts such as various open governance efforts. Those cases might indicate how subjects or users are unable to break free from the instrumentally rational apparatus tied to the liberal state.

The emergence of a deterritorial neoliberal dispositif can also undermine the process, since it keeps the subject occupied with consumerism and competition to achieve career goals. Here we are dealing with the dominance of the homo economicus subjectivity, where ‘One of the main problems, Domscheit-Berg (2011) acknowledges, “was the sheer volume of data. The collection of material was too large for people to enter into the debate simply”’ (Cammaerts, 2013:431). In other words, it can be argued that this is an acknowledgement that the current average subject needs mediation, since it does not have the mindset or time to go through such information.

As Habermas puts it:

The ethical-political self-understanding of citizens in a democratic community must not be taken as a historical-cultural a priori that makes democratic will-formation possible, but rather as the fluid content of a circulatory process that is generated through the legal institutionalization of citizens’ communication (1998:161).

But, one could also argue that the subject is not naturally bound by certain cognitive ethics. Hence, a non-manifestation of a ‘communicative action’ tied to such cognitive ethics does not mean that what prevents the subject from engaging in ‘communicative action’ is some kind of subordination to structures of instrumental rationality. When Foucault (1991) criticised modern
forms of punishment for being hidden from the public, he felt that the public should be exposed to those practices that maintain this alleged public security as a means of a possible reaction against them. However, neither the reaction nor the premises to which one should react were guaranteed. One should, in a sense, be open to reacting to any demonstration of state power or organised power. Such reaction is what the apheretic ethics of critique dictate. But, in the case of WikiLeaks, it seems that one expects a reaction based on certain ideas on democracy and justice. Therefore, it can be argued that a ‘governmentality’ appears here that aims to nurture such reactions.

The following quotes illustrate the resemblance of other civil society actors to WikiLeaks. For a start, as Roberts put it,

By the end of 2010 it was clear that WikiLeaks’ modus operandi had fundamentally changed. It started the year with a straightforward conception of its role as a receiver and distributor of leaked information. At year’s end, it was performing a different function: still hoping to function as a trusted receiver of leaks, but now working with mainstream media to decide how – or if – leaked information ought to be published’ (2012:124).

On other hand, Pieterse argues that

Social media and WikiLeaks are part of this cross-border communications field, just like Médecins Sans Frontières, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Complaints of NGO interference by the monopoly holders have gradually died down; similarly, WikiLeaks will become part of the landscape. In time the complaints of the old information monopolists will become routine and boring. The major international NGOs, if they are service-delivery organisations, usually take a step back from overt political criticism and involvement and, if they are transnational advocacy NGOs (TANGOs), they may refrain from criticizing donor countries. WikiLeaks differs from the major international NGOs by its counter-hegemonic approach (Pieterse, 2012:1916)

I suggest that WikiLeaks do not really differ from the rest. They are part of the same apparatus of a liberal democratic institutionalism that does interact with the economic. Roberts acknowledges this identification:

The outflow of leaked information was constrained by the newspapers’ judgment of its newsworthiness, and their willingness to invest money and time in the task of processing more records. This was, from the point of view of WikiLeaks, a distasteful bargain, against which Assange himself routinely kicked, either by threatening to release information unilaterally or by adding new media outlets to the consortium without the consent of its other members. The success of this reluctant marriage hinges on the capacity of major media to invest resources in the task of sifting and interpreting leaked information.
Ironically, though, this capacity is itself being undermined by the growth of the internet (Roberts, 2012:124).

Hence, one could argue, especially given the way that Roberts makes his arguments, that this is a case of neoliberal governmentality, since the democratic is subordinated to the economic. Another way to look at it is that the democratic realises its connection to the economic. At the same time, the governmental state apparatus recognises the deterritorial cultural power of the liberal democratic paradigm: ‘In recent years the US state department has been an active proponent of open media and the internet as ways to establish or strengthen democracy’ (Pieterse, 2012:1909).

More explicitly and very importantly,

Some US government agencies have embraced openness and adopt an agenda similar to that of George Soros’ Open Society Foundation. To some extent the premise is, if you can’t beat them, join them. Be on the side of Google, Facebook, Twitter, Apple and social media technologies (Pieterse, 2012:1916-1917).

In any case, some essential observations can be made from the above. There is a glimpse of a global governmentality apparatus. It is, of course, only a glimpse. As has been suggested before, we are still in an era that networks fight hierarchies. In this context, Pieterse (2012) points out the contradictions between the democratic character that the US promotes externally, and its internal dubious practices.

But, this apparatus is rather ‘forced’ to become decentralised.

Following the intelligence failures of 9/11 the US government desegregated information circuits and merged defence, diplomatic and intelligence information pools, which enabled defence personnel to access embassy cables and, allegedly, pass them on to WikiLeaks. So US government actions made the WikiLeaks disclosures possible. The root tension between hyper-connectivity and hegemony is that hyper-connectivity is multidirectional and cannot easily be harnessed, dictated or controlled. As several discussions point out, at issue are questions of whistleblowing and civil disobedience (Pieterse, 2012:1913).

In this context, we trace the connection between this so much discussed state-corporate apparatus and the freedom of the information movement and the democratization movement. In other words, Pieterse suggests that

Over recent decades globalization and financialisation have led to a major hiatus of regulation and to a global governance gap...Organisations such as WikiLeaks and movements from the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street and frustrated voters in Russia show other faces of the digital turn...They are expressions of emancipatory cosmopolitanism (Pieterse, 2012:1922).
The last points towards what else WikiLeaks can be within the global civil society that the cosmopolitan advocates of a reflexive subjectivity envision (see more in Part III). For one, if WikiLeaks is now a new form of journalistic platform, then as Ward puts it, the aim of a cosmopolitan journalism ethics is the promotion of this global democratic world...In this way, journalism ethics crosses borders. The journalist becomes a global citizen with a global social contract and a cosmopolitan set of ethical principles (Ward, 2010:5).

He also uses the word 'naturalistic' which exactly reflects the governmental aspect of such approaches (see introduction) that want to conceal an alternative meaning: ‘my naturalistic journalism ethics are extended and redefined to become the basic concepts of a global journalism ethics’ (Ward, 2010:5). Ward argues throughout his book explicitly for a global cultural citizenship and global patriotism as the new manifestation of public reason. Olesen (2011) discusses cultural citizenship as an emerging concept in relation to network publics that could eventually meet Habermas’s public sphere in connection to the concepts of ‘life politics’ (Giddens) and ‘sub-politics’ (Beck). These concepts rather blend emancipation with a way of living, and a world consisting of liberal democracies with a globalised cosmopolitan liberal social democracy as multifaceted crisscross cultural communities (see Part III). It is in this context that, in neogovernmentality, the moral tries in its own terms to meet the economic at the level of the structure in order to coproduce the juridical (see introduction).

In Habermas’s words:

In agreement with the concept of deliberative politics, these principles express a simple idea: the mass media ought to understand themselves as the mandatary of an enlightened public whose willingness to learn and capacity for criticism they at once presuppose, demand, and reinforce; like the judiciary, they ought to preserve their independence from political and social pressure; they ought to be receptive to the public's concerns and proposals, take up these issues and contributions impartially, augment criticisms, and confront the political process with articulate demands for legitimation. The power of the media should thus be neutralized and the tacit conversion of administrative or social power into political influence blocked. According to this idea, political and social actors would be allowed to "use" the public sphere only insofar as they make convincing contributions to the solution of problems that have been perceived by the public or have been put on the public agenda with the public's consent. In a similar vein, political parties would have to participate in the opinion- and will-formation from the public's own perspective, rather than patronizing the public and extracting mass loyalty from the public sphere for the purposes of maintaining their own power (1996:378-379).
Once again there is a clear connection with the Platonic and Aristotelian model of the enlightened public that will forge the enlightened governors/institutions.

In other words, as Reid-Henry reminds us in his discussion of WikiLeaks, Balibar has commented, “every public space is, by definition, a political space, but not every political space is (already) a public space” (Balibar 2009:191)’ (Reid-Henry, 2011:3). In this context, the quest is for the political space to become a public space.

Hence, there is a conscious attempt in Olesen to move further beyond traditional politics, thereby establishing political struggle as an aesthetic pluralism. This attempt is to be a pursuit in parallel network publics established and facilitated by digital platforms such as various social media, which does not necessarily contrast Habermas’s suggestion. As Olesen puts it, ‘With time, we might even experience cultural citizenship as something even Habermas would attest to’ (Olesen, 2011:18). Such an account rather evolves a certain democratic emancipation into a flexible but more structured mode of subjectivity. The latter, although it might subscribe to cognitive ethics, maintains its character by invoking the utopian realist premise that reality can be perceived in more than one way, but the vision of a cosmopolitan social democracy is both possible, and, in many ways ideal (see more in Part III).

Hence, Olesen is more ‘honest’ in regard to the radicalism of his claims when he acknowledges that he campaigns in favour of this sort of cosmopolitan pluralism. He does not claim as Fraser does, for example, that there is a big struggle between alternative democratic voices. For the problem with Fraser is that that she seems to fail to acknowledge that such democratic voices are not really that radical or anti-liberal.

To clarify, Olesen offers,

Fraser goes a long way in tracing counterpublics. She writes (1992, 67): Members of subordinated social groups—women, workers, peoples of color, and gays and lesbians—have repeatedly found it advantageous to constitute alternative publics. I propose to call these subaltern counterpublics in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs. While I acknowledge how she is describing a counterpublic as a parallel discursive arena, I remain hesitant to extent this into networked publics, and in particular into social network sites such as Facebook. Rather, I am leaning up against the critique of Fraser raised by Warner who suggests that Fraser’s account of counterpublics ‘sounds like the classically Habermasian description of rational-critical publics with the word oppositional inserted’ (Warner 2002, 85) (Olesen, 2011:15).
Olesen’s account of Fraser points out the paradox of her own approach. This paradox is highlighted here to define the limitations of the emancipatory potentials of the public sphere, and as consequence of the parrhesia tied to it. In other words, I will stay a little longer on Fraser, for her account further illuminates the type of parrhesia that derives from a Habermas-inspired engagement with politics, even if she allegedly disagrees with Habermas as well.

To elaborate, Fraser’s approach is consistent with her condemnation of the Foucauldian ethics of critique as incomprehensible and not really anti-neoliberal (see also introduction), while at the same criticising Habermas for his inability to ‘recognise power relations within the lifeworld’ (Ashenden, 1999:157). The latter points towards Fraser’s contradictory notion of the possibility to engage in a legitimate struggle against power via the use of the public sphere.

This paradox is highlighted by Ashenden:

while agreeing with aspects of Fraser’s critique, I want to suggest that this criticism cuts to the core of Habermas’ account more radically than Fraser recognizes and that a fundamental problem with Habermas’ formulation is more properly considered to be result of the hypostatisation of the categories system and lifeworld which occurs as a necessary product of his move from philosophy to politics. This is tied directly to the structure of Habermas’ critical theory and to his ‘solution’ regarding the legitimation of law through an appeal to communicative ethics (Ashenden, 1999:157).

In this context, Fraser fails to ‘correct’ the lack of emancipation that indeed derives from a Habermasean approach. For Fraser’s counter-publics are not something that oppose Habermas’s public sphere rather again a step further in crafting a connection between public spheres and the politics of parrhesia.

In other words, the transition from philosophy to politics powered by the legalisation of ‘communicative reason’ that Ashenden argued for above embodies the same problem pointed out in my discussion of Sauter and Kendal’s use of parrhesia. In their discussion of Foucault, they employed the ethics of parrhesia that are concerned with the governance of the ‘polis’. Such governance is based on ‘enlightened’ democratic leaders, and such leaders can be envisioned only by the proper ‘enlightened’ citizens. In that case, the public sphere constitutes the space in which such parrhesiatic public reason can be formulated.

By this token, individual self-care beyond a subjectivity tied to citizenship and legalised authorities cannot exist. It is still a struggle for governing the civil society. Only, in this case the parrhesiatic ethics of the ‘polis’, rather than merely political economy, formulates subjectivities at the level of the civil society, as a means of envisioning enlightenment as a legislation in thinking. To put it differently, at no point does it seem plausible for one to trace in the above an account of
the public that captures Foucault’s claim that it is in public rather than in private that one should exercise an unlimited critical thinking tied to enlightenment as an ongoing self-realization (see introduction). These public spheres are rather limited and regulated.

Pieterse’s conclusion captures the essence of this sub-section’s discussion. The cosmopolitan merely appears as a positive re-appropriation of US foreign policy that, even if it is still violated internally, marks a new emancipatory rationale for approaching the world. I have suggested that such an approach mimics, in certain ways, ‘communicative interaction’. Populations are culturally democratised or liberalised before their respective territorial base goes through all the economic and institutional liberalisation processes as subjects of cognition prone to reach a consensus with respect to the universality of a liberal democratic emancipation.

This democratic struggle, indeed, opposes a global economic neoliberalisation. But, it is also about the manifestation of a certain liberal democratic perception of emancipation, cognition, and rights or, as the next part of the thesis evidences, of a cosmopolitan reflexive imaginary. In both cases, we deal with two different sub-conducts of a neogovernmental conduct influenced by Neoplatonism which attempt to re-envision rationality and democracy in the West, while universalising this envisioning.

A ‘mentality’ of governance emerges here that aims to co-shape neoliberal globalisation by inserting a particular globalist democratic imaginary at the level of the production of structures. In other words, whether contemporary global populations realise it or not, their claims are rather tied to these new processes of producing global subjectivities. Their claims are a manifestation of the potentials that global democratic institutions, deliberative democratic procedures, and (as discussed in Chapter 5) a reflexive cosmopolitan subjectivity offer. It is an invitation to play the ‘game of knowledge’ which is tied to subjectivity and the ethics of self-care and truth telling that are concerned with the ‘polis’. And, when ‘games of truth’ become ‘games of knowledge’, ‘games of power’ cease (see introduction).
Chapter 4 introduced Habermas’s account of legal rights as a means to turn to deliberative democracy. The latter was tied to a ‘world policy’ discussion that in turn linked to a discussion of international and/or global governance. The chapter then turned to WikiLeaks and to other connections between public spheres, democratization and cyberspace. In this context, the discussion is not, of course, about the WikiLeaks case *per se*. I placed democracy, emancipation and governance concerns within a context of the information era. I focussed on some prominent examples that demonstrated my ‘fictitious’ connection between Habermas’s democracy, contemporary issues of regulation and social action, the Alcibiades ‘parrhesia’ and a transcendental account of enlightenment.

At the same time, the chapter further suggested how several of these issues can be seen from the point of view of the cosmopolitanism discussed in Part III. As has been established in the introduction, my aim is to apply a governmentality critique to forms of democratic activism from two distinct points of view. Therefore, I have attempted here to establish the ‘neogovernmental’ sub-conduct tied to Habermas’s notion of the public reason or sphere and the interaction of it with a neoliberal governmentality in conditions of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. In the process, I have drawn parallels with the other ‘neogovernmental’ sub-conduct tied to the reflexive sociology of Beck and Giddens, on which I focus next.
Introduction to Chapter 5

Chapter 5 approaches the theme of the governance of the self and the theme of structures of domination at a more abstract level. The first theme unfolds within a philosophical discussion of ethics that focuses on how ethics interact with knowledge and power in reflexive sociology. The terms established in Chapter 1 allow me to engage in a parallel discussion between Foucault and Beck and Foucault and Giddens with respect to an ethical differentiation tied to two different types of parrhesia. The argument of Chapter 3 is also important for, in addition to putting forward a parallel discussion between Foucault and Habermas for the purpose of forging a certain neogovernmental sub-conduct, it also adds to crystallizing Foucault’s ethos of enlightenment. This crystallization is also important in order to add to the ethical difference of parrhesia an ethical difference tied to enlightenment without having to revisit Foucault’s account of enlightenment. The second theme is approached from a methodological point of view in relation to an analysis of a structural constructivist approach. However, the two are explicitly connected throughout all sections, tied to Beck’s ‘sub-politics’ and Gidden’s ‘life politics’.

Finally, these two themes lead to a third concerned with the interaction of a reflexive subjectivity (i.e., technologies of the self) and a reflexive dispositif (i.e., structures of domination) with neoliberal capitalism at the level of the structure of social reproduction. This theme brings out more explicitly the normative comparison between Foucault and Beck and Foucault and Giddens with respect to the interaction between ethics, knowledge, and power in the governmental arena. In this context, in this chapter I explore the ways that reflexive sociology attempts to insert certain moral norms at the level of the structure of the social reproduction, while in the next chapter I follow the political discourses and the governmental regulation that emerge from reflexive sociology.

‘Sub-politics’ and ‘life-politics’ forge a morality tied to a certain interaction between self-care and knowledge which I critically contemplate as a means to pave the ground for demonstrating how the meta-levels of the those concepts, which are ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘third way politics’ respectively, lead to concrete ways of governing the present.
5. Risk, and the reflexive subject

5.1. Beck

5.1.1. Structural constructivism

My aim here is to contemplate on what grounds a certain kind of reflexivity emerges in relation to the problematisation of what enlightenment is and how the project of modernity or enlightenment can be better envisioned in the midst of contemporary processes of regulation. Foucault clearly claims that he writes ‘fictions’ that are established by outlining different ethical outlooks. As noted before, Habermas was more dogmatic in his account of the superiority of a certain outlook or position, to the point of discarding all others, but he still acknowledged that his analysis operates at the philosophical level of trying to envision reality rather than to describe it. In Beck it is hard to distinguish whether a certain emancipation tied to enlightenment is plausible because this is where reality is heading or because he wants to legislate it in that direction. Where structures end and social action begins is the issue initially explored in this section, and such an issue depends on whether one can use theory ahistorically to describe reality as a means to envision via such a description a certain type of emancipation.

In this context, my focus is Beck’s analysis of the techno-economic sphere as a source of a reflexive governance that ‘replaces’ the instrumentally rational dispositif. The latter has been, as noted before, the source of certain governmental regulation. Beck seems to suggest, though, that this ‘replacement’ can eventually offer more emancipatory opportunities for realising modernity. My issue is to contemplate to what extent Beck’s analysis aiming at emancipation is rooted in a descriptive analysis of the social that actually claims to explain reality.

So, the understanding of the dynamics of the interaction between the liberal dispositif and a ‘techno-economic sphere’ is vital, specifically in evaluating what kind of emancipatory opportunities Beck suggests that the present offers along the lines of the power or freedom and structures or social action dichotomies.

In ‘Risk Society’, Beck outlines a certain transformation of politics in four theses (1992:183-187). First, Beck suggests that the relationship between social transformation and political direction was originally conceived in the project of the industrial society on the model of the ‘divided citizen’. On the one hand, as a citoyen, the latter avails himself of his democratic rights in all arenas of political will formation, and on the other hand, as a bourgeois, he defends his private interests in the fields of work and business. Correspondingly, a differentiation occurs between a politico-economic and a techno-economic system (1992:183).
In this context, the techno-economic system is considered as essentially ‘non-political’ (Beck, 1992:184). This assumption establishes technological and economical processes in relation to progress as the source of development, meaning that techno-economic and social progress are paired. Any positive outcome suggests progress, and any negative outcome, rather than leading to political disputes, should be perceived as an ‘unfortunate’ delay on behalf of science to figure out how progress can occur rapidly, thereby solving any problems of well-being (see Beck, 1992:184). Here, ‘progress replaces voting’ (Beck, 1992:184) in the sense that scientifically produced choices should eventually make political choices irrelevant.

In other words, Beck makes the point that science and technocratic expertise operate outside the democratic sphere. Beck attributes to science culture per se the role of dictating through its rationalisation processes the governing of the social (see also below). He then suggests that the globalisation of industrial society brings these two spheres together, in which case the techno-economic sphere rather dominates the democratic one:

With the globalization of the industrial society, then, two contrary process of organizing social change interpenetrate one another: the establishment of a political parliamentary democracy and the establishment of an unpolitical, non-democratic social change under the legitimizing umbrella of ‘progress’ and ‘rationalization’. The two behave towards each other like modernity and counter-modernity. On the one hand, the institutions of the political system—parliament, government, political parties—functionally presuppose in a manner conditioned by the system the production circle of industry, technology and business. On the other hand, this pre-programs the permanent change of all realms of social life under the justifying cloak of techno-economic progress, in contradistinction to the simplest rules of democracy—knowledge of the goals change, discussion, voting and consent (Beck, 1992: 184).

As such, the political system merely facilitates a depoliticised or decentralised techno-economic governance.

In Foucault, this decentralisation is framed rather differently. Western democracy has so far been inseparable from liberal legalism in the sense of being a product of the liberal politico-juridical matrices. It is not science per se but the politico-juridical matrices that forge the democratic structures (i.e., structures of domination). As noted before (see introduction and Part I), these matrices are products of the Reformation–Counter-reformation processes that led to the rise of the scientific method and empiricism. It is the rationalisation of philosophy in the midst of these processes that gave birth to the legalistic state, and its institutions that in turn have shaped scientific progress. There are no institutions of democracy on the one hand and the regulation of the techno-economic sphere on the other, even if these two do collide within this suggested globalisation of industrial society.
Secondly, Beck suggests that due to this subordination of the democratic to the techno-economic, the political should be understood differently. Instead of merely declaring the death of politics, one can observe that political activity progressively establishes its space of operation outside the traditional political sphere. Society itself becomes the political in the era of risk, suggesting that civil society becomes a field of politics with reflexive capabilities rather than a mere target of political economy. Still, my concern is to highlight that the liberal dispositif might yet maintain control over these kind of politics, while also being re-appropriated by them.

This relationship leads to the third thesis. Beck suggests that the techno-economic sphere separates further itself from the political one (‘unbinding of politics’). Hence, as it stops using the political system to merely implement itself, it focusses on governing the social solely on its own premises, thereby becoming political from non-political. Thus the techno-economic sphere becomes primarily responsible for governing risks, thereby having to deal with the moral and political dimensions of its activity:

The business and techno-scientific action acquire a new political and moral dimension that had previously seemed alien to techno-economic activity. If one wished, one might say that the devil of the economy must sprinkle himself with the holy water of the public morality and put on a halo of concern for society and nature (Beck, 1992:186).

It is here that the second thesis meets this third, in the sense that the individual should focus on engaging in this political activity that is inherently tied to the social.

However, in Foucault’s neoliberalism, this alleged diffusion of power into the social rather depicts the more ‘instrumental’ ‘mirroring society as an enterprise’ principle. In ordo-liberalism, economic law becomes the source of a decentralised economic regulation of the social (competition building) (see Chapter 2). The governability of the subject is to be structured, especially in American anarcho-liberalism, by internalising the dream of completion tied to a capitalist utopia (see Chapter 2).

In his fourth thesis, Beck suggests that the techno-economic sphere has become the political one and the political one has become a non-political. The political is now ‘the sub-political system of scientific, technological and economic modernization’ (Beck, 1992:186).

I suggest that the above thesis put forward by Beck, rather than being invalid it simply highlights an observation that Foucault made from the very beginning. By perceiving the political and the techno-economic as politico-juridical matrices inherently tied to the legalism of the social contract or to the political economy of liberalism, it is evident that an autonomous political never really existed in the sense that Beck argues. This perception suggests that ‘sub-politics’ are not *ipso facto* an indication for a transition from an industrial society to a risk society. Risk and its politics should not be crafted on this basis.
Modern institutions have achieved the right balance between prosperity and oppression that allowed reflexive forces to emerge. Reflexivity defeats traditional institutions. Beck traces the rise of a new politics here, but this assumption is hindered by the conviction that these new politics are governed by the techno-economic sphere which in turn offers the means for a more direct political engagement powered by the social. In this context, scientific knowledge is not disputed, but is rather democrtised on the grounds of reflexivity.

It is on these grounds that in Beck one can observe this overlap between ‘scientific enlightenment’ and ‘therapeutic enlightenment’. Beck, although analytically not a supporter of a scientific enlightenment, descriptively overemphasises its current impact on the social (see below). This emphasis was as a means of building upon it a theory of plausible emancipation.

To clarify, Beck connects the spill-over of information not to the re-appropriation of the governmental techniques of an instrumental rationality but to a departure from the control of the politico-juridical matrices on science. He then builds upon this assumption a different kind of control over the social that leaves more room for subjects to contemplate the governance of themselves. In order one to contemplate whether such self-governance leads to ‘technologies of domination’ or ‘technologies of living’, one should pay attention to the fact that emancipation is rooted in subjects that envision their pacts of freedom. They envision them by being capable of acting politically when they can interact with the knowledge produced by the techno-economic sphere. The structural apparatus has been descriptively set as solid and not-really open-ended. As a result, the overall ‘games of power’ remain halted, and rather than that being an indirect critique motivated by a certain ethical preference for more open-ended ‘games of power’, there is a celebration of such ‘games of power’ as likely to lead to a certain democratic utopia.

Hence, at a first glance, ‘sub-politics’ appears to be a contested concept in terms of the binary explanatory/descriptive and emancipatory/analytical role it plays in Beck’s theory. If we are talking about politics operating at the micro-level here, then in Foucault, although the micro power is always decentralised, at the same time it remains tied to the state as the central point of the dispositif as a macro power. If one aims to argue beyond the state, then one can turn to Deleuze’s deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation processes in relation to globalisation that operate under the mode of ‘control’ (see introduction and Chapter 1). In this latter analysis, the dispositif is not bound to be associated with the state and its institutions, so it can critically capture Beck’s reflexive ‘sub-politics’.

I have introduced here my methodological concerns with respect to Beck’s reflexive sociology, contrasting him where necessary with Foucault. I have also briefly outlined how the concept of ‘sub-politics’ emerges in connection to Beck’s attempt to describe reality as a means to stage his theory of democratic emancipation.
5.1.2. ‘Sub-politics’: An overview

Having summarised the problems behind Beck’s approach, I will now focus on depicting more explicitly how ‘games of power’ are regulated at the sub-political level in a manner that keeps them stagnant. The premise that unfolds below is that ‘sub-politics’ are tied both to ‘structures of domination’ and to ‘technologies of domination’.

In ‘sub-politics’, the individual has turned his focus away from the politico-economic sphere. The individual increasingly focusses on the operation of the techno-economic sphere. However, how does the individual obtain her subjectivity?

If one employs the Foucauldian dispositif that operates at the level of the milieu, then power is everywhere. Furthermore, in order for freedom to be everywhere, one should recognise first that power is everywhere as well.

When Beck suggests that modernity has politicised society via media outlets and constitutional rights, while gradually depoliticising politics, he seems to indicate that freedom can be everywhere in the sense of exercising political activity at various levels (see Beck, 1992:194). However, he rather fails to incorporate into this assumption that the politicisation of society spreads power everywhere as well. He does recognise that the centralised state and the use of the police are the opposite side, namely that of control, in this politicisation of society that has created various sub-political centres: ‘The exercise of state power and political liberalisation are by all means mutually related’ (Beck, 1992:195).

Yet, again the problem here, which applies to all emancipatory outlooks on decentralisation or determinantalisation, is the assumption that they increase the possibilities of freedom rather than possibly also spreading power or control everywhere. It is not of course that Beck quite suggests that the only quality being spread is freedom. As a matter of fact, he rather suggests something different and possibly ‘worse’. He suggests that in conditions of reflexivity, in which the natural is being fully encompassed by the social, the freedom that a certain mode of power produces is the only possible freedom. Foucault, of course, did not claim some sort of transcendental account of freedom. As derived from his discussion of ethics, freedom is a possibility to move beyond stagnant power games as a means to envision an individual way of living. However, if a doctrinal mode of power tied to structures is the only source of freedom and the issue of freedom becomes an issue of choosing between different alternatives of such freedom, then the games of power are not really open-ended. This is how this ‘realist constructivist’ or ‘utopian realist’ merging that appears in the governance of freedom by the reflexive sociology of Beck brings power and freedom together.

As such, Beck makes an interest argument which we find in Giddens as well (see section 5.2.) regarding how the domination of the techno-economic sphere has led to internal conflicts of
interpretation. Such conflicts make cultural mediation possible. Thus, legal rights are dissociated from traditional and legal procedures, and they become tied to scienticism (see Beck, 1992:196). But, because there is a conflict between scientific responses to risk, further ignited by the operation of multiple global media outlets, the individual has to interpret such responses.

The novelty here is in that we are not merely talking about the individual as a consumer who makes decisions on the basis of the quality of the products. In a sense, among one’s decisions is whether one has to perceive oneself as such a consumer, and if not, how one does have to perceive oneself. A variety of public spheres emerge here that, although they allegedly represent some form of scientism as a response to risk, divergently stage the problematisation of reflexivity (see most notably the rise of environmental issues; Beck, 1992: 197):

In this sense, individualization processes broaden the scope for sub-political structuring and decision-making in the private sphere, below the level where state influence is possible...These different partial arenas of cultural and social ‘sub-politics’—media publicity, judiciary, privacy, citizens’ initiative groups and the new social movements—add up to forums of a new culture, some extra institutional, some institutionally protected (Beck, 1992:198).

Therefore these public spheres can operate as sub-cultures with daily life implications. This operation obviously concerns the individual *per se* at the level of privacy. His more personal decisions regarding family are not so much linked to relative public policies as much as to the individual outlook on notions of family, career, and even the meaning of life. Beck emphasises that, although the private sphere was legally protected, it is detradionilisation that solidifies its further autonomy (see Beck, 1992:198).

Hence, as is stressed above in regard to surpassing the consumer attitude, as Beck puts it by focussing on Germany,

The rational choice, hierarchical, means-end model of politics (which was probably always fictitious, but was cultivated for a long time by bureaucracy research and theory) has begun to crumble (Beck, 1992:199).

It is here that the seeds for the invention of a new politics via the broader social sciences should be found (see also Chapter 6). Beck attempts to highlight this need against a strict political science analysis that searches for a politics that no longer exist. As Beck puts it,

this fluidization of politics into a political process is only being half-heartedly appreciated by social science. The directedness and structure of this process...is still assumed (simply for reasons of the practicability of political science analysis). The fiction of the political-administrative system as the center for politics likewise continues to exist. In that way,
however, the development which occupies the center of attention here cannot come into sight: the unbinding of politics (Beck, 1992:199).

This sub-section has taken a first closer look at what ‘sub-politics’ is in Beck, trying to draw again, where necessary, some parallels with Foucault. This analysis has contemplated whether Beck’s account of ‘sub-politics’ tied to the epistemological staging of the problematisation of emancipation in regard to envisioning enlightenment is emancipatory or not.

5.1.3. ‘Sub-politics’: The democratisation of expertise

I elaborate more here on how exactly the techno-economic sphere interacts with the sub-political one. My aim is to contemplate further the grounds on which a scientific enlightenment is independent from the instrumentally rational politico-juridical matrices, and to contemplate the extent to which politics as a reflection on a more reflexive scientific knowledge constitutes a form of a therapeutic emancipation at the level of self-care (i.e., ethics).

The function of politics as ‘sub-politics’ is reflected in a new relationship between reflexive expertise and subjectivity. Capitalism is now driven, according to Beck, by reflexive scientific knowledge. The problem is that despite its reflexivity, science tends to operate in an isolated laboratory condition (i.e., black-boxed knowledge), thereby limiting democratic interaction between knowledge and individual choice. The knowledge that science produces has disassociated politics from decision-making and placed the latter to the hands of scientific experts who unconsciously took this role. The problem, then, is that an ‘unconscious’ activity shapes the subjectivity of the scientist per se and more importantly of the social, since scientific reflexivity is still in some ways tied to progress.

In Beck’s words,

One can see that history presupposes and develops the ability to change and influence human nature, to produce culture, to manipulate the environment and to replace constraints of natural evolution with self-created conditions. Still this should not deceive us that thrusts into new areas are occurring here. The talk of ‘progress’ presumes the subject whom all this is ultimately supposed to benefit. Unleashed thinking and acting in feasibility categories are oriented to the opposite, the object, the mastery of nature and the increase of social wealth it makes possible. When the principles of technological feasibility and arrangement encroach upon the subjects themselves in that way, then the very foundations of the model of progress are cancelled. The bourgeoisie’s pursuit of its own interests destroys conditions of existence for the citoyens, who are ultimately supposed to hold all the democratic strings of development in their hands, according to the popular image of the division of labor in industrial society (Beck, 1992:207).
Beck connects the above primarily to the operation of medicine in relation to the impact of medical knowledge on the social:

Thus, medicine possesses a *free pass* for the implementation and testing of its ‘innovations’, on the basis of the structure of its activity (Beck, 1992:207).

In other words, it is this laboratory-produced progressive knowledge, and not the conscious scientist as an expert, that produces the kind of knowledge which shifts the social:

The doctors do not owe their structuring power to their special rationality or to their particular successes in the protection of the highly valued commodity, ‘health’. Rather, it is the product and expression of a successful *professionalization*, (at the turn of the twentieth century) and as a corresponding limiting case it is likewise of general interest for the conditions that give rise to the sub-political structuring power of professions (or in an ‘incomplete’ form, of occupations) (Beck, 1992:209).

The mentioning of professionalisation might suggest the importance of politico-juridical regulation; however, in Beck this suggestion is fairly underdeveloped and somewhat contradictory with the way that reflexivity has been so far staged.

By this token,

Whereas in politics consciousness and influence can coincide, at least in theory, with the functions and tasks performed, in the field of ‘sub-politics’, consciousness and actual effects, social change and influence systematically diverge (Beck, 1992:212).

Elaborating on the critical assumptions made in the first sub-section, what we encounter in the above is basically a critique of scientific enlightenment (see introduction) rather than of the politico-juridical matrices that have structured this knowledge or capitalised it. Hence, Beck rather neglects the possibility that these changes are the very manifestation of liberal politics. The argument that politics have collapsed is not well-founded, for if one employs Foucault’s dispositif, this is what politics has always been. In other words, it is one thing to argue that democratic politics never existed and another to say that they have ceased to exist.

This concern with democratic politics leads to the main reason that Beck engages in this discussion. His elaboration is not as straightforward as Giddens’s (see section 5.2.). It is safe to argue, though, that his aim is to take advantage of the opportunities that the techno-economic sphere offers, to suggest that along with this new power function of that sphere comes an inherent freeing of reflexive expertise that empowers the subject with the opportunity to acquire knowledge in order to take control in the formation of his own subjectivity.

This dynamic leads back to the issue of power and freedom in regard to the descriptive and analytical dimension of Beck’s argumentation. My continuous emphasis on the dispositif suggests
that if Beck is wrong descriptively, it is then hard for him to formulate a valid analytical suggestion with respect to an emancipatory self-care or governance. However, since the descriptive is somewhat contingent, one can for the sake of contingency accept Beck’s argument in regard to the autonomy or semi-autonomy of the techno-economic sphere as also to the opportunities for individual formation of subjectivity.

If that is the case, the critique shifts, to some extent, to what a desirable power or freedom looks like. I say ‘to an extent’ because one can always wonder whether that political invention which can lead to a better, and by extension, more emancipatory vision of modernity and enlightenment is limited because of a misunderstanding of reality or because it is willingly tied to certain power structures. In other words, on the one hand, Beck, by linking both power and freedom to decentralisation, places the struggle for freedom at the level of the interaction between the techno-economic sphere and civil society. On the other hand, if one links power and control to the politico-juridical, it becomes evident that this interaction between the techno-economic and civil society reproduces regulation, while remaining a target of regulation itself.

But again, this problematic staging of reflexivity is not ipso facto problematic in terms of achieving some kind of political invention. The critique of such a possible invention is made on the basis that it is bound to be a limited one exactly due to this congruence between the utopian and the realist. Rather than perceiving this utopian realism in a similar manner to Foucault’s power-freedom pairing, in reflexive sociology, the utopian merges with the realist and the analytic with the descriptive.

By this token, Beck misuses constructivism. This use takes the notion that everything is a social construction to the level that structures are fully reflexive. The power of the dispositif is that it is both contingent and in a sense ‘eternal’.

The techno-economic as a reflexive sphere that now structures the social can allegedly produce everything. However, when something produces everything, it might as well produce nothing. This is an assimilationist pluralism that constitutes reflexivity as a form of subjectivity. Osborne has explored this argument in his analysis of Giddens (see section 5.2.).

In effect, the descriptive account of a reflexive techno-economic sphere meets the analytical choice in ethics that is put forward by Beck. Hence, Beck offers a form of invention that is content with regulations tied to subjectivity. The first problem of ‘sub-politics’ meets the second one. In this context, the realist-descriptive understanding of structures is disguised as a utopian-analytical effort to creatively identify opportunities that can be matched with the decision to reintroduce a certain set of ethics. This assumption connects this kind of sociology to the political philosophy that appears in ‘Alcibiades’ and Neoplatonism, as established in the introduction and Chapter 1.
In this way, my focus shifts to the debate on parrhesia. The latter is in a sense only semi-autonomous from the debate on structural constructivism, since as I have suggested so far, the reason that Beck chooses this set of ethics relates to how his descriptive premises turn into analytical ones. The way that Beck identifies what power is in his epochal understanding of contemporary high modernity targets not a critique of politico-juridical matrices but a techno-economic sphere that socialises nature and is prone to be democratised (see also ‘life politics’ below). The ethics of self-care that are tied to the ‘polis’ are facilitated by reflexivity in interpretations of techno-economic expertise. Furthermore, such ethics navigate the risks that derive from reflexivity:

Science’s monopoly on rationalism excludes self-skepticism; the professional monopoly of men stands in contrast to the universalist demands for equality, under which modernity entered the scene; and so on. This also means, however, that many risks and issues arise within the continuity of modernity and are asserted against the limitations, the functional imperatives and the fatalism of progress in industrial society (Beck, 1992:233).

The above statement suggests why Beck is himself a champion of an alternative political regulation deriving from social sciences that proposes the reinvention of certain democratic politics at the sub-political level. Those can merge with science via the interaction of ‘sub-politics’ with the techno-economic sphere, thereby making knowledge reflexive. Beck suggests that this merging precipitates a shift to collective decision making in the sense of a spill-over and of decentralisation (see Beck, 1992:191).

Hence, all these conceptual observations, not entirely valid descriptively, are significant in relation to how they lead to a political invention. The hermeneutical subtle differences between Foucault and Beck are tied to different approaches to what constitutes the problematisation of what modernity or enlightenment is. Beck discusses democratisation in order to suggest how in this reflexive modernisation that emerges from ‘sub-politics’ there is no single solution rather than multiple solutions. As well, Beck connects this to his alleged shift to risk in which reflexivity as response to risk can ‘emancipate’ modernity from itself (Beck, 1992:191). This shift, in Foucault, is again an inherent characteristic of liberalism that entails an ongoing self-reflection of governance on the grounds of striving to identify the proper equilibria of governance as things occur. And, of course, modernity itself, in Foucault, is this possibility for unlimited manifestations (see introduction).

Therefore, ‘reflexive modernity’ might be a redundant epochal definition with questionable emancipatory value that unnecessarily expands on the valid observation that modernity can move beyond Marx’s analysis, which merely accommodates an industrial society. Beck uses this epochal understanding as a stepping stone. He locates in this new concern of the ‘moral’ (i.e., ethics) by the ‘economic’ an opportunity to envision a certain account of ethics tied to certain interaction with knowledge. Hence, instead of arguing that the moral is lost in the economic, he suggests that the
very concern of the techno-economic sphere with the notion of morality in relation to its new political role is an opportunity to bring the moral dimension into politics. This account concerns the thesis with respect to the premise that there is a notable ‘invention’ of how to govern freedom as a means to realise a different modernity.

My disagreement derives from what Beck’s observations leading to a certain political invention in governing freedom tell us about power and freedom at a now global scale. It is an issue of ethics rather than of debating how accurately Beck describes contemporary issues of governance. It is an issue of highlighting the ethical differentiation between Foucault and reflexive sociology with respect to enlightenment and parrhesia in connection to governing the self and others.

If risk was basically a sociological view on neoliberalism that ‘wrongly’ becomes an epochal concept tied to a cosmopolitan manifesto (see Chapter 6), then the problem would be less significant. Beck, essentially, in that case, would have provided us with some useful insights on how the concept of ‘risk’ can further solidify neoliberal governmentality. This is interesting more for those management-and public policy-oriented governmentality studies.

In this manner, Dean discusses Beck:

Here I suggest that Beck provides us with a figure of thought that might be usefully adapted to the concerns of an analytics of government. Beck writes of reflexive modernization, and in doing so hopes to avoid the sterile debates over modernism and postmodernism. While not acceding to this diagnosis, or the problematic of modernity in which it is located, we can usefully introduce the notion of ‘reflexive government’ or the governmentalization of government into the lexicon of an analytics of government. This notion indicates a process that entails a shift of the liberal and social problematics of security from the security of social and economic processes to the security of governmental mechanisms (Dean, 2010: 206-7).

Since there is an explicit concern for ethics, politics and governance, however, one should focus on the connection between an objective or descriptive account of social transformations and the suggestions for political actions that derive from it. Those are perceived as both utopian and realist, but these terms need to be linked now to a more concrete discussion of ethics.

This sub-section’s main focus here has been better understanding the connection between the techno-economic sphere powered by a more reflexive scientific knowledge and ‘sub-politics’ as the space that democratic moral filters are developed and applied to such reflexive knowledge. I have hinted at a connection with the ‘Alcibiades’ type of parrhesia. The extent to which scientific knowledge is fully unbound by the politico-juridical matrices thereby becoming reflexive is questionable. However, there is a solid effort by Beck to utilise a certain moral reflexivity tied to
interpreting the techno-economic truth-telling as means of a self-care orientated towards a certain account of democracy.

5.1.4. ‘Sub-politics’ and ethics

I will now focus explicitly on the issue of ethics. My aim is to compare Beck’s ethics with Foucault’s in regard to parrhesia and enlightenment.

Beck (1997), in his final chapter in ‘The Reinvention of Politics’, titled ‘The Art of Doubt’, gives time and time again a positive account of the ethics of doubt that interestingly adds to Foucault’s ethics of critique. For example, at the very beginning of the chapter, Beck suggests the following:

Isn’t there an elemental fundamenta[lism of self-righteousness and indoctrination hidden in all enlightenment as practiced so far, something which always threatens to turn enlightenment into its very opposite? Perhaps the decline of the lodestars of primary enlightenment, the individual, identity, truth, reality, science, technology, and so on is the prerequisite for the start of an alternative Enlightenment, one which does not fear doubt, but instead makes it the element of its life and survival (Beck, 1997:161).

The above captures a Foucauldian ethos of enlightenment as a form of critique.

In addition, the following offers an explicitly positive outlook on Foucault:

What is so terrible in Foucault’s insight that the institutions of liberation are in fact elaborate systems of subordination? Certainly our disappointed ideals rebel. An entire experimental order of Enlightenment proves to be opposite of Enlightenment. But is this not an expression of the desire to unmask, the quintessential pleasure of Enlightenment, which does not even shy away from its own arrogance and its initial hopes, joyously toppling the monuments of its own tyranny? (Beck, 1997:161).

However, this account is also repeatedly mixed with the seeds of something else. For example, his use of the social contract indicates a denunciation of ‘laissez-faire’ ethics. Beck provides a new social contract that requires an alternative denunciation of conflict:

Perhaps doubt, mine and yours, that is, will create space for others, and in the development of the others, for me and us? Could this utopia of a questioning and supporting doubt form a basis, a fundamental idea for an ethics of a post-industrial and radically modern identity and social contract? (Beck, 1997:162).

The reference to the social contract is inevitably a denunciation of conflict. To explain, liberalism as understood by Foucault was not really contractual. It counts on certain identified inherent qualities of humans and the market place. Furthermore, in *Society Must be Defended* (see
introduction and Chapter 1), it becomes evident that even when the social contract can be used as a means to navigate the rise of the state, it signifies a cultivated fear of the conflicting aspects of human nature rather than the conscious rational decision to tame conflict.

The denunciation of conflict matters because, according to the parrhesiatic ethics of critique, conflict should be accepted on the basis that radical doubt inevitably battles certainty. Hence, a rejection of conflict on the basis of a social contract suggests that doubt becomes the source of a pluralist society empowered by a variety of acceptable forms of knowledge rather than the source of an ongoing critique (see also Giddens’s ‘life politics’ in the next Section 5.2).

In other words, Beck praises aesthetics as capable of leading to a positive manifestation of doubt (see Beck, 1997:167-168), which shape a matured modernity that embraces doubt. However, he again turns this into a new project of governing men and their freedom. He specifically perceives radicalised modernity as a ‘political programme’:

The political programme of radicalized modernity is scepticism! Doubts and error are the gravediggers of the old and the standards of the new modernity to be achieved (Beck, 1997:168).

Interesting is also the use of the phrase ‘established doubt’. Beck refers not only to the gradual dissolution of traditional power that creates new doubts, but the doubts that instrumental rationality never managed to define. However, the following phrasing of the interaction between an established doubt and constructivist action presents an explicitly regulatory or legislative account of freedom:

Established doubt requires a new distribution of power, new structures of decision making, a new architecture of institutions, a new type of technology and technology development, a new science, new learning groups and ways to revise decisions-not least of all the anticipation of side-effects (Beck, 1997:168-9).

The use of the word ‘new’ suggests a society that has to exist under some kind of dispositif, which might be more fragmented or morally driven than a mono-dimensional instrumentally rational one. In any case, it does not cease to interact with existing apparatuses or to suggest that ethics cannot exist without relation to the dispositif or, to go back to my pivotal parrhesiatic analogy, to the ‘polis’.

In this context, Beck makes another interesting statement:

Nothing is as invigorating as an established doubt. First, it is the champagne of thinking. Second, I know no foundation of such scope and elasticity for a critical theory of society (which would then automatically be a self-critical theory) as doubt. Third, doubt points the way to a new modernity. It is more modern than the old, industrial modernity we know.
The latter, after all, is based on certainty, on repelling and suppressing doubt (Beck, 1997:173).

What strikes me first in the above is the further emphasis on the ‘established doubt’, namely the doubt that derives from the nature of the things as they are now, which could suggest an engagement with life or the empirical as the ‘will to life’. Later, Beck does return to the issue of critique to suggest that social theory should be empirical and conceptual in nature rather than linked to a normative framework, as with Marx. Here, Beck endorses social theory as a hub of critique that delves into the empirical (i.e., philosophy as fieldwork). The latter is critical without denouncing life (see introduction), and Beck shares this conviction that creating concepts through an engagement with empirics is how social theory should function (see Beck, 1992:175-6).

However, once again we have to take refuge in the issue of the dispositif in order to navigate the subtle differences between Beck and Foucault. Existing doubt is very suspicious for it is more likely to be produced by an apparatus (i.e., dispositif). The importance of understanding structures as rationales rather than as processes established by the fundamentalism of science again becomes evident. It is this understanding that captures better how ‘games of truth’ (i.e., deconstructing certainties) become ‘games of knowledge’ (i.e., structuring uncertainties). The latter, even when they look fragmented or reflexive, might remain tied to a dispositif that deliberately manifests as fragmented or reflexive.

For example, one might be confused by the following statement:

A major contradiction of industrial modernity is that simultaneously doubt must be fomented and security asserted for the production and reproduction of power, technology and state. Something Max Weber probably suspected, but did not reveal, is the connection between doubt and freedom, doubt and democracy. Truth is a presumption with which people deceive themselves and others as to one’s meaning (Beck, 1997:174).

The above is supplemented by a praise of the French and even the Anglo-Saxons for replacing the project of grand enlightenment with doubt. Power and freedom are perceived interactively on this basis. Immediately afterward, Beck refers to how the Germans engage with doubt in a theoretically immense ‘despair’ that one can find in, among others, Socrates. A preference emerges here for Anglo-Saxon, more playful and ironic critical engagement, which suggests that established doubt is related to the will to accept the existing.

The biggest danger here is for one to misunderstand power-freedom dynamics. For in Beck, power becomes freedom and vice versa. This utter blurring of any distinction is connected to the assumption that a critically self-reflective social theory cannot exist. It is true that the various sociologies of knowledge, and even social theory as a hub of critique, have to deal with the problem of being self-reflexive. But, in this reflexive sociology that vital aspect of self-critique is once and for all lost on the basis that now there is nothing outside of reflexivity.
Doubt is this reflexivity. This assumption leads to a monstrous merging of governance with contingency tied to the socialisation of the natural in relation to a reflexive subjectivity. That merging allegedly tries to prevent another ‘monstrosity’—to which I have referred throughout the thesis—namely the merging between neoliberalism and the postmodernist contingency as commodification of chaos. If the demise of the polis leads to that kind of disassociation from doctrines that made the ethics of the Cynics possible, the decline of the state in conditions of high modernity made postmodernist ethics possible. Reflexivity comes as a moral reinstatement of the ‘polis’ in order to counterbalance individualist chaos.

Foucault, before his acknowledgment that the contemporary era offers more opportunities for creative deconstruction, suggests that the West in general and more so liberalism and modernity are inherently prone to being deconstructed. The ‘games of truth’ remain open in the West; there is an ongoing struggle between power and freedom (see introduction). But, crucially, it is not that truth cannot exist outside of reflexivity, but rather that freedom appears when one does not try to transform truth into a discourse of knowledge operating as a power structure. On this basis, freedom can exist as a reflexive ethos, namely as a practice of living or as a scientific asceticism that is concerned with the means of deconstruction rather than with the establishment of a reflexive social order.

The Foucaudian ethics of doctrinal disassociation are not an ethics of chaos. Social theory, if it is to operate as hub of critique, should be exactly that: a ‘hub’ rather than a discipline with fixed parameters in regard to what can be approached critically and what cannot. Reflexivity cannot nullify any external point of view by the means that everything is reflexive. Additionally, social theory certainly cannot be a source of governmental regulation. Once one is concerned with establishing a certain sociopolitical order, one shifts automatically from an ethos (i.e., practices) to morals (doctrines) (see more on the Giddens section below).

In this context, it seems to me that ‘doubt’ is not the means for capturing the unimaginable rather than a celebration of what Baudrillard perceives as the society of simulacra (see also Section 5.2). For if the purpose of ‘games of truth’ comes down to a reconceptualisation of established patterns of subjectivity rooted in desire in connection to the reconceptualisation of the politics that govern them, then we have this realist celebration of the existing.

Therefore, Beck’s function of ‘doubt’ seems to share much with the parrhesiatic trajectory that starts with ‘Alcibiades’ and leads to the Neoplutonic parrhesia that is tied to doctrines of ethics (morals) (see intro and Chapter 1). It is the latter that focusses on ‘games of knowledge’. And, in these games, the same things are baptised recurrently, differently (i.e., simulacra).

Beck’s ethics aim at finding freedom in the fact that each individual can be part of the process of trying to open and then reseal discourses of knowledge. Such ethics point towards a new form of governmentality rooted either in an inherent subordination to the existing dispositif or in
the deliberative initiations of new mentalities of governing subjectivity and freedom. Hence, there is, after all, an essential rejection of the purity of the ‘art of doubt’.

The denunciation becomes clearer in the Chapter 6, as I focus more on ‘World Risk Society’ and Beck’s essay on Cosmopolitanism. I also discuss selected passages from Reflexive Modernization in which Beck’s governmentality can be more explicitly traced, for not only are many of the already problematic themes identified in this ‘art of doubt’ sub-section crafted in a less nuanced manner in these works, but it also becomes clearer how the connection between science, dispositif, ethics and freedom is explicitly tied to a certain mode of governance.

In sum, Beck’s ethics of doubt do not constitute a non-structured orientation in thinking focussing on practices of living. His ethics rather align with envisioning a doctrinal morality as a means to govern freedom or subjectivities and, as an extension, the freedom of subjects.
5.2. Giddens

5.2.1. Structural constructivism

I focus again here first on the issue of tracing the difference between the descriptive and the analytical with respect to structures and social action. It becomes evident that in Giddens there is a more explicit acknowledgment of the role that a reflexive sociological analysis aims to play. Giddens does not focus much on drafting claims that attempt to describe reality, rather he focusses on orientating descriptive observations towards a certain analysis. This approach is, in one sense, more honest than Beck’s, but it is equally, if not more, governmental in that it involves an ethics that filter truth in a manner that reproduces subjectivities tied to structures and technologies of domination.

In the reflexive sociology of Giddens, reflexivity is also recognised as a reality. This reflexivity does not necessarily lead to some form of desirable politics, so Giddens aims to reclaim the role of the intellectual as a legislator through social theory rather than through economics. This reclaiming is not driven by a desire to ‘rule’, but by an existential need to make sense of the world that one lives in (see also Osborne, 1998:151).

In this context, we are dealing with an issue of parrhesia, namely of telling the truth and searching for the truth as a means to take care of the self and the others. However, this is the parrhesia that is concerned with the ‘polis’, and, by this token, with technologies of the self and the governance of freedom; of the freedom of oneself in conjunction with the freedom of others.

Giddens is fairly celebratory of the present. He suggests that the West has been fully detradionalised, thereby fulfilling the project of modernity. Detradionilisation means the transition from a formulaic truth to multiple truths that are always open to doubt. ‘Formulaic truth’ projects the future and the past into the present. ‘Formulaic truth’ uses a fixed doctrine in order to reproduce the present by making any new information compatible with the established.

Modernity was always supposed to be a departure from that kind of truth. According to Giddens, though, this departure has never really taken place. Giddens suggests with functionalism rejected, ‘compulsion’, the inexplicable attachment to the past, keeps modernity from realising the ethos of enlightenment.

Now, however, the project of modernity is being fulfilled as it breaks free from the instrumentally rational descriptions of Weber. Knowledge in conditions of high modernity leads to a reflexive production of power (see Giddens, 1994:57-8). This assumption raises the question of the grounds on which such statement is valid in terms of the reflexivity of knowledge.

Furthermore, if we partially accept that, it raises the issue of what kind of new control we experience when knowledge does not facilitate the ‘iron cage’ but ‘reflexivity’. In the Section 5.1
(on Beck), I pointed out that such an assumption was possible because of the limited consideration of the dispositif. If a spill-over in regulation occurs to the extent that decentralised and bottom-up political activity breaks free from overall biopolitical strategies, then there is room for contingency, reflexivity and doubt.

What concerns me here is how the ‘dispositif’ fits to Giddens’s account. In other words, what opens the possibilities of reflexivity? I emphasise again that the above is important because the origins of the divergence between a Foucauldian embrace of enlightenment, doubt, and parrhesia and that of reflexive sociologists is related to the dimension of power and freedom in regard to where structures end and constructivist action begins. This is the initial focus of this section. I then target what kind of governance of freedom one wants to put forward.

Staying for now with the first concern, I want to make some first observations on the issue of the dispositif in Giddens. In the very beginning of his book *Modernity and Self-identity*, Giddens suggests in relation to the concept of detraditionalisation that reflexive, high, or late modernity is the institutionalisation of doubt. In this context, governance and the self have to be reflexively made (see Giddens, 1991:3). Therefore, there are options and possibilities for different manifestations of social structures and subjectivity. I accept this premise in the sense that it acknowledges that the dispositif (i.e. institutional reflexivity) becomes reflective.

It leads into tying such a concern to what kind of governance of freedom one wants to put forward. In Giddens, there is a more conscious effort to direct the reflexivity of the institutions towards a certain preferable mode of governance. Giddens, in the beginning of *Modernity and Self-Identity*, states explicitly that the book is analytical rather than descriptive (see 1991:2). He therefore acknowledges that his descriptive assumptions intertwine with a certain agenda that his analysis aims to put forward.

In this context, as in Beck, one can trace an overemphasis on the opportunities that ‘sub-politics’ offer. However, in Giddens, the dispositif is the source of reflexivity. Giddens seems more content with outlining a new governmental apparatus. He does not suggest that a new form of governmentality can exist without an apparatus. Hence, he does not position the argument in a manner that claims further emancipatory credit on the basis that it surpasses the apparatus, as is more likely the case in Beck.

Therefore, a critique of Giddens relates not necessarily to a problematic understanding of the dispositif, although such a problem does appear on occasion, and is thereby considered throughout my critical analysis. Rose’s explains, ‘For Giddens, reality has changed and politics must respond. This assertion of sociological determinism opens the argument to all the fashionable nostrums of contemporary epochal sociology’ (2000:1396).

The main issue, then, becomes not how much freedom one identifies as possible, but what kind of freedom one perceives as desirable. Freedom is not a quantifiable issue. For instance, let us
say that before detradionilisation there was 20% reflexivity, and after detradionilisation there is 70% reflexivity. Foucault wants 100% reflexivity, while reflexive sociologists want to bring reflexivity down to 60%. Such quantification is obviously misleading. One cannot argue that what reflexive sociologists attempt to do is to reduce reflexivity in a quantifiable manner.

Giddens feels that there is indeed unlimited reflexivity, because his understanding of a utopia is plausible within a merely reflexive dispositif. Reflexivity is equated with freedom. The use here of the term ‘relative idealism’ or ‘utopian realism’, as in Giddens and Beck, makes further sense (see also Section 5.1.)

Foucault, by contrast, for two reasons would never state that modernity has been realised fully: first, modernity as an ideal form of an ongoing self-realisation can never be fully realised; second, and more grounded, in order to capture the spirit of modernity one has to envision possibilities for individual self-cultivation. Such a vision goes against any form of power exercised on the basis of the premise that a subject should be formed, and then governed in some institutionalised fashion.

The problematisation is what modernity should be rather than how much freedom modernity offers us in order to envision it as we see fit. Foucault suggests that modernity should be a mental platform for ongoing critical conduct as a way of living, but he also suggests that the dispositif in relation to the project of liberalism governs the possibilities for this kind of mental freedom, determining the sites of veridiction. Giddens accepts sites of veridiction, but the rise of the reflexive culture offers the possibility for a variety of reinterpretations or for a re-appropriation of the dispositif. Thus, Giddens is content with the possibilities of emancipation that the present offers.

Yet one can argue, Foucault, as we saw in the introduction, is also content with the opportunities of the present. Hence, the conflict between Foucault and the reflexive sociology of Giddens lies in structural limitations and ethics together. It is Giddens’s choice to capitalise reflexivity on the basis of a reconfiguration of the politico-juridical matrices rooted in morality as a certain mixture of autonomy with communitarianism. By contrast, the structural issue does still play a role in the sense that this kind of parrhesia, concerned with the ‘polis’, is inherently tied to a morality supported by a reflexive structural apparatus.

As Osborne (see 1998:80) puts it, reflexivity becomes a form of subjectivity rather than a reaction to something. What starts as a reaction is tied to a naturalised attachment to governance, and here reflexivity becomes the vehicle to re-envision different manifestations of subjectivity. Osborne (see 1998:81) suggests that there is the illusion of invention put forward by the self. This premise embraces institutions of power on the merit of their reflexivity, while the new technologies of the self make reflexivity a type of subjectivity.
Such an account anticipates a new governmental apparatus whose advocates (i.e. Beck, Giddens) found it both realist and emancipatory. It is emancipatory for those who are content with such reflexivity. What Giddens wants to achieve is achievable because he embraces the premise of governing the subject. His particular understanding of third way politics suggests explicitly that he crafts a kind of governmentality tied to explicit social democratic strategies and an also reflexive neoliberal governmentality (see Chapter 6).

By this token, Giddens’s invention is possible because it uses the reflexivity of the liberal apparatus in order to claim the ability to penetrate social reproduction at the level of the structure. The goal is to re-appropriate liberalism rather than to bring liberalism down. Foucault suggests that liberalism is a constant process of reflection on equilibria of governance. Modernity is a constant process of reflection as an ethos. Confusing the one reflexivity with the other leads to the assumption that a re-appropriation of liberal democracy is a full-realisation of the reflexive ethos of modernity. Furthermore, the reflexive ethos of modernity is confused with reflexive subjectivity. The faults of this assumption in regard to emancipation become clear in the discussion of ‘life politics’ below.

To conclude, some notable differences arise between Giddens’s and Foucault’s account of ethics and truth-telling with respect to the issues of parrhesia and ‘enlightenment’. I have suggested that Giddens’s analysis is tied to a certain epochal sociology that seems to claim a descriptive account of reality as a means of legitimising a certain legislation in thinking, bolstered by the premise that this is the epoch in which enlightenment is fully-realised.

5.2.2. ‘Life politics’: An overview

I introduce here a more explicit account of ‘life politics’ as means of crystallising Giddens’s ethics. Life politics are described by Giddens himself as politics post-emancipation. They are politics tied to a way of life. My aim is to indicate how such politics connect to structures and technologies of domination.

I initially focus on Giddens’s ‘life politics’ chapter in *Modernity and Self-identity*, the theme being the interaction between self-growth, society and liberal individualism in relation to the problematisation of reflexivity and modernity. This theme is connected to that of structural constructivism in the following sense: Giddens suggests that it is this ethos of self-growth of modernity, rather than a mono-dimensional individualism, that triggers social transformation (see Giddens, 1991:209). Hence, again, here we find the celebration or acceptance of an identifiable reflexivity as sufficient in terms of leading to emancipation, which goes hand in hand with a new governance. This celebration gives a first account of how a new governmental conduct interacts with liberal capitalist individualism and its biopolitics at the level of structure.
However, before Giddens proceeds in establishing what ‘life politics’ is, he clarifies first what emancipatory politics is. I follow this narrative. Understanding ‘emancipatory politics’ is important in distinguishing between ‘life politics’ and ‘emancipatory politics’, while at the same time recognising a certain interaction between the two. Regarding the latter, Giddens analyses Habermas within the discussion of ‘emancipatory politics’. In this context, the suggestion in the introduction that a new governmentality tied to ethics consists of two semi-autonomous but interactive conducts (Habermas and cognitive ethics [see Part II] and reflexive sociology and ethopolitics) is further substantiated here.

Giddens offers the following definition: ‘I define emancipatory politics as a generic outlook concerned above all with liberating individuals and groups from constraints which adversely affect their life chances’ (Giddens, 1991:210). He further clarifies the concept by suggesting that, by and large, ‘emancipatory politics’ have a hierarchical understanding of power. ‘Emancipatory politics’ is concerned with reducing or eliminating ‘exploitation’, ‘inequality’ and ‘oppression’. Giddens acknowledges that in his analysis there is a difference in such political understanding of who the target or the driving force of emancipation is. Hence, Habermas’s account of republicanism fails to capture this new republicanism as a hybrid of communitarian notions and a Foucauldian and/or postmodernist informed non-hierarchical account of power. For, this connection results in efforts to reconcile the (life) bios with the transcendental.

Leaving Marx’s emphasis on class aside, the focus is more on the individual. Giddens suggests that ‘emancipatory politics’ use ‘justice’ to battle ‘exploitation’; ‘equality’ to battle ‘inequality’; and ‘participation’ to battle ‘oppression’. Giddens suggests that a drive for justice and democratisation emerges from here (see 1991:212), correlating such aims with Rawls and Habermas (see, 1991:213), arguing that both contribute to organising a project of emancipation. Rawls is concerned with ‘justice’ as the ideal form that can offer emancipation, while Habermas with ‘communication’. My critique of the latter approach is put forward in Part II in regard to the suggestion that language operates as a power structure rather than as a form of emancipation. This critique also understands Habermas’s account as a form of parrhesia that attempts to use the discourse in order to extract a moral governance for the social.

Giddens, on the contrary, perceives emancipatory politics as not being governmental enough, suggesting that such politics deal with an embryonic point of emancipation without giving an account of what happens when the emancipation principles have been implemented or achieved. He is concerned with intensifying governmental rationales for governing emancipation. Put in another way, he suggests that emancipation should be part of an ongoing social activity.

A Foucauldian position does initially align with Giddens’s suggestion. As argued before, the concern of Foucault’s parrhesia is not unlimited freedom or reflexivity in a quantifiable sense. In addition, Habermas and Rawls’s ideal forms easily retreat to a fairly conservative interaction with the existing structures (see Part II Ch. 4).
My critique of ‘life politics’ arises on the basis of how the individual exercises her freedom in relation to exercising the reflexive power of modernity. ‘Life politics’ seeks the moral re-appropriation of the politico-juridical matrices as also a diffusion of regulation that blurs the distinction between a ‘top-down’ governance and a ‘bottom up’ governance. It is here that the dichotomy between the two types of parrhesia can be fully realised. Giddens, as has been said, makes reflexivity a form of subjectivity, arguing quite powerfully that ‘life politics’ does not primarily concern the conditions which liberate us in order to make choices: ‘it is a politics of choice’ (Giddens, 1991: 214). This suggests that emancipation—or in Beck’s terms risk and the response to that risk—is an issue of perception and choice. There is not necessarily an ideal form of emancipation, since emancipation depends, as we find in Foucault, on an ethical choice. In this context: ‘while ‘emancipatory politics’ is a politics of life-chances, ‘life politics’ is a politics of lifestyle’ (1991: 214).

The problem in the above is exactly the necessity for one to make choices that evade options structured by a reflexive dispositif. For as reflexive as the institutions of modernity are supposed to have become, they essentially constitute a reflexive dispositif of power. A choice should signal the ability to escape from the necessity to choose among variations of manifestations of a certain system of knowledge. Instead of the parrhesia that is an ethos of living, we rather deal here with the one that needs an established doctrinal knowledge in order to function.

Moreover, Giddens suggests that ‘in this arena of activity, power is generative rather than hierarchical’. This suggestion, however, can, if extended, indicate that constructivism overpowers structures. In other words, Giddens suggests that the subject creates its own new power structures as it exercises its reflexive freedom, a ‘dangerous’ perception that neglects the fact that power produces the avenues of its own re-appropriation. Such understanding brings Giddens closer to Beck. The dispositif exists but becomes a generative process. When Foucault argued that power and freedom are everywhere rather than merely suggesting what Giddens argues here, he stressed the ability of the existing dispositif to create specific possibilities of freedom. A structural representation of a power that has to be opposed does not disappear altogether.

Power dovetails with the next concern about the connection between biopower or biopolitics and ‘life politics’. Giddens focusses on the issue of genetic manipulation, which has been contemplated already in Beck. Beck’s ‘sub-politics’ of medicine functions similarly to ‘life politics’. As such, Giddens subscribes to a problematic conviction similarly to Beck, for he also suggests that there is an emancipation in that the choice that one (i.e., the subject) has to make can alter one’s own body at the level of an internalisation of conducts (technologies of the self or of domination). Politics now operates at the sub-level of life.

Giddens bases that assumption on the following account:
the body has not become just an inert entity, subject to commodification or ‘discipline’ in Foucault’s sense. If such were the case, the body would be primarily a site of emancipatory politics: the point would then be to free the body from the oppression to which it had fallen prey. In conditions of high modernity, the body is actually far less ‘docile’ than ever before in relation to the self, since the two become intimately coordinated within the reflexive project of self-identity. The body itself - as mobilized in praxis—becomes more immediately relevant to the identity the individual promotes (1991:218).

The above becomes more evident in the broader discussion of nature. Human nature in particular becomes a product of genetic engineering (see 1991:219).

What Giddens fails to recognise here is that the very fact that the individual can only perceive his own body through the reflexive project of self-identity is a manifestation of ‘technologies of the self’ on the basis that choices of subjectivity are still tied to a certain dispositif. Giddens in his formal definition of ‘life politics’ suggests that

life politics concerns political issues which flow from processes of self-actualization in post-traditional contexts, where globalizing influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes of self-realization influence global strategies (Giddens, 1991:214).

In this context, Giddens ties the problematisation of reflexivity to one of globalisation, while describing how the self interacts with regulatory structures. This interaction is elaborated in Chapter 6.

A concern here becomes to clarify on what grounds the issue of choice is essentially an issue of ethics:

Life political issues cannot be debated outside the scope of abstract systems: information drawn from various kinds of expertise is central to their definition. Yet because they centre on questions of how we should live our lives in emancipated social circumstances they cannot but bring to the fore problems and questions of a moral and existential type (Giddens, 1991:224).

My critique is that the issue of ethics becomes one of morals. As noted in the introduction, moving beyond certain moral constraints is not an embrace of pure anarchy. The effort to establish an alternative form of parrhesia has been made to suggest how a mode of practices of self-care can guide individual behavior, and, in turn, social interaction. Such practices aim to evade a doctrinal legalistic moral code. It is in this context that I critically attend to Giddens’s phrasing that life politics ‘call for a remoralising of social life and they demand a renewed sensitivity to questions that the institutions of modernity systematically dissolve’ (1991:224).
Life politics, then, are essentially ethopolitics. ‘Life politics’ are concerned with a morality that brings the individual and the community together. Self-care is related to the care of the ‘polis’, as runs the definition of the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia in which structures of expertise acquire the value of the Platonic pastoral power that has been discussed in Part I of the thesis. In Rose’s account of how a community functions in the politics of the likes of Giddens, a community involves neighbourhoods, associations, regions, networks, sub-cultures, age groups, ethnicities, and life-style sectors. Communities govern behavior through ethics, thereby linking autonomy to civility (i.e. ethopolitics) (2000:1398-1399).

This metaphorical function of community as a crisscrossed cultural space is summarised by Etzioni (1997), as quoted in Rose:

community is defined by two characteristics: first, a web of affect-laden relationships among a group of individuals, relationships that often crisscross and reinforce one another (rather than merely on one-on-one or chainlike individual relationships), and second, a measure of commitment to a set of shared values, norms and meaning, and shared history and identity- in short, to a particular culture (p127) (Rose, 2000:1401).

This sub-section has presented an introduction to ‘life politics’ deploying a critique of the concept, supported by a comparison to Foucauldian ethics. This comparison has focussed on how community operates and how it is related to the parrhesia tied to the ‘polis’. In addition, it has provided a schematic critical approach to link the previous methodological discussion of Giddens to the concept of life-politics.

5.2.3. Life politics: Experts truth-telling, ethics and the bios

My aim here is to focus more explicitly on the interaction between truth-telling and ethics with respect to ‘life politics’. I pay particular attention to highlight how a Platonic pastoral power tied to the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia operates in life politics.

In Reflexive Modernization, Giddens suggests that the source of authority in tradition is the ‘sage’. According to his understanding, the bureaucratic instrumentally rational era that Weber describes is characterised by the bureaucrat expert who represents the rational legal authority. Such an authority is embodied by bureaucratic institutions of discipline and control (see Giddens, 1994:83).

Expertise in Giddens takes a new form which allows us to crystallise the Platonic pastoral power (i.e., passing skills) discussed before (see Part I), tied to the inward direction of conduct that we find in the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia. Giddens suggests that coupling compulsiveness with the disciplinary society in the same fashion as Weber and Foucault is not quite accurate. Giddens attempts to dispute the connection between discipline and expertise in order to introduce a positive account of the latter, and in so doing he draws a distinction between ‘officials’ and ‘experts’.
Experts are not necessarily professionals; rather, expertise is something transferable or approachable for anyone. Laypeople can become experts and experts can positively transfer knowledge.

In addition, Giddens suggests that expertise replaces tradition, as it is decentered, revisionist in regard to knowledge, specialised, incompatible with esoteric wisdom, and complementary to institutional reflexivity (see Giddens, 1994:84). Here, a connection with the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia appears. Faith is placed in transferable skills and interaction with the institutional (polis). At the same time, there is a break from the wisdom of the sage which is a characteristic of both types of parrhesia in Foucault. Giddens emphasises that such an expertise is exactly reflexive in regard to the constraints of formulaic truth. Also, its decentered aspect is not a testimony to a spill-over of bureaucratic institutions that remain bound to hierarchical structures. On the contrary, it is a testimony to the appearance of truly disembedding mechanisms. Those suggest the evacuation of tradition and the diffusion of knowledge into social relations across space and time.

Therefore, expertise systems focus on the cultivation of the individual on the basis of transferable bits of knowledge. A strict absolutism might not be in order here, as ‘The expert purveys universalizing knowledge’ (Giddens, 1994:86). But again, we are dealing with a self-care that is based on a ‘game of knowledge’. To use Osborne’s terms (see introduction), ‘scientific enlightenment’ and ‘therapeutic enlightenment’, which come together in this reflexive expertise culture, are bound to seek knowledge. Reflexivity and doubt are necessary, but the drive to create certainties persists:

Expert knowledge, and the general accumulation of expertise, are supposed to provide increasing certainty about how the world is, but the very condition of such certainty, not to put too fine a point on it, is doubt (Giddens, 1994:86).

Such expert knowledge is still bound by power values such as time and resources (see Giddens, 1994:85), and by the desire for certain skills instead of others.

A new dispositif emerges here from decentered processes. But, the role of a liberal dispositif and its instrumentally rational matrices should be also properly considered. A further shift away from monolithic forms of expertise indeed occurs. However, the multiple authorities that now exist according to Giddens (see Giddens, 1994:87) should not highlight such ‘disembedding’ as a cut from the liberal dispositif. It is at points like this that the critique has to operate on two levels, namely contrasting the two forms of parrhesia, while re-establishing the function of the liberal dispositif.

Giddens himself raises the problems of science in regard to its inability to stand by the premise ‘nothing is sacred’. In this context, when expertise is associated with science, it is hard to argue that there is much space for multiplicity. Beck’s account of the techno-economic sphere as
also Giddens’s account of expertise suggest a reflexive scientific knowledge. However, as
decentered as expertise might have become, none can argue that the main centres that produce
knowledge are not the institutions (i.e., public and private sector).

Giddens suggests that the institutions are now reflexive. Since, there is no empirical study
provided by Giddens in regard to the exact function of institutions, the argument is based on
conceptual ideal forms. By this token, it is always possible to argue again that an institutional
reflexivity indicates the liberal re-establishment of equilibria of governance that are now more
reflexive rather than the rise of the reflexive ethos of modernity. Additionally, the control that the
politeo-juridical matrices mirroring neoliberal economic law have over expertise is always a factor
that verifies this re-establishing of equilibria.

The connection between the ethics of expertise and biopolitics is important in Rose’s
further analysis of the concept of ethopolitics. Rose stages the problematisation of reflexivity in
regard to the ‘life politics’, and also ‘sub-politics’ (see Section 5.1.), of genetics in the proper
governmental context:

I would argue that within the political rationalities that I have termed ‘advanced liberal’ the
contemporary relation between the biological life of the individual and the well-being of
the collective is posed somewhat differently (Rose, 1996). It is no longer a
question...Rather it consists in a variety of strategies that try to identify, treat, manage or
administer those individuals, groups or localities where risk is seen to be high. The binary
distinctions of normal and pathological, which were central to earlier biopolitical analyses,
are now organized within these strategies for the government of risk (Rose, 2001:6-7).

The emphasis on rationales operating within advanced liberalism (neoliberalism) is evident. Then
there is a more explicit connection to the dispositif reflected in a number of public policies:

Over the second half of the 20th century biopolitical concerns with minimization of risks to
health – control of environmental pollution, reduction, of accidents, maintenance of bodily
health, nurturing children – became intrinsic not just to the organization of health and social
services, but to expert decisions about town planning, building design, educational
practice, the management of organizations, the marketing of food, the design of
automobiles and much more. That is to say, for over 150 years, risk thinking has been
central to biopolitics (Rose, 2001:7).

In addition, in the following passages one can find that Rose not only addresses Beck’s
initial concerns in regard to the non-democratic autonomy of techno-economic sphere. He also
raises his own concerns in regard to how power exists even when the reflexive morals supported by
the pastoral relationship between experts and individuals play a major political role:
Decision-making in the biomedical context takes place within a set of power relations that we could term of ‘pastoral’. I have referred to Swedish eugenics as pastoral, in a sense close to that developed by Foucault — a form of collectivizing and individualizing power concerned with the welfare of the ‘flock’ as a whole. But this contemporary pastoral power is not organized or administered by the ‘state’ – even if we use this term to encompass the whole complex of legislation provision, state-funded research organizations and national committees of enquiry into the medical and ethical aspects of the new biomedicine. It takes place in a plural and contested field traversed by the codes pronounced by ethics committees and professional associations, by the empirical findings generated by researchers, the attitudes and criteria used by employers and insurers, the tests developed and promoted by psychologists and biotech companies, the advice offered by self-help organizations and sociological critiques. Crucially, this pastoral power does not concern itself with the flock as a whole. For at least three decades, professionals involved in this work have explicitly rejected the view that they are, or should be, seeking to limit the reproductive capacities of those at risk...(Rose, 2001:9).

By this token, Rose does not deviate from his position that ‘mediated instruments’ tied to the dispositif govern at an embryonic point the possibilities for social action (see introduction). What is crystallised here is this ‘mediated’ function of the dispositif rooted in a different pastoral power, namely the one that Foucault connects with Plato rather than Judaism (see introduction and Chapter 1). Such a pastoral power concerned with passing skills is inherently tied to a reflexive subjectivity powered by the ethics concerned with the ‘polis’ as the sum of crisscross cultural communities:

But this pastoralism does not simply entail a priest-like shepherd knowing and mastering the soul of the individual troubled sheep. Perhaps one might best describe this form of pastoral power as relational... It works through the relation between the affect and ethics of the guider - the genetic counselors and allied experts of reproduction who operate as gatekeepers to tests and medical procedures – and the affects and ethics of the guided – the actual or potential parents who are making their reproductive decisions, and upon their networks of responsibility and obligation. These new pastors of the soma espouse the ethical principles of informed consent, autonomy, voluntary action, and choice, and non-directiveness. But in the practices of this pastoral power, such ethical principles must be translated into a range of micro-technologies for the management of communication and information. These blur the boundaries of coercion and consent. They transform the subjectivities of those who are to give consent or refuse it, through discursive techniques that teach new way of rendering aspects of oneself into thought and language, new ways of making oneself and one’s actions amenable to judgment. And they reshape the telos of these encounters in specific ways, for example in terms of psychological notions of mental
health, or in terms of the recent, but currently ubiquitous idea of ‘quality of life’ – each now defined within, and measured by, any number of rating scales (Rose, 2001:9-10).

Then Rose explicitly indicates how this inward direction of conduct operates:

Nonetheless, this pastoral power differs from Christian pastorship, where the vectors of power flowed one way, requiring the submission of the sheep to the will of the shepherd, and the internalization of that absolute will in the form of self-examination and self-mastery. These counseling encounters entail intense bi-directional affective entanglements between all the parties to the encounter, and indeed generate multiple ‘virtual’ entanglements with parties not present – distant relatives, absent siblings, potential offspring. In these entanglements, the ethical relations of all the subjects to themselves and to one another are at stake – including the experts themselves’ (Rose, 2001:10).

By this token, it becomes evident that the issue is not whether the experts themselves are shaped by these ethical politics as much as they shape them or not. Beck, for example, has called this a political ‘invention’ on the basis that risk does help sub-politics to emerge. There is an invention in drafting those morals that can deal with risk through reflexivity. If that is the case, Rose suggests that there is then a responsibility to contemplate the new power relations that emerge from this political invention, both in terms of the function of ethics as doctrinal morals and in terms of its reconnection to the biopolitical apparatus (see also Chapter 6).

Therefore, the ethics of critique cannot be supplemented by the morals of ‘sub-politics’. They cannot also become merely a choice within the biopolitical or ethopolitical apparatus. My understanding of Rose is that he raises the issue that such a statement is itself a discourse of power that naturalises reflexivity:

Within these new ethics, the human vital order has become so thoroughly imbued with artifice that even the natural has to be produced by a labour on the self – natural food, natural childbirth and the like. Even choosing not to intervene in living processes becomes of kind of intervention (Rose, 2001:19).

Giddens himself has argued that in post-traditional contexts, we have no choice but to choose how to be and how to act (see Giddens, 1994:75).

Choice and reflexivity should not operate like that, namely as merely forms of subjectivity. Giddens ignores that choice is still produced by established power rather than power being produced by choice. Furthermore, the latter is still not emancipatory. To the extent that a critique can manifest only as life-style choice rather than as full-fledged technology of living that involves a set of parrhesiatic practices beyond institutionalised moral politic-juridical regulation, it becomes a ‘technology of domination’.
In other words, the question cannot always be what kind of institutions we want. It should also be whether we want such institutions at all. For the systematic efforts of experts to provide their own account of institutions or other options, which is still tied to governmental politico-juridical matrices, dictates the issues that should be a concern of choice and those that should be not.

Overall, if we connect this function of ‘choice’ with the healthism that is obsessed with quality of life (see Rose’s ‘ubiquitous quality of life’ phrasing before), then a somewhat disturbing secular humanist euphoria rises from the ashes of the nihilist postmodern manifestation of reflexivity. This euphoria has its roots in this lack of understanding of the role that the politico-juridical matrices have played in crafting a perception of progress rooted in individual activity. In reflexive sociology, progress might be contingent. But, this misguided anthropocentrism seems to continue perpetuating the view that a morally driven reflexivity can lead to a utopia. This perception is on the basis that this sort of emancipated individual can make those choices that will alleviate any sort of suffering. Hence, fixing the environment, ending discrimination, and healing physical and mental individual suffering can all be tied to social interventions that can turn whatever ills are attributed to nature into a socially managed risk.

Furthermore, when reflexive sociology is not utopian in this euphoric sense it suddenly becomes ‘dangerously’ realist. Its naturalisation is dangerous because it does not naturalise reflexivity in general. It naturalises a reflexivity bound to operate within existing forms of power in a way that seems inescapable. The paradox is conveyed in the following statement that is related to the utopian realist premise:

Analytically, it is more to accurate to say that all areas of social activity come to be governed by decisions—often, although not universally, enacted on the basis of claims to expert knowledge of one kind or another. Who takes those decisions, and how, is fundamentally a matter of power. A decision, of course, is always somebody’s choice and in general all choices, even by the most impoverished or apparently powerless, refract back upon pre-existing power relations. The opening-out of social life to decision-making therefore should not be identified ipso facto with pluralism; it is also a medium of power and of stratification (Giddens, 1994:76).

The above statement could easily have been made by Foucault himself. The difference is that the Foucauldian ethos of enlightenment is an individual experiment with reality or truth and the possibilities of going beyond it. Thus, although one will never fully overcome power, one should always strive towards that end by focussing on practices of living.

In Giddens, the ‘grand experiment of modernity’ is exactly an experiment of formulating a reflexive project of man. As noted before, Foucault characterises as ‘projects of man’ the kind of enlightenment that aims to craft an ideal form of nature in order to establish governance
mechanisms that will mirror it. Reflexive sociology tries to disguise such premise. In the end, however, the distinction between power and free action collapses under a grand project of reflexivity in which human nature takes the shape of a reflexive subjectivity. The latter forms a new reflexive dispositif (see Chapter 6).

The idea of a ‘calling’ has here been discarded altogether, in favour of a utilitarian morality or a Neoplatonic one. And if the first is tied to a sense of calling in the form of the urge or compulsion for competition, ethopolitics break free from this compulsion, becoming essentially euphoric (i.e., obsessed with an optimism that reconciles materialist and post-materialist concerns on the basis of achieving an overall welfare tied to a progressive fusion of different cultures). Hence, ‘competition’ is re-appropriated by the euphoric drive pursued Chapter 6 in regard to ethopolitical governmental technologies.

On the other hand, the point of the parrhesiatic discussion is the emphasis on a self-cultivating asceticism. Foucault made his own mention of the value of pleasure. And, it does seem paradoxical for an argument deeply related to Nietzsche, namely a proponent of vitality, to criticise ethopolitics on the basis of a euphoric vitalism. However, the focus of this thesis is the later Foucault of ethics, who merged Nietzsche with the Socratic, Cynical and Stoic parrhesia as also with the Weberian asceticism. Such connection establishes, in my mind, explicitly the ascetic self-care Foucault characterises as ‘technologies of living’, as the precondition of emancipation. The avant-garde artistic vitalism found in Nietzsche is reconceptualised as a means not to seek pleasure but to take care of the self. This self-care is based on a self-exploration which needs ‘ascecis’ in order to be fulfilled.

The Foucaudian parrhesia maintains an ascetic emancipatory value, in the sense that emancipation or the will to life is not the unrestricted enjoyment of materialism. A ‘detachment’ from forging subjectivities, which are inevitable carriers of dualistic forms of rationalist moral regulation, can be traced here. Emancipation is the ability of self-enforcing a certain ‘calling’ as a means of self-cultivation in which experimentation through ascecis sets its own sites of veridiction. The individual is truly self-governed not by any doctrine, but by the ascetic practice that is its own calling.

As noted in the introduction, living life to the fullest is a self-growing experience whose vitality is not euphoric. The whole discussion of the Cynics that Foucault offers intends to indicate how the asceticism of the calling that has been inherently linked to a rationalist moral doctrine (i.e., Platonism) or a religious one (i.e., Christianity) can operate autonomously (i.e. detachment). Enlightenment is not the ethos of a reflexive subjectivity operating within a liberal capitalist modernity. The practices, the mode, will provide their own morality rather than a morality its code.

One might ponder what this means for the social. Well, once more Foucault’s parrhesia is not concerned with the ‘polis’. It is concerned with the self. One has to put a ‘laissez-faire’ trust on
doubt. One has to assume that an individual concerned with self-cultivation is inherently against any form of instrumental domination that can prevent such cultivation for him and the others. Such a self-cultivation is also inherently tied to understanding in a manner that creates empathy. It is in this sense that taking care of the self leads to taking care of others.

It is no surprise, of course, that, as noted in Part I, such individualism can be confused with a neoliberal version. Recently the German minister of economics, Wolfgang Schäuble, channelled Goethe—Foucault’s last philosophical ideal type—to draw an analogy with neoliberal practices of individualism. This comparison responded to a comment about the involvement of a German company in a bribery scandal in Greece. Schäuble stated that ‘everyone should take care and mind of their own business, and then everything will work out’ (for everyone).

However, in parrhesia, as noted in Chapter 1, the ethics are not utilitarian. Violent interaction between individuals can always occur. Socrates, of course, was the quintessential example of refusing to perform the slightest violent or antagonistic action against the society or polis, thereby accepting his own death. But, even if violent conflict does occur, it will be guided by a ‘mode of living’ (technologies of living). Such a mode of living can lead to an apheretic ‘code’, and, a code is always tied to ‘honour’.

Osborne (1998) made the suggestion that there is an analogy between aristocratic nobility and the expertise culture of ethopolitics. This analogy appears in terms of a moral obligation of those with higher skills or positions to those who lack such skills or status. Such an analogy was rather made as a historical substantiation of the Platonic pastoral power in terms of the ideas that have shaped, within the West, the ethopolitical conduct. But, if nobility is a form of honourable conduct associated with guiding one’s actions through a set of conducts for the sake of telling the truth rather than for securing social status, then it is this nobility that one should trust in balancing self-care with the social.

Governing through ethics is desirable as a form of taking care of the self and others as opposed to the normalising power of a disciplinarian biopolitical dispositif. However, ‘ethopolitics’, to borrow Rose’s vocabulary (2000:1399), uses: ‘shame, guilt, obligation, trust, honor and duty’ to achieve ‘reciprocity, mutuality, cooperation, belongingness, and identity’. Thus, the mixture of these sort of qualities for the above purposes fails to deal with ‘honour’. For honour, in my view, is something that is cultivated via the parrhesia of detachment and non-duality that focusses on the responsibility of self-growth.

I have here crystallised the connection of ‘life politics’ with the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia vis-à-vis the parrhesia tied to the ethics of Foucault. Life politics are tied to a concern with the polis on the basis of forging a multicultural reflexive subjectivity that turns everything into a reflexive choice of interpreting experts’ knowledge. A euphoric outlook emerges from this misconceived

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6 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIbJHSSnOBs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIbJHSSnOBs)
envisioning of utopia which, as elaborated below, attempts to resolve even health issues by expanding the acceptable cultural options.

5.2.4. ‘Life politics’: Therapeutics

A discussion of how this therapeutic expertise is forged and interpreted can further enlighten how ‘life politics’ approach existential concerns in regard to human nature.

The pastoral power that is exercised through the acquiring of expertise or by the choices that increased access to expertise provides is treated as the ultimate form of therapy. This treatment leads back to perceiving ‘life politics’ as Osborne’s therapeutic enlightenment (see introduction) in which freedom is governed by the internalisation of conducts produced by a reflexive expertise. The role of healing the individual is not merely a concern of psychology as a discipline. The morality of the reflexive subject is tied to the need to have multiple choices for belonging. This pluralism in turn depends on the acceptance that others should also have this choice. This function reinforces the community and the social, while ‘healing’ the isolated individual from problems of representation.

One should not fail to recognise that against the postmodernist pessimism, a euphoric outlook on pluralism is cultivated by reflexive sociology that suggests that a certain plurality in choices of belonging should ‘heal’ existential crisis. In ‘Reflexive Modernization’ Giddens (1994:68) discusses Freud’s discovery that traditional attachment has remained as a compulsion, due to the fact that instrumental rationality marginalised the emotional aspects that enlightenment was supposed to establish in place of tradition. In conditions of instrumental rationality, the quest for a life purpose operates as a compulsion. Giddens correlates this compulsion with Weber’s take on the puritan ‘calling’, which more than a form of denial was a compulsive urgency to ‘achieve’. Achievement and compulsion go hand in hand, thereby preventing urgency from becoming a hedonistic desire (see Giddens, 1994:71).

This compulsiveness still appears in Foucault’s account of neoliberal competition building (see Chapter 1). In Foucault, such compulsion is healed by escaping from the games of knowledge. As noted before, the game of knowledge is distinct from the game of truth. Life politics operate within games of knowledge because they are concerned with constructing discourses of subjectivity supported by expertise. Hence, in life politics there is a desire to find fulfilment in discourses of socialisation (i.e., life-style choices). In Giddens, the emotional aspect of enlightenment is fulfilled by such therapeutic ethics, leading back to the argument in favour of a reflexive subjectivity as a realisation of modernity.

The same applies to Giddens’s conceptual understanding of addiction. Addictions are also choices that attempt to cope with the post-traditional order. Life-style obsession becomes an acceptable one as long as it is not quite an obsession. To elaborate, Giddens suggests that the
emptiness that lack of conviction creates in regard to executing a certain routine leads to an obsession with certain life-style choices. I believe, however, that what he means is that obsession exists when the life-style option does not constitute a conscious self-realising activity rather than an inescapable effort to fill those empty spaces of time with something. In this context, one goes from one addiction to another (see Giddens, 1991:71). However, since such a distinction is hard to make within pastoral relationships of expertise tied to a reflexive culture, this ‘life-style obsession’ is rather endorsed as a solution to the problem of emptiness.

Giddens himself talks also about ‘invented’ traditions. Giddens’s argument is extracted from Hobbsbaum’s account of how institutions use traditional symbolism to re-establish new forms of authority (see Giddens, 1991: 94). One could connect this to Baudrillard’s account of ‘simulacra’ (copies; things that have lost their affiliation to their original value/quality). Giddens himself engages in this discussion by using the words ‘relics’ and also ‘simulacra’ in regard to habits (see Giddens, 1991:101-103).

Habits can also be compulsions powered by a pulverising connection with traditions. Such connection powers life choices that eventually become life-style options. Giddens attempts to disguise this connection between life-style and commodities, thereby becoming, himself, a generator of simulacra or relics.

I also suggest that such a connection can substantiate the view that reflexivity as a form of subjectivity is merely a simulacrum of the reflexivity of liberal equilibria of governance. Despite his will to engage with neoliberal capitalism in third way politics (see Chapter 6), Giddens repeatedly attempts throughout his various works to dissociate commodities from life-style. His aim is to reformulate the dispositif into something new rather than to acknowledge an interaction between a reflexive conduct and a neoliberal one.

However, that is why I emphasise the interaction between these conducts at the level of the structure of the social reproduction. So, instead of arguing that life-style is a commodity, I suggest that commodity and life-style are one thing. They manifest re-appropriated cultural options (i.e., relics, simulacra) produced by a re-appropriated dispositif that still has a centralised character (i.e., institutional matrices) and a decentered one (i.e., technologies of the self). Habits operate within the pacts of such dispositif with the aim to identify the proper equilibria for governing freedom.

What is observed here is that full engagement with a certain mode of life can be easily associated with compulsion or addiction. In this context, more ‘pessimistic activist’ outlooks on life (see introduction) and a quest for a different kind of vitality are denounced. They are denounced on the grounds not of an irreversible biological handicap, but of a failure to overcome the new endless list of minor psychological conditions by grasping the opportunities that this new reflexive sociality offers. Instead of this sensitivity towards differences (disorders) that one can find in the liberal circles of psychology; here, there is a therapeutic ‘enforcement’ of health on the basis that the more
pluralist the social is the more possible it is for one to be ‘healed’ by finding those choices that one’s reflexive subjectivity allows one to make. ‘Knowing oneself’ and ‘taking care of oneself’ merges in a manner that again subordinates the second to the first.

The source of the assimilationist aspect of reflexivity can be found in the cultural parameters of the West and the project of modernity that reflexive sociology poses. Giddens has discussed the discoveries of anthropology in regard to the validity of the knowledge of other cultures. He has even mentioned that he, as well, has been interested in alternative forms of spirituality such as Buddhism (see Giddens, 1994:78). However, by the same token, he establishes new cultural parameters in regard to what constitutes the West as sites of veridiction.

No one can deny that the West is loosely a system of knowledge. But, in a genealogical approach, with its lack of origins, the parameters are ‘very’ loosely defined (see introduction). The project of enlightenment as an individual ethos rather than as a grand reflexive project of man is also reflexive. Giddens’s comparison of other cultures with the West suggests that other cultural paradigms can be respected only in their own culture. If they enter the West and its grand project of reflexivity, they have to be tied to reflexive expertise and criss-cross cultural communities. For example, when one finds value in Buddhism this must not be because Buddhism provides a way of utilising its practices for the purpose of dealing better with our particular social reality. Rather, it must be because Buddhism can act as an attempt to find the short cut (see also the Cynics in Chapter 1) that allows us to break free from the dogmatism of our ‘reality’.

An overall issue appears here, which is that of reflexivity as assimilationism, to which Rose has attached the term ‘civic republicanism’. Giddens has used the term ‘civic liberalism’. But, the word ‘republicanism’ is rather more insightful. In both cases we are referring to a fragmented collective liberal consciousness of autonomous individuals, albeit one bound by certain ethical principles. However, the use of the word ‘republicanism’ suggests that this fragmented pluralist consciousness is now the dominant culture that should not be opposed by anyone as citizenship rights attest to this culture. The liberal subject cannot transcend into an anarchic ‘homo economicus’ guided by the laws of the market, nor should individual cultures be respected on their own individual merits. They should be respected as pacts of the reflexive universe. There is a moral reflexive centre, and the sub-cultures can be tolerated not only as pacts of security but as also cultural co-contributors to that pluralist moral imaginary.

This is the point of distinguishing between a moral doctrine and the ethics tied to ‘technologies or practices of living’. The latter constitutes the practice of engagement with life from an ascetic and critical point of view that evades pessimism. The individual picks and dissolves subjectivities as a means to achieve self-realisation. The individual does not find self-realisation by building and projecting subjectivities via a synthesis of internalised life-style choices (i.e., inward direction of conduct). It is here that it becomes obvious why the ethics of critique are compatible only with the first function:
Social norms, on the other hand, manifested only adaptation to a particular artificial order of society and its requirements for normativity, docility, productivity, harmony and the like. Some suggest that the new politics of life has once more mistaken social norms for vital, ones, for example that the molecular politics of psychiatry, with its claims to be able to manipulate and transform personality and emotion, has incorporated the social into the vital, and has taken key features of vitality itself – or example sadness – errors open to correction in the name of a social, not a vital, norm of health (Rose, 2001:19).

The above paragraph summarises the ethopolitical function of therapeutic correction. Ethopolitics escape from the control of instrumental rationality only to forge this congruence between, in Osborne’s terms, a scientific enlightenment and a therapeutic one. This congruence leads to the use of science as a reflexive expertise capable of providing therapeutic choices in regard to how nature itself should function. This function of science is now associated with our reflexive knowledge in regard to what the desirable is. By this token, a choice in Giddens’s own acknowledgment (see before), is inevitably a product of the power relations that structure our knowledge.

This acknowledgment, however, leads to a constructivist fundamentalism. Vitality seems to exist only within specific socially constructed accounts of it. In this context, life and nature merges with the social; thereby a dysfunction in the relationship between the individual and the social has no naturalist connotations. To put differently, the ‘unnatural’, in medical terms, no longer exists. An identity has to be created for any condition or type of belief on the basis that nature does not exist outside the social. The unnatural is a dysfunction of socialisation that can be therapeutically treated via the reflexive subjectivity rather than an explicit type of condition or belief.

It is this problem in the connection of the individual with community and ethics in relation to the ‘sub-politics’ of health that points towards a governmentality of ‘ethopolitics’ as ‘life politics’ in Rose:

In the second half of the 20th century, a new alliance formed between political aspirations for a healthy population and personal aspirations to be well: health was to be ensured by instrumentalizing anxiety and shaping the hopes and fears of individuals and families for their own biological destiny. The very idea of health was re-figured – the will to health would not merely seek the avoidance of sickness of premature death, but would encode an optimization of one’s corporeality to embrace a kind of overall ‘well-being’ – beauty, success, happiness, sexuality and much more (Rose, 2001:17).

In this context, there is the rise of the politics of lifestyle rooted in this kind of individualisation that the above alliance creates. The connection is apparent between the individual
and the community or the collective in association to an inward direction of conducts (i.e., technologies of the self).

The next passage highlights the new instrumentalisation that ties ethopolitics to biopolitics, thereby pointing towards the interaction of ethics with an instrumentally rational truth-telling at the level of the structure of the social reproduction:

It was this enlarged will to health that was amplified and instrumentalized by new strategies of advertising and marketing in the rapidly developing consumer market for health – non-prescription medicines, health insurance, private health care, healthy food, vitamins and dietary supplements and the whole range of complementary, alternative and ‘self-health’ practices. By the start of the 21st century, hopes, fears, decisions, and life-routines shaped in terms of the risks and possibilities in corporeal and biological existence had come to supplant almost all others as organizing principles of a life of prudence, responsibility and choice...Selfhood has become intrinsically somatic – ethical practices increasingly take the body as a key site for work on the self (Rose, 2001:17-18).

It is here that the problematisation of modernity in regard to reflexivity fully merges with the problematisation of globalisation. ‘Man’ can no longer be defined. But reflexive sociology is a ‘project of men’ as it is concerned with formulating those governmental structures that can, in Deleuze’s terms (see introduction), relatively reterritorialise reflexivity and freedom as a means to structure a new form of subjectivity as reflexive. Chapter 6 deals with the more explicit governmental implications of such a project.

In conclusion, ‘life politics’ are predominantly attached to a therapeutic function that fails to achieve a self-powered self-care. ‘Life politics’ embody this therapeutic enlightenment that is concerned with offering aesthetic choices tied to a liberal democratic paradigm (i.e., doctrine), which will in turn be internalised by reflexive subjects.
Conclusion to Chapter 5

Chapter 5 is initially concerned the observation made by Beck that science, institutions and the political are becoming fragmented. The negative connotations of a reflexivity emerging from such fragmentation are attributed to the technocratic management of risk, exercised by science operating in laboratory conditions, and the new institutions that carry forward that operation. This assumption takes a positive turn, as the techno-economic sphere opens up a new political space for participation operating at all levels of the social (i.e., ‘sub-politics’). The first section has explored the validity of such a claim in regard to structural constructivism.

The implications of such an argument are here further explored, defining what power is and what emancipation is, in conditions of reflexivity. All sub-sections, in one way or the other, revolve around the issue of the descriptive-analytical. The descriptive observations made by Beck are inherently linked to certain analytical suggestions that have essentially nullified the power-freedom dichotomy.

The Beck section in Chapter 5 ends with a discussion on the ‘art of doubt’. The analytical elaboration of Beck in regard to ethics suggests that a certain morality should accompany the ethics of doubt. I have connected such morality to an outline of a reflexive subjectivity. The latter is, in turn, tied to a pluralism operating within this Neoplatonic pastoral expertise. ‘Sub-politics’ operate on this basis, and it becomes evident on what grounds Beck reinforces the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia that is tied to games of knowledge capable of leading to ‘technologies of the self/domination’.

The Giddens section in Chapter 5 also begins with an analysis of the structural constructivist issue. In Giddens, the dispositif as a notion is better acknowledged. However, Giddens suggests that processes outside of a liberal instrumentally rational dispositif, related to an ethical realisation of modernity, provide the means for re-appropriating a liberal democratic dispositif. My focus in regard to contemplating this kind of claim has been placed again on the interaction between the descriptive and the analytical, power and freedom, and the utopian and the realist.

Subsequently, ‘life politics’ is introduced in regard to the function of a ‘reflexive subjectivity’. Here, it becomes apparent that the new dispositif is also rooted essentially in the notion that the ‘natural’ becomes the ‘social’. Here, the social is a manifestation of certain ethics powered by a reflexive pluralism. Life politics provides us with a more solid understanding of what constitutes a ‘community’ in regard to ‘autonomy’ in a globalised and informational era (high modernity). ‘Expertise’ is introduced as a manifestation of the Platonic pastoral power that facilitates the reflexive subjectivity. ‘Therapeutics’ constitute another aspect of the same function of such expertise, incorporating any type of condition, behaviour, or belief into a reflexive subjectivity. The latter is linked with ‘technologies of the self/domination’.
Introduction to Chapter 6

Chapter 6 is motivated in part by the idea that Foucault’s is a fieldwork philosophy tied to writing ‘fictions’. In this context, my use of governmentality attempts to approach those aspects of Beck’s and Giddens’s conceptual argumentation in which more explicit rationales and technologies of governing freedom can be grasped. Still, when I apply the ‘governmentality’ concept here, I refer, again, to the nuanced use that we find in the late Foucault, tied to three axes of genealogy (i.e., power, truth, and ethics). This use of governmentality, although capable of grasping governmental technologies of power, is explicitly tied to the parrhesiatic discussion of ethics that relate the problematisation of how to govern the others to the problematisation of how to govern the self.

Beck’s analysis is, for the most part, slightly generic in all of his works. However, one can find in his elaboration of ‘world risk’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, relating to his account of how politics (should) function, the crafting of such rationales that can justify the application of governmentality critique to them. In terms of Giddens, for some, ‘third way politics’ is not sufficiently explicit in terms of outlining a new socialist public policy agenda. However, in my view, it is explicit enough to provide the means to correlate more abstract engagement with social action in ‘life politics’ and a more concrete political programme. Third way politics is a more explicit policy elaboration of the ‘life politics’ that is the overarching concept.

In general, Beck’s elaboration is, as I have suggested, slightly more generic and not really analysed in the literature (e.g. Rose, Osborne) that inspires my critique. Giddens’s analysis has more direct policy implications, and it is the primary target of the critique put forward by that literature (i.e. Rose, Osborne), so my analysis of Giddens incorporates this critique. Moreover, such a critique is tied to policy implications with respect to bringing together critical concepts and regulations and contemporary trends along the lines of writing ‘fictions’.

Although the sections on Giddens below are relatively richer in scope in comparison to the ones on Beck, the latter are also important in terms of offering a better conceptual understanding of reflexive sociology in general. In this context, individual sections in both chapters primarily explore Beck and Giddens. However, the way that their different pieces of work are split in Chapter 5, with its more foundational concerns, and Chapter 6, with its more policy-oriented ones, serves the overall purposes of the chapters. As a result, it strengthens the function of Part III.
6. The governmentality of the global third way politics

6.1. Beck and the reinvention of politics

6.1.1. World risk and third way governmentality

In the World Risk Society (1999) that follows the Reinvention of Politics (1997) and rather establishes Beck as a cosmopolitan advocate, the way that risk interacts with doubt, the epochal, and the political indicates an explicit concern for manifesting a certain governmental conduct. I attempt here to further elucidate how the function of such a conduct is tied to the utopian realist dynamic. The latter merges constructivism and realism (see Beck, 1999:136), thereby undermining the emancipation that can derive from doubt.

To start with, Beck suggests that

Reversal rather than revision seems to be the order of the day; radical socialism, Giddens (1994b) suggests, has become conservative and conservativism has become radical. Little has changed: the script of modernity is yet to be rewritten, redefined, reinvented. This is what the theory of world risk society is all about (Beck, 1999:134).

The above is related to the issue of acting on the existing as a means to envision a socialist governmentality, a concern much more explicit in Giddens (Section 6.2.).

Beck, in his earlier contribution to Reflexive Modernization, attempts to guide the problematisation of reflexivity in regard to risk into a foundational discussion of third way politics. This account becomes evident in the following elaboration:

Is the transferral of the communist systems into capitalist systems a ‘leftist’ or a ‘rightist’ undertaking? Is the resistance to that process, that is to say, the protection of the ‘achievements’ of what remains of socialism, ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive’? Are those who disturb the graveyard peace on the left by mercilessly exhibiting the perversions of socialism in all their concrete forms still promoting the cause of the ‘class enemy’, or are they already taking the role of a ‘post-socialist left’ and laying the basis of their claim on the future Europe? (Beck, 1994:42).

In this context, there is the political dimension, in the traditional sense, of risk on the grounds that the rise of political risks has been strengthened by the collapse of the Soviet Union. What is interesting in such elaboration is that it points towards a governance deficiency, reflected in the mention of a ‘paralysis’ on behalf of the ‘West’ in regard to its governmental agenda at the national and, particularly, the international level (see Beck,1994:34). In consequence, it becomes clearer that Beck’s problematisation of reflexivity is tied to a governance concern.
However, a deficiency is hard to define under conditions of reflexivity, since a deficiency is a form of risk, and risk is culturally contingent. Beck, in the *World Risk Society*, ultimately acknowledges that ‘it is cultural perception that defines what risk is’ (1999:135). In this context, Beck is concerned with a certain reflexive subjectivity in which risk is connected with our reflexive responses to potential dangers. Risk is tied to reflexivity as a manageable danger that requires us to find the proper response. And, reflexivity is directly connected to a concern for the ‘polis’ as a means to govern freedom.

This problematisation of reflexivity is tied to that of globalisation in terms of the severe risks that the latter poses:

The brilliantly staged risk of globalization, however, has already become an instrument for reopening the issue of power in society. By invoking the horrors of globalization, everything can be called into question: trade unions of course, but also the welfare state, maxims of national policy and, it goes without saying, welfare assistance (1999:138).

In Deleuze’s terms, the deterritorialisation-reterritorialisation dynamics of globalisation point towards a relative reterritorialisation. The relative reterritorialisation dynamics of Beck’s analysis is reflected in the above. It is also reflected in Beck’s understanding of ‘established risks’:

Established risk definitions are thus a magic wand with which a stagnant society can terrify itself and thereby activate its political centres and become politicized from within (Beck, 1999:138).

The use of the word ‘established’ in relation to doubt or risk leads back to the discussion of the art of doubt (see Chapter 5). The very definition of ‘established risks’ reveals this limited scope of invention that eventually reconciles a will to change with the will to navigate the existing. This reconciliation is again related to accepting the utter contingency of risk only to narrow it down for the sake of control.

Here, it becomes clearer that as doubt becomes risk and as risk is connected to the ‘established’, there is a will by Beck to initiate change by responding to the existing, or, even more so, there is the will to go into a battle of interpretations (i.e. a game of knowledge). Once more, in this utopian realism, the analytical and the descriptive or the structural and the constructivist or power and freedom merge with each other. Reflexivity socialises nature, thereby naturalising its own analysis.

Beck, of course, on occasion (see also Chapter 5) recognises the political control exercised by the nation state (see Beck, 1999:139). This acknowledgment leads to the following statement: ‘Politically and sociologically, modernity is a project of social and technological control by the nation state’ (Beck, 1999:139). This is the closest that we get to an acknowledgment of the dispositif.
But, his interpretation of Weber rather insists on perceiving risk as a full disassociation from the deliberative exercise of political control:

Weber does not recognize or discuss the concept of ‘risk’, one of whose peculiarities is to have lost precisely this relationship between intention and outcome, instrumental rationality and control (Beck, 1999:139).

Once again, Deleuze’s ‘societies of control’ do recognise risk and how it creates new opportunities for action, possibly beyond the control of a now neoliberal dispositif; yet, risk is tied to the dispositif. When Beck argues that our ability ‘to colonise the future...slips out of our hands’ (Beck, 1999:139), he suggests that we miss an opportunity here. By this token, he neglects existing overarching strategies tied to politico-juridical or economic matrices, thereby placing too much value on our ability to shape the present. Such an account is rather legitimised by the ‘risk trap’ characterisation in which ‘doing nothing and demanding too much transforms the world into a series of indomitable risks’ (Beck, 1999:141).

Hence, Beck essentially asks for some sort of policy-making action powered by the social as a means to govern risk:

This social invisibility means that, unlike many other political issues, risks must clearly brought to consciousness, only then can it be said that they constitute an actual threat, and this includes cultural values and symbols...as well as scientific arguments (Beck, 1999:143).

But, one should be wary of such an action. I want to make again the connection here with the interesting observation made by Osborne (1998) (see the Giddens section in Chapter 5). Osborne is concerned with a ‘therapeutic enlightenment’ in which sub-politics might appear to empower self-governance when they essentially merely promote less hierarchical and less absolutist expertise. Such expertise, however, leads to an inward direction of conduct as a new function of the technologies of the self.

The above argument is evident in the following from Beck:

Word risk society theory does not plead for or encourage...a return to a logic of control in an age of risk and manufactured uncertainties—that was the solution of the first and simple modernity. On the contrary, in the world risk society the logic of control is questioned fundamentally and not only from a sociological point of view but by ongoing modernization itself. Here is one of the reasons why risk societies can become self-critical societies. Different agencies and actors—for example managers of chemical industries and insurance experts—contradict each other (Beck, 1999:142).
Something similar has been contemplated in Chapter 5 in regard to sub-politics. Here, it merely becomes more evident that a governmentality can be traced on the grounds that, although there is a conflict in expertise, it is in the expertise, namely in interpreting internalising knowledge, that the political now lies in. Furthermore, Beck insists on separating this reaction to risk from reactions emerging from a neoliberal dispositif. The latter is the case in a neoliberal governmentality tied to risk and the insurance industry (see Chapter 2).

The descriptive blends again with the analytical. On the whole, all realist or idealist (utopian) concerns end with this suggestion that despite or because of its contingency, risk should be attended to. Instead of trusting an art of doubt empowered by the individual, however, the political derives from this reflexive expert knowledge. Different forms of expertise compete in order to define invisible hazards.

Moreover, Beck essentially suggests that environmental consciousness is a critical part of the reflexive governmental rationales. Therefore, ecological issues are not even open to such competing interpretations of expertise (see 1999:142-142):

At the same time we know, at least in principle that the impacts of risk grow precisely because nobody knows or wants to know about them. A case in point is the environmental devastation of Eastern Europe under the communist regime (Beck, 1999:143).

Here, a direct account of a certain risk as ‘devastating environmental disaster’ arises that aims precisely to draw attention to something (environment) as a means to attribute to it a certain interpretative value (disaster). In other words, one can argue that the issue of managing the risk is an outcome of the disaster, but there is also an issue of interpretation of what constitutes environmental devastation. The analytical blends again with the descriptive. In any case, it is Beck as the expert rather than the average subject who is among those who determine those risks or the appropriate response to them.

This operation of power circles back to what sub-politics are. It leads back to the game of politics as a game of knowledge, namely an interaction between conflicting forms of expertise in which subjectivity remains a product of a discourse (a form knowledge). Reflexive subjectivity produces power relations revolving around reflexive expertise. The latter determines the sites of veridiction of what is to be opposed, while it disguises power into competing discourses that essentially represent the same dispositif, ‘hidden’ due to its reflexivity.

Beck wants to debunk instrumental rationality, but in the act of this debunking, he structures the subject as reflexive. He suggests the following:

First...demonopolization of expertise...Second, the circle of groups to be allowed to participate...must instead be opened up according to social standards of relevance: informalisation of jurisdiction...Third...opening the structure of decision-making...
Fourth...creation of partial publicity...Fifth, norms for this process—modes of discussion, protocols, debates, evaluations of interviews, forms of voting and approving—must be agreed on and sanctioned: self-legislation and self-obligation (Beck, 1994:29-30).

All the above point towards an unspoken but nonetheless traceable inward direction of conduct. I suggest that those five points lead to an interactive relation between structures of domination and technologies of the self. There is clearly a legislation in thinking operating here. A formation of subjectivity is rooted in interpreting expertise or contributing to expertise for the sake of achieving a certain optimisation of one’s life chances or quality of life by means of a reflexive subjectivity.

Hence, despite the acceptance of risk as culturally contingent, the understanding of who produces knowledge is the main issue at stake here. *World Risk Society* intensifies the problems that I have identified in *Risk Society* in regard to the dispositif. Beck does not follow up on certain themes presented in the ‘art of doubt’ section that closes the *Reinvention of Politics*. And, even there, the direction that the art of doubt would eventually take was evident (see Chapter 5). Doubt is the facilitator of a reflexive subjectivity.

In this context, Beck, in contrast to his (at least more) positive take on Foucault in the ‘art of doubt’, goes back to this mono-dimensional account of critical social theories as mere critiques of industrial/instrumentally rational modernity:

Many social theories (including those of Michel Foucault and those of the Frankfurt School of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno) paint modern society as a technocratic prison of bureaucratic institutions and expert knowledge in which people are mere wheels in the giant machine of technocratic and bureaucratic rationality (Beck, 1999:147).

On the basis of such critique, Beck suggests that ‘world risk society’ is the opposite of that. This account becomes clearer when he suggests how his approach differs from that of Scott Lash:

At this point it is pertinent briefly to outline some of the core notions of the hazards of risk society: *organized irresponsibility, relations of definition, social explosiveness of hazards*, and to summarize the arguments of the welfare state. To me these concepts combine arguments why it is necessary not only to talk in terms of ‘risk culture’ (Scott Lash, 1999), which lacks the institutional dimension of risk and power, but also to theorize risk society with its cultural focus on the institutional base of contemporary globalized industrial society (Beck, 1999:149).

There is validity in the above in regard to a certain alignment between Rose and Beck as far as the new institutions emerging from the techno-economic sphere is concerned (see Chapter 5). But, as we have also seen before in terms of drafting the big picture, the above suggests a failure to understand that Foucault’s dispositif captures exactly the institutional. In Foucault there is the
reflexivity of liberalism and its institutions in terms of re-establishing equilibria of governance. The reflexivity of modernity is the ethos to move beyond such ‘re-establishment’. In Beck, reflexivity and re-establishment are one and the same. Hence, instead of having power and its possibilities for freedom, we have the merging of power with freedom within this reflexive battle of interpretations as a ‘game of knowledge’. Reflexive subjectivity and reflexive institutions are part of this game.

By this token, Beck not only neglects the value of the dispositif, but he further rather hinders his framework by this inability to eventually escape the epochal:

To me the key to explaining this state of affairs is the mismatch that exists in the risk society between the character of hazards or manufactured uncertainties produced by late industrialism and the prevalent relations of definition which date in their construction and content from an earlier and qualitatively different epoch (1999:149).

There is in the above the recurring pattern of insisting not on the changing of ‘rationales’ but on the changing of ‘conditions’. The first is linked to the dispositif. The second is linked to this vague epochal analysis. In such analysis one cannot really distinguish between what is considered to be an irreversible reality, and what is a conscious effort to establish an irreversible understanding of reality, or else between the descriptive and the analytical. A new governmentality is built upon this vague ‘irreversibility’.

This sub-section has introduced Beck’s account of the ‘world risk society’ as a certain problematisation tied to globalisation concerns that leads to a certain governance response. By building upon themes from the previous chapter, such as the dichotomies of power and freedom, and descriptive and analytical, with respect to the epochal, I have attempted to apply a governmentality critique to the way that Beck stages this problematisation of ‘world risks’.

6.1.2. Politics, sub-politics and governmentality

Now, I want to focus more explicitly on highlighting the governmental function of ‘sub-politics’ with respect to a more fragmented institutionalism tied to a reflexive subjectivity. I give a more in-depth account of how Beck attempts to present the function of sub-politics as a political invention capable of acting at the level of the milieu. At the same time, I criticise such an invention as an attempt to also re-appropriate the instrumentally rational dispositif in a manner that places emphasis on the interaction between centralised rationales (i.e., structures of domination) and social and individual action (i.e., technologies of domination). There is a connection between the power, truth and ethical axes of genealogy. I suggest that Beck’s truth-telling acts in such a manner that leads to a ‘relative deterritorialisation’ tied to ‘structures or technologies of domination’.

My first concern here is to indicate that a certain interaction with the established political order is supplemented by the reflexive subjectivity that operates at the sub-political level. In other
words, we are dealing here with a depoliticisation-repoliticisation discussion in regard to what constitutes politics in a reflexive modern environment.

In ‘Reflexive Modernization’ Beck reinforces the idea that he does engage with traditional politics on the basis of the following:

First, anyone who abolishes the boundary between politics and non-politics deprives herself or himself of the basis of his argument. Where everything is somehow political, then somehow nothing is political anymore. Isn’t the necessity of political paralysis somehow being counterfeited into the virtue of sub-political mobility and emotionality, following the motto that if nothing works anymore, then somehow everything works? Incidentally, ‘The knowledge that everything is politics’, as Klaus von Beyme writes, ‘leads us astray if it is not supplemented with the insight that everything is also economics or culture’ (Beck, 1994:33-4).

In other words, Beck overcomes this issue of what the political is by suggesting that

The distinction between official politics and sub-politics, which is oriented to the systematic structure of society, must therefore be contrasted with the distinction between simple (rule-directed) and reflexive (rule-altering) politics. The latter measures itself by the depth, the quality of the political. The phrase ‘politics of politics’, or ‘invention of the political’, which aims at this, need not be meant normatively by any means...Thinking minimalistically, we are dealing today with the concrete operational idea of the invention of the political. Conceiving of it maximalistically, ‘society’ or groups in society are setting off on that mission. The distinction between official and reflexive politics can be applied to both politics and sub-politics as well as to the conditions for their politicization (Beck, 1994:36).

One can trace in the above a Neoplatonic rationality that eventually ties doubt to the parrhesia of doctrinal morals. Such a parrhesia manifests as those politics of ethics that claim a role in the process of constructing subjectivity as means to take care of the self by taking care the community. The discussion of ethics attempts to deflect the critique posed above in terms of how reflexivity cancels the power-freedom dichotomy by offering an explicit political programme powered by ethics. However, those ethics are in turn inevitably enabled by a reflexive subjectivity.

By this token, as we see in the World Risk Society, Beck’s institutionalism becomes more clearly something distinct from that of neoliberalism, which is concerned with facilitating economic regulation. It becomes clearer on the basis of tracing the seeds of a different kind of individualism:

individualization is a structured concept, related to the welfare state: it meansinstitutionalized individualism...people are invited to constitute themselves as
individuals: to plan, understand, design themselves as individuals and, should they fail, to blame themselves. Individualization thus implies, paradoxically, a collective life-style (Beck, 1999:9).

In this context, Beck brings doubt again into the discussion (see Beck, 1994:32-33). He still refuses, however, to remove doubt from the processes of constructing subjectivity. Hence, instead of ‘communities’ of critical thinking we have ‘communities’ of life style. In the latter, economic activity in the form of expressing interests and taste is filtered by a quest to structure subjectivity as a means of satisfying a sense of belonging in a reflexive manner.

As a matter of fact, Beck is willing to contemplate a Machiavellian realism:

Inventing the political means creative and self-creative politics which does not cultivate and renew old hostilities, nor draw and intensify the means of its power from them; instead it designs and forges new content, forms and coalition...This does not mean the ‘politics of convictions’ (Max Weber) or a politics of lip service. On the contrary, the invention of politics requires a Machiavellian realism (see below), but does not exhaust itself therein. Instead, it practices and struggles for spaces, forms and forums of style and structure formation inside and outside the political system (Beck, 1994:38).

Beck’s above emphasis on ‘practices’, ‘space’, ‘forms’ and ‘forums’ paints the picture of these ‘crisscross communities’ that, in conjunction to the reference to Machiavelli, reveal how deeply governmental their operation is. Their governmental function brings together the loose connections that we find in Beck between rationales or institutions such as welfare and the rise of sub-politics.

Again, power and freedom overlap rather than compete, as the concept of ‘sub-politics’ becomes a new form of ‘governmentality’. In the beginning of a paragraph in the ‘Beyond Left and Right’ section situated towards the end of his contribution to Reflexive Modernization, Beck suggests that ‘if it is true that governmental tasks die and new ones must be defined and constituted, then the question arises of which tasks and how they are defined’. He then connects this at the end of the same paragraph to the suggestion that ‘the classical areas of symbolic politics can be moved out and delegated back to the organized sub-politics of the society’ (Beck, 1994:40).

‘Sub-politics’ are now supposed to act at the level of the milieu. They define what power is; thereby they have achieved an unbinding from centralised matrices, since they are responsible for producing power. Power cannot disappear (realism), but in reflexivity, as noted before, it disappears in the sense that is imposed by the reflexive power relations of expertise that is pastoral in the Neoplatonic sense.

To use once more the following terms, the descriptive absorbs the analytical thereby leading to this limited political invention. In this context, reflexivity is a form of subjectivity that
operates as a governmental ‘technology of the self’. Reflexivity is an invention for interacting with the existing. The existing ‘becomes’ rather than ‘is’ reflexive. Therefore,

‘Reflexive politics, then, does not mean just the invention, it means the clearing out of the political’ (Beck, 1994:41).

But what does this really entail? Beck’s perception that sub-politics now access the milieu suggests a re-appropriation of the centralised dispositif. What it also does is structure a new dispositif in which a state ‘forced’ by sub-politics takes a central role in facilitating the operation of sub-politics, in opposition to merely governing civil society via neoliberal economic law (i.e., clearing out the political).

A re-appropriated micro-macro governmental operation of the liberal state is reinforced:

So this is not a plea for new governmental tasks within the old forms. Quite to the contrary, the core of the argument is that this new task simultaneously forces the state into a new form of managing tasks. The state must practice self-restraint and self-abnegation, give up some monopolies and conquer others temporary and so on (Beck, 1994:41).

As such, Beck suggests a form of governing freedom powered by a morality that controls doubt. Hence, doubt must be organised and controlled:

And that is precisely what clears the way into sub-politicization and triggers the opposite impulses towards ‘more of the same’ and non-politics. The opposition between old and new modernity is a shock which encompasses and electrifies all fields of action in modern society. Uprisings encounter the resistance of the routines and those caught up in them. Reflexive, not simple, sub-politics must organize itself. Two patterns can be explored for this: the blockade and the coalition (Beck, 1994:44 in Beck).

In this context,

A general paralysis comes about along with sub-politicization; the modernizers as well as their critics run in place or get caught in the thicket of fomented points of view and interests. This petering out of the implementation process of industrialization, formerly so well oiled by consensus, slows the process and is the precursor of an anarchic self-limitation and self-control of previously unchecked industrialization as usual (Beck, 1994:44).

In the above, we find another mention of a ‘paralysis’ that leads to this neo-Machiavellianism which points towards a new governmental account of institutions in relation to the function of networks or communities:
The general confusion and opposition inside and outside the institutions necessitates and favours the formation of support networks crossing the boundaries of systems and institutions, which must be personally connected and preserved. In a certain way, then, the disintegration of institutions makes room for a refeudalization of social relationships. It is the opening for a neo-Machiavellianism in all areas of social action. Orderings must be created, forged and formed. Only networks, which must be connected together and preserved and have their own ‘currency’, allow the formation of power or opposing power (Beck, 1994:44).

Furthermore, in his ‘cosmopolitan manifesto’ in the beginning of the World Risk Society, Beck ties ‘community’ to the ‘sub-politics’ of risk in connection to globalisation. Thus, he gives a first account of what ‘cosmopolitanisation’ means:

Post-national communities could thus be constructed and reconstructed as communities of risk. Cultural definitions of appropriate types or degrees of risk define the community, in effect as those who share the relative assumptions (Beck, 1999:16).

By this token, Beck’s self-organisational concern in regard to the political (Beck, 1994:39-40) is undermined by his silence on the neoliberal dispositif, as also his creation of a new reflexive dispositif tied to the ethics of the ‘polis’. The post-national communities are partly already structured by a neoliberal dispositif with globalising tendencies. Beck’s further emphasis on risk suggests how economic concerns in regard to risk can collide at the level of the structure of social reproduction with the cosmopolitan definition of risk as a threat to the ethics of reflexivity. This congruence points towards the emergence of a new reflexive dispositif concerned with governing risk.

I have in this sub-section advanced my account of the function of ‘sub-politics’ in Beck. At the same time, I have prepared to link Beck’s truth-telling with a certain set of reflexive ethics, while pointing again towards the connection with the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia. Finally, I have made an initial connection between the way that Beck brings ‘world risks’ and ‘sub-politics’ together and his account of cosmopolitanism.

6.1.3. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics and governmental rationales

I focus now explicitly on this connection between truth-telling and ethics in Beck with respect to globalisation, with particular attention to Beck’s account of cosmopolitanism.

It is clear by now that the overall concern of Beck’s ethics is the ‘polis’. In his paper ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies’, Beck spells this out:

To the extent that the parrhesia tied to the ‘polis’ enables ‘sub-politics’ and nurtures reflexivity, Beck suggests that only via a concern for the ‘polis’ can one take appropriate care of the self and the others. In Beck’s earlier contribution to Reflexive Modernization we see how individualisation appears to be somewhat problematic. Trapped among liberal individualism and an un-willingness to trust an individualism powered by the ‘art of doubt’ Beck takes refuge in epochal re-appropriation in order to introduce a new communitarian individualism:

cosmopolitanization means internal globalization, globalization from within the national societies. This transforms everyday consciousness and identities significantly. Issues of global concern are becoming part of the everyday local experiences and the ‘moral life-worlds’ of the people (Beck, 2002:17).

This cosmopolitanisation from within the society that Beck envisions is concerned with the reconciliation between individualism and society:

Put in plain terms, ‘individualization’ means the disintegration of the certainties of industrial society as well as the compulsion to find and invent new certainties for oneself and others without them. But it also means new interdependence, even global ones. Individualization and globalization are in fact two sides of the same process of reflexive modernization (Beck, 1994:14).

At this point, the issue of ethics is clearer, as Beck suggests a globalisation rooted in the cosmopolitan democracy that places this collectivity at the global stage. This suggestion contrasts an individualism that has exhausted the moral resources of modernity, while being bound by this compulsion that Giddens has pointed out (see Chapter 5).

Here, one can get a better grasp of what modernity is for Beck. In the ‘cosmopolitan manifesto’, which is the introductory chapter in the World Risk Society, again, far from an experiment in ethics, modernity needs Christian morality as a facilitator of political freedom (Beck, 1999:10). The Christian morality that Beck channels is obviously one with Neoplatonic connotations and Hegelian premises, rather than one linked with pastoral power and the Reformation–Counter-Reformation processes. The aim of this channelling is the establishment of an ethical reference point, one concerned exactly with the governance of the ‘polis’ or the self-governance of the individual in alignment with the interests of the ‘polis’.

Where ‘polis’ appears, one can now read ‘crisscross globally spread communities’ instead:

‘Globalization’ is a non-linear, dialectic process in which the global and the local do not exist as cultural polarities but as combined and mutually implicating principles. These processes involve not only interconnections across boundaries, but transform the quality of the social and the political inside nation-state societies (Beck, 2002:17).
The cultivation of such global communities aligns with the straight reference in Kant’s conception of ‘world citizenship’, which Beck connects to cosmopolitan consciousness (see Beck, 1999:17).

In the same paper, Beck is also inspired by Hegelian idealism in conjunction with a shift to relativity as reflexivity:

Consequently the theory and sociology of inequality still have to take the step from Newtonian mechanics to Einsteinian relativity theory. Put in classical terms: Hegel’s master–slave dialectic was conceived territorially. It must be re-thought in de-territorialized transnational terms. The same holds true for the semantics of justice, solidarity, etc., including the social philosophy of justice. What then remains of them is an open question’ (Beck, 2002:34).

At the same time, the further implications of a governmentality concerned with the polis becomes evident when ‘multiculturalism’ is discarded by Beck on the basis of making the individual a sole product of a cosmopolitan ‘assimilationist’ multicultural society. The latter is explicitly an aspect of a global political programme as a cosmopolitan manifesto:

According to the multicultural premise, the individual does not exist. He is a mere epiphenomenon of his culture. Cosmopolitanism argues the reverse and presupposes individualization. The idea that this process could continue to the point where, under the banner of political democracy and of the recognition of human rights and of individual freedom, national particularisms dissolve into a comprehensive and varied world civilization, has perhaps become a little more tangible since the end of the Cold War. The constructivism–realism dilemma: the ‘cosmopolitan perspective’ is an anti-essentialist perspective. The conception of cultures as homogeneous unities of language, origin and political identity, as maintained by methodological nationalism, is the exact opposite of the cosmopolitan self-conception (Beck, 2002:37).

Hence, instead of emancipating the individual, this cosmopolitan assimilationism erects its own barriers to plurality by, again, tying it to a reflexive civility:

To sum up, I suggest three characteristics – globality, plurality and civility, that is, the awareness of a global sphere of responsibility, the acknowledgement of the otherness of others and non-violence – as defining features of a ‘de-territorialised’ concept of cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2002:36).

Civility is tied to the morals of a reflexive subjectivity associated with a certain politico-economical governance of freedom via new institutions, and new technologies of the self. Beck does not escape from the faults of the deterritorilisation-reterritorialisation process in relation to globalism (neoliberal globalisation), fundamentalism, and democratic authoritarianism. Those,
according to Beck himself (see 2002:38-42), are related to this ‘monstrous/paradoxical’ merging of capitalism with postmodern chaos. Instead, cosmopolitanism itself becomes one of the, in Deleuze’s terms, governmentalities of relative reterritorialisation.

Here, a ‘project of man’ with its distinctive governmentality emerges due to the fact that Beck does not ‘trust’ the ‘laissez-faire’ value of the ethics of critique to deal at any point alone with the self and the social. Neoliberalism has overturned the laissez-faire of the markets on the basis that certain economic regulation needs to initiate or sanction the naturalism of economic activity. Beck overturns the ‘art of doubt’ by drafting a cosmopolitan manifesto. The latter is concerned with imposing a certain moral direction on doubt in order to initiate a reflexivity that can thrive in conditions of governmentally staged risks.

In conclusion, I have focussed here explicitly on Beck’s account of cosmopolitanism. I suggest that in Beck cosmopolitanism appears as a concept that brings ‘sub-politics’ and the parrhesia tied to the ‘polis’ together. By this token, I have tried to indicate how Beck is concerned with drafting a global governance manifesto tied to ‘structures and technologies of domination’ within relative reterritorialisation processes.
6.2. Giddens and the third way politics

6.2.1. A social democratic governmentality

I now similarly focus on applying a governmentality critique to Giddens with respect to his social democratic regulatory suggestions. My focus is his more politically oriented *The Third Way*, which establishes a connection between life politics and ‘third way politics’ tied to a certain also cosmopolitan agenda.

In *The Third Way* Giddens has been particularly concerned with the origins and evolution of socialism. By this token, one can quickly observe that his political concerns are more grounded than Beck’s. Beck’s cosmopolitanism as a third way reinvention of politics remains more generic in its analysis. It rather lacks precisely a more systematic engagement with socialism as this foundation of a new politics.

Giddens (see 1999:3) presents the initially Marxist-influenced socialism as being against individualism and the anti-humanist tendencies of capitalism. The first thing to note of that observation is that social democracy is concerned with humanising capitalism. The second is its ethical/philosophical dimension. Socialism’s goal is to either humanise or overthrow capitalism. However, what is of particular significance is that according to Giddens, socialism—even before Marx—replaced its initial philosophical and ethical dimension with a concern with economics.

Furthermore, Giddens suggests that essentially capitalism and social democracy have overlapped in terms of structuring the dominant dispositif of the Western state during the previous century. The welfare state is a prominent example, as it was a byproduct of a more tamed socialism (i.e., social democracy) and a conservatism more prone to care about income equality than was the case prior to World War II (see Giddens, 1999:4).

Giddens also emphasises that the neoliberalism initiated by Thatcher and Reagan was not a full-fledged break from the previous welfare era. By this token, he mentions the examples of leftist parties across the world that followed Thatcherist policies (see Giddens, 1999:6). In addition, he emphasises the libertarian aspect of a free-market neoliberalism against the conservative tendencies of a neoliberal right (see Giddens, 1999:6).

Similarly, social democracy has been a nuanced political manifestation. Giddens stresses the fact that Keynesianism, as the economic doctrine of the welfare era and of an ‘old’ social democracy, was not against capitalism. It was a ‘healing’ doctrine that was concerned with correcting the irrationalities of classical liberalism and its capitalism (see Giddens, 1999:10). It was concerned with humanising capitalism.

In terms of the ethical concerns, Giddens attacks conservative ideas of pluralism in regard to issues of life-style and social roles (see Giddens, 1999:12). He praises, however, the global...
orientation of neoliberalism which old social democracy lacks (see Giddens, 1999:14). In other words, neoliberalism has struggled to reconcile market fundamentalism with conservatism, while social democracy has failed to make its egalitarianism functional (see Giddens, 1999:15-6).

The above points towards the creation of a problematisation concerned with socialism that has the tendency to reconcile neoliberalism with the left in connection to globalisation. The problematisation of globalisation is tied to the overarching problematisation of reflexivity and modernity. Giddens acknowledges how governance and governmental choices have led to globalisation:

Globalization is quite often spoke of as if it were a force of nature, but it is not. States, business corporations and other groups have actively promoted its advance...Globalization, in sum, is a complex range of processes, driven by a mixture of economic influences...taken as a whole, globalization is transforming the institutions of the societies in which we live. It is certainly directly relevant to the rise of the ‘new individualism’ that has figured large in social democratic debates (see Giddens, 1999:33).

What should concern us here is not whether globalisation is an epochal reality but on what grounds a congruence on observation of processes of deterritorialisation (e.g., economic integration, communication revolution) along with overall cultural shifts (e.g., post-materialism) are related to new forms of governance to which Giddens makes a notable contribution.

Giddens (1999:19) has already emphasised how various political debates across Europe were structured around ecology and this new term ‘post-materialism’ (see Inglehart, 1971-1977), which refers to the concern with quality of life (life-style). In addition, he emphasises the realisation made by social democrats that social security and economic performance, and solidarity and individualism should not be mutually exclusive.

Giddens acknowledges that post-materialism has some depoliticising tendencies, while the rise of neoliberalism has increased the commodification of living. He emphasises, however, that post-materialism has been backed up by empirical studies (survey data) that suggest that, other than older age groups of conservative libertarians, the rest of society and particularly the youngsters are concerned with post-materialist values (i.e., post-industrial values tied to issues of rights and morality rather than with mere survival and economic standards of living [see Giddens, 1999:21-22]). And, within such a post-materialist environment, rather than the death of politics one sees a new manifestation of the political through the struggle to fulfill post-materialism in a more nuanced manner than that of mere consumerism. A new social democracy can emerge from that environment (see Giddens, 1999:23).

Hence, Giddens clearly elaborates a socialist governmentality with an emphasis on technologies of the self fostered by a post-materialist individualism. Morality and community (polis), namely the two characteristic of the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia and the subsequent Neoplatonic
thought, come to the forefront of Giddens’s analysis. Against the liberal individualism of the ‘me’ society which Foucault’s neoliberal competition building clearly accommodates, Giddens raises the moral concerns of this reflexive era. By this token, the problematisation of a reflexive modernity is progressively concerned with narrow governmental premises aligned with existing power structures on the basis that those power structures were always partly leftist. The term ‘left’ meets the term ‘reflexive’, thereby hindering any discussion of broader emancipatory value in such analysis.

Giddens, himself, acknowledges that the most prominent criticism against third way politics is the following:

The more recent appropriation of ‘third way’ by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair has met with lukewarm reception from most Continental social democrats, as well as from old left critics in their respective countries. The critics see the third way in this guise as warmed-over neoliberalism (Giddens, 1999:25).

Similarly, he addresses Norberto Bobbio’s account of how the left-right dichotomy works (see 1999:40-46). Bobbio, according to Giddens, suggests that it is the necessity of an adversarial model of politics that re-appropriates the right-left dichotomy as an illusion of conflict. It is an illusion, since there is always at a given period a dominant discourse embodied by either the left or the right which forces the opposite side for that period to align itself with that discourse. By this token, a certain core principle of the one side, for example the concern of the left with equality, rather than being a product of a false dichotomy it is forced to manifest in a certain way that is dictated by the dominant in that period’s side (right or left).

Still, despite the fact that, as discussed above, Giddens accepts the interaction between the right and the left, and he does contemplate Bobbio’s account, he also suggests that ‘third way politics’ is something new. Giddens reaffirms that the left-right distinction is not merely a trick of the adversarial model. The left has distinctive value on the basis of being concerned with equality and thereby with ‘politics of emancipation’ (see Giddens, 1999:42). Bobbio, according to Giddens, acknowledges this value, but it is not clear whether such acknowledgement can evade assimilation by an existing dominant discourse.

Giddens ponders,

Are we, as Bobbio seems to suggest, just in a period of transition, before left and right re-establish themselves with full force, or has there been a qualitative change in their relevance? (Giddens, 1999:43).

Giddens endorses the latter statement by firmly embracing the view that the old social democracy is irreversibly dead. Socialist economic management of capitalism should be put to rest (see Giddens,1999:43). But, the term ‘centre-left’ is not an innocent one, because it can end up substantiating Bobbio’s account. What is needed is something that comes from the left of the centre
in order to meet the lifestyle diversity of the center, thereby transcending the right-left adversarial dichotomy (i.e. radical center) (see Giddens, 1999:45).

This perception leads to the key conceptual elaboration of ‘neogovernmentality’ on the basis of a complementary interaction at the level of the structure of social reproduction. Giddens’s analysis is now an effort to transvaluate capitalism via a political or ethical management capable of interacting with neoliberalism in such a manner that alters the core functionalities of neoliberal economic management (i.e. third way as radical centre).

As Rose (2000:1400) puts it,

During the last two decades, this social mentality of government has come under challenge from all sides of the political spectrum...It is this image that infuses Third Way politics, as well as other post-social politics and anti-politics that took shape in the final decade of the 20th century...Politics is to be returned to society itself, but no longer in the social: in the form of individual morality, organizational responsibility, and ethical community (see Rose, 1996).

The following conveys this new political and ethical direction as an effort to overcome capitalism within capitalism:

No one any longer has any alternatives to capitalism—the arguments that remain concern how far, and in what ways, capitalism should be governed and regulated. These arguments are certainly significant, but they fall short of the more fundamental disagreements of the past. As these circumstances have shifted, a whole range of other problems and possibilities have come to the fore that are not within the reach of the left-right scheme. These include ecological questions, but also issues to do with the changing nature of family, work and personal and cultural identity. Of course, values of social justice and emancipation have a connection with all of these, but each of these issues cross-cuts those values. To the emancipatory politics of the classical left we have to add what I have elsewhere called the life politics. The term may or may not be a good one. What I mean by it is that, whereas emancipatory politics concerns life chances, life politics concerns life decisions. It is a politics of choice, identity and mutuality (Giddens, 1999:43-4).

In other words, the concern for a social democratic governance suggests overcoming the left-right dichotomy altogether. The adversarial model is in a sense substituted by life politics. The important point that I want to make here, however, already introduced in Beck, is that ‘life politics’ is a new kind of dispositif. This dispositif is a byproduct of the merging at the level of the structure of the social reproduction of neoliberalism with a new social democracy.

My suggestion is substantiated by giving a Foucauldian outlook on the above account provided by Giddens. In terms of the descriptive problems, Giddens lacks an overarching
understanding of a liberal and neoliberal dispositif, thereby perceiving differentiations at the level of political doctrines. Bobbio’s point in a sense was a reaffirmation of Foucault’s dispositif on the grounds that there is a dominant political rationale that nullifies the other side rather than an interaction between two sides.

In terms of the analytical premise, the following should be noted. Foucault has argued that a socialist governmentality needs to be invented, but even if Giddens’s social democracy is more successful to that end, it is yet a form of governmentality concerned with regulating freedom within a predominantly liberal capitalist society. Such regulation highlights more explicitly the discussion of limited invention made in the previous chapter within the blurred descriptive or analytical aims of reflexive sociology. As becomes evident in Rose (see 1999; 2000:1396-1397), the strength of reflexive sociology lies in building upon pre-existing practices of social democracy within the liberal democratic paradigm.

In this first more focussed attempt to grasp a new apparatus in Giddens, I want to emphasise the interaction between governance and the new forms of political activity that ‘life politics’ suggests. I will draw this from Modernity and Self-Identity, which I have discussed in Chapter 5. As Giddens puts it there,

What is the sense of ‘politics’ in ‘life politics’? It is conventional in political theory to recognize a narrow and broad conception of politics. The first refers to the processes of decision-making within the governmental sphere of the state; the second sees as political any modes which are connected with settling debates or conflicts where opposing interests or values clash. Life politics is politics in both of these senses (Giddens, 1991:226).

Giddens here comes closer to Foucault, as he suggests that despite the independent relationship between various expertise cultures and the individual, centralised control by the institutions of the state remains. Such control is not to be underestimated. This refers to the first aspect of politics. The second suggests that the reflexivity of the subject and of the institutions—which has been partly helped by ‘emancipatory politics’—creates a whole new spectrum of political activity.

Once again, this conception is not entirely Foucauldian because liberal politics were always operating at two levels. If one points towards the emphasis of Foucault on direct biopolitics in neoliberalism, then Giddens might be right in the sense that neoliberal governmentality is a product of an institutional reflexivity with ‘life politics’ connotations. This account is somewhat evident in Gidden’s understanding of neoliberalism (see below). But, hence, ‘life politics’ is inherently dependent on an existing liberal dispositif. ‘Life politics’ is also bound to become itself a form of dispositif tied to centralised governmental appropriation (i.e., structures of domination) as also to a desirable type of subject as reflexivity (i.e., technologies of domination).
Giddens connects the fate of the left to an overarching revitalisation of a political which becomes capable of finding the economic law at the level of the structure in order to redirect its decentralised regulation. Reflexivity constitutes a shift from the laissez-faire naturalism that aims to facilitate the operation of certain identified natural principles to the idea that nature is a social construction. The last traces of acting along the divine or nature are dissolved into choice.

Neoliberal governmentality is as such reflexive, since it is understood that competition should be built. Reflexive sociology and its politics take a similar route, thereby interactively facilitating a new dispositif. This new dispositif does not govern civil society (see Foucault’s account of classical liberalism in Chapter 1); rather it incorporates economic law, and now ethics, in order to produce the civil society that, in this context, becomes the milieu. The natural environment and the natural laws are now reflexive discourses produced by the social and vice versa.

These third way politics entail a new form of governance in the narrow sense and a broader one in the sense of ‘life politics’ or in Beck’s term ‘sub-politics’. The narrow sense of politics involves a variety of governmental aims for the state. I summarise them as follows: equality, the strengthening of the public sphere, diversity, market regulation, fostering of social space, human capital development, effective system of law, economic responsibilities against individualist destabilising greed, cultural role in relation to morals, and globalist outlook (see Giddens, 1999:47-8).

Giddens suggests that social movements and NGOs, as aspects of politics in the broader sense, cannot fully replace government in executing the above aims. This broader function of the new politics becomes more and more significant, though. Giddens highlights the connection of reflexivity with globalisation by stressing that the significance of ‘life politics’ is an outcome of globalisation (see Giddens, 1999:48).

Here, he explicitly ties this account of ‘life politics’ to Beck’s ‘sub-politics’: ‘Ulrich Beck speaks of the emergence of “sub-politics”—politics that has migrated away from parliament towards single-issue groups in the society’. From that assumption he goes on to refer to notable cases (i.e., boycott of Shell oil company) in which such sub-political activity has instilled a new set of moral responsibilities in corporate ethics (see Giddens, 1999:49-50). This is a notable articulation in terms of merging the ethical with the economic in regard to structural regulation.

This articulation interestingly more directly connects governance and social action. Giddens refers again to Beck in a way that rather summarises my observation: ‘Beck compares “the immobility of the government apparatus” with the “mobility of agents on all possible levels of society”, and “the petering out of politics” with “the activation of sub-politics”’ (1999:50). In my view Beck’s account, rather than being a form of emancipation, adds another dimension to the neoliberal biopolitical technologies of the self. However, for Giddens and Beck, such technologies of the self, namely the quest to mirror a liberal capitalist dispositif in accordance with a set of
morals or the quest to find moral fulfilment within an entrepreneurial society, is a form of emancipation.

The top-down and bottom-up distinction is blurred here in a manner that in my view hinders rather than promotes emancipation. As I discussed in the previous chapter in terms of structural constructivism, it is hard to evade domination when you have correlated freedom to rather stagnant power relations tied to present social action. In that case, power is not in interaction with freedom; freedom is a certain account of power. In this context, Giddens welcomes Beck’s view that ‘Citizens’ initiative groups...have taken power unilaterally, without waiting for the politicians. They, not the politicians, have put ecological issues, and many other new concerns too, on the agenda’ (Giddens, 1999:50).

This particular blurring of power with freedom is a very important point of critique that encompasses or further crystallises the core of the critique put forward in the previous chapter. To reiterate, there is in Giddens a lack of the nuanced vagueness that we find in Foucault and his ethos of critique in terms of constructivist capabilities. Foucault starts from the point of perceiving a more autonomous and structurally established power (i.e., domination). Power cannot be fully surpassed via present social action, for power relations are inevitable.

The premise in Foucault that power is socially constructed refers to its origins rather than to the present. The continuous reproduction of power does not mean that bottom-up social activity can rearticulate power as such. The ongoing reproduction of the social is based on the assumption that stagnant power relations reflect both top-down (i.e., structures) and bottom-up functions of social reproduction (i.e., technologies of the self). However, this assumption, instead of hindering freedom, offers a solid point of reference (i.e., stagnant power relations) which one should strive to overcome. The latter disappears in reflexive sociology’s claim that established power is a product of freedom and nature a product of the social.

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, reflexivity becomes a form of subjectivity, and political identity can be legitimate only as reflexive. By this token, the activity of what some (i.e., most notably Mary Kaldor, 2003) refer to as a ‘dark side’ of global civil society (fundamentalisms and nationalisms) are excluded from the opportunities of sub-political activity. In Giddens’s words, ‘Far right parties and movements would be dangerous if they did become anything more than minority concerns’ (Giddens, 1999:52).

Such a reflexivity is, as noted in the previous chapter, tied to expertise. The top-down/bottom-up distinction is replaced by an inward direction of morality through this reflexive expertise as opposed to the previous instrumentally rational one: Giddens explains,

Science and technology used to be seen as outside politics, but this view has become obsolete. All of us live in a more ‘interrogatory’ relationship with science and industrial innovation than used to be the case... Decision making in these contexts cannot be left to
experts’, but has to involve politicians and citizens. In short, science and technology cannot stay outside democratic processes. Experts cannot be relied upon automatically to know what is good for us, nor can they always provide us with unambiguous truths; they should be called upon to justify their conclusions and policies in the face of public scrutiny (Giddens, 1999:59).

The governmentality of this expertise in terms of this assimilationist reflexivity becomes evident in Giddens’s suggestion that some forms of expert knowledge should be internalised more than others. In other words, certain disputes in interpreting expert knowledge, such as the dispute in regard to environmental change, should evade pluralism. In this context, Giddens, as Beck in the previous section, embraces the core premise of the literature of ecological modernisation which suggests that ‘action on environmental issues should be taken even though there is scientific uncertainty about them’ (Giddens, 1999:61). There is, at this point, a connection between security, control and expertise, as in order for reflexivity to exist, threats against quality of life and pluralism must be addressed.

The difference is that insecurity is not connected with danger, but with risk:

Risk isn’t exactly the same as danger. Risk refers to dangers we seek actively to confront and assess. In a society such ours, oriented towards the future and saturated with information, the theme of risk unites many otherwise disparate areas of politics: welfare state reform, engagement with world financial markets, responses to technological change, ecological problems and geopolitical transformations. We all need protection against risk, but also the capability to confront and take risks in a productive fashion (Giddens, 1999:64).

By this token, the broader function of politics as ‘life-politics’ or ‘sub-politics’ precipitates a new aspect of an overarching contemporary dispositif as third way politics. Such a dispositif is inherently a mixture of narrow and broad politics. Neoliberalism, itself, in its mainly American anarcho-liberal manifestation, has focussed on direct biopolitical governance through the internalisation of competition of building as a neoliberal utopia (see also Chapter 2). Giddens further establishes a governmentality rooted in the two dimensions of the political through a repoliticisation.

This repoliticisation is conveyed in the following statement:

How far will ‘sub-politics’ replace the more conventional spheres of politics and government? Beck is right to argue that declining interest in party and parliamentary politics isn’t the same as depoliticization. Social movements, single issue groups, NGO’s and other associations of citizens surely will play a part in politics on a continuing basis-from a local to a world level. Governments will have to be ready to learn them, react to the issues they raise and negotiate with them, as will corporations and other business agencies.
Yet the idea that such groups can take over where government is failing, or can stand in place of political parties is fantasy (1999:53).

It should come as no surprise by now that given the connection between reflexivity, social democracy and globalisation this depoliticisation and repoliticisation discussion can be linked to one about deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Giddens suggests that government should be understood in a more general sense than only national government. Social democrats have to consider how government might best be reconstructed to meet the needs of the age (1999:53).

To conclude, I have presented here the way that Giddens merges social democracy and the functions of neoliberalism (i.e., the third way). Giddens attempts to envision a post-materialist form of governance that remains rooted in the neoliberal economic model. Politics are important in this process. Giddens suggests that narrow politics have to respond to the rise of the more post-materialist broad politics. By this token, if narrow politics are still powered to a certain extent by established politico-juridical matrices and if broad politics have to interact with the narrow politics, we are still indeed dealing with a dispositif that is tied to both structures and technologies of domination. The third way politics reflects this merging of social democracy and neoliberalism at the level of narrow politics in connection to the rise of ‘life politics’ or ‘sub-politics’ at the level of broad politics.

6.2.2. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics and governmental rationales

I will now focus more on how the above account of ‘third way politics’ in connection to depoliticisation and repoliticisation processes is directly linked to deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation processes. This new social democracy is inherently universalist in its perspective. By this token, a direct connection can be made again, as was the case with Beck, between cosmopolitanism and the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia with respect to globalisation and the fulfilling of enlightenment or modernity.

Globalisation progressively acquires a more central role in Giddens’s analysis of third way politics. As I argued before, the new politicisation is essentially concerned with a relative deterritorialisation of reflexivity on the grounds of dealing with risk. As Giddens puts it,

The overall aim of third way politics should be to help citizens pilot their way through the major revolutions of our time: globalization, transformations in personal life and our relationship to nature (1999:64).

The above summarises how the problematisation of reflexivity is tied to globalisation. The premise behind the staging of this problematisation is to govern risk.
However, ‘life politics’ dictates that citizens themselves embody ‘third way politics’, thereby co-drafting in the process a third way manual. At this point, the function of community in relation to a new account of civil society becomes better understood in terms of its morality, rationalism, and existential outlook.

In the beginning of his ‘State and the Civil Society’ chapter, Giddens reiterates the connection between social democracy and globalisation, explicitly referring to cosmopolitanism:

Third Way politics is one-nation politics. The cosmopolitan nation helps promote social inclusion but also has a key role in fostering transnational systems of governance (Giddens, 1999:69).

Right before that he also confirms once again the connection between governance, the civil society, and economy in what he refers to as ‘mixed economy’.

In this context, he presents a new summary of a third way governmental programme focussing on fostering ‘the radical centre; the democratic state; active civil society; the democratic family; the new mixed economy; equality as inclusion; positive welfare; the social investment state; the cosmopolitan nation; cosmopolitan democracy’ (Giddens:1999:70).

Several of these points overlap with each other to the extent that it is almost redundant to separate them. I will not engage with them further, since my focus is not on the explicit manifestations of such rationales in public policies. This summary suffices to indicate how the double-function of politics (i.e., broad and narrow) comes together into a relative deterritorialisation context.

Giddens (see 1999:71) subscribes to the opinion that the modern state has been forged by war. The governance provided rights to maintain a social contract with its subjects. It is hard to situate such brief analysis in the detailed processes of state-building that Foucault has described in the ‘Society Must Be Defended’ and ‘Security Territory Population’ lectures (see introduction and Chapter 1). Giddens’s argument, however, seems compatible with the idea that Foucault explores in ‘Society Must Be Defended’, namely that it was the denouncing of conflict that led the citizens to willingly legitimise the state.

Therefore, Giddens’s account of democratisation as the embodiment of a reflexive subjectivity can connects to a break from the premise that it is the fear of conflict which powers a democratisation of the social contract with the state. Giddens slightly downplays Beck’s argument that it is the triumph of liberal institutions that have led to more reflexivity and cosmopolitinisation (see previous section). In Giddens it is more the self-realisation of modernity that has unveiled the deeper forces which are reshaping global society, including the demand for individual autonomy and the emergence of a more reflexive citizenry.
Once more, there is this inconsistency in regard to who understands better the dispositif. In the previous chapter I argued that, overall, Giddens’ account is tied more to the context of an instrumentally rational dispositif. Beck seems to suggest that the dispositif is being for the most part replaced by the techno-economic sphere and its sub-politics. On the other hand, life politics in Giddens’s more consistent double-emphasis on governance and social action in relation to taking into account neoliberalism is in a sense a new aspect of a renewed dispositif.

Here, Giddens’ argument is much more concerned with a governmental reform of liberal institutions rather than with some kind of politics that, although they derive from liberal institutions, are here to replace them. When he explicitly turns his focus to civil society, he emphasises once more that government can and must play a major part in renewing civic culture. This civic culture is key to understanding Giddens’s ‘fascination’ with the notion of ‘community’ within the context of life politics.

These crisscross communities of life-style (see Chapter 5) should not be simplistically related to options of commodities. However, as Giddens himself suggests, they can operate only within a liberal capitalist economy. In this economy, though, it is the primary concern of governance to make sure that there will be governmental involvement in terms of social integration and provision of accessible facilities. ‘Life politics’ are based on the fact that the individual will have a basic or high income and affordable public services in order to afford his life-style choices. The principle of community can also acquire self-organisational capacities via social entrepreneurship, namely communal entrepreneurial activity driven occasionally by volunteerism.

My more explicit critique of the governmentality that has been so far sketched in this subsection operates within three overlapping layers, which come together in regard to how one should take care of the self: (1) ‘third way politics’ as ‘life politics’ is restrictive; (2) ‘third way politics’ as ‘life-politics’ is designed to operate within a liberal capitalist society; (3) ‘third way politics’ as ‘life-politics’ is both restrictive and euphoric at the same time. These intertwined concerns can be elaborated as follows.

(1) There is a clear concern with restricting individual cultivation for the sake of instilling morality. Volunteerism, for example, is an effort to attach individual self-care to the care of the others. One could argue that via volunteerism one takes care of the self as he takes care of the others, since there are various incentives for personal growth within volunteerism. This is, however, a point at which the semantic difference between the two kinds of parrhesia again appears. In Foucault’s parrhesia, one does not seek personal growth via engagement with the social. He grows outside of the social, and he shares this growth as he sees fit. As noted before, one has to take care of the self in order to take care of the others. One does not take care of the self by taking care of the others.
(2) This concern with the ‘other’ is fundamentally linked to a liberal capitalist economy and a deeply governmental state. To make a quick connection with the previous point, one of the incentives of volunteerism is, for example, acquiring job experience. In addition, as I argued above, any life-style choice, although not purely a commodity, is interconnected with the monetary consumption of that choice. Neoliberal capitalist commodification becomes almost indispensable from life-style choices. Civic culture leads to an assimilationist monetarist multicultural universe that encompasses the whole globe.

There is the classical social democratic interventionist rationale which emphasises that issues of welfare and education should be neither left alone to regulation by the markets nor depend on individual action. In ‘third way politics’ the governmental element is equally strong, as this sort of politics becomes an art of governing civil society that so far has been more or less governed by political economy. There is a call for explicit governmental intervention at the level of the civil society through strategies of community-building that will establish pluralist sites of veridiction as the pacts of security turned to control from which subjectivity will emerge. This interventionist rationale is not far from the equally decentralised, exhaustive, and reflexive neoliberal rationales of regulation on the basis of modelling society as an enterprise.

To the extent that one can recognise at least a semi-autonomy to ‘Third Way politics’, though , a social democratic governmentality is invented. This ‘invention’ points towards the issue of co-producing regulation at the level of the structure, thereby making capitalism inherently something no longer serving a merely economic function. It is a depoliticisation of politics as an adversarial struggle among radical alternatives, or, to put it differently, a politicisation of aesthetics.

As Rose puts it (2000:1399), there is a shift from ‘schools, asylums, reformatories, workhouses, washhouses, homes (for the young, old and damaged), unified regimes of public services broadcasting’ and so forth, to ‘advertising, marketing, the proliferation of goods, the multiple stylisations of the act of purchasing, cinemas, videos, pop music, life-style magazines, television soap-operas, advice programs and talk shows’. It is a shift in the civilising project of man from discipline to biopolitics to ethopolitics in regard to shaping civility.

Some examples of this politicisation are associated with the notion of ‘relative uncommodification’. I use this notion in connection to certain ‘democratic’ hactivist efforts to make liberal products, which are inevitably culturally charged, globally available. I believe that this type of hactivism is a useful case for contemplating how relative uncommodification operates as ‘neogovernmentality’. This is, as noted before, within the premise of writing fictions by connecting theory with empirics in order to unmask plausible relationships between certain ideas and empirical evidence.
First of all, if computer protocol as a certain set of rules that facilitates the digital distribution of information is a tool of universality, as Galloway (2004) suggests, then a chicken-or-egg dilemma emerges. Does the hacker use the internet to envision a ‘free’ and possibly Foucauldian parrhesiastic individualism, or is her subjectivity already structured, meaning that thereby any projection is a projection of that subjectivity?

According to Galloway the value system of hackers appears as follows:

“Hackers tend to be an idealistic lot. Some might say naive,” write the editors of 2600, a quarterly journal on hacking. “We believe in freedom of speech, the right to explore and learn by doing, and the tremendous power of the individual.” Yet this is a new type of individual. This is not the same individual who is the subject of enlightenment liberalism. It is an extension (perhaps) of the modern dream of individuality and independence. Yet this new resistive agent has more in common with the autonomous “boids” of Tom Ray’s Tierra than with radicals from protocol’s prehistory (Galloway, 2004:160).

It is hard for anyone to answer what this really means in order to evade the chicken-or-egg dilemma raised above. The answer is connected to the struggles to define the proper use of protocol. It is a struggle between neoliberal regulation, hactivism and tactical use. As Galloway explains:

The limits of personal behavior become the limits of possibility to the hacker. Thus, it is obvious to the hacker that one’s personal investment in a specific piece of code can do nothing but hinder that code’s overall development (2004:170).

In this context, I think that is useful to contemplate the following:

Jameson said somewhere that one of the most difficult things to do under contemporary capitalism is to envision utopia. This is precisely why possibility is important. Hackers are machines for the identification of this possibility (Galloway, 2004:168-9).

But, of course, what is this utopia? In reflexive sociology, utopia is the universalisation of multiculturalism as freedom of multifaceted information tied to a variation of acceptable choices. Surely this kind of hactivism has an anti-commercial bent. However, if a hacker hacks a major commercial song, film, or the like, namely a content that is meant to be commodified, who does this hurt? It hurts the profit of a specific corporation. Therefore, it changes the way that business takes place. But, it does not change the type of culture that has been commodified. It simply ‘relatively uncommodifies’ it. For example, asking rhetorically, is YouTube ‘emancipatory’ or does it merely multiply the content, and strengthen the pluralism of a Hollywood-like entertainment while still interacting with it within a cosmopolitan reflexive life-style commodification?
In this context, digital piracy through free software as a means to attack corporate interests or establish anonymity (see hacktivism applications such as Torpark [web browser], Torbird [email client] and Scatterchat [IM client] in Cammaerts, 2013) does not really change the fact that the subject still desires the commodity—maybe even more, because she can access it for free. Maybe less in a reverse psychological sense, because it is free. In any case, she still desires it. She desires it because the commodity is a cultural product as well, namely one that resonates with her as a reflexive ethopolitical subject operating within a liberal capitalist society.

By this token, however, the subject can satisfy a desire that the system purposely exploits by building cultural commodities. Such piracy might still lead to an emancipatory agenda. It could be a democratisation of the control of desire. Nevertheless, in the end would the subject not still desire the same avatars of a commodified biopolitical control, thereby allowing their future use for the very same reason? The answer is both yes and no. Yes, because they will be commodified. No, because the desire is not simply a derivative of corporate manipulation. Desire can be easily fit into a life-style pursuit. Such a mentality can be traced back to the initial commercialisation of the morality of Christmas by corporations. In other words, essentially the one (i.e., desire) complements the other (i.e., life-style).

Sezneva (2014) presents an aspect of piracy that acts as a facilitator of a global culture. Such a piracy hurts capitalism in the short run, while it expands its reach in the long run without necessarily having this aim. What we have here is an actual facilitation of a global culture that pushes capitalism towards creating better accessibility to its commodities, thereby increasing the capability of various populations to afford such commodities. Therefore, corporations can reap the profit of the life-style pursuits that cosmopolitanism nurtures.

According to Sezneva, existing regulation has the following characteristics:

the prevailing effect of legal distribution – especially in the so-called developing world – is to restrict access, not universalize it...When respected, IPRs restrict circulation to certain regions and marginalize the rest. They are an obstacle in the way of satisfying the desire to become worldly among the people that they regulate (Sezneva, 2014:2238).

In this context, a neoliberal capitalism commodifies what has already emerged, while having on a case-by-case basis to restrict access to commodities. Cosmopolitanism through such hactivist piracy transforms liberal culture into a universal commodified pluralism accessible to everyone. By the same token, that it attacks profit, it also establishes certain cultural options manifested in products tied to a global culture.

Sezneva borrows Nyer’s ‘abject cosmopolitanism’. Nyer’s term ‘abject’ collides with reflexive sociology’s notion of reflexive subjectivity. Briefly, Nyer discusses a cosmopolitan ‘open borders’ outlook on the formulation of migration laws in order to suggest that such a cosmopolitan
outlook makes an essentially ‘apolitical’ claim, namely that the identity of the other is nobody (Erlman in Sezneva, 2014:2231).

By the same token, Sezneva suggests that piracy breaks the intellectual property social contract on the basis that cultural commodities should belong to everyone:

Intellectual property enforcement operates by activating a specific social imaginary in which creators, producers and their audiences are reciprocally bounded and form a common semantic universe. It positions this particular form of boundedness as normative and universal. Piracy, in this context, emerges as a countermovement that threatens to destroy this universe, and is increasingly constituted by anti-piracy activism as ‘abject’ (Sezneva, 2014:2238).

In other words, there is no other. Since, the subjectivity of everyone is now a reflexive one, that subjectivity becomes ‘abject’.

In terms of the adaption of corporate practices in this sort of hactivist democratisation effort, statistics (e.g., views, clicks, sales) become important for the brand at the cultural level (i.e., life politics). People feel that their support of a certain brand is not only an issue of quality of life, need, or desire (i.e., biopolitics of self-care). Therefore, a certain brand ties itself to a certain sub-cultural paradigm obviously associated with a number of compatible sub-cultures, because the subject satisfies his need for representation through the brand. The consumption is an endorsement of certain values. Rose (see 2000:1402) explicitly connects life-style to commercialisation powered by various media and marketing strategies. Obviously, the fact that cultural values manifest as commodities (e.g., places, products, services) demonstrates the inescapable connection to capitalism, which further shapes a virtual informational economy that commercialises meta-needs (i.e., post-materialist needs) along with desires.

In contrast to the processes of de-anonymisation that one could trace in a Habermas’s affiliated deliberative democratic regulation (see Part II), the importance of statistics in the whole process suggests that the anonymity of the user or consumer can be maintained. Anonymity does not prevent consumption patterns from giving an account not only of wealth but of taste as political representation. Rose (1999) in his chapter ‘Numbers’, which is rather linked to the chapter ‘Control’, has also suggested more explicitly that statistics are not solely tied to the instrumentally rational operation of capitalism. Statistics are not used only to estimate factors such as birth rates, death rates, age and well-being; they are used to identify and measure the desires and life choices of the subject, connecting life-style trends with commercialism.

In doing so, life-style is also connected to employment. It is a struggle between career, consumption, and representation. ‘Third way politics’ recognise work as a provider of identity as also the responsibility of one to be productive. However, ‘third way politics’ do also emphasise the
limitations of work as a form of identity. Neoliberal meritocratic competition-building also attempts to give a level of significance to any form of employment that now increasingly has its own career pathway (i.e., modelling society as an enterprise; competition building). In a third way society, one cannot fully escape from such neoliberal rationales; thereby life-style preferences are tied to profession. The profession becomes a medium of such preferences. The profession provides the necessary consumerist power in order for taste or representation to be expressed. To the extent that one can choose his profession, profession itself becomes a life-style manifestation.

In this context, along the lines of this ‘fictitious’ critical engagement with the interaction between a certain rationale of governance and the social that derives from Foucault, I suggest that there is a new ‘slavery’ that demands happiness, happiness to be a part of this ethopolitical capitalism. The necessity for an urgency for competition remains, but it is re-appropriated by this driving energy that ‘must’ emerge when your job is or becomes your hobby. Emancipation is inherently governed. Within a highly competitive market, qualities such as ‘flexibility’, ‘communication skills’, and an ‘outgoing or positive personality’ supplement other technical skills and educational qualifications, thereby bringing competition and profession as a life-style together. It is a merging between the capitalist urgency and the enjoyment of life. Work now becomes the ‘master’ that demands you to be happy while you doing it. The more permanent the position is, the more the employers might expect one to treat their establishment as one’s communal hub. This expectation would make sense in an attempt to associate their brand to a certain type of life-style, since this association is linked with another, namely the association of happiness with productivity and positive attitude with skills for providing services.

Similarly, an argument can be made that entrepreneurship is equally driven by the will to forge communities and enjoy life-style options rather than being purely driven by a competitive drive for success. For example, a recent documentary examining online gaming, which is on the rise, suggested that this emerging industry is approached differently across the globe. Whereas in Japan competitive gaming has led to immense struggle for success for the sake of acquiring stardom and endorsements, in the UK there is the mentality of merely enjoying the activity while forging communal ties with other gamers. In other words, in Japan we see a rapid neoliberalisation of the life-style choice of gaming in terms of competition building. In the UK the attitude is that the gamer plays less competitively, as he is more concerned with forging a community. The financial benefits in the form of endorsements might come among, other opportunities, with successfully making one’s YouTube channel a ‘communal hub’.

The latter function also cultivates a care for transferable expertise which is in turn capitalised by sponsors on the basis that this expertise is absorbed by other individuals. For example, there are the kick starter campaigns or other life-style amateur YouTube channels whose content is based on providing some sort of tutorial or becoming the hub of a certain sub-culture.

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7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=of1k5AwiNxl
This interaction reflects again the merging of biopolitics with ethopolitics in a number of ventures of self-entrepreneurship that are associated with life-style preferences. Similarly, an argument can be made for strengthening celebrity culture. Celebrities in the era of twitter become more explicitly the new pastoral experts and/or the hubs of a cultural community. And, of course, such hubs are most notably commodified via marketing. Again, cultural representation and consumption come together under a new kind of individualism.

(3) As becomes evident from the above, there is a not-at-all innocent euphoric vitality emerging here. This euphoria characterises both the morality and the mixed economy of ‘third way politics’. In the previous chapter, I correlated this emergence to the discussion of ethics in regard to honour.

The initial aim of social democracy has been a Marxist atheist utopia that maintains the view that secular rationalism, if it gets rid of excessive greed, can lead to a socially constructed utopia. That utopia had, however, a modesty in its materialist expectations. In reflexive sociology, utopia becomes life-style obsessed.

The above has already been explored to some extent in the previous chapter in regard also to the ‘utopian realist’ premise. Having fully adapted the idea that nature is now a product of human choice at every possible level, including genetics, reflexive sociology’s utopian realism rather suggests that utopia is also a human choice. The realism derives from the fact that it is not possible to agree on what utopia is. However, reflexive sociology supplements that realism by suggesting that utopia is the ability to have the freedom to envision individually what you see fit.

This view is not postmodernist, however, because this envisioning cannot become a full-fledged reality that can encompass the social. It can only operate as life-style choice of a society that is once and for all reflexive. This reflexive society leads back to the critique that reflexivity becomes a form of subjectivity. The existence of communities goes hand in hand with respecting the existence of other similar communities and abiding to such rules that can allow one’s own community to exist.

In this context, the new human rights are now the rights of the subject to be reflexive (see Section 6.2.3). This type of secular humanism becomes now obsessed with the idea that what can solve almost anything is reflexivity supported by equality in economic opportunities, the democritisation of science and technology, the lack of discrimination, and—as a last resort—the provision of some welfare pillows for those who might for whatever reason fall behind.

Such aims lead to an eternal self-renewed utopia. That utopia is carefully structured in this self-renewed sense in order to avoid being correlated with ‘end of history’ type of narrowed arguments. The latter are tied to a fixed perception of liberal democracy in relation to the state-centric international as utopia. Reflexive sociology and its ethopolitics offer a rather ‘dangerous’ utopia that seems so loose in nature; so careful in its alignment with certain aspects of
instrumentally rational modernity, like the value of science and the irreversibility of capitalism; and so euphoric in its morality, that it can easily pass its agenda off as utopian when it is deeply realist.

Again, we cannot all agree on what utopia is, but at least a loose definition of the term should point towards something quite different from the existing, thereby to something that is difficult to grasp. Foucault’s ethos of critique on the basis of remaining in a constant struggle with power is a more likely utopian realism. It is utopian because there is a level of freedom that cannot be captured. It is realist because there is a set of actions that can make the struggle worthwhile. In other words, in Foucault there is an effort to escape from doctrinal affiliations while maintaining a structured way of living tied to an autonomous existence. In reflexive sociology, there is a reflexive interpretation of various doctrines that rather leads to a pulverisation of meaningfully different ways of living.

As such, reflexive sociology’s utopia is in a sense a euphoria. Such a euphoria controls vital aspects of self-emancipation, while ‘hedonistically’ emancipating others. In this secular humanism, life-style meets rational desires thereby creating this euphoric culture of self-indulgence. When neoliberal competition building does not prevail as such, the subject becomes obsessed with being successful or well-off just enough to pursue her life-style choices.

Giddens’s account of the ‘democratic family’ (see 1999:89-98) points towards this euphoric celebration of that kind of reflexivity that, by being a form of subjectivity it (i.e., reflexivity), can operate within traditional social roles. From gay marriages—and all the choices that the ‘sub-politics’ of medicine and genetics offer in terms of the exact structure that a family can take—to friendship-oriented social relationships, there is this immense quest to make everything work by providing an all-resolving moral reflexive outlook. The Platonic or Neoplatonic parrhesia is in full force.

Rose has summarised ethopolitics in regard to self-governance in the following way:

By ethopolitics I mean to characterize ways in which the ethos of human existence – the sentiments, moral nature or guiding beliefs of persons, groups, or institutions – have come to provide the ‘medium’ within which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government. In ethopolitics, life itself, as it is lived in its everyday manifestations, is the object of adjudication. If discipline individualizes and normalizes, and biopower collectivizes and socializes, ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-techniques by which human beings should judge themselves and act upon themselves better than they are (Rose, 2001:18).

In terms of morality Giddens has suggested the following:

The ‘me’ generation is a misleading description of the new individualism, which does signal a process of moral decay. Rather to the contrary, surveys show that younger
generations today are sensitized to a greater range of moral concerns than previous generations were. They do not, however, relate these values to traditional forms of authority as legislating on questions of lifestyle. Some such moral values are clearly post-materialist in Inglehart’s sense concerning for example ecological values, human rights or sexual freedom (1999:35-36).

In terms of community, he writes,

The theme of responsibility, or mutual obligation, was there in old-style social democracy, but was largely dormant, since it was submerged within the concept of collective provision. We have to find a new balance between individual and collective responsibilities today (1999: 37).

But, regardless of whether or not some sort of apathy associated with a ‘me’ culture is surpassed via ‘ethopolitics’, incidents of disorderly behavior can manifest in various aspects of pursuing this life-style entertainment. In contrast to Giddens’s suggestion (see 1999:86-89) that an embrace of the morality tied to the community brings harmonic social behavior, the opposite can be the case. An embrace of the life-style choices related to the notion of community does not at all times go hand in hand with a respect of the ‘physical’ community (e.g., city or neighbourhood) in which the activities of a life-style community take place. For every volunteer and community association who helps police the streets, there can also be a disorderly behaviour from euphoric engagement with life or the reflexive attitude towards authority that increasingly leads to several violations of rules of conduct.

I am not trying to play devil’s advocate from a conservative point of view here, in terms of moral demise, when my critique is of doctrinal morality in general. However, reflexive subjectivity might fails significantly in providing concrete patterns of behavior for those daily cases in which the thing to do is not obvious. One might try to find a way to escape previous forms of conservative morality, while running the risk of escaping morality altogether.

In other words, it is my belief that ethopolitical life-style engagement has replaced the value of taking care of the self in the sense of transcending the self with the value of pleasuring the self. It, thereby, still governs too much, given all these interventionist welfare rationales spreading from family to education to social responsibility, while failing to fulfill its own moral obligations. One cannot go as far as to connect euphoria to hedonism, because of this Neoplatonic morality tied to ‘technologies of the self’. However, something that is possibly neglected is that such a morality also has an inherent utilitarian undertone. The latter instils the notion to the subject that in order for a plurality of choices to exist, values such as solidarity and acceptance are functionally necessary. This functionality prevents forms of fundamentalist violence in relation to political struggles from manifesting, but its politicisation of life-style easily turns into a euphoric engagement with politics and life.
An example of seeing this function in the interaction between experts and laymen is that of taking pictures or filming events in those cases that the laymen meets the celebrity or expert. The contemporary technologically advanced ‘Smartphones’ along with the social media boom has led to this obsessive capitalisation of any event as a means to demonstrate or share a life-style experience. Autonomy as a life-style manifestation is powered by an inward direction of conduct. In this case, conduct would be whatever a celebrity or expert represents (sub-culture or knowledge). The euphoric inward direction is reflected in the action of having as a first priority taking pictures for the purpose of a vain cultivation of a certain image (i.e., identity by association) rather than merely being respectfully present in the moment.

By this token, the idea of an ascetic ‘calling’ related to the Foucaudian understanding of parrhesia is lost. This sort of self-care is again what drives my critique here. For, as noted before, the thesis does not subscribe to a postmodernist view: I do not critique ‘ethopolitics’ on the basis that it does not allow to radical cultures to manifest. In other words, I do not suggest that either everything is equally valid or nothing is valid. A religious doctrine can be an object of critique as much as reflexive sociology is; not because it hinders, when fundamentalist, a postmodernist pluralism, but because of the also non-emancipatory way that it understands the ethics of truth-telling or self-care.

To sum up, I have tried to indicate how the connection between narrow and broad politics functions in regard to this renewed social democracy tied to a reflexive subjectivity. I paid particular attention to crafting the term ‘utopia’ as one that can highlight the interaction between consumerism and a multicultural morality. By this token, I have connected processes of politicisation and depoliticisation with processes of reterritorialisation and deterриториisation.

### 6.2.3. Cosmopolitanism: Global governance and governmentality

Here, I focus on how Giddens’s politics can influence the reterritorialisation and deterриториisation processes with respect to more direct global governance concerns.

By the end of *The Third Way* Giddens briefly engages with a global governance discussion that, although it maintains this double functionality of politics, is more concerned with institutionalised forms of governance. I am not particularly concerned with putting forward an imperialist critique or defending a postmodernism pluralism here. I am concerned, however, with whatever cultural imperialist implications are posed by a cosmopolitan global governance, on the basis that the cosmopolitanisation of global governance inevitably means the imposition of a structural reality as a means to narrow reflexivity to a form of subjectivity.

Giddens, along with other cosmopolitans, take this reflexive subjectivity as the core of the human rights discourse, thereby defining sovereignty on the basis of whether such human rights are
fulfilled. The ‘human rights’ concept is important in terms of bringing nature and ethics or ethopolitics and biopolitics together.

Rose summarises interestingly this biopolitical or ethopolitical regime:

While many critics see the new biomedicine as individualizing, we can already see new forms of collectivization emerging...Individuals who identify themselves and their community through their biology challenge the vectors that lead from biological imperfection or abnormality to stigmatization and exclusion. They use their individual and collective lives, the evidence of their own existence and their vital humanity, as antagonistic forces to any attempt to re-assemble strategies of negative eugenics within a new exclusionary biopolitics. They demand civil and human rights for those whose lives, previously, were deemed less worthy of life. They call for recognition, respect, resources, research, control over medical and technical expertise (Rose, 2001:19).

By this token, cosmopolitan regulation aims to project these ethopolitical rights on those spaces that, if not regulated, initiate this ‘dark side’ of civil society (see before). Giddens, for example, discusses how the collapse of the bipolar world along with other globalising processes has led to the rise of depoliticised global spaces. The ‘New Wars’ thesis put forward by fellow cosmopolitan advocate Mary Kaldor (2012) is concerned with the instability that has emerged in third world states with the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalisation.

Moreover, such a concern is extended to relatively stable but authoritarian states, if an opportunity arises. For example, the recent Arab uprisings have been widely welcomed across Western academia as an ‘Arab Spring’, while the role of Western democratic activism has been particularly praised in regard to global civil society (see also previous chapter). By this token, cosmopolitan global governance includes a more institutionalised approach to global civil society as a conceptual umbrella of democratising movements and institutions.

In addition, if one draws from the ethopolitical operation of hactivism discussed above in relation to the democratising efforts of this new human rights regime, then one can observe serious and impactful efforts of cosmopolitanisation. Global populations become prone to accept cosmopolitan culture as they interact within the spaces of an ethopolitical global informational economy. As well, such tendencies are reinforced by the utilisation of hactivist platforms such as WikiLeaks. The hactivism of WikiLeaks can be quite organised, conservative, limited, and institutional in its nature, as other open governance and deliberative democratic practices have been (see Chapter 4). But WikiLeaks, in conjunction with social media, can also be viewed as a hactivist platform associated with cosmopolitan democratising movements.
Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, when reflecting on the role of WikiLeaks on the Arab uprisings at a notable public event⁸, argued that the release of those documents made the support of these regimes by Western governments difficult to maintain. Regardless of that, these governments do engage in such practices themselves. In this context, the interventions in Libya might, for example, reflect more the UN R2P (responsibility to protect) agenda rather than military and economic interests, as was more likely the case in Iraq. For the Western world this goes back to the Neoplatonic writings of St Augustine on ‘Just War’. Those ideas justify global governance and peacebuilding missions. In Held’s words, ‘Effective power is challenged by the principles of self-determination, democracy, and human rights as the proper basis of sovereignty’ (Held, 2003:164).

It is here that one can find the more radical and contested nature of ethopolitics. The democratisation movements and the structures that support them use again the moral and aesthetic cosmopolitan democratic culture in order to mobilise people when and where necessary. Therefore, even when there is the radicalism of protesting, this radicalism is one rooted in the internalisation of the culture of a therapeutic self-governance (i.e., autonomy), which is turn facilitated by a community of autonomous individuals. Activists, academics, cultural icons and cultural commodities are these experts who can transfer an internalising therapeutic value system.

What is more, Giddens (1999: Ch. 5) briefly discusses international institutions and the role of the EU. At the moment, such institutions remain highly monetarist and content with a state-centric international order. However, President Obama’s various foreign policy concerns constitute a more contemporary and, due the super power status of the US, more important example of ‘third way politics’ than that of Giddens’s focus on Blair’s new labour party.

The USA is, of course, far from being a cosmopolitan nation. Many of its policies reflect conservative hegemonic practices tied to neoliberal developmental incentives. One should not neglect the fact that the most notable hacktivists, including Assange, are at war with the militaristic practice of the US state. Moreover, Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States, along with events such as Brexit, might raise objections to globalisation. Is Trump’s election an example of this monstrous merging between neoliberalism and postmodernism tied to a post-truth political environment that falls within globalisation? Is it an example of a merging between conservativism and the postmodern within the context of counter-globalisation and neo-nationalisms which Kaldor, among others, has examined? Is it a yet another resurgence of what Giddens characterized as ‘compulsion’ (see 5.2.4)? Is it an isolated political event that has to do with the particularities of the electoral system etc.? Such recent events obviously exceed the scope of the thesis, while other elections such as the presidential elections of Austria (2016) and France (2017) send mixed signals.

⁸ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wq8IRZjjjXQ
All in all, anyone wanting to decode more recent events from a globalisation-counter-globalisation perspective would have to focus on what are the dominant problematisation, apparatus and techniques of governance. One can for example observe the ‘war’ that the media establishment has waged against Trump as also Obama’s attempts to oppose Trump through the coordination of various NGOs. One should also keep tracing the quick response of most of the major globalist corporate and civil society entities to Trump’s conservative agenda with respect to issues such as the environment, multiculturalism, immigration, gay rights etc.

At the same time, to the extent that the problematisation of how to govern the self has been in part ‘hijacked’ by public reason and reflexive subjectivity, the attempt of the population to deem conservative or neoliberal rhetorics as suddenly being anti-establishment and emancipatory might as well be an exercising of reflexive subjectivity. Such exercising could be right on the edge between moving beyond the new pacts of control by means of going backwards to liberal pacts of security and/or forward towards the postmodern identity politics, and falling right back into a reflexive subjectivity that strives to identify emancipation in the opportunities that are available. It is the strength of the neogovernmental establishment after all that has led to the paradox of having various alternative ‘rebellious’ online media supporting Trump as an anti-establishment solution, which is the equivalent of the populism that one can find in the rise of fascism. In our times, these acts rather indicate spasmodic efforts to move beyond the way that the power games are frozen under the mode of control. Still, such efforts are rather far from achieving a genuine ‘problematisation’.

In this context, the impact of ethopolitics as a governmental strategy that has merged with neoliberalism in a number of notable Western countries has so far influenced their foreign policy in a measurable way. It has influenced it in regard to the notions of how global populations should be governed or should govern themselves. If one observes the US foreign policy under President Obama’s administration, one can identify a cosmopolitan discourse that has to some extent impacted serious policy-making. In connection with Assange’s statement above, one can suggest notable support of the Arab uprisings at the level of the state in the West. Such support led to ‘surprising’ moves such as the non-preservation of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, which held close ties to the US governance. By this, token, cosmopolitanism urges Western states to increasingly perceive human rights violations as an abolishment of the principle of sovereignty (see Held before).

At a more symbolic level, there is President Obama’s 2009 speech in Cairo that established the efforts for forging a new context for interaction between the US and the Muslim

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9 The tile of the speech was “A New Beginning” given on 4 June 2009 at Cairo University Egypt https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09.
world. The soft-power elements of the speech are evident. There is a multicultural approach manifested in the acknowledgment of the importance of the Arab civilisation mixed with subtle overlaps with liberalism and the Christian West. There is the reference in the monotheistic nature of Islam and the tribute to the Arab contributions in science. And, most importantly, it made the statement that the US does not want to dictate to other countries what to do, but there is set of values, human rights, that are intrinsic to all humans and which governance should reflect.

For example, President Obama stated,

I believe that America holds within her the truth that regardless of race, religion, or station in life, all of us share common aspirations—to live in peace and security; to get an education and to work with dignity; to love our families, our communities, and our God. These things we share. This is the hope of all humanity.

Additionally, he said,

‘I have come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles - principle of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.

In only a few lines we see the use of words such as ‘peace’, ‘security’, ‘work’, ‘education’, ‘dignity’, ‘humanity’, ‘tolerance’, ‘justice’ and ‘progress’, forging a capitalist but also moral universality.

Finally, President Obama explicitly connected international political concerns with environmental governance. In a recent interview\textsuperscript{10}, he suggested that conservatives will have to eventually adapt to the new reality that suggests that environmental change is not a choice. This statement can be linked to two of the points made by Giddens, discussed in Sub-Section 6.2.1.: One, ‘third way politics’, attempts to set an agenda that surpasses the right-left dichotomy, accepting that environmental change cannot be a choice of political orientation. Similarly, two, environmental action should be taken regardless of whether some people disagree on whether such risk is valid or not. The sites of veridiction of exercising a reflexive interpretation of expert knowledge are set. They are set in relation to the fact that environmentalism, as also human rights, constitutes a structural necessity for the function of the ethopolitical universe rather than an option open to reflexive evaluation.

I have focussed here on connecting a renewed social democratic or cosmopolitan universality tied to Giddens with the contemporary function of human rights and a global civil society. I have also made the same connection with notable US outlooks on global governance

\textsuperscript{10} https://news.vice.com/video/president-obama-speaks-with-vice-news
issues tied to peace, development and the environment, as reflected in some of President Obama’s speeches. Lastly, I addressed some recent political developments in connection to the cosmopolitan governmental technologies tied to the US. My aim has been to indicate the global dimensions of this renewed social democratic governance of Giddens and its current status within the context of a governmentality critique.
Conclusion to Chapter 6

In Chapter 6, how risk meets reflexivity has become more explicit. This connection points towards new governmental rationales. The concept of reflexive subjectivity as a ‘technology of the self’ re-appears within the context of a world-risk society. The understanding of the function of politics in conditions of reflexivity has been further crystallised. Finally, a cosmopolitan manifesto has been explored as the global third way account that Beck has provided. Beck’s ethics have been explicitly identified here as cosmopolitan ethics. These ethics, concerned with a global ‘polis’, function as a moral compass for navigating the demise of the state and structuring globalisation within a relative reterritorialisation context. The latter is linked with structures or technologies of domination.

Chapter 6 follows the connection between ‘third way politics’ and ‘life politics’, concerning itself with grasping the rationales and technologies of ‘third way politics’. ‘Third way politics’ are associated with the reinvention of social democracy that is in turn tied to a cosmopolitan global governance political agenda. ‘Third way politics’ are essentially powered by the double function of life politics as both narrow (institutions) and broad (social action). ‘Third way politics’ is in a sense the political program of ‘life politics’. The descriptive again meets the analytical. For if ‘life politics’ claim to have a descriptive value also, ‘third way politics’ as a merely analytical concept builds upon life politics as a both descriptive and analytical concept.

The critique is focussed on a governmental agenda with global implications powered by an interaction with capitalism and certain reflexive morals. A negative presentation of an overarching impact on ethical behaviour was put forward along the lines of moral restrictions, commodification of life-style and the cultivation of a euphoric vitalism. In this was, it was suggested that ‘third way politics’ fail in their aim to bring the descriptive and the analytical together as a means to produce freedom out of power. On the contrary, their exhaustive analysis hinders any attempt to grasp some kind of emancipation beyond ‘structures of domination’. By the same token, they also fail to merge autonomy with community and to overcome capitalism. By contrast, their morality takes on a euphoric character that manages to be both restrictive and negatively freeing in terms of its impact on ethics of self-care.

In terms of how the above are more explicitly linked with the ‘(neo)governmentality critique’ put forward in this thesis, it is suggested that third way politics do succeed in overcoming the left-right dichotomy by forging a new form of ‘governmentality’. This governmentality meets the neoliberal one in conditions of deterritorialisations or reflexivity. In this context, a new dispositif is forged that conveys this double function of politics as regulation via reflexive decentralised institutions (i.e., narrow politics as ‘structures of domination’) and the governability of the subject (i.e., broad politics as ‘technologies of the self/domination’). This account sums up my ‘(neo)governmentality critique’, bringing the body of this thesis to the end.
Conclusion

I have attempted to dwell on Foucault’s genealogical account of power, truth, and ethics in the West as a means of crystallising a certain philosophical trajectory tied to the Socrates that appears in Plato’s Phaedo and Laches, and the Cynics in contrast to a Neoplatonic trajectory tied to Plato’s ‘Alcibiades’.

In the introduction, I put forward an overview of Foucault’s life work, while focussing on the recent and current state of Foucauldian or governmentality studies in the Anglo-Saxon world. The latter was my first concern with respect to contemplating Foucault’s political use. Foucault offers a critical way of conduct with respect to power relations rather than a concrete theory of democratic emancipation. I backed up this premise by engaging in an outline of how ‘governmentality’ works within the power, truth and ethics axes of genealogy. In the process, I crystallised the direction that my contribution will take by suggesting how a governmentality operating within these three axes can be applied to contemporary theories of democratic emancipation in conditions of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. I then unfolded these premises that I set upfront by presenting a coherent account of the progression of Foucault’s work; the debates with respect to enlightenment; and the two ethical differentiations that derive from parrhesia.

In Part I, my aim was to set the ancient background of the West by focussing on Foucault’s discussion of parrhesia. In so doing, it became evident that in his discussion of antiquity Foucault was concerned with power relations from the point of view of truth-telling and ethics. This discussion is progressively linked with his account of the processes that led to a massive shift in the way that power was exercised in the form of instrumental rationality. Although a genealogical analysis of instrumental rationality could take into account more explicitly the interaction between power, truth and ethics, it is the particular focus on producing ‘structures of domination’ as a means to govern the freedom of people that led Foucault to initially focus mainly on the issue of power. However, by bringing together the ancient background of the West and Foucault’s account of instrumental rationality in conditions of high modernity, I have suggested that it is possible to give a better account of how the freedom of people is governed in the present. In this context, a governmentality account of contemporary power relations emerges through a genealogical analysis that utilises all three axes (i.e., power, truth, and ethics).

In Part II, I focussed specifically on Foucault’s engagement with the question of ‘what is enlightenment?’ tied to the issue of how modernity should or could be envisioned with respect to the Foucault-contra-Habermas debate. I presented a critical analysis of Habermas’s use of language by pointing to links with the transcendentalism that appears in the ‘Alcibiades’ parrhesia and the negative universality of creating projects of man that derives from Habermas’s envisioning of enlightenment. By extrapolating on Owen’s and Osborne’s accounts of the problems in Habermas’s
theory, also tied to a Foucauldian analysis, I attempted to further highlight the difference between a ‘legislation in thinking’ and an ‘orientation in thinking’. Philosophy acts as constituted knowledge tied to a legislation in thinking rather than as an attitude and test tied to an orientation in thinking. Such a difference is directly connected with the difference between ‘games of knowledge’ and ‘games of truth’, and ‘technologies of the self’ and ‘technologies of living’.

I subsequently focussed on existing manifestations of deliberative democratic politics tied to a Habermasean account of democratic emancipation. I did not claim either that the cases discussed are necessarily a clear manifestation of Habermasean politics or that my attempt to extract from them a ‘governmentality’ tied to a ‘legislation in thinking’ has a positivist value. Simply, as noted in the introduction, ‘governmentality’ tied to genealogy is a potentially fictitious analysis that starts from building critical concepts and continues with tracing their manifestation at the level of their operative value (see ‘field-work philosophy’, a conceptual engagement with reality as a ‘will to life’, and ‘social theory as a hub of critique’ in the introduction.)

In Part III I aimed to enrich the existing critical discussion of cosmopolitan politics driven by accounts of reflexivity. My main aim was to make explicit the methodological differences between Foucault and the reflexive sociology of Beck and Giddens. Instead of accepting that the whole debate of power and freedom with respect to emancipation actually operates at the level of a philosophical contemplation, I indicated that there is here a blurred relationship between the descriptive and the analytical. Foucault has tied such a philosophical contemplation to genealogy as a potentially fictitious attempt to unmask the relationship between power, truth and ethics. However, I suggested that both Beck and Giddens attempt to argue that massive changes have taken place in terms of how power and freedom are produced with respect to ‘risk’. These changes are further carried forward descriptively through the same analytical concepts (i.e., reflexivity tied to ‘sub-politics’ and ‘life politics’) that aim to link these changes with desirable emancipation. Hence, instead of a genuine attempt to unmask power relations, we have a certain depiction of power relations that leads to a deceptive positive outlook on possibilities for achieving and/or structuring emancipation.

Beck’s ‘sub-politics’ lead to a decentralised mode of power in which the reflexive subjects can interpret freely that kind of expert knowledge that they wish to internalise. A governmentality critique can be applied here, for Beck is concerned with subjectivity, expertise, and internalisation within a fixed reflexive liberal democratic paradigm (i.e., ‘games of knowledge’) consisting of ‘structures/technologies of domination’ (i.e., the sub-political sphere) and ‘technologies of the self’ (i.e., internalisation of knowledge).

The same applies to Giddens’s ‘life politics’. ‘Life politics’ is a more developed concept inherently designed to acknowledge a liberal instrumentally rational dispositif and to interact with it in order to decentralise it. I have focussed on indicating the governmentality behind the politics of life-style tied to crisscross cultural communities. In the process, I have drawn on Rose’s critique
of ‘ethopolitics’ and his account of the pastoral relations of expertise. I have also focussed on the notion of therapeutics with respect to Osborne’s account of a ‘therapeutic enlightenment’. The overall argument was that there is the emergence of a euphoric culture that attempts to heal the individual by accommodating him to various aesthetic and cultural communities.

Having established my critique of the foundations of reflexive sociology, I focussed next on tracing governmental rationales at the level of political manifestos (see Beck and the cosmopolitan manifesto and Giddens and third way politics). More specifically, by putting again into action a governmentality critique at the level of the operating value of certain rationales, I focussed on the connection between ‘third way politics’ tied to ‘life politics’ and issues such as the ongoing structuring of cyberspace, entertainment, work ethics, the human rights regime and the environment. My aim was to crystallise how neoliberal rationales blend with this renewed social democracy at the level of manifesting political agendas and social trends in a manner that re-appropriates ‘structures and technologies of domination’.

All things considered, there is an ongoing struggle between processes of deterritorialsation and reterritorialisation, and, one should never claim ‘end of history’ type of arguments with respect to the type of governmentality exercised. As noted in the introduction, a historian who is a genealogist should always expect new analyses that will supersede her own. Her contribution derives from this very acknowledgment that is necessary if a novel account is to be put forward in the first place. More so, as established, this use of genealogy becomes a type philosophy tied to transgression in which case its ‘fictions’ are attempts to raise suspicion in order to move beyond it.

At the same time, this thesis has not claimed that neogovernmentality alone can give an account of the present. One shall expect neither centre-left parties to monopolize power globally nor neogovernmental technologies to be the only traceable ones. My focus has been the function of neogovernmentality. In parallel, I have focused on the interaction between a neoliberal governmentality and a neogovernmentality in conditions of deterritorialization/reterritorialisation under the mode of ‘control’. Other than the possible exploration of new forms of governmentality this thesis leaves open the possibility of tracing neoliberal governmental practises, while it points towards how neoliberal governmentality overlaps with neogovernmentality with respect to concerns of governing the self and others in the present.

To sum up, the thesis has attempted to reinforce Foucault’s status as an ethical philosopher. The two main questions of the thesis have been where Foucault was going with his research in his final lectures and what a certain understanding of his later work tells us about the attempts of others to outline or move beyond ‘structures of domination’. In this context, I have further crystallised a Foucauldian ethos and how it is connected to a governmentality critique. Having done so, it has been possible to add to existing applications of such a critique with respect to certain theories of democratic emancipation.
All in all, Foucault is certainly a philosopher open to interpretation. Foucault, himself, put forward this use of hermeneutics tied to genealogy which attempts to re-imagine what certain texts could tell us about the ethos of a person and the power relations of the era that she lived as a means to rethink the present. Therefore, I certainly understand that leaving aside certain clearly arbitrary uses of Foucault that have not focussed on how he evolved and rearranged his own research, there are grey areas between radical theories of democracy and Foucault with respect to issues of autonomy and the public sphere.

Therefore, having recognised this issue of interpretation, my future aim is to continue writing towards highlighting Foucault’s ethics in particular with respect to parrhesia in comparison with other interpretations of Foucault. At the same time, I aim to use my account of ‘neogovernmentality’, supported by Foucault’s ethics, in order to continue monitoring how ‘structures of domination’ and ‘technologies of the self’ operate within the deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation processes that are taking place. The overall promise is to contribute to re-establishing philosophy as a critical way of conduct concerned with how one should live or social theory as an academic hub of critique.
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