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"The Candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others".
ABSTRACT

The education policy development in the Sudan should be understood within the context of Islamic general policy orientation and the specific goals and aims of education as perceived by the national policy-makers in the Central Government. The policy orientation has been in line with how the Islamic leaders in the country defined Sudanese society. The framework of educational policies showed a consistent trend towards the building of an Arab-Islamic society. The government's determination to uphold this trend was showed by the persistent policy of centralisation of education policy development. There was in all of this a lack of political will on the part of the central government to meet the real educational needs of the South Sudan.

For practical and security reasons as well as for the fact that the Sudan Government censors research on policy issues it was not feasible to carry out the investigation in the Sudan. The researcher however was motivated and influenced by the availability of resource persons and the convenience of carrying out the empirical work within the UK.

The study puts into proper perspective the impact of the educational policies on educational development in the South Sudan which, to some extent, was compounded by the lack of unity among the southern politicians. The research has filled in some of the gaps in the existing knowledge about education in the South Sudan. It provides a vital insight upon which future action regarding the direction for educational development in the South Sudan could unfold.

B.K. Beninyo.
DEDICATION

TO

MY FAMILY

My wife Betty Koyaki Katoro who was the engine driving me through the difficult moment of our time. She gave me the initial push to take up this research programme and continued to stir me throughout the three years. It would have not been possible for me to reach this stage without her presence and the presence of the children. Despite her heavy work load as a student and the Lady of the house she properly looked after us.

My two elder boys, George Katoro and Joel Katoro, who are in the refugees camp in Uganda have been particularly inspiring to me. Despite the hardship they are facing in the refugees camp, they continuously encouraged me not to breakdown because of the state of their hardship they are going through but to get on with the programme. Their letters kept my nerves down. May this piece of work inspire them in their studies.
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CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis presents an examination of educational policy development in the Sudan especially as it relates to the southern part of that country. In an ideal world educational policy-making would be a process whereby the various pressures for educational change are translated into formal government expression. This normally presupposes an understanding of the educational needs of different parts of a country and a close examination of the means available to the relevant authorities to meet those needs.

However in a country like the Sudan, which has been afflicted by severe inter-ethnic rivalries and distrust and where peculiar difficulties bedevil the relationship between its northern and southern regions, such policy making is not easily done. Moreover the political situation of recent years has seriously limited the examination and publication of educational policy in the southern Sudan. This thesis is therefore intended to bridge a gap in public understanding particularly concerning the connection between the educational situation which has recently existed in the Southern Sudan and the actions of all the parties concerned with educational policy: the politicians and officials of the Khartoum and Southern governments and those implementation agents who have had the task of interpreting policy and actualizing its expectations.
The main burden of this thesis is that the central government in the Sudan has been influenced in its policy making not by the realities of the educational situation in different parts of the country but by its own ideological and constraining political agenda. This political stance has overridden the serious environmental, cultural and other factors which delineate different sections of this large and various country. However in the case of the Southern Sudan an additional reason for the failure of realistic educational development appears to lie with the Southern Sudanese politicians who have neglected to assert that limited autonomy which, at least for a time, was their prerogative and have been drawn by self-interest into supporting the pan-Sudanese agenda determined by Khartoum. This thesis is not however wholly backward-looking, for it does present some lessons for the future if an educational policy which leads to some genuine development in the Southern Sudan is going to become a reality.

So this thesis attempts to assess the context of the educational policy development in the country with particular reference to the impact and implications of the policies on the development of education in the Southern Sudan. The lack of information regarding the realities of educational development in the Southern Sudan made this subject area of sufficient importance to warrant investigation at this opportune moment. Taking into consideration the nature of policy development in the Sudan and the sensitivity of this particular policy area chosen for investigation the researcher feels that this is a suitable time to carry out the research. Ideally empirical research should have taken place within the Sudan where a broad spectrum of witnesses, well placed in educational policy-making
positions and other section of the population who have some relation to issues of educational policies, would have been interviewed. The current political situation in the Sudan and the rigid educational policy direction pursued by the Sudan government, which does not allow for other alternative educational policy options, made it practically difficult for the researcher to carry out the empirical research within the Sudan. As a result it has been rather difficult for the researcher to employ the most ideal methods of investigating this policy area. The choice of the research method was therefore influenced by the complex political environment within the country and the environment in which the individual interviewees, chosen for the interviews, were placed. More elaborate explanation of the methodology is provided in chapter two of this thesis.

One of the reasons for doing this research is to define the policy problems faced by decision makers and their agents. It is intended to develop awareness and understanding of Sudanese educational policies and define the actual constraints with particular relation to educational development in the Southern Sudan so as to provide a basis for the future educational development, hopefully when the present war in the country comes to an end. The research therefore focuses mainly on various educational policy areas and their implementation problems. It also analysis why the autonomous Southern Sudan Regional Government was ineffective in the developing suitable and relevant educational policies for the Southern Sudan.
The contents of this thesis include a general description of historical, political and religious development in the Sudan which, to a large extent, influenced the later policy development in the country. The chapters that follow the introduction relate to specific educational policy areas - Universal Primary Education in the Sudan; Curriculum Policies; Policies on Teachers; Language Policies; Higher Education Policies; The Regional Government and Decentralization Policy of Education; and the National Education Policies.

The following sections of this introduction focus on the racial and ethnic characteristics of the people of the Sudan; its colonial and missionary history and the independence period from 1956 to 1969. This background is important because it set into proper context the understanding of the political and educational development in the contemporary Sudan.

1.1 RACIAL AND ETHNIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE OF SUDAN

One of the most striking characteristics of the Sudan is the diversity of its peoples. It is a country of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious conglomeration. It makes it a microcosm of the black continent; a factor that made the achievement of unity among the various groups difficult (1). This fact led to the experiences of the political, social and educational turmoil during both the colonial and post colonial periods. The Sudanese are divided among 19 major ethnic groups and about 597 subgroups and speak more than 100 languages and dialects (2). The total population of the country is broadly divided into two
groups based on historical, racial, linguistic and cultural origins. The northern Sudanese are identified broadly as Arabs and the southern Sudanese as Africans. The major ethnic composition of the Sudan is shown in appendix 8.

1.1.1 THE NORTHERN SUDANESE.

The dividing line between the north and the southern Sudan is at 12 degrees latitude. The northern Sudan is an example of a region where an immigrant race has gained cultural and political domination over a less well-organized indigenous population. The longest established inhabitants of the northern Sudan fall into two groups:

The first were the Negro Groups. These are now represented by some of the various Nuba tribes who live in the Nuba Mountains; the inhabitants of the Ingessana hills and the Fur of Darfur. The Fur are sedentary agriculturists who live in or near the Marra Mountains (Jebel Marra). These tribes are related to the Negro population of West Africa e.g. the Kanuri and the Hausa of Nigeria. (3)

The second group represents the people referred to by Barbour as the brown race. These are represented by the Red Sea Hills Beja tribes. They bear the physical similarities to certain of the tribes of south Arabia but whether they are originally of the African or Asiatic origin is not known. They occupied their present territory for at least the last 5000 years (4). Although the Beja are Muslims or adopted Muslims, they retained their Bedawiye language which belongs to the Cushitic branch of the Hamito Semitic language.
family. The Nubians who are occupying the area between Khartoum and Upper Egypt are also primarily representatives of the brown race (5).

The question “what is an Arab?” is particularly complex in the Sudan. According to the definition by Clovis Maqsud “an Arab is one whose destiny is either by force of circumstances or intentionally, bound to Arab World as a whole. Whoever is descended from Kurdish, Negro or Armenian stock but has inhabited an Arab country becomes an Arab by force of circumstances and by reason of the free association of his destiny with that of the Arab World” (6). In the Sudan many of the 39% who claim to be Arabs today are really Arabised Nubiyan, who have over the last four or so centuries adapted Arabic language, culture and Islam. As explained by John Markakis however, once a community becomes Arab in self-concept, it is important for it to secure status within the Arab framework by devising a genealogical pedigree more impressive than mere Arabisation (7).

Biologically the Arabs who immigrated into the Sudan were mainly assimilated by the indigenous people, but their language, religion and to a large extent their tribal structure were superimposed throughout the area (8). No mention is made in any manuscript of Arab immigration to the Sudan prior to the foundation of Islam. The reason is obviously the lack of interest felt for any ancestor who left Arabia in the pagan “days of ignorance” (9). The desire of all was to display their fathers as pillars of the true faith. According to
the general impression given by H. A. McMichael there were four tides of Arab immigration into the Sudan:

1. The first flowed through Egypt in the 7th and 8th centuries and was a natural sequel of the conquest of the country. These are divided into two main groups according to their genealogies:
   
   (a) the Jaliyin and Danagla group who are descended from the Ismailite tribes of northern Arabia.
   
   (b) The Guhayana group whose ancestors included Kahlan and Himyar and who originally came from Southern Arabia and Yemen.

2. The second immigration took place in the 8th century across the Red Sea by way of Abyssinia as a result of the overthrow of the Ommayyads and the ‘Abbasids’ and eventually resulted in the foundation of the Arab-Fung hegemony in the Gezira.

3. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the conquest of the Mamluk Sultans that broke down the barrier which had been for so long presented by the Christian Kingdom of Dongola opened the way for the third wave of fresh inflow of Arabs into the Sudan. To this period belongs the great Guhayna movement.

4. The fourth great immigration followed the foundation of the Fung Kingdom and the conquest of Egypt by Selim I. No mention is made of any intensive tribal movement into the Sudan occurring later than the first half of the 17th century.

Arabisation and Islamisation of the northern Sudan was completed by the early 15th century, as the Arab newcomers married local women, including the daughters of the
traditional rulers. This helped solidify their hold since inheritance in the local tribes traditionally passed through the females, although this custom soon changed to accommodate the Arab practice of inheritance through the male line. At the same time the conversion of the native people into Islam had often established between them and the Arabs a potent link of spiritual brotherhood (10).

From the 16th century to the 19th century a semblance of political unity was given to the northern Sudan by the supremacy of the Fung Kingdom of Sennar. In the 17th century this Kingdom extended from the third cataract to the Abyssinia highland and from the Red Sea to Darfur. The northern Sudan was thus held together by the Arabic language, the Muslim faith and a sense of sharing in the Arab heritage (11). Whatever schisms exist between the educated and the illiterate, almost all the northern Sudanese are agreed on the acceptance of the Arab heritage, and of the Islamic faith and way of life that go with it. Nor is there any significant demand among those whose mother tongue is not Arabic, whether Beja, Nubian or Fur that their languages be adopted in place of Arabic for administrative, educational or general use (12).

A demand for education arose because of the spread of Islam, the settlement of the Arab tribes and the rise of the Muslim Kingdoms. Unlike the southern Sudan, the northern Sudanese have been in contact with the sources of Muslim education in the north and east and had a developed political system. They were relatively easier to reach than the other regions of the Sudan. Religious education, being a basic requirement of all Muslim
societies demanded a knowledge of the Koran and consequently an ability to read and write in order to “inculcate and strengthen the faith”. As a result of these factors they were able to establish and develop an educational system suitable to their needs (13).

In the north the British colonial administration, which commenced its control of the territory in 1898, had therefore begun with a sound working knowledge of the structure and dynamics of Muslim Sudanese society. It had conciliated a wide range of notables and religious leaders. The notables were encouraged, within the limits of deference and ‘loyalty’ to speak their minds in a way which produced a useful and diversified feed-backs of Sudanese opinion. In response to this opinion, the colonial government sometimes undertook major revisions of policy. By 1918, the northern Sudanese notables were prosperous and secure; their views were treated with deference and had a visible influence upon policy making (14).

1.1.2 THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE

The people of the southern Sudan are characterized by their ethnic and linguistic diversity. The inhabitants consist of members of many Negroid tribes, speaking many languages and professing many beliefs (15). According to anthropologists there are altogether 572 tribes and sub-tribes in the southern Sudan under three broad headings: Nilotic, Nilo-Hamites and Sudanic (16). They have little unity among themselves and virtually no affinity with
the north (17). Of the three, the Nilotic traditions contain no reference to migration from outside the Sudan. Their way of life is generally so minutely adapted to their present environment that it seems likely that they have occupied the same region for a very long time (18).

There are three major Nilotic-speaking peoples in the southern Sudan - the Dinka, the Nuer and the Shilluk. These three groups form a very large, compact and sharply demarcated group which in 1956 included 56% of the total southern population (19). All the Nilotics are conspicuous for their absorbing interest in cattle, which enter widely into their customs and traditions. Some observers have pointed out that “it is not easy for anybody unacquainted with the Nilotics to realize the overwhelmingly important part that the cattle play in their lives”. Almost their only possession, cattle have a prominent role in economic, social, religious and aesthetic life, “and to their acquisition almost everything is sacrificed”. Local kinship groups were centred round the activities of a cattle camp and the society was organized in a series of small, mutually opposed segments, which occasionally combined for a cattle raid but whose tribal life was normally “a kind of ordered anarchy in which every section plays the game of feud according to the rules” (20). The economic self-sufficiency and independence arising from this pervasive pastoral emphasis did not predispose them to cooperate readily with foreigners (21). Temperamentally the Nilotics are by far the most introvert of the people of the Sudan, desiring nothing from the foreigner except to be left alone, and when this is not granted showing determined opposition and only yielding with extreme slowness to the
overwhelming pressure brought to bear on them by the government and the missionary (22).

The Hamitic speakers are generally considered to have spread outwards from the Ethiopian highlands and the horn of Africa. Other traditions say that these tribes seem at one time to have come from the mountainous area that lies along the Sudan-Uganda border east of the Nile river (23). Within this group are the Bari, Mundari, Nyagbara, Pajulu, Kakwa, Lokoya, Lolubo and the Latuho. This group as a whole is distinguished by their cultural features which include the great importance attached to rain-making, and existence of rain chiefs. This made the political task of creating a sense of tribal, regional or national patriotism very difficult (24).

Some of the Sudanic-speaking Negroes are very long established, but others have been entering Sudan in successive waves from the south-west over a considerable period. Apart from the large Azande tribes they have been little studied by anthropologists. Though speaking loosely related languages they possess little unity among themselves. This group falls into four main classes:(25)

(a) The Azande

(b) The Ndogo-Sere group.

(c) The Moru-Madi group.

(d) The Bongo-Baka group.
It was not only the great number and the extreme variation of scale of the southern languages and politics which made the south Sudan a difficult field for educational experiment, the south also represented an extreme diversity of its modes of political and socio-economic organization (26). For example:

1. The Azande were organized politically as severely despotic and ruthlessly competitive military principalities. The Azande principalities, with perhaps closest analogies to the Baganda, developed a highly centralized system of provincial government and a fairly elaborate military and administrative organization at the court of each Zande prince (27). Absolute authority lay with the only aristocratic clan, the Avongara clan, from where the princes were derived. The Avongara clan recognized rigid distinctions between chiefs and the commoners. Political, economic and social status depended exclusively on birth, but the politically superior group, the Avongara, had to maintain their position by organized political and military means (28).

2. The Nilotic Shilluk were held together by the “divine kinship” of their King (Reth). There were no tribal divisions among the Shilluk. Anthropologists emphasized that the Reth’s function in the Shilluk society was religious and ritual rather than political and administrative and that the Shilluk shared with the other Nilotic peoples a tendency to divide into mutually opposed segmentary sections (29). Power among the tribe stemmed from wealth and strength of personality. The
Shilluk King actively resented the mission as a rival source of authority i.e. a threat to ritual and religious status (30).

3. The Nuer are, on other hand, what L.S.M. Sanderson and G.N. Sanderson called 'acephalous' people. They had no chiefs and no specifically political structure of any kind. The Nuer institutions are the most extreme and clearest example of the absence or extreme fragmentation and weakness of political authority (31).

4. Among the Bari, political influence was divided largely according to the accidents of personal prestige, village chiefs and clan heads. Among the other tribes of Eastern Equatoria e.g. the Latuho, rain makers seemed to have been the most influential individuals; but these ritual experts were not the kind of 'chiefs' that the colonial government could easily use as administrative subordinates (32).

The societies of the southern Sudan as narrated demonstrated extreme cultural isolation before they were opened up from 1840 onward. The Nilotic people in particular have been throughout their recorded history, very resistant to external influence of any kind, whether Arab or European, Muslim or Christian. Until the second half of the 19th century most of the peoples of the southern Sudan had never been in contact with any major civilization (33). Therefore no forces making for unity counteracted their multiple diversity. The Nilotics, with their inflexible way of life, bound up with their cattle complex, were notoriously conservative in their modes of thought and behaviour, which made them hard to 'develop' (34). They had a highly ascriptive social system. The opportunities offered by missionaries were attractive, possibly, to social misfits, which were quite rare in the society. The Nilo-Hamites e.g. the Bari and Latuho, were less accessible and almost
equally specialized in their modes of life. Their economic organization did not cater for alternative ways of life. A child in school was a loss to his family (35).

The unsettled history resulted in large numbers of small tribal or kinship groups within the Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and Sudanic peoples. The conditions varied considerably and nowhere were the tribes united and prepared to confront any forces from outside on equal terms (36). Such a situation could not form a proper base for western educational system to take off easily.

Appendix 8 shows the ethnic composition of the people of the Sudan.

1.2. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION AND MISSIONARY EDUCATION: A PERIOD OF CONFUSION AND CONTRADICTION.

1.2.1. British Colonial Administration in the Sudan:

The background to the British intervention and eventual occupation of the Sudan is connected with the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 which set into motion the scramble for the partition of Africa. Before the British occupation of Egypt the Sudan was from 1820 to 1881 under the control of Egypt. The Egyptians invaded the Sudan in 1820 and installed an Egyptian governor at Khartoum. The main objective of this exercise was
to gain control of the White Nile slave trade and to ensure a regular supply of Negro slave recruits for the Egyptian army. Slave raiding was thus an official function of government and during the next 30 years a series of expeditions ravaged the country southwards of Khartoum between the Blue and White Nile, the homelands of the Dinka, the Nuer, the Shilluk and the Bari. As early as 1839 an Egyptian military post was planted at Gondokoro, close to where the White Nile cuts the modern frontier between Uganda and the Sudan (37). Appendix 9 which shows northern Africa on the eve of partition clearly indicates the extent of the area under the Egyptian control of the Sudan before the partition. The Egyptian drive to the south petered out some four years before the revolution of the Mahdi in 1881 put an end to Egyptian administration in the Sudan as a whole (38). The boundary of the Mahdist Sudan almost represented the boundary of the modern Sudan (Appendix 10).

British occupation of the Sudan in 1898 had important security and strategic significance in the British position in Egypt. There seemed to have been no fresh social or economic impulses for British imperial expansion in the interior of Africa. Tropical Africa was looked at as a third rate adjunct of the British economy, which was worth the extension of coastal influence, but did not justify the effort of administration inland (39). The British invasion of Egypt in 1882 shattered the general Anglo-French collaboration based on the old coast arrangements for territorial self-denial which had a significant effect on the European balance. After the occupation of Egypt, it seemed to French observers that Britain was driving for African empire. French diplomacy was therefore focused on
putting pressure on the British in Egypt. The occupation of Egypt also gave Bismarck the chance to deepen the rift between Britain and France and to enter the "African game" (40). This development thus set off the scramble for Africa.

Lord Salisbury, who as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary handled the British side of the partition during the decisive years from 1886-1892, built the whole of his African policy around the retention of Egypt (41). Throughout the partition the over-riding concern of the policy-makers in Britain was to claim those regions of the continent which seemed vital for the security of the Mediterranean and therefore in the world (42). For the French the British occupation of Egypt was felt as an intolerable affront to French national self-respect and so the Nile project enjoyed support far outside the ranks of convinced colonialists once its connection with Egypt had been clearly established (43). Salisbury had decided in 1889 that the European powers must be kept out of the Nile Valley for the security of Egypt and the British position in that country. The Nile was therefore essential to Salisbury's overall imperial strategy (44). By 1898 Britain had endowed with strongly acquisitive overtones a Sudan policy which had in the later 1880s been gradually and rather reluctantly initiated as a purely defensive strategy to protect the Nile waters and so to safeguard the British position in Egypt (45). The Southern Sudan, except for its contribution to the Nile waters, was seen as "useless territory". The main priority for the British policy-makers was the urgent need to defend its frontiers against other European powers but only exceptionally any need to 'waste' precious funds on the administration of its 'savage' inhabitants (46).
The great confrontation between French and British imperialism which eventually determined complete British control of the whole Sudan was the struggle for the control of Fashoda in Southern Sudan. This came to be known as Fashoda crisis. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher regarded Fashoda as the logical conclusion of the strategic necessity of the Egyptian policy assiduously practiced for over a decade by the men who controlled foreign affairs in Britain (47). During the Fashoda crisis all the leaders of the political parties in Britain came out openly in favour of the Nile Valley strategy. In a speech on 12 October 1898, Rosebury warned the French not to make a mistake “which can only lead to a disastrous conflagration”; the next day Asquith spoke in the same sense; on 28 October Harcourt spoke of the need for national unity; while Campbell-Bannerman said on 24 November that “we ranged ourselves as one man in terminating to resist the aggression” (48).

The Sudan’s southern international frontier was finally settled in 1906. In 1907 and indeed for nearly two decades thereafter, ‘administration’ in much of the southern Sudan was still virtually synonymous with military operations. The peculiarities of southern administration in this period did not reflect any long-term plan to separate the southern from the northern Sudan. They reflected rather the almost complete dereliction by Khartoum of its administrative responsibilities in the south, and its refusal to provide resources for anything but punishment. It greatly used fire and the sword as a cheap substitute for administration (49).
This historical background, to a very large extent explains the reluctance by the British colonial administration to get much involved in the later development, particularly in the Southern Sudan.

1.2.2. The advent of the Christian Missionaries in the Sudan:

Christian missionaries had quite a different motive from the British occupiers for entering the Sudan. Of the missions which were anxious to enter the Sudan in 1898, the Anglican Church Missionary Society was the first established. According to the Sandersons, the policy and strategy were often determined, not by financial constraints nor even by the experience of those responsible for day-to-day administration, but by "prompting of the Spirit" at meeting of the General Committee (50). For the Society, in 1898 and at least a decade thereafter, the overwhelming priority in the Sudan was the conversion of Muslims, not of Southern 'pagans' (51). This priority indeed reflected the overall policy of the missionaries in the late nineteenth century and twentieth century. The claim of Islam to be a final and perfect revelation which superseded Christianity was seen as an inescapable challenge. Nowhere was the 'rebuke of Islam' felt more sharply than in the Sudan, where the fate of Gordon in January 1885 was seen as the sacrificial death of a Christian martyr - a martyrdom to which Christians should respond. This was the background to the foundation, at a meeting called by the CMS at Exeter Hall shortly after Gordon’s death, of the Gordon Memorial Mission to the Sudan. It was clear from the founding resolution that
the principal centre of the mission was ultimately to be Khartoum and that the mission was
to be to “Arabs and Africans” in that order (52).

However the motive of the missionaries were frustrated by both Cromer and Kitchener
who did not want the Christian missionaries in the Sudan at all. Cromer regarded
Christian missionaries as at best almost useless and at worst a dangerous stimulant to
“Muslim fanaticism” (53). On 4 January 1899 Cromer publicly assured the Muslim
notables of Omdurman that the government would respect Islam and would not interfere
with it in any way. It would, he believe, be unfortunate if this declaration was to be
immediately followed by the advent of Christian missionaries, especially missionaries
whose proclaimed objective was to convert Muslims. Cromer feared that “Muslim minds”
might fail to distinguish between the missionaries and the administration (54).

When permission was granted on 11 October 1898 to the CMS it was with the warning
that no missionary activity could be permitted in the Muslim north but the CMS could
begin their work in the Fashoda region in the Southern Sudan, where there was already a
garrison. The CMS for a long time argued against establishing their mission in the
southern Sudan. It was not until January 1899 when the first CMS mission station was
opened in Fashoda. Fashoda was regarded as the Siberia of Sudan. A report in The Time
of 14 April 1900 that Fashoda was regarded as “the Siberia of the Sudan” was carefully
noted at the CMS headquarters (55).
Catholics had however superceded the British in the Sudan. After the collapse of the Jesuit and Franciscan Missions on the Upper Nile in the early 1860s, the mission to the Sudan had been revived by Daniele Comboni, who had worked on the White Nile in 1857-9. In 1867, after prolonged study, Comboni had founded a ‘Missionary Institute for Negroland’ at Verona; in 1871 he resumed work in the Sudan, but in southern Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains rather than in the deep and lethal South (56). In 1882-3, after Comboni’s death, the stations in the Nuba Mountains were overrun by the Mahdists and the missionaries were taken prisoners (57). Therefore Catholics because of their previous experience in the northern Sudan, in sharp contrast to the CMS, had established themselves in the southern Sudan with remarkable speed and efficiency. This success owed nothing to the Sudan government, which had at the outset been even less helpful to the Catholics than the CMS. The Catholics did not waste time and energy in campaigning against the restrictions on proselytisation in the northern Sudan (58). The first permission granted by the British colonial administration to the Catholics was to the Austrian Catholic Mission in May 1899, in principal to start work at Fashoda. The first Catholic mission was founded in February 1901 at Lul, just upstream of Fashoda.

Another mission that sought permission to work in the Sudan was the American United Presbyterian Mission. It was also granted permission, in principal, in October 1898 to work in the Fished region. Their early mission station was established at Doleib Hill, on the east bank of the White Nile just downstream of its confluence with the Sobat river (59).
Under Article VI of the Condominium Agreement of January 1899, the governor-general had powers to define by proclamation “the conditions under which Europeans of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with and reside in the Sudan or to hold property within its limits”. These powers were freely used to control the missions and their activities. As Sandersons have said the missions operated under the sword of Damocles (60).

1.2.3. The Development of Education during the Colonial Period:

Educational development in the Sudan in general and in the southern Sudan in particular had been shaped by the relationship between the colonial administration and the Missionaries. This relationship had, to extent, been influenced by the divergent objectives of the British colonial administration and those of the missionaries as well as the attitudes and modes of life of the indigenous population. Whatever reactions these three elements displayed during the colonial period can probably be attributed to the perception each one had about the situation at that time. Because of the varying perceptions each one had there appeared to have been created periods of confusions and contradictions especially in relation to development in the southern Sudan. The receptiveness of the Sudanese peoples to the western education could be therefore measured against that perception, the degree of contacts with the outside world previously and their nature of life. The different historical evolution between the north and southern Sudan had a marked effect on the rate
of development between the two regions. This factor subsequently subjected the two parts of the country to differential treatment by the colonial administration.

Negative attitudes towards the missionary education in the Southern Sudan and the resistance of the southern Sudanese towards the western education tended to obscure the understanding of the diversities and the real factors that accounted for the differential development of education between the northern and southern Sudan during the colonial and post colonial periods. Northern Sudanese writers like Mohammed Omer Beshir blamed British imperialism and missionary perversion as an explanation for the underdevelopment in the southern Sudan (61). Though there may be some elements of truth here, one must not ignore the fact that the south underwent different phases of historical evolution in terms of education and civilization in the western sense. While the people in the northern Sudan had contacts with sources of Muslim education in the north and east, and had a developed political system much earlier, the south had little contact with the outside world that had any significant effect on their lives until the second half of the 19th century. The societies in the southern Sudan therefore virtually remained culturally isolated. The lack of broad political allegiance acted as a decisive disadvantage which helps explain the difficulties, conflicts and tragedies that subsequently developed in the southern Sudan (62) in their relation with the northern Sudan. Mohammed Omer Beshir had argued against the educational policies pursued by missionaries and the use of English in the schools instead of Arabic. This was on the ground that, he said, the missionaries were using the schools as Christian agents for conversion of the children to
Christianity. He provided no justification to support this claim; nor did he justify why the use of Arabic language and not English would have had a favourable educational effect on the tribes in the southern Sudan.

Kenneth J. King in his article “Nationalism, Education and Imperialism in the Southern Sudan, 1920-1970” (63) pointed out the tendency of the northern Sudanese writers, like Beshir and Abdel al-Rahirn, to skim over the realities of southern life and attitudes and their refusal to make use of mission archival or oral interviews with southerners on the scale that has become commonplace in other parts of Africa. King stated that it is difficult to come to any very definite conclusions about the nature of missionary work in the southern Sudan during the British administration, and will not be possible until access can be had to the various mission archives, and much more work is done with the products of the schools. On the suggestion that “the missionaries worked for the perversion of education to suit their own ends”, he admitted that this might have been possible but he argued that it is necessary to examine whether a small number of missionaries could really have been influential enough to change large sections of the southland to an anti-northern position. There is sufficient evidence in East Africa alone to show that a small number of foreign missionaries were quite unable to change certain attitudes or customs that were central to a particular people (64). In the southern Sudan, it would simply not have been possible, one missionary has pointed out, for a group of outsiders to get southerners to hate the north unless the animus had already been there (65). King has also pointed out that the assumption that the Christian religion was handed to southerners in a way that
turned them implacably against their Muslim neighbours is obviously of critical importance in the propaganda war. Besides the religious ingredients, the southerners consider the south-north conflict as racial and national (66). It is national in the sense that all talk of "unification" or national-building from the time of the early Graduates Congress has signified to southerners the submerging of southern culture in Islamic culture.

It has often been asserted that the missions were deficient in their commitments to educational goals and in professional skills as educators (67). The evidences are suspect on several grounds:

1. It was not based upon any first hand experience of educating the southern Sudanese. The indigenous educational experience was not based on a western type of education but on the traditional way of life of the people.

2. The official criticism was not validated by any marked superiority of the government’s own system in the northern Sudan which was, as the De La War’s Commission, pointed out and Sir Stewart Symes admitted, lagging far behind the mainly missionary systems in Kenya and Uganda. With its usual intense and introverted parochialism, the Sudan Government never made any serious study of education in these territories - a study which might have enabled it to evaluate its own missionary educators more objectively and constructively.

3. The British officials often made the Missions scapegoats for the confusions and contradictions inherent in the educational policy which the government itself prescribed for the southern Sudan, especially from about 1930 onwards (68). The
government demanded that the schools should produce a handful of efficient clerks, teachers and minor officials, but without any "detribalizing" effects and indeed while educating the majority of boys for a return to 'traditional' life. In the formation of this policy the Missions had no say whatever (69).

Lauwerys has aptly pointed out that the Missionaries were never entirely free to do as they wanted: the British authorities supported them when it suited their purpose and placed restrictions on them when this seemed necessary in the light of their own aims (70).

In the Sudan the support or restrictions imposed on the Missions, in terms of education in the southern Sudan, have been influenced by the colonial administration’s relation with the Muslim northern Sudan. The overriding motive for the stringent control of the Missions’ activities, especially between 1895 to 1905 was the conviction by the British administration in Khartoum that indiscreet missionary activities in the southern Sudan or the appearance of active government support for the Missions would provoke a dangerous outbreak of Muslim protest in the northern Sudan. “It was of the utmost importance that the Muslims should not gain the impression that the government was conniving at unfair competition with the Mission”, said the Governor-general, Wingate (71). “Once such an impression gets aboard it can only result in exciting the prejudice of the Mohammedans both against Christianity and against the government” (72). According to R. Wingate, the Governor-general of Sudan in 1902, the development of education in the southern Sudan can be carried subject to two over-riding conditions:

1. That nothing should be done which might promote conversion to Islam.
2. That this opposition to Islamisation should not become known in the northern Sudan, where it might provoke an embarrassing and even dangerous Muslim protest (73).

These are confusing attitudes that made the taking of proper direction of education difficult in the southern Sudan. This trend had adverse consequences on the future development of education in the southern Sudan and cultivated the earlier air of superiority by the northern Sudanese over the Southern Sudanese. Despite the Government’s stringent control not to give the Missions a free-hand in the running of education in the southern Sudan, it too was not interested to get directly involved with it. For instance J. Currie, who became the Director of Education in 1900 persistently refused to become involved in the southern education until a comprehensive policy had been evolved. Such a policy never developed until the British left the Sudan in 1956. In the eyes of Currie the major tasks of education in the Sudan was to produce adequate Sudanese junior officials, clerks and artisans to replace expensive expatriates for employment in both the northern and the southern Sudan. This meant almost exclusive concentration on northern education, where even small sums produced quick and tangible results (74). Out of the 4178 classified posts in the Sudan Government service in 1920, 1544 posts were held by northern Sudanese, 535 by the British, 1824 by the Egyptians, 167 by the Syrians and 108 by others (75). None of these were held by the southern Sudanese. Currie even quoted a report on the native education in South Africa which emphasized the need for ‘a thorough knowledge of the actual social conditions of the native people as an indispensable foundation for a complete and scientific scheme of education’ (76).
At this time it was inconceivable to carry out a comprehensive study into the social conditions of the fragmented societies of the south. In the first place access to the tribes was difficult if not impossible for colonial officials and secondly most of the many languages spoken by the numerous tribes were incomprehensible to the officials. Thirdly the southern tribes, particularly the Nilotics, have been noted throughout their recorded history to have been very resistant to external influence of any kind whether Arab or European. With the lack of any broad political unity among the tribes, the study intended by Currie, in order to provide some bases for comprehensive policy, was to a great extent not conceivable in the short term. It would not, for instance, be easy to establish a proper ground for education in such acephalous tribes as the Nuer. Practically the colonial administrators were not in a situation that could enable them to have access to the needed information about the social conditions of the tribes in the southern Sudan.

In the late 1920s the government recognized the difficulties in taking direct responsibility for education in the southern Sudan and recognized the missions as a more suitable instrument. Of particular importance for the future development of education in this respect in the southern Sudan was the Hillelson Report of 1922 (77). Hillelson, an official of the Department of Education, did not recommend any government directed elementary education, even though he considered that offered by the missionary societies to be inadequate. His recommendations were for increased government control, accompanied by increased government assistance through a system of grants-in-aid. He advanced, among
other things, the idea that the syllabus should be regulated by the government, and also proposed that a resident representative of the Department of Education should be posted to the southern Sudan. In 1926 a Resident Inspector of Education was located in the south. This year also marked the beginning of the formal payment of subsidies to the schools in the south. The subsidies were given subject to the following conditions:

1. That a European exercise uninterrupted supervision over the schools and withdrawal from the station was permitted only in the cases of sickness and home leave.
2. That the syllabus as laid down be adhered to.
3. That the Resident Inspector is satisfied with the progress and efficiency of the schools.
4. That if any of the conditions are unfulfilled, the Resident Inspector may reduce or withdraw the grant for the following year.

An Educational Conference held in Juba in 1932 under the Chairmanship of the Director of Education confirmed that the government would not provide its own schools, but cooperate with the Missions in providing an education which would not only aim at guarding against “the destruction of native social institutions and the diversion of the African from his natural background” but also at “teaching him to adopt himself and his institutions to changing ideas and conditions” (78). But the government, especially the Civil Secretary, H.A. McMichael, was determined to prevent the Missions from exploiting this indispensability.
The Missions were not to be permitted to achieve a share in the educational policy-making lest they become an active force in the development of general southern policy. The Missions could not therefore use their educational monopoly as a means of pressure. H.A. McMichael saw in the possible missionary participation in educational policy-making not a useful contribution, but an irrelevant nuisance. He pointed to the Governor-general that, for instance, the establishment of a Southern Educational Advisory Council with the Missionary representation would make it difficult for the government to resist a similar Northern Advisory Council with unofficial Sudanese representation. The formation of such a council as an officially recognized body would of course have made it difficult for the government to ignore the missionary’s view on educational policy in the southern Sudan (79). An analysis of this policy approach taken by the colonial government indicates a strong inclination towards accommodating the northern interests. Apparently all the policies developed have been equated against the northern reactions or opinions to the policy proposals.

One of the reasons why the British Administration was reluctant to get involved in the development of education in the southern Sudan was the financial commitment involved. The adoption of indirect rule, which meant leaving the tribes to sort out their own affairs emanated from the British Administration’s recognition of the reality of the situation: the British simply were not willing to invest resources in the southern Sudan (80). Sir Stewart Symes who succeeded Maffey as the Governor-general of the Sudan in 1933 was reluctant
to what he said a “waste of any of his limited funds on the very unpromising south” (81). Martin Parr, the Governor of Equatoria Province in 1936 said that the Governor-general “wanted the administration kept on a care and maintenance basis without the undertaking of new work”, and warned the D.Cs to restrain “their Englishman’s passion to put wrong things right”. The Missions were warned that they must “respect tribal sanctions and utilize the existing customs”. They were further charged to “ensure that their educational policy was entirely in accord with the declared policy of the government” (82). In R.K.Winter’s circular of July 1932, as the new Secretary for Education, he bluntly stated that elementary vernacular education should concentrate neither on ‘adaptation’ nor on ‘producing intermediate entrants’, but on ‘sending the boy happily to his tribal environment’. By 1933 the Missions were being officially encouraged, to open more bush schools and sub-grade schools. This attitude showed the lack of interest in education in the southern Sudan at a time when the south badly needed the educated manpower to spearhead its development. The British administration advocated indirect rule but could not provide the opportunity for the indigenous population to have the education so as to enable them manage the native affairs effectively.

Because of the peculiar situation in the Sudan especially in terms of north verses south the missionaries did not enjoy the relative freedom of opportunity that have been provided to other missionaries in the other African countries such as Uganda. The Phelps-Stokes Commissions’ recommendations which were supposed to be the educational analogue of indirect rule in the British colonial countries had a better ground for success in, for
example Uganda than in the Sudan. For instance the Governor-general Sir Stewart Symes was less concerned to preserve "the so-called traditional institutions" than to modernize the Sudan and develop its economy (83). It is true, as has been stated by Garvey that comparatively few of the detailed suggestions of the Phelps-Stokes Commissions were put into effect (84), but the confusions and the contradictions in the application of some of the recommendations in the southern Sudan muddled the trend of education. For instance at the initial stages the missionaries believed that Christianity and civilization were intricately related. The government, on the other hand, was motivated in its educational programme of the 1920s by the desire to adapt the education to the supposed capabilities of the local Africans and to local conditions as they perceived them. These two sets of motives are significantly different. One is basically conversional, the other basically adaptationist.

A general review of the educational situation in the southern Sudan indicates a general state of neglect by the central government in Khartoum. This was clear in the statement of one of the British officials who stated that the state of the south was fundamentally the result of neglect, and neglect was itself the result of Khartoum's misguided parsimony. He felt that the "Northern Administrative system was unsuitable for the south"; but felt that under any system of administration centralized at Khartoum, the south would always be at disadvantage in its competition with the north for funds and skilled personnel (85). "If one has clever and stupid boys in the same class one cannot blame the master for spending his time on the former, to the detriment of the latter. So if one has a country in which one part is progressive and the other backward and they are bracketed together, the latter goes to
the wall”, said Stinand. He recommended that “the Negro provinces should be a class by
themselves under a Vice-Governor-General if necessary” (86). This argument explained
the great disadvantage into which the southern Sudan was placed.

In terms of educational progress, economic and social development the south therefore
lagged far behind the northern Sudan. Separate administration of the two regions could
have been an ideal option for development in the Sudan. Practically speaking, anything but
one-Sudan policy was unthinkable (87). There was the assumption, kindled by nationalism,
that the north would be able to do much more for the south than the British, and that they
would be welcomed as liberators (88). The reaction of the southern Sudanese was that
“you can’t do this to us, putting us into the jaws of the northern Sudanese”. There were
too few educated Southern Sudanese in the south to formulate a policy or hold their own,
so they said: “for God’s sake stay and keep the wolves at bay, while we get some
education” (89). This is a situation where two distinctively different racial groups with
quite different backgrounds and hostile past relationships have been forced to be governed
together. This is “the colonial paradox of creating nation-states out of previously
segmented and even mutually independent units, yet keeping them disunited and
sometimes intensifying mutual disrespect and animosity”(90). This fact is attributable to
the present unstable situation in the Sudan.

A colonial policy that had significant political and educational implications on the southern
Sudan was the “Southern Policy”. The onset of the indirect rule in 1925 saw the real
genesis of the Southern Policy as a practical form of government for the southern provinces (91). The ‘spurious landmark’ in the Southern Policy was the Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922, which empowered the Civil Secretary to declare certain regions “Closed Districts” and to forbid any alien or any native of the Sudan to enter and remain in the same Districts (92). Sudanese historians are unanimous that this Ordinance was “intended to exclude Egyptians, Northern Sudanese and other Muslims likely to engage in activities which would prejudice the administrative policy followed in the south” (93) and generally to insulate the south from the northern influence. The political object of the Southern Policy was clearly stated in a Memorandum by H.A. McMichael on 10th August 1928: “to create a solid barrier protecting the south against the insidious political intrigue which must in the ordinary course of events increasingly beset our path in the north” (94). This was seen as a way of combating political agitation which would have been detrimental to the stability of the British administration. H.A. McMichael defined in explicit terms what had come to be known as the Colonial Southern Policy:

“The policy of the government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with the structure and organization based to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit upon the indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs”

The implementation of the Southern Policy required a number of measures that would eliminate all traces of Arab influences in the south and revitalization of Negroid African customs. The steps instituted by the government to carry out the policy included the encouragement of the use of English language in the mission schools and in offices, the
prohibition of the use of Arabic language and Arab dress, the replacement of Arab Administrators by the indigenous ones and the removal of Arab traders from the south and the recognition and use of African laws (95). Following a Conference held in Rejaf southern Sudan, it was recommended that the following languages be recognized and adopted: Dinka, Bari, Moru, Ndogo, Nuer, Shilluk, Madi and Zande (96).

In terms of ethnic relationship between the north and the south, the Southern Policy only served to reinforce the general situation of mistrust already prevalent, though some extremely ethnocentric authors in the northern Sudan have in the past attempted to attribute the entire separation of the south from the north to a British colonial device (97). The controlling postulate was that the south was fundamentally distinct from the north and required distinctive administrative organization (98). The creation of this barrier implied the eradication from the south of the Arabic language which would indisputably bring Islam with it. According to John O. Voll (1991) the acceptance of Christianity and the resistance to Islam in the Southern Sudan could be associated with the contrasting images of British and Arab intervention in the Southern Sudan (99). Although the British did little to develop the south educationally and economically, aspirations for such development were then still foreign to communities (100). However the British administrative system that respected and protected the autonomy of the local communities became more acceptable in the later years of the colonial rule. The image of the northern Arabs, whether prior to colonial rule or since independence has never enjoyed a similar
appreciation (101). Instead aggravated animosity became the pattern rather than the exception in the south-north relationship.

Dunstan M. Wai, in his book *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan*, provided the southern perspective of the merits and demerits of the “Southern Policy”. According to him the Southern Policy was based on two premises:

1. that the Negroid Africans of the south are culturally and, to some extent, racially distinct from the northern Arab Sudanese;

2. that the southern provinces would either develop eventually as a separate territorial and political entity or be integrated into what was then British East Africa.

Wai argued against the northern Sudanese view that the Southern Policy erected artificial barriers between the north and the south and that the policy eliminated Arab influence in the southern Sudan. Tensions and animosities had for a long time characterized the interactions between the north and the south as evidenced by the fact that no previous administration had achieved political and economic unification in the Sudan (102). Hatred already had deep roots between the two parts of the country before the existence of the Southern Policy in the 1930s. According to Wai to blame the colonial administration for eliminating Arab influences in the south is to imply that the south needed Arabization. The contention is in itself culturally imperialistic; it is an argument against a rival in cultural imperial pursuits (103). The most valid criticism of the Southern Policy, according to Wai, is that it did not strive to bring about social or economic progress in the south as it did in the north. Not only did the two-pronged policy serve to further alienate one region from
the other, but after the policy was later abandoned by the colonial administration, the south was left dangerously vulnerable to the pursuits of the Arab north (104). Consequently when Sudanization of the administration took place virtually all the posts vacated by the British and other foreigners were taken over by the northern Sudanese. It took little beyond this to convince southerners that a new colonialism had arrived.

In the educational field, one of the intentions of the Southern Policy was to educate the southerner 'up to government service standards' and to create a new literate class in order to dispense with the northern Sudanese officials who carried the 'contamination' of Arab and Muslim influence (105). In fact the reaffirmation of the Southern Policy by Sir H. McMichael in 1930 implied the training of a large body of southern Sudanese as a minor civil servants and technicians through Intermediate schools. There was a rapid growth in terms of pupils in the southern Sudan between 1930 and 1932. The total pupil population rose from about 2600 to over 4100, while post elementary education rose up by nearly 80% from the figure of 1930 to nearly 500 (106). This growth however ended there. McMichael's 1930 programme of accelerated educational development had by 1932 been quietly abandoned. In the early 1930s the British officials in the south Sudan developed the techniques of administration which enabled them to dispense with expanded bureaucracy. District Commissioners became paramount chiefs among the people whom they served. In this situation therefore there was no need for rival educated southern elites. Consequently between 1932-1936 there was virtually no increase in the school enrollment, while the intermediate enrollment, the growing point of the system actually shrank by over
12% (107). In the final analysis of this policy, the educational aspect of the policy was the deliberate discouragement of the development of a southern Sudanese intelligentsia similar to that which had grown up in the north (108).

After 1933 the Government convened no more “Southern Education Conference” and abandoned any pretense of consultation. Such a state of affairs had disastrous implications on the southern education and placed the southerners at the greatest disadvantage at the time of independence of the country. The absence of southern official candidates for Sudanisation posts was not therefore inevitable. The educational policies pursued by the government contributed greatly to this situation. Out of about 800 posts Sudanised only 8 of them were occupied by the southern Sudanese (109).

The following section tries to demonstrate whether there is any significant differences in the policy approach developed by the government in independent Sudan in relation to that during the British colonial period.

1.3 THE INDEPENDENCE PERIOD (1956-1969): WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?

The Sudan achieved its independence on the 1st January 1956. The first Parliamentary government that was formed was at first held in high esteem as the symbol of nationalism (110). But at best Parliament was a superficial instrument. It had been introduced into the
Sudan at precisely the time parliamentary forms were rapidly disappearing form other countries in the Middle East (111); this has been the main source of influence for the political development in the Sudan. Apparently the political parties in the Sudan were not well-organized groups with distinct objectives, but loose alliances motivated primarily by personal interest and loyalty to the various religious factions (112).

The country obtained independence without the rival political parties having agreed on the form and content of a permanent constitution (113). As a result factional maneuvers dominated the parliamentary session at a time when crucial decisions affecting the proposed constitution and the future of the south had to be made. No proper formula was found in terms of the north-south relation; what became clear was the policy of control of the south by the national government. This was shown by the wholesale replacement of the British administrators in the southern by northern Sudanese, which confirmed the southern fears of domination by the Muslim Arabs. The government's policy was to employ northern administrators in the southern region, to ignore demands for a federal system, and assimilate the south through a policy of Arabization and Islamisation (114). In the Legislative Assembly that was formed only 13 of the 95 seats were allotted to the southern Sudanese and therefore they had no effective means of exerting any influence in the Parliament (115).

The structural disparities that existed between the north and the south during the colonial period continued into the independence period. The precedence set by the colonial
administration in favour of the development of the north, in terms of all aspects of social economic and educational developments, gave the north the advantage of superiority over the south. The north had a number of advantages over the south in terms of setting the basis for development. It had earlier access to sources of civilization of the north and east. From the 16th to 19th centuries a semblance of political unity had almost been achieved in the northern Sudan mainly through the influence of Islam and Arabic language. The southern Sudan remained isolated up to the end of the 19th century. No forces making for unity therefore counteracted its multiple diversity. The Turko-Egyptian and the Mahdiya period have been highly instructive periods (116). The entrenchment of slavery during the former period and the rise of economic class of traders (jalaba) dependent on the slave trade have both had profound effect on subsequent history and economic structure of the country, particularly as regards the alienation of the mainly Negroid south from the north. This factor underlines how the vestiges of the slave culture are still reflected in the prejudices that persist in modern Sudan with serious political and economic repercussions (117).

The British occupation altered the socio-economic structure of the country by introducing a colonial pattern of development. But though the colonial power had destroyed the earlier forms of economic exploitation it installed its own condition for exploitation and by favouring mainly the northern group within the country, the system set in motion the dynamics of marginalisation (118). This situation was responsible for the present profile of elites in the Sudan. The uneven distribution of educational facilities produced relatively
large number of educated elites in the north Sudan who were later to constitute an important layer in the national political and administrative set up. This resulted in a gradual emergence of a national middle class with virtually full monopoly over the economic, political and administrative powers in the central and northern belts of the country (119). These were the elites who determined the trend of education in the southern Sudan during the periods of independence. Education became the main ideological tool of the Islamic national government. The main objective of which was to establish a new Sudan characterized by cultural and religious homogeneity.

The earlier approach to the development of educational policy by the national government of the Sudan apparently has been shaped by the previous trends taken by the colonial government. The initial attitudes of the northern politicians and the civil servants towards the south were not that much different from that of the British imperialists. They assumed:

"the south had been deliberately underdeveloped, its people were particularly backward, and it deserved the benign assistance of the more developed and cultured north, backed if necessary by firmness" (120).

This attitude by the northern politicians was seen as rather colonial by the southern Sudanese. But in the eyes of the northern politicians and policy-makers the Missionaries were the primary impediment to the development of education in the south Sudan and to the policy of cultural integration where it was hoped Islam and Arabism could have played the same assimilative role as for the north (121). The abandonment of the Southern Policy was discussed in the Sudan Administrative Conference held in Khartoum in April 1946.
The Conference pointed out the relative backwardness of the peoples of the southern provinces which it attributed to the Southern Policy pursued by the colonial administration (122). In his circular of 16th December 1946 the Civil Secretary called for the revision of an obsolete Southern Policy, in response to “recent political development both inside and outside the Sudan; and for the re-statement of the policy in a form which can be publicly explained and supported, and which would be acceptable to the northern Sudanese opinion” (123). This revision implied that the southern Sudan should henceforth be regarded as inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and Arabised northern Sudan. This reversal of the Southern Policy was bitterly criticized by the Governor of Bahr El Ghazal, in the south Sudan, who said that:

“The South’s future is being advised upon and is even likely to be decided by the wrong men in the wrong place, i.e. by a body of people capable and conscientious but without any direct understanding of the south; preoccupied with the political ferment of the north and seeing everything through Omdurman spectacles” (124).

This set in motion the pattern of centralized policy making that continued to affect any development and educational activities in the southern Sudan. This suited the interest of the northern Sudanese very well.

One particular report of the International Commission on Secondary Education has given some support and encouragement to the northern Sudanese, in terms of their drives for Arabisation and Islamisation of the education system in the latter period to independence. This Commission was appointed on 1st December 1954 by the British governor-general
on the initiative of the first Sudanese Minister of Education. The Commission consisted of one Civil Servant from the Indian Ministry of Education (Chairman), four British as members, which included Charles Morris, then Vice-Chancellor of the University of Leeds, Miss Charlesworth, Headmistress of Sutton High School for Girls, L.C. Welcher, the Australian Principal of the University College of Khartoum, two Egyptian members, Sayyed Mohammad Farid abu Hadid of the Cairo Higher Training College and Dr. Abdeal Aziz al-Sayyid Ibrahim, Director General of Egyptian Primary Education and Professor of Education at the University of Ain Shams, and a Sudanese, Dr. Ahmad Al-Tayyib (Secretary). The Commission spent some six weeks in the Sudan with a few days in the southern Sudan (125). It came out with the following recommendations which had far reaching implications for educational development in the southern Sudan:

1. Education "had to deal with problems like the unification of the people, particularly as between the north and the south, bridging the social, cultural and economic differences which exist between the different regions, eradicating customs and traditions which are reactionary or out of harmony with the new shape of things". By implication this means the eradication of the southern cultures and traditions because the history of the Sudan has shown that the southern tribes have been the most reactionary in the country.

2. "The aim of education in the Mission schools is chiefly religious" and that there were in the south "hundreds of elementary schools which are mostly sub-grades". On the basis of this gross misinformation, the Commission recommended that the government should:
(a) Take over the education of the people of the south and provide them with schools that can develop them into ‘good citizen’ of the country.

(b) That Arabic should become the medium of instruction not only in the southern secondary schools, but also in the elementary schools.

(c) Vernaculars in the southern Sudan should be discontinued as medium of instruction at any level of education.

These recommendations, especially in regards to vernaculars, were based upon evidences which can be described as a farrago of ignorance and prejudice. None of the members of the Commission had knowledge of any of the southerners; nor does the Commission’s report contain any hint that it had taken evidence from educationists who had such knowledge (126). However, Sir Charles Morris and Miss Charlesworth, who nevertheless signed the main report, did record a dissenting opinion. They recommended that “where the vernacular is extensive, and where there exists some literature and strong local sentiment, the vernacular should continue as the language of instruction in the earlier stages”. Interestingly this dissenting opinion appeared neither in the body of the report, nor in the summary of the main recommendation. It appeared in another document entitled “Summary of the main conclusion and recommendations”, which appears to have been in origin an analysis, with official comments, prepared for internal use within the Ministry and which may have been included by oversight in the published report. Here the Morris-Charlesworth amendment appears accompanied by official covering minutes which ends with the words “For vetting and approval please” (127).
The International Commission, so ready to promote ‘national unity’ by condemning the mission education and rejecting southern languages had almost nothing to offer to the specifically southern needs which secondary education might be expected to serve. The report was quite silent about the crucial role of secondary education in producing the political, administrative, technical and professional cadres which the south so urgently needed in the Sudanisation process going on. The report instead sets a disastrous precedent which the north had picked up and used as a weapon or means to retard the development of education in the southern Sudan. The Commission’s incautious remarks about the role of education in ‘nation-building’ encouraged the Ministry of Education in its policy of “assimilation and indeed of Islamisation”, for in 1955 few northern Sudanese had any doubts that the expansion of Islam was the most effective means of bridging cultural differences (128). As the Minister of Education later appreciatively remarked, “the Commission had submitted many valuable recommendations especially as regards the south, the system of which will be assimilated with that of the north accordingly” (129). According to Mohammed Omer Bestir, the report of the Commission marked a period of dissection of the problems of education and suggestions for remedies respectively (130). In a practical sense the commission’s report has focused the attention of the Khartoum government on areas which are irrelevant to the development of education in the southern Sudan. Since independence (1956), the Khartoum government continued to pursue this same policy approach with regards to educational development in the southern Sudan but with no apparent good results. The outcome of this policy has been the continuous civil wars in the country with no apparent end in sight. Logically this policy should have been
dropped for a more acceptable one to accelerate educational development in the southern Sudan. The Sudan government never made any serious study of education in the southern Sudan as a prerequisite for relevant education for the south; a study which might have enabled it to evaluate its own education more objectively and constructively.

Another development that shaped the minds of the pioneers of the independence period of Sudan came from the first pressure group of elites who formed themselves into what became known as the “Graduates Congress”. As early as July 1939 this “Graduates Congress”, in a note on education submitted to the government, had called for the nationalization of the Church schools in the southern Sudan (131). By implication the Congress held the Missions responsible for the backwardness of education in the southern Sudan. It suggested that education should be oriented towards the Arab and Islamic culture but not African culture because the Sudan had much in common with Arab countries of the Islamic Orient (132). According to the Congress the improvement of education in the south could not be achieved through a missionary system subsidized by the government, but through the opening of government schools similar to those in the north and where the Arabic language could provide the lingua franca. It also suggested the cancellation of subventions to mission schools and the unification of education syllabus in the northern and southern Sudan (133).

Since some of the founders of the Graduates Congress were also the initial or pioneer leaders of independent Sudan e.g. Ismail El Azhari and Sayyid El Mirghani, the ideas
advanced by them formed the nuclei of the educational reforms in the Sudan. The role of the Missions in the southern education was intensively disliked by the northern Muslim Sudanese. The Missionaries were regarded as enthusiastic auxiliaries of the old Southern Policy and conversion of southerners to Christianity was seen as a politically-inspired exercise in national disruption (134). The widespread southern suspicion of the northerners was popularly attributed to a successful missionary campaign of denigration with plentiful reference to the iniquities of the old slaving days (135). By very natural over-simplification, the intensive Arabisation and Islamisation of the south was seen by most northern Sudanese as the obvious road to national integration, and as the culmination of a long process of historical development (136).

The attempts at Islamisation and Arabisation of the southern Sudan by simply reversing the British policy did not work though it did a lot of damage to the development of education in the southern Sudan by retarding further progress. The northern political parties failed to give sufficient weight to the undeniable differences between the two regions. For instance the Special Commission formed in 1956 listed a number of points which it urged all Sudanese to bear in mind so as to understand the 1955 southern revolt. The Commission identified five broad categories of points, which emphasized the differences between the north and the south: (137)

1. The northern and the southern Sudanese have very little in common.  
   Religiously, the north is Muslim, the south is Christian and pagan; racially, the north is Arab, the south is Negroid; linguistically northern Sudanese
speak Arabic while the southern Sudanese speak more than 80 languages.

In addition to these factors, there are geographical, historical and cultural differences.

2. For historical reasons the southern Sudanese regarded the northern Sudanese as traditional enemies.

3. The British administrative policy until 1947 encouraged the southern Sudanese to progress along African and Negroid lines. Through the Closed District Order and the Permits of Trade Order the Sudanese were prevented from knowing each other or learning from each other. The Missionaries, who controlled much of the education system in the south, favoured this policy for reasons of their own.

4. For political, financial, geographic and economic reasons the northern Sudan progressed quickly in every field, while the southern Sudan lagged behind. This inevitably created a feeling among the underdeveloped people that they were being cheated, exploited and dominated.

5. All of these circumstances contributed to the absence among the southern Sudanese of a feeling of common citizenship with the northern Sudanese or a feeling of nationalism or patriotism towards the Sudan as a whole. Their loyalty remained tribal.
Aggrey Jaden, (a Southern Sudanese politician), the President of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), at a Conference on the southern Sudan, held in Khartoum in March 1965 offered a case in point. He declared that: (138)

"The Sudan falls into two distinct areas in terms of geographical area ethnic groups and cultural systems. The northern Sudan is occupied by a hybrid Arab race who are united by their common language, common culture and common religion and they look to the Arab world for their cultural and political inspiration. The people of the southern Sudan, on the other hand, belong to the African ethnic group of East Africa. They do not only differ from the hybrid Arab race in origin, arrangement, and basic systems, but in all conceivable purpose. There is nothing in common between the various sections of the community, no body of shared beliefs, no identity of interests, no local signs of unity and above all, the Sudan has failed to compose a single community".

Between 1957 to 1964 education in the southern Sudan was pressed into the service of political objectives. In order to reduce the western influence and ideas, and in a way to harmonize the educational system the government decided in 1962 to nationalize the Church schools in the southern Sudan and expelled the Missionaries from the southern Sudan. The Missionary education system was seen to undermine the Islamic institutions in the country, particularly the 'Kalwa'. (139). Ironically the Missionaries were not expelled from the northern Sudan and they continued to play important role in the education of the
Muslim children in the northern Sudan. Today more than 95% of the students in the Church schools in the north are Muslims.

A new Southern Policy had come into force in 1949 when it was endorsed by a Legislative Assembly. The first Sudanese Minister of Education informed the members of the Assembly that:

“As the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions it is of great importance that there should be one language which is understood by all its citizens. That language would only be Arabic and Arabic must therefore be taught in all our schools” (140).

In August 1949 the Anglo-Sudanese Executive Council resolved that Arabic should become the common language of the Sudan (141).

In another policy statement the Minister declared that the policy is:

“to weld the system of education hitherto in use in the northern and southern provinces respectively into one harmonious whole designed to meet the needs of the pupils in all parts of the Sudan” (142).

The new system was designed to bring a halt to the whole system of education that has been established in the south Sudan by the missionaries. The abrupt nature by which the policy changes were to take place meant a complete disruption of the minimum progress made by the missionaries.
Ideally changes should be planned in the light of information, research and experiment and consultation at the regional and local levels. The results of such research and experiment can be used to guide the changes effectively. Educational needs cannot be evaluated except in the light of all the individual and social purposes which education may serve. In the Sudan such ideals are taken for granted as shown by the deeds of the government. In November 1950 the Legislative Assembly passed the Minister of Education’s Five-Year Plan for the Southern Sudan (1951-1956) without any study of the southern situation. The main objective of this plan was to “go a considerable way towards the unification of the education systems in the whole of the Sudan by the assimilation of methods of teacher-training, the use of similar text-books, the adoption of common syllabus and the introduction of Arabic into all schools above the village level (143). What was new in the educational policy adopted for the southern Sudan after 1957 was that, unlike the British policy of restricting the educational development during the 1930s, it involved active interference with the existing system. This was carried out in great haste and with very little regard to the destructive educational consequences upon the southerners.

Instead of expanding the secondary sector and maintaining the pace of intermediate expansion, the government lavished funds upon post elementary institutes of Islamic studies, known as the ‘Mahads’. By 1962 there were in the southern Sudan six intermediate Mahads and one secondary Mahad with a total of 500 pupils. Recruits for these intermediate Mahads were sometimes obtained simply by an administrative order posting qualified elementary leavers to them rather than to secular intermediate schools
Expansion in the post elementary secular schools was less encouraging. There were only 8 intermediate schools by 1953/54 and only one secondary school (145). The total numbers of students in the southern secondary school in the year 1953/54 was only 187. In 1959/60 there were two secondary schools in the south with a mere total student population of 361 boys. In the northern Sudan between 1959/60 and 1961/62 enough teachers were found to create 31 new boys’ secondary school streams and to provide 50 streams in all. This trend was intended to retard secular education in the south and indoctrinate the southern children through Islamic education. The indirect motive of this development was to use education as an ideological tool by the regime to obtain their political and religious persuasion.

The independent government of the Sudan has no inclination towards what the southern Sudanese considered relevant education for the south. Soon after independence the Sudan government opted to identify itself with the Arab nations. Subsequently its educational policies are derived and influenced by the educational policies adopted in the Arab world countries. Educational cooperation among these countries is facilitated not only by the common language, culture and religion but also by similar structural and functional aspects in the educational enterprises (146). The standardization of the education system came from 1957 Agreements on Cultural Unity signed by Syria, Jordan and Egypt; and the Cultural Charters signed by Iraq and Egypt in 1957. These two Agreements, endorsed by all the Arab States, sought to strengthen the feelings of Arab unity by eliminating the many variations of education within and between the Arab states and to adopt the educational
system to the needs of development (147). The Agreements called for a 6:3:3: education ladder and provided for the application of a model curriculum in terms of content and time allocated to various subjects (148). Much of the time in the time-table is devoted to Arabic and religion i.e. 8 periods per week to Arabic and six periods for religion as compared six periods per week for English, two periods for the sciences and two periods each for geography, history (except in the final class in the secondary school where the number is increased to four) and other subjects. The implementation of such a framework had some repercussion on relevant education for the southern Sudanese and meant a total alienation of the southern Sudanese from the main-streams of the education in the country and the uprooting of the southern students from their local environment and culture. The question of the need of relevant education for the southern situation became no more a debatable issue in the Sudan. Relevance is defined according to the northern Sudanese’s perception of the term relevance.

Under the military regime of General Ibrahim Abboud (1958-1964), Islam and Arabic were officially championed by the authorities with the objective of creating a new Sudan characterized by cultural and religious homogeneity to replace the state of pluralism (149). The Abboud’s government lacked dynamism and made no efforts to satisfy or even placate political demands in the country (150). It failed to launch a convincing programme of economic and social development (151). The regime suppressed expressions of religious and cultural differences using police to bolster government’s efforts to Arabise the society (152). The dissolution of parliament by the regime cut off any legitimate outlets for
southern complaints. This stress on conformity with the Islamic education persisted until the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 when the Southern Sudan was granted a regional autonomy. Whether the south had benefited during the period of the regional autonomy has not been studied or evaluated. The period of the regional autonomy lasted with the period of President Nimeiry which is researched in the main body of this study.

The history of the Sudan, in terms of north-south relationship, has shown that the southern Sudan has been subjected to the perceived needs and ideologies of the rulers in Khartoum in all its economic, social, political, and educational aspects. The structural bases established by the colonial administration, that favoured the northern Sudanese, placed the northern Sudanese at great advantage over the south. It laid a good ground for the Khartoum government to pursue its perceived objectives in terms of Islamisation and Arabisation. The national government has been conceived by the Southern Sudanese as the replica of the colonial government.

The British Colonial government’s objective in the conquest of the Sudan was not primarily to develop the Sudan nor was it for any economic interests. The objective was purely defensive strategy to protect the Nile waters and so to safeguard the British position in Egypt. Though the Missionaries had eventually got involved in the field of education this was not also their original motive for entering the Sudan. The primary objective was the conversion of the Arabs in particular and African in general into Christianity. It was because the law did not allow the missionaries to operate in the
northern Sudan that forced them to concentrate in the southern Sudan. These factors accounted greatly for the lack of motivation in serious educational development in the southern Sudan.

Chapter two discusses the research methodology employed in carrying out this research. It also contained some explanation of why the empirical research was undertaken within the United Kingdom and not within the Sudan.
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CHAPTER TWO

2. JUSTIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY

2.1. INTRODUCTION.

The central theme of the study is to examine the contemporary educational policy and practices in the Sudan and to analyze its impact and implications on educational development in the Southern Sudan with the desire to establish a basis for the future educational policy development for the Southern Sudan. Very little documentation or literature exist in relation to education in the southern Sudan within the contemporary Sudan. A relatively large body of documentation about education in the Sudan originating from the north Sudan, is available but most provide quite patchy reflection of the true picture of the state of education in the southern Sudan. The understanding of such literature gives one the impression of the educational policies in the Sudan as being profoundly inter-linked with the specific Islamic educational policy context. Other literature reviewed provides some basic insight into the policy trends, the factors that influenced the shaping of the policies and the conflicts in the Sudanese policy development.
This study will attempt to provide an analysis of the government educational policy and to explain this in terms of particular understanding of the diverse characteristics of the Sudanese society. To provide a broader picture of the Sudan as a whole it has been necessary to trace the trends of the educational policy development in the Sudan from the earlier periods and to examine how they relate to the development of education in the period under review. This is to provide an adequate information of the background of the current educational situation in the country as a whole and to the southern Sudan in particular. The intention is to provide a true picture of the Sudanese educational policies and to create awareness and understanding of the policies. The study also attempts to set in proper perspective the power relationship between the central government and the regional government in terms of the educational policy development. This is to establish to what extent the conflict in the educational policy development in the country was dependent on the locus of the central control over education. It is expected that what would be learned from this would form a basis for the future educational policy development for the southern Sudan.


The 1969 to 1992 period marks the sixteen years of the Nimeiry era which was followed by the rule by four other leaders. Little literature is available during this period that specifically focuses on educational policies of the Sudan in general and the southern Sudan.
in particular. No particular reason has been advanced for the lack of documentation on the policies of education but the possible explanation could be related to the policy of censorship by the Sudanese government on studies connected to government policies. However from the little literature available it is possible to establish the general picture in the country during the period under review and the general trends of policies that might have possibly affected the educational policy development in the country. Those that provide substantial insight into the general trends of policies in the Sudan include Garvey-Williams (1976) (1); the Report of the Sudan Education Sector Review (February 1977) (2); Harold D. Nelson (1983) (3); El-Fatih A. Abdel Salam (1989) (4); Graham F. Thomas (1990; 1993) (5); Peter Woodward (1994) (6); Bona Malwal (1994) (7). The most comprehensive of these is the country study edited by Harold D. Nelson.

In the book edited by Harold D. Nelson, Nimeiry is said to have justified his military coup in the Sudan on the grounds that the bickering and corruption of the civilian politicians had paralyzed the decision-making process, had prevented actions being taken to deal with the country’s economic and regional problems and had left the Sudan after 13 years of independence without a permanent constitution. One of the initial successes which has been attributed to Nimeiry was the ending of the 17 years civil war in the southern Sudan that resulted in the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement and provided a Regional autonomy to the southern region. However it has been stated that despite the apparent solution of the southern problem, Nimeiry failed to provide the country with a sense of national unity. According to Nelson after the settlement in the southern Sudan Nimeiry
attempted to mend fences with the Muslim religious groups in the north. He reinforced the special position of Islam in Sudan - one of the elements of conflict between the north and the south, - and recognized the Sharia as the source of all legislation.

The literature mentions the various political organs of the government during the reign of Nimeiry and the problems associated with them. The constitution enacted in 1973 provided for the sharing of legislative functions between the President and the National People’s Assembly. In practice much authority is said to have remained concentrated in the hands of the President through his control over appointments, candidates and elections and his ability to issue decrees bypassing normal governmental channels. The subservience of the People’s Assembly has been underscored by changes in its size and composition ordained by Nimeiry and the frequency with which he has brought its dissolution- in 1978, 1980 and again in 1981- far short of the four-year term prescribed in the constitution.

The powers bestowed on the President by the constitution enabled him to control high government appointments at both national and regional levels. He determined when the People’s Assembly was to meet and appointed some of the members. He was believed to exercise de facto control over designation of members of the Political Bureau and over the Central Committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), which nominated the single presidential candidates, made policy recommendations to the government, and cleared all candidates for national and local offices. It has also been stated that by frequently shifting leading politicians among posts in the Cabinet, the SSU, the Assembly, Regional
Government, and other Organizations, Nimeiry employed his broad appointive power as a tool for ensuring that the country's complex political institutions remained subject to his authority. These changes of personnel and dependence of officeholders on the President's approbation reduced the likelihood of any political rival building an autonomous power base and have enabled him to divert blame for economic and other shortcomings to the failing of subordinate officeholders.

Another significant practice mentioned in Nelson was that of having a few individuals identified as members of his inner circle. But the degree to which he has sought their counsel is said to have remained unknown.

The literature describes the political situation in the southern Sudan as well. The Southern Provinces Regional self-government Act of 3rd March 1972, translated the Addis Ababa Agreement into an organic law having the character of a constitution for the Southern Region. The law provided for an executive body in the form of a High Executive Council and a legislative body known as the People's Regional Assembly. In addition to its regional law-making powers, the Regional Assembly by a two third majority could request that the President of the Republic postpone the coming into force of any national law the members believe would adversely affect the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President of the Republic, on the other hand, could veto any bill passed by the Regional Assembly that he deemed contrary to the constitution.
The Regional Assembly and the High Executive Council were forbidden to legislate or exercise powers with respect to national defense; external affairs; air and inter-regional river transport; communications; customs and foreign trade; immigration and nationality; economic, social, and educational planning and currency.

In summary Nelson's study pointed out that the dominating features of the Sudanese politics since the assumption of government by Nimeiry in 1969 was the heightened concentration of actual power in the hands of Nimeiry. All major initiatives in both domestic and international affairs were carried out by his personal direction.

The state of education in the southern Sudan from the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972) to 1976 was clearly presented in the report prepared by Garvey-Williams, who was an Adviser on education in the Regional Ministry of Education (1972-1976) (8). Garvey-Williams mentioned in the report the general picture of education in the southern region. In general terms, he stated that the quality of education in the southern region of the Sudan was poor. Education at primary level in particular was unproductive in that the needs of the children who form the bulk of the output were largely disregarded and the children derived little from their schooling that was of real benefit to them in their future lives (9). According to Garvey-Williams the schools were generally lacking guidance and direction although he did not specifically mention the reasons for this lack of guidance and direction. He however attributed the inadequacies in the southern education to the following factors:
1. Shortages of manpower and finance.

2. Poor organization and weak administrative procedures.

3. The lack of effective monitoring and the absence of well-formulated curricula reflecting well-defined objectives.

These shortcomings, according to Garvey-Williams, could be attributed to the breakdown of normal government, the absence of economic development and the paucity of educational opportunity in the region during a period of almost two decades.

The study conducted by the government-sponsored Education Sector Review Commission (Dec. 1975-Feb. 1977), which was presented in the Report of the Sudan Education Sector Review, February, 1977 (10), in many respects reflected an ideal theoretical approach of educational development in the country. The probable explanation was to attract foreign assistance for educational development in the country. The Review Commission's study focused on two main areas: firstly the appraisal of the system of education from 1970 to 1977 and secondly to provide a strategy for adoption for the future. What was indicated in the letter of transmittal addressed to the Minister of Education showed that, though the study lasted for 14 months, the commission did not visit the southern Sudan in order to have a comprehensive coverage of the state of education in the whole country. There was also no mention of inputs emanating from the Southern Regional Government related to the study.
The report focused on a number of areas which were central for the development of education in the Sudan. The following are the summary of the areas relevant to this study:

1. Universalization of Primary Education:

   The commission’s report mentioned the universalization of primary education within a period of 15 years starting from the date of the presentation of report (1977). One way to attain universalization, according to the commission, was to diversify the form of the primary school so as to suit the various local conditions and circumstances.

2. Higher Education:

   The report recommended that the higher education institutes must be regarded as sources of cultural, social and technological influences on society. Their establishment must be planned with a view to equable distribution among the various regions of the country and to the suitability of conditions in their locations. Each must make its contribution towards serving national objectives.

3. Financial Decentralization:

   The report mentioned that financial decentralization must go hand in hand with administrative decentralization. Independent regional units must be set up with powers to collect and spend money, develop local resources and appoint local teachers. Educational legislation must be developed in such a way as to allow for greater participation not only by the concerned organizations but also by individuals outside these organizations. The big question was whether the government was prepared to part from central financial control.
4. Eradication of Illiteracy:-

The report proposed the formulation of a plan for the eradication of illiteracy within a period of ten to fifteen years. It is not easy to point out here the basis that the commission has used to set this target taking into account the debilitating state of education at that time and the fact that the commission did not travel widely to assess the true state of education in the whole country. The achievement of this objective through the approach put forward by the commission was also quite doubtful and unreliable. According to the commission, the approach should be both political and popular (whatever is meant by popular), through a competent organization relying on financial resources outside of the education budget, such as development funds, returns from industrial and commercial firms, donations and contributions by employers, organizations and societies, besides voluntary efforts.

5. Arabic Language:-

The report mentioned that Arabic language should be used as a language of instruction at all levels and for all types of education. This recommendation provided no allowances for the unique situation in the southern Sudan where Arabic is not much known and English has been the medium of instruction at all levels of education. The report stated that care should be taken to raise the standard of the Arabic language as a subject taught in itself and as a medium of instruction. This can be accomplished, according to the report, by satisfactory qualification of language teachers, linguistic vetting of all text-books and provision of school libraries with Arabic books suitable to students at various grades.
6. Centralization of Teacher Training and Education:

The report stated that the Teacher-Training Department of the Ministry of Education should continue to be responsible for laying down the general policy for initial and in-service teacher training.

Some of the issues raised in the report of the Sudan Education Sector Review were bound to have some implication to the development of education in the southern Sudan.

The article by El-Fatih A. Abdel Salam on 'Ethnic Politics in the Sudan' (11) provides a reflection of the northern Sudanese perception of ethnicity in the Sudanese politics. The article mentioned that many of the northern Sudanese conceive the existing cultures of the Sudan as being in a state of melting pot that would eventually simmer into an invigorated and uniquely one Sudanese culture. They assumed that the southern Sudanese would retain distinctions in language, custom, and religion, but only for some time. Whatever the varying rates of assimilation, however, most would eventually disappear into the larger Sudanese cultural totality. This is assumed to eventually result into a 'core culture' composed essentially of Islamic Afro-Arab values, life styles and identification. However, the article pointed out that since the social and political base for ethnic politics has failed, so far, to simmer into the expected core culture, there remains great unfinished task of national building for the government.

This perception has likely implications on the development of education in the whole country in general and the southern Sudan in particular. This is because of the use of
education to achieve this objective. According to the article the core culture theory provides broad criteria for detecting and curtailing the influence of ‘alien’ politics that threaten the stability of the society. This specifically pointed to the western influences and the southern Sudanese cultures. This probably has been one of the main reasons for the central control of educational planning and educational policies.

The study carried out by Patrick D. Lynch and Saifeislam Omer (12) pointed out the reasons why the promises made by Nimeiry’s government, in the ‘New Educational Policy’ could not be accomplished. The article looked at the issues within the national context. It analyzed the process of implementation of the new educational policy and the degree to which the NEP achieved its goals as perceived by the participants in the system of education at that time. The new educational policy plan was to have prepared the people for constructing a new socialist society by introducing a “new” kind of education in addition to an expansion of schooling. In practice there was nothing new in the declaration in relation to perceived educational needs of the southern Sudan. The south remained subjected to the educational policies perceived as relevant by the central government without the practical participation of the southern Sudanese to the policy formation. What the study considered as success were the change in the schooling system from 4-4-4 plan to 6-3-3 plan, expansion of access to schooling and the regionalisation of the educational system. What it did not present was what these successes meant to the development of education in the southern Sudan. How relevant were the changes?
The factors which were said to relate to the low rate of implementation of the educational plans included:

1. The failure of the planners to take into account the complexity of the political-cultural process in the country.
2. The resource constraints which affected all planning. Missing was also a reliable data base upon which to make decisions about school mapping and where to allocate resources effectively for maximizing learning and increasing learning. In a country as large as the Sudan is and as remote as most of the southern Sudan is, there are bound to be some difficulties in terms of identifying and quantifying the education that could be necessary to meet the needs of the majority of the population in the country. Policy-decisions cannot intelligently be made in the absence of reliable data and the analysis of the underlying factors in implementation of the policies. This required proper research.
3. The management and leadership of the reform was poor. The schools were built enthusiastically by the communities without the benefit of guidance.
4. The change in the curriculum could not be accomplished because its leadership was too unstable, and the government provided too small a resource base to provide a quality education for the expanded enrollment.
5. The frequent changes in Ministers of Education negatively affected the implementation; ten Ministers served during the 15-year period of Nimeiry’s reign. Twelve Ministers of Education held the portfolio in the southern Sudan in the same period. The result was a lack of decision-making about the direction of the plan, its curriculum and the share of the national budget necessary for expanding school system.
The necessary conditions which were missing in the NEP, according to the study, include a planning infrastructure to make manpower projections and a reliable data base upon which to make decisions about school mapping or where to allocate resources effectively for maximizing learning and increasing equality.

Peter Woodward’s article (13) provides us also of a further insight into political situation of the Sudan during Nimeiry’s period and the period thereafter. He attempted to assess broadly the extent to which those now in power appear to have “broken the mould” of Sudanese politics, or how far even their experiences represent less a revolution than a continuation of themes in Sudanese politics. His past analysis had not suggested that Sudan was likely to be transformed by an essentially ideological grouping, be it communist or Muslim Brotherhood in origin. The obvious route to “revolution”, he said, is for such movements to capture the state and then use its power to transform society to the particular ideological blueprint of the movement. The state itself has limited capacity and its ability to impose the views of its rulers on such a vast country as the Sudan with a heterogeneous population has always been limited, he said.

Political control, said Woodward, has never been that assured to any regime, and since independence in 1956 there has been a succession of unstable civilian and military governments. They lacked the kind of ethnic and religious links that could spread their influence widely into the Sudanese society, at least in the northern Sudan. He mentioned
that a sense of something less than a clear revolutionary ideology was apparent in the large congresses called to decide on Sudan’s direction. For instance in the autumn of 1991 no less than 4000 ‘experts’ were assembled to a conference on a Comprehensive Strategy at which they were invited to chart the course for the Sudan to the year 2000. At the same time, and apparently unrelated to this conference, a new stricter code pertaining particularly to women-dress, and office conditions was suddenly promulgated. Such developments, according to Woodward, made it unclear how far there is a hidden ideological agenda unfolding; how far a small group are taking ad hoc and/or pragmatic decisions on ideological matters; and how far there really is a degree of ideological doubt in the regime which would be receptive to some inputs from Sudanese society more generally.

With regard to the economy, Woodward said, the developments of the late 1970s have largely continued. Thus, the ‘Islamisation’ of the economy through the banking and credit system is not new. The Islamists may be just as much perceived as milking what they can from the economy by controlling currency, community markets, foreign trade and aid, as did those who ruled before them. The combination of the slide into civil war, economic collapse and general political incompetence throughout the 1980s had long left Sudan increasingly isolated and marginalised.

Bereft of resources, and with accelerating inflation, there was, in Woodward’s view, little with which to win support. Education and the media may be used for the purpose of
achieving Islamic objectives, but while the quantity of the former may have expanded, its quality is widely believed to be in sharp decline. Coercion may repress opposition, according to Woodward, but it is hardly likely to cement the state in place especially in such a heterogeneous and historically lightly governed country. International isolation will not also make the task any easier.

Bona Malwal (14) presented what in his view is at stake in Sudanese politics. He focused his attention in the north-south Sudan relationship. In his point of view the mistrust between the north and the south is a general problem; it has not just arisen with the present Islamic fundamentalists but is at the heart of the Sudanese conflict. No northern political party or leadership is prepared to concede anything approaching equality to the south. According to him most northerners seem to believe that the south must remain part of Sudan, but that southerners must accept that they are not equal of northerners, and that the north must remain in control of the country. The north is very suspicious about what the south might do with its power given half a chance. The northerners believe that the south seeks every opportunity to break away from the north and that the only way to ensure that this does not occur is for the north to maintain a strong military and security presence in the south, to thwart any such attempts and to maintain the union by force. Bona Malwal argues that the Islamic fundamentalists use the role of Islam as an excuse with which to disguise Arab racism. The apparent debate about the role of Islam in the politics of Sudan today is not basically a genuine religious call of duty but a strategy to
dominate and control the Sudanese politics and the state. This is how the religious conflict in the Sudan should be understood, he said.

Graham F. Thomas' books (15) discuss the political conflicts in the Sudan from the year 1950 to 1989. He apparently focused very particular interest in the Sadiq al-Mahdi's government possibly as being his personal friend. In general he said the government in the Sudan was sliding from one crisis to another. There was no effective government, and chaos and disorder were widespread phenomena. He mentioned the open criticism of the internal and external policies being pursued by Sadiq al-Mahdi between the year 1986 and 1989, in particular the fact that nothing had been achieved economically. Agreement with the IMF was elusive and the infrastructure had collapsed.

Close examination of the structure of the democratic government headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi, indicated a total lack of stability, according to Thomas's analysis. By the time, for instance, the fourth list of Cabinet members was issued in March 1989 only three of the original 1986 Council members remained in major posts, and even these had been moved to other departments. Not only had there been major reshuffles of posts, but the Ministries themselves had been re-cast, necessitating even more changes. The prime pre-occupation of the government, according to Thomas's assessment, was simply to survive and none of the major problems were being addressed.
As well as existing within the context of recent literature on Sudanese politics the subject of this thesis demonstrates a modern phenomenon which indicates an example of intra-national conflict. As such it has a place within modern studies of ethnic conflicts. There has been several studies carried out about ethnic conflicts, not specifically directed to the ethnic situation in the Sudan, but which have a relation to the state of ethnicity in the contemporary Sudan. A study carried out by an American sociologist, Melville Dalton, is relevant to the ethnic conflict. In a book based on his long experience as a participant and observer in six business firms (Men who Manage, 1959) Dalton offered a revealing picture of organizational structure in terms of conflicting cliques and their interminable struggles for gaining more power and ensuring a greater share of organizational rewards. Even if sometimes exaggerated, the analysis showed in a striking way to what extent organization members and groups can be primarily interested in the pursuit of their narrow interest and the consolidation and improvement of their own power position, even at the expense of wider organizational interests (16). This analysis has some semblance to the situation in the Sudan in terms of the use of religion and ethnic identity to hold to political powers in the country.

Donald L. Horowitz explains ethnic conflict in terms of modernization theory. He defines conflict as a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize or eliminate rivals. Horowitz attributes conflict to uneven distribution of economic and educational opportunities in the modern sector. The fundamental assumption underlying modernization theories has been articulated in terms of converging
aspirations: "People’s aspirations and expectations change as they are mobilized into the modernizing economy and polity. Men enter into conflict not because they are different but because they are essentially the same. It is by making men more alike in the sense of possessing the same wants that modernization tends to promote conflict" (17). One further instance of the use of modernization theories is that because some groups gain a headstart in the competition for the rewards of modern world, the social classes that emerge tend to overlap and reinforce ethnic group boundaries, thereby making ethnic group confrontations more intense (18). This theory partly fits well in terms of northern and southern Sudan conflict situation where the northern Sudan had greater advantages in terms of modern sector of development.

Ethnically divided societies have a problem of achieving equity and maintaining national cohesion. The position of ethnicity as presented by Bacchus (1989) is that "there is enough evidence to support the view that the achievement of equity and maintenance of cultural diversity in multi-ethnic societies are not only desirable objectives in their own right but are also important prerequisites for achieving social stability and sustained social and economic development of these societies (19). However, as argued by Watson, "which policies are pursued will depend upon how the majority views its own economic, political and/or cultural position vis- -vis other groups in society, how it perceives the socio-economic development of that society and how the minority groups respond” (20). How the minority respond to the policies may well depend upon how far they perceive these policies as improving or hindering their position within the society. In the case of the
Sudan where the relationship between the northern and southern Sudan has been most of the time antagonistic, the perception by the Southern Sudanese of the northern policies has been that of hindering their development. There is presumably a high degree of unwillingness to compromise on the existing prejudices and assumptions. This is specially so because of the stress placed by the national government upon the dominant religion as a basis for national unity and national integration. One would agree with Watson that where integration is the policy pursued educational diversity will no be recognized. The long-term aim of both politicians and educationists is that minorities will gradually become integrated into the social and political framework of the majority with future generations becoming assimilated (21). On reflection, this is the conception the central government in the Sudan has in their relentless insistence in pursuing their centralizing policies.

Watson has also identified one of the most effective strategies used in most developed and developing countries to bring about national unity. “The most effective long-term educational measures to achieve national unity have been to use the curriculum and the syllabuses of individual subjects taught, reinforced through the state’s control of examination system and policy towards national language provision” (22). The Sudan government has attempted to employ these policies and this has been apparently one of the key factors in educational policies related to the key educational areas.
2.3. JUSTIFICATION OF THIS INVESTIGATION AND WHY THE EMPIRICAL STUDY TOOK PLACE IN UK.

The structure of this thesis has been influenced by the availability of sources and the convenience of carrying out the empirical work within the United Kingdom (UK). This research could not have been easily carried out within the Sudan because of a number of reasons. The first is the question of the interplay between the researcher and the current government (the policy-makers). The existing conflicts between the southern and the northern Sudan as reflected in the present on-going war in the country would not have provided a safe atmosphere for the researcher to carry out the empirical work without security risk. The researcher was a Headteacher for Secondary School in the Southern Sudan for a period of seven years (1978-1985). He held a number of other posts in the Regional Ministry of Education thereafter; this included the posts of Deputy Director for Administration (1985-1987); Director of Research and Educational Documentation (1987-1989); Director of Planning and Development Administration. He represented the Equatoria State Ministry of Education in a Coordination Meeting of Directors General of Education in the Sudan in Khartoum (Feb. 1991). He was the only person who strongly opposed the new Islamic educational policies which were being introduced at that time. All the Directors General who attended the meeting were of Islamic background. His opposition to the Islamic education policies created an unfavourable relation between him as the educational planner for the Equatoria State and his Minister who was an Islamic fundamentalist.
Education is one of the main issues of contention in the present crisis in the country and is also central to the current Islamic fundamentalist ideological attempt to mould an Islamic society in the Sudan. The nature of the research and what it intends to investigate would not therefore fit in the educational programmes of the government. The question that would have been asked would be what the findings of the study would be used for. The present government of the Sudan censors researches on policy issues because it has got its own agenda of how the policies for the country, including educational policies, are to be developed and what trends they should take. Generally educational policy issues are areas which are not subjected to open discussion in the Sudan as this would provide avenues for challenging the official views of the government on educational matters. This can be reflected in the absence of detailed analysis of the educational policies in the available literature on policies in the Sudan. The researches which are allowed are those whose findings are expected to justify or reinforce the trends that the government has already set itself to achieve or follow. The term for such research will not provide a sufficient degree of freedom to ensure that the work is genuinely conditioned by curiosity, freedom to establish the researcher’s own research methods, and freedom in the nature of presentation and dissemination of the results.

The censorship by the Sudanese government of most of its policy issues is extended even to the control of its documentation within certain organizations within and outside the Sudan. The ODA Library in Glasgow, for instance, contains a large number of reports and journal articles about Sudanese educational policies but access to them have been severely
restricted. Out of the 42 journal articles and consultants' reports identified as available in that Library, the researcher was granted access to only seven of the reports and journals. Access could not be availed to him to the rest of the reports and articles because the Sudan government has commissioned their uses (23). The Senior Education Adviser in ODA reported that at the present moment the Sudan Government has very poor relations with the British government and several world organizations, as a result it is quite reluctant to allow the exposure of its policies through the available documentation with such organizations. The researcher was advised to seek clearance from the Sudanese government. The researcher believes that such clearance would not have been granted to him. Consequently, because of this restrictions, there is too little awareness of the real context in which the Sudanese government has developed its educational policies. This has led to ill-informed policies especially in relation to the southern Sudan.

Research on educational policy is regarded with suspicion in the Sudan because of the political and religious context in which they have been made. The education system in the Sudan has been one of the principal instruments through which the Islamic system has been sustained and perpetuated in the country. It has always remained a central political issue and has been perceived by all the political parties in the Sudan as a terrain over which political struggle occur.

There is a significant reason why the study focuses mainly on the southern Sudan. It is intended to fill in the gaps in the present knowledge of the educational policies and
practice in the Sudan in terms of the southern Sudan and help to underline the basic problems affecting educational development in the southern Sudan. The researcher is aware of the fact that the present Sudan government would not be interested in the findings of this research and it would not make any difference to the educational practice of the government. But the research is important in the sense that it provides a vital insight into the Sudanese educational practices and sets a basis upon which future action will unfold in terms of development of education in the southern Sudan, for instance, when it gets separated from the northern Sudan.

The research has also been influenced by a sensitivity to the area of policy in regards to the Sudanese politics. The sensitivity of the policy area would not have allowed respondents within the Sudan to be at ease to freely provide answers to the questions relevant to the research area. Fortunately, the researcher has discovered a number of Sudanese resources available within UK who are in a position to provide adequate information in regard to the research area. The selection of the persons to be interviewed was therefore based on the individual person’s knowledge of the Sudanese educational policies. Those interviewed were regarded as having had empirical knowledge of particular areas of educational policy or being in position of influence with regards to educational policies in the Sudan. Some of these persons had played key roles in the development of government policies. They are therefore in a position to provide information and unique insight into the educational policy issues in the Sudan which could not have been easily provided if the interviews
were conducted within the Sudan. The researcher was able to identify 39 of such persons available for the interview within UK.

2.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

The choice of a research method for this study was determined partly by the nature of its subject matter and partly by the situation of Sudanese politics and its relationship with the researcher at the time. The subject matter is clearly educational policy and it must therefore be governed by the traditions of policy research. But unfortunately little has been written about policy research in the field of education. Standard education research textbooks (Louis Cohen and Lawrence Manion, 1992; Torsten Hosen and Maurice Kogan, 1984; Rene Sarah and Vernon Trafford, 1990) discuss historical research, survey research, and describe different techniques related to this subject matter such as archival and questionnaire oriented methods. Policy research has been defined as the process of conducting research on, or analysis of, a fundamental social problem in order to provide policy-makers with pragmatic, action-oriented recommendations for alleviating the problem (24). Doing policy research for problem definitional purpose has been described by Weiss (1977) as the "enlightenment function" of social research (25). An example of a policy research study for definitional purposes is described by James Coleman (1975) in his famous study on the equality of educational opportunity. Coleman made the observation that major contribution of his study was to help policy-makers define educational inequality. Previously, inequality had been defined solely in terms of the amount of resources that were put into educational system. Coleman's study helped to
shift attention and understanding away from input and toward the unequal effects of the resources on the children. Therefore, many policy research studies may actually focus primarily on shaping policy-makers’ understanding of the social problems, and by doing so, make the causes and alternative solutions clearer (26).

Policy research may be considered as a branch of contemporary history because much of the evidences are derived from written sources such as regulations, acts, and policy statements. It indicates for instance who took part in devising policy; who took part in implementing policy and who were affected by the implementation of the policy. In fact as mentioned by Richardson and Jordan (1979), policy-making has to take account of how it will be implemented, who will implement it and who will be recruited and motivated to help in its implementation. The policy-maker who fails to think about the impact on clients or likely response of practitioners in the field will not be making policy that will work (27).

Methods include archival (desk) research, individual testimonies from questionnaires, and individual interviews. If possible triangulation should involved all of these methods measured against each other, and triangulation would also require a variety of witnesses whose testimonies can be measured against each other. The problems with written questionnaires, especially in the subject area as this, are that they provide no immediate feedback as in the case of interviews which permit one to follow-up leads and thus permitting much greater depth and clarity. Questionnaires are framed with specific answers in mind, to which the respondent replies with a selection from a number of short responses. They can be usefully employed in surveys of opinion about previously known
and agreed phenomena. Questionnaires cannot however be exploratory: cannot thereby attract answers which the questioner has not previously thought about. Questionnaires also have the weakness of not probing deeply enough to provide a true picture of the situations studied. The flexibility and adaptability and human interaction that are unique strengths of the interview also allow subjectivity and possible bias that in some research situation are its greatest weakness (28).

Ideally the empirical research should have taken place in the Sudan where a cross-section of the population, particularly the policy-makers like the Ministers and civil servants well placed in the policy-making positions, plus the teachers and, could have been involved in the research. This has not been possible because of the prevailing political and security situation in the Sudan. The choice of witnesses was therefore necessarily limited by the need to be restricted to those living at present in the United Kingdom (UK). The chosen methods for this research were a limited amount of desk research and interviews of witnesses. The researcher had chosen interview approach to this research mainly because of the limited number of the well informed respondents available in UK. The researcher would not like to lose the valuable information the respondents may possess by unduly constraining their responses. The use of the interview method enabled the researcher to obtain information that would probably not have been provided if questionnaires or other methods were used. The interview questions were focused toward eliciting the respondents knowledge on:

1. The Sudanese educational policies.
2. How the policies were implemented.

3. What were the impact and implications of the policies on the development of education in the southern Sudan.

The verbal questions were open-ended so as to enable the respondent to provide the researcher with much factual information they know about the Sudanese educational policies during the period under review. To substitute for open questions as stated by Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, the researcher would need to lengthen the questionnaires with endless lists of multiple choice and agreed/disagree statements, which are then handled by sophisticated data-processing analytical techniques to try to massage some pattern or meaning out of the huge mass of pre-coded and punched data (29). Open-ended questions eliminate the need for several closed questions and that subsequent data analysis becomes clear and easy.

Before practically carrying out the empirical research, the researcher had taken the task of identifying possible individuals within UK, who are assumed to have some knowledge of the Sudanese educational policies. These were done mainly through some Sudanese organizations and communities and friends in UK. Initially 152 persons, of various professional backgrounds, were identified. This number was later shortlisted to 45 persons based on their presumed knowledge related to the educational policies. The questions and the methods to be employed were signaled to the participants in advance, mainly through telephone. All, except two, had accepted to be interviewed. This then led to the researcher
scheduling the dates and possible times to interview the individual persons who accepted
to take part in the interview.

The interviews, which lasted from the middle of January to the middle of September 1994,
were tape-recorded. Permission for the tape-recording was sought from the individual
from the initial start of the interview. Four persons had declined to be tape-recorded. In
this case the researcher had to take notes of the interviews. The resulting interview
audiotapes and written notes were transcribed into proper script and provides a testimony
of those interviewed. This collection will be deposited in the Department Library of the
University of Leeds, School of Education for use by other researchers.

Tape-recording had the advantage of obtaining all the information of each of the individual
respondent verbatim, and allowed the tape-recorded data to be played back more than
once and thus enabled thorough study of the testimonies provided by the respondents.
During the process of interviewing it made it possible for the researcher to give thought to
what the interviewee was saying and enable him to formulate follow-up questions.
However the tape recording had a number of disadvantages. The disadvantages included
the fact that everything said by the individual respondent was recorded. The material
recorded were then transcribed and read before useful data were at hand. It was an
expensive exercise in terms of the funds, i.e. to obtain the machine and all its accessories.
Secondly it took quite a long time and required a lot of patience to have them transcribed,
leave alone the ear-aching exercise of listening to all the tapes. Thirdly there was the
problem of finding a conducive atmosphere to carry out the recording without undue 
interruption, especially in family homes where the presence of the small children was 
sometimes difficult to avoid. One other principal disadvantage of using a tape-recorder 
with the interview, as mentioned by Walter R. Borg and Meredith D. Gall (1989), which 
was observable in few cases during the interview, was that the presence of the tape 
recorder changed the interview situation or the mode of the interviewee to some degree. 
However despite these problems, over 90% of the interviews were successfully conducted 
without much interference.

One other basic problem encountered was related to the expenses incurred in the process 
of traveling almost all over the UK to carry out the interviews. In order to complete the 
interviews the researcher had to travel to a number of cities in the UK, sometimes more 
than once. The researcher traveled to the following cities in the whole course of the 
interviews: London, Reading, Oxford, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Blackburn, 
Durham, Edinburgh, and Glasgow.

One other significant problem encountered was that despite the fact that the individuals 
selected for the interviews were informed quite in advance a number of them did not sort 
themselves out for the day of the interview. This fact underlines one of the reasons why 
the researcher did not opt for the questionnaire approach for the fear of low returns. This 
could be attributed to the preoccupation of the individuals to other pressing problems and 
needs in the environment in which they reside.
2.5. COMMENTS AND OBSERVATION:

The responses and what had influenced the responses reflected very much on the political orientation and cultural inclination of the individuals and from which part of the Sudan the individuals come. The refusal rates by people to be interviewed and the presumed reasons for refusal reflect also the same orientation. The political judgments are possibly permeated by the sense of the past in assessing the motives of the research, rather than on the merits of the research. Three persons (all from the northern Sudan) have refused to be interviewed although they have initially accepted the researcher's request to interview them. These three persons belong to the National Islamic Front, the party of the present Fundamentalist Islamic government of the Sudan. This is quite understandable in the Sudanese situation where different value judgments opposed to each other exist in the country, especially between the north and the south. Within the context of the present Islamic government the policies being implemented cannot be inconsistent with the socio-economic, religious, political and military strategies of the National Islamic Front (30). The assumption is that the exposure of the real context of the government policies through such research would increase the already existing polarization in the country and undermine the government-intended policy drives. Out of the 39 persons finally interviewed only seven were from the northern Sudan.

Though the political differences in the Sudanese politics, especially between the northern and southern Sudan, seemed to have affected the responses of some of the respondents,
the research has revealed significant factual information related to the educational policies in the Sudan that was not easily obtainable before. It is assumed that this will contribute significantly to the future development of educational policies in the southern Sudan in particular.

The following table shows the categories of the respondents to the interview.

**TABLE 1. THE RESPONDENTS TO THE INTERVIEW:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. School Teachers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. University Lecturers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Some of these have been previously school teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Politicians</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>These include former Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan and former President of the Southern Regional Government; Governor of Regional State; and National and Regional Ministers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Others</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TOTAL</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next chapter analyses one of the specific policy areas - Universal Primary Education in the Sudan. It points out that though universal primary education has been considered as a
desirable and basic form of education for the majority of education, the implementation of the policy has not been easy to realized.
REFERENCES:


8. Garvey-Williams, Ibid.


11. El-Fatih A. Abdel Salam, Ibid.


13. Peter Woodward, Ibid.
15. Graham F. Thomas, Ibid.
23. Correspondence with the Senior Education Adviser in the ODA, Dr.D.G.Swift, 11th August 1994.
30. Reported by a Sudanese Ambassador.
CHAPTER THREE

3. UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION IN THE SUDAN

3.1. INTRODUCTION.

Most of the governments of the African and other third world countries have the desire to offer basic education to all their citizens but the ways and means of achieving the objective have not been easy to come by. The meeting of the African Ministers of Education in Addis Ababa in 1961 noted that education was a fundamental ingredient in social and economic development of the African countries. They resolved that basic education should gradually expand so that by 1980 universal primary education could be achieved (1). The question of how the initiative and the implementation of the programmes were to be carried out was left to the individual country using its own devices, since the conditions and environment in each of the countries varied. The Sudanese national government, in its Five-Year Plan (1972-1977), had the provision of the universal primary education as one of its long term goals (2). Its plan was to achieve a nationwide enrollment of 60% for the primary schooling by 1977 and universalisation of primary education to be achieved by 1992 (3). It did not however define how this was going to be achieved in such a country as the Sudan with its heterogeneous population and environment as well as wide diversities in the provision of education. What was apparent was that no research was undertaken in particular to determine the possibility of success in the implementation of the plan and the back-up services that might be required to the system.
The UN Inter-Agency Team (ILO) that carried out a study connected to growth, employment and equity in the Sudan in 1975 noted, from the onset of the introduction of the policy for the implementation of the primary education, that the achievement of universal primary education in the Sudan at the earliest possible date had no reasonable prospect of being realized without a change in policy that was being pursued by the Sudanese government and without a complete break from the trends of enrollment (4). The trend of education taken by the Sudanese government did not take into consideration the realities of the educational needs in the various parts of the Sudan. The educational policies developed in the Sudan have been influenced by educational policy developments in the Arab world which focused more towards the Arab strategy for the development of education. The difficulties that the government was bound to face were clear from the existence of regional disparities in the enrollments of the school aged children. For instance, though the southern region housed about 25% of the population of the Sudan in 1972, the ratio of registration for the primary school was only 8.2% (5). There was also an imbalance between the urban and rural areas. For instance, although about 79% of the population lived in the later its share of education was less than 30%.

One of the main reasons for the air of pessimism about the trend taken by the government was attributed to the national policy geared towards the establishment of Arab culture and Islamic faith through education. This approach was irrelevant to the southern region and the response from that end to the sort of education provided was largely negative. For
instance President Nimeiry, in his speech about the new educational policy in 1970, stated that his education revolution was intended to enable the Sudanese nation to play its role in diffusing the Arab culture and the principles of the Islamic faith throughout the African continent (7). The educational programme of the revolution stressed the social and cultural importance of Arabic (8). This policy trend was bound to come into conflict with the southern cultures and therefore alienated the southern part of the country from the main stream of the national education.

The orientation of the policy of education towards the Arab World has been reflected in the content of the curriculum provided for the school throughout the period under review. The policy direction has remained unchanged for all this period. The national government probably found it difficult to reconcile its Arab World interest with the relevant educational needs for development throughout the country. This insistence is clear from the report of the ODA/BC Adviser in Public Administration and Management Development in 1987, ten years after the report given by the UN Inter-Agency Team. This later report stated that “the target for universal primary education cannot be achieved for a long time to come” for the same reasons as provided by the UN Inter-Agency Team. It further stated that there were insufficient funds to expand primary education to reach 100% or even 90% enrollment rates before the year 2000. The whole educational development strategy was based on the optimistic financial presumptions that were not easy to realize e.g. the dependence on local government funding, self-help funding and external contributions. The ODA/BC Adviser therefore stated that “the achievement of
universal primary education at the earliest possible date has no reasonable prospect of being achieved without a change in the policy of the national government” (9). The national government has apparently been reluctant to provide a real breakthrough in the search for an ideal system that embodies the wide diversities in the country.

The management structure of the education system in the country as a whole is top-heavy and highly centralized, with little room for regional government, parents, teachers and other members of the community to participate in the education of the children. There was lack of a well-defined policy regarding the development of the relevant and viable alternative educational policy that would take account of the traditional societies in the southern Sudan. Such a state was not therefore conducive to motivating parents, particularly those in the rural areas, to send their children to school.

3.2. PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT

The national government had intended to raise the ratio of acceptance of children aged 7 into the first grade of primary schools from 45.7% in 1975/76 to 100% in 1990/91. The southern and western parts of the Sudan at this time had less than 10% enrollment rates. In 1974/75 the total number of pupils in the primary schools for the whole of the Sudan was 1,249,431. This number of pupils increased to 1,491,704 in 1980/81, a rise of 7.2%. In 1990/91 the number went up to 2,079,649, an increase of 39% over the 1980/81 figure. This was relative to the population increase in the country and represented only 18% of
the total population of the children under 15 years, estimated at this time at 11,300,000 (10).

There were great disparities in the enrollment of school age children between the various parts of the country. The north and the east enrolled about three times as high a proportion of children as the west, and the southern region only enrolled about one sixth as many as the rest of the country (11). Table two below shows this variation.

**TABLE 2: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS IN THE PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN THE SUDAN, 1974/75-1980/81:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>1974/75</th>
<th>1977/78</th>
<th>1980/81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN</td>
<td>175411</td>
<td>198581</td>
<td>181273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL</td>
<td>397557</td>
<td>429489</td>
<td>456494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN</td>
<td>120397</td>
<td>124680</td>
<td>141486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KORDOFAN</td>
<td>150339</td>
<td>173623</td>
<td>218492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARFUR</td>
<td>92065</td>
<td>81071</td>
<td>137310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHARTOUM</td>
<td>192982</td>
<td>169394</td>
<td>214051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB/TOTAL N.SUDAN</td>
<td>1128751</td>
<td>1176838</td>
<td>1349106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER NILE</td>
<td>26059</td>
<td>20693</td>
<td>32431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAHR EL GHAZAL</td>
<td>41168</td>
<td>28114</td>
<td>32491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUATORIA</td>
<td>53363</td>
<td>48307</td>
<td>77676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB/TOTAL S.SUDAN</td>
<td>120590</td>
<td>97114</td>
<td>142598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1975/76 approximately 97,000 children were enrolled in the government maintained primary schools in the southern Sudan. This number represented less than 22% of the total primary school age children in the south Sudan, which represents less that 10% of the national enrollment. The total number of the school age children was estimated as 446,664 (12). The average enrollment rate in the northern Sudan as a whole in the same year was more than 50%.

The proportion of the primary school age group (7-12) actually attending schools also varied considerably from one province to another in the southern Sudan. For instance the Lakes Province had 12.4% enrollment, Bahr El Ghazal Province 12.8%, Jonglei Province 13.6%, Western Equatoria Province 39.6%, and Eastern Equatoria Province 40.8%.

There were 445 primary schools in the southern Sudan in the year 1975/76 and a total of 2,199 classes. These number of classes did not represent however the actual number of classrooms. There were classes of pupils with no classrooms and schooling was undertaken out of doors. There were also other premises where two sessions of schooling took place and the same classroom being used daily by two separate classes (13). All these situations were indicative of the problems the government was to have been faced with in the implementation of the universal primary school policy in the southern Sudan in particular. There has not been any indication that the government took into consideration
these problems before setting the target date for the achievement of universalisation in the country.

The provinces with the low rates of enrollment were those where cattle herding is the main preoccupation of the tribal people. This suggests that labour requirements linked with cattle herding, the traditional migratory patterns associated with grazing of cattle at different seasons, the tribal customs and the parental attitudes were all contributory factors that limited the number of children sent to schools. These factors determined the low levels of demands and support for schooling (14) in the western sense of formal education. Controlling the migratory movement of these tribes would entail the provision of permanent areas for pastures and water. The regional government neither had the funds nor others means to persuade the parents to send their children to school or to support the policy of the universal primary education. It was not even easy for the regional government to develop the patterns of schooling that would meet the special social and economic conditions of these people. The orientation of the national education policies towards the Arab backgrounds would also mean that there would be some discrepancy between the values taught in the school and the dominant values of the societies in the southern Sudan. These societies did not conceive of the education provided as part of a series of socio-economic changes designed to bring about real improvement in their material and cultural conditions. This meant that the setting of targets for the achievement of universal primary education was inconceivable (15). There was lack of political will
right from the start to develop an awareness and understanding of the environmental, cultural, economic and social problems existing in the various parts of the country.

Another important constraint in the implementation of the universal primary education policy especially in the southern Sudan was the number and quality of the teachers available. The number of teachers employed in the government-maintained primary schools in the south Sudan in 1975/76 was 2460 for 2199 classes. This gave a ratio of about 1.1 teacher to a class. This was indicative of a heavy teaching load for the teachers. Apart from the inadequate number of the teachers available the quality was as well poor. Nearly 46% of the teachers were untrained. The cattle herding provinces had more untrained teachers than the trained ones. This was because many teachers were reluctant to go to teach in those provinces (16).

The only areas in the southern Sudan where the prospect for universal primary education was relatively possible were the provinces of Eastern and Western Equatoria. A study on "Demand and Supply of Educational Facilities in the Sudan" between 1973-1986, revealed a rapid quantitative expansion in education in Equatoria (17). The enrollment of the school aged population (7-12) had reached 60% in 1985/86. The total number of the primary schools reached about 400 in the same year. However this upward trend of enrollment was interrupted by the intensification of the war in the country between the national government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army which forced almost all the schools in the area to close. As a result, from 1986 to 1991, the total number of the primary
schools in the area dropped from 400 to only 72 i.e. almost 82% drop from the 1985 figure (18). The number of the pupils had also drastically dropped. Despite this adverse development resulting in massive defense and national security costs leave alone the mounting debts and lack of adequate resources, the national government in 1990 came up with a new target date, 1993, for the achievement of universal primary education in the country. It is difficult to gauge the logic behind the setting of this new target time.

3.3. THE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN.

The implementation of the universal primary education in the southern Sudan had a remoter chance of success than anywhere in the country. The southern Sudan is the poorest part of the country and much of it has remained inaccessible to modern influences and the established government schools. It is as well the least developed area in the country. The former Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan and a former President of the Southern Sudan Regional Government (1978) attributed the lack of the educational development in the southern Sudan to the policy and attitudes of the national government towards education in the southern Sudan. He said "the ruling elites in Khartoum are opposed to the expansion of education in the southern Sudan because this was going to deprive them of their educational monopoly and would awaken the southerners to demand for their rights. The northern government was therefore determined to keep the south
down educationally through such devices as the imposition of Arabic, the lack of good teachers, irrelevant learning and teaching materials and control of funds for educational development in the south Sudan” (20). However, although the major block in the educational development in the southern Sudan was the national government, about three quarters of the researcher’s interviewees had blamed the southern regional government and the southern politicians for not having played their roles well enough to effect changes in education in the southern Sudan. For instance, although the national government came up with the policy of universal primary education, however unrealistic this might have been, the regional government on its part never seriously studied or analyzed the policy in order to devise a better approach in implementing the policy in the southern Sudan. The regional government never informed the citizens of the south about the policy (21). It did not also have clear agenda of how education was to be developed in the southern Sudan (22). The politicians focused much of their attention to the survival of their individual interests. The southern political parties on the other hand were there “to create faces” for election into offices and once that was achieved they succumbed to what the national government directed them to do irrespective of its relevance to educational development in the southern Sudan (23). “They do not want to be left out” (24).

There was, in general, a lack of political will on the part of the southern regional government and the southern politicians to press for the improvement of education in the southern Sudan. For instance the regional government provided no explanation about the significance of the policy of universal primary education and did not initiate discussion
about the general framework with the implementers of the policy e.g. the teachers, the area education officers, the local chiefs and the parents who were particularly influential among the rural population (25). These groups of people were not aware of what roles they were to play in the implementation process of the policy. Like the national government the regional government did not carry out any feasibility study or any kind of research into how best the policy could be handled and what pace the implementation of the policy could take especially in regard to the semi-nomadic tribes. This was necessary in order to employ a suitable approach or procedure to initiate the programme in the region (26). The regional government therefore, like the national government, lacked accurate statistics for the school age children and others factors that could have formed the bases for the implementation of the programmes (27).

The former governor of Equatoria State (1989) and a one time Minister of Education for the same state (1986) stated that the needed data of the school aged children could not be collected because of lack of manpower to carry that out (28). Universal primary education could not be effectively undertaken without knowing the needs of the local communities through an effective inspectorate (29). This was a basic problem in the system of education in the southern Sudan according to the Governor. Funding was not also made available to the regional government for the implementation of the universal primary education programmes and moreover the south did not have a guaranteed source of raising revenue locally (30). One of the weaknesses that the former Minister of Education mentioned was that the Regional Ministry of Education had spent greater efforts in
strengthening the positions in the headquarters of the Ministry and thus ignored the vital areas of education such as the Inspectorate and Teacher Training Departments (31). These were supposed to be the essential Departments for the implementation of the universal primary education policy.

The haphazard plan of education in the south especially in terms of realizing universal primary education has been shown in the location of the primary schools in the region. The government educational plan, particularly in choosing the location of schools, has been political in the sense that the politicians decided the building of schools simply for the sake of getting votes (32). Concentration of schools were more in the urban areas than in the rural areas. Some of the schools found in the rural areas were constructed without taking into consideration the catchment areas for the pupils to feed the schools. For instance the government had built a number of schools in the Kapoeta area but no educational activities were taking place in them, e.g. the schools at Iwato, Pariga, and Tijeye. There were neither pupils nor teachers in those schools. The schools at Iwato and Moboya were located in the middle of no man’s land though they were more beautiful than even the University of Juba (33).

The Toposa and the Boya tribes who occupy greater area of Kapoeta Province have no desire or incentive to send their children to schools. These attitudes also apply to the other pastoralist tribes like the Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, Murle, Anywak and Latuho. These tribes prefer their children to look after the cattle. In order to succeed in educating the Toposa
people, for example, you need first to settle them while gradually introducing them to the new way of life (34). These tribes have their unique ways of life which required a different approach. A proper research at the initial stage would have been necessary to assess the possibilities of carrying this out. The main sources of attraction to them are grazing land and water (35). Increasing the size of enrollment of children into the primary schools among these tribes therefore entailed the digging of wells to provide water for the cattle and for the growing of pastures around them (36), which the government was not able to provide. This would reduce the amount of their movement and thereby availing the opportunity to provide some form of formal primary education to the children (37). The second factor would have been to use the vernacular as a language of instruction. This would require having teachers who were capable to teach in those vernaculars. No provisions have been made in the government educational system for the training of the vernacular teachers in the Sudan. The third essential strategy, which was of crucial importance, could have been to provide more boarding schools (38). In the past, a few boarding schools were provided but were mainly confined to pupils in the urban areas. This policy was later scrapped by the government because of lack of funds to sustain them. The absence of boarding schools and local initiatives, i.e. the active involvement of the local chiefs, meant that getting the children to schools from such tribes was difficult (39). There were no incentives that could have motivated the parents to send their children to schools (40). The government was not in a position to provide answers to the question of pasture and water, two important factors that guided the lives and movements of the
tribes (41). There was therefore no basic ground for any success of the policy of the universal primary education. There was no way of how it could be enforced.

One of the mistakes that have been existing in the Southern Regional Government was that of being complacent in accepting any Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to carry out its own projects without concern for the regional needs and regional priorities in the field of development (42). Normally the Regional Government called meetings of Cabinet Ministers or those connected to policy decisions to hurriedly evaluate NGO projects and readily accepted them without proper study of how the project would be incorporated into the general development framework of the southern region (43). This has been clearly demonstrated in the projects of the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) that operated in the Eastern Equatoria Province. The NCA took up an educational project which was entitled “Educational Support Project”. This was originally intended to provide support to the existing regional government educational programmes. But the Regional Ministry of Education provided no guidelines of operation for the NCA (44). In the absence of the government’s educational plan of work the NCA developed its own plans of action which were presented to the government and were endorsed without any change (45). There was no monitoring and inspection of the NCA educational activities by the Regional Ministry of Education. This resulted in the NCA locating schools in the locations of their choice not necessarily where the government wanted the schools to be located. This resulted in some schools being located in areas where the demand was low or motivation for education was not available (46). For instance the schools built in Imurok
area had no pupils to use them. In Kiela, the people actually burned the school desks to use as firewood for cooking (47). In a way the educational activities of the NCA were not properly directed by the government for a long term educational impact e.g. in effecting universal primary education programmes.

Paradoxically in the areas where the parents had great interests to send their children to schools e.g. in the Acholi, Madi and Bari lands, not enough schools were provided to suffice their needs. The local council educational institutions in the rural areas that were meant to be the main organs for the implementation of the universal primary education policy were crippled by financial constraints and other basic institutional infrastructures such as buildings (48). The self-help schools built by the local people, e.g. those in the Yei area, through local initiatives were not provided with the needed teachers by the Regional Ministry of education or the provincial Education Department. The lack of educational provision and the absence of the needed teachers acted as a break in the attempts to expand education through self-help (49).

3.4. EDUCATIONAL WASTAGE

One of the characteristic features of the educational system in the Sudan is its dependence on annual promotional examinations within a level of education and the terminal public examinations for transfer to the next educational levels. This practice is said to have made a mockery of the whole concept of the universal primary education (50). This was an accepted norm by the government as reflected, for instance in the educational policy
speech of President Nimeiry in his declaration of the new educational policy in 1970. The President stated that "every child has equal right to the opportunity of education; the only limiting factor is the child's ability to participate in it. Everyone with the necessary ability and ambition will have a fair chance" (51). The examination was the only device used to prove the abilities of the children. For the pupils in the southern Sudan the chances of success were very minimal because of the number of obstacles to fair competition such as the Arabic language and the irrelevant (abstract) curriculum. They did not therefore have an equal opportunity for education. The examinations practically destroyed most of the children at the bud, particularly the children from the southern Sudan. Many were either dismissed at the various stages of the primary school or were asked to repeat the class.

The question that remained unanswered was the purpose of the policy of universal primary education and what form it was supposed to take. Many children were being dismissed from the first stage of the primary school when they were as young as 8 or 9 years. This practice existed throughout the period under review. Statistical figures are not available from the Sudanese Ministry of Education to show the decline in enrollment between Grade 1 and Grade 6 of primary education, either in the country as a whole or in south Sudan in particular. What follows in tables 3 and 4 are the results of the Grade 6 leaving examinations which demonstrate that half of the candidates in the Western and Eastern Equatoria regions managed to gain admission into intermediate education. If we consider Equatoria Region as a better region in terms of educational provision and development
than the other regions in the southern Sudan, then we can conceive of how the situation was in the other regions.

Table 3: The Primary Leaving Examination Results for Western Equatoria Province:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cand Male</th>
<th>Cand Fem</th>
<th>Cand Tot</th>
<th>Total Pass.</th>
<th>Total Pass.</th>
<th>Total Fail</th>
<th>Total Fail</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85/6</td>
<td>2342</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>3241</td>
<td>1236</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1522</td>
<td>2627</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86/7</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>2435</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Primary Leaving Examination Results in Eastern Equatoria Province:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cand Male</th>
<th>Cand Fem</th>
<th>Cand Tot</th>
<th>T.P. Male</th>
<th>T.P. Fem</th>
<th>T.P. Tot</th>
<th>T.F. Male</th>
<th>T.F. Fem</th>
<th>T.F. Tot</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85/6</td>
<td>3180</td>
<td>2061</td>
<td>5241</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>2484</td>
<td>1799</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>2757</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86/7</td>
<td>2794</td>
<td>1344</td>
<td>4138</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>1685</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>2453</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There was no indication in the policy of the universal primary education that suggested that the primary pupils were being prepared for a future as farmers, to become men and women who might develop the resources of the country. As reported by the UN Inter-
Agency Team they were studying in the hope of getting a good enough marks in the grade six primary leaving examinations to enter the intermediate schools (53). The “Purpose of learning is to pass the examinations; the purpose of passing the examinations is to climb up the educational ladder; the purpose of climbing the educational ladder is to gain the certification which will ensure subsequent employment in the modern sector activities” (54). This was a concept that was en-grained into the minds of the pupils, parents as well as the teachers.

3.5. THE SOURCES OF FINANCING THE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION:

The Sudanese government had a persistent problem of mobilizing the necessary financial and human resources to achieve the quantitative targets of the universal primary education policy. An analysis of the economic problems of the Sudan as presented jointly by the Sudanese Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the World Bank, and the IMF pointed out to a number of constraints that affected the Sudanese economy (55). These included:

1. The economic and financial effects of the intensification of the war between the national government and the southern based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.

2. The collapse of Sudan Government revenue, leading to unstable levels of expenditures and excessive borrowing.

3. Significant declines in the level of infrastructural provision and in general
maintenance of the government revenue.

4. An over-elaborate apparatus of ineffective controls which increased the size of the unproductive bureaucracy. This was said to have accounted for the reluctance of the Sudanese expatriates to have nothing to do with the government in terms of investment in the country.

The Sudanese environment was so unreliable and the government policies so inconsistent that no long term investment was undertaken by any private investors (56). Because of this state of the economy the Sudanese government sought the community's cooperation to reduce the cost of the reforms in education. It is not easy to judge the commitment of the community and the type of resources the government expected the community to have at their disposal to sustain such long term programmes. In the drive to achieve universal primary education the government of President Nimeiry estimated that 2/3 of the cost of building schools, hostels and houses for the teachers would be covered by local efforts i.e. through self-help (57). According to the 1975/76 proposition, the central government's share to education was 14.1%; of the People's Local Councils was 81.7% and only 1% from the self-help source and 3.2% from external sources (58). From the general economic and financial situation in the country the reliability of the government on the local efforts had a very meager chance of success. No basis was provided by the government that indicated the significance of the local sources. The concept of self-help as envisaged by the government could only be understood by the tribes who had understood the values of education in the western sense of education. Those who valued their
traditional way of life such as the pastoral tribes saw no relevance to those types of education and the request for self-help therefore would not have appealed to them.

The new sources of financing education proposed by the new Islamic government that came to power in 1989 showed similar unreliable funding sources as those proposed during President Nimeiry’s period. The new sources of funding education proposed in 1990 were the following:

1. Establishment of Education Financing Fund to be financed by non-governmental sources, such as companies, investment firms and banks, in particular percentages. As mentioned earlier in the report of the UN Inter-Agency Team, no private investors were motivated to invest in the Sudan because of its failing economy.

2. Regulation of certain fees designated for Education Financing Fund.

3. The citizen, the expatriates and the revenues from the investment institutions.

4. The unused revenues from the lands of the Ministry of Education.

5. The establishment of investment firms such as paper manufacturing factory, copy books and textbooks printing press, chalks, teaching aids and toy producing factories. The establishment also of estates in strategic places in the towns and a Commercial Bank in which the students should be the share holders.

7. When establishing major developmental projects, the cost of education was to be included in the general cost of the project.

8. Educational institutions were to be encouraged to become productive units to contribute towards the functions of the institutions.
These were in many aspects farfetched proposals which did not have any chance of success. In the first place there was no research or simple study carried out to assess their viability. These were proposals moreover made at a time of the intensification of the war in the country. The execution of the war in the southern Sudan, in particular, was a government priority. All these factors made the implementation of the universal primary education as proposed by the national government unthinkable.

3.6. CONCLUSION:

The universal primary education policy was adopted without the appropriate research and the appropriate provisions in terms of the physical facilities such as the school buildings, relevant textbooks and the needed teachers. There was no prospect that the teachers required would be available particularly for the remoter regions like the southern Sudan. The remote nature of much of the Sudan and very poor communication and transport infrastructures, made the collection of the much needed data for designing sound policy to plan realistic implementation phases of the policy in the whole country very difficult.

There were very limited consultations between the national government and the regional government as well as the population in general on the matters related to the implementation of the universal primary education policy in the country. The government apparently did not take into consideration the difficulties that it would encounter in terms
of mobilizing the necessary financial and human resources to achieve the quantitative targets within the specified period. The lack of adequate resources, the mounting debts and the massive defense and national security costs would have been sufficient reasons for careful and resourceful planning of how the policy could be implemented. Success in the implementation of the policy in the Sudan required major changes in the educational policy thinking, practice and provisions, as well as financial and human resources.

There was an apparent lack of political will on the part of both the national and the regional governments to develop an awareness and understanding of the policy of the universal primary education in the light of the environmental and other cultural or social problems involved. This has been clear from the poor organization and the lack of effective monitoring of the educational activities related to the policy. The government’s educational system in a way worked against the concept of universal primary education by maintaining the examination system at all grades and at all terminal levels. For the case of the southern Sudan the irrelevant curriculum and the language problems had an added disadvantage. These factors bring into question the validity of the policy of the universal primary education. The government did not specify clearly at what level or grade it considered the basic education to end. With all these multitudes of problems and obstacles in place, the possibility of the government achieving universal primary education in the country in the foreseeable future is not conceivable.

In the next chapter we will consider the possible viability of government policies on the curriculum in the schools (primary intermediate and secondary). To a large extent the
curriculum policy of the government demonstrates the unwillingness of the central government to embrace a multicultural dimension in the curriculum that would be relevant to all the regions in the country.
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20. Louis Loyaak (30/5/94); Brian Badi (29/5/94); Darius Hakim (7/8/94); Vigil Jima (15/2/94); Justin Yonama (10/3/94); and William Mursal (2/3/94).
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22. Peter Tibi (7/8/94), a Veterinary Doctor, has been active in the Sudanese politics.
24. Louis Loyaak (30/5/94), has been School Inspector for the Primary and Intermediate Schools in Equatoria Region.
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CHAPTER FOUR

4. CURRICULUM POLICY

4.1. INTRODUCTION.

Curriculum policy development is ideally considered a matter of national deliberation and choice. This is based on the assumption that the national government has the obligation to cater for the national interests and needs of the whole population in the country and has the capability to meet these needs. In an ideal situation the development of curriculum should be subjected to public participation through discussions or consultations in order to rationalize the desirability and feasibility of the policy nationwide. In most of the developing countries the degree of public participation in policy framework is dependent on how the national government views the impact of the public inputs in the policy formation i.e. in terms of how the national leaders perceived the national interests and needs. Curriculum policy development and formation in the Sudan has to be therefore understood within the context of the general national policy trend of the government and the specific goals and aims with respect to which education is relevant. It has to be also viewed in the light of the type of society the national government wants to mold through education.

The trends of policies adopted by the Sudanese national government pointed toward the building of an Arab-Islamic society. To achieve this within such a heterogeneous society as the Sudan is, the government resolved to adopt a centralized system of policy
development. The approach therefore taken by the government was to have the curricula in the Sudan developed nationally through the Central Ministry of Education, which works out the details of the curricula and draws the syllabus for all stages of general education according to the general goals and aims of education in the country. What has been revealed from the responses from the research interviewees about the curriculum policy development in the Sudan is indicative of a lack of consultations with experts in the field of curriculum and the people at the grassroots levels. Debates, in open forums, have not therefore been normal procedure in the development of curriculum in the country in spite of the diversities. There were no interactions between the curriculum policy-makers in the centre in Khartoum and the professionals at the grassroots, such as the teachers, a process that would have provided the necessary bases for the curriculum development policies. This might have led to the development of curricula more acceptable and relevant to the whole country. Not completely represented in the curriculum development processes have been the southern Sudanese. From the available statistics from the southern Sudan, up to 1989 there were only three trained curriculum developers in the whole of the southern Sudan (1). Even these were neither provided with the opportunity to take part in the development of the curriculum nor consulted for matters related to the curriculum development in the whole of Sudan, leave alone the southern Sudan. Consequently the curriculum developers in the centre can be assumed to have lacked the necessary information or inputs for designing relevant curriculum policy framework for the entire country.
4.2. THE CURRICULUM POLICY STRUCTURE:
The main feature of the Sudanese educational policies development has been the adherence to centralization. All the plans of the curriculum development and administration were discussed centrally and approved by the National Council for Curriculum before they were executed. The Council was chaired by the Under Secretary in the Central Ministry of Education. The membership of the National Council for Curriculum remained quite fluid over the period under review (2). The membership of the council depended very much on how a member’s political colours were viewed in the eyes of the government. From the government point of view (as presented in the report of the Sudan Education Sector review) the members of the National Council for Curriculum were selected from experienced professional educationists from the various disciplines of education. There is however insufficient information available to support this statement. Before the period under review curriculum development tasks, particularly for the primary and intermediate schools, were carried out by the staff at the Bakht-er-Ruda Institute of Education (3)

According to the researcher’s informer the Curriculum Administration Section of the central Ministry of Education had the following functions:

1. Planning, development, implementation and revising of the curriculum.
2. Preparation and revising the textbooks and the teaching manuals.
3. Selecting other appropriate teaching aids.
4. Assisting in research, technical supervision, evaluation and training related to curriculum development.

The centralization of the curriculum development made it possible for the government to censor any educational materials e.g. text-books, introduced into the Sudanese educational system (4). This policy trend also acted as a disincentive to people who might have been interested in the field of curriculum because of lack of prospects for utilization of the knowledge so acquired in the area of curriculum. The policy apparently did not allow for expanding options which would have, otherwise, suited the diversities in the different part of the country.

One of the factors that had influenced the curriculum policy development in the Sudan has been the government’s vested interest in the Arab and Islamic World. This has been expressed in a number of educational policy statements of the government as a basic aim of education in the Sudan. For instance, the President Nimeiry stated in his first address on his new educational policy that: “The educational revolution meant first and foremost a fundamental change in the curriculum to implement the aims of the revolution and to nurture its ethos. This is to confirm the links of the country with the Arab and Islamic heritage” (5). This special external influence on the development of the Sudanese education was also evident in the statement of the Central Minister of Education in President Nimeiry’s government (1970), when he stated: “The pattern of the education system is the type recommended by many Arab Education Conferences, particularly by the Conference of Arab Ministers of Education in 1964. The same recommendation was put
forward by the Conference of Arab Ministers of Education and Planning held in Tripoli in 1966 and in Morocco in 1970. It was strongly felt that a common pattern of educational organization would facilitate the interchange of teachers and educational ideas throughout the Arab World” (6).

The common approach to educational development in the country has also been reflected in some of the content of the syllabuses of the Sudanese schools. This is particularly clear in the humanity disciplines such as geography, history and civics. For instance the geography for the third year intermediate school has been divided into two sections. The first section is devoted to the geography of the Sudan; but the content is largely based on the northern part of the country. The second section concentrates on the geography of the Arab land which include the following Arab countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, the Kingdom of Morocco, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Gulf Emirates of Bahrain, Gatar and Abu Dubai, and Yemen (7). The geographical environment in these countries, to some extent, resemble the northern part of the Sudan but not the southern part. Since these areas were examinable in the intermediate leaving examinations they were therefore an obvious disadvantage for the students from the southern Sudan. The content of the history covers the same areas. The general aims of teaching history were:

1. To explain to the students the ideas of belonging to the Arab World through the study of the history of the ancient Arab civilization and discovering the origin of the common civilization of the ancient Arab World.
2. To enable the students to attain a minimum historical facts and information which would enable them to absorb their ancient and modern history and thereby introducing them to the rest of the world civilizations.

3. To inform the students of some historical facts which connect them with the ancient international, Islamic and national inheritance in accordance with the study of the history of the Arab civilizations and the history of the Islamic countries as well as the modern history of the Sudan.

4. To develop in the students the skills to construct, criticize, analyze and evaluate the different news, views and stories which often conflict with each other and how to interpret them correctly and to develop a logical response to the historical events (8).

The contents of these two subject clearly show that the curriculum policy development did not take into account the diversities prevailing in the country. As a result the relevance of the curriculum developed only suited the northern Sudan (9). The policy was not, in anyway designed to link the individuals, particularly those from the south, to his local environment. It provided no incentive or motivation to both the teacher and the student (10), except to pass the examinations. The curriculum policy developers could therefore be considered as having overlooked the socio-political and cultural complexity in the Sudan and the varied environmental and geographical differences between the Sudan and the rest of the Arab countries. These curricula remained unaltered for the whole period under review. They were translated from Arabic into English at Maridi ‘Curriculum Centre’ for use in the southern schools.
Arabism, as an important element in the cultural development of the people of the Sudan had also had an important influence in the development of the curriculum in the country. This fact has been mentioned by 23 of the research interviewees. This was also clear from the statement of President Nimeiry in 1970 as an important element of the new educational policy. He stated that: “The educational programme of the revolution stresses the social and cultural importance of Arabic, which is now the only obligatory subject in the school certificate curriculum. The education revolution enables the Sudanese nation to continue to play its historic role in diffusing Arab culture and the principles of the Islamic faith throughout the African Continent” (11). This trend continued to be evident from the guidelines of the Sudanese curriculum policy that came out from the 1990 Education Policy Conference held in Khartoum. These guidelines contained the following:

1. The national curriculum should be applied in all the regions of the Sudan with Arabic language as the medium of instruction.

2. The school syllabuses should deal with the cultural, religious and ethnic diversities in such a way that they focus on its positive aspects to consolidate national unity.

3. Attention should be paid to Arabic language programmes and to the development of its teaching methods and giving it much care in areas of language interference.

4. Teaching of the living foreign languages should be paid attention to.

5. The content of the curriculum should be based on originality and integration of aspects of knowledge.
6. School programmes and educational activities should give special consideration to girls’
education and upbringing as future wives and mothers, as well as effective participants in
the overall development.

7. Pre-school education curriculum should inculcate in the young children religious values
and disciplines, making use of the children’s talents of imitation and memorization through
recitation.

8. Taking cognizance of the Arab strategy on education and curriculum development,
emphasis should be put on the professional aspects of teacher education and training
curriculum. These aspects should equip the trainees with basic skills which include
continuous education and learning throughout the life time and providing them with
enough knowledge of the sciences of the holy Koran to enable them to effectively impart
this knowledge to the pupils (12).

The absence of the southern Sudanese educationists and politicians in the 1990 policy
conference was indicative of the government desire to take the Islamic way without
hindrance from the southern opposition. This exclusion has not however been a new
element in the trends of the Sudanese national government education policy formation.
Perhaps in contrast to the previous governments, this has been an open reinforcement of
the practices inherited from the previous governments. This has been clear from the list of
the participants to the conference which set the national framework of the educational
policies to be followed in the country. Those who effectively participated in the
conference were those who represented the aspirations of the government of the day. The
whole conference was orchestrated for demonstrating a support for Islamic education policies. All the main participants were Arabs in race and Islamic in religion (appendix 1).

The stress on Arabism is also noticeable in the subject allocations (appendix 2 to 5). 30% of the time budgeted in the time-table in the primary school per week was devoted for the teaching of Arabic language. In the intermediate school this takes up about 19% of the time in the time-table. In the secondary school the number of periods per a week for the Arabic language is equal to the that allotted for the English language for the first and second year. In the third year of the secondary school the number of periods for the Arabic language is greater than that for the English language.

Islamisation of education has been one of the conspicuous features in the Sudanese system of education, though this remained a hidden agenda, to some extent, during the earlier period of the regime of President Nimeiry. It featured more prominently during the government of Omer El Beshir, that took over power in 1989. This last drive was reinforced by an academic Islamic Conference held in Khartoum in 1987. In January 1987, the Department of Islamic Studies and Psychology at the University of Khartoum and the Washington-based Institute for Islamic Knowledge held a conference on Islamisation of knowledge. This notion appealed to the Muslim Brothers, the Islamic Fundamentalists, and became the cornerstone of their educational theorizing when they took power in 1989. This notion eventually formed the bases of the Sudanese educational philosophy of the Islamic Fundamentalist government (13). To effect this notion two
institutes for Islamisation of knowledge were set up in 1991; one in Khartoum and the other within the University of Gezira. The basic aim of these institutes is to see to it that all knowledge emanates from 'Islamic principles' (14).

4.3. DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION AND THE CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Decentralization policy is a phenomenon that appeared in the Sudanese political scene at the time of President Nimeiry. In 1972 as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement the national government promulgated a policy of decentralization of the administration of education in the Sudan. But the hollowness of this policy was clear from the initial stage of the implementation. For instance the central Minister of Education, in a speech on the new educational policy, stated that “there will be a strengthening and reinforcement of education in the regions to enable them deal with the day to day requirement of the regions. The aim is to give a large measure of local autonomy within the framework of tactful central control” (15). There were no bases provided for the realization of relevant educational development in the southern Sudan as the declaration was not followed by giving the Regional Government of the south the legislative power to produce any other education policy option that it considered relevant to educational development in the southern Sudan. The Regional Government did not have the type of decentralized authority to enable it to exercise its own independent powers and to enjoy a legal personality distinct from that of the central administration. It was compelled to operate
within the national policy framework set for it in Khartoum. The tactful control mentioned by the Minister has been reflected in the tighter control over funds for the southern Sudan. The lack of participation of the southern Sudanese in the curriculum development was therefore indicative of the tactful approach of the government to the curriculum policy issues and thus depriving southern inputs into the curriculum.

The curriculum development and the training of the teachers remained firmly under the central control in Khartoum. All the school text-books and other school materials provided for the southern schools remained in Arabic even though over 75% of the schools in the southern Sudan used English as a medium of instruction (16). No provision, particularly in terms of funds, was provided for the regional government to translate the books into English, leave alone the fact that the south lacked good translators for the different school subjects. Such handicaps were said to have accounted greatly for the failures in the local and national examinations (17). These were reflected in the number of school drop-outs and repeaters at all the levels of education. Two out of every hundred pupils enrolled in the first primary grade proceed on to tertiary education. As for the rest they leave before the end of the period by drop-out within each level and by failure in public examinations.

The lack of relevance in the curriculum contributed greatly in the creation of the big gap between the community and the so-called ‘educated’ who seek livelihood in the urban areas and despise the rural areas (18). The curriculum development in the Sudan, with
particular reference to the southern Sudan, illustrated a case of dealing with unequal powers i.e. a top down approach (19). It provided no opportunity for the regional government to provide an alternative policy option. The initiatives taken by the regional government for alternative approaches were frustrated by the lack of funds to implement them. For instance the attempt by the regional government, in 1984, to revise the primary and intermediate schools syllabuses so as to produce some relevant teaching materials could not take off because of lack of funds (20).

4.4. RURALISATION OF EDUCATION.

The policy of ruralisation of the curriculum, particularly for the primary level of education, has been a policy advocated by most developing countries of the Third World and most of the aid agencies mainly because of the orientation of the majority of the population in these countries towards the rural areas. The intention has been largely to make the curriculum content more relevant to the rural environment. A number of reports about educational development in the Sudan have pointed out the irrelevance of the education provided for the majority of the rural population in the country. A typical report connected to this situation was that of Garvey-Williams (1976). It stated that: “Commonly what was taught was ill-planned, limited and in large measure irrelevant to content and purpose. There is very little in reasoning and application. Education does little to prepare the majority of the children for whom the primary schooling will be terminal, for better life in the countryside where most will remain and where, in the foreseeable future, opportunity for the majority of the population should be found. The education provided is extremely
ineffective and wasteful” (21). This criticism for the curriculum for the primary also applied to those of the intermediate and secondary schools curricula. The result of this, to the southern Sudan, was reflected in the poor results in the Sudan School Certificate Examinations as compared to those of the northern Sudan.

Relevant education in the Sudan has always been defined in the northern Sudanese context of relevance and has not always been favourable for the south. President Nimeiry, in one of his educational speeches in 1976 stated that: “education needed to be revolutionized in order to meet the challenges of the socio-economic and cultural development” (22). But the orientation of the education policies as reflected in the school curriculum clearly showed that it had no proper basis for the socio-economic and cultural development of the whole country. The trend of education policies focused less on the needs of education of the whole country, hence their irrelevance.

President Nimeiry in 1976 decreed (decree No.703) the formation of Sudan Education Sector Review, whose main objectives (23) were outlined as:

1. To analyze the educational system and related activities and assess the system’s capacity and effectiveness in realizing the objectives of general education and development in its economic, social and cultural aspects.

2. To formulate proposals for realistic strategies of educational development through expansion or contraction of training programmes to ensure the needs of the overall development.
3. To determine priorities for the education investment.

The committee which was formed was made up of members from the Ministry of Education in cooperation with the World Bank (IBRD). This committee reviewed the educational, economic and social development issues in the country and submitted its report in February 1977 under the title “Sudanese Education, an Appraisal and Strategy for Action”. The review confirmed that the school curricula were predominantly theoretical and inadequate to meet the requirements of socio-economic development of the country. Its recommendations for promoting education and increasing its relevance to the developmental requirements formed the basis of the strategies for the educational development in the Six-year Plan of Economic and Social Development (1977/78-1982/83). It recommended that some primary schools were to take the form of integrated rural education centres (24). The new curriculum in the primary school was to be based on an environmentally related and activity-oriented approach. The problem that was to be encountered was in the area of implementation. As stated by John Theakstone “when the Sudan has a problem, it would call an outsider to come and write a report about the problem. This would be the end of the problem. The report would be shelved and no action taken about it” (25). Educationally the Sudanese government has been entangled in an Arab-Islamic educational policy web which apparently it found difficult to back away from however irrelevant the policy might be for the Sudan. One of the reasons given was the financial backing that the Sudan gets from some of the Arab countries (26).
One of the practical steps recommended by the committee for the ruralisation of education was the introduction of practical rural activities in the curriculum of the primary education with the following objectives:

1. To acquaint the children with some manual skills.
2. To help children to learn by doing.
3. To link their education to the local environment so that a lasting attachment to it can be formed.
4. To strengthen the link between the local people and their schools so that the latter can participate fully in educating both young and grown ups and thus plan their role in the local community participation.
5. To develop the schools where possible into economically productive units, so that they can maintain themselves, or at least shoulder a reasonable share in that maintenance.

The viability and acceptability of this form of education among the rural population were not researched into. As far as the perception of the majority of the rural African population are concerned the objectives mentioned above were not new innovations. For them farming is not an art that can be necessarily learned in the schools. Children in the rural areas have been introduced to farming, herding and other rural activities at quite an early age. One of the basic reasons why this form of education was unattractive was the lack of social prestige associated with it (27). Moreover jobs are not easily available in the government departments for agricultural school graduates.
4.5. INTEGRATED RURAL EDUCATION CENTRES (IRECS).

Four of the research interviewees have been directly involved in the project of the Integrated Rural Education Centres (IRECS). The concept of the integrated rural education centres revolves around the land i.e. geared towards the development of positive attitudes towards the land (28). It discouraged white collar ambitions for jobs in the urban areas. The idea was to develop the people to be self-employed in activities which were rural oriented (29). Such activities included poultry, pottery, basketry, animal husbandry, agriculture and fishery. The introduction of the rural education centres was not well planned and not enough time was given to explain and convince the rural population about the importance and values of this form of education (30). This was reflected in the lack of involvement of the rural population in the project and the scarcity of the essential tools and equipment for the project. The parents saw no significance of this form of education which tied their children to the land (31). Most preferred their children to have a form of education that would take them up the education ladder and get employed in the urban areas with the government. For instance in 1984, the IREC school at Bahr-Naam near Maridi, in southern Sudan, had a total enrollment of 85 pupils. By 1985, the enrollment had dropped by half to 44. The parents here preferred to send their children to a conventional primary school four miles away rather than having them in the rural education centre school (32).

In the “Sudan Education - An Appraisal and Strategy for action, 1977”, the IREC was described as a “model primary school whose educational services are extended to the
young and whose Enlightening and vocational activities are directed to adults and the
surrounding community” (33). The National Report on the development of Education,
presented to the Conference of Education in Geneva (July 1979), on the other hand,
described the IREC as “an ideal form of a primary school in the rural setting that stands as
a pivot of social activity in all its aspects” (34). This report stated that: “The centre, in
addition to teaching children, participates in literacy teaching, adult education and training
in all that is associated with the improvement of rural environment. It provides
opportunities for continual education based on a comprehensive programme. The centre
will rely on specially trained primary school teachers and government employees from the
neighbouring countryside” (35). The implementation of the IREC project was however
difficult, particularly in the southern Sudan for a number of reasons. The essence of the
IREC development programme entailed community participation and the integration of the
various services into the programme. This was lacking right from the initial stages (36).
The costly construction of the buildings (prefabricated) of the IRECS excluded
community participation and involvement. The specially trained teachers and the supposed
government employees from the neighbouring countryside were not available, not only at
the location of the projects but in the whole of the southern Sudan. The Tripartite Review
and Evaluation Mission that later reviewed the IRECS programmes in the Sudan, for
instance, noted that “while visualizing the image of IRECS in concrete terms with respect
to their expected functions, IREC as a one primary school concept would be prohibitively
costly for any developing country and might even be regarded as in contradiction to the
education policy of the Sudan. Instead of democratizing education, it would introduce two
systems of education unequal in quality and whose cost would affect the whole system” (37).

From the definitions of the IREC given there is a clear indication of misunderstanding of the IREC concept. There was no clear direction provided by either the national government or the regional government in the southern Sudan for successful implementation. For instance the Central Minister of State for Education, El Sayed Hassan Ahmed Yousif, in his opening speech in the seminar on the integrated rural education (30/10/ - 2/11/78) stated that “there is no intention that the IRECS will at any time replace the traditional primary schools” (38). This statement contradicted the very concept that considered IRECS as model primary schools and was a clear indication of lack of government commitment to the programme which could benefit the rural areas, if properly planned and executed. For the aid agencies the IREC development programme was a central activity linking education to reality by making it more relevant to rural southern Sudan and supporting educational knowledge and skills with services and facilities for effective impact on the living conditions of the rural population and the national economy (39).

The planned curriculum reform for the integrated rural education centres envisaged a new type of teacher whose traditional role of teaching children would stretch to include some community development tasks in the rural settings (40). The training intended to be provided to the selected IREC teachers was to reflect the rural community needs for a
better life and to help them grasp and understand the guiding philosophy and objectives of their future work as well as acquire the skills necessary for their work. In an attempt to achieve these goals an ambitious training programme was formulated which included the following areas (41):

A. Rural Education and Home Economics:
   1. Practical and field work.
   2. Art and craft.
   3. Agricultural extension.
   4. Cooperatives.
   5. Home Economics.

B. Workshop Programmes:
   1. Carpentry.
   2. Tin and Plumbing.
   3. Building.
   4. Electricity.

C. Community Development:
   1. Different topics on Community Development.
   2. Research and Educational Psychology.
   3. Visits to local Departments and Institutions.

D. Other Training Areas:
   1. Library use.
   2. Demonstration Lessons.
3. Audio Visual and Teaching Aids.
4. Discussion and methods of conducting it.
5. Public lectures by officials of the departments involved in the community development activities.

From the above list of topics it is clear that some of the areas were irrelevant to the southern Sudan rural environment e.g. electricity and plumbing and others like building and carpentry has limited market.

Other activities, which were outside the teachers’ traditional roles, which they were expected to engaged in, included (42):

1. To identify the socio-economic and cultural problems in the community.
2. To impart literacy skills to illiterate adults and youth.
3. To impart health education.
4. To provide lessons on cooperative organizations and civic training.
5. To engage in community development activities by providing local leadership for various activities, mobilize the community for construction and provision of public facilities.
6. To organize cultural activities such as sports and festivals.

The teachers selected lacked the abilities to perform the community tasks bestowed on them and as a result most of the work of the project in the IRECS in the southern Sudan, situated in the Maridi area, was done by the foreign experts, who found themselves surrounded by untrained and inexperienced counterparts (43). The three national
counterparts at the IRECS at Maridi were all secondary school graduates and had no previous experience in research (44).

It was not clear what the new curriculum was intended to achieve since there were no substantial changes made in the examinations system, increased school provision, quality of teachers and learning materials and the appropriate training of the needed teachers (45). The only form of training given to the selected teachers was in the form of workshops and seminars, which lasted for only a short period of time. For instance, a three week workshop was organized on curriculum materials, content formulation and teaching strategies from 23rd November to 14th December 1981. Apart from this three weeks workshop all the other seminars and workshops were of shorter duration, lasting three to five days (46). A further disincentive to the teachers in the rural areas was the perception of the teachers' role in the minds of the rural community. The members of the rural community have a different conception of the teachers in terms of rural development. For them the rural primary school teachers have no place in what they perceived as development, except to prepare their children to enter the modern sectors (47).

The lack of commitment by both the regional and national governments to the IREC concept had, in a way, contributed to the failure of the project in the southern Sudan. Rural development projects need the support of the government and political leaders if they are to succeed. The project in the southern Sudan did not have the strong backing of the regional government (48). This has been shown by quite intermittent payment of the
staff salaries and the lack of the essential provision for the projects. The planned Coordination Committees to supervise and put into action the objectives of the IRECS never took off. There were three committees planned to harmonize the effectiveness of the IRECS development programmes. These were:

1. Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee. This was to be the highest policy committee in the southern Sudan, whose main function was to review the progress and policies of the project and give necessary advice to the different departments.

2. The IRECS Executive Board was to concern itself in the discussion of the achievements, constraints, drawbacks and budgetary problems of the programme and to take necessary administrative measures.

3. Maridi Executive Committee was to administer and review the day to day activities of the pilot IRECS programmes.

As it turned out the above committees have not only failed to function but were not constituted (49). This demonstrated the lack of interest by the government in the IRECS projects.

4.6. INSPECTION OF SCHOOLS.

Inspection of schools is an important element in the evaluation of the schooling system and in particular the relevance of the curriculum. This important area of education has not been properly utilized for the benefit of the schools in the southern Sudan in particular. There has been an apparent lack of attention paid to it by both the national and regional governments. Consequently the primary aim of education was made to serve largely the
requirements for the promotion to the next level of the educational system and did little to prepare the majority of the children for whom the primary education, for instance, was to be terminal for a better life in the countryside (50). The teacher's concern was therefore to teach whatever was there in the syllabus to enable the pupils pass the examinations. Relevance was not of much concern to them.

The Southern Regional Ministry of Education had two departments that were intended to have some involvement with the curriculum development matters and other services to enhance educational development in the southern Sudan. These were the Departments of School Inspectorate and Technical Service Division. The School Inspectorate Department was supposed to compose of a team of guidance and resource persons who were to monitor and coordinate educational activities, provide consultancy services, and in-service teacher education programmes as well as on-the-job teacher assistance (51). But practically little or no real inspection or supervision of schools was carried out by this department. The administrative staff and the few inspectors at the regional, provincial and district levels did not have the means of transport and other logistics to carry out the inspection (52).

There was a number of indications that showed lack of concern by the Regional Ministry of Education of the importance of the Department of Inspectorate. This was illustrated by the small number of inspectors for the schools at the three levels of education and the selection of persons with less or no professional experience in the teaching profession. As
one of the research interviewees has said: “the department was meant for those who have failed as teachers and school administrators. It was a sanctuary for inefficient and disgruntled teachers and school administrators” (53). It was not uncommon for school inspectors to be thrown out of some schools they visited. This had happened in 1982 and 1984 in Juba Day Secondary School, where the researcher was a Headteacher. In the first instance it happened when an inspector decided to take over a lesson from the teacher he was to be inspecting in the middle of the session. He did worst than the teacher and the students shouted on him until he was forced to come out of the class. Two other inspectors made similar mistakes in other classes. After discussing the issue with the head of the inspection team the Headteacher had asked the inspectors to quit the school.

Not all the provincial and district councils had school inspectors attached to them. In the State of Equatoria in the Southern Sudan, which was considered a better state to the rest of the other southern states in terms of the number of schools and personnel, the number of school inspectors for the three levels of education was quite negligible. The table 5 below shows the picture of the situation. As a result very little inspection was carried out. One of the interviewees, who was once an Assistant Headteacher of a secondary school in the southern Sudan stated that during the five years he has been as an A/Headteacher the school he was in was not inspected even once (54).
### Table 5: School Inspectors in Equatoria State, Southern Sudan (1989):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA COUNCIL</th>
<th>CADRE</th>
<th>NO. OF INSPECTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juba Town</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juba Central</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magwi</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapoeta</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukudum</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikotos</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terekeka</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajokeji</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yei</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morobo</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundri</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maridi</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yambio</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambora</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezo</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Intermediate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Inspectorate</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>4 These were for Sec.Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.7. **CONCLUSION.**

Curriculum policy development in the Sudan has been influenced by the general policy trends of the national government. At the heart of this trend has been the Arab-Islamic orientation of the Sudanese policies. Consequently the curriculum policy has been initiated and developed without adequate and adequately secured knowledge of either the conditions for their success or their possible and likely consequences or implications. The reasons ranged from the absence of effective information-gathering mechanisms to the reluctance, on the part of the national policy-makers, of probing into the situation which might reveal facts that would undermine the policies held dear for political or religious reasons.

There has been an apparent conflicting conception of the objectives to be achieved in the development of the curriculum in terms of the south and north of the Sudan. This conflict of understanding was derived from what ‘relevant education’ means within the Sudanese context of education for the whole country. Because of the diversities existing between the north and the southern Sudan and the direction of policies adopted by the national government, which is geared to the Arab-Islamic World, what has been considered relevant education for the national government has remained irrelevant for the southern Sudan. Quality and relevance therefore mattered less in the curriculum policy followed in the Sudan in terms of the educational development of the southern Sudan. In reality the type of education received implied a process of alienation of the southern Sudanese pupils from their own society and the local environment.
There has been an extreme difficulty in the Sudan of reaching any agreement about the real aims of the curriculum that would have taken account of the realities in the country because of the restricted participation in the curriculum policy development. The lack of participation and lack of coordination of the various elements involved in the programme implementation had a lot to play in the deficiencies of the curriculum content. There were also constraints in terms of overall resources e.g. funds.

The ruralisation of education largely failed because the policy was not accompanied by a rationalization of the objectives of the primary education. Both the national and regional governments were not committed to the concept of ruralisation though this was the form of education much favoured by the Aid Agencies, e.g. the World Bank. The success of the IRECS projects required firstly the political will, support and guidance from the government and politicians, the various committees and commitments of the teachers. Secondly, the understanding, support and participation of the parents and the community. All these elements were missing. The selection bias of the education system implied a constant pre-occupation of the teachers and the pupils with the requirements for passing the examinations however irrelevant the curriculum was.

The next chapter attempts to diagnose the policies on the teachers in general and the policies related to their training and education
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CHAPTER FIVE

5. POLICIES ON TEACHERS

5.1. INTRODUCTION:

The policies governing the teachers, their training and education are central to the
development and smooth functioning of any educational system. In many countries such
policies occupy a central position in the overall educational policy plans. However the
application of the policies and their effectiveness vary according to the political persuasion
and direction of the government in power. The stability of the teaching force and their
effectiveness in the implementation of the educational policies depend on how the
government applies the policies affecting the teachers and also on the prevailing
conditions within the profession such as the salaries and promotion prospects and other
working conditions. The basic teacher policy issues include initial and in-service training,
appointments (recruitment) and salaries and promotion.

The Sudanese government has recognized the focal role of the teachers in the moulding of
the Sudanese society. In order to maintain a unified professional and Islamic ideological
thinking or approach of educational development and to build the type of society the
government envisaged, the Sudanese government was bent to adopt and maintain central
control of the teacher training and education in the whole country. One of the factors that
has influenced the Sudanese educational policy trend has been its desire for the unity of
the Arab destiny and the need for increased cooperation and movement on the path of
complete unity as its aim of purpose (1). The policy for teacher training and education has
therefore remained the prerogative of the Central Ministry of Education in Khartoum since
independence (1956). The Department of Teacher Training and Education at the Central
Ministry of Education planned and programmed teacher education and training within the
general framework of educational development in the country (2). The centralized
institutions recommended to carry out the training programmes and plans of teacher
training for the three levels of education (primary, intermediate and secondary) were the
following (3):

1. The College of Education, University of Khartoum, for the secondary schools. Until
1977, when the University of Juba was opened, this was the only institution for the
training of teachers for the secondary schools.

2. The Intermediate Teacher Training Institute at Omdurman for the training of teachers
for the intermediate schools.

3. The Institute of Education at Bakht-er-Ruda, also in the north, for the training of the
primary teachers.

4. The Technological Colleges (Khartoum) for the training of teachers for the technical
secondary schools.

According to the report of the Sudan Education Sector Review (1977), the Regional
Institutions for Education in the Southern Sudan and other regions in the country were to
serve as institutions for text-book experimentation and recommendation of necessary modifications to guarantee their suitability for regional needs. Whether the regional needs were to be taken into consideration right from the initial stage of formulating policies for the training of the teachers were not mentioned in the report. The need for wider representation in the planning of the policies to suit the wider national needs was not also indicated in the report.

5.2. RECRUITMENT POLICY:

The trainees for the primary teacher training institutes were recruited from among the intermediate school leavers and put through a four year pre-service training course. The selections were simply done on the basis of results in the intermediate leaving examinations. Pure academic courses were provided in the first year of the pre-service course and the professional training was introduced in the second year. Practical training started in the third year through to the fourth year. The courses ended with a primary school teacher certificate which was obtained through passing a final examination which was centrally set and marked in the centre in Khartoum (4).

The Intermediate school teachers were trained in the post secondary institutions. The recruitment for this level were from the students who had completed their secondary school education (‘O’ level). These were put through a two year course which included academic, professional and practical studies run concurrently. This also ended with the
final examinations which were centrally set and marked. The successful candidates were awarded Intermediate School Teaching Diplomas (5).

There were two categories of teachers for the secondary schools. The first were those who have gone through a four year training in the Faculty of Education in the university. These were awarded B.Ed.Degrees at the end of the four year course. The second category were those who attended post-graduate diploma courses for one year. These were awarded Dip.Ed. after passing the final examinations (6).

The Ministry of Education had problems in the recruitment of students who performed very well in their final examinations in the various levels of education for the teacher training institutes for a number of reasons. In the first place, generally, an ordinary Sudanese citizen's perception about teaching profession is very poor (7). Secondly the government itself accorded lower status to the teaching profession. It selected students with lower grades in the school certificate examinations for admission into the teacher training institutes. One of the speeches of President Nimeiry on education confirmed this perception. The President had said, in the light of prospects of education in the southern Sudan, in 1970: "All the students who this year (1970) passed School Certificate in Rumbek Secondary School (these were southern Sudanese students whose grades in the School Certificate could not allow them admission into the national university) have been appointed as Intermediate school teachers. Those who were unsuccessful in the School Certificate Examinations were admitted to Malakal Teacher Training Institute. Other southern pupils from the intermediate schools who did not pass school certificate
examinations have been admitted to teacher training institutes” (8). This demonstrated the image the government showed about the teaching profession in the country which, in a way, made students and their parents to look down on the teaching career, despite the central role of the teachers in education.

The Director for the Department of Teacher Training and Education in the Regional Ministry of Education in Juba, Southern Sudan, stated in one of his speeches to education workshops in Juba in 1989 that “we have so far failed to accept the fact that if we want to improve our education system, we must first and foremost insist on recruiting good quality students for teacher training. Until we accept this fact and cease to believe that teacher training is for the poorly qualified ex-intermediate and ex-secondary schools students, we cannot expect to achieve qualitative education. With the present poor selection, and poorly qualified teacher-trainers we will continue to have ill-prepared primary school teachers and finally poorly qualified students” (9). The often occurring non-payment or delays in the payments of the teachers salaries and the poor status of the teachers in the Sudanese society were further significant disincentives for students to join the teacher training institutes. Professions such as Medicine, Engineering and Law were placed high in the professional choices of students (10). It has also been pointed out that some students have used the acceptance into the teacher training institutes or the teaching profession as a stepping stone into other professions (11). This was clear from the number of students who got admitted into the Faculty of Education in the University with lower grades. The lower acceptance grades set for admission of students into the Faculty of Education in the
national Universities in the Sudan as compared to the faculties of, say, Medicine, Engineering and Law, have made many students, with no teaching desire, to obtain university degrees. But soon after graduation many left the teaching profession and instead joined other professions (12).

5.3. TEACHER, TEACHER TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN.

After the 17 years civil war in the Sudan, which ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, the Southern Regional Government was faced with a growing demand on education on the one hand and a dearth of facilities, materials and teachers on the other. The government was forced to resort to employing untrained teachers (13). This situation was created by the long civil war which brought about the destruction of the educational infrastructures and depleted the teaching profession of the needed teachers. One other factor that aggravated the situation was the change over of the school system from the 4-4-4 (i.e. four years primary, four years intermediate and four years secondary) school structure to the 6-3-3 system from 1972. This made the demands for the facilities, equipment, materials and particularly teachers more acute, especially for the primary school sector (14).

The Regional Government had planned to train an estimated number of 2000 primary school teachers in the Six Year Development Plan for the Southern Region (1977/78 -
1983/83). But the actual number of teachers produced in the planned period from the primary teacher training institutes was only 1115, short by 885 teachers. This shortfall had an impact on the rate of the primary school development and placed an ever-increasing reliance on the employment of the untrained teachers (15). The existence of a large backlog of the untrained teachers made the region continue to resort to recruiting untrained teachers so as to maintain the planned growth rate in the primary school enrollments. The target enrollment established in the Six Year Development Plan for the Southern Sudan was 45% of the 7-12 year age group (16). Similar difficulties existed in the intermediate school sector.

Until 1983, the teacher training institutes established in the Southern Sudan were only for the training of the Arabic pattern primary school teachers. In 1973/74 there were only two such institutes in the southern Sudan, i.e. Malakal and Tonj Teacher Training Institutes. In 1982/83 the number increased to four when Mbili and Maridi Teacher Training Institutes were added to the two established earlier (17). All of them were faced with the problems of overcrowded classes, accommodation, lack of equipment, books, training aids, visual aids, chemicals, lack of essential facilities such as science laboratories, Home Economics workshops and libraries. All of these factors had significant impact on the effectiveness and efficiency in the training and retraining of the teachers (18).

The Arabic medium teachers had a better opportunity for training than the teachers of the English medium schools (19). This was because of the availability of the training institutes
using Arabic as a medium of instruction in both the north and south of the country. There was no single primary teacher training institute established by the government in the southern Sudan for the training of the English medium teachers. The only English medium intermediate teacher training institute was established in the town of Maridi, in the southern Sudan in 1983. But the annual output of this was very small indeed. For instance in 1985 only 12 teachers graduated from this institute out of the total of the first batch of the intake of 36 students (20). The causes of these high drop-outs were not questioned nor studied and therefore no solution was provided. One explanation given by one of the 12 graduates of the institute in 1985 was that the conditions in the institute was not particularly conducive to the type of student teachers admitted in the institute at the initial stage (21). Those selected were from among the untrained teachers who were already teaching in the intermediate schools. The majority were married and had children to care for. The institute did not provide facilities, such as accommodation for the married students. Because of the irregularities in the payment of the teachers’ salaries and the low salary received by most teachers at that time, many found it quite difficult to maintain themselves in the institute and at the same time maintain their families at home with the small salaries (22).

Faced with the problems of a lack of sufficient teacher training institutes to train the English pattern teachers in particular, the regional government through the Regional Ministry of Education, with assistance from the Norwegian Church Aid, established a teacher training institute in Juba to train this group of teachers. This decision to establish
the institute was taken unilaterally by the regional government without the approval of the central government. As a result the national government refused to recognize the certificate issued by the institute. The only reason provided was that the training of teachers was not the prerogative of the regional government. Consequently the certificate awarded to the teachers from this institute did not provide the teachers with the financial benefit normally attached to certificates from similar institutes (23). This acted as a disincentive to those teachers who had gone through the institute. Apparently there was little motivation for hard work for a number of them during the whole course.

5.4. POLICY OF TRANSFERS OF TEACHERS.

Continuity and stability are essential components for the achievement of a healthy and sound growth of an institution. Frequent transfers of personnel in the institutes and schools were detrimental to well-being and sound progress. The Ministry of Education in the Sudan, in general, had a policy of frequent transfers of teachers and tutors from schools to schools and institutes to institutes and also from school to institutes and vice versa (24). This had been, in particular, a common component of the education system in the southern Sudan. This process had brought about undue confusions and frustrations among the teachers as this resulted, in many cases, in the destruction of properties on transit through the rough roads, interruptions of the education of the children of the teachers on transfers and sometimes separation of families. At the same time this caused discontinuity and interruption in the smooth functioning of the schools and institutes (25). Because of the poor record keeping in the Regional Ministry of Education and the
Province and District Education offices, and the lack of regular inspection of the schools and institutes, there were sometimes problems of keeping track of the movements of the teachers between the schools and institutes (26). Hence some of the schools were over-staffed while others remained understaffed. This was particularly so of the schools in the urban areas as compared to the schools in the rural areas. Some schools had more and better qualified teachers while others had few. There were schools which were stocked with teachers who specialized in particular subjects and poorly catered for in other subjects. For instance Supiri Intermediate School (an Arabic medium intermediate school), in Juba town, had many trained Arabic teachers but none for English (27). There was a greater concentration of teachers, particularly female teachers, in the urban schools than in the rural schools (28). The female teachers preferred to teach where their husbands were working in the towns (29).

At Tonj Teacher Training Institute only one tutor had remained for four years in the same institute. Apart from the principal, who had the longest continuous service of three years at the institute, all the rest of the staff had stayed at the institute for a period ranging from a few months to two years (30). At Mbili Teacher Training Institute, in 1981, there was no single tutor present who had been serving at the institute since the establishment of the institute in 1976. At Maridi Institute there were only two teachers who had remained at the institute since its establishment in 1977 to 1981 (31).
It was also a common practice in the Regional Ministry of Education to transfer long service and experienced teachers from the classroom work to the office desk work in the Ministry of Education Headquarters or to the various education offices in the provinces and districts. Usually such long service teachers were higher up in the promotional scales which were very limited in the salary structures of the schools. As stated by John Theakstone this was one of the problems besetting classroom teachers in the Sudan. “The only way in the Sudan to get a better salary was to move into the bureaucracy. Unless and until the government is able to provide financially attractive salary structure within the teaching system in the school there would always be a problem” (33).

5.5. SCHOLARSHIP POLICY.

This information provided about the scholarship policy came mainly from the former Director General of the Regional Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, Southern Region (34).

The priorities for the offers of scholarships for training within and outside the country was governed by the government’s policy for the development of the country’s human resource. It was therefore dependent on the areas of priority that the government had in the field of development. This was generally reflected in the Central Government’s statements to the National Parliament or in the Regional Assembly in the Southern Region (35). The various Ministries and Departments were expected to follow the government’s priorities in their own training needs. But some of the Ministries and Departments in
certain circumstances did not follow or abide by the priorities set by the government in their areas of selection and areas of training. The belief was that the central government was not in touch with training needs of the various regions and therefore was not well placed to plan for the training needs or set training priorities for the regions.

The national government had national training schemes which were centrally managed and administered (36). The Southern Region rarely benefited from these schemes. A number of reasons have been provided by the Director General of Public Service and Administrative Reform why the Southern Region could not share in the national scholarship schemes.

1. The information regarding the offers of the scholarships was not easily availed to the regional government. If provided the information, in most, cases arrived in the region too late to make the necessary arrangements for taking up the offers. One of the research interviewees said this was a deliberate action done by officials from Central Scholarship Board to deny the southern Region the opportunity of the scholarship offers (37).

2. The announcement or the notification of the offers of scholarship were usually made through the Arabic news media e.g. Arabic news papers which were not readily available for the southern Sudanese readers. The majority of the southern Sudanese are not good in the Arabic language.

3. There was a Department of Training in the northern Sudan where all the nominations were dealt with. The southern region did not have any specific department in the Regional Ministry of Public Service to handle the scholarship cases. Consequently no proper channel existed between the centre and the region to coordinate scholarship offers.
4. The Regional Ministry of Public Service and the Regional Ministry of Education apparently did not question the scholarship policy issues of the national government nor followed up the cases with the central government. It was assumed that even if the south secured the scholarships, there would not have been enough candidates with the required qualifications to take up the offers. The blame for this assumption was put on the previous Ministers of the Regional Ministry of Public Service, many of whom were said to lack proper qualifications to manage the affairs of the public service.

The Southern Regional Government created a regional scholarship scheme which was intended to sponsor the southern Sudanese and to be paid for by the regional government. But because of insufficient funds raised locally within the southern region few southern Sudanese were offered scholarships through the scheme (38). Instead of the regional government pressing the national government for its share of the national scholarship offers it opted for a practice which it could not itself support.

It has been common to find persons trained in specific fields in the various Ministries and Departments not to be assigned to the areas for which they have been trained. This is said to have been particularly the case with the Regional Ministry of Education. For example, an individual trained as a primary school teacher being made in-charge of the secondary education section; a sport teacher with no training at all in the field of education appointed minister of education. The Regional Ministry of Public Service did not have the mechanism or the power to control the misuse or misplacement of manpower in the
various regional ministries or departments. It expected the ministries concerned to deal with such issues (39). The candidates selected for scholarships were expected to have signed contracts which obliged them to work for the particular ministry or department for a minimum period of five years. This policy was not strictly followed.

5.6. IN-SERVICE TRAINING.

The in-service training of teachers, like any other teacher training in the country, comes under the control of the Central Ministry of Education. The reason given for this centralization was to avoid the probability of duality in the programmes of the training and administration (40). It was not easy to judge how genuine this reason was having in mind the diverse conditions prevailing in the various part of the country. The main centre of the In-Service Teacher Training Institutes (ISETI) was in Khartoum with some subordinate centres established in the other areas of the country. ISETI was supported by the UNICEF technically and financially. Until 1975 all the ISETI activities and courses were confined in the northern Sudan. In 1979 there were already 29 ISETI sub-centres in the country but only three were in the southern Sudan (41).

In the northern Sudan in-service training facilities existed in all the teacher training institutes and detailed programmes were worked out according to set plans to call teachers during sessions in batches for the in-service. The activities were of various kinds e.g. programmes to get the teachers acquainted with the recent developments in the syllabuses, text-books, teaching methods and the use of visual aids (42). The duration of such courses
varied from a few days to a number of weeks depending on the type, nature and aims of the courses on offer. There were other courses organized by the Central Ministry of Education for teachers, supervisors and educational administrators during vacations. These were intended to initiate new ideas and practices related to methods of teaching, supervision, feed-backs, evaluation, administrative procedures and financial measures (43).

In the southern Sudan since the inception of the in-service teacher training programmes in the Sudan, there were only three sub-centres established. These were created in the three main towns in the southern Sudan i.e. Malakal, Wau, and Juba (44). The ISETI programmes in the southern Sudan were solely limited to providing two years in-service training courses for the untrained teachers employed in the nearby primary schools. These centres were supervised and directed from the main ISETI centre in Khartoum, where the courses and assignments were planned and produced (45). The main reason provided for the difficulty of extending the system in the southern Sudan was that a sub-centre must have sufficient schools within a radius of a few miles to provide enough trainees to make the establishment worthwhile. In the southern Sudan schools were generally few in number and were far between. A Consultancy report (1981) about training of teachers for the primary schools in the southern region of the Sudan identified four basic areas why the programmes of the ISETI have not been successfully implemented in the Southern Region (46):
1. The expansion of the ISETI programmes has been slow partly due to the absence of a well formulated policy and plan of operation suited to the prevailing needs of the southern Sudan.

2. There were acute shortages of facilities e.g. buildings and furniture.

3. There were very few reference books or materials, apart from the assignments prepared from Khartoum. The books, materials and exercises prepared by the national institute in Khartoum took no or little cognizance of the different environmental conditions and the social and cultural life in the southern Sudan.

4. The ISETI was not flexible enough to respond to the language problems, cultural differences and the local environmental peculiarities in the southern Sudan.

The materials and assignments produced at the centre in Khartoum in Arabic had two main problems for the southern Sudan (47):

1. The southern Sudan presented completely different environmental, cultural and teaching situations. Therefore the relevance of such materials and assignments were doubtful.

2. To many in the southern Sudan Arabic is a second language. This raised the problem of the level of understanding of such courses and of their applicability to the teaching situation in the southern Sudan.

The language policy in the southern Sudan required that the teachers in the rural area schools use vernaculars as media of instruction up to primary four. This implied that teachers must be trained how to teach in the vernaculars, otherwise they would face some
difficulties. Some of the assignments should have been therefore in the vernaculars to enable them to teach their classes well and proficiently (48).

The language problem, which was a disincentive to the English medium teachers, easily deprived such teachers from attending the training courses provided in the in-service centres. For instance in Wau sub-centre, 27 trainees joined the two years course in 1978/79. Some of these trainees had learned through the Arabic medium while others had gone through the English medium. This, first of all, created a problem in the running of the course. Secondly, most of the teachers, especially those who had gone through the English medium, found the course difficult to follow in Arabic and decided to withdraw from it. This resulted in having only ten trainees completing the whole course. Out of the ten only six of them passed. These were the group who had gone through the Arabic medium of instruction (49).

In addition to the language problem there was the problem of the influence of town life on the teachers from the rural areas who were exposed to it. The policy was to have the selected teachers from the rural schools transferred to the schools within or close to the ISETI centres located within the towns. Many of such trainees did not like to go back to their respective rural schools but instead applied for other attractive jobs so as to remain in the town (50).
In Juba sub-centre, in the 1977/78 session, from the 24 trainees who joined the centre, only four passed at the end of the course; thus leaving the other 20 without certificates. The major reason given for this high failure rate was that due to the remoteness of the places of work, they could not submit their research work in time for the examinations, which were marked in the main centre in Khartoum (51).

The total number of the teachers expected to have been trained in the three sub-centres in the southern Sudan between 1975 and 1982 was 303. This was a small number compared to the number of the untrained teachers existing in the primary schools in the southern Sudan. This is clearly indicated in table 6 below. The total number of untrained teachers in the 1978/79 was 1873, which was more than the number of trained teachers. In the north, in the year 1980, there were 5558 teachers, tutors, supervisors and headteachers who had gone through the in-service courses and programmes (52).

### Table 6: Distribution of Primary Teachers in the Southern Sudan (1978/79):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prov.</th>
<th>Trained Male</th>
<th>Trained Feml</th>
<th>Trained Total</th>
<th>Untr. Male</th>
<th>Untr. Feml</th>
<th>Untr. Total</th>
<th>Total Male</th>
<th>Total Feml</th>
<th>Total Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E.Eq.</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>1096</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>1399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.Eq.</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.Nile</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.E.G.</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1496</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>1573</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>3069</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>3735</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were also administrative problems involved in the operation of the ISETI activities. The relationship of the sub-centres in the southern Sudan vis-à-vis the Central Ministry of Education, Regional Ministry of Education and the Provincial Administration was not clearly defined. Administratively the ISETI sub-centre principals in the southern Sudan were linked to the Regional Ministry of Education in Juba, while technically they were linked with Khartoum. The principals normally corresponded directly with the ISETI national office in Khartoum and provided only copies of the correspondences to the Regional Ministry of Education in Juba (53). This caused difficulties in the administration of the centres in the region. There was also no continuous feedback established between the centres, the Province Education offices and the Regional Ministry of Education. This resulted in the lack of communication and knowledge about the ISETI activities and programmes among the administrators. There was also no or little coordination of the in-service initial training courses with the other pre-service courses being organized in the region as was the case in the northern Sudan (54).

One important aspect of the ISETI programmes observed by the Consultancy report was the high cost per unit of running the courses in the southern Sudan. This high unit cost was due to the small enrollment of about 25 teachers for 3 to 5 tutors employed to teach them for a period of two years. This gave a student/tutor ratio between 8.3 and 5. If you consider the total expenditure which included salaries of the tutors and supporting staff,
allowances, costs of materials and administrative costs on training only 25 teachers for
two years, it was a very uneconomic and costly undertaking (55).

5.7. BRAIN DRAIN.

“A noticeable feature of the Sudanese manpower development is a large scale ‘brain and
skills drain’ of Muslim Sudanese to the Arab countries especially Saudi Arabia, Libya and
the Gulf States. The cumulative effect of this exodus has been damaging and remittances
from overseas Sudanese do not compensate for the lost of skills. The government has
adopted a complacent attitude towards what they contend they cannot control and regard
the drift of skills as a means of ‘repaying’ financial support from the rich Arab donors. It is
an unfair equation, for capital aid, however generous, cannot enhance development if the
Sudan’s absorptive capacity is constantly eroded by the lost of professional, skilled and
even semi-skilled manpower” (56). This statement sums up the situation caused by the
government policy of ‘loaning’ or seconding teachers to the oil-rich Arab countries. The
government gave consideration to this policy in the preparation of the programmes and the
curriculum for the teacher training and retraining in the country. The secondment policy
was considered, generally, an acceptable norm and a device to accommodate the pressures
from the Teachers Trade Unions to go to work in the oil-rich Arab States (58). The
government also considered this as a mechanism for retaining civil manpower, though a
pattern of absences of two to five years was very hard to absorb and there was a tendency
to leave the civil service employment on return to the Sudan which no system of bonding
seemed to have been able to stop (59). There was the feeling that you should not have to
work for the sort of money and in the sort of conditions that the Sudan can provide in the public sector (60).

The official trend of loaning teachers was said not to have caused much damage to the state schools because the selection procedures were controlled by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Public Service, which seconded teachers in the subject areas where there were surplus of teachers (61). There were no evidences to prove that there were surplus teachers during the period under review. There were however other unofficial streams of brain drain into the Gulf States that were not controlled by the government. These included the teachers who left the country on their own because of the poor economic situation in the country (62). The poor economic situation accounted largely for the great number of the Sudanese Nationals Working Abroad (SNWA). The estimated number of the Sudanese nationals working abroad varied from 600,000 to 800,000 with 70% of these in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s (63). In spite of the value of the largely unofficial remittance of hard currency that the SNWA provided and helped to keep the Sudan afloat, there were several damaging psychological influences. It has been commonly said that “the Sudan is a place from which to escape or to which to retire. The Sudan government employment is so poorly paid by comparison with Saudi Arabia that it does not really justify much hard work” (64). Sudan is a country one cannot live in because of a number of reasons (65):

1. In terms of jobs, there are plenty of jobs but the salary is not sufficient.
2. There exist social and political oppression: if one is aware of the political situation one finds it difficult to live there. If one is politically active, it is dangerous for one to live there. If one is not politically active and not politically aware, one cannot live one’s social life in peace.

The government might not have been directly encouraging the brain drain to the oil rich Arab countries but the wrong policies of the government did force professionals to go away (66). The professionals were denied the opportunity to perform their work professionally because of a lack of facilities and the necessary amenities as well as financial incentives for hard work. In some cases however the government did encourage the brain drain through dismissals (67). It was also a strategy applied by the government to get rid of troublesome individuals in the various professions. In the whole period of President Nimeiry’s regime there were successive purges of senior civil servants, including teachers and lecturers, for political reasons especially at senior levels (68). This situation created an expectation that if responsibility was taken and hard work noticed sooner or later victimization would result. The best thing was to do as little as possible and draw as little attention to oneself as possible (69).

The Sudanese educational phenomenon of exporting brains to the oil rich Arab countries had also a fundamental effect on the qualities of education in the country (70). The obvious effect of this can be seen in the difference in the teaching of the science subjects between the boys and girls secondary schools in the northern Sudan. In the Sudan because
of the Islamic sex discrimination, women science graduates or women graduates from other disciplines were not given the opportunity to emigrate to the oil rich Arab countries. So they remained to teach these subjects within the country. As a result science subjects were better taught in the girls secondary schools where the teachers were mainly women than in the boys secondary schools in the north. Consequently the examination results in the girls secondary schools were often much better than those in the boys secondary schools. For instance students in the upper top grades accepted into the universities in the science faculties were mainly women e.g. in the faculties of Medicine and Veterinary Science (71). This phenomenon had also some side effect on the women graduates working within the country. This was particularly noticeable among the women Veterinary Doctors who had problem of utilizing their knowledge in the rural areas. In the first place they have the difficulty of persuading their parents to have them go to work in the rural areas. Secondly, if they succeeded to go to the rural areas, they usually found it difficult to persuade the male farmers to allow them to perform their professional functions in the field (72). These factors were sources of frustrations for the women graduates in particular.

There were attempts by the Sudanese government to curb the exodus of the professionals to other countries by offering some financial inducements but these attempts could not be sustained because of the poor state of the economy in the country. In the 1990, for example, the Education Policies Conference recommended that “in order to attract the best elements to improve the teaching profession and to put an end to the teachers’
immigration, the teaching profession should be regarded as one of the first class professions such as the Medical service, the Judiciary and the Diplomatic service. The teachers should be provided some fringe benefits such as free housing, transport, medical treatment, increments and allowances” (73). It was easy to come up with such recommendations but putting them into practice remained a big problem to the government.

The southern Sudan was not much affected by the problem of the brain drain to the Middle East until the mid-1980s because of two main reasons. Firstly because the majority of the teachers in the southern Sudan were not Muslims and secondly because the majority could not teach through the Arabic medium. The Muslim teachers from the south who got into the streams of teachers going into the oil-rich countries did so through the government official channel. These were on secondment contracts of two to three years.

5.8. THE TEACHERS TRADE UNIONS

The Teachers Trade Unions had played a significant role in the formulation of educational policies in the Sudan during the period before the regime of President Nimeiry (74). This role was, to a large extent, curtailed during Nimeiry’s regime. There were three levels of the teachers trade unions. These were the Primary, Intermediate and Secondary schools Teachers Trade Unions. When Nimeiry came to power in 1969 the teachers trade unions were expected to be the mouth piece of the government and were to propagate the philosophy and ideology of what was referred to as the May Revolution (75). They were no more an effective instrument in influencing educational policy development (76). Their
basic concern became the struggle to improve the teachers conditions of service particularly the teachers salaries. They became less concerned with macro-policy issues i.e. major issues of education such as the content of education, class size, library, laboratory etc. They argued that the quality of education was directly related to their conditions of service (77).

The period of Nimeiry also witnessed the introduction of a new element in the Sudanese educational system. This was the emergence of a system of private tutoring, which was a feature much associated with or practiced in Egypt (78). This feature became common in the Sudan in the mid-1970s. It was a practice whereby the wealthy parents engaged teachers to provide private tutoring to their children during the periods outside the normal school hours. This became an attractive phenomenon as it enabled the teachers to earn some extra money to add to their meager salaries (79). This feature led to the development of what became known as the Teachers' Trade Union Evening Schools. This was a system of semi-private schools, run by the teachers trade unions and provided the school leavers with the opportunity to continue with their education during evenings. This system became officially recognized by the government as a viable means of providing education for a great number of school leavers and school drop-outs (80).

Because of the availability of part-time teaching and private tutoring, the teachers were reluctant to take up extra responsibilities in the schools. Many refused to be transferred to the rural schools where such opportunities did not exist (81). The result was the creation
of mal-distribution of teachers, especially good and experienced science and maths teachers. This therefore led to the development of a trend of untrained and less experienced teachers flowing into the rural area schools. This had a significant impact on the performance of the students from the rural schools. This impact has been reflected in the poor results of the students from these deprived rural area schools (82).

The active trade unions were those mostly in opposition to the government (83). These concentrated more on attempts to overthrow the government rather than suggesting to the government the best ways of improving the government educational policies. In acting thus they overlooked their important role of enhancing and improving the quality and standard of education in the country (84). The Trade Unions were also the channels through which some opportunists got into leadership positions without necessarily being the best or the right persons for the positions (85). For example the Minister for Services (the services Ministry included the Ministries of Education and Health) in Equatoria State in 1988 gained that post through the trade union. This Minister had no basic knowledge about either education or health. By the time he was appointed as a Minister he was on a waiting list of those to be interviewed for a teaching job in the schools in the southern region.

5.9. THE TEACHERS CADRE POLICY.
This was a policy devised by the government in 1977 to improve the teachers’ terms of service and to broaden the base of the salary structure so as to accommodate the increasing number of teachers (86). The policy aimed at achieving three main things:

1. To provide a better opportunity for promotion by broadening the base of the salary structure.

2. To provide better salary scales in order to prevent the outflow of teachers from the schools into other opportunities, either abroad or within the country.

3. To cope with the new educational system.

There were multi-fold factors that triggered the government to take up this decision (87):

1. There was a period, from the early 1970s when many teachers were seen moving away from the teaching profession in the country to go to teach in the Middle East oil rich countries. This initially affected the teachers of the primary and intermediate schools.

2. It was also realized that teachers were moving away from the teaching profession to join other professions within the country. This was discovered to be due to the fact that the teachers were not regularly promoted or paid as compared to other professions. They also remained for a longer period in the same salary scale in relation to their colleagues in other professions who were of equal levels of education. They were as well not accorded the same privileges as accorded to other professions e.g. transport and housing facilities.

In terms of prestige or status in the society the teachers faired even worst. All these factors have caused many teachers to change their profession to join others which had relatively better terms of services.
3. The third factor of urgency was the change of the education system from the 4-4-4 to the 6-3-3. This change triggered off great expansion of schools; thus requiring very many teachers especially at the primary and intermediate school levels.

This situation had forced the government to attempt to find a means to better the teachers' terms of service so as to keep them in the teaching profession. The mechanism devised by the government was in the form of the teachers' cadre. To effect this the schools were classified according to the number of streams. The logic behind this was that previously, for instance, all the Headteachers were accorded the same scale regardless of the size of the schools and the work loads involved. The cadre policy provided the opportunity for specific scales to be awarded, taking into consideration such criteria as qualification, experience, seniority and the size of the schools. A Headteacher of a three stream school, for example, was assumed to have more responsibilities than that of a two or one stream school. This was to be reflected in the salary scale. The other posts within the structure of the schools were similarly changed and the salary scales followed accordingly. For example a Deputy Headteacher or a Head of Department in a three stream school had a higher salary scale than that in a two or one stream school (88).

The cadre policy also established a different salary range for the teachers from those of the other traditionally attractive professions such as those for Doctors and Engineers. The scales for the teachers were made to be higher, i.e. one step higher. The cadre policy also provided other privileges which by the law of the day would not have been stated
categorically e.g. the provision of housing and transport allowances. These allowances were abolished for the other professions but were included in the teachers’ salaries (89).

The implementation of the new salary structure for the teachers was done according to the guidelines provided by the central government which came about as a result of an agreement between the central government Ministries of Education, Public Service and Finance and the Teachers Trade Unions (90). The Regional Government did not participate in this agreement. The implementation of this scheme was immediate and fast in the northern Sudan. This was because the central Ministry of Public Service, soon after the passing of the cadre policy, had posted a Director of Personnel (Establishment) to the central Ministry of Education with a delegated authority to carry out the promotion of the teachers in the northern Sudan according to the new salary structure without referring the cases to the central Ministry of Public Service for approval. In the southern Sudan there was a backlog because there was no representative of the Ministry of Public Service in the Regional Ministry of Education with the same delegated authority as that in the north. So every case of promotion of the teachers in the southern Sudan had to be passed to the Regional Ministry of Public Service for processing and approval (91). It is to be noted that the Regional Ministry of Public Service was the only Ministry in the Southern Sudan that had the authority and power from the central government to process and approve the appointment, promotions and even increments of pay to all the civil servants in the whole of the southern Sudan. This regional central control was one of the contributory factors in the delay in the implementation of the cadre policy in the southern Sudan.
At the levels of the provinces and districts, under whose jurisdiction the primary and intermediate education was placed, there were no Departments of Establishments capable of handling the cases of appointments and promotions. As a result, there were great delays in the forwarding of files from the provinces to the Regional Ministry of Public Service in order to implement the new salary structure (92). There was therefore a delay of several years before the implementation of the cadre policy could fully be carried out in the southern Sudan.

In general, the main constraints in the implementation of the Public Service policies were created because of the lack of establishment offices at the province and district levels capable enough to deal with cases of appointments, promotions, and increment of pay. Because of the serious need for teachers, the Assistant Commissioners for Education at the province levels and the Education Officers at the district levels appointed many teachers without following the right procedures including taking into account the existence of posts in the nominal rolls and without bringing the cases to the Regional Ministry of Public Service (93). So at the time of the implementation of the cadre policy, a complex situation arose, not only of promotion but also appointments and finding previous vacant posts in the nominal rolls against which the appointments and promotions were to be made (94).

A further constraint was that, because the primary and the intermediate levels of education were under the Local Government, under the 1971 Local Government Act, their personnel
budgets were prepared and approved at the provincial level by the Commissioners of the Provinces. Because the provincial and district offices lacked well established departments of establishment, they had the problem of budget preparation. The success for the implementation of the cadre policy depended very much on the availability or support of a budget which was to be reflected in the nominal rolls. The absence of all these factors, particularly at the provincial and district levels had caused the delay in the execution of the new salary structure and therefore brought about a lot of frustrations among the teachers in the southern Sudan (95).

5.10. CURRICULUM POLICY FOR TEACHER TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

The Sudanese government maintained a close relationship between the formulation of its educational policies and the training and education of the teachers (96). The Sudan Education Sector review recommended a close cooperation between the training institutes in order to ensure the achievement of a unified professional thinking and an integrity that would make possible the full utilization of the available resources (97). There is no available literature that showed that this trend was taken and from the evidence provided by the interviewees there was not much cooperation. Apparently the curriculum policy development has been confined to the inner circle within the Department of Curriculum in the central Ministry of Education.
During the Nimeiry's regime the programmes of the teacher training institutes were supposedly to be directed toward widening the bases of teachers' qualification so as to enable them to:

1. Understand and apply the theories of education in such fields as pre-primary education, adult education, social development, social services, statistics and library science.
2. Teach three or more subjects as a contribution to overcoming teachers shortages.
3. Fuse together subject teaching and teaching methods in the institutes of education.
4. Prepare the teachers to accept in-service training in stages.

The curriculum policy for teacher training and education of the Sudanese government that came to power in 1989 was geared more towards the achievement of ideological and religious objectives than was the case during the Nimeiry's regime. The aims of the curriculum for the teacher training and education were stated as (98):

1. Taking cognizance of the Arab strategy on education and curriculum development special emphasis is to be put on the professional aspects of teacher education and training curriculum. This aspect should equip the trainees with the basic skills which include continuous education and learning through the life time, and providing them with enough knowledge of the sciences of the Holy Koran to enable them effectively impart this knowledge to their pupils. The trainees should also have considerable professional language skills, particularly for teachers working in areas of linguistic interference, to enable them overcome the difficulties facing the students of those areas.
2. The curriculum of the teacher training be directed towards the achievement of major national aims, which include:

(a) Consolidation of national unity.

(b) Combating of divisionist and segregative sentiments.

(c) Respect of the diverse opinions and beliefs of others.

(d) Taking into account representation of the various environments of all the religions in the curriculum for teacher training, as far as it is possible.

3. Creation of conducive atmosphere in all training institutions for proper moulding of teacher’s personality as a good citizen and exemplary to his students based on religious values and national spirit

5.11. CONCLUSION.

The successive Sudanese governments since independence in 1956 have recognized the teachers as key professional group that must be managed, controlled and directed towards the moulding of an Arab-Islamic society. The training policies have therefore been geared towards the production of teachers with specific knowledge oriented to the Arab-Islamic world and Islamic ideologies. The government remained quite inflexible in applying the policies related to teacher training and education. Hence its policy of centralization of the teacher training institutes in the country which provided very little room for any alternative policy framework that would, otherwise, have accommodated the training needs of manpower resources in the whole country. One of the most powerful influences on the training policies in the Sudan has been the government’s interest in the Arab-Islamic
countries, especially the oil-rich Arab States, who have been the country's main financial benefactors.

The orientation of the teachers in the training institutes towards the Arab-Islamic background or environment has significant implications in relation to the application of knowledge to the reality of the educational needs of the country, particularly for the teachers for the southern schools. This has created a lack of awareness and understanding of the environmental problems in the country. The training provided made the teachers, especially those in the southern Sudan, not to be good media for linking education and training they received to the practical needs and situation within the local environment.

The government's desire for Arab unity has taken priority over all other national needs of education. This has been one of the basic principles that also influenced educational policy formation in the Sudan. The government however failed to provide the right ingredients for the unity of the country. Hence it was difficult to redress the imbalances or disparities in the educational provision in the country. What the Sudan required was, in reality, unity in diversity i.e. the unity that takes account of or accommodates the diversities existing in the country but not simply forced assimilation.

There is every indication that the imbalances in the provision of education in the country will persist if the trends of educational policies so far taken by the government are maintained. These were policies initiated and developed without adequate information that
would have formed a broad base for policy decisions for a country as large and diversed as the Sudan. Nobody among the research interviewees was precisely aware of who, within the country, provided the required information or inputs to make the central government take decisions on educational policy issues. The most probable explanation was that the government did not require those inputs as there were already ‘proven path’ of education in the Islamic sense of education.

The policies related to the teachers in general did not contribute to work satisfaction. It instead contributed to instability in the teaching force that led to teachers deserting the teaching profession or migrating to the oil-rich Arab countries. This has accounted greatly to the attrition in the profession and the loss of experienced teachers. The conditions that prevailed within the teaching profession such as low salaries poor promotion prospects and the low status in the Sudanese society were issues that caused the attrition in the teaching force. These factors were also the causes in the growth of the system of private tutoring, teachers’ trade union evening schools and the brain drain to the oil-rich Arab countries. The government’s attitudes, though not easy to concretize, have in many ways supported or encouraged the teachers’ desertion of the teaching profession or the poor status accorded to the teachers. For instance by selecting students of lower grades to be admitted into the training institutes at all levels. Consequently many students used this route as a stepping stone to other professions e.g. for getting a university degree.
The policy of centralized teacher training did adversely affect the training and provision of teachers for the schools in the southern Sudan. The policies were generally not framed to suit the prevailing needs of teachers and schools in the southern Sudan. These therefore affected the development of relevant education in the south. These policies have been responsible for the large number of untrained teachers in the southern Sudan. One of the reasons for this, particularly for the teachers for the primary schools, was the lack of training institutes, both in the north and south, to train teachers using the English medium for the English pattern schools. The bulk of the untrained teachers in the southern Sudan were from the English pattern primary and intermediate schools. The policy of decentralization of administration of education did not correct the imbalance as it did not carry with it the transfer of political, legislative or legal powers that would have enabled the southern regional government to exercise its own independent powers to, for instance, establish teacher training institutes specifically to suit the southern situation.

The next chapter looks into the language policies in the Sudan and how these have influenced education in the country as a whole and the southern Sudan in particular.
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6. LANGUAGE POLICY

6.1. THE LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT.

There are more than 100 languages spoken as mother tongues in the Sudan. Of these the Arabic language has been recognized constitutionally as the official language and the main medium for conduct of government in the whole country from the time of independence in 1956. The English language has been acknowledged as the principal language in the southern Sudan since 1972 as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement that recognized the Southern Sudan as an autonomous region within united Sudan (1). Despite this constitutional provision the language policy that attempted to differentiate the position of the southern region from the rest of the other parts of the country, the language issue remained a controversial educational matter between the north and southern Sudan. It remained a strongly guided political matter by the central government. In the southern Sudan the language issue was considered as a sensitive area of education which was not subject to open debate because of the political implication it would cause in the south - north relation.

The report of the Sudan Education Sector Review (1977), that was regarded as one of the most comprehensive government sponsored reports, recommended the use of the Arabic language as a language of instruction at all levels and for all types of education. But the
reason the report gave to support this recommendation took no cognizance of the multilingual nature of the country. It stated that “Arabic language is the means for the Sudanese child to attain knowledge and relate to life. It is also its heritage and culture” (2). The simplified argument put forward for the Arabicisation policy was that the Sudanese should study in Arabic just as the Germans study in German and the English in English (3). Considering the multitude of the languages existing in the country and the absence of proper research undertaken to come to this conclusion on the language policy, one could envisage difficulties in the implementation of the policy right from the initial stage.

Politically the apparent objective of the Arabicisation policy was stated as being in pursuit of national integration and national unity. This has been the reflection of northern Sudanese scholars and politicians. For them Arabic was an indispensable element in the national integration and unity. This is what Mohammed Omer Beshir, renowned northern Sudanese Educationist, had said: “National integration cannot be accelerated if English continues to be accorded a principal place and the southern languages are accorded a minor position. In the process of national integration, English cannot play the same role as Arabic and a southern language” (4). Five of the research interviewees from the northern Sudan have supported the integrative element of the Arabic language. The introduction of the Arabic language as medium of instruction in the schools was said to be acceptable because Arabic is the language of the nation (5). What probably was said to have been lacking was the right combination of initiative and commitment to this cause (6). The
approach taken was a political move with less thorough study of the technical problems involved in the implementation e.g. the provision of the reference materials, trained teachers and funds (7).

From the southern Sudanese point of view the enforced use of the Arabic language was doomed to failure because Arabic was one of the thorny issues in the south - north relation in the whole history of the Sudan. This was reflected in some of the responses of southern Sudanese to the language policy issues in the country. Francis M.Deng, in his book “Dynamics of Identification”, for instance, questioned that “given the fact that the southerner is not an Arab, should Arabism be used as the foundation for national identity and integration or should uniting labels be explored and used” (8). Jack Ngalam said “to sacrifice one’s mother tongue for a national language for the sake of national unity and integration, is stretching the point too far” (9). Soforonio Efuk stated that the national language policy undermined the very fabric of the southern Sudanese society (10). It was not in the interest of the central government to encourage the use of the local languages in the schools. This was indicative of the government’s insensibility to take account of the desire of the southern Sudanese to preserve their traditional cultures. Language, culture, identity and traditional values would be regarded as part of this preservation (11). As Kelman has argued (in Watson, 1994), “although a common language would obviously make for a more unified and cohesive society, efforts to create such a language where it does not clearly exist may have precisely the opposite effect. In determining whether a common language would be helpful and, if so, what form it ought to take, policy-makers
and language planners must consider not only the potential of such a language in binding the population to the nation state, sentimentally and instrumentally but also the sentimentally and instrumentally based resistance that the proposed policy would call forth in different sub-groups within the population" (12). As far as the Arabic language was concerned the government was not prepared for any ideal option.

The academic justification of the policy of Arabicisation was provided by Dr. Ali El Tahir Sharaf El Din of the Department of Physics, University of Khartoum, in a paper presented to a seminar organized by the National Council for Higher Education, where he defined Arabicisation as: “the transfer of knowledge from a foreign language into Arabic with the purpose of providing human knowledge for the Arab readers through books and for the Arab audience through speech, all within an authentic Arab mode of thought. Arabicisation within these limits should be governed by Arab cultural patterns and in harmony with Arab methods of education, deduction of facts and development of concepts” (13). This was how Dr. Ali El Tahir justified his point of view: “anyone who receives his education in an alien language would become unable to think in an Arab way. He in fact becomes a foreigner to his culture whatever superficial aspects of it he portrays” (14). How would Dr. Ali El Tahir justify his argument in the light of all the Sudanese graduates, including himself, who have gone through the universities within and outside the country using the English medium. Until the 1990s all the universities in the Sudan, except the Omdurman Islamic University and Cairo University branch in Khartoum, were running in English. Dr. Ali El Tahir did not take into consideration the multilingual and
multicultural nature of the Sudanese society, but regarded the Sudan as wholly an Arab-Islamic country.

The teaching of the Arabic language in the schools put much emphasis on Arabising (15). This was clearly shown in the content of the Arabic language curriculum where the recommended books contained only materials from Arab backgrounds especially at the early stages of education. The context of the books were completely removed from the learners from the southern Sudan (16).

One of the primary objectives of the national language policy, focused on Arabicisation, was to try to detribalize the indigenous tribes in the Sudan with all their multiple languages (17). A significant detribalizing effect of Arabicisation had already been seen among some of the tribes in the western Sudan e.g. among the Fur and the Nubas. The people in the Nuba Mountain Areas (mainly the Nuba tribes) did not have an alternative to the use of Arabic language as a medium of instruction in the schools. They have been subjected to the use of Arabic language over many centuries by the forceful and powerful Arabs (18). The imposition of the Arabic language and Arab culture on these tribes had greatly distorted the general lives of the people in these areas. In the schools the children were harshly punished for speaking their local languages (19). The success of Arabicisation in these areas made the national government to assume that a similar development of assimilation could take place in the southern Sudan over a period of time. Hence its consistent and relentless insistence on the use of Arabic language throughout the country.
Ideally the major objective of a language policy is to maintain harmony and cohesion of the nation’s unity and at the same time to maintain the cultures of the people which are best expressed through the various languages (20). This seemed not to have been the case in the Sudan because of the strong connection of Islam and Islamic culture to the Arabic language which placed no relevance to the development of local languages within the national language framework (21). The link between Islam and Arabic language in the Sudanese context was accountable for the arbitrary nature of the language policy formation in the country without the necessary studies about its feasibility and the impact on education. It was assumed that there was no alternative language better or equal to Arabic (22). The implementation of the national language policy did not even take into consideration the financial and human resources essential for implementation. This was more of a political expedient than a contribution to effective education for the whole population in the country (23). This explicitly meant the use of political power to subjugate the use of the other languages in the country. There was generally a lack of political will on the part of the government to consider other languages in the country as important in the socio-economic development of the country. The real motive was acculturation of the whole of the country through Arabicisation (24). According to Abdel Mural Girshab, a lecturer from University of Gezira, Arabicisation was an emotional political decision rather than a decision that was to help in having an effective development of education (25). It was not based on a properly laid down planned programme that was to be implemented gradually over a long period of time (26).
A southern Sudanese linguist from the University of Juba stated that the language policy of using Arabic as a medium of instruction would not have been a dangerous thing but the way it was introduced and how it was introduced was bad (27). He gave three main reasons for the failure of the policy:

1. Not sufficient time was provided for the training of the teachers and the phasing out of the English pattern teachers. There was in fact no laid out programme for the gradual phasing out of the English medium teachers nor their re-training in the use of Arabic language as a medium for teaching in the schools.

2. The immediate implementation of the policy triggered resistance, self-defense which were not conducive to the implementation of a language policy, however good the policy might have been. The attitude of the people and the impression they had about Arabic was therefore of repulsion.

3. The policy was imposed without proper research.

6.2. THE LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN.

The Southern Provinces Regional self-government Act of 3rd March 1972 translated the Addis Ababa Agreement into an organic law having the character of a constitution for the southern Sudan. The law provided for an executive body in the form of a High Executive Council and a legislative body known as the Regional People’s Assembly. The Act prohibited any prejudice of the rights of citizens resident in the southern Sudan on the grounds of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth or sex. The English language was designated as the principal language of the southern Sudan, although other languages may
be used for reasons of practical necessity or efficiency (28). The reason for the choice of English as the principal language for the southern Sudan was explained as: “The choice of English as the principal language of the south, at the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement was in consideration of the fact that our background in English is stronger than in any other foreign language including Arabic” (29). The Addis Ababa Agreement enacted that: “Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan and English the principal language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any other language or languages which may serve a practical necessity or to the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative functions of the Region” (30). The terms ‘official’ and ‘principal’ languages have not been defined in the Agreement. This was an ambiguous statement to which eventually no serious concern was paid as it carried no significant weight as far as the central government was concerned (31). The self-government Act moreover did not permit the Regional People’s Assembly and the High Executive Council to legislate or exercise powers with respect to economic, social and educational planning (32). These were areas without which the regional language plans were bound to fail.

It took the Southern Regional government four years from the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement before it came out with an alternative language policy for the southern Sudan. The general attitude of the Regional Government was that the national language policy issue, with particular reference to the position of Arabic, was a sensitive area because of its integrative element in the eyes of the central government. The politicians in the south
were aware of the political implications it entailed in terms of their positions in the
government. The Regional government was also conscious of the reluctance of the central
government to change the existing language policy that would otherwise unsettle the
existing status quo. The regional government was therefore faced with the dilemma of
maintaining national unity and at the same time securing regional loyalty. Because of this
tsituation the regional government was forced to come up with a language policy which
was intended to accommodate both the national and regional aspirations.

The lack of unity among the southern politicians made it practically difficult for the
regional government to have consensus on policy issues in terms of south - north relations.
This was because of the division among the politicians especially between those who were
outside the country during the 17 years civil war and those who stayed inside the country
during that period (33). The conflict of interest and the lack of agreement on policy issues
affecting the southern Sudan made it difficult for the Regional People’s Assembly to make
effective use of, for instance, the provision in the Regional self-government Act that
allowed it, by a two-third majority, to request the President of the Republic to postpone
the coming into force of any national law or policy that the members believed would
adversely affect the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region (34).
Hence the formation of the dual pattern of language policy for the southern schools which
was devised in order to accommodate the northern and southern interests (35). This was a
political decision taken by the Regional Government which was not rewarded by the
central government (36).
The Regional Language Policy (1976) says that (37):

1. From primary one to primary four in the rural areas vernacular language shall be the medium of instruction. English and Arabic shall be taught as subjects. From primary four to primary six English shall be the medium of instruction and Arabic shall continue to be taught as a subject. In the urban primary schools the medium of instruction shall be Arabic and English shall be taught as a subject.

2. In the intermediate schools Arabic shall be the medium of instruction and English shall be taught as a subject.

3. In the secondary schools English shall be the medium of instruction and Arabic shall be taught as a subject.

Six of the research interviewees pointed out that the regional government’s approach to the formation of the regional language policy was similar to that imposed by the central government. It made the same mistakes the central government made by not having carried out proper research and consultation with regard to the formation of the language policy and without taking account of the factors that would affect its implementation. The regional language policy was therefore created in a vacuum in that it came out without a proper plan of how the implementation was going to be carried out (38). One of the main problems was the absence of trained Arabic and English teachers in the southern Sudan to teach these languages effectively (39). The regional government for instance did not provide answers to the following questions (40):

1. Were the teachers available?
2. Have the teachers been trained or how long would it take to have them trained?

3. Were the teaching materials made available?

4. What were the aims of having the local languages taught?

5. Were there definite plans made for the use of these local languages and how would this be sustained in the long run?

The available teachers for the local languages were the few former bush school teachers (41). The formulation of the regional language policy that favoured the use of the local languages in the primary schools was not even followed by the production of reading materials e.g. text-books, local newspapers or programmes in the radio to listen to so that the language could regenerate itself (42). If the intention of having the local language was to make the children read and write in that language, what use were they to make of their reading or writing ability once they have gained it? This question was not answered.

The regional language policy framework contained a number of confusions. In the first place it did not follow the national trend of language policy which was Arabic as a medium of instruction and English to be taught as a subject (43). In one way the southern politicians did not like to be seen as siding with the north while on the other hand they would like to please the northern government so as to maintain their positions. This was one of the main causes of the ambiguity in the language policy (45).

The confusion in the regional language policy was clearly shown in the schooling system in the southern Sudan (46). The Arabic pattern pupils were not given the minimum knowledge of English language until they reach the intermediate school level. At this level
they were expected, after three years, to have sufficient bases of knowledge of English to enable them to go and learn in English in the secondary school, which also lasted three years. While the students struggled to know the language they were at the same time struggling to know the subject matters (47). The language teachers were also affected in their effectiveness in the teaching because of the lack of text-books. The few books available were shared within schools and pupils were not allowed to take them home. There were no schools or public libraries to which the pupils could go to read (48). Moreover many of the teachers were not resourceful because of lack of training. They therefore lacked confidence in the language teaching (49).

The regional government’s dual language policy was also a disaster for educational development in the southern Sudan in the sense that the compromising dual nature of the policy had the impact of creating people who were practically uneducated (50). Very few were able to go to the university. On average less than ten southern Sudanese students were admitted into the national universities in any single year (51). The highest number of southern students taken in one year was in 1973, where 91 students got accepted in the national university. These were mainly students who returned from East Africa after the 17 years of civil war. They were exempted from sitting for Arabic in the examination as a prerequisite for admission into the national universities (52).

The Arabic language as the official language of the Sudan and the predominant language of instruction and the English language as the principal language of the southern region
had also caused a number of administrative problems in the southern Sudan. These included the duplication of school materials, office equipment, translation of syllabuses and books from Arabic into English (53). One other offshoot of the dual language policy was the creation of a spirit of confrontation and conflict between the students of the two patterns of schools. The English pattern students were often branded by the Arabic pattern students as foreign students (54). This sometimes created an atmosphere not conducive to learning as frequently physical fighting broke out between the two patterns which often resulted into the closure of schools.

From early 1980s the pressure on the use of Arabic as a medium of instruction in the southern schools continued to increase. Fewer and fewer southern students were admitted into the national universities because of the poor performance in the examinations. The main cause for the low admission was attributed to not having passed the Arabic language in the examinations as a pre-condition for admission. The confusion among the politicians also continued to build. On the one hand some southern politicians regarded Arabic as an element in northern political and cultural domination. On the other hand some of the politicians in the central government and in the regional government (the insiders) considered their unfamiliarity with Arabic a handicap. This has been manifested in the lack of interest of southern Sudanese politicians to contest for seats in the national assembly. Two reasons were given for this reluctance. Firstly because the proceedings of the national assembly touched less on the affairs of the southern region. Secondly because the southern
politicians lacked confidence in participating in the debates in the national assembly which were conducted in Arabic (54).

Because of the many problems and confusions enumerated, the regional language policy failed to be implemented. Another attempt to produce a workable language policy framework for the southern Sudan was made by Equatoria State Ministry of Education, in an educational conference held in the town of Juba, in May 1988. The conference came out with the following recommendations as a basis for a regional language policy for the southern region (55):

1. That from primary one to primary three vernaculars be the media of instruction. English and Arabic be taught as subjects. From primary four to primary six English shall be the medium of instruction and Arabic shall be taught intensively as a subject. The vernacular language shall continue to be taught in these stages as a subject.

2. That in the intermediate and secondary schools English shall continue to be the medium of instruction with Arabic taught intensively as a subject. A vernacular language shall continue to be taught as a subject and to be examinable.

3. Vernacular languages shall be included in the curriculum of the primary teacher training institutes in the southern Sudan.

These recommendations were approved by the Equatoria State government but their implementation was halted by the military coup of 1989 which brought a new Islamic government in power. The new regime came up with a new language policy which emanated from a ‘national’ education policies conference held in Khartoum in September
1990. The new National Language Policy demanded that Arabic be the medium of instruction, without exception, throughout the Sudan (56). This policy therefore crippled the attempt of the regional government once again.

6.3. THE INSTITUTE OF REGIONAL LANGUAGES (IRL).

Resolution No.247 (1975) of the Regional High Executive Council instructed the Regional Ministry of Education to re-introduce the teaching of local languages in the southern schools while at the same time aiming to enable the children to become proficient in Arabic and English (57). As a result the Regional Government established an Institute of Regional Languages (IRL) in the town of Maridi in 1977. The institute was originally meant to be a research centre for the study of the regional languages. It was to engage in the development of the southern languages through linguistic research, the training of the IRL staff and teachers and it was to develop mother tongue literacy materials and graded materials for translation to English or Arabic (58). The IRL received assistance from the American-based Summer Institute of Linguistics. The SIL was basically a religious organization, and its original objective was to translate the Bible into as many languages as possible. This primary objective was not stated in the organization's later contract with the regional government for fear of incrimination as a Christian religious organization. They were even prepared to write the materials in the local "Juba Arabic" if this would enable them to reach their primary objective, provided that the features depicted showed the southern characteristics (59). They were not prepared to come to direct confrontation with the central government (60). The SIL first came into the southern Sudan in 1974,
two years after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. When the Institute of Regional Languages was formed in 1977 SIL took the opportunity to make an agreement with the regional government of the South to assist in the local language project.

The Institute of Regional Languages however failed to live up to its primary objectives for a number of reasons:

1. The central government was not in favour of the centre because it believed that the institute would work against the policy of Arabicisation of the southern Sudan (61). As a result the expected funds from the central government were not provided.

2. The IRL was linked to the Curriculum Development Centre at Maridi but there were no southern Sudanese trained in curriculum development to run the Curriculum Centre (62).

3. The Regional Government did not do much to have the regional languages implemented. It did not put in the meager financial resources to develop the institute. The language policy issues were considered ‘sensitive areas’. The regional government did not therefore avail the funds for the training of the teachers. The few old village school teachers were the only ones being trained by the SIL (63).

4. The majority of the southern Sudanese, including the politicians, have a low opinion of the local languages. The local language officers themselves felt too low or down graded for being called local language officers. They did not like to be identified with local languages. As a result several of them sought for further training in other fields and so left the job of being local language officers (64).
5. Learning the local language was not a prestigious form of learning because of the belief that its acquisition did not take one anywhere and no job opportunities were at hand for it and moreover it was not financially rewarding (65).

6. There was a lack of consistency in the application of the policy of the local languages. Though the regional government language policy advocated the use of the local languages, it did not emphasize or encourage their use. As a result no value was put on the learning of the local languages by the students, parents and teachers because these could lead to no useful ends. The English and Arabic languages were considered the only avenues for higher learning and employment in the urban centres (66).

7. The IRL could have produced some materials in the local languages with the assistance provided by the SIL, but it lacked the means or outlets of enforcing the implementation. There was no political will or the mechanisms, on the part of the regional government to distribute the materials to other schools other than the pilot schools in Maridi (67).

6.4. THE LANGUAGE POLICY AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

Until the late 1980s all the higher institutions of learning, except the Omdurman Islamic University and the Cairo University branch in Khartoum, were using English as the medium of instruction. But the talks about changing the medium into Arabic had started as early as 1970. A Ministerial and Technical Committee on the University of Khartoum had in 1970 expressed the view that the use of English as a medium of instruction in the university education reflected a kind of cultural dependency. It recommended that Arabic
should be given its proper place as the main language of instruction. It also recommended its adoption as the official language of communication in university meetings (68). The attempts were met with mountains of difficulties including the lack of resources for translating the huge volumes of English reference books and materials into Arabic, and the financial resources to buy alternative Arabic books from the other Arab countries (69). Moreover, despite the international character of the modern Arabic, its usage varies from country to country (70). All these factors made the earlier attempts to change the medium of instruction from English into Arabic in the University abortive.

According to Yusuf Fadl Hassan, a lecturer at the University of Khartoum, there was no doubt about the value, validity and urgency of Arabicising the curriculum without undermining the role of English: what probably was lacking, he stated, was the right combination of initiative and commitment to this cause (71). Yusuf Fadl Hassan, like many other northern Sudanese intellectuals, did not take account of the complexity of Sudanese society and the implications the changes in the language policy might cause to university education. The Arabicisation of the university education could not be accomplished during the whole period of President Nimeiry's regime though Arabic language remained a prerequisite for acceptance into the national universities.

The full weight of the Arabicisation policy on the university education was felt from the year 1989 when the current Islamic Fundamentalist government took over power in the Sudan. The prospect for its success is not easy to assess since the original factors that prevented the earlier implementation attempts are still in place. The importance of
Arabicisation to the new government regime, in higher education, was summed up by Dr. Sharaf El Din (72) as follows:

1. It would make it easier for the teacher to express himself accurately and for the student to absorb and understand the subject.

2. It would strengthen the link between the students and the university and their community. Self-esteem and self-reliance would be encouraged and greater scope offered for intellectual inquiry and debate.

3. In economic term, Arabicisation will save money as locally produced books are less costly than imported ones.

4. The use of Arabic for teaching is a means of promoting the national identity and unity and ending dependence on foreign cultures.

5. There will be a return to Arab cultural origins and roots.

6. Arabicisation can provide a powerful factor in promoting cultural and national unity among the Sudanese in all their diverse ethnic groups.

These academic arguments by Dr. Sharaf El Din were ideals which realistically did not suit the complex situation in the Sudan. The argument provided by Dr. Sharaf El Din totally disregarded the existence of the Africans in the Southern Sudan, in particular, whose cultural origins are quite distinct from those of the Arabs in the northern Sudan and who regard Arabic as an alien language. All that he has stated suited the northern Sudan but not the south. The University of Juba, in the southern Sudan, for instance, was established with the principal objective of taking account of the Southern Region’s needs and to
respond more quickly and sensitively to the environment in the southern Sudan (73). Dr. Sharaf was not in any case concerned about the impacts the policy he advocated would have on those who were not Arabs.

The response to Dr. Sharaf's justification for using Arabic as a language of instruction in the national universities has been provided by Sibrino B. Forojalla in the light of the position of the University of Juba. Sibrino B. Forojalla, a lecturer in the University of Juba, stated that the same reasons or arguments put forward by Sharaf could equally be the arguments that the African Sudanese in the southern Sudan could put in regards to being subjected to Arabicisation by the Arab dominated northern government. Besides the basic differences between the north and the south, there were a number of difficulties in the implementation of the Arabicisation policy in the universities (74) which included:

1. The lack of text-books and other reference in Arabic for the use of students and lecturers in the range of subjects.

2. The lack of a sufficient number of lecturers able to teach the range of subjects offered in the universities in Arabic.

3. The lack of adequate funds from which to meet the needs for the required books and other materials and teaching staff.

4. The lack of sufficient time allowed between the commencement of the policy and the expected commencement of its implementation.

Other related factors included:
1. The variation in the Arabic language usage among the various Arab countries which would present some problems in the use of the imported books without revision to suit the Sudanese situation.

2. The ability of the academic staff to lecture in Arabic varied widely. A typical example was that of the academic staff of the University of Juba who could be divided into four groups according to their knowledge of and ability to lecture in Arabic (75):

   (a) There are those who could teach in Arabic without too much difficulty given adequate supplies of text-books and reference materials and sufficient time to prepare.

   (b) There are those who have some knowledge of Arabic but would require at least one or two years of special training to enable them teach properly.

   (c) There are those who only have knowledge of spoken colloquial Arabic.

   (d) There are those who have no knowledge of Arabic at all, spoken or otherwise.

Apparently the government did not have a definite planned programme of how to deal with the multitude of difficulties in the implementation of the Arabicisation policy in the university education. There were, for instance, no planned phases of the implementation and how the English lecturers were going to be phased out. What was practically taking place was the dismissal of lecturers who could not cope with the Arabicisation policy (76).
The Arabicisation policy had also caused some confusion in the learning ability of the students. The students were lectured in Arabic, given notes in Arabic but when they go to the library they only got English reference books or materials, which many found difficult to comprehend (77). The students had difficulties of connecting what the lecturer gave in Arabic and what were contained in the library books in English. Therefore converting the cognitive processes so that listening was translated into reality when the student read in English became a problem (78). One of the offshoots of this problem was that the lecturers began to print their own notes in Arabic and sold them to the students. So there grew up a sort of profit making market for the lecturers in the university. The notes were printed with the promise to the students that the examinations would come out of the notes provided. Consequently the students only concentrated on the limited amount of notes printed by the individual lecturers. The knowledge acquired in the various disciplines was therefore most probably limited to the notes provided (79).

Most of the universities in the Sudan were 50% understaffed and were overloaded. Introducing further difficulty in the form of the Arabic language as a medium of instruction caused an additional problem (80). The political nature of the introduction of the language policy was a characteristic of the approach of the government that came to power in 1989. The policy was seen by many academics as part of the cultural “siege” being tighten around the country (81). For instance, the Central Distribution House, originally established by Nimeiry in 1970, was made to censor all overseas publications before allowing them inside the country (82).
6.5. CONCLUSION.

In talking about education, it is inevitable that the language question come to the front line because it is the medium through which knowledge is transmitted. In the Sudan the language policy has been focused on Arabicisation of education. This has been consistently and relentlessly pursued by the various governments in the Sudan since independence in 1956. The Sudanese government’s preoccupation with the policy of Arabicisation was based on the conception that Arabic was the only channel for forging oneness of the country, though apparently there was no nationwide sentiment of belonging together created. A final analysis of the language policy aimed at imposed linguistic uniformity shows clear ideological and religious justification based on Islamic religion. From the government’s point of conception Arabicisation was synonymous with breaking down ethnic loyalty and destruction of multilingual characteristics of the Sudanese society. It associated multilingualism with divisiveness which, it assumes, works against the intended form of identity envisaged by the government. But all the indications were that this was simply a convenient scapegoat for the real causes of divisiveness. It did not, for instance, take into consideration the historically entrenched cultural, linguistic and religious differences between the north and south Sudan.

From the national government’s perception multilingualism was a barrier to national integration and unity and that allowing linguistic diversity in the country would preclude political unity. In coming to this conclusion the government disregarded the important
element of carrying out a thorough study to assess the suitability and impact of the language policy that it decided to adopt in the country. Neither did it make any reference to linguistic experts who might be in a position to give advice on the language. The only explanation that could be advanced was that such a study was not necessary and relevant because, from the government stand, the importance of Arabic could not be equated with any other language. The position of Arabic was not subject to public debate or public opinion.

There was a complete lack of political will on the part of the government to search for other alternative language of significance to education. It was not prepared to harness whatever positive advantages of the phenomenon of multilingualism were there. There were some living examples from other countries that proved that multilingual policy did not work against national unity e. g. in Kenya, Ghana, Switzerland and Belgium. A Nigerian linguist, Ayo Bomgbose, for instance stated that “a common language is not a necessary condition for a unified state and that one or more major language groups can coexist with minimal conflict between them” (83). However coping with the consequences of multilingual policy was a thing that the national government was not prepared to face.

The subordinate position of the Southern Regional government, in terms of the national policy issues, and the constitutional and political constraints that controlled its functions, forced the Regional Government to make a language policy pronouncement that was prone to failure. This was a language policy which was intended to accommodate the
national interest and contain the regional sentiments. This compromising approach manifested itself in the general attitude by the regional government that the language policy issue in the Sudan was a sensitive matter. This attitude was based on the assumption that the unity of the country anchored on using Arabic language nationwide. But another hidden element in this attitude was the fact that the politicians in the regional government feared losing their positions which were dependent on their allegiance to the national policies. This sensitivity was, in many ways, a hindrance to positive language policy development in the region.

The deliberate enforcement of the Arabic language as the medium of instruction in the schools and university education had a disastrous effect on education in the southern Sudan. It apparently worked against the attainment of meaningful education in the southern Sudan and was accountable for the low standards of education and the great number of failures and drop-outs. It denied the majority of students from the southern Sudan the opportunity of entering the national universities. Another anomaly in the language policy, in terms of employment in the southern Sudan, was that the graduates of the universities who expected to work in the south were to work through English as the principal language in the government in the southern Sudan. In the final analysis the regional government was left in a state of total dilemma and a lack of definite direction.

The next chapter analyses the policies applied to the Higher Education in the Sudan. It in particular highlighted the effects of the higher education policies on the southern Sudan.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

7. HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY

7.1. THE NATIONAL POLICY TRENDS:

The expressed philosophy, objective and orientation of higher education in the Sudan was intended to relate the university education to the needs and demands of the Sudanese society with a view of assuring 'national identity' and 'originality'. Its basic role, as expressed by the national government, besides playing a greater part in serving the needs of the community, was to demonstrate a greater interest in the social and cultural life and problems of the community (1). The basic pre-occupation of the government was how to devise the means and approach of achieving these goals which it had set itself.

Soon after President Nimeiry came to power in the Sudan on the 25th May 1969 he directed changes of the university in accordance with the philosophy of his new government. The university was to be guided by the ideology of the new political system, the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) (2). This was a new political organization created by Nimeiry after he banned all the political parties in the country. A Ministerial and Technical Committee, constituted on the 4th November 1969, was to review the functions, structures and the laws of the university of Khartoum. This Committee focused its attention on two main areas:

1. The need to link up the university to the state so that it became an inseparable part of the government’s machinery, geared towards the interests of the Sudanese people.
2. The need to link up the university with Sudanese society so that it could meet its intellectual and scientific needs. This was to be resolved through changes in the content of the University education (3).

The Committee, in its recommendations, criticized the university for having continued to exist almost like an isolated foreign institution. This was a type of phrase that had been commonly used to attack most universities in the African countries especially those with Western basis of foundation. The recommendations that the Ministerial and Technical Committee provided were embodied in the National Council for Higher Education Act, 1972. The National Council for Higher Education (NCHE) was given quite substantial powers over institutions of higher learning in the country. It was supposed to be in a position to coordinate the activities of the higher education institutions and their development in so far as this was required for meeting national needs and for getting full value for Government money (4). The functions of the National Council for Higher Education included the following:

1. Surveillance over the planning and coordination of general policy of higher education and setting plans for projects for their execution.

2. Defining the role of every institution of higher learning within the framework of its plans and programmes.

3. Specifying the number of students admitted annually, the standards and ratio of those admitted to enroll in the academic and technical education, including the ratio of admission to each discipline.
4. Determining the appointment qualifications for each member of staff and other terms of service.

5. Reviewing budget proposals submitted by the governmental institutions of higher education and itemizing the amount of grants to be paid before recommending it to the President of the Republic. It is worth noting that the President of the Republic was also the Chancellor of all institutions of higher education in the country.

6. Assessing the performance of the institutions of higher education and reviewing their annual reports. The scale of the review was influenced by a number of considerations including the amount of money that can be made available.

The National Council, chaired by the Minister of Education, included in its membership five other Ministers and twelve other members holding positions of responsibility in higher education institutions (5). The presence of the Ministers in the Council was basically to guard or guide the government policies regarding higher education and to see to it that the higher education institutions operate within the policy framework set for them by the government. This was indicative of the government plans to have control of the higher education institutions. But to what extent the Ministers in the National Council or the National Council as a whole influenced the activities on higher institutions of learning was not easy to determine. The composition of the Council itself was an indication that it could not be able to meet oftener than perhaps three or less times a year. Its functions were, of necessity, confined to matters of policy (6).
The 1973 Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, under the Chapter entitled "The Directives principles of the State Policy", specified that the State "guarantees the academic independence of the university and safeguards freedom of thought and scientific research". It also stated that it was incumbent on the state to "direct academic learning and scientific research towards the service of the society and development requirements" (7). A similar principle was stated in the 1985 Provisional Constitution after the overthrow of President Nimeiry. Both of the constitutions contained elements of freedom and control. Clause 6 of the 1973 University Act defined the meaning of autonomy of the university and the relationship of the university with the law of the country and the national policies as thus: "Without prejudice to the laws for the time being in force or any national policy for the coordination of higher education, the university shall be independent body in which the members of the academic staff shall enjoy freedom of thought and scientific research" (8). In the course of time during President Nimeiry's reign the academic freedom and freedom of thought became gradually eroded because of continuous political interference in the activities in the university.

The period of President Nimeiry witnessed a great deal of interference and interruption in the activities of the universities in the country (9). This period saw quite a substantial brain drain away from the academic work in the universities to political organizations and to secondment to the oil-rich Arab countries. About 25% of the university staff were seconded to the Gulf States and between 10 to 15% were on secondment to the political organizations inside the country, mainly the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) (10). During
the 16 years of President Nimeiry’s reign 19 of his Ministers were university lecturers (11). Although the effect of this brain drain was not measured, the fact that the most experienced lecturers were the ones being taken away meant that the impact on the universities must have been significant. The introduction of the branches of the SSU in the universities also meant the involvement of the students in the politics of the country. Though the various political parties were banned when Nimeiry came to power, they featured within the universities, although much underground. The positions in the SSU organization within the universities were contested on the basis of former political groupings (12). The results of all these involvement have been reflected in the frequent factional friction among the students which often brought about disruptions in the academic work because of frequent closure of the universities. It was a common feature of the universities in the Sudan to have on the average about four months of effective university teaching instead of nine (13).

7.2. INDIGENIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.

Indigenization of higher education was a concept that surfaced more prominently from 1989 when the fundamentalist Islamic government of Prime Minister General Omer El Beshir took over power in the Sudan. This concept was in existence during the previous regimes in the country but was not openly manifested as during this period. This was conceived with the intention of rooting education in the ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ of the Sudan. The government’s declaration about this policy trend stated that the first aim of the government was the “indigenization of higher education so that it can express adequately
the distinctive traits of the Sudanese people which originate from their Islamic Arabian and African beliefs and heritage” (14). One of the reasons for this move has been the fear of foreign influence on the Sudanese students. Mazrui (1978) presented similar argument. He argued that modern African universities are the pinnacle of cultural dependency, because, apart from their language of instruction, which is usually a European language, they train students in Eurocentric models values, knowledge and understanding. The result is that the educated elites become perfect conduits for Western intellectual penetration (15). The only means put forward for the implementation of this policy was through the use of Arabic as the medium of instruction in all the institutions of higher education in the country. It was therefore declared that no students would be enrolled in an institution of higher education unless he secured a pass in both Arabic language and religious studies (16).

The government of El Beshir placed university education at the top of its educational agenda. This was evident from the number of decisions taken in connection with higher education, the speed with which they were being implemented and the patterns of appointments to top posts in the higher education sector (17). A number of decrees were passed by the Prime Minister at the end of 1989 which related to the development in higher education. Three of the decrees were for:

1. The creation of five new universities to be situated in Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile, Kordofan, Darfur, and Port Sudan.
2. The doubling of the number of admission to the older universities.
3. The use of Arabic as a medium of instruction at the higher education levels (18).

The government also formulated a new Higher Education Act 1990 which contained the powers of the National Council for Higher Education. Section 6 of the 1990 Higher Education act charged the National Council for Higher Education with the following responsibilities:

1. The formulation of general policy on higher education.

2. Planning and programming of higher education within the framework of state policy.

3. Supervising its plans, coordinating and defining the roles of all institutions of higher education within the specified policy, plans and programmes (19).

The seriousness that the government attached to the control of policies on higher education has been reflected in the type of persons placed in charge of the policy organ of Higher Education Council. The overall supervision of the National Council for Higher Education was entrusted to Brig. General Zubair Mohammed Saleh, Deputy Chairman of the Revolution Command Council (RCC) and Deputy Prime Minister. The Chairmanship of the National Council for Higher Education was given to Dr. Ibrahim Ahmed Omer who was said to have been a high ranking National Islamic Front (NIF) member of long standing. He was later appointed the Minister of Higher Education and Research (20).

One of the reasons that the government provided for the expansion of the number of the universities was to prevent the students from going outside the country for their studies. The hidden agenda of Islamisation was not mentioned. The UNESCO report of 1973/74
reported that 4,286 Sudanese undergraduate students were enrolled in universities outside the Sudan (21). These were on scholarships allowed by the Ministerial Council for Human Resources. They were held in 36 different countries, 37% of them in Egypt and 32% in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union (22). In 1981/82 there were 21,916 Sudanese students who were studying abroad (23). Table 7 below show this according to the areas of specialization:

Table 7: Number of Sudanese Students Studying Abroad by Specialization for the Academic Year 1981/82.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIALIZATION</th>
<th>NO. OF STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Medicine</td>
<td>2266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pharmacy</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dentistry</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Veterinary Science</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Agriculture and Forestry</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Engineering</td>
<td>1699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Economics and Political Science</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Science</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Arts</td>
<td>1303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Law</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Commerce</td>
<td>1860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Journalism</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Statistics</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Education and Psychology</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One other basic justification for the expansion of the universities was to increase the number of available places in higher education (24). This argument was based on the study which was said to have been carried out by the National Council for Higher Education in 1990 which showed that the total number of students admitted into higher education institutions annually, over the past decade remained at about 5000 although the number of students eligible to receive higher education had increased (25). The study was said to have established that the number of students studying abroad privately was greater than those being educated in the country. The annual average amount remitted to support such students was estimated at between 25 million to 45 million US dollars (26). The government therefore argued that the basic determinant of who got higher education and who did not was no longer academic qualification but the ability to pay (27). Hence, one of the fundamental considerations, from the government’s point of view, in embarking on the expansion of higher education was to correct this imbalance and to “ensure justice and democratization of Education” by enabling those who qualified to enter universities and...
other institutions of higher education get the opportunity to do so, instead of being frustrated by the lack of funds required to study abroad (28).

The government’s policy of expansion plus the policy of enforcing the policy of Arabicisation in university education was seen by the academics of the universities as part of the ‘cultural siege’ being tighten around the universities (29). A Report by the World University Service about education in the Sudan revealed that the regime’s decision to increase enrollment at a time of dire economic crisis in the Sudan was designed to broaden the National Islamic Front’s base in the higher education system and increase its share of adherents among the future members of the elite in the country (30). According to a senior lecturer at the University of Gezira, the expansion of the universities in the Sudan was simply political propaganda designed to gain popularity (31). He pointed out that the haphazard expansion of the universities was done without taking into consideration the plans the universities had already in the pipeline for implementation. A typical example he provided was that of the Faculty of Medicine in the University of Gezira. The intake into the University of Gezira for the Faculty of Medicine was 50 students when the fundamentalists took over government in the Sudan in 1989. The plan of the university was to increase the number gradually with a corresponding increase in the number of the teaching staff, equipment and premises. The university was in fact working with only 50% manpower of the required teaching staff (32). These were genuine difficulties that warranted the gradual expansion of the university. The government ignored this situation and went ahead to double the intake to 100 students without any increase in staffing or
equipment. The following year (1990) the number was double again to 200 students. In 1992 the number reached 500 students i.e. a tenfold increase from the 1989 intake (33). The actual amount of the teaching was practically decreased because of dismissals during the same period. There were 15 lecturers dismissed from the University of Gezira alone between 1990 and 1992. Other universities in the country also faced the same fate of dismissals. 28 lecturers were dismissed from the University of Khartoum, 48 from the University of Juba, and one from the Ahlia University in the same period (34).

According to Sibrino B. Forojalla, a lecturer from the University of Juba, though the new policy of the expansion of the universities apparently attempted to ameliorate the existing inequalities in higher education opportunities in the country, it practically served to exacerbate them, particularly in relation to the southern Sudan and other peripheral regions (35). This was because no prior studies were conducted to ascertain the country’s needs for educational expansion at the higher education level and how best it could be organized (36). For the Southern Sudan there were apparently very few secondary schools which were functioning to warrant the establishment of the two new universities in the region i.e. Wau and Malakal. Most of the secondary schools in the southern Sudan were at this time closed because of the war. But even during the peaceful period there were very few southern students who managed to be admitted to the only university in the south, Juba University.
7.3. THE UNIVERSITY OF JUBA.

In accordance with the Provision of Article 106 of the National Constitution, the President of the Republic of the Sudan, Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiry, issued a Provision Order cited as "The University of Juba Act, 1975" (37). This Provision established the University of Juba as a corporate body with perpetual succession and a common seal. Under the Provision, the University of Juba was to have the following functions bounded by the general policy of the state and the programmes prescribed by the National Council for Higher Education (38):

1. To study and search for the natural resources with the object of promoting and developing the same, and to prepare qualified cadres in the sciences pertaining to such resources for the purpose of promoting the rural environment in the southern region and such similar regions all over the country.

2. To prepare assisting cadres of technicians and advisers and open doors to such rural citizens and blend experience with knowledge.

3. To undertake such sociological studies as may be necessary for environmental promotion and to graduate qualified cadres in the sciences of economics, public administration, business administration and community development.

4. To inculcate the aims of national unity and diversified culture through sociological studies and any other means.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Commission of the European Communities held discussions in April 1976 on the possibility of funding by the
Commission of a programming study of the University of Juba in the southern Sudan (39). This was to be done through the European Development Fund. The study agreed upon was conducted by a team of International Consultants under the umbrella of the Inter-University Council (IUC). The team was made up of the following persons:

1. Professor J.D. Turner, University of Manchester, Leader of the team.
2. Dr. W.J. Boelman, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
3. Professor M.W. Danby, University of Newcastle Upon-Tyne.
4. Professor M.J. Delany, University of Bradford.
5. Professor R.R. Hofmann, University of Giessen.
7. Dr. C.J.J. Richter, Agricultural University of Wageningen.
8. Professor L. Roche, University of Wales.
9. Mr. R.S. Taylor, University of Reading.
10. Mr. J.M. Theakstone, Head of the East and Central African Division of the IUC, who acted as the Coordinator of the Team and the Editor of the Report.

The study focused on six main areas:

1. Description of the objectives and functions of the planned university according to the development policy of the Sudanese government.
2. Working out the structure and organization of the university.
3. Presenting models of the teaching programmes of the various subjects taking into account the particular economic, social and cultural context of the southern Sudan.
4. Determining the location and architectural outline of the university as well as the necessary buildings.

5. Presenting the list of the necessary equipment.

6. Determining approximately the costs for the implementation and operation of the university and work out a consistent plan for the financing of the university.

The team of the International Consultants provided the following comprehensive justification and advantages of opening of a regional university in the Southern Region on the Sudan (40):

1. It would make it possible to prepare the people for the development situations in the Southern Region within a development oriented environment.

2. It would be able to respond more quickly and sensitively to the rapidly changing needs of the region undergoing rapid transformation.

3. It would operate with greater economy than one placed elsewhere.

4. Special account could be taken of the region’s needs in allowing entry to the university. Thus, the Senate of the University was to retain control over the entry of a proportion of the students so as to ensure that the Region’s relative lack of opportunity for secondary education will not place the school-leavers at a disadvantage in seeking access to higher education.

5. The natural resources of the southern region are quite different from those of the north. The region has the possibility for the production of such tropical crops as rice, coffee, tea and cassava. Cattle raising is also one of the major activities in the
south. Training is more meaningful, they said, if undertaken in the areas where the natural resources exist.

6. The programme of the College of Education will enable teachers for the secondary schools to be more rural-oriented. The assumption was that the teachers produced would be able to introduce courses of immediate relevance to the local situation.

7. The researches to be undertaken in the university were to be directed to the needs of the region.

From the policy framework regarding the opening of the University of Juba and the points presented by the team of consultants, one would surely assume that the University of Juba was meant to serve the needs of the Southern Region of the Sudan. The primary objective could be interpreted to meant that the university was intended for the development of the natural resources in the southern Sudan and to the production of its people well fitted to provide services in the rural areas.

According to John M Theakstone, the Coordinator of the International Team of the Consultants, the team who studied and thus recommended the establishment of the University of Juba, believed strongly that the university was genuinely a regional university to serve the southern region (41). This was what was contained in the legislation drafted for the opening of the university. But within the first year of the opening of the university the original objective of having a regional university was changed into a national university (42). The change over was very quick and the reasons for this, as provided by Theakstone, were connected to the following:
1. The national politics, based on the northern view of building on the Addis Ababa Agreement and to go for national unity by making the university a national rather than a regional university. The intention was to make the university a symbol of national unity.

2. The number of qualified secondary school leavers from the north of the country was too great for the capacity of the University of Khartoum. Very few southern students qualified for admission into the university. This was therefore a mopping-up exercise to accommodate the northern students. So the equity argument went by the board.

3. In terms of academic staff there were very few southern staff who were willing and able to work as university staff especially the range of senior southerners available for the job. At this initial stage there were already a sufficient cadre of northern staff who could not go well with Nimeiry’s regime in Khartoum, who felt more at home in Juba. These were the cadre of lecturers who filled the University of Juba initially. This recruitment of the initial lecturers for the University of Juba were done without due consideration of the proposals made by the International Team of Consultants that the first staff to be appointed to the university should be aware of the nature of the institution and the type of persons it has been set up to produce.

The former President of the Southern Regional Government and Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan stated that though the establishment of the University of Juba was not discussed at the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, he knew that the university was established specifically to build manpower for the development of the Southern Region (43). It was later on that the Khartoum government commandeered it and made it
an extension of the University of Khartoum to take the surplus students from the northern Sudan (44). The national government saw the university as an important instrument for sustaining national integration and national unity of the country (45). When the machination of the national government became clear the university became a focal arena for north-south political controversy and conflict (46). This sudden change in the development of the University of Juba as was envisaged by the International Team of Consultants was detrimental to manpower development meant specifically for the southern Sudan. The motives of the national government to involve the international body was simply to obtain the funds for the establishment of a university (47). Once that objective was achieved it decided what was considered politically best in the national interest. The International body had no legitimate power to decide what was politically correct for a sovereign country however bad the policy was for one section of the society in question. The only option left could have been to withheld the funds for the completion of the project.

7.3.1. THE MODELS OF THE TEACHING PROGRAMMES IN THE UNIVERSITY OF JUBA.

The original concept of establishing the University of Juba as envisaged by the planners, particularly the international planners was neither introduced into the system nor attempts made to do so (48). The International Donors were pushing for a form of education that was terminal and basically oriented to producing middle cadre professionals (49). This was based on the assumption, in the 1970s and 1980s, that higher education had a low rate
of return. As a result basic education plus technical and vocational education gained credentials for international support. But was that the type of education the southern Sudanese required at this time? This question was not seriously taken account of. The International body had the money and they were the ones to decide where the money should be spent. In this particular case of the Sudan they did not succeed. One of the fundamental problems regarding the vocationally oriented education as envisaged by the international donors was the conflict between the parental push where the parents wanted their children to advance up the academic ladder because they saw the future income tied closely to academic qualification and the planners pushing for the vocationally oriented qualification (50). “You cannot force parents into a kind of education where there are limited horizons” (51). Incidentally one of the features in the Sudan was the fact that the Sudanese government itself accorded greater status to the university education and this level of education received greater government support than was the case in the other African countries further south (52).

The basic problem of the University of Juba was the question of the implementation of the policies related to it (53). According to the programme worked out by the international consultants, no student was to register direct for a degree programme on a first admission into the University of Juba. The objective was for the university to produce people of middle caliber at the diploma level. But this objective was aborted right from the initial stage of the opening of the university. The first intake of the students into the university, the majority of whom where from the northern Sudan, revolted against the diploma
programme to be offered in the university (54). The northern students, in particular, devalued the diploma courses as meant for the southern students and not for them. This became politically volatile situation for the university administration in terms of who should be offered degree course and who should be offered the diploma course (55). To offer the diploma courses for the southern Sudanese and degree courses for the northern Sudanese was seen as politically unwise under the existing situation when the memory of the 17 years civil war was still fresh in the minds of most of the southern Sudanese. The university administration therefore yielded to the pressure of the students and the whole set up of the programme was changed into degree programmes instead of diploma (56).

7.3.2. THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE UNIVERSITY OF JUBA.
The Regional Government had no influence over the policies and development of the University of Juba though it was aware of the original objectives of the opening of the university. According to the former Minister of Education of Equatoria State, who later became the Governor of the same State, the Regional Government did not have a say in the central government policy issues (57). The Southern leaders, including the President of the Region, were just nominal heads and the south was literally run from Khartoum (58).

The appointment of the Vice Chancellor for the University of Juba was done by the President of the Republic of the Sudan without consultation with the President of the Southern Regional Government. All the Vice Chancellors, so far appointed for the
University of Juba, had come from the northern Sudan (59). The Chairman of the University of Juba Council, who was a southerner, was also a nominal central government appointee (60). He apparently had only a ceremonial role with not much influence on the policy and administration of the university (61), despite the fact that the University Act granted him substantial powers over the policy issues of the university. According to the University Act, the Chairman of the University Council was responsible for presiding over and leading the University Council. He had the right to initiate such plans as might be necessary to ensure the implementation of the policy prescribed by the state and the National Council for Higher Education (62).

The general attitude of the Regional government was that of fear of confrontation with the central government on national policy issues and attitudes of apathy about policy matters related to the University of Juba (63). The attitudes of the central government and the general political trends of the Khartoum government were not to allow any opposition to the national policies by any appointee of the central government (64). The government of Nimeiry was well known for purges and dismissals of those who showed signs of dissent of his policies. This had cowed most of the southern political and constitutional post holders.

The Council of the University of Juba, as the top administrative organ for the university, had a number of technical problem that made its functions ineffective. The first problem was the composition of the Council itself. From the list of the members as shown below, it
was clear that the convening of regular meeting was not practicable. Secondly the southern representatives who were supposed to be in the Council could not take up their positions. It was assumed that there were no capable southern Sudanese to take up the positions assigned for the south in the University Council (65). As such the positions were either left vacant or taken up by the northern staff. This meant that the influence of the Southern Sudanese in the University of Juba Council was very minimal. The Vice Chancellor of the University of Juba was the most powerful figure of the university (66). The implementation of the university policies depended very much on how he interpreted them (67). The University of Juba Council was to compose of the following persons:

1. The Chairman.
2. Six members experienced in and devoted to higher education representing the Provinces of the Southern Region.
3. Two members representing the People’s and Vocational organizations in the Southern Region of the Sudan.
4. Five members well versed in higher education.
5. The Vice Chancellor, University of Khartoum.
6. The Vice Chancellor, University of Gezira.
7. The Vice Chancellor, Khartoum Polytechnic.
8. The Dean, Faculty of Veterinary Science, University of Khartoum.
9. The Dean, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Khartoum.
10. The Vice Chancellor, University of Juba.
11. The Secretary General, University of Juba.
12. The Deans of Colleges, University of Juba.
13. The Dean of Students, University of Juba.
14. Two Students Representatives, University of Juba.

The Regional Government apparently did not question the discrepancies in the application of the policies for which the University of Juba was established. It did not press for the implementation of the original objectives for the university and never bothered to fill up the vacant posts for the southern Sudanese within the University Council. The Regional government also did not constitute a body that could have, for instance, worked closely with the University Council in the issues related to intake into the university and to determine the priorities in terms of manpower training for the southern Sudan (68). In other words there was no direct link between the University of Juba and the Regional government for the development of manpower for the southern Region of the Sudan.

In the absence of the regional government’s inputs into the university, the university was producing people at the whims of the respective Deans and the Chancellor of the University. For instance when a particular Vice Chancellor saw a particular area as ‘relevant’, he went ahead in executing the plan, although this may not have been in the university’s policy plans (69). For example, the Vice Chancellor, Dr. Abdel Al, in 1982 believed that to improve the educational quality in the southern Sudan, emphasis must be put in the training of the primary school teachers (70). This programme was not within the policy of the university. In any case a one year Certificate course was eventually started in
the university for teacher in-service training. The College of Education was however ill-prepared for this course as the whole college did not have a single person qualified for the primary teacher training (71). So the materials provided to the teacher, substantially, had no practical relevance to the teachers in that level of training apart from broadening their academic horizon. There was nothing in the way of improving their skills and knowledge relevant to the primary school classroom teaching (72).

The question of whether the University of Juba was a national or regional institution was not resolved. The southern politicians did not apparently care whether the majority of the students were from the north or south (73). What was relevant to them was the presence of a university in the southern Sudan. One of the reasons given why the regional government could not pressure the central government to maintain the University of Juba as a regional institution was the fear of lack of funds. The region was severely handicapped by uncertainties of financial resources which it could not raise autonomously in the region. Such finances were uncertain both in terms of quantity and timing of the flow (74). Any project in the southern Sudan that was not within the framework of the national government plan was not funded (75).

7.4. ADMISSION TO THE UNIVERSITY.

The admission of students into universities in the Sudan formed part of the functions of the National Council for Higher Education. Under the Organization of Higher Education Act, 1975, the determination of the number of students to be admitted every year to the
institutions of higher education in the country, the minimum requirements for admission and the ratio of students admitted to the different disciplines, were the responsibilities of the National Council for Higher Education (76). The International Consultants that recommended the opening of the University of Juba, proposed that a high proportion of students admitted to the University of Juba, at least in its early years, were to come from the southern Sudan (77). It was necessary, they advised, for the National Council for Higher Education and the University of Juba to device an arrangement to ensure a high proportion of southern students admission. The team also suggested that the National Council build into its admission system an allocation procedure to enable it to give priority to students from the southern Sudan, where it is desirable, to ensure equity of placement in higher education (78). The inclusion of such an escape clause like 'where it is desirable' was indicative of the consultants' awareness of the trends taken by the national government that were not in agreement with the recommendation of the consultants. This escape clause suited the national government's plans very well. This had manifested itself clearly by the fact that the national government never paid heed to the advice of the consultants. The students' admission continued to be based on the achievement in the Sudan School Certificate Examinations. This was based on the aggregate marks in the three best relevant subjects taken and no exceptions were given to the students from the southern Sudan (79). Very few southern students therefore managed to be admitted in the universities through the 'national pool' (80). For instance in 1979, the University of Khartoum admitted no students with an aggregate below 216. The Central Admission Office in Khartoum in that year admitted only 8 students from the southern Sudan (81).
The University of Juba had to go down to 157 to ensure an adequate intake from the south. This was intended to appease the southern politicians (82).

The trend of passes of the southern students and the rate of their admission into the universities had remained unchanged for most of the years, as shown in tables 8, 9 and 10. There were several factors that contributed to the poor performance of the southern students. These included the poor quality of teachers, lack of appropriate text-books, the Arabic language which was compulsory for admission into the universities, the lack of teaching and learning equipment and the poor socio-economic backgrounds of the southern students (83). Because of all these disadvantages, the University Council of the University of Juba instituted a policy of ‘Special Intake’ for the southern students’ admission into the University of Juba. So there were three types of intake into the University of Juba (84):

1. The National Intake: This intake was done at National Admission Office and the students competed at the national level. At this level, a maximum of 8 students from the south Sudan qualified for admission to the University of Juba annually. 200 students were taken into the University of Juba annually through this national pool.

2. The Special Intake: This intake was for the southern students who might have narrowly missed admission through the national pool. This was to balance the number of the northern students in the university. 100 students were taken through this channel each year.
3. The Mature Intake: This was the intake from the working people who possessed good previous certificates for entrance into the university. About 92 were admitted through this channel each year.

The following Tables 8, 9 and 10 below explain clearly the extent to which the students from the Southern Region have been taken into the national universities through the national pool.

Table 8: Admission to University of Khartoum:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Khart.</th>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Kordofan</th>
<th>Darfur</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ. &amp; S. Stud.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>192</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>93</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>170</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>186</td>
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Table 9: Admission to University of Gezira:

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<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Science &amp; Techn.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
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<td><strong>8</strong></td>
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Table 10: Admission to University of Juba:

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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
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7.5. CONCLUSION.

Although the Sudan government has recognized the importance of higher education in the socio-economic development of the country it did not do enough to provide the most
acceptable policies that answered the question of the over-all societal goals and needs nation-wide. This has been mainly because of the inflexible policies that the government adopted which were directed to the achievement of the prescribed objectives of the national government. The rigid policies did not take into serious consideration the relevant needs of the population all over the country. The assumed philosophy and policy orientation of higher education was to assure ‘national identity’ and ‘originality’ geared more to the northern Sudanese societal norms. The government’s definition of the phrase relevant education or relevant needs have always reflected the northern background.

The national government has not been in a position to establish a clear sense of direction that would have avoided the planning failures of the past. New policies on higher education that came up have not taken account of the past policy failures and therefore remained not reliable instruments of educational development and effective guides to actions. The basic problem has been the reluctance of the government to take the trouble to identify all the factors militating against policy formation and policy implementation and to weigh them in specific case studies. There was therefore a lack of valid information on, for instance, economic, demographic and political conditions affecting planning of the location of the institutions of higher education. The policies were initiated without adequately secured knowledge about either the conditions for their success and the likely consequences. This was not entirely because of lack of information-gathering mechanisms but because of the reluctance of the government to probe into situations which might
reveal facts which might undermined the policies held dear by the central government for maintaining and sustaining its political, ideological, cultural and religious objectives.

Ideally major policies such as those related to higher education, where the interests of greater sectors of the society were focused, should be subjected to systematic policy analysis which required the identification and measurement of the impacts of competing options and procedures for implementation, thus helping to rationalize the desirability and feasibility of the policies. But apparently the formulation of policies on higher education in the Sudan remained largely secretive, without the involvement of the academics and were often announced abruptly as decrees. Consultations with experts and debates in open forums were not normal procedures. These made implementation of policies difficult because of lack of commitments of the policy implementers.

The university's autonomy and academic freedom were at the discretion of the national government depending on the ideological out-look of the government of the day. Because of the fluid political situation in the country which had been responsible for the state of political instability, the government was not in a position to tolerate criticism from autonomous institutions endowed with public funding. The university on the other hand tried to maintain that criticism of the government of the day was a legitimate function and moral duty of the university. This has been one of the bases of the systematic dismissal of university lecturers on political ground during both the Nimeiry regime and the period thereafter. This had the effect of depriving the universities of the most experienced staff.
Indigenisation of higher education institutions has been one of the features of the policies for higher education in the country. In the Sudanese context, indigenisation concept went beyond Sudanization of the staff. It involved the need for identity and continuity of the Sudanese ‘heritage’ which embraced mainly the Arab-Islamic culture and tradition. The concept was conceived with the intention to root education in the ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ of the Sudan. This conception seemed to have not taken notice of the fact that the supposed implementers of the policy i.e. the teaching staff were mostly western-minded individuals with varied ideological affiliations. How effective these were as instruments of implementing the policy of indigenisation have not been studied.

The basis of the indigenization policy has been mainly through Arabicisation and Islamisation of knowledge. This had in all aspects disregarded the indigenous elements in the southern Sudan and their potential for development. As noted by Africa Watch, the indiscriminate application of the policy was not only a breach of academic freedom but also part of a wider cultural strangulation. Seen from this prospective the goal of indigenization of the higher education could be assumed to merely ‘pacify’ the institutions of higher education or to control them so as to achieve the desired aims. The intention, especially from the period starting in 1989, was to structure and mould the institutions to fit the ‘Islamization of knowledge’ concept.
The fact that the Arabicisation policy of the Institution of Higher Education proved largely abortive in the past was an indication of lack of commitment to the policy and the difficulties involved in its implementation which included financial, human and material resources. The fact remains that the attempts to introduce Arabicisation policy had been done without proper studies before putting it into practice. There were no sufficient and convincing justifications for its acceptance and implementation. This had been clearly shown by the lack of the instruments for implementation, for example, the needed funds and lecturers. Because of immense prestige of the Arabic language to the national government it had blinded the government of the importance of the other languages in education. Political expediency dictated the whole educational policy development in the country. The whole exercise has therefore been directed at assimilating the other languages and cultures in the country.

Part of the reason for the expansion of universities in the Sudan has been related to the policy of indigenisation. This was intended to prevent students from the country going to study abroad. It was what has been referred to as 'cultural siege'.

The history of university education in the Sudan has showed continued discrimination against students from the deprived regions particularly those from the southern Sudan. This had been reflected in the regional disparities in the distribution of institutions of higher education and quite disproportionate enrollment into them. The southern Sudan had remained a passive recipient of national policies and not active participant in the policy
formation. Hence southern politicians were generally said to have lacked motivation to form their own visions and means of achieving them. Though these politicians were quite aware of the southern situation and southern needs in terms of higher education, they lacked the legitimacy of using their own strength and potential for creating a better life for the southern Sudan. Besides this factor, there was a lack of unity and cohesion among the southern politicians which made them ineffective force against the northern intransigence. They remained objects to be manipulated by the central government. A further obstacle that handicapped the southern regional government from making autonomous policy decisions in the south was the uncertainty of financial resources which could not be estimated autonomously in the region. It has not been therefore possible, for instance, for the regional government to take control of the University of Juba in order to achieve the objective for which the university was initially established. Instead the University of Juba was commandeered by the central government to achieve it political objectives and to accommodate the surplus students from the northern Sudan. It was a question of ‘who owns and controls what’.

The next chapter deals with the regional educational policy issues and how they relate to the national educational policies. It analysis how the decentralization policy affected the development of education in the southern Sudan and how much did the regional government benefited from this policy.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

8. THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION

POLICIES OF EDUCATION.

8.1. THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT.

The Regional Government was created as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement signed between the Sudanese national government and the Southern Sudan Rebel Movement (Anyanya) in 1972. This Agreement resulted in the establishment of an autonomous Southern Regional Government in the Southern Sudan within a united Sudan. This trend was taken in recognition of the 9th June 1969 Declaration by President Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiry which recognized the Southern Sudan as having distinct characteristics from the rest of the country. The Declaration stated that:

"Southern Sudan is geographically a distinct region in the country; the inhabitants are ethnically and culturally different from the rest of the Sudanese; they therefore have the right to home-rule within the one Sudan" (1).

This declaration became part of the organic text of the Sudanese constitution as the "self-government Act, 1972". Article 6 of the 1973 Sudanese national constitution provided for the administration of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan to be based on a system of decentralization in accordance with what was specified by law. Article 7 of the same constitution provided for the division of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan into regions with the view to achieve popular participation in the government through the application of policy of decentralization which shall be specified by law (2).
Three of the research interviewees, former cabinet ministers in the central government of the Sudan, stated that the Addis Ababa Agreement was not a comprehensive agreement especially in terms of policies of education for the southern Sudan. For instance the former Minister of Education in the southern regional government (1985), who later became the Governor of the State of Equatoria (1988) and also held the portfolio of the Minister of Labour (1987 in the central government, had this to say:

"The Addis Ababa Agreement embodied nothing in a way of developing education in the southern Sudan. Hence the creation of the ten years of confusions and contradictions in the education system in the southern Sudan. There were no provision made in the agreement for giving, for instance, funds to bring the level of education in the southern Sudan to that of the northern Sudan. The southern politicians did not realize that the north had a hidden agenda in the discussion of the Addis Ababa Agreement especially in the direction the Sudan was to take in regards to Islam and Arabic" (3).

This statement was similar to that made by the leader of the 17 years civil war and the architect of the Addis Ababa Agreement on the side of the rebel movement. He stated that the Addis Ababa Agreement did not come up with a concrete educational policies for the southern Sudan (4). According to the agreement the southern Sudan was to lay its own educational policies within the framework of the national policies of education. The southern regional government failed to implement this due to a number of reasons which shall be specified later in this chapter. A specific area which he said was made clear in the
agreement was the regional language policy for the southern Sudan where: “English was agreed to be the principal language in the southern Sudan i.e. a language of instruction in education and for use in government offices in the southern Sudan. The local languages (vernaculars) were to be used as media of instruction at lower levels of primary schools in the rural areas” (5). The Regional Government language policy, which was produced in 1976, was a departure from the agreed language policy in the Addis Ababa Agreement (6). There was no mention in the agreement that Arabic was to become the main language of instruction for the southern Sudan. It was agreed for it to be taught as a subject in the southern schools (7).

What complicated the educational policy issues in the southern Sudan as revealed from the responses of three quarters of the research interviewees was the lack of direction and cohesion among the southern politicians and the lack of legitimate powers to independently govern the southern Sudan. This lack of cohesion was clearly specified by the former President of the Southern Regional government, who pointed out that:

“At the initial stages of the regional government there were ‘tag-of-wars’ between the southern Sudanese who came from exile, referred to as returnees (outsiders) and those southern Sudanese politicians who remained inside the country (insiders) during the 17 years civil war. The insiders sided with the Khartoum government and branded the returnees as separatists. This atmosphere created tensions among the members of the regional government and therefore worked against any legitimate interests of the southern Sudanese. Suitable educational policies which
would have been relevant to the southern Sudan could not therefore be developed” (8).

This statement agreed with the statement made by another former Minister of Labour in the central government (1989) about the effect of the Addis Ababa Agreement on the southern leadership. According to him: “The Addis Ababa Agreement brought about power struggle among the southern politicians. The power struggle was between those who came from East Africa and other neighbouring countries and those who remained inside the country during the 17 years civil war. It was difficult to reconcile the two to agree on common policy strategy of education for the southern Sudan. For those who remained inside the country, President Nimeiry symbolized a ‘miraculous’ leader and using him to change the past war situation was important. Those who came from outside thought differently. So education suffered for lack of direction and for lack of funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Those who remained within the country were inclined to accept the policies derived from the central government wholesale. Educational policies or policy plans initiated in the southern Sudan were therefore dishonoured by the central government and were as a result not implemented, for instance, the regional language policy. This disunity was effectively exploited by the central government to achieve its cherished educational objectives. This was clearly demonstrated in the central government appointment of southern leadership of its choice to administer the government in the south in total disregard of the opinions of the southern Sudanese. Bribing of the southern Ministers was a common practice. As a result the north was able to block any viable policy for educational development of the southern Sudan” (9).
There was therefore conflicting allegiance to the national and regional policies. The concept of maintaining national unity and regional loyalty became central in the creation of ambiguity and contradiction in the implementation of the national and regional policies of education. The Southern Regional Government could not therefore establish a workable formula to implement any educational policy planned by the regional government without the interference by the central government. For instance in 1979 the central Minister of Education, on a visit to one of the secondary schools in the southern Sudan which was using English as a medium of instruction, ordered the Regional Minister of Education to have the students who so requested be taught in Arabic. This request came about when one of the students who came from the Arabic pattern intermediate school expressed to the central Minister of Education the difficulties the Arabic pattern students were facing of learning through the English medium. The Regional Minister of Education accepted the change without reference to the regional language policy which stipulated that English was the language of instruction in all the secondary schools in the Southern Regional of the Sudan (10).

The former Minister of Education in the State of Equatoria also recalled another instance where the regional government failed to implement regionally initiated education policy. In 1974 the Southern Regional Government had planned to develop Maridi Teacher Training Institute as a Curriculum Development Centre as well as a Teacher Training Centre (11). This plan was frustrated because of three main reasons:
1. Lack of funds from the central government in Khartoum.

2. The project was ill-started. There was lack of planning in the Regional Ministry of Education for effective use of the funds that the Regional Government could raise locally. There was a general feeling of scepticism among the southern leadership about the possible reaction of the northern government to the project.

3. There was lack of coordination of the bodies involved in the execution of the project (12).

There was also no consistency or coherence in the policy implementation basically because of the conflicts of interest among the regional government cabinet. For instance, in the 1985 Education Conference, contrary to the Regional Language Policy, the Regional Minister of Education recommended the implementation of the national language policy in the southern schools. This was opposed by the Deputy Governor of the Regional Government as being contrary to the regional language policy (13).

Changes in the regional education policies and the Regional Ministry of Education structures and personnel were at the discretion of the central Ministry of Education. Frequent changes of the regional government and subsequent changes in the persons holding the portfolio of the Minister of Education was a common feature of the government in the southern Sudan. This created an atmosphere of uncertainty which in turn affected continuity in the policy trend and policy implementation. The implication was
that the regional government was not free to make and implement its own policies of education.

The southern Ministers in the central government were also ineffective in influencing policies in the centre that affected the southern region (14). One of the reasons has been the disunity that existed among them that made it not possible for them to present a concerted influence. The former Minister of Labour (1989) had this to say: “Privately the southern Ministers in the Central Government or the MPs in the National Assembly did talk about the needs of the south Sudan and they tried to attract individual Arabs in the government and outside the government to the needs of the south. Publicly some Ministers or MPs made alliance with different political parties in the north through whom they expressed their views of the south to the central authority. But it was in the interest of the northern politicians to make sure that the southern politicians did not present a united front or views regarding the needs of the south. So each ‘father head’ provided contradictory views on the different policy issues regarding the southern Sudan” (15). The Minister further stated that the fight of the north against any development in the southern Sudan succeeded because the southern leaders avoided responsibilities in order to satisfy their personal needs or interests and so destroyed the priority needs of the south which they represented.
8.2. DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION.

Article 6 and 7 of the 1973 Sudanese Constitution provided for the application of decentralization system of administration in the Sudan (16). The indications from the research interviewees pointed to the fact that this pledge for decentralization remained largely on paper and was not properly implemented to realize the benefits normally derived from the system of decentralization as described by Rondinelli. According to Rondinelli (1981), "decentralization is necessary to increase the scope of decisions and thus incentives available to local participants, as well as to build institutions and to encourage, structure, focus and stabilize such participation" (17). This requires certain pre-conditions and supporting policies and changes in attitudes and behaviour on the part of the central government. These elements were missing in the case of the Sudan. As also stated by Balado Ruiz-Gallegos, decentralization entails the transfer from the centre to the regional authorities all those powers and responsibilities necessary to satisfy the interests within the ambit of its authority and which at the same time would make provision for transfers of funds necessary to make the decentralization policy viable, without which the entitlement to facilities transferred to it would not be developed for want of vital economic support (18). The facts revealed by this research showed that all these elements were missing in terms of the southern Sudan.

According to a lecturer in Political Science in the University of Khartoum, the decentralization policy for the southern Sudan was "a mythical dream because the south had no power in the first place related to national policy issues. It was not a participant of
the central government's machinery of administration and policy-making for the country. It had neither wealth nor institutions. The decentralization policy was never meant to devolve administrative powers from the centre. It was simply an attempt to bring the people closer to the government in the centre” (19). This policy was the basis of the Local Government Act, 1971 (20). The Local Government Act, 1971, was a constitutional legal action of the government that brought the use of the local people of the various regions in the country as instruments of administration. But the needs of these local people were to be met by the centre in the north. The north remained firmly the master and controller of everything including education and finance (21). Incidentally the Local Government Act, 1971, was the Act upon which the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was based. The only protocol that constituted a new element in the Agreement from the 1971 Act was the military protocol that permitted equal representation of the military personnel in the southern Sudan from both the south and north (22). Chapter III of the People’s Local Government Act, 1971, Article II (I) stated that:

“The Regional High Executive Council shall in general be responsible for political enlightenment, people’s mobilization, economic and social development and consolidation of national unity in accordance with the objectives of the May Revolution. The People’s Province Executive Council (PLC) shall ensure that services rendered by the PLC’s are directed towards the benefits of the citizens of the area at the highest standards and are in conformity with the national policy” (23).
It is to be noted that one cannot have power that has no context. The lecturer in Political Science pointed out that “the southern Sudan lacked the context of sovereignty to decide to have independent choice and to have the capacity to enforce. The main controlling factor of inaction among the southern politicians was the lack of power to transcend the northern politicians who had both power and influence on the southern Sudan. What was existing in the southern Sudan was the politics of survival. The southern leaders were afraid of confrontation with the north because they believed confrontation would be costly (24). This fear of confrontation was attributed to repeated purges during President Nimeiry’s regime of those who could not conform with his policies. This state of affairs was noted in the report by Dr. G. W. Glentworth, ODA/BC Adviser in Public Administration and Management Development, on a visit to Sudan in 1987. This report stated that “the repeated purges and the use of presidential directives in appointments destroyed even the stability and self-confidence that reliance on seniority produced. It was better on the whole to do nothing, or at least to look after yourself before the inevitable axe fell” (25).

Under the 1972 Act, the Regional Minister of Education, who was a member of the Regional High Executive Council, held the portfolio for the Minister of Education and was responsible to the Southern Regional Government. This responsibility, under the terms of the Act, was to be exercised within the framework of the national policy of education (26). This binding to the national educational policies and educational planning rendered the Regional Minister of Education practically ineffective and powerless. Section Six of
the 1972 Act specifically stated that “neither the People’s Regional Assembly nor the
Regional High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any power on matters of
national nature which among other matters include educational planning” (27). More than
that the Regional Government had no control over financial resources with which to carry
out whatever regional plans it had. For instance a Committee of the People’s National
Assembly in its 1976 evaluation of the result of the Local Government Act of 1971,
concluded that “the insufficiency of funds was the basic cause of weakness in the
institutions of the People’s Local Government and of running them into empty skeletons”
(28). The Central Ministry of Education was entrusted with all the following functions:

1. Planning for the educational development in accordance with the overall
   national plans for socio-economic development.

2. Setting the goals and objectives of national education in the light of policies
   approved by the state.

3. Drawing the curricula for the achievement of the set goals and objectives.

4. Teacher education and training.

5. Technical and vocational education.

6. Adult education and functional literacy (29).

In a national report presented to the 37th Session of the International Conference of
Education (1979) by the Sudanese Minister of Education, the Minister stipulated that the
Regional Ministry of Education in the Southern Sudan was entrusted with the same
functions which were to be executed in full coordination with the Central Ministry of
Education and in accordance with the national policy (30). This statement contradicted what has been stipulated in Article 6 of the Local Government Act which practically paralyzed the entire machinery of the southern regional government. It allowed little room for the regional government to handle the affairs of the region without seeking approval from the central government (31). Such approval was never granted. All major educational matters had to be referred to the Central Ministry of Education for decision making. There was therefore no possibility for the regional government to confidently manage its own educational plans or programmes (32). The reliance of the regional government on funds from the central government was one of the main controlling factors.

The national policy-making structure provided no opportunity for southern participation and there was no effective coordination mechanism established. There was no well defined responsibilities and areas of control that the regional government would rely on for effective educational development in the southern Sudan. One critical disadvantage concerned the formulation of educational objectives and aims which remained the sole responsibility of the central government. The members of the central government tended to neglect major cultural aspects of the southern Sudan and instead emphasized on national integration and unity (33). The point that related to the lack of participation by the southern Sudanese in the national policy issues was made clear by the former Governor of Equatoria State who pointed out that:

"The President Nimeiry's policy of decentralization relegated the southern Sudanese to positions in the southern Sudan. They were not taking part in the
formation of national policies in the central government. The President of the Southern Regional Government, who was also supposed to be a Vice President of the whole country, was not part of the central government system. His functions and authorities were entirely limited to the southern Sudan. He had no defined link with the centre in Khartoum despite his position as a Vice President of the country” (34).

Another important point in the south-north relation which the former Governor pointed out was the channel through which the central government dealt with the regional government. In terms of funds and policy issues the southern regional government was approached through the Central Ministry of Local Government (35). This clearly indicated that the regional government was not part of the main central system and this was also indicative of subordinate position of the regional government in the central government structure.

A further lack of clarity in the channel for implementation of the educational policies was shown in the roles given to the Province Education authority. According to the 1971 People’s Local Government Act, the Province Education Committee, chaired by the Assistant Commissioner for Education, was responsible for the following tasks:

1. Formulation of provincial education policies.
2. Administration and supervision of primary, intermediate and secondary schools.
4. Formulation and implementation of educational plans.
According to the same Act the three levels of schools were not directly under the control of the Regional Ministry of Education but that of the Regional Ministry of Administration which falls directly under the Central Ministry of Local Government (36). The delegation of the said responsibilities to the provinces had several setbacks. Firstly in practice liaison between the provinces and the central Ministry of Local Government was difficult because of communication problems and distance. Secondly the powers supposedly given to the provinces were not clearly defined and besides that the province offices did not have sufficient resources to fulfill the functions transferred to them (37).

The effects of the divisions of responsibilities in education between the various administrative organs were clearly demonstrated in the areas of accountability. According to the Province Inspector of Schools (primary and intermediate) many problems were created for the Assistant Commissioner for Education especially in regards to issuing and taking of commands because of the lack of clear cut areas of accountability (38). The Assistant Commissioner in this case received orders from three sources:

1. The Regional Ministry of Education from where most of the manpower for the province were obtained.

2. The Regional Ministry of Provincial Administration through which the funds for the province were received.

3. The Commissioner of the Province who was his immediate boss.
As a result administrative tasks such as school inspections, distribution of services, and provision of facilities tended to be discontinued; the administrative machinery thus lost cohesion and the functions became duplicated uneconomically (39).

The decentralization policy did not have significant educational impact in the southern Sudan except in the area of quantitative expansion of the schools and in the opportunity provided to the regional government to recruit its own teachers, although the training of the teachers remained the prerogative of the central government (40). The regional government was obliged to work within the framework provided by the national government. One of the main reasons provided was because “the Sudan was playing to the tunes of its financiers i.e. the Arab World” (41). It was this external political pressure that acted against the national government providing leeway for the regional government to introduce alternative educational policies that could, otherwise, have been relevant to the southern Sudan. For instance, although the regional government was allowed, to a certain extent, to manage and administer the schools at the primary, intermediate and secondary levels, it was not permitted to develop or to participate in the development of relevant curricula for the southern Sudan or to establish its own teacher training institutes. The national government, for example, refused to recognize a teacher training institute jointly established by the Norwegian Church Aid and the Southern Regional Government in 1983 to train the untrained English pattern teachers for the primary and intermediate schools in the southern Sudan (42). This demonstrated the powers the national government had over development of education in the southern Sudan.
The constraints that inhibited more rapid development of educational functions and powers in the southern Sudan, particularly during the earlier stages of the period under review, had been vividly summarized by John Glover (1973) as follows:

1. Considerable unevenness in development as between the provinces, indicating a lack of planned development.

2. The provincial efforts have necessarily been concentrated upon daily administration with little spare capacity being made available for planned change and improvement.

3. A period of rapid expansion has similarly absorbed administrative staff and has coincided with the particular problems arising from the structural alteration, economic variability and political uncertainty.

4. Staff development has not kept pace with administrative needs; decentralized departments of education lacked sufficient staff with suitable training and experience at executive and organizational levels.

5. A somewhat cumbersome system of financial allocation and control remained centralized in Khartoum and tended to act as a brake upon initiative and enterprise, whether in connection with a large-scale project or a relatively minor development (43).
8.3. CONCLUSION.

The Addis Ababa Agreement did not provide the Southern Regional Government with sufficient ground and freedom to make and implement its own educational policies. The southern politicians apparently did not carefully study the implications of the agreement and how the policies agreed upon were to be realized and sustained for the development of education in the southern Sudan without undue interference from the central government. The power structure between the national and regional governments remained ambiguous and subject to central government interpretation in a way that suited the northern objectives. There were no defined powers and responsibilities that enabled the regional government to manage educational development programmes in the southern Sudan without the interference from the central government. Apparently the southern politicians, at the time of the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, were more interested in bringing about the end of the civil war and were less prepared to tackle the intricacy of a government and to deal with the task of reconstruction and development. In general there was a lack of long term vision for the development of education in the southern Sudan.

The Addis Ababa Agreement did not also seriously examine the financial implications of the Agreement i.e. in terms of clear sources of funding which would sustain an autonomous educational development in the southern region rather than the complete dependence on grant-in-aid from the central government, which remained uncertain throughout the period under review. Bereft of funds the Regional Government could do
little in the way of educational development or creating its own educational development plans. The national government on the one hand was prepared to thwart any autonomous educational development attempts by tighter financial control to the region and to maintain the unity of the country through any means including constitutional and legislative control. The Regional government had no control over financial resources with which to carry out its own educational plans. The regional revenue base was too small to provide adequate taxes to carry out decentralized functions. The widely dispersed population in the southern Sudan who were largely rural oriented was too small to support productive or service functions of the region. Not only that but the region also lacked adequate legal powers to collect and allocate revenues within its own local jurisdictions.

Some of the causes for the abandonment of the policies agreed upon in the Addis Ababa Agreement lay in the conflicting allegiance of the southern politicians to national and regional policies. The concept of maintaining national unity and regional loyalty was one of the central factors in the creation of the ambiguity and contradictions in the policy issues. The atmosphere of confrontation among the politicians worked against any viable educational policies for the southern Sudan. This led to the general lack of insight and lack of clear policy direction as to what and how education was to be developed in the southern Sudan within the framework provided by the national government. The real educational problems in the southern Sudan was not therefore seriously addressed because of the need to maintain national unity. There was therefore no consistency in policy approach and policy implementation. The educational needs of the south was as a result
sacrificed for political interest. The national government exploited the southern division well to achieve national interest and thus strangled educational development in the southern Sudan by making the southern policy-makers ineffective. The regular changes of the regional government and threats of dismissals or purges created an atmosphere of fear and therefore inaction and apathy within the regional government.

The policy of decentralization had no significant impact on the development of education in the southern Sudan. The whole decentralization system instead created a state of institutional confusion especially in terms of delegation of powers. It did not provide a clear mandate and a clear set of responsibilities. The constitutional provisions effectively prohibited the regional government from managing its own educational affairs. Major educational matters were therefore referred to the central Ministry of Education for decision-making. This created a state of uncertainty in institutional context.

The decentralization provisions were also quite vague about the extent and forms of decentralization, for instance, in terms of the roles and relationship between the north and south and between the provinces and the regional government. This was indicative of a lack of national government's political commitment to decentralization which was, if anything, generally superficial. It did not, for example, allow for the development of regional capacity in terms of funds and human resources to realize the benefits of decentralization. It did not create an alternative means of decision-making for the regional government, neither was there proper coordinating body established. The administrative
linkage between the central and the southern regional government was very weak and was mainly ‘top-down’ control procedures rather than channels of mutually beneficial, cooperative and reciprocal interaction.

The next chapter deals with the general educational policy framework at the national level. It reflects on the broad bases of educational policy development in the whole country. It also depicts the way how and why the national government wanted to follow the particular policy of education throughout the country.
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CHAPTER NINE

9. THE NATIONAL EDUCATION POLICIES:

9.1. THE NATIONAL TRENDS:

The national education policies in the Sudan were in line with how the national government defined Sudanese society. The trends of policies adopted projected the Sudan as an Arab-Islamic country despite the unique situation of the Sudan in terms of the great ethnic and cultural diversities existing in the country. This approach was manifested in practical terms by having Arabic as the official language and medium of instruction in education, Islam as the official religion of the country and the curriculum oriented towards the Arab World and the northern Sudan. These were also reflected in the policy statements of the national leaders since independence of the Sudan in 1956.

The overriding issue in the Sudan has been the basic constitutional question of how the Sudan defined itself legally and politically and how it balanced the majority and minority rights and representation in the country (1). The policies adopted tended to disregard the complexity of the politico-cultural diversities in the country. The national leaders had sought no alternative legislation other than the Islamic one. These were clearly shown in the statements of the political leaders at various periods of the regimes in the country since independence as illustrated by the following. In 1956 the Grand Gadi (Chief Justice), Sheikh Hassan Muddathir, proposed that the Sudan should be governed by an Islamic
Constitution because “the Sudan is an Islamic country; its social organization is built upon the Arab customs and Islamic ways” (2). The first Prime Minister of the Sudan, Ismail al-Azhari, put the matter starkly enough when he stated that: “This is an Arab country. It will remain an Arab country. Those who do not like it are free to leave it and go to where they like”. This in general reflected the view of most of the northern Sudanese in the 1950s. Islam is, in the Sudanese context, regarded both as a creed and regulation in the sense that religion and the state are inseparable (3). In 1957 a joint statement by the leaders of the Mahdiyya (UMMA) and the Khatmiyya (DUP) political sects was issued calling for the Sudan to be an Islamic Parliamentary Republic with Sharia as the source of legislation (4). These two parties were the two religious sects that formed the basis for the political parties that emerged in the 1940s and have continued to play a dominant role in the post-independence period (5). In 1958, the priority of the military government of General Ibrahim Abboud was to “unify” the country through Islam and Arabic language (6). The spread of Islam and Arabic language became the official policy of Abboud’s government. This period was generally considered a period of forced Islamisation and Arabicisation through forced mental change and psychological tortures (7). “You can only be the light of your society if you read in Arabic, speak in Arabic and preferably if you are a Muslim” (8). This forced policy was implemented through the establishment of many ‘kalwas’ all over the country. A department for Religious Affairs, started in 1955 within the Ministry of Education, was charged with the extension of Islam in the southern Sudan. This Department established 12 Islamic schools of elementary level in the southern Sudan. This
development came out clearly in the statement of President Abboud in the Parliament in 1958 where he stated that:

“It is my government’s concern to support religious education and that is clearly shown by the progress made by the Department of Religious Affairs and the development of the ‘Mahads’ under its aegis” (9).

Ten years after independence, Sayed Sadig El Mahdi (then a Prime Minister) declared in his first address to the Constituency Assembly that “the dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arabic and this nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival” (10).

There was apparently very little substantive change in theory and practice in the Sudanese laws until the period of the military rule of President Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiry in 1969. The 9th June 1969 Declaration, made by the President, marked the beginning of the policy for regional autonomy for the southern Sudan. The Declaration in principle acknowledged the ethnic and cultural diversities in the country. In practice however the Declaration was cosmetic in its implementation. The focus of the laws continued to favour the northern Sudan. The Constitution adopted in 1973 stated that “Islamic law and custom shall be the main source of legislation. Personal matters of the non-Muslims shall be governed by their personal laws” (11). President Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiry had this to say in his first address on the “new educational policy”: 
"In its zeal to widen, improve and systematize the field of education, the
Revolution has given special consideration to the establishment of the College of
Islamic and Arabic Studies, which is to concern itself with the study of the
intellectual and spiritual heritage of the Sudan. It is to enable the Sudanese nation
to play its historic role in diffusing Arab culture and principles of Islamic faith
throughout the African continent. The educational programme of the Revolution is
to stress the social and cultural importance of Arabic which is to be an obligatory
subject in the school certificate curriculum" (12).

In the same address on the new educational policy the Minister of Education stated that
the pattern of the education system was the type recommended by many Arab Education
Conferences, particularly by the Conference of the Arab Ministers of Education in
Baghdad in 1964. The same recommendation was put forward by the Conference of the
Arab Ministers of Education and Planning held in Tripoli in 1966 and in Morocco in 1970.
It was strongly felt that a common pattern of educational organization would facilitate the
interchange of teachers and educational ideas throughout the Arab World. This
standardization of the education system emanated from the earlier agreements among
some of the Arab countries. The 1957 Agreement on the Cultural Unity signed by Syria,
Jordan and Egypt and the Cultural Charters signed by Iraq and Egypt in 1958. These two
agreements sought to strengthen the feelings of Arab unity by eliminating the variations in
education within and between the Arab States (13). Joseph S. Szyliowicz clearly described
the approach in the Arab countries as follows:
"Administratively the structure of education in all the Arab States is practically identical. Apart from some variations of details, the common pattern is one of extreme centralization. The Ministers of Education exercising almost dictatorial control over all aspects of education" (14).

This was reflected in the Sudan where the Central Ministry of Education in Khartoum was responsible for educational planning, drawing up of the curricula and syllabi, setting examinations, training of teachers and maintaining control of the smallest points of execution of educational policy (15).

Two main features of the May Revolution (the Nimeiry Revolution), in the field of education, as outlined by the Minister of Education, also showed some of the inconsistencies in the education policies as far as the whole country was concern. The Minister stated that:

1. "Education is essentially a democratic and political right available to every citizen without exception and without conditions. The only limiting factor is the individual’s own ability.

2. The Arabic language is to be the medium of instruction throughout the various stages of education. Special emphasis shall be given to Arabic studies and to the spiritual legacy of our past" (16).

The fact was that the emphasis placed on the use of Arabic language as a medium of instruction throughout the country was a form of condition or control which alienated the southern Sudanese from the main stream of the Sudanese education. At the time of the
introduction of the policy the language of education in the southern Sudan was English. The ability of the southern Sudanese students were therefore limited by the language difficulty. The educational development was not democratic in the sense that participation in the educational policy formation was limited to the northern Sudanese. The few Southern Sudanese in the National Assembly were ineffective in presenting the needs of the south because of two main factors. In the first place because the proceedings of the National Assembly touch less on the affairs of the Southern Region. Secondly because the southern representatives in the National Assembly are said to be less confident in participating in the debates which are conducted in Arabic (17). According to the former President of the Southern Regional Government the southern Sudanese did not participate in the national policy making and were not consulted on national policy issues. They could not therefore influence the central government policy formation (18). A factor that eluded the southern politicians at the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement was the fact that they did not realize that the north had a hidden agenda in the discussion that led to the signing of the Agreement in regards to the direction the national government intended to take as far as Islam and Arabic was concern (19). The Addis Ababa Agreement relegated the southern Sudanese politicians to positions in the southern Sudan and were not taking part in the formation of policies in the centre including those that affected the southern Sudan directly (20). The Vice Presidents of the Republic of the Sudan from the southern Sudan stationed in Juba were not part of the system in the centre. They had no defined links with Khartoum despite their positions as Vice Presidents of the Sudan (21).
Chapter II, Article 14 of the 1973 Constitution stated that: "education is an investment for good citizenship and production as well as a service for the individual and the society and thus it must be under complete supervision of the State which directs and plans for it according to set policies" (22). The moulding of the particular type of the Sudanese society as defined by the northern leaders entailed central control. A former Central Minister for Labour stated that the needs of the southern Sudan have been an appendage in the national government’s educational agenda (23). In the northern Sudanese prospective, if you do not want to be an Arab you must be confused (24). What was regarded as relevant education for the southern Sudan were therefore irrelevant as far as the educational priorities of the central government were concerned (25). The southern leaders had no choice and were not free (26). The southern Sudan as well lacked the context of sovereignty to decide to have independent choice and to have the capacity to enforce. The leaders lacked the power to transcend the northern leaders who influenced the policies for the whole country (27).

The former Minister of Labour in the National Government had this to say about the government policy trend: "The policy of Arabisation and Islamisation of education is not strictly a religious conception but a racial and cultural conception. It is a process of transformation of the whole person or society. It is a process of becoming a Sudanese. There is no time limit for this process to be accomplished" (28). Islam is used as an excuse with which to disguise Arab racism (29). Various approaches were employed by the government in an attempt to indoctrinate the southern Sudanese to adapt the Arab culture
and the Arab life-style. For instance between 1970 and 1974 about 400 southern Sudanese students were provided scholarships for studies in Egypt, despite the fact that their performances in the Sudan School Certificate Examinations were poor, with the intention that they would later contribute to change the society in the southern Sudan in the image of the Arabs (30). This approach apparently failed to achieve the intended objectives.

Arabic is quite intimately related to a culture which is much connected with Islam in the Sudanese context (31). The assumption is that the moment one is indoctrinated in this language related culture one is most likely to adopt the culture of the religion (32). The Arabic language always evokes the idea that you are a Muslim or aspire to be a Muslim because only then will you be raised to a full human being (33).

The national policy trends did not provide the possibility for free choice. The Regional Government in the southern Sudan, that was created as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement, could not therefore legislate its own independent educational policies despite the President Nimeiry's policy of decentralisation of education. It was deprived of the legitimate power to legislate by the central government. There were two provisions which controlled positive actions by the Regional Government. Section Six of the 1972 Act stated that:

"Neither the People’s Regional Assembly nor the Regional High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any power on matters of national nature which among other matters include educational planning" (34).
Section Ten of the Act stated that:

"The People’s regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and development of the southern Sudan in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the establishment and administration of public schools at all levels in accordance with the national plans for education and economic and social development” (35).

From these provisions there is a clear indication that the legal boundaries between the national and regional planning has not been clearly defined. It is not clear what the phrase “other matters” in Section Six of the Act meant. Whereas the regional government appeared to be the sole responsible body over the education in the southern Sudan after the Addis Ababa Agreement, the central government controlled the structures, the system and the policies of educational development through constitutional provisions which prohibited the regional government from managing its own affairs (36). What the central government expected from the regional government was for it to become simply a replica of the national government and to function in the same way. So it could not have the validity of independent development (37). The transferring of the administrative functions to the regional government without adequate legal powers, including financial powers, undermined the benefits of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The southern Sudan was not directly considered as part of the central government’s machinery to which specific budgets were directly apportioned (38). It was dealt with through the Ministry of Local Government (39).
What has been clear from the interviews conducted in this research was that the inner process of educational policy-making in the Sudan was not much known to the majority of the public including even those close to the policy-making body. This was mainly because of the lack of involvement of the wider representation in the policy making processes especially from the regions outside the centre. The divorce between the policy statements of the national leaders and their practical application and the concentration of powers in the central government was an issue which prevented genuine contribution to the decision making process and the subsequent isolation of the political and legislative institutions, especially from the southern Sudan. The discussions of the Council of Ministers were kept confidential and the minutes, resolutions etc. were not exposed to the public; neither were they quoted (40). The bribing of the southern Sudanese Ministers in the central government was a common feature of the central government and consequently many were forced to accept the policies emanating from the centre though these might work against the needs of the southern Sudan (41). The centre as a result was in a position to tie the south to impracticable and irrelevant education, strangled the south and made it ineffective; thus retarding the development of education in the southern Sudan (42).

9.2. EDUCATION AND NATIONAL UNITY:

One of the important components of the Sudanese educational policy objectives was to bring about national unity. This component was important because it was through it that the diffusion of the Arab culture and Islamic faith could be achieved. The importance of
this objective was mentioned in most of the policy statements of the national governments in the Sudan since independence. The government’s sponsored Sudan Educational Sector Review (1977), for instance, stated that “the Sudan has its ethnic affiliations and its regional responsibilities and all these must find their places in education to confirm the links of the nation with both the Arab and Islamic heritage and the heritage of Africa (43). In order to achieve this aim maintaining the unity of the country was required. The main instrument chosen was education. One of the statements directed towards this objective reads: “In conformity with the constitution, the general education aims to create a healthy socialist community, promote national unity and respect for the country’s heritage and values” (44). In the 1990 educational policy statement of the government, one of the objectives of education in the Sudan was the strengthening of the spirit of national unity in the young and developing in them the sense of belonging and loyalty to the nation (45). All these statements which expressed the desire for national unity were indicative of the existence of some elements of disunity that affected the implementation of the national education policies. What was missing was the right choice of the means and methods to bring about this unity without encroaching on the rights of other groups in the Sudan. Apparently the government did not seriously take into account the complex Sudanese society and the difficulties of imposing the views of the rulers at the centre on such a vast country as the Sudan containing a heterogeneous population.

The implementation of the educational policy to achieve national unity in the country was affected by a number of factors. The basic factor was the failure of the national
government to transform the realities of the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity existing in the country into factors of strength for consolidating the unity of the Sudan and its peoples (46). The rulers lacked the kind of ethnic and religious links that could spread their influence widely into the Sudanese society (47). From the interviews conducted it was clear that the approaches used to bring about the implementation of the policy were those that worked against achieving the objective. One of the northern Sudanese intellectuals (a politician) stated that the problem of the Sudan, in essence, was a crisis of governance that emanated from a crisis of identity. The north, represented in its political parties, always looked for its identity beyond the boarders of the Sudan i.e. either to the Arab World or to the Islamic World (47). “The ‘unity’ of the Sudan was basically a northern banner under which all the political parties in the north marched. To them the word ‘unity’ meant nothing else than denying the south its political rights” (48). Another northern Sudanese intellectual (university lecturer) stated that there has not been an integrated mechanism for educational policy-making in the Sudan that enhanced national unity. The lack of involvement of a wider representation from other regions in the formation of educational policies in the centre was a contributory factor. Consequently the policies developed were always partial and worked for the interests of the northern Sudan (49). Most of the policy decisions were taken by the individual Ministers in the central government; e.g. the decision to make religion compulsory in the Sudan School Certificate Examinations (50).
The government's policy of the Arabicisation and Islamisation of education also worked against national unity because it practically alienated the south from the political system in the country. These trends showed the ambiguity of the Sudanese educational policy applications in terms of the government's policy pronouncements. For instance the National Charter, which was the principal manual for the Sudanese Socialist Union (the only political organ of President Nimeiry's regime), stated that:

"Education is a right for all citizens who must benefit from it as a duty. It must be democratic in practice, functional in nature and closely related to socio-economic development plans. It must bring about qualitative, ideological and vocational changes on its recipients to renew the society and build for the future" (51).

The southern Sudan did not benefit from the education provided since the goals were set to serve only the needs of the northern Sudan. Clear indications of this were found in the content of the curriculum where, for instance, such disciplines as History, Geography, Civics, Sociology were written in such a way as to depict the northern background and features only (52). The curriculum content was not designed to link the individual to his local environment. It was unproductive in the sense that the needs of the children, especially those at the primary level, were largely disregarded. The children therefore derived very little from their schooling that was of real benefit to them in their future lives (53).

The key to an understanding of the contemporary Sudanese educational problems therefore lies with the politico-cultural diversity which have been overlooked by the
national government of the Sudan. Though President Nimeiry’s government recognized the ethnic and cultural differences existing between the north and the south, these differences were not accommodated within the educational system befitting the southern backgrounds and cultures. Instead the government continued to enforce the Arab-Islamic culture on the Sudanese people. The government’s strong belief in the unity of the Arab destiny and in increasing cooperation and movement on the path of complete Arab unity as its aim and purpose (54) was a contributory factor in this approach to education. To maintain and spread the dominant Arab culture and Islam in the Sudan it was necessary that the political, legislative, economic and administrative control remained in the hands of the ruling Arab groups in the northern Sudan (55). The laws of the country were oriented towards this end. This was, for instance, reflected in statement of the Vice President of President Nimeiry’s ruling Revolutionary Command Council (1970), Babiker Awadala, himself a former Chief Justice who stated that:

“The law must be in conformity with the social life of the people for whom it is promulgated. This is because it is impossible to find a law of one nation that is suitable to a different nation. Now the difference between the Sudanese community and Anglo-Saxon society is very clear. But the preceding governments and leaders did not take these differences into consideration, but they followed the British and they neglected the danger of tying us to the laws of colonialization in the courts” (56).

President Nimeiry on one hand, after signing the peace agreement with the south, also reaffirmed the special position of Islam in the Sudan and recognized the Sharia as the source of all legislation (57), thus effectively continuing to subject the southern Sudanese
to the laws that apparently brought about the civil wars in the Sudan in the first place. The legislation that was eventually applied was based on the Islamic law and customs as stipulated in the 1973 constitution of the country. All indications showed that the Islamic leaders in the Sudan were not prepared to part from having the Sharia and Customs as the two main sources of legislation of the country. The 1990 National Dialogue Conference on the Political System in the Sudan made it abundantly clear that Islam was both a worship and social dealing and it was the right of the Muslims to observe the legislation of their religion in various fields of life; and that the Sharia and Customs shall be the two main sources of legislation in the Sudan (58).

From the southern Sudanese perspective the central government’s educational policies were policies of expedience designed to satisfy the northern Arab-Islamic educational objectives without considering other factors, like broad based participation in policy formation, the ethnic and cultural diversities, the economy, and all other factors to sustain the policy in the whole country (59). The basic problems, according to this perspective, that posed a threat to the unity in the Sudan, were attributed to three main causes:

1. The dominance of one nationality over the others. The policies adopted were meant to enhance the legitimacy and control by the regimes in the northern Sudan.
2. The sectarian and religious bigotry that has dominated the Sudanese political scene since independence.
3. The unequal development in the country (60).
Two speeches made by the leader of the Sudan People Liberation Movement and Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) on the 3/3/84 and 22/3/85, on the occasions marking the 11th and 12th anniversary of the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, described the national crisis afflicting the Sudan since independence as a crisis of identity emanating from the inability of the Sudanese to reconcile themselves with the cultural and ethnic realities that make them a nation (61). This factor was also expressed in the National Dialogue Conference on the Political System in the Sudan in 1990. The Conference pointed out that the Sudan’s major political parties were facades of sectarian formations and were not parties in the contemporary sense of the word, i.e. with respect to organization, ideology and practice; their sole objective was power (62). The national government has failed to design suitable mechanisms that would have reinforced the sentiments of oneness such as broad based participation in the national issues, power sharing, and multi-ethnic base for political parties. Instead it invoked the Islamic and Arab symbolism that had an impeding influence for national integration.

The Addis Ababa Agreement provided an important landmark in the approach to accommodating ethnic and cultural diversity. But for technical, constitutional and economic reasons this has not been practical to implement. Constitutionally the Addis Ababa accord contained some escape clauses that made it easier for the national government to avoid the implementation of the terms of the Agreement. For instance the Agreement specified that the local languages in the south Sudan “may serve a practical necessity for the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative
functions of the Region” (63). In the first place this contradicted one of the policy statements of the May Revolution which said that Arabic language was to be the official language of the country and the medium of instruction throughout the various stages of the state education: “special emphasis should be given to the Arabic studies and to the spiritual legacy of our past” (64). Secondly although the Regional government has been “empowered” to promote the local languages and cultures, educational planning remained a prerogative of the central government. The President of the Republic continued to retain the veto power over regional legislation. The regional government was obliged to operate within the policy framework set by the central government. The national government provided no budget for the implementation of the local languages and the region itself had no alternative source of funds to execute the plan (65).

A national political conference on the Political System in the Sudan (1990) stated that cultural, language, historical and environmental diversity in the Sudan could be a factor of strength. It identified education as the means to express these diversities in harmonious ways so as to bring about unity of the people in a spirit of fraternity and equality (66). But the method it employed amounted to lack of recognition of the diversities in the country. For instance to achieve the above objective, it stated that the government was to be guided by the past experience, which was to maintain the status quo in favour of the north. It stated that:
1. "Arabic language is the official language of the Republic of the Sudan. This is what has been agreed upon since the Legislative Assembly of 1948, and stated in the successive constitutions.

2. Languages, culture and history of the Sudan are characteristics of the country. The State should curtail any inclination to give any privileges to any specific culture, language or historical heritage”.

It added that educational planning, in this context, should consider the historical experience of the Arabic language as a mother language of a big Sudanese group, as well as being the official language since the time of independence (1956), and employ it in education to the extent which may serve well these roles (67). This was tantamount to discarding all other languages and associated cultures. A former Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan and President of the Regional Government in the southern Sudan (1978) stated that since the Regional government was not part of the policy making body in the central government it could not influence such policy trends that emanated from the centre. The implementation of any regional educational policy that originated from the southern Sudan was dependent on whether the policy fitted the framework of the central government. The idea was to integrate the overall educational system in the country for effective control by the central government (68)

Education, in the broadest sense, became a part of an ideological battle ground that the northern parties wanted to hold to. For the regional government, it was not clear as to
where the point of convergence of the national and regional policies was and it was
difficult to pin-point which policies were binding and which ones were not binding (69).

The functionality of the education provided depended very much on the outlook of the
national policy-makers in terms of what society the country wants to produce through
education. The southern Regional Government’s assertion to develop southern identity did
not therefore agree with the perceived identity of the northern leaders and consequently
the central government applied all means at its disposal to retard education in the south
Sudan (70). For instance the former Governor of Equatoria State in the southern Sudan,
who also earlier held the portfolio of the Minister of education in the same State, stated
that there were no provisions made in the central government for giving funds for
education in the southern Sudan to bring it to the level of education in the northern Sudan.
The Regional Minister of Education in the Southern Sudan continued to apply for funds
from the general pool of the reserve funds in the central government in Khartoum (71).

“The linear expansion and improvement of the quality of education in the southern Sudan
was therefore made difficult mainly because of the financial difficulties and the northern
government’s determination to deal with the ways in which the southern Sudanese wanted
to go in the field of education. This was a fundamental issue in the development of
education in the southern Sudan. As far as the south wanted to go in their own way, the
north was determined to keep luke-warm in the way of the development of education in
the south. They were determined to have the education of the south channeled through
Khartoum so as to develop the Arab system of education” (72).
The former Minister of Labour (1989) in central government of the Sudan on the other hand stated that the educational policy strategies in the Sudan provided two options to the southern Sudanese i.e. either one becomes part of the Islamic society and follows that educational system or one remains outside it and no concern was taken of one’s education (73). In general, the central government had interfered very much in the educational development in the southern Sudan by taking measures that disrupted the objectives of the regional government.

9.3. CONCLUSION:

The dominating feature of the Sudanese politics during the period under review was the concentration of the actual powers in the centre. The fundamental reason for this central control apparently emanated from the national government’s desire to have the government policies guided by Islamic ideologies and Islamic educational policy trends. There has been a persistent innate recognition by the national leaders in the Sudan for an appeal to Islam as a guiding basis for national policy development. Islamic State is guided by three basic principles (74):

1. Koran is the fundamental constitution;
2. the Government is to operate on the basis of the Shura (Consultation);
3. the Ruler is to be guided by the teachings of Islam.
One fundamental requirement of an “Islamic Order” is that the Sharia (Islamic Laws) will have to be implemented in the Islamic State (75). The Islamic laws (Sharia) and customs have remained therefore the only source of legislation in the country despite the complex political-cultural, ethnic and religious diversities in the country. The government consequently failed to provide an answer to the basic constitutional question of how the country defines itself legally and politically and how it balances the majority and minority rights and representation in the country. This is not that the national leaders were not conscious of the complex society, but simply because of their conviction of orienting the policies on the Islamic principles. This conviction took precedence over all other considerations.

Although the national leaders have been inclined to impose their powers on such a vast country as the Sudan with a heterogeneous population, they lacked the kind of ethnic, cultural and religious links that could have spread their influence widely into the Sudanese society. This apparently was due to lack of wide participation in the national policy development. The policies developed have therefore been considered as policies of political expedience designed to satisfy the northern Arab-Islamic educational interests or objectives.

What was considered as one of the main factors that shaped policy development in the country was the identity issues. The identity crisis which emanated from the government’s inability to take into consideration the cultural and ethnic realities in the country affected
the general education policy framework in the Sudan. From the southern Sudanese perspective the central government is not prepared to concede anything approaching equality to the south. The policies and the legislation subjected the southern Sudan to the national policy framework oriented largely to the Muslim north. The central government’s policy was apparently not to develop a distinctive southern culture or identity but to assimilate the south into what is commonly referred to in the northern intellectual circle as ‘core culture’ i.e. Islamic Afro-Arab culture. All indications were that the educational policies were geared towards the achievement of this goal. The central policy development, and central legislation tended to be directed towards thwarting any attempt by Southern Regional Government to develop any alternative educational policy or programme outside the national framework.

Although the Regional Government had a legislative body in the form of the People’s Regional Assembly, its power were severely restricted by the National Constitution. The President of the Republic had a veto power over all legislation emanating from the regional government that were assumed to be outside the national framework. The regional government therefore had no effective means of influencing national policies. The southern representatives in the national Assembly have also not been effective catalysts for the southern interests because of two factors. In the first place the regional issues feature less in the national assembly and secondly the use of Arabic in the national assembly effectively deprived them from effective participation.
The insistence of the national government on the policy of national unity had also much to
do with the government interest to spread the Islamic faith throughout the country. The
policy had less chance of success because the main factors that divide the south and the
north were not addressed by the central government. The factors that threatened national
unity were the very ones being used to bring about the unity of the country e.g. Arabic and
Islam. The government’s external interest for the Arab unity and its interests in the Arab
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The limited scope of this study in terms of accessibility to primary and secondary resources meant that it was not possible to undertake more than a partial analysis of the extent of educational policy issues in the Sudan. This has been particularly the case in terms of the imbalance of the respondents to the interviews from the northern and southern Sudan. The analysis may not therefore be a definitive answer to the complex educational policy issues for the whole country but has value as a basis for the future policy development in the Southern Sudan as it provides important knowledge of educational policy issues which were not documented before. The study, to some extent, mirrored the complex educational policy issues in the country in general and the southern Sudan in particular and has a definitional purpose for the future policy-makers, particularly for the Southern Sudan. A more complete study would have included, as essential element, detailed analysis of documentation on education policies within the country and extensive interviews of education policy-makers and other individuals connected with education within the country. However as stated in the introduction to this study, the empirical study could not take place within the country for practical and security reasons. The Sudanese government would not have permitted the research to be carried out. However the respondents to the interviews available within the United Kingdom included individuals with very high and valuable knowledge of the Sudanese educational policies.
The information they provided would not have been easily obtained if the study was conducted within the Sudan.

The researcher was also aware from the initial stage of the shortcomings of the study particularly because of the antagonistic situation existing at the moment as a result of the present on-going civil war in the Sudan between the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (a southern based liberation army) and the Khartoum government. This situation might have influenced the individual respondent's perception of how the information gathered was going to be used. This factor might have also restrained some respondents, particularly those from the northern Sudan from releasing all the required information that they know of the Sudanese education policies that they could easily provide under a normal situation. The researcher was also aware of the advantage of carrying out the study at this moment mainly because of the possibility of obtaining information that would not otherwise be obtainable within the Sudan because of the Sudanese government's policy on censorship on research on policy issues.

The answers to the interviews obtained through the open-ended questions had one particular disadvantage. It did not provide sufficient opportunity for the participants to reflect, on their own, on the questions as could have been the case with the use of questionnaires. But the use of the open-ended approach proved beneficial in that it enabled the interviewees to reveal more complete information they know about educational policies in the country than they would if questionnaire approach was used. The interviews
progressed smoothly and to a great extent achieved the intended objective. The valuable information obtained could form a basis for future education policy development in the Southern Sudan.

Evidences derived from the historical and political development particularly during the colonial period in the Sudan point to unevenness in the handling of racial or ethnic issues in relation to the southern and northern Sudan. There have also been clear indications of uneven distribution of the economic and educational opportunities and an apparent lack of interest specifically focused towards bridging the development gaps that existed between the southern and northern Sudan. Based on the fact that the motives for the British occupation of the Sudan was not geared to economic or other forms of development of the country, but for their strategic security interests in Egypt, it is not to explain the colonial administration’s reluctance to develop what was called unproductive Southern Sudan. The policies that the colonial administration and national government opted to pursue tended to perpetuate the ethnic, political and educational differences between the two parts of the country. The headstart advantage the northern Sudan had in relation to the southern Sudan was reinforced by the reluctance of the colonial government to directly get involved with the education of the southern Sudanese while at the same time imposing policies for stringent control over the education provided to the south by the missionaries. As a result the southern Sudanese were left by the British relatively as backward as before (1) at the time of independence in 1956.
The evaluation of the educational policies within the period under review points to a policy of domination and the difficulties in policy implementation which could be attributed to two main factors: firstly, the policy of centralization with lack of participation by a large spectrum of the population in the different parts of the country which was aimed at protecting the Islamic educational trends and secondly, most of the policy-decisions were apparently taken without acknowledged implications of those policies and the future development needs of the majority of the population in the country. This implied a lack of continuity in the government policy directions. The southern Sudanese participation in the policy process was severely restricted and little recognition is provided for their rights and needs in the country’s Islamic law and in education. The Regional autonomy provided to the Southern Sudan as a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement was largely superficial in importance. The powers of the Regional People’s Assembly and the Regional Executive Council were limited by the provisions in the constitution. For instance, Section Six of the self-government Act, 1972 which stated that “neither the People’s Regional Assembly nor the Regional High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any power on matters of national nature which among other matters include educational planning”. The Regional Executive Council was responsible to Khartoum for almost all its functions. The central government was also successful in exploiting the differences that existed among the southern Sudanese politicians and so successfully reduced the pressure the southern Sudanese could have exerted as a united block.
There are two significant factors that tended to govern all the policy development in the Sudan. These are the Islamic religion and the Arabic language. These factors have appeared in all the policy areas researched into in this thesis as conspicuous components of the Sudanese government educational policies in the country. To borrow the words of Horowitz as applied to countries trying to build a homogeneous society, the determination of the government of the Sudan to pursue Islamic policies is to create a homogeneous identity in the Sudan and to compel acknowledgment of prominence of Arab culture and Islamic religion. As stated by Horowitz acknowledgment of prominence implies destruction of the evidence of diversity (2) which the southern Sudanese persistently resisted. The difficulty in the achievement of the national government policy for national integration and national unity lies within this approach to create homogeneity.

The education system has been the main instrument employed by the government to try to create a homogeneous society in the country. The government assumed that the most effective measures to achieve national unity and to build a homogeneous identity was through the use of curriculum and syllabuses, developed nationally, which were reinforced through central control of the examination system. The general view as expressed by Watson clearly depict the situation in the Sudan. It is generally believed that schooling can be used effectively to bring about assimilation because not only does the curriculum largely ignore different facets of minority rights but there is usually official insistence on teaching through one national language medium (3).
As has been expressed by a number of the interviewees and in some of the national conferences, for instance the 1991 National Dialogue Conference on the Political System in the Sudan, Islamic religion is not a matter of faith for the national government in the country but an integral part of “national identity” and in fact an inextricable part of sense of peoplehood or nationhood in the eyes of the government. These features clearly ignore the Christian and animist Africans in the southern Sudan. The education system has been used to control and direct social aspirations with the aim of preserving and promoting the interests of the Muslim groups in the northern Sudan. This has been reflected in the specific educational policy areas investigated in this thesis. One would said that the policy of assimilation through the school system, a common language and school curriculum is not only unique to the Sudan. Precedence had already been set in some of the developed countries like the USA, UK, Canada and Australia (4). The main difference the methods of approach of the development of the policy to bring about uniformity and the characteristics of the population that make up the country.

One could easily equate the conflict relationship in the Sudan to that in the former apartheid South Africa. In both cases the policies pursued advocated segregation and political and economic discrimination against non-European (in the case of South Africa), non-Arab (in the case of Sudan) groups. But there is one big difference between the two in that whereas in former South Africa the policies pursued emphasized complete separateness, including intermarriages between the whites and other ethnic groups, in the Sudan separate development for the Southern Sudan was not an option of the central
government. The objective of the central government is not to develop a distinctive Southern Sudanese identity but to assimilate or if possible to destroy the southern identity so as to create what is called a core Islamic culture or identity. The main objective of the policies, as reflected in the findings of this research, was to create a situation where the Southern Sudanese distance themselves from their cultures - to become detribalized. The subjection of the students in the southern Sudan to the prescribed curriculum, syllabuses and textbooks that endorsed official central government policies is a clear indication.

The following section of the concluding chapter looks into the future development of education in the southern Sudan in the light of the findings revealed by the analysis of existing education policies. There are assumed to be two possible prospects for the future development of education in the southern Sudan; one is the prospect that the Southern Sudan will continue to exist within a united Sudan, and the second prospect is that the Southern Sudan might become an independent entity.

10.1. THE FUTURE PROSPECT FOR EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A UNITED SUDAN.

Educational policy, like any policy in general, ideally reflects the political options of the society concerned. It is ideally based on the kind of society or the kind of manpower the society or government wants to build in order to realize the development of that society or government. In the case of the national government of the Sudan, as has been revealed by
this research, the educational policies largely reflected Islamic educational values and ideals. It is not difficult to see in the very consistent educational policies development in the Sudan a consistent intention of the central government to build an Arab-Islamic society and to uproot the other cultures in the country, particularly the southern Sudanese cultures. The education provided as such did not result in a sound pattern of education in the Southern Sudan especially among the rural population. It did not stimulate the building up of a system of general education attractive to the majority of the rural population whose social and cultural patterns did not fit the trend of education emphasized by the central government.

In order to have the national education policies guided by the Islamic ideologies and principles the government persistently maintained the system of centralization of the development of education policies for the whole country regardless of the diversities in the country. There was an apparent innate recognition by the national government leaders of an appeal to Islam as a guiding basis for national policies of education. The apparent inability by the central government to take into consideration the cultural and ethnic realities in the country in the general policy framework acted as a disincentive to the education provided by the government. The central control of education policies enabled the government, for instance, to censor the content of the curriculum for all forms of education including teacher education and training. The curricula at all levels of education in the Sudan have been considered as a repository for worthwhile Islamic activities and values into which all the Sudanese children needed to be initiated. This had a far reaching
adverse effect, as regards relevance of education, on the southern Sudanese. It provided no alternative framework to accommodate the training or educational needs of the southern Sudan.

One of the conflicts in educational policy development in the Sudan, particularly in relation to northern and southern Sudan, was related to the definition of what was relevant education for the Sudan. From the researcher's point of view, relevant education could be that kind of education that has an interplay with the learner's environment and which can prepare the individual adequately for tomorrow's life. In order to come to terms with what was relevant education in the Sudan one needs to ask such questions as relevant education to whom and for what end in view? Who determined the needs of the society and on what criteria? Whatever educational policy was envisaged for the Sudan it remained largely irrelevant to the southern Sudan because the answers to the questions above were provided by the central government without any relevant inputs by the southern Sudanese. The educational policy objectives were consciously directed towards the achievements of values, ideals, attitudes and aspirations based on Arab-Islamic backgrounds. The national policy framework therefore never contributed to the achievement of educational development objectives for the southern Sudan. The basic problem has been the reluctance on the part of the central government to take the trouble of identifying all the factors militating against sound policy formulation and implementation that could realize sustainable development in the various parts of the country.
The consistent trend of educational policies development in the Sudan over the decades of Sudanese independence is indicative of the continuation of the same policies in the future united Sudan. This projection is based on the uncertainties that the southern Sudan had continued to face, such as institutional uncertainties emanating from a lack of political and economic stability and frequent changes of government and the personnel. There are no apparent indications that the central government would abandon its previous central control over the activities of the regional government in the southern Sudan such as:

1. the power structure remaining subject to central government interpretation and suiting the central government objectives;
2. the thwarting of any autonomous educational development attempts by financial control;
3. the lack of adequate legal powers to collect and allocate revenues within the regional local jurisdictions.

These inadequacies were compounded by the conflicts and lack of unity among the southern politicians in terms of national and regional policies. This worked and is likely to continue to work against the achievement of any viable educational policies relevant for the southern Sudan.

The relative strength of the central government’s control over all political, economic and educational structures in the country would make matters difficult for whatever government would be formed in the southern Sudan within a united Sudan. Genuine educational development in the southern Sudan would be feasible only to the extent that it
acquires genuine autonomous legal power that could enable it to take independent policy decisions on education and other development sectors without undue interference from the central government. What can be deduced from the central government’s previous reactions is that the central government is quite certain that effective participation by the south in national policy-making processes, if allowed, could become an important factor in the political control of education in the southern Sudan. Besides, education could make a considerable contribution to the political maturity of the people of the southern Sudan and the development of its capacity for active and responsible participation. Having this in mind, despite the economic and financial constraints the central government faced, it was not and may not be prepared to relinquish certain prerogatives over central control of educational policy matters.

The gesture shown by President Nimeiry by the introduction of the policy of decentralization was quite superficial and had no significant impact in terms of relevant educational development in the southern Sudan. It was practically an evolvement of an administrative system devoid of power to the regional government in the south and without the understanding of the social and cultural structures and political system within which that administrative system was to operate. The decentralization policy, for instance, did not allow for the development of regional capacity in terms of funds and human resources in order to realize the benefits of the decentralization policy. It did not therefore act as a source of solution to the education policy crisis. This was indicative of the lack of
political will on the part of the central government to depart from the basic Islamic policy orientations.

The government's educational policies provoked skepticism among the southern Sudanese intellectuals because the policies were perceived as irrelevant to the needs of the southern Sudan. The education provided was seen as a tool of repression. There was too much interference in the political activities of the southern regional government. This prevented sensitive educational issues, such as language and the content of the curriculum, to be effectively addressed or discussed by the southern regional government. The southern regional government occupied a subordinate position in terms of the national policy issues and the constitutional and political constraints controlled its functions. The majority of the southern politicians were moreover excluded from power and influence in the central government because of lack of access to the language of power and government i.e. Arabic. The positions occupied by the southern politicians in the national and regional government were dependent on their allegiance to the central government policies. As such the southern politicians were permanently placed under fear of purges or dismissals.

The maintenance of the unity of the country was an important and indispensable component of the central government's educational policy drive. This was enforced on the population of the country regardless of the great cultural and environmental diversities prevailing in the country. What was overlooked by the central government was the fact that unity based on a 'national culture' required a degree of social communication as
regards language, ideology, common interests and acceptance of common heritage. All these elements were missing in the case of the Sudan in terms of the south and north relationship and have been difficult to achieve through the instruments chosen by the central government, for instance through the means of Arabisation and Islamisation. The intention was to create a situation where education provided the means by which the southern Sudanese would distance themselves from their cultures and the southern environment. These were means to break down ethnic loyalty and the multilingual characteristics of the country. The attempts to create greater cultural uniformity by the central government in such areas as language, historiography and education in general created considerable resistance by the southern Sudanese who feared that the centrally engineered policies would destroy the fabric of the southern cultures. But, despite this awareness by the southern Sudanese of the negative impact of the policies emanating from the north, the regional government was powerless to provide an alternative solutions because of the central control.

However this policy of uniting the Sudan through a centrally controlled system of Islamization has not proved successful. In the 39 years of the Sudan's independence the state has experienced two major civil wars, the first lasting 17 years while the second, which began in 1983, has so far continued for 12 years. This is hardly evidence of a successful strategy of unity. The huge national resources which have been wasted in prosecuting the war in the south have surely held the Sudan back in its efforts to develop its economy and its civil society. In addition, the militarisation of society and politics
caused by the ongoing war effort has made more remote any final aim of developing a pacified and developed community in the whole of the country. In recent months some dissatisfaction with the current Sudanese state of affairs has been noticeable in neighbouring Arab countries. It is therefore not impossible to posit a situation where the Northern Sudanese are persuaded that for the good of their entire state (and its acceptability within Islam) they have to live at peace with their Southern provinces in a culturally diverse nation.

In order for the southern regional government to realize the fundamental right to education within a united Sudan there are a number of general pre-conditions which cannot be neglected without risking the success of the intended actions. In the main there is the problem of overcoming the economic, technical, political and cultural dependence on the northern Sudan. Unless real decision-making as well as effective means of implementation are fully in the southern regional government's hands, any educational policy and programme initiated by the regional government would remain only a paper exercise. The extent to which and the manner in which educational policies and programmes could be implemented with success would depend therefore upon the economic, political, social and cultural context within which they would operate in the country and the political will on the part of the central government to bring about the necessary transformation in the education system. This political will, of necessity, need to open up the structures of the economic, political and educational opportunities to the
southern Sudanese and appropriately re-define and re-organize the value system accordingly in the light of the complex Sudanese society.

The future development of education in the southern Sudan, of whatever level, would be dependent on the availability of resources, financial, human and material. These are necessary for a successful implementation of educational policies and programmes directed towards achieving sustainable educational goals in the southern Sudan. These resources have not in the past been made available to the southern regional government and the southern regional government has been denied the possibility of mobilizing the resources in the southern Sudan. Future educational financing in the southern Sudan within a united Sudan will therefore depend on the southern government’s ability to make or obtain an adequate budgetary provision for education. It is possible that due to budgetary constraints the government may not be able to make additional allocations which may be required for improved development of education in the southern Sudan. In the absence of adequate data on the proportion and consistent pattern of expenditure incurred on education, it is difficult to determine what the impact of plan-outlays would be on the development of the different levels and types of education in the southern Sudan. But one almost certain effect of stabilizing the situation in the Southern Sudan would be access to multi-lateral and bi-lateral funds which would then become available (as they are not at present) to assist in the development of the country.
In summary any reformation of policy for a unified but culturally diverse Sudanese state should overcome the following weaknesses of past strategies:

1. The neglect of regional, local and institutional planning in national policy-making. The lack of southern regional government participation in the national policy formulation must be avoided.

2. The inadequate political commitment of the central government to educational policies derived from the southern regional government.

3. The uncertainties of long-term planning caused by the political instability and the frequent changes in the government and the personnel involved.

4. The inadequate involvement of educational planners in the implementation of educational policies or plans. The educational policy-planners in the central government were generally quite detached from the grassroots activities.

5. The over-rigid character of the educational policies and plans. Educational planning in the Sudan has not been a continuous process which permitted flexibility and did not evolve in response to changing needs in the various parts of the country.

Retrospectively it would be correct to say that the effects of the educational policies in the Sudan were marginal in the southern Sudan. The policies were unable to ensure major progress in education in the southern Sudan. The main reason was the manner of the policy-making process without the needed information as bases for the policy-making. There was under-estimation or disregard of the coordinating role of educational policies and plans where the southern Sudanese could play important role.
10.2. THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR EDUCATION IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN IN AN INDEPENDENT SOUTHERN SUDAN.

It is clear that future educational development in the southern Sudan will depend first and foremost on the ending of the present civil war in the country and the relinquishing of power over the southern Sudan by the present central government of the Sudan. It is possible that this dispensation could occur within a multi-cultural but federated united Sudan. It seems at present more likely that there would occur a complete constitutional separation of the Arabized and Islamic north and centre of Sudan from the African and Christian or animist south. A future education in the Southern Sudan would then entail the re-adaptation and re-organization of the education system to meet the realities and objectives for education in the southern Sudan. This would imply a critical review of the system in existence, its policies and goals, and its relevance to meeting the development objectives of the southern Sudan. Education has to be conceived as integral part of the future of the southern society. In the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 there was an apparent lack of clear vision for the educational development in the autonomous Southern Sudan. Hence the several years of confusion and contradiction in the direction of education in the southern Sudan. There were several other inadequacies, most of which were related to the equality of access to education and the internal disagreement and conflicts among the southern politicians as well as external pressures on the southern
politicians from the central government in terms of allegiance to the central government policies.

The reassessment of what has happened in the past as revealed by this research, a diagnosis of the current situation and the determination of a future plan of action with clearly defined objectives to be achieved in a projected time perspective would be a prerequisite for creating a favourable context for educational development in the southern Sudan. This implies political commitment and a clear sense of direction on the part of the southern government and the evolution of appropriate administrative structures and procedures that would facilitate educational development. What would influence or determine the pace and pattern of the educational development would be the interplay of the political, economic and cultural factors within the south. This is likely to be influenced by the attitudes that the southern politicians would develop and the value system they would absorb today either within the country or outside the country in the countries of their exile. It would be possible for the conflicts and the lack of agreement that afflicted the politicians after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement to surface again, perhaps in a different form in the politics of the government in the Southern Sudan. The form of confrontation may be different because, in an independent Southern Sudan, the element of northern Sudanese would not anymore directly influence policy issues. But the fact that presently the southern Sudanese politicians are being exposed to varying value systems is likely to affect their future outlook.
The reform of the education system would involve taking options and necessary measures for carrying out political intentions. In ideal circumstances this political intention would represent the will of the people. Before the southern Sudan can hope to discover the directions in which solutions might be found, it must first be aware, accept and understand the score of southern problems and their human and institutional causes. It must also be aware of the limits within which a future south will operate so that, at least, it can have some ideas of where its development efforts should lead to. This would require unity of purpose and consensus among the southern politicians.

There are lessons to be learned by the politicians from the earlier attempts by the southern regional government to rehabilitate the education system after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. As revealed by this research the regional government had failed to properly worked out plans to rehabilitate education in the south. Though much of the obstacles were attributed to the central government control over the political activities in the southern Sudan, the southern politicians had a lot to be blamed for. The conflicts among the southern politicians accounted greatly for the lack of direction in the educational system in the southern Sudan. They could not, for instance, take advantage of some of the provision in the constitution that allowed the Regional People’s Assembly to halt or prevent the execution of the national policies that had adverse affect on the south. The atmosphere was not therefore conducive to establishing the right profile for enacting suitable educational policies for the southern Sudan. Political instability and uncertainty
did not encourage the Regional leaders to look beyond short term concerns. The Regional Government did not, for example, take due consideration for:

(a) correct identification of the educational needs of the southern Sudan;

(b) correct analysis of the problem areas; and

(c) elaboration of the appropriate solutions to the problems.

The lack of unity among the southern politicians meant that the system was torn from within by arguments over specific policy matters where any one answer or group of answers affected the prospect of attaining the educational objectives envisaged as suitable to meet the educational needs of the southern Sudan. The arguments were over priorities in policy matters particularly in setting the priorities in operational terms that were clear and meaningful, for instance on the curriculum, language of instruction and other fields of training. The result was confusion and the lack of policy direction. This lack of direction and the lack of effective coordination mechanisms in terms of educational programmes led to delays and waste of resources. Individual foreign organizations, for instance, were left on their own to decide and promote what in their own view was relevant education. The southern politicians were, to some extent, able to point out what was irrelevant in the education provided but were unable to say what would be right and better.

One of the problem areas the Southern Regional government faced within the united Sudan was the policy of centralization of educational policies development and total disregard of the complexity of the politico-cultural diversities in the country. The coming of the Southern Sudan as an independent sovereign state may not automatically remove
the problems caused by the complex elements of the society. The Southern Sudan, with its numerous tribes, will present similar complex features and similar problems that would require careful approach to deal with. Some of these problems have already manifested themselves within the Southern Sudan rebel movement against the central government of the Sudan. Apparently the movement has been divided up into factions on a more or less tribal basis. This phenomenon calls into question what form of government the future government of independent Southern Sudan would take in order to accommodate the different interest groups. Avoidance of concentration of power of policy-making in the central government of the Southern Sudan would be healthy to a large extent. This would avoid the previous intrigue of maintaining unity with the objective of domination. Concentration of power in the central government will prevent a genuine contribution to the policy-making process and the subsequent isolation of local institutions. This would cause disgruntlement and disillusion which could be possible causes for conflict. The real task for the future government of the Southern Sudan will be to find the right choice of means and methods to bring about southern unity without encroaching on the rights of groups of the population in the Southern Sudan. A decentralized form of government might be the most appropriate.

The task of managing educational development does not end with the decision to introduce it as has been the case, for instance, in the introduction of the policy of universal primary education. The entire process must be carefully planned, supervised and monitored. This is an important point to note in the future development of education in the
Southern Sudan especially in terms of the rural population. Primary education will continue to be the terminal stage of schooling for most children for a long period to come in the southern Sudan. Hence the needs for its proper policy and plans. For various economic, social and cultural reasons in the past a majority of children have not been enrolled in the schools. If they enrolled, not all of them continued through the prescribed period of the courses. There would be a need to know about the links between enrollment and retention patterns and the economic situation of the parents as well as their socio-cultural based attitudes towards schooling especially as regards the pastoralists. At the present moment it is not quite clear to what extent the parents, the majority of whom are poor and live in the rural areas and consider their children who help them from the age of seven or eight as economic assets, are prepared to wait for six to eight years for their children to become productive members of the family. A thorough research is essential in this field before setting a time scale for such a policy as that related to universal primary education. This would enable the design of appropriate measures to promote enrollment and retention of children in schools for the appropriate duration of schooling.

Another difficult issue that the future government of the Southern Sudan will face after the war will be the accommodation of the different age groups in the schools. Circumstances for formal education would have altered. These would produce a situation in which adult education will be likely to play a more prominent role in the education system in the Southern Sudan. This will take account of the large numbers of people who would not
have the opportunity for formal education during the long period of the civil war. This would require a clear policy direction suitable for the target groups.

The required re-orientation of the educational system in the Southern Sudan towards functional education and training and for productive service in the rural areas prescribe, no doubt, a thorough revision of the curricula. The research provides a number of lessons that can be learned from the past failures in the development and implementation of the rural development programmes, for example, the integrated rural education centre projects. Any form of development, especially that related to rural development, calls for members of the community to reach a certain degree of awareness and a capacity for active commitment. Such awareness was not cultivated among the rural population in the southern Sudan where the pioneer IRECs projects were established. Basically the reasons for the failure of the rural education projects were attributed to the following:

1. There were principal differences in the concept and practice of the integrated rural education centres.

2. The rural development programmes were unable to mobilize political support and economic resources necessary for the structural reforms and implementation.

3. The administration at both the headquarters of the Regional Ministry of Education and at the location of the rural education projects were not so much designed to produce innovations essential for the rural transformation and to motivate the rural population. Many of the parents were not
prepared to send their children to the school to learn skills which they considered they could teach their children much better than a teacher in the school.

4. The success of the integrated rural education projects depended, to a great extent, on the relative intensity of skilled manpower devoted to organization, management and technical assistance. These elements were apparently missing in the case of the rural education development in the southern Sudan.

Policies related to secondary education is another important educational issue that the future Southern Sudan will have to deal with. The ten years of experience of the researcher as a Headteacher of secondary school in the Southern Sudan had shown him clearly the picture of what the government, the parents and even the teachers expected from a secondary school education. All of them expected the secondary school to provide an education that was to take the students to the university. This stage of education was therefore considered transitional to tertiary education, particularly university education. Unfortunately, as revealed by the study, very few students managed to get into the universities. Since the secondary education curriculum, which was centrally developed, was not employment-oriented, the majority of the students who could not get access to the universities were not also easily employable in either the urban or rural areas. They largely became misfits in the southern environment in particular.
The question that the future Southern Sudan government will have to address is what education should be provided at the secondary school level that would be useful to the majority of the students within the southern environment especially those not able to get admission into the university. It will have to determine either to continue to have the secondary stage of education as a preparatory stage for university education or to have it as a terminal education or to have a balance of the two. It has also to address the question of parental push for their children to progress up the academic ladder. To provide terminal education at the secondary stage will entail taking measures to reform the curriculum and to provide adequate facilities and basic infrastructures of the schools. Whether such measures can be accomplished will depend upon the nature and pace of socio-economic progress of the Southern Sudan.

An important element in the policy-making process that must be noted is that educational reform should not merely be a political process, but also a comprehensive long-term project implementation which will require consideration of all the technical instruments such as future research into the relevant fields of education. The danger, as revealed in the study, will be the failure to establish clear priorities and the lack of political will and support on the part of the government. It will be essential for the government to consider educational reform as a broadly based process of ascertaining and influencing public opinion at all levels of the society and this has to be a gradual process if the reform is to be accepted or understood.
Terminal secondary education would require the diversification of the courses at this level of education which should be directed to promoting employability and productivity of the students once they complete their secondary school studies. The likelihood is that the Southern Sudan will continue for sometimes to admit a relatively greater percentage of the secondary students into the university in order to meet the badly needed high level manpower for the development of the Southern Sudan after the long period of deprivation. In any case educational planning at the secondary level, as in the other levels of education, should be integrated with the general policy of socio-economic and cultural development of the Southern Sudan. Decisions of a political character relating to priorities and purpose must be tied with the solution of administrative and practical problems.

One of the burning issues that the southern Sudanese have been facing was access to university education. Several factors, as revealed in the research, contributed to this lack of access to higher education institutions. The ultimate objective of university education in the Southern Sudan would be to prepare the southern people for the development situation in the Southern Sudan. This will entail the determination of priorities in terms of manpower needs. It needs to be underlined that estimates of manpower needs, particularly as regards skilled personnel, are useful in guiding educational development, at least for short term. There has to be prior study to ascertain the country’s needs and how best to organize them.
Vocationally-oriented university education in the Southern Sudan will be effective only if it is promoted within the context of the development background of the southern Sudan. The recommendations by the International Consultants for the opening of the University of Juba would be an ideal framework for university education in the Southern Sudan. The question will really not be whether there should be a place for vocationally-oriented university education in the Southern Sudan but how the vocational education is to be fashioned to meet the intellectual, social and cultural needs within the southern environment. This requires political will and commitment which had been missing among the southern politicians. The government will have to provide a clear and unambiguous policy direction to avoid planning and implementation failures. It will also have to provide possible answers to the fundamental question regarding parental push where the parents require their children to advance up the academic ladder because they see the future income closely tied to academic qualification. The government will have to convince the parents as well as the students of what the future holds for the vocationally-oriented graduates. A study will have to be carried out to identify all the factors that militate against this form of education and what practical solutions could be provided.

One of the main difficulties that would affect the development of university education in the Southern Sudan would be the financing of the university education. Foreign aid would be an important source of finance. But what the government of the Southern Sudan must be aware of is the fact that reliance on foreign aid for launching new educational programmes and substantially improving on the existing ones presents serious problems,
mainly because the terms of foreign aid do not always take cognizance of the behaviour of recurrent educational expenditures. The government will have to be in position to mobilize local resources to balance this.

There may be no relatively long-lasting solutions to educational development in the Southern Sudan unless the whole of the southern society, particularly the southern politicians, are shifted to new tracks. There are enough lessons in the past to learn from and from which the right bases for proper education in an independent Southern Sudan could be established.
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APPENDIX 1: The Main Participants to the 1990 Education Conference on the Policies of Education in the Sudan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ROLE</th>
<th>RACE/RELIGION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. General Omer El Beshir</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Gen. El Tijani El Tahr</td>
<td>V/P.M. &amp; Chairman</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. D. A. El-Turabi</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Toufik A. Suleiman</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Al-Tayeb Z. Al-Abdin</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Abdel Rahman M. Said</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Taj El Sir Mustafa</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saffia A. Al-Tayib</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. A. Nur El-Din</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Shams El-Din Z. Abdin</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yassein A. A. Wahaab</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jaleb Mahmed</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Al-Muniam H. Al-Nadi</td>
<td>Main Participant</td>
<td>Arab/Muslim</td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX 2: Time Table Distribution for the Primary Education in the Sudan, 1977:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>1ST. YR</th>
<th>2ND. YR</th>
<th>3RD. YR</th>
<th>4TH. YR</th>
<th>5TH. YR</th>
<th>6TH. YR</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Rel. Educ.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maths</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S,Studies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.E.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural St.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ec.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT/WK</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
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</table>

APPENDIX 3: Time Table Distribution for the Intermediate Education in the Sudan, 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>1ST.YEAR</th>
<th>2ND.YEAR</th>
<th>3RD.YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rel.Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial or Agric. Arts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.E.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Economics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOT/WEEK</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

APPENDIX 4: Time Table Distribution for the First and Second Year Secondary Education in the Sudan, 1977:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>FIRST YEAR</th>
<th>SECOND YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rel. Education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Language</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Language</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biology</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Language</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL/WEEK</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
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APPENDIX 5: Time Table Distribution for the Third Year Secondary Education in the Sudan, 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compulsory Subject</th>
<th>No. of Periods/Week</th>
<th>Optional Subject</th>
<th>No. of Periods/Week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rel. Education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Group (A):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Addition Maths or Biology.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Language</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Group (B):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Physics or English Literature</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Language</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Group (C):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chemistry or History</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Maths.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Group (D):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Geography or French Language</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group (E):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Art</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL/WEEK</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Depended on the number of Options taken.

APPENDIX 6: LIST OF THE RESPONDENTS TO THE INTERVIEWS:

1. Mr. Soforonio Efuk (Interviewed on 10/2/94): He was formerly an Assistant Headmaster of a Secondary School in the Southern Sudan (1986); currently a Journalist.

2. Mr. Ezbon Yombek (interviewed on 11/2/94): A Lecturer, University of Juba.

3. Mr. Vigil Jima (interviewed on 15/2/94): He has been a Cooperative Development Officer (Head of Cooperative Department). He was an active participant in political debates in the Southern Sudan.


5. Mr. Peter Kur Riak (interviewed on 3/3/94): An Assistant Lecturer, University of Juba, College of Education. He was formerly a teacher of English in the Secondary School.

7. Dr. Justin Yonama (interviewed on 10/3/94): A Lecturer University of Juba.


9. Mr. Ahmed Abdel Muniem (interviewed on 10/3/94): A Lecturer, University of Gezira.

10. Mr. Santino Loro (interviewed on 11/3/94): A Lecturer, University of Juba where he also acted as an Assistant Academic Registrar of the University. He was
formerly an Assistant Coordinator of NCA Cooperative Development Project in the Southern Sudan.

11. Dr. Martin D. Ettore (interviewed on 11/3/94): A Pharmacist and was one time (1979) a part-time teacher in a secondary school in Juba, Southern Sudan.

12. Mr. John M. Theakstone (interviewed on 12/3/94): He was formerly the Head of the East and Central African Division of IUC and acted as the Coordinator of the International Team of Consultants for the establishment of the University of Juba in the Southern Sudan and was the Editor of the Consultants' Report.

13. Mr. Lawrence Modi Tombe (interviewed on 22/3/94): He is a former Minister of Education in Equatoria Region (1985/86); a former Minister of Labour in the Central Government of the Republic of the Sudan (1987); a former Governor of Equatoria State (1988); and a former Sudanese Ambassador to Rumania (1991/1993).


16. General (Rt.) Joseph Lagu (interviewed on 25/3/94): A former Leader of the Southern Sudan Rebel Movement (Anyanya) in the 17 years civil war in the Sudan (1955-1972); a former President of the Southern Regional Government and Vice
President of the Republic of the Sudan (1978); and a former Sudanese Ambassador to the UN ((1990/92).


18. Dr. Kabalu Sidgi (interviewed on 17/5/94): A Lecturer, University of Khartoum and was an active politician during President Nimeiry’s regime in the Sudan.

19. Mr. El Bagir El Alfi (interviewed on 19/5/94): A Lecturer in the University of Gezira and a former executive member of the National Teachers Trade Union.

20. Mr. Omer Mustafa Shurkian (interviewed on 20/5/94): A Lecturer, University of Gezira.

21. Mr. Mohammed Adam Mahmoud (interviewed on 20/5/94): A Lecturer, University of Khartoum.

22. Mr. Omer A. Mahmoud (interviewed on 20/5/94): An Assistant Lecturer, University of Juba and a former teacher in an intermediate school in Juba, Southern Sudan.

23. Dr. Wani Tombe (interviewed on 25/5/94): A Lecturer, University of Juba and a former Cooperative Development Project Officer in the NCA in the Southern Sudan. He coordinated the establishment of Arapi Teacher Training Institute between the Southern Regional Ministry of Education and the NCA in 1986.

24. Mr. Mark Longa (interviewed on 25/5/94): An Assistant Lecturer, University of Juba.
25. Mr. Ivo Loliya (interviewed on 28/5/94): A Lawyer and a former Legal Adviser to the Governor of Equatoria State in the Southern Sudan (1987/88).

26. Mr. Brian Badi (interviewed on 29/5/94): A former Project Manager of Imatong Forestry Company Office in Juba in the Southern Sudan (1985-1988). The pilot project of the Integrated Rural Education Centres (IRECS) at Maridi in the Southern Sudan was within his local village area and so had a first hand knowledge of the impact of the project on the local population.

27. Mr. Louis Loyaak (interviewed on 30/5/94): He was a School Inspector for the Primary and Intermediate Schools in Equatoria Region (1987/89) in the Southern Sudan and had a long experience as a teacher in these two levels of education.

28. A Head of Charitable Organization who requested to remain anonymous was interviewed on 31/5/94. He has constant contacts with the Sudan.

29. Dr. Kunjwok Kwawang (interviewed on 7/6/94): He was a Lecturer in Political Science in the University of Khartoum and later became a Minister of Labour in the Central Government of Republic of the Sudan (1989).

30. Joshua Mure (interviewed on 10/6/94): A Technician in the Regional Ministry of Transport and Communications in the Southern Sudan. He had some contacts with the Technical Schools in the Southern Sudan.

31. Dr. Steven Yar (interviewed on 23/6/94): He was a former Director of Establishment in the Regional Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, Southern Region (1976-1983).
32. Mr. Abdel Mural Girshab (interviewed on 26/6/94): A Senior Lecturer, University of Gezira and Head of Department (Agriculture).

33. Mr. Victor Vuni (interviewed on 9/7/94): A Tutor in Wau Institute of Health in the Southern Sudan.

34. Dr. Hakim Darious (interviewed on 7/8/94): A Lecturer, University of Juba.

35. Dr. Peter Tibi (interviewed on 7/8/94): A Veterinary Doctor, and had been an active participant in the politics of the Southern Sudan.

36. Dr. John B. Mairi (interviewed on 10/8/94): A Lecturer in the College of Education, University of Juba; he was formerly an English Language teacher in the Secondary School in Juba.

37. Mr. Edward Momo (interviewed on 10/8/94): A former Tutor and National Counter-Part for the Integrated Rural Education Centres at Maridi in the Southern Sudan. He left the project for a University education and later became an Assistant Lecturer, University of Juba.

38. Mr. Avelino Androga (written correspondence from Nairobi): A former Coordinator of Education in the NCA in the Southern Sudan.

39. A Sudanese Ambassador (wants to remain anonymous) has sent to the researcher a document written by him about the Islamic laws and their consequences on the Southern Sudan.
APPENDIX 7: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS.

At the initial stage of the interview some personal details were requested from the interviewees such as the names and the individual credentials including the roles they have played in the policy-making process. This was not much of a problem as the researcher had this information before the date of the interview.

There were five main questions in the interview:

1. What educational policy/policies of the Sudan did you know during the period 1972-1992?

2. How did you come to know these policies?

3. How were the policy/policies implemented?

4. What were the problems in the implementations of the policies?

5. What were the impacts and implications of the policies on the development of education in the Southern Sudan?

Other questions that followed were those directed to lead responses of the interviewees which were to obtain some clarity.
Appendix 8:
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE SUDAN.

EGYPT

ZAGHAWA

NUBIANS

EGYPT

SHAYQIYAH

SHUKRIYAH

NUGIAN DESERT

EGYPT

Omdurman

HARTOUNI

NQATF

SHUK91YAH

Khartoum North

Wad Madani

Al-Ubbayid

At-Ubbayid

BAUGARAH

AI-7lb

NUER

DINKA

BAQQARAH

ZAGHAWA

LIBYA

CHAD

MARIA

MTARNS

THE SUDAN

AS-SUDD

PAJULU

MORD

AZANDE

LUK

DINKA

AFRIC

CENTRAL AFRICA REPUBLIC

UGANDA

Kения
Northern Africa on the Eve of Partition.
Appendix 10: THE NILE VALLEY IN THE MAHDIST ERA, c.1880-c.1900.
