Housing tenure and urban unrest: Responding to contemporary rioting through housing-related mechanisms

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Abstract

In 2011 England experienced the worst outbreak of urban unrest in a generation (Newburn, 2015). The cost to the public purse was significant, lives were lost and property destroyed. Immediate political pronouncements and media coverage reporting the disorder painted a picture of lawlessness and anarchy. The focus of responses from political figures and in mainstream media was on the declining moral and respect of those involved (Flint & Powell, 2012).

The day before the riots the Department for Communities and Local Government launched a consultation seeking views on extending the powers of possession to social housing providers to make the process of eviction easier and more flexible. This consultation was updated on the 10 August 2011; just four days after the riots had begun, to reflect the disorder. Within this consultation a question was added as to whether more eviction powers needed to be given to housing providers to deal with situations such as riots. Despite vociferous contestation from organisations such as Shelter, the proposals passed into legislation under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014).

To this day there remains little evidence about the actual housing tenure of the rioters. Very little has since been discussed about the use of housing-related mechanisms as a suitable way of dealing with urban unrest. Housing has remained relatively elusive in the discussion about the riots despite new powers of possession specifically geared towards social housing tenants as a result of the 2011 disorders.

This study seeks to address this gap. The exploration of the housing-urban disorder nexus is the thread running through this thesis, and it examines how the responses to the riots demonstrates contemporary rationalities for governing marginal populations and explores the apparent shift towards a more punitive society. Empirical data has been collected from 30 frontline practitioners working in housing, behaviour control and policing roles. These practitioners work in cities across England for organisations of various scales. Establishing a practitioner view was important, as these are the actors who sit between national level policy frameworks and the tenants whose day-to-day lives are governed (to a certain extent) by housing management practice. The aim of this study is to explore and attempt to understand from the perspective of one-the-ground officers and authorities why such a housing-related response to the disorders materialised, to what degree it is believed that these mechanisms are appropriate and a useful part of the behaviour-control arsenal and what, if anything, this might change for the future of governing populations.
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<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour Contracts</td>
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<td>ASB</td>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour</td>
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<td>ASBO</td>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Criminal Behaviour Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIH</td>
<td>Chartered Institute of Housing</td>
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<td>CrASBO</td>
<td>Criminal Anti-Social Behaviour Order</td>
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<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
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<td>FIP</td>
<td>Family Intervention Project</td>
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<td>FIT</td>
<td>Family Intervention Tenancy</td>
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<td>ISO</td>
<td>Individual Support Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPNA</td>
<td>Injunction to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHA</td>
<td>Local Housing Allowance</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSVT</td>
<td>Large Scale Voluntary Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>National Housing Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Private Rented Sector</td>
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<td>RSRS</td>
<td>Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTB</td>
<td>Right to Buy</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>Troubled Families Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
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<td>YOT</td>
<td>Youth Offending Team</td>
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1. Introduction

Political pronouncements by Prime Minister David Cameron presented the riots as ‘criminality pure and simple’. Critiques of this argument suggest that reading the riots as purely criminal removes any need, and indeed space, for debate around the possibility that the underpinning causes for the disorder may have been structural. The purpose of this chapter is to begin to place the 2011 riots in a wider political, economic, social and legislative context, outlining the way in which housing and behaviour control polices and discourse have developed over recent decades and to unpick the complexities of analysing the disorders. Whilst setting the scene for the remaining thesis, this chapter will also outline the importance and unique contribution of this research.

1 Prime Minister David Cameron described the riots as ‘criminality, pure and simple’ in his speech following the riots, documented in the Daily Hansard Debate, 11 August 2011: Column 1051.
1.1 Overview of the study

The rationale behind this research was to explore the notional link formed through political narratives and particular policy responses between *housing tenure* and *urban unrest*. Throughout this thesis the aim has been to remain as close to these two key themes as possible; to explore the relationship between each of the areas of social policy and to begin to understand how, through policy-making, political discourse and media commentary, these two fields have become symbiotic. In order to make sense of this relationship, it is important to place this research within the wider socio-economic and cultural context of contemporary England. It is the aim of this chapter to develop this context and some of the important underlying factors that bring together both housing tenure and urban unrest as areas worthy of further study.

In August 2011 riots spread across England in what has been described as the worst outbreak of urban disorder in the country in a generation (Newburn, 2015). The causes of the riots, and the responses to them, which are explored throughout this thesis, have offered various insights into what happened during that time, what the perceived underlying motivations were for the violence – if there was any identifiable motivation – and what the state and its citizens should be doing in response to them.

The policy responses to the riots were arrived at quickly, and often “characterised more by rhetoric that evidence” (Lewis et al., 2011, p. 8). During the course of the riots, and in the weeks and months that followed, the courts were sitting throughout the night to cope with the number of people that had been arrested (Newburn, 2015). In London Operation Withern was launched, which was a Metropolitan Police inquiry into the riots whereby witnesses were interviewed and hours of CCTV footage reviewed (Briggs, 2012b).

In the immediate aftermath of the riots the government launch a number of schemes that focused on rebuilding local communities and businesses. These included The Recovery Scheme (making areas safe and clean), The High Street Support Scheme (financial support for businesses that might close as a result of the riots) and a Homelessness Support Scheme (for those who needed to be rehoused because they were made homeless by the disorder) (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013). Just five days after the rioting subsided, the then Housing Minister, Grant Shapps MP, announced on behalf of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG herein) that a consultation

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2 It is worth noting that the political and economic context being referred to here is before the referendum upon which it was decided Britain would exit the EU (Brexit), and does not take into account any political or attitudinal affects the Brexit vote may have on Britain. It is also important to note that while references will be made to policies and legislation that affects devolved nations, the riot clause has only been implemented in England.
seeking to extend the rights of possession for social housing providers should be amended to reflect the disorder.

Another policy response which directly referenced the 2011 riots as its under-pinning rationale was the Troubled Families Programme (TFP). This was announced four months after the riots in December 2011. Not in itself an entirely new policy initiative, as it followed on from earlier initiatives such as FIPs, the TFP was launched following the 2011 riots and was presented as another governmental response to the disorders:

The story behind the rhetoric of a ‘broken society’ full of troubled families is a pure exemplar of the truncation and distortion of public understanding in respect of the ongoing articulation of poverty, social class and space in British society. (Slater, 2011, p. 110)

In March 2012, the Government announced the High Street Innovation Fund, a fund which was to be “shared out among the 100 most blighted local authority areas in England” (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013, p. 9).

Following on from the recommendations made by the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel’s final report the Home Secretary requested a review of the policing response, undertaken by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, which found that more work needed to be done around the protocols for responding to disorder and the way in which information is used and disseminated to better handle public order offences (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013). There was also work around tackling gang culture, following a cross-Governmental report Ending Gang and Youth Violence, which focused on how individuals can be supported to leave their gang lifestyles, as well as trying to prevent gang affiliation in the first place (HM Government, 2011). A focus on those not in employment, education or training (NEET) were also the focus of the government social mobility drive in response to the riots, which was encapsulated under the Building Engagement, Building Futures strategy to increase opportunities for young people in an attempt to stop them from getting into the poverty cycles in the first instance.

However, it remains the riot clause and the TFP where housing ‘fit’ into the policy responses, and which are arguably the most contested and controversial. For example, the riot clause faced contestation from large swathes of the housing sector, yet still gained Royal Assent under the auspices of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act on 13 March 2014. The aim of these amendments, according to DCLG, was to offer relevant stakeholders a more simplified and effective suite of powers to tackle anti-social behaviour (ASB), with a clear focus on victims and communities (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011b, 2012a). The Act, like the term ASB, is broad, covering a wide remit of issues from irresponsible dog ownership to dealing with gangs and organised criminal groups, port and border security and extradition arrangements. Two other key components of the Act were the
Community Trigger and Community Remedy; both of which empower local communities, giving them more say in how agencies should respond to complaints of ASB and the sanctioning of offenders (Heap, 2016). This focus on the victim is indicative of the Government’s standpoint on matters of ASB. This echoes the sentiments of previous governments, where there has been a distinct dichotomy between the perpetrator and the victim; where perpetrators are homogenised as pathologically deviant, in turn legitimising increased punitive and contractual punishments in an attempt to ‘correct’ behaviours according to normative conduct (Crawford, 2003). Although it is the riot clause (see Box 1.1, for a full excerpt of the clause) that is central to this thesis, it is important to understand the wider context of ASB legislation and discourse under the Coalition Government (2010-2015) and the later Conservative Government (2015- ), as this provides a useful lens through which to explore some of the underpinning rationales and motivations for particular policy mechanisms. Interestingly however, the government’s broader ambition for its ASB policy was to make powers ‘tenure neutral’, however, the riot clause directly contradict this by having a power that can only be enacted upon those in social housing and is a power that sits directly with housing providers.

In order to contextualise the governance of housing management and urban unrest since the riots in England, it is also essential to understand the foundations upon which these policies were built. A reflection on past legislative and policy developments will help to make some sense of the Government’s approach to the 2011 disorders and their reliance upon ASB and housing mechanisms. Unlike previous legislation governing social housing providers and their powers of possession, more recent legislation, since the 2011 riots, has removed the ‘locality’ element for offences committed in a riot-related context. Essentially this means that a landlords’ housing management function does not necessarily have to have been affected for this discretionary power to be implemented. Therefore, a social housing tenant, or member of the tenancy holder’s family living at the property, can commit an indicatable offence in the context of a riot anywhere in England and still face eviction from their home, as well as any other criminal charges that are brought against them.3 The notion of double-jeopardy penalisation for certain groups of people – social housing tenants involved in urban disorder in this case – is central to this thesis. A second key issue, an extension of double-jeopardy penalisation, is the collective punishment of social housing tenants and families in this context. Legislation states that a tenancy holder is responsible for not only their actions, but the actions of anyone living or visiting the property. This means the actions of one member of the household could result in an entire family being evicted. An attempt to unpack and

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3 The legalities of such a move have been questioned (Hodkinson and Robbins, 2012) and the clause was not to be applied retrospectively, meaning that anyone who was found guilty of committing an indicatable offence in the 2011 riots would not face eviction under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014).
theorise the underpinning rationality behind the particular legislative changes, as well as the frontline responses to the developments, forms the foundations of this study. To begin to make sense of how this particular outcome from the 2011 riots manifested itself into legislation, and to what degree this will have an impact on the social housing sector, it is important to start by contextualising these legislative changes within the broader political and socio-economic landscape of a post-recession England.  

Throughout this thesis there are three underlying assumptions being made, all of which will be challenged through a comprehensive review of the relevant literature and an in-depth analysis of the empirical fieldwork. These assumptions are, firstly, that through direct changes to social housing policy in response to the disorder, there is a political (and possibly even a public) understanding that social housing tenants were a significantly-representative group involved in the disorders. Even if the political statements refute that these pronouncements are not about poverty but morals, the collective punishment of social housing tenants transmits a message that these events were in fact about social housing tenants. Secondly, identifying urban unrest as a specific type of ASB overstates the issue of urban disorder in the UK, framing it as one that requires a discrete suite of policy initiatives. The third assumption is that wider governmental agendas were part of the Government’s driving-force for making legislative changes to social housing policy and not as a way of reducing the potential outbreak of future disorder, as the Coalition’s rationale suggested (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013). Through a detailed exploration of the literature building on a cross-section of theoretical and policy frameworks, these assumptions will be explored and challenged.

**Contextualising the study**

In responding to the DCLG consultation that suggested extending the powers of possession to landlords in a riot context, many commentators from the social rented sector were asking: why housing? (Shelter, 2011). To some, the connection between social housing mechanisms as a response to the riots was seemingly illogical given that it was not explicitly a housing issue per se. For this reason, this chapter is tasked with demystifying this connection. It is argued here, and throughout the thesis, that the riots and their responses did not happen in a vacuum, isolated from other socio-economic, fiscal and political influences. For example, housing policy and ASB policy have been widely recognised as inextricably linked through legislative powers, academic, political and media discourse, and in practice itself, where housing officer roles have expanded into behaviour-control territories (Atkinson, 2006; Crawford, 2003; Flint, 2008).

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4 It is useful to use the 2008 global financial crisis as a starting point for contextualising the 2011 riots. Significant research, as will be explained throughout the thesis, shows that urban unrest is particularly pronounced during times of economic crisis. Elements of the global financial crisis have also been expressed as part of the resentment felt amongst less-well off parts of the population who were angry at the behaviour of the elites.
Likewise, poor behaviour, violence and criminality have often been linked with poverty, which is of fundamental importance to contemporary challenges around housing policy and practice (Murray, 1996). Broader issues such as the global financial crisis have simultaneously profiled the corruption of the disorderly elite, fuelling concerns and frustration over the widening inequalities (Sayer, 2016). Joseph Rowntree Foundation and New Policy Institute conducted an extensive study, *Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion 2013*, which highlighted concerns around rising inequalities, which they argue are being exacerbated by austerity politics. These concerns also extended to the way in which welfare reform is being predicated as a solution to the economic crisis, implying that too much public money is being spent on those people who are not working (MacInnes, Aldridge, Bushe, Kenway, & Tinson, 2013). Evidence, however, shows that trend is now shifting and in fact a growing cohort of individuals facing poverty are working families; an issue that has got worse over the last ten years (MacInnes et al., 2013). As this report explains, people are classed as living in poverty if their household income is below 60 per cent of the median income for all UK households. The number of working-age adults with incomes below this threshold has increased by a fifth (1.5 million) over the last four years to 2013 (MacInnes et al., 2013). This report also highlights that as the social rented sector continues to shrink in terms of the number of dwellings in the sector, the private rented sector is increasing. As more individuals are facing less choice about the housing tenure they are able to live in, because they do not meet the requirements for social housing or cannot afford the deposit to buy a property, the private rented sector is becoming the dominant tenure for housing people in the greatest poverty (MacInnes et al., 2013). This raises concerns about the direction of social housing policy, where mechanisms are offering housing providers greater powers to evict tenants, leaving them little option but to move into the private sector at a time when people need greater support with housing and the associated costs of living. The danger in this type of policy direction is that issues, such as ASB, could be exacerbated, which could have the unintended consequence of greater social problems, rather than ‘fixing’ them (which was the ostensible objective of the riot clause). It also highlights some of the significant challenges that policy-makers face in addressing housing affordability and inequality, especially in the context of the global financial crisis and its slow recovery; pushing more people away from the social rented sector into private rented housing could further exacerbate the levels of poverty that households face, yet the continuation of increased powers of eviction within the social rented sector will only continue to drive this trend forward.

It is important to therefore explore the housing tenure-urban disorder nexus that was established in response to the disorder in an attempt to understand the political motivations for the way in which the Government responded to the 2011 riots. The contribution being made in
this thesis filters into, and builds upon, the general understanding of the 2011 riots and where this intersects with housing management and ASB governance. This behaviour-tenure nexus, it is argued, is continually manipulated, stretched and expanded in such a way that increasingly criminalises particular individuals, for particular actions which then leads to unequal, two-tier, collective punishments.

**A preface to housing policy in the UK**

Housing in England is differentiated by tenure; each tenure being treated differently in both legal and policy terms. As Blandy and Goodchild explain, in English law “[t]he idea is that property is a group of rights, some of which may be added or removed in different situations” (Blandy & Goodchild, 1999, p. 34). The three key tenures within the UK housing system are owner-occupation, the private rented sector and social housing. This is a crude categorisation, as there are many variations within each of the separate tenures that can differentiate individuals’ rights and enjoyment over the use of their property, such as owner-occupation with a mortgage or without, or social housing where the tenancy is held with a local authority or a registered social landlord. There are variations over the way in which these are governed. These differences are particularly noticeable in the social rented sector, where the governance of a tenant can vary between different parts of legislation depending on which body is the landlord. The key point here, however, is that an individuals’ rights and the degree of autonomy they have to behave as they wish is contingent upon which housing tenure they reside in. This includes noticeable differences in the rented sector, where private renting, as opposed to public renting, encompasses very different processes in terms of allocation and governance of tenants. As Kemeny (1995) explains: “the terms under which private and publicly rented housing are available [their conditions of tenure in terms of security and rights] is so fundamentally different that they are effectively two separate tenures” (Kemeny, 1995, p. 257). Rising financial inequalities in Britain, which can be more noticeable in certain areas such as London, has meant that housing affordability leaves many people without much choice about the housing they can live in (Savage, 2015). For example, a combination of needing a high deposit to secure a mortgage and scarcity of suitable properties in the social rented sector is pushing many people into a largely unregulated private rented sector.

For those individuals who are the freeholder (or essentially the home owner) they are often understood to have the most rights over what they do with their property and have less interference in the way they, or members of their family, behave. Therefore those who own their own home may have to get permission to do certain things, such as make material alterations to the physical structure of the property, which is dependent upon planning legislation for example, but they do not have their behaviour managed in the same way as someone who lives in a property owned by someone else as the landlord. Owner occupation
is not recognised as a legal concept, but is often used within policy and discourse as such and is considered the preferential tenure, or tenure of first choice over renting.

The differentiation between housing tenures goes beyond the legal rights and levels of governance. As the prioritisation of housing tenures has changed over time in political narratives and through policy shifts, homeownership has gone through a process of normalisation in Britain; the prevailing discourse being that England is a “nation of home owners” (Gurney, 1999, p. 164). This has happened for a number of reasons. As Gurney argues, this normalisation of homeownership has developed through a generation who have been subjected to ‘tenure socialisation’, whereby their parents will have owned their own home and they have therefore never experienced renting. In turn this has constructed non-home owners as an outgroup, left open to stigmatisation (Gurney, 1999). This process of normalisation towards home ownership then leads to the inference that those who do not own their own home are in some way ‘flawed consumers’ (Bauman, 2007), which has, in part, stemmed from the trajectories of government initiatives. A key policy that epitomises this shift in attitude is the Right to Buy (RTB), introduced under the Housing Act 1980. This policy contributed significantly to the symbolic imagery about the benefits of owning your own home. These benefits were primarily viewed along the lines of capital gains, material wealth, status and social mobility:

When the Conservative Party won the general election in 1979 it considered that its housing policies, and in particular its ‘Right to Buy’ scheme, had contributed to its electoral success. Hence the expansion of home ownership remained a key element of its policy and formed part of its approach to a property-owning democracy and popular capitalism in which home ownership was viewed as a means of broadening access to capital assets rather than simply as a housing policy. (Mullins & Murie, 2006, p. 42)

Another key reason for home-ownership being heralded as the preferable housing choice is the perceived ontological security that comes with owning, rather than renting from a landlord (Flint, 2015). This ontological security refers to the continuity that an individual has in their lives, the assurance that they will be able to remain, securely, in their home and within their communities. Those who rent, especially within the private rented sector, where there is much less regulation than the socially-rented sector, are often at the mercy of their landlord. Tenants, both within the private or social rented sector, are also responsible for the behaviour of their visitors or family members living in the property. Their tenancy can be contingent on the behaviour of these other individuals; a responsibility that does not extend to home owners in the same way.

Despite the noticeable differences between the tenures, especially in respect of the security of tenure and levels of governance, changes to housing policy and the tenure structures, as Lowe and Meers demonstrate, are beginning to merge. In particular, processes such as financialisation and responsibilisation, concepts that would once have just related to a
particular tenure (homeownership and social housing respectively) are now tending to ‘bleed’ across the two tenures (Lowe & Meers, 2015). Lowe and Meers observe, the financialisation of housing is now a hugely important issue, as documented elsewhere (Rolnik, 2013), which has had a profound impact on the ideological construction of housing and the challenges this has presented in the form of housing crises. These changes have resulted in social housing, once a housing tenure that people aspired to live in (Flint, 2003), becoming one that has become widely unpopular and increasingly difficult to access due to the declining stock levels and increased attention to need-based allocations, whereby applicants are ‘scored’ according to particular characteristics. In many areas this has meant that social housing has been a domain only for the very poorest (Murie, 2012a), resulting in distinctive challenges around the way in which the sector, and the tenants themselves, are perceived in broader political and media discourses. Deregulation and privatisation of the social-rented sector has led to the sector being residualised through ongoing policies sustained by all administrations since Thatcher’s, regardless of political leaning. Residualisation, a term often associated with the social housing sector since the rapid decline in stock levels, refers to the quality and quantity of the properties that remain in the sector, the residual dwellings (Burrows, 1999). These are often those that are in the least popular areas or of the worst repair and condition and did not get sold through the RTB, but remain difficult to let. As Malpass highlights:

Social rented housing as a whole has drifted, or been driven, towards a position where it is seen as a tenure of last resort, a residual sector for what Margaret Thatcher once disparagingly referred to as ‘the elderly and social cases’. In this context, therefore, it is tempting to agree that housing is, or has become, the wobbly pillar under the welfare state. (Malpass, 2005, p. 3)

The result of which, reinforced by dominant political discourse, has been to place a greater emphasis on the relative benefits of homeownership, whilst simultaneously reducing the security of tenure and increasing the conditionality for social housing tenants. As Deacon explains, conditionality is “the idea that those claiming welfare should be required to fulfil conditions regarding their own behaviour and that of their children” (Deacon, 2004, p. 911). These conditions are present in many areas of social policy including welfare to work programmes, education and schooling, health and housing (Bastagli, 2008; Deacon, 2004).

The dominant undertone in this particular political narrative is that of aspiration and responsibilisation. Both concepts have been a dominant feature of discourses around housing, behaviour and welfare provision for some time. Aspiration was an important part of the political rationale under Thatcher’s Conservative Governments, where the promotion of policies such as RTB was predicated on the notion that homeownership would correlate with social mobility, as Jones (2011) explains in his analysis of the working-class in contemporary Britain:
We have seen how ‘aspiration’ is presented as the means of individual salvation: that is, everyone’s aim in life should be to become middle class. Both Thatcherism and New Labour have promoted this rugged individualism with almost religious zeal. Rather than the old collective form of aspiration, based on improving the conditions of working-class people as a whole, the new mantra was that able individuals should ‘pull themselves up by their bootstraps’ and climb the social ladder. (Jones, 2011, p. 250)

The symbolic imagery created through the idea of climbing the social ladder implied that by accruing capital and wealth, achieved through home ownership for example, instilled responsibilisation in individuals, and how everyone has a role in society to ensure prosperity, security and conformity to the dominant neoliberal norms. This was evident in the successive New Labour manifesto. The idea of ‘responsibility’ was a key tenet under New Labour, the architects of the Respect Agenda, which encompassed the Respect Task Force, which came out of the Home Office’s 2003 White Paper, Respect and Responsibility – Taking a Stand against Anti-social behaviour. As Gaskell notes, this was building on the ‘success’ of the government’s ASB agenda, claiming that their intention was “to go ‘broader’, deeper’ and ‘further’ in its approach to tackling anti-social behaviour” (Gaskell, 2008, p. 223).

The global financial crisis of 2008 also had a significant impact on all housing sectors in Britain, which led to multiple housing crises affecting all tenures, and has had a profound effect on individuals’ housing options. For example, there have been supply-side issues of new housing during the financial crash, difficulty for buyers to access finance to purchase properties (especially first time buyers) and increased pressure on the private rented sector as a result of these issues, leading to a lack of availability as well as ongoing concerns about the lack of regulation in the sector (Flint, 2015; Maclennan & O’ Sullivan, 2012; Murie, 2012b; Rolnik, 2013; Sprigings, 2012). It has also had an impact on the way in which social housing and state subsidies are considered politically, economically and culturally, especially in media and public discourse. This, combined with other housing and welfare policies, has exacerbated existing, and provided new, challenges for the social housing sector. Access to social housing, or the difficulties in doing so, has been further exacerbated by the Coalition Government’s welfare reforms. It should also be highlighted at this point that like much of this study, it is England rather the devolved nations of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, that are most affected by these changes. For example, in Scotland where housing powers are within the remit of the Scottish Government, priority need – the system used in England to calculate the deservedness and urgency of public housing – does not exist. This does not mean that access to public housing is much easier, given similar issues with a lack of available stock, but it demonstrates the different approaches to housing, as well as the ideological connotations of public housing.

Meanwhile, the Conservative and Liberal Democratic Coalition Government aimed to reduce the size of state government and ostensibly transfer powers to the local level for the better
provision of services and their delivery. The reality, however, as Parker suggests, is that Cameron’s Government “proved keen to devolve responsibility for cutting public services, but less so to share real power and responsibility with local people (Parker, 2015, p. 110). Under the auspices of Localism, the ‘Big Society’ programme has been deployed as a project to rationalise austerity and welfare support and to provide a discursive setting for politicians to address societal issues, with a focus on the future (Jacobs, 2015). Viewed as a narrative construction, the ‘Big Society’ is premised on the notion that a “lack of individual responsibility has broken Britain” (K Jacobs, 2015, p. 33). The implementation of austerity politics as a way of reducing deficit and debt, since the global financial crisis of 2008 has seen further cuts and caps to the welfare provision. Arguably this has the potential to exacerbate the marginalisation of the poorest. Since the global financial crisis, the rich, and in particular bankers, have faced increased criticism publicly (Sayer, 2016). Nevertheless, surveys show that public attitudes towards the poor, such as ‘welfare mothers’, ‘chavs’ and ‘dole scroungers’ have faced greater criticism and stigmatisation (Hills, 2015).

Recent research conducted by Beatty and Fothergill (2016) also demonstrates the uneven impact of welfare reform. Their findings show that particular areas, including older industrial areas, less prosperous seaside towns and particular London boroughs, were the hardest hit, whilst much of London and the south of England were less so. For example, Blackburn and Blackpool lost around £560 per working age adult following the 2015 reforms. In Guildford, Richmond upon Thames and Hart, Hampshire, however, these losses were just £150, £140 and £130 per working age adult respectively (Beatty & Fothergill, 2016). These difficult challenges place housing policy directly at their centre and were all prominent in 2011, during the build up to the riots. One of the key ideas that this thesis attempts to challenge is whether the changes to welfare reform and the legislative amendments to housing policy after the riots was mere coincidence or whether the riots provided a suitable opportunity for the Government to deploy and legitimise broader agendas around public housing policies.

The next sections will give an overview of the relevant housing and ASB legislation affecting the social housing sector and reflect upon the legislative landscape and powers available to housing providers both pre- and post- the 2011 riots. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief overview of the remaining seven chapters of this thesis, providing a map through which the research is structured, including the existing literature spanning the relevant housing, ASB, criminology and sociology fields before turning to the fieldwork conducted and a summary of the empirical, policy and practice, theoretical and methodological contributions made by this study.

*The intersection of ASB and housing policy in the UK*
Changes to housing policy over the last three decades have, arguably, developed in unique and unequal ways. In particular, social rented housing has become more noticeably intertwined with anti-social behaviour and behaviour control policies, in what Crawford (2003) has termed new approaches to contractual governance. The rise of privatisation during the 1970s and 1980s, the increasing governmental prioritisation of ASB within political agendas under the New Labour Governments (1997-2010) and the continued responsibilisation of tenants meant that security of tenure has become increasingly contingent upon particular conditions, governing how tenants and members of the household behave in and around the property. A situation has arisen whereby the focus has been around the behaviours of the individual, rather than focus on state-driven policies to help address some key issues, as Manzi shows by drawing on DCLG discourse: “The consequence for housing policy has been an approach that emphasised individual responsibility and largely avoided state-based solutions, whilst promoting sustainability through social balance and tenure diversification”. (Manzi, 2010, p. 9)

This shift in housing policy over recent decades means that social housing is continually taking on more of a behaviour control role “with a rise in conditionality attached to tenancies (introductory or probationary tenancies contingent on acceptable behaviour)” (Manzi, 2010, p. 12). The slow decline of the social housing sector, in terms of the market share and the condition of the properties and neighbourhoods (Forrest & Kearns, 2001; Hastings, 2004), combined with the increase in conditionality has created a situation of deeply-embedded stigmatisation and a continually-perceived need for new powers, exacerbating concerns about crime and low-level anti-social behaviour (Burney, 2005).

Following the election victory of the Conservative Party at the 1979 general election the government of Margaret Thatcher pursued the housing policy of the RTB that was introduced under the Housing Act 1980 (and the Tenants’ Rights (Scotland) Act 1980). It is this policy that brought about fundamental changes to the social housing sector and which has been supported by successive governments ever since, albeit with increased restriction over the years. As King (2010) explains, the majority of the RTB sales were during the 1980s before revisions and caveats had added increased conditions, caps on the discounts and restrictions to who qualified, essentially meaning that the political and electoral costs were minimised as the majority of people who wanted, or could, buy their council property had already done so.

Through the mid- to late-1980s more stringent powers around enforcing tenancies were introduced through the Housing Act 1985 and 1988 (Squires, 2008), where lifelong tenancies were being usurped by assured shorthold tenancies. As Mullins and Murie (2006) also explain, these Acts during the late 1980s also marked a change in housing policy that began to focus more towards private renting, allowing tenants to effectively choose their landlords, as
well as including provisions to set up Housing Action Trusts. In part this was a drive to
dismantle the Housing Corporation monopoly, but also as a way of attempting to address
some of the key concerns around deprivation in high-population council-owned housing
estates.

The Housing Act 1996 introduced changes to housing policy that made significant steps
towards reducing the security of tenure for tenants (Hunter, 2006). The Act brought in three
new measures designed to address “unruly tenants” (Burney, 2005, p. 21) at a time when the
media was particularly focused on neighbours from hell (Field, 2003). These were
introductory tenancies, extension of the grounds for possession in cases of nuisance or
annoyance (Ground 2 for secure tenancies, Ground 14 for assured tenancies) (Arden &
Brown, 2014). This meant that social landlords could use ‘introductory tenancies’, whereby
no security of tenure was afforded to the tenant in the first year and landlords could evict
without appeal (except by judicial review) for anti-social behaviour (Burney, 2005).

Consequently, rather than a court hearing, where the landlord needs to provide sufficient
evidence to prove grounds for eviction, the process is managed internally by the housing
provider and so long as they have followed the correct procedure, the court has to grant the
eviction (Hunter, 2006). This process is slightly different for housing associations, where the
legal framework is set in the 1988 Housing Act, as Hunter (2006) explains:

In 1995 permission was given to two housing associations working in Northern Manchester to
use assured shorthold tenancies as a means of controlling ASB on estates that were being
regenerated (Ruggieri and Levison, 1998). In this context the tenancies are generally referred
to as ‘starter tenancies’. An assured shorthold tenant only has security for a fixed term period
(a minimum of six months) and at the end of the time may be evicted simply
by the landlord
serving a two-month notice. (Hunter, 2006, p. 139)

Despite subtle differences in the semantics of the legislation, both starter and introductory
tenancies represented a continued shift towards the reduction of an individuals’ security of


tenure. Giving landlords the increased power and autonomy to decide who could occupy their
properties suggested that housing policy was moving towards a more behaviour-centred
industry, whereby an individuals’ actions were closely monitored and judged according to a
‘normative standard’ of deservedness.

This trajectory continued through the ongoing prioritisation of tackling ASB in communities.
One of the more notable pieces of legislation, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, offered an
‘official’, albeit ambiguous, definition of what constituted ASB. This was when an individual
was “acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one
or more persons not of the same household (as the defendant)” (Squires, 2006, p. 159). The
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was nonetheless criticised from its conception by scholars
(Burney, 2005; Flint & Nixon, 2006; Millie, 2008; Muncie, 1999). Burney’s analysis of the
Act was that “legislation passed in response to anecdotal and unspecified social threats is
never likely to produce the anticipated impact, and so it is with that emblem of punitive populism, the anti-social behaviour order” (ASBO) (Burney, 2002, p. 469). The ASBO was introduced under s.1 of the Crime and Disorder Act and allowed the courts broad flexibility to make prohibitions to prevent repeat behaviour deemed anti-social, with no maximum time limit, but to be for a minimum of two years (Burney, 2005). The lack of substantive evidence underpinning this legislation, along with the broad and ambiguous definition, led scholars to argue that almost anything could, if authorities so wished, be considered anti-social (Squires, 2006, 2008). The subjectivity of defining what behaviours were likely to cause harm or distress to others also meant that enforcement could become unequal across the country, where particular behaviours may be tolerated by some individuals in certain areas, but not in others (Bannister & Kearns, 2013).

Despite the criticisms of earlier legislation, the increasing ASB agenda continued, blurring the criminal and civil boundaries further under the Police Reform Act 2002. This new piece of legislation saw the introduction of the post-conviction ASBO, or the CrASBO. This, as Squires (2006) explains: “introduced an entirely new character to the orders. Now they could be simply sentencing add-ons, indistinguishable from the criminal process and effectively providing retrospective sentencing for past activities” (Squires, 2006, p. 139). What was seemingly continuing to happen was an increase in the types of behaviours that fell within the remit of ASB powers, increasing the risk that people became criminalised because of the continued addition of new powers, rather than individuals actually behaving in a different manner.

By 2003 the ASB agenda was firmly established. However, New Labour were still keen to continue driving this policy area forward, now focusing in particular on the moral behaviour of individuals. Therefore, in 2003 the Anti-Social Behaviour Bill was introduced, following the Respect and Responsibility White Paper, whereby individual responsibility became a central part of governmental discourse (Brown, 2004), shifting focus away from structural factors and moving towards individual behaviours. Other significant changes as part of this Act included Part 4 of the ASB Act 2003 (sections 30-36), which introduced dispersal orders; a power given to police in England and Wales, whereby they could disperse groups of two or more from a particular area, where it was believed that group was going to cause ASB or intimidation. While this is a power granted to the police, and therefore out of the remit of housing-management, it is another example of social control mechanism taking place and the interactions of different agencies with a responsibility for controlling behaviour. The way in which individuals were being governed was continuing to expand with broader geographical and temporal obligations being placed on particular groups. As Crawford (2009a) highlights, the government’s pre-occupation with ASB at the time was often focusing on the ‘aesthetics’
of behaviour, targeting particular vulnerable groups, such as young people, in order to be seen to ‘be doing something’ to tackle the ASB problem. The 2003 Act also amended the Housing Act (1996) through the addition of “strong injunctive powers against anti-social tenants, including the power of arrest where violence was used or threatened” (Burney, 2005, p. 108).

Building upon the anti-social behaviour agenda, New Labour launched their Respect Agenda in 2006. In the Respect Action Plan the then Prime Minister Tony Blair referenced the work that New Labour had done to date. In particular the work to reduce child poverty and through public services such as the Sure Start, tax credits for families in work and increased sports provision in communities were emphasised. Blair also recognised that there were still problems with behaviour in certain communities; this being the foundation for the Respect Agenda. In the foreword to the action plan Blair explained: “what lies at the heart of this [anti-social] behaviour is a lack of respect for values that almost everyone in this country shares” (Home Office, 2006, p. 1). Blair goes on to discuss some of the powers that have been introduced under New Labour’s ASB crusade, including the ASBO, the Anti-Social Behaviour Contract (ABCs), dispersal orders and crack house closures. ASB terminology had become part of everyday dialect, and Blair was clear that he was pleased ASBO had become a “household expression”. Building on this work, the action plan set out further aims to expand the ASB agenda going forward:

The Respect Action Plan is about taking a broader approach. It recognises that, as well as enforcement we have to focus on the causes of anti-social behaviour, which lie in families, in the classroom and in communities. We need to tackle root causes with the same rigour and determination as we have taken with anti-social behaviour. Everyone can change – if people who need help will not take it, we will make them. If we are to achieve the vision of the Britain that we all want, then there is no room for cynicism. We need to take responsibility for ourselves, our children and our families, support those who want to do the same – and challenge those who will not. (Home Office, 2006, p. 1)

Atkins highlights that the Respect Agenda was conceptualised by seeing the solution to fixing Britain’s problems through processes of culture change: “Through its Respect Agenda, New Labour advanced a model of active social democratic citizenship, in which strong communities are founded on reciprocal rights and responsibilities” (Atkins, 2012, np). In addition to the Respect Agenda, the government formally launched a Respect Standard for Housing Management in 2006 with the aim of ensuring “that local agencies tackle unacceptable behaviour and its causes to improve quality of life for residents – particularly those in the most disadvantaged communities” (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006).

Gaskell’s analysis of this agenda suggests that the conceptualisation is flawed however. While the emphasis is about instilling respect amongst young people, Gaskell’s research showed that
it is often the young people that feel they have little respect within society and they are the individuals being disrespected:

A culture of respect is already very much present amongst young people within the inner-city and within inner-city schools, but it is one that places an emphasis on violence, a violent image and a lack of home in ‘conventional norms’ such as achievement ideology. The young people in this research felt they were leaving school ill-equipped to embody responsible citizens, workers and consumers. As a result, feeling disrespected by the state, living in insecure and often dangerous environments, without the voice, power or belief that change could be enacted, many young people subvert their citizenship, creating an alternative framework of respect for themselves. (Gaskell, 2008, p. 235)

The political trajectory of interventionist policies to help instil good behaviours into problem families continued through additional housing mechanisms. In 2009 additional powers were provided to social housing providers in England and Wales under the Housing and Regeneration Act (2008) where they could offer Family Intervention tenancies (FITs). These tenancies were not secure, therefore there was no need to provide any grounds for termination or possession and they were voluntary on part of the tenant (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009). FITs were designed to provide landlords with the power to move families who engaged in ASB into other, more suitable, accommodation:

Social landlords and practitioners involved in Family Intervention Projects have reported difficulties when seeking to move families involved in anti-social behaviour into dispersed accommodation or purpose-built units due to a lack of clarify over the type of tenancy a family should be offered for the duration of that stay…By introducing this new type of tenancy, we have sought to make it easier for social landlords and their partners to work together to make the right choices in how behaviour support services should best be offered. (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009, p. 7)

However, the Welfare Reform Act (2012) had major implications for housing policy and was again linked very closely to the notion of ‘responsibility’ often seen as an important indicator over the deservedness of an individuals’ entitlement to social housing (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2013), and could be problematic in exacerbating problems that previous government policies – such as Family Intervention Projects – have attempted to redress. The reforms to housing policy included the ‘benefits cap’, the Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (RSRS), widely known as the ‘Bedroom Tax’ (Lowe & Meers, 2015), as well as other changes to Local Housing Allowance (LHA) which has been reformed to increase in line with the Consumer Price Index, rather than the previous Retail Price Index, and therefore does not increase at the same higher rate than it did previously (Hills, 2015).

The final step in this trajectory of housing and ASB policy came as a result of the 2011 riots. Under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014) a new provision, the riot clause, was offered. The power offers social housing providers with discretionary powers to order possession in relation to secure tenancies (under the Housing Act 1985) and assured tenancies (under the Housing Act 1988) came into power (see box 1.1). As mentioned previously, this clause was first proposed in the DCLG consultation, A new mandatory power
of possession of anti-social behaviour, before becoming part of the White Paper Putting victims first: More effective responses to anti-social behaviour. By the time this had passed through the legislative process it was added to the statute book as a discretionary ground (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011a).

1.2 The 2011 riots

In August 2011, riots spread across England over four nights. In total 66 towns and cities were affected. The trigger for the riots, which started in Tottenham, was the fatal shooting of a young, black man, Mark Duggan, by armed police. Mark Duggan lived on the Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham, an estate that has a long, sustained history of tension with the police (Briggs, 2012a). Broadwater Farm has been affected in the past by riots, most notably the 1981 and 2005 disorders. In each case, the riots started because of a resident’s encounter with the police. Historically, where grievances have been experienced between this community and the police, local custom has been for a peaceful protest to the local police station. It is here where an authority figure would address the aggrieved crowd. However, in the case of the 2011 riots this did not happen. During this peaceful protest, the lack of response from any authority figure in the police led to rising anger, which was arguably the point whereby the protest turned from being relatively peaceful into the violence that triggered the wider disorders (Lewis et al., 2011).

In the following days these riots spread. First they travelled across London to Enfield, Brixton, Oxford Circus, Hackney and Waltham Forest by day two. They eventually reached 22 out of the 32 boroughs by the third day. Then, by day three, the riots began to spread across England, to the West Midlands (Birmingham, West Bromwich and Nottingham all witnessed particularly serious outbreaks of unrest), Liverpool, Medway (Kent), Thames Valley, Bristol, Leeds and smaller urban locales such as Huddersfield in West Yorkshire. By Tuesday 9 August widespread disorder took hold in Manchester and Salford and the riots had spread to a total of over 66 locations (Lewis et al., 2011). In total it was estimated that the 2011 riots cost in the region of £300 million, with approximately 5100 offences committed according to ten English police forces (Benyon, 2012). There were over 2584 business premises and 231 residential dwellings affected (Benyon, 2012). The Metropolitan Police reported in early 2012 that they had made 3223 arrests, 2179 of which had been charged or summonsed. Those convicted of looting, irrespective of the value of the goods appropriated, were handed sentences with an average of 14.1 months in prison, which is almost twice the usual time of 8.8 months, with 10.4 months compared to the usual 5.3 months for violent disorder and 7.1 months against 2.4 months for those convicted of theft (Slater, 2011).
The 2011 riots, unlike past outbreaks of civil unrest in England, were unprecedented because of their contagion. The rapid spread of violence arguably created an immediate moral panic (Cohen, 2002). Information being reported in the news and through political broadcasts were conflicting as new information was being received and what transpired to be previously reported speculation was later discredited. This led to what commentators have referred to as an ‘information vacuum’ (Hall & Brotherton, 2011). Over time, as more information became available, politicians, commentators and academics alike began to offer insights into why the riots took place. One of the most notable analyses was the collaborative research between The Guardian and London School of Economics (LSE herein). Some of the key findings from this research highlighted that during the course of the 2011 riots, and in the build up to them, there was widespread anger and frustration with the police and the way in which they treated particular groups in society (Lewis et al., 2011). Of the people interviewed, they highlighted that 85 per cent said policing was an ‘important’ or ‘very important’ part of why people rioted during this time. This frustration and anger extended further, where people felt that they were not treated with respect by the police and in certain cases that policing practices were discriminatory; in particular the use of stop and search was raised as one mechanism that people felt was being used unfairly. Other key findings from this piece of research focused upon dispelling some of the political- and media-driven myths around the riots, their causes and the way in which they spread. For example, they recognise that gangs behaved atypically. It was noted that gangs “suspended hostilities with their postcode rivals” (Lewis et al., 2011, p. 4). It was acknowledged that there were a cross-section of rioters, although the majority were young and male and generally poorer that the country overall. The findings also show that the perceived “suspension of normal rules” did provide an opportunity to acquire goods for free, there were also other reasons motivating people to get involved in the disorder. These included the increase in tuition fees, the closure of youth services, the dismantling of education maintenance allowance and, more generally, the generally perceived socio-economic injustices that pervade many people’s lives (Lewis et al., 2011).

The Non-political, Political and Post-political Argument

Reporting of the riots was emotive, powerful – both in rhetoric and through visual representations – and divisive. Immediate responses such as Prime Minister David Cameron’s ‘criminality, pure and simple’ redress, along with many other viewpoints presented as ‘truths’ caused a number of explanations about the causes of the riots and the backgrounds of the rioters themselves to proliferate. These can be broadly categorised, although not always neatly contained, using three particular perspectives: the non-political, political and post-political.

The non-political interpretation of the 2011 riots is the narrative that dominated politicians’ rejoinders and the news media reporting, building on Cameron’s dictum of ‘criminality, pure
and simple’. There is very little evidence to suggest that this sentiment entered the academic debate in the same way, although, as will become clearer when looking at the post-political argument, there is a more intellectually sophisticated analysis of individuals’ apparent lack of political motive. Seeing the riots as purely criminal, however, contributes very little to the debate around why the 2011 riots spread in the way they did. Much of the discussion around a lack of morals and responsibility – dominant themes throughout wider societal discussion on areas such as welfare – suggested that the rioters were not politically engaged, but rather feckless, greedy and locked into a state of dependency. The framing of this debate focused on two key causes. First, a lack of personal, and parental, responsibility was frequently cited as a significant contributory factor for the disorder and secondly, the failure of previous governments. New Labour were accused of trapping people into particular cultures through the provision of a welfare state that encouraged, and enhanced, dependency. New Labour were also accused of running an unwieldy and inefficient administration, which was not nimble enough to respond to these societal issues. Much of this rhetoric stemmed from, and was built upon, narratives being promoted through the Centre for Social Justice (Social Justice Policy Group, 2006), a think tank established by Iain Duncan Smith in 2004, who was Leader of the Opposition and then Secretary of State for Work & Pensions and who was still the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions at the time of the riots and was vociferous about the breakdown in families and benefit dependency as a causal factor of the 2011 riots (Mulholland, 2011).

Those commentators subscribing to the political debate refute the last argument on the premise that it simply transfers the blame away from the state towards the individual. Within this debate sits arguments leaning towards structural causes, such as employment, living costs, cuts to welfare provision all playing a significant impact in an individuals’ propensity to riot (Tyler, 2013b). Whilst recognising that the way in which particular groups behaved may have put other people in danger and their behaviour being somewhat reckless, the argument is that the sense of frustration being felt by certain people means that for them, such behaviours were possibly seen as legitimate. Other arguments, such as that of Millington (2012) suggest that while the behaviour displayed by many during the riots may have been viewed as purely criminal, for some it is the only way that that some individuals could have their voices recognised in a society where power is disproportionality weighted towards the wealthy, the media and key political figures.

Pertinent to both the explanation of the 2011 riots, the distinction between ‘riot’, ‘protest’ and simply behaviour subscribing to neoliberal orthodoxy has all coalesced to form a third, alternative view posited by scholars in response to the 2011 riots; the post-political debate. Within this argument, the reliance on standard social science explanations of governmentality,
advanced marginality and the penal state (all discussed in further detail in the next chapter) are repeating typical liberal rhetoric and naively denying that the working class are ever capable of behaving in a socially harmful way, and the that the media and political response to the riots does not hold any merit in comparison to social science inquiry; instead their underlying motivation is to capitalise on the situation and to bolster their revanchist policies (Treadwell, Briggs, Winlow, & Hall, 2013).

One of the key arguments to come from the post-political thought is that there are no coherent alternative ideologies being put forward, even in the case of what initially appears to be a highly politically-charged unrest, such as the Arab Spring (Winlow & Hall, 2012). This argument is important, as it demonstrates a strong critique against the epistemological framework supporting much of this thesis. Briefly, this framework utilises the theoretical perspectives of Foucault (governmentality) and Wacquant (advanced marginality and the penal state) to explore how populations are managed and controlled and how penal mechanisms have shifted over time. In particular, this study is keen to explore this change through the manifestation of power relations between the state, state actors and street-level bureaucrats and individuals to look at how particular issue are constructed. This framework places contemporary issues such as housing, behaviour control, urban unrest and punishment into the context of a Western capitalist culture, functioning according to dominant neoliberal rhetoric. A visual model of this was drafted throughout the research to help envisage the complexity of the relationships, which can be found in Appendix A. The challenge, therefore, is to unpack this narrative, to be receptive to its criticisms and to carefully challenge aspects of the narrative in the context of this thesis, to defend the use of governmentality, advanced marginality and the penal state in what is a critical governmentality approach to this study (see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion on the methods and frameworks).

1.3 The Housing Crisis

The latest housing crisis in Britain stemmed from the global financial crisis in the USA. However, as Whitehead and Williams (2011) explain, longer term factors have caused the housing market to be very volatile for a long period of time and therefore a crash in the market was not entirely surprising. These factors include: “a fiscal system that favours owner-occupation, particularly with respect to the gains accruing from housing price increases; since the 1980s, a highly deregulated finance market; [and] a continuing problem of inadequate supply response” (Whitehead & Williams, 2011, p. 1159).

As Manzi (2015) suggests, however, given the diversity and number of issues and challenges facing housing in England, we should be thinking of the present situation as a multitude of
housing crises, rather than a homogenous housing crisis. Manzi articulates this by explaining the position of the housing market of recent years as a conjunction of housing crises from affordability, supply and delivery, the right housing in the right areas as well as flexibility of moving between tenures and security of tenure in the rented sector.

1.4 Broken Britain, Big Society and Austerity

Understanding the rationale and development for particular discourses and narratives are a key aspect of this study. In particular, narratives around the dominance of neoliberalism in contemporary Britain are important to explore, as they can provide some understanding of the way in which populations are governed and controlled. In Britain more recently, some of the most significant discourses for social policy have included Broken Britain, Big Society and Austerity. These were significant in the Coalition Government’s drive to push the Conservative Party image away from its connotations as the ‘nasty party’ and to move towards a strong economy and socially inclusive society (Zhang, 2013). Broken Britain, Big Society and Austerity each centred on the dominance of neoliberalism. For Harvey:

According to theory, the neoliberal state should favour strong individual private rights, the rule of law and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade. These are the institutional arrangement considered essential to guarantee individual freedoms. (Harvey, 2005, p. 64)

Neoliberalism can be best conceptualised as a ‘political project’ with its broadest aim to reduce state intervention in social and economic matters; instead it relies on the notion that market processes are better placed to produce wealth and prosperity (Forrest & Hirayama, 2009). In the British context, Forrest and Hirayama’s analysis offers a succinct overview of the way in which the privatisation of state housing stock was transformed through a strong neoliberal agenda:

The transfer of state housing to the market was buttressed by reduction in new building for social renting, combined with a targeting of subsidies in the homeownership sector. The financial deregulatory ‘big bang’ in 1987 signalled the end of a separate circuit of mortgage finance and paved the way for a highly competitive market in home loans and increasingly ‘innovative’ products designed to draw more households into homeownership…The growth of homeownership in Britain has been substantially boosted by the discounted transfers of state housing, which had acted to conceal and delay growing affordability problems. (Forrest & Hirayama, 2009, p. 1003)

The dominance of neoliberalism discourses as a way of improving both the social and economic wealth of a nation underpins much of the literature spanning the urban studies fields which are drawn upon in this thesis. Likewise, the use of the ‘neoliberal city’ as an important feature of urban unrest was also present in media analysis, political pronouncements and key theoretical explanations for the 2011 disorders. The term neoliberal city can seem somewhat
vague. However, the work of Loïc Wacquant focuses on the emergence of new strategies and coercion that have worked to reduce the levels of state welfare and workers’ rights which has led to more punitive mechanisms to control, and sanction, people’s behaviour whilst simultaneously inequality in particular areas is increasing as the wealthier accrue greater power and wealth. For Wacquant (2001, 2009), neoliberalism is viewed as eradicating the social rights enjoyed through the welfare state, whereby the core of the neoliberal state is a penal state; the precariat, a new class emerging as a result of widening social inequalities, is managed through a combination of workfare and prisonfare (Squires & Lea, 2012).

**Broken Britain**

The Broken Britain narrative was a term first coined by the Conservative party’s think-tank, the Centre for Social Justice, in their 2006 report Breakdown Britain: An interim report on the state of the nation. Flint & Powell (2012 offer a convincing critique of broken Britain as a concept being applied to the 2011 riots). Government policy discourses have paid significant attention to the way in which the state and stakeholders – including street-level bureaucrats, police and other third sector and community groups – can play a role in managing ‘problem’ populations. These populations are often categorised broadly into key groups such as problem families, youth population (McKenzie, 2015; Slater, 2012) and the workless (also read as workshy, lazy and scrounger) populations (Valentine & Harris, 2014). The language and recommendations in the various Government policy papers have privileged particular perspectives through discourses that take the focus away from “market failures and income inadequacies under neo-liberal hegemony to one of state and personal failure” (Wiggan, 2012, p. 401). So, with government policies managing to discursively shift the focus away from the structural failings of the state and place the blame towards the populations in question, populist narratives of a Jeremy Kyle culture symbolically ‘breaking’ Britain has become embedded in the discussions around social welfare provision (Briggs, 2012b, p. 11).

The notion of Broken Britain emerged under the New Labour administration following their 1997 election victory, where ASB became a central policy focus, suggesting the ‘problem of ASB’ was one which needed tackling and that this was to be achieved through government intervention. As Burney (2005) explains, the then Leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair explained how his government would not just get tough on crime, but the causes of crime during a radio interview in 1995. It was clear in the run up to his election success that this would be the tone of his government and their priorities.

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5 See Chapter 2 for a fuller history and critique of the rising ASB agenda from New Labour through to the Coalition Government.
Explanations for poverty and unemployment have become widely reshaped and explained as a result of active decisions and personal failures for not engaging within education and labour markets, rather than governments focusing on the unequal distribution of resources (Wiggan, 2012). Wiggan goes on to explain:

In the ‘liberal welfare regimes’ of the US, UK, New Zealand and Australia, in particular, this has been eased by the ongoing discursive reconstruction of poverty and unemployment as manifestations of personal failure and poor social behaviour, facilitated by expensive benefit payments that make few demands of recipients, encouraging passivity and dependency on the state. (Wiggan, 2012, p. 384)

Nowhere is this sentiment more pronounced than in the discourse of the Centre for Social Justice’s, a think-tank established by Iain Duncan Smith. Their report Breakdown Britain drew upon Sir Winston Churchill’s first principles of Conservative welfare policy: “a ladder – ‘we are for the ladder, let all try their best to climb’ – and a net – ‘below which none shall fall” (Social Justice Policy Group, 2006). In the report the argument being constructed was that whilst Churchill’s ambition was laudable at the time where privilege was for the few and absolute poverty an imminent threat for the majority, in today’s society ambitions should be greater and beyond a net through which no one should fall:

The trouble with nets – even safety nets – is that people get tangled up in them. The longer one stays in a state of dependency, the less chance one has of escaping from it. Indeed, this is a condition that persists across the generations, with social mobility actually diminishing despite, or perhaps because of, the modern welfare state. (Social Justice Policy Group, 2006, p. 22)

The Centre for Social Justice outlined five key ‘pathways’ to poverty that they suggested were at the root of breakdown Britain: family breakdown, educational failure, economic dependence, indebtedness and addiction. As Wiggan (2012) highlighted, these key themes gained considerable media attention, bolstering the conservative neoliberal discourse that welfare dependency and irresponsibility is a direct result of excessive social expenditure.

A renewed focus on community empowerment, whereby the issue of ASB is one which should involve the “collective efficacy” of communities, rather than say the police, became important in the crime-control agenda under the Coalition Government’s Big Society project (Hodkinson & Tilley, 2011). This was demonstrated through the introduction of Neighbourhood Justice Panels “which aim to provide a forum for discussion of anti-social behaviour and low-level crime between community members and local practitioners” (Hodgkinson & Tilley, 2011, p. 297).

The prolonged reference to austerity, and how austerity measures are essential in order to build a strong economy have also resulted in many scholars denouncing such approaches. Mary O’Hara (2015) opens Austerity Bites by explaining that the book tells the story “of the (all too often) voiceless, invisible people who have been the victims of one of the most
radically regressive and destructive economic experiments the UK has ever seen” (O’Hara, 2015, p. 1). As with the political justifications for expanding state penal networks and definitions of what constitutes ASB which continues to criminalise particular behaviours, austerity politics was also supported by the myth that Britain needed to make cuts to the welfare state, which was burgeoning and too expensive to be sustainable (Hills, 2015; Sayer, 2016). For Hills (2016) blaming New Labour for excessive state spending is a fundamental contradiction and inaccuracy, given the evidence which shows that financial sector debt is seven times that of public central debt. Nonetheless, as Sayer explains, the rhetoric of excessive state spending is allowed to proliferate:

So the government, aided by a compliant press and a feeble, craven opposition, has set up the bystanders, the 99%, but especially those on low to middling incomes, who have been told that ‘we’ must reduce ‘our debt’ and tighten our belts. Not only have real wages dropped but public sector cuts have led to job losses, particularly affecting women, while benefits for the unemployed, the disabled and people on low incomes have been drastically cut. (Sayer, 2016, pp. 235-236)

These austerity measures, justified using a collective account of how ‘we’ have all contributed to this debt has manifested itself largely in the form of changes to the welfare system under Universal Credit which sought to cap the amount of welfare support any given household can receive.

1.5 The Research

Premise for the research

Unlike any previous outbreak of urban disorder in Britain, the 2011 riots displayed certain unprecedented characteristics, in particular the scale and contagion of the disorder. The national level construction of the issues largely focused on criminality and morality narratives. In responding to the riots, politicians and mainstream media focused on the punitive “tough stance” policing and legislating, including operating courts during the night to process the volume of people facing charges, punitive sentences to those committing minor offences, which may otherwise have gone unprosecuted outside of a riot context and the removal of welfare entitlement to those found guilty of riot-related offences. It also began a housing tenure – urban disorder nexus that was largely absent from historical riots. As Campbell (1993) recognised following the summer riots across particular housing estates in England and Wales in the early 1990s, these outbreaks all occurred at a time of national economic crisis. It is difficult to therefore wholly refute that riots are not in any way linked to, or contingent upon, economic downturns and times of fiscal restrictions. Whilst it is not the purpose of this thesis to provide an explanation for why people were motivated to take part in the disorders,
an awareness of the social and economic context in which the riots took place, along with the historical political and legal trajectories within the social housing and ASB fields sets the context. Rather than being able to suggest that there is a clear explanation, which can then be addressed with a clear set of policy responses, this thesis takes the position that the multiple riots and the complexity of wider structural issues means that more nuanced explanations need to be considered. This thesis in particular focuses on the Government’s appetite to respond to the disorders through restrictions over welfare entitlement and social housing tenancies. With the ostensible aim of this approach being to prevent future outbreaks of disorder, it would infer that those responsible for the disorder were primarily social housing tenants. The data to support this claim, however, does not exist and it is therefore the underlying premise of this research to explore the rationale for such a response by taking a practitioner perspective to address why, and how useful, this approach could possibly be for preventing future disorders, as this was how the Government framed the underpinning rationale for their policy response at the time.

**Overarching study aims**

The key aims for the research, including the underlying research questions are stated here for clarity and will be referred to throughout the thesis:

**Research Aims**

- To examine the way in which social housing tenants were constructed as a homogenous group significantly representative during the 2011 disorders;
- To explore the way in which legislative and policy changes construct and legitimise social housing, and housing-related mechanisms, as an effective measure in preventing future outbreaks of urban unrest; and
- To identify and examine the different understandings and interpretations of the 2011 riots at both national policy making and local practice scales and to begin to elicit how practitioners may respond to future disorders based upon recent legislative changes.

**Research Questions**

- How was social housing (and social housing tenants) constructed as a significant factor of the 2011 riots?
- How were interventions focused on social housing, and social housing tenants, constructed as suitable mechanisms for the prevention of further outbreaks of urban disorder in England?
- Why were the 2011 riots linked to housing and housing tenure?
Is there a difference in the understanding of the 2011 riots, and of how to prevent urban disorder generally, between national level policy making and local level practice?

What are the envisaged implications and impacts for the social housing sector arising from the legislative and management changes implemented in response to the 2011 riots?

**Structure of the thesis**

Following this introductory chapter, the thesis goes on to explore and critically review the existing relevant literature, highlighting the work upon which this study builds and where the gaps for further exploration exist. It then presents an account of the research design and methodology, including the limitations of the study, before presenting and analysing the empirical data generated by the fieldwork. Finally, the thesis concludes with a commentary on the key contributions it has made, including key findings, their policy and practice implications, and its methodological and theoretical contributions. The thesis is structured in the following way:

**Chapter 2: Governance mechanisms for behaviour control: conceptualising housing and anti-social behaviour policies**, is the first of the two literature review chapters. In this chapter the underlying conceptual framework is mapped, drawing on the concepts of governmentality (Foucault) and advanced marginality and the penal state (Wacquant). The chapter opens with a rationale and background of these concepts, and how they are being applied together to provide a lens for the thesis. Drawing on other social sciences research, this chapter explores the shifts in the political economy and the effects that neoliberal ideology has had on the way in which populations are governed and managed. In particular, this chapter highlights the way in which particular groups are perceived as different, dangerous or in need of increased intervention, how particular groups and behaviours are constructed as problematic and how housing and ASB policies in contemporary Britain provide mechanisms for controlling individuals’ behaviour.

**Chapter 3: Responding to contemporary urban unrest: political protests or acts of anti-social violence?** Building on the foundations set in Chapter 2, this chapter focuses on urban violence, especially the 2011 riots, offering a background to urban unrest both in the UK and internationally helps to frame some of the key arguments and interpretations of what sparks disorder, who it is that is involved in these behaviours and how they can be best prevented. In particular, this chapter aims to grapple with the tension between whether the 2011 riots could be considered as political protests or whether they were simply acts of criminality and ASB.
Chapter 4: *Methodology*, provides a reflexive overview of the rationale for adopting a qualitative research approach to this study. This chapter reflects on the epistemological underpinnings of the research, whilst reflecting upon the strengths and limitations of the approaches adopted.

Chapter 5: *The Construction of Issues and Responses*, the first of the three chapters presenting the findings from this study, looks at the way in which particular issues were constructed in explaining the underlying causes of the riots, such as the prolific gang culture and the welfare recipient, both of which were argued to be indicative of a Broken Britain. This chapter traces the way in which the Government and media portrayed the riots and began to legitimise their policy responses. In order to get a fuller picture of how these responses were received, the reports from housing and third sector organisations have been analysed. The key aim of the chapter is to outline the complexity and nuances of the 2011 riots, whilst beginning to show how the role of social housing became constructed as an issue leading to a clear housing-urban disorder nexus in political and legislative discourses.

Chapter 6: *Exploring local level perspectives: The complexity of responding to urban disorder through housing mechanisms*, unpacks the way in which strategic and frontline practitioners understood and experienced the 2011 riots within their localities and to reflect on how they perceived the national responses to the riots, in particular through housing and behaviour control mechanisms. In doing so, this chapter examines the perspectives of those working on the frontline and in communities, how they see the future of social housing unfolding and the impact that legislative amendments, such as the riot clause, may have on tenants, in particular in the case of any future urban disorder.

Chapter 7: *Spaces of Misunderstanding? Exploring the power and resistance dynamics within and between national policy making and local practice*, is the final of the three empirical chapters and attempts to elicit the ways in which frontline practitioners resisted national policy that they considered to be unwarranted in the case of 2011 riots. The chapter also considers the complex conflicts that begin to emerge between different groups of practitioners, within organisations and at an intra-personal scale.

Chapter 8: *Discussion and conclusions: key contributions from this thesis*, draws together the thesis, reflecting on its original aims and research questions to demonstrate the key findings and original contribution this study makes to the field. This chapter also reflects upon particular areas where further study would enhance social science research and policy and practice, in particular the work that needs to be done in the case of any future outbreaks of urban disorder.
2. Governance mechanisms for behaviour control: conceptualising housing and anti-social behaviour policies

“In all the countries where the neo-liberal ideology of submission to the ‘free market’ has spread, we observe a spectacular rise in the number of people being put behind bars as the state relies increasingly on the police and penal institutions to contain the disorders produced by mass unemployment, the imposition of precarious wage work and the shrinking of social protection.” (Wacquant, 2001, p. 404)
2.1 Introduction

Housing and ASB have become intertwined in policy and practice, with ASB policy having its roots in social housing management (Crawford, 2003). Particular populations have become more closely governed and controlled through everyday practices of intervention and surveillance. The types of behaviours and ways of living have become categorised as acceptable or not through the development of normative practices closely associated with social mobility and respect. It is the purpose of this chapter to explore the way in which both housing and ASB have been conceptualised in contemporary society and in doing so developing a framework through which it is possible to analyse the housing tenure – urban disorder nexus central to this thesis.

Primarily, the underpinning theoretical perspective is largely drawn from the work of Michel Foucault, in particular governmentality, established as an appropriate tool to be adopted when exploring the issues present here (Dean, 1999; Flint, 2002; Garland, 1997; Lippert & Stenson, 2010; McKee, 2009; Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006; Stenson & Watt, 1999). In order to get a more robust perspective on the key issues, this will be augmented with the work of Loïc Wacquant, in particular his theses around advanced marginality and the penal state (Hancock & Mooney, 2012a; Rodger, 2012; Wacquant, 2001, 2008, 2009). In this introductory section, both these theorists’ key ideas will be explored, providing an overview of the key tenets, their applicability to this study and some of their shortcomings and critiques of their work.

Governmentality distinguishes particular “mentalities, arts and regimes of government and administration that have emerged since ‘early modern’ Europe” (Dean, 1999, p. 2). Governmentality is concerned with the how of governing; to understand how individuals are governed and govern themselves (Flint, 2002; Parr, 2009a). Derived from essays delivered at the College de France in the late 1970s, governmentality is based upon the conceptual triangulation of sovereignty, discipline and government (Flint, 2002). The focus for the concept of governmentality is the relationships between government and others, and government and the individual:

[Foucault’s work] focused particularly upon the relations between two poles of governance: the forms of rule by which various authorities govern populations, and the technologies of the self through which individuals work on themselves to shape their own subjectivity. (Garland, 1997, p. 174)

Within the concept of governmentality there are a number of key ‘mechanisms’ that help to understand the relationship between sovereignty, discipline and government and the way in which power manifests itself in terms of governing behaviour (and resistance to this power) and helps to show the fluidity of what is considered deviant and in need of particular forms of
governance (Crawford, 2003). For Foucault power did not just refer to the state, but instead should be viewed as a continuum from individual self-governance (technologies of the self) through to the governance of others through more formal governmental strategies (Parr, 2009a, p. 365).

For this study, governmentality offers an important platform through which to understand the way that the control of particular populations are understood and the way in which mechanisms of governance are adopted and utilised. Of particular interest is the way in which practices of governance have changed over time. No longer are people punished and sanctioned through the use of physical, and public, torture (gallows, flogging etc.) but rather punishment through restrictions. These restrictions can be the loss of liberty (incarceration), loss of their home (eviction) or other, more subtle forms of governance through the loss of income (welfare sanctions or fines) or restrictions on access to particular areas, people or performing behaviours (curfews, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, Anti-Social Behaviour Contracts).

To take a Foucauldian view of this shift in governance, it is argued that punishment of behaviour has shifted towards the use of “technologies of subtle power”; moving away from punishment of the body to punishment of the mind (Cohen, 1972). Foucault’s view on the rationale behind the shifting mechanisms for governance are understood as not an attempt to punish less, but to punish better and more deeply into the social body. Continuing to explore these issues, as many housing and ASB scholars have done, shows this shift in techniques of governance that aligns with the dominant neoliberal ideology of how people should live their lives according to particular norms and codes around respect, mobility and profitability.

This concept, like any particular standpoint or perspective, is subject to a degree of critique. It is not the purpose of this chapter to refute these criticisms wholesale and defend Foucault’s work as the zenith of social theory, but instead to elucidate some of the main arguments and shortcomings and begin to find ways to enhance these important ideas. As Garland states “the criticism that an approach ‘doesn’t deal with everything’ is not a particularly damaging one” (Garland, 1997, p. 204). As Garland suggests, all analytical frameworks are only partial and therefore rather than reject a particular conception outright, adopting ways to address the criticisms can offer a powerful tool to understand and explain contemporary governance: “Rather than viewing governmentality research as an autonomous mode of enquiry, it should be developed in conjunction with the sociological tool necessary to it” (Garland, 1997, p. 204).

A key area of concern facing governmentality is the lack of attention that it pays to the messiness of reality (McKee, 2009). As Parr (2009) explains, there is a need to move our
attention towards ontologically focused questions; here she suggests that we move beyond the
construction of ASB and focus attention to the reality of ASB (Parr, 2009, 364). Steps can be
taken to start overcoming some of these criticisms and focus attention towards the messiness
of reality, taking the analysis beyond just exploring the construction of issues. However, it is
also important to pay attention to the construction of issues because of the way in which
dominant media and political discourses build up particular ideological positions that can then
transcend into policy-making and on-the-ground practice (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, &
Roberts, 2013).

Therefore, an understanding of what has been identified as the shortcomings of
governmentality as a lens through which to analyse and understand the technologies and
rationalities of government is key to being able to adopt additional frameworks to enhance
governmentality, in particular in relation to housing studies, an underlying rationale for
adopting the framework in this study. McKee (2009) usefully synthesises the main criticisms
as:

- its disregard of empirical reality, the promotion of an overly abstract view of governing where
  politics is reduced to rationality; its inattention to social difference; Foucault’s widely accepted
  rejection of state theory; and the perceived (in)adequacy of Foucault’s ‘politics of resistance’.
  (McKee, 2009).

There is strong support amongst housing scholars for the applicability of taking a Foucauldian
approach. Nonetheless, in order to overcome some of the broader concerns raised, this work
will adopt other sociological concepts that will help to mitigate some of governmentality’s
shortcomings, whilst offering a robust analytical tool through which to scrutinise the data. The
additional concepts of advanced marginality and the penal state (Wacquant), as well as moral
panics (Cohen) and biopolitics (Foucault), will be adopted to help utilise this Foucauldian
approach in a meaningful way. The concept of moral panics is a substantial body of work
closely associated with Stanley Cohen. Grounded in the era of Mods and Rockers as a rising
group of individuals potentially threatening the valued social cohesion and norms of broader
society, the concept of the moral panic explores these public and media reactions to particular
types of deviancy or social problem (Cohen, 2002). Biopolitics is a term that became
particularly popular in social order studies through Foucault’s work, Society Must be
Defended (Lemke, 2001). Specifically, biopolitics is a term used to refer to “a mode of power,
which operates through the administration of life itself – meaning bodies (both individually
and collectively), their health, sanitation, procreation, mental and physical capacities and so
forth” (McKee, 2009, p. 466). As McKee explains, underpinning biopolitics is the mechanism
of governance that focus on the management of populations rather than territories.

The work of Wacquant, and the way he conceptualises advanced marginality and the penal
state, is also useful for the analysis in this study. Taking this approach to augment
governmentality, is a starting point for developing a more robust framework through which to interrogate the developments in housing and ASB policies in England. As Jones (2010) explains, the work of Foucault and Wacquant are well positioned to help understand the state system more holistically:

Foucault (1977) was concerned with the development of the Western system of prisons, organisations, administrative and legal hierarchies for social control – and the growth of disciplinary society *as a whole* - revealing that schools, factories, barracks, and hospitals all share a *common organisation*, in which it is possible to control the use of an individual’s time and space hour by hour. The penal state is on this trajectory, if seen as a stage in the development of the state system *as a whole*. (Jones, 2010, p. 396, emphasis in original)

Wacquant’s work, especially around the concept of marginalisation and the penal state, offers a useful lens through which to make sense of the issues around urban unrest and the rationale for governing and controlling populations to manage and prevent urban disorder. Wacquant’s work explores the way in which the state has become a key institution in the surveillance, and coercion, of populations under the neoliberal project in advanced societies (Squires & Lea, 2012). Wacquant largely outlines the way in which the state has become increasingly a ‘penal state’; where the most marginalised population are subjected to increasing punitive sanctions and less able to defend themselves against precarious employment, unemployment and welfare cuts, characterised as the ‘centaur state’ (Squires & Lea, 2012); a supposedly liberal and permissive system at the head for the middle and upper classes, but disciplining and controlling for the poorest (Mayer, 2010, p. 94). An exploration of housing policy enables an insight into how particular issues are developing in unequal ways. This is particularly true for those living in social housing, who could be placed at greater risk of punishment than someone in another housing tenure because of the additional powers authorities have to sanction tenants. This growing inequality is having profound effects on urban spaces, especially the tensions between rich and the poor (Sayer, 2016). Wacquant uses his analyses to also reflect upon urban disorder, as Stenson highlights:

Because of the growing inequalities, job insecurity, social dislocation and public disorder associated with the politics of the New Right, from riots and chronically high levels of violent crime in US city ghettos, to the miners’ strike and uprising by poor whites and minority ethnic groups in England, these usually involve the toughening police and criminal justice policy. (Stenson, 2012, p. 42)

Stenson continues to draw out Wacquant’s arguments, explaining that advanced societies are moving from welfare to workfare states:

In ‘workfare states’ new forms of control are less emollient and nurturing. There are masculine-toned, punitive, ‘zero tolerant’ developments in policing and criminal justice, aimed mainly at perceivably troublesome boys and men, and the shift away from maternal, femininetoned, nurturing dimension of state-craft, once aimed also and perhaps mainly at managing and supporting poor women and children. (Stenson, 2012, p. 43)
Chapter 2  Governance mechanisms for behaviour control

For others, this masculinisation of state governance and support and the reduction in empathy for the situations of the most marginalised is central to Wacquant’s thesis in *Punishing the Poor*: “We can interpret the processes surrounding the penalisation of poverty as part of a ‘civilising offensive’ designed to contain and discipline the *precariat* in a post-welfare era” (Rodger, 2012, p. 90).

Like governmentality, Wacquant’s work has its shortcomings. In particular these criticisms largely coalesce around the lack of nuance that Wacquant pays to marginality and the groups who are considered to be in a position of advanced marginality in society. There are five key areas: other aspects of the penal-welfare arena beyond prison; poverty and the daily life of the *precariat*; gender; local level practice; and a lack of empirical data. Wacquant does recognise some of these key underpinning concerns around the urban crisis and neoliberal public policy, as Rodger (2012) highlights:

> The problem populations that are constructed out of the chaos of economic crisis may be a more permanent feature of neoliberal societies because, increasingly, they are resistant to re-absorption back into the mainstream economy. Wacquant recognises this as a key problem of advanced marginality. (Rodger, 2012, pp. 95-96)

This recognition shows that *advanced marginality* always exists within a society, and whilst the tensions and violence that may arise from such exclusion may sometimes be ‘subdued’ this can remerge through the ebb and flow of capitalist societies:

Disorder and conflict are embedded features of competitive capitalist market systems. The social disorganisation and occasional violence generated by economic processes are always present, especially in the marginal populations and communities who lost most in a competitive market society. (Rodger, 2012, 92)

Rodger continues to argue that particular cities on the margins, such as Moss Side in Manchester, for example, have become ‘danger-filled battlegrounds’, as competitive markets and societies make it harder for those living in the poorest of areas to survive. He draws on the work of Young (2007) who refers to the *penury of the urban ghetto*. The argument here is that people are not necessarily feckless or lazy and choose not to work, but instead are only able to access “slave-like” jobs (Young, 2007). Faced with this difficulty to achieve meaningful employment is another way that for some, the most marginal, engaging within a more ‘normative society’ can be challenging. However, whilst it is recognised that Wacquant offers a significant amount to the work of advanced marginality in neoliberal cities, how these patterns have developed over time and the implications, and myths that surround some of the moral panics and characterisations of the populations living in these areas, some criticise the lack of attention that he pays to ‘poverty porn’ or the “details about the pains of the daily life of the ‘*precariat*’” (Hancock & Mooney, 2012a, p. 129). It is recognised that Wacquant’s extensive work has been significant in moving debates forward, the observations, or critique, being posited here is that they can be further developed to understand the relationship and role
that the media have in influencing the opinions of the public and policy-makers. Here Hancock and Mooney argue that ‘poverty porn’, the way in which the media sensationalise the lives of those living in poverty, is working to present a truth about the way in which certain populations live their lives:

In programmes such as [Jeremy Kyle, Trisha, The Fairy Jobmother and the like], ‘dysfunctional’ working-class families are contrasted with the ‘normality’ of middle-class lives; ‘backward-looking’ attitudes among the poor are rendered shameful; middle-class values associated with self-improvement and aspiration are revered. These programmes, designed to titillate and entertain, invoke anger and indignation and a way to ‘know’ working-class lives in a manner wholly de-contextualised from a critical understanding of the broader historical and structural processes that shape them. (Hancock & Mooney, 2012a, p. 111)

As Hancock and Mooney suggest here, the way in which particular populations are presented through voyeuristic mainstream media ignores key underlying issues, favouring instead to castigate individuals for their own personal failure through flawed personalities and a lack of ambition. A further criticism that Hancock and Mooney highlight is the lack of attention that is paid to the consequences of other policy areas, which can be neglected in his work.

Drawing on the work of Mayer (2010), Hancock and Mooney claim:

Housing, education, immigration or urban development are all policy areas, whose goals, strategies, and instruments have been significantly reconfigured so that they, too, contribute to regulating and controlling urban marginality. (Mayer, 2010, p. 99 as cited in Hancock and Mooney, 2012, p. 110)

More broadly, there has also been criticism around the lack of attention paid to women, poverty and marginalisation and the gendered nuances of women and prison, something that is a fundamental problem in both advanced neoliberal societies, but also the areas suffering advanced marginality. For example, Hunter and Nixon (2001) highlight how it is often the woman who faces eviction in cases of ASB, because it is most frequently women-headed households living in such areas. However, it is the behaviour of the son or the partner that usually contributes significantly to the trajectory of behaviour that leads to eviction. Whilst it could be argued that this very study is also guilty of this shortcoming, it should be emphasised that the focus was on the practitioner, which is another area often neglected in Wacquant’s work and helps to refocus some of the debate on the messiness of reality. Focusing on the practitioners’ perspectives, and the challenges that they face on a day-to-day basis, does offer a unique contribution to this field, and does go some way to addressing the key concerns raised about the gaps in Wacquant’s work, in particular the points that Hancock and Mooney raise around the important role of the media in shaping attitudes towards more marginalised or poorer populations.

A final key area of criticism around Wacquant’s work is the lack of empirical reality, as Measor crystallises in her analysis of Wacquant’s work: “empirical material permits us to sketch faces onto the stick figures of the oppressed, and render them more human by attention
to their troubles and pains” (Measor, 2012, p. 147). Again, while the work here may not be looking directly at the lives of the people through which policy will inevitably impact directly, it is taking account of empirical reality. Focusing on the practitioner, the conduit between the policies (enacted either through parliaments and national governments or at an institutional level) and the people whose daily lives will be affected by particular types of governance.

2.2 Increasing punitive techniques: from welfare to workfare?

To begin to make some sense of the way in which populations are governed and to glean some insight into the workings of modern political economies it is helpful to start by taking a top-down view. This section will therefore begin to explore ‘neoliberalism’, asking what is it and what does it mean for housing and ASB policy in the UK?

For Wacquant, a significant feature of neoliberalism is the emergence of new strategies of control and coercion (Squires & Lea, 2012, p. 1). Wacquant takes the view that neoliberalism is “demolishing many of the social rights of the welfare state” (Squires & Lea, 2012, p. 1). At the core of the neoliberal state, it is argued, is a ‘penal state’, whereby the precariat is managed through a combination of prisonfare and workfare (Squires & Lea, 2012, p. 2).

A number of elements of this argument would benefit from further exploration. Firstly, by precariat, Wacquant characterises people within this social class, broadly, along similar lines to the work of Guy Standing (Standing, 2011). For Standing the precariat is a new and rising class of people who demand free migration and a universal basic income (Standing, 2011). This group of people are rising in globalised Western societies and are a product of the rising inequalities and the difficulty in securing meaningful, consistent work on a basic income sufficient to cover the costs of living. Meanwhile techniques of governance through workfare are increasing, as people are being actively encouraged to move away from state-dependency and towards more sustainable existences often through subservient work programmes. Standing talks about “the neoliberal mantra that success is measured by consumption” (Standing, 2011, p. 129), which lead people to adopt other practices to acquire goods that they may not be able to do through conventional means such as credit cards, pay-day lenders or through ‘credit’ companies such as Bright House, which have high interest rates, or indeed shoplifting, reinforcing poverty and inequality, which can continue to exacerbated by adopting such shopping habits. In line with broader arguments about today’s society, the dominance of capitalism is driving people to behave in increasingly irrational ways to ensure they are able to continue to participate actively in today’s ‘consumerist’ society. This line of argument also fits within the post-political debates around the 2011 riots.
Prisonfare and workfare, Wacquant argues, have become the contemporary neoliberal successor to the welfare state. Referring back to the idea of the centaur state, the contemporary neoliberal state has become one where those with the least economic power suffer from exacerbated levels of punishment (Loïc Wacquant, 2010). Where the Keynesian welfare state ostensibly pursued full employment and social cohesion through education, the shift towards a more punitive state highlights how particular behaviours and policies are indeed criminalising particular groups. By this it is argued that particular behaviours or actions can become criminal, or sanctioned as a crime, if they are committed by particular people, but not others. For example, the governance of social housing tenants, and how living in social housing means an individuals’ behaviour, is more closely monitored and governed than someone who owns their own home. This heightened monitoring displays strong characteristics of the panoptican. The panoptican was Jeremy Betham’s architectural design for an institutional prison. The principle was that at the centre would be a watchtower, surrounded by prison cells. The cells would be well-lit, while the watchtower dark, meaning that the imprisoned subjects would never know exactly when they were being observed (Foucault, 1991). While the physical structure of the panoptican was never realised in Britain, the principles of surveillance and governance apply, as a reading of Foucault’s interpretations of the concept shows:

Each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication. The arrangement of his room, opposite the central tower, imposes on him an axial visibility; but the divisions of the ring, those separated cells, imply a lateral invisibility. And this invisibility is a guarantee of order. (Foucault, 1991, p. 200)

The metaphorical architecture of the panoptican can be observed and understood as ‘punitive techniques’, in that areas of social housing are heavily observed through CCTV and an increased presence of authority figures observing the behaviours of populations. Therefore being in these areas heightens an individuals’ chance of being caught behaving in an anti-social or criminal way, potentially providing a fast-track towards punitive action being taken against them. Within this way of thinking there is also the assumption that the ‘eyes’ are always watching and that the ‘offender’ cares that they are being watched. Cohen’s net widening and mesh thinning fishing analogies are another way of making sense this idea of a penal state. For Cohen the continued pushing and pulling of the definitions of behaviours that constitute ASB, or that cause political concern, mean that the net is being cast wider, allowing the system to grow and mutate, ‘netting’ people who may once not have become part of the criminal justice system and meaning fewer people can escape from it (Cohen, 1985).

The arguments presented here demonstrate a compelling analysis of how neoliberal states are expanded and developing in uneven ways, displaying more punitive characteristics of
governance to ensure that individuals are being productive citizens. Moving away from welfare provisions, states are become dominated by workfare-type projects, which operate alongside increased punitive mechanisms to control populations and urban spaces.

2.3 Understanding ASB: the stigmatisation of particular social groups?

This shift in welfare state to a workfare, and some degree prisonfare, state has altered the way in which particular populations are ‘supported’ by the state. A declining shift in state benevolence has been witnessed as economic productivity of individuals becomes the marker of their successes. One group often defined by their lack of success are social housing tenants in contemporary Britain (Hodkinson & Robbins, 2013). Exploring the relevant literature enables the key issues to be unpacked, highlighting the nuanced perspectives of marginality and how this has been advanced over more recent years, meaning this group have become ostracised by political and mainstream media discourses.

A dominant element of this stigmatisation is rooted within the dichotomous binary of ‘them’ versus ‘us’. This othering of particular groups can manifest itself in many ways and commonly it is often a notional “deservedness” scale that is talked about when considering access to welfare provision (Bastagli, 2008; Dwyer, 2004). This othering of particular groups has become widespread through political and media narratives, which in turn affects the public perceptions of emotive issues such as ‘the benefit scrounger’ (Jensen & Tyler, 2015; Tyler, 2013a). As Hills (2015) shows, discourses that suggest social spending is disproportionately high for those on benefits “feeds gross misconceptions” (Hills, 2015, p. 259). As the next two excerpts from Hills’s work shows, general public perceptions can be very different to the reality of the issues:

[A YouGov survey] asked, ‘Out of every £100 of this welfare budget, how much do you think is spent on benefits for unemployed people?’ Half of those surveyed thought that 40 per cent or more of spending was on the unemployed; a quarter thought it was more than 60 per cent. The average was 41 per cent… it is actually 4 per cent. (Hills, 2015, p. 259)

[In a 2001 BSA survey] Forty-four per cent thought that benefits for the unemployed were the largest item on this list [of social security spending], and 27 per cent that they were the second largest. Only 28 per cent correctly identified retirement pensions as being the biggest item. (Hills, 2015, p. 259)

Public attitudes, such as those highlighted by Hills, therefore appear to be ignorant of the actual scale of particular societal and policy issues. This over-inflation of anxiety towards those who receive welfare provision is the product of media sensationalisation of particular
issues, leading to pejorative perceptions of those already most marginalised (Gilligan, 2013) and statistics show attitudes are still hardening (Taylor-Gooby, 2015).

This points towards a fundamental issue about the lack of evidence to accurately reflect the reality of crime and ASB, suggesting that perhaps the panic and exaggeration of such issues is indicative of a social construction process used for wider political gains. Millie (2008) suggests, claiming that the entire ASB industry is a construct can downplay the significance for the victims of particular offences and behaviours. However, a key issue that has to be contended with is how it has been overstated and the challenges and risks that this can raise, which do fall in line with Cohen’s ‘mesh thinning’ and ‘net widening’ analogies, meaning that increasing numbers of people are being classified as anti-social as the types of behaviours considered to be such are increasing (Cohen, 1985). It also means that as the ‘risk’ of ASB continues to proliferate, increasing the fear amongst the wider public, more powers and agencies are put in place to tackle the problem, essentially meaning that more strenuous efforts are being made to look for ASB (Millie, 2007). Taking this one step further, Prior (2009) believes that the concept of crime itself needs further interrogation (i.e. what is crime? Why are particular behaviours labelled so?). He argues that in other policy fields, such as health policy, epidemiology is built into the process, but no such thing exists in ASB. Instead we are often reliant on anecdotal reports of the issues, whereby policy-making is based upon normative understandings of how people should behave (often wealthier, well-educated, middle-classes) and making decisions about what constitutes acceptable and anti-social behaviour respectively. Frank Field’s Neighbours from Hell (Field, 2003) focuses on one anecdotal example of this. Field suggests that “the face of the new politics belongs to Jason…destroyer of peace and order for whom no laws then existed to control his behaviour” (Field, 2003, p. 14). The way in which this story is relayed draws on the classic process of dichotomising particular groups. The uncontrollable behaviour of Jason was always targeted towards the hardworking resident. The supposition that Jason would inevitably be an alcoholic in later life suggests that ASB is considered by some as a pathological trait within people. The way in which Field refers to having no previous powers to deal with this behaviour also infers that this type of behaviour was a new issue and one which has become a threat to society, thus underpinning New Labour’s ASB framework, despite a lack of data to truly reflect the scale of these perceived issue.

This lack of knowledge about the issues privileges public fears in policy-making and ignores “factors that generate such fears” resulting in an ironic situation whereby the “poverty of knowledge is, in part, what gives ‘anti-social behaviour’ its power as a policy concept” (Prior, 2009, p. 21). Body-Gendrot makes a similar argument, suggesting “crime is what society decides it to be; the dangerous classes are defined arbitrarily by institutions in the same
recurrent way as in the past (Body-Gendrot, 2000, p. xxiv). Furthering her analysis of crime as a construct, malleable and fluid depending on political priorities and public attitudes, Body-Gendrot argues that the broader criminal justice system “reflects the values of society and the resources it wants to allocate to it. The offences of the poorest are punished...while those on Wall Street go free” (Body-Gendrot, 2000, p. 133).

Similarly, in the UK the ASB agenda, which gained considerable traction following the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) under New Labour governance, was premised on the definitional ambiguity of what constituted ASB (Jacobson, Millie, & Hough, 2008; Millie, 2007, 2008; Squires, 2008). This ambiguity has been heralded by certain commentators and politicians as beneficial to the agenda, as it means that the many issues deemed to be a blight on modern society can be remediated through new, more flexible powers (Burney, 2005; Crawford, 2009a). It is this lack of clarity that led Carr and Cowan (2006) to conceptualise ASB, and the ASB agenda more broadly, as a ‘vehicular idea’. By this, they usefully show how the ASB agenda, given the vague nature of ASB and lack of very clear definition, can be “manipulated by different types of intellectual or expert” (Carr & Cowan, 2006, p. 57), which can be used to legitimise and argue for particular policy goals or ambitions, which in the case of this study, it is argued, is what happened in the context of the riot clause.

Alongside the ambiguity, there have been ongoing debates about the actual scale of the problem. In mainstream news coverage and political debates and manifestos the problem is articulated as a significant threat; one that is on a rising trajectory and poses immediate danger to broader society. However, reporting and collating of statistics varies between authorities and in different localities, leaving a dearth of reliable data to substantiate these claims (Parr, 2009a). The Home Office attempted to redress this gap on 10 September 2003 where a one-day count was undertaken in an attempt to better understand the scale of ASB in the UK (Edwards, 2013). However, as Flint (2006) highlighted, this problem of definitional ambiguity was also present in this initiative because the list of behaviours considered anti-social for this count omitted behaviours that appeared in other lists of ASB – including other lists devised by the Home Office. Such behaviours missing from the one-day count included racism, domestic violence or homophobic attacks. Prior (2009) saw the one-day count as the Government’s way to overcome this concern about the lack of evidence and knowledge of ASB. The one-day count not only lacked a rigorous definitional framework, it was also too limited in scope to be extrapolated broadly. Nonetheless, the Government did use the one-day count’s findings of 66,000 reports of ASB as a proxy to report that there are 13.5 million police incidents per year (Prior, 2009).

The issues raised here highlight some of the challenges and barriers facing those responsible for policy and practice in housing and ASB fields. It demonstrates that definitional ambiguity
can be both problematic and unjust because of the way it can materialise in uneven ways in practice, while simultaneously celebrated by others for its scope to punish more widely, and manipulate circumstances, for behaviours that may otherwise not fall sufficiently within the parameters of the available powers to punish accordingly.

**Policing the Crisis and Folk Devils**

To help understand some of the key issues around the control and management of population it is useful to consider two particular bodies of work: *Policing the Crisis* and *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*. These both conceptualise how particular behaviours and social groups have become characterised as problematic, in need of further governance or a threat to wider societal norms. They fit within the governance framework being adopted here, as they demonstrate the importance, and influence, of media discourse on both public perceptions and social control.

*Policing the Crisis* is a seminal text within criminology and social disorder fields. It explores the social phenomenon of mugging and its emergence as a “new strain of crime” (Hall *et al*., 2013). Of importance to the research being conducted here is how through media and political narratives particular issues and types of crime or deviancy can become newsworthy and of national interest because of their apparent novelty, despite having existed in some form for some time:

> We showed that neither the ‘crime’ [mugging] nor its label were, in the strict sense, new. Yet the agencies of control and the media approached the phenomenon with absolute conviction of its ‘novelty’...Of course, ‘novelty’ is a conventional news value; but it is not necessary for the press to invent a whole new category in order to catch public attention with ‘something new and different’. Moreover, the label and the conviction of novelty seemed to prevail, also, amongst the professional and expert agencies who ought to know about such things. (Hall *et al*., 2013, p. 32)

Despite mugging already existing within society, the way in which the media represented and highlighted the novelty meant the belief that such a crime was increasing at a significant rate meaning the ideological construction had become a ‘reality’ or ‘social fact of things’ (Hall *et al*., 2013). This study also showed how these ‘social facts of things’ had even infiltrated in the understanding and lexicon of the practitioners. In essence ‘mugging’ had become the next ‘moral panic’.

*Folk Devils* became a phrase closely associated with the work of Cohen (2002), and was linked to the idea of *moral panics*. Firstly, the idea of moral panics, it is argued in this thesis, offers an interesting perspective on the mechanisms and techniques adopted in political and mainstream media discourses which are used to castigate particular groups of people as problematic and a threat to the dominant cultural norms of harmony and civility. In Cohen’s third edition of *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* he introduced the book with the addition of *new*
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moral panics: young, working-class violent males; school violence; ‘wrong drugs’ used by the wrong people at wrong places; child abuse, satanic rituals and paedophile registers; sex and violence; welfare cheats and single mothers; and refugees and asylum seekers. In this latest edition, Cohen talks about how media effects have not changed over time. In particular he refers to the effect that widespread reporting has on public attitudes even when there is only a small number of, or even isolated, incidents. He highlights, importantly, that these panics can proliferate even whether there is ambiguity around the evidence. For Cohen, a dearth of evidence to support a particular moral panic is overcompensated “by confident appeals to common sense and intuition” (Cohen, 2002, p. xx). These appeals can be easier to sustain where they come from “voices of authority…if only by sheer repetition” (Cohen, 2002, p. xx).

Of particular relevance and interest to this study is the focus on one of the new categories that Cohen adds to his thesis; welfare cheats and single mothers. The caricaturisation of the welfare cheat, Cohen argues, can be traced back to Thatcher’s government, where there was a “deliberate construction of an atmosphere of distrust” (Cohen, 2002, pp. xx-xxi). The idea was that a disproportionately large group of welfare claimants were ‘ripping off’ the state, which paved the way for institutional practices (laws, administrative procedures) to be implemented to curtail this problem. This process led to the stigmatisation of claimants and to the titles of ‘welfare cheats’, ‘social security frauds’ or ‘dole scroungers’ (Cohen, 2002, p. xxi).

The idea of a moral panic rests on the notional threat to established value systems (Garland, 2008; le Grand, 2015). Le Grand (2015) explores the idea of ressentiment through the construction of the chav. [Chav is a pejorative term used to describe a social group - of usually younger people – who appear to behave, act or look a particular way that is seen, in class and cultural terms, as deviant, subservient or subversive (reference). Chavs, therefore, are then seen] as an undeserving poor group of people, or an underclass, and how over time (developing from a moral panic to a broad concern of moralisation) social policy targeting such perceived groups (as well as class-based shaming and stigmatisation) is justifiable and acceptable (even presented as something to be laughed at through comedy or satire) in what he refers to as “legitimate form of class contempt” (le Grand, 2015, p. 9). As Cohen would also add here, the mainstream media are a key vehicle in creating moral panics. Much of the concern around particular behaviours is about protecting cultural values that are perceived to be under threat by particular groups or behaviours (Cohen, 2002, p. 10). The example that Cohen uses is pornography, but equally as relevant is the generic welfare entitlement and behaviour control concern.

**Respect and responsibility**
Respect and responsibility became a significant part of New Labour’s lexicon. Working as a rebuttal to the problem of the ‘underclass’, a divisive and controversial discourse that gained considerable attention and popularity prior to New Labour, having its origins in the US, and that provided a platform for new approaches to tackling problematic behaviour, the moralistic resonance of this terminology marked the next step in enhancing damaging discourses towards particular groups. The focus on responsibility and individualisation has seen the extension of behaviour control to institutions such as social housing providers where their management practices are being shaped to encourage social responsibility (see Raco, 2009). It was envisaged this would happen through a process of constructing communities to appeal to the middle-classes – those who possess responsible and unproblematic attitudes and behaviours towards citizenship – in what Atkinson referred to as “domestication by cappuccino” (Atkinson, 2003), but which fits into more recent discussions around gentrification.

In 2006 New Labour launched the Respect Action Plan, which was New Labour’s attempt to tackle societal anxieties about the lack of respect, an issue that was considered a major social problem in contemporary Britain (France & Meredith, 2009). Falling under the ‘respect’ agenda, the government continued to refine the definition of ASB to help outline the particular issue and defend the vague terminology attached to it:

> Family problems, poor education attainment, unemployment, and alcohol and drug misuse can all contribute to anti-social behaviour. But none of these problems can be used as an excuse for ruining other people’s lives. Fundamentally, anti-social behaviour is caused by a lack of respect for other people. As a society we have rules and standards of behaviour. For the minority who flout these rules and standards, we must take action to enforce them. (Home Office, 2003, 7)

The Respect Agenda continued to place the problem family as the centre of contemporary issues of behaviour control, as Minton (2009) highlighted:

> If the behaviour of young people is one plank of the antisocial-behaviour agenda, the responsibility of their parents is the other, reflected in legislation which punishes parents for the bad behaviour of their children, such as the mother who was sent to prison because her daughter was truanting from school. (Minton, 2009, p. 163)

Minton refers to the parenting courses that officers were running in particular local authorities as a way of engaging with those who do need support. One of the officers involved in the initiative Minton discusses also agreed that it was wrong to criminalise people for non-criminal offences, but that in some cases intervention and support was needed and welcomed by certain families and parents. Coming out of New Labour’s respect agenda were Family Intervention Projects (FIPs). FIPs fitted into the Government’s broader agenda of tackling ‘problem families’; those displaying a multitude of issues and behaving in a highly problematic way that was detrimental to the surrounding community (Parr, 2009b). FIPs were a policy initiative building on the Dundee Families Project; a project designed to support families who were homeless or at a significant risk of becoming homeless because of anti-
social behaviour (Dillane, Bannister, & Scott, 2001). Like other family interventions designed to curtail ASB, FIPs were “underpinned by a conceptualization of ‘problem families’ as both the cause of anti-social behaviour and the site of solutions” (Parr, 2009b, p. 1270). Over time, these projects were expanded and by 2012 there were approximately 500 in almost all local authorities in the UK (Flint, 2012). These projects represented a form of coercive support; another example of techniques of subtle governance through ‘the inspection of domesticity’ (Flint, 2012). Both Parr and Flint offer useful perspectives of the importance of FIPs. Parr highlights that being able to measure their success through comparisons to other projects is difficult, as each project can manifest itself in different ways on the ground. Building on this idea Flint unpacks the arguments that position FIPs as a metaphor for the panoptican by again focusing on the nuance of each case in reality. The argument that social workers are ciphers of middle-class values can be refuted, as research demonstrates, and actually the social workers that are supporting families can indeed be part of the same social class, live in the same areas and indeed share the same values (Flint, 2012).

In many ways, initiatives such as FIPs demonstrated a shift in direction for New Labour, who had doggedly pursued ‘enforcement-led’ strategies of governance for managing ASB up until this point (Squires, 2008). However, many years into New Labour’s ASB agenda it emerged that there needed to be an “appropriate balance between enforcement and support” (Squires & Stephen, 2005, p. 525).

Despite nearly a decade since the introduction of the Respect Agenda and the ongoing ‘crusade’ against ASB, in 2012 the Home Office, under the administration of the Coalition Government, were still explicitly vociferous about their commitment to ASB:

I believe that everyone has the right to feel safe in their home and in their neighbourhood. That is why reducing anti-social behaviour is a priority for the government, and should be a priority for every police force. But it is not a problem the police can tackle alone. Anti-social behaviour should also be a priority for other local agencies with responsibilities for community safety, including councils and social landlords, even as belts are tightened. (Home Office, 2012, p. 1)

Despite an apparent appetite to continue the political drive against ASB and to maintain it as a priority item on the manifesto, there was a sense that the Coalition Government were not prepared to fund the agenda to quite the scale New Labour had, and that the tightening of budgets would mean that the responsibility for social control and governance would have to be further concentrated to other actors of social control. As the Home Office White Paper quoted above suggested, this would include council and social landlords, which essentially means that the connection between particular types of housing and ASB would continue to deepen, despite a broader aim of the Coalition to make ASB powers tenure-neutral (Heap, 2014, 2016).
2.4 Governing populations: the use of housing and anti-social behaviour policy

To return to the central premise of this thesis very briefly, it is important to question: what does this mean for housing tenure and urban unrest? While the next chapter will explore urban disorder, and in particular the 2011 riots in much greater detail, it is important to recognise the inextricable connection between these disorders and social housing in particular. It will be argued in the next chapter and throughout the thesis that it would be too simplistic to just consider the 2011 riots as nothing more than banal acts of pure criminality. From the empirical data gathered in this study, plus the opposing perspectives, it is possible to begin unpacking this argument. It is therefore crucial to the understanding of this thesis that social disorders are deeply rooted, especially for theorists such as Wacquant, within broader political platforms:

A new century dawns, the incapacity of the governments of the advanced countries, that is the refusal or reticence of their ruling classes converted to neoliberalism to check the social and spatial accumulation of economic hardship, social dissolution and cultural dishonour in the deteriorating working-class and/or ethnocratic enclaves of the dualizing metropolis promises to engender abiding civic alienation and chronic unrest which pose a daunting challenge to the institutions of citizenship. The deep rooting and wide reverberations of the social disorders generated by advanced marginality are major springs behind the spectacular expansion and generalized hardening of police and penal policies trained on the urban sub-proletariat in the United States and the European Union since the denunciation of the Fordist-Keynesian social compact. (Wacquant, 2008, 7)

What is pertinent from this passage is the way in which social disorders are arguably generated from advanced marginality, yet are met with increased punitive sanctioning ignoring the underlying structural reasons that caused the initial disorder. Responses to the 2011 riots were in no way an exception to this. The media coverage and political pronouncements also took a punitive stance (Bassel, 2012). Along with extraordinarily lengthy prison sentences for offences that would not normally be considered serious enough to carry custodial sentences in a non-riot context, for the perceived threat that the riots posed to society seemingly justified the punitive responses (Slater, 2011). Likewise, public attitudes deplored the behaviour of particular groups and processes of othering – seen through broom armies in Manchester for example – which were considered as a rebuff towards these actions (Bloom, 2012). The symbolic undertone of these responses suggested the literal sweeping of the rioters off the streets, dichotomised as ‘scum’, and in the case of Manchester, not representative of the true Mancunian spirit (Bloom, 2012).

In particular the connection between the disorders, housing and ASB was particularly illuminated through the government’s announcement of the Troubled Families Programme. As discussed elsewhere the announcement of this programme, with the ambition being to
turn around the lives of 120,000 problem families, coincided with the riots and the narrative at its unveiling was inextricably linked to the broken Britain sentiment and concern of the morals and behaviours of particular groups. According to the government’s own guidance, the troubled families were households who: are involved in crime and anti-social behaviour, have children not in school, have an adult on out of work benefits, and cause high costs to the public purse (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012b). The definition of crime and anti-social behaviour was what made this particular response housing-related:

Households where 1 or more member has an anti-social behaviour order, anti-social behaviour injunction, anti-social behaviour contract, or where the family has been subject to a housing-related anti-social behaviour intervention in the last 12 months (such as a notice of seeking possession on anti-social behaviour grounds, a housing-related injunction, a demotion order, eviction from social housing on anti-social behaviour grounds) (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012b, p. 4)

The way in which a judgement was made as to whether families’ lives had been turned around were that each child in the family has fewer than three exclusions and less than 15% of unauthorised absences in the most recent three terms; a 60% reduction in ASB over the last six months; and an offending rate of all minors in the household by 33% (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012b). This would mean that housing providers would need to produce the evidence in the case of ASB reduction highlighting the connection between housing and post-riot interventions.

However, the programme has faced much criticism for the way in which is characterises and problematizes particular social groups in seemingly indiscriminate ways (Levitas, 2012a, 2012b) but also as a piece of flawed policy making. Bonell et al outline a number of lessons learned from the TFP, explaining that its failure was “both predictable and predicted” and that “the first lesson is not to make policy as a rapid and ill considered response to high profile events” (Bonell, McKee, & Fletcher, 2016, p. 1). In their analysis, they argue that a targeted programme that is “aimed at only the most troubled families...has little chance of effecting major changes in the overall prevalence of violence or risk of future riots” (Bonell et al., 2016, p. 1).

Governing territories and the rise of revanchism have become popular discourses within urban studies more recently and are worth reflecting upon in this study. Revanchism derives from the French word revanche, literally meaning revenge, and stems from a group of bourgeois national reactionaries in late 19th century Paris who “were determined to reinstate the bourgeois order with a strategy that fused militarism and moralism with claims about restoring public order on the streets” (Slater, 2016, np). This concept was revived by geographer Neil Smith, who saw distinct parallels between late 19th century Paris and 21st century New York City, where mayor Rudolph Giuliani and police chief William Bratton coalesced in their campaign of ‘quality of life policing’, widely known as ‘zero-tolerance policing’ (Newburn &
Central to the concept of ‘zero tolerance’ policing was taking a more punitive approach towards behaviours and activities such as “public begging, low-level incivilities, public drunkenness and urination, fare dodging and most famously of all, ‘squeegeeing’” (Newburn & Jones, 2007, p. 226). However, despite celebrating the ‘New York miracle’ of zero-tolerance policing reducing crime levels in the city, Mooney and Young’s critique unpacks this:

[T]he fall in the crime rate was largely a cultural product. Zero-tolerance was introduced because of the falling arrest rate. Thus zero-tolerance arose as the result of the drop in crime, rather than the fall in crime being a result of zero-tolerance”. (Mooney & Young, 2006, pp. 401-402, emphasis in original)

This highlights the issues faced when trying to understand levels of crime and disorder. Despite falling rates in both the UK and Northern America, the media and policy-makers continued to ignore this, rather focusing on negative stories and issues of respect and morality in order to be seen to be ‘doing something’ in light of the global crime drop (Mooney & Young, 2006). Here there is a strong link between the behaviours identified as ‘quality of life’ offences and the prescriptive lists of anti-social behaviours in the UK in what can be observed as a parallel criminalisation of particular nuisances, which in the context of this study are important, as one’s housing tenure can determine which powers can be used to sanction against these behaviours. Hancock and Mooney articulate the ASB ‘phenomenon’ in a particularly useful way for this study:

[B]ecause of the subjective nature of its base and the extreme flexibility of each category could have the potential to generate an almost endless number of infringements. An on top of this add the obsession with measurement (how many?) and targets (have we met them?). It is a formula for a permanent moral anxiety; it is a prescription for targets which will never be met. It is fairly easy, for example, to understand where burglaries begin and end and to provide reasonably good figures of their number and their increase or reduction. It is another thing to talk about eliminating rowdy behaviour (how rowdy is rowdy?) or litter (how clean is clean?) and who is the judge? (Mooney & Young, 2006, p. 400)

This highlights the way in which a policy focus on crime, as well as the media construction, has continued to both blur the boundaries between crime and ASB (Carr & Cowan, 2006), as well as continuing to push the boundaries of behaviours that are considered anti-social (G. Young, 2016), capturing more offences in more areas. There is also more ways of being able to identify when people are behaving in an anti-social way through the increased use of CCTV and also through co-opting other tenants to be the ‘eyes and ears’ reporting back to landlords (Bradley, 2012).

Given the inextricable link between housing management and ASB control, there is continued concern about the way in which such agendas may continue to propound issues of territorial stigmatisation. The idea of territorial stigmatisation is where particular areas face prejudice based upon the people who live there, and is significantly important when considering issues
of social control over particular populations and the way in which areas are governed. As Cochrane (2003) explains, imaginaries of a city as a dangerous place can be constructed along various classifications or demographics, including race, but also through say unemployed, uneducated and violent men (see Campbell, 1993), creating perceptions of fear about certain parts of the cities, where urban policies (from planning through to policing) are needed to protect people from the ‘dangerous class’. This is also evident through more recent regeneration and redevelopment policies:

Private and public policies help to construct areas of protected/defended housing while marginalizing those who live in others. On the one hand large-scale redevelopment, sponsored by urban development corporations and other agencies, serves to renew and redefine some areas of the city, bringing them back into use (see, e.g., Byrne 1997), while others – the peripheral estates and other areas of social housing – become sinks for the poor and the delinquent, places to be managed and to be presented as terrible warning to the middle classes and the respectable (disciplined and ordered) poor. (Cochrane, 2003, p. 534)

The idea of protecting particular people, groups and places is also reflected through the way in which populations are constrained and controlled. Returning to Body-Gendrot, her work into social control in cities provides a better picture of how this looks in reality. Not only does she grapple with the way that issues of crime are constructed, she explores the way in which particular populations are contained and controlled. In France the les exclus (the excluded) are made up of various ethnicities, ages and genders, but all share the same “fate” of unemployment or the loss of benefits (Body-Gendrot, 2000). Her comparative study between France and the US, also shows that the French banlieue are often in peripheral locations, unlike in the USA, where the poor and marginalised are often concentrated in monoracial cities. The UK is similar to the French context. Rather than entirely poor and deprived cities, like in the US, in the UK cities are made up of poor and wealthy populations; however there are clear differences between these populations, with the marginalised poor confined often to the peripheries out of view from the productive neoliberal centres (Wacquant, 2008). In London, in particular, this situation is being worsened with recent changes to social housing allocation, which means that people can be rehoused outside their existing communities and there is a trend whereby people are being pushed to the peripheral London boroughs, such as Barking or Dagenham – away from their communities, networks and even employment (Dorling, 2013).

Recent scholarly debates such as those by DeVerteuil (2006) and Slater (2014) use the concept of revanchism in the neoliberal capitalist city where taking away from the poorest in society has become hugely popular. Framed around housing struggle, Slater (2016) shows how behaviours such as squatting are being criminalised, whilst properties are being left empty. Slater draws upon the case study of an individual who is apprentice builder in London, but because of the low-wages and high cost of living has little alternative but to squat. Given that this is an illegal status, despite this individual trying to earn enough money to sustain
himself, he is still subject to eviction; demonstrating how the ‘successful citizen’ has become the figuration and epitome of success (morally sufficient, mobile, and deserving) whereas the poor (at the bottom of society) are the antithesis (Slater, 2016). They can be perceived both as a threat (relating to the fear around crime and unrest, where the poor are determined to disturb normative social order) but also responsible for their circumstances. Wiggan (2012) offers a comprehensive account of welfare policies from New Labour and the Coalition government to show how the rhetoric of blaming the poor for their own circumstances has developed. For example, drawing on Green and White Papers in 2010, Wiggan shows how the language conveyed in these documents suggest that the benefit system encourages welfare dependency, trapping the poorest people into a system of poverty:

[these documents] implicitly convey the message that people claim benefits because they are rational economic actors, benefit income is more secure and attractive than employment as incentives to take and sustain paid work are weak; this has created a culture of worklessness and allowed benefit dependency to be passed between generations, afflicting whole families and contributing to excessive and ineffective public expenditure; to tackle poverty we must view benefits not as a solution to insecurity and need related to the business cycle or regional imbalances in employment demand, but as a main cause of the persistence and prevalence of poverty. (Wiggan, 2012, p. 389)

Lisa McKenzie’s work offers useful insights on this theme, highlighting that despite what national rhetoric suggests there is social capital within housing estates. The ground level perspective that McKenzie adopts can often be neglected in discourses around such areas of concentrated social housing, a topic often dominant by negative discourses of poverty, deprivation and cultures of dependency and hopelessness. McKenzie’s research focuses in particular on the St. Ann’s estate in Nottingham. St. Ann’s, like many inner city areas, was once a vibrant, popular and sociable area. It was diverse; often attracting many people moving from other parts of England and further afield, often because of its low rents and access to Nottingham. However, over time its reputation has worsened, as McKenzie explains:

St. Ann’s has some of the most serious disadvantages within the City of Nottingham, but is also one of the 10 per cent most deprived neighbourhoods in the UK. Life expectancy is only 68 for men and 76 for women...compared to other local authorities, Nottingham has the ninth highest percentage of ‘under-20s’ living in poverty. (McKenzie, 2015, p. 39)

McKenzie’s work is important here. Much of what McKenzie discusses offers an alternative perspective to the views that proliferates through the mainstream media about ‘problem estates’ and social housing tenants. Rather than homogenising populations and places, McKenzie provides nuance and texture that can be useful when trying to unpick the prevailing discourses. Through her detailed ethnographic studies, McKenzie (2015) explains that you do not simply reside in St. Ann’s, but rather you are St. Ann’s: “being St. Ann’s has recognised value for these women within the neighbourhood” (McKenzie, 2013b, p. 1349). Drawing heavily on Bourdieu’s theory of capital exchange and value, McKenzie shows how ‘black culture’ has become seductive, and authentic, to both the white women and men on the estate.
For the women, they are drawn to the culture because it is interesting, while the men attempt to emulate the culture because it is ‘cool’. In the social context the idea of multiculturalism gives a sense of satisfaction and pride, and it is felt that exposing their children to such diversity is offering them richer life experiences and opportunities that they, as parents, perhaps had themselves. This richness and sense of being and belonging – or local social capital – is largely disregarded in political discourses. Rather than seeing the shifting cultures as a positive and enhancing experience, racial and class stigmatisation dominates, threatening wider civility. McKenzie also draws on the work of Lawler in her analysis, who suggests that white working-class people are rarely named as class subjects, but they are constantly represented and reproduced as ‘disgusting subjects’ (Lawler, 2005). This is also something that Tyler (2013a) has written about developing her thesis on revolting subjects. For Skeggs the way people look and live is often considered as a pathological issue, “the underlying pathologies of class position” (Skeggs, 2004). These visual representations and particular understandings of how these people live their lives is being constantly played out through popular media and culture, in television shows such as *Little Britain*, *EastEnders* and *Benidorm*, and serves to caricaturise particular groups of people based on middle-class understandings and interpretations of the way in which working-class people live their lives.

**Transformations to the social housing sector**

We want to tackle the Jeremy Kyle generation of people who can’t be bothered to get off the sofa...having a council home should be a privilege, not a right. (Paul Ellis, Conservative Councillor and housing spokesperson, Wandsworth Council, as quoted in The Sunday Times (London), November 13, 2011)

The housing sector was a key part of the privatisation process, which has led housing to be widely considered as a mechanism through which to accrue wealth (most notable was Thatcher’s famous dictum about having a ‘legacy’ to leave to one’s children) rather than a basic human right of shelter (Rolnik, 2013). This is not an issue exclusive to Britain, but one common where the neoliberal ideology of homeownership is given priority, as Rolnik explains:

The commodification of housing, as well as the increased use of housing as an investment asset integrated in a globalized financial market, has profoundly affected the enjoyment of the right to adequate housing across the world. The belief that markets could regulate the allocation of housing as the most rational means of resource distribution, combined with experimental ‘creative’ financial products underpinned by housing, has led public policymaking towards the abandonment of the conceptual meaning of housing as a social good, part of the commonalities a society agrees to share or to provide to those with fewer resources: a means to distribute wealth. (Rolnik, 2013, p. 1059)

This process has had wider, and perhaps unintended, consequences, including the residualisation of the social housing sector (Keith Jacobs & Manzi, 2000), whilst simultaneously creating an increasingly competitive market for social housing and creating
differentiated geographies of tenure causing polarisation between areas (Forrest & Murie, 2011). Such issues have moved the academic debate towards questioning the current function of social housing in today’s society (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2007) and attempting to unpack the significant stigmatisation about those who rely on state-subsidized housing (Hanley, 2012; McKenzie, 2015).

Although ideologically the policy of RTB was promoted as an opportunity to propel individuals’ social mobility, in reality this was not always the case. For those who did purchase their property under the scheme, it was not always the panacea that it was portrayed in political discourse. For example, Blandy and Hunter (2013) show how the scheme was risk laden, although that was not always articulated clearly. Cases where tenants who were in or already had rent arrears were still eligible, and able to then become part of the RTB. However, the consequences for not keeping up-to-date with mortgage payments, plus the additional costs of owning a home, were, for some, problematic. Those who could not sustain mortgage payments were repossessed, leaving them classed as intentionally homeless, meaning that the local authority does not have any obligation to re-house them (Blandy & Hunter, 2013).

The negative consequences of the RTB scheme were not just felt by individual households through isolated cases of unaffordability. The negative and problematic after effects of the RTB had national impact, leading to a sustained ‘crisis’ for the social housing sector. The lack of new stock to replace that which was removed from the sector through the scheme meant the sector became overwhelmed and unable to deal with the demand. When coupled with wider issues within the housing market, such as the lack of affordable homes in the right areas, especially in London housing markets, the need for financial support to deal with the increasing burden of housing costs, it shows how very little has been done through government policy to redress the issues caused through the privatisation of social housing. Other changes to the social housing sector also exacerbated its decline. During the late 1980s and 1990s, following the RTB of the 1980s that hollowed out a substantial proportion of the social housing sector, a new form of demunicipalisation had begun (Malpass & Mullins, 2002). Large-scale voluntary transfer (LSVT) was a process whereby municipal housing stock was passed over to new landlords. As Malpass and Mullins highlight, this process gained significant traction in 1988 when Chiltern District Council sold off 4600 council houses to a new housing association, marking the start of what ended up being the removal of nearly 600,000 homes from the social housing sector by March 2001 (Malpass & Mullins, 2002). These processes have led to what some suggest is ‘the death of council housing’ in the UK (Flint, 2003).

Recognising such issues, Fitzpatrick and Pawson raised a key question: who and what is social housing for? (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2007, p. 163). Here Fitzpatrick and Pawson
recognise the tension in government narratives about the underlying role of social housing, where on the one hand there is a continued commitment to positioning social housing as a ‘safety net’ (as suggested in the Housing Green Paper published in 2000) whilst on the other there is a wider ambition for social housing to become a mixed tenure of choice (discussed in the same Green Paper). The authors suggest, without a significance increase in the size of the sector, this disconnect remains irresolvable (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2007). Their findings conclude that social housing will remain, for the foreseeable future at least, a ‘safety net’ to provide housing for the poorest and in greatest need, which heightens the risk that the sector continues to face increasing stigmatisation. Nonetheless, the authors argue that a focus should remain on the spatial polarisation in communities, rather than tenure polarisation, “as this is what most affects poorer people’s well-being and longer-term life changes” (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2007, p. 179). Some years later, following the formation of the Coalition government in the UK, Fitzpatrick and Pawson (2013) revisit this issue, taking an international perspective. The hypothesis in this work is that guaranteed security of tenure in public housing is being pushed over a critical threshold from a permanent ‘safety net’ to a temporary ‘ambulance service’ (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2013). Through the use of fixed-term tenancies, the provision of housing in the socially-rented sector is defined as a tenure for “short-term respite provision” (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2013, p. 2), rather than being a long-term option for individuals and families.

In their work to challenge the underlying role of social housing in contemporary Britain, Fitzpatrick and Pawson (2013) carefully explore the way in which homelessness legislation – in particular the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 – has contributed to the residualisation of the social housing sector, where legislation gave certain households (those at risk of homelessness) an ‘enforceable right’ to housing; firmly denoting social housing as a safety net. As Murie (2012b) recognised, the result of residential mobility and choice has led to increased spatial and social differentiation: “The strongest drivers for segregation related to residential mobility and choice – the places people moved to reflected their occupation, income, position in the life cycle, ethnicity and social class” (Murie, 2012b, p. 1033).

This, then, leaves those who do not have the same residential mobility in a situation where they are often left at the mercy of the residualised social housing sector, having little option about where they are able to live:

As people are given more choice in housing, those with the least choice are increasingly concentrated in the housing that few people want; that of poor design and quality, expensive to heat, in bleak environments, often isolated on the edge of towns and cities. Although there have always been estates that have been difficult to let, the statistics of exclusion – unemployment, economic inactivity, low school achievement – reveal increasing polarisation (Power & Tunstall, 1995) between these estates and the rest of society. For many, social housing has become a symbol of failure in the consumer society – a tenure of last resort. (M. Taylor, 1998, p. 820)
Another area of concern for politicians, practitioners and academics alike has been the increase of social segregation for those living on these estates and the reputation of them, being labelled as ‘sink estates’, suffering from multiple, complex problems. This was something that more recently gained attention, as the then Prime Minister David Cameron vowed to ‘blitz’ the worst of the UK’s sink estates in an attempt to eradicate issues of gangs and anti-social behaviour; here a link back to the riots was made, inferring that such estates were part of the root cause (Davies, 2016). Problems of segregation stem from both policies that have worked against particular areas, and are the result of these policies, where dominant discourses linking poverty and criminality flourish. This segregation can also be read as marginalisation and a form of social exclusion, where people are housed in areas peripheral to their economic centres, with difficult transport links, a lack of sustainable opportunities as well as other below-par amenities and infrastructure, such as schools and childcare.

These situations also demonstrate some of the key challenges that policy-makers face, whilst also highlighting some of the particular paradoxes in housing policy. To illustrate this, it can be particularly useful to explore the idea of the social housing tenants and the security, longevity and choice a tenant has in respect to both keeping and terminating their contracts. Pawson and Munro (2010) make a number of interesting and important observations on these issues. They highlight that high rates of tenancy turnover in social housing can be considered problematic – both from the point of view of a landlord who then has the expense of cleaning, repairing and rent voids – and for the broader issues around tenant stability and community cohesion. However, a lack of choice is tantamount to social exclusion: “mobility is an important marker of social inclusion and it is the lack of residential mobility that constitutes social exclusion in deprived estates, in an increasingly mobile, ‘beyond place’ world” (Pawson & Munro, 2010, p. 148). In a context where stock levels are insufficiently low to meet the need, this choice has been removed in many instances for tenants:

Constrained supply has meant that initial access is controlled by a bureaucratic process designed to ration on the basis of need and, once housed, social renters may often have little choice but to tolerate situations that are sub-optimal in some way (Monk et al., 2008). Their options for seeking an improvement within the sector are strictly limited by allocation and priority systems; and the trade-off in relation to rents and costs is undermined both by rent structures that do little to reflect quality difference and a Housing Benefit system that protects the great majority of tenants from any change in their rent. (Pawson & Munro, 2010, p. 147)

Given the lack of new stock being added to the sector, means the current system of assessing who is eligible for social housing is a purely bureaucratic and calculated process, determined by a points-based strategy. This means that only those who are considered appropriate, according to the relevant criteria, are able to access social housing and that can often be those facing multiple needs. No longer is social housing a tenure of choice, but rather of last resort (M. Taylor, 1998). It is here where the link between housing policy and the ASB agenda become clearer.
The anti-social behaviour agenda

The contemporary obsession with ASB, was fuelled by New Labour and, in particular, Blair’s ‘personal crusade’ (Squires, 2008) to tackle the persistent issue threatening societal norms arguably created a sense that this was a new issue that Britain was facing; a crisis on an unprecedented scale. However, even a brief reflection over the way in which crime and behaviour control have been prioritised in Western liberal democracies clearly shows that this has been an ongoing concern for some time. Nonetheless, it was under New Labour during the late 1990s that ASB became a key political priority. For Blair his aim was to get “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime” (Burney, 2005, p. 18), which led to the entire ASB armoury being repackaged with instruments such as the ‘community safety order’ (later to become the Anti-Social Behaviour Order) being posited as the most appropriate mechanism to deal with the management of crime amongst both difficult families and problematic individuals in deprived areas. As Burney (2005) illustrated, ASB became the “hydra-headed monster that represented a spectrum of bad behaviour, from serious to merely irritating, afflicting neighbourhoods” (Burney, 2005, p. 16). Much of the New Labour rhetoric about the blight of ASB – or anti-social individuals and families in particular – was often inextricably linked to the problem of the ‘welfare state’, the governance and management of which underwent significant reform since 1997 in diverse fields such as healthcare, policing and behaviour control and urban policy, with a focus-shift towards “forms of active and engaged citizenship in which policy-making and implementation ostensibly becomes a process of ‘co-production’ between welfare providers and welfare users” (Raco, 2009, p. 436). Crawford (2009a) makes similar observations, suggesting that the New Labour Government’s preoccupation with ASB was infiltrating all arenas of social policy:

With its genesis in the management of public housing, we have witnessed the proliferation of a range of programmes and interventions formulated under the rubric of ‘tackling anti-social behaviour’ that have infused diverse areas of social life. Policy domains as extensive as education, parenting, youth services, city centre management, environmental planning, social housing and traditional policing increasingly can be said to be governed through a preoccupation with ‘anti-social behaviour’. (Crawford, 2009a, p. 5)

This shift towards a prioritisation of the active and engaged citizen represents the subtle shifts in power that ASB management and behaviour control in communities have undergone. Through the process of widening the penal networks away from the sole preserve of ‘hard’ end criminal justice institutions, such as the police and the courts, towards a ‘softer’ end of criminal justice, such as housing providers and healthcare professionals for example, there has also been a shift in, and conceptualisation of, the power relations. These shifts demonstrate how the focus has changed over the way that particular populations are governed, that conditions to entitlement are applied, and removed, and the way in which the criminal justice
net has been widened taking on a bottom-up community approach, shifting away from historically-dominant top-down governance.

Developing Wacquant’s idea of the punitive state, Squires (2008) develops an important argument around the “new culture of punitiveness” (Squires, 2008, p. 306) and also draws on the ‘net widening’ analogy. Of particular importance here is the way in which he analyses the use of ABCs, which he explains are often seen as a toothless mechanism on the soft-end of the behaviour control spectrum, when in fact, it can be highly punitive when considered in the context of how it may be used to support or expedite an eviction case (Squires, 2008). Understood in this sense, ABCs can be seen to form this punitive turn, as housing providers can use them within their evidence base to show the steps that they have taken to be as inclusive and supportive towards a tenant as possible, but that the tenant has not been prepared to engage. Such examples show how mechanisms can be used to control tenants where there is a lack of engagement with the measures that housing providers are putting in place and how these powers can result in eviction despite being voluntary and not legally binding.

Whilst this contemporary turn towards ASB as a political priority is something that can be understood as ‘new’ – in the sense that it developed political momentum unlike before – criminologists and sociologists have long been theorising crime and governance in neoliberal societies. Foucault and Cohen articulate the changes in governance and crime control as a move from punishment of the body towards punishment of the mind (public flogging through to incarceration) with the aim not being to punish less but to punish better. This idea of ‘subtle power’ can be understood through the prison model, a landmark in the punitive city (Cohen, 1985, p. 26). As Cohen explains: “For Foucault, it was precisely the redistribution of the penal power into the wider social space that marked the great disciplinary projects of the nineteenth century (Cohen, 1985, p. 76). These “disciplinary projects” disassembled existing powers into more flexible mechanisms of control which could then be easily adapted by different bodies responsible for the governance of behaviour. Some of these disassembled powers included diversionary activities, such as halfway houses, in what Illich termed the “iatrogenic feedback loop” where different stages constructed the ‘deviant’ and its programmes accordingly (Cohen, 1985, pp. 55-56). Taken in this sense, there is a view that the interventions and mechanisms being put in place to ostensibly eradicate particular types of behaviour or problem are, conversely, exacerbating the issues.

Following 13 years of New Labour governance, which was a significant period in time for the development of the ASB agenda, Labour lost the 2010 general election, and instead the administration was held by a Conservative-led Coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Given the expansive period in time which Labour had reigned over the ASB agenda, the new Government’s Home Office proposed renewed mechanisms and policies. As Heap (2016)
suggested, these changes are quite possibly the government “putting their stamp” on the ASB agenda, but some of the changes do, ostensibly, work to simplify the ‘bloated toolkit’ and to streamline the process. Some of the key changes included what was originally known as the Injunction to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance (IPNA), which replaces the ASBO, ASB Injunction and Individual Support Order (ISO) – which became known simply as the injunction, the Criminal Behaviour Order (CBO) replacing the Criminal Anti-Social Behaviour Order (CrASBO) and a plethora of different orders becoming streamlined into two levels of Community Protection Orders. One of the key differences with the new powers is that they have to include ‘positive requirements’ – so rather than just being enforcement-led, they have to encompass some degree of support – such as alcohol treatment (Wigzell, 2014).

The table, below, offers a brief synthesis of these changes:

**TABLE 2.1: CHANGES TO THE ASB SYSTEMS UNDER THE COALITION GOVERNMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous system</th>
<th>Revised system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASBO on conviction</td>
<td>‘Criminal Behaviour Order’ – available on conviction for any criminal offence, and including both prohibitions and support to stop future behaviour likely to lead to further anti-social behaviour or criminal offences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASBO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim ASBO</td>
<td>‘Crime Prevention Injunctions’ – a purely civil order with a civil burden of proof, making it much quicker and easier to obtain. The injunction would also have prohibitions and support attached, and a range of civil sanctions for breach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASB Injunction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Support Order (ISO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention Order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack House Closure Order</td>
<td><strong>Community Protection Order (Level 2)</strong> – a local authority/police power to restrict use of a place or apply to the courts to close a property linked with persistent anti-social behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premises Closure Order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothel Closure Order</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Designated Public Place Order</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Interim Management Orders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gating Order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dog Control Order</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Litter Clearing Notice

Community Protection Order (Level 1) – a notice issued by a practitioner to stop persistent anti-social behaviour that is affecting quality of life in an area or neighbourhood, with a financial penalty for non-compliance, or other sanctions where relevant e.g. the seizure of noise-making equipment

Noise Abatement Order

Graffiti/Defacement Removal Notice

Police ‘Direction’ power – a power to direct any individual causing or likely to cause crime or disorder away from a particular place, and to confiscate related items

Direction to Leave

Dispersal Order

The role of the practitioner [and housing as a site of resistance]

Power relations and mechanisms of governance are an essential component of the social control statecraft (Wacquant, 2001, 2008). However, it is important to note that this power is not linear, nor is it purely top-down. This is one of the areas where both Foucault and Wacquant’s work does not offer sufficient explanations for what happens at the local scale (Hancock & Mooney, 2012a). The governance of urban spaces, and indeed social housing, is subject to complex ‘webs’ of power between the state, local authorities and frontline officers and the subjects themselves. Within each of these categories there are power relations between the groups and within the groups, where for example, certain practitioners may hold contrary views to another, or where social housing tenants may self-define as deserving over other tenants who behave in particular ways. For example, Bradley illustrates how tenants who sit on the providers’ committee can often distance themselves from other tenants through such processes, resorting to populist narratives around fecklessness to create this distance between themselves and the others (Bradley, 2012). For this study the role of the frontline practitioner responsible for the implementation of national-level policy making is of central importance. Where particular behaviour control mechanisms are discretionary, the way in which a practitioner makes decisions and understands the contexts are crucial.

Having established the way in which housing policy trajectories have had a number of unintended or adverse consequences of increasing and perpetuating marginalisation and social exclusion, it has become clear how social housing and the ASB agenda has become quite inextricably linked (Burney, 2005; Flint, 2002; Flint & Nixon, 2006; Hunter, 2006; Lister, 2006). Given the state of the social housing sector today, the reduction in the volume of
homes still under social rent does not necessarily equate to a reduction in the ‘ASB industry’ (Millie, 2007). Many of the ASB powers had their genesis in housing management (Crawford, 2009) and therefore housing is a central aspect of the ASB debate, and it is impossible to consider one without the other.

Flint (2003) argues that through policy developments in UK, social housing during the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the emergence of two aspects of identity. First is that tenants and housing providers are “subject to rationalities of marketization and consumption”, implying that tenants are active, informed and empowered “consumers” of social housing. Second, tenants’ self-conduct is being “increasingly framed within their membership of local communities”, which includes obligations put on them to be responsible for such membership (Flint, 2003, p. 612). It is such tensions that Flint suggests “social housing may become a site of new forms of resistance to dominant government rationalities” (Flint, 2003, p. 612).

Emerging dominant rationalities of social housing governance in the UK during the early 2000s demonstrated government utilization of ethopolitics in governing conduct. This governing of conduct was through a framework of fixed moral codes, what “Rose terms ‘aesthetic elements’, involving conducting oneself through a prescribed art of living in relation to work, consumption, and other aspects of existence” (Flint, 2003, p. 613). Governance of tenants takes a two-track approach. Brown (2004) suggests that this can take the form of the ‘stick’ approach through legal action, but also a ‘carrot’ approach of rewarding tenants for good behaviour and responsibility. This duality of punishment balanced with rewarding positive behaviour has also been apparent throughout the social control industry where other agencies, such as housing officers, have become part of the policing (that is policing with a small ‘p’) function.

The welfare state has, as expressed elsewhere, been under close scrutiny in political and media quarters, and has indeed become stigmatised, through notions of fecklessness, abuse and its ability to trap people into dependency. In line with the ‘responsibility’ narrative that runs through all this work, Dwyer (2004) provides useful analysis through his exploration of conditionality in the UK and its effect on citizenship. He draws on Giddens, and his ‘reciprocal relationship between right and responsibilities’ as well as an ‘active society’, of which you can only participate if you’re part of a paid labour market. For Crawford (2009a) this idea is the “precautionary principle”:

[T]he new powers in seeking to govern future behaviour imply a precautionary approach. They have a pre-emptive logic that resonates with the ‘precautionary principle’, under which regulators fall under a responsibility to take steps to protect against potential harms, even where the evidence is uncertain and it is not known whether the harms will come to fruition. (Crawford, 2009a, pp. 8-9, emphasis in original)
In contention of the rising ASB agenda, Crawford conceptualises it as “regulatory creep”, where new powers are an interference with civil liberties and the use and enjoyment of particular spaces (Crawford, 2009b, p. 812). This regulatory vernacular treats subjects as rational actors who are ‘motivated’ and ‘capable’, or in other words have sufficient personal agency to understand the consequences of their behaviour. For Crawford, this does not fit with the traditional subjects and usual suspects of criminal justice, often young people, and therefore substantiates his claim that criminal justice and regulation “as currently deployed in the British public policy debate” are awkward bedfellows (Crawford, 2009b, pp. 810-811).

**Housing staff and their role in policing ASB**

Housing staff are a central part of the power-control network, as they are often the ones that are now responsible for policing behaviour (soft end), as Saugeres explains:

> Henderson and Karn (1987) show that housing staff use their discretionary powers to manipulate some of the rules in favour of some tenants at the expense of others, and in doing so maintaining wider social inequalities. They argue that the unequal distribution of resources does indeed reflect the class, race and gender structure of the society at large. (Saugeres, 1999, p. 97)

As this quote shows, housing staff and housing management is not an objective position, and officers have a degree of discretionary power when it comes to the governance of their tenants and the surrounding communities:

> What I would argue is that the idea of objectivity and neutrality is an illusion which is sustained and reproduced in dominant housing management discourses in order to justify and legitimate an essentially unequal process of allocation of scare resources. As Lipsky (1980) also argues, the idea that housing management reality is objective is a myth that serves to justify the views of those in power and the ways in which welfare bureaucracies operate. (Saugeres, 1999, p. 101)

By highlighting the discretionary powers available to housing staff it shows a degree of agency. This agency, when considered in cases of discretionary powers, highlights the power available to on-the-ground practitioners, therefore showing the value of paying attention to the local level. Utilising the work of Bourdieu, Flint explains that “Bourdieu argues that the symbolic universe of the working classes is dominated by such professional groups and their interpretation of the world” (Flint, 2003, p. 615). Here it is being argued that housing professionals may be this intermediary class, “transmitters of knowledge to their working-class ‘clients’ whose conduct they seek to shape in relation to set of constructed codes of normalized and responsible behaviour” (Flint, 2003, p. 615). As with society more broadly, this influence is likely to come from mainstream media and political discourses.

**2.5 Conclusion**
This chapter has mapped the key underpinning conceptions of governmentality, the penal state and advanced marginality, developing a cohesive amalgam and drawing on other key bodies of literature to challenge and support these ideas. This chapter has attempted, by adopting the work of Foucault and Wacquant in particular, to highlight how over recent decades the mechanisms of governance have shifted. These shifts have, on the one hand, included the use of tools and powers that restrict the rights of individuals, either through incarceration, financial means, eviction or prohibitive powers restricting access to particular areas, people or behaviours. The move away from physical punishment towards punishment of the mind has not been a way of reducing punishment, but rather providing more functional punishment; punishing better. The shift in the way that populations are governed and sanctioned, concepts such governmentality and biopolitics for example, to draw upon Foucault, cannot be understood completely in isolation. By drawing on Wacquant’s exploration of prisonfare and advanced marginality an understanding the broader political economy of neoliberal societies offers a great deal of value. The warehousing of particular populations comes as a result of the political ideology that favours the economically-productive citizen who lives by the normative codes of capitalist society. State reliance or deviance from these normative codes suggests an undermining of typical societal behaviours. In order to protect those in society who do adhere to these codes; the deviant population need to be ‘warehoused’.

Central to the argument here is the ideological project of neoliberalism. The way in which this dominant ideology has been rolled out through Western democracies and the impact it has had on the economic and social functions, it is important to understand how this has affected the way in which society functions and how media, political and public perceptions and understandings are formed and sustained.

A fusion of diminishing tenure security rights with a marketization approach to allocation and maintenance of tenancy has resulted in a shifting focus away from social housing as a home towards social housing tenants becoming and being ‘responsible’ citizens, who should aspire to become homeowners and progress from the social housing sector. Those who are responsible citizens, but do not have the means to purchase their property are then favoured over those considered to be part of an ‘underclass’; a group of people who are considered undeserving of state subsidised housing based on the way in which their behaviour and morality has been considered as not conforming to the normative codes of responsibility. Through various mechanisms those populations deemed problematic are contained in ways that allow for greater control over their day-to-day lives. This does not have to be just the prison. Other forms of containment or surveillance through housing, and areas within a city where people are housed, means that authoritative figures can monitor behaviour more closely. While the idea of the panoptican may never have been fully realised, certainly as
Bentham’s blueprints suggest, governance structures have been established to increase the visibility of these populations.

There are also forms of bottom-up governance, where other tenants police their own communities and differentiate themselves from other tenants. This type of behaviour would fit into the broader thinking around othering and perceptions of ‘us and them’. As Bradley (2012) shows through some of his work around tenant membership on housing provider committees, there can often be visible tensions between tenants who perceive themselves as better in certain ways than others; tenants can be observed making the same pejorative assumptions about their neighbours and fellow tenants as middle-class commentators and politicians make about particular populations.

Given this sometimes negative representation of particular groups of poor people in the UK sustained through discourses and narratives it is unsurprising that the sector and its tenants are often scapegoated, as in the case of the 2011 riots. Responding to cases of urban disorder in the UK through housing-related mechanisms, whilst not supported en masse by the housing sector, was accepted as legitimate, witnessed through the successful passing of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014) which now has a clause specifically dedicated to the powers of possession available to housing providers in the context of urban disorder. This legitimisation, it is being argued, following a review of the existing literature in the field is more evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, in terms of the way it is building on other housing-related policy and practice shifts that co-exist in the context of the 2011 riots.6

6 When referring to the context of the 2011 riots, it is refers to a post-GFC landscape, along with the other aforementioned social problems such as multiple housing crises and austerity politics. Within housing policy itself, there has also been recent changes to the tenancy security and provision of new introductory tenancies, all of which, it is being argued are influential and significant in the way the government responses to the 2011 riots.
3. Competing interpretations of the 2011 riots: political protests or acts of anti-social violence?

“The Prime Minister was in no doubt about the reasons for the 2011 riots: ‘This was not political protest, or a riot about politics. It was common or garden thieving, robbing and looting’. The government refused to establish an official investigation modelled on the 1981 Scarman inquiry. Many seemed to believe that trying to explain and understand the serious breakdown in public order was an attempt to excuse or justify it”. (Benyon, 2012, p. 15)
3.1 Introduction

A definitive explanation for the 2011 riots has never been reached. Many scholars have expended significant time and effort in attempting to do so, but counter-arguments remain so diametrically opposed, that it is difficult to be certain about exactly why the 2011 riots developed into such a significant outbreak of urban disorder. This chapter will explore some of these arguments in an attempt to unpack the layers of complexity that shroud the discourses of the 2011 riots and to scrutinise the competing interpretations of the riots more fully, and begin to better understand the implications of these differing explanations. Despite the lack of any definitive explanation, an exploration of the ongoing debates nonetheless help to make some sense of what happened, what may have motivated so many people to take part and to begin to unpack some the rationales for why the government responded in the way they did through mechanisms such as the eviction of tenants or interventions such as the Troubled Families Programme.

In the 1960s America saw a “brutal implosion” of the black ghetto following disorders (Wacquant, 2008, p. 4). Wacquant also draws attention to what he calls the slow decomposition of European working-class territories, and in particular the French banlieues. Here Wacquant focuses on the urban periphery, where he argues that in a post-Fordist era this decomposition is determined from above through the triangular relationship between the state, social classes and the city (Wacquant, 2008). When considering these areas, Wacquant expresses his deep dissatisfaction with what he describes as metaphorical and phony descriptions of unrest and marginality (such as ghetto and underclass). He attempts to dispel the myth around ‘race riots’, claiming that many outbreaks of disorder during the 80s and 90s were labelled as ‘race’, but in fact were just as much about poverty and inequality as racial tensions (Campbell, 1993; Wacquant, 2008).

Again, to draw on Wacquant’s analysis of urban disorder, the idea of viewing violence from ‘above’ and ‘below’ provides a useful lens through which to construct arguments to explain both the disorder, the way in which they have been understood and why punitive responses such as the riot clause have been implemented. From below there is mass unemployment, relegation to decaying neighbourhoods and heightened stigmatization. From above it is often viewed as symptoms of moral crisis, based on an understanding that it is pathological reasons embedded within the lower classes that causes the anti-social behaviours witnessed in particular (poorer) areas.

Despite the significant chasm between the arguments that view disorder from above or from below, much of the commentary that reported the riots failed to take into account the nuance
Chapter 3

Competing interpretations of the riots

of the disorders. It is the purpose of this chapter to unpack some of these differences to get a broader understanding of the various interpretations of the riots, but also to begin making some sense of why particular responses gained the following and support they did.

3.2 The 2011 riots

Unlike previous outbreaks of urban disorder, the Government did not launch a public inquiry into the 2011 riots (Phillips, Frost, & Singleton, 2013). Instead of in-depth inquiries as in the case of previous riots such as The Scarman Review of the 1981 Brixton riots, a policy review was undertaken and a cross-party panel established by Nick Clegg, who was Deputy Prime Minister at the time of the 2011 riots. The cross-party panel, known as the Riot Communities and Victims Panel (Riot Panel herein) were tasked with a remit “to listen to views of communities and victims about the riots” (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011, p. 7). This provided an account of their views, culminating in a range of broad findings falling into six key categories: children and parents; building personal resilience; hopes and dreams; riots and the brands; the usual suspects; and police and the public. For Phillips et al. these responses did “not compare with the systematic bipartisan studies undertaken in the wake of some earlier riots” (Phillips et al., 2013, p. 3). Also, the omission of the rioters’ voice in the Panel’s surveying suggested that only the views of non-rioters held any significance or importance (Phillips et al., 2013).

Scholarly analysis of the riots was as equally divisive as political and media commentary and interpretation. Broadly, the key arguments being proffered for the outbreak of the 2011 riots fall into three categories. The first is the non-political argument, dominated by politicians’ and media commentators’ responses. In this line of analysis, the argument is that there was no evidence of political motivation, instead it was ‘criminality, pure and simple’; the manifestation of Broken Britain following decades of moral decay and benefit dependency. The second strand of argument, aligning more closely with the political narrative of ‘criminality, pure and simple’ is that the riots, and rioters, lacked any clear motivation for their actions. However, rather than just stop there, in this line of argument, what scholars label the post-political, people’s propensity to get involved in the riots was representative of the dominance of capitalism, highlighted by the types of stores that were targeted during the disorders. Their behaviour could be explained as opportunistic, chance to accumulate material wealth otherwise unavailable to them (Žižek, 2011). In this understanding of the riots, a number of other factors are significant, such as the rioters’ ‘moral behaviour’ and ability to self-govern their actions, the lack of political engagement of rioters and the significance of consumerism and accruing capital, material capital, financial capital or symbolic capital. The
latter refers to the widespread attention paid to the shops and brands that were targeted during the looting, such as *Foot Locker* and *JD Sports*, rather than *Waterstone’s* book store.

The third broad category of analysing the riots leans more towards structural issues of inequality and stigmatisation, where the debates suggested that there were in fact clear motivations or actual grievances which incited people to take part in the disorder. In this category the scholars’ arguments favour an analytical approach more in-keeping with previous outbreaks of disorder, whereby the actions of those on the streets during the four nights in August 2011 were representative of something more political albeit often poorly articulated. It is, therefore, possible to show that the 2011 disorders did share commonalities with the riots of previous decades (Newburn, 2015). It also supports the arguments being extended that suggest the riots did have an element of rationality behind them and that people did hold resentments beyond simply a desire to consume and acquire material wealth otherwise unavailable to them.

It would be over-simplistic to suggest that all the explanations and analysis of the riots will neatly fit into one of these three categories. Even where debates seemingly fit comfortably into one or the other, there are also layers of complexity within these theories that would suggest the explanations of the riots should perhaps be best understood as a continuum, rather than distinct, isolated silos. However, there is merit in separating the explanations out. By having distinct categories of argument, it enables a richer understanding of the complexities associated with trying to determine the causes of the riots. It allows the populist rhetoric that dominated mainstream media channels in response to such a major event to be interrogated and helps alternative views to be put forward to challenge the negative stereotyping that comes from certain discourses and policy responses.

For philosopher Žižek, the 2011 riots represented ‘shopping for free’ as much as any political statement (Žižek, 2011); a symbol of neoliberal triumph (Treadwell *et al.*, 2012). For scholars supporting this argument the rioters were largely apolitical and apathetic, motivated only by the opportunity to consume items that would otherwise be out of the financial means of many involved (Treadwell *et al.*, 2013). Adopting Bauman’s (2011) semantics, this argument frames the rioters as defective consumers (Bauman, 2011; Jeffery & Jackson, 2012; Slater, 2012). This particular debate, as Till (2012) has argued, denounced the 2011 riots, and particularly the outbreaks in London, as difficult to address because of their “banality and lack of clear target” (Till, 2012, 73). For this reason, Till suggests, that politicians reduced the 2011 riots to “‘criminality, pure and simple’, because criminality can be ‘simply’ dealt with through the law” (Till, 2012, pp. 73-74). Adopting this stance also allows the Government to shift any blame away from the state and any structural factors, such as cuts to welfare or austerity.
measures, and places the blame directly on the individuals and their lack of self-control and self-governance (Tyler, 2013b).

Treadwell et al., drawing on their ethnographic data collected from rioters during the 2011 unrest, began to build a theory that suggested the riots were a “product of objectless dissatisfaction” (Treadwell et al., 2013, 1). To support their underpinning notion that the riots represented neoliberalism’s triumph and that the 2011 riots were clearly consumer riots is the argument that they “contained no clear oppositional substance and appeared to endorse today’s pervasive consumer-capitalist ideology in the most brazen terms” (Treadwell et al., 2013, 8).

Sensational media reporting and political pronouncements that focused on the idea of ‘mob rule’ and ‘anarchy’ also fuelled a powerful ‘them and us’ divide, where citizens’ morality and decisions on how to self-govern their behaviour became a measure of whether an individual was deserving or undeserving of particular things, such as access to social housing for example (Bloom, 2012). In response to the riots many groups formed to clean the streets, what the media referred to as the ‘broom armies’. This imagery created the illusion that the rioters were being ‘swept off the streets’:

The general image during and after the disturbances was one of ‘broom armies’ pitching in to fight back against mob rule with domestic cleaning equipment in a ‘Blitz Spirit’… The Sun ran with a double-page spread of broom-armed volunteers in Lavender Hill and Hackney, featuring Hayley Miller, whose t-shirt was emblazoned with the motto ‘Looters are Scum’, while the Daily Express ran the headline ‘Sweep Scum Off Our Streets’. (Bloom, 2012, p. 84)

Using examples such as these, and polls taken at the time which showed the public support for retaliation to the rioters through water cannon or the army, Bloom argues that extreme public reaction was unsurprising given that “ministers seemed infected with alarm and revulsion” (Bloom, 2012, 84). This alarmist reaction to the riots, Bloom argues, continued long after the riots had subsided, quoting the Community Secretary Eric Pickles blaming the riots on the “uneducated, unemployed sub-class” (Bloom, 2012, 84).

Despite the explanations for the riots being placed into these three categories, which in itself demonstrates the different ways in which the 2011 riots can be interpreted, there are further layers of contradiction and conflicting explanation that mean even within one wider argument there are multiple different perspectives. In the post-political explanation, Treadwell et al. do not blame the individual’s morality, or personal failure to consume, as pathological or that the individual should be personally considered blameworthy. Instead, they suggest that in the post-political present there is no tangible or universal explanation or unifying political symbolism available to make sense of the precariousness and marginalisation that particular populations, such as swathes of disenfranchised young people, face in the society that surrounds them. For this reason, it is argued that:
...subjects are forced to stew over the bleak reality of their material conditions and their durable but objectless sense of exploitation, irrelevance and anxiety in isolation. Unable to divest themselves of torment and nagging doubt, perpetually marginalized youth populations have become moody and vaguely ‘pissed off’ without ever fully understanding why. (Treadwell et al., 2013, p. 3)

Here the theory being built up suggests that such feelings amongst younger populations of marginalisation and an inability to access the material goods that they believe they deserve traps people in a vacuum “of deep-seated, inarticulate and destructive dissatisfactions” (Treadwell et al., 2013, 3). Their main critique of alternative explanations to the 2011 riots which suggest they represented something of political protest, was that there is a danger of academics falling back on their laurels and relying on safe explanations of governmentality and the incredulity that working-class citizens could commit such heinous offences, and how doing so fails to ever address some of the wider issues.

In contrast to the first argument a second set of debates frame the argument against the setting of state and structural factors that impact on the lives of those who were involved in the riots. In this line of argument, analysis suggests that there were motivations behind the actions of the rioters and ignoring the political elements provides a simplistic perspective of disorders and prevents useful discussions to genuinely try to gain a deeper understanding of the disorders (Reicher & Stott, 2011).

Political pronouncements and mainstream media coverage often reported the riots in a way that suggested those involved had identifiable character traits and therefore their behaviour was not entirely surprising. The particular traits that were commonly referred to included gang membership, criminal records or career criminals, dysfunctional homes and a dependency on, and conformity to, a benefits culture (Social Justice Policy Group, 2006). This led to an understanding that the 2011 riots were the riots of the underclass (Tyler, 2013b), representing nothing more than ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Klein, 2012). The morality of society, and specifically how the morality of the rioters differed from wider society, became an important aspect to the way in which the 2011 disorders were understood, leading to a dominant narrative that the disorders epitomised the anti-social behaviours of a part of society that has become demoralised and indeed ‘broken’ (Flint & Powell, 2012). This explanation is flawed according to Morgner (2014), because the behaviour of the rioters should in fact be viewed as the pro-social act of solidarity that emerged “to support one group against the other because the members are socially close and at the same time distant from the other” (Morgner, 2014, p. 98). The groups being described here are principally the coalescing of younger people, who are viewed as having an asymmetrical relationship with the police; therefore solidarity was formed among the rioters who could see the in-group membership and similarities. Therefore, according to Morgner’s thesis, the actions of the rioters against the police were politically motivated through a sense of injustice, rather than banal anti-social behaviour or violence.
This idea of detaching the 2011 riots from any form of political protest whatsoever by dismissing it as representative of a culture of entitlement has been widely criticised elsewhere by academics. For example, Klein highlights that it is simplistic to consider the riots as ‘freak events’ or ‘British exceptionalism’ (Klein, 2012). Instead they should be seen as “part of wider and more general protests against cuts, including demonstrations against increases in university tuition fees and public sector strikes” (Klein, 2012, p. 132). Also, considering the temporal context of the riots at a time of economic stagnation, it aligned with the established thesis that there is correlation between economic recession and public unrest (Campbell, 1993; Klein, 2012). Campbell argued that “neither manners nor mothers [were] to blame, but that there [was] an economic emergency in many neighbourhoods” (Campbell, 1993, p. 303) for the riots during the 1990s across a number of British estates. In doing so, she attempted to debunk the myth that these outbreaks were because of an underclass and blaming families where mothers were unmarried and fathers absent. There can be clear links drawn between the wider social and economic context of the early 90s that Campbell refers to and the 2011 riots.

Newburn’s (2015) analysis of the 2011 riots also goes beyond the explanation that the riots, and rioters, were apathetic and operating without any motivation. Newburn explains that in spite of popular analysis attempting to distinguish the 2011 riots from past events through “distinctive characteristics” in comparison to historic events of disorder, there are also a number of continuities. For Newburn, he identifies the distinctive characteristics as the “influence of gangs, the role of consumerism and the centrality of looting [through] to the sheer scale of the violence and destruction” (Newburn, 2015, p. 59). Another continuity between the disorders that Newburn highlights was the location of disturbances. Many of the incidents did take place around relatively impoverished, inner-city communities with sizable minority ethnic communities” (Newburn, 2015, p. 59). However, where previous riots were predominately conflicts between members of the community, such as the ‘bread’ riots in Ely during the 1990s (Campbell, 1993), the 2011 riots saw a broad cross-section of the youth population demonstrating collective antagonism towards the police (Newburn, 2015). This suggests, unlike the apolitical analysis outlined earlier, that in fact there were identifiable, and politically motivated, factors compelling young people to become involved in the riots beyond purely materialistic and consumerist desire. In identifying some of the key differences between the 2011 riots and those of previous decades, Newburn identified four key areas: (i) the ‘fluidity’ of the 2011 riot in part because of the information flows of communication made available through the BlackBerry Messenger service; (ii) the looting, whilst present in many outbreaks of disorder, was on a more substantial scale; (iii) concerns over the way the riots were handled by the police was explicitly stated by key politicians, including the Prime Minister (whereas in previous cases there appeared an element of political support for the police); (iv) and the noticeably more excessive response from the penal state. A key point to
highlight here though is the second remark about looting being on a more substantial scale than before. Newburn explicitly states that this has “led a number of academics to argue that the riots were fundamentally an exercise in violent consumerism, the danger in so doing is that the ‘political’ and protest elements of the riots become marginalised” (Newburn, 2015, p. 60).

Millington (2016) aims to unpack the post-political argument further, suggesting that by focusing on consumerism and looting as simply consumerism and apolitical, it fails to address the symbolic importance and effect of consumerism:

...the retailers looted were almost without exception the same vendors that colonise the retail spaces of the urban poor: Foot Locker, Comet, Currys, Carphone Warehouse and so forth. Looters were no more able to exercise “choice” than a regular shopper. Those arguing that consumerism – a desire to possess fashionable trainers – has pacified the working classes should not lose sight of Marx’s point that while property appears to be the source or cause of alienation, it is really its consequence. (Millington, 2016, pp. 7-8)

Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1993) idea of the “dominated field”, or the local game as Millington refers to it as, having the latest trainers “really does matter” (Millington, 2016, p. 9) in terms of symbolic status. However, to assume that an individuals’ only motivation was to acquire this status ignores the reality that these individuals could also be angry about the death of Mark Duggan, or more broadly, the treatment by the police towards certain groups which could stem from their own encounters (Millington, 2016). The understanding that individuals were either mindlessly looting or protesting against injustice is arguably too myopic. For example, Millington draws on interviews conducted as part of the Reading the Riots project to show how spaces like JD Sports, Footlocker or Carphone Warehouse are political spaces and therefore being targeted during the riots does in fact suggest some political motivation: “These fucking shops, like, I’ve given them a hundred CVs… not one job” (Millington, 2016, p. 14 as cited in Lewis et al., 2011, p. 26). Here it is possible to see demonstrable anger targeted towards particular spaces for political reasons. Whilst the rioters, and swathes of the younger generations more broadly, were being accused publicly of being workshy, their own experiences of being trapped out of the labour market caused antagonistic feelings amongst those who feel hopelessly trapped in their current situations (Millington, 2012).

Factoring in local context also demonstrates the difficulty in making policy responses to the riots in a single particular way, as the idiosyncratic structuration of the disorders means that the disorders had different causal effects and motivations (Millington, 2016). As Jeffery and Jackson (2012) observe, the riots experienced at the Salford Shopping City did not exhibit the same characteristics as the riots experienced at Manchester’s Arndale Centre. Whilst they are both shopping arcades, the former housed low-cost retailers such as Wilkinson, Bon Marche and Lidl, whereas the latter has high-end shops featuring brands such as Bang and Olufsen, or designer commodities such as Footlocker. Making this distinction is important for a number of reasons. It highlights that while retail areas may have been a popular target for rioters
throughout England, the consumerist argument of acquiring goods that otherwise would be unobtainable becomes quite weak in the Salford context:

The riots took place here not because of its intrinsic potential as a profitable place for looting but because of a particular antagonism between the police and the people who live in the social housing estates adjacent to the Precinct. (Jeffrey & Jackson, 2012, p. 18)

Exploring the nuance of geographical context also allows for debates around inequalities to be examined. Salford, like many of the other locations that were targeted during the 2011 riots, not only suffered from problems of deprivation, including low-employment opportunities for many, but is also an area with stark visible inequalities. Drawing on other ethnographic research, Slater (2012) explains that what was construed as mindless violence in mainstream and political explanations for the riots is in fact the young dispossessed populations responding to the various structural factors that have a negative impact on their lives, including the poverty, deprivation, and lack of suitable employment, as well as the way they are treated, especially by authorities such as the police (Slater, 2012). For McKenzie her analysis of the riots is a good example of the importance of understanding local nuance: “The stigmatization of specific groups, particularly related to locality, have been central in producing new ways of exploitation through the fields of culture, and media, inventing new forms of class differentiation, and class antagonism” (McKenzie, 2013a, p. 2). The case of Manchester and Salford’s distinct riots also offers support to the argument that local tension and antagonism did play a role in the disorders: “the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police…suggested that the events in Salford were about attacking the police and not in the first instance about looting” (Jeffrey & Jackson, 2012, p. 19).

The moral judgement of the rioters, and to what degree they should be punished, parallels with broader issues around the welfare state, dependency and entitlement. Through perpetuated narratives of meritocracy and moral worth closely associated with economic value (Valentine & Harris, 2014) the understanding that a dangerous class of people are threatening social norms becomes a strong perspective for many people.

Non-political, Political, Post-Political: Limitations in the analysis

Although there appears to be a clear dichotomy between the different riot-related discourses and explanations for the 2011 disorders, with a fight against inequality and class prejudice on the one hand and apathy and consumerism on the other, there are also further compelling argument that obfuscate the boundaries between these distinct categories. Drawing on quotes from the rioters themselves, there is a stark contrast between what Treadwell et al. found:

Freddie: Fuck the police, I am going to get what I can. We arranged to steal stuff. We didn’t just go out and see what we could get, we got together to discuss it and which vehicle we could use…we decided on a Corsa and a White van. It was organised bruv. We thought by stealing from the shops we’d be getting back at the police. We did Argos when we found out it
was being raided, the Wood Green JDs [a sports chain in North London] and then East Ham Foot Locker [another sports chain in East London]. We sold some but kept a lot of it ourselves. I had about £1500 in trainers, but we had electrical stuff, tracksuits, hats, the lot. (Treadwell et al., 2013, pp. 7 - emphasis in original, quoted verbatim)

And to re-quote what researchers undertaking the Reading the Riots project found:

I literally went there to say, ‘All right then, well, everyone’s getting free stuff, I’m joining in’, like, ‘cos, it’s my fucking area. These fucking shops, like, I’ve given them a hundred CVs…not one job. That’s why I left my house. (Lewis et al., 2011, 26 as cited in Tyler, 2013, 5)

Supporting the political argument, academics such as Tyler and Millington draw particular attention to the politicisation of sports apparel stores such as Footlocker. They argue that the individuals’ sense of frustration about not being able to work in order to legitimately purchase the goods was a motivation for them to leave their houses. For those adopting the political stance, this was not just about the banal appropriation of designer goods, but frustration because of wider structural issues. This message does not transpire from the ethnographic research conducted by Treadwell et al. though. Although the rioters involved in their study talk about the same stores and appropriate the same types of goods, in the explanations offered here there is a sense of getting back at the police and ceasing an opportunity to consume for free.

For Till (2012) the 2011 riots represented something of a ‘broken middle’. Drawing on the historic international riots, Till conceptualises the typical riot-related political responses into two distinct types of urban disorder based largely around their geographical boundaries. The first being riots that take place in socially deprived areas and are therefore defined by their boundaries. The second narrative is where events take place in urban centres. These are understood as spaces where the usually excluded leave their own territories and infiltrate those spaces from which they would usually be excluded (Till, 2012, 72). To illustrate this, he uses key historic riots as case studies to support the narratives. The former type of disorder comprises events such as the Broadwater Farm riot of 1985, the Los Angeles riots of 1992 and the Parisian banlieue riots of 2005. Till argues that this category of riot is much simpler for a government to deal with, both spatially – as it is contained within a particular area – and politically – because it is assumed that this is the typical normative behaviour of this particular group whether they be black, poor or unemployed (Till, 2012, 73). Politically, this category of riot is not problematic in that the accompanying narrative suggests that these people are beyond help; it is simply the way they behave and there is little anyone can do to change this, aligning with the punitive state theory, where incarceration can often be considered as the only option. To support his argument Till draws on Nicholas Sarkozy’s infamous response to the 2005 riots in the French banlieues that this was the behaviour of the ‘racaille’, a term translated to mean scum, but arguably with more pejorative connotations as it “designates a
subhuman, inherently evil” group of people (Till, 2012, 73). The second type of riot is more problematic to governments, as the unrest takes place in prominent places that threaten the harmony of the establishment. To illustrate this category, Till refers to the Poll Tax riots of 1990 in Trafalgar Square, the student protests in London during 2010 and the Occupy Wall Street events during 2011. In particular, this category of riot is problematic as their sensitivity can mean that any error in attempting to control the protest could spark more violent unrest, such as kettling during the 2010 student protests or the use of mace on innocent women during the 2011 Occupy events (Till, 2012, 73). These preceding events could also have influenced the way in which the government responded to the riots, utilising the ‘purely criminal’ narrative to give the illusion that they were in control and taking action against the rioters, minimising the criticism that followed the previous protests and events (Rosie & Gorringe, 2009).

However, one important statement that was made in this report was that “no one group is identifiable” (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012). Some of the political and media responses attempted to identify particular groups of people or sections of society responsible, the reality was that the demographic make-up of rioters during the 2011 riots was diverse and difficult to attribute to just one particular section of society:

> The rioters… proved at first to a surprisingly mixed bunch: there were teenage hooligans of both sexes and all races, but there were older people, a school assistant who sipped stolen beer and was thus deemed to have ‘supported the civil disorder’, mothers on shopping sprees, children as young as nine, religious zealots jeering police in Stamford Hill, Olympic ambassadors such as Chelsea Ives… graduates such as Natasha Reid who looted a store in Enfield… and the wealthy middle-class Laura Johnson tagged for theft in Charlton. There were many more and there were no clear answers provided by their motives, class or ethnic origins. (Bloom, 2012, p. 91)

Clarke (2012) makes a similar argument following her research profiling the rioters in Manchester, where she states that we need move away from the simplistic catchall term of ‘rioters’ and realise that those involved in the 2011 riots did not belong in one homogenous group (Clarke, 2012). Following the 2011 riots, Clarke profiled four individuals who had been involved in the disorders in various different ways. Her key message from this was that motivations to get involved in the disorders builds on a range of complexities. In one particular case, an individual has a long history of alcohol and substance abuse. At the time of the riots she was in a local park, drinking with friends. Unaware of the wider politics, this individual did not realise that what was happening was mass-scale rioting and looting. Given the carnivalesque nature of the behaviour being displayed, she joined in and did take good she found on the street. However, unaware of the broader context her motivation was not to incite violence or cause broader disruption, it was simply a case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. It is this type of analysis that highlights how problematic housing-related policy responses to this type of event can be. The complexity of people’s needs, the support they may
require in order to build some normality into their daily lives could be completely undermined by being evicted from their home, especially when their behaviour was not affecting housing-management function or that they were fully aware of the broader context of what was happening and what consequences they may face.

3.3 The threat to norms: the riot of an underclass?

*Underclass is an ugly word, with its whiff of Marx and the lumpenproletariat. Perhaps because it is ugly, ‘underclass’ as used in Britain tends to be sanitised, a sort of synonym for people who are not just poor, but especially poor. So let us get it straight from the outset: the ‘underclass’ does not refer to degree of poverty, but to a type of poverty. (Murray, 1990, p. 1)*

Referring to the French *balieues* Wacquant (2008) talks about the powerful media campaign propounding the belief that these areas are “swimming in anomic and on the brink of constant rioting” (Wacquant, 2008, p. 140) due to a toxic combination of isolation, deterioration and immigration. The media present these areas on a continuum of ‘ethnic ghetto’ as the hard version to places that are becoming ghettoised as the soft version. As Wacquant clearly explains, this imagery is shared widely and not just by the public, but also by executives in state bureaucracies who are responsible for the day-to-day management of these areas and the populations living in them. The dominance of these narratives are eroding public sympathy and hardening attitudes towards welfareism. For Uitermark (2014), urban policy making in the UK that attempts to prevent conflict and disorder can be understood as ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ policies, which in themselves create divisions and dislocate societies. Therefore, the unintended consequences are that the exact behaviour they are attempting to prevent is actually being exacerbated. Jeffery and Jackson’s research unpicks the nuances in the riots of the North West, making a clear distinction between the Manchester and Salford riots. While they concur that there was an element of consumeristic behaviour evident in the disorder they are keen to assert that Manchester’s Arndale Centre, with its designer higher-end stores, is very different to Salford’s precinct with budget stores and pawn brokers. Their analysis of the behaviour displayed in Salford suggests that long-standing deprivation and inequality has prevailed for decades as surround areas are undergoing substantial regeneration projects driven by “central government and embraced by local elites” (Jeffrey & Jackson, 2012, p. 19). Furthermore, their analysis highlights broader structural issues in this area and amongst the residents in parts of Salford: “resistance to the police in these neighbourhoods is a continual process; the riot events and their policing were not exceptional; rather they stood as a result of a recent intensification of a political project that is increasing inequality” (Jeffrey & Jackson, 2012, p. 19). It is implicit within this argument that motivations for people to riot in certain areas, where there is growing inequality, could well be motivated by more than simply
criminal intentions, but as a demonstration of frustration at the constant difficulties they face in certain communities.

It is the aim for this final section of this chapter to begin to understand and unpack the link that the government made between ASB, the riots and housing mechanisms and how the debate remains heavily reliant on the dichotomisation of poverty along the deserving-undeserving binary.

The media and many front-bench politicians quickly conformed to the benefit dependency culture narrative in response to the disorders. The imagery of shops such as Currys and Footlocker being looted seemingly provided sufficient evidence to suggest that these individuals conformed to the ‘something-for-nothing’ culture that welfare traps people into (Social Justice Policy Group, 2006). The solution, it was often argued, was to ‘teach a lesson’ to those who could not behave like the majority of citizens who have respect for their communities. The removal of benefits, extended custodial sentences and the removal of social housing (through ASB mechanisms) were mooted as a necessary and proportionate response in the political pronouncements. YouGov polls shortly after the disorders showed that such political responses were largely supported by the public, with over 60 per cent agreeing that social housing should be taken away from the rioters (Moran, 2011). As this thesis shall revisit in later chapters, there was little forethought as to the implications of such action, instead the ostensible underpinning notion for such a response is that it would show individuals that they cannot behave in this way without consequences, with an understanding that this would help to prevent a repeat of the disorder in the future (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013). However, in spite of a seemingly uninterrupted run at introducing new legislation in response to the riots, Morgner (2014) critically challenged this approach and instead proffers the argument that the 2011 riots were not anti-social, as depicted through mainstream channels, but rather a display of pro-social behaviour amongst certain, often marginalised groups, who behaved in a benevolent way to defend themselves against a more powerful ‘enemy’ (Morgner, 2014).

Despite what a deeper critique and analysis of the 2011 riots could offer to politicians and policy-makers, the dominance of populist arguments prevailed, and it is to this that the chapter now turns.

The riot-related political discourse following the riots was arguably deeply-rooted in historical understandings of particular groups in society. Take Murray, as an example, whose theory of the underclass transitioned into the vocabulary of the British media, denoted a very particular type of person. This was not just a ‘poor’ person because of their low income, this was a ‘poor’ person whose behaviour made them distinctive from those in low income (Murray,
1990). His conceptualisation saw the underclass as poor because of the way they kept their homes, and themselves, their consistent unemployment and inability to maintain work, their addictions to drugs and alcohol and their inability to instil proper values into their children.

The lumpen that Murray referred to was defined in the Manifesto of the Communist Party as the “dangerous class”, “the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society” (Tyler, 2013a, p. 184). For Tyler, the lumpen and underclass denote a category with the function “to lump together an entire plethora of disenfranchised people into one stigmatizing category, denoting dangerousness and expendability” (Tyler, 2013a, p. 185). Elsewhere, Tyler explains how the underclass differs from Marx’s conception of class formations that were conceptualised as “historically contingent and relational – classes are formed through antagonism and struggle” (Tyler, 2013a, p. 3). Instead, the underclass is seen as “an adjunct class divorced from the body politic” (Tyler, 2013a, p. 3).

Specifically in the context of the 2011 riots, but something that can be extrapolated to a view of the urban poor more generally, is the idea that in modern Britain a new class has been formed: the workless class. The use of rhetorical devices such as this offers support to the case that the 2011 riots were not about inequality or poverty but a “psycho-cultural problem” (Tyler, 2013a, p. 4). This view of the urban poor suggests that inequalities are deserved. Drawing upon a Joseph Rowntree Foundation funded research project, Understanding Attitudes to Tackling Economic Inequality, Tyler shows how there is a widespread consensus that people have “plenty of opportunities to pull themselves out of poverty” (Bamfield & Horton, 2009 as cited in Tyler, 2013, p. 4). Such perspectives fail to see the complexities of issues in certain areas, such as finding meaningful employment in post-industrial cities.

This viewpoint was widely held by right-wing commentators and the media, who individualised particular issues such as poor educational attainment or a lack of ‘drive’ to engage in the working economy, without considering other issues such as mental illness, disability or more structural factors such as a lack of employment opportunities or the types of employment that are suitable for sustaining a family (Valentine & Harris, 2014). Popular culture and comedy in the UK has come to characterise this viewpoint through shows such as Shameless which is centred on a fictional council estate in Manchester, with the main protagonist, Frank Gallagher, the epitome of right-wing perceptions of our ‘benefit scrounger’. He is an alcoholic, openly avoiding work to live a seemingly care-free life of drink, drugs and socialising. Many of the storylines show him unaware of his children’s behaviour, or encouraging his children to follow in his footsteps. Other characters popularised though such shows include Vicky Pollard, a young mum with a number of children to different fathers, who is always donned in her bright pink tracksuit. As Jones explains:
Pollard is presented as a grotesque working-class teenage single mother who is sexually promiscuous, unable to string a sentence together, and has a very bad attitude. In one sketch she swaps her baby for a Westlife CD. In another, when reminded to take her baby home she replies: ‘Oh no it’s OK, you can keep it, I’ve got loads more at home anyway.’ Johann Hari points out that we are laughing at two ex-private-school boys dressing up as working-class single mothers. (Jones, 2011, p. 127)

Such traits fit directly into the pejorative caricature of the ‘chav’, which as Jones (2011) highlights, is how this representation then becomes part of the discourse around particular populations, like single mothers, frequently adopted in mainstream media presented as a true representation (Jones, 2011). Valentine and Harris (2014) also focus on the characterisation of the chav, and through their own fieldwork with a broad strata of people from different backgrounds show how those who would sometimes be seen to fit the chav category (i.e. living on a council estate, single parent, unemployed) work to distance themselves from such pejorative labelling though an ‘othering’ process. Like the middle-class respondents in their research who evaluate their own lifestyles as superior to the perceived ‘chav’, the same process was evident with the working-class respondents, who would distance themselves from the chav insult to “reinforce their own sense of self-worth and identity” (Valentine & Harris, 2014, p. 86). The Social Action and Research Foundation’s report *A Tale of Two Cities* explains in their analysis of the 2011 riots in Manchester and Salford: “families that have troubles are constructed within dominant government rhetoric as families that cause trouble” (Lone & Silver, 2012, p. 4). This report also explained that if the goal is to achieve more “stable, secure and protective homes for themselves and their children then it would seem prudent to create an environment that develops a strengths based model, which builds on the capabilities of these families” (Lone & Silver, 2012, p. 4).

**Housing and the 2011 riots: a ‘golden ticket’ opportunity?**

The government’s decision to respond to the riots through housing mechanisms, namely the eviction of social housing tenants, has received relatively little coverage in academic literature. Most notable was the work of Hodkinson and Robbins:

The stigmatization of social housing tenants reached new revanchist depths after the 2011 summer riots when a generalized reaction against the disorderly urban poor rapidly gave way to a specific attempt to link the riots to council housing in particular, with several local authorities stating their intention to evict tenants associated with the unrest. (Hodkinson & Robbins, 2013, p. 70)

Hodkinson and Robbins describe the response in terms of the ‘revanchist depths’ that the government took following the disorder. This argument links with much of what has been discussed previously about how punitive and derisory attitudes that have grown towards the urban poor and marginalised. The context of the 2011 disorders could also have been influential in shaping the discourse towards social housing tenants. As Sayer (2016) shows, it is during periods of economic downturn when the public attitudes are most likely to be
negative towards populations dependent upon welfare provision because of ongoing stigmatisation, often proliferated in the media, around benefit scroungers and frauds (Jones, 2011; Valentine & Harris, 2014). While there has been relatively little else written specifically about the nexus between housing and the disorder, from the analysis by Hodkinson and Robbins, along with a reflexive review of the way in which housing and ASB policies have developed over the last three decades, including a reduction in both the stock of housing in the sector and the security of tenure granted to new tenants, along with the increased governance and punitive sanctioning of tenants – it does begin to raise questions about the Government’s motivation to respond in this way and whether this is just the next step in the neoliberal agenda. This raises the questions: did the government perceive the 2011 riots as the ‘golden ticket’ opportunity to drive forward their continued ambition to give housing providers greater powers of possession and tenants less security of tenure?

3.4 Conclusion

The ongoing debate about the underlying motivations for the 2011 riots continues to oscillate between acts of criminality, ASB and consumerism on the one hand and underlying political or structural motivations on the other. These competing interpretations do not provide any concrete explanations of the riots in 2011, or why they accelerated in the way they did and caused disruption on such a national scale. Instead, they offer a rich debate about the different ways in which the disorders can be analysed and demonstrate the complexity of the particular issues here. These issues extend beyond the actions of the rioters during the four days in August 2011, to include socio-economic, political, economic concerns as well as broader issues with policing, social control and rising inequalities.

Being able to take a broader perspective on the timeline of responses being five years on from the riots means that it is possible to begin exploring the underlying motivations for some of the immediate political discourses and the subsequent policy responses. The Prime Minister David Cameron’s official speech declaring the riots as ‘criminality, pure and simple’, it is argued, worked to shut down any space for further debate. Having positioned the government narrative in this way allowed the government to be seen to be taking action by dealing with these ‘criminals’ through night courts and more severe prison sentences than would usually be awarded for such behaviours, as well as broader political initiatives such as the TFP and the threat to evict social housing tenants and remove welfare benefits from individuals.

Academic debate took a more measured, critical stance than the riot-related political discourses. Two broad strands of academic debate augment these official responses, the first being ‘political’ (i.e. that structural causes underpin the behaviours demonstrated in some
cases) and the second being ‘post-political’ (i.e. that the neoliberal ideology is so advanced people are conditioned and motivated to consume in whatever way they are able to do so). Each perspective makes compelling arguments for each of their respective positions and there is merit to both perspectives. For the context of this study, the key argument being put forward here is if there are such convincing arguments for both political and post-political motivations, responding to the disorders through mechanisms that target single populations could be problematic.

Beyond these arguments, critical perspectives such as Morgner’s analysis, refutes the labelling of the riots as acts of ASB. Instead, the behaviours displayed could in fact be acts of pro-social behaviours, where groups of people who have been marginalised by society joined together to take a stance against institutions such as the police. Their actions to do so through urban unrest, it is argued, was because it is the only way that their voices could be heard and their concerns put forward.

The particular response to evict social housing tenants remains largely unexplored. However, when taken in the context of the broader responses, it is possible to see how such an action does fit with the broader, long-standing narratives of how particular populations behave. Suggesting that these were the riots of the underclass aligns with the well-established pejorative labelling that has been attached to particular populations over time and has become a taken-for-granted ‘fact’ in political and cultural perspectives about how certain individuals in the ‘Jeremy Kyle’ generation, as discussed in Chapter 2, live their lives.

To return to the focus of this chapter and to try to understand whether the riots were political protests or acts of anti-social violence, the answer is not clear. Taken collectively, the analysis and research of the 2011 riots shows the complexity of understanding, and responding, to the disorders and it would therefore be too simplistic to suggest that there is a single clear cause. The riots varied between geographical contexts and the rioters came from a broad cross-section of backgrounds. The Riot Panel’s conclusion was that there was no one cause or group that could be blamed for these incidents. This shows that responding to the disorders through a one-size-fits-all punishment regime of punitive prison sentences and the removal of welfare support is also problematic and could lead to unintended consequences and significant collateral damage.

**Justifying the premise of this thesis**

What this, and the preceding chapter, has hopefully mapped out is how through the socio-economic force of neoliberalism, which in turn has led to the privatisation of a huge swathe of public assets, such as housing, reinforces the ideological conception that free-market forces will “do good”. Geographer and philosopher David Harvey articulates neoliberalism as a class
project. This has had a huge impact on the housing market; the availability of suitable dwellings, access and affordability of housing and the reputations of those living in particular types of housing or areas. These pressures have shaped the role of housing managers, where they have become wardens of communities, policing particular types of behaviour that have often been broadly categorised under the umbrella term ‘anti-social behaviour’. Through the increased competition for socially-rented accommodation, following a large sell-off of dwellings to sitting tenants, the demolition of unfit-for-use stock and the lack of new development for the sector has meant that the resource has become scarce, leading to longer waiting lists and a need to determine who should be allocated the properties first and on what basis. This challenge, which has arguably only become more difficult over recent decades, has led scholars to raise broader ontological questions about what is the role for social housing? As detailed in these chapters, Fitzpatrick and Pawson (2007, 2013) have grappled with this issue, attempting to determine whether the political perception of the sector is a temporary ‘safety net’ welfare provision, easing people back into mainstream society through a helping hand when they are most in need, or whether it is becoming an ambulance service. There are conflicts both in policy and practice, but also in the academic conceptualisation, around the role of the sector as well as the ideological vision of what the sector could be like in the future. The stigmatisation of council housing, which has now extended to social housing generally, has increased and in turn been influential in public perceptions of those who occupy such housing (Hastings, 2004). With continued negative media attention and derogatory political sentiment, reflected through policies and legislation, the role of the frontline housing and ASB officer is crucial. The management and support they offer to their tenants, whilst being directed by national-level policies presents an interesting area to explore power and resistance. Frontline officers are, in the same way that the general public, privy to people’s sentiment towards the sector and will read the same newspapers and watch the same programmes. There is, therefore, the risk that attitudes of these officers could be affected by the negative mainstream discourses. This will be explored more fully though the empirical chapters.

Then having explored the 2011 riots, and placing them into a wider international and historical context, the emerging key concern is the dismissive approach prominent political ministers and the media took to the disorders and those involved. Rather than responding to the 2011 riots with an official inquiry, as in previous cases, the trite, and arguably somewhat dogmatic, response was that these events were a display of “criminality, pure and simple”, with no further explanation needed and rather a review of policy and more punitive legislative responses to deal with the plight of ‘broken Britain’ was the answer.
Questions have been raised, and in this thesis in particular, about the appropriateness of housing-related policy responses to the 2011 riots. The disorders were not contained on the urban estates of the poor and feckless, despite what the media have portrayed. The scale and contagion of the riots meant that a cross-section of society was involved in the disorders, rather than the containment to one particular group within society. Taking the sociological perspectives from scholars such as Bourdieu, Wacquant, Tyler, Slater and McKenzie for example, an exploration of class structure, class prejudice, territorial stigmatisation, inequality, revanchism and pejorative discourses of fecklessness, broken morals and the underclass begin to bridge between the urban marginalisation, social housing estates and responding to the 2011 riots through housing mechanisms. Owen Hatherley’s article in The Guardian just after the riots suggested that there does seem to be a logical rationale for evicting the rioters, but rather than accepting this position, it is important to unpack why this logic continues to persist.

Social scientists spanning housing, criminology, sociology and urban studies have expended extensive effort on empirical scrutiny and the theoretical conception of pertinent issues, all of which form a solid foundation for this thesis. What is missing from the literature, and where the rest of this thesis attempts to bridge these gaps, is the explicit exploration of housing tenure and urban unrest and what this could mean for the future of housing policy and practice.
4. Methodology

This chapter provides a detailed account of the system of methods adopted for this study. Building upon the existing literature spanning housing policy, behaviour control and urban unrest fields, this study aims to bridge the gaps identified from a detailed review of this work. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with housing and anti-social behaviour practitioners across England to elicit the perceptions of national policy from the frontline, reflecting upon what this may mean for the governance of social housing tenants in the event of any future urban disorder in England.
4.1 Introduction

Following the 2011 riots there has been a substantial body of research into the underlying causes of the disorders and the motivations of the rioters, of which an overview has been provided in earlier chapters. In particular, The Guardian and LSE collaborated to undertake an extensive research project, *Reading the Riots*, inspired by that of the Detroit Free Press newspaper and Michigan’s Institute for Social Research pioneering research following the 1967 riots in Detroit.

As part of the Guardian and LSE collaboration, a team of researchers conducted 270 interviews with people involved in the riots across six locations in England. This, along with a number of other detailed studies by academics with extensive expertise in social disorder, has provided a number of explanations about people’s propensity to riot and what the underlying causes of the disorders in 2011 were, albeit often conflicting. It was therefore a conscious decision taken at the start of this research to not conduct an inquiry into people’s motivations to riot, but rather to explore the local experience of the disorder from the perspectives of those responsible for the management of individuals' housing and behaviour; those who at the time of the riots would have been put on high alert by sovereign authorities, such as the police, to assist with the identification of those involved in the riots.

The focus of this study has been an inquiry into the views and perceptions of frontline and strategic practitioners, in particular to get a better understanding of their responses to national government policies within the field in which they work. It is also important to stress that this research, unlike the other studies conducted in response to the 2011 riots, focuses primarily on housing and the affects to housing policy in England. A number of other studies have considered the effects of the 2011 riots on housing policy (see Hancock & Mooney, 2012b; Hodkinson & Robbins, 2013), but none to date have considered the changes to housing policy from the perspectives of those who are responsible for the tenancy management and behaviour control of social housing and local neighbourhoods. This approach therefore required an inquiry into what their perceptions to such changes were, how they perceived these changed to impact on their day-to-day practice and what impact this would have on their tenants or people living within their communities. In order to elicit discussion and begin to draw out these views, a qualitative method of inquiry needed to be adopted.

This chapter is split into three main sections, further breaking down the research process, then going on to give a detailed and candid account of the experience in the field where the

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7 Interviews for *Reading the Riots* were conducted with people in London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Salford and Nottingham.
rationale for participant selection is considered along with the limitation of the study and the potential for developing this research in the future. Finally, the third section is a detailed account of the way in which the empirical data has been managed and analysed and how the key themes were initially identified and developed in the findings for this research.

4.2 Research Strategy: A Qualitative Approach

It was a conscious decision to adopt a qualitative approach to the research. The rationale for doing so was because of the complexity of the area of enquiry and the value-laden nature of the controversial policy developments being suggested as a solution. It was therefore necessary to adopt a flexible, open approach to gathering data which was primarily semi-structured interviews allowing for research participants to take an element of control over the nature of the discussion, whilst the researcher could use open questions and prompts to keep the discussion relevant. Adopting a qualitative approach allowed the researcher to “get closer to the individual’s point of view” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 10) enabling the subject’s perspective to be captured more closely, something that would have been methodologically impossible to do by adopting a quantitative approach to this particular study.

Qualitative research has the scope to offer a great deal of nuanced perspectives through illuminating issues that would not be possible by using a quantitative inquiry (Mason, 2002). However, it is important from the outset to be aware of the research design process, which for Maxwell (1996), is not simply a one-directional, linear process “from problem formulation to conclusions or theory” (Maxwell, 1996, p. 2). Instead an interactive model should be adopted whereby: “the research design does not begin from a fixed starting point or proceed through a determinate sequence of steps, and it recognizes the importance of interconnection and interaction among the different design components” (Maxwell, 1996, p. 3).

Maxwell’s interactive model is a useful starting point for considering the research design, one which takes into account the reflexive nature and iterative process of designing a qualitative research project.
FIGURE 4.1: AN INTERACTIVE MODEL OF RESEARCH DESIGN (MAXWELL, 1996)

Here Maxwell illustrates how the different aspects of research design are closely linked and relational upon each other, rather than being simply a linear or cyclical cycle.\(^8\) The different aspects of the research design process are connected forming two key stages, represented by this hour-glass model as the *upper* (purposes, conceptual context and research questions) and *lower* (research questions, methods and validity) triangles. The upper triangle, which Maxwell labels the ‘external aspects’ of the research design process, represents what we already know about the field of study, whilst the lower triangle, the ‘internal aspects’ of the research design process, concentrates on the approach that is being implemented to answer the research questions, which are formed through an understanding of what gaps there are in the existing literature and why this research is important. This model is an over-simplification of the process, something that Maxwell also recognises, but it is a useful way to begin considering the research strategy.

For this thesis, a similar process has been adopted. First, considering the purpose of the research was important to answer questions such as: what is the ultimate aim for this study? What issues are going to be explored and highlighted in this study? Why is this research important? Undertaking a review of the existing literature and commentary of the relevant policies and legislative changes provides an overview of what already exists and the apparent gaps in the current knowledge. In the context of this study, it was clear that whilst there has been both an historical and contemporary exploration of urban disorder and housing policy

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\(^8\) Here Maxwell is drawing upon previous scholarly work that has represented these aspects of research design as linear or cyclical. For a list of reference upon which Maxwell draws, see Maxwell, 1996, p. 5.
and practice, especially within the remit of the rising ASB agenda and behaviour control, the two aspects of urban disorder and housing policy taken together remain largely under-researched.

Having outlined the purpose of the research it is important, as part of this iterative process, to then consider the relevant and appropriate conceptual context: what theories and existing established contextual frameworks will allow for the phenomena being studied here to be sufficiently analysed and ordered into a coherent understanding? The epistemological underpinning of this research takes a social constructionist perspective. In terms of an analytical framework, the concept of governmentality has been adopted, which was augmented by using other bodies of work such as Wacquant’s penal state and advanced marginality thesis and Cohen’s folk devils and moral panics. Originally posited by Foucault, more recently housing scholars have adapted and adopted the concept to counter-factor the criticisms of the concept’s shortcomings and it has become a credible analytical framework to adopt in this field (McKee, 2009; Parr, 2009a; Stenson & Watt, 1999). Again, like the ‘purposes’ stage of the research design, this too was an iterative process, moving between the purpose, contextual framework and research questions stages simultaneously to develop a coherent framework. It is also worth noting a particular challenge in the research design at this stage was that this thesis was part of a studentship network, which meant that a predesignated topic was outlined, and the researcher had to fit in with this prescribed remit. Despite the initial remit being broad, it was difficult to feel ownership of the research at first, making it more difficult to define the ‘external aspects’ of the research design process. This challenge was, in part, overcome through the process of having to develop a research proposal and presentation at the end of the first year of study, which allowed critique from peers and academics, and helped to shape the thesis. The fieldwork, which is discussed later in this chapter, also helped to give the study a clearer focus as the researcher developed a better understanding of the existing policy and practice field, including the different ways of working and the challenges practitioners raised when talking about their day-to-day work.

Alongside developing the processes of the external aspects of the research, and having developed a clearer perspective of the remit of the study and an appropriate conceptual framework, it was possible to begin to define and hone the research questions so they can be used to frame the project and better understand the phenomena being studied. Again, this was also an iterative process throughout the study as new, and unexpected, aspects of the ‘phenomena’ were uncovered. It is also important to understand how these research questions relate to one another to ensure a coherent and robust investigation will be conducted.

Having established a set of research questions, it is possible to move onto the second triangle in Maxwell’s interactive model, which focuses on the ‘internal aspects’ of the research design.
For Maxwell, there are four key areas when considering the methods within the research design model:

- Your research relationship with the people you study;
- Your research site selection and sampling decision;
- Your data collection methods; and
- The data analysis techniques you will use.

When considering the question ‘what will you actually do’ in this research, it was always clear that the purpose was not about why the riots happened, although an understanding of the key debates is essential for a better awareness of the context in which this study is based. Instead, the aim of the research was to explore the responses following the riots, in particular responses within the social housing sector.

Finally, the fifth stage in Maxwell’s model is validity. This will be covered in more detail later in this chapter, as validity within social science research is often a contentious area, especially to non-social science researchers. However, it is explicit throughout this research that the perspectives put forward are those of the participants, and not to be misinterpreted as factual evidence. The data gathered here is the subjective perceptions of practitioners, drawing on their own experiences and that the interpretation and the analysis is that of the researcher, where the epistemological and ontological basis has been discussed in this chapter and the adoption of a particular (and relevant according to this field of study) analytical framework has been adopted to offer a level of rigidity to this study.

**Rationale for using a qualitative approach**

Qualitative research has faced considerable criticism from those who traditionally have taken a positivist approach to research. These criticisms are often predicated on the lack of transparency about how research has been conducted:

The academic and disciplinary resistances to qualitative research illustrate the politics embedded in this field of discourse. The challenges to qualitative research are many. Qualitative researchers are called journalists, or soft scientists. Their work is termed unscientific, or only exploratory, or entirely personal and full of bias. It is called criticism and not theory, or it is interpreted politically, as a disguised version of Marxism, or humanism.

(Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 7)

Here Denzin and Lincoln usefully outline the key objections to qualitative research from the perspective of “hard science” positivists from fields such as chemistry, economics and psychology, which “are often seen as the crowning achievements of Western civilisation” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 7). However, as Maxwell suggests, qualitative research is not easier than quantitative research nor are they different ways of doing the same thing:
Qualitative and quantitative methods are not simply different ways of doing the same thing. Instead, they have different strengths and logics and are often best used to address different questions and purposes. The strengths of qualitative research derive primarily from its inductive approach, its focus on specific situations or people, and its emphasis on words rather than numbers. (Maxwell, 1996, p. 17)

Whilst qualitative inquiry faces criticism for being vague and anecdotal (Mason, 2002; J. Ritchie, Lewis, McNaughton Nicholls, & Ormston, 2014), as Maxwell describes, the deployment of qualitative methods as serving an entirely different purpose to quantitative methods. For example, the way in which individual organisations and frontline practitioners could not be explored in the same way through a quantitative exploration. The depth of understanding of the complex issues, challenges and areas of governance can only come from the time-laden processes of qualitative exploration; through conversations, open-ended questioning and corroboration through repeated interviews with other participants. There are also other aspects of qualitative research that causes some to approach it with trepidation, especially those from a positivist ontological position. However, as Searle highlights, these “scientific [discussions] of eligibility make assumptions that sit uncomfortably with many conceptions of qualitative social and cultural research” (Seale, 2004a, p. 72) and it is important to be aware of the many advantages it can offer to social science researchers. A further layer to add to the complexity of reliability and validity is the adoption of a social constructionist epistemology:

Scientific discussions of validity and reliability are firmly rooted in the realist tradition. Here, the task of the researcher is to find something out about the world and report findings in an objective, value-free manner. If, however, research knowledge itself is treated as a social construction, it is hard to sustain a commitment to realism and objectivity. (Seale, 2004a, p. 72)

As outlined elsewhere in this thesis, even amongst those investigating urban unrest, there is a conflict between social constructionist and realists; with the latter arguing that social scientists never go beyond the well-trodden ground of governmentality. However, the argument in this study in particular is that whilst it is not the intention to ‘clear the blame’ of any particular social group and their actions during the riots, the key focus is to unpack that Government’s rationale for responding to the riots using housing-mechanisms; through which the argument suggests that this response is the result of ongoing narratives that have constructed particular issues around the perceptions of social housing, tenants and the way in which they behave. Whilst the breadth of information that can be elicited from a survey, for example, may be absent, in its place is the depth of information that come with exploratory research methods such as semi-structured interviews, which were adopted in this study (and discussed further, below). The advantages to such approach, in relation to quantitative research, include the revelations that such depth can offer:

An exploratory approach can reveal phenomena that have not been predicted in advance. Thus it can be said that quantitative research often establishes the prevalence of things already
known about, whereas in-depth case study research can find things that no one has ever noticed before. (Seale, 2004a, p. 76)

Given the focus of this research is around the way policies were amended in response to the 2011 riots, it is important to be able to explore and consider the way in which policy is constructed through the language used, which Marston (2000) explains cannot be sufficiently undertaken using a positivist approach, as it fails to “address the way in which policy language constructs welfare identities” (Marston, 2000, p. 349).

In order to make sense of the empirical data collection in this study, it is important to have an analytical framework to provide a way of interpreting the data. The framework for this research also adopts governmentality as an underpinning tool for analysis. Governmentality has faced much criticism for a number of reasons including its disregard for empirical reality (McKee, 2009) and therefore it was important in this study to ensure that it does not follow the same trajectory, whereby the messiness of social reality is ignored. Therefore, adopting a ‘realist governmentality’ approach (McKee, 2009) is important to ensure rigour within this study, including recognising the multiple voices involved in the social processes of governing (and resisting governance):

By focusing on strategies from below which aim to resist governmental ambitions, this emphasizes that subjects are reflexive and can accommodate, adapt, contest or resist top-down endeavours to govern them if they so wish. Recognizing multiple voices and the contested nature of identity may also negate the tendency to focus on mentalities of rule from the perspective of the rulers, programmers and planners alone, thereby introducing a more grounded perspective. (McKee, 2009, 479)

Rose et al. also highlight this criticism, and further support the rationale for undertaking fieldwork with frontline practitioners, who have to deal with the on-the-ground complexities of daily life:

Some have suggested that these analyses [governmentality] have focused only upon the mind of the programmer and ignore the messy world of realpolitik, of implementation and nonimplementation – a world far from the serene world pictured in the texts studied by the governmentalists. (Rose et al., 2006, p. 99)

Here, along with other more recent work (as alluded to above) demonstrates the real concern amongst critical governmentalists is about ensuring that research does take into account the disordered reality beyond the texts. It is this point where the scope of qualitative research becomes not only useful, but essential, in ensuring that the theoretical framework underpinning this research will provide effective and robust research through effective analysis and interpretation of the empirical data.

**The scope and limitations to qualitative research**

When considering the research methodology, it is also important to be aware of its inseparable relationship to the epistemological underpinnings and theoretical frameworks of the study to
ensure reconciliation between the different aspects and to design a research project whereby the many different components demonstrate congruence, allowing the initial research aims and objectives to be fulfilled.

It is also important to be aware of the “implicit hypocrisy” that belies a social constructionist methodology. By this Burr is referring to the academic’s agency in the research project and their ability, or even inability, to take an entirely objective perspective of the data, the research participants and the discourse. Burr explains:

As Craib (1997) rightly points out, there is an implicit hypocrisy in a social constructionism that must assume some agentic subject – the academic – who is capable of standing outside of discourse and commenting upon it for the benefit of lay people, who are simply subject to discourse. (Burr, 2003, p. 183)

This presents a particular difficulty to social constructionist scholars: how do you become sufficiently qualified to take the agentic role? There is an inherent dilemma for any qualitative researcher around positionality and how to separate oneself from the participants insofar as is possible. It is impossible to entirely detach personal perspectives from research, but in order to help produce rigorous and robust analysis, the use of frameworks helps to ensure that data is interrogated. In terms of the empirical data collection here, 30 qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted. These were, as much as was possible, driven by the research participants. Basic questions and prompts were offered to keep the conversation relevant to the subject, but the prioritisation of the key areas of interest was left to the participants. Transcription and early coding allowed the researcher to begin to identify key arguments or points being made, which could then be ‘tested’ in future interviews. For example, the research could suggest that other participants have said or argued a particular point and then seek the new participant’s view. Without ‘leading the witness’, so to speak, it was felt that this gave practitioners something to challenge their own thinking and practices, often resulting in balanced responses where participants would see the positive aspects of other practitioners’ view and then they could build on this with their own views or ways of working. As much as possible, it was felt this left the interviewer as neutral as possible in the interaction, as any views being put forward were of other practitioners, and not those of the researcher.
4.3 In the field: A reflexive account of the empirical study

Methods adopted

The main method adopted in this study was face-to-face interviews,\(^9\) augmented by the analysis of a number of key documents. The data used in the final analysis is mainly drawn from the transcripts of the interviews; however the document analysis provides a useful contextual precursor to the commentary elicited from the interview.

For this study, a total of 30 face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were conducted with housing and behaviour control practitioners across England. These interviews lasted, on average, 45-minutes and were recorded and then transcribed verbatim, which were then available for analysis.

Face-to-face interviews

The advantages of using a semi-structured approach are usefully outlined by Flick where he demonstrates that an interviewees’ “subjective theory”, by which he means an interviewees’ “complex stock of knowledge about the topic under study” (Flick, 2006, p. 155) can be elicited through such an approach:

This knowledge includes assumptions that are explicit and immediate and which interviewees can express spontaneously in answering an open question. These are complemented by implicit assumptions. In order to articulate these, the interviews must be supported by methodological aids, which is why different types of questions…are applied… They are used to reconstruct the interviewee’s subjective theory about the issue under study. (Flick, 2006, p. 156)

The interviews were conducted with practitioners in various housing and behaviour control capacities across three geographical locales (see Appendix C for the interview schedules); London, Greater Manchester and the West Midlands conurbations. These interviews were conducted between December 2012 and September 2013. The interviews were distributed evenly throughout the nine months, which allowed each interview to be transcribed immediately afterwards. The advantage of this was that it offered an opportunity to reflect on the interview whilst the contents of the discussion were still clear in the researcher’s mind. This allowed for any initial emerging themes or key quotes to be considered. Secondly, it allowed for a reflexive approach to be adopted for future interviews. For example, if questions being asked were noticeably unclear or ambiguous, they could be amended for future interviews and if issues were arising in interviews that were not being explicitly asked to participants, these topics could be written into future interview schedules. Likewise, any

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\(^9\) With the exception of one interview which was conducted via Skype because the difficulty arranging a face-to-face interview with the participant.
questions that appeared to be tangential to the central issues could be written out of future interview schedules. This was also useful in terms of identifying when particular issues had reached saturation point, whereby the answers being provided were identical and it was felt that the issue in question was sufficiently addressed by participants.

These interviews had a number of topics identified as important, which then allowed the research participants to explore these areas, drawing on other inter-related or disparate areas that they considered important and relevant. This helped to draw out some of the social and political complexities that practitioners have to grapple with in their day-to-day roles, as well as helping them to articulate their understanding of the disorders and subsequent governmental responses.

**Document analysis**

The adoption of document analysis to augment the interview data was to help ensure rigour was built into study. This was also an important part of the analysis, as it ensured that the key issues that were being debated were understood and acknowledged, or explored further where relevant. The documents used for this analysis included the ‘official’ response to the riots, which included an interim and final report from the Riots Communities and Victims Panel, other reports that were conducted both within the housing sector and from organisations with vested interests in people’s housing, welfare and criminal justice issues. Where relevant, responses to the consultation proposing the extension of additional powers to evict social housing tenants were referred to.

Using documents in qualitative research is common practice, with the understanding of “document” as fairly broad:

> Documents are standardised artefacts, in so far as they typically occur in particular formats: as notes, case reports, contracts, drafts, death certificates, remarks, diaries, statistics, annual reports, certificates, judgements, letters or expert opinions. (Flick, 1996, p. 246)

However, a number of important considerations need to be taken into account when selecting documents, including some of the following questions:

- Who has produced this document and for what purpose and for whom is the document’s intended audience?
- Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?
- Is the evidence credible? Is the evidence free from error and distortion?
- Is the meaning clear and comprehensible? (Adapted from Flick, 1996)

The documents used in this research (a full list of the documents included can be found in Appendix D) can be considered reliable in respect of their sources being established
organisations with influence within their specific remits (i.e. working with voluntary organisations, representing housing organisations or working to curtail gang violence to name a few). The riots were of national interest and therefore the responses were often intended to illuminate particular aspects of society and social policy (i.e. The Runnymede Trust focused on race, NCVO focused on the role of third sector organisations in society and so on), to give some context to these particular issues and to start offering some future recommendations, according the organisation’s interests and remit. The remit for these reports would be to offer an erudite analysis of the effects of the riots on each particular field to the government and other political actors, with recommendations of how national and local government should best respond. The underlying rationale for organisations producing these reports was to offer more detailed perspectives into key issues such as housing, gangs and racial tensions in order to highlight the potential unintended consequences that populist ideological responses could have on the future life courses of individuals and the effect this could have on communities more broadly.

**Participant selection and recruitment**

In order to get a good understanding of what effect the legislative changes would have on the social housing sector, it was determined that the sampling selection would be a mix of frontline and strategic stakeholders within housing and behaviour control remits. These descriptors have been left intentionally vague; this is because there is much variation in the job titles given to practitioners. The labels attributed here therefore serve two key purposes: firstly, they allow the reader to get an understanding of the research participants’ role, but also maintain the anonymity of their identities. Table 4.2 outlines the participants included in this study and their geographical locale and professional remit in more detail.

**Table 4.2: Research Participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>Organisation type</th>
<th>Geographical locale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ASB Officer</td>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Housing Officer</td>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ASB Officer</td>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ASB Officer</td>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Estate Safety Officer</td>
<td>ALMO</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gang Prevention Officer</td>
<td>ALMO</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ASB Officer</td>
<td>Local Authority</td>
<td>West Midlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ASB Officer</td>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>ASB Officer</td>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>East London</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ASB Officer</td>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>ASB Officer</td>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>East London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Solicitor</td>
<td>Legal Practice</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Participant recruitment initially involved a purposive sampling technique, because of the nature of the participants required for this study. As the aim was to garner the nuanced perspectives from the frontline (the ‘messiness’ of reality), it was important to recruit those working on-the-ground. Often these are the practitioners who do not have profiles online, or email addresses that are widely publicised, so initial contact was more difficult. In addition to this contacts of the supervisory team were also approached to take part and suggest further contacts. This eventually led to the snowballing of more participants being recruited through these networks. This was a slow, often challenging process for a number of key factors. Firstly, there was an element of non-receptiveness to academic research by practitioners. Secondly, the practitioners being approached for this study often had busy and demanding work schedules, which made it difficult to prioritise the time to spend participating in this study. Thirdly, there was a strong element of trepidation when talking about the riots, both in the sense that people felt defensive, to some degree, about the responses to the riots in the housing sector and policy because of mainstream media, and people raised concerns about feeling like their voice was representing their organisation. This latter point, whilst mitigated by stringent ethical conduct, did make it a particular challenge to recruit frontline workers, who felt they had to ‘gain permission’ from their managers before participating, whilst those at a strategic level had more autonomy to make such decisions. The relationship between the researcher and the participant remained arms-length, with participation just being a one-hour interview and with only very minor follow up for points of clarification.

Geographical locations sampled, as discussed elsewhere, focused on three key large urban areas in England: London, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester. These areas were
selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, they offered a good mix of demographics and levels of violence and disorder experienced throughout the 2011 riots. Each of the areas selected experienced various pockets of disorder, significant enough to make national news. Secondly, each of the areas selected had significant levels of social housing within the city region, which meant that there were more housing and ASB officers working in this area. Finally, from a practical perspective, each of the locations were easy to access within the budgetary and time constraints of the researcher.

Building on the research of academics such as Clapham, Franklin and Saugeres (2000), for example, this study was concerned with how local housing and behaviour control practitioners reacted to national responses to the 2011 riots, in particular to the functions of tenancy management. The study adopted the perspective of Clapham et al., whereby practitioners should not simply be viewed as ciphers but rather active in the production of responses (Clapham et al., 2000). This will be explored more fully throughout the empirical chapters, but briefly to add some additional context, this idea is that practitioners themselves are active in the production of responses; shaping and resisting particular powers according to what they think will be most effective in their context.

Participant recruitment and involvement in this research was, particularly at the beginning of the process, a difficult one. These challenges will be discussed more fully later, however contextually, it is important as these challenges shaped the way in which participants were included in the research and the geographical locales that were subsequently considered. Initially the intention was to focus solely on London, where a number of London boroughs would be used as case studies to explore these issues. However, it quickly became apparent that there was resistance from the practitioners that were being targeted for this research. This resistance was two-fold: practitioners were saturated by previous requests from researchers (on an organisational level) and there was trepidation to participate, presumably for fear of incriminating an organisation’s response to dealing with the 2011 riots (on a personal level). This challenge was overcome by adapting the research design, which as aforementioned, is an important part of the research design process; it is essential, as a qualitative researcher, to reflect upon each part of the research process throughout the study and to adapt accordingly if shortcoming are apparent. Upon reflection, the research has profited from this revised approach.

The principal benefit from the revised approach to geographical locales included in the study meant that a shift from a London-centric to a England-wide focus fits into the underlying theoretical framework more advantageously taking into account the sensitivities to temporal and spatial issues, including the “micro-level factors that may shape universalistic
governmental rationalities” (McKee, 2009, p. 480). It also takes into consideration the nuances at various local contexts:

> Examining the various local contexts in which governmental rationalities, strategies and techniques are actively contested opens up a critical space in which to explore how central ‘plans’ are mediated from below and the way in which projects of rule are applied differently in different places. (McKee, 2009, p. 480)

Again, in line with McKee’s emphasis on taking into consideration the nuances of local contexts, this research widened its scope from beyond London to focus on two other locations: Greater Manchester and the West Midlands. Using this wider geographical scope allowed research participants to be included from different locations, which faced different experiences during the 2011 riots and, as later chapters will explain, taking into consideration the context of locality is very important when exploring the 2011 riots and subsequent responses. All participants had, to some degree, involvement with either social housing management or the policies and practices of controlling people’s behaviour and managing communities. However, the types of organisation and specific locations varied across the spectrum of practitioners. This was an enlightening process, as the fundamental motivation for this research was to explore the practitioners’ perspective of the updated legislation offering housing providers extended powers of possession in the context of urban disorder. Although the new riot clause provision is only a discretionary one (something that is itself important and is considered in more detail in the empirical chapters) it is nonetheless applicable to all social housing providers.

**Participants, organisations and local context**

Given the sensitive and polemic nature of this study for practitioners\(^\text{10}\) recruitment was slow to begin with and difficult throughout the process. However, once certain connections were made, there was an element of snowballing. This did mean that geographically, participants were often from different areas within the three main research locales. This provides an interesting and nuanced perspective of what impact legislative changes could have on the social housing sector, as well as being able to explore and elicit the varied experiences of practitioners during the time of the 2011 riots.

The participants included in the research operated at different levels within the housing management and behaviour control hierarchy. The decision to ensure participants were from different roles within an organisation (from management to frontline) was part of the research design. The rationale for doing so was to enable an insight into whether national policy shifts

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\(^{10}\) Whilst the research itself is not considered sensitive, insofar as it is another study into the 2011 riots and is not putting anyone in any direct ‘ethical danger’, practitioners in some cases demonstrated a reluctance to speak to the research for fear of incriminating the organisation’s response to the riots. The limitations of the study and the ethical considerations are covered in more detail throughout this chapter.
are viewed differently between those working at a strategic level and those working on the frontline responsible for the delivery of such policy changes. While the sample may not have been large enough to really draw any strong conclusions between the different levels of seniority, from the scale of the study it felt like there was some alignment between the different hierarchies within an organisation.

During the research further dimensions to the participants became apparent, a serendipitous encounter, but one that offered an interesting perspective to the research nonetheless. A naïve assumption was that all research participants, and in particular the housing managers, were entirely distinct from their subjects; the social housing tenant. This was, in fact, not always the case. A number of research participants came from families who lived, or still live, in social housing or were in fact themselves social housing tenants. This, along with other ‘identity factors’ such as gender, age and ethnicity also impacted on the practitioners’ perspectives and their positionality as an authoritative figure:

Me personally, I have a challenge in that I am quite young. So I’m only twenty-six and there are occasions when I’m talking to older tenants and having to not lecture, but tell them…not what to do, but how to maintain their tenancy. And you do get a lot of…you know… “You’re a kid”, you know, because I’m talking to fifty-year-olds. So that can be quite difficult… It’s about us recognising what our role is with them and… sometimes I think it can get quite heavy handed about things, knocking on the door all the time. I’m a tenant of a housing association, so I know what it’s like to the other side of it. I don’t always want my housing officer knocking at the door. (Housing Officer, RSL, Greater Manchester)

The reflexive research model allowed this new revelation in the methodology to offer positive insights into the practitioners’ perceptions of the particular issues being focused upon. It also demonstrates the importance in exploring the ‘messiness’ of empirical reality. It also highlighted the complexity of power relationships between tenants and housing providers, and that in fact it was not that the housing provider governed their subjects as such, but rather supported them to maintain their tenancies and adhere to wider regulation.

The organisations included in the research also varied in size, scope and structure. There were a number of national organisations, independent organisations and local authorities in respect of housing practitioners, as well as other research participants from the police force and other statutory and third-sector organisations. This was significant because the resources available to one organisation may change the approach and scope of their work in comparison to another, say smaller, organisation that is unable to equip themselves with the same resources.

The local context is also important and in this research varied. From some organisations, as discussed above, their ‘pepper potted’ housing stock meant that they could draw their experiences from various areas including more affluent areas, or communities where the population is mainly the elderly to other areas where they had housing stock that was considered more deprived and imbued with social problems. Other practitioners were based
on the estates that they managed, or within a small geographical location where their properties were contained. Here the experiences were more restricted in the respect that they could only talk about a very small area, but nonetheless was illuminating. For example, in East London, where the majority of the London research participants were based, some of the areas studied in particular suffer from high levels of deprivation coupled with social problems (high unemployment, low wages when – often insecure – employment is gained and high rents making housing unaffordable for many, as well as social issues such as diverse nationalities) as well as clear material inequality\(^{11}\) between the housing stock being considered in this research and the multinational banking firms located in the prestigious Canary Wharf. Combined, these different reasons were considered the ingredients for the ‘perfect storm’ for rioting and yet very little unrest was observed in these areas. Nonetheless, the tenants living in these areas could potentially be subjected to the same sanctions as areas that suffered high levels of violence during the disorder. The significance of this and its importance to the research will be considered in more detail in chapters five, six and seven, but for the purposes of this section it is important to state the significance and insight gained from researching in both areas affected by the riots and areas that avoided any (or certainly any major) incidents during the unrest in 2011.

**Limitations to the study**

There were a number of limitation and challenges to the study that will be addressed in this section. A number of initial and apparent limitations can be addressed and overcome relatively straightforwardly.\(^{12}\) For example, Tottenham, the London borough where the 2011 riot started, was omitted from the research. Its inclusion could have offered useful insights into the responses to the 2011 riots, however, exploring areas that were not affected by the riots to same degree, yet were still affected by the responses to the riots equally, offered an interesting perspective to explore the power and resistance mechanisms to national policy-making at a local level. The study also did not include practitioners from other high profile locations such as Wandsworth where their decision to pursue an NOSP of a rioter’s parent made national headlines. One of the main reasons for not pursuing these particular cases were pragmatic; field work began in December 2012, which was over a year after the riots and it having pursued such lines of inquiry feedback being received suggested that these prominent areas had worked hard to move on from the riots and they were not prepared to reflect back on

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\(^{11}\) The contrast between the condensed social housing stock and the tower blocks of Canary Wharf was startling. The researcher, waiting in the reception of one RSL waiting for the interview participant could overhear a conversation between a tenant and the landlord trying to negotiate a rent payment scheme of a few pounds per week, whilst being able to see the bankers moving between desks and offices in the tower blocks of Canary Wharf.

\(^{12}\) The researcher presented the emerging findings to a number of audiences at academic workshops and conference, which enabled a reflexive approach to the study’s limitation to be adopted and considered. This process has proved invaluable to the shaping of this research and is therefore central to the methodology of the study.
these experiences. It is also important to reiterate at this point that the aim of the study is not to explore why people rioted, but to reflect upon the policy changes post-2011 riots and how practitioners responded to these changes. Given that the riot clause will affect all local authorities in England, having a diversity of perspectives, including the views of those practitioners from areas where they will be affected by legislative changes, but were not necessarily affected by the riots, arguably provides a more holistic perspective of the responses to the disorders.

Having established some resistance to researchers investigating the riots in the geographical areas discussed above, flexibility in the approaches to participant recruitment, and the areas in which to focus the research, needed to be designed into the process of participant recruitment. Given particular sensitivities to the riots, and the sense in some particular areas that they had provided their response to the riots and were trying to move attention away from the events of August 2011, meant that access to some of the most heavily-affected areas was not possible.

A second limitation to the study, it could be argued, is that the voices being included here are identifiable as ‘officials’ and ‘professionals’ rather than ‘citizens’ or ‘lay’ perspectives, which for Prior and Barnes (2011) all agents are “involved in complex relations of power” when it comes to the processes of delivering social policies (Prior & Barnes, 2011, 268). This research would, in some ways, have profited from having the voices of those affected by policy changes heard. However, within the scope of this study, this additional perspective would have undoubtedly have meant that particular issues would not have been given the space in which they need to be sufficiently analysed. Of course the individuals who are affected by government policy are important when considering issues such as governance, but a study to include these voices would work best by adopting a co-production methodology, which would involve these individuals in the research design, rather than simply seeing them as subject to be investigated. More discussion about this can be found in the final section of the conclusion, which looks at areas for further study.

Finally, a third limitation that became apparent throughout the study, but which would have been difficult to overcome given the time barriers, is a longitudinal perspective. To have been able to revisit the research participants after a given period of time to explore how, if at all, attitudes had changed over time, to reflect the ongoing austerity measures and other socio-economic challenges that have arisen since the election of a Conservative Government, would have offered a further dimension to this study, and in particular to how practitioners and frontline officers react and respond to national government rhetoric.

4.4 Analysing the data
Adopting a reflexive approach to analysis

Software was not used for the coding and analysis of the data in this study. Instead, the manual thematic coding was undertaken thoroughly, adopting a reflexive approach. Key areas of interest were highlighted and noted from each of the transcripts, all of which were transcribed verbatim. Once key themes were highlighted, they were cross referenced with existing literature to check what, if anything, had been written on this topic. As the interviews progressed this process was ongoing, allowing for reflection between the interviews to begin to filter out topics that were already exhaustively written about, or that were not directly relevant to the unique contribution of this study. Where particular topics were highlighted as interesting, with relatively little existing literature available, these areas were prioritised in future interviews. Having the fieldwork span a considerable number of months (December 2012 – July 2013), this reflexive approach worked well, offering more time and space to review the relevance and importance of the way in which the interviews were conducted.

Coding approach and emerging themes

Coding of the transcripts was an ongoing and iterative process throughout the data collection stage of the research. Having conducted 30 interviews, each approximately one-hour long there was a large amount of data that needed to be processed. It was at this point that a coding process needed to be adopted. This is an important stage for a number of reasons, as Seale (2004b) highlights:

A coding scheme emerges both deductively from pre-existing concerns, questions and hypotheses, and inductively from the data itself. Unlike the classical quantitative social survey, where the aims of the research project stay relatively fixed from beginning to end, qualitative research can often be more exploratory, and can end up addressing issues that were not imagined before the project began. For this reason, it may be appropriate to understand coding as being also a type of indexing… whereby the analyst is marking sections of text according to whether they look like [they are] contributing to emerging themes. (Seale, 2004b, p. 313)

This exploration of themes through coding, as Seale states, did raise issues and new areas of interest that were not considered at the beginning of the project. The coding process was therefore also an iterative one, whereby a process of going between interviews, transcripts and existing literature helped to shape the data and to draw out pertinent issues as well as identifying gaps within the existing body of work where this research could offer a timely and important original contribution.

Ethical consideration

Before being able to transition from desk-based research into the ‘field’, the research needed to be granted ethical approval by the relevant ethical committee. As Flick explains, the
consideration of research ethics is important, especially in studies that involve human participant (see Appendix B for examples of the consent forms sent to research participants):

Codes of ethics are formulated to regulate the relations of researchers to the people and fields they intend to study. Principles of research ethics ask that researchers avoid harming participants involved in the process by respecting and taking account their needs and interests. (Flick, 2006, p. 45)

Within this study the research participants broadly share a similar educational level as the researcher and are able to communicate and process the information with minimal external support, that is to say that research participants in this study were not considered to be ‘vulnerable people’ (Flick, 2006). Within this study, ethical consideration was built into each aspect of the research process, including research participant recruitment. The main method of recruitment for research participants was through email, either directly or via other agencies that offered their support to participant recruitment. Within these emails, it was stressed that participation was entirely voluntary, participants could withdraw from the study at any point without having to give a reason and their name, role and organisation would be omitted from any of the research outputs to ensure anonymity. In a number of cases, where something the participant has said, either through a direct comment or reference to something that potentially removes their anonymity, extra care has been taken to ensure that what is being said by participants does not reveal their identity. This can be either through the use of vague descriptors of what they have said (if they are, for example, referring to the area in which they work) or by omitting the direct quotes in their entirety and instead discussing the point through general prose.

Participants all received a research information sheet and a consent form (see Appendix B) at the point they agreed to participate in the research. A number of the participants returned these forms signed ahead of our meeting, for others it was explained and completed at the beginning of the interview. In the case of the former, the issue was raised again before the interview was conducted, to ensure that the interview participant was entirely sure of the interview process and the way that the research was going to be used. In a number of cases, participants talked about their comments “being on the record”, the implication being that they are happy for their names to be attached to their comments. However, for the processes of equity and transparency, all names and organisations have been omitted.

Each interview was audio recorded for later transcription and analysis. This, again, is something that each participant expressly gave their permission for me to do. Audio data will be stored securely for one year following the thesis submission. Transcripts will remain with

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13 It was decided that even where participants did give expressed consent to use their names and/or organisation they would still be omitted, as the inclusion of such personal information would not add any value to the research or the findings.
the author, stored securely, for an indefinite period. The advantages to audio recording the interviews is twofold; firstly, it allows the research to give full attention to facilitating the interview, including considering any follow up questions from the interviewee’s prior remark and secondly, it allows the research to go back to what was said and listen, verbatim, to the comments made – and surrounding context – to ensure that participants’ remarks are not skewed or misinterpreted.

4.5 Conclusion

Given the nature of this study, with the underpinning aim of elucidating nuanced and localised perspectives of the 2011 riots, a qualitative approach was adopted. This approached allowed for sufficient exploration of the complex field of housing and ASB policy and practice. Qualitative research has faced considerable criticism because of its apparent lack of rigour. In the context of social policy, and for this study, this was not considered a barrier. By adopting an analytical framework and taking the relevant steps to ensure that a robust data collection process, and subsequent approach to the analysis, countermands this critique.

The fieldwork for this study focused on the practitioners’ perspective on amendments to housing and ASB legislation. In the context of the 2011 riots, this was a perspective that was largely overlooked, which is why it is an important area to research. In addition to the practitioner interviews, this research also explored some of the key responses to the riots through the analysis of third-sector and housing organisation reports and recommendations.

This study has developed the housing-disorder nexus by bridging the existing areas of housing, ASB and criminology. By employing a qualitative research method, this area of academic study has been enhanced, giving a broader perspective of issues associated with housing and behaviour management in the context of urban disorders. The iterative approach of data collection and reviewing the literature means that relevant developments are being made to the field, whilst the adoption of a practitioner-focused study means that there is also potential for broader policy and practice impact as there has been an element of ‘buy in’ from participants.

A reflexive account of the methodology

Throughout this chapter there have been a number of points where the weaknesses have been identified. It is the purpose for this final section to reflect on the way in which the methods developed throughout the process from the original intention to the manifestation of the final product.
The original intention for this study was to undertake a full discourse analysis from a cross-section of national and local newspapers on the riots. However, it was always important to ensure that within this study there was input from frontline practitioners. In order to ensure that this cross-sectional research design was employed in a meaningful way, and under the time constraints of this study, the discourse analysis element was reduced to ensure capacity to undertake a good number of interviews was possible. From early scoping there was in excess of 10,000 news stories on the riots over the one-year period from August 2011 to August 2012. There was much duplication in the stories, as well as many that did not offer particular relevance to the focus of this study which was exploring the policy responses to the disorders and to better understand the how the housing-related responses fitted into these. It was therefore decided to take only the ‘grey literature’; government reports, third sector and charitable organisations and any relevant housing organisation responses. This provided a much more focused search of pertinent material that fitted into the more specific focus of understanding the role of housing mechanisms in the context of urban unrest and in particular the 2011 riots.

It is also worth acknowledging that this study was part of an Economic and Social Research Council studentship. This meant that the broad conception of the study parameters was already in place (urban unrest and housing tenure) and it was then over the course of the scoping (largely confined to the first year of study) that the more focused framing took place. It was also informed by the data collection. While the research questions were preliminarily designed from the visible gaps in knowledge spanning housing, ASB and social control literature through the interviews with practitioners particular priorities and areas of importance emerged and this also contributed to the framing of the study.

Finally, it is worth noting the areas of England where the data collection took place. As is evident, areas like Tottenham and Wandsworth were not included in the study, despite being central to the disorders. This was for two main reasons. Firstly, access to the relevant people in these areas was very difficult and it was said that practitioners and policy makers in these areas have been inundated with researchers. Given the fieldwork did not commence until 2013 (two years after the riots) many of the local authorities most affected by the disorder had been over-researched and had made their official response and position on the disorders, and respective policy decisions, evident and wished to move on. However, there is still much scope for exploratory research in these areas with the relevant practitioners and is something that should be revisited.
5. The Construction of Issues and Responses

The connection between housing policy and the 2011 riots was not necessarily immediately obvious. The riots were largely reported as taking place in urban centres, with a particular focus on the looting aspects of the disorder; narratives focused on young people, expensive brands and wanton violence. Nonetheless, the DCLG responded by offering housing providers greater powers to withdraw social housing from rioters. It is the aim of this chapter to unpick some of these narratives through closer scrutiny of policy and third-sector responses to the riots and to begin to understand how and why social housing narratives became intertwined in the broader discourse.
5.1. Introduction

Given the unprecedented scale and contagion of the 2011 riots, it was unsurprising that they were quickly followed by prominent political pronouncements and sensational media coverage. There was an expectation upon the Government to respond quickly. This arguably led to an “information vacuum” (Hallsworth & Brotherton, 2011; Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011); a combination of contradictory, conflicting and reactionary responses based on the release of inaccurate information and premature assumptions.\(^\text{14}\) The sense that immediate political responses were reactionary was shared by commentators:

> On the Left, much of the attention has focused on the role of economic inequality and economic grievances among sections of society. On the Right, attention has focused more heavily on the role of criminality and morality. But as one commentator points out, amidst this debate there has been little in the way of reason ‘and rigorous scientific approach’ to understanding these events. (Goodwin, 2011, np)

It is therefore the aim of this chapter to examine in more detail the political and policy responses to the 2011 riots, taking into account the complexities and contradictions with a particular focus on how housing was constructed within these discourses as a potential policy solution for the prevention of future riots and to work towards fixing the societal issues of ‘Broken Britain’.

For the purposes of this research selected responses are included in the analysis. These responses include the political and media pronouncements of prominent Government ministers in the immediate aftermath of the riots, reports published by organisations and local councils, the official Government response from the Riots Panel and the extensive research conducted collaboratively by The Guardian newspaper and the LSE. Where relevant, other interpretations and reports will be used to illustrate and corroborate the arguments being made in this chapter. By drawing on a broad range of responses, published at various stages following the riots, it is possible to identify the way in which the issues and responses were constructed and to what extent the 2011 riots were presented as a ‘housing problem’.

**Understanding and challenging responses to the riots**

Analysing the 2011 riots is complex, in large part because of the available data and competing claims. Even the responses that drew upon statistical data, often presented as factual

\(^{14}\) For example, it was initially understood and reported that Mark Duggan was in possession of a weapon and had fired the first shot at the police, with the bullet becoming lodged in an officer’s radio, which was incorrect. The Riots Panel talk about this in their interim report, saying “[t]he rumours surrounding the shooting were not countered effectively. This was exacerbated by the release of information concerning an ‘exchange of fire’ which had to later be retracted. In this ‘information vacuum’ unfounded reports via social media could gain currency” (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011). This is just one example of how the immediate responses were misleading and contradictory in the immediate period during and directly following the riots.
certainties, should be treated with care and interrogated accordingly. Ball and Drury’s (2012) analysis of the riots statistics highlights why some of the figures used by commentators to support particular claims are deeply problematic:

At face value, the results suggest that those brought before the courts in the aftermath were fairly characteristic of those who generally appear before the courts in a given year. Thus the inference is that the majority of participants in the August riots were already ‘criminals’. However, as is becoming clear, this interpretation of the data was seriously flawed. (Ball & Drury, 2012, p. 10)

Whilst the construction that most rioters were recidivists was only one strand of the riots discourse, it does illustrate that some of the apparent ‘facts’ used in response to the riots were flawed. Ball and Drury go on to explain that in spite of this, it did not stop politicians using the statistics to characterize the riots:

Public statements that most rioters were already ‘criminals’ treated as unproblematic the circular way that the data was produced, with those already known to the police most likely to be identified and arrested. This simple statistical flaw did not restrain politicians from knowingly (or unknowingly) using the data to both characterize the August riots and define policy responses. (Ball & Drury, 2012, p. 13)

It is also important to consider the way in which the rioters were largely represented as having criminal records, with the implication being that these people were ‘career criminals’ (London Evening Standard, 2011). This was especially true in the immediate aftermath of the riots, although the narrative was sustained in some of the later responses to the riots. Specifically, Ball and Drury (2012) explain that “previous research on urban riots has pointed out that arrest or conviction figures neither necessarily reflect crowd composition nor ‘riot’ severity” (Ball & Drury, 2012, p. 11) and that participants of recent urban disorders can be “divided into four categories based on two sets of criteria: (1) face covered or uncovered; (2) previously known to the police or not known to the police” (Ball & Drury, 2012, p. 11). The table below illustrates this in terms of the likelihood of riot participants being identified:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Known to police</th>
<th>Not known to police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Face uncovered</td>
<td>Most likely to be identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face covered</td>
<td>Less likely to be identified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taken from Ball and Drury (2012)

This means, and again particularly in the immediate aftermath of the riots, that because of the reliance on CCTV evidence, it is very likely that those people arrested and/or charged for riot related offences would have already been known to the police and were more likely to already

15 ‘Career criminal’ was a label widely attributed to the rioters, in line with the narrative that the rioters were the ‘usual suspects’. In the article quoted here, the label ‘career criminal’ had been attributed to the rioters by the acting Head of Scotland Yard at the time of the riots, Tim Godwin.
have a criminal record. This inevitably affects the data and the knowledge we have about the rioters. It also allowed some commentators to frame the riots and rioters in a particular way, without explaining the complexities that lie behind the data, enabling myths to be perpetuated and presented as factual.

It is important to be aware of this when considering any response to the riots, as it is indicative of the complexities in responding to urban disorder more generally. The unprecedented nature of the 2011 riots, along with the early knee-jerk responses caused by the information vacuum and the reliance on flawed data or presupposed understandings of the disorder led to some responses being somewhat misleading, adding further layers of complexity to the explanations for the riots. Given this complexity, there is a need to explore the way in which the disorder was constructed in order to interrogate the rationale of the policy solutions and the way in which those who are responsible for delivering policies on the ‘frontline’ perceived such responses.

5.1 Reactions to the riots

Starting with a broad overview of the grey literature, some of the key messages are being drawn out to start mapping the way in which mainstream reports began with a moral outrage against the riots and moved towards a local level focus on particular social groups; in particular social housing tenants in this case. The key question here is: why did housing, and housing mechanisms, become part of the response to the 2011 riots? In the immediate aftermath of the 2011 riots it would be reasonable to suggest that the responses could be interpreted as reactive. Illustrating this point was David Cameron’s reaction to the Wandsworth Council decision to begin proceedings to evict a social housing tenant whose son was involved in the riots,16 declaring: “I think for too long we have taken too soft an attitude to people who loot and pillage their own community. If you do that you should lose your right to housing at a subsidized rate” (quoted in Topping & Wintour, 2011, np).

This announcement came on the 12 August 2011; just two days after the riots subsided, highlighting the immediacy of the political reactions. The idea that we, the majority of the British nation, have tolerated the behaviour of riotous individuals was a common narrative running throughout the initial responses to the riots. David Cameron’s response made an explicit connection between the disorder and social housing tenants. This pronouncement also has symbolic significance in terms of who the Government supposed were rioting and where they came from. The legal and policy suggestion of evicting social housing tenants

16 See Section 5.2 for a fuller discussion about housing and the riots and see Figure 5.1 for the specific details of this case.
demonstrated the Government’s perception that the riots were a problem of social housing tenants. Such announcements began to legitimise the punitive approaches to sanctioning the rioters, and their families. It was these reactionary responses, criticised by other actors such as the Trades Union Congress (TUC), which revived the Broken Britain narrative, by drawing on an understanding that the 2011 riots were purely an issue of criminality and a lack of morality. This emphasis on morality was another prominent narrative device, used in an apparent attempt to deflect the blame for the riots away from the state and towards the individual, demonstrated through David Cameron’s speech addressing the riots:17

Everywhere I’ve been this past week, in Salford, Manchester, Birmingham, Croydon, people of every background, colour and religion have shared the same moral outrage and hurt for our country. Because this is Britain. This is a great country of good people. Those thugs we saw last week do not represent us, nor do they represent our young people - and they will not drag us down. (Cabinet Office, 2011)

In the same speech David Cameron also refers to the rioters’ “twisted moral codes” differentiating ‘them’ (the rioters) from ‘us’ (the hard-working majority)18 and thereby reinforcing his position that the riots were primarily a matter of personal responsibility:

These riots were not about race: the perpetrators and the victims were white, black and Asian. These riots were not about government cuts: they were directed at high street stores, not Parliament. And these riots were not about poverty: that insults the millions of people who, whatever the hardship, would never dream of making others suffer like this. No, this was about behaviour, people showing indifference to right and wrong, people with a twisted moral code, people with a complete absence of self-restraint. (Cabinet Office, 2011)

Despite this articulation of ‘them’ and ‘us’, David Cameron’s speech concludes:

The restoration of responsibility has to cut right across society. Because whatever the arguments, we all belong to the same society, and we all have a stake in making it better. There is no ‘them’ and ‘us’ – there is us. We are all in this together, and we will mend our broken society – together. (Cabinet Office, 2011)

Between these two Cabinet Office statements there is a noticeable incoherence in what is being said, demonstrating that even within Government discourse the understanding of the disorders was conflicted and contradictory. For example, in his speech Cameron begins by defining the rioters and the majority of society as two dichotomous groups – the idea that a subset of the British population lack personal responsibility and self-restraint – which is then juxtaposed with the statement that there is no ‘them’ and ‘us’, it is just ‘us’ and we are all responsible for “repairing our broken society”. This denial of the them and us dichotomisation is countermanded by the reiteration of a Broken Britain, which Cameron has argued elsewhere

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17 For example, one argument in this thesis is that the morality narrative was powerful enough to legitimise the government responding in a punitive way, whilst simultaneously shifting the blame away from structural factors such as unemployment and poverty and placing the blame with individuals who did not take personal responsibility. This argument is discussed more in section 5.4.

18 Within the narratives of responsibility and morality is the idea that the tax-payer is a full citizen, entitled to full membership rights; by comparison, worklessness or unpaid work – such as caring for children or family members – is not considered to be an equal contribution to society, reducing the rights of such individuals to certain provisions.
is largely because of certain people within society that refuse to engage in economic activities such as paid work and paying taxes.

Other prominent Government ministers reacted in similar ways. Iain Duncan Smith MP, then Minister for Work and Pensions, also responded to the riots using this morality narrative, as his comments in The Guardian illustrate:

> While I am, like many, appalled at the events of last week, I am not entirely surprised – I have felt that Britain's social fabric has been fraying for some time. On Monday the Prime Minister spoke of the social problems in some of our communities, characterised by the breakdown of responsibility, of respect for one's neighbours and for authority. He spoke of morality, the rise of dysfunctional and broken homes, fatherlessness, and a culture in welfare and in schools that puts entitlement and rights above responsibilities and hard work. (Duncan Smith, 2011)

The perspective of the Government, as illustrated by the responses above, suggested that they perceived the riots as a cultural issue; the social pathologies of particular groups of society meant that they were predisposed to behave in a particular, often anti-social, way. David Cameron and Iain Duncan Smith also explicitly drew a distinction between hard work and responsibility on the one hand and entitlement, rights and dependency on the other. Yet in direct contradiction they explain that we are ‘all in this together’ when it comes to ‘mending our broken society’. These examples demonstrate how immediate responses were founded on a limited evidence base – with no data cited to support the alleged background of the rioters – suggesting that responses were predicated on predetermined notions and assumptions about the causes of the riots and who was involved. This was considered in non-governmental commentaries on the riots, such as the report commissioned by the Runnymede Trust (2011):

> Condemnation as opposed to explanation defined the immediate political response as the government and the mass media sought to translate the disorders into a narrative fix for the public consumption. Someone had to be blamed and it didn’t take the coalition government long to identify a folk devil that would then be made responsible for the worst disturbances the UK has witnessed since those of the 1980s. (Hallsworth & Brotherton, 2011, p. 3)

The particular folk devil being alluded to in this context is those with gang affiliations. The political responses may be read as identifying multiple folk devils ‘responsible’ for the riots by building on historical and stigmatized narratives of particular groups of individuals, such as those who do not work in paid employment, those who live in social housing or those that rely on other state benefits, not just gang members. For example, in an interview with the BBC in August 2011, David Cameron explained:

> We’ve got to find ways of enforcing responsibility in our society and if you live in a council house you are getting a discount from what other people have to pay and so with that should come some responsibilities. For those people who may struggle as a result of being evicted he said they… should have thought of that before they started burgling… in some cases it may actually help break up some of the criminal networks on some housing estates if these people are thrown out of their houses and I think quite right too. (Excerpts from an interview with David Cameron, BBC, 12 August 2011)
This quote highlights some important points. Firstly, it assumes that everyone who lives in social housing would be aware that their behaviour could have led to eviction from their property. At the time of the 2011 riots the ‘riot clause’ was not part of any legislation, so it may not have been entirely clear what the consequences would be. The nature of the disorders also meant that many of the people became involved in the riots serendipitously. Secondly, the commentary that explicitly talked about the consequences for those living in council housing could mislead the public that it was council housing tenants in particular that were responsible for the disorder. Many organisations and professional bodies also disseminated reports documenting their perspectives of what caused the disorder, with a range of interpretations and suggestions for the causes of the riots, as well as their response to the initial political pronouncements. For example, London Councils\(^{19}\) made strong reference to the notion of morality and responsibility, referring to the riots as “undermining social resilience” (London Councils, 2012), whilst their report also addressed popular perspective of the multifarious explanations for the disorders:

We believe that many factors lay behind the cause of the riots, and that these varied between groups of people, according to place, age and circumstance. However, there are a set of common factors which create an environment that appear to pre-dispose individuals to choose to step outside the law. (London Councils, 2012, p. 1)

For London Councils, these common factors were disadvantage and criminal backgrounds, educational factors leading to a sense of disengagement and a lack of aspiration - usually through worklessness; all of which strongly resonate with the political pronouncements presented above. The TUC’s response, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister’s speech:

The focus on a small number of families, variously described by the Prime Minister as characterizing ‘generations of worklessness’; representing ‘selfishness’; and taking advantage of ‘rights without responsibilities’ is misguided. (TUC, 2011)

The National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) produced a report drawing on voices and perspectives from across the voluntary sector.\(^{20}\) This was consistent with many of the popular narratives, focusing on issues such as deprivation, inequality, relationships with the police and young people with nothing to lose. The NCVO focused on the disengagement of young people especially, explicitly blaming young people’s perception of government and politics as a causal factor for their motivation to riot:

Some attendees [to an event held to discuss the riots] commented that politics holds little meaning for young people. Some went further to suggest that there has been a slow moral decline of political and economic institutions. They suggested that events such as the MPs’ expenses scandal, risk-taking bankers and the phone hacking scandal have cumulatively led to

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\(^{19}\) London Councils is a cross-party think-tank that lobbies and represents all 32 London boroughs and the City of London regardless of political persuasion.

\(^{20}\) The NCVO report was a collation of views gathered from an event they held with frontline and support bodies convened in September 2011, with ongoing engagement.
The most noticeable distinction between the NCVO’s position and that of London Councils’, and that of the Government, is that whilst each concur that young people may feel a sense of disenfranchisement or a lack of aspiration, for the NCVO, the rioters’ motivations were not simply mindless criminality. Instead, they argued that they should be understood as a reaction to the behaviour of the elite in the widely documented expenses scandal, bankers’ bonuses and the News International phone hacking scandal that was orchestrated by influential members of the establishment. Both NVCO and the Government focus on the idea of declining morality, but the interpretations of these manifestations of moral decline differ. The explanations given here continue to demonstrate the contradictions in responses to the riots, where the London Councils and governmental perspectives can be read as one of mindless criminality – apolitical rioting and looting – and the NCVO’s response implied that perhaps there were underlying motivational factors driving people to behave as they did, suggesting an element of protest was present during the 2011 riots.

It was not only national responses that focused on the core issues of morality, responsibility, young people and parenting. Local responses also had a broadly similar perspective about what caused the riots. For example, on the 10 August 2011 the Manchester Evening News reported on the riots using a quote by Gavin Poole from the Centre of Social Justice:

Perhaps this time around, it is not just society which has failed the riot generation, but their own families. Gavin Poole, of the Centre for Social Justice says these youngsters may be a “lost generation” facing life on benefits in ghettos scarred by poor housing and street gangs, “completely devoid of aspiration”. The anarchy they bring to the streets is a mere projection of the anarchy in which they have grown up. This, for them, is normal behaviour. (P. Taylor, 2011)

Here a particularly strong viewpoint is taken, whereby anarchic families are constructed as perpetuating the behaviour of the rioters. At both a national and local level the similarities in the reporting was indicative of how powerful the immediate narratives and discourses pertaining to the riots were, and how the causes and the individuals involved were being illustrated. Responses such as those from the Centre for Social Justice also broadened this idea that a lack of personal responsibility was a causal factor of the 2011 riots, but that it was also a problem of parental, rather than just individual, responsibility. Considering the cause of the riots as a lack of parental responsibility and framing the riots as a generational concern allowed for explanations of the rioters ‘knowing no better’, and to state that for some families, those with deeply entrenched social issues, this behaviour was normal. This point is important, as essentially the argument is suggesting that these individuals are not aware of the

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consequences of their actions. Knowing no better infers that there is a fundamental lack of understanding around the wider social and economic implications of their behaviour and therefore, by extension, they cannot be held morally accountable. Again, this is another explanation that over simplifies the underlying issues. Linking with the narrative of responsibility and parenting, the NCVO talked about latchkey children:

One [reason for believing young people have no power in society] was identified in the phenomenon of latchkey children, which has led to young people forming social relationships outside the family, often in gangs. Spokespersons from frontline organisations working in areas affected shared that some known gangs in the areas united during this short period due to a vision of collective causes and hatred of the police. (Allen et al., 2011, p. 6)

There was a sense that ‘problem’ families, in particular ‘broken families’, were leaving children with little alternative but to foster other forms of social support networks, such as gang affiliation for example.

The activity of gangs in orchestrating and subsequently being actively involved in the 2011 riots was another popular narrative alongside the discourses of personal responsibility and broken Britain. In David Cameron’s speech responding to the riots, following on from talking about toughening policing in Britain, he turned to gangs and gang culture:

It’s time for something else too. A concerted, all-out-war on gangs and gang culture. This isn’t some side issue. It is a major criminal disease that has infected streets and estates across our country. Stamping out these gangs is a new national priority…we will fight back against gangs, crime and the thugs who make people’s lives hell and we will fight back hard. (Cabinet Office, 2011)

However, the prevalence of gangs in the 2011 riots has been discredited, in particular by the Runnymede Trust’s ‘Perspectives’ report offering a powerful rebuttal to the “grip of gang fever or gang talk” (Hallsworth & Brotherton, 2011, p. 3). Whilst gangs and gang culture may not be the central focus for this research, it is a useful parallel to draw upon to demonstrate how particular populations were constructed in a way that outlined identifiable groups which could then be blamed, offering the Government a platform to demonstrate they are attempting to deal with underlying issues. As both the social housing and gang culture narratives show, these constructions are formulated based on historical stigmatised narratives, rather than with clear evidence and data. This lack of data was a primary concern for the Runnymede Trust:

Evidential support for the claim that gangs were behind the riots was justified on the basis of a statement released by the Metropolitan Police claiming that around a fifth to a quarter of the people they had arrested in relation to the riots were ‘gang affiliated’. This would provoke papers like the Daily Mirror (2011) to bizarrely read this as conclusive evidence that gangs were therefore behind the riots. (Hallsworth & Brotherton, 2011, p. 5)

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22 Problem families were a popular narrative in responding to the 2011 riots. This chapter will further discuss this narrative, but also how the TFP was discussed as a policy solution to the 2011 riots, despite it being an already active programme during the 2011 riots.

23 The use of existing and current political objectives being utilised and seemingly legitimised by narratives pertaining to the 2011 riots, such as the rationale for the TFP being to prevent children from broken becoming affiliated with gangs will be discussed later in this chapter.
For the Runnymede Trust, the concerns were not only about the unfounded evidence to support the statements being made, but also the complexity associated with the accuracy of gang designation figures and police statistics on gang affiliation, which themselves were not robust. In the comprehensive analysis and critique of gang talk in response to the riots, the Runnymede Trust report explains how the adoption of such narratives, or folk devils, should not only be understood as iterations of past narratives, but also the damaging impact unfounded political pronouncements can have on what are already vulnerable citizens or communities:

The gangland thesis, as such, is really no more than an iteration of an older narrative about the underclass read as the undeserving poor. Only this time, by implicating black culture, what we have is a highly racial discourse that panders to fears of the black criminal other; fears widely distributed in a society with a longstanding racial heritage; fears that are now being mobilized by gang talkers. And this is precisely what Cameron means when he evokes ‘the broken society’; bad people mired in an illness of their own making. (Hallsworth & Brotherton, 2011, p. 8)

Again, like the responses discussed earlier, the immediate contrasting explanations and contradictions of the 2011 riots highlight the problematic nature of the responses, especially where folk devils are used as scapegoats. In the case of the gangland thesis from the above quote, this response can be understood as problematic because of its highly racialised discourse; essentially suggesting that the cause of the riots was racial tension, a narrative refuted in the official response to the riots. Such scapegoating also has implications for other, often vulnerable, groups who are understood in particular ways, especially those that are considered to form part of an underclass in British society. It is this aspect of the gangland thesis that is a useful parallel for thinking about the impacts of suggesting that social housing tenants were a significant part of the political discourses.

In the months following the disorders, reports documenting the ‘official’ responses to the riots were produced. The Riots Panel produced their interim report on 28 November 2011. This report began to frame an argument towards a need to focus on building social and economic resilience, in particular with younger people who feel disenfranchised in wider society:

In our visits to many deprived areas, we observed a sense of hopelessness. Many young people we met felt that goals many people take for granted such as getting a job or going to college or university were unachievable for them. They believed that they were bearing the brunt of cuts caused by irresponsible bankers who had enriched themselves at the cost of others: ‘There are double standards in morality’ and were bitter about the rise in tuition fees and the removal of the Educational Maintenance Allowance…It is clear that young people can be responsible, ambitious, determined, conscientious – all the things which their parents, schools and the community want them to be. The question is how more young people can be encouraged to develop a positive mindset even in difficult circumstances. (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011, p. 93)

The interim report was also explicit that its scope was a national overview and was not taking into account the “DNA of each riot” (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011, p. 7). The
Panel clearly recognised that each riot had its own idiosyncrasies, concluding that “there was no single cause of the riots and no single group was responsible” (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011, p. 11). Then on the 28 March 2012 the Panel’s final report was published. This report documented their findings which were primarily focused on the lack of personal and community resilience, with six areas in particular outlined as causal factors of the 2011 riots: children and parents, building personal resilience, hopes and dreams, riots and the brands, the usual suspects and police and the public. Housing, in any substantive sense, was absent from this report. Brief remarks alluded to wider structural issues affecting the lives of often younger people, whereby poor housing was one of the factors, but housing was not considered in this report as a factor in determining a reason for the riots or in identifying who the rioters were.

The Guardian and LSE’s research identified this injustice within society as one key causal factor for people becoming involved in the riots. In particular they suggested that rioters were generally poorer than the general population and their involvement was often opportunistic:

Many rioters conceded their involvement in looting was simply down to opportunism, saying that a perceived suspension of normal rules presented them with an opportunity to acquire goods and luxury items they could not ordinarily afford. They often described the riots as a chance to obtain “free stuff”. (Lewis et al., 2011, p. 5)

These remarks fit within the post-political argument for the 2011 riots. They suggest, like this body of literature, that the dominance of material wealth through neoliberal capitalist ideology is of importance to individuals’ feeling of status and belonging. The Guardian and LSE’s research was also important for raising a key issue that was largely absent in other responses, especially those of the government: that the riots and indeed the rioters were not a single homogenous group; rioters’ motivations differed, as did their consciousness:

Many of those who took part described a sense of euphoria during the looting, combined with a disbelief that they were not being stopped as police struggled to cope. “It was just everyone was smiling. It was literally a festival with no food, no dancing, no music but a free shopping trip for everyone,” said one 16-year-old girl from Wandsworth. For others, there is a sense of personal regret. A 15-year-old girl described being scared and unwilling to take part when the riots flared up in her area. “Then, after it all kicked off and everyone was doing it, you just joined in and it felt fine. It just felt natural, like you were just naturally shopping,” she said. But subsequently she handed herself in to the police, and, asked what she thought about her actions now, she said: “I’m ashamed. To think that I went that low to go steal in these shops when they’re like, basically, that’s their business, that’s how they’re providing for their families, and we’ve basically ruined that and they’ve got to start from scratch”. (Lewis et al., 2011, pp. 28-29)

Other key findings suggested that the rioters were mainly young males, but the rioters did come from a cross-section of local communities. Their findings indicated that the rioters did have grievances, much like the NCVO report suggested, which included the rise in university tuition fees, and closure of youth services. In particular, there was a focus on the way certain people were treated by the police and police community relationships more generally. Despite
reference to the rioters being generally poorer than the majority population, this research did not suggest that social housing was a causal factor, nor were social housing tenants a predominantly representative cohort. It also dispelled some of the other myths about particular folk devils that were prominent in political pronouncements. The Reading the Riot research claimed that the urban disorder was not perceived to be race riots and, much like the Runnymede Trust’s report, the 2011 riots were not a gang issue:

Gangs behaved in an entirely atypical manner for the duration of the riots, temporarily suspending hostilities with their postcode rivals. The effective four-day truce applied to towns and cities across England. However, on the whole the role of gangs in the riots has been significantly overstated (Lewis et al., 2011, p. 4)

Over the months following the riots, local councils and organisations also produced reports, often from their own research or observations of the riots. Alongside some of the London-wide responses there were also more localized responses to the disorder providing local perspectives of the causes of the riots, demonstrating the idiosyncrasies and heterogeneous nature of the different riots that took place across England. In Birmingham, Councillor Alan Rudge of Birmingham City Council commissioned PeterLatchford OBE to write a report about the Birmingham disorder (Latchford, 2012); They Moved like Fish: The Birmingham Riots of August 2011. This was a detailed and lengthy report, covering a multitude of causes and responses, on both a national scale, but also for Birmingham more specifically. The report recognised the national level perceptions of the riots were largely ‘criminal’, however, it did raise concerns about how the national response overshadowed local issues (Latchford, 2012). The interpretation of the Birmingham riots, like many of the other national and local interpretations, was complex and not reducible to a single explanation:

What happened in the city centre was a heady brew of excitement, opportunity, bravado and immaturity, seasoned by pinches of protest, criminality, resentment, and a sense of materialist entitlement. It was the descendant of a rave: a semi-spontaneous event – but taking place in a city centre rather than in the countryside, damaging shops and buildings rather than hedges and farm machinery. It was thrilling, it was illicit; it was two fingers raised to – what? – “the system”. (Latchford, 2012, p. 8)

The reports’ key discussion focused on the disillusionment of young people who were rebelling against ‘the establishment’. Subsequently, the overall recommendation was a need to recognise this sense of alienation:

We need to recognise and respond to the alienation felt by many of our young people and the warped values that are at play in society. We need to take the opportunity presented by the networked society, as demonstrated negatively by the rioters, positively to rethink public services, the nature of leadership, our ambitions for Birmingham, and the way public servants do their work. We need to build on and deepen the work that has been done to surface and address inter-ethnic tensions. (Latchford, 2011, p. 9)

In Greater Manchester the Social Action and Research Foundation’s (2012) report entitled A Tale of Two Cities highlighted the dichotomy between the way in which the disorders were
experienced between Manchester and Salford. This report offered some recommendation, which again, like many of the other national and local responses focused on developing resilient communities:

The recommendations in this report provide a framework for developing more resilient communities that are pro-active and work within a model of interdependency that will provide the social support structures required for people within Greater Manchester to fulfil their potential. (Lone & Silver, 2012, np)

The absence of housing from responses to the 2011 riots, both nationally and locally, was stark. Despite the immediate political pronouncements promising to take a tough stance against rioters including the eviction of tenants from their state-subsidized housing, in the Riot Panel’s findings and all other national and local reports, housing, particularly social housing, was not discussed. There was also an absence of statistical evidence to suggest the housing tenure of the rioters. Despite this, the notional nexus between social housing and the riots still persisted in some commentary. Policy Exchange produced a report on the third anniversary of the riots, *The Estate We’re In: Lessons from the frontline*, which unequivocally framed the riots as a social housing problem:

Let us state the obvious: the riots did not start in a street of Georgian houses with spacious sash windows and manicured lawns. The riots started on a social housing estate - Broadwater Farm Estate in Tottenham, to be exact. (Knight, 2014, p. 13)

The assumptions being made in this quote, along with the title of the report that substitutes ‘state’ for ‘estate’ which is suggestively judgemental, is indicative of right-wing perceptions of social housing in Britain. In this report it is immediately apparent that social housing estates are considered as the incubators of social problems that predispose their inhabitants to become involved in disorder:

The state of many of Britain’s social housing estates is nothing short of a national embarrassment. Too often, crime, unemployment, gangs and violence are rife, The human cost is heartbreaking [sic]; the cost to the public purse immense. (Knight, 2014, p. 7)

The Policy Exchange report, along with other political pronouncements, make an assumption that all social housing estates are bad for the people who live on them and bad for the rest of society because of the cost involved in not only maintaining the fabric of the buildings but controlling the behaviour of social housing tenants. It is this perception, which has been widely discussed in the academic literature (Hanley, 2012; McKenzie, 2015; Valentine & Harris, 2014), which was used to justify particular actions in response to the urban disorder. It is this implication of social housing as a suitable mechanism in response to the 2011 riots that this chapter now turns.

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24 The difficulty that housing officers experienced in being able to identify rioters for other practitioners – such as the police and local authorities – is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
5.2 Housing as a proportionate response to the riots

The immediate political response to the 2011 riots demonstrated that the Government was taking a “tough stance” approach against the rioters:

"First and foremost, we need a security fight-back. We need to reclaim our streets from the thugs who didn’t just spring out of nowhere last week, but who’ve been making lives a misery for years. Now I [David Cameron] know there have been questions in people’s minds about my approach to law and order. Well, I don’t want there to be any doubt. Nothing in this job is more important to me that keeping people safe. And it is obvious to me to do that we’ve got to be tough, we’ve got to be robust, we’ve got to score a line between right and wrong right through the heart of this country – in every street and in every community. (Cabinet Office, 2011)"

This tough stance narrative, which manifested itself as a ‘fight-back’ to regain ‘our’ streets, conveyed a strong undertone of ‘othering’ the rioters in order to justify particular responses and foster the support of the wider population. The idea of othering here is displayed through the semantics of ‘reclaiming’ streets and communities from a particular groups in society, labelled here as ‘thugs’.

However, this tough stance did not only mean that extraordinary lengths of custodial sentencing were served, but also the threat to remove welfare benefits, including state-subsidised housing, from those found to have been involved in the riots or whose family members were convicted of riot-related offences. These reactions were also shared by a number of local authorities and housing associations. Inside Housing, the trade press for social housing, published a snap poll of 36 councils and housing associations, where 14 social landlords said they would pursue eviction, 13 would consider eviction on a case-by-case basis and just nine said they would not evict rioters. A particularly notable case came from the London Borough of Wandsworth:

"A council tenant whose son appeared in court charged in connection with Monday night’s disturbances in Clapham Junction will today (Friday) be served with an eviction notice…Wandsworth Council has acted immediately in the wake of local magistrates courts hearings to instigate tough action against tenants or members of their household who were directly involved in the disturbances. (Wandsworth Borough Council, 2011)"

Wandsworth Council’s decision to begin possession proceedings against one of its tenants was taken just four days after the tenant’s son had been arrested for his involvement in the riots. This action demonstrated the immediacy of these tough stance responses that were being adopted in reaction to the disorder. Wandsworth’s Council leader, Ravi Govindia, welcomed the swift action by the Council’s housing department, explaining:

"In Wandsworth we are determined to take the strongest possible action against any tenant or member of their household responsible for the truly shocking behaviour perpetrated on local homes and businesses earlier this week. This council will do its utmost to ensure that those who are responsible pay a proper price for their conduct. Ultimately this could lead to eviction from their homes. (Wandsworth Borough Council, 2011)"
Making individuals ‘pay the proper price’ for their behaviour during the riots was a common phrase used to justify the more retributive approach to punishment. However, what was not addressed, highlighted by Wandsworth’s perspective, are two key issues that fundamentally distinguish social housing from other tenures: the double-jeopardy sanctioning from both criminal and civil powers and the collective punishments of the tenancy holder and the household through eviction. As Wandsworth’s case shows where social housing tenants guilty of rioting can be both punished through the criminal justice system, and additionally face eviction which would have affected the entire family. In this case, the individual is punished twice for the same offence as he will serve custodial sentence (therefore losing his liberty) and face eviction (therefore losing his home) along with leaving the rest of his family homeless.

This illustrates the dichotomy between socially rented housing and private sector housing; whereby a family living in the private sector would not be subjected to the same levels of punitive punishment for the behaviour of one family member. Such punishments reinforce the notion that social housing is perceived as a luxury to be earned through good behaviour and societal contributions. It was only from certain housing providers and organisations, such as Shelter, in their response to the Government’s consultation, that this double-jeopardy punishment was given any consideration.  

Wandsworth’s approach to punishing rioters had the backing and support of the Prime Minister, as it fitted within the broader narratives of fixing Broken Britain and demonstrating a lack of tolerance for the anti-social behaviours that we have ostensibly been tolerating for too long. It was such narratives that conflated social housing, tenants of social housing, benefit dependency and a breakdown of moral aptitude. Further outlined in the case study in Box 5:1:

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A Government Standard Note (SN/SP/6064) was released that raised concerns about using eviction for rioters, highlighting that “eviction is the ultimate sanction against tenants who exhibits anti-social behaviour” and it also recognized “much of the rioting/looting did not take place in the vicinity of social housing estates”; however, this was not mentioned in any of the subsequent government responses.
Such responses suggest that social housing is a proportionate mechanism for dealing with outbreaks of disorder. Given the dominance of these narratives, through the amendments of a Government consultation, the media-political focus on Broken Britain and the lack of morality, and newsworthy stories of rioters living in social housing, implied that this is a particular issue needed immediate action. There had been no evidence presented to suggest that social housing tenants were significantly over-represented during the riots and to date there is no available data to indicate the rioters’ housing tenure.

Despite the lack of evidence, certain commentators continued using social housing estates to frame their perspectives of the riots, as the quote from Gavin Poole from the Centre for Social Justice, where he used the term ‘ghetto’ to refer to inner city social housing estates, highlights. This term implies that social housing estates are dangerous areas, plagued with social problems, implying the inhabitants are violent and therefore predisposed to urban disorder.

**Box 5.2: The Wandsworth Case**

The most prominent ‘eviction case’ from the 2011 riots was attempted by Wandsworth Council, who served the mother of Daniel Sartain-Clarke - a rioter convicted to 11 months imprisonment because of his involvement in Croydon’s riots - with a notice seeking possession (NOSP). Wandsworth Council’s official response was widely reported, including in this article from The Guardian:

> Wandsworth Council's leader, Ravi Govindia, said that, in signing a tenancy agreement, tenants had agreed not to take part in activities that could jeopardise their housing. The council felt it had the power to terminate the agreement against the tenant, despite the fact that she was not involved in the riots and her son has only been charged, not been convicted. "The mother can challenge the notice-seeking process," he said. "The tenancy agreement does not just apply to the mother but the entire household." (Wandsworth Borough Council, 2011)

Maite de la Calva had been a resident of Wandsworth for over fifteen years and had occupied her current home for five years, along with Daniel Sartain-Clarke and her other two younger children. Ms. de la Calva worked part time, volunteered for a local charity as well as being involved in many activities in her local community. She had widespread support from local people, including the local pastor. Her case was eventually dropped after receiving legal support from human rights organisation, Liberty. Some commentators reported this U-turn with a sense of dissatisfaction:

> Council bosses have abandoned their attempts to kick the family of a convicted rioter out of their council house. Maite de la Calva was told she would be evicted from the family's £225,000 taxpayer-subsidised home after her son Daniel was jailed for joining in a raid on an electronics store but the action has been dropped after the 18-year-old's mother promised he wouldn't do it again. (Doyle & Greenwood, 2012, emphasis added)
which is continuing to stigmatise particular sections of society. Loïc Wacquant (2008) talks about the usage of the term ‘ghetto’ by media, politicians and state managers as a way of conveying particular areas as being where social problems gather and fester:

They are known, to outsiders and insiders alike, as the ‘lawless zones’, the ‘problem estates’, the ‘no-go areas’ or the ‘wild districts’ of the city, territories of deprivation and dereliction to be feared, fled from and shunned because they are – or such is their reputation, but in these matters perception contributes powerfully to fabricating reality – hotbeds of violence, vice and social dissolution. (Wacquant, 2008, p. 1)

The stigmatisation imbued in some of the responses to the riots was critiqued by other commentators. For example The Contextual Theology Centre’s report, Taking Back the Streets: Citizens’ responses to the 2011 riots, raises concerns about how particular narratives could be seen to be hardening public attitudes:

The political narrative around Britain’s poorest communities has acquired a harder edge, and opinion polling suggests that there has been a similar hardening in public attitudes. The language of ‘scroungers’ and ‘shirkers’ is increasingly deployed to suggest that Britain’s poor are responsible for their condition. (A. Ritchie & Burbridge, 2013, p. 33)

Opinion polling of the general public in response to the 2011 riots also suggested that public attitudes were hardening – especially towards those individuals who received state-subsidized benefits. YouGov polls showed that 85 per cent of the British public agreed with David Cameron that the root causes of the riots were because a lack of responsibility in parts of our society (Moran, 2011). A separate poll also showed that 81 per cent of people thought that under-18s involved with the riots should be publicly named, 68 per cent thought that people involved in the riots or looting should have any welfare benefits they may receive removed and 62 per cent thought that if people lived in a council house they should be evicted from their homes (Moran & Thompson, 2011).

It is this conflation of social housing with the social ills that were presented as significant contributory factors of the 2011 riots, supporting the idea that some of the political and media reactions to the disorder were based on preconceived notions of who was rioting (see the Riot Panel’s response of ‘the usual suspects’) and indeed where they lived.

So far, this chapter has explored how housing was brought into the immediate riots commentary, and how it was largely ignored in later subsequent commentary. However, ‘neighbourhood’ was also popular discourse in response to the riots, in particular, the idea of deprived, inner-city neighbourhoods. This may never have been explicitly considered as a social housing concern but it would be reasonable to suggest that, certainly in the political pronouncements, poor neighbourhoods and social housing could be used interchangeably. Returning to the Contextual Theology Centre’s report, their recommendations for overcoming the issues of stigmatization and the hardening of attitudes towards certain ‘neighbourhoods’ are particularly relevant:
All too often in political debate, our poorest neighbourhoods are talked about, and not talked with. This is true on left and right alike: they are treated either as worthy recipients of the state’s largesse or as the focus of blame and disapproval; as ‘scroungers’ and ‘shirkers.’ This report suggests a change of perspective is urgently needed. The people worst affected by the riots have a vital contribution to make – both to the debate about what the riots meant, and to the actions that will enable their streets to be reclaimed as places of safety and community. (A. Ritchie & Burbridge, 2013, p. 33)

The use of language such as ‘reclaim’ suggested that there was an ‘us’ and ‘them’ undertone to this response. There is also a noticeable shift from some of the other more immediate responses to the riots that focused the blame of the riots on individuals. In particular, the Contextual Theology Centre’s response suggested that people living in the poorest neighbourhoods, the places where these policy interventions are often focused, are only talked about, rather than talked to. The argument here is that often there is little time expended to understand what is important within communities and how members of these communities feel, or what their views are on policies that directly affect their lives. This response implies that policy decisions are predicated on assumptions about people in poorer neighbourhoods, rather than understanding the complexities that come with living in particular areas, an argument supported by Wacquant, who suggested that politicians use the term ‘ghetto’ liberally without understanding the intricacies of the residents’ lives. Whilst some of the commentary in the Contextual Theology Centre’s report appears more willing to explore and challenge some of the responses that are perceived as stigmatising, it still fails to address, or even comment upon, the issues around the use of eviction or housing-related mechanisms specifically, instead referring to the neighbourhood level more broadly.

Even in the months following the disorders the discussion of housing-related mechanisms as a response to the 2011 riots remained absent. However, in February 2012, six months after the riots, Inside Housing, the CIH and the NHF collaborated to produce *The Riot Report: How housing providers are building stronger communities.*

This report presented the recommended role that social housing providers could play in “building stronger and safer communities” (Inside Housing, Chartered Institute of Housing, & National Housing Federation, 2012, p. 3). Furthermore, it explicitly stated that policy-makers should be listening to housing providers:

This report…shows how the work of social landlords is already leading the way towards building stronger, safer communities. We want policy-makers to listen to housing professionals who understand the wider contact of the difficulties some members face. It’s

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26 The Chartered Institute of Housing is the organisation that governs the professional standards and independent advice for the housing industry, the National Housing Federation is an umbrella body that represents independent non-profit housing associations in the UK and Inside Housing is one of the leading magazines for social housing, providing news, analysis, opinion and forums.

27 The Riot report does not explicitly state that it is a response to the political pronouncements of evicting social housing tenants, one research participant was involved in the writing of this document and explained that its principle purpose was to show the government that the social housing sector has a wide range of supporting and inclusive strategies and activities that are a benefit to local communities.
time to learn from their successes and to ensure the events of last summer never happen again. 

*(Inside Housing et al., 2012, p. 5)*

The point of this report was to dispel the myths around social housing, and social housing tenants, using case studies to demonstrate the positive and holistic work undertaken in the housing sector, which included building skills and enhancing relationships within communities. The intention was to demonstrate to policy-makers that social housing had been misrepresented in the responses to the 2011 riots and that the use of housing related mechanisms, such as eviction, were not appropriate. However, like almost all the other responses to the riots, *The Riot Report* never explicitly discussed the use of eviction as a sanction for rioting and how the housing sector representatives in England perceive such a response.

Despite the passage of time and continued lack of evidence to suggest that there was a substantive correlation between rioters and housing tenure, the Government remained vociferous in their support for the new powers of possession to be extended to social housing providers:

> Many rioters chose to move out of the locality in which they lived in order to do damage in neighbouring areas. We are therefore taking action to enable landlords to impose housing sanctions on tenants and members of their household where they choose to wreck other people’s local communities as well as their own. Following consultation, we have included provisions in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill to enable landlords to seek to evict tenants where they or members of their households are convicted of riot related offences, committed anywhere in the UK. (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013, p. 27)

Despite the Riot Panel’s report not mentioning the new powers of possession for social housing landlords, the Government continued to talk about the new sanctions that were being introduced. It is the focus of the next section of this chapter to explore the suggested responses and policy solutions arising from the 2011 riots, including the amendments to what was the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill (2011) that specifically made the link between housing and the 2011 riots.

### 5.3 The suggested responses and policy solutions arising from the riots

The immediacy of the Government’s revision to the consultation about the powers of possession for housing providers was telling. It was clear that the political rhetoric was focusing on punitive responses and largely towards those receiving state benefits, who were considered accountable for the disorder:

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28 Research participants who were involved in this publication have explained that it was a direct response to national and local government reactions to the riots which supported the eviction of social housing tenants.
On 3 August the Government published a consultation paper on proposals to introduce a new mandatory power of possession to enable landlords to take swifter action to evict their most anti-social tenants. On 15 August, following the riots and looting across England between 6 August and 10 August, the consultation was broadened to seek views on whether the existing discretionary ground for possession should be extended to include convictions for riot-related offences committed by the tenant or member of their household, whenever they took place within the United Kingdom. (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012a, p. 5)

Despite responses to the consultation, most notably from Shelter, challenging this strategy, claiming that it was inconceivable why a housing related response should be considered proportionate for non-housing related offences, denouncing the move as a “symbolic gesture” (Shelter, 2011), the amended Bill was subsequently passed into legislation. It has been established that these new powers will not be applied retrospectively; meaning the powers under the 2014 ASB Act cannot be applied to anyone involved in the 2011 disorder. This means that the responses to any future riots in England could have different consequences for people living in social housing who were involved in the riots, or whose family members were involved in the riots. Part of the political rationale for this power was to act as a deterrence, however, the findings from this research suggest that tenants would most likely be unaware that such a law exists, or be able to think about the consequences of their actions in the context of the disorders as they happen. Instead, it is argued here that the riot clause is another example of how “technologies of subtle power” (Foucault, 2003) are being used as a form of social control towards particular populations.

It is important to understand the potential implications of what the new clause could have on social housing tenants. Regardless of how the housing sector perceive such a response, the potential of these powers now mean that social housing tenants, or family members of social housing tenants who live in the property, could face both prosecution through the criminal justice system and eviction from their home, regardless of where the riot-related offences took place. The new clause removes the ‘locality’ element, which currently exists when it comes to consideration of eviction. What this has traditionally meant is that if an offence, or a tenant’s behaviour, is having an impact on housing management functions and/or in the locality (however the landlord or local authority defines locality, as there is no legal definition) then they could be served with a Notice of Seeking Possession Order (NOSP). However, if the behaviour does not affect the tenancy, then it is not a housing management concern, and it would probably not be reasonable to serve a NOSP. Having considered the construction of the riots, and the way in which social housing has become part of the Government’s response to the riots, the absence of any detailed interrogation and discussion of housing tenure in the political responses to the riots has been conspicuous. The only other discussion of housing in the responses to the riots – aside from the Riot Report – was from London Councils. Their

29 The “riot-clause” only applies to England and has not been adopted under any of the devolved powers to Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland.
report talked about the use of “housing interventions as a lever for wider change” (London Councils, 2012, p. 14) for longer-term local initiatives. The report did not elaborate on this in any further detail leaving the response quite difficult to interpret and to know exactly what interventions could act as a lever for wider change beyond just being an attempt to deter people from rioting in the future.

Other significant policy solutions to the 2011 riots focused on “local economic resilience”, with a business-centric approach. This was predicated as a way of not only showing that the wider community were not afraid of the minority of rioters, but that also by injecting local business with money and support it would also be helping poorer local communities by creating a platform to link disadvantaged residents to economic opportunities (Allen et al., 2011). Another widely proffered policy solution to the 2011 riots was tackling gangs and gang culture in the UK, which again, much like the issue of social housing, was one that was widely overstated in the responses to the 2011 riots.

From an exploration of the perceived causes of the riots at both national and local scale and from the immediate days of the riots through the months and years following the riots a number of patterns began to emerge. Firstly, the way in which the Coalition Government justified policy solutions using assumptions based on a stigmatised understanding of social issues. This was raised in the academic research of Ball and Drury (2012), arguing that the statistics behind the riots and those used in political pronouncements were on occasions flawed or skewed because of the way in which evidence was gathered but nonetheless still used by politicians to put forward particular arguments. This included the argument that the rioters were recidivists, subsequently reviving the Broken Britain narrative and legitimising punitive sanctioning. Secondly, many of the suggested causes and policy responses, regardless of what more detailed research showed, formed part of a wider governmental agenda. In particular the trajectory of housing policy moving towards a more conditional and less secure social housing sector, the work around the Troubled Families Programme and policing and gang culture in Britain. Finally, a disconnect between what has been suggested and what has ultimately become the policy solutions to the 2011 riots began to emerge, raising concerns around the motivation and rationale of such decisions on the one hand and the legitimacy and appropriateness of the responses on the other.

5.4 The complexities of constructing issues and responses to the 2011 riots

The way in which the causes of the riots were constructed and articulated demonstrated the complexities and nuances associated with the narratives pertaining to the 2011 riots. It also
shows how the responses were often conflicting and sometimes incoherent. It also demonstrates the difficulty in being able to reduce the riots to one single cause. Therefore, the media and political responses could be understood as utilising the riots to shape the responses in particular ways, giving impetus to the Government’s (and sections of the media) broader ideological agendas. This understanding was also suggested by research participants and will be discussed more fully in later chapters. However, it is worth noting here that a number of research participants suggested that the Government perceived the 2011 riots as their ‘golden ticket’ in terms of pushing forward wider governmental agendas. Some of this has been evident from this exploration of responses and as alluded to at the end of the preceding section. In particular, the changes to housing policy post-2011 riots conforms to the historical trajectory of the housing agenda, which has observed the ongoing reduction in the security of tenure for social housing tenants.

Much of the commentary and explanations for the riots were oversimplified. Commentary on deprived ‘council’ estates, or ghettos, suggested that the riots took place on social housing estates across the country. In fact the location of the 66 riots predominantly centred on high streets, town centres and retail parks. Housing estates were not sites of disorder during the 2011 riots. Policy Exchange’s report wanted to “make clear” the riots did not start in affluent suburbs of Georgian houses with spacious sash windows, but instead they started on social housing estates; Broadwater Farm in Tottenham was implicated in particular. The protests following the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan, a resident of Broadwater Farm estate, involved individuals living on the estate, as they were his family and friends, and the protests were at the local police station. The protest from Broadwater Farm to the police station in events where the community has a grievance with the police is a long-standing custom in this area. On a national scale, rioters’ housing tenure has never been understood fully, as there is little or no data to support this.

In-depth research into the causes of the riots allowed the notion of broken Britain and a declining moral fabric in British society to be challenged. There is sufficient analysis and commentary to refute these narratives, demonstrating the complexities in trying to definitively understand exactly what caused the riots to develop as they did. The NCVO report offered some recommendations that raised the voluntary sector’s concerns with the Government’s responses to the riots that also articulate the complexities of the 2011 riots:

An over-arching recommendation is to recognise the complex, long term nature of the causes of the riots. Three nights of disorder did not represent isolated, spontaneous criminality but

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30 The terminology “golden ticket” was used by research participants in responding to the government’s policy solution, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
31 Housing policy trajectories have been intricately explored in many other pieces of academic research, for example see Mullins & Murie (2006). For a brief overview of the more recent changes, which in particular support the arguments being made in this chapter, see Chapter 2.
should be seen as part of a wider set of social, economic and policy issues. It is important that these incidents are not seen as an entirely separate problem to ‘solve’ but should be viewed as part of a range of co-ordinated policy responses. (Allen et al., 2011, p. 18)

The report then moved to the language used to frame the debate:

The language used by the government is important as it sets the tone of much of the debate. Delegates identified a number of concerns, where it was felt that language such as ‘feral youths’ and ‘Broken Britain’ is provocative and unhelpful. Government should therefore consider carefully the impact of the language and tone that it uses in public debates. (Allen et al., 2011, p. 18)

It is important to recognise that the suggested causes and consequent policy solutions were only partial responses, often based on flawed and/or stigmatised assumptions about particular groups in society. Instead, the Government’s responses have worked to strengthen wider political agendas, rather than trying to understand the root causes of the riots. It is already possible to see how particular groups have been made more vulnerable by the way in which the causes of the 2011 riots were constructed and subsequently responded to; such as the security of tenure for social housing tenants.

5.5 Conclusion

By exploring alternative explanations for the riots, it is possible to understand the way in which blame can be constructed by building on pre-existing notions and perceived understandings, rather than evidence. This device is also true in the case of how social housing became considered as a necessary and proportionate response to the 2011 riots.

This chapter has demonstrated that the political and official responses were conflicted and contradictory. Not only did the responses conflict between commentators and organisations, but some responses also conflicted with themselves over time following on from the 2011 riots. The responses could broadly be understood as two parallel narratives. On the one hand the responses were attempting to understand and tackle the economic and social aspects of the riots and the physical destruction that had taken place. These responses considered the economic impacts to businesses, the damage caused to communities and injuries to people. On the other hand, there were more ideological responses, taken in spite of contrary or no evidence to drive forward other political agendas. Within this narrative, characteristics such as social decay, lack of ‘proper morals’ and personal responsibility of British citizens was utilized to shift the blame away from the state and towards the individual.

Despite the official response to the riots in which the Riots Panel explicitly stated they could not identify one single cause of the riots or that no single group was responsible, the Government pursued their agenda to introduce new powers of possession to landlords to evict
social housing tenants who were found guilty of riot-related indictable offences. With the riot clause passing into legislation in 2014, amendments to housing policy in England become one of the lesser-known legacies of the 2011 riots. When the proposed amendments were at consultation stage, Shelter responded by saying that eviction was nothing more than a “symbolic gesture” and that it was “not at all obvious why Ministers feel a specifically housing-related sanction is appropriate to a non-housing related disorder” (Shelter, 2011, p. np). But the influence of such a policy shifts that social housing estates, and the social problems that they create and foster, are sites harbouring problematic citizens and it is therefore proportionate, and essential, to offer new mechanisms to remove housing tenancies in the event of a riot, regardless of the proximity to an individuals’ property. Despite the noticeable absence of a discussion of housing in the official responses to the riots it begins to raise further questions, which the two subsequent chapters will endeavour to explore: What are practitioners’ perspectives of the ‘riot clause’ and how do they perceive the rationale for using housing related mechanisms in the context of urban disorder? What do such developments in housing policy mean for social housing? How useful or effective will the new tools be in preventing and responding to urban disorder? The next chapter looks in further detail at the frontline experiences and reactions to the disorders to being to unpack the nuances of the 2011 riots.
6. Exploring local level perspectives: The complexity of responding to urban disorder through housing mechanisms

Research participants involved in this study talked about the introduction of the riot clause as passing into legislation with relatively little ‘fanfare’. By this, they often meant that amongst the dominance of dramatised headlines focusing on lawlessness and the anarchic nature of the disorders, there was very little meaningful discussion about the changes being made to the powers afforded to social housing providers to evict tenants involved in the disorder. This chapter focuses on the frontline voices to highlight the significance of these changes and to provide analysis of what these changes may look like on the ground.
6.1. Introduction

At the time of the disorders, and in the immediate aftermath, the political outcry against a broken Britain was fervent; a concerted effort to ‘fix’ these problems was promised. This, as earlier chapters have detailed, centred on individuals and families who display non-conformative, and morally insufficient behaviours. Two key policy goals at the time was the riot clause and the Troubled Families Programme. The latter was an attempt to turn around the lives of 120,000 families identified as ‘problematic’, who were described as a small number of people causing the biggest problems in society. The riot clause, the focus of this study, was built on the notion of responsibility and deservedness, whereby the actions of those involved in the riots should be punished by taking away ‘state provided’ benefits that they show little responsibility towards. The policy trajectories of both the riot clause and the TFP dissipated over time. The riot clause is now legislation, but has gained little attention since (in part because it was not to be applied retrospectively, but also little critique or scrutiny in scholarly activity), while the TFP is rarely considered in terms of the riots, but rather is being scrutinised as a piece of policy-based evidence rather than evidence-based policy (Bonell et al., 2016).

It is therefore the ‘local voice’, lived experiences and empirical data are essential to understanding policy and policy delivery in this particular context. Of fundamental interest in this study is the way in which housing and ASB practitioners reacted to the riot clause, and what value they saw this adding to their daily working practices. Given that the riot clause is a discretionary, rather than mandatory, ground there is potentially much scope for different outcomes. Dobson recognised this, and highlighted that: “empirically driven accounts showed that pernicious policy would not necessarily result in pernicious practices” (Dobson, 2015, p. 690). This demonstrates that even if national-led Government policy at first appears excessively punitive, the way in which it is transferred into practice by frontline officers may be less severe. Equally, there does remain a risk that frontline officers and housing providers might take a disproportionately heavy-handed approach, in line with political discourses, in situations where this might not necessarily be the best approach.

This chapter explores the perspectives of local practitioners and their perspectives of the riots in London, Greater Manchester and the West Midlands. In doing so, this chapter will elicit local perceptions of the riots and the national Government’s response to the riots through housing-related mechanisms. In doing so it will highlight the nuances and complexities of the 2011 riots in the different contexts across England; demonstrating the importance of local expertise and understanding local issues and concerns. Taking the local officers’ perspective,
those responsible for the day-to-day to management of behaviour control, highlights the underlying complexities of housing and ASB management, which can be overshadowed in populist rhetoric. It also allows for a more textured analysis over the modes of governance and social control in contemporary society. In particular these modes of governance often manifest themselves in the *technologies of subtle power* (Foucault, 2003) which has expanded over the last three decades in relation to housing-related mechanisms to manage populations, and which was very clearly evident during the 2011 riots.

A dominant local voice in response to the riots was portrayed in the media was that of local community activists, which worked to further enhance the discourse that this was to some degree a riot of the ‘underclass’ by presenting a more dominant, alternative display of social interaction as a rebuttal to the behaviour of the previous days. In particular groups the example of the ‘broom armies’ who were fighting back against the rioters, creating a metaphor that invoked the sense that people were literally sweeping the problems off the streets. Stories were published that expressed community anger and personal loss. News reports with small business owners and people who had lost their homes were prolific. Whilst recounting these experiences was undeniably upsetting for the individuals involved, these stories collectively fitted into the dominant narrative of ‘us and them’, where the rioters were characterised as not being representative of the British values that the majority of society apparently uphold. These local perspectives corroborated national political perspectives, demonstrating support for punitive punishment and incarceration.

It is recognised that there are many local voices, including individuals who were involved in the disorders, or other residents of social housing for example. It is not being argued here that practitioners’ voices are more important than other voices, but instead this research focuses on their perceptions and understanding of the disorders as this has been a relatively under-researched area in the context of the 2011 riots. These practitioners come from a range of agencies such as the police, housing providers and other statutory bodies as well as legal representatives and community charities. All participants were working in their current roles, or an equivalent position, at the time of the riots and recall the challenges they faced in responding effectively. This involvement ranged from participants witnessing the riots and helping identify rioters from stills taken from CCTV footage through to determining suitable actions against those found to be involved in the disorders where it was not considered serious enough to take before the courts. These views offer rich perspectives about local communities, local residents and what works well when attempting to create inclusive, harmonious communities from a bottom-up approach. This chapter draws on these views to demonstrate

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32 The Daily Express ran the headline ‘Sweep scum off our streets’ on 10 August 2010, in what they described as a “national fightback” by the “vast majority of law-abiding citizens” (http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/264069/Sweep-scum-off-our-streets).
the complexity of understanding and responding to outbreaks of urban disorder, as well as to highlight the disparities between the national level understandings of the problems and local realities.

In order to get a better understanding of the local level perspectives of the riots, and whether they are different to the national level construction, the remainder of this chapter will be framed by the following questions: how were the different riots understood and interpreted at a local level by strategic and frontline practitioners?; how did practitioners respond to the immediate political and policy narratives and subsequent legislative changes to social housing policies?; and what does this mean for local social housing policies and practices in the future?

6.1 Local understandings and interpretations of the 2011 riots

Disparity between national explanations and local experiences

On a national scale the image being portrayed was often one of inner-city social housing tenants being prolific contributors to the urban disorder witnessed in 2011. It was suggested that it was the role of the social housing sector to respond to the riots and sanction the rioters appropriately. Giles Peaker, Housing and Public Law solicitor and editor of the Nearly Legal Housing Law and Comment blog, highlighted this in his article for the Guardian:

> The question for social housing providers may well turn out to be how far they are willing to be hired muscle, the enforcers of the government’s social contract, and risk the potential financial consequences if they decide against taking on that role. (Peaker, 2011)

In order to ensure that housing providers could become the “hired muscle”, powers were subsequently extended to social landlords, allowing them to serve tenants with a NOSP in the context of riot-related disorder. In addition to the explicit ‘riot clause’ the requirement to reduce ASB by 60% for those part of the TFP also meant that housing providers were indeed playing a central role in the response to the disorders, despite little evidence to show that social housing tenants were a significant demographic in the disorders. The perspectives of participants interviewed in this research showed that the local experiences of the riots were very different to that which was presented nationally. Like many people who witnessed the riots, participants in affected areas spoke of their fear as the riots broke out:

> I was actually working [at the time of the riots breaking out]… [and] we were all sent home from work early, because it wasn’t too far away from where the office was that I was based at

33 The idea of inner-city social housing tenants being prolific contributors to the urban disorder can be seen in political pronouncements, including Iain Duncan Smith’s response to the 2011 riots (http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/riots_culture_and_iain_duncan_smiths_poverty_o_f_analysis).
As this participant explains, as the riots were unfolding people did not know what was happening and sensational media reporting, which in part fuelled the general hysteria, was providing contrasting information, not always based on any supporting evidence (creating the information vacuum, as mentioned in Chapter 5). In response to the initial chaos and panic, there needed to be clear and visible responses to the riots, according to participants, because of the scale of the disorder. Research participants felt that the lack of any measured explanation contributed to the scapegoating of social housing tenants because social housing tenants were seen as “easy targets”. This demonstrates the way in which the political discourse and subsequent policy decisions arose from the creation of a moral panic about particular ‘problem’ populations (Cohen, 2002), while simultaneously demonstrating the way in which mechanisms of the ‘penal state’ can be enacted in such cases to enforce punitive sanctions on the population as a form of governance (Wacquant, 2001).

In an interview with one ASB Officer for a London Borough local authority, when asked whether he agreed with mainstream media and political perspectives that anti-social behaviour was considered synonymous with social housing he explained:

I agree that that’s how the media portrays it, definitely… I mean it’s not just anti-social -- well, [pause] I don’t know… it’s horrendously Hello! magazine but take Benefits Street, you know… it doesn’t help, you know and there are certain parts of the media who are always quick to sit on people who live in social housing… or living off benefits and living -- and [pause] people can be just as anti-social in private rented accommodation, you know… So I agree with what you said there but obviously I don’t agree that’s [a] correct [assumption to make]. (ASB Officer, LA, London)

For many research participants in this study, their interpretation of the national level coverage and responses was primarily based on historically-stigmatising, ideological understandings of ‘council estates’, evident through the excessive use of labels such as feral, feckless and underclass. These dominant narratives demonstrate the processes of state-crafting and the dominance of neoliberal ideologies that have worked to demonise marginal populations and allowed for unequal, even punitive, governance mechanisms to be adopted in the day-to-day management of particular populations (Hancock & Mooney, 2012a; Mayer, 2010; Wacquant, 2009; Wacquant, 2010).

The practitioners involved in this study all tended to have a good knowledge of the local communities and the people that they work with (i.e. young people, ‘problem’ families and vulnerable citizens). It was often cited that if rioters were identified by research participants as their tenants, that they were in fact not the feral, unruly and morally deficient youths depicted
by politicians and commentators, but children of ‘model tenants’, previously unknown to the organisation due to their good behaviour. Housing and ASB officers in particular talked about the way that their tenants, or tenants in their communities, were feeling at the time of the disorders in 2011. They reported that feelings from local communities did vary considerably, from harmonious and relatively content (such as in areas of East London) to discontent and anger (such as in Salford). These contextualised feelings contributed to the levels of violence communities experienced during the 2011 riots, it emerged from the fieldwork.

In some communities, where there were high levels of deprivation, an issue that was widely considered part of the cause for disturbances. In reality there were no outbreaks of violence whatsoever in some of the areas that one would expect to see violence according to the dominant riot-related political discourse. Some local practitioners explained that this was because there was little tension, especially towards the police and other authorities in the build up to the riots:

There may have been other things simmering or going on [in Tottenham], that I’m not aware of. We didn’t have anything. There was nothing bubbling under in this area that would have allowed this to be a catalyst for, for the riots in this area...there’s -- there was no other tensions, the relationship with the police is, is good and strong...so again, I think there’s no axes to grind, there’s no history, there’s no baggage in the same way there are in say, Hackney (Housing Officer, RSL, East London)

Responses such as this highlight the nuances between the riots across the different geographical locations. It also emphasises the importance of local relationships, understanding of issues and the way in which areas are managed and policed. The Housing Officer in this particular case explained how closely they, as a housing provider, work with the local police and how they are a visible presence on the streets. Often, the authorities recognised and know the names of many residents and the residents likewise know who they are. While it was recognised this is not a panacea for removing all local tensions and issues, it can be a way to engage more effectively with residents, especially at times such as the riots.

Participants from across the various housing and behaviour control functions that were interviewed for this study also argued that the relationship between an individual’s housing tenure and propensity to riot was weak and that it was other factors motivating people to riot. This was clear in Greater Manchester, where all research participants identified the Manchester city centre riots to be characteristically distinctive to the Salford riots. A Greater Manchester Fire Commander, who was involved at a strategic level in response to the riots, described, in his view, the nature of the Manchester and Salford riots:

Manchester was… some of it was about trying to get the police in… and a lot of it was about, most of it I would say, was opportunism and people, you know, taking a chance to piggy-back on something which had unfolded elsewhere and a lot of [riot tourism]. (Fire Commander, Greater Manchester)
Salford for me was more like what I had been used to [in Northern Ireland]… it was, you know, a riot with malicious intent, real malicious intent, and my own opinions of it are that if, certainly the people that were orchestrating it in Salford had have got their way they would have killed a police officer that night… if they had have been able to isolate a police officer and watching from the police cameras, there was a lot of tactics being used by the rioters that I was used to, in that they used the intricate nature of the entry system, you know, in and around where properties were, you know, the small streets, the entries where they would congregate, they would attack, they would disperse and regroup, attack, regroup, you know, disperse, regroup and… they also used tactics that I was familiar with in Northern Ireland. (Fire Commander, Greater Manchester)

In line with some of the analysis of the 2011 riots explored in earlier chapters, each of the riots did present different characteristics and were largely contextually-driven. This was not always recognised through national reporting, which tended to homogenise the disorders. Even in cases where authorities found individuals to be looting (i.e. “getting free stuff” in the view of mainstream media) research participants explained it was not simply a case of seeing this as criminality, pure and simple. There were cases where people used the riots as an opportunity to acquire daily essentials and not just designer and high-end goods; they were acquiring daily essentials such as food or home products. Research participants highlighted that for some parts of the community, they feel disenfranchised and voiceless, with little sense of how they move away from this situation and therefore a single explanation of the riots, condemning all rioters as morally twisted, ignores certain highly-complex factors.

Local practitioners explained the disparity between the national perception of poor areas, rioting and their local experience. Some research participants talked about the areas that they work in as suffering from problems of poverty and deprivation, which were explained as causal factors of the riots on a national level. However, where some participants identified their local areas as those typically understood as the type of area that would riot, they explained that they were not affected by the 2011 disorders at all. Participants articulated this to be because of strong community ties and extensive work with communities to engage them in positive activities. Where incidents did occur on housing estates, some of which participants did describe as notoriously problematic, the outbreaks of disorder were characterised as minimal, copycat riots. Incidents included the looting of small chain supermarket or in a few cases deliberate violence towards other individuals, often as part of an on-going feud, as people were aware that police resources were overburdened and deployed elsewhere within cities. When asked why areas that people presumed would be affected did not experience the rioting in 2011, participants talked about the work they do with their younger tenants (and family members) and the important role housing providers play in creating and maintaining harmonious communities:

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34 For example one participant talks about a tenant targeting a family by fire-bombing their cars. However, both these families were well-known to local authorities, as were their ongoing rivalries.
On our estates, which as you can see, [are] ex-council, high levels of deprivation, huge…in terms of the profile of our residents, much [more] disproportionately younger people [and] we didn’t have a single riot-related incident…We’d like to say it’s because of us, and I think to a certain extent some of it is…when we took control of the stock from the council…our Chief Exec [was] very clear about what the impacts on the quality of life are. (Head of Housing, RSL, East London)

This participant then went on to explain that the investment made in the quality of the housing, explaining that it does not look like social housing any more, and the environmental work the organisation has undertaken in the area gave people a feeling of ownership in the area and they therefore were more inclined to respect it. Alongside the physical and environmental work, the social role of the organisation, especially with younger people, was also considered important:

It’s also very clear that young people…you’ve got to work with them, involve them…have a real relationship with them, as opposed to knowing they’re there but not really engaging with them. So, again, our youth offer…our work at the time, we were delivering the youth contract…for the local authority, so we had a huge infrastructure already in place that was engaging and working with young people…employment, training, leisure, all of that stuff…we already had that in place. (Head of Housing, RSL, East London)

For this participant, working with the young people in the local area is a key part of the role of housing providers, who are often integral to supporting community cohesion. What is striking is the emphasis on how structural factors, such as employment and training, are important contributors to the way in which young people behave. Here the research participant argues that the work being done to engage young people in meaningful activities did have an impact on this particular area and encouraging individuals to not get involved in the disorder. The various structural factors that can impact on the way an individual feels in terms of their integration into mainstream society were raised by a number of participants. One legal representative stated that society places an emphasis on the importance of work and income, with an increased focus on the importance of being a ‘tax-earner’ and the ability to participate in consumerism, meaning that those people who are unable to engage in meaningful work at a living wage begin to inwardly view themselves as part of an underclass:

I certainly sense within the younger generation there’s…a degree of hopelessness. I think with…some people they seem to feel trapped don’t they? Almost as if they view themselves as an underclass. Not that society views them that way, but that’s how they view themselves…and it’s very, very sad to see that in young people… (Lawyer, Greater Manchester)

Here, the participant perceives the powerful national rhetoric as being influential on the way in which particular individuals feel about themselves. This can have a negative effect on the value that particular individuals have about their own ability to participate in mainstream society (i.e. the confidence to find work) and essentially it could be argued that the proliferation of such media discourses will only exacerbate the issues and continue these negative cycles. Here this demonstrates that a lot of the frontline and on-the-ground
interactions are examples of subtle governance as support mechanisms rather than to simply punish when people deviate from normative behaviours, often captured through the surveillance of populations, as outlined more fully in Chapter 2 (Foucault, 1991). It also highlights how practitioners, especially housing officers, work with their tenants to prevent them becoming caught up in the widened net of anti-social activities that can bring people into the criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985).

It was noted when speaking to research participants, and in particular housing officers, how defensive they were of their tenants and the work they do, especially when probed about their own tenants’ involvement in the disorders. Many participants explained that of the few tenants that did become involved, the nature of their crimes was not the most severe incidents. This sense of defensiveness was observed from all housing providers who participated in this research. Reflexively, this can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, housing officers often talked about their ethos; the pride in the work they do and the importance of their roles within communities and when dealing with vulnerable citizens. The suggestion, therefore, that their tenants were involved in significant offences during the riots would be an indication that they were not effectively performing in their positions of responsibility. For research participants here, the suggestion that their tenants were over-represented during the riots was triggered by the imagined link between social housing and deviant behaviour presented in political statements and the national media:

In relation to Manchester a large amount of the people that were involved in the riots weren’t Manchester residents… a very small proportion of them were people living in the social rented sector… and of those that were identified that were involved… a very small proportion of them were young people, it was generally adults. So I do know within… within the social housing world… there was a backlash to the way that politicians were coming out with political rhetoric in relation to the riots and giving an impression that it was all -- it was all because of social tenants. It was all social tenants that were causing the problem and that they needed to be brought to account and that they needed to be punished… And I know that [the] reaction to it, [from] the Chartered Institute of Housing was to pull together a document… that actually provided an opportunity for housing providers to celebrate everything that they do in relation to keeping community cohesion into providing services beyond bricks and mortar services. (Neighbourhood Safety Officer, RSL, Greater Manchester)

Secondly, there was a sense of frustration from housing officers about the outsiders’ view of social housing. Housing providers talked about social housing as a valuable asset. They also talked about many of their tenants as “just like us”, often questioning: why would they be any different? Where tenants did get involved in the riots and lived in social housing, it was understood locally as more to do with demographics (i.e. it is more to do with the fact that they were young people and therefore either got caught up in the riots through curiosity and peer pressure, or were arrested because they fitted the descriptions of a rioter). It was not because they were social housing tenants. This highlights a potential explanation for local

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35 It is worth highlighting that research participants also had conflicting views on the role and provision of social housing, which is addressed in more detail later in this chapter.
difference, and the importance for local perspectives whilst simultaneously highlighting how problematic national-led narratives can be, especially when such narratives feed directly into policy responses, as in the case of the TFP and riot clause following the 2011 disorders (Bonell et al., 2016). This also confirms Cohen’s concerns, raised in Chapter 2, that a lack of evidence to support a particular moral panic is overcompensated by voices of authority repeating appeals to common sense and intuition (Cohen, 2002). Here the unequivocal blaming of ‘troubled families’, welfare recipients and others deemed to be morally insufficient ‘contained’ the problem of rioting to a particular sub-section of society, whereby punitive political responses could remedy the issues that are contributing to the broken Britain society.

Research participants explained that their housing stock was largely unaffected because they were not located in central business districts, which were the primary target for the rioters nationally. Participants talked about “riot tourism” to hotspots; areas with retail and leisure facilities where goods could be appropriated, rather than residential areas. However, very few participants identified their own tenants doing so. This point, again, raises curiosity over the need for increased housing powers.

This section has shown how different areas experienced different types of riots during the 2011 disorders. One key distinction was between ‘consumer’ riots (such as those in Manchester city centre) and ‘community’ riots (such as those in Salford city centre). The stark contrasts, observed by all research participants in the Greater Manchester region, show the complexities and nuances of the 2011 riots, something that was largely ignored on a national scale. The national narrative of “pure criminality” overlooked some of the genuine grievances that individuals in certain communities had. The local voice, therefore, is an important part of understanding issues at a local level and in seeing how to prevent, either by proactive engagement, or responding in a contextually relevant way further outbreaks of urban violence in the future.

**Pressure on the social housing sector**

Despite very little evidence to suggest that the riots were primarily a social housing problem, ideological perceptions of social housing and the welfare state, political pronouncements and media coverage collectively conflated issues of the riots and social housing. Inevitably this placed pressure on social housing providers who had to balance the demands from external stakeholders, such as MPs and the police on the one hand, with their role and responsibility to their tenants on the other. One participant, a legal practitioner in London, who worked on cases involving social housing tenants in the aftermath of the riots, talked about his perception of housing officers in a London borough, where the local authority were keen to pursue the eviction of rioters:
As far as we could see, one of the elected members decided to say something to the press and once they’d said that, decisions were made… I never got any impression that the housing officers wanted to push it… it’s not really in their nature to jump straight in. They [pause], whatever their individual -- it’s hard to generalise, but I very rarely find housing officers want to go straight for possession, because that’s just an indication that they’re failing as housing officers. They want to see what else they can do… I’m pretty confident it was the elected members shooting their mouth off and once they’ve done that, you’ve got no choice but to follow through. It’s a brave officer who turns around to the elected member and says, no… I mean they should do, and they could do lawfully, [but it] doesn’t tend to happen. It’s a… big ask. It’s a very big ask. (Legal representative, London)

The recognition that social housing providers were put under external pressure in the aftermath of the 2011 riots was also observed across England. In Greater Manchester, a legal practitioner described the strain being placed onto social housing providers:

My experience was that the police put a… lot of pressure on social landlords… “It’s your tenant, why can’t you evict them?” [That] was the general consensus… and the response was always… “you know, you’re familiar with the trial process in this country, we can’t just go and… boot them out, there’s got to be court hearings, there’s got to be evidence, there’s got to be findings, then we have to wait for the court order. Very, very similar to your process”. But there was a lot of pressure put on landlords. Not just politically I would say, but you know, by other agencies, particularly by the police in my… experience (Legal Representative, Greater Manchester)

This was corroborated by a Neighbourhood Safety Officer, who at the time of the riots was working within the social housing sector in Manchester. Her remarks documented here were in response to Sir Richard Leese’s, Leader of Manchester City Council, speech following the riots, announcing his support for the eviction of rioters:

It got people’s backs up… there was a general feeling, certainly with colleagues I spoke to and some of them… worked for the local authority in Manchester, but some of them worked for providers within Manchester and… they were saying, ‘why has he said that? Why has he given the impression that landlords are now going to identify perpetrators and evict them from their properties?’ You know, he created a lot of discontent. Certainly for those who would now be expected to act upon what he said. (Neighbourhood Safety Officer, RSL, Greater Manchester)

The local perspectives documented here explain how stakeholders external to the landlord, in particular MPs and the police, applied pressure on social housing providers to ‘deal with the rioters’, ignoring barriers such as the court process that is necessary as part of an eviction case, a process that also carries a large financial burden for an organisation, regardless of the final outcome. The pressure from external stakeholders, who may not always be fully aware of the specific role of a housing officer, also failed to take into account the importance housing officers place on supporting their tenants. Many housing officers considered eviction to be a negative reflection upon their ability to fulfil their role, which many defined as supporting tenants and encouraging people to behave in ways which will allow them to sustain their tenancies. The additional problem, which could also be a contributory factor to the increased pressure placed upon housing providers, is that the dominant riot-related political discourse that proliferated in the immediate aftermath (i.e. removing welfare benefits, eviction and so on) may well have contributed to creating unrealistic public expectations, and when this is not
then carried out look to be taking a ‘soft’ approach towards the people initially outlined as responsible for the violence.

A Neighbourhood Officer from Greater Manchester explained the importance placed on housing providers to ensure that they work with tenants to achieve this inclusivity and that they are able to maintain their tenancies where possible; simply evicting tenants in a seemingly arbitrary way would not be fulfilling the role of a housing provider:

Some of our more…intolerant…community members…those who only see things in very black and white terms…‘well, just evict them’… [But] we are a social landlord, we are socially responsible and even though…we are a team of officers who are enforcing…legislation and enforcing…tenancy agreements, we’re not in it because we want to go around evicting people. We would only do that as a very last resort, because we are supposed to be…a provider that’s supposed to be looking to socially include people, not socially exclude people…I would be very, very surprised, once the absolute grounds come in on the 20 October, I would be very, very, very surprised if you saw a sudden increase in social landlords wanting to use that particular piece of legislation. (Neighbourhood Safety, RSL, Greater Manchester – participant’s emphasis)

The pressures felt from within the housing sector were broader than just in the context of the 2011 riots. The increased pressures being placed on the housing sector is important and relevant for this study. Firstly, it demonstrates the changes occurring in the social housing sector more broadly. Secondly, it shows that because of these ongoing changes, social problems are being considered as a social housing issue and therefore the responsibility of the sector to address them. This has been expended to provide more context and detail in Chapter 2.

Participants from the housing sector spoke about how their roles have, over time, gained additional responsibilities extending to behaviour control and dealing with anti-social behaviour. This is not a new phenomenon, nor is it related specifically to the riots; however, it does set the context for the increased expectation on housing providers to adopt additional roles in respect of behaviour control and policing:

Participant: I mean as housing officers we’re supposed to be police officers, social workers, teachers [participant laughs] nurses, we’re supposed to do everything, you know, it’s not just housing as a whole.

Interviewer: Is [that] because of how closely linked you are to the tenant?

Participant: Yeah, it can be…definitely. Because you can control, in a lot of ways, people’s behaviour, because at the end of the day, if they carry on they’re going to have nowhere to live and that terrifies them. (Excerpt from interview transcript with a Housing Officer, RSL, East London)

This case highlights how the threat of eviction can be enough to change an individuals’ behaviour in some cases, and for this reason practitioners welcome having such powers as part of their toolkit. However, the undertone in this interview was about the lack of specialist skills officers can have in adequately dealing with some of their tenants. This is not a reflection
upon the officers’ ability to undertake their role in housing-management function, but rather that these functions are extending beyond helping to sustain tenancies, ensuring rent is paid and that buildings and communities are in a good state of repair; instead supporting tenants’ with mental health issues is increasingly becoming part of the Housing Officer role too. This Housing Officer, whilst seemingly jovial about the additional roles being applied to Housing Officers more generally, articulated a sense of pressure being felt within the organisation about being able to deal with all these issues effectively. Earlier in the same interview a different Housing Officer was talking about the pressures, and the responsibility she felt, in ensuring tenants with mental illnesses are receiving sufficient support:

We’ve tried to assist her [a female tenant], but...her vulnerability is that she is alcoholic...she’s been to rehab, doesn’t seem to work. We give her floating support…floating support is short term assistance…you know, because we’re not qualified in mental health or alcoholism. It’s a short term assistance to try to assist someone with their [vulnerability] but it is only short term. And she had that for numerous amounts of occasions and you know, in the end, we had to withdraw it because it wasn’t going anywhere. It’s very difficult, we’re not judging. (Housing Officer, RSL, East London)

Here, the Housing Officers at this RSL in East London each relayed stories of particularly challenging incidents that they have to deal with as part of their job. The increased responsibility and holistic nature of their role today meant that in the aftermath of the riots many other agencies looked to the housing officers to respond. The housing officers’ concern over their capabilities when dealing with specialist issues, such as mental health, begins to show the complexities of managing behaviour and populations, something that is neglected in political discourse. Exploring how the Government responded to the riots in a way which homogenised both the events themselves, but also those involved, highlights how very little attention was paid to the nuanced challenges that frontline staff face on a daily basis.

The changes to the consultation of social housing providers’ powers of possession and their apparent position of responsibility in sanctioning the rioters, according to participants, increased the pressure on housing and ASB officers to respond:

I mean when the riots came up... there was a big... discussion between the council and police and all that on the expectation of who should be seen to be doing what. And then obviously we have the government or the media saying this should be done... to stop rioters; take effect on their tenancies and all that kind of thing. What was not taken into account was that... the issue being was when we had the council and like saying look, you should deal with these tenants... at the end of the day, it’s not affected our tenancy management and this is where the sticking point was... in respect of us taking action against tenants, because what’s happened, I mean this could have happened down in London, or in the city, if it’s not affecting our tenancy management, then if we weren’t going to take an anti-social behaviour order, or possession, would that be deemed to be reasonable? And that was the biggest issue in respect of those, when it comes to the riots. We were asked, there was some people identified as being involved in it, however... due to there not affecting our tenancy management, they’re not, a lot of these were not even in, not even caused problems before at all, umm, we were limited on what action we could do. (ASB Officer, RSL, Greater Manchester)
There was a sense that housing providers were having additional pressures placed upon them during the 2011 riots, as this ASB Officer explained, in Greater Manchester at meetings following the riots where decisions were being made on how to punish rioters, the social housing sector demonstrated that if their tenancy management functions were not affected by the tenants’ actions then there is very little that they can, and indeed want to, actually do. Another Housing Officer, also from Greater Manchester, explained that if offences have been committed away from the home and are criminal, then it is the role of the police to seek punishment and once that has been done it does not then seem reasonable for housing providers to offer a second punishment through their own mechanisms:

I mean, I am not entirely sure about the legalities of it… because I don’t think there’s any specific sections [sic] within rioting and it’s very difficult for a housing organisation to take action. I think, against somebody who breaks the law away from their home… because if they get punished for that through the judicial system, is it then appropriate for us to punish them through our system, if they’re nowhere near the neighbourhood? If they’ve not affected their immediate neighbourhood? [sic] But I think there is some argument in there, particularly in Manchester, for instance, whereby everywhere’s your neighbourhood and if you do something outside you can link it in through the tenancy agreement, to say they have behaved in, in a way that breaches it, but I wouldn’t personally have been comfortable with taking action against somebody who would have been involved in the riots, in the city centre of Manchester, for example, if they live in Gorton about two miles out of the centre… because it’s not related. They’re being punished by the police for that. (Housing Officer, RSL, Greater Manchester)

Participants from the social housing sector expressed their disdain at the way in which tenants were being utilised as an explanation for the riots, as one Neighbourhood Safety Officer explained in respect to the authority’s support for evicting rioters:

I remember the Leader of Manchester City Council that evening…basically announcing that, you know, it wouldn’t be tolerated in Manchester, and that anybody who lived in…social housing would get evicted… So I spent a lot of my evening, that evening after that announcement, because I think it was on Granada reports or something like that and I know as soon as Richard Leese said it, I was like, “oh my god, what’s he saying? What is he saying?” Because you know, anybody who’s been involved in…the housing world and is dealing with incidents of ASB on estates knows that you can’t evict somebody unless it’s happening in the locality of their property and quite clearly this is happening in the city centre and you don’t have properties in the city centre… some landlords do, but certainly…for him to say that on behalf of social providers in Manchester, it got people’s backs up…there was a general feeling, certainly with colleagues I spoke to and some of them…worked for the local authority in Manchester, but some of them worked for providers within Manchester…they were saying, “why has he said that? Why has he given the impression that landlords are now going to identify perpetrators and evict them from their properties?” You know, he created a lot of discontent. (Neighbourhood Safety, RSL, Greater Manchester)

Participants did express, both here and elsewhere, that this type of political discourse felt like a request for action. In certain cases, as this officer has articulated, this can be particularly frustrating as it does not pay sufficient attention to the complexities of housing management. For example, eviction is considered as a last resort, and certain offences may not warrant eviction as it could exacerbate, rather than curtail particular behaviours. It also infers that the 2011 riots were essentially a ‘social housing issue’, where little data exists to support this. Not only did research participants talk about their frustration at such responses because of the
additional pressures this was placing on them as Housing Officers and their ability to work effectively, but it also suggested that the sector was an undesirable housing option and an incubator of social problems. The Neighbourhood Safety Officer quoted above talked about the CIH, NHF and Inside Housing contribution following the riots, *The Riot Report*. The rationale behind this report, according to this participant, was to show the positive work coming out of the social housing sector in an attempt to ‘myth-bust’ the national responses to the riots.

### 6.2 Responding to the riots: the local voice in response to the 2011 riots

Having established that the use of housing, and the vague notion of ‘locality’, in response to the 2011 riots was considered a red-herring by many participants, presenting additional challenges to housing providers, this chapter will now explore how housing providers responded to the national, political and local pressures. These responses are considered as a process of education by housing officers about their role and permitted powers, bringing a sense of reality to the relevant issues, with the other stakeholders involved in both the social control of communities and in responding to the 2011 riots.

**Understanding daily realities**

It was discussed earlier how on occasions those working in the housing sector faced pressure to serve NOSPs on tenants identified as rioters from external stakeholders. This section focuses on the idea of “realism”, something Housing and ASB Officers raised as important in terms of their response to this pressure.

The public outcry in the aftermath of the riots left Housing Officers explaining that they were being approached by other agencies and stakeholders to take action of tenants involved in the riots. This pressure was cited to be coming from local MPs in particular; however, some participants did explain that the police also made similar requests. However, as research participants explained, they do not always have the capacity to evict tenants, especially in the immediate aftermath when all they were being supplied with by the police was a name and address, rather than any supporting evidence:

> [We were] just running through each case and looking at the facts and then deciding on the best course of action based on the facts…so just trying to bring some realism to it really and sort of say, “well, you know, we’re not evicting everybody on here”. And actually, we couldn’t because there… [was] so few of them [from] social housing. (Anti-Social Behaviour Officer, Local Authority, West Midlands)

Eviction is not a tool social housing landlords are prepared to use liberally. This is important, as it shows that safeguards are in place to protect the tenants’ rights but also demonstrates that
social housing landlords understand that eviction will not solve the problem of urban disorder, as this only makes the ‘problem’ people less regulated. This means that eviction, certainly in cases of low-level ASB, is a short-termist, performative practice leaving the evicted tenant under less scrutiny, which could potentially lead to greater problems long-term. There was some agreement about the value of eviction amongst practitioners, where the wider community is at risk from particular individuals. It was also important to have a transparent and equitable process in place when attempting to evict someone. The following excerpt discusses this point:

Participant (P): People are often surprised...about how difficult [evicting a tenant]...can be. It is a long drawn out process.

Interviewer: But then I suppose it needs to have its safeguards...

P: ...of course, yeah, of course. The process is right I think. And, you know, it might take a long time, but it needs to take a long time, as you say, because...other than going to prison, it’s probably the worst thing you can do to somebody. Take their home, take their liberty, they’re about the two worst things you can do to a person. (Excerpt from Interview with Legal Representative, Greater Manchester)

Secondly, it emphasises the point that the social housing tenants were not necessarily over-represented during the 2011 riots. It is these arguments that offer a perspective of the reality to frontline response to the riots. For local authorities in particular, where they are responsible for entire boroughs (and therefore populations across all housing tenures), it became evident how few individuals involved in the riots identified were social housing tenants. This presented further difficulties for authorities, in terms of responding to rioters who were not social housing tenants:

I guess the difficulty for us... was the ones that weren’t social housing tenants, that were either living in private rented, or... owned [their own property]. Particularly in owner-occupier properties whose behaviour wasn’t that serious... [we] would end up deciding what kind of response we could possibly give, because [they] weren’t in the realms of an ASBO, probably weren’t even in the realms of an ABC... but we wanted...that person to know that we knew... And we also wanted to offer any support. So, essentially the bottom tier of action that took, was quite a standard letter, which was the lowest level we took, which basically just said “Dear blah, blah, or parent/guardian, you know, on so and so you did this, blah, blah, blah... these are the possible consequences, here’s the website and telephone number for our targeted youth support service, we’d encourage you to contact them”. (ASB Officer, LA, West Midlands)

The reality, therefore, was that very few individuals were identified as social housing tenants and authorities were restricted in what action they were able to take. It also illustrates the point that those individuals living in social housing are exposed to the risk of greater punitive sanctioning and conditions on their tenure security and liberty (Cohen, 1985) than those living in other housing tenures, but who still commit similar offences.

**Ignoring the complexities: homogenisation of social housing tenants**
In suggesting that the eviction of social housing tenants could be one response to those convicted of riot-related offences, the inference is that social housing tenants were both present and prominent during the riots. This, combined with the wider narrative of deficient morality and responsibility, both of individuals as well as their families and the local community, homogenised social housing tenants as both feckless and rioters. Such stereotyping and prejudice was widely publicised in the aftermath of the riots. An example by Richard Littlejohn, columnist for the Daily Mail, began to infer that there was a link between rioters, fecklessness and social housing estates in his article; The politics of envy was bound to end up in flames, on 12 August 2011:

The kind of hooligan seen throwing petrol bombs at the police and climbing through the front window of Currys to liberate 42 inches of hi-def [sic], surround-sound home entertainment isn’t interested in a law-abiding, nine-to-five existence. Most of them don’t get up before midday, except on the mornings they have to sign on the dole. They’d rather live on benefits or the proceeds of gang crime. (Littlejohn, 2011)

He then went on to say:

Some of the parents were out looting alongside their offspring. The realisation is finally dawning in some quarters that we’re now into the third, or even fourth generation of inner-city underclass. There are plenty of decent mums on some of these estates, but they are fighting a daily losing battle against the gang culture. (Littlejohn, 2011)

It is clear that the argument was being constructed in a way that social housing tenants (people living on “these estates”) were inextricably linked to criminality and gang culture, worklessness and benefits. This seemingly acted as a way of both justifying the Government’s one-size-fits-all response and the targeting of particular groups of people believed to be ‘the rioters’; social housing tenants involved in the riots should not expect to receive the benefits that society can offer if they cannot maintain their part of the agreement. Grant Shapps (Housing Minister at the time of the riots) was vociferous in responding to the riots that those living in social housing should not expect to be able to continue living in their state-subsidised home if they were involved in the riots, regardless of where this committed, as discussed in Chapter 3. This narrative of evicting rioters from their social housing was therefore constructed and presented as a logical argument in the context of political narratives and shifting social housing policy since the 1980s, building on the underclass discourses that have become synonymous in the discussion of social housing and behaviour (Haworth & Manzi, 1999; Murray, 1990, 1996; Tyler, 2013b), the argument of state-crafting and penalising the poor disproportionately (Wacquant, 2009), and illustrates the idea of the centaur state (liberal at the top, punitive at the bottom) and the justification of increased pervasive governance of particular populations (Malpass, 2005; Slater, 2016; Stenson, 2005; Loïc Wacquant, 2010).

Narratives presented through mainstream media channels not only have the potential to influence the opinions of the general public, resulting in increased stigmatisation or
resentment towards particular populations, it also could influence practitioners’ perspectives, as sensationalised media coverage will also be observed by those who are in positions of authority and ultimately responsible for managing the same particular situations (Rosie & Gorringe, 2009). To illustrate this further, Gorringe and Rosie’s (2008) earlier study exploring the management of policing protests (the G8 protests in this case, but they argue the same principles applied in other situations such as the G20 protests) shows that sensationalised media reporting can not only influence practitioner perspective, but can also undermine the work they do. Their fieldwork in this area offers an interesting parallel to some of the behaviours and practices that could transcend beyond policing into housing-management:

A senior officer argued that the ‘influence of the media can undermine months of police work’ and noted police attempts to minimize such effects ‘by establishing relationships of trust and engaging with people in the media to encourage them to be more responsible’ and check reports before filing them (Ross, Interview). To this extent, at least, negotiated management must be played out in the media too. Ross captured the significance of this in asserting ‘cops read papers too’ (Ross, Interview). (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008, p. 193)

Throughout the interviews conducted in this research there was a sense amongst some practitioners of a rising frustration about the morals of some tenants, with them often citing media channels as their source of information, suggesting that ‘housing officers read papers too’, highlighting the power that pernicious, ideological political discourses can have on those who are responsible for managing the behaviour of particular populations. The danger is that excessive force could be exercised on particular groups unfairly through the process of increased stigmatisation through populist notions imbued within theories such as the underclass.

To ensure that a balanced perspective is taken, it is important to highlight that there were some cases of eviction following the riots. It must be stressed though that these cases were more complex than simply an individual being involved in the disorders:

There were a couple of cases where we did end up terminating the tenancies, but I don’t think any of them were from the rioting alone. They were people that were already known to us, and were already in the system, so it was just like “well that’s just going to get added to that”, and therefore the proportionate response is now eviction, but there wasn’t anybody… who we said “right, because of you doing that [in the context of the 2011 riots], we’re going to go for a possession” and I think that was purely because there weren’t many, as I say, that were social housing tenants… or that… had been involved in the real serious stuff. (ASB Officer, LA, West Midlands)

But certainly…they had no issues with rioting at all [in this borough]. It wasn’t an issue at all…none of our tenants were arrested, or certainly charged with anything…related to the riots that were happening in the Birmingham city centre at all. (Housing Officer, RSL, West Midlands)

There were some examples nationally of people being evicted who were convicted of offences carried out during the riots. However, research participants explained that in these cases it was because an individual had already committed a number of other offences, for which they were
going to be served a NOSP, and their involvement in the riots was another offence to strengthen the case of the eviction notice. Therefore, the individual was likely to face eviction, even if they had not been involved in the riots:

There was one, we did evict one that had been responsible for throwing a fire-bomb in the back of a police car…but he was already…on an introductory tenancy and had already been known to us and had already been part way through the process. (ASB Officer, LA, West Midlands)

Where rioters were identified by social housing landlords as their tenants, they were often not the typical ‘imagined’ riter that was presented in national media. In a number of examples it was cited that it was the children of a tenant and, in many cases, they were previously unknown to the housing organisation because of their overall good behaviour. As this ASB Officer in Greater Manchester explained, there was often a very clear rationale for not pursuing the eviction of a tenant in a riot related incident:

And I mean, just off the top of my head, because it’s quite a long time ago, you know, it wasn’t a case of us sitting on our hands. One individual was living with elderly parents, who had a completely unblemished tenancy history. So, you know, I think, quite rightly, we took a view, you know, that we’re talking about an unruly eighteen year old, who’s doing something without his parent’s knowledge. They’re in no way condoning or sanctioning part of that behaviour and it would be, in terms of evidencing proportionality and reasonableness, [we] kind of wouldn’t get past first base and it wouldn’t be right, ethically, to have [done so]. (ASB, RSL, Greater Manchester)

What is also important to note, and emphasised in the following extract, is that being a social housing tenant does not equate to being morally deficient, something that the mainstream media, particular right-wing leaning, can often suggest (as per Richard Littlejohn’s quote above):

A housing officer met with my client and said, this is terrible behaviour, your son mustn’t do it again and she said, “I agree, he mustn’t do it again”… she was more cross with him [than the local authority] were. She was a…charming, devout Christian …so got quite, kind of strong, Catholic family. She was more cross with him than anybody else… and as she’s pointed out with some justification, he has no history of rioting and he hasn’t rioted subsequently. It’s suggested that it’s probably just a one-off thing, with him being a bit of a prat… and so it all fell away. (Barrister, London)

Here the mother of a rioter expressed the anger she felt towards her son for his behaviour during the riots. It highlights the danger of homogenising all rioters and all social housing tenants as feckless or poor parents. In cases such as this, it becomes more difficult to see how eviction would address the issue of preventing an individual from being involved in the riots.

The importance of local knowledge and expertise

Given that for many research participants in this study large proportions of their tenants had not been identified as being involved in the riot, nor had their housing stock been directly affected, the task of responding was not a race for eviction, as the national rhetoric was attempting to portray would happen. Instead there was a focus on contextually-individualised
and reparative work being conducted. This was being done in an attempt to actually understand the motivations behind people’s behaviour and to ensure that they do not reoffend, rather than punitive punishment without any restorative element. It was also seen as the responsibility of all local stakeholders to get involved in the responses to the disorders in 2011. Knowing the local community, especially younger people, and how to deal with their expectations and behaviour was cited as one of the ways in which riots were prevented in certain areas. Ensuring that responses to incidents, such as the riots, include a focus on restorative practice was a fundamental concern to practitioners. Here it demonstrates the power of subtle governance can also be used in a positive and constructive way. Local practitioners explained that this was the best approach when attempting to prevent the future outbreak of rioting. One of the biggest challenges that practitioners faced in the aftermath of the disorders was thinking about how they could begin to change stereotypes and perceptions of those involved in the riots, and to highlight the heterogeneous nature of the unrest. A reparation project, conducted in East London, is a particularly useful example highlighting the importance of working locally. The idea for this project, a research participant explained, arose from discussions with the younger population about how they think their neighbourhood should be policed. The outcome was that the younger people wished to be treated with respect and in a polite manner by the police, which led this participant to realise that whilst “being tough”, to draw on national rhetoric, was important, so was educating both the younger populations and officers responsible for social control:

After those riots we had so many assaults on police and, and attacks on police vehicles etcetera that I set up a reparation project in [the local] Police Station. It just so happened, as part of cost cutting, they had… made redundant the couple of people who used to wash the vans… so then I got every kid who’d done anything against the police, did their reparation there and… the first couple of meetings -- the first couple of sessions we did were quite remarkable, because the kids started work, you know a couple of adult supervisors and I don’t know and may be five, six or seven kids and… the police officers were coming out and saying: “Ay, you know, are you from a youth club or are you a volunteers, what?” And then they heard they were young offenders and it was like, double-take. But it was the same for the kids, they appreciated -- began to appreciate that these were ordinary human beings, who you could have a joke and a laugh with. Very different to their experiences which had nearly always been confrontational…and they can’t see the police as that man could be helping my grandma tomorrow, or that mum -- that, that man or woman police officer could be helping my little siblings, you know, they, they don’t see them that way. They get -- and part of it is constructed, they get themselves into a, you know, sort of a street, peer attitude, where, it, it’s not cool to say anything but negative about the police and that fosters itself, but we do quite a lot of work to break that down. (Youth Offending Team, East London)

This kind of activity, which at first does not appear punitive, was in fact considered a powerful, yet constructive approach to dealing with incidents such as the riots. It brought young offenders, some of whom had assaulted police officers, face-to-face with the officers on the grounds of the police station. The rationale of this, and other similar approaches, was that people could “face up to what they’ve done and not just behave [as they wish and] not be allowed to see these people as sub-human… because that’s the very thing that we don’t want
the police to think of them” (Youth Offending Team, East London). Other examples of such mechanisms of governance included strategic operations on housing estates. Where CCTV was available, housing officers were able to monitor where groups were forming and be able to send officers on the group (i.e. community police officers) to talk to groups, find out what they are doing, explain to them the consequences of being involved in the disorder and to signpost them to services that are open for them to engage in more positive activities. Related to this latter point, in one area of East London it was decided to open all community centres, rather than close everything down, during the riots so that young people had a safe space to go to, and a distraction from the disorders and from getting involved.

A better understanding of the local issues that contribute to criminality, anti-social behaviour and urban disorder, which can, as in this case, be around issues of poor relationships between the police and the young community, may be an effective way to help reduce the tensions and better inform both the local population and those working to control the behaviour of such populations.

6.3 Beyond the 2011 riots: The impact on future policies and practices

The focus for the remainder of this chapter is to explore the potential future impact of the 2011 riots on housing policy and practice. The changes under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014) were not applied retrospectively. This means a housing provider will not be able to evict a tenant using the ‘riot clause’ for incidents that took place in 2011. Legal practitioners explained that given the temporality from the riots to the legislation being passed, it would have been too difficult and costly to try to evict someone. This means the direct impact of the riot clause will not be realised until any future incidents of urban disorder take place in England, which does pose a particular challenge to this study, as there is no clear evidence of the power this new piece of legislation holds. However, it is important here to get an understand of how practitioners would see these new powers, and to what degree, if at all, they would be supportive of housing-related sanctions being applied in instances where housing management functions were not affected. By exploring the potential impacts of the new Act, research participants’ responses elucidate the complexities they are faced with when dealing with urban disorder as well as the power of national rhetoric.

In order to begin to understand the impact on future policies and practices it is important to reflect on the value practitioners perceive the social housing sector as having. This section will deal with the overall sentiment towards the housing-related mechanisms posited as a response to the riots, before moving to unpick the way in which the Government have sought to change legislative powers around the geographical boundaries that housing officers can
serve NOSPs in the context of urban disorder. Finally, the section will end with an analysis of the potential further stigmatisation and precarity facing social housing tenants, both from national level policy making, but also from local level decisions being made as a result of national rhetoric and policy infiltrating local practice.

**The mentality of locality**

From lengthy discussions with research participants, the notion of locality was a central aspect when considering responses to those tenants involved in the riots. Locality was the defining reason for practitioners resisting national policy changes; the appetite for evicting tenants where the local neighbourhood was not affected was absent. Landlords explained that if a tenant leaves the area to become involved in urban disorder and both the neighbourhood and housing management functions are not affected, there then seems little justification for pursuing eviction. However, the definition of locality is ambiguous. Whilst legal practitioners talk about using case law to gauge what a judge would consider ‘the locality’, for housing officers and other frontline practitioners the mentality of locality is contextually driven and a difficult term to negotiate, especially in the context of the 2011 riots. The following quotes from research participants show both legal and frontline perspectives on the challenge of defining locality:

There’s case law that really says what is apparent to the sort of ordinary man in the street, you know, are there local facilities, is it the local... I think it’s the Lawler case that’s and incident between two tenants in the high street... [And it came down to] would the normal man think that the high street would be in the locality of the property... So usually when we look at locality we draw up a map and we look at... the sort of questions I’d ask my clients... Now locality in a village and locality in a city could be very different... so usually say, for an estate I’d be looking at the perimeter of the estate, usually, as the guiding mark. But the size of the estate may differ... If something has occurred at the local church, or Mosque or shopping precinct... school, then it might not be as clear cut, but I think that the case law basically says locality really is on a case-by-case basis... generally, if you’re going beyond a mile, mile and a half, then I think you’re going to struggle, but if you’re in a village, where the properties are dotted around and may be the church, you know, you can stretch those boundaries to...the context in which the property is situated. (Legal Representative, London)

Locality is another ambiguous... I say -- are they saying that locality includes the whole of Manchester or is it just around here, the Moss Side area? But that’s another issue that you need to think. If the government defined locality as the whole of Manchester, then we may be able to take that and apply that to our tenancy agreement, that locality could mean anywhere in Manchester. So, we have to make sure that we define and if we put something in our tenancy to say locality, umm, what do they mean by locality? ... What tends to happen is, if say, an example being, is we had recent, well quite a few years back now... some kids, they were in a little gang, causing issues around Moss Side, Whalley Range, but it was all... that will be classed more like locality...if they were like going over to north Manchester. I don’t know whether that would be classed as locality... elsewhere. But that is where Manchester City Council would take it up from there, because if they were doing an Anti-Social Behaviour Order, then they would take that up, because we wouldn’t have all the evidence about what’s going on if it’s in Salford, or north Manchester. (ASB Officer, RSL, Greater Manchester)

In addition to the complexities of understanding why individuals were rioting and identifying who it was rioting, and then where they lived and what housing tenure they reside in, came the
issue of when was it appropriate to pursue eviction? From a legal perspective, as highlighted above, this is very much contextually driven and a reliance on previous case law, and what is stated in the tenancy, is what a judge will base a decision on. Frontline practitioners articulated this as: ‘you know what it looks like when you see it’. Officers were aware of when an issue was affecting their area. It is unsurprising that the lawyers see the issue as one of law and the ASB officers as one of locality, it does, however, highlight the lack of clarity around what is considered ‘locality’. It, like ASB policy definitions more broadly, is open to interpretation. This is problematic when thinking about how the individual might perceive the notion of locality (if they pay any consideration at all to the way their behaviour and geographical boundaries might affect their tenancies), and whether it is ever clear that behaving in a particular way, in a certain area away from their home could have different consequences if they, or their parents, live in a socially-rented property.

A Housing Officer in East London illustrated this point by explaining her reluctance to use eviction as a sanction, except in cases where a neighbourhood is being severely affected and all other attempts to change a tenants’ behaviour has been exhausted. In certain cases there is little alternative choice:

But if we can try and manage and change behaviour and keep them in their home, then that’s a success for us. Evicting someone is not a success… So I think our ethos is, what can we do to stop the behaviour? And if eviction is the only way of doing it, then we will evict, and we’re very clear that we will and we have, and we publicise it, but that’s not pause that’s not a success for us. If we can find another means of stopping the behaviour, then that’s what we’ll go for. (Housing Officer, RSL, East London)

Their expertise and intricate knowledge of the locality they work in and their tenants, which could also include ongoing local grievances between neighbours, meant that the reluctance for Housing Officers to evict was driven by a sense of equity. If a crime is committed away from the property, and the housing management function has not been affected, then how is it fair to double punish certain people simply because of their housing tenure type? This was a viewpoint shared by most participants, who appreciated that the behaviour displayed during the riots was deplorable, but a criminal conviction served should be considered the “debt paid to society” (Legal Representative, London) and double-jepardy punishments of eviction, where the crimes did not affect the locality, are deeply unjust.

In response to the 2011 riots and evicting, frontline practitioners also spoke of the ability to pursue satisfactory lines of punishment without the additional riot clause. If a tenant, or family member of a tenant, was involved in the riots and had detrimentally affected the housing management function, and it was agreed that eviction would have been a suitable sanction,
practitioners explained that they already had powers to do this, and the existing powers, being mandatory, rather the discretionary like the riot clause, would have been preferred due to the likelihood of achieving the officer’s key aim:

Well, we hope it’s not going to need to be used but I imagine...if something like 2011 kicked off again, then I imagine that we might find it being used...but it...also...goes back to this idea... [that it is a] discretionary ground, so the judge is still going to be able to have to decide whether it’s proportionate or not, so it’s not going to guarantee that landlord possession... So, if the behaviour was in the locality anyway, you’ve already got the elements of the ground that you could be reliant on, so really the only benefit it might be bringing is that you can use it when the behaviour’s happened outside the locality. But then, the Catch-22 is then the judge is more likely to say that’s not proportionate. (ASB Officer, Local Authority, West Midlands)

It was perceived that the new power of eviction would have very limited benefit to frontline officers. Given that there is currently no precedent set, it would be down to the first organisation using this power to take this to court, through what research participants anticipated would be a lengthy and expensive court process. For this reason, many frontline officers said the existing powers would suffice, should any repeat disorders follow the same pattern as the 2011 riots (people involved in low-level crime, people involved in behaviours away from their house or first time offenders for example). Participants said that they would leave it to the larger housing organisations – those with access to more funding for such proceedings – to use this power in the first instance. The way in which the local appetite for this power clashes considerably with the national-level rhetoric around making eviction easier aroused suspicion that the Government’s approach may well have been underpinned by other motivations, such as reducing the security of tenure or hardening attitudes towards social housing tenants.

Further marginalisation and precarity

Practitioners’ primary concern about the negative image of the social housing sector that was presented by national media and political responses focused on how it could exacerbate the marginalisation of populations, making more individuals’ lives at risk of increased precarity, while undermining the considerable effort housing providers expend in helping support tenants and foster harmonious communities. This directly builds on the work of Foucault, Wacquant, Cohen and others that has been outlined in earlier chapters, where particular populations are subject to more intensive surveillance, governance and conditionality, which lead to disproportionate levels of punishment for behaviours that are understood or considered – often by the middle-classes and elite populations – as anti-social, problematic or troubled

So far this thesis has highlighted the significant changes that have taken place in housing policy over the last three decades, and how policies have sustained a reduction in the security

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36 Social housing providers could use Schedule 2 of the 1985 and 1988 Housing Acts respectively to serve a NOSP on tenants whose behaviour was affecting housing management functions and/or neighbours and neighbourhoods.
of tenure for social housing tenants. Additional amendments to policy, as a result of the 2011 riots, with the introduction of the riot clause and particular aspects of the TFP continue to further reduce the security of tenure for social housing tenants. The changes also furthers the risk of marginalising more people, as housing providers gain more powers and the boundaries of what constitutes ASB continues to expand. The move to introduce the riot clause, thereby potentially punishing certain people twice and disproportionately, was articulated by participants as punishment on a class basis:

I find it bizarre that we’ve got a serving Prime Minister who is threatening to take tenancies from families who were involved in riots. If our children were involved in that… we wouldn’t have done anything wrong, neither have these people, apart from maybe living in poverty and having other worries than their thirteen or fourteen year old and it’s punishment on a class basis, very clearly so. (Head of YOS, London)

The notion of double-jeopardy punishment of the rioters living in social housing was a common narrative running through the fieldwork, with research participants recognising that additional punishment only applies to particular groups in society. The participant quoted above elaborated on this duality of punishment with the explicit connection to poverty. For this participant, the viewpoint was clear that the response was on a class basis, ignoring the complexities and difficulties faced by some families. Having worked in communities with high levels of deprivation and problems associated with this, the participant suggests that other factors can prevent parents from knowing the whereabouts of their children at every point of the day (i.e. childcare of siblings, when a child is going to/from school, when a child is socialising, when a parent might be at work). What this participant suggests is that it could be possible that a parent could face punishment through eviction for riot-related offences without them having any knowledge that their child has been involved. In particular, this situation will apply to some of the most vulnerable families – those with additional pressures such as raising a number of children alone, finding work or working whilst balancing child care commitments. Here, the understanding of the riot clause appears an indiscriminate punitive punishment against a collective group of individuals, rather than a preventative measure or addressing some of the root causes of both the 2011 riots and urban unrest more generally. It ignores the complexity of the daily lived experience for some individuals and will only serve to further marginalise the most vulnerable citizens in society. What has been demonstrated here are small, localised examples of how marginalised and poorer populations can be disproportionately affected by contemporary policy making, whereby the state (again, understood as the centaur state) does not protect its citizens but instead served to punish. This builds on the work of Wacquant (2009, p. 41) and in particular the argument that there has been a: “gradual replacement of a (semi-) welfare state by a police and penal state for which the criminalisation of marginality and the punitive containment of dispossessed categories serve as social policy at the lower end of the class and ethnic order”. And while Wacquant’s
work is closely grounded in the USA, what is demonstrated here is how the post-welfare trend witnessed in the US over recent decades is happening in the UK too, albeit in different, more subtle way.

6.4 Conclusion

The bottom-up practitioner perspective, considered throughout this chapter is important in understanding the implications that the 2011 riots have had on the social housing sector. On a national scale, the riots appear to have been constructed in a way that makes the legislative changes appear proportionate, justifiable and necessary. Considering the severity of the 2011 riots, new measures were seemingly needed and supported in the public opinion. However, this viewpoint shared by politicians and national mainstream media simplifies the complexities and nuances of the 2011 disorders. It has also led to flawed policy-making, as Bonnel et al. (2016) highlighted in specific reference to the TFP. It fails to acknowledge that the perspectives and subsequent responses taken were not based upon any evidence, but rather ideological understandings and perceptions of the issues. By being able to speak to practitioners responsible for implementing policies it was possible to uncover these complexities and the gain different perspectives to the 2011 riots.

Reflecting back to the beginning of this chapter, the identified aim was to attempt to answer three key overarching questions, which from analysis of the data will now be answered to conclude this chapter:

- How were the different riots understood and interpreted at a local level by strategic and frontline practitioners?
- How did practitioners respond to the immediate narratives and subsequent legislative changes to social housing policy?
- What does this mean for social housing policies and practices in the future?

Given the complexities and nuances of the 2011 riots, inevitably agreement on the real underlying causes and the best remedies are subject to much disagreement and debate. It is also true of the data collated in this research. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, organisations and other bodies – both within and beyond the housing sector – had conflicting and contradictory views. This chapter has drawn on the perceptions and perspectives of local level practitioners, analysed and interpreted by the researcher, using the analytical framework developed in the earlier part of the thesis to demonstrate the uneven patterns of policy-making across populations, and how the poor and more vulnerable were disproportionately targeting in the riot-related responses to the disorders. Arguably, there is possibly no way of ever offering a
definitive reason for exactly why any particular outbreak of urban disorder happens, especially when on the same scale (geographically and in term of the number of people involved) as the 2011 riots. Instead, by drawing out the layers of complexity and the difficulties and challenges that practitioners faced in the aftermath of the 2011 riots it is possible to show how a single response, such as the riot clause, was not considered the best course of action in response to the 2011 disorder and does not address the underlying causes the riots, nor acts as a preventative mechanism for any future disorder. Similar analysis of the TFP has come to the same conclusion (Bonell et al., 2016). Instead, it is suggested that responding to the 2011 riots through housing-related mechanisms, such as the use of eviction, is a political response, fitting in with the wider agenda of social housing being a tenure of last resort and home ownership and social mobility being a dominant mantra for politicians, in a continued, gradual shift from a welfare to penal state (Wacquant, 2009). The view that eviction is an appropriate way to respond to urban disorder, as articulated by the research participants in this study, is one based upon a stigmatised understanding of social housing and the lives of those who live in social housing.

**How were the different riots understood and interpreted at a local level by strategic and frontline practitioners?**

Participants explained the nuances of the riots. Housing, ASB and local police officers mostly acknowledged that the ‘pure criminality’ response from political elites was an oversimplification of the lived experiences on the ground. The different motivations for rioting, as illustrated by the experiences from Greater Manchester, show that even within close proximity, different urban centres experienced different forms of riots. Manchester was targeted by those rioters allegedly motivated by consumerism, the Salford riots were what participants described as ‘community’ riots. These riots were motivated by other grievances, such as the lack of sustainable employment, low wages and the inequality felt by members of these communities. Having such different motivations for urban disorder, as apparent from what research participants have said, demonstrates that their complex nature cannot reasonably be resolved by a one-size-fits-all response, such as that of the riot clause.

Nonetheless, the Government vociferously pursued housing sanctions in direct response to the 2011 riots. Despite the Riots Panel’s findings into the causes of the 2011 not mentioning housing or social housing, and certainly not suggesting that social housing tenants were significantly over-represented during the 2011 riots, in combination with a lack of support from the housing sector evidenced by the responses to the consultation, DCLG still persisted with the additional provisions allowing landlords to seek eviction of tenants involved in the riots. This move, for research participants in this study, was a clear demonstration that the Government were pursuing wider ideological agendas. In the context of the Coalition
Government, along with previous Governments’ approaches to housing policy provisions that continue to reduce social housing tenants’ security of tenure fits within the social mobility rhetoric favouring home-ownership and responsibility and responsibilisation of citizens. This rhetoric, where welfare subsidies should be ‘earned’ through acceptable behaviour with increased sanctioning and conditionality, is becoming a dominant characteristic of the welfare state in Britain. Research participants were also clear about their view on the Governments’ perception of social housing and its tenants; often a view that was articulated as one predicated upon a stigmatised notion of who lives in social housing, and that their motivation was to live ‘an easy life’ on state subsidies.

Another important point raised by participants, which arguably was ignored, or certainly not given the attention that research participants here believe it should have received, was that structural factors do matter and were significant in respect of the 2011 riots. Whether this meant such factors were a driver for people to incite rioting, because they do not know any other way of articulating their anger, or whether they felt disenfranchised and that they had nothing to lose by joining in, inequality and marginalisation were expressed as an important causal factor of the 2011 riots. An individuals’ housing tenure, however, was not considered a reason for someone to get involved in a riot and this was an opinion shared by all participants from the various agencies and geographical locales.

**How did practitioners respond to the immediate narratives and subsequent legislative changes to social housing policies?**

Participants across all sectors and geographical locations talked about the riots as deplorable, acknowledging that much of what was happening at the time was criminal and did require punishment. In this respect, participants understood why certain pronouncements were being made and harsh punishments were being received. Research participants understood the need in some cases to show how seriously the authorities were taking the riots. However, within the housing sector in particular, there was discontent with the way in which social housing was being positioned as a way of punishing rioters.

Following the riots and the subsequent amendments to the DCLG consultation, politicians and local authorities were vociferous about using tenancies as a form of punishment. On this point, research participants talked about their frustration at such populist responses without sufficient underpinning evidence to support their pejorative claims. Research participants who worked in the housing sector felt that responding through housing-related mechanisms such as eviction did little but exacerbate the stigmatisation of social housing and social housing tenants. Such responses also ignored the positive work that takes place within areas of social
housing, including the support being offered to families who struggle with some of the daily activities that others may take for granted, such as ensuring children attend school.

When considering the subsequent legislative changes, the feeling amongst participants could be described as ambivalent, rather than some of the anger expressed in the immediate aftermath. Following the unsuccessful case in Wandsworth, participants suggested that social housing providers would be hesitant to serve NOSPs in such contexts. Participants were also clear about other powers and tools available to them that would mean the new riot clause could be redundant from the outset. Because social housing practitioners did not feel that they could justify pursuing the eviction of social housing tenants in response to the riot, where offences had been committed away from the property, there was little need for new legislation. If, on the other hand, a tenant had been involved in a riot-related offence that did affect the housing management function, existing powers would have allowed the appropriate course of action, which may have been eviction, to be taken.

What does this mean for social housing policies and practices in the future?

The riot clause marks a potentially significant change for social housing tenancies. The removal of the locality element now means that in the context of urban disorder, social housing tenants could be at a greater risk of punishment than other individuals living in other housing tenures.

Research participants suggested that the riot clause has not had an impact on their day-to-day working practices so far. However, many did acknowledge that in the event of another riot the outcome could be different. For research participants in this study, the addition of the riot clause is not a preventative measure. There is a sense that if England was to experience urban disorder in the future, social housing tenants may still not be aware of the possible consequences of their involvement, which could be both custodial sentences and eviction. Therefore, social housing tenants are not being supported by new legislation but instead facing further precarity and potentially further marginality and vulnerability if riots do break out in the future.

Local perspectives highlight the complexity of understanding urban disorder and how national policy oversimplified the issues. The responses were ‘knee-jerk’ and ideological, with a focus on the punishment of the rioters, and the groups of society understood to be involved in the riots, or what may have caused the riots according to evidence.
7. Spaces of Misunderstanding? Exploring the power and resistance dynamics within and between national policy making and local practice

Following the 2011 riots there was pressure on the Government to be seen to be doing something to tackle the problem. One response was to extend the power of possession to housing providers so that they can evict tenants for their involvement in the riots, inferring this was a particular problem for housing provided that needed addressing. What this chapter will highlight is that the frontline experience was very different to the way it was portrayed from particular media angles. Focusing on the practitioners’ responses, this chapter looks at the way in which the policy may translate in practice.
Chapter 7

Spaces of Misunderstanding

7.1 Introduction

Within the housing sector, but also to some degree within other agencies involved in the social control of populations, the riot clause was a divisive legislative amendment in response to the 2011 riots. Despite riots not being a particularly regular experience in Britain, taking action as the unrest was occurring seemingly gained public attention, as YouGov surveys highlighted. In a letter to leaders of local authorities with social housing stock and Chief Executives of Housing Associations, Grant Shapps MP explained:

As the Prime Minister indicated last week and I set out on 10 August, we are now in addition [to new mandatory powers] proposing that the existing discretionary grounds for possession for anti-social behaviour and criminality is broadened. I want to ensure that where social tenants or members of their family are found guilty of serious anti-social behaviour or criminality of the sort we’ve witnessed in recent days, that will categorically provide a ground on which a social landlord may seek possession of the property. (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011b)

Like other policies and initiatives within the context of the Coalition Government, and more recently proposals from the new Conservative Government there is a clear trajectory of increased conditionality and sanctioning being applied in respect to accessing, and maintaining, state welfare subsidies. Social housing tenants are no exception to this continued reconfiguration process of the welfare state under austerity politics. Following the development of housing policy over the last three decades and a trajectory that has worked largely in favour of homeownership and to reduce the tenure of security for social housing tenants, there is a compelling argument to suggest that the sector is situated within a wider climate of political, and public, advanced stigmatisation (Stenson, 2012; Wacquant, 2008).

The negative connotations around social housing estates and their residents has pervaded popular culture, hardening public attitudes towards the welfare system and those relying on state benefits, effectively legitimising further punitive action (Flint, 2002; Hills, 2015; Manzi, 2015; Murie, 2012a).

Following the amendments to the government’s 2011 consultation that looked to expand powers of possession to housing providers, there was both concern and frustration within the social housing sector at the political rhetoric denouncing social housing tenants as the rioters. Research participants explained that such narratives continued to stigmatise the sector and social housing tenants whilst simultaneously suggesting that the housing providers were not doing enough to effectively regulate their tenants’ behaviour. The Government’s response to the 2011 riots has subsequently emphasised the perceived role of housing providers as responsible for the policing and sanctioning of individuals’ behaviour and actions. Housing practitioners also raised their frustration with the expansion of their roles into policing
behaviour, which they perceived as a substitute for government cuts in areas, such as the police force.

It is the aim of this final empirical chapter to explore this apparent ‘space’ between national policy making and local practice to understand the power and resistance dynamics that can emerge from policy-making decisions. In doing so, this chapter will look at how national, top-down policy-making was understood and explained by research participants working at a local scale and how they perceived these new powers to affect their day-to-day housing management and behaviour control functions. This chapter will then turn to how practitioners at a local level can, and do, resist top-down power that attempts to change the way that they manage their communities and tenants. This section will address why practitioners at a local level would want to resist national powers, which ostensibly have been provided to help make their daily operations of frontline officers easier. The resistance to national policy making that this chapter explores may be classified into two categories: pragmatic and ethical resistance.

Finally, the chapter will turn to the other power-resistance dynamics that emerge from the housing-urban disorder model (see Appendix A) to show the complex social realities of dealing with social unrest, and in particular the challenge of doing so through housing-related mechanisms. This final section will address the disparities between organisations at a local level, between practitioners within organisations and indeed personal conflicts as practitioners attempted to make sense of the disorders and consider the appropriate courses of action to be taken amidst strong public and political pressure. From a detailed analysis of the different power-relation dynamics it is possible to see how national rhetoric was beginning to infiltrate local practitioners’ narratives, which could be a sign that the resistance to such punitive sanctioning was starting to waver. When talking about national rhetoric infiltrating the practitioners’ narratives, this refers in particular to explanations of the 2011 riots. Later it will be argued that the historical trajectory of social housing policies and the stigmatisation the sector has faced has had a longer-term impact on the way practitioners view social housing tenants and may welcome new powers because of their frustration with particular tenants.

This section will draw on the ‘realist governmentality’ framework adopted elsewhere by scholars such as Flint (2002), Stenson (2005) and McKee (2009). The particular advantage of this approach is that it helps to understand the power relations and government rationalities, in particular the ability for bottom up resistance to be mobilised against top down mentalities of rule (McKee, 2009). Here, what becomes apparent is the way in which housing providers talked about how they used particular mechanisms to control behaviour and regulate their tenants, such as ABCs, or where, when other attempts to align behaviour according to institutional norms have failed, the threat of eviction can be a powerful tool for practitioners to regulate conduct. However, in the case of the 2011 riots, the practitioners themselves
displayed a strong element of resistance. McKee’s (2009) work, again, offers a useful insight. McKee’s research explored the governmental techniques of micro-managing the behaviour of long-term unemployed citizens in Australia who failed to actively engage in activities they were being asked to adopt, and found: “the potential for bottom-up resistance to top-down mentalities of rule, and a potential disjuncture between political rationales and their effects in reality” (McKee, 2009, p. 477) can occur when individual discretion is granted. Here the key concern is that there is the potential for uneven sanctioning of individuals who may have been misrepresented as deviant in the context of urban disorder, which arguably will exacerbate, rather than dissipate, particular issues in marginalised urban locales.

7.1 Top-down power dynamics: The local perspective

Underpinning the Government’s rationale for enhancing housing-related mechanisms in response to the urban disorder was a stated desire to fix an issue that posed a threat to wider society.

Despite powers already being available to housing providers that allowed landlords to evict a tenant in cases of ASB, the governmental perception was that these needed to be enhanced, as the riots were a demonstration that current powers were not as effective as they could be:

We know that the threat of eviction can act as a powerful driver of improved behaviour. It cannot be right for that sanction to apply only to criminal behaviour towards neighbours or in the locality of the property as it does at the moment. Where a social tenant or a member of their household decided to wreak havoc in someone else’s community, social landlords should have the same scope to take action. (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011b)

The inference in such political action is that urban unrest amongst social housing tenants is an immediate threat to wider societal norms. It also suggests that it is a problem that happens with some frequency, but which frontline officers are too ill-equipped to deal with effectively. It was the only clause that specified to such granularity what particular action could be sanctioned against, which goes against the general definitions of ASB, which have often remained intentionally vague. Practitioners who were involved in this research were concerned about this and the level of disproportionality. Practitioners felt that, in the case of urban disorder that took place away from an individuals’ home, it was not the role of a housing officer to take action.37

It seems very unfair that if you’re convicted of an offence, and it happens to be a rioting offence, you can then potentially lose your home, where if you’re convicted of any other

37 With the introduction of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014) there was a second clause that removed the locality element, which is the harassment of any of the landlords’ employees. The link to a person’s home and tenancy is arguably clearer with this clause, as it is the landlord that is responsible for the property and the tenancy management and is therefore clearly linked with the property and the tenancy.
offence, you don’t tend to lose your home, do you? Unless it’s related to where you’re living… [the] anti-social behaviour, you know. If I go out and…mow somebody over with my car, I’m not likely to lose my home because of that and to me, that’s much more serious, consequently, isn’t it? (Neighbourhood Services, ALMO, West Midlands)

My view is that, that any tenancy sanctions are reasonable when they are applied in relation to the conduct of that tenancy, so whether that involves… an altercation between one person and another away from the property, but relates to the fact that they’re next door neighbours and there’s a dispute, that’s fine… If it relates to someone doing drugs in the premises, again, that relates to the use of the property, but I think someone behaving badly [pause] I don’t think should mean, if it has no connection with the property, that they should lose their tenancy… and also, the other thing that is interesting is, obviously, the riot ground only deals with convictions relating to one group of, type of offences… but if someone commits and offence even more serious, but is not connected to a riot, why are they allowed to keep their tenancy then? (Legal Representative, Greater Manchester)

For these practitioners, the riot clause presented an unequal policy response that disproportionately affected social housing tenants. The practitioners reflected their discontent at the lack of coherence of this policy shift, which prescribed rioting specifically as an offence upon which this power could be used. The lack of coherence also extended to the way in which the locality aspect of this power was removed only in the case of urban disorder. As the comment above reflects, there is a more clear justification for serving a NOSP where a behaviour takes place away from the property, but has some clear link back to it – for example an altercation with a next door neighbour could be argued to be related to the property irrespective of where an offence may take place, given that the victim lives in close proximity to the perpetrator.

The additional clause brought in under the 2014 ASB, Crime and Policing Act also echoes the immediate political responses, which was that the Government perceived the riots as “purely” anti-social behaviour and criminality and therefore a punitive response was valid and proportionate. There was no attempt to explore whether there may have been any other underlying causes to be addressed and, even following the Riot Panel’s final report, which offered some other possible explanations, the Government still focused on the riot clause, despite the absence of social housing from any official response.38

The move to include urban disorder into the extended powers of possession for social housing providers was an ostensible effort to help modify some tenants’ behaviour; a way of demonstrating that rioting would not be tolerated and by doing so individuals could lose their home if they were a social housing tenant. David Cameron justified this policy through the idea of promoting responsibility in what he regards as “the most important word in politics” (BBC, 2011). The changes made were given apparent legitimacy through the use of the well-established ‘Broken Britain’ narrative in the absence of any actual evidence to suggest that

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38 Housing, including social housing, was absent from both the Riot Communities and Victims Panel’s interim and final reports, as well as a the majority of all other organisation’s reports into the causes and responses to the riots, with the exception of the responses to the initial consultation into extending the powers of possession for social housing landlords.
this was an issue amongst social housing tenants. Here, it is possible to begin to see the top-
down response to the 2011 riots through housing-related mechanisms as perhaps a way of
furthering wider political agendas rather than an attempt by national Government to begin
addressing local problems. This line of argument supports, and builds upon, the arguments put
forward by Wacquant when he talks about the centaur state and the reframing of a welfare to a

Participants in this research found it difficult to articulate how these amendments would, in
practice, ever be used. They felt that it would not be able to achieve its apparent aim of
changing an individual’s behaviour and increasing their responsibility:

I understand why it’s there [the riot clause]. It’s certainly there to send a message out, that you
know, this sort of behaviour will not be tolerated again…I understand why it’s in the
legislation, I just don’t know how much practical use it’s ever going to have. (Solicitor,
Greater Manchester)

There is a noticeable disconnect here, however. This participant recognises that the clause is
there to convey a message about being ‘tough on crime’, but essentially, the participant felt
that the chances of a tenant actually being aware that such a clause exists, or that such powers
were available to their housing provider, was very low:

It’s difficult to say [whether the riot clause would have changed people’s behaviour] isn’t it as
to how many…of the rioters were actually tenants or more likely to be. There was a lot of
young people weren’t there? Children of tenants, for example. I mean I see a lot of cases
where…possession is sought on the behaviour of children of tenants in and around the locality
of the property anyway. Whether that would have given them an extra thing to think about, or
it…was almost as if mass hysteria sort of took over in parts of the country. Whether that would
have entered their consciousness, you know, “I don’t want my mum to lose her house, so I’m
not going to go and steal trainers from wherever it was”, probably not I would say…I’m
getting the distinct impression that it’s probably not going to be used (Solicitor, Greater
Manchester)

This sentiment was present in many of the interviews conducted. While, on the one hand, the
clause may be characterised as the Government taking a ‘tough stance’ on feckless behaviour,
it was promoted as a way in which the broader society would be protected. Marketing it as
such therefore suggests that it is serving a wider benefit, however if tenants are unaware of its
existence it is unlikely it will be able to act as a deterrence as it was framed in political
narratives following the riots. One participant, whose charity works within deprived
communities in Greater Manchester, explained that while it was a punitive mechanism, it was
a good thing for society:

[It is a] punitive clause, so if anything happens again, Government can be seen to be punishing
offenders of riots… is that a good thing or a bad thing? For society it’s a good thing. Society
needs to be shown that we do take things seriously and we do get punished… would it stop a
young person getting involved and doing it? Not a chance, because they’re because… A they
wouldn’t know about it and B caught up in the moment… absolutely not…but society on the
whole do need, do need to have that justice is done and seen to be done and I think that’s what
that clause is about. That justice is seen to be done. (Community Charity Worker, Greater
Manchester)
There is a visible tension here between the messages from housing providers and that of this community worker. For the charity worker ‘being seen to be doing something’ was a positive response, although this does not appear to recognise that the riots were not specifically linked to social housing tenants. This may only be a single case, but it does begin to highlight how the riot clause could be unchallenged, even by those who were familiar with the issues in communities and the adverse effect that eviction can have on an individual’s life course. The use of social housing tenancies as a way of punishing and preventing urban disorder also reinforced the sentiment that housing tenancies are a governance mechanism designed to modify individuals’ behaviour according to particular moral codes and norms. This, however, was highlighted as problematic because, it was argued, the nature of a housing tenancy should be contractual and related to the use of the land, rather than the behaviour of a tenant, or their family, in a locality defined by the housing provider:

Under the pre-2011 Act amendments there’s got to be some nexus between the use of the land and the activity... because that’s... about controlling how you use the land. It’s not controlling you as a tenant. It’s not about making you a morally good person. And that’s the shift you’re seeing in the new… amendments, to move it away from the use of the property, to being a morally good person. (Legal Representative, London)

From this then, it could be understood that reasons for the introduction of the riot clause were that the Government perceived local problems as something that needed additional powers to be granted or they saw the riots as an opportunity to (i) be seen to be doing something about deviancy and rampant criminality, in what one participant considered “playing to the galleries” or (ii) saw the riots as an opportunity to pursue other governmental agendas, particularly related to the reduction of tenure security in social housing based on ideological and stigmatised notions of both social housing tenants and those involved in the riots as being morally deviant. A further reason, as articulated by participants, for the introduction of the riot clause was the pacification of the general public and vote garnering. In a number of instances, research participants discussed the riot clause, as well as wider changes to anti-social behaviour legislation, in the context of political popularity. Despite the research interviews being conducted during 2013 and 2014, the next General Election was being held in May 2015, and for a number of participants this was considered an important factor to consider. The articulation and perception of such motivation to make changes supported an argument that the responses to the 2011 were little more than political and ideological:

I think there was a feeling of something needed to be done, or needed to be shown to be done...because I thought it was really funny how quickly the, what is now the Act, was amended in response to the riots...that [the] introduction of the what I sort of call the riot ground, you know, that... was within days of the riots happening and I don’t think I’ve ever seen anything so sort of immediately topical (Legal Practitioner, London)

Rejecting knee-jerk reactions
Practitioners articulated the role of Housing and ASB Officers as not being a ‘popularity contest’. One housing officer explained that their remit was not to pacify populations – and by this the research participant was referring to politicians and other stakeholders involved in policing urban policy:

It would have been very easy after a huge traumatic event, like the riots, and you know -- the politicians… what they have to do and what they have to been seen to be doing and what they say [they are doing] is to a different audience, I think, than my job. My job is not to pacify people, or… a popularity contest, or anything like that… and I can think on a much longer scale about what the impact of the decisions that we take today would be. (Housing Officer, RSL, East London)

Not only did the participants believe that the Government’s justification for the riot clause as offering preventative powers against future disorder was flawed, but that it also had the potential to be counter-intuitive, given that it lacked any restorative qualities. Instead participants suggested it should just be viewed as a form of punishment once an offence has been committed, with practitioners suggesting that it was a purely punitive measure. It is important to consider that the devolved administrations have chosen not to adopt the riot clause in their housing policies and legislation. One ASB and Policing manager from Wales explained that:

Wales have rejected it because housing is devolved… and Wales tried to take a slightly more liberal view and wanted to also show that… we don’t have the type of problems that London does and all of that… I think it’s more of a political statement that we don’t need this. (ASB and Police Manager, Wales)

With the rioting contained to only England in 2011, it is not necessarily surprising that the devolved nations have omitted this particular clause.

### 7.2 Resisting top-down power dynamics

The Government’s rebranding of ASB powers under the new Act included the streamlining of the existing ‘bloated’ powers toolkit (Home Office, 2012). Much of this was focused towards supporting the community, with a clear victim focus. Another objective, which the riot clause directly undermined, was the attempt to make powers tenure neutral. The riot clause actually offered very little additional powers to providers, hence Shelter’s concern in response to the consultation that highlighting housing was merely a symbolic gesture. Almost all practitioners, particular housing officers, were unenthusiastic about the new powers because they were either unhelpful or in opposition to the role that housing officers perceived themselves as having. This represents an emerging ‘subversion’ of policy in what Prior and Barnes (2011) describe as ‘agencies of resistance’:
Chapter 7

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Such agencies of resistance denote an engagement by service providers and/or users in the production of strategies for dealing with the contingency of service delivery contexts that constitute modifications or alternative to, or rejections of, the intended processes or outcomes of policy delivery. (Prior & Barnes, 2011, p. 269)

Prior and Barnes’ exploration into the resistance of policy by service providers demonstrates that resistance can take different forms depending upon the context; service providers can resist particular strategies and practices that do not conform to the priorities set down in official policy (see Prior, 2009).

Changes to housing policy: Anger or ambivalence amongst practitioners?

The riot clause was amended from a statutory power, as originally suggested in the Government’s 2011 consultation, to a discretionary power. This therefore gives housing providers autonomy over whether they choose to use this power in the event of a future outbreak of urban disorder. It is the aim of this section to address the question: why would social housing providers want to resist increased powers of possession? Research participants were asked to consider what action they, or their organisations, may advocate in the outbreak of any future disorder, reflecting upon the 2011 riots and largely assuming any future disorder followed a broadly similar pattern of behaviours. Following analysis of the data, two distinct types of resistance emerged; defined as pragmatic resistance and ethical resistance in this study as categories to analyse the different rationales and motivations practitioners cited for resisting the extended powers of possession.

Pragmatic resistance can be understood here as the inability, or the unwillingness, to evict tenants based on the existing powers and tools available to housing providers. Housing providers stressed the importance of locality (a point that spans both pragmatic and ethical resistance), because officers knew that, once a case was presented in court, unless there were other substantiating reasons for serving the tenant with eviction, other than solely being involved in the riots, it would be unlikely to succeed:

When the riots came up…there was a big…discussion between the council and police and all that on the expectation of who should be seen to be doing what. And then obviously we have the Government, or the media saying this should be done… to stop rioters, take effect on their tenancies and all that kind of thing. What was not taken into account was that… at the end of the day, it’s not affecting our tenancy management and this is where the sticking point was… in respect of us taking action against tenants. Because what happened, I mean this could have happened down in London, or in the city [Manchester], if it’s not affecting our tenancy management, then if we weren’t going to take an anti-social behaviour order, or possession, would that be deemed to be reasonable? And that was the biggest issue in respect of those, when it comes to the riots. We were asked, there was some people identified as being involved in it, however… due to [them] not affecting our tenancy management, they’re not, a lot of these were not even in, not even caused problems before at all…we were limited on what action we could [take]. (ASB Officer, RSL, Greater Manchester)
Using the riots to pursue eviction was also perceived as an expensive option for housing providers, especially in light of Wandsworth Council’s decision to reverse their pursuit to evict the mother of a rioter, where it was clear that authorities lacked confidence that the court would award possession. Additionally, housing providers already had the ability to serve a NOSP and evict a tenant with existing powers, should an incident of rioting have affected their tenancy agreement, which was also a factor in practitioners’ ambivalence towards the new powers. Related to this is the idea of proportionality. Where a ground is discretionary there has to be a twofold test. This would mean that the judge would look at whether the incident had actually happened and then whether it was necessary and proportionate to grant the order. This latter point can be challenging for a housing provider to prove, and would be potentially blocked on grounds of human rights, for example (ASB Officer, West Midlands). A more generic understanding of proportionality is whether a practitioner would consider an offence or type of behaviour committed to be worth pursuing to the point of serving a NOSP or some other form of sanction on the individual or their families. In the context of the riots, when considering the use of eviction for rioters, there were some instances where practitioners probably would not even consider the use of eviction:

...it’s all around proportionality, you know, before it even goes to court. The police and other departments will be having that discussion around... yes, we’ve got this power, [but] is it proportionate? If you look at some of the examples where they’ve stole, you know, penny sweets in some cases, or really low-value stuff, have they just got carried away? They weren’t the ones that smashed the windows, [they just] got carried away and [have] gone in… which is still your criminal offence and contribution to the riots overall, but really, do they deserve to lose their home for that? (Police Officer, Greater Manchester)

This officer, echoing the sentiment of many research participants, explained that in spite of any national response or political pressure, the local practitioners involved in making the decisions for crime and ASB procedures – and involved in responding to events such as the 2011 riots – would discuss the best options they perceived in the local context and on a case-by-case basis. He, therefore, suggested that he would not envisage many cases of eviction to be brought against rioters – especially those who had only committed very minor offences – in the event of any future urban disorder.

Finally, the third reason for pragmatic resistance was a lack of evidence. With no evidence able to specifically show that social housing tenants were a prominent demographic element of the 2011 riots, and therefore not necessarily needing to be “taught a lesson”, as suggested by national discourse, research participants talked about organisations waiting to see how the larger organisations - with more funding to pursue such legal challenges - were going to react:

I am not that keen, for many of my landlord clients, to be the pioneers of using these new injunctions, because they’re going to have to fund the Court of Appeal cases if they do, [pause] I’d let London and Quadrant do it, they’ve got tons of money (Legal Representative, London)
Once it was clear, especially following the Wandsworth Council case being quashed, that there was not going to be social housing tenants evicted *en masse*, the issue soon subsided:

I… certainly don’t think Wandsworth managed to evict anyone. I think they backed down after the Ms de la Calva one. I’m not actually aware of any local authority that managed it… I think Wandsworth took the lead and when they couldn’t get it through, one else did… so nothing’s happened…since. (Legal Practitioner, London)

*Ethical resistance* can be considered distinct to pragmatic resistance, and demonstrates how the complex issues of housing and ASB management can differ between individual officers and housing providers. Practitioners talked about their role within an organisation, the responsibility they are duty bound to offer their tenants and communities as well as maintaining the inclusivity ethos of social housing management. Ethical resistance, therefore, is used here and interpreted as the housing provider not *wanting* to evict tenants, as opposed to pragmatic resistance being where they *could not* evict tenants. Of course, as with any aspect of this research, views sometimes conflicted and participants disagreed. This was most notable when considering whether eviction should be used more or less in cases of urban disorder, but also ASB more generally, and over the role of eviction itself. Both of these issues are covered later in the chapter. However, there was a clear pattern - amongst the housing officers most notably, where they viewed their role as part of a support network for their tenants and communities. This was conveyed by housing officers as their responsibility for inclusivity; which for a number of participants went against the idea of evicting tenants, especially in the context of the 2011 riots, which was the main offence these new extended powers focused upon:

Some of our more…intolerant…community members…those who only see things in very black and white terms…‘well, just evict them’… [But] we are a social landlord, we are socially responsible and even though…we are a team of officers who are enforcing…legislation and enforcing…tenancy agreements, we’re not in it because we want to go around evicting people. We would only do that as a very last resort, because we are supposed to be…a provider that’s supposed to be looking to socially *include* people, not socially exclude people…I would be very, very, very surprised if you saw a sudden increase in social landlords wanting to use that particular piece of legislation. (Neighbourhood Safety, Greater Manchester)

This reveals how landlords were taking a considered approach to their responses; arguably unlike the national responses which were labelled as “playing to the galleries” (Housing Officer, East London) and as a knee-jerk reaction to the disorders by research participants because of the immediacy of the extended powers being posited and lack of evidence supporting the particular policy amendments. As cited elsewhere, one legal practitioner explained that she had never seen legislative amendments suggested so quickly and that within the time between the disorders and the changes to the policy consultation there was insufficient time to understand whether the suggested changes were addressing the issues concerned.
The focus on how social housing providers should respond following the riots also ignored the work that was being done not only during the riots but also in the time before the riots. Many participants talked about their wider and ongoing involvement in local activities and place-making. Whilst this did vary between organisations, some of which had very dispersed stock and therefore a less prominent presence in the community than some other organisations, there was still a sense of being able to identify and connect with tenants. In the case of the 2011 riots, much of this focus was on the relationship between housing providers and younger populations, those who would be typically the children of tenants rather than the tenants themselves. Through on-going work with local residents and other agencies, housing providers talked about the historical relationships with their tenants and their ability to identify “at risk” groups. Programmes such as FIPs had enabled practitioners to know their tenants’ households, including those who may have been most likely to be lured, either through peer pressure or curiosity, to sites of rioting:

The other thing we’ve got is our Family Intervention Project. So, again, what we were able to do was – the young people that were most at risk of falling into involvement, we already knew them...and a lot of them, we were already engaging with them and working with them and we were able to call them, call mum and dad, call the guardians, whoever was responsible for them and say, “where are they? What are they doing?” We opened our youth facilities as well, [which] lots of people didn’t. I think [others] thought it was too risky. (Housing Manager, East London)

Awareness of the groups of young people, who may have been most inclined to travel to riot areas, meant that housing providers could ensure that youth facilities were opened and that local practitioners who knew the individuals could encourage them to go there instead and explain to them about the potential consequences of becoming involved in the riots. The participant quoted above also explained how in their area they used CCTV and capitalised on their close links with the police to monitor the situation. When they saw small groups forming, they asked for the police to informally approach these groups, check what was happening, let them know that facilities were open and to outline some of the consequences they may face should they become involved in any of the wider disturbances taking place. This participant was particularly keen to emphasise the importance of preventing people from becoming involved, rather than simply relying on punishment at the point an offence had been committed, showing a desire to take a non-punitive stance where possible. It was cited on a number of occasions that some individuals perceived the carnivalesque appearance of the riots as exciting and, unlike what the national rhetoric suggested, some individuals would not have been aware of the punitive sanctions they were going to face for being involved in the disorders. It was also noted by certain practitioners that holistic approaches to their work meant that they had been engaging with their young populations to help with education, training and employment, which was cited as another reason for their tenants not being involved as they had too much to lose. There is a clear parallel to some of the earlier debates
around the structural factors affecting individuals’ involvement in the disorder and how important in can be for individuals to feel as though they have a ‘stake’ in society.

The prioritisation of longer term work to help support people maintain their tenancies and cope with particular situations, including finding training and work and offering safe environments for people to socialise in, were some of the key mechanisms that housing providers considered as helping prevent people from becoming involved in urban disorder. The resistance towards the use of a “riot clause” to widen the powers of possession to housing providers demonstrated the non-punitive stance of many housing providers prefer to take.

An extension of this concern from practitioners was that whilst young people may not have necessarily been aware of the custodial sentences they could face, and the implications this could have on their future life courses, the use of housing tenancies as a sanction was a collective punishment for the entire family. So even though it was a child of a tenancy holder who had been involved in a disorder, their parent/s and siblings could also lose their home, which will inevitably have implications on their life chances too.

The issue of locality, a key aspect of the riot clause, also had ethical resonance when research participants talked about resisting national policies. For many practitioners, they were clear that if someone had committed an offence as part of the riots outside of the locality, they would have already faced criminal charges. Practitioners therefore felt it unnecessary to pursue civil enforcement alongside the criminal charges already being brought. Often where tenants were identified as rioters – which was not considered a significant number from the experience of research participants in this study – they had not had a previous record of ASB or criminality. Therefore, there was no justification to then subject them to the double-jeopardy punishment of eviction in addition to criminal charges:

I actually don’t think the ground itself, because it’s still a discretionary ground, I don’t think it’s going to make any difference… Because, my experience was… it is all in context and it is all to do with, you know, whether or not it is reasonable in the bigger picture. So actually, the amendment itself, I don’t think -- maybe had they made it a mandatory ground… then you have to show proportionality, but then I think you would have been dealing with, or may end up dealing with a whole raft of human rights-based challenges… you know, article eight, right to a home. Those cases very rarely succeed on the tenant’s part, but I can’t think of a case that might be more clear cut than, you know, a nineteen year old boy, rioting in Manchester, when he lives in London… his parents are great tenants, lovely people [laughs], no problems…younger siblings in the home… the fact that he… overcomes the first limb, even on proportionality, even if it was a mandatory ground, you still have to demonstrate that it’s proportionate… I think that’s where the block is. (Legal Representative, London)

However, not all practitioners necessarily agreed with this view. There were a number of instances where practitioners’ narratives aligned more closely with the Government’s rhetoric around a lack of morality or respect. What became more evident was that participants’ own internalised views of the riots conflicted as they switched between their personal views of the
disorder and the way they were able to respond within their professional capacity. It is this inter- and intra-personal conflict that is explored in the final subsection of this chapter.

7.3 The complex social reality: Conflicting understandings and disparities

Throughout this research, both from reviewing the existing literature and from the empirical fieldwork conducted, a common issue has continually emerged, which is the complexity and nuances of the 2011 riots in respect of both the way in which individuals’ motivation to become involved in the riots has been understood and the subsequent policy responses.

Political and media commentary arguably appeared, to some extent, to use the riots as a heuristic device; from the initial pronouncements the image being portrayed was one of an underclass, living on welfare benefits and in social housing, with a history of criminal convictions and probably affiliated to a gang. The national response, therefore, needed to be punitive in an attempt to revive self-responsibility. It was through such devices that a distinct ‘us and them’ narrative emerged, allowing the Government to commend the majority of “hard-working, responsible citizens”, whilst denouncing the minority, the underclass, for their complete disregard for morality and respect.

These responses were recognised by the research participants as a way of scapegoating individuals and pursuing wider governmental agendas, as one participant observed: “you see I wonder if it was all part of a bigger agenda, which was the shift in social housing from being a right, to being a benefit?” (Legal Representative, London). The groups identified as being responsible for the riots in the immediate aftermath, before there had been any time to undertake any research into the people involved, also fitted into wider, existing narratives. The negative connotations attached to the social housing sector, in part as a result of policies that have reduced the quantity and quality of properties available as well as the increase of ‘poverty porn’ culture had simultaneously stigmatised the tenants who live in socially-rented accommodation. Popular culture in Britain now widely understands the council tenant to be feckless, workshy and lacking responsibility (Jensen, 2014; Jensen & Tyler, 2015; McKenzie, 2015; Tyler, 2013a, 2013b). It therefore makes it possible for this now identifiable group of individuals to easily become the scapegoat in other contexts to drive forward particular political goals. This has also been made easier by the “hardening” of public attitudes toward people relying on the welfare state for financial support, including housing (Allen et al.,
2011). This allows authorities to adopt more punitive approaches without much public protestation.

The viewpoint from the frontline was, however, quite different. Many research participants talked about their frustration over the political responses to the riots, which not only suggested that social housing tenants lacked any responsibility, but also that the sector itself – and therefore the housing providers – were not fit for purpose:

There was a backlash to the way that politicians were coming out with political rhetoric in relation to the riots and giving an impression that it was all… because of social tenants… [That] it was all social tenants that were causing the problem and that they needed to be brought to account and that they needed to be punished… I know our reaction to it, within the [organisation] was to pull together a document… that actually provided an opportunity for housing providers to celebrate everything that they do in relation to keeping community cohesion, into providing services beyond bricks and mortar services, you know. You look at any housing provider now… they do far… more in terms of… added-value services to the community than perhaps any council or any other organisation within a local neighbourhood.

(Neighbourhood Office, Greater Manchester)

This participant then went on to explain that the 2011 riots and the way in which they were represented at a national level has provided a challenge for housing providers to demonstrate that “it’s not the social tenants that are the bad people of the world… and it’s not social housing tenants who are responsible for the riots…actually there’s lots of good that comes out of…social [housing]” (Neighbourhood Officer, Greater Manchester).

In the same way that the political responses to the riots created a divide in opinion, the use of housing-related mechanisms was also discussed in different ways by the research participants. The governmental impetus to create new powers that widen the geographical area in which a housing provider can evict a tenant in the context of urban disorder was widely understood by research participants as part of the dismantling process of the social housing sector and the reduction in a tenant’s security of tenure. However, even where participants understood why the Government did extend the powers of possession of housing providers, opinions were divided over whether they thought that such changes were necessary. Housing officers often suggested that on the whole evicting someone for behaviour not in the locality was not appropriate and that in the case of future riots they would have to judge each case as it arises.39

The argument here is that, within the existing trajectory of increased sanctioning and reduced security of tenure, the pressure that was placed on landlords to “act” in response to the 2011 riots will be exacerbated in the case of future disorder. Now that the legislation exists in

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39 Following the 2011 riots there were a number of incidents where tenants were evicted because of their involvement. However, the tenant’s involvement in the riots was one of a number of reasons attached to the NOSP and did, in some ways, affect the tenancy management (e.g. bringing stolen goods onto the premises). Whilst only speculation, it is suggested that in any further urban disorder this will be the case, but the use of eviction purely on involvement in urban disorder remains to be seen.
statute, landlords do have the legal powers to evict tenants in the case of urban disorder, regardless of where the tenant commits the offence. However, there is evidence of resistance – as highlighted above - to such powers, which continues to reveal complexity in the way in which housing mechanisms are viewed, and potentially adopted, in practice.

In light of mounting pressure on housing providers in the aftermath of the 2011 riots, in future outbreaks of urban disorder there is a risk that these conflicting dynamics could lead to uneven patterns of punishment, both across housing tenures generally, but also within the social housing sector where different providers take different approaches to the disorder according to their perspective of the underlying issues. This is problematic, in particular, when thinking about future life courses. For social housing tenants who were involved in the riots, who may have already been experiencing particular structural issues around unemployment, or low-wage employment, for example, a criminal record and eviction – leading to the risk of having to pay higher rents in the PRS – can only place more barriers in the way of this individual’s social mobility. If, as dominant neoliberal ideologies suggest, an individual has to ‘pull themselves up by their bootstring’, work hard and become financially independent in order to unlock the ‘culture of dependency’ they are trapped in, these uneven patterns of punishment seem perverse, only exacerbating the issues that successive governments are attempting to prevent.

The next section looks at the complex landscapes of local level power and resistance, whilst observing the research participants’ views of what role social housing should be playing in contemporary society and whether these viewpoints, some of which resonate with national rhetoric, change the way in which research participants think landlords should respond in respect of urban disorder.

**Social housing as a way of controlling behaviour**

At a local level, there was disagreement about the use of eviction. It was agreed that serving a NOSP, even if the landlord had no intention to pursue the eviction, was a powerful and effective governance mechanism to encourage a tenant to change their behaviour. As one ASB Officer explained, some tenants only know what it is like to live in the social housing sector and threatening them with eviction and the potential of the additional responsibility and limited support in the private sector is a terrifying prospect:

I stepped forward in my civilian clothing, half the stature of a police officer and say, “okay, but I’m also here representing your housing association and I need to talk about how this is going to affect your tenancy” and all of a sudden it was like, right, turn off the TV, go upstairs [to the children], come in and we used to start, suddenly start having their attention, they’d be listening. And if we said jump and stand on one foot, they would do it. And that was really shocking to all of us, because the lack of respect for police, and yet, anything to do with housing, is just so important to them because a housing association house is all they’ve ever known. The private market to them is very scary, not only the costs involved, but... you know,
first of all the lump sum they need for the deposit, like a month’s rent in... advance. They
don’t understand the system either. The system some people have always known is benefits,
housing associations, the fact it’s really done for you and going out to find one on your own,
going to get references, a month’s rent in advance, the fact that you could then lose it on a
whim is really, really frightening and obviously a lot of people... on housing association aren’t
in a position to buy, so when you suddenly mention a threat to their tenancy, that’s
huge...because the other issue is they also, a lot of people in housing associations, especially
in Wales have also lived in the same area and asking them to move area is like asking me to
move from where I live to London, you know, it, it’s quite a dramatic change for them to have
to move even, I don’t know, ten miles away (ASB Officer, South Wales)

In this case, the participant was talking about when landlord representatives and the police
work in coordination when dealing with issues of behaviour control. The power of a housing
tenancy, as illustrated here, offers a commanding governance tool to engage problematic
tenants, sometimes more so than the police are able to do with the powers that are afforded to
them in the context of low-level crime and ASB.

For landlords though, evicting tenants, certainly in the context of the riots, was considered
counterproductive. If a tenant was to be evicted from their property for involvement in crime
and ASB, such as an offence committed in the context of the 2011 riots, then they would
become deemed ‘intentionally homeless’ by authorities. This means that the local authority
and local registered providers would not have any duty to re-house the tenant meaning that it
was likely that that the tenant and their family will have no other housing option other than the
private sector. This can be problematic for some tenants in particular, who are reliant on the
support that can be offered from a social housing landlord. Some research participants
explained how they became more involved in a person’s life and by doing so could understand
more about the person, such as mental health problems for example. In such cases, it was
explained that particular behaviours, such as playing loud music during the early hours of a
morning, could be related to these mental health issues (for example trying to block out
auditory hallucinations). Having this understanding can help when dealing with complaints
from other neighbours, where an officer may be able to explain to someone why they are
behaving the way they are and that support is being put into place to help turn this around.
Participants explained that this level of support and understanding that is being offered by
housing and ASB officers can help to develop more harmonious communities and maximise
the life chances for vulnerable individuals. This level of engagement and support would not be
available in the private sector and therefore could lead to greater volumes of people entering
the criminal justice system, where in fact they need specialist support and care.

Research participants also talked about the added challenge when evicting a tenant who then
moves from the providers’ housing stock into the private sector but remains within the same
community, or even on the same street in some cases. This issue was raised in a number of
cases by research participants. For example, when a Neighbourhood Officer from the West
Midlands was asked if she got a sense of where the pressure to evict was coming from in the
aftermath of the riots, she explained that she sensed it was because of pressure, not from politicians but other local actors, such as the police, who were advocating arbitrary evictions. Here this participant explained that local politicians had a good understanding of the issues that this posed for everyone in a community:

Most of my police colleagues that I deal with on a day-to-day realise well actually, if we evict somebody, then where do they go… probably they’ll go into the private sector, because we won’t rehouse them and actually, have they got less control over them if they’re in the private sector? We also work really closely here with the police’s offender management team and the offender management team is very much about people -- keeping people in their properties… and controlling their offending behaviour and knowing where they’re living, so they can control offending behaviour. So, we don’t get a lot of pressure at all to evict people, because they’ll want to keep tabs on them… so that actually plays in with what the police are trying to do (Neighbourhood Officer, ALMO, West Midlands)

In these cases, problems of underlying ASB and criminality had not been addressed and therefore problems continued. For those research participants responsible for controlling behaviour in local communities, keeping a tenant in a managed property can be beneficial. It is at this point where the space between national policy-making and local practice could be interpreted as a “space of misunderstanding”.

Whilst this particular participant did explain that in her locality there was very little appetite for eviction, even amongst politicians in what is a Conservative-controlled borough, the riots could perhaps have played a role in supporting the move towards using introductory tenancy and in particular the use of shorter two-year introductory tenancies (as opposed to the usual five-year tenancy this organisation offers) for those tenants deemed as potentially problematic.

In turn, this raises the issue of what role social housing is perceived to be playing, and practitioners’ feel social housing should be doing in a local community. This idea is fundamental to this final section, as it is the perceived role of social housing that causes most of the tensions at a local level.

**Local level power and resistance dynamics**

A number of different power/resistance dynamics appeared to be operating at the local level; these dynamics included differences between the various stakeholders, which can manifest itself both between and within organisations. There were also differences between the way in which organisations operating at a local level either agreed with, or resisted, the national level rhetoric. Finally, there were personal conflicting dynamics, where participants’ views appeared to vary between resistance of powers at one point and conforming to national, pejorative rhetoric at other points as participants seemingly switched between personal and professional views of the riots.
The variation between different stakeholders is not surprising, given the different remits and aims of the practitioners. However, the different stakeholder perspectives were significant when considering the use of eviction in response to the riots. This was clear in one RSL in East London, where the views between the housing team and the ASB team differed substantially:

A lot of housing associations don’t like eviction, or don’t have the resources like we have to evict, so for ASB grounds. So -- but we tie everything in to that. So if they’re in rent arrears, we’ll tie the rent arrears into the action, so one person’s doing one action. Not ASB are going to serve you a NOSP, and then two weeks later rents will -- we try to tie that into one, one overall case on that person... so we do... do roughly -- yeah, on ASB and rents included, anything up to 10 a year. Don’t always get those, you know, you get a lot of suspended possessions, by the judge or, we decide, agree, outside of court a suspended order and if they do anything in that time we go back to court and get the property back... But we do use eviction... and I don’t think people use it enough. (ASB Officer, RSL, East London)

This participant did explain, in addition to this, that the use of eviction was very much a last resort and in some cases when a NOSP is served it may be for the purposes of warning a tenant and getting them to modify their behaviour. Nonetheless, the view from the ASB perspective was very different from the housing perspective within the same organisation. When this Housing Officer was asked about her view on evicting tenants because of their involvement in the riots, her explanation returned to the idea of collective punishment discussed earlier:

I think it’s a difficult one and it’s almost on a case-by-case basis...because actually what we tend to find with this type of crime, or criminal behaviour, is that... the sanction is not applied against the person who committed the crime, it’s committed -- the sanction will be against the family... And I struggle with that... Because I think in terms of control, influence... intent... most of the families will not have A, any idea that person was involved in anything, certainly wouldn’t have sanctioned them being involved in anything, and by kicking the family out, who are you hurting? I don’t think housing’s role is to punish anyone. (Housing Officer, RSL, East London)

Here, the recognition was that social housing tenants face the unfair penalisation of being evicted by their landlord in cases where they had not committed any offence. As discussed in the previous chapter, there can be a number of reasons why a tenancy holder may not be aware of the whereabouts of each family member at every time of the day. Furthermore, the way in which certain people became involved in the riots, or was arrested on suspicion of being involved in the riots, means that people were not always fully aware of the severity of the riots at the time of becoming involved in some way (see Clarke, 2012 as a good example of this).

The key point for resistance here was the unfair nature of collective punishment. When discussing the issues of research participants’ tenants being involved in the riots, the most common response was that it was the children of a tenant, rather than the tenant directly being involved in the disorder. Likewise, it was common for practitioners to talk about the parents
of the rioters identified as ‘model tenants’, often who had long-standing tenancies and had otherwise not been problematic tenants. Again, this demonstrates how the riot clause has apparently misunderstood the problems of the riots at a national scale with the local practice of housing management. This point is not to suggest that there are no problems within urban areas and in areas of social housing, but, that in the context of the 2011 riots, many housing officers could not identify any particular cause for concern or additional powers required (even if a number of research participants did welcome these additions).

**Subjecting tenants to both top-down and bottom-up power**

As observed by the Framework diagram (Appendix A), in the space between national scale policy making and local level practice sits the individuals affected by the power dynamics and policy shift. In this case, it is social housing tenancy holders and those who are living at that particular property. Given that the riot clause affects anyone who lives at a property, the tenancy holder therefore has the additional responsibility of any family member’s behaviour, much like other legislation has defined a tenants’ responsibility over relatives living at the property with cases of ASB more generally.

The compression from both top-down and bottom-up power is evident when considering how national housing policies have, over time, affected local housing stock. To refer back to one Neighbourhood Officer from the West Midlands, who above was quoted for saying that it is useful to “keep tabs” on problematic tenants, the challenge is being able to justify allowing them to keep their tenancies given the way in which social housing is allocated, the conditions placed on their tenancies and the competitive nature of applying for social housing in this borough.

This research participant explained that policies such as the RTB have left them with an under-supply of stock, making the application process more difficult and competitive. In turn this has meant that other means to ensure the most “deserving” people are provided with accommodation have had to be put into place through a points-based system. The participant explains that under the Localism Act (2011) the local authority had decided to operate the introductory tenancy policy, usually awarding new tenants an initial five-year term. However, in cases where the tenant has been identified as potentially at risk, in terms of their behaviour or any historical convictions, then shorter two-year tenancies may be offered. Here the ‘responsibility’ narrative is very clear:

I think the council felt, well, actually, we want to swing the balance round here and say to people, “having a council property [in this borough] is... something to be valued, because we haven’t got enough council housing and we have got loads of people on the waiting list”. So, what it... did here, it influenced politicians in the view as not because they want to... evict more people, because they actually see the eviction as last resort... but what I think they wanted to get across to people was [that] this is a very scarce resource and we want you to
look after it and we want you to value being a council tenant. (Neighbourhood Officer, ALMO, West Midlands)

At this point it is evident that national housing policy, namely thorough the RTB, has left local authorities without adequate housing stock for the local needs. Housing has to be allocated on some basis that would appear equitable, even though it is clear here that more discretionary powers around who are housed, and with what level of security of tenure, is being placed with the providers. This idea was then elaborated on, suggesting the “political vision” has been to create better communities:

I think here the… political vision has been “look, if we want to… have better communities and we want people to value their community it is about making them appreciate that actually they’re getting a very scarce resource here and if they don’t want it and they can’t look after it and they can’t behave themselves, there’s hundreds of other people behind them who’d take that property tomorrow and would behave themselves. (Neighbourhood Officer, West Midlands)

**Wavering resistance? Practitioner-level conflicts**

Further complexities are added when individuals and organisations responsible for making the decision of how rioters are to be punished are given discretion over how to use these powers. It is at this point where research participants began to show conflicting perspectives with their own views of the national responses to the riots and where it became apparent that the national rhetoric was infiltrating their views and perceptions. It appears that inter-organisational conflicts, as well as the intra-personal conflicts, are a result of national rhetoric infiltrating the vocabulary of research participants. For example, in a number of instances, a participant was vociferously rejecting the housing-related responses to the 2011, saying that it was not the role of housing to punish people, before going on to discuss the issues using pejorative terminology stemming from national rhetoric:

I get very angry about things, politics, society, community, all the rest of it, I wouldn’t dream of going out and rioting. It’s not in me to do that. So what’s the difference for me, who can get very angry about something like Mark Duggan, what stops me going out and putting a brick through a window? It was criminal behaviour. It was not a reaction to anything like… you know, [so] the initial [unrest] may have been anger, right or wrong. Anger, against the police and the way they managed what happened after Mark’s death, but actually the riots around the country, I’m sure if you asked most of them, who is Mark Duggan? [They would] not a clue. (Housing Officer, RSL, East London)

Here the research participant is talking about understanding the anger that people may be feeling, but othering the rioters by projecting her own views on how she would deal with particular situations. This participant had also previously recognised that engaging young people and around training and employment were key priorities for organisations in order to prevent rioting. Despite this understanding of how structural factors were an integral part of some individuals’ motivation to riot on the one hand, on the other the national narrative of
“pure criminality” had infiltrated her vocabulary, where in the quote above she has discounted individuals’ potentially genuine anger at their situation by subscribing to the mainstream media’s view of the disorders. Here the appetite for additional discretionary powers that have been afforded to housing providers begins to seem appealing to those who had earlier rejected the role of housing in punishing people’s behaviour.

The complex relationship between practitioners and their perspectives is also important to note. For example within organisations there were clear examples of practitioners articulating conflicting views about the way their tenants are governed and the use of particular mechanism such as eviction. The most striking clash of viewpoints was often around how punitive enforcement should be, and often this was between those with housing-focused roles and those with ASB-focused roles. Whilst to some degree this difference of opinions between these groups of practitioners is not surprising, given that the former’s objective is to help sustain tenancies, and the latter’s to deal with ‘problematic’ behaviour in the locality, these conflicts have the potential to give disjointed messages to those who are subjects of these governance mechanisms, but will inevitably cause some confusion within housing-management organisations about what they should be doing to tackle problems. The next two quotes highlight one particular example; where the housing officer explains how they are trying to reduce the number of evictions, while in the same organisation the ASB Office talks about how they see scope for using eviction more:

[R]educing the number of evictions year-on-year was the way we’ve started to think about [how we do] things… sustaining tenancies, about trying to find out what it is that is dysfunctional within the family, or within the relationships that we can intervene with to help you try and stay and become functional, because otherwise, you know, this revolving door idea, that actually, you take one family, they cause grief, you move them on, you then get another dysfunctional family in so you just move them on… that’s not the right way to do it. So I think our ethos is, what can we do to stop the behaviour? And if eviction is the only way of doing it, then we will evict, and we’re very clear that we will and we have, and we publicise it, but… that’s not a success for us. (Housing Officer, RSL, East London)

A lot of housing associations don’t like eviction, or don’t have the resources like we have to evict… we… do roughly… on ASB and rents included, anything up to 10 a year. Don’t always get those, you know, you get a lot of suspended possessions, by the judge or, we decide, agree, outside of court a suspended order and if they do anything in that time we go back to court and get the property back… But we do use eviction… and I don’t think people use it enough. (ASB Officer, RSL, East London)

A further issue that was observed here is how practitioners’ opinions of tenants occasionally digressed towards the populist narratives observed through mainstream media. For example, when discussing the riots with an ASB officer in London, there was reference being made to a ‘notorious’ family, who often manage to evade prosecution, because of witness intimidation it was suggested, and how they were the typical sort of people to be involved. In describing these tenants, this officer talked about how “they had the high range cars…outside their house, the house has been professionally decorated, which no working person can afford, to pay
professional decorators” before going on to say “there were flat-screen plasmas in every room” (ASB Officer, East London). This type of discussion, which highlighted the symbolic aspects of the ‘benefit culture’, such as the flat screen TV was used to illustrate this participant’s growing frustration at the way some tenants behave. While it must be acknowledged that not all practitioners responded in this way, in fact this was a minority viewpoint, it does raise concerns around the way in which these populist narratives of shirkers and scroungers is also infiltrating the perceptions of authority figures. It is this adoption of such discourses, which raises the question of how much longer will frontline practitioners continue to resist punitive top-down policies? As an extension of this question, there also needs to be further consideration around what sanctioning of particular populations may look like in the future, if the powers continue to become more expansive, but also discretionary, where organisations will have autonomy over how to respond to incident such as the riots.

*Tensions when working in partnership*

Although this has been covered in places throughout this chapter, it was worth just revisiting in a little more detail some of the tensions between different stakeholders when working in partnership.

A common remark from all practitioners interviewed as part of this study emphasised the move towards partnership working and the importance of doing so. Practitioners talked about multi-agency meetings and mechanisms to ensure community cohesion. While many agreed that this worked well and was important, it was also clear that this was not without its own tensions and perhaps not always working as efficiently as it could. This is something that Gilling has explored more fully, where he explains that partnership working is “not rocket science” yet issues in doing so effectively still persist: “yet this begs the question of why, if it is not that difficult to construct an effective partnership, problems with the partnership approach still exist” (Gilling, 2005, p. 736). This was also articulated through the participant interviews. While it was acknowledged that authorities need to be working in partnership to ensure services are delivered more effectively, it is not without its challenges. In this instance the participant was talking about a particularly challenging individual that they have had to deal with who has severe behavioural issues, having been convicted 160 times, and who also has drug and alcohol addictions:

> I don’t think one organisation can do it on their own. But I think that until we all understand each other’s objectives we’re not going to get [anywhere], because we use the word partnership and we say we do it, but I’m not sure we do. I feel sometimes it’s lip service and actually we don’t do true partnership working and I think you still come across too many areas
where, for example, the Youth Offending Team will be against the use of an ASBO because they don’t understand what it’s about (ASB Officer, Local Authority, West Midlands).

This was a common perspective. It was often discussed in ways of misunderstanding, rather than a lack of willingness to adopt partnership approaches. It was said that the police can often be perceived as hard-edged and all about enforcement, while ASB are considered (to other authorities, such as YOTs or housing teams) as trying to penalise everything. As the participant quoted above went on to explain, “we’re not trying to penalise everybody, but there has to be some kind of stick [otherwise] I don’t think we’re really going to completely get there” (ASB Officer, Local Authority, West Midlands).

### 7.4 Conclusion

The power and resistance dynamics in respect of the 2011 riots, as well as the national responses and local policy and practice, are not linear, but cyclical and often conflicting. This alone, as observed in the framework diagram (Appendix A), shows that a one-size-fits-all response to the riots, without proper consideration of the underlying causes, is unlikely to achieve its aim of preventing future disorder. The absence of a formal inquiry was linked to a portrayal of the riots as apolitical, building upon historical social constructions about particular groups. When considering the Government’s motivation for their responses it is also important to be aware of the timing at which particular pronouncements were made and the evidence that were used to support such aspersions. In the case of social housing tenants, where there was no evidence to suggest which housing tenure the rioters resided in, the argument of many research participants here was that the political responses were ideological in two ways. Firstly, social housing tenants were used as scapegoats in order to have an identifiable group of people whereby the Government could find ways of punishing them and therefore be “seen to be doing something”. Secondly, they were used as a way of legitimising the continuation of social housing policy that reduces the tenants’ security of tenure and gives the housing provider greater power and discretion over who is allocated social housing and on what conditions their entitlement is based. This ideology is often imbued with stigmatisation, which is then perpetuated through its use, especially when being presented as factual.

It is not within the scope of this research to be able to suggest firmly whether the new powers of possession were well intentioned – in so far as they were generally provided to deter individuals from participating in urban disorder or act as a preventative measure against disorder – or whether they were part of an ongoing agenda to remove welfare benefits from a perceived underclass of people in an attempt to fix the problems of an alleged Broken Britain.
However, even if the policy was well-intentioned – a genuine attempt to prevent rioting and warn people of the serious consequences of becoming involved in such behaviour – it was not welcomed by practitioners on a local level leading to policy subversion, where the intended consequences of the policies are not realised arising from a lack of engagement from those frontline practitioners who are responsible for the delivery of such policies. Resistance, through a lack of engagement, can only be partially understood in this context, as the new powers will not be applied retrospectively. Thus it is impossible to say exactly what practitioners and organisations would do in the context of a future riot. However, from the empirical research conducted here, it is possible to suggest that practitioners would exercise their discretion, or utilise other existing powers, to reject the ‘riot clause’ and use other ways of sanctioning their tenants or attempting to address the underlying causes of their behaviour.

This resistance has appeared to come from two slightly different, although sometimes overlapping, perspectives; pragmatic resistance and ethical resistance. The former refers to the more practical and technical reasons for housing providers to not pursue eviction through the new powers in the case of the riots. These reasons include the differentiation between crime and ASB, the former will be dealt with through the criminal justice system and if it has not affected the tenancy then it is considered that suitable punishment has been served. Where housing management functions were not affected there is a lack of will to evict and where housing management functions have been affected there are already tools in place that deal with the problems adequately. When considering this form of resistance the riot clause appears superfluous. When considering the ethical resistance, the riot clause was framed as unnecessary. While a number of practitioners, and in particular from the more ASB-focused roles, there was some appetite for increased powers. From a housing-management perspective however, practitioners explained how the tenuous link of behaviours committed away from the property and the use of eviction was unreasonable and disproportionate. Housing practitioners also spoke about the way in which they see their role as helping people to sustain tenancies and to ensure communities are as harmonious as possible. The use of eviction could, in certain cases, result in exacerbated issues of ASB should a tenant be moved from social housing into the private sector where the available powers to manage behaviour are diminished. Reference was also made the way in which the riot clause reflected punishment on a class basis and irrespective of whether or not practitioners were resisting for pragmatic or ethical reasons, the lived reality was that there was no real need for the power whatsoever, because they were not overwhelmed with their tenants being involved in the disorder. The powers have been established by utilising long-established pejorative rhetoric about the way in which a welfare state encourages feckless behaviour, ASB and violence.
To return to the title of this chapter, to what extent was there a ‘space of misunderstanding’ between national level policy making and local level practice? It would initially appear that what happened in respect of social housing in the aftermath of the riots was perhaps a misunderstanding, whereby on a national scale policy-makers assumed that practitioners needed more powers. However, the perspective from the frontline line is that they did not need these powers and should they implement them (in the advent of future disorder) problems could be worsened. However, from a deeper exploration, it could be suggested that the space is not formed through a misunderstanding, but instead ongoing conflicts over the role and values of social housing and therefore should be perhaps be considered as a space of contention instead. By this it is meant that at a national scale the government perceive the social housing sector to be an incubator of welfare dependency, stifling social mobility and ambition, whilst the local practitioners, and most notably the housing officers, can demonstrate the wider community value to social housing. The contention therefore is fundamentally a struggle over how the tenure should be viewed.
8. Conclusion: Exploring the housing tenure-urban unrest nexus

ASB policy has been deeply embedded within housing policy from its formative years. The conflation of social housing and behaviour control is, therefore, not a new concept. However, the 2011 riots in urban England reconfigured the symbiotic housing-behaviour relationship, creating a new form of housing tenure-urban unrest nexus.
8.1 Introduction

The conception of this thesis began with the principal objective of exploring housing tenure and urban unrest. Framed by the 2011 riots, this study has unpacked the relationship between housing and urban disorder to illuminate why housing mechanisms were utilised as a response to the 2011 riots and to begin bridging the gap between a number of significant existing bodies of literature on housing policy; ASB policy; and urban unrest. In doing so, this study has developed a deeper understanding of an emerging housing-disorder nexus, offering new perspectives on the developments across the housing and ASB fields.

In this final chapter the study’s original aims are revisited, along with a number of initial assumptions that were raised in the introduction.

8.2 Revisiting the research questions: key findings

In setting the scene for this thesis three underlying assumptions were made. These were (a) that through direct changes to social housing policy in response to the disorder there is a political (and perhaps public) understanding that the 2011 riots were a significant issue amongst social housing tenants, (b) specifying urban unrest as a specific type of ASB suggests that rioting is an endemic issue in the UK, one that requires a discrete suite of policy initiatives, and (c) wider governmental agendas were part of the Government’s motivation for making legislative changes to social housing policy, rather than as a way of reducing the potential outbreak of future disorder.

Following the 2011 riots there was an emergence of a new form of housing-disorder nexus. Where previous responses to urban disorder may have explored housing conditions quite broadly, it was only following the 2011 riots that social housing was positioned by the Government as a suitable mechanism to deal specifically and directly with urban disorder. The riot clause that emerged is deeply-rooted in the contemporary political and government ideology underpinning housing policy, social policy and the transformation of the welfare state. These represent a continuum, as well as a realignment of policies that have long supported the rise of private home ownership and renting over social housing. These policies have resulted in the residualisation of the social housing sector, leaving some of the least desirable properties in some of the poorest areas within the remaining stock. Over time this has generated further issues around who is prepared to live in such housing, which has created a populist notion that equates social housing tenants with discourses of the underclass, fecklessness and lazy behaviour; all factors that are indicative of a lack of respect for society
more broadly. Immediate Government responses to the riots utilised this long-standing rhetoric, denouncing the riots as ‘criminality, pure and simple’. The media were largely supportive of this rhetoric and subsequent public polls suggested that the public too were also broadly unsympathetic towards the rioters and supported punitive sanctioning.

One of the key areas of concern with such an approach however, is that the support for removing an individuals’ home on the grounds of their involvement in the disorders ignored the fact that there was little evidence to suggest that the problem lies within the social housing sector. The conflation of the disorder and social housing paved the way for the riot clause, which passed into legislation with very little contestation beyond those in the sector who responded to the consultation. A further tenuous link appeared in the Government’s ostensible rationale for creating this legislation as a deterrence to future outbreaks of urban disorder. The key demographic for the rioters was young and male, but many investigations into the disorders, including the Riot Panel’s own findings, found that there was no one indefinable group (such as social housing tenants) represented.

Nonetheless, the Government’s response to the riots outlined a number of specific mechanisms that would be adopted to tackle this problem. One of these was the TFP, which aimed to turnaround the lives of 120,000 ‘problem’ families. The second key response for this study was the extension of powers to evict social housing tenants involved in disorder. Both of these policies generated strong political and public support. Historical narratives and policy trajectories have, however, helped to build a strong public resentment towards elements of the welfare state and those reliant upon state provision. The imagery developed around the lazy, feckless dole-scrounger (see Jones, 2011; Valentine & Harris, 2014) has persisted for many decades under neoliberal governmental ideologies, which arguably provides the foundations for punitive measures to be taken against those seen to not be conforming to the normative codes of conduct in ‘civilised society’. This historical context, combined with the evident governmental and public panic at the time of the riots, arguably provided the Government with a suitable environment to further pursue its particular housing and behaviour control policies.

From the perspective of many research participants included in this study, the link between housing and the riots was understood as the Government seizing an opportunity to push forward with broader political agendas associated with social housing and the security of tenure. From undertaking the fieldwork and exploring the existing literature in this field, there is a clear difference in the ways that the riots have been understood. Within scholarly debate, there still remains little consensus about why the riots started and why they developed to the
scale they eventually did. There are many competing perspectives about the underlying causes, which in this study have been largely categorised into three perspectives: non-political; political; and post-political. What also emerged from the fieldwork is how the lived experience of the riots was articulated in a way that countered national media reporting. While many participants did talk about the main high streets and shopping areas being badly affected, there were also evident local distinctions to the underlying motivations for the riots. Illustrated most strongly through interviews conducted with participants in Greater Manchester, the differences between the Manchester city centre riots and those in Salford were clear. In the former, the riots were largely articulated as ‘consumer riots’, where higher-end stores were targeted for their expensive and on-trend items had both financial and social value. The latter we considered ‘community riots’ however, in part caused by ongoing inequality and deprivation, poor relationships with the police and many residents feeling as though they do not have a stake in the wider society. Analysis of the Salford riots (see Jeffrey & Jackson, 2012 as a good example of such analysis) did explain that looting was also part of the disorders, however the stores available to the residents of Salford are not on the same scale as those in other, more affluent retail areas, and to therefore suggest that these disorders were simply motivated by a desire to acquire goods overlooks some of the more deeply-entrenched problems and challenges in poorer areas that have suffered from long-term inequality.

Thinking ahead, it is difficult to predict exactly what the future will be following on from the legislative changes under the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014). The riot clause is a discretionary ground, and from the fieldwork undertaken here, one that practitioners involved in this study were not entirely supportive of. Many considered the riot clause to be redundant from the outset. In their view, existing powers provide practitioners with sufficient tools to perform an effective housing management function. The use of eviction, considered as a last resort by housing staff, was already in use for cases of ASB that affect housing management functions and the other residents in these communities. Given that the application of these existing powers occurs within the context of accumulated precedent, experience and an aim to deliver good practice, practitioners would be more likely to continue to utilise existing measures rather than a new untested power that would, in effect, achieve the same outcome.

Where the housing providers’ management function has not been affected by tenants’ behaviour and where a tenant may have been involved in riots outside of the locality of their property, then housing providers felt that it was not the role of a housing officer to punish individuals for such an offence. Practitioners explained that making this link was unclear, and indicative of punishment on a class basis. Here, practitioners displayed signs of moral or normative resistance towards national policy. Housing officers, in particular, largely felt that their role was to help individuals and households to sustain their tenancies, and to help build
harmonious communities and positive futures, rather than implementing draconian punishments that lacked a clear rationale and justification. There was relatively little, if any, restorative qualities in these powers and practitioners were clear that this was unequal punishment towards certain populations.

8.3 Housing policy in a post-2011 riots era: contributions from this study

This thesis contributes unique empirical data to housing and ASB fields. Following central Government changes to legislation in 2014, as a direct response to the 2011 disorders, there has been a new dimension added to the housing-behaviour nexus. The additional new powers awarded to housing providers following the riots led to an immediate backlash from parts of the housing sector. It was said, most notably by Shelter, that responding to the 2011 riots through housing-related mechanisms was a purely symbolic gesture. Despite a lack of evidence to show which housing tenure rioters belonged to, and relatively little appetite from the housing sector for these new powers, the legislation passed through Parliament without much contestation, gaining Royal Assent in 2014. Very little has been written about this in both media and academic contexts. In scholarly debate, Hodkinson and Robbins explored this, arguing that “the stigmatisation of social housing tenants reached new revanchist depths” (Hodkinson & Robbins, 2013, p. 70) following the 2011 riots, as connections were being made between the disorders and housing. This study develops this work through the addition of empirical data gleaned from qualitative research undertaken with frontline practitioners. This perspective is important. It allows for a more nuanced analysis of the government’s response to the 2011 riots, whilst also developing some the conceptual thinking around the advances of housing and ASB policy. In seeking the perspectives of those working on the frontline, rather than the rioters themselves, it allows for new perspectives of the disorders to be highlighted, which will hopefully contribute to the prevailing debates. In particular, the practitioner perspective here allows for a refreshed look at the way in which populations are governed through housing and ASB mechanisms and how the mentalities of governance – although complex and non-linear – continue to demonstrate resistance and autonomy towards top-down national government strategies, whilst competing at a local-level with other authorities to establish the best forms of governance for the each of the respective practitioners’ desired outcomes.

Theoretical contribution

Social control and the governance of particular populations is a well-theorised area. It is also one which is inextricably linked to housing studies, given that most of the underlying issues
and policies designed to redress them span across housing and ASB policy and practice remits.

The theoretical underpinnings for this study come from Foucault’s conception of governmentality, a concept already utilised widely within housing studies. With its focus on the *how* of governing, it offers a useful lens to explore the way in which individuals are governed, and govern themselves, and the relationships of power between the state and its citizens. Wacquant’s work on the punitive state and advanced marginality has also been adopted to understand the underpinning rationales behind such punitive policy developments and governance mechanisms that have been adopted in response to the disorders. Populations are being increasingly governed in more unequal ways depending upon where individuals live and the housing tenure that they reside in. The ASB agenda proliferated in the late 90s, starting an increased trajectory of increased governance mechanisms available to housing providers through the connection of housing tenure and behaviour control and the riot clause represents a further extension and escalation of this.

Critics of Foucauldian approaches to the social sciences, particularly in the field of urban disorder, dismissed the political arguments following the riots, claiming that scholars continue to deny that the working classes are ever capable of behaving in a socially harmful way and perhaps to some degree this may be true. It has never been the intention of this study to deny that some of the behaviour displayed during the disorders did not deserve custodial sentences. The behaviour was atypical, and out of the riot context much of the behaviour would have still be unacceptable, although offences may have received slightly lighter sentences. The key point of contention with the post-political argument in this context is that whether or not there is an element of denial about the non-working class and their role in the disorder, the introduction of the riot clause remains disproportionate and unfair because of its double-jeopardy and collective punishments, where there is a dearth of evidence to support the case.

A key concept that has been adopted throughout this study, to help make sense of the data, the existing arguments and policy landscape has been governmentality. With a particular focus on the modes of governance, the interactions between those governing and the subjects being governed, on both a national and local scale, this study has highlighted some of the implicit complexities in the day-to-day management of housing and behaviour control. It has been argued throughout the thesis that the 2011 riots mobilised an extension of the housing-behaviour relationship to develop an explicit housing tenure-urban unrest nexus; something that has not been observed in such a way before. Therefore, the modest contribution that this study makes is to observe how the mentalities of government have developed over time and how this influences perspectives to dealing with incidents of urban unrest. Adopting a realist governmentality perspective, established as a useful lens within the housing policy field,
works to allay some of the criticisms of governmentality; particularly the lack of attention paid to the messiness of reality.

In particular, what is highlighted here is how mechanisms of governance are developing incrementally over time, pervading ever more of the population and the spaces in which they can enter and behave when they are there (or prevent certain people from entering particular spaces altogether). McKee (2009) observed this through the concept of *biopolitics*, whereby it is the management of populations, rather than territories, which have become central to governance techniques. Following the disorders, the extension of powers to housing providers represented this biopolitic-mechanism; the riot clause could operate as a device to punish people in particular ways, not necessarily because of their actions, but because of the population in which they belong. It is useful to refer back to Squires and Lea’s (2012) discussion of the ‘centaur state’ at this point, as again, the riot clause is another way of being able to demonstrate how inequalities in society have significant impacts on how particular individuals are able to live their daily lives. For those at the metaphorical head of the centaur state, the liberal penal system rarely interferes with their daily lives. However, for those lower down the ‘body’, or the system, their lives come under much greater scrutiny and control. In the case of the 2011 riots this was noticeable; those who came from a middle-class background and owned their own home (or they lived with parents who owned their own home) were never threatened with eviction, unlike those who did live in social housing and therefore reliant on state support. Such techniques of governance and punishment fit within the ongoing trajectory of increased punitiveness for the most marginalised, along with the notion of social mobility and respectability being the way to avoid such draconian treatment by state authorities.

*Behaviour-tenure nexus*

The findings from this study show that the 2011 riots have enhanced the behaviour-tenure nexus, whereby housing is now part of the urban disorder governance and management toolkit. Whilst this may not change the daily practice of governing people and places, it could have a profound impact in the future in the event of any urban disorder. What it does highlight though is how increased powers are being passed to agents of social control, meaning individuals are subject to greater scrutiny about the way they behave and responses are continuing to be both punitive in their proportionality and unequal in terms of the types of individuals who are affected by these new powers.

While there has been a long standing relationship between housing and ASB powers, with the two being inextricably linked, the riot clause enhances this, providing more expansive powers beyond the remit of the previous property locality limitation for behaviours relating to riots. As argued elsewhere (G. Young, 2016), the introduction of the riot clause represents an
expansion of the boundaries for the types of behaviours that are considered ASB. Empirically, this supports Cohen’s (1985) net widening conceptualisation, whereby more people and more behaviours are being considered as ASB, which heightens individuals’ chances of falling within the remit of the criminal justice system.

**Spaces of misunderstanding?**

Speculation amongst some research participants suggested that the Government may have seen the riots as a ‘golden ticket’ to pursue other political projects, such as the continued reduction in security of social housing tenancies. This study has gone some way to exploring this argument. Tracing the political responses from the Prime Minister David Cameron’s official speech, condemning the riots as ‘criminality, pure and simple’, the DCLG’s consultation suggesting new powers for housing providers, especially in cases of urban disorder, a housing sector rebuttal against such policy moves, through to the eventual passing of the legislation in 2014, it possible to understand how practitioners have interpreted the response in this way.

In many ways, after exploring the trajectory of housing policy developments over the last few decades, the riot clause does appear to be the next step in reducing the rights of social housing tenants and continuing the neoliberal project privatisation of public goods, such as social housing. The Government also positioned the response to the riots as a way of tackling the plight of Broken Britain; to teach those who behave irresponsibly a lesson. What this study does show is how the Government’s response through housing mechanisms and the use of eviction could exacerbate the very issue that they are trying to resolve. Practitioners were very clear that evicting someone is a last resort. The result of evicting someone can be that they move into the private rented sector, but still remain in the same area, causing the same issues but under less scrutiny from the authorities.

**Sites of resistance**

The data here not only shows that there was a space of misunderstanding between national policy responses and on-the-ground practice, but that there was active resistance to this particular mechanism. Defined in this study in two ways, the resistance articulated by the practitioners could be considered either pragmatic or ethical. The former refers to resistance to the riot clause because of the other existing powers which allow housing providers to deliver their relevant housing-management functions adequately. For example, should a tenant be involved in a riot-related offence within the locality of their property, which could be considered as an act of ASB, and it is affecting the locality then existing powers would allow providers to serve a NOSP. If they were found to be involved in a riot outside of the locality of their property, but they brought stolen goods back to their home, there is also a clear link to
the housing management-function and again, existing powers would allow housing providers to deal with this accordingly. Then demonstrating an ethical resistance, the research participants in this study were clear about how they saw their role as a housing officer. For them, their objective was to ensure that residents sustain their tenancies and that communities function harmoniously. They did not see the eviction of tenants as a key indicator of successful professional practice. Practitioners in this study were disinclined to support the riot clause. There was a sense that policing was transcending away from more traditional forms and into the remit of housing management, but it was expressed that it is not a housing role to punish people. There was a clear sense of resistance where an offence was committed away from the locality of the property and that had been sanctioned through criminal proceedings; both from the perspective of inequality in double-jeopardy punishments, but also because of the collective effects this punishment would have on entire households.

The introduction of a riot clause that affects a population disproportionately, without substantive evidence to support its basis, is difficult to legitimise. This study has examined why such a response was taken and what this may mean for the future of housing management. From the empirical data collected and analysed here, there is a clear sense that while practitioners are currently showing signs of resistance towards this power, political pressure in the event of any future outbreak of disorder may mean that more social housing tenants are evicted because of their involvement in riots, while those in private-sector housing will not face the same level of punishment. Despite it being considered deeply unfair and not considered a suitable way of dealing with the issues that the Government purported it wished to tackle, political ideology and rhetoric meant that practitioners were not surprised that such a response was heralded as a ‘silver bullet’ that would help to tackle the contemporary problems of an alleged Broken Britain. There are also underlying tensions between the different functions (in particular housing and ASB) around the use of eviction, and how this could also affect the way in which discretionary powers are used by housing providers, depending on how the internal dynamics of an organisation work and what external pressure the different practitioners are subjected to. For example, should urban unrest unfold in the future, there could be a tension between those within a housing function and those within an ASB function about how any tenants identified are punished, and this could unfold in uneven ways across different housing providers and geographical contexts according to the authority’s discretion.

8.4 Future study

There is still much scope for future theorisation and empirical investigation around the issues of housing, ASB and urban unrest. It is hoped, however, that this study has offered a unique
perspective on these issues, upon which scholars can develop and enhance the arguments and findings leading to further contributions; not only to the relevant academic areas of study, but to achieve impact beyond the academy though useful and practical insights and recommendations being transferred to policy-makers, non-academic research organisations and frontline practitioners.

From a methodological perspective, further research could adopt ethnographical exploration of practitioners’ daily realities. There would be merit in a longer-term study that adopts an ethnographical methodology to further unpack the complexities and challenges of working on the frontline in housing and ASB roles under an austerity government.

There is also potential to co-produce a future research agenda in this field. In particular areas of the social sciences co-production is becoming an important way of developing research agendas and building partnerships. This particular research agenda would benefit from adopting such an approach, involving practitioners with designing and setting the research focus on matters that are pressing within the field, and in particular around the way in which their roles are changing under austerity governments. This could also be extended to begin to incorporate the voices of the governed into future research agendas. It is an important to ensure that broad perspectives are taken into account to ensure that the work being done in the academe can have meaningful impact on many audiences. Whilst it was not within the capacity of this study to incorporate both those governing and those being governed, there is certainly considerable scope for work to be undertaken to explore the effects of pernicious housing policies, such as eviction, on individuals’ life courses. This could also incorporate both racial and gendered perspectives, to elicit more diverse understandings of the way in which particular groups are marginalised within contemporary housing policy and practice.

Finally, there is potential to continue expanding this research and developing the conceptual and empirical understanding of the housing-disorder nexus if the riot clause is ever utilised by practitioners.

**A reflexive account of the research**

Finally, this last section reflects back on the study conducted here and outlines some of the way in which this research could be improved, or done differently, with some justification and explanation for the differences that this could have made.

As the riot clause was never used during the period of the study, at times it was quite difficult to know exactly how the interviews should have been framed. Upon reflection, the interviews were useful and have provided new insights into housing management, ASB and urban disorder. However, if this interview was to be undertaken again, an element of co-design
would be incorporated from the beginning, ensuring that research participants and beneficiaries were involved in the shaping and framing of the research from the very beginning.

What did emerge through the study was the complexities of the on-the-ground experiences by those working for the various behaviour-control authorities. Having now been able to see this, and hear about the various perspectives involved in the governance of populations, a number of more in-depth case studies could have been conducted. This could have involved working with two or three organisations and gaining a critical mass of interviews from within each of them, rather than recruiting across working disciplines. This could have provided some interesting insights into the day-to-day workings of housing providers and their interactions with tenants and other authorities in the locality.

Finally, as part of the cross-sectional research design, other methods could have been employed to get a better idea of public perceptions of the riots and rioters, or some to try to develop new understandings of the rioter demographics through quantitative mechanisms (secondary data analysis, surveys etc.).

Nonetheless, it is still felt that the study as it is still provides an interesting insight into the 2011 riots, and brings more empirical data to the debate. It offers a unique exploration of the under-research riot clause, and provides a useful starting point for further research into the use of housing-related policy responses in an urban unrest and ASB context.
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Davies, C. (2016). David Cameron vows to 'blitz' poverty by demolishing UK's worst sink estates.


Hancock, L., & Mooney, G. (2012a). Beyond the penal state: advanced marginality, social policy and anti-welfarism. In P. Squires & J. Lea (Eds.), *Criminalisation and..."
advanced marginality: Critically exploring the work of Loic Wacquant (pp. 107-128). Bristol: The Policy Press.


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Appendix A: Framework

NATIONAL LEVEL

- Pro-eviction (punishment for those lacking ‘morality’ and cannot behave ‘responsibly’)
- Pro-punitive punishment (eviction, benefit removal/sanction, extra-ordinary prison sentencing

TENANTS (INDIVIDUAL/FAMILIES?)

- “Violence from above” (Wacquant, 2009)

LOCAL LEVEL

- Inequality (Punishment on a class basis, double-jeopardy)
- Pragmatic resistance (not reasonable or proportionate, wrong sort of tenants, not tenants)
- Ethos (incluctancy, support)
- Evidence?

THE GAP

- What is the state’s perception of rioting? (See Barry Goldwater via Sophie Body-Gendrot – “fused together negative perceptions of civil unrest”)
- Why does it exist?

IDELOGICAL UNDERSTANDING

POWER

RESISTANCE

POWER

POWER
Appendix B: Information Sheet & Consent Form

RESEARCH INTO HOUSING, BEHAVIOUR CONTROL AND URBAN DISORDER

INFORMATION SHEET

This research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and is part of a White Rose Doctoral Training Centre research project researching the 2011 riots and their social and policy context, which seeks to broaden the debates of disorder to a number of salient sub-themes. This research is supported by the Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance Group who are also assisting with identifying suitable participants for this research.

The aim of the research is to provide rigorous and robust evidence into whether housing has been constructed as a significant causal factor of the 2011 riots and to explore the ways in which the different responses to the 2011 riots are having direct implications on housing and anti-social behaviour policies. The research is also looking at the way in which housing is being used as a sanction for those involved in riot-related offences and I am keen to hear a range of perspectives on this matter. The main approach for gathering this data is interviews with key stakeholders who have experience working within housing or anti-social behaviour policy and practice roles in London.

Participation in the project is entirely voluntary. You are under no obligation to be involved and should you agree to participate you are free to withdraw at any point. However, your views are important to me and I would welcome the opportunity to find out about your experience and opinions regarding housing and anti-social behaviour.

I will be speaking to you as part of a broad study, which will involve representatives and stakeholders from across London, in order to provide a representative sample of the context and experiences from a wide range of housing, management and behaviour control perspectives.

Typically the interview will take no longer than 45 minutes. The interviews will be audio recorded and transcribed so that I can fully analyse the content. If you require a copy of the recording please inform me and I will arrange this for you. Participants will remain anonymous and all information given will remain confidential to the researcher. Information you provide will be held securely and will be anonymised. Although your comments and suggestions may be included in the final doctoral thesis and any subsequent publications, your name will not be used and I will ensure that you cannot be identified. This project has been ethically approved by the University's Research Ethics Committee.
Contacting the researcher

Should you wish to ask a question about the project or if you wish to receive further information about the project please contact me on gjyoung1@sheffield.ac.uk. If you have any concerns about the project and wish to speak with supervisory team, they will be happy to discuss the research with you.

Professor John Flint, Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield. Email: john.flint@sheffield.ac.uk, telephone: 0114 222 6092

Professor Caroline Hunter, York Law School, University of York. Email: caroline.hunter@york.ac.uk, telephone: 01904 235806
CONSENT FORM

Title of Project: Housing, behaviour control and urban disorder

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions about the project and these questions have been answered satisfactorily.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and I am able to withdraw at any point.

3. I understand that all my responses will be kept strictly confidential and anonymised. Responses will only be accessed by the researcher and supervisory team.

4. I understand that my name will not appear in this research and I will not be identifiable in the doctoral thesis or subsequent publications.

5. I agree to the interview being audio recorded.

6. I agree to take part in this research project.

Name

Signature

Date
Appendix C: Interview schedules

C.1. Interview schedule – housing officer

**INTERVIEW SCHEDULE**

**CONTEXT & BACKGROUND**

Could you talk about the area that you work in? *In terms of the demographics, urban form (types of housing, facilities, access to facilities), economic context (employment, available jobs, education)*

What type of issues do you have to deal with on a day-to-day basis? *Levels of ASB, types of ASB, other issues that arise? Are these specific to this area?*

*If relevant:* Challenges that you face as an ALMO/RSL/LA? *In terms of compared with other types of housing provider? Does this hinder/help the way you are able to control behaviour?*

How was your borough/area/estate affected by the 2011 riots? *Could you talk about some specific cases? What were the responses to these cases?*

**FOR RIOT AFFECTED AREAS: HOUSING AND THE RIOTS**

Where did the riots happen in your borough? *Were there any cases of rioting in residential areas? If so, what type of housing was it? Who was responsible for the management of the housing in the riot-affected area?*

Do you think there is any connection between housing and the riots? *If so, how? Trying to establish whether housing has been constructed as a cause of the 2011 riots. Can housing be used as a way of explaining urban disorder/conflict more generally?*

*If no:* If there is not a connection between housing and urban disorder, why do you think a person’s tenancy is being used as a way of sanctioning their behaviour? *Shelter’s notion of housing sanctions as a ‘symbolic gesture’.*

Who is best placed to try to prevent outbreaks of urban disorder? *Historically riots have centred on housing estates (so management would be ideally placed to govern/prevent future incidents)*

**FOR RIOT AFFECTED AREAS: RESPONSES TO THE RIOTS**

What role did housing and housing management play in the immediate response to the riots? *Prompt: clean-up operations, rehousing tenants*

Was eviction for tenants involved in the riots considered? *If so, why was this considered a suitable response for those committing riot-related offences?*

Have opinions changed within your organisation towards the use of eviction for riot-related offences, or anti-social behaviour more generally? *Has eviction as a sanction become more favourable or used/attempted to be used more frequently?*

**HOUSING AND ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR**
What are the challenges housing associations face when dealing with ASB?

Are there any specific challenges that you, or your organisation face, that may be different to other organisations? Could you talk about why this is? How are you managing these issues?

In mainstream media ASB is often considered synonymous with social housing tenants – do you agree with this? Would you say this is a fair assumption to make? Can you think why or explain why this link is often made?

**POLICY CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENT POST-2011**

What has changed since the 2011 riots? Have ASB strategies been updated since the riots? Will ASB policies стрategies be reviewed in light of changing ASB legislation?

Are any of these changes because of the riots? If not, then what has caused this change?

Do you believe that housing-related sanctions, such as eviction, should be applied to riot-related and other serious offences? Why/why not? What challenges or issues does this raise?

What are the issues in applying eviction to offences occurring beyond the vicinity of the tenanted property?

What are the rationales and justifications for using housing tenancies?

- Eviction
- Demotion of tenancy
- Injunctions

**RELATIONSHIPS**

Could you talk a bit more about the relationship you have with your tenants?

- challenges?
- what works well?
- what could be improved?
- how does this change when a tenant has to become a witness in a court case?

What relationships do you have with other practitioners?

- as above (1-3)
C.2. Interview schedule – Legal representatives

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES

CONTEXT & BACKGROUND
Which landlords do you represent and what type of work do you do for them?

Did you or your firm do any work specifically coming out of the 2011 riots? If so, what were the types of legal proceedings? Could you talk about some of the outcomes (e.g. injunctions, evictions)?

LINKS WITH HOUSING
Is there a clear rationale for housing tenancies as a sanction?

Do you see social housing as having a particularly important role in the responses to ASB (and rioting in particular)? What understanding, or connection, can you make between the 2011 riots and housing tenure? Was it understood as primarily a problem amongst council estates and areas suffering inner-city deprivation?

Do you have a view on other housing tenures?

Who should be responsible for policing ASB?

Who is best placed to prevent future outbreaks of urban unrest? Explain reasons for suggesting particular bodies/organisations/stakeholders

POWERS OF SANCTIONS
To what degree do legal practitioners support eviction? This can be from low-level ASB through to high-level, such as rioting, trying to get some sense of when it may be justified, if at all.

What strength of argument was there for refusing or accepting possession of the grounds of rioting? Examples to illustrate this

ATTITUDES SINCE THE RIOTS
Have there been any noticeable changes in behaviours, attitudes, policy-making decisions etc., since the riots? The requests for ways to use a tenancy to sanction behaviour

Could you talk about your views on the new grounds for possession in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014)?

THE OPERATION OF [IN COMING] LEGISLATION
Are the changes to legislation fit for purpose/relevant? Are those with decision-making powers able to exercise sufficient discretion? Does legislation prevent cases of possession because of a lack of hard evidence? Will the new grounds for possession be useful?

How well do housing officers and ASB officers understand legislation and how well do they apply it, in your experience? From particular cases etc.
C.3. Police

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (POLICE)

CONTEXT & BACKGROUND

Could you talk about the area that you work in? In terms of the demographics, urban form (types of housing, facilities, access to facilities), economic context (employment, available jobs, education)

What type of issues do you have to deal with on a day-to-day basis? Levels of ASB, types of ASB, other issues that arise? Are these specific to this area?

How was your borough/area/estate affected by the 2011 riots? Could you talk about some specific cases? What were the responses to these cases?

FOR RIOT AFFECTED AREAS: HOUSING AND THE RIOTS

Where did the riots happen in your borough? Were there any cases of rioting in residential areas? If so, what type of housing was it? Who was responsible for the management of the housing in the riot-affected area?

Do you think there is any connection between housing and the riots? If so, how? Trying to establish whether housing has been constructed as a cause of the 2011 riots. Can housing be used as a way of explaining urban disorder/conflict more generally?

If no: If there is not a connection between housing and urban disorder, why do you think a person’s tenancy is being used as a way of sanctioning their behaviour? Shelter’s notion of housing sanctions as a ‘symbolic gesture’.

Who is best placed to try to prevent outbreaks of urban disorder? Historically riots have centred on housing estates, so where does the responsibility lie?

FOR RIOT AFFECTED AREAS: RESPONSES TO THE RIOTS

What was the relationship between the police and housing associations/landlords in the immediate aftermath? Expectations of what each other should be doing? Coordinating responses? Finding perpetrators? Deciding on suitable sanctions?

Was eviction for tenants involved in the riots considered? If so, why was this considered a suitable response for those committing riot-related offences?

Have the 2011 riots had any impact on the way the police operate? Have specific policies, procedures or approaches changed as a response of the 2011?

HOUSING AND ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

What are the challenges the police face when dealing with ASB?

Are there any specific challenges that you, or your organisation face, that may be different to other organisations? Could you talk about why this is? How are you managing these issues?
In mainstream media ASB is often considered synonymous with social housing tenants – do you agree with this? Would you say this is a fair assumption to make? Can you think why or explain why this link is often made?

**POLICY CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENT POST-2011**

What has changed since the 2011 riots? Have ASB strategies been updated since the riots? Will ASB policies/strategies be reviewed in light of changing ASB legislation?

Are any of these changes because of the riots? If not, then what has caused this change?

Do you believe that housing-related sanctions, such as eviction, should be applied to riot-related and other serious offences? Why/why not? What challenges or issues does this raise?

What are the issues in applying eviction to offences occurring beyond the vicinity of the tenanted property?

What initiatives/approaches do you have to tacking ASB in your area?

- what was the rationale for these approaches? (How was the problem identified? What were the pressures to change particular problems/behaviours)
- what challenges have you had?
- what has worked particularly well?

**RELATIONSHIPS**

Could you talk a bit more about the relationship you have with residents in your community?

- challenges?
- what works well?
- what could be improved?
- how does this change when a tenant has to become a witness in a court case?

What relationships do you have with other practitioners? *(e.g. Housing practitioners, social services, health workers)*

- as above (1-3)
- which practitioners are best in dealing with ASB?
- which practitioners are best at support the police in their work? *Why is this?*
- which practitioners are the most problematic to work with? *Why is this?*
Appendix D: Responses to the 2011 riots

1. Official and government reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation(s)</th>
<th>Report name and authors</th>
<th>Main arguments/relevance to housing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riots Communities and Victims Panel</td>
<td>5 days in August - An interim report on the 2011 English Riots</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riots Communities and Victims Panel</td>
<td>After the riots - The final report of the Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)</td>
<td>The rules of engagement, A review of the August 2011 disorders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Government Information Unit (LGiU)</td>
<td>The 2011 Summer Riots: One year on, how is local government working to prevent and respond to future riots?</td>
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<tr>
<td>House of Commons Home Affairs Committee</td>
<td>Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of August 2011</td>
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2. Local authority reports

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation(s)</th>
<th>Report name and authors</th>
<th>Relevance to housing</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haringey Council</td>
<td>Tottenham One Year On</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tottenham Community Panel</td>
<td>After the Riots: Taking Tottenham Forward - Recommendations of the Tottenham Community Panel</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Birmingham City Council</td>
<td>They moved like fish - The Birmingham Riots of 2011, Peter Latchford OBE</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>London Councils</td>
<td>London’s Local Councils: Responding to the riots and promoting safe, resilient communities</td>
<td>Talks about the role of London Councils as developing policies and lobbies “tackling issues that undermine social resilience”</td>
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3. Professional body reports

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation(s)</th>
<th>Report name and authors</th>
<th>Main arguments/relevance to housing</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
<td>Responding to the Riots - A TUC briefing</td>
<td>Fairly dismissive of the government’s response to the 2011 riots. Draw quite</td>
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heavily on the way in which Cameron makes links between the “riots and the new moral underclass”, whereby the TUC state that “this group is said by the Prime Minister to include 120,000 ‘problem families’ whose lives he has pledged to ‘turn around’. Without due consideration to real issues of poverty and deprivation, the TUC argue that situations will only get worse and inequality in Britain will continue to grow - as recent trends already indicate.

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<tr>
<th>Organisation(s)</th>
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<th>Main arguments/relevance to housing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside Housing, Chartered Institute of Housing and National Housing Federation</td>
<td>The riot report - How housing providers are building stronger communities</td>
<td>Through case studies around the broad areas of opportunities and aspirations; education, skills and jobs; family support; and communicating with communities, this report highlights the positive work that housing providers are doing to help build resilient communities. Written in ‘defence’ of the social housing sector.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
<td>4 days in August, Strategic Review into the Disorder of August 2011</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nacro</td>
<td>Nacro’s response to the interim report from the Riot, Communities and Victims Panel</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Runnymede</td>
<td>Urban Disorder and Gangs, A Critique and a Warning, Simon Hallsworth and David Brotherton (Runnymede Perspectives)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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4. Research and academic reports
5. Other responses/reports

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<th>Organisation(s)</th>
<th>Report name and authors</th>
<th>Main arguments/relevance to housing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North London Citizens</td>
<td>Citizens’ Inquiry into the Tottenham Riots. Foreword by David Lammy</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>After the Riots Forum</td>
<td>From blame to positive action. Saalik Haleem (The Cordoba Foundation) and Don de Silva (Initiatives for Change UK)</td>
<td>Neighbourhood only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Rowntree Foundation</td>
<td>The riots: what are the lessons from JRF’s work in communities? John Low</td>
<td>Neighbourhood only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council for Voluntary Organisations</td>
<td>After the riots: Evidence from the Voluntary and Community Sector on the causes of the 2011 riots and next steps for policy and practice. James Allen, Charlotte Stuffins and Karl Wilding (October 2011)</td>
<td>They argue that voluntary sector organisation’s voices were marginalized. They argue that voluntary organizations on the frontline need to be listened to, as they will be the ones implementing and dealing with policies and the aftermath and have a better understanding of the complexities in communities. Their understandings of the causes of the riots were that they were complex, but did cite: hopelessness amongst young people, police relations, worklessness, latchkey children and provocative and unfair media language. Housing was not mentioned.</td>
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