A reading of selected writings of James Joyce in relation to the works of Gilles Deleuze (and Félix Guattari).

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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I also wish to acknowledge the contributions from the numerous contacts I have made at the Leeds University’s ‘Penelope and the Body’ conference as well as the three International James Joyce Symposia which I have attended.
Chapter One consists in a more complete survey of the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on the works of James Joyce than has previously been available, together with an overview of Deleuzian philosophy. The focus in the first chapter is on Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of philosophers and writers alike as ‘symptomatologists’ of their times and the ethico-political beliefs which they implicitly share with Joyce. I relate this to Hardt and Negri’s political speculations. The conceptual ‘tools’ which make up ‘schizoanalysis’ are set out. The second chapter uses these tools in a ‘symptomatological’ diagnosis by first setting out and then going beyond Joyce’s depiction of the ‘paralysis’ of the populace in *Dubliners* and *A Portrait* to his fuller understanding of our problematic situation in modernity depicted and diagnosed in the masochism of Bloom in *Ulysses*. In Chapter Three, I look at the epiphany, Deleuze’s concept of Joyce’s ‘epiphanic machine’, ‘duration’ as understood by Bergson and Deleuze, and the Deleuzian concept of ‘affect’ as potentially liberatory insights, after the preceding focus on negative ‘symptomatological’ diagnoses. Together with a critique of the prevailing views of Joyce’s epiphany I analyse three stories in *Dubliners* as illustrative of Deleuze’s understanding of the concept of the epiphany. In the fourth and fifth chapters I focus on Issy in the *Wake* read in terms of the ‘bird-girl’ of *A Portrait* and couple this with the Deleuzian concept of the ‘girl’ as a crucial, but misunderstood, node in what can be seen as the ‘rhizomatic assemblage’ or ‘network’ constituting the ‘epiphanic machine’ of the *Wake*. In Chapter Four, after first setting out the range of readings of Issy available in current Joycean criticism, I look at ‘The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggie’ (*FW* 219.18–252.21) in terms of a further Joycean challenge to modernity’s ‘oedipalising’ tendencies through Izod/Issy. Here, I place a final emphasis on the significance of incest and the incest taboo in ‘the Mime’ as the culmination of Joyce’s ‘symptomatological’ diagnosis of modernity, and in counterbalancing this, his use of the ‘affect’ of colour to offer us a productive ‘line of flight’. In Chapter Five I recapitulate on Deleuze’s highlighting of the letter in his positive comments on the *Wake* and then, by using some established discussions in Joycean criticism as an introduction, engage in a reading of Issy’s letter (*FW* 279F1) as the Wakean ‘line of flight’ by reading ‘her’ as liberatory ‘desiring machine’ with all of its ethico-political potentialities.
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Footnotes
Footnote entries comply with Section 10 ‘References’, Paragraphs 2.1 and 3, of the
MHRA Style Guide: A Handbook for Authors, Editors, and Writers of Theses
(London: Modern Humanities Research Association, 2002), and follow the rule that
‘the first reference to a book, article, or other publication is given in full’, and later
references in ‘the shortest intelligible form’.

References to Joyce’s major works, plus the page number (and also for Finnegans
Wake the line numbers) are given in parentheses in the text itself:

Abbreviations

(D) ‘Dubliners’: Text, Criticism and Notes, eds Robert
Scholes and E. Walton Litz (New York: Viking, 1977)
(SH) Stephen Hero: Part of the first draft of ‘A Portrait of the
Artist as a Young Man’, ed. by Theodore Spencer
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1956)
(CW) The Critical Writings of James Joyce, ed. by Ellsworth
Mason and Richard Ellmann (New York: Viking, 1959)
II and III ed. by Richard Ellmann (New York: Viking,
1957, 1966)
(P) A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: Text, Criticism
and Notes, ed. by Robert Scholes and A. Walton Litz
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1968)
(U) Ulysses: Annotated Students’ Edition (London and New
York: Penguin, 1992)
(FW) Finnegans Wake (London and New York: Penguin,
1992)
References to Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s major works are also given in parentheses in the text together with the page numbers:

Abbreviations


(B) *Bergsonism*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Haberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988)

(S) *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. by R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988)


(WIP)  

Chapter I

This chapter will attempt to provide both an overview of Deleuzian philosophy, and an introduction to Deleuzoguattarian 'schizoanalysis', as well as a more complete survey of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari's readings of Joyce than has previously been available. Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari use Joyce's works in a variety of ways some of which appear to conflict. These apparent discrepancies will be addressed. This inevitably long and complex introductory chapter will be divided into three parts in which a number of sub-headings will be included. The chapter will conclude with a provisional assessment of the Joyce which Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari construct.

Deleuze and Joyce

Neither Deleuze alone nor Deleuze and Guattari offer a lengthy critique of Joyce's work as they have with Proust and Kafka. In fact they appear to address Joyce through a 'multiplicity of fragments'. It might be argued, as Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer note, that this may be because 'there is no firmly entrenched French tradition of Joyce criticism (as there is in the case of Kafka, who has long been an important element in the French literary and philosophical debate ...)', as indeed has Proust. However, I would rather see this in terms of the breaks, cuts, and fragmentations of Deleuzian philosophy's 'machinic' approach which maximises its productive potential. I will discuss this approach below.

In the many fragments which they devote to Joyce, Deleuze and Guattari clearly show that they are familiar with his works and through their 'machinic' (dis)connectivities they bring to Joycean criticism an entirely new dimension. Nevertheless, precisely because of Deleuzian philosophy's fragmented approach very little attention has been paid to the high regard which Deleuze writing alone and with Guattari has for Joyce's works in general, and in particular Finnegans Wake, and his unique insight has consequently not been fully appreciated. There has been little opportunity to take an overview of Deleuze's engagement with Joyce because of the

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scattered nature of his references to him and his works. There is no compilation in English which brings all of Deleuze's many references to Joyce together. 'Joyce Indirect' is the only anthology of Deleuze's writings on Joyce listed in the 'Bibliography of the Works of Gilles Deleuze'. It was composed by Jean Paris and acknowledged by Deleuze, but it contains only a few of the original passages in French which mention Joyce.

Unfortunately, 'Joyce Indirect' is restricted to three early texts by Deleuze covering a period of less than ten years (Proust and Signs, Difference and Repetition, and Logic of Sense), and even so, a number of passages dealing directly with Joyce in these books are not included. As this anthology was never updated, no references to Joyce made by Deleuze writing alone, after 1972, have been incorporated, and the many references to Joyce and his works in the co-authored publications with Guattari do not appear either, although they are probably better known to us because of the fame or notoriety which the two-volumed Capitalism and Schizophrenia has attracted.

It follows that 'Joyce Indirect', although the only publication of its type, can hardly be regarded as a definitive anthology. Moreover, Paris himself made no comment on the passages but simply reproduced them. There is no means of knowing whether he, or more importantly Deleuze, regarded these passages as being of greater significance than the ones which had not been selected or missed. I have chosen to treat all the passages which refer to Joyce or his texts as being of potentially equal value, given Deleuze's anti-hierarchical approach and his refusal to judge – 'better be a roadsweeper than a judge', as he holds. This better accords with his belief that it is the reader who needs to

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use and instill value into any given section of his works rather than the author acting as final arbiter, despite the necessity of ‘following in his wake’ [3.1].

Paris extracts five passages from these three books, but there are at least twenty-five passages which directly name Joyce and/or his books in their works. These include three references to Joyce in *Proust and Signs* of which Paris notes two. There are five passages in which Joyce is mentioned in *Difference and Repetition*, and again Paris highlights two of these. Six passages refer, at some length, to Joyce in *Logic of Sense* and Paris has extracted one of these. In addition there are two relevant passages in *Anti-Oedipus*, a reference to Joyce in *Kafka*, five such passages in *A Thousand Plateaus*, one in *The Fold*, one in *What is Philosophy?*, and one in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, which are not mentioned in ‘Joyce Indirect’. I have collected all of these references to Joyce in an Appendix to the thesis. These are numbered and, when they are referred to, these numbers appear in square brackets. I believe that it is necessary to stress the fact that all of the references to Joyce which Deleuze made and Paris selected were approved by Deleuze personally and that ‘Joyce Indirect’ contains no negative comments on Joyce’s work.
Part 1. Introduction to Deleuzian philosophy

Deleuze draws on many philosophies and literary and artistic sources to construct his philosophy. The overview will include partial summaries of those earlier philosophies which, read differently by Deleuze, impact most significantly on my reading of Joyce. Consequently I will be highlighting his interpretation of Bergson, Nietzsche, and Spinoza rather than his work on Lucretius, Hume, Liebniz and Kant. To the last named he dedicated an affectionate study of ‘an enemy’, whilst all the rest were conjoined through ‘a secret link constituted by the critique of negativity, the cultivation of joy, the hatred of interiority, the exteriority of forces and relations, the denunciation of power’. I will argue that not only does Deleuze share this ‘secret link’ with these philosophers but also with Joyce himself.

I will not be making any distinction between the work of Deleuze when he is writing alone and that of Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative work. Guattari is a major theorist in his own right and his contribution to their joint work is not that of a junior partner. Yet, despite the possible added vitality – or as Bogue has put it ‘humour, energy and audacity’ – which their joint work displays, Deleuze is the professional philosopher and it is primarily Deleuzian philosophy with which I am concerned here. However, in fairness to Guattari, I will not omit his name from any reference I make to their joint work despite the occasional textual clumsiness this causes.

Throughout the thesis I will be concerned with drawing attention to the parallels between Joyce’s and Deleuze’s ethics and will begin to explore this in the first chapter through Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of philosophers and writers alike as ‘symptomatologists’ of their times. ‘Symptomatology’ is an important part of both Deleuzian philosophy and Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘rhizomatic’ or ‘schizoanalytic’ practice. Briefly stated, Deleuze notes that ‘symptomatology’ is the diagnosis of a

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coalescence of external forces or investments which opens up the possibility of productive change, and he states that achieving this ‘is always a question of art’. (M 14) It gives us an ethical diagnosis of the ills which beset society, and as such has an evident political dimension. Deleuze opposes ethics, which he equates with life and desire,\(^7\) to judgemental moralising. He draws on Nietzsche in the latter’s contrasting of life with a morality which he argues holds us all in chains and must be properly understood before we can gain any release from it: ‘[m]orality is merely sign language, merely symptomatology ... one must already know what it is about to derive profit from it’.\(^8\) He further states that ‘we need to determine the value of morality from the perspective of life itself’.\(^9\) I will be arguing that Joyce too develops his ‘symptomatological’ insights, which stem from his intuitive awareness of this judgemental morality, through a progressive delineation of modernity’s societal ills.

In summarising his work on Deleuze,\(^10\) the philosopher Alain Badiou has said\(^11\) that there are only three types of thinking in Deleuze and Guattari’s final work together (WIP) and these do not include the political. These are thinking on science (as

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\(^7\) In disagreeing with Foucault (Gilles Deleuze, ‘Désir et plaisir’, Magazine littéraire, no.325 (octobre 1994), 59-65), Deleuze explains that whereas Foucauldian ‘pleasure’ is simply inert and reactive, the concept of ‘desire’ grasps the active dynamic of the production of social reality, and he concludes that ‘[p]leasure interrupts the positivity of desire and the constitution of its plane of immanence’ (p. 64). He sees desire in positive ‘machinic’ terms as ‘desiring machine’, concepts which will be explained below.


function),\textsuperscript{12} on art (as ‘affect’),\textsuperscript{13} and on philosophy (as the creation of concepts).\textsuperscript{14} He went on to say that Deleuze writing alone was only interested in philosophy and not politics and that even when writing with Guattari only the political concepts of ‘becoming’, ‘desire’, and ‘minorities’ occur. According to Badiou there is not a Deleuzian politics as such only a Deleuzian ethics. Writing from a different perspective the Joycean critic Joseph Valente concurs by stating that the ‘becoming-woman’ keystone of Deleuzian philosophy has ‘no determinate political effects’.\textsuperscript{15} Whilst I agree that both are correct in Deleuze’s privileging of ethics over politics, Deleuze and Guattari themselves address their own statement that:

\begin{quote}
The fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly, and that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: ‘Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?’ \textit{(AO 29)}
\end{quote}

and this exploration has set the stage for developing a political theory and practice from their work.

Although Paul Patton began to explore the political potential of Deleuzian philosophy in his micro-analysis of current Australian Aboriginal resistance to white rule,\textsuperscript{16} it is undoubtedly Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s \textit{Empire},\textsuperscript{17} and its companion volume,\textsuperscript{18} which has received more attention. They attempt to follow

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\textsuperscript{12} ‘Function’ brings into play the ‘machinic’ aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy, explained below. It emphasises ‘use’ and ‘purpose’ rather than meaning.

\textsuperscript{13} ‘Affect’ is explained on page 52 below.

\textsuperscript{14} Philosophic concepts feature particularly prominently in Deleuzian philosophy, and all concepts will be shown by words or phrases in single inverted commas together with definitions and explanations. I will elaborate on Deleuze’s understanding of the concept below.


\textsuperscript{16} Paul Patton, \textit{Deleuze and the Political} (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).


\textsuperscript{18} Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, \textit{Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of
Deleuze and Guattari’s line of thought in *A Thousand Plateaus* and by applying it at the widest global level claim to see beyond the unquestioned bases of Anglo-American political theory which prop up capitalism. *Empire*’s central premise is that the phase of imperial capitalism has been replaced by a new global capitalism. This ‘new form of sovereignty’ consists of corporations, global-wide institutions, and other command centres without any responsibility to or governance by the people. Hardt and Negri claim repeatedly that the defining feature of this new postmodern sovereignty is its ‘determinationalisation’ or dispensing with territorial borders along with the contrasts and distinctions which they have traditionally supported. Yet, they argue that far from offering a bleak future such globalisation gives the prospect of a radical global social transformation. They conclude that the accelerating integration of economic, political and cultural powers in the world is a force for good. Their most contentious but optimistic claim is that the population of the world and in particular the poor, deprived, oppressed and inarticulate masses now potentially form a fluid and powerful network with the strength to bring about the most radical step in the liberation of humankind since the Industrial Revolution. This ‘multitude’, they argue, is the key to ‘true’ democracy on a global scale.

Consequently, they dispense with old modernist theories of sovereignty, and the state of perpetual warfare as seen in Hobbes.19 They reject the commercial need for the security of contracts as advocated by Locke and Hume,20 and go beyond a Marxist analysis based on dialectic and class warfare with its supposedly inevitable proletarian revolution; holding that all such modernist formulations no longer apply because of the ‘social eruption’ of the ‘global multitude’.21 They espouse a new republicanism, demand that democracy be taken more seriously than the Rousseaucesque ‘elective aristocracy’ which now passes for democracy in the Western world, and advocate


20 Ibid, p. 344.

21 Ibid.
through the ‘common(s)’ the abolition of private property, coupled with the unrestricted movement of peoples by granting ‘global citizenship’ to all. Slavoj Žižek has summarised their approach as follows:

Hardt and Negri describe globalization [in Deleuzian terms] as an ambiguous ‘deterritorialization’: victorious global capitalism penetrates into every pore of our social lives, into the most intimate of spheres, and installs an ever-present dynamic, which is no longer based on patriarchal or other hierarchic structures of dominance. Instead, it creates a flowing, hybrid identity. On the other hand, this fundamental corrosion of all important social connections lets the genie out of the bottle: it sets in motion potential centrifugal forces that the capitalist system is no longer able to fully control. It is exactly because of the global triumph of the capitalist system that that system is today more vulnerable than ever. The old formula of Marx is still valid: Capitalism digs its own grave. Hardt and Negri describe this process as the transition from the nation-state to global empire, a transnational space which is comparable to Rome, where hybrid masses of scattered identities develop.

As Gopal Balakrishnan writes, this approach ‘represents a spectacular break’ with the negativity of current left-wing political thinking, and it has excited much euphoric comment such as that of Duncan Bell:

[Despite the plethora of published material on Globalisation] ... there has been little profound, sustained political reflection on the process(es) [involved], on its intellectual roots and structure, and on the radical potential that it may contain. Empire is a glowing exception to this, a stunningly ambitious, multi-faceted, and richly suggestive book. ... it can rightly claim to be the most important critical-theoretic analysis of the topic yet attempted.

22 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p.204.
25 Duncan S. A. Bell, ‘Empire’, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University, [www.theglobalsite.ac.uk 2001] [website accessed 1/12/2004].
Certainly, Anna Tsing, amongst many other commentators on globalisation, fails to appreciate Hardt and Negri’s powerful insights and portrays globalization as an ‘imagined congeries’ of ‘hit or miss convergences’ rather than a ‘single claimant as a world-making system’. 26

I will take into account Hardt and Negri’s powerful new thought in this thesis, although I believe that a major weakness in their argument is that it gives scant attention to the massive recuperative (‘reterritorialising’) forces which global capitalism inherits and commands by bringing its peoples back to unitary subjectivity and little more than passive consumers. Understandably, in constructing a positive revolutionary approach, Hardt and Negri concentrate on ‘determinationalisation’ through capitalism’s liberatory potentialities. They are well aware that ‘all that is solid melts into air’ in modernity, 27 and that this creates a social space in which radical change can take place. Furthermore they draw upon Anti-Oedipus to substantiate their argument for social revolution. 28 Here, Deleuze and Guattari state that rather than resist capital’s globalization we have to accelerate it and ‘go in the opposite direction. To go still further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialisation’. (AO 239)

Yet, in doing this, Hardt and Negri downplay Deleuze and Guattari’s stress on the importance of the massive ‘reterritorialising’ forces which constrain and suppress any activity or thought which threatens the capitalist system:

What we are really trying to say is that capitalism, through its process of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear. (AO 34)


27 Marshall Berman. All that is solid melts into air: experience of modernity (New York: Simon Schuster, 1982). Berman takes his title from Marx’s description of capitalism’s ability to transform the world.

and ‘[d]eterritorialization must be thought of as a perfectly positive power that has
degrees and thresholds’. Nevertheless, it ‘is always relative, and has reterritorialization
as its flipside or complement’. (TP 53-54) It seems evident that Hardt and Negri’s call
for ‘global citizenship’ and the unrestricted movement of peoples will, without a major
ethical change, surely result in a backlash against immigration as has already been seen
throughout Europe as globalisation begins to take effect. The power shift envisaged in
such statements as ‘... throughout the ontological terrain of globalization the most
wretched of the earth becomes the most powerful being’, 29 because:

the poor [are] the paradigmatic subjective figure of labor today ... they are included
in the circuits of production and full of potential, which always exceeds what
capital and the global political body can expropriate and control, 30

is a state of affairs which will surely not be realised overnight, if at all, without an
ethical shift. There is little evidence as yet that the patriarchal symbolic order has been
finally overturned, that the power of the nation state has been fatally undermined, that
hierarchies are disappearing, or even that the modern unitary subject has been or is
about to be ethically reconstituted outside of consumerism as a result of the economic
changes already brought about by this new ‘turbo-capitalism’. Yet, it is precisely this
new subjectivity which Hardt and Negri quite rightly place at the centre of any real
revolutionary change:

We need to identify a theoretical schema that puts the subjectivity of the
social movements of the proletariat at center stage in the processes of
globalization and the constitution of global order. 31

To be effective, although they ignore the possibility, this surely must be a change which
cannot be recapturable by the reterritorialising forces of capitalism.

29 Ibid. p.363.

30 Hardt and Negri, Multitude. p.40.

Despite their occasional references to Céline, Kafka, Melville, Dostoyevsky, and Robert Musil, and assurances that 'the idea of “affect” plays a decisive and multifaceted role in *Empire*, I believe that Hardt and Negri do not fully recognise and give appropriate weight to the critical importance of literature’s ethical input to Deleuzoguattarian thinking. Although in *Multitude* they devote several pages to Bakhtin’s concepts of the ‘carnivalesque’ and ‘polyphonic’ as he applies them to Dostoyevsky’s novels, and note that ‘in a polyphonic conception of narrative there is no centre that dictates meaning’, they relate Bakhtin’s insights to ‘a theory of organisation based on the freedom of singularities that converge in the production of the common’. This seems to be antithetical to Deleuzian thought which might be better stated as a theory of disorganisation. They seem to be unaware that the ethical shift, required in a changed subjectivity, which can be provided by ‘great literature’ – including but going beyond ‘Rabelais’s laughter and Dostoyevsky’s tears’ – is required to accomplish this. As Derek Attridge rightly points out, with respect to the carnival and the carnivalesque, ‘by virtue of its subordinate status, [the carnivalesque] digression serves the whole of which it is both part and not part. Crucial to [such] digression is its temporary nature. It always swerves back,’ and allows for recuperation, or ‘reterritorialisation’ within the dominant order. We need to go beyond the carnivalesque to the ‘affects’ of ‘great literature’ to achieve lasting change.

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33 Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, pp.208-211.

34 Ibid. p.211.

35 Ibid. (My italics)


It is this aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy which I will be highlighting in my thesis on Joyce. The revolutionary changes to be wrought in Hardt and Negri's analysis crucially rely, not on the 'affects' of 'great literature' but on instant world wide communication via cyberspace, the internet, and television ('the ether' as they put it) to compose the new subjectivity of 'the multitude' as the motivating force in the radical change they envisage. Thus, in Multitude, they state that '[d]eprivation may breed anger, indignation and antagonism ... but revolt arrives only on the basis of wealth – that is a surplus of intelligence, experience, knowledge, desires', with this intelligence and knowledge being acquired very largely from interactions in cyberspace.

Yet, it is not only the commercialisation of television but the threat of increased consumerism through the advertising potential of the internet, by capitalism in its global form, which makes for the capture, or 'reterritorialisation', of 'desire' through 'the ether' not just possible but even likely. Evidently, were global capitalism to accomplish this with the supposedly coalescing 'multitude', even in part, then the internet itself would have become a major tool in suppressing the very revolutionary flame which, according to Hardt and Negri, it is about to spark. The new subjectivities of potential Third World members would then be constituted not into revolutionaries but into passive consumers powerless under an 'elective democracy' as are the majority of their present counterparts in the Western world. In these circumstances, cyberspace seems to be an unreliable, though evidently necessary, revolutionary tool and a major force is required to counterbalance any partial capture by the capitalist forces of consumerism.

Unlike Hardt and Negri, Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari clearly argue that 'the multitude' are created through authorial endeavours: '[h]ealth as literature, as writing, consists in inventing a people who are missing. It is the task of the fabulating function to invent a people'. (ECC 4) When such a people coalesces into a 'multitude' thereby forming a fluid and powerful network they must surely first acquire a new subjectivity

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38 In their recapitulation of Bakhtin's Dostoyevsky they refer to this as a 'literary detour'.

39 Kramavskas. 'Empire, or Multitude. Transnational Negri', pp. 42-43.
which ‘operates primarily through knowledge, communication, and language’\(^{40}\) in order to accomplish this, as Hardt and Negri rightly argue. Deleuze and Guattari envisage that ‘great literature’ has to play an essential part in bringing this about. In making this claim Deleuze does not see the book or the author dictating the process in transcendent terms but rather acting as conduits through which incorporeal revolutionary ‘intensities’ \((DR 222-3)\)^{41} pass in order to be perceived by their readers: ‘the incorporeal is not high above \((en hauteur)\), but is rather at the surface’. \((L 130)\) These productive incorporeal ‘intensities’ which the author is able to summon up in the book exist only as part of a functioning social machine working in conjunction with and on the same level as other available productive forces. \((TP 4)\) Consequently, the importance of literature in any revolutionary social change remains a strong and consistent strand in both Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking and cannot be dismissed or elided.

Despite these caveats, Hardt and Negri’s approach is invaluable, I argue, as it maps and reveals some of the latent potential available in this new phase of global capitalism which has never been done before. If their theorisations are seen as a state of affairs which could conceivably come about rather than something which is inevitable, I would not wish to contest but rather add to their overall analysis. As they state:

> We have to recognize where in the transnational networks of production, the circuits of the world market, and the global structures of capitalist rule there is the potential for rupture and the motor for a future that is not simply doomed to repeat the past cycles of capitalism.\(^{42}\)

However, whilst we may not be inevitably doomed to to repeat the past of capitalism neither are we free to assume that its ‘boom and crash’ cycles cannot occur

\(^{40}\) Hardt and Negri. *Empire*, p.29.

\(^{41}\) Deleuze states here that ‘intensity’ is a direct measure of difference and the ‘sufficient cause’ of everything which we regard as an essence or being. According to him everything is a ‘becoming’ defined by a process driven by differences in ‘intensity’: ‘Everything which happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, [these are] difference of intensity ... the condition of that which appears ... is determined and comprised in difference of intensity, in intensity as difference.’

\(^{42}\) Hardt and Negri. *Empire*, p.239. (My italics)
again, (ECC 113) and the ethical function of literature must be allowed to play its part here in order to help ensure that we can go beyond capitalism. Following Deleuze and Guattari, I continue to believe that there is a basic continuity in all of the phases of capitalism in the always present threat to recuperate and nullify new developments which undermine the system. Consequently, I believe that in Deleuzoguattarian terms Hardt and Negri’s political analysis is both invaluable and incomplete. In order to go beyond capitalism it is necessary to recognise such ‘reterritorialisations’ and that ‘great literature’ – when it is not itself captured by such ‘reterritorialisations’, an important point which I will make below – has a major role in diagnosing and alerting people to it as well as pointing out and even creating the forces of ethical liberatory potential available within global capitalism.

Joyce, I argue, is well aware of capitalism’s ‘reterritorialising’ tendencies as he shows in *Dubliners, A Portrait*, and *Ulysses*, he is however able to look forward to a different state of affairs in part in *Ulysses* and much more significantly – given Hardt and Negri’s stress on capital’s ‘deteriorialisation’ – in *Finnegans Wake* with its adumbration of ‘transnational space’ and ‘hybrid masses of scattered identities’, predating but suggestive of and looking forward to the life-affirming potentialities which go beyond the subject unified as consumer in global capitalism. In Joyce’s work, not only do we have the social paralysis afflicting the people in *Dubliners*, much as it may be said to compose the voiceless Third World poor today, but in *Ulysses* Joyce gives his protagonist Bloom – whom I will argue is an exemplar of societal masochism under capitalism – the role of a worker in advertising, the very activity which is concerned with making us passive consumers, and continues to threaten today and tomorrow to insinuate itself throughout Hardt and Negri’s ‘ether’.

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Deleuze states unequivocally that his work, with and without Guattari, is 'philosophy, nothing but philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word', yet literature offers a thread of continuity throughout all of his and their joint publications. When asked in an interview in 1988 if literature shouldn't be treated as distinct from philosophy, Deleuze disagrees. He states that he does not recognise a difference between them, and regards great authors as 'symptomatologists' very much akin to philosophers. (N 142) This Nietzschean theme he first broached in Proust and Signs, continued to develop in Masochism: An Interpretation of Coldness and Cruelty, elaborated on with Guattari in Kafka, and retained throughout his entire oeuvre. Deleuze's last publication in 1993, Essays Critical and Clinical, which is primarily devoted to literature, includes major philosophers as well as writers of fiction without any overt distinction being made between the two groups. Thus, as one critic puts it 'Melville and Kafka rub shoulders with Kant and Spinoza: all are writers', and one should add 'symptomatologists' or diagnosticians of society: 'more a physician than a patient, the writer makes a diagnosis, but what he diagnoses is the world'. (ECC 53) It is the ethical imperative which literature can provide in the revolutionary process, when it is not entrapped by the 'reterritorialising' forces of capitalism, which Deleuze wishes to highlight and why he refuses to separate philosophy and literature. Hardt and Negri need to take this into account. Nevertheless, despite his refusal to separate them Deleuze regards philosophy as working through its concepts in parallel with the 'affects' of literature, as will be explained below.

In drawing literature into philosophical discourse Deleuze is not attempting to make it either more theoretical or arcane but rather emphasising its importance. He would agree both with Irigaray's assessment that philosophy enjoys the status of 'master discourse', for 'it is indeed philosophical discourse [which] one must question

and disturb ... it lays down the law for all the others ... it constitutes the discourse of discourses',

and with Derek Attridge that:

The exercise of making the Wake a central and not a digressive text in our literary culture can ... create a space where it might be possible to reassess the function and character of the literary and its potential importance for us as members of an always changing, always changeable society.

I wish to stress here that Attridge’s observation is one which I develop as the basis for my thesis. Hardt and Negri’s analysis indicates that such a space now exists. As Balakrishnan notes, ‘In an excursus on Machiavelli [in Empire], they maintain the time has come to compose great manifestos which pry open an empty space for transformative intervention, and beckon the multitude to surge through’. Read in Deleuzian terms, I believe that the Wake itself may be regarded as such a manifesto.

In stating this I wish to dissociate my argument from that of Philippe Sollers. As Tel Quel’s influential editor, throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, Sollers consistently argued that avant-garde literature, with Joyce’s work at the heart of it, played a central role in influencing the political climate. At the Fifth International Joyce Symposium held at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1975, Sollers, then in his Maoist period, brandished a copy of Finnegans Wake, held it aloft, and cried, ‘Vive la Révolution!’ A taunt seemingly directed at the Americans and their attempts to ‘tame’ the Wake, but also apparently because underneath the dustwrapper, the cover of the book was red as was Mao’s little red book, and he was evidently equating the two and suggesting that the Wake could be presented directly to the Western ‘masses’ as an equivalent revolutionary tool. In his attempt to align the Wake with ‘Mao’s’ propagandist


47 Attridge, Peculiar Language, p. 238.

48 Balakrishnan, ‘Hardt and Negri’s “Empire”’, p.304.

49 Anecdotal evidence confirmed by Pieter Bekker, joint editor of ‘The James Joyce Broadsheet’ and member of the Leeds University James Joyce Reading Group, who was present at the session in Paris when Sollers made his intervention.
writing, and the Chinese Communist revolution, Deleuze and Guattari would undoubtedly see Sollers approach as wrong-headed if not fascistic. (AO xiii) My point is simply that Hardt and Negri’s Deleuzoguattarian theory which might help to bring about a different revolution would benefit enormously by taking ‘great literature’ and particularly the *Wake* into account, in order to strengthen its necessary ethical dimension.

Following Spinoza, who claims that the prophet produces his own people, Deleuze and Guattari regard ‘great literature’, as an essential component in creating ‘the multitude’ as revolutionary assemblage. In this connection works which Deleuze and Guattari cite include those of D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, Hardy, Melville, Kafka, Proust, and both Joyce’s *Ulysses*, and the *Wake*. All of which, except the *Wake*, have been conscripted into ‘the literary canon’ of academia. This both captures ‘great literature’ for an hierarchal and élitist audience and in its ‘reterritorialisation’ by the forces of an hegemonic capitalist socius through the Institutional State Apparatus of academia, stifles and tames much of its productive revolutionary intensities, although nothing can completely nullify the latent ethical and hence political potential of these works. Deleuze and Guattari do not see ‘great literature’ in hegemonic, transcendent or élitist terms although they fully appreciate that it can be and frequently is read in this way. Rather, as with Kafka’s work, they believe that it is the often unrecognised or suppressed but always potentially subversive aspect of such literature which makes it ‘great’.

Seemingly paradoxically they name all such ‘great literature’ as ‘minor’ and note its potential socio-political effects through ‘determinatorialisations’. For them ‘minor literature’ is the ‘revolutionary force for all literature ... pushing determinatorialization to such an extreme that nothing remains but intensities’. (K 19) They stress its absolute

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necessity in the revolutionary process. Deleuze and Guattari regard ‘minor literature’ as ethical and political, collective, and revolutionary in its impact. It ‘deterritorialises’ one territory as it maps out another. According to them, ‘minor literature’ creates the means by which ‘deterritorialization’ can take place and therefore it is a literature of the people:

The literary machine thus becomes the relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come ... because the literary machine alone is determined to fill the conditions of a collective enunciation that is lacking elsewhere in this milieu: literature is the people’s concern. (K 18)

I believe that the very difference or ‘singularity’ of the *Wake* separates it from other ‘great works’ of literature and has resulted in its exclusion from the ‘literary canon’. Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s considerable insight enables them to grasp this but they fail to go beyond the portmanteau and esoteric words, which they correctly highlight, and consequently do not fully appreciate its absolute radical potential. For instance, other ‘great’ works, even when read as ‘minor’, offer patriarchal forces an easier means of recuperation because they are couched in the language and syntax of the Symbolic order. The *Wake*, on the other hand, through Joyce’s deliberate elevation of lexis over syntax – whereby the ‘multiplicity’ of words to be drawn out themselves create the syntax – resists such incorporation, and does not allow an easy subsumation into the ‘literary canon’, much as standard Joycean criticism attempts to draw it in. In Joyce’s deployment of several types of grammar we, as readers, are forced to reorganise the phrases and syntax which he supplies and draw out disparate meaning. Such creative difficulties are deliberately compounded at the macro-level by Joyce’s ‘accretive’ composition, ‘lateral integration of sections’, and presentation as ‘a uniform textual continuum’, which stylistically emphasises spatiality and time as ‘duration’. They nevertheless can be held to appreciate that the *Wake* offers us:

... matter-movement bearing singularities [epiphanies] or *haecceities* ... an expressivity-movement always bearing a foreign tongue within each language and nonlinguistic categories within language as a whole (nomad poetic lineages). [Writing], then, on the same level as the real of an unformed matter, at the same

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time as that matter traverses and extends all of nonformal language [and becomes] a revolutionary machine, all the more abstract for being real. A regime that no longer operates by the signifier or the subjective. ... singular and immanent abstract machines. (TP 512)

In total this creates an impossible incoherenceability from a patriarchal perspective and offers an opportunity as its exceptional ‘minoritarian’ qualities consequently remain undiminished. These extend not only to the undermining and problematisation of the accepted understanding of what ‘great literature’ supposedly tells us, in liberal humanist terms, but go well beyond this to give the means of liberating our full ethical potential, and in doing so undermine the mores of a society constituted under capitalism. Yet, the new global order remains undergirded by a powerful and unified ‘reterritorialising’ moral climate. Terry Eagleton notes in this connection the influence of the unquestioned ‘universal values’ distilled from ‘great literature’ and propagated by the academy, as Institutional State Apparatus, which imposes on it belief in:

[the] timeless unity of the human spirit, of the superiority of the imaginative to the actual, of the inferiority of ideas to feelings, of the truth that the individual stands at the center of the universe, of the relative unimportance of public as against interpersonal life, and of the practical as against the contemplative, and other such modern prejudices.53

and he concludes that ‘[l]ike all the most effective forms of power, high culture presents itself simply as a form of moral persuasion’.54 The Wake, I argue, is consequently the only work of ‘great literature’ advocated by Deleuze which can be held to retain its full subversive and liberatory capacity and as such is crucial to Deleuzian ethico-political thought. It deserves to be accorded even greater weight by Deleuze and Guattari than even they give it, as it does in Hardt and Negri’s Deleuzoguattarian analysis and prognosis, but it receives no mention from them.

Evidently I need to explain further what is meant by Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘symptomatology’, but even prior to this I need to examine their particular

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54 Ibid., p. 54.
understanding of philosophy and the philosophic concept. In *What is Philosophy?* they hold that ‘philosophy is the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts’, (*WIP* 2) and as such they conclude that most other understandings of philosophy, principally conceived as ‘contemplation’, ‘reflection’ or ‘communication’, are both incomplete and questionable. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari designate any philosophy taken to be ‘contemplation’ as ‘objective idealism’, and they regard Plato as the founding father of this method because of his ‘contemplation’ of ‘Ideas’. (*WIP* 29-30)

If, for instance, one takes the ‘Idea of Justice’ in *The Republic*\(^{55}\) which resides in the world outside of the cave in a separate realm of pure ‘Ideas’,\(^{56}\) it is evident that for Plato only the overarching disembodied mind containing these ‘ideas’ can act as impartial judge giving us a pure idea of justice uncontaminated by worldly or bodily issues. Yet, such an approach judges life and justice from the impossible godlike perspective of someone who isn’t alive and has never lived in the world. Consequently, Plato is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the very different understandings of justice in different times and in different parts of the world for different peoples. This is because he has elevated the concept of ‘justice’ to an ‘other worldly’ position which belies its construction in the socio-historical context which Socrates, as Plato’s spokesman, and his opponents have hinted at in their earlier discussions on the city. He is even unable to give due weight to the impersonal forces, such as the economic, religious and linguistic which manifest themselves in the world and have played an important part in any given formation and understanding of this concept. Deleuze and Guattari regard such transcendental elevations and the reduction of concepts to essences as unacceptable as they evade the centrality of worldly, bodily issues and consequently of their understanding of the concept. Plato, in effect, needs to be brought down to

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\(^{56}\) Ibid. Book VI.
earth. Consequently, both Deleuze himself (L 253) and Foucault\(^{57}\) in commenting on Deleuze have stated that his thought is a ‘reversal of Platonism’.

Deleuze and Guattari similarly target Descartes and Kant when they look at philosophy conceived as ‘reflection’, and they call this the philosophy of ‘subjective idealism’. Although they acknowledge that in Cartesian philosophy the doubting subject cannot be sure of the objective status of ‘Ideas’, and that Platonism must consequently be bracketed out of the equation, idealism is nevertheless allowed in via the back door through Descartes’ creation of an occult, irreducible, immaterial, and ontological ‘cogito’, (WIP 24-27) which is now taken to be located in the subject rather than in a supposedly objective realm of transcendent ideas. Therefore, as Deleuze and Guattari see it, ‘subjective idealism’ in the case of Descartes is mistaken insofar as it appertains to the subject’s implicit knowledge of thought as creative of being.

Although Kant calls Cartesianism into question, ‘[w]e cannot say with Descartes, “I think therefore I am. I am a thing that thinks”’, (KCP viii) he nevertheless maintains the same emphasis. (WIP 32) He does this by giving primacy to the apperceptive or self-conscious nature of human experience and action by endowing it with the status of ‘phenomenal experience’ and separating it from ‘the world in itself’, (WIP 31-32, 85) thereby perpetuating a Cartesian dualism where it becomes a reflection upon space and time as well. (WIP 27) From Plato’s theory of forms to Kant’s noumenal reality of ‘the thing-in-itself’, Platonic, Cartesian, and Kantian metaphysics erect a two world theory of reality. Consequently, in all of their philosophies a supposedly ‘true’ world overshadows an ‘apparent’ world available to our senses but regarded as inauthentic and a mere semblance of the original.

Finally, Deleuze and Guattari take issue with the philosophy of ‘communication’, which they name ‘intersubjective idealism’, and here they have Husserl and

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phenomenology in their sights. Husserl’s project aims to reinstate the Kantian ‘transcendental subject’ in the phenomenal world, in order to place it within the empirical ground of ‘actual experience’:

Husserl sees it [Kant’s thought] through to the end by discovering, in non-numerical multiplicities or immanent perceptivo-affective fusional sets, the triple root of acts of transcendence (thought) through which the subject constitutes first of all a sensory world filled with objects, then an intersubjective world occupied by the other, and finally a common ideal world that will be occupied by scientific, mathematical, and logical formations. (WIP 142)

Therefore, Husserl figures the transcendent ‘Idea’ as neither a pre-existing object, nor a presupposition of subjective reflection, but rather as a consequence of intersubjective interaction. On this understanding, Deleuze and Guattari argue, philosophical activity is indistinguishable from the ‘communication’ which takes place between subjects. Joyce shows us the problematic of such communication which does and does not take place between subjects through Bloom in the ‘Aeolus’ episode of Ulysses.

In attacking the philosophies of ‘contemplation’, ‘reflection’ and ‘communication’, and designating them as variants of philosophic idealism, Deleuze and Guattari clearly indicate their own philosophic stance. They eschew such ‘psychologisms’. Theirs is an absolute philosophy of immanence, materialism, and difference opposed to idealism and the transcendent in any of its forms. Following Hume, Deleuze had already adopted a version of empiricism, an interest which he continues during his association with Guattari. (WIP 53-54) For Hume, all supposedly true, timeless, logical and universal principles – including causality, necessity, identity and lawfulness (WIP 214) – are effects of experience; they are fictions which the mind imposes on the experiences of our material being allowing us to order our world and our constructed selves within it into manageable forms. Moreover, Deleuze couples Hume’s insight with that of


Spinoza which in his understanding of ‘substance’ allows him to speak of the ‘plane of immanence’ on which ‘the truth of the new humanity is determined historically, technically, and politically [and] the singular is presented as the multitude’,\(^{60}\) as Hardt and Negri put it.

Deleuze and Guattari categorise the philosophies of ‘contemplation’, ‘reflection’ and ‘communication’ as ‘arborescent’ and their own immanent philosophy as ‘rhizomatic’. Both these concepts are used in a wide variety of different circumstances, \((TP\ 3-25)\) with the former in general terms indicating hierarchies of height and depth and the latter a proliferation of ‘grounded’ surface connections. ‘Arborescence’ in this specific instance indicates ideological systems which seek to establish both hierarchy and a fundamentally dichotomous sets of relations in all their lines of thought. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘rhizomatic’ philosophic system conversely denies this bi-polar method of thought by working through ‘the middle’ and employing decentred sets of material linkages between concepts, processes, relations, ‘intensities’, and speeds and slownesses:

A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, \textit{intermezzo}. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb ‘to be’, but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and ... and. . . and. . .’. This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb ‘to be’. ... proceed from the middle, through the middle, coming and going rather than starting and finishing. ... move between things, establish a logic of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings. ... The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. ... a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle. \((TP\ 25)\)

Deleuze states that ‘we always have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that we deserve given our way of being or our style of life’, \((NP\ 1)\) consequently our prevailing ‘arborescent’ way of thinking inevitably leads to judgemental moralising and ‘sad’ outcomes. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari argue that ‘rhizomatics’ as a form of pragmatics solely concerned with what can be achieved in the world gives us a ‘joyful’ ethical alternative. It is because of this alternative offered by literature that Deleuze

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\(^{60}\) Hardt and Negri. \textit{Empire}. p.73.
would no doubt argue that his injunction to author's to 'create a people' is in no sense to offer the author a privileged, transcendent, arborescent position. In effect, Deleuzian 'rhizomatics' shows how concepts, texts and the forces which compose them can be made to work differently through the establishment of new material connections. Pivotal concepts which define the relationship between things within a Deleuzian 'rhizomatic' cartography include 'becomings', commencing with 'becoming-woman', and also the 'Body without Organs' ('BwO') located on the 'plane of immanence', as the focal point of 'schizoanalysis', as will be explained below.

Contemplation, reflection or communication, they argue, cannot be definitive of philosophical activity because what is fundamentally elided here is the creation of the material concepts on which they rest and the linkages then established. By taking for granted the invention of these concepts and the immanent forces which constitute them such philosophies lose their groundedness in the material world. Deleuze and Guattari hold that the philosophers cited and the philosophies they have created teach the exact opposite of what they actually do. These idealisms actually create concepts and material connections whilst arguing for uncreated ideal essences which are held to precede them in a transcendent state somehow divorced from the real world. Deleuze and Guattari are not suggesting that human beings do not 'contemplate, reflect or communicate', nor that philosophy should not concern itself with these actions, only that it is a mistake to equate these actions directly with philosophical activity itself. For them philosophy is grounded in the creation of concepts allowing for new ways of thinking. These are entirely dependent on and bound up with the problematics and differences of this world and philosophy becomes 'idealism' when it forgets this fundamental fact.

This approach to philosophy not only placed him at odds with traditional views but also with his structuralist, post-structuralist, postmodern peer group. Deleuze's materialism rejects any conception of the sign, or symptom, which limit it to a linguistic model. Rather than sticking to the Saussurean derived semiology with many of his contemporaries, he bases his understanding of signs on Pierce’s 'sem(e)iotics\(^6\) and

\(^6\) Charles Sanders Peirce. *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, 8 vols,
couples this with the work of Hjelmslev,\textsuperscript{62} and then brings into play the ‘order words’ of Austin\textsuperscript{63} and Searle,\textsuperscript{64} agreeing with them that command and performance are at the heart of grammar and communication.

In contrast to this approach language is foundational for the greatest post-structuralist Jacques Derrida, yet its uncertainties allow for infinite deconstruction. This stance ultimately undermines any belief or argument, ‘political’ or otherwise, which he or anyone else cares to posit. This is the dilemma which he finally presents us with. As André Pierre Colombat points out:

Deleuze’s two books on cinema shed a new light on his criticism of linguistic signs. They also exemplify his radical opposition to any form of structuralism based on linguistics or even to the most brilliant and subtle word games played by Derrida’s Deconstruction. The point is not to unveil a Signifier nor a paradoxical founding trace but to evaluate forces, arrangements and an entire battlefield; to map thinking as a vital process.\textsuperscript{65}

James Williams too contrasts Deleuze and Derrida to the latter’s detriment:

Broadly, the contrast between Deleuze and Derrida lies in the former’s preparedness to adopt systematic forms, arguments and concepts from the history of philosophy and then to cast them, still fully functional, in a new and disruptive setting. The latter shies away from this inclusive approach, preferring to undermine historical arguments from the outset and replacing them with a much looser methodological framework. Deleuze offers us principles and methods for a philosophy of difference, whereas Derrida offers us an ethos and style of writing about difference explicitly resistant to the emergence of principles or methods.\textsuperscript{66}


\textsuperscript{66} James Williams, \textit{Gilles Deleuze’s ‘Difference and Repetition’: A Critical}
It is the life-enhancing, life-giving 'vitalism' of such a cartographic process which is the key to Deleuze's philosophy. He does not take language as foundational. As a philosophic vitalist, though one of a different stripe to those who were concerned with a mystical, transcendent life force, as everything is immanent for him, he takes a materialist perspective on life: life seen as 'machinic connections'.

Similarly, Deleuze's dispute with Jacques Lacan was based on the latter's early refusal to take 'the real' as possible. It is impossible for the Symbolic order, as Lacan conceived it, and consequently for patriarchal language but not for life itself. (Lacan appears to move towards this position himself when he engages directly with Joyce's later works, when 'the category of the sinthome allowed him to think the Symbolic as permeated by the Real, instead of [being] radically distinct from it'. The real is absolutely essential for life and production and requires no mediation via language. For Deleuze the importance of 'great literature' lies in the impersonal 'affects' which its language mobilizes or generates for our use. Deleuze points out, for instance, that we do not need language as an intermediary to tell us when we feel the warmth of sunlight on our face, we simply experience its 'affect' as real. In this his approach is quite distinct from Derrida, the earlier Lacan and all who took the linguistic turn following and/or critiquing de Saussure.

Deleuze states that the two intimately linked prizes of philosophy are the attainment of a Nietzschean 'cheerfulness' (Heiterkeit) at the death of God, and the concomitant abolition of transcendent values. Eschewing materialism, Derrida's

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recourse in his later works to a theo-philosophy of transcendence, influenced by Levinas and linked to the theme of negative theology stemming from Pseudo-Dionysius and Meister Eckhart\(^6^9\) would be considered by Deleuze and Guattari as a completely unacceptable move: ‘[w]henever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is Philosophy whenever there is immanence’. (WIP43) Finally, Deleuze stresses that philosophy’s main concern must be to seek a ‘restoration of immanence’ and, in so doing absolutely forbid ‘the return of any transcendence’. (ECCI 37)

Nevertheless, Deleuze’s philosophical approach may appear to open it to Derridean deconstructive linguistic criticism, but this need not be the case. In Anti-Oedipus Hjelmslev’s linguistics is proposed as an alternative to that of Saussure. Hjelmslev had developed an immanent theory of language, which escapes the constraining identity of the signifier. Language for him is deterritorialised, decoded, and subject to the flows of desire; a very satisfactory position for Deleuze to adopt. In addition, Peirce provides Deleuze with a generalised, non-linguistic semiotics, rather than a Saussurean or indeed Derridean semiology. Deleuze made a distinction between semiotics and semiology, and expressed a very clear preference for semiotics which he defines as ‘the system of images and signs independent of language in general’. (C2 29) For him, ‘[j]ust as philosophy must constantly come into contact with “non-philosophy”’,\(^7^0\) so language comes into contact with “non-language material”’,\(^7^1\) and resolves itself in ‘the middle’.

For Derrida, as for the early Lacan, everything is ultimately posited on lack or loss, implying an original plenitude. Unlike Deleuze, Derrida has not taken ‘difference’ as irreducible. Insofar as such lack is bound up with desire for Derrida and Lacan, Deleuze would hold that this ties their approaches to the ‘oedipalisations’ of capitalism, and their

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\(^7^0\) Gregg Lambert, The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (New York and London: Continuum, 2002), passim.

\(^7^1\) John Marks, Gilles Deleuze. p.142.
politics to a recoupment by it. Consequently, despite their often public disagreements, René Major has shown how similar, and indeed interdependant, much of Derrida and Lacan’s work is. Moreover, Derrida is exercised by the loss of meaning which is of little concern for Deleuze. For him, the ‘sting of the negative is extracted from the structural semiosis, allowing a truly diacritic sign to emerge. And the Derridean différance yields to the Deleuzian different/ciation’. Following Bergson, ‘differenciation’ concerns the ‘actualisation’ of the ‘forces of virtuality’ and ‘differentiation’ the totality of diacritic relations of ‘the virtual’ on which it draws.

Despite asserting that his work is ‘philosophy, nothing but philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word’ when one turns to the traditional philosophic view of concepts there are substantial differences between established views and Deleuze’s understanding of how such concepts should be understood. The traditional means is to understand concepts as determinate ideal entities serving as points of identification which must conform to the logic of exclusive disjunction. In other words, things either do or do not belong within them. Traditionally understood concepts are concerned with clear-cut categorization and thus the establishment of identity. Deleuze and Guattari regard the philosophic concept quite differently. It is not to be seen in such a cut-and-dried fashion. They see it as determined by context and difference, ‘pure and simple variations ordered according to their neighbourhood’. Their formulation of the concept is therefore:

... incorporeal, even though it is incarnated or effectuated in bodies. But, in fact, it is not mixed up with the state of affairs in which it is effectuated. It does not have spatiotemporal coordinates, only intensive ordinates. It has no energy, only intensities ... The concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing—pure Event, a hecceity [sic] ... It is like the bird as event. (WIP 21)

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75 My italics
This effectuation of the concept ‘in bodies’ was addressed by Joyce through Stephen Dedalus’s Aristotelian ruminations at the beginning of the ‘Proteus’ episode in *Ulysses* where he goes beyond ‘coloured signs. Limits of the diaphane’, with its idealist limitations, to the materialism and immanence of Aristotle’s conclusion: ‘[b]ut he adds: in bodies. Then he was aware of them bodies before of them coloured. How? By knocking his sconce against them, sure.’ (*U* 45) Nevertheless, I am not concerned with the certainties, essences or clearly defined identities which Stephen’s Aristotelian speculations, filtered through a Thomist prism, appear to be seeking here, but rather with Deleuze and Guattari’s seemingly cryptic understanding of the concept as giving the material ‘event’, in all of its ‘thisness’ or ‘haecceity’.

Thus, it would seem that Deleuze and Guattari in equating the bird with ‘the event’ have in mind the ‘musicality’ of the bird song and its ‘line of flight’ to freedom rather than any species specific bird which might better suit Stephen’s musings, and indeed the traditional idea of the philosophic concept. One is reminded here of the young girl in *Giacomo Joyce* who is likened to ‘[a] bird twittering after storm, happy that its little foolish life has fluttered out of reach of the clutching fingers of an epileptic lord and giver of life, twittering happily, twittering and chirping happily’. Flight and music feature prominently in my later readings of Joyce’s works. The Deleuzian concept ‘like the bird as event’ escapes the clutching fingers of a traditional, patriarchal philosophy. To understand Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of the concept better one needs to understand its near equation with ‘the event’ before proceeding further.

Deleuze’s *Logic of Sense* is the principal work in which he addresses the concept of ‘the event’ most fully. He does this in an exploration of what can be regarded as sense and what is to be seen as nonsense. Deleuze always treats ‘sense’ as having great

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76 Jacques Aubert (*The Aesthetics of James Joyce* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992) here identifies the French translation of Aristotle’s, *De Sensus et Sensibilia*, III, p.439, which Joyce used, as well as the specific quotation: ‘Colour is the limit of the diaphane in any determined body’ (Aubert, ‘Appendix B’, p. 134).

ontological significance by opposing it to ‘essence’. He notes elsewhere that there is ‘no ontology of essence, there is only an ontology of sense’.\(^78\) In a unique philosophic combination, in *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze takes a surprising approach and examines ‘the event’ in terms of both Stoic philosophy and psychoanalysis. He selects from Stoic philosophy their ‘theory of bodies’.\(^{L 4}\) For the Stoics ‘events’ are not bodies seen in commonsensical terms but are incorporeal entities which ‘subsist’ and ‘inhere’. ‘Pure events’ precede language not as essences but as singular and impersonal ‘intensities’ indicating a pre-individual existence *inside* the language which expresses them. Deleuze argues that it is particularly through the release of such impersonal intensities in Joyce’s use of portmanteau and esoteric words that he constructs his ‘epiphanic machine’.

‘Events’ are thus independent of their actual formation and use in language and always exceed it. The ‘event’ is a *haecceity* ... a draught, a wind, a day, a time of day, a stream, a place, a battle, an illness’.\(^{N 141}\) Moreover, in order to underline its nebulous qualities impossible to capture in words, Deleuze has further stated that ‘[a]ny event is a fog of a million droplets’.\(^{79}\) Hardt and Negri in critiquing Deleuze’s concept of the event as ‘the production of the social ... as a chaotic, indeterminate horizon marked by the ungraspable event’,\(^{80}\) fail to grasp that it is precisely the crucial unknown features of ‘social production’ stemming from the ‘virtual’ which characterises the event for Deleuze and for Guattari.\(^{81}\) It cannot be reduced to the Marxian analysis which they then attempt.

In speaking of his use of Stoic philosophy in *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze points out that the Stoics draw a mental line between things and events, which allows them to explore the impersonal aspect, the ‘it’, of ‘the event’ which tends to dissolve the self.\(^{L}\)


\(^79\) Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p.65.

\(^80\) Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p.28.

63) I will be relating this conception of the ‘it’ or ‘haecceity’ to the epiphanic ‘bird girl’ of *A Portrait* in Chapter Three, and to Issy in the *Wake* in Chapters Four and Five. The ‘it’ consists of the ‘virtual intensities’ which make up the ‘thisness’ of ‘the event’ as a processual ‘becoming’. These concepts will be explained below.

In addition to the Stoics and psychoanalysis, Deleuze’s understanding of the ‘event’ also owes something to Maurice Blanchot who particularly notes the ambiguities inherent in the concept. For Blanchot ‘there is the part of the event which is realized and accomplished [and] there is that “part of the event which cannot realize its accomplishment”’. (*L* 151-152) Thus, the ‘narrative event’ for Blanchot can never be fully described: ‘[n]arrative is the movement towards a point – one that is ... unknown, ignored, and foreign’. Drawing on this, Deleuze holds that an ‘event’ elucidates the seeming paradoxes of sense and nonsense. In order to illustrate this he brings into play Lewis Carroll’s literary and logical paradoxes [2.1] and links these to Joyce’s work which he sees as ‘a method of questions and answers which doubles that of problems’[2.2]. Instances of this in Deleuze’s *Logic of Sense* are taken from Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* (*L* 234-236) where the ‘smile without a cat’ shows us an ‘impersonal event’ by freeing the ‘virtual’ ‘affect’ of the smile from its ‘actualisation’ on the face of a particular cat. (These concepts will be defined below.)

Deleuze points out too that, in *The Hunting of the Snark*, Carroll used literary and logical paradoxes to conjure up an absurd, nonsensical, world through the use of invented, esoteric, language which yet creates and coalesces into a kind of ‘sense’ with its own inherent logic. With Carroll, according to Deleuze, we are cast into a sea of difference. Thus, the very word ‘snark’ has not an ‘always already’ given meaning, which would allow an Althusserian interpellation by hailing us and effectively

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83 Ibid, pps. 46, 234.

underwriting an already coherent self. Carroll draws on impersonal forces to configure new animals and create ‘events’ by actively inventing a new language, and a different world, and implicitly sets it alongside common sense understanding through his use of invented and portmanteau words:

\[
\text{Twas brillig, and the slithy toves } \\
\text{Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:} \\
\text{All mimsy were the borogoves, } \\
\text{And the mome raths outgrabe.}^{85}
\]

In his conception of the ‘event’, we can also see that Deleuze is implicitly connecting us to the *Wake*. For as Tim Conley points out, in his assessment of the *Wake* as the supreme example of ‘nonsense literature’, it goes much further than does Carroll in its ‘gesture to the immeasurable, ludicrous, and dangerous depths of meaning’.\(^86\) Such ‘nonsense’ for Deleuze is not simply whimsical. He would believe that it points to the possibility of the creation of a different world and new ‘becomings’ through physical, chemical and biological changes. As Duszenko notes, Joyce, in the *Wake*, was also aware of such potential changes.\(^87\)

This then is the significance of ‘the event’ for Deleuze, conceived in terms of its ‘speaking’ the philosophic concept. The Deleuzian concept epitomises new thinking, whether newly created or re-worked from earlier meanings, it always brings into play new meanings, new understandings of life, and new opportunities through its revelation


\[\text{\textsuperscript{86} Tim Conley, ‘“Oh me none onsens!”: Finnegans Wake and the Negation of Meaning’, James Joyce Quarterly, 39.2 (Winter, 2002), p.242.}\]

of change and difference. Moreover, for Deleuze it is this creative thinking which emphasises life itself as change and difference and underpins Deleuzianism as an ethical philosophy. I should perhaps add that the creation of such Deleuzian concepts is potentially available to everyone and is not restricted to professional philosophic circles.

One can now see how it is that in his formative work *Difference and Repetition*, contemporaneous with *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze is able to offer a critique of the predominant Western philosophic tradition as a system of thinking, predicated always upon concepts as determinate ideal entities serving as points of identification. James Williams summarises the importance of *Difference and Repetition* as 'stand[ing] out as one of the great philosophical works of the twentieth century'. He notes that Deleuze's 'outstanding achievement lies in the comprehensive and rigorous innovation *Difference and Repetition* implies for philosophical accounts of the structure of reality ... extend[ing] to new ideas about values and action'. Furthermore, as Williams stresses, it is 'as much about how to live and how to create as it is about a philosophical view of the world'.

Thus, Deleuze shows in *Difference and Repetition* that concepts traditionally conceived of as determinate ideal entities which result in points of identification ensure a categorization, including a unified theory of the self, which obscures and tames the radical otherness of difference. He argues that this effaces creativity or what he calls 'the genitality of thinking'. (DR 266) It is just such Joycean creativity, although this is achieved by 'affect', which leads me to highlight the *Wake* in this thesis. Deleuze's philosophy accepts the claim that concepts are only formulated in conjunction with problems which are necessarily located in this world even though they are 'not mixed up with the state of affairs in which [they are] effectuated'. (WIP 21) Such worldly problems are frequently brought to the attention of philosophy through the

88 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's 'Difference and Repetition', p.1.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.
'symptomatological' ‘affects’ of great literature. The concept is meaningless if ‘it is not ... linked to a problem that it resolves’. (WIP 79) For Deleuze conceptual thinking offers a new and different response to such problems, (WIP 133) as the construction of concepts is not simply an epistemological but an ontological project in which ‘the multitude’, in its quest to attain a new subjectivity in global capitalism, must be completely invested. This is an awareness which Joyce also shows in his fictional characters’ confrontations with ‘the Imperial British state’ – capitalism’s then chief protagonist and historical ‘actualisation’ – coupled with its hegemonic collaborator ‘the holy Roman catholic and apostolic church’. (U 24)

Anyone who believes that Joyce was only incidentally concerned with capitalism in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, with money providing its ultimate value judgement, should read Osteen on the former, and Critchley and MacCarthy on the latter. To take one obvious example from the Wake, which Critchley and MacCarthy do not use, Joyce humorously retells La Fontaine’s fable of the ant and the grasshopper as the tale of ‘the Ondt and the Gracehoper’ (FW 414.14-419.10). Here Shaun tells the story and attempts to place himself as its bourgeois hero by showing himself as the prudent ant with Shem as the wasteful grasshopper. Clearly, Shaun’s intention is to use the fable to illustrate capitalist values. However, in his choice of the Ondt as his double he betrays himself as this is a word that is both the Danish word for evil and a permutation of ‘don’t’, all of which ties in with his generally negative view of life. The Ondt’s ‘Ad majorem I. s. d!’ (FW 418.4) means ‘for the greater glory of pounds, shillings, and pence’.


92 Dounia Bunis Christiani. Scandinavian Elements of "Finnegans Wake" (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965). p. 188.
Part 2. Deleuze’s philosophic antecedents

Deleuze’s Bergsonism

Deleuze’s commitment to a materialist philosophy resonates with his involvement with the philosophy of Bergson which he develops further in *Bergsonism* and *Cinema 2*. Contrary to the Cartesian philosophy highlighted above there can be no separation of mind and body for Bergson. Moreover, his philosophy has no room for occult or unknowable power which Descartes has imported into his philosophy. Bergson’s philosophy is an anti-Cartesian monism which does away with appeals to the ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ in its insistence that mind is just an emergent phenomenon of the bio-physical matter of the brain. There is only matter and its energetic movement and this complex movement entirely explains mind and consciousness itself. Any difference between these aspects of matter is simply one of degree not of kind. Therefore for Bergson the relationship between consciousness, the brain, and the material world is one of continuity and connectedness. Consciousness is simply the product of a bio-physical process. This process is one of selection which involves a resolution of forces. This selectionist model results in the twin concepts of the ‘virtual’ and the ‘actual’, both of which are basic to Deleuzoguattarian philosophy and underpin many of their conceptual developments.

Whilst Hardt and Negri in *Empire* implicitly privilege Spinoza over Bergson, as the most important formative influence on his thought, a growing number of commentators assert that Deleuze’s philosophy is fundamentally Bergsonian. Thus, for Alain Badiou in *The Clamor of Being*, Bergson is Deleuze’s major philosophical reference point, and Constantin V. Boundas argues that, in returning to Bergson, Deleuze has argued for a

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philosophy of ‘difference’ much more convincingly than Heidegger, structuralism or Derrida. Nevertheless, Deleuze’s considerable inventiveness and his use of ‘free indirect discourse’ comes into play when confronting other philosopher’s works, as it does with both Bergson and Nietzsche. Thus, in order to understand Deleuze’s use of a key Nietzschean concept, ‘the eternal return’, which holds particular significance in my Deleuzian understanding of the Wake, and is held by Keith Ansell Pearson to be arguably ‘the central teaching ... of Nietzsche’s whole philosophy’, one needs to take into account that he is reading it differently through a Bergsonian ‘lens’ as an aspect of ‘duration’, or the time of the ‘virtual’ as ‘the time of life’.

Moreover, Ansell Pearson would seem to position Deleuze with respect to Bergson more precisely than has my previous unqualified statement:

[i]t is inadequate to describe Deleuze as a Bergsonian, not simply because of the many and varied sources he draws upon, but rather because of the highly innovative character of his Bergsonism. ... Deleuze is both profoundly Bergsonian and radically different from Bergson.97

Nevertheless, Ansell Pearson may seem to beg the question as to precisely what Bergsonism is. As Hanna98 points out:

Even as Whitehead gives Bergsonism a final impersonal and universal focus which it did not possess, so does Existentialism give Bergsonism a final personal and individual focus which it did not possess [either]. Bergson’s insights survive incorporated within viewpoints other than his own and more sharply drawn than his own.99


95 Deleuze, ‘I have nothing to admit’, p.112.


97 Ansell Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual, p. 3.


Furthermore, Deleuze not only calls for a ‘return to Bergson’, but defines his own philosophy in terms of such:

[a] ‘return to Bergson’ [which] does not only mean a renewed admiration for a great philosopher but a renewal and extension of his project today, in relation to the transformations of life and society, in parallel with the transformations of science. (B 115)

I will examine their differences as they impact on my reading of Joyce’s works in Chapter Three when I address the Joycean epiphany, his ‘epiphanic machine’, and his and their different understandings of ‘duration’.

The Bergsonian ‘virtual’ is the totality of the material universe and the ‘actual’ is a minor subset of this which from a human and animal perspective is based on our survival needs. Here, one must stress that both the ‘virtual’ and the ‘actual’ are as material, and therefore as real and solid, as each other, even though we seem only to recognise this in the term ‘actual’. Yet, the ‘virtual’ in all of its enormous complexity constantly impacts on, enters into, and actually constitutes our body/brain through our senses, although we may well not be aware of this. For instance we may only become aware of our heartbeat at moments of emotional stress or exertion. Thus, beginning from the quantum level through its atomic and molecular structures and movements, then proceeding to the machinery of the cell, and the complex electrical, chemical, hydraulic, pneumatic and kinetic functioning of the body and its organs, including the brain and the nervous system, we have a functioning ‘machine’ which ‘actualizes’ consciousness by selecting, from this ‘virtual’ totality, that which is necessary for the survival of the organism. However, as the ‘actual’ is extracted and solidified from the totality of the ‘virtual’ it always loses something vital in the process:

[L]ife is a movement, materiality is the inverse movement ... the matter which forms a world being an undivided flux, and undivided also the life that runs through it, cutting out in it living beings all along its track. Of these two currents the second runs counter to the first, but the first obtains, all the same, something from the second. There results between them a modus vivendi, which is organization.\(^\text{100}\)

Later, I will be relating such 'cuttings' and interactions to Issy in the *Wake* when I read 'her' as Joycean 'desiring machine' and 'line of flight'.

Although there cannot be an exact equation between the Bergsonian concepts of the 'virtual' and the 'actual' and Deleuzian concepts, I believe that it is helpful to see a correspondence between the concepts of 'the plane of immanence' and its textual counterpart 'the second plane of writing' as equating to the Bergsonian 'virtual'. Its significance for this thesis cannot be overestimated for as Hardt and Negri note, 'the primary event of modernity [is] ... the discovery of the plane of immanence'. Moreover, I am inclined to align Deleuzian 'chaos' with this concept as for Joyce 'chaos = cosmos'[1.4]. Moreover, I believe that for the purposes of this thesis, 'the plane of organisation', or its textual equivalent 'the first plane of writing', can usefully be conceived as more or less equivalent to 'the actual'. Nevertheless, one must recall that the Deleuzian concept is determined by context and difference, 'pure and simple variations ordered according to their neighbourhood' and no exact correspondence between these terms should or can be drawn.

Bergsonian 'becomings' are key to any understanding of Deleuze's philosophy, which is above all concerned with the ontological processuality of 'becoming' rather than with static unitary 'being' or 'essence'. Deleuze and Guattari stress its importance:

... the becoming without which nothing would come about in history [although it] does not merge with history ... it launches a people, an earth, like the arrow and discus of a new world that is never-ending, that is always in the process of coming about 'acting counter to time, and therefore acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come.' Acting counter to the past, and therefore on the present, for the benefit, let us hope, of a future – but the future is not a historical future, not even a utopian history, it is the infinite Now – the Intensive or Untimely, not an instant but a becoming. (*WIP* 112)

On this definition 'becoming', as Deleuze and Guattari understand it, is clearly located in Bergsonian 'duration' as the time of the 'virtual', and time as 'duration' is a joyful affirmation of 'becoming'. In particular their emphasis on the 'untimeliness' of

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‘becoming’ stresses the importance of future time and Deleuze’s interpretation of the Nietzschean ‘eternal return’ of difference, as I will explain below. These are the keys to the openness of life which always offers previously unimagined or even unimaginable lines of new ‘becomings’, through ‘lines of flight’, as again will be explained below. Hardt and Negri accept such ‘becomings’ which ‘launch a people, an earth’, and the inevitability of changed subjectivities for ‘the multitude’: ‘[t]he multitude has internalized the lack of place and fixed time; it is mobile and flexible... The coming imperial universe, blind to meaning, is filled by the multifarious totality of the production of subjectivity’. 102

Deleuze and Guattari inform us that ‘[a]bove all, becoming does not occur in the imagination [the] reality specific to becoming [is] the Bergsonian idea of a coexistence of very different durations, superior or inferior to ours, all of them in communication’. (TP 240) Consequently, reading in a ‘rhizomatic’ or ‘schizoanalytic’ manner, I believe, means attempting as readers to begin to work with ‘duration’ or ‘pure time’, as ‘a single, universal and impersonal Time’ rather than with our commonsensical understanding of a clock-time contaminated by space. (B 80) The concept of ‘becoming’ culminating in ‘becoming imperceptible’ derives from Bergson but it is extensively developed by Deleuze and Guattari. As ‘becoming-woman’ is the starting point for such autopoietic ‘becomings’ and is particularly important in my thesis, I will introduce it at this point.

It is ‘becoming-woman’ on which I will focus in this thesis because it is the medium through which everyone (man or woman) must pass in order to commence and continue with ‘rhizomatic processuality’:

Becoming-woman is... not imitating or assuming the female form, but emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman. (TP 275)

'Becoming-woman' is the first kind of 'becoming' simply because it takes us beyond the Symbolic order and patriarchy: 'all becomings begin with and pass through becoming-woman'. (TP 277) It is the entry into a world of minoritarian marginality and 'multiplicity', of 'collective assemblies of enunciation' which change as they operate. It is the space which 'the multitude' will occupy. According to Deleuze and Guattari, 'Woman' does not have an essence but she 'expresses a territory and processes of deterritorialization', (TP 232-309) and the processuality of 'becomings' are not to be pursued along pre-ordained pathways:

To become is not to progress or regress along a series. Above all, becoming does not occur in the imagination ... Becomings-animal are neither dreams nor phantasies. They are perfectly real. But ... it is clear that the human being does not 'really' become an animal any more than the animal 'really' becomes something else. ... What is real is the becoming itself ... not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes. ... The becoming-animal of the human being is real, even if the animal the human being becomes is not; and the becoming-other of the animal is real, even if that something other it becomes is not. ... a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself ... it has no term, since its term in turn exists only as taken up in another becoming of which it is the subject, and which coexists, forms a block, with the first. This is the ... reality specific to becoming (the Bergsonian idea of a coexistence of very different 'durations,' superior or inferior to 'ours,' all of them in communication). (TP 240)

'Becoming-woman' is symbiotically linked to 'becoming-girl' and it is only in combination that they allow for both the necessary initial 'becoming' and the channel through which all other becomings can take place. Deleuze and Guattari statements that '[i]t is certain that molecular politics proceeds via the girl and the child', and 'becoming itself is a child or a girl', (TP 277) have particular resonance in my thesis. To see 'becoming-girl' in common-sensical terms as obviously preceding 'becoming-woman', directly followed by 'becoming-animal' – as one moves logically from gender difference to biological development then to the broader field of the animal kingdom and beyond – through 'becoming-plant', then 'becoming-atom', until the final stage of 'becoming-imperceptible' is reached would be a complete travesty. It would capture the concept of becoming from 'virtual' time or 'duration' on the 'plane of immanence', and imprison it on the actualised plane of space, or 'plane of organisation', as I will explain below. If this were done then in our 'becomings' we would be simply imitating the girl, woman, or the animal. One is dealing with 'becomings' which lack a subject, becomings without unitary representation. Thus in 'becoming-woman'/ 'becoming-
girl’, it is never as this woman or that one, never as this girl or that one, that becomes, since the ‘woman’ or ‘girl’ in turn exist only in order to be taken up in another ‘becoming’ which only as it ‘becomes-other’ is then nameable (eg. as woman or girl), and which simply coexists, or as Deleuze and Guattari style it ‘forms a block’, with the first. This ‘real’ is the only reality specific to the process of becomings. It is reality as the coexistence of very different ‘durations,’ superior or inferior to ‘ours.’ all of them interacting together. (TP 240)

If one cannot see ‘becoming-girl’ as the natural first step to ‘becoming-woman’, what is one to see it as? What is usually overlooked, in most discussions about or applications of the concept of ‘becoming-woman’, is that Deleuze and Guattari finesse it by placing at the centre of the ‘becoming-woman’ assemblage the further concept of ‘becoming-girl’. This is not a subordinate, or developmental, concept added as an afterthought, nor is it a deliberate Brunoian complicatio introduced in order to create excess, difference, and life – a move for which Deleuze praises Joyce elsewhere [1.4/2.3]. Deleuze and Guattari rather see ‘becoming-girl’ as the ‘real product’ and ‘differential essence’ of ‘becoming-woman’: ‘[i]t is not the girl who becomes a woman; it is becoming-woman that produces the universal girl ... becoming-woman or the production of molecular woman is the girl herself’, (TP 276) and ‘[t]he girl is like the block of becoming that remains contemporaneous to each opposable [actualised] term, man, woman, child, adult’, (TP 277) as the reality of ‘becoming-woman’/ ‘becoming-marginal’. Moreover, ‘[s]exuality, any sexuality, is a becoming-woman, in other words, a girl’. (TP 277) I take the largely neglected but vital concept of ‘becoming-girl’ as crucial to my thesis in later chapters. It is precisely the significance of ‘becoming-girl’ in relation to ‘becoming-woman’ which I will begin to exploit in my readings of Ulysses and bring to a head in the Wake, as I read such ‘becomings’ in terms of the Stephen/Joycean muse or epiphanic ‘bird girl’ of A Portrait.

It is in ‘Memories of a Bergsonian’ (TP 237-239) that Deleuze and Guattari set out what they mean by ‘blocks of becoming’ which is primarily seen in ‘becoming-girl’. Such a block allows, indeed ensures, ‘rhizomatic’ connections with any other becoming in any order, it is the very stuff of ‘becomings’, which can and should follow the first autopoietic step of becoming through ‘becoming-woman’. It need not necessarily do so
of course. As I will show, in Chapter Two, Bloom’s constant ‘molecular’ movement towards ‘becoming-woman’, through his empathetic responses to women’s suffering and our awareness of him as the new ‘womanly man’(U 614) are constantly thwarted at the many moments of his ‘becoming-woman’ – with all of its productive epiphanic potentialities through ‘becoming-girl’ – because of his masochism and the coldness and manipulative calculation which this engenders, as ‘he plots and plans everything out’, (U 910) and in doing so turns away from ‘becoming-girl’. This masochistic denial will also be explored further below in ‘symptomatological’ societal terms.

One sees the above mentioned interaction and ‘cutting out’ in Bergson’s conception of time too.103 The time of the ‘virtual’ is designated as ‘duration’ but the time of the ‘actual’, particularly in modernity, is that of clock-time which in its extraction from ‘duration’ loses much of ‘duration’s’ temporality as the time of life. ‘Duration’ is not simply concerned with the differing lengths of life of a human being, a mayfly, a two-hundred year old carp, or a redwood tree, but with the ‘intensites’ which make up that life. We are all well aware of the excessively quick passage of clock-time when we are absorbed in something or emotionally involved and contrariwise the snail-like progress of clock-time when we are marking the seconds, minutes, days, and weeks before we can end a tedious task. Yet we generally claim to be unaware of any time other than the clock-time of everyday living. However, when sensitive and intuitive people become aware of the impossibility of synchronising clock-time and ‘duration’ it can result in real problems for them. For instance Max Brod, notes of Kafka that ‘something very like a breakdown occurred resulting from [an acute awareness that] his “inner” and “outer” clocks were not in unison’.104

David Wood105 has suggested that the turn to and emphasis on language which has characterised philosophy and, we might add, literary criticism and cultural ‘theory’,

103 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.272.


105 David Wood, The Deconstruction of Time (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities
during so much of the twentieth century will be replaced by a ‘spiralling return’ to a more fundamental issue, in this one: that of ‘time’. If this is the case, he argues, the contribution of Bergson will undoubtedly have to move centre stage. Several philosophers and critics such as John Mullarkey support this contention. Mullarkey focuses on Bergson’s argument that

... most representations of time abolish what is peculiarly temporal about it. Our supposedly common-sense notions of time stem, he claims, from a philosophical heritage with roots going back to Plato. What that heritage has given us is a constant tendency to ignore what is special about time in favour of confusing its properties with those of various other phenomena: space, language and thought.

Thus time is not an innocent concept. Not only is it not immediately clear but our ideas about time are themselves transient. Mullarkey argues that this is precisely what makes Bergson’s approach to time so interesting and problematic: the representation of time has a history to it which is not incidental but necessary. In reflecting this evolving nature of the depiction of time Bergson’s own philosophy undergoes a continual process of recreation. It is transient, evolutionary, and temporal. It is apparent that for Bergson that the passing of time cannot be adequately conceived simply in terms of the straightforward succession of chronological time. This does not mean that Bergson completely abandons clock-time, as a corruption, in favour of duration. He retains it in a state of both constant tension and unequal union with the latter. Deleuze and Guattari build on Bergson’s concept of ‘duration’ as I will show in Chapter Three where I relate this to Joyce’s ‘epiphanic machine’. Moreover, Joyce is himself Bergsonian when he states that ‘we cannot or will not conceive the past in any other than its iron memorial aspect. Yet the past assuredly implies a fluid succession of presents, the development of an entity of which our actual present is a phase only’.


106 Ibid, p.xi.


Deleuze in the *Logic of Sense* constructs an image of thought, based on the thought of the Stoics, which has temporal dimensions. In Stoic philosophy there are two forms of time: Aion and Chronos:

... on one hand, the always limited present, which measures the action of bodies as causes and the state of their mixtures in depth (Chronos); on the other, the essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events, at the surface, as effects (Aion). (L 61)

Thus, Deleuze sets against ‘Chronos’ (L 60-61) – the clock-time of the extended present – which ‘...situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines a subject’, the time of ‘Aion’, (L 77, 132, 162-165) as ‘duration’ which he later sees as:

the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is both going to happen and has just happened. (TP 262)

‘Aion’ releases from the ‘whole’ past the previously unrealized potentialities of the passing presents, potentialities which have never actually existed, or could even have been thought of by us prior to their ‘actualisation’. In doing this it does not rely upon the possibilities and missed opportunities which we can see in our personal and social histories. It goes beyond these to address the impersonal forces from which we are constituted and, by drawing on the unimagined and unimaginable potentialities residing in the ‘whole’ past, enables the completely and perpetually new to emerge as ‘event’, ‘haecceity’, or ‘epiphany’.

Through his encounter with Bergson and Nietzsche, Deleuze develops his understanding further by setting out three orders of time. The first deals with a continuous present represented by clock-time. Here past and future are regarded as extensions of the present with ‘nothing new under the sun’. This gives ‘bare repetition’ or the repetition of the same. Hardt and Negri note of global capitalism that it attempts

to ‘suspend history and thereby fix the existing state of affairs for eternity’. This epitomises ‘bare repetition. I will suggest that many Joycean critics implicitly read the *Wake* in such terms. The second order brings into play the living past as co-existent with the present. Here, the past is seen to press in upon the present with all of its unrealized potentialities. In this second order, the order of ‘duration’, it is the past which really exists, the fleeting present being rapidly and continuously subsumed into it:

The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements which coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass ... The past does not follow the present, but on the contrary, is presupposed by it as the pure condition without which it would not pass. In other words, each present goes back to itself as past. *(B 59)*

The third order of time is revolutionary. It is the time of the future. It creates the completely new by drawing on the hidden, unrealised forces of the ‘whole’ past or ‘duration’ and violently destroying the ‘bare repetitions’ of the extended present. Such ‘creative destruction’ is echoed in Hardt and Negri’s statement that the ‘multitude’ in their ‘new way of living will ... act as “new barbarians”. They will “destroy with an affirmative violence and trace new paths of life through their own material existence”’. *(B 59)* Deleuze specifies Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’, in its perpetual newness and creativity, as emblematic of the third order of time.

Deleuze draws upon Bergson’s concept of ‘duration’ as the time of ‘the virtual’, and the productive power of difference, in order to visualize this. He links it with Hamlet’s ‘time out of joint’ as Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’. By conjoining this third order of the passing of time, with the second order, he conceptualises the ‘eternal return’ as the return of difference, a difference which, as we will see, is quite distinct from diversity as:

we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which

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speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with specters and phantoms before characters – the whole apparatus of repetition as a terrible power. (DR 10)

For Deleuze, the concept of the repetition of difference epitomises a repetition in which change and life are given, through the ‘circle in which Sameness is said only of that which differs’[1.1]. Time is eternal only in its power to always produce the new, over and over again – with no origin and no end. The only constant in time, the only ‘Same’, is the power of not remaining the same. This is what characterises ‘duration’ as ethical as opposed to clock-time. Thus, Deleuze argues that ‘the eternal return’ only concerns the return of life’s active forces whilst ‘reactive force will not return’. (NP 71)

It is likely that Deleuze’s understanding of ‘the eternal return’ allowed Hardt and Negri to posit the ‘clean break’ between the ‘reterritorialising’ aspects of imperial capitalism and its globalised successor without taking properly into account the forces of difference and the new offered by ‘great literature’ and in particular those of the Wake. The ‘eternal return’ for Deleuze is entirely bound up with ‘becoming’ and ‘duration’ beyond either the spirit of revenge or the forces of negative resentment which Nietzsche has highlighted. For Deleuze it embodies the life-giving differences basic to his Bergsonian philosophic vitalism. It evidently contests the basis of globalising capitalism which as Hardt and Negri have to admit seeks to ‘create the very world it inhabits’ by ‘operating on and containing all registers of the social order’, 112 in its ‘reterritorialising’ attempt to reduce life to ‘bare repetition’.

Deleuze links Joyce’s work to the Wakean ‘eternal return’ as ‘a world of differences ... without identity’ as a Joycean ‘chaosmosis’ or chaodyssey (chaos-errance) and nothing other than the power of affirmation of ‘chaos’ itself [1.1, 2.4]

What does Deleuze mean by equating the Nietzschean ‘eternal return’ with Wakean chaos as ‘a single and same affirmation’? [1.1]. As D.H Lawrence in ‘Chaos in Poetry’, relayed by Deleuze and Guattari state:

Lawrence describes what produces poetry: people are constantly putting up an umbrella that shelters them and on the underside of which they draw a firmament and write their conventions and opinions. But poets, artists, make a slit in the

112 Ibid, p. xv.
umbrella, they tear open the firmament itself, to let in a bit of free and windy chaos and frame, in a sudden light, a vision that appears through the rent ... Then come the crowd of imitators who repair the umbrella with something vaguely resembling the vision, and the crowd of commentators who patch over the rent with opinions: communication. Other artists are always needed to make other slits, to carry out necessary and perhaps ever-greater destructions, thereby restoring to their predecessors the incommunicable novelty that we could no longer see. ... The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither does the writer write on a blank page; but the page or canvas is already so covered with preexisting, preestablished clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings us the vision. (WIP 203-204)

All of this is perhaps best summarised in Klee’s famous aphorism ‘not to render the visible, but to render visible’, or as Colin MacCabe puts it: ‘[t]he argument is no longer about whether the novelist represents reality correctly but whether the novelist produces new elements within reality which must then be taken account of’.  

In effectively equating ‘the eternal return’ with the Wake, Deleuze puts it within an entirely positive framework. The Wake offers itself to us as a cosmos but the condition under which it does so is that this cosmos is equivalent to the potentially productive intensities of chaos [1.4]. It is ‘a chaos-become-cosmos’. Deleuze believes that the Viconian process of recirculation, apparently only capable of creating stasis, seems rather to offer the ‘anenergetic’ dynamic which causes this ‘chaosmos to turn’. Joyce’s process of Wakean ‘chaosmosis’, in which chaos gives rise to consistency ‘transforms chaotic variability into chaoid variety’. [8.1] Joyce’s creativity and inventiveness is presented to us through the conscious, minute control of his text which Beckett recorded as ‘a paroxysm of wroughtness’, echoed in Finn Fordham’s observation that the


115 Bogue. Deleuze on Literature, p.4.

116 Ellmann papers at Tulsa University, Number 3, Beckett. [see Finn W. M. Fordham,
Wake gives us writing which is ‘a kind of metalwork filigree’.\textsuperscript{117} Yet, despite this control, I argue, we are always given excess, an ‘eternal return’ of difference not only through the deployment of esoteric and portmanteau words, but also the structural and other lexical and syntactic devices he employs, in order to repeatedly let ‘in a bit of free and windy chaos’ as singular and impersonal intensities which show us their pre-individual existence inside the language which expresses them independent of their actual formation and use.

Unlike Kaufmann’s\textsuperscript{118} liberal-humanist interpretation of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ which can be regarded as nothing more than the ‘bare repetition’ of Bergson, Deleuze makes the most extraordinary and ‘monstrous’ use of this concept as the third order of time, without deviating from anything which Nietzsche has written. He reads ‘the eternal return’, and hence the Wake, as constituting the highest possible thought of difference and repetition, an ethical thought both beyond the moral law of good and evil and even beyond the natural laws which govern only the surface of the world. Deleuze reads it through a Bergsonian lens as giving us the perpetually new through difference. In linking the Wake so closely to his reading of the Nietzschean ‘eternal return’, Deleuze clearly thinks that it holds enormous productive potential and it has a very special place in his literary canon.

Thus, Joyce’s monstrous use of Vico is seen by Deleuze as taking the Viconian constraining cycles which seem to offer only ‘bare repetition’, and showing that they become in Joyce’s hands the Nietzschean ‘eternal return’ of true difference: the ‘seim anew’, (FW 215.23) as he locates Viconian ‘returns’ in ‘duration’. In arguing for the ‘ungrounded chaos’[1.2] of Viconian repetitions in the Wake, Deleuze’s view contrasts


with the stasis which these repetitions have often previously been taken to demonstrate by a long line of Joycean scholars, spanning several generations, including such weighty contributors as Atherton, Hart, Tindall, Norris, and McCarthy.

Thus, Atherton saw the entire structure of *Finnegans Wake* as dependent on a Viconian cyclic view of history with 'the incidents described ... happening over and over again', with the lives of gentile men merely being reflections of the patterns set down by the gods and heroes of Vico's first two cycles, in a depressing repetition of the same.119 Later scholars followed his lead and McCarthy took Atherton's assertion even further, stating that whilst Viconian cycles, 'are not simply circular but involve an upward movement towards an apocalypse of fulfillment of purpose [in the *ricorso*] Joyce denies his readers even this'.120 I believe that Deleuze's Bergsonian conceptualisation of the Nietzschean 'eternal return', offers a different model which allows us to read the Viconian cycles employed in the *Wake*, not as the deadening return of the unchanging 'bare repetitions' specifically attributed to them by McCarthy, and in more general terms by Kaufmann, but as the joyful opening up into life itself through the differences of the 'third order' of time.

Consequently, for Deleuze, as for Bergson, 'common-sense reality', on which many Joycean critics appear to rely, gives us an incomplete and biased version of reality. Even post-structuralist Joycean critiques such as that of Christine van Boheemen-Saaf,121 seem to be 'based on the concepts of loss, lack and lapsus', as


Marie-Dominique Garnier puts it.\textsuperscript{122} Reality, for Bergson as for Deleuze, must encompass both the ‘actual’, as the object or thing itself, and the ‘virtual’ as the forces and intensities which make it up and consist in its processual ‘becomings’, as it changes and differs from its former self. One may care to see this processuality of difference in the \textit{Wake} too where in the opening word we get the ‘riverrun’ rather than the static concept of ‘river’. For as Heraclitus notes, and Joyce was well aware, ‘it is not possible to step into the same river twice’.\textsuperscript{123}

From the above one can see why the philosophic concept, with all of its life-giving potential, as Deleuze and Guattari define it, resides in the Bergsonian ‘virtual’ rather than the ‘actual’ of everyday life, although it comes into being or is created as a result of the problems posed in the latter. Thus, the Deleuzian concept is drawn from, or is created by Deleuze from ‘virtual’ intensities. The invention of such a concept draws on these forces and materialises or ‘speaks’ as a unique ‘event’. (\textit{WIP} 21)

Moreover, it is clear that their concentration on the forces of the Bergsonian ‘virtual’, rather than the ‘actual’, underpins Deleuze and Guattari’s later statement that in their work ‘[a]ll we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machinic assemblages and their various types’, (\textit{TP} 4) characterised by difference. This indicates their focus on the material life-giving forces coalescing into the forms which make up our world, as much as on the ‘actual’ forms in the world itself. Such ‘forces’ and ‘intensities’ cannot be readily isolated and classified by the logic of exclusive disjunction, or indeed easily pinpointed:

The concept of a bird is found not in its genus or species but in the composition of its postures, colors, and songs: something indiscernible ... A concept is a heterogenesis ... an ordering of its components by zones of neighborhood. ... an intension present in all the features that make it up. (\textit{WIP} 20)


The Deleuzian concept evidently derives from Bergsonian vitalism.

Like their equivalent literary ‘affects’, Deleuzian concepts can allow us to recreate our very being as their newness enables us, as Louis Althusser puts it, to become aware of and contest ourselves constructed as ‘always already subjects ... constantly practic[ing] the rituals of ideological recognition’ and completely in tune with the exigencies of the ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’. These ‘ISAs’ trick us into believing that ‘we are concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects’. Constructing concepts for Deleuze and Guattari means bringing into existence an ethical project which can result in a changed outlook and community, as for them ‘[t]he world awaits its inhabitants, who are lost in neurosis’. (C2 205) Hardt and Negri may well argue that ISAs are on the wane and that the ‘multitude’ has been or is being constituted in cyberspace, but I would agree with Deleuze that ‘the world still awaits its inhabitants’. As John Kraniavskas points out, ‘the multitude is the body without organs of politics’. Its existence is still largely located in ‘virtuality’ on the ‘plane of immanence’, not on the ‘plane of organisation’ and ‘actuality’.

Bergson’s philosophy has contributed massively to Deleuzian philosophy and ‘rhizomatics’ or ‘schizoanalysis’ through its underpinning of the concept, its ontological ‘becomings’ rather than ‘being’, its emphasis on the ‘virtual’, and above all its ‘vitalism’ and ethical emphasis on life. However, although Deleuzian concepts can create our very being this cannot be done without the parallel ‘affects’ generated through the arts and particularly great literature, as I have stressed above with regard to Hardt and Negri’s theorising.

Despite his refusal to distinguish between philosophers and writers, in fact Deleuze always recognizes some difference between the functions of literary and philosophical texts. The former are principally concerned with the creation of ‘affect’ and the latter with the invention of new concepts. ‘Affect’ does not equate directly to emotion or

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124 Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, p.55.

125 Kraniavskas, ‘Empire, or Multitude. Transnational Negri’, p.36.
feeling as we again have the Bergsonian process and principle of selection coming into play. 'Affect' can be seen as 'virtual' emotion or the totality of emotional movement potentially available within the body, and the 'actual' feelings, 'affections', or emotions experienced as a selection and assimilation of some of these into consciousness. Nevertheless, great literature's creation of 'affect', if it functions for the reader, can and should bypass or disrupt the selective censors of everyday commonsense living and can release or create previously unrealised or unacknowledged emotions. In addition to literature, painting, music, and the arts in general, can ensure 'affects' as the 'non-human becomings of man'. Achieving such 'affects' are 'the task of all art ... which raise[s] them to the height of the earth's song and the cry of humanity: that which constitutes tone, health, becoming'. (WIP 170) 'Affects' are life-enhancing and consequently ethical. Deleuze sees new 'affect' and the creation of new concepts as parallel developments within literature and philosophy rather than '... a matter of one monitoring or reflecting the other'. (N 125) They come together at the point where life, literature, and the arts throw up new problems for philosophy. For Deleuze the new 'affects' which literature creates pose problems for philosophy which it needs to resolve by creating new concepts. Contrariwise, the new concepts which Bergson's philosophy introduced, for example, were taken up by Proust in his In Search of Lost Time.
Deleuze's Nietzsche

Nietzschean thought and particularly his concept of the 'eternal return', reworked through Deleuze’s Bergsonism, has already been shown to be of great significance in the latter’s philosophy. Nietzsche’s thinking is also adopted and adapted by Deleuze and Guattari to considerable effect in their understanding of ‘symptomatology’. Deleuze can be seen as one of Nietzsche’s ‘new philosophers’, one of those who ‘have found their task ... in being the bad conscience of their age’ 126 by both alerting us to the problems which afflict us and at least implicitly pointing to the way in which these might be overcome by offering us a new art of living. I believe that Joyce’s work can be viewed in the same light.

Thus, Deleuze refers to Nietzsche’s statement which designates ‘the philosopher as a physician of culture’, 127 and broadens this to include writers and artists ‘[a]s Nietzsche said, artists and philosophers are civilisation’s doctors’, (N 143) and ‘[p]erhaps one day we will know that there wasn’t any art but only medicine’. (WIP 173) As such, the diagnosis of the symptoms should allow these ‘doctors’, if not to offer a ‘cure’, at least to indicate where ‘health’ might lie, and give us the opportunity to obtain it. Consequently, Deleuze defines both the philosopher and the writer as ‘the physician of himself and the world’. (ECC3) He shows how Nietzsche diagnoses ‘the disease’ of nihilism by isolating its symptoms of ‘ressentiment’, (NP 111-121) stemming from the bad conscience bequeathed by Christianity, (NP 131-132) through the widespread acceptance of its impossible ascetic ideal, (NP 143-144) its consequent moral strictures, and an afterlife created to enforce them.


Nietzsche traces nihilism's etiology to a certain relation of active and reactive forces and in doing so invents the genealogical method as a critique of the history of moral values argued for by traditional historians. He rejects their understanding of morality as an innate human capacity by pointing out its historical emergence through the material forces which produce moral concepts. He argues that conscience, shame, and guilt are produced by dominant historical forces. I will read HCE's shame and guilt in the *Wake*, in this light. In this respect, Nietzsche focuses on Christianity's asceticism and its sacrificial rhetoric with its life-denying aspect and develops an immoral or 'non-moral' thought to replace it. His genealogical perspective creates a version of the past which privileges the most vital and powerful life enhancing forces available to us in the present.

Thus, Nietzsche distinguishes between 'passive nihilism', 'a paralysis of the will' engendered by Christianity – depicted so effectively by Joyce in *Dubliners* – and 'active nihilism', which 'does not believe but does not thereby lose itself... [as it] gives the spirit a dangerous freedom'. Nietzsche then gives us the diagnosis of 'passive nihilism' as self-defeating together with a means of treatment through 'active nihilism' leading to the 'transvaluation of all values' and creative possibility in which 'active joy is the supreme ethical test'. (S 29) Joyce too, I argue, moves from depicting 'passive nihilism' in *Dubliners* to advocating 'active nihilism'. According to Joseph Valente, in *Ulysses*:

> Joyce opposes to the negative skepticism of mockery the positive doubt of imaginative possibility. Both [Joyce and Nietzsche] sought to redeem the world of becoming and the creative activity it demands from the moribund reification of

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dogmatic thought – philosophical, religious, and political – and the meager, makebelieve experience it fosters. They wanted to discredit static, universal forms and to reanimate the play of appearances of style ... to affirm the life-process itself.\textsuperscript{132}

In Deleuzian terms Joyce was well aware that ‘[t]he world is the set of symptoms whose illness merges with man’, and his works ‘then appear as an enterprise of health’, (ECC 3) and he implicitly agrees with Deleuze’s ethico-political point of view. (ECC 4)

Jung, a deeply religious man, was well aware of the underpinning religiosity of both his analytic psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis, as well as the Protestant rationale of science in its entirety, the Enlightenment project, and the humanism which it spawned. He states that:

We always think that Christianity consists in a particular confession of faith, and in belonging to a Church. No, Christianity is our world. Everything we think is the fruit of ... the Christian Middle Ages. Our whole science, everything that passes through our head, has inevitably gone through this history. It lives in us and has left its stamp upon us ... The whole character of our mentality, the way we look at things, is also the result of the Christian Middle Ages; whether we know it or not ... The age of rational enlightenment has eradicated nothing. Even our method of rational enlightenment is Christian. The Christian \textit{Weltanschauung} ... does not allow of any further rationalisation; it is something that has happened, that is present. We are inevitably stamped as Christians.\textsuperscript{133}

Although Jung’s views are limited by their Eurocentricity they can nevertheless be easily extended to large parts of the global scenario where monotheistic religions hold sway. Whatever criticisms both Joyce and Deleuze have of Jung, he is surely right on the vital issue of the continuing moralistic influence of monotheism on a diversity of world cultures. However, Hardt and Negri in their discussion of current Islamic and Christian fundamentalisms\textsuperscript{134} see their resistance to the forces of globalisation as all important and designate them approvingly as postmodern projects. They fail to see how


\textsuperscript{134} Hardt and Negri. \textit{Empire}. pp. 145-150.
they privilege morality over ethics. Nietzsche, in addressing the judgemental morality of Christianity, and seeing it as extending to liberal humanism under capitalism, puts it more succinctly: '[t]hey have got rid of the Christian God, and now feel obliged to cling all the more to Christian morality'. 135 He argues that we need to recognise and turn away from the moral and societal 'illness' engendered by Christianity which Jung diagnoses although he does not see Christianity in the same negative terms as Nietzsche.

Even though Victorian patriarchal morality stemming from the masculine God of Judaeo-Christianity may be perceived to be on the wane as the influence of institutional religion continues to decline and women, through liberal feminism, continue to gain more equal economic rights, this does not alter the underpinning moralistic 'oedipalised' scenario. It fails to take into account that we are all, men and women alike, constructed within the capitalist hegemony which does not differ in fundamentals from Joyce’s time as Jung’s diagnosis shows. Whether we are governed and constituted by the old religion – as fully fifty per cent of the USA’s citizenry apparently still believe – or by the forces of secular liberal humanism and capitalist individualism, they cannot finally be distinguished from each other, a fact which the Christian Right’s espousal of market economics in the USA nicely illustrates. We not only partake in but consist of capitalism’s intensities engendered by Christianity. Nevertheless, the development of an all encompassing globalised capitalism, through its very fluidity, is paradoxically generating the possibility of resistance, as Hardt and Negri appreciate, through ‘the lived experience of the global multitude’. 136 Interestingly they liken potential revolutionaries of today to Christians of the later Roman Empire and their inexorable hollowing out of the terrestrial order of things which resulted in a new, rejuvenating era of nomadic barbarian migrations and invasions.

Joyce, I argue, goes beyond Jung’s ‘symptomatology’ to offer us that ethical ‘health’ which Nietzsche and Deleuze spoke of: ‘[h]ealth as literature, as writing,


136 Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, pp. 210-211.
[which] consists in inventing a people who are missing. It is the task of the fabulating function to invent a people', (ECC 4) or as Joyce put it through Stephen: ‘to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race’, which, given the heterogeneity of the Irish which Joyce celebrates in the *Wake*, extends the concept of ‘race’ to the ‘human race’ as a whole. Such ethical statements bringing into play literature and authorship could take further, I believe, Hardt and Negri’s understanding of the way in which the Deleuzoguattarian ‘multitude’ might be constructed.

Several critics have noted Joyce’s early interest in Nietzsche but then suggested that this waned in his later works.137 Conversely, I argue that it will become apparent in this thesis that Joyce, in his mature use of Nietzsche in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, was also anticipating Deleuze in the latter’s reworking of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ and his emphasis on ‘symptomatology’, processuality, style, affirmation and, like Bergson too, ‘becomings’ and the life-process itself in opposition to static or ‘molarised’ thought and behaviour.

Deleuze’s Spinoza

Another major source for Deleuze’s ‘symptomatology’, and my reading of Joyce’s ethics, is the philosophy of Spinoza. Spinoza attempts to find out how we can relate ourselves to a God whom he sees as encompassing the entirety of being. His monism then takes God to be a singular ‘substance’ which is both entirely self-generated and ‘absolutely infinite’. Such a ‘substance’ has unlimited attributes ‘each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence’. God’s ‘divine nature’ both determines and encompasses everything which exists. Spinoza’s argument depends on the proposition that ‘the human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God’. This then allows ‘certain and determinate’ or finite ‘modes’ or ‘modes of the attributes of God’ to be established, since it is ‘the modes of thinking which make up the “essence of man” and constitute “the being of the human mind”’.138 Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘plane of immanence’ derives from Spinoza’s ‘substance’ but goes beyond it, ‘providing a ground from which idols have been cleared’ (WIP 43).

Joyce in his references to Spinoza always appears to place him in humorous contexts such as in Ulysses where Molly refers to Bloom’s talk ‘about Spinoza ... I smiled the best I could all in a swamp leaning forward as if I was interested’. (U 914) This contrasts with Bloom’s earlier reference to the same event when he ‘[t]old her what Spinoza says in that book of poor papa’s. Hypnotised, listening’. (U 367) In the Wake Spinoza appears as a medical problem in ‘chronic spinosis’, (FW 150.7-8) and is aligned with the brothers Grimm as a spinner of fairy tales for bed-time in ‘spinooze’, (FW 414.7-16) and finally as a vegetable or even an ass ‘same hue of boiled spinasses’. (FW 611.36)

Deleuze, seemingly contrariwise, reserves his highest admiration for Spinoza’s Ethics. (WIP 59-60) However, Joyce, in implicitly contrasting the body (which in a Deleuzian reading must also be extended to the body politic and the textual body) and bodily activities through medical problems, bodies in bed, and Molly’s menstruation

with Bloom's over-intellectualisation of Spinoza, indicates that he is closer to Spinoza's, and Deleuze's thought, than is Bloom. Spinoza's 'parallelism' is founded on the argument that mind and body cannot be separated. They constantly interact and the mind certainly does not govern the body nor is it distinct from this, (S 18) as Joyce's depiction of Bloom himself clearly indicates.

Deleuze holds that the most original contribution of his second doctoral thesis (EP) is its analysis of the composition of finite 'modes' in Spinoza. His modal analysis concludes that Spinoza is offering us both a clinical diagnosis of the passive state of human bondage as well as a treatment for this passivity, through thought 'becoming-active', in pursuit of an 'ethical task'. This revolutionary move of Spinoza shifts the traditional emphasis in philosophy from its age-old concern with Aristotelian morality, and its concentration on the realisation of man's supposed 'essence' as a rational animal, to an ethics whereby a person is defined not by what they are or should be in principle (their essence), but by what they can do, what they are capable of. (S 23) This is also a political question as philosophy now needs to establish what conditions allow a person's and a community's capacities to be best effectuated. I suggest that Joyce also made the same journey from the Aristotelian/ Thomist judgemental morality – particularly shown through Stephen in Chapter Three, Section Two of A Portrait in the Retreat sermons, if we can equate Joyce's and Stephen's experience of a Jesuit education – to an emphasis on life and ethics through Wakean 'affects'.

Despite Joyce's seeming trivialisation of Spinoza this central concern of Deleuze's understanding of him shows, I believe, that they are at one in this, witness the 'affect' of Joyce's bringing into the reader's consciousness the limitations placed on the lives of his characters in Dubliners, through the strictures imposed by the colonial socius. Such strictures result in personality deformations and indicate the need for remedial action as already noted. One can see clearly how this ontological question forms the basis for the ethico-political philosophy developed by Deleuze with Guattari in their later collaboration, as it does I believe that of Joyce. Thus, as Foucault notes of Deleuze and Guattari:

... the major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism ... And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini – which was able to mobilize and use
the desire of the masses so effectively – but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us. I would say that Anti-Oedipus ... is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time.\textsuperscript{139}

I believe that this Spinozist ‘anti-fascist’ ethico-political outlook also applies to Joyce’s work as a whole. To take only two small examples, when the Citizen in the ‘Cyclops’ episode of Ulysses is advocating a return to the greatness of yesteryear he recalls a glowing Irish past in terms of commerce, trade, expertise and the domination of the Irish over the other nations (U 423-425). This precisely echoes the way in which commercial colonial exploitation had elevated British power over Ireland and reduced it to such dire straits. His bombastic talk is offered as an over-compensation for such deprivation but it paradoxically insists on the maintenance of the very system which caused it. His thought is fascistic and ‘reterritorialising’ and Joyce expects us to ‘symptomatically’ grasp this through his ironic ‘affects’.

Earlier, in ‘Ivyday in the Committee Room’, Henchy argues in a muddle-headed way that Ireland needs to obtain British capital and the increased commodification which it offers in order to obtain release from the very colonial exploitation which he is turning to. Rather than challenge this argument and set against it the independence which Parnell held out for – and whose views they are supposedly gathered together to propagate – Crofton agrees with Henchy. This blatant sell-out to their exploiters is not picked up by the rest of the party workers whose only concern is to consume their Guinness and escape into semi-drunk len oblivion rather than address their real problems. Lyons even suggests in this very gathering that Parnell was not ‘a fit man to lead us’ and unlike Dante in A Portrait, is not even challenged. Yet, King Edward the Seventh, with all of his known adulteries is to be accepted as ‘just an ordinary knockabout like you and me ... a good sportsman’. All of this is ironically advocated at the very heart of the Nationalist camp as they accept the ‘fascism’ of the oppressor, and capitalism’s

\textsuperscript{139} Michel Foucault, ‘Preface’. in Deleuze and Guattari. Anti-Oedipus. p.xiii.
oedipal 'reterritorialisations', rather than match it with any new thought of what they might achieve.

Thus, Joyce brings his ethico-political work to a head in the *Wake* – for instance he explicitly uses Bergson against the fascistic and capitalistic 'dime-cash' (*FW* 149.17) philosophy of Wyndham Lewis. Whereas in *Dubliners* and *Ulysses* the modern is equated with images of the city and the metropolis and at least implicitly all of the unrealised potentialities of capitalism, in the *Wake* Joyce ‘symptomatologically’ engages with those repressive energies of capitalism and the State/Church, which falsely equate such plenitude with happiness, by depicting, exaggerating and undermining the over-stimulation it engenders. Even more so than *Ulysses* as cosmopolis, a book which contains everything and undermines the premises and promises of capitalist modernity, the *Wake* goes straight to the heart of both colonial and post-colonial mastery and extends in its ‘symptomatological’ analysis to the global capitalism which has now overtaken us. Not only does it diagnose and expose the incestuous desiring forces entrapped in the nuclear family of modernity with all of its societal consequences, but it is written in and yet against the hegemonic English language. Deleuze and Guattari point out that it demolishes this, in terms of both lexicality and meaning, through its exotic and portmanteau words. It does this not by denying meaning but by opening up meaning to a vast range of ‘multiplicities’ unconstrained by any control, other than Joyce’s implicit anti-hegemonic direction.

However, Deleuze and Guattari fail to point out that such ‘multiplicities’ do not spring solely from portmanteau and esoteric words, but also from an extended lexis of puns, anagrams such as Chapelizod, lipograms like ‘Lps’, the frequent transposition of letters or sounds in words as metathesis, and single, double and triple acrostics, and things do not even stop there. Wakean lexis is coupled with an aberrant syntax only springing in part from the employment of such words. Residual syntactical shapes themselves are employed by Joyce in order to apparently make for intelligibility whilst creating ambiguity and violating grammatical structures. Moreover, if one looks at the larger issue of the *Wake*’s structure and the letter within it, which Deleuze and Guattari read as a ‘microcosm’ of the book, one needs to ask what is its precise relationship to the *Wake* as a whole? Is it synecdochic, paradigmatic, or representative? Nothing is
certain. In employing such a vast range of 'multiplicities' the *Wake* not only denies fascism's unitary understanding but renounces any such element in the ethico-political approach it offers. In so doing it joyfully destroys the authority and hegemony of the Symbolic order without taking on its systemic fascistic underpinnings, and as such is truly creative and 'deterritorialising'.

Here, I need to stress that as with Joyce, Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, their 'only overtly political texts',¹⁴⁰ are more concerned about ethical implications than in offering us a political programme with its inevitable fascistic implications. (*AO* 380) For them, ethics is solely concerned with the production of new creative lines of life. Paradoxically, perhaps, the species formation which this inevitably involves results in the loss of much of that vital essence which is life itself. The only political programme which they might offer in these circumstances is one which constantly allows for new life to emerge, and enhances it in all of its potentiality, rather than focusing solely on humanity. To set out a political agenda from such a standpoint is clearly very difficult if not impossible. If one privileges the 'gene pool' in its entirety over the human in order to give presently 'actualised' life forms, in all of their variety, maximum opportunities to reproduce and further entrench themselves, one needs to ask if this would hinder the emergence of new life forms and what, in any case, this would mean in terms of practical politics and the human. Would this entail ensuring that the living viruses known to be a direct threat to humanity – such as the expected mutation of the 'chicken flu' virus with a human influenza virus liable to lead to a global 'pandemic' – be allowed to do so rather than attempting to prevent this from happening or wiping it out if it did?

Yet, human life itself is implicitly privileged in Deleuze's thought through its lone ability to think creatively and develop new concepts, and this may seem to answer the question. Nevertheless, the dilemma remains, and Deleuze and Guattari writing together never directly address the problem, even though when writing later Guattari and Negri...
evidently think primarily in terms of the human.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, I believe that Hardt and Negri’s attempt in \textit{Empire} to develop the political thought derived from \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} cannot be legitimately criticised on these grounds, as Slavoj \v{Z}i\v{z}ek, despite his initial praise of their work, finally attempts to do by stating that ‘[i]n their socio-economic analysis there is simply a lack of concrete, precise insight which is concealed in the Deleuzean jargon of ‘multiplicity’, ‘deterritorialization’, etc.\textsuperscript{142}

Deleuze and Guattari’s ethico-political conception stems as much from Spinoza and Nietzsche as it does from Bergsonian vitalism. The productivity involved here results not in a new subject but rather in a subject as a ‘work of art’. (\textit{N} 92) What is produced through such an art of living is an ‘individuation’ involving and evolving through weak and strong intensities and active and passive ‘affects’ enabled by a field of physical forces. \v{Z}i\v{z}ek’s need for a political agenda based on ‘concrete, precise insight’ – presumably with its concrete, precise subjects – cannot be accommodated here without negating the very idea of the change, difference and ultimate impossibility of forecasting the future and the unknown forms, including that of a different humanity, which new life forms will take according to Deleuze and Guattari.

Thus, for them the human ‘subject’ as it now appears to us may well be completely stripped of both interiority and identity and transformed into ‘an event of individuation’. Such a self would only exist as a ‘mode of intensity’, (\textit{N} 98-99) never as a personal subject. (\textit{AO} 18) The danger involved in such a process when encountered in current ‘actualised’ existence lived within our common-sense capitalist world, is that of succumbing and becoming a burned out case, ‘a schizophrenic’, rather than making use of ‘the schizophrenic process’ by extracting some surplus value from its productivity and fecundity, so as to both temporarily ‘become imperceptible’ oneself, and pass something on to the collectivity.


\textsuperscript{142} \v{Z}i\v{z}ek, ‘Empire’, in \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung}. 
Hardt and Negri note that ‘[h]ere is where the primary site of struggle seems to emerge, on the terrain of the production and regulation of subjectivity’,\textsuperscript{143} when ‘[t]he multitude has internalized the lack of place and fixed time ... The coming imperial universe, blind to meaning, is filled by the multifarious totality of the production of [a new] subjectivity’.\textsuperscript{144} Nevertheless, whereas Žižek argues that Hardt and Negri are too Deleuzian in taking this approach, I believe that in concentrating solely on the human rather than prioritising ‘life’ in both its existing and, more importantly potential non-human and post-human forms, they may not be Deleuzian enough. It is essential to stress the importance of all life as the ethical basis of Deleuze and Guattari’s ethico-political approach, and to realise this by coming to politics via literature and the arts if one is to more closely align one’s thought with theirs. Deleuze states explicitly for the author that ‘[y]ou write [ethically] with a view to an unborn people that doesn’t yet have a language’, (N 143) nor, one might add, a recognizably human form or subjectivity. By repeatedly linking the *Wake* to the concept of ‘chaos’ and ‘the eternal return’ as Joyce’s ‘chaosmosis’ [1.1, 2.4, 8.1], and as such ‘a single and same affirmation’, Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari indicate the significant position which it occupies for a radical ethics through a re-enchantment of an aesthetic which could allow the creation of a new sense of being and harmony in the world.\textsuperscript{145}

Human harmony is always associated with ‘the multitude’ and communal experience, by Deleuze and Guattari. This concept consequently owes a great deal to Spinoza’s ‘substance’, for it is in Spinoza’s *Political Treatise* that the multitude becomes ‘a productive essence’.\textsuperscript{146} Thus, rather than the Marxist proletariat contesting the future it is: ‘the multitude of poor people, [who] have eaten up and digested the multitude of proletarians [who do so].’\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{143} Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 321.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid, p. 380.

\textsuperscript{145} Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, pps. 20, 99-118.

Joyce and the ethico-politics of community

Like that of Nietzsche, Joyce’s aesthetic and ethical stance may not always seem to accord with this communal view especially if we attribute some well known statements made by Stephen Dedalus to the young Joyce as his straightforward fictional alter ego: ‘The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails’ (P.215), and couple this with other statements by Joyce such as:

No man, said the Nolan, can be a lover of the true or the good unless he abhors the multitude; and the artist, though he may employ the crowd, is very careful to isolate himself... If the artist courts the favour of the multitude he cannot escape the contagion of its fetishism [sic] and deliberate self-deception, and if he joins in a popular movement he does so at his own risk. (CW 69, 71)

In particular, when we recall Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘political’ texts, (AO, TP) specifically aimed at both political fascism and the fascism in all of our heads, Joyce’s rebuttal of his brother Stanislaus’s concerns about the growth of fascism in Italy: ‘Don’t talk to me about politics; I am only interested in style’, 148 hardly seems to accord with their views. Yet, Joyce’s views on politics, as on other matters, mutated over time, and since the 1980s there have been many major studies 149 which clearly belie Joyce’s statement to his brother about his lack of interest in, or his turning away from, politics. 150 This leads Vincent Cheng to argue that the excessive interest which many Joycean critics have shown in his stylistic experiments not only ignores his ‘manifestly political content and ideological discourse’, but leads to an appropriation and recuperation of the ‘bitter resentment against the imperiums of State, Church, and

147 Hardt and Negri, Empire. p.158.


149 These include: Dominic Manganiello, Joyce’s Politics (London: Routledge, 1980); Trevor L. Williams. Reading Joyce Politically (Gainsville: University Press of Florida); and Cheryl Herr. Joyce’s Anatomy of Culture (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); as well as numerous book chapters, articles and lectures given by these and many other authors.

Academy’ of an Irish-Catholic colonial writer by these forces. 151 This denigration of Joyce’s stylistic experiments is, I fear, rather like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. From a Deleuzian angle it is from the creative interaction between Joyce’s stylistic experiments and his ‘political content and ideological discourse’ that his ethico-political outlook springs. Such writerly productivity takes place in ‘the middle’ for Deleuze. This is a concept which will be further explained below.

I agree with Seamus Deane that Joyce’s works rather than maintaining a division between the artist and the collectivity of which he is an inevitable part, aim to both raise and ethically explore ‘the question of how the individual subject can be envisaged in relation to its community, its past history, and a possible future’. 152 This is especially so, of course, if one reads this in terms of the Deleuzian subject as a coalescence of shifting forces, intensities, and ‘becomings’ rather than as ‘actualised’ unified subjects. Therefore, although Joyce was evidently ‘a product of colonial Ireland … and wrote out of that formation’, 153 I must disagree with Cheng 154 insofar as he implies that Joyce’s ethico-political stance can and should be limited to such a reading and be effectively divorced from his aesthetics and particularly his latter day style, or ‘nonstyle’ as Deleuze puts it [3.2], in the Wake.

Joyce, I believe, through the book’s ‘rhizomatic’ style ultimately like Faulkner ‘becomes black’ (TP 292) or ‘minoritarian’. This takes his work well beyond his native Ireland and its people – whilst using their plight as illustrative – to all ‘minoritarian’


154 Cheng, Joyce, Race, and Empire, p. 2.
communities who live outside the hegemonic symbolic order and, as ‘subalterns’, lack a voice. In this connection, Hardt and Negri note that ‘[n]o one is powerless; even the old, the sick and the unemployed are engaged in the “immaterial labour” that produces “total social capital”. In their statements on this ‘multitude’ they conclude that ‘[t]he poor itself is power. There is World Poverty, but there is above all World Possibility, and only the poor is capable of this’. Joyce, I argue, provides the subalterns with a necessary voice.

Vincent Cheng is not wrong of course and his insights are illuminating, but if we take a Deleuzian perspective they are somewhat limiting. Nevertheless he is certainly not alone in taking this stance and Boheem-Saaf in Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma of History, offers us a not dissimilar view as she bases Joyce’s works and particularly the Wake in his and the community’s loss of the Irish language. To limit Joyce to Irishness, Irish history and language, and the viewpoints of the petite bourgeoisie and working class of Dublin at the turn of the century is, I believe, to do him a great disservice. This is a fundamental issue which I will continue to explore below.

According to Deleuze although this ethical task which I attribute to Joyce is translatable into everyday terms by the sad or joyful perceptions of life which we hold, these must not be seen as offering new polar oppositions. Thus, Joyce like Deleuze, I argue, is always concerned to work from ‘the middle’, or ‘the fold’, (FLB) the connecting ‘ands’ rather than linguistic operations of identity: ‘thinking with AND instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking for IS’. Significantly, Rose and O’Hanlon note that Joyce ‘never uses the format “either/ or” but always the “and”’, a fact which

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156 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p. 230.

157 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p.57.

158 Danis Rose, and John O’Hanlon. Understanding ‘Finnegans Wake’: A Guide to the
I believe both Cheng and Boheemen-Saaf, amongst other Joycean critics, might well note. Deleuze holds that our sad perceptions diminish not only our individual power, but the power of all life because we are bound up with life in all of its forms. Sad perceptions isolate, joyful ones allow us to conjoin with others. This is both an ethical and a political stance.

Deleuze’s ethical approach means seeing evil not as located within irredeemable individuals, but rather recognising that the desires and investments which turn life against itself in such people or groups are also present in ourselves and as such must be addressed by us. In no sense does this allow us to condone the forces designated as evil, but it does show us that we too are not exempt from such forces. Thus, the people categorized as evil are to be seen as composed of images and investments which are never simply theirs and never entirely other than ourselves. We are always in ‘the middle’. Each of us is made up of impersonal forces through which our individual characters are effected, and ‘symptomatology’ is the ethical rather than moral diagnosis of such a collection of investments.

Throughout Joyce’s work it is evident that he makes no opposition, except perhaps ironically between ‘joy’ and ‘sadness’ which always modulate in his oeuvre. Although ultimately his works offer us a joyful affirmation of life. It is this which makes him a great author in Deleuze’s eyes, and also allows him to be read ‘symptomatologically’ and productively in ethico-political terms. It will be implicit in much of what I argue that, far from moralising, Joyce like Deleuze indicates the inhuman powers which produce sadness and sets against these the forces of life-enhancing humour by ‘offering a chance for the reader to laugh too – at notions of readers, authors, texts, and interpretations’, 159 as well as the inhuman powers which constitute them and so much of modern life.

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159 Conley, ‘“Oh me none onsens!”’. p.246.
If one takes a single example from the *Wake* to illustrate this, the conflict between the brothers Shaun and Shem which has simmered throughout the first five chapters comes to a boil in Chapter 1.6. The Shem-Shaun bi-polarity is built into the narrative structure of the chapter as this takes the form of a quiz contest in which Shem asks all but one of the questions and Shaun gives most of the answers. There are twelve questions in all and the chapter ends with the shortest question and answer: ‘12. *Sacer esto? / Answer: Semus sumus!*’ (*FW* 168.13-14). The Latin *sacer* means both ‘sacred’ and ‘accursed’, and Shaun’s question seems to ask whether Shem will be scapegoated. The answer which Joyce gives, here as elsewhere, is that Shem is not alone as both brothers share in the same nature, and by implication each and everyone is Shem. This becomes evident during Chapter 1.7, where Shaun repeatedly tries to increase the distance between himself and his twin, and Shem answers him by trying to embrace his brother in order to assuage his fears and effect a union between them. I argue, in Chapters Four and Five that this conflict can only be ended through the intensities of ‘Issyness’ acting in their relationship through the ‘middle’.

I have previously looked at ‘becomings’ in general and specifically the initiating ‘becomings’ of ‘becoming-woman’ symbiotically linked to ‘becoming-girl’. I would now like to briefly explore the ultimate state of ‘becoming’ which all other ‘becomings’ move towards. In reading great works like Joyce’s *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* we may ‘become-imperceptible’ – Deleuze’s ultimate aim for us as individuals and as a people (*TP* 279) – not by making moral judgements, but by entering into their experiences and becoming more aware of the forces of life and death from which such judgements of good and evil are derived. However, we can never remain ‘imperceptible’ as such. It is not something that can be achieved once and for all. It is a ‘becoming’, not a being. It is the challenge of freedom and ethics: of opening ourselves to the life that passes through us, rather than objectifying that life in advance through a moral system of good and evil.

We might compare this to Stephen Dedalus’s aesthetic theory in *A Portrait*, which to some extent may reflect the earlier Joyce’s views. Stephen opines that art can be divided into three forms: the lyrical, the epical, and the dramatic. The lyrical form is the direct expression of emotion. In the epical form the artist allows his personality to pass
into the narration itself. However, in the dramatic form vitality belongs to the characters themselves and by entering into their experiences the artist's creative involvement becomes completely impersonal, as indeed should that of the reader. The Joycean/Dedalian artist, somewhat like God himself, becomes detached from his creation 'paring his fingernails', yet as material being, from a Deleuzian perspective, the artist unlike a transcendent God, remains immanent within his work as he 'becomes imperceptible'. The later Lacan too came to recognize this when he designated Joyce as 'sinthome'; as a self-creation existing only through and because of his writing as symptom.

What Foucault called the 'author function' is not applicable to Joyce's works:

... the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging of invention, it is because, in reality we make him function in exactly the opposite fashion.

Joyce's works simply refuse to function in this reductive manner. For Deleuze too, the proper name 'Joyce' does not refer to a particular person as an author but to a regime of signs or 'affects', a particular multiplicity or assemblage. This feature of Deleuzian philosophy has particular resonance when one comes to address those Joycean critics who persist in reading the *Wake* psychoanalytically as in some way revelatory of Joyce's personal biography. Deleuze speaks of Spinoza's philosophy or Joyce's works in much the same way as he would speak of the Richter scale in seismology or Alzheimer's disease in medicine. For him Joyce's late works in particular are to be seen as a mode of individuation which is always impersonal. Deleuze echoes Foucault's characterisation of the early scientific text here as Foucault notes that in the seventeenth or eighteenth century scientific discourses began to be received for themselves:


161 Ibid. p.119.
... in the anonymity of an established or always redemonstrable truth; [it was not] the reference to the individual who produced them [which] stood as their guarantee. The author function faded away, and the inventor’s name served only to christen a theorem, proposition, particular effect, property, body, group of elements, or pathological syndrome. By the same token, literary discourses came to be accepted only when endowed with the author function.\textsuperscript{162}

I believe that Deleuze and Foucault would be at one in their denial of the author function in Joyce’s work, had the latter ever addressed it, and that they are joined at this point by the later Lacan who regards Joyce’s perpetual writing not only as the necessary act required to ward off a psychopathological syndrome but one which releases the joy of ‘feminine jouissance’, and as such, in Deleuzian terms, is supremely ethical.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid. p.109.
Part 3. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘schizoanalysis’

One cannot easily separate Deleuzian philosophy from Deleuzoguattarian ‘schizoanalysis’ or ‘rhizomatics’ and many of the concepts making up ‘schizoanalysis’ have already been introduced or mentioned. What remains is to specify the specific ‘tools’ which ‘schizoanalysis’ employs. In sum, ‘schizoanalysis’ consists of a two-fold task: first find the ‘BwO’, then map the lines which cut across it.

The Body without Organs and ‘schizoanalysis’

It is the ‘BwO’ and the lines of intensity which criss-cross it that Deleuze and Guattari look for in ‘schizoanalysis’ rather than the ‘actualised’ body which stems from it, or its psychic counterpart in the case of psychoanalysis. The ‘BwO’ helps to explain the ‘machinic’ relationship between things within a Deleuzian ‘rhizomatic’ cartography. The ‘BwO’ takes the ‘actualised’ body, whether that of an animal, human, social or political formation such as the ‘multitude’, or text, as a limit or a tendency. This body is recognised in the ‘BwO’ not as a corporeal or textual element but rather in terms of its constituent forces as a set of variously informed ‘durational’ ‘speeds’ and life-giving ‘intensities’ which ‘know only relations of movement and rest, of speed and slowness, between unformed, or relatively unformed, elements, molecules or particles borne away by fluxes’. In this it owes a great deal to the Stoic ‘theory of bodies’ (I.4).

The ‘BwO’ is located on the ‘plane of immanence’ which for purposes of convenience and clarity can be related to the Bergsonian ‘virtual’. Just as connected ‘BwOs’ are themselves simply ‘becomings’, the ‘plane of immanence’ in its entirety is nothing more than a ‘plane of becoming’ itself. Hardt and Negri refer to the ‘plane of immanence’ as a ‘plane of forces of the desire and cooperation of the multitude’. Unfortunately, this elides the distinction between the ‘plane of immanence’ and the ‘BwO’. What Deleuze and Guattari consider to be specific to the ‘production’ and

163 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p.92.
164 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p.201.
‘becomings’ of ‘BwOs’, which distinguish them from the ‘plane of immanence’ in general, can be best seen by some definitions which they give us: ‘[it is that which] serves as a surface for the recording of the entire process of production of desire’; (AO 11) ‘[it is] the field of the immanence of desire’. (TP 154) One’s ‘BwO is said to be “desire” ... that which one desires and by which one desires’, and ‘there is desire whenever there is the constitution of a BwO under one relation or another’. (TP 165) Thus conceived ‘desire’ is both entirely productive and strictly impersonal.

In following Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri highlight the importance of the desire ‘of the multitude of mobile and flexible workers’ who are socially diffused throughout the global ‘Empire’ of capitalism in its latest phase.165 They place such desire at the heart of the current – or as I would see it ‘potential’ – social revolution ‘because desire has no limit and (since the desire to exist and the desire to produce are one and the same thing) life can be continuously, freely, and equally enjoyed and reproduced’.166 The ‘multitude’ is here implicitly conceived not as an ‘actual’ collection of diverse peoples but as the constituent desiring forces which make up its ‘BwO’.

Elizabeth Grosz has summarized the Deleuzian concept of ‘BwOs’, as the location of desire, interacting on, and largely constituting the ‘plane of immanence’ as:

the body before and in excess of the coalescence of its intensities and their sedimentation into meaningful, functional, organised, transcendent totalities ... a point or process to which all bodies, through their stratifications, tend; a becoming that resists the processes of ... organisation according to the three great strata or identities it opposes: the union of the organism, the unification of the subject, and the structure of significance.167

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165 Hardt and Negi, Empire, p. 209.

166 Ibid. p. 349.

As ‘actualised’ beings consisting of corporeal bodies, we are located on an adjacent plane, ‘the plane of organisation’, governed by these three great strata of identities: biological evolution and ‘the union of the organism’, social patriarchy and ‘the unification of the subject’, morality and the ‘structure of significance’, all concerned to limit and restrict or deny life as impersonal desire. The theorisation of the denial of desire can be traced back to the thought of Plato and extends throughout the postmodernist/ post-structuralist thought of Lyotard, Lacan, and Derrida where it appears as ‘the void’, ‘lack’, ‘loss’ or ‘lapsus’. Consequently this thinking continues to pervade our thought processes today; as, despite being constituted by desiring intensities stemming from a ‘BwO’, we are by and large unaware of the vast range of intense and productive forces available to us from that source. Unable, because of the exigencies of everyday life, to perceive directly the intensive ‘multiplicities’ populating the ‘plane of immanence’, we may nevertheless receive them indirectly – though no less intensively – as the living forces making up the different ‘affects’, which works of art and literature draw on and enable us to recreate and incorporate as our own emotions and sensations, when we are not shielded from these by the Lawrentian ‘umbrella’.

Thus, ‘schizoanalysis’, incorporating ‘symptomatology’, takes the ‘actualised’ organic and non-organic forms of our everyday lives and attempts to work back to the pure flux of life forces from which they coalesce through ‘their’ respective ‘BwOs’. (We need to understand too that ‘BwOs’ strictly speaking do not ‘belong’ to anyone or anything, they are no more than impersonal forces and connectivities). When addressing the textual body and its constituent ‘BwO’, Deleuze and Guattari use the phrases ‘the first’ and ‘the second plane of writing’. The first plane can be regarded as a facet of ‘the plane of organization’ and ‘the second plane of writing’ as an aspect of ‘the plane of immanence’ or ‘the virtual’. Consequently, as with the ‘plane of organisation’ and ‘the plane of immanence’, for Deleuze and Guattari there is:

a clear distinction between two planes of Writing: a ... plan(e) that organizes and develops forms (genres, themes, motifs) and assigns and develops subjects (personages, characters, feelings) [the ‘plane of organisation’]; and an altogether different plane [a sub-set of the ‘plane of immanence’] that liberates the particles of an anonymous matter, allowing them to communicate through the ‘envelope’ of forms and subjects. retaining between them only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness, floating affects ... forms develop and subjects form (on the plan[e] of organization-development) as a function of a plane that can only be
inferred. [Here] there are only speeds and slownesses between unformed elements, and affects between nonsubjectified powers. (TP 267-268)

In elaborating on ‘schizoanalytic’ procedure in my readings of Joyce’s works, the ‘BwO’, epitomising impersonal desire, will be taken as the intensive reality of the body of the text which consistently diagnoses social reality and its capture and channelling of such desire, whilst at the same time offering an alternative ‘line of flight’.

‘Actualised’ bodies, whether organic or textual, simply consist of lines rather than points: lines of flow, lines of longitude and latitude. Thus, the ‘actualised’ body can be regarded as a cartography and it is these mappings to which we must turn in tracing the activities of their constituent ‘BwOs’. I will attempt to draw these lines out from the body of the text. Thus, ‘rhizomatic’ or ‘schizoanalytic’ procedure is concerned to infer and chart as far as possible the lines zig-zagging across the smooth surface of the ‘BwO’ in order to produce a diagram of the relative intensities populating it.

Ian Buchanan\textsuperscript{168} believes that it is in their examination of the novella,\textsuperscript{169} that Deleuze and Guattari ‘come as near as they ever do to providing a set of procedural notes for the technique of analysing such lines’.\textsuperscript{170} He points out that they find three types of line: the ‘line of segmentarity’, the ‘line of molecularity’, and the ‘line of flight’. In fact, Deleuze in a collaborative text\textsuperscript{171} provides us with much more concrete information as he delineates the three categories which allow us to function as individuals or groups, and he argues that as ‘singularities’, we are entirely composed by such a series of lines.


\textsuperscript{169} A Thousand Plateaus, Chapter 8 ‘1874: Three Novellas, or “What Happened”’.

\textsuperscript{170} Ian Buchanan, ‘Hitchcock’s The Birds’.

\textsuperscript{171} Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues.
Thus, the 'plane of organisation' is the 'actual' area of our lives through which we are structured into behavioural roles, through moralities and principles. Here we have the rigid 'line of segmentarity' or 'molar line' where things have specific values and a specific place. It is a rigid, structured, and fixed line which divides, orders, hierarchizes, and regulates social relations through binary codes, creating the oppositions between sexes, classes, and races, and dividing the real into subjects and objects. We use this line as a foundation to give our lives consistency and meaning. The 'line of segmentarity' is a stratifying line which controls identity and functions according to a law of conjugality. Elements such as personal identity, family, class, religion, the law, the state, gender and sexuality are regimes of this line. Here one's parts fit together, they conjugate. We are 'oedipalised' and interpellated on this plane as Joyce clearly delineates in *Dubliners*.

Simultaneously, but in contrast, we have the 'line of molecularity' or 'molecularisation', which veers away from the strict rigidity of the 'molar line'. This is a more fluid line, which forms connections and relations beyond the rigidity of the molar line. It maps processes of 'becoming', change, movement, and reorganization. Whilst it is not in itself revolutionary, it nevertheless accounts for both sociopolitical and micro 'becomings', demassifying 'molar segmentations', and creating cracks between segments so that something may pass between them. 'Molecular lines' make detours, 'they sketch out rises and falls; but they are no less precise for all this, they even direct irreversible processes' 172. However, the movements which they engender are on 'the plane of immanence' and as such below the threshold of our normal perception. These lines manifest themselves as barely perceptible fissures and flaws, or secret lines of disorientation: 'all those red raddled obeli cayennepepper cast over the text, calling unnecessary attention to errors, omissions, repetitions and misalignments' *(FW 120.14-16)* does not simply apply to the 'Tunc' page of the *Book of Kells*, as it aptly describes them. Here, rather than clearly defined parts fitting together mechanically in sequence, one only has *lacunae* and discontinuities. The 'line of molecularity' comes into play through the unsettling 'affects' which Joyce also calls up

in *Dubliners*, and all of his later works. I will argue later that the ‘molecular’ line is Bloom’s line. Flieger summarises the distinction between the two lines as follows:

To put it simply, the molar register concerns whole organisms, subjects, forms, and their interaction, including social action; while the molecular register considers non-subjective being on the level of chemical and physical reactions, intensities, in a radically material ‘micropolitics’. ¹⁷³

‘[M]an is the molar entity par excellence, whereas becomings are molecular’, (*TP* 292) and we are engaged in a constant tug-of-war between processual ‘becomings’ and ‘molarised Being’ even though this may not be consciously evident to us most of the time. Unfortunately our ‘molecular’ attempts at ‘becoming other’ are largely thwarted and recuperated through the patriarchal forces of the capitalist socius working on a ‘molar line’. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the ‘molar’ and the ‘molecular’ lines are not irreconcilable polar opposities. The distinction between them is qualitative rather than quantitative. Massive ‘molarity’ can never completely swamp the ‘molecular’ line and its potential ‘becomings’, because the latter creates a path which traverses and destabilises the former. It enables energy seepage to take place within and through all ‘molar’ unities. As John Marks puts it, ‘[t]he molecular is rather a potential within the molar’, ¹⁷⁴ however, its potential is to subvert or betray the molar entity and give us greater life. Such betrayals, unlike those of Proust’s ‘world of love’ which return us to patriarchal recuperation, are characteristic of the Deleuzian ‘war machine’ and ‘nomad’. (*TP* 351-423) They undermine patriarchy and oedipalised identity, and Joyce through Molly brings them into play, as I will show in Chapter Two.

Whereas the ‘molar’ line implies arborescence, organisation, bipolarity, and hierarchy, the ‘molecular’ line entails ‘rhizomatic’ potentiality, and ‘becoming’. The ‘molar’ line is particular to the ‘plane of organisation’ where desire or libidinal energies becomes viscous or even solidified into transcendental signifiers tending to restrict the flow and production of both meaning and use. On the other hand the ‘molecular’ line,


characteristic of the ‘plane of immanence’ and hence the ‘BwO’. ensures that desire or life moves freely in ‘unstructured’, ‘rhizomatic’ flows. Consequently, as will become evident in Chapter Two, even Bloom’s ‘empty BwO’ allows for some molecular movement. Joyce’s portrayal of Bloom, I will show, simply highlights and takes to the limit the conflictual tendency universal to us all in capitalist modernity and postmodernity.

Finally, Deleuze gives us the ‘line of flight’, or the ‘nomadic line’. This revolutionary line characterises the ‘becomings’ of the ‘plane of immanence’. Flieger notes that ‘becoming is a process, a line of flight between states which displaces and disorients subjects and identities’\(^\text{175}\), and ‘“becoming” as a line of flight, moving towards excess, other, exteriority’\(^\text{176}\). However, like the ‘line of molecularity’, it too operates alongside the ‘plane of organisation’ in a molecular coagulation melding and in collusion with it. Yet, the ‘line of flight’ enables a move away from both the ‘segmentarity’ of the ‘molar’ and the ‘evanescence’ of the ‘molecular lines’ into areas of change, difference, experimentation and renewal.

Deleuze and Guattari bring together the productive ‘middle’, ‘becomings’, and the ‘line of flight’:

A becoming is always in the middle, one can only get it by the middle. A becoming is neither one nor two [points], nor the relation of the two, it is the in-between, the border or line of flight or descent running perpendicular to both.\(^\text{TP 293}\)

It is also the ‘event’ which best illustrates the Deleuzian concept that allows time to take off on a new path ‘as new lines of time or “lines of flight”’. Consequently, it is on this line, Deleuze suggests, that we move away from fixed positions to overcome our human perceptions and its limitations. Through this line we are enabled to become more than our human selves and expand to our highest powers as we are involved in the previously hidden potentialities and ‘becomings’ of life itself. The ‘line of flight’ is the

\(^{175}\) Flieger, ‘Becoming-woman: Deleuze, Schreber and Molecular Identification’, p.43.

\(^{176}\) Ibid. p.47.
line of creativity, volition, excitement, and flight. It is the line of ‘rhizomatic’ or ‘schizoanalytic’ processuality and ‘becomings’. This line offers life, at the cost of a complete transformation through difference.

Conversely, as its mutations and differences produce not just the progression of history but disruptions, breaks, new beginnings and ‘monstrous’ births, it is also the line of danger and risk, loss and possible annihilation. It is the line which in collision with the ‘line of segmentarity’ or ‘molarity’, operating in conjunction with the ‘line of molecularity’, threatens us with black holes and oblivion often resulting in the burned out case of clinical schizophrenia. I argue that this is Joyce’s creative line, and it is on this line that his greatest works are located. Joyce according to Mercanton states: ‘that book [Ulysses] was a terrible risk. A transparent line separates it from madness’. It may well be that Lucia, Joyce’s daughter, attempting to emulate her father and encouraged by him to do so, fell into the black hole which his creativity allowed him to avoid, albeit at considerable cost. Nevertheless, in our later Deleuzian reading of the Wake, I argue that any attribution of the text as a more or less disguised representation of Lucia’s troubled life or other aspects of Joyce’s personal life, is completely beside the point as I read it in terms of the ‘second plane of writing’. Deleuze describes the attraction of this line as ‘the most complex of all, the most tortuous: it is the line of gravity or velocity, the line of flight and of the greatest gradient’, a line which has something mysterious about it, for, according to him, it is nothing other than the progression of the soul of the dancer.

180 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p.125.
It is through ‘affect’, as the crucial element in terms of ‘becomings’, that the creativity of Joyce’s ‘line of flight’ comes into its own for his readers: ‘literature as production, as operation of affect-producing machines’ [3.3]. Thus, Michael Levenson writing about ‘The Dead’ in Joyce’s Dubliners has said:

Joyce himself, choosing exile, sought to escape exactly those forces, emanating from deep within the colonial state, that combine to break Gabriel Conroy. And yet, Joyce was not content merely to live outside the grip of his home colony, merely to escape the fatal tangle of political tension. Against the threat of being absorbed within a larger frame, he set out to contain the container, to swallow those who would swallow him in their contexts. The characteristic strategy of his work is to bring inside the fiction exactly those pressures that surround it in the living world.

As Deleuze would put it, Joyce ‘tries to take hold of a force in order to make it [his] own’. (ECC 132) Levenson is here showing that Joyce’s ‘line of flight’, encompassing the impersonal ‘pressures’ or forces of the socius – first instanced in Dubliners – is not simply an attempt to escape, but a productive enterprise making these intensities available to us as ‘affect’, in keeping with Deleuze and Guattari’s belief that the ‘line of flight’ must offer a positive renewal within and not out of society. Joyce’s action exemplifies this Deleuzoguattarian tenet:

Good people say that we must not flee, that to escape is not good, that it isn’t effective, and that one must work for reforms. But the revolutionary knows that escape is revolutionary ... provided one sweeps away the social cover on leaving. (AO 277)

This ‘sweep[ing] away of the social cover’ is both an ethical and a political response and lies at the heart of ‘symptomatology’ and Joyce’s work.

The passages which have been taken to suggest for Deleuze and Guattari that Joyce’s work and in particular Finnegans Wake, do not ultimately offer us the liberatory

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potential of other authors. [5.1] coupled with the suggestion that the *Wake* might indeed be tied to a traditional view of the Viconian 'cyclic unity of the sentence, text or knowledge' of Bergsonian 'bare repetition' [6.1] has been the subject of over-much attention. I suggest that this is largely because *A Thousand Plateaus* and *Kafka*, rather than *Difference and Repetition, Logic of Sense*, or even *What is Philosophy?*, are much better known by literary critics, and the counter-balancing picture which the latter offer is consequently not taken into account by them. Nevertheless, these concerns need to be addressed.

Timothy Murphy has summarised Deleuze and Guattari's apparently anti-Wakean view in these passages in terms of its 'deterritorialising' of the English language as only serving in the end to act as a second-order grid containing the text, with the circular structure of *Finnegans Wake* reflecting this.\textsuperscript{183} One needs to ask whether this is a valid assessment of the book's supposedly underlying structure, and indeed whether it represents Deleuze and Guattari's considered view given their later statement. [8.1] In this connection it must be noted that Murphy has also taken a much more positive view of *Finnegans Wake* than that offered above, in which he takes a broader view of Deleuze's overall assessment of the *Wake* by linking it to earlier Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche's 'eternal return' as 'the seim anew' (*FW* 215.23).\textsuperscript{184} In this more considered article he seems to regard the negative assessment of Deleuze and Guattari which he articulated in 'Only Intensities Subsist' as less than definitive of their overall appreciation of the *Wake*, although in neither case does he offer any explanation for their apparent volte face.

One can set against Murphy's apparent equivocation Marie-Dominique Garnier's view that:


\textsuperscript{184} Timothy S. Murphy, 'The Eternal Return of "The seim anew": Joyce's Vico and Deleuze's Nietzsche', *James Joyce Quarterly*, 35.4 (1999), 715-735.
Deleuze and Guattari’s misconception of Joyce ... has been detrimental to both fields, the critical and the philosophical. Joyce’s words can easily be shown to be neither roots, nor entirely geared to a circular form. Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual machines need to be connected to micro-readings of the Joycean corpus, so far almost entirely subjugated to the dominant voices of post-Romantic, ‘Oedipean’ criticism (i.e. one based on the concepts of loss, lack and lapsus).\(^{185}\)

Garnier brings out the key point that there is a real need to engage in micro-readings of Joyce’s corpus, and the *Wake* in particular, from a Deleuzian angle.

As she points out, one cannot reduce the exotic and portmanteau words of the *Wake* to ‘arborescent’ roots as Deleuze well knew as early as 1968, as these give us ‘a maximum of disparate series (ultimately, all the divergent series constitutive of the cosmos)’, which bring ‘into operation linguistic dark precursors ([the], esoteric words, portmanteau words) which rely upon no prior identity, which are above all not ‘identifiable’ in principle’ [1.3].\(^{186}\) For as Katie Wales points out ‘Wakese neologisms combine with established words to produce a new lexical currency with suggestive configurations of undertones, often working ... in cohesive chains’.\(^{187}\) Such a ‘new lexical currency’ ‘rhizomatically’ breaks with any ‘arborescent’ roots in the multiplicities and deliberate excess of meanings supplied, they are ‘not “identifiable” in principle’ as Deleuze himself stresses. Moreover, one must add to this new lexicality the disruptive influence of Wakean syntax. Unfortunately, I lack the space here to relate Wales’s valid point to Deleuze’s apparent volte face. I believe that it is not the *Wake* itself which Deleuze and Guattari attack but the meanings and problematic that their peer group, including Sollers and Lacan, impose upon it which they reject.


\(^{186}\) My italics.


Conclusion

I have argued that Deleuze and Guattari conceive Joyce’s works as those of a great ‘symptomatologist’, and his late works as epiphanic ‘events’ which allow readers to experience the ‘affects’ capable of setting in train the ‘rhizomatic/ schizoanalytic’ process which may result in the ethical prospect of ‘a people to come’ as ‘multitude’. Yet, I believe that Deleuze and Guattari themselves have fallen short in their appreciation of the *Wake*’s full radical potentiality as I will argue later in the thesis. I have also argued that Hardt and Negri’s ground breaking Deleuzoguattarian analysis of global capitalism would greatly benefit from taking into account Joyce’s work and the *Wake* in particular. In order to set the scene for my exploration of the *Wake*, I will first continue with a ‘symptomatological’ analysis of Joyce’s earlier works coupled with *Ulysses* in the next chapter.
Chapter II

In this chapter I will be making a ‘symptomatological’ assessment of our problematic situation in modernity through the masochism of Bloom in *Ulysses* which, I will argue, is a further development by Joyce of the societal ‘paralysis’ that he diagnoses in both *Dubliners* and *A Portrait*. Unlike Hardt and Negri, who appear to assign a discrete structure to global capitalism in *Empire*, I believe that strong recuperative (‘reterritorialising’) forces, forming a continuum with earlier phases, persist in its current phase. If this is the case it is necessary to address rather than simply gloss over them. Consequently, in my opinion, Joyce’s ‘symptomatological’ diagnoses are as pertinent and valuable today as they were when he wrote them.

In concentrating on the largely negative view of society which Joyce presents us with in *Ulysses* and his earlier works, prior to its ‘symptomatological’ culmination in the *Wake*, which then allows its much more positive ‘deterritorialising’ ‘affects’ to break through, I want to relate his work as a whole to the Deleuzian concept of ‘the dark precursor’. Deleuze brings this concept into play somewhat narrowly in his comments on the *Wake*’s ‘cosmic letter’ by referring to its esoteric and portmanteau words as ‘dark precursor’ whose resonating series result in the ‘epiphany’[1.3] with the *Wake* conceived of by Deleuze as an ‘epiphanic machine’. However, I think that the concept can be applied more widely to Joyce’s work.

The phrase ‘the dark precursors’ (les sombres précurseurs) refers to the ominous meteorological signs that foreshadow a coming storm. Deleuze develops the concept in *Difference and Repetition* where he states that:

Thunderbolts explode between different intensities, but they are preceded by an invisible, imperceptible dark precursor, which determines their path in advance but in reverse, as though intagliated. Likewise, every system contains its dark precursor which ensures the communication of peripheral series. ... it is the in-itself of difference ... which relates heterogeneous systems and even completely disparate things. (*DR* 119-120)

I regard the *Wake* as the thunderbolt of ‘creative destruction’ which clears the way for a proper appreciation of the ethical potentiality of literature. *Ulysses* and its predecessors
determine its path in advance but in reverse through their necessarily negative ‘symptomatological’ diagnoses.

In order to arrive at a ‘symptomatological’ assessment of *Ulysses* I will attempt to move the focus from the narrative, plot and ‘character’ of Bloom – necessarily conceived by Joyce on the ‘first plane of writing’ – to the impersonal lines, forces and intensities making up capitalism’s ‘BwO’, which I argue that Joyce intuitively drew on to produce his portrait of Bloom. It is largely through narrative, plot and ‘character’ that such lines and forces are made available at least in the earlier episodes of *Ulysses* and in the preceding works. As the two planes of writing overlap and interact, it will necessarily be the case that the ‘first plane of writing’ features strongly in my assessment. However, by bringing into play ‘the second plane of writing’ in this chapter I attempt to take a clinical look at *Ulysses* as a societal diagnosis. This will offer an initial ‘schizoanalysis’ of Joyce’s works which will establish a basis for further exploration in my later chapters on the *Wake*.

After an introductory statement on what I mean by societal masochism, I will start with the experience of minor characters who appear in both *Dubliners* and *Ulysses* which will help bring together the societal paralysis depicted in the former work with the more complex diagnosis of social masochism more fully delineated through Bloom. It will also be necessary to bring into play the institutional sadism depicted in *A Portrait* which is then both contested by and reclaimed through Bloom’s masochism in *Ulysses*. I will then move through a consideration of Deleuze’s theorisations on societal masochism and its ‘affects’, as it impacts upon and forms the ‘characters’ in *Ulysses*, to Molly’s attempt to use masochism, so conceived, to create an ethical ‘line of flight’. Although the contradictory nature of Molly’s makeup, itself necessarily contaminated by masochism, prevents this from being fully realised, its potentiality for achieving a ‘line of flight’ is adumbrated. I conclude that such ‘lines of flight’ are better realised in the *Wake*.

As Richard Brown writes, Joyce quite deliberately:

... drew on a huge variety of sources for his presentation of Bloomian sexuality and the traces of different, potentially conflicting, kinds of discourses on the question
are woven into the book so that we feel that the history and literature, as well as the phenomenon of masochism have been presented to us.\textsuperscript{188}

Evidently, Joyce went to an enormous amount of trouble in order to present a full and authentic picture of masochism to the ‘normal’ reader through Bloom, whatever risks this may appear to offer for her alienation from him and her consequent withdrawal of sympathy.

A number of writers including Frances Restuccia and in particular David Cotter\textsuperscript{189} have stressed the autobiographical element in Joyce’s writing as his letters apparently attest to strong masochistic inclinations.\textsuperscript{190} Cotter therefore begins his thesis from the assumption that ‘sexual masochism runs like a core through the center of Joyce, and is the impetus of his writing’\textsuperscript{191} and, despite admitting that ‘masochism does not wholly account for Joycean sexuality’,\textsuperscript{192} unabashedly concludes with the statement that ‘the centrality of this masochism [leads] to Joyce’s confessions’.\textsuperscript{193} He argues in effect that Joyce’s psychopathology over-rode any other authorial considerations as he obsessively, and meticulously, depicted it in great detail through Bloom and Stephen in \textit{Ulysses}, and indeed throughout all of his other works.

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\textsuperscript{191} David Cotter, \textit{James Joyce and the Perverse Ideal}, p.1.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid. p.221.

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid. p.222.
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This may or may not be the case for, as Brown notes, Joyce’s ‘writing never becomes confessional ... Its dominant mode remains parodic’.\(^{194}\) Insofar as this is so it is a parody of our societal situation today, just as it was then of 1904 Dublin, for as Deleuze averred masochistic rituals consist of the undermining by parody of social constructs of identity. Whatever the psychological truth or otherwise of the masochism of Joyce, Cotter’s thesis holds no interest for ‘schizoanalysis’, despite his claimed reliance on Deleuzian philosophy, because in Deleuze’s thought the writer should not be viewed as a patient but as a physician who makes a diagnosis of the world. (ECC 53)

Furthermore, I wish to argue that it is precisely because of his masochism that ‘Bloom retains his precarious normality throughout’,\(^ {195}\) and more importantly his implicit appeal for the ‘normal’ reader. Brown believes that ‘... it is the new onanistic concept of sexuality that saves him in the reader’s eyes, permitting, even requiring, a degree of “perversity” in order to guarantee the “normality” of his deviation from the narrow traditional ideal’.\(^ {196}\) Be that as it may, he rightly concludes that we retain ‘our sympathy with Bloom’s character and actions’.\(^ {197}\) Whatever reasons are advanced for retaining our sympathy for and identification with Bloom, and these may go well beyond masturbation to include, for example, his fair-mindedness, common sense and sympathy with the underdog, I argue that it is the inbuilt societal masochism ‘affecting’ and effecting us all which keeps us ‘onside’ with Bloom, and it is this that ensures that we are always aware that he is somehow fundamentally like us. Simply put, it is this awareness of being like us which, I believe, is signified, rather than being put at risk by his masochism. For as Eugene Holland has written:

... not just as a consumer but also as a citizen, the subject within liberal-democratic capitalism is thoroughly enmeshed in structures where nearly every (apparent) act of self-constitution, of self-affirmation, or even of self-defense

\(^ {194}\) Brown, *James Joyce and Sexuality*, pp. 87-88.

\(^ {195}\) Ibid, p.88.

\(^ {196}\) Ibid.

\(^ {197}\) Ibid.
turns out to strengthen the powers of capital or the state over that subject—turns out, in other words, to (also) be an act of masochism, in the properly socio-historical, Masochian sense of the term.\textsuperscript{198}

By stressing the powers of the state over the subject, Holland brings out the ultimately recuperative, 'molar' or 'reterritorialising' aspect of capitalism, our victimization, and the difficulties involved in making productive changes. However, Holland’s stress on masochistic ‘molarising’ tends to make it indistinguishable from ‘paralysis’ in its societal ‘affects’. Consequently, I believe that he fails to stress sufficiently the subversive aspect which is constitutive of masochism on its ‘molecular line’, a subversiveness which Bloom’s masochism forcefully brings into play. For, as we have noted above the ‘molecular line’ when it comes into play in conjunction with the ‘molar line’ allows detours which ‘even direct irreversible processes’.\textsuperscript{199}

As a precursor to the exploration of Bloom’s and our masochism in modernity, I would first like to focus on the forces which constitute some minor Joycean characters to show how Joyce is gradually moving us from the diagnosis of societal ‘paralysis’ and victimization in \textit{Dubliners} to the more profound awareness of the complex masochism portrayed through his central character Bloom.

In ‘symptomatological’ terms there are very many occasions in Joyce’s works when he shows us that the ‘paralysis’ of Ireland is due to the ‘molar’ intensities coalescing in ‘the socius’ which then ‘actualise’ historically through the collaboration of the Roman Catholic Church and the colonising English State. This has occurred at least from the time of the occupation of Ireland by Henry II who obtained a Papal Bull and the blessing of Pope Adrian to justify his invasion of Ireland. Hence, Stephen’s ‘I am the servant of two masters …’ (\textit{U} 24) in the ‘Telemachus’ episode of \textit{Ulysses}, and

\textsuperscript{198} Personal correspondence. (Eugene W. Holland is the author of \textit{Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis: The Sociopoetics of Modernism} (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and \textit{Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Anti-Oedipus’: Introduction to schizoanalysis} (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).

\textsuperscript{199} Deleuze and Parnet, \textit{Dialogues}. p.124.
Joyce’s: ‘Ireland my first and only love/ Where Christ and Caesar go hand in glove’. 200

One can quite reasonably, I suggest, read Stephen’s statement as anticipating Althusser’s recasting of Marx’s ‘false consciousness’, 201 as our being ‘hailed’ or ‘interpellated’ into identity as unwilling servants. Stephen is effectively stating that our very identities are constituted by hierarchic capitalistic forces, I suggest, which poses the greatest problem and dilemma for him and for us today despite the changed status of capitalism from imperialistic to global. Permanent and radical change for us requires a radical and ethical change of the social order rather than bi-polar moral reversals, and this is not automatically available.

Jan Ford reminds us that:

In ‘The Boarding House’, we have a version of Joyce’s outrage at lifelong entrapment based on succumbing to the passing desire of the moment. But Polly is as much the victim of her own sexual desire as is Bob Doran; both are being manipulated by Mother/Society: ‘The pleasure of love lasts but a fleeting but the pledges of life outlasts a lifetime’. (FW 444.24-25) 202

However, I believe that Ford is mistaken if she directly equates ‘Mother’ with societal authority. ‘Mother’, as ‘outlaw’, can do no more than gain temporary access to the role of patriarchal authority of the Symbolic order as both Kristeva, 203 in general terms, and Joyce here through Polly’s mother, show. (U 682-684) Clearly, the Church is a very important, or possibly the most important, element in ensuring this ethical paralysis through its often hypocritical morality.

Mrs Mooney in ‘The Boarding House’ is able to divest herself of a husband, whom she and society regard as no more than an encumbrance, set up and run effectively a

200 James Joyce, Gas from a Burner: A broadside in verse (Trieste: James Joyce, 1912).

201 Althusser, For Marx, passim.


boarding house, and shrewdly encourage the liaison between her wayward daughter Polly and the eligible Bob Doran, by not only not preventing but even helping to ensure that Polly become pregnant by him, in order to insist that he marry her. Thus, in *Dubliners*, despite his evident reluctance, Mrs Mooney is enabled to ride roughshod over Bob Doran’s clear objections to marriage by exploiting his weak position at work, implicitly threatening him with dismissal – as ‘she had all the weight of social opinion on her side’ – and finally and quite unscrupulously threatening to use *force majeur*, in the shape of her violent son Jack, to bring this about. Nevertheless, she is enabled by the priest to leave her husband in the first instance, and it is only by the moral threat of instant dismissal from the ‘great Catholic wine merchant’s office’, where Bob had laboured for thirteen years to establish himself, that this can be brought about. Mrs Mooney has effected a temporary bi-polar reversal of the social order but this does not alter its patriarchal structure, constituted through ‘molarising’ forces, in fact it merely confirms it.

In order to gain ascendancy, in the ‘Boarding House’, Mrs Mooney literally plays her cards right, but these are only the societally controlling cards of the Roman Catholic Church through whose moral forces she is momentarily empowered. It is the hypocritical, prying, morality of the Church which backs Doran into a corner: ‘the priest had drawn out every ridiculous detail of the affair and in the end had so magnified his sin that he was almost thankful at being afforded a loophole of reparation’, just as the dismissal from the wine merchants is threatened through Catholic morality rather than Doran’s failure to perform his job well. Ultimately, despite Margot Norris’s arguments, which on occasion seem to offer her agency: ‘the Mooney’s have “crust”, that is, a bold and vulgar audacity in the way they play their games and in the way they use bourgeois morality for their own purposes and designs’; it is not Mrs Mooney but the controlling forces of the patriarchal authority of the Church’s underpinning discourse which ensures her ‘successes’, and I believe that these forces reassert themselves in *Ulysses*, but this time to her disadvantage. Moreover, Colin MacCabe observes that even in ‘The Boarding House’:

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Mrs Mooney, the mother, is not allowed to speak for herself because the [patriarchal] narrative immediately fixes her for the reader. It is information shared between reader and text that enables the narrative to pronounce that 'she dealt with moral problems as a cleaver deals with meat'. This direction on how to understand Mrs Mooney is guaranteed by the reference in the simile back to the butcher's shop where Mrs Mooney started her career. In its use of information already given to make a judgement on a character, the text elaborates a common strategy of classic realism, the knowledge shared by narrative and reader places them in a dominating position vis-a-vis the characters and their discourses. 

It is not the characters but the always already established force of the narrative discourse which determines the 'molar' process and its outcomes, including the 'paralysis' of Bob Doran which working through us determines our reading. Mrs Mooney, as Joyce ironically indicates in his choice of surname, is as dominant as the moon in the night sky outshining all of the other stars and seemingly in total control of the heavens in 'The Boarding House'. However, the feminine moon does not generate her own heat and light, she merely reflects that of the masculine and temporarily hidden sun. When it appears and makes this plain the moon pales into insignificance and then disappears.

Bob Doran has been sadistically disempowered by a dominatrix in the form of Mrs Mooney, but he differs from Bloom in the 'Circe' episode in his reluctance to enter into an implicit contractual relationship with her and be dispossessed of his masculine empowerment, and as such offers us a half-way house between paralysis and Bloomian masochism in *Ulysses*. His plight, I argue, is a very instructive precursor to that of Bloom and the transition from societal paralysis to societal masochism which Joyce now diagnoses. This can be seen in the 'Cyclops' episode of *Ulysses* where Joyce exposes the reaction of his drinking companions to the grief displayed by Bob Doran on learning of the sudden death of Paddy Dignam. (*U* 390-391)

Here we see Bob Doran, worse (or possibly better) for drink, with all of his defences down – *in vino veritas* – expressing his innermost and hitherto repressed

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feelings for a newly deceased drinking companion. The differences or ‘intensities’ of the ‘BwO’ or ‘abstract machine’ assert themselves: ‘the pure abstract machine of a twilight state’ has taken over. (TP 169) It ‘crops up when you least expect it, at a chance juncture, when you are falling asleep, in a twilight state, hallucinating ...’. (TP 168-169) or drunk. It is at this juncture that ‘the real’ intrudes into symbolically ordered reality, which then breaks down as reality collapses into it. (For Deleuze and Guattari, unlike the early Lacan for whom the real was impossible, there is of course no distinction to be drawn between ‘the real’ and reality, and they explicitly state in contradistinction to Lacan that ‘[t]he real is not impossible’. (AO 27)) What has happened here is that for Bob Doran the ‘abstract machine’ has simply brought into play a new power of consistency. He has been invaded by the forces of ‘his’ fully real but never ‘actual’ ‘BwO’ as this is the precise point where the ‘abstract machine’ suddenly changes in kind. Albeit temporarily he is no longer governed solely by a paralysing ‘molar line’ but – through these changes in the ‘abstract machine’ – simultaneously by a ‘molecular’ one veering away from the strict rigidity of the ‘molar line’ mapping potential micro-becomings.

His outburst earns him immediate condemnation and marginalisation by the embarrassed working-class narrator, captured by, constructed through, and spokesperson for the ‘molar’ forces and low-grade ‘intensities’ constituting Dublin’s ‘socius’. Consequently, Doran is dismissed as the ‘lowest blackguard in Dublin when he’s under the influence’. In their ‘common-sense’ terms, viewed more sympathetically, he might be seen as being in shock and possibly beginning the mourning process for a close friend, but such a ‘common-sense’ response is denied to the narrator who as spokesperson for the group one might have thought would have some sympathy for Dignam’s sudden and early death himself. Why is Doran dealt with so savagely? He has committed the first and unpardonable transgression here by overtly challenging the goodness of Christ and with it the Catholic Church (one of the two masters which Stephen Dedalus —‘signatures of all things I am here to read’ (U 45) — has already


207 Buchanan. ‘Hitchcock’s The Birds’.
pointed out paralyses Ireland), and the underpinning moral order of Dublin’s social order.

Alf, posited as a ‘good’ character, willing to uphold the status quo of the male homosocial group, yet caught in a difficult situation implicitly having to defend the patriarchal anchorage of the Roman Catholic religion, but not able to go too far in its defence, as superficial blasphemy and denigration of the clergy are integral to the mores of such men in public house gatherings, resorts to an attempted riposte by undermining the seriousness of the offence. He asks a question, but couches it in such a way that the whole situation can be easily retrieved, by saying ‘I beg your parsnips’, rather than seriously challenging Doran with a straightforward question. It is now up to Bob Doran to make the next move in this social game and shamefacedly back down. After all we were informed in ‘The Boarding House’ that he had not only confessed to the priest but also in an apparent acceptance of Catholicism now regularly ‘attended to his religious duties’, despite his earlier ‘freethinking’. Nevertheless, he does not back down, or in Deleuzoguattarian terms the changed status of his ‘BwO’ will not allow him to do so. Alf again tries unsuccessfully ‘to pass it off’, but the consistency of the new ‘abstract machine’ of Bob Doran is insistent.

The proprietor of the pub, an integral institution in patriarchal working-class Dublin, then adds his weight to Alf’s implicit defence of the system by stating that this is ‘a respectable licensed premises’ and thus further marginalises Bob as not respectable/ lacking in respect, just as it places the public house as an adjunct of the Church and respectability. We not only have the ‘molar’ line holding everyone in place in the social order being fully displayed on the ‘plane of organisation’ here, but also its complementary but deviant ‘line of molecularity’ which in its discontinuity and disorientation problematises the ‘molar’ line without being able to fully subvert it. The unfortunate Bob Doran is hardly in a position to take advantage of the ‘line of flight’ which this ‘molecular’ intrusion of ‘the real’ into reality momentarily offers him.
The failure of anyone in the pub to show the slightest empathy with Bob Doran in his confused display of grief for ‘Willy’ Dignam is perhaps the most striking feature of this episode. As a ‘man’, one is not allowed to show compassion, leave alone passion, for another man even (perhaps particularly) if the recently deceased has been a close and accepted member of the group who has, according to Bloom, drunk himself to death in your company and impoverished his family in the process – even to the point of getting out of his deathbed, demanding his boots and staggering to the top of the stairs in order to join his erstwhile companions at the pub and in consequence suffering a fatal heart attack. Protestations of male companionship are shown to be completely hollow here, the separateness of the ‘clean and proper [male] self’ must be maintained at all costs, as must the consistency of the repressive ‘molar line’. Is it not also possible that Doran’s earlier freethinking, and his outspoken denial of God’s existence, also played its part in the lack of compassion of his fellow drinkers and allowed for and even necessitated the narrator’s attack?

Doran then starts to weep. This display of the ‘feminine’ is of course totally unacceptable and another major breach of male etiquette. His grief is immediately denigrated as ‘snivelling’ by the incredulous narrator, ‘doing the weeps about Paddy Dignam, true as you’re there’, a truly womanly thing to do. That any ‘man’ in the assembly might start to weep for Dignam is immediately refuted by the use of the ubiquitous working-class masculine swearword ‘bloody’ coupled with a ploddingly obvious irony as the ‘tear is bloody near your eye’.

Moreover, the narrator, as masculinity’s spokesman, is by no means finished. A complete dismantling of Doran is called for such has been the enormity of his utterance and display of emotion. Consequently, the working class male narrator as defender of the Symbolic order gets down to business. He characteristically turns his wrath onto the abject female wife as daughter of her mother. Both are women outside of the law and inevitably for the patriarchal order they are therefore the real cause of the difficulty.

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(This patriarchal way of thinking is applied elsewhere to the Irish problematic as a whole whereby, ‘a dishonoured wife, says the citizen, that’s what’s the cause of all our misfortunes’. (U 420 ) First it is the turn of the wife and daughter, as whore, ‘the little sleepwalking bitch he married ... at two in the morning without a stitch on her, exposing her person, open to all comers, fair field and no favour’. Here one recalls Polly’s provocative song in ‘The Boarding House’: ‘I’m a ... naughty girl ... you know that I am’, together with the comment of one of the music-hall artistes who had ‘made a rather free allusion to Polly’.

Then it is the turn of the mother, who ‘kept a kip in Hardwicke street’, she is revealed, as Bloom threatens to reveal Bella Cohen in the Circe’ episode of Ulysses, as no more than a Madam who keeps a brothel, pimps for her daughter, and as such is socially unacceptable. Rather than working for Mrs Mooney the law of patriarchy is now turned against her. Given that ‘[a]ll of the resident young men spoke of her as The Madam’, in ‘The Boarding House’, Mrs Mooney has already been at least implicitly typecast, and the narrator in ‘Cyclops’ is simply confirming and using this: ‘[a]nd the old prostitute of a mother procuring rooms to street couples’. Rather than focusing on Bob Doran’s lack of ‘respectability’, the narrator as spokesman for patriarchy, is seen to turn the tables on Mrs Mooney herself as lacking in respectability and the real cause of Doran’s homosocial marginalisation.

Here, Ford’s equation of ‘Mother’ with ‘Society’ is shown to be only tenuous as the symbolic order reasserts itself and indicates Mrs Mooney’s true position as patriarchal puppet. The unacceptable abject women are blamed as they clearly lie behind Bob Doran’s outburst and suspiciously – to the assembled men – implicit homosexual attachment in his ‘extravagant’ claims for Paddy Dignam as a drinking companion who was ‘the noblest, the truest ... poor little Willy, poor little Paddy Dignam’. These are terms better reserved by even more ‘respectable’ church-going citizens, than those in the public house, for Christ himself. Though here again we have the homosexual ambiguity of a bloodied, abject, Jesus on the cross being seen as the ‘proper’ object of desire. For, despite the channelling of desire to the abject woman/ wife and mother through Christianity, Jesus as idealised object of desire standing behind this remains stubbornly male.
This brief episode throws a clear light upon Dublin's male pub culture through a superb piece of artistry. Even though Joyce does not allow us to see this as merely a localised, sordid yet limited, working-class episode. He rounds it off by bringing in the 'high style' frequently used throughout the 'Cyclops' episode to link this snippet's transgressive elements with high culture and the society as a whole by having another, this time an 'educated', narrator interject and remark with equal irony, 'And mournful and with a heavy heart he bewept the extinction of that beam of heaven'. This is how Bob Doran's grief and micro-political rebellion is viewed by rich and poor, educated and uneducated, alike in a hegemonic patriarchal society which immediately attempts to snuff it out as quickly and brutally as possible denying him and themselves any opportunity of not just a 'line of flight' in 'becoming woman' but any line of 'molecular' deviance from the 'molar line' of the Symbolic order. Can one really argue, as Hardt and Negri implicitly do, that such a scenario and such attitudes belong to an earlier phase of capitalism and cannot have their counterpart in our globalised world?

By revealing this and its threatening abject elements here as elsewhere, Joyce subverts the very basis of that patriarchally gendered society time and time again, as Christine Froula points out. He shows us through the crushing response which Bob Doran's attempted 'line of flight' receives that such a 'line' is possible for his readers and Joyce does this by 'symptomatologically' 'sweep[ing] away the social cover on leaving'. (AO 277) I argue that Joyce here moves us beyond that patriarchal discourse by which readers were captured in 'The Boarding House' as we completely lose sympathy with the controlling discourse of the narrator and his cronies. Through the paralysing forces composing this discourse Joyce has provided us with the insight that what is holding the oedipalising homosocial order in place is precisely that homosexuality which it consciously rejects through homophobia. I will explore this further below.

Were we to take the same line of argument as Hardt and Negri or Haines in ‘Telemachus’ we might easily explain or dismiss Bob Doran’s societal ‘paralysis’ by locating it in and blaming it on bygone imperial capitalist history (U 24) which is best forgotten. Haines is able to do this by conveniently setting aside the fact that colonial occupation and exploitation is still in place at the time when he is speaking and that he is personally reaping the benefits of such exploitation, as he is ‘bursting with money and indigestion’(U 2) through inherited, ill-gotten, wealth as Mulligan informs us that ‘[h]is old fellow made his tin by selling jalap to Zulus or some bloody swindle or other’. (U 6) Contrary to any such conclusion, Joyce through his invocation of masochism goes beyond any presumed ‘localised’ paralysis, and certainly beyond individual psychopathology or even ‘self-hood’, as it is a major constituent of everyone in colonial and post-colonial society – still located in capitalism – yesterday, today and even tomorrow.

Joyce implicitly shows us in his highlighting of Bloom’s masochism that we are all not simply paralysed by the outside forces of the capitalist ‘socius’ emanating from the ‘plane of immanence’, operating in a state of Marxist ‘false consciousness’, but are actually masochistically constituted as subjects through its intensive forces and as such divided. We constantly shore up societal ‘always already’ givens on a paralysing ‘molar’ line as if the forces which constitute them somehow make us unique self-possessed individuals whilst – from time to time in an uncomfortable half-awareness that this is simply not the case – attempting to subvert them and our ‘selves’ on a ‘molecular’ line by becoming other, as we have seen happens to even such societally victimised characters as Bob Doran.

Bloom as masochist both embodies his own relative economic disempowerment and feminisation as a ‘foreigner’ and Jew in the racist sub-culture of Dublin and Ireland whilst ironically and ‘symptomatically’ embodying and diagnosing the very feminisation and disempowerment of the Celtic/Irish males, subject to the patriarchal control of British imperialism,210 who surround him and project their feminisation and

210 Matthew Arnold, On the Study of Celtic Literature (Port Washington: Kennikat, 1905), passim.
economic disempowerment onto him as sacrificial victim. Whereas Hardt and Negri
strongly advocate the abolition of all immigration controls by calling for ‘papiers pour
tous!’, I would argue that this can only result in the new ‘foreigners’ receiving the same
treatment as Bloom, unless economic change is accompanied by a major ethical change.

Daniel Dervin points out that Bloom’s masochism is also an attempt to resolve the
guilt which he feels over his father’s suicide, and I believe that this too can be related
to the disempowerment of both Jews and Celts in Ireland under patriarchy, and, one
might add, the subaltern ‘multitude’ of today’s ‘turbo-capitalism’. To take only one
example from Ulysses, Bloom’s masochistic negativism is shown in his futile attempt
to assuage the Citizen, his chief tormentor in the ‘Cyclops’ episode, by joining those
who fulsomely compliment him on his past athletic prowess, praise which even the
narrator of the episode will not join in. (U 410) Such servility merely acts as a cue for
the citizen to further vilify Bloom and merely intensifies his contempt for him –
contempt which Bloom in his masochistic bind may well be seeking, of course, as I will
show.

Bloom’s Jewishness is evidently crucial to his scapegoating and Frances Limberger
locates the peculiar figuration of the Jewish male as different and feminised according
to Catholic tradition. This tradition, known as ‘the blood libel’, states that Jewish
blood must flow for ever on the anniversary of Christ’s death as the Jews as a race are
held to be responsible for the death of the Saviour. Consequently, it was believed that
not only the Jewish female but also the Jewish male menstruates, and was therefore
feminine, or as the citizen implied in the ‘Cyclops’ episode, a ‘pishogue’ or ‘half and
half’. (U 416) neither unitary male nor oedipalised female. The narrator of this episode
expressed it even more bluntly, with regard to Bloom, as ‘one of those mixed middlings

211 Daniel Dervin, ‘Bloom Again: Questions of Aggression and Psychoanalytic
Reconstruction’. American Imago 47 (Fall-Winter 1990), 249-269.

Bloomsday 100, 19th International James Joyce Symposium (Dublin, 12-19 June.
2004).
he is. Lying up in the hotel Pisser was telling me once a month with headache like a totty with her courses'. (U 439) Joyce can even be held to be making the same point more lightheartedly when he relates the difficulty which Bloom's bleeding haemorrhoids periodically cause him: '[h]ope its not too big bring on the piles again'. (U 84) Even his masturbation is used in the 'Ithaca' episode to underline the point of sexual ambiguity: 'because of the surety of the sense of touch in his firm full masculine feminine passive active hand'. (U 788)

There is little evidence that in today's 'turbo capitalism' anti-Semitism has disappeared, in fact it can be argued that it has become more diffuse and widespread. For example the Israelis themselves may have allowed such 'fascism in their heads', implicitly inherited from the anti-Semitism of the Nazis, to be absorbed by them and redirected against the disempowered and feminised Palestinians whilst regarding any criticism of their policies as anti-Semitic. Thus, Haggai Matar, an Israeli activist himself, has said that:

Today militarisation and racism among the Jewish population have reached fascist level. The repression of critical thinking, the total acceptance of the occupation's crimes, the idolisation of the army and the gradual acceptance of 'ethnic cleansing' [of the Palestinian population] - all of these constitute only a part of society's collapse.213

In addition to the social alienation with which Bloom is burdened - as a Jew in Ireland, with all of the feelings of impotence this engenders - and an almost inevitable identification with the aggressor, it appears that his choice of effective impotence through masochism is a means of distancing himself from Molly's suffering at the loss of Rudy, linked to the unwarranted responsibility, guilt and shame he feels at this loss. Such a 'failure' to produce a male successor can be taken to indicate social disempowerment, particularly with someone who has had a Jewish upbringing. This strategy of impotence, both attested to and belied by his masturbation which was regarded as a sinful perversion in Catholicism, allows him to maintain a distant asexual desire for Molly, whilst giving his need to humiliate himself free play by ensuring her freedom to chose other sexual partners. Yet, despite the empathy with women's

213 Peretz Kidron, ed., Refusenik!: Israel's Soldiers of Conscience (London: Zed Books,
suffering which he evidently feels, in yet another Joycean irony, we are told in ‘Penelope’ that Molly may now have a far more robust attitude to Rudy’s death than Bloom credits her with. She may, in fact, have simply got over it.

Bloom, however, may think that the only way to alleviate what he still regards as his wife’s suffering is to give her the masculine role of sadistic dominatrix in order that he and not she will suffer for the guilt he feels and thus give credence to his adoption of a masochistic stance. It would seem that since the death of his son Rudy and the guilt which this has engendered in him, Bloom can only relate sexually to Molly if he positions her in the extreme masculine dominatrix role, and that as soon as the sympathy which he feels for her as wife and mother returns, as in the first few pages of ‘Calypso’, the loss of the child intrudes and he loses his sexual desire for her. However, I must point out that any psychological speculation or interpretation, no matter how ‘insightful’, takes me away from a focus on the Ulyssean ‘characters’ in terms of their societally formative forces on ‘the second plane of writing’.

In his commitment to a guilt-ridden, punishment-seeking, masochism it might be added that the scenario featuring his and Martha Clifford’s letters, in ‘Lotus Eaters’, potentially gives us a latent, if aborted, asexual masochistic episode as we wonder here just what Bloom has asked Martha to do in order to earn the epithet ‘naughty boy’, the repeated promise of punishment and her refusal to accept that other wor(l)ld. Perhaps Bloom’s reason for not pursuing this relationship further is that there is no ‘strong-membered’ male available in this scenario before whom he can both humble himself and then masochistically control through his own abasement.

Masochism works indirectly through education, insinuation and manipulation. It implicitly sets up and relies upon an unwritten contract. The idea behind the masochist’s contract is that pleasure is postponed in order to prolong the positive, immanent process of desire.  

214 However, such postponed pleasure is rarely if ever attained. As with Bloom

2004), p.98.

214 Deleuze, ‘Désir et plaisir’, p. 64.
and Bella Cohen, its failure frequently results in the masochist abandoning his strategy
and resorting to a degree of verbal or actual violence turned against the contractual
partner, echoing that which he had sought from her previously, and returning him to the
sadistic forces which he has constructed to constitute her. Ironically it is often the
display of excessive sadistic violence by the partner which causes the contractual
breakdown. However, even if this does not occur, as the sadist by definition does not
honour contracts, any masochist faces inevitable ritualistic failure.

Bloom, in an implicit contractual arrangement, was constantly trying to educate
Molly and, as she well knew, he manipulated her and her sexual situations to meet his
own needs: ‘the way he plots and plans everything out’. \(U\) 910) According to Molly, he
had sent Milly to Mullingar so that the coast was clear for her adulterous affair with
Boylan, an affair which she believed that he had not only encouraged but deliberately
set up and effectively choreographed. However, Molly is complicit in this cover-up as
she doesn’t want Milly to witness an affair which she has already decided that she
wants to take place. Furthermore, Bloom was not only concerned about her
understanding, vocabulary and pronunciation of foreign words such as
‘metempsychosis’ \(U\) 79, 804) and ‘voglio’ \(U\) 77) but in educating/ inducting her into
masochism. He attempts to do this through introducing her to such books as Ruby: The
Pride of the Ring – with its ‘Fierce Italian with a carriage whip’, \(U\) 77) although he
would no doubt wish the gender roles to be reversed – Sweets of Sin, \(U\) 304) James
Lovebirch’s Fair Tyrants with ‘the part about where she hangs him up out of a hook
with a cord flagellate’, \(U\) 890) Sacher-Masoch’s Tales of the Ghetto, \(U\) 302) and of
course – rather than buying her ‘wondrous gowns and costliest frillies’ \(U\) 303, 372) –
he rather parsimoniously purchases garters for her and Boylan/ Raoul. \(U\) 888-889) In
the ‘Ithaca’ episode Bloom extends this educative control through an extraordinary
range of requirements including ‘the clandestine satisfaction of erotic irritation in
masculine brothels’. \(U\) 803)

Sacher-Masoch’s central point in many of his stories is that only after a dominatrix
has contractually acted with appropriate ritualised cruelty, with respect to the
masochistic male, can it be declared that she has ‘made him a man’. Thus in Masoch’s *The Divorced Woman*, the heroine complains that ‘Julian’s ideal was a cruel woman, a woman like Catherine the Great’. (*M* 21) Through such submissive ordeals the male masochist has sought a ritual rebirth, in which the father is denied a role in his new identity:

... what is beaten, foresworn and sacrificed, what is ritually expiated, is the father’s likeness, the genital sexuality inherited from the father. ... This is the real ‘Apostasy’. To become a man is to be reborn from the woman alone, to undergo a second birth. (*M* 100)

According to Deleuze, (*M* 94) the masochistic contract generates a type of law which leads straight into ritual. The masochist is obsessed and ritualistic activity is essential to him, since it epitomizes the world of fantasy and draws on the forces of the ‘BwO’, whilst prolonging the positive, immanent process of desire. Nevertheless, reliance on ritual demands cooperation from all participants in the masochist’s dramatic enactments and this cooperation cannot be sustained indefinitely. Three main types of rite occur in Masoch’s novels: hunting rites, agricultural rites and rites of regeneration and rebirth. The coexistence and interaction of these three rites sum up the mythical complex of masochism. Deleuze states that we find it again and again, variously embodied throughout the work of Masoch. (*M* 94) The last would appear to be the essential rite in which the other two culminate and from which they derive their function in the totality of the myth. It is this rebirth which Bloom strives for through the mythical body of Molly: the rebirth of his lost son Rudy, the rebirth of his sexual relationship with Molly, his own rebirth, and the rebirth of Ireland. Yet such a revolt is in the end a fantasy as Bloom can gain from his ritualised masochistic endeavours only temporary relief and a false sense of self. In its emphasis on rebirth it resembles the ‘resurrection’ central to Christian belief and the ritualistic Mariolatry of the Roman Catholic Church.

Whereas there is widespread if not universal attachment to myths of rebirth in different cultures, Christianity and masochistic ritual share the commonality of re-birth

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215 Deleuze, ‘Désir et plaisir’. p. 64.
without the father’s involvement or even presence. In Christianity, God keeps a safe
distance from the ‘sinful’ scene sending the Paraclete as ‘helper’ – as the name implies
in Greek – or even substitute for God in the insemination process. As Mulligan puts it:
‘My mother’s a jew, my father’s a bird’, (U 22) similarly the father in masochistic ritual
is entirely expunged from the scene. This contrasts greatly with Greek or even Hindu
mythology where Krishna, as the incarnation of Vishnu, descends to earth and wrecks
sexual havoc amongst the cow-girls by inseminating them by the score.

In a typical double irony, Joyce deploys Tom Kernan, Martin Cunningham’s
alcoholic Roman Catholic convert, to set the scene which shows that whilst Bloom
succumbs without question to the rituals of masochism he sees clearly through the
transcendent hollowness of the Church’s rituals which entrap his fellow citizens:

Mr Kernan said with solemnity:
—I am the resurrection and the life. That touches a man’s inmost heart.
—It does, Mr Bloom said.

Your heart perhaps but what price the fellow in the six feet by two with his toes to
the daisies? No touching that. Seat of the affections. Broken heart. A pump after
all, pumping thousands of gallons of blood every day. One fine day it gets bunged
up and there you are. Lots of them lying around here: lungs, hearts, livers. Old
rusty pumps: damn the thing else. The resurrection and the life. Once you are dead
you are dead. That last day idea. Knocking them all up out of their graves. Come
forth, Lazarus! And he came fifth and lost the job. Get up! Last day! Then every
fellow mousing around for his liver and his lights and the rest of his traps. Find
damn all of himself that morning. (U 133)

Bloom is however too obsessively focused on his own and other masochistic rebirths
and its supposed attainment through its ritual to appreciate how similar are these to the
Christian preoccupation with rebirth, new life, and resurrection, allied to the Church’s
ritualistic control. Yet the forces which constitute the societal controls of Roman
Catholicism are also evinced through Bloom’s masochistic rituals and the belief which
underpins them. This shows that Bloom’s masochism is not only implicitly aligned
with, but is actually constituted by, the very same hegemonic controlling forces which
make up Roman Catholicism and it is thus recoupable by such forces for capitalism. It
is not only Bloom who is so constituted, or his Irish Catholic peer group, but all of us in
capitalist society today.
The shame and humiliation which cuckolding brings about on its masochistic perpetrator is both an essential feature of the masochistic contract and its central ritual. Cuckolding offers the key to the ritualised scenarios Bloom devises in ‘Circe’ as the degradation which it affords him both highlights and exacerbates his shame and loss of face. Viewed from the wider social angle the situations the masochist devises are made deliberately unpalatable to the oedipalised heterosexual, as the main objective is to make his witnesses/ readers uncomfortable and dislocate their sense of self. The success of the masochistic ritual depends upon both the spectators’ laughter directed at the masochist and, more importantly, the implicitly undermining of their own gendered identities. When this is achieved the masochist has accomplished his aims and has exercised a subtle control throughout the scenarios enacted. I suggest that, as readers of Ulysses, Bloom’s deliberate subversion of his own masculinity problematises our own previously unquestioned securities and gendered identities. The world as it is presented to us by Bloom, we are forced to acknowledge, is our own world.

Bloom is actually very upset at the prospect of Boylan’s cuckolding, witness his state of mind at the end of ‘Lestrygonians’ where he goes out of his way to avoid coming face to face with Boylan rather than confronting him. Bloom says, ‘Won’t look. Wine in my face. Why did I? Too heady. Yes, it is. The walk. Not see. Get on’ and his heart pounds. (U 234) The contrast here with his bravery, even foolhardiness at the end of the ‘Cyclops’ episode is marked and points to the need for masochistic sexual debasement which in ‘Circe’ results in his politely thanking Boylan for allowing him to apply his ‘eye to the keyhole and play with yourself while I just go through her a few times’. (U 670) He even couples this with a further request for degradation in first thanking Boylan and then asking ‘May I bring two men chums to witness the deed and take a snapshot’. (U 670)

Many Joycean critics will point out that this is pure fantasy of ambiguous origin and that both Molly and Boylan as well as Bloom himself are here nothing more than fantasies and that the whole scenario cannot be taken seriously. From a Deleuzian viewpoint things cannot be dismissed, downgraded, or simply laughed off in this way. Everything is real, everything is immanent for Deleuze. These fantasies, just as much as Stephen Dedalus’s insight into the controlling forces of the Roman Catholic Church
allied to the British imperialist state, are 'symptomatically' diagnosing the social order, and indeed taking Stephen's diagnosis further. The 'Circe' episode, in marked contrast to that of 'Penelope', shows Bloom in complete control of the script through his debasement. Here, his ritualised casting of himself, Boylan and Molly in theatrically enacted adultery, in which he dances attendance on Boylan - and the opportunity for absolute degradation which this offers - affords him that mental and physical torture which he craves, giving him some release from guilt and sexual tension; but it also, and more importantly, convincingly points to that masochistic enmeshment in capitalism's structures which Holland has referred to.

As with Bloom in 'Circe' the willing servitude in *Venus in Furs* which Severin demonstrates in the rituals he devises is there in order to intensify his shame through his worship of Wanda as masterful torturess. These masochistic rituals may appear to make Severin insignificant, but he is actually the focus of attention holding in place, controlling and directing the ritual, as Molly has herself recognized with respect to Bloom. This ritual includes organizing one's own cuckolding whilst railing against it. Thus Mackey's naive assumption in his book *Chaos Theory and James Joyce's Everyman*, shared no doubt by many a reader, that Bloom wishes to replace Rudy with Stephen, as adopted son within a reconstituted nuclear family, is problematised by his own troubled statement: '[h]aving asked Stephen if he is willing to stay over for the night, having offered an enticing view of Molly's appeal, Bloom can't help but wonder about the impasse her attraction might create'. Even his humiliation at the hands of Boylan appears not to be enough for Bloom, and Stephen may well be the next 'mark' for him as he persists in seeking yet further humiliation. Nevertheless, Mackey's assumption that Bloom wishes to re-establish a nuclear family has wider implications as I will show. Moreover, with Bloom and Stephen, as putative father and son, one sees the homoerotic investment of the social order manifesting itself in a different form through the 'mother'/ female.

Clearly what is of interest for Deleuze in Sacher-Masoch’s novels is his delineation of societal masochism as a response to Hapsburg and Ottoman imperialism. (M 26) Masoch describes the disempowerment of ‘the minorities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire [and] the role of women in the agricultural communes of the steppe, religious sects ... and in panslavism’; (DR 114) ‘[h]is work is deeply influenced by the problems of nationalities, minority groups and revolutionary movements in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, hence his Galician, Jewish, Hungarian, Prussian tales’. (M 9) In novels such as *The Judith of Bialopol*, Masoch depicts ‘a woman patriot, [who] in order to save her town, asks to be brought before the Turks, surrenders her husband to them as a slave and gives herself to the Pasha’. (M 26) Bloom, presumably, could ask for nothing more given his obsession with the Orient. (U 72-73) Rather than giving a name to a perverse psychological condition Deleuze insists that Masoch’s importance lies in his contributions to the development of the novel which now needs to be read in the light of its world-historical dimension and its diagnostic ‘affects’. He argues that Masoch brought into focus the previously silent voices of the minorities of the Austro-Hungarian empire, rather like Kafka, and he pays particular attention to the resistance of women within these groups as a minority within minorities. Deleuze contrasts Masoch as a sophisticated and perceptive novelist with the crudities of de Sade: ‘[t]he aesthetic and dramatic suspense of Masoch contrasts with the mechanical, cumulative repetition of Sade’. (M 34) Such Sadean repetitions seem to suggest the ‘bare repetitions’ of Bergson’s continuous present, and the ‘plane of organisation’ rather than the implied drawing of Masoch on the ‘whole’ time of the past or ‘duration’, and ‘the plane of immanence’.

Deleuze situates socially and historically masochistic practices as acts of ethico-political resistance, no matter how ultimately ineffective they might turn out to be. (TP 155) In so doing Deleuze argues that Sacho-Masoch restores to their historical situation social acts of resistance which from a narrow psychoanalytic perspective can only appear as the psychopathological symptoms of disturbed individuals. It is, of course, argued here that in employing similar tactics Joyce does the same in his depiction of the Irish Jew Bloom located in a colonial Ireland ruled by Church and State, thus
highlighting the often conflicting forces of the ‘molar’ and ‘molecular’ lines which compose us all. Whilst Hardt and Negri celebrate the ‘primacy of resistance’\footnote{Hardt and Negri, Multitude. pp. 64-69; and Empire, pps. xvi. 211-212.} to global capitalism even if it stems from radical Islamic fundamentalism resulting in death for suicide bombers and victims alike – and as such is profoundly anti-Deleuzian as it emphasises death over life and a supposedly transcendent martyrdom in heaven as a reward for the perpetrators – they do not seem to appreciate that masochism which offers the most common form of resistance in the Western world is recoupable on its molar line through capitalism’s ‘reterritorialising’ forces.

Both Joyce and Deleuze appreciate that masochism is a response and an attempt to counteract sadism. In societal terms they both appear to agree on and highlight the significance of the powerful apparatuses of Church and State whose sadistic forces not only bring into play subversive masochistic activity as a countervailing rebellion, but actually and perhaps paradoxically constitute, negate and attempt to reclaim it. Deleuze shows this through his analysis of Masoch’s work, and Joyce gives us many early instances of the means whereby the Church exercises sadistic control at the micro level. Thus, in *A Portrait*, Stephen’s unjust pandying is carried out by an evidently sadistic Father Dolan. Moreover, Stephen’s courageous attempt to challenge this injustice is defeated by the complicity not only of Fathers Conmee and Dolan, but also that of his own father in casually relating his and their betrayal to Stephen as if it were of no account. Joyce shows us that the negative forces of the Church, working through priests and docile fathers, deal with all such naïve challenges with impunity. Stephen’s willingness to accept the pain of pandying and to run the gauntlet of a potentially painful rebuff from a hypocritical authority in which he trusts, and has been contractually committed to by his father, unwittingly places him in the role of masochistic victim. Whilst his attempted rebellion brings into play the ‘molecular line’ available to the masochist, the passive acceptance of the betrayals of his ‘fathers’ when he his made aware of this reconstitutes him on the dominant ‘molar’ line of the masochist.
Father Dolan's sadism indicates that such priests have a key systemic role in the Church's exercise of power; for, in exercising his sadistic control Dolan breaks the unwritten contract of fairness and reciprocity binding student and teacher together. Furthermore, he may well not seek to root out activities like 'smuggling', but rather covertly encourage them in order to ensure further opportunities for the exercise of the Church's power. In this instance as with the sadism displayed by the priest at the Catholic retreat\(^{218}\) we can clearly see, as Deleuze claims, that 'sadism is institutional'. (M 134) It is against this repressive background and Stephen's childish attempt to overcome it that Joyce, I believe, took his previous societal examination a step further by portraying his main character Bloom in *Ulysses* as strongly masochistic and as such offering a more sophisticated, if ultimately nullified, challenge to Church and State than simply depicting the paralysis they engender.

Deleuze in *Logic of Sense* notes that:

> ... the voyeur [undergoes] a more intense participation than if he had himself experienced these passions, the double or the reflection of which he now surveys in the faces of others. This is the case in Klossowski's works, when Octave establishes the law of hospitality according to which he 'gives' his wife Roberte to the guests. (this strange theme of theft and gift, it will be recalled, appears also in Joyce's *Exiles*) [2.6]

and Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* add that:

> Desire knows nothing of exchange, *it knows only theft and gift*, at times the one within the other under the effect of a primary homosexuality. Thus the antiexchangist amorous machine encountered by Joyce in *Exiles*’ [4.2].

These quotations can be seen to relate not simply to Klossowski's works, or Joyce's *Exiles*, but equally if not more so to Bloom in *Ulysses*. Certainly the homosexual reference about Bloom which Mulligan makes is unmistakeable: ‘[t]he wandering jew ... Did you see his eye? He looked upon you to lust after you. I fear thee, ancient mariner. O, Kinch, thou art in peril. Get thee a breechpad’. (U 279) However, Marilyn

\(^{218}\) Earlier still in *Dubliners* we can see the parallels between Father Flynn and the 'queer old josser' in 'An Encounter'. Here too the passionate emphasis of the latter on the whipping of young boys anticipates and forms a link with the sadistic Father Dolan of *A Portrait*.
French has designated Mulligan himself as having homosexual designs on Stephen Dedalus and such statements are seen, by her, as a disguised projection of his own desires, which accords with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s view of patriarchal society as I will show.

In the Deleuzian diagnosis of ‘primary homosexuality’, through his ‘gift’ of Molly to Boylan, and later attempted gift of her to Stephen, as well as his imploring ‘strongmembered males’ to use her in the ‘Circe’ episode, I argue that there is a direct link with the ‘molarising’ forces constituting the homosocial order and its underpinning homosexuality in ‘oedipalised’ modernity, and that Joyce uses Bloom’s masochistic voyeurism to exemplify and, as I hope to show, to challenge this. Here I am relying, not simply on Deleuze, but to a large extent on the powerful argument of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. Whatever additional reasons there may have been for the savage treatment meted out to Bob Doran above, the uneasy relationship between repressed homosexuality – expressed through homophobia – and the homosocial order which Sedgwick pinpoints, is the motivating force for his narratorial denigration.

Sedgwick brings together homosexuality, homosociability and homophobia in a powerful explanatory model in the introduction to her readings of Alfred Lord Tennyson, and Charles Dickens. She convincingly argues that the price paid for a hegemonic patriarchal homosociability with its implicit homosexual underpinning is a rigidly enforced homophobia. Sedgwick notes that male-male desire is legitimated on a homosocial basis and that this allows the privileges accorded to males to be maintained in a patriarchal society. However, homosociability is regulated and policed by homophobia and misogyny. Furthermore, in her understanding, heterosexual marriage retains its importance because of the social stigma attached to male-male eroticism, it

221 Ibid. pp. 1-27.
acts as a buttress against the revelation of such forces by helping to maintain social norms. Nevertheless, the instability of a social order which privileges male-male relationships, dependent upon ‘a primary homosexuality’ which the patriarchal fellowship must itself condemn and refute, is self-evident as the treatment accorded to Doran attests.

Sedgwick is also cited by Margot Norris in her analysis of ‘A Painful Case’ in *Dubliners*. Norris gives a double reading of the narrative in the light of the two great sex scandals which dominated the headlines at the time. The first was that of Parnell’s adultery with Kitty O’Shea and she reads it as Joyce’s ironic comment on what happens to both Mrs Sinico and Duffy when the latter behaves ‘properly’, in the way that Dante O’Riordan and the priests would expect him to behave, and the dire consequences this has for the refusal of desire. Norris then turns to the Oscar Wilde case and to what she then argues is Duffy’s latent homosexuality which will not allow him to consummate his relationship with Mrs Sinico. She particularly relies on the lines ‘Love between man and man is impossible because there must not be sexual intercourse and friendship between man and woman is impossible because there must be sexual intercourse’, and Duffy’s patronising of the ‘dull eatery in St George’s Street’ where ‘he felt himself safe from the society of Dublin’s gilded youth’. Sedgwick’s comments on Wilde’s *Dorian Gray*, ‘as having a thematically full “homosexual” meaning’ are used by Norris to underpin her argument. According to this reading it is the stigma of ‘homosexuality’, involving criminalisation at that time, that Duffy seeks to avoid. Consequently, he cannot afford to reveal himself, in the way that Bob Doran has inadvertently revealed himself, and in doing so disclose the hidden homosexual forces binding together the homosocial group in the pub, policed by a rabid homophobia. One might see too a faint foreshadowing of Bloom’s cuckolding in Captain Sinico’s evident willingness to leave his wife alone for long periods with another man.

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I would like to add to Sedgwick's diagnosis that, viewed in terms of 'the second plane of writing', it is the channelling of impersonal desiring forces through capitalism's 'oedipalising' tendencies which accounts for this 'primary homosexuality' according to Deleuze and Guattari. As I hope to show in Chapter Four, the distortion of desire in modernity is accomplished for men through a castrating pincer movement in which the forces of free flowing desire are first captured in the nuclear family as an institution which then channels such masculine desire incestuously to the mother and sister and finally imposes a taboo on its realization. The crippling effects of this are then carried forward into the homosocial relationship and the objectification and denigration of all women under the aegis of a repressed but ever present 'primary' homosexuality and consequent misogyny. Joyce carries this 'symptomatological' diagnosis of the modern capitalist socius beyond the individual and social 'paralysis' endemic at the turn of the twentieth century in Dublin through societal masochism in Bloom, and indicates how patriarchy is held in place by homophobia constituted in the nuclear family situation.

Bloom's avoidance of carnal intercourse with his wife or other women forms part of the same masochistic constellation as his cuckold. His sexual arousal is kept distinct from any feeling of love or sympathy. This is also indicated in the 'Nausicaa' episode where, as he implies, had he known of Gerty's lameness it would have been impossible for him to desire her sexually, to masturbate and ejaculate. Whenever he empathises with women and their suffering such empathy kills his desire. Yet, unlike Boylan, he cannot help relating sympathetically to women's suffering, as his concern for Mrs Purefoy in the 'Oxen of the Sun' episode demonstrates. Consequently, only by elevating women into the 'masculine' position of strength and power can he become sexually aroused. This adds further weight to both Sedgwick's argument and Deleuze's point about the male masochist's 'primary homosexuality' [4.2].

Bloom's 'masculine' women range from the 'slavey' with the crooked skirt who whacks the carpet when cleaning it, to Bella/ Bello and the upper-class women who bestride their horses and ride and drink like men. Thus, in 'Circe' Bloom seems to have yearned for prolonged degrading cruelty at the hands of three upper-class women: Mrs.
Yelverton Barry, Mrs. Bellingham, Mrs. Mervyn Talboys. (U 591-593) Mrs. Bellingham claims that Bloom addressed her ‘with fulsome compliments as a Venus in furs’, (U 592) which of course shows Joyce’s awareness of Sacher-Masoch’s *Venus in Furs*. (One can also see an echo of this reading in *Giacomo Joyce* with a ‘pale face surrounded by heavy odorous furs. Her movements are shy and nervous. She uses quizzingglasses’. Mrs Bellingham too wore both furs and quizzing glasses.) All three ladies testify that Bloom implored them ‘to chastise him as he richly deserves, to bestride and ride him, to give him a most vicious horsewhipping’. (U 593) However, Bloom confesses that he ‘meant only the spanking idea. A warm tingling glow without effusion. Refined birching to stimulate the circulation’. (U 593-594) Setting aside the humour this accords with Richard Baumeister’s account of authentic masochistic ritual whereby:

masochists desire pain in small, very carefully measured doses[they typically] seek pain without injury. In a sense masochists fictionalize pain ... Masochists do not want to be harmed. They want safe pain.  

Despite seeking degradation at the hands of a dominatrix they wish to retain control of the situation.

When Bloom becomes Bella/Bello’s ‘bondslave’, and she/he takes sadistic control and grinds her/his heel into Bloom’s neck, then grabs his/her hair violently and drags him/her forward whilst squatting on his/her face, and finally whilst stubbing out a cigar in Bloom’s ear and bestriding him, hurtfully squeezes his/her testicles, she has gone too far and Bloom is enraged. Bella/Bello has gone beyond the always implicit threat which Wanda posed for Severin in *Venus in Furs*, when she said, ‘beware, I might grow to enjoy [inflicting cruelty]. (M 21) She/ he has broken a cardinal rule of the unwritten, but as Bloom believes implicitly understood, contract: ‘[y]ou have broken the spell. The last straw’ (U 661) he says – this is ‘the spell’ cast through fantasised ritual activity – and he proceeds to hurl insults at her as he demands that she ‘[f]ool someone else not me’. (U


This again reflects on our condition in modernity. We both tolerate and seek some pain because of the feelings of guilt and shame imposed on us through our Christian/liberal-humanist consciences but we threaten to revolt if this becomes too great. We will contribute generously to Tsunami relief funds and respond with alacrity to Live8’s aims to abolish world poverty, just as long as they don’t impinge on our own consumer-driven life styles too much and cause too much pain.

Through the complex forces which constitute Bloom as masochist he attempts a subversive resistance and control not by asserting his masculinity but by parodying that masculinity and taking the judgement of his peers to excessive lengths by refuting and degrading that unified masculinity which neither his Irish compatriots nor ultimately the British imperial state will allow him (and one must add them). In Deleuzoguattarian terms this may be regarded as the initial autopoietic move to ‘becoming woman’. Unfortunately this is not the case. Constituted as masochist by the very forces which ensure his domination such a perverse rebellion ends in inevitable failure as he is recuperated by these constituting forces. It is the very coldness and calculation which goes into the masochistic act which militates against its success. Molly observes of Bloom ‘living with him so cold’. (U 925) Such coldness and calculation (U 910) are irretrievably linked to the exploitative ‘molar’ forces of capitalism. As Eugene Holland has said such masochistic forces capture and constitute everyone in the capitalist socius as one sees with Boylan and the Citizen.

In his deliberate choice of Boylan, whom he regards as ‘the worst man in Dublin’ (U 115) as his cuckolder, we see a parody of that one-dimensional ‘hyper-masculinity’(U 923-924) for which the colonialised Irish male constantly strives but which he fails to attain. Boylan himself, as much as the Nationalist Citizen whom Joyce satirises so effectively in the ‘Cyclops’ episode, (U 382-383) is no more than a pawn in the sadistic game which the British state is playing with Ireland. Boylan, the Citizen, and all of their Irish compatriots, male and female alike, are part of that.

‘symptomatological’ masochism which epitomises colonial Ireland. Thus, despite his massive genitals, and ‘the poking and rooting and ploughing he had up in [Molly]’ (U 913), Boylan lacks ‘spunk’ (U 877) and fails to father a child on Molly. Yet, those Irish men who have fathered many children in ‘holy wedlock’, such as Simon Dedalus or Theodore Purefoy, are not exempt from the same dehumanising forces stemming from the capitalist ‘socius’, indeed their subjection to the marital demands of their respective churches exemplifies this as their womenfolk are ground into the dust through excessive child bearing and the former, at least, impoverishes his over-large family rather than providing for them. This epitomises the Irish male’s conflictual status under imperialism as the play on the word ‘spunk’ in Boylan’s case also indicates a lack of courage. Despite the striving for hyper-masculinity they are textually depicted by Joyce as impotent and feminised as is Bloom their effective exemplar.

Thus, Boylan portrayed as an Edwardian ‘masher’, in a vain attempt to have everything his own way, twice loses out on Bloom’s ‘throwaway’. He first does this through his conventional wisdom preferring the ‘favourite’ to Bloom’s ‘outsider’. Then by his self-satisfied patriarchal disregard of a woman’s feelings he ‘throws away’ any prospect of receiving Molly’s love, and incidentally any prospect of ‘becoming woman’ himself. Consequently, he unwittingly takes on a bit part in Bloom’s script which simply indicates that he is masochistically entrapped as just another pawn in the culture of a colonial power, despite his complacent failure to recognise this. Boylan, depicted as no more than a gigantic ‘one-eyed’ penis, shares his one-eyed identity with the Cyclopean Citizen.

Boylan is represented as apolitical but in the Citizen’s previous athletic prowess (U 410) and ironic gigantism (U 382) now reduced by his excessive drinking to the physical status of someone with the medical condition of ‘dropsy’, (U 444) we have a near match. Now the Citizen in his oedemised impotence is ‘all wind and piss’ as he ‘waddle[s] to the door puffing and blowing’. (U 425) Drinking has given the Citizen the morbid ‘feminine’ fluidity which in his one-eyed identity as hyper-masculine he refuses

227 Ibid.
to accept. The forces of societal masochism bodily forth by Joyce through Bloom which eschews patriarchal masculinity and attempts to replace it with a forceful femininity simply highlights this refusal.

As the Citizen seeks to avenge the ‘insult’ which Bloom has given to the Roman Catholic God and Christ by ‘contaminating’ them with Jewishness, and thereby feminising them even further, he picks up a weapon. It is not ‘a couched spear of acuminated granite’ (U 383) or even ‘a mighty cudgel fashioned out of paleolithic stone’, (U 384) but a Jacob’s biscuit tin. (U 445) This tin was made in Britain as were the biscuits it formerly contained. It epitomises the exploitative importation of British goods into the Irish market. It shows that the citizen despite his protests is totally dependent on and subsumed by colonialism and capitalism. He is so imbued with the fascistic values of the conqueror that he has no native weaponry left. In a typically ironic Joycean twist it seems apparent too that the biscuit manufacturers were probably Jewish.

Even ‘the famous old Irish red wolfdog setter formerly known by the sobriquet of Garryowen and recently rechristened by his large circle of friends and acquaintances Owen Garry’ (U 403) which almost attacks the narrator, and would ‘tear [Bloom] limb from limb’(U 448) if it could only catch him, is domesticated in the next episode – during Gerty MacDowell’s encounter with Bloom – to ‘grandpapa Giltrap’s lovely dog Garryowen that almost talked, it was so human’. (U 458) Thereby subduing, and anthropomorphizing, not only the national dog’s savagery but also domesticating the nationalist citizen as ‘grandpapa Giltrap’ within an ‘oedipalised’ capitalist family circle.

All of the homosocial group which surround Bloom in their attempts to divert attention from their predicament whether through drink, gambling, Nationalist boasting and fantasy, blaming the foreigner or Jew, the female betrayer and adulteress, or as with Boylan his diversionary cuckoldry, only temporarily displace the problem. They are all implicitly addressing ‘the (non)-being of a persistent question to which the cosmic ‘Yes’ of Mrs Bloom corresponds, without being a response, since it alone adequately occupies and fills that space’[1.3]. We see the implicit parallels which Joyce draws between Bloom inviting the foreigner and ‘usurper’ Boylan into the intimacies of his
wife's bed and home reflected in the citizen's remarks, '[t]he strangers, says the citizen. Our own fault. We let them come in. We brought them'. He recognises the genesis of the problem, then illogically turns this against the Jew and the female other: 'The adulteress and her paramour brought the Saxon robbers here ... a dishonoured wife, says the citizen, that's what's the cause of all our misfortunes', (U 420) in an acceptance of imperialist patriarchal misogyny. Joyce gives him the deeply ironic line: 'Raimeis, says the citizen. There's no-one as blind as the fellow that won't see'. (U 423)

Both the Citizen and his nationalist cohort oppose force to force '[w]e'll put force against force, says the citizen', (U 427) in a 'bare repetition' of the same. An ironically named John Wyse advises Bloom who complains of persecution and injustice to do the same, '[r]ight ... Stand up to it then with force like men'. (U 432) Bloom equates force with hatred and turns back to its bipolar opposite by offering 'love' – monopolised by institutional Christianity – as the only conceivable alternative in another 'bare repetition'. Deleuze points out in Proust and Signs that Proust regards this 'world of love' as fundamentally defective as it is characterised by betrayal. Joyce, too, immediately satirises Bloom's statement, (U 433) as it implicitly returns him and us to the institutional religion of Roman Catholicism which is in cahoots with British colonialism and state capitalism.

It is necessary to stress that in advocating love, Bloom's love is a masochistic version which is used by the masochist as a major means of establishing and maintaining control, as of course it is by the Church. An injunction to love is not love itself, a thought of love is not a loving thought. Bloom's call for love epitomises the Church's fascistic method of control. Both the citizen's and Bloom's responses are seen as complicit with the 'always already' givens, bipolarities and 'bare repetitions' of a continuous present dominated and determined by the forces which 'masochistically' constitute Christian morality, colonialism, and capitalism on a conflictual 'molar' line: 'love or hatred are no longer sentiments but affects [which] traverse the body like arrows, they are arms of war.' (TP 356) As indeed the early twenty first century continues to show us as the remaining super-power lovingly offers freedom and democracy through war to an embattled people in Iraq, forgetting the words of the American officer in the Vietnam war who declared that 'in order to save this village it
was necessary to destroy it'. A different ethical position would stress new thought and ‘affects’ through ‘desire’ and life itself rather than the failed simplistic bipolar moral responses dredged up as the only alternatives: ‘[k]nowing how to love ... means extracting ... the flows, the n sexes that constitute the girl of that sexuality’. (TP 277)

This attempt to elide the problem is epitomised through Bloom in the ‘Sirens’ episode with its deliberate use of linguistic excess and musicality as Karen Lawrence points out: ‘the play of language is in fact, a kind of linguistic diversion from the main event of the day, which occurs offstage: Molly’s adultery with Boylan’. Andrew Warren shows Bloom becoming pleasantly distracted in this episode despite the frequent reminders of his pending cuckolding which he both seeks and abhors. Warren argues convincingly that:

the episode’s simultaneous obsession with and distraction from Molly’s infidelity parallels a similar obsession with and distraction from the realities of British Colonial Rule. The musical diversion not only distracts Bloom from his own loneliness and the usurpation of his house and bed, but the musicality also distracts him (and reader, and narrative) from the usurpation of Ireland by the British.

Bloom fails to address the problem appropriately, as he neither turns to new conceptual thought nor to new ‘affects’. For, as Deleuze and Guattari point out, ‘there are other ways, other procedures than masochism, and certainly better ones’. (TP 15)

Joyce offers precisely that different ethical response in the ‘Sirens’ episode itself which is overlooked by both Lawrence and Warren both of whom see the episode as a ‘diversion’. As Joseph Valente shows the barmaids initially break through and subvert from within the controlling patriarchal order no matter if this control is wrested back from them well before the episode ends. Joyce is able to portray women as socially oppressed and sexually exploited, but he also creates a space of resistance where the


molecular' intensities of the siren song actually belongs to the Sirens before its 'molar'
appropriation and recuperation by the males in the public house. Their 'song' brings
about a series of overlapping becomings. There is the 'becoming laughter' of the
'becoming language' of their 'becoming music' which in its 'girlish' intensity almost
culminates in a 'becoming woman', (U 333-335) as they implicitly satirise colonialised
masculinity by laughing at Bloom. Here, as in the 'Oxen' episode, as Froula points out,
Joyce's interpretation of his culture subverts the transferences of a traditional
masculine perspective, and undermines the Symbolic order at its root by the most
powerful form of gender transgression and reveals the social law of gender for what it
is:

Joyce’s modernist self-portraiture brings the repressed maternal substrate of
masculine psychohistory to 'the light of day' – to consciousness and conscience in
a way that is nothing short of revolutionary for the culture founded on its
repression.

Such an epiphanic revelation challenges the fraternal substrata on which the present
homosocial order is based. Joyce in his use of masochism diagnoses this
even more precisely than Froula allows by showing that even such 'molecular'
subversion is entangled with its recuperation through the 'molar line' of the Symbolic
order, and as such shows both the possibilities and difficulties in establishing and
maintaining a viable 'line of flight'. It is through the intensities of Issy in the Wake as
Joyce’s ultimate siren and 'desiring machine' that a resolution to this problem
is ultimately revealed.

'Symptomatology' is the diagnosis of a coalescence of immanent external forces or
investments which opens up the possibility of productive change in people and society,
yet it is evident that Joyce’s choice of Bloom as his protagonist emphasises the
difficulties preventing such productivity; difficulties, I should add, which Hardt and
Negri do not sufficiently take account of. Clearly as an Irish Jew located in a racist sub-

231 Froula, Modernism's Body: Sex, Culture and Joyce, p.28.
232 Ibid, p.3.
section of society such productive ‘outside’ forces are in short supply. Yet, despite its weaknesses, Bloom’s ‘BwO’ still allows some productive activity despite its ‘intensities’ being ‘turned down’ to their lowest point and operating at almost zero degrees. Bloom is constructed through the ‘empty BwO’ of a masochist which Deleuze and Guattari regard as being ‘sewn up’, ‘smothered’, filled only with what they call ‘pain waves’. (TP 150,152,155-156) Such a ‘BwO’ allows only limited productivity as ‘the masochist uses suffering as a way of constituting a “BwO” and bringing forth a plane of consistency of desire’, (TP 155) as an essentially ‘sad’ construction. Nevertheless, with all of its limitations it works in part for Bloom as it does for us. Moreover, such productive forces as are available for him coalesce to give his masochism a distinctly subversive edge.

Although Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus stress the immense powers of ‘reterritorialization’ and ‘recoding’ of capitalism when, after surging forward it reaches a limit – as ‘the boom and the crash’ – it then operates on a recuperative ‘molar line’; they nevertheless acknowledge its enormous underlying ‘rhizomatic’ or ‘schizophrenic’ potential and hence ultimate ‘lines of flight’ which can in principle shatter and take us beyond capitalism and our current state. The personal difficulty is in setting in train and maintaining autopoietic becoming and the linked, over-arching, societal difficulty is in overcoming the economic limits which would allow us to move beyond capitalism. The textual Bloom frequently sets in train such ‘becomings’ on ‘the second plane of writing’, but through his heightened masochism is simply unable to maintain them. One can argue that the same is finally true of the barmaids in the ‘Sirens’ episode and even Molly herself. Although they move towards ‘becoming woman’ they are ultimately constituted through the patriarchal male gaze. The barmaids recognise themselves in terms of patriarchally unified and hence disempowered selves and acquiesce in their assigned roles. Miss Douce sadly notes ‘aren’t men frightful idiots?’ and Miss Kennedy rejoins ‘[i]t’s them has the fine times’. (U 331) Molly, however, offers more resistance.

In addition to the ‘molar’ acceptance of societal ‘givens’ Joyce clearly shows us the masochistic ‘molecular’ subversiveness which is latent in every one of us through our potential questioning of and opposition to accepted societal mores. Although such masochistic subversion does not ultimately succeed in itself, it can nevertheless set in train a process which for example seems to briefly allow Molly in the ‘Penelope’ episode the opportunity to take liberatory advantage of Bloom’s frustrated rebellion. Molly moves beyond the ultimately ‘molarising’ masochistic schema in which Bloom – and through him the State apparatuses in their recuperative strategy – seeks to enmesh her. She attempts to fly beyond their nets by using the ‘molecular line’ of discontinuity which Bloom’s masochism brings into play, as this creates a space which allows her a limited subversive freedom. She is able to do this by recalling from the ‘whole time’ of her own ‘duration’ all of the things Bloom does not know and consequently cannot control. In the active joy which Molly displays we have the necessary conditions for her freedom to be established through a ‘line of flight’. This active joy is shown through her recollection of her own and Milly’s ‘girlhood’ – ‘Molly. Milly. Same thing watered down’ (U 111) – for the ‘molecular woman is the girl’. (TP 276) Nevertheless, Molly’s identification with Milly and her joy in recollecting her own girlhood are tempered by envy and an awareness of her own ageing and fading charms. So her excitement and forward looking thrust are inflected by an element of sad resignation which finally works against her establishing a ‘line of flight’.

As with Molly’s envy, although Bloom is aware that Milly is ‘[a] wild piece of goods. Her slim legs running up the staircase’, (U 81) ‘the girl as fugitive being’, (TP 281) he is unable to use or control such joyful ‘movement’ which from his perspective ‘cannot be [fully] perceived’ because it ‘can occur only by means of affect, passion, in a becoming that is the girl’, (TP 281) instead he is reduced to a passive contemplation and a reliance on ‘destiny’. (U 81) A destiny which has already deprived him of a son and probably in part engendered the negativities of his constructing ‘BwO’. Nevertheless, although Bloom cannot connect with this, in such moments when he fondly remembers ‘Silly Milly’, and quotes ‘poor old professor Goodwin’s’ ditty, (U 75) and the ‘becoming-cat’. ‘becoming-horse’, ‘becoming-animal’ which Milly offers him, (U 813) this indicates his depleted, yet still potentially productive, empathy with the intensities
of the ‘girl’. (In this connection, Richard Ellmann notes in *Giacomo Joyce* that ‘the fillyfoal, “equine portrait”, of the Oxen in the Sun episode, gradually turns into Millicent Bloom’. 234) The ‘girl’ does not always handle him so kindly however as in the ‘Sirens’ episode where at least through the narrator he is equated by Miss Douce and Miss Kennedy with the old fogey in Boyd’s, and indeed all of mankind, (*U* 248) and later he is left to wistfully note ‘a dusty seascape’ with ‘[a] lovely girl, her veil awave upon the headland wind around her’. (*U* 260) It is from such weakened positive forces that his subversive actions stem even if, from such potentially epiphanic moments, it cannot result in an autopoietic ‘becoming-woman’. As with his failure to connect sexually with Molly, his isolated masturbation with Gerty and his unconsummated relationship with Martha Clifford, Bloom hints at sexual interest in his daughter without realising it.

This potentially incestuous relationship is carried forward in a different guise by Joyce in the *Wake*, not in terms of ‘actual’ consummation but in its realisation of and challenge to the forces constituting the patriarchal nuclear family in modernity and its incestuous underpinning conceived on ‘the second plane of writing’. Thus, Hardt and Negri correctly point out that whilst

 decreasing proportions of the U.S. population are involved in the nuclear family … One should not think that the crisis of the nuclear family has brought a decline in the forces of patriarchy. On the contrary, discourses and practices of ‘family values’ seem to be everywhere across the social field. … One is always still in the family … the function of the institution is both more intensive and extensive. The institution work(s) even though [it is] breaking down – and perhaps all the better the more [it] breaks down. 235

We are all constituted through these continuing Christian (or monotheistic, if one is including Jewish or Muslim populations) ‘family values’ and the limitations which they impose on potentially free-flowing desiring forces.

In the ‘Calypso’ episode Bloom is affected by a dark cloud which slowly covers the sun as Jewish images of the desert, the dead sea, the plagues, the cities of the plain, the

desolation of a captive, then a scattered people, crowd into his mind. At the same time.
an old hag crossing the street clutching ‘a noggin bottle by the neck’, (U 73) strengthens
the affect of barrenness, bringing about images of age and death: ‘an old woman’s: the
grey sunken cunt of the world. Desolation. Grey horror seared his flesh’, and ‘Cold oils
slid along his veins, chilling his blood: age crusting him with a salt cloak’. But the
landscape changes once more, bringing out life-giving invisible forces and this
immediately affects Bloom’s mood ‘Quick warm sunlight came running from Berkeley
Road, swiftly, in slim sandals, along the brightening footpath. Runs, she runs to meet
me, a girl with gold hair on the wind’, (U 74) offering him the opportunity to ‘become-
woman’ through ‘becoming-girl’. But he turns away from this and even in ‘Circe’,
despite proclaiming that ‘O, I so want to be a mother’ and giving birth to ‘eight male
yellow and white children, (U 614) he does not ‘become-woman’ but rather remains a
masochist’s parody of a woman.

Yet, I believe that Joyce intuitively appreciates that such masochistic ‘molecular
lines’ can fragment, at least temporarily, the ‘molar segmentations’ of Church/State
colonialism and capitalism. It can create cracks between its segments so that something
productive may pass between them through ‘the middle’. Consequently in Ulysses it is
not Bloom but Molly who perhaps gains most from his masochistic strategy. Whereas,
according to Holland, capitalism would appear to leave the citizen only the fleeting
power of micro-resistance available through masochistic strategies, such a depressing
scenario always resulting in failure, this outcome is not inevitable for those who both
resist its negative force and use its ‘molecularity’ productively as Molly attempts to do.
Despite its failings, Deleuze holds that masochism dismantles the constructed individual
identity and as such is potentially productive. For this reason, he believes that
masochism is ethically and politically potent and serves liberty, because it ‘at least
temporarily’ dismantles the socially constructed self within a capitalist society.

However, it is the fleetingness of its true resistance which places a question mark
against it. Clearly, masochism’s very existence is dependent upon societal constructs, is
brought into play by them, and ultimately allows its resistance to be recaptured. Yet,

215 Hardt and Negri, Empire, p.197.
some instances of the socially constructed identities which masochism temporarily dismantles include gender – what a man or woman ‘should’ be – and the patriarchal beliefs that a woman’s sexual desire should be solely focussed on her husband, that her body belongs to and is in fact his property. Masochistic rituals consist of the undermining by parody of such social constructs of identity.

Critics such as Suzette Henke and Kaja Silverman make perceptive observations on masochism and its relationship to our society in general, but in contradistinction to Holland, they appear to give insufficient weight to the fact that the masochistic rebellion against sadistic societal overcodings is constituted and thus recoupable by the paralysing forces of capitalism. This, as Holland recognizes, is because masochism’s negative controlling aspect is made up in large part of forces similar if not identical to those which constitute the repressive aspects of capitalism on its ‘molar’, ‘reterritorialising line’. Whilst Henke notes that Bloom is ‘imaginatively colluding in the subversion of marital stability by up-ending traditional expectations and putting his own phallic powers deliberately under erasure’; 236 and Silverman too, argues more generally that masochism ‘works insistently to negate personal power and privilege’, 237 I believe that they do not take sufficiently into account this underlying recuperative aspect.

Although their observations are in tune with one aspect of Deleuze’s appreciation of Masochian subtlety in both advocating and simultaneously undermining the contract, (M 13) and incidentally diagnosing the marriage contract in particular as the foundation of the nuclear family and contemporary society’s ‘family values’, this does not complete the Deleuzian picture. These understandings of masochism’s subversive qualities fail to recognise the coldness and control which has to be exercised by the masochist in order to achieve his or her ends. Such coldness is ‘sad’ and life-denying,


consequently in broader terms it can only offer a partially successful rebellion against the sadistic control of the State, because both types of control emphasise stasis and stem from the same conglomeration of negative forces.

Of all the characters in *Ulysses* perhaps Molly comes nearest to establishing a ‘line of flight’. She undoubtedly encourages and enjoys Boylan’s sexual attentions, as Bloom in ‘Circe’ intends, but she takes this on her own terms and does not like or accept his crassness as we see in ‘Penelope’. At the beginning of the final sentence in Penelope she calls Boylan an ‘ignoramous’ (*U* 924) who fails to ask permission and consequently doesn’t know his proper place: ‘standing out that vulgar way in the half of a shirt they wear to be admired’. (*U* 924) Yet, she acknowledges that she is ‘a little like that dirty bitch in that Spanish photo he [Bloom] has’, (*U* 892) and she uses Boylan to satisfy her own desires. Even if we believe that she protests too much at this point and that rather than being offended by Boylan’s rough treatment she may – because of her excessive denials – actually appreciate being slapped on the backside, she is nevertheless upset by his failure to admire her. Despite the much more positive ‘intensities’ which stem from ‘her’ ‘BwO’, as opposed to those constituting Bloom, the masochism which goes to make up even the most robust person under capitalism may be seen here as re-surfacing.

Joyce has earlier subtly informed us that such slaps indicate commodification and ownership within capitalist society, in tune with the ‘molar line’ of masochism, when he mentions in ‘Calypso’ that the breeders in the cattle market slapped ‘a palm on a ripemeated hindquarter’, (*U* 71) and again in ‘Wandering Rocks’ where Ned Lambert slaps ‘a piebald haunch’. (*U* 297) Yet, there is little doubt that in stating ‘that’s no way for him’ (presumably, to behave), and ‘sure you might as well be in bed with what with a lion’. (*U* 924) she has been both surprised and disappointed by Boylan’s sheer brutishness, complete self-absorption, lack of even moderately good manners, any consideration for her feelings and his total unwillingness or inability to indulge in sweet-talk. He reveals his complete assimilation by the ‘molar line’ and a consequent
capitulation to capitalist mores by only being able to treat her as a commodity. Nevertheless, she anxiously looks forward to his further promised visit.

This critical assessment of Boylan is immediately followed in the text by her positive reference to Bloom in ‘God I'm sure he'd have something better to say for himself an old Lion would’. (U 924) It would seem that of the two she might actually prefer Bloom’s amatory attentions, had they been as available as they once were, which indeed Wanda would those of Severin in Venus in Furs. A point which is given greater credibility in Molly’s later statement in ‘Penelope’ that Bloom truly understands women and a woman’s body: ‘I liked him because I saw he understood or felt what a woman is’. (U 932) Bloom’s ‘molecular’ potential for ‘becoming woman’ is highlighted and this contrasts with Boylan and the other men she has known who are ‘all mad to get in there ... you’d think they could never get far enough up and then they're done with you’. (U 902) Such conventional men, constructed almost entirely from the ‘molar lines’ which constitute patriarchal modernity, take no account of women’s needs but are only concerned to satisfy their own desires.

The recuperative ‘molar line’ of Bloom’s masochistic fetishism remains dominant throughout Ulysses, and drives Molly in the ‘Penelope’ episode to make the exasperated remark that if he persists in only wanting to kiss her bottom then she’ll force him to stick his tongue ‘7 miles up my hole as he's there my brown part’, (U 929) for which she will charge him either a pound or a pound and a half. In both instances we are reminded of the status patriarchal society consigns women to as they are forced to trade sex directly for money or possible longer term financial reward without their partners having to give a thought to their emotional needs. Molly’s reaction shows that even she cannot finally escape the ‘masochistic nets’ of patriarchy. As Stephen observes in Stephen Hero:

A woman’s body is a corporal asset of the State: if she traffic with it she must sell it either as a harlot or as a married woman or as a working celibate or as a mistress. But a woman is (incidentally) a human being: and a human being’s love and freedom is not a spiritual asset of the State. ... A human being can exert freedom to produce or to accept, or love to procreate or to satisfy. Love gives and freedom takes. (SH 202-203)
Yet, even in denigrating her husband, and reducing their sexual encounters to that of a prostitute and her client, and instancing her avarice, Molly would like to get Bloom to penetrate her in some way. No doubt this is why, in part, despite his unfeeling crudity, she still wonders if Boylan will come again at four next Monday as he has promised. After ten years of non-penetrative sex it seems that Molly is very similarly placed to Wanda. Severin uses the love Wanda feels for him to manipulate and instruct her in how to torture him. The same is equally true of Bloom.

Molly’s resistance is akin to that shown in Sacho-Masoch’s novels by the disempowered women of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and has a masochistic edge. In calling for resistance as the ‘key to every active political position’ in the new world of global capitalism,\textsuperscript{238} as ‘the political aim of being-against is always to subvert the power of imperial sovereignty’,\textsuperscript{239} Hardt and Negri regard resistance as ‘prefigur[ing] an alternative global society’.\textsuperscript{240} As argued above, however, if this is a masochistic resistance it will be recuperated by the very powers which constitute global capital. The forces of masochistic ‘reterritorialisation’ which reclaim Molly need to be taken account of by Hardt and Negri. It is the case that Molly’s micro-political resistance only becomes apparent in the final episode when she is given agency and a voice. Then we are at last made aware that she is both inside and outside of Bloom’s masochistic ritual operating in ‘the middle’, and like Masoch contesting the sensible world from within as she occupies ‘...a curious interworld, in which bodies and words, things and ideas interpenetrate and the traditional demarcations between the physical and the metaphysical become blurred’\textsuperscript{241}

\textsuperscript{238} Hardt and Negri, \textit{Empire}, p.211.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid, p. 212.
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid, p.xvi.
Unlike Bloom’s construction of Bella/Bello as dominatrix in the ‘Circe’ episode, in ‘Penelope’ Molly resists his attempts to place her in this role. This rejection takes a number of forms. Thus, she explicitly rejects Bloom’s choice of reading matter: ‘th’eres nothing for a woman in all that invention made up’. (U 890) Moreover, Bloom himself is prone to over-estimating his success in his educational endeavours with Molly. For instance in ‘The Sirens’ episode he claims that he held her ‘hypnotized listening’ (U 367) by his talk on Spinoza, but we learn in ‘Penelope’ that far from any interest in what he was trying to teach her, she was only aware of sitting in a ‘swamp’ as her menstrual period had just started. (U 914) Here Joyce ironically opposes the intensities of ‘molecular lines’ of the constituent ‘BwO’ which compose Molly, through her actualised corporeal bodily functions, to the ‘molar’ lines constituting Bloom’s attempted masochistic indoctrination.

We learn from Molly that Bloom, despite an attempt to gain total control, knows little of her girlhood and the Gibraltar days and nights shared with Mulvey and of Stanhope which she deliberately keeps hidden from him. Yet, she has undermined her own resistance for she must have told him of the former at least, as in the ‘Ithica’ episode Bloom, briefly concerned about Milly’s paternity, remarks on ‘lieutenant Mulvey, British Navy’, in this connection. (U 812) Molly’s resistance to Bloom’s demands inflected with a degree of ‘sad’ resentment is also seen in such remarks as ‘Im to be slooching around down in the kitchen to get his lordship his breakfast while he lies rolled up like a mummy will I indeed’, (U 926) and more generally expressing her awareness of women’s powerlessness and confinement in patriarchal society, she remarks that men can ‘pick and choose what they please ... but were to be always chained up’, (U 924) echoing the remarks of the barmaids in the ‘Sirens’ episode (U 331) but attempting to move beyond them.

We see in sentence two of ‘Penelope’ that she is prepared to show Bloom the spot where Bartell d’Arcy kissed her on the choir-stairs not simply to shock Bloom, but to demonstrate to us that Bloom doesn’t know or control everything about her life. (U 882) Crucially, she also states that ‘theyre not going to be chaining me up no damn fear once I start I tell you ...’. (U 924) Nevertheless she is entrapped by being financially reliant on either Bloom or Boylan. Yet, Molly’s insight into Bloom’s perversely manipulative
tendencies give her a degree of freedom which she uses. After all it is not an ‘empty BwO’ which works through Molly. It may well be that the only immediate object of desire available to her is Boylan, but she uses him in a far more liberatory way than he her, and as Balázs suggests\(^\text{242}\) she maintains her concern for Bloom despite everything, whereas Boylan cares for no one but himself.

Although Molly is implicated in Bloom’s plans she resists the cold controlling forces constituting his ‘molar line’, in the ‘Penelope’ episode, and privileges the desiring intensities which stem from the full ‘BwO’. Thus, in the final sentence of ‘Penelope’, going beyond the ‘oedipalisations’ of both Boylan and Bloom, whilst using the latter’s ‘molecular line’, she becomes momentarily in Joyce’s words ‘prehuman and presumably posthuman’. (LI 180) Molly imagines being picked up by strange men: a sailor, a gypsy, or even a murderer (U 925) in language which ‘becomes’ more and more a ‘line of flight’ as she contests the claims of patriarchal society through husband and lovers and merges ‘molecularly’ with such nomadic outsiders as her conventional bodily identity slips away. Yet, whilst moving towards such new ‘becomings’, Molly is always drawn back into Dublin’s masochistic social order as her monologue shows.

Deleuze and Guattari ask us ‘[h]ow to become a nomad and an immigrant and a gypsy in relation to one’s own language?’ and they answer for Joyce, Molly and perhaps us, ‘steal the baby from the crib [become-child], walk the tightrope’\(^\text{243}\). This is ‘the tightrope’ of the ‘line of flight’ and in its ‘becoming child/ becoming girl’, ‘become woman’ one must not fall off and succumb to ‘molarising’ pressures. Molly is finally presented by Joyce as almost accomplishing this as her final ‘yeses’ relate to and encompass those men who live nomadically and outside of the identity imposed by the sadistic constraints of Church and State power. She has become aware of a ‘nomadic line’ of escape and, as Grosz indicates, ‘a nomadic line, gives a line of becoming


imperceptible, which disaggregates the molar structure'. Yet, she cannot fully escape the masochism which constitutes everyone in the social order, and Joyce’s success in creating her as ‘embedded’ character exemplifies this. However much Joyce has sought to represent his Penelope as beyond the human, he has ‘actualised’ her too thoroughly for this.

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Conclusion

In his essay ‘Nomadic Thought’, Deleuze shows that the history of sedentary peoples, from the earliest despotic states to modern liberal democracies, has been constituted by a discourse of sovereignty, hierarchy, and arborescence, imbricated with sadistic institutional control. From Plato onwards traditional philosopic discourse has thus not only been concerned with clear cut identity, the unified subject, and instrumental rationality, but it has also been closely allied with contracts, institutions and the administration of law. The latter, as I have shown, also closely concern masochism which, despite its resistant ‘molecularity’, is inevitably returned to the recuperative ‘reterritorialising’ forces of modernity and capitalism which actually constitute ‘masochism’. However, Joyce through Molly indicates the ‘lines of flight’ which are available to us in capitalist modernity, although she does not ultimately accomplish this transformation.

Furthermore, Joyce through Bloom offers a profound diagnosis of pervasive societal masochism under capitalism by going beyond simple ‘molarising’ paralysis and, in the ‘Penelope’ episode, allowing new liberatory potentialities, or ‘lines of flight’, to emerge via masochism’s ‘molecular’ line. Thus, Molly is depicted in Penelope as achieving a degree of freedom rather than becoming the ritualised corporeal body of ‘Circe’ which Bloom’s masochistic enactment seeks. Yet, she does not achieve full freedom despite bringing into play the ‘nomadic’. Molly is constrained by masochism and finally has not ‘nomadically’ wandered far enough. It is only in the Wake that Joyce shows us the full potential of his liberatory writing. Here, it is Issy who finally holds the key. As Hardt and Negri put it in terms of the ‘multitude’: ‘nomad singularity is the most creative force and the omnilateral movement of its desire is itself the coming liberation’.


Chapter III

In this chapter I will introduce the concept of the Deleuzian ‘epiphanic machine’ as its ‘affects’ appear from Joyce’s use in the *Wake* of a wide range of lexical and syntactic devices including portmanteau words. This will result in an emphasis on the ‘molecular’ movement, ‘deterritorialisations’ and ‘lines of flight’ available to us in the capitalist ‘socius’ in a movement away from the ‘molar’ ‘reterritorialising’ forces which have tended to dominate my analyses in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, in addressing earlier overly optimistic readings of ‘Two Gallants’, ‘A Painful Case’ and ‘The Dead’ from *Dubliners*, in terms of the epiphany – due in large part to an incomplete understanding of ‘duration’ from which their epiphanies spring – it will be necessary to offer an interpretation more in keeping with Joyce’s presentation of the stories. I will also suggest that a Deleuzian understanding of the epiphany, as part of his Bergsonism, allows for a better critique of *Dubliners* and the later works than does that of those critics who take a more traditional view of Joyce’s epiphany. However, I will be concerned here with *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait* only insofar as they offer an introduction to the epiphany.

Deleuze and Guattari regard great books as entirely ‘machinic’. They are not primarily concerned with a book’s ‘meaning’ but rather its functioning as ‘a little machine’. *(TP 4)* By casting the epiphany in open ‘machinic’ and temporal terms, rather than a closed mechanical system, Deleuze sheds a completely different and more revealing light on the centrality of this phenomenon in Joyce’s work than have Joycean critics who have previously engaged with its occurrence. This is because whilst the epiphany is an unstable concept for Deleuze [a]centred on difference, movement, and change, he reads it in terms of ‘duration’. Such a reading implicitly brings into play Bergsonian philosophy and, as I indicated in Chapter One, I will show in the present chapter how Deleuze both uses and radically recasts Bergsonian ‘duration’, and with it an understanding of the epiphany.

In the following two chapters I will feature Issy as epiphanic ‘desiring machine’ and ‘becoming-girl’ and form a ‘rhizomatic’ link with the epiphanic ‘bird-girl’ of *A
Portrait. This will emphasise the Wake’s ‘machinic function’ rather than its ‘meaning’. By addressing the epiphany ‘machinically’, I will be bringing into play Deleuze’s ‘second plane of writing’. This will take us beyond the delineation of character, plot, narrative, or authorial biographic features supposedly subsumed in the text, to the positive ‘singularities’, ‘investments’, ‘intensities’, ‘lines’ and ‘becomings’ drawn from ‘duration’. In short, the Joycean epiphany, as understood by Deleuze, allows the productive impersonal desiring forces of the Wakean ‘BwO’ conceived in terms of the capitalist outside to emerge and take centre stage.

This approach to the Wake is ‘minoritarian’, and sets it at odds with many Joycean critics such as Patrick McCarthy who concludes that the Wake is ‘not a revolutionary volume that might destroy literature as we know it’, and John Gordon’s belief that the Wake ‘takes place chronologically, according to a fixed set of temporal and spatial coordinates, with certain identifiable characters and stage properties including “a specific family at the centre of the book [which] has certain identifiably derivative affinities with Joyce’s family …”’.  

Thus, despite Joyce’s well known interest in recording the minutiae of 1904 Dublin life and cartography in Ulysses, I will not be addressing his ‘realism’ on the ‘first plane of writing’, but rather the productive ‘intensities’ with which it is conjoined on the ‘second plane of writing’ in the Wake. This plane in its ‘becomings’: ‘dissolves forms and persons and gives rise to movements, speeds, delays, and affects, as if as the narrative progressed something were escaping from impalpable matter’. (TP 268) Such an ‘escape’ characterises ‘becomings’ as epiphanic ‘lines of flight’. When I address the Wake it is precisely the ‘liberat[ion of] the particles of an anonymous matter’ (TP 267-268) released from the letter, and Issy’s version of it in particular, (FW 279F1) rather than the Wakean ‘envelope’ which contains it (FW 109) that I will be concerned with.


249 Ibid, p.64.
The 'second plane of writing' is just a 'plane of becomings' consisting of 'floating affects, so that the plane itself is perceived at the same time as it allows us to perceive the imperceptible'. (TP 267) It is the site of textual 'BwOs' and it extracts and abstracts 'intensities' from the movement of the 'virtual open whole' of duration. (CI 59) The 'second plane of writing' constructs a reality of a different order. Joyce's intuitive access to it can be seen in Bergsonian terms as complementing and completing his intellectual understanding:

Consciousness, in man, is pre-eminently intellect. It might have been, it ought, so it seems to have been also intuition. Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and this finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter. A complete and perfect humanity would be that in which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full development.250

The 'affects' which Joyce intuitively creates are culled from the intensities of the 'BwO'. These 'affects' enable access to the powerful nonorganic and intensive vitality which pervades all of great literature conceived in minoritarian terms.

'Becoming-girl' is the primary 'block of becoming' which gives us the 'thisness' or haecceity of Joyce's epiphany: '[t]he girl is ... defined by a relation of movement and rest, speed and slownesses, by a combination of atoms, an emission of particles: haecceity'. (TP 276-277) It is highly significant for my reading of not just the Wake – determined as an 'epiphanic-machine' – but also for Ulysses and all of Joyce's earlier works which feature epiphanies. One sees the significance of this 'block of becoming' for Stephen/Joyce by turning to the last pages of Chapter Four of A Portrait, where the 'bird-girl' epiphany is located.

Significantly, this is preceded by a 'dark precursor' when the banter of his schoolmates playing on his Ancient Greek name – 'Here comes The Dedalus! ... Bous Stephanoumenos! Bous Stephaneforus! ... Stephanos Dedalos! Bous Stephanoumenos!'

Bow Stephaneforos!' – precipitates a vision of Icarus as the masculine ‘fabulous artificer ... a winged form flying above the waves and slowly climbing the air’. This ‘hawk-like man flying sunwards above the sea’ is immediately known to be ‘a prophecy of the end he had been born to serve and had been following through the mists of childhood and boyhood, a symbol of the artist forging anew in his workshop out of the sluggish matter of the earth a new soaring impalpable imperishable being’. The ‘dark precursor’ foreshadowing the ‘bird-girl’ epiphanic ‘event’ appears in reverse or intagliated as his ‘line of flight’ is momentarily linked to Icarus and the masculine and as such ‘majoritarian’ literature. Yet, in his transcendent ‘soaring sunward’ the masculine hubris and subsequent ‘reterritorialising’ fall awaiting him is foreshadowed. He is not rooted to the earth nor cognisant of the personal and social circumstances and difficulties which surround him and have first to be overcome. Not only do we have the fall into reality depicted in the diary which follows at the end of the book, but this is carried through into the ‘Telemachus’ episode of Ulysses where the telegram telling him of his mother’s mortal illness calls him back to Dublin, home and ‘actuality’. This apparent escape from the legendary labyrinth does not succeed and Stephen/ Joyce as writer does not completely accomplish this even in Ulysses as I have attempted to show in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, Stephen has changed. The ‘dark precursor’ reveals him at the point of giving up any idea of pursuing the priesthood as a career and instead aspiring to that of a writer. Stephen has taken the initial autopoietic step by deciding to attend university.

However it is only when the ‘bird girl’ appears that the transcendent masculine ‘dark precursor’ is displaced and gives way to a truly epiphanic moment. At this point the forces of the ‘real, or ‘virtual’, have completely broken through and taken over Stephen’s consciousness and language. A radical change has taken place in his intuitive understanding through a change in the ‘abstract machine’. Whilst nothing in the external world has changed for Stephen, everything has in fact changed. Following on this momentous decision his muse has appeared. ‘The crack’ through which the real explodes into reality has opened up. (TP 198-200) Furthermore, in this vivid evocation we see that Joyce’s language gives us meaning as connection and function through a repetition which adds nothing of outward significance to his original expression. Here, the inside and outside of the planes of ‘immanence’ and ‘organisation’ come together as
'affect': '[h]er bosom was as a bird’s, soft and slight, slight and soft as the breast of some dark-plumaged dove.' Time for Stephen has changed to that of 'duration' and to think in such terms is to think ‘beyond the human condition’\(^{251}\) and to go beyond language because ‘[i]ntuition presupposes duration, it consists in thinking in terms of duration’.\(^{252}\) Deleuze and Guattari would see the repetition in the passage not as a chiasmus but instead meaning as 'machinic' connection and function.

Here, in a Deleuzian reading, we are not concerned with Plato’s ideal forms as pure universals abstracted from the material world’s detritus but rather the reverse. We have a meeting of strata previously kept apart by rational thought: ‘[w]hen we speak of abstract machines, by “abstract” we can also understand “extract” in the sense of extracting. They are montages capable of relating all the heterogeneous levels that they traverse.’\(^{253}\) There is a moment of ‘claritas’ of pure revelation extracted from the forces of the ‘virtual’ yet conjoined with and consisting of the ‘reality’ of the material world which surrounds Stephen. Despite his aestheticism, his description shows that the ‘bird-girl’ is rooted in reality. Her body is prominently figured. She has ‘long slender bare legs’, ‘[h]er thighs ... were bared almost to the hips’, ‘her bosom’ and ‘long fair hair’, ‘her face’, ‘cheek’, and ‘her foot’ all were featured, together with her clothes ‘the white fringes of her drawers’, and ‘[h]er slate blue skirts’. Her body gives us the textual body of Joyce’s future texts culminating in the ‘BwO’ of the *Wake*.

In this enormously productive epiphany from *A Portrait*, which is fundamental to my reading of the *Wake*, we already see 'girlness' offering a yet further strand in this 'block of becoming': the productivity of 'becoming-animal' through 'becoming-bird', as 'the power of literature itself: the power to see differently by tearing perception from its human home', (*TP* 243, 245; *N* 137; *ECC*, Chapter 10) and 'transform oneself in perceiving difference' (*TP* 243) through those 'transversal becomings' which the writer


\(^{253}\) Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, p. 35.
‘becoming-animal’, or the ‘becoming-writer’ of the animal allows. According to Deleuze we are here released from our moorings, in our own and even wider human concerns, to the freedom of the productive immanent outside as we take on new perceptions and new worlds through difference and realize a new ‘sense’ of consistency offered by Joyce’s text. Even the ‘becoming-animal of the human’ (TP 277) must be preceded by the rhizomatic connections established through the ‘block of becoming’ which is ‘the girl’. This is ‘becoming-girl’ as the productive ‘fold’ or ‘middle’, as haecceity or epiphany, just as ‘the production of molecular woman is the girl herself’. (TP 277)

I believe that Joyce drew on, reworked in Ulysses, and developed enormously in the Wake, the earlier intuitive epiphanic ‘afects’ which he had previously given us. This is not to imply that these later works contain no new epiphanies operating through portmanteau words or other structural, lexical or syntactic means. Every time that they bring into play new ‘afects’ by tapping into the hidden forces constituting the ‘whole past’, as the second synthesis of time; or produce something radically new through the difference of the ‘eternal return’ and the third synthesis of time there is a new epiphanic moment brought about through Joyce’s intuitive insight which, ‘presupposes duration, it consists in thinking in terms of duration’. (B 31) It is ‘the movement by which we emerge from our own duration … [and] make use of [it] to affirm … and recognize the existence of other durations’. (B 32-33) However, in my reading of the Wake, by following Joyce and ‘disentangling’ and ‘re-embodying’, as well as ‘setting up a resonance between two objects’ [3.1], I find ‘the bird girl’ epiphany as it resonates with the preceding Icarian image to be the most productive of all of Joyce’s epiphanies.

Moreover, even the reworking of earlier epiphanies such as the ‘bird-girl’ gives us an ‘eternal return’ of the new and as such an original epiphanic moment in the sense of the Deleuzian ‘simulacrum’[1.2] just as real and potentially productive as the supposed original. In arriving at this view Deleuze had reworked the Ancient philosophies of Epicurus and Lucretius. (L 266-279) His view is quite unlike the loss of the real instanced by the better known Baudrillardian ‘simulacrum’ where all references to the
forces of production, ‘affect’, history, etc., are lost through ‘bare repetition’, as is the potentiality of any positive ethico-political involvement. Reading the *Wake* in terms of Deleuzian simulacra allows us to see the newness and authenticity of every epiphanic ‘becoming’ in the *Wake*.

‘Duration’

As indicated in Chapter One there are some important differences between Bergsonian ‘duration’ and that of Deleuze of which I now need to take account. I need to engage with the similarities and differences between Bergson’s and Deleuze’s understanding of ‘duration’, as ‘time conceived purely in terms of life’ itself, in order to relate the outcome to my later readings of the *Wake*. I need to see if a different understanding of ‘duration’ developed by Deleuze, though still based in Bergsonism, allows us to relate better Joyce’s ‘epiphanic machine’ to the ‘desire’ which many critics have read into Joyce’s works as simply depicting human sexual desire. Deleuze and Guattari argue that impersonal desire is a much wider concept than this. Hardt and Negri, for example, in following their understanding, note in political terms that ‘desire has no limit (since the desire to exist and the desire to produce are one and the same thing) because life can be continuously, freely, and equally enjoyed and reproduced’. I am not arguing that human sexual desire is not depicted, or that it is not a significant feature of the *Wake*, but I am arguing for its reading as an impersonal transformative force. This is because ‘sexuality any sexuality is a becoming-woman in other words a girl’. (TP277) Thus, Shari Benstock points out that ‘[w]hile sex seems to be at the center of what the *Wake* is all about, it is a subject that is constantly eluded and elided

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with multiple linguistic and semantic delays’. Joyce is less concerned here, I suggest, with the representation of sexual acts than with the impersonal intensities which constitute them extra-linguistically.

Bergson and Deleuze have very different approaches to the relationship between ‘duration’ as the time of ‘the virtual’ and ‘the actual’ in the creation of an ‘event’ such as the epiphany. Bergson was concerned to bring these much closer together and even to unify ‘the actual’ and ‘the virtual’ in order to increase the range of possibilities open to human evolutionary development. Reacting against but greatly influenced by Darwinism, he focused much more than has Deleuze, even in his ‘political’ works with Guattari, on mankind’s rootedness in everyday existence and the unthinking habits of mind which such utility necessitates; thereby, as he believed, preventing us from obtaining a wider vision and greater evolutionary potentialities. Bergson’s main concern was to point out how mankind might get out of an evolutionary rut by seeking experience beyond our utilitarian concerns and obtaining, ‘properly human experience’ which he held would give us new potentials of energy and new opportunities for evolutionary development. Here Bergson’s perfectionism and residual humanism are foregrounded as he undoubtedly focuses on the ‘plane of organisation’ rather than the ‘plane of immanence’, and in doing so gives particular weight to ‘the process of differenciation’. (DR Chapters 2, 3, 4)

Deleuze on the other hand is unwilling to limit his philosophy to the human and distances himself somewhat from Bergson in this regard. His thought constantly strives to exceed the human, to go beyond humanity as such, although we need to stress that his remains a philosophy of immanence and materialism and that he completely eschews the transcendent. We have already noted that his concepts ‘becoming-woman/becoming-girl’ are not concerned with individualised humans as such, or even humanity


itself, but are to be seen as constellations of forces constituted by lines of varying 'intensities' working through 'BwOs' located on 'the plane of immanence' and, in their insistence on 'new life', making an ethical statement. It is precisely this which distinguishes Deleuzian philosophy from that of Bergson and may also problematise the political philosophy of Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, despite the latter's claimed indebtedness to *A Thousand Plateaus*, and their willingness to accept a new communal subjectivity.

Going beyond Bergson and the human Deleuze targets such 'becomings' which consist of interacting intensities, as in 'becoming-animal' for example where 'the human being does not become animal in reality, but there is nevertheless a reality of the becoming-animal of the human being'. *(TP 253)* Deleuze is always attempting to think beyond the human condition, and in the process he draws on Spinoza's philosophy. His focus is not primarily on extending mankind's perception or 'affectivity'/feelings in 'the actual' on the 'plane of organisation', but in enlarging awareness of 'the virtual' itself with all of its hidden potentialities emitted through the 'intensities' which give rise to humanity. He asks questions such as 'what is the relation of the writing machine ... to becomings-animal?', *(TP 243)* questions which either would not occur to Bergson or which he would regard as irrelevant.

For Deleuze, as for Spinoza, the human is neither fixed in its form nor determined in its function, as an *imperium in imperio*, but open to an 'affective becoming' with nonhuman or extrahuman 'BwOs' or assemblages, and indeed other unknown forces with which it is capable of evolving within a play of chance and necessity. As Hardt and Negri* note, 'Donna Haraway carries on Spinoza's project [of asserting that the laws governing human nature do not differ from those of nature as a whole, by] breaking down the barriers we pose among the human, the animal, and the machine'.* These

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forces, Deleuze holds, are capable of yielding a practically unlimited diversity of combinations. (F 131) Joyce of course anticipates him. In the ‘Penelope’ episode of *Ulysses* his intention is to present Molly as ‘prehuman and presumably posthuman’, (LI 180) unfortunately as I have pointed out above he is so successful in depicting Molly as ‘embedded’ character on the ‘first plane of writing’ that he has ‘actualised’ her too thoroughly. However, in the *Wake* one has humans ‘machinically’ transformed by and connected to all of their recent inventions as ‘extrahuman assemblages’. (FW 309.14-22) Whereas Deleuze would accept Bergson’s understanding of ‘the event’, and of course the *Wake* as such an ‘event’, he would thus ask us to go much further beyond Bergson’s conception of ‘duration’. He states that ‘[t]he event does not relate the lived to a transcendent subject = Self, but, on the contrary, is related to the immanent survey of a field without subject’. (WIP 48) Of course to read the *Wake* as Deleuzian ‘event’, ‘a field without [a] subject’ has enormous implications for both Joycean criticism and one must add Hardt and Negri’s theorisations. Ansell Pearson argues that:

> Deleuze construes a ‘nonpsychological life ... the nonorganic life that grips the world and renders it accentred and rhizomatic, existing not only beyond the sphere of Darwinian adaptation but also beyond the realm of Bergsonian *durée* and creative evolution. 262

This statement, whilst it makes the central point very well, tends to separate too drastically Bergson from Deleuze. Bergson himself has stated that ‘philosophy should be an effort to go beyond the human’, 263 and Deleuze has said of Bergson that:

> Bergson is not one of those philosophers who ascribes a properly human wisdom and equilibrium to philosophy. To open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman


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(durations which are inferior or superior to our own), to go beyond the human condition: This is the meaning of [his] philosophy. (*B 28*)

Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari evidently accept Bergsonian ‘duration’ and build on it:

we consider Bergson to be of major importance ... Beginning in *Time and Free Will*, he presents duration as a type of multiplicity opposed to metric multiplicity or the multiplicity of magnitude. Duration is in no way indivisible, but is that which cannot be divided without changing in nature at each division. (*TP 483*)

and in commenting on what would seem to be the ‘duration’ of a human life and then bringing into play ‘lines of longitude’ and ‘latitude’, ‘haecceities’, and the speeds and slownesses of other ‘life forms’ within a set of ‘durations’:

You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a *life* (regardless of its *duration*) – a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity). Or at least you can have it, you can reach it. (*TP 262*)

Thus, Deleuze retains, extends and intensifies rather than sidelines or negates Bergson’s ‘duration’.

Furthermore, as I will argue below, the *Wake* takes Bergsonian ‘duration’, in its conception of the epiphanic ‘event’, further in order to encompass the whole of life itself conceived as ‘the nonorganic life that grips the world and renders it acentred and rhizomatic’. Joyce does this by bringing into play ‘zones of indiscernibility and undecidability’, which give us the ‘variations, modulations, intermezzi, [and] singularities of a new infinite order’, (*TP 158*) and in doing so the *Wake* exists within an extended understanding of and emphasis on ‘duration’. It also accommodates Deleuze’s understanding of Nietzsche’s ‘active nihilism’ which, as we observed at the outset, gives enormous creative potentialities through the ‘transvaluation of all values’, bringing into play ‘a dangerous freedom’ epitomized in the *Wake*’s use of ‘creative destruction’ and its absolute newness. As such Joyce like Deleuze thinks ‘beyond the

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265 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pps. 208, 209.
human', and this is nowhere more evident than in the revelations which he characterises as epiphanies.

The epiphanic 'event' as the radically new only appears according to Bergson and Deleuze when the temporality of 'duration' opens, or is opened up. The *Wake* as 'event' is thus a creation made available through an opening in 'duration', a gap prised open by Joyce's insistent inventiveness and intuitive creativity. Such an 'event' is not preexistent to its actualisation no matter how many precursors we, or for that matter Joyce, might seem to offer. This is because 'the event' which only emerges out of 'duration' is simply 'pure invention' and nothing else. The 'pure freedom' which such invention offers is necessarily without any prior determinants.

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266 Ibid. p. 22.
Joycean criticism

Richard Brown’s valid point about the way in which some Joycean critics, in addressing the epiphany, managed to side-line Joycean criticism for many years as an entirely esoteric pursuit needs to be taken into account here. Noting that the ‘bad start’ made by Joycean criticism ‘had not necessarily improved’, Brown writing in the mid-1980s was able to claim of such Joyceans as William Schutte\(^{267}\) that their criticism ‘suffered from isolation, developing a partly autonomous language and field of reference dominated by certain almost ‘talismanic “Joycean” terms like “epiphany”’.\(^{268}\)

Possibly the Joycean scholar who has most concerned himself with epiphanies is Morris Beja\(^{269}\) who together with other critics such as Theodore Spencer\(^{270}\) has shown us the extraordinary broadening out which occurs through an appreciation of the immensity of the past which both *Ulysses* and the * Wake* afford, with critics such as Spencer arguing that the latter offers us ‘an epiphany of all of human history’. (*SH* 22) We can relate this insight to the ‘whole past’ of the Bergsonian second synthesis of time. However, Beja would undoubtedly disagree with the Deleuzian proposition that either *Ulysses* or the * Wake* might be ‘epiphanic events’ in themselves:

... it has been fashionable to speak of one or another of his entire works as ‘an’ epiphany. Such statements are extravagant and pointless at best, and at worst misleading and distorting. Works of art, to be sure, often ‘reveal’ things; but they are no more epiphanies by virtue of that fact alone than is the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. If an epiphany is ‘sudden,’ as it is, then works as long as the average short story – and certainly any novel – simply cannot ‘be’ epiphanies, for they cannot be ‘experienced’ or apprehended immediately. ... while a painted mimetic record of a frozen moment may perhaps be called ‘an’ epiphany, in regard to a novel the most one can say is that at the end a general recollection of all that has

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been read may lead up to a sudden revelation – but that is a momentary experience not to be confused with all the time one has spent on the book. 271

Here Beja is at odds with such critics as John Orr272 who argues for the ‘epiphanous novel’. Yet, despite being unique immediately apprehended revelations, Beja also took the view that Joyce used his earlier epiphanies over and over again in his later works. One can both agree and use his insight if we consider such repetition in terms of the Deleuzian ‘simulacrum’ whereby every copy is an original including the original itself. Beja noted forty distinct epiphanies throughout Joyce’s work tracing their ‘appearance or reflection’ in *Stephen Hero, A Portrait, Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. He also agreed that ‘as Irene Hendry Chayes273 suggested, the stories in *Dubliners* … are related in method and objectives to epiphany’; 274 and ‘the works in this collection represent a new type of story which seems written almost in order to provide an introduction and background to an epiphany’, 275 although he does not expand on this.

Beja points out that ‘[c]ritics of Joyce have differed – sometimes enormously – in their interpretation of epiphany, but almost all have agreed on its profound importance in Joyce’s aesthetics and fiction’. 276 Later he argues that the epiphany:

... is not merely an intense moment of emotion or a sudden feeling of exhilaration, it is a sudden spiritual ‘manifestation.’ Something is revealed, there is a feeling of new knowledge gained instantaneously and apparently irrationally. … [which] may become positively cosmic in its reference, as in ‘the night of the Apophanypes’ in *Finnegans Wake*. 277

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273 Irene Hendry [Chayes], ‘Joyce’s Epiphanies’, *Sewanee Review*, 54 (Summer, 1946), pps. 452, 454.


275 Ibid, p.94.

276 Ibid. p.84. n.8.
Yet, he fails to pursue this further despite his claim that Joyce used his earlier epiphanies again and again. Beja sees only two ‘similarities’ to epiphanies, in the *Wake*, which appear in either *A Portrait* or its predecessor *Stephen Hero*, together with ‘the epiphanic phrase’ from *Ulysses*, ‘she comes at night’, which he sees as being reflected in, ‘all that I might have been of you meant to becoming, bewailing like a man that innocence which I could not defend like a woman’. (*FW* 193.36-194.2)

From my viewpoint, and even from his own, this seems to be extremely odd. For instance if we take Deleuze and Guattari’s view of the *Wake* as ‘epiphanic machine’, through its *haecceity*, and ‘the girl’: ‘proceed[ing] not by subjectivity but by *haecceity*, pure *haecceity*’, (*TP* 271) we can see that the epiphanic ‘bird-girl’ of *A Portrait* – a precursor of Issy as I argue – in her ‘gently stirring the water with her foot hither and thither’, is clearly recalled in the *Wake*’s ‘hitherandthithering waters’. (*FW* 216.4) Whilst the ‘bird girl’ is only stirring the waters gently and this image is transfigured by the flood of waters which is Anna Livia as the Liffey, water is the essential common creative element involved. This might well be read as the dynamic ‘becoming-girl’ of Anna Livia, conceived as the fluidity of ‘becoming-woman’, to give only one instance of Joyce’s reworking of a key epiphanic moment which Beja, despite his meticulous attention to the text apparently ignores. Clive Hart\(^{279}\) may well object to my designation of such reworkings as new epiphanies in themselves preferring to see these in terms of motifs or themes. Although it is the case that thematic elements can be drawn out from the epiphanies, from a Deleuzian perspective this approach tends to elide ‘difference’, according to Deleuze’s understanding of ‘simulacra’, by implicitly seeing them in terms of originals and copies, rather than being completely new in themselves. Furthermore, the ‘hitherandthithering waters’ quotation which closes I.8 leads directly into II.1 and the further extension of Joyce’s ‘epiphanic machine’ through what initially appears to be nothing other than a trivial children’s game, but which in effect gives us an entire

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\(^{277}\) Beja, ‘Epiphany and Epiphanies’, p.726.

\(^{278}\) Ibid, p.710.

"symptomatology" and diagnosis of modernity as the lines which compose it pervade the text, as I will argue in Chapter Four. Moreover, ALP/Issy are further conjoined here as ALP is also the old form of Izod/Issy, the bride elect in the game, and their multiplicities the rainbow girls 'bright elects, consentconsorted' (FW 239.28) echo and reinvent the 'bird-girl' epiphany.

In his assessment of Joyce's novels, Beja's omissions of epiphanic 'affects' and 'becomings' in the Wake may be due to his belief, that the book 'is a ... well, a something else', in other words not a 'modern novel'. Consequently, his considered statement that Bloom's epiphany, at the end of the 'Circe' episode (U 702-703) in Ulysses, is the 'most effective moment of vision in all of Joyce', fails to mention that 'a fairy boy of eleven ... kidnapped' has clear echoes in the Prankquean episode of the Wake (FW 21-23) in a tale probably patterned on just such an epiphanic fairy story. This, I believe, indicates the limitations of his assessment.

We surely need to ask why Beja and the Joycean critics who have taken their lead from him, despite their meticulous readings and attention to detail, cannot see the Wake in terms of an 'epiphanic machine'. Perhaps the key lies in his and their identification of the epiphany with isolated moments as 'a frozen tableau'. In his near immersion in the 'woolf pack' formed by Thomas Woolfe and Virginia Woolf, (TP 192-207) Beja appears to prefer such frozen 'moments of revelation' which 'are probably more frequent in the works of Thomas Wolfe than any other novelist'; although they are shown as appearing frequently enough in Virginia Woolf's work. Thus, in The Waves

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284 Deleuze and Guattari, 'One or Several Wolves?'
we have a revealing example, quoted by Beja, showing us that when Bernard seems to be about to merge with the outside, in an autopoietic step of ‘becoming-imperceptible’, as he ‘suddenly feels himself being annihilated and becoming part of the “unfeeling universe”’, he draws back rather than commit himself, and he ‘pulls himself together’ (as masculine unified self). He:

... notices an expression in his hairdresser’s face: ‘It is thus I am recalled. (For I am no mystic; something always plucks at me – curiosity, envy, admiration, interest in hairdressers and the like bring me to the surface)’.285

and he returns to the ‘actual’ world of hairdressers, and everyday emotions whilst dismissing such becomings as mystical.

This unwillingness to proceed with the processuality of ‘becoming part of the “unfeeling universe”’, characterises Beja’s attitude too, I suggest, and restricts him to regarding the epiphany as an intense but isolated moment, as did Stephen. Beja is not alone in this as Theodore Spencer also believes that Joyce’s epiphanies rely upon ‘an unmoving moment of time [which] still remains essentially static’.286 We need to recall here that it is Joyce’s intuition which grants us his epiphanies. To think intuitively, in terms of epiphanies is to enter into ‘duration’ through change, movement, and different speeds: ‘pure relation of speed and slowness, and nothing else’. According to Deleuze, there could be nothing static or isolated about epiphanic ‘essences’ stemming from ‘duration’. Even ‘if Joyce too begins by seeking the secret of epiphanies within the object, first within significant contents or ideal significations, then in the subjective experience of an aesthete’[3.1], and initially sees this as a ‘frozen moment’:

By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments. (SH 188)

and as with the Ballast Office clock:


286  Spencer, ‘Introduction’ to Stephen Hero.
I will pass it time after time, allude to it, refer to it, catch a glimpse of it. It is only an item in the catalogue of Dublin’s street furniture. Then all at once I see it and know at once what it is: epiphany. ... Imagine my glimpses at that clock as the gropings of a spiritual eye which seeks to adjust its vision to an exact focus. The moment the focus is reached the object is epiphanelised, (SH 189)\textsuperscript{287}

in *Dubliners* he is already parodifying and bringing down to earth the aesthete Stephen’s thoughts about the epiphany. Thus, in ‘Two Gallants’, Lenehan, awaiting Corley’s return, skips into the road to see the clock of Trinity College at the beginning of the evening, then notes the time by the clock of the College of Surgeons whilst he and Corley both recall the latter’s picking up of a girl under Waterhouse’s clock. Joyce ironically emphasises movement and change in association with these clocks rather than the stasis of a specific moment with the Ballast Office clock, and he associates this not with a transcendent ‘spiritual’ and aesthetic moment but with the grubby goings on of a back street Lothario who, as we come to learn later in *Ulysses* is reduced to begging money from Stephen in order to survive. Just as Joyce has brought the Icarian ‘hawk man’ crashing to earth, through the embodied ‘bird-girl’, so here he brings the aestheticised epiphany down to earth through the realities depicted in the ‘Two Gallants’. He does this again with ‘A Painful Case’. However, it is in his final story in *Dubliners* that Joyce truly takes leave of his initial conception of the epiphany as a ‘frozen moment’ as I will show. Thus, Deleuze implicitly notes of Joyce’s development through incremental repetition, from *Stephen Hero* to *A Portrait* and back to *Dubliners* then forward through *Ulysses* and the *Wake*, that ‘[i]t is only when the significant contents and the ideal significations have collapsed and given way to a multiplicity of fragments, to chaos – but in addition, the subjective forms to a chaotic and multiple impersonal reality – that the work of art assumes its full meaning’ [3.1].

‘Duration’, as we have learned from Bergson, works in conjunction with the ‘virtual’ potentialities or ‘intensities’, from which the human intellect normally takes only spatialised slices, including concepts such as clock-time. (B 22) Such spatialised time-slices are rather like the individual still photographs which when moved rapidly in sequence through a projector give us the impression of lifelike movement. (CI) Taken

\textsuperscript{287} My italics
individually they remain static, and it is this stasis with which our rational intellects feel most comfortable. Such static conceptualisations are not wrong, they are simply limited, as Bergson discovers:

For we contrive to find resemblances between things in spite of their diversity, and to take a stable view of them in spite of their instability in this way we obtain ideas which we can control, whereas the actual things may elude our grasp.²⁸⁸

Deleuze holds with Bergson that these static slices of time represent only one half of reality, but it is this half with which our common sense reason and the entirety of science constantly work. (B 116) Beja’s and his followers identification of the epiphany with ‘a frozen tableau’ appears to indicate that he and they may have been intellectually seduced by such rational/scientific approaches into just such a static view of time with the epiphany consequently being seen as akin to the photographic still. Matthew Hyland notes that ‘[m]otion, as Bergson showed, is indivisible, and and what is continuously transformed is the very relation between subject and object’.²⁸⁹ Joyce, I believe, finally came to realize the epiphany as the ‘variable essence of things’, (B 34) characterised by constant movement and change, as he re-works them in the Wake. As we learn from Deleuze, the Joycean epiphany consists of ‘the amplitude of a forced movement which sweeps aside and overruns the series’ [1.3]. This ‘movement, like the girl as a fugitive being, cannot be perceived’. (TP 281) I would therefore both differ from and agree with Brown that whilst earlier critics were correct in highlighting the concept of epiphany they were woefully wrong in their understanding of its place in ‘duration’.

Beja regarded both the Wake and Dubliners as beyond his remit as he was particularly concerned with the modern novel. I will be implicitly criticising his failure to address Wakean epiphanies in the next two chapters and have already looked at several epiphanies in Ulysses in the preceding chapter. However, it has been difficult to find a Joycean critic who takes his general approach and addresses Dubliners in terms


²⁸⁹ Matthew Hyland, ‘Continuous crisis. Historical action and and passion in Antonio Negri’s Insurgencies’. Radical Philosophy. 112 (March/ April 2002) 31-37 (p.36)
of ‘duration’ and the ‘Bejain’ understanding of the epiphany. Mary Ann Gillies\(^{290}\) most nearly fits these requirements. Both Beja and Gillies in their understanding of the epiphany fail to see that ‘duration’ from which it stems is not limited to the psychological. Like other critics, such as Theodore Spencer – who in his ‘Introduction’ to the first edition of *Stephen Hero* states that *Dubliners* is a series of epiphanies describing apparently trivial but actually crucial and revealing moments in the psychology and lives of different characters – they both stop short in their appreciation of Bergson’s philosophic and Joyce’s writerly development. Thus, like Beja and Spencer, Gillies restricts ‘duration’ to psychological experience and consequently sees the epiphany in these terms, thereby failing to take account of the strength of the ‘reterritorialising’ negative forces also emanating from the ‘plane of immanence’ which both form and assail the characters ‘actualised’ in *Dubliners*.

In effect Gillies fails to come to terms with the particular socio-historical situation of the Dublin ‘socius’ constrained by the capitalistic imperialism of that time. Such ‘idealism’ exactly makes Brown’s point that the decontextualisation and foregrounding of the epiphany leads to an esoteric and isolated pursuit. It clearly takes it away from a Deleuzian materialistic understanding. Deleuze shows that Bergson’s thought ‘evolved from the beginning to the end of his work’, and ‘duration’ comes to be seen less and less reducible to something solely psychological as it appears in *Time and Free Will*,\(^{291}\) and forms a new ontology, as the ‘variable essence of things’, ‘immanent to the universe’, by the time he works through *Matter and Memory*,\(^{292}\) and reaches *Creative Evolution*.\(^{293}\) The result is that Bergson eventually gives us the true material ontology of ‘becomings’. (B 34)


\(^{292}\) Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, *passim*.

\(^{293}\) Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, *passim*. 
Even Gillies’s own analysis shows that the attempts of the individuals depicted to realize freedom, growth and ‘become-different’ frequently do not succeed. This was surely Joyce’s point. The restrictions which the imperial capitalist ‘socius’ imposes upon them actively work against such potential liberations, as he well knew. Gillies believes that the fifteen stories that make up *Dubliners* are important because they are centrally structured around epiphanies in the lives of ordinary Dubliners. However, she differs from Beja in this one respect as he focuses on the trivialities which foreshadow an epiphany and to this extent relies on Stephen’s remark in *Stephen Hero* ‘[t]his triviality made him think of collecting many such moments together in a book of epiphanies.’ *(SH 216, 218)* Gillies argues contrariwise that Joyce’s epiphanies illustrate the extraordinary moments with which each life is filled, and show how such moments both encapsulate and define lives. The implied optimism of Gillies’s statement, that ‘[i]n these, a Bergsonian-like involuntary memory brings about a sudden insight into life, thereby prompting the main characters to change their manner of life’, 294 must however be set against Joyce’s purpose in *Dubliners* of showing the forces of paralysis which grip its inhabitants, making such life-changing possibilities far more difficult to realise than Gillies allows.

‘A Painful Case’ shows personal memory being deployed in several different ways resulting in several epiphanies, according to Gillies. Initially, Mr Duffy’s life is given through a straightforward narration. Intimate details of his habits, career, education, and personality are set out. Then an incident which involves his memory of events buried in the past are recalled, as the central moment of the narrative arrives. Some months after the termination of an affair with Mrs Sinico, which ended when she expressed a desire to become his mistress, Duffy came across a paragraph in the newspaper relating the circumstances of her death. The article upsets him and initiates a prolonged reflection about their relationship: ‘As the light failed and his memory began to wander he thought

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her hand touched his. The shock which had first attacked his stomach was now attacking his nerves’. (D 116)

According to Gillies these memories and the images of their past life provoked by the article prompt Duffy to re-evaluate his life and actions, and he realizes that his life has been empty and futile, and that she was the only thing to have brought him joy. In his despair, he felt ‘that he was alone’. For Gillies this moment became a significant epiphany. She argues that the chance nature of such devastating recollections mirrors Joyce’s assertion about the nature of the epiphany as ‘a sudden spiritual manifestation’ – for, despite Duffy’s attempt to ignore or forestall the consequences of the memories, they take over his present life in much the same way that Bergson, on her interpretation, says that recollection does. The complexity of his epiphany and the resultant impact on his life depend, for Gillies, on Duffy having a personal memory which functions in precisely the way that involuntary memory is held to do. Yet, Duffy’s recollections of Mrs Sinico are tempered by the circumstances surrounding them as Gillies admits. Joyce is beginning to ironise his earlier conception of the epiphany as ‘a sudden spiritual manifestation’ and ‘frozen moment in time’ by bringing into play all the movements and ‘intensities’ of the real world which go to make them up. For instance the movement of the train and Mrs Sinico’s suicide as well as Duffy’s night time wanderings and ruminations are foregrounded here in order to problematise the epiphany as a ‘frozen moment’. Moreover, in no sense is Duffy shown to have experienced the intensive life-enhancing affirmative intensities which accompany or compose an epiphany. His moralising guilt over Mrs Sinico’s death results in a distorted memory of their relationship, one based on his fear that his actions led to her apparent suicide. Duffy remains entrapped in a subjectivity and life-style which is largely constructed by the negative forces of capitalistic modernity which he hardly seems capable of combatting. At no point in the story does he experience the ethical joy which accompanies life giving intensities as Stephen has with the ‘bird-girl’ epiphany.
'The Dead' is the longest, most complex, and most critically acclaimed story in *Dubliners*. Gillies argues that it contains many elements that Joyce was later to use in more extended works, as well as a very good example of a personal memory based central moment. Here, a life changing epiphany occurs after the evening's entertainment, she claims, when Gabriel and Gretta have retired to their hotel room. Unlike Gabriel, flushed by the success of the party, Gretta is quiet and withdrawn. She finally explains the reason for her mood, thereby undergoing a moment of such emotional distress that Gabriel is startled out of his complacency into self-reflection. Gretta's is the original epiphany. She has heard a familiar song that has revived the memory of her first love, Michael Furey, who died, she believes, because of his great love for her. This recollection affects her deeply and in turn prompts her husband Gabriel, to examine his own past and present.

Gillies believes that Gretta's epiphany causes Gabriel to experience one himself. She argues that this is both a Proustian method of recollection – as a recollection brought to present life prompts another – as well as also being Bergsonian, because it shows how memory impinges on present life which is, in turn, altered by this event. However, Deleuze understands Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu* as a 'symptomatology' of various worlds of signs indicating underlying forces which mobilize the involuntary and ontological unconscious. These worlds include those of love, the social world, the material world, and the world of literature and art – which he notes that Proust sees as transforming all of the others. (*PS* 26-102) The world of love according to Proust, Deleuze argues, is characterised by insincerity and betrayal and, I suggest, Gillies's invocation of Proust rather than substantiating Furey's absolute commitment throws doubt upon it.

Thus, even if Michael Furey's death was not caused by his trip to Gretta's home during a storm, Gretta, possibly disappointed in her marriage to Gabriel, because it lacks the great passion she thought love entailed, may choose to explain Michael's death as a result of his love for her. Be that as it may, the events of the past assume a

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Ibid, p. 223
significance that may in fact be distorted but they force both Gretta and Gabriel to reassess their present lives according to Gillies. She appears to imply a future ‘happy outcome’ through such problematization and reflection which for her suggests a new beginning, but Joyce’s depiction of the negative forces at work in the Dublin of that era might seem to indicate otherwise; these forces would of course include the ‘world’ of love, not simply characterised by betrayal alone but by the recuperative forces of Christianity.

Gillies fails to appreciate that in epiphanic terms the importance of ‘The Dead’ is that it is the story in which Joyce finally turns away from seeing the epiphany as a ‘frozen moment’ which he now appears to regard as the aesthetic misconception of his younger self. He takes further his ironic re-working of the Ballast Office clock of *Stephen Hero* in ‘Two Gallants’, and his ironic problematisation of the epiphany in ‘A Painful Case’, to show that the frozen isolated aesthetic moment of his original understanding of the epiphany was far too narrowly conceived. The epiphany is composed of all the material forces of the universe, including its reception into consciousness, which stem from the ‘virtual’, or Lawrentian ‘chaos’. Movement, change and difference are intimately involved and as Joyce went on to show in the *Wake*, and Deleuze remarked it ‘releas[es] the precious image from the natural conditions that determine it, in order to reincarnate it in the chosen artistic conditions’ [3.1].

Thus, Gabriel, in the ‘Distant Music’ passage, first sees Gretta in aesthetic terms and then through Gretta’s revelations is forced to take account of all that has gone on before and the immanent realities which account for her pensive pose. Gabriel has to learn, as Joyce has learned, that behind the epiphanic moment there is a material history with which it is inextricably intertwined. This cannot be encapsulated in a ‘freeze frame’ it is rather an ongoing moving picture or cinematic experience involving not only past experiences but the challenges and activities involving the present and future. Thus, this final story in *Dubliners* shows Joyce entering into his mature style(s) as he leaves behind his earlier aestheticism and reaches out for a more grounded viewpoint. *Dubliners* preceded *A Portrait* in publication terms and unless we see Joyce operating in ‘duration’ rather than linear clock-time this argument would appear to make little
sense. The question would remain, ‘how could he problematise a position which he had not yet adopted?’ Only, I suggest, by working backwards and forwards through incremental repetition in ‘duration’ as the time of life. *Dubliners* was being written in clock-time well before *A Portrait* was undertaken, but Joyce was working simultaneously on *Dubliners* and *Stephen Hero* in 1904. Although the first version of *Dubliners* was sent to Grant Richards in 1905 well before *A Portrait* first appeared in published form in 1914, it wasn’t until 1907 that Joyce wrote ‘The Dead’. The following year he abandoned *Stephen Hero* and began recasting it as *A Portrait*. Then in 1914 when *Dubliners* was finally published so *A Portrait* began serial publication in the *Egoist*. Joyce was probably playing dialectically with the idea of the epiphany throughout this period, both putting it forward as an aesthetic concept and ironically undermining it at the same time. From *A Portrait* on the Joycean epiphany is continuously interwoven with movements, nodes, dynamic concepts, and is more detached from the character’s subjectivity, except when it is being parodied.

To be fair to Gillies it is certainly the case that some stories do end with a kind of revelation in which as Connor puts it ‘the reader shares the moment of enlargement of consciousness of character’.296 Thus, at the end of ‘Araby’ the disappointed boy who has been deceived and diminished by the tawdry glamour of the bazaar sees himself ‘as a creature driven and derided by vanity: and my eyes burned with anguish and anger’, *(D 20)* but this is hardly a Bergsonian epiphany by Gillies’s standards. Moreover, as Connor points out, ‘in most other cases, there is no such congruence between the perceptions of character and reader’, rather ‘most of the stories end with anticlimax, incompleteness, or even concealment’.297 In ‘Clay’ for instance Maria seems to be completely unaware of the limitations which her life in the Dublin of that epoch has placed on it, and in this I would argue she is not unlike a member of the ‘poor’ yet to be constituted within Hardt and Negri’s ‘multitude’. Nevertheless, Joyce makes evident the


297 Ibid.
forces which ‘congeal’ to form her problematic situation thereby offering the reader the necessary insights to go beyond this.

Beja acknowledges the difficulty of giving a clear definition of epiphanies, but then attempts to do so – whilst acknowledging that both Stephen and Joyce go ‘beyond [any] definition [as Stephen has stated] “to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they are the most delicate and evanescent of moments”.’\(^{298}\) Therefore, from both a Joycean and a Deleuzian point of view we need to be wary of this move, and it is worth recalling here too Lacan’s ‘pas à lire’,\(^{299}\) which indicates that Joyce’s writing cannot be interpreted within a psychoanalytic critical context. As Budgen states, Joyce wanted his readers ‘to understand always through suggestion rather than direct statement’,\(^{300}\) and although Beja pays particular attention to the way in which Stephen describes epiphanies in *Stephen Hero*, he sees this as at best ‘helpful but not all sufficient …vague and general as they are’\(^{301}\) and he immediately seeks greater clarity.

It is not this supposed vagueness which commends them to a Deleuzian reading. In fact Deleuze too, following Bergson closely,\(^{302}\) regards such Joycean intuition, which gives us his ‘epiphanic machine’, as a precise instrument which turns intellect and lived experience away from simply noticing utility and survival, towards the very conditions and intensities which allow such experience to take place (*B* 115-116):

> Intuition is the method of Bergsonism. Intuition is neither a feeling, an inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy, but ... one of the most fully developed methods in

\(^{298}\) Beja, *Epiphany in the Modern Novel*, p.79.


philosophy. It has its strict rules ... which Bergson calls ‘precision’ in philosophy. (B 13)

These rules are then set out by Deleuze in considerable detail. Intuition is not itself ‘duration’ for either Deleuze or Bergson, but rather ‘presupposes duration’. 303 It is ‘the movement by which we emerge from our own duration’ and ‘make use of our own duration to affirm ... and recognize the existence of other durations’, passing ‘beyond both idealism and realism in the process’. (B 33)

Beja’s approach immediately reductively ‘actualises’ it to form a ‘badly analysed composite’ which contaminates true time, as ‘duration’, implicitly acting in unconstrained ‘smooth space’, with the severely restricted ‘striated space’ of ‘clock-time’. (TP 352) Effectively it confuses differences in kind with differences of degree. (B 17-18) Despite this, we have Beja’s ‘general working definition’ as:

a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether from some object, scene, event, or memorable phase of the mind – the manifestation being out of proportion to the significance or strictly logical relevance of whatever produces it. 304

which he has further dissected into:

... two major types: what I call the ‘retrospective’ epiphany, and that of ‘the past recaptured.’ The retrospective epiphany is one in which an event arouses no special impression when it occurs, but produces a sudden sensation of new awareness when it is recalled at some future time. I shall discuss such moments of delayed revelation when we come to both Joyce and Thomas Wolfe. Discussion of experiences involving the actual recapture of the past, as opposed to its mere recollection, is best postponed until the section on Marcel Proust in my second chapter. 305

Immediately we see in this ‘clarification’ with its conflation of Joyce’s and Thomas Wolfe’s epiphanies and separation of Joycean and Proustian ones a division which Deleuze [3.1, note] does not make.

303 Ibid. p.13.
305 Ibid. p.15.
Beja, like Gillies, is relegating Joycean epiphanies to the status of personal memory and 'mere' recollection, and as such depriving them of any sense of 'becoming', whilst granting Proustian epiphanies access to the ontological 'whole' past of the 'virtual' from which all 'becomings' must stem. However, Deleuze is far more concerned with the 'univocity' which Joyce and Proust share – although this 'univocity' will of course be expressed through difference – rather than any division between the two; they each make evident those conditions which allow living experience to take place. Deleuze points out that when we:

... compare the Proustian conception of the image with ... Joyce's epiphany ... [t]he following features seem to be shared: image as autonomous link between two concrete objects insofar as they are different (image, concrete equation); style, as multiplicity of viewpoints toward the same object and exchange of viewpoints toward several objects; language, as integrating and comprehending its own variations constitutive of a universal history and making each fragment speak according to its own voice; literature as production, as operation of affect-producing machines; explication, not as didactic intention but as technique of envelopment and development; writing as ideogrammatic method (with which Proust allies himself on several occasions). [3.3]

Beja, however, falling foul of his overly clear distinctions, is 'never absolutely certain whether Stephen actually recaptures the past [like Proust], or whether he simply recalls it, even during his visions in the Night-town episode of Ulysses.' Eventually, he simply leaves this in abeyance and goes on to argue that:

far more important in Joyce's fiction ... are what I call retrospective epiphanies, those occasions when an event seems trivial while it occurs and assumes importance only long after it has passed. ... one day, even if many years later, it is remembered and produces a revelation – but only in retrospect. 306

In contrast to Beja, Hugh Kenner307 argues strongly for the relationship of subjective perception and objective revelation in the Joycean epiphany. It seems to me that Deleuze would come down strongly in favour of Kenner's implicitly topological approach here, working through the 'middle', though he might well disagree with

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306 Ibid, p.77

Kenner's assumption that the treatment of aesthetics in *A Portrait* is ironic\(^{308}\). Kenner had stated that 'it is things which achieve epiphany under the artist's alchemical power, and not his own soul which he manifests ...',\(^{309}\) and 'it is radically impossible to understand what Joyce is talking about from the standpoint of the post-Kantian conviction that the mind imposes intelligibility upon things'.\(^{310}\) This too is very much in line with Bergson's thinking on intuition\(^{311}\) springing from an immanent 'outside'. a possibility which Kant would have denied. As Kenner appreciates, Kant's thinking remains a rational 'psychologism',\(^{312}\) as noted above, and Deleuze\(^{313}\) accepts Bergson's move from the conception of 'duration' as purely human and restricted to our consciousness to granting it a reality encompassing all the forces composing organic and inorganic matter, including mind and consciousness. Beja, on the other hand, argues that:

> Although such an epiphany would arise from the perception of something external, Joyce's emphasis is generally on the perceiving consciousness, the subject who actively adjusts his 'spiritual' vision to focus on the object, which in turn 'is epiphaniised.' Realizing this point helps us to understand Joyce's attitude toward epiphany, which is related to his whole view of the act of perception and consequently to his aesthetic theory. His stress on the perceiver is in line ... with the general development in epistemology from an emphasis on the object that reveals itself, fundamentally through God's grace, to an emphasis on the role of man's mind and imagination: from revelation by the object to insight on the part of the subject. *For Joyce to have given the primary role to something outside man's consciousness would have involved him in metaphysical problems which he avoids.*\(^{314}\)

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\(^{308}\) Ibid, p.137.

\(^{309}\) Ibid, p.141.

\(^{310}\) Ibid, p.138.

\(^{311}\) Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 291.


\(^{313}\) Also see Philip Turetzky, *Time*, pp. 212-214.

\(^{314}\) Beja, *Epiphany in the Modern Novel*, p.77. (My italics for emphasis)
Yet, Beja concedes that Joyce’s language is occasionally ambiguous, and there are a few expressions in Stephen’s exposition of aesthetics – at one point he mentions that “the object achieves its epiphany” – which in themselves might lead one to suppose that Stephen regards epiphany as a nonsubjective phenomenon.  

However, Beja does not see it this way arguing that:

The tendency to focus on the object stems partially, I think, from a misleading concentration on some vague implications in Stephen’s general aesthetic theory, when it is more worthwhile to look at his actual epiphanies. There is not one in which the ‘otherness’ of the object is as significant as the revelation produced in the perceiver. When, in the Portrait, Stephen sees an inscription of the word foetus, he does not learn a thing about the carving, but a good deal about himself and his place in the world. Later in the novel he sees the wading girl, and what he and the reader learn about her does not have nearly the significance of what they learn about Stephen. These examples could be multiplied indefinitely and would only demonstrate Joyce’s full awareness of what Proust’s Marcel realizes even as he tastes the madeleine dipped in tea: ‘It is plain that the object of my quest, the truth, lies not in the cup but in myself’ (Swann’s Way, 1:34).  

Contrariwise, it is precisely in such a major epiphany as the ‘bird girl’ that Joyce may be seen as deploying and reworking, throughout Ulysses and the Wake, this image as a ‘block of becoming’: ‘the girl’ as epiphanic producer of ‘becoming woman’ as she appears in ‘simulacra’ throughout Joyce’s works. Using a non-Deleuzian terminology she can be seen as Joyce’s constant creative ‘muse’. Moreover, it seems that having divided Joycean and Proustian epiphanies, Beja needs to bring them together here in order to make his point.

Conclusion

The problems and weaknesses in some Joycean critics understanding of the epiphany have been addressed and an alternative understanding has been advanced. I now need to move to readings of the Wake in order to see if this Deleuzian alternative is valid.

315 Ibid, pp.77-78.

316 Ibid, p.78.
Chapter IV

In the next two chapters, where I address the *Wake*, I intend to develop the insights provided in the previous chapter. I will take the earlier Deleuzian understanding of the epiphany constructed through portmanteau words and combine it with the later Deleuzoguattarian conception of ‘becoming girl/becoming woman’ through Issy, as well as some of the other lexical, syntactic, and structural usages which Deleuze and Guattari ignore. In the first place I believe that a more complete understanding of Joyce’s works seen from a ‘symptomatological’ Deleuzian perspective can be gained by focusing on Issy in the *Wake*. Secondly, however, it will be argued that by reading Issy in relation to Anna Livia – because ‘becoming woman or the molecular woman is the girl herself’, *(TP 276-277)* or as Joyce may have put it ‘the way to daughter led through mother, the way to mother through daughter’(*U* 815) – that the productivity of the reading will be substantially increased. Of course the Wakean ‘affects’ which I hold that Joyce creates through Issy occur either through or in conjunction with the words and syntax which compose ‘her’ as text.

I will focus my readings of Issy on two areas of the book where ‘she’ appears prominently. In this chapter I will look at *The Mime of Mick, Nick, and the Maggies* (*FW* 219.18-252.21) and in Chapter Five I will examine in detail Issy’s ‘music’ or ‘love letter’. (*FW* 279F1) Throughout both chapters I will attempt to present Issy in Deleuzoguattarian terms as a crucial, but misunderstood, node in what can be seen as the ‘rhizomatic assemblage’ or ‘network’ which constitutes the ‘epiphanic machine’ of the *Wake*. I argue that ‘she’ is more than simply a textual presence which calls into question our traditional concepts of character through the activity of portmanteau words, although ‘she’ is certainly that too. Issy, I believe, is not to be conceived of as either unified textual character on ‘the first plane of writing’ – and certainly not on ‘the plane of organisation’ as Lucia Joyce – but as the intensities of the ‘desiring machine’ offering readers a ‘line of flight’. Issy conceived as ‘desiring machine’ is not to be thought of in terms of internal mechanisms, but only as operational (dis)connections, *(AO 36)* for ‘there is only desire and the social, and nothing else’. *(AO 29)* Desire, as the *Wake’s* ‘Body without Organs’, ‘continually dismantle[s] the organism, causing
asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate’. (TP 4) Issy, conceived as such disruptive desire in my reading, operates through ‘the middle’, and is located on ‘the second plane of writing’.

Derek Attridge points out the need for a different criticism from that offered by standard readings of the *Wake* when he argues that:

[w]hen the *Wake* is welcomed, it is often by means of a gesture that simultaneously incapacitates it, either by placing it in a sealed-off category (the impenetrable and inexpressible world of the dream), or by subjecting it to the same interpretative mechanisms that are applied to all literary texts, as if it were no different: the elucidation of an ‘intention’ (aided by draft material and biography), the analysis of ‘characters’, the tracing of ‘plot’, the elaboration of ‘themes’, the tracking down of ‘allusions’, the identification of ‘autobiographical references’, in sum, the whole panoply of modern professional criticism.317

He strongly implies that the *Wake* needs to be read differently by critics and that the *Wake* resists such readings or attempted ‘reterritorialisations’. Marie-Dominique Garnier, from a Deleuzian viewpoint, concurs and even goes beyond Attridge.318 In my focus on Issy, I accept both Attridge’s and Garnier’s strictures and requirements, as I believe that Deleuze and Guattari’s quotation from D.H. Lawrence’s ‘Chaos in Poetry’ states poetically Joyce’s achievement in the *Wake*. (WIP 203-204)319

Consequently, it is not the Husserlian phenomenology of ‘communication’ and ‘meaning’ which I will be looking for through Issy but Deleuzoguattarian ‘function’ and ‘affect’. From such an angle, I believe that Hardt and Negri’s reliance on ‘the communication among singularities [which] emerges through the collaborative social process of production’,320 available via cyberspace, may not be sufficient in itself to ensure that ‘[t]hese singularities act in common and thus form a new race, that is, a politically coordinated subjectivity that the multitude produces [when] a new humanity


319 See pp. 47-48 above.

What is also needed according to Deleuze and Guattari is ‘the deterritorialization speed of the affect’, (TP 356) in order to ‘uproot one from humanity’, (TP 240) for as Deleuze states ‘the affect is the “new” and new affects are ceaselessly created, notably by the work of art’. (CI 98-99) Read as function and ‘affect’ Issy can give a clear indication of what is missing from Hardt and Negri’s analysis.

In any Deleuzian critique it is necessary to take into account contemporary societal ‘events’ and their ‘affects’. It is widely held that despite his wanderings Joyce never left Dublin. In looking at the social conditions which the book is held to diagnose from such a perspective one needs to start from here, although Joyce’s Dublin represents all modern cities. Deleuze and Guattari of course see the contemporary in terms of the problematics posed by the ‘reterritorialisations’ of capitalism, and Joyce has been shown above to explore and diagnose these in Ireland and elsewhere, first through societal paralysis and then through Bloomian masochism.

The societal problems epitomised through Bloom relate to patriarchy’s weakened ability to contain the dilemmas it poses through the impersonal forces of desire at certain historical moments in modernity. Joyce’s early writings, extending we are told from his first poem as a child, through Dubliners and A Portrait to Ulysses, can be seen to focus on one historical moment in which these problematics of the intensities of desire were historically highlighted: Parnell and the reactions to his adultery which split down the middle both Irish opinion and the Nationalist movement – itself deeply implicated in Church and State repression of desire. Whereas such new Irish women as the fictional Miss Ivors, in ‘The Dead’, had helped create Parnell and consequently wished to maintain him in position, his libidinal ‘splitting’ encouraged them to betray him as they too echoed the recuperative forces of Church and State. Dante Riordan in A Portrait, though hardly a new Irish woman, profoundly illustrates this repressive tendency.

From a Deleuzoguattarian angle too one needs to take into account that the *Wake* was written between two world wars and, read ‘symptomatically’, the effects and ‘affects’ of this historical placement necessarily resonate throughout the text. During the First World War the soldiers fighting in the trenches, and afterwards those on the ‘home front’, realised that they had been lied to by their leaders and patriarchal values came to be seen as little more than a sham. (A prescient Stephen in the ‘Aeolus’ episode of *Ulysses* voiced this awareness even though the words, ironically, were spoken by the ‘oedipalised’, sentimental, would-be Irish revolutionaries against the hegemonic control of England and the English language: ‘Noble words coming. Look out’, expressing values which he was aware were already ‘gone with the wind’. (U 180-181)) Questioned from all sides, the repressions expressed through ‘noble words’ weakened, and the impersonal desiring forces – stemming from the ontological unconscious or ‘BwO’ – surfaced once more as the patriarchal Symbolic order was no longer able to contain them. In formal terms one might see this as suffragettism, the Women’s Movement, and the clamour for votes for women. This, however, is to ‘oedipalise’ such unpredictable libidinal forces, as their ‘affects’ went much further than this.

The underlying question was ‘how could the daughters of the new twentieth century cope with this new fault line, and the opportunities and dangers it offered?’ In *Ulysses*, Molly’s adultery encouraged by Bloom can be seen as both reflecting in reverse the problem forced upon the Irish nation as a result of Parnell’s sexual indiscretion and pointing the way to a feminist consciousness. Both Parnell’s and Molly’s indiscretions expose the split caused by a weakened patriarchy no longer able to contain adequately free-flowing desire. In Molly’s reversal we are shown that this problem is finally brought to a head through the female. The *Wake* takes this problematic situation further with Issy epitomising and highlighting uncontainable desiring forces, constituted by patriarchy as ‘other’ and consequently female.

The historical moment, when Joyce was writing the *Wake*, was that of the roaring twenties, the jazz age, with the advent of the flapper set against the background of looming economic and international political crises which witnessed the Wall Street crash and a bankrupted and a resentful Germany about to slough off an imposed democracy and embrace either Communism or Nazism during the early 1930s. These
were problems which would ultimately culminate in The Second World War. Again, we see, highlighted by Joyce, the split caused by the release of these impersonal desiring forces on the bourgeois young women of the time, through a capitalist formation no longer able to adequately contain them.

Many young women such as Peggy Guggenheim, are instanced by Carol Loeb Shloss in her biography of Lucia Joyce\(^{322}\) who, gaining their freedom in a release from patriarchal repression, initially seem to take control of their own lives and engage in ‘free love’, whilst never making any lasting contractual relationships with the feckless young men – who were equally concerned to have a good time – frequently become pregnant and have many abortions, marry and divorce often, then become clinically depressed and threaten or actually attempt suicide and, if they survive such attempts, then spend considerable time in mental hospitals in a belated patriarchal effort to ‘re-oedipalise’ them. Whilst such difficulties may seem to afflict a particular class and expatriate culture only, there is substantial evidence to show that this problem was widespread throughout the Western social order. The first lines of Issy’s letter in the *Wake* may reflect this general malaise ‘...With all these gelded ewes jilting about and the thrills and ills of laylock blossoms ... I was thinking fairly killing times of putting an end to myself and my malody’. (FW 279F1.1-2) This will be discussed in the following chapter. It is the failure of a weakened patriarchy to contain the impersonal forces of desire and their effects on a generation of young women and men, which these lines signify, I argue, rather then a personal *cri de coeur* of one such young woman: Lucia Joyce.

Despite the above analysis, I need to stress that linking *Dubliners*, *A Portrait*, *Ulysses* and the *Wake*, to particular historical moments does not mean that they are contained and explained by or through these times. The *Wake*, in particular, is an open text and speaks to everyone today and tomorrow whatever the particular historical circumstances capitalism brings about. Because of its productive desiring ‘multiplicities’ it cannot be ‘oedipally’ fixed and ‘molarised’ in clock-time, nor given

‘meaning’ through always already available formulations. Similarly, I believe that it is precisely the inability of the capitalist social order to maintain its hold on productive desire which gives Hardt and Negri, who make this a central plank of their argument in *Empire* and *Multitude*, such potential importance in changed circumstances. Yet, the *Wake* both pre-dates and goes beyond *Empire*, I would argue, in its bringing into focus productive desire which it does through Issy.

Although I am writing on Joyce and Deleuze my attribution of a multiplicity of Deleuzian concepts to Issy in this and the following chapter is not a Joycean attempt to have it both – or indeed many – ways at the same time, but rather to take advantage of my earlier definition of the Deleuzian concept. At the outset of Chapter One, I defined the Deleuzian philosophic concept not in terms of the logic of exclusive disjunction, but rather as one determined by context and difference: ‘pure and simple variations ordered according to their neighbourhood’. (*WIP* 19) In setting out there the links which the ‘line of flight’ has to ‘affect’, ‘the middle’, the ‘event’, and most significantly ‘becomings’ and the ‘BwO’ as pivotal concepts, it seems to me that all of the concepts which I use with Issy can be regarded as variations or expansions of ‘her’ as ‘desiring machine’ and the process of ‘becoming girl’ as ‘she’ appears in a variety of contexts within the text. Consequently, Issy can never be pinned down as textual character or unified subject or person. One can know ‘her’ only through textual ‘affects’. Thus, despite the weight of critical opinion which avers that Joyce’s guilty association with Lucia is directly or indirectly depicted in and fundamental to our understanding of the *Wake*, by reading Issy on the ‘second plane of writing’, I wish to go beyond this critical consensus and with it an entire understanding of the *Wake* itself.

Even those critics who have attempted Deleuzian readings of the *Wake* have not made explicit the critical feature of the ‘second plane of writing’ in their analyses, and consequently I believe that they have not been able to bring out the importance of Joyce’s epiphanic ‘bird-girl’ muse or her appearances ‘anew’ throughout Joyce’s entire corpus as Deleuzian ‘simulacrum’. In particular no one has made the ‘rhizomatic’ link between ‘her’ earlier appearances and ‘her’ final significant and culminatory appearance in the *Wake* as Issy, and Joyce’s consequent highlighting of the forces of impersonal desire in the *Wake*. As Deleuze points out of the portmanteau words which
constitute Issy and the *Wake*: ‘[b]etween these basic series, a sort of *internal resonance* is produced; and this resonance induces a *forced movement*, which goes beyond the series themselves. These are the characteristics of the simulacrum, when it breaks its chains and rises to the surface: it then affirms its phantasmatic power, that is, its repressed power’ [2.3]. In my reading of the *Wake* it is Issy who/which releases this repressed power as ‘bird girl’ simulacrum.

From the standpoint of traditional *Wake* criticism, the first question to be asked must be: given the major figures of HCE and ALP, who have been read as representing male and female principles, encompassing all of the minor ones,⁴³³ and that Adaline Glasheen needs over three hundred double-column pages to list and identify the characters, real and fictitious who appear or are mentioned in the *Wake*,⁴³⁴ why should I focus on Issy in this chapter? Even if one limits the cast to five main ‘characters’ (H. C. Earwicker, his wife Anna Livia, their twin sons Shem and Shaun, and the daughter Issy) this choice still seems quite arbitrary. However, as has been indicated above, I intend to read Issy not as a ‘character’ on ‘the first plane of writing’ but rather as ‘desiring machine’ offering a ‘line of flight’ on the ‘second plane’. I believe that Joyce’s statement that there is ‘no connection between the people in *Ulysses* and the people in *Work in Progress.* There are in a way no characters ...’ ,⁴³⁵ together with the assurance which he gave to Eugene Jolas that ‘[t]ime and the river and the mountain are the real heroes of my book’,⁴³⁶ allows for this approach. Furthermore, in stressing the textuality of Issy and the other ‘characters’ one needs to take into account Derek Attridge’s comment on characters in the *Wake*:

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One possibility is to turn for assistance to the other meaning of the word *character*: a written sign. ... by allowing the two senses to overlap (which, in spite of their sharing a single signifier, our discursive habits usually prevent), by insisting that every time the term *character* is used to mean an ‘assemblage of consistent personal qualities’ it should be thickened and coloured by the sense of character as ‘arbitrary sign in a conventional, historically determined system’, we may be able to talk about characters in a novel without subscribing to the ideological premises which habitually underpin such discussions. And this, of course, is just what Joyce does: it is only in this double sense that we can legitimately talk of HCE and ALP as ‘characters’ in *Finnegans Wake*: they are persons only insofar as they are at the same time letters scattered across the text.327

and one might add Issy not simply as the daughter of HCE, or even a disguised representation of Lucia Joyce, but rather ‘the dotter of his eyes’. (*FW* 372.03)

Richard Brown’s comment of two decades ago that ‘it has seemed easier to account for items in Joyce’s texts through an investigation of their similarity to events in his life, than to ask questions about the relevance of such items to contemporary issues’,328 seems to be as true today as it was then when David Wright,329 for example, writing at the same time as Brown, observed of the *Wake*, that:

[T]hroughout Joyce’s work, the traits in question clearly derive from his own, focusing on autobiographical characterisation can show that for all its oddity, the *Wake* treats some of the same concerns as Joyce’s earlier works.330

Yet, as Wright himself notes ‘[c]haracterisation in the *Wake* can become bewilderingly fluid and difficult to define’,331 which is not surprising given Joyce’s assertion that there


331 Ibid, p.104.
are ‘in a way no characters’ in the *Wake*, unless one is talking of character as written sign. 332

Who or what then is Issy? Critics’ views range from either ignoring Issy 333 or acknowledging ‘her’ existence with a certain perplexity – which generally incorporates a belief that, whilst initially conceived by Joyce as a major character, Issy’s importance was downgraded later and so she only appears by default in the published text – to a belief that Issy is more easily explained than the other characters in the *Wake*, often leading to a straightforward association of Issy with Lucia Joyce 337 as ‘her psychical counterpart in real life’, and thus a clinical schizophrenic. Very many feminist critics link Issy and Lucia directly, not least Hélène Cixous 341 who

332 I do not wish to denigrate or ignore the excellent work done by Andrew Norris in ‘The Search for Character in *Finnegans Wake*’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Leeds, School of English, 1992). His highly intelligent and subtle analysis shows that it is possible to convincingly draw out characters from the *Wake*. Nevertheless, from a Deleuzian viewpoint I am more concerned with the *Wake* as offering, not a more or less disguised set of characters ‘actualised’ through the ‘first plane of writing’, but the lines, forces and intensities derived from the ‘second plane of writing’ which constitute all characters in capitalist modernity. This is how I interpret Joyce’s ‘in a way there are no characters’ in the *Wake*.


335 David Hayman, ‘I Think Her Pretty: Reflections of the Familiar in Joyce’s Notebook VI.B.5’, *Joyce Studies Annual* 1 (1990), 43-60 (pp. 50-51).


338 Laurent Milesi, ‘Toward a Female Grammar of Sexuality: The De/Recomposition of “Storiella as she is syung”, *Modern Fiction Studies* 35.3 (Autumn 1989), p. 579.


suggests that the ‘profound relationship’ of Joyce and Lucia, to quote Jung,\textsuperscript{342} went beyond the usual love of a father for his daughter and developed into an incestuous one. Cixous speaks of ‘this ardent and guilty father’,\textsuperscript{343} whose guilt is indirectly depicted in the \textit{Wake} through the crimes of Earwicker. However, Shloss, who has written the most recent and certainly the most meticulously researched biography of Lucia to date, believes that there is insufficient evidence to come to a definitive conclusion on ‘the hoary head of incest for which there is no historical evidence’.\textsuperscript{344} I believe that this whole approach shows the pervasive ‘oedipalising’ forces of traditional criticism at work in even one of the best attested feminist theorists.

Such an approach has been surprisingly summarised in Margot Norris’s blunt assertion that Joyce simply took his everyday experiences and transcribed them indirectly into the \textit{Wake}, although in fairness one must add that she does not make a direct reference to Joyce and Lucia’s supposed incestuous relationship. Nevertheless, in noting ‘the depressing circumstances of Joyce’s life’, Norris believes of II.1, that this

\ldots can be recognized in transcribed form in the children’s chapter: Joyce’s worsening eye problem becomes Glugg’s inability to see and determine colours; the unintelligibility of Lucia’s worsening madness becomes the enigma of female

\textsuperscript{341} Cixous, \textit{The Exiles of James Joyce}, pp.105-106 and Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{342} Ellmann papers at the University of Tulsa, Number 152, Jung, from interview notes with Richard Ellmann (see Fordham, ‘James Joyce’s \textit{Finnegans Wake} and Lucia Joyce’s Breakdown’, p.56).

\textsuperscript{343} Cixous, \textit{The Exiles of James Joyce}, p.15.

\textsuperscript{344} Shloss, \textit{Lucia Joyce}, p. 443.
nature and desire encoded in the heliotropic riddle; Joyce’s dental pain becomes little Glugg’s tummy ache.\textsuperscript{345}

This sits rather oddly with her assertion that ‘Finnegans Wake might be said to be “about” not being certain what it is about: its subject is the nature of indeterminacy itself.’\textsuperscript{346} Despite her ‘decentred subject’,\textsuperscript{347} evidently for Norris as for the others, Issy is Lucia Joyce, whatever her other uncertainties about the \textit{Wake}.

Nevertheless, even if one were to take Norris’s biographical or Jung’s psychoanalytical approach to Joyce’s work, it seems evident that such lines as ‘[t]hose quiet cold fingers have touched the pages, foul and fair, on which my shame shall glow for ever. Quiet and cold and pure fingers. Have they never erred?’,\textsuperscript{348} do not refer to Lucia as Issy but to one or more of Joyce’s pupils in Trieste, and such ‘pupil-teachers erringnesses’ (\textit{FW} 279F1.4-5) might well be seen in these terms. Yet, Jung in focusing on Lucia as Joyce’s ‘femme inspiratrice [or] his anima’\textsuperscript{349} finds Lucia to be directly implicated in both \textit{Ulysses} and the \textit{Wake}. Other Joyce critics, not easily characterised as feminist or working within a psychoanalytic frame, apparently accept the Lucia/ Issy connection. These range from Adaline Glasheen who wrote that ‘Joyce observed his daughter’s madness with care and interest and wrote about it with great power and bad taste’,\textsuperscript{350} to Finn Fordham’s observation twenty years later that Lucia’s dance ‘becomes a metaphor for the book itself’.\textsuperscript{351}

\textsuperscript{345} Norris, \textit{Joyce’s Web}, p.185.


\textsuperscript{347} Norris, \textit{The Decentered Universe}, passim.

\textsuperscript{348} Joyce, \textit{Giacomo Joyce}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{349} Jung used Aristotle’s terminology in the latter’s \textit{Physics, De anima (On the Soul)}, he believed that the anima was the inner feminine part (or soul) of the male personality.

\textsuperscript{350} Glasheen, \textit{Third Census of ‘Finnegans Wake’}, p.149.

Moreover, there have been a considerable number of novelists, short story writers, poets, and playwrights over the years who have made Lucia Joyce and her relationship to the work of her father the subject of their endeavours, and Michael Hastings is only the latest of them at the time of writing. In the notes to his play Calico he states unequivocally that Joyce’s incestuous relationship with Lucia was the unacknowledged cause of Lucia’s schizophrenia, guiltily reflected by Joyce in the Wake, as he holds that ‘[n]obody will deny that this book is about incest with [his] daughter’. As noted above Shloss is more circumspect arguing that there is insufficient evidence for such a conclusion although the possibility of incest with her brother Giorgio is raised by Shloss as she asks ‘why was the ten-year-old Lucia ... sleeping in the same bed with her sexually self-conscious brother?’.

Whatever their views, and whatever their doubts, I believe that they all attempt to read Issy in commonsensical terms as ‘a character’ located on ‘the first plane of writing’. In doing this they may, I suspect, have been somewhat misled by Joyce himself in his mischievous reference to ‘the charictures in the drame!’ (FW 302.31-32) These ‘charictures’, I believe, are less characters than Joycean caricatures, or Deleuzian

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354 Shloss, Lucia Joyce, p. 72.
mappings of forces, whose immanent relations constitute the Wakean machine as I hope to show. As Foucault put it in his essay on Deleuze, ‘univocity’ is ‘the principal condition which permits difference to escape the domination of identity’, and Deleuze himself states unequivocally that such ‘difference must be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to different without any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed’. (DR 117) It is precisely this difference of articulation and ‘rhizomatic’ connection which characterises Issy and distinguishes her from Lucia’s schizophrenic disconnections.

Given the above conspectus of critical opinion, it appears that in the main Joycean critics seem to largely ignore the ‘second plane of writing’, or textual ‘plane of immanence’ – where I believe we should locate the intensities of Issy – in order to arborescently ‘root’ ‘reterritorialize’ and ‘oedipalise’ her, as a more or less disguised depiction of Joyce’s ‘schizophrenic’ daughter Lucia. To some degree, they may all be regarded as attempting to entrap the book in Joyce’s immediate everyday concerns, or at least a generalised Freudian ‘familial’ representation. Even Christine van Boheemen-Saaf, whom one would expect to be exempt from this ‘oedipalising’ approach in her attempt to move away from Joyce’s family situation through an alternative historicist line, seems to fall into the same trap. She finds only loss and ‘mourning’ pervading a text unable to speak the past or properly engage with the present. Boheemen-Saaf sadly bemoans ‘the lack of interiority of discourse’ following on from the loss of a ‘coherent selfhood’. Such assertions, in their implicit reliance on the ‘lack’ and loss of masculinist unitary identity imposed through the ‘feminisation’ of Celtic Ireland through colonial patriarchy, return her argument to the ‘molar line’ of modernist recuperation epitomised by the ‘oedipalised’ readings of Issy as Lucia. It is perhaps significant that Boheemen-Saaf has stated that ‘the simplest way of describing her book Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma of History’ is as ‘a study in the informative

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presence of what Freud calls the "death-instinct", whilst Deleuze and Guattari refer to the "ridiculous death instinct" invoked by Freud. (TP 155) Consequently, I argue, from a Deleuzian standpoint, that whatever its other merits, her critique is unable to trace "the curve of the present that goes towards the future announced by the new assemblage of Life that appears on the horizon", which I believe that Issy as 'girl' offers us in the Wakean assemblage.

From a Bergsonian/Deleuzian angle the works cited above limit Joyce's work to the 'bare repetitions' of the 'continuous present' and consequently, as I argue on their behalf, a restrictive reading of the Wake. Do such negative understandings differ at all from the lack and losses instanced in Baudrillard's version of 'simulacra'? Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze, Hardt and Negri, and particularly Guattari writing alone all roundly condemn such life-denying negativities: "the perpetual ruminations over the "death of" this, and the "end" of that".

Stephen, of course, projects a certain negativity throughout Ulysses, and I would separate his youthful epiphanic 'writerliness' from that of Joyce's later understanding of the epiphany in the Wake for, as Deleuze comments, the writer 'and the reader in his wake, is the one who "disentangles" and "re-embodies"' such experiences [3.1] as 'the incredible feeling of an unknown Nature—affect'. (TP 240) Such an 'affect': 'is not a personal feeling [but] the effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel. ... the violence of these animal sequences, uproot one from humanity'. (TP 240) Stephen's 'bird-girl' appears differently throughout Joyce's later work whilst always signifying new life and hope as she 'uproot[s] one from humanity'. Thus, in Ulysses after we have had the life-denying experience of Bloom during the


359 Gregg Lambert. 'On the Uses and Abuses of Literature for Life', in Deleuze and Literature, ed. by Ian Buchanan, and John Marks, p.155.

360 Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings, p.125, Simulations, p.28.

cloud sequence in ‘The Calypso’ episode, the epiphanic ‘girl’, in a life-giving ‘becoming sun’ returns differently. (U 74) Deleuze and Guattari have said of ‘the girl’: ‘[w]hat is a girl? ... individuation ... proceed[ing] not by subjectivity but by haecceity, pure haecceity. “Fugitive being” ... pure relation of speed and slowness, and nothing else’. (TP 271) ‘[H]aecceity’ itself is the ‘thisness’ or ‘it’ of an ‘event’ – an ‘event’ such as the ‘bird girl’ epiphany, or the Wakean ‘assemblage’ or ‘epiphanic machine’ in its totality - with its entire capacity to ‘affect’ or infect us as readers. ‘Pure haecceity’ is:

a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing or substance. ... consist[ing] entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules and particles, capacities to affect and be affected. (TP 261)

‘Pure haecceity’ epitomises not only ‘the girl’ but pervades the *Wake* itself as epiphanic ‘event’. This emphasis on ‘haecceity’ clearly reinforces the potential of a productive reading of Issy as ‘the girl’ crucial to the Wakean assemblage as ‘epiphanic machine’. As such one needs to look at the impersonal intensities which make up textualised incest in the *Wake* in order to allow the text to free itself, and us, from the ‘oedipalising’ recuperations through Joyce and Lucia’s (supposedly) incestuous relationship in which many of the above critics would entrap it. Whilst the textual signs of both father-daughter and brother-sister incest undoubtedly exist in the *Wake*, Deleuze, following Chrysippus the Stoic, (L 130) sees such incest as a signifying relationship with ‘a new discourse, a new logos animated with paradox and philosophical values and significations which are new’:

This is a reorientation of all thought and of what it means to think – *there is no longer depth or height*. ... It is always a matter of ... showing that the incorporeal is not high above (en hauteur), but is rather at the surface, ... the superficial ... par excellence, ... not Essence but Event. (L 130)

Issy as the intensities of ‘the girl’ as ‘she’ or ‘it’ is implicated or involved in every aspect of the text including incestual encounters. As Glasheen states ‘every is is Issy’,

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and one might add that so is every ‘and’ as she constantly works through the textual middle as ‘desiring machine’. So, just as ‘her’ symbiotic relationship as ‘girl’ depends on ‘becoming woman’, as ‘the girl is the “becoming woman” of each sex’, (TP 277) one can trace ‘her’ not only through the obvious symbiotic relationship with Anna Livia, but in the ‘becoming woman’ of Shem and Shaun as they merge in deliquescent identity, and even as the major force ensuring the repeated failures of HCE to maintain his unified patriarchal self, and his consequent though resisted movement towards ‘becoming woman’.

As Luce Irigaray points out, the ‘woman-thing’ opposes patriarchal oneness through ‘speak[ing] “fluid”’, for ‘[f]luid ... is, by nature, unstable. Unless it is subordinated to geometrism’. In addition to the ‘line of flight’ and the creative flight offered by the ‘bird-girl’ of A Portrait there is a substantial ‘rhizomatic’ link between her as evidently ‘a strange and beautiful seabird’ with legs ‘delicate as a crane’s [with] an emerald trail of seaweed’, and the fluidity of ALP as river, HCE as the sea (as well as the mountain) and Issy as the rain cloud Nuvoletta in the Wake. This watery link also extends to Ulysses, itself based on Odysseus’s voyage and adventures, where Gibraltar as a rock set in the sea figures prominently and such figures as Mulvey and for that matter the one-legged sailor whom Molly throws a coin to, as well as Murphy the sailor in ‘Eumaeus’, not forgetting the bar-maid Sirens, all play their part in this link. As for the problem of ‘geometrism’ one recalls that it is rather unsuccessfully related to the fluidity of ALP. (FW 283.32-284.4; 286.21-30) The geometry problem has been seen in II.2 as the heroic (Viconian) quest for knowledge, yet this is a quest for ‘meaning’ rather than ‘function’ which, we note later, results in ‘the Fall’ from the Garden of Eden.

Issy, as ‘line of flight’, is ‘desiring machine’, the vital impetus or élan vital of the Wake’s dynamic, and as such, I believe, has something crucial to add to Hardt and


Negri’s theorisations. I would argue that they need to go beyond the ‘communication’ of cyberspace as liberatory device to address the ‘oedipalising’ forces of the monotheistic religions and the consequent nuclear family which form a cornerstone of many Third World peoples’ subjectivities; peoples whom they seek to radicalize as ‘the multitude’ of globalised capitalism. I will argue in the next chapter that in Issy’s so-called ‘love letter to her teacher’ the impersonal forces of desire are brought to the fore and it is such free-flowing desire which needs to be released and brought into play in order to bring about Hardt and Negri’s revolution.

Our oedipalised nuclear family relationships in modernity are seen by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, in opposition to much psychoanalysis, to be historically specific and engendered by capitalism rather than being a universal given. Moreover, such ‘oedipalisations’ are not to be seen as limited to the neurotic individuals in our society but rather to characterise everyone. In their argument, not only is the institution of the nuclear family the creation and bastion of capitalism, but it is constituted by incestuous desire and its fixed subjectivities are maintained by the incest-taboo at the heart of its oedipalising structure. Because the incest-taboo always already exists in modernity and hails us into identity, amorphous free flowing desire is captured and ‘docile subjects supposedly discover what they desire at the same time that they discover they cannot have it’.

In this way desire is initially isolated from the rest of society and restricted to the nuclear family. Oedipal incest has both captured desire and forbidden it and in doing so become the false representation of desire itself. The nuclear family consequently seems to have been ‘fabricated to meet the requirements of [the capitalist] social formation’ as it internalises prohibitive authority ensuring submission as docile subjects to the father, the boss, the law, the state, religion, the homosocial order with its accompanying homophobia and misogyny, advertising, consumption, and capital in general. The incest-taboo is then the moral means whereby subjectivity, the properly socialised

366 Althusser. For Marx. p.233.

367 Holland, Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, p.37.
citizen, the nuclear family and capitalism itself are held in place. Even though the nuclear family as an institution is in crisis in global capitalism, its fragmentation and dispersal as 'family values' ensures that it is more pervasive and powerful than ever before, as Hardt and Negri point out. In this, I believe one can problematise their assumption in *Empire* that there is a clean break between imperial and global capitalism particularly as they rely heavily on the communicative aspects of the internet and television to bring resistance to this about. One can argue that much of the internet and most of television through its advertising content is set up to continue the formation of its users or viewers as implicit members of a nuclear family and 'oedipalised' consumers through the channelling of desire.

Freud, himself, in accepting the prohibition against incest and the renunciation of primordial desire argued that the incest taboo is the crucible in which both human subjectivity and culture are formed. The 'apology for incest' (*L* 130) to which Deleuze referred above is concerned to free desire from such capture in capitalist modernity. I argue that Joyce turns to such an apologia in *Finnegans Wake*, and in doing so takes even further the 'symptomatological' diagnosis of societal ills as 'paralysis' in *Dubliners* and 'masochism' in *Ulysses*, which I argue are direct outcomes of the incestuous distortions of desire. Joyce does this in the main, I believe, by addressing and challenging the problem of the incest-taboo and the opportunities afforded thereby through Issy/Maggie.

Desire captured by incest and then forbidden by the incest-taboo simply masks and falsifies its potentialities. Deleuze and Guattari note that 'incest with the sister', and one might add daughter, is '... the *intensive model* of incest itself. (*AO* 159) Sons, however, are not left out of the equation for '[i]t is by using the girl ... by pointing to [her] as the object of his desire that ... a dominant [oedipalised] history is fabricated for him'. (*TP* 276) As Deleuze has earlier stated, here

we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with specters and phantoms before characters. (*DR* 10)

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368 Hardt and Negri. *Empire*, p.197
Joyce may be regarded as addressing this issue in the Wakean playlet ‘The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies’. In ‘The Mime’ Joyce gives Issy the part of Izod, the sexual prize for her brother Glugg/ Shem, with his twin Chuff/ Shaun waiting lecherously for her in the wings. Joyce presents us with a masked version of Issy in the role of Izod as the intensities of the girlish ‘object of desire’ undergirding the incestuous family relationships. For, as HCE quickly becomes aware, the playlet depicts his own incestuous urges as the boys in their final fight ‘adumbrace a pattern of somebody else or other’. (FW 220.15-16) Insofar as HCE is ‘Here Comes Everybody’ then, we have Issy as Izod, embodying the captured ‘desiring forces’ which underpin the nuclear family in modernity, with Glugg/ Shem’s inability to complete the game epitomising the incest-taboo.

This can be seen from a Deleuzian angle as the Izodian mask which capitalism imposes and fixes on the mother and daughter/sister in the nuclear family as the father’s and brothers’s overly restricted ‘objects of desire’; as ‘[i]t is not via a flow of shit [as money] or a wave of incest that Oedipus arrives, but via the decoded flows of capital’. (AO 267) Incestuous desire derives from the constitutive forces of capitalism. Of course in this claustrophobic channelling of desire within the nuclear family, father-son and son-son incestuous desire is also created. The roots of the homosocial order with its attendant homophobia are laid down in this way. I have already instanced this through Stephen-Bloom and Bob Doran in Ulysses, and in the Wake we have the Noah-Ham relationship. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘incest with the sister [is]... the intensive model of incest’. This is because ‘the girl’s becoming is stolen first [through capitalism’s recuperative strategy] the boy’s turn come next’. (TP 276) Izod then in ‘the Mime’ is the captured ‘oedipalised’ representation of desire, an ‘actualised’ mask which must be recognised and set aside as Joyce, I believe, fully appreciated. However, even in ‘the Mime’ the intensive forces of desire, as ‘line of flight’, which compose Issy are also made available to us through the colour heliotrope as I will argue later.

The forces of this impersonal desire are given even more prominence I believe in Issy’s so called love letter to ‘her’ teacher (FW 279F.1-37) which I will explore in the
next chapter. Through the exotic and portmanteau words which ‘she’ brings to the text, one sees connections with other peoples and other times bringing into play life’s multiple possibilities, even though they can also be read as giving the reductive incestuous modernist longings for brother and father. In using such portmanteaux, I argue, Issy is brought fully into play by Joyce as the hidden potentialities or ‘virtual’ intensities which make up both the Wakean text and desire as life itself and as such ‘she’ or ‘it’, as ‘desiring machine’, undermines and gives an alternative to the incestuous entrapment of desire in the nuclear family of modernity.

Deleuze argues that although desire has been captured by incest and the incest-taboo in modern society, in reality it cannot be reduced to sexual relations between bodies or people. (L 210) He describes a desire that produces and exceeds bodies. There is a flow of life or desire which passes through and constitutes bodies whether organic or textual. For him, and I would argue Joyce, desire is a principle of creativity, invention, and possibility. As free-floating libido, desire cannot be attached to a character, and crucially in this connection David Hayman notes Joyce’s statement of Issy’s relationship to ALP in his 1923 ur-workbook for the Wake (Notebook VI.B.3): ‘Mum-letterwriter. Is—her libido … the Beyond (The James Joyce Archive 29.241)’. Barbara Kennedy reminds us that ‘Deleuze writes that the beyond of becoming-woman is becoming-girl’, and one knows that the libido is simply impersonal sexualised energy according to both Freud and Lacan and a fundamental part of the id. As Deleuze and Guattari said of the id:


It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said the id. Everywhere it is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. (AO 1)

Perhaps we have here in Joyce’s note the kernel of his id-eology: Issy as id-entity, or more precisely the ‘non-entity’ of the Deleuzian ‘desiring machine’, as an arrangement of heterogeneous elements or ‘haecceity’. Issy as ‘the It with an itch in it’, (FW 268.04) the formative force of the ‘It girl’ of the 1920s, and ALP as ‘mum’ the letter writer, as Clive Hart has shown,373 embodying the Wake microcosmically.

In her concluding monologue, ALP’s ‘becoming-imperceptible’ as she merges with the sea and is replaced by Issy, ‘Now a younger’s there’, (FW 627.6) can be seen to reveal the excess and hidden ‘potentialities’ available to the ‘actualised’ figures of ‘mum’ and us whatever the fears she expresses. In a sense this extends the conception of the Kristevan ‘abject’ where everything unacceptable to pristine unitary patriarchy is symbolised in the concept of ‘mother’, as potential destabiliser of the Symbolic order.374 As such, Issy’s survival as cloud and water (FW 159.6-18) as ALP’s replacement, is not only pre-personal but even pre-human. Thus, Stephen Dedalus in his encounter with the epiphanic ‘bird girl’ becomes aware of ‘the slow drifting clouds ... a host of nomads on the march’ offering him, in conjunction with the girl, a ‘line of flight’:

Her nakedness yielded to him, radiant, warm, odorous and lavishlimbed, enfolded him like a shining cloud, enfolded him like water with a liquid life: and like a cloud of vapour or like waters circumfluent in space the liquid letters of speech, symbols of the element of mystery, flowed forth over his brain.375

The ‘bird-girl’ is a water-bird with water as an additional ‘rhizomatic’ link characterising ALP and Issy, as the rain cloud Nuvoletta and ‘her’ divergent selves as Rainbow girls, just as the cloud offers a link with flight.


Issy, as Izod, has been looked at somewhat negatively above in my initial reading of the playlet in order to highlight Joyce’s completion of his ‘symptomatological’ diagnosis, and mount a further challenge to State/Religion and capitalist hegemony, through a revelation of the fundamental formative influence of the incest-taboo. However, I did not stress in this analysis the objective of the game which involves Shem-Glugg’s guessing the heliotrope colour of Issy’s underwear which, I argue, can give us a better picture of Issy’s potential as the ‘girl’ and ‘line of flight’. It would surely be mad, perverse, too vulgar, or at least crude to suggest that the best way to get into the *Wake* is through Issy’s drawers! Yet, we need to note that in one version of Issy’s letter, the one to Jaun/Shaun, (*FW* 457-461) we have both the drawers of ‘drawhwer nearest’ (*FW* 457.26) together with the implicit winning of the girl, underpinned by Stephen’s ecstatic encounter with the ‘bird-girl’ in *A Portrait* where ‘the white fringes of her drawers were like feathering of soft white down’. Moreover, O Hehir informs us that ‘drawher’, as ‘dearbhrathair’ pronounced ‘draher’ means ‘brother’ in Gaelic. Here the impersonal ‘model intensities’ of brother-sister incest are being underlined I would argue through the fetishisation of the drawers. Furthermore, this offers a link with the societal masochism Joyce depicts in *Ulysses*, through Bloom and his obsession with Molly’s underwear: ‘begging me to give him a tiny bit cut off my drawers’. (*U* 882) Deleuze notes that fetishistic desire is the process of disavowal central to masochism. (*M* 30, 110)

Yet, it is not the fetishism of Bloom’s obsession with such underwear which most concerns me here, nor the ‘rhizomatic’ link with the epiphanic ‘bird-girl’, but rather the colour of heliotrope which pervades and even constitutes Issy throughout the *Wake*, for Joyce tells us that Glugg ‘must fand for himself by gazework what their colours wear as they are all showen drawens up’. (*FW* 224.26-27) It is this fact which I believe that Deleuzian readers of Joyce need to concentrate on. In this colour, I argue, one has the

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377 My italics.
means of seeing Issy released from her masked Izodian self of masculine ‘object of desire’ on a ‘molar’ line. Interestingly in this connection Saint Patrick, (‘Same Patholic’ \((FW\) \(611.10\)) as the personification of Roman Catholicism in Ireland, and Bishop Berkeley (‘pidginfella Bil Kelly-Bel Kelly (\(FW\) \(611.27\)) debate whether white light, as unity (and the unity of the Catholic Church), or colour as difference, as ‘Archdruid’ Berkeley argued, better represent the ‘true inwardness of reality’. (\(FW\) \(611.21\)) It is of course as difficult to separate the colour from the material as it is to separate the smile from the Carrollian cat, or white light (of Issy) into all the colours of the rainbow (as Issyian Rainbow girls) but the ‘molecular line’ allows us to do so, and both Deleuze and Joyce I believe argue for colour and difference ‘in trues coloribus resplendent’. (\(FW\) \(611.22-23\)) For, as Atherton notes, in his ‘complication’ of unitary white light, Joyce drew on the philosophy of Bruno.\(^{378}\) [1.4]

Joyce, by stressing the impersonal intensities of colour as a central motif, I argue, moves the focus from fetishised sexual desire to the forces constituting the ‘virtuality’ of impersonal desire as ‘life’ itself, of which ‘actualised’ human sexual desire in any of its forms is only one manifestation. He indicates this change of emphasis in the following terms:

*The scheme of the piece ... is the game we used to call Angels and Devils or colours. The Angels, girls, are grouped behind the Angel, Shawn, and the Devil has to come over three times and ask for a colour. If the colour he asks for has been chosen by any girl she has to run and he tries to catch her. As far as I have written he has come twice and been twice baffled. (\(LI\) \(295\)*

It is the colour rather than the fetishised knickers which Joyce draws attention to as the object of the game, even though it has become embroiled in sexual intrigue.

The colour is of course ‘heliotrope’ which Glugg fails to guess, even when reluctantly aided by the rainbow girls, who actually support his rival Chuff, and offer anagrams to supposedly help him: ‘O theoperil! Ethiaop lore, the poor lie’. (\(FW\) \(223.28\)) The question central to the game remains unanswered by Glugg. In fact the familial game itself must remain incomplete as it epitomises the incest-taboo, and one

recalls Deleuze’s observations that it is ‘the method of questions-problems by means of which Joyce animates his work’ [1.4], which is ‘not the non-being of the negative but the (non)-being of a persistent question’ [1.3]. To which, I believe, Glugg’s incorrect guesses ‘correspond, without being a response, since [they] alone occupy and fill that space’ [1.3], a textual space which Joyce has deliberately opened up: ‘[w]hen the h, who the hu, how the hue, where the huer?’. (FW 257.34-35) I will examine this effective non-response below. It is the ‘virtual’ impersonal intensities which make up desire through the stammered colour, or ‘hue’, as offering a ‘line of flight’, rather than the ‘oedipalising’ familial forces which entrap and constantly ‘reterritorialise’ us within the capitalist nexus which are of significance here.

If one takes the colour itself, one recalls that Clytie, the water nymph in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, 379 died for love of Apollo the sun god who rejected her in favour of Leucothoe, and she decayed or was transformed into the flower heliotrope. Clytie betrayed Apollo’s adultery with Leucothoe to her father, who trapped them in bed with his finely spun nets, thus reasserting patriarchal power and confining Clytie to the ‘abjection’/madness of the female in such an arrangement. Thus, Thomas Hood in his poem ‘Flowers’ alludes to Clytie: ‘I will not have the mad Clytie/ whose head is always turned by the sun’. 380 Hood is emphasising the movement of the flower. This is a tropism which brings into play Issy’s move to the sun as Nuvoletta, the cloud girl, which would result in a rainbow and the Rainbow girls, bringing to the fore again the debate between Bishop Berkeley and Saint Patrick on white light and the spectrum. (FW 611) The themes of infatuation and the delirium of unquenched desire, betrayal – which as we will see characterises the ‘nomadic’ ‘war machine’ – adultery, madness, and ‘machinic disconnections’ are all directly or indirectly linked to this colour in the Victorian ‘language of flowers’. 381 Untrammelled desire temporarily released from its


381 Anon, *The Language of Flowers: being a lexicon of the sentiments assigned to flowers, plants, fruits, and roots* (Edinburgh: Patton and Ritchie, 1849); Vernon
patriarchal channelling and repressions in the historical moment of the 1920s through the ‘flapper generation’ with its incumbent ‘madnesses’, nevertheless shook off for a time the symbolic ‘father who trapped them in bed with his finely spun nets’. Joyce seems to have equated ‘girlness’ with flowers in Giacomo Joyce: ‘[h]er body has no smell: an odourless flower’ and ‘[a] flower given by her to my daughter. Frail gift, frail giver, frail blue-veined child’,382 As Richard Ellmann notes, ‘Joyce wrote of the same incident in “A Flower Given to My Daughter”, a poem dated “Trieste, 1913”. A “frail pallor” is also characteristic of Stephen’s girl in A Portrait’. 383

Throughout Ulysses, as Restuccia notes, ‘flowers are virtually ubiquitous’ and she links them with women’s blood as Joyce’s ‘secular eucharistic signs’:

They are established as synecdoches of women: in ‘Douce Lydia. Bronze and rose’, ‘rose’ is a sort of badge of Lydia Douce’s identity; and Molly states outright of herself, ‘I was a Flower of the mountain yes when I put the rose in my hair’, and of women in general, ‘we are flowers all’. This metonymy ramifies. If flowers/women hold sacramental value, Henry Flower, the Rose of Castile, Boylan’s carnation, in sum, the entire linguistic floral world of Ulysses gains sacramental significance.384

Here, I believe, Restuccia is in some danger of viewing women/flowers from an ‘oedipalising’ perspective, a problem which re-occurs in her attempt to show the ubiquity of ‘eucharistic signs’ in Ulysses, no matter how ‘secular’ her designation of these attempts claim to be. In the Wake, if not in Ulysses or Giacomo Joyce, Joyce bids us concentrate on the abstracted colour, I suggest, rather than its manifestation in the form of a flower/woman, although we might read ‘roses’ as synonymous with menstruation and the consequent ‘leakages’ which constitute the ‘line of flight’385 and thus one’s ‘becoming woman’.

Coleman, ed., The Language of Flowers (Barnstaple: Chilton Designs, [1852], reprinted 1996).

382 Joyce, Giacomo Joyce, p. 3.
383 Ibid. p.13.
384 Restuccia, Joyce and the Law of the Father, p.82.
Deleuze comments:

... the colour-image does not refer to a particular object, but absorbs all that it can: it is the power which seizes all that happens within its range, or the quality common to completely different objects. There is a symbolism of colours, but it does not consist in a correspondence between a colour and an affect. Colour is on the contrary the affect itself; the virtual conjunction of all the objects which it picks up. (C1 118)\textsuperscript{386}

Similarly, Stephen Dedalus after his encounter with the ‘bird-girl’ sees a new world opening before him at the end of Chapter Four in the epiphanic colour and form of a flower:

A world, a glimmer or a flower? Glimmering and trembling, trembling and unfolding, a breaking light, an opening flower, it spread in endless succession to itself, breaking in full crimson and unfolding and fading to palest rose, leaf by leaf and wave of light by wave of light, flooding all the heavens with its soft flushes, every flush deeper than the other.

Such ‘soft flushes’ resonate with the girl’s ‘faint flame trembl[ing] on her cheek’, and her ‘affect’ on Stephen as ‘[h]is cheeks were aflame’. Moreover, the watery image called up by ‘breaking’ (as breakers), ‘wave’, both repeated twice, and ‘flooding’ with it’s ‘f’ echoing through ‘soft flushes’ and ‘flush’ and the sound of the water lapping through the ‘s’s’ is significant, not only because she is a ‘water-bird’ but for the resonance and connectivity this has with water throughout Ulysses and the Wake.

Deleuze has likened Joyce to Proust [3.3] and in Issy’s heliotropically hued knickers we might well see yet another connection between the two. In A la recherche du temps perdu we are given a crucial insight into ‘duration’ and involuntary memory through a line from Chateaubriand’s Mémoires d’Outre-tombe:\textsuperscript{387}

A sweet and subtle scent of heliotrope was exhaled by a little patch of beans that were in flower; it was brought to us not by a breeze from our own country but by a

\textsuperscript{386} My italics.

wild Newfoundland wind, unrelated to the exiled plant, without sympathy of shared memory or pleasure.\textsuperscript{388}

As Ronald Bogue observes, ‘[heliotrope] is an anomolous part that connects other parts, without pertaining to a whole’.\textsuperscript{389} Such (dis)connectivity instances, I believe, Issy as the \textit{Wake}'s primary ‘block of becoming’, acting as a machinic connectivity working through cuts and breaks, whereas for Proust it works synaesthetically. As Deleuze points out for Proust this is: ‘an anomalous associative chain only unified by a creative point of view, which itself plays the role of anomalous part in the ensemble’. (\textit{PS} 102) Here, I suggest, we can link Issy as the anomalous part in the Wakean ensemble through ‘her’ colour.

In connection with Proust, Bogue states, ‘that which puts the subject and the heliotrope in contact with one another is without relation to the plant – a wind from a New World’,\textsuperscript{390} bringing the scent of heliotrope. By relating the wind to Issy, as productive ‘middle’, we can see that the ‘line of flight’ which constitutes ‘her’ through the colour heliotrope, breaks the patriarchal relationship between femininity and Nature and Issy’s recuperation into an ‘oedipalised’ feminine representation through plants, fruit, trees, and flowers:

I soared from the peach and Missmolly showed her pear too ... Whet the bee as to deflowret greeny grassies yellowhorse ... twigs too is nil, tricks trees makes nix. ... Quicken, aspen; ash and yew, willow, broom with oak for you. (\textit{FW} 360.28-361.8)\textsuperscript{391}

Millie/ ‘Missmolly’/ Issy is nothing other than impersonal intensive desiring forces, unencumbered by the usual oedipalising trappings of ‘femininity’. Such a series of ‘machinic’ breaks aligns with Brown’s observation that despite a degree of


\textsuperscript{389} Bogue, \textit{Deleuze on Literature}. p.48.

\textsuperscript{390} Ibid, pp.47-48.

\textsuperscript{391} I owe this extract and the highlighting of plants/ trees to Katie Wales, \textit{The Language of James Joyce}, p.149.
conventionality in the consistent identifications between girls and the days of the month, girls and flowers, women and rivers, men and buildings, and so on, whereby the world is pressed into gender in Joyce's works, there is also a considerable amount of intentional disruption of sexual identifications in the *Wake*. 392

Thus, although one could focus on Issy and plants, or colours and the language of flowers, from a Deleuzian point of view we must appreciate that colour is affect itself, (C1 118) and one recalls that:

> The affect is impersonal and is distinct from every individual State of things: it is none the less singular, and can enter into singular combinations and conjunctions with other affects. ... this is why the affect is the 'new' and new affects are ceaselessly created, notably by the work of art. (C1 98-99)

It is, I argue, the disrupting fragmentation which Issy as 'affect' causes which leads to the explosion of identities in the *Wake*. For, as Colebrook notes:

> If affect is not the perception of something by an organising observer, but the presentation of a force of something to-be-perceived from points beyond our own, then affect opens the line of time to disruption, giving an "untimely" time or a time "out of joint". 393

Consequently, we as readers are drawn into the future 'untimely' time of 'duration' and obtain, like Glugg at the point of heliotropic revelation, an epiphanic 'affect' as the 'eternal return' of the new, and a disruption or fragmentation of our subjectivity as it 'extracts' for us 'a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations' through Joyce's implicit emphasis on 'heliotrope' in the game/ play.

Yet, one needs to ask why Glugg does not go beyond the incest taboo and win Issy as sexual prize. Here, I suggest, one needs to take into account Roland McHugh's gloss of 'glugger' as Hiberno-English for an unhatched egg, 394 and his suggestion that Glugg

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393 Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze*, p.61.

like Stephen/ Joyce adopts a strategy of ‘silence exile and cunning’. In the ‘series’ of ‘eggburst, eggblend, eggburial and hatch-as-hatch can’, (FW 614.32-33) one can discern in the Joycean egg the reworking of a Viconian structure for the *Wake* with all of its creative potential. In the unhatched egg, we have an indication of ‘birth’ as the characteristic institution of the divine age, ‘marriage’ as indicative of the heroic age, the ‘burial’ of the civic age, and finally the *ricorso* as ‘rebirth’ through ‘the eternal return’ of the new. (This of course is writ large in the *Wake* with Earwicker as Humpty Dumpty perched on the wall of wedlock who nevertheless had a great fall. He then fragmented and was buried throughout the text, but, in his earlier manifestation at least, he attempted to rise again and was transmogrified.) Glugg is the ‘eggsicumudderher-in-chaff’, (FW 240.15) and ultimately he commands Chuff and the Rainbow girls. Moreover, as twins ‘the jimminies’ have seemingly enjoyed incestuous sexual relations with their sister. (FW 22.24-26) Why then does he deliberately fail to guess the answer?

In Shem’s taking the part of ‘Glugg’ I argue that we can see his relationship to Issy in a new light. In retaining its potentialities and refusal to take on organized form, the egg signifies ‘pure intensities’, and multiple ‘lines of flight’. Deleuze and Guattari diagrammatically represent ‘The Dogon Egg and the Distribution of Intensities’ at the head of their Chapter 6 ‘November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?’ (TP 149) and they go on to:

> treat the BwO as the full egg before the extension of the organism and the organization of the organs, before the formation of the strata; as the intense egg defined by axes and vectors ... by dynamic tendencies involving energy transformation and kinematic movements involving group displacement, by migrations: all independent of accessory forms because the organs appear and function here only as pure intensities. ... The tantric egg. (TP 149)

and ‘tantric’ relates to the sacred writings of Hinduism and Buddhism. The relationship between Glugg and Issy can be conceived, I argue, as the epiphanic forces which when released from the ‘BwO’ constitute the ‘sacred’ writing of the letter and the *Wake* itself.

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395 Ibid, p.228.
Joyce in a typical reversal makes this plain by linking Issy’s drawers directly with words (drows) through the anagram ‘a drows er’ in ‘O Evol, kool in the salg and ees how Dozi pits what a drows er’. (*FW 262F.2*) Without Issy/ Izod’s words/ drawers providing the intensive ‘middle’ or ‘desiring machine’ neither the letter nor the *Wake* could exist. Furthermore, not only is ‘[t]he intense egg’ as epiphanic ‘affect’ pervasive of the *Wake*, insofar as there are clear links between the egg and HCE through Humpty Dumpty and his fall resulting in his loss of reputation, and fragments of the former’s name and identity which then pervade the entire text; (*FW 45.14; FW 47.26-29*) but the ‘farcical’ ‘whale’s egg’, ‘forced’ with the fat meat of ‘pemmican’ (possibly indicating and incorporating *Ulysses* through its connection with ‘the home’ both without (Bloom’s) and with (Boylan’s) ‘potted meat’) is widely taken as a description of the *Wake* itself requiring particular readerly attributes:

very like a whale’s egg farced with pemmican as were it sentenced to be nuzzled over a full trillion times for ever and a night till his noddle sink or swim by that ideal reader suffering from an ideal insomnia. (*FW 120–11.14*)

Nevertheless, in the potential freedom which Issy as ‘the girl’ and ‘line of flight’ offers, Joyce is always aware of the immense oppositional powers of modernity which aim to prevent this ‘detrimentalisation’ happening. Thus, John Gordon notes the effect of institutionalised religion as an integral aspect of the State/capitalist formation in Issy’s letter to their captive representative the priest Jaun/ Shaun, as it recaptures the sexual energy of the id:

Issy’s concluding ‘ah ah ah ah’ (*FW 461.32*) is probably the sound of a woman’s orgasm and certainly the enthusiastic response of someone being taught how to ‘tumble’, (*FW 461.31*) but Shaun’s emphatic ‘MEN!’ (*FW 461.33*) converts it into the conclusion of a prayer-lid clamped on libido at the last minute.396

Joyce highlights this through the masculine symbolic order of modernity instantiated in Shaun’s ‘Men’. Deleuze and Guattari also point out that ‘[e]very time desire is betrayed, cursed, uprooted from its field of immanence, a priest is behind it’. (*TP 154*)

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Yet, although Issy's 'line of flight' appears to have been recuperated at the end of 'her' interjection in Jaun's sermonising, this interjection may be better seen as an aside to 'her' main contribution to the letter (FW 279F1) where such controlling forces are overcome, as I will show in the next chapter. There are strong indications of a direct link between the two 'letters'. For instance 'her' 'interjection' here includes four crossed kisses, 'XXXX' (FW 458.3) as we would find at the end of such a letter, and the phrase 'with my fondest' (FW 458.2) echoes the first 'relatively lucid version of the missive' to quote McCarthy, as does 'must now close it with fondest'. (FW 111.16-17) Furthermore, 'her' 'gift of memento nosepaper' (FW 457.34) can be read either as a tissue, handkerchief, notepaper, newspaper or, I would argue, the letter itself. For, not only is Issy not repressed or in human terms deflated by Jaun, as the very epitome of hypocritical moralising directed against 'her', but Joyce is able to bring 'her' 'girlish' intensities ever more into play at FW 279F1.

Adaline Glashen has established a textual identity with Issy and Anna Livia Plurabelle through the sharing of the syllable 'belle' in Plurabelle and Isabel, and one recalls that ALP, who is responsible for the final version of the letter, can be regarded as both producing and being produced by Issy. (TP 276) This double productive 'becoming' is highlighted at the very 'end' of the Wake when the patriarchal father/HCE as sea reclaims ALP the river; yet 'she' is reconstituted or resurrected as 'Nuvoletta'/Issy, her other and younger 'self' to restart or continue the life process in an 'eternal return' of difference, just as the reader is enjoined to start the book again at the 'beginning', through Issy/ALP, with the process of 'riverrun'. Consequently, Issy as ALP or ALP as Issy work together in the 'different' processual riverrun. HCE, seen as 'male principle' and from this perspective as State/religious/capitalist recuperation – at that definitive moment – is overcome, despite HCE becoming 'her' 'cold mad father.

397 McCarthy, 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', p. 578.
399 Glasheen, Third Census of 'Finnegans Wake', p.138.
400 McCarthy. 'The Structures and Meanings of Finnegans Wake', p.564.
my cold mad fear father’. (FW 628.1-2) Yet, Issy conjoins productively with HCE even here as she asks him to ‘Carry me along, taddy, like you done through the toy fair’. (FW 628.8-9)

ALP like her husband HCE is an abstract force frequently known only by her initials, or by some Joycean distortion of her full name Anna Livia Plurabelle as: ‘Apud libertinam parvulam’, (FW 7.23), ‘appy, leppy and playable’ (FW 41.23), ‘Amnis Limina Permanent’ (FW 153.2) ‘anny livving plusquebelle’, (FW 327.6) ‘Appia Lippia Pluvialilla’, (FW 548.6) and ‘Alma Luvia, Pollabella’. (FW 619.16) She exists only through fragmentation and difference in the text and as such can be read as the product of the Issyian ‘desiring machine’. Whatever we make of this, and we may well be ‘lost in the bush’, (FW 112.3) it must be admitted that it is largely a female affair and Joyce’s ‘mistresspiece’ as he remarked himself, (LI 206) as not only does Alp[h], ‘the sacred river’ run ‘past Eve and Adam’s’ instead of Adam and Eve’s Church in Chapelizod at the book’s ‘beginning’, (FW 03.1) but Joyce assures us that ‘[f]emelles will be preadaminant’ (FW 617.23-24) throughout. Thus, the dam, dames and demoiselle not only precede Adam, but are stubbornly resolute or adamant, and even untameable or adamantine. They evidently constitute the book in the sense of ALP/ Issy’s ‘girlish’ ‘intensities’ and ‘becomings’ – coupled with HCE’s failure through his obvious ‘abjection’ to maintain a patriarchal identity and the ‘male principle’.

Moreover, Issy as ALP’s élan vital and the book’s primary ‘block of becoming’ enables ALP to become Shem in a ‘machinic’ connection, just as Shem/ Joyce by using

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401 In The Powers of Horror: An Essay in Abjection, Julia Kristeva argues that all forms of fixed identity, whether those of individuals or groups, have their basis in symbolic castration and projection. Coinciding with the discovery of sexual difference, repressed parts of the self experienced as vulnerable and ‘feminine’ (as a result of symbolic castration in the Oedipal crisis), are projected onto those who are different, who then, as a result of their victimisation, free their oppressor of this ‘femininity’ which cannot be acknowledged as belonging to the self. Thus, Kristeva argues that the ‘abject’ constitutes anything that is excluded from fixed identity and the symbolic order and this excluded other is constituted as feminine lack. Deleuze reads this negative patriarchal assessment of feminine lack in positive terms offering the prospect of ‘becoming-woman’.
the alphabet/ALP-hab(i)t, ‘becomes writer’ and ‘becomes animal’ by the same token. Shaun in his opposition to Shem ensures that they respectively become the Mookse and the Gripe, (FW II.6) Tristopher and Hilary, (FW II.1) Chuff and Glugg, (FW II.1) Kev and Dolph, (FW II.2) the Onndt and the Graschoper, (FW III.1) Jaun and Dave, (FW III.2) Kevin and Jerry, (FW III.4) and Saint Patrick and the Archdruid Berkeley, (FW IV) and yet they paradoxically merge in a riot of ‘becoming others’ as they both ‘affirm and complicate all the series at once’[1.4]. Here, Joyce’s intuitive insight also brings into play the twin motif which Deleuze argues is not a polarization but rather gives us the ‘in-between’, ‘fold’ or ‘middle’, allowing for a passage ‘between two things … the twins are masters of flows, their passage, their alternation and their disjunction’, (ECC 47-48) which clearly enhances the figuration of Issy as the productive ‘in-between’ of their appearance and difference in the Wake.

Thus, Issy as productive ‘middle’ allows ALP, like Shem and Shaun and many other supposed ‘characters’ in the Wake to constantly fragment and merge as no more than aspects of each other. O Hehir even indicates that HCE and ALP ‘share a certain identity’:

... the Irish word alp (olp) means, among other things, a hump. ... The word alp actually means a short, thick, heavy bit of almost anything: a material substance, solid or liquid; speech; sound; action; work. Therefore, depending on its use, it may be translated ‘hump’, it is clear that ALP is merely another name for HCE – at least some of the time.402

Furthermore, although ALP is a river in English the Alps are mountains, and HCE as Porter as ‘port’ is himself liquid (the alcoholic drink), the left-hand side looking forward of a ship, an harbour for ships, and like a river a porter ‘transports’. Yet again, both ALP as ‘hump’ and HCE as ‘humpty dumpty’ are fragmented throughout the text as Issy works between them. Deleuze would argue that they become ‘terms’ or ‘proper names’ only at the point of this disappearance or ‘deterritorialisation’. In the main, they appear to offer us ‘lines of becoming’ rather than the ‘end-points’ of actualised ‘characters’ and, it seems to me, that here the ‘deliquesence of identity’ characterising ‘becomings’ both continues and goes well beyond the ‘molecular’ mergings of Molly

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and Milly in *Ulysses*, as we see in the 'becomings-imperceptible' of the washerwomen at the end of 1.8.

By drawing on the propensities of 'betrayal' or subversion which Issy as nomadic 'war machine' provides, Joyce, through ALP contests and subverts the unified patriarchal identity for which her husband HCE constantly but unsuccessfully strives. In *Multitude*, Hardt and Negri argue that 'War is no longer at the disposal of political powers. It defines the foundation of political systems' for it 'is becoming the primary organising principal of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises'. 403 Perpetual warfare is now the means of maintaining capitalist world order and social hierarchy. War has become a form of rule which not only controls the population but produces and reproduces all aspects of social life in global capitalism today. Yet, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the subversive 'nomadic' aspect of the 'war machine' and its propensity for betrayal rather than support of patriarchy and the State. (TP 351-423) Issy acting in this capacity betrays and undermines patriarchy whether seen in the guise of Jaun/Shaun or HCE and, in doing so, Joyce, I believe, comments prophetically through Issy on the weaknesses of the global capitalist 'socius', and the potentialities of the forces constituting 'the multitude'. I will examine this relationship further in the next chapter. As Irigaray might put it, whilst HCE (and the globalised socius) is always seeking to fulfill man's fantasy of 'the eternal return of sameness', 404 it is the 'fluidity' of Issy/ALP which undermines his endeavour. Even in his final manifestation as patriarchal father he can only manifest this through the fluidity of the sea. A gullible HCE is 'gulled' by the very 'gulls' (*FW 628.13*) which circling overhead are the 'bird-girl' and Issy 'herself'.

HCE struggles throughout the text to maintain his identity as unified patriarchal monolith. Yet, his identity, like that of ALP, is being constantly fragmented as it mutates into other becomings as Joyce rings the changes on his initials: 'Haroun


Childeric Eggeberth', (FW 4.32) 'Hag Chivychas Eve', (FW 30.14) 'He Can Explain', (FW 105.14) 'Hear! Calls! Everywhair!', (FW 108.23) 'Hwang Chang everytime'. (FW 130.35) 'H.C.E. has a codfisck ee', (FW 198.8-9) 'economy, chemistry, humanity', (FW 306.14-15) 'Howe cools Eavybrolly!', (FW 315.20) 'hash-say-ugh', (FW 407.30) and 'hardest crux ever'. (FW 623.33-34) Such 'multiplicities' allow for an extraordinary range of connections through the 'rhizomatic' conjunction 'AND...AND...AND', not only in the *Wake* or in Joyce's earlier work but the world and cosmos itself [1.3/1.4]. As Rose and O'Hanlon put it, Joyce 'never uses the format “either/ or” but always the “and”'. This ‘and’ works here, I would add, through the ‘rhizomatic’ intermediary of Issy as connective ‘middle’ and the primary ‘block of becoming’.

Thus HCE as ‘economy, chemistry, humanity’ (FW 306.14-15) is generally linked with the rational scientific outlook of modern man and specifically with Bloom’s scientific and humanitarian outlook, whilst the statement that ‘H.C.E. has a codfisck ee’ (FW 198.8-9) goes even further by clearly associating HCE with the Bloom of the ‘Cyclops episode’ where we have the narrator’s repeated references to his ‘codfisck ee’: ‘with his cod’s eye counting up all the guts of the fish’ (U 384) and as ‘old cod’s eye’. (U 408) Harry Blamires holds that Bloom unlike the Cyclopian one-eyed citizen is thus linked by extension to God’s charitable two-eyed view. However, Blamires fails to spot that Bloom is himself one-eyed in these references, as is HCE and God by extension. Joyce may well be commenting here on the shortcomings of the patriarchal monotheistic god not on his supposedly charitable two-eyed view. The link with Bloom implicates HCE in the societal masochism which I have attributed to him in Chapter Two, and as such his universality as ‘Here Comes Everybody’. (FW 32.18-19) In this regard one can also see HCE’s confession to the Cad in masochistic terms, (FW 35-36) and Issy’s implicit involvement. HCE may appear to be about to ‘become bird’ as ‘hulm

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405 Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p.57.


culms evurdyburdy'. \textit{(FW 378.4-5)} and in Deleuzian terms able to take a ‘line of flight’ particularly as ‘Hery Crass Evohodie’ \textit{(FW 546.10-11)} seems to open up the second and third orders of time through the latin ‘crass’(tomorrow) and ‘hodie’ (today) but this phrase can also be read in English as bringing him down to earth through its reference to his ‘crassness’. The \textit{Wake} further compounds this by linking him to Persse O’Reilly through the satirical ballad which treats the latter as a universal scapegoat, and as such offers another link to Bloom. Joyce permutates his initials to give us ‘ech’, \textit{(FW 264.3)} and also substitutes a K for the C, as in ‘Hek’, \textit{(FW 199.24)} fragmenting him further by bringing him into the Gaelic/ Celtic split of the Irish language.

This linguistic split, which I will detail below, is more often denoted as the P/Q split. Here, these initials might be taken as bringing into play the Issyian figure of the Prankquean, \textit{(FW 21-23)} with HCE transformed into Jarl van Hoother. Here, van Hoother/ HCE, as majoritarian protestant conqueror, informs the minoritarian prankquean/ Issy, that she must ‘shut up shop, dappy’. \textit{(FW 23.5)} He then seeks to enforce his will with a God-like thunder word as ‘the hearsomeness of the burger felicitates the whole of the polis’ – with ‘polis’ as both ‘the police’ and (Ancient Greek City) ‘State’ receiving the felicitations or congratulations of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, fluidity supervenes, as the Prankquean flows in and out of his solid patriarchal castle, and steals and transforms his children, thus undermining and fragmenting his authority. As a result ‘they all drank free’, \textit{(FW 23.7-8)} because ‘that was the first peace of illiteratise porthery in all the flamend floody flatuous world’. \textit{(FW 23.9-10)} Just like poetry or more mundanely a pot of porter, the Prankquean flows all round the fixities and solidity of van Hoother who can only respond to her fluidity with the speech of the patriarch: his own ‘solid’ shit. Consequently, she operates in the ‘smooth space’ of ‘duration’, whereas he is ‘striated’ or constipated in clock-time. This is a constipation which Bloom in \textit{Ulysses} manages to avoid, \textit{(U 83-84)} as he unlike van Hoother has some access to the ‘molecular’ line, as well as the ‘jakes’.

Thus, not only is HCE dispersed everywhere throughout the text like ALP but he appears in one fragmented form or another in sections where there appears to be no obvious reason for his appearance, washed up like flotsam and jetsam. His potential processuality of ‘becomings other’ continues through his close association with a
variety of other ‘characters’ not only Jarl van Hoother, but also the Festy King, the Norwegian Captain, and the Russian General who may all be seen as his doubles. Nevertheless, throughout all such potentially changed and changing identities HCE is always working against this trend and striving, no matter how unsuccessfully, as with van Hoother, to retain his false sense of identity through masculine unity and his ‘clean and proper’ self. His early appearance as Finnegan laid out at his wake or simply as a giant stretched across the landscape indicates his presence and pervasiveness throughout the text. (*FW* 3.18-24)

Although this is only the result of his fall and fragmentation, like Humpty Dumpty, (*FW* 45.14; *FW* 47.26-29) it is brought about through his relationship to Issyian figures. There is some connection here to the laughably overdrawn giant citizen whom Joyce depicts in the ‘Cyclops’ episode of *Ulysses*, (*U* 382) generally contrasted, by Joycean critics, in his one-eyed nationalism with Bloom’s supposedly balanced two-eyed vision, but actually symbiotic with the latter’s masochistic outlook. HCE, by attempting to attain such a gigantic one-eyed status, despite or because of his guilt and self-doubt, unsuccessfully strains throughout the *Wake* to attain what is in any case an impossible patriarchal unity, and in so doing he merely acts as a foil for ALP/ Issy’s fragmenting subversion.

At the outset of Chapter 1.5 we have a long list of possible titles for Anna Livia’s ‘untitled mafestas memorialising the Mosthighest’, (*FW* 104-7) and we find that HCE’s name is proposed as an alternative title to the ‘untitled mafestas’, as ‘Arcs in His Ceiling’. (*FW* 104.13) One interpretation of this would be that his brain was malfunctioning, or that he was obsessed with sex and the arcs of ALP’s body in the ‘geometer’ problem which enclose the ovoidal womb. Yet again, ‘the arkway of his three shuttoned castles’, (*FW* 22.33-4) from which Jan van Hoother/ HCE emerges, would indicate his continuing attempt to obtain/ maintain a unified patriarchal position, and impose his magisterial will on his female ‘subjects’. However, another interpretation might imply transcendent sainthood – the link to St. Joan of Arc with ‘her abstract line of flight, her molecular production, her indifferences to memory, her non-figurative of desire. Joan of Arc? …’. (*TP* 277) If this is the case HCE is immediately brought down to earth as any such sanctification is immediately nullified in the
‘becoming-animal’ association of ‘For Ark, see Zoo’, and he moves from the beginning to the end of the alphabet without achieving his aim. This invalidating of his patriarchal status and identity is confirmed in a reading of ‘Arcs in His Ceiling’ as the French, ‘arc-en-ciel’ as rainbows, and hence Issy as the Maggies/ Rainbow girls’s fragmenting intervention. It is then completely negated as ‘nonoun as Husband’, where he loses his very status in the linguistic Symbolic order. One can only hope that ‘He Can Explain’ (FW 105.14) for as we are told, at the very beginning of Chapter 1.5, all of this takes place in ‘disjointed times’, (FW 104-05) which I argue indicates the Nietzschean ‘eternal return’ of difference as the ‘time out of joint’ set in Deleuzian ‘duration’. Consequently there is HeCitEncy, and HCE as indeterminate subject for – despite her inconsistency with Issy as Lucia – as Norris said of the Wake in general, ‘its subject is the nature of indeterminacy itself’. Thus, Joyce undermines the patriarchal Symbolic order and nuclear family through ALP’s, HCE’s and the twins involvement with Issy.

I have tried to show that the ‘desiring machine’ which is Issy not only interacts with but even produces ALP, HCE, and their ‘sons’, through cuts, breaks, fragmentations and epiphanic connective relationships. As textual presence, I have argued, ‘she’ completely undermines our traditional conception of character. As an exemplar of the Deleuzoguattarian ‘nomadic war machine’ Issyian betrayals of patriarchy may well illustrate the problematics of global capitalism’s attempt to shore up its system through perpetual warfare.

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Chapter V

In this chapter I will continue to show, through a reading of the footnote at *FW* 279FI, that ‘Issyness’ or ‘girlness’ – conceived in terms of the Deleuzoguattarian ‘girl’ and the epiphanic Joycean ‘bird girl’ – is not only a pervasive feature of Wakean textuality, but is also one of its fundamental liberatory dynamics and indeed a motivating force in all of Joyce’s writing. Here, too, Issy conceived as the Wakean ‘desiring machine’ through whom/which the impersonal intensities of sexuality and gender are abstractly embodied, is inflected in the different stylistic registers which Joyce adopts in both the letter in general and in the *Wake* itself.

The scandalous, seductive, enticing, inviting, flirtatious nature of this footnote, I argue – ‘[s]he was flirtsome then and she’s fluttersome yet’ (*FW* 28.15) – makes even clearer the textual ‘affects’ of the *Wake* which Joyce achieves in part through his use of portmanteau words, conceived as epiphanic in the Deleuzian sense of the term. Moreover, the ‘fluttersome’ in this phrase again brings into play the ‘bird-girl’ epiphany of *A Portrait*, and can also be linked to the ‘the bird as event’. (*WIP* 21) I continue to argue in this chapter that the instabilities of meaning which the reader is consequently asked to produce by Joyce extend beyond the *Wake* itself, undermining and potentially recasting English literature *per se*, in order both to challenge the basic assumptions and very meaning of our life under capitalist modernity, yesterday, today, and tomorrow, and to suggest a ‘self-less’ ethico-political alternative. As such, I believe, Joyce’s work in its ‘affects’ may be identified with the ethico-political approach of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, and consequently has lessons for Hardt and Negri.

Whilst this footnote is not to be reductively conceived as ‘the key’ to the *Wake* in its highlighting of ‘Issyness’, as Issy pervades the *Wake* in its entirety as a force charged with ethico-political potential, it evidently gives Issy a voice and is therefore a significant ‘node’ in the ‘rhizomatic assemblage’ or Wakean ‘epiphanic machine’. In making this claim I can draw some support from Marian Eide who has said that the ‘love letter at the heart of *Finnegans Wake*, is the appropriate genre for ethical writing.
It takes up no place, always being in circulation, addressed to, responsive to, another’. 409

The significance of Issyness, as the differences of Wakean textuality in all of its fickle, yet inviting, flirtatiousness, fully revealed in *FW* 279F1, lies in seeing the book as Issyian ‘desiring machine’ working through its questioning and problematisation of meaning, gender, and identity with the epiphanic ‘girl’ as its symbolic locus. Moreover, the temptations and flirtatiousness of Issy/ Maggy have already been seen to be crucial to the major theme of HCE’s failure to retain an unsullied masculine identity through his, and one should add our, ‘Fall’ into Original Sin: ‘and wasn’t that very both of them, the saucissters ... meeting waters most improper (peepette) ballround the garden, trickle trickle trickle triss, please, miman, may I go flirting?’. (FW 96.12) Once again ‘fluidity’ links the ‘bird-girl’ of *A Portrait* to ALP, HCE (as sea), and the twins via Issy operating through ‘the middle’. As flirtatious ‘girl’ of sexuality, Issy offers the means of release from this constraining patriarchal identity.

The *Wake* might be conceived as a Deleuzian monstrous ‘girl child’410 fathered by Joyce on the masters of English literature whose writing styles he parodies so effectively in the ‘Oxen of the Sun’ episode in *Ulysses*. I have argued above that the ‘great literature’ which they are jointly held to constitute can paradoxically only be such when it is read as ‘minor literature’. Only then can its subversive and liberatory ‘affects’ be realised. I believe that the academy rather than reading such works in this way tends to stress the very features which maintain the traditional thinking and morality of liberal humanism’s accession to Christianity in its pious underpinning of our capitalist society. Joyce in the ‘Oxen of the Sun’ episode is parodying the literary styles which go to make up ‘great literature’, and revealing them as no more than aspects of ‘the first plane of writing’ which are still being used to negate their primary revolutionary ‘affects’ stemming from the ‘second plane’.


410 Deleuze, ‘I have nothing to admit’, p.112.
Whereas both Deleuze and Joyce parody earlier 'writers', I believe that it is only Joyce, of the two, who in the *Wake* rewrites and parodies his own earlier efforts going beyond them and the whole of established English literature in the process. Deleuze is correct in pointing out that Joyce's use of portmanteau words epitomises the linguistic instabilities and the sexually capricious nature of Wakean language, and its capacity to 'affect' us, although he does not appear to take into account the other equally important structural and linguistic devices Joyce uses to accomplish this. These 'affects' I associate with the Deleuzoguattarian 'child' synonymous with the 'girl', as Deleuze and Guattari tell us that 'becoming itself is a child or a girl'. *(TP 277)* Yet, Issy's 'girtness' extends through difference Deleuze's emphasis on Joyce's esoteric and portmanteau words as the sole source of the epiphanic and provides the means whereby all of the Wakean letter's divergent 'cosmic series' are brought into play through Joyce's 'chaosmosis'.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze says of Joyce's work as a whole that it draws 'together a maximum of disparate series (ultimately, all the divergent series constitutive of the cosmos) by bringing into operation linguistic dark precursors (here, esoteric words, portmanteau words)' [1.3]. Whilst there are a substantial number of words which may be conceived of as esoteric to a French or English reader in *Dubliners* ('gnomon', 'simony'), *A Portrait* ('haha', 'suck', 'pandybat', 'drisheens', 'tundish', 'foetus', etc.), and *Ulysses*, as Deleuze explicitly states [2.1], I suggest that his somewhat restricted understanding of the *Wake* as an 'epiphanic machine' can only be justified through his highlighting of the importance of portmanteau words as many of these so-called 'esoteric' words would not be esoteric to a Dubliner at the beginning of the twentieth century and may not be so even today. More importantly, he does not bring into the 'epiphanic machine' assemblage vital missing 'components' such as Joyce's employment of a wide range of verbal inventions in a lexis extending way beyond esoteric words to include puns, anagrams, lipography, metathesis and aberrant syntax, or even his own concepts of the 'desiring machine' and 'becoming-girl'. All of these add to and multiply Wakean 'affects' and in sum nullify Deleuze and Guattari's later objections that finally esoteric and portmanteau words 'only posit a cyclic unity of the sentence, text, or knowledge' *[6.1]*.
Yet, Deleuze when speaking of ‘newness’ through ‘the eternal return’ of difference, and relating this to understanding of the ‘simulacrum’, notes of the epiphany that:

The identity of the object read really dissolves into divergent series defined by esoteric words, just as the identity of the reading subject is dissolved into the decentred circles of possible multiple readings. Nothing, however, is lost; each series exists only by virtue of the return of the others. Everything has become simulacrum, for by simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned [1.2].

This is even more true of portmanteau words and the variety of other lexical and grammatical devices, as well as the crucial ‘affects’ of ‘becoming-girl’, which Joyce brings into play by drawing into and complicating all of the heterogeneous series constitutive of the cosmos, and it is these in sum which give us Joyce’s ‘machine for producing epiphanies’ [3.1]. Joyce states in Stephen Hero that ‘the soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems ... radiant. The object achieves its epiphany’, (SH 218) and he finds a particularly ‘radiant’ example of this in A Portrait where the ‘bird-girl’ is an object constituting the means and process of his future writing. Such radiance does not set this moment apart from the difference, movement and change which, I have argued, characterises Deleuze’s understanding of the Joycean epiphany, but rather brings it into play.

Deleuze points out that Joyce begins by seeking the secret of epiphanies within the object and then through his subjective experience as an aesthete, but that neither are sufficient in themselves to give us his ‘epiphanic machine’. It is only when both the object and the subjective forms have given way to a multiplicity of fragments, as a chaotic and multiple impersonal reality, that Joyce is able to give us the full meaning of the Wake as it functions for us. Despite not mentioning Issy I find it difficult to see this ‘multiplicity of fragments’ as not referring to the ‘affects’ which ‘she’ creates. For me it is the fragmentation offered by Issy which is key to my understanding. Yet, there is no ‘true’ meaning to the Wake, according to Deleuze. except in its offering us the prospect of new ‘becomings’. No matter how insightful the labours of such scholars as Patrick McCarthy and John Gordon may be they cannot give us a supposedly ‘true’ meaning of the Wake.
Joyce’s meticulous construction of the book deliberately contests any unitary meaning. My epiphanic exemplar of the ‘bird-girl’ must then be reconceived in terms of a process of change, ‘a multiplicity of fragments ... a chaotic and multiple impersonal reality’ [3.1]. The static being of the patriarchal order is thus contested through the ‘girlish’ instabilities of language and meaning which in their impact on the reader undermines all of majoritarian literature and, indeed, the Symbolic order itself. Thus, Joyce, through Shem in his contest with Shakespeare (‘shaggspick, other Shakhisbeard’, (FW 177.32)) claims that he will wipe (spoken) English off the face of the earth: if his ‘lankalivline lasted he would wipe alley english spooker, multaphoniaksically spuking, off the face of the erse’, (FW 178.5-7) just as he wipes his arse, and Ireland of its contamination. Moreover, the faecality which is being cleansed extends to the capitalist socius through money as shit and capitalism’s ultimate dependence on the language of the patriarchal symbolic order. Even if conceived as comically hyperbolic Shem’s statement cannot be dismissed on these grounds as Deleuze and Guattari hold that there are no contradictions, apparent or real, only different degrees of humour. (AO 68)

The importance of the letter is made apparent both through its frequent reappearances and its pervasive quality, as it is referred to in nearly every chapter of the Wake. Clive Hart notes that the very first word of the Wake, ‘riverrun’, (FW 3.1) suggests the ‘Reverend’ of the final version of the letter. (FW 615.12) Nevertheless, there are crucial differences between the words, and between the versions of the letter in its various appearances, which I will explore in more detail below. The difference between FW 279F1 and FW 615.12 lies in the former offering a more significant location of the characteristic subversive instabilities of the Wake.

We are informed that we must ‘cling to it as with drowning hands’. (FW 119.3) The frequency of its appearance is matched only by its metamorphoses since it always arrives in a different form. Bernard Benstock argues that its significance exists both on the literal and allegorical levels, although each is a manifestation of history: ‘personal,  

political, and romantic'. Patrick McCarthy informs us that it appears as a satirical ballad, a telegram, a newspaper story, a movie script, a radio show, a last will and testament, a form, a passionate love letter, an anonymous letter to the editor, a Punic admiralty report, and that it is even given a religious twist as it becomes a pastoral letter to be read at Sunday mass.

Deleuze treats the letter as somehow symbolic of, or as acting as a general motif or paradigm for the *Wake* as a whole. The very lack of identity in the portmanteau word, which he highlights, allows the letter as a microcosm of the *Wake* to induce identity in the book as a whole. [1.3] This is the identity of difference, and it is this extreme difference which characterises the *Wake* beyond any other book. Once again we can equate such difference to life itself in a Deleuzian understanding. Through these ‘dark precursors’ which constitute both the letter and the book the positive powers or affirmations of life are made manifest in our ‘becomings’. (TP 296)

It is clearly important, if one is arguing for the significance of Issy through her contribution to the letter, to establish that Joyce was intending to give ‘her’ a voice at *FW* 279F1. McCarthy argues that, given the diversity of the letter, we may be dealing not with one letter, but with several distinct documents each authored by a different character and concerned with a different subject. In fact, McCarthy even speculates that it might be reasonable to regard Issy’s ‘love letter to her teacher’ (*FW* 279.F1) as he defines it, as existing quite apart from the main letter itself, although he eventually concedes that all letters are ultimately variant forms of the same archetypal document. What he does not do is question this as a letter. Certainly *FW* 279.F1 gives Issy ‘voice’ and, even though the footnote contains few if any of the identifying characteristics of a normal letter, it is this voice which resonates throughout both the letter as a whole and the *Wake* itself.

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414 Ibid. pp. 559-632.
If one takes into account other footnotes in this chapter, such as those at FW 261F1 and FW 293F2, one can see that they both connect with FW 279F1 and substantiate my assertion that Issyness gives us the scandalous, though often childlike, seductive, enticing, flirtatious textual ‘affects’ of the Wake. They can be read as fragments of Issy’s letter. Whilst McCarthy notes that ‘Issy finally seizes her chance to speak at FW 457-461’, when Shaun/Jaun or Juan (FW 461.31) at last allows her to, this too appears to be a fragment of Issy’s letter. Thus, at FW 458.2-3 there is the phrase ‘with my fondest’ followed by four crossed kisses. Finally the beginning of FW 279F1, with its introductory ‘come’ and the prayer like end as ‘Amum’ is coupled with a final postscript which also indicates that this passage is a kind of letter.

Benstock offers a completely contrasting view to that of McCarthy by arguing that the entire letter has been written by Issy and is far more homogeneous than the latter allows. He comes to Issy via Maggy/ Maggie, being particularly concerned to establish that ‘Maggie is Issy’ rather than Anna Livia, as Edmund Wilson, had assumed. He notes that the name Maggie most often appears in ‘the all-important letter which has been dug up from the midden heap by the neighbour’s hen’. Benstock believes that the final form of the letter (FW 615-19) allows ‘Anna Livia [to] vindicate the archetypal man H.C.E., and the letter serves like those of Paul and Peter in the New Testament to deify the Son of Man’; arguments which my thesis contests. Nevertheless, like Glasheen, Benstock notes that in this context Maggie is seen in her role as Mary Magdalene, and her two personalities, before and after salvation, which he then relates to the split personalities of Issy.

415 Benstock, Joyce-Again’s Wake, pp.7-10.

416 Ibid. p.10.

Despite the final version of the letter being signed by ‘Alma Luvia, Pollabella’, (FW 619.16) Benstock concludes that since the letter-writer is Issy – which quite contradicts his earlier assertions that Shem was the writer, and that one (stolen) version was written by Shaun – it is at this stage that Maggie is most important. Without taking into account the ‘fluidic’ relationship which I have tried to establish between ALP and Issy, through ‘becoming woman/becoming girl’, Benstock’s statement, without further evidence, is hardly acceptable. Yet, he closes his argument with an attempt to establish that Maggie is Issy, rather than Anna Livia, stating that:

it is apparent that the Maggie of the Wake is not mother but daughter, except in the flashbacks when A.L.P. remembers herself as her young self: ‘just a young thin pale soft shy slim slip of a thing then’ (FW 202.27) and ‘Just a whisk brisk sly spry spink spank sprint of a thing thersomere’. (FW 627.4-5)

Finally he agrees with Glasheen that ‘the “Maggies” of ‘The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies’(FW 215-59) are the plural form of Issy, and are the temptresses who lurk throughout, especially as the Raven and the Dove, the “Magdalenes”; and he refers us to the Sally-Christine split personality418 found in Morton Prince’s The Dissociation of a Personality.419

Despite its evident flaws and contentious statements, Benstock’s emphasis on Issy/Maggy as the letter writer, I suggest, gives us the means to examine in Deleuzoguattarian terms the more concise letter which McCarthy, Hayman, and Rose and O’Hanlon from very different viewpoints accept that Issy ‘writes’ at FW 279F.1. Moreover, Benstock’s argument also appears to indicate ‘her’ pervasiveness throughout the other versions of the letter. David Hayman quotes Joyce to show that Issy’s letter is best regarded as ‘the juvenile version of the “Revered Letter”’, (FW 615.12-619.16)420 which appears to definitively contradict McCarthy’s speculation about the Issy letter

418 Benstock, Joyce-Again’s Wake, pp. 8-10.


possibly being distinct from the letter considered as a whole. As such, I believe that it may be regarded as the ‘childish’ or ‘girlish’ version of the older, final and ‘womanly’ version signed by Anna Livia as ‘Alma Luvia, Pollabella’ (*FW* 619.16) with all of its symbiotic productive potential. Despite the critics’ differences of opinion – and even the possibility that it is not a letter at all – everyone would at least agree that Issy speaks in *FW* 279F.1.

Throughout Issy’s letter there are various hints about its generic status. Although McCarthy refers to *FW* 279F.1 as Issy’s ‘love letter to her teacher’, Danis Rose and O’Hanlon regard it as ‘Issy’s musical letter’, even though they do not elaborate on their understanding. Just as Deleuze does not make a clear distinction between writers and philosophers, he also allows that painters, musicians and writers can produce ‘the new’ when they find an ‘outside’ to painting, music and writing, when ‘the melodic line draws along the sound, or the pure traced line colour, or the written line the articulated voice’. This approach immediately problematises the letter’s apparent focus on any ‘actualised’ love/sexuality, for music, like colour in ‘The Mime’, has both the capacity to bring into play the intensive forces of ‘the virtual’, and to release ‘affects’ which then, at least for a time, transport and constitute us afresh. We are not then solely concerned with the textual ‘plane of organization’ or ‘first plane of writing’, but more evidently with the ‘beyond’ of this through ‘the second plane of writing’. As Bergson notes:

> Let the music express joy or grief, pity or love, every moment we are what it expresses. ... In point of fact it does not introduce these feelings into us; it introduces us into them, as passers-by are forced into a street dance. *Thus do pioneers in morality proceed.*

Given the above mentioned distinctions between the two, it seems to me that Bergson has ethics rather than judgemental morality in mind when he writes this. I would argue that Joyce is precisely just such ‘a pioneer’ in ethics and desire rather than

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in morality and that his intense interest in music may indeed confirm this. To take one well known example, as Blamires notes of the 'Sirens' episode of *Ulysses*:

the episode contains two charming siren barmaids as well as much song, and the style represents an elaborate attempt to imitate musical form in words. The musical devices parodied include: structural development of small figures and phrases; a continuous symphonic manipulation of sharply identifiable themes; the use of emphatic rhythmic figures and patterns; varied tonal contrasts; rich onomatopoeic orchestration which mimics the interplay of strings, brass and woodwind; repetition and partial repetition; echo and semi-echo; contrapuntal play of phrase against phrase; percussive explosions; recapitulations in different 'keys'; and so on. This technical experimentation apart, Joyce peppers the episode with lines and phrases taken from opera and operetta popular at the time, from Victorian and Edwardian drawing-room ballads, from music-hall favourites and from traditional songs. The introductory flourish has been said to represent the tuning up of an orchestra. It seems more sensible to regard it as an overture, for it lays before us, in concise form, many of the themes (fifty-seven, to be exact) to be fully and richly explored in the body of the episode.

Throughout this episode Joyce evidently conceives music as an intensely erotic yet impersonal force. The music of Issy's letter resonates in the *Wake* with as much intensity as it does in *Ulysses* and *A Portrait*. For example, there are clear 'rhizomatic' connections with Wagner and the Wakean 'Tristan and Isolde' theme through Issy as Isolde.

Furthermore, the problematisation of Issy's letter as 'love letter' increases if one persists in McCarthy's reading of Issy 'who in the basic family situation is one person' and who then writes a 'love letter' to her teacher. I now intend to establish not so much whether the musical nature of this version of the letter can be 'proven' and set against McCarthy's reading of Issy, but whether the transforming intensities which compose music and the intensities of Issy as 'desiring machine' can analogically induce a change in our own ethical position.

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Issy’s letter at **FW 279F1**

I will read this footnote ‘schizoanalytically’ by focusing on the ‘lines’, ‘intensities’ and ‘becomings’ which make up the *Wake*’s ‘BwO’ conceived as Issyian ‘desiring machine’ on the ‘second plane of writing’. I will pinpoint those features of *FW 279F1* which not only give a better understanding of the *Wake* in Deleuzian terms, but also emphasise its potential contribution to Hardt and Negri’s theorisings in *Empire* and *Multitude*. In order to do this within the space available I will have to be selective.

The scandalous ‘affects’ of playful seductiveness through the enticing, inviting textual body of Issy inflected through the strange instabilities of Wakean language are evident in the opening lines of the version of the letter at *FW 279F1*. This is immediately apparent in the first sentence: ‘Come, smooth of my slate, to the beat of my blosh.’ From a Deleuzian angle the word ‘come’ immediately beckons towards the processuality of ‘becomings’, as opposed to ‘being’, and indicates that the phrase stems from the ‘second plane of writing’. The impersonal forces of the ‘desiring machine’ are immediately evident as ‘[c]ome’ not only indicates both a lewd invitation and sexual orgasm, but it immediately goes beyond this through its musical ‘intensities’. ‘Come’ signals musicality in its implicit reference to the many songs and hymns which begin with this word and which demand our attention and participation. Popular songs and hymns which spring to mind include ‘Come into the garden Maude’, and ‘Come all ye faithful’. ‘Come’ is too a popular ballad opening which in its implicit offering of a concealed narrative can be read as referring to the concealed narratives of the *Wake* as a whole. Moreover, the insertion of ‘beat’ in the sentence offers a reference to both the rapid ‘heartbeat’ of love and the musical beating of time, a phrase which elsewhere in the *Wake* poses the question of capitalism’s failure to work in ‘duration’ as the ‘time of life’: *why can't you beat time? (FW 419.8)*

The ‘beat of my blosh’ can be read as ‘beating about the bush’ rather than facing the issue. In Deleuzoguattarian terms this is the central ethical issue of freeing desire and subjectivity from the deadening recuperative forces of incestuous desire in which the nuclear family under capitalism and Christianity is entrapped. ‘Oedipalised’ desire ensures the formation of the ‘so-called’ unified subject and underpins the patriarchal designation of ‘identity’. This is the significant ethical issue which the Hardt and
Negrian 'multitude' must address in order to obtain a 'new earth' through a new subjectivity. Thus, the phrase 'beat of my blosh' returns us to Issy's 'bush' and immediately sets desire and life against the stultifying forces of modernity.

The use of 'slate' by pupils in schools at that time, seems to justify McCarthy’s suggestion that this is an alluring 'love letter' addressed by Issy to her teacher when one also takes into account the phrases 'pupil teacher's' and 'perfectionclass', (FW 279F1.4-5) but again it exceeds the personal. Issy as the Wakean 'desiring machine', where '[s]exuality, any sexuality, is a becoming-woman, in other words, a girl', (TP 277) takes us through explicit sexual references to 'coming', 'slate' as 'slit', and 'blosh' as girlish blushing to exemplify the teasing flirtatiousness constitutive of the Deleuzian 'girl' as text. The Wake and the letter within it is figured as an act of creative destruction and as such 'slate' may be the act of 'wiping the slate clean', whether by ridding us of the majoritarian readings of Shakespeare and 'great literature' in general, or the English language as restrictive Symbolic order. Only then can a new writing be created which offers a new and different understanding.

In fact the suggestion that 'smooth[ing] of my slate' implies 'wiping the slate clean' goes beyond even this by referring obliquely to the telling by Butt and Taff of Buckley's shooting of the Russian general after he has symbolically wiped himself on the turf of Ireland. (FW 335-355) In this story's emphasis on shooting those generals in the rear-end who have insulted and exploited Ireland it links us directly to the Duke of Wellington: 'Hit, hit, hit! This is the same white harse of the Willingdone, (FW 10.12-13) and again by implication to the history of colonialism and the patriarchal suppression through warfare of a people's desire for freedom. However, Joyce in the Wake heaps ridicule upon both the repression and the form which resistance to it takes. In its emphasis on masculine rear-ends, shit, guns and shooting this recalls John Wyse's injunction to Bloom to 'stand up to them like men' and points to the implicit

homosexuality underpinning masculine identity constituted under patriarchy together with the resort to warfare dependent on its denial.

We know that Stephen’s ‘bird-girl’ in *A Portrait* implicitly teaches Stephen. She offers him a call to life and creativity. Blushing characterises both the girl and Stephen. In her case there is ‘a faint flame [which] trembled on her cheek’, whilst ‘his cheeks were aflame’, and ‘his heart trembled’ too as he ‘becomes girl’, ‘becomes animal’, ‘becomes writer’ through his artistic muse. The phrase ‘beat of my blush’ reminds us of this. Unlike Stephen’s earlier encounter with the prostitute, in *A Portrait*, Stephen’s muse, despite a certain sexual teasing, is still girlishly innocent. Now as Issy/Maggy in the *Wake* who as ‘Venus’ is ‘gigghibly tempatrix’ (*FW* 79.18) and consequently giggly, glib, libidinal, empathetic yet tempting. ‘She’ offers temptation to pater, patriarchy and the Church of Patrick, as well as playing tricks with time. Such tricks include transporting us to ‘duration’ as the time of life rather than keeping us in capitalism’s deadening clock-time. As ‘Nuvoletta, a lass’ and ‘cloud girl’ she also offers, in ‘her’ raindrops, to form a river of life, (*FW*159.6-18) and remains, somewhat ambiguously, both chaste and chased in ‘perpetually chaste’, (*FW* 606.1) amongst other things then, ‘she’ is a ‘virgin most prudent’. In *FW* 279F1 Issy/Maggy takes on the attributes of both the prostitute and the ‘bird girl’ in *A Portrait*. Whereas they were previously kept separate in an implicit virgin/whore bi-polarisation, Issy’s repeated confrontation of her dark mirror image brings them together: ‘I know you are a viry vikid girl’ (*FW*527.5) as ‘she’ says to her mirror image. All in all, Issy is immediately presented to us as Deleuzian ‘girl’.

The Issy letter can also be viewed as commenting on its historical circumstances. I argued above that it is the failure of a weakened patriarchy after the First World War to contain the impersonal forces of desire and their effects on the then contemporary youth during ‘the jazz age’ which made for considerable social instability; an instability which, of course, the letter reflects. Issy can be thought of as recognising this through such phrases as ‘the thrills and ills of laylock blossoms’. (*FW*279F1.2) McHugh tells us

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starkly that ‘laylock’ equates to ‘cunt’ through the inversion of part of ‘laycock’, as free love became the order of the day in the 1920s with women just as much as men able to take the sexual initiative without any long term commitment being at stake, they enjoyed both the ‘thrills and ills’ of these liaisons.

Nevertheless a vacuum in society had been created, through the loss of self-confident manhood occasioned by the terrible experiences of the Great War, which was carried forward into the post war years. Issy may be addressing this when she says ‘Don’t be of red, you blanching mench!’. (FW 279F1.30) Issy seems to be saying that the loss of an imposed identity is not something to be afraid of. The phrase ‘blanching mench’ could contain the French for white and the German for men with both sets of men being feminised through ‘blanche’. Yet, Issy’s ‘beat of my blosh’ as the blushing activity of the ‘desiring machine’ is not matched by the ashen faces of these ‘blanching mench’. The entirely justified fears of the fighting men on both sides of the trenches were seen as a derogation of the heroism demanded of the men in uniform and a white feather (la plume blanche) was routinely issued to conscientious objectors and deserters on the Home Front in England and France. No doubt similar measures were taken in Germany. Certainly summary execution was often meted out to dissenting soldiers who would now be seen as suffering from post traumatic stress disorder but were then regarded as cowards who were ‘letting the side down’. One must also ask, in this connection, is ‘blanching mench’ a comment on the ‘white men’ of Europe dragging the entire world into a barbaric war as the culmination of historical conflict between Germans and French, and does this phrase allude to the Deleuzian racist ‘faciality’ of White European Men as they impose capitalism on the world? I will bring both of these questions into play below.

After the ‘Great’ War there could be no unquestioned assumption as to just what a ‘man’ was, with all of its destabilising effects on patriarchy, and potential for new subjectivity. Similarly, in Multitude, Hardt and Negri’s awareness that perpetual war is

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427 McHugh, Annotations to ‘Finnegans Wake’, p. 279.
being used strategically today, in order to maintain global capitalism’s world order. Social hierarchy and implicitly ‘masochistic’ subjectivity, is seen by them as being fundamentally flawed. It has similar ‘deterritorialising’ ‘affects’ on the participants and produces instabilities of desire in global-capitalism’s ‘Empire’. Issy as Isolde in the *Wake*\(^\text{428}\), gives us just such an illustration of the instabilities engendered by desire and its potential for creating new subjectivities. In the lines ‘[t]his isabella I’m on knows the ruelles of the rut and she don’t fear andy mandy’, (*FW* 279F1.30-31) both Tristan and Isolde know the rules ‘of the rut’, that is the acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in a patriarchal society attending his escorting of her to King Mark her betrothed. Both of course chose to ignore the rules as ‘isabella’/ Isolde/ Issy at least ‘doesn’t fear any man’ (‘she don’t fear andy mandy’) even presumably were she to die: ‘andy mandy’, for her new found but illicit love. We are also reminded that such a betrayal of king, husband and patriarchal rules may well be justified. The ‘ruelles’, ‘rue elles’ or rules may well suit the the ruler but not the ‘rue[ing]’ experienced by many married women whose husbands treat them badly: ‘Your are me severe? Then rue’. (*FW* 279F1.11) I will take up this issue below.

In their disregard for and breaking of the rules of acceptable behaviour Tristan and Isolde not only bear comparison to Issy/ Maggy but to the Greek warrior Achilles and the Amazon Penthesilea who are taken as exemplars by Deleuze and Guattari for their twin concepts of ‘the nomad’ and the ‘war machine’ which have been briefly referred to above. The concepts of ‘the war machine’, and ‘becoming-woman’ and implicitly ‘becoming girl’, are ‘rhizomatically’ connected at several points in Deleuze and Parnet’s *Dialogues* and they receive detailed treatment in several sections of Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*. (*TP* 351-423) The ‘war machine’ is defined by Deleuze as:

\[\text{a linear assemblage which is constructed on lines of flight. In this sense, the war machine does not at all have war as its object; it has as its object a very special space, smooth space, which it composes, occupies and propagates. Nomadism is precisely this combination ‘war machine-smooth space’. ... A war machine tends to be revolutionary, or artistic, much more so than military. (N 33)}\]

One should add that from the standpoint of the State in ‘stratified space’ the ‘war machine’ is a potential source of betrayal and the individuals who compose it are traitors.\textsuperscript{429} We can also relate ‘Nomadism’, a concept introduced in Chapter Two, to the ‘active’ mode of existence advocated by Nietzsche in his \textit{On the Genealogy of Morality}, as the minoritarian becomings whose ‘value is to trigger uncontrollable movements within the majority population’.\textsuperscript{430} ‘Smooth space’ can then be seen as the space of ‘duration’ and ‘becomings’, flux, immense speeds, and metamorphosis, as opposed to ‘striated space’, which is resistant to movement, stable, slow and clearly demarcated in clock-time.

Issy is not only linked to Isolde but to the Amazons and hence Penthesilea in the final pages of the \textit{Wake} where we are told that Issy is ‘the wild Amazia, when she would seize to my other breast! And what is she weird, haughty Niluna, that she will snatch from my ownest hair! For ‘tis they are the stormies.’( \textit{FW} 627.28 –31) Issy is thus presented as ‘becoming Amazon’. ‘She’ is in a symbiotic relationship with ALP whose ‘other breast’ presumably also makes ‘her’ Amazonian. We can connect this directly to the ‘nomadic’ Amazonian ‘war machine’ in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, and the betrayals which characterize both this machine and indeed Issy/ ALP as free flowing desire undermining patriarchal convention.

Deleuze and Guattari take Kleist’s writings as an exemplar of the ‘nomadic’ ‘war machine’, (\textit{TP} 33) and single out his drama \textit{Penthesilea} for special attention.\textsuperscript{431} This drama is concerned with warrior maidens, the Amazons, whose institutions ‘are weak and their social structures unstable’.\textsuperscript{432} Their ultimate aim is not to establish an

\textsuperscript{429} Deleuze and Clair Parnet, \textit{Dialogues}, p. 41.


alternative State but rather to oppose and destroy the conquerors of their country. Whilst Kleist nevertheless believes that, ‘[a] nation [has] arisen, a nation of women’. Deleuze would no doubt quote Joyce with approval by seeing this so-called nation as a ‘nonation’, (FW 36.22) not as patriarchal state but as the coalescing intensities of a female nomadic horde. In *Penthesilea* as Bogue points out: ‘the personal and political aspects of war are intertwined, the forces of affective intensities and physical violence meeting in unstable relations of love and combat’.

In order to wage sporadic wars with surrounding tribes, and in the process ‘become warrior’, these ‘maidens’ cut off their left breasts so that they could better wield their weaponry of bows and arrows. It would appear that they were thus implicitly granted that masculine status of right-handedness whereas their previous status of female would have made this impossible as sinistrality better accords with a patriarchal view of their female otherness. However, from our Deleuzian perspective this self-mutilation can be perhaps better seen as positioning them in the productive ‘middle’ half way between women with and men without breasts. Yet, their intention in such battles was to capture the strongest and most virile men and return to their homeland to mate with them in order to breed and increase the Amazonians’ fighting potential. It is for this reason that the Amazons descended on the combatants at Troy.

These warrior maidens observed two rites both of which threatened to unleash uncontrollable forces. The first, known as ‘The Feast of Flowering Virgins’, inaugurated the hunt for men. The warrior-virgins were declared ‘Brides of Mars’, and ‘like the fiery hurricano’s blast’ they descended upon their prey. The second rite, ‘The Feast of Roses’ marked the return of the warrior-virgins, when their male captives – those selected for mating – were adorned with roses and invited to join in orgiastic pleasures with their conquerors. In the first ritual, an anonymous force of violence was unleashed.

434 Bogue, *Deleuze on Literature*, p. 121.
set loose, in the second, an equally anonymous impersonal desiring force was released. Interestingly enough this repositioned these most virile men as passive females bedecked with roses which signals menstruation.

Both nomadic rituals were institutions that attempted to regulate ‘deterritorializing’ forces but they were constantly endangered because of the uncertainties of the control which they tried to impose as this frequently resulted in a collapse into unrestricted violence, anarchy and eroticism. There is a parallel here with the ‘minoritarian’ becomings which ‘trigger uncontrollable movements within the majority population’.436 As Deleuze and Guattari state:

The man of war [becomes] inseparable from the Amazons. The union of the girl and the man of war ... simultaneously produces the becoming-woman of the latter and the becoming-animal of the former, in a single ‘block’ in which the warrior in turn becomes animal by contagion with the girl at the same time as the girl becomes warrior by contagion with the animal. ... in an asymmetrical block of becoming ... It is in the vestiges of a double war machine ... that Achilles and Penthesilea, the last man of war and the last queen of the girls, choose one another, Achilles in a becoming-woman, Penthesilea in a becoming-dog. (TP 278)

We see here that ‘contagion’ of ‘the girl’ as ‘block of becoming’ which allows ‘becoming woman’ and ‘becoming animal’ to take place. Deleuze and Guattari thus conceptualise the ‘war machine’ in Penthesilea as a metamorphic force which disrupts stable codes and social relations in complete opposition to the State, as it seems that Issy as ‘girl’ does throughout the Wake. Like Issy, as Maggies or rainbow girl multiples, (FW 226.21-227.18) the Amazons ‘surg[e] forth like lightning, “between” the two States, the Greek and the Trojan. They sweep everything away in their Passage’. (TP 355) These ‘girls’:

... do not belong to an age group, sex, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce n molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to the dualism machines they cross right through. (TP 277)

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Hence, the warrior in her/ his betrayal of 'the world of dominant significations and the established order' is inevitably 'coded' or categorised as a traitor from an hegemonic State perspective.\(^{437}\)

Deleuze and Guattari note that throughout *Penthesilea*, Achilles pursues Penthesilea and in doing so defies his commander and the Greek social order whilst in accepting his advances she too violates 'the collective law of her people, that law of the pack that forbids the “choice” of an enemy', *(TP 355)* and through her betrayal becomes 'war machine' as much as through her fighting prowess. Issy too, when regarded as 'war machine' betrays, for as writer of 'some anomorous letter, signed Toga Girilis'. *(FW 112.29-30)* as Tindall notes, 'she is a tea-girl who, putting on a *toga virilis*, has taken man’s place',\(^{438}\) as warrior. Furthermore, Issy as 'a tea-girl' not only offers us a shibboleth for love/ sexuality through 'wetting the tea', but also invokes the revolutionary opposition to the colonising State in the reference to the Boston Tea Party mentioned in the letter.

As Deleuze and Guattari state of *Penthesilea*, 'Kleist marvellously explains how forms and persons are only appearances, produced by the displacement of a center of gravity on an abstract line, and by the conjunction of lines on a plane of immanence'. *(TP268)* Similarly, the Tristan and Iseult scenario in the *Wake* shows the 'war machine' not as a machine *for* war, but rather an agglomeration of free flowing desiring 'intensities' oriented along a 'line of flight' and ranged against the repressive social machinery which configures or 'codifies' all processes and production within the extrinsic ends of a State operating along the single 'static' or 'molar' line of a unitary history. Issy as 'desiring machine' is both nomadic, 'molecular', and at the same time the 'war machine' as:

> the war machine ... seems to be irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law ... , a celerity against gravity; secrecy against the public, a power against sovereignty, a machine against the apparatus. *(TP 352)*

\(^{437}\) Deleuze and Clair Parnet, *Dialogues*, p. 41.

The ‘war machine’ as a ‘power against sovereignty’ allows for ‘the multitude’ as ‘a mode of social organisation that is not sovereign’ as Hardt and Negri recognise, although they fail to fully appreciate that it tends to be artistic. (N 33)

In reviewing Penthesilea, Deleuze takes from Bergson the idea that ‘affects’ are not internalised subjective states, but forces stemming from the ‘outside’:

sentiments are torn from the interiority of a ‘subject’ so they may be violently projected into a milieu of pure exteriority that instills in them an incredible speed, a catapulting force: love or hatred are no longer sentiments but affects. These affects are so many instances of the becoming-woman, the becoming-animal of the warrior (bear, dogs). Affects traverse the body like arrows, they are arms of war. The deterritorialization speed of the affect. (TP 356)

and we have already noted that such textual ‘affects’ constitute the ‘intensities’ which are Issy, conceived as ‘desiring machine’, and need to be accorded a greater place by Hardt and Negri in their understanding of how ‘the multitude’ can be formed. These ‘affects’ result in the ‘becoming warrior’ of the ‘war machine’ and are thus conjoined with the ‘becoming girl’ of Issy as the dynamic of ‘becoming woman’ already conceived through epiphanic ‘becomings’.

By moving with the watery flow which characterises Issy/ALP, I have moved away from reading the sentences at FW 279F1.30-31 in straightforward historical terms as these elide the real significance of Issy. ‘She’ as the Wake’s sexually capricious tendency both exceeds and inflects upon historical and current political scenarios. Thus, Issy has already indicated great fickleness in her desiring oscillations between Shem and Shaun in ‘The Mime’, as is the case elsewhere in the Wake. (FW 461.30-32) One may add that there is a ‘rhizomatic’ connection here with Molly in the ‘Penelope’ episode of Ulysses. Her use of ambiguous personal pronouns indicates her hesitation between Boylan and Bloom, interspersed with memories of Mulvey and Stanhope, which culminates, I have argued above, in her ‘molecular’ movement and attempted ‘line of flight’ to ‘nomadic’ men. As Shloss notes of the Wake, ‘the narration frequently

teases us about its own status as a book of “hides and hints and misses in prints”. (FW 20.10-11)” as meaning is elided through excess. Thus, whilst O Hehir argues that ‘cooledas’ in ‘cooledas as culcumbre’ (FW 279F1.27-28) relates to the Gaelic ‘cúil-deas’ as pretty headed girl,\(^{440}\) one might equally well read it as the sexuality of ‘the girl’ through the juxtaposition of ‘cul’ as head and ‘as’ as bottom and still bring into play the phallic symbolism of the cucumber. It is the indeterminacy of Wakean textuality, read as constantly changing impersonal sexuality, and its implications through Issyian ‘misses in print[s]’ which needs to be addressed.

In support of Rose and O’Hanlon’s belief that this is ‘Issy’s musical letter’,\(^{441}\) O Hehir and Dillon relate ‘malody’ (FW 279F1.4) to the Greek ‘song’ of melôdia and the ‘choice’ which the Latin ‘malo’ offers.\(^{442}\) Here Issy offers the reader a choice as ‘she’ ‘remembered all your pupil-teacher’s erringnesses in perfection class’, (FW 279F.4-5) as the way out of the societal impasse. This choice which Issy is offering readers, I believe, allows ‘erringnesses’, or life-affirming differences, instanced throughout Wakean textuality/sexuality, to be privileged and set against that deadening ‘perfection’ which characterise the activities of a social system operating through a masculinized unitary identity and concerned always to ascertain the truth and then ‘correct’ everything else. Under the Christian code of conduct we are expected to strive for perfection in everything as Saint Matthew specifically enjoins us: ‘be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect’.\(^{443}\) In these life affirming ‘erringnesses’ one again recalls Stephen’s encounter with the ‘bird-girl’ and the productivity of ‘becoming writer’ by ‘throw[ing] open before him in an instant of ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory’, set against the constraints of a


\(^{441}\) Rose and O’Hanlon, *Understanding ‘Finnegans Wake’*, p. 151.


\(^{443}\) Matthew, 4. 48.
living death in Ireland: ‘[t]o live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life!’

The death-dealing injunction to avoid all ‘error’, and consequently difference, is evident not just in school classes, working classes, or even the glass(es) in which Issy’s scapegoated mirror image Maggie is routinely condemned, but throughout traditional literature and life itself under modernity. Hardt and Negri understand this for as they approvingly note with regard to Bakhtin’s attack on Russian formalism, the then reigning tradition of literary criticism, he ‘poses the aesthetic limits of formalism by demonstrating its immobility and lifeless circularity’. The Roman Catholic negation of free-flowing desire, as an aspect of modernity’s hegemonic ‘reterritorialising’ control, is well illustrated by Joyce, in A Portrait, when at the end of Chapter 3, section ii, Stephen confesses his sexual sins which ‘trickled from his lips, one by one, trickled in shameful drops from his soul, festering and oozing like a sore, a squalid stream of vice. The last sins oozed forth, sluggish, filthy’; and the priest to whom he confesses condemns such ‘fluid’ activities as ‘dishonourable and unmanly’. One is reminded here of the very similar treatment meted out to Bob Doran by the priest in ‘A Boarding House’, and HCE in his confession to the Cad. (FW 36-37) The priest may then implicitly offer Stephen a life of chastity as a member of the priesthood; or, as Doran was offered, the ‘manly’ sexual outlet of the so-called ‘merried’ state whereas Joyce offers, through Issy in the Wake, the joyful difference of free-flowing desire.

Such scandalous ‘erringnesses’ allow for the contestation of the repressive forces of incest and the incest taboo, as the sole focus of desire, which constitute everyone born into a nuclear family – these forces I have argued being depicted through the masked Issy as Izod in ‘the Mime’ – and the emergence of the intense seductive melody of Issy’s ‘girlness’ when released from the constraints of incestuous desire which, as Deleuze argues, offers some antidote for our condition in modernity. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari note that ‘music’ ‘has always sent out lines of flight [as] “transformational

444 My italics
multiplicities” overturning the very codes that structure or arborify it’. \(TP\) 11 for ‘musical form, right down to its ruptures and proliferations, is ... a rhizome’. \(TP\) 12

Stephen/ Joyce at the moment of ‘becoming writer’ in \textit{A Portrait} is assailed by ‘a confused music within him as of memories and names which he was almost conscious of but could not capture even for an instant’. He hears ‘from each receding trail of nebulous music ... always one longdrawn calling note ... A voice from beyond the world was calling’ him. Similarly in conjoining the ‘bird girl’ with the Deleuzian ‘becoming girl’, one might read Issy’s malody/ melody as ‘a line of flight [the process of becoming] between states which displace and disorient subjects and identities...a line of flight, moving towards excess, otherness, exteriority’,\(^{446}\) and as such offering a furtherance of ‘life’ itself, through Wakean textual ‘flightiness’.

I have already brought into play the line ‘[y]our are me severe? Then rue’ \((FW\)
279F1.11) which, according to McHugh, relates to two songs: ‘A Married Woman’s Lament’ containing the lines ‘you use me severe’, and ‘The Sorrow of Marriage’ with its phrase ‘then rue’. ‘Rue’ is of course one of the names of the teenage Rainbow Girls \((FW\) 227.14) and indicative of subversion and disruption. Moreover, the theme of the failure of the institution of conventional Christian marriage as ‘a newfolly’ is continued in the following statement ‘My intended, Jr, who I’m throne away on, (here he inst, my lifstack, a newfolly likon)’, \((FW\) 279F1.11-12) with its ironic reference to ‘thrown’ as both the iconic throne of a queen offered in the romantic view of marriage – with the woman placed on a pedestal as subservient ‘Virgin’ Mary – and the lavatory as ‘throne’, where ‘woman’ conceived in masculinist terms as the rejected waste\(^{447}\) of urine and faeces are flushed away. Such women are indeed ‘thrown away’ unless they can be severe(d) from their partners, a conclusion which Roman Catholicism still cannot countenance.

\(^{446}\) Flieger, ‘Becoming-woman: Deleuze, Schreber and Molecular Identification’, pps. 43, 47.

\(^{447}\) Kristeva, \textit{The Powers of Horror}, passim.
I believe that it is ‘the girl’s’ powerful (a)sexual appeal which contends with the patriarchal tendency to ‘throw away’ women/wives in such Issyian statements as ‘I can live simply and solely for my wonderful kinkless and its loops of loveliness. When I throw away my rollets there’s rings for all.’ (FW 458.31-32) Here, Issy contests this ‘throwing away’ of women/wives. ‘She’ can be read here as referring to the sexual appeal of girl’s hair in ‘kinkless’ and ‘loops’, with the latter also drawing in female contraception through the ‘coil’ as ‘loop’, as well as the right to make her own decisions as to whether conception may or will not take place. Issy is here, in her reply to Shaun/Jaun as the priestly representative of patriarchy, stating that she will not wait demurely for him whilst he is away. By emphasising promiscuity through giving ‘rings for all’, and thus taking on agency, Issy is saying that the female in general can ‘throw away’ the domestication of ‘rollets’ or hair curlers and the constraints of marriage to just one man as his sole property to do with as he will.

Furthermore, by relating Issy to Alice in Alice in Wonderland, which Joyce so frequently does, (FW 279F1.3) he ensures that we read Issy/Alice as contesting and rebutting the ‘throne’ and the authority of the King and Queen of Hearts. This is made doubly clear by Carroll as in a final confrontation between the Queen and Alice, the Queen of Hearts’ command ‘[o]ff with her head’, gains no support as ‘[n]obody moved’, whereas Alice’s exclamation that ‘[y]ou’re nothing but a pack of cards!’, exposes the Queen, her consort and even her subjects as disempowered. Symbolically, kingship or queenship also represents adulthood. Alice’s (and Issy’s) victory can be taken here as the victory of the ‘girl’ or ‘child’ over adulthood and ultimately the ‘arborescence’ of Royal rule and the patriarchal order. Likewise, Stephen in A Portrait, at the transformational moment of encounter with his artistic muse ‘happy and near to the wild heart of life’, becomes aware of ‘figures of children and girls and voices childish and girlish in the air’. I will address the issue of the Deleuzian ‘child’ below.

Issy says that ‘Nature tells everybody about but I learned all the runes of the gamest game ever from my old nourse Asa. A most adventuring trot is her and she vicking well knowed them all heartswise and fourwords’. (FW 279F1.19-21) ‘Nature tells everybody about’ seems to relate straightforwardly enough to ‘spring has sprung’, (FW 279F1.17) but Issy seems to immediately countermand it by an imposition of the cultural on the
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my old nourse Asa
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No doubt becoming in the process a 'gigglibly tempatrix'. (FW 79.18) 'Rue' is
be
in
Issy
'runes'
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contained
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obliquely commenting on the song 'The
and
word
Sorrow of Marriage' which McHugh cites with its phrase'then rue'. McHugh448tells us
that 'nari' in 'they're nary nay of my day'(FW 279F1.16) is Scandinavianfor wife and
this too may relate to the trials and tribulations of Christian marriage and the nuclear
family adumbratedabove. It seemsevident that 'nari' is an harbinger of things to come
in the Issyian letter as 'she' makes frequent reference to Scandinavia, the Danes,
Vikings and Norse gods, runes, folktales or legends, throughout its latter part. This
indicate
having
learned
that
could
of the sadnessesof the modem 'marriage game' from
her Scandinaviannurse, the 'desiring machine' of Issynessavoids such entrapment.Of
course this nurse, if female, must be equatedto some extent with 'Mother Nature' in
discourse.
informs
However,
Christiani
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invented
Odin
that
patriarchal
us
was
who
and
449
'runes',
here
Asa,
taught
and
meaning 'of the gods', may refer to him in a typical
Joyceanreversal.
Nevertheless, it seemsthat Issy is pointing out that things have to be learned rather
than acted upon instinctively and that marriage is not an inevitability. In fact we are told
by David Hayman that the first-draft version read 'I learned all the values of the gamest
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Asa',
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game ever
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line with Christiani tells us that "'Asa" is frequently used as the English for the Norse
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'Asa'
However,
'Ase',
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gods'.
equivalent
word
452
Gynt's mother.
We know too that the Vikings (vicking) were great adventurers: 'A
is
her',
'trot'
trot
the
may well refer to globe-trotting - or
most adventuring
and whilst

448McHugh, Annotations to Tinnegans Wake', p. 279.

449ChriStiani, ScandinavianElementsof Tinnegans Wake',p. 150.
450Hayman, ed., A First-Draji
45 1

Version oj*'Finnegans Wake', p. 157. (My italics)


452McHugh, Annotations to Tinnegans Wake', p. 279.


even Leon Trotsky who having returned from exile in Siberia was People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and, as such, managed the founding of the Red Army in the U.S.S.R. – 'trot' also relates to horses or donkeys and thus Issy's 'becoming-animal', as the Old Norse word for god is Ass. Issy sees the old Norse's (nourse) wisdom as stemming from the 'heart', 'art' or 'arse' making her 'heartswise' and body-centred. Issy then returns us to textuality by the mention of 'fourwords' (FW 279F1.21) or forewords. Of course temporality may be being alluded to through 'fourwords' as 'forwards' and 'backwards'. There may too be a reference to 'mamalujo' which is made up of the four words heading the Gospels: Mark, Matthew, Luke and John. However, one must ask here whether these are just Issy's reference to naughty Anglo-Saxon four letter words with 'vick[ing]' to be read as 'fuck[ing]'? Elsewhere of course Issy's reference to her wicked double Maggy, as her nurse, '(msch! msch! [me! me!]) with nurse Madge, my linkingclass girl, she's a fright', (FW 459.3-4) might seem to bear this out.

Issy speaks of 'cecilies', (FW 279F1.3) during the opening sequence. This relates to 'Nircississies', (FW 526.34) as Isis, kisses and flowers, and even more to 'Secilas'. (FW 526.35) This underlines the immediately preceding 'salices', (FW 526.32) and the salaciousness of Alice and Issy/Maggy. Deleuze has stressed the correlation between the approaches of Lewis Carroll and Joyce in his Logic of Sense [2.1, 2.2, 2.5], and I believe that in the use of 'cecilies' we see evidence of the way in which Issy conjoins productively with Alice. Not only do we have the homophonically encoded or encrypted portmanteau words 'nircississies', 'secilas' and 'salices' of the Alice of Alice in Wonderland, but also the Alice of Alice Through the Looking Glass (Alices 'through their laughing classes'(FW 526.34-35)) together with the multiple Issy's of 'nircississies', and hence the Rainbow girls.

The 'laughing classes' also give us the 'looking glasses' and again bring into play Alice and the naughty Maggy. Not so much then the 'daughters/mothers of invention',

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although they are this too, as the scandalous ‘doaters of inversion’. Atherton points out that:

Finnegans Wake is full of references to Alice. Joyce found her exactly what he needed to complete the elaborated symbol of the Virgin which he formed out of the combined characters of Alice, Iseult, the dissociated personality girl Christine Beauchamp, and Swift’s two Stellas. Alice, of course, was the looking-glass girl; there were two Iseults—and Miss Beauchamp had many personalities. The combination of them all gives Joyce the effect he wanted of constantly changing personalities in the same character. We are probably not meant to conclude that any one of the personalities is the main one, for Joyce seems to try to give them all equal value.

Yet, the centrality of virginity, which Atherton assigns Issy to, is in some doubt. After all, ‘kissmiss [is] coming’, (FW 624.06) gives us the impersonal intensities of Christmas/ the birth of Christ as Issy/Maggy. Both Jesus and Mary his virgin mother are thus transmogrified into the undifferentiated ‘perverse body’ (L 281) of Issy/ Maggy as ‘kissykissy’(FW 102.28) – which Joyce had already intimated was his intention with Gerty and Bloom in the masturbatory sequence of the ‘Nausicaa’ episode, as their interaction parodies the simultaneous activities of the church service – and the impersonal intensities of a salacious free-flowing sexuality, a monstrous concept long repressed by the Church. This gives the ‘eternal recurrence’ of gifts with a difference, released from the limitations of conventional understanding and expression. Issy lisps and Joyce may be alluding to this when he uses ‘Isp’: ‘Lsp! I am leafy speaking’. (FW 619.20)

However, in order to kiss, an ‘actualised’ Issy would have to use her lips, and in referring to her synthesis with ALP in ‘Alma Luvia Pollabella’ (FW 619.16) Joyce, in dropping the ‘i’, may be seen to be dropping the ego from Issy as ‘desiring machine’. This might seem to emphasise the Deleuzian impersonality of desiring forces in the Wake rather than its more explicit ‘actualisation’ in Ulysses. Further emphasis is given

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454 As Adaline Glasheen, (‘Finnegans Wake and the Girls from Boston, Mass.’, The Hudson Review, Vol. VII (1), 1953, pp. 90-96) tells us Joyce was greatly influenced by Morton Prince’s accounts of multiple personality and particularly that of Christine Beauchamp in his book The Dissociation of a Personality.

455 Atherton, The Books at the Wake, p. 128-129.
to Issy’s egoless conjoining with ALP in the penultimate line of the book: ‘Lps. The keys to. Given!’, (FW 628.15) which seems to indicate the impersonality of the ‘desiring machine’ and its textual pervasiveness in the *Wake*.

‘Leafy’ is not only the Liffey here as ALP, (FW 619.20) but also Issy as a leaf – ‘child of tree, like some lost unhappy leaf’ (FW 556.19) – which may be seen as having ‘rhizomatically’ detached itself from the ‘arborescent’ elm of Mrs Quick enough in her conversation with the ‘straited’ stone of Miss Doddpebble, as ‘she’ works across the waters through the living ‘middle’ (FW 215-216; 620.19-20) of the river as text. During ALP’s final monologue too in which Issy appears symbiotically with her as ‘a daughterwife from the hills’, (FW 627.2) operating again between ALP and HCE, Issy is again transmogrified into a leaf, and the pages or leaves of the Wake itself: ‘My leaves have drifted from me’. (FW 628.6)

Thus, one needs to set these examples against Atherton’s virginal representation of Issy ‘who’ projects her ‘naughtiness’ onto ‘her’ mirror image Maggy as temptress. (FW 527.5-8) After all, ‘lies’ too feature in ‘cecilies’. Far from detracting from her ‘girlness’ conceived as childlike innocence this ‘wickedness’ simply enhances it, for as Deleuze and Guattari have said: ‘The girl is certainly not defined by virginity’ for ‘[s]he is an abstract line, or a line of flight’; (TP 276-277) which continues to locate ‘her’ on the ‘second plane of writing’. Clearly, one has considerable evidence throughout Chapter II.2 and indeed in ‘the love letter’ itself that Issy is anything but the congealment of innocent or virginal forces (FW 279F1.19-20) which Atherton would attribute to her.

Issy’s warns the reader, just as much as the recipient of ‘her’ letter in the *Wake* itself, that ‘[y]ou sh’undn’t write you can’t if you w’udn’t pass for undevelopmented’. (FW 279F1.5-6) For in the *Wake* as the extreme ‘writerly’ text we, as readers, do the re-writing although the initial ‘disentangl[ing]’ and ‘re-embod[y]ng’ is implicitly directed by Joyce as he sets ‘up a resonance between two objects, [and] produces the epiphany’[3.1]. Certainly this sentence may sound as if Issy were repeating back to her teacher instructions which he had previously imposed on her, but I would rather suggest
that reading the ‘love letter’ as HCE’s, or even Joyce’s, ill-concealed guilty secret is to ‘pass for undeveloped’. The ‘affects’ gleaned from writing, reading and textuality are surely the point. This does not conflict with Rose and O’Hanlon’s understanding of this phrase as ‘one should not write if one cannot, lest one pass for underdeveloped’, which rather than seeing the *Wake* as a ‘readerly’ text can be better read in terms of attentive and knowledgeable readerly re-writing.

Issy assures us that ‘[t]his is the prop[er] way to say that, Sr.’, (*FW* 279F1.6) and ‘her’ use of tripple ‘p’s in ‘prop[er]’ evidently refers us to Swift’s little language, to Stella, and ‘her’ own lisp, as well as to the ‘p/k’ split of the Celtic languages. McCarthy adds that P and Q also relates to ‘the two girls involved in a nebulous act of indiscretion with Earwicker, who in turn merge into the figure of the “prankquean”’ (*FW* 21-23). ‘Multiplicities’ abound and there may well be some mileage to be made out of ALP’s propping up of HCE too.

What is singular and hence significant about ‘prop[er]’, it seems to me, is its possible embedding of Vladimir Propp’s name in the phrase. If this is deliberate then it may well be a reference to Propp’s seven spheres of action in folk tales of which the Norse ‘sago’ saga (*FW* 279F1.25) is one. The *Wake*, read as a folk tale, will then be seen to contain not only a ‘false hero’ and ‘villain’ as it does in Shaun – also seen as a ‘dispatcher’ in his capacity as Shaun the Post – a ‘real hero’ in Shem, and a ‘helper’ in Anna Livia. ‘She’ not only helps out HCE but is also a giver or ‘donor’ as she hands out presents from her sack. More importantly, there is a ‘sought for person’ in Issy herself, not simply as ‘The Mime’s’ incestuous ‘object of desire’ always accompanied in Russian folk tales, according to Propp, by her ‘father’ – who here would of course be

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459 Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, trans. by Laurence Scott (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968). This book was written in 1928 and it may well have been known to Joyce in some form or another.
HCE, signifying the familial channelling and repressions of incestuous desire in modernity – but more significantly the sought for presence pervading Wakean textuality and the ‘affect’ of the *Wake* itself.

Grace Eckley has pointed out that Joyce’s use of children’s lore in the *Wake* allows him to ‘treat adult themes with childish lightness’, whilst ‘open[ing] a window to the adult world’ involving ‘courtship, marriage, birth and death, sacrifice, oblation and ceremony of a very primitive as well as a sophisticated kind’. Deleuze and Guattari state that ‘[i]t is certain that molecular politics proceeds via the girl and the child’, and ‘becoming itself is a child or a girl’. (TP277) Joyce makes frequent reference to fairy stories and nursery rhymes or ‘nonsense reams’ (*FW* 619.17) which add substance to this point. Issy/Maggy is always able ‘to talk childish, [when] theatred with Mag’, (*FW* 461.28) – that is both ‘seated’ and sexually ‘heated’ – and the child always allows for humour. Thus, in the ALP/Issy ‘assemblage’ at the ‘end’ of the *Wake*, whereas ALP’s dignity in the face of death is notable, the fear of ‘those therrble prongs!’ (*FW* 628.5) and ‘[c]arry me along, taddy, like you done through the toy fair’, (*FW* 628.8-9) evinces the child, humour, and ALP’s childishness forming another link with Issy. Paradoxically, this child-like quality offers a return to innocence.

Through such childish talk we have a reference to Goldilocks in ‘goldylocks’, (*FW* 615.23) then Peter Piper in ‘Peeter the Picker’, (*FW* 616.09) and Hansel and Gretel or ‘handsel for gertles’, (*FW* 618.03) leading us directly to Humpty Dumpty ‘hampty damp’. (*FW* 619.08-09) The Babes in the Wood put in a convoluted appearance in ‘[t]he woods are fond always. As were we their babes in’. (*FW* 619.23-24) Goody Two Shoes is invoked as ‘goodiest shoeshoes’ (*FW* 622.10) coupled with Puss in Boots as ‘possumbotts’. (*FW* 622.11) We also have ‘horner corner’ as Little Jack Horner, (*FW* 623.03) and Mother Goose as ‘old mutthergoosip!’ (*FW* 623.03-04) following close on their heels. Finally, of course, this wonderland ‘wanterlond’, (*FW* 618.22) or ‘waterland’ of Alice/Issy’s being illuminated throughout by Aladdin’s lantern ‘laddy’s

lampern'. (FW 621.07) Eckley's observation, I suggest, not only underlines the importance of 'the Mime', but gives support to my Deleuzian reading of Issy's letter by expanding this beyond Scandinavian folklore to include children's lore through Alice/Issy, in her 'girl-child' contestation of the adult world.

In reading the *Wake*, we as reader-writers must 'chews to swallow all you said', (FW 279F1.7) we must both chew over many times and finally choose from what Joyce, through Issy, has said; and from all they didn't say but merely implied: 'all you saidn't'. (FW 279F1.7) Orality offers a space for 'becomings'. We 'can eat [Issy's] words', (FW 279F1.7) for 'there's a key in my kiss', which also refers obliquely to the 'seedcake kiss' shared by Bloom and Molly, and eaten by him, and more directly to the crossed kisses which end the letter: '[w]ith Kiss. Kiss Criss. Cross Criss. Kiss Cross', (FW 11.27) and Issy as 'desiring machine'.

Issy's supposed Latin in 'Quick erit faciofacey' (FW 279F1.8) seems to be an odd remark, curiously placed, to say the least. Apparently, Joyce first intended to use this phrase to start a new paragraph and then changed his mind.461 Roland McHugh relates this phrase to the Latin *quod erat faciendum*, and translates it as 'which was to be done'.462 O Hehir and Dillon expand on this by giving us the Latin 'quod erat faciendum feci' as 'what had to be done I did'; 'quid erit facio' as 'what will be I do'; and 'quid erit feci' as 'what will be I did'.463 There is clearly an insistence here that we pay attention to the intensities which go to make up Issy's kiss, yet in placing 'Quick erit faciofacey' next to it, Joyce implies that the 'affect' of the kiss stems from the impersonal face instanced by the elided ego in Issy's kissing 'Isp'.

Issy operates 'machinically' and 'cutting' figures in such operations as I have noted previously. Furthermore, the 'Quick' is the seat of emotions, feeling, or 'affect', and in

462 McHugh, *Annotations to 'Finnegans Wake'* , p. 279.
itself it recalls the phrase ‘cut to the quick’. Cutting out the ego allows desire to flow freely. If the phrase is dependent on Latin, as the above critics assume, then there is again an obvious link between Gerty MacDowell ‘playing at being an Irish princess’, as Glasheen puts it,\textsuperscript{464} and Issy, for Gerty’s seductive display takes place against the background of a Roman Catholic church service and the adoration of the Virgin conducted in Latin. Issy projects her ‘wickedness’ onto her mirror image Maggy. Such duplicity is caught in the double-facedness of ‘faciofacey’.

Neither McHugh nor O Hehir and Dillon pick up on Issy’s clear reference to the ‘face’ and ‘faciality’ contained in ‘Quick erit faciofacey’. Yet, Issy’s vanity figures both in this phrase and prominently throughout the \emph{Wake}. I suggest that this ‘wickedness’ is Issy’s awareness of free-flowing desire and as such a privileging of ‘the quick’ over ‘the dead’. Deleuze and Guattari devote an entire chapter to the face. (\textit{TP} 167-192) They note that sexuality, and hence the ‘girl’, and politics are combined through the face, as the face ensures that:

\begin{quote}
[e]verything remains sexual ... there are new coordinates. ... the face depends on an abstract [desiring] machine that ... touches all other parts of the body, and ... other objects without resemblance. The question then becomes what circumstances trigger the machine that produces the face and facialization. (\textit{TP} 170)
\end{quote}

and they find that,

\begin{quote}
[t]he face is not a universal. It is not even that of the white man; it is White Man himself ... The face is the typical European ... the first divergence types, are racial: yellow man, black man ... Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face ... From the viewpoint of racism ... [t]here are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be. ... Racism ... propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been wiped out. (\textit{TP} 176-178)
\end{quote}

They conclude that ‘the face is a politics’; (\textit{TP} 181) it is an anti-minoritarian, anti-female, racist, patriarchal politics including everyone and attempting to clamp down on any deviance from the \textit{status quo}. As Hardt and Negri put it, Deleuze and Guattari

\textsuperscript{464} Glasheen, \textit{Third Census of ‘Finnegans Wake’}, p.138; and \textit{‘Finnegans Wake and the Girls from Boston, Mass.’}, pp. 90-96.
challenge us to conceive racist practice not in terms of binary divisions and exclusion but as a strategy of differential inclusion. No identity is designated as Other, no one is excluded from the domain, there is no outside.  

Read in conjunction with Cheng’s comments above on Joyce’s perceptive insight into the masculine sexualisation of the ‘penisolate ware’ (FW 3.06) and the other conflicts depicted in the *Wake* – the repression through feminisation of the Celt by both the French  and the English; Irish resistance to this instanced through Stephen Dedalus’s encounter with Haines, (U 24) together with Joyce’s ironical view of the ‘heroism’ of Irish nationalism in the ‘Cyclops’ episode, and Bloom’s perverse attempt to counter racism and feminisation in *Ulysses* (U 376-449) – it is evident that ‘Quick erit faciofacye’ can be seen to relate to a range of Joyce’s ethico-political concerns if we read it from a Deleuzoguattarian inclusive perspective. Not least, and this is something which Cheng does not pick up on, the point that Joyce embeds ‘war’ in ‘ware’ or ‘wares’ indicates the cause of much modern conflict in the production and distribution of goods or ‘wares’, for we have made material goods the measure of all values in modernity. The state of perpetual war(e)fare which Hardt and Negri forecast for global capitalism simply carries this one stage further.

Issy is far more than mere masculine ‘object of desire’, not simply as Atherton put it, ‘[t]he daughter [a]s all the young girls who have ever been loved by old men’, but rather the connectivities of the ‘desiring machine’ itself offering us the prospects of ‘becoming woman’ through ‘becoming girl’. Thus, Issy, as ‘line of flight’, in her


‘affects’ both identifies and dismantles the face of white patriarchal hegemony, which is quite an achievement for as Deleuze and Guattari put it:

Dismantling the face is no mean affair. ... the face is a politics [and] dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings, an entire becoming-clandestine. Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity. Here, the program, the slogan, of schizoanalysis is ... know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight. (TP 188)

Issy’s kissing ‘l(i)ps’ do precisely this I believe.

The seductive sensuality of the text is again brought to the fore in Issy’s statement: ‘[w]hen we will conjugate together to lose her to master to miss while morrow fans amare hour, verbe de vie and verve to vie, with love ay loved have I on my back spine and does for ever’. (FW 279F1. 8-11) Such ‘conjugations’, I argue, relate to the impersonal sexual couplings of the text with the reader through ‘the girl of that sexuality’ (TP 277) and the writer’s concern about both the mastery this involves and the dread of losing the reader as loved one: ‘to lose her to master to miss’, as we are set free on a sea of portmanteau words. The ‘amare hour’ (‘amare’ being the Latin for love470) is stressed in ‘love ay loved have I on my back spine and does for ever’(ay/ai471 being Chinese for love). This, I believe, is also a statement about the book itself and the forces within its textuality as we are reminded of Beckett’s statement that the Wake ‘is not about something it is that something itself’472.

Deleuze alludes to comments made by Beckett in his ‘German Letter of 1937’ in which he says that, in order to spare no effort in undermining language, it is necessary to ‘bore one hole after another in it, until what lurks behind it – be it something or

471 McHugh, Annotations to ‘Finnegans Wake’, p. 279.
nothing – begins to seep through; I cannot imagine a higher role for a writer today.\textsuperscript{473} This differs very little from D. H. Lawrence’s statement quoted above. (\textit{WIP} 203-204) Moreover, the ‘back spine’ is both that of the prone girl figured as sexual enticement and the spine of the book indicating its seductive textuality. ‘We will conjugate together’ refers, in this reading, as much to the conjugation of the \textit{Wake}’s verbs ‘verbe de vie and verbe to vie’ (\textit{FW} 279.F1.9-10) as it does to salacious sexual activity. In this connection, McHugh refers to ‘conjugate’ as the conjugation of verbs,\textsuperscript{474} and also to the French of ‘verbe de vie and verbe to vie’. It seems to me that Issy in emphasising ‘life’ here through ‘verbe de vie and verbe to vie’, uses ‘vie’ to indicate not just life but the time of a life as ‘duration’ as the French indicates, and possibly as the needed revolutionary movements which particularly characterize modern French history. Moreover, following Deleuze, I believe that the life Issy offers can be seen here as ‘vying’ with ‘phallic’ mastery and its ‘oedipalisation’.

Furthermore, in the ‘verse’ of life which is set against the ‘doing words’ of ‘Quick erit faciofacey’ with its masculinist injunction to act we have, I believe, Joyce’s insistence that we value the process of ‘becoming’ in itself, free from patriarchal norms or actions.\textsuperscript{475} Here he appears to be working on a parallel line with Bergson, Nietzsche, Spinoza and the other philosophers of ‘life’ whom Deleuze took as formative influences on his own ethical and vitalistic philosophy: ‘there are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life’. (\textit{WIP} 74) So ‘toloseher tomaster tomiss’ can be read not only as the Issyian struggle to free desire from its masculinist capture, but also the \textit{Wake} from a masculinist reading. Therefore, ‘while morrow fans amare hour … love ay loved’ (\textit{FW} 279.F.9) is linked to the textual verbs of life, ‘morrow’ is also coupled with the Nietzschean ‘eternal return’ of future time. We then see the Issyness or the ‘verse’, enthusiasm, vigour or love of life as the pervasive ‘spirit of the


\textsuperscript{474} McHugh, \textit{Annotations to \textquoteleft Finnegans Wake\textquoteright}, p. 279.

\textsuperscript{475} Colebrook, \textit{Gilles Deleuze}, p.145.
literary work offering the potentialities of a new future, and an ethical injunction, as Deleuze and Guattari put it: ‘[k]nowing how to love means extracting from one’s sex the particles, the speeds and slownesses, the flows, the _n_ sexes that constitute the girl of that sexuality’. (*TP* 277) Something which a masochistic Bloom, as indicated in Chapter Two, is finally unable to accomplish, but which the ‘affects’ of Issy’s textual love offer to the reader as a ‘line of flight’.

As Issy ‘grig[s] my collage juniorees who, though they flush fuchsia, are they octette and virginity in my shade’, (*FW* 279F1.14-15) ‘she’ once more returns to the sexuality of ‘the girl’ and a dominant Wakean stylistic mode. Here, one can have ‘grig’ as either a ‘small eel’, giving rise to further phallic speculation, ‘a grasshopper or cricket’ possibly relating to HCE as Earwicker/earwig – and I would interject Deleuze’s ‘becoming-insect’ – or even to the phrase ‘merry or lively as a grig’ indicating apparently that Issy, and the _Wake_, is full of fun and life. In this connection Molly in the ‘Penelope’ episode of _Ulysses_ ‘grigged’ Josie Powell by breaking ‘in[to] fits of laughing with the giggles’ and appearing ‘in great humour’ before her, after having won Bloom away from her rival. Josie’s chagrin was such that she subsequently ‘didnt darken the door much after we were married’. (*U* 879)

‘[P]rigs beg in to pry’ (*FW* 279F1.17) has been interpreted in sexual terms. However, a more obvious meaning can be attributed to this phrase. Issy may well be directing us to look at prigs and their prying nature as they look askance whilst actually gaining surreptitious pleasure from their moralistic voyeurism. Furthermore, in their prying, they exercise general judgemental/moral control in society. After all, isn’t HCE’s sin in the park, as both victim and villain in the voyeristic scene, being hinted at, by Issy, and his conscience-stricken ‘molarising’ morality once more being suggested as a recurring ‘reterritorialising’ theme of the _Wake_?

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Issy appears to playfully indicate the ingredients of a salad in her statement, ‘[h]ow Olive d’Oyly and Winnie Carr, bejupers, they reized the dressing of a salandmon and how a peeper coster and a salt sailor med a mustied poet atwaimen’ (FW 279F1.21-23). In ‘Olive d’Oyly’ we have olive oil, in ‘Winnie Carr’ vinegar, in ‘bejupers’ possibly juniper oil used for flavouring, in ‘the dressing of a salandmon’ both a salad dressing and a salmon salad, in ‘a peeper coster’ a pepper castor, in ‘salt sailor’ a salt cellar, and in ‘mustied poet’ a mustard pot. Setting aside for the moment the many other different readings which this sentence might allow – for instance ‘Carr’ in Gaelic means ‘spear’ – one needs to ask why this interjection is here and what significance it plays in Issy’s letter.

According to Carol Shloss this passage may simply be a comment on Lucia’s ‘salad days’, or conversely her mental condition through her ‘word salads’ and her schizophrenic ‘malody’ (FW 279F1.4). However, as argued above, I believe that Bonnie Kime Scott is more correct in stating that ‘Issy doesn’t share Lucia’s schizophrenia’. I argue, together with Katie Wales, that ‘word salads’ may be better held to characterise the textuality and style of the *Wake* itself. I also believe that Wakean ‘word salads’ are directly linked to the ‘girlness’ of Issy. The interpretation of this sentence as a reference to a ‘word salad’ need not bring the entire Lucia/Issy-Joyce connection back into close focus as Shloss indicates. Issy may also be speaking lightly of Winnie and Olive who together with Beatrice, Nelly and Ida, Amy and Rue make up the Rainbow Girls ‘trailing their teenes behind them’ (FW 227.12-14) and refer, from a Deleuzian viewpoint, to the ‘singularities’ of their multiple ‘becomings’ made available through the Issyian primary ‘block of becoming’: ‘[s]ay them all but tell them apart’ (FW 226.30).


479 Scott, *Joyce and Feminism*, p.185.

480 Wales, *The Language of James Joyce*, p. 150.
I need to clarify the distinction between Issy's/ the Wake's 'word salads' and those of the clinical schizophrenic. Silvano Arieti has pointed out that Joyce employs 'clang associations' in the Wake, and as Keith Booker argues, '[r]epetition, homophonic logic, words treated as things – all characteristics of the speech of schizophrenics [together with clang associations] are also central features of the writing of Joyce'. Moreover, as Deleuze notes, the 'grammatical transformations' of Schreber (L 214) – who is so frequently cited by Deleuze and Guattari as a key example of potentially creative schizophrenia – are particularised in the oxymoron, as the most common figure of speech in his memoirs, a rhetorical feature which is also centrally shared by Joyce, according to Rabain. Yet, the 'word salads' of the clinically diagnosed schizophrenic patient, despite their often uncanny resemblance to Wakean formations such as '[w]het the bee as to deflowret greendy grassies yellowhorse', (FW 360.29-30) consist in the main of 'incoherent speech, poverty of content of language and superficial nonsense including digressive, vague, overelaborate, circumstantial speech', if we are to give any credence to the 'molarising' diagnosis of the American Psychiatric Association. Wakean style and clinically diagnosed schizophrenic's ‘word salads’, far from being synonymous are only superficially similar, as Jung observed in his comparison of Joyce’s writing with Lucia’s ramblings.


484 An example supplied by Katie Wales.

485 American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Table 5.1, p.234.

One picks up on Issy's and the text's salaciousness in 'kill kackle, kook kettle' (*FW* 279F1.25) with its implied 'wetting of the tea' as a favourite Joycean image for orgasm. 'K[ackle]' may resonate with the phrase 'cut the cackle' and relate to the length and repetitiousness of the Earwickian saga, or to Issy's own noisy and superficially inconsequential talk. However, as cackle also brings to mind the clucking of a hen, is Issy not reminding us that this letter was discovered by Biddy and that it was dug out of a midden, and the 'muck heap' of human history and contemporaneity? One recalls the lavatorial reference given by McHugh where the capital 'O's in 'Olive d'Oyly' are read as the bottom or A(r)se with 'O0' supplied when we come to the word 'kook', which may then be seen as a reference to the geometric ALP (*FW* 293) and, in Deleuzian terms, the process of 'becoming woman'. Consequently, Issy's 'kettle', rather than being simply a utensil for boiling water, could be read in terms of the phrase 'a pretty kettle of fish', invoking both the fish-like smell of Issy's soiled knickers and a Joycean comment on our ethico-political failings.

Such interpretations only take into account individual words, and it is perhaps significant that 'kill kackle, kook kettle' brings four words together in a doubled pattern of imperative and noun. Does this relate to the 'fourwords' of Asa (*FW* 279F1.21) and the textuality of 'forewords', or even the four words of Stephen's philosophic tussle with the spatial and the temporal in the 'Proteus' episode of *Ulysses* through 'nebeneinander' (one-thing-next-another) and 'nacheinander' (one-thing-after-another) (*U* 45), despite the German words being compounds of three not four words? Elsewhere in the *Wake* one finds such a cluster of alliterative 'k's and it is here that they occur in groups of three rather than four. The 'kill' of our phrase might be related in some way to 'killykillkilly' (*FW* 4.7-8) as both 'ostrygods' and 'fishy-gods' are mentioned here (*FW* 4.1-2) as they are implicitly in Issy's letter; (*FW* 279F1.20) or indeed to the adjacent phrase 'Brékkek Kékkek Kékkek Kékkek! Kóax Kóax Kóax!' (*FW* 4.2) Although the latter seems to be linked to the Ku Klux Klan and that other Dublin in Georgia as 'the Whoyteboyce of Hoodie Head'. (*FW* 4.5) Perhaps in emphasising the 'k' or hard 'c'

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sound Joyce through Issy is primarily referring to the ‘P/K’ split in Celtic languages, as O Hehir explains. 488

If this is the case it might also account for similar pairings/distinctions in the letter such as ‘killing/ putting’, ‘peeper coster’, and even phrases such as ‘prigs beg in to pry ... plentyprime of housepets to pimp and pamper ...’ which if set against ‘kill kackle, kook kettle’, might be regarded as instancing the Celtic language and a national split, and refer back to the aforementioned pre-Babellian unity, (FW 21.9) the Reformation and the Protestant/Catholic split, or, in a Bergsonian/Deleuzian understanding, the intensities and potentialities of the ‘virtual’ ‘whole past’ rather than pointing to a solely Judeo-Christian problem. However, by emphasising Issy as Wakean textuality, I believe that the emphasis could be better placed on the indeterminacies of the text, particularly as the pairing of ‘p’ and ‘k’, regarded as ‘voiceless stops’ by linguists, allows for letter substitution so that ‘peeper’ might become ‘keeper’, ‘kill’ change to ‘pill’, and ‘kettle’ to ‘pettle’. Joyce more evidently allows this substitution elsewhere in the Wake with ‘pristopher polombos’ and ‘Kresbyterians’ (FW 120.02) for Christopher Columbus and Presbyterians. Such textual indeterminacies return us not only to the Issyian ‘girl’, as capricious and irresponsible in patriarchal and symbolic order terms, but to these as key features of Wakese itself, as we once more have ‘hides and hints and misses in prints’. (FW 20.10-11)

Issy’s exhibitionism, and that of the text, in ‘her’ ‘flaunt[ing] on the flimsyfilmsies’ (FW 279F1.14) is shown by McHugh who interprets ‘stagstruck’ (FW 279F1.30) as stage-struck. ‘She’ either asks or recalls ‘[w]asn’t it just divining that dog of a dag in Skokholme as I sat astrid uppum their Drewitt’s altar, as cooledas as culcumbre, slapping my straights till the sloping ruins, postillion, postallion, a swinge a swank, with you offering me clouts of iliscents and them horns stagstruck on the leasward!’ (FW 279F1.26-30) Throughout the sentence as a whole there are indications that Issy is presenting herself through all of the ‘intensities’ which go to makeup a Scandinavian sex-goddess implicitly contesting Christianity. She speaks of the divine, an altar, offerings, incense, and in the next sentence tells us not to be afraid of her. Thus, the

Icelandic summary of Norse mythology cool ‘Eddas’ is evident in ‘cooledas’. Clearly with ‘dag’, ‘Skokholme’ at least in part Stockholm, and by ‘their Drewitt’s altar’ Issy is bringing into play the Norse gods scenario, pre-dating and possibly replacing the Christianity mentioned in previous sentences, as we have divine and divinity in ‘divining’ and ‘dog’ as a reversal of ‘god’ and possibly a reversal of the sole ‘God’ of Christianity, whilst ‘cumbre’ as mountain summit may locate the home of the Norse gods. The link with stage-struck exhibitionism and the exhibitionism of the text is maintained here through Norse gods and Wagner’s operas, which of course includes ‘Tristan and Isolde’, and, as Nietzsche early appreciated, themselves contest Christianity. Such ‘exhibitionism’ finds a distinct resonance through Hardt and Negri’s conception of ‘the multitude’s’ initial formation in terms of public ‘spectacle’, or as they put it its performative, carnivalesque nature ... highly theatrical, with giant puppets, costumes, dances, humorous songs, chants, and so forth ... street festivals in which the anger of protesters co-exists with their joy in the carnival.

In the phrase ‘a swinge a swank’, (FW 279F1.29) Issy’s alliterative ‘s’ is foregrounded. Key textual motifs of swanking and wanking are encapsulated in this word. No doubt the ‘intensities’ composing ‘her’ ‘femininity’ would allow Issy to show off or ‘swank’ in new apparel, as the new apparel of the Wakean text, just as Bloom/HCE are known to masturbate or ‘wank’ in the presence or with the aid of teenage girls who may either be affronted or may, like Gerty or Issy/Maggy, be accomplices. ‘[S]winge’ appears to relate to the masturbatory act itself as the Old English ‘swengen’ meant ‘shake’or to ‘toss’ which no doubt gives us the schoolboy phrase ‘tossing off’. The depiction of masturbation in Ulysses amongst other things certainly called forth a ‘swingeing’ moral attack on the book as did the condemnation of HCE staged within the Wake itself. Yet, as noted above, Richard Brown argues that it is Bloom’s masturbation which allows him to retain a precarious normality in the reader’s eyes. Certainly, the scattering of the seeds of the semen indicates that wider productivity which the

489 Hardt and Negri, Multitude. p.211.


491 Brown, James Joyce and Sexuality. p.88.
Bloom/Molly ‘seedcake’ holds for readers of *Ulysses*. Masturbation, still theoretically punishable by death,\(^{492}\) is regarded as deeply sinful by the Christian Church,\(^{493}\) which no doubt accounts for its frequent celebration in *Ulysses* and the *Wake*.

Issy’s mention of ‘stagstruck’ (*FW* 279F1.30) may be referring less to stage-struck than to a ‘stag-night’ with ‘homers’ indicating both a stag’s antlers and the masculine sexual desire which she knowingly provokes; just as Lenehan asks of Blazes Boylan in the ‘Sirens’ episode of *Ulysses* ‘Got the horn or what?’ as he impatiently makes his way out of the pub to his assignation with Molly. (*U* 344) Yet, we are also drawn back to childhood through nursery rhymes and ‘little Jack Homer’ (*FW* 623.03) although this reference to the boy who ‘stuck in his thumb and pulled out a plum’, may also refer to Izod/ Issy as the ultimate prize available for the winner of the contest between the twins in ‘The Mime’. There is too an implicit reference here to ‘that house [where] A. Horne is lord’, (*U* 502) this is the National Maternity Hospital ‘well known [through] Dr A. Horne ... the able and popular master’, (*U* 550) where the medical students gather prior to celebrating in the pub, after the birth of Mrs Purefoy’s son: ‘Horhorn, quickening and wombfruit’ is twice repeated at the beginning of the ‘Oxen of the Sun’ episode in *Ulysses*. (*U* 499, 500) The sexual slang of the ‘horniness’ of the combatant brothers ‘struck’ or provoked by Izod/ Issy as sexual prize, whilst they as the ‘stags’ ‘ruck’ or engage in a ritual mating contest, would also then be emphasised as indicative of Glugg and Chuff’s fight at the end of ‘The Mime’. (*FW* 252.14-21) One can also recall here HCE’s ‘the Blessed One, the Harbourer-cum-Enheritance. Even Canaan the Hateful’ (*FW* 264.8-10) read as incestuous desire, and incest taboo, as HCE contemplates the playlet in ‘Horn of Heathen, highbrowed! Brook of Life, back-frish!’ (*FW* 264.5-7) The Scandinavian ‘ruka’ too which means ‘fuel’ would of course add to the twins competitive flames.


\(^{493}\) Leviticus 18.
Of course Issy tells us that 'them horners [were] stagstruck' 'on the leasward!'. (FW 279F1.30) and whilst 'the lea' coupled with 'sward' may seem to indicate dry land and pasture, 'leasward!' as 'leeward' is not only the opposite of 'windward' but brings into play ships and the sea. The connections with Issy as 'line of flight' and ALP through water and fluidity are again foregrounded and once again offer a link to the epiphanic 'bird-girl'. A ship's drift to the 'leeward' side not only refers us to the previous appearances of sailors and sailing ships in the references to 'Vikings', Odysseus and the like, but gives us a somewhat different reading of 'horners' as sailors playing their phallic 'hornpipes'. The invocation of nomadic sailors thus brings into play the freedom of unconstrained desire not limited simply to sexuality, and certainly not channelled through the incestuousness of the brothers and sister or constrained by the nuclear family's incest-taboo. Issy is also, I suggest, making an evident connection with Molly's attempted 'line of flight' made possible in part through the fantasised nomadic men she yearns for towards the end of the 'Penelope' episode. (U 925) The 'war machine' too is inextricably connected to 'nomadism', in Deleuze and Guattari's writings as indicated above, and here the 'war machine' can be seen to refer to the 'betrayals' or subversive undermining of patriarchy and capitalism itself, as well as Molly's betrayals. Hardt and Negri's invocation of the poor of the world as a potentially 'fluid and powerful network' bears this out, as they envisage it in 'nomadic' and 'war-machinic' terms. Thus they liken today's potential revolutionaries to the Christians of the later Roman Empire, working inexorably from within to hollow out the dominant order of things, and in the process inadvertently preparing the way for a new and rejuvenating era of barbarian migrations.494

We are enjoined to 'sing loud, sweet cheeriot, like anegreon in heaven!', (FW 279F1.32) this seems to be a negro spiritual and once again emphasises the musicality of this letter and Issy as 'line of flight'. Is the introduction of the black minoritarian slave experience meant to signal something different from that of the conventional Catholic Christianity of Irish marital rules; or is it more likely to conjoin them as both peoples, the Afro-Americans and the Celtic Irish, are effectively enslaved? We know that the early slaves in North America were not allowed to marry as they belonged

494 Hardt and Negri, Empire, pps. 207, 393.
completely to the white slave owner and that any sexual union between them was considered to be illegitimate as of course were any offspring. Here both McHugh and O Hehir and Dillon have suggestions to offer with the word ‘anegreon’. McHugh links the song/hymn of ‘Swing Low, Sweet Chariot’ to the song ‘Anacreon in Heaven’ via ‘anegreon in heaven!’ and then to a line from it: ‘I’ll swinge the ringleaders’.

Firstly we need to remind ourselves that such songs are part of ‘Issy’s musical letter’, and ‘swinging’ may well relate to jazz. However, such ‘swinging’ relates as much to the hanging of runaway slaves in the Southern States of America before the Civil War as hegemonic white rule dispatched yet another negro to heaven. This is particularly the case as it also refers to the attitude of the British Government to the Irish rebels and their threats and actions in hanging the ringleaders, such as ‘the croppy boy’ lament frequently featured in Ulysses. (U 365-370) It could also have some resonance with ‘a swinge’ in ‘a swinge a swank’ (FW 279F1.29) above as condemned men, particularly if hanged in public, were traditionally expected to put on a show of defiant bravado showing that they were truly men. This show could indeed include a final erection and ejaculation as Alf states in the ‘Cyclops’ episode of Ulysses, (U 393) for no one wants to hear the ‘medical evidence’ refuting this ‘heroic’ explanation from Herr Professor Luitpold Blumenduft. (U 394)

O Hehir and Dillon tell us that ‘Anakreôn’ was a Greek lyric poet which doesn’t immediately seem to offer much mileage, although Negro spirituals and lyric poetry may have something in common. After all Katie Wales states that:

I have avoided calling the Wake a ‘novel’, for it seems to me that the kind of competence the ‘ideal reader’ ultimately needs for the Wake is drawn not from the experience of reading fiction but from that of reading poetry. Finnegans Wake is an epic prose-poem.

Both McHugh and O Hehir and Dillon seem to ignore or take as implicit the negro in ‘anegreon’ and also, unlike Joyce himself, the presumably heavenly enjoyment of

495 Rose and O’Hanlon, Understanding ‘Finnegans Wake’, p. 151.
496 Wales, The Language of James Joyce, p.154.
cigar or 'sweet cheeriot'. In Deleuzoguattarian terms the reference to the negro conjures up the writer’s need to ‘become-black’ in order to be read as a ‘minor’ writer: ‘[a]s Faulkner said, to avoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to become-black’. (TP 292) There does appear to be a continuation of the heavenly hereafter to be enjoyed by the singers of the spirituals and the next sentence: ‘The good fother with the twingling in his eye will always have cakes in his pocket to bethroat us with for our allmichael good’. (FW 279F1.32-34) ‘The good fother’ as ‘God’, the good father, when linked to the Archangel Michael through ‘allmichael good’ suggests the plenitude to come for the Christian faithful as God ‘will always have cakes in his pocket to bethroat us with’, even when the cake is reduced to the single wafer of the Catholic Mass, and presumably keep us, or them, singing lustily for ever in heaven.

Yet, according to McHugh, in Issy’s statement ‘the good fother’ rather than meaning ‘father’ here actually equates to ‘a cartload’.497 It might seem more appropriate in the context to read ‘fother’ as ‘fodder’ and relate this to the cakes on offer. Cakes are served on a doyley and this is linked with a cart through the opera company Doyley Carte and, no doubt, the operatic interests of John Joyce/ Simon Dedalus, Molly and Stephen in Ulysses, as Bloom plans a future for him as ‘a society singer’ in ‘Eumaeus’. (U 773) Moreover, the ‘Olive d’Oyly’ (FW 279F1.21) from which this particular line of interpretation sprang has been linked above to women in patriarchal society, toilets and excreta through its double ‘O’s’.

Rose and O’Hanlon reasonably interpret this as Issy’s ‘father, with a twinkle in his eye, [who] will always have cakes in his pocket for her’,498 which reminds us of Bloom and the cake of soap he purchases and pockets in ‘The Lotus Eaters’ episode as well as its comforting properties when he runs from Boylan at the end of ‘Lestrygonians’. This masochistic allusion would bring us back to the Earwickian nuclear family situation depicted in ‘The Mime’ with Issy’s reference to Shaun as the angelic Saint Michael through ‘allmichael good’, Shem as Devil, and HCE’s benevolent goodwill through the

497 McIlugh, Annotations to ‘Finnegans Wake’, p.279.
implicit offering of Issy as sexual prize or ‘cakes’, although this is the prize he really wants for himself. Moreover, ‘for our allmichael good. Amum’ can be read as ‘for our Almighty God. Amen’. As such it draws this letter to a near prayer-like close and it appears to return me to my argument of previous chapters.

Amen to all that then, but not quite, rather ‘Amum. Amum. And Amum again’(FW 279F1.34) as Issy says. We are suddenly transported beyond Judaeo-Christian beliefs and even those of Nordic mythology to Ancient Egypt and ‘Amun’ – although there was a King Amon of Judea about 642-640 BCE. ‘Amun’, or ‘Amon’ was the hidden Egyptian god, the first and only god, god of the air and fertility, he had no history and because of this borrowed the history and form of other gods. 499 In one of his many aspects he became a horned god giving us yet another possibility for ‘them homers stagstruck’. (FW 279F1.29-30) In this manifestation, he took on the mutilated representation of Seth, ‘the creator of confusion, who creates both the tempest and the storm throughout the length and breadth of the heavens’, 500 and here one recalls God’s/HCE’s thunder words. Seth signified disorder and violence. He was a ravisher, a pederast and fratricide, all disasters were caused by this god of destruction, yet he was defeated and emasculated by Horus, and became female or feminised, and in consequence the Ancient Egyptians ceased to fear him and cut off his ears in effigy, replacing them with horns.

In his emasculation we then have yet another variation on ‘them homers stagstruck’ as the horns of the cuckold and hence one more reference by Issy to Bloom – who is pictured with antlers in the ‘Circe’ episode – Molly, Boylan, and motifs originating in Ulysses. Of course Amun did not restrict himself to merging with Seth, as ‘Amun-Re’ he also united with the sun god ‘Re’ and in this guise was regarded as ‘king of the gods’ (nesou netjerou). Re was the phoenix god, god of resurrection. In Amun then one has


499 Inscription on a bas relief found in 1912 within the Deir el-Medineh temple.

the most ‘arborescently’ elevated version of God, akin to Jehovah, coupled with and even indistinguishable from the femininity/ feminisation attributable to Jesus.

In this connection, Issy refers not to Amun but to Amum as both a ‘mum’ and a ‘mummy’. The ‘mummy’ of course offers a link to Egypt and Amun, but ‘mum’ appears to bring into play ALP as mother and the author of the final version of the letter. Also ‘Amum again’ reflects the book’s title in a feminised reversal. Rather than being about the masculine ‘Finn again’ it is to be better seen as having been rewritten through the letter as ‘Amum again’. This would seem to resonate with the significance I am giving to Issy/ALP as the ‘becoming-woman’ through ‘becoming-girl’ symbiosis signifying Wakean textuality. Moreover, Amun’s wife, the goddess of heaven, was called Mut which may offer a link with the Mutt and Jute episode (FW 15-18) in which Shem and Shaun appear as opposing yet interchangeable forces. Such ‘rhizomatic’ links could be taken to further stress the evolving ‘feminine’ deliquescence of identity – vectored through Issy – characterising the twins, and Issy might also be playing on the phoenix like qualities of Bloom at the end of the ‘Cyclops’ episode.

However, we cannot completely end at this prayerful point. The Issyian letter appears to contain a postscript in its final lines. (FW 279F1.34-37) This final sentence is as demanding as anything which has gone before: ‘For tough troth is stronger than fortuitous fiction and it’s the surplice money, oh my young friend and ah me sweet creature, what buys the bed while wits borrows the clothes’. (FW 279F1.34-36) Truth may be stronger/ stranger than fiction no matter how tough it is to take but where is the ‘truth’ here, no matter how strange, and why is fiction regarded as ‘fortuitous’? Is this a postscript which problematises the ‘truths’ of Christian/ liberal-humanist morality – in the latter case as the ‘tough truths’ of the market place, the ‘bottom line’ and ‘competitive advantage’ – or is it confirming them? Is this a comment on the monotheistic religions in general with their dogmatic beliefs springing from accidental, chance or even casual circumstances as ‘fortuitous fiction’? Or is it the still unrealised ‘utopian’ vision of a different world peopled by ‘the multitude’ regarded as currently fictitious but eventually fortuitous should the ‘new earth’ ever be realised, and that it is this which is being highlighted, no matter how unlikely this possibility may seem to be to us today. It is surely time to take the ‘kook kettle’ (FW 279F1.25) off the hob, make a
final cup of tea, and ‘lock your kekkle up’. (FW 585.24) One comes to the end of this reading of Issy’s letter with more questions than answers still outstanding: ‘the (non)-being of persistent question[s]’, to which my attempts at best do no more than occasionally ‘adequately occupy and fill that space’. [1.3] This of course is the beauty of the *Wake*. 
Comments on this interpretation of Issy’s letter.

Yet, if one accepts David Hayman’s argument that Issy’s letter ‘is the juvenile version of the “Reverend Letter”’, with this completed adult version regarded as ‘Anna Livia’s final draft of her letter’, (FW 615-619) one can take further some points mentioned above. From my Deleuzian perspective it is the intensities of ‘the girl’ and/or ‘child’ which I find in the juvenile letter which need to be stressed. The final version of the letter written by ALP connects with ‘riverrun’ (FW 3.01) as the first word of the text through ‘Reverend’ and strongly suggests that the letter can at least be regarded as a microcosm of the Wake as Clive Hart suggests. Yet, I believe that this final version reveals fundamental differences between itself and the Wake; they are different in time, and I believe that both Hayman’s and Hart’s argument can and should be reversed. It is the ‘child like’ or ‘girl like’ aspect of Issy’s juvenile letter which makes it far more typical of Wakean textuality and motifs as a whole than the final version, as I have argued throughout.

The river is fluidity and movement, it runs. Its processual movement and ‘becomings other’ situate it in the ‘virtual’ and the time of ‘duration’. The Reverend occupies a static position as subject or role on ‘the plane of organisation’, he exists in clock-time. ‘He’, it nearly always is a he and certainly was in Joyce’s day, is a ‘revered end’, a Deleuzian ‘end point’ rather than ‘a line’, a ‘Dirtdump’ or ‘dead pope’, (FW 615.12) the garbage can of received history, not a ‘line of flight’, unlike Issy/ALP as the ‘becoming-woman’ of the Wake. H(C)e is on the textual ‘plane of organisation’, she is on the textual ‘plane of immanence’. Through his constant attempts to retain an unsullied masculine identity, HCE is the ‘molar’, ‘reterritorialising’ agent, demanding reverence, she is the ‘deterritorialising’ flipside not always supplying it. Without the vitality of Issy’s letter ALP’s final ‘reverend’ version cannot capture or encapsulate the spirit of the Wake, just as ALP without Issy lacks ‘her’ essential élan vital. It is in Issy’s

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letter, or letters as there are more than one that we get the ‘true’ microcosm of the
Wake. ALP’s culminating letter and the Wake only resonate as ‘singularities’ and work
in conjunction through Issy’s which acts through the ‘intensive middle’ or ‘in between’
as footnotes between the text.

The vast and unending ‘multiplicities’ which Joyce gives us, even in the apparently
minor footnote at FW 279F1, through Issy as the Deleuzian ‘girl’. are such that we can
reasonably see it as bringing into play the ‘whole world’ of the unrealised past and as
such the ‘second synthesis of time’, as well as a pathway to the ‘third synthesis’. It
implicitly opposes that ‘stratification’ and ‘segmentation’ which ‘oedipalised’, ‘molar-
line’ thinking imposes on us as our ‘actualised’ death in life of modernity. As individual
readers we may well see that:

It is at this mobile and precise point, where all events gather together in one that
transmutation happens: this is the point at which death turns against death; where
dying is the negation of death, and the impersonality of dying no longer indicates
the moment when I disappear outside of myself, but rather the moment when death
loses itself in itself, and also the figure which the most singular life takes on in
order to substitute itself for me. (L 153)

Joyce and Deleuze, I argue, are at one in their attempts to give us a new reality
through the pathos of humour by dismantling any unified content which they have
produced, the former mainly through the ‘affects’ which we see in Issy’s letter and
throughout the Wake itself, and the latter in the main through his disjunctive ‘thought’:
‘[i]n truth, there are never any contradictions, apparent or real, but only degrees of
humour’. (AO 68) I believe that their intention is to produce a new reality through their
work, a reality as an ethos or a ‘rhizomatic’ style which functions ‘machinically’: ‘it
functions through and because of its own dismantling. It is born of dismantling’, (K 48)
or that fragmentation which characterises Issy and the Wake.

In the two preceding chapters such an Issyian dismantling can be seen as being
related to ‘the Fall’ as the central theme of the book. I believe that to reduce the Wake to
a depiction of the shame of ‘this ardent and guilty father’ does Joyce, and far more

504 Cixous, The Exiles of James Joyce, p.15.
importantly his readers, who construct the meaning of the text for themselves, absolutely no service whatsoever. The hidden potentialities of the text released by Joyce’s creativity and genius are then simply obscured or lost. We have to look at Joyce’s depiction of the Fall in our current and future context and re-write or re-think it as we appreciate that today HCE’s striving for respectability, unified selfhood, and general acceptance ‘IS’ every ‘actualised’ man (and to a large extent every woman) just as he was when Joyce perceptively called ‘him’ into existence. Hardt and Negri’s quest for a ‘new humanity’ under globalised capitalism has yet to be realised.

HCE in his attempt to evade shame, but actually bringing it upon himself, and Anna Livia in her possibly well meaning but ultimately unsuccessful defence of her husband, in which she too not only reveals but adds to his reasons for shame, together echo our own predicament and consensual evasion as we complacently refuse – like Boylan, the Citizen, Cunningham, and Deasy in Ulysses – to call into question the fundamental concepts, values and ‘affects’ of the European tradition which has led to our current difficulties. Where we do, as with Bob Doran and Bloom himself, it appears that we are faced with insurmountable difficulties. Deleuze would argue that foremost amongst these difficulties remains our unwillingness or even a perceived inability to eschew our assigned identities and think in terms of ‘becomings’, the primary example of which, as I have explained, is ‘becoming-woman’ through ‘becoming-girl’.

As Luce Irigaray has pointed out, this entails releasing the intensities: ‘of what you buried in oblivion to build your world. ... how can I return ... I take place only in you ... into that dark abyss which you imagine me to be’,505 as we allow the unrealised forces which make up the ‘whole’ past to emerge. Joyce, whether writing of the ‘Sirens’ or Mrs Purefoy in the ‘Oxen of the Sun’ episode in Ulysses, or Stephen’s mother depicted in A Portrait and Ulysses, or even the forces constituting Issy/ ALP in the Wake, was particularly aware of this and determined to bring it to our attention as an ethical problem. He went beyond even this. Whether we create new concepts or new ‘affects’ we need to move beyond the human to a universal perspective, and this I believe is what

Joyce aspired to and achieved in the *Wake*, and why it is so difficult for us to come to terms with from the ‘sedimented’ perspective of our ‘oedipalised’ selves. Joyce, and Deleuze who came to this differently, both created an ethics based on and crucial to life itself. We cannot see ethics in terms of humanity alone since this would limit and close down any ‘becomings’ to that which we already know or believe ourselves capable of becoming. Both Joyce and Deleuze go beyond such limited human perspectives. Joyce, is intuitively aware that life is to be seen in terms of ‘duration’ and the ‘virtual’ and is not to be conceived exclusively in terms of pre-given forms. There is always the potentiality for difference with previously unthought new ‘becomings’ or ‘lines of flight’ being created. To my mind ‘Issy’ in the *Wake* exemplifies this liberatory possibility. Joyce is pointing out that we are nothing other than our power to ‘become’ different and obtain new subjectivities. Furthermore, in restricting ourselves to pre-given norms and moral codes we effectively deny life.
Conclusion

In this thesis I have attempted to explore whether Joyce’s writings, and in particular *Finnegans Wake*, have both productive and liberatory potential in Deleuzian and Deleuzoguattarian terms. The thrust of my argument throughout has been that the *Wake*, in its embodiment of Joyce’s late style or ‘non-style’, [3.2] is not only a ‘rhizomatic text’, or even the most ‘rhizomatic’ or ‘schizoanalytic’ of all his works, but it is the prime example of this in English and probably world literature, surpassing works which even Deleuze and Guattari appear to favour or at least equate with Joyce’s.506 I have argued that if Deleuze and Guattari had not only added to their understanding of the Joycean epiphany as ‘epiphanic machine’ the lexical and syntactic experiments which Joyce used to achieve this, in addition to the portmanteau words they correctly highlight, but even more importantly their own concept of ‘becoming-girl’ as the essential dynamic of ‘becoming-woman’ and related this to Issy, they would have gained a far clearer picture of the unique worth of the *Wake*. If, in ‘arborescently’ prioritising Joyce’s *Wake*, I can be accused of not sticking to the ‘rhizomatic’ script of Deleuze and Guattari, I believe that an acceptable riposte might well be that neither do they – insofar as they make explicit their own prioritisations. In arguing this, I have attempted to go beyond the positive assessments of the *Wake* which Deleuze [1.1-1.4, 2.1-2.6, 3.1, 3.3, 7.1, 9.1], and Deleuze and Guattari [4.1, 4.2, 6.2, 8.1] make, through the ‘beyond’ which Issy read as ‘the girl’ and ‘line of flight’ has offered. In doing so I have deliberately contested the thumbs down verdict which they appear to have given on Joyce’s last work in some of their joint writings [5.1 in particular, but also 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6]. Although I can muster some limited support here,507 I am aware that no other critic has gone as far out on a limb as I have in making these Deleuzoguattarian

506 Raymond Roussel [1.3], Lewis Carroll [1.4], Artaud [2.5], and even Klossowski [4.2] together with Ezra Pound [6.5], as well as Wagner, Mallarmé, Marx and Freud [6.4] and Maurice Leblanc, Borges, and Gombrowicz [7.1], all seem to be regarded as at least his equal, and both Kafka as well as Beckett [5.1] his superiors, in important respects.

claims for the *Wake* against some of the judgements of Deleuze and Guattari themselves. Yet, I believe that the *Wake* so considered moves well beyond the purely literary no matter how much re-ordering and re-positioning might be required here as Attridge has convincingly argued.\(^{508}\)

It seems that Deleuze was as concerned to help bring about an ethical as much as a political revolution, as the latter needs to result from completely ‘new thought’ and ‘affects’ and cannot take place without the former, which is always in danger of being contaminated and destroyed by the ‘fascistic’ thinking and ‘oedipalising’ investments of past ‘actualisations’. I have argued that this applies equally to Joyce, a point with which Attridge would again seem to agree.\(^{509}\) This point that ethical change is all important, in the move to changed subjectivities, may have become obscured somewhat in the case of Deleuze and Guattari by the political thrust of their best known works, the two volumed *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, and Guattari’s lifelong interest in and advocacy of political revolution.\(^{510}\) One can cite in particular his well known joint work with the extreme left wing political activist Toni Negri\(^{511}\), and the works which followed on from this association after Guattari’s untimely death.\(^{512}\) I have consequently paid particular attention to Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* and *Multitude* in this thesis and found them wanting in terms of the vital ethical input acquired from ‘great literature’. In *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari state that:

> schizoanalysis as such has strictly no political program to propose. If it did have one, it would be grotesque and disquieting at the same time. It does not take itself for a party or even a group, and does not claim to be speaking for the masses. No

\(^{508}\) Attridge, *Peculiar Language*, pp. 233-234.

\(^{509}\) Ibid, pp. 237-238.


\(^{511}\) Guattari, and Negri, *Communists Like Us*.

political program will be elaborated within the framework of schizoanalysis. (AO 380)

Ansell-Pearson believes that '[t]he politics that emerges from the challenge of Deleuze and Guattari is clearly a politics of freedom, but this is freedom conceived in a way that has never been articulated by the tradition of modern thought, whether liberal, Marxian, or libertarian'. 513 It seems to me that Hardt and Negri in Empire and Multitude come closest to articulating Ansell Pearson’s ‘politics of freedom’ in the phase of global capitalism, despite their several lacunae. Nevertheless, they fall short in their attempted realization of Deleuze and Guattari’s aims. It is first an ethical rather than a political freedom for which they argue, as indeed does Foucault in commenting on their work. (AO xiii)514

Similarly with Joyce, I believe, he is not primarily concerned with the ‘PANOPTICAL PURVIEW OF POLITICAL PROGRESS AND THE FUTURE PRESENTATION OF THE PAST’ (FW 272. R1) in merely political terms, but to enjoin the reader to leave behind the murky historical past of the hen’s letter you ‘hinnyhennyhindyou’, (FW 272.19) by adopting a new ethical perspective and reading ‘THE FUTURE PRESENTATION OF THE PAST’ as ‘the eternal return’ constituting the highest possible thought of difference and repetition where the only return is the joyful return of difference and new life from the ‘whole’ past. Together with Deleuze, Joycean ‘affect’ can be seen as allowing an ethical thought both beyond politics and the moral law of good and evil and even beyond the natural laws which govern only the surface of the world. This is particularly evident in the Wake.

Deleuze has given us a number of different ethical perspectives ranging from an ethics of the ‘eternal return’, 515 to an ethics of ‘the event’, 516 an ethics of ‘affect’ as it is


514 Michel Foucault, ‘Preface’.

515 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, and Difference and Repetition.
realised in bodies,\textsuperscript{517} and even an ethological ethics.\textsuperscript{518} However, I believe that these are all simply aspects of the same ethics. This, I have argued, is an ethics of ‘becoming’ located in the ‘virtual’ or the ‘plane of immanence’, and where textuality is concerned ‘the second plane of writing’. It is an ethics based on Deleuze’s ‘perspectivism’ whereby not only can we not step twice into the same Heraclitean river, but the person who does the stepping, as a constituent part of the world, is also constantly changing like the river. We are all in the process of ‘riverrun’ as Joyce succinctly implied despite our constant attempts to be and remain ‘Reverend’.

This means that whereas every differentiated individual is connected to all of the forces and intensities which make up an immanent world, such individuals – given the particular experiences and forces through which they are constituted – have a unique perspective on and in the world, yet one which is constantly changing and potentially ‘becoming other’. This is certainly not to be taken as a Deleuzian argument for human ‘selfhood’ as such. I have attempted throughout the thesis, to highlight the manner in which Joyce’s style results in a magnification of ‘affects’ which work against such an understanding of individuation and unified selfhood as it moves into the realms of the communal and even the post-human. Deleuze, like Joyce in the \textit{Wake}, as Jan Ford has cogently argued, follows Nietzsche’s prescriptive or symptomatological insight:

\begin{quote}
that whatever exists is of a piece, and that individuation is the root of all evil [this is] a conception of art as the sanguine hope that the spell of individuation may yet be broken, as an augury of eventual reintegration.\textsuperscript{519}
\end{quote}

By instancing such fragmentation and ‘rhizomatic’ connection through Issy, I believe that Joyce may be seen as pre-dating, and even surpassing, Deleuze in this respect. As Shari Benstock has observed ‘[t]he \textit{Wake} is a kaleidoscope of constantly

\textsuperscript{516} Deleuze, \textit{The Logic of Sense}; Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{What is Philosophy?}.

\textsuperscript{517} Deleuze, \textit{Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza}, and Deleuze, \textit{Spinoza: Practical Philosophy}.

\textsuperscript{518} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}.

\textsuperscript{519} Quoted in Ford, ‘James Joyce and Those (K)nights of “Rufial Continence”’, p.246.
shifting perspectives'; structured by and founded on the portmanteau, but going beyond this, and Jean Paris observes that:

... once it is established, it must by its own movement extend itself to the totality of living and dead languages. And here indeed is the irony of the portmanteau style: the enthroning of a principle of chance which, prolonging the intentions of the author, in so far as they are perceptible, comes little by little to substitute for them, to function like a delirious mechanism, accumulating allusions, parodying analogies, and finally atomizing the Book.  

Such a 'delirious mechanism' accords with the acquisition of a new subjectivity. For, 'the code of delirium or of desire proves to have an extraordinary fluidity', (AO 15) experienced as 'intensities', transitions, and 'becomings', leading in turn to a new subjectivity. (AO 18-19)

As Tim Conley notes: 'the range of associations for "Plumtree's Potted Meat", as it recurs in Ulysses, may be numerous but they are limited'. Attridge has made the same point about puns as opposed to portmanteau words. Conley continues that 'by contrast, Finnegans Wake may recycle a word or phrase but it never has the same meaning twice, let alone the same situational context within the narrative'. The Wake's recontextualising, according to Conley, ensures that 'meanings will always stretch past any scope of individual intention'. As Jacques Derrida averred, the postman and with him the letter and meaning 'would always and yet never arrive', because as Susan Stewart puts it the 'deficiency of signification is rapidly turned into a surplus' with an over-abundance of meaning. However such over-abundance does not cancel meaning itself but rather does the opposite. As Umberto Eco points out, 'there is nothing more

520 Shari Benstock, 'Sexuality and Survival in "Finnegans Wake"', p.251.
521 Quoted in Attridge, Peculiar Language, p.206.
522 Ibid, p.197.
523 Conley, '"Oh me none onsen!"', p.243.
525 Susan Stewart, Nonsense: Aspects of Intertextuality in Folklore and Literature
meaningful than a text which asserts that there is no meaning'. 526 I believe that this
gives us not simply the Lyotardian void which Christine van Boheemen-Saaf 527 has
read into the Wake but also and more importantly the post-human becomings of life
itself, through the dynamic of the Issyian text.

Deleuze states of the productivity of Joyce’s late Wakean style: ‘style is never a
matter of the man, it is always a matter of essence (nonstyle)’. [3.2] Yet, Joyce’s late
style is such that whilst authorial intentions are seemingly swept aside by the technique
he employs the reader is to some extent at least directed by a text constructed like ‘a
tapestry’, 528 with its very many ‘carefully interwoven’ 529 themes. Nevertheless, the
manner of composition of the Wake allows for a multiplicity of ‘rhizomatic’
connections to be established:

Finnegans Wake was composed in a manner best described as accretive. Beginning
with an outline scheme, Joyce proceeded to compose separately a number of
episodes which he subsequently integrated to constitute a chapter (or sequence of
chapters). Each episode, or Section, was developed and extended through a number
of draft stages at each of which several additions, revisions, and deletions of textual
elements were effected. At a determinable point in its linear development, each
Section was laterally integrated with one or more other sections and this
subsequently revised as a uniform textual continuum.530

Such a deliberate system of lateral breaks and multiple integrations designed to
‘mechanically’ cut the linearity of any textual formation through ‘a system of
interruptions or breaks (coupures)’, (AO 36) epitomised through Issy, gives us Joyce’s
‘epiphanic machine’ functioning like ‘a delirious [rhizomatic] mechanism’, and ensures
that Joycean ‘nonstyle’ founded on portmanteau and esoteric words is also ‘constituted

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526 Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,


528 Wales, The Language of James Joyce, p.149.

529 Atherton, The Books at the Wake, p. 143.

by the coexistence in the same sentence of an infinite series of viewpoints according to which the object [and subject] is dislocated, sets up a resonance or is amplified' [3.2].

Such dislocations result in a stammering or stuttering of the language itself which are both echoed by and exceed the confessions of HCE to the Cad: ‘there is not one tittle of truth ... in that purest of fibfib fabrications’. (FW 36.33-34) Here, we seem initially to be on firm(ish) commonsensical ground in believing that Earwicker’s stuttering simply shows his nervousness and possible guilt, as he begs the Cad to ‘Shsh shake, co-comerai!’, (FW 36.20) ‘for the honours of our mewmew mutual daughters... I am woowoow willing to take my stand, sir, upon the monument, that sign of our ru ru redemption’. (FW 36.22-25) It would seem that stuttering becomes both an oblique way of referring to his fall from grace and implicitly ‘the Fall’ from Eden/grace as the theme of the book itself: ‘Dimb! He stottered from the latter. Damb! he was dud’. (FW 6.9-10) Conceived on the textual ‘plane of organisation’, or ‘first plane of writing’, it is an indication of HCE’s inability to mount a convincing defence of his sinful actions or to maintain the unsullied upright identity for which he perpetually strives. Yet, Issyness always intervenes and in doing so takes us beyond his statement as a confessional fall from grace to the ‘plane of immanence’ or ‘second plane of writing’, and the intensities which constitute his shame.

Thus, Deleuze regards such Joycean stutterings as intimately linked to style and the forces within and beyond language through his use of portmanteau words, and one must add puns and his entire lexical and syntactic resources as I have pointed out before, and he connects this to the economic cycles and limits of the forces of the capitalist outside:

*When a language is so strained* that it starts to stutter, or to murmur or stammer ... *then language in its entirety reaches the limit* that marks its outside and makes it confront silence. When a language is strained in this way, language in its entirety is submitted to a pressure that makes it fall silent. Style – the foreign language within language – is made up of these two operations; or should we instead speak with Proust of a nonstyle, that is, of ‘the elements of a style to come which do not yet exist’? Style is the economy of language. To make one’s language stutter, face to face, or face to back, and at the same time to push language as a whole to its limit, to its outside, to its silence – this would be like the *boom* and the *crash*. (ECC113)

It is through the recognition of and engagement with language pushed to its limits and beyond that the *Wake*’s ethical potential for change lies, through an initial Nietzschean
'creative destruction', prior to an engagement with its 'line of flight'. One result of this could be, as Attridge notes, an 'alter[ation of] cognitive frameworks across a wider domain, allowing further acts of creativity in other minds', possibly leading to an ethico-political communal movement by 'a people to come' envisioned by Deleuze and Guattari, (WIP 218) and brought about at least in part through Joyce's 'epiphanic machine'. This would give us a new ethic, 'a cultural consciousness, the conscience of the race', as Riquelme, paraphrasing Stephen Dedalus in A Portrait, has put it. (If we take 'the race' as extending beyond the Irish people to humanity as a whole, and indeed beyond even this to the post-human and life itself.) It is precisely this 'cultural consciousness' which I believe Deleuze and Guattari would wish Hardt and Negri to show more attention to in their analysis of the manner in which 'the multitude' is to be constituted.

I argue that the Wake reunites the conditions of real experience through its problematic structure, based on portmanteaux but extended through Issy, which connects us to the entirety of the immanent 'virtual whole' whilst enabling us to loosen our grip and even discard – as we see through Shem in the Shem and Shaun conflicts – much of the 'actual'. Just as James Williams points out of Deleuze's philosophic principles in this connection: 'Deleuze's insight is that [connecting] must be ephemeral, at least at the level of actual possessions whether [these are] identifiable things or ideas – including our selves and our sense of acting as a free subject', and Hardt and Negri make this a central point of their argument through the 'common(s). We can transform ourselves in perceiving difference and thinking the 'seim anew'. This occurs in the Wake despite, or paradoxically because of, the conscious, minute control of his

531 Derek Attridge, 'Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other', PMLA 114 (January 1999), pp. 22-23.


533 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze's 'Difference and Repetition', p.5.

text which Rose and O'Hanlon liken to that of 'a mosaic worker' as Joyce meticulously 'piece[d] together his gargantuan opus'.

However, we are neither involved in a total 'reterritorialisation' which such control implies, or even a complete 'dterриториalisation' with Joyce's 'nonstyle' ensuring that he deliberately loses 'his' grip, but rather a creative ethical act working through the tensions and intensities of the intuitive 'middle'. Thus, McBride in addressing the *Wake* as simply a 'schizophrenic phantasmagoria' seems to ignore the 'flipside' of Joyce's necessary channelling of these creative yet potentially destructive forces in his act of creation, through his determination to ensure that the Wakean 'machine' has 'exactly all the meanings one wants it to have according to its functioning; the essential point being that it functions, that the machine works'. [3.1] As Deleuze and Guattari note '[a]rt is not chaos but a composition of chaos that ... constitutes, as Joyce says, a *chaosmos*, a *composed chaos*—neither foreseen nor preconceived. Art transforms chaotic variability into *chaoid* variety'. [8.1]

Roland Barthes in *S/Z* divided narrative fiction into two main types: *lisible*, or readerly, and *scriptible* or writerly. Whilst the *Wake* evidently resides at the far extreme of the *scriptible* text, demanding the reader's constant involvement in effectively rewriting it, Wales points out this 'open-endedness [nevertheless] leads to a kind of restriction for the reader'. For, as Umberto Eco argues:

such 'open' texts are in fact 'closed' in the sense that their readers must mentally engage with the text in the way that the text demands, however freely; the reader is built into the text, as it were, as part of its structural strategy.

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Of course, if this were not the case, and the *Wake* was simply a 'schizophrenic phantasmagoria', it would be impossible to talk of Joyce's overall ethico-political thrust. Joyce effectively builds us into the text even though this cannot negate Paris's valid observation that 'the principle of chance' brought about by Joyce's portmanteau style inevitably replaces the author's intentions. I have argued that it is in the Issyian 'middle' that Joyce's ethical intentions and 'intensities' and those of the reader productively meet in a potential new 'becoming' experienced as 'an intense feeling of transition, states of pure, naked intensity stripped of all shape and form'. *(AO 18)* Like Deleuze, Joyce makes change and difference fundamental. Bergson puts it this way:

> There is another method of composition, more ambitious, less certain, which cannot tell when it will succeed, or even if it will succeed at all. It consists in working back from the intellectual and social plane to a point in the soul from which there springs an imperative demand for creation. [...] To obey it *completely new words have to be coined, new ideas would have to be created*, but this would no longer be communicating something, *it would not be writing*. Yet *the writer will attempt to realise the unrealisable*. He will revert to the simple emotion, to the form that yearns to create its matter, and will go with it to meet ideas already made, words that already exist, briefly *social segments of reality*. All along the way he will feel it manifesting itself in signs borne of itself. *He will be driven to strain the words, to do violence to speech.*

As such, we experience that 'divergence of series, decentring of [Viconian] circles, constitution of the chaos which envelops them, internal resonance and movement of amplitude, aggression of the simulacra' *[2.3]* characterising 'pure difference'.

Kristeva goes some way to meet this in observing that Joyce's *Wake*an discourse is ethical in its breaking down of all identity. *[542]* She is aware that his 'echolalic' or pre-symbolic poetic tones are invested in the feminine-maternal 'semiotic chora' which transgresses, subverts and offers the possibility of alternatives to the patriarchal

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symbolic order. Consequently, I have stressed throughout my readings of the *Wake* that this ethico-political perspective, centred on impersonal desire, applies as much to the *Wake* as it does to Deleuzian philosophy. As Patrick McGee states, the *Wake*:

> ... articulates a desire that ... is the antithesis of property ... beyond the ideologies of gender and nationality. In the *Wake* ... the articulation of desire is the answer and the antidote to the domination of place through the concept of private property and to the domination of language – whether by a gender, a race or a class – through the concept of the proper; it is the opening ... that makes it possible to begin to imagine an ethics not only of sexual difference, as Irigaray desires, but of difference itself.

Such an articulation of an ethics of difference as that created by Joyce in the *Wake* as 'event' is an innovative act which results not simply in lasting alterations to the author's subjectivity, which Lacan focuses on, or with the 'epiphany bound up with Joyce's ego', as the Lacanian Roberto Harari puts it; but more significantly it offers the opportunity to his readership for wider ethical and social change, as Attridge has noted.

Attridge’s disarticulations or, as I would prefer to call them, ‘pure differences’ amount in Deleuzian thinking to the release of the potential intensities of new life in future time: ‘[a] nonpsychological life ... the nonorganic life that grips the world and renders it acentred and rhizomatic’. It is in this sense, I believe, that the ethical and political can be united in the future and that Joyce’s ethical ‘meaning’ is revealed. I argue that this places Joyce alongside Deleuze in privileging ethics over morality.


Joyce, like Deleuze in his philosophy, thus leaves us through the *Wake* the imperative to seek new beginnings, the need to extract ‘virtual potentialities’ from the rubble of modernity, and the need to reinvent history. He effectively rethinks time in terms of ‘duration’ in a series of life-giving ‘becomings’.

In making the claim that *Finnegans Wake* exists more completely on the ‘plane of immanence’ than does *Ulysses* and is an ‘haeccetic’ culmination of this and all of Joyce’s previous work, I believe that I am simply taking further Margot Norris’s demonstration that the *Wake* comments upon all Joyce’s previous work by carrying his intuitive insights to new levels. The *Wake*, through Issy, thus becomes in my argument the ‘BwO’ of all of Joyce’s *oeuvre* as here he brings together on the ‘second plane of writing’ – or the textual ‘plane of immanence’ – through his late ‘rhizomatic’ or ‘schizophrenic’ style, ‘all the divergent series constitutive of the cosmos’ [1.3], offering us the resonating series which make up all of his previous work and going beyond them.

I have argued that Joyce accomplishes this, not simply by his use of esoteric and portmanteau words and other lexical and grammatical devices, but through Issy as impersonal ‘desiring machine’, for ‘the BwO is desire; it is that which one desires and by which one desires’. (*TP* 165) Consequently, considered as Joyce’s culminating and concluding ‘Event’ which has created its own ‘sense ... disengaged or distinguished from the state of affairs which produce it and in which it is actualised’, (*L* 211) I do not think it ridiculous or excessive to apply the following extract, from Nietzsche’s well-known statement on the death of God, to *Finnegans Wake*: ‘[t]his tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard’. This time is the time of life, the time of ‘the virtual’ or that of the ‘plane of immanence’. It is ‘duration’ itself, offered to us through


the *Wake*. Thus, the Gracehoper recognises that the Ondt, as the embodiment of
capitalism, has achieved great things, but points out that ‘duration’ cannot be
constrained by capitalist imperatives which it always exceeds:

Your feats end enormous, your volumes immense,
(May the Graces I hoped for sing your Ondtship song sense!),
Your genus its worldwide, your spacious sublime!
But, Holy Saltmartin, why can’t you beat time? (FW 419.5-8)

Here, the beating of time also alludes to the musical and hence the ethical nature of
Joyce’s writing,\(^{551}\) as ‘a language which speaks before words’, (DR 10) or as Bloom
According to a Deleuzoguattarian reading of *Finnegans Wake*, it may be time to move
on beyond the constraining moralistic clock-time of the State, Religion, liberal-
humanism, and even the new global capitalism itself, through ‘[t]eems of times and
happy returns’. (FW 215.22-23)

Read together, in this way, Joyce’s and Deleuze’s works may give us more than
just hope through ‘a counter-philosophy of the schizophrenic laughter and revolutionary
joy of the[ir] great books’;\(^{552}\) they offer us new ethico-political thought and ‘affect’ and
the opportunity for autopoietic ‘becomings’ pointing the way for ‘a people to come’.
(*WIP* 218)


\(^{552}\) Deleuze, ‘Nomadic thought’, p. 147.
Appendix

References to Joyce by Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, arranged in chronological order of their original publication date, and in order of their appearance in the texts.

(Passages instanced in ‘Joyce Indirect’ are indicated by a star: *)

1. Difference and Repetition (Deleuze, 1968)

1.1. Eternal return relates to a world of differences implicated one in the other, to a complicated, properly chaotic world without identity. Joyce presented the *vicus of recirculation* as causing a *chaosmos* to turn; and Nietzsche had already said that chaos and eternal return were not two distinct things but a single and same *affirmation*. The world is neither finite nor infinite as representation would have it: it is completed and unlimited. Eternal return is the unlimited of the finished itself, the univocal being which is said of difference. With eternal return, chao-errancy is opposed to the coherence of representation; it excludes both the coherence of a subject which represents itself and that of an object represented. *Re*-petition opposes *re*-presentation: the prefix changes its meaning, since in the one case difference is said only in relation to the identical, while in the other it is the univocal which is said of the different. Repetition is the formless being of all differences, the formless power of the ground which carries every object to that extreme ‘form’ in which its representation comes undone. The ultimate element of repetition is the disparate [*dispars*], which stands opposed to the identity of representation. Thus, the circle of eternal return, difference and repetition (which undoes that of the identical and the contradictory) is a tortuous circle in which Sameness is said only of that which differs. (1994, p.57)

1.2. [W]hen the modern work of art develops its permutating series and its circular structures, it indicates to philosophy a path leading to the abandonment of representation. It is not enough to multiply perspectives in order to establish perspectivism. To every perspective or point of view there must correspond an autonomous work with its own self-sufficient sense: what matters is the divergence of series, the decentring of circles, ‘monstrosity’. The totality of circles and series is thus a formless *ungrounded* chaos which has no law other than its own repetition, its own reproduction in the development of that which diverges and decentres. We know how these conditions are already satisfied in such works as Mallarmé’s *Book* or Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*: these are by nature problematic works. The identity of the object read really dissolves into divergent series defined by esoteric words, just as the identity of the reading subject is dissolved into the decentred circles of possible multiple readings. Nothing, however, is lost; each series exists only by virtue of the return of the others.
Everything has become simulacrum, for by simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned. The simulacrum is the instance which includes a difference within itself, such as (at least) two divergent series on which it plays, all resemblance abolished so that one can no longer point to the existence of an original and a copy. It is in this direction that we must look for the conditions, not of possible experience, but of real experience (selection, repetition, etc.). It is here that we find the lived reality of a sub-representative domain. If it is true that representation has identity as its element and similarity as its unit of measure, then pure presence such as it appears in the simulacrum has the ‘disparate’ as its unit of measure – in other words, always a difference of difference as its immediate element. (1994, pp.68-69)

* 1.3. [I]t is not by the poverty of its vocabulary that language invents the form in which it plays the role of dark precursor, but by its excess, by its most positive syntactic and semantic power. In playing this role it differentiates the differences between the different things spoken of, relating these immediately to one another in series which it causes to resonate. For the same reason ... the repetition of words cannot be explained negatively, cannot be presented as a bare repetition without difference. Joyce’s work obviously appeals to quite different procedures [than Raymond Roussel’s]. However, it remains a question of drawing together a maximum of disparate series (ultimately, all the divergent series constitutive of the cosmos) by bringing into operation linguistic dark precursors (here, esoteric words, portmanteau words) which rely upon no prior identity, which are above all not ‘identifiable’ in principle, but which induce a maximum of resemblance and identity into the system as a whole, as though this were the result of the process of differentiation of difference in itself (see the cosmic letter in Finnegans Wake). What takes place in the system between resonating series under the influence of the dark precursor is called ‘epiphany’. The cosmic extension coincides with the amplitude of a forced movement which sweeps aside and overruns the series, ultimately a death instinct, Stephen’s ‘No’ which is not the non-being of the negative but the (non)-being of a persistent question to which the cosmic ‘Yes’ of Mrs Bloom corresponds, without being a response, since it alone adequately occupies and fills that space (1994, pp.121-122).

*1.4. [...]the conditions under which a book is a cosmos or the cosmos is a book appear, and through a variety of very different techniques the ultimate Joycean identity emerges, the one we find in Borges and in Gombrowicz: chaos = cosmos.]

Each series tells a story: not different points of view on the same story ... but completely distinct stories which unfold simultaneously. The basic series are divergent: not relatively, in the sense that one could retrace one’s path and find a point of convergence, but absolutely divergent in the sense that the point or horizon of convergence lies in a chaos or is constantly displaced within that chaos. This chaos is itself the most positive, just as the divergence is the object
of affirmation. It is indistinguishable from the great work which contains all the complicated series, which affirms and complicates all the series at once. (It is not surprising that Joyce should have been so interested in Bruno, the theoretician of complicatio.) ... Each series explicates or develops itself, but in its difference from the other series which it implicates and which implicate it, which it envelops and which envelop it; in this chaos which complicates everything. The totality of the system, the unity of the divergent series as such, corresponds to the objectivity of a 'problem'. Hence the method of questions-problems by means of which Joyce animates his work, and before that the manner in which Lewis Carroll linked portmanteau words to the status of the problematic (1994, pp.123-124).

1.5. [The] conception of the ontological scope of the question animates works of art as much as philosophical thought. Works are developed around or on the basis of a fracture that they never succeed in filling. The fact that the novel, particularly since Joyce, has found a new language in the mode of an 'Enquiry' or 'Questionnaire' and presents essentially problematic events and characters obviously does not mean that nothing is certain; it is obviously not the application of a generalised method of doubt nor the sign of a modern scepticism but, on the contrary, the discovery of the question and the problematic as a transcendent horizon, as the transcendental element which belongs 'essentially' to beings, things and events. It is the novelistic or theatrical or musical or philosophical, etc., discovery of the Idea, and at the same time the discovery of a transcendent exercise of sensibility, of image-memory, language and thought, by means of which each of these faculties communicates in full discordance with the others and opens on to the difference of Being by taking its own difference as object – in other words, by posing the question of its own difference. Hence that form of writing which is nothing but the question 'what is writing?' ... giv[ing] rise to the greatest monotonies and the greatest weaknesses of a new-found common sense in the absence of the genius of the Idea, but also to the most powerful 'repetitions', the most prodigious inventions in the para-sense when the Idea emerges in all its violence. (1994, pp.195-196).

2. Logic of Sense (Deleuze, 1969)

2.1. It is easy to cite various authors who have known how to create serial techniques of an exemplary formalism. Joyce, for example, secured the relation between the signifying exemplary series 'Bloom' and the signified series 'Ulysses', thanks to multiple forms which included an archeology of narrative modes, a system of correspondence between numbers, a prodigious employment of esoteric words, a method of question and answer and the establishment of currents of thought or multiple trains of thought (Carroll's double thinking?) (1990, pp.38-9).

2.2. We can speak of events only in the context of the problem whose conditions they determine. We can speak of events only as singularities deployed in a problematic field, in the vicinity of which the solutions are organized. This is why an entire method of problems and solutions traverses Carroll's work ... But the paradoxical instance is the Event in which all events communicate and are
distributed. It is the Unique event, and all other events are its bits and pieces. Later on, James Joyce will be able to give sense to a method of questions and answers which doubles that of problems – the Inquisitory which grounds the Problematic. The question is developed in problems, and the problems are enveloped in a fundamental question. And just as solutions do not suppress problems, but on the contrary discover in them the subsisting conditions with which they would have no sense, answers do not at all suppress, nor do they saturate, the question, which persists in all of the answers. There is therefore an aspect in which problems remain without a solution, and the question without an answer. It is in this sense that problem and question designate ideational objectivities and have their own being \textit{a minimum of being} (see the ‘answerless riddles’ of \textit{Alice}). We have already seen how esoteric words were essentially tied to them. On one hand, the portmanteau words are inseparable from a problem which is deployed in the ramified series. ... In each case, there is a distribution of singularities. (1990, pp.56-57)

*2.3. [C]ertain literary procedures (the same holds for other arts) permit several stories to be told at once. This is, without doubt, the essential characteristic of the modern work of art. It is not at all a question of different points of view on one story supposedly the same; for points of view would still be submitted to a rule of convergence. It is rather a question of different and divergent stories, as if an absolutely distinct landscape corresponded to each point of view. There is indeed a unity of divergent series insofar as they are divergent, but it is always a chaos perpetually thrown off center which becomes one only in the Great Work. This unformed chaos, the great letter of \textit{Finnegans Wake}, is not just any chaos: it is the power of affirmation, the power to affirm all the heterogeneous series – it ‘complicates’ within itself all the series (hence the interest of Joyce in Bruno as the theoretician of the \textit{complicatio}). Between these basic series, a sort of internal resonance is produced; and this resonance induces a \textit{forced movement}, which goes beyond the series themselves. These are the characteristics of the simulacrum, when it breaks its chains and rises to the surface: it then affirms its phantasmatic power, that is, its repressed power. Freud has already shown how the phantasm results from at least two series, one infantile and the other post-pubescent. The affective charge associated with the phantasm is explained by the internal resonance whose bearers are the simulacra. The impression of death, of the rupture or dismembering of life, is explained by the amplitude of the forced movement which carries them along. Thus the conditions of real experience and the structures of the work of art are reunited: divergence of series, decentering of circles, constitution of the chaos which envelops them, internal resonance and movement of amplitude, aggression of the simulacra. (1990, pp.260-261)

2.4. The secret of the eternal return is that it does not express an order opposed to the chaos engulfing it. On the contrary, it is nothing other than chaos itself, or the power of affirming chaos. There is a point where Joyce is Nietzschean when he shows that the \textit{vicus of recirculation} can not affect and cause a ‘chaosmos’ to revolve. To the coherence of representation, the eternal return substitutes something else entirely – its own chaodyssey (\textit{chao-errance}). Between the
eternal return and the simulacrum, there is such a profound link that the one cannot be understood except through the other. Only the divergent series, insofar as they are divergent, return: that is, each series insofar as it displaces its difference along with all the others, and all series insofar as they complicate their difference within the chaos which is without beginning or end. ... Thus, the eternal return is, in fact, the Same and the Similar, but only insofar as they are simulated, produced by the simulation, through the functioning of the simulacrum (will to power). It is in this sense that it reverses representation and destroys the icons. It does not presuppose the Same and the Similar; on the contrary, it constitutes the only Same—the Same of that which differs, and the only resemblance—the resemblance of the unmatched. ... It is the power to affirm divergence and decentering and makes this power the object of a superior affirmation. ... it does not make everything come back. ... What is selected are all the procedures opposed to selection; what is excluded, what is made not to return, is that which presupposes the Same and the Similar, that which pretends to correct divergence, to recenter the circles or order the chaos, and to provide a model or make a copy. For all its long history, Platonism happened only once, and Socrates fell under the blade. For the Same and the Similar become simple illusions when they cease to be simulated. (1990, pp.264-265)

2.5. [End note] 11. It is in this sense that, in Carroll, invention is essentially vocabular, rather than syntactical or grammatical. As a consequence, portmanteau words can open up an infinity of possible interpretations by ramifying the series; nevertheless, syntactical rigor eliminates a certain number of these possibilities. The same holds true in Joyce, as Jean Paris has shown in *Tel Quel* (1967), no. 30, p. 64. The opposite is the case with Artaud, but only because there is no longer a problem of sense properly speaking. (1990, p.343)

2.6. [I]n the Des Forets’ novel and its gossip-voyeur, ‘seeing’ designated a very special operation or contemplation. It designated a pure vision of reflections which multiply that which they reflect. These reflections offer the voyeur a more intense participation than if he had himself experienced these passions, the double or the reflection of which he now surveys in the faces of others. This is the case in Klossowski’s works, when Octave establishes the law of hospitality according to which he ‘gives’ his wife Roberte to the guests. He attempts to multiply Roberte’s essence, to create as many simulacra and reflections of Roberte as there are persons establishing relations with her, and to inspire Roberte to emulate somehow her own doubles, thanks to which Octave, the voyeur, possesses and is able to know her better than if he had kept her, quite simply, for himself. ... We possess thoroughly only what is expropriated, placed outside of itself, split into two, reflected in the gaze, and multiplied by possessive minds. ... To possess is thus to give over to possession and to see the given multiplied in the gift. ‘Such common partaking of a dear but living being is not without analogy to the devoted gaze of an artist’ (this strange theme of theft and gift, it will be recalled, appears also in Joyce’s *Exiles*) (1990, pp.282-283).
3. Proust and Signs, Part Two (Deleuze, 1970-73\textsuperscript{553})

* 3.1. The entire interest thus shifts from the privileged natural moments to the artistic machine capable of producing or reproducing them, of multiplying them: the Book. In this regard, we can scarcely avoid the comparison with Joyce and his machine for producing epiphanies. For Joyce too begins by seeking the secret of epiphanies within the object, first within significant contents or ideal significations, then in the subjective experience of an aesthete. It is only when the significant contents and the ideal significations have collapsed and given way to a multiplicity of fragments, to chaos – but in addition, the subjective forms to a chaotic and multiple impersonal reality – that the work of art assumes its full meaning, that is, exactly all the meanings one wants it to have according to its functioning; the essential point being that it functions, that the machine works. Then the artist, and the reader in his wake, is the one who ‘disentangles’ and ‘re-embodies’: setting up a resonance between two objects, he produces the epiphany, releasing the precious image from the natural conditions that determine it, in order to reincarnate it in the chosen artistic conditions\textsuperscript{554}. (2000, pp. 155-6).

3.2. As we descend the degrees of essence, from the signs of art to the signs of Nature, love, or even worldliness, there is necessarily reintroduced a minimum of objective description and associative suggestion; but this is only because essence here has material conditions of incarnation that are then substituted for the free artistic spiritual conditions, as Joyce would say. But style is never a matter of the man, it is always a matter of essence (nonstyle). It is never a matter of viewpoint but is constituted by the coexistence in the same sentence of an infinite series of viewpoints according to which the object is dislocated, sets up a resonance, or is amplified (2000, pp. 166-167).

*3.3. We should have to compare the Proustian conception of the image with other post-Symbolist conceptions: for example, Joyce’s epiphany or Pound’s imagism and vorticism. The following features seem to be shared: image as autonomous link between two concrete objects insofar as they are different (image, concrete equation); style, as multiplicity of viewpoints toward the same object and exchange of viewpoints toward several objects; language, as integrating and comprehending its own variations constitutive of a universal history and making each fragment speak according to its own voice; literature as production, as operation of affect-producing machines; explication, not as didactic intention but as technique of envelopment and development; writing as

\textsuperscript{553} The original edition was published in 1964, but it was only in Part 2 of the second edition which was added in 1970, plus a further essay added to this in 1973, that references to Joyce appeared.

\textsuperscript{554} See Joyce, Stephen Hero. We have seen that the same was true of Proust, and that, in art, essence itself determined the conditions of its incarnation, instead of depending on given natural conditions.
ideogrammatic method (with which Proust allies himself on several occasions) (2000, p.188).

4. *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972)

4.1. Hence Proust maintained that the Whole itself is a product, produced as nothing more than a part alongside other parts, which it neither unifies nor totalizes, though it has an effect on these other parts simply because it establishes aberrant paths of communication between noncommunicating vessels, transverse unities between elements that retain all their differences within their own particular boundaries. Thus in the trip on the train in *In Search of Lost Time*, there is never a totality of what is seen nor a unity of the points of view, except along the transversal that the frantic passenger traces from one window to the other, 'in order to draw together, in order to reweave intermittent and opposite fragments.' This drawing together, this reweaving is what Joyce called *re-embodying*. (1984, pp.43-44).

4.2. There is a question that Marcel Mauss at least left open: is debt primary in relation to exchange, or is it merely a mode of exchange, a means in the service of exchange? ... [I]f exchange underlies everything [as Levi-Strauss argues], why is it that what takes place looks like anything but an exchange? Why must it be a gift, or a countergift, and not an exchange? And why is it necessary that the giver also be in the position of someone who has been robbed, so as to demonstrate clearly that he does not expect an exchange, not even a deferred exchange? Is it theft that prevents the gift and the countergift from entering into an exchangist relation. Desire knows nothing of exchange, it knows only theft and gift, at times the one within the other under the effect of a primary homosexuality. Thus the antiexchangist amorous machine encountered by Joyce in *Exiles*, and by Klossowski in *Roberte*. (1984, pp.185-186).

5. *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975)

5.1. There has been much discussion of the questions 'What is a marginal literature?' and 'What is a popular literature, a proletarian literature?' The criteria are obviously difficult to establish if one doesn't start with a more objective concept – that of minor literature. Only the possibility of setting up a minor practice of major language from within allows one to define popular literature, marginal literature, and so on. Only in this way can literature really become a collective machine of expression and really be able to treat and develop its contents. Kafka emphatically declares that a minor literature is much more able to work over its material. Why this machine of expression, and what is it? We know that it is in a relation of multiple deterritorializations with language; it is the situation of the Jews who have dropped the Czech language at the same time as the rural environment, but it is also the situation of the German language as a 'paper language'. Well, one can go even farther; one can push this movement of deterritorialization of expression even farther. But there are only two ways to do this. One way is to artificially enrich this German, to swell it up through all the resources of symbolism, of oneirism, of esoteric sense, of a
hidden signifier. This is the approach of the Prague school, Gustav Meyrink and many others, including Max Brod. But this attempt implies a desperate attempt at symbolic reterritorialization, based in archetypes, Kabballa, and alchemy, that accentuates its break from the people and will find its political result only in Zionism and such things as the ‘dream of Zion’. Kafka will quickly choose the other way, or, rather, he will invent another way. He will opt for the German language of Prague as it is and in its very poverty. Go always farther in the direction of deterritorialization, to the point of sobriety. Since the language is arid, make it vibrate with a new intensity. Oppose a purely intensive usage of language to all symbolic or even significant or simply signifying usages of it. Arrive at a perfect and unformed expression, a materially intense expression. (For these two possible paths, couldn’t we find the same alternatives, under other conditions, in Joyce and Beckett? As Irishmen, both of them live within the genial conditions of a minor literature. That is the glory of this sort of minor literature – to be the revolutionary force for all literature. The utilization of English and of every language in Joyce. The utilization of English and French in Beckett. But the former never stops operating by exhilaration and overdetermination and brings about all sorts of worldwide reterritorializations. The other proceeds by dryness and sobriety, a willed poverty, pushing deterritorialization to the point where only intensities subsist). (1986, pp. 18-19).

6. A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980)

6.1. That is why the most resolutely fragmented work can also be presented as the Total Work or Magnum Opus. Most modern methods for making series proliferate or a multiplicity grow are perfectly valid in one direction, for example, a linear direction, whereas a unity of totalization asserts itself even more firmly in another, circular or cyclic, dimension. Whenever a multiplicity is taken up in a structure, its growth is offset by a reduction in its laws of combination. The abortionists of unity are indeed angel makers, doctores angelici, because they affirm a properly angelic and superior unity. Joyce’s words, accurately described as having ‘multiple roots’, shatter the linear unity of the word, even of language, only to posit a cyclic unity of the sentence, text, or knowledge. Nietzsche’s aphorisms shatter the linear unity of knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return, present as the nonknown in thought. This is as much as to say that the fascicular system does not really break with dualism, with the complementarity between a subject and an object, a natural reality and a spiritual reality: unity is consistently thwarted and obstructed in the object, while a new type of unity triumphs in the subject. The world has lost its pivot; the subject can no longer even dichotomize, but accedes to a higher unity, of ambivalence or overdetermination, in an always supplementary dimension to that of its object. The world has become chaos, but the book remains the image of the world: radicle-chaosmos rather than root-cosmos. A strange mystification: a book all the more total for being fragmented. (1987, p. 6).

6.2. Nomadic waves or flows of deterritorialization go from the central layer to the periphery, then from the new center to the new periphery, falling back to the old center and launching forth to the new. The organization of the epistrate
moves in the direction of increasing deterritorialization. Physical particles and chemical substances cross thresholds of deterritorialization on their own stratum and between strata; these thresholds correspond to more or less stable intermediate states, to more or less transitory valences and existences, to engagements with this or that other body, to densities of proximity, to more or less localizable connections. Not only are physical particles characterized by speeds of deterritorialization—Joycean tachyons, particles-holes, and quarks recalling the fundamental idea of the 'soup'—but a single chemical substance (sulfur or carbon, for example) has a number of more and less deterritorialized states. ... Deterritorialization must be thought of as a perfectly positive power that has degrees and thresholds (epistrata), is always relative, and has reterritorialization as its flipside or complement. (1987, pp.53-54).

6.3. The notion of minority is very complex, with musical, literary, linguistic, as well as juridical and political, references. The opposition between minority and majority is not simply quantitative. Majority implies a constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it. Let us suppose that the constant or standard is the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language (Joyce’s or Ezra Pound’s Ulysses). It is obvious that ‘man’ holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc. That is because he appears twice, once in the constant and again in the variable from which the constant is extracted. Majority assumes a state of power and domination, not the other way around. It assumes the standard measure, not the other way around. Even Marxism ‘has almost always translated hegemony from the point of view of the national worker, qualified, male and over thirty-five’. A determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered minoritarian, by nature and regardless of number. in other words, a subsystem or an outsystem. This is evident in all the operations, electoral or otherwise, where you are given a choice, but on the condition that your choice conform to the limits of the constant (‘you mustn’t choose to change society. . . ’). But at this point, everything is reversed. For the majority, insofar as it is analytically included in the abstract standard, is never anybody, it is always Nobody—Ulysses—whereas the minority is the becoming of everybody, one’s potential becoming to the extent that one deviates from the model. There is a majoritarian ‘fact’, but it is the analytic fact of Nobody, as opposed to the becoming-minoritarian of everybody. (1987, p.105).

6.4. The unique book, the total work, all possible combinations inside the book, the tree-book, the cosmos-book: all of these platitudes so dear to the avant-gardes, which cut the book off from its relations with the outside, are even worse than the chant of the signifier. Of course, they are entirely bound up with a mixed semiotic. But in truth they have a particularly pious origin. Wagner, Mallarmé, and Joyce, Marx and Freud: still Bibles. If passion delusion is profoundly monomaniacal, monomania for its part found a fundamental element of its assemblage in monotheism and the Book. The strangest cult (1987, p.127).
6.5. It should not be said that the genius is an extraordinary person, *nor* that everybody has genius. The genius is someone who knows how to make everybody/ the whole world a becoming (Ulysses, perhaps: Joyce’s failed ambition, Pound’s near-success). One has entered becomings-animal becomings-molecular, and finally becomings-imperceptible (1987, p.200).

6.6. We are segmented from all around and in every direction. The human being is a segmentary animal. Segmentarity is inherent to all the strata composing us. Dwelling, getting around, working, playing: life is spatially and socially segmented. The house is segmented according to its rooms’ assigned purposes; streets, according to the order of the city; the factory, according to the nature of the work and operations performed in it. We are segmented in a binary fashion, following the great major dualist oppositions: social classes, but also men-women, adults-children, and so on. We are segmented in a *circular fashion*, in ever larger circles, ever wider disks or coronas, like Joyce’s ‘letter’: my affairs, my neighborhood’s affairs, my city’s, my country’s, the world’s ... We are Segmented in a linear fashion, along a straight line or a number of straight lines, of which each segment represents an episode or ‘proceeding’: as soon as we finish one proceeding we begin another, forever proceduring or procedured, in the family, in school, in the army, on the job. School tells us, ‘You’re not at home anymore’; the army tells us, ‘You’re not in school anymore’ ... Sometimes the various segments belong to different individuals or groups, and sometimes the same individual or group passes from one segment to another. But these figures of segmentarity, the binary, circular, and linear, are bound up with one another, even cross over into each other, changing according to the point of view (1987, pp.208-9).

7. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (Deleuze, 1988)

7.1. For Leibniz, as we have seen, bifurcations and divergences of series are genuine borders between incompossible worlds, such that the monads that exist wholly include the compossible world that moves into existence. For Whitehead (and for many modern philosophers), on the contrary, bifurcations, divergences, incompossibilities, and discord belong to the same motley world that can no longer be included in expressive units, but only made or undone according to prehensive units and variable configurations or changing captures. In a same chaotic world divergent series are endlessly tracing bifurcating paths. It is a ‘chaosmos’ of the type found in Joyce, but also in Maurice Leblanc, Borges, or Gombrowicz. Even God desists from being a Being who compares worlds and chooses the richest compossible. He becomes Process, a process that at once affirms incompossibilities and passes through them. The play of the world has changed in a unique way, because now it has become the play that diverges. Beings are pushed apart, kept open through divergent series and incompossible totalities that pull them outside, instead of being closed upon the compossible and convergent world that they express from within. (1993, p.81).
8. *What is Philosophy* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991)

8.1. Art is not chaos but a composition of chaos that yields the vision or sensation, so that it constitutes, as Joyce says, a chaosmos, a composed chaos—neither foreseen nor preconceived. Art transforms chaotic variability into chaoid variety, as in El Greco's black and green-gray conflagration, for example, or Turner's golden conflagration, or de Stael's red conflagration. Art struggles with chaos but it does so in order to render it sensory, even through the most charming character, the most enchanted landscape (Watteau) (1994, pp.204-205)


9.1. There are only monstrous, devouring fathers, and petrified, fatherless sons. If humanity can be saved ... it will only be through the dissolution or decomposition of the paternal function. ... As Joyce will say, paternity does not exist, it is an emptiness, a nothingness—or rather, a zone of uncertainty haunted by brothers, by the brother and sister. The mask of the charitable father must fall in order for Primary Nature to be appeased, and for [Melville's] Ahab and Claggart to recognize Bartleby and Billy Budd, releasing through the violence of the former and the stupor of the latter the fruit with which they were laden: the fraternal relation pure and simple. (1997, p.84).
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